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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2145 



April 1989 




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Departtnent of State 

bulletin 



Volume 



/ Number 2145 / April 1989 



The Department uf State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin's contents include major ad- 
dresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



JAMES A. BAKER, III 

Secretary of State 

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 



The Secretary of State has determuied that 
the publication of this periodical is neces- 
sary in the transaction of the public busi- 
ness required by law of this Department. 
Use of funds for printing this periodical 
has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through 
September 30, 1989. 



Department of State Bulletin (ISSN 
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus an- 
nual index) by the Department of State, 
2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 
20.520. Second-class postage paid at Wash 
ington, D.C, and additional mailing of- 
fices. POSTMASTER: Send address 
changes to Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Most of the contents of this publi- 
cation are in the public domain and not 
copyrighted. Those items may be re- 
printed; citation of the Department of 
State Bulletin as the source will be ap- 
preciated. Permission to reproduce all 
copyrighted material (including pho- 
tographs) must be obtained from the origi- 
nal source. The Bulletin is indexed 
online by Magazine Index (Dialog file 47; 
BRS file MAGS), in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature and the online ver- 
sion of Readers' Guide (WILSONLINE file 
RDG), and in the PAIS (Public Affairs In- 
formation Service, Inc.) Bulletin. Articles 



are abstracted by Readers' Guide Ab- 
stracts (WILSONLINE file RGA). The 
Bulletin also participates in Mead Dat; 
Central's full-text online services, LEXR 
and NEXIS. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



CONTENTS 



The President 

1 Inaugural Address 

2 Address Before a Joint Session 

of the Congress 

4 News Conference of January 27 

(Excerpts) 

5 President Holds Session With 

News Reporters 

The Vice President 

7 Visit to Venezuela and 

El Salvador 



Europe 

38 Secretary Meets With NATO 
Allies (Secretary Baker, Gro 
Harlem Briuicltland, Jon 
Baldt'i)! Hannibalsson, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, Andreas Pa- 
pandreou. Karolos Papoulias, 
Jacques Poos, Mesut Yilmaz) 

43 First Report on Cyprus (Mes- 

sage to the Congress) 

44 Security Challenges Facing 

NATO in the 1990s (Paul H. 
Nitze) 



The Secretary 

8 James A. Baker, III, Sworn in as 

Secretary of State (Secretary 
Baker, President Bush, Bio- 
graphic Data) 

10 Secretary-Designate's Confir- 
mation Hearings 

13 Address Before the Panel on 
Global Climate Change 

16 The International Agenda and 
the FY 1990 Budget Request 

21 Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Africa 

24 Peace and Relief in Sudan 

(Secretary Baker, Fact Sheet) 



Arms Control 

25 MBFR Talks Conclude (Final 
Communique) 



Canada 

26 President's Visit to Canada 

(Secretary Baker, President 
Bush, Brian Mulroney) 



East Asia 

32 Visit of Japanese Prime Minister 
(President Bush, Noboru 
Takeshita) 



South Asia 

48 Soviets Withdraw From Af- 
ghanistan (President Bush) 



United Nations 

49 UN Narcotics Trafficking Con- 
ference Adopts Convention 
(Text of Convention) 



Western Hemisphere 

59 Human Rights in Cuba: An 
Update 



Treaties 

62 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

63 Department of State 

63 USUN 

Publications 

64 Foreign Relations Volumes 

Released 

65 Foreign Relations Supplement 

Microfiche Released 

66 Background Notes 

Index 



Economics 

33 East Asia, the Pacific, and 
the U.S.; An Economic 
Partnership 




THE PRESIDENT 



Cmrse Herbert Walker Bush took the 
oath of office as the 41st President of 
the United States on January 20. 1989. 

(While House photo by Susan Biddle) 



The Inaugural Address 
of President Bush 



George Bush was sworn in as the 
ilst President of the United Stales on 
the west side of the Capitol on Janu- 
ary if), 1989. Following is the text of 
his inaugural address.' 

There is a man here who has earned a 
lasting place in our hearts— and in our 
history. President Reagan, on behalf 
of our nation, I thank you for the won- 
derful things that you have done for 
America. 

I have just repeated word-for-word 
the oath taken by George Washington 
200 years ago; and the Bible on which I 
placed my hand is the Bible on w-hich 
he placed his. It is right that the mem- 
ory of Washington be with us today, not 
only because this is our bicentennial in- 
auguration but because Washington re- 
mains the Father of Our Country. He 
would. I think, be gladdened by this 
day. for today is the concrete ex- 
pression of a stunning fact: our con- 
tinuity these 200 years since our 
government began. 

We meet on democracy's front 
porch. A good place to talk as neigh- 
bors and as friends, for this is a day 
when our nation is made whole, when 
our differences for a moment are 
suspended. 

My first act as President is a 
prayer: "Heavenly Father, we bow our 
heads and thank you for your love. 
Accept our thanks for the peace that 
yields this day and the shared faith that 
makes its continuance hkely Make us 
strong to do your work, willing to hear 
and heed your will, and write on our 
hearts these words: 'Use power to help 
people.' For we are given power not to 
advance our own purposes, nor to make 
a great show in the world, nor a name. 
There is but one just use of power, and 
it is to serve people. Help us to re- 
member, Lord. Amen." 

I come before you and assume 
the presidency at a moment rich with 
promise. We live in a peaceful, pros- 
perous time, but we can make it better. 



For a new breeze is blowing, and a 
world refreshed by freedom seems re- 
born; for in man's heart, if not in fact, 
the day of the dictator is over. The to- 
talitarian era is passing, its old ideas 
blown away like leaves from an ancient, 
lifeless tree. 

A new- breeze is blowing, and a na- 
tion refresher! by freedom stands ready 
to push on. There is new ground to be 
broken and new action to be taken. 

There are times when the future 
seems thick as a fog; you sit and wait, 
hoping the mists will lift and reveal the 
right path. But this is a time when the 
future seems a door you can walk right 
through — into a room called tomorrow. 

Great nations of the world are mov- 
ing toward democracy — through the 
door to freedom. Men and women of 
the world move toward free markets — 
through the door to prosperity. The 
people of the world agitate for free ex- 
pression and free thought — through the 
door to the moral and intellectual satis- 
factions that only liberty allows. 

We know what works. Freedom 
works. We know what's right. Freedom 
is right. We know how to secure a more 
just and prosperous life for man on 
Earth — through free markets, free 
speech, free elections, and the exercise 
of free will unhampered by the state. 

For the first time in this century — 
for the first time in perhaps all his- 
tory — man does not have to invent a 
system by which to live. We don't have 
to talk late into the night about which 
form of government is better We don't 
have to wrest justice from kings; we 
only have to summon it from within 
ourselves. 

We must act on what we know. I 
take as my guide the hope of a saint: 
in crucial things, unity; in important 
things, diversity; in all things, 
generosity. 

America today is a proud, free 
nation, decent and civil— a place we 
cannot help but love. We know in our 
hearts, not loudly and proudly but as a 



^ent 01 state Bulletin/April 1989 



THE PRESIDENT 



simple fact, that this country has mean- 
ing beyond what we see and that our 
strength is a force for good. 

But have we changed as a nation 
even in our time? Are we enthralled 
with material things, less appreciative 
of the nobility of work and sacrifice? 

My friends, we are not the sum of 
our possessions. They are not the meas- 
ure of our lives. In our hearts, we know 
what matters. We cannot hope only to 
leave our children a bigger car, a bigger 
bank account. We must hope to give 
them a sense of what it means to be a 
loyal friend, a loving parent, a citizen 
who leaves his home, his neighborhood 
and town better than he found it. 

What do we want the men and 
women who work with us to say when 
we are no longer there? That we were 
more driven to succeed than anyone 
around us? Or that we stopped to ask 
if a sick child had gotten better and 
stayed a moment there to trade a word 
of friendship? 

No president, no government can 
teach us to remember what is best in 
what we are. But if the man you have 
chosen to lead this government can help 
make a difference, if he can celebrate 
the quieter, deeper successes that are 
made not of gold and silk but of better 
hearts and finer souls, if he can do 
these things, then he must. 

America is never wholly herself 
unless she is engaged in high moral 
principle. We as a people have such a 
purpose today. It is to make kinder the 
face of the nation and gentler the face 
of the world. 

My friends, we have work to do. 
There are the homeless, lost and roam- 
ing. There are the children who have 
nothing — no love and no normalcy. 
There are those who cannot free them- 
selves of enslavement to whatever 
addiction — drugs, welfare, the demor- 
alization that rules the slums. There is 
crime to be conquered, the I'ough crime 
of the streets. There are young women 
to be helped who are about to become 
mothers of children they cannot care 
for and might not love. They need our 
care, our guidance and education, 
though we bless them for choosing life. 

The old solution, the old way, was 
to think that public money alone could 
end these problems. But we have 
learned that is not so. And in any case, 
our funds are low. We have a deficit to 
bring down. We have more will than 
wal'et, but will is what we need. 

We will make the hard choices, 
looking at what we have and perhaps 
allocating it differently, making our 



decisions based on honest need and 
prudent safety. 

And then we will do the wisest 
thing of all. We will turn to the only 
resource we have that in times of need 
always grows: the goodness and the 
courage of the American people. 

I am speaking of a new engage- 
ment in the lives of others — a new ac- 
tivism, hands-on, involved, that gets 
the job done. We must bring in the 
generations, harnessing the unused tal- 
ent of the elderly and the unfocused 
energy of the young. For not only lead- 
ership is passed from generation to 
generation but so is stewardship. And 
the generation born after the Second 
World War has come of age. 

I have spoken of a thousand points 
of light — of all the community organiza- 
tions that ai'e spi-ead like stars through- 
out the nation, doing good. 

We will work hand-in-hand, encour- 
aging, sometimes leading, sometimes 
being led, rewarding. We will work on 
this in the White House, in the Cabinet 
agencies. I will go to the people and 
the programs that are the brighter 
points of light, and I'll ask evei\y mem- 
ber of my government to become 
involved. 

The old ideas are new again be- 
cause they are not old, they're time- 
less — duty, sacrifice, commitment, and 
patriotism that finds its e.xpression in 
taking part and pitching in. 

We need a new engagement, too, 
between the e.xecutive and the Con- 
gress. The challenges before us will be 
thrashed out with the House and Sen- 
ate. We must bring the Federal budget 
into balance. We must ensure that 
America stands before the world 
united — strong, at peace, and fiscally 
sound. But, of course, things may be 
difficult. 

We need compromise; we have had 
dissension. We need harmony; we have 
had a chorus of discordant voices. 

For Congress, too, has changed in 
our time. There has grown a certain 
divisiveness. We have seen the hard 
looks and heard the statements in 
which not each other's ideas are chal- 
lenged but each other's motives. Our 
great parties have too often been far 
apart and untrusting of each other. 

It's been this way since Vietnam. 
That war cleaves us still. But, friends, 
that war began in earnest a quarter of 
a century ago, and surely the statute of 
limitations has been reached. This is a 
fact: The final lesson of Vietnam is that 
no great nation can long afford to be 
sundered by a memory. 



A new breeze is blowing, and the 
old bipartisanship must be made new 
again. To my friends — and yes, I do 
mean friends — in the loyal opposition- 
and yes, I mean loyal — I put out my 
hand. I am putting out my hand to yo 
Mr. Speaker. I am putting out my hai 
to you, Mr. Majority Leader. For this 
the thing: This is the age of the offere 
hand. 

We can't turn back clocks, and I 
don't want to. But when our fathers 
were young, Mr. Speaker, our differ- 
ences ended at the water's edge. We 
don't wish to turn back time, but whi 
our mothers were young, Mr. Majorit; 
Leader, the Congress and the executi 
were capable of working together to 
produce a budget on which this natio) 
could live. Let us negotiate soon and 
hard. But in the end, let us produce. 

The people await action. They di( 
not send us here to bicker. They ask 
to rise above the merely partisan. "In 
crucial things, unity" — and this, my 
friends, is crucial. 

To the world, too, we offer new & 
gagement and a renewed vow: We wil 
stay strong to protect the peace. The 
"offered hand" is a reluctant fist; onc' 
made — strong — it can be used with 
great effect. 

There are today Americans who 
are held against their will in foreign 
lands and Americans who are unac- 
counted for. Assistance can be shown 
here and will be long remembered. 
Good will begets good will. Good fait 
can be a spiral that endlessly moves i 

"Great nations like great men mi 
keep their word." When America say 
something, America means it, wheth 
a treaty or an agreement or a vow 
made on marble steps. We will alway 
try to speak clearly, for candor is a 
compliment. But subtlety, too, is goo 
and has its place. 

While keeping our alliances and | 
friendships around the world strong- 
ever strong — we will continue the iic 
closeness with the Soviet Union, 
consistent both with our security ami 
with progress. One might say that nu 
new relationship in part reflects the i 
umph of hope and strength over expc 
ence. But hope is good. And so is 
strength. And vigilance. 

Here today are tens of thousands i 
our citizens who feel the understand- jj 
able satisfaction of those who have I 
taken part in democracy and seen thi I 
hopes fulfilled. But my thoughts havi 
been turning the past few days to tin 
who would be watching at home — to : 
older fellow who'll throw a salute by 



Department of State Bulletin/April 191 






THE PRESIDENT 



iself when the flag goes by and the 
nan who'll tell her sons the words of 
battle hymns. I do not mean this to 
"entimental. I mean that on days 
this, we remember that we are all 
: (if a continuum, inescapably con- 
ed by the ties that bind. 
Our children are watching in 
hA> throughout our great land. And 
hem I say, thank you for watching 
Kiii-acy's big day. For democracy be- 
s to all of us, and freedom is like a 
It i fill kite that can go higher and 
ler with the breeze. 
And to all I say: No matter what 
■ (.ii-fumstances or where you are, 
arc part of this day, you are part of 
lilc of our great nation. 
A president is neither prince nor 
)', and I don't seek "a window on 
I's souls." In fact, I yearn for a 
■ tei' tolerance and easy-goingness 
Mt i-ach other's attitudes and way of 

There are a few clear areas in 
I h we as a society must rise up 
1 'd and express our intolerance. The 

olivious now is drugs. When that 

cncaine was smuggled in on a ship, 
ly as well have been a deadly bac- 
, so much has it hurt the body, the 
of our country. There is much to be 

and to be said but take my word 
;: This scourge will stop. 
JAnd so, there is much to do, and 
Irrow the work begins. 
[ do not mistrust the future; I do 
fear what is ahead. For oui- prob- 

are large, but our heart is lai-ger. 
challenges are great, but our will 
eater And if our flaws are endless, 

love is truly boundless. 
Some see leadership as high drama 
,he sound of trumpets calling. And 
'times it is that. But I see history 
book with many pages, and each 
ve flu a page with acts of hope- 
ss and meaning. The new breeze 
s, a page turns, the story un- 
— and so today a chapter begins — a 
I and stately story of unity, diver- 
and generosity — shared and writ- 
ogether. 
Thank you. God bless you. God 

the United States of America. 



President Addresses 

Joint Session of the Congress 



Text from Weekly Compilation of 
dential Documents of Jan. 30, 1989. 



Folloiring are excerpts from 
President Bush's address before a joint 
session of the Congress on February 9, 
1989.^ 

Less than 3 weeks ago, I joined you on 
the west front of this very building 
and, looking over the monuments to our 
proud past, offered you my hand in fill- 
ing the next page of American history 
with a story of extended prosperity and 
continued peace. And tonight I'm back 
to offer you my plans as well. The hand 
remains extended. The sleeves are roll- 
ed up. America is waiting. And now we 
must produce. Together we can build a 
better America. 

It is comforting to return to this 
historic chamber. Here, 22 years ago, I 
first raised my hand to be sworn into 
public life. So tonight I feel as if I'm re- 
turning home to friends. And I intend, 
in the months and years to come, to 
give you what friends deserve: frank- 
ness, respect, and my best judgment 
about ways to improve America's fu- 
ture. In return, I ask for an honest 
commitment to our common mission of 
progress. If we seize the opportunities 
on the road before us, there'll be praise 
enough for all. The people didn't send 
us here to bicker. And it's time to 
govern. 



Securing a more peaceful world is 
perhaps the most important priority I'd 
like to address tonight. You know, we 
meet at a time of extraordinary hope. 
Never before in this century have our 
values of freedom, democracy, and eco- 
nomic opportunity been such a power- 
ful and intellectual force around the 
globe. Never before has our leadership 
been so crucial, because while America 
has its eyes on the future, the world 
has its eyes on America. 

It's a time of great change in the 
world, and especially in the Soviet 
Union. Prudence and common sense 
dictate that we try to understand the 
full meaning of the change going on 
there, review our policies, and then 
proceed with caution. But I've person- 
ally assured General Secretary Gor- 
bachev that at the conclusion of such a 
review, we will be ready to move for- 
ward. We will not miss any opportunity 
to work for peace. The fundamental 



facts remain that the Soviets retain a 
very powerful military machine in the 
service of objectives which are still too 
often in conflict with ours. So let us 
take the new openness seriously. But 
let us also be realistic. And let us al- 
ways be strong. 

There are some pressing issues we 
must address. I will vigorously pursue 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 
The spread, and even use, of sophisti- 
cated weaponry threatens global secu- 
rity as never before. Chemical weapons 
must be banned from the face of the 
Earth, never to be used again. This 
won't be easy; verification — extra- 
ordinarily difficult. But civilization 
and human decency demand that we 
ti'y. The spread of nuclear weapons 
must be stopped. I'll work to strength- 
en the hand of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Our diplomacy 
must work every day against the prolif- 
eration of nuclear weapons. 

Around the globe, we must contin- 
ue to be freedom's best friend. We must 
stand firm for self-determination and 
democracy in Central America, includ- 
ing in Nicaragua. It is my strongly held 
conviction that when people are given 
the chance, they inevitably will choose 
a free press, freedom of worship, and 
certifiably free and fair elections. 

We must strengthen the alliance of 
the industrial democracies, as solid a 
force for peace as the world has ever 
known. This is an alliance forged by 
the power of our ideals, not the petti- 
ness of our differences. So let's lift our 
sights to rise above fighting about beef 
hormones, to building a better future, 
to move from protectionism to 
progress. 

I've asked the Secretary of State 
to visit Europe next week and to con- 
sult with our allies on the wide range of 
challenges and opportunities we face 
together, including East-West rela- 
tions. And I look forward to meeting 
with our NATO partners in the near 
future. 

I, too, shall begin a trip shortly to 
the far reaches of the Pacific Basin, 
where the winds of democracy are cre- 
ating new hope, and the power of free 
markets is unleashing a new force. 

When I served as our representa- 
tive in China 14 or 15 years ago, few 
would have predicted the scope of the 
changes we've witnessed since then. 
But in preparing for this trip, I was 



fitment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



THE PRESIDENT 



struck by something I came across 
from a Chinese writer. He was speak- 
ing of his country, decades ago, but his 
words speak to each of us in America 
today. "Today," he said, "we're afraid of 
the simple words like 'goodness' and 
'mercy' and 'kindness.'" My friends, if 
we're to succeed as a nation, we must 
rediscover those words. 



IText from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Feb. 13, 1989. ■ 



News Conference 
of January 27 
(Excerpts) 



President Bunk held a news 
conference on January 27, 1989.^ 



I think it's been officially announced 
that we're going to — certainly to To- 
kyo, then on to China, and I'm looking 
forward to it very much. And then, 
also, we'll be stopping for a relatively 
brief stop in Korea on the way back 
from China. We've had other invita- 
tions. That's about all we can do. And 
in a nostalgic basis, needless to say, 
Barbara and I are looking forward in a 
very personal way to going back to 
Beijing. 



Q. What signal do you think it 
may send the world that you're mak- 
ing your first visit to China — after, 
of course, the ceremonial trip to 
Tokyo — while Soviet leader Gor- 
bachev, having asked for early talks, 
is still waiting for a response? 

A. I don't know what signal it sends 
in that regard. But let me just remind 
you that I'm the one who does not believe 
in "playing the Soviet card" or "playing 
the China card." We have a strong bilat- 
eral relationship with the People's Re- 
public of China. I have a personal 
acquaintance with the leaders with 
whom I will be meeting there, including 
Deng Xiaoping [Chairman of China's 
Central Military Commission] and being 
that close — it just seemed like an appro- 
priate visit, but not to signal a playing of 
the card to go one up on Mr. Gorbachev. 
There's nothing of that nature in this 
visit. That is a strong, important strate- 



gic and commei'cial and cultural relation- 
shi]) that we have with the Chinese — the 
largest number of people in the world in 
that country. And so, the visit stands on 
its own and does not have any signaling 
that should be detrimental to anybody 
else's interest. 

Q. Your national security ad- 
viser. Brent Scowcroft, said last week 
on television that the cold war was 
not over and that he felt that Mr. Gor- 
bachev was trying to make trouble for 
the Western alliance. What is your 
view? 

A. I'm not sure that's an exact — I 
should let the General defend himself. 
But I've expressed my view not only in 
the campaign context but in several 
times afterward, and also to Mr. Gor- 
bachev. Our Administration position, 
in which Gen. Scowcroft is in total 
agreement — indeed, he'll be one of the 
leaders in this reassessment — is: Let's 
take our time now. Let's take a look at 
where we stand on our strategic arms 
talks; on conventional force talks; on 
chemical, biological weapons talks; on 
some of our bilateral policy problems 
with the Soviet Union; formulate the 
policy and then get out front — here's the 
U.S. position. 

I don't think the Soviets see that as 
foot-dragging. I'm confident they don't. 
Indeed, I made that clear to General 
Secretary Gorbachev just this week in a 
rather long talk with him. I want to try 
to avoid words like "cold war" if I can be- 
cause that has an implication. If someone 
says cold war to me, that doesn't proper- 
ly give credit to the advances that have 
taken place in this relationship. So I 
wouldn't use that term. But if it's used in 
the context of — do we still have prob- 
lems; are there still uncertainties; are 
we still unsure in our predictions on So- 
viet intentions — I'd have to say, yes, we 
should be cautious. 



Q. Yasir Arafat's [Chairman, 
Palestine Liberation Organization] 
been over in Europe meeting with 
Foreign Ministers of Spain, France, 
and Greece. Marlin [Fitzwater, White 
House spokesman] has said, and so 
has Mr. Scrowcroft, that it's too early 
for Arafat to meet with Secretary of 
State-designate Jim Baker. On what 
level would it be appropriate for 
Arafat to meet with an American 
official, an Assistant Secretary of 
State, for example? 

A. As we changed the policy on the 
Middle East on dealing with — I mean, as 
the change came about in the policy on 



communicating with the PLO, it was n 
based on their acceptance of three pr | 
ciples. As long as they stay hooked ar 
stay committed to those three princi- 
ples, we will have, when appropriate, 
meetings with the PLO. 

I haven't given any thought at all 
when a meeting with Chairman Aral 
with an American official is appropri 
And I would wait to see how we go fo 
ward. The point in talking to them is 
try to facilitate peace in the Middle 
East. And it seems to me that if then 
some logical step that requires high-] 
sign-off by various participants over 
there, then and then only would it be 
proper to elevate the meetings to thai 
level. 

You crawl before you walk. We're 
just starting to talk to them because 
they have, dramatically, I'd say, agre 
to the principles that are part of our 
policy. 

Q. You said in a wire service i 
terview the other day that you nee 
to have some foreign policy initiat 
early in your Administration. It 
seems the Soviet relationship is go 
on the back burner while you disci 
the nuclear force structure, for ex 
pie. In what area are you going to 
to move forward? Central Americi 
The Mideast? Where? 

A. All of them. But we had to h; 
little time. We're not going to let thi; 
Soviet thing put us in the mode of foi 
draggers. We're going to be out fron 
There's no reason to suggest that all 
have to do is react to a speech by the 
General Secretary. I want to take tb 
fense in moving this relationship for- 
ward and taking steps that are in the 
interest of freedom around the world 
whether it's in Eastern Europe or in 
strengthening our alliance. 

But there are plenty of trouble 
spots — one of them as you mentioned 
think. Central America. But we neec 
complete the reviews. I can't tell you 
where you will see the first major 
initiative — whether it's going to be tl 
Middle East, whether it's going to be 
Central America. We have problems, 
course, that afflict the whole confine 
and other continents in this Third W 
debt problem, and then, of course, th 
Soviet Union. 

But, no, I don't want to play de- 
fense, and I don't want to look like w 
foot-dragging, just waiting around t( 
others set the agenda. Prudence is tl 
order of the day. And when you're gu 
ning for something as important as s 
laterally .supported policy in Central 



THE PRESIDENT 



ifrica, it does take a little time. I've 
ly been here less than a week. 



Q. Do you ag:ree with Senator 
■ wer's [Secretary of Defense- 

iynate] testimony in which he 
1 'sn't seem to believe that the SDI 

lategic Defense Initiative] pro- 
.ini. as envisioned by President 

aj;an, is likely? And if you do agree 
A h it. can you expand on that? 

A. No, I think I should wait and see 
i ttle more what John Tower means. My 
) ition has not changed on SDI. 

Q. Which is? I mean, John Tower 
ii said that he doesn't believe that a 
iro-scale SDI to protect the popula- 
1, as envisioned bv Reagan, is 
i'iy. 

A. Before I comment on Tower's tes- 
: nny. I'd better read it. If he's talking 
lit a shield so impenetrable that that 
II nates the need for any kind of other 

I Mise. I probably would agree with 

! . certainly short-run. But I'd better 
' 'V by waiting until I see what he said. 

(J. The first action taken by your 
' retary of State was to order the 

II rding up of the Embassy in Kabul. 
J s that indicate that this Adminis- 
I ion, this country, then, has no in- 
I 'nee with the rebels and you are 

1 fearful of chaos and massacres 
j| -e? And to what extent did you dis- 
i this with Gorbachev the other 

A. Did not discuss it with him the 
T day. And what it indicates is a pru- 
, policy to protect a handful of Amer- 
lives. It's a step that other countries 
! taken in Afghanistan. Certainly I 
k we'd all agree there is uncertainty 
it what follows. I'm convinced the 
ets will continue their withdrawal, 
well they should. But it is simply a 
lent way in which to protect life, I 
k. We've had meeting after meeting 
1 Afghan rebels, and there's no ques- 
in their minds how we feel about, 
a Soviet presence in that country. 
I think there's a lot of uncertainty, 
there's enough uncertainty that a 
•etary of State was taking prudent 
)n in this regard. 

Q. What role do you see for the 
ted States after the Soviets with- 
\ in that country? 

A. Catalytic role for helping bring 
it stability hopefully in a govern- 
t where the people have a lot to say. 
it won't be easy. 



iartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



Q. A Tehran radio report this 
morning seems to indicate that they 
are rejecting your statement of a 
week ago today that good will would 
beget good will. While you didn't spe- 
cifically mention Iran by name in 
your speech, what would your mes- 
sage to them be on relations, and 
what would your message be to them 
about helping get the hostages out? 

A. I would make a broad appeal, 
ti'anscending Iran, to anybody who can 
be helpful to get the hostages out. I 
haven't seen the wire copy, but if there is 
such a story by them, maybe they're say- 
ing. Well, look, we're not holding your 
hostages. And I'd have to say. Well, from 
our intelligence, our information, that's 
probably correct — probably correct. In 
terms of the future — there was a period 
of time when we had excellent relations 
with Iran, and I don't want to think that 
the status quo has to go on forever. But I 
do think that the renunciation of terror 
in any form and facilitating, to the de- 
gree they can, the release of the hos- 
tages would be a couple of good steps 
they could take. 



Q. A few minutes ago on the an- 
swer concerning the hostages, you in- 
dicated that Iran was probably not 
holding the hostages. Did you mean 
to say that we believe that Iran exer- 
cises no control over people who are 
holding the hostages? 

A. No, I mean to say they are not 
holding the hostages. Do they have any 
control? I think you can get varying de- 
grees of intelligence on that, various as- 
sessments as to how much control they 
have over Hezbollah or these families or 
whoever it is. And also, you've got differ- 
ent groups involved in the holding of 
these hostages. But, no, I'm glad to get 
a chance to clarify it because, unless 
the information I have is wrong, Iran 
itself — the government — is not actually 
holding these people. If they were, I 
would just reiterate my view that the 
way to improve relations is to let them 
go, give these people their freedom. 
They didn't do anything wrong. 

Q. Do we believe that Iran can 
exercise influence to gain the hos- 
tages' release? 

A. I think thev can have influence. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Jan. 30, 1989. ■ 



President Holds 
Session With 
News Reporters 



The following are excerpts from a 
question-and-ansiver session President 
Bush held ivith reporters in the Oval 
Office on February 16, 1989.^ 

We support the Afghan efforts to fash- 
ion a stable, broadly based government, 
responsive to the needs of the Afghan 
people. Throughout the long, dark 
years of Afghanistan's occupation, the 
international community has been 
steadfast in its support of the Afghan 
cause, and this certainly has been true 
for the United States. Our commit- 
ment, the commitment of the United 
States to the people there, will remain; 
and it will remain firm, both through 
our bilateral humanitarian aid pro- 
gram and through the UN efforts to 
remove the mines and resettle the refu- 
gees and help reconstruct the war-torn 
economy. 

We would call upon the Soviet 
Union to refrain from other forms of in- 
terference in Afghan affairs. The Sovi- 
et Union has nothing to fear from the 
establishment of an independent, non- 
aligned Afghanistan. And they do bear 
a certain special responsibility for heal- 
ing the wounds of this war. I would 
hope that the Soviet Union would gen- 
erously support international efforts to 
rebuild Afghanistan. 

There will be a fuller statement on 
this later on.- 

Q. Were you hoping also that the 
rebels would not conduct a bloodbath 
once they get in the ascendant and 
really take power. 

A. Yes 

Q. I mean, it's a two-way street, 
isn't it? In victory, magnanimity. Is 
there any sense that you would like t( 
convey that to the rebels, or do you 
think it's just a one-way street for the 
Soviets? 

A. I don't think a bloodbath is in 
anyone's interest. And I think if we had 
a catalytic role, I would hope it would be, 
along with others, working toward rec- 
onciliation and toward a peaceful resolu- 
tion now to all the problems. There's 
been enough of a bloodbath there. I think 
you raise a good point; and, yes, I feel 
strongly that the time for recrimination 
is over, the time for bloodbaths is over. I 
would like to see the various factions get 



THE PRESIDENT 



together and come up with recommenda- 
tions that would lead to a peaceful Af- 
ghanistan with no more bloodbaths. 

Q. The Soviet Union is calling 
for an immediate cease-fire in Af- 
ghanistan and an embargo on arms 
shipments. Would you go along with 
that idea? 

A. Here's one of the complicating 
factors on that call. There is some con- 
cern about what we call stockpiling; and 
it would not be fair to have tremendous 
amounts of lethal supplies left behind 
and then cut off support for resistance, 
thus leaving an unacceptable imbalance. 
Before one could do anything other than 
appeal for peaceful resolution, which I've 
done, one needs to know the real facts on 
this question — this troublesome 
question — of stockpiling. 

Q. Does that mean that you will 
continue to aid the rebels? 

A. That means we will do what we 
need to do to see that there is a peaceful 
resolution to this question, that one side 
does not dominate militarily, and we will 
be encouraging reconciliation. 

Q. What is your reaction to the 
action by the Central American coun- 
tries yesterday that appears to under- 
mine the standing of the contras, to 
say the least, and leave them in a very 
vulnerable position? And was your 
Administration, as has been report- 
ed, caught off guard on that? 

A. Let me say on that one that 
there's some positive elements of what's 
taking place there. There are also some 
troublesome elements. Positive because 
the Nicaraguans appear to be taking 
steps in accord with the Esquipulas 
agreements; they're talking about na- 
tional reconciliation and full freedoms, 
including complete freedom of the press 
and free and fair elections and an end to 
subversion. To the degree that rhetoric 
goes forward and is enacted, that's good. 
But there's 90 days now in which to final- 
ize arrangements. What's troubling to 
me is that claims like this have been 
made at one time, only to see those 
claims repudiated: promises made, 
promises broken. I think we have to be 
wary of supporting any positive ele- 
ments like commitments to democracy 
and yet say, wait a minute, let's be sure 
that we not leave the resistance standing 
alone, leave them twisting out there 
without fulfillment of the commitment to 
democracy on the part of the Sandinistas. 



In terms of being caught off guard, 
we are in the midst of a review of our 
whole policy there. If you ask me would I 
have predicted that the five Presidents 
would have worked out agreement in 
this detail at this time, I'd have to tell 
you that, having talked to President 
Azcona [of Honduras], having our Secre- 
tary of State deal with two foreign min- 
isters just recently — I think within the 
last 10 days — that I wouldn't have said 
that they'd do e.xactly what they did do. 
But as I say, there's some positive ele- 
ments to it, and there's some trouble- 
some elements. 

Q. How does that note of caution 
translate into policy and action on 
your part? 

A. You mean from the future? Work 
here in the next 90 days with the leaders 
to see that there's not just some fluffy 
promises out there but that there's some 
teeth in the promise of democratization. 
That is what has to be done. We are 
going to keep our resolve to have the 
people of Nicaragua have what these 
other countries have there: democracy. 
We're talking about freedom of the 
press, freedom of elections, freedom of 
worship. And it's fine to spell these 
things out in generalities, but now let's 
get down to how we proceed. What does 
a free and fair election mean? I want to 
see some certification of the election 
process. But we've got time now — little 
bit of time now — in which to make very 
clear that our resolve, our commitment 
to democracy, is still there. 

Q. How do you intend to stand by 
your commitment to the resistance? 
And might that mean a request for 
additional nonlethal aid. at the end of 
which — 

A. It could mean that. It could 
mean that. But again, I think we've got 
to work with this process now the best 
we can. But I don't think anybody would 
want to suggest that we would leave peo- 
ple with no humanitarian aid. I can't 
imagine anyone taking that view. 

Q. Will you intend to ask Con- 
gress to approve of that aid? 

A. We have some time on that too. 
But I obviously want to know what the 
status quo is at the time. I have every in- 
tention of seeing that these people re- 
ceive humanitarian support, but how 
that comes about, we'll just have to wait 
and see. 



Q. West Germany wants to po 
pone the modernization of the sho 
range missiles. Obviously this is : 
the American position. They wanti 
also to open negotiations with the 
viets on that. How do you respond 
that? Hyou don't agree with that,, 
you concerned by the unity of NAT 
on that? 

A. I would respond to it this wa^ 
The Secretary of State is talking to a 
the NATO leaders; he'll be back in to 
over this weekend. I will sit down hei 
in this chair and talk to him about wl 
he has found. 

In the meantime, I am inclined t 
feel that we are far closer to West Ge 
many than the public perceptions ml 
be. I have been in touch with Helmut 
Kohl [Chancellor, Federal Republic o 
Germany], and there have been oppo 
tunities for him to express to me inoi 
nate concerns on this question. Othe: 
German leaders have been here rece 
and the Secretary of State's been the 
So I would use this opportunity to sh 
down the concept that there are maj( 
divisions between ourselves and the 
Federal Republic on this question. 

But I'm not worried about NAT( 
unity. You always worry that you ha\ 
your act totally together, and that's ( 
of the reasons I wanted these early c 
.sulfations. I think now, as a result of 
Secretary of State's wonderful trip o 
there — and I say wonderful because 
touched a lot of bases and the cables 
most encouraging along the lines of 
NATO unity — that having said that, 
the mood is pretty good. I don't won 
too much about divisions in NATO, a 
do then feel that we will be in a posit 
with a united NATO to move forwar 
consultation with the Soviet Union. 
That's the next step, and we have cer 
leadership responsibilities that all of 
here are prepared to accept in that 
regard. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of P 
dential Documents of Feb. 20, 1989. 

-Fortext see Bulletin of March 198 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/April ' 



HE VICE PRESIDENT 



|ce President Visits 
Venezuela and El Salvador 

Vice President Quai/le headed the 
sidential delegation to the 
iugiiration qfCarlos Andres Perez 
^President of Venezuela (February 1- 
''hsi)) and visited El Salvador 
jibruarii 3). 




President Quayle and Argentine President Carlos Andres Perez. 



nezuela 

people of our two counti-ies share 
strongest belief in the dignity of 
, embodied in our mutual commit- 
t to the advancement of democracy 
I'espect for human rights .... The 
of the dictator has, indeed, passed, 
lis hemisphere, new life has been 
n to the idea that freedom works, 
it does not work of and by itself. 
ace the constant threat of en- 
chment upon our shores of an alien 



and outmoded ideology. To defeat it, 
we must strengthen the ties that bind 
us. Only our combined solidarity will 
ensure the consolidation on this conti- 
nent, within the framework of demo- 
cratic institutions, of a system of 
individual liberty and social justice 
based on respect for the essential 
rights of man. 

Remarks to 

the American Embassy Community, 

Caracas, February 1, 1989 



El Salvador 

El Salvador is a democracy, so it's not 
surprising that there are many voices 
to be heard here. Yet in my conversa- 
tions with Salvadorans of very differ- 
ing points of view, I have heard a single 
voice; it is a clear one. No one wishes 
more political violence or destabiliza- 
tion in the region or an end to the dem- 
ocratic process that began 10 years ago. 
Salvadorans are united in their desire 
for peace, for a share in the prosperity 
of the nation, for law and justice to 
guide their society. They are united in 
their sense of what their country can 
be ... . Our commitment, as Ameri- 
cans and as allies, is to democracy. Our 
support is for the people of El Salvador. 
It is they who choose their leaders; it is 
they who decide the course of their des- 
tiny; and it is to the people of El Sal- 
vador that we direct our continued 
support. 

Departure Statement, 
San Salvador, February .3, 1989 ■ 




Vice President Quayle and Sal- 
vadoran President Jose Napoleon 
Duarte. 



irtment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



James A. Baker, III, Sworn In 
as Secretary of State 




In a formal ceremony at the White House, James A. Baker, III, was sworn in 
as the 61st Secretary of State on January 27, 1989, by Chief Justice William Re- 
nquist. Mrs. Baker held the Bible, and President Bush witnessed. Secretary 
Baker officially took the oath of office on January 25, 1989, at the Department 
of State. 



Following are remarks bi/ 
President Bush and Secretari/ Baker 
at the latter's formal swearing-in 
ceremony at the White House on 
January 27, 1989. 

President Bush' 

This is a very special occasion for me 
because, as you all know, Jim and I 
have been friends for a long time, going 
back perhaps more years than either of 
us would care to admit — long, really, 
before our public lives began. And 
we've served in government together, 
campaigned together, traveled a long 
way through some rough and tumble 
times. It's well known that the new Sec- 
retary of State is my friend. I have 
great confidence in him. And judging 
from how he sailed through the con- 
firmation process — thank you, 
gentlemen — the U.S. Senate shares 
that confidence. 

As Secretary of State, he will be 
my principal foreign policy adviser. As 
I pledged in my Inaugural Address a 



week ago, my presidency will usher in 
the age of the offered hand, and that 
applies certainly to foreign policy. I've 
also spoken of a new engagement. No- 
where is the need for a new engage- 
ment greater than in foreign policy. 

The postwar generation has come 
of age, and today we live in a distinctly 
different world than that which we 
were born into: a world that demands 
new strategies and new solutions. To- 
day we see a process of change in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in 
the Middle East. A changing situation 
creates new possibilities as well as dan- 
gers. In southern Africa and in Indo- 
china, there is diplomatic progress. In 
Central and South America, total- 
itarian forces still threaten to under- 
mine the will of the people. We must 
keep democracy on the march. We're 
faced with change and the potential for 
change all over the world. And it's up to 
us to guarantee that the United States 
remains an engaged power for positive 
change. 



In another era, the Secretary of 
State's role was largely confined to 
matters of war and peace. Today's 
world is much more complex than 
that — more dangerous, too. Today's 
Secretary of State must be preparei 
work with our allies to solve such gl 
al threats as the international narco 
trade, terrorism, the degradation of 
the world's environment, and the ec( 
nomic distress of developing countri 
That's why I chose James Baker. He'; 
savvy; he's sensitive; he's tough — a r: 
combination, indeed. And so, Jim, 
you've got a big job ahead of you, lea 
ing; coming up with bold, new initia- 
tives; helping all of us fulfill the 
President's special role in foreign po^ 
cy. We will also try to restore bipart 
sanship based on trust, open 
communication, and consistency of 
action. 

This is a time for America to re; 
out and take the lead, not merely re; 
This is a time for America to move f 
ward confidently and cautiously, not 
treat. As the freest and the fairest { 
the most powerful democracy on the 
face of the Earth, we must continue 
shine as a beacon of liberty, beacon 
justice, for all the people of the worl 

Those of you who are here todaj 
Jim Baker's family, closest friends- 
know something that many other pe 
pie will soon learn for themselves: J 
Baker will be a great Secretary of 
State. 

Secretary Baker^ 

I am truly honored and privileged t( 
stand before you today. Many of you 
have come a long distance to be hert 
and as you mentioned, Mr. Presidem 
you and I have come a long distance 
gether. I hope to continue to merit y 
confidence. I know I will continue tc 
enjoy our friendship. One other thin 
hope that in foreign policy, we're goi 
to make a better team than we ofter 
times did on the tennis courts in Te; 
[Laughter] 



THE SECRETARY 



The taking of an oath is always a 
tnn moment. Yet I cannot help but 
k that there will be even more sol- 
moments to follow. Because it's 
jiji my experience for 8 years here 
in Washington that after the 
iring-in, sooner or later, comes the 
iring at. [Laughter] 
Mr. President, through your choice 
the Senate's consent, I will occupy 
ffice that dates from the infancy of 
Republic. Over the last few weeks, 
learned a lot about the job. I find 
nore I learn about it, the more 
ble I become. Yet mixed with that 
ility is a pride — not in myself but 
ir great country. 

One of the statutory duties of the 
etary of State is to be the custo- 
of the Great Seal of the United 
!s. We're all pretty familiar with 
Teat eagle, holding the olive 
ches but also holding the arrows. 
e's a reverse side to that seal, how- 
that interests me. On it is an un- 
hed pyramid and on the bottom, a 
n inscription which means, "A new 
r of the ages." It's dated 1776. 
Vo me this expresses our fore- 
rs' conviction that our country of- 
something new. Our Constitution, 
lemocracy is a new order of human 
ity. And the unfinished pyramid is 
nbol of strength, and it's a symbol 
ritinuity. 

America rests on the broadest pos- 
base which, of course, is the con- 
(tion of every American. But the 
of America — to perfect our soci- 
;o strengthen and extend 
om — is really never finished. 
Is I stand here today — very grate- 
) you, Mr. President — I recognize 
we are entering a new era of inter- 
nal relations; one that's filled with 
than its share of promise but per- 
more than its share of perils as 
I also recognize that our country 
>r new in our capacity to meet the 
fcnge and to advance the cause of 
ilom. 
enter this office secure in the 
ledge that under your leadership, 
'resident, and with the support of 
Congress and the support of the 
rican people, we can continue suc- 
ully what we began two centuries 



James A. Baker, III 
Secretary of State 



James A. Baker, III, was sworn in as 
the 61st Secretary of State at the De- 
partment of State on January 25, 1989, 
and at a formal ceremony at the White 
House on January 27, 1989. He was 
nominated by President-elect Bush on 
November 9, 1988, and confirmed by 
the Senate on January 25, 1989. 

James A. Baker, III, served as the 
67th Secretary of the Treasury from 
February 1985 to August 1988. In Au- 
gust 1988, he assumed the role of Cam- 
paign Chairman for the presidential 
campaign of Vice President George 
Bush. 

Prior to serving as Secretary of 
the Treasury, Mr. Baker had been ap- 
pointed by President Reagan as Chief 
of Staff to the President of the United 
States, a position which he occupied 
from January 1981 through January 
1985. While at the White House, he was 
a member of the National Security 
Council and remained a member as Sec- 
retary of the Treasury. While at Treas- 
ury, he was also Chairman of the 
President's Economic Policy Council. 

In 1980 Secretary Baker served as 
Senior Adviser to the Reagan/Bush 
general election campaign. From Janu- 
ary 1979 to May 1980, he was the Chair- 
man of Vice President Bush's campaign 
for the 1980 Republican presidential 
nomination. 

Secretary Baker was the Republi- 
can Party's nominee for Attorney Gen- 
eral of the State of Texas in 1978. He is 
a native Houstonian and practiced law 
there with the firm of Andrews & 
Kurth from 1957 to 1975. 

In August 1975, Secretary Baker 
was appointed by President Ford to be 
the Under Secretary of Commerce. 
Secretary Baker joined President 



Ford's presidential campaign in 
May 1976 as Deputy Chairman for Dele- 
gate Operations and in August became 
National Chairman of the President 
Ford Committee. 

Secretary Baker graduated from 
Princeton University in 1952. After 2 
years of active duty as a Lieutenant in 
the U.S. Marine Corps, he entered the 
University of Texas School of Law at 
Austin. He received his J.D. with hon- 
ors in 1957. 

A member of the American, Texas, 
and Houston Bar Associations, the 
American Judicature Society, and the 
Phi Delta Phi honorary legal fraternity, 
Secretary Baker also serves on the 
Board of Trustees of the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Schol- 
ars at the Smithsonian Institution. He 
has served on the governing bodies of 
the Texas Children's Hospital and the 
M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor 
Institute. 

Secretary Baker has been the re- 
cipient of the Jefferson Award for dis- 
tinguished public service from the 
American Institute for Public Service, 
an award for Distinguished Public 
Service from the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard, and 
the Woodrow Wilson Award for distin- 
guished achievement in the nation's 
service from Princeton University. 
Secretary Baker was selected in 1986 
as a distinguished alumnus of the Uni- 
versity of Texas. He has received nu- 
merous honorary degrees. 

Secretary Baker was born 
April 28, 1930. He and his wife, the for- 
mer Susan Garrett, reside in Washing- 
ton, D.C. They have eight children. 



Press release 10 of Jan. 30, 1989. 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
iqU Documents of Jan. 30, 1989. 
Fe.xt from press release 9 of Jan. 30 and 
l\ ('ompilation of Presidential Docu- 
nf.Jan. 30. ■ 



tljrtment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearings 



Secretary of State-designate 
James A. Baker, III, appeared before 
the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on January 17, 1989. He 
was confiryned by the full Senate on 
January 25.^ 

It is an honor to appear before you as 
President-elect Bush's nominee to be 
Secretary of State. I also appreciate 
your willingness to hold these hearings 
while we are still in the transition per- 
iod. Every Administration aspires to hit 
the ground running, instead of just hit- 
ting the ground. 

This Friday a new President will 
take office. He will govern an America 
vastly different from the country we 
knew even as recently as the beginning 
of this decade. When George Bush first 
campaigned for the presidency, Ameri- 
can institutions and values were being 
questioned. Over the last 8 years, we 
have reaffirmed them. As a result, our 
nation has emerged much stronger both 
at home and abroad. For this, we owe 
thanks to Secretary Shultz and, above 
all, to Pi-esident Reagan. 

The legacy of the Reagan era is a 
more vibrant America. We have proven 
that our President can lead, that our 
government works, that progress can be 
made. The creativity of the individual 
and respect for his or her rights — the 
touchstones of democracy — have become, 
once more, ideas in the ascendancy. 

Some of that vibrancy is reflected in 
the international developments of our 
time. Our most powerful foe, the Soviet 
Union, so aggressive a decade ago, is un- 
dergoing an ideological soul-searching of 
historic proportions. Regional conflicts 
long thought to be intractable — in South- 
west Asia and southern Africa, for 
example — have begun moving toward 
resolution with the help of creative 
American diplomacy. And the interna- 
tional economy, driven by the longest 
American peacetime economic expansion 
on record, has provided new hope for 
progress. 

A World in Transition 

These developments are symptomatic of 
the great changes and challenges we face 
in the decade ahead. Our world is under- 
going five significant transformations. 

First, the democratic revolution: 

Many nations in Latin America have 



recently achieved democracy or are 
struggling toward it, while in Asia, the 
Philippines and South Korea have joined 
the democi'atic ranks. But many of these 
new democracies are fragile. Their insti- 
tutions need time to take root, and suc- 
cess is not assured. And, while millions 
of people elsewhere are demanding free 
political institutions, we know that the 
demands for freedom are not always 
granted peacefully, if at all. 

Second, the spread of free enter- 
prise: Free markets and private initia- 
tive are the new watchwords of economic 
development — because these concepts 
work in practice. Classic socialism and 
variants of government-controlled econ- 
omies have been discredited. The na- 
tions of the Pacific rim in particular 
have shown that the free enterprise 
model works astonishingly well for 
developing countries, not just mature 
economies. But in many regions, the 
problems of debt, large trade imbal- 
ances, and protectionist pressures over- 
shadow this progress and threaten the 
future. 

Third, change in the communist 
world: Virtually every communist gov- 
ernment is now experimenting with eco- 
nomic ideas once denounced as heretical, 
including a role for a market economy. 
But the crisis of the communist systems, 
even by their own admission, is much 
broader. Political change, especially the 
demand for freer institutions, is high on 
the agenda. Yet it is not clear that re- 
forms will be successful or that democra- 
cy will be the outcome. 

Fourth, technological progress: 

Rapid advances in the technology of in- 
formation and communications have 
helped to bring about a global economy, 
shrinking time and space and transcend- 
ing the traditional boundaries of the 
nation-state. It is already clear that in 
today's global economy, dome.stic econom- 
ic policies can no longer be considered 
independently of their international con- 
sequences. But it is not yet certain that 
we will have the cooperation we need. 
And trade advantages, unfairly pursued, 
could lead to more economic strife and, 
eventually, to growing protectionism. 

Fifth, new military trends: The 

same technological change affecting the 
international economy is altering strate- 



gic military relationships. Precision 
guidance enables the conventional we 
ons of today to destroy targets that, i 
years past, were assigned primarily 
nuclear weapons. Research on the Sti 
tegic Defense Initiative is exploring t 
potential for altering the future mix > 
offense and defense. We must continu 
to assess the impact of these changes 
on deterrence and arms control. 

There is another, more worrisom 
aspect of the new military trends. A 
dangerous proliferation of high tech- 
nology has begun. Just as we are con 
trolling or eliminating some nuclear 
weapons, chemical warheads and ball 
tic missiles have fallen into the handi 
governments and groups with proven 
records of aggression and terrorism. 

The Contraries of Our Times 
and How To Approach Them 

These five ti-ansformations present u 
with a series of contraries and para- 
doxes. We could advance toward an 
increasingly democratic world, or, if 
fragile democracies fail, the cause of 
freedom could be thrown back. The i 
ter national economy could continue t 
grow, or the stresses of competition 
could lead to protectionism and rival 
trading blocs — ultimately to the diss 
vantage of all. A properly conceived 
proach by the Atlantic alliance could 
extend the progress we have made v, 
the Soviet Union. Or through mistak 
on either side of the Iron Curtain, th 
opportunity could be lost. Finally, ne 
military technologies could provide ; 
greater stability at lower levels of foi 
Or we could encounter a new and dar 
age if we cannot halt the spread of W' 
ons that put nations on a hair trigger 
particularly in politically unstable 
i-egions. 

I am asking you to vote to confir 
me as Secretary of State. So it is rig 
and proper that I tell you as best I c; 
my approach to this challenging worl 
this world of contraries. 

During my legal training, I beca 
aware of a set of lectures by Justice 1 
jamin Cardozo called "The Nature of 
Judicial Process." And I recall being 
struck by his observation that, "Ther 
is in each of us a stream of tendency, 
whether you choose to call it philosop 
or not, which gives coherency and dii 
tion to thought and action." Some ha' 
described my philosophy as "pragmai 



10 



THE SECRETARY 



ilike to say that labels can be mis- 

ing — I am actually a Texas Repub- 
n, all of whom are conservative. I 

admit to pragmatism, however, if by 
It you mean being realistic about the 
Id and apjjreciating the importance 
etting things done. 

My purpose is not to understand 

world in order to accept it but to un- 
stand it in order to change it where 
essary — sometimes by large steps, 
:n of necessity by small steps, yet al- 
s pressing forward. And the only 
e guide for such change is the com- 

of American ideals and values — 
»dom, democracy, equal rights, re- 

t for human dignity, fair play — the 
iiciples to which I adhere, 

I believe in freedom for the individ- 
because it's a God-given right and the 
roe of human creativity. The Foun- 

of our country recognized that such 

dom was preserved best by limited 
jrnment — the checks and balances 

em that still provides the framework 
)ur success. Part of that system is a 

ntralized government, a government 

; to the people, a government of the 
ole. I would argue, too, that econom- 
eedom — the free market system — is 
issential part of the framework, 
(illy, and above all, I believe, like 
Koln, that the United States has a 

ial role in this world, a special con- 
ation to make — as he put it, "the 

best hope of earth." 

tiership and Bipartisanship 

ense of realism, my stream of ten- 
y, tells me that we can advance to- 
i those ideals if we are resolved on 
issues. 

The fir,st is the necessity for Anieri- 
ieadership. Some years ago, as Sec- 
Ty of the Treasury, I spoke of the 
ership "choice" — but, in fact, it is 
loice at all. As the most powerful 

iocracy, the largest economy, the 
thiest society, and the greatest con- 
ration of scientific talents, we are 
g to substantially affect the future 
ther we do so consciously or not. We 
36 a force for freedom and peaceful 
ge unlike any other in this world, 
if we fail to do so, we will not be able 
in or to hide from the consequences. 
U.S. leadership must adjust for a 
d that has outgrown the postwar 
The United States is simultaneously 
bune for democracy, a catalyst for 
national cooperation, and a guard- 
)f our national interests. We live in a 
d of powerful adversaries. We can- 
lake the survival of democracy for 



granted or assume that if we do not pro- 
tect our own interests, someone else or 
some international organization will act 
on our behalf. We also live in a world of 
increasingly influential allies whose co- 
operation is essential if we are to sur- 
mount common problems. There are new, 
global dangers, such as terrorism, the 
international narcotics trade, and the 
degradation of the world's environment, 
that cannot be managed by one nation 
alone — no matter how powerful. These 
realities will not permit a blind isola- 
tionism or a reckless unilateralism. Only 
through a realistic approach can we 
write a new chapter of American leader- 
ship for a rapidly changing world. 

Thei'e is a second issue we must re- 
solve. It concerns the relationship be- 
tween the executive and the Congress in 
the realm of foreign policy. Simply put, 
we must have bipartisanship to suc- 
ceed. That's the verdict of history and of 
recent exj^erience. 

Bipartisanship does not mean that 
we must always agree. There are and 
will always be differences in approach 
and on substance. Airing those differ- 
ences in a manner that respects the oth- 
er person's right to disagree is a strong 
affirmation of the democratic process. 
But eventually, we must proceed, and 
when we do, it is best that we do so to- 
gether if we are to achieve the national 
interest. On this subject, let me quote 
Dean Acheson. He was evidently ac- 
quainted with some of our Texas customs 
because he said that there was a rule in 
the saloons of the Old West: "Never shoot 
the piano player." And he wrote that in 
foreign policy, the President was the pi- 
ano player. 

Yes, this is an appeal for a kinder, 
gentler Congress. But bipartisanship is 
also more than Acheson's "holy water 
sprinkled on political necessity." It's the 
lubricant that enables the branches of 
government to overcome their natural, 
constitutionally designed friction, a 
friction that arises from our differing 
perspectives and our different 
responsibilities. 

As a realist, I know we need biparti- 
sanship to succeed. While the executive 
is responsible for proposing and execut- 
ing foreign policy, the legislature sup- 
ports, modifies, and sometimes vetoes a 
course of action. Thus, bipartisanship is 
decided in practice. So let our recent ex- 
perience be our teacher. When we held 
the line together, on Afghanistan, or 
throughout the INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] negotiations, we suc- 
ceeded. When we did not — in Central 
America — the outcome was unsatisfac- 
tory to everyone. 



The conclusion is inescapable. In or- 
der to succeed, we must work together. 
And a bipartisan foreign policy is sus- 
tained by three principles: 

• First, trust that w'e each have 
the public interest in mind, that we 
are doing our best to carry out our 
respon.sibilities; 

• Second, consultation, that we are 
trying to communicate, that we taking 
off and landing together; and 

• Third, consistency, that our deci- 
sions and agreements, once arrived at, 
ai'e, in fact, decisions and agreements 
that will be kept. 

Senators Danforth and Boren have 
suggested a new means of consultation — 
including periodic meetings of Members 
of Congress with the Secretary of State 
and sometimes the President — to discuss 
the larger and longer term issues. As 
President-elect Bush wrote to Senator 
Danforth on November 18, 1988, "As soon 
as my National Security team is in 
place, I will ask them to meet with you 
to discuss your e.xcellent suggestions." I 
look forward to that meeting. 

Armed then with the conviction of 
American leadership and the practices 
of bipartisanship, let us together — the 
executive and the Congress — tackle the 
formidable agenda before us. 

The International Agenda: 
The Americas 

First on that agenda is our neighbor- 
hood — the countries that border us, the 
countries of our continent and our hemi- 
sphere. The United States is both a con- 
tinental and a maritime power, which 
gives us a unique geopolitical perspec- 
tive. But we are not exempt from the old 
rule that foreign policy begins at home. 
It is rooted and must be rooted in our 
values. And it gathers both strength and 
vitality from our immediate neighbor- 
hood — how well we do with our friends 
and neighbors to the north and south. 

Recently, working with Canada, we 
achieved a free trade agreement — 
something both nations had sought for 
100 years without success. A lot of ink 
and some anguish has been spilled over 
the economic implications of this agree- 
ment with respect to certain industries. 
In my view, the free trade agreement is 
in our mutual interest. And there are 
geopolitical implications that go far be- 
yond the economic signficance of this 
achievement. 

The U.S. -Canada agreement repre- 
sents a signal success in a strategy de- 
signed to move all nations toward a more 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



open trading system. It proves that the 
two largest trading partners in the 
world cannot only eliminate tariff bar- 
riers but can also negotiate solutions in 
such areas as services and investment — 
both increasingly transnational in 
scope — while still respecting national 
sovereignty. It shows that an active, in- 
ternationalist free trade policy can cata- 
lyze a bipartisan domestic coalition and 
turn back the forces of protectionism. So 
it can be done. And we look forward to 
working with Canada on other important 
issues, including international environ- 
mental problems, as we extend the range 
of our new cooperation. 

To the south, we have an equally sig- 
nificant set of issues to consider. Our 
neighbor Me.xico is deeply in debt and 
faces some serious challenges to its so- 
cial fabric. But Mexico also has many 
assets — the capabilities of its people and 
its significant natural resources. The 
Mexican Government, led by President 
Salinas, is taking the road of economic 
and political reform. It is a difficult 
road, and we are determined to help. 

It is in our interest to do so. It is 
time we regarded Mexico with the re- 
spect and seriousness it warrants. 
Whatever the past, we mu.st all be aware 
that America's relationship with Mexico 
means a great deal. It is as important as 
our relationship with any other country 
in the world. I am convinced that we can 
make progress together, working on the 
basis of equality and mutual respect. I 
know President-elect Bush looks forward 
to early consultations with President 
Salinas and [Canadian] Prime Minister 
Mulroney to chart the course ahead. 

Another matter on our continental 
agenda is Central America. We have now 
had nearly 10 years of frustrating and 
sometimes contradictory American poli- 
cies toward that region. Some successes 
have been achieved. Most Central Amer- 
ican nations are more democratic and 
more respectful of human rights than 
they were. And we must help to defend 
those achievements from threats against 
human rights, whether the threats are 
from the left or the right. 

Still, the overwhelming blemish re- 
mains: the terrible draining conflict be- 
tween Nicaragua and its neighbors and 
between the Nicaraguan Mar.\ists and 
their own people, some of whom have 
taken up arms and merited American 
support. Starting in 1987, all of the gov- 
ernments of the area stepped back from 
the brink long enough to agree on a set 
of principles for peace. The Esquipulas 
agreement, known as Esquipulas II and 
authored by President Arias of Costa 



Rica, expresses well everyone's objec- 
tives. It's a good platform for peace. 
What it lacks is a mechanism for enforce- 
ment. That problem emerged clearly in 
the record of negotiations following the 
Sapoa accords between the Sandinistas 
and the democratic resistance. To date, 
neither democracy, as specified by 
Esquipulas II, nor the reintegration of 
the resistance, as pledged in the Sapoa 
accords, has materialized. 

Clearly, we need a different ajj- 
proach, an ajjproach that must be bipar- 
tisan here in Washington if it is to 
succeed there in the region. Events have 
shown that only such bipartisan action 
influences the Sandinistas. 

That is why we must unite on clear 
goals for Central America — democrati- 
zation, development, and security for ev- 
ery state in the region. All of them must 
be free of the fear of subversive neigh- 
bors. All of them must be able to share 
in an economic development plan, per- 
haps assisted by our European and Japa- 
nese allies. But none of this can occur 
unless the promises of democracy and se- 
curity become reality. We must insist on 
protection for human rights in Nicara- 
gua, El Salvador, and their neighbors — 
applying equal standards faii'ly to all. 

These objectives of American diplo- 
macy carry a great national respon- 
sibility. We cannot and we must not 
abandon the democratic resistance. We 
must stand by them until our mutual 
goals are achieved. 

Finally, I'd like to make a sugges- 
tion. In 1992, we will celebrate the 500th 
anniversary of Columbus' voyage of dis- 
covery. I'd like to suggest that today we 
embark on a voyage of rediscovery — of 
the Caribbean and of South America. 
Our neighbors in this hemisphere are 
engaged in a quest for greater freedom 
and economic progress. We share many 
of their interests. And together we also 
face the scourge of drugs. Now is the 
time to take a fresh look at these prob- 
lems and to make more of our oppor- 
tunities to overcome them. 

Transformation of 
Our Allies and Friends 

Let me move now from our neighborhood 
to the broader world of our friends and 
allies. Through commerce, political al- 
liance, and defense agreements, the 
United States links together two highly 
dynamic, advanced regions — Western 
Europe and the nations of the Pacific. 
We are at once an Atlantic power and a 
Pacific power, and there should not be 
any thought to expand one relationship 
at the expense of the other. 



Realism compels us to understai 
the great changes taking place anion 
our allies and friends in both region.- 
This year marks the 40th anniversar 
the founding of NATO, the most sucei 
ful alliance in history. But today's Y\'i 
ern Europe is not the exhausted Eui' 
recovering from its own devastation, 
is it the single Europe of the political 
sionaries. A new appreciation is neeil 
on our side and theirs of how we can 
adapt to changing circumstances as s 
force for peace. 

Certainly, in the first instance, r 
requires, as President-elect Bush has 
suggested, a meeting of our minds or 
how to proceed with a changing Sovi( 
Union. In an era of constrained defen 
budgets, we require a common appro 
to the new military facts created by t 
INF Treaty — the need to modernize • 
nuclear and conventional weapons. W 
need a set of both realistic and prude 
standards for conventional arms cont 
We also need a common approach to t 
issues of loans and credits, trade, an( 
technology transfer to Moscow and E 
ern Europe. Finally, we need to estal 
lish a more equitable and creative ba 
on which to share responsibilities. 0\ 
discourse and consultations should b( 
free and frank as befits allies of long 
standing. 

The stakes have not changed. Oi 
commitment to NATO is stronger be 
cause we as nations are stronger. As 
as Europe remains the most heavily 
armed continent, where American at 
Soviet troops face each other on the 
front lines, the Atlantic alliance will 
our first line of defense. 

The year 1989 also marks 32 yeai 
since the signing of the treaty of Ron 
that gave official birth to the [Europi 
Common Market. And in only 3 more 
years, the enlarged Common Market 
will have achieved the objective of th; 
treaty — a single market. But will thi 
new Europe — a rising economic supe 
power — be outward looking or inwan 
Will it be another building block in tl 
new edifice of a more open, global tn 
ing system or a massive bloc protects 
against external competition? Will it 
a healthy, dynamic economy that pro- 
duces an abundance of jobs or a cauti 
stagnant region content with persisti 
unemployment? The correct anwers t 
these contraries will be found, I belie 
in a Europe that looks outward, not i 
ward; that promotes structural refor: 
that breaks down barriers, that offer 
economic opportunities for all nations 
not only for Europe. As an ally and 



12 



THE SECRETARY 



a major trading partner, the United 
ates will take a keen interest in this 
insformation. 

Turning to the Pacific rim, we find 
triking success already in the making. 
) area offers comparable achievements 
creating advanced economies in rec- 
1 time. This economic progress is an- 
)red in the remarkable partnership, 
f! four decades old, between the 
lited States and Japan. I e.xpect that 
rtnership to strengthen further and 
Dand in scope. 

Many have spoken of the Pacific cen- 
y and the Pacific rim as the world of 
ti' future. One thing is certain. The 
vrld's economic promise to the end of 
r s century depends on how well the 
I ited States and its Pacific partners 
n iiage their affairs. Our relations with 
t Pacific — as our relations with Eu- 
rie and, indeed, our own continent — 
nst emphasize outward-looking eco- 
Bnic policies that promote trade and 
giwth. I do not underestimate the chal- 
l(ge in Asia, or in other regions, of 
4 ieving free and fair trade, of avoiding 
a forms of protectionism, including the 
q nipulation of exchange rates. After 
1 rly a decade when the American 
ifl nomy has driven international growth, 
\' are all facing a changing world. The 
r ' that success brings responsibility 
' find a fuller e.xpression as the Pa- 
:, : nations assume more important 
'« nomic and political roles. 

We have vital political and strategic 
ii 'rests in the Pacific as well. These in- 
I 'sts are well served by military capa- 
:i<s based in Japan, the Philippines, 
a Korea — and by our close cooperation 
« h these nations. We must enhance 
t coopei'ation while shouldering com- 
1 defense and development 
'I iiinsibilities. 
The U.S. relationship with the Peo- 
~ Itepublic of China, important in its 
1 right, also contributes strongly to 
' ii\erall stability of the international 
p tical order. President-elect Bush's e.x- 
u qve, personal experience in China 
facilitate the expansion of our im- 
;;mt and multifaceted ties. 
( )ur policy toward the Pacific as a 
<]r must tie together all strands: to 
ire the region's economic growth, 
its global implications, in the con- 
• f a secure regional deterrence. 
Ilk we are going to see in Asia the 
— <ity for closer coordination with 
\N [Association of South East Asian 
ns] and other regional groups — and 
fa|)s even new institutional arrange- 
•i.as. As we enter a new era charae- 
M zed especially by the greater strength 



Secretary Addresses Panel 
on Global Climate Change 



Following are remarks by Secre- 
tary Baker before the Response Strate- 
gies Wo7-king Group of the Inter- 
governmental Panel on Climate 
Change at the Department of State on 
January 30, 1989.^ 

I am very pleased to have the oppor- 
tunity to join you this morning, how- 
ever briefly, and to welcome you to the 
Department of State. You are the first 
official group that I've had the pleasure 
of welcoming to the Department. 

I would also like to welcome 
Bill Reilly, who is here with us this 
morning— President of the World Wild- 
life Fund and the Conservation Founda- 
tion. Bill has let President Bush talk 
him into becoming the nominee for the 
post of Administrator of the U.S. Envi- 
ronmental Protection Agency, and it's 
my fervent hope, Bill, that nothing you 
hear at this conference this morning 
will cause you to change your mind. 

The truth is, though, as I don't 
need to tell those of you who are here, 
we face some very difficult problems. It 
is also true, though, that we now recog- 
nize them to be problems, and in my ex- 
perience in government, that is at least 
half of the battle. 

Some months ago President Bush 
said, "We face the prospect of being 
trapped on a boat that we have irrepa- 
rably damaged — not by the cataclysm of 
war but by the slow neglect of a vessel 
we believed to be impervious to our 
abuse." 

The establishment of the Inter- 
governmental Panel on Climate Change 
and this meeting of the panel's Re- 
sponse Strategies Working Group, I 
think, shows beyond a doubt that this is 
a transnational issue. We are all in the 
same boat. And as I put it in my testi- 
mony to the Senate recently, "The tides 
and the winds can spread environmen- 
tal damage to continents and hemis- 
pheres far removed from the immediate 
disaster." 

So if I may borrow a phrase from 
the environmentalists, the political 
ecology is now ripe for action. We know 



that we need to act, and we also know 
that we need to act together That is 
what this meeting is all about. 

But I would take it even a step fur- 
ther. One of the big advantages of being 
Secretary of State is that because I am 
not a scientist, I am, therefore, not 
called upon to assess the evidence, es- 
pecially on global climate change. Yet 
it is also clear, I think, that we face 
more than simply a scientific problem. 
It is also a diplomatic problem of when 
and how we take action. And here, if I 
might, I would like to make four 
points. 

The first is that we can probably 
not afford to wait until all of the uncer- 
tainties have been resolved before we 
do act. Time will not make the problem 
go away. 

The second is that while scientists 
refine the state of our knowledge, we 
should focus immediately on prudent 
steps that are already justified on 
grounds other than climate change. 
These include reducing CFC emissions, 
greater energy efficiency, and 
reforestation. 

The third is that whatever global 
solutions to global climate change are 
considered, they should be as specific 
and cost-effective as they can possibly 
be. 

The fourth is that those solutions 
will be most effective if they transcend 
the great fault line of our times — the 
need to reconcile the transcendent re- 
quirements for both economic develop- 
ment and a safe environment. 

Without in any way downgrading 
the difficulty of the task, I would con- 
clude by noting that progress generally 
results when common interests are 
joined to a common understanding. 
This meeting and others like it will 
play a crucial role in moving us all to- 
ward that common understanding of 
what we must do to protect and to pre- 
serve our environment. 



'Press release 11. 



iMiartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



of our friends, the challenge of our agen- 
da can be put this way: Our mutual suc- 
cess should pave the road toward closer 
association, not a detour to the dead end 
of counterproductive rivalry. That's a 
road we must pave together. 

Transnational Issues 

The future of our civilization also de- 
mands that we act in concert to deal 
with a new class of problems, transna- 
tional in nature. Terrorism has become a 
means for small groups, sometimes sup- 
ported by nations, to attack innocent ci- 
vilians around the world. The narcotics 
traffickers have become powerful 
enough to undermine governments, even 
as their drugs poison societies. Fanatics 
spread their messages of intolerance and 
hate using mass communications that cut 
across borders. Every nation also knows 
now that we face major ecological chal- 
lenges. The tides and winds can spread 
environmental damage to continents and 
hemispheres far removed from the im- 
mediate disaster. Scientists have warned 
us against the possible consequences of a 
long-term warming trend, the so-called 
greenhouse effect. 

President-elect Bush has called for 
an international conference on global en- 
vironmental issues. I believe the United 
States must lead this effort. We need to 
help foster a change of attitude, a recon- 
ciliation of the transcendent require- 
ments for both economic development 
and a secure environment. As Treasury 
Secretary, I pressed the multilateral de- 
velopment banks toward consideration of 
conservationally sound, sustained devel- 
opment and helped develop debt-for- 
charity swaps to aid conservation in de- 
veloping nations. As Seci'etary of State, 
I hope to build on this record. 

No one has yet perfected the poli- 
cies of collective action we need to deal 
with this special range of global prob- 
lems. But the stakes are too high for us 
to desist. We will begin with our allies, 
include our friends, and challenge our 
adversaries to make common cause in 
treating these issues. 

Realism in U.S. -Soviet Relations 

Beyond the Americas, be.\'ond greater 
partnership with our allies, beyond fac- 
ing global problems, lies the U.S. -Soviet 
relationship. Thanks to the policy of 
peace through strength pursued over the 
last 8 years, our dealings with Moscow 
have become noticeably less tense. There 
has been progress in arms control — 
notably the INF Treaty — human rights, 



bilateral ties, and regional conflicts. We 
look forward to the day, coming soon, 
when all Soviet troops will have left 
Afghanistan. 

Some have suggested that this prog- 
ress deserves a radically different U.S. 
policy. Others fear that [Soviet Presi- 
dent] Mikhail Gorbachev has stolen a 
march on the democracies through such 
actions as the unilateral reduction in 
troops and tanks in Europe. The mean- 
ing and permanence of the new Soviet 
policies are being debated intensely here 
and abroad. 

There are good reasons for both op- 
timistic and pessimistic views of today's 
Soviet Union. No one can doubt that 
there are very real changes. Many were 
unthinkable just a few years ago. The 
SS-20s are being destroyed. Soviet 
troops are leaving Afghanistan. Some 
political prisoners have been released. 
American doctors will soon visit psychi- 
atric hospitals where prisoners of con- 
science have been sent. Soviet history 
itself is sometimes subject to harsh scru- 
tiny. In others words, the slogans of 
glasnost and perestrulka are being given 
content. 

These are reasons to be hopeful. But 
realism requires us to be prudent. How- 
ever fascinating the twists and turns of 
perestroika may be, and however rivet- 
ing the details of Soviet decline as re- 
ported in Soviet newspapers, the Soviet 
Union remains a heavily armed super- 
power. The talk is different but the force 
structure and policies that support far- 
reaching interests and clients have not 
changed commensurately. Many of those 
policies and those clients are hostile to 
American values and threaten our inter- 
ests and our allies. That's a reality. 

Still, I would not underestimate the 
impact of Moscow's domestic troubles on 
Soviet foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism 
as a philosophy for a society must be in 
doubt when the system, after 70 years, 
produces declining health, shortages of 
food and consumer goods, and an obso- 
lete industrial base. The political 
changes now being made are themselves 
reflective of a continuing paradox: While 
the purpose of reform is ostensibly to 
prevent a recurrence of dictatorial 
abuse, the reform itself depends on the 
concentration of power in one man's 
hands. 

Meanwhile, the East European 
countries are in ferment as the ground 
rules of their own governments and their 
relations to the U.S.S.R. are rewritten. 
And the Baltic States and Armenia have 
reminded the world of ethnic dilemmas 



long suppressed by Stalinist methods. 
These situations too cannot be ignored' 
In light of both the change and cor 
tinuity in the Soviet Union, realistic 
American policy should be guided by 
these principles. 

First, we should continue to wel- 
come reform and changes in the Soviei 
Union that promise more freedom at 
home, in the workplace, in public instil 
tions. But we should never measure tb 
progress of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms \y\ 
how many credits, concessions, or ac- 
commodations we might make ostensil 
to help him succeed with his domestic 
plans. Ultimately, as the Soviets them 
selves acknowledge, pei-estroika depen 
not on help from outside but on politic; 
bureaucratic, and sociological changes 
the Soviet Union. 

Second, while recognizing that M 
cow's policies are informed by a new 
sense of realism, we should also under 
stand that our policies have contributt 
to that sense of realism. Our willingne 
to support the mujahidin — not only ec 
nomic dilemmas in the Soviet Union- 
helped bring about the Soviet with- 
drawal from Afghanistan. Our willing^ 
ness, with NATO, to deploy the Pershi 
and cruise missiles — not only food 
shortages — helped bring about the IN 
Treaty. Where we have not raised the 
cost of adventure or aggression, we S6 
little evidence of change. Can it be a c 
incidence that the only regional confli 
where we failed to bring consistent, e: 
fective pressure — in Central America 
we see little trace of new thinking in 
Soviet foreign policy? 

Third, we must continue to probe 
Moscow along every aspect of our 
agenda — arms control, human rights, 
gional conflicts, and bilateral relation 
We are interested in cooperating and 
gotiating to make progress wherever 
can be made. Arms control should en- 
compass conventional and chemical 
weapons and ballistic missile prolifer; 
tion, going beyond expressions of gem 
principles to practical details. And hu 
man rights means full compliance wit 
the Helsinki accords. There can be no 
laxation of our standards on this issue 

Fourth, we need additional focus 
the regional conflicts, whether in Cen 
tral America, South Asia, southern 
Africa, the Persian Gulf, or the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. Does the Soviet Unioi 
truly see a lowering of tension and nej 
tiations to be in its own interests? We 
should not allow the rhetoric of restra. 



14 



THE SECRETARY 



become a substitute foi- restraint it- 
f. iKir should we permit interest in 
'lomatic processes to be sufficient in 
' iihsence of a commitment to making 
ual progress. 

Fifth, we may need a new category 
iiur relations, to deal with global prob- 
is such as terrorism, drugs, and the 
, ironment. We ought to find out 
it her Moscow can be helpful on these 
.lies and if not, why not. 

1 am convinced that Western 
eiiLith and Soviet domestic weakness 
e set the stage for the remarkable re- 
asm that has distinguished Mr. Gor- 
^■hev's tenure so far Our task is to 
• aiige affairs so that whatever the out- 
iiie of pcrestroika, a more responsible, 
cistructive Soviet foreign policy will 
r lain in Moscow's interest. We look for- 
vi'd to such a policy, not only in dealing 
' li I lid issues but with the newer dan- 
, - and flashpoints that concern us. 

ill of the world's hope for a more 
^ ceful international order rests on the 
ei come. 

F solving Regional Conflicts 

1 a lit to turn to those very regional 
flicts that have denied peace and 
: '(lom to the peoples of southern Afri- 

Siiuth and Southeast Asia, and the 
A Idle East. We have made encouraging 
p gress in the recent agreement, medi- 
al :1 by the United States, that provides 
fi Namibian independence and a with- 
d wal of Cuban and South African 
ti ips from Angola. And we will be 
« ching carefully to be sure that Cuba 
d s carry out its obligations. But more 
iiMled. Angola desperately requires 
. eiial reconciliation. And until that 
I' irs, we shall continue to support 
L ITA [National Union for the Total 
Ii ependence of Angola] and its leader 
' IS Savimbi, as President-elect Bush 
indicated. Namibia will be a new and 
:ile state. In South Africa itself, the 
■~ses and strains that accompany the 
liable end of apartheid will provide 
\ei-e test for all involved. We must 
ik long and hard in this country 
lit our role and about the effects of 
actions — not on our own self-esteem 
I'll the people we want to help. Final- 
' e must also not forget the very real 
Kill and developmental needs of the 
pie throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 
In South Asia, we look forward to 
il withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
hanistan and that country's achieve- 
it of independent neutrality with a 
ei-iiment fully acceptable to the Af- 
11 people. And as tensions decrease in 
hanistan, we also hope to build on 



the more constructive relationship being 
forged now by the leaders of India and 
Pakistan. It is essential to improve ties 
with both Pakistan and India if we are to 
encourage this process. 

All nations in Southeast Asia and 
the international community as a whole 
should look forward to the withdrawal 
of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. 
There, too, a difficult national reconcilia- 
tion must be undertaken. The United 
States will continue to work for a new 
Cambodia, free of both Vietnamese occu- 
pation and the Khmer Rouge. 

Turning to the Middle East, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict has long engaged 
America's attention, resources, and good 
will. Our mediation has borne partial 
fruit in the Eqyptian-Israeli Peace Trea- 
ty, part of the Camp David accords for a 
comprehensive settlement. And our poli- 
cy in the Middle East has been truly bi- 
partisan. Every Administration has 
made its contribution. I was proud to be 
part of the Reagan team that e.xpanded 
our relationship with Israel into a true 
strategic alliance and that also met our 
responsibilities in the Persian Gulf. 

Now. President Reagan has autho- 
rized a dialogue with the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] after Yasir 
Arafat declared his organization's recog- 
nition of Israel's right to exist in peace, 
supported UN Resolutions 242 and 338, 
and renounced terrorism. Dialogues 
bring messages. And we are bringing a 
message to the PLO about terrorism and 
about the need for even more realism — 
realism that makes practical progress on 
the ground jjossible. But the existence of 
the dialogue should not lead anyone to 
misunderstand our overall policy or 
question our enduring support for the 
State of Israel. 

As President-elect Bush has de- 
scribed it, we have a solid consensus on 
the objectives and means of making 
peace between Israel and its Arab neigh- 
bors. These include the purpose of the 
negotiations, which is, above all, a just, 
enduring peace that ensures Israeli se- 
curity and satisfies the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinians. We advocate direct 
negotiations based on UN Resolutions 
242 and 338. which include the 
exchange of territory for peace. Real- 
istically, .Jordan must play a part in any 
agreement. The Palestinians must par- 
ticipate in the determination of their 
own future. We continue to believe, how- 
ever, that an independent Palestinian 
state will not be a source of stability or 
contribute to a just and enduring peace. 
These are sound principles and they 
should guide us. 



Today, the rocks are flying and the 
blood is flowing — bad blood — between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis in the 
areas under Israeli military administra- 
tion. We are determined to build upon 
the achievements of our predecessors in 
changing that situation, which must be 
the foundation of a secure peace. And 
we look forward to working with all the 
parties in the area to achieve it. 

A Middle East policy focused exclu- 
sively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
however, would be too limited. Libya 
continues to be a destabilizing factor 
in North Africa and elsewhere in the 
region. Lebanon remains a rebuke to 
everyone's hopes for a restoration of sta- 
bility and independence for that tragic 
country. A lasting peace remains to be 
established between Iran and Iraq. 
Meanwhile, the issues of chemical war- 
fare and ballistic missile proliferation 
compel our attention. We are going to be 
working with other nations to take the 
initiative on these issues. Surely the 
tragic experiences, the casualties, the 
victims of the Iran-Iraq war demand 
from the world and the region a more 
civilized order 

We are also going to be working 
with the United Nations on some of 
these regional conflicts. The United Na- 
tions should be seen for what it is, an e.x- 
pression of the world's desire for peace 
but also, too often, the scene of those 
passions that prevent peace. Experience 
indicates that when nations need chan- 
nels, when nations agree upon proce- 
dures, when they agree on much of the 
substance, the United Nations offers a 
valuable forum for making progress. We 
support that, and we support the United 
Nations. Yet in the final analysis, the 
United Nations can be neither a substi- 
tute for American leadership nor an 
excuse for a failure to try. 

Chemical Warfare and 
Technological Proliferation 

The final point I want to discuss today is 
the proliferation of new and dangerous 
weapons, often in states with a history 
of terrorism and aggression. Perhaps the 
most frightening is the combination of 
the ballistic missile, against which there 
is currently no defense, and chemical 
weapons, outlawed as a crime against 
civilization. Yet the fact remains that 
these weapons have been used. The in- 
ternational reaction to such use has not 
been strong enough or timely enough. 
Nations are now stockpiling these weap- 
ons. And too often those few countries 



Martment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



with the technical capacity to make these 
deadly chemicals have not been careful 
enough to prevent their proliferation. 
Weapons, of course, do not start 
wars. Conflicts, hatreds, ambitions, and 
sometimes accidents do start wars. 
Nonetheless, we must take special meas- 
ures to prevent the accumulation of 
weapons, which, by their very nature, 
would create fear and hair-trigger re- 
sponses. I know this concern to be very 
much on the mind of President-elect 
Bush, and we are determined to build on 
the recently concluded Paris conference 
and to make progress soon. 

Conclusion 

Clearly, we face a formidable agenda as 
we attempt to deal with the contraries of 
our age. Yet we start with the strong 
hand of a strong America. And we shall 
persist because we know that the stakes 
are very high. 

In a few years, we could know 
whether a lasting constructive relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union is possible. 
Whether the world economy will prog- 
ress. Whether our allies in Europe and 
Asia will look outward. Whether we can 
extend arms control and deterrence. 
Whether we can deal successfully with 
global problems like the environment, 



terrorism, and drugs. Whether we can 
create the new frameworks for the devel- 
oping countries to move forward free of 
the curse of regional conflicts. 

For me and for my generation, these 
are great prospects, but they are even 
greater for the ne.xt generation of Amer- 
icans. President-elect Bush spoke for us 
all when he said to a group of students at 
Westminister College, "We have lived 
our lives partly in the sunlight but al- 
ways in the shadow of struggle. . . . That 
struggle is not yet over." And then he 
told these young Americans, "Your gen- 
eration has an opportunity to emerge 
from that shadow and finally enjoy the 
sunlight without fear." 

I am certain that a realistic Ameri- 
can leadership can seize that oppor- 
tunity and usher in a more peaceful and 
prosperous era. It is the chance to lift 
the shadow of struggle and to leave a 
better world for America that motivates 
me. That is why I am here today to seek 
your support. Together, and under the 
leadership of our President, we can 
do it. 



'The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



The International Agenda and 
the FY 1990 Budget Request 



Secretary Baker's statement before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
01/ Februarij 21, 1989^ 

I am honored to appear before you as 
Secretary of State to discuss the main 
lines of our foreign policy and our fiscal 
year (FY) 1990 budget request in sup- 
port of that policy. 

In my confirmation hearing, I 
noted that America is vastly different 
from the country we knew even as re- 
cently as the beginning of this decade. 
Then American values and institutions 
were being questioned. Eight years 
of the Reagan era, however, have 
reaffirmed them. As a consequence, 
America today is a more vibrant and 
stronger nation. We have demonstrated 
once again that our form of government 
works and that progress is possible in a 
setting which encourages the creativity 
of the individual and respects his or her 
rights. 



Some of that vibi-ancy is reflected 
in international developments of our 
time. Our most powerful foe, the Soviet 
Union, so aggressive a decade ago, is 
undergoing a soul-searching of historic 
proportions. Democracy is continuing to 
take root and grow around the world on 
an impressive scale. Regional conflicts 
long thought to be intractable have be- 
gun moving toward resolution with the 
help of creative American diplomacy. 
And the international economy, driven 
by the longest American peacetime 
economic expansion on record, has 
provided new hope for progress. 

Still, while there is every reason 
to look to the future with optimism, it 
would be a serious mistake to assume 
that continued progress is assured. In 
my confirmation hearing, I enumerated 
five major transformations underway — 
the democratic revolution, the spread of 
free enterprise, major changes in the 
communist world, rapid changes in 



technology, and changing strategic- 
military relationships. There are trei < 
to be found in each case favorable to 
our interests. But there is and can b« 
no reason for complacency. Every on 
of these transformations holds withii 
a contrary trend that could set us ba . 

We could advance toward an in- 
creasingly democratic world, or, if fr - 
ile democracies fail, the cause of 
freedom could be set back. The intei- 
tional economy could continue to gr<i 
or the stresses of competition could 
lead to protectionism and rival tradii 
blocs — ultimately to the disadvantagi if 
all. A properly conceived approach b 
the Atlantic alliance could extend thi 
progress we have made with the Sov 
Union. Or through mistakes on eithe 
side of the Iron Curtain, this opporti - 
ity could be lost. Finally, new militai 
technologies could provide greater st 
bility at lower levels of forces. Or we 
could encounter a new and darker aj: 
if we cannot halt the spread of weapi ^ 
that put nations on a hair-trigger, \y< 
ticularly in politically unstable regio 

How should we approach this 
rapidly changing world? As a conser 
ative and a realist, I believe our poll 
must always be guided by the basic 
American principles to which I ad- 
here — freedom, democracy, equal 
rights, respect for human dignity, fa 
play. And I am convinced that we ca^ 
advance these values if we are resol' 
on two issues. 

The first is the necessity for Ar 
ican leadership. As the most powerf 
democracy, the largest economy, the 
wealthiest society with the greatest 
concentration of scientific talent, we 
are going to substantially affect the 
course of human events whether we 
so consciously or not. We can be a f( 
for freedom and peaceful change unl 
any other in this world. But if we fa 
to do so, we will not be able to run ( 
to hide from the consequences. 

Second, the executive and the C 
gress must approach foreign policy i 
the spirit of bipartisanship. This doe 
not mean that we will not have our ( 
ferences. Airing those differences in 
manner that respects the right of ot 
ers to disagree is a strong affirmatic 
of the democratic process. But event 
ally we must proceed, and when we 
it is best that we do so together if w 
are to achieve the national interest. 

Recent experience affirms this 
lesson. When we held the line togetl 
on Afghanistan, for example, and 
throughout the INF [intermediate- 



16 



Department of State Bulletin/April I'S 



THE SECRETARY 



nge nuclear forces] negotiations, we 
cceeded. When we did not, as in Cen- 
il America, the outcome was un- 
tisfactory to everyone. 

In the course of my confirmation 
itimony, I said that trust, consulta- 
in, and consistency were essential to 
partisanship. Surely the crucial out- 
me of that process is a decision to go 
ward, not only with united purpose 
t also with sufficient resources. To 
t it plainly, we must put our money 
ere our mouths are. 

That is the context in which we 
3uld discuss the international affairs 
iding request. Over the past several 
irs, we have all come to recognize 

facts: first, discretionary budget 
;hority for international affairs, has 
ually declined from a high of $26.3 
lion in 1985 to about $18.3 billion in 
59. As a percentage of GNP [gross 
ional product], economic assistance 
clays during 1989 will be at an all- 
16 low, less than three-tenths of 1%. 
}ond, the existing efforts are ham- 
•ed increasingly by reporting re- 
rements, earmarks, and restrictions, 
at the very time when we all agree 
the importance of American lead- 
hip, when we all agree that we face 
■apidly changing world, we have to 
erse the trend toward less flexibility 
management of foreign assistance. 

With this in mind, I welcome the 
ort of the committee's T^sk Force on 
•eign Assistance. I am sui-e the com- 
■tee will understand that we have not 

fully reviewed all of the report's 
ommendations, but on the whole it's 
«ry good piece of work. We do need 
nange in the system, to make it 
re flexible, moi'e accountable, and, 
've all, more effective. We look for- 
•d to working with the Congress in 
ping legislation that best serves 

vital national interests. 

Armed then with the conviction of 
lerican leadership and the practice 
)ipartisanship, let us together — the 
cutive and the Congress — tackle 

formidable agenda before us. 

J International Agenda: 
'? Americas 

|st on that agenda is our neigh- 
Ihood — the countries of our hemi- 
tere. We share with Canada a border 
ending over 5,000 miles. And while 
have our differences from time to 
e, as all nations do, that border has 
g facilitated peaceful contact be- 
ien peoples sharing similar values 

1 outlook, as well as commerce on 
enormous and growing scale. 



Recently, working with Canada, we 
achieved a Free Ti-ade Agreement. In 
my view, the agreement is in our mu- 
tual interest. Moreover, by showing 
how free trade policies can catalyze bi- 
partisan coalitions and turn back the 
forces of protectionism, it also repre- 
sents a signal success in a strategy de- 
signed to move all nations toward a 
more open trading system. And we look 
forward to working with Canada on 
other important issues, including inter- 
national environmental problems, as we 
extend the range of our cooperation. 

To the south, we have equally sig- 
nificant issues to consider. Our neigh- 
bor Mexico is deeply in debt and faces 



As the most powerful 
democracy, the largest 
economy, the wealthiest 
society with the greatest 
concentration of scientific 
talent, we are going to 
substantially affect the 
course of human events 
whether we do so 
consciously or not. 



serious challenges to its social fabric. 
But Mexico also has many assets — the 
capabilities of its people and its signifi- 
cant natural resources. The Mexican 
Government, led by President Salinas, 
is taking the difficult road of economic 
and political reforms. We are deter- 
mined to help. 

I'd like to reiterate the suggestion 
I made in my confirmation hearing. In 
1992, we wili celebrate the 500th an- 
niversary of Columbus' voyage of dis- 
covery. Let's mark that event now by 
embarking on a voyage of rediscovery of 
the Caribbean and of South America. 
Our neighbors are engaged in a quest 
for greater freedom and economic pro- 
gress. We share many of their inter- 
ests. And together we also face the 
scourge of drugs. Now is the time to 
take a fresh look at these problems. 

In Central America, we have had 
nearly 10 years of frustrating and some- 
times contradictory American policies. 



Still, there have been some successes. 
Most Central American nations are 
more democratic and respectful of hu- 
man rights than they were. Still, the 
overwhelming blemish remains: the 
terrible draining conflict between Nic- 
aragua and its neighbors and between 
the Nicaraguan Marxists and their own 
people, some of whom have taken up 
arms and merited American support. 

In 1987, the governments of Cen- 
tral America signed the agreement 
known as Esquipulas II. Later the 
Sandinistas and the democratic resist- 
ance concluded the Sapoa agreement. 
The principles embodied in Esquipulas 
and Sapoa are good. They are right. 
Together Esquipulas and Sapoa con- 
stitute a good platform for peace. 
What's lacking is a mechanism for en- 
forcement to translate these principles 
into reality. 

We need to establish timelines for 
performance. We must be able to deter- 
mine compliance. And we have to de- 
velop incentives and disincentives to 
improve the prospects for such compli- 
ance in the first place. 

A unified bipartisan approach in 
this country is essential to achieve our 
objectives. Such an approach will cer- 
tainly increase our leverage. Working 
with the Central America democracies, 
key friends in South America, and our 
allies in the European Community, I'm 
confident we can build the pressure on 
the Sandinistas to live up, finally, to the 
promises they've made. We will not 
abandon the democratic resistance as 
we give diplomacy a chance. 

Transformation of Our 
Allies and Friends 

Let me move now from our neigh- 
borhood to the broader world of our 
friends and allies. The United States 
links together two highly dynamic, ad- 
vanced regions — Western Europe and 
the Pacific. We are at once an Atlantic 
and a Pacific power, and there should 
not be any thought to expand one rela- 
tionship at the expense of the other. 

Our friends and allies in both re- 
gions are experiencing great changes. 
Western Europe today is a far cry from 
the exhausted continent which emerged 
from World War II. On the basis of our 
just-completed trip, I believe that we 
are beginning to develop a new appre- 
ciation on our side and theirs of how 
we can adapt to these changes and to 
a different world. 

I found a great consensus, at least 
in general terms, on how we should 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



deal with a changing Soviet Union. I 
found a recognition that we will need a 
common approach to the new military 
facts 

created by the INF Ti-eaty — the need 
to refine a comprehensive concept on 
security, modernization, and arms con- 
trol. That concept must also develop a 
better basis for sharing responsibilities. 

We also talked on my trip about 
how we, the United States and its West 
European friends, can work better to 
respond to the enormous economic 
changes which are taking place in the 
Atlantic region. In only 3 years, the 
[European] Common Market will 
achieve the objective of the 1957 treaty 
of Rome which established it — a single 
market. I emphasized that the new 
Europe — this rising economic super- 
power — must be outward and not in- 
ward looking. I noted also that as an 
ally and a major trading partner, the 
United States will take a keen interest 
in this transformation. 

Turning to the Pacific rim, we find 
a striking success already in the mak- 
ing. No other area has created such ad- 
vanced economies in such a short time. 

Our relations with the Pacific — as 
with Europe and our own continent — 
must emphasize outward-looking eco- 
nomic policies that promote trade and 
growth. I do not underestimate the 
challenge in Asia, or in other regions, 
of achieving free and fair trade. After 
nearly a decade when the American 
economy has driven international 
growth, we all face a changing world. 
The rule that success brings responsi- 
bility will find a fuller e.xpression as the 
Pacific nations assume more important 
economic and political roles. 

We have vital political and strategic 
interests in the Pacific as well. These 
interests are well-served by military 
capabilities based in Japan, the Philip- 
pines, and Korea — and by our close co- 
operation with these nations. We must 
enhance that cooperation while shoul- 
dering common defense and develop- 
ment responsibilities. 

Our relationship with the People's 
Republic of China, important in its own 
right, also contributes strongly to the 
overall stability of the international po- 
litical order President Bush's exten- 
sive, personal experience in China will 
facilitate the expansion of our impor- 
tant and multifaceted ties. I know he 
and I are looking forward to our visit 
to Beijing next week. 



Transnational Issues 

The future of our civilization also de- 
mands that we act in concert to deal 
with new transnational issues. Tech- 
nological advances have brought enor- 
mous benefits. But at the same time, 
modern technology has created new 
complications. The old scourge of 
terrorism, for example, has taken 
on a new significance because of in- 
stantaneous communications and the 
development of powerful plastic explo- 
sives. Missile technology has magnified 
the destructive power and geographical 
reach of small groups determined to 
achieve their purposes by whatever 
means necessary. The drug traffickers 
have benefited from transportation and 
communications lines that often rival 
those of government. 

It is increasingly evident that we 
face serious challenges to the health of 
our environment, and President Bush 
has called for an international confer- 
ence on global environmental issues. I 
believe the United States must lead 
this effort. We should foster a change 
of attitude, a recognition that economic 



The rule that success 
brings responsibility will 
find a fuller expression 
as the Pacific nations 
assume more important 
economic and political 
roles. 



development and a secure environment 
are both necessary. They go together 
As Ti-easury Secretary, I pressed the 
multilateral development banks to fos- 
ter conservationally sound, sustained 
development and to initiate special pro- 
grams to promote conservation in devel- 
ojjing countries. As Secretary of State, 
1 hope to build on this i-ecord. 

No one has yet perfected the ap- 
proaches to joint action we need to deal 
with this special range of global prob- 
lems. But the stakes are too high for us 
to ignore them. We will begin with our 
allies, include our friends, and chal- 
lenge our adversaries to make common 
cause in treating these issues. For im- 
plementing policies and programs, we 
will continue to rely heavily, although 



Ill 
lit 



by no means exclusively, on the Uni: 
Nations and its specialized agencies, 
which are contributing importantly I 
resolving many of the world's shared 
problems. u 

East-West Relations 

Thanks to our policy of pursuing pea 
through strength, our dealings with 
Soviet Union are less tense. We hav( 
made progress in arms control — esp( 
cially the INF Ti-eaty — human rights 
bilateral ties, including a dramatic e: 
pansion in academic and cultural ex- 
changes, and regional conflicts. We i 
pleased that Soviet troops have left 
Afghanistan on schedule. And we ha 
reason to be optimistic that, in the r 
too distant future, Cuban troops will 
withdrawn from Angola in conjunct!' 
with South Africa's departure from 
Namibia. We also look forward to th. 
day when Vietnamese troops leave 
Cambodia. 

Thei-e are good reasons for both 
optimism and pessimism about the £ 
viet Union. No one can doubt that ft 
ment is underway and that there ha' 
been important changes in the past : 
years. The SS-20s are being destroy. 
Soviet troops have left Afghanistan. 
Some political prisoners have been r 
leased. And a new, more constructiv 
Soviet approach to regional conflicts 
Southern Africa and Southeast Asia 
holds out the promise that regional 
problems in those troubled areas ma 
be on their way to resolution. 

These are reasons to be hopeful 
But realism requires us to be prude: 
The jury is still out on whether the 
process of reform will succeed. The 
Soviet Union remains a heavily armt 
superpower While its rhetoric is 
different, the force structure and po 
icies that support far-reaching inten 
and clients have not yet changed cor 
mensurately. Perhaps they will, but 
that hasn't happened, not yet. 

In light of both the change and 
continuity in the Soviet Union, realis 
policy for America and its allies shoi 
be guided by these principles. 

First, we should continue to we 
come and encourage reform in the 
Soviet Union that promises more fn 
dom. But we should never measure 
progress of Mr Gorbachev's [Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev] reforr 
by how many credits, concessions, o 
accommodations we might make osti 
sibly to help him succeed with his d( 
mestie plans. Perestroika depends m 



18 



Department of State Bulletin/April 15 



THE SECRETARY 



help troni outside but on changes in 
I Soviet Union itself. That's a lesson 
rbachev learned from Brezhnevs 
lures. We should learn it as well. 

Second, while recognizing that 
)SCOw's policies are informed by a 
w sense of realism, we should also 
derstand that our policies have con- 
buted to that sense of realism. Our 
jport for the DiKJaliidhi helped bring 
DUt the Soviet withdrawal from 
ghanistan. NATO's willingness to de- 
ly the Pershing and cruise missiles 
Iped bring about the INF Treaty. 

Third, we must continue to probe, 
n challenge, Moscow along every as- 
:t of our agenda — arms control, hu- 
in rights, regional conflicts, bilateral 
ations, and transnational or global is- 
js. We are interested in cooperating 
i negotiating to make progress wher- 
;r it can be made. We are also inter- 
led in seeing the "new thinking" 
oiled in practice, not just in slogans. 

Fourth, we need additional focus 
regional ]3roblems. whether in Cen- 
|1 America, South Asia, the Horn of 
'rica. South Africa, the Persian Gulf, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet re- 
msiveness in these areas may be one 
;he best indications of real change in 
net behavior. 

I am convinced that Western 
■ength and Soviet domestic weakness 
fe set the stage for the remarkable 
lism that has distinguished Mr. Goi'- 
hev's tenure so far. As I discussed 
h our allies, we need to challenge 

Soviets with new, well-considered 
:iatives in all aspects of our e.xpand- 

agenda. Our task is to arrange af- 
•s so that whatever the outcome of 
estroika, a more responsible, con- 
uctive Soviet foreign policy will re- 
in in Moscow's interest. Much of the 
rld's hope for a more peaceful inter- 
ional order rests on the outcome. 



solving Regional Conflicts 

'ant to turn now to those regional 
iflicts that have denied peace and 
edom to the peoples of Africa, South 
1 Southeast Asia, and the Middle 
St. We have made encouraging pi'og- 
s in the recent agreement, medi- 
d by the United States, that pro- 
es for Namibian independence and a 
hdrawal of Cuban and South African 
ops from Angola. And we will be 
tching carefully to be sure that Cuba 
1 South Africa carry out their obliga- 
ns. But more is needed. Angola 
^perately requires national reconcilia- 
n. Until that occurs we shall con- 



tinue to support UNITA [National 
Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola] and its leader Jonas Savimbi. 

To this end, we should be prepared 
to pay our fair share of UN peacekeep- 
ing efforts, not only in Angola and 
Namibia but throughout the world. The 
Bush Administration, following the ini- 
tiative of our predecessor, will propose 



We should foster a change 
of attitude, a recognition 
that economic develop- 
ment and a secure 
environment are both 
necessary. 



a one-time transfer of Department of 
Defense and foreign aid funds to meet 
our peacekeeping requirements 
in the current year. 

We must also think long and hard 
about how we can help best to end 
apartheid in South Africa. And we 
must never forget the very real human 
and developmental needs of people 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 

In South Asia, we welcome the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan and look forward to that 
country's achievement of an indepen- 
dent and nonaligned government fully 
acceptable to the Afghan people. 

The international community looks 
forward to the withdrawal of Viet- 
namese forces from Cambodia. There, 
too, a difficult national reconciliation 
must be undertaken. The United States 
will continue to work for an indepen- 
dent Cambodia, free of both Viet- 
namese occupation and the Khmer 
Rouge. 

'in the Middle East, the Arab- 
Israeli conflict has long engaged Amer- 
ica's attention, resources, and good 
will. Our mediation bore partial fruit in 
the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Ti-eaty. But 
the task of fashioning a comprehensive 
settlement remains. Israel and its Arab 
neighbors must be at the center of the 
negotiating process. As always, we 
stand ready to help. 

The purpose of negotiations is a 
just, enduring peace that ensures Isra- 
eli security and satisfies the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians. Toward that 



end, we advocate direct negotiations 
based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. 
Realistically, .Jordan must play a part in 
any agreement. And the Palestinians 
must participate in determining their 
own future. We continue to believe, 
how-ever, that an independent Palesti- 
nian state will not be a source of sta- 
bility or contribute to a just and 
enduring peace. 

A Middle East policy focused ex- 
clusively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
however, would be too limited. Libya 
continues to be a destabilizing factor in 
North Africa and elsewhere in the re- 
gion. The situation in Lebanon remains 
a rebuke to everyone's hopes for a res- 
toration of stability and independence 
for that tragic country. And a lasting 
peace remains to be established be- 
tween Iran and Iraq. 

We will continue working with 
other nations on these issues. We will 
also work with the United Nations on 
some of these regional conflicts. The 
United Nations should be seen for what 
it is, an expression of the world's desire 
for peace and also, too often, the scene 
of those passions that prevent peace. 
Experience indicates that when nations 
agree on procedures and substance, the 
United Nations offers a valuable forum 
for making progress. 

Chemical Warfare and 
Other Weapons Proliferation 

Proliferation of new and dangerous 
weapons, often to states with a history 
of terrorism and aggression, is of grow- 
ing concern to the international commu- 
nity. And for good reason. Perhaps 
most frightening is the combination of 
the ballistic missile and chemical weap- 
ons. Although outlawed as a crime 
against civilization, chemical weapons 
have been used. 

Weapons, of course, do not start 
wars. Nonetheless, we must take spe- 
cial measures to prevent the accumula- 
tion of weapons, which, by their very 
nature, create fear and threaten hair- 
trigger responses. We are determined 
to build on the recently concluded Paris 
conference and to make progress soon. 

Overview of Our 
Funding Request 

Clearly, we face a formidable agenda as 
we attempt to deal with the contraries 
of our age. Yet we start with a strong 
America. And we can be stronger still 
if we work together to overcome the 
challenges before us. 



Ijjsartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



That requires our collective wisdom 
and skill, but it also requires resources 
and the flexibility to use them where 
they are most needed. I'd like to give 
you the highlights of our funding re- 
quest for FY 1990. I would only caution 
that pending the completion of the 
National Security Council review of 
foreign policy and national security 
challenges, individual account adjust- 
ments may be recommended; however, 
in aggregate, the budget levels will 
remain the same. 

For budget function 1.50 — interna- 
tional affairs — we are asking $19.3 bil- 
lion in discretionary spending authority, 
with the levels of the Export-Import 
Bank to be determined as negotiations 
with the Congress on the freeze cate- 
gory proceed. This $19.3 billion is an 
increase of $1.7 billion, or W7c, over 
what Congress appropriated in FY 
1989, but in real terms, it's less than 
what we received in FY 1985, 1986, and 
1987. International affairs spending 
takes less than 2% of the total Federal 
budget. So in submitting these figures, 
if I may understate the case, we do not 
feel we are imposing an unreasonable 
burden on the resources of the Ameri- 
can people. Quite the contrary. We are 
asking for an investment to secure our 
vital national interests and a peaceful 
future. 

Our request has two major compo- 
nents. First, our aid program which in- 
cludes both bilateral and multilateral 
foreign assistance. The $14.6 billion in 
discretionary funds we are seeking un- 
der this heading help our friends and 
aUies. But, first and foremost, they 
serve America's own interests abroad. 
Of that amount: 

• $5.3 billion, or 36%, will be pro- 
vided to Israel and Egypt, to sustain 
our commitment to their security; 

• $1.8 billion, or 12%, will be pro- 
vided to four countries in which the 
United States enjoys base rights — Por- 
tugal, Greece, Turkey, and the Philip- 
pines — in fulfillment of "best efforts" 
and pledges we made when our base 
rights agreements were negotiated; 

• $1.1 billion, or 7%, will fund pro- 
grams to key regional friends in the 
Middle East, Africa, and East Asia- 
Pakistan, Thailand, Kenya, Somalia, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Oman, and Morocco — 
some of which now provide, or are 
pledged to provide when needed, access 
to strategic base facilities to U.S. 
forces; 



• Just over .$900 million, or 6%, 
will support our efforts to foster peace, 
democracy, and development in Central 
America; 

• Just over $150 million will be pro- 
vided in economic and military aid to 
the four Andean democracies — Colom- 
bia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia — whose 
social fabric and democratic institutions 
are threatened by the growing power of 
narcotics traffickers; 

• An additional $800 million would 
provide humanitarian and develop- 
mental aid to countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, not mentioned earlier, and fund 
small-scale but critical military aid pro- 
grams in the region; and 

• $900 million, representing 6% of 
the total foreign assistance request, 
would support other bilateral programs 
in the Caribbean, South and East Asia, 
and around the globe. 

Our foreign assistance funding re- 
quest also includes $1.6 billion for the 
multilateral development banks, cover- 
ing U.S. contributions to the World 
Bank, its affiliates, and the regional de- 
velopment banks. This amount would 
honor current U.S. commitments to 
these institutions of about $1.3 billion 
and clear $314 million in arrears. 

The remainder of our request, 
some .$2 billion, or 14% of the total, 
provides funding for the Peace Corps, 
for voluntary contributions to such in- 
ternational organizations as the UN 
Development Program and UNICEF 
[UN Children's Fimd] and for such 
items as AID [Agency for International 
Development] operating expenses, refu- 
gee assistance programs, and interna- 
tional narcotics control. 

We expect to transmit to the Con- 
gress shortly the Administration's pro- 
posed foreign assistance authorization 
bill as well as the State Department 
authorization bill for FY 1990. In addi- 
tion to authorizing funding levels, the 
foreign assistance bill will propose 
some substantive changes in the legisla- 
tion governing our assistance programs, 
including some initiatives to allow 
scarce security assistance dollars to 
be stretched further than allowed by 
curi-ent law. 

I would also note that, as in pre- 
vious years, we are seeking in our bud- 
get request to maintain the relative 
proportion of economic assistance (65%) 
to military aid (35%). 

Let me add a few more details on 
both economic and military assistance. 

I'd like to point out that in Central 
America and the Caribbean, democratic 



111 
1(1 



institutions are taking root in countrJ^ 
where just a few years ago many de- 
spaired of that ever happening. Thess 
new democracies desperately need ou 
help. President Reagan's Caribbean 
Basin Initiative and the National Bip; 
tisan Commission on Central Americ; 
provide comprehensive strategies for 
advancing the important process of 
democratic institution-building. TheS' 
strategies have earned strong bipar- 
tisan support. The Bush Administrat 
believes it essential to continue this 
effort. For FY 1990, we are requestin 
$735 million in economic assistance fc 
Central America and $206 million for 
the Caribbean. We are also seeking 
$157 million for the Andean countries- 
Now on the security side, I woul 
like to note these changes. 

For FY 1990, our total request fc 
discretionary security assistance fum- 
ing (MAP [military assistance pro- 
gram], FMS [foreign military sales], 
ESF [economic support funds], IME' 
[international military education and 
training], antiterrorism assistance, a 
peacekeeping operations) is $8.5 billii 
That compares with $8.1 billion appn 
priated by the Congress for FY 1988 
and again for FY 1989. 

Despite this increase, the securit 
assistance total is less than the level 
appropriated in FY 1987. The cuts fr 
the levels provided in FY 1985 and li 
are even deeper. 

For the first time, we are not 
seeking an allocation of MAP funds f 
specific country programs. Instead, ' 
are combining "the MAP and FMS pr 
grams and requesting that the total- 
approximately $5 billion— be provide- 
in the form of forgiven FMS credits, 
that is to say, grants. Use of FMS in 
lieu of MAP will enable countries ca{ 
ble of doing so to apply defense as- 
sistance to commercial purchases. Th 
all-grant program initiative is part ol 
our effort to strengthen new, fragile 
mocracies and ease the financial burc 
of countries whose economic health ii 
vital to our own. 

The second part of our overall re 
quest finances the operations of the 
Department of State, USIA [United 
States Information Agency], the Boa 
of International Broadcasting, and 
other smaller foreign affairs agencies 
We are seeking $4.6 billion for these 
purposes. 

These funds will enable us to cor 
duct diplomatic and consular operatic 
in our increasingly complex world. Ir 
the administration of foreign affairs a 
count, we provide for salaries and ex- 



20 



Department of State Bulletin/April 1!| 



THE SECRETARY 



nses, a vital component in an agency 
lich depends so much on its people at 
me and around the world. We also 
e these funds to provide for the se- 
rity of our people, facihties, and op- 
itions. They also allow us to acquire 
d maintain our buildings abroad. 

Out of this sum, we will also pay 
r assessed contributions to the 
lited Nations and other international 
Tanizations ($715 million), peacekeep- 
r activities ($111 million), and U.S. 
rticipation in multilateral interna- 
nal conferences ($6 million). We must 
y what we owe to these institutions 
ive are to play our full role. Congres- 
inal approval of the full amount 
juested would enable us to pay 
5 million of prior year arrearages, 
lese funds would be directed toward 
ecial activities that are mutually 
reed upon by the United States and 
! respective international organiza- 
ns. Payment would be conditioned 
on such arrangements. 

(nclusion: 

I e Need for Change 

I I me conclude by returning to one 
11 y earlier themes on the need for 

c iHge, a need also emphasized by the 
1 ;k Force on Foreign Assistance. It is 
c ir to me that we will need new legis- 
i on so that the executive branch will 
i 'e the latitude to manage effectively 
t limited resources at our disposal. I 
a 'ee with the task force's conclusion, 
a 1 I quote, "The current 500 pages of 
f ?ign assistance legislation, developed 
-0 r the past 28 years, are strewn with 
olete, ambiguous and contradictory 
f icies, restrictions and conditions." 

One e.xample will suffice of how the 
rent systems deprives us of the 
f cibility to respond intelligently to 
e nts. In FY 1989, for example", Con- 
a ss cut our combined MAP, ESF, and 
F .S request by $210 million, or 4%. 
I L because most of the funds in these 
a ounts were earmarked for specific 
c ntry programs at or above the levels 
« requested, we had to cut security 
■iance programs in such coun- 
- as Jordan, Indonesia, Thailand, 
i:;swana, Zaire, Belize, and the Do- 
n lican Republic by between 44% and 
9f. Additionally, legislation forced 
uto cut assistance to Turkey, an im- 
B'tant NATO ally, by a whopping 
?' million. 

If we are given the needed flexibil- 
then the levels in our FY 1990 bud- 
lequest will enable us to fund, on a 



modest scale, these and other programs 
we have had to curtail sharply in recent 
years. In my view, this is essential. No 
foreign policy, however intelligent, can 
be meaningful without the resources to 
do the job. That is what we are asking 
for here today. 



'Press release 31. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



Secretary's Interview 
on "Meet the Press" 



Secretary Baker was interviewed 
oti NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on 
February 19, 1989, by Garrick Utley, 
NBC News; Karen Elliot House, The 
Wall Street Journal; aud John Dancy, 
NBC's chief diplomatic corre- 
spondents 

Q. While you were in Europe, a big 
event occurred in Central America. 
The five Central American 
Presidents met, they reached an 
agreement which will lead to sup- 
posedly free elections in Nicaragua, 
the disarming and disbanding and 
disbursing of the contras based in 
Honduras, which were the key to the 
Reagan Nicaraguan policy. Our re- 
sponse has been rather silent. Are we 
for it or against it — that agreement? 

A. I think we're for parts of it. But 
with respect to that part that talks 
about disbanding the contras, we really 
need to see what the fine print is. The 
agreement doesn't even contain the fine 
print yet. What it was was a commit- 
ment to develop a plan with respect to 
the contras. 

There are some elements of the 
agreement that look promising — the idea 
of democratization in Nicaragua, the 
idea of noninterference by Nicaragua in 
the affairs of its neighbors. But, of 
course, these are promises that Nicara- 
gua has made before, so the key here 
will be in the implementation. 

We think that there needs to be, as 
we've said before with respect to the 
Esquipulas II and the Sapoa accords, 
some sort of an enforcement mechanism 
to make sure that the Sandinistas keep 
the promises they've already made. 



Q. But are you saying that the 
United States is not prepared to allow 
the disbanding of the contras as of 
now? And does that mean that you 
would want to seek some kind of fund- 
ing from Congress — the so-called hu- 
manitarian aid — to keep them going? 

A. I think we have, at the very 
least, a moral obligation to seek human- 
itarian aid for the contras when it 
expires on March 31, and I believe Presi- 
dent Bush has already indicated that he 
would be doing so. 

Q. That continues despite this 
agreement? 

A. Yes — and should. 

Q. Some people have said that 
you were surprised by what happened 
in Central America. It happened 
while you were in Europe. Melvin 
Laird, former Defense Secretary, said 
you shouldn't have gone to Europe; 
you should have been here "minding 
the store," concentrating on Central 
America, that you haven't even yel 
formally named an assistant secre- 
tary for Latin American affairs. How 
do you respond to that? 

A. We have picked an assistant sec- 
retary for Latin American affairs. 

I'd respond to that by telling you 
that I've been getting free advice from 
Mel since the Ford-Carter campaign 
back in 1976. I got a fair amount of it as 
Chief of Staff of the White House from 
Mel and as Secretary of the Treasury, 
and it's been worth what I've paid for it. 

Q. You did get an opportunity, 
obviously, to hear from the Eu- 
ropeans. Is it possible to modernize 
the nuclear forces in Europe and re- 
tain Germany as an ally? 

A. I think it is. This is a matter, of 
course, that we will be working very 
closely with the Germans on between 
now and the time of a possible NATO 
summit toward the end of May. It's really 
not a U.S. -Germany issue; it's an alli- 
ance issue. And one of the purposes of 
this trip, of course, was to e.xplore issues 
such as this with all of our alliance part- 
ners, and we did so. And we will be 
working this particular issue in close 
consultation with them leading up to the 
NATO summit. 

Q. But do you really find all the 
other Europeans as reluctant as the 
Germans to do what we have agreed 
needs to be done for alliance defense? 

A. I find all of our alliance partners 
committed to certain principles — the 
principle of flexible response, the princi- 
ple of forward defense, the principle of 



Cpartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



nucleai- coupling, and so forth, which, of 
course, are the keys to our position on 
this issue. 

I also find them committed to the 
idea of completing the so-called compre- 
hensive concept, which will contain 
both a security and an arms control 
element — completing it by the time of 
the NATO summit. So this is a matter 
that we have to continue to work out. 
There are going to be views on both 
sides; in fact, we have alliance partners 
who see it differently right now. 

Q. But do you feel that you came 
away from this trip and your visit 
with Helmut Kohl with an iron-clad 
commitment from Kohl to go ahead 
with modernization? 

A. No. But I didn't go into the trip 
seeking an iron-clad commitment from 
the Chancellor to do that. That was not 
the purpose of the trip. As I've said be- 
fore, it was not a decision-taking trip: it 
was more or less an agenda-setting trip. 
I was there to listen and to learn — and I 
did. And so that was not the purpose of 
the trip. 

Q. But he expressed commitment 
to a 1988 communique by the NATO 
allies which envisions modernizing 
the nuclear weapons that are there as 
necessary. Did you take that to be a 
commitment to modernize? 

A. He restated — we, I suppose, 
jointly restated — the commitment of the 
1988 Brussels communique, which ba- 
sically says that we must keep these 
short-range nuclear forces up to date. I 
have to say one other thing: I found no 
one, during the course of this trip, who 
thought that we should have moved to- 
ward some sort of a third "zero option," 
who did not feel that we should maintain 
a land-based nuclear missile in Europe. 

Q. I think what John is getting at 
is, what is your attitude toward Hel- 
mut Kohl and the West (iermans right 
now? Are you satisfied with his, with 
their, position on this very delicate 
issue? 

A. Oh, yes, because we understand 
the delicateness of the issue from their 
standpoint. We certainly do. And, as I 
think I mentioned during the course of 
our trip back, to John who was on the 
airplane, there has, I think, been far too 
much emphasis on a disagreement here 
between the United States and the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany. There is no 
disagreement. We're going to work this 
out. We have our view. We've got to give 
the Congress certain assurances if we 
want to go forward with this program. I 



think probably that we'll be able to work 
this out satisfactorily between now and 
the end of May. 

Q. Does that mean that you have 
now accepted 1991 or 1992 as a date for 
deploying these modernized Lance 
missiles? 

A. No, it doesn't mean that at all. It 
means we will continue to e.xplore this 
issue, work this issue in close consulta- 
tion with the Germans and our other al- 
liance partners. 

Q. Can I just ask on the Germans 
here for a minute? Chancellor Kohl 
seems to be saying, "My political 
problems are so difficult that if you 
push me too much, you will wind up 
with an alternative you'll like even 
less after the next German election." 

Are we also going to go quietly, or 
drop the chemical weapons issue with 
Libya? I mean, do the Germans pay 
no price for knowingly helping Libya 
produce a chemical weapons plant? 

A. The Germans have responded 
quite fully to our concerns about support 
for that plant by some of their compa- 
nies. What they've done is substantially 
tighten their export control laws; they 
have substantially increased the penal- 
ties that their companies will pay for any 
such future activity. I really believe that 
they have acted and acted forcefully and 
firmly. 

You might say that they should have 
done it a little earlier: maybe you can 
make that argument. But we're pleased 
with what they've done. 

Q. Let's turn to the Middle East 
right now. The Reagan Administra- 
tion opened the door to contacts/talks 
between the United States and Yasir 
Arafat and the PLO [Palestine Liber- 
ation Organization]. In your time in 
office, do you think that the PLO has 
been living up to its side of the agree- 
ment? Are they showing good faith, 
in your eyes? 

A. So far, we have had one incident 
which some are inclined to argue consti- 
tuted an endorsement, if you will, or a 
return to terrorism by the PLO — 

Q. Israel made that complaint. 

A. — an incident in southern 
Lebanon, yes — and suggested that some- 
how we should break off the dialogue. 
That was not our conclusion. We did, 
however, go to the PLO through our Am- 
bassador in Tunis and say, "Look here, 
now. These kinds of things cannot con- 
tinue if you want to continue this dia- 
logue with the United States." 



Q. You put them on warning. 

A. We put them on warning befoi 
we even began the dialogue with them 
because we made it clear to them that 
were not going to have a dialogue unle: 
they renounced terrorism by actions ai 
by words. 

Q. Clearly you have a dialogue 
with the PLO, and your Soviet coun 
terpart is getting his own dialogue 
with everyone in the Middle East nc 
on a trip. Is the Middle East an are; 
that needs to incubate further befoi 
you actually go in and try to solve tl 
problem? Or is it one that, if it incu 
bates further, blows up? 

A. I don't think it's one that if it i 
cubates further, it blows up. I hope noi 
because I think that if you had to bal- 
ance risks here, the risk would be gre 
er in taking precipitous action than it 
would in waiting awhile, analyzing the 
situation, working on the ground 
carefully — tilling the ground — and rrn 
ing sure that when you do go in there, 
you have some reasonable prospect of 
success. 

And this is the message, if I may 
say so, that we have given our alliance 
partners. We have said, in effect, "Loc 
we understand the importance of U.S. 
involvement if we are ever to achieve 
peace in the Middle East." We under- 
stand that. But we're not sure that thf 
process is best served by a big, high- 
level, high-visibility international coni 
ence begun too early. We think that 
there ought to be some quiet consulta- 
tion done before we ever get close to 
that. 

Q. Is Yasir Arafat conducting i 
direct talks with the Israelis throuji 
Palestinians through European 
diplomats? 

A. I have no knowledge of that. 

Q. This past week there was a 1 
of attention focused on you because 
your decision, finally, to sell a largt 
amount of stock that you hold in 
Chemical Bank, which grew out of 
former bank holdings you had in 
Texas — some controversy because y 
were holding that stock when you 
were Secretary of the Treasury, ant 
of course, banks were very heavily i 
volved in Third World debt question 

Even though you say you had yo 
attorney's advice that this was lega 
do you think it had the appearance 
a conflict of interest? 

A. I don't think so. With 90-90 
hindsight, you might argue that. But I 
me make sure vou understand, first of 



22 



THE SECRETARY 



1, I am not just selling my Chemical 
ock: I'm giving directions to my trust- 
! to sell any publicly traded stocks I 
)ld so that there can be no possible such 
)pearances in the future. So I really 
slieve I'm going beyond what's required 
id what has been recommended. 

Further, I set up a blind trust when 
eame into government in 1981. For 6'/2 
iars, the clear cut rule was that gov- 
■nment officials were entitled to partici- 
ite in broad policy matters that might 
feet everybody, or everybody in a par- 
;ular industry. And, accordingly, I par- 
;ipated in a whole range of things at 
e White House and at the Treasury. 

Q. But President Bush has made 
hies a top priority issue — highly 
sible. His counsel in the White 
ouse, €. Gordon Gray, has been re- 
lonsible for executing that. Has he 
ten doing a good job, in your 
linion'.' 

A. Yes, 1 think so. 

Q. Do vou think he sabotaged 
|»u? 

A. No, 1 don't think so. I think he 
as doing his job as he saw it. 

Q. One other personal question. 

the Administration, John Tower is 
$11 waiting for confirmation. An 
Bl agent involved in the investiga- 
On was quoted as saying that if a 
wspective agent had the kind of 

ckground check that John Tower 
ts, he would not be hired by the 

JI. Given that, do you think he is an 
(propriate Secretary of Defense? 
A. Yes, I do. And 1 talked to the 

esident yesterday, reporting to him on 

e results of my trip; and 1 can report 

you that the President feels that way 

well — strongly. 

Q. Could we talk about your re- 
»rt to the President? You said, be- 
<re you left, that one of the things 
»u wanted to find out was how the 
flies felt about lifting the trade re- 
rictions that were imposed after the 
(viets moved into Afghanistan. The 
tviets have now moved out. There is 
igreat deal of pressure from the al- 
;s to lift these trade restrictions. 

A. The "no-exceptions" rule. 

Q. That's right. What did they 
111 you about those restrictions? 

A. Interestingly enough, I expected 
hear from each and every one of them 
lOUt how important it was to lift the 
o-e.xceptions" rule, and I only heard it 
om, at most, three countries — and I re- 



ally think probably only two, and then 
sort of in passing. So it did not appear to 
be quite as big an issue. 

Q. Does that mean the United 
States is not about to lift these trade 
restrictions? 

A. No, no, no. What it means is 
that I'm in a position now to report this 
to the President. He will make the deci- 
sion in due course. And I wouldn't want 
to prejudge what — 

Q. What you seem to be saying is 
that there wasn't a great deal of con- 
cern about it. 

A. What I'm saying is thei'e was not 
as much concern as there had been me- 
dia speculation before we left. That's all 
I'm saying. The President might decide 
it's quite appropriate to lift that, inas- 
much as it was put on there when the 
Soviets went into Afghanistan. 

Q. On Afghanistan, is this Ad- 
ministration interested in working 
out with the Soviets, as Mr. Gor- 
bachev is asking you to, some kind of 
political accommodation in 
Afghanistan? 

A. I think that this Administration 
is interested in self-determination for 
the Afghan people. That's why we've 
been interested in Afghanistan as long 
as we have. And frankly I think that's 
why we have a situation where the Sovi- 
ets are leaving Afghanistan. So that 
continues to be our goal — self- 
determination for the Afghan people. 

Q. Now that the Soviets have 
left — the military forces have pulled 
out — when are we going to stop sup- 
plying weapons to the rebel side? 

A. I think we believe in the princi- 
ple of positive symmetry here, if I may 
say so. 

Q. A wonderful diplomatic term. 

A. Yes, it's wonderful; but you 
know, for a long time we talked about 
negative symmetry — and that's the 
reason I used the word "positive" 
symmetry — because the Soviets have 
dumped a lot of equipment in there, a lot 
of military equipment, to prop up this 
puppet regime which really has a very 
poor human rights record and is 
denying the people of Afghanistan self- 
determination. Our view is, we need to 
do what we can to see that they have an 
opportunity for self-determination. 

Q. How long do you give that re- 
gime? How long will it be necessary 
to keep arming the rebels? 



tpartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



A. I don't know. I don't want to put 
a timeframe on it because I would simply 
be guessing. We've got some intelligence 
estimates, but I'm not free to share 
those with you. 

Q. The matter of Salman Rushdie 
and the book. The Satanic Verses, 
broke while you were on your trip. 
Your response on that was simply to 
say that all of this, and especially 
putting a price on his head, was 
regrettable. That seems a very mild 
response for such a serious action. 
Why so mild? 

A. What I said in addition to that, if 
I'm not mistaken, was that the United 
States continues to oppose terrorism in 
all of its forms and particularly state- 
sponsored terrorism. I believe we added 
later, during the course of the trip, that 
if Iran really is serious about rejoining 
the community of civilized nations, this 
is not the kind of behavior that leads to 
that. 

Q. But this is really an outra- 
geous situation. There are bookstores 
in America which have pulled the 
books off the shelves. And this sort 
of thing happened in this country! 

A. Yes. It's not something that we 
ought to condone in any way, and we 
ought to speak out against it. I quite 
agree. 

Q. Are we trying by this rela- 
tively mild response— the Dutch, for 
example, cancelled the visit by the 
Foreign Minister to Iran. Are we try- 
ing bv this response to encourage 
Iran? 

A. No. To encourage them in this 
kind of behavior? Absolutely not. 

Q. To move back into the family 
of nations, to use your phrase? 

A. Oh, no, no. No. I think, frankly, 
that we have expressed our view that 
this is behavior that is basically intoler- 
able now — without passing judgment on 
the book, because I think we have to say 
that. I haven't read the book; I haven't 
seen the book; I don't know what is said 
in there. So I don't mean to be blessing 
the book, on the one hand, when I say 
that. 

Q. Can I just take you to where 
you're going next week — Asia? You, 
as Treasury Secretary, talked a bit 
about the need for some special or dif- 
ferent relationship with the Japanese. 
Now that you're in this job, do you 
still think we should be seeking some 
special marriage with the Japanese 
because they are rich and we're al- 
legedly poor or — 



23 



AFRICA 



A. I think we have a special rela- 
tionship with the Japanese. What I was 
suggesting at Treasury, frankly, was 
that w^e find a way to a better dialogue 
with not just the Japanese but the newly 
industrializing democracies of Asia as 
well — the Japanese and those newly in- 
dustrializing democracies — with respect 
to economic and trade issues partic- 
ularly. 

I think we have a very good relation- 
ship with the Japanese. It's an extraordi- 
narily important relationship to both 
countries, and I think that's evidenced 
by the fact that the President is attend- 
ing the funeral of Emperor Hirohito. 

Q. Can I turn to a more personal 
aspect of your job".' The Secretary of 
State has to deal with crises, goes 
dashing around the world talking 
with leaders. There's also a thing 
called "a view of the world," the 
"vision thing," as George Bush 
has called it. 

Once in 1982 you were quoted as 
saying, "I am not a man of vision. I 
do not pretend to be. That is not my 
job." Your job then was White House 
Chief of Staff and administrator. 
Now you're Secretary of State. Where 
is the vision going to come from'.' 

A. We'll have a vision, and it will be 
a good one. We have a President who will 
supply a good part of that; and we have 
very good people employed at the State 
Department who will be developing 
things like that for us. We have 28 stud- 
ies ongoing right now, and I think we 
know where we want to go and what we 
want to accomplish. That's the way I'd 
define the vision. 

Q. Will there be any real policy 
differences with the Reagan Adminis- 
tration or simply a continuation of 
the basic policy line? 

A. I think in many respects the 
basic policy line of the Reagan Admin- 
istration will continue, and it should con- 
tinue. The "winds of freedom" are blow- 
ing around the world; we're winning 
East-West. There are a whole host of 
things I could cite for you that I think 
would indicate it would be a serious mis- 
take to depart from some of those policy 
lines. 

On the other hand, there will be 
some differences. I've already spoken to 
some of those in my Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions testimony. It may not amount to a 
vision in your view, but I've, neverthe- 
less, talked about some of them. It was a 
fairly comprehensive statement, if I may 
say so. 



Peace and Relief in Sudan 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 8, 1989' 

The U.S. Government remains pro- 
foundly concerned about massive hu- 
man suffering in Sudan. The cause is 
the civil war, now in its sixth year. 
Most of the war's victims are civilians 
who are displaced and impoverished or 
who starve to death for lack of delivery 
of available food. The death toll from 
starvation in 1988 alone is estimated to 
range in the hundreds of thousands. 

Many Sudanese and expatriates 
are laboring tirelessly to ensure food 
deliveries, and the cooperation with 
these efforts by both the Sudanese Gov- 
ernment and Sudanese People's Libera- 
tion Army (SPLA) has improved in 
recent months. But much more needs to 
be done. We call on authorities at all 
levels on both sides to remove remain- 
ing obstacles and do everything possi- 
ble to provide emergency relief to 
victims caught in garrison towns and 
other areas of the war zone. Failure to 
do so will mean that thousands more 
will die in the coming rainy season. 
The United States will do all it can to 
support this effort. We call on other do- 
nors also to undertake or expand relief 
efforts. 

The sad reality, however, is that 
starvation will almost certainly not end 
until the fighting ends. As friends of 
Sudan, we urge the Sudanese Govern- 
ment and the SPLA to put peace first 
and to agree to an early cease-fire 
which would promote that goal and al- 
low relief to reach those in need. 



FACT SHEET, 
FEB. 8, 1989 

Sudan is an important country af- 
flicted by years of civil war, economic 
disorder, and famine. The scale of suf- 
fering is so large that causes of the war 
and goals of the combatants have be- 
come of secondary importance. The 
United States believes that no issue is 
as urgent as providing food to the inno- 
cent victims of this conflict. But we 
recognize that the famine is the direct 



result of the war. The achievement of 
peace is the real answer to the suffer- 
ing and human tragedy in Sudan. 
Hence, our central objective is to end 
the war. 

Sudan's problems have brought it 
the world's attention. The urgency for 
the United States is heightened by oi 
long ties of friendship with Sudan, ou 
support for its democratic institution; 
and the importance of its stability foi 
the region. Our policy thus is centere 
on interrelated issues: support for Su 
dan's democracy, a peaceful solution 
to the war, and relief for its victims. 

Famine and Relief 

Delivery of relief rather than the ava; 
ability of supplies has been the major 
problem facing relief efforts. Relief 
programs are maddeningly hard to ir 
plement in the vastness of southern 
Sudan, an area the size of France. 
Deaths related to famine during the 
past year are impossible to count, but 
estimates range into the hundreds of 
thousands. Perhaps over 2 million 
southern Sudanese have fled to the 
north or to Ethiopia to escape the 
fighting and hunger. Inefficiency and 
opposition by elements on both sides 
have sometimes hindered delivery of 
relief. Even without a war, any relief 
effort would be severely complicated 
the inhospitable terrain, bandits, anc 
the pervasive lack of reliable informa^ 
tion on population concentrations and 
need. The few existing tracks or road' 
are mined or otherwise contested by 
combatants, many of whom are out ol 
touch with any authority. 

Despite these obstacles, there is 
progress on relief, and the United 
States has been in the forefront of ef- 
forts to provide it. The current Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) program to deliver food to no 
combatants on both sides in the war 
zone is largely a U.S. initiative and w 
accepted by both sides in part as a re- 
sult of strong U.S. leadership and en- 
couragement. Since both sides harboi 
suspicions about the purpose and use 



'Press release 30 of Feb. 21, 1989. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin/April 191' 



ARMS CONTROL 



od, the ICRC's participation has been 
isential. It is experienced in working 
ith adversaries in conducting relief 
itivities across battle lines and in 
laranteeing that food reaches non- 
imbatants. Deliveries began in De- 
[mber 1988 to the government-held 

ns of Wau and Aweil and the SPLA- 
:ld towns of Akon and Yirol. 
While the ICRC role is crucial, it is 
Mt the only available instrument for 
rlief. We have been actively soliciting 
joposals from private voluntary orga- 
F.ations which might be interested in 
iiTving out relief efforts on both sides 
( the war zone. As early as 1986, the 
lited States opened discussions with 
■ Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation 
soeiation (SRRA), the relief arm of 
I ' Sudanese People's Liberation Move- 
I'nt (SPLM), to review the possibility 
(American private voluntary organi- 
/ ions providing assistance into the 
It h. While the SRRA agreed in prin- 

■ li' to such assistance, no established 
I \ate voluntary organizations were 
MJing to undertake relief operations 
ithe circumstances w^hich existed at 

t it time. 

One serious constraint continues to 
lack of reliable information on needs 
I tieas controlled by the Sudanese 
I iple's Liberation Army (SPLA) — 
■■ L.M's military wing — and the hesi- 
e\ of organizations to begin opera- 
l^ without a better understanding of 
lis and the security situation. While 
1 irmation and appropriate responses 
t' those areas are being developed, 
t r.S. Government is emphasizing 
r ief efforts targeted on government- 
1- t lolled garrison towns in the south 
'i-h have the largest identifiable 
ations of displaced persons in the 
■' zone) and accessible areas outside 
t war zone in which large numbers of 
d placed persons have gathered. These 
ii lude southern Darfur, southern Kor- 
(1 :ui, Khartoum, and the Nile regions. 
The United States has been a lead- 
contributor to multilateral relief 
..> lations in Sudan. Concerned that 
r lef be gotten into the war zone to 
irnment-controlled towns where 
II needs were developing, U.S. offi- 
- opened discussions with the Su- 

■ use Government and the SPLA on a 
p sible ICRC program in November 
117. Although the United States had 



MBFR Talks Conclude 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
FEB. 2. 1989 

Following the decision to open in March 
this year the negotiation on convention- 
al armed forces in Europe, the states 
participating in the negotiations on the 
mutual reduction of forces and arma- 
ments and associated measures in cen- 
tral Europe have decided to conclude 
these negotiations. The final meeting 
was held today. 

Since 1973 these negotiations have 
served to maintain a serious dialogue 
between East and West on .security is- 
sues. They have provided the first mul- 
tilateral forum for the exploration of 
the complex problems associated with 



been providing as much assistance as 
possible to southern Sudan, first signs 
of famine in SPLA-controlled territory 
appeared in the spring of 1988 when 
some 300,000 Sudanese refugees cross- 
ed into Ethiopia and were settled in 
UN camps. The dimensions of the fam- 
ine became clearer by the summer 
when an estimated 200,000 war victims 
began to gather north of the war zone. 
The war, logistical difficulties, and 
flooding impeded relief operations until 
a U.S. -financed airlift was initiated in 
September. By year's end, overland 
routes, again subject to SPLA attacks, 
were just beginning to open. During 
the past 2 years, the U.S. Ambassador 
has declared 10 disasters in Sudan, and 
more than $60 million has been spent 
on relief This includes about $30 mil- 
lion during the past 6 months chan- 
neled through the ICRC, bilateral 
programs, and private voluntary orga- 
nizations as flood waters receded and 
the extent of needs was identified. 

The War and Its Resolution 

Causes of the conflict in Sudan are ex- 
ceedingly complex. Sudan is both Isla- 
mic and Christian, African and Arab. 
The civil war turns on questions of na- 
tional identity and the nature of the 
Sudanese state. Generalizations can be 



efforts to strengthen stability and 
security in Europe. The extent of 
common ground has proved to be insuf- 
ficient to enable the participants to 
agree on a treaty. Nevertheless the po- 
sitions of the two sides have converged 
on a number of issues. The participants 
have gained valuable experience and a 
clearer picture of what will be neces- 
sary to achieve mutually agreeable and 
verifiable reductions and limitations of 
forces and armaments in Europe. 

The participants wish to express 
their gratitude to the Republic of Aus- 
tria for its generous assistance and the 
excellent facilities it has provided for 
these negotiations in Vienna. ■ 



misleading. Not all northerners want 
Islamic law and an Islamic state. Not 
all southerners support armed rebel- 
lion. Both sides are asserting deeply 
held values. Thus ending the war while 
supporting democracy has proven to be 
an elusive objective. But the tragedy 
will be prolonged and enormous if the 
solution is found on the battlefield rath- 
er than at the bargaining table. 

The United States has also taken a 
leading role in promoting a negotiated 
settlement. Intensive efforts through- 
out 1988, including those by the United 
States, unfortunately did not succeed 
in bringing Prime Minister Sadiq and 
SPLA leader John Garang together. 
But many contacts at other levels be- 
tween the sides helped prepare the way 
for productive talks which took place in 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in November 
between Sudan's Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) — one of three principal 
northern political parties — and SPLA 
representatives. The DUP/SPLA pro- 
posal contained the key elements of 
compromise which would halt the fight- 
ing and permit both sides to join in a 
constitutional convention for discussion 
of the issues separating them and lead- 
ing to a new constitution for Sudan. 



Coartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



25 



CANADA 



Ethiopian support and sanctuary 
for the SPLA have been essential for 
the SPLA. The United States has 
taken the initiative in discussing Ethio- 
pia's policies and role with the Soviets. 
We will continue to seek an end to ex- 
ternal interference in Sudan and prog- 
ress with the Soviets in pursuit of 
negotiated solutions to these regional 
problems. The United States believes, 
however, that Sudan's civil war involves 
fundamental internal issues and griev- 
ances which Sudanese themselves must 
resolve. 

Based on the stated positions of 
both sides, resolution of the issues 
should not be impossible. The SPLA 
does not propose secession but insists 
that the south share economic wealth 
and political power on a negotiated ba- 
sis. 'The Prime Minister and his gov- 
ernment agree. The sticking point is 
the country's legal system. The SPLA 
and most southerners do not agree that 
Islamic law should be applied in the 
non-Muslim south or that non-Muslims 
living in the north should be subject to 
it; much less, in the southerners' view, 
should it be the basis of the constitu- 
tion. Northern parties are divided on 
these points, although the extent of dif- 
ferences and whether they are bridge- 
able is not clear. No party, however, has 
said it opposes discussion of Islamic law 
in the context of a constitutional con- 
vention of all Sudanese parties. 

Despite the promise of the DUP/ 
SPLA peace proposal, the government 
has not brought about agreement of the 
constituent assembly and cabinet, 
which could lead to implementation of 
the proposal. The United States sup- 
ports all three fundamental elements of 
the DUP/SPLA peace proposal: a con- 
stitutional convention to bring the par- 
ties togethei', no preemptive moves to 
revise or implement Islamic laws pend- 
ing the conference, and a cease-fire 
demonstrating the good will of both 
sides to engage in productive talks. 

Of these considerations, a cease- 
fire, which is necessary for getting re- 
lief to all those in need, is most urgent. 



President's Visit to Canada 



'Press release 14. 




President Bush and Prime Minister Mulroney. 



President Bush t'isited Ottawa on 
February 10, 1989. Following are re- 
marks by the President and excerpts 
from a question-and-answer session he 
and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
held with reporters after their 
luncheon and a news conference 
Secretary Baker held later that day. 



26 



PRESIDENT BUSH AND 
PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY 

President Bush. Let me just say on 1 
half of Mrs. Bush, our Secretary of 
State, and others, this has been a gO( 
visit. It is an important visit becaust 
symbolizes the importance that we 



Department of State Bulletin/ April 1S 



lace on the relationship with Canada, 
fe're each other's largest trading part- 
er. We are friends. We share a long, 
aceful border, and we have many 
)innion interests. 

Today we had an opportunity to 
scuss not just the bilateral relation- 
ip that is very, very strong and very 
}od but we had a chance to talk about 
le East-West relationship. I had a 
lance to talk about the problems on 
ade; indeed, our trade ministers are 
Iking right now, you might say. And 
), I felt the visit was outstanding. 

The Prime Minister and I reviewed 
16 concerns that he has about acid 
in, and I referred him to what I said 
st night to the American people: my 
itermination to move on forward with 
stting limits, with legislation, and 
len moving to discussions with Cana- 
, leading to an accord that I think 
ill be beneficial to both countries, 
lat problem — and it has been a 
•oblem — is one that we are both 
■termined to move forward toward 
lution. 

In terms of the trade agreement, 
I, of course, have saluted the coura- 
ous position taken by the Prime Min- 
cer of Canada. We have great respect 
r that in the United States; and we 
int to now do our part, part of the 
aited States, to follow through with 
iiatever implementation is required. 

The mood was upbeat, the spirit 
<od, and I am very glad that this was 
/ first visit outside of the continental 
lited States as President. We will 
ep in touch, and each of us has 
edged to see that this strong relation- 
ip becomes even stronger. 

Q. To what degree did you assure 
e Prime Minister of your feeling of 
nfidence that the Congress will go 
9ng with you on your acid rain re- 
est last night? 

President Bush. I think the Prime 
nister is aware of the political divi- 
ins and political waves there in our 
untry on this issue. But I assured 
m that the time for just pure study 
IS over and that we've now ap- 
oached the time for legislative action. 
)ledged that in the campaign. And so, 
the degree there is disparity, a lack 
uniformity in the Congress, I think 
e Prime Minister sees it as my re- 
onsibility to try to move forward to 
that which I said I wanted to do. 



Q. I Inaudible I afraid that the 
Arctic blast has just swept across the 
continent following on last summer's 
drought has created some permanent 
damage in the agricultural regions 
on both sides of the border. I wonder 
if you discussed that at all and wheth- 
er there could be a cooperative way of 
dealing with this and maybe at some 
point making a proposal to get some 
of the surplus Canadian water down 
into the drought-stricken regions of 
the United States? 

President Bush. We did not dis- 
cuss water diversion. We did not dis- 
cuss the effects of the Arctic cold air. 
We did talk about the need for a global 
approach to environmental concerns. 

Q. Do you have an estimate of 
how long it will take, assuming the 
Congress goes along with your legis- 
lative program, before you are ready 
to talk about a bilateral accord? 

President Bush. No, but we're 
going to press forward with this right 
awav. We have a brand new Adminis- 
trator of EPA [William Reilly, Envi- 
ronmental Protection Agency]. We've 
got a legislative team to propose the 
legislation I talked about last night. 
And we've gotten some reasonable lev- 
els of funding. So we're on the move. 
But we (lid not discuss an exact 
timeframe. I would be misrepresenting 
or understating things if I didn't say 
that the Prime Minister once again im- 
pressed on me the urgency of moving 
as fast as we can, but we didn't set a 
time. 

Q. You were saying that you 
weren't in a position yet to discuss a 
specific timetable and targets for re- 
duction of acid rain. 

President Bush. We will be dis- 
cussing targets, and we will get an 
agreement on that, I'm sure. But I 
have an obligation now to recommend 
to our Congress the setting of certain 
limits, so we will move forward with 
that much specific. 

Q. What kind of reductions and 
what kind of timetable do you have in 
mind? 

President Bush. I have in mind as 
fast as possible. 

Q. I wondered if you are satisfied 
with the steps that the President has 
outlined to deal with the acid rain 
question or whether you have asked 
for more here? 



CANADA 



Prime Minister Mulroney. I think 
that this represents quite substantial 
progress. It wasn't so long ago that 
Canada was sort of going it alone in 
many ways in this area. The Presi- 
dent's position puts a great impetus for 
action domestically in the United 
States, which is a condition precedent, 
and the President is signaling, as well, 
subsequent discussions that will lead to 
an acid rain accord to benefit both the 
United States and Canada. This, I 
think, is real progress. And while I 
suppose I'm like a lot of people who 
would like it done tomorrow in this 
area, I know it's now going to happen, 
but this represents a very measurable 
progress. I view it as evidence of the 
commitments that the President gave 
during the campaign and has referred 
to since, including his speech to the 
Congress last night, which is, for a 
neighbor and friend troubled by this 
problem for some time, very 
encouraging. 

Q. Presuming you and the Presi- 
dent reach an agreement, could you 
begin to discuss an accord before the 
full U.S. program is in place on acid 
rain, or will it be necessary to wait 
until its legislation is through 
Congress? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. The 
Americans will, of course, deal with 
their own problems domestically, free 
from any comment by me about what 
happens internally. But clearly, what 
the President is saying is that he has a 
two-pronged approach: one that will 
summon the legislative authority of the 
Congress of the United States to put in 
place those mechanisms that are re- 
quired there, and secondly, an arrange- 
ment which will be negotiated with 
Canada to conclude an accord which 
will deal, hopefully, in a definitive 
manner with this. 

Q. Would you prefer to undertake 
negotiations immediately with the 
United States instead of waiting for 
them first to pass laws? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. First, 
it is necessary for the President to talk 
about this with legislators and that the 
Americans are prepared to pass their 
own laws for the purification of their 
atmosphere in this domain. In the sec- 
ond place, as the President has just in- 
dicated, we are on the way to advance, 
rapidly I hope, toward the conclusion of 
the negotiations for a bilateral accord 
about the international environment. 



27 



CANADA 



Therefore, we are encouraged by the 
developments and the declarations of 
President Bush today. 



Q. Did you discuss the steel issue, 
and did you make any mention of 
keeping Canada out of the voluntary 
export program that the steel lobby 
in the United States wants? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. There 
is a meeting going on now between Ms. 
Hills [U.S. Trade Representative] and 
Minister [of International Trade] John 
Crosbie in regard specifically to that. 
But as you know, Canada is a fair trad- 
er, and we should not in any way be im- 
pacted by that kind of proposition. We 
wouldn't deserve in any way to be in- 
cluded within its purview. And that 
would be the position that Mr. Crosbie 
will be explaining to Ms. Hills. 

Q. Would you like 1995 or the year 
2000 for a 50% cut in transporter 
emissions on acid rain. 

President Bush. Too early to an- 
swer that. 

Q. Will negotiations start this 
year? 

President Bush. I hope so. 

Q. Were you on the same wave- 
lengths on East-West relations in 
your discussions this morning? 

President Bush. We were. And I 
have great respect for the Prime Min- 
ister's views. I have great respect for 
his understanding with his experience 
of the alliance and its importance. I 
value his judgment on what's happening 
inside the Soviet Union. And so, we 
had a long, I think, productive discus- 
sion about that. I had an opportunity to 
explain to him that our review of our 
national security policies, our foreign 
policy objectives — it's a serious thing. 
It is not a foot-dragging operation. It is 
not trying to send a signal to [General] 
Secretary Gorbachev that we want to 
move backward. It is simply prudent. I 
am absolutely convinced that the Sovi- 
ets understand this; and I'm also con- 
vinced that the — I don't want to put 
words in his mouth — but the Prime 
Minister of Canada, a very important 
part of all of this, understands it as 
well. 



SECRETARY BAKERS 

As the President said just prior to de- 
parture, his view was that this was a 
very good and successful visit. He 
felt — he put it, characterized it — 
upbeat about it and very pleased that 
this was his first visit outside the 
United States as President of the 
United States. 

This was primarily an agenda- 
setting meeting. There was concen- 
tration in the following major areas: 
implementation of the Free Trade 
Agreement, the full range of East-West 
issues, the question of acid rain, ques- 
tions regarding Central America, mat- 
ters respecting the NATO trip that I 
am just to embark upon tomorrow, and 
several other items that were touched 
on to a lesser degree. 

Q. How did Central America 
come up, and what part would the 
Canadians play in Central Ameri- 
can policy? 

A. The Canadians, as you know, 
have been interested in Central Ameri- 
can policy, and they're interested, as are 
others in this hemisphere, in knowing 
what the policy approach of the United 
States will be. The President made it 
clear that it was important from the 
standpoint of the United States that 
we — our feeling that it was important 
that we have a unified policy in the 
United States; that is, one that the legis- 
lative and executive branches of the gov- 
ernment are agreed upon. Only in that 
way, the President said, can policy really 
be effective. 

F\irther, he pointed out that it 
was his hope that the nations of this 
hemisphere — the Central American 
democracies, some countries in South 
America, Canada, and the United 
States — could all adopt, or pretty much 
subscribe to, a policy that represented a 
diplomatic approach to the issues and 
that had at least some of the goals to be 
achieved — those goals that are stated in 
the Esquipulas accords. 

Q. Was there any discussion 
about Canadian concerns about mov- 
ing toward oil drilling in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge? 

A. There was no discussion of that. 

Q. Could you explain the failure 
of the President to give Mr. Mulroney 
even vague targets for acid rain 
reductions or a date by which those 
reductions might be achieved? 



A. The President told the Prime 
Minister that — called his attention to i 
statements that the President had ma( 
during the campaign where he said he 
wanted to reduce emissions by, 1 think 
he said, millions of tons; that it would I 
premature for the President to establi: 
targets before he had had an oppor- 
tunity to consult with the Congress wi 
respect to an issue that will have high 
political content in the United States. 

The President did say, however, th 
he intends to offer a comprehensive pn 
posal for dealing with this issue to oui 
Congress, calling for specific emissior 
reductions and a specific timetable. Hi 
said that the time for study is over an( 
the time for action is now, and he said, ; 
I think you heard during the departur 
that subsequently, we hope we can beu 
discussions bilaterally toward an acid u 
rain accord with Canada. 

Q. What do you think is going 
be the impact — and was it discussea 
at all today — with our NATO ally 
Canada of a zero-growth defense 
budget in the United States? 

A. It was discussed today, and th- 
President told the Prime Minister, in c 
feet, why he decided to depart from tl 
2Fli real growth figure in the Reagan 
budget and propose a zero real growtl 
budget for FY 1990. There were discu: 
sions as well of the importance of Can 
da's contribution to NATO's defense. 

Q. I have two questions. One, 1 
wonder if there was any discussion 
about any changes in Glass-Steagai 
the United States in light of the fac 
that American Express is getting a 
Schedule B bank in Canada. And ji 
as a follow-up on the defense ques- 
tion, whether there were any discu! 
sions on Canada's plan to purchase 
nuclear submarines. 

k. The nuclear submarine issue ( 
not come up, and neither did the Glass 
Steagal issue, although that may have 
come up in Ambassador Hills' discus- 
sions. I think she was here having sep 
rate discussions with Minister Crosbit 
about implementation of the Free Tra( 
Agreement. But it did not come up in 
discussions with the Prime Minister. 

Q. Going back for a moment to 
Central America, several Central 
American Presidents approached tli 
Secretary General recently about tl 
possibility of a UN peacekeeping 
force being set up. Was there any 
discussion given to Canada's past pi 
ticipation in a number of such peac 
keeping forces with the possibility 
that Canada might play a role in thi 
peacekeeping forces? 



28 



CANADA 



A. I had a discussion to that effect 
ith Joe Clark (Secretary of State for 

ternal Affairs] on the way in from the 
■port, and he and I are going to have a 
■eater in-depth meeting this evening. I 
ink we're going to spend a couple of 
urs together 

I made the point to the Minister 
at it would be the hope of the United 
ates that we would not depart from 
e requirements of Esquipulas II and 
e Sapoa accords: in other words, that 

should not substitute for those goals 
lich we think are worthwhile goals, 
me lesser standard for the Central 
nerican countries. 

Q. Did you discuss today, in your 
scussions of East-West, the question 
relaxing technology and other 
fade restrictions against trade with 
te Soviet Union? And, whether or 
ft you discussed it today, what is the 
jjministration's position now on the 
Inetable of the change that takes 
I ice when the Soviets move out of 
. ghanistan? 

A. You're talking about the "sole- 
I -eptions" rule? That's an issue that I 
I ject to have discussions about with 
i:h of the NATO Foreign Ministers 
( it I'll be visiting with. The issue did 
I ; come up today. It probably will come 
I in our discussions this evening with 
J nister Clark. 

Q. Any decision on that, though? 

A. The position is that we ought to 
> -tainly find out what the other NATO 
( intries — how they feel about it, wheth- 
I (II' not it's something that they feel 
t remely strongly about, whether it's 
s nething that we ought to move on 
I A, or give some consideration to 
1 ving on at a later date. 

Let me say this: I know some of you 
t nk my mind is made up on that issue. 
1 IS not. I want you to know that. I 
t nk you might have reference to the 
'. Ill' magazine article where I said that 
\ ought to consider getting something 
I that. It also said that was an embry- 
( iC thought — and it was. 

Generally speaking, I do think it's a 
I )d idea in the relationship to, if you're 
t ng to give something, ask for some- 
t ng in return. 

But I'll have to tell you this: Our al- 
1 < feel perhaps more strongly about 
t s than do the Soviets. So we'll be 
' cussing it with them in the context 
I how we move. 




Mrs. Bush and Mrs. 
Mulroney (center). 



Mulronev read Owl Moon to the classmates of Nicholas 



President Bush and Prime Minister Mulroney. 




partment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



29 



CANADA 



Q. Are you carrying any message 
from the President on this super tour, 
or is it largely of good will and con- 
sultations with counterparts? 

A. It's a listening trip and a consult- 
ing trip, but I am carrying a message 
and the message is: Look, we want to 
make it clear that we think the way to 
approach the East-West relationship is 
with prudence and with realism. We 
want you to understand we are not drag- 
ging our feet seeking delay for the sake 
of delay but that we want to hear your 
views with respect to our negotiating — 
matters such as our negotiating posture 
in START [strategic arms reduction 
talks] matters, such as short-range 
nuclear modernization, and the like. 

Q. With reference — not to drag 
it out — but the Cariucci-Shultz ex- 
change of letters before you came 
on — State's position — when you say 
your mind is not made up, should I 
line you up with Mr. Shultz in the 
sense that you can see a point to get- 
ting off this "no-exception" rule? 
Because, as we understood it, the 
Pentagon tried to freeze the sanc- 
tions even after the Soviets leave; 
State didn't think that's wise. 

A. That was the debate that took 
place up to and through noon on 
January 20. 

Q. Right, I'm trying to — 

A. There are a number of policy is- 
sues that we are taking a look at, and 
this is a matter of quite some impor- 
tance to our allies, and it will certainly 
be the focus of some of our discussions on 
this trip. 

I'd like to hear from them specifi- 
cally how important they think it is. We 
recognize, as the State Department did 
in that letter that you make reference to, 
that this doesn't mean that we're open- 
ing the doors to technology transfer, be- 
cause COCOM [Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls] is still 
going to apply. 

It does remain a fact that President 
Carter put this "no-exceptions" policy 
into place when the Russians marched 
into Afghanistan. They are leaving; in- 
deed, they are. The policy was put into 
place, however, at a time when they were 
not funneling a billion dollars a year into 
Central America. 



Q. Just to change the subject a 
little bit. Could you tell us how you 
think that your stock holdings that 
we read about in the paper this morn- 
ing fit into Bu.sh's policy that people 
should not do anything that looks 
like it could be perceived as a con- 
flict of interest, whether it was in 
actuality? 

A. Sure. Let me say this, with re- 
spect to that. For the 8 years that I have 
been in government, I have sought and 
relied upon the advice and counsel of ca- 
reer attorneys at the Treasury Depart- 
ment, at the State Department, and at 
the Office of Government Ethics. I have 
been guided by their advice and counsel, 
and I will continue to be guided by their 
advice and counsel. 

In the course of being thereby 
guided, I had created a blind trust in 
early 1981, when we first came into of- 
fice. That trust has been in force and in 
existence ever since. I have executed re- 
cusal statements at each of the govern- 
ment posts that I have served, and I 
have been very careful about recusing 
myself from specific issues that might 
constitute a conflict or an appearance 
of conflict. 

I was advised by career attorneys at 
these departments and at the Office of 
Government Ethics that participation in 
general policy issues — general policy 
determinations — was appropriate. I was 
specifically so advised at the Treasury 
Department in the summer, I think, of 
1987 following the promulgation of the 
Justice Department's ruling that said 
that there can be some cases in which 
participation in general policy issues can 
constitute an appearance of conflict. I 
sought and received at the time a spe- 
cific determination from the Office of 
Government Ethics. 

I hope that's a complete answer for 
you, but I'll be glad to respond to other 
questions if you have them. 

Q. Do you think it is necessary at 
this time for the Bush Administra- 
tion to think stricter lines existed in 
the past Administration? 

A. I think that the Pre.sident has 
made it very clear that ethics are a very 
important issue for him. He did so in the 
campaign; he's done so in speeches since 
then. I think that it would be appropri- 
ate and in keeping with his campaign 
pledges and his statements. 

Let me say that discussions continue 
with attorneys from the State Depart- 
ment, the Office of Government Ethics, 



and the White House counsel's office re 
garding mechanisms or actions that 
could be taken in my case that would 
serve to insulate me from charges or 
suggestions of conflict of interest. Tho: 
discussions are on-going. They have no 
been concluded. 

As I indicated earlier in my state- 
ment, I would tend to be guided by the 
results of those discussions. 

But let me say one other thing, if 1 
might. My papers could not have gone 
for confirmation as Secretary of State- 
could not have gone to the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee — had not 
there been approval by the Office of Gi 
ernment Ethics and the predecessor tn 
the White House counsel's office, whici 
is the Transition Office. They could not 
have gone up there had they not ap- 
proved the mechanism that we suggest 
be used to avoid conflicts or the appeal 
ance of conflicts. 

There are a number of additional 
mechanisms that could be considered, 
ranging from recusals to creation of a 
different kind of trust. I have a qualifi( 
blind trust. I could consider creating a 
diversified blind trust; I could considei 
a waiver. The discussions now revolve 
around waiver. 

Q. Why is Mr. Gray [L. Boyden 
Gray, General Counsel to the Presi- 
dent] seeking a change from the sta 
tus that you had in the past if that 
was acceptable then? Why are the 
regulations getting tougher? 

A. Why are the regulations getti 
tougher? You'll have to ask the attorne 
in the Justice Department who wrote 
that opinion in early 1987. 

Q. Why did he decide it's due fo- 
a change? He's telling you to divest, 
right? 

A. That's really not exactly right. 
I've never had a conversation with Mr. 
Gray at all on this subject — not one. H 
did have a conversation with the attor- 
neys that were i-epresenting me in the 
confirmation process. He never said, a 
understand it, to Bob Kimmitt [Robert 
M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary-designa 
for Political Affairs], "The Secretary 
should sell his bank stock." He raised 
that as an option in his discussions wit 
Mr. Kimmitt, but he did not say that it 
was required. 

As I understand the situation, the 
decision really is with me in terms of 
whether or not I seek a waiver. I have 
concluded that I should seek a waiver, 
because that gives me additional prote^ 
tion and helps avoid the appearance of 
any sort of a conflict of interest. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin/April 191 



CANADA 



So I have concluded to seek a waiver. 
fhe White House could say, "No, we 
von't grant you that waiver," and I 
ould do a number of things. I could say. 
Fine, I'll go to a diversified blind 
I'ust." I could say, "I'll take myself out 
f Third World debt issues and not have 
ny even on a broad general policy ba- 
is." Or I could sell stock. 

Once those discussions are over and 
determination has been made, that's 
hen I will then be faced with an obliga- 
1111 to take some action one way or the 
then 

Q. Can you tell me how the Presi- 
ent's insistence that the acid-rain is- 
ue be considered domestically right 
ow, before we look for bilateral 
Kreements. differs from President 
;eagan's insistence on studying the 
latter for the past 8 years'? 

A. It differs significantly, because 
le President has said the time for study 
over; the time for action is now. He has 
)id, "I am going to pi'esent a proposal to 
le Congress that will have, as a part of 
. reduction of emissions." 



Q. Is that the same policy? 
i^hat's — 

A. No. it really isn't the same, be- 
luse if we go forward before we have 
lied the ground — after all, we've been 
1 office now, let's see, 21 days, I think — 
we go forward before we have tilled 
lie ground, we're going to have a diffi- 
ult enough political situation in the 
nited States getting this done as it is. 
■o we ought to do it right. 

But he gave the Prime Minister, I 
(link, firm assurances that the attitude 
f the United States on this issue has 
* hanged. I think the Prime Minister be- 
leves that, and the President has said he 
1 going to move forward with discus- 
ions with the Congress, and then we'll 
lok forward to negotiating a bilateral 
ccord. He also said — out there as he 
'as leaving — it would be before the end 
fthe year. 

Q. Tell us what you mean by 
Itilling the ground." Logistically, 
'hat things have to be decided on a 
omestic level"? 



A. What has to be decided primari- 
ly is what is the target for reduction, 
and who's going to pay the price. And 
that latter question is a very, very im- 
portant question that affects different 
regions of the United States in different 
ways — or it could affect different regions 
in different ways, depending on what 
method you used to take care of the cost. 

Q. There are reports today of the 
new draft Executive order that would 
further restrict the disclosure of clas- 
sified information and would deny se- 
curity clearances to people and 
wouldn't tell them why they had been 
denied. Have you seen these and do 
you have any recommendations? 

A. What was the latter part of it? 

Q. It would deny people the rea- 
sons they've been refused security 
clearance. 

A. I have not seen that, no. 

Q. Do you have recommenda- 
tions — 

A. And it would not be available to 
them on a Freedom of Information basis? 

Q. Apparently not. 

A. I think we ought to at least look 
at it. I have not seen that. I am aware 
of proposals to re-issue an Executive 
order — maybe it's already been done — 
similar to the order the Reagan Admin- 
istration issued with respect to timely 
notification of covei't action to the Con- 
gress. Is this embraced within the con- 
text of that E xecutive order? 

Q. Your comment about the zero 
defense budget; was there anything in 
the discussions today which might al- 
low Mr. Mulroney to take a similar 
kind of action? He's under some 
spending pressure here. Defense ex- 
penditures are — 

A. There was no discussion. The 
meeting took note of the respective 
percentages of GNP that are devoted 
to defense. 

Q. Could the advanced missile 
testing have brought the government 
here under some pressure as a desta- 
bilizing and possibly an offensive sys- 
tem as differentiated from a defensive 
system? Did that come up? 



A. The President expressed his ap- 
preciation for what's taken place in that 
regard. Of course, it's the view of the 
United States that it is defensive and 
that that testing is extraordinarily im- 
portant in terms of the NATO deter- 
rence and in terms of our national 
security interests. 

Q. The NATO allies are going to 
ask you what effect the zero growth 
defense budget is going to have on 
U.S. troop strength in Europe and so 
forth. What are you going to tell 
them? 

A. We're going to tell them we hope 
it doesn't have any adverse effect at all 
on force structure and that generally 
what we have — that's what we believe as 
a result of our consultations with the 
Chiefs [of Staff] and with officials at the 
Department of Defense. 

Q. [West German] Chancellor 
Kohl said in an interview today that 
he didn't think that Germany had to 
make a decision on Lance moderniza- 
tion until 1991 or so. 1992. Did you dis- 
cuss this with Mr. Mulroney, and how 
is this going to affect U.S. — 

A. No. What time did he make that 
statement? 

Q. It was an interview in today's 

Financial Times. 

A. No, that did not come up in the 
discussions. 

Q. How is this going to affect 
U.S. policy as you — 

A. One of the purposes of my trip is 
to discuss issues just such as that. So I 
can't tell you how it's going to affect U.S. 
policy until I complete the trip. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Feb. 20, 1989. 
^Press release 15 of Feb. 14. ■ 



liepartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



31 



EAST ASIA 



Visit of Japanese Prime iVIinister 




Prime Minister Noborii Takeskita 
of Japan made an official working visit 
to Washington, D.C., February 1-3, 
1989, to meet with President Bush and 
other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
the President and the Prime Minister 
after their meeting on February 2^ 

President Bush 

Let me begin by expressing once 
again, on behalf of the American peo- 
ple, the condolences on the passing of 
Emperor Showa, a most gentle man of 
great learning. I look forward to call- 
ing on the new Emperor when I visit 
Japan later this month. 

It has been a pleasure and honor 
for Barbara and me to welcome you, 
Mr. Prime Minister, to the White 
House. You are one of our first official 
visitors, and this reflects the impor- 
tance I place on the relations between 
our two countries, the strength of our 
nations' ties, and the promise that our 
relationship holds for the future of the 
world. 

Two weeks ago, here in Washing- 
ton, the United States conducted a rit- 
ual that spoke of both continuity and 



32 



change. For the 41st time in 200 years, 
the United States swore in a new Presi- 
dent. And in the transition from one 
President to the next, we Americans 
reaffirmed the strength of our democ- 
racy and our commitment to values on 
which it was built. Japan and the world 
can count on the United States to con- 
tinue to work for peace, democracy, 
freedom, and justice around the world. 
The scope of America's vision is global, 
and we will continue to shoulder the 
obligations that belong to a global 
power. 

Continuity will also be the mark of 
relations between the United States 
and Japan. On occasion we may have 
differences, but these are the differ- 
ences of friends. And in the last 40 
years, our two nations have been truly 
close friends. The peace and prosperity 
we both enjoy today are among the 
fruits of that friendship. Simply put: 
We respect one another. We need one 
another And w^e will continue to work 
together for the good of our peoples 
and of all humanity. 

During this visit, the Prime Minis- 
ter and I worked on the continuing 
business of the friendship between our 
countries. We confirmed that the trea- 



ty of mutual security and cooperation i 
the foundation of our relationship. I 
noted the importance of allies assum 
ing greater responsibilities in the 
cause of peace. The Prime Minister an 
I agreed that these responsibilities 
take many forms. In this regard, I ap- 
plaud Japan's pledge to make further 
significant increases in overseas devel 
opment assistance programs. At the 
same time, we believe that the most 
powerful engine for economic develop- 
ment and growth — in fact, the only en- 
gine that works — is the entrepreneur, 
large and small. And entrepreneurshij 
is a product not of massive aid package 
but of free and open economies that do 
not carry crushing burdens of ta.xation 
and regulation and that maintain the 
rule of law, including contract and 
property law. 

Along these lines, we agreed on 
the importance of supporting democra 
cy and sustained growth and reform ir 
the Philippines. Toward this end, we 
pledge to make every effort to launch 
the multilateral assistance initiative 
for the Philippines this year. 

The Prime Minister and I reviewe 
the progress our nations have achieved 
in bringing our economies into better 
balance and in further opening our 
markets to each other's goods and serv 
ices. We also recognize the need for 
continued policy efforts in these areas 
The Prime Minister reaffirmed Japan' 
determination to promote strong do- 
mestic growth and structural adjust- 
ments. And I told him that I am 
determined to reduce our budget 
deficit. 

In the area of multilateral coopen 
tion, we agreed that we would continu 
to coordinate policies through estab- 
lished settings, especially the econom 
summit. We will look forward to the 
next summit meeting, which will be 
held in Paris. We also agreed on the in 
portance for continued global prosper 
ity of a successful Uruguay Round. 
And we agreed on the importance of 
frequent consultation at all levels on 
economic issues. 

All in all, our talks were positive 
and forthright, befitting close allies. 
The Prime Minister and I first met 
some time ago, and this week's meet- 
ings have helped us become even bette 
acquainted. We've laid the groundworl 
for close cooperation, as we deal with 
the issues and the opportunities of the 
last decade of the 20th century. 



EAST ASIA 



•inie Minister Takeshita^ 

,\ish to convey on behalf of the Japa- 
sc people my deepest appreciation to 
t' (iovernment and people of the 
lilted States for their expressions of 
iii|iathy and condolences on the de- 
>r of Emperor Showa. The people of 
1 1,1 11 are also deeply touched that you 
il Mrs. Bush will attend the funeral 
d-i'iiiony. 

Looking back upon the 43 years 
;Hf the end of the war. I am reminded 
,f\v of the friendship and cooperation 
! ■ American people have consistently 
(tended to us through the years. I am 
! ily grateful that you have so gra- 
etisly invited us to Washington at 
tis busy time, so soon after your 
iitiguration. 

1 appreciate the remarks you have 
j;t made on the thoughts we shared in 
(r first meeting. Our first meeting 
^ s truly promising in opening the 
pspective into our future. I believe it 
! iked a new start for U.S. -Japan co- 
( -ration, which will serve to help 
( >ure peace and prosperity for the 
1 rid. as we move toward the 21st cen- 
t -y. P'ortunately the basis of our coop- 
it ive relationship is firm and sound. 
e -lapan-U.S. security arrangement, 
' 111 which this relationship rests, has 
I er been better. The successful solu- 
t ns we have been able to achieve re- 
[ (ling bilateral economic issues have 
f iiiinstrated the resilience of our rela- 
iiship. Thus, through a dialogue, is- 
'^ between our two countries can be 
I (lived. 

In sustaining noninflationary 
L iwth of the international economy 
i I in reducing e.xternal imbalances in 
" economies, the President and I 
ired the view that macroeconomic 
icy coordination is of crucial impor- 
ice. I stated to the President that 
Japanese economy will continue to 
)w through strong domestic demand, 
it imports are expected to continue 
increase, and that structure adjust- 
nt efforts will be further enhanced, 
e President stated that he will make 
ermined efforts to reduce the budg- 
deficit. 

The world faces a number of chal- 
ges but is rich with promises. In 
ir words: The new breeze is blowing, 
u and I share the conviction that now 
he time for Japan and the United 
ites to further strengthen policy 
irdination and to joint endeavors 
order to create a better world. 

We will consult closely on our poli- 
s toward the Soviet Union, which of- 



partment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



fers new challenges and opportunities 
for East-West relations. We will work 
together to ensure peace and prosper- 
ity in Asia, the Middle East, Central 
and South America, and other parts of 
the world. We will work together to 
strengthen the free trading system 
and agree to cooperate closely for the 
progress of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 

No nation can substitute for the 
United States as the leader of the de- 
mocracies around the world. I look to 
you, Mr. President, for wise and firm 
leadership, and you will have my full 
support. For my part, I will continue to 



pursue my diplomatic goal of Japan con- 
tributing more to the world. 

Japan and the United States have a 
number of common tasks ahead. To- 
gether we must take those initiatives to 
solve the many problems facing our 
world. Our meeting today confirmed 
that if our two peoples work together, 
hand-in-hand, there is nothing we can- 
not achieve. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of F^eb. 6, 1989. 

-Prime Minister Takeshita spoke in 
Japanese, and his remarks were translated 
by an interpreter. ■ 



East Asia, the Pacific, and the U.S.: 
An Economic Partnership 



Overview 

The economies of the East Asian and 
Pacific region' are important in the in- 
ternational trade of the United States 
and play a large and growing role in 
the world economy. During the past 
two to three decades, much of the re- 
gion has experienced rapid economic 
growth, sometimes more than 10% per 
year, largely because most East 
Asian governments are committed to 
outward-looking and market-oriented 
policies. Their combined gross national 
product is now about three-quarters of 
U.S. total output. Japan is the major 
economic power in the region. Other 
East Asian economies — such as 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore — are emulating its success- 
ful model of high rates of savings and 
investment, more efficient and ad- 
vanced industry, high-technology ex- 
ports, and increased educational and 
technical training. China also has been 
attempting to transform its economy 
along market lines and has experienced 
high rates of economic growth. 

East Asian exports have pene- 
trated almost every corner of the globe. 
Since 1983 U.S. -East Asian trade 
across the Pacific has exceeded our 
trade across the Atlantic. In 1987 U.S. 
trade with East Asia, which accounted 
for 35% of our global commerce, was 
greater than with any other region. At 
the same time, the U.S. trade deficit 
with East Asia was $107 billion, more 
than 60% of our worldwide trade 
shortfall. 



East Asian economic success has 
been accompanied by the growth of de- 
mocracy in the region. New democratic 
governments in the Philippines and 
South Korea exemplify this trend to- 
ward greater popular participation in 
the political process. This economic 
and political progress is buttressed by 
various bilateral military arrange- 
ments with the United States, which 
provide security and stability in the 
region. 

The economic growth and political 
development of East Asian countries 
and areas will likely give the region an 
even greater role in world affairs in the 
years leading up to the 21st century. 
Their exports, technological advances, 
capital, foreign investment, and eco- 
nomic assistance will have an increas- 
ing impact on other regions and on 
international trade and finance. The 
United States hopes that the region 
will take the lead in further reducing 
its trade barriers, either unilaterally 
or in the current Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations under 
the auspices of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A more 
open international trading system will 
enhance East Asia's future economic 
development and lessen the U.S. trade 
imbalance with the region. 

The United States will continue to 
be the major power in the Pacific, even 
though the rapid growth of the East 
Asian economies has lessened our rela- 
tive economic position. The U.S. mar- 
ket will probably remain the largest for 



33 



EAST ASIA 




INDIA I (.(Sr H 

■r\^ BURMA- ^ 
a«rGLADESH „ , LAOS Hana, Hong Kong 






Pacific 
Ocean 



(UK) 



^Manila 



Rangoon • 

THA,LAN. -^^^^^ 

BangkoK . camBODiU • . 

* -iy X tfi?nofn Penh P(«IL(f*PiNES 



Philippine 
Sea 




Yaren» 
NAURU 



^^^ k SOLOMON 
EA VV^LANDS 

Honiara*^ 



Indian 
Ocean 



VANUATliv. 



Caledonia ' 

(FRANCE) 



TUVALU 
Funafuti* 



Suva''^ 



Tasman 
Sea 



Names and boundary represenlation 
are not necessarily authoritative. 



Wellinglqn 
/ /ZEALAND 



0243 1-99 STATE (INR/GE) 



East Asian exports, but it is not likely 
to absorb their future rapid growth to 
the extent that it did earlier in this 
decade. The United States will contin- 
ue to be an important source of 
investment, high technology, and man- 
ufacturing facilities for East Asia, and 
our service industries are poised for an 
expanded role in the region. Addi- 
tionally, it remains an educational mag- 
net: 39% of all foreign students in the 
United States are East Asians. The 
mutually beneficial partnership be- 
tween the United States and East Asia, 
both multilaterally and through many 
personal ties and experiences, contrib- 
utes to developing a stronger inter- 
national economic system and the 
strengthening of democratic institu- 
tions among our allies and friends. 
A sense of interdependence is 
evolving among the economies of East 



Asia and the Pacific. The Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
has fostered cooperation among its 
members and dialogue with govern- 
ments in the Pacific basin and with oth- 
er developed countries. Community 
consciousness also has contributed to 
the formation and development of other 
organizations, such as the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council and the Pacific Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Conference. Future 
cooperation in the region could come 
from dialogue in some kind of new Pa- 
cific basin forum on various topics of 
mutual interest: 

• Structural economic policies, 
such as privatization of public enter- 
prises and lowering of trade barriers, 
that would promote further growth, ef- 
ficiency, private sector initiatives, and 
free trade; 



• Deregulation and improvement • 
transportation systems to facilitate tli 
movement of goods, people, and infor- 
mation throughout the region; 

• Promotion of educational ex- 
changes with the United States; and 

• Protection of natural resources 
and the environment. 

The United States hopes to partic 
pate with all market-oriented govern- 
ments of the region in the developmen 
of this dialogue and the establishment 
of a mutually beneficial East Asian/ ^ 
Pacific agenda in the coming years. 

Japan 

Because of its strength as the second 
largest economy in the noncommunist 
world, Japan is the major economic 
power in East Asia. The combined Gh 
of the United States and Japan totals 
about 35% of world output. The two 
countries have close economic, politi- 
cal, cultural, and security ties. This & 
liance has been and will continue to b 
the cornerstone of U.S. policies in Ea» 
Asia. 

Japan's strong export performano 
since the 1960s has been the envy of d' 
veloped and developing countries. Ja- 
pan's share of world exports is now 
more than 10%, about twice its share 
20 years ago. U.S. -Japanese trade has^ 
grown to $116 billion in 1987, second 
only to U.S. -Canadian commerce. Ou- 
trade deficit with Japan, which begar 
in 1965, has increased to almost $60 b 
lion per year in 1986-87, although it ii 
now coming down slowly. 

The U.S. Government aims to in- 
crease U.S. exports to Japan. During, 
the past 4 years, U.S. -Japanese trade 
negotiations have opened Japanese mi 
kets for U.S. exports of such items as 
drugs, medical equipment, semicondv 
tors, telecommunications equipment, 
beef, and citrus products. In addition 
American goods have become more 
competitive in Japan because of the dl 
preciation of the dollar and greater 
U.S. attention to the quality of our e> 
port products. Although much progra 
has been made, the United States con 
tinues to call upon Japan to implemen 
further trade liberalization and to ex- 
pand its domestic markets. The U.S. 
Government has pointed out that sucl 
measures would benefit Japan, the 
United States, and the international 
trading system. 



34 



EAST ASIA 



According to U.S. data, the stock 
Jirect investment in each other's 
momies grew rapidly to $43 billion 
the end of 1987, almost three times 
re than in 1982. Japan's direct in- 
itment in the United States was 
rly $31 billion at the end of 1987. 
ere are Japanese-owned manufactur- 
facilities in 40 U.S. States, employ- 
more than 100,000 Americans. 
Pxluctive foreign investment can 
Hnij; better jobs, more efficient opera- 
is, greater choice of quality goods at 
ilH'titive prices, and the transfer of 
liial and technology to us. They also 
li'ct the growing linkages between 
two economies. 

The United States and Japan have 
i kt'd to coordinate their economic 
hit's and e.xchange rates to assure 
lilc economic growth. For example, 
two countries agreed in October 
. fi that Japan should cut interest 
I's while increasing government 
. tiding and that the United States 
.^ uld continue to seek reductions in 
It budget deficit, in order to reduce 
t'ir large external imbalances. This 
ln'ration has been bolstered by 
littnnual subcabinet economic meet- 



ings, numerous trade negotiations, and 
other official contacts between the two 
countries. 

Japan has become a major source of 
economic aid, primarily to other coun- 
tries in Asia. At the Toronto economic 
summit in June 1988, Japanese Prime 
Minister Noboru Takeshita outlined a 
new program of $50 billion in official 
development assistance over the next 5 
years. The Government of Japan in- 
tends to increase the grant component 
of this assistance, require fewer condi- 
tions on its loans, and provide $1 billion 
in debt relief to the poorest developing 
countries. Japan is likely to become the 
world's largest aid donor in 1989. The 
United States welcomes this develop- 
ment as part of our interest in having 
our allies make a greater contribution 
to common global interests. We hope 
that Japan will extend a greater pro- 
portion of its expanded foreign aid pro- 
gram on a grant basis. 

China 

During the past decade, the United 
States and the People's Republic of Chi- 
na (P.R.C.) have enjoyed a significant 
expansion in economic relations. The 



United States is China's third largest 
trading partner. In 1988 our bilateral 
trade exceeded $13 billion, nearly a 
seven-fold increase since diplomatic re- 
lations were normalized 10 years ago. 
In the same period, U.S. investment 
committed to China increased to more 
than $;-5 billion and has focused on ener- 
gy exploration, electronics, te.xtiles, 
food processing, hotels, and construc- 
tion. This relationship has been 
achieved without compromising our 
friendship for, or cooperation with, the 
people of Taiwan. 

China has had impressive economic 
growth during the last decade, averag- 
ing nearly 10% per year. Under the 
leadership of Chairman Deng Xiaoping, 
the P.R.C. has undertaken a series of 
far-reaching economic reforms, includ- 
ing decentralizing enterprise manage- 
ment, relaxing price controls, and 
encouraging trade and investment with 
market economies. As a result of these 
reforms, industrial production rose 
dramatically, and agricultural output 
expanded and diversified. Recently, 
however, China postponed further price 
reforms in an effort to bring inflation 
under control. In 1988 the annual offi- 
cial inflation rate was about 20% na- 



Economic Indicators, 1987 

(U.S. $ millions, unless otherwise indicated) 





Population 

(millions) 


GNP 


Real GNP 
Growth 

(%) 


GNP Per 
Capita 

(U.S.S) 


Consumer Price 
Intiation 

(%) 


Exports 

(f.o.b.) 


imports 

(c.i.f.) 


Trade 
Balance 


U.S. 
Exports 


U.S. 
Imports 


U.S. Trade 
Balance 


ASEAN' 


301.0 


199,827 


5.4 


663 


- 


83,354 


79,751 


3,603 


9,840 


18,052 


(8,212) 


Australia 


15.9 


195,521 


4.4 


12,100 


7.1 


26,433 


29,350 


(2,917) 


5,467 


3,287 


2,180 


Zhma 


1.074.0 


293,383 


9.4 


273 


7.3 


39.542 


43,392 


(3.850) 


3,488 


6,911 


(3.423) 


Hong Kong' 2 


5.7 


46,196 


13.6 


8,230 


5.5 


48,478 


48,467 


11 


3,983 


10,490 


(6,507) 


ndonesia' 


170.4 


65,291 


3.0 


383 


8.0 


17.600 


13,100 


4,500 


764 


3,719 


(2,955) 


Japan 


121.1 


2,384,500 


4.2 


19,537 


0.1 


229,100 


149,200 


79,900 


28,200 


88,074 


(59,874) 


Korea 


42.1 


118,300 


12.6 


2,830 


3.0 


47,282 


41,021 


6,261 


7,665 


17,991 


(10,326) 


Vlalaysia' 


16.5 


29,800 


4.7 


1,750 


0.8 


17,897 


12,670 


5,227 


1,895 


3,053 


(1,158) 


New Zealand '3 


3.3 


35,200 


- 0.9 


10,700 


13.5 


7,196 


7,233 


(37) 


815 


1,180 


(365) 


Philippines' 


57.7 


33,398 


5.7 


595 


7.4 


5,720 


7,715 


(1,455) 


1,584 


2,481 


(897) 


Singapore' 


2.6 


19,398 


8.8 


7,413 


0.9 


28,622 


32,487 


(3,865) 


4,023 


6.395 


(2,372) 


Taiwan 


19.7 


97,200 


11.2 


4,925 


0.2 


52,100 


33,000 


19.100 


7,186 


26.406 


(19,220) 


Thailand' 


53.7 


47,000 


6.6 


875 


2.5 


11,719 


13,023 


(1,777) 


1,483 


2,387 


(904) 


United States 


243.9 


4,487,700 


4.0 


18,400 


4.4 


252,866 


424,082 


(171,216) 


- 


- 


- 



*' Product data are on gross domestic product (GDP), rather than gross national product (GNP). 

2 Total exports include reexports; total domestic exports were $19,700 million. 

3 GDP for fiscal year ending IVlarch 31, 1988. 

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Embassies, International Monetary Fund, East Asian and Pacific governments 



CjDartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



35 



EAST ASIA 



tionwide and 25-30% in urban areas. 
Despite China's opening to the West, 
opportunities to trade with and invest 
in China are restricted in many impor- 
tant ways by Chinese law and practice. 

China continues to be strongly in- 
terested in acquiring state-of-the-art 
technology in order to modernize key 
sectors of its economy. In recent years, 
the United States has liberalized con- 
trols on the export of high-technology 
items to China. Chinese imports of 
computers and sophisticated electronic 
equipment have increased dramatically. 

The United States and China have 
the largest bilateral science and tech- 
nology cooperation program of its kind 
for each side, with some 400 coopera- 
tive activities under 30 bilateral agree- 
ments. For example, a December 1985 
agreement provides for cooperation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
More than 30,000 Chinese students cur- 
rently are enrolled in U.S. universities, 
while roughly 7,000 Americans are 
studying or teaching in the P.R.C. 

Four Asian "Tigers" 

The newly industrialized economies of 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore are often referred to as the 
four Asian "tigers" or "dragons." Their 
success stems in large part from a 
commitment to private sector and/or 
market-oriented economic policies that 
have resulted in very rapid growth of 
industries and exports as well as the 
unleashing of human resources. 

In recent years, the United States 
has played an important part in this 
economic development by providing a 
relatively open market for their prod- 
ucts. Our trade deficits with the four 
"tigers" grew to $38 billion in 1987, ac- 
counted for primarily by deficits with 
Taiwan ($19.2 billion) and South Korea 
($10.3 billion). As these two have be- 
come stronger economically, they have 
begun to lower their trade barriers and 
make their exchange rates more realis- 
tic, but they need to do more on both 
fronts to reduce their trade imbalances 
with the United States. 



South Korea. The Republic of Ko- 
rea has witnessed astounding economic 
changes in this decade as real GNP has 
doubled. In the process, Korea has be- 
come America's seventh largest trading 
partner among individual countries. It 
now exports high-technology goods, 
such as automobiles and electronics, to 
the United States, Japan, and else- 
where. Soaring per capita income, de- 
clining unemployment, and reduced 
foreign debt have allowed Korea to 
move in the direction of a more liber- 
alized economy. During the past year. 
South Korea has made the transition to 
democracy by restoring freedom to the 
media and providing for full participa- 
tion in elections. A multiparty political 
system has emerged. The United 
States fully supports these political de- 
velopments while continuing to provide 
military support under a bilateral secu- 
rity agreement. 

Taiwan. The people of Taiwan have 
generated enviable economic growth, 
averaging nearly double-digit annual 
rates since the 1950s. As elsewhere in 
East Asia, industry has expanded and 
produced higher value-added products. 
Taiwan's authorities have lowered tar- 
iffs, relaxed foreign exchange controls, 
strengthened the protection of intellec- 
tual property, encouraged export diver- 
sification, and appreciated the 
currency (40% against the U.S. dollar 
since 1985). Although U.S. exports to 
Taiwan have increased, our trade defi- 
cit with Taiwan was $19 billion in 1987. 
Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves at 
the end of 1988 were about $75 billion, 
exceeded only by Japan. Taiwan's politi- 
cal system has become more open 
in recent years. The United States wel- 
comes Taiwan's economic and political 
modernization but has urged its leaders 
to lower trade barriers further and al- 
low a more realistic exchange rate. 

Hong Kong and Singapore. These 
two "city states" also have experienced 
rapid economic development; they have 
the highest per capita GNPs among the 
newly industrialized economies. Lack- 
ing natural resources, the accomplish- 
ments of Hong Kong and Singapore 



have been largely due to strong marke 
orientation and hard-working and dist 
plined labor forces. Savings and inves 
ment rates in Singapore are among th 
highest in the world. Hong Kong and 
Singapore are extremely successful e> 
amples of the virtues of export-led 
growth. Their economies, which have 
almost completely free markets and 
which center around very busy ports, 
are totally dependent on the mainte- 
nance of an open international trading 
system. Both Hong Kong's domestic e) 
ports and reexports from China have 
skyrocketed in the past 20 years. 

ASEAN Countries 

More than 300 million people live in tl' 
six nations which make up the Associa 
tion of South East Asian Nations — the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tha 
land, Singapore, and Brunei. The 
ASEAN countries are rich in natural 
resources, possess talented and hard- 
working populations, and, to a large e 
tent, have pursued market-oriented d 
velopment policies. Since 1977 these 
nations have averaged annual real GN 
growth of more than 5% , one of the ec 
nomic success stories among developii 
countries. 

The United States has maintaine 
cooperative economic relations with tl 
ASEAN countries. We continue to be 
the largest consumer for ASEAN mai 
ufactures. U.S. -ASEAN trade, ex- 
panding rapidly, was about $28 billior 
in 1987, making ASEAN our seventh 
most important trading partner. Unf( 
tunately, most ASEAN countries (not 
including Singapore and Brunei) reta 
relatively high tariff barriers and oth 
nontariff constraints. U.S. direct in- 
vestment in ASEAN economies totah 
approximately $10 billion at the end o 
1987. Many U.S. companies manufac- 
ture increasingly higher technology 
products and components in ASEAN 
countries for reexport to the United 
States and other markets. The Unitec 
States has engaged in regular econon 
ic dialogue with ASEAN. In addition, 
we are engaged in the U.S. -ASEAN 
initiative, a broad-gauged study of ou 
economic relationship, including anah 
sis of possible liberalization measures 
both sides can take to strengthen it. 



36 



EAST ASIA 



The Philippines. After years of 
'dining economic health, the Philip- 
iits increased its real GNP by almost 
( in 1987; even stronger growth is an- 
•ipated in 1988. President Corazon 
iiuino's government has instituted fis- 
I and market-opening reforms, but 
on' could be done to make the econ- 
iiy more efficient and dynamic and to 
icdurage foreign investment. Unem- 
iiyment and underemployment remain 
liiuis problems. The Philippines has a 
rut' external debt totaling approx- 
iiately $30 billion. The United States 
1 s strongly supported the transition 
t democracy in the Philippines during 
le past 3 years. 

The U.S. Government is providing 
ii' Philippines with high levels of eeo- 
niic and security assistance — about 
:i"i million during FY 1988 — as part 
( (lur effort to maintain mutually ben- 
( cial economic, political, and security 
ilations. U.S. military facilities in the 
1 ilippines are very important to U.S. 
(feiise interests in the Pacific, a large 
rt of the Philippines' and the region's 
(tenses, and the source of substantial 
( inomic benefits — employing more 
t m (i8,000 Filipinos and injecting 
I ndreds of millions of dollars into the 
1 a! economy. The U.S. Government 
; has taken the lead in calling on its 
I ends and allies to increase aid, pro- 
I lie investment, and open markets to 
1 ilippine exports. 

Indonesia. The Indonesian 
( jnomy — the largest though least de- 
1 oped (in terms of annual per capita 
i ome) among ASEAN members — has 
t ed the challenge of lower and fluctu- 
1 ne oil prices since 1983. In order to 
( iniote growth, the Government of In- 
( lesia has undertaken sweeping 
s uctural reforms, restrained public 
; 'nding, maintained currency con- 
\ libility, encouraged foi'eign invest- 
r nt and capital market development, 
i 1 instituted a series of trade, bank- 
i ;, and tax reforms. The United 
; itt's welcomes these initiatives. Indo- 
I -ia has boosted non-oil exports, 
\ ich now account for more than one- 
Hf of its export earnings. External 
( nt has risen sharply in recent years 
I about $45 billion at the end of 1988. 



Malaysia. The Malaysian economy 
is moving from dependence on commod- 
ities (such as tin and rubber) to a light 
manufacturing base. Electronics prod- 
ucts have become the largest export 
earner. Malaysia had a 1987 trade sur- 
plus of more than $5 billion. Commerce 
with the United States has grown rap- 
idly. Real GNP growth was nearly 5% 
in 1987 and is expected to be higher in 
1988. The country's financial condition 
remains solid because the government 
has pursued responsible fiscal policies. 

Thailand. Thailand had economic 

growth of almost 7% in 1987, and pros- 
pects are even better for 1988. The 
government has promoted export diver- 
sification and encouraged foreign in- 
vestment. Foreign exchange earnings 
from tourism soared in 1987 to nearly 
$2 billion. The United States is Thai- 
land's largest export market. However, 
the Thais are very concerned about 
U.S. agricultural subsidies, partic- 
ularly for rice, and the threat of U.S. 
import restrictions, especially on tex- 
tiles. The main recent U.S. concern 
about our trade with Thailand has been 
lack of Thai protection of U.S. intellec- 
tual property rights, such as copyrights 
and patent protection of U.S. phar- 
maceutical products. 



South Pacific 

Australia. The main source of strength 
in the Australian economy is its export 
sector, especially agricultural products 
and raw materials. Exports increased 
by 19% in 1987. About one-half of Aus- 
tralian merchandise exports go to 11 
Asian nations, principally Japan. How- 
ever, Australia remains an important 
trading partner with the United 
States. It is one of the few Pacific coun- 
tries with which the United States has 
a sizable and consistent trade surplus. 
The Australian Government has under- 
taken significant economic reforms, in- 
cluding a program of phased tariff 
reductions. It has complained about 
subsidized U.S. agricultural exports 
that restrict Australian sales. Our long 
and cooperative alliance relationship 
with Australia is based on mutual eco- 
nomic, political, and security interests. 



New Zealand. Prime Minister 
David Lange's government has insti- 
tuted far-reaching reforms, including 
decreases in protectionism, less gov- 
ernment spending, and better manage- 
ment of the public sector, in order to 
achieve more efficient resource alloca- 
tion and to reduce inflation. As a re- 
sult, real GNP was down slightly in 
1987 and is expected to decline further 
in 1988. New Zealand remains heavily 
dependent on agricultural exports. Ja- 
pan, Australia, and the United States 
account for about one-half of New Zea- 
land's trade. For many years, the 
United States and New Zealand were 
military allies under the Australia- 
New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) 
treaty. However, in 1986, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment suspended its security guar- 
antees to New Zealand under the 
ANZUS alliance because of New Zea- 
land's restrictive policy regarding U.S. 
naval ship visits. The United States 
hopes that the New Zealand Govern- 
ment will come to realize the value of 
restoring traditional alliance 
cooperation. 



'Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, In- 
donesia, Malaysia, Thailand. Australia, and 
New Zealand are considered here. ■ 



37 



EUROPE 



Secretary Meets With NATO Allies 



Secretary Baker departed Ottawa 
o» February 11, 1989, to confer with 
NATO allies in Europe. He returned to 
Washington on February 17. Following 
are remarks he made on various 
occasions during the trip. 



Iceland 



REYKJAVIK, 
FEB. 11, 1989' 

Foreign Minister Hannibalsson. Now 

that our discussions are over, I think it 
is right to mention, in a few words, 
what we touched upon. 

This is the first visit by the Ameri- 
can Secretary of State on his schedule 
to visit the Foreign Ministers of all the 
other NATO countries. What we main- 
ly talked about was the period of 
change in the East-West relations that 
we are now experiencing, the prepara- 
tions for the NATO leaders' conference 
in Brussels this spring, and then, first 
and foremost, the NATO proposals in 
disarmament matters, especially as far 
as the talks that are now starting in 
the beginning of March in Vienna are 
concerned, which have the main goals 
of trying to obtain an accord on conven- 
tional disarmament and conventional 
armies on the European Continent. 

Then we talked about many bilat- 
eral issues; we talked about defense co- 
operation. We talked about the whaling 
issue and specific issues in that 
conte.xt. 

These were very productive talks, 
and, as the Secretary of State men- 
tioned, these talks were conducted in a 
manner that is directed at trying to es- 
tablish a personal working relationship 
with his colleagues within NATO, as 
President Bush has emphasized that 
the cooperation within NATO is one of 
the cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy. 

Secretary Baker. Let me simply 
say that the minister and I have had 
very productive discussions, taking 
note of the fact that we have somewhat 
similar backgrounds, by virtue of the 
fact that we both were finance minis- 
ters before we became foreign minis- 
ters. The United States and Iceland 
are friends and allies, and together 
we're founding members of the NATO 
alliance. 



We had wide-ranging discussions 
on the full range of NATO issues — 
issues related to East-West matters 
and the bilateral issues, which are at 
the forefront of relationships between 
the United States and Iceland. 

I'm glad that this was the first 
country that I was able to visit outside 
the North American Continent as Sec- 
retary of State of the United States. I 
look forward to a continuing relation- 
ship with the minister and the estab- 
lishment of a close, personal rela- 
tionship between us. 

Q. Were you able to offer any as- 
surance to the Icelanders on the ques- 
tion of off-shore pollution from the 
NATO base here on Iceland? 

Secretary Baker. We were able to 
offei' some assurance with respect to 
the ground water problem that e.xists. 
The study that is being conducted will 
be released sometime during the month 
of February, and we agreed that imme- 
diately upon release of that report, we 
would begin discussions to see how we 
can address the problem together. 

Q. Did you issue [sic] the problem 
of second NATO airport in Iceland? 

Secretary Baker. We talked about 
that issue as well, and had a full dis- 
cussion about that issue. 

Q. And the results? 

Secretary Baker. The matter will 
remain under consideration. I think the 
minister is disposed to seeing the alter- 
nate airport located at the best possible 
location, as long as it is made quite 
clear that there will be no specific mili- 
tary requirements with respect to its 
use. I think that, ultimately, those as- 
surances will be forthcoming. 

Q. Do you want that airport in 
Iceland, or is another country 
possible? 

Secretary Baker. It would be pref- 
erable if it were in Iceland. 



United Kingdom 



LONDON. 
FEB. 12, 19892 

Foreign Secretary Howe. I would like, 
if I may, to just make a very short 
statement saying that we have been de- 
lighted to welcome the new Secretary 



i 1 



of State here on his first visit since 1 
appointment. It is part, of course, of 
his tour of NATO capitals, so that th 
topics we have discussed have been 
very largely concentrated in that 
area — the handling of East-West reli 
tions and the way in which the NAT( 
alliance addresses itself to that. We 
have taken the opportunity of talking, 
about as many other things as we've 
had time to do, and we've had an ex- 
tremely useful opportunity of talkini 
together. 

We're not, of course, strangers, 
cause I knew Secretary of State Bat 
when he was Secretary of the Treas- 
ury. We both share a common past o: 
being ex-finance ministers, which 
consolidates the strength of our 
relationship. 

Q. Have any decisions been 
reached? 

Foreign Secretary Howe. This i 
not an occasion for decision-taking; ii 
an occasion for reviewing the agenda 
The Secretary of State would like toii 
say something now. 

Secretary Baker. I would like i(^ 
echo what Sir Geoffrey has said. Am 
as he has pointed out, we are, indee( 
not strangers. We have had an assoc 
tion through my experience as Secrt 
tary of the Treasury, his as Chancel ■ 
of the Exchequer and as Secretary i 
his current capacity. 

We did concentrate on issues af- 
fecting the alliance, but we talked 
about a whole wide range of issues a 
well. In answer to your initial specit 
question, I thought we had a very 
productive and, hopefully, fruitful 
discussion. 

Q. Did you reach any consensu 
between the United States on how i 
handle the question of modernizati i 
of the Lance missiles in Europe? 

Foreign Secretary Howe. No. T ■^ 
is not an occasion for us reaching spt 
cific conclusions on any topic. The St 
retary of State is on a tour to the wl e 
range of NATO capitals, and we shal 
be considering continuing our manaj 
ment of that and other questions to- 
gether within the alliance as always, 
think we aren't going to have any nn 
questions, unless you would like to si 
something. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin/April 19' 



EUROPE 



Secretary Baker. I would like to 
lyjust one thing. As I have pointed 
it, as I pointed out yesterday, and in 
)th Canada and Iceland, this trip of 
line is primarily an agenda-setting 
•ip. It gives us an opportunity to con- 
ilt with our NATO allies at a time 
hen we are engaged in policy formula- 
.111 in the United States. 

President Bush, of course, believes 
rongly in the importance of the alli- 
ice. He would like to do everything he 
m to maintain a strong alliance and, 
fact, if possible, strengthen it. One 
ay to do that is to have true consulta- 
ons rather than simply briefings or 
)tifications, and this affords us 
1 opportunity to have those true 
■nsultations. 



West Germany 



ONN. 

EB. 13, 1989-* 

hought I would give you a readout on 
r meeting. This will be on the rec- 
d. I apologize for not staying too 
ig, because we've got the Defense 
inister waiting. We ran about 15 or 20 
inutes over. 

First of all, I want to say that our 
ssion was conducted in a very, very 
iendly atmosphere, because this was 
neeting between old friends — and 
len I say that, I'm using the Chancel- 
■'s language and not mine, but I sub- 
ribe to it. Fundamentally, in my view, 
e bottom line on this meeting is that 
e German-American partnership is 
I'ong. We are strong partners, and we 
List one another. 

We discussed the question of the 
byan chemical weapons plant and the 
tions that the Federal Republic has 
ken with respect to changes in their 
port control laws relating to the pun- 
iment of offenders, and with respect 
a statement that they are going to is- 
e in a day or so, laying out the full 
.•ts as they understand them sur- 
unding this incident. I expressed the 
ct that we were very pleased with the 
tions that they've taken as they have 
tlined them to us. We spent some 
ne on that. We spent a good bit of our 
ne on discussions regarding Easi- 
est security. 

And on that score, I would say to 
u that we had productive discussions 



on East-West security matters, includ- 
ing the SNF [short-range nuclear 
forces] issue. We took note of, of 
course, and reaffirmed the Brussels- 
NATO communique of 1988, including 
the importance of maintaining the for- 
ward defense and flexible response 
strategy. We agreed on the need to 
complete a comprehensive concept for 
alliance security and arms control at 
the next NATO summit, and we agreed 
that our discussions on these matters 
will be continuing. The Chancellor told 
us, in no uncertain terms, that what he 
had said in the Financial Times inter- 
view was exactly in line with what was 
said in the NATO communique of May 
1988, and several times he said to us, "I 
have not changed my position." He au- 
thorized us to say that to you. 

Q. Does that mean that the SNF 
debate is simply behind you? That it 
will be dealt with in the NATO sum- 
mit and it will no longer be directed 
to— 

A. It means that there is commit- 
ment to resolve this through further dis- 
cussions and negotiations. 

Q. And there won't be any inter- 
im discussions; it will then be dealt 
with in NATO, I mean— 

A. It will be dealt with whenever 
the next NATO summit is, in terms of 
being formally dealt with, and we would 
expect, of course, to have continuing dis- 
cussions in the interim. 

Q. Do you think you can get Con- 
gress to support financially the devel- 
opment of modernization of the 
Lance missile, if we don't get a deci- 
sion or commitment to deploy it until, 
say, 1991 or 1992? 

A. Let's wait and see what happens 
at the next NATO summit, because that 
is the decision meeting. As I have said 
before, this trip was not intended to be a 
decision-taking trip. These are agenda- 
setting meetings; they're consultative 
meetings. I'm here to listen. So we can't 
answer that question until we actually 
have the summit — whenever that's going 
to be. 

Q. I wanted follow up on some of 
the remarks you made on the plane 
yesterday about the START [strategic 
arms reduction talks] treaty — your 
own feelings about it and the ability 
to get it through Congress. I wonder 
if you could clarify those remarks, 
because there is some confusion. 



A. If there is any confusion, let me 
set it straight. All I intended to say — 
and I have said this before, maybe not in 
the confirmation hearing, although I 
said something very close to it in the 
confirmation hearing — is we want to 
reexamine the negotiating positions; 
take a look at what's on the table; review 
the bidding, so that when we move for- 
ward, assuming we do, when we bring 
back a treaty, we will bring back one 
that we can get ratified. That's all I was 
intending to say. 

Q. You suggested in that conver- 
sation yesterday that there were 
flaws in the existing outline which 
might not allow it to make it through 
Congress if it were there in its pres- 
ent form. 

A. I think if you read the exact lan- 
guage, and I went back and had it read 
to me, it is clear that I expressed reser- 
vations about the potential ratifiability 
of the agreement, that we want to make 
certain — 

Q. — in its present form? 

A. We do have — and we've said this 
many times — to make a strategic mod- 
ernization decision in the United States. 
And we have to confront that, and we, 
therefore, will have to take a look at — 
and I'm not saying that this is a flaw in 
our present negotiating positions or 
anything — but we have taken a position 
against mobile missiles. One of the 
things that we will have to examine in 
our strategic modernization review is 
the question of mobile missiles. But what 
I was really speaking to was the general 
principle that we want to make certain 
that whatever we bring back, we can get 
ratified and that we don't bring back a 
SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] 
agreement and have that kind of problem 
with any START agreement that we 
negotiate. 

Q. Back on SNF, the Germans 
are pushing for commitments 
in the comprehensive concept — 
commitments to negotiate on SNF. 
Are you willing to support that? 

A. You see, again, this was not a 
decision meeting. This meeting was to 
simply set the agenda. I have told you 
what we discussed and where we left it. 
And I want to leave it there. There will 
be further discussion, and I'm sure ques- 
tions such as that will be dealt with in 
those further discussions as we move to- 
ward a NATO summit. 



apartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



39 



EUROPE 



Q. Chancellor Kohl said that he 
wasn't saying anything new. But you 
are saying that there will be further 
discussions. That implies that there 
is still disagreement about what he 
said, that we want to find out exactly 
what he meant — it sounds like you 
haven't yet. 

A. I have found out that he was not 
backing off prior positions as many peo- 
ple had suggested. He said that and au- 
thorized me to say that to you. So it 
seems to me that we have. 

Q. Can you tell us what you un- 
derstand him to be saying when he 
says that he is in line with the May 
1988 communique? What does that 
mean to you? 

A. What it means to me specifically, 
with reference to paragraph 5 of that 
communique, just to pick one paragraph, 
is: "Our aim will be to continue to pre- 
vent any kind of war or intimidation. By 
maintaining credible deterrence the Al- 
liance has secured peace in Europe for 
nearly 40 years. Conventional defenses 
alone cannot insure this. Therefore, for 
the foreseeable future there is no alter- 
native to the Alliance strategy for the 
prevention of war. This is a strategy of 
deterrence based upon an appropriate 
mix of adequate and effective nuclear 
and conventional forces which will con- 
tinue to be kept up-to-date where 
necessary." 

Q. When was the decision on 
modernizing the Lance to be made? 
Was it to be made this year or was it 
to be made next year? 

A. That decision will be the subject 
of discussion, as will others, leading up 
to this next summit. It would be, in our 
view, preferable if the decision could 
be made at the next summit. And we 
will be working to see if that can be 
achieved, taking into consideration the 
interests of all of our NATO partners. 

Q. You went into this meeting 
with a rather fuzzy situation with 
regard to the deployment decision 
which you just mentioned. But clear 
differences [exist] between the two 
governments with regard to negotia- 
tions on the question. Do you feel 
that there has been any narrowing of 
meaning toward the meeting-of-minds 
between you and Chancellor Kohl and 
the German Government about the is- 
sues of negotiating on these short- 
range missiles? 



A. I think that there will be con- 
tinuing discussion with respect to both 
of those, although I have to say this was 
not a decision-taking meeting. That was 
not really what we were here for. It did, 
I hope, clear up some confusion that had 
crept into the public record out there. 

Q. Having talked now with Chan- 
cellor Kohl, and obviously with some 
of the other allies as well, and having 
discussed the political problems in 
Germany which we did discuss in Brit- 
ain, for example, do you have a better 
understanding now of the process 
that NATO ought to take to try to 
avoid putting the kind of pressure on 
the Chancellor that could give him 
trouble next year in the elections? 

A. I think it's fair to say that after 
spending this much time here and in 
these countries, I will have a better 
understanding — hopefully I will; that's 
the purpose of the trip. 



A. We briefly touched upon that 
subject, and there were no major difft 
ences between us in that regard. It is 
little hard to respond to your questioi 
the way that it was posed. 



Denmark 



COPENHAGEN, 
FEB. 13. 1989» 

Q. Have you had a chance to discuss 
with your Danish counterpart the 
German Chancellor's indication that 
he wants to postpone the moderniza- 
tion of the short-range missiles? 

A. We have discussed a wide range 
of issues — some having to do with the al- 
liance, and bilateral issues as well, and 
we did touch upon the SNF issue in the 
context of the comprehensive concept. 

Q. And the German decision? 

A. We talked about the SNF issue 
in the context of the comprehensive con- 
cept; that's basically where I'd leave it. 

Q. What did you say about it? 

A. We will have to talk about that 
later. 

Q. Is it acceptable from your Ad- 
ministration's point of view that the 
Danes say "no" to the nuclear ships 
in the harbors in peace time? 

A. Let me say that the minister and 
I have had a number of discussions that I 
think we ought to keep between us for 
the time being. 

Q. Have you discussed that 
subject? 




OSLO, 

FEB. 15, 19895 

Prime Minister Brundtland. We ha 

been happy to receive the American 
foreign minister here today with his 
delegation. We appreciate highly th( 
terest in a broad dialogue with the 1 
ropean allies and that you so quickl; 
visited Oslo. You have a tight schedi 
to see all the allies in such a short ti 
But we think it is a very important 
start for a new Administration. Am 
will be working with you on all the \ 
tal issues that we have to deal with 
togethei'. 

Secretary Baker. It is a pleasu 
for me to be here. This is, as you kn 
my first trip to Norway. I am deligh 
to have the ojjportunity to be here, i 
lighted to be able to meet with my 
counterpart, [Foreign] Minister 
Stoltenberg. I look forward to estat 
lishing a close personal relationship 
with him. We are going to meet aga 
during the course of this month in 
Washington; he will be there later o 
this month. 

I might say that our relations — 
relations between the United State: 
and Norway — are in such good shap* 
that there frankly were no specific 1 
lateral issues that we had to spend 
much of our time on. We talked for t 
most part about, a broad range of Ea 
West issues and other issues respeci 
the alliance. 

Q. Did you discuss the "compr 
hensive concept"? 

Prime Minister Brundtland. T 

answer is yes. 

Q. Can you tell us Norway's pc 

tion on the "comprehensive concep 

Prime Minister Brundtland. L' 

[me] say it this way: In the "compreh 
sive concept," there are many parts 
be discussed within that framework. 
We believe that it should be a wide 
agenda including both deterrence art 
disarmament negotiations; a perspec 
five on the NATO side for our dealin 



40 



Department of State Bulletin/April 1£) 



EUROPE 



,th and cooperation to find solutions 
,th the Warsaw Pact and Soviet 
[lion; and in that it means the SNF 
estion, as I know you are concerned 
th, is part of that total agenda. 

Q. Should there be negotiations 
1 SNF? Should there be negotiations 
I SNF within the "comprehensive 
ncept"? 

8 Prime Minister Brundtland. We 
ed to discuss the content of the "com- 
jehensive concept" even more before 
t?re is a clear answer to all the ques- 
t ns involved as we see it. 



Greece 




.;kaka. 

I;B. 14. 1989« 

■ rotary Baiier. Let me just say that 
. have had a very interesting discus- 
.<! today with [Foreign] Minister 
imaz and with Prime Minister Ozal. I 
a pleased to be here. It's my first trip 
t Furkey since I was here in 1953 when 
I as a member of the U.S. Marine 

■ps. 

1 am looking forward to establish- 
1 a close personal relationship with 
• minister. We've met once before in 

-hington, although I've had some 
p )r contacts with Prime Minister 
Cil. 

Foreign Minister Yilmaz. We ap- 

p date very much the gesture of the 
"ri .■ U.S. Administration to consult 
' h the allies so promptly. Although 
o American friends have termed this 
a I "get-acquainted" visit, we must 
s that the outstanding qualities of 
\ Baker are very well known to us, 
we believe that he will be an asset 
the further strengthening of our re- 
i; ons with the United States. 
During our talks this afternoon, 
tiad the opportunity to briefly cover 
i.-sues concerning the alliance and 
111 lateral relations. We are grati- 
[i 1 to note that both sides have the 
IV 1 to further enhance these relations 
!1 fields and in a mutual beneficial 
and not to mortgage them to the 
;i 'rests of any third party. 



ATHENS. 
FEB. 14. 1989' 

Prime Minister Papandreou. It was 

with great pleasure that we welcomed 
today the new U.S. Secretary of State, 
Mr James Baker, who is making a tour 
of the European capitals in order to es- 
tablish strong bonds among the Foreign 
Ministers so that they may confront the 
increasingly complicated problems hu- 
manity, and particularly our region, 
faces. 

I stressed to the Secretary that it 
is not only the desire of the Greek Gov- 
ernment but of all Greek people to ad- 
vance and to constantly improve 
relations between our two countries 
and to resolve any existing bilateral is- 
sues in a spirit of goodwill and coopera- 
tion. At the same time, we had 
the opportunity to exchange views on 
issues pertaining to the "region of 
Europe" — East and West — and Latin 
America. I want to wish Mr. Baker a 
good trip and every success in his 
work. 

Secretary Baker. It's a real pleas- 
ure for me to have the opportunity to 
be here in Greece. As I told you, I have 
been anxious to return for many years. 
The only time I have spent in Greece 
was way back in 1953 when I spent 
quite a bit of time here engaged in ex- 
ercises with your armed forces as a 
part of the NATO exercises at the time. 
I recalled to you the very, very warm 
relationships that existed in those days 
between the Greek and American peo- 
ples: and you pointed out how those re- 
lationships, government to government, 
are improving all the time and how we 
can look forward in the very near term 
to relationships between the Greek and 
American people that are equally as 
warm as they were in 1953. 

As the Prime Minister indicated, 
we had frank and friendly discussions 
of a wide range of issues — East-West is- 
sues, issues affecting the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty Organization, and our 
bilateral issues. And I share the Prime 
Minister's view that we can proceed in 
a spirit of mutual cooperation and 
understanding. 



ATHENS. 
FEB. 14. 1989-* 

Secretary Baker. I'm pleased to have 
had the opportunity to come to Greece 
in the first weeks of my tenure as Sec- 
retary of State, to meet Prime Minis- 
ter Papandreou and my colleague, 
Foreign Minister Papoulias, who, of 
course, was delayed coming in from 
Spain but did arrive here in time for us 
to have a dialogue. 

President Bush is committed to 
two-way communications between the 
United States and its allies, and I view 
this visit as a first step in a process of 
regular high-level consultations. We 
held talks today on a variety of matters 
of mutual concern; we had a chance to 
share views on NATO, East-West poli- 
cies, regional issues, and bilateral is- 
sues which are important to both of our 
governments. 

I earlier characterized our talks as 
frank but friendly. We discussed the is- 
sue of bases; my government believes 
that continuing the relationship is in 
the interest of both our countries and 
in the interest of the NATO alliance as 
well. We still have difficult issues to re- 
solve, but I'm very hopeful for an early 
and successful conclusion of negotia- 
tions. We also discussed the problem of 
terrorism and the need for very close 
cooperation among democracies to de- 
feat this scourge. 

Foreign Minister Papoulias. I had 

the opportunity to welcome my col- 
league, Mr. Baker, in Athens after a 
troika trip to the Middle East. I was 
delayed in my return but fortunately I 
have met with him. We will have the 
opportunity to meet on many other oc- 
casions in the future. 

With the Prime Minister, Mr. Bak- 
er discussed bilateral issues, certainly 



Secretary Baker's 


NATO Itinerary 


February 11 


Reykjavik, London 


February 12 


London, Bonn 


February 1.3 


Bonn, Copenhagen, 




Oslo, Bonn 


February 14 


Bonn, Ankara, 




Athens, Rome 


February 15 


Rome. Madrid, 




Lisbon, Brussels 


February 16 


Brussels. 




Luxembourg. 




The Hague. Brussels 


February 17 


Brussels, Paris 



lartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



41 



EUROPE 



the course of the negotiations, issues of 
terrorism, East-West relations, the big 
issue of the Middle East, Central 
America — that is, a whole range of in- 
ternational issues. I, too, had the op- 
portunity to brief Mr. Baker on the 
results on my troika tour of Middle 
East capitals; and I think there is an 
interest — an increased interest — by 
the United States of America in assist- 
ing the effort of finding a permanent, 
just, and lasting solution for the Middle 
East. I hope that I will be meeting 
soon again with my colleague in Vienna 
and that we will have the opportunity 
and a greater length of time to continue 
this good beginning we have made to- 
dav in Athens. 



We talked about a full range of 
issues — issues involving East-West 
matters. We talked about issues involv- 
ing the NATO alliance, about the fact 
the approach of the United States and 
Portugal to alliance issues is quite of- 
ten very, very similar. 

We" talked as well about regional 
issues — issues involving questions in 
southern Africa, about the withdrawal 
of Cuban troops from Angola and the 
Angolan/Namibian settlement, and a 
host of other issues. 




MADRID, 
FEB. 15. 19899 

Let me say that we have had a very in- 
teresting and successful discussion, 
and I'm delighted to have the oppor- 
tunity to be here in Madrid and visit 
with my colleague. I think that it's a 
particularly appropriate time to have 
consultations with the minister [For- 
eign Minister Francisco Fernandez- 
Ordonez] during the period of time that 
he is President of the European 
Community. 

We covered the bilateral issues be- 
tween the United States and Spain and 
concluded quite frankly that the rela- 
tionship between our two countries has 
improved considerably over the past 
several years and is continuing to im- 
prove; we took note of that fact. We dis- 
cussed briefly East-West issues, issues 
affecting the NATO alliance, and cov- 
ered, perhaps even more briefly, our 
views on issues involving regional con- 
flicts such as Central America. 



E 



^«W::i.-J:*iiSi*K»»iJSW:l«S:y^^W 



Portugal 



LISBON, 
FEB. 15, 1989>" 

The relationship with Portugal is one of 
the very closest which my government 
enjoys. I have had extended discussions 
with the minister [Foreign Minister 
Joao de Deus Pinheiro] and, indeed, 
with the Prime Minister [Anibal 
Cavaco Silva] as well. 



Luxembourg 



LUXEMBOURG, 
FEB. 16, 1989" 

Foreign Minister Poos. It was a great 
pleasure and privilege of the Lu.x- 
embourg Government to welcome today 
Mr James Baker, the Secretary of 
State of the United States. We welcome 
the wish of Mr. Baker to have consulta- 
tions with the European allies, espe- 
cially in Luxembourg, in the same 
spirit of his predecessor. And our dis- 
cussions of today were conducted in the 
spirit of friendship which characterizes 
the Luxembourg-American relationship 
since the First World War. 

We touched [on] several topics of 
transatlantic relations, and I will let 
our distinguished guest expose the 
main topics of our bilateral talks. Let 
me finish by stressing that our dia- 
logue will continue and Mr. Baker and 
his [inaudible] are always welcome 
guests in Luxembourg. 

Secretary Baker. It is a pleasure 
and a privilege to be here and have the 
opportunity to visit your country and 
to have the opportunity to meet with 
you and to have the opportunity to 
meet with the Prime Minister in the 
year that is the 10th anniversary of 
your independence and the 40th anni- 
versary of the North Atlantic Treaty 
alliance. 

I might say for the benefit of the 
press what I said to you and that is that 
Luxembourg has been a steadfast alli- 
ance partner of the United States. The 
relationship between our two countries 
has historically been very close, and it 



continues to be close. I would say sinL [ 
ply that we had discussions with the 
Prime Minister [Jacques Santer] and. 
the Foreign Minister on a wide rangelfi , 
topics — alliance topics, topics affecti 
regional issues in various parts of th 
world. We concluded, quite happily, 
that our bilateral relations are in exc 
lent condition. 

Q. How do you feel about Aya- 
tollah Khomeini's offer of a very hi) 
price of a million dollars or more f( 
the assassination of the author witi 
whom he disagrees [Salman Rushdl 
author of The Satanic Verses]! 

Secretary Baker. I think that it 
regrettable and that, of course as yo 
know, the United States is firmly co 
mitted to oppose terrorism in all its 
forms, and particularly state-sponso 
terrorism. 




PARIS, 

FEB. 17. 1989'2 

I might just say that we have had a 
very good visit. I had the opportuni 
before a working lunch with Foreign 
Minister Dumas, to visit with Prim 
Minister Rocard. I have also had an 
portunity to see my good friend and 
former colleague Pierre Beregovoy. 
spent a number of years together as 
nance ministers. We had a very prO' 
five, I think, working lunch in whicl 
discussed a wide range of topics — E 
West issues, international issues, re 
gional issues, and issues affecting tl 
alliance. 



iPress release 17 of Feb. 15, 1989. Jo 
Baldvin Hannibalsson is Iceland's Minist 
of Foreign Affairs. 

-Press release 16 of Feb. 14. Sir Geol 
frey Howe is the U.K.'s Secretary of Sta 
for" Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 

•'Press release 20 of Feb. 21. 

^Press release 18 of Feb. 15. 

■'iPress release 19 of Feb. Ki. Gro Hai 
Brundtland is Norway's Prime Minister. 

'■Press release 21 of Feb. 15. Mesut 
Yilmaz is Turkev's Foreign Minister. 

'Press release 22 of Feb. 16. Andrea 
Papandreou is Greece's Prime Minister. 

^Press release 23 of Feb. 15. Karolos 
poulias is Greece's Foreign Minister. 

■'Press release 25 of Feb. 17. 

"'Press release 27 of Feb. Ki. 

iiPress release 29 of Feb. 21. Jacque 
Poos is Luxembourg's Foreign Minister 

Impress release 32 of Feb. 21. ■ 



42 



Department of State Bulletin/April 19 



irst Report on Cyprus 



EUROPE 



' :SSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 

VK. 1, 1989' 

iitoiTlance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
nutting to you this bimonthly report on 
mi'ss toward a negotiated settlement of 

t yprus question. 

At this early point in my Administra- 

1. let me first reconfirm that the United 

■ tis has a fundamental interest in assist- 

thi- people of Cyprus in the search for a 
, iii.u and just settlement. Over the years, 
Aerican governments have come to appre- 
c^e that such a settlement can come only 
thugh a process of negotiation that e.x- 
p sses the desires and aspirations of the 
" irjnt people. 

.At the same time, there is a legitimate 

for outside parties to play in supporting 

m-gotiation process. Under my Admin- 
alion, we will continue high-level atten- 
1 to Cyprus. To assure day-to-day senior 
ol:er involvement with the issues and pro- 
y • a point of contact with the Congress, 
a Department of State created the post of 
S' cial Cyprus Coordinator in 1981 and has 
ai gned this responsibility continuously to 
a ilicy-level officer since that time. 

To provide a basic framework for nego- 
ti ions between the two communities, the 
b' ; and most viable approach has been and 
CI inues to be the effort led by the Secre- 

Oeneral of the United Nations, Javier 

•;: lie Cuellar. The United Nations has 
a 1 involved with the Cyprus question for 
2- ears because the international commu- 

has recognized that the United Nations 

ihiuely placed to deal with the issue. 
1 current Secretary General, Javier Pe- 
rt de Cuellar, has considerable personal ex- 
p ence with the Cyprus question and a 
tr idate from the U.N. membership to use 
h Jood offices to work for a solution. We 
si -e this high regard for his patience and 
al ities, have given him unwavering sup- 
pi ., and will continue to do so. 

We will take every advantage of oppor- 
ti ties to make constructive contributions 
t( he Secretary General and to the parties. 
W believe it is important that the parties 

' full participation to the negotiating 



process and that the atmosphere between 
them be improved through contacts and 
confidence-building measures to help bring 
the two communities together. We also sup- 
port efforts to achieve a workable plan for 
reducing military tensions. 

We will continue to develop our long- 
standing relationships of confidence and 
respect with both parties to the dispute. 
The previous Administration also consulted 
frequently with allies and friends, partic- 
ularly such interested parties as Greece, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. We plan 
to pursue such consultations and discussions 
vigorously. 

With specific reference to the most re- 
cent 60-day period since the last report on 
Cyprus, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar 
continues his efforts to help the Cypriot 
parties reach a solution to the conflict. As 
agreed at the November 22-23 New York 
meetings hosted by the Secretary General, 
the two sides initiated a second round of 
talks in Nicosia on December 19 with the as- 
sistance of the Secretary General's Special 
Representative, Oscar Camilion. Discus- 
sions in Nicosia are continuing and will be 
followed by another meeting in April with 
the Secretary General to review progress. 

In his latest report to the Security 
Council on U.N. operations in Cyprus (for 
the period June 1 through November 30), a 
copy of which is attached, the Secretary 
General observed that the talks that began 
last August mark "the first time in the past 
quarter of a century that the leaders of the 
two communities have committed them- 
selves to such a personal and sustained ef- 
fort to achieve an overall settlement and to 
endeavor to do this by a specific target 
date." He continued that a "good working 
relationship" had developed between the two 
leaders. The Secretary General also sug- 
gested that the two sides should begin ex- 
ploring "a wide range of options for each of 
the issues that must be resolved." 

Both sides responded to the Secretary 
General's suggestion with proposals. There 
are constructive elements in the ideas pre- 
sented by both parties, and we hope that 
they will continue to examine new and/or ex- 
panded options in a spirit of constructive 
compromise. 



I note that military deconfrontation is 
the subject of one of the papers presented by 
the Turkish Cypriot community and that 
both sides have indicated agreement in prin- 
ciple with the concept. 

The Secretary General expressed con- 
cern that the "troops of both sides continue 
to be in dangerous proximity to each other" 
in Nicosia. Such proximity was the immedi- 
ate cause of the death of a Turkish Cypriot 
soldier on December 12, 1988, and a Greek 
Cypriot National Guardsman on July 31, 
1988, both killed by gunfire from the oppo- 
site side of the buffer zone. The United Na- 
tions is now working with the two parties to 
achieve some adjustments of military posi- 
tions in Nicosia to ease this situation. We 
strongly support this effort as we have sup- 
ported past efforts to reduce tensions and 
prevent further serious incidents. 

The Secretary General's previous report 
also commented on the dangers of demon- 
strations close to the buffer zone. In his 
most recent report, he states that, in re- 
sponse to the expression of U.N. concerns 
about these events, the Government of Cy- 
prus has given assurances that "it will in fu- 
ture do whatever is necessary to ensure 
respect for the status quo in the buffer 
zone." 

As we enter 1989, peoples worldwide are 
reaching out for the wisdom to forge new un- 
derstanding with old foes. Experience has 
given the people of Cyprus an intimate ap- 
preciation of the cost of bitterness and en- 
mity. They are now engaged in a difficult 
negotiation that is the only route to recon- 
ciliation and peace. They merit America's 
continued support and have our most sincere 
wishes of success in their endeavor. 

Sincerely, 

George Bush 



'Identical letters addressed to Jim 
Wright, Speaker of the House of Represent- 
atives, and Claiborne Pell, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Mar. 6, 1989). ■ 



artment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



43 



EUROPE 



Security Challenges Facing NATO in the 1990s 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the Nobel bistitute's 
Leangkollen Seminar in Oslo on Febru- 
ary 6, 1989. Ambassador Nitze is spe- 
cial adviser to the President and the 
Secretary of State on arms control 
matters. 

I thank you for the kind words of intro- 
duction. It is an honor to be here at 
this distinguished institute to partici- 
pate in the Leangkollen Seminar 

I propose to address the security 
challenges facing the North Atlantic 
alliance as we enter the 1990s and 
lessons NATO can take from its recent 
experience in meeting such challenges. 

Challenges Ahead 

As it prepares to enter the next dec- 
ade, NATO can look back on a period 
of substantial success. The challenge of 
Soviet INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] missiles was met and, as a re- 
sult, the INF Treaty is in place; the 
basic outline of a strategic arms reduc- 
tion treaty has been established; impor- 
tant confidence-building measures have 
been implemented; nuclear testing talks 
have moved us well along toward com- 
pletion of verification protocols for the 
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nu- 
clear Explosions Ti-eaties, which would 
enable their ratification; progress has 
been made toward reestablishing sup- 
port for the 192.5 Geneva protocol ban- 
ning illegal chemical weapons (CW) use 
and toward completing a comprehensive 
and verifiable ban on production or 
possession of chemical weapons; and a 
mandate has been concluded for nego- 
tiations on conventional armed forces 
in Europe. 

But this review is a litany not of 
tasks completed but rather of good be- 
ginnings yet to be concluded. Even the 
INF problem will not be behind us 
until the treaty has been fully imple- 
mented. And, in the other areas, there 
is a long road yet ahead. 

As the alliance travels this road, 
its fundamental goal should remain un- 
changed — to seek collectively to protect 
the ability of its member nations to live 
in peace with freedom and to do so by 
deterring war. 



In ensuring the maintenance of a 
strong deterrent into the 1990s, NATO 
must continue to proceed along two 
fronts. It must take the steps — through 
updating of its forces — necessary to 
sustain a viable deterrent capability, 
and it must continue to seek through 
dialogue to bound and reduce the level 
of confrontation between East and West. 

Force Updating Requirements 

Force updating requirements exist in 
all legs of the NATO triad, and options 
are being reviewed. 

With respect to the strategic leg, 
the United States is well along toward 
modernizing its sea-based forces — with 
the Trident submarine, D-5 missile, 
and sea-launched cruise missile — and 
its air-based forces — with the B-1 and 
Stealth bombers and the air-launched 
cruise missile. But the land-based por- 
tion is another story, and this is where 
force updating efforts must focus in the 
immediate future. 

U.S. fixed, land-based missiles 
have been vulnerable to Soviet attack 
for some time now, and the problem 
is getting worse. Successive U.S. Ad- 
ministrations have proposed plans for 
basing new ICBMs [intercontinental 
ballistic missiles] in survivable modes, 
but these plans have not garnered sus- 
tained support. The Bush Administra- 
tion must resolve this problem, if this 
part of the U.S. strategic triad is to 
remain viable. 

Efforts should also continue on the 
strategic defensive side. A robust SDI 
[Strategic Defense Initiative] research 
program is important and necessary, 
both as a hedge against the major 
Soviet SDI program, which has been 
underway for over two decades, and 
because of the safer world that a more 
defense-based deterrence potentially 
can provide. 

But it remains crucial that SDI be 
guided by the criteria of survivability 
and cost-effectiveness at the margin, 
which are incorporated into U.S. law. 
Deployment of a space-based defense 
system itself vulnerable to attack would 
encourage the Soviets to attack that 
system early in a crisis; deployment 
of a system that was not cost-effective 



at the margin would encourage the 
U.S.S.R. to proliferate cheaper offi 
sive systems in response. 

With regard to the nonstrategic lu 
clear leg of NATO's triad, the impo 
tant task is to update the aging ai's a, 
of nuclear systems NATO will retai 
the aftermath of the INF eliminaii- 
and the Montebello decision, which 
mandated unilateral reductions and 
modernization of the remaining NA i 
systems. 

Throughout this decade, NAT( a: 
emphasized its policy of maintainim 
in Europe only the minimum numbi oi 
nuclear weapons required for deter 
rence. This has enabled us unilatei-; ; 
to reduce the number of these wea| ■ 
by 2,400 since 1979. By keeping 
NATO's nuclear capabilities up-to-il r, 
we will not only maintain our secui , 
but we may also open up the possil ty 
of further unilateral cuts in NATO'- 1- 
theater nuclear arsenal. 

As for NATO's conventional foi s. 
the alliance continues to face a hug 
Warsaw Pact preponderance in con i- 
tional capabilities. The unilateral ci 
announced by Mr Gorbachev last 1 
cember are a step in the right direi 
tion, and we welcome them, but th i 
cuts by no means eliminate the con !i- 
tional superiority of the Warsaw P: 
or of the Soviet Union alone. It wn I 
be imprudent to assume that this i 
balance can be redressed solely tin : 
arms control negotiations, especial 
NATO lacks in those talks the le\ . 
of significant, ongoing force updati 
efforts. One must also consider th( !■ 
that, given the record of past effor at 
conventional arms control, any reli' 
from arms control in this area is 111 v 
to come only several years in the fui e. 

Arms Control Efforts 

With regard to the alliance's arms ( i- 
trol agenda for the years ahead, N I 
ministers have laid out a program 
which strikes me as correct — comp 
tion of a START [strategic arms I'c 
tion talks] treaty, a chemical weajn 
ban, and an agreement on stabilizii 
conventional arms reductions. We 
should not underestimate the diffic yj 
of the task. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/April 61 



t- 



As I said earlier, the basic outline 
I START treaty has been estab- 
led — approximately 50% cuts in stra- 
ic nuclear warheads and in Soviet 
listic missile throw-weight to equal 
ings, with somewhat smaller cuts in 
ivery vehicles and with sublimits on 
most destabilizing systems. But 
ny tough issues remain in START — 
sea-launched cruise missiles, air- 
nehed cruise missiles, mobile 
iMs, verification, and linkage of a 
^RT treaty to limits on strategic de- 
368, among others — and thus much 
gh negotiating lies ahead. 
Similarly, we have established a 
•nework in the defense and space 
cs for dealing with the strategic de- 
se programs of the two sides, but 
eral difficult issues remain. 
With regard to the chemical weap- 
negotiations, one cannot underesti- 
i.e the complexities involved in, first, 
uring the participation of all CW- 
sessing and CW-capable states and, 
)nd, creating an effective verifica- 
regime in the face of new technolo- 
1, increasing proliferation, a dual- 
ible chemical industry, and the 
i to protect sensitive nonchemical 
pons-i'elated information during 
sections. 

As for the negotiations on conven- 
lal arms, aside from the preliminary 
ies resolved in the mandate talks, 
entire task lies before us. As we 
in these talks, we must remember 
importance of avoiding the tempta- 
to anticipate arms limits and to 
1st our force structuring and updat- 
plans prematurely. Experience and 
: teach us that such actions, by re- 
ng the other side's incentives to pay 
ice for our reductions, reduce the 
lihood that the anticipated limits 
ever be established. 
All of this means that, in addition 
,s foi'ce updating requirements, the 
nee faces a very full agenda of arms 
rol efforts. There is opportunity for 
it progress in reducing the level of 
t-West military confrontation across 
board. But complacency is unjusti- 
; much hard work lies ahead if this 
ntial is to be realized. 



« 



ffii 



Lessons for Meeting 
the Challenges Ahead 

As the alliance approaches its force up- 
dating and arms control tasks, it can do 
so most effectively by keeping in mind 
the lessons learned from the experience 
of the past. I would like to suggest six 
such lessons to guide NATO's efforts. 

Lesson Number One — the Proper 
Role of Arms Control. First, we 
should always keep in mind the proper 
role of arms control, what arms control 
can accomplish and what it cannot. 

Arms conti-ol can play an important 
role in enhancing our security and pro- 
ducing a more stable East-West rela- 
tionship. But it cannot be a substitute 
or replacement for adequate defenses. 
Instead, it is but one element of our 
overall security policy, a complement to 
the measures we must take unilaterally, 
such as maintaining weapons and forces 
necessary for an adequate deterrent. 
Indeed, experience shows that what we 
as an alliance are able and willing to do 
for ourselves is not only more impor- 
tant to our security than what we can 
accomplish through arms control but is 
also essential to the success of our arms 
control efforts. 

Understanding this point becomes 
particularly important when one as- 
sesses the contribution the prospective 
START treaty would make to our se- 
curity and how the Administration 
should proceed in the START 
negotiations. 

In crafting our START position, we 
have been concerned that we enhance 
our force survivability and thus 
strengthen strategic deterrence. Of 
course, arms control alone cannot solve 
our force survivability problems. What 
it can and should do is make it easier 
for us to take the steps needed to im- 
prove survivability by protecting the 
appropriate options for force updating 
and by reducing and bounding the So- 
viet threat; otherwise, that threat could 
negate the effect of those improvements. 

As I said earlier, the U.S. strategic 
force survivability problem currently 
resides primarily with the land-based 
leg. Our fixed silos are vulnerable 
today and they will be tomorrow; no 
plausible arms control agreement can 
remedy that. So the important thing is 



EUROPE 



to ensure that arms control does not 
block steps that can improve ICBM sur- 
vivability and, in fact, makes enhancing 
survivability through those steps easier. 

To protect options for ICBM sur- 
vivability, we have been working with 
the Soviets in the START negotiations 
to develop an effective verification 
regime that would allow both rail- 
mobile and road-mobile ICBMs. Other 
options for survivable ICBM basing are 
also possible. Furthermore, by substan- 
tially reducing Soviet ballistic missile 
warheads and throwweight, START 
would greatly constrain Soviet ability 
to destroy ICBMs in these basing 
modes through barrage attacks. 

Thus START would not preclude 
our ability to deploy survivable ICBMs, 
and it would make the job easier by 
reducing the threat to such a force. 

We are also being careful to protect 
the steps necessary for enhancing the 
survivability of our sea-based leg. We 
are currently deploying Ti-ident sub- 
marines, which are quieter and able to 
operate in much larger ocean areas 
than the Poseidons they replace and 
thus are more survivable. We will en- 
sure that the START treaty places no 
unacceptable constraints on this impor- 
tant program. And should we become 
concerned that Ti'ident submarines con- 
centrate too many missiles on too few 
platforms, there is no constraint what- 
soever in START that would preclude 
our disti'ibuting our SLBM [sea- 
launched ballistic missile] warheads on 
a larger number of platforms by deploy- 
ing fewer warheads on each submarine. 

With regard to the air-based leg, 
due largely to our success in negotiat- 
ing the rule for determining how 
bomber weapons will be counted, we 
have protected the right to deploy the 
full force of strategic bombers that we 
consider necessary for a robust deter- 
rent. This is the number we had been 
planning to deploy even in the absence 
of a START treaty. 

In sum, the START treaty that 
appears to be developing would not 
exacerbate our force survivability prob- 
lems. It u'oiild provide the leeway 
needed to undertake the force moderni- 
zation necessary to redress those prob- 



45 



EUROPE 



lems and would make the job easier 
by reducing and bounding tlie Soviet 
threat. It fully satisfies the proper 
objectives for a good arms control 
agreement. 

While the Bush Administration is 
justifiably reviewing details and will 
want to put its own stamp on the U.S. 
approach, the basic START outline rep- 
resents a prudent course. President 
Bush has promised to pursue a verifia- 
ble and stabilizing agreement to reduce 
strategic arsenals by 50%. I urge our 
NATO partners to continue to support 
this approach. 

Lesson Number Two— The Impor- 
tance of Keeping in Mind the Proper 
Objective. The second lesson is the 
need to always keep in mind the pi'i- 
mary objective of our arms control and 
security efforts, that of enhancing 
stability. 

We seek to reduce the incentives 
that the other side might have to strike 
first in a crisis or to provoke a crisis 
that might lead to a military confronta- 
tion. To dissuade the Warsaw Pact from 
contemplating reckless action, our mili- 
tary forces as a whole should have the 
necessary chai-acteristics of effective- 
ness, fle.xibility, diversity, and sur- 
vivability against an attack focused 
directly on those forces. 

On occasion, one hears about force 
reductions as an inherently worthy out- 
come of arms control efforts, as if this 
should be our prime objective. But re- 
ductions per se are not necessarily 
good. If the remaining forces are more 
vulnerable to a first strike, or the re- 
maining force levels present a greater 
temptation to the other side to take 
reckless action, stability is reduced. 
Rather, reductions should be seen as a 
means which, if properly utilized, can 
serve the goal of enhancing stability. 
This is why, in START, we have 
insisted on focusing cuts, through war- 
head sublimits, on the most destabiliz- 
ing systems. It is also why we insisted 
that INF reductions be asymmetrical to 
equal levels. It is a lesson that will be 
especially important as we enter the 
conventional arms talks. 

Some proposals for reductions in 
conventional forces, even asymmetrical 
cuts favoring the West, may look at- 
tractive while actually exacerbating our 
security situation. It will be important 
that the alliance focus not on the levels 
of cuts but rather on the forces and 



capabilities remaining after those cuts, 
to determine whether that outcome 
would be more or less stable than the 
situation today. 

Lesson Number Three — Patience 
on Principles, Creativity on Other 
Issues. The third lesson relates to 
the many issues that will arise in any 
negotiation. To conduct a negotiation 
effectively it is crucial to know the dif- 
ference between issues of principle and 
other issues, to be patient in adhering 
to one's position on the former, and to 
be creative in finding solutions to the 
latter. 

Early in the INF negotiations, 
NATO identified the five principles that 
would guide U.S. efforts: equality of 
rights and limits between the United 
States and Soviet Union; limits on U.S. 
and Soviet systems only, with no com- 
pensation for third-country systems; 
global application of limits; no weaken- 
ing of NATO's conventional deterrent; 
and effective verification. 

In the face of Soviet resistance 
and considerable public skepticism, we 
clung patiently to these principles and, 
in the end, got a treaty that satisfies 
them all. But such a treaty would not 
have been possible if we had been un- 
willing to work creatively and fle.xibly 
on a broad range of other INF issues. 
Any negotiation must involve give 
and take. A good negotiator must be 
not only a good advocate but also a 
good listener We must recognize the 
legitimate security concerns of the 
other side and use our imaginations to 
find mutually satisfactory compromises. 
An arms control negotiation should 
not be a zero-sum game but rather a 
search by the negotiating partners for 
solutions that will improve the situation 
for both. 

Thus, as we continue ongoing nego- 
tiations and enter new ones on conven- 
tional arms, we must be clear about our 
principles, about the minimum require- 
ments to make an agreement accept- 
able. We must be prepared to hold 
tenaciously to these principles, even to 
see the negotiations fail if the only al- 
ternative is to sign an agreement that 
does not meet those basic security 
needs. But, within this principled 
framework, we must be prepared to 
work flexibly to find a mutually accept- 
able outcome. 



Lesson Number Four — The Pr 
Approach to Compliance. The foun 
lesson relates to compliance policy, 
means by which we provide the oth 
side incentives to comply with agre' 
ments. This consists of two basic ta 
being able to verify compliance witl 
treaty obligations and demonstratin 
the will to respond should noncom 
pliance be detected. 

With regard to verification, it i 

important that we set the proper st 

ard for negotiated regimes to meet 

would be nice if we could attain per 

verification, that is, if we could be 

of detecting any violation of a treat 

provision. But such a standard is ui 

i-eachable, even with the most intri; 

verification regime we could devise 

Moreover, we must realize that 

rights we obtain for our inspectors 

gain access to the other side's facili 

will necessarily create the same aci 

for their inspectors to our facilities 

And there are many highly sensitiv 

facilities at which inspections by th 

other side would damage our secur: 

Thus, in designing a verificatio 

gime, we face an unavoidable dilem 

created by two countervailing objec 

fives: the desire to have access to s 

broad range of facilities on the oth( 

side to detect and deter cheating ai 

the need to protect sensitive facilit: 

our own from inspectors of the oth( 

side. No solution to this problem c; 

be completely satisfactory; we mus 

seek one that properly balances ve 

fication concerns against other sect 

requirements. 

We believe such a balance was 
achieved in the INF Ti-eaty. We re: 
that we cannot be sure of detecting 
every possible instance of Soviet cl 
ing on INF, but we are confident t 
should the U.S.S.R. violate the tre 
in any militarily significant way, wi 
would be able to detect the violatio 
in time to respond effectively and, 
thereby, deny the Soviets the bene r" 
the violation. The risk of detection SO 
helps to deter violations. We call tl 
standard effective verification; it i.-- 
the guideline we should follow in oi ' 
negotiations as well. 

The other side of the coin is wl . 
we do if a violation is detected. Ce 
tainly, it is not enough to be able t 
detect violations; if we are to provi 
clear incentives to the other side t( 



i 



46 



Department of State Bulletin/April i 



iply with agreements, we must dem- 
trate to them our will to react to 
violations in a manner that will 
ly them the benefits they might 
le to gain from such noncompliance. 
Recent compliance problems cen- 
gd first on SALT [strategic arms 
itation talks] II and then on the 
M [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Ti-eaty; in 
h cases, when the Soviets resisted 
efforts to get them to redress their 
ations, we found it difficult to deter- 
le an appropriate and proportionate 
ponse. Most options seemed unre- 
d or disproportionate to the effect 
he violations or politically difficult 
sustain. 

In response to Soviet violations of 
LT II, President Reagan finally de- 
d that we would no longer be bound 
SALT II restrictions but would con- 
le to e.xercise restraint in structur- 
our strategic forces. This decision 
led out not to have the dire conse- 
nces feared by some; it did not re- 
in a large buildup beyond SALT II 
Is in the number of Soviet or U.S. 
tegic forces. In fact, in the long 
. this decision may turn out to have 
litated arms control, if it drives 
le to the Soviets that the United 
|es will act in response to uncor- 
(ed violations. 

As we now face the problem of the 
snoyarsk radar, one hopes that our 
jT II decision, the Western consen- 
that that radar is a clear violation 
le ABM Ti-eaty, and our policy of 
jluding no more strategic arms 
feements until the violation is cor- 
ed will convince the Soviets to rem- 
the problem. 

It is important to maintain a long- 
n perspective when we consider re- 
ises to noncompliance. The more 
edient course may be to wink at vio- 
bns, reassuring ourselves that their 
ct is not that significant. In the 
t run, this may be so, but it can 
i a message to the other side that, 
16 long run, may produce substan- 
compliance problems. 

Lesson Number Five — The Impor- 
ce of Alliance Unity and Parlia- 
itary and Public Support. The fifth 
on is one we know well, but one I 
ertheless emphasize because of its 
:inuing importance. That is the need 
stablish programs and positions 
. will foster alliance unity and com- 
id parliamentary and public support. 



Much of the INF story is a tale of 
Soviet attempts to split the alliance and 
to turn our publics and parliaments 
against us. Thus, the treaty is a tribute 
to and a product of alliance unity — the 
determination of the basing countries to 
proceed with deployments, the cohesion 
of NATO at every step of the negotia- 
tions, and the solidarity of our allies 
and friends in Asia who contributed so 
much to the global zero outcome. 

Such unity and support will be no 
less critical in the conventional arms 
talks as well as other negotiations. 
Thus, we must continually ask our- 
selves as we consider new positions: 
Is this a stance that will enable us to 
maintain an alliance consensus and sus- 
tain public and parliamentary support 
in the face of Eastern efforts to under- 
mine it? 

Lesson Number Six — The Proper 
Approach to Linkage. The final lesson 
has to do with the broader perspective, 
the linkage of arms control efforts to 
each other and to the other aspects of 
East-West relations. 

As you know, we have insisted that 
U.S. -Soviet discussions not focus sim- 
ply on arms control but rather cover 
a broad agenda, including also human 
rights, regional conflicts, bilateral mat- 
ters, and transnational issues. This rec- 
ognizes that relations between nations 
involve much more than the level of 
arms, which, in fact, reflect as much as 
they cause tension and mistrust. A sim- 
ilarly broad perspective is maintained 
in the CSCE [Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] process, 
where we insist that progress be 
balanced between security, economic 
and scientific cooperation, and human 
rights concerns. 

This approach is sensible, but one 
should not take it too far by insisting 
that conclusion of any treaty be tightly 
linked to conclusion of treaties in other 
areas or demonstration of satisfactory 
behavior by the other side in other 
dimensions. 

For example, some argued that we 
should not conclude the INF Ti-eaty 
with the Soviets until they were out of 
Afghanistan or until they improved 
their human rights performance. This 
missed the fact that we were not ne- 
gotiating the INF Treaty to do the 
Soviets any favor, thus requiring a 
concession on some other issue in 
return: we were negotiating to do 
ourselves a favor by enhancing our 
security. When we were able to con- 



artment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



EUROPE 



elude such a treaty, there was no rea- 
son to deny ourselves the immediate 
realization of its benefits. 

We have, of course, pressed ahead 
on Afghanistan, human rights, and 
other East- West problems, addressing 
them on their own terms while mindful 
of their place in the relationship as a 
whole. And we have made progress in 
those areas as well. 

The more prevalent linkage we 
hear of today is between START and 
the conventional arms talks, that the 
former should not be concluded before 
the latter. Such linkage implies that a 
START treaty would weaken our deter- 
rent against conventional attack or that 
the Soviets need a START treaty so 
badly that, to secure it, they would 
sign a conventional arms agreement 
that they would not otherwise accept. 
But neither of these conditions applies. 

A good START treaty and a good 
agreement on conventional arms are 
both in the interest of the West, 
whether considered separately or to- 
gether. Each should be pursued at its 
own pace, even while ensuring that our 
approaches to the two are mutually 
consistent. 

A Final Thought— How NATO 
Should React to Gorbachev 

To my six lessons, let me add a thought 
on how NATO should react to Mr. Gor- 
bachev and the changes occurring in 
the U.S.S.R. 

There can no longer be doubt that 
extraordinary things are happening in 
the Soviet Union. This has been evi- 
dent during my six trips there over the 
last 3 years. What is not clear is where 
these changes are headed, whether 
they will be sustained, and how they 
will affect East- West relations in the 
long run. 

Gorbachev now appears to be un- 
der several types of internal pressure 
to moderate Soviet international behav- 
ior and proceed with negotiation of se- 
rious arms control measures. One type 
of pressure comes from the difficulty 
of achieving the domestic targets of 
perestroika while maintaining the past 
burden on the economy of truly extra- 
ordinary military spending. Another 
comes from the growing realization in 
the Soviet Union, due to glasnost. that 
the threat of an attack on the Warsaw 
Pact by NATO was a wholly trumped- 
up illusion created to support the doc- 
trine of the inevitability of Soviet 
expansion. 



47 



SOUTH ASIA 



Soviet rhetoric about "military 
sufficiency," and Gorbachev's announce- 
ment of arms cuts and force restructur- 
ing, provide reason for hope that these 
pressures will eventually produce a de- 
sirable result. But we must always re- 
member to base our security policies on 
Soviet capabilities and behavior rather 
than hopes or expressed intentions. 
And, to date, their military capabilities 
have not changed substantially. 

Moreover, hopeful signs from the 
Soviet Union are a result not only of 
internal pressures but also of external 
incentives, for example, evidence of 
NATO's capability and will to resist 
unacceptable Soviet behavior. If we are 
to maximize the chances that hoped-for 



improvements will be realized, we must 
keep these incentives in place. 

We should resist the entreaties of 
some to "help Gorbachev out." It is not 
clear that NATO economic aid to the 
U.S.S.R. would do more than postpone 
pressures to implement the most neces- 
sary or difficult parts of perestroika. It 
is also not clear whether such help 
would redound to NATO's long-term 
advantage. 

Instead, while carefully watching 
events in the U.S.S.R., we should con- 
tinue vigorously to pursue our own in- 
terests. We should do what is necessary 
to maintain an adequate deterrent. We 
should continue to provide the Soviets 
incentives to conclude meaningful and 



stabilizing arms control agreement.^,] 
And we should seek out and be pre ( j 
pared to react creatively to oppor- |j 
tunities for concrete achievements i 
East- West relations. 

Conclusion 

Much good work has been accompli e( 
over the past 8 years. I think we c; 
safely say that NATO's lot has impi . 
since 1981. But this is no time to n- 
on our laurels. There is much work t 
to be done and the potential for mu 
accomplishment. By moving forwan 
with a clear sense of purpose, and \ h 
unity, the alliance can meet the ch:i 
lenges of the years ahead and creat 
even greater assurance that our air y 
to live in peace with freedom will li 
sustained. ■ 



Soviets Withdraw From Afghanistan 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
FEB. 16, 1989' 

Today marks the start of a new chapter 
in the history of Afghanistan. For the 
first time in over 9 years, Soviet forces 
no longer occupy that country. This de- 
velopment marks an extraordinary tri- 
umph of spirit and will by the Afghan 
people, and we salute them for it. 

Much remains to be done, however 
For the Afghan people, the struggle for 
self-determination goes on. We support 
Afghan efforts to fashion a stable, 
broadly based government responsive 
to the needs of the Afghan people. We 
call upon Afghan resistance leaders to 
work together toward this end. As long 
as the resistance struggle for self- 
determination continues, so too will 
America's support. 

Throughout the long dark years of 
Afghanistan's occupation, the interna- 
tional community has been steadfast in 



its support of the Afghan cause. This is 
also true for the United States. U.S. 
support for the Afghan people and the 
subsequent Soviet military withdrawal 
from Afghanistan constitute a powerful 
example of what we Americans can ac- 
complish when executive and Congress, 
Republican and Democrat, stand to- 
gether. The Government and people of 
Pakistan also can take particular satis- 
faction from this event; their courage 
and solidarity contributed significantly 
to the Afghan struggle. 

Now, more than ever, the Afghan 
people deserve the continuing help of 
the international community as they 
begin the difficult process of reclaim- 
ing their country, resettling their peo- 
ple, and restoring their livelihood. The 
commitment of the United States to the 
Afghan people will remain firm — both 
through our bilateral humanitarian aid 
program and through UN efforts to re- 
move mines, resettle refugees, and re- 



construct Afghanistan's war-torn 
economy. We call upon other nation o 
contribute all they can and hope tli 
the United Nations and the resista 
can come to mutually acceptable ai 
rangements for the nationwide dist 
bution of needed food supplies. 

The Soviet Union has now fulf .>d 
its obligation to withdraw from Af 
ghanistan. We welcome that decisi 
We call upon the Soviet Union to r( 
frain from other forms of interfere ? 
in Afghan affairs. The Soviet Uni( 
has nothing to fear from the establ i- 
ment of an independent, nonalignei I 
ghanistan. At the same time, the 
U.S.S.R. bears special responsibil 
for healing the wounds of this war, i 
we call upon it to support generous 
international efforts to rebuild 
Afghanistan. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of I 
dential Documents of Feb. 20, 1989. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletin/April ' 



I 

LMITED NATIONS 



|SI Narcotics Trafficking Conference Adopts 
invention 



• The UN Conference for the Adop- 
't' a Coiwention Against Illicit 
r in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho- 
Substances was held in Vienna 
,iber ^5-December 20, 1988. It was 
led by representatives of 106 
lies; the U.S. delegation was 
•,i,'d by Ann Wrobleski, Assistant 
^ II tary for International Narcotics 
I tti-rs.' ' 
Following is the text of the conven- 
I adopted by consensus on Decem- 



f Piniies to thix Concentioii, 
Ih I ply concerned by the magnitude of 
rising trend in the illicit production of, 
1 iaiid for and traffic in narcotic drugs and 
;. jhutropic substances, which pose a seri- 
)i threat to the health and welfare of 
1 laii beings and adversely affect the eco- 
, cultural and political foundations of 



/'i (/)/(/ concerned also by the steadily 
I asing inroads into various social 
ips made by illicit traffic in narcotic 
:.- and psychotropic substances, and par- 
laily by the fact that children are used 
lany parts of the world as an illicit drug 
umers market and for purposes of illicit 
liKtion, distribution and trade in narcot- 
uus and psychotropic substances, which 
Ills a danger of incalculable gravity, 
Rf'cog)ii:iiig the links between illicit 
fie and other related organized criminal 
\ ities which undermine the legitimate 
inmies and threaten the stability, securi- 
riil sovereignty of States, 
Urrogiiizing also that illicit traffic is an 
inational criminal activity, the suppres- 
nf which demands urgent attention and 
highest priority, 

.Airin-e that illicit traffic generates large 
ncial profits and wealth enabling trans- 
imal criminal organizations to pene- 
f, contaminate and corrupt the 
etures of government, legitimate corn- 
rial and financial business and society at 
Is levels, 

lii'terinined to deprive persons engaged 
icit traffic of the proceeds of their crim- 
activities and thereby eliminate their 
n incentive for so doing. 
Desiring to eliminate the root causes of 
indblem of abuse of narcotic drugs and 
'tropic substances, including the illicit 
III for such drugs and substances and 
■ irmous profits derived from illicit 



I I 



Considering that measures are neces- 
sary to monitor certain substances, includ- 
ing precursors, chemicals and solvents, 
which are used in the manufacture of nar- 
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the 
ready availability of which has led to an in- 
crease in the clandestine manufacture of 
such drugs and substances. 

Determined to improve international co- 
operation in the suppression of illicit traffic 
by sea. 

Recognizing that eradication of illicit 
traffic is a collective responsibility of all 
States and that, to that end, co-ordinated 
action within the framework of international 
co-operation is necessary. 

Acknowledging the competence of the 
United Nations in the field of control of nar- 
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances and 
desirous that the international organs con- 
cerned with such control should be within 
the framework of that Organization, 

Reaffirming the guiding principles of 
existing treaties in the field of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances and the 
system of control which they embody. 

Recognizing the need to reinforce and 
supplement the measures provided in the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
that Convention as amended by the 1972 Pro- 
tocol Amending the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and the 1971 Conven- 
tion on Psychotropic Substances, in order to 
counter the magnitude and extent of illicit 
traffic and its grave consequences, 

Recognizing also the importance of 
strengthening and enhancing effective legal 
means for international co-operation in 
criminal matters for suppressing the inter- 
national criminal activities of illicit traffic. 

Desiring to conclude a comprehensive, 
effective and operative international conven- 
tion that is directed specifically against il- 
licit traffic and that considers the various 
aspects of the problem as a whole, in partic- 
ular those aspects not envisaged in the exist- 
ing treaties in the field of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances. 

Hereby agree as follows: 



Article 1 



Definitions 

Except where otherwise expressly indicated 
or where the context otherwise requires, 
the following definitions shall apply 
throughout this Convention: 



(a) "Board" means the International 
Narcotics Control Board established by the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. 
and that Convention as amended by the 1972 
Protocol Amending the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; 

(b) "Cannabis plant" means any plant 
of the genus Cannabis; 

(c) "Coca bush" means the plant of any 
species of the genus Erythroxylon; 

(d) "Commercial carrier" means any 
person or any public, private or other entity 
engaged in transporting persons, goods or 
mails for renumeration, hire or any other 
benefit; 

(e) "Commission" means the Commis- 
sion on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations; 

(f ) "Confiscation," which includes for- 
feiture where applicable, means the perma- 
nent deprivation of property by order of a 
court or other competent authority: 

(g) "Controlled delivery" means the 
technique of allowing illicit or suspect con- 
signments of narcotic drugs, psychotropic 
substances, substances in Table I and Table 
II annexed to this Convention, or substances 
substituted for them, to pass out of, through 
or into the territory of one or more coun- 
tries, with the knowledge and under the su- 
pervision of their competent authorities, 
with a view to identifying persons involved 
in the commission of offences established in 
accordance with article -3, paragraph 1 of the 
Convention; 

(h) "1961 Convention" means the Sin- 
gle Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: 

(i) "1961 Convention as amended" 
means the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Proto- 
col Amending the Single Convention on Nar- 
cotic Drugs, 1961; 

( j) "1971 Convention" means the Con- 
vention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971; 

(k) "Council" means the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations; 

(1) "Freezing" or "seizure" means tem- 
porarily prohibiting the transfer, conver- 
sion, disposition or movement of property or 
temporarily assuming custody or control of 
property on the basis of an order issued by a 
court or a competent authority; 

(m) "Illicit traffic" means the offences 
set forth in article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, of 
this Convention: 

(n) "Narcotic drug" means any of the 
substances, natural or synthetic, in Sched- 
ules I and II of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention 
as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961; 



lartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



49 



UNITED NATIONS 



(o) "Opium poppy" means the plant of 
the species Papaver soinniferum L; 

(p) "Proceeds" means any property 
derived from or obtained, directly or indi- 
rectly, through the commission of an offence 
established in accordance with article 3, 
paragraph 1; 

(q) "Property" means assets of every 
kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, 
movable or immovable, tangible or intan- 
gible, and legal documents or instruments 
evidencing title to, or interest in, such 
assets; 

(r) "Psychotropic substance" means 
any substance, natural or synthetic, or any 
natural material in Schedules I, II, III and 
IV of the Convention on Psychotropic Sub- 
stances, 1971: 

(s) "Secretary-General" means the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations: 

(t) "Table I" and "Table 11" mean the 
correspondingly numbered lists of sub- 
stances annexed to this Convention, as 
amended from time to time in accordance 
with article 12: 

(u) "Transit State" means a State 
through the territory of which illicit narcot- 
ic drugs, psychotropic substances and sub- 
stances in fable I and Table II are being 
moved, which is neither the place of origin 
nor the place of ultimate destination thereof. 



Article 2 



Scope of the Convention 

1. The purpose of this Convention is to pro- 
mote co-operation among the Parties so that 
they may address more effectively the vari- 
ous aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances having an in- 
ternational dimension. In carrying out 
their obligations under the Convention, the 
Parties shall take necessary measures, 
including legislative and administrative 
measures, in conformity with the fundamen- 
tal provisions of their respective domestic 
legislative systems. 

2. The Parties shall carry out their 
obligations under this Convention in a man- 
ner consistent with the principles of sover- 
eign equality and territorial integrity of 
States and that of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other States. 

3. A Party shall not undertake in the 
territory of another Party the e.xercise of ju- 
risdiction and performance of functions 
which are exclusively reserved for the au- 
thorities of that other Party by its domestic 
law. 



Article 3 



Offences and Sanctions 

1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under its domestic law, when com- 
mitted intentionally: 



50 



(a) (i) The [jroduction, manufacture, 
extraction, preparation, offering, offering 
for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any 
terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dis- 
patch in transit, transport, importation or 
exportation of any narcotic drug or any psy- 
chotropic substance contrary to the provi- 
sions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 
Convention as amended or the 1971 
Convention; 

(ii) The cultivation of opium poppy, 
coca bush or cannabis plant for the purpose 
of the production of narcotic drugs contrary 
to the provisions of the 1961 Convention and 
the 1961 Convention as amended; 

(iii) The possession or purchase of 
any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance 
for the purpose of any of the activities enu- 
mei'ated in (i) above; 

(iv) The manufacture, transport or 
distribution of equipment, materials or of 
substances listed in Table I and Table II, 
knowing that they are to be used in or for 
the illicit cultivation, production or manu- 
facture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances: 

(v) The organization, management 
or financing of any of the offences enumer- 
ated in (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above; 

(b) (i) The conversion or transfer of 
property, knowing that such property is de- 
rived from any offence or offences estab- 
lished in accordance with subparagraph (a) 
of this paragraph, or from an act of partici- 
pation in such offence or offences, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illic- 
it origin of the property or of assisting any 
person who is involved in the commission of 
such an offence or offences to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions; 

(ii) The concealment or disguise of 
the true nature, source, location, disposi- 
tion, movement, rights with respect to, or 
ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offence or of- 
fences established in accordance with sub- 
paragraph (a) of this paragraph or from an 
act of participation in such an offence or 
offences: 

(c) Subject to its constitutional princi- 
ples and the basic concepts of its legal 
system; 

(i) The acquisition, possession or 
use of property, knowing, at the time of re- 
ceipt, that such property was derived from 
an offence or offences established in accord- 
ance with subparagraph (a) of this para- 
graph or from an act of participation in such 
offence or offences; 

(ii) The possession of equipment or 
materials or substances listed in Table I and 
Table II, knowing that they are being or are 
to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, 
production or manufacture of narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances; 

(iii) Publicly inciting or inducing 
others, by any means, to commit any of the 
offences estaljlished in accordance with this 
article or to use narcotic drugs or psycho- 
tropic substances illicitly; 



(iv) Participation in, associatio?] 
conspiracy to commit, attempts to comr 
and aiding, abetting, facilitating and co 
seling the comission of any of the offend 
established in accordance with this arti( 



2. Subject to its constitutional print 
pies and the basic concepts of its legal s; 
tem, each Party shall adopt such measu 
as may be necessary to establish as a cr 
nal offence under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the possession 
purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugi 
psychotropic substances for personal co: 
sumption contrary to the provisions oft 
1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as 
amended or the 1971 Convention. 

3. Knowledge, intent or purpose re- 
quired as an element of an offence set fc 
in paragraph 1 of this article may be in 
ferred from objective factual circumstai 

4. (a) Each Party shall make the coi 
mission of the offences established in ace 
ance with paragraph 1 of this article lial 
to sanctions which take into account the 
grave nature of these offences, such as i 
prisonment or other forms of deprivatio 
liberty, pecuniary sanctions and 
confiscation. 

(b) The Parties may provide, in a< 
tion to conviction or punishment, for an 
fence established in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this article, that the offe 
shall undergo measures such as treatmi 
education, aftercare, rehabilitation or s 
reintegration. 

(c) Notwithstanding the precedit 
subparagraphs, in appropriate cases of 
minor nature, the Parties may provide, 
alternatives to conviction or punishmer 
measures such as education, rehabilitai 
or social reintegration, as well as, wher 
offender is a drug abuser, treatment an( 
aftercare. 

(d) The Parties may provide, eith 
an alternative to conviction or punishm 
or in addition to conviction or punishm< 
an offence established in accordance wi 
paragraph 2 of this article, measures fc 
treatment, education, aftercare, rehabi 
tion or social reintegration of the offend 

5. The Parties shall ensure that the 
courts and other competent authorities 
ing jurisdiction can take into account fs 
circumstances which make the commiss 
of the offences established in accordanc 
with paragraph 1 of this article particu- 
serious, such as: 

(a) The involvement in the offenct 
an organized criminal group to which tl 
fender belongs; 

(b) The involvement of the offendi 
other international organized criminal 
activities; 

(c) The involvement of the offende 
other illegal activities facilitated by cor 
mission of the offence: 

(d) The use of violence or arms bj 
offender; 

(e) The fact that the offender hole 
public office and that the offence is conr 
ed with the office in question; 



Department of State Bulletin/April 



UNITED NATIONS 



(f ) The victimization or use of minors; 

(g) The fact that the offence is copi- 
ed in a penal institution or in an educa- 
,1 institution or social service facility 
their immediate vicinity or in other 

s to which school children and students 
Irt for educational, sports and social 
|.'ities; 

(h) Prior conviction, particularly for 
liar offences, whether foreign or domes- 

the extent permitted under the do- 

ic law of a Party. 

'|6. The Parties shall endeavour to ensure 

any discretionary legal powers under 

domestic law relating to the prosecu- 

oof persons for offences established in 

dance with this article are exercised to 

mize the effectiveness of law enforce- 
I measures in respect of those offences 
1 .vith due regard to the need to deter the 

iiission of such offences. 

" The Parties shall ensure that their 
ii ts or other competent authorities bear 

ind the serious nature of the offences 
1 It-rated in paragraph 1 of this article 
1 lie circumstances enumerated in para- 

!i .') of this article when considering the 
uality of early release or parole of per- 
.1 Liinvicted of such offences. 

;. Each Party shall, where appropriate, 
t ilish under its domestic law a long stat- 
t f limitations period in which to com- 
t ij proceedings for any offence 
lished in accordance with paragraph 1 

,< article, and a longer period where the 

I ?d offender has evaded the administra- 
• if justice. 

. Kach Party shall take appropriate 
^ ares, consistent with its legal system, 
-lire that a person charged with or con- 
I nf an offence established in aceord- 
i\ ith paragraph 1 of this article, who is 

II within its territory, is present at the 
■( sary criminal proceedings. 

I For the purpose of co-operation 
II g the Parties under this Convention, 
ling, in particular, co-operation under 
es 5, 6, 7 and 9, offences established in 
dance with this article shall not be con- 
ad as fiscal offences or as political of- 
s or regarded as politically motivated, 
lut prejudice to the constitutional lim- 
ns and the fundamental domestic law of 
arties. 

1. Nothing contained in this article 
affect the principle that the descrip- 
if the offences to which it refers and of 
defences thereto is reserved to the do- 
c law of a Party and that such offences 
be prosecuted and punished in conform- 
ith that law. 



Article 4 

idiction 

ch Party: 

(a) Shall take such measures as may 
•cessary to establish its jurisdiction 
:he offences it has established in accord- 
iwith article 3, paragraph 1, when: 



(i) The offence is committed in its 
territory; 

(ii) The offence is committed on 
board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft 
which is registered under its laws at the 
time the offence is committed; 

(b) May take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences it has established in accordance 
with article 3, paragraph 1, when: 

(i) The offence is committed by one 
of its nationals or by a person who has his 
habitual residence in its territory; 

(ii) The offence is committed on 
board a vessel concerning which that Party 
has been authorized to take appropriate ac- 
tion pursuant to article 17, provided that 
such jurisdiction shall be exercised only on 
the basis of agreements or arrangements re- 
ferred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of that 
article; 

(iii) The offence is one of those es- 
tablished in accordance with article 3, para- 
graph 1, subparagraph (c) (iv), and is 
committed outside its territory with a view 
to the commission, within its territory, of 
an offence established in accordance with 
article 3, paragraph 1. 

2. Each Party: 

(a) Shall also take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdic- 
tion over the offences it has established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, 
when the alleged offender is present in its 
territory and it does not extradite him to 
another Party on the ground: 

(i) That the offence has been com- 
mitted in its territory or on board a vessel 
flying its flag or an aircraft which was reg- 
istered under its law at the time the offence 
was committed; or 

(ii) That the offence has been com- 
mitted by one of its nationals; 

(b) May also take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdic- 
tion over the offences it has established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, 
when the alleged offender is present in its 
territory and it does not extradite him to 
another Party. 

3. This Convention does not exclude the 
exercise of any criminal jurisdiction estab- 
lished by a Party in accordance with its 
domestic law. 



Article 5 



Confiscation 

1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as 
may be necessary to enable confiscation of: 

(a) Proceeds derived from offences es- 
tablished in accordance with article 3, para- 
graph 1, or property the value of which 
corresponds to that of such proceeds; 



(b) Narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, materials and equipment or oth- 
er instrumentalities used in or intended for 
use in any manner in offences established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1. 

2. Each Party shall also adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to enable its 
competent authorities to identify, trace and 
freeze or seize proceeds, property, instru- 
mentalities or any other things referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this article, for the pur- 
pose of eventual confiscation. 

3. In order to carry out the measures 
referred to in this article, each Party shall 
empower its courts or other competent au- 
thorities to order that bank, financial or 
commercial records be made available or be 
seized. A Party shall not decline to act un- 
der the provisions of this paragraph on the 
ground of bank secrecy. 

4. (a) Following a request made pur- 
suant to this article by another Party hav- 
ing jurisdiction over an offence established 
in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, 
the Party in whose territory proceeds, 
property, instrumentalities or any other 
things referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
article are situated shall: 

(i) Submit the request to its compe- 
tent authorities for the purpose of obtaining 
an order of confiscation and, if such order is 
granted, give effect to it; or 

(ii) Submit to its competent authori- 
ties, with a view to giving effect to it to the 
extent requested, an order of confiscation is- 
sued by the requesting Party in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this article, insofar as it 
relates to proceeds, property, instrumen- 
talities or any other things referred to in 
paragraph 1 situated in the territory of the 
requested Party. 

(b) Following a request made pur- 
suant to this article by another Party hav- 
ing jurisdiction over an offence established 
in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, 
the requested Party shall take measures to 
identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds, 
property, instrumentalities or any other 
things referred to in paragraph 1 of this ar- 
ticle for the purpose of eventual confiscation 
to be ordered either by the requesting Party 
or, pursuant to a request under subpara- 
graph (a) of this paragraph, by the re- 
quested Party. 

(c) The decisions or actions provided 
for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this para- 
graph shall be taken by the requested Party, 
in accordance with and subject to the provi- 
sions of its domestic law and its procedural 
rules or any bilateral or multilateral treaty, 
agreement or arrangement to which it may 
be bound in relation to the requesting Party. 

(d) The provisions of article 7, para- 
graphs 6 to 19 are applicable mutatis mutan- 
dis. In addition to the information specified 
in article 7, paragraph 10, requests made 
pursuant to this article shall contain the 
following: 



artment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



51 



UNITED NATIONS 



(i) In the case of a request pertain- 
ing to subparagraph (a)(i) of this paragraph, 
a description of the property to be confis- 
cated and a statement of the facts relied 
upon by the requesting Party sufficient to 
enable the requested Party to seek the order 
under its domestic law; 

(ii) In the ease of a request pertain- 
ing to subparagraph (a)(ii), a legally admis- 
sible copy of an order of confiscation issued 
by the requesting Party upon which the re- 
quest is based, a statement of the facts and 
information as to the extent to which the ex- 
ecution of the order is requested; 

(iii) In the case of a request pertain- 
ing to subparagraph (b), a statement of the 
facts relied upon by the requesting Party 
and a description of the actions requested. 

(e) Each Party shall furnish to the 
Secretary-General the text of any of its laws 
and regulations which give effect to this 
paragraph and the text of any subsequent 
changes to such laws and regulations. 

(f ) If a Party elects to make the tak- 
ing of the measures referred to in subpara- 
graphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph 
conditional on the existence of a relevant 
treaty, that Party shall consider this Con- 
vention as the necessary and sufficient trea- 
ty basis. 

(g) The Parties shall seek to conclude 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, agree- 
ments or arrangements to enhance the effec- 
tiveness of international co-operation 
pursuant to this article. 

5. (a) Proceeds or property confiscated 
by a Party pursuant to paragraph 1 or para- 
graph 4 of this article shall be disposed of 
by that Party according to its domestic law 
and administrative procedures. 

(b) When acting on the request of an- 
other Party in accordance with this article, 
a Party may give special consideration to 
concluding agreements on: 

(i) Contributing the value of such 
proceeds and property, or funds derived 
from the sale of such proceeds or property, 
or a substantial part thereof, to intergovern- 
mental bodies specializing in the fight 
against illicit traffic in and abuse of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances; 

(ii) Sharing with other Parties, on a 
regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds 
or property, or funds derived from the sale 
of such proceeds or property, in accordance 
with its domestic law, administrative pro- 
cedures or bilateral or multilateral agree- 
ments entered into for this purpose. 

6. (a) If proceeds have been transformed 
or converted into other property, such prop- 
erty shall be liable to the measures referred 
to in this article instead of the proceeds. 

(b) If proceeds have been inter- 
mingled with property acquired from legiti- 
mate sources, such property shall, without 
prejudice to any powers relating to seizure 
or freezing, be liable to confiscation up to 
the assessed value of the intermingled 
proceeds. 



(c) Income or other benefits derived 
from: 

(i) Proceeds; 

(ii) Property into which proceeds 
have been transformed or converted; or 

(iii) Property with which proceeds 
have been intermingled shall also be liable 
to the measures referred to in this article, 
in the same manner and to the same extent 
as proceeds. 

7. Each Party may consider ensuring 
that the onus of proof be reversed regarding 
the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or oth- 
er property liable to confiscation, to the ex- 
tent that such action is consistent with the 
principles of its domestic law and with the 
nature of the judicial and other proceedings. 

8. The provisions of this article shall not 
be construed as prejudicing the rights of 
bona fide third parties. 

9. Nothing contained in this article 
shall affect the principle that the measures 
to which it refers shall be defined and im- 
plemented in accordance with and subject to 
the provisions of the domestic law of a Party. 



Article 6 



Extradition 

1. This article shall apply to the offences es- 
tablished by the Parties in accordance with 
article 3, paragraph 1. 

2. Each of the offences to which this ar- 
ticle applies shall be deemed to be included 
as an extraditable offence in any extradition 
treaty existing between Parties. The Par- 
ties undertake to include such offences as 
extraditable offences in every extradition 
treaty to be concluded between them. 

3. If a Party which makes extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty re- 
ceives a request for extradition from anoth- 
er Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may consider this Convention as 
the legal basis for extradition in respect of 
any offence to which this article applies. 
The Parties which require detailed legisla- 
tion in order to use this Convention as a 
legal basis for extradition shall consider en- 
acting such legislation as may be necessary. 

4. The Parties which do not make extra- 
dition conditional on the existence of a trea- 
ty shall recognize offences to which this 
article applies as extraditable offences be- 
tween themselves. 

5. Extradition shall be subject to the 
conditions provided for by the law of the re- 
quested Party or by applicable extradition 
treaties, including the grounds upon which 
the requested Party may refuse extradition. 

6. In considering requests received pur- 
suant to this article, the requested State 
may refuse to comply with such requests 
where there are substantial grounds leading 
its judicial or other competent authorities to 
believe that compliance would facilitate the 
prosecution or punishment of any person on 



account of his race, religion, nationalit r 
political opinions, or would cause preju;e 
for any of those reasons to any person ; 
fected by the request. 

7. The Parties shall endeavour to r . 
dite extradition procedures and to siin . 
evidentiary requirements relating tluM 
in respect of any offence to which thi- 
cle applies. 

8. Subject to the provisions of its d le 
tic law and its extradition treaties, the - 
quested Party may, upon being satisfit 
that the circumstances so warrant aiv' 
urgent, and at the request of the req 
Party, take a person whose extradition 
sought and who is present in its territi 
into custody or take other appropriate 'a 
ures to ensure his presence at extradit i 
proceedings. 

9. Without prejudice to the exerci- )i 
any criminal jurisdiction established i ;■ 
cordance with its domestic law, a Part; i 
whose territory an alleged offender i.'i in 
shall: 

(a) If it does not extradite him i' ^■ 
spect of an offense established in accni r.i 
with article 3, paragraph 1, on the gi^ : 
set forth in article 4, paragraph 2, sul ; 
graph (a), submit the case to its compe ii 
authorities for the purpose of prosecut ,, 
unless otherwise agreed with the requ i 
Party; 

(b) If it does not extradite him i ^ 
spect of such an offence and has estahl eo 
its jurisdiction in relation to that offii i 
accordance with article 4, paragraph i 
subparagraph (b), submit the case to ii 
competent authorities for the purpose 
prosecution, unless otherwise request' 
the requesting Party for the purposes 
preserving its legitimate jurisdiction. 

10. If extradition, sought for purp 
of enforcing a sentence, is refused bee 
the person sought is a national of the r 
quested Party, the requested Party sh 
its law so permits and in conformity w 
the requirements of such law, upon ap] 
tion of the requesting Party, consider i 
forcement of the sentence which has bi 
imposed under the law of the requestii 
Party, or the remainder thereof. 

11. The Parties shall seek to conch 
bilateral and multilateral agreements ' 
carry out or to enhance the effectivem 
extradition. 

12. The Parties may consider ente 
into bilateral or multilateral agreemei 
whether ad hoc or general, on the tran 
to their country of persons sentenced t 
prisonment and other forms of depriva 
liberty for offences to which this artic 
plies, in order that they may complete 
sentences there. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin/Aprillii 



UNITED NATIONS 



Article 7 



tual Legal Assistance 

he Parties shall afford one another, pur- 
nt to this article, the widest measure of 
ual legal assistance in investigations, 

I ^ecutions and judicial proceedings in re- 
m to criminal offences established in ac- 
lanee with article 3, paragraph 1. 

5 2. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded 
ccordance with this article may be re- 
sted for any of the following purposes: 

(a) Taking evidence or statements 
n persons; 

(b) Effecting service of judicial 
iments; 

(c) Executing searches and seizures; 

(d) Examining objects and sites; 

(e) Providing information and eviden- 
y items; 

(f) Providing originals or certified 
es of relevant documents and records, 
iding bank, financial, corporate or busi- 

records; 

(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds, 
lerty, instrumentalities or other things 
videntiary purposes. 

3. The Parties may afford one another 
other forms of mutual legal assistance 
ved by the domestic law of the requested 

y- 

4. Upon request, the Parties shall facili- 
or encourage, to the extent consistent 
their domestic law and practice, the 

^nce or availability of persons, includ- 

jersons in custody, w'ho consent to assist 

ivestigations or participate in 

jeedings. 

"5. A Party shall not decline to render 

aal legal assistance under this article on 

grounds of bank secrecy. 

5. The provisions of this article shall not 
It the obligations under any other trea- 
Blateral or multilateral, which governs 
ill govern, in whole or in part, mutual 

assistance in criminal matters. 
7. Paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article shall 
y to requests made pursuant to this ar- 

if the Parties in question are not bound 
treaty of mutual legal assistance. If 
e Parties are bound by such a treaty, the 
^spending provisions of that treaty shall 
if unless the Parties agree to apply 
jgraphs 8 to 19 of this article in lieu 

of. 

i. Parties shall designate an authority, 
hen necessary authorities, which shall 

the responsibility and power to execute 
ests for mutual legal assistance or to 
smit them to the competent authorities 
xecution. The authority or the authori- 
iesignated for this purpose shall 
Jtified to the Secretary-General, 
smission of requests for mutual legal 
tanee and any communication related 
Jto shall be effected between the au- 
ties designated by the Parties; this re- 
;ment shall be without prejudice to the 
. of a Party to require that such re- 



quests and communications be addressed to 
it through the diplomatic channel and, in 
urgent circumstances, where the Parties 
agree, through channels of the International 
Criminal Police Organization, if possible. 

9. Requests shall be made in writing in 
a language acceptable to the requested Par- 
ty. The language or languages acceptable 
to each Party shall be notified to the 
Secretary-General. In urgent circum- 
stances, and where agreed by the Parties, 
requests may be made orally, but shall be 
confirmed in writing forthwith. 

10. A request for mutual legal assistance 
shall contain: 

(a) The identity of the authority mak- 
ing the request; 

(b) The subject matter and nature of 
the investigation, prosecution or proceeding 
to which the request relates, and the name 
and the functions of the authority conduct- 
ing such investigation, prosecution or 
proceeding; 

(c) A summary of the relevant facts, 
except in respect of requests for the purpose 
of service of judicial documents; 

(d) A description of the assistance 
sought and details of any particular pro- 
cedure the requesting Party wishes to be 
followed; 

(e) Where possible, the identity, 
location and nationality of any person 
concerned; 

(f ) The purpose for which the evi- 
dence, information or action is sought. 

11. The requested Party may request 
additional information when it appears nec- 
essary for the execution of the request in ac- 
cordance with its domestic law or when it 
can facilitate such execution. 

12. A request shall be executed in 
accordance with the domestic law of the re- 
quested Party and, to the extent not con- 
trary to the domestic law of the requested 
Party and where possible, in accordance with 
the procedures specified in the request. 

13. The requesting Party shall not 
transmit nor use information or evidence 
furnished by the requested Party for inves- 
tigations, prosecutions or proceedings other 
than those stated in the request without the 
prior consent of the requested Party. 

14. The requesting Party may require 
that the requested Party keep confidential 
the fact and substance of the request, except 
to the extent necessary to execute the re- 
quest. If the requested Party cannot comply 
with the requirement of confidentiality, it 
shall promptly inform the requesting Party. 

15. Mutual legal assistance may be 
refused: 

(a) If the request is not made in con- 
formity with the provisions of this article; 

(b) If the requested Party considers 
that execution of the request is likely to 
prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre 
public or other essential interests; 



(c) If the authorities of the requested 
Party would be prohibited by its domestic 
law from carrying out the action requested 
with regard to any similar offence, had it 
been subject to investigation, prosecution or 
proceedings under their own jurisdiction; 

(d) If it would be contrary to the legal 
system of the requested Party relating to 
mutual legal assistance for the request to be 
granted. 

16. Reasons shall be given for any refus- 
al of mutual legal assistance. 

17. Mutual legal assistance may be 
postponed by the requested Party on the 
grounds that it interferes with an ongoing 
investigation, prosecution or proceeding. In 
such a case, the requested Party shall con- 
sult with the requesting Party to determine 
if the assistance can still be given subject to 
such terms and conditions as the requested 
Party deems necessary. 

18. A witness, expert or other person 
who consents to give evidence in a proceed- 
ing or to assist in an investigation, prosecu- 
tion or judicial proceeding in the territory 
of the requesting Party, shall not be pros- 
ecuted, detained, punished or subjected to 
any other restriction of his personal liberty 
in that territory in respect of acts, omis- 
sions or convictions prior to his departure 
from the territory of the requested Party. 
Such safe conduct shall cease when the wit- 
ness, expert or other person having had, for 
a period of fifteen consecutive days, or for 
any period agreed upon by the Parties, from 
the date on which he has been officially in- 
formed that his presence is no longer re- 
quired by the judicial authorities, an 
opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless re- 
mained voluntarily in the territory or, hav- 
ing left it, has returned of his own free will. 

19. The ordinary costs of executing a re- 
quest shall be borne by the requested Party, 
unless otherwise agreed by the Parties con- 
cerned. If expenses of a substantial or ex- 
traordinary nature are or will be required 
to fulfill the request, the Parties shall con- 
sult to determine the terms and conditions 
under which the request will be executed as 
well as the manner in which the costs shall 
be borne. 

20. The Parties shall consider, as may 
be necessary, the possibility of concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or ar- 
rangements that would serve the purpose of, 
give practical effect to or enhance the provi- 
sions of this article. 



Article 8 



Transfer of Proceedings 

The Parties shall give consideration to the 
possibility of transferring to one another 
proceedings for criminal prosecution of of- 
fences established in accordance with arti- 
cle 3, paragraph 1, in cases where such 
transfer is considered to be in the interests 
of a proper administration of justice. 



artment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



53 



UNITED NATIONS 



Article 9 

Other Forms of Co-operation and Training 

1. The Parties shall co-operate closely with 
one another, consistent with their respective 
domestic legal and administrative systems, 
with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of 
law enforcement action to suppress the com- 
mission of offences established in accord- 
ance with article 3, paragraph 1. They shall, 
in particular, on the basis of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements: 

(a) Establish and maintain channels of 
communication between their competent 
agencies and services to facilitate the secure 
and rapid exchange of information concern- 
ing all aspects of offences established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, in- 
cluding, if the Parties concerned deem it ap- 
propriate, links with other criminal 
activities: 

(b) Co-operate with one another in 
conducting inquiries, with respect to of- 
fences established in accordance with arti- 
cle 3, paragraph 1, having an international 
character, concerning: 

(i) The identity, whereabouts and 
activities of persons suspected of being in- 
volved in offences established in accordance 
with article 3. paragraph 1: 

(ii) The movement of proceeds or 
property derived from the commission of 
such offences; 

(ill) The movement of narcotic 
drugs, psychotropic substances, substances 
in Table I and Table II of this Convention 
and instrumentalities used or intended for 
use in the commission of such offences; 

(c) In appropriate cases and if not con- 
trary to domestic law, establish joint teams, 
taking into account the need to protect the 
security of persons and of operations, to car- 
ry out the provisions of this paragraph. Of- 
ficials of any Party taking part in such 
teams shall act as authorized by the appro- 
priate authorities of the Party in whose ter- 
ritory the operation is to take place; in all 
such cases, the Parties involved shall ensure 
that the sovereignty of the Party on whose 
territory the operation is to take place is 
fully respected: 

(d) Provide, when appropriate, neces- 
sary quantities of substances for analytical 
or investigative purposes; 

(e) Facilitate effective co-ordination 
between their competent agencies and serv- 
ices and promote the exchange of personnel 
and other experts, including the posting of 
liaison officers. 

2. Each Party shall, to the extent neces- 
sary, initiate, develop or improve specific 
training programmes for its law enforce- 
ment and other personnel, including cus- 
toms, charged with the suppression of 
offences established in accordance with arti- 
cle 3, paragraph 1. Such programmes shall 
deal, in particular, with the following: 



(a) Methods used in the detection and 
suppression of offences established in accord- 
ance with article 3, paragraph 1; 

(b) Routes and techniques used by 
persons suspected of being involved in of- 
fences established in accordance with arti- 
cle 3, paragraph 1, particularly in transit 
States, and appropriate countermeasures; 

(c) Monitoring of the import and ex- 
port of narcotic drugs, psychotropic sub- 
stances and substances in Table I and 
Table II; 

(d) Detection and monitoring of the 
movement of proceeds and property derived 
from, and narcotic drugs, psychotropic sub- 
stances and substances in Table I and Table 
II, and instrumentalities used or intended 
for use in, the commission of offences estab- 
lished in accordance with article 3, para- 
graph 1; 

(e) Methods used for the transfer, con- 
cealment or disguise of such proceeds, prop- 
erty and instrumentalities; 

(f ) Collection of evidence; 

(g) Control techniques in free trade 
zones and free ports; 

(h) Modern law enforcement 
techniques. 

3. The Parties shall assist one another 
to plan and implement research and training 
programmes designed to share expertise in 
the areas referred to in paragraph 2 of this 
article and, to this end, shall also, when ap- 
propriate, use regional and international 
conferences and seminars to promote co- 
operation and stimulate discussion on prob- 
lems of mutual concern, including the special 
problems and needs of transit States. 



Article 10 



International Co-operation 

and Assistance for Transit States 

1. The Parties shall co-operate, directly or 
through competent international or regional 
organizations, to assist and support transit 
States and, in particular, developing coun- 
tries in need of such assistance and support, 
to the extent possible, through programmes 
of technical co-operation on interdiction and 
other related activities. 

2. The Parties may undertake, directly 
or through competent international or re- 
gional organizations, to provide financial as- 
sistance to such transit States for the 
purpose of augmenting and strengthening 
the infrastructure needed for effective con- 
trol and prevention of illicit traffic. 

3. The Parties may conclude bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements to 
enhance the effectiveness of international 
co-operation pursuant to this article and 
may take into consideration financial ar- 
rangements in this regard. 



Article 11 



Controlled Delivery 

1. If permitted by the basic principles of 
their respective domestic legal systems. 
Parties shall take the necessary measur 
within their possibilities, to allow for th 
appropriate use of controlled delivery at 
international level, on the basis of agree 
ments or arrangements mutually consen 
to, with a view to identifying persons in 
volved in offences established in accords 
with article 3, paragraph 1, and to takin 
gal action against them. 

2. Decisions to use controlled delive 
shall be made on a case-by-case basis an 
may, when necessary, take into consider 
tion financial arrangements and under 
standings with respect to the exercise o 
risdiction by the Parties concerned. 

3. Illicit consignments whose contro 
delivery is agreed to may, with the cons 
of the Parties concerned, be intercepted 
allowed to continue with the narcotic dr 
or psychotropic substances intact or re- 
moved or replaced in whole or in part. 



Article 12 

Substances Frequently Used in the III 
Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs or 
Psychotropic Substances 

1. The Parties shall take the measures t 
deem appropriate to prevent diversion c 
substances in Table I and Table II used 
the purpose of illicit manufacture of nai 
drugs of psychotropic substances, and s 
co-operate with one another to this end. 

2. If a Party or the Board has infor 
tion which in its opinion may require th 
elusion of a substance in Table I or Tabh 
it shall notify the Secretary-General an 
furnish him with the information in su] 
of that notification. The procedure de- 
scribed in paragraphs 2 to 7 of this arti 
shall also apply when a Party or the Bot 
has information justifying the deletion < 
substance from Table I or Table II, or tl 
transfer of a substance from one Table t 
other. 

3. The Secretary-General shall trai 
such notification, and any information w 
he considers relevant, to the Parties, to 
Commission and. where notification is r 
by a Party, to the Board. The Parties sh 
communicate their comments concernin 
the notification to the Secretary-Genen 
together with all supplementary inform 
tion which may assist the Board in estal 
lishing an assessment and the Commiss 
in reaching a decision. 

4. If the Board, taking into account 
extent, importance and diversity of the 
use of the substance, and the possibility 
ease of using alternate substances both 
licit purposes and for the illicit manufac 
of narcotic drugs or psychotropic sub- 
stances, finds: 



54 



Department of State Bulletin/April 1 



UNITED NATIONS 



(a) That the subtance is frequently 

i in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic 
or psychotropic substance; 

(b) That the volume and extent of the 
it manufacture of a narcotic drug or psy- 
ropic substance creates serious public 
th or social problems, so as to warrant 
rnational action, 

it shall communicate to the Commission 
ssessment of the substance, including 
ikely effect of adding the substance to 
;r Table I or Table II on both licit use 
illicit manufacture, together with rec- 
lendations of monitoring measures, if 
that would be appropriate in the light of 
ssessment. 

5. The Commission, taking into account 
•omments submitted by the Parties and 
•omments and recommendations of the 
■d, whose assessment shall be deter- 
itive as to scientific matters, and also 
ig into due consideration any other rele- 
factors, may decide by a two-thirds ma- 
y of its members to place a substance in 
5 1 or Table II. 

i. Any decision of the Commission taken 
uant to this article shall be communi- 
1 by the Secretary-General to all States 
ither entities which are. or which are 
led to become, Parties to this Conven- 
and to the Board. Such decision shall 
Tie fully effective with respect to each 
f one hundred and eighty days after the 
of such communication. 
'. (a) The decisions of the Commission 
1 under this article shall be subject to 
<w by the Council upon the request of 
■"arty filed within one hundred and 
y days after the date of notification of 
ecision. The request for review shall be 
to the Secretary-General, together 
all relevant information upon which the 
ist for review is based. 

(b) The Secretary-General shall 
imit copies of the request for review 

he relevant information to the Commis- 

to the Board and to all the Parties, in- 

5 them to submit their comments 

n ninety days. All comments received 

be submitted to the Council for 

deration. 

(c) The Council may confirm or re- 
the decision of the Commission. Noti- 
on of the Council's decision shall be 
mitted to all States and other entities 
1 are, or which are entitled to become, 
es to this Convention, to the Commis- 
md to the Board. 

: (a) Without prejudice to the gener- 
of the provisions contained in para- 
T 1 of this article and the provisions of 
^61 Convention, the 1961 Convention as 
ded and the 1971 Convention, the Par- 
hall take the measures they deem ap- 
■iate to monitor the manufacture and 
ibution of substances in Table I and Ta- 
! which are carried out within their 
torv. 



(b) To this end, the Parties may: 

(i) Control all persons and enter- 
prises engaged in the manufacture and dis- 
tribution of such substances; 

(ii) Control under license the estab- 
lishment and premises in which such manu- 
facture or distribution may take place; 

(iii) Require that licensees obtain 
a permit for conducting the aforesaid 
operations; 

(iv) Prevent the accumulation of 
such substances in the possession of manu- 
facturers and distributors, in excess of the 
quantities required for the normal conduct 
of business and the prevailing market 
conditions. 

9. Each Party shall, with respect to 
substances in Table I and Table II, take the 
following measures: 

(a) Establish and maintain a system 
to monitor international trade in substances 
in Table I and Table II in order to facilitate 
the identification of suspicious transactions. 
Such monitoring systems shall be applied in 
close co-operation with manufacturers, im- 
porters, exporters, wholesalers and re- 
tailers, who shall inform the competent 
authorities of suspicious orders and 
transactions. 

(b) Provide for the seizure of any sub- 
stance in Table I or Table II if there is suffi- 
cient evidence that it is for use in the illicit 
manufacture of a narcotic drug or psycho- 
tropic substance. 

(c) Notify, as soon as possible, the 
competent authorities and services of the 
Parties concerned if there is reason to be- 
lieve that the import, export or transit of a 
substance in Table I or Table II is destined 
for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances, including in par- 
ticular information about the means of pay- 
ment and any other essential elements which 
led to that belief. 

(d) Require that imports and exports 
be properly labelled and documented. Com- 
mercial documents such as invoices, cargo 
manifests, customs, transport and other 
shipping documents shall include the names, 
as stated in Table I or Table II, of the sub- 
stances being imported or exported, the 
quantity being imported or exported and 
the name and address of the exporter, the 
importer and, when available, the consignee. 

(e) Ensure that documents referred to 
in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph are 
maintained for a period of not less than two 
years and may be made available for inspec- 
tion by the competent authorities. 

10. (a) In addition to the provisions of 
paragraph 9, and upon request to the 
Secretary-General by the interested Party, 
each Party from whose territory a sub- 
stance in Table I is to be exported shall en- 
sure that, prior to such export, the following 
information is supplied by its competent au- 
thorities to the competent authorities of the 
importing country: 



(i) Name and address of the export- 
er and importer and, when available, the 
consignee; 

(ii) Name of the substance in 
Table 1: 

(iii) Quantity of the substance to be 
exported; 

(iv) Expected point of entry and ex- 
pected date of dispatch; 

(v) Any other information which is 
mutually agreed upon by the Parties. 

(b) A Party may adopt more strict or 
severe measures of control than those pro- 
vided by this paragraph if, in its opinion, 
such measures are desirable or necessary. 

11. Where a Party furnishes informa- 
tion to another Party in accordance with 
paragraphs 9 and 10 of this article, the Par- 
ty furnishing such information may require 
that the Party receiving it keep confidential 
any trade, business, commercial or profes- 
sional secret or trade process. 

12. Each Party shall furnish annually to 
the Board, in the form and manner provided 
for by it and on forms made available by it, 
information on: 

(a) The amounts seized of substances 
in Table I and Table II and, when known, 
their origin; 

(b) Any substance not included in Ta- 
ble I or Table II which is identified as hav- 
ing been used in illicit manufacture of 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, 
and which is deemed by the Party to be suf- 
ficiently significant to be brought to the at- 
tention of the Board; 

(c) Methods of diversion and illicit 
manufacture. 

13. The Board shall report annually to 
the Commission on the implementation of 
this article and the Commission shall peri- 
odicallv review the adequacy and propriety 
of Table I and Table II. 

14. The provisions of this article shall 
not apply to pharmaceutical preparations, 
nor to other preparations containing sub- 
stances in Table I or Table II that are com- 
pounded in such a way that such substances 
cannot be easily used or recovered by readi- 
ly applicable means. 



Article 13 

Materials and Equipment 

The Parties shall take such measures as 
they deem appropriate to prevent trade in 
and the diversion of materials and equip- 
ment for illicit production or manufacture of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
and shall co-operate to this end. 



rtment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



55 



UNITED NATIONS 



Article 14 



Measures to Eradicate Illicit Cultivation 
of Narcotic Plants and to Eliminate Illicit 
Demand for Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 

1. Any measures taken pursuant to this 
Convention by Parties shall not be less 
stringent than the provisions applicable to 
the eradication of illicit cultivation of plants 
containing narcotic and psychotropic sub- 
stances and to the elimination of illicit de- 
mand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances under the provisions of the 1961 
Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended 
and the 1971 Convention. 

2. Each Party shall take appropriate 
measures to prevent illicit cultivation of and 
to eradicate plants containing narcotic or 
psychotropic substances, such as opium pop- 
py, coca bush and cannabis plants, cultivated 
illicitly in its territory. The measures 
adopted shall respect fundamental human 
rights and shall take due account of tradi- 
tional licit uses, where there is historic evi- 
dence of such use. as well as the protection 
of the environment. 

3. (a) The Parties may co-operate to in- 
crease the effectiveness of eradication ef- 
forts. Such co-operation may, inter alia. 
include support, when appropriate, for inte- 
grated rural development leading to eco- 
nomically viable alternatives to illicit 
cultivation. Factors such as access to mar- 
kets, the availability of resources and pre- 
vailing socio-economic conditions should be 
taken into account before such rural devel- 
opment programmes are implemented. The 
Parties may agree on any other appropriate 
measures of co-operation. 

(b) The Parties shall also facilitate the 
e.xchange of scientific and technical informa- 
tion and the conduct of research concerning 
eradication. 

(c) Whenever they have common fron- 
tiers, the Parties shall seek to co-operate in 
eradication programmes in their respective 
areas along those frontiers. 

4. The Parties shall adopt appropriate 
measures aimed at eliminating or reducing 
illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psycho- 
tropic substances, with a view to reducing 
human suffering and eliminating financial 
incentives for illicit traffic. These measures 
may be based, iiiter alia, on the recommen- 
dations of the United Nations, specialized 
agencies of the United Nations such as the 
World Health Organization, and other com- 
petent international organizations, and on 
the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Out- 
line adopted by the International Confer- 
ence on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, 
held in 1987, as it pertains to governmental 
and non-governmental agencies and private 
efforts in the fields of prevention, treatment 
and rehabilitation. The Parties may enter 
into bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
arrangements aimed at eliminating or re- 
ducing illicit demand for narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances. 



5. The Parties may also take necessary 
measures for early destruction or lawful dis- 
posal of the narcotic drugs, psychotropic 
substances and substances in Table I and 
Table II which have been seized or confis- 
cated and for the admissibility as evidence 
of duly certified necessary quantities of 
such substances. 



Article 15 



Commercial Carriers 

1. The Parties shall take appropriate meas- 
ures to ensure that means of transport oper- 
ated by commercial carriers are not used in 
the commission of offences established in ac- 
cordance with article 3, paragraph 1; such 
measures may include special arrangements 
with commercial carriers. 

2. Each Party shall require commercial 
carriers to take reasonable precautions to 
prevent the use of their means of transport 
for the commission of offences established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1. Such 
precautions may include: 

(a) If the principal place of business of 
a commercial carrier is within the territory 
of the Party: 

(i) Training of personnel to identify 
suspicious consignments or persons; 

(ii) Promotion of integrity of 
personnel; 

(b) If a commercial carrier is operat- 
ing within the territory of the Party: 

(i) Submission of cargo manifests in 
advance whenever possible; 

(ii) Use of tamper-resistant, indi- 
vidually verifiable seals on containers; 

(iii) Reporting to the appropriate 
authorities at the earliest opportunity all 
suspicious circumstances that may be re- 
lated to the commission of offences estab- 
lished in accordance with article 3, 
paragraph 1. 

3. Each Party shall seek to ensure that 
commercial carriers and the appropriate au- 
thorities at points of entry and exit and oth- 
er customs control areas co-operate, with a 
view to preventing unauthorized access to 
means of transport and cargo and to imple- 
menting appropriate security measures. 



Article 16 

Commercial Documents 
and Labelling of Exports 

1. Each Party shall require that lawful ex- 
ports of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances be properly documented. In ad- 
dition to the requirements for documenta- 
tion under article 31 of the 1961 Convention, 
article 31 of the 1961 Convention as amended 
and article 12 of the 1971 Convention, com- 
mercial documents such as invoices, cargo 
manifests, customs, transport and other 



shipping documents shall include the n:i 
of the narcotic drugs and p.sychotropic > 
stances being exported as set out in the 
spective Schedules of the 1961 Conventioi 
the 1961 Convention as amended and the 
Convention, the quantity being exported 
and the name and address of the exporte 
the importer and, when available, the 
consignee. 

2. Each Party shall require that con 
signments of narcotic drugs and psycho- 
tropic substances being exported be not 
mislabelled. 



Article 17 



Illicit Traffic by Sea 

1. The Parties shall co-operate to the ful 
extent possible to suppress illicit traffic 
sea, in conformity with the Internationa 
of the sea. 

2. A Party which has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel flying i 
flag or not displaying a flag or marks of 
istry is engaged in illicit traffic may rec 
the assistance of other Parties in suppre 
ing its use for that purpose. The Parties 
requested shall render such assistance v 
in the means available to them. 

3. A Party which has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel exercis 
freedom of navigation in accordance wit 
ternational law and flying the flag or di 
playing marks of registry of another Pa 
is engaged in illicit traffic may so notify 
flag State, request confirmation of regi 
and, if confirmed, request authorizatior 
from the flag State to take appropriate 
measures in regard to that vessel. 

4. In accordance with paragraph 3 ( 
accordance with treaties in force betwe 
them or in accordance with any agreem^ 
or arrangement otherwise reached bet\ 
those Parties, the flag State may authoi 
the requesting State to, inter alia: 

(a) Board the vessel; 

(b) Search the vessel; 

(c) If evidence of involvement in i 
traffic is found, take appropriate action 
respect to the vessel, persons and cargc 
board. 

5. Where action is taken pursuant t 
this article, the Parties concerned shall 
due account of the need not to endanger 
safety of life at sea, the security of the ■ 
sel and the cargo or to prejudice the con 
mercial and legal interests of the flag Si 
or any other interested State. 

6. The flag State may, consistent w 
its obligations in paragraph 1 of this ari 
subject its authorization to conditions ti 
mutually agreed between it and the req 
ing Party, including conditions relating 
responsibility. 

7. For the purposes of paragraphs 3 
and 4 of this article, a Party shall respc 
expeditiously to a request from another 
tv to determine whether a vessel that is 



56 



UNITED NATIONS 



ts flag is entitled to do so. and to 
ests for authorization made pursuant to 
graph 3. At the time of becoming a Par- 
this Convention, each Party shall des- 
;e an authority or, when necessary, 
orities to receive and respond to such 
ests. Such designation shall be notified 
igh the Secretary-General to all other 
ies within one month of the designation. 
i. A Party which has taken any action 
cordance with this article shall 
ptly inform the flag State concerned of 
esults of that action. 
). The Parties shall consider entering 
bilateral or regional agreements or ar- 
ements to carry out. or to enhance the 
tiveness of, the provisions of this 
le. 

0. Action pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
article shall be carried out only by war- 
. or military aircraft, or other ships or 
aft clearly marked and identifiable as 

J on government service and authorized 
at effect. 

1. Any action taken in accordance with 
irticle shall take due account of the 
not to interfere with or affect the 

s and obligations and the e.xercise of ju- 
;ation of coastal States in accordance 
the international law of the sea. 



Article 18 



'Trade Zones and Free Ports 

3 Parties shall apply measures to sup- 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psy- 

opic substances and substances in 
I and Table II in free trade zones and 

'8 ports that are no less stringent than 
applied in other parts of their 

;Qries. 

. The Parties shall endeavour: 

(a) To monitor the movement of goods 
'arsons in free trade zones and free 

, and, to that end, shall empower the 
etent authorities to search cargoes and 
ling and outgoing vessels, including 
ure craft and fishing vessels, as well as 
ift and vehicles and, when appropriate, 
irch crew members, passengers and 
baggage; 

(b) To establish and maintain a sys- 
detect consignments suspected of 
ining narcotic drugs, psychotropic sub- 
es and substances in Table I and Ta- 

passing into or out of free trade zones 
ree ports; 

(c) To establish and maintain surveil- 
systems in harbour and dock areas and 
ports and border control points in free 
zones and free ports. 



Article 19 



The Use of the Mails 

1. In conformity with their obligations under 
the Conventions of the Universal Postal 
Union, and in accordance with the basic 
principles of their domestic legal systems, 
the Parties shall adopt measures to sup- 
press the use of the mails for illicit traffic 
and shall co-operate with one another to 
that end. 

2. The measures referred to in para- 
graph 1 of this article shall include, in 
particular: 

(a) Co-ordinated action for the preven- 
tion and repression of the use of the mails 
for illicit traffic; 

(b) Introduction and maintenance by 
authorized law enforcement personnel of in- 
vestigative and control techniques designed 
to detect illicit consignments of narcotic 
drugs, psychotropic substances and sub- 
stances in Table I and Table II in the mails; 

(c) Legislative measures to enable the 
use of appropriate means to secure evidence 
required for judicial proceedings. 



Article 20 



Information to be Furnished 
by the Parties 

1. The Parties shall furnish, through the 
Secretary-General, information to the Com- 
mission on the working of this Convention in 
their territories and, in particular: 

(a) The text of laws and regulations 
promulgated in order to give effect to the 
Convention; 

(b) Particulars of cases of illicit traf- 
fic within their jurisdiction which they con- 
sider important because of new trends 
disclosed, the quantities involved, the 
sources from which the substances are ob- 
tained or the methods employed by persons 
so engaged. 

2. The Parties shall furnish such infor- 
mation in such a manner and by such dates 
as the Commission may request. 



Article 21 



Functions of the Commission 

The Commission is authorized to consider all 
matters pertaining to the aims of this Con- 
vention and, in particular: 

(a) The Commission shall, on the basis 
of the information submitted by the Parties 
in accordance with article 20, review the op- 
eration of this Convention; 

(b) The Commission may make sug- 
gestions and general recommendations 
based on the examination of the information 
received from the Parties: 



(c) The Commission may call the at- 
tention of the Board to any matters which 
may be relevant to the functions of the 
Board; 

(d) The Commission shall, on any 
matter referred to it by the Board under ar- 
ticle 22, paragraph Kb), take such action as 
it deems appropriate; 

(e) The Commission may, in conformi- 
ty with the procedures laid down in arti- 
cle 12, amend Table I and Table II; 

(f ) The Commission may draw the at- 
tention of non-Parties to decisions and rec- 
ommendations which it adopts under this 
Convention, with a view to their considering 
taking action in accordance therewith. 



Article 22 



Functions of the Board 

1. Without prejudice to the functions of the 
Commission under article 21. and without 
prejudice to the functions of the Board and 
the Commission under the 1961 Convention, 
the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1971 
Convention: 

(a) If, on the basis of its examina- 
tion of information available to it, to the 
Secretary-General or to the Commission, or 
of information communicated by United Na- 
tions organs, the Board has reason to be- 
lieve that the aims of this Convention in 
matters related to its competence are not 
being met, the Board may invite a Party or 
Parties to furnish any relevant information; 

(b) With respect to articles 12, 13 
and 16; 

(i) After taking action under sub- 
paragraph (a) of this article, the Board, if 
satisfied that it is necessary to do so, may 
call upon the Party concerned to adopt such 
remedial measures as shall seem under the 
circumstances to be necessary for the execu- 
tion of the provisions of articles 12, 13 
and 16; 

(ii) Prior to taking action under (iii) 
below, the Board shall treat as confidential 
its communications with the Party con- 
cerned under the preceding subparagraphs; 

(iii) If the Board finds that the Par- 
ty concerned has not taken remedial meas- 
ures which it has been called upon to take 
under this subparagraph, it may call the at- 
tention of the Parties, the Council and the 
Commission to the matter. Any report pub- 
lished by the Board under this subpara- 
graph shall also contain the views of the 
Party concerned if the latter so requests. 

2. Any Party shall be invited to be rep- 
resented at a meeting of the Board at which 
a question of direct interest to it is to be 
considered under this article. 

3. If in any case a decision of the Board 
which is adopted under this article is not 
unanimous, the views of the minority shall 
be stated. 



57 



UNITED NATIONS 



4. Decisions of the Board under this ar- 
ticle shall be taken by a two-thirds majority 
of the whole number of the Board. 

5. In carrying out its functions pur- 
suant to subparagraph 1(a) of this article, 
the Board shall ensure the confidentiality of 
all information which may come into its 
possession. 

6. The Board's responsibility under this 
article shall not apply to the implementation 
of treaties or agreements entered into be- 
tween Parties in accordance with the provi- 
sions of this Convention. 

7. The provisions of this article shall not 
be applicable to disputes between Parties 
falling under the provisions of article 32. 



Article 2.3 



Reports of the Board 

1. The Board shall prepare an annual report 
on its work containing an analysis of the in- 
formation at its disposal and, in appropriate 
eases, an account of the e.xplanations, if any, 
given by or required of Parties, together 
with any observations and recommendations 
which the Board desires to make. The Board 
may make such additional reports as it con- 
siders necessary. The reports shall be sub- 
mitted to the Council through the 
Commission which may make such com- 
ments as it sees fit. 

2. The reports of the Board shall be 
communicated to the Parties and subse- 
quently published by the Secretary-General. 
The Parties shall permit their unrestricted 
distribution. 



Article 24 



Application of Stricter Measures Than 
Those Required by This Convention 

A Party may adopt more strict or severe 
measures than those provided by this Con- 
vention if, in its opinion, such measures are 
desirable or necessary for the prevention or 
suppression of illicit traffic. 



Article 25 



Non-Derogation From Earlier Treaty 
Rights and Obligations 

The provisions of this Convention shall not 
derogate from any rights enjoyed or obliga- 
tions undertaken by Parties to this Conven- 
tion under the 1961 Convention, the 1961 
Convention as amended and the 1971 
Convention. 



Article 26 



Signature 

This Convention shall be open for signature 
at the United Nations Office at Vienna, from 
20 December 1988 to 28 February 1989, and 
thereafter at the Headquarters of the 
United Nations at New York, until 20 
December 1989, by: 

(a) All States: 

(b) Namibia, represented by the 
United Nations Council for Namibia: 

(c) Regional economic integration or- 
ganizations which have competence in re- 
spect of the negotiation, conclusion and 
application of international agreements in 
matters covered by this Convention, refer- 
ences under the Convention to Parties, 
States or national services being applicable 
to these organizations within the limits of 
their competence. 



Article 27 



Ratification, Acceptance, Approval 
or Act of Formal Confirmation 

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval by States and by 
Namibia, represented by the United Na- 
tions Council for Namibia, and to acts of 
formal confirmation by regional economic 
integration organizations referred to in ar- 
ticle 26, subparagraph (c). The instruments 
of ratification, acceptance or approval and 
those relating to acts of formal confirmation 
shall be deposited with the Secretary- 
General. 

2. In their instruments of formal con- 
firmation, regional economic integration or- 
ganizations shall declare the e.xtent of their 
competence with respect to the matters gov- 
erned by this Convention. These organiza- 
tions shall also inform the Secretary- 
General of any modification in the extent of 
their competence with respect to the mat- 
ters governed by the Convention. 



Article 28 



Accession 

1. This Convention shall remain open for ac- 
cession by any State, by Namibia, repre- 
sented by the United Nations Council for 
Namibia, and by regional economic integra- 
tion organizations referred to in article 26, 
subparagraph (c). Accession shall be effected 
by the deposit of an instrument of accession 
with the Secretary-General. 

2. In their instruments of accession, re- 
gional economic integration organizations 
shall declare the extent of their competence 
with respect to the matters governed by 



this Convention. These organizations s\^ 
also inform the Secretary-General of ar 
modification in the extent of their comp 
tence w'ith respect to the matters govet 
bv the Convention. 



Article 29 



Entry Into Force 

1. This Convention shall enter into forci 
the ninetieth day after the date of the d 
posit with the Secretary-General of the 
twentieth instrument of ratification, act 
ance, approval or accession by States oi 
Namibia, represented by the Council fo 
Namibia. 

2. For each State or for Namibia, n 
sented by the Council for Namibia, rati 
ing, accepting, approving or acceding t 
this Convention after the deposit of the 
twentieth instrument of ratification, ace 
ance, approval or accession, the Conver 
shall enter into force on the ninetieth d 
after the date of the deposit of its instr 
ment of ratification, acceptance, appro^ 
accession. 

3. For each regional economic intej 
tion organization referred to in article 
subparagraph (c) depositing an instrun 
relating to an act of formal confirmatio 
an instrument of accession, this Convei 
shall enter into force on the ninetieth c 
after such deposit, or at the date the Ci 
vention enters into force pursuant to p; 
graph 1 of this article, whichever is late 



Article 30 



Denunciation 

1. A Party may denounce this Conventi 
any time by a written notification addi 
to the Secretary-General. 

2. Such denunciation shall take effi 
for the Party concerned one year after 
date of receipt of the notification by the 
Secretary-General. 



Article 31 



Amendments 

1. Any Party may propose an amendmei 
to this Convention. The text of any sucl 
amendment and the reasons therefore s 
be communicated by that Party to the 
Secretary-General, who shall communi( 
it to the other Parties and shall ask the 
whether they accept the proposed amen 
ment. If a proposed amendment so circi 
lated has not been rejected by any Part 
within twentv-four months after it has 



58 



Department of State Bulletin/April 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



llated, it shall be deemed to have been 
pted and shall enter into force in re- 
t of a Party ninety days after that Party 
deposited with the Secretary-General 
strument expressing its consent to be 
d by that amendment. 
2. If a proposed amendment has been 
ted by any Party, the Secretary- 
ral shall consult with the Parties and, 
luijnrity so requests, he shall bring the 
n, together with any comments made 
ir Parties, before the Council which 
li rule to call a conference in accord- 
H II h Article (i2, paragraph 4, of the 
lit r of the United Nations. Any amend- 
; I i suiting from such a Conference shall 
nilMKlied in a Protocol of Amendment. 
Mill to be bound by such a Protocol shall 
-piired to be expressed specifically to 
M . rt'tarv-General. 



Article 32 



element of Disputes 

there should arise between two or more 

a ies a dispute relating to the interpreta- 
ir application of this Convention, the 
I. - shall consult together with a view to 
icment of the dispute by negotiation, 
, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
ir>f to regional bodies, judicial process 
111 I- peaceful means of their own choice. 
;, .\ny such dispute which cannot be 
111 m the manner prescribed in para- 
li 1 nf this article shall be referred, at 
rijuest of any one of the States Parties 
f dispute, to the International Court of 

1 cc for decision. 
i. If a regional economic integration or- 

1 latiiin referred to in article 26, subpara- 
h u) is a Party to a dispute which 
It lie settled in the manner prescribed 
rauraph 1 of this article, it may, 

1 mil a State Member of the United Na- 
. 1 ii|uest the Council to request an ad- 
\ opinion of the International Court of 
' ' 111 accordance with article 65 of the 
:r of the Court, which opinion shall be 
'liril as decisive. 

I, i:ach State, at the time of signature 
iil'ication, acceptance or approval of 

. I invention or accession thereto, or 
1 luional economic integration organi- 

II, at the time of signature or deposit of 
t of formal confirmation or accession, 
ill rlare that it does not consider itself 
'1 liy paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article. 
't lirr Parties shall not be bound by 

J iphs 2 and 3 with respect to any 
Having made such a declaration. 
). Any Party having made a declaration 
' fiirdance with paragraph 4 of this arti- 
at any time withdraw the declara- 
iiotification to the Secretary- 



Article 33 



Authentic Texts 

The Arabic, Chinese, English. French, Rus- 
sian and Spanish texts of this Convention 
are equally authentic. 



Article 34 



Depositary 

The Secretary-General shall be the deposi- 
tary of this Convention. 



In Witne.ss Whereof the undersigned, 
being duly authorized thereto, have signed 
this Convention. 

Done .^t Vienna, in one original, this 
twentieth day of December one thousand 
nine hundred and eighty-eight. 



ANNEX 



Table I 



Table II 



Ephedrine Acetic anhydride 

Ergometrine Acetone 

Ergotamine Anthranilic acid 

Lysergic acid Ethyl ether 

l-phenyl-2-propanone Phenylacetic acid 

Pseudoephedrine Piperidine 

The salts of the sub- The salts of the sub- 
stances in this Table stances listed in this 
whenever the exist- Table whenever the 
ence of such salts is existence of such 
possible. salts is possible. ■ 



Human Rights in Cuba: An Update 



Introduction 

Since he came to power in 1959, Fidel 
Castro has sought to subordinate all as- 
pects of Cuban life to the ideals and 
aims of the revolution. President Cas- 
tro set the tone in 1961 when he said 
"within the revolution, everything; 
against the revolution, nothing." The 
current constitution states that civil 
liberties may not be exercised "con- 
trary to the decision of the Cuban peo- 
ple to build socialism and communism." 
Although the Cuban Government pays 
lip service to civil liberties and human 
rights, it subordinates these "rights" to 
its own aims and has become one of the 
worst human rights violators in the 
Western Hemisphere today. 

In the face of heightened interna- 
tional scrutiny initiated by the UN Hu- 
man Rights Commission (UNHRC) at 
its session last year, Cuba has taken 
steps to demonstrate an improved hu- 
man rights record. These include per- 
mitting visits by international human 
rights monitors and releasing many po- 
litical prisoners. Fidel Castro himself 
denies there is a problem of human 
rights in Cuba and its officials have 
lauded their government's record of hu- 
man rights olDservance. The interna- 
tional community must ensure that 
these statements are matched by 
deeds. The facts speak for themselves. 



Recent Improvements 

There has been positive change in Cuba 
on the human rights front. In the face 
of international pressure, as well as re- 
formist tendencies elsewhere in the so- 
cialist bloc, the Cuban Government in 
the past year has undertaken a number 
of limited, perhaps temporary, re- 
forms. About 250 political prisoners 
have been released and allowed to emi- 
grate. Prison conditions have im- 
proved. Reform of the penal code 
decriminalized many petty offenses, 
although it made no significant change 
with regard to "political crimes." Cu- 
ban authorities, at least for the mo- 
ment, grudgingly tolerate the 
e.xistence of domestic human rights 
groups. 

In 1988 the Cuban Government 
permitted inspection visits to Cuba 
by outside observers, including repre- 
sentatives of Amnesty International 
and the Bar Association of the City of 
New York. Cuba accepted inspection 
visits by representatives of the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), as well as an extraordinary 
visit by a team from the UNHRC. 
ICRC observers were allowed to visit 
prisoners in Cuban jails and, through 
consultations with the authorities, to 
seek to ensure adherence to interna- 
tional norms. Another ICRC inspection 
is now being planned for early 1989. 



iartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



59 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The extraordinary September 1988 
visit to Cuba by the UNHRC's "Cuba 
working group" took place after Presi- 
dent Castro earlier that year extended 
an invitation to the UNHRC to send 
observers. Despite promises, Cuban 
authorities dragged their feet on mak- 
ing advance public announcements re- 
garding the group's intended visit. 
Following its own agenda during the 
10-day trip, the six-person team held 
detailed discussions with a range of Cu- 
ban officials and was able to meet with 
nearly 90 of the 1,500 private individu- 
als who sought to bring human rights 
complaints to the group's attention. Cu- 
ban authorities sought to discourage 
contact between the group and private 
citizens through police intimidation 
around the group's hotel but gave as- 
surances that no punitive measures 
would be taken against those who did 
appear before the delegation. 

New Repression 

Despite these assurances, there have 
been credible reports of repressive 
measures directed against human 
rights activists in Cuba following the 
working group's visit. About 30 activ- 
ists, many of whom were seeking to ex- 
ercise freedom of speech or peaceful 
assembly, have been subjected to puni- 
tive actions ranging from harassment 
and beatings to detentions and 
imprisonment: 

Gustavo Venta, Lazaro Linares, 
Francisco Benitez Ferrer, and Ale- 
jandro Benitez Ferrer were arrested 
in conjunction with the September 20, 
1988, demonstration outside the Hotel 
Comodoro during the Cuba working 
group's visit. All were sentenced to 3-6 
months in prison. Venta was reportedly 
beaten on September 22, 1988, by state 
security agents after his arrest. 

Pablo Pupo Sanchez and Juan 
Garcia Cruz — the President and Vice 
President of the Free Art Association 
(APAL) who testified before the Cuba 
working group — were arrested on Oc- 
tober 18, 1988, at a meeting in a private 
home and are reportedly being held in 
the Villa Marista detention center. 

APAL members Armando Araya 
Garcia, Rita Fleitas Fernandez, 
Octavio Garcia Alderete, Secundino 
Hernandez Castro, David Hornedo 
Garcia, and Aida Valdes Santana were 
arrested on October 20, 1988, during a 
peaceful wreath-laying ceremony at the 
Jose Marti momument in Havana. They 



were charged with disorderly conduct 
for inciting riots and received sen- 
tences ranging from 7 to 12 months in 
prison. 

Tania Diaz Castro, Secretary 
General of the Cuban Human Rights 
Party, was involved in a November 29, 
1988, altercation with prison guards at 
Combinado del Este prison, reportedly 
beaten, and sentenced hours later to 1 
year in prison on charges of disturbing 
the peace. 

Cuba Today 

These developments bear out critics' 
charges that the improvements noted 
above do not indicate any basic change 
in the fundamental repressive nature of 
the Cuban system under Fidel Castro. 
Cuban authorities could negate recent 
gains, particularly if international 
pressure for continued improvement 
should slacken. 

One-Party System. The Commu- 
nist Party is the only party permitted 
by law in Cuba. Its leadership com- 
pletely controls the political process. 

Freedom of Assembly or Associa- 
tion. Cuba's constitution contains no 
guarantees of freedom of assembly or 
association. The government deter- 
mines the legality of associations and 
has not acted on letters applying for 
recognition from the Cuban Human 
Rights Committee and the Cuban Com- 
mission for Human Rights and National 
Reconciliation. Membership in party- 
controlled mass organizations, such as 
the Union of Communist Youth, is al- 
most a necessity. 

Right to Privacy. The Cuban state 
monitors private citizens' activities 
through an elaborate system of inform- 
ers, block wardens, and 80,000 block 
committees called "Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution." Telephones 
are tapped, and mail is opened. 

Freedom to Travel or Emigrate. 

Internal travel is not restricted, but 
government permission to travel 
abroad is required. Attempting to 
leave the country illegally can result in 
fines or jail sentences of up to 3 years. 
Emigration is strictly controlled, and 
even those who apply to emigrate often 
are dismissed from work, evicted from 
their housing, and denied access to con- 
sumer goods. 



Freedom of Speech. No critic: 
of the party or its leadership is pei 
ted. Those who do dissent may be s 
verely punished. Andres Jose Solai 
Teseiro was arrested in 1981 on 
grounds that he was thinking of or 
nizing a political party and had dr; 
letters about this to foreigners ask 
for their opinions. Solares was con 
victed of "enemy propaganda" and 
fenced to 8 years imprisonment, e\ 
though the letters were never sent. 

Freedom of the Press. Media 
controlled by the state, owned by t 
government or party-controlled or 
zations, and operate strictly accon 
to party guidelines. Writers must 
government approval and support 
their work. Acceptance of a manus 
is based on the political backgroun 
the author, as well as suitability of 
contents. 

Academic Freedom. Educatio 
the exclusive prerogative of the sti 
There is no alternative to governm 
run schools; religious or private sc 
and universities are prohibited. Tl 
state school system follows and 
preaches the guidelines of Marxist 
Leninism, as interpreted by the p; 

Artistic Freedom. Art is com 

pletely under government control. 
February 1988, authorities confisc 
the paintings of Raul Montesino, a 
dependent artist not affiliated wit 
state-controlled artists' cooperativ 

Freedom to Worship. Althouj, 
the constitution guarantees the ri(» 
religious belief, Cubans who pract 
their religion face serious discrim 
tion and, in the case of Jehovah's V 
nesses and some other fundaments 
religions, legal penalties. Churchg 
are excluded from Communist Par 
membership and thus are barred f 
holding high-level positions in the j 
ernment and most professions. Chi 
state relations are directly control 
by the party. In 1988 Cuban author 
made limited concessions to religi( 
denominations, such as permitting 
Catholic Church to purchase a prii 
press and Protestant churches to i 
port Bibles. 

Political Killings and Execu- 
tions. In the early years of the revi 
tion, summary execution of oppone 
was a frequent practice. As late as 
1982, 29 people were executed for " 
ting against Castro." Although the 
death penalty remains an optional 
ishment for "crimes against the sta 



60 



Department of State Bulletin/April 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



redible reports of political execu- 
~ have been received in the past 



Arbitrary Arrest and Detention. 

er Article 61 of the constitution, 
state may arrest anyone it consid- 
harmful to the "decision of the Cu- 
people to build socialism and 
munism." Arrests can be made se- 
ly and without warrants. Arrest 
uently is followed by detention in 
offices of the security forces, who 
n conduct lengthy interrogations 
lOut an attorney present. Preven- 
detention may take the form of 
se arrest, imprisonment, or involun- 

psychiatric treatment. There are 
erous credible reports of detainees 

for long periods, frequently incom- 
icado and without judicial hearings 
iformation as to the charges 
nst them, in direct violation of Cu- 
law. Elizardo Sanchez, head of the 
ficial Cuban Commission for Hu- 

Rights and National Reconcilia- 

was held without charges for 5 
Lhs in 1986-87 after he gave an in- 
iew to foreign journalists. 

Fair Trial. Cuban courts in prac- 
are totally subordinate to the Com- 
ist Party. Five-member panels of 
■es preside over all civil courts. Of 
3 judges, three are professionally 
(ified; the other two are "worker's 
psentatives" charged to see that 
interests of the revolution" are 
scted. Political trials, usually held 
cret, typically take less than 1 day, 
in cases where long prison terms 
it stake. 

!!ldequate Defense. Government- 
inted attorneys are available 
i defendants. However, these 
hders — government officials — are 
1 ill-prepared and unsympathetic 
rd the defendant. In addition, de- 
; attorneys frequently are not in- 
ed of the trial until the day it 
ns. Attorneys have been them- 
s imprisoned for defending per- 
charged with political offenses, 
in rules of evidence do not meet in- 
ational standards. 

Prison Conditions. Numerous re- 
3 characterize the Cuban prison 
em as harsh, wath generally inade- 
e diet, housing, sanitary facilities, 
medical care. General prison condi- 

including cell conditions and 
, have improved over the past year, 
t remains to be seen if these are 



permanent changes. Harsh punishment 
cells — although somewhat improved in 
1988 to prepare for international 
visitors — continue to exist. No formal, 
effective mechanism exists for the pro- 
tection of prisoners' rights. Physical 
abuse is common, and credible reports 
of use of torture in the past exist. 

Access to Prisons. Until late 1987, 
the Cuban Government refused permis- 
sion for international human rights or- 
ganizations to visit Cuban prisons. The 
1988 visits of the ICRC and others are 
described above. When foreign delega- 
tions visit Cuban prisons, prisoners 
have testified that the visits are care- 
fully organized to show the positive as- 
pects of Cuban prisons — areas that 
have been cleaned, cell blocks that have 
been painted, etc. Once the visitors 
leave, they say, conditions return to 
their previous state. Relatives and 
friends of prisoners are given only lim- 
ited access to prisoners. 

Political Prisoners. Amnesty In- 
ternational's 1988 report notes that po- 
litical prisoners in Cuba continue to be 
held for long periods in "prison condi- 
tions amounting to inhuman or de- 
grading treatment." Former political 
prisoners describe systematic forms of 
abuse: beatings by prison officials; in- 
adequate diet; denial of medical care, 
fresh air, and exercise; denial of family 
visits and mail, sometimes for years; 
and extended periods of solitary con- 
finement or incarceration in inhumane 
punishment cells. There are persistent 
reports of political prisoners sent to 
psychiatric facilities instead of prisons. 

There are no precise figures on the 
number of political prisoners in Cuba, 
or on Cuba's prison population as a 
whole. Amnesty International's report 
for 1987 estimated some 300-400 politi- 
cal prisoners in Cuba at that time, of 
whom 69 were plantados liistoricos. 
(The plantados, or "steadfast ones," 
are prisoners, many of whom were ar- 
rested more than 20 years ago who re- 
fused to accept political reeducation.) 
Other estimates — which include per- 
sons jailed for their religious beliefs, 
for trying to leave Cuba "illegally," for 
being conscientious objectors, and for 
other reasons — are in the thousands. 

In 1988 President Castro- 
responding to petitions from the U.S. 
Catholic Conference and a direct re- 
quest from Archbishop O'Connor — 
released some 250 political prisoners, 
including 65 plantados historicos. The 



Cuban Government at the end of 1988 
announced it would also release the 
four remaining plantados historicos 
and 40 other prisoners. Released pris- 
oners report, however, that "new plan- 
tados" are replacing those released. 
Although it is difficult to estimate 
their numbers, these new prisoners, 
who refuse to accept ideological re- 
orientation, are housed in Combinado 
del Este prison. 

Economy. The government con- 
trols the means of production and is ba- 
sically the sole employer in the country. 

Rationing. National rationing be- 
gan in 1962, and rationing of meat and 
fresh vegetables continues today. Add- 
ed to the food shortage is, for the aver- 
age citizen, the scarcity of consumer 
goods and the very low average per 
capita income. A standard pair of 
shoes, for example, can cost about 90% 
of an average monthly wage. Due to 
shortages of consumer goods, most Cu- 
bans must spend many weary hours 
standing in lines when they can afford 
to buy such items. 

Health Care. Although the Cuban 
Government claims to have made signif- 
icant advances in health care since the 
revolution, problems still remain. Un- 
availability of drugs, overcrowding, 
and unsanitary conditions are typical 
at many Cuban hospitals. A confiden- 
tial 1987 report by the Communist Par- 
ty, based on a public opinion survey in 
Holguin Province, details the poor 
state of health care and concludes that 
"the people are not satisfied with the 
medical care." 

Housing. Housing, another area in 
which President Castro has claimed 
great strides, also remains deficient. 
Out of 10 million people, nearly one- 
quarter reportedly live in substandard 
housing. 

The New Elite. In Cuba, contrary 
to Marxist theory, ownership of the 
means of production does not mean that 
the upper class of privileged elites has 
been eliminated. On the contrary; 
since the revolution a new class struc- 
ture has evolved. The political and mil- 
itary leadership lives very comfortably, 
with access to automobiles, luxury 
goods, better housing, and special re- 
sorts, while the majority of Cubans 
must cope with severe scarcity and 
poor quality of housing, food items, and 
basic consumer products. 



liartment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



61 



TREATIES 



Rights of Business. For ideological 
reasons, a "private sector" economy is 
virtually nonexistent. Collectivization 
has eliminated almost all private farm- 
ing from the economy. The 1968 "revo- 
lutionary offensive" nationalized 56,000 
small food and handicrafts shops, re- 
pair shops, and even street stands. 

The Right of Labor. The Cuban 
constitution places "the demands of the 
economy and society" over individual 
choice in employment. The party exer- 
cises absolute control of organized la- 
bor through the umbrella "Confed- 
eration of Cuban Workers." The right 
to strike is prohibited and punishable 
by imprisonment. Collective bai'gain- 
ing does not exist. Workers cannot 
change jobs without permission from 
the Minister of Labor. Independent 
unions are prohibited, and, in the past, 
workers who have tried to organize in- 
dependent unions have been sentenced 
to long prison terms. 

Conclusion 

The Cuban revolution celebrated its 
30th anniversary in January 1989. As 
described above, the revolution has fail- 
ed to guarantee basic civil and political 
rights to the Cuban people or to pro- 
vide for their economic and social well- 
being. Recent welcome improvements 
in human rights observance have come 
about because of international pres- 
sure. The Castro regime continues to 
exercise broad repression and to deny 
political and civil liberities. Cuban au- 
thorities' recent actions against the Cu- 
ban human rights community is clear 
evidence that Fidel Castro will not tol- 
erate an independent voice or any form 
of public criticism to exist within Cuba. 
Given Cuba's current human rights 
situation, the sole recourse of the 
international community must be a con- 
tinuation of close scrutiny of the Cuban 
Government's human rights practices. 
Inside Cuba, Fidel Castro and the Com- 
munist Party are the law, but the rest 
of the world can and must continue to 
watch closely and judge Cuban authori- 
ties' behavior on behalf of the people of 
Cuba who have no such opportunity. ■ 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on the international recognition 
of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 
19, 1948. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1953. 
TIAS 2847. 

Accessions deposited : Bangladesh, Jan. 6, 
1988: Guatemala, Aug. 9, 1988. 

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts 
of violence at airports serving international 
civil aviation, supplementary to the conven- 
tion of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7.570). Done at 
Montreal Feb. 24, 1988.' [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 100-19. 

Signatures : Cameroon, Nov 23, 1988; Philip- 
pines, Jan. 25, 1989. 

Conservation 

Protocol to the convention on wetlands of in- 
ternational importance, especially as water- 
fowl habitat, of Feb. 2, 1971. Done at Paris 
Dec. 3, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1986; 
for the U.S. Dec. 18, 1986. [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 99-28. 

Accessions deposited : Egypt, Sept. 9, 1988; 
Greece, June 2, 1988. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised. 
Done at Paris'july 24, 1971. Entered into 
force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited : Trinidad and Tobago, 
May 19, 1988. 

Berne convention for the protection of liter- 
ary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886; com- 
pleted at Paris May 4, 1896; revised at 
Berlin Nov. 13, 1908; completed at Berne 
Mar 20, 1914; revised at Rome June 2, 1928, 
at Brussels June 26, 1948, at Stockholm July 
14, 1967, and at Paris July 24, 1971, amended 
in 1979. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-27. 
Accession deposited : U.S., Nov. 16, 1988. 
Entered into force for the U.S. : Mar 1, 1988. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and 
preventing the illicit import, export, and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property. 
Done at Paris Nov. 14. 1970. Entered into 
force Apr 24, 1972; for the U.S. Dec. 2, 1983. 
Acceptance deposited : Colombia, May 24, 
1988. 

Ratifications deposited : Byelorussian 
S.S.R.,2UkrainianS.S.R.,2U.S.S.R.,2 
Apr 28, 1988. 

Customs 

International convention on the harmonized 
commodity description and coding system. 
Done at Brussels June 14, 1983. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1988. 



Protocol of amendment to the internal: 
convention on the harmonized commn^l 
description and coding system. Done :> 
Brussels June 24, 1986. Entered into In, 
Jan. 1, 1988. 

Accession deposited : U.S., Oct. 27, 19n- 
Entered into force for the U.S. : Jan. 1. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the civil aspects of intci 
tional child abduction. Done at The H;u 
Oct. 25. 1980, Entered into force Dec, 1 
1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. [Senate 
Treaty Doc. 99-11. 
Signature : Norway, Jan. 9, 1989. 
Ratification deposited : Norway, Jan. 9, 
1989.-* 

Maritime Matters 

International convention on standards i 
training, certification, and watchkeepi 
for seafarers, 1978. Done at London Jul 
1978. Entered into force Apr 28, 1984. 
Accession deposited : Algeria, Oct. 28, 1 

Pollution 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna 
convention for the prevention of polluti' 
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 
1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983. 
Accessions deposited : Suriname, Nov. 
1988; Syria, Nov. 9. 1988.-'-5 

Protocol to the convention on long-ranj 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 
(TIAS 10541), concerning monitoring a 
evaluation of long-range transmission < 
pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with an 
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984. Entere^ 
force Jan. 28, 1988. 

Ratification deposited : Italy, Jan. 12. 1' 
Accession deposited : Portugal, Jan. 19, 

Convention for the protection of the oz 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna M 
1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Ratification deposited : Greece, Dec. 2! 
1988. 

Montreal protocol on substances that c 
plete the ozone layer, with annex, Doni 
Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into 1 
.Jan. 1, 1989, [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100- 
Ratification deposited : Malta, Dec. 29, 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and puni 
ment of crimes against internationally 
tected persons, including diplomatic ai 
Done at New York Dec, 14, 1973. Entei 
into force Feb, 20, 1977, TIAS 8532. 
Accession deposited : Bhutan, Jan. 16, 1 

Torture 

Convention against torture and other c 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or p 
ment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. 
tered into force June 26, 1987,^ [Senate 
Treaty Doc. 100-20, 
Ratification deposited : Italy, Jan, 12, li 



62 



Department of State Bulletin/April 



PRESS RELEASES 



id Heritage 

").-ention concerning the protection of the 
|d cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Nov. 28, 1972. Entered into force Dee. 
i7.5. TIAS8226. 
fication deposited : Paraguay, Apr. 27, 



ijtance deposited : Cape Verde, Apr. 28, 



jVTERAL 



lal cooperation for reducing demand, 
nting illicit use, and combatting illicit 
uction and traffic of drugs. Signed at 
lopan Feb. 9, 1989. Entered into force 
9, 1989. 



ement extending the agreement of Jan. 

179 (TIAS 9179), as extended, on cooper- 
in science and technology. Effected by 

inge of notes at Beijing Jan. 25 and 27, 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1989; effec- 

='eb. 1, 1989. 

'national Tropical Timber 
nization(lTTO) 

•eimbursement agreement. Signed at 
5 Dec. 27, 1988. Entered into force 
,27, 1988. 



wandum of understanding regarding 
■ration in ensuring the safety and 
'someness of fresh and fresh frozen 
rs, clams, and mussels exported to the 
id States from Mexico. Signed at Aca- 
Nov. 12, 1988. Entered into force 
12, 1988. 



idad and Tobago 

ement for the exchange of information 
respect to taxes. Signed at Port of 
[Jan. 11, 1989. Enters into force upon 
change of notes confirming that the 
3S have met all constitutional and stat- 
requirements. 

tda 

ement relating to the agreement of 
28, 1988, for sales of agricultural com- 
ics. Signed at Washington Feb. 2, 
Entered into force Feb. 2, 1989. 

d Kingdom 

ement extending the agreement of 
18, 198(3, as extended, concerning the 
s and Caicos Islands and narcotics ac- 
es. Effected by exchange of notes at 
ington Jan. 19, 1989. Entered into force 
9, 1989. 



Not in force. 

With statement(s). 

With reservation(s). 

Not in force for the U.S. 

Does not accept optional annexes III, 

ndV. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State. Washington, D.C. 20.520. 



No. Date 

*13 2/3 

14 2/8 

1.5 2/14 

16 2/14 

17 2/15 

18 2/15 

19 2/16 

20 2/21 

21 2/15 

22 2/16 

23 2/15 



USUN 



Subject 

Baker: luncheon toast in honor 
of Japanese Prime Minister 
Takeshita. 

Baker: statement on peace 
and relief in Sudan. 

Baker: news conference, Ot- 
tawa, Feb. 10. 

Baker, Howe: remarks, Lon- 
don, Feb. 12. 

Baker, Hannibalsson: re- 
marks, Reykjavik, Feb. 11. 

Baker: remarks, Copenhagen, 
Feb. 14. 

Baker, Brundtland: remarks, 
Oslo, Feb. 15. 

Baker: news briefing, Bonn, 
Feb. 13. 

Baker, Yilmaz: remarks, An- 
kara, Feb. 14. 

Baker, Papandreou: state- 
ments, Athens. Feb. 14. 

Baker, Papoulias: remarks, 
Athens. Feb. 14. 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 

No. Date Subject 

*117 11/1 Reagan: women. Commit- 
tee III. 

*118 11/1 Gross: law of the sea, 
plenary. 
119 11/3 Walters: Cambodia, 
plenary. 

*120 11/2 Walters: note to correspond- 
ents on meeting with 
Afghan resistance 
delegation. 

*121 11/3 Okun: human rights in the 
occupied territories, 
plenary. 

*122 11/3 Walters: note to correspond- 
ents on adoption of Reso- 
lution A/43/20, 
Afghanistan. 

*123 11/4 Okun: disarmament, 
Committee I. 

*124 11/4 Wrobleski: narcotics, 
Committee III. 

*125 11/4 Waldrop: program plan- 
ning. Committee III. 

*126 11/4 Cahill: assistance to Pal- 
estinian people, Commit- 
tee II. 

*127 11/7 Montgomery: information, 
Special Political 
Committee. 



*24 2/17 Baker: statement on the dis- 
position of his stock hold- 
ings, Rome, Feb. 14. 
25 2/17 Baker: remarks after meeting 
with Spanish Foreign Min- 
ister, Madrid, Feb. 15. 

*26 2/16 Baker: remarks, Madrid, 
Feb. 15. 

27 2/16 Baker: remarks, Lisbon, 

Feb. 15. 

28 2/17 Foreign Relations of the 

United States, Memoranda 
of the Secretary of State, 
1949-1951, and'Meetings 
and Visits of Foreign Digni- 
taries, 1949-1952, micro- 
fiche publication released. 

29 2/21 Baker, Poos: remarks, Lux- 

embourg, Feb. 16. 

30 2/21 Baker: interview on "Meet 

the Press," Feb. 19. 

31 2/21 Baker: statement before the 

House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 

32 2/21 Baker: remarks, Paris, 

Feb. 17. 
*33 2/23 Baker: news briefing, Tokyo. 
34 2/27 Baker: interview on "Face the 
Nation," Beijing, Feb. 26. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



*128 


11/8 


n29 


11/9 


*130 


11/11 


n3i 


11/10 


*1.32 


11/11 


*133 


11/14 


*134 


11/15 


*135 


11/15 


*136 


11/15 


*137 


11/15 


n38 


11/15 


*139 


11/16 


*140 


11/17 


*141 


11/17 



*142 11/18 



Nygard: personnel. 

Committee V. 
Byrne: human rights, 

Committee III. 
Hoh: program planning, 

Committee V. 
Cahill: economic and social 

progress. Committee II. 
Tyson: development. 

Committee II. 
Gross: South Atlantic, 

plenary. 
Waldrop: property rights, 

Committee III. 
Schneider: religion. 

Committee III. 
Kates: Nicaragua, Commit- 
tee II. 
Tyson: Nicaragua, 

Committee II. 
Byrne: Central America, 

plenary. 
Adelman: Bangladesh, 

Special Meeting on 

Assistance. 
Hoh: budget. Committee 

V. 
Nygard: Iran-Iraq Military 

Observer Group, 

Committee V. 
Walters: African economic 

development report, 

plenary. 



63 



PUBLICATIONS 



*143 


11/17 


Boschwitz: refugees, 
Committee III. 


*144 


11/17 


Walters: Namibia, plenary. 


*145 


11/21 


Byrne: U.S. contributions, 
ad Ikic committee for the 
announcement of volun- 
tary contributions to the 
1989 UNHCR program. 


*146 


11/21 


Gross: U.S. contributions, 
ad hoc committee for vol- 
untary contributions to 
UNRWA. 


*147 


11/23 


Byrne: decolonization, 
plenary. 


*148 


11/23 


Montgomery: information, 
Special Political 
Committee. 


*149 


11/23 


Cahill: trade embargo 
against Nicaragua, 
Committee II. 


*150 


11/23 


Immerman: South Africa, 
Security Council. 


*151 


11/25 


Walters: ECOSOC report, 
Committee III. 


*152 


11/28 


Walters: international se- 
curity. Committee I. 


*153 


11/28 


Waldrop: elections. 
Committee III. 


*154 


11/28 


Byrne: host country re- 
sponsibilities, Commit- 
tee on Relations with the 
Host Country. 


*155 


11/30 


Okun: international peace 
and security. Commit- 
tee I. 


*156 


12/1 


Byrne: mercenaries. Com- 
mittee III, Nov. 29. 


*157 


12/2 


Nelson: apartheid, plenary. 


*158 


11/30 


Okun: host country respon- 
sibilities, plenary. 


*159 


12/1 


Byrne: migrant workers, 
"Committee III, Nov, 29. 


*160 


12/1 


Byrne: human rights in 
Chile, Committee III. 
Nov. 30. 


*161 


12/2 


Hume: occupied territo- 
ries. Special Political 
Committee, Nov. 29. 


*162 


12/2 


Okun: UN General Assem- 
bly session in Geneva, 
plenary. 


*163 


12/2 


Nygard: budget. Commit- 
tee V. 


*164 


12/7 


Cahill: trade and develop- 
ment. Committee II, 
Dec. 6. 


*165 


12/7 


Gross: development as- 
sistance. Committee II, 
Dec. 6. 


*166 


12/6 


Montgomei-y; Middle East, 
plenary. 


*167 


12/7 


Gross: assistance by inter- 
national financial institu- 
tions, Committee II, 
Dec. 6. 


*168 


12/7 


Gross: international traffic 
in toxic products. Com- 
mittee II, Dec. 6. 



*169 12/6 Walters: nomination of 

Thomas P. Pickering as 
U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the UN. 

*170 12/7 Byrne: host country re- 
sponsibilities. Commit- 
tee on Relations With 
the Host Country, 
Dec. 6. 

*171 12/8 Byrne: 40th anniversary of 
the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights, 
plenary. 

*172 12/8 Byrne: human rights in 
Afghanistan, plenary. 

*173 12/9 Byrne: human rights, 

Committee III, Oct. 27. 

*174 12/14 Gross: 1990-91 budget, 
Committee V. 

*175 12/14 Gross: international devel- 
opment strategy. 
Committee II. 



"176 12/14 



*177 12/14 



*178 12/14 



*179 12/14 



"180 12/21 



181 12/22 



Byrne: southern Lil 
Security Council. 

Gross: poverty. Con. 
II. 

Walters: Palestine, | 
nary, Geneva. 

Gross: resolution on ( 
Committee II. 

Gross; budget, Comff 
V. 

Shultz: tripartite agn 
ment among Angoh 
Cuba, and South A 
and bilateral agreei 
between Angola an 
Cuba, signing cerei 
at the UN. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. I 



Foreign Relations Volumes Released 



AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY; 
SUMMIT, FOREIGN 
MINISTERS- MEETINGS, 

19551 

The Department of State on January 19, 
1989, i-eleased Foreign Relations ofihe 
United States, 1955-1957, Volume "V, 
Austrian State Treaty; Summit and 
Foreign Ministers' Meetings, 1955. This 
volume presents documentation on 
three efforts by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France to reach 
final decisions on aspects of the World 
War II peace settlement. Only in the 
case of the Austrian State Ti-eaty were 
they successful. 

Of the most lasting significance 
were the final negotiations, begun in 
1947, for an Austrian state treaty. In 
these negotiations, the Soviet Union 
abandoned its intransigent position on 
restoring Austrian independence and 
agreed to the withdrawal of all occupa- 
tion forces from the country in return 
for an Austrian declaration of perma- 
nent neutrality. The Austrian State 
Ti'eaty was signed at Vienna on May 15. 

The heads of govei'nment meeting 
of the three Western powers with the 
Soviet Union, held in Geneva in July 
1955, was the first such gathering since 
World War II. The most significant 
question at issue for the West in these 
discussions was reunification of Ger- 
many, but the Soviet Union believed 



that European security was more 
important. This divergence of view 
the tone for the conference. The si 
mit conference is best known for P 
dent Eisenhower's proposal for mu 
aerial inspection, a proposal that t 
came known as "open skies." Althi 
the President's idea was summaril; 
jected by the Soviet Union, it rem 
an integral part of U.S. disarmam 
proposals for many years. 

The only result of the Geneva 
ference, other than the "spirit of ( 
neva" proclaimed by the press, wa 
directive from the heads of govern 
to their foreign ministers calling f 
further discussions of the issues a 
other meeting at Geneva in the fal 

From the first foreign iTiiniste 
meeting on October 27, Secretary 
State Dulles reported that the Sov 
positions had remained unchanged 
the summit conference. Two week: 
polite wrangling on the issues gavi 
on November 11 to a statement by 
eign Minister Molotov, which DuUt 
characterized as one of the "most 
cynical and uncompromising" that 
had heard. Although the meetings 
tinued until November 17, they we 
completely without success. 

This is the most recent volume 
the Department of State's official c 
matic documentary series begun ii 
1861. Foreign Relations of the Unii 



64 



PUBLICATIONS 



s, 1955-1957, Volume V, comprises 
lages of government records, most 
lich were previously classified. The 
ne was prepared in the Office of 
jiistorian. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
rtment of State. This authoritative 
lal record is based on files of the 
e House, the Department of State, 
pther government agencies, 
.hopies of Volume V (Department of 
Publication No. 9454; GPO Stock 
)44-000-02238-9) may be pur- 
d for $27.00 (domestic postpaid) 
the Superintendent of Documents, 
Government Printing Office, 
ington, D.C. 20402. Checks or 
y orders should be made payable 
3 Superintendent of Documents. 



iR EAST: JORDAN- 
] MAN, 1955-1957^ 

)epartment of State on Janu- 
5, 1989, released Foreign Rela- 
ofthe United States, 1955-1957, 
le XIII, Near East: Jordan- 
n, an 800-page volume consisting 
'viously classified records of the 
? House, State Department, and 
government agencies, 
hese newly released documents 
nstrate President Eisenhower's in- 
ing concern with growing Soviet 
nee in the Near East in the mid- 
. Early in 1957, the President re- 
ed and Congress approved a reso- 
authorizing U.S. economic and 
iry assistance programs and, if 
sary, the use of U.S. armed forces 
tect the independence and terri- 
integrity of Near East countries 
st communist aggression. The 
ihower doctrine, as this policy be- 
known, substantially augmented 
economic and security assistance 
se countries and laid the basis for 
erm American commitment 
st Soviet e.xpansion in the area. 
er Congressman James P. Rich- 
/isited the Near East as the Pres- 
5 special envoy and conducted 
■tant discussions relating to 
itial implementation of the 
hower doctrine. Lebanon, Saudi 
a, and Yemen were among the 
ries he visited. 

oviet penetration into the Near 
was a real threat by 1957. In con- 
to good U.S. relations with Jor- 
L,ebanon, and Saudi Arabia, the 
hower Administration became in- 



creasingly concerned at what it viewed 
as an "anti-West and leftist drift" in 
Syria. In August 1957, Damascus ac- 
cepted additional Soviet economic and 
military aid, named a leftist as army 
commander in chief, and expelled three 
U.S. diplomats. Syria's neighbors 
shared U.S. fear that Syria would be- 
come a base for extensive Soviet sub- 
version in the area. President 
Eisenhower dispatched veteran diplo- 
mat Loy W. Henderson to the Middle 
East for discussions with Turkish, 
Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese lead- 
ers, and U.S. assistance to those coun- 
tries was expedited. In October Soviet 
charges that the United States and 
Turkey were stirring up a war over 
Syria heightened the crisis, but efforts 
by King Saud at mediation and discus- 
sions in the United Nations diffused 
the situation. 

This volume, prepared in the Of- 
fice of the Historian, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State, is the 
most recent in the Department of 
State's official diplomatic documentary 
series begun in 1861. It is the first of 



six volumes which will document U.S. 
policy toward the Middle East in 1955- 
57. It includes documents on bilateral 
relations between the United States 
and Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, and Yemen and on U.S. policy 
concerning Muscat and Oman. Four 
volumes will provide documentation 
on U.S. policy concerning the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and the Suez Canal cri- 
sis and another will include material on 
regional policies as well as bilateral re- 
lations with Iran and Iraq. 

Copies of Volume XIII (Depart- 
ment of State Publication No. 9665, 
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02198-6) may 
be purchased for $24.00 (domestic post- 
paid) from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Checks or money orders should be 
made payable to the Superintendent 
of Documents. 



'Press release 7. 
-Press release 8. 



Foreign Relations Supplement 
Microfiche Released 



The Department of State on Febru- 
ary 17, 1989, released the microfiche 
publication. Memoranda of the Secre- 
tary of State, 1949-1951, and Meetings 
and Visits of Foreign Dignitaries, 1949- 
1952, a supplement to the Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States series. This 
publication presents a chronological rec- 
ord of memoranda by Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson or one of his depu- 
ties from 1949 through 1951 and addi- 
tional material relating to meetings 
between senior U.S. and foreign offi- 
cials held from 1949 through 1952. 

These years witnessed the rapid 
intensification of cold war tensions. 
Several dramatic events, including the 
fall of China to the communists, the So- 
viet Union's testing of an atomic weap- 
on, and the outbreak of the Korean war, 
severely tested the Truman Adminis- 
tration's resiliency. The entry of com- 
munist China into the Korean conflict 
and Truman's difficulties with Gen. 
MacArthur placed additional strains on 
his Administration. These memoranda 
show policymakers debating these 
issues and coming to decisions. 



Other major topics covered in these 
memoranda are the postwar adminis- 
tration of Japan, negotiation of the 
Japanese Peace Treaty, the peace set- 
tlement with Germany and Austria, the 
formation of NATO, the growing fears 
of Soviet aggression in Europe after 
the onset of the Korean war, and the 
development of contacts with Yugo- 
slavia, which resisted Soviet control. 
The documents also focus on U.S. ini- 
tial responses to the problems of 
emerging nations, the Kashmir dis- 
pute, and the competing claims of Ar- 
abs and Jews in the Middle East. Global 
topics include atomic energy and inter- 
national economic questions. 

The heightened international ten- 
sions were accompanied by mounting 
domestic political attacks on the Tru- 
man Administration's foreign policies. 
A recurrent theme in many of the mem- 
oranda is the concern of the President, 
Acheson, and their aides to respond to 
or ward off Republican criticisms. Sen- 
ator Joseph McCarthy's charges of com- 
munist penetration of the government 
were seen as of particular danger. The 



Irtment of State Bulletin/April 1989 



65 



PUBLICATIONS 



memoranda also reveal executive 
branch officials' preoccupation with sus- 
taining congressional support for the 
Marshall Plan, Point Four, and mili- 
tary assistance programs. 

The material on meetings with for- 
eign dignitaries provides additional 
documentation on several bilateral and 
regional relationships. Appro.ximately 
two-thirds of these documents relate to 
meetings between President Truman 
and British Prime Ministers Churchill 
and Attlee and French Prime Minister 
Pleven and President Auriol. Topics 
range from bilateral and colonial 
questions to regional and global is- 
sues involving post-World War II recon- 
struction, the movement toward great- 
er economic and political unity in 
Europe, and political and military 
developments in China and Korea. 
Acheson's memoranda relating to his 
conversations with British Foreign Sec- 
retary Anthony Eden and French For- 
eign Minister Robert Schuman are 
particularly comprehensive. Other ma- 
terials in this collection relate to the 
Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting 
in Paris, a U.S. visit by New Zealand 
Prime Minister Sydney Holland, and 
meetings with foreign leaders at the 
seventh UN General Assembly in 1952. 

The documents in this publication 
were maintained by the Executive Sec- 
retariat of the Department of State. 
The Secretary's memoranda are pre- 
sented chronologically, as filed by offi- 
cers of the Executive Secretariat, 
followed by the documents on the meet- 
ings and visits. All related documents, 
including routing slips and notes, fol- 
low the papers to which they were orig- 
inally attached. Both collections were 



part of Lot 53 D 444, which contained 
the Memoranda of the Secretary of 
State, 1947-1952, an earlier microfiche 
supplement to the Foreign Relations 
series. This supplement complements 
that publication. Lot 53 D 444 has been 
transferred to the National Archives 
and Records Administration where it is 
preserved in Record Group 59. 

All material in these two collec- 
tions has been reproduced except for a 
few papers that could not be declas- 
sified in whole or in part because of 
continued sensitivity on national secu- 
rity or privacy grounds. This micro- 
fiche publication is part of the 
Department's effort to make the official 
foreign affairs record more widely 
available to scholars and other users. 
These publications reproduce signifi- 
cant and unique collections of historical 
documents, only a small part of which 
can be printed in Foreign Relations 
volumes. 

The two collections in this publica- 
tion, comprising 3,471 manuscript 
pages on 39 microfiche cards and ac- 
companied by a 66-page printed guide 
containing a comprehensive index, 
were prepared by the Office of the His- 
torian, Bureau of Public Affairs, De- 
partment of State. Copies of the 
publication (Department of State Pub- 
lication No. 9672; GPO Stock No. 044- 
000-02240-1) may be purchased for 
$20.00 from the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks 
or money orders should be made pay- 
able to the Superintendent of 
Documents. 



Background Notes 



This series provides brief, factual suml 
ries of the people, history, governmeni 
economy, and foreign relations of aboutf 
countries (excluding the United States 
of selected international organizations 
cent revisions are: 

Algeria (Nov. 1988) 
Argentina (Oct. 1988) 
Botswana (Dec. 1988) 
Cameroon (Nov. 1988) 
Comoros (Oct. 1988) 
Denmark (Nov. 1988) 
French Antilles and Guiana 

(Jan. 1989) 
Hong Kong (Nov. 1988) 
Liechenstein (Jan. 1989) 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 

(Jan. 1989) 

A free copy of the inde.x only may 
tained from the Public Information Di' 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
State, Washington, D.C. 20.520. 

For about 60 Backgroioid Notes a 
a subscription is available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. G 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. 
20402, for .$14.00 (domestic) and $17.50 
eign). Check or money order, made paj 
to the Superintendent of Documents, 
accompany order ■ 



Press release 28 of Feb. 17, 1989. 



66 



roEX 



t^ril 1989 

^j^lume 89, No. 2145 

\'hanistan 
>i.Kiit Holds Session With News 

ipnrters 5 

-iliiit's News Conference of January 27 

Mi'i-pts) 4 

■elarv's Interview on 

.I.ct the Press" 21 

nts Withdraw From Afghanistan 

.ush) 48 

uerican Principles 

'i Inaugural Address of President Bush . . 1 

'tsident Addresses Joint Session of the 

ingress 3 

tetary-Designate's Confirmation 

earings 10 

lis Control 

t International Agenda and the FY 1990 

lidget Request (Baker) 16 

f'^'R Talks Conclude (final 

mmunique) 25 

1 iiieiit's News Conference of January 27 

Kcerpts) 4 

e etary's Interview on 

leet the Press" 21 

erity Challenges Facing NATO in the 

•(is'(Nitze) 44 

; ada. President's Visit to Canada (Baker, 

ish, Mulroney) 26 

( icress 

i I Report on Cyprus (message to the 

'iigress) 43 

I International Agenda and the FY 1990 

idget Request (Baker) 16 

r ident Addresses Joint Session of the 

iigress 3 

e etary-Designate's Confirmation 

■arings 10 

I 1. Human Rights in Cuba: 

1 I'pdate 59 

.) -us. First Report on Cyprus (message 

the Congress) 43 

; Asia. East Asia, the Pacific, and the 

S.; An Economic Partnership 33 

l4 lomics. East Asia, the Pacific, and the 

S.: An Economic Partnership 33 

'il alvador. Vice President Visits 

nezuela and El Salvador 7 

II ironment. Secretary Addresses Panel 

( Global Climate Change 13 



Europe 

MBFR Talks Conclude (final 

communique) 25 

Secretary Meets With NATO Allies 38 

Secretary's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" 21 

Security Challenges Facing NATO in the 

1990s (Nitze) 44 

Human Rights. Human Rights in Cuba: 

An Update 59 

Japan 

Secretary's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" 21 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister (Bush, 

Takeshita) 32 

Middle East 

President's News Conference of January 27 

(excerpts) 4 

Secretary's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" 21 

Narcotics. UN Narcotics Trafficking 

Conference Adopts Convention (text of 

convention) 49 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
President Holds Session With News 

Reporters 5 

Secretary Meets With NATO Allies 38 

Security Challenges Facing NATO in the 

1990s "(Nitze) 44 

Pacific. East Asia, the Pacific, and the 

U.S.: An Economic Partnership 33 

Presidential Documents 

James A. Baker, III, Sworn in as Secretary 

of State (Baker, Bush, biographic data) . . 8 
First Report on Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 43 

The Inaugural Address of President Bush . . 1 
President Addresses Joint Session of the 

Congress 3 

President's News Conference of January 27 

(excerpts) 4 

President's Visit to Canada (Baker, Bush, 

Mulroney) 26 

Soviets Withdraw From Afghanistan .... 48 
Visit of .Japanese Prime Minister (Bush, 

Takeshita) 32 

Publications 

Background Notes 66 

Foreign Relations Supplement Microfiche 

Released 65 

Foreign Relations Volumes Released 64 



Sudan. Peace and Relief in Sudan (Baker, 

fact sheet) 24 

Treaties. Current Actions 62 

U.S.S.R. 

The International Agenda and the FY 1990 

Budget Request (Baker) 16 

President's News Conference of .January 27 

(excerpts) 4 

Secretary's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" 21 

Soviets Withdraw From Afghanistan 

(Bush) 48 

United Nations. UN Narcotics Trafficking 

Conference Adopts Convention (text of 

convention) 49 

Venezuela. Vice President Visits Venezuela 

and El Salvador 7 

Western Hemisphere 

The International Agenda and the FY 1990 

Budget Request (Baker) 16 

President Holds Session With News 

Reporters 5 

Secretary's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" 21 

Name Index 

Baker, Secretary 8,10,13,16,21,24,26,38 

Brundtland, Gro Harlem 38 

Bush, President 1,3,4,5,8,26,32,43,48 

Hannibalsson, Jon Baldvin 38 

Howe, Sir Geoffrey 38 

Mulroney, Brian 26 

Nitze, Paul H 44 

Papandreou, Andreas 38 

Papoulias, Karolos 38 

Poos, Jacques 38 

Quayle, Vice President 7 

Takeshita, Noboru 32 

Yilmaz, Mesut 38 



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^ JUN § \m 







Dpparttnent of Staie 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2146 / May 1989 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
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JAMES A. BAKER, III 

Secretary of State 

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Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

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Director, 

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CONTENTS 




FEATURE 

1 President's Trip to Japan, China, and South Korea 

(Secretary Baker, President Bush, White House Statement) 



Tie Secretary 



Interview on "MacNeil/Lehrer 

Newshour" 
Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 



/irica 



Human Rights Issues in Africa 

(Kenneth L. Brown, 

Robert W. Farrand) 
Namibian Independence and 

Troop Withdrawal From 

Angola (Secretary Baker) 



/>ms Control 



I 



European Security Negotiations 
Open in Vienna (President 
Busk, Stephen J. Ledogar, 
John J. Maresca, Western 
Position Paper) 



Est Asia 



Update on Cambodia (David F. 
Lambertson) 

Cambodia — A Profile 

Burma: Political Situation and 
Human Rights (David F. 
Lambertson) 

Burma — A Profile 

Future Prospects for the Philip- 
pines (David F. Lambertson) 

FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
East Asia and the Pacific 
(William Clark, Jr.) 



Economics 

53 Dealing With the International 
Debt Crisis (Nicholas F. 
Brady) 



Europe 

56 New Horizons in Europe 

(Secretary Baker) 
59 Secretary Meets With Soviet 
Foreign Minister (Secretary 
Baker) 

IVIiddie East 

61 FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
the Middle East (A. Peter 
Burleigh, Edward S. Walker) 

63 Secretary Meets With Israeli 
Foreign Minister (Moshe 
Arens, Secretary Baker) 

65 Continued Fighting in Lebanon 

(Department Statements) 

66 U.S. and PLO Meet in Tunis 

(Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.) 

67 Iraq to Pay Compensation 

(Department Statement) 

Narcotics 

68 Certification for Narcotics 

Source and Transit Countries 
(Secretary Baker, Ann B. 
Wrobleski) 



Refugees 

72 FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
Refugee Programs (Jonathan 
Moore) 



Terrorism 



74 



78 



Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature 

(L. Paul Bremer, HI) 
Iran's Threats Against Author 

(Alvin P. Adams, Jr.) 



United Nations 



81 



83 



FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
Organizations and Programs 
(Sandra L. Vogelgesang) 

UN Human Rights Report on 
Cuba (President Bush) 



Western Hemisphere 

84 Presidential Election Held in El 

Salvador (White House 
Statement) 

85 Chilean Fruit Exports to the 

U.S. (Secretary Baker, Joint 
Statement) 



Treaties 

86 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

89 Department of State 

Publications 

89 Department of State 

Index 




President and Mrs. Bush were among the many dignitaries attending the funeral of 
Emperor Hirohito in Tokyo on February 24. 1989. Shown here are (left to right): Mrs. 
Soeharto, President Soeharto of Indonesia, President Kaunda of Zambia, Mrs. Bush, 
President Bush, President Von Weizsaeeker of West Germany, and President Mitterrand 
of France. 



(White House photo by Carol Powers) 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




President's Trip 
to Japan, China, and South Korea 



President Bush departed 
the United States on February 22, 1989, 

to visit Japan {February 23-25), 

where he represented the JJyiited States 

at the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, 

Chiyia (February 25-27), 

and South Korea (February 27). 

He returned to Washington 

on February 27. 



TOKYO 



:retary Baker's 
Jews Briefing, 
). 23, 19891 

ant to just simply start by saying 
t the President has completed eight 
terals. Two of those, as I under- 
id it, have already been briefed to 
by Marlin [Fitzwater, Assistant to 
President and Press Secretary] — 
bilateral with President Mitterrand 
'ranee and Prime Minister Take- 
,a. In addition to that, he has com- 
;ed bilaterals with Portuguese 
me Minister Scares, Egyptian Pres- 
it Mubarak, Thai Prime Minister 
itchai, Jordanian King Hussein, Is- 
li President Herzog, and the Presi- 
it of India, Mr. Benkhataram. 

Q. King: Hussein, after his meet- 
, said that in recent years, he's 
n concerned about the United 
tes but that he thinks that Presi- 
it Bush is someone he can have 
at faith in. What did the President 

to change the King's mind about 
5. intentions? 

A. President Bush and King Hus- 
1 go back a long way. They've known 
h other for a long time; they've been 



friends; they've worked together. I 
think it's fair to say that there was a 
recognition on the part of both that 
there are perhaps some opportunities 
out there with respect to the Middle 
East peace process that haven't existed 
before. There's somewhat of a dynamic 
in the whole process that is relatively 
new — when you consider the fact that 
the United States has a dialogue with 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation], when you consider the fact of 
the recent human rights report, when 
you consider the fact that the conflict 
there has dragged on for as long as it 
has. And I think that there was a genu- 
ine appreciation on the part of both of 
those leaders that perhaps there were 
some opportunities out there that 
should be carefully looked at, carefully 
thought through, and, if possible, cap- 
italized on. 

Q. But if I could follow; he 
seemed to express that there was a 
difference in the attitude of the Unit- 
ed States. Is there? 

A. I'm not aware of any difference. 
I think the United States has always 
been committed to doing whatever it can 
to further the peace process in the Mid- 
dle East. 

Q. Are we talking about a new 
Middle East peace plan here? 
A. No. 



Q. We're obviously talking about 
some kind of new initiative. Could 
you fill us in on what's going on? 

A. It depends on who you're talking 
to when you ask what's going on. A nu- 
mber of people have some different ideas 
that they're floating. Of course, there's 
the idea of an international conference 
under the sponsorship of the five perma- 
nent members of the Security Council 
of the United Nations. There are other 
ideas, as there have been from time to 
time throughout the long torturous 
course of this problem in the Middle 
East. 

Let me, if I might, tell you what the 
view and attitude of the Bush Adminis- 
tration is. We, too, think that there are 
perhaps some opportunities — perhaps. 
We think they ought to be explored very 
carefully, that there ought to be an ex- 
tensive amount of practical groundwork 
accomplished before we rush off to have 
a big, high-visibility conference under 
the television lights. We think that it is 
important that we do what we can to 
build the environment for direct negotia- 
tions between the parties that are going 
to lead to permanent peace in the Middle 
East. 

We are concerned that if we act too 
precipitously, we might preempt promis- 
ing possibilities that could surface if we 
adopted a more reasoned and measured 
approach. 



liiH->artmont nf Qtato RiiMotin/Mau 1 QRQ 



Q. Did you make any kind of spe- 
cific proposal to King Hussein or Mr. 
Mubarak about any kind of meeting; 
any new American proposal? 

A. No, we did not. We said basically 
what I've just said to you. In addition, 
we said we recognize the important role 
that the United States plays in the peace 
process in the Middle East. We made the 
point that the United States would e.\- 
pect to be active in the Middle East 
peace process. 

Q. Did you see any common 
ground among Hussein, Mubarak, 
and Herzog? 

A. Yes. I think all three of those 
leaders recognize the fact — that I men- 
tioned a moment ago — that there is a 
certain dynamic now in the region. 
There is a ree.xamination on the part of a 
number of the major players. I think 
that there's a genuine sharing of views 
that it is, in fact, direct negotiations that 
will ultimately lead to peace and that 
somehow we must find a way to get to 
those direct negotiations. 

Q. Direct negotiations between 
whom? 

A. Direct negotiations between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis. 



Q. 
A. 



Not the PLO? 

Palestinians. 



Q. What role, if any, has Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze's visit to the 
Middle East played in creating this 
new dynamic that you see in the pros- 
pects for peace in the region? 

A. I don't think that has played a 
major role, quite frankly, in creating the 
new dynamics. I think the dynamics 
were there. I think that they are af- 
fected in large part by the intifada [up- 
rising] and the results that that has had 
on public opinion around the world and 
on public opinion, frankly, within the 
countries in the Middle East. I think it's 
healthy, quite frankly, that the Soviet 
Union would be interested in contribut- 
ing to the cause of peace in the Middle 
East. I suppose we would want to know 
that there were concrete contributions 
that they had in mind, rather than sim- 



ply rhetorical exercises. It's my under- 
standing that when I meet with Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna in 
March, we will have further discussions 
along these lines. 

I might say one final thing; it's 
obvious, of course, that the Soviet 
Union can have influence with Syria. 
One thing that I think might contribute 
in a way toward peace in the Middle 
East would be if the Soviet Union could 
find its way clear to establishing full 
diplomatic relations with Israel. Anoth- 
er thing that might contribute, as far 
as action by the Soviet Union is con- 
cerned, is if the Soviet Union was to 
cease its support of radical countries in 
the Middle East region such as Libya. 

Q. Presumably all the Middle 
East leaders wanted to know what 
the Bush Administration's position 
on an international peace conference 
is going to be. What did the President 
say on that particular point? 

A. The President made the points 
that I've just made to you; that we think 
it's very important to carefully till the 
ground here and take advantage of what- 
ever opportunity is out there, don't lose 
or preempt a promising possibility by 
acting too precipitously. That's number 
one. 

Number two, the United States is 
on record as being willing to participate 
in an international conference which is 
properly structured — the key words are 
"properly structured." An international 
conference, to be helpful, must lead to 
direct negotiations between the parties. 
I think most everyone agrees that you 
will not get to peace in the Middle East 
until you get to those direct 
negotiations. 

Q. Before we left Washington, 
Gen. Scowcroft [Brent Scrowcroft, 
Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs] was making a 
point that the President would be 
coming here with new ideas, new pro- 
posals for the bilateral talks. Can you 
elaborate on those now? 

A. I'm sorry — new ideas and new 
proposals during the course of these 
bilaterals? 



Q. Yes. 

A. The President outlined, duri 
the course of these bilaterals, his vie 
with respect to the U.S.- U.S.S.R. r 
tionship, with respect to the overall 
East-West relationship — and there 
quite a bit of discussion on that, as a 
matter of fact, during the course of 1 
hour and a half with President Mitte 
rand. There were in-depth discussio 
the approach that the Administratiii 
will be taking with respect to the pr ■ 
lems of Central America. Again that 1 
came up at the Mitterrand bilateral, i^ 
Marlin has already briefed you on tl 
There was, as I've just indicated to , 
a full exposition of our views with ri 
spect to how we think we should ap- 
proach the question of Middle East 
peace. 

Q. After Emperor Hirohito d ^ 
in Britain. Canada, and Australi 
veterans groups and others said t i 
were firmly opposed to any high-l f 
delegations coming to the funera 
That didn't happen in the United 
States. The VFW [Veterans of Fo 
eign Wars] and the American Le^; n 
raised no objections to George Bi ii 
coming here. Were you surprised 
that, and what does it indicate — , 
maturity of the United States or 
what? 

A. Maybe it indicated maturitj 
Maybe it indicated that the wounds 
healed as far as the United States i; 
cerned. As the President said when 
announced this trip, he pointed out 
very important relationship that ex 
today between the United States ar 
Japan — the security relationship as 
as the economic relationshijj — and n 
the difference in approach and diffe 
in view is what you suggest it is. I d 
know. 

Q. Aside from the meeting w 
President Herzog, has the Presid 
discussed these new approaches v 
other Israeli leaders, and can yoi 
us what they've said? 

A. No, we have not had those d 
cussions as yet. I've simply laid out 
you what our view is in terms of the 
the thing ought to be approached. 



nonartmont nf Qtato Riillotin/MaU 



Bilaterals 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




e in Japan, President Bush held bilat- 
meetings with a number of world 
rs, among whom were — 



le Minister Benazir Bhutto 
kistan... 



dent Jose Sarney Costa of Brazil. 




(White House photo by Michael Sargent) 




(White House photo ijy Uavid Valdez) 



Q. The PLO again today with a 
new — made a new appeal for direct 
negotiations — offered the negotia- 
tions with the Israelis. Are those the 
kinds of direct negotiations you'd like 
to see? 

A. I can't speak for and will not 
presume to speak for the Israelis, partic- 
ularly since the President has not as yet 
met with Prime Minister Shamir; he 
will be meeting with him. I have not as 
yet met with Foreign Minister Arens; I 
will be meeting with him. So I can't an- 
swer that question. 

Q. Will these be the first times 
that the Israelis will be hearing the 
new approaches, do you think, with — 

A. I have spoken of this approach 
in my trip around NATO capitals last 
week. I'm sure woi-d has filtered back to 
Israel, and we've had a very private and 
low-level discussion of this. But there has 
been no discussion at anything like the 
ministerial level. 

Q. Since your trip last week, 
have you spoken to the President 
about how to respond to Gorbachev 
and this feeling in Europe about a 
need to respond to Gorbachev? And in 
the Mitterrand meeting, did Presi- 
dent Bush tell Mitterrand how the 
West might respond to, particularly, 
Gorbachev's initiatives at the United 
Nations? 

A. There was a general review of 
the whole issue the way I reviewed it, if 
I may say so, with foi-eign ministers on 
my trip — the salient points being that 
the NATO alliance is very, very strong, 
substantively we're in very good shape. 
We're winning the battle on a substan- 
tive basis, politically and economically. 
There is this public perception and 
public diplomacy aspect of it that we 
probably are not winning on. We need to 
deal with that but not just from a public 
relations standpoint; we need to deal 
with it in concrete, substantive ways. We 
did not discuss today the specifics of 
those. I have suggested before that such 
things as emphasizing at our summit 
meetings — various summit meetings, 
NATO summit meetings and that sort of 



thing — the political, social, and economic 
content of the relationship as opposed to 
just the .security relationship might be 
one w'ay to go. 

Q. You said a little while ago 
that the United States believes there 
must be direct talks between Israel 
and the Palestinians. The President 
the other day said our policy was to 
encourage direct talks between the 
Israelis and the Jordanians. Did 
somebody misspeak? And might you 
clarify what Palestinians you are 
talking about? 

A. I think the Jordanians would be 
an appropriate party in these discus- 
sions, and I think you might well e.xpect 
to see them involved in such discussions 
at an appropriate time, particularly if 
those discussions took place in the con- 
text of an international conference. 

Q. Which Palestinians are you 
talking about when you say there 
should be talks between Israel and 
the Palestininans? 

A. The Palestinian people. 

Q. Did King Hussein indicate his 
willingness to be party to those dis- 
cussions under the right conditions? 

A. I think the position of King Hus- 
sein is well-known in terms of being in- 
terested in doing whatever he can to 
forward the peace process in the Middle 
East and to arrive at peace in the Middle 
East. The key would be under the right 
circumstances and under the right 
conditions. 

Q. You're saying that you think 
he'd be an appropriate party. Did he 
indicate that to the President today? 

A. The President didn't get into 
those kinds of specifics, quite frankly. 
That question never came up. I think his 
position of being willing to assist the 
peace process in any way he can is 
rather well-known. 

Q. How about the hostages? Have 
you heard anything — any new threats 
against them by Khomeini? 

Q. Will there be a meeting with 
Aquino? 

A. I don't believe so. 



Q. Why not? 

A. Scheduling problems. 

Q. You're snubbing her. 

A. No, scheduling. 



President Bush's 

News Conference (Excerpts), 
Feb. 25, 19892 

I have had an e.xtremely useful set o 
meetings with leaders familiar with 
the problems and prospects of the m 
jor geographic areas of the world. A 
as all of you are aware, Internationa 
affairs have entered an e.xtraordina 
interesting period; a period of fluidi 
in which several regional problems- 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, th( 
Middle East, to name just a few' — ha 
renewed prospect for resolution. Ma 
of the parameters of these complex 
regional problems are in flux. And, 
therefore, it is important to convers 
with the men and women who are th 
most influential leaders on the scen( 

I enjoyed meeting with the Eui 
pean leaders. During my lunch wit! 
President Mitterrand and in discus- 
sions with President Cossiga of Ital. 
with the King of the Belgians, with 
President Soares of Portugal, King 
Juan Carlos of Spain, the President 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Prime Minister Ozal of Turkey, 1 en 
phasized that our relationship with 
rope and the North Atlantic allianci 
remains central to our foreign polic; 
and our security interests. They all 
sured me that their countries share 
this strong commitment to the allia 
and considered it the key to their pa 
and their future security. 

The meetings with the Presidei 
of Egypt and Israel and with the Ki 
of Jordan form part of a larger effor 
bring peace to the Middle East. I m 
clear the continuing readiness of th 
United States to facilitate this effoi 
a manner that's consistent with the : 
curity of Israel and the security of ( 
Arab friends in the region as well. "■ 
discussed what new opportunities m 



Bilaterals 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




llent Ibrahim Babangida 
eria... 




Hussein I of Jordan 



1 , jj|p»'-** m' . ^^mm-w-^ - -^---— -.w-ww*' ■ 


1 \>^ 'P^' 


1 . . ^ 



(White House photo by David Valdez) 




exist for our diplomacy, the importance 
of moving forward to take advantage of 
the positive elements in the current 
situation. 

The meeting with Prime Minister 
Bhutto of Pakistan, an important new 
leader, addressed a number of impor- 
tant issues, including our common 
interest in promoting Afghan self- 
determination in the aftermath now of 
the Soviet troop withdrawal. The emer- 
gence of democracy in Pakistan is 
something that we Americans all sa- 
lute. Consistent with this development, 
we also discussed what might be done 
to promote greater prosperity and se- 
curity in South Asia and particularly 
between Pakistan and India. 

With the President of India, we 
talked about the good nature of our re- 
lationship and the opportunities for im- 
proving the climate of peace in the 
region. He expressed to me his interest 
in the talks that their Prime Minister 
has had with the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan. 

In my discussion with Prime Min- 
ister Chatchai of Thailand, with Lee 
Kwan Yew of Singapore, and President 
Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, we 
had a chance to talk about the latest de- 
velopments in the area, with particular 
emphasis on Cambodia. What remains 
clear from these discussions is the ab- 
solute requirement that we maintain 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] unity and support for a 
political settlement in Cambodia fea- 
turing an interim government led by 
Prince Sihanouk, with whom I'll be 
meeting, I believe, in China — I believe 
that's set. The goals, as ever, are two- 
fold: full and permanent Vietnainese 
withdrawal from Cambodia and the 
permanent prevention of a return to 
power by the Khmer Rouge. 

I also met with President Mobutu 
of Zaire. We discussed important eco- 
nomic issues and the new prospects for 
peace and self-determination in Angola 
and Namibia. I'll shortly be discussing 
the problems and opportunities of devel- 
opment with the President of Brazil — 
President Sarney — and the President of 
Nigeria — I'll be meeting with him in 
just a few minutes. 



Throughout all of our discussions 
on a variety of issues, I found a shared 
sense of satisfaction that East-West 
relations — they all were interested in 
this — are now clearly proceeding on 
the basis of an agenda favorable to 
the United States, its allies, and its 
friends. As a result of my discussions, I 
feel more confident than ever that we 
and our allies will move together to 
promote global peace, prosperity, and 
security. All these sessions, though 
highly concentrated, have been very 
useful to me overall and have provided 
me with an opportunity to exchange 
views with many of the most important 
world leaders. 

And then, I should add, Barbara 
and I and Secretary Baker had an op- 
portunity to pay our respects just now 
to the new Emperor and to express to 
him our pleasure at being here. It was 
right and proper that the United States 
be represented in this way and to give, 
in a personal sense, our condolences to 
him, to the Empress, and to his family. 



Q. The United States has been 
very firm with the Soviet Union in re- 
cent years on human rights issues. Do 
you intend to be equally firm with the 
Chinese? And are you taking a list to 
them of dissidents? And whose cases 
are you interested in? 

A. I think our position is so well- 
known to the Chinese — indeed, they 
have had an opening, a glasnost, if you 
will, that I wouldn't have thought possi- 
ble, and — if you set the clock back to 
when I was Ambassador there — 
whether there's any specific list, I'm 
not familiar with that right now. I'll be 
briefed on the approaches we'll take as 
we fly to China. But I think both the 
Soviet Union and China know of our 
commitment to human rights. And it is 
beholden on any American President to 
reiterate our commitment to human 
rights. 



Q. I'm just curious whether you, 
as a World War II veteran who was 
shot down not all that far from here, 
felt any sense of unease yesterday ap- 



pearing before the coffin and bowi 
before the Emperor and the new 
Emperor? 

A. No, I didn't. And I can't say 
that in the quiet of the ceremony th: 
my mind didn't go back to the wondi 
of it all, because I vividly remembei 
my wartime experience. And I vivic 
remember the personal friends who 
were in our squadron who are no lor 
alive as a result of combat, a result 
action. But my mind didn't dwell on 
that at all. What I really thought, il 
there was any connection to that, w 
isn't it miraculous what's happened 
since the war. I remember the stori 
in reading as preparation for this v 
the visit of MacArthur and the forn 
Emperor here. That was historic, a 
that set a whole new direction. And 
MacArthur's decision at that time 
proved to be correct in terms of Jap 
move toward democracy. I honestly 
tell you that I did not dwell on that 
didn't feel any sense other than my 
mind thinking of personal relations 
and things of that nature, but noth: 
to do about whether it was right to 
here. I was certain from the day th 
committed to come here that this w 
correct for the United States. And 
haps having been in combat in Worl 
War II, maybe the decision was moi 
correct: maybe it was more profoun 
be here. It leaves out my experience 

I'm representing the United St; 
of America. We're talking about a fri 
and we're talking about an ally. We 
talking about a nation with which w 
have constructive relationships. Su 
we've got some problems, but that ' 
all overriding — and respect for the 
peror. And remember back in World 
War II, if you'd have predicted that 
would be here because of the hard f 
ing and the symbolic nature of the 
problem back then of the former Er 
peror's standing, I would have said, 
"No way." But here we are, and tirr 
moves on: and there is a very good 1 
son for civilized countries in all oft 

Q. You referred in your openi 
statement to your talks with Midi 
East leaders and new opportunity 
a positive element in the region. C 



.^..A ^* o«««» 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




(elaborate on that and perhaps tell 
vhen you conclude your review 
^•n you're going to take some — 

iA. I think the whole accej^tance by 
leader YasirJ Arafat of the condi- 
s for talks is positive, and I think 
is seen as a very positive signal in 
Arab world. I think that there's a 
gnition on the part of Israel that 
1 the intifada and the difficulties on 
West Bank that something needs to 
one. There's a readiness on the 
of other Arab states to get serious 
it negotiation and discussion, 
pt's new standing in the area is a 
• important ingredient that could 
to where they could be more of a 
lyst for peace. All of these are in- 
lients that I think offer oppor- 
:y. Everybody understands that 
re we just go rushing out to do 
!thing for the sake of doing some- 
y that we take a step that is 
ent. 

I've been in this job for 1 month, 
this problem has been there for 
after year after year. But when I 
about the underlying potential for 
e, I think that's widely accepted 
There're still some very tough ele- 
s. You've got some radical ele- 
,s in, what I would say, the far left 
e PLO. You have a couple of coun- 
that have not been overly con- 
tive toward the peace movement, 
hat's overridden, it seems to me, 
lese elements that I've just 
ibed. 



3- You said you wouldn't believe 
ipening that has occurred in 
(3 when you were the U.S. envoy 
. How does it feel to be back as 
ident of the United States".' 
K. I don't know, but I'm looking for- 
to it. This will be my fifth visit back 
leaving China and Barbara's si.xth. 
I am told that the Chinese leaders 
loking forward to this return visit. 
-Kcited about it, and I think that the 
ionshi]) with China is strong. We ob- 
;ly have differences 
them, and they'll have something to 
bout that, I'm sure. I know I will 
■el at the changes. I did on the last 
and i)eo]jle have told me that just 



^* »< o*-%*^ 



in the last 2 years, there's been even 
more change. There is an openness in 
China today that I never would have pre- 
dicted 15 years ago, and I can't wait to 
have the discussions with these top lead- 
ers because this relationship is very im- 
portant. And we spend a lot of time when 
we're back home properly worrying about 
and being concerned about NATO and 
East-West relations, in the sense of U.S. 
versus Soviet, but we must never neglect 
our friends in the Pacific. 

This visit will be a way to talk about 
common objectives and work on the dif- 
ferences that we may have on trade or 
whatever else it is. But we've passed the 
day on the U.S. -China relationship 
where anyone talks about "playing a 
card." That was a term that was highly 
offensive to the Chinese, and properly 
so. Our relationship, the China-U.S. re- 
lationship, stands on its own in terms of 
cultural e.xchange and trade and on com- 
mon strategic interests and on the way 
we view most of the world — not all of it, 
because we have some big differences 
with them on some areas. But what I 
want to do is to strengthen that and to 
build on those common perceptions and 
to make them understand that we will 
never take for granted this relationship 
and that we will never do anything in 
dealing with the Soviets that would 
inure to the detriment of our Asian 
friends, be they Chinese, be they 
ASEAN, be they Japanese. That's an im- 
portant point to make because we're 
going to have some very interesting 
work to be done with the Soviet Union. I 
think the Chinese understand that, but I 
will make the point that we're not going 
to move forward in a way that would 
denigrate theii' interests or diminish the 
bilateral relationship between China and 
the United States, that it stands on its 
own. So we've passed the days of "play- 
ing a card" and where only discussion 
with China had to do with the strategic 
equation — Moscow, the United States, 
Beijing. It's past that now. We want to 
find ways to build. 

We talk to Deng Xiaoping [Chair- 
man, Central Military Commission] 
about this and Zhao Ziyang [General 
Secretary, Chinese Communist Party] 



and Li Peng [Premier of the State Coun- 
cil], President Yang [Yang Shangkun, 
President of China], and then I can talk 
to you later on about what we might have 
accomplished or what big problems re- 
main out there. The relationship is 
strong, and I'd like to strengthen it. 

Q. Are you pleased to see them 
drawing closer to the Soviets 
themselves'/ 

A. I have no problem with this. I 
said this to Mi\ Gorbachev before I be- 
came President. And this visit next 
spring is a good thing, and it's nothing 
detrimental to the interests of the Unit- 
ed States in that regard. Even if there 
was — we should try to go about it, in my 
view. But there isn't. So if the question 
gets into this equation: Do you worry 
that the Soviets and the Chinese will get 
back to the Khrushchev era, almost una- 
nimity on everything'? No, I don't. 
There's a fierce independence in China 
today, and they've moved out early on in 
terms of market incentive and in terms 
of — oh, lots of things: privatization, no 
more communes in their agriculture, for 
example. These are dramatic changes, 
and they haven't fully felt the effect of 
these changes. Now they have some eco- 
nomic problems that go with fast eco- 
nomic change. Inflation is concerning 
them, and how you handle rapid growth 
is concerning them, but they're moving 
in this market-oriented way that we 
think is a very good thing. 

So I'm not concerned about their 
going back to a relationship that was al- 
most two against one automatically. It's 
not that kind of a thing anymore. I don't 
think that's a concern we have. 



Responses to Questions 

Submitted by the 

Kyodo News Service 

of Japan, 
Feb. 16, 19893 

Q. What kind of role will the Bush 
Administration expect Japan to play 
in the global economic and Western 
national security spheres? 




A. First of all, a word about the 
global role of the United States during 
my Administration. 

Japan and the world can count on 
America to continue to work for peace, 
democracy, freedom, and justice around 
the world. The sco]5e of America's vision 
is global, and we will continue to shoul- 
der the obligations that belong to a 
global power. 

At the same time, of course, it is im- 
portant that our allies assume greater 
responsibility in the cause of global 
peace and prosperity. It is not for me to 
prescribe Japan's role in the world. The 
decision is up to the Government and 



people of Japan. During Prime Minister 
Takeshita's recent visit to Washington, 
he and I agreed that there are many 
ways Japan can contribute to global 
peace and prosperity. Our defense coop- 
eration is one of those ways. Another is 
foreign economic assistance. I welcome 
Japan's pledge to make further signifi- 
cant increases in overseas development 
assistance programs. 

Along these lines. Prime Minister 
Takeshita and I agreed on the impor- 
tance of supporting democracy and sus- 
tained economic growth and reform in 
the Philippines. Toward this end, we 
pledged to make every effort to launch 
the multilateral assistance initiative for 



President Bush and Prime Minister I 
boru Takeshita met in the .4kasaka I 
ace. To the President's left are Secre 
Baker and Chief of Staff Sununu. To 
Prime Minister's rijfht are Chief Cab' 
Secretary Keigo Obuchi and Ambassi 
to the U.S. Nobuo Matsunaga. 



.ii—x:.. /Kjl — . 



ily. 



Mi 
k 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




Philippines this year. I also welcome 
Ill's decision to take part in peace- 
oing operations and your generous of- 
of financial support for the relief 
resettlement in Afghanistan and 
hern Africa. Those are also ways to 
ribute. 

The United States and Japan — the 
Id's two largest economies — have 
ial responsibilities to sustain free 
e. Prime Minister Takeshita reaf- 
led in Washington Japan's deter- 
\diim to promote strong domestic 
vth and structural adjustments. In 
u-ea of multilateral cooperation and 
al economic growth, we agreed 
we would continue to coordinate 
■ies through established fora, espe- 
y the economic summit. We look 
ard to the ne.xt summit meeting, 
h will be held in Paris. We also 
■ed on the importance of a success- 
Ji'uguay Round [multilateral trade 
tiations]. And we agreed on the 
)rtance of frecjuent consultations at 
'vels on economic issues. 

Q. How do you envision U.S.- 
n relations under your Adminis- 
ion'.' Some of your advisers have 
mmended forming a "new part- 
hip" with Japan. What are your 
ngs about this recommendation? 
.A. We have used the word "partner- 
' to describe our relationship for a 
oer of years now, and during the 
se of the Reagan Administration, we 
new meaning to that term. Our 
lershij) is bilateral, regional, and 
il. We consult frequently and coop- 
' closely on virtually every issue of 
rtance. This is not a "new partner- 
' but a continuing one that has de- 
)ed over 40 years of cooperation. I 
onfident it will continue to develop 
icquire new meaning, but rather 
a "new partnership," it will be a 
nually "renewed partnership." 

Q. Defense Secretary-designate 
ir said Japan should extend its 
ine defense beyond the present 
)-mile limit. Do you support this 
? Would you ask Japan to beef up 
efense'/ If so, how much of its 
' should Japan allocate for de- 
e spending? 



A. We are fully satisfied with the 
mutually agreed division of defense roles 
and missions in our security arrange- 
ments, under which Japan has primary 
responsibility for defending its territory, 
seas and skies, and sea lines of communi- 
cation. We are also encouraged by Ja- 
pan's continued and steady progress in 
improving its defense capability within 
the framework of those roles and mis- 
sions, recognizing there is still room for 
greater improvement, especially in the 
area of sustainability. Further we appre- 
ciate Japan's increasing contribution to 
the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in 
Japan. Rather than engage in a sterile 
exercise of measuring security in arbi- 
trary terms such as GNP, the United 
States and Japan are putting our efforts 
toward a much more productive and im- 
portant purpose; that of working to- 
gether to attain defense capabilities 
which will ensure our mutual security. 

Q. Would you support a U.S.- 
Japan free trade agreement modeled 
after the U.S. -Canada free trade 
agreement? The U.S. deficit with Ja- 
pan has been on the rise again in re- 
cent months. Do you favor the yen's 
further appreciation against the 
dollar? 

A. The U.S. and Japanese Govern- 
ments agree on the need to pursue mul- 
tilateral and bilateral efforts to create a 
more open international trading system. 
We will stress the multilateral approach. 

We are always open to new ideas. 
But in our view, the key now is to work 
hard for the success of the Uruguay 
Round. At the recent G-7 meeting [com- 
prised of the finance ministers of Canada, 
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States], 
the financial authorities of the major 
countries agreed the global economic sit- 
uation and outlook remain positive and 
that no changes in their commitment to 
cooperation on exchange rate policies 
were needed. 

During our recent meeting. Prime 
Minister Takeshita and I noted progress 
that both the United States and Japan 
have made toward reducing external im- 
balances, but we also agreed that fur- 
ther policy efforts are needed. The 



Prime Minister assured me that Japan 
remained determined to encourage 
strong domestic growth and structural 
reform. And I reaffirmed our strong 
determination to reduce our budget 
deficit. 

Q. A reduction of conventional 
arms is said to be the top priority of 
the Bush Administration in the U.S.- 
Soviet arms negotiations. What is 
your response to President Gor- 
bachev's announcement to cut 500,000 
Soviet troops? Do you foresee a U.S.- 
Soviet summit by next summer? 

A. It is true that a major priority of 
my Administration is in the area of con- 
ventional arms control. Thus we welcome 
and look forward to the negotiation on 
conventional armed forces in Europe 
(CFE). We, along with our NATO allies, 
will seek in CFE to enhance stability 
and security at a lower level of forces. To 
that end, NATO will seek the elimina- 
tion of the Warsaw Pact's substantial su- 
periority in Europe. Accordingly we 
welcome the announcement of Soviet 
force reductions as a positive step in the 
right direction and look forward to the 
full implementation of the force cuts de- 
scribed by Chairman Gorbachev. Even 
with these reductions, however, the War- 
saw Pact has far to go to correct the con- 
ventional forces imbalance in Europe. 

Regarding a summit, both sides, of 
course, want to be well prepared before 
engaging in a summit. We are in the 
process of reviewing elements of our pol- 
icy toward the Soviet Union and consult- 
ing closely with our allies and friends to 
ensure that we have a sound foundation 
for long-term progress in East -West re- 
lations. Secretary of State Baker and 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have 
several opportunities in the months 
ahead to begin addressing the many is- 
sues between our countries. Thus, while 
I am confident a summit will take place 
sometime in the future, it is too early to 
discuss a specific date. 



artmpnt r>f .(^tatp Riillotin/Mau IQRQ 




I 



BEIJING 



Secretary Baker's 

Interview on 

"Face the Nation" 

(Excerpts), 
Feb. 26, 1989* 



Q. Here we are in China. I know that 
you've already had several meetings 
with Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. 
What's been curious to a lot of us in 
the press is what the spokesman told 
us, which is that human rights hasn't 
come up. Every time our government 
goes to the Soviet Union, we always 
bring it up; we make it a big issue. 
Human rights violations are just as 
bad in this country, if not worse. Why 
don't we bring it up here? 

A. It has been brought up here. It 
has been brought up in China, specifi- 
cally so, and has been discussed. It 
hasn't been done — 

Q. Our spokesman said that it 
wasn't. 

A. It hasn't been done with big pub- 
lic fanfare and a lot of noise because, 
frankly, we think that sometimes you 
make iDetter progress on human rights 
when it's done quietly and low key. 

Q. When was it done? 

A. It was done during the course of 
my meeting with the Foreign Minister 
last night. 

Q. Why wouldn't the President 
bring it up with Deng Xiaoping or Li 
Peng? 

A. Because the decision was made 
to bring it up at the foreign minister 
level. 

Q. Does that not diminish the 
significance, the importance, by hav- 
ing it— 

A. Not at all. 

Q. Why not? Why doesn't the 
President at the presidential level, 
like President Reagan used to? 



A. I think the message got through 
loud and clear, and we had a good discus- 
sion on the issue. 

Q. Is there a double standard 
here on human rights? 

A. No, I don't think there's a double 
standard — 

Q. I mean in terms of the Soviet 
Union. 

A. Oh, I don't think so at all. If you 
go back and look at what's happened, I 
think you'd see that China began open- 
ing up its economy and opening up its 
political system and opening up with re- 
spect to human rights a lot earlier than 
the Soviet Union did. 

We've made dramatic progress in 
the last year or so with the Soviet 
Union. But China started moving a lot 
earlier than the Soviet Union. 

Q. You could argue that that's 
true on the economic side but not nec- 
essarily on the human rights side. 

A. I believe it's true in terms of the 
wide range of those issues, I really do. 

Q. You seem to be plagued by this 
criticism that you don't have a for- 
eign policy; that this Administration 
has been very slow off the mark 
here — in the Middle East, in Central 
America, in Europe. I don't mean to 
try to get a defensive answer because 
I know you've been asked this a lot 
but merely to have you explain to the 
American people — 

A. You know, I haven't been asked 
yet. That question has not come to me 
yet; it's come to others. 

Q. Let me ask you. then. 

A. I'll give you the same — 

Q. Then let me put it to you: Why 
so slow? 

A. I'll give you the same answer 
that the President gave the other day. 

Q. No, give your own answer. 

A. It's an outrageous suggestion. 
You know, you don't change policy just 
because you change Administrations. 
That would be a terrible mistake. 

A lot of things are going well; the 
winds of freedom I'eally are blowing 
around the world, when vou look at 



what's happening in Afghanistan, in 
southern Africa, and a whole host of 
places. 

We have some new dynamics, as 
mentioned the other night, in the Mid \ 
East — some opportunities. That does 
mean that it makes sense to come cha 
ing out in the first 4 weeks of this Ad 
ministration with some high-visibilit. 
plan that might or might not succeed. 
We'd much rather till the ground care 
fully, do a lot of in-depth preparation 
and not run the risk of preempting th 
real possibility of success by moving 
quickly. 

Q. You have a President who r 
have more foreign policy experienc 
than any president in 1.5 years. 

A. Absolutely. 

Q. He was Vice President for I 
years, and he's got something like 
dozen foreign policy reviews going 
And every time there's an opportu 
that comes along — for instance, ii 
the Middle East — he's studying. h» 
not seizing, he's not responding to 
Soviets. 

A. No, I disagree with that. Th 
simply not true. 

Q. Why so much study? Why 
aren't you all ready to just seize tl 
opportunities? 

A. Because it makes sense to re' 
policy when you have a new Adminisi 
tion coming in. That doesn't mean yo 
change policy, but you really ought ti 
view it. And that's what we're doing 
whole host of areas. 

Q. Why don't you have your U 
in place? You have the PLO with a i 
initiative ready, saying constantly 
they want to talk to Israel; you ha 
the Soviets moving in, intruding i 
what was our turf, brokering rela 
tions in the Middle East. .\nd, as I 
understand it, you don't even have 
your Middle East team in place at 
State Department. 

A. It would probably surprise y 
to know that we hax'e over 50 — proba 
about .55 — presidential appointments 
quiring Senate confirmation who hav 
been agreen upon; only 15 of those hi 



rkn»n..«mAn* A« CtotA QtillAtin/KAoif 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




n announced because it takes an inor- 
ate amount of time nowadays to get 
I clearance. There's no such thing as 
■hour name check; it takes 7 days. 

Q. Why is that? 

A. A full field background takes 
ut 5 weeks. Why is that? I think it's 
ause the standards are a lot tougher 
■, and the scrutiny is much greater. 

Q. I mean, you're picking people 
J are in government. Some of the 
pie I know that you're wanting to 
ig in are already there. 

A. Yes, and you're going to ask me 
the FBI says they have to have a 
field investigation again? I can't an- 
r that. Ask the FBI. 

Q. Tell me why you don't have 
leone on your Middle East desk. 

A. He's been named; it leaked out 
to 3 weeks ago. You know who it is. 

Q. Leaked out but not appointed. 

A. Not formally announced. Why? 

Q. Yes. 

A. Because he's waiting on his 

he's a career Foreign Service offi- 
and yet he has to go through a full 
1 background investigation by the 

Q. Here's one of the accusations: 
're all afraid of [Senator] Jesse 
ms. 

A. And, by the way, we've been in 
•e for about 30 days, you know. 

Q. [Israeli Foreign Minister] 
ihe Arens, who just met with Mr. 
vardnadze, is coming to the Unit- 
>tates in less than a month. Will 
be ready with initiatives to pre- 
t to him when he comes? Will your 
Ti be in place? Will you be ready 
that meeting? 

A. The team will be in place, and 
A'ill be very ready for the meeting 
we're looking forward to the meet- 
As I said the other night in the 
fing, we have already had some very 
level discussions with the Israelis, 
you keep talking in terms of initia- 
s and big plans, and you want to see 
ething presented under the kleig 



LortmAnt r\t C«4tA Qi illAf in /K/I,sif i QQQ 




Mrs. Bush during a tour of the Forbidden City in Beijing. 



lights and in front of the cameras. That's 
the wrong way to go. If you really want 
to make some progress in the Middle 
East, that's the wrong way to go. 

Q. But doesn't it bother you that 
Mr. Gorbachev looks as though he's 
besting you all over the world? 

A. Not a bit. Not a bit. It really 
doesn't, because we're winning on subs- 
tance. The NATO alliance is winning at 
every turn on substance; on human 
rights, on arms control, on regional. Look 
at what's happening in Afghanistan, look 
at what's happening in the southern part 
of Africa, look at what's happening on 
arms control, look at what's happening on 
human rights. So we're winning on subs- 
tance. He may be winning on public rela- 
tions and perceptions. So it doesn't bother 
us, not one bit. 



President Bush's 

Interview on 

Chinese Television, 
Feb. 26, 19895 

Q. I'm sure millions of Chinese peo- 
ple are watching this program now. I 
wonder if you would like to say a few 
words to them first. 

A. I do have an opening statement, 
but first let me thank you for this unique 
opportunity. It's a great honor for me to 
be the first American President to speak 
to the Chinese people in a live broadcast. 
And I feel as if I were talking to old 
friends who, while out of sight, have 
never, never been out of heart and mind. 

Fourteen years ago, Barbara and I 
came to your beautiful land when I was, 
as you said, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Of- 



11 



fice. And for us, returning to Beijing is 
a homecoming. Our work here was a 
source of great personal satisfaction, a 
happy, challenging time in our lives. 
Ami we actually went to church here: in- 
deed, our daughter was baptized in our 
faith here. We rode bicycles down the 
hutungs [narrow streets] of Beijing and 
came to have a general feeling of affec- 
tion for the Chinese people. We knew 
then that the relationship that we would 
establish between our two nations would 
be a special one indeed. 

And we were right. Today the 
bridges that started with the Shanghai 
communique yeai's ago — today that rela- 
tionship has joined our peoples together 
in friendship and respect. Our two coun- 
tries continue to weave an increasingly 
rich fabric of relations through our e.x- 
panding trade and cultural and scientific 
exchanges. American students study at 
many of your finest universities, and we 
welcome thousands of Chinese students 
and researchers to educational institu- 
tions in the United States. The under- 
standing and friendship that these 
students have developed will only help to 
improve and deepen relations between 
our two countries in the years ahead. 

I've spoken to the American people 
about a new breeze blowing in the world 
today. There's a worldwide movement to- 
ward greater freedom: freedom of hu- 
man creativity and freedom of economic 
opportunity. We've all begun to feel the 
winds of change sweep us toward an ex- 
citing and challenging new century. 
These winds — new, sometimes gentle, 
sometimes strong and powerful. China 
was one of the first nations to feel this 
new breeze, and like a tree in a winter 
wind, you've learned to bend and adapt 
to new ways and new ideas and reform. 

Many challenges lie before our two 
nations. 'Together we must find political 
solutions to regional conflicts. We must 
foster global growth. And together, in 
order to make life better for future gen- 
erations, we must seek solutions to 
woi'ldwide concerns, such as our planet's 
environment, the threat to all people 
from international terror, the use and 
spread of chemical and biological weap- 
ons, and international drug trafficking. I 



know your leaders share with me a de- 
termination to solve these and other 
problems, and as President of the United 
States, I look forward to continuing to 
work closely with them as I have done in 
the past. 

The Americans and Chinese share 
many things, but perhaps none is more 
important than our strong sense of fam- 
ily. Just a few weeks ago, Barbara and I 
were blessed by a new grandchild. When 
I think of her and I think of the beautiful 
children of China, my commitment to 
peace is renewed and reaffirmed. 

I am confident that when future 
generations of Chinese and Americans 
look back upon this time, they'll say that 
the winds of change blew favorably upon 
our lands. Thank you for your friend- 
ship, your hospitality, and the many 
warm memories of this wonderful coun- 
try that Bai'bara and I take with us as 
we return tomorrow to the United 
States. 

Q. You've been in office for just a 
month, and many people are probably 
surprised that you've decided to come 
to China so soon. Why now? 

A. Now because, you see, I view 
the relationship between China and the 
United States as highly significant, as 
one of the very most important relation- 
ships that we have. And so, it has a lot 
to do with bilateralism, with our trade 
and our cultural exchanges, and what I 
said here about the children. But it's 
more than that. It really has, because of 
China's importance and ours, a lot to do 
with woi'ld peace. And so, before much 
time went by, I wanted to reaffirm the 
importance that the United States places 
on this bilateral relationship, and I 
wanted to pledge to the Chinese 
leaders — and I've met the top four lead- 
ers in the last day and a half — that this 
relationship will grow and it will pros- 
per. We have economic problems, and 
China has some. But together we're 
going to solve them, and we're going 
to move forward. 

Q. This is your second day in 
China. How do you assess your time 
here? What specifically have you 
achieved on this trip? 



A. It's been a period — just in thai 
short period of time — to visit with tln^ 
Chinese leadership and Chairman Dc 
Xiaoping and others — Zhao Ziyang ai- 
Li Pend, Chairman Yang — all of these 
men giving a lot of their time to expla 
the reforms in China, the new directit 
that China is taking in world affairs. 
We had an interesting exchange on tht 
forthcoming visit of General Secretar 
Gorbachev coming here. And it is im- 
portant that they understand what I'n 
thinking in terms of the Middle East ( 
the subcontinent or our relations with 
the Soviet Union on arms control, anc 
it's important I understand theirs. It 
hasn't been a visit that has three poir 
on an agenda. It's a visit with a much 
broader perspective and a reaffirmat 
of a relationship that's strong. 

Q. You know perhaps as well a 
anyone about the development of 
relations between your country am 
China. How would you say that rel 
tionship contributes to world peaci 
and development? 

A. I think it contributes a lot, b( 
cause in the first place, we in the Un 
States have a disproportionate respoi 
sibility for discussions on strategic wi 
ons, for example, and we want to go 
forward with the Soviet Union, in thi 
instance, on negotiations. But we don 
want to do that in a way that would ji 
ardize the interests of any other couii 
And so, in that one area, we can have 
discussions with Chinese, just as our 
Secretary of State, Jim Baker, had w 
the European leaders. 

Another area is the economy. We 
have some economic problems at hom 
and I wanted to assure the Chinese li 
ers that I am going to do my level bet 
get our deficit down. 

The Chinese people might say, 
"What in the world does that have to 
with me living in Beijing or down in 
Shanghai or out further in the countr 
side?" The economies of the world are 
terlocked in a way. If I can do my job 
properly, that might mean lower inte 
rates. And what does that mean to tl 
average man on the street in China? 
That might mean that eventually his 
goods come to him at a lower price. U 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




e back to the fact that the visit is a 
ice to explore in depth the compli- 
d international relationships and to 
d on this bilateral relationship. 

' Q. It's said there's vast potential 
iitrenjftheninjf both the economic 
n technological cooperation bet- 
i.ii China and the United States. 
1 do we best tap that potential, 

I Ikiw do we overcome problems 

II as the restrictions on the trans- 
]>i technology'? 

\. In the first place, I had an op- 
) unity just a minute ago — I was al- 
L late for your program because I 
talking to Ziao Ziyang, a very im- 
sive leader, about the economy and 
t reforms. We congratulate the Chi- 
leaders in the steps they've taken 
rd economic reform. 
In terms of something technical like 
nological e.xchange, I made clear to 
Chinese leaders, particularly in a 
ersation with Li Peng, that we are 
ared to go the extra mile in terms of 
^tment, in terms of business, ex- 
5 and imports. When I was here in 
la 15 years ago, total trade was $800 
on. And now, depending on how one 
ants for it, we would say we would 
I figure of $14 billion. So we're going 
ave forward. We will advance tech- 
ry to China as much as we possibly 
inder what is known as the COCOM 
rdinating Committee for Multi- 
al Export Controls] arrangement, 
e are some highly sensitive, highly 
isticated military technologies that 
lot even sure China is interested in 
hat we are ]:)rohibited from export- 
inder the law. Having said that, we 
exported some highly sophisticated 
lology to China, and as President, I 
to continue to do that. That will 
fit the life of the average Chinese 
?n. 

We're in an information society in 
V' ways in the United States, and 
•ly that is going to come to China — 
)uter knowledge and education tech- 
es that are coming to the average 
ese kid from computers. We've been 
ed by advanced technology, and now 
ant to share it as much as we can. 




The President and Chinese leader Deny Xiaoping; offered toasts during their luncheon at 
the Great Hall of the E'eople. 



Q. You know there are reforms in 
China right now, and the Chinese 
Government is trying to attract more 
foreign investment. Does your Admin- 
istration have or plan to have any 
specific measures to encourage 
American businesses to invest in 
China'.' 

A. We had a chance to talk about 
that here today with the Chinese lead- 
ers, and I did point out to them that 
there are certain things that we'd like to 
see China move forward on that would en- 
hance further investment here. I'd like 
to see an investment treaty between the 
two countries of some sort — an agree- 
ment, not a treaty but a bilateral agree- 
ment on trade. We — like we do not just 
with China but many other coun- 
tries — talk about copyright and patent 
protection, and yet I find on this visit 
that China is moving forward with a new 
patent code and now is drafting copyright 
legislation, which would be very helpful. 



There are some artificial barriers. 
The good thing about a visit like this is 
we can sit and talk to the leaders in a 
dispassionate way. Where they disagree 
w'ith me, they will tell me, and where I 
disagree with them, I'm obliged to tell 
them. That's what a good frank relation- 
ship can do. 

But I told them that I must work to 
get the budget deficit in the United 
States down, because that does have an 
adverse impact on international interest 
rates. There are things that we can do, 
and there were things that I've asked 
China to do in terms of facilitating busi- 
ness. Sometimes I think your country is 
as bad as mine is on red tape. And to get 
the best flow of investment, China needs 
to do better on red tape, and so do we. 
It's a two-way street. 



irtmont <->{ ^tato Riillotin/IUlaw 1QftQ 



White House Statement, 
Feb. 27, 19895 

The President and Mrs. Bush were 
delighted by the warm reception in 
China. The entire range of Chinese 
leadership met with the President, 
showing theii' respect for him person- 
ally and for the United States. The 
luncheon hosted by Chairman Deng 
Xiaoping and the President's live ap- 
pearance on Chinese national television 
were both quite unusual and under- 
scored the Chinese appreciation for the 
trip. 

The President feels the visit was 
successful in several ways. Both coun- 
tries underscored their desire to move 
forward on bilateral issues, noting our 
bilateral trade level up from $10-14 bil- 
lion, more Chinese students in the 
United States, a developing military 
relationship, and a large and growing 
science and technology relationship. 
The President expects both countries 
to move forward in all of these areas. 



There are problems on both sides, 
of course. They are concerned about 
Taiwan and what they consider to be 
excessive U.S. export controls. In addi- 
tion, we hope for more progress in hu- 
man rights. 

The President felt the talks on in- 
ternational issues went very well, espe- 
cially the discussions on Cambodia. 
Both China and the United States 
agreed the liberalization of China's in- 
vestment regulations is desirable, and 
the Chinese are pursuing this ap- 
proach. The Chinese said they had com- 
pleted a patent law and are working on 
a new copyright law, both of which are 
necessary to protect intellectual prop- 
erty rights. 

The President and Mrs. Bush also 
shared a personal excitement about the 
private aspects of the trip. They were 
especially moved by the Sunday morn- 
ing church service, the warmth of the 
Chinese people, and the many changes 
that have been made in Chinese society 
in recent years. 



President and Mrs. Bush greeted local members of the U.S. Embassy staff at the 
ambassador's residence. 




Responses to Questions 

Submitted by Xinhua 

of China, 
Feb. 16, 19896 

Q. What is the general assessment 
the current world situation? Since 
there exists a wide disagreement oi 
whether the process of detente is ir 
versible, I would like to know your 
views on this question. 

A. I am cautiously optimistic. Th 
one constant in today's world is changi 
For the most part, the direction of 
change is positive from the standpoin 
America's values and interests. Arou; 
the globe, I see increased respect for 
and interest in democratic values of 
openness, human dignity, pluralism, ( 
mocracy, individual initiative, and em 
preneurship. I see a worldwide trend 
toward greater recognition of the nee 
for cooperative solutions to woi'idwidf 
concerns, such as peaceful resolution 
conflicts, environmental issues, and ( 
suring global economic growth. Balai 
has been restored in the Internationa 
system by a Western policy of strengi 
and realism. 

Important differences based on 1 
damental values and interests contin 
to guide the policies of nations, both I 
ward their own citizens and toward ot 
members of the international commun 
Being fundamental, these differences 
must not be minimized nor do they len 
themselves to easy resolution. In addi 
tion, our world still is a tumultuous, d; 
gerous place. Just as we appear to be 
making headway in reducing the thre; 
nuclear war through the arms reductii 
process, we must grapple with the pro 
erating dangers to civilized society fn 
terrorism, the use and spread of chem 
and biological weapons, together with 
T sophisticated delivery systems, ballis 
I tic missiles, and international drug 
^ trafficking. 

I Yet I would argue that the world 
i. significantly less turbulent and less t 
3 gerous today than it would otherwise 
I thanks to the farsighted statesmen ii 
I cent decades. China's leaders were st 
I of the first to contribute to this effort 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




as Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in 
ping- in the 1970s, I was privileged to 
e been part of this historic process, 
lay we find ever broader acceptance of 
proposition that in our increasingly 
rrelated world, national security 
not be achieved through military 
ins alone. Moreover, through their 
1 e.xpei-ience, more and more nations 
realizing that the freeing of market 
es and human creativity is the true 
is for sustained prosperity and na- 
al success. 

Nothing in this world is irreversible 
n a political, military, economic, or 
al perspective. That is why Amer- 
foreign policy is grounded on values 
abide and a realistic determination 
afeguard our interests and those of 
allies and friends. 
Finally I would say that any man 
1 11 grandchildren is a cautious opti- 
t by definition. He has a big stake in 
future. 

Q. With regard to disarmament, 
/hich area do you think a break- 
'>ug:h will be most feasible — the 
lear, conventional, or biochemi- 
' And it is widely reported here 
t your Administration might slow 
n the SDI [Strategic Defense Ini- 
ive] program. If that is the case, 
m't it mean the U.S. -Soviet talks 
■oncluding a START I strategic 
s reduction talks] agreement will 
iccelerated? What is the prospect 
<n early START agreement? 
A. The United States is committed 
•ogress in all aspects of arms 
rol — nuclear, conventional, and chem- 
Our goals include a strategic arms 
cement which will enhance strategic 
ility and security; conventional arms 
ictions in Europe which will result in 
ility at lower levels of conventional 
es; and a comprehensive, truly global, 
effectively verifiable chemical weap- 
Dan. One cannot predict which arms 
rol negotiations will meet with the 
lest success, but I hope for significant 
;-ress in all fields. My Administration 
II viewing the current status of negotia- 
5 in each of these areas even as I visit 
• country. 



artment of State Bulletin/Mav 1989 



Bilateral 




While in China, the President held a bilateral meeting on February 26 with 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. 



Chemical weapons have been much 
in the news recently. Unfortunately, over 
the past decade, the world has witnessed 
an accelerated erosion of respect for in- 
ternational norms against the use of 
chemical weapons. The United States 
seeks to reverse this trend. Our first 
objective is the negotiation of a compre- 
hensive, truly global, and effectively 
verifiable chemical weapons ban. In this 
connection, I am proud to have pre- 
sented to the Geneva Conference on Dis- 
armament, in 1984, a U.S. draft treaty 
to ban chemical weapons, which remains 
the basis of the Conference on Disarma- 
ment negotiations for such a ban. The 
United States is also working to stem the 
proliferation of chemical weapons and to 
restore respect for and strengthen the 
norms against illegal chemical weapons 
use. The Paris conference on chemical 
weapons use, held in January, was a 
helpful step in this regard. 

In the conventional area, new nego- 
tiations on conventional armed forces in 
Europe will begin in Vienna in March. 
At present, the Warsaw Pact has a more 
than 2-to-l advantage in tanks and artil- 



lery over NATO. While I welcome the re- 
cently announced Soviet conventional re- 
ductions as a step in the right direction, 
even with these cuts, Warsaw Pact 
forces will still retain substantial con- 
ventional superiority over NATO. Re- 
dressing this military imbalance in 
forces will be a prime objective of NATO 
at the upcoming talks. 

In the START talks, U.S. and So- 
viet negotiations have made solid pro- 
gress, including the development of the 
outline of an effective verification regi- 
me, an absolute necessity for a success- 
ful START agreement. While the 
strategic arms reduction process will be 
a major focus of my Administration's re- 
view of U.S. arms control positions, the 
United States is committed to working 
toward a START agreement which will 
improve strategic stability and reduce 
the risk of war. 

As to the Strategic Defense Initia- 
tive, it is an important program which is 
designed to contribute to stability. We 
will continue our research in this area to 
help us understand how and when we 
might move in the direction of a greater 
reliance on defenses. 



1«; 




Q. As the two parts of Korea are 
prepared to hold hish-level talks, the 
protracted tensions on the peninsula 
seem somewhat relaxed. Do you think 
the time is coming for the United 
States to respond positively to the 
DPRK's [Democratic People's Repub- 
lic of Korea) demand for the with- 
drawal of U.S. troops from South 
Korea? 

A. I am encouraged by regional 
trends affecting Korea, particularly 
China's positive role in seeking reduced 
tensions on the peninsula. While the at- 
mosphere has improved somewhat, hard 
realities remain. North Korea has a very 
large standing army stationed well for- 
ward. It would be far too optimistic at 
this time to suggest that tensions have 
been reduced to the point where the de- 
terrence provided by U.S. forces in Ko- 
rea is no longer needed. At the request 
of the Republic of Korea, our forces ai'e 
in Korea to deter aggression from the 
North. They will remain as long as the 
Government and people of South Korea 
want us to remain and as long as we be- 
lieve it is in the interest of peace to keep 
them there. 

Q. Thanks to the efforts made by 
the parties concerned, some hot spots 
in the world are cooling off. As a re- 
sult, the world public opinion is fo- 
cusing its attention on the Middle 
East and Central America, where the 
United States has remarkable influ- 
ence. Do you intend to make some 
readjustment to the I'.S. policies to- 
ward these two regions and more ac- 
tively make use of your influence to 
help promote early and just solutions 
to the problems there'.' 

A. The United States continues to 
seek a just solution to conflicts in Cen- 
tral America, based on democracy, re- 
spect for human rights, and security. 
In El Salvador, the popularly elected 
government of President Duarte has 
worked, with our support, to institu- 
tionalize democracy, despite an orga- 
nized military assault by communist 
forces. There has been considerable suc- 
cess in curbing human rights abuses 
from the far right and within the mili- 



1R 



tary. We will continue to support the 
Ciovernment of El Salvador in its efforts. 

In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas still 
.seek to consolidate their totalitarian 
conti'ol and regional hegemony. The 
press and church remain harassed. Polit- 
ical opponents are jailed. And the econ- 
omy continues in a downward spiral 
while the Sandinistas maintain by far 
the largest army in Central America. A 
just peace can come to Nicaragua only 
when the Sandinistas negotiate in good 
faith with the democratic resistance 
and the civic opposition and cease to 
threaten the neighboring Central Amer- 
ican democracies. 

In Central America, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment continues to support the Es- 
quipulas II agreement in all of its 
provisions, which include provisions call- 
ing for democratic freedom of the press; 
labor rights; freedom for opposition 
groups to organize, hold meetings, dem- 
onstrations, etc. We believe that all the 
commitments, including those to democ- 
racy, must be complied with if there is to 
be lasting peace in the region. In verify- 
ing compliance with all the principles of 
Esquipulas II, there also needs to be an 
enforcement mechanism to promote ad- 
herence to its provisions, particularly 
concerning democracy and cessation of 
support for subversive groups in the re- 
gion. In this regard, economic aid to 
Nicaragua should be conditioned on ac- 
tual performance, not just on words but 
deeds. 

The Arab-Israeli conflict is among 
the most difficult of regional conflicts. 
The United States has long been com- 
mitted to a just settlement of this dis- 
pute based on the principles embodied in 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338. Our commitment to a negoti- 
ated settlement will not waver; we will 
continue to work closely with the parties 
to forge a common basis that will facili- 
tate negotiations among them and a du- 
rable settlement. 

There are also a number of difficult 
and dangerous problems in the Middle 
East. We must find a way to deal with 
the missile proliferation, chemical and 
biological weapons, the conventional 
arms race, as well as other conflicts, 



such as Lebanon and the gulf. These a 
problems in which the international co 
munity can play a leading role. 

Q. Your country is still playing 
leading role in the fields of econom 
and technology, but the challenges 
from .lapan and Western Europe ar 
getting serious. How do you evaluai 
the challenges, and what would you 
do to handle them during your 
tenure'? 

A. The .Japanese and European 
economies are, indeed, growing stronj 
as are the newly industrialized econ- 
omies which follow free-market prac- 
tices. We regard this growth as a higl 
positive development. It has been a pr 
ority of our foreign policy since World 
War II to encourage the economic de\ 
opment of friendly countries. We take 
some justified satisfaction, I think, in 
the current success of free and open 
world trading and financial systems. ' 
vigorous competition in world market 
has been, and will continue to be, a d 
ing force for the improvement of worl 
living standards. By keeping world n' 
kets open, we will reward those entrt 
jweneurs and managers and workers 
who can adapt most quickly to changi 
markets. I have every confidence in 
American business and American lab 
They will handle the challenges, and 
e.xpect to continue to be the world's le 
ing economy. 

Q. What do you think should It 
and could be done to make the cur- 
rent Sino-U.S. relationship, which' 
healthy, even better and more solio 

A. First let me say that I certaii 
agree that the current state of our re 
tionship is healthy. Both countries ha 
come so far since my stay in China 13 
years ago. We now cooperate in many 
areas — political, economic, scientific, 
cultural, educational, and military. U 
China trade is booming, and U.S. cor 
panies are making a strong and grow 
contribution in China. Thousands of (' 
nese and American students and pro 
fessors are involved in educational 
e.xchanges with some of the finest ins 
tutes and universities in both our cou 
tries. American tourists are visiting 
China by the hundreds of thousands. 



rtonartmont <->f Qtato Ri illotin/Mau 1l 



ui 



I Hi 

til- 

tl.lV 

lltii 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




1 perhaps most importantly, our two 
ernments maintain a serious and co- 
ative dialogue on a wide range of bi- 
ral and international issues, finding 
we have many interests in common. 
To improve relations further and 
;e them more solid, I think we should 
d on what we have already accom- 
hed. We need to keep up the dialogue 
\veen our two governments on politi- 
ssues of mutual concern: global 
e. regional conflicts in Asia and 
where, arms control, how to combat 
scourges of terrorism and drugs, and 
multiple threats to the global envi- 
nent. We see eye-to-eye on many of 
e. We also need to encourage more 
)le-to-peoi)le contacts, which have 
vn so dramatically in the last de- 
. These promote understanding and 
t. 

We should also seek to expand our 
lomic relationship. The opportunities 
rade and investment between our 
litries are enormous. We have to find 
B of taking advantage of them. To do 
will require efforts on both sides, 
tinned steps by China to make its 
e practices compatible with those of 
•lajor trading partners and remove 
•iers to trade and investment are im- 
ant if China is to expand commerce 
attract capital for its modernization, 
e.xample, improvements in intellec- 
property protection, a less regu- 
1 trading system, and more effective 
B protections for investors could have 
ry favorable effect. The United 
es, for its part, must keep its mar- 
open to Chinese exports and con- 
e to give China access to advanced 
nology needed for modernization. 
Science and technology cooperation 
lid also expand. We have developed a 
(ue relationship in this field. Cooper- 
ri involves some of our best scientists 
most advanced technical facilities 
ecners a wide range of important en- 
ors in such fields as fusion enei'gy, 
ic health, and the environment. Both 
itries have a lot to gain from these 
: activities. 



Cultural and educational exchanges 
in other fields should grow as well. A 
good example of successful bilateral co- 
operation in education is the Manage- 
ment Training Center at Dalian. Since 
the U.S. and Chinese Governments es- 
tablished the center in 1980, with the 
help of U.S. corporations and univer- 
sities, it has produced over 2,300 gradu- 
ates trained in modern business and 
management practices. The Dalian cen- 
ter has become a model for other man- 
agement centers in China. It can also 
serve as a model for bilateral cooperation 
in other fields. 

In addition to the positive develop- 
ments in our ])olitical and economic rela- 
tions, I think it is especially noteworthy 
that friendly cooperation is also taking 
place between our defense forces. We 
are looking forward to continuing and 
expanding these activities in the future. 

The United States recognizes that 
Taiwan is an important issue for the Chi- 
nese Government and people. We are 
pleased to see that the growing oppor- 
tunities for trade and travel between 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait have con- 
tributed to a climate of relaxed tensions 
and hope these trends will continue. The 
United States is committed to abide by 
the three communiques of 1972, 1979, 
and 1982, which provide a firm basis for 
the further development of our relations. 

One final point on building relations 
for the future: When differences arise 
between us, as they inevitably will, we 
need to continue to approach them in a 
constructive spirit. If we do, I think we 
will build a strong foundation for bilat- 
eral ties and see expanding cooperation 
in new fields that will benefit both our 
peoples. 



SEOUL 



Remarks Following 

Meeting With 

President Roh, 
Feb. 27, 19897 

President Roh and I had very useful, 
wide-ranging discussions. We reviewed 
the political situation in this part of the 
world. I told him about my China visit, 
and we had a chance to review our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union as well. We 
are both pleased by trends toward re- 
laxations of tension in this part of the 
world. President Roh's vordpolitik — 
reaching out to China, the Soviets, and 
Eastern Eurojje — and his initiatives 
toward North Korea contributed impor- 
tantly to these trends. 

The United States fully supports 
Korea's creative diplomacy. Despite 
such positive policies, some hard real- 
ities remain. Among these is that Nor- 
th Korea maintains the world's fifth 
largest military force, a force deployed 
just 25 miles north of here. The United 
States remains committed to the secu- 
rity and freedom of the Rejniblic of Ko- 
rea. And I had an opportunity to make 
that point very clearly to President 
Roh. Perhaps some of the confidence- 
building measures that we've pro- 
posed, measures that have worked well 
in Europe, will also be applied to the 
Korean Peninsula. 

Besides the diplomatic and secu- 
rity issues, we discussed ways to 
strengthen the free world economic 
system. We had a frank discussion of 
economic problems — Korea being a 
very important trading partner with 
the United States. Korea has benefited 
from U.S. open markets, and I think 
we both agree we need to move as 
quickly as possible to fully open mar- 
kets. We must expect fair access to the 
markets here. And I believe that Presi- 
dent Roh understands that. 

But all in all. the trip has 
been too short. The hospitality has 
been wonderful. And inasmuch as I do 
not want to make the [National] Assem- 
blv mad — the elected leaders in the 



17 




The President of the Republic ot Koria, Koh Tae Woo, and his wife. Kim Ok Sook, 
with President and Mrs. Bush at the Blue House, the official residence of Korea's 
President. 



met 



various parties that represent Korea's 
democracy — we should go. 

Thanlc you, Mr President, very 
much for an unfoi'gettable visit. 



Address Before 

the National Assembly, 
Feb. 27, 19895 



I stand in your assembly as Presidents 
Eisenhower, .Johnson, and Reagan have 
stood before me, and I reaffirm, as 
they did, America's support, friend- 
ship, and respect for the Republic of 
Korea and its people. As a former mem- 
ber of a body like this — of the House of 
Representatives of the United States — 
I take particular pleasure in coming 
back to this legislative chamber where 
the freely elected representatives of 
Korea's own democratic success story 
meet to debate and implement the will 
of the Korean people. I know there 
must be times when this body — just 



like the U.S. Congress — is full of noise 
and contention and emotion. But that is 
the sound of democracy at work, and we 
wouldn't have it any other way. As the 
great statesman Winston Churchill 
once said. "Democracy is the worst 
form of government, e.xcept for all 
others." 

This is my first major address on 
foreign soil since becoming the 41st 
President of the United States of 
America. And my visit here today re- 
flects the importance that I place on 
the relations between our two coun- 
tries, the strength of our nations' ties, 
and the promise that our relationship 
holds for the future of the world. 

My inauguration as President a 
month ago represented a tradition in 
the United States that speaks of both 
continuity and change. Continuity and 
change will also be the guideposts of 
relations between the United States 
and Korea in the years ahead. Where 
change is needed or inevitable, let us 
be a positive force for change. Where 
continuity is our mandate, let us go for- 



ward resolute in our commitment to 
freedom and democracy. Throughou' 
let our close economic and strategic 
relationship remain as it is — a pillar 
of peace in East Asia. 

I first came to the Asian Pacific 
region during World War II, more 
than 45 years ago. I was a teenager- 
19 years old. I was flying torpedo 
bombers in the U.S. Navy. And it w 
then, for the first time in my life, tl 
I truly appreciated the value of free 
I dom and the price that we pay to kei 
"i it. Believe me, I have never forgotte 
= In the early years following Wo 

I War II, the future of Korea, and of; 
£ Asia, was very much in doubt. It wa 
i time of great struggle between Kon 
^ hope for freedom, Korea's hope for 
5 prosperity, and the twin menaces of 
^ war and invasion. On a .June mornin 
% 1950, the communist army of the Nc 
? smashed into the Republic of Korea, 
tent on destroying your nation. And 
without hesitation or delay, Americ; 
and UN forces rushed to your aid, a 
together Americans and Koreans 
fought side by side for your right to 
termine your own future. 

And I do remember the devasta 
of your country. Your cities lay in n 
ble. Your factories were in shamblee 
Millions of your people w'andered tl 
streets homeless and hungry. And i 
1951, in the midst of the war, Gen. 
Douglas MacArthur addressed a joi 
session of our Congress; he spoke o: 
Korea, saying — here's his quote — "1 
magnificence of the courage and for 
tude of the Korean people defies de- 
scription." And as he spoke those 
words, our Congress interrupted h 
with applause — sustained applause- 
you and your people. And after the 
war, you overcame every imaginabl 
hardship. 

History will long record your s' 
ry; how in less than a generation 
you stepped into the light of liberty 
and economic opportunity. You can 
be proud of the miracle that you've 
achieved, and we are proud to be 
associated with you. 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




•ea: A Rising Nation 

ay, Korea is a rising nation; a vi- 
nt, dynamic nation; a nation riding- 
crest of the wave of tlie future, 
never before has the pride and the 
2:ress of your nation been more evi- 
t than last summer, when this mag- 
cent city played host to the 24th 
mpic Games. Nearly 10,000 athletes 
n KiO nations were here. Another 3 
on people watched on television. 

I what they saw, from the moment 

II Ki Keung carried the torch into 

• Olympic stadium until the last em- 
; of the Olympic flames were extin- 
;hed at the closing ceremonies, was 
iicredibly spectacular sports festi- 
You played host to the world, and 
t a truly gracious host you were. 
2;ratulations. 

The past several years have 
essed the emergence of the 
re Asian Pacific region. My trip — 
nning in Jaj^an, stopping in China, 
concluding here in Korea — stands 
'stimony to the reality and what it 
ns to the future of the world. Today 
is one of the most dynamic areas 
arth economically, politically, and 
imatically. And the Republic of Ko- 
;tands at the fore. You're a world- 
; economic power. Your commit- 
: to democracy is demonstrated 
' right here in this chamber. And 
■bold diplomacy, your iiordpolitik 
cy of relaxing tensions toward Nor- 
orea, China, the Soviet Union, and 
ern Europe] is reshaping relations 
id beyond the Asian Pacific region. 

itaining Freedom and Democracy 

y meetings with Prime Minister 
•shita of Japan, China's Deng 
ping and the three other top lead- 
and with you and your leaders, I've 
issed challenging bilateral global 
regional issues, and our discus- 
^ have been marked at all times by 
rit of friendship and cooperation, 
come here today as the leader of a 
ful friend and a dependable ally. 
I'm here todav to ensure that we 




President Bush addressed the National Assembly during his visit to South Korea. 
Behind the President is Kim .Jai Son, the spealxer of the assembly. 



work together in all things. Our most 
important mission together is to main- 
tain the freedom and democracy that 
you fought so hard to win. As Presi- 
dent, I am committed to maintaining 
American forces in Korea, and I am 
committed to support our mutual de- 
fense treaty. 

There are no plans to reduce U.S. 
forces in Korea. Our soldiers and air- 
men are here at the request of the Re- 
public of Korea to deter aggression 
from the North, and their presence 
contributes to the peace and stability 
of Northeast Asia. They will remain in 
the Republic of Korea as long as they 
are needed and as long as we believe it 
is in the interest of peace to keep them 
there. 



In the years ahead, we must work 
together as equal partners to meet the 
evolving security needs of the Korean 
Peninsula. Peace through strength is a 
policy that has served the security in- 
terests of our two nations well, and we 
must complement deterrence with an 
active diplomacy in search of dialogue 
with our adversaries, including North 
Korea. The American people share 
your goal of peaceful unification on 
terms acceptable to the Korean people. 
It is for that reason that we actively 
support the peaceful initiatives of 
President Roh — to build bridges to the 
north — and I will work closely with the 
President to coordinate our efforts 
to draw the North toward practical, 
peaceful, and productive dialogue to 
ensure that our policies are comple- 
mentary and mutually reinforcing. 



irtmont nt QtotA Ri illAtin/ftyioif 1 QQQ 




I have spoken of the need for vig- 
ilance, strength, and diplomacy to de- 
ter aggression and preserve peace. 
There is another source of strength, 
and it is well represented in this as- 
sembly. The development of democratic 
political institutions is the surest 
means to build the national consensus 
that is the foundation of true security; 
just as we must work together to 
achieve better security within a demo- 
cratic framework, we must also work 
together to achieve greater economic 
prosperity within the system of free 
and open international trade. 

Progress of the Korean Economy 

The progress of the Korean economy is 
an inspiration for developing countries 
throughout the world. By unleashing 
the energies and creativity of your tal- 
ented people, you've led Korea into an 
era of unprecedented opportunity and 
prosperity. Korea has become an indus- 
trial power, a major trading power, and 
a first-class competitor. You're fulfill- 
ing the prophecy of the Indian poet 
[Rabindranath] Tagore who wrote, 
"Korea, once a bright light of the 
golden age of Asia, if it is relit it will 
be the light of the East." Korea has 
achieved great prosperity through par- 
ticipation in the international trading 
system. It has made the nations of free 
Asia the envy of the world, and all Ko- 
reans can take pride in what you as a 
people have achieved. 

And yet, we also cannot overlook 
that your economic success has created 
concern in the management of our bi- 
lateral economic relations. For the 
American people, and for the Korean 
people as well, reducing our bilateral 
trade imbalance will be both a chal- 
lenge and an opportunity. The chal- 
lenge will be to resist the calls for 
protectionism. The opportunity will be 
to expand the prosperity of both our 
countries. And we both — you and I — 
have a lot at stake. You are our seventh 



largest trading partner — larger than 
many of our traditional European 
partners — and our trade is growing. 
The United States is both Korea's larg- 
est market and second largest source of 
import. And we're also a leading source 
of the investment and technology that 
you will need to fuel further economic 
growth and development. 

Korea's economy has benefited 
greatly from the free flow of trade. 
And yet today, in many countries, 
there is a call for greater protection- 
ism. And I'm asking you to join the 
United States in rejecting these short- 
sighted pleas. Protectionism is fool's 
gold. Protectionism may seem to be the 
easy way out, but it is really the quick- 
est way down. And nothing will stop 
the engine of Korea's economic growth 
faster than new barriers to interna- 
tional trade. 

We've made progress in this area. 
American e.xports to Korea are up. Ko- 
rean tariffs are down, and its nontariff 
barriers are down, too. And the service 
sector is opening. But let me be candid, 
and I want you to have this direct from 
me: if we are to keep our bilateral rela- 
tionship growing even stronger, much 
more needs to be done. And I am confi- 
dent that our two nations, working to- 
gether, can accomplish the tasks still 
before us. 

As one of the world's major trading 
powers, the Republic of Korea sets 
an e.xample for other nations which are 
watching what you do. As an emerging 
economic leader, you inevitably shoul- 
der important responsibilities to 
ensure the continued strength and sta- 
bility of the global marketplace. You, 
the representatives of the Korean peo- 
ple, will face the challenge to improve 
living standards, to continue to open 
domestic markets, and to adopt appro- 
priate international financial and ex- 
change rate policies that reflect your 
standing as a prosperous and powerful 
trading nation. 



The United States shares simils 
responsibilities for the well-being of 
the world economy. Our two peoples 
should, at all times, bear in mind th: 
our trading system is truly an interi 
tional joint venture, and that we sha 
a special responsibility for its contin 
ued success. 

Renewing the U.S. Commitment 
to Peace 

My friends — and we are truly frienc 
I began today by talking about my ii 
guration as the new President of the 
United States of America, just a few 
short weeks ago. The tradition of pa 
ing the torch of leadei'ship from one 
American president to another is a 
time when we celebrate the strength 
of our democracy and a time when w 
renew our commitment to the values 
on which it is built. 

Today, I am renewing my comm 
ment to you as the leader of one sove 
eign state to the elected legislative 
body of another I am renewing my 
commitment to you to work togethe 
for the good of our peoples and of all 
humanity. And as I reflect over the 1 
40 years of Asian history, the trend 
remarkably positive. At the end oft 
Second World War, Asia lay in ruins 
Through the 19.50s and the 1960s, the 
forces of radical revolution at times 
peared to be the wave of the future. 
And now, in the 1980s, human aspire 
tions for basic political and economii 
freedoms have become almost univei 
sal. And as we gather here in your > 
tional Assembly, these aspirations a 
no longer a far off dream for your gi 
country — for Korea. Instead, throug 
your devotion and hard work, they ha^ 
become a reality. And we celebrate 
your triumph. In the years ahead, th 
United States will stand with you, i 
we'll stand with you against the fon 
of oppression and for the forces of 
peace, prosperity, independence, 
and democracy. 



rkonartmont nf Qtato Rllllfitin/Mau 1 



FEATURE 
Visit to Asia 




sponses to Questions 
Submitted by the 
Yonhap News Agency 
3f South Korea, 
=b. 16, 19896 

, Would you tell me your views on 
Mth Korean efforts to increase eco- 
inic cooperation and political rela- 
^ns with socialist countries? 

A. I support these efforts. Presi- 
it Roh's opening to the Soviet Union, 
^tern Eui-ope, and China is aimed at 
ering world peace and understand- 
. Today almost every country I'ecog- 
?s South Koreas great economic 
lortance. I am sure more countries in 
e will move from economic ties to full 
tical and diplomatic ties with the Re- 
lic of Korea. 

Q. In his address before the UN 
neral Assembly in October last 
T. President Roh proposed a six- 
ty conference, calling for South 
\ North Korea, the United States, 
an, China, and the Soviet Union to 
-'uss a peaceful reunification of 

divided Korean Peninsula. What 
he U.S. position on the proposal? 

A. President Roh's six-party confer- 
3 idea is an imaginative forward- 
ing proposal. It is another example 
le Republic of Korea Government's 

approach of reconciliation and ac- 
modation in dealing with jieninsular 
tical and security problems. Obvi- 
y such a conference would require 
'ful preparation and a cooperative at- 
de by all participants. 

Q. While seeking improved rela- 
is w ith China and the Soviet 
on, the South Korean Government 

asked the United States to open 
doors to the isolationist North Ko- 
, hoping that exchanges between 
>hinglon and Pyongyang will con- 
lute to reduction of tension on the 
ean Peninsula. Have you seen any 
its of progress in U.S. efforts to 
3 North Korea to get rid of its iso- 
onist policy? 



A. We have long supported North- 
South dialogue as the key to peace and 
reunification of the peninsula. President 
Roh's initiatives to that purpose in July 
1988 and in his October speech at the 
United Nations were most welcome. In 
the spirit of these measures, the United 
States announced last October 31 some 
new- steps to encourage private aca- 
demic, cultural, and other nongovern- 
mental exchanges with North Korea. We 
also authorized the export of human- 
itarian goods to North Korea and again 
authorized substantive exchanges bet- 
ween our diplomats in neutral settings. 
Since then the United States and North 
Korea have had substantive contacts in 
Beijing on December 6 and -January 24. 
There has been greater academic ex- 
change between the United States and 
North Korea as well. Several American 
universities plan to host North Korean 
scholars this year. I do not know how far 
these academic and diplomatic contacts 
will go, but they are useful first steps. 

Q. Radical Korean students with 
anti-American sentiment are demand- 
ing the w ithdrawal of U.S. troops 
from South Korea. At the same time, 
I know that there are some American 
experts on Northeast Asian affairs 
who speak of a symbolic or gradual 
reduction of the troops. Do you envi- 
sion any possibility of the troop with- 
drawal in the near future in light of 
the security situation on the Korean 
Peninsula? 

A. There are no plans to reduce 
U.S. forces in Korea. Our soldiers, sail- 
ors, airmen, and marines are there at 
the request of the Republic of Korea to 
deter aggression from the North, and 
their presence contributes to the peace 
and stability of Northeast Asia. They 
will remain in the Republic of Koi-ea as 
long as the Government and the people of 
South Korea want us to remain and as 
long as we believe it is in the interest of 
peace to keep them there. Our two gov- 
ernments periodically review the appro- 
priate strength and composition of U.S. 
forces stationed in Korea under our mu- 
tual defense treaty obligations. 



Q. The United States has contin- 
ued to ask South Korea to open its 
markets fully for more U.S. exports. 
The Korean people have an under- 
standing of U.S. efforts to reduce its 
large trade deficits, but they think 
that current U.S. pressure is exces- 
sive. I would like to hear your views 
on trade friction existing between the 
two countries. 

A. Korea has enjoyed very open ac- 
cess to the American market, especially 
in cars, consumer electronics, and ma- 
chinery. This has been crucial to Korea's 
achievement of the world's highest eco- 
nomic growth rate during the last 3 
years. We seek access to all world mar- 
kets. A free market enhances a coun- 
try's standard of living. Consumers 
benefit from lower prices and a wider va- 
riety of goods and services. The United 
States and Korea have prospered to- 
gether on the strength of a free world 
trading system. I believe it is in Korea's 
self-intere.st to w^ork to preserve this 
system. Therefore, I do not see U.S. 
market-opening efforts in Korea or else- 
where as excessive. 

Q. Your visit to Beijing will be 
followed by the visit by Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev, which is expected 
in April or May for the first Sino- 
Soviet summit talks in three decades. 
Do you have any special reasons for 
your decision to go to China after at- 
tending the funeral of the late Japa- 
nese Emperor? Do your discussions 
with Chinese leaders include the 
problem of the Korean Peninsula? 

A. Having represented my country 
in China, I have fond memories and close 
ties there. Barbara and I are looking for- 
ward in a very personal way to going 
back to Beijing. We also have important 
matters to discuss with the Chinese lead- 
ers. I am sure our talks will touch on is- 
sues affecting the Korean Peninsula. 



hartment of State Bulletin/Mav 1989 




ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE 



Arrival Remarks, 
Feb. 27, 19895 

Let me just say that it's great to be 
back home again at the conclusion of a 
productive and rewarding trip to Ja- 
pan, China, and Korea, a trip which un- 
derscored that America is and will 
remain a Pacific power. 

There were imjjortant symbols. I'll 
never forget that solemn moment when 
we paid our nation's respect to the late 
Emperor of Japan; the warm and genu- 
ine handshakes between old friends in 
Beijing's Great Hall of the People; and 
the opportunity for the freely elected 
leader of a 200-year-old nation to ad- 
dress the freely elected legislature of a 
blossoming democracy, Korea. 

But we laid out an important sub- 
stantive course: thoughtful and candid 
conversations with world leaders, over 
20 of them, leaders from Asia — China, 
Japan, Korea, Thailand, Singapore, In- 
dia, Pakistan, and the Philippines — and 
our allies from Europe — France, Bel- 
gium, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Ger- 
many, and Spain — and leaders from 
the Middle East— Egypt, Israel, and 
Jordan — and the Presidents of Brazil, 
Nigeria, and Zaire. 

I return tonight pleased with the 
progress made toward lasting and mu- 
tually beneficial relationships with our 
allies and friends. Of course, differ- 
ences remain. Work is yet to be done; 
opening foreign markets to U.S. com- 
petition, continuing to encourage the 
growth of democracy and human 
rights, and strengthening of our alli- 
ances. But common ground was found. 

In Japan we have our most impor- 
tant Asian ally and one of our largest 
trading partners. Our discussions 
there emphasized the responsibilities 
we share in the field of defense. But we 



also spoke of ways in which the world's 
strongest and most innovative econ- 
omies can cooperate more closely to 
fuel growth not only at home but also in 
the developing world. 

In China I talked with the leaders 
that I'd known nearly 1-5 years ago, 
when I served as Chief of the U.S. Liai- 
son Office. It is clear from my trip that 
China approaches its thaw with the So- 
viets with caution and realism. We 
agreed that the Soviets must be judged 
not by their rhetoric but by their ac- 
tions, such as whether the Soviet Union 
actually draws down its military forces 
along China's border and persists in en- 
coui-aging Vietnam to completely with- 
draw from Cambodia. We also agreed 
that after Cambodia has achieved a 
genuine end to Vietnam's occupation, 
free elections should be held under a 
coalition government led by Prince 
Sihanouk, with whom I met in Beijing. 
The United States remains committed 
to a result that precludes a return to 
power by the Khmer Rouge. The Chi- 
nese leaders appreciate our concern 
and are willing to work toward a peace- 
ful coalition. 

On the final leg of my journey, I 
went to Korea, where I saw both de- 
mocracy and economic liberty work in a 
country whose security is assured by 
our joint efforts in vigilance. Thirty 
years ago, such progress was unim- 
aginable, and it stands as a testament 
to the Korean people and our commit- 
ment to them. 

From these 4 days of intensive dis- 
cussions, I return with one especially 
vivid impression: The world looks to 
America for leadership not just because 
we're militarily strong, not just be- 
cause we have the world's largest econ- 
omy, but because the ideas we have 
championed are now dominant. Free- 
dom and democracy, openness, and the 
prosperity that derives from individual 
initiatives in the free marketplace — 
these ideas once thought to be strictly 
American — have now become the goals 
of mankind all over Asia. 



The success of our nation's foreig 
policy is the responsibility of the Pre; 
dent, with the counsel and support of 
the Congress. This important trip hi 
only underscored for me what can be 
achieved through a strong and bipart 
san working relationship between th( 
White House and Congress. I'm anx- 
ious to sit down with congressional 
leadership to brief them on details of 
these critical visits, and together we 
must ensure that this initial success 
only a first step down a long path of 
peace and understanding with our 
friends and allies. If common grounc 
can be found halfway around the wor 
in the shadow of Mt. Fuji, the histori 
Great Hall of the People, or the gard' 
of Korea's Blue House, surely it can ) 
found at home among men and wome 
of common purpose. We must respec 
each other and join together as one i 
pursuing a foreign policy that ensuri 
the security of our country, its econoi 
opportunity, and freedom and indivic 
ual rights around the world. 



'Press release 33. 

-Held at the U.S. Ambassador's resi- 
dence (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Document.s of Mar. 6, 1989). 

'•Released by the White House on 
Feb. 22 (text from Weekly Compilation o 
Presidential Documents of Mar. G). 

'Interview was conducted by Leslie 
Stahl (press release 34 of Feb. 27). 

"Text from Weekly Compilation of Pi 
dential Documents of Mar. 6. 

'■Released by the White House on 
Feb. 2.5 (text from Weekly Compilation o 
Presidential Documents of Mar. G). 

'Held at the Blue House, the official 
idence of the President of Korea (text fr( 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Doeu 
ments of Mar. 6). ■ 



»l 



npnnrtmpnt nf ^itatp Biill(^tin/Mav 1 



HE SECRETARY 



ecretary's Interview 

m "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" 



Secretari/ Baker was interviewed 
u the "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" on 
\arch 2i, 1989.'^ 

First, let's go through some of the 
tails to make sure we understand 
]he aid to the contras]: the continua- 
lon of non-lethal aid, $4.5 million a 
lonth until February 1990. Define 
'ion-lethal." 

A. It's basically aid that just sup- 
prts the existence of the resistance. It's 
othing; it's food; it's humanitarian as- 
itance. It's not — 

Q. No guns? No ammunition? 

A. No guns. No ammunition. In 
:t, I think it probably means no parts 
' vehicles. Don't hold me to that, be- 
use that's been the subject of a lot of 
ibate up there in the past. But ba- 
ally it's just humanitai'ian assistance, 

n-lethal, non-militarv. 

■ 

Q. And the purpose of it is to do 
iiat for the contras'! Keep them alive 
r 10 months? 

A. The purpose of it is to — yes, 
;re's a moral obligation here, certainly 
the part of the United States. The 
rpose is to, at the very least, keep 
;m alive for this period. 

There is a provision in here as well, 
course, that the assistance can be 
3d for voluntary reintegration or vol- 
tary regional relocation of the resis- 
ice should they choose to go back to 
caragua, participate in the elections 
?re; should they choose to relocate to 
Tie other country in the region. But it 
1 only be used if it's voluntary on their 
rt and if there is progress being made 
vard democratization in Nicaragua. 

Q. Who makes the decisions on a 
)nthly basis, though, as to whether 
not this money is being used prop- 
y and what applies — I mean, 
lether this kind of an expenditure 
proper, that kind of expenditure is 
t? 

A. We will have to do that. Aetu- 
y, it will be the Agency for Interna- 
nal Development (AID) probably, 
lich is the agency which has been ad- 
nistering humanitarian assistance to 
> resistance for (|uite some time. And 
A'ill have to administer it in keeping 
th the bi])artisan accord, which, of 
arse, will be the basis for legislation 
it will be passed by the Congress to 
thorize and appropriate the money. 



Q. In an ideal world — and I'm not 
suggesting for one minute that we're 
in it — but in an ideal world, what 
would happen to the contras at the 
end of this 10 months? Where would 
they be, and what would they be 
doing? 

A. If the ideal world were full dem- 
ocratization in Nicaragua, full compli- 
ance by the Sandinista government with 
the promises that they gave in the Esq- 
uipulas agreement and in other agree- 
ments, what they would be doing is 
being reintegrated into Nicaraguan 
society, reintegrated into a safe, demo- 
cratic society. That would be ideal, if you 
have performance by the Nicaraguan 
Government. 

If you don't have performance by the 
Nicaraguan Government, the resistance 
would then, in that event, likely be in 
place right where it is now, sustained 
through this humanitarian assistance. 

Q. And you'd be back for another 
10 months or a year for the same kind 
of thing? 

A. Then you'd be back with a reex- 
amination of the policy, at least with re- 
spect to what the policy of the United 
States would be. 

Q. This agreement is based on 
the premise, I would assume, that the 
contras are not going to continue the 
war. Is that right? 

A. The agreement is based on the 
premise that there is going to be an 
effort on the part of everyone in the 
region — the United States, perhaps 
other countries, hopefully countries in 
Europe, maybe in Mexico, Venezuela, 
Canada — to support a major diplomatic 
effort to get democratization going in 
Nicaragua. 

So it doesn't contemplate hostilities; 
in fact, it goes in the other direction. We 
are going to continue the policy of not 
making assistance available for offensive 
military action. We're going to continue 
the present policy, as well, of making 
sure that we're not supporting people 
who are engaged in human rights 
violations. 

Q. Was that part of the deal 
here? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you tell the contras be- 
forehand, "If we continue to give you 
$4. .5 million a month in non-lethal 



aid, you have got to stop the military 
part.?" 

A. No. We didn't tell the contras 
beforehand in connection with this 
agreement. That has basically been U.S. 
policy since the Congress refused in 
February of 1988, I think it was, to vote 
any further military assistance. So we 
are going to continue that, and we're 
going to represent that to the Congress, 
have an undertaking that we will not 
make it available to anybody who is en- 
gaged in offensive military action. 
They're entitled to defend themselves if 
they're attacked. 

Q. Let's talk about the Sandi- 
nistas. First of all, was this deal, ei- 
ther directly or indirectly, run by the 
Sandinista government — today's deal? 

A. "Run by the Sandinista" — 

Q. The Sandinista government. 

A. Oh, you mean, was it run by 
them for approval? No. 

Q. Not necessarily for approval 
but just to inform them that before 
the President announced today — 

A. Not by the executive branch. I 
can't tell you what people in the legisla- 
tive branch may or may not have done as 
far as the Sandinistas are concerned. 
They have more contacts with the San- 
dinistas than we do. 

Q. Okay. So there are no quiet 
understandings with the Sandinista 
government in any way tied to this 
agreement? 

A. None. 

Q. As you know, the Nicaraguan 
Foreign Minister, on behalf of the 
Sandinista government, issued a 
statement awhile ago condemning to- 
day's agreement, saying it was con- 
fusing and unclear and that it goes 
against the regional peace pact by the 
Central American Presidents. 

A. We don't think it does go against 
the regional peace pact. We think it's 
consistent with it. We did di.scuss this 
agreement in some detail with the Presi- 
dents of the four Central American de- 
mocracies. We think they support this 
agreement. We think they will support 
it. We think the agreement will enable 
us to work with them to, frankly, keep 
pressure on the Sandinistas to move to- 
ward democratization. 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



The reason the Sandinistas don't 
like this agreement is because it will en- 
able us to give them some incentive to 
keep their promises, to give the people 
of Nicaragua democracy. 

Q. So you're not upset about their 
reaction to this? 

A. No, not at all. I'm not the least 
bit surprised either. 

Q. You're not surprised at all? 

A. No — 

Q. Doesn't it take two to make 
peace? 

A. — that the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment would not be — no. I'm not; I'm not 
surprised at that. 

Q. Was this idea discussed with 
the Soviet Union before? 

A. No, not this idea, although in my 
discussions with [Foreign] Minister 
Shevardnadze in Vienna several weeks 
ago, I raised with him the fact that the 
Soviet Union was continuing to funnel 
some $1 billion a year into Nicaragua 
and that the United States didn't look 
too favorably upon that. 

Q. To which he replied? 

A. To which he replied with their 
public position, which is, "If you stop 
giving any assistance to any countries in 
Central America, we will stop giving as- 
sistance to Nicaragua." To which we rep- 
lied, as we always have, "That is an 
absolute non-starter." 

This agreement, if I may say so, will 
give us a much stronger hand and a bet- 
ter position from which to negotiate with 
the Soviet Union on this issue. 

Q. In what way? 

A. We will now have a unified policy 

position, as far as the United States is 
concerned. We will not have the legisla- 
tive branch going one way and the e.xecu- 
tive branch going another. We will have a 
truly bipartisan foreign policy; and when 
we speak, the Soviets will know we are 
speaking for the United States. 

Q. You mean they can't go 
around you right to the Speaker of the 
House or others? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. Do you think that will also 
help you in dealing, eventually, with 
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua? 

A. I would hope it will help us to en- 
courage the Sandinista government, 
once again, to simply perform on the 
promises that they've made so often over 
a period of 10 years. I think it will help 
us with the Central American de- 
mocracies. I think it will help us encour- 
age countries in Europe and countries in 
this hemisphere to support this effort to 
get to peace and democracy through a 



24 



diplomatic approach, because we are put- 
ting the military approach on hold for a 
period of time. 

Q. How did this deal come about? 
Who talked to whom? 

A. As you know, there was senti- 
ment, I think, in both parties — the Dem- 
ocratic congressional leadership and the 
Republican executive branch leadership 
following the election — to see if we could 
get back to bipartisanship in foreign 
policy. 

The United States succeeds many 
times in foreign policy where we are uni- 
fied. When we're not unified, normally 
we've failed. Our Central American poli- 
cy has been a failure. Without trying to 
pin the blame, it's been a failure because 
we haven't been unified. You can't oper- 
ate that way. It just doesn't work. 

Ronald Reagan was fond of sajang — 
President Reagan used to say partisan- 
ship ought to stop at the waters edge. It 
really should if you're going to be suc- 
cessful. So I think there was a genuine 
desire on the part of both the Demo- 
cratic leadership in the Congress and 
the President to try very hard to get 
back to bipartisanship in this most 
thorny of foreign policy issues. 

Q. To be very specific about it, 
did President Bush say to you, 
"Friend, go make a deal on Central 
America; let's get this thing behind 
us."? 

A. No, not that way. But we did talk 
about the importance of trjdng to bridge 
the gap with respect to Central Amer- 
ica. There were two areas, frankly, 
where we had not been unified in our 
foreign policy in the last 6-8, 10 years. 
One is Central America and the other is 
South Africa. In both respects, we've 
had trouble being successful. We just 
haven't been successful, because we 
haven't been unified. We'd like to find a 
way to get back to bipartisanship in both 
of those areas. 

South Africa is extraordinarily dif- 
ficult, because it has a high domestic po- 
litical content in the United States. But 
I did talk to the President shortly after 
the election about those two problem 
areas. He did say, "You know, if we can 
do it, fine, but we've got to maintain our 
principles." He said, "I do not want to 
and I will not abandon the resistance. 
We have an obligation to these people." 

Q. You are, of course, well known 
as a man who has made many suc- 
cessful deals in your career. On your 
scale, your own scale, was this a hard 
deal to make or was it easy? 

A. It was a hard deal to make. We 
put in a lot of hours, all of us; but then 
there were a lot of people and it was not 



ju.st the leadership. You're going to ha\ 
a couple of people on the program in ju 
a minute who were very instrumental 
making this thing fly. 

Q. Congressman Bonior and Co 
gressman Edwards from the two op- 
posite poles. 

A. Two opposite poles on this issu 
and they came together. Without those 
two, we couldn't have had the support 
that we're going to have for this policy 
the House. The same thing happened 
over on the Senate side. We had Senato 
John McCain of the Republicans; Senat 
Connie Mack, a freshman Senator who 
worked hard on this; and Senator Chri: 
Dodd, again on the other pole; and thej 
came together. 

Q. What was it? Was it just a 
kind of mutual weariness with this i 
sue that everybody kind of wanted t^ 
get this thing done? 

A. I think that was it. I think ever 
body wanted to get it done, and every- 
body knew how destructive it was to the 
national security interests of the Unite 
States, to the national interests of the 
United States, to continue this diver- 
gence between the legislative and execi 
five branches; totally counterproductiv 

Q. As you know, in the past the 
reason that so many Democrats wei 
not supporting the Reagan Adminis 
tration policy on contra aid, etc., ir 
Central America is because they dii 
not feel that the Administration 
really wanted peace in the area. Th 
wanted a military solution. What d 
you do to convince the Democrats 
this time that you really are suppor 
ing the peace process? 

A. What we said was basically, 
"Look, you have a new President and a 
new Secretary of State. We have the 
same goals, and we had the same goals 
the Reagan Administration as our opp 
nents on the Hill; that was democratiz; 
tion in Nicaragua and peace in the 
region. We have the same goals. Let's 
trust each other for awhile and see if v 
can achieve those goals through a dipk 
matic approach." That was basically tl 
pitch. 

The fight had gone on a long time, 
believe they were willing and I'eady to 
trust us; we were willing and ready to 
trust them; and I hope we can make it 
work. I really believe we have an excel 
lent chance of making it work. 

Q. What about the general feel 
ing also, though, that what the Rea 
gan .Administration really wanted 
was the elimination of the Sandinis 
government in Nicaragua, that it w 
seen as a threat to stability and de- 
mocracy in the region? What's the 



THE SECRETARY 



ush Administration's attitude to- 
ard Daniel Ortega and the Sandi- 
sta government? 

A. The position that we took in our 
gotiations on the Hill was that the 
)als of the Esquipulas accord were the 
)als that we should embrace: democra- 
sation in Nicaragua, non-interference 

the affairs of neighbors — for instance, 
le export of subversion into El Salvador 

Nicaragua — freedom of religion, free- 
)m of the press, that sort of thing; on 
e other hand, voluntary reintegration 
the resistance into a safe, democratic 
'Ciety. Those were the goals of Es- 
lipulas. And they are noble goals: they 
e worthy goals. If we can accomplish 
ose, that's what we would like to do. 
nd we found a majority of the Con- 
ess, on both sides, who were willing to 
nbrace those same goals. 

Q. But you can live with a leftist 
indinista government in Nicaragua, 
that right — as long as the process 
at— 

A. If there is democracy: if they 
ep the promises that they gave us in 
;quipulas, which was to move to 
mocracy — freedom of religion, free- 
m of the press, free and fair elections, 
ley've scheduled an election for Febru- 
y 1990. Let's see if they live up to their 
omises. 

If they do [and] if we really believe 
democracy, we shouldn't second-guess 
lat comes out of an election just be- 
ase we don't like the party that won. If 
; a leftist party that wins, if the win 
IS in a true, open, free, and fair demo- 
itic election, we ought to live with that 
^t like we ought to live with the winner 
t's a strong right-wing party that wins, 
has just happened in El Salvador. 

We should not be free to pick and 
oose the winners if we truly believe in 
moci'acy. 

Q. There's been a lot of talk 
out a slow start for you as Secre- 
ry of State. Do you think today's 
nouncement is going to stop a lot of 
at talk? 

A. I don't know. Maybe I would sim- 
/ say we just drifted into this thing 
cause people have been saying, "You 
ow, you're adrift." We've spent the last 
veeks almost up on the Hill working on 
is. So, I don't know. 

Q. But the very thing they crit- 
ized you for. as you know — one of 
e things — was that you were sur- 
ised in the early days of the Bush 
Iministration by the second part of 
e Central American presidents 
ing. 

A. Yes, that's correct, and — 



Q. They took the initiative. 

A. Yes, but you see that's really not 
true. We weren't surprised. The fact of 
the matter is we can't be players. We 
can't be players unless we have an agree- 
ment like this, unless the executive 
branch is given what is supposed to be 
its constitutional right and obligation, 
the right to go out and conduct our 
diplomacy and to implement our foreign 



policy without having it undercut by 
the legislative branch. We're not going 
to have that now. We're not going to 
have that through February of next 
year, so it will enable us to be players 
and to shape what happens in the re- 
gion in favor of democracy and in favor 
of peace. 



iPress release 46 of Mar. 27, 1989. I 



Secretary's Interview 

on "This Week With David Brinkley" 



Secretary Baker was interviewed 
on ABC-Ws "This Week With David 
Brinkley" on March 26, 1989, by David 
Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, ABC 
News, and George F. Will, ABC News 
analysts 

Q. As you know, there's widespread 
support for this new arrangement in 
Central America which you an- 
nounced this week, but there are a 
few criticisms. One is this; that this 
goes beyond what we call bipartisan- 
ship between the Republicans and 
Democrats, White House and the 
Congress. It goes into, to some de- 
gree, a surrender of presidential pow- 
er to Congress. What do you say 
about that? 

A. I think I would agree with 
Elliott Abrams [former Assistant Secre- 
tary for Inter-American Affairs] who 
said what this agreement really does is 
restore presidential power. If you look at 
the accord carefully, you will see that 
the leadership in the Congress acknowl- 
edges the President's primary respon- 
sibility for implementing foreign policy, 
and basically it's a restoration of presi- 
dential power and not any diminution of 
it. 

Q. As you know, C. Boyden Gray, 
the White House Counsel, is one of 
those who's made this complaint, in 
effect saying that you have negotiated 
an agreement that has diminished 
George Bush's power. 

A. I don't agree with that. There's 
no legislative veto question here, be- 
cause there's nothing that will be embod- 
ied in legislation, and that was carefully 
considered during the course of negotiat- 
ing the agreement, and — 

Q. So it's not embodied in legisla- 
tion. In effect, you're saying George 
Bush has given away, in a side letter, 
what he wouldn't do in the law, but 
the end result is the same. 



A. No. The end result simply is not 
the same. This is a voluntary agree- 
ment. You do not have the question arise 
here with respect to constitutional pow- 
ers and prerogatives, because the Con- 
gress is not imposing its will, in effect, 
through legislation upon the executive. 
Let me simply say that this matter was 
considered. There would have been other 
options. Other options would have in- 
volved taking a much shorter period of 
humanitarian assistance for the resis- 
tance which would have failed to link the 
assistance to democratization in 
Nicaragua. And that really is what we 
are all seeking here to accomplish and to 
judge. We want to see the Sandinistas, 
for a change, keep their promises. 

Q. C. Boyden Gray, a few weeks 
ago, embarrassed you publicly by 
calling attention to your bank stock. 
You sold it at that point. Now he is 
complaining that you have made a 
deal that is wrong. Is there room for 
both of you in this Administration? 

A. Nice try, Sam. 

Q. [Laughter] 

A. The fact of the matter is the 
President, the Chief of Staff , the na- 
tional security adviser to the President, 
and I all discussed this particular provi- 
sion. So good try. 

Q. Nice duck, Mr. Secretary. 

Q. So you don't care to predict 
how long C. Boyden Gray will be in 
the Administration, I take it? 

A. Good try, David. 

Q. What do you say to those who 
say the following; that the Baker so- 
lution to the Nicaraguan problem is a 
solution only if there really is no 
problem and never has been? That is, 
it's a solution if Nicaragua is not the 
Nicaragua that has been charac- 
terized by the Reagan-Bush-Baker 



;partment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



Administration as a regime bent on 
external expansion. 

A. I disagree with that, because the 
purpose here of this accord, as I just said 
a moment ago, is twofold, really. It is to 
achieve democratization in Nicaragua, 
and now everyone agrees that that is the 
central focus and purpose of our policy. 
And, secondly, to permit reintegration 
of the resistance but only under safe 
and democratic conditions. So there's a 
clearly stated policy and policy purpose 
here. 

Q. There's a clearly stated hope, 
but what is the leverage? What incen- 
tives do the Sandinistas have to nego- 
tiate now down to pluralism? 

\. There were in-depth discussions 
with the leadership about carrots and 
sticks. The fact of the matter — 

Q. Can you tell us about the 
sticks? 

A. Sure. I'll be glad to speak to 
those as well. But let me simply say that 
what you have here is the legislative 
branch saying fine, you go and you im- 
plement that policy of incentives and dis- 
incentives, and we will stay out of it. We 
will, in effect, acknowledge the execu- 
tive's obligation or responsibility to im- 
plement foreign policy. 

The sticks would involve — should 
the occasion arise, and hopefully there 
will be movement toward democratiza- 
tion in Nicaragua, and we won't have to 
use stick.s — but the sticks would involve 
tightening of economic sanctions, fur- 
ther diplomatic sanctions if that was 
necessary, and, as I said in the press 
briefing room at the White House on 
Friday, there is nothing in this agree- 
ment that would foreclose the President's 
future request for military assistance 
should things deteriorate substantially. 

Q. .\bout the Soviet Union; they 
are one regime that does have le- 
verage over the Nicaraguan regime. 
What do you expect, and what do you 
know, and how have you talked to the 
Soviet Union about how their behav- 
ior should be shaped by this new 
plan? 

A. We've discussed, generally 
speaking, with the Soviet Union — I dis- 
cussed with [Foreign] Minister Shev- 
ardnadze in my meeting with him in 
Vienna our problems with their continu- 
ing to funnel roughly $1 billion a year 
into Nicaragua. About half of that is in 
the form of military assistance. We've 
made known our problems with that. So 
far the response has been the public re- 



sponse which they give, which is that 
they'll stop doing this when the United 
States stops supporting other regimes' 
democratic institutions and governments 
in Central America. And, of course, we 
say that's a non-starter. 

One thing this agreement does, if I 
may say so, is give us, I think, a consid- 
erably stronger position to advance this 
position with the Soviet Union. 

Q. If the Latin Presidents meet- 
ing in May come up with a plan for re- 
patriation and disbandment of the 
contras that is to achieve its result 
before the 10 months are up for the 
money that you've just now won from 
Congress, will you agree, or will 
you insist, on keeping the contras to- 
gether as a possible fighting force af- 
ter November-December? 

A. Another thing this agreement 
does for us is it gives us a leg up really 
in participating and being a player in 
the discussions that will lead to that 
agreement — that is, the agreement to 
repatriate and reintegrate. And you 
were quite right in your earlier ques- 
tioning of the Nicaraguan Deputy For- 
eign Minister to the effect generally that 
it's only that they come up with a plan by 
May 15. 

So what we will do is take a look at 
that plan. We will not necessarily sign 
on automatically under any and all cir- 
cumstances. Suppose they come up with 
a plan to bring the resistance to the 
United States? We wouldn't sign onto 
that. Let me just say this one final 
thing, because this point came up a good 
bit in our discussions with the leader- 
ship. We made it quite clear that the 
United States would not sign away in ad- 
vance its right to conduct its own diplo- 
macy and its own foreign policy, and we 
would not, therefore, sign on to any 
agi'eement that others might come up 
with without our participation and 
cooperation. 

Q. In the Soviet Union today, 
there is an election. It's not the kind 
of election we are accustomed to with 
all kinds of people running for every- 
thing and having fundraisers with 
chicken and peas and so on. But it is 
an election of sorts. More than one 
candidate to be chosen in many, many 
races. What do you make of this? 

A. I make of it that things are 
changing in the Soviet Union, and 
they're changing rather dramatically. We 
make of it as well that the changes that 
are taking place are probably going to 
last, because once you give people a 
taste of the fruits of freedom, it's pretty 



hard to reverse that process. In other 
words, there's no getting the genie bail 
in the bottle. 

As I've said before, it's the hope dl 
the United States that perestroika will 
succeed, because we think that would L 
good for the Soviet Union and good for 
the world as well. We wish Mr. Gor- 
bachev success in this. We do believe, a 
the same time, that we must continue t 
be prudent and realistic in the way we 
api)roach the Soviets, because they re- 
main a heavily armed superpowei; We 
also believe that whether or not per- 
csfroiku succeeds depends on what hap 
pens in the Soviet Union and not what 
we in the West might do or not do. 

Q. Prudence and realism so far 
still includes in the .American agene 
the modernization of certain missih 
in Europe that many Europeans loo 
ing at the Soviet Union say are just i 
longer necessary. How do you resist 
this tendency to say no matter how 
armed the Soviet Union is, its inten- 
tions have so dramatically changed 
that such policies as the moderniza- 
tion of our forces in Europe are 
superfluous? 

A. The way you resist that is to 
make the point which I did during my 
trip around to NATO capitals 6 or 8 
weeks ago that clearly we all still belie 
in the doctrine of flexible response in 
our NATO strategy. We believe in for- 
ward defense. We believe, as a matter 
fact, in no third zero, and all of our 
NATO partners agree with us on that. 

So you have to sit down, and you 
have to talk these things through, and 
in fact, we do believe these doctrines 
which have formed the very basis and 
foundation of NATO, then it is importg 
that there be an up-to-date, land-base( 
missile in Europe. There's no disagree 
ment on that. What we need to do is 
come up with a formulation that recog 
nizes that, and at the same time recog 
nizes the point you just made in your 
question, and that is that there are cei 
tain political pressures on some of our 
NATO allies. 

Q. In recent weeks, you have 
made the point that some day the Is 
raelis may want to talk to — have to 
talk to— the PLO [Palestine Libera 
tion Organization], for which you 
have been severely admonished pub- 
licly by Israeli officials. Do you stil 
feel that wav? 



26 



Department of State Bulletin/May 19 . 



\FRICA 



A. Here's the way I feel. I feel that 
we're ever going to have peace in the 
idflle East, that we will have to have at 
me point dialogue between Israelis 
id Palestinians. Now then, what I've 
so said, and I do believe strongly is 
lat we should not rule out categorically, 
)Solutely, and unconditionally in ad- 
ince any dialogue that would lead to 
ace. 

Q. Including the PLO-Israeli dia- 
gue, I take it? 

A. We should not rule out uncondi- 
jnally and categorically in advance any 
alogue that would lead to peace. 

Q. I can understand your walk- 
ig on egg shells, because Israeli offi- 



cials of the present government, of 
course, are adamantly opposed to 
that, at least in public. Yet there are 
some private stories that some of 
them may be moving in that direc- 
tion. Do you think they are"? 

A. I don't want to speculate on that, 
other than to take note of what you've 
just said: that there are some stories — 
not just private but public stories — to 
that effect. But I don't want to speculate 
on that. 

Q. Would it be a good thing if it 
were happening'.' 

A. I just don't want to hypothesize 
with you about it. 



1 Press release 47 of Mar. 27, 1989. 



"luman Rights Issues in Africa 



Folloicing are statements by 
''pntij Assistant Secretarif for African 
fairs Kenneth L. Brown and Depatij 
isistant Secretary for Human Rights 
■rf Humanitarian Affairs Robert W. 
'rra)id before the Subconnnittee on 
reig)i Operations of the House 
)p)'opriations Committee on 
brnary 7 and 8, 1989.'' 



5PUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY BROWN, 
CB. 7, 1989 

im pleased to appear befoi-e this sub- 
Timittee to discuss human rights is- 
es in Africa. With your permission, 
v'ill briefly summarize the human 
■hts situation in countries of particu- 

interest. 

Nearly 12% of America's own popu- 
ion traces its roots to Africa. Thus 

have a special attachment to that 
itinent and are deeply committed to 
? advancement of human rights, eco- 
mic freedom, and the well-being of 

people. We and the peoples of Africa 
share an interest in the establish- 
•nt of pluralistic representative 
v'erinnents which are secure from 
:ernal threats and are supported by 
ix\ and competitive economies. 

Some of the news from Africa on 
man rights during the past year has 
?n encouraging; some of it, quite 
nkly, has not. On the "plus" side of 
' ledger, Botswana, Mauritius, and 
e Gambia continue to be outstanding 
[•formers. Each is a functioning mul- 
arty parliamentary democracy with 
luman rights record that compares 



favorably with many Western democ- 
racies. However, situations of civil war 
or ethnic strife in Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan have 
produced masses of refugees and large- 
scale loss of life over the past yeaj-. Due 
to its abhorrent system of apartheid, 
South Africa remains a special case. 
The human rights situation there con- 
tinued to deterioi-ate in 1988, a matter 
of grave concern to all of us. 

Let me now review the human 
rights situation in some specific 
countries. 

Burundi 

The Government of Burundi has taken a 
number of significant steps to heal that 
nation's wounds and promote national 
reconciliation in the aftermath of inter- 
ethnic violence in mid-August 1988. In 
October President Buyoya named a new 
cabinet in which 12 of 24 portfolios — 
including that of prime minister — are 
held by the majority Hutus. In addi- 
tion, he brought to approximate parity 
the number of Hutu and Tutsi gover- 
nors administering Burundi's 15 
provinces. He appointed an ethnically 
balanced Commission on National Unity 
whose mandate is to explore what must 
be done to solve the longstanding eth- 
nic divisions in Burundi society. Re- 
cently the President also pardoned and 
released from prison the six signatories 
of a protest letter written after the 
August violence. 

The most dramatic evidence of the 
impact of the Burundi Government's 
efforts to calm tensions and pi'omote 



national harmony can be seen in the 
successful voluntary repatriation to 
their homes in Burundi of more than 
•50,000 refugees who had fled to Rwanda 
as a result of the ethnic violence. The 
government cooperated closely with 
Rwanda, Zaire, and the UNHCR 
[UN High Commissioner for Refugees] 
to create a climate of security and con- 
fidence among the refugees. A key in- 
gredient in this process was the 
government's decision to grant amnesty 
to all refugees. The effort was so suc- 
cessful that virtually all of the refugees 
had returned home within 4 months 
after the violence. 

While implementation of announced 
i-eforms will be difficult, the Buyoya 
government has made a good start. We 
and other donors, all of whom have 
been encouraged by these develop- 
ments, will continue to ui-ge full com- 
pliance with government policy aimed 
at promoting national reconciliation and 
respect for human rights. Nonetheless, 
it would be unwise to overlook the basic 
fact of divisions between the Tutsi and 
Hutsu, which hold a potential for re- 
newed conflict and call for continual 
attention and effort. 

Mozambique 

The Government of Mozambique also 
took major steps in 1988 to improve hu- 
man rights in that country. Substantial 
numbers of exjn-opriated church proper- 
ties were returned, and the government 
reaffirmed, during a Papal visit in 
September, its commitment to complete 
religious freedom for the people of 
Mozambique. The military justice sys- 
tem was i-evamped to try political pris- 
oners by provincial coui-ts under normal 
judicial procedures. Heads of both the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and Amnesty Intei'na- 
tional visited Mozambique, and the 
ICRC began a program of prison visits 
and commenced relief flights into con- 
flict areas. Over 2,000 prisoners were 
granted full amnesties, and pardons 
were issued to hundreds of people who 
had been jailed under security laws. 

There has been more open debate 
at party and government meetings, and 
President Chissano has been encourag- 
ing the citizenry in open meetings to 
voice their concerns. Overall, we are 
seeing a broadening of participation 
within the established structui-es. In 
preparing for the 5th party congress 
and in drafting a new constitution, ref- 
erences to Marxism are being removed 
and replaced with statements on de- 



27 



AFRICA 



mocratization, the private market, and 
individual as well as collective interests. 

Despite these important steps, 
serious human rights problems remain 
due to drought and civil conflict which 
have caused the displacement of over 
1 million Mozambicans and the depar- 
ture of almost 1 million refugees. At- 
tacks by RENAMO [Mozambique Na- 
tional Resistance] guerrillas against de- 
fenseless civilians have been well 
documented from a number of govern- 
ment and nongovernmental sources, in- 
cluding missionaries, international 
organizations, and emergency relief 
workers. Interviews with hundreds of 
refugees and displaced Mozambicans in 
early 1988 documented a pattern of 
RENAMO atrocities that included the 
murder of an estimated 100,000 civil- 
ians, mass kidnapings, mutilation, 
rapes, robbings, and forced labor. 
There is no indication that RENAMO 
attacks on civilians have decreased. Our 
policy is to use whatever influence is 
available to us to encourage an end to 
hostilities and peaceful solutions of the 
conflict in Mozambique. Mozambicans 
themselves, however, must be the pri- 
mary architects of a peaceful future for 
their country. 

Liberia 

The human rights situation in Liberia 
has improved in some respects but not 
in others. The year 1988 saw several 
adverse developments. Liberia's system 
of authoritarian government combined 
with insecure leadership prevented fur- 
ther moves toward greater pluralism 
of the type which had occurred since 
the end of the 140-year-old Americo- 
Liberian oligarchy in 1980. 

The fact that some degree of insti- 
tutional pluralism has emerged over the 
past few years — in contrast to many 
other countries in the region — is at 
times overlooked in the close scrutiny 
that Americans accord human rights in 
Liberia. There are more press publica- 
tions, and the fourth estate has spo- 
radically grown bolder in its reporting 
and editorial content, though govern- 
ment closings of newspapers occasion- 
ally occur. Opposition political parties 
have been allowed to operate and prop- 
agate their views publicly. A growing 
number of Liberians living outside the 
country — many of whom left Liberia in 
the wake of the 1980 coup or the 1985 
coup attempt — are returning, without 
harassment by the government. The 
ruling National Democratic Party 
of Liberia (NDPL) has engaged opposi- 
tion parties in discussions on possible 
power-sharing. Within the military. 



9R 



better discipline has led to a decrease 
in incidents of harassment of civilians. 
The legislature has, at times, acted 
independently of the e.xecutive. 

Despite the positive aspects out- 
lined above, over the past year, there 
have been a number of setbacks to im- 
proved human rights observance. In the 
wake of the discovery of an alleged 
coup plot last April, the government 
responded by detaining several jour- 
nalists and by suspending two inde- 
pendent newspapers and one party 
newsletter for ai-ticles critical of the 
government. No headway has been 
made in the power-sharing talks with 
the opposition. Several of the alleged 
conspirators in a July coup plot, includ- 
ing Nicholas Podier, former vice head of 
state, died under questionable circum- 
stances. Others detained in 1988 — in- 
cluding William Kpoleh, a former 
opposition presidential candidate, and 
two American citizens — were held for 
weeks without charge and without ac- 
cess to counsel. The Americans were 
released in November 1988. Events be- 
fore and during the trial of Kpoleh and 
nine others on charges related to the 
April coup plot presented a mi.xed pic- 
ture; there were some alleged instances 
of government interference in the judi- 
cial process but other examples, such 
as the issuance of court orders in vari- 
ance of the government's wishes, dem- 
onstrated some separation of powers. 
Serious questions remain about the ad- 
ministration of justice and e.xecutive 
branch willingness to respect the inde- 
pendence of the judiciary. The NDPL- 
controUed legislature demonstrated 
greater signs of docility ois-a-vis the 
executive. The government also im- 
pinged on the right of association by 
banning all student organizations and 
continuing restrictions on worker rights 
to unionize. 

Our policy is to encourage the 
growth of democratic institutions and 
the rule of law in Liberia, a policy 
which we have clearly enunciated in our 
contacts with the government. We have 
funded e.xchanges and training on is- 
sues relating to constitutionalism and 
democracy. Our embassy has sponsored 
seminars on subjects such as the inde- 
pendent press and the separation of 
powers. We have also funded the crea- 
tion of a law library, which is designed 
to help improve the quality of judicial 
proceedings. 

Language in the fiscal year (FY) 
1988 and FY 1989 foreign assistance ap- 
propriations acts made economic sup- 
port fund (ESF) obligation contingent 
upon certification of improvements in a 
number of economic and human rights 



areas. For reasons noted above, we di' 
not consider it appropriate to certify i 
human i-ights grounds in order to re- 
lease ESF monies. Blanket withholdir 
of ESF to all sectors — including the 
nongovernmental sector — may not, 
based on evidence thus far, serve as a: 
inducement to the Government of Lib- 
eria to change its ways. Nor, of course 
is it helpful in terms of fostering pri- 
vate enterprise or meeting basic hums 
needs. We look forward to working 
with your subcommittee to fashion 
ways in which U.S. concerns can be 
articulated to the government while n 
penalizing those elements of society 
which U.S. assistance programs have 
historically, and for good reasons, bee 
designed to assist. 

Uganda 

Since coming to power 3 years ago. 
President Yoweri Museveni and his N 
tional Resistance Movement have mac 
impressive progress in promoting na- 
tional reconciliation and instilling re- 
spect for human rights in war-torn 
Uganda. Museveni has also gradually 
begun to get the economy back on its 
feet, reaching accommodation with th 
World Bank and the IMF [Internatioi 
Monetary FundJ. The remaining obsti 
cle to national unity is the ongoing in 
surgency in the north and east. 

Perhaps the most noteworthy im 
provement in the human rights situa- 
tion under President Museveni is the 
conduct of his troops. The National 
Resistance Army (NRA) is a well-dis 
plined force in comparison to previou 
Ugandan armies, although its cohesic 
has been affected by the number of f( 
mer rebels who have been integi'ated 
into the NRA after taking advantage 
Museveni's amnesty offers. Recently, 
there have been allegations that the 
NRA has committed human rights 
abuses in the north. As it has in the 
past, the government has stated that 
these charges will be investigated an( 
those responsible dealt with. Indeed, 
since coming to power, the Museveni 
government has held its troops to a 
standard of accountability previously 
unheard of in Uganda. We are con- 
cerned about these recent allegations 
and are investigating them. It is im- 
portant to remember that the NRA i 
engaged in a struggle against a 
disorganized insurgency which has bf 
extremely cruel in its treatment of th 
local population. 

We are also impressed by the 
number of newsjjapers operating in 
Kampala and by the relatively free P' 



I 

i 



AFRICA 



;ical debate which takes place in the 
ational Resistance Council. Another 
jmonstration of improved human 
ghts conditions is the fact that refu- 
se repatriation continued at an accel- 
•ated pace, so that by the end of 1988 
most all former Ugandan refugees 
,d returned home. President Museveni 
ilcomes visits by human rights orga- 
zations and, in past years, has sought 
•portunities to discuss our annual hu- 
an rights reports. A i-ecently ap- 
•inted constitutional commission is 
sked with working with the public to 
aft a new constitution. When he came 
power, President Museveni commit- 
d himself to elections within 4 years. 

There is room for impi'ovement. We 
vestigate, to the best of our ability, 

allegations of torture or other 
uses by the NRA or other govern- 
ent officials, and we are concerned by 
e number of former rebels who are 
Id in civilian prisons while undergo- 
g a political screening process. We 
e encouraged, however, by the recent 
anting of access to militarv barracks 

ICRC delegates. 
On balance, our relations with 
»anda since President Museveni took 
wer have been very good. We believe 

is doing a credible job of restoring 
ganda's shattered economic and hu- 
in infrastructure and is taking steps 

ensure that Uganda's tragic history 
mot repeated. The United States 
puld continue to help in any way 
tesible. 

1 nya 

I lations between the United States 
■c 1 Kenya have been close since 
I nya s independence 25 years ago. We 
h .e a deep and multifaceted rela- 
t iiship with this key country. Over 100 
IS. companies are active there. We 
1 .(' large economic assistance and 
i R'e Corps programs and a significant 
curce of military cooperation. Over 
t ' years, Kenya has followed a fi'ee- 
r iket approach which has made its 
einoniy the envy of many neighbors. 
I Kenya's relatively open political sys- 
I the coups and ethnic strife which 
■ |ilagued many other African coun- 
■.-- have been largely absent. 

This very positive environment 
• I rs recent infringements of human 
' ^ in Kenya both puzzling and dis- 
iig. During the past year, a 
liner of actions by the Government 
I Kenya have caught our attention. In 
-pi'ing of 1988, the secret ballot was 
led by "queueing" in parliamen- 



Namibian Independence 
and Troop Withdrawal From Angola 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 31, 1989' 

Tomorrow marks the beginning of the 
transition process toward Namibian in- 
dependence, which has been long 
awaited by the people of Africa's last 
colony. For the United States, this day 
represents the culmination of years of 
effort — under both Democratic and 
Republican Administrations, with 
the broad support of the American 
people — to achieve the independence 
of Namibia through a peaceful, nego- 
tiated process that recognizes the fun- 
damental human rights of the people of 
Namibia to choose their own form of 
government democratically. 

April 1 offers the hope of new be- 
ginnings in Angola, as well. The proc- 
ess of total Cuban troop withdrawal 
formally begins on that day. As foreign 
forces withdraw from that country, 
there are new and challenging oppor- 
tunities for the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and 
the National Union for the Total Inde- 
pendence of Angola (UNITA) to end the 
tragic civil war that has ravaged An- 
gola since its independence. 

The agreements that are leading to 
independence for Namibia and Cuban 
troop withdrawal from Angola would 
not have been possible without the 
goodwill and commitment to tough 
choices by the parties most directly 
involved. In addition, the support of 
other countries seeking a peaceful res- 
olution to the problems of the region 
was crucial. In particular, the active 
cooperation of the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. has been an example of 



how superpowers, working together, 
can help resolve regional conflicts. 

We are proud of the American con- 
tribution to this process, and we re- 
main committed to its successful 
completion. The United States has al- 
ready provided, and will continue to 
provide, aircraft to move essential UN 
personnel and cargo to Namibia. We 
have reopened the U.S. Liaison Office 
in Windhoek, with a small American 
staff, to maintain contact with the UN 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
which will oversee the process leading 
to independence, as well as with others 
involved in the transition effort. 
President Bush has authorized that 
$5 million be made available from the 
emergency refugee and migration as- 
sistance fund to sup])ort the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
repatriation program to return refu- 
gees to Namibia by the start of the 
country's first election campaign, 
scheduled to begin July 1. 

In addition, the United States to- 
day is making its first contribution of 
$1.5 million toward the e.xpenses of 
UNTAG. This represents the first in- 
stallment toward our total assessed 
contribution of appro.ximately $128 mil- 
lion. The Administration has requested 
from the Congress the necessary fund- 
ing authority to meet this obligation, 
which will be crucial in enabling the 
United Nations to carry out its man- 
date in Namibia. I urge the Congress 
to give this request prompt and favor- 
able consideration. 



'Press release .57. 



tary primary elections, and the use of 
"queueing" for future general elections 
was discussed. In August 1988, the Na- 
tional Assembly hastily passed con- 
stitutional amendments which gave the 
President the right to replace judges 
and allowed pohce to detain suspects in 
capital crimes without charge for up to 
14 days instead of 24 hours. A number 
of Kenyans suspected of belonging to 
subversive groups were detained with- 
out charge before being rushed through 
court without legal representation. Hu- 
man rights groups asked a Kenyan law- 
yer, Gibson Kuria, who had previously 
been detained after representing politi- 



cal detainees, to visit the United 
States; he was not allowed to do so. 
Another lawyer who accepted the 
Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Human 
Rights Award on Kuria's behalf had his 
passport confiscated upon his return 
to Kenya. 

More in accordance with the kind 
of Kenya we are familiar with. Presi- 
dent Moi released nine political de- 
tainees in early 1988. Soon after that, 
he appointed a new police commissioner 
and charged him with cleaning up the 
police force. Despite high unemploy- 
ment and population growth, Kenya 



tmartmpnt nf <>tatp Biillptin/Mav 1Q8Q 



29 



AFRICA 



continues to accept a significant 
number of refugees. 

In essence, our policy challenge is 
to make clear our concerns on these 
issues while maintaining the special 
friendship with a country which re- 
mains one of Africa's success stories 
both in terms of economic growth and 
political stability. We believe we should 
remain engaged and continue our forth- 
right dialogue on human rights issues 
with senior Kenyan officials. 

Ethiopia 

Our human rights activities in Ethiopia 
have centered on food delivery and dis- 
tribution during the international food 
relief effort of the past year. We have 
also been concerned about restrictions 
on political freedoms and freedom of 
movement and human rights violations 
occurring in conjunction with the 
northern civil war. 

There has been little change in the 
human rights situation outside the war 
zone. The government still holds an es- 
timated 2,000-3,000 political prisoners, 
detained without charge or trial. The 
government continues its resettlement 
program but contends it seeks volun- 
tary participants. We are aware of only 
one incident during 1988 in which peo- 
ple were forcibly resettled. The govern- 
ment is also pi'oceeding quietly with its 
"villagization" program whereby people 
are collected in settlements to ra- 
tionalize the delivery of central services. 

We are unable to investigate all al- 
leged human rights abuses rising from 
the civil war in the north but are aware 
that, on at least one occasion, govern- 
ment planes attacked civilians gathered 
at a food distribution center. All war- 
ring parties impress civilians into mili- 
tary service, and little or no care is 
shown the civilian population in the 
conflict areas. 

Despite the introduction of a new 
constitution in September 1987, the 
people of Ethiopia have little or no ac- 
cess to legal due process. The Mengistu 
regime continues to rule with an iron 
hand, using violence when deemed 
necessary. 

The United States took the lead in 
the relief effort which provided more 
than 1 million tons of food. This pre- 
vented mass starvation among a needy 
population originally estimated to be 
several million. Food delivery to home 
areas was sufficiently successful that 
people did not have to abandon their 
homes to move to feeding camps or to 
neighboring countries. All available in- 
dications are that the rains in 1988 were 



30 



plentiful, and the people expect good 
harvests. However, we should not be 
complacent, as Ethiopia could still have 
a shortfall of a half-million tons of food. 

Despite the overall success of the 
international effort, donors encountered 
many obstacles: Ethiopian insurgents 
attacked and destroyed several convoys, 
the government often closed access 
roads to target areas for security rea- 
sons, and, in April 1988, the govern- 
ment expelled all foreign relief workers 
from the war-torn and drought-stricken 
northern Provinces of Eritrea and Ti- 
gray. In general, the government and 
the insurgents put military priorities 
before humanitarian concerns. After 
the expulsion of foreign relief workers, 
indigenous organizations picked up the 
slack but were not allowed to distribute 
food outside government-controlled 
areas. Insurgent relief organizations 
expanded their food distribution net- 
works to areas under their control. 

Sudan 

Sudan has one of the few functioning 
democracies in Africa, though there is 
little participation by the largely non- 
Muslim southern population due to the 
civil war. In areas not affected by the 
civil war, there is wide freedom of 
speech and the press. Opposition pa- 
pers in Khartoum can be sharply criti- 
cal of the government. Personal 
freedoms are generally respected out- 
side the war zone. 

In the zones of conflict, the civil 
war, now entering its sixth year, has 
caused human suffering unparalleled in 
Africa last year. Numbers are only 
guesses, but an estimated 1-2 million 
southern Sudanese have fled north, los- 
ing the ability to survive on their own. 
About 330,000 southern Sudanese have 
fled to refugee camps in Ethiopia, often 
walking for months across southern 
Sudan to reach them — many dying on 
the way. There is no reliable way of 
knowing the numbers of victims of 
starvation. 

The tragic paradox is that there is 
sufficient food in Sudan to avert starva- 
tion but not enough is being delivered. 
Both sides have tended to place other 
considerations ahead of the delivery of 
food. Still, by late 1988, efforts of the 
ICRC and private voluntary organiza- 
tions were making significant, if slow, 
progress. Despite ongoing intensive re- 
lief efforts, thousands more may starve 
unless the warring parties can find 
their way to a cease-fii'e which will per- 
mit much larger deliveries of food into 
the war zone. It is urgent that relief 



iJ 



f 



supplies be in place by April when the 
rains will again block overland routes 
and many airfields for 6 months. But i 
cease-fire will not be achieved absent 
greatly enhanced mutual trust, which, 
in turn, hinges on the government's 
ability to deliver assurances to the 
south about the status of Islamic laws 
during a constitutional conference. Thi 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army/ 
Democratic Unionist Party accord of 
early December embodied this kind of 
bargain, which is why the United 
States was deeply and vocally disap- 
pointed that the accord has not been 
vigorously pursued. 

Somalia 

The Department of State welcomes co 
gressional interest in Somalia and seel 
bipartisan support for a policy that is 
consistent with U.S. interests. We 
share the same principal concerns and 
objectives: high among them are an er 
to the fighting, national reconciliation 
and human rights improvements. 

Publicly and privately, we have 
been urging Somalia to seek a politica 
solution that will achieve national rec- 
onciliation with the northern Somalis 
from whom the Somali National Move 
ment (SNM) draws its members. 
Important to such a solution will be 
improved observance of human rights, 
and we have noted a change for the 
better since combat was at its most ir 
tense in the late spring and early sunn 
men Since that time, substantiated 
reports of atrocities have virtually 
stopped. 

The government has announced 
measures which, if implemented, will 
go a long way toward ending the fight 
ing and promoting national reconcilia- 
tion. President Siad has instructed hit 
army to exercise restraint toward civi 
ians, and he announced that refugees 
would be welcomed back to their 
homes. He invited all interested do- 
nors, including the ICRC, to aid in th 
relief and reconstruction of the north. 
He appointed a constitutional commit- 
tee whose objective was to study the 
root cause of the conflict and recom- 
mend corrective measures. 

The commission presented a far- 
reaching report that describes the wai 
as "unwinnable" in military terms and 
calls instead for a negotiated political 
solution aimed at national reconcilia- 
tion. To this end, it urges the Preside! 
to free all persons detained since the 
fighting began, restore constitutional 
guarantees against arbitrary arrest, 
demilitarize northern towns, ease rule 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/May 198,. 



AFRICA 



Hgainst public gatherings, and place lo- 
jjal people in positions of civil authority 
,|here. It also calls for economic liber- 
jflization in the north plus a major gov- 
rnnient-sponsored, donor-supported 
elief and reconstruction effort. Presi- 
ent Siad endorsed the report verbatim. 
After releasing over 100 prisoners 
1st fall, he has now set up a special 
ibunal to review the cases of all per- 
ons detained since the fighting began, 
•ith instructions to release all who are 
.■illing to accept the government's ani- 
esty. President Siad has also set up 
nother commission to investigate 
reader charges of human rights 
buses, and he invited Amnesty In- 
?rnational to send a delegation to 
I omalia. We will be closely watching 

Iiese developments, and we hope the 
ositive announcements will be imple- 
lented fully and quickly. 

We believe it is very important that 
le United States remain engaged in 
domalia in order to keep that mo- 
il lentum going. We need to show our 
i| ipport for positive change while con- 
i nuing to press for further 
iprovements. 

ijouth Africa 

he South African Government took 
Iditional measures during 1988 to 
ippress opposition to apartheid. In 
?bruary, the government effectively 
mned 17 antiapartheid organizations, 
eluding the United Democratic Front 
JDf^), a loosely organized national 
ovement of more than 600 anti- 
)artheid groups, and prohibited the 
rgest labor union, the black-controlled 
ongress of South African Ti-ade 
nions, from engaging in political ac- 
uities. A total of 32 organizations 
ere banned in 1988. In June the 
)vernment renewed for a third con- 
■cutive year the state of emergency, 
,is time placing tougher restrictions 
1 the media, which further reduced 
■ailable information on the number of 
'tentions and the extent of political 
olence and made it harder for political 
jponents of the government to have 
leir voices heard. 

In December 1988, the Department 

State strongly protested the convic- 
ons of 11 UDF activists in the Delmas 
eason trial. The implications of the 
•rdict were far reaching: although 
)ne of the defendants had been ac- 
ised of direct instigation of violence, 
le judge asserted that they were part 

a UDF conspiracy to make South 
frica "ungovernable" through a cam- 
liun of mass action, of which violence 



was an intended and inevitable 
component. 

The African National Congress 
(ANC) — in an apparent major change in 
its policy of not attacking civilian tar- 
gets — was responsible for a number of 
bombings that resulted in civilian casu- 
alties. In addition, violence between 
rival black organizations, particularly 
clashes in Natal Province between UDF 
supporters and Chief Buthelezi's Zulu- 
led Inkatha movement, continued at a 
high level last year. While townships in 
the rest of the country remained quiet, 
relative to the tumultuous 1984-86 
period, occasional attacks on black 
"collaborators" continued. Candidates 
in the October municipal elections were 
particular targets. South African se- 
curity forces and/oi- i-ightwing vig- 
ilantes were suspected of involvement 
in a number of unsolved killings and 
bombings directed against anti- 
ajjartheid individuals and groups. 

On the positive side, in December 
1988, the South African Government 
commuted the death sentences of the 
Sharpeville Six, who had been present 
in a crowd that killed a black township 
official and were subsequently con- 
victed of murder. Several prominent 
political prisoners were released, 
including Henry Gwala (ANC leader), 
Zeph Mothopeng (president of the Pan 
African Congress), and Zwelakhe Sisulu 
(journalist). Moses Mayekiso, a promi- 
nent trade union official on trial for 
treason, was granted bail. Three promi- 
nent UDF activists, who escaped police 
custody and took refuge in the U.S. 
Consulate General in Johannesburg in 
September, were allowed to leave the 
consulate unmolested and were subse- 
quently granted passports for ti-avel 
abroad. The estimated number of per- 
sons detained without charge declined 
to 1,.500 at the end of 1988, compared to 
1,850 at the end of 1987. 



Resource Commitments 

The United States not only identifies 
and protests human rights violations 
wherever they occur in Africa but also 
directly attacks the causes and effects 
of human rights abuses through its as- 
sistance programs: in FY 1989, the 
U.S. Agency for International Develop- 
ment and the State Department are 
jointly administering a .$2-million hu- 
man rights program in Africa. These 
funds are being used to assist in law 
codification, to promote fair multiparty 
elections, upgrade legal facilities, edu- 
cate people about civil and political 
rights, and to assist in the legal de- 



fense of those charged with violating 
repressive or discriminatory statutes. 

Refugees and displaced persons are 
often a manifestation of human rights 
abuses. Afi-ica has the largest number 
of refugees — currently over 4 million — 
of any continent in the world. The U.S. 
Government is and has been, since the 
late 1970s, the largest single donor of 
refugee and migration assistance aid in 
Africa. And that enables us to take a 
lead role in fostering solutions to these 
kinds of human rights problems. Dur- 
ing FY 1989, the United States will 
provide about $55 million in assistance 
to African refugees escaping turmoil 
and political persecution in their native 
countries. Of this amount, $11 million 
will be provided to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, which, 
among other things, aids political pris- 
oners and victims of persecution. 

The question of resources is vital. 
This country's commitment to human 
rights in Africa must be matched by 
the commitment of real resources. As 
you are well aware, we have witnessed 
over the past half-dozen years a sea 
change in economic policy in Africa, 
as government after government has 
turned away from the intellectually and 
empirically bankrupt practices of state 
control to open up their economies to 
the invigorating forces of market com- 
petition. This process has been a slow 
and difficult one, with more than its 
share of fits and starts, involving, in 
most cases, both the reduction of total 
spending and the reallocation of re- 
sources toward more productive ac- 
tivities. Both of these are necessary 
and will prove beneficial over the long 
term. But both also involve a short- 
term cost to particular elements of soci- 
ety, often the poorest and least politi- 
cally influential. 

The process of economic policy re- 
form in Africa is one of the most pro- 
found developments there is in this 
generation, and we wish fervently to 
see it succeed. Only with the revitaliza- 
tion of Africa's economies can the wel- 
fare of its poorest citizens be improved. 
But we realize that adjustment is strong 
medicine, often resisted by the patient. 
Experience thus far has shown that ex- 
ternal assistance can help to improve 
its chances for success. The United 
States has made a substantial contribu- 
tion to this process through our bilat- 
eral assistance effort, and we would 
urge that this support be continued, 
even in these difficult budgetary times. 



iepartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



31 



AFRICA 



Conclusion 

We are both encouraged by some 
trends in African human rights per- 
formance and undaunted by the work 
still to be done. In many of the world's 
poorest countries, where subsistence 
living conditions are almost beyond the 
imagination of most Americans, we 
need development resources to assist us 
in urging governments to allow basic 
freedoms. Freedom of the pi-ess, re- 
ligious tolerance, and free elections are 
vital human rights, and we must con- 
tinue to assist governments and peoples 
in developing societies to claim those 
fundamental freedoms. We must con- 
tinue to build on what we and Africans 
have begun to accomplish. 



DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FARRANI), 
FEB. 8, 1989 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to add to Mr. Brown's remai'ks. I would 
like to comment on a few human rights 
trends that affect most, although not 
all, of the countries in Africa and to 
elaborate on the possible roots of these 
problems. 

To begin, most African countries 
are one-party states, with power con- 
centrated in the chief e.xecutive. These 
one-party systems often have strong in- 
ternal disciplinary mechanisms, which 
limit dissent within the party. In these 
societies, there are also often limita- 
tions on press freedom and on public 
expression of opposing political or re- 
ligious views, as well as restrictions 
on freedom of peaceful association 
and assembly. 

Some Africans argue that these 
limitations are necessary at this stage 
in the young lives of their nations. They 
point to the fact that country bound- 
aries in Africa were often drawn by co- 
lonial powers with no consideration 
given to the various tribes that were 
thrown together. 

Some African leaders see the task 
of nation-building — that is, of creating 
loyalty to the nation rather than to a 
tribe or an ethnic group — as the first 
necessity if their countries are to have 
any kind of a stable future. They fear 
that allowing untrammeled dissent 
among the populace will make it much 
more difficult to build this sense of na- 
tionhood. Indeed, in many cases, Af- 
rican leaders feel their fears have been 
proven justified, as countries around 
them suffer the continuing instability of 
one military coup after another. They 
often fail to see that repression of non- 
violent e.xpression can breed violent 



32 



dissent, which, in turn, causes more 
repression. This cycle, once begun, is 
difficult to break. 

Second, many African countries 
suffer from totally inadequate justice 
systems. In many cases, the basic pi'ob- 
lem seems to be that the e.xecutive 
branch of government is either unwill- 
ing to allow an independent judiciary to 
flourish or is unable to devote the fi- 
nancial and educational resources nec- 
essary to establish the rule of law. In 
some cases, colonial practices were de- 
signed to suppress agitation against 
colonial rule rather than to protect 
individual rights, and these practices 
have, unfortunately, endured in these 
societies. In other cases, police are not 
well trained in arrest and investigation 
procedures and consequently feel com- 
pelled to extract confessions by force, 
in order to obtain convictions and con- 
trol crime. Court opinions may go un- 
published, so that each judge must 
decide each case anew without the ben- 
efit of precedent. Moreover, law en- 
forcement agents or employees of the 
court system may not be paid ade- 
quately enough to prevent wide-scale 
corruption. 

Finally, the problem of ethnic dis- 
crimination and strife persists, as illus- 
trated most vividly in South Africa and 
so tragically in Burundi in August of 
last year, when an estimated 5,000 
Burundi citizens, perhaps more, died in 
ethnic violence. Ethnic tensions played 
a role — to varying extent — in many of 
the civil conflicts from which stemmed 
so many of the major human rights 
abuses in Africa during 1988, particu- 
larly in the Hoi'n of Africa. 

All of these concerns and consid- 
erations, if true — and we in the Bureau 
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Af- 
fairs believe they are accurate depic- 
tions of what is actually going on in 
many parts of Africa — all of these con- 
siderations lead us to ask: Wliat can we 
do in a practical way to help African 
nations improve their human rights re- 
cords? There are no easy answers and 
the tools available to us are the same as 
those we use elsewhere in the world — 
among them, quiet diplomacy, economic 
leverage, public statements, debate in 
international organizations, and threats 
to reduce or withdraw our assistance 
jjrograms. 

We recognize that our effectiveness 
will be blunted if we e.xcuse the human 
rights abuses of some African countries 
on the grounds that the human rights 
records of their neighbors are worse. 
At the same time, it would not serve 
our interest, or advance our principles, 



if we focused all of our attention on 
those countries whose more liberal at 
titude toward public expression permit 
us to know more details of such abuser 
as do occur. So sometimes, to be effec 
five — I repeat, effective — we must 
structure our criticism to take these 
realities into account. 

Finally, we must be a bit humble 
and recognize — as is the case through- 
out the world — that only Africans can 
improve human rights practices in Af- 
rica. In that respect, we have encoura) 
ing news. As you know. Section 116(e) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act provides 
for use of certain assistance funds for 
human rights projects each year. In th 
past few years, requests for funding fc 
such projects from African countries 
show an increasing awareness of and 
commitment to human rights issues. 
A few countries have led the way in 
searching for African solutions to the; 
human rights problems by establishin 
independent human rights leagues or 
commissions, as has happened in Mau 
tania, Togo, and Uganda, or have 
placed greater emphasis on human 
rights issues by the creation of specia* 
institutions, such as the Judicial Com 
mission and the Department of Citize 
Rights and Liberties in Zaire. These 
commissions obviously cannot and do 
not provide all the answers. It would 
premature to say that they have been 
effective in all, or even many, respect 
but they are a start. 

Other African countries are now 
seeking our assistance in creating siff 
ilar organizations. But the real key t( 
change in Africa is the courageous in 
dividuals — government leaders, civil 
servants, lawyers, teachers, doctors, 
journalists, students, men and womei 
people from all walks of life and all et 
nic groups — who on a day-to-day basi 
are taking risks to speak out, to teacl 
people about their basic political and 
civil rights, and to hold governments 
their international commitments to hi 
man rights. I am deeply pleased to 
have been invited to participate in 
these hearings today, and I hope this 
exchange of views will give new encoi 
agement to those quiet but persistent 
and often unknown heroes of the hum 
rights cause in Africa. 



'The complete transcript of the hear 
ings will be published by the committee ar 
will be available from the Superintendent 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



» 



ARMS CONTROL 



European Security Negotiations 
Open in Vienna 



Separaie negotiations on conven- 
fiiiiial armed forces in Europe (CFE) 
'uiil on confidence- and security- 
hiiililincj measures (CSBMs) opened in 
\'ii una on March .9, 19S9. 

Following are a statement by Pres- 
iilt')it Bush: a statement by Ambas- 
^iiihir Stephen J. Ledogar, head of the 
I'.S. delegation to the CFE talks, that 
ijijieared in a joint USI A/State Depart- 
iiii lit publication entitled "CFE"; the 
i( xi of the Western position paper on 
'.'FE: and a statement by Ambassador 
hilni J. Maresca, head of the U.S. dele- 
liitlon to the CSBMs talks, made at the 
''V.s/ plenary session of the CSBMs 

'alks. 



I'KESIDENT BUSH, 
MAR. 9, 1989' 

Piiilay marks the beginning of a process 
if great importance for the people of 
Kiirope, the United States, and Canada 
Hid for all who share the hope of a safer 
uifl more secure Europe. In Vienna the 
nations which are members of the Con- 
IVi-ence on Security and Cooperation in 
Kiirope (CSCE) and the members of the 
Xnrth Atlantic alliance and Warsaw 
Pact will begin two negotiations whose 
tidal is to reduce the threat of conven- 
tiiinal weapons in Eurojje — one on con- 
\entional armed forces in Europe 
;('FE) and another separate negotia- 
tion on further confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs). 

The negotiation on conventional 
forces in Europe offers a new oppor- 
tunity to redress the imbalance in mili- 
tary forces which strongly favors the 
Warsaw Pact and which has been a 
source of tension since the end of World 
War II. The NATO allies aim to elimi- 
nate the capability for launching sur- 
prise attack and for initiating large- 
scale offensive actions. 

The negotiations on confidence- 
and security-building measures will 
address the problem of mistrust in the 
military and security spheres and the 
risk of confrontation arising through 
miscalculation. Our aim is to lift the 
veil of secrecy from certain military 
activities and forces and thus contrib- 
ute to a more stable Europe. 



Although these two negotiations 
have different participants and aim at 
different kinds of accords, they share a 
common purpose. That purpose is to 
make Europe safer, to reduce the risk 
of war, and to strengthen stability on 
the continent that has seen more blood- 
shed in this century than any other 
part of the world. 

We and our NATO allies share a 
common commitment to democratic 
values, respect for each others' sover- 
eignty, and support for a strong de- 
fense. NATO's approach to these 
negotiations, therefore, rests on two 
important principles: that maintaining 
strong and modern defenses is essential 
to our security and freedom and that 
negotiated and effectively verifiable 
agreements can enhance our security 
and the prospects for lasting peace. 

Of course, these negotiations are 
part of a larger process, one which 
must address the causes as well as the 
symptoms of the current division in 
Europe. Progress in the military field 
alone is not enough to bring enduring 
peace. What is needed is genuine rec- 
onciliation and an end to the division of 
Europe. True security cannot exist 
without guarantees of human rights 
and basic freedoms for all people. 

The negotiations on security in Eu- 
rope offer new (jromise for the future. 
We embark on them with the hope that 
we can build a lasting framework for a 
more stable and secure future, but we 
are realistic about the difficulties 
ahead. With a renewed dedication 
to a constructive dialogue, we can 
make progress. The commitment of 
the United States to this effort is 
unswerving. 



AMBASSADOR LEDOGAR 

On March 9, representatives of all 23 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries will 
sit down together and begin the effort 
to negotiate a conventional arms con- 
trol agreement for Europe, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. The comprehen- 
sive scope of the negotiation on conven- 
tional armed forces in Europe (CFE) 
sets it apart from previous conven- 
tional arms talks, which included only 
some members of NATO on the West- 
ern side and focused exclusively on cen- 
tral Europe. 



We begin at an auspicious time for 
European arms control. Last year's 
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces] Treaty provided for the elim- 
ination of a whole class of theater nu- 
clear missiles. In doing so, it focused 
renewed attention on the existing im- 
balance of conventional forces in Euro- 
pe and provided a useful model for 
verification of future agreements. By 
requiring mandatory on-site inspec- 
tion, both the INF and the "transpar- 
ency" measures agreed at Stockholm in 
1986 have provided important prece- 
dents for monitoring compliance with 
future arms control agreements, and 
they may have helped to persuade the 
Soviet Union that vigorous inspection 
is beneficial, not damaging, to its 
security. 

Most recently several Warsaw Pact 
states, including the Soviet Union, 
have announced plans to make uni- 
lateral cuts in their military forces. If 
carried out as promised, these will go 
part of the way toward reducing the 
dangerous imbalance of conventional 
forces on the continent. 

We cannot, however, allow Mo- 
scow's recent geniality to let us lose 
sight of the problems that have brought 
us to the negotiating table. The uni- 
lateral conventional force reductions 
announced by the Warsaw Pact — taken 
in large part because of domestic 
imperatives — are no substitute for a ne- 
gotiated system of arms control mea- 
sures embodied in formal, verifiable, 
state-to-state agreements. 

The unilateral reductions an- 
nounced by Moscow and its allies would 
remove some 12,000 tanks, 9,100 artil- 
lery pieces, and an unspecified number 
of armored troop carriers — as well as 
other equipment — from the area the 
CFE negotiation will cover. This will 
still leave a Warsaw Pact superiority 
of more than 2-to-l in each of these 
categories — a capability that will 
rightly continue to concern NATO mili- 
tary planners and allied governments 
and publics. CFE must and will address 
this issue. 

In a statement last December 8, 
NATO foreign ministers sketched out 
the alliance's main objectives in the 
new negotiations: 



1 Department of State Bulletin/May 1989 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



• A limit on total holdings of those 
armaments most relevant to offensive 
action — the seizing and holding of 
territory — at substantially lower lev- 
els, with parity in these forces between 
the two alliances; 

• A limit on the holdings of such ar- 
maments by any one country, set at a 
fixed percentage of the total holdings of 
the two sides in Europe; 

• Ceilings on such armaments held 
by forces stationed outside the borders 
of their own country; and 

• Effective and rigorous verifica- 
tion, including exchange of detailed 
information on military forces and 
mandatory inspection. 

In combination these measures 
would have a direct impact on the mas- 
sive forward deployments of offensively 
oriented Soviet armored forces that 
have been stationed in Eastern Europe 
for a generation and which make cen- 
tral Europe the site of the heaviest con- 
centration of military force in the 
world. 

CFE will not be the first effort to 
reduce conventional forces in Europe. 
Mutual and balanced force reduction 
(MBFR) negotiations, focused on cen- 
tral Europe, were held from 1973 until 
February 1989. These talks did not re- 
sult in an agreement, but they enabled 
the 12 NATO participants and the War- 
saw Pact states to set forth their secu- 
rity and arms control concerns and to 
define a range of possible objectives for 
a conventional agreement. By clearing 
away some of the "underbrush" on this 
exceptionally complicated subject and 
giving the two sides negotiating expe- 
rience on conventional forces, MBFR 
helped lay the groundwork for the new 
talks. 

The 23 countries participating in 
the CFE talks will, of course, be solely 
responsible for determining their 
outcome. The mandate for the talks 
establishes CFE as an autonomous ne- 
gotiation "within the framework of the 
CSCE process" — that is, separate but 
with some links to the 35-country Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Representatives to the CFE 
negotiation will meet periodically with 
the 12 European neutral and non- 
aligned states for an update on CFE's 
progress. The 23 have pledged to take 
the views of other CSCE states into 
consideration in the CFE negotiation 
when appropriate. The next CSCE 
follow-up meeting, in Helsinki in 1992, 
will exchange views on progress in 
CFE. 



These arrangements, which all 35 
CSCE states have agreed on, ensure 
that the members of the two alliances 
can negotiate confidentially, out of the 
limelight, and without artificial dead- 
lines, while also ensuring that other 
European states will be able to express 
informal views on CFE issues through- 
out the negotiation. 

The mandate we concluded January 
10 sets the ground rules and estab- 
lishes a forum for the United States 
and its NATO allies, together with the 
Warsaw Pact countries, to make a new 
beginning in conventional arms control 
in Europe. We and our allies are com- 
mitted to achieving an agreement that 
enhances stability and lowers force lev- 
els. We call on the members of the War- 
saw Pact to join us in this endeavor. 



NEGOTIATION ON 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED 
FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE): 
WESTERN POSITION PAPER 

Position paper provided by the delega- 
tions of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lux- 
embourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 

Objectives 

The objectives of these negotiations, as 
agreed in the mandate, are: 

• The establishment of a secure 
and stable balance of conventional 
forces at lower levels; 

• The elimination of disparities 
prejudicial to stability and security: 
and 

• The elimination, as a matter of 
high priority, of the capability for 
launching surprise attack and for ini- 
tiating large-scale offensive action. 

Through the approach outlined be- 
low, the Western delegations will seek 
to establish a situation in which sur- 
prise attack and large-scale offensive 
action are no longer credible options. 
We pursue this aim on the basis of 
equal respect for the security interests 
of all. Our approach offers a coherent 
whole and is intended to be applied si- 
multaneously and in its totality in the 
area of application. 

Rationale 

The rationale for our approach is as 
follows. 



The present concentration of force; 
in the area from the Atlantic to the 
Urals is the highest ever known in 
peacetime and represents the greatest 
destructive potential ever assembled. 
Overall levels of forces, particularly 
those relevant to surprise attack and 
offensive action such as tanks, artil- 
lery, and armored troop carriers, musi 
therefore, be radically reduced. It is 
the substantial disparity in the num- 
bers of these systems — all capable of 
rapid mobility and high firepower — 
which most threatens stability in Eu- 
rope. These systems are also central t( 
the seizing and holding of territory, th 
prime aim of any aggressor. 

No one country should be permit- 
ted to dominate Europe by force of 
arms. No participant should, therefort 
possess more than a fixed proportion c 
the total holdings of all participants in 
each category of armaments, commen- 
surate with its needs for self-defense. 

Addressing the overall number an 
nationality offerees will not, by itself, 
affect the stationing of armaments out 
side national borders. Additional limit 
will also be needed on forces stationed 
in other countries' territory. 

We need to focus on both the levels 
of armaments and the state of readi- 
ness of forces in those areas where the 
concentration of such forces is great- 
est, as well as to prevent redeploymer 
of forces withdrawn from one part of 
the area of application to another. It 
will, therefore, be necessary to apply 
a series of interlocking sublimits cov- 
ering forces throughout the area, 
together with further limits on arma- 
ments in active units. 

Specific Measures 

The following specific measures withi 
the area of application would fulfill 
these objectives: 

Rule 1: Overall Limit. The overa 
total of weapons in each of the three 
categories identified below will at no 
time exceed: 

Main Battle Tanks 40,0( 

Artillery Pieces 33, 0( 

Armored Troop Carriers 56, 0( 

Rule 2: Sufficiency. No one coun- 
try may retain more than 30% of the 
overall limits in these three categorie; 
i.e.: 

Main Battle Tanks 12, 0( 

Artillery Pieces 10, 0( 

Armored Troop Carriers 16, 8(' 



34 



ARMS CONTROL 



Rule 3: Stationed Forces. Among 
■duiitries belonging to a treaty of alli- 
nice, neither side will station arma- 
iicnts outside national territory in 
u'tive units exceeding the following 



'Is: 



3,200 

1,700 
6,000 



Main Battle Tanks 

l^rtillery 

'\rmored Troop Carriers 



Main Battle Tanks 
Ai-tillery Pieces 
Ainiored Troop Carriers 

Rule 4: Sublimits. In the areas in- 
licated below, each group of countries 
jehmging to the same treaty of alliance 
Uiall not exceed the following levels: 

(1) In the area consisting of Bel- 
gium, Denmark, the Federal Republic 
)f Cermany, France, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
N'di'way, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the 
Liiited Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czecho- 
>l((vakia, the German Democratic Re- 
nihlic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
hi' territory of the Soviet Union west 
if the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byel- 
irussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, 
Urals, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, 
Trans-Caucasus, North Caucasus mili- 
tary districts: 



20,000 

16,500 

28,000 

(of which no 

more than 12,000 

armored infantry 

fighting vehicles) 

(2) In the area consisting of Bel- 
gium, Denmark, the Federal Republic 
t)f Germany, France, Italy, Luxem- 
Oourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, Czech- 
pslovakia, the German Democratic Re- 
lt)ublic, Hungary, Poland, and the 
territory of the Soviet LTnion west of 
the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byel- 
Drussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, 
Urals military districts in active units: 

Main Battle Tanks 11,300 

Artillery 9,000 

Armored Troop Carriers 20,000 

(3) In the area consisting of Bel- 
gium, Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Italy, Luxem- 
bourg, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and the territory of the Soviet Union 
comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, 
Carpathian military districts in active 
units: 

Main Battle Tanks 10,300 

Artillery 7,600 

Armored Troop Carriers 18,000 



(4) In the area consisting of Bel- 
gium, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demo- 
cratic Republic, and Poland in active 
units: 

Main Battle Tanks 8,000 

Artillery 4, .500 

Armored Troop Carriers 11,000 

(5) Rule 4 is to be seen as an inte- 
grated whole which will only be applied 
simultaneously and across the entire 
area from the Atlantic to the Urals. It 
will be for the members of each alliance 
to decide how they exercise their enti- 
tlement under all of these measures. 

Rule 5: Information Exchange. 

Each year holdings of main battle 
tanks, armored troop carriers, and ar- 
tillery pieces will be notified, disag- 
gregated down to battalion level. This 
measure will also apply to personnel in 
both combat and combat-support units. 
Any change of notified unit structures 
above battalion level, or any measure 
resulting in an increase of personnel 
strength in such units, will be subject 
to notification, on a basis to be deter- 
mined in the course of the negotiations. 

Measures for Stability, Verification, 
and Noncircumvention 

As an integral part of the agreement, 
there will be a need for: 

• Stabilizing Measures: To buttress 
the resulting reductions in force levels 
in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area. 
These should include measures of 
transparency, notification, and con- 
straint applied to the deployment, 
movement, storage, and levels of readi- 
ness of conventional armed forces 
which include conventional armaments 
and equipment; 

• Verification Arrangements: To 
include the exchange of detailed data 
about forces and deployments, with the 
right to conduct on-site inspection, as 
well as other measures designed to pro- 
vide assurance of compliance with the 
agreed provisions; 

• Noncircumyention Provisions: In- 
ter alia, to ensure that the manpower 
and equipment withdrawn from any one 
area do not have adverse security im- 
plications for any participant; and 

• Provision for temporarily exceed- 
ing the limits set down in Rule 4 for 
prenotified exercises. 



|il9epartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



The Longer Term 

In the longer term, and in the light of 
the implementation of the above meas- 
ure, we would be willing to contem- 
plate further steps to enhance stability 
and security in Europe, such as fur- 
ther reductions or limitations of con- 
ventional armaments and equipment 
and the restructuring of armed forces 
to enhance defensive capabilities and 
further to reduce offensive capabilities. 



AMBASSADOR MARESCA, 
MAR. 9, 1989 

Let me first join with those colleagues 
who preceded me and express the grat- 
itude of my government to our Austrian 
hosts for making these splendid halls 
available for our negotiation and for 
their magnificent hospitality during 
the past few days. We can only hope 
that this historic setting will inspire us 
all to the highest purpose and stand- 
ards of statecraft. 

The negotiations we are inaugurat- 
ing today will be about security. But as 
we commence our common effort, we 
will do well to recall the breadth of that 
concept. If our experience in CSCE has 
taught us anything, it has been that the 
security of nations can neither be fully 
measured nor ultimately achieved 
through military means alone. Indeed, 
the military confrontation which has 
plagued Europe for 40 years is the 
reflection — not the cause — of the politi- 
cal and social divisions of the continent. 

As Secretary Baker suggested in 
his speech on Monday [March 6], true 
and lasting security for all the nations 
and peoples of Europe can only be built 
upon a foundation of confidence — 
confidence of nations in their neighbors 
and confidence of citizens in their 
governments. 

The proposal tabled by the mem- 
bers of the North Atlantic alliance to- 
day constitutes an important step 
toward building this kind of confidence 
in the area of military affairs. That is 
why the United States fully supports 
it. 

Nations cannot be expected to re- 
duce their military forces unless they 
have some measure of confidence that 
their neighbors harbor no hostile inten- 
tions toward them. Massive Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact deployments of offen- 
sively capable forces throughout central 
Europe, as well as on the flanks of the 
European Continent, do not inspire 
confidence. Add to that closed fron- 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



tiers, suppression of political and labor 
movements, and the suffocating secrecy 
which has shrouded virtually all as- 
pects of Warsaw Pact military affairs, 
and it is no wonder that the West, for 
four decades, has viewed its neighbors 
to the east with suspicion and fear. 

Our proposal is designed to con- 
tinue the task of reducing this wall of 
suspicion. The measures we and our al- 
lies have proposed go to the heart of 
the confidence problem in European 
military affairs. Put simply, we pro- 
pose that all European states should 
e.xchange on an annual basis complete 
information on what conventional 
forces and armaments they have on the 
European Continent and where they 
are deployed. To deepen our confidence 
in the information we receive, we will 
press for the right to evaluate it 
directly. 

Further we and our allies propose 
to fortify e.xisting regimes of inspec- 
tion and observation of military activ- 
ities to buttress our understanding of 
capabilities and intentions. As [British 
Foreign Secretary] Sir Geoffrey Howe 
said on Monday, "A good idea is worth 
improving." 

We have also proposed an innova- 
tive new forum where representatives 
of our military establishments can ex- 
press directly to each other their views 
and concerns. I think we can be genu- 
inely optimistic on the prospects for 
moving in the direction of a more stable 
and secure future for Europe. The cli- 
mate of East-West relations today may 
be more conducive to advancing the 
agenda of peace and security than at 
any time in the past 40 years. The "new 
thinking" in the Soviet Union and in 



some countries of Eastern Europe 
holds out the possibility of a change in 
the attitudes of those governments to- 
ward their neighbors and their citizens. 

However, our optimism should be 
tempered by realism and prudence. 
Just as there are opportunities we must 
pursue, there are realities we cannot 
ignore. The cold war was not a mirage. 
It was a real international situation 
with identifiable characteristics — the 
political division of Europe, the mil- 
itarization of East-West relations, and 
the competition between two largely 
incompatible social and economic sys- 
tems. All of these characteristics, to a 
greater or lesser extent, remain with 
us today. 

Nevertheless we need not be hos- 
tages to an unhappy past, nor even to a 
complicated present. No aspect of East- 
West relations is immune to change for 
the better. In that regard, we welcome 
the new wind blowing from the East. 
Glasnost and perestroika are words 
which have ignited hope in the hearts of 
millions of Europeans. 

But our hopes for a more stable and 
peaceful European order have been 
disappointed befoi-e. We in the West 
await with great anticipation the deeds 
which will give real meaning and subs- 
tance to the slogans. 

We welcome the opportunity to dis- 
cuss our conventional forces — they are 
defensive forces and have never posed a 
threat to the security of any state on 
this continent. We are equally disposed 
to discuss the extension of openness in 
military affairs. Openness presents no 
challenge to the Western democracies; 
it is a natural characteristic of our free 
societies. 



But at the same time, we will judge 
all proposals made in these talks by thei 
same rigorous standards which we have 
applied to the measures which we and 
our allies have introduced today. Suc- 
cess in our endeavor can only be meas- 
ured in terms of improved security for 
all the states represented here. We will 
not enter into any agreement in this 
negotiation which erodes the West's ca- 
pacity to defend itself. 

The task at hand — extending 
openness and confidence in military 
affairs — is an important one. But, as I 
noted when I began, our efforts are 
only part of a broader process. The con- 
fidence and openness we seek in mili- 
tary affairs must also extend to the 
relationship between governments and 
the governed throughout Europe. 

Only when ideas, people, and infor- 
mation move freely across borders, and 
individuals everywhere have a say in 
the decisions which affect their lives, 
will we be able to achieve a Europe 
which is truly stable and secure. 

These thoughts are old friends to 
many of us; an attractive alternative to 
others; unfortunately, they are still 
perceived as a threat by some. Regard- 
less of how one views them, however, 
these simple ideas represent the fu- 
ture. It is our sincere hope that the en- 
deavor which we are commencing todaj 
in the area of military confidence- 
building will serve to advance this 
larger vision of openness and freedom 
for all Europeans. 



'Text from Weeklv Compilation of Pres 
dential Documents of Mar. 13, 1989. ■ 



36 



;AST ASIA 



Jpdate on Cambodia 



t David F. Lamhertson 

Statenu'iit before the Subcommittee 
A^ian and Pacific Affairs of the 
ouae Foreign Affairs Committee on 
arch 1, 1989. Mr. Lambertson is Dep- 
y Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
d Pacific Affairs.^ 

appreciate the opportunity to appear 
;fore the subcommittee once again to 
scuss the curi-ent situation in Cam- 
)dia and our poHcies in support of 
forts to achieve an acceptable Cam- 
)dian settlement. 



r\e Basic Situation 

le United States and the vast major- 
' of nations of the world have con- 
mned Vietnam's illegal occupation of 
imbodia and remain united in calling 
r Hanoi both to withdraw completely 

remaining forces and to join with all 
the Cambodian parties in a conscien- 
ms effort to negotiate a settlement, 
e are convinced that only a compre- 
nsive political solution acceptable to 

sides can bring to an end the suffer- 
y of the Cambodian people, reestab- 
h a free and inde])endent Cambodia, 
d restore i-egional stability. 

In this conte.xt, we remain un- 
;erably opposed to a return to power 
the Khmer Rouge, who left a legacy 
brutality and depravity from their 
le during the 1970s and whose ac- 
'ities to the pi'esent day recall that 
irlier reign of terror. A durable settle- 
fent in this conflict must contain effec- 
.'e measures to ensure that the Khmer 
)Uge can never regain control and 
bject the Cambodian people once 
:ain to the horrors of the past. While 
e precise measures to be adopted re- 
ain a crucial area of negotiation 
aong the Cambodian parties and their 
pporters, and will surely require di- 
et involvement of the international 
immunity, it is clear that discredited 
hmer Rouge leaders, including Pol 
)t, should not be allowed to play any 
le in a future Cambodian Government. 



ietnam's Withdrawal 

lis past year the United States wel- 
med both Hanoi's pledge in May to 
ithdraw 50,000 troops by the end of 
e year and its subsequent withdrawal 
a significant number of Vietnamese 



forces from Cambodia. However, we es- 
timate that only 3.5,000 troops were ac- 
tually withdrawn in the second half of 
1988, and our current best estimates, 
which we regularly review, are that 
60,000-70,000 Vietnamese troops re- 
main in Cambodia. 

Since we firmly believe that Viet- 
nam's illegal occupation of Cambodia — 
now in its Uth year — is the root cause 
of the conflict, we continue to urge 
Hanoi to issue a precise timetable for 
the withdrawal of all its remaining 
forces during 1989 and to allow for the 
verification of their withdrawal. Hanoi 
has itself raised a September with- 
drawal as possible under certain condi- 
tions; we would encourage Vietnam to 
agree to this timeframe without condi- 
tions. However, I want to stress that 
Hanoi must carry out a true and com- 
plete withdrawal — without Vietnamese 
soldiers remaining in Cambodian uni- 
forms or any other subterfuges de- 
signed to allow Vietnam to retain 
control. 

We stress the primary importance 
of the Vietnamese withdrawal in a 
Cambodian settlement for two reasons. 
Obviously, the Cambodian people will 
be unable to reestablish a truly sov- 
ei'eign and independent country until 
Vietnam's occupation ends; Cambodians 
must be allowed to determine their own 
future free from Vietnam's control. In 
addition, Vietnam's invasion of Cam- 
bodia has constituted a direct threat to 
the security of Thailand — a long-time 
friend and treaty ally of ours — and to 
regional stability. International opposi- 
tion to Vietnam's aggression is over- 
whelming; the vast majority of the 
world community has repeatedly con- 
demned Vietnam's actions, most pub- 
licly at the United Nations where the 
annual resolution on Cambodia passes 
with increasing margins. 

In addition to this international 
censure, it is apparent that the Viet- 
namese people have paid a heavy eco- 
nomic price for their leaders' military 
and political adventurism in Cambodia. 
The benefits of stability and progress — 
which other nations of the region 
enjoy — have not accrued to Vietnam, 
which supports the fifth largest mili- 
tary force in the world but has become 
a nation in e.xtreme poverty sustained 
only by Soviet largesse. Clearly, a 
settlement in Cambodia would permit 



Hanoi to devote attention and resources 
toward rectifying Vietnam's substantial 
economic jjroblems. 

I would like to add that, in the 
context of an acceptable settlement in 
Cambodia which includes the complete 
withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops, we 
are prepared to normalize our i-elations 
with Vietnam. The Vietnamese under- 
stand that the pace and scope of the 
development of oui' relations would de- 
pend on continued progress on the 
POW/MIA [prisoner of war/missing in 
action] issue. As we have said repeat- 
edly, we look forward to normalizing 
our relations under those conditions. 
We have made clear to Hanoi that co- 
operation on the POW/MIA issue 
is extremely important to the Admin- 
istration, the Amei'ican people, and 
Congress and that, while this is a hu- 
manitarian issue which should be pur- 
sued separately on its merits, progress 
in this area must continue if there is 
to be political support in this country 
for a fully normalized relationship. 

The Negotiating Process 

The progi-ess made to date toward the 
eventual complete withdrawal of Viet- 
namese forces from Cambodia under- 
lines the importance of the negotiating 
process underway to achieve an accept- 
able and comprehensive negotiated set- 
tlement. We have been encouraged by 
the sustained level of diplomatic efforts 
during the past year and have wel- 
comed the quickening pace of the 
various multilateral and bilateral 
discussions in the last 3 months. These 
have already resulted in agreements in 
principle on some of the elements es- 
sential to an acceptable solution — the 
coordination of a Vietnamese with- 
drawal with reduction of outside mili- 
tary assistance to all parties, for 
example. 

Nevertheless, important differ- 
ences remain — particularly on the 
formation of an interim government 
preceding elections — and we continue 
to urge all involved parties to continue 
their serious efforts to reach a compre- 
hensive settlement. We believe that any 
agreement which fails to address both 
the external and internal aspects 
of Cambodia's future would not be 
sustainable. 



department of State Bulletin/May 1989 



37 



EAST ASIA 



In this context, Hanoi must recog- 
nize its special responsibility to contrib- 
ute to a comprehensive agreement. 
Having created the present situation 
through its invasion, installation of a 
protege regime in Phnom Penh, and 10- 
year occupation, Vietnam cannot limit 
its participation in a solution to its 
own troop withdrawal — no mattei- how 
important that step may be. Hanoi 
must play an active ancl direct role 
in the settlement process, should talk 
directly with [Cambodian] Prince 
Sihanouk, and has the obligation to en- 
sure that the leaders it installed in 
Phnom Penh adopt reasonable positions 
in negotiations among the Cambodian 
groups. 

The U.S. position on the necessai-y 
components of an acceptable settlement 
is clear: the verified and complete with- 
drawal of all Vietnamese forces, effec- 
tive safeguards against a Khmer Rouge 
return to power, and the restoration of 
genuine self-determination to the Cam- 
bodian people. We believe that in such 
a solution Pi'ince Sihanouk's role is cru- 
cial as leader of an interim government 
preceding elections and as the focus for 
national unity. 

We realize that only the Cambo- 
dians themselves can resolve the details 
of their own future — whether the issue 
is the form of government they will 
have or the country's political orienta- 
tion. We only hope that the Cambodian 
people have an opportunity to choose 
their future leaders through democratic 
means. We believe that the Cambodians 
themselves must also decide if it is bet- 
ter to include elements of the Khmer 
Rouge, minus their senior leadership, 
as part of an interim government or 
leave the Khmer Rouge on the outside 
in any final settlement. 

We are prepared to support those 
practical and reasonable measures 
which will help achieve the goal of a 
truly free, independent, and peaceful 
Cambodia. We intend to continue our 
close and active consultations regarding 
a Cambodian settlement with the non- 
communist Cambodian groups, the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] governments, China, 
the Soviet Union, and other interested 
parties. 



The Noncommunists 

We believe that continuity in our ap- 
proach to this issue is warranted and, 
indeed, essential. This means maintain- 
ing our support for Prince Sihanouk 
and the Cambodian noncommunist 
resistance (NCR) in their valiant strug- 
gle for a free and independent Cam- 
bodia. The organizations of Prince 
Sihanouk and of former Prime Minister 
Son Sann have improved militarily. Dur- 
ing the past year especially, both the 
Sihanoukian National Army (ANS) and 
the Khmer People's National Liberation 
Front (KPNLF) have strengthened 
their forces and have made encouraging 
progress in expanding their presence in 
the interior of Cambodia. We believe 
that they could become an increasingly 
viable alternative to both the Viet- 
namese-supported People's Republic of 
Kampuchea (P.R.K.) and the mur- 
derous Khmer Rouge, and that they 
can and will play a key role in a settle- 
ment which serves the best interests of 
the Cambodian people. 

ASEAN has been in the forefront 
in supporting the Cambodian NCR 
groups, and we have been happy to be 
able to contribute to this effort. In sup- 
port of the noncommunist resistance, 
we have provided for the supply and 
transportation of nonlethal material as- 
sistance to the forces of both Prince 
Sihanouk and Son Sann under two con- 
gressional appropriations. Solarz pro- 
gram assistance consists of three major 
components: medical/malaria preven- 
tion, training, and commodity procure- 
ment. The McCollum program provides 
excess Department of Defense stocks 
and covers administrative and transpor- 
tation expenses. We continually evalu- 
ate and assess the needs of the 
noncommunist resistance and believe 
that the programs that are in place 
have been appi'opriate and effective. In 
FY [fiscal year] 1989, $5 million has 
been budgeted for nonlethal assistance 
under the Solarz program, and $500,000 
is budgeted under the McCollum 
program. 

However, in preparation for a set- 
tlement in Cambodia and to strengthen 
the noncommunist resistance to help 
prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge 
to power, we believe that our assistance 
to the NCR should be augmented. For 
FY 1990, we have recjuested an increase 
to .$7 million for the Solai-z progi'am 
and $.500,000 again for the McCollum 



program. In this regard, we hope that 
the current cap on ESF [economic sup- 
port fund] assistance can be removed 
or, if it remains, that it will be set at a 
level which will pei'mit maximum flexi- 
bility in responding to evolving circum- 
stances. We will continue to review our 
level of support in close consultation 
with congressional leaders. I want to 
note with appreciation how well we 
have been able to work together on thi; 
important issue. 

ASEAN's Role 

The United States has worked closely 
and energetically with the ASEAN na- 
tions to resolve the Cambodia situatior 
We have strongly supported ASEAN 
efforts to mobilize the international 
community in opposition to Vietnam's 
occupation. We believe that this broadll 
based effort has, over the years, dem- 
onstrated to Hanoi the economic and 
diplomatic consequences of its policy ir 
Cambodia, and that this effort should 
be continued until Vietnam has ended 
its occupation. We have also worked 
with ASEAN at the UN General As- 
sembly to increase the margin of votes 
for the annual resolution on Cambodia 

On the regional level, we have wel 
comed ASEAN's energetic and sus- 
tained diplomatic efforts to achieve a 
comprehensive solution in Cambodia 
through its Jakarta informal meeting 
process. The Jakai'ta informal meeting 
have brought together the parties moi 
directly involved in the Cambodian coi 
flict — the four Cambodian factions, 
Vietnam, Laos, and ASEAN members 
While not achieving dramatic break- 
throughs, the Jakarta informal meetin 
process has helped to narrow differ- 
ences on the wide range of issues in- 
volved in a comprehensive agreement. 
The first Jakarta meeting, held in Jul^ 
1988, reached a consensus on two 
points: a total Vietnamese withdrawal 
and the need to prevent the Khmer 
Rouge from regaining control. 

Unfortunately, it appears that rel: 
tively little progress was made at the 
second Jakarta informal meeting, Feb- 
ruary 19-21. The results made clear 
that it is now time for Hanoi and 
Phnom Penh to make a major effort tc 
address seriously the remaining is- 
sues — particularly the formation of an 
interim government preceding electior 
in Cambodia and the establishment of 



38 



EAST ASIA 



II international presence sufficiently 
tiling to carry out its duties in support 
I' a settlement. We urge ASEAN to 
iintinue its efforts and encourage its 
u'mber governments to maintain the 
trong sense of unity characteristic of 
hat organization as they work together 
I achieve an acceptable solution in 
'ainbodia. The United States will con- 
iinie to su])port fully ASEAN's efforts. 

)ther Countries 

n addition to our frequent contacts 
ith the ASEAN states, we have made 
anibodia a priority in our discussions 
ith other interested governments — in 
articular with both the Soviet Union 
(nd China. Cambodia was discussed 
uring the President's recent Asian 
rip. for example — which as you know 
Iso included a meeting with Prince 
ihanouk in Beijing. We believe it is 
nportant that the Chinese and Sovi- 
ts, as major supporters of opposing 
let ions, continue their bilateral di- 
logue on Cambodia as well. 

Other governments, such as those 
r -Japan, France, and the United King- 
om, have also been, and will remain, 
nportant points of contact for us on 
lis subject. These discussions should 
nhance prospects for a settlement as 
e endeavor, singly and together, to ex- 
rt a constructive influence on the par- 
ies directly concerned to make the 
ecessary decisions to restore to Cam- 
odia peace, security, and a system of 
overnment which represents the aspi- 
ations of its people. 

The international community as a 
hole — including the United States — 
-'ill also have a critical role to play in 
ustaining a Cambodian settlement 
hrough its continued close attention to 
he evolving situation inside Cambodia 
illowing a settlement and its support 
ir an effective international monitoring 
I'fsence. 

'he Khmer Rouge Problem 

Ve fully share the serious concern of 
he international community regarding 
he i)ossibility that the withdrawal of 
/ietnamese troops might lead to the 
ft urn to power of the Khmer Rouge — 
vhich we believe is their long-term 
;(ial. We are totally and categorically 
i|)|)osed to a dominant role for the 
\hmer Rouge in Cambodia's future. An 
11 rt'ptable settlement must contain ef- 
ective and workable safeguards to pre- 



Cambodia — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 181.040 sq. km. (69,900 sq. mi.); about 
the size of Missouri. Cities: Capital — 
Phnom Penh (pop. 700,000 est.). Other 
rlticK — Battambaiig, Siem Reap. Kompong 
Cham. Kumpong Som, Kompong Thorn. Ter- 
rain: Central plain drained by the Tonle Sap 
(Great Lake) and Mekong and Bassac Riv- 
ers. Heavy forests away from the river and 
lake, mountains in the southwest (Card- 
amom Mountains) and north (Dangrek 
Mountains) along the border with Thailand. 
Climate: Tropical monsoon with rainy 
season .June-(3ctober and dry season 
November-May. 




People 

Nationality: Noun ayid adjective — 
Cambodian(s), Khmer Population (1989): 
6.84 million. Avg. annual growth rate: 
2.29c. Density: :37/sq. km. (99/sq. mi.). Eth- 
nic groups: Khmer 90%, Chinese 5%, hill 
tribes, small numbers of Burmese and Viet- 
namese. Religions: Theravada Buddhism 
95%, Islam, animism, atheism. Languages: 
Khmer (official) spoken by more than 95% of 
the population, including minorities. Some 
French still spoken. Education: Literacy — 
approx. 48%. Health: Life crpectancy — men 
47 yrs.; women 50 yrs. 

Government 

Government is disputed between resistance 
coalitions and Vietnamese-installed authori- 
ties in Phnom Penh. No single authority con- 
trols the entire country. 

Administrative subdivisions: 18 prov- 
inces and one autonomous municipality. 

Flag: Democratic Kampuchea — a red 
field with three stylized yellow towers 
(repre- 



sentative of Angkor Wat) in the center 
Nonco>nmiinists — two horizontal blue 
bands, divided by a wider red band on which 
is centered a white stylized representation 
of Angkor Wat. People's Repiililic of 
Kdiiipnclica — a red field with five stylized 
yellow towers. 

Economy 

GNP: $570 million (1988). Per capita GNP: 

Estimated less than .$100. 

Natural resources: Timber, gemstones, 
some iron ore, manganese and phosphate, 
hydroelectric potential from Mekong River. 

Agriculture: About 4,848.000 hectares 
(12 million acres) are unforested land; all 
are arable with irrigation but less than 2 
million hectares are cultivated. Products — 
rice, rubber, corn, meat, vegetables, dairy 
products, sugar, flour 

Industry: Tiipen — rice milling, fishing, 
wood and wood products, textiles, cement, 
some rubber production but largely aban- 
doned since 1975. 

Trade: Figures not available. Exports 
(est. at $3 million, 1986) — dried fish, rubber, 
pepper, wood. rice. Major partners — 
Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe. Imports 
(est. at $17 million, 1986)— food, petroleum 
and lubricants, machinery, insecticides. Ma- 
jor partners — Vietnam, USSR, Eastern 
Europe. 

Official exchange rate: Approx. 100 
riel = US$1. Free market rate varies. 

Economic aid: LInknown amounts from 
USSR and Eastern Europe to areas under 
Phnom Penh control. Some humanitarian aid 
from the UN and private groups. UN relief 
efforts coordinated by the Secretary Gen- 
eral's Special Representative for Human- 
itarian Assistance to the Kampuchean 
People provided more than $40 million per 
year in assistance, most of it for displaced 
Khmer along the Thai-Cambodian border. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and and some of its specialized and re- 
lated agencies, including the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(both unattended since 1975); Asian Devel- 
opment Bank (ADB); Group of 77; World 
Federation of Trade Unions for Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK); none for People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea (PRK). 



Taken from (with some figures updated) the 
Background Notc-i of April 1987, published 
by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State. Editor: .Juanita Adams. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/May 1989 



39 



EAST ASIA 



vent this from happening. This is not a 
simple requirement since the Khmer 
Rouge retain significant military 
strength in comparison with the other 
Cambodian factions. We also oppose 
domination by the Vietnamese-imposed 
Phnom Penh regime, the communist 
P.R.K., which now has the largest 
number of troops of the four factions. 
Its sway, too, must be constrained 
in a settlement. 

ASEAN, Prince Sihanouk, and oth- 
ers — including China — have proposed a 
number of concrete measures for con- 
trolling the Khmer Rouge — as well as 
the P.R.K. — which merit very serious 
consideration. 

• Free, internationally supervised 
elections are a requirement accepted by 
all Cambodian parties; we cannot imag- 
ine that the Cambodian people would 
willingly vote for the return of the 
Khmer Rouge to power. 

• The discredited senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders most responsible for 
heinous crimes against the Cambodian 
people, including Pol Pot, must be pre- 
vented from playing a role in a future 
Cambodian Government (e.g., through 
their removal abroad). 

• The forces of the four Cambodian 
factions might be frozen in location, 
reduced to equal numbers, and/or pos- 
sibly disarmed under international 
monitoring. 

• Outside arms shipments to the 
Khmer Rouge — and to the P.R.K. — 
must be ended. 

• International access to Khmer 
Rouge camps along the Cambodian-Thai 
border must be improved — and efforts 
made to allow freedom of choice to the 
unfortunate people who may be in them 
involuntarily and to reduce the Khmer 
Rouge ability to impress young people 
as soldiers and porters. 

• An international conference 
should be held, once there is agreement 
on the basic elements of a settlement, 
to mobilize the international community 
to guarantee and support the settle- 
ment agreement with special attention 
to its provisions relating to the control 
of the Khmer Rouge. 

• There is a growing international 
consensus that there must be an inter- 
national presence established in Cam- 
bodia sufficiently strong to be able to 
monitor effectively the Vietnamese 
withdrawal, a cease-fa-e, and other 
provisions. By whatever title this 
should be an armed peacekeeping 
force — probably under UN auspices. 



• Finally, a comprehensive settle- 
ment should provide for a body to mon- 
itor the human rights situation and 
publicize throughout the world any 
Cambodian human rights violations. 
Evidence of the true nature of the 
Khmer Rouge was readily available well 
before 1975, but people gave it insuffi- 
cient attention, and Cambodia paid a 
terrible price. We must not let a similar 
situation recur. 

China's Support 

for the Khmer Rouge 

We have discussed with China, on a 
regular basis, the need to control the 
Khmer Rouge in the context of a settle- 
ment. I would note that during the last 
9 months there has been a significant 
evolution in China's position regarding 
the Khmer Rouge. Last July 1, a Chi- 
nese statement called for the establish- 
ment of a four-party coalition with 
Prince Sihanouk in charge while Viet- 
nam withdrew and the imposition of a 
freeze on Cambodian forces, noting 
"these forces should refrain from get- 
ting involved in politics and interfering 
in the general election." It asserted 
that the leaders of each of the factions 
in the coalition would have to be ac- 
ceptable to the other factions — suggest- 
ing that Pol Pot and others of his ilk 
could have no role. In November, for 
the first time, the Chinese accepted, in 
princiijle, a reduction of military as- 



sistance simultaneous with a verified 
Vietnamese withdrawal. Based on its 
public statements as well as our privatt 
discussions, we believe that Beijing 
does not support a return to power by 
the Khmer Rouge. 

We will continue to work to define 
with more precision the elements of an 
acceptable, comprehensive Cambodian 
settlement and seek to ensure that it 
contains the safeguards necessary to 
assure a stable and secure future for 
that country. We expect continued prog-' 
ress toward a solution in the months 
ahead, although there are likely to be 
setbacks as well, and we cannot predict 
just when this tragic conflict, in fact, 
will end. But the end is drawing closer) 
and we are heartened that this is so 
We hope that the Cambodian people 
those who have suffered under the 
Khmer Rouge and Phnom Penh regime= 
and those hundreds of thousands of 
Cambodians who were caused to flee fc 
camps along the Cambodian-Thai 
border — will be able soon to return 
once more to normal lives in a nation Sf 
peace — a free and independent Cam- 
bodia. For there to be any other out- 
come would be a tragedy for us all. 



^ 



i 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee ant 
will be available from the Superintendent c 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Burma: Political Situation 
and Human Rights 



by David F. Lambertson 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
Honse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 2. 1989. Mr. Lambertson is Dep- 
utij Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs. '^ 

For 2(5 years prior to September 1988, 
Burma was a single-party dictatorship 
dominated by the military which pur- 
sued a socialist economic policy. In a 
popular, essentially nonviolent uprising 
unprecedented in the nation's postinde- 
pendence history, millions of Burmese 
demanded, late last summer, that the 
regime step down to make way for a re- 
turn to a multiparty, democratic politi- 
cal system. On September 18-19, the 



military leadership reasserted contro 
when the military seized power. In tht 
days following, troops suppressed opei 
political dissent, sometimes violently. 

Political Situation 

Long before the dramatic events of Au 
gust and September 1988, Burma had 
been gripped by a variety of insurgen 
cies, most based on ethnic minority 
groups and some dating as far back as 
the days immediately following inde- 
pendence from Great Britain in 1948. 
Some of the ethnically based insur- 
gents are fighting for a measure of au- 
tonomy, if no longer for outright 
independence. But most insurgent 
groups are no more than narcotics syn 
dicates with private armies. The Bur- 
ma Communist Party, the only 



40 



Department of State Bulletin/May 198^ 



EAST ASIA 



isurgent group with stated political 
DJectives based in ideology, encour- 
jes opium production and traffics in 
arcotics to sustain itself. Though 
lese groups have been confined to re- 
lote areas on Burma's periphery — for 
le most part — and pose no serious 
ireat to the central government, the 
e Win government used its continued 
cistence to justify in part the need for 
ithoritarian rule, including the opera- 
on of an extensive security apparatus. 

The upheavals of the summer of 
•88 followed riots by students and 
orkers in June protesting police bru- 
ility against students the previous 
arch, repression of political rights, 
id the government's mishandling of 
urma's economy. In late July, the 
ader of Burma and chairman of the 
iling Burma Socialist Program Party 
iSPP), Ne Win, abruptly resigned the 
irty chairmanship. The choice of Sein 
win — widely regarded as responsible 
r numerous deaths of protestors dur- 
g earlier demonstrations — as his suc- 
■ssor touched off new antigovernment 
■monstrations. Efforts to suppress 
em by lethal force provoked even 
rger scale demonstrations, forcing 
?in Lwin's resignation after only 17 
lys in office. 

Sein Lwin was succeeded by 
aung Maung, a moderate and re- 
jected civilian. Confronted by con- 
nuing demonstrations, Maung Maung 
edged a national referendum for a 
ultiparty system to be followed by 
actions if the referendum passed. 
>pular distrust of the government, 
wever, resulted in a rejection of this 
ncession and continuing demonstra- 
)ns and strikes, which brought the 
untry to a standstill and disrupted 
A' and order. The army then swept 
aung Maung aside and formally took 
iwer Army loyalties to Ne Win re- 
ain strong, and most observers see 
e former ruler's hand behind the mili- 
ry takeover and subseciuent forceful 
pression of demonstrators. As it 
ppressed opposition by massive ap- 
ication of force, the military leader- 
ip vowed to hold multiparty elections 
id to relinquish power to the result- 
ii government. Over 180 parties have 
nee registered to contest the elec- 
ins, including the successor of 
e BSPP, the National Unity Party. 

Of this multitude, the principal po- 
ical party in Burma appears to be 
e National League for Democracy 
.LD), led by a former general. Tin Oo, 
Mid Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the 



epartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



Burma — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 678,576 sq. km. (262,000 sq. mi.); 
slightly smaller than Texas. Cities: 
Capital — Rangoon (pop. 2.5 million). Other- 
cities — Mandalay, Moulmein. Terrain: 
Varied. Climate: Tropical, monsoon. 




South 
China Sea 






People 

Nationality: Noun and adjective — Bur- 
mese (sing, and pi.). Population (1987): 
:57, 900,000. Annual growth rate: 2%. 
Ethnic groups: Burman 68%, Shan 9%, 
Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, In- 
dian 2%. Religions: Buddhist 85%; Mus- 
lim, traditional. Christian, other 13%. 
Languages: Burmese, ethnic languages. 
Education: Attendance — 84%. Years com- 
pulsory — 4. Literacy — 66%. Health: Infant 
mortality rate — 96/1,000. Life expectancy — 
57 yrs. Work force (14.8 million est.): 
Agriculture— 66.1%. Industry— 12%. 
Trade— 9.1%. Goi'ernment—W.6%. 

Government 

With the military's assumption of govern- 
mental authority on September 18, 1988, 
all civil government activities were sus- 
pended, including the executive, legisla- 
tive, and judicial branches. These functions 
are now exercised by the military au- 
thorities. Military State Law and Order 
Restoration Councils replaced the previous 
civilian Councils of State. As of December 
1988, military government remained in ef- 
fect pending promised national multiparty 
elections and eventual transfer of power to 
an elected civilian government. 

Type: Interim military government. 
Independence: Jan. 4, 1948. Constitution: 
The previously applicable constitution was 
ratified on Jan. 3, 1974. It is not known 
which of the constitution's provisions are 



considered relevant by the governing mili- 
tary authorities. 

Subdivisions: Seven divisions (ethnic 
Burman majority) and seven states (non- 
Burman majority). 

Political parties: As of December 
1988, there were more than 140 registered 
political parties. All have been created 
since the military takeover in September 
1988. 

Central government budget (1986); 
$4,368 billion, including expenditures of 
state economic enterprises. 

Defense (1985 est.): 4.2% of GDP. 

Flag: Red with blue canton; in the 
canton, a white cogwheel and rice stalk 
encircled with 14 white stars. 

National holiday: Independence Day, 
Jan. 4. 

Economy 

GDP (Burmese FY 1985-86 in current dol- 
lars): $8 billion. Annual growth rate: 
l%-4%. Per capita income: $210. Avg. in- 
flation rate (last 4 yrs.); 6%. 

Natural resources: Oil, timber, tin, 
tungsten, copper, lead, precious stones. 

Agriculture (27% of GDP); Products- 
rice, beans and pulses, maize and oilseeds, 
peanuts, sugarcane. 

Industry (10% of GDP); Ti/pcs— food, 
textiles, timber products, petroleum, con- 
struction materials. 

Trade (FY 1986); Exports— $500 mil- 
lion f.o.b.: rice, teak and hardwoods, base 
metals and ores. Major markets — Japan, 
Western Europe, ASEAN countries. 
Imports — $620 million f o.b.; machinery, 
tools, transportation equipment, spare 
parts. Major suppliers — Japan, Western 
Europe, ASEAN. 

Official exchange rate: lSDR = Kyat 
8.551; 6.9 Kyat = US$l (Mar. 1988). 

Fiscal year: April 1-Mar. 31 (since 
April 1974). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

UN and some of its specialized and related 
agencies, including the World Bank, Inter- 
national Finance Corporation (IFC), Inter- 
national Development Association (IDA), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT); Seabeds Committee; Asian Devel- 
opment Bank; Colombo Plan. 



Taken from the Backciroiind Notes of Feb- 
ruary 1989, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State. 
Editor; Juanita Adams. ■ 



41 



EAST ASIA 



founder of modern Burma. The NLD 
appears to command the support of a 
great many Burmese in various re- 
gions of the country and is perceived as 
the principal opponent of the military 
regime. While the NLD has not offi- 
cially stated whether it will participate 
in an election, most observers predict 
it will. 

Former Prime Minister U Nu is as- 
sociated with the Democracy Party; its 
relative strength is not reckoned to be 
on a par with the NLD. The National 
Unity Party is viewed as essentially a 
re-creation of the old Burma Socialist 
Program Party, which ruled Burma 
from 1962 until it was dissolved last 
September. The NUP does appear 
to receive to some extent preferen- 
tial treatment from the military 
government. 

Of the 185 or so other parties, the 
vast majority are very small local 
groups, many of which are little more 
than debating societies. We have re- 
ports that some parties, perhaps 30 to 
40, have actively discussed an electoral 
alliance with the NLD. 

On February 17 of this year, the 
government's election commission an- 
nounced a timetable which calls for an 
election in April or May 1990. No pre- 
cise date has been set. The commis- 
sion's announcement stated that an 
election law would be issued by 
March 1, 1989, to be followed by consul- 
tation with the political parties. It did 
not give any indication when restric- 
tions on public gatherings would be 
lifted or when political parties would 
be allowed access to the news media. 

Foreign Assistance 

As regards foreign assistance, Burma's 
principal bilateral donors — Japan, West 
Germany, and ourselves — suspended 
assistance to Burma last August and 
September. At that time, we stated 
that we looked forward to resuming as- 
sistance when conditions in Burma per- 
mitted us to do so. We are looking for 
meaningful political and economic re- 
form in Burma before resuming 
assistance. 

The World Bank and Asian Devel- 
opment Bank (ADB) have continued to 
disburse funds for previously existing 
assistance projects since the Septem- 
ber 1988 military takeover. However, 
we do not now expect either the World 
Bank or the ADB to approve any new 
loans for Burma. World Bank disburse- 
ments this year for Burma will amount 



to approximately .$25-$30 million, and 
ADB funding significantly less. 

The assistance cutoffs by Burma's 
donors have no doubt had a substantial 
impact. In recent years, Burma de- 
pended overwhelmingly on foreign aid 
to remain solvent, and its current for- 
eign exchange holdings are now vir- 
tually nil. The regime has stopped 
servicing much of its debt, although it 
has not repudiated any of it, and has 
had to resort to barter arrangements 
to secure supplies of many basic goods 
which must be imported. In the circum- 
stances, we see the prospect of a re- 
sumption of aid as an important incen- 
tive to the military authorities to keep 
their promise of free, fair, multiparty 
elections. 

In February of this yeai; Japan an- 
nounced its decision to recognize offi- 
cially the Saw Maung government. 
With recognition, Japanese law re- 
quires resumed funding of official 
aid projects. 

We have no desire to see the plight 
of the Burmese people worsened by 
suspension of projects clearly intended 
for their benefit. However, we are con- 
cerned that continued funding of a va- 
riety of assistance projects may well 
reduce incentives for the regime to im- 
plement both political and economic 
reforms. 

Human Rights 

With regard to human rights, the situa- 
tion for many years has been far from 
satisfactory. The annual human rights 
reports submitted to Congress have de- 
tailed the areas of particular concern, 
and I will not repeat all of them here. 

Within the past year, there were 
large-scale indiscriminate killings of 
Burmese citizens by the regime's secu- 
rity forces. Official versions of these in- 
cidents have been widely at variance 
with numerous eyewitness accounts by 
foreign diplomats, journalists, and oth- 
er observers. Observers estimate that 
in Rangoon several hundred were killed 
by police during antigovernment riots 
in March and June, although it is im- 
possible to confirm these figures. 

During the week of August 8-13, 
troops opened fire on unarmed citizens 
protesting Sein Lwin's accession to 
power. At least several hundred people 
were killed, but actual numbers can 
never be known. 

On September 19, troops in a 
number of Burmese cities, including 
Rangoon, opened fire on demonstrators 
protesting the military takeover. In 



one instance, shootings occurred in 
front of the U.S. Embassy and were ol 
served by Embassy personnel. From 
eyewitness accounts, body counts in tl 
hospitals, and photographic evidence, 
U.S. and other observers estimate 
possibly 1,000 people were killed in 
Rangoon during the September 19-21 
period. During both episodes of shoot- 
ing in August and September, the Uiii 
ed States expressed directly to 
the Burmese authorities our concern 
and urged that the shooting cease 
immediately. 

Following the September takeove 
military authorities rounded up man\ 
young people in Rangoon and elsewhe 
and reportedly pressed them into ser' 
ice as porters in areas where the 
military continues to battle various ii 
surgent groups. In the past, this prat 
tice had been reported as common in 
the areas where insurgent groups ai'i 
active, primarily areas inhabited by 
minority group peoples. This was the 
first instance that we are aware of, 
however, where the military pressed 
ethnic Burmans into such service. 

According to a number of reports 
from those who escaped or otherwise 
survived the experience, treatment o 
impressed porters was harsh. They 
were made to carry heavy loads of da 
gerous ordnance, given little to eat oi 
drink, and made to walk in advance o 
troops when ambushes or booby trap.^ 
were expected. There are reported ii 
stances of porters who were wounded 
and simjjly being left to die. 

Also following the September mi 
tary takeover, perhaps as many as se 
eral thousand students who had been 
active in antiregime protest activity 
fled Rangoon and other urban areas i 
escape feared retribution. Some in- 
tended to join insurgent groups or to 
form their own; others simply sought 
save their lives. The military govern- 
ment announced that those who re- 
turned would not be harmed and set 
repatriation centers to assist student 
turning themselves in. Some availed 
themselves of these centers and other 
simply returned on their own. 

Reports began to surface in late 
1988 that some of these returning stu 
dents had been arrested, tortured, a 
even executed. While we have no ban 
evidence to confirm these reports am 
the military authorities have denied 
them, we regarded some of them to b 
at least sufficiently credible to warra 
raising the matter with the military 
government. Also in late 1988, the Th 
and Burmese Governments concluded 



«1 



42 



Department of State Bulletin/May 19< 



^ 



EAST ASIA 



an agreement for the repatriation of 
Istudents wishing to return home from 
iThailand. We have no reason to believe 
that any of these students to date have 
been subjected to human rights abuses 
by Burmese authorities, but we remain 
concerned about the lack of adequate 
leans to monitor their welfare. 

We also have no reason to believe 
.'hai authorities have forced the re- 
(atriation of Burmese students from 
Jhailand, but we have consulted with 
,he Royal Thai Government to express 
3Ur concern that students returned 
From Thailand not be mistreated by the 
jurmese regime and about the lack of 
monitoring once students have gone 
)ack. 



summary 

in summing up the situation in Burma, 

fve believe there is no question but that 
he majority of Burmese want a com- 
ilete overhaul of their country's politi- 
al and economic systems. They took to 
he streets of Burma's cities and towns 
unprecedented numbers last summer 
10 demonstrate on behalf of a return to 
lUltiparty democracy. For a brief mo- 
ent, it looked like they would succeed 
forcing the one-party dictatorship to 
Itive them what they wanted. The mili- 
ry's bloody intervention in September 
as a severe setback to their hopes and 
,e hopes of those around the world 
ho sympathized with their aspira- 
l«ons. In the period since, the military 
gime has sought retribution against 
laany of those most active in the pro- 
est movement and committed serious 
man rights violations in the process. 
On the positive side of the balance 
heet, however, it needs to be noted 
tiat the regime has insisted from the 
Utset that it did not seek power for 
pwer's sake and that it would organize 

hold elections once law and order 
lere restored. It allowed the registra- 
lon of political parties and some party 
rganizational activity. The election 
""j*' ftmmission established by Maung 

iaung was permitted to continue its 
li* lork. The regime has now announced 

irough timetable leading up to an 
ml'" lection in 1990. We welcome this de- 
lii'S* felopment, although we would have 
iirei referred — as I am sure the Burmese 
mIi' bople would prefer — to see the mili- 
wtfi ^ry government fix a firm and earlier 
toi« lite for polling. 

!««» The United States has a limited 
ofl" renda in Burma. We have an impor- 
(nt interest in eliminating the produc- 



iorl 



tion of opium and halting the traffic in 
illicit drugs, and we look forward to the 
time — hopefully soon — when it will be 
possible to resume bilateral antinarco- 
tics cooperation. Beyond that, we want 
to see a peaceful, stable, and prosper- 
ous Burma administered by a govern- 
ment acceptable to its people and 
posing no threat to its neighbors. Bur- 
ma is a country of great natural wealth 
and promise, and we also look forward 
to the time when we can once again 
contribute toward the realization of 
that promise through our bilateral aid 
program. All that needs the political 



and economic reforms the Burmese so 
obviously desire. Once before in Bur- 
mese history, in 19(50, a military gov- 
ernment peacefully turned over power 
to civilians and resumed its purely mil- 
itary functions. We hope the current 
rulers of Burma will respond to the as- 
pirations of their people by following 
this example. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Future Prospects for the Philippines 



by David F. Lambertson 

Statement before the Si(bcoi)nnittee 
on Asia7i and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 7. 1989. Mr. Lambertson is Dep- 
iitii Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs.^ 

Our policy of unequivocal support 
for Philippine efforts to rebuild 
democracy — and for the Aquino 
Administration — in the face of numer- 
ous challenges over the past 3 years has 
been successful. A stable, democratic, 
and prosperous Philippines — with 
friendly ties to and continued close se- 
curity cooperation with the United 
States — is critically important to the 
peace and stability of Southeast Asia 
and to U.S. intere.sts both within and 
outside the region. While it is the Phil- 
ippine people who deserve the credit 
for their accomplishments over the past 
3 years, our support has helped the 
Aquino government reestablish demo- 
cratic political institutions, preside 
over an emerging political consensus, 
and recover from a severe economic re- 
cession. As President Bush said on the 
occasion of the third anniversary of the 
EDSA- revolution: 

We Americans hold a special place in our 
hearts for the Filipino people, whose profound 
yearning-s for democracy, social justice, and hu- 
man rig-hts are shared by all Americans. The 
democratic government of the Philippines inher- 
ited a faltering economy and weakened political 
institutions. The Philipi)ine Government has 
made great progress in dealing with these prob- 
lems... America's commitment to the Philippines 
remains imshaken. President Aquino lias our 
total support in her effort to maintain national 
unity, revitalize democracy, revive the economy, 
and counter the comnumist in-surgency. 



Political Situation 

Since I last testified on the Philippines 
before this committee in March 1988, 
Philippine democracy has become more 
stable. President Aquino, who has 
maintained her personal stature and 
enormous popularity, has further con- 
solidated her hold on the political cen- 
ter. There is an emerging consensus 
that neither the extraeonstitutional op- 
position of the extreme left nor that of 
the far right offers credible leadership 
or real policy alternatives. As to the 
balance of forces within the democratic 
framework which has been established, 
her position remains strong as well. A 
two-party system seems to be gradu- 
ally emerging. Elements from across 
the political spectrum have allied them- 
selves with the newly formed pro- 
Administration LDP [Lahan ng De- 
mokratikong] Party. This party domi- 
nates the House of Representatives, 
represents almost one-third of the Sen- 
ate, and has incorporated many pro- 
vincial and local officials. The second 
major political party, the Liberal Par- 
ty, is also part of the pro-Aquino coali- 
tion. When Vice President Laurel 
moved into open opposition to the Pres- 
ident, few public figures joined him. 

The Philippine Congress has a nu- 
mber of important legislative accom- 
plishments to its credit in 22 months, 
including two budgets, a military pay 
raise bill, the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Law, and free high school edu- 
cation legislation. The Congress has 
filled a key political role as a forum for 
policy debate and scrutiny of executive 
branch performance but has been crit- 
icized in the press for alleged corrup- 
tion, a lack of focus, and excessive 



jpartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



43 



EAST ASIA 



personality politics. President Aquino 
enjoys considerable influence in the 
Congress, especially in the House 
where over three-fourths of the Con- 
gressmen belong to pro-Aquino politi- 
cal parties. As would be expected in a 
country which had no functionally inde- 
pendent legislature for 15 years, there 
is an ongoing period of adjustment bet- 
ween the executive and legislative 
branches. The differences that arise 
in this adjustment period some- 
times mask the significant extent of 
executive-legislative cooperation that 
actually exists. President Aquino in- 
volves herself in managing executive- 
congressional relations as necessary 
and has had some major successes re- 
cently on policy issues, such as agree- 
ment to postponement of the harangaij 
[local] elections from last fall until later 
this month and avoidance of a tariff bill 
that would have violated government 
agreements with the World Bank. 

President Aquino has taken major 
steps to reestablish the independence 
of the Philippine judiciary, but the judi- 
cial system is hampered by such prob- 
lems as inadequate resources, heavy 
case loads, and reported corruption 
and intimidation of witnesses. Because 
defendants enjoy strict legal safe- 
guards and the Philippines follows a 
discontinuous trial system, convictions 
often take many years; even civil liti- 
gation can take years. The failure to 
provide justice more efficiently has 
contributed to a jjropensity to resort to 
remedies outside the legal system. An 
experiment to conduct trials on a con- 
tinuous basis began in early 1989 and, 
if successful, will be widely instituted. 
In a case of special interest to the Unit- 
ed States, the first conviction of 
a major narcotics violator in at least 
3 years took place in January 1989, 
reflecting the personal efforts of the 
Secretary of Justice to improve the 
Philippine judicial system. 

Communist Insurgency 

The Aquino government continues to 
face enormous challenges to democratic 
rule. The Communist Party of the Phil- 
ippines (CPP), its armed wing, the New- 
People's Army (NPA), and its front 
organization, the National Democratic 
Front (NDF), remain the most serious 
long-term threat to democracy in the 
Philippines. 

During 1988, President Aquino's 
continuing popularity, democratic re- 
forms, strong economic growth, and 



improved military performance have 
challenged the insurgent leadership 
and compounded their serious internal 
disagreements. The Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP) has announced 
that NPA strength has declined slight- 
ly, although numerical estimates are 
extremely unreliable. While there is a 
great deal of variation from region to 
region, we also have concluded that the 
communist insurgency has stopped 
growing. The military also claims that 
communist areas of operations have 
shrunk and that it lost fewer weapons 
to the communists than it captured in 
1988. In many areas the communists 
are suffering from serious weapons and 
ammunition shortages. Insurgency re- 
lated deaths are running about 10 per 
day — the same level as 1987 but down 
from earlier years. The AFP, however, 
is suffering fewer casualties in armed 
engagements and is inflicting higher 
losses on the insurgents. 

In a series of raids in 1988, the 
AIT captured top leaders, compro- 
mised valuable documents, and exposed 
communist fronts and finances. These 
i-aids were exploited for their pi-opa- 
ganda value and undoubtedly under- 
mined the morale of the communists. 
The Philippine military has demon- 
strated its ability to exploit intel- 
ligence obtained from captured cadre 
and documents in the raids. The Manila 
press has re])orted that several organs 
of the Communist Party are distracted 
by an ongoing purge of suspected gov- 
ernment agents. 

The government is making a great- 
er effort to expose communist front 
groups (including human rights organi- 
zations, labor unions, student groups, 
and peasant organizations). Some of 
these groups are losing members and 
funding sources. Nevertheless, they re- 
main an important part of the political 
scene in the Philippines. Communist 
front groups have succeeded in garner- 
ing aid from foreign humanitarian 
organizations and in influencing the 
political debate on issues such as 
human rights. 

Still, it would be premature to say 
that the tide has turned. The peace and 
order situation is improving in many 
areas of the country, but the insurgen- 
cy is more active in others. The com- 
munists maintain large support bases 
in many isolated rural areas. The 
communists continue to engage in kid- 
napings, extortion attempts, and 
assassinations. The escape of the for- 
mer head of the New People's Army, 
Romulo Kintanar, in November was an 



44 



embarrassment for the military and 
a morale booster for the communists. 
Should the rural economy deteriorate, 
the insurgency could regain momentum 
The Muslim insurgency in souther 
Mindanao is currently inactive. The 
Muslim liberation movements are di- 
vided with some groups attempting to 
resolve their problems through politic; 
solutions. The conflict could escalate, 
Muslim leaders decide the government 
is not seriously negotiating with them. 

Civil-Military Relations 

President Aquino's relations with the 
AFP have improved considerably. She 
acknowledges the essential military 
role in combating the insurgency and 
has implemented earlier promises of a 
40%-60% military pay raise and a lar- 
ger share of the budget for defense. 
Improved deliveries of military equip- 
ment also have helped morale and im- 
proved the effectiveness of the force. 
The Secretary of National Defense an' 
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 
have repeatedly demonstrated their 
loyalty to democratic government. 
Loyal officers who understand and re 
spect the democratic process have bee>^ 
assigned to key command positions. 
Many AFP officers have come to appr- 
ciate that President Aquino remains 
extremely popular and has deprived 
the communists of a claim to political 
legitimacy. 

The military, however, has yet to 
regain completely its premartial law 
professionalism and apolitical repu- 
tation, and some officers in the AFP 
continue to be discontented. Such 
alienated officers criticize the presen 
military leadership and political dire 
tion of the civilian government. Theii 
concerns are relatively unfocused anc 
unlikely to result in broadly supporte 
antigovernment military actions at tl 
time. Should the government suffer S' 
rious reverses against the insurgents 
or should the AFP perceive its in- 
terests to be threatened, however, 
military disenchantment could again 
become a destabilizing factor in Phili 
pine politics. 

At the present time, the pro- 
Marcos and dissident Reform the An 
ed Forces of the Philippines (RAM) 
elements suffer from poor leadership, 
disunity, and demoralization. Marcos 
loyalists presently have little popular 
support outside Marcos' home provini 
and insufficient military support to 
launch a credible coup attempt. None 
theless, elements within the AFP, as- 



Department of State Bulletin/May 19) 



EAST ASIA 



i well as some business representatives 
and exmilitary officers, continue to 
plot disruptive activities or to spread 
rumors of antigovernment actions. 
Much of the rumors are part of a con- 
tinuing rightwing effort to discredit 
the Aquino Administration. While we 
cannot rule out attempts to stage an 
embarrassing incident and create an 
impression of instability, Philippine 
authorities are taking appropriate 
measures to ensure public safety. 

Human Rights 

Respect for human rights in the Philip- 
pines has vastly improved under Presi- 
dent Aquino's Administration. Charges 
that the level of human rights abuses 
are worse than under Marcos are dis- 
missed by most knowledegable Fili- 
pinos, including the leadership of the 
Catholic Church. When President 
Aquino assumed power, she was con- 
fronted by a discredited judicial 
system, an active and violent commu- 
nist insurgency, and a culture in which 
personal disputes are often settled by 
violent means. In this challenging envi- 
ronment, she moved rapidly to release 
l)i)litical prisoners, remove media con- 
trols, restore democratic institutions, 
and hold free and fair elections for a 
new Congress and thousands of local of- 
tuials. The government has largely im- 
[ik'niented the 1987 constitution's jjrovi- 
■iiuns on political, s(K'ial, and civil rights. 
Despite strong ])()])ular support for 
Pi-esident Aquino's reform agenda and 
iier personal commitment to the protec- 
:ii)n of human rights, however, there 
vvere (as we reported to the Congress 
II our annual human rights report on 
he Philippines) continuing problems 
ivith human rights in 1988. The vast 
najurity of human rights violations in 
he Philippines are related to the com- 
nunist insurgency and government 
'fforts to counter it. Human rights 
ibuses by some members of the police 
ind military have undoubtedly oc- 
■urred, but these are in violation of 
.government policy. Anticommunist ci- 
lilian volunteer organizations, some- 
imes termed "vigilantes," continued 
form in areas where the NPA pres- 
Mice is strong. The number of allega- 
ions of human rights abuses by some of 
hese groups also increased. It is likely 
hat some anticommunist groups have 
)een involved in human rights viola- 
ions; other allegations are probably 
abricated by communist-influenced or- 
ganizations seeking to weaken often ef- 
'ective anticommunist citizen groups or 
discredit the Aquino government. 



To establish more effective govern- 
ment control over local security, the 
government is replacing the dis- 
credited Marcos-era Civilian Home 
Defense Forces and armed civilian vol- 
unteer organizations with a civilian mi- 
litia known as Citizens Armed Forces 
Geographical Units (CAFGUs). The 
CAFGUs are led by military officers 
and manned by government-recruited 
and trained personnel who are subject 
to military regulations enforcing re- 
spect for human rights. 

Reports of the disappearance of 
human rights activists and members of 
leftist organizations increased during 
the second half of 1988 and remain a 
source of concern. Some of these inci- 
dents may be related to internal NPA 
purges. In response to this and other 
human rights concerns. President Aq- 
uino, in December, strongly reaffirmed 
her government's commitment to hu- 
man rights and her determination to 
take stronger steps to ensure respect 
for them. She established a special com- 
mittee under the leadership of the 
Secretary of Justice to review human 
rights policy issues. She also desig- 
nated city and provincial state prosecu- 
tors to assist families in searching for 
missing relatives in military camps 
and detention centers. 

To promote more rigorous obser- 
vance of military human rights regula- 
tions. Secretary of National Defense 
Ramos has directed that military com- 
manders be held resjjonsible for viola- 
tions by their suboi'dinates and ordered 
that human rights records be an impor- 
tant consideration in military promo- 
tions. Training of military personnel 
now places greater emphasis on the re- 
spect for human rights. Aquino has 
also shifted a number of human rights 
cases against members of the armed 
forces from military to civilian courts. 
In February, an accused assassin of 
a human rights lawyer in Cebu was 
tried, convicted of this human rights 
abuse, and sentenced to life imprison- 
ment. The conviction came less than 
9 months after the crime. 

U.S. officials continually raise our 
human rights concerns in discussions 
with Philippine Government and mili- 
tary officials. They are aware of our 
concerns, as well as those of respected 
human rights organizations, and are 
committed to eliminating human rights 
violations in the Philippines. 

U.S. -Philippine Relations 

The United States and the Philippines 
enjoy excellent bilateral relations. The 
United States is the Philippines' larg- 



est trading partner (approximately 
35% of Philippine trade), largest overall 
foreign investor (over $1 billion in in- 
vestment), and is home to over 1 million 
ethnic Filipinos. Our shared history, 
culture, and language have made the 
relationship special for both countries. 
We are committed to mutual defense 
under the 1951 mutual defense treaty 
and our security relationship is strong 
and valued. Pursuant to the 1947 mili- 
tary bases agreement, the United 
States also maintains and operates 
major military facilities on the Phil- 
ippine bases at Clark and Subic. 

Our successful conclusion of the 
most recent review of the military 
bases agreement in October 1988 laid 
the foundation for continuation of our 
mutual security relationship after 1991. 
President Aquino has stated that a new 
agreement will be required in 1991 to 
continue the U.S. military presence in 
the Philippines after that time. The 
U.S. Government is preparing to nego- 
tiate a new agreement, which would 
enter into effect in 1991. 

We are confident that it will be 
possible to negotiate a new arrange- 
ment, satisfactory to both parties, 
based on our mutual interest in the con- 
tinuation of the U.S. military presence. 
Recent Philippine public opinion polls 

indicate that the Philijjpine public re- 
mains strongly in favor of the U.S. se- 
curity relationship and the retention of 
the military facilities. The August 1988 
Ateneo poll, taken dui'ing a break in 
the 1988 military bases agreement re- 
view talks, found 74% of those polled in 
Manila in favor of retention (under cer- 
tain conditions), with even higher sup- 
port outside of Manila. The results 
would likely have been even more favor- 
able had the poll been taken after con- 
clusion of the review. Public awareness 
of the bases, according to the poll, has 
also increased sharply. This strong 
public support will become an increas- 
ingly important consideration for Phil- 
ippine politicians as the 1992 elections 
approach. 

The Philippines also derives major 
economic benefits from hosting the 
U.S. military facilities. The Philip- 
pines expects to receive $481 million 
annually in "bases-related" assistance 
in FY 1990 and FY 1991. In addition, we 
estimate the direct economic flows into 
the Philippine economy resulting from 
the presence of the U.S. facilities to be 
approximately $500 million per year. 
This sum includes procurement of Phi- 
lippine products and use of Philippine 
service contractors, salaries of Filipino 
employees, and personal spending by 



Department of State Bulletin/May 1989 



45 



EAST ASIA 



military and civilian personnel assign- 
ed in the Philippines or there on a tem- 
porary basis. 

The Philippine economy would suf- 
fer severely from a precipitous U.S. 
withdrawal. The U.S. military is the 
second largest employer in the Philip- 
pines after the Philippine Government. 
Many Philippine companies sell sub- 
stantial amounts to the U.S. military. 
If the U.S. facilities were foreign coun- 
tries, they would be the Philippines 
seventh largest trading partner. The 
Philippine Government has commis- 
sioned several studies on how to adjust 
to a U.S. departure, but we have seen 
no credible plan to make the areas 
economically viable without a U.S. 
presence. Other former U.S. military 
facilities (for example at Sangley Point) 
are not being used in commercial 
ventures. 

In addition, there are substantial 
intangible economic benefits. Because 
of the U.S. commitment to its external 
defense, the Philippines can devote 
scarce military funding to combating 
the domestic communist insurgency. 
The U.S. military presence also en- 
hances the Philippines' image of politi- 
cal stability during this period of rapid 
change and readjustment to democracy, 
thereby increasing its ability to attract 
needed foreign investment. 

In addition to the economic disloca- 
tion caused by the withdrawal of the 
U.S. military from the Philippines, 
there would be an undeniable political 
cost to both countries if we are unable 
to work out a new agreement. Regard- 
less of our ability to relocate functions 
currently performed at Clark and Su- 
bic, our withdrawal would be seen by 
other Asian countries as a diminution 
of U.S. power in the region. 

The United States also enjoys sig- 
nificant benefits from our security re- 
lationship. The Philippines is located at 
a strategic crossroads between the Pa- 
cific Ocean and the South China Sea, 
adjacent to the Asian mainland, and 
near the critical straits that lead to the 
Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Be- 
cause of this strategic location, U.S. 
Naval and Air Force units deployed in 
the Philippines could effectively pro- 
tect regional air and sealanes and 
maintain a counterweight to Soviet 
forces in the South China Sea. The 
U.S. facility at Subic Bay is the prima- 
ry port, training area, and logistical 
support base for U.S. 7th Fleet units 
operating in the Western Pacific and 
the Indian Ocean. It contains a major 
supply depot, serves as an important 



communications link, offers ship repair 
facilities, and ojjerates an airfield for 
the 7th Fleet's carrier force. Clark Air 
Base is the headquarters of the U.S. 
13th Air Force. The Clark facility 
serves as a staging point for strategic 
airlifts into the Indian Ocean including 
the island of Diego Garcia, permits 
easy surveillance of strategic "choke- 
points" in the region, and provides 
training of aircrews from the United 
States and other friendly countries. 

We recognize that negotiations may 
be long and possibly contentious be- 
cause the Philippine side will raise sev- 
eral tough issues that must be resolved. 
These issues include: duration of the 
agreement, assistance, Philippine eco- 
nomic benefits from the presence of the 
facilities, and so-called sovereignty is- 
sues (Philippine Government involve- 
ment in U.S. military uses of the 
facilities and criminal jurisdiction). 

Obviously, we hope and expect a 
successful renegotiation. However, pru- 
dent planning dictates that our mili- 
tary examine alternatives should we 
fail to reach a satisfactory agreement. 
A number of potential alternatives are 
being pursued. 

U.S. Assistance to the Philippines 

The Administration's FY 1990 assis- 
tance request ($458.6 million) for the 
Philippines incorporates the first half 
of the President's 2-year best efforts 
pledge made in conjunction with the 
1988 review of the military bases 
agreement. Failure to provide any part 
of this assistance would adversely af- 
fect our bilateral relationship and, in 
particular, complicate our efforts to 
negotiate continued access to our mili- 
tary facilities on Philippine bases at 
Clark and Subic for the period beyond 
1991. This level of assistance is fully 
justified by the enormous Philippine 
needs for economic development neces- 
sary to alleviate poverty and under- 
mine the appeal of the insurgents. 
Similarly the military assistance is 
necessary to help the Philippine armed 
forces improve its counterinsurgency 
capabilities and attain its professional- 
ization goals. 

While my colleague from the De- 
fense Department can go into more 
detail on our security assistance 
program, let me just say that U.S. mil- 
itarv assistance to the Philippines — 
$200 million FMS [foreign military 
sales] financing grant and $2.6 million 
IMET [international military education 
and training] — that we are requesting 
for FY 1990 will provide essential re- 



sources to the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, promote military profes- 
sionalism, and improve morale, thereby 
enhancing AFP capability to support 
Philippine democracy. This aid is tar- 
geted on improving the AFP's ability to 
counter a threatening communist in- 
surgency by improving training and by 
upgrading tactical mobility and com- 
munications. U.S. military assistance 
is also designed to improve troop mo- 
rale by providing for basic soldier 
needs (uniforms, boots, and medical 
support). 

The Philippine Government also 
confronts serious economic difficulties, 
including widespread poverty, under- 
employment, and a large foreign debt. 
Our economic assistance supports the 
government's reform programs, which 
are key to revitalizing the economy, im- 
proving social conditions, and provid- 
ing essential rural infrastructure. 
Government reforms contributed to 
6.7'7f economic growth in 1988, but 
further efforts are needed. Our FY 
1990 bilateral economic assistance 
program — development assistance, $55 
million; PL480, .$41 million; and ESF 
[economic support fund], $160 
million — will continue to support the 
overall U.S. assistance strategy by 
helping reduce constraints to sustained! 
economic growth, particularly in 
agriculture and rural industry and 
infrastructure. 

Economic Situation 

Economic recovery in the Philippines 
is continuing. The annual rate of GNP 
growth increased from 5.69^ in 1987 to 
6.7% in 1988. Personal consumption and' 
markedly increased capital investment 
were almost equal contributors to eco- 
nomic expansion in 1988. Recent in- 
creases in investment are important 
because only by increasing the stock of 
investment can the Philippines sustain 
broadly based growth. For too long af- 
ter the 1986 change in government, in- 
vestment was at low levels because of 
the widespread impression among po- 
tential investors that the political cli- 
mate was fragile. 

Along with this growth, company 
profits have increased as sales of con- 
sumer goods have surged. Unemploy- 
ment has fallen to under 10%, and there 
has been a steady increase in manufac- 
turing employment, although jobs re- 
main a significant concern with 30% of 
the workforce underemployed. The Phi- 
lippine economy must create 750,000 



46 



Department of State Bulletin/May 1989 



EAST ASIA 



new jobs each year to keep pace with 
new entrants to the labor force. 

Philippine macroeconomic policy 
has contained inflationary pressures 
while stimulating this rapid growth. 
The annual inflation rate was 8.8% in 
1988. As World Bank President Barber 
Conable recently noted, the Philippines 
"...has demonstrated that a high debt 
country can forge recovery through a 
combination of enlightened government 

'policies and private initiative." He 
went on to note that where the average 
growth for 17 high-debt countries in 
1988 was less than 3%, the Philippines' 
was closer to 19c. Where the average 
rate of inflation for those countries was 

I about 80%, the Philippines was less 
than 9%. 

Philippine foreign debt stands at 
$28.2 billion. In spite of the favorable 
impact of rescheduling, debt service 
takes 30% of the Philippines' e.xport 
earnings. The Philippine Government, 
in the face of tremendous political pres- 
sure to limit debt service payments, 
has pursued a responsible policy of hon- 
oring debts incurred under the Marcos 
government. President Aquino recently 

I vetoed a bill that would have mandated 
a joint legislative-executive commission 
on debt, because she believed this ac- 
tion would interfere with the executive 
branch's authority to set the Philip- 
pines' debt policy. Although the Philip- 
pine Senate overrode her veto by a 22-0 
vote, the House of Representatives up- 
held the President's veto. Nevertheless, 
the Philippine Congress will continue 
to review closely the Philippine 
Government's debt policy. 

Philippine exports grew 25% in 
1988. Nontraditional products (gar- 
ments, textiles, electronics, furniture, 
and processed foods) now account for 
77% of export earnings. In order to 
sustain export growth, the Philippines 
must increase investment, improve in- 
frastructure, maintain an appropriate 
'xchange rate, and continue other 
.■conomic reforms. 

The Philippine Government's eco- 
lomic reform effort, with important 
inigress behind it, has slowed in some 
Jolitically difficult areas. VAT [value 
ulded tax] imposition and enactment 
)f the land reform law were important 
nitiatives, and the first phase of trade 
iberalization has been completed. 
However, politically sensitive privatiza- 
iiin has not been as rapid as planned, 
decentralization has also been a partic- 
ilarly difficult area. The government's 
)o(tr performance in disbursing funds 
'or infrastructure projects and in de- 



centralizing decisionmaking must be 
improved to sustain economic growth. 

Even with this recent economic 
progress, there continues to be signifi- 
cant poverty and underemployment in 
the Philippines. Some 52%> of all house- 
holds fall below the official poverty line 
of $540. Rapid population growth is 
exacerbating urban migration and 
straining social services. A rapidly 
expanding labor force is also holding 
down real wage rates. 

The United States has supported 
the Philippine economic recovery in a 
number of ways. We increased econom- 
ic and military assistance immediately 
after President Aquino's accession to 
power and have continued to provide 
high levels of assistance. A new, signifi- 
cantly more liberal textile agreement 
has spurred exports and created em- 
ployment. We have encouraged Philip- 
pine efforts to attract foreign invest- 
ment and have provided the most 
liberal possible coverage under the 
U.S. GSP [general system of prefer- 
ences] program. Probably most im- 
portant over the long term is our 
leadership role in organizing a Multi- 
lateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) for 
the Philippines. This ambitious pro- 
gram aims at putting the Philippines 
firmly on the path to .'iustainable eco- 
nomic growth through continuing 
economic restructuring, enhanced 
assistance, and investment. 

Multilateral Assistance Initiative 

The Multilateral Assistance Initiative 
is a unique opportunity to assure 
the primary U.S. interest in the 
Philippines — long-term, stable Philip- 
pine democracy with growing economic 
well-being for its nearly 60 million 
people. In that environment, the 
traditionally close U.S. -Philippine eco- 
nomic, political, cultural, and 
security relationships will continue 
to thrive. 

I believe there are compelling rea- 
sons for the United States to take a 
leadership role in this initiative. The 
MAI will make a major difference in 
the future of the Philippines. It will 
build on significant Philippine econom- 
ic progress to demonstrate that democ- 
racy and private-seetor-led economic 
development work. It will strengthen 
the Philippine commitment to sound 
economic policies which will serve as 
a catalyst for new private investment 
from both domestic and foreign 
sources. 



In practical terms, MAI resoui-ces 
will be linked to the progress of the 
Philippine Government in imjjlement- 
ing its appropriate, donor-supported 
economic reform program. The avail- 
ability of these resources will give 
crucial leverage to reform advocates 
within the Philippine Government. 
Such leverage will help them win diffi- 
cult political approval of controversial 
restructuring measures. The MAI will 
also support administrative reforms to 
enable the Philippines to use assistance 
faster and more effectively, thereby re- 
ducing the assistance pipeline. It will 
accelerate the development of rural in- 
frastructure. Ultimately, we believe 
the MAI will significantly enhance the 
ability of the Philippine Government to 
deliver services, attract employment to 
depressed rural areas, and undermine 
the appeal of the communist insurgency. 

There are important political rea- 
sons for the United States to play an 
active role in developing the MAI. The 
MAI is a concrete demonstration of our 
unequivocal support for democracy in 
the Philippines. Our fostering of this 
key multilateral program for the Phil- 
ippines will strengthen Philippine 
political support for maintenance of 
strong, friendly bilateral relations. A 
successful MAI will also be a model of 
how the impact of U.S. assistance can 
be multiplied through cooperative un- 
dertakings to strengthen emerging 
democracies. 

The MAI is also an experiment in 
international assistance cooperation. 
U.S. leadership of this multilateral 
program will leverage scarce U.S. as- 
sistance into much larger benefits for a 
country of central importance to U.S. 
policy interests — an innovative policy 
initiative in an environment of shrink- 
ing assistance resources. This pioneer 
effort will advance U.S. assistance ob- 
jectives by strengthening the effective- 
ness of assistance through multilateral 
cooperation. For example, the MAI has 
already elicited a strong Japanese com- 
mitment in favor of increased support 
for economic reforms in the Philip- 
pines. The excellent policy dialogue we 
have established with -Japan on the Phi- 
lippines may have an important spill- 
over effect in other countries of mutual 
interest, as .Japan assumes its place as 
the world's largest bilateral donor. 

Finally, we have enormous curi-ent 
and future commercial stakes in a pro- 
gram that will help sustain broadly 
based, strong economic growth in the 
Philippines. Approximately 30% of 
Philippine trade is currently with the 



Department of State Bulletin/May 1989 



47 



EAST ASIA 



United States. Special efforts to ex- 
pand the Philippine economy rapidly, 
with its large domestic market, will 
enhance export opportunities for 
U.S. industry. The linkage of the two 
economies is apparent in last year's 
trade figures. U.S. exports to the Phil- 
ippines rose 18% (to $1.9 billion) as a 
result of the Philippine recovery. The 
orientation of the MAI toward policies 
to stimulate private investment will 
also directly benefit U.S. enterprises 
seeking profitable investment 
opportunities. 

U.S. Commitment to the MAI 

President Bush has strongly endorsed 
the concept of the MAI. In his video ad- 
dress to the Philippine people on the 
occasion of the third anniversary of 
President Aquino's assumption of of- 
fice. President Bush noted the impor- 
tance of the program and his hope that 
it will be launched this year. President 
Bush and .Japanese Prime Minister 
Takeshita have twice expressed their 
joint support for a successful program. 
Former President Reagan, also a 
strong supporter of the MAI, earlier 
recommended that it begin as soon as 
possible. The original congressional 
impetus for the development of the pro- 
gram, and bipartisan support it has re- 
ceived, are further evidence of the key 
role it plays in future U.S. policy to- 
ward the Philippines. 

The MAI reflects our dedication to 
Phili|ipine democracy and prosperity. 
The Administration's request for .$200 
million for the first U.S. contribution 
to the plan underscores the high impor- 
tance we attribute to this unique op- 
portunity in an extremely tight budget 
environment. Without appropriation of 
this $200 million, the United States 
cannot lead the MAI or obtain pledges 
from other donors; the MAI would like- 
ly never get underway. A failure of the 
MAI at this point could have an ad- 
verse impact on our overall bilateral 
ties, including our security relations. 

Special MAI Authorizing Legislation 

The Administration will propose spe- 
cial authorizing legislation for the MAI. 
The legislation we intend to propose 
will clearly link use of FY 1990 funds 
and subsequent requests for appropria- 
tions to an appropriate Philippine 
economic reform program. It will 
recognize that progress in implementa- 
tion of that reform will be the primary 
factor in Congress' determination of 



appropriations in subsequent years. 
The legislation will foresee annual con- 
sultations with the Congress to review 
jointly the progress the MAI is achiev- 
ing in reaching its goals. The full 
involvement of the Congress in the 
program and its accomplishments will 
be essential to the success of the MAI. 

A key element of the MAI is em- 
bodied in our request, as part of the in- 
tended legislation, for "no-year" money. 
Since disbursements of assistance and 
subsequent requests for appropriations 
will be linked to Philippine progress in 
economic reform, no-year money will 
provide both the flexibility and the 
leverage to make that linkage work. 

Magnitude of the MAI 

The MAI is designed to provide the fi- 
nancial resources to maintain strong 
economic growth as Philippine econom- 
ic restructuring accelerates. This 
financing will come from enhanced 
official assistance and increased 
private capital flows, principally new 
investment. The extraordinary assist- 
ance will be used to stimulate the 
necessary conditions for significant 
additional private flows, primarily in 
investment in the Philippine economy. 
There is no firm objective or yardstick 
for gauging the success of the program 
in financial terms. The success of the 
MAI will come from the continuing 
economic reforms that will attract the 
private investment necessary to ex- 
pand the Philippine economy over the 
medium term. The magnitude of that 
investment is difficult to predict. 

The Participation of Other 
Donors and Institutions 

The MAI, to be successful, must be a 
truly multilateral program. We antici- 
pate that the United States and Japan 
will be the major bilateral donors, with 
the World Bank and IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] also jilaying critical 
roles. In addition to talks with the Phi- 
lippine Government, we have held sev- 
eral informal meetings with officials of 
the Government of Japan and consulted 
jointly with the World Bank and the 
IMF. A general consensus has been 
reached on organization of the plan. We 
have held informal consultations with a 
number of other potential participants 
in Europe and Asia, as well as with the 
Canadian Government, over the past 
year and have received indications that 
many wish to be a part of the MAI. 
These donors, generally, are awaiting 



more definite information on the level 
of participation of the United States 
and Japan — and the further develop- 
ment of the Philippine economic plan — 
before committing to specific levels of 
resources. Therefore, appropriation of 
U.S. funding is a key step in this proc- 
ess. As the original proponent of the 
MAI, the U.S. Government must make 
a contribution commensurate with U.S. 
interest in its success in order to en- 
courage other donors to undertake sim- 
ilar roles. 

In view of the large foreign debt 
service burden that the Philippine Gov- 
ernment must currently support, we 
believe that bilateral assistance com- 
mitted under the MAI should be princi- 
pally grant. The actual breakdown 
between grant assistance and conces- 
sional lending will be determined in 
large part by each donor's assistance 
policies and domestic legal framework 
for assistance. We anticipate that at 
least some other donors will provide 
grant assistance. 

The Role of the Private 
Sector in the MAI 

The MAI will be successful only if it 
promotes a policy environment in the 
Philippines that will attract increasing 
amounts of private investment, from 
both domestic and foreign sources. In 
view of this essential private-sector fo- 
cus for the program, we have been con- 
sulting with U.S. business leaders with 
interests in the Philippines and the 
U.S. element of the U.S. -Philippine 
Business Committee. We anticipate 
more formal development of programs 
to attract investment to the Philippines 
as we approach launching of the initia- 
tive, and U.S. funding for it becomes 
available. 

The appointment of a special U.S. 
representative for the MAI will be an 
important element in mobilizing the de- 
gree of ])rivate-sector interest in the 
program that we believe is both possi- 
ble and necessary. We recognize the 
many advantages of a special U.S. rep- 
resentative and are now actively con- 
sidering how to structure the position. 
We are also considering possible candi- 
dates but cannot predict if and when 
such an appointment might be made. 

Timetable for the MAI 

There is no definite timetable for the 
MAI. At the conclusion of Japanese 
Prime Minister Takeshita's visit to 
Washington in early February, and 



48 



Department of State Bulletin/May 19891 



EAST ASIA 



again following their late February 
meeting in Tokyo, President Bush and 
the Prime Minister pledged to make ev- 
ery effort to launch the MAI this year. 
We are now actively working with the 
Philippine Government, the Japanese 
Government, and other potential par- 
ticipants toward that goal. The Phil- 
ippine Government has recently 
formulated its coordinating committee 
for the initiative. The chairman of the 
committee, a widely respected Philip- 
pine business leader, Roberto Vil- 
laneuva, is organizing the Philippine 
Government's participation. The gov- 
ernment is also working to develop its 
economic restructuring paper which, 
with the support of international finan- 
cial institutions and donors, will pro- 
vide the framework for the initiative. 
Much remains to be done before a 
,precise date can be set for launching 
the plan. 

World Bank President Conable was 
recently in Manila and e.xpressed the 
willingness of the Bank to help with the 
MAI and coordinate it under the rubric 
->{ its consultative group for the Philip- 
Dines. The IMF will also cooperate in 
.leveloping the initiative. A pledging 
session may be held as part of an en- 
lanced consultative group meeting lat- 
'r this year. Such a meeting will be 
irranged in close coordination with the 
^ank, the Philippine Government, and 
ither donors, based on the pace of 
)reparations for the initiative and the 
levelopment of the Philippine economic 
lajjer. Any formal announcement of the 
aunching of the plan will be fully coor- 
linated with the Philippine Govern- 
nent, the Japanese Government, the 
Vorld Bank, the IMF, and other poten- 
ial participants. In view of the critical 
ole the Congress has played in making 
he MAI possible, the Congress would 
le fully consulted prior to and involved 
n the announcement. We will also con- 
iiiue to consult closely with Members 
f Congress as progress is made in 
eveloping the framework for the pro- 
ram over the next several months. 



FY 1990 Assistance Request 
for East Asia and the Pacific 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ngs will be published by the committee and 
/ill be available from the Superintendent of 
)ocuments, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
ice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^Military headquarters occupied by De- 
inse Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Gen. 
idel Ramos in February 1986. ■ 



my 



by William Clark. Jr. 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
February 27. 1989. Mr. Clark is Acting 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs.^ 

Since the bureau was last represented 
before this committee, the East Asia 
and Pacific region has continued to 
exhibit the dynamism for which it is 
noted. This progress is visible in the 
clothes we wear, the cars we drive, the 
appliances in our homes, and the means 
by which we communicate electron- 
ically. Less visible here at home is the 
growing volume and value of American 
products flowing in the other direction. 
Enjoying hard-earned purchasing pow- 
er, the consumers of the Asia Pacific 
are becoming as eager to import as 
they have been to export. As a result, 
more than one-third of the entire inter- 
national commerce of the United States 
now is with East Asia. 

I can also report with pleasure 
that movement toward greater democ- 
racy and political openness has contin- 
ued; indeed, it has accelerated. In the 
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
elsewhere, democracy continues to ad- 
vance. Reform also progresses in Chi- 
na, albeit at a slower pace. And in tiny 
Fiji, movement has begun to restore 
constitutional democracy. In short, we 
are witnessing a spread to countries, 
large and small, of shared values that 
complement and reinforce our economic 
and security stake in the region. We 
have also seen considerable movement 
in recent months toward resolving the 
situation in Cambodia, although many 
obstacles remain to an acceptable 
outcome. 

As welcome as the overall trends 
and developments are, we have no cause 
for complacency. Indeed, the region's 
very dynamism poses challenges to 
which we must respond positively if 
the United States is to remain a key 
player. Allow me to offer several obser- 
vations that are relevant to our foreign 
economic and security assistance 
programs. 

First, economic development has 
not been evenly distributed, even with- 
in countries which have exhibited ex- 
emplary growth rates. For example, 
the Philippines economy has begun to 



eoartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



recover from years of mismanagement. 
But it will take a large and sustained 
effort to overcome widespread 
poverty, unemployment, and lack of 
infrastructure. 

Second, except for Japan, Austra- 
lia, and New Zealand, democracy is 
still very new in most countries. We 
rightly applaud the elections conducted 
in the Philippines and the Republic of 
Korea. They are important not only for 
the peoples concerned but as models for 
other countries. Still, we must remem- 
ber that these trends could be reversed 
if the elected governments are unable — 
or are perceived as being unable — to 
deal with the serious economic and po- 
litical problems they face. 

Third, economic and political pow- 
er is becoming more diffuse. The Unit- 
ed States is the predominant security 
guarantor in the region. But we 
no longer dominate economically and 
must increasingly work in concert with 
friends and allies. National independ- 
ence and economic success have fos- 
tered proud nationalisms that require 
from us more subtle and flexible 
policies. 

Finally, although the Asia Pacific 
is largely at peace, serious sources 
of tension — both between states and 
internally — remain unresolved. 

Foreign assistance is only one of 
the means at our disposal to promote 
U.S. interests in this evolving interna- 
tional environment. It does not guaran- 
tee success, no matter how generous it 
might be. Nevertheless, adequate lev- 
els of economic and security assistance 
remain key components to our overall 
strategy. The difficult but successful 
review of our bases arrangements with 
the Philippines is a clear example of 
how important foreign assistance can 
be in this new environment. Our re- 
quest for fiscal year (FY) 1990 includes 
the first half of the President's best 
efforts pledge to seek additional fund- 
ing. Honoring this pledge is essential 
to continued access to these facilities. 

The importance of foreign aid to 
our interests in the Asia Pacific, in re- 
ality, goes far beyond the dollars and 
cents. Our aid programs provide visi- 
ble and highly welcome symbols of our 
long-term commitment to remain en- 
gaged in the region's affairs. If the 
countries of the region do not believe 
that we intend to remain fully en- 
gaged, it will seriously hamper our 



49 



EAST ASIA 



efforts in other areas such as human 
rights, arms control, or the settlement 
of regional conflicts. 

Despite many assurances to the 
contrary, there exists in East Asia and 
the Pacific concern that budgetary 
pressures will compel the United 
States to pull back from our longstand- 
ing involvement in the region's affairs. 
Declining foreign aid levels in real 
terms add to this fear. 

For some years, the United States 
has been second to Japan in providing 
economic assistance to the Asia Pacific. 
Both we and the recipient nations have 
welcomed Japan's efforts to improve the 
economic welfare of its neighbors. But 
it would not be in our interest, or the 
interests of the nations of the region — 
or of Japan, for that matter — for Japan 
to bear the entire burden. 

You will find below a thorough dis- 
cussion of our security and economic 
aid recommendations for each of the 
proposed recipient countries, as well as 
for two regional programs. I have also 
appended statistical analyses respon- 
sive to your interests. But in summary, 
our requests come to a total of $813.76 
million, with $552.85 million going to 
economic assistance — development as- 
sistance, economic support fund (ESF), 
PL 480, and the Philippines — and the 
remainder to military assistance — 
international military education and 
training (IMET) and foreign military 
sales (FMS) credits. 

These requests take into account 
the absolute need to reduce the budget 
deficit and reflect our priority con- 
cerns. Exclusive of the Philippines 
Multilateral Assistance Initiative 
(MAI), the request is 8.3% higher than 
in FY 1989 and is 5.5% of total U.S. for- 
eign economic assistance. This modest 
increase follows several years of suc- 
cessive decreases in economic assist- 
ance to the region. 

On the military side, the $85.47 
million increase requested for military 
assistance is to provide FMS to the 
Philippines. 

In closing, let me add that, in view 
of the evolving international environ- 
ment in the Asia Pacific, these requests 
are short of the amounts required to 
maximize our ability to promote and 
defend U.S. interests in the region. As 
we look ahead to a possible political set- 
tlement in Cambodia, new needs will 
appear. We are holding our own and be- 
lieve that our requests for FY 1990 will 
meet our minimal needs. But I hope 
that working together we will be able 
to enhance the resources available to 
the Asia Pacific region in the years to 
come. 



50 



U.S. Economic Assistance to East Asia and the Pacific, FY 1985-90 




I will now turn to individual coun- 
try programs. 

Philippines 

A stable, democratic, and prosperous 
Philippines — with friendly ties to and 
continued close security cooperation 
with the United States — is critically 
important to the peace and stability of 
Southeast Asia and to U.S. interests 
both within and outside the region. 

The Administration's FY 1990 as- 
sistance request ($481 million) for the 
Philippines includes the first half of 
the President's 2-year best efforts 
pledge made in conjunction with the 
1988 review of the military bases 
agreement. This assistance is essential 
to continued access to military facili- 
ties in the Philippines after 1991. U.S. 
military facilities at Clark Air Force 
Base and Subic Bay are important to 
the security of the United States, the 
Asia-Pacific region, and the Philippines 
in the face of a greatly expanded Soviet 
presence. They are vital to U.S. power 
projection capability into the Western 



Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and t 
protection of commercially important 
sealanes. 

U.S. military assistance to the 
Philippines— $200 million in FY 1990- 
will provide essential resources to the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines, pro- 
mote military professionalism, and im 
prove morale, thereby enhancing their 
capability to support Philippine democ- 
racy. This aid is targeted on improvin 
the armed forces' ability to counter a 
threatening communist insurgency by 
improving training and upgrading 
tactical mobility and communications. 
U.S. military assistance is also de- 
signed to improve basic field soldier 
morale by providing for basic soldier 
needs (uniforms, boots, and medical 
support). 

The Philippine Government also 
confronts difficult economic challenge!' 
including widespread poverty, unem- 
ployment, and a massive foreign debt. 
Our economic assistance supports the 
govei'nment's reform programs, which 
are key to revitalizing the economy, in: 



!ll 
1(1 

X 
»f 

a 
lit 

m 
] 

Si 

ilr 

Irei 

(p 

k 
IS; 



Department of State BulJetin/iVlay 19t v. 



EAST ASIA 



t roving social conditions, and provid- 
ig essential rural infrastructure, 
lovernment reforms contributed to 

7% economic growth in 1988, but fur- 
ler efforts are needed. Our bilateral 
conomic assistance program (develop- 
lent assistance, $55 million: PL 480. 
41 million: and ESF, $160 million) will 
Dntinue to support the overall U.S. 
ssistance strategy by helping reduce 
mstraints to sustained economic 
rowth, i^articularly in agriculture and 

ral industry and infrastructure. 

In addition, the Administration 
as requested $200 million as the ini- 
al U.S. contribution to the MAI. The 
iternational Monetary Fund (IMF), 
'brld Bank, and Japan are expected to 
lay major roles in the program. Other 
lateral donors have expressed inter- 
it. Broad participation of donors coor- 
inated through the MAI program will 
ultiply the impact of scarce assis- 
ince resources in a country vital to 
ir interests. The MAI will support 
:onomic reforms and provide needed 
frastructure to enhance the invest- 
lent climate. This will encourage the 
nergence of the private sector as the 
■imary engine of economic growth. 
I'ithout the MAI, the Philippines like- 

woukl be unable to sustain broad- 
>sed economic growth which is essen- 
^1 to counter the communist 
isurgency. 

nailand 

nailand, the only U.S. treaty ally on 
le Southeast Asian mainland, is the 
He neighboring state resisting the 
letnamese occupation of Cambodia, 
lie Thai, thus, face some 70,000 
letnamese troops in Cambodia and 
.other 10,000-15,000 in Laos. The 
etnamese army constitutes the fifth 
rgest standing army in the world, far 
tnumbering the Royal Thai Armed 
trees. While the Vietnamese now 
aim to have withdrawn all but 50,000 
oops from Cambodia, the threat to 
aailand remains. Diplomatic nego- 
itions continue, but nothing on the 
'ound has changed militarily. 

Mutual security cooperation is the 
re element in the U.S. -Thailand bilat- 
tal relationshi]), a relationship that 
;S served important U.S. interests 
tremely well. The Thai, particularly 
e government's military leadership, 
ew our economic and security assis- 
nce ($19.5 million in development as- 
stance and ESF, and $47.4 million in 
WS and IMET) as a measure of U.S. 
pport and commitment. Moreover, 
ir assistance helps support the 
quisition and maintenance of U.S.- 



)epartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



U.S. Military Assistance to East Asia and the Pacific, FY 1985-90 




100 



200 



$ millions 



produced military hardware by 
Thailand — thereby enhancing sus- 
tainability of Thai forces and inter- 
operability with U.S. forces in the 
event of a contingency. 

South Pacific Region 

We are requesting $17.7 million in eco- 
nomic assistance ($11.2 million in ESF 
and $6.5 million in development assist- 
ance) for the South Pacific regional pro- 
gram in FY 1990. The program 
provides assistance to 10 island nations: 
Niue, Western Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua 
New Guinea, Kiribati, and the Cook Is- 
lands. In addition, we are requesting 
IMET grants totaling $255,000 (Papua 
New Guinea, $75,000: Solomon Islands, 
$75,000; Tonga, $75,000: and Vanuatu, 
$.30,000). Our goals are to: 

• Maintain access to the region's 
sealanes: 

• Assist friendly governments that 
pursue policies supportive of U.S. in- 



terests both in the region and in inter- 
national forums: 

• Restore and preserve regional 
good will toward the United States, 
which has suffered from the lack of 
U.S. presence in the post-World War II 
period: and 

• Preserve U.S. access to marine 
resources in the region's exclusive eco- 
nomic zones. 

The population of the entire re- 
gion, almost one-eighth of the Earth's 
surface, is approximately 5 million. 
The area is in political transition. Fiji, 
long considered a good example of a ma- 
turing parliamentary democracy, is re- 
covering in the aftermath of two mili- 
tary coups. Vanuatu has suffered from 
a prolonged political crisis, with one of 
the protagonists enjoying support from 
Libyan-trained thugs. Papua New- 
Guinea, with approximately 70% of the 
region's population — while enjoying a 
vigorous parliamentary democracy — 
has suffered from revolving door cabi- 



51 



EAST ASIA 



nets and a high level of largely non- 
political violence. 

The Soviet Union, not a traditional 
player in the South Pacific, has made 
inroads with now lapsed fisheries pacts 
in Kiribati and Vanuatu and with pro- 
posals to the regional oceanographic 
research organization. Papua New 
Guinea has announced that it will per- 
mit the Soviets to open their first resi- 
dent mission in the islands. 

Australia and Japan are the major 
aid donors to this part of the world, but 
their aid is not a substitute for Ameri- 
can participation which underlines our 
continuing humanitarian and strategic 
interests. 

Fiji 

We are requesting $1 million in eco- 
nomic assistance for Fiji in FY 1990 all 
under ESF. Fiji's population of appro.x- 
imately 718,119 persons is almost equal- 
ly divided between indigenous Fijians 
and persons of Indian descent. Before 
the 1987 military coups, Fiji was con- 
sidered a model of stable, parliamen- 
tary democracy, relative interracial 
harmony, and economic progress: the 
Indo-Fijians largely dominated the 
modern economy with the indigenous 
Fijians enjoying political dominance. 
However, elections in 1987 brought an 
Indian-dominated government to power 
and sparked the military coups. 

In response to the overthrow of the 
elected government, U.S. assistance to 
Fiji was suspended. In December 1988, 
President Reagan e.xercised his author- 
ity under Section 614(A) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act to restore economic 
assistance. 

U.S. interests in Fiji include: 

• Encouraging the return of con- 
stitutional representative government; 

• Limiting Soviet influence in the 
South Pacific; 

• Maintaining access to the re- 
gion's ports for U.S. warships and 
aircraft: 

• Preserving access to the region's 
fisheries resources; and 

• Ensuring continued support for 
U.S. positions in regional and interna- 
tional forums. Fiji consistently has 
been a strong advocate of U.S. regional 
and global interests, although its influ- 
ence has been eroded by recent politi- 
cal events. Fiji also provides peace- 
keeping forces in Lebanon, the Sinai, 
and Afghanistan. 

The restoration of U.S. assistance 
is aimed at strengthening the position 
of moderates who want a broadly based 



52 



democratic solution for their country, 
and our programs will focus on projects 
with direct human needs benefits to all 
of Fiji's ethnic groups. 

Military assistance to Fiji, 
$100,000 in IMET and $300,000 in FMS, 
remains on hold under Section 513 of 
the Foreign Operations, E.xport Fi- 
nancing, and Related Programs Appro- 
priations Act of 1989. The requests for 
FY 1990 are for planning purposes only, 
and there is no intention to restore mil- 
itary assistance at this time. 

Cambodian Resistance 

We are seeking to increase in FY 1990 
our nonlethal assistance to the Cambo- 
dian noncommunist resistance from FY 
1989's sum of $5 million to $7 million. 
Our primary objective here is to en- 
hance the noncommunist resistance's 
ability to compete with the communist 
Khmer Rouge, whose return to politi- 
cal power the United States unaltera- 
bly opposes. The requested sum would 
demonstrate tangible American sup- 
port for ASEAN's [Association of South 
East Asian Nations] strategy of apply- 
ing political and military pressure on 
Vietnam to negotiate a peaceful solu- 
tion to the Cambodian problem. It 
would be used for the training and 
equipping of two noncommunist resis- 
tance groups fighting the Vietnamese 
occupation forces and the Vietnamese- 
installed regime in Phnom Penh. 

Indonesia 

The fifth most populous nation in the 
world and a major voice in ASEAN, In- 
donesia lies astride vital air and sea 
lines of communication between the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans and offers 
access to valuable raw materials (espe- 
cially oil and natural gas). It has played 
a constructive role in international af- 
fairs as a generally moderate voice in 
the nonaligned movement, ASEAN, 
OPEC, [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries], and in Islamic or- 
ganizations. Within ASEAN, Indonesia 
has taken a leading role in the effort to 
end Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. 
Over the past two decades, the Indo- 
nesian Government has furthered polit- 
ical stability and has pursued sound 
economic policies. In the face of lower 
world prices for its major exports, In- 
donesia has initiated a major market- 
oriented deregulation of its economy. 

The Indonesian Government views 
economic and security assistance pro- 
grams as an important indicator of U.S. 
concern for the security and stability 
of Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The 



Administration is seeking a total of $5 
million FMS grant funding and $2 mil- 
lion in IMET in FY 1990. This will help 
Indonesia to meet its legitimate de- 
fense modernization needs, while at the 
same time enhance regional stability. 
Increased purchases of U.S. defense 
articles, following up on the F-16 pur- 
chase, will be assisted by the availabili 
ty of FMS financing. Under the IMET 
program, we expect to provide profes- 
sional military education and technical 
training to selected personnel to en- 
hance managerial skills, technical capa 
bilities, and support of U.S. -origin 
equipment. 

Proposed development assistance 
funding of $43 million will help to sup- 
port a more open, less regulated, mar- 
ket and trade-oriented economy. Our 
assistance also helps to improve long- 
term, sustainable employment and in- 
come opportunities, in line with Indo- 
nesia's search for jobs for the 20 millioi 
people who will enter the labor force 
over the next decade. Other goals in- 
clude imjjroved agricultural produc- 
tivity, human resources development, 
reduced fertility, and improved child 
and infant survival. 

Proposed PL 480 funding is $10 
million for Title I and $4,918 million fc 
Title II. Title I provides food grains t( 
supplement domestic production; the L 
cal currency proceeds from the grain 
sales provide further support for AID 
[Agency for International Develop- 
ment] development programs. Title II 
is particularly focused on nutrition ed 
cation activities in less developed are; 
of the Indonesian archipelago. Title II 
monetization programs create employ 
ment through enterprise development 
and community water and sanitation 
schemes. 

Singapore 

We have requested $50,000 for militar 
education and training. The program 
will include professional military edu- 
cation (with an emphasis on command 
and staff courses) and technical train- 
ing (emphasizing infantry training, 
navy explosive ordinance disposal, anc 
basic underwater SEAL training). 
Singapore fully utilizes its IMET al- 
location and makes a significant con- 
tribution of its owm to maximize the 
benefit of this education and training 
opportunity. 

Singapore is a staunch supporter ( 
a continued U.S. role in East Asia and 
the Pacific. In addition to being a vocs 
proponent of a U.S. presence in the re 



fi 



ECONOMICS 



nil, the Government of Singapoi-e al- 
\\ s U.S. military elements access to 
'V' facilities and airfields. Singapore 
Iniated at a key crossroads for air 
111 nc-ean traffic between the Indian 
1(1 Pacific Oceans. Enjoying strong 
(iiiomic growth in 1988, Singapore 
IS one of the world's most open econ- 
nies. It is a free trading nation which 
ares our interest in keeping markets 
lien. Furthermore, through its mem- 
iTship in ASEAN, Singapore makes 
;i impoi-tant contribution to stability 
i Southeast Asia. Its thoughtful voice 
iinfluential and counsels moderation 
international organizations, such as 
f I II maligned movement. Our modest 
iiirity assistance program with 
ngapore reinforces military-to- 
lilitary cooperation and results in 
listantial commercial benefits to the 
iiied States through FMS case sales. 
. ireiiver, it bolsters Singapore confi- 
( nee in our commitment to the region 
m1 enhances the climate for coopera- 
'•11 I in a broad range of bilateral and 
iinational issues. 

ilaysia 

ilaysia has been an active participant 
i ASEAN's strategy to force a with- 
( iwal of Vietnamese forces from 

iiiliodia and to secure a negotiated 
, tlement. Soviet forces at Cam Ranh 
] y pose a potential threat to Ma- 
I sia's security, and Soviet naval forces 
ixularly transit the Malacca Straits. 
] maligned, but staunchly anticommu- 
i;t, Prime Minister Mahathir and 
( ler senior Government of Malaysia of- 
I ials have publicly endorsed the con- 
liued presence of U.S. facilities in the 
ilippines. 

The proposed $1 million in funding 
• IMET will ensure that Malaysian 
•med Forces personnel are familiar 
th U.S. doctrine, equipment, and 
litary management techniques and 
ovide a foundation for close coopera- 
>n between U.S. and Malaysian 
•ces. Malaysia views our modest se- 
rity assistance program (the only 
■m of U.S. aid it now receives) as tan- 
ole evidence of our commitment to 
security and stability, which is of 
rect benefit to U.S. interests in 
e region. 



Dealing With the 
International Debt Crisis 



'The cciiii])lete transcript of the hearings 
ill be published by the committee and will 
? available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ents. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
ashington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Nicholas F. Brady 

Remarks before a conference on 
Third World debt sponsored by the 
Brookings Institution and the Bretton 
Woods Committee on March 10. 1989. 
Mr. Bradij is Secretary of the Treasury. 

More than 40 years ago, the represen- 
tatives of 44 nations met at Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, to build a new 
international economic and financial 
system. The lessons learned from a 
devastating world depression and 
global conflict guided their efforts. At 
the concluding session, the president of 
the conference, Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau, described this les- 
son in the following manner: 

We have come to recognize that the 
wisest and most effective way to protect our 
national interests is through international 
cooperation — that is to say. through united 
effort for the attainment of common goals. 
This has been . . . the great lesson of con- 
temporary life — that the peoples of the 
Earth are inseparably linked to one another 
by a deep, underlying community of 
purpose. 

The enduring legacy provided by 
the Bretton Woods institutions is last- 
ing testament to the success of their ef- 
forts. This community of purpose still 
resides in these institutions today. We 
must once again draw on this special 
sense of purpose as we renew our ef- 
forts to create and foster world growth. 

These past 7 years, we have faced a 
major challenge in the international 
debt problem. This situation is, in fact, 
a complex accumulation of a myriad of 
interwoven problems. It contains eco- 
nomic, political, and social elements. 
Taken together, they represent a truly 
international problem, for which no one 
set of actions or circumstances is re- 
sponsible, and for which no one nation 
can provide the solution. Ultimately 
resolution depends on a great coopera- 
tive effort by the international commu- 
nity. It requires the mobilization of the 
world's resources and the dedication of 
its goodwill. 

Since 1982 the world cominunity 
has endeavored to come to terms with 
international debt. In 1985 we paused 
and took stock of our progress in ad- 
dressing the problem. As a result of 
that review, together we brought forth 



epartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



a new strategy, centered on economic 
growth. This still makes sense. How- 
ever, it is appropriate that now, almost 
4 years later, we again take stock. Thus 
in recent months, we have undertaken 
to look afresh at the international debt 
situation. The purpose was to discover 
what progress has been made; to see 
where we as a community of nations 
have succeeded and where we have not. 
And where our success has not met our 
expectations, to understand why we 
have not achieved our goals. We have 
studied in depth, we have consulted 
widely — seeking and taking into ac- 
count the views of debtor nations, mul- 
tilateral institutions, commercial 
banks, and legislatures. We have also 
consulted closely with Japan and other 
industrial countries in order to begin 
to lay the basis for a common approach 
to the debt problem by the creditor 
countries. 

Let me share with you the results 
of our reassessment as part of the on- 
going process of international collab- 
oration. I would hope that the ideas and 
suggestions I put forth here will pro- 
vide a basis for a concerted effort by 
the international community to rein- 
vigorate a process that has become 
debt-weary. However, we must 
strengthen the process without stop- 
ping it. As we move ahead with these 
ideas in the weeks ahead, it is impor- 
tant to continue working on individual 
debt problems. 

Recent Progress 

Our review confirmed that we have ac- 
complished much, but much remains to 
be done. The experience of the past 4 
years demonstrates that the fundamen- 
tal principles of the current strategy 
remain sound. 

• Growth is essential to the resolu- 
tion of debt problems. 

• Debtor nations will not achieve 
sufficient levels of growth without 
reform. 

• Debtor nations have a continuing 
need for external resources. 

• Solutions must be undertaken on 
a case-by-case basis. 

In recent years, we have seen posi- 
tive growth occur in many debtor na- 
tions. Last year six major debtor 



53 



ECONOMICS 



nations realized more than 4% positive 
growth. This is primarily due to the 
debtors' own efforts. The political lead- 
ership of many of these nations have 
demonstrated their cominitment to 
implement vital macroeconomic and 
structural reforms. In many countries, 
this has been reflected in the privatiza- 
tion of nationalized industries. In some 
countries, there has also been a move 
toward opening their shores to greater 
foreign trade and investment. Current 
account deficits have been sharply re- 
duced, and the portion of export earn- 



Capital flight has drained resources 
from debtor nations' economies. Mean- 
while neither investment nor domestic 
savings has shown much improvement. 
In many cases, inflation has not been 
brought under control. Commercial 
bank lending has not always been 
timely. The force of these circum- 
stances has overshadowed the progress 
achieved. Despite progress, prosperity 
remains, but for many, out of reach. 
Other pressures also exist. The 
multilateral institutions and the Paris 
Club have made up a portion of the 



. . . debtor nations must focus particular attention on 
the adoption of new policies which can better encour- 
age new investment flows, strengthen domestic sav- 
ings, and promote the return of flight capital. 



ings going to pay interest on external 
debt has declined. These are signifi- 
cant achievements. All the more so, 
since in parallel progress, a number of 
debtor nations have advanced toward 
more democratic regimes. This has re- 
quired great courage and persistence. 
The people of these countries have 
made substantial sacrifices for which 
they have earned our admiration. We 
must work together to transform these 
sacrifices into tangible and lasting 
benefits. 

In another positive development, 
we have avoided a major disruption to 
the global payments system. Commer- 
cial banks have strengthened their capi- 
tal and built reserves, placing them in 
a stronger position to contribute to a 
more rapid resolution of debt problems. 
The "menu" approach of the current 
strategy has helped to sustain new fi- 
nancial support while also encouraging 
debt reduction efforts. The banks have 
provided loans in support of debtor 
country economic programs. The stock 
of debt in the major debtor countries 
has been reduced by some $24,000 mil- 
lion in the past 2 years through various 
voluntary debt-reduction techniques. 

However, despite the accomplish- 
ments to date, we must acknowledge 
that serious problems and impediments 
to a successful resolution of the debt 
crisis remain. Clearly in many of the 
major debtor nations, growth has not 
been sufficient, nor has the level of eco- 
nomic policy reform been adequate. 



54 



shortfall in finance. Commercial bank 
exposure to the major debtors since 
1985 has declined slightly, while the ex- 
posure of the international institutions 
has increased sharply. If this trend was 
to continue, it could lead to a situation 
in which the debt problem would be 
transferred largely to the international 
institutions, weakening their financial 
position. 

These are realities that we cannot 
deny. They are problems we must ad- 
dress if we are to renew progress on 
the international debt crisis. 

Let me reiterate that we believe 
that the fundamental principles of the 
current strategy remain valid. How- 
ever, we believe that the time has come 
for all members of the international 
community to consider new ways that 
they may contribute to the common 
effort. 

In considering next steps, a few 
key points should be kept in mind. 

First, obviously financial re- 
sources are scarce. Can they be used 
more effectively? 

Second, we must recognize that re- 
versing capital flight offers a major op- 
portunity, since in many cases flight 
capital is larger than outstanding debt. 

Third, there is no substitute for 
sound policies. 

Fourth, we must maintain the im- 
portant role of the international finan- 
cial institutions and preserve their fi- 
nancial integrity. 



Fifth, we should encourage debt 
and debt service reduction on a volun- 
tary basis, while recognizing the im- 
portance of continued new lending. 
This should provide an important step 
back to the free markets, where funds 
abound and transactions are enacted i 
days, not months. 

Finally, we must draw together 
these elements to provide debtor coun 
tries with greater hope for the future. 

Strengthening the Current Strategy 

Any new approach must continue to 
emphasize the importance of stronger 
growth in debtor nations, as well as tl 
need for debtor reforms and adequate 
financial support to achieve that 
growth. We will have success only if 
our efforts are truly cooperative. And 
to succeed, we must have the commit- 
ment and involvement of all parties. 

First and foremost, debtor nation- 
must focus particular attention on the 
adoption of new policies which can bet 
ter encourage new investment flows, 
strengthen domestic savings, and pro- 
mote the return of flight capital. This 
requires sound growth policies which 
foster confidence in both domestic am^ 
foreign investors. These are essential; 
ingredients for reducing the future 
stock of debt and sustaining strong 
growth. Specific policy measures in 
these areas should be part of any new 
International Monetary Fimd (IMF) 
and World Bank programs. It is wort 
noting that total capital flight for moi 
major debtors is roughly comparable 
their total debt. 

Second, the creditor community- 
the commercial banks, international 
financial institutions, and creditor 
governments — should provide more e. 
fective and timely financial support, 
number of steps are needed in this 
area. 

Commercial banks need to work 
with debtor nations to provide a broad 
range of alternatives for financial sup- 
port, including greater efforts to 
achieve both debt and debt service re- 
duction and to provide new lending. Tl 
approach to this problem must be real: 
tic. The path toward greater credit- 
worthiness and a return to the 
markets for many debtor countries 
needs to involve debt reduction. Dive 
sified forms of financial support need 
to flourish, and constraints should be 
relaxed. To be specific, the sharing a 
negative-pledge clauses included in e; 
isting loan agreements are a substan- 



(1 



ECONOMICS 



ial barrier to debt reduction. In addi- 
ion, the banl<ing community's interests 
ave become more diverse in recent 
ears. This needs to be recognized by 
oth banks and debtors to take advan- 
ige of various preferences. 

A key element of this approach, 
lerefore, would be the negotiation of a 
eneral waiver of the sharing and 
Bgative-pledge clauses for each per- 
irming debtor to permit an orderly 
rocess whereby banks, which wish to 
3 so, negotiate debt or debt service re- 
jction transactions. Such waivers 
ight have a 3-year life to stimulate ac- 
vity within a short but measurable 
meframe. We e.xpect these waivers to 
:celerate sharply the pace of debt re- 
action and pass the benefits directly to 
le debtor nations. We would e.xpect 
btor nations also to maintain viable 
?bt/equity swap programs for the du- 
Ition of this endeavor and would en- 
>urage them to permit domestic 
itionals to engage in such transactions. 
Of course, banks will remain inter- 
ted in providing new money, espe- 
ally if creditworthiness improves over 
le 3-year period. They should be en- 
luraged to do so, for new financing 
111 still be required. In this connec- 
pn, consideration could be given in 
ime cases to ways of differentiating 
■w from old debt. 

The international financial institu- 
ms will need to continue to play cen- 
al roles. The heart of their efforts 
)uld be to promote sound policies in 
p debtor countries through advice 
Id financial support. With steady per- 
mance under IMF and World Bank 
'.ograms, these institutions can cata- 
e new financing. In addition, to 
jpport and encourage debtor and com- 
srcial bank efforts to reduce debt and 
bt service burdens, the IMF and 
orld Bank could provide funding, as 
rt of their policy-based lending pro- 
ams, for debt or debt service reduc- 
n purposes. This financial support 
kuld be available to countries which 
ct to undertake a debt-reduction 
ogram. A portion of their policy- 
sed loans could be used to finance 
ecific debt-reduction plans. These 
nds could support collateralized debt 
bond exchanges involving a signifi- 
nt discount on outstanding debt, 
ey could also be used to replenish re- 
aves following a cash buyback. 



Moreover, both institutions could 
offer new, additional financial support 
to collateralize a portion of interest 
payments for debt or debt service re- 
duction transactions. By offering di- 
rect financial support for debt and debt 
service operations, the IMF and the 
World Bank could provide new incen- 
tives, which would act simultaneously 
to strengthen prospects for greater 
creditworthiness and to restore volun- 
tary private financing in the future. 
This could lead to considerable im- 
provements in the cash flow positions of 
the debtor countries. 

While the IMF and World Bank 
will want to set guidelines on how their 
funds are used, the negotiation of 
transactions will remain in the market 
place — encouraged and supported, but 
not managed, by the international 
institutions. 

It will be important that the IMF 
and the World Bank both be in a strong 
financial position to fulfill effectively 
their roles in the strengthened strat- 
egy. The Bretton Woods Committee 
has provided an important public serv- 
ice in mobilizing capital resources for 
these institutions. The capital of the 
World Bank has recently been re- 
plenished with the implementation of 
the recent general capital increase pro- 
viding approximately $75,000 million in 
new resources to the World Bank. 

With respect to the IMF, the im- 
plementation of these new efforts to 



financing in support of this effort may 
wish to consider doing so. This could 
contribute significantly to the overall 
success of this effort. We believe that 
creditor governments should also con- 
sider how to reduce regulatory, ac- 
counting, or tax impediments to debt 
reduction, where these exist. 

The third key element of our think- 
ing involves more timely and flexible fi- 
nancial support. The current manner in 
which "financial gaps" are estimated 
and filled is cumbersome and rigid. We 
should seek to change this mentality 
and make the process work better. At 
the same time, we must maintain the 
close association between economic 
performance and external financial 
support. 

While we believe the IMF should 
continue to estimate debtor financing 
needs, we question whether the inter- 
national financial institutions should 
delay their initial disbursements until 
firm, detailed commitments have been 
provided by all other creditors to fill 
the financing "gap." In many instances, 
this has served to provide a false sense 
of security rather than meaningful fi- 
nancial support. The banks will them- 
selves need to provide diverse, active, 
and timely support in order to facilitate 
servicing of the commercial debt re- 
maining after debt reduction. Debtor 
nations should set goals for both new 
investment and the repatriation of 
flight capital and to adopt policy meas- 



the creditor community . . . should provide more 
effective and timely financial support. 



strengthen the debt strategy could help 
lay the basis for an increase in IMF 
quotas. There are, of course, other 
important issues that have to be ad- 
dressed in the quota review, including 
the IMF arrears problem and a need 
for clear vision of the IMF's role in the 
1990s. It is our hope that a consensus 
can be reached on the quota question 
before the end of the year. 

Creditor governments should con- 
tinue to reschedule or restructure their 
own exposure through the Paris Club 
and to maintain export credit cover for 
countries with sound reform programs. 
In addition, creditor countries which 
are in a position to provide additional 



ures designed to achieve those targets. 
Debtor nations and commercial banks 
should determine through negotiations 
the portion of financing needs to be 
met via concerted or voluntary lending 
and the contribution to be made by vol- 
untary debt or debt service reduction. 

Finally, sound policies and open, 
growing markets within the industrial 
nations will continue to be an essential 
foundation for efforts to make progress 
on the debt problem. We cannot rea- 
sonably expect the debtor nations to in- 
crease their exports and strengthen 
their economies without access to 
industrial-countrv markets. The 



ipartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



55 



EUROPE 



Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
provides an important opportunity to 
advance an open trading system. We 
must all strive to make this a success. 

Conclusion 

Taken together, the ideas I have dis- 
cussed today represent a basis on which 
we can work to revitalize the current 
debt strategy. We believe that through 
our efforts, we can provide substantial 
benefits for debtor nations in the form 
of more manageable debt service obli- 
gations, smaller and more realistic fi- 
nancing needs, stronger economic 
growth, and higher standards of living 
for their people. 

If we work together, we can make 
important progress toward our key 
objectives: 

• To assure that benefits are avail- 
able to any debtor nation which demon- 
strates a commitment to sound policies; 

• To minimize the cost or contin- 
gent shift in risk to creditor govern- 
ments and taxpayers; 

• To provide maximum oppor- 
tunities for voluntary, market-based 
transactions rather than mandatory 
centralization of debt restructurings; 
and 

• To better tap the potential for al- 
ternative sources of private capital. 

In the final analysis, our objective 
is to rekindle the hope of the people and 
leaders of debtor nations that their sac- 
rifices will lead to greater prosperity in 
the present and the prospect of a future 
unclouded bv the bui'dens of debt. ■ 



New Horizons in Europe 



Secretary Baker's address at the 
niinisterial meeting signaling the 
opening of two new security negoti- 
ations i)i Europe — talks on confidence- 
and security-huHding measures 
(CSBMs) and separate talks on 
conventional armed forces in Europe 
(CFE)—in Vienna on March 6, 1989.^ 

We meet here today in a historic set- 
ting. Vienna, of course, is a living 
monument to the creativity of Western 
culture. This city is also a crossroads of 
civilization. It reminds us that Europe 
and the achievements of Europe have 
always gone beyond the limits of geog- 
raphy to influence the wider world. 

But Vienna also bears witness to 
vanished hopes. Negotiations and 
agreements intended to bring enduring- 
peace to Europe have been discarded 
too often in war. Too often the lack of 
security in Europe has meant a lack of 
security for the entire world. That is 
why we are meeting here to negotiate. 
Our purpose is to improve the security 
of Europe, thereby also strengthening 
the foundations of world peace. 

I believe that we need a larger per- 
spective, a common vision of where 
we are headed and why, if we are to 
succeed. 

East-West Visions 

After the Second World War, Europe 
and the world were confronted by two 
distinctly opposing views. The United 
States and its allies in Western Europe 
held the vision of free peo])les, living 
under the rule of the law, their individ- 
ual freedoms protected, and their dem- 
ocratic governments responsible to 
those people. 

We believed, and we continue to 
believe, that freedom of speech and of 
religion, freedom from fear, and free- 
dom of opportunity were and are the 
natural rights of free men everywhere. 
We were certain, and we continue to be 
certain, that free markets and individ- 
ual initiatives are the surest routes to 
social and economic progress. 

We sought, and we continue to 
seek, our security in a coalition of free 
nations drawn together by common val- 
ues, not only mutual interests. And we 
envisioned then, as we envision now, 
a Europe at peace — its nations free 
to develop in diversity but united 
against war. 



Our vision was not the only visioi 
There was another view opposed to th 
values most cherished by the West. 
And the competition between the two 
visions gave us the difficult legacy wii 
which we live today: a Europe, forcilil 
divided against the will of its peoples: 
Europe, the most heavily armed conti 
nent in the world. 

Now, as we approach the end of 
this decade, new horizons are beckon- 
ing, horizons that offer us the oppor- 
tunity to go beyond the conflicts of th 
past. The other vision is changing. It 
changing because we in the West havt 
been faithful to our own vision. And i 
is changing because realism has begi 
to triumph in the Soviet Union. 

Perestroika. glasnost, and democ 
ratization are the slogans of the "new 
thinking." There are encouraging de 
velopments in human rights and in tl 
emphasis upon the rule of law. Econ- 
omies once rigidly fixed in the gri]) < 
centralized control are being loosene 
and a role for individual initiative ha 
been decreed. Recently, [Soviet] Gei 
al Secretary Gorbachev has declare(' 
"World politics, too, should be guide 
by the primacy of universal human v 
ues." The rhetoric of Soviet foreign 
policy is being reshaped with less 
emphasis on the use of force; [Foreig 
Minister Shevardnadze affirmed tha 
again today, and that's very good. 

No one can foretell where this 
process will lead or even whether it 
will endure. Yet we cannot deny the 
ality of what is actually happening i 
Europe today. Dostoevsky, in his nc 
The Possessed, wrote that "The fire 
in the minds of men, not in the roofs 
buildings." The revolutionary chang 
in that part of Europe still behind a 
rusting iron curtain are changes abo 
all in the minds of men, in their visi 
of the future. People want freedom: 
freedom of the mind; freedom in the 
home; freedom in the workplace; anc 
free governments. And these freedo 
will heal the wounds inflicted by sta 
nation and tyranny. 

A Europe of Freedoms 

I propose that we dedicate ourselve; 
creating a new Europe — a Europe 
based on these freedoms: 



it 



• The freedom of all Europeansi 
have a say in decisions which affect 
their lives, including freedom of the 



56 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/May 1! ia 



Hi 

n 



EUROPE 



orkplace. The legality of Solidarity, 
"or example, should really be the norm 
nd not the subject for negotiations. 

• The freedom of all Europeans to 
ixpress their political differences, 
vhen all ideas are welcome and human 
ights are truly inviolable. Monitors of 
he Helsinki agreements, for example, 
hould be honored and not hunted by 
heir governments. 

The freedom of all Europeans to 
xchange ideas and information and to 
ixercise their right to freedom of move- 
(lent. The researcher in Prague, for 
xample, should be able to find the 
■ooks he needs. Barbed wire should not 
eparate cousins in Hamburg from 
ousins in Dresden. And a wall should 
ot divide Berlin, continuing, as we've 
een just in the past month, to cost the 
ves of people seeking freedom. 

• Finally, the freedom of all Euro- 
eans to be safe from militai'y intim- 
lation or attack. Those in the West 
nould be free of the fear that the mas- 
ve forces under Soviet command 
light invade them. Those in the East 
'lould be free of the fear that armed 
oviet intervention, justified by the 
rezhnev doctrine, would be used 
gain to deny them choice. 

"New thinking" and the Brezhnev 
Bctrine are in fundamental conflict. 
e call today upon General Secretary 
Drbachev to renounce the Brezhnev 
»etrine — beyond any shadow of a 
Bubt. Let the "new thinking" sweep 
(vay this vestige from the era of 
tagnation. 

These four freedoms are insepar- 
4e. They are the principles for the 
w Europe; they are the keys that 
•en the door to the European house of 

f future. As the American President 
raham Lincoln said, "A house divid- 
against itself cannot stand." A con- 
lent divided by a wall cannot be 
cure. A secure and prosperous Euro- 
can never be built on the basis of ar- 
'icial barriers, fear, and the denial of 
dependence. 

I am happy to report that we have 
\de some jjrogress toward realizing 
e new Europe of the freedoms — 
ogress upon which we all can build, 
le Conference on Security and Co- 
eration in Europe — through the 
"sinki, Madrid, Stockholm, and now 
s Vienna documents — has defined 
er more precisely the obligations of 
ites. We have em])hasized a new free- 
m for individuals and the expanded 
ticept of openness and confidence- 
ilding measures in the field of secu- 
y. We support this process. The 



Helsinki Final Act embodies our vision 
of Europe. And NATO's security di- 
mension has always had the prevention 
of war as its only purpose. 

Economic and Environmental 
Initiatives 

Economic change is also a marked fea- 
ture of the new Europe. The creation of 
a single market by 1992, looking out- 
ward to benefit all who wish to trade, 
would surely fulfill the hopes of those 
postwar visionaries who rightfully saw 
economic union as a buttress of peace 
and freedom. Centralized economies 
are slowly divesting the straitjacket of 
outmoded Marxist-Leninist theories. 
And the desire for increased commer- 



And so, as we eye the horizon, im- 
portant questions remain unanswered. 
Will the new rhetoric be translated 
into new actions, or will we see a repe- 
tition of the past — of hopes disap- 
pointed once more? 

Will East and West, together, be 
able to dismantle the barriers thrown 
up by the old era of competing visions? 
Will these barriers finally be removed; 
will the Berlin Wall and the barbed 
wire and the watch towers finally be 
relegated to history? Will the Soviet 
Union demilitarize its foreign policy in 
Europe; will it cease to threaten de- 
mocracy's house with tens of thousands 
of tanks? 

I was encouraged by what [For- 
eign] Minister Shevardnadze said ear- 
lier today as he spoke of far-reaching 



The current force levels and force structures in 
Europe are not engraved in stone. They are the 
product of history, the results of conflict. And they 
can be changed. 



cial contact is strong and growing ever 
stronger. There is also a genuine possi- 
bility for all industrialized nations, 
both East and West, to work together 
on newly recognized transnational 
problems. 

Dangers to our environment, for 
example, risk the most fundamental se- 
curity of all the Earth's citizens. Just 
last week, to protect the globe's ozone 
layer, the European Community and 
the United States decided to end the 
use of all chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
by the year 2000, assuming adequate 
substitutes can be found — as we believe 
they can. We hope the Soviet Union 
will consider joining us in the spirit of 
"new thinking." 

Reducing Military Confrontation 

This is progress. But while the old era 
apparently recedes before the horizons 
of the new Europe, those horizons are 
still too distant. The arms and the arm- 
ies still face each other. An iron curtain 
still divides this continent. Too many 
governments have followed their sol- 
emn signature on human rights pledges 
with violent suppression of dissent. 



reductions. In recent years, we have 
seen reasons to be hopeful about the 
new Soviet thinking. But both realism 
and prudence require that we test the 
new thinking to make sure that it 
means new policy and, above all, 
changes in military deployments. We 
have sought to discover whether East 
and West could take steps together — 
irreversible steps — that lead toward 
the Europe of the freedoms. And we 
have also sought to reduce the level of 
military confrontation. 

Here, too, there is progress to 
report. Responding to an American 
proposal, the Soviet Union joined 
the United States in achieving an 
intermediate-range nuclear forces 
treaty that provides for the elimination 
of an entire class of nuclear-capable 
missiles. The treaty contains impor- 
tant precedents, especially in the areas 
of verification and asymetrical reduc- 
tions to equality. We have also made en- 
couraging progress in the START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] talks 
toward reducing strategic forces. And 
we look forward, once our review is 
completed, to further steps on the road 
toward arms reduction and arms 
control. 



57 



EUROPE 



Chemical Weapons Elimination 

President Bush has declared that the 
control and elimination of chemical 
weapons is a high priority for the Unit- 
ed States. Since 1984, when he tabled a 
draft treaty to eliminate chemical 
weapons from the face of the Earth on 
an effectively verifiable basis, the 
United States has exercised leadership 
in the Geneva negotiations. We will 
continue to be at the forefront of these 
efforts in the future as well. However, 
until we eliminate these weapons in a 
verifiable way, the United States will 
maintain a minimal chemical deterrent. 
Recently, we were gratified by the 
response to President Reagan's call for 
a conference on the use of chemical 
weapons — and the success of that con- 
ference under the leadership of the 
Government of France. Clearly, some 
nations are ready for action. 

The United States is prepared to 
lead in dealing with this problem. And 
so I am happy to announce that as one 
of his first acts. President Bush has di- 
rected our new Administration to ex- 
plore ways to accelerate the removal of 
our existing chemical weapons from 
Germany. The early removal of these 
weapons will require available safe 
storage and the development of practi- 
cal plans to destroy them. 

But unilateral action is not enough. 
The Soviet Union has enormous stocks 
of chemical weapons threatening Euro- 
pe. We, therefore, call on the Soviets to 
join us, to accelerate the destruction of 
their enormous stockpile of these 
frightening weapons. 

Finally, we must address the 
threat of chemical weapons prolifera- 
tion. We can build on our recent suc- 
cess in Paris. We propose that we bring- 
together governments and representa- 
tives of the international chemical in- 
dustry. We have been discussing with 
Australia the general question of prolif- 
eration and the importance of holding 
such a conference. For a number of 
years, Australia has played a leading 
role internationally in trying to pre- 
vent the spread of chemical weapons, 
including as leader of the Australia 
group of Western chemical-producing 
states. I am pleased to tell you, there- 
fore, that the Government of Australia 
has agreed to take the initiative in or- 
ganizing such a conference. 

Its purpose will be to discuss the 
growing problem of the movement of 
chemical weapons precursors and tech- 
nology in international commerce. We 
hope to establish better means of com- 
munication about this deadlv trade. 



58 



Conventional Military Imbalances 

Progress on nuclear arms control and 
chemical weapons, however, is not suffi- 
cient. We shall never be able to set 
East-West relations on an irreversible 
course toward enduring improvement 
unless we deal with the huge conven- 
tional military imbalances in Europe. 
We can define the issue simply: a vast 
force, spearheaded by heavily armored 
units and supported by massive fire- 
power, has been fielded by the Soviet 
Union and its allies. That force points 
West. 

We in the West have faced this 
threat since the dawn of the cold war. 
Today, Soviet and Warsaw Pact mili- 
tary forces go far beyond those conceiv- 
ably needed for defense. Wai'saw Pact 
tanks outnumber NATO tanks by over 
3-to-l, Warsaw Pact artillery exceeds 
NATO's artillery by 3-to-l, and the 
Warsaw Pact holds more than a 2-to-l 
advantage over NATO's armored troop 
carriers. 

These ratios speak for themselves. 
And as NATO has pointed out, these 
are forces best suited to an invasion of 
Western Europe. 

It is this array of Soviet armed 
might that divides Europe against its 
will and holds European hopes hostage 
to possibly hostile Soviet intentions. 

Lately, we have heard that Soviet 
military doctrine is changing to meet a 
standard called "reasonable sufficien- 
cy." And in December at the United 
Nations, General Secretary Gorbachev 
declared the Soviet intention to with- 
draw 50,000 men, 5,000 tanks, and 
other selected equipment from certain 
areas of Eastern Europe. Several East 
European governments have also an- 
nounced unilateral force reductions. 

That's a start, a very good start. 
It's a very hopeful start, and, of 
course, we are watching to see the 
words become deeds. And equally clear 
is the necessity to go further. Even af- 
ter these reductions, the Warsaw Pact 
would retain a 2-to-l edge in tanks and 
artillery. The Warsaw Pact's conven- 
tional military preponderance, espe- 
cially in the spearheads of attack, is, in 
fact, what makes an invasion possible. 

These are hard facts. These are 
the facts that have to be changed if our 
negotiations are to be successful and if 
the foundations of a new Europe are to 
endure. The arms control process must 
now be focused strongly on this East- 
West imbalance. 

The United States, together with 
the other Western participants in these 
talks, has developed serious proposals 



to end disparities in conventional 
ground forces and to introduce far- 
reaching confidence-building and 
stabilizing measures. 

Our approach focuses on the 
achievement of significant reductions 
key military capabilities that are de- 
signed for invasion. For example, we 
propose an overall limit on the total ai 
mament in Europe and that no more 
than 40,000 tanks should be deployed 
by the 23 participating states in the 
CFE negotiations. In addition, Westei 
participants are prepared to introduc 
new confidence-building measures in 
the near future, aimed at increasing 
transparency and reducing the possi- 
bility of surprise attack. Ultimately, ( 
course, stability will be achieved whe 
no country is able to dominate by fore 
of arms. 

Let me emphasize once more, hov 
ever, that change in the military bal- 
ance is only one part of the process. 
Only when the causes of the historic c 
vision of Europe have been removed, 
when we have achieved the free flow ( 
people and information, when citizens 
everywhere enjoy free expression, on 
then will it be possible to eliminate t( 
tally the military confrontation. In 
other words, we cannot remove the 
symptoms, unless we deal fundamen- 
tally with the causes. I am encourage 
that increasingly people from both 
East and West understand that rela- 
tionship. We must all work to bring 
about far-reaching changes that end 
the division of this continent. 

The United States is committed 
working with reasonable men and wc 
men in all countries to achieve succe: 
We approach the negotiations, which 
will begin a few days from now in thi 
very halls, with a clear goal, solid pr 
ciples, and well-defined objectives. 

Our goal in these negotiations, a 
in all arms control negotiations, will 
to prevent war — any war, nuclear or 
conventional — deter aggression, and 
increase stability at lower levels of 
armed forces. We shall judge every 
proposal not simply by the numbers i 
weapons reduced but by the impact c 
deterrence and stability. 

To achieve this goal, we reaffirn 
the unity of purpose between the Un 
ed States and its European allies. \^ 
have long recognized, as NATO Seer 
tary General Manfred Woerner said, 
that "Europe needs America as Ame 

ica needs Europe Separate, we 

would become victims of world histo 
cal development; together we can det 
mine the course of world history for 
better." 



EUROPE 



Our negotiating objectives are well 
fined. 

First, as I mentioned earlier, the 
ATO allies have called for equal ceil- 
gs in key items of equipment at levels 
low current NATO forces. This 
mid be the best step toward a secure 
irope at lower levels of arms. 

Second, no state should possess 
pabilities designed primarily for 
rasion. 

Third, a regime of mutual open- 
ss and transparency about military 
itters should be expanded which can 
ter confidence, clarify intentions, 
d thereby strenghten stability. 

In addition, we hope that all states 
11 adopt doctrines and force struc- 
res which faithfully reflect defensive 
entions. 

As these negotiations unfold, we 
d our allies will e.xplore every oppor- 
(lity for progress. The current force 
els and force structures in Europe 
! not engraved in stone. They are 

product of history, the results of 
aflict. And they can be changed. 

If the past is any guide, however, 
can expect many proposals that 
)mise the perfection of disarmament 
ire would only abandon the pragma- 
m of deterrence. To paraphrase 

ston Churchill, the counsel of per- 
Ition is admirable in a clergyman but 
practical in a statesman. The oppor- 
ities are too precious to be squan- 
ed in sweeping but impractical 
iposals. Instead, let us do the work 
jeace carefully, progressing step by 
IP and verifying each step. 

inclusion 

ave spoken today of the new Europe, 
he freedoms, of the new horizons 
■koning to a continent divided 40 

rs ago because of a conflict of vi- 
is. As that conflict weakens, it may 
possible to remove the old obstacles 
own up in Europe's path. That is our 
Ik. We must remove at last the con- 
(itional force imbalances and curtains 
lecrecy that have so long imperiled 
ropean security and, with it, world 
ice. 

This essential step will not be 
y. It will produce new challenges 
' perhaps some difficult moments. 
; we cannot desist from the task. 



I have argued that a clearer under- 
standing of the Europe of the future 
will ease the burden. Already, we can 
glimpse part of that horizon of a peace- 
ful and prosperous Europe for which so 
many have sacrificed. Yet though it 
beckons, we know that nothing can be 
taken for granted. It falls to us to take 
the next step, if not the final one, on 
this journey. 

Prophecy is God's gift to but a few, 
yet imagination is the birthright of ev- 
ery human being. We can but dimly see 



the future through the mists of change, 
yet we can all imagine the world we 
would like to see. That is the summons 
of our undertaking. Let us, therefore, 
go forward together to build that Euro- 
pe we would like to see — a free, open, 
secure, and prosperous Europe; a 
whole Europe, ennobling by example 
all mankind. 



'Press release 35. 



Secretary Meets With Soviet Foreign IVIinister 



Following are Secretary Baker's 
remarks and a question-and-answer 
session with reporters after his 
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze in Viemia on March 7, 
1989 ^ 

Let me simply say that we had a very 
good initial meeting. We had a very 
broad discussion, and I think it was 
quite substantive. We had 1 hour of 
one-on-one, and then we had another 
hour at a plenary session. This meeting 
generally, I think, set the stage for our 
next meeting which I'm sure the [For- 
eign] Minister has told you will be in 
Moscow sometime during the first 2 
weeks in May. 

I think it is fair to say that these 
talks were conducted in a very positive 
atmosphere, and this reflected the 
determination of all of us to work to- 
gether and to cooperate. As we were 
walking out, the [Foreign] Minister 
characterized our meeting as a good 
beginning, and I would certainly agree 
with that. I told him, as I had told our 
NATO allies during the course of my 
trip around Europe a couple of weeks 
ago, that we believe perestroika is good 
for the Soviet Union, and we think it is 
good for the rest of the world, and we 
hope that the Soviets succeed. I also 
noted our belief that the success of per- 
estroika is really dependent upon what 
the Soviets do and not what we in the 
West do. 

I talked about our desire to expand 
the agenda of our dialogue to include 
therein those global issues or transna- 
tional issues which cut across national 
boundaries, and he agreed that we 
could do that. I laid out our desire to 
expand some of the existing parts of 
our agenda, such as arms control, so 
that we can deal with problems like 
missile and chemical weapons prolifera- 



tion. He agreed that we should try to 
do this. I think this is an example of 
our shared interests in really what is 
basically a North-South problem. 

We raised other parts of our exist- 
ing agenda beginning with human 
rights, as we always do; made clear 
that we wanted to see continued prog- 
ress on human rights— that we'd seen 
good progress up until about December 
and then seen very little progress over 
the course of the past couple of months 
but that we were quite confident once 
we had the dialogue resumed that that 
progress would continue. 

I stressed our continuing disap- 
pointment with some of the actions in 
Berlin. I mentioned these in my speech 
yesterday [page 56]— these incidents 
where German Democratic Republic 
guards recently killed a would-be es- 
capee and caught another one against 
the western embankment of the Spree 
River in the British sector of Berlin. 

We talked about bilateral ties, 
about the importance of improving and 
expanding on those, on the intellectual 
and cultural e.xchanges. I told him that 
our review of the strategic arms talks 
was moving along; that we would ex- 
pect that to be completed toward the 
end of April; that the United States 
had, in addition to our review of our 
negotiating position on the strategic 
arms reduction talks (START), to com- 
plete a strategic modernization review 
as well. 

With respect to the conventional 
armed forces in Europe (CFE) talks, 
I pointed out that we are determined 
to see agreements that change force 
structures, that emphasize defensive 
force structures, minimize those forces 
such as tanks and artillery that make 
offensive operations thinkable. I 
pointed out again, as I did in my 



59 



EUROPE 



speech yesterday, that we believe the 
Soviets are moving in this direction 
and that that is encouraging. 

Yes, there are differences between 
us with respect to how we will deal 
with aircraft, how we will deal with na- 
val forces; and there are differences be- 
tween us with respect to short-range 
nuclear weapons. I would point out to 
you that naval forces and short-range 
nuclear weapons were expressly ex- 
cluded from the negotiating mandate 
for these talks. 

We talked about regional conflicts. 
We talked about the fact that this is a 
part of our agenda that requires special 
attention, although I think it is fair to 
say that we have made some pretty 
good progress working together on 
some regional conflicts, speaking spe- 
cifically of what's going on in Angola 
and Namibia and what has just hap- 
pened in Afghanistan. 

We talked of the Soviet "new think- 
ing" and the application to some of 
these regional areas. We discussed the 
Mideast. We discussed Central Amer- 
ica. We discussed cooperation in the 
Horn of Africa. We made the point that 
with respect to the "new thinking," we 
were anxious to see action and not just 
rhetoric. We made the point that we 
really weren't seeing much sign of the 
"new thinking" insofar as current So- 
viet posturing with Iran is concerned. 
We said we were looking for signs of the 
"new thinking" in Central America as 
well. 

We welcomed the Soviet interest in 
the Middle East. We genuinely believe 
that we can perhaps move toward peace 
in the Middle East by working together 
but that it is important that we begin a 
process that has some real chance of 
success. We pointed out our reserva- 
tions about beginning with a big inter- 
national conference under the glare of 
the television lights, and we said that 
pushing prematurely for such a confer- 
ence in our view could preempt more 
promising possibilities that might oc- 
cur down the line. 

Finally the question of a summit 
did come up. The United States is not 
ready as yet to set a date for the next 
summit, and I am sure that this is a 
matter that we will be discussing at 
our next ministerial. 

Q. You spoke of the review on 
START, but do you have any inkling; 
yet on when those talks might 
resume — those negotiations? 



A. I think I said to you, and I said 
to the [Foreign] Minister, that that re- 
view will be completed by the end of 
April. Upon the completion of that re- 
view, we will then begin to assess when 
we think those talks should resume. 
Clearly they can't resume until we com- 
plete the review, but the review will be 
completed by the end of April. 

Q. Does the United States agree 
on the Soviet plan of holding an inter- 
national conference on the Middle 
East? 

A. No. I've just spoken to that in 
quite some detail. We think that an inter- 
national conference could well, in fact, be 
counterproductive. We believe that work 
at lower levels, on the ground, to bring 
about a climate that can help lead to di- 
rect negotiations between the parties is 
what is needed. Peace in the Middle East 
will come from direct negotiations bet- 
ween Israelis and Palestinians. 

Q. What did you mean when you 
said that you complained to the Sovi- 
ets about their posturing on Iran? Is 
that in connection with the Rushdie 
case [Salman Rushdie, author of The 
Satanic Verses] or otIuT mattersy Can 
you I'xpaiid on tliaty 

A. No, I'd rather leave it right 
there, but it does include the matters 
you mentioned. 

Q. On the question of Central 
America, did you raise the amount of 
Soviet aid to Nicaragua? 

A. %s. 

Q. Did you ask them to cut it 
back? 

A. That is a request that has been 
made before, but the answer is yes, we 
did. We pointed out the fact that the 
United States is not furnishing any mil- 
itary assistance to the resistance in 
Nicaragua, that the Armed Forces of 
Nicaragua are way out of proportion to 
anything else that exists in Central 
America and, in fact, represent a rather 
significant threat to their neighbors. 

Q. Did you suggest that there 
might be willingness to move on high 
technology trade on our part? 

A. I didn't link it to anything. 

Q. Was there a Soviet response to 
that? 

A. The response was that some con- 
sideration could be given to cutting back 
on military assistance to Nicaragua if 
the United States would see fit to elimi- 
nate any security assistance to other 
states in Central America, which, of 
course, is not acceptable to the United 



States by virtue of the imbalance that 1. 
exists as far as Nicaragua and its neighj 
bors are concerned. | 

Q. On the human rights issue, j 
did you mention specific cases? i 

A. Yes, we did mention specific 
cases, as we have in our prior 
discussions. 

Q. Did you give names? 

A. I would not want to give you th 
names because that's something on 
which we can expect progress if we dot 
put the names out there in the public 
arena. 

Q. Would you care to comment i 
the European Community iroiku pro 
posal regarding the Middle East? 

A. I have the same comments on 
that as I expressed to the EC troika 
ministers yesterday that I've just givei 
you here. We should be very careful th 
we do not preempt what might be mort 
promising opportunities down the line 
by rushing to a high visibility interna- 
tional conference on the Middle East. 

The situation cries out for some ha 
work on the ground to bring about an ;i 
mosphere that will be conducive ulti- 
mately to direct negotiations between 
the parties. We have a new situation in 
the Middle East. We have a dialogue b( 
ween the United States and the Pal- 
estine Liberation Organization (PLC), 
something that has not existed before. 
We have a certain dynamic, I think, th 
may provide some opportunities, if we 
ai'e careful about how we go about ap- 
proaching those opportunities. 

Q. Did you agree on a set of 
working-level talks between now 
and — 

A. We agreed that we would con- 
tinue the method of handling our dia- 
logue as we have in the past, that whei 
we have full-blown ministerials — and, 
course, this was not one of those becau 
it was our initial meeting around the 
edges of the conference here in Vienna- 
but we agreed that we would have ex- 
perts accompany us when we have our 
ministerial meetings in the future. 



'Press release 37 of Mar. 10, 1989. 



60 



Department of State Bulletin/May 191 



MIDDLE EAST 



-Y 1990 Assistance Request 
or the Middle East 



Folloirh/g are statements by 
'dward S. Walker and A. Peter 
'iirleigli. Dcpiiti/ Assistant Secretaries 
)r Near East and South Asian 
Miirs, before the St(bconnnittee on 
'urope and the Middle East of the 
'oiise Foreign Affairs Committee on 
tarch 1, i, and 9, 1989. '■ 



EPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
WALKER, 
[AR. 1. 1989 

he search for a comprehensive, peace- 
il settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
inflict and the promotion of U.S. in- 
rests and access in the Middle East 
•e major objectives of the Bush Ad- 
inistration. While the region as a 
hole remains volatile, there have been 
gnif leant steps toward peace over the 
ist decade. Above all the Treaty of 
iace Between Egypt and Israel — 
hose 10th anniversary occurs at the 
id of this month — remains the cor- 
■rstone and model of the peace proc- 
s. We welcome and support the 
mmitment of both countries to fur- 
er strengthening and deepening their 
lateral relationship. 

We are committed to working 
)sely with the Government of Israel 
id with moderate Arab leaders for a 
solution of the outstanding issues of 
e Arab-Israeli conflict, including the 
ilestinian question. This will involve 
i;enuine process of consultation with 
e Israeli leadership at every stage, 
,d we look forward to the early visits 

Washington of Foreign Minister 
rens and Prime Minister Shamir, 
'cretary Baker also is particularly in- 
rested to assure that our consulta- 
)ns extend fully to the Congress, and 
is in this spirit that I appear here 
da\-. 
The Administration's approach 

the peace process is based on the 

inciples which have governed U.S. 
ilicy over the past two decades. As 
'cretary Baker indicated in his con- 
•mation hearings, we believe that op- 
irtunities to move the peace process 
rward need to be carefully e.xplored. 
e want to build a positive environ- 
ent for direct negotiations because 
ily such negotiations can lead to true 

ace. We see no need to rush to a high 



visibility international conference 
whose outcome would be highly 
problematic. 

The situation in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip remains difficult. The Pal- 
estinian uprising continues, and the 
level of violence remains high. An im- 
portant step is to reduce the level of vi- 
olence. The 15-month uprising, the 
reduction of Jordan's financial and ad- 
ministrative involvement since last 
summer, and the devaluation of the Joi-- 
danian dinar have had serious reper- 
cussions for the Palestinian residents of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 

The Middle East region confronts 
Israel with a number of major security 
problems, particularly the proliferation 
of ballistic missile technology and 
chemical weapons. The United States is 
committed to maintaining Israel's qual- 
itative and technological capacity to de- 
fend itself against these threats. We 
will not relax our efforts to assure Is- 
rael's ability to maintain and protect 
its vital security interests. 

Israel and the United States have 
developed an effective program of stra- 
tegic cooperation, including training, 
exercises, and close consultations on 
the regional security environment. We 
will work to further strengthen our 
strategic cooperation in these areas. 

Assistance to Israel 

A fundamental element of U.S. foreign 
policy has been support for a strong 
and secure Israel. Our links with Israel 
are broad and deep, based on shared 
values, common interests, and a com- 
mitment to democracy and freedom. In 
recent years, we have developed insti- 
tutional and commercial links which 
have reinforced these traditional ties. 
These include the Joint Political Mili- 
tary Group, which is concerned with 
strategic cooperation: the Joint 
Security Assistance Planning Group, 
which coordinates U.S. military as- 
sistance to Israel; the Joint Economic 
Development Group, focusing on eco- 
nomic issues; and the Free Trade 
Agreement signed in 1985. 

Since 1948 the United States has 
provided over $43 billion in assistance 
to Israel. We have made a major con- 
tribution to Israel's security and 
development. 



Our proposed assistance program 
for Israel in FY 1990 consists of $1.8 
billion in foreign military sales (FMS) 
financing grant and $1.2 billion in eco- 
nomic support funds (ESF), all pro- 
vided on a grant basis. These figures 
reflect close consultations between our 
two governments. 

Our military assistance to Israel 
will focus on three areas: cash flow re- 
quirements associated with the pur- 
chases of the advanced fighter aircraft 
(F-15 and F-16); financing the Israeli- 
produced Merkava tank; and naval mod- 
ernization through purchases of three 
SAAR V corvettes and two Dolphin- 
class submarines. Within the $1.8 bil- 
lion total for military assistance, we 
are providing additional benefits to Is- 
rael. Four hundred million dollars is 
authorized for offshore procurement 
expenditures in Israel. 'These funds 
are worth much more than their dollar 
value since they provide an added in- 
jection into the Israeli economy in the 
form of jobs, technology, and increased 
production. This is also the case with 
regard to the $100 million in directed 
offsets, mandated purchases of Israeli 
defense articles by the United States. 
Further the U.S. Defense Department 
procures over $2.50 million of Israeli 
military items through our defense in- 
dustrial cooperation and procurement 
program which provides additional sup- 
port to the Israeli economy. 

Israel uses U.S. economic aid to re- 
pay FMS loans made by the United 
States to Israel prior to 1985 and for 
some commodity imports. In 1988 Is- 
rael refinanced FMS loans under FMS 
debt reform legislation. Israel has re- 
quested and received permission to re- 
finance $5.45 billion of its high Interest 
FMS debt. To date it has refinanced 
$4.75 billion, resulting in a debt serv- 
ice savings of approximately $150 mil- 
lion annually over the next 5-10 years. 

Finally two other programs will 
provide significant resources to Israel. 
Under the fair pricing initiative passed 
last year, Israel will save $90 million in 
costs associated with the purchase of 
F-16 aircraft. The United States will 
also provide Israel $120 million for 
joint research under the Arrow anti- 
ballistic missile research program, a 
part of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
research. 



61 



MIDDLE EAST 



Our economic assistance of $1.2 
billion in ESF is also important in sup- 
porting economic stability and struc- 
tural reform. In 1985 Israel faced 
soaring inflation (445'}^), a huge govern- 
ment budget deficit (13% of GDP), and 
rising unemployment. Thanks to far- 
reaching economic stabilization meas- 
ures and U.S. economic assistance, 
Israel was able to reduce inflation to 
16% in 1987 and to restore economic 
growth. In January 1989, Finance Min- 
ister Peres announced a package of eco- 
nomic measures to improve prospects 
for growth and to reduce inflation, in- 
cluding the 13.4% devaluation of the 
shekel, cuts in food and fuel subsidies, 
a virtual no-growth budget, ta.\ reduc- 
tions, and continued reform of the capi- 
tal market. 

West Bank and Gaza Strip 

The unrest in the West Bank and Gaza 
is a vivid reminder that the future sta- 
tus of the occupied territories and the 
1.6 million Palestinians who live there 
are at the center of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Jordan's decision in July 1988 
to reduce ties with the territories has 
focused attention on fundamental is- 
sues involved in the search for peace, 
among them how the security concerns 
of Israel, Jordan, and other states in 
the area are to be reconciled with Pal- 
estinian aspirations. 

Our assistance jirogram in the 
West Bank and Gaza was initiated in 
1975 with strong congressional sup- 
port. The Palestinians, Israel, and 
Jordan have welcomed the program. In- 
deed it is more urgently needed than 
ever in view of the economic problems 
of the territories. Inadequate infra- 
structure imjjedes economic progress 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Unemploy- 
ment and underemployment cause 
hai'dships and contribute to instability 
and violence. Over the medium term, 
economic development and self-reliance 
can give Palestinians a larger stake in 
a peace settlement and encourage mod- 
erate forces within the Palestinian 
community. 

Notwithstanding the current dif- 
ficulties, we remain committed to 
fostering economic development in the 
territories and improving the condition 
of the residents. The United States has 
provided over $98 million in direct as- 
sistance to the West Bank and Gaza 
program since 1975. Private voluntary 
organizations — such as Catholic Relief 
Services, Save the Children Federa- 



tion, and American Near East Refugee 
Aid — have pai'ticii)ated. The private 
voluntary organizations, in recent 
years, have increased their activities 
in the territories in such areas as 
health, sanitation, agricultural devel- 
opment, water supply, and community 
development. 

For FY 1990, we are requesting 
$12 million for these activities in the 
territories. This will fund projects to 
impi'ove health, water, and sanitation: 
to develop agricultural credit and pri- 
vate sector activities: and to construct 
schools and roads. The private volun- 
tary organizations have continued to 
operate and administer projects de- 
spite the disturbances. The Palestin- 
ians, Israel, and Jordan all want us to 
continue and expand the program. 

The U.S. program in the West 
Bank and Gaza represents our com- 
mitment to a secure future for the 
Palestinians and all states in the region 
based on cooperation and dialogue, not 
conflict. It is important to our efforts 
to engage moderate Palestinians and 
Arab governments to build on what has 
been achieved since the Camp David 
accords. 



DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

WALKER, 
MAR. 2, 1989 

I am pleased to testify this morning on 
the Administration's proposed FY 1990 
security assistance programs for 
Egypt, Middle East regional coopera- 
tion, and the multinational force and 
observers (MFO). 

Ejfypt 

A strong, stable Egypt is central to 
U.S. strategic interests in the Middle 
East. Egypt's leadership in the Arab- 
Israeli peace process, its influence as a 
force for moderation in a turbulent re- 
gion, and its support for peaceful reso- 
lution of regional conflicts are all 
congruent with U.S. values and objec- 
tives. The broad-based bilateral rela- 
tionship we enjoy today with Egypt is 
due in no small part to the breadth of 
our economic and security cooperation 
efforts over the past decade. 

Over the past year, Egypt's re- 
integration into the Arab fold has 
continued, as Egypt has returned to 
prominence in Arab councils. All but 
three Arab countries have now rees- 
tablished diplomatic relations with 
Cairo. Most important, Egypt has 



62 



made no concessions to regain its pos 
tion in the Arab world — a clear signal 
that a commitment to peace can yield 
solid political dividends. 

As the 10th anniversary of the 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty approachi 
Egypt remains fully committed to 
peace and to a reasonable bilateral re 
lationship with Israel. Two of the moi 
troublesome irritants in the Israel- 
Egypt relationship have recently bee 
resolved. In January an Egyptian 
tribunal accepted official Egyptian 
responsibility for the tragic 1985 shm 
ings at Ras Burqa and awarded the 
Israeli — and one American — victims 
or their families fair compensation. 
Within the past week, Egypt and Isi' 
el have resolved the final issues out- 
standing following the September 19^ 
decision of an international arbitral 
panel in favor of Egypt's claim to Tab 
Israeli withdrawal from the area is e 
pected to follow shortly. Resolution o 
the Taba dispute — which was facili- 
tated by active U.S. diplomacy — 
demonstrates to other states in the V' 
gion that peaceful negotiations can 
bear fruit. 

Over the ])ast year. President 
Mubarak has promoted U.S. efforts t 
move the Arab-Israeli peace process 
forward. Egypt backed Secretary 
Shultz's initiative of early 1988, de- 
signed to offer both sides an incentiv 
to engage in direct negotiations by 
linking interim arrangements with f 
nal status. Egyi)t's encouragement C( 
tributed to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 
Arafat's agreement to renounce terr^ 
ism, accept negotiations on the basis 
UN Security Council Resolutions 24i 
and 338, and recognize Israel's right 
exist — thereby clearing the way to a 
U.S. -PLO dialogue. President Muba- 
rak's upcoming trip to Washington 
should present a further opportunity 
exchange views on how to encourage 
rael and responsible Palestinians to 
move toward direct peace negotiatioi 

Egypt and the Soviet Union hav( 
expanded the scope of their relations 
over the past year, culminating in thi 
visit of Foreign Minister Shevardnad 
to Cairo last week. Egypt's ability tc 
bring the Soviets and Israelis togeth 
in Cairo demonstrates an activism in 
Egyptian foreign policy which is like 
to expand. While we can expect Egy 
to solidify its Arab ties and to modes 
expand its political and economic coo 
eration with the Eastern bloc, Egypt 
should continue to look to the United 
States as its key economic and securi 
partner outside the region. 



Department of State Bulletin/May 1£ 



MIDDLE EAST 



Internally Egypt's most pressing 
roblem remains the economy. After a 
remising start on economic reforms in 
iid-1987, Egypt's leaders adopted a 
lore cautious posture, as inflation and 
uggish economic conditions began to 
rain the social fabric. Discussions 
ith the International Monetary Fund 
MF) and the World Bank on an eco- 
)mic reform package have been going 
1 for over a year, after Egypt made 
)lid initial steps toward trimming the 
idget, encouraging agricultural liber- 
ization, establishing a competitive 
tchange rate policy, and adjusting 
ices toward international levels, 
gypt's budget and balance of pay- 
ents remain deeply in deficit. Debt 
scheduling benefits expired in June 
188, and arrears on external debts are 
ounting steadily. The balance-of- 
yments picture is especially troub- 
ig, with higher world grain prices, 
bt servicing, and lower oil proceeds 
mbining to squeeze available foreign 
change resources. 

Reform progress has continued 
ross a number of areas. Tourism is 
oming, reflecting more realistic ex- 
ange rate policies and privatization 
management. Agricultural liberali- 
tion has been broadened, with 
bsidies removed on feed corn and re- 
ced on fertilizers and pesticides. The 
vernment is also in the process of im- 
?menting a substantial increase in 
e price of bread — always a politically 
!'ficult move in Egypt given the vivid 
Emories of the 1977 riots. These all 
present important steps in the right 
•ection. 

We have encouraged Egypt to con- 
idate these and other reform efforts 
a comprehensive program that can 
Timand the broad support of the IMF, 
3 World Bank, and the Western donor 
Timunity. The new IMF program 
jld then pave the way to another 
bt rescheduling which would provide 
tical relief to Egypt's balance of 
yments. We continue to use our as- 
tance program to creatively encour- 
e both macroeconomic and sector re- 
■ms. In order for the reform effort to 
:eeed, the Egyptian Government 
1st be convinced that economic 
owth and better living conditions for 
? Egyptian people will result. 

For FY 1990, the Administration is 
luesting a total of $2.3 billion in com- 
led military, economic, and food as- 
tance to Egypt. These levels, while 
;h in an era of scarce resources, are 
al to help meet Egypt's most urgent 



Secretary Meets With 
Israeli Foreign Minister 



Following are remarks by 
Secrefari/ Baker and Israeli Foreign 
Minister Moslie Arens after their 
meeting at tlie Department ofState on 
March IS. 19S9J 

Secretary Baker. We affirmed to the 
[Foreign] Minister that President Bush 
and I are firmly committed to continu- 
ing the historic U.S. -Israeli partner- 
ship and to do all we can to assure 
Israel's security and economic well- 
being. 

These are, of course, important 
goals for the United States because Is- 
rael is a friend — and not only a friend 
but an ally — and because Israel must 
be secure if we are going to make prog- 
ress toward peace in the Middle East. 

Our principal focus of attention, of 
course, was on the peace process. We 
both agreed that need for progress is 
of the highest priority and that we 
would continue to work together to 
achieve direct negotiations. I made 
clear our view that movement toward a 
comprehensive peace must be based on 
the principals of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242. 

We can and must find a way to 
move ahead which at one and the same 
time meets Israel's legitimate security 
needs and addresses the legitimate po- 
litical rights of the Palestinian people. 
We reviewed the current situation in 
the West Bank and Gaza, and we con- 
sidered various reinforcing and recip- 
rocal steps which might be taken to 
diffuse the tensions there. 

Finally, I reaffirmed our desire in 
the weeks and months and years ahead 
to continue to work closely with Israel 
in the search for peace. In this connec- 
tion. President Bush and I look forward 
to further discussions with Prime Min- 



ister Shamir when he visits Washing- 
ton. I'm hopeful that with goodwill on 
both sides, we can move forward to- 
ward our shared goal of peace. 

Foreign Minister Arens. It was a 

privilege for me to meet with the Sec- 
retary of State. I came here as the For- 
eign Minister of the newly elected 
government in Israel and have had the 
chance to meet the Secretary of State 
of the newly elected Administration 
here in Washington. We meet after a 
very solid foundation of friendship. I 
would say our alliance has been built 
over the past years between the United 
States and Israel. The Secretary of 
State has played a very important part 
in building that foundation in past posi- 
tions that he has held. 

We share common ideals and val- 
ues, common interests, and certainly 
the common objective of advancing the 
peace process. I think that our talk to- 
day contributed to building a basis of 
understanding between us on how we 
should proceed in order to advance as 
expeditiously as possible in the search 
for peace in the Middle East. 

Q. What about these reciprocal 
steps'? Are you receptive to the idea of 
reciprocal steps to reduce tension"? 

Foreign Minister Arens. We have 
exchanged views on the subject. We 
certainly want to reduce tension. That 
is an interest that we have quite aside 
from the interest that the U.S. Govern- 
ment has on that subject, and I think 
that we will find common ground on 
how to do that. It's not easy to do that 
considering the violence in the area at 
the present time. 



'Press release 39. 



security and economic requirements, 
thereby supporting important U.S. 
goals and interests in the region. 

Our FMS financing request of 
.$1.3 billion in grant assistance will 
permit the Egyptians to continue their 
urgent militai-y modernization pro- 
gram. Designed to facilitate Egypt's 
replacement of aging, obsolete Soviet 
equipment with fewer but better quali- 
ty U.S. items, the program has focused 



heavily on Egypt's armor and air re- 
quirements. In 1990 Egypt will con- 
tinue its development work in prepara- 
tion for the planned MlAl eoproduction 
program which is aimed at adding 555 
advanced U.S. tanks to Egypt's inven- 
tory during the 1990s. The Egyptians 
will also continue their preparations for 
receiving, beginning in 1991, their 
thii'd tranche of 40 F-16 fighter air- 
craft. A third major focus of Egypt's 



63 



MIDDLE EAST 



defense spending will be its efforts to 
improve its integrated air defense com- 
mand, control, and communications 
program. Finally a significant portion 
of the FMS funding we provide to 
Egypt will continue to be dedicated to 
the operations and maintenance re- 
quirements of equipment already deliv- 
ered to its inventories. 

The $1.7 million international mili- 
tary education and training (IMET) 
program is an important adjunct to our 
military assistance effort in Egypt. 
IMET helps train Egyptian military 
personnel to operate and maintain the 
increasing stock of U.S. equipment in 
the Egyptian military inventory. Fund- 
ing will also be used to assist Egyptian 
officers in mastering U.S. doctrine and 
management concepts, enhancing their 
use of U.S. -supplied equipment, and 
strengthening military ties between 
the two countries. 

While U.S. military assistance to 
Egypt has been on a grant basis since 
FY 1985, Egypt continues to have diffi- 
culty meeting payment terms on the 
$4.5 billion in commercial interest rate 
FMS loans incurred between 1979 and 
1984. Egypt was able to postpone debt 
payments due from January 1987 
through June 1988 in the conte.xt of a 
multilateral Paris Club rescheduling 
agreed to in the wake of the 1987 IMF 
standby arrangement. Rescheduling 
benefits have expired, however, and 
Egypt must resume payments begin- 
ning this July to avoid a cutoff of 
U.S. assistance under the Brooke 
amendment. Absent another debt re- 
scheduling or substantially increased 
cash inflows from foreign donors, Egypt 
will have difficulty servicing these and 
other debt obligations, given the diffi- 
cult prospects for the country's balance 
of payments. 

Egypt has not yet availed itself of 
the FMS debt restructuring option of- 
fered by Congress in the 1987 continu- 
ing resolution. The benefits to Egypt 
could be substantial — up to $90 million 
per year in interest savings at current 
rates. However, they are dwarfed by 
the magnitude of Egypt's balance-of- 
payments financing gap, which will 
total more than $3 billion before re- 
scheduling in 1989. An IMF" program, 
debt rescheduling, and new money in- 
flows are essential to close this gap and 
stabilize Egypt's economy. 

Our $815 million ESF request for 
Egypt balances support for Egyptian 
economic stabilization and development 
objectives. For balance-of-payments 



support, we plan to allocate a portion of 
our ESF program in the form of a cash 
grant. In addition our commodity im- 
port program will provide balance-of- 
payments support by funding im])orts 
of American manufactured goods and 
other commodities. The remainder of 
our ESF will be assigned to project 
and sectoral programs designed to pro- 
mote growth-oriented development in 
the productive sectors of the economy. 

We plan to continue our close com- 
munications with the subcommittee re- 
garding the disposition of any cash 
transfer assistance for Egypt. Mindful 
of the subcommittee's concerns and the 
need for economic reform progress, the 
Administration has not yet recom- 
mended disbursement of cash transfer 
resources from either FY 1988 or 
FY 1989 ESF programs for Egypt. We 
will continue to encourage the Govern- 
ment of Egypt to work toward signifi- 
cant economic reforms. At the same 
time, we believe it is vitally important 
for our bilateral relationship with 
Egypt that we have the capacity to re- 
spond flexibly to Egypt's needs. Accor- 
dingly we urge the subcommittee to 
remove existing restrictions on cash 
transfer assistance to Egypt in the FY 
1990 legislation. 

Our PL 480 Title I program con- 
tinues to provide an important though 
diminishing resource for Egypt to con- 
serve foreign exchange for sensitive 
grain imports. For F"Y 1990, we are re- 
questing $160 million in PL 480 Title I 
assistance, a decline of $10 million from 
the prior year. At current grain prices, 
this amount will finance about 15% 
of Egypt's wheat and flour import 
requirement. 

Multinational Force and Observers 

Apart from the Egypt program, the 
Administration is requesting $24.4 mil- 
lion in FY 1990 funding to support 
U.S. participation in the MFO, the in- 
ternational peacekeeping organization 
which monitors the security arrange- 
ments of the Egypt-Israel Peace Trea- 
ty. After 8 years of successful 
operations, both parties regard the 
MFO's continued presence as an essen- 
tial element in fostering a spirit of mu- 
tual eoojieration and confidence and a 
means for strengthening the peace 
process. 



DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

WALKER, 
MAR. 9, 1989 

I am pleased to appear before this sii 
committee to describe our proposed 
assistance programs for Jordan, 
Lebanon, Oman, and Yemen in 
FY 1990. These progi'ams are an im- 
portant element in our overall relatic 
with each of these countries and are ; 
key factor in helping us achieve goals 
which benefit us all. I would like to b 
gin by providing an overview of the s 
uation in the Middle East and descril 
our programs in Jordan and Lebanon 
My colleague, Mr. Peter Burleigh, w 
discuss our programs in Oman and 
Yemen. 

Middle East Overview 

As we discussed in hearings this sub 
committee held last week on our pro- 
grams in Israel, the West Bank and 
Gaza, and Egypt, we and our friends 
the Middle East face serious chal- 
lenges. Our close and cooperative tie 
with our key friends are probably th 
most important assets we have in pr 
serving U.S. interests in the region. 
Jordan is an excellent example. I am 
also afraid Jordan is an example of hi 
recent trends in LT.S. security assist 
ance can result in disproportionate ( 
in aid levels to important friends. 

Jordan 

The last 15 months have seen a dranr 
ie change in the way that King Huss 
has been moved to react to the Pales 
tinian problem. The intifada, or upr 
ing, which began in December 1987, 
significantly altered Jordan's relatio 
ship with the West Bank and its Pal- 
estinian population. 

Jordan's links, which were main 
with the pre-1967 traditional leader- 
ship, became increasingly tenuous a 
the youthful leadership of the upris- 
ing consolidated its position. Jordan' 
ability to speak on behalf of the 
Palestinians was based on its formei 
relationships. This linkage has erod 
along with the leadership role of the 
older generation as the uprising has 
continued. 

Concluding that he could no lonj 
claim the lead role in addressing the 
Palestinian element of the Arab-Isrj 
conflict. King Hussein took what he 
has called a "tactical step" in the pe 
process by placing the burden to pei 
form in the peace process on the PL' 



64 



It 



MIDDLE EAST 



id challenging Arafat to assume the 
isponsibilities of leadership. 

King Hussein recognized the real- 
' that Jordan could only speak for the 
,lestinians to the extent they both 
reed. In doing so, he did not opt out 
the peace process with Israel. With 
18 longest border of any state with Is- 
lel, Jordan must participate in this ef- 
rt. Indeed peace and security are in 
irdan's vital interest. 

King Hussein continues to be a 
itical factor in the peace process. 
Illy he has the credibility and national 
sets to give Israel the assurance it 
ust have that its negotiating partner 
n deliver on its commitments. King 
ussein must play a major role in facili- 
ting any Israeli-Palestinian 
commodation. 

Jordan's importance to the United 
.ates goes well beyond the peace proc- 
s. The United States shares strate- 
c interests with Jordan, whose 
oderate policies have supported peace 
id stability in the region. Our corn- 
on efforts to end the Iran-Iraq con- 
ct have recently seen considerable 
ogress. King Hussein's influence in 
•ab circles provides a measure of 
oderation insuring, for example, 
aq's development of a moderate post- 
ir regional role. 

Jordan plays a vital role in the ef- 
•t to curb worldwide terrorism. King 
jssein has vigorously opposed the use 
terrorism in all its manifestations 
th in the Middle East and beyond. 
16 Jordanian Armed Forces have 
M'ked diligently to prevent the use of 
rdanian territory as a base for raids 
Israel. Hussein has consistently and 
urageously opposed support by other 
•ab states for extremist groups. 

The United States and Jordan have 
d a special military-to-military rela- 
)nship for many years. That relation- 
ip has declined since the demise of 
e 1985 Jordan arms sale, which would 
ve provided F-16 fighters to Jordan, 
isistance from the United States has 
en drastically reduced: there is no 
,S. military equipment in the 
peline for the first time in many 
ars. Exercises have been curtailed, 
id training of Jordanian officers in 
e United States has been reduced 
le to budgetary constraints in the 
rdanian Armed Forces. Despite prob- 
Tis in our relationship, good will re- 
nins strong, but it is not an 
exhaustible reserve. 

Jordan's economy is in serious diffi- 
Ity. It has been hard hit by recent 



cuts in subsidies from gulf govern- 
ments as well as remittances from Jor- 
danians working abroad. It is now 
suffering a foreign exchange crisis of 
majoi' proportions. 

Hussein's government has re- 
sponded to Jordan's economic problems 
with strong and sound initiatives which 
the United States strongly supports. It 
has implemented austerity measures to 
conserve foreign exchange and curb do- 
mestic spending. It has renewed em- 
phasis on privatization of state-owned 
firms and issued appeals for financial 
help from its Arab neighbors. Discus- 
sions are also being held with the World 
Bank on the subject of a loan with quick 
disbursement. Jordan has had a long 



history of on-time debt payments, and 
its recent economic policy reforms — 
including freeing interest rates, dis- 
mantling controls on investment, and 
currency devaluation — are in accor- 
dance with World Bank structural ad- 
justment conditions. 

These economic difficulties come 
just as U.S. military aid to Jordan has 
declined sharply. Our military assist- 
ance to Jordan averaged $68 million an- 
nually over the last decade, reflecting 
our concern for the security of Jordan, 
its contribution to the peace process, 
and shared strategic interests. Last 
year (FY 1989), we requested $48 mil- 
lion in FMS credits for Jordan to pro- 
vide spare parts for U.S. equip- 



Continued Fighting in Lebanon 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 16. 1989> 

The U.S. Government is deeply con- 
cerned over the heavy exchange of shell- 
ing and consequent loss of life March 14 
in Beirut. The fighting illustrates yet 
again Lebanon's urgent need to escape 
the downward cycle of violence and po- 
litical disintegration. 

We urge all sides to exercise re- 
straint and to avoid civilian casualties 
at all costs. We call on Gen. Awn and 
Dr Huss [rival prime ministers; Gen. 
Awn is Christian-backed leader and Dr. 
Huss is Muslim-backed leader] to coop- 
erate and coordinate directly with one 
another to work together to restore 
and invigorate Lebanon's legitimate 
national institutions. We call on all 
Lebanese to support these national in- 
stitutions. The goal which we strongly 
support and which all parties must 
work for is well-known and has not 
changed — the restoration of Lebanon's 
unity, sovereignty, and territorial in- 
tegrity, with the withdrawal of all for- 
eign forces and the disbandment of the 
militias. 

The fighting also threatens to de- 
stroy the Arab League's peace initia- 
tive on Lebanon. The United States 
actively supports this initiative and en- 
courages the Arab League to continue 
its effort. We call on the Lebanese and 
all other concerned parties to join in 
this support. The suffering of innocent 
Lebanese civilians has continued far 
too long, and Lebanon's peace and sta- 
bility must be restored. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 29. 1989^ 

The United States welcomes the Arab 
League's call for a cease-fire in 
Lebanon. We strongly support that 
call, and we share the Arab League's 
concern about the grave situation in 
Lebanon. The shelling must stop, and 
the land and sea blockades must end. 
All parties to the fighting must negoti- 
ate their differences with one another. 

Further, civilian casualties and 
suffering must be avoided at all costs, 
including all attacks on residential 
areas and on sources of civilian food, 
water, fuel, and electricity. 

The United States applauds the 
Arab League's continuing efforts to 
help resolve the political impasse in 
Lebanon. We encourage the Arab 
League Committee on Lebanon, under 
the leadership of the Kuwaiti Foreign 
Minister, to continue its peace initia- 
tive. We stand ready to assist the ini- 
tiative however we can. 

The United States remains com- 
mitted to the restoration of Lebanon's 
unity, sovereignty, and territorial in- 
tegrity, with the withdrawal of all for- 
eign forces and the disbandment of the 
militias. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. 

-Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Margaret DeB. Tut- 
wiler. ■ 



spartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



65 



MIDDLE EAST 



ment already in Jordan's inventory and 
other urgently needed supplies. The re- 
quest included no new weapons systems. 

Regrettably, because of severe 
budget constraints, at the end of the 
FY 1989 security assistance allocations 
process, we were able to provide only 
$10 million in FMS credits to Joi'dan. 
This level does not support our inter- 
ests in Jordan and, if continued, would 
not allow us to pursue the important 
cooperative efforts in which we have 
been involved. 

I am convinced no one in the execu- 
tive or legislative branches wanted this 
result. And I realize that last year's aid 
level for Jordan is only one dramatic ex- 
ample of the problem we face as we try 
to fund high priority programs while 
remaining within reduced budget lev- 
els. I hope that in the course of discus- 
sions in the months ahead, we bear in 
mind the case of Jordan and work to 
avoid a similar result in FY 1990. 

Lebanon 

We remain deeply concerned about con- 
ditions in Lebanon. Partition has deep- 
ened, especially after parliament's 
failure last September to elect a new 
president. Two cabinets have formed: 



one in Christian east Beirut, led by 
Lebanese Army Gen. Michel Awn; the 
other in Muslim west Beirut, led by Dr. 
Salim al-Huss. For much of the past 6 
months, the two cabinets have been 
grappling with the problem of con- 
trol over institutions of the central 
government. 

There are now some signs that co- 
ordination is growing between the two 
cabinets. They appear to be cooperat- 
ing in opening more crossing points 
between east and west Beirut. The 
United States welcomes such coopera- 
tion, and we encourage Gen. Awn and 
Dr. Huss to work together to restore 
and invigorate as many of the legiti- 
mate institutions of the central govern- 
ment as possible on both sides of the 
"green line." 

The United States is committed to 
the restoration of Lebanon's unity, sov- 
ereignty, and territorial integrity, in- 
cluding the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces. Toward those ends, we support 
the election of a consensus president 
who is dedicated to national reconcilia- 
tion and to the immediate implementa- 
tion of political reform. We believe the 
fighting last month in east Beirut, bet- 
ween the Lebanese Armed Forces and 
the Lebanese Forces militia, further 



demonstrates the urgent need to re- 
store Lebanon's legitimate national 
institutions. 

The United States actively sup- 
ports the current efforts of the Arab 
League to help Lebanon out of its po- 
litical impasse. We have been encour- 
aged by the Lebanese response to the 
league's initiative, and we remain 
ready to assist the Arab League in 
its effort. The suffering of innocent 
Lebanese civilians has continued far 
too long, and Lebanon's peace and sta 
bility must be restored. 

Economic conditions in Lebanon 
are desperate. Inflation has moder- 
ated, but unemployment remains higl 
perhaps a third of the population regi 
larly receives humanitarian relief, in 
eluding food assistance. In FY 1989, 
the United States will help feed ap- 
proximately 135,000 needy Lebanese 
families through our PL 480 Title II 
program. Our modest $2 million ESF 
program in FY 1990 will help meet tl 
operational costs associated with the 
relief and rehabilitation activities of 
private voluntary organizations. 



DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETAR ' 

BURLEIGH, 
MAR. 9, 1989 



U.S. and PLO Meet in Tunis 



AMBASSADOR PELLETREAU'S 

STATEMENT, 
MAR. 22, 1989' 

Our meeting today took place in the 
context of our common objective of 
comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East. We began discussing in depth the 
general political environment as well as 
some of the substantive issues related 
to the peace process. We also discussed 
developments that have occurred since 
our first meeting last December 16 
from the viewpoint of whether they 
have contributed to, or detracted from, 
the atmosphere conducive to negotia- 
tions. The PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] is fully aware of our 
very strong views on terrorism and 
violence. 

For our part, we tried to explain 
principles and practical considerations 
which underline U.S. views. We also 
listened to the authoritative statement 



of PLO positions. We asked a lot of 
questions, and we answered some too. 

I think it is fair to say that much of 
the discussion focused on practical 
steps which can be taken to reduce ten- 
sions in the occupied territories and 
lead to direct negotiations. Based on 
[UN Security Council] Resolutions 242 
and 338, those negotiations must ensure 
the legitimate security needs of Israel 
as well as the legitimate political rights 
of the Palestinian people. 

We believe a good deal of prepara- _ 
tory work is necessary before this 
stage is reached. However, today there 
is clearly a new dynamic in the Middle 
East of which this dialogue is an impor- 
tant part. The immediate objective is 
to create a political environment in 
which productive, direct negotiations 
between Palestinians and Israelis can 
be sustained. 



■Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., is the U.S. 
Ambassador to Tunisia. ■ 



Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf 

The Persian Gulf and Southwest Asii 
region are vital to U.S. and Western 
economic and strategic interests. 
About 65% of proven world oil reserv 
and almost 25% of current world oil 
production are located in the gulf. C' 
tinned access to this commodity at 
reasonable prices is vital to Japan, tl 
European Community, and the world 
economy in general. In 1988 Saudi 
Arabia became our number one sourc 
of imported crude. One of the top strai 
gic priorities of the United States ano 
its allies must be to help assure that t 
states of the region remain free from 
hostile influence and intimidation. 

Over the past year, we have seen 
major changes in this part of the wor 
Iran's inability to continue the war a 
the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war hi 
reduced the danger of Iranian attem] 
to threaten the gulf states. The end > 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
removes Soviet forces from a positioi 
from which they could more easily ha 
intervened in the gulf littoral and 
threatened lines of communication vi 
to the West. 



66 



Department of State Bulletin/May M 



MIDDLE EAST 



I The willingness of the United 
lUes t(i stand by its commitments in 
reuion was a major factor in bring- 
about the cease-fire in the Iran- 
U| war and the Soviet withdi-awal 
m Afghanistan. Although the U.S. 
iivy protection regime in the gulf in 
|s7-.S8 was controversial, few would 
iue now that it was not successful, 
e strong support of the United 
ates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for 
' Afghan resistance helped convince 
' Soviets that it could not win the 
r in Afghanistan. 

While we have made a major con- 
but ion to security and stability in 
Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, 
illenges remain. For e.xample, 
mian threats during the war high- 
hted for Arab gulf states the impor- 
ice of maintaining a strong self- 
fense capability. This need contin- 
5, and we are working closely with 
;m to take appropriate measures. 
Also we must continue to assess 
viet intentions in the region. Over 
' last decade, the Soviet Union has 
janded diplomatic ties with the gulf 
:tes. It has, for many years, main- 
(ned major military supply relation- 
(ps w'ith several states, particularly 
iq and South Yemen, and appears to 
seeking to increase militai'y sales 
:h others, such as Kuwait and the 
lited Arab Emirates. We hope the 
viets will take a more constructive 
oroach toward the region under Gor- 
:hev and not, as so often in the past, 
■asure the success of Soviet policy by 
' degree to which it frustrates the 
als of the United States and its 
ies. 

Our relationships with the mod- 
ite states of Southwest Asia and the 
rsian Gulf are increasingly comple.x, 
th political, military, diplomatic, and 
jnomic dimensions. I think this will 
evident as I discuss our relation- 
ips with the two countries in the re- 
)n under review today — Oman and 
? Yemen Arab Republic. These as- 
tance programs support U.S. secu- 
y interests by assuring access to im- 
rtant military facilities, maintaining 
ace and stability at strategic choke- 
ints, and countering Soviet 
;Tuence. 



nan is one of the most durable and 
ible friends of the United States in 
e Middle East. It resisted the region- 
tide in the late 1970s and 1980s when 



Iraq to Pay 
Compensation 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAR. 28. 19891 

On March 27, 1989, the United States 
and Iraq reached agreement regarding 
compensation for the 37 crewmen who 
lost their lives in the May 17, 1987, at- 
tack on the U.S.S. Stark in the Persian 
Gulf. 

The Government of Iraq has 
agreed to pay over $27 million as full 
compensation for their deaths. The 
agreement was reached in Baghdad fol- 
lowing discussions between the Foreign 
Ministry of Iraq and the U.S. delega- 
tion headed by State Department Legal 
Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer, which in- 
cluded Capt. John Geer, Chief of the 
U.S. Navy Claims Division. 



' Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
Tutwiler. ■ 



it supported Egypt's adherence to the 
Camp David accords. The access agree- 
ment that we concluded with Oman in 
1980 became the keystone of U.S. strat- 
egy for the protection of the Persian 
Gulf, and it was critically important to 
U.S. military activities in the gulf over 
the past 2 years. Without Oman's coop- 
eration under the access agreement, 
which allows U.S. military access to 
certain facilities in Oman under contin- 
gency conditions, U.S. central com- 
mand strategy and operations would 
have been severely constricted. 

The access agreement has served 
both Omani and U.S. interests, ce- 
menting a closer bilateral relationship 
and an e.xtensive dialogue. Oman, a na- 
tion of no more than 1.5 million inhabi- 
tants, faces serious threats from its 
neighbors and values greatly the secu- 
rity offered by its relationship with the 
United States. Iran lies just across the 
Strait of Hormuz, and the Iran-Iraq 
war put all gulf Arab states on notice 
of Iranian ambitions. The Soviet- 
supported People's Democratic Repub- 
lic of Yemen (South Yemen) aided a 
Marxist secessionist movement in 
Oman's southern region in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and skirmishes took place 
along the Oman/South Yemen border as 
recentlv as November 1987. 



U.S. economic assistance to Oman, 
in the form of ESF, began with the ac- 
cess agreement in 1980. ESF was $20 
million in 1985 but dropped in subse- 
quent years. Our FY 1990 request for 
Oman includes $20 million in ESF and 
$100,000 in IMET. Oman views this 
economic assistance as an integral 
component of the agreement and of the 
relationship. The 10-year agreement is 
due for review in 1990, and economic 
assistance will be an important compo- 
nent in the review process. 

Oman is a modest oil exporter, and 
its economy is dependent on the petro- 
leum industry. The fall in oil prices in 
1985-86 sent the Omani economy into a 
recession that has worsened with every 
passing year; the projected budget def- 
icit for 1989 is over $1 billion. Our as- 
sistance is aimed at helping Oman to 
diversify its economy and strengthen 
commercial links with the United 
States, with emphasis on the manage- 
ment of fisheries and scarce water 
resources. 



Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) 

Our FY 1990 request for the Yemen 
Arab Republic includes $2 million of 
FMS financing on a grant basis, $1.1 
million for IMET, $5 million in PL 480 
food aid, and $21.15 million in develop- 
ment assistance. 

The Yemen Arab Republic occupies 
a strategic location at the southwest 
corner of the Arabian Peninsula, bet- 
ween Saudi Arabia and South Yemen. A 
stable North Yemen, able to defend it- 
self and increasingly meet the needs of 
its people, is important to peace and 
stability in this key region at the south- 
ern end of the Red Sea. 

The relationship between North 
and South Yemen, although showing re- 
cent signs of improvement, remains 
fragile and unpredictable. North Ye- 
men has been threatened in the past 
decade by direct attacks and attempts 
at subversion from the South. The lead- 
ership in Aden continues to be firmly 
tied to the Soviet Union, which has 
rearmed South Yemen since the de- 
struction caused by the 1986 coup. 

The Yemen Arab Republic is one of 
the poorest and least developed coun- 
tries in the Middle East. The U.S. firm 
Hunt Oil discovered oil in 1984 and 
the country joined the ranks of the 
petroleum-exporting nations in late 
1987. Neither exports nor reserves are 
large, however, and the government's 
income from oil exports has not been 



67 



NARCOTICS 



enough to compensate for continued de- 
clines in worl<er remittances and Arab 
donor aid. This situation, combined 
with a large, rapidly growing popula- 
tion and serious lack of infrastructure, 
means that the Yemen Arab Republic 
will remain heavily dependent on out- 
side assistance as it works to improve 
the lives of its citizens and become eco- 
nomically self-sufficient. 

The U.S. security assistance pro- 
gram, while small, supports equipment 
previously provided and offers an alter- 
native to Yemeni dependence on the So- 
viets. Despite its size, our program 
enjoys a high profile within the Yemeni 
military, and U.S. equipment and as- 
sistance are frequently compared favor- 
ably against Soviet equipment and 
assistance. The FMS funds requested 
for FY 1990 will be used to maintain 
U.S. -origin equipment and support 
the training needed for effective opera- 
tion of the equipment. The Yemeni Gov- 
ernment also is concerned about the 
U.S.S.R.'s position in any future crisi.s 
involving South Yemen, given the large 
Soviet investment in its Mar.xist ally. 
U.S. assistance, complemented by long- 
standing cooperative assistance pro- 
grams with Saudi Arabia, provides 
assurances that North Yemen has other 
friends who will assist with the defense 
it needs. 



'The complete ti-anseript of the liear- 
ings will be published by the committee aiifl 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Certification for Narcotics Source 
and Transit Countries 



Following are the text of identical 
letters Secretary Baker sent to Jim 
Wright. Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Claiborne Pell, 
chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, on March 1, 
19H9, and statements by Assistant 
Secretary for International Narcotics 
Matters Ann B. Wrobleski before the 
House of Representatives Task Force 
on Narcotics Control on March 9 and 
March 15.^ 



SECRETARY'S LETTER 

TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 1, 1989 

Attached is the President's first Determina- 
tion [Presidential Determination 89-11] re- 
garding the certification of major narcotics 
source and transit countries required by the 
Foreign Assistance Act. Quite frankly, he 
and I are both deeply troubled by the state 
of affairs upon which he based his certifica- 
tion decisions. Despite the hard work and 
dedication of many public servants and pri- 
vate citizens, both here and abroad, the in- 
ternational war on narcotics is clearly not 
being won. In fact, in some areas we appear 
to be slipping backwards. 

Nonetheless, we present you these cer- 
tifications in good faith in the hope that we 
can work together against the drug menace. 
For six countries, there are statements that 
explain the certification while acknowledg- 
ing that each of the six can and must do 
more in the future to end the drug trade. 
For one country, we have provided a justi- 
fication statement for a vital national inter- 
est waiver These certification decisions 
have all been made after careful delibera- 
tion recognizing that the efforts of foreign 
governments to stem the production and use 
of drugs have yielded mixed results. While 
there is need for much improvement, the 
President and I believe these certifications 
are an important element in working toward 
that goal. 

As you know, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988 established the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy. Bill Bennett has been 
selected by the President to become the 
first director of this office and has been 
instructed to pursue aggressively his new 
duties to revitalize our national anti-drug ef- 
fort. One of his first priorities after con- 
firmation will be to develop a revised 
national drug control strategy. As that 
strategy is being formulated, we would like 
to establish a dialogue on drugs with the 
Congress. A cooperative relationship with 
full exchange of ideas between the executive 
and legislative branches is the best way to 
forge an integrated and cohesive national 



strategy that will ultimately prove effecti\ 
in curbing the availability and use of drugs 
in America. 

Finally, I want to assure you that nar- 
cotics will remain a key element of our for- 
eign policy agenda. The President and I 
intend to raise this issue with foreign lead 
ers and express our personal interest in 
their efforts to reduce the supply of illicit 
drugs bound for the U.S. 

We look forward to working with the 
Congress to establish a sound drug contro 
strategy to remove the scourge of drugs 
from our nation. 

Sincerely yours, 

James A. Baker, 1 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

WROBLESKI, 
MAR. 9, 1989 

The Department will provide testi- 
mony today on the President's deter 
minations with respect to certificatio 
of Mexico and countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean. 

In these regions of the Western 
Hemisphere, President Bush on 
March 1 certified Mexico, Belize, The 
Bahamas, and Jamaica. It must be 
noted that Secretary Baker, in a spe- 
cial letter to the Speaker, qualified t\ 
President's certifications, saying that 
he and the President "are both deeph 
troubled by the state of affairs upon 
which he based his certification deci- 
sions . . . the international war on na 
cotics is clearly not being won. In fad 
in some areas we appear to be slippin 
backwards." 

For six countries, including Mexi 
and The Bahamas, the Secretary sale 
". . . each of the six can and must do 
more in the future to end the drug 
trade." 

As we prepare to discuss these ai 
other countries today, I want to call 
special attention to another part of th 
Secretary's letter, which I think cann 
be overemphasized. Noting the con- 
firmation hearings for the Director oi 
National Drug Control Policy and the 
requirement that the office develop a 
revised national drug control strateg; 
Mr. Baker said the Administration 
would like to establish a dialogue on 
drugs with Congress — a cooperative i 
lationship with full exchange of ideas 
between the executive and legislative 
branches — in pursuit of an integratec 
and cohesive national strategy. It is 



68 



NARCOTICS 



;lii' spirit of that letter that I pre- 
iii mir assessment of the subject 
lies. In doing so, I will draw upon 
tenitttioiial Narcotics Control 
mil (/I/ Report which was submitted 
■A)xh i. 



CXKO 

f\R(i remained the largest single 
aiiitry source for heroin, the second 
j-ucst source for marijuana, and a 
luliiig transit point for cocaine. Mexi- 
( expanded the scope of opium and 
luijuana eradication programs, while 
tkiiig steps to improve operational 
1 i. u'ncy. Still opium poppy and can- 
]\n~. cultivation continue at high 
; il>, and our concern about the avail- 
aliiy of heroin in such quantities 
.- iir_j our border is heightened by our 
■ iirrrns about opium production in 
, 111 licast and Southwest Asia, largely 
I cduntries where we have little if any 
|litical access. Production in Burma, 
».u^, Iran, and Afghanistan threatens 
increase U.S. heroin supplies, mak- 
y even more imperative the need to 
effective in Mexico. There is concern 
long some domestic drug abuse ex- 
rts that heroin popularity will rise in 
i neai' future, partly as a result of 
; highly publicized negative conse- 
ences of crack and increased Asian 
oduction. Cocaine seizures rose 
arply, but Mexico remains one of the 
)st critical land links to South Amer- 
.n sources of supply. 

Newly elected President Carlos Sa- 
.as de Gortari has made antinarcoties 
ograms a national priority for his 
w government, and the Attorney 
■neral's budget for 1989 will exceed 
6 million, up from $19.5 million in 
■87. A strong, positive tone for bilat- 
al relations was set in an early meet- 
? between then President-elect Bush 
d Mr. Salinas, and the U.S. Govern- 
mt, anticipating continued improve- 
mts in the program, is prepared to 
operate with Salinas on these en- 
ncements. However, U.S. officials 
e concerned about the inhibiting ef- 
:ts of corruption throughout the pro- 
am. U.S. enforcement agencies 
ntinue to monitor instances of drug- 
lated corruption within Mexico. 

President Bush noted these prob- 
Tis in his certification statement: 

I am determined to build upon this dia- 
;ue. Me.xico is a narcotics source country 
which cooperative efforts must succeed, 
iwever, there are problems with the pro- 
am. Opium and heroin availability did not 
minish, and the estimates which show a 
ight decline in marijuana production are 



considered soft. Corruption remains a seri- 
ous impediment to program effectiveness, 
and many major trafficl<ers remain at large. 
Working together, much more can be done. 
Mexico must expand and intensify its 
poppy and cannabis eradication programs, 
using aerial surveys to compare pre- and 
posteradication totals to verify the destruc- 
tion of crops. An improved Operation Van- 
guard should be resumed next year. We will 
continue w'orking with the Government of 
IMexico on the issue of corruption. Mexico is 
capable of improving its eradication cam- 
paign and could achieve the same successful 
results as they did in the 1970s; improve- 
ments must be made by increasing aircraft 
utilization rates and alleviating current pi- 
lot shortages. Cocaine interdiction efforts 
could also be improved. Increased funding is 
requested in the FY 1990 budget to cover 
costs of maintenance support for the Mexi- 
can eradication fleet and aerial survey 
efforts. 



Caribbean 

The Bahamas continues to be a major 
transit country for cocaine and mari- 
juana entering the United States and is 
an important money-laundering center. 
Cooperation with U.S. enforcement 
agencies in 1988 is considered good, 
with numerous joint undercover as 
well as regular operations, including 
OPBAT, underway. U.S. -assisted oper- 
ations resulted in the seizure of more 
than 10 metric tons of cocaine and more 
than 13 metric tons of marijuana. Fol- 
lowing the arrest of several important 
traffickers, the Government of the 
Commonwealth of The Bahamas 
imposed new and more stringent sen- 
tencing; it is also more actively investi- 
gating corruption, which continues to 
be a factor affecting operational effec- 
tiveness. The Bahamas signed an 
agreement in accordance with the 
Chiles amendment on February 17, 
1989. 

President Bush noted the very co- 
operative relationship we have with the 
Government of the Commonwealth of 
The Bahamas in his certification state- 



Copies of 
the Report 



Free, single copies of the 29-page exec- 
utive summary of the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 
March 1989 are available from the Pub- 
lic Information Division, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



ment. "Nonetheless," the President 
said, "the reality is that too much co- 
caine still passes through The Bahamas. 
And, while the Government of the Com- 
monwealth of The Bahamas is more ac- 
tive in investigating allegations of 
corruption, we are concerned by re- 
ports that corruption still exists. 
Prime Minister Pindling and his minis- 
ters must forcefully address this issue. 
We also believe that noteworthy Baha- 
mian cooperation in joint antinarcoties 
efforts should be accompanied by strong- 
er unilateral efforts to curb drug traf- 
ficking and consumption within The 
Bahamas." 

Cuba sits amidst some of the pri- 
mary drug routes into the United 
States, and aircraft and seacraft are 
reportedly eluding U.S. agents by en- 
tering Cuban territorial waters or air- 
space. In the past, U.S. officials have 
accused Cuban officials of involvement, 
and indictments were returned against 
four ranking officials in 1982. Cuban 
authorities have publicly expressed an 
interest in antidrug cooperation with 
us but have not elaborated on what kind 
of cooperation they envision. 

The Dominican Republic has be- 
come an ideal staging area and refuel- 
ing stop for traffickers smuggling co- 
caine into the United States. Some 
marijuana is also transshipped by traf- 
fickers, who are attracted by the is- 
land's 63 airstrips. The government 
ranks the drug problem as a major pri- 
ority and in 1988 passed tough new 
antidrug legislation which imposes 
mandatory sentences. The very effec- 
tive Joint Information Coordination 
Center, vital to the monitoring of drug 
traffic through that part of the Carib- 
bean, can serve as a model for other 
countries. 

Haiti improved its drug interdic- 
tion efforts in 1988, despite two coups 
and four governments. The Avril gov- 
ernment improved the climate for 
cooperation. Seizures increased sub- 
stantially in 1988, thanks in part to a 
new Center for Information and Coor- 
dination at Port au Prince airport, but 
the volume of trafficking remains be- 
yond the capability of the narcotics po- 
lice. U.S. enforcement agencies are 
concerned that the uncertain situation 
in Haiti and lack of strong control by 
the central government have led to the 
increasing use of Haitian waters and 
Haitian-registered vessels for the 
transshipment of cocaine. Although 
corruption remains a problem, the 
Avril government did remove from 



epartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



69 



NARCOTICS 



service a number of military officers 
suspected of involvement. 

Jamaica has reduced marijuana 
production dramatically, from a high of 
1,755 metric tons in 1986 to 405 metric 
tons in 1988. The island is also a transit 
point for cocaine; traffickers are now 
paying for services in kind, increasing 
the amount of cocaine available for Ja- 
maican consumption. Money laundering 
does not appear to be a major problem, 
with most drug proceeds being laun- 
dered elsewhere. Cooperation with 
U.S. authorities remains quite good on 
the vigorous eradication campaign, as 
well as interdiction and investigations. 
Seizures dropped below 1987 levels, but 
a number of improvements, including 
new procedures and expanded training, 
are in place for 1989 to enhance the en- 
forcement effort. Heavy fines have 
been levied by U.S. Customs on air- 
lines and shipping firms whose vessels 
have been used to smuggle narcotics 
out of Jamaica. 

Jamaica has kept down marijuana 
production and should continue to do so 
through repeated eradication cam- 
paigns. The U.S. Government looks 
forward to working with the govern- 
ment of newly elected Prime Minister 
Michael Manley, building on recent 
progress in eradication and enforce- 
ment. Trafficking networks must be 
dismantled and traffickers brought to 
justice. Jamaica also needs to launch a 
comprehensive drug prevention pro- 
gram aimed at preventing an increase 
in cocaine abuse. Aerial eradication is a 
priority for FY 1990, and funds will be 
used to provide aircraft support for 
eradication and interdiction, maxi- 
mizing the efficiency of Jamaica's 
programs. 

Central America 

Belize is no longer a major source 
country for cannabis, now producing 
only 120 metric tons a year, thanks to a 
successful U.S. -assisted aerial eradica- 
tion program. However, it is becoming 
an increasingly important transit coun- 
try for cocaine from South America 
and marijuana from Guatemala. Law 
enforcement resources are limited, but 
enforcement capabilities are improv- 
ing. Money laundering is not a factor. 

Costa Rica is increasingly impor- 
tant as a cocaine transit country, with 
estimates that 6-12 metric tons of co- 
caine are being transported through its 
territory by air and sea. Authorities 
remain vigilant to the possibility of 
labs being established, but no new labs 



were found in the last 2 years. Can- 
nabis cultivation appears to be less ex- 
tensive than previously estimated, and 
the export trade is a minor enterprise. 
Costa Rica is not a major money- 
laundering center, although a highly 
publicized money-laundering trial has 
focused attention on the issue. 

Guatemala increased in impor- 
tance to the U.S. drug situation as ma- 
jor amounts of opium and marijuana 
were produced during the past year. 
U.S. officials estimate that as much as 
150 kilograms of heroin are smuggled 
into the United States, probably under 
the control of Mexican traffickers. Gua- 
temala is also important to the cocaine 
trade, serving as a transit point for 
narcotics headed for Florida, Louisi- 
ana, and Texas and for precursor chem- 
icals destined for South America. 
Guatemala has conducted effective 
eradication efforts and cooperates with 
U.S. officials on a chemical tracking 
program and interdiction efforts. 
Money laundering is not a major factor. 

Honduras is a transshipment point 
for Colombian cocaine. The key event of 
1988 was the arrest and expulsion of 
Matta Ballesteros, a major Honduran 
trafficker with Colombian connections; 
he is now imprisoned in the United 
States. Honduras signed a bilateral an- 
tinarcotics agreement with the United 
States last November, accenting the co- 
operation evident in the opening of a 
permanent Drug Enforcement Admin- 
istration (DEA) office last May and in 
cooperation on seizures and investiga- 
tions. While there have not been the 
dramatic seizures that occurred in 
1987, U.S. and Honduran authorities 
collaborated on a seizure of 453 kilo- 
grams last August. There was also co- 
operation on operations at sea with the 
U.S. Coast Guard. 

Nicaragua continues to be men- 
tioned by informants and traffickers as 
a cocaine transit point. In 1986 there 
were accusations that top government 
officials engaged in trafficking. 
Nicaragua is now cooperating with 
Costa Rica on drug matters but not 
with U.S. enforcement agencies. 

Panama was denied certification 
in 1988 following the indictments of 
General Noriega by two U.S. grand 
juries on charges of narcotics traffick- 
ing. Despite being fired by the lawful 
President of Panama in 1988, Noriega 
illegally remains in control of the Pan- 
amanian Defense Forces. Panama 
continues to be a principal money- 
laundering center for the South Ameri- 



can cocaine trade and a transit site io 
cocaine and precursor chemical ship- 
ments. Noriega's defiance of Presiden 
Delvalle and continued control of Pan-, 
ama's police forces prevents President 
Delvalle from effectively implementir 
his policy of full cooperation with the 
United States. While some minimal c 
operation continues between Noriega 
and the DEA on a limited number of 
enforcement matters, cooperation on 
money laundering has bogged down 
since Noriega's indictment. President 
Delvalle's government continues to al 
low boarding of Panamanian flag ves- 
sels by U.S. narcotics officials. U.S. 
prohibition on aid to the Noriega-Soli 
regime continues. 

In sum these countries are of vit; 
interest to our narcotics control strat 
egy, not only because of the critical 
impact that production and traffick- 
ing from countries like Mexico, The 
Bahamas, and Jamaica are having on 
our current situation but because oft 
potential for increased production an 
trafficking through the myriad coun- 
tries that lie along the cocaine trail t( 
South America. 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

WROBLESKI, 
MAR. 15, 1989 

The Task Force on International Nar 
cotics Control has asked the Depart- 
ment to provide testimony today on 
Southeast Asia and Pacific nations. 
This region includes three countries 
which are major factors in the produi 
tion and refining of opium and heroir 
Burma, Laos, and Thailand — as well 
key transit countries. 

Two countries — Burma and Laos 
were denied certification by Presi- 
dent Bush on March 1. Burma's once- 
promising aerial eradication effort h; 
been grounded; no eradication effort 
has been made in 1989 and prospects 
are for expanded cultivation of what i 
already the world's largest supply of i 
licit opium. There continue to be re- 
ports implicating officials of the Lao 
Government in narcotics production 
and trafficking. The President certi- 
fied Thailand, which continues to be 
successful in suppressing opium culti 
vation; Hong Kong, a major financial 
center for the Golden Triangle heroin 
trade which cooperates closely with 
U.S. law enforcement agencies; and 
Malaysia, which has a strong record ^ 
cooperation in efforts to curb heroin 
trafficking. 



70 



Department of State Bulletin/May 19 



NARCOTICS 



With respect to denial ofcertifica- 
on, let me note that aid is not a factor 

! Syria, Iran, and Laos or with the 
overnment of Afghanistan; aid had 
>en previously suspended to Burma 
id Panama. Laos is reportedly seek- 
g a loan through the Asian Develop- 
ent Bank, which will have to be 
iposed, as would loans sought by any 
untry denied certification. We do 
ive a continuing interest in prisoner- 
-war/missing-in-action (POW/MIA) 
vestigations with Laos, which was 
e basis for the previous national in- 
rest certification. However, we felt 
at the information we had concerning 
ficial involvement in drug trafficking 
IS compelling, given the require- 
ents under Section 2013(b). Trade 
nctions are discretionary to the 
■esident, and no recommendations — 
firmative or negative — are made on 
ade sanctions for the six countries de- 
ed certification. 

The following regional and country 
mmaries are drawn from the 1989 lu- 
•national Narcotics Control Strategy 
■port. 

igional Summary 

le civil turmoil in Burma has re- 
Ited in the suspension of the Socialist 
■public of the Union of Burma's an- 
al aerial o])ium eradication program, 
tween .January and March 1988, 
irma reported eliminating over 
,000 hectares of opium. But at year's 
d, it was estimated that Burmese 
oduction of opium was up in absolute 
•ms. There is no immediate prospect 
It the aerial eradication campaign 
11 be resumed in time to be effective 
ainst the 1989 cro]3. Indeed the dis- 
rbances will most likely result in un- 
scked o])ium jjroduction in Burma. 
There have been some narcotics 
itrol activities undei'taken in Laos, 
the summer of 1988, the Lao Govern- 
nt raided two refineries in Oudomsai 
ovince and later tried 48 traffickers 
tted in the raid; among those con- 
.'ted was the governor of the prov- 
e, a central committee member. A 
;h-level delegation of U.S. Govern- 
nt officials traveled to Vientiane in 
rly 1989 to discuss a number of is- 
es, including narcotics control. Lao 
'icials assured the U.S. represen- 
Jves that they had begun to address 
!ir opium problem, as evidenced by 
'ir agreement with the UN Fund for 
ug Abu.se Control (UNFDAC) to 
onsor a .$5.8 million rui'al integrated 
ot program in an opium-growing re- 



partment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



gion in northern Vientiane Province. 
This project is scheduled to get under- 
way before July. For the first time, Lao 
officials accepted, in principle, previ- 
ous offers of bilateral U.S. narcotics 
control assistance. 

However, there has been no reduc- 
tion in opium production in Laos, and 
there continues to be information about 
the e.xtensive involvement of Lao mili- 
tary and civilian officials in the narcot- 
ics trade. 

Thailand was successful in ensur- 
ing that opium production did not in- 
crease during 1988. But, given the 
demand for opium among the indige- 
nous hill tribe addict population, it is 
possible that no further reductions will 
be made in the coming years in the es- 
timated 28 metric tons of opium pro- 
duced in Thailand; there is difficulty 
also in eradicating the remaining 
opium poppy, which is grown increas- 
ingly in small, inaccessible plots. 

Heroin trafficking remains a seri- 
ous problem in Southeast Asia, partic- 
ularly in Thailand where an excellent 
communications infrastructure pro- 
vides traffickers good access to inter- 
national markets. There is evidence 
that heroin is transported through 
Vietnam, notably through the port of 
Da Nang. During 1988, heroin seizures 
in Thailand doubled over the previous 
year's totals, and 10 heroin refineries 
were immobilized. 

Country Summaries 

Burma's political turmoil has grounded 
its large-scale aerial eradication pro- 
gram most probably until a government 
enjoying greater credibility and sup- 
port among the Burmese people than 
the current military regime is seated 
in Rangoon. Traffickers capitalized on 
diminished enfoi-cement efforts to 
smuggle large quantities of opium and 
heroin with little interference. The 
prospect for 1989 is grim; given highly 
favorable climatic conditions and the 
suspension of programs to destroy 
crops or seize shipments of drugs or 
precursor chemicals from China, Thai- 
land, and India, traffickers may har- 
vest and move as much as 1,400 metric 
tons of opium to heroin refiners in 
Southeast Asia. Money laundering is 
not a factor. 

The People's Republic of China 

does not produce significant amounts of 
illicit narcotics. But U.S. officials are 
increasingly concerned about the trans- 
shipment of Golden Triangle heroin 
through southern China to Hong Kong 



and ti'affic in precursor chemicals into 
the triangle. The Chinese Government 
is responsive to these developments, 
ironically resulting from its own 
"openness policy" and is particularly 
concerned about indications of rees- 
tablished "Triad" influence in southern 
China. A new law controlling precursor 
chemicals was enacted in December 
1988 as part of a reinvigorated enforce- 
ment effort. China sent police officials 
to the United States to give evidence in 
the "Goldfish" heroin case. 

Hong Kong is both the financial 
and money-laundering center of the Far 
East narcotics trade and an important 
transit center for Golden Triangle her- 
oin destined for Australia, Canada, the 
United States, and Europe. Hong Kong 
police, who made record heroin sei- 
zures and arrested a number of key 
traffickers in 1988, believe that as 
much as half the heroin seized came 
overland through China. A high degree 
of cooperation exists with U.S. offi- 
cials. Hong Kong is moving forward 
with legislation enabling the courts to 
trace, freeze, and seize proceeds of 
drug trafficking and is considering a 
U.S. -proposed mutual legal assistance 
agreement. 

Indonesia is a transit site for her- 
oin, opium, hashish, and precursor 
chemicals. Heroin is exported to Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, and Western 
Europe; the amounts reaching U.S. 
markets are not considered significant. 
New interest focuses on Bali. West Eu- 
ropeans are heavily involved in the in- 
creasing traffic from this major resort 
area, which is augmented by the high 
number of international flights. Money 
laundering is not a factor. 

Laos is the only country to date for 
which the extensive involvement of mil- 
itary and government officials has led 
to accusations that the government is 
facilitating narcotics trafficking dur- 
ing the corruption review required by 
Section 2013, PL 99-570. The Lao Gov- 
ernment has made repeated efforts in 
the past year to convince U.S. officials 
of its intention to curb illicit narcotics 
production and trafficking. However, 
U.S. officials believe that opium pro- 
duction continues to expand and could 
be approaching the 300-metric-ton 
mark and that heroin refining contin- 
ues. Laos is exporting heroin and mari- 
juana through 'Thailand, Vietnam, and 
China. The government has welcomed 
U.S. consultations on narcotics and a 
UN narcotics-related crop substitution 
program. 



71 



REFUGEES 



Malaysia is an important heroin 
conversion and transit center, export- 
ing primarily to Europe and Australia. 
Plagued by drug abuse among its own 
population and concerned by the domi- 
nance of criminal elements in the 
trade, Malaysia considers drug traffick- 
ing a national security problem and has 
the death penalty for traffickers. A 
strong domestic enforcement program 
which drove heroin seizures up by li)09c 
in 1988 seems to have reduced drug 
availability, and a new property forfei- 
ture act provides a vital new weapon. 
But the e.xpected bounty of opium com- 
ing from the Golden Triangle in 1989 
will put the capability of the country's 
forces to a test. 

The Philippines exports locally 
grown and Thai marijuana and is also a 
transit point for Golden Triangle heroin 
and South American cocaine smuggled 
into Guam, Australia, Europe, and the 
United States. Foreigners are still 
principals in the trade, but Filipino 
groups have also emerged. Filipino po- 
lice conducted more than 1,000 narcot- 
ics raids in 1988 and made important 
seizures and arrests, but the enforce- 
ment effort, which the United States 
assists, is hampered by budget and 
structural restraints. 

Singapore, which is a transship- 
ment point for Southeast Asian heroin 
and has high potential for money laun- 
dering, cooperates with U.S. officials 
in monitoring and intercepting inter- 
national drug traffic. Singapore offi- 
cials are especially worried about 
domestic drug use. 

Thailand has reduced opium culti- 
vation to about 28 metric tons but re- 
mains significant as a refiner of heroin 
and conduit for opium/heroin from 
other sources in the Golden Triangle. 
High quality Thai marijuana is export- 
ed to the United States and other mar- 
kets, and there is also an active trade 
in precursor chemicals. The Royal Thai 
Government counters these activities 
with a vigorous enforcement program 
that doubled heroin seizures in 1988, 
while also seizing increased amounts of 
opium, morphine, and marijuana. Thai- 
land is also an important money-flow 
country. 



FY 1990 Assistance Request 
for Refugee Programs 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent uf 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Jonathan Moore 

Stateiueiit before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee on March -^2. 
1989. Ambassador Moore is Director of 
the Bureau for Refugee Progra ins^ 

I am pleased to be here today to pre- 
sent the Department of State's FY 1990 
request for migration and refugee 
assistance, the emergency refugee mi- 
gration and assistance, and the De- 
partment's authorization bill. 

The Department of State is re- 
questing authorization for $370 million 
for the migration and refugee assist- 
ance appropriation for FY 1990. We 
are requesting $10 million for the 
emergency refugee and migration 
assist- 
ance appropriation account. 

The U.S. refugee program is an es- 
sential expression of the U.S. commit- 
ment to humanitarian principles as well 
as a means of supporting other U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. Our abiding, 
bipartisan, international commitment 
of assistance to refugees and ubiqui- 
tous diplomatic advocacy on their be- 
half projects our highest ideals through- 
out the world and pursues the stability, 
which is in our national interest, 
through the alleviation of persecution, 
violence, and poverty which breed refu- 
gees. Through our programs, the De- 
partment allows for the admission and 
resettlement of refugees who are of the 
greatest concern to the United States 
and provides assistance to 1.3 million 
refugees worldwide for life-sustaining 
support, primarily through contribu- 
tions to multilateral organizations. 

The refugee program is facing 
great challenges and opportunities this 
year On the one hand, program needs 
for admissions and assistance are at 
their greatest levels in recent years — a 
challenge, indeed, at a time when the 
Administration and the Congress are 
focusing on limiting government ex- 
penditures. On the other hand, many of 
these needs have arisen as a direct con- 
sequence of our foreign policy successes 
and offer the opportunity to begin to 
resolve longstanding problems that 
have faced the international community 
for some time. The FY 1990 migration 
and refugee assistance request reflects 
the concern for balancing the need to 



address humanitarian and other for- 
eign policy objectives with the need t 
restrain spending. 

Admissions Program 

The Department is requesting $156.5 
million for refugee admissions, which 
is estimated to support admissions oi 
about 84,000 refugee.s — the same leve 
of admissions funiled in the FY 1989 
appropriation. The actual admissions 
ceilings for FY 1990 will be deter- 
mined by the President in the late su 
mer after consultations with the 
Judiciary Committees, as required b 
the Refugee Act of 1980. 

There have been significant rece 
developments which impact the admi 
sions programs. The most dramatic ( 
velopment is the continuing increase 
the number of Soviets receiving per- 
mission to leave the Soviet Union an( 
applying for refugee admission to thi 
United States, both in Moscow and i: 
Western Europe. New, overdue, and 
most welcome policies of liberalized t 
igration and I'elaxation of prohibitioi 
against departure from communist 
countries challenge us to review our 
admissions policies in the context of 
tremendous resource implications th 
now carry. 

In the past few months, the leve 
of Soviet applications have greatly si 
passed previous estimates, resulting 
severe pressure on available resourc 
The Department currently has FY 1 
funding for 19,000 Soviet admission: 
(with funding for East European/ 
Soviet admissions at a total of 25,50(' 
The FY 1990 budget estimates admi 
sions of 22,500 East Europeans and 
Soviets. 

The President has just announcf 
the Administration's intent to reque 
supplemental appropriations to the 
Congress of $100 million for the mig 
tion and refugee assistance appropr 
tion for FY 1989. The primary goal i 
to address the need for additional re 
sources for Soviet refugee admissioi 
although we are also requesting som 
funds for admissions of refugees fro 
other regions and for certain high pi 
ority refugee assistance needs. The 
De])artment is reviewing our policie 
examining alternatives which might 
implemented by FY 1990, and reeval 



il 



72 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/Mav 1 to 



(t! 



REFUGEES 



ing resource requirements to manage 
e program over the long term. 

For East Asia, the FY 1990 budget 
ovides for a total of 49,500 admis- 
)ns: 25,000 from first -asylum coun- 
ies and 24,500 under the orderly 
parture program from Vietnam, in- 
iding 13,000 Amerasians and their 
mily members. I remain hopeful that 
e Socialist Republic of Vietnam will 
sume negotiations on unrestricted ac- 
ss to resettlement programs by for- 
sr reeducation center detainees and 
eir families in the near future. 

The request assumes that levels of 
missions from the Near East/South 
5ia ((3,500), the Western Hemisphere 
,000), and Africa (2,000) will be about 
e same as the FY 1989 consultations 
.■els. 

isistance Programs 

18 Department is requesting $173.4 
llion for refugee assistance pro- 
ams, an increase of about $1.9 mil- 
■n from the FY 1989 level. This 
quest includes $25.5 million for East 
;ia. $58.2 million for Africa, $80.3 
llion for the Near East/South Asia, 
d $11.2 million for the Western 
miisphere. Most of our contributions 
e channeled through international or- 
nizations, including the UN High 
immissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
? International Committee of the Red 
•OSS (ICRC), the UN Relief and 
jrks Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine 
;fugees in the Near East, and the UN 
irder Relief Organization (UNBRO) 
• Khmer on the Thai-Cambodian bor- 
r. The Department also supports ac- 
ities of private voluntary 
ganizations. 

Our assistance program must deal 
th two problems: the pressure to 
ep e.\i:>enditui'es down in the face of 
vere increases in humanitarian needs 
le U.S. percentage of support to such 
-iltilateral organizations as UNHCR 
d the ICRC has slipped over the last 
/ears significantly below traditional 
.'elsl and the tendency of the admis- 
)ns program to eat up a larger por- 
)n of the overall migration and 
fugee assistance account (in FY 1984 
ughly 70% of this budget went to as- 
^tance and in FY 1990 roughlv 57% 
41). 

A number of developments in re- 
onal refugee assistance programs are 
iteworthy. 

Concerning East Asia, there will 
an international conference on In- 
ichinese refugees this summer in Ge- 



neva. I have just returned from the 
preparatory meeting for this confer- 
ence held in Kuala Lumpur. The goal of 
these efforts is to develop a comprehen- 
sive and revitalized approach to deal 
with Indochinese refugees, spurred by 
the largest outflow of Vietnamese boat 
refugees since the early 1980s. Strong 
progress, with U.S. leadership, was ac- 
complished at Kuala Lumpur toward 
acceptance of an integrated, mutually 
reinforcing strategy of balanced na- 
tional commitments. Its components in- 
clude the preservation of first-asylum 
(our foremost concern), screening pro- 
cedures to determine refugee status, 
assurances of third-country resettle- 
ment, plans for repatriation of the 
country of origin, and strengthened 
regular departure programs from 
Vietnam. Its commitments will be un- 
dertaken together by source countries 
such as Vietnam, by countries of refuge 
such as Thailand and Malaysia, and by 
resettlement and donor countries such 
as the United States, Canada, Austra- 
lia, and Japan. Along with new struc- 
tures and procedures to address the 
Indochinese refugee program, a suc- 
cessful Geneva conference will carry- 
new resource implications. In addition 
movement toward an agreement on 
Cambodia could require the initiation 
of programs to repatriate the 300,000 
Khmer in Thailand. 

In Africa we are heartened by our 
major foreign policy success in south- 
ern Africa that promises to lead to re- 
patriation of Namibian refugees and 
independence. We hope that will create 
a climate for resolution of other refugee 
problems in southern Africa. At the 
same time, we are preoccupied with the 
growing numbers of refugees and dis- 
placed persons and with the seeming 
intransigence of the conflicts that gen- 
erate these refugee situations. The 
number of African refugees has 
reached 4 million, up from 3 million 
last year. The ICRC is providing relief 
to as many as 1 million displaced 
persons. 

In the Near East and South Asia, 
we are concerned with two major is- 
sues. First, the Afghan refugee popula- 
tion remains the largest single refugee 
group — more than 3 million persons in 
Pakistan and 2 million in Iran. Owing 
to the successful conclusion of an 
agreement on the Afghan conflict and 
the Soviet withdrawal, the United 
States hopes that the political and mili- 
tary conditions in Afghanistan will so 
improve as to allow the repatriation of 
refugees in time, although in the imme- 



diate term, refugees are still arriving 
in Pakistan. Second, UNRWA, which 
provides assistance primarily through 
education and medical programs for 
Palestinian refugees in the Middle 
East, has increased program needs in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, partic- 
ularly for emergency medical care 
needed because of the Palestinian up- 
rising and the Israeli response. 

In Central America, there is an in- 
flux of Nicaraguans into other coun- 
tries in the region. There will be an 
international refugee conference in 
May to address Central American refu- 
gee needs. 

Emergency F\ind 

The President recently responded to 
several increased, unforeseen assist- 
ance needs by authorizing the use of 
$17.5 million from the emergency fund. 
This drawdown included $5 million for 
the UNHCR appeal for funds to re- 
patriate refugees to Namibia, $5 mil- 
lion for the ICRC appeal for the Horn 
of Africa, $5 million for the ICRC ap- 
peal for Afghan conflict victims, and 
$2.5 million for the UN Special Coor- 
dinator for Afghanistan. A sum of $23 
million in the fund is available only for 
other Afghan needs through a program 
of the Agency for International Devel- 
opment (AID). A balance of $12.6 mil- 
lion is available for other refugee 
needs. 

Other Activities 

The Department is also requesting 
$30.3 million for other activities. Of 
the total, we are requesting $20 million 
for the refugees to Israel program for 
FY 1990. The remaining $10.3 million 
includes a contribution to the head- 
quarters budget of the ICRC and the 
assessed and voluntary contributions to 
the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Migration. 

The Department is requesting $8 
million for the administrative expenses 
of the Bureau of Refugee Programs. 
This includes funding for 107 perma- 
nent positions. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



73 



TERRORISM 



Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature 



by L. Paul Bremer. Ill 

Statement before the House For- 
eign Affairs Committee on Februarij 9, 
19S9. Ambassador Bremer is Ambas- 
sador at Large for Counter-Terrorism.'^ 

The callous destruction of Pan Am 
Flight 103 on December 21, 1988, was a 
terrible international tragedy. The vic- 
tims were not only the passengers and 
crew on the plane and the villagers in 
Lockerbie [Scotland] but also their rel- 
atives, friends, and all those who were 
touched by this horrible act. We deeply 
regret the loss families and friends of 
those on Pan Am 103 have suffered, and 
we share their anguish. And we share 
the pain of the people of Lockerbie who 
also lost friends and relatives. 

We are determined to do every- 
thing in our power to see that this 
cowardly, senseless act will not go 
unpunished. We are committed to 
bringing the jjerpetrators to justice. 
Working with the British and other 
governments, we will follow every lead 
until we have answers. It may take 
time — there are not always quick an- 
swers in these cases — but I am confi- 
dent that by using all of our resources, 
we will succeed in locating the mur- 
derers. Then we will exert all effoi'ts 
to bring them to justice. 

Right now investigators fi'om the 
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] 
are in Lockerbie, in London, in Frank- 
furt, and elsewhere working closely 
with their counterparts. We have estab- 
lished a task force within the intel- 
ligence community to mobilize our as- 
sets worldwide to gather information on 
potential suspects. We have approached 
dozens of other governments through 
intelligence and diplomatic channels for 
their assistance. 

Because the case is under investi- 
gation, and hopefully will eventually 
lead to trial, I am sure you will under- 
stand that I am not able to discuss the 
details of the investigation itself. How- 
ever, I am optimistic that in the end, 
we will succeed. 

In your February 3 letter of invita- 
tion to appear before the committee, 
you asked me to address a variety of 
topics. Some of these, including the ad- 
equacy of the Foreign Airport Security 
Act, an overall evaluation of the re- 
quired foreign airport security as- 



74 



sessments, and several others can be 
addi'essed more authoritatively by my 
colleagues from the F^AA [Federal Avia- 
tion Administration]. Consequently, I 
defer- to them on these matters. 

However, three of the topics raised 
in your letter are directly relevant to 
my area of responsibility, and I would 
like to respond to them. They include: 

• An assessment of the current 
international terrorism threat to U.S. 
interests and civilians; 

• An overview and status of the 
U.S. Government's counterterrorism 
policy: and 

• The extent of international coop- 
eration with the U.S. Government on 
practical antiterrorism measures. 



The Terrorist Threat 

Let us begin with the threat which ter- 
rorism poses to U.S. interests today. 

Our preliminary analysis of the 
data for 1988 indicates that there were 
almost 900 international terrorist 
incidents last year, a new record. 
Terrorism clearly remains a major 
international problem. 

The international nature of the ter- 
rorist threat is poignantly highlighted 
by the passenger list from Pan Am 103. 
Citizens of almost 20 nations died as a 
result of this single tragic event. Over- 
all, international terrorism claimed the 
lives of almost 400 people last year. 

In dealing with international ter- 
rorism, we must — and do — constantly 
evaluate the nature of the threat, which 
changes markedly over time. As we 
take steps to reduce our vulnerability 
to terrorist attack, terrorists continue 
to try to find new "weak links" in the 
security chain which they can exploit. 
There are no quick fixes in this business. 

For example, as the committee is 
aware, the international aviation com- 
munity has made considerable progress 
in making it more difficult for hijackers 
to introduce weapons into the cabin of 
an aircraft. The tightened security and 
inspection procedures envisioned by the 
Foreign Airport Security Act of 1985, 
which your committee helped initiate, 
played a useful role in this security 
effort. As a result, there has been a 
significant drop in the number of hi- 
jackings. In 1986 and 1987, there was a 
total of three hijackings worldwide. 



But while hijackings are down, :i 
craft sabotage is up. In 1986 and 19^^ 
there were six explosions aboard air- 
craft resulting in 13.5 deaths. For tin- 
first time, we have had more inciden 
of sabotage than hijacking. And now 
must add Pan Am 103 to this tragic t 

New technology makes an impac 
on the counterterrorism front. In sor 
instances, technical advances like pla 
tic explosives help terrorists. On the 
other hand, our counterterrorism 
efforts are strengthened by the avail 
ability of new technology, such as tht 
thermal neutron analyzer machines, 
detect such explosives. The evolutior 
technology will go forward. So we m 
continue to anticipate how terrorists 
might try to turn technology to theii 
advantage. 

Our basic goal is constant. We s^ 
to deter and prevent terrorist attack 
In the event of a tei-rorist incident, \ 
seek the apprehension, prosecution, 
and i)unishment of those responsible 
Our government has developed a eou 
terterrorist policy to deal with the 
broad worldwide terrorist threat anc 
its evolving nature. 

Overview of U.S. 
Counterterrorism Policy 

American counterterrorist policy stf 
on three solid pillars. 

First, we will not accede to ter- 
rorist demands. We will not pay ran 
som, pardon convicted terrorists, or 
pressure other countries to give in t 
terrorist demands. In other words, ' 
will make no deals. But we will talk 
anyone authoritative — anywhere, an 
time — about the welfare and uncond 
tional release of our hostages. 

Second, we have taken the lead 
pressuring states which support ter- 
rorist groups and use terrorism as p 
of their foreign policy. ,We have show 
these states that they will be penali; 
for supporting terrorism. The Unite- 
States will not tolerate their aiding ; 
abetting terrorist groups by supplyi 
them with weapons, money, passpor 
training bases, and safehouses. 

Third, we are imposing the rule 
law on terrorists for their criminal a 
tions. Good police work is catching t 
rorists, and they are being brought 
trial. Since 1986, the United States 1 
had a law which enables our law en- 



TERRORISM 



cement agencies to better combat 
Torism overseas. Popularly called a 
ng arm" statute, the law makes it a 
eral crime to kill, injure, threaten, 
ain. or seize an American citizen 
ywhere in the world in order to com- 
a third person or government to 
:ede to a terrorist's demands. 

S. Policy: 

iW Is It Working? 

we have a clear and comprehensive 
mterterrorist policy. How is it 
rking? 

Let us look first at the "no conces- 
ns" element of our policy. Obviously, 
s element of our policy was damaged 
the Ivan-contra affair. However, 
ee then, we have made crystal clear 

governments steadfast commitment 
the "no deals" principle. No country, 
group should believe there is gain in 
ing to blackmail the United States. 

Based on my own meetings with 
nterterrorism officials and experts 
m other countries and in this coun- 
, I believe we have largely recovered 

credibility lost by the Iran-co»/ro 
B.ir. The international counterter- 
lism community understands our 
ition, and there is strong bipartisan 
iport here for our policy of firmness 
lealing with terrorists. I hope and 
ieve that the new Administration 
1 continue to benefit from this high 
i\ of support by the American 
iple. 

We have enjoyed an important 
asure of success on the second ingre- 
nt of our policy — pressuring states 
ich support terrorism. As a result, 
le of the more notorious state sup- 
ters of terrorism have attempted — 
)licly at least — to distance them- 
.'es from terrorism. 

Our 1986 airstrike on Libya's ter- 
ist cam]) was the watershed event 
he world's fight against terrorist- 
iporting states. European nations 
owed our lead against Libya by 
i)osing political, economic, and se- 
ity measures against the Qadhafi re- 
le. European Community members 
)elled more than 100 Libyan "diplo- 
ts" and restricted the movements of 
er Libyan "diplomatic" and "consul- 
personnel. These moves severely 
naged Libya's European network 
licated to supporting international 
rorism. 



Qadhafi learned that his support 
for international terrorism would not be 
cost free, and he changed his behavior 
which, after all, was the objective of 
our attack. Libya's involvement in ter- 
rorism declined from 19 incidents in 
1986 to 6 in 1987 and another 6 in 1988. 

However, we must remain particu- 
larly vigilant regarding Qadhafi. There 
is reason to believe that Libya con- 
tinues support for terrorism, albeit in a 
more subtle, less flagrant fashion. 
Moreover, Libya's continued work on a 
chemical weapons production facility 
emphasizes the need for e.xtremely 
careful monitoring of Qadhafi's actions. 

Syria, another long-time supporter 
of terrorism, also felt the pressure of 
our counterterrorism strategy. In late 
1986, British and West German courts 
established Syrian complicity in ter- 
rorist attacks in London and West 
Berlin. Together with Great Britain, 
the United States joined an interna- 
tional campaign employing diplomatic, 
political, and economic sanctions to con- 
vince Syria to reduce its link to ter- 
rorists groups. 

These efforts worked. In 1985, 
Syria was implicated in 34 terrorists in- 
cidents but in 1986 only 6. In 1987, a 
year after our pressures, we detected 
Syria's hand in only one incident and in 
none in 1988. Moreover, Syria expelled 
the violent Abu Nidal organization 
from Damascus in June 1987 — a major 
victoiT for our counterterrorist 
policies. 

These efforts may not force these 
nations to cease entirely their support 
for terrorist groups. Indeed, both 
Libya and Syria continue to provide 
such support. But a concerted, vig- 
orous Western strategy does make 
them move more cautiously and become 
more circumspect. 

The third and final element of our 
counterterrorism policy — using the rule 
of law against terrorists and encourag- 
ing others to do the same — is maturing 
into a potent weapon for two basic rea- 
sons. First, there has been a sea 
change in international attitudes toward 
terrorists. Second, governments have 
decided to provide law enforcement 
agencies the resources necessary to de- 
ter terrorism. 

Not long ago, many usually respon- 
sible countries granted terrorists dis- 
pensation for their crimes. Ironically, 
terrorists were perceived as victims of 
those vague forces called "oppression" 
and "imperialism" — victims oi', worse, 
romantic adventurers whose behavior 
should be indulged. 



No longer is this true. Terrorists 
began to lose this international indul- 
gence as they widened their circle of 
targets in the late 1970s. In some in- 
stances, they even attacked their sym- 
pathizers and supporters. The shock of 
such actions turned indulgence to 
revulsion. 

And as popular disgust mounted, 
politicians finally insisted on action to 
counter the terrorists. Law enforce- 
ment agencies were given the resources 
to do their jobs. National police depart- 
ments now have the surveillance gear, 
the communications equipment, and the 
money for overtime to gather intel- 
ligence and to track and arrest ter- 
rorists. As a result, more and more 
terrorists are being brought to trial and 
convicted. 

• On November 3, 1988, a Maltese 
court sentenced the sole surviving ter- 
rorist in the November 1985 hijacking 
of an Egyptian airliner to 25 years im- 
prisonment — the maximum sentence 
under Maltese law. The surviving hi- 
jacker belonged to the Abu Nidal 
organization. 

• On October 27, 1988, a Sudanese 
court passed the death sentence on five 
Palestinian terrorists for their attack 
this year on Khartoum's Acropole Hotel 
and the Sudan Club. These five were 
also members of the Abu Nidal 
organization. 

• In July 1988, a Pakistan court 
convicted five terrorists for an Abu 
Nidal organization attack against a Pan 
Am airliner in Karachi in September 
1986. 

• A French court convicted, in ab- 
sentia, on October 20, 1988, the notori- 
ous Fatah terrorist Colonel Hawari to 
10 years — the maximum allowed under 
French law — for complicity to transport 
arms, ammunition, and explosives and 
for criminal associations. 

• A West German court is cur- 
rently trying Muhammad Hamadei, a 
Lebanese terrorist implicated in the 
1985 TWA hijacking which resulted in 
the murder of an innocent American 
seaman, Robert Stethem. 

• Hei-e in Washington, D.C., Fawaz 
Younis, a Lebanese terrorist will soon 
go on trial for holding American cit- 
izens hostage when he led the 1985 hi- 
jacking of a Roval Jordanian Airlines 
flight. 

• In Greece, authoi'ities will soon 
decide on Muhammad Rashid's extradi- 
tion to this country where he is wanted 
for planting a bomb in 1982 on a Pan 
Am airliner. His extradition to the 



75 



TERRORISM 



United States would be an important 
indication of Greece's adherence to its 
stated policy of combating terrorism. 

In short, the United States has a 
counterterrorism policy in place and it 
works. However, it is obvious that we 
cannot succeed alone. Many of the 
essential ingredients in combating 
terrorism — gathering intelligence 
information, monitoring the movements 
of suspected terrorists, intercepting 
and appi-ehending ten-orists — require 
effective international cooperation. 

International Cooperation in 
Counterterrorism 

As terrorists expand their activities, 
and as international repugnance to ter- 
rorist acts intensifies, nations in- 
creasingly regard terrorism as a 
collective threat and a common prob- 
lem. The desire to promote interna- 
tional cooperation, already strong, was 
particularly evident in the aftermath of 
the attack on Pan Am 103. 

International condemnation of the 
sabotage of Pan Am 103 was swift and 
emphatic. Many individual nations con- 
demned the attack. The Secretary Gen- 
eral of the United Nations issued a 
statement in late December 1988 ex- 
pressing "outrage" at the attack. This 
statement was echoed by the President 
of the Security Council, speaking on be- 
half of the council, who condemned the 
attack and called on all states to assist 
in the apprehension and prosecution of 
those responsible. Similarly, the 12 
members of the European Community 
released a joint statement deploring the 
sabotage of Pan Am 103. 

The sabotage of Pan Am 103 has 
emphasized the need for prompt action 
to strengthen further aviation security 
measures. The FAA immediately issued 
orders for increased security measures 
on American carriers to deal with the 
new situations. But we cannot solve the 
problem alone. It is clear that we need 
to encourage the adoption of more 
stringent security measures throughout 
the aviation community. 

Improving Aviation Security 

To pursue this work, the international 
community is turning to the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) an agency of the UN system 
based in Montreal. ICAO is the ac- 
knowledged body responsible for set- 
ting standards in the field of civil 



aviation and is, therefore, the appropri- 
ate forum for international followup to 
Pan Am 103. 

On January 24, the United King- 
dom and the United States jointly an- 
nounced that, in response to the 
destruction of Pan Am 103, they were 
requesting a special session of the 
ICAO council to pursue ways "to im- 
prove international aviation security 
procedures." On January 30, the ICAO 
council decided to hold such a special 
session on February 15-16, 1989, to dis- 
cuss ways to counter the growing trend 
of sabotage against civil aviation. A 
number of ICAO members — including 
the United States, the United King- 
dom, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Australia, and Switzerland — will be 
represented by their ministers of trans- 
portation at this meeting. 

We expect representatives at this 
special ministerial-level council meeting 
to begin by reviewing briefly the exist- 
ing aviation security measures. Avia- 
tion standards, as defined and adopted 
by ICAO members, are contained in 
Annex 17 to the Chicago convention 
(which established ICAO in 1944). 

Over the years, a great deal of 
important work has been done to im- 
prove the measures in Annex 17 which 
should not be overlooked. For example, 
following the June 1985 hijacking of 
TWA 847, Annex 17 was exhaustively 
reviewed. In December 1985, Annex 17 
was amended to include a number of 
provisions intended to prevent the use 
of weapons or dangerous devices aimed 
at causing bodily harm and damage to 
property aboard aircraft. 

In i986, ICAO's Unlawful Inter- 
ference Committee reviewed ICAO's se- 
curity standards to ensure that they 
were updated promptly as necessary. 
This committee, with support from the 
ICAO Secretariat, identified four areas 
that warranted priority attention as 
particularly vulnerable to placement of 
explosive devices. These included ramp 
security, weapons detection, cargo/mail/ 
small parcel handling, and courier 
service. 

Work on aviation security stand- 
ards has continued in ICAO's Aviation 
Security Panel, which reports to the 
Unlawful Interference Committee. This 
panel has identified several priorities 
for work in ICAO. These include se- 
curity controls to detect devices which 
might be carried by unsuspecting par- 
ties unwittingly acting as couriers for 
terrorists and passenger management 
methods to ensure that passengers 
leave nothing behind on an aircraft. 



Much of this work will continue a 
intensify as ICAO defines new ap- 
proaches to security. To facilitate this 
work, we hope that the February 1.5-) 
ministerial council session will endors 
a plan of work that establishes pri- 
orities for technical work in ICAO. 
These priorities include: 

• Detection of sabotage devices, i 
pecially explosives; 

• Comprehensive screening of 
checked baggage; 

• Comprehensive screening of pas 
sengers and hand baggage; 

• Controlling access to aircraft b 
ground personnel; and 

• Establishing a new ICAO servi 
available to members at their i-equesl 
to assess security at individual airpoi 
and to recommend improvements as 
necessary. 

We also expect the ministerial w 
review the status of secui'ity-related 
training provided by ICAO. 

Finally, we expect the ICAO mir 
terial will discuss the need for in- 
creased attention to "tagging" plastic 
explosives for detection. Relatively li 
tie technical work has been pursued t 
date in this area. However, the trage' 
of Pan Am 103 emphasizes both the 
urgency and importance of such worl 

The ICAO council meeting next 
week will bring together some of the 
world's foi'emost authorities in aviatii 
security. Their meeting underscores 
commitment of the international com 
munity to continue the worldwide fig 
against terrorism. The combination c 
this political will and technical exper 
tise lends considerable momentum tc 
the important work in ICAO on avia- 
tion security, which has and will con- 
tinue to make significant progress. 

Handling Terrorist Threats 

I know a number of members are int' 
ested in our government's policy on 
handling terrorist threats. 

Each week, we receive literally 
dozens of threats — most of them di- 
rected at American officials abroad. ^ 
urgently and carefully analyze them, 
a threat is deemed credible, we take 
immediate steps to counter the threa 
by getting the information into the 
hands of people who can take steps t( 
counter the threat. For example, in t 
case of a threat to an airline, we get 
that information into the hands of air 
port security officials responsible for 
aviation security. This is the purpose 
the FAA security alert bulletins sent 



76 



TERRORISM 



ine corporate security officials and 
lirport security officials. 
We do not routinely make terrorist 
jats public. To do so would encour- 
copycat" terrorist threats which 
Id initially cause panic and disrupt 
services and, in the end, cause in- 
erence to the alerts themselves. As 
, we already receive on the average 
e threats to American airports or 
ines each day. 

Nor is it our policy to selectively 
■t people to lerrorist threats. If we 
e a credible and specific terrorist 
at to an airline which cannot be 
ntered effectively on the spot, then 
policy is to recommend that the 
ine cancel the flight. Otherwise, we 
lid issue a public travel advisery to 
American traveling public. It is not 
policy to alert government officials 
not the general public to such a 
■at. There is, and can be, no double 
idard. 

While priority attention will con- 
e on aviation security, we cannot 
•look work in other vital areas. As 
Achille Lauro tragedy demon- 
tes all too clearly, passenger ships 
also vulnerable to terrorism, includ- 
sabotage. The International Mar- 
e Organization (IMO) already has 
!n a number of steps to enhance 
itime security. IMO security 
sures were analyzed in detail at 
October 1988 meeting of the IMO 
itiine Safety Committee, which 
•ed to review these measures an- 
ly. During 1989, the IMO will spon- 
at least two regional security 
inar,'^ — one in the Caribbean and 
in the Mediterranean. These semi- 
1 will offer training and assistance 
;ates' application of IMO security 
sures. We fully support this work 
■WO and will participate actively in 
■e seminars. 

Mr. Chairman, my remarks thus 
lave been addressed to the topics 
identified in your letter of invita- 
as of particular interest to the 
mittee. Permit me, however, to in- 
e a reference to an indispensable 
ponent of our counterterrorism 
rt, namely our antiterrorist as- 
uice program (ATA), a program this 
mittee was instrumental in 
blishing. 

iterrorist Assistance Program 

■e its inception in 1984, ATA has 
ned over 650 students from 28 na- 
s in advanced civil aviation security 
irport police management. Both 



courses are offered at the Transporta- 
tion Safety Institute — a FAA facility in 
Oklahoma City — and include a mi.xture 
of classroom instruction supplemented 
by on-the-scene instruction at major 
U.S. airports. 

Countering the e.xisting threats to 
international civil aviation requires an 
effective aviation security program 
which includes well-trained staff sup- 
plemented by a variety of technical 
aids. Any such system has built-in re- 
dundancy and recognizes that the most 
critical element in aviation security is 
the well-motivated employee who takes 
his or her duties seriously. We are con- 
fident that our basic ATA teaching pro- 
gram is sound and contributes to the 
building of such a system. It teaches 
the interdependence and supplemental 
effects of people, dogs, and e.xisting 
electronic technology such as .x-rays. 
We will incorporate into our training, 
as they emerge, the "lessons learned" 
from the Pan Am 103 bombing. 

Bomb-detector dogs already hold a 
critical role in aviation security as part 
of a comprehensive effort to detect 
plastic explosives. There are limits, 
however, to what can be done with 
sniffer dogs. Dogs are capable of de- 
tecting plastic e.xplosives, but they 
present logistical problems. At large 
airports such as those in the United 
States and Europe, dogs provide only 
part of the solution. Since the ATA pro- 
gram generally works with less devel- 
oped nations, which often have small 
international airports, some of the 
problems presented by using detector 
dogs at major international airports 
may pose fewer difficulties at the 
smaller airports. 

We are working to broaden the 
scope of our aviation security training, 
such as that offered through the ATA 
program. During FY [fiscal year] 1988, 
the United States worked with the 
French to improve aviation security in 
West Africa, with the Canadians to do 
the same at Manila International, and 
with the British in broad-based coun- 
terterrorism training for Pakistan. In 
cooperation with South Korea, we orga- 
nized a conference of Pacific rim nations 
to establish enhanced aviation security 
standards before and during last year's 
summer Olympic period. 

The ATA program, with the range 
of training that it can offer, is a vital 
element in the U.S. response to the 
threat posed by international terrorism. 
For FY 1990, the President is seeking 
$10,017 million to support ATA training. 
These funds will finance training for 



some 1,500 recipients from 25 nations 
and provide a modest amount of train- 
ing-related equipment. 

The ATA program also works with 
the FAA's assessment of airports as 
provided under the Foreign Airport Se- 
curity Act. The Department of State 
and the FAA cooperate closely in this 
FAA airport assessment program. Em- 
bassy officials are routinely involved in 
scheduling these assessments and facili- 
tating the work of the FAA security 
officials during their visit. When defi- 
ciencies are identified in an airport's se- 
curity program by the FAA officials, as 
they were in Caracas in the summer of 
1988, State and FAA work together to 
develop an effective assistance pro- 
gram. State, through its antiterrorism 
assistance program, generally offers 
training in advanced civil aviation se- 
curity or airport police management to 
help correct any such deficiencies. 
FAA, under its own authorities, pro- 
vides related assistance. In the case of 
Caracas, the problems identified were 
corrected to FAA's satisfaction before 
the 90-day notice period expired. 

Research and Development 

In addition to training under the ATA 
program, we are continuing our work in 
research and development. One priority 
is to identify and develop new tech- 
nology to apply to the process of e.xam- 
ining baggage so that materials such as 
plastic explosives can be more consis- 
tently detected. While the first models 
are only now in production, the thermal 
neutron analyzer developed for the 
FAA offers real promise as a means of 
ensuring that plastic explosives cannot 
evade detection. 

On behalf of the U.S. Government, 
the State Department coordinates and 
funds a national counterterrorism re- 
search and development program. In 
FY 1990, we will be seeking $6 miUion 
to support this interagency program. 
Included in the research and develop- 
ment program are projects to develop 
new forms of less expensive and more 
widely applicable detectors to identify 
plastic explosives or chemical/biological 
agents in closed containers. I hope that 
members of this committee will con- 
tinue to support this program. 

Another example of our research 
and development efforts at State is the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security's funding 
for the development of a high-tech- 
nology "sniffer" to detect nitrogen va- 
pors, such as those emitted by 



77 



TERRORISM 



explosives in automobiles, packages, 
luggage, or persons. The first operat- 
ing models of this equipment, developed 
under contracts with Thermedics, Inc. 
totaling nearly $7 million, will be deliv- 
ered to the State Department this sum- 
mer. This equipment will be applied as 
part of our program to protect high- 
threat posts and to ensure the security 
of the Secretary as he travels. This 
equipment offers promise as the possi- 
ble basis for other prototypes which 
would be applicable for use in checking 
airline passengers, their luggage, and 
carry-on items. 

Terrorism remains a major interna- 
tional problem. While we continue to 
make progress in countering terrorism 



in some areas, new dimensions to this 
problem emerge with dismaying fre- 
quency. There is no single magic solu- 
tion to this international scourge. Yet 
our political will is strong, our available 
resources are carefully used, and our 
technical expertise is among the best in 
the world. We remain deeply committed 
to our concerted effort to combat ter- 
rorism, as are the members of the com- 
mittee. We greatly appreciate your 
support which is essential if we are 
to prevail. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Iran's Threats Against Author 



by Alvin P. Adams, Jr. 

Statement before the Subconimittee 
on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Interna- 
tional Operations of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 8, 1989. 
Mr. Adams is Acting Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism.' 

I appreciate the opportunity to review 
the Rushdie affair with you and mem- 
bers of your subcommittee. This affair 
is extremely complex in its weave of do- 
mestic and foreign dimensions and 
highly volatile, given the profoundly 
sensitive political and religious nerves 
it strikes. 

We want to make it clear from the 
outset that we are absolutely commit- 
ted to freedom of expression, which we 
consider a fundamental human right. 
This is a right shared by people around 
the world. Furthermore, it is specially 
affirmed for Americans in our Con- 
stitution. We — all of us represented 
here and others in the Federal Govern- 
ment — will do whatever we can to pro- 
tect this right. 

We take seriously the threats 
which have emanated from Tehran con- 
cerning Salman Rushdie's book The Sa- 
tanic Verses. The reaction against the 
book already has spawned considerable 
violence in South Asia and may well 
have motivated the February 28 fire- 
bombings of two bookstores in Berke- 
ley, California, and the Riverdale Press 
in New York City. We consider the 
threats against Mr. Rushdie and his 
book to be an invitation to commit an 



78 



act of terrorism, unprecedented in con- 
temporary international behavior. The 
calls by the Iranian leadership for Mr. 
Rushdie's murder are made all the 
more repugnant by the specter of the 
offers of a massive reward. 

At the same time, in addressing 
these threats, we must take a clear- 
headed view, coolly assessing their na- 
ture and crafting an effective response 
to them. This is not the first time we 
have faced serious threats from Iran or 
other states which support interna- 
tional terrorism. It will not be the last. 

What we need to do, and what we 
are doing, is to apply longstanding 
principles and tactics developed to deal 
with threats of terrorism. They include 
firmness in the face of attempted in- 
timidation and a measured response co- 
ordinated with our friends and guided 
by an effective and realistic strategy. 

We are responding to the Rushdie 
affair in a number of ways. I will elabo- 
rate on them as well as discuss the gen- 
esis of the threat later in my testimony. 
The basic principles which guide our 
responses are: 

• Without regard to the merits of 
the book, the threat to Mr. Rushdie, his 
publishers, and booksellers constituted 
totally unacceptable behavior by the 
leader of a state; 

• While uncertain of the precise 
impact of these threats and public of- 
fers of a reward for murder, we took the 
threats seriously; 

• Given the threat against Ameri- 
cans in Pakistan, both diplomatic and 
security responses were in order on our 
part; and 



• Our responses called for prior 
consultations with other countries 
which were even more directly thret 
ened than we, particularly the Unit( 
Kingdom as Mr. Rushdie is a British 
citizen and resident. 

Public Reactions 

As for the initial phase of the affair, 
February 14, Ayatollah Khomeini m 
his infamous statement condemning 
The Satanic Verses and calling sumnr 
ily for the death of Mr. Rushdie. The 
statement contained more general 
threats against enterprises in the U 
ed Kingdom and the United States 
which published and sold the book. 
Khomeini's statement followed much 
earlier criticism of the book by othei 
concerned Muslims and the severe r 
ing in Islamabad. 

Given the profoundly sensitive 
chords this affair has touched in We 
ern and Islamic values, the confusec 
state of Iranian politics, and the enc 
mity of the challenge the affair pose 
we sought initially to analyze events 
Tehran and confirm Khomeini's thre: 

Our reaction made clear our sh; 
rejection of these threats. At the Fe 
ruary 16 press briefing, the State E 
partment spokesman, Charles Redn 
made a formal statement which said 

We are appalled by the death threat 
sued against Salman Rushdie by the Ay; 
toUah Khomeini, as well as a subsequent 
offer of a rew'ard for his murder We takt 
these threats very seriously. Such threai 
are completely irresponsible and are ini 
patible with basic standards of internati 
conduct. 

Speaking in Luxembourg the sa 
day, Secretary Baker reiterated oui 
jection of the death thi'eat and adde 
that ". . . the United States is firnil 
committed to oppose terrorism in a. 
its forms and particularly state- 
sponsored terrorism." 

Also on February 16, the Euro); 
Parliament passed a resolution con- 
demning the threats and calling on 
Council of Europe to sanction Iran i 
they were carried out. 

In the next days, there were coi 
flicting statements from Iranian ofl 
cials. Some suggested that Iran mig 
withdraw the death threat if Mr. Ru 
die expressed regret for the offense 
Islam. On February 19, however, a 
statement attributed to Khomeini n 
erated the threat in strong terms, a 
soon the entire Iranian leadership h 
joined the chorus of those calling foi 
Mr. Rushdie's death. In response, th 



II 



TERRORISM 



eign Ministers of the Eui-opean 
mmunity, meeting in Brussels on 
briiary 20, unanimously condemned 
Jin's behavior. In a notable display of 
iity, they decided to withdraw their 
iiior diplomats from Tehran. Within a 
U'days, all had left. 
' On February 19 during a television 
erview. Secretary Baker reiterated 
condemnation of the death threat 
i offers of a reward for Mr Rushdie's 
irder, as well as the U.S. Govern- 
nt's official opposition to terrorism, 
cretary Baker added: ". . . that if 
m really is serious about rejoining 
! community of civilized nations, this 
lot the kind of behavior that leads to 
It." 

On February 21, President Bush 
de the following statement: 

I strongly support the EC-12 declara- 
1 in respon.se to the Iranian threats 
inst Rushdie. However offensive that 
k may be, inciting murder and offering 
'ards for its perpetration are deeply of- 
sive to the norm of civilized behavior. 
:1 our position on terrorism is well 
iwn. In the light of Iran's incitement, 
uld any action be taken against Ameri- 

interests, the Government of Iran can 
ect to be held accountable. 

On February 22, the State Depart- 
nt spokesman remarked referencing 

calls from Iranian leaders for Rush- 
's death: 

The . . . statements constituted an 
tement to commit an act of terrorism, an 
!r of money for Rushdie's murder, which 
«es it all the more repugnant ... all this 

direct assault on freedom of expression, 
ich is a fundamental human right. . . . 

On February 28, after the two book 
res in Berkeley and the newspaper 
ice in New York were bombed, the 
f isident said: 

While the details surrounding these in- 
?nts and the motives of those who carried 
m out are still unclear, I think that it is 
lortant to take this occasion to state 
t 5re the U.S. Government and, I'm con- 
ced, the American people stand on vio- 
ee and on our rights. This country was 
I nded on the principles of free speech and 

gious tolerance. And we fought through- 

our history to protect these principles. 
d I want to make unequivocally clear that 

United States will not tolerate any as- 
:lt on these rights of American citizens. 



The President added that should it 
Dear that any Federal laws have been 
dated in these bombing attacks, he 
J ted Attorney Genei-al Dick Thorn- 
rgh "to use all of the resources of the 
!I and all other appropriate resources 

It 



of this government to identify and bring 
to justice those responsible. We don't 
yet know if the bombings are related to 
the book. The Satcuiic Verses. But let 
me be clear: Anyone undertaking acts 
of intimidation or violence aimed at the 
author, the publishers, or the distribu- 
tors of The Satcuiic Verses will be pros- 
ecuted to the ma.ximum extent of the 
law. And, yes, some of the Muslim faith 
can interpret that book as highly offen- 
sive, and I can be sensitive to that, but 
we cannot and will not condone violence 
and lawlessness in this countrjy. And I 
think our citizens need to know how 
strongly I feel about that." 

On March 3, Attorney Geperal 
Thornburgh told a delegation from the 
U.S. publishing industry that Ameri- 
can law enforcement officials would 
take every precaution to help protect 
publishers and booksellers from 
threats and acts of violence prompted 
by the controversy. 

There is no doubt about the posi- 
tion of the United States. Khomeini's 
statements constitute incitement to 
commit an act of terrorism, and the of- 
fer of money for Mr. Rushdie's mui'der 
makes this behavior all the more reck- 
less and callous. Mr Rushdie's book has 
clearly offended many Muslims, but 
Khomeini's claim to speak for all Mus- 
lims is completely unjustified. I want 
to emphasize that no other Islamic gov- 
ernment or leader — except Qadhafi — 
has endorsed his death threat. The 
Sheikh of Cairo's Al-Azhar University, 
a leading institution of Islamic learn- 
ing, while condemning the book, has 
rejected Khomeini's death threat, say- 
ing it does not conform with Islamic le- 
gal proceedings. 

There has been much talk about in- 
ternal political factors as a reason for 
Khomeini's threats and their endorse- 
ment by other Iranian leaders. Obvi- 
ously this is the case. But we must not 
fall into the error of justifying Iran's 
conduct in the process of seeking to un- 
derstand it. Although, they have done 
so with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
all Iranian leaders have embraced Kho- 
meini's statements. The Government of 
Iran, as a whole, is responsible for this 
behavior — so-called moderates and rad- 
icals alike. 

Diplomatic Responses 

The public statements are not our only 
reaction to the threats against Rush- 
die. We have been dealing with the is- 
sue on several fronts, similar to the 
way we confront other terrorist threats 



through a combination of public diplo- 
macy, private diplomacy, and security 
measures. 

In addition to our public condemna- 
tions already reviewed, we are working 
closely with friends who are more di- 
rectly threatened and approaching 
other countries wdiich have broader re- 
lations with Tehran than we do and 
who, therefore, can give greater prac- 
tical effect to their outrage. Our objec- 
tive is to encourage other states to 
stand up and be counted on this issue 
and to exploit opportunities which 
arise in their dealings with Iran to 
demonstrate their disapproval in a con- 
crete way. 

We have raised the Rushdie matter 
in a number of countries — including, 
for example, Japan and the Soviet 
Union — to ask that they make clear 
their opposition to this behavior. We 
have raised it elsewhere. Our embas- 
sies around the world have been pro- 
vided material for discussions of the 
matter with host governments. 

We note that the West European 
countries are working together and co- 
ordinating their actions. The European 
Community, for example, withdrew its 
ambassadors from Iran and suspended 
high-level visits. As mentioned previ- 
ously, the Council of Europe strongly 
condemned the Iranian threats. Presi- 
dent Bush has expressed support for 
these actions. We plan this week to 
make a statement at the UN Human 
Rights Commission at its meeting in 
Geneva. 

As the committee is aware, the 
United States already maintains vari- 
ous restrictions on diplomatic and 
economic dealings with Iran. U.S. pro- 
hibitions against the sale of militarily 
useful items to Iran and a near total 
ban on Iranian exports to the United 
States remain firmly in place. We con- 
tinue to discourage third country arms 
sales to Iran. As you already know, we 
maintain no official presence in Tehran, 
and Iranian diplomats posted to the 
United Nations in New York remain 
under travel controls. We have strict 
security procedures that must be fol- 
lowed before issuing visas of any type 
to Iranian nationals. 

Threat Assessment 

On another front, we also are dealing 
with the security aspects of the Iranian 
threat, trying to assess potential threats 
more fully, and taking precautions 
where indicated. There are basically 



liiDartment of State Bulletin/Mav 1989 



79 



TERRORISM 



two dimensions to these threats raised 
by the Iranian statements. One is po- 
tential action by individuals reacting 
on their own to the descriptions of Mr. 
Rushdie's book but inspired by the Ira- 
nian rhetoric and stimulated by the of- 
fer of a reward for killing the author. 
The second dimension of the security 
threat emanates from the possibility of 
more professional operations organized 
by the Iranians or their surrogates in 
the event organs of the Government of 
Iran itself actively follow up on the 
death threat. 

In assessing the threats, clearly 
Mr. Rushdie is the most apparent tar- 
get. His life is in danger; both he and 
the British authorities must assume 
that someone may actively try to carry 
out the threat against him. Given Mr. 
Rushdie's nationality and residence in 
the United Kingdom, British interests 
are perhaps the next most likely tar- 
get, at least from individuals reacting 
to Iran's rhetoric. 

In view of the demonstrations 
which already have taken place against 
the U.S. cultural facilities in Islamabad 
and a number of threats which have 
been made against individuals and 
business enterprises in the United 
States, we are also a potential target. 
With respect to overseas facilities, 
the State Department advised all 
diplomatic posts in the most likely 
threatened areas that the possibility of 
anti-U.S. activity existed. Posts were 
advised to report to the Department on 
local reactions to the Rushdie affair. 
U.S. aviation security already has been 
heightened in the aftermath of the Pan 
Am #103 bombing, and any additional 
threats continue to be thoroughly 
evaluated. 



As for the future, it is difficult to 
tell how this situation will evolve, 
whether the threats by Iran and the 
violence it has provoked will fade or 
whether there will be attacks actually 
linked to organs of the Government of 
Iran. In the latter event. President 
Bush already has made clear that Iran 
will be held accountable. 

As long as the Government of Iran 
continues to act with reckless abandon 
and total irresponsibility, Tehran must 
continue to face, at a minimum, heavy 
criticism and isolation. This incident is 
not the only conduct that isolates Iran 
and disqualifies it from normal rela- 
tions with the rest of the world. The 
Government of Iran continues its 
broader policy of support for interna- 
tional terrorism, including support for 
those holding hostages in Lebanon. We 
find this policy abhorrent and unac- 
ceptable. It will have to stop if Iran 
wants to become a member of the inter- 
national community. 

Many Muslims feel offended by this 
work. But no individual has the right to 
incite the murder of another for what 
he thinks and writes. Islam, along with 
Christianity and Judaism, is one of the 
world's great monotheistic religions, 
with a deep reverence for human life. 
One of the sadder aspects of this sad af- 
fair may be that it has tended to ob- 
scure some of the basic precepts of 
Islam. 

One final point: In our outrage 
over Iran's behavior, it is important 
that we not erroneously assume that it 
involves a fundamental conflict bet- 
ween Islamic and Western values. The 
book. The Satcn/ic Verses, uses Islamic 
themes and symbols for imaginative 
and artistic purposes. In the process, 
its author has offended many Muslims 



and others. But the conflict here is i 
between those who like the book anc 
those who don't. Nor is our quarrel ( 
with Islam. It is with those in Iran \ 
apparently believe that in the name 
Islam, they have the right to incite t 
murder and who, by this repugnant 
havior, have isolated themselves froi 
the majority of Muslims and mankin 

In conclusion the responsible mf 
bers of the international community 
are united in our condemnation and 
outrage against incitement to murd( 
and threats to bookstores and pub- 
lishers and to free speech itself. Ser 
tor Moynihan's resolution, S. Res. 6! 
underscores that point. We will not 
cannot tolerate threats to murder ai 
efforts to exercise our fundamental 
rights. 

We hope that the Iranian leader 
ship will realize quickly that incitin 
violence is very much against Iran's 
own long-term interest, destructive 
its international image, and puts at 
grave risk its relationships with oth 
countries. 

For our part, we will be mon- 
itoring the situation closely and rea 
firming our dedication, as we have 
here, to the protection of American 
izens and American rights. We will 
continue to work to deter anyone fr 
converting threats into further 
violence. 



'The complete transcript of the hea 
ings will be published by the committee 
will be available from the Superintende 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



An 



Dpnartmpnt ni S^tatp Biilletin/Mav ' 



* 



INITED NATIONS 



ff 1990 Assistance Request 
r Organizations and Programs 



Sandra L. Vogelgesang 

Statement hefove the Subcommittee 
Fiireigii OperaticDis. E.rport Fi- 
iiviiig. cuid Related Programs of the 
».s(' Appropriations Committee on 
ii'ch 22, 19S9. Dr. Vogelgesang is 
pull/ Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
tio)ial Organization Affairs.'^ 

;elcome the o])portunity to appear 
ore vou today to present the Presi- 
it's FY 1990 budget request of $209 
Uion for the international organiza- 
ns and programs account. This 
[uest will fund U.S. voluntary con- 
butions for development, human- 
rian, and scientific assistance 
)grams and activities undertaken by 

■ United Nations and the Organiza- 
n of American States (OAS). 

Across the UN system, its develop- 
nt and technical agencies are taking 
ck of past accomplishments, assess- 

■ their capacity, and readying them- 
ves to meet the needs of the new 
.■ade just ahead. The $209 million ap- 
)priation request before you reflects 
ee factors: 

• U.S. support for intensified ef- 
ts to increase the coherence of UN 
;tem technical assistance in develop- 
: countries pi-ovided by the UN De- 
opment Program (UNDP), the UN 
ildren's Fund (UNICEF), and other 

I agencies; 

• Continued emphasis on programs 
:echnical agencies of the UN system, 
h as the International Atomic En- 
ry Agency (IAEA) and the World 
teorological Organization (WMO), 
ich address key issues facing the 
ited States in an increasingly com- 
X, economically interdependent, and 
t-ironmentally interrelated world; 

> Sizable investments in the re- 
bilitation and reconstruction of 
ghanistan following a decade of occu- 
tion and war. 

This request, like many others pre- 
ited to this Congress for FY 1990, 
"lects a balance among different 
Dices. We have striven to make room 

■ new initiatives and yet maintain 
pport for continuing programs — such 
UNDP, UNICEF. and IAEA— which 
ve long since proven their value. 



Despite our concern for observing 
budgetary restraint, we have been able 
to include two new line items of critical 
importance to the United States. These 
are $16 million for the UN Afghanistan 
Emergency Trust Fund and $100,000 
for the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- 
mate Change. 

I would like to turn now to a more 
specific analysis of our request. 

UN Development Program 

We are requesting $107.8 million, or 
over 50% of our total request of $209 
million, for UNDP. The size of the U.S. 
contribution is seen by donors and re- 
cipients alike as a signal of the value 
and credibility of UNDP's programs 
and U.S. leadership. The U.S. contri- 
bution is a key catalyst in encouraging 
contributions from other members. 
This arrangement gives the United 
States substantial influence over a 
large share of multilateral assistance 
around the world. UNDP has tradi- 
tionally received the largest allocation 
of any of the programs in the interna- 
tional organizations and programs ac- 
count, not only because of its central 
funding role but also because of its uni- 
versal character, its broad geographic 
coverage, and our firm belief that 
UNDP serves the interests of the Unit- 
ed States. The organization's activities 
are not tied to any particular sector of 
development effort. Its coordinating 
role within the UN system permits it 
to tackle development problems with an 
integrated approach that helps assure 
maximum impact from scarce 
resources. 

Joining with other major Western 
donors, the United States has been 
encouraging UNDP to pursue key man- 
agement reforms to improve its pro- 
gram and project formulation and 
establish more effective monitoring 
and evaluation of its activities. These 
reforms were begun in 1985 by your 
former colleague. Brad Morse. His suc- 
cessor. Administrator William Draper, 
has pursued these management initia- 
tives vigorously. 

Overall voluntary contributions to 
UNDP's central resources for 1989 to- 
taled in excess of $1 billion. The largest 
total contribution ever recorded from 
all donors was registered in 1989. The 
level of U.S. funding has fallen from a 



high of $165 million in FY 1985 to 
$107.5 million in FY 1987. Our request 
of $107.8 for FY 1990, only slightly less 
than the previous year's request, re- 
flects primarily the overall constraints 
on the Federal budget rather than any 
diminished commitment to UNDP and 
the fact that UNDP enjoys sufficiently 
broad support from key donors to per- 
form its critical role in the UN system. 

UN Children's Fund 

The second largest item in our request 
is $33.9 million for UNICEF, nearly a 
6% increase over our FY 1989 request. 
UNICEF works closely with the gov- 
ernments of developing countries in 
their efforts to improve the welfare of 
children and mothers and to enable 
children to develop their full mental 
and physical potential. UNICEF fo- 
cuses particular attention on the least 
developed countries and the major 
causes of death and disease among chil- 
dren under 5 years of age. It comple- 
ments and reinforces U.S. bilateral 
assistance programs, such as the 
Agency for International Development's 
(AID) child survival fund. 

More than most programs in the 
UN system, UNICEF has earned the 
confidence and admiration of the Amer- 
ican people and Congress. It has been 
immensely successful in reducing dra- 
matically infant and child mortality 
rates in developing countries. The best 
known approach has been through well- 
publicized mass childhood immuniza- 
tion and oral rehydration therapy 
campaigns. 

The 1989 Slate of the World's Chil- 
dren report estimates that these basic, 
low-cost health interventions save the 
lives of nearly 1 million children every 
year. The year 1990, the target date 
for attaining the World Health Organi- 
zation's (WHO) goals of universal child- 
hood immunization and oral rehydration 
therapy, is fast approaching. To come as 
close as possible to achieving that goal 
and to sustain the momentum of these 
vitally important activities well into the 
next decade, UNICEF needs the contin- 
ued, strong support of the United 
States. 



81 



UNITED NATIONS 



International Atomic Energy Ag-ency 

The third hu-gest item in our request is 
$25.2 million for the IAEA. Histori- 
cally the United States has been a 
strong supporter of the IAEA and its 
safeguards system, which serve critical 
U.S. security and nonproliferation in- 
terests. In his address to Congress on 
February 9, President Bush pledged to 
"strengthen the hand" of the IAEA as a 
central part of the Administration's ef- 
forts to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons. A significant portion of the 
U.S. voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA accomplishes this purpose by 
providing direct support to the IAEA 
safeguards system. It assures that nu- 
clear material, intended for peaceful 
purposes, is not diverted for military 
use. U.S. funds designated for safe- 
guards and nonjjroliferation support 
research and development activities at 
U.S. laboratories and the provision of 
U.S. e.xperts' services to the IAEA 
safeguards department . 

In addition the U.S. voluntary con- 
tribution to the IAEA supports the 
IAEA technical cooperation program, 
which enables many developing states 
to secure — in a safe manner — the bene- 
fits of the [)eaceful atom for the promo- 
tion of agriculture, human health, 
industi'y, and energy production. As 
with funds designated for safeguards 
activities, a significant portion of U.S. 
funds supporting IAEA technical as- 
sistance will be expended in the United 
States — at laboratories and univer- 
sities and in the commercial sector. 



UN Afghanistan Emergency 
Trust Fund 

We have proposed $16 million in sup- 
port of the UN Afghanistan Emergency 
Trust Fund. With the recent with- 
drawal of Soviet troops from Afghani- 
stan after nearly 9 years of brutal 
occu])ation, a major international relief 
effort must be undertaken to assist the 
•5 million Afghan refugees and 2 million 
internally displaced Afghans in return- 
ing to their homes. This movement will 
represent the largest migration of peo- 
ple since World War II. 

We will continue our bilateral 
cross-border humanitarian assistance, 
but the enormity of the problem and 
the demands for e.\])ertise, experience, 
and funds compel an international re- 
sponse. The United Nations and its 
technical and development agencies, if 
fully and effectively managed and coor- 



dinated, have the capacity to lead this 
effort. We are working directly with 
the UN agencies and the UN Coordina- 
tor for Humanitarian Aid to Afghani- 
stan to help the UN effort realize its 
potential and perform the massive task 
required of it. 

The coordinated UN program will 
provide the Afghan refugees and dis- 
placed persons with emergency sup- 
plies needed to restore their fields and 
villages and begin again to feed them- 
selves. It will support basic health 
care. Over time it will help the Afghans 
begin to reconstruct their local areas 
and ultimately their country. The pro- 
gram will be decentralized and geared 
to provide assistance directly to the 
Afghan people, not through the illegiti- 
mate Kabul regime. 

The United States has a major 
stake in helping the Afghans win the 
peace now that they, with our help, 
have won the war. The permanent re- 
turn of the Afghan refugees and dis- 
placed persons will be a force for 
stability in their country and through- 
out the South Asian region. The U.S. 
contribution to the emergency trust 
fund is a significant component of our 
overall Afghan strategy. It will allow 
us to influence significantly the direc- 
tion of the UN effort and encourage 
other donor states to contribute sub- 
stantially to the trust fund as well. 

Organization of American States 

The $10 million level of our contribu- 
tion of the development assistance pro- 
grams of the OAS represents our 
commitment to the inter-American sys- 
tem and our belief that OAS technical 
cooperation activities fill an important 
development need not met by other pro- 
grams. Specific activities include basic 
education and education for work; em- 
ployment generation and small busi- 
ness promotion; biotechnology as 
applied to food, environment, and natu- 
ral resources; trade information and 
telecommunications development; and 
development and application of mate- 
rials technology. 

U.S. voluntary contributions serve 
as an important catalyst to generate 
external resources for the OAS from 
the private sector, multilateral institu- 
tions, and nonmember countries. They 
also play an important role in fostering 
inter-American cooperation for devel- 
opment and enhance the U.S. ability to 
work with OAS members on programs 
of mutual interest. 



82 



Other Contributions Request 

Our request for $8 million for the V^d 
Environment Program (UNEP) rep 

sents a $1.2 million increase over oui 
FY 1989 request. It includes .$7.7 mi 
lion to be contributed to UNEP's En- 
vironment Fund and an estimated 
$.300,000 for multilateral environmei 
tally related activities, such as the 
Vienna Convention for the Protectioi 
the Ozone Layer and the Cartagena 
Convention for the Protection and Di 
velopment of the Marine Environmei 
of the Wider Caribbean Region and i 
lated protocols. UNEPs activities cc 
plement the efforts of the United 
States to improve our own environ- 
ment. UNEP's multilateral approach 
engages both industrialized and dev( 
oping countries and promotes coopei 
tion on regional problems, such as 
climate change, marine pollution, ai 
desertification. 

The request for $2 million foi- th 
International Convention and Sciei 
tific Organization (ICSO) contribu 
tions enables the United States to 
support educational, scientific, cul- 
tural, and communication activities 
that directly benefit U.S. interests. 
These benefits were formerly derive 
through membershi]) in the UN Edu 
tional. Scientific, and Cultural Orga 
zation (UNESCO). Programs such a. 
the Intergovernmental Oceanograpl 
Commission, the "man and the bio- 
sphere" program, the international 
hydrological program, and the inter 
tional geological correlation prograi 
are all actively supported by the Un 
ed States, and we have a continuing 
terest in the work they do. 

The World Meteorological Org 
nization's (WMO) voluntary cooper 
tion program i)rovides training and 
equipment to help less developed coi 
tries improve their national 
meteorological and hydrological ser' 
ices. U.S. support for this program 
ables the United States to receive m 
timely and reliable data for the U.S. 
National Meteorological Center and 
ternational meteorological reports 
which are used by the U.S. public ai 
private sectors. We are requesting i 
million for FY 1990 to support the w 
of this program. 

The UN Capital Development 
Fund (UNCI)f^) jjrovides grant capii 
assistance to the least developed cot 
tries for projects that are too small 
be considered by other multilateral 1 
nancing institutions. Our request of 
$1.5 million will enable the UNCDF 



Department of State Bulletin/May 1 



UNITED NATIONS 



inue to focus on the poorest people 
e grassroots for laborers, small 
ers, the unemployed, and other 
ps in need of small amounts of caj)- 
whether for a water pump, a foot 
:ge, or fertilizer and seeds. 
The UN Educational and Train- 
Program for Southern Africa 
ETPSA) is designed to provide ed- 
ion and training to students from 
th Africa and Namibia who are de- 
these opportunities in their own 
itries. Our request of $800,000 for 
program will serve to demonstrate 
. support for the aspirations of 
e young people as they develop 
s that are necessary to assume 
ership roles in their societies. 
Promotion of private sector devel- 
ent is a major U.S. priority both in 
rnational organization affairs and 
velopment assistance. Our request 
iOO.OOO to fund the UN Industrial 
elopment Organization's (UNIDO) 
stment promotion office in Wash- 
on, D.C., will contribute to 
mplishing this objective. The 
hington investment promotion of- 
matches U.S. business organiza- 
5 with industrial investment 
)rtunities in developing countries, 
king in joint ventures between the 
parties. The U.S. parties to joint 
ures have unlimited opportunities 
)ntribute resources to the projects, 
1 long-term returns on their invest- 
ts, and simultaneously develop new 
kets in both developing and devel- 
I countries. The sole funding 
ce for FY 1990 is our voluntary 
ribution from this account. 
The UN Trust Fund for South Af- 
(UNTFSA) provides humanitarian 
stance to victims of apartheid and 
il discrimination in South Africa 
Namibia. Our request of $250,000 
rovide assistance to black South Af- 
ns persecuted under existing re- 
sive legislation demonstrates U.S. 
mitment to the cause of freedom, 
ice, and equality in South Africa 
Namibia. 

Our contribution of $220,000 to the 
Development Fund for Women 
IFEM) will encourage the integra- 
of women as vital participants in 
process of economic and social de- 
pment. Women in developing coun- 
s too often have been considered 
nly marginal to the essential proe- 
ms of development. 
The Convention on International 
de in Endangered Species 
TES) of wild flora and fauna pro- 
s a mechanism for protection of en- 



UN Human Rights Report on Cuba 



PRESIDENT BUSH, 
FEB. 27, 1989» 

I wish to express my support for the 
UN Human Rights Commission's re- 
port on human rights in Cuba. We find 
the report full, balanced, and objec- 
tive. Consideration of Cuba marks a 
watershed in the UN treatment of hu- 
man rights abuses. For too long, the 
United Nations has focused on small 
countries which lack extensive support 
within the organization. Many of those 
countries today are either functioning 
democracies or have taken significant 
steps on the road toward full democ- 
racy. Meanwhile longstanding violators 
of human rights have enjoyed immunity 
from scrutiny and have even fostered 
human rights investigations into other 
countries. 

For more than 30 years, the people 
of Cuba have languished under a regi- 
me which has distinguished itself as 
one of the most repressive in the world. 
Last year the international community 
won an important victory when the UN 
Human Rights Commission decided to 
conduct a full investigation into the sit- 
uation in Cuba. The report which was 



released in Geneva is based on first- 
hand testimony about persistent viola- 
tions of human rights in that country and 
is the culmination of that investigation. 
The United States firmly believes 
that this report should begin a long- 
term effort to bring about true and 
lasting changes in the Cuban Govern- 
ment's performance on human rights. 
In the year since the UN Human 
Rights Commission decided to investi- 
gate Cuba, there have been slight and 
superficial improvements. But much 
more needs to be done before the Cu- 
ban people can truly be said to enjoy 
the rights guaranteed them by the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights. I 
call upon other members of the commis- 
sion and all countries that value free- 
dom to maintain pressure on the Cuban 
Government by continuing UN mon- 
itoring of the human rights situation 
in Cuba. The people of Cuba and op- 
pressed people everywhere look to the 
United Nations as their last best hope. 
We must not disappoint them. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Mar. 6, 1989. ■ 



dangered species of wildlife and plants 
against overexploitation through inter- 
national trade. Our request of $200,000 
for the CITES trust fund will support 
meetings of parties to the conven- 
tion and certain operations of the 
secretariat. 

The UN Fellowship Program 
(UNFP) is designed to compensate 
U.S. Federal agencies for the adminis- 
trative costs incurred in arranging and 
monitoring training funded by UN sys- 
tem agencies in the amount of $6 mil- 
lion. Our request includes $200,000 for 
this program for FY 1990. 

'The Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage officially designates, 
as outstanding and irreplaceable, prop- 
erties of international significance. 
Through the World Heritage Fund, the 
convention provides financial assist- 
ance to nations to protect these univer- 
sally acclaimed natural and cultural 
sites from deterioration and destruc- 
tion. The request for $200,000 will en- 
able the United States to continue to 



influence the allocation of the fund to 
projects of importance to U.S. policies 
and programs. 

Our contribution of $100,000 to the 
UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of 
Torture (UNVFVT) furthers our mul- 
tilateral human rights objectives in the 
UN Human Rights Commission and 
supplements U.S. bilateral human 
rights efforts. The fund's major goal 
is to provide medical and psycholog- 
ical assistance to victims and their 
families. 

The International Fund for Agri- 
cultural Development (IFAD) is rec- 
ognized as an effective development 
assistance program. We have not re- 
quested any funding for IFAD in 
FY 1990 because negotiations for 
IFAD's third replenishment are still un- 
derway. When the current negotiations 
are concluded and a satisfactory agree- 
ment is reached, we intend to request 
funding within existing resource levels. 

The final item is our $100,000 re- 
quest for the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC 



liartment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



was established in 1988 to provide an 
international forum to analyze and re- 
spond to the growing changes in the 
Earth's atmosphere as a result of natu- 
ral and man-made chemicals. As one of 
the countries likely to be most affected 
by climate change and by decisions as 
to the manner in which to respond to 
this global problem, the United States 
must play a leading role in the deter- 
mination of those decisions. 

Our total request is a little over 
$17 million less than that appropriated 
for FY 1989. Overall monetary con- 
straints on the Federal budget have 
forced us to confine the request within 
these limits. We have reviewed the pi'o- 
grams and resource situation of these 
agencies and believe that these re- 
quests are appropriate to their present 
situation. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion I would like to mention 
that as we participate in the UN sys- 
tem over the ne.xt decade — for example, 
with UNICEF and the UNDP in shap- 
ing the direction their programs will 
take — we will do so on a solid basis of 
managerial improvements. 

We will also shape the direction of 
the UN system agencies that strive to 
eliminate world poverty, hunger, and 
inadequate health care in the develop- 
ing world within a framework of broad 
donor consensus. In this effort, we will 
focus on the need to take a new look at 
the relationships among the partners in 
the system to assure that they rein- 
force each other and build on inherent 
strengths. As a basic policy, we contin- 
ue to support UNDP's central funding 
and coordinating role. With other ma- 
jor donors, we will seek an improved 
division of labor between UNDP and 
the technical and specialized agencies 
of the UN system which reflects in- 
creased emphasis on building institu- 
tional capacity of developing countries 
and transferring specific technical 
knowledge. 

Our goals may sound lofty. How- 
ever, we believe that, through hard 
work and a sincere commitment to mul- 
tilateralism, we can succeed. 



Presidential Election Held in El Salvador I 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 2U402. ■ 



WHITE HOUSE STATEIVIENT, 
MAR. 22, 1989' 

President Bush spoke earlier today 
with Alfredo Cristiani, the winner of 
the Salvadoran presidential election, to 
congratulate him on his victory. The 
President assured iVIr. Cristiani that 
the United States would continue to 
work closely with El Salvador to help 
the Salvadorans create and protect a 
durable democracy there. Mr. Cristiani 
affirmed his recent public statements 
that he and his Administration will be 
committed to respect human rights. 
President Bush invited Mr. Cristiani to 
visit Washington at an early date. 

On Sunday, March 19, hundreds of 
thousands of Salvadoran peasants, 
working people, businessmen and wo- 
men, and citizens from every walk of 
life defied threats of death and terror 
from Marxist guerrillas to vote in that 
country's presidential election. This 
was the sixth national election El Sal- 
vador has held under international su- 
pervision in the last 7 years. 

What we witnessed last Sunday 
should leave no doubt; the people of El 
Salvador are passionately committed to 
the democratic rights and liberties they 
have fought for and won with U.S. sup- 
port in recent years. 

Our policy in El Salvador, forged 
through bipartisan consensus and with 
bipartisan support is clear; we are com- 
mitted to continued democratic prog- 
ress and the defense of human rights. 
There must be no turning back to the 
dark and terrible past. We expect and 
the Salvadoran people clearly desire 
continued steady progress toward es- 
tablishing the rule of law, an effective 
judicial system, and security against 



political violence from either the rigl 
or the left. There is also a message f( 
the FMLN [Farabundo Marti Nation 
Liberation Front] guerrillas in Sun- 
day's election; the Salvadoran people 
clearly yearn for an end to the terrib 
violence to which they have been 
subjected. 

The time has come to end the vii 
lence and secure an honorable peace 
that will protect the rights ancl secu- 
rity of all Salvadorans, regardless of 
their political views, to participate i 
safe and fair political process. If the 
FMLN would embrace that goal, we 
are confident that this tragic war ca 
come to an end. The President wel- 
comes Mr. Cristiani's stated commit- 
ment to continue the dialogue with t 
FMLN guerrillas and hope the guer 
rillas accept his offer. 

Moreover, the guerrillas will no 
succeed in obtaining the political vie 
tory in the United States that they 
cannot win among the people of El S 
vador. The United States is commiti 
to the defense of democracy and hun 
rights in El Salvador. So long as El i 
vador continues on that path, the Ui 
ed States will remain a firm and ste 
ally. 

A final note — last Sunday's elecl 
heralds the final months of the presi 
dency of Jose Napoleon Duarte, a gr 
patriot and champion of democracy. 
President salutes President Duarte 
his courage, his patriotism, his stea 
fast commitment to democracy, and 
his enormous and lasting contributi' 
to building an authentic democratic 
process in his country. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pi 
dential Documents of Mar 27, 1989. ■ 



84 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



liilean Fruit Exports to the U.S. 



VT STATEMENT, 

R. l(i. 1989 

■etary Baker met this morning 
I Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan 
je Errazuriz and with Agriculture 
!ster Jaime de la Sotta to discuss 
lifficult situation currently affect- 
IJhilean fruit exports to the United 
as and elsewhere. Recognizing the 
er to the Chilean economy and the 
to protect the safety of consum- 
Secretary Baker and his Chilean 
ts agreed that the two countries 
Id continue to work together closely 
n urgent basis to resolve this 
lem. 

In particular Secretary Baker 
ked the Foreign Minister for the 
essive cooperation and under- 
ding the United States has re- 
d from the Government of Chile 
from all those involved in the Chil- 
fruit industry. The Chilean minis- 
in turn, expressed deep concern 
he damage already suffered by 
and emphasized the need for 
action to avoid further economic 
social costs. In this regard, they al- 
to the heavy financial losses al- 
y incurred and especially to the 
"that about 200,000 Chilean workers 
their families face unemployment 
3ven destitution. Secretary Baker 
onded that the United States 



shared concern over the damage being 
suffered in Chile. He also noted that 
U.S. industry and consumers were be- 
ing harmed as a consequence of the des- 
picable act of those responsible for the 
poisoning of the fruit. 

The two sides reviewed the cooper- 
ative efforts being taken by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
Chilean authorities, and others with an 
active role in fruit exports and im- 
ports. The goal of these interdependent 
efforts is to swiftly return the situation 
to normal in a manner which serves the 
important interests of both the pro- 
ducers and consumers in reestablishing 
the safety and reliability of food trade. 
Secretary Baker and the two Chilean 
ministers expressed satisfaction that a 
team of experts from the FDA would 
travel to Santiago immediately to 
offer their services to their Chilean 
counterparts. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 29, 1989' 

The FDA has recently decided to allow 
all Chilean fruit except melons to once 
again be released for sale in the United 
States. This decision will certainly be 
welcomed by U.S. consumers. FDA 
vigilance and quick action in this case 
reflect a careful balancing of the need 



to protect the safety of our consumers 
and to promote foreign trade. Once 
again our ports and markets are open 
to Chilean fruit. I am pleased to en- 
dorse FDA Commissioner Young's elo- 
quent comment that our own families 
look forward to eating fresh fruit from 
Chile. 

This unfortunate episode under- 
scores the need for vigilant interna- 
tional cooperation. In this regard, I am 
pleased that we were able to work in a 
positive spirit of teamwork with the 
Chileans in order to return their fruit 
safely to our markets. I can only hope 
that the resumption of fruit sales will 
hold losses to Chile's economy to a 
minimum. 

As a next and essential step, those 
individuals who made the threatening 
calls to our Embassy in Chile and who 
tampered with the grapes that were 
discovered in Philadelphia must be 
found and brought to justice. By their 
acts, they jeopardized not only the 
safety of U.S. consumers but also 
caused much suffering for the people 
of Chile. The United States will do all 
that it can to assist in identifying and 
prosecuting these criminals. 



'Press release 54. 



artment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



85 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on tlie recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force 
June 7, U).^!); for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
TIAS 6997. 

Accessions deposited : Algeria, Feb. 7, 1989; 
Antigua and Barbuda, Feb. 2, 1989; Kenya, 
Feb. 10, 1989. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 

Accessions deposited : Vanuatu, Feb. 22, 
1989; Zimbabwe, Feb. 8, 1989. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered 
into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7.570. 
Accession deposited : Zimbabwe, Feb. 8, 
1989. 

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts 
of violence at airports serving international 
civil aviation, supplementary to the conven- 
tion of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS7570). Done at 
Montreal Feb. 24, 1988.' 
Ratification deposited : United Arab Emi- 
rates, Mar. 9, 1989. 

Conservation 

Convention on wetlands of international im- 
portance especially as waterfowl habitat, as 
amended. Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. En- 
tered into force Dec. 21, 197.5; for the U.S. 
Dec. 18, 1986. 

Accessions deposited : Malta, Sept. 30, 1988; 
Vietnam, Sept. 20, 1988. 

Protocol to the convention on wetlands of in- 
ternational importance especially as water- 
fowl habitat of Feb. 2, 1971. Adopted at 
Paris Dec. 3, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 
1, 1986; for the U.S. Dec. 18, 1986. 
Accession deposited : Venezuela, Nov. 23, 
1988. 

Convention on international trade in endan- 
gered species of wild fauna and flora, with 
appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 
8249. 

Accessions deposited : Chad, Feb. 2, 1989; 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Nov. 30, 
1988. 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973, on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
Adopted at Gaborone Apr. 30, 1983.' [Sen- 
ate] Treaty Doc. 98-10. 
Acceptances deposited : Denmark, Jan. 10, 
1989; India, Jan. 11, 1989; Sri Lanka, Nov. 7, 
1988. 



Containers 

International convention for safe containers, 

with annexes, as amended. Done at Geneva 

Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 

1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037, 

10220. 

Accession deposited : Vanuatu, Jan. 13, 1989. 

Copyright 

Berne convention for the protection of liter- 
ary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, as 
revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended 
in 1979. Entered into force for the U.S. 
Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-27. 
Accessions deposited : Liberia, Dec. 8, 1988;- 
Mauritius, Feb. 9, 1989;^ Peru, May 20, 1988; 
Trinidad and Tobago, May 16, 1988. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR car- 
nets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 
1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978; for 
the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 
Accession deposited : Algeria, Feb. 28, 1989. 

Fisheries 

Protocol to amend the international conven- 
tion of May 14, 1966, for the conservation of 
Atlantic tunas (TIAS 6767). Done at Paris 
July 10, 1984.1 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-4. 
Acceptances deposited : Cuba, Jan. 11, 1989; 
Ghana, Dec. 12, 1988. 

Genocide 

Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris 
Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 
1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989. 
Accession deposited : Korea, Dem. People's 
Rep. of, Jan. 31, 1989. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the International Maritime 

Organization. Done at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. 

Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 

4044. 

Acceptance deposited : Malawi, Jan. 19, 

1989. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of maritime naviga- 
tion, with protocol for the suppression of 
unlawful acts against the safety of fixed 
platforms located on the Continental Shelf. 
Done at Rome Mar. 10, 1988.' [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 101-1. 

Signatures : Brunei, Feb. 3, 1989; Nether- 
lands, Jan. 23, 1989; Seychelles, Jan. 24, 
1989. 

Ratification deposited : Seychelles, Jan. 24, 
1989. 

Nuclear Accidents 

Convention on early notification of a nuclear 
accident. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. En- 
tered into force Oct. 27, 1986; definitively 
for the U.S. Oct. 20^ 1988. [Senate] Treaty 
Doe. 100-4. 

Ratification deposited : Yugoslavia, Feb. 8, 
1989. 



Nuclear Material — Physical Protectiof 

Convention on the physical protection of 

nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 

Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 

Feb. 8, 1987. 

Ratification deposited : Austria, Dec. 22, 

1988. 



86 



Patents — Plant Varieties 

International convention for the protect! 
of new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961 
revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. E 
tered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 1019 
Accession deposited : Australia, Feb. 1, 
1989. 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozoi 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mai 
1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Accessions deposited : German Dem. Re 
Jan. 25, 1989; Liechtenstein, Feb. 8, 198 
Panama, Feb. 13, 1989; Uruguay, Feb. 2 
1989. 

Montreal protocol on substances that de 
plete the ozone layer, with annex. Done 
Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into fc 
Jan. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1 
Proclaimed by the President : Mar. 9, 19! 
Accessions deposited : German Dem. Re 
Jan. 25, 1989; Liechtenstein, Feb. 8, 198 
Ratifications deposited : Ghana, Mar. 8, 
1989; Panama, Mar. 3, 1989; Venezuela, 
6, 1989. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conve 
tions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363. 
3364, 3365), and relating to the protecti 
victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at ( 
neva June 8, 1977. Entered into force D 
1978.-i 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conve 
tions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 
3364, 3365), and relating to the protecti 
victims of noninternational armed conf 
(Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.-* [ 
ate] Treaty Doc. 100-2. 
Accessions deposited : Nigeria, Oct. 10, 
Solomon Islands, Sept. 19, 1988. 

Satellite Communications Systems 

Agreement relating to the Internationa 
Telecommunications Satellite Organizal 
(INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at W, 
ington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into fore 
Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7.532. 
Accessions deposited : Nepal, Mar. 1, 19; 
Zimbabwe, Mar. 15, 1989. 

Operating agreement relating to the Ini 
national Telecommunications Satellite C 
nization (INTELSAT), with annex. Don 
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
force F>b. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Signatures : Nepal Telecommunications 
Corp., Mar. 1, 1989; Government of Zim 
babwe, Mai". 15, 1989. 



Department of State Bulletin/May 



TREATIES 



/ention on the International Maritime 
llite Organization (INMARSAT), with 
■X. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. En- 
d into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
■ssion deposited : Czechoslovakia. Dec. 8, 

•ating agreement on the Interna- 
d Maritime Satellite Organization 
lARSAT), with annex. Done at London 

3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 

TIAS 9605. 
ature : Czechoslovakia, Dec. 8, 1988. 

ndments to the convention and operat- 
igreement on the International Mar- 
3 Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) 
pt. 3, 1976 (TIAS 9605). Adopted at 
Ion Oct. 16, 1985.1 
ptance deposited : Oman, Nov. 28, 1988. 




ocol amending the slavery convention 
id at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926, and an- 
TS 778). Done at New York Dec. 7, 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, for 
■rotocol; July 7, 1955, for the annex to 
rotocol; for 'the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 

lementary convention on the abolition 
very, the slave trade, and institutions 
)ractices similar to slavery. Done at Ge- 
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 
357; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 

'ication of succession deposited : An- 
and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988; effective 
1, 1981. 



national sugar agreement, 1987, with 
>ces. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. En- 
I into force provisionally Mar. 24. 1988. 
'ication of provisional application : Boliv- 
?b. 2, 1989. 
ssion deposited : Mexico, Feb. 22, 1989. 

arism 

■national convention against the taking 
stages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 
Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
I.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 
ssion deposited : Kuwait, Feb. 6, 1989. 



■national tropical timber agreement, 
with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 
Entered into force provisionally 

1, 1985; for the U.S. Apr 26, 1985. 

ssion deposited : Panama, Mar. 3, 1989. 



eiition against torture and other cruel, 

man, or degrading treatment or punish- 

Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. En- 

into force June 26, 1987. •' [Senate] 
ty Doe. 100-20. 
Fications deposited : Netherlands, 

21, 1988;2 Portugal, Feb. 9, 1989.2 



Trade 

United Nations convention on contracts for 
the international sale of goods. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262.] 
Ratifications deposited : Denmark, Feb. 14, 
1989; German Deni. Rep., Feb. 23, 1989. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 

discrimination against women. Done at New 

York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 

Sept. 3, 1981. •< 

Ratification deposited : Luxembourg, Feb. 2, 

1989. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done 
at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratifications deposited : Byelorussian 
S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R.," U.S.S.R., 
Oct. 12, 1988; Malaysia, Dec. 7, 1988. 
Acceptances deposited : German Dem. Rep., 
Dec. 12, 1988; Korea, Rep. of., Sept. 14, 
1988. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Arrangement concerning the construction of 
a high frequency radio communications facil- 
ity. Effected by exchange of notes at Can- 
berra Dec. 16,'l988, and Jan. 20, 1989. 
Entered into force Jan. 20, 1989. 

Bahamas 

Agreement on the control of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances, with appendix. 
Signed at Nassau Feb. 17, 1989. Entered 
into force Feb. 17, 1989. 

Belgium 

Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 
7 and 19, 1981 (TIAS 9970), in the field of ra- 
dioactive waste management. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Washington and Mol 
Jan. 5 and 24, 1989. Entered into force 
Jan. 24, 1989. 

Bolivia 

Agreement amending the air transport 
agreement of Sept. 29, 1948, as amended 
(TIAS 5.507, 6340). Effected by exchange of 
notes at La Paz June 28 and Aug. 23, 1988. 
Entered into force Aug. 23, 1988. 

Canada 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 26, 1973, as amended (TIAS 7837, 
9352), for promotion of safety on the Great 
Lakes by means of radio. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Ottawa Dec. 2, 1987, 
Aug. 10 and Oct. 24, 1988. 
Entered into force: Feb. 1, 1989. 

Arrangement in the area of coal/heavy oil 
coprocessing. Signed at Washington and Ot- 
tawa Jan. 19 and Feb. 14, 1989. Entered into 
force Feb. 14, 1989. 



China 

Memorandum of agreement regarding inter- 
national trade in commercial launch serv- 
ices, with annex. Signed at Washington Jan. 
26, 1989. Enters into force upon U.S. noti- 
fication of approval of a license for the 
export of the ASIASAT or AUSSAT satel- 
lite(s), or any other satellite, to China for 
launch therein. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 
25 and Dee. 14, 1987, relating to trade in 
cotton and manmade fiber textiles and tex- 
tile products. Effected by exchange of notes 
at San Jose Dec. 2, 1988, "and Jan. 4, 1989. 
Entered into force Jan. 4, 1989. 

France 

Agreement for cooperation in high energy 
laser-matter interaction physics research 
and development. Signed at Washington and 
Paris Dec. 12 and 19, 1988. Entered into for- 
ce Dec. 19, 1988. 

Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 
18, 1977 (TIAS 8839), in the field of 
liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Washing- 
ton and Paris Nov. 1, 1988, and Jan. 11, 
1989. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1989. 

Gabon 

International expi-ess mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Libreville 
and Washington Jan. 23 and Mar. 8, 1989. 
Entered into force Apr. 17, 1989. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
June 8, 1976, as extended (TIAS 8657), in 
the field of liquid metal-cooled fast breeder 
reactors. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington and Bonn Nov. 1 and Dec. 30, 
1988, and Feb. 8, 1989. Entered into force 
Feb. 8, 1989; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Mar. 11, 1987, as amended, for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities. Signed at Tegucigalpa 
Feb. 9, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 9, 
1989. 

Hungary 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 15 and 25, 1983, as amended and ex- 
tended (TIAS 10666), relating to trade in 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Budapest Nov. 29 and Dec. 13, 
1988. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1988. 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) 

Agreement for the application of safeguards 
in connection with the treaty for the prohibi- 
tion of nuclear weapons in Latin America 
(TIAS 7137). Signed at Vienna Feb. 17, 1989. 
Enters into force on the date of U.S. noti- 
fication to IAEA that U.S. statutory and 
constitutional requirements for entry into 
force have been met. 



artment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



87 



TREATIES 



Israel 

Land lease anri purchase agreement [for 
construction of diplomatic facilities], with 
annexes. Signed at Jerusalem Jan. 18, 1989. 
Entered into force Jan. 18, 1989. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Aug. 27, 1986, as amended, re- 
lating to trade in textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kingston Oct. 26 and Nov. 1, 1988. Entered 
into force Nov. 1, 1988. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Aug. 27, 1986, as amended and extended, re- 
lating to trade in textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kingston Nov. 9"and 30, 1988. Entered into 
force Nov. 30, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Aug. 27, 1986, as amended and extended, re- 
lating to trade in textiles and textile prod- 
ucts and the administrative arrangement of 
Aug. 27, 1986, as amended, relating to visa 
and certification procedures for exports of 
textile products from Jamaica. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Kingston Sept. 14 and 
Dec. 19, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 

Japan 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Jan. 31, 1979 (TIAS 9814), in the field of 
liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors. 
Signed at Tokyo Jan. 27, 1989. Entered into 
force Jan. 27, 1989. 

Korea 

Agreement concerning the importation and 
distribution of foreign motion pictures in 
the Republic of Korea. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Washington Dec. 30, 1988. En- 
tered into force Dec. 30, 1988. 

Agreement concerning market access for 
wine and wine products in Korea, with an- 
nexes. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Jan. 18, 1989. Entered into for- 
ce .Jan. 18, 1989. 

Macao 

Agreement amending the administrative ar- 
rangement of Aug. 21, 1981, for a visa sys- 
tem relating to trade in certain textile 
products. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Hong Kong and Macao Nov. 2 and Dec. 12, 
1988. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1988; ef- 
fective Jan. 1, 1989. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 28, 1983, and Jan. 9, 1984, as amended 
and extended, relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
products and the administrative arrange- 
ment of Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, for a 
visa system relating to trade in certain tex- 
tile products. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Hong Kong and Macao Nov. 7 and 
Dec. 30, 1988. Entered into force Dec. 30, 
1988; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 



Marshall Islands 

Investment incentive agreement. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Majuro Jan. 20, 
1988, and Jan. 25, 1989. Entered into force 
Jan. 25, 1989. 

Mauritius 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 3 and 4, 1985, as amended, relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Port Louis Dec. 14, 
1988, and Jan. 25, 1989. Entered into force 
Jan. 25, 1989. 

Mexico 

Agreement modifying the agreement of 

June 18, 1982 (TIAS 10.534), concerning land 

mobile service in the bands 470-512 MHz 

and 806-890 MHz along the common U.S.- 

Me.xico border. Signed at Mexico Sept. 12, 

1988. 

Entered into force: Feb. 8, 1989. 

Agreement amending and extending the air 
transport agreement of Aug. 15, 1960, as 
amended and extended (TIAS 4675, 7167). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
Sept. 23, 1988. 
Entered into force: Mar. 7, 1989. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 13, 1988, as amended, concerning trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Washington Oct. 25 and Nov. 
17, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 17, 1988. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 13, 1988, as amended, concerning trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Washington Nov. 17 and 23, 
1988. Entei-ed into force Nov. 23, 1988. 

Memorandum of understanding on coopera- 
tion in management and protection of na- 
tional parks and other protected natural and 
cultural heritage sites, with annex. Signed 
at Mexico and Washington Nov. 30, 1988, 
and Jan. 24, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 
24, 1989. 

Morocco 

Agreement regarding joint cooperation in 
fighting against international terrorism, or- 
ganized crime, and the illicit production, 
trafficking, and abuse of narcotics. Signed 
at Rabat Feb. 10, 1989. Entered into force 
Feb. 10, 1989. 

Nigeria 

Mutual cooperation agreement for reducing 
demand, preventing illicit use, and combat- 
ting illicit production and trafficking in 
drugs. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Lagos Jan. 13 and 24, 1989. Entered into 
force Jan. 24, 1989. 

Papua New Guinea 

Status of forces agreement. Signed at Port 
Moresby Feb. 28, 1989. Entered into force 
Feb. 28, 1989. 



Peru 

Agreement concerning the reciprocal e. 
emption from income tax of income der; 
from the international operation of ship 
Effected by exchange of notes at Lima 
Dec. 15, 1988. Entered into force Dec. 
1988. 

Romania 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 28 and Mar. 31, 1983, as amended ; 
extended, relating to trade in cotton te 
and the agreement of Nov. 7 and 16, 19f 
amended, relating to trade in wool and 
made fiber textiles and textile product: 
fected by exchange of notes at Buehare 
Nov. 28, 1988, and .Jan. 12, 1989. Enter 
into force Jan. 12, 1989; effective Jan. 1 
1989. 

Agreement amending the administrati 
rangement of Oct. 13, 1982, and Aug. 2 
1983, concerning a visa system relatinj 
trade in certain textile products. Effet 
by exchange of letters at Bucharest Se 
16, 1988. and Jan. 18 and 31, 1989. Ent. 
into force Jan. 31, 1989. 

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 

Agreement concerning reciprocal exen 
from income tax of income derived froi 
international operation of ships and air 
Effected by exchange of notes at Bridg 
town and Kingston Oct. 11, 1988, and 
Feb. 15, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 
1989. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement on the establishment of joi 

Loran-C and Chayka radionavigation s 

terns, with annex. Signed at Moscow W 

1988. 

Entered into force: Mar. 2, 1989. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement ( 
Sept. 20, 1976, as amended and extend 
(TIAS 10213), in the field of liquid met 
cooled fast breeder reactors. Effected 
exchange of letters at Washington and 
lev Nov. 1 and Dec. 14, 1988. Entered i 
force Dec. 14, 1988. 

Agreement extending the agreement o 
May 14, 1987, as extended, concerning 
Montserrat and narcotics activities. El 
ed by exchange of notes at Washington 
28, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 28, li 



■Not in force. 
-With declaration(s). 
■'Not in force for the U.S. 



88 



F^ESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



apartment of State 



ss releases may be obtained from the Of- 
of Press Relations, Department of 
Jte. Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Dale Subject 

3/6 Baker: address at the opening 
of the CFE negotiations, 
Vienna. 

3/10 Baker; statement following 
meeting with Austrian 
Foreign Minister Mock, 
Vienna, Mar. 5. 

3/10 Baker: remarks, question- 
and-answer session 
following meeting with 
Soviet F'oreign Minister 
Shevardnadze, Vienna, 
Mar. 7. 

3/9 Richard A. Boucher appointed 
deputy spokesman 
(biographic data). 

3/13 Baker, Arens: remarks 
following meeting. 

3/14 Baker: statement before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, House 
Appropriations Committee. 

3/15 Baker: statement before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. 

3/21 Baker: statement before the 
Subcommittee on 
International Operations, 
House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 

3/23 V. Kim Hoggard appointed 
Senior Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Public 
Affairs (biographic data). 

3/23 Baker: remarks at memorial 
service for John J. McCloy, 
Brick Presbyterian Church, 
New York City, Mar. 21. 

3/24 Thomas R. Pickering sworn 
in as U.S. Permament 
Representative to the UN, 
Mar. 20 (biographic data). 

3/27 Baker: interview on 
"MacNeil/Lehrer 
Newshour," Mar. 24. 

3/27 Baker: interview on "This 
Week With David 
Brinkley," Mar. 26. 

3/27 Baker: interview on "The 
Today Show," Houston. 

3/27 Baker: interview on "Good 
Morning, America," 
Houston. 

3/28 Margaret DeB. Tutwiler 
sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Public 
Affairs and Department 
spokesman. Mar. 3 
(biographic data). 



*51 3/29 Robert M. Kimmitt sworn in 
as Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, Mar. 2 
(biographic data). 

*52 3/29 John T McCarthy, U.S. 

Ambassador to Lebanon 
(biographic data). 

*53 3/29 Dennis B. Ross, Director, 
Policy Planning Staff 
(biographic data). 
54 3/29 Baker: Chilean fruit sales 
resume in U.S. 

*55 3/31 Program for the visit of 
Egyptian President 
Mubarak, Apr. 1-5. 

56 3/31 Baker: address at consultation 

on a new hemispheric 
agenda. Carter Presidential 
Center, Atlanta, Mar. 30. 

57 3/31 Baker: statement on Namibia 

and Angola. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Division, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

President Bush 

Continuity and Change in U.S. -Korean 
Relations, National Assembly, Seoul, 
Feb. 27, 1989 (Current Policy #1155). 

Secretary Baker 

Statement at Senate Confirmation Hear- 
ings, Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee, Jan. 17, 1989 (Current Policy #1146). 

The International Agenda and FY 1990 Budg- 
et Request, House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee, Feb. 21, 1989 (Current Policy 
#1147). 

New Horizons in Europe, ministerial meet- 
ing signaling Mar. 9 opening of CSBM and 
CFE talks, Vienna, Mar. 6, 1989 (Current 
Policy #1154). 

Africa 

The U.S. and Sudan: Peace and Relief (Re- 
gional Brief, Feb. 1989). 

Southwestern Africa: Blueprint for Peace 
(GIST, Feb. 1989). 

Arms Control 

Confidence- and Security-Building Meas- 
ures Negotiations (GIST, Mar. 1989). 

Department/Foreign Service 

Bureau of Public Affairs Services to the 
Public (Public Information Series, Jan. 
1989). 



East Asia 

FY 1990 Foreign Assistance Requests for 
East Asia and the Pacific, Acting As- 
sistant Secretary Clark, Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Feb. 27, 1989 (Cur- 
rent Policy #1150). 

Burma: Political Situation and Human 
Rights, Deputy Assistant Secretary Lam- 
bertson. Subcommittee on Asian and Pa- 
cific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Mar. 2, 1989 (Current Policy 
#1153). 

Future Prospects for the Philippines, Depu- 
ty Assistant Secretary Lambertson, Sub- 
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mar. 7, 
1989 (Current Policy #1157). 

Update on Cambodia, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary Lambertson, Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Mar. 1, 1989 (Current 
Policy #1152). 

U.S. E.xport Controls and China (GIST, 
Mar. 1989). 



Economics 

The World Bank (GIST, Mar. 



1989). 



Europe 

Security Challenges Facing NATO in the 
1990s, Ambassador Nitze, Nobel Insti- 
tute's Leangkollen Seminar, Oslo, Feb. 6, 
1989 (Current Policy #1149). 

CSCE Vienna FoUow-Up Meeting, A Frame- 
work for Europe's Future (Selected Docu- 
ments #35, Jan. 1989). 

25th Semiannual Report — Implementation of 
Helsinki Final Act, Apr. 1, 1988-Sept. 30, 
1988 (Special Report #181, Feb. 1989). 

Human Rights 

Human Rights Issues in Africa, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretaries Brown and Farrand, 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 
House Appropriations Committee, Feb. 7 
and 8, 1989 (Current Policy #1148). 

Human Rights in Cuba: An Update (Public 
Information Series, Jan. 1989). 

Science & Technology 

Toward a Global High-Definition TV Produc- 
tion Standard, U.S. Coordinator Landau, 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, 
Consumer Protection, and Finance, House 
Energy and Commerce Committee, 
Mar. 8", 1989 (Current Policy #1158). 

Terrorism 

Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature, Ambas- 
sador Bremer, House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Feb. 9, 1989 (Current Policy 
#1151). 

Western Hemisphere 

El Salvador: Presidential Election Guide, 
(Public Information Series, Mar. 1989). ■ 



li)artment of State Bulletin/May 1989 



89 



^DEX 



Iy1989 

|ume89, No. 2146 



ca. Human Rights Issues in Africa 

rown, Farrand) 27 

ola. Namibian Independence and Troop 

[ithdrawal From Angola (Baker) 29 

s Control 

pean Security Negotiations Open in 
enna (Bush, Ledogar, Maresca, Western 

sition paper) 33 

Horizons in Europe (Baker) 56 

etary's Interview on "This Week With 

ivid Brinkley" 25 

ma 

Tia: Political Situation and Human 

ghts (Lambertson) 40 

•na — A Profile 41 

ibodia 

bodia— A Profile 39 

ite on Cambodia (Lambertson) 37 

, Chilean Fruit Exports to the U.S. 

aker, joint statement) 85 

la. President's Trip to Japan, China, 
d South Korea (Baker, Bush, White 

luse statement ) 1 

jress 

na: Political Situation and Human 

ghts (Lambertson) 40 

ification for Narcotics Source and 
ansit Countries (Secretary's letter to 

Congress, Wrobleski) 68 

1990 Assistance Request for East Asia 

d the Pacific (Clark) 49 

990 Assistance Request for the Middle 

st (Burleigh, Walker) 61 

990 Assistance Request for 
ganizations and Programs 

pgelgesang) 81 

1990 Assistance Request for Refugee 

ograms (Moore) 72 

re Prospects for the Philippines 

imbertson) 43 

an Rights Issues in Africa (Brown, 

rrand) 27 

3 Threats Against Author (Adams) . . 78 
jrism: Its Evolving Nature 

•emer) 74 

ite on Cambodia (Lambertson) 37 

I. UN Human Rights Report on Cuba 

ash) 83 

Asia 

ification for Narcotics Source and 
ansit Countries (Secretary's letter to 

; Congress. Wrobleski) 68 

1990 Assistance Request for East Asia 

i the Pacific (Clark) 49 

lomics. Dealing With the International 

bt Crisis (Brady) 53 

ilvador. Presidential Election Held in 
Salvador (White House statement) . . 84 



Europe 

European Security Negotiations Open in 

Vienna (Bush, Ledogar, Maresca, Western 

position |)aper) 33 

New Horizons in Europe (Baker) 56 

Foreign Assistance 

FY 1990 Assistance Request for East Asia 

and the Pacific (Clark) 49 

FY 199(1 Assistance Request for the Middle 

East (Burleigh, Walker) 61 

FY 1990 Assistance Request for Refugee 

Programs (Moore) 72 

Human Rights 

Burma: Political Situation and Human 

Rights (Lambertson) 40 

Human Rights Issues in Africa (Brown, 

Farrand) 27 

UN Human Rights Report on Cuba 

(Bush) 83 

Iran. Iran's Threats Against Author 

(Adams) 78 

Iraq. Iraq to Pay Compensation 

(Department statement) 67 

Israel. Secretary Meets With Israeli 

Foreign Minister (Arens, Baker) 63 

Japan. President's Trip to Japan, China, and 

South Korea (Baker, Bush, White House 

statement) 1 

Korea. President's Trip to Japan, China, 

and South Korea (Baker, Bush, White 

House statement) 1 

Lebanon. Continued Fighting in Lebanon 

(Department statements) 65 

Middle East 

FY 199U Assistance Request for the Middle 

East (Burleigh, Walker) 61 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 25 

U.S. and PLO Meet in Tunis 

(Pelletreau) 66 

Military Affairs. Iraq to Pay Compensation 

(Department statement) 67 

Namibia. Namibian Independence and 

Troop Withdrawal From Angola 

(Baker) 29 

Narcotics. Certification for Narcotics 

Source and Transit Countries (Secretary's 

letter to the Congress, Wrobleski) 68 

Nicaragua 

Secretary's Interview on "MacNeil/Lehrer 

Newshour" 23 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 25 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
European Security Negotiations Open in 

Vienna (Bush, Ledogar Maresca, Western 

position paper) 33 

New Horizons in Europe (Baker) 56 

Organization of American States. FY 1990 

Assistance Request for Organizations and 

Programs (Vogelgesang) 81 

Pacific. FY 1990 Assistance Request for 

East Asia and the Pacific (Clark) 49 

Philippines. Future Prospects for the 

Philippines (Lambertson) 43 



Presidential Documents 

European Security Negotiations Open in 
Vienna (Bush, Ledogar, Maresca, Western 
position paper) 33 

President's Trip to Japan. China, and South 
Korea (Baker, Bush, White House 
statement) 1 

UN Human Rights Report on Cuba 
(Bush) 83 

Publications. Department of State 89 

Refugees. FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
Refugee Programs (Moore) 72 

Security Assistance 

FY 1990 Assistance Request for East Asia 
and the Pacific (Clark) 49 

FY 1990 Assistance Request for the Middle 
East (Burleigh, Walker) 61 

Terrorism 

Iran's Threats Against Author (Adams) . . 78 

Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature 
(Bremer) 74 

Trade. Chilean Fruit Exports to the U.S. 
(Baker, joint statement) 85 

Treaties. Current Actions 86 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Meets With Soviet Foreign 
Minister (Baker) 59 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 25 

United Nations 

FY 1990 Assistance Request for Organiza- 
tions and Programs (Vogelgesang) 81 

Namibian Independence and Troop 
Withdrawal From Angola (Baker) 29 

UN Human Rights Report on Cuba 
(Bush) 83 

Warsaw Pact 

European Security Negotiations Open in 
Vienna (Bush, Ledogar, Maresca, Western 
position paper) 33 

New Horizons in Europe (Baker) 56 

Western Hemisphere. Certification for 
Narcotics Source and Transit Countries 
(Secretary's letter to the Congress, 
Wrobleski) 68 

Name Index 

Adams, Alvin P. , Jr 78 

Arens, Moshe 63 

Baker, Secretary 1,23,25,29,56,59,63,68,85 

Brady, Nicholas F 53 

Bremer, L. Paul, III 74 

Brown, Kenneth L 27 

Burleigh, A. Peter 61 

Bush, President 1,33,83 

Clark, William, Jr 49 

Farrand, Robert W 27 

Lambertson, David F 37,40,43 

Ledogar, Stephen J 33 

Maresca, .John J 33 

Moore, Jonathan 72 

Pelletreau, Robert H., Jr 66 

Vogelgesang, Sandra L 81 

Walker, Edward S 61 

Wrobleski, Ann B 68 



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he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volume 89 / iNumber 2147 




#- JUL- 10 1989 
pnaTQi'i ^'Wzv.Cj lishahy 

•-^ ,'■■ \,- -.-',:. . , ■-T" [■'•:■* ^r-,","' ;•■•:■ 



June 1989 




The President and the congressional lead- 
ership announce the Bipartisan Accord on 
Central America. 

(White House photo by Michael Sargent) 



Dppartntpnt of Stat p 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2147 / June 1989 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
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JAMES A. BAKER, III 

Secretary of State 

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

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PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

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CONTENTS 





' le President 

Commitment to Democracy and 
Economic Progress in Latin 
America 

Encouraging Political and 
Economic Reforms in Poland 



le Secretary 

U.S. and Latin America: A 
Shared Destiny 

Power For Good: American For- 
eign Policy in the New Era 

Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 

Interview for "American 
Interests" 



Srica 



Transition to Independence 
Marred in Namibia (Depart- 
ment Statement) 



tms Control 

1 Chemical Weapons Disposal Pro- 
gram (Max L. Friedersdorf) 



Eonomics 



2 



Request for U.S. Contributions 
to Multilateral Development 
Banks (Nicholas F. Brady) 

Status of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (Carta A. Hills) 

Foreign Direct Investment in a 
Global Economy 



Europe 

35 The Baltic States in an Era of 

Soviet Reform (Paula J. 
Dobriansky) 

36 NATO Nuclear Planning Group 

Meets in Brussels (Final 
Communique) 

37 Polish Roundtable Accords 

(White House Statement) 
39 President Meets With Irish 
Prime Minister (President 
Bush) 



Middle East 

40 Visit of Egyptian President 

(President Bush, Mohammed 
Hosni Mubarak) 

41 Continuation of Arms Sales to 

Saudi Arabia (President 
Bush) 

42 Visit of Israeli Prime Minister 

(President Bush, Yitzhak 
Shamir) 

43 Situation in Lebanon (Depart- 

ment and White House State- 
ments) 



Nuclear Policy 

44 Nuclear Cooperation With 
EURATOM(Le«er Coffee 
Congress) 



Pacific 

45 U.S. -New Zealand Relations: 
Some Parting Observations 
(Paul M. Cleveland) 



Security Assistance 

52 FY 1990 Security Assistance 
Request (H. Allen Holmes) 

Western Hemisphere 

55 U.S. Support for Democracy 

and Peace in Central America 
(Secretary Baker. President 
Bush, Bipartisan Accord, 
Joint Declarations) 

59 FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
Latin America and the Carib- 
bean (Michael G. Kozak) 

66 President's Meeting With El 

Salvador's President-Elect 
(White House Statement) 

67 Soviet Policy in Central Amer- 

ica (White House Statement) 

67 Electoral and Media Laws in 

Nicaragua (Department 
Statement) 

Treaties 

68 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

70 Department of State 

Publications 

70 Department of State 

Index 



Science & Technology 



48 



51 



Toward a Global High-Definition 
TV Production Standard 
(Sonia Landau) 

U.S. International Activities in 
Science and Technology 
(Message to the Congress) 



THE PRESIDENT 



Commitment to Democracy 

and Economic Progress 

in Latin America 



President Bush's address before 
Council of the Americas conference 
the Department of State on May 2, 

oking around the world today, in de- 
loping countries and even in the com- 
inist bloc, we see the triumph of two 
eat ideas: the idea of free govern- 
nt and the idea of free enterprise, 
id certainly, Latin America and the 
ribbean are proving fertile ground 

these ideas. Democracy, a decade 
the e.xception, I think we would all 
ree, is today the rule. And the sym- 

of this new breeze is the ballot box. 
id by year's end, 14 national elections 
11 have been held across the Americas. 
And let's remember what it means 
vote in some countries when democ- 
?y itself is at stake. We're not talking 
out people who may stay home from 

l)oils because it's raining or rush- 
ur traffic is heavy. We're talking, in 
lie cases, about people literally risk- 

their lives to exercise their demo- 
itic right. 

And listen to the words of a Sal- 
doran man on the eve of last month's 
esidential elections in that country — 
•ctions that guerrilla forces vowed to 
;rupt: "Of course, I'm going to vote, 
hough I have to admit it's very scary, 
■re, going to the grocery store can be 
ngerous — but you have to do it. And 
u have to vote, too. We just can't roll 
sr and play dead each time we're 

eatened." That's the voice of democ- 
:y speaking, and it's the voice of cour- 
e and hope. 

Economically, although there is 
junting concern about international 
bt, there are encouraging signs as 
■11. Mexico has joined GATT [General 
!;reement on Tariffs and Trade] and 
moving toward a more open and in- 
rnationally oriented economy. In Cos- 
Rica and Brazil and Venezuela, new 
ntures are creating export oppor- 
nities that promise a broader eco- 
mic base for those countries. You 

the business community are among 
e pioneers and partners in these 
anges. And you're contributing to 



Latin America's increased produc- 
tivity — you're helping the region to 
fulfill its potential for progress. 

The historic shift in political and 
economic thinking now underway in 
Latin America is good news for us all. 
Our task is clear: to make the most of 
the new opportunities open to us, we 
must improve our working partner- 
ships in this hemisphere — between 
countries north and south; between 
government, business, and labor; and, 
in the United States, between the dif- 
ferent branches of the Federal govern- 
ment. We share common interests — we 
must work toward a common aim. 

My Administration will work to 
build a new partnership for the 
Americas — a partnership built on mu- 
tual respect and mutual respon- 
sibilities. And we seek a partnership 
rooted in a common commitment to 
democratic rule. 

The battle for democracy is far 
from over. The institutions of free gov- 
ernment are still fragile and in need of 
support. Our battlefield is the broad 
middle ground of democracy and popu- 
lar government — our fight against the 
enemies of freedom on the extreme 
right and on the extreme left. 

Democracy for Nicaragua 

As a result of the recent Bipartisan Ac- 
cord on Central America, the United 
States is speaking with one voice on a 
matter of crucial importance to peace 
in Central America: bringing democ- 
racy to Nicaragua and peace to the 
region. And I want to salute our 
Secretary of State [James A. Baker, 
III] for hammering out this bipartisan 
accord when many, 2 or 3 months ago, 
said that it could not be done. 

Let me take this opportunity to 
make several observations on steps that 
are vital to peace, security, and democ- 
racy in Central America. 

First, Nicaragua's effort to export 
violent revolution must stop. We cannot 
tolerate Sandinista support — which 
continues today — for the insurgencies 
in El Salvador and Guatemala and ter- 
rorism in Honduras as well. Peace in 



the region cannot coexist with attempts 
to undermine democracy. 

And second, we call upon the Sov- 
iet Union to end Soviet-bloc support for 
the Nicaraguan assault on regional de- 
mocracy. The United States ended mili- 
tary aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance 
2 years ago. And yet, since that time, 
the Soviets continue to funnel about 
$0.5 billion worth of military assist- 
ance a year to the Sandinista regime — 
about the same rate as before we 
stopped our military aid to the con- 
tras. Furthermore, Cuba and Nicara- 
gua, supplied by $7 billion in Soviet- 
bloc aid, have stepped up the arms flow 
to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Soviet- 
bloc weapons, such as AK-47s, are 
now being sent through Cuba and 
Nicaragua to the guerrillas. And that 
aid must stop. 

The Soviet Union must understand 
that we hold it accountable for the con- 
sequences of this intervention — and for 
progress toward peace in the region 
and democracy in Nicaragua. As the 
Bipartisan Accord makes clear, contin- 
ued Soviet support of violence and sub- 
version in Central America is in direct 
violation of the Esquipulas agreement 
concluded by the nations of Central 
America a year and a half ago. 

Finally, within Nicaragua, we 
want to see a promise kept — the prom- 
ise of democracy, withheld by the San- 
dinista regime for nearly a decade. To 
this end, the United States will con- 
tinue to supply humanitarian aid to the 
Nicaraguan Resistance through the 
elections scheduled in Nicaragua for 
February of 1990. The conduct and the 
outcome of those elections will demon- 
strate to Nicaragua's neighbors and the 
international community whether it 
means to deliver on democracy. 

But the Sandinistas' recent attacks 
are ominous. April 25th was the bench- 
mark date for Nicaragua to have in 
place electoral laws consistent with 
free and fair elections. Instead, re- 
strictive new election and press laws 
have been pushed through the San- 
dinista-controlled legislature. These 



.^»« ^< 04««>. 



.iia*:»/ I. .ma -laoo 



THE PRESIDENT 



laws have been unilaterally imposed, 
and the proposals of Nicaragua's oppo- 
sition parties have been ignored. The 
result is a stacked deck against the op- 
position and stacked rules of the game. 

The election law mandates uni- 
laterally that half of all foreign political 
contributions go to the Supreme Elec- 
toral Council, which remains under 
Sandinista control, and ignores pro- 
posals put forward by the opposition to 
provide for unlimited freedom of access 
for international election observers. In 
effect, that is a stacked deck against 
freedom. The new law governing press 
conduct gives excessive controls to the 
Interior Ministry to police violations 
against what they call "national integ- 
rity" and continues the prohibition of 
private-sector ownership of television 
stations. 

If there's to be peace in Nicaragua, 
the Sandinista regime must work with 
the opposition — including the Resist- 
ance — to put in place election and press 
laws that are truly free and fair. And 
that means to have free and fair elec- 
tions with outside observers given un- 
fettered access to all election places 
and to all proceedings. It means a se- 
cret ballot on election day, the freedom 
to campaign, to organize, to hold 
rallies— and to poll public opinion, to 
operate independent radio and TV 
stations as well. It means the absence 
of intimidation either from a politicized 
Sandinista military or police or from 
those neighborhood block committees 
that control people's ration cards. It 
means an end to the arrests and bully- 
ing of opposition leaders. It means 
freeing all political prisoners jailed 
under the Sandinista rule, not just a 
handful of former Somoza soldiers. 
And if the Sandinistas fail this 
test, it will be a tragic setback— and 
a dangerous one. The consolidation of 
tyranny will not be peace; it will be 
a crisis waiting to happen. 

Current Elections for Democracy 

I want to mention several other Latin 
American nations where elections can 
signal positive change. 

In El Salvador, last month's free 
and fair elections proved another ring- 
ing affirmation of that nation's commit- 
ment to democracy. We expect ARENA 
[National Republican Alliance] to exer- 
cise its political power responsibly. And 
I have conveyed personally to Presi- 
dent-elect Cristiani our commitment to 



human rights in El Salvador. I honestly 
feel that he shares my concern, and he 
deserves our support. 

In Paraguay, the only country 
whose dictator had held power longer 
than Fidel Castro, elections have just 
taken place— the first hopeful sign that 
Paraguay is on its way to joining the 
democratic mainstream. And we do 
congratulate President-elect Rodriguez 
on his electoral victory and look for- 
ward to working with him. This demo- 
cratic opening must continue. 

In Panama, however — Jim [Secre- 
tary of State Baker] spoke to you all 
about this yesterday [see p. 5] — the 
forecast for freedom is less clear. A 
free and fair vote in the elections 
scheduled for this Sunday would enable 
Panama to take a significant step to- 
ward ending the international isolation 
and internal economic crisis brought on 
by the Noriega regime. And, in spite of 
intimidation from authorities, Pan- 
ama's opposition parties have — with 
great courage — taken their campaign 
to the Panamanian people. The Noriega 
regime's candidates are trailing in poll 
after poll by a margins of two to one. 

Unfortunately, as Secretary Baker 
told you yesterday, it is evident that the 
regime is ready to resort to massive 
election fraud in order to remain in 
power. The Noriega regime continues 
to threaten and intimidate Panama- 
nians who believe in democracy. It's 
also attempting to limit the presence 
and freedom of action of international 
observers and to prevent journalists 
from reporting on the election process 
in Panama. Let me be clear: the United 
States will not recognize the results of 
a fraudulent election engineered simply 
to keep Noriega in power. 

All nations that value democracy — 
that understand free and fair elections 
are the very heart of their democratic 
system — should speak out against elec- 
tion fraud in Panama. And that means 
the democracies of Europe — they ought 
to be speaking out about this — as well 
as nations in this hemisphere strug- 
gling to preserve the democratic sys- 
tems they've fought so hard to put in 
place. 

It is time for the plain truth: the 
day of the dictator is over. The people's 
right to democracy must not be denied. 



l! 



It 



Principles of Economic Freedom 

A commitment to democracy is only 
element in the new partnership that 
envision for the nations of the Amer: 
cas. This new partnership must also 
aim at ensuring that the market eco 
omies survive and prosper and prev; 
The principles of economic freedom 
have not been applied as fully as the 
principle of democracy. While the po 
erty of statism and protectionism is 
more evident than ever, statist econ 
omies remain in place, stifling grow 
in many Latin nations. 

And that is why the United Sta1 
has made a new initiative to reduce 
weight of the debt, as Latin govern- 
ments and leaders take the difficult 
steps to restructure their economies 
Economic growth requires policies t 
create a climate for investment — oni 
that will attract new capital, one th; 
will reverse the flight of capital out 
the region. 

We welcome the broad, inter nat 
al support that has been expressed i 
our ideas to strengthen the debt stn 
egy. We urge the parties involved — 
international financial institutions, 
debtor countries, commercial banks 
to make a sustained effort to move t 
process forward. We recognize the c 
peting claims debtor governments n 
try to satisfy as they work to advan 
economic reform, service their debt 
and respond to the needs of their cit 
zens. However, we also understand t 
progress can be an incremental 
process — case-by-case, step-by-step 
provided there is a clear commitmei 
to economic reform — I want to say 
some case-by-case successes in this 
hemisphere. To that end, we've star 
discussions, as you know, with Mexi 
and Venezuela and other countries a 
well. 

Narcotics Traffickers 

Finally, our common partnership m 
confront a common enemy: internati 
al drug traffickers. Drugs threaten 
izens and civil society throughout ou 
hemisphere. Joining forces in the w; 
on drugs is crucial. There is nothing 
be gained by trying to lay blame anc 
make recriminations. Drug abuse is 
problem of both supply and demand- 
and attacking both is the only way w 
can face and defeat the drug menace 
I believe that there is much mor 
understanding on this point in this 
hemisphere south of our border than 
there used to be. It is my view that 
countries to the south felt for many 



npnartmpnt nf State Bulletin/June 1 



THE PRESIDENT 



s that this was simply the problem 
1 U.S. market for this insidious 
iduct. Now they see that their own 
ieties are being undermined by drug 
. Now they see that their own sense 
)rder is being undermined by those 
fficking in narcotics. So I would call 
much more cooperation between the 
ntries of this hemisphere to combat 

menace of narcotics. 



nclusion 

=re's a place in this new partner- 
p for all of you in the Council of 
lericas. Thomas Paine said that, 
e prosperity of any commercial na- 
1 is regulated by the prosperity of 

est." Your efforts do contribute. 
3y contribute directly to the greater 
sperity of all of the nations of the 
lericas. 

The challenge I've spoken of today 
I't be easy. But all of us— north and 
th, in government and in the private 
tor — can work together to meet the 
llenges and master them. We know 
ve got a lot of work to do. And you 
)w you've got a lot of work to do — 
•k that won't wait — to ensure that 
the Americas enjoy the peace, the 
edom, and the prosperity that we 
rish. 

Thank you for what you're doing, 
double your efforts. And I promise 
I, we'll do our level best in the execu- 
3 branch of this government. 



Encouraging Political and 
Economic Reforms in Poland 



'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
tial Documents of May 8, 1989. ■ 



President Bush's address before 
citizens of Hamtramck, Michigan, on 
April 1?', 1989.' 

Americans are not mildly sympathetic 
spectators of events in Poland. We are 
bound to Poland by a very special 
bond — a bond of blood, of culture, and 
shared values. So it is only natural 
that, as dramatic change comes to Po- 
land, we share the aspirations and ex- 
citement of the Polish people. 

In my inaugural address, I spoke 
of the new breeze of freedom gaining 
strength around the world. "In man's 
heart," I said, "if not in fact, the day 
of the dictator is over. The totalitarian 
era is passing, its old ideas blown away 
like leaves from an ancient lifeless 
tree." I spoke of the spreading recogni- 
tion that prosperity can only come from 
a free market and the creative genius 
of the individual. I spoke of the new 
potency of democratic ideas — of free 
speech, free elections, and the exercise 
of free will. 



Resurgence of the 
Democratic Ideal 

We should not be surprised that the 
ideas of democracy are returning with 
renewed force in Europe — the home- 
land of philosophers of freedom whose 
ideals have been so fully realized in 



. . . liberty is an idea 
whose time has come in 
Eastern Europe. 



America. Victor Hugo said: "An inva- 
sion of armies can be resisted, but not 
an idea whose time has come." My 
friends, liberty is an idea whose time 
has come in Eastern Europe. 

For almost half a century, the sup- 
pression of freedom in Eastern Eu- 
rope, sustained by the military power 
of the Soviet Union, has kept nation 
from nation, neighbor from neighbor. 



As East and West seek to reduce arms, 
it must not be forgotten that arms are a 
symptom, not a source, of tension. The 
true source of tension is the imposed 
and unnatural division of Europe. 

How can there be stability and se- 
curity in Europe and the world as long 
as nations and people are denied the 
right to determine their future — a 
right explicitly promised them by 
agreements among the victorious pow- 
ers at the end of World War 11? How 
can there be stability and security in 
Europe as long as nations, which once 
stood proudly at the front rank of in- 
dustrial powers, are impoverished by a 
discredited ideology and stifling au- 
thoritarianism? The United States has 
never accepted the legitimacy of Eu- 
rope's division. We accept no spheres 
of influence that deny the sovereign 
rights of nations. 

Yet the winds of change are shap- 
ing a new European destiny. Western 
Europe is resurgent. Eastern Europe 
is awakening to yearnings for democra- 
cy, independence, and prosperity. In 
the Soviet Union itself, we are encour- 
aged by the sound of voices long silent 
and the sight of the rulers consulting 
the ruled. We see "new thinking" in 
some aspects of Soviet foreign policy. 
We are hopeful that these stirrings 
presage meaningful, lasting, and more 
far-reaching change. 

Let no one doubt the sincerity of 
the American people and their govern- 
ment in our desire to see reform suc- 
ceed in the Soviet Union. We welcome 
the changes that have taken place, and 
we will continue to encourage greater 
recognition of human rights, market 
incentives, and elections. 

East and West are negotiating on a 
broad range of issues, from arms re- 
ductions to the environment. But the 
cold war began in Eastern Europe; if it 
is to end, it will end in this crucible of 
world conflict — and it must end. The 
American people want to see East and 
central Europe free, prosperous, and 
at peace. With prudence, realism, and 
patience, we seek to promote the evolu- 
tion of freedom — the opportunities 
sparked by the Helsinki accords and 
deepening East-West contact. 

In recent years, we have improved 
relations with countries in the region. 
In each case, we looked for progress in 



.M»» ^t o«M«A Diiii<%*:i 



THE PRESIDENT 



its international posture and internal 
practices — in human rights, cultural 
openness, emigration issues, opposition 
to terrorism. While we want relations 
to improve, there are certain acts we 
will not condone or accept — behavior 
that can shift relations in the wrong 
direction: human rights abuses, tech- 
nology theft, and hostile intelligence 
or foreign policy actions against us. 

Some regimes are now seeking to 
win popular legitimacy through re- 
forms. In Hungary, a new leadership is 
experimenting with reforms that may 
permit a political pluralism that only a 
few years ago would have been unthink- 
able. And in Poland, on April 5, Soli- 
darity leader Lech Walesa and Interior 
Minister Kiszczak signed agreements 
that, if faithfully implemented, will be 
a watershed in the postwar history of 
Eastern Europe. 

Under the auspices of the round- 
table agreements, the free trade union. 



Reviewing U.S. Policies 

The Polish people understand the mag- 
nitude of this challenge. Democratic 
forces in Poland have asked for the 
moral, political, and economic support 
of the West. And the West will respond. 
My Administration is completing a 
thorough review of our policies toward 
Poland and all of Eastern Europe. I 
have carefully considered ways the 
United States can help Poland. We will 
not act unconditionally. We will not of- 
fer unsound credits. We will not offer 
aid without requiring sound economic 
practices in return. We must remember 
that Poland is still a member of the 
Warsaw Pact. We must take no steps 
that compromise the security of the 
West. 

The Congress, the Polish-American 
community, the American labor move- 
ment, our allies, and international fi- 
nancial institutions must work in 
concert if Polish democracy is to take 



We accept no spheres of influence that deny the sover- 
eign rights of nations. 



Solidarity, will be formally restored; a 
free opposition press will be legalized; 
independent political and other free as- 
sociations will be permitted; and elec- 
tions for a new Polish senate will be 
held. These agreements testify to the 
realism of Gen. [Wojciech] Jaruzelski 
and his colleagues. And they are in- 
spiring testimony to the spiritual guid- 
ance of the Catholic Church, the in- 
domitable spirit of the Polish peo- 
ple, and the strength and wisdom of 
Lech Walesa. 

Poland faces, and will continue to 
face for some time, severe economic 
problems. A modern French writer ob- 
served that communism is not another 
form of economics; it is the death of 
economics. In Poland, an economic sys- 
tem crippled by the inefficiencies of 
central planning almost proved to be 
the death of initiative and enterprise. 
Almost — but economic reforms can still 
give free rein to the enterprising im- 
pulse and creative spirit of the Polish 
people. 



root anew and sustain itself. We can 
and must answer this call to freedom. 
And it is particularly appropriate, here 
in Hamtramck, for me to salute the 
members and leaders of the American 
labor movement for hanging tough with 
Solidarity through its darkest days. 

The Poles are now taking concrete 
steps that deserve our active support. 
I have decided on specific steps by the 
United States, carefully chosen to rec- 
ognize reforms underway and to en- 
courage reforms yet to come once 
Solidarity is legal. 

• I will ask Congress to join me in 
providing Poland access to our gener- 
alized system of preferences, which 
offers selective tariff relief to bene- 
ficiary countries. 

• We will work with our allies and 
friends in the Paris Club to develop 
sustainable new schedules for Poland to 
repay its debt, easing a heavy burden 
so that a free market can grow. 

• I will also ask Congress to join 
me in authorizing the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation to operate in 
Poland, to the benefit of both Polish 
and U.S. investors. 



i> 
Siiv 
;ert 

till 
11 ■ 

•J 
» 



• We will propose negotiations fo 
private business agreement with Po- 
land to encourage cooperation betwe 
U.S. firms and Poland's private busi- 
nesses. Both sides can benefit. 

• The United States will continuflk 
to consider supporting, on their mer 
viable loans to the private sector by 
International Finance Corporation. 

• We believe that the roundtable 
agreements clear the way for Poland 
be able to work with the Internation; 
Monetary Fund on programs that su] 
port sound, new, market-oriented ec 
nomic policies. 

• We will encourage business an 
private nonprofit groups to develop i 
novative programs to swap Polish de 
for equity in Polish enterprises and ) 
charitable, humanitarian, and envir 
mental projects. 

• We will support imaginative e< 
cational, cultural, and training pro- 
grams to help liberate the creative 
energies of the Polish people. 

When I visited Poland in Septen 
ber 1987, I told Chairman Jaruzelski 
and Lech Walesa that the American 
people and Government would respoi 
quickly and imaginatively to signific 
internal reform of the kind we see m 
Both of them valued that assurance, 
it is especially gratifying for me to \ 
ness the changes now taking place ir 
Poland and to announce these impor- 
tant changes in U.S. policy. The Uni 
States keeps its promises. 

If Poland's experiment succeeds 
other countries may follow. While w( 
must still differentiate among the m 
tions of Eastern Europe, Poland off( 
two lessons for all. First, there can 1 
no progress without significant polit 
cal and economic liberalization. Secc 
help from the West will come in cone 
with liberalization. Our friends and 
European allies share this philosop? 

The West can now be bold in pro 
posing a vision of the European futur 
We dream of the day when there will 
no barriers to the free movement of 
people, goods, and ideas. We dream 
the day when East European people; 
will be free to choose their system o: 
government and to vote for the partj 
their choice in regular, contested ele 
tions. We dream of the day when Eas 
European countries will be free to 
choose their own peaceful course in 1 
world, including closer ties with Wes 
ern Europe. And we envision an Eat 
ern Europe in which the Soviet Unic 
has renounced military intervention 



Honortmant r>f QtatO Rllllptin/June 1 



THE SECRETARY 



nstrument of its policy — on any pre- 
. We share an unwavering conviction 
one day all the peoples of Europe 
live in freedom. 

Next month, at a summit of the 
th Atlantic alliance, the leaders of 
Western democracies will discuss 
le concerns. These are not bilateral 
es between the United States and 
Soviet Union. They are, rather, the 
;ern of all the Western allies, calling 
common approaches. The Soviet 
on should understand, in turn, that a 
, democratic Eastern Europe as we 
sion it would threaten no one and no 
itry. Such an evolution 
Id imply, and reinforce, the further 
rovement of East-West relations in 
imensions — arms reductions, politi- 
relations. trade — in ways that en- 
?e the safety and well-being of all of 
ope. There is no other way. 
What has brought us to this open- 
The unity and strength of the de- 
racies, and something else — the bold 
thinking in the Soviet Union; the 
te desire for freedom in the hearts of 
len. We will not waver in our dedica- 
to freedom now. If we are wise, unit- 
and ready to seize the moment, we 
be remembered as the generation 
helped all of Europe find its destiny 
eedom. 

Two centuries ago, a Polish patriot 
ed Thaddeus Kosciuszko came to 
•e American shores to stand for free- 
Let us honor and remember this 
of our own strugg'e for freedom by 
nding our hand to those who work 
shipyards of Gdansk, and walk the 
lied streets of Warsaw. Let us recall 
vords of the Poles 

struggled for independence: "For 
■ freedom and ours." Let us support 
jeaceful evolution of democ- 
in Poland. The cause of liberty 
vs no limits; the friends of freedom, 
orders. 



U.S. and Latin America: 
A Shared Destiny 



Text from weekly Compilation of Presi- 
ial Documents of Apr. 24, 1989. ■ 



Secretary Baker's address and 
question-and-answer session before the 
Council of the Americas conference at 
the Department of State on May 1, 
1989.'^ 

I do believe that we meet at a rather 
historic moment for Latin America, 
and for that matter, a rather historic 
moment for the United States. Across 
the Americas today, from Punta Are- 
nas to California, an old order is dying, 
and a new world is struggling to be 
born. 

Brazil is manufacturing communi- 
cation satellites. Mexico has joined the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade]. A new vision of regional 
trade and integration is taking shape 
in the Caribbean Basin. And the winds 
of democracy are blowing across the 
hemisphere, from Chile to Paraguay to 
Central America. 

The United States, I'm happy to 
report, does not stand aloof from the 
historic changes which are transform- 
ing our hemisphere — just the opposite. 
We are proudly rediscovering our 
shared heritage with Latin America 
and our shared heritage with the 
Caribbean. 

Stand in the Miami airport today, 
or go as I do frequently to San Antonio. 
Close your eyes and listen. You could 
easily imagine yourself in Caracas or 
in San Jose. The fifth largest Spanish- 
speaking community in the world now 
lives in the United States of America. 
Soon we will be entering the 21st 
century, and the hemisphere will face a 
choice between two very, very different 
futures. Down one road lies a vision of 
freedom and opportunity and economic 
development. It is a vision in which all 
citizens share as partners in a global 
economy and as a true community of 
democratic nations. Down the other 
road lies a failed vision of dictatorship, 
state control, and missed opportunity. 
We know which road we have to travel, 
and we know that we've all got to travel 
that road together. To put it simply, the 
United States, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean need each other today as 
never before. 



Confronting Common Issues 

The agenda of issues before us con- 
firms, I think, the new reality — democ- 
racy; development; debt; trade: drugs; 
migration; the environment; nuclear 
proliferation. These are not respon- 
sibilities which one could label "north" 
or "south." They are, instead, the com- 
mon challenges that we must confront 
together to shape successfully our 
shared destiny. 

In recent weeks and months. Presi- 
dent Bush and I have heard that very 
message. We have heard it, as a matter 
of fact, in person from Presidents Sa- 
linas [Mexico], Alfonsin [Argentina], 
Perez [Venezuela], Sarney [Brazil], Ar- 
ias [Costa Rica], Azcona [Honduras], 
Cerezo [Guatemala], and Duarte [El 
Salvador], and from Prime Ministers 
Charles [Dominica], Manley [Jamaica], 
Robinson [Trinidad and Tobago], and 
Sandiford [Barbados]. 

I believe the region's democratic 
leaders are reaching out to the United 
States to offer a new partnership, one 
based on mutual respect and one based 
on shared responsibility. The new Pres- 
ident of the United States and his new 
Administration have an answer. And 
that answer is: We are also reaching 
out. 

The problems we face will not be 
resolved through quick promises, and 
they are not going to be resolved with 
easy answers. Instead, we've got to 
confront them together; we've got to 
confront them with candor; we've got to 
confront them with commitment; and 
we've got to confront them with cour- 
age. We can begin by recognizing a 
simple truth that we have forgotten too 
many times in the past, and that is that 
we have much to learn from each other. 

In recent years, the people of 
North America have learned a lesson 
from the people of Latin America, a 
lesson about personal courage and 
about the passion of ordinary people to 
be free. Peasants and political leaders, 
shopkeepers and market ladies have 
defied death threats and guerrilla vio- 
lence, colonels and co)nandantes, to 
stand up for democracy. We learned 



artmant nt Qtata Ri illotin/.ll ino IQRQ 



THE SECRETARY 



that lesson again last March in El Sal- 
vador, and we will learn it again next 
Sunday in Panama. 

We have watched far-sighted demo- 
cratic leaders take the first vital, and 
often politically difficult, steps to shed 
layers of state regulation and special 
preference that for too long have held in 
check the creative, productive energies 
of this hemisphere. And we haye 
watched them accentuate values we 
hold dear with their own special sense 
of family, friendship, culture, and hos- 
pitality. We hope that our e.xperience in 
the United States with democracy — we 
hope that our experience in the United 
States with a free economy — may offer 
useful lessons to our friends in Latin 
America. 

The United States enjoys political 
stability, peaceful succession of power, 
unquestioned civilian authority, and 
the steady expansion of human rights. 
We enjoy these blessings because for 
200 years — for 200 years — we have 
struggled to ensure that every citizen 
in the United States can shape his or 
her own political destiny. We are com- 
mitted to helping our neighbors wage 
that successful democratic struggle 
also. 

We have also learned that a free 
economy releases the energies of indi- 
viduals and entrepreneurs, that it re- 
wards initiatives, and that it offers 
upward mobility. Economic liberty is 
the surest way to fulfill the aspirations 
of our citizens. Those nations which 
have turned to this model have already 
begun to see a tangible reward. 

During earlier phases of our his- 
tory, we in the United States too often 
sought rapid growth at the expense of 
our nation's environment. We hope that 
other nations can learn from our mis- 
takes, rather than repeating them. 

While we have much to learn from 
each other, I think it's fair to say also 
that we have much to expect from each 
other as well. Together we must set 
aside the easy politics of blame and the 
easy politics of mutual recrimination. 
Let us forge instead a new bond of co- 
operation and mutual responsibility. 

Democracy: Sweeping Latin America 

The democratic wave sweeping Latin 
America today has been propelled by 
the aspirations of ordinary people for 
freedom and for a better life. Now, one 
question, above all others, confronts 
this hemisphere: Can democracy 
deliver? 



Can democratic governments begin 
to satisfy their peoples' basic needs for 
jobs, health care, homes, and schools? 
Can fragile, new, civilian regimes con- 
struct and strengthen democratic insti- 
tutions? Can they protect their citizens 
against organized violence from both 
the extreme right and the extreme left? 
And can they normalize succession of 
power through peaceful electoral proc- 
esses? The answer to these questions 
has got to be yes. 

Yet, hanging over every decision 
which the region's elected leaders con- 
template is the specter of deep econom- 
ic and social crisis and the weight of a 
burgeoning foreign debt. "The elected 
Presidents of the continent," The Econ- 
omist magazine wrote recently, "rule 
from capital cities ringed by shanty- 
towns, swollen with refugees from the 
depressed countryside." 

That, of course, is not our shared 
vision of the hemisphere's future. 
Clearly, the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean must begin to grow 
again, and the fruits of that growth 
have got to be widely shared. 

To grow, the region cannot contin- 
ue to be a net exporter of capital. In- 
stead, it must create a climate for 
investment that will bring capital 
flight to the region, and that will, at 
the same time, attract new capital 
flows. Debt is a problem, but debt, 
quite frequently, is also simply a symp- 
tom of a larger problem. Listen to the 
words of Carlos Andres Perez to a 
group of international labor leaders 
some 3 or so weeks ago: "If we say, for 
the sake of argument, that the debt dis- 
appears and if we continue managing 
our economies as we have managed 
them in the past, inevitably we would 
continue in the same situation of unem- 
ployment and disaster." 

Today, democratic governments 
must try to reform bloated state- 
dominated economies, service their 
debt, and satisfy the real needs to their 
citizens — all at the same time. We un- 
derstand that facing this challenge 
alone is a nearly impossible juggling 
act. 



Facing the Challenges Together 

We do not expect Latin American na- 
tions to face this challenge alone. As 
they move forward to take the neces- 
sary, but difficult, steps to restructure 
and reform their economies, we must 
be prepared to hear their calls for help. 
When a poor country like Bolivia 
makes exemplary market-oriented re- 



forms and sticks to them in the face 
falling export prices and mounting 
litical costs, we have got to be read; 
lend a helping hand. Indeed, it is a ) 
sponsibility all of us — we in govern- 
ment and in the international financ 
institutions, and you in the private 
tor and the commercial banks — mus 
accept together. 

Within its first 5 weeks, the Ai 
ministration announced a new appi' 
to help reduce Latin America's debt 
burden. In the weeks and in the mo 
to come, we must negotiate, case by 
case, the details of that policy to en 
sure continued economic reform, a i 
reduction in existing debt burdens, 
and new capital flows in the future. 

If we ask Latin Americans to - 
away the layers of protection that 
shield their economies from the fre 
flow of trade in goods and services, 
then we, too, must confront protect 
ism in the United States, and we m 
steadily reduce the barriers to proc 
ucts from the rest of the hemispheri 

If we ask that Latin Americans 
confront the new menace of organ iz 
drug cartels, now often in league w 
guerrilla movements, then we must 
only assist them in that effort, but 
must also confront the terrible dem 
that exists in our country for these 
drugs. Only by tackling supply and 
mand can we free our hemisphere f 
the drug menace. 

If we are engaged in a joint vei 
ture north and south to advance an 
defend democracy, then each of us i 
do our part — collectively when 
possible — to create new mechanism 
and to strengthen existing ones to ( 
fend human rights, to guarantee th 
tegrity of free elections, and to 
establish sanctions against those w 
threaten democratically elected 
governments. 

In Panama, free and fair electi' 
this coming Sunday would end that 
tion's political and economic crisis, 
it would end its international isolat 
as well. Unfortunately, the Noriega 
regime's response has been to prep: 
for a massive fraud and to restrict t 
presence of international observers 
press. 

If democracy is to continue to c 
velop in this hemisphere, practices 
such as this simply cannot be tolera 
The position of the United States, I 
think, is quite clear. And that simp 
that there can be and will be no aei 
modation as far as we're concerned 
with a Noriega-dominated regime. 
There is still time for Panamanians 



.J. _.X 0*^M.^ I 



THE SECRETARY 



ave their country from the increasing 
estruction wrought by the Noriega 
ictatorship. The key is in the hands of 

I he defense forces. They can fulfill 
heir constitutional duty as professional 

Koldiers and allow elections to proceed 
eely and fairly. Or they can face the 

i onsequences of the past on which 
eneral Noriega has placed them. 
If the peoples and the governments 

'Jf Latin America and the Caribbean 
sk the United States of America to 

M)rgo unilatei-al initiatives and work in- 
tead in good faith with the region's de- 
locracies in a new, cooperative effort 

1 ) support democracy, then, I think, it's 
Illy fair that we ask these same peo- 
es and governments to join with us in 
ood faith to turn the promise of that 
iplomacy into a reality throughout 

fills hemisphere. 

The Administration, as you know, 

1 as negotiated a new bipartisan accord 
ith the Congress on Central America 
;ee Selected Documents No. 36, "U.S. 

n upport for Democracy and Peace in 
entral America"]. We are committed 

ih work with the democratic leaders of 
entral America and of the rest of the 
mericas to translate the bright prom- 
e of the Esquipulas agreement into 
)ncrete realities on the ground. That 
a challenge, but frankly, it is also an 
Dportunity. All those who advocate di- 
lomacy and political solutions to the 
jgion's conflicts now have a respon- 
bility to prove that this is the best 
id the surest route to achieve our 
jmmon goals. The promises in that re- 
ional treaty for democracy, for peace, 
id security must not only be kept, 
ley must be verified. 

We are prejiared, as President 
ush declared in announcing the ac- 
ird, to support a process that guaran- 
■es democracy in Central America. 
ut the United States cannot support 
pai)er agreement that sells out the 
icaraguan people's right to be free, 
id their right to enjoy a free and hon- 
5t democratic election. 

Together with the other de- 
pi locracies, we have got to send a clear 
lessage to others outside this hemi- 
ahere, and we will be sending this 
lessage: This hemisphere is not a 
umping ground for their arms or for 
leir failed ideologies. We are looking 

■J )r signs of new thinking. The Soviet 
'nion now has an opportunity to dem- 
iistrate its so-called new thinking in 

[(( Dncrete and tangible ways in Central 
.merica. That is what Esquipulas re- 
uires, that is what the democratic 



community demands, and that is what 
the economic integration and develop- 
ment of that war-torn region really 
requires. 

Some look at the crises and prob- 
lems facing Latin America today, and 
they despair. I am not one of those. I 
really believe that if we seize the oppor- 
tunities before us, we can achieve what 
the pioneers and frontiersmen who 
first settled these lands could really 
only dream. 

I believe the day will come when 
Carlos Andres Perez and Raul Alfon- 
sin, Vinicio Cerezo, Jose Napoleon Du- 
arte, Carlos Salinas, Julio Sanguinetti 
[President of Uruguay], Jose Azcona, 
Oscar Arias — and many, many others — 
will be seen as the pioneers who blazed 
the trail that will lead one day to the 
world's first democratic hemisphere. I 
believe that the hemisphere can become 
a model for the rest of the planet for a 
true partnership between the devel- 
oped and developing nations, where 
trade is free, where prosperity is 
shared, and where the benefits of 
technology are harnessed for all. 

And I believe that through joint ef- 
fort and through partnership, the day 
will come when in all nations of the 
Americas the rule of law prevails, hu- 
man rights are respected, the strong 
are just, the weak are secure, and the 
people live in peace. 

Q. If Noriega continues to con- 
trol Panama, would we alter the 
schedule for the transfer of the Canal 
Zone to the Republic of Panama? 

A. Let me simply say in answer to 
that question that, as I indicated in my 
formal remarks, we will have a great 
deal of difficulty normalizing our re- 
lations with any Panamanian Gov- 
ernment that is controlled by Gen. 
Noriega. It would be premature for me 
to suggest that we would take any ac- 
tion of the nature that you suggest. 

The United States believes in abid- 
ing by its treaty obligations and abid- 
ing by its agreements. So I'm not going 
to answer the hypothetical that you've 
suggested beyond saying that as long as 
Gen. Noriega retains power, there will 
be no normalization of relations bet- 
ween Panama and the United States. 

Q. In some of your remarks here 
today, and thinking back to your con- 
firmation hearings, tends to continue 
the focus we have, I think, felt during 
the past 8 years. I remember your 
confirmation hearings having to do 
mostly with Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
and Cuba. 



I'm wondering how you perceive 
now the ability or the flexibility of 
trying to disburse that attention a bit 
to the total hemisphere. You've made 
the comments here, but we're still 
wondering about the resources 
needed in order to have this partner- 
ship with the private sector to ad- 
dress, really, the problems of the total 
hemisphere. 

A. Let me simply say, when you 
suggested my confirmation hearings 
concentrated on those three areas 
within the hemisphere, you did not 
mean to suggest that they didn't con- 
centrate as well on a whole host of 
other areas outside the hemsiphere, 
because they did. But you're quite right 
that within the hemisphere, the ques- 
tions seemed to come primarily in 
those three areas. 

I would refer you to the statement 
I made to the [Senate] Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, as I went up for con- 
firmation, in which I said — I think I 
took pains to point out — that it's the en- 
tire hemisphere that is important. It's 
the entire hemisphere that's impor- 
tant as far as the United States is 
concerned. 

One of the first things, of course, 
that President Bush — one of the first 
meetings he had was with President 
Salinas [of Mexico] when President 
Bush was still President-elect. One of 
the first initiatives, of course, was to 
deal with the problems of South Amer- 
ica and Me.xico and other — well, some 
countries in Central America — was 
the proposal of the Treasury Depart- 
ment for a new approach to the debt 
problems. 

I think we recognize the impor- 
tance of Mexico, certainly; we recog- 
nize the importance of South America. 
We simply have some problems in Cen- 
tral America that we need to continue 
to focus on and put behind us, but that 
does not in any way take away from the 
importance of other areas in the hemi- 
sphere as far as the United States is 
concerned. 

Q. The current evaluation of the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the 
views as to its effectiveness have been 
coming from the congressional side 
rather than the Administration side. 
The new ideas that are involved in the 
CBI II legislation are basically con- 
gressional initiatives in contrast to 
the Reagan Administration which 
sponsored the legislation initially. 



...«.»...« ^t 0«^4^ D.. 11.^4 



' ■..».., HOOO 



THE SECRETARY 



Is that likely to be the continu- 
ance of the consideration of that leg- 
islation? Or does the Administration 
expect to become more initiative- 
taking? 

A. We strongly support that 
legislation — most all aspects of it. 
There are some aspects that get us in 
trouble in the GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] and some 
other areas that we cannot support 
for that reason. But we do support 
strengthening the Caribbean Basin Ini- 
tiative. After all, the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative was an initiative of the Rea- 
gan Administration of which the Presi- 
dent and I were both a part. So we 
support it, and we support it strongly 
and we will be doing what we can to see 
it move forward. 

Q. Regarding the drug situation 
in Latin America, would you com- 
ment on the initiative the United 
States and Latin American countries 
are taking to take some steps forward 
with this problem? 

A. As you know and as I indicated 
in my remarks, it's a problem that has 
to be addressed both from the stand- 
point of supply and demand. I think 
sometimes we up here have a tendency 
to beat our chest and try and blame 
others to some extent with some of our 
problems. 

At the same time it's very, very im- 
portant that countries that are pro- 
ducers of drugs, or countries that are 
transit countries for drugs coming into 
the United States, accept their respon- 
sibilities as well. We've got to do what 
we can to interdict the supply coming 
into this country, but we've also got to 
do what we can to address the demand. 
This is a major issue in the United 
States, one of the most significant and 
substantial political issues that we are 
debating up here in the United States 
today. 



You're aware of the legislation cre- 
ating the so-called drug czar [William 
J. Bennett] in the Executive Office of 
the President. There is supposed to be 
an overall, comprehensive drug plan 
presented by him. The legislation re- 
quires this within 6 months. I think it's 
now about 3 or 4 months. 

I have visited with Mr. Bennett on 
this and he's visited with other cabinet 



officers as well in order that we can 
come forward with a plan that has the 
support of all agencies and depart- 
ments and that is integrated. 

We will continue to concentrate o 
this problem because it represents a 
very, very significant and major prob- 
lem" for the United States. 



'Press release 76. 



Power For Good: American 
Foreign Policy in the New Era 



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Secretary Baker's address before 
the 1989 co7ivention of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) 
on April U, 1989.^ 

I'm pleased to be here today, and I will 
try and keep my formal remarks brief 
enough that we have time for questions 
and answers later on. 

Being brief does remind me, 
though, of the old story about the three 
people that were sent on a factfinding 
mission to some remote part of the 
South Pacific. It happened to be a law- 
yer, a cabinet secretary, and a news- 
paper editor. As luck would have it, 
their airplane developed engine trou- 
ble. They went down. They were cap- 
tured by cannibals. As the pot started 
to boil, the cannibal chief said, "Every- 
body gets one last wish. What will it 
be?" He turned to the lawyer, and he 
said, "Yes, indeed, he has one last 
wish." He said, "May I give you my 
card," and the chief took the card and 
turned to the cabinet secretary and 
said he would very much like to deliver 
just one last time his famous lecture 
on his 10 greatest accomplishments in 
government. The chief said okay. He 
turned to the newspaper editor who 
promptly said, "Cook me first. I've 
heard that speech three times already." 

So I'm going to try and keep the 
formal part of the remarks brief 
enough to avoid that. 



Changes and Challenges 
Reshaping International Order 

I've always believed that the media pi 
an essential role in educating this de- 
mocracy of ours, but the news as you a 
know very, very well is not always jus 
about what we in government do or fa 
to do. The most important service, I 
think, that you can render the govern 
ment and to the people alike is to help 
explain the most important changes 
which are transforming this world of 
ours. So today, I'd like to discuss thos 
changes with you, and I'd also like to 
describe the actions that we've taken 
far to lay the foundation of an Americ 
foreign policy for new times. 

A decade ago, the world beyond c 
borders was a familiar place but, if I 
may say so, not a very reassuring oni 
The Soviet Union was on the march. 
Democracy seemed to be in retreat, 
and our values were being questionec 
We and our allies also faced severe 
economic problems that undermined 
confidence in the free market and 
undermined confidence in free trade 
as well. 

Now, after a decade that I think 
will always be known as the Reagan 
era, the world beyond our borders is i 
more reassuring place. Soviet forces 
have left Afghanistan. Other regiona 
conflicts inflamed by Soviet interver 
tion have begun moving toward resoh 
tion with the help of some, I think — 



n(>nartm(^nt of State Bulletln/June 19 



THE SECRETARY 



'rhaps biased, with all my bias hang- 
g out — with the help of some creative 
iiiiTican diplomacy. Once again, I 
ink. it's fair to say that democracy is 
1 the march. We have reaffirmed our 
lues. And the international economy, 
liih has been driven by the longest 
tiiii-ican peacetime expansion on 
cni'd, has provided new hope for 

[iiuress. 

This more reassuring world, 

i(iui;h, is also, I think it's fair to say, 

I loming a less familiar one. The 
mid has clearly outgrown the clash 

I I \\ een the superpowers that domi- 
1 tf(l world politics after World 

\ii- II. Instead we face a series of 
lallenges that are reshaping the 
i\\ international order. 

• We could advance toward an in- 
easingly democratic world, or, if new 
d fragile democracies fail, the cause 
freedom could well be thrown back. 

• The international economy could 
ntinue to grow, or the stresses of 
mpetition, trade imbalances, and 

bt could lead to protectionism; it 
uld lead to rival trading blocs — 
timately to the disadvantage of all 
us. 

• The international community of 
tions could act to deal with transna- 
)nal dangers such as envii'onmental 
zards, terrorism, and the drug 
ade, or these problems could grow 
)rse because of a failure to work 
gether. 

• A properly conceived approach by 
e Atlantic alliance could e.xtend the 
ogress that we've made with the So- 
et Union, leading to far more cooper- 
ive East-West relations. Or through 
istakes on either side of the Iron Cur- 
in, this opportunity could be lost. 

• Finally, new military technolo- 
es could provide greater stability at 
vver levels of forces. Or we could en- 
unter a darker age if we cannot halt 
e spread of weapons that put nations 

a hair-trigger — particularly, if we 
il to make progress in resolving vol- 
ile regional conflicts. 

Unlike the last 40 years, the task 
fore us is, therefore, more complex, 
id it is more nuanced. It has become 
ss susceptible to the grand gesture, 
e single solution, or the overarching 
)ctrine. We face a see-saw contest on 
anv fronts. 



Leadership, Realism, and 
Bipartisanship 

Winston Churchill used to say that in 
confusing situations it was always best 
to resort to first principles. Those 
principles, I think, begin with the ne- 
cessity for continued American leader- 
ship. As the world's most powerful 
democracy, and the world's largest 
economy, we're going to affect the fu- 
ture substantially, whether we do so 
deliberately or not. We can, therefore, 
be a force for freedom and peaceful 
change unlike any other country in the 
world. But if we fail to do so, the conse- 
quences will surely seek us out. There 
is no place to run, and there is no place 
to hide. We must, therefore, use Amer- 
ica's power in the right way, and we 
must use it for good. 

Our leadership, however, must be 
attuned to the times. Common prob- 
lems and still powerful adversaries 
make our increasingly influential allies 
more important than ever before to 
success. New dangers, such as terror- 
ism, the international narcotics trade, 
and the degradation of the natural en- 
vironment, cannot be managed by one 
nation alone. These realities will not 
permit the United States a blind isola- 
tionism or a reckless unilateralism. 
Instead, they remind us of America's 
unique role: we are, after all, simul- 
taneously a tribune for democracy, a 
catalyst for international cooperation, 
and the guardian of America's national 
interest. 

The second principle is that Ameri- 
can leadership must be realistic. By 
that I mean not only an understanding 
of the way the world works but also a 
willingness to use that understanding 
to change the world, guided by those 
values that we refer to as American 
values that are so important to us. 

The idea that American moral val- 
ues and an engaged foreign policy are 
somehow in contradiction, I think, is 
clearly incorrect. A democratic society 
will not long support a policy which is 
at variance with its beliefs. And a poli- 
cy that does not serve our interests, 



even if it makes us feel very good, will 
be ultimately self-defeating. Realism 
today means not the exclusion of values 
but their inclusion as the guiding light 
of our policy. 

And the third and final principle 
is bipartisanship. Now by this I don't 
mean a cessation of debate or the end to 
the constitutionally designed friction 
between the executive and the Con- 
gress. Differing perspectives and dif- 
ferent responsibilities will often yield 
opposing points of view. The demo- 
cratic process nourishes and safe- 
guards the right to disagree. 

Yet when all is finally said, some- 
thing must then be done. We must pro- 
ceed with the business of foreign policy, 
and when we do, it's best that we do so 
together, if we're going to achieve our 
national objectives. 

Leadership, realism, and bipar- 
tisanship — those are the tools, I think, 
with which we can build a new and 
promising era. We've already begun to 
lay the foundation. In the 80 days since 
President Bush's inauguration, we have 
moved to initiate our agenda and to lay 
the foundation for future action. Today, 
I want to discuss some of our activities 
in more detail, providing, if I may, a 
sense of how they fit our foreign policy 
plan for the future. 

Canada and Mexico 

First, as I noted in my confirmation 
hearings, our agenda begins with the 
neighborhood, the countries of this con- 
tinent. The President has indicated the 
importance we place on our relation- 
ships with both Canada and Mexico. 
That was emphasized by his early 
meetings with Prime Minister Mul- 
roney and with President Salinas. Our 
dealings with these two vital neighbors 
have gone beyond the merely symbolic. 
We've taken the initiative on two issues 
which are at the top of their respective 
agendas. We are working with Mexico 
to reduce that nation's burden of debt. 
And the President has committed 
himself to introduce legislation that 
establishes a definite timetable for 
substantial reductions of the chemicals 
that create acid rain. 



THE SECRETARY 



Central America 

Second, we have reached a bipartisan 
consensus on a plan designed to lead 
Central America away from the conflict 
of recent years and toward a future of 
democracy and economic progress. 
This plan addresses a problem that for 
too long has not only divided our neigh- 
bors abroad but, indeed, has divided 
Americans here at home. 

The bipartisan accord signed in 
March clearly states the objectives of 
our policy toward Nicaragua and our 
policy toward Central America. Those 
objectives are democracy, an end to 
subversion of neighbors, and an end to 
Soviet-bloc military ties that threaten 
U.S. and regional security. The accord 
draws upon the Esquipulas II agree- 
ment, which was authored by President 
Arias of Costa Rica, and the efforts of 
the Central American nations to devel- 
op their own principles for freedom and 
peace. And our policy emphasizes that 
the process which leads to these goals 
must be based on credible standards of 
compliance, strict timetables for enfor- 
cement, and effective and ongoing 
means of verification. 

The accord also stipulates that 
Congress will extend humanitarian as- 
sistance at current levels to the 
Nicaragua Resistance through Febru- 
ary 28, 1990, just after new interna- 
tionally supervised elections are to be 
held in Nicaragua. 

This new American policy — our 
"new thinking," to borrow a phrase — 
has already gained the support of the 
Central American democracies, of 
Canada, of Venezuela and other de- 
mocracies in this hemisphere and in 
Europe. In the weeks ahead, we intend 
to build on this support. 

Through this agreement, we are 
sending an important message to the 
world: Americans can unite on an issue 
of vital national interest. We're also 
sending another message: our hemi- 
sphere is not, and should not be, a 
dumping ground for Soviet arms or for 
a failed Soviet ideology. 

Frankly, we've been looking for 
signs of new thinking from Moscow on 
this issue. Recently, we heard some 
promising words. Standing in the pres- 
ence of Fidel Castro, Mr. Gorbachev de- 
clared, and I quote, "We are resolutely 
against any theories and doctrines 
justifying the export of revolution or 
counterrevolution and all forms of for- 
eign interference in the affairs of sover- 
eign nations." 



That certainly sounds promising. 
We hope it's going to prove to be true. 
But at this point, the Soviet Union con- 
tinues to reject President Arias' appeal 
to give the slogan of new thinking 
some content. Soviet aid to Cuba and 
Nicaragua continues to support subver- 
sion against El Salvador. The Soviet 
Union's military aid to Nicaragua alone 
is more than $.500 million a year — five 
times what the United States provides 
to El Salvador — and far in excess of 
any legitimate Soviet security con- 
cerns. As a consequence of that aid, 
Nicaragua now fields a military force 
far in excess of its neighbors — in fact, 
it fields the largest army in the entire 
history of Central America. 

So we call again upon the Soviet 
Government to think anew about its ac- 
tions here in our hemisphere and about 
the consequences of those actions for 
the future. 

Middle East 

The third area where we've begun to 
lay a foundation for peace and security 
is in the Middle East. On March 25, we 
celebrated the 10th anniversary of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. But to 
mark the anniversary is also really, I 
think, to realize how much remains un- 
done. And all we have to do, if I may in- 
terject here, is to read the newspapers 
this morning to see how very much 
does remain to be done. The daily vio- 
lence in the West Bank and Gaza — the 
stones thrown, the lives lost — are all 
adding to an already bitter legacy of 
hatred between Arabs and Israelis. 

Last week President Mubarak of 
Egypt and [Israeli] Prime Minister 
Shamir visited Washington. His Majes- 
ty, King Hussein of Jordan, will be 
visiting us next week. 

I do not doubt that after so many 
years of strife, there is a very deep 
yearning on the part of all for peace. 
But it's also clear, I think, that the sub- 
stantive gap between the parties is far 
too wide, and the atmosphere is far too 
clouded by violence and tension and 
mistrust to launch negotiations now. 
We have, therefore, been stressing for 
2 months the need for a step-by-step 
process. Its purpose is to reduce ten- 
sions, to promote dialogue between Is- 
raelis and Palestinians, and to build an 
environment that can sustain negotia- 
tions on interim arrangements and per- 
manent status. 



Last week. Prime Minister Sham 
responded. He made clear that the .s^( 
tiifi quo was unacceptable. He also em 
phasized Israel's desire to advance a 
political process that might lead ulti- 
mately