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Deparlitivn  t 

5;,,  buUetMU 

ie  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  89  /  Number  2145 


April  1989 


DiPOsrroFiY  , 

I 

%^  \m  2    1939  ^ 


Pn-^TOM  5=1351.10  LIS^AHV 


lnauguration/1 


Canada/26 
NATO/38 


Departtnent  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume 


/  Number  2145  /  April  1989 


The  Department  uf  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major  ad- 
dresses and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


JAMES  A.  BAKER,  III 

Secretary  of  State 

MARGARET  DeB.  TUTWILER 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determuied  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  neces- 
sary in  the  transaction  of  the  public  busi- 
ness required  by  law  of  this  Department. 
Use  of  funds  for  printing  this  periodical 
has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through 
September  30,  1989. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  (ISSN 
0041-7610)  is  published  monthly  (plus  an- 
nual index)  by  the  Department  of  State, 
2201  C  Street,  NW,  Washington,  D.C. 
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ington,  D.C,  and  additional  mailing  of- 
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changes  to  Superintendent  of  Documents 
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NOTE:  Most  of  the  contents  of  this  publi- 
cation are  in  the  public  domain  and  not 
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printed; citation  of  the  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  ap- 
preciated. Permission  to  reproduce  all 
copyrighted  material  (including  pho- 
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online  by  Magazine  Index  (Dialog  file  47; 
BRS  file  MAGS),  in  the  Readers'  Guide  to 
Periodical  Literature  and  the  online  ver- 
sion of  Readers'  Guide  (WILSONLINE  file 
RDG),  and  in  the  PAIS  (Public  Affairs  In- 
formation Service,  Inc.)  Bulletin.  Articles 


are  abstracted  by  Readers'  Guide  Ab- 
stracts (WILSONLINE  file  RGA).  The 
Bulletin  also  participates  in  Mead  Dat; 
Central's  full-text  online  services,  LEXR 
and  NEXIS. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


CONTENTS 


The  President 

1  Inaugural  Address 

2  Address  Before  a  Joint  Session 

of  the  Congress 

4  News  Conference  of  January  27 

(Excerpts) 

5  President  Holds  Session  With 

News  Reporters 

The  Vice  President 

7  Visit  to  Venezuela  and 

El  Salvador 


Europe 

38        Secretary  Meets  With  NATO 
Allies  (Secretary  Baker,  Gro 
Harlem  Briuicltland,  Jon 
Baldt'i)!  Hannibalsson,  Sir 
Geoffrey  Howe,  Andreas  Pa- 
pandreou.  Karolos  Papoulias, 
Jacques  Poos,  Mesut  Yilmaz) 

43  First  Report  on  Cyprus  (Mes- 

sage to  the  Congress) 

44  Security  Challenges  Facing 

NATO  in  the  1990s  (Paul  H. 
Nitze) 


The  Secretary 

8  James  A.  Baker,  III,  Sworn  in  as 

Secretary  of  State  (Secretary 
Baker,  President  Bush,  Bio- 
graphic Data) 

10        Secretary-Designate's  Confir- 
mation Hearings 

13        Address  Before  the  Panel  on 
Global  Climate  Change 

16        The  International  Agenda  and 
the  FY  1990  Budget  Request 

21         Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Africa 

24        Peace  and  Relief  in  Sudan 

(Secretary  Baker,  Fact  Sheet) 


Arms  Control 

25        MBFR  Talks  Conclude  (Final 
Communique) 


Canada 

26        President's  Visit  to  Canada 

(Secretary  Baker,  President 
Bush,  Brian  Mulroney) 


East  Asia 

32        Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
(President  Bush,  Noboru 
Takeshita) 


South  Asia 

48        Soviets  Withdraw  From  Af- 
ghanistan (President  Bush) 


United  Nations 

49         UN  Narcotics  Trafficking  Con- 
ference Adopts  Convention 
(Text  of  Convention) 


Western  Hemisphere 

59        Human  Rights  in  Cuba:  An 
Update 


Treaties 

62  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

63  Department  of  State 

63  USUN 

Publications 

64  Foreign  Relations  Volumes 

Released 

65  Foreign  Relations  Supplement 

Microfiche  Released 

66  Background  Notes 

Index 


Economics 

33        East  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and 
the  U.S.;  An  Economic 
Partnership 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Cmrse  Herbert  Walker  Bush  took  the 
oath  of  office  as  the  41st  President  of 
the  United  States  on  January  20. 1989. 

(While  House  photo  by  Susan  Biddle) 


The  Inaugural  Address 
of  President  Bush 


George  Bush  was  sworn  in  as  the 
ilst  President  of  the  United  Stales  on 
the  west  side  of  the  Capitol  on  Janu- 
ary if),  1989.  Following  is  the  text  of 
his  inaugural  address.' 

There  is  a  man  here  who  has  earned  a 
lasting  place  in  our  hearts— and  in  our 
history.  President  Reagan,  on  behalf 
of  our  nation,  I  thank  you  for  the  won- 
derful things  that  you  have  done  for 
America. 

I  have  just  repeated  word-for-word 
the  oath  taken  by  George  Washington 
200  years  ago;  and  the  Bible  on  which  I 
placed  my  hand  is  the  Bible  on  w-hich 
he  placed  his.  It  is  right  that  the  mem- 
ory of  Washington  be  with  us  today,  not 
only  because  this  is  our  bicentennial  in- 
auguration but  because  Washington  re- 
mains the  Father  of  Our  Country.  He 
would.  I  think,  be  gladdened  by  this 
day.  for  today  is  the  concrete  ex- 
pression of  a  stunning  fact:  our  con- 
tinuity these  200  years  since  our 
government  began. 

We  meet  on  democracy's  front 
porch.  A  good  place  to  talk  as  neigh- 
bors and  as  friends,  for  this  is  a  day 
when  our  nation  is  made  whole,  when 
our  differences  for  a  moment  are 
suspended. 

My  first  act  as  President  is  a 
prayer:  "Heavenly  Father,  we  bow  our 
heads  and  thank  you  for  your  love. 
Accept  our  thanks  for  the  peace  that 
yields  this  day  and  the  shared  faith  that 
makes  its  continuance  hkely  Make  us 
strong  to  do  your  work,  willing  to  hear 
and  heed  your  will,  and  write  on  our 
hearts  these  words:  'Use  power  to  help 
people.'  For  we  are  given  power  not  to 
advance  our  own  purposes,  nor  to  make 
a  great  show  in  the  world,  nor  a  name. 
There  is  but  one  just  use  of  power,  and 
it  is  to  serve  people.  Help  us  to  re- 
member, Lord.  Amen." 

I  come  before  you  and  assume 
the  presidency  at  a  moment  rich  with 
promise.  We  live  in  a  peaceful,  pros- 
perous time,  but  we  can  make  it  better. 


For  a  new  breeze  is  blowing,  and  a 
world  refreshed  by  freedom  seems  re- 
born; for  in  man's  heart,  if  not  in  fact, 
the  day  of  the  dictator  is  over.  The  to- 
talitarian era  is  passing,  its  old  ideas 
blown  away  like  leaves  from  an  ancient, 
lifeless  tree. 

A  new-  breeze  is  blowing,  and  a  na- 
tion refresher!  by  freedom  stands  ready 
to  push  on.  There  is  new  ground  to  be 
broken  and  new  action  to  be  taken. 

There  are  times  when  the  future 
seems  thick  as  a  fog;  you  sit  and  wait, 
hoping  the  mists  will  lift  and  reveal  the 
right  path.  But  this  is  a  time  when  the 
future  seems  a  door  you  can  walk  right 
through — into  a  room  called  tomorrow. 

Great  nations  of  the  world  are  mov- 
ing toward  democracy — through  the 
door  to  freedom.  Men  and  women  of 
the  world  move  toward  free  markets — 
through  the  door  to  prosperity.  The 
people  of  the  world  agitate  for  free  ex- 
pression and  free  thought — through  the 
door  to  the  moral  and  intellectual  satis- 
factions that  only  liberty  allows. 

We  know  what  works.  Freedom 
works.  We  know  what's  right.  Freedom 
is  right.  We  know  how  to  secure  a  more 
just  and  prosperous  life  for  man  on 
Earth — through  free  markets,  free 
speech,  free  elections,  and  the  exercise 
of  free  will  unhampered  by  the  state. 

For  the  first  time  in  this  century — 
for  the  first  time  in  perhaps  all  his- 
tory— man  does  not  have  to  invent  a 
system  by  which  to  live.  We  don't  have 
to  talk  late  into  the  night  about  which 
form  of  government  is  better  We  don't 
have  to  wrest  justice  from  kings;  we 
only  have  to  summon  it  from  within 
ourselves. 

We  must  act  on  what  we  know.  I 
take  as  my  guide  the  hope  of  a  saint: 
in  crucial  things,  unity;  in  important 
things,  diversity;  in  all  things, 
generosity. 

America  today  is  a  proud,  free 
nation,  decent  and  civil— a  place  we 
cannot  help  but  love.  We  know  in  our 
hearts,  not  loudly  and  proudly  but  as  a 


^ent  01  state  Bulletin/April  1989 


THE  PRESIDENT 


simple  fact,  that  this  country  has  mean- 
ing beyond  what  we  see  and  that  our 
strength  is  a  force  for  good. 

But  have  we  changed  as  a  nation 
even  in  our  time?  Are  we  enthralled 
with  material  things,  less  appreciative 
of  the  nobility  of  work  and  sacrifice? 

My  friends,  we  are  not  the  sum  of 
our  possessions.  They  are  not  the  meas- 
ure of  our  lives.  In  our  hearts,  we  know 
what  matters.  We  cannot  hope  only  to 
leave  our  children  a  bigger  car,  a  bigger 
bank  account.  We  must  hope  to  give 
them  a  sense  of  what  it  means  to  be  a 
loyal  friend,  a  loving  parent,  a  citizen 
who  leaves  his  home,  his  neighborhood 
and  town  better  than  he  found  it. 

What  do  we  want  the  men  and 
women  who  work  with  us  to  say  when 
we  are  no  longer  there?  That  we  were 
more  driven  to  succeed  than  anyone 
around  us?  Or  that  we  stopped  to  ask 
if  a  sick  child  had  gotten  better  and 
stayed  a  moment  there  to  trade  a  word 
of  friendship? 

No  president,  no  government  can 
teach  us  to  remember  what  is  best  in 
what  we  are.  But  if  the  man  you  have 
chosen  to  lead  this  government  can  help 
make  a  difference,  if  he  can  celebrate 
the  quieter,  deeper  successes  that  are 
made  not  of  gold  and  silk  but  of  better 
hearts  and  finer  souls,  if  he  can  do 
these  things,  then  he  must. 

America  is  never  wholly  herself 
unless  she  is  engaged  in  high  moral 
principle.  We  as  a  people  have  such  a 
purpose  today.  It  is  to  make  kinder  the 
face  of  the  nation  and  gentler  the  face 
of  the  world. 

My  friends,  we  have  work  to  do. 
There  are  the  homeless,  lost  and  roam- 
ing. There  are  the  children  who  have 
nothing — no  love  and  no  normalcy. 
There  are  those  who  cannot  free  them- 
selves of  enslavement  to  whatever 
addiction — drugs,  welfare,  the  demor- 
alization that  rules  the  slums.  There  is 
crime  to  be  conquered,  the  I'ough  crime 
of  the  streets.  There  are  young  women 
to  be  helped  who  are  about  to  become 
mothers  of  children  they  cannot  care 
for  and  might  not  love.  They  need  our 
care,  our  guidance  and  education, 
though  we  bless  them  for  choosing  life. 

The  old  solution,  the  old  way,  was 
to  think  that  public  money  alone  could 
end  these  problems.  But  we  have 
learned  that  is  not  so.  And  in  any  case, 
our  funds  are  low.  We  have  a  deficit  to 
bring  down.  We  have  more  will  than 
wal'et,  but  will  is  what  we  need. 

We  will  make  the  hard  choices, 
looking  at  what  we  have  and  perhaps 
allocating  it  differently,  making  our 


decisions  based  on  honest  need  and 
prudent  safety. 

And  then  we  will  do  the  wisest 
thing  of  all.  We  will  turn  to  the  only 
resource  we  have  that  in  times  of  need 
always  grows:  the  goodness  and  the 
courage  of  the  American  people. 

I  am  speaking  of  a  new  engage- 
ment in  the  lives  of  others — a  new  ac- 
tivism, hands-on,  involved,  that  gets 
the  job  done.  We  must  bring  in  the 
generations,  harnessing  the  unused  tal- 
ent of  the  elderly  and  the  unfocused 
energy  of  the  young.  For  not  only  lead- 
ership is  passed  from  generation  to 
generation  but  so  is  stewardship.  And 
the  generation  born  after  the  Second 
World  War  has  come  of  age. 

I  have  spoken  of  a  thousand  points 
of  light — of  all  the  community  organiza- 
tions that  ai'e  spi-ead  like  stars  through- 
out the  nation,  doing  good. 

We  will  work  hand-in-hand,  encour- 
aging, sometimes  leading,  sometimes 
being  led,  rewarding.  We  will  work  on 
this  in  the  White  House,  in  the  Cabinet 
agencies.  I  will  go  to  the  people  and 
the  programs  that  are  the  brighter 
points  of  light,  and  I'll  ask  evei\y  mem- 
ber of  my  government  to  become 
involved. 

The  old  ideas  are  new  again  be- 
cause they  are  not  old,  they're  time- 
less— duty,  sacrifice,  commitment,  and 
patriotism  that  finds  its  e.xpression  in 
taking  part  and  pitching  in. 

We  need  a  new  engagement,  too, 
between  the  e.xecutive  and  the  Con- 
gress. The  challenges  before  us  will  be 
thrashed  out  with  the  House  and  Sen- 
ate. We  must  bring  the  Federal  budget 
into  balance.  We  must  ensure  that 
America  stands  before  the  world 
united — strong,  at  peace,  and  fiscally 
sound.  But,  of  course,  things  may  be 
difficult. 

We  need  compromise;  we  have  had 
dissension.  We  need  harmony;  we  have 
had  a  chorus  of  discordant  voices. 

For  Congress,  too,  has  changed  in 
our  time.  There  has  grown  a  certain 
divisiveness.  We  have  seen  the  hard 
looks  and  heard  the  statements  in 
which  not  each  other's  ideas  are  chal- 
lenged but  each  other's  motives.  Our 
great  parties  have  too  often  been  far 
apart  and  untrusting  of  each  other. 

It's  been  this  way  since  Vietnam. 
That  war  cleaves  us  still.  But,  friends, 
that  war  began  in  earnest  a  quarter  of 
a  century  ago,  and  surely  the  statute  of 
limitations  has  been  reached.  This  is  a 
fact:  The  final  lesson  of  Vietnam  is  that 
no  great  nation  can  long  afford  to  be 
sundered  by  a  memory. 


A  new  breeze  is  blowing,  and  the 
old  bipartisanship  must  be  made  new 
again.  To  my  friends — and  yes,  I  do 
mean  friends — in  the  loyal  opposition- 
and  yes,  I  mean  loyal — I  put  out  my 
hand.  I  am  putting  out  my  hand  to  yo 
Mr.  Speaker.  I  am  putting  out  my  hai 
to  you,  Mr.  Majority  Leader.  For  this 
the  thing:  This  is  the  age  of  the  offere 
hand. 

We  can't  turn  back  clocks,  and  I 
don't  want  to.  But  when  our  fathers 
were  young,  Mr.  Speaker,  our  differ- 
ences ended  at  the  water's  edge.  We 
don't  wish  to  turn  back  time,  but  whi 
our  mothers  were  young,  Mr.  Majorit; 
Leader,  the  Congress  and  the  executi 
were  capable  of  working  together  to 
produce  a  budget  on  which  this  natio) 
could  live.  Let  us  negotiate  soon  and 
hard.  But  in  the  end,  let  us  produce. 

The  people  await  action.  They  di( 
not  send  us  here  to  bicker.  They  ask 
to  rise  above  the  merely  partisan.  "In 
crucial  things,  unity" — and  this,  my 
friends,  is  crucial. 

To  the  world,  too,  we  offer  new  & 
gagement  and  a  renewed  vow:  We  wil 
stay  strong  to  protect  the  peace.  The 
"offered  hand"  is  a  reluctant  fist;  onc' 
made — strong — it  can  be  used  with 
great  effect. 

There  are  today  Americans  who 
are  held  against  their  will  in  foreign 
lands  and  Americans  who  are  unac- 
counted for.  Assistance  can  be  shown 
here  and  will  be  long  remembered. 
Good  will  begets  good  will.  Good  fait 
can  be  a  spiral  that  endlessly  moves  i 

"Great  nations  like  great  men  mi 
keep  their  word."  When  America  say 
something,  America  means  it,  wheth 
a  treaty  or  an  agreement  or  a  vow 
made  on  marble  steps.  We  will  alway 
try  to  speak  clearly,  for  candor  is  a 
compliment.  But  subtlety,  too,  is  goo 
and  has  its  place. 

While  keeping  our  alliances  and    | 
friendships  around  the  world  strong- 
ever  strong — we  will  continue  the  iic 
closeness  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
consistent  both  with  our  security  ami 
with  progress.  One  might  say  that  nu 
new  relationship  in  part  reflects  the  i 
umph  of  hope  and  strength  over  expc 
ence.  But  hope  is  good.  And  so  is 
strength.  And  vigilance. 

Here  today  are  tens  of  thousands  i 
our  citizens  who  feel  the  understand-  jj 
able  satisfaction  of  those  who  have      I 
taken  part  in  democracy  and  seen  thi  I 
hopes  fulfilled.  But  my  thoughts  havi 
been  turning  the  past  few  days  to  tin 
who  would  be  watching  at  home — to  : 
older  fellow  who'll  throw  a  salute  by 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  191 


THE  PRESIDENT 


iself  when  the  flag  goes  by  and  the 
nan  who'll  tell  her  sons  the  words  of 
battle  hymns.  I  do  not  mean  this  to 
"entimental.  I  mean  that  on  days 
this,  we  remember  that  we  are  all 
:  (if  a  continuum,  inescapably  con- 
ed by  the  ties  that  bind. 
Our  children  are  watching  in 
hA>  throughout  our  great  land.  And 
hem  I  say,  thank  you  for  watching 
Kiii-acy's  big  day.  For  democracy  be- 
s  to  all  of  us,  and  freedom  is  like  a 
It i fill  kite  that  can  go  higher  and 
ler  with  the  breeze. 
And  to  all  I  say:  No  matter  what 
■  (.ii-fumstances  or  where  you  are, 
arc  part  of  this  day,  you  are  part  of 
lilc  of  our  great  nation. 
A  president  is  neither  prince  nor 
)',  and  I  don't  seek  "a  window  on 
I's  souls."  In  fact,  I  yearn  for  a 
■  tei'  tolerance  and  easy-goingness 
Mt  i-ach  other's  attitudes  and  way  of 

There  are  a  few  clear  areas  in 
I  h  we  as  a  society  must  rise  up 
1  'd  and  express  our  intolerance.  The 

olivious  now  is  drugs.  When  that 

cncaine  was  smuggled  in  on  a  ship, 
ly  as  well  have  been  a  deadly  bac- 
,  so  much  has  it  hurt  the  body,  the 
of  our  country.  There  is  much  to  be 

and  to  be  said  but  take  my  word 
;:  This  scourge  will  stop. 
JAnd  so,  there  is  much  to  do,  and 
Irrow  the  work  begins. 
[  do  not  mistrust  the  future;  I  do 
fear  what  is  ahead.  For  oui-  prob- 

are  large,  but  our  heart  is  lai-ger. 
challenges  are  great,  but  our  will 
eater  And  if  our  flaws  are  endless, 

love  is  truly  boundless. 
Some  see  leadership  as  high  drama 
,he  sound  of  trumpets  calling.  And 
'times  it  is  that.  But  I  see  history 
book  with  many  pages,  and  each 
ve  flu  a  page  with  acts  of  hope- 
ss  and  meaning.  The  new  breeze 
s,  a  page  turns,  the  story  un- 
— and  so  today  a  chapter  begins — a 
I  and  stately  story  of  unity,  diver- 
and  generosity — shared  and  writ- 
ogether. 
Thank  you.  God  bless  you.  God 

the  United  States  of  America. 


President  Addresses 

Joint  Session  of  the  Congress 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
dential  Documents  of  Jan.  30,  1989. 


Folloiring  are  excerpts  from 
President  Bush's  address  before  a  joint 
session  of  the  Congress  on  February  9, 
1989.^ 

Less  than  3  weeks  ago,  I  joined  you  on 
the  west  front  of  this  very  building 
and,  looking  over  the  monuments  to  our 
proud  past,  offered  you  my  hand  in  fill- 
ing the  next  page  of  American  history 
with  a  story  of  extended  prosperity  and 
continued  peace.  And  tonight  I'm  back 
to  offer  you  my  plans  as  well.  The  hand 
remains  extended.  The  sleeves  are  roll- 
ed up.  America  is  waiting.  And  now  we 
must  produce.  Together  we  can  build  a 
better  America. 

It  is  comforting  to  return  to  this 
historic  chamber.  Here,  22  years  ago,  I 
first  raised  my  hand  to  be  sworn  into 
public  life.  So  tonight  I  feel  as  if  I'm  re- 
turning home  to  friends.  And  I  intend, 
in  the  months  and  years  to  come,  to 
give  you  what  friends  deserve:  frank- 
ness, respect,  and  my  best  judgment 
about  ways  to  improve  America's  fu- 
ture. In  return,  I  ask  for  an  honest 
commitment  to  our  common  mission  of 
progress.  If  we  seize  the  opportunities 
on  the  road  before  us,  there'll  be  praise 
enough  for  all.  The  people  didn't  send 
us  here  to  bicker.  And  it's  time  to 
govern. 


Securing  a  more  peaceful  world  is 
perhaps  the  most  important  priority  I'd 
like  to  address  tonight.  You  know,  we 
meet  at  a  time  of  extraordinary  hope. 
Never  before  in  this  century  have  our 
values  of  freedom,  democracy,  and  eco- 
nomic opportunity  been  such  a  power- 
ful and  intellectual  force  around  the 
globe.  Never  before  has  our  leadership 
been  so  crucial,  because  while  America 
has  its  eyes  on  the  future,  the  world 
has  its  eyes  on  America. 

It's  a  time  of  great  change  in  the 
world,  and  especially  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  Prudence  and  common  sense 
dictate  that  we  try  to  understand  the 
full  meaning  of  the  change  going  on 
there,  review  our  policies,  and  then 
proceed  with  caution.  But  I've  person- 
ally assured  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev that  at  the  conclusion  of  such  a 
review,  we  will  be  ready  to  move  for- 
ward. We  will  not  miss  any  opportunity 
to  work  for  peace.  The  fundamental 


facts  remain  that  the  Soviets  retain  a 
very  powerful  military  machine  in  the 
service  of  objectives  which  are  still  too 
often  in  conflict  with  ours.  So  let  us 
take  the  new  openness  seriously.  But 
let  us  also  be  realistic.  And  let  us  al- 
ways be  strong. 

There  are  some  pressing  issues  we 
must  address.  I  will  vigorously  pursue 
the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI). 
The  spread,  and  even  use,  of  sophisti- 
cated weaponry  threatens  global  secu- 
rity as  never  before.  Chemical  weapons 
must  be  banned  from  the  face  of  the 
Earth,  never  to  be  used  again.  This 
won't  be  easy;  verification — extra- 
ordinarily difficult.  But  civilization 
and  human  decency  demand  that  we 
ti'y.  The  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
must  be  stopped.  I'll  work  to  strength- 
en the  hand  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA).  Our  diplomacy 
must  work  every  day  against  the  prolif- 
eration of  nuclear  weapons. 

Around  the  globe,  we  must  contin- 
ue to  be  freedom's  best  friend.  We  must 
stand  firm  for  self-determination  and 
democracy  in  Central  America,  includ- 
ing in  Nicaragua.  It  is  my  strongly  held 
conviction  that  when  people  are  given 
the  chance,  they  inevitably  will  choose 
a  free  press,  freedom  of  worship,  and 
certifiably  free  and  fair  elections. 

We  must  strengthen  the  alliance  of 
the  industrial  democracies,  as  solid  a 
force  for  peace  as  the  world  has  ever 
known.  This  is  an  alliance  forged  by 
the  power  of  our  ideals,  not  the  petti- 
ness of  our  differences.  So  let's  lift  our 
sights  to  rise  above  fighting  about  beef 
hormones,  to  building  a  better  future, 
to  move  from  protectionism  to 
progress. 

I've  asked  the  Secretary  of  State 
to  visit  Europe  next  week  and  to  con- 
sult with  our  allies  on  the  wide  range  of 
challenges  and  opportunities  we  face 
together,  including  East-West  rela- 
tions. And  I  look  forward  to  meeting 
with  our  NATO  partners  in  the  near 
future. 

I,  too,  shall  begin  a  trip  shortly  to 
the  far  reaches  of  the  Pacific  Basin, 
where  the  winds  of  democracy  are  cre- 
ating new  hope,  and  the  power  of  free 
markets  is  unleashing  a  new  force. 

When  I  served  as  our  representa- 
tive in  China  14  or  15  years  ago,  few 
would  have  predicted  the  scope  of  the 
changes  we've  witnessed  since  then. 
But  in  preparing  for  this  trip,  I  was 


fitment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


THE  PRESIDENT 


struck  by  something  I  came  across 
from  a  Chinese  writer.  He  was  speak- 
ing of  his  country,  decades  ago,  but  his 
words  speak  to  each  of  us  in  America 
today.  "Today,"  he  said,  "we're  afraid  of 
the  simple  words  like  'goodness'  and 
'mercy'  and  'kindness.'"  My  friends,  if 
we're  to  succeed  as  a  nation,  we  must 
rediscover  those  words. 


IText  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Feb.  13,  1989.  ■ 


News  Conference 
of  January  27 
(Excerpts) 


President  Bunk  held  a  news 
conference  on  January  27,  1989.^ 


I  think  it's  been  officially  announced 
that  we're  going  to — certainly  to  To- 
kyo, then  on  to  China,  and  I'm  looking 
forward  to  it  very  much.  And  then, 
also,  we'll  be  stopping  for  a  relatively 
brief  stop  in  Korea  on  the  way  back 
from  China.  We've  had  other  invita- 
tions. That's  about  all  we  can  do.  And 
in  a  nostalgic  basis,  needless  to  say, 
Barbara  and  I  are  looking  forward  in  a 
very  personal  way  to  going  back  to 
Beijing. 


Q.  What  signal  do  you  think  it 
may  send  the  world  that  you're  mak- 
ing your  first  visit  to  China — after, 
of  course,  the  ceremonial  trip  to 
Tokyo — while  Soviet  leader  Gor- 
bachev, having  asked  for  early  talks, 
is  still  waiting  for  a  response? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  signal  it  sends 
in  that  regard.  But  let  me  just  remind 
you  that  I'm  the  one  who  does  not  believe 
in  "playing  the  Soviet  card"  or  "playing 
the  China  card."  We  have  a  strong  bilat- 
eral relationship  with  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China.  I  have  a  personal 
acquaintance  with  the  leaders  with 
whom  I  will  be  meeting  there,  including 
Deng  Xiaoping  [Chairman  of  China's 
Central  Military  Commission]  and  being 
that  close — it  just  seemed  like  an  appro- 
priate visit,  but  not  to  signal  a  playing  of 
the  card  to  go  one  up  on  Mr.  Gorbachev. 
There's  nothing  of  that  nature  in  this 
visit.  That  is  a  strong,  important  strate- 


gic and  commei'cial  and  cultural  relation- 
shi])  that  we  have  with  the  Chinese — the 
largest  number  of  people  in  the  world  in 
that  country.  And  so,  the  visit  stands  on 
its  own  and  does  not  have  any  signaling 
that  should  be  detrimental  to  anybody 
else's  interest. 

Q.  Your  national  security  ad- 
viser. Brent  Scowcroft,  said  last  week 
on  television  that  the  cold  war  was 
not  over  and  that  he  felt  that  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev was  trying  to  make  trouble  for 
the  Western  alliance.  What  is  your 
view? 

A.  I'm  not  sure  that's  an  exact — I 
should  let  the  General  defend  himself. 
But  I've  expressed  my  view  not  only  in 
the  campaign  context  but  in  several 
times  afterward,  and  also  to  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev. Our  Administration  position, 
in  which  Gen.  Scowcroft  is  in  total 
agreement — indeed,  he'll  be  one  of  the 
leaders  in  this  reassessment — is:  Let's 
take  our  time  now.  Let's  take  a  look  at 
where  we  stand  on  our  strategic  arms 
talks;  on  conventional  force  talks;  on 
chemical,  biological  weapons  talks;  on 
some  of  our  bilateral  policy  problems 
with  the  Soviet  Union;  formulate  the 
policy  and  then  get  out  front — here's  the 
U.S.  position. 

I  don't  think  the  Soviets  see  that  as 
foot-dragging.  I'm  confident  they  don't. 
Indeed,  I  made  that  clear  to  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  just  this  week  in  a 
rather  long  talk  with  him.  I  want  to  try 
to  avoid  words  like  "cold  war"  if  I  can  be- 
cause that  has  an  implication.  If  someone 
says  cold  war  to  me,  that  doesn't  proper- 
ly give  credit  to  the  advances  that  have 
taken  place  in  this  relationship.  So  I 
wouldn't  use  that  term.  But  if  it's  used  in 
the  context  of — do  we  still  have  prob- 
lems; are  there  still  uncertainties;  are 
we  still  unsure  in  our  predictions  on  So- 
viet intentions — I'd  have  to  say,  yes,  we 
should  be  cautious. 


Q.  Yasir  Arafat's  [Chairman, 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization] 
been  over  in  Europe  meeting  with 
Foreign  Ministers  of  Spain,  France, 
and  Greece.  Marlin  [Fitzwater,  White 
House  spokesman]  has  said,  and  so 
has  Mr.  Scrowcroft,  that  it's  too  early 
for  Arafat  to  meet  with  Secretary  of 
State-designate  Jim  Baker.  On  what 
level  would  it  be  appropriate  for 
Arafat  to  meet  with  an  American 
official,  an  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State,  for  example? 

A.  As  we  changed  the  policy  on  the 
Middle  East  on  dealing  with — I  mean,  as 
the  change  came  about  in  the  policy  on 


communicating  with  the  PLO,  it  was  n 
based  on  their  acceptance  of  three  pr  | 
ciples.  As  long  as  they  stay  hooked  ar 
stay  committed  to  those  three  princi- 
ples, we  will  have,  when  appropriate, 
meetings  with  the  PLO. 

I  haven't  given  any  thought  at  all 
when  a  meeting  with  Chairman  Aral 
with  an  American  official  is  appropri 
And  I  would  wait  to  see  how  we  go  fo 
ward.  The  point  in  talking  to  them  is 
try  to  facilitate  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  if  then 
some  logical  step  that  requires  high-] 
sign-off  by  various  participants  over 
there,  then  and  then  only  would  it  be 
proper  to  elevate  the  meetings  to  thai 
level. 

You  crawl  before  you  walk.  We're 
just  starting  to  talk  to  them  because 
they  have,  dramatically,  I'd  say,  agre 
to  the  principles  that  are  part  of  our 
policy. 

Q.  You  said  in  a  wire  service  i 
terview  the  other  day  that  you  nee 
to  have  some  foreign  policy  initiat 
early  in  your  Administration.  It 
seems  the  Soviet  relationship  is  go 
on  the  back  burner  while  you  disci 
the  nuclear  force  structure,  for  ex 
pie.  In  what  area  are  you  going  to 
to  move  forward?  Central  Americi 
The  Mideast?  Where? 

A.  All  of  them.  But  we  had  to  h; 
little  time.  We're  not  going  to  let  thi; 
Soviet  thing  put  us  in  the  mode  of  foi 
draggers.  We're  going  to  be  out  fron 
There's  no  reason  to  suggest  that  all 
have  to  do  is  react  to  a  speech  by  the 
General  Secretary.  I  want  to  take  tb 
fense  in  moving  this  relationship  for- 
ward and  taking  steps  that  are  in  the 
interest  of  freedom  around  the  world 
whether  it's  in  Eastern  Europe  or  in 
strengthening  our  alliance. 

But  there  are  plenty  of  trouble 
spots — one  of  them  as  you  mentioned 
think.  Central  America.  But  we  neec 
complete  the  reviews.  I  can't  tell  you 
where  you  will  see  the  first  major 
initiative — whether  it's  going  to  be  tl 
Middle  East,  whether  it's  going  to  be 
Central  America.  We  have  problems, 
course,  that  afflict  the  whole  confine 
and  other  continents  in  this  Third  W 
debt  problem,  and  then,  of  course,  th 
Soviet  Union. 

But,  no,  I  don't  want  to  play  de- 
fense, and  I  don't  want  to  look  like  w 
foot-dragging,  just  waiting  around  t( 
others  set  the  agenda.  Prudence  is  tl 
order  of  the  day.  And  when  you're  gu 
ning  for  something  as  important  as  s 
laterally  .supported  policy  in  Central 


THE  PRESIDENT 


ifrica,  it  does  take  a  little  time.  I've 
ly  been  here  less  than  a  week. 


Q.  Do  you  ag:ree  with  Senator 
■  wer's  [Secretary  of  Defense- 

iynate]  testimony  in  which  he 
1  'sn't  seem  to  believe  that  the  SDI 

lategic  Defense  Initiative]  pro- 
.ini.  as  envisioned  by  President 

aj;an,  is  likely?  And  if  you  do  agree 
A  h  it.  can  you  expand  on  that? 

A.  No,  I  think  I  should  wait  and  see 
i  ttle  more  what  John  Tower  means.  My 
)  ition  has  not  changed  on  SDI. 

Q.  Which  is?  I  mean,  John  Tower 
ii  said  that  he  doesn't  believe  that  a 
iro-scale  SDI  to  protect  the  popula- 
1,  as  envisioned  bv  Reagan,  is 
i'iy. 

A.  Before  I  comment  on  Tower's  tes- 
:  nny.  I'd  better  read  it.  If  he's  talking 
lit  a  shield  so  impenetrable  that  that 
II  nates  the  need  for  any  kind  of  other 

I  Mise.  I  probably  would  agree  with 

!  .  certainly  short-run.  But  I'd  better 
'  'V  by  waiting  until  I  see  what  he  said. 

(J.  The  first  action  taken  by  your 
'  retary  of  State  was  to  order  the 

II  rding  up  of  the  Embassy  in  Kabul. 
J  s  that  indicate  that  this  Adminis- 
I  ion,  this  country,  then,  has  no  in- 
I  'nee  with  the  rebels  and  you  are 

1    fearful  of  chaos  and  massacres 
j|  -e?  And  to  what  extent  did  you  dis- 
i  this  with  Gorbachev  the  other 

A.  Did  not  discuss  it  with  him  the 
T  day.  And  what  it  indicates  is  a  pru- 
,  policy  to  protect  a  handful  of  Amer- 
lives.  It's  a  step  that  other  countries 
!  taken  in  Afghanistan.  Certainly  I 
k  we'd  all  agree  there  is  uncertainty 
it  what  follows.  I'm  convinced  the 
ets  will  continue  their  withdrawal, 
well  they  should.  But  it  is  simply  a 
lent  way  in  which  to  protect  life,  I 
k.  We've  had  meeting  after  meeting 
1  Afghan  rebels,  and  there's  no  ques- 
in  their  minds  how  we  feel  about, 
a  Soviet  presence  in  that  country. 
I  think  there's  a  lot  of  uncertainty, 
there's  enough  uncertainty  that  a 
•etary  of  State  was  taking  prudent 
)n  in  this  regard. 

Q.  What  role  do  you  see  for  the 
ted  States  after  the  Soviets  with- 
\  in  that  country? 

A.  Catalytic  role  for  helping  bring 
it  stability  hopefully  in  a  govern- 
t  where  the  people  have  a  lot  to  say. 
it  won't  be  easy. 


iartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


Q.  A  Tehran  radio  report  this 
morning  seems  to  indicate  that  they 
are  rejecting  your  statement  of  a 
week  ago  today  that  good  will  would 
beget  good  will.  While  you  didn't  spe- 
cifically mention  Iran  by  name  in 
your  speech,  what  would  your  mes- 
sage to  them  be  on  relations,  and 
what  would  your  message  be  to  them 
about  helping  get  the  hostages  out? 

A.  I  would  make  a  broad  appeal, 
ti'anscending  Iran,  to  anybody  who  can 
be  helpful  to  get  the  hostages  out.  I 
haven't  seen  the  wire  copy,  but  if  there  is 
such  a  story  by  them,  maybe  they're  say- 
ing. Well,  look,  we're  not  holding  your 
hostages.  And  I'd  have  to  say.  Well,  from 
our  intelligence,  our  information,  that's 
probably  correct — probably  correct.  In 
terms  of  the  future — there  was  a  period 
of  time  when  we  had  excellent  relations 
with  Iran,  and  I  don't  want  to  think  that 
the  status  quo  has  to  go  on  forever.  But  I 
do  think  that  the  renunciation  of  terror 
in  any  form  and  facilitating,  to  the  de- 
gree they  can,  the  release  of  the  hos- 
tages would  be  a  couple  of  good  steps 
they  could  take. 


Q.  A  few  minutes  ago  on  the  an- 
swer concerning  the  hostages,  you  in- 
dicated that  Iran  was  probably  not 
holding  the  hostages.  Did  you  mean 
to  say  that  we  believe  that  Iran  exer- 
cises no  control  over  people  who  are 
holding  the  hostages? 

A.  No,  I  mean  to  say  they  are  not 
holding  the  hostages.  Do  they  have  any 
control?  I  think  you  can  get  varying  de- 
grees of  intelligence  on  that,  various  as- 
sessments as  to  how  much  control  they 
have  over  Hezbollah  or  these  families  or 
whoever  it  is.  And  also,  you've  got  differ- 
ent groups  involved  in  the  holding  of 
these  hostages.  But,  no,  I'm  glad  to  get 
a  chance  to  clarify  it  because,  unless 
the  information  I  have  is  wrong,  Iran 
itself — the  government — is  not  actually 
holding  these  people.  If  they  were,  I 
would  just  reiterate  my  view  that  the 
way  to  improve  relations  is  to  let  them 
go,  give  these  people  their  freedom. 
They  didn't  do  anything  wrong. 

Q.  Do  we  believe  that  Iran  can 
exercise  influence  to  gain  the  hos- 
tages' release? 

A.  I  think  thev  can  have  influence. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Jan.  30,  1989.  ■ 


President  Holds 
Session  With 
News  Reporters 


The  following  are  excerpts  from  a 
question-and-ansiver  session  President 
Bush  held  ivith  reporters  in  the  Oval 
Office  on  February  16, 1989.^ 

We  support  the  Afghan  efforts  to  fash- 
ion a  stable,  broadly  based  government, 
responsive  to  the  needs  of  the  Afghan 
people.  Throughout  the  long,  dark 
years  of  Afghanistan's  occupation,  the 
international  community  has  been 
steadfast  in  its  support  of  the  Afghan 
cause,  and  this  certainly  has  been  true 
for  the  United  States.  Our  commit- 
ment, the  commitment  of  the  United 
States  to  the  people  there,  will  remain; 
and  it  will  remain  firm,  both  through 
our  bilateral  humanitarian  aid  pro- 
gram and  through  the  UN  efforts  to 
remove  the  mines  and  resettle  the  refu- 
gees and  help  reconstruct  the  war-torn 
economy. 

We  would  call  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  to  refrain  from  other  forms  of  in- 
terference in  Afghan  affairs.  The  Sovi- 
et Union  has  nothing  to  fear  from  the 
establishment  of  an  independent,  non- 
aligned  Afghanistan.  And  they  do  bear 
a  certain  special  responsibility  for  heal- 
ing the  wounds  of  this  war.  I  would 
hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  gen- 
erously support  international  efforts  to 
rebuild  Afghanistan. 

There  will  be  a  fuller  statement  on 
this  later  on.- 

Q.  Were  you  hoping  also  that  the 
rebels  would  not  conduct  a  bloodbath 
once  they  get  in  the  ascendant  and 
really  take  power. 

A.  Yes 

Q.  I  mean,  it's  a  two-way  street, 
isn't  it?  In  victory,  magnanimity.  Is 
there  any  sense  that  you  would  like  t( 
convey  that  to  the  rebels,  or  do  you 
think  it's  just  a  one-way  street  for  the 
Soviets? 

A.  I  don't  think  a  bloodbath  is  in 
anyone's  interest.  And  I  think  if  we  had 
a  catalytic  role,  I  would  hope  it  would  be, 
along  with  others,  working  toward  rec- 
onciliation and  toward  a  peaceful  resolu- 
tion now  to  all  the  problems.  There's 
been  enough  of  a  bloodbath  there.  I  think 
you  raise  a  good  point;  and,  yes,  I  feel 
strongly  that  the  time  for  recrimination 
is  over,  the  time  for  bloodbaths  is  over.  I 
would  like  to  see  the  various  factions  get 


THE  PRESIDENT 


together  and  come  up  with  recommenda- 
tions that  would  lead  to  a  peaceful  Af- 
ghanistan with  no  more  bloodbaths. 

Q.  The  Soviet  Union  is  calling 
for  an  immediate  cease-fire  in  Af- 
ghanistan and  an  embargo  on  arms 
shipments.  Would  you  go  along  with 
that  idea? 

A.  Here's  one  of  the  complicating 
factors  on  that  call.  There  is  some  con- 
cern about  what  we  call  stockpiling;  and 
it  would  not  be  fair  to  have  tremendous 
amounts  of  lethal  supplies  left  behind 
and  then  cut  off  support  for  resistance, 
thus  leaving  an  unacceptable  imbalance. 
Before  one  could  do  anything  other  than 
appeal  for  peaceful  resolution,  which  I've 
done,  one  needs  to  know  the  real  facts  on 
this  question — this  troublesome 
question — of  stockpiling. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  that  you  will 
continue  to  aid  the  rebels? 

A.  That  means  we  will  do  what  we 
need  to  do  to  see  that  there  is  a  peaceful 
resolution  to  this  question,  that  one  side 
does  not  dominate  militarily,  and  we  will 
be  encouraging  reconciliation. 

Q.  What  is  your  reaction  to  the 
action  by  the  Central  American  coun- 
tries yesterday  that  appears  to  under- 
mine the  standing  of  the  contras,  to 
say  the  least,  and  leave  them  in  a  very 
vulnerable  position?  And  was  your 
Administration,  as  has  been  report- 
ed, caught  off  guard  on  that? 

A.  Let  me  say  on  that  one  that 
there's  some  positive  elements  of  what's 
taking  place  there.  There  are  also  some 
troublesome  elements.  Positive  because 
the  Nicaraguans  appear  to  be  taking 
steps  in  accord  with  the  Esquipulas 
agreements;  they're  talking  about  na- 
tional reconciliation  and  full  freedoms, 
including  complete  freedom  of  the  press 
and  free  and  fair  elections  and  an  end  to 
subversion.  To  the  degree  that  rhetoric 
goes  forward  and  is  enacted,  that's  good. 
But  there's  90  days  now  in  which  to  final- 
ize arrangements.  What's  troubling  to 
me  is  that  claims  like  this  have  been 
made  at  one  time,  only  to  see  those 
claims  repudiated:  promises  made, 
promises  broken.  I  think  we  have  to  be 
wary  of  supporting  any  positive  ele- 
ments like  commitments  to  democracy 
and  yet  say,  wait  a  minute,  let's  be  sure 
that  we  not  leave  the  resistance  standing 
alone,  leave  them  twisting  out  there 
without  fulfillment  of  the  commitment  to 
democracy  on  the  part  of  the  Sandinistas. 


In  terms  of  being  caught  off  guard, 
we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  review  of  our 
whole  policy  there.  If  you  ask  me  would  I 
have  predicted  that  the  five  Presidents 
would  have  worked  out  agreement  in 
this  detail  at  this  time,  I'd  have  to  tell 
you  that,  having  talked  to  President 
Azcona  [of  Honduras],  having  our  Secre- 
tary of  State  deal  with  two  foreign  min- 
isters just  recently — I  think  within  the 
last  10  days — that  I  wouldn't  have  said 
that  they'd  do  e.xactly  what  they  did  do. 
But  as  I  say,  there's  some  positive  ele- 
ments to  it,  and  there's  some  trouble- 
some elements. 

Q.  How  does  that  note  of  caution 
translate  into  policy  and  action  on 
your  part? 

A.  You  mean  from  the  future?  Work 
here  in  the  next  90  days  with  the  leaders 
to  see  that  there's  not  just  some  fluffy 
promises  out  there  but  that  there's  some 
teeth  in  the  promise  of  democratization. 
That  is  what  has  to  be  done.  We  are 
going  to  keep  our  resolve  to  have  the 
people  of  Nicaragua  have  what  these 
other  countries  have  there:  democracy. 
We're  talking  about  freedom  of  the 
press,  freedom  of  elections,  freedom  of 
worship.  And  it's  fine  to  spell  these 
things  out  in  generalities,  but  now  let's 
get  down  to  how  we  proceed.  What  does 
a  free  and  fair  election  mean?  I  want  to 
see  some  certification  of  the  election 
process.  But  we've  got  time  now — little 
bit  of  time  now — in  which  to  make  very 
clear  that  our  resolve,  our  commitment 
to  democracy,  is  still  there. 

Q.  How  do  you  intend  to  stand  by 
your  commitment  to  the  resistance? 
And  might  that  mean  a  request  for 
additional  nonlethal  aid.  at  the  end  of 
which — 

A.  It  could  mean  that.  It  could 
mean  that.  But  again,  I  think  we've  got 
to  work  with  this  process  now  the  best 
we  can.  But  I  don't  think  anybody  would 
want  to  suggest  that  we  would  leave  peo- 
ple with  no  humanitarian  aid.  I  can't 
imagine  anyone  taking  that  view. 

Q.  Will  you  intend  to  ask  Con- 
gress to  approve  of  that  aid? 

A.  We  have  some  time  on  that  too. 
But  I  obviously  want  to  know  what  the 
status  quo  is  at  the  time.  I  have  every  in- 
tention of  seeing  that  these  people  re- 
ceive humanitarian  support,  but  how 
that  comes  about,  we'll  just  have  to  wait 
and  see. 


Q.  West  Germany  wants  to  po 
pone  the  modernization  of  the  sho 
range  missiles.  Obviously  this  is  : 
the  American  position.  They  wanti 
also  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
viets  on  that.  How  do  you  respond 
that?  Hyou  don't  agree  with  that,, 
you  concerned  by  the  unity  of  NAT 
on  that? 

A.  I  would  respond  to  it  this  wa^ 
The  Secretary  of  State  is  talking  to  a 
the  NATO  leaders;  he'll  be  back  in  to 
over  this  weekend.  I  will  sit  down  hei 
in  this  chair  and  talk  to  him  about  wl 
he  has  found. 

In  the  meantime,  I  am  inclined  t 
feel  that  we  are  far  closer  to  West  Ge 
many  than  the  public  perceptions  ml 
be.  I  have  been  in  touch  with  Helmut 
Kohl  [Chancellor,  Federal  Republic  o 
Germany],  and  there  have  been  oppo 
tunities  for  him  to  express  to  me  inoi 
nate  concerns  on  this  question.  Othe: 
German  leaders  have  been  here  rece 
and  the  Secretary  of  State's  been  the 
So  I  would  use  this  opportunity  to  sh 
down  the  concept  that  there  are  maj( 
divisions  between  ourselves  and  the 
Federal  Republic  on  this  question. 

But  I'm  not  worried  about  NAT( 
unity.  You  always  worry  that  you  ha\ 
your  act  totally  together,  and  that's  ( 
of  the  reasons  I  wanted  these  early  c 
.sulfations.  I  think  now,  as  a  result  of 
Secretary  of  State's  wonderful  trip  o 
there — and  I  say  wonderful  because 
touched  a  lot  of  bases  and  the  cables 
most  encouraging  along  the  lines  of 
NATO  unity — that  having  said  that, 
the  mood  is  pretty  good.  I  don't  won 
too  much  about  divisions  in  NATO,  a 
do  then  feel  that  we  will  be  in  a  posit 
with  a  united  NATO  to  move  forwar 
consultation  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
That's  the  next  step,  and  we  have  cer 
leadership  responsibilities  that  all  of 
here  are  prepared  to  accept  in  that 
regard. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  P 
dential  Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1989. 

-Fortext  see  Bulletin  of  March  198 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/April ' 


HE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


|ce  President  Visits 
Venezuela  and  El  Salvador 

Vice  President  Quai/le  headed  the 
sidential  delegation  to  the 
iugiiration  qfCarlos  Andres  Perez 
^President  of  Venezuela  (February  1- 
''hsi))  and  visited  El  Salvador 
jibruarii  3). 


President  Quayle  and  Argentine  President  Carlos  Andres  Perez. 


nezuela 

people  of  our  two  counti-ies  share 
strongest  belief  in  the  dignity  of 
,  embodied  in  our  mutual  commit- 
t  to  the  advancement  of  democracy 
I'espect  for  human  rights  ....  The 
of  the  dictator  has,  indeed,  passed, 
lis  hemisphere,  new  life  has  been 
n  to  the  idea  that  freedom  works, 
it  does  not  work  of  and  by  itself. 
ace  the  constant  threat  of  en- 
chment  upon  our  shores  of  an  alien 


and  outmoded  ideology.  To  defeat  it, 
we  must  strengthen  the  ties  that  bind 
us.  Only  our  combined  solidarity  will 
ensure  the  consolidation  on  this  conti- 
nent, within  the  framework  of  demo- 
cratic institutions,  of  a  system  of 
individual  liberty  and  social  justice 
based  on  respect  for  the  essential 
rights  of  man. 

Remarks  to 

the  American  Embassy  Community, 

Caracas,  February  1,  1989 


El  Salvador 

El  Salvador  is  a  democracy,  so  it's  not 
surprising  that  there  are  many  voices 
to  be  heard  here.  Yet  in  my  conversa- 
tions with  Salvadorans  of  very  differ- 
ing points  of  view,  I  have  heard  a  single 
voice;  it  is  a  clear  one.  No  one  wishes 
more  political  violence  or  destabiliza- 
tion  in  the  region  or  an  end  to  the  dem- 
ocratic process  that  began  10  years  ago. 
Salvadorans  are  united  in  their  desire 
for  peace,  for  a  share  in  the  prosperity 
of  the  nation,  for  law  and  justice  to 
guide  their  society.  They  are  united  in 
their  sense  of  what  their  country  can 
be  ...  .  Our  commitment,  as  Ameri- 
cans and  as  allies,  is  to  democracy.  Our 
support  is  for  the  people  of  El  Salvador. 
It  is  they  who  choose  their  leaders;  it  is 
they  who  decide  the  course  of  their  des- 
tiny; and  it  is  to  the  people  of  El  Sal- 
vador that  we  direct  our  continued 
support. 

Departure  Statement, 
San  Salvador,  February  .3,  1989  ■ 


Vice  President  Quayle  and  Sal- 
vadoran  President  Jose  Napoleon 
Duarte. 


irtment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


THE  SECRETARY 


James  A.  Baker,  III,  Sworn  In 
as  Secretary  of  State 


In  a  formal  ceremony  at  the  White  House,  James  A.  Baker,  III,  was  sworn  in 
as  the  61st  Secretary  of  State  on  January  27,  1989,  by  Chief  Justice  William  Re- 
nquist.  Mrs.  Baker  held  the  Bible,  and  President  Bush  witnessed.  Secretary 
Baker  officially  took  the  oath  of  office  on  January  25,  1989,  at  the  Department 
of  State. 


Following  are  remarks  bi/ 
President  Bush  and  Secretari/  Baker 
at  the  latter's  formal  swearing-in 
ceremony  at  the  White  House  on 
January  27,  1989. 

President  Bush' 

This  is  a  very  special  occasion  for  me 
because,  as  you  all  know,  Jim  and  I 
have  been  friends  for  a  long  time,  going 
back  perhaps  more  years  than  either  of 
us  would  care  to  admit — long,  really, 
before  our  public  lives  began.  And 
we've  served  in  government  together, 
campaigned  together,  traveled  a  long 
way  through  some  rough  and  tumble 
times.  It's  well  known  that  the  new  Sec- 
retary of  State  is  my  friend.  I  have 
great  confidence  in  him.  And  judging 
from  how  he  sailed  through  the  con- 
firmation process — thank  you, 
gentlemen — the  U.S.  Senate  shares 
that  confidence. 

As  Secretary  of  State,  he  will  be 
my  principal  foreign  policy  adviser.  As 
I  pledged  in  my  Inaugural  Address  a 


week  ago,  my  presidency  will  usher  in 
the  age  of  the  offered  hand,  and  that 
applies  certainly  to  foreign  policy.  I've 
also  spoken  of  a  new  engagement.  No- 
where is  the  need  for  a  new  engage- 
ment greater  than  in  foreign  policy. 

The  postwar  generation  has  come 
of  age,  and  today  we  live  in  a  distinctly 
different  world  than  that  which  we 
were  born  into:  a  world  that  demands 
new  strategies  and  new  solutions.  To- 
day we  see  a  process  of  change  in  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  in 
the  Middle  East.  A  changing  situation 
creates  new  possibilities  as  well  as  dan- 
gers. In  southern  Africa  and  in  Indo- 
china, there  is  diplomatic  progress.  In 
Central  and  South  America,  total- 
itarian forces  still  threaten  to  under- 
mine the  will  of  the  people.  We  must 
keep  democracy  on  the  march.  We're 
faced  with  change  and  the  potential  for 
change  all  over  the  world.  And  it's  up  to 
us  to  guarantee  that  the  United  States 
remains  an  engaged  power  for  positive 
change. 


In  another  era,  the  Secretary  of 
State's  role  was  largely  confined  to 
matters  of  war  and  peace.  Today's 
world  is  much  more  complex  than 
that — more  dangerous,  too.  Today's 
Secretary  of  State  must  be  preparei 
work  with  our  allies  to  solve  such  gl 
al  threats  as  the  international  narco 
trade,  terrorism,  the  degradation  of 
the  world's  environment,  and  the  ec( 
nomic  distress  of  developing  countri 
That's  why  I  chose  James  Baker.  He'; 
savvy;  he's  sensitive;  he's  tough — a  r: 
combination,  indeed.  And  so,  Jim, 
you've  got  a  big  job  ahead  of  you,  lea 
ing;  coming  up  with  bold,  new  initia- 
tives; helping  all  of  us  fulfill  the 
President's  special  role  in  foreign  po^ 
cy.  We  will  also  try  to  restore  bipart 
sanship  based  on  trust,  open 
communication,  and  consistency  of 
action. 

This  is  a  time  for  America  to  re; 
out  and  take  the  lead,  not  merely  re; 
This  is  a  time  for  America  to  move  f 
ward  confidently  and  cautiously,  not 
treat.  As  the  freest  and  the  fairest  { 
the  most  powerful  democracy  on  the 
face  of  the  Earth,  we  must  continue 
shine  as  a  beacon  of  liberty,  beacon 
justice,  for  all  the  people  of  the  worl 

Those  of  you  who  are  here  todaj 
Jim  Baker's  family,  closest  friends- 
know  something  that  many  other  pe 
pie  will  soon  learn  for  themselves:  J 
Baker  will  be  a  great  Secretary  of 
State. 

Secretary  Baker^ 

I  am  truly  honored  and  privileged  t( 
stand  before  you  today.  Many  of  you 
have  come  a  long  distance  to  be  hert 
and  as  you  mentioned,  Mr.  Presidem 
you  and  I  have  come  a  long  distance 
gether.  I  hope  to  continue  to  merit  y 
confidence.  I  know  I  will  continue  tc 
enjoy  our  friendship.  One  other  thin 
hope  that  in  foreign  policy,  we're  goi 
to  make  a  better  team  than  we  ofter 
times  did  on  the  tennis  courts  in  Te; 
[Laughter] 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  taking  of  an  oath  is  always  a 
tnn  moment.  Yet  I  cannot  help  but 
k  that  there  will  be  even  more  sol- 
moments  to  follow.  Because  it's 
jiji  my  experience  for  8  years  here 
in  Washington  that  after  the 
iring-in,  sooner  or  later,  comes  the 
iring  at.  [Laughter] 
Mr.  President,  through  your  choice 
the  Senate's  consent,  I  will  occupy 
ffice  that  dates  from  the  infancy  of 
Republic.  Over  the  last  few  weeks, 
learned  a  lot  about  the  job.  I  find 
nore  I  learn  about  it,  the  more 
ble  I  become.  Yet  mixed  with  that 
ility  is  a  pride — not  in  myself  but 
ir  great  country. 

One  of  the  statutory  duties  of  the 
etary  of  State  is  to  be  the  custo- 
of  the  Great  Seal  of  the  United 
!s.  We're  all  pretty  familiar  with 
Teat  eagle,  holding  the  olive 
ches  but  also  holding  the  arrows. 
e's  a  reverse  side  to  that  seal,  how- 
that  interests  me.  On  it  is  an  un- 
hed  pyramid  and  on  the  bottom,  a 
n  inscription  which  means,  "A  new 
r  of  the  ages."  It's  dated  1776. 
Vo  me  this  expresses  our  fore- 
rs'  conviction  that  our  country  of- 
something  new.  Our  Constitution, 
lemocracy  is  a  new  order  of  human 
ity.  And  the  unfinished  pyramid  is 
nbol  of  strength,  and  it's  a  symbol 
ritinuity. 

America  rests  on  the  broadest  pos- 
base  which,  of  course,  is  the  con- 
(tion  of  every  American.  But  the 
of  America — to  perfect  our  soci- 
;o  strengthen  and  extend 
om — is  really  never  finished. 
Is  I  stand  here  today — very  grate- 
)  you,  Mr.  President — I  recognize 
we  are  entering  a  new  era  of  inter- 
nal relations;  one  that's  filled  with 
than  its  share  of  promise  but  per- 
more  than  its  share  of  perils  as 
I  also  recognize  that  our  country 
>r  new  in  our  capacity  to  meet  the 
fcnge  and  to  advance  the  cause  of 
ilom. 
enter  this  office  secure  in  the 
ledge  that  under  your  leadership, 
'resident,  and  with  the  support  of 
Congress  and  the  support  of  the 
rican  people,  we  can  continue  suc- 
ully  what  we  began  two  centuries 


James  A.  Baker,  III 
Secretary  of  State 


James  A.  Baker,  III,  was  sworn  in  as 
the  61st  Secretary  of  State  at  the  De- 
partment of  State  on  January  25,  1989, 
and  at  a  formal  ceremony  at  the  White 
House  on  January  27,  1989.  He  was 
nominated  by  President-elect  Bush  on 
November  9,  1988,  and  confirmed  by 
the  Senate  on  January  25,  1989. 

James  A.  Baker,  III,  served  as  the 
67th  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  from 
February  1985  to  August  1988.  In  Au- 
gust 1988,  he  assumed  the  role  of  Cam- 
paign Chairman  for  the  presidential 
campaign  of  Vice  President  George 
Bush. 

Prior  to  serving  as  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  Mr.  Baker  had  been  ap- 
pointed by  President  Reagan  as  Chief 
of  Staff  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  a  position  which  he  occupied 
from  January  1981  through  January 
1985.  While  at  the  White  House,  he  was 
a  member  of  the  National  Security 
Council  and  remained  a  member  as  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury.  While  at  Treas- 
ury, he  was  also  Chairman  of  the 
President's  Economic  Policy  Council. 

In  1980  Secretary  Baker  served  as 
Senior  Adviser  to  the  Reagan/Bush 
general  election  campaign.  From  Janu- 
ary 1979  to  May  1980,  he  was  the  Chair- 
man of  Vice  President  Bush's  campaign 
for  the  1980  Republican  presidential 
nomination. 

Secretary  Baker  was  the  Republi- 
can Party's  nominee  for  Attorney  Gen- 
eral of  the  State  of  Texas  in  1978.  He  is 
a  native  Houstonian  and  practiced  law 
there  with  the  firm  of  Andrews  & 
Kurth  from  1957  to  1975. 

In  August  1975,  Secretary  Baker 
was  appointed  by  President  Ford  to  be 
the  Under  Secretary  of  Commerce. 
Secretary  Baker  joined  President 


Ford's  presidential  campaign  in 
May  1976  as  Deputy  Chairman  for  Dele- 
gate Operations  and  in  August  became 
National  Chairman  of  the  President 
Ford  Committee. 

Secretary  Baker  graduated  from 
Princeton  University  in  1952.  After  2 
years  of  active  duty  as  a  Lieutenant  in 
the  U.S.  Marine  Corps,  he  entered  the 
University  of  Texas  School  of  Law  at 
Austin.  He  received  his  J.D.  with  hon- 
ors in  1957. 

A  member  of  the  American,  Texas, 
and  Houston  Bar  Associations,  the 
American  Judicature  Society,  and  the 
Phi  Delta  Phi  honorary  legal  fraternity, 
Secretary  Baker  also  serves  on  the 
Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Woodrow 
Wilson  International  Center  for  Schol- 
ars at  the  Smithsonian  Institution.  He 
has  served  on  the  governing  bodies  of 
the  Texas  Children's  Hospital  and  the 
M.D.  Anderson  Hospital  and  Tumor 
Institute. 

Secretary  Baker  has  been  the  re- 
cipient of  the  Jefferson  Award  for  dis- 
tinguished public  service  from  the 
American  Institute  for  Public  Service, 
an  award  for  Distinguished  Public 
Service  from  the  John  F.  Kennedy 
School  of  Government  at  Harvard,  and 
the  Woodrow  Wilson  Award  for  distin- 
guished achievement  in  the  nation's 
service  from  Princeton  University. 
Secretary  Baker  was  selected  in  1986 
as  a  distinguished  alumnus  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Texas.  He  has  received  nu- 
merous honorary  degrees. 

Secretary  Baker  was  born 
April  28,  1930.  He  and  his  wife,  the  for- 
mer Susan  Garrett,  reside  in  Washing- 
ton, D.C.  They  have  eight  children. 


Press  release  10  of  Jan.  30,  1989. 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
iqU  Documents  of  Jan.  30,  1989. 
Fe.xt  from  press  release  9  of  Jan.  30  and 
l\  ('ompilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
nf.Jan.  30.  ■ 


tljrtment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary-Designate's  Confirmation  Hearings 


Secretary  of  State-designate 
James  A.  Baker,  III,  appeared  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  January  17, 1989.  He 
was  confiryned  by  the  full  Senate  on 
January  25.^ 

It  is  an  honor  to  appear  before  you  as 
President-elect  Bush's  nominee  to  be 
Secretary  of  State.  I  also  appreciate 
your  willingness  to  hold  these  hearings 
while  we  are  still  in  the  transition  per- 
iod. Every  Administration  aspires  to  hit 
the  ground  running,  instead  of  just  hit- 
ting the  ground. 

This  Friday  a  new  President  will 
take  office.  He  will  govern  an  America 
vastly  different  from  the  country  we 
knew  even  as  recently  as  the  beginning 
of  this  decade.  When  George  Bush  first 
campaigned  for  the  presidency,  Ameri- 
can institutions  and  values  were  being 
questioned.  Over  the  last  8  years,  we 
have  reaffirmed  them.  As  a  result,  our 
nation  has  emerged  much  stronger  both 
at  home  and  abroad.  For  this,  we  owe 
thanks  to  Secretary  Shultz  and,  above 
all,  to  Pi-esident  Reagan. 

The  legacy  of  the  Reagan  era  is  a 
more  vibrant  America.  We  have  proven 
that  our  President  can  lead,  that  our 
government  works,  that  progress  can  be 
made.  The  creativity  of  the  individual 
and  respect  for  his  or  her  rights — the 
touchstones  of  democracy — have  become, 
once  more,  ideas  in  the  ascendancy. 

Some  of  that  vibrancy  is  reflected  in 
the  international  developments  of  our 
time.  Our  most  powerful  foe,  the  Soviet 
Union,  so  aggressive  a  decade  ago,  is  un- 
dergoing an  ideological  soul-searching  of 
historic  proportions.  Regional  conflicts 
long  thought  to  be  intractable — in  South- 
west Asia  and  southern  Africa,  for 
example — have  begun  moving  toward 
resolution  with  the  help  of  creative 
American  diplomacy.  And  the  interna- 
tional economy,  driven  by  the  longest 
American  peacetime  economic  expansion 
on  record,  has  provided  new  hope  for 
progress. 

A  World  in  Transition 

These  developments  are  symptomatic  of 
the  great  changes  and  challenges  we  face 
in  the  decade  ahead.  Our  world  is  under- 
going five  significant  transformations. 

First,  the  democratic  revolution: 

Many  nations  in  Latin  America  have 


recently  achieved  democracy  or  are 
struggling  toward  it,  while  in  Asia,  the 
Philippines  and  South  Korea  have  joined 
the  democi'atic  ranks.  But  many  of  these 
new  democracies  are  fragile.  Their  insti- 
tutions need  time  to  take  root,  and  suc- 
cess is  not  assured.  And,  while  millions 
of  people  elsewhere  are  demanding  free 
political  institutions,  we  know  that  the 
demands  for  freedom  are  not  always 
granted  peacefully,  if  at  all. 

Second,  the  spread  of  free  enter- 
prise: Free  markets  and  private  initia- 
tive are  the  new  watchwords  of  economic 
development — because  these  concepts 
work  in  practice.  Classic  socialism  and 
variants  of  government-controlled  econ- 
omies have  been  discredited.  The  na- 
tions of  the  Pacific  rim  in  particular 
have  shown  that  the  free  enterprise 
model  works  astonishingly  well  for 
developing  countries,  not  just  mature 
economies.  But  in  many  regions,  the 
problems  of  debt,  large  trade  imbal- 
ances, and  protectionist  pressures  over- 
shadow this  progress  and  threaten  the 
future. 

Third,  change  in  the  communist 
world:  Virtually  every  communist  gov- 
ernment is  now  experimenting  with  eco- 
nomic ideas  once  denounced  as  heretical, 
including  a  role  for  a  market  economy. 
But  the  crisis  of  the  communist  systems, 
even  by  their  own  admission,  is  much 
broader.  Political  change,  especially  the 
demand  for  freer  institutions,  is  high  on 
the  agenda.  Yet  it  is  not  clear  that  re- 
forms will  be  successful  or  that  democra- 
cy will  be  the  outcome. 

Fourth,  technological  progress: 

Rapid  advances  in  the  technology  of  in- 
formation and  communications  have 
helped  to  bring  about  a  global  economy, 
shrinking  time  and  space  and  transcend- 
ing the  traditional  boundaries  of  the 
nation-state.  It  is  already  clear  that  in 
today's  global  economy,  dome.stic  econom- 
ic policies  can  no  longer  be  considered 
independently  of  their  international  con- 
sequences. But  it  is  not  yet  certain  that 
we  will  have  the  cooperation  we  need. 
And  trade  advantages,  unfairly  pursued, 
could  lead  to  more  economic  strife  and, 
eventually,  to  growing  protectionism. 

Fifth,  new  military  trends:  The 

same  technological  change  affecting  the 
international  economy  is  altering  strate- 


gic military  relationships.  Precision 
guidance  enables  the  conventional  we 
ons  of  today  to  destroy  targets  that,  i 
years  past,  were  assigned  primarily 
nuclear  weapons.  Research  on  the  Sti 
tegic  Defense  Initiative  is  exploring  t 
potential  for  altering  the  future  mix  > 
offense  and  defense.  We  must  continu 
to  assess  the  impact  of  these  changes 
on  deterrence  and  arms  control. 

There  is  another,  more  worrisom 
aspect  of  the  new  military  trends.  A 
dangerous  proliferation  of  high  tech- 
nology has  begun.  Just  as  we  are  con 
trolling  or  eliminating  some  nuclear 
weapons,  chemical  warheads  and  ball 
tic  missiles  have  fallen  into  the  handi 
governments  and  groups  with  proven 
records  of  aggression  and  terrorism. 

The  Contraries  of  Our  Times 
and  How  To  Approach  Them 

These  five  ti-ansformations  present  u 
with  a  series  of  contraries  and  para- 
doxes. We  could  advance  toward  an 
increasingly  democratic  world,  or,  if 
fragile  democracies  fail,  the  cause  of 
freedom  could  be  thrown  back.  The  i 
ter national  economy  could  continue  t 
grow,  or  the  stresses  of  competition 
could  lead  to  protectionism  and  rival 
trading  blocs — ultimately  to  the  diss 
vantage  of  all.  A  properly  conceived 
proach  by  the  Atlantic  alliance  could 
extend  the  progress  we  have  made  v, 
the  Soviet  Union.  Or  through  mistak 
on  either  side  of  the  Iron  Curtain,  th 
opportunity  could  be  lost.  Finally,  ne 
military  technologies  could  provide  ; 
greater  stability  at  lower  levels  of  foi 
Or  we  could  encounter  a  new  and  dar 
age  if  we  cannot  halt  the  spread  of  W' 
ons  that  put  nations  on  a  hair  trigger 
particularly  in  politically  unstable 
i-egions. 

I  am  asking  you  to  vote  to  confir 
me  as  Secretary  of  State.  So  it  is  rig 
and  proper  that  I  tell  you  as  best  I  c; 
my  approach  to  this  challenging  worl 
this  world  of  contraries. 

During  my  legal  training,  I  beca 
aware  of  a  set  of  lectures  by  Justice  1 
jamin  Cardozo  called  "The  Nature  of 
Judicial  Process."  And  I  recall  being 
struck  by  his  observation  that,  "Ther 
is  in  each  of  us  a  stream  of  tendency, 
whether  you  choose  to  call  it  philosop 
or  not,  which  gives  coherency  and  dii 
tion  to  thought  and  action."  Some  ha' 
described  my  philosophy  as  "pragmai 


10 


THE  SECRETARY 


ilike  to  say  that  labels  can  be  mis- 

ing — I  am  actually  a  Texas  Repub- 
n,  all  of  whom  are  conservative.  I 

admit  to  pragmatism,  however,  if  by 
It  you  mean  being  realistic  about  the 
Id  and  apjjreciating  the  importance 
etting  things  done. 

My  purpose  is  not  to  understand 

world  in  order  to  accept  it  but  to  un- 
stand  it  in  order  to  change  it  where 
essary — sometimes  by  large  steps, 
:n  of  necessity  by  small  steps,  yet  al- 
s  pressing  forward.  And  the  only 
e  guide  for  such  change  is  the  com- 

of  American  ideals  and  values — 
»dom,  democracy,  equal  rights,  re- 

t  for  human  dignity,  fair  play — the 
iiciples  to  which  I  adhere, 

I  believe  in  freedom  for  the  individ- 
because  it's  a  God-given  right  and  the 
roe  of  human  creativity.  The  Foun- 

of  our  country  recognized  that  such 

dom  was  preserved  best  by  limited 
jrnment — the  checks  and  balances 

em  that  still  provides  the  framework 
)ur  success.  Part  of  that  system  is  a 

ntralized  government,  a  government 

;  to  the  people,  a  government  of  the 
ole.  I  would  argue,  too,  that  econom- 
eedom — the  free  market  system — is 
issential  part  of  the  framework, 
(illy,  and  above  all,  I  believe,  like 
Koln,  that  the  United  States  has  a 

ial  role  in  this  world,  a  special  con- 
ation to  make — as  he  put  it,  "the 

best  hope  of  earth." 

tiership  and  Bipartisanship 

ense  of  realism,  my  stream  of  ten- 
y,  tells  me  that  we  can  advance  to- 
i  those  ideals  if  we  are  resolved  on 
issues. 

The  fir,st  is  the  necessity  for  Anieri- 
ieadership.  Some  years  ago,  as  Sec- 
Ty  of  the  Treasury,  I  spoke  of  the 
ership  "choice" — but,  in  fact,  it  is 
loice  at  all.  As  the  most  powerful 

iocracy,  the  largest  economy,  the 
thiest  society,  and  the  greatest  con- 
ration  of  scientific  talents,  we  are 
g  to  substantially  affect  the  future 
ther  we  do  so  consciously  or  not.  We 
36  a  force  for  freedom  and  peaceful 
ge  unlike  any  other  in  this  world, 
if  we  fail  to  do  so,  we  will  not  be  able 
in  or  to  hide  from  the  consequences. 
U.S.  leadership  must  adjust  for  a 
d  that  has  outgrown  the  postwar 
The  United  States  is  simultaneously 
bune  for  democracy,  a  catalyst  for 
national  cooperation,  and  a  guard- 
)f  our  national  interests.  We  live  in  a 
d  of  powerful  adversaries.  We  can- 
lake  the  survival  of  democracy  for 


granted  or  assume  that  if  we  do  not  pro- 
tect our  own  interests,  someone  else  or 
some  international  organization  will  act 
on  our  behalf.  We  also  live  in  a  world  of 
increasingly  influential  allies  whose  co- 
operation is  essential  if  we  are  to  sur- 
mount common  problems.  There  are  new, 
global  dangers,  such  as  terrorism,  the 
international  narcotics  trade,  and  the 
degradation  of  the  world's  environment, 
that  cannot  be  managed  by  one  nation 
alone — no  matter  how  powerful.  These 
realities  will  not  permit  a  blind  isola- 
tionism or  a  reckless  unilateralism.  Only 
through  a  realistic  approach  can  we 
write  a  new  chapter  of  American  leader- 
ship for  a  rapidly  changing  world. 

Thei'e  is  a  second  issue  we  must  re- 
solve. It  concerns  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  executive  and  the  Congress  in 
the  realm  of  foreign  policy.  Simply  put, 
we  must  have  bipartisanship  to  suc- 
ceed. That's  the  verdict  of  history  and  of 
recent  exj^erience. 

Bipartisanship  does  not  mean  that 
we  must  always  agree.  There  are  and 
will  always  be  differences  in  approach 
and  on  substance.  Airing  those  differ- 
ences in  a  manner  that  respects  the  oth- 
er person's  right  to  disagree  is  a  strong 
affirmation  of  the  democratic  process. 
But  eventually, we  must  proceed,  and 
when  we  do,  it  is  best  that  we  do  so  to- 
gether if  we  are  to  achieve  the  national 
interest.  On  this  subject,  let  me  quote 
Dean  Acheson.  He  was  evidently  ac- 
quainted with  some  of  our  Texas  customs 
because  he  said  that  there  was  a  rule  in 
the  saloons  of  the  Old  West:  "Never  shoot 
the  piano  player."  And  he  wrote  that  in 
foreign  policy,  the  President  was  the  pi- 
ano player. 

Yes,  this  is  an  appeal  for  a  kinder, 
gentler  Congress.  But  bipartisanship  is 
also  more  than  Acheson's  "holy  water 
sprinkled  on  political  necessity."  It's  the 
lubricant  that  enables  the  branches  of 
government  to  overcome  their  natural, 
constitutionally  designed  friction,  a 
friction  that  arises  from  our  differing 
perspectives  and  our  different 
responsibilities. 

As  a  realist,  I  know  we  need  biparti- 
sanship to  succeed.  While  the  executive 
is  responsible  for  proposing  and  execut- 
ing foreign  policy,  the  legislature  sup- 
ports, modifies,  and  sometimes  vetoes  a 
course  of  action.  Thus,  bipartisanship  is 
decided  in  practice.  So  let  our  recent  ex- 
perience be  our  teacher.  When  we  held 
the  line  together,  on  Afghanistan,  or 
throughout  the  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  negotiations,  we  suc- 
ceeded. When  we  did  not — in  Central 
America — the  outcome  was  unsatisfac- 
tory to  everyone. 


The  conclusion  is  inescapable.  In  or- 
der to  succeed,  we  must  work  together. 
And  a  bipartisan  foreign  policy  is  sus- 
tained by  three  principles: 

•  First,  trust  that  w'e  each  have 
the  public  interest  in  mind,  that  we 
are  doing  our  best  to  carry  out  our 
respon.sibilities; 

•  Second,  consultation,  that  we  are 
trying  to  communicate,  that  we  taking 
off  and  landing  together;  and 

•  Third,  consistency,  that  our  deci- 
sions and  agreements,  once  arrived  at, 
ai'e,  in  fact,  decisions  and  agreements 
that  will  be  kept. 

Senators  Danforth  and  Boren  have 
suggested  a  new  means  of  consultation — 
including  periodic  meetings  of  Members 
of  Congress  with  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  sometimes  the  President — to  discuss 
the  larger  and  longer  term  issues.  As 
President-elect  Bush  wrote  to  Senator 
Danforth  on  November  18,  1988,  "As  soon 
as  my  National  Security  team  is  in 
place,  I  will  ask  them  to  meet  with  you 
to  discuss  your  e.xcellent  suggestions."  I 
look  forward  to  that  meeting. 

Armed  then  with  the  conviction  of 
American  leadership  and  the  practices 
of  bipartisanship,  let  us  together — the 
executive  and  the  Congress — tackle  the 
formidable  agenda  before  us. 

The  International  Agenda: 
The  Americas 

First  on  that  agenda  is  our  neighbor- 
hood— the  countries  that  border  us,  the 
countries  of  our  continent  and  our  hemi- 
sphere. The  United  States  is  both  a  con- 
tinental and  a  maritime  power,  which 
gives  us  a  unique  geopolitical  perspec- 
tive. But  we  are  not  exempt  from  the  old 
rule  that  foreign  policy  begins  at  home. 
It  is  rooted  and  must  be  rooted  in  our 
values.  And  it  gathers  both  strength  and 
vitality  from  our  immediate  neighbor- 
hood— how  well  we  do  with  our  friends 
and  neighbors  to  the  north  and  south. 

Recently,  working  with  Canada,  we 
achieved  a  free  trade  agreement — 
something  both  nations  had  sought  for 
100  years  without  success.  A  lot  of  ink 
and  some  anguish  has  been  spilled  over 
the  economic  implications  of  this  agree- 
ment with  respect  to  certain  industries. 
In  my  view,  the  free  trade  agreement  is 
in  our  mutual  interest.  And  there  are 
geopolitical  implications  that  go  far  be- 
yond the  economic  signficance  of  this 
achievement. 

The  U.S. -Canada  agreement  repre- 
sents a  signal  success  in  a  strategy  de- 
signed to  move  all  nations  toward  a  more 


11 


THE  SECRETARY 


open  trading  system.  It  proves  that  the 
two  largest  trading  partners  in  the 
world  cannot  only  eliminate  tariff  bar- 
riers but  can  also  negotiate  solutions  in 
such  areas  as  services  and  investment — 
both  increasingly  transnational  in 
scope — while  still  respecting  national 
sovereignty.  It  shows  that  an  active,  in- 
ternationalist free  trade  policy  can  cata- 
lyze a  bipartisan  domestic  coalition  and 
turn  back  the  forces  of  protectionism.  So 
it  can  be  done.  And  we  look  forward  to 
working  with  Canada  on  other  important 
issues,  including  international  environ- 
mental problems,  as  we  extend  the  range 
of  our  new  cooperation. 

To  the  south,  we  have  an  equally  sig- 
nificant set  of  issues  to  consider.  Our 
neighbor  Me.xico  is  deeply  in  debt  and 
faces  some  serious  challenges  to  its  so- 
cial fabric.  But  Mexico  also  has  many 
assets — the  capabilities  of  its  people  and 
its  significant  natural  resources.  The 
Mexican  Government,  led  by  President 
Salinas,  is  taking  the  road  of  economic 
and  political  reform.  It  is  a  difficult 
road,  and  we  are  determined  to  help. 

It  is  in  our  interest  to  do  so.  It  is 
time  we  regarded  Mexico  with  the  re- 
spect and  seriousness  it  warrants. 
Whatever  the  past,  we  mu.st  all  be  aware 
that  America's  relationship  with  Mexico 
means  a  great  deal.  It  is  as  important  as 
our  relationship  with  any  other  country 
in  the  world.  I  am  convinced  that  we  can 
make  progress  together,  working  on  the 
basis  of  equality  and  mutual  respect.  I 
know  President-elect  Bush  looks  forward 
to  early  consultations  with  President 
Salinas  and  [Canadian]  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  to  chart  the  course  ahead. 

Another  matter  on  our  continental 
agenda  is  Central  America.  We  have  now 
had  nearly  10  years  of  frustrating  and 
sometimes  contradictory  American  poli- 
cies toward  that  region.  Some  successes 
have  been  achieved.  Most  Central  Amer- 
ican nations  are  more  democratic  and 
more  respectful  of  human  rights  than 
they  were.  And  we  must  help  to  defend 
those  achievements  from  threats  against 
human  rights,  whether  the  threats  are 
from  the  left  or  the  right. 

Still,  the  overwhelming  blemish  re- 
mains: the  terrible  draining  conflict  be- 
tween Nicaragua  and  its  neighbors  and 
between  the  Nicaraguan  Mar.\ists  and 
their  own  people,  some  of  whom  have 
taken  up  arms  and  merited  American 
support.  Starting  in  1987,  all  of  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  area  stepped  back  from 
the  brink  long  enough  to  agree  on  a  set 
of  principles  for  peace.  The  Esquipulas 
agreement,  known  as  Esquipulas  II  and 
authored  by  President  Arias  of  Costa 


Rica,  expresses  well  everyone's  objec- 
tives. It's  a  good  platform  for  peace. 
What  it  lacks  is  a  mechanism  for  enforce- 
ment. That  problem  emerged  clearly  in 
the  record  of  negotiations  following  the 
Sapoa  accords  between  the  Sandinistas 
and  the  democratic  resistance.  To  date, 
neither  democracy,  as  specified  by 
Esquipulas  II,  nor  the  reintegration  of 
the  resistance,  as  pledged  in  the  Sapoa 
accords,  has  materialized. 

Clearly,  we  need  a  different  ajj- 
proach,  an  ajjproach  that  must  be  bipar- 
tisan here  in  Washington  if  it  is  to 
succeed  there  in  the  region.  Events  have 
shown  that  only  such  bipartisan  action 
influences  the  Sandinistas. 

That  is  why  we  must  unite  on  clear 
goals  for  Central  America — democrati- 
zation, development,  and  security  for  ev- 
ery state  in  the  region.  All  of  them  must 
be  free  of  the  fear  of  subversive  neigh- 
bors. All  of  them  must  be  able  to  share 
in  an  economic  development  plan,  per- 
haps assisted  by  our  European  and  Japa- 
nese allies.  But  none  of  this  can  occur 
unless  the  promises  of  democracy  and  se- 
curity become  reality.  We  must  insist  on 
protection  for  human  rights  in  Nicara- 
gua, El  Salvador,  and  their  neighbors — 
applying  equal  standards  faii'ly  to  all. 

These  objectives  of  American  diplo- 
macy carry  a  great  national  respon- 
sibility. We  cannot  and  we  must  not 
abandon  the  democratic  resistance.  We 
must  stand  by  them  until  our  mutual 
goals  are  achieved. 

Finally,  I'd  like  to  make  a  sugges- 
tion. In  1992,  we  will  celebrate  the  500th 
anniversary  of  Columbus'  voyage  of  dis- 
covery. I'd  like  to  suggest  that  today  we 
embark  on  a  voyage  of  rediscovery — of 
the  Caribbean  and  of  South  America. 
Our  neighbors  in  this  hemisphere  are 
engaged  in  a  quest  for  greater  freedom 
and  economic  progress.  We  share  many 
of  their  interests.  And  together  we  also 
face  the  scourge  of  drugs.  Now  is  the 
time  to  take  a  fresh  look  at  these  prob- 
lems and  to  make  more  of  our  oppor- 
tunities to  overcome  them. 

Transformation  of 
Our  Allies  and  Friends 

Let  me  move  now  from  our  neighborhood 
to  the  broader  world  of  our  friends  and 
allies.  Through  commerce,  political  al- 
liance, and  defense  agreements,  the 
United  States  links  together  two  highly 
dynamic,  advanced  regions — Western 
Europe  and  the  nations  of  the  Pacific. 
We  are  at  once  an  Atlantic  power  and  a 
Pacific  power,  and  there  should  not  be 
any  thought  to  expand  one  relationship 
at  the  expense  of  the  other. 


Realism  compels  us  to  understai 
the  great  changes  taking  place  anion 
our  allies  and  friends  in  both  region.- 
This  year  marks  the  40th  anniversar 
the  founding  of  NATO,  the  most  sucei 
ful  alliance  in  history.  But  today's  Y\'i 
ern  Europe  is  not  the  exhausted  Eui' 
recovering  from  its  own  devastation, 
is  it  the  single  Europe  of  the  political 
sionaries.  A  new  appreciation  is  neeil 
on  our  side  and  theirs  of  how  we  can 
adapt  to  changing  circumstances  as  s 
force  for  peace. 

Certainly,  in  the  first  instance,  r 
requires,  as  President-elect  Bush  has 
suggested,  a  meeting  of  our  minds  or 
how  to  proceed  with  a  changing  Sovi( 
Union.  In  an  era  of  constrained  defen 
budgets,  we  require  a  common  appro 
to  the  new  military  facts  created  by  t 
INF  Treaty — the  need  to  modernize  • 
nuclear  and  conventional  weapons.  W 
need  a  set  of  both  realistic  and  prude 
standards  for  conventional  arms  cont 
We  also  need  a  common  approach  to  t 
issues  of  loans  and  credits,  trade,  an( 
technology  transfer  to  Moscow  and  E 
ern  Europe.  Finally,  we  need  to  estal 
lish  a  more  equitable  and  creative  ba 
on  which  to  share  responsibilities.  0\ 
discourse  and  consultations  should  b( 
free  and  frank  as  befits  allies  of  long 
standing. 

The  stakes  have  not  changed.  Oi 
commitment  to  NATO  is  stronger  be 
cause  we  as  nations  are  stronger.  As 
as  Europe  remains  the  most  heavily 
armed  continent,  where  American  at 
Soviet  troops  face  each  other  on  the 
front  lines,  the  Atlantic  alliance  will 
our  first  line  of  defense. 

The  year  1989  also  marks  32  yeai 
since  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  Ron 
that  gave  official  birth  to  the  [Europi 
Common  Market.  And  in  only  3  more 
years,  the  enlarged  Common  Market 
will  have  achieved  the  objective  of  th; 
treaty — a  single  market.  But  will  thi 
new  Europe — a  rising  economic  supe 
power — be  outward  looking  or  inwan 
Will  it  be  another  building  block  in  tl 
new  edifice  of  a  more  open,  global  tn 
ing  system  or  a  massive  bloc  protects 
against  external  competition?  Will  it 
a  healthy,  dynamic  economy  that  pro- 
duces an  abundance  of  jobs  or  a  cauti 
stagnant  region  content  with  persisti 
unemployment?  The  correct  anwers  t 
these  contraries  will  be  found,  I  belie 
in  a  Europe  that  looks  outward,  not  i 
ward;  that  promotes  structural  refor: 
that  breaks  down  barriers,  that  offer 
economic  opportunities  for  all  nations 
not  only  for  Europe.  As  an  ally  and 


12 


THE  SECRETARY 


a  major  trading  partner,  the  United 
ates  will  take  a  keen  interest  in  this 
insformation. 

Turning  to  the  Pacific  rim,  we  find 
triking  success  already  in  the  making. 
)  area  offers  comparable  achievements 
creating  advanced  economies  in  rec- 
1  time.  This  economic  progress  is  an- 
)red  in  the  remarkable  partnership, 
f!  four  decades  old,  between  the 
lited  States  and  Japan.  I  e.xpect  that 
rtnership  to  strengthen  further  and 
Dand  in  scope. 

Many  have  spoken  of  the  Pacific  cen- 
y  and  the  Pacific  rim  as  the  world  of 
ti'  future.  One  thing  is  certain.  The 
vrld's  economic  promise  to  the  end  of 
r  s  century  depends  on  how  well  the 
I  ited  States  and  its  Pacific  partners 
n  iiage  their  affairs.  Our  relations  with 
t  Pacific — as  our  relations  with  Eu- 
rie  and,  indeed,  our  own  continent — 
nst  emphasize  outward-looking  eco- 
Bnic  policies  that  promote  trade  and 
giwth.  I  do  not  underestimate  the  chal- 
l(ge  in  Asia,  or  in  other  regions,  of 
4  ieving  free  and  fair  trade,  of  avoiding 
a  forms  of  protectionism,  including  the 
q  nipulation  of  exchange  rates.  After 
1  rly  a  decade  when  the  American 
ifl  nomy  has  driven  international  growth, 
\'  are  all  facing  a  changing  world.  The 
r  '  that  success  brings  responsibility 
'  find  a  fuller  e.xpression  as  the  Pa- 
:, :  nations  assume  more  important 
'«  nomic  and  political  roles. 

We  have  vital  political  and  strategic 
ii  'rests  in  the  Pacific  as  well.  These  in- 
I  'sts  are  well  served  by  military  capa- 
:i<s  based  in  Japan,  the  Philippines, 
a   Korea — and  by  our  close  cooperation 
«  h  these  nations.  We  must  enhance 
t  coopei'ation  while  shouldering  com- 
1  defense  and  development 
'I  iiinsibilities. 
The  U.S.  relationship  with  the  Peo- 
~  Itepublic  of  China,  important  in  its 
1  right,  also  contributes  strongly  to 
'  ii\erall  stability  of  the  international 
p  tical  order.  President-elect  Bush's  e.x- 
u  qve,  personal  experience  in  China 
facilitate  the  expansion  of  our  im- 
;;mt  and  multifaceted  ties. 
( )ur  policy  toward  the  Pacific  as  a 
<]r  must  tie  together  all  strands:  to 
ire  the  region's  economic  growth, 
its  global  implications,  in  the  con- 
•  f  a  secure  regional  deterrence. 
Ilk  we  are  going  to  see  in  Asia  the 
— <ity  for  closer  coordination  with 
\N  [Association  of  South  East  Asian 
ns]  and  other  regional  groups — and 
fa|)s  even  new  institutional  arrange- 
•i.as.  As  we  enter  a  new  era  charae- 
M  zed  especially  by  the  greater  strength 


Secretary  Addresses  Panel 
on  Global  Climate  Change 


Following  are  remarks  by  Secre- 
tary Baker  before  the  Response  Strate- 
gies Wo7-king  Group  of  the  Inter- 
governmental Panel  on  Climate 
Change  at  the  Department  of  State  on 
January  30,  1989.^ 

I  am  very  pleased  to  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  join  you  this  morning,  how- 
ever briefly,  and  to  welcome  you  to  the 
Department  of  State.  You  are  the  first 
official  group  that  I've  had  the  pleasure 
of  welcoming  to  the  Department. 

I  would  also  like  to  welcome 
Bill  Reilly,  who  is  here  with  us  this 
morning— President  of  the  World  Wild- 
life Fund  and  the  Conservation  Founda- 
tion. Bill  has  let  President  Bush  talk 
him  into  becoming  the  nominee  for  the 
post  of  Administrator  of  the  U.S.  Envi- 
ronmental Protection  Agency,  and  it's 
my  fervent  hope,  Bill,  that  nothing  you 
hear  at  this  conference  this  morning 
will  cause  you  to  change  your  mind. 

The  truth  is,  though,  as  I  don't 
need  to  tell  those  of  you  who  are  here, 
we  face  some  very  difficult  problems.  It 
is  also  true,  though,  that  we  now  recog- 
nize them  to  be  problems,  and  in  my  ex- 
perience in  government,  that  is  at  least 
half  of  the  battle. 

Some  months  ago  President  Bush 
said,  "We  face  the  prospect  of  being 
trapped  on  a  boat  that  we  have  irrepa- 
rably damaged — not  by  the  cataclysm  of 
war  but  by  the  slow  neglect  of  a  vessel 
we  believed  to  be  impervious  to  our 
abuse." 

The  establishment  of  the  Inter- 
governmental Panel  on  Climate  Change 
and  this  meeting  of  the  panel's  Re- 
sponse Strategies  Working  Group,  I 
think,  shows  beyond  a  doubt  that  this  is 
a  transnational  issue.  We  are  all  in  the 
same  boat.  And  as  I  put  it  in  my  testi- 
mony to  the  Senate  recently,  "The  tides 
and  the  winds  can  spread  environmen- 
tal damage  to  continents  and  hemis- 
pheres far  removed  from  the  immediate 
disaster." 

So  if  I  may  borrow  a  phrase  from 
the  environmentalists,  the  political 
ecology  is  now  ripe  for  action.  We  know 


that  we  need  to  act,  and  we  also  know 
that  we  need  to  act  together  That  is 
what  this  meeting  is  all  about. 

But  I  would  take  it  even  a  step  fur- 
ther. One  of  the  big  advantages  of  being 
Secretary  of  State  is  that  because  I  am 
not  a  scientist,  I  am,  therefore,  not 
called  upon  to  assess  the  evidence,  es- 
pecially on  global  climate  change.  Yet 
it  is  also  clear,  I  think,  that  we  face 
more  than  simply  a  scientific  problem. 
It  is  also  a  diplomatic  problem  of  when 
and  how  we  take  action.  And  here,  if  I 
might,  I  would  like  to  make  four 
points. 

The  first  is  that  we  can  probably 
not  afford  to  wait  until  all  of  the  uncer- 
tainties have  been  resolved  before  we 
do  act.  Time  will  not  make  the  problem 
go  away. 

The  second  is  that  while  scientists 
refine  the  state  of  our  knowledge,  we 
should  focus  immediately  on  prudent 
steps  that  are  already  justified  on 
grounds  other  than  climate  change. 
These  include  reducing  CFC  emissions, 
greater  energy  efficiency,  and 
reforestation. 

The  third  is  that  whatever  global 
solutions  to  global  climate  change  are 
considered,  they  should  be  as  specific 
and  cost-effective  as  they  can  possibly 
be. 

The  fourth  is  that  those  solutions 
will  be  most  effective  if  they  transcend 
the  great  fault  line  of  our  times — the 
need  to  reconcile  the  transcendent  re- 
quirements for  both  economic  develop- 
ment and  a  safe  environment. 

Without  in  any  way  downgrading 
the  difficulty  of  the  task,  I  would  con- 
clude by  noting  that  progress  generally 
results  when  common  interests  are 
joined  to  a  common  understanding. 
This  meeting  and  others  like  it  will 
play  a  crucial  role  in  moving  us  all  to- 
ward that  common  understanding  of 
what  we  must  do  to  protect  and  to  pre- 
serve our  environment. 


'Press  release  11. 


iMiartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


of  our  friends,  the  challenge  of  our  agen- 
da can  be  put  this  way:  Our  mutual  suc- 
cess should  pave  the  road  toward  closer 
association,  not  a  detour  to  the  dead  end 
of  counterproductive  rivalry.  That's  a 
road  we  must  pave  together. 

Transnational  Issues 

The  future  of  our  civilization  also  de- 
mands that  we  act  in  concert  to  deal 
with  a  new  class  of  problems,  transna- 
tional in  nature.  Terrorism  has  become  a 
means  for  small  groups,  sometimes  sup- 
ported by  nations,  to  attack  innocent  ci- 
vilians around  the  world.  The  narcotics 
traffickers  have  become  powerful 
enough  to  undermine  governments,  even 
as  their  drugs  poison  societies.  Fanatics 
spread  their  messages  of  intolerance  and 
hate  using  mass  communications  that  cut 
across  borders.  Every  nation  also  knows 
now  that  we  face  major  ecological  chal- 
lenges. The  tides  and  winds  can  spread 
environmental  damage  to  continents  and 
hemispheres  far  removed  from  the  im- 
mediate disaster.  Scientists  have  warned 
us  against  the  possible  consequences  of  a 
long-term  warming  trend,  the  so-called 
greenhouse  effect. 

President-elect  Bush  has  called  for 
an  international  conference  on  global  en- 
vironmental issues.  I  believe  the  United 
States  must  lead  this  effort.  We  need  to 
help  foster  a  change  of  attitude,  a  recon- 
ciliation of  the  transcendent  require- 
ments for  both  economic  development 
and  a  secure  environment.  As  Treasury 
Secretary,  I  pressed  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks  toward  consideration  of 
conservationally  sound,  sustained  devel- 
opment and  helped  develop  debt-for- 
charity  swaps  to  aid  conservation  in  de- 
veloping nations.  As  Seci'etary  of  State, 
I  hope  to  build  on  this  record. 

No  one  has  yet  perfected  the  poli- 
cies of  collective  action  we  need  to  deal 
with  this  special  range  of  global  prob- 
lems. But  the  stakes  are  too  high  for  us 
to  desist.  We  will  begin  with  our  allies, 
include  our  friends,  and  challenge  our 
adversaries  to  make  common  cause  in 
treating  these  issues. 

Realism  in  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

Beyond  the  Americas,  be.\'ond  greater 
partnership  with  our  allies,  beyond  fac- 
ing global  problems,  lies  the  U.S. -Soviet 
relationship.  Thanks  to  the  policy  of 
peace  through  strength  pursued  over  the 
last  8  years,  our  dealings  with  Moscow 
have  become  noticeably  less  tense.  There 
has  been  progress  in  arms  control — 
notably  the  INF  Treaty — human  rights, 


bilateral  ties,  and  regional  conflicts.  We 
look  forward  to  the  day,  coming  soon, 
when  all  Soviet  troops  will  have  left 
Afghanistan. 

Some  have  suggested  that  this  prog- 
ress deserves  a  radically  different  U.S. 
policy.  Others  fear  that  [Soviet  Presi- 
dent] Mikhail  Gorbachev  has  stolen  a 
march  on  the  democracies  through  such 
actions  as  the  unilateral  reduction  in 
troops  and  tanks  in  Europe.  The  mean- 
ing and  permanence  of  the  new  Soviet 
policies  are  being  debated  intensely  here 
and  abroad. 

There  are  good  reasons  for  both  op- 
timistic and  pessimistic  views  of  today's 
Soviet  Union.  No  one  can  doubt  that 
there  are  very  real  changes.  Many  were 
unthinkable  just  a  few  years  ago.  The 
SS-20s  are  being  destroyed.  Soviet 
troops  are  leaving  Afghanistan.  Some 
political  prisoners  have  been  released. 
American  doctors  will  soon  visit  psychi- 
atric hospitals  where  prisoners  of  con- 
science have  been  sent.  Soviet  history 
itself  is  sometimes  subject  to  harsh  scru- 
tiny. In  others  words,  the  slogans  of 
glasnost  and  perestrulka  are  being  given 
content. 

These  are  reasons  to  be  hopeful.  But 
realism  requires  us  to  be  prudent.  How- 
ever fascinating  the  twists  and  turns  of 
perestroika  may  be,  and  however  rivet- 
ing the  details  of  Soviet  decline  as  re- 
ported in  Soviet  newspapers,  the  Soviet 
Union  remains  a  heavily  armed  super- 
power. The  talk  is  different  but  the  force 
structure  and  policies  that  support  far- 
reaching  interests  and  clients  have  not 
changed  commensurately.  Many  of  those 
policies  and  those  clients  are  hostile  to 
American  values  and  threaten  our  inter- 
ests and  our  allies.  That's  a  reality. 

Still,  I  would  not  underestimate  the 
impact  of  Moscow's  domestic  troubles  on 
Soviet  foreign  policy.  Marxism-Leninism 
as  a  philosophy  for  a  society  must  be  in 
doubt  when  the  system,  after  70  years, 
produces  declining  health,  shortages  of 
food  and  consumer  goods,  and  an  obso- 
lete industrial  base.  The  political 
changes  now  being  made  are  themselves 
reflective  of  a  continuing  paradox:  While 
the  purpose  of  reform  is  ostensibly  to 
prevent  a  recurrence  of  dictatorial 
abuse,  the  reform  itself  depends  on  the 
concentration  of  power  in  one  man's 
hands. 

Meanwhile,  the  East  European 
countries  are  in  ferment  as  the  ground 
rules  of  their  own  governments  and  their 
relations  to  the  U.S.S.R.  are  rewritten. 
And  the  Baltic  States  and  Armenia  have 
reminded  the  world  of  ethnic  dilemmas 


long  suppressed  by  Stalinist  methods. 
These  situations  too  cannot  be  ignored' 
In  light  of  both  the  change  and  cor 
tinuity  in  the  Soviet  Union,  realistic 
American  policy  should  be  guided  by 
these  principles. 

First,  we  should  continue  to  wel- 
come reform  and  changes  in  the  Soviei 
Union  that  promise  more  freedom  at 
home,  in  the  workplace,  in  public  instil 
tions.  But  we  should  never  measure  tb 
progress  of  Mr.  Gorbachev's  reforms  \y\ 
how  many  credits,  concessions,  or  ac- 
commodations we  might  make  ostensil 
to  help  him  succeed  with  his  domestic 
plans.  Ultimately,  as  the  Soviets  them 
selves  acknowledge,  pei-estroika  depen 
not  on  help  from  outside  but  on  politic; 
bureaucratic,  and  sociological  changes 
the  Soviet  Union. 

Second,  while  recognizing  that  M 
cow's  policies  are  informed  by  a  new 
sense  of  realism,  we  should  also  under 
stand  that  our  policies  have  contributt 
to  that  sense  of  realism.  Our  willingne 
to  support  the  mujahidin — not  only  ec 
nomic  dilemmas  in  the  Soviet  Union- 
helped  bring  about  the  Soviet  with- 
drawal from  Afghanistan.  Our  willing^ 
ness,  with  NATO,  to  deploy  the  Pershi 
and  cruise  missiles — not  only  food 
shortages — helped  bring  about  the  IN 
Treaty.  Where  we  have  not  raised  the 
cost  of  adventure  or  aggression,  we  S6 
little  evidence  of  change.  Can  it  be  a  c 
incidence  that  the  only  regional  confli 
where  we  failed  to  bring  consistent,  e: 
fective  pressure — in  Central  America 
we  see  little  trace  of  new  thinking  in 
Soviet  foreign  policy? 

Third,  we  must  continue  to  probe 
Moscow  along  every  aspect  of  our 
agenda — arms  control,  human  rights, 
gional  conflicts,  and  bilateral  relation 
We  are  interested  in  cooperating  and 
gotiating  to  make  progress  wherever 
can  be  made.  Arms  control  should  en- 
compass conventional  and  chemical 
weapons  and  ballistic  missile  prolifer; 
tion,  going  beyond  expressions  of  gem 
principles  to  practical  details.  And  hu 
man  rights  means  full  compliance  wit 
the  Helsinki  accords.  There  can  be  no 
laxation  of  our  standards  on  this  issue 

Fourth,  we  need  additional  focus 
the  regional  conflicts,  whether  in  Cen 
tral  America,  South  Asia,  southern 
Africa,  the  Persian  Gulf,  or  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict.  Does  the  Soviet  Unioi 
truly  see  a  lowering  of  tension  and  nej 
tiations  to  be  in  its  own  interests?  We 
should  not  allow  the  rhetoric  of  restra. 


14 


THE  SECRETARY 


become  a  substitute  foi-  restraint  it- 
f.  iKir  should  we  permit  interest  in 
'lomatic  processes  to  be  sufficient  in 
'  iihsence  of  a  commitment  to  making 
ual  progress. 

Fifth,  we  may  need  a  new  category 
iiur  relations,  to  deal  with  global  prob- 
is  such  as  terrorism,  drugs,  and  the 
,  ironment.  We  ought  to  find  out 
it  her  Moscow  can  be  helpful  on  these 
.lies  and  if  not,  why  not. 

1  am  convinced  that  Western 
eiiLith  and  Soviet  domestic  weakness 
e  set  the  stage  for  the  remarkable  re- 
asm  that  has  distinguished  Mr.  Gor- 
^■hev's  tenure  so  far  Our  task  is  to 
•  aiige  affairs  so  that  whatever  the  out- 
iiie  of  pcrestroika,  a  more  responsible, 
cistructive  Soviet  foreign  policy  will 
r  lain  in  Moscow's  interest.  We  look  for- 
vi'd  to  such  a  policy,  not  only  in  dealing 
'  li  I  lid  issues  but  with  the  newer  dan- 
,  -  and  flashpoints  that  concern  us. 

ill  of  the  world's  hope  for  a  more 
^  ceful  international  order  rests  on  the 
ei  come. 

F  solving  Regional  Conflicts 

1  a  lit  to  turn  to  those  very  regional 
flicts  that  have  denied  peace  and 
:  '(lom  to  the  peoples  of  southern  Afri- 

Siiuth  and  Southeast  Asia,  and  the 
A  Idle  East.  We  have  made  encouraging 
p  gress  in  the  recent  agreement,  medi- 
al :1  by  the  United  States,  that  provides 
fi  Namibian  independence  and  a  with- 
d  wal  of  Cuban  and  South  African 
ti  ips  from  Angola.  And  we  will  be 
«  ching  carefully  to  be  sure  that  Cuba 
d  s  carry  out  its  obligations.  But  more 
iiMled.  Angola  desperately  requires 
.  eiial  reconciliation.  And  until  that 
I'  irs,  we  shall  continue  to  support 
L  ITA  [National  Union  for  the  Total 
Ii  ependence  of  Angola]  and  its  leader 
'  IS  Savimbi,  as  President-elect  Bush 
indicated.  Namibia  will  be  a  new  and 
:ile  state.  In  South  Africa  itself,  the 
■~ses  and  strains  that  accompany  the 
liable  end  of  apartheid  will  provide 
\ei-e  test  for  all  involved.  We  must 
ik  long  and  hard  in  this  country 
lit  our  role  and  about  the  effects  of 
actions — not  on  our  own  self-esteem 
I'll  the  people  we  want  to  help.  Final- 
'  e  must  also  not  forget  the  very  real 
Kill  and  developmental  needs  of  the 
pie  throughout  sub-Saharan  Africa. 
In  South  Asia,  we  look  forward  to 
il  withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops  from 
hanistan  and  that  country's  achieve- 
it  of  independent  neutrality  with  a 
ei-iiment  fully  acceptable  to  the  Af- 
11  people.  And  as  tensions  decrease  in 
hanistan,  we  also  hope  to  build  on 


the  more  constructive  relationship  being 
forged  now  by  the  leaders  of  India  and 
Pakistan.  It  is  essential  to  improve  ties 
with  both  Pakistan  and  India  if  we  are  to 
encourage  this  process. 

All  nations  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
the  international  community  as  a  whole 
should  look  forward  to  the  withdrawal 
of  Vietnamese  forces  from  Cambodia. 
There,  too,  a  difficult  national  reconcilia- 
tion must  be  undertaken.  The  United 
States  will  continue  to  work  for  a  new 
Cambodia,  free  of  both  Vietnamese  occu- 
pation and  the  Khmer  Rouge. 

Turning  to  the  Middle  East,  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  has  long  engaged 
America's  attention,  resources,  and  good 
will.  Our  mediation  has  borne  partial 
fruit  in  the  Eqyptian-Israeli  Peace  Trea- 
ty, part  of  the  Camp  David  accords  for  a 
comprehensive  settlement.  And  our  poli- 
cy in  the  Middle  East  has  been  truly  bi- 
partisan. Every  Administration  has 
made  its  contribution.  I  was  proud  to  be 
part  of  the  Reagan  team  that  e.xpanded 
our  relationship  with  Israel  into  a  true 
strategic  alliance  and  that  also  met  our 
responsibilities  in  the  Persian  Gulf. 

Now.  President  Reagan  has  autho- 
rized a  dialogue  with  the  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization]  after  Yasir 
Arafat  declared  his  organization's  recog- 
nition of  Israel's  right  to  exist  in  peace, 
supported  UN  Resolutions  242  and  338, 
and  renounced  terrorism.  Dialogues 
bring  messages.  And  we  are  bringing  a 
message  to  the  PLO  about  terrorism  and 
about  the  need  for  even  more  realism — 
realism  that  makes  practical  progress  on 
the  ground  jjossible.  But  the  existence  of 
the  dialogue  should  not  lead  anyone  to 
misunderstand  our  overall  policy  or 
question  our  enduring  support  for  the 
State  of  Israel. 

As  President-elect  Bush  has  de- 
scribed it,  we  have  a  solid  consensus  on 
the  objectives  and  means  of  making 
peace  between  Israel  and  its  Arab  neigh- 
bors. These  include  the  purpose  of  the 
negotiations,  which  is,  above  all,  a  just, 
enduring  peace  that  ensures  Israeli  se- 
curity and  satisfies  the  legitimate  rights 
of  the  Palestinians.  We  advocate  direct 
negotiations  based  on  UN  Resolutions 
242  and  338.  which  include  the 
exchange  of  territory  for  peace.  Real- 
istically, .Jordan  must  play  a  part  in  any 
agreement.  The  Palestinians  must  par- 
ticipate in  the  determination  of  their 
own  future.  We  continue  to  believe,  how- 
ever, that  an  independent  Palestinian 
state  will  not  be  a  source  of  stability  or 
contribute  to  a  just  and  enduring  peace. 
These  are  sound  principles  and  they 
should  guide  us. 


Today,  the  rocks  are  flying  and  the 
blood  is  flowing — bad  blood — between 
the  Palestinians  and  the  Israelis  in  the 
areas  under  Israeli  military  administra- 
tion. We  are  determined  to  build  upon 
the  achievements  of  our  predecessors  in 
changing  that  situation,  which  must  be 
the  foundation  of  a  secure  peace.  And 
we  look  forward  to  working  with  all  the 
parties  in  the  area  to  achieve  it. 

A  Middle  East  policy  focused  exclu- 
sively on  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict, 
however,  would  be  too  limited.  Libya 
continues  to  be  a  destabilizing  factor 
in  North  Africa  and  elsewhere  in  the 
region.  Lebanon  remains  a  rebuke  to 
everyone's  hopes  for  a  restoration  of  sta- 
bility and  independence  for  that  tragic 
country.  A  lasting  peace  remains  to  be 
established  between  Iran  and  Iraq. 
Meanwhile,  the  issues  of  chemical  war- 
fare and  ballistic  missile  proliferation 
compel  our  attention.  We  are  going  to  be 
working  with  other  nations  to  take  the 
initiative  on  these  issues.  Surely  the 
tragic  experiences,  the  casualties,  the 
victims  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war  demand 
from  the  world  and  the  region  a  more 
civilized  order 

We  are  also  going  to  be  working 
with  the  United  Nations  on  some  of 
these  regional  conflicts.  The  United  Na- 
tions should  be  seen  for  what  it  is,  an  e.x- 
pression  of  the  world's  desire  for  peace 
but  also,  too  often,  the  scene  of  those 
passions  that  prevent  peace.  Experience 
indicates  that  when  nations  need  chan- 
nels, when  nations  agree  upon  proce- 
dures, when  they  agree  on  much  of  the 
substance,  the  United  Nations  offers  a 
valuable  forum  for  making  progress.  We 
support  that,  and  we  support  the  United 
Nations.  Yet  in  the  final  analysis,  the 
United  Nations  can  be  neither  a  substi- 
tute for  American  leadership  nor  an 
excuse  for  a  failure  to  try. 

Chemical  Warfare  and 
Technological  Proliferation 

The  final  point  I  want  to  discuss  today  is 
the  proliferation  of  new  and  dangerous 
weapons,  often  in  states  with  a  history 
of  terrorism  and  aggression.  Perhaps  the 
most  frightening  is  the  combination  of 
the  ballistic  missile,  against  which  there 
is  currently  no  defense,  and  chemical 
weapons,  outlawed  as  a  crime  against 
civilization.  Yet  the  fact  remains  that 
these  weapons  have  been  used.  The  in- 
ternational reaction  to  such  use  has  not 
been  strong  enough  or  timely  enough. 
Nations  are  now  stockpiling  these  weap- 
ons. And  too  often  those  few  countries 


Martment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


with  the  technical  capacity  to  make  these 
deadly  chemicals  have  not  been  careful 
enough  to  prevent  their  proliferation. 
Weapons,  of  course,  do  not  start 
wars.  Conflicts,  hatreds,  ambitions,  and 
sometimes  accidents  do  start  wars. 
Nonetheless,  we  must  take  special  meas- 
ures to  prevent  the  accumulation  of 
weapons,  which,  by  their  very  nature, 
would  create  fear  and  hair-trigger  re- 
sponses. I  know  this  concern  to  be  very 
much  on  the  mind  of  President-elect 
Bush,  and  we  are  determined  to  build  on 
the  recently  concluded  Paris  conference 
and  to  make  progress  soon. 

Conclusion 

Clearly,  we  face  a  formidable  agenda  as 
we  attempt  to  deal  with  the  contraries  of 
our  age.  Yet  we  start  with  the  strong 
hand  of  a  strong  America.  And  we  shall 
persist  because  we  know  that  the  stakes 
are  very  high. 

In  a  few  years,  we  could  know 
whether  a  lasting  constructive  relation- 
ship with  the  Soviet  Union  is  possible. 
Whether  the  world  economy  will  prog- 
ress. Whether  our  allies  in  Europe  and 
Asia  will  look  outward.  Whether  we  can 
extend  arms  control  and  deterrence. 
Whether  we  can  deal  successfully  with 
global  problems  like  the  environment, 


terrorism,  and  drugs.  Whether  we  can 
create  the  new  frameworks  for  the  devel- 
oping countries  to  move  forward  free  of 
the  curse  of  regional  conflicts. 

For  me  and  for  my  generation,  these 
are  great  prospects,  but  they  are  even 
greater  for  the  ne.xt  generation  of  Amer- 
icans. President-elect  Bush  spoke  for  us 
all  when  he  said  to  a  group  of  students  at 
Westminister  College,  "We  have  lived 
our  lives  partly  in  the  sunlight  but  al- 
ways in  the  shadow  of  struggle. . . .  That 
struggle  is  not  yet  over."  And  then  he 
told  these  young  Americans,  "Your  gen- 
eration has  an  opportunity  to  emerge 
from  that  shadow  and  finally  enjoy  the 
sunlight  without  fear." 

I  am  certain  that  a  realistic  Ameri- 
can leadership  can  seize  that  oppor- 
tunity and  usher  in  a  more  peaceful  and 
prosperous  era.  It  is  the  chance  to  lift 
the  shadow  of  struggle  and  to  leave  a 
better  world  for  America  that  motivates 
me.  That  is  why  I  am  here  today  to  seek 
your  support.  Together,  and  under  the 
leadership  of  our  President,  we  can 
do  it. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


The  International  Agenda  and 
the  FY  1990  Budget  Request 


Secretary  Baker's  statement  before 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
01/  Februarij  21,  1989^ 

I  am  honored  to  appear  before  you  as 
Secretary  of  State  to  discuss  the  main 
lines  of  our  foreign  policy  and  our  fiscal 
year  (FY)  1990  budget  request  in  sup- 
port of  that  policy. 

In  my  confirmation  hearing,  I 
noted  that  America  is  vastly  different 
from  the  country  we  knew  even  as  re- 
cently as  the  beginning  of  this  decade. 
Then  American  values  and  institutions 
were  being  questioned.  Eight  years 
of  the  Reagan  era,  however,  have 
reaffirmed  them.  As  a  consequence, 
America  today  is  a  more  vibrant  and 
stronger  nation.  We  have  demonstrated 
once  again  that  our  form  of  government 
works  and  that  progress  is  possible  in  a 
setting  which  encourages  the  creativity 
of  the  individual  and  respects  his  or  her 
rights. 


Some  of  that  vibi-ancy  is  reflected 
in  international  developments  of  our 
time.  Our  most  powerful  foe,  the  Soviet 
Union,  so  aggressive  a  decade  ago,  is 
undergoing  a  soul-searching  of  historic 
proportions.  Democracy  is  continuing  to 
take  root  and  grow  around  the  world  on 
an  impressive  scale.  Regional  conflicts 
long  thought  to  be  intractable  have  be- 
gun moving  toward  resolution  with  the 
help  of  creative  American  diplomacy. 
And  the  international  economy,  driven 
by  the  longest  American  peacetime 
economic  expansion  on  record,  has 
provided  new  hope  for  progress. 

Still,  while  there  is  every  reason 
to  look  to  the  future  with  optimism,  it 
would  be  a  serious  mistake  to  assume 
that  continued  progress  is  assured.  In 
my  confirmation  hearing,  I  enumerated 
five  major  transformations  underway — 
the  democratic  revolution,  the  spread  of 
free  enterprise,  major  changes  in  the 
communist  world,  rapid  changes  in 


technology,  and  changing  strategic- 
military  relationships.  There  are  trei  < 
to  be  found  in  each  case  favorable  to 
our  interests.  But  there  is  and  can  b« 
no  reason  for  complacency.  Every  on 
of  these  transformations  holds  withii 
a  contrary  trend  that  could  set  us  ba  . 

We  could  advance  toward  an  in- 
creasingly democratic  world,  or,  if  fr  - 
ile  democracies  fail,  the  cause  of 
freedom  could  be  set  back.  The  intei- 
tional  economy  could  continue  to  gr<i 
or  the  stresses  of  competition  could 
lead  to  protectionism  and  rival  tradii 
blocs — ultimately  to  the  disadvantagi  if 
all.  A  properly  conceived  approach  b 
the  Atlantic  alliance  could  extend  thi 
progress  we  have  made  with  the  Sov 
Union.  Or  through  mistakes  on  eithe 
side  of  the  Iron  Curtain,  this  opporti  - 
ity  could  be  lost.  Finally,  new  militai 
technologies  could  provide  greater  st 
bility  at  lower  levels  of  forces.  Or  we 
could  encounter  a  new  and  darker  aj: 
if  we  cannot  halt  the  spread  of  weapi  ^ 
that  put  nations  on  a  hair-trigger,  \y< 
ticularly  in  politically  unstable  regio 

How  should  we  approach  this 
rapidly  changing  world?  As  a  conser 
ative  and  a  realist,  I  believe  our  poll 
must  always  be  guided  by  the  basic 
American  principles  to  which  I  ad- 
here— freedom,  democracy,  equal 
rights,  respect  for  human  dignity,  fa 
play.  And  I  am  convinced  that  we  ca^ 
advance  these  values  if  we  are  resol' 
on  two  issues. 

The  first  is  the  necessity  for  Ar 
ican  leadership.  As  the  most  powerf 
democracy,  the  largest  economy,  the 
wealthiest  society  with  the  greatest 
concentration  of  scientific  talent,  we 
are  going  to  substantially  affect  the 
course  of  human  events  whether  we 
so  consciously  or  not.  We  can  be  a  f( 
for  freedom  and  peaceful  change  unl 
any  other  in  this  world.  But  if  we  fa 
to  do  so,  we  will  not  be  able  to  run  ( 
to  hide  from  the  consequences. 

Second,  the  executive  and  the  C 
gress  must  approach  foreign  policy  i 
the  spirit  of  bipartisanship.  This  doe 
not  mean  that  we  will  not  have  our  ( 
ferences.  Airing  those  differences  in 
manner  that  respects  the  right  of  ot 
ers  to  disagree  is  a  strong  affirmatic 
of  the  democratic  process.  But  event 
ally  we  must  proceed,  and  when  we 
it  is  best  that  we  do  so  together  if  w 
are  to  achieve  the  national  interest. 

Recent  experience  affirms  this 
lesson.  When  we  held  the  line  togetl 
on  Afghanistan,  for  example,  and 
throughout  the  INF  [intermediate- 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  I'S 


THE  SECRETARY 


nge  nuclear  forces]  negotiations,  we 
cceeded.  When  we  did  not,  as  in  Cen- 
il  America,  the  outcome  was  un- 
tisfactory  to  everyone. 

In  the  course  of  my  confirmation 
itimony,  I  said  that  trust,  consulta- 
in,  and  consistency  were  essential  to 
partisanship.  Surely  the  crucial  out- 
me  of  that  process  is  a  decision  to  go 
ward,  not  only  with  united  purpose 
t  also  with  sufficient  resources.  To 
t  it  plainly,  we  must  put  our  money 
ere  our  mouths  are. 

That  is  the  context  in  which  we 
3uld  discuss  the  international  affairs 
iding  request.  Over  the  past  several 
irs,  we  have  all  come  to  recognize 

0  facts:  first,  discretionary  budget 
;hority  for  international  affairs,  has 
ually  declined  from  a  high  of  $26.3 
lion  in  1985  to  about  $18.3  billion  in 
59.  As  a  percentage  of  GNP  [gross 
ional  product],  economic  assistance 
clays  during  1989  will  be  at  an  all- 
16  low,  less  than  three-tenths  of  1%. 
}ond,  the  existing  efforts  are  ham- 
•ed  increasingly  by  reporting  re- 
rements,  earmarks,  and  restrictions, 
at  the  very  time  when  we  all  agree 
the  importance  of  American  lead- 
hip,  when  we  all  agree  that  we  face 
■apidly  changing  world,  we  have  to 
erse  the  trend  toward  less  flexibility 
management  of  foreign  assistance. 

With  this  in  mind,  I  welcome  the 
ort  of  the  committee's  T^sk  Force  on 
•eign  Assistance.  I  am  sui-e  the  com- 
■tee  will  understand  that  we  have  not 

fully  reviewed  all  of  the  report's 
ommendations,  but  on  the  whole  it's 
«ry  good  piece  of  work.  We  do  need 
nange  in  the  system,  to  make  it 
re  flexible,  moi'e  accountable,  and, 
've  all,  more  effective.  We  look  for- 
•d  to  working  with  the  Congress  in 
ping  legislation  that  best  serves 

vital  national  interests. 

Armed  then  with  the  conviction  of 
lerican  leadership  and  the  practice 
)ipartisanship,  let  us  together — the 
cutive  and  the  Congress — tackle 

formidable  agenda  before  us. 

J  International  Agenda: 
'?  Americas 

|st  on  that  agenda  is  our  neigh- 
Ihood — the  countries  of  our  hemi- 
tere.  We  share  with  Canada  a  border 
ending  over  5,000  miles.  And  while 
have  our  differences  from  time  to 
e,  as  all  nations  do,  that  border  has 
g  facilitated  peaceful  contact  be- 
ien  peoples  sharing  similar  values 

1  outlook,  as  well  as  commerce  on 
enormous  and  growing  scale. 


Recently,  working  with  Canada,  we 
achieved  a  Free  Ti-ade  Agreement.  In 
my  view,  the  agreement  is  in  our  mu- 
tual interest.  Moreover,  by  showing 
how  free  trade  policies  can  catalyze  bi- 
partisan coalitions  and  turn  back  the 
forces  of  protectionism,  it  also  repre- 
sents a  signal  success  in  a  strategy  de- 
signed to  move  all  nations  toward  a 
more  open  trading  system.  And  we  look 
forward  to  working  with  Canada  on 
other  important  issues,  including  inter- 
national environmental  problems,  as  we 
extend  the  range  of  our  cooperation. 

To  the  south,  we  have  equally  sig- 
nificant issues  to  consider.  Our  neigh- 
bor Mexico  is  deeply  in  debt  and  faces 


As  the  most  powerful 
democracy,  the  largest 
economy,  the  wealthiest 
society  with  the  greatest 
concentration  of  scientific 
talent,  we  are  going  to 
substantially  affect  the 
course  of  human  events 
whether  we  do  so 
consciously  or  not. 


serious  challenges  to  its  social  fabric. 
But  Mexico  also  has  many  assets — the 
capabilities  of  its  people  and  its  signifi- 
cant natural  resources.  The  Mexican 
Government,  led  by  President  Salinas, 
is  taking  the  difficult  road  of  economic 
and  political  reforms.  We  are  deter- 
mined to  help. 

I'd  like  to  reiterate  the  suggestion 
I  made  in  my  confirmation  hearing.  In 
1992,  we  wili  celebrate  the  500th  an- 
niversary of  Columbus'  voyage  of  dis- 
covery. Let's  mark  that  event  now  by 
embarking  on  a  voyage  of  rediscovery  of 
the  Caribbean  and  of  South  America. 
Our  neighbors  are  engaged  in  a  quest 
for  greater  freedom  and  economic  pro- 
gress. We  share  many  of  their  inter- 
ests. And  together  we  also  face  the 
scourge  of  drugs.  Now  is  the  time  to 
take  a  fresh  look  at  these  problems. 

In  Central  America,  we  have  had 
nearly  10  years  of  frustrating  and  some- 
times contradictory  American  policies. 


Still,  there  have  been  some  successes. 
Most  Central  American  nations  are 
more  democratic  and  respectful  of  hu- 
man rights  than  they  were.  Still,  the 
overwhelming  blemish  remains:  the 
terrible  draining  conflict  between  Nic- 
aragua and  its  neighbors  and  between 
the  Nicaraguan  Marxists  and  their  own 
people,  some  of  whom  have  taken  up 
arms  and  merited  American  support. 

In  1987,  the  governments  of  Cen- 
tral America  signed  the  agreement 
known  as  Esquipulas  II.  Later  the 
Sandinistas  and  the  democratic  resist- 
ance concluded  the  Sapoa  agreement. 
The  principles  embodied  in  Esquipulas 
and  Sapoa  are  good.  They  are  right. 
Together  Esquipulas  and  Sapoa  con- 
stitute a  good  platform  for  peace. 
What's  lacking  is  a  mechanism  for  en- 
forcement to  translate  these  principles 
into  reality. 

We  need  to  establish  timelines  for 
performance.  We  must  be  able  to  deter- 
mine compliance.  And  we  have  to  de- 
velop incentives  and  disincentives  to 
improve  the  prospects  for  such  compli- 
ance in  the  first  place. 

A  unified  bipartisan  approach  in 
this  country  is  essential  to  achieve  our 
objectives.  Such  an  approach  will  cer- 
tainly increase  our  leverage.  Working 
with  the  Central  America  democracies, 
key  friends  in  South  America,  and  our 
allies  in  the  European  Community,  I'm 
confident  we  can  build  the  pressure  on 
the  Sandinistas  to  live  up,  finally,  to  the 
promises  they've  made.  We  will  not 
abandon  the  democratic  resistance  as 
we  give  diplomacy  a  chance. 

Transformation  of  Our 
Allies  and  Friends 

Let  me  move  now  from  our  neigh- 
borhood to  the  broader  world  of  our 
friends  and  allies.  The  United  States 
links  together  two  highly  dynamic,  ad- 
vanced regions — Western  Europe  and 
the  Pacific.  We  are  at  once  an  Atlantic 
and  a  Pacific  power,  and  there  should 
not  be  any  thought  to  expand  one  rela- 
tionship at  the  expense  of  the  other. 

Our  friends  and  allies  in  both  re- 
gions are  experiencing  great  changes. 
Western  Europe  today  is  a  far  cry  from 
the  exhausted  continent  which  emerged 
from  World  War  II.  On  the  basis  of  our 
just-completed  trip,  I  believe  that  we 
are  beginning  to  develop  a  new  appre- 
ciation on  our  side  and  theirs  of  how 
we  can  adapt  to  these  changes  and  to 
a  different  world. 

I  found  a  great  consensus,  at  least 
in  general  terms,  on  how  we  should 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


deal  with  a  changing  Soviet  Union.  I 
found  a  recognition  that  we  will  need  a 
common  approach  to  the  new  military 
facts 

created  by  the  INF  Ti-eaty — the  need 
to  refine  a  comprehensive  concept  on 
security,  modernization,  and  arms  con- 
trol. That  concept  must  also  develop  a 
better  basis  for  sharing  responsibilities. 

We  also  talked  on  my  trip  about 
how  we,  the  United  States  and  its  West 
European  friends,  can  work  better  to 
respond  to  the  enormous  economic 
changes  which  are  taking  place  in  the 
Atlantic  region.  In  only  3  years,  the 
[European]  Common  Market  will 
achieve  the  objective  of  the  1957  treaty 
of  Rome  which  established  it — a  single 
market.  I  emphasized  that  the  new 
Europe — this  rising  economic  super- 
power— must  be  outward  and  not  in- 
ward looking.  I  noted  also  that  as  an 
ally  and  a  major  trading  partner,  the 
United  States  will  take  a  keen  interest 
in  this  transformation. 

Turning  to  the  Pacific  rim,  we  find 
a  striking  success  already  in  the  mak- 
ing. No  other  area  has  created  such  ad- 
vanced economies  in  such  a  short  time. 

Our  relations  with  the  Pacific — as 
with  Europe  and  our  own  continent — 
must  emphasize  outward-looking  eco- 
nomic policies  that  promote  trade  and 
growth.  I  do  not  underestimate  the 
challenge  in  Asia,  or  in  other  regions, 
of  achieving  free  and  fair  trade.  After 
nearly  a  decade  when  the  American 
economy  has  driven  international 
growth,  we  all  face  a  changing  world. 
The  rule  that  success  brings  responsi- 
bility will  find  a  fuller  e.xpression  as  the 
Pacific  nations  assume  more  important 
economic  and  political  roles. 

We  have  vital  political  and  strategic 
interests  in  the  Pacific  as  well.  These 
interests  are  well-served  by  military 
capabilities  based  in  Japan,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Korea — and  by  our  close  co- 
operation with  these  nations.  We  must 
enhance  that  cooperation  while  shoul- 
dering common  defense  and  develop- 
ment responsibilities. 

Our  relationship  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  important  in  its  own 
right,  also  contributes  strongly  to  the 
overall  stability  of  the  international  po- 
litical order  President  Bush's  exten- 
sive, personal  experience  in  China  will 
facilitate  the  expansion  of  our  impor- 
tant and  multifaceted  ties.  I  know  he 
and  I  are  looking  forward  to  our  visit 
to  Beijing  next  week. 


Transnational  Issues 

The  future  of  our  civilization  also  de- 
mands that  we  act  in  concert  to  deal 
with  new  transnational  issues.  Tech- 
nological advances  have  brought  enor- 
mous benefits.  But  at  the  same  time, 
modern  technology  has  created  new 
complications.  The  old  scourge  of 
terrorism,  for  example,  has  taken 
on  a  new  significance  because  of  in- 
stantaneous communications  and  the 
development  of  powerful  plastic  explo- 
sives. Missile  technology  has  magnified 
the  destructive  power  and  geographical 
reach  of  small  groups  determined  to 
achieve  their  purposes  by  whatever 
means  necessary.  The  drug  traffickers 
have  benefited  from  transportation  and 
communications  lines  that  often  rival 
those  of  government. 

It  is  increasingly  evident  that  we 
face  serious  challenges  to  the  health  of 
our  environment,  and  President  Bush 
has  called  for  an  international  confer- 
ence on  global  environmental  issues.  I 
believe  the  United  States  must  lead 
this  effort.  We  should  foster  a  change 
of  attitude,  a  recognition  that  economic 


The  rule  that  success 
brings  responsibility  will 
find  a  fuller  expression 
as  the  Pacific  nations 
assume  more  important 
economic  and  political 
roles. 


development  and  a  secure  environment 
are  both  necessary.  They  go  together 
As  Ti-easury  Secretary,  I  pressed  the 
multilateral  development  banks  to  fos- 
ter conservationally  sound,  sustained 
development  and  to  initiate  special  pro- 
grams to  promote  conservation  in  devel- 
ojjing  countries.  As  Secretary  of  State, 
1  hope  to  build  on  this  i-ecord. 

No  one  has  yet  perfected  the  ap- 
proaches to  joint  action  we  need  to  deal 
with  this  special  range  of  global  prob- 
lems. But  the  stakes  are  too  high  for  us 
to  ignore  them.  We  will  begin  with  our 
allies,  include  our  friends,  and  chal- 
lenge our  adversaries  to  make  common 
cause  in  treating  these  issues.  For  im- 
plementing policies  and  programs,  we 
will  continue  to  rely  heavily,  although 


Ill 
lit 


by  no  means  exclusively,  on  the  Uni: 
Nations  and  its  specialized  agencies, 
which  are  contributing  importantly  I 
resolving  many  of  the  world's  shared 
problems.  u 

East-West  Relations 

Thanks  to  our  policy  of  pursuing  pea 
through  strength,  our  dealings  with 
Soviet  Union  are  less  tense.  We  hav( 
made  progress  in  arms  control — esp( 
cially  the  INF  Ti-eaty — human  rights 
bilateral  ties,  including  a  dramatic  e: 
pansion  in  academic  and  cultural  ex- 
changes, and  regional  conflicts.  We  i 
pleased  that  Soviet  troops  have  left 
Afghanistan  on  schedule.  And  we  ha 
reason  to  be  optimistic  that,  in  the  r 
too  distant  future,  Cuban  troops  will 
withdrawn  from  Angola  in  conjunct!' 
with  South  Africa's  departure  from 
Namibia.  We  also  look  forward  to  th. 
day  when  Vietnamese  troops  leave 
Cambodia. 

Thei-e  are  good  reasons  for  both 
optimism  and  pessimism  about  the  £ 
viet  Union.  No  one  can  doubt  that  ft 
ment  is  underway  and  that  there  ha' 
been  important  changes  in  the  past : 
years.  The  SS-20s  are  being  destroy. 
Soviet  troops  have  left  Afghanistan. 
Some  political  prisoners  have  been  r 
leased.  And  a  new,  more  constructiv 
Soviet  approach  to  regional  conflicts 
Southern  Africa  and  Southeast  Asia 
holds  out  the  promise  that  regional 
problems  in  those  troubled  areas  ma 
be  on  their  way  to  resolution. 

These  are  reasons  to  be  hopeful 
But  realism  requires  us  to  be  prude: 
The  jury  is  still  out  on  whether  the 
process  of  reform  will  succeed.  The 
Soviet  Union  remains  a  heavily  armt 
superpower  While  its  rhetoric  is 
different,  the  force  structure  and  po 
icies  that  support  far-reaching  inten 
and  clients  have  not  yet  changed  cor 
mensurately.  Perhaps  they  will,  but 
that  hasn't  happened,  not  yet. 

In  light  of  both  the  change  and 
continuity  in  the  Soviet  Union,  realis 
policy  for  America  and  its  allies  shoi 
be  guided  by  these  principles. 

First,  we  should  continue  to  we 
come  and  encourage  reform  in  the 
Soviet  Union  that  promises  more  fn 
dom.  But  we  should  never  measure 
progress  of  Mr  Gorbachev's  [Soviet 
President  Mikhail  Gorbachev]  reforr 
by  how  many  credits,  concessions,  o 
accommodations  we  might  make  osti 
sibly  to  help  him  succeed  with  his  d( 
mestie  plans.  Perestroika  depends  m 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  15 


THE  SECRETARY 


help  troni  outside  but  on  changes  in 
I  Soviet  Union  itself.  That's  a  lesson 
rbachev  learned  from  Brezhnevs 
lures.  We  should  learn  it  as  well. 

Second,  while  recognizing  that 
)SCOw's  policies  are  informed  by  a 
w  sense  of  realism,  we  should  also 
derstand  that  our  policies  have  con- 
buted  to  that  sense  of  realism.  Our 
jport  for  the  DiKJaliidhi  helped  bring 
DUt  the  Soviet  withdrawal  from 
ghanistan.  NATO's  willingness  to  de- 
ly  the  Pershing  and  cruise  missiles 
Iped  bring  about  the  INF  Treaty. 

Third,  we  must  continue  to  probe, 
n  challenge,  Moscow  along  every  as- 
:t  of  our  agenda — arms  control,  hu- 
in  rights,  regional  conflicts,  bilateral 
ations,  and  transnational  or  global  is- 
js.  We  are  interested  in  cooperating 
i  negotiating  to  make  progress  wher- 
;r  it  can  be  made.  We  are  also  inter- 
led  in  seeing  the  "new  thinking" 
oiled  in  practice,  not  just  in  slogans. 

Fourth,  we  need  additional  focus 
regional  ]3roblems.  whether  in  Cen- 
|1  America,  South  Asia,  the  Horn  of 
'rica.  South  Africa,  the  Persian  Gulf, 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Soviet  re- 
msiveness  in  these  areas  may  be  one 
;he  best  indications  of  real  change  in 
net  behavior. 

I  am  convinced  that  Western 
■ength  and  Soviet  domestic  weakness 
fe  set  the  stage  for  the  remarkable 
lism  that  has  distinguished  Mr.  Goi'- 
hev's  tenure  so  far.  As  I  discussed 
h  our  allies,  we  need  to  challenge 

Soviets  with  new,  well-considered 
:iatives  in  all  aspects  of  our  e.xpand- 

agenda.  Our  task  is  to  arrange  af- 
•s  so  that  whatever  the  outcome  of 
estroika,  a  more  responsible,  con- 
uctive  Soviet  foreign  policy  will  re- 
in in  Moscow's  interest.  Much  of  the 
rld's  hope  for  a  more  peaceful  inter- 
ional  order  rests  on  the  outcome. 


solving  Regional  Conflicts 

'ant  to  turn  now  to  those  regional 
iflicts  that  have  denied  peace  and 
edom  to  the  peoples  of  Africa,  South 
1  Southeast  Asia,  and  the  Middle 
St.  We  have  made  encouraging  pi'og- 
s  in  the  recent  agreement,  medi- 
d  by  the  United  States,  that  pro- 
es  for  Namibian  independence  and  a 
hdrawal  of  Cuban  and  South  African 
ops  from  Angola.  And  we  will  be 
tching  carefully  to  be  sure  that  Cuba 
1  South  Africa  carry  out  their  obliga- 
ns.  But  more  is  needed.  Angola 
^perately  requires  national  reconcilia- 
n.  Until  that  occurs  we  shall  con- 


tinue to  support  UNITA  [National 
Union  for  the  Total  Independence  of 
Angola]  and  its  leader  Jonas  Savimbi. 

To  this  end,  we  should  be  prepared 
to  pay  our  fair  share  of  UN  peacekeep- 
ing efforts,  not  only  in  Angola  and 
Namibia  but  throughout  the  world.  The 
Bush  Administration,  following  the  ini- 
tiative of  our  predecessor,  will  propose 


We  should  foster  a  change 
of  attitude,  a  recognition 
that  economic  develop- 
ment and  a  secure 
environment  are  both 
necessary. 


a  one-time  transfer  of  Department  of 
Defense  and  foreign  aid  funds  to  meet 
our  peacekeeping  requirements 
in  the  current  year. 

We  must  also  think  long  and  hard 
about  how  we  can  help  best  to  end 
apartheid  in  South  Africa.  And  we 
must  never  forget  the  very  real  human 
and  developmental  needs  of  people 
throughout  sub-Saharan  Africa. 

In  South  Asia,  we  welcome  the 
withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops  from 
Afghanistan  and  look  forward  to  that 
country's  achievement  of  an  indepen- 
dent and  nonaligned  government  fully 
acceptable  to  the  Afghan  people. 

The  international  community  looks 
forward  to  the  withdrawal  of  Viet- 
namese forces  from  Cambodia.  There, 
too,  a  difficult  national  reconciliation 
must  be  undertaken.  The  United  States 
will  continue  to  work  for  an  indepen- 
dent Cambodia,  free  of  both  Viet- 
namese occupation  and  the  Khmer 
Rouge. 

'in  the  Middle  East,  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  has  long  engaged  Amer- 
ica's attention,  resources,  and  good 
will.  Our  mediation  bore  partial  fruit  in 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Ti-eaty.  But 
the  task  of  fashioning  a  comprehensive 
settlement  remains.  Israel  and  its  Arab 
neighbors  must  be  at  the  center  of  the 
negotiating  process.  As  always,  we 
stand  ready  to  help. 

The  purpose  of  negotiations  is  a 
just,  enduring  peace  that  ensures  Isra- 
eli security  and  satisfies  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Palestinians.  Toward  that 


end,  we  advocate  direct  negotiations 
based  on  UN  Resolutions  242  and  338. 
Realistically,  .Jordan  must  play  a  part  in 
any  agreement.  And  the  Palestinians 
must  participate  in  determining  their 
own  future.  We  continue  to  believe, 
how-ever,  that  an  independent  Palesti- 
nian state  will  not  be  a  source  of  sta- 
bility or  contribute  to  a  just  and 
enduring  peace. 

A  Middle  East  policy  focused  ex- 
clusively on  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict, 
however,  would  be  too  limited.  Libya 
continues  to  be  a  destabilizing  factor  in 
North  Africa  and  elsewhere  in  the  re- 
gion. The  situation  in  Lebanon  remains 
a  rebuke  to  everyone's  hopes  for  a  res- 
toration of  stability  and  independence 
for  that  tragic  country.  And  a  lasting 
peace  remains  to  be  established  be- 
tween Iran  and  Iraq. 

We  will  continue  working  with 
other  nations  on  these  issues.  We  will 
also  work  with  the  United  Nations  on 
some  of  these  regional  conflicts.  The 
United  Nations  should  be  seen  for  what 
it  is,  an  expression  of  the  world's  desire 
for  peace  and  also,  too  often,  the  scene 
of  those  passions  that  prevent  peace. 
Experience  indicates  that  when  nations 
agree  on  procedures  and  substance,  the 
United  Nations  offers  a  valuable  forum 
for  making  progress. 

Chemical  Warfare  and 
Other  Weapons  Proliferation 

Proliferation  of  new  and  dangerous 
weapons,  often  to  states  with  a  history 
of  terrorism  and  aggression,  is  of  grow- 
ing concern  to  the  international  commu- 
nity. And  for  good  reason.  Perhaps 
most  frightening  is  the  combination  of 
the  ballistic  missile  and  chemical  weap- 
ons. Although  outlawed  as  a  crime 
against  civilization,  chemical  weapons 
have  been  used. 

Weapons,  of  course,  do  not  start 
wars.  Nonetheless,  we  must  take  spe- 
cial measures  to  prevent  the  accumula- 
tion of  weapons,  which,  by  their  very 
nature,  create  fear  and  threaten  hair- 
trigger  responses.  We  are  determined 
to  build  on  the  recently  concluded  Paris 
conference  and  to  make  progress  soon. 

Overview  of  Our 
Funding  Request 

Clearly,  we  face  a  formidable  agenda  as 
we  attempt  to  deal  with  the  contraries 
of  our  age.  Yet  we  start  with  a  strong 
America.  And  we  can  be  stronger  still 
if  we  work  together  to  overcome  the 
challenges  before  us. 


Ijjsartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


That  requires  our  collective  wisdom 
and  skill,  but  it  also  requires  resources 
and  the  flexibility  to  use  them  where 
they  are  most  needed.  I'd  like  to  give 
you  the  highlights  of  our  funding  re- 
quest for  FY  1990.  I  would  only  caution 
that  pending  the  completion  of  the 
National  Security  Council  review  of 
foreign  policy  and  national  security 
challenges,  individual  account  adjust- 
ments may  be  recommended;  however, 
in  aggregate,  the  budget  levels  will 
remain  the  same. 

For  budget  function  1.50 — interna- 
tional affairs — we  are  asking  $19.3  bil- 
lion in  discretionary  spending  authority, 
with  the  levels  of  the  Export-Import 
Bank  to  be  determined  as  negotiations 
with  the  Congress  on  the  freeze  cate- 
gory proceed.  This  $19.3  billion  is  an 
increase  of  $1.7  billion,  or  W7c,  over 
what  Congress  appropriated  in  FY 
1989,  but  in  real  terms,  it's  less  than 
what  we  received  in  FY  1985,  1986,  and 
1987.  International  affairs  spending 
takes  less  than  2%  of  the  total  Federal 
budget.  So  in  submitting  these  figures, 
if  I  may  understate  the  case,  we  do  not 
feel  we  are  imposing  an  unreasonable 
burden  on  the  resources  of  the  Ameri- 
can people.  Quite  the  contrary.  We  are 
asking  for  an  investment  to  secure  our 
vital  national  interests  and  a  peaceful 
future. 

Our  request  has  two  major  compo- 
nents. First,  our  aid  program  which  in- 
cludes both  bilateral  and  multilateral 
foreign  assistance.  The  $14.6  billion  in 
discretionary  funds  we  are  seeking  un- 
der this  heading  help  our  friends  and 
aUies.  But,  first  and  foremost,  they 
serve  America's  own  interests  abroad. 
Of  that  amount: 

•  $5.3  billion,  or  36%,  will  be  pro- 
vided to  Israel  and  Egypt,  to  sustain 
our  commitment  to  their  security; 

•  $1.8  billion,  or  12%,  will  be  pro- 
vided to  four  countries  in  which  the 
United  States  enjoys  base  rights — Por- 
tugal, Greece,  Turkey,  and  the  Philip- 
pines— in  fulfillment  of  "best  efforts" 
and  pledges  we  made  when  our  base 
rights  agreements  were  negotiated; 

•  $1.1  billion,  or  7%,  will  fund  pro- 
grams to  key  regional  friends  in  the 
Middle  East,  Africa,  and  East  Asia- 
Pakistan,  Thailand,  Kenya,  Somalia, 
Tunisia,  Jordan,  Oman,  and  Morocco — 
some  of  which  now  provide,  or  are 
pledged  to  provide  when  needed,  access 
to  strategic  base  facilities  to  U.S. 
forces; 


•  Just  over  .$900  million,  or  6%, 
will  support  our  efforts  to  foster  peace, 
democracy,  and  development  in  Central 
America; 

•  Just  over  $150  million  will  be  pro- 
vided in  economic  and  military  aid  to 
the  four  Andean  democracies — Colom- 
bia, Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Bolivia — whose 
social  fabric  and  democratic  institutions 
are  threatened  by  the  growing  power  of 
narcotics  traffickers; 

•  An  additional  $800  million  would 
provide  humanitarian  and  develop- 
mental aid  to  countries  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa,  not  mentioned  earlier,  and  fund 
small-scale  but  critical  military  aid  pro- 
grams in  the  region;  and 

•  $900  million,  representing  6%  of 
the  total  foreign  assistance  request, 
would  support  other  bilateral  programs 
in  the  Caribbean,  South  and  East  Asia, 
and  around  the  globe. 

Our  foreign  assistance  funding  re- 
quest also  includes  $1.6  billion  for  the 
multilateral  development  banks,  cover- 
ing U.S.  contributions  to  the  World 
Bank,  its  affiliates,  and  the  regional  de- 
velopment banks.  This  amount  would 
honor  current  U.S.  commitments  to 
these  institutions  of  about  $1.3  billion 
and  clear  $314  million  in  arrears. 

The  remainder  of  our  request, 
some  .$2  billion,  or  14%  of  the  total, 
provides  funding  for  the  Peace  Corps, 
for  voluntary  contributions  to  such  in- 
ternational organizations  as  the  UN 
Development  Program  and  UNICEF 
[UN  Children's  Fimd]  and  for  such 
items  as  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development]  operating  expenses,  refu- 
gee assistance  programs,  and  interna- 
tional narcotics  control. 

We  expect  to  transmit  to  the  Con- 
gress shortly  the  Administration's  pro- 
posed foreign  assistance  authorization 
bill  as  well  as  the  State  Department 
authorization  bill  for  FY  1990.  In  addi- 
tion to  authorizing  funding  levels,  the 
foreign  assistance  bill  will  propose 
some  substantive  changes  in  the  legisla- 
tion governing  our  assistance  programs, 
including  some  initiatives  to  allow 
scarce  security  assistance  dollars  to 
be  stretched  further  than  allowed  by 
curi-ent  law. 

I  would  also  note  that,  as  in  pre- 
vious years,  we  are  seeking  in  our  bud- 
get request  to  maintain  the  relative 
proportion  of  economic  assistance  (65%) 
to  military  aid  (35%). 

Let  me  add  a  few  more  details  on 
both  economic  and  military  assistance. 

I'd  like  to  point  out  that  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean,  democratic 


111 
1(1 


institutions  are  taking  root  in  countrJ^ 
where  just  a  few  years  ago  many  de- 
spaired of  that  ever  happening.  Thess 
new  democracies  desperately  need  ou 
help.  President  Reagan's  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative  and  the  National  Bip; 
tisan  Commission  on  Central  Americ; 
provide  comprehensive  strategies  for 
advancing  the  important  process  of 
democratic  institution-building.  TheS' 
strategies  have  earned  strong  bipar- 
tisan support.  The  Bush  Administrat 
believes  it  essential  to  continue  this 
effort.  For  FY  1990,  we  are  requestin 
$735  million  in  economic  assistance  fc 
Central  America  and  $206  million  for 
the  Caribbean.  We  are  also  seeking 
$157  million  for  the  Andean  countries- 
Now  on  the  security  side,  I  woul 
like  to  note  these  changes. 

For  FY  1990,  our  total  request  fc 
discretionary  security  assistance  fum- 
ing (MAP  [military  assistance  pro- 
gram], FMS  [foreign  military  sales], 
ESF  [economic  support  funds],  IME' 
[international  military  education  and 
training],  antiterrorism  assistance,  a 
peacekeeping  operations)  is  $8.5  billii 
That  compares  with  $8.1  billion  appn 
priated  by  the  Congress  for  FY  1988 
and  again  for  FY  1989. 

Despite  this  increase,  the  securit 
assistance  total  is  less  than  the  level 
appropriated  in  FY  1987.  The  cuts  fr 
the  levels  provided  in  FY  1985  and  li 
are  even  deeper. 

For  the  first  time,  we  are  not 
seeking  an  allocation  of  MAP  funds  f 
specific  country  programs.  Instead,  ' 
are  combining  "the  MAP  and  FMS  pr 
grams  and  requesting  that  the  total- 
approximately  $5  billion— be  provide- 
in  the  form  of  forgiven  FMS  credits, 
that  is  to  say,  grants.  Use  of  FMS  in 
lieu  of  MAP  will  enable  countries  ca{ 
ble  of  doing  so  to  apply  defense  as- 
sistance to  commercial  purchases.  Th 
all-grant  program  initiative  is  part  ol 
our  effort  to  strengthen  new,  fragile 
mocracies  and  ease  the  financial  burc 
of  countries  whose  economic  health  ii 
vital  to  our  own. 

The  second  part  of  our  overall  re 
quest  finances  the  operations  of  the 
Department  of  State,  USIA  [United 
States  Information  Agency],  the  Boa 
of  International  Broadcasting,  and 
other  smaller  foreign  affairs  agencies 
We  are  seeking  $4.6  billion  for  these 
purposes. 

These  funds  will  enable  us  to  cor 
duct  diplomatic  and  consular  operatic 
in  our  increasingly  complex  world.  Ir 
the  administration  of  foreign  affairs  a 
count,  we  provide  for  salaries  and  ex- 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  1!| 


THE  SECRETARY 


nses,  a  vital  component  in  an  agency 
lich  depends  so  much  on  its  people  at 
me  and  around  the  world.  We  also 
e  these  funds  to  provide  for  the  se- 
rity  of  our  people,  facihties,  and  op- 
itions.  They  also  allow  us  to  acquire 
d  maintain  our  buildings  abroad. 

Out  of  this  sum,  we  will  also  pay 
r  assessed  contributions  to  the 
lited  Nations  and  other  international 
Tanizations  ($715  million),  peacekeep- 
r  activities  ($111  million),  and  U.S. 
rticipation  in  multilateral  interna- 
nal  conferences  ($6  million).  We  must 
y  what  we  owe  to  these  institutions 
ive  are  to  play  our  full  role.  Congres- 
inal  approval  of  the  full  amount 
juested  would  enable  us  to  pay 
5  million  of  prior  year  arrearages, 
lese  funds  would  be  directed  toward 
ecial  activities  that  are  mutually 
reed  upon  by  the  United  States  and 
!  respective  international  organiza- 
ns.  Payment  would  be  conditioned 
on  such  arrangements. 

(nclusion: 

I  e  Need  for  Change 

I I  me  conclude  by  returning  to  one 
11  y  earlier  themes  on  the  need  for 

c  iHge,  a  need  also  emphasized  by  the 
1  ;k  Force  on  Foreign  Assistance.  It  is 
c  ir  to  me  that  we  will  need  new  legis- 
i  on  so  that  the  executive  branch  will 
i  'e  the  latitude  to  manage  effectively 
t   limited  resources  at  our  disposal.  I 
a  'ee  with  the  task  force's  conclusion, 
a  1  I  quote,  "The  current  500  pages  of 
f  ?ign  assistance  legislation,  developed 
-0  r  the  past  28  years,  are  strewn  with 
0  olete,  ambiguous  and  contradictory 
f  icies,  restrictions  and  conditions." 

One  e.xample  will  suffice  of  how  the 
0  rent  systems  deprives  us  of  the 
f  cibility  to  respond  intelligently  to 
e  nts.  In  FY  1989,  for  example",  Con- 
a  ss  cut  our  combined  MAP,  ESF,  and 
F  .S  request  by  $210  million,  or  4%. 
I L  because  most  of  the  funds  in  these 
a  ounts  were  earmarked  for  specific 
c  ntry  programs  at  or  above  the  levels 
«  requested,  we  had  to  cut  security 
■iance  programs  in  such  coun- 
-  as  Jordan,  Indonesia,  Thailand, 
i:;swana,  Zaire,  Belize,  and  the  Do- 
n  lican  Republic  by  between  44%  and 
9f.  Additionally,  legislation  forced 
uto  cut  assistance  to  Turkey,  an  im- 
B'tant  NATO  ally,  by  a  whopping 
?'  million. 

If  we  are  given  the  needed  flexibil- 
then  the  levels  in  our  FY  1990  bud- 
lequest  will  enable  us  to  fund,  on  a 


modest  scale,  these  and  other  programs 
we  have  had  to  curtail  sharply  in  recent 
years.  In  my  view,  this  is  essential.  No 
foreign  policy,  however  intelligent,  can 
be  meaningful  without  the  resources  to 
do  the  job.  That  is  what  we  are  asking 
for  here  today. 


'Press  release  31.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Secretary's  Interview 
on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Secretary  Baker  was  interviewed 
oti  NBC-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on 
February  19, 1989,  by  Garrick  Utley, 
NBC  News;  Karen  Elliot  House,  The 
Wall  Street  Journal;  aud  John  Dancy, 
NBC's  chief  diplomatic  corre- 
spondents 

Q.  While  you  were  in  Europe,  a  big 
event  occurred  in  Central  America. 
The  five  Central  American 
Presidents  met,  they  reached  an 
agreement  which  will  lead  to  sup- 
posedly free  elections  in  Nicaragua, 
the  disarming  and  disbanding  and 
disbursing  of  the  contras  based  in 
Honduras,  which  were  the  key  to  the 
Reagan  Nicaraguan  policy.  Our  re- 
sponse has  been  rather  silent.  Are  we 
for  it  or  against  it — that  agreement? 

A.  I  think  we're  for  parts  of  it.  But 
with  respect  to  that  part  that  talks 
about  disbanding  the  contras,  we  really 
need  to  see  what  the  fine  print  is.  The 
agreement  doesn't  even  contain  the  fine 
print  yet.  What  it  was  was  a  commit- 
ment to  develop  a  plan  with  respect  to 
the  contras. 

There  are  some  elements  of  the 
agreement  that  look  promising — the  idea 
of  democratization  in  Nicaragua,  the 
idea  of  noninterference  by  Nicaragua  in 
the  affairs  of  its  neighbors.  But,  of 
course,  these  are  promises  that  Nicara- 
gua has  made  before,  so  the  key  here 
will  be  in  the  implementation. 

We  think  that  there  needs  to  be,  as 
we've  said  before  with  respect  to  the 
Esquipulas  II  and  the  Sapoa  accords, 
some  sort  of  an  enforcement  mechanism 
to  make  sure  that  the  Sandinistas  keep 
the  promises  they've  already  made. 


Q.  But  are  you  saying  that  the 
United  States  is  not  prepared  to  allow 
the  disbanding  of  the  contras  as  of 
now?  And  does  that  mean  that  you 
would  want  to  seek  some  kind  of  fund- 
ing from  Congress — the  so-called  hu- 
manitarian aid — to  keep  them  going? 

A.  I  think  we  have,  at  the  very 
least,  a  moral  obligation  to  seek  human- 
itarian aid  for  the  contras  when  it 
expires  on  March  31,  and  I  believe  Presi- 
dent Bush  has  already  indicated  that  he 
would  be  doing  so. 

Q.  That  continues  despite  this 
agreement? 

A.  Yes — and  should. 

Q.  Some  people  have  said  that 
you  were  surprised  by  what  happened 
in  Central  America.  It  happened 
while  you  were  in  Europe.  Melvin 
Laird,  former  Defense  Secretary,  said 
you  shouldn't  have  gone  to  Europe; 
you  should  have  been  here  "minding 
the  store,"  concentrating  on  Central 
America,  that  you  haven't  even  yel 
formally  named  an  assistant  secre- 
tary for  Latin  American  affairs.  How 
do  you  respond  to  that? 

A.  We  have  picked  an  assistant  sec- 
retary for  Latin  American  affairs. 

I'd  respond  to  that  by  telling  you 
that  I've  been  getting  free  advice  from 
Mel  since  the  Ford-Carter  campaign 
back  in  1976.  I  got  a  fair  amount  of  it  as 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  White  House  from 
Mel  and  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
and  it's  been  worth  what  I've  paid  for  it. 

Q.  You  did  get  an  opportunity, 
obviously,  to  hear  from  the  Eu- 
ropeans. Is  it  possible  to  modernize 
the  nuclear  forces  in  Europe  and  re- 
tain Germany  as  an  ally? 

A.  I  think  it  is.  This  is  a  matter,  of 
course,  that  we  will  be  working  very 
closely  with  the  Germans  on  between 
now  and  the  time  of  a  possible  NATO 
summit  toward  the  end  of  May.  It's  really 
not  a  U.S. -Germany  issue;  it's  an  alli- 
ance issue.  And  one  of  the  purposes  of 
this  trip,  of  course,  was  to  e.xplore  issues 
such  as  this  with  all  of  our  alliance  part- 
ners, and  we  did  so.  And  we  will  be 
working  this  particular  issue  in  close 
consultation  with  them  leading  up  to  the 
NATO  summit. 

Q.  But  do  you  really  find  all  the 
other  Europeans  as  reluctant  as  the 
Germans  to  do  what  we  have  agreed 
needs  to  be  done  for  alliance  defense? 

A.  I  find  all  of  our  alliance  partners 
committed  to  certain  principles — the 
principle  of  flexible  response,  the  princi- 
ple of  forward  defense,  the  principle  of 


Cpartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


nucleai-  coupling,  and  so  forth,  which,  of 
course,  are  the  keys  to  our  position  on 
this  issue. 

I  also  find  them  committed  to  the 
idea  of  completing  the  so-called  compre- 
hensive concept,  which  will  contain 
both  a  security  and  an  arms  control 
element — completing  it  by  the  time  of 
the  NATO  summit.  So  this  is  a  matter 
that  we  have  to  continue  to  work  out. 
There  are  going  to  be  views  on  both 
sides;  in  fact,  we  have  alliance  partners 
who  see  it  differently  right  now. 

Q.  But  do  you  feel  that  you  came 
away  from  this  trip  and  your  visit 
with  Helmut  Kohl  with  an  iron-clad 
commitment  from  Kohl  to  go  ahead 
with  modernization? 

A.  No.  But  I  didn't  go  into  the  trip 
seeking  an  iron-clad  commitment  from 
the  Chancellor  to  do  that.  That  was  not 
the  purpose  of  the  trip.  As  I've  said  be- 
fore, it  was  not  a  decision-taking  trip:  it 
was  more  or  less  an  agenda-setting  trip. 
I  was  there  to  listen  and  to  learn — and  I 
did.  And  so  that  was  not  the  purpose  of 
the  trip. 

Q.  But  he  expressed  commitment 
to  a  1988  communique  by  the  NATO 
allies  which  envisions  modernizing 
the  nuclear  weapons  that  are  there  as 
necessary.  Did  you  take  that  to  be  a 
commitment  to  modernize? 

A.  He  restated — we,  I  suppose, 
jointly  restated — the  commitment  of  the 
1988  Brussels  communique,  which  ba- 
sically says  that  we  must  keep  these 
short-range  nuclear  forces  up  to  date.  I 
have  to  say  one  other  thing:  I  found  no 
one,  during  the  course  of  this  trip,  who 
thought  that  we  should  have  moved  to- 
ward some  sort  of  a  third  "zero  option," 
who  did  not  feel  that  we  should  maintain 
a  land-based  nuclear  missile  in  Europe. 

Q.  I  think  what  John  is  getting  at 
is,  what  is  your  attitude  toward  Hel- 
mut Kohl  and  the  West  (iermans  right 
now?  Are  you  satisfied  with  his,  with 
their,  position  on  this  very  delicate 
issue? 

A.  Oh,  yes,  because  we  understand 
the  delicateness  of  the  issue  from  their 
standpoint.  We  certainly  do.  And,  as  I 
think  I  mentioned  during  the  course  of 
our  trip  back,  to  John  who  was  on  the 
airplane,  there  has,  I  think,  been  far  too 
much  emphasis  on  a  disagreement  here 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany.  There  is  no 
disagreement.  We're  going  to  work  this 
out.  We  have  our  view.  We've  got  to  give 
the  Congress  certain  assurances  if  we 
want  to  go  forward  with  this  program.  I 


think  probably  that  we'll  be  able  to  work 
this  out  satisfactorily  between  now  and 
the  end  of  May. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  that  you  have 
now  accepted  1991  or  1992  as  a  date  for 
deploying  these  modernized  Lance 
missiles? 

A.  No,  it  doesn't  mean  that  at  all.  It 
means  we  will  continue  to  e.xplore  this 
issue,  work  this  issue  in  close  consulta- 
tion with  the  Germans  and  our  other  al- 
liance partners. 

Q.  Can  I  just  ask  on  the  Germans 
here  for  a  minute?  Chancellor  Kohl 
seems  to  be  saying,  "My  political 
problems  are  so  difficult  that  if  you 
push  me  too  much,  you  will  wind  up 
with  an  alternative  you'll  like  even 
less  after  the  next  German  election." 

Are  we  also  going  to  go  quietly,  or 
drop  the  chemical  weapons  issue  with 
Libya?  I  mean,  do  the  Germans  pay 
no  price  for  knowingly  helping  Libya 
produce  a  chemical  weapons  plant? 

A.  The  Germans  have  responded 
quite  fully  to  our  concerns  about  support 
for  that  plant  by  some  of  their  compa- 
nies. What  they've  done  is  substantially 
tighten  their  export  control  laws;  they 
have  substantially  increased  the  penal- 
ties that  their  companies  will  pay  for  any 
such  future  activity.  I  really  believe  that 
they  have  acted  and  acted  forcefully  and 
firmly. 

You  might  say  that  they  should  have 
done  it  a  little  earlier:  maybe  you  can 
make  that  argument.  But  we're  pleased 
with  what  they've  done. 

Q.  Let's  turn  to  the  Middle  East 
right  now.  The  Reagan  Administra- 
tion opened  the  door  to  contacts/talks 
between  the  United  States  and  Yasir 
Arafat  and  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liber- 
ation Organization].  In  your  time  in 
office,  do  you  think  that  the  PLO  has 
been  living  up  to  its  side  of  the  agree- 
ment? Are  they  showing  good  faith, 
in  your  eyes? 

A.  So  far,  we  have  had  one  incident 
which  some  are  inclined  to  argue  consti- 
tuted an  endorsement,  if  you  will,  or  a 
return  to  terrorism  by  the  PLO  — 

Q.  Israel  made  that  complaint. 

A.  — an  incident  in  southern 
Lebanon,  yes — and  suggested  that  some- 
how we  should  break  off  the  dialogue. 
That  was  not  our  conclusion.  We  did, 
however,  go  to  the  PLO  through  our  Am- 
bassador in  Tunis  and  say,  "Look  here, 
now.  These  kinds  of  things  cannot  con- 
tinue if  you  want  to  continue  this  dia- 
logue with  the  United  States." 


Q.  You  put  them  on  warning. 

A.  We  put  them  on  warning  befoi 
we  even  began  the  dialogue  with  them 
because  we  made  it  clear  to  them  that 
were  not  going  to  have  a  dialogue  unle: 
they  renounced  terrorism  by  actions  ai 
by  words. 

Q.  Clearly  you  have  a  dialogue 
with  the  PLO,  and  your  Soviet  coun 
terpart  is  getting  his  own  dialogue 
with  everyone  in  the  Middle  East  nc 
on  a  trip.  Is  the  Middle  East  an  are; 
that  needs  to  incubate  further  befoi 
you  actually  go  in  and  try  to  solve  tl 
problem?  Or  is  it  one  that,  if  it  incu 
bates  further,  blows  up? 

A.  I  don't  think  it's  one  that  if  it  i 
cubates  further,  it  blows  up.  I  hope  noi 
because  I  think  that  if  you  had  to  bal- 
ance risks  here,  the  risk  would  be  gre 
er  in  taking  precipitous  action  than  it 
would  in  waiting  awhile,  analyzing  the 
situation,  working  on  the  ground 
carefully — tilling  the  ground — and  rrn 
ing  sure  that  when  you  do  go  in  there, 
you  have  some  reasonable  prospect  of 
success. 

And  this  is  the  message,  if  I  may 
say  so,  that  we  have  given  our  alliance 
partners.  We  have  said,  in  effect,  "Loc 
we  understand  the  importance  of  U.S. 
involvement  if  we  are  ever  to  achieve 
peace  in  the  Middle  East."  We  under- 
stand that.  But  we're  not  sure  that  thf 
process  is  best  served  by  a  big,  high- 
level,  high-visibility  international  coni 
ence  begun  too  early.  We  think  that 
there  ought  to  be  some  quiet  consulta- 
tion done  before  we  ever  get  close  to 
that. 

Q.  Is  Yasir  Arafat  conducting  i 
direct  talks  with  the  Israelis  throuji 
Palestinians  through  European 
diplomats? 

A.  I  have  no  knowledge  of  that. 

Q.  This  past  week  there  was  a  1 
of  attention  focused  on  you  because 
your  decision,  finally,  to  sell  a  largt 
amount  of  stock  that  you  hold  in 
Chemical  Bank,  which  grew  out  of 
former  bank  holdings  you  had  in 
Texas — some  controversy  because  y 
were  holding  that  stock  when  you 
were  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  ant 
of  course,  banks  were  very  heavily  i 
volved  in  Third  World  debt  question 

Even  though  you  say  you  had  yo 
attorney's  advice  that  this  was  lega 
do  you  think  it  had  the  appearance 
a  conflict  of  interest? 

A.  I  don't  think  so.  With  90-90 
hindsight,  you  might  argue  that.  But  I 
me  make  sure  vou  understand,  first  of 


22 


THE  SECRETARY 


1,  I  am  not  just  selling  my  Chemical 
ock:  I'm  giving  directions  to  my  trust- 
!  to  sell  any  publicly  traded  stocks  I 
)ld  so  that  there  can  be  no  possible  such 
)pearances  in  the  future.  So  I  really 
slieve  I'm  going  beyond  what's  required 
id  what  has  been  recommended. 

Further,  I  set  up  a  blind  trust  when 
eame  into  government  in  1981.  For  6'/2 
iars,  the  clear  cut  rule  was  that  gov- 
■nment  officials  were  entitled  to  partici- 
ite  in  broad  policy  matters  that  might 
feet  everybody,  or  everybody  in  a  par- 
;ular  industry.  And,  accordingly,  I  par- 
;ipated  in  a  whole  range  of  things  at 
e  White  House  and  at  the  Treasury. 

Q.  But  President  Bush  has  made 
hies  a  top  priority  issue — highly 
sible.  His  counsel  in  the  White 
ouse,  €.  Gordon  Gray,  has  been  re- 
lonsible  for  executing  that.  Has  he 
ten  doing  a  good  job,  in  your 
linion'.' 

A.  Yes,  1  think  so. 

Q.  Do  vou  think  he  sabotaged 
|»u? 

A.  No,  1  don't  think  so.  I  think  he 
as  doing  his  job  as  he  saw  it. 

Q.  One  other  personal  question. 

the  Administration,  John  Tower  is 
$11  waiting  for  confirmation.  An 
Bl  agent  involved  in  the  investiga- 
On  was  quoted  as  saying  that  if  a 
wspective  agent  had  the  kind  of 

ckground  check  that  John  Tower 
ts,  he  would  not  be  hired  by  the 

JI.  Given  that,  do  you  think  he  is  an 
(propriate  Secretary  of  Defense? 
A.  Yes,  I  do.  And  1  talked  to  the 

esident  yesterday,  reporting  to  him  on 

e  results  of  my  trip;  and  1  can  report 

you  that  the  President  feels  that  way 

well — strongly. 

Q.  Could  we  talk  about  your  re- 
»rt  to  the  President?  You  said,  be- 
<re  you  left,  that  one  of  the  things 
»u  wanted  to  find  out  was  how  the 
flies  felt  about  lifting  the  trade  re- 
rictions  that  were  imposed  after  the 
(viets  moved  into  Afghanistan.  The 
tviets  have  now  moved  out.  There  is 
igreat  deal  of  pressure  from  the  al- 
;s  to  lift  these  trade  restrictions. 

A.  The  "no-exceptions"  rule. 

Q.  That's  right.  What  did  they 
111  you  about  those  restrictions? 

A.  Interestingly  enough,  I  expected 
hear  from  each  and  every  one  of  them 
lOUt  how  important  it  was  to  lift  the 
o-e.xceptions"  rule,  and  I  only  heard  it 
om,  at  most,  three  countries — and  I  re- 


ally think  probably  only  two,  and  then 
sort  of  in  passing.  So  it  did  not  appear  to 
be  quite  as  big  an  issue. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  the  United 
States  is  not  about  to  lift  these  trade 
restrictions? 

A.  No,  no,  no.  What  it  means  is 
that  I'm  in  a  position  now  to  report  this 
to  the  President.  He  will  make  the  deci- 
sion in  due  course.  And  I  wouldn't  want 
to  prejudge  what — 

Q.  What  you  seem  to  be  saying  is 
that  there  wasn't  a  great  deal  of  con- 
cern about  it. 

A.  What  I'm  saying  is  thei'e  was  not 
as  much  concern  as  there  had  been  me- 
dia speculation  before  we  left.  That's  all 
I'm  saying.  The  President  might  decide 
it's  quite  appropriate  to  lift  that,  inas- 
much as  it  was  put  on  there  when  the 
Soviets  went  into  Afghanistan. 

Q.  On  Afghanistan,  is  this  Ad- 
ministration interested  in  working 
out  with  the  Soviets,  as  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev is  asking  you  to,  some  kind  of 
political  accommodation  in 
Afghanistan? 

A.  I  think  that  this  Administration 
is  interested  in  self-determination  for 
the  Afghan  people.  That's  why  we've 
been  interested  in  Afghanistan  as  long 
as  we  have.  And  frankly  I  think  that's 
why  we  have  a  situation  where  the  Sovi- 
ets are  leaving  Afghanistan.  So  that 
continues  to  be  our  goal — self- 
determination  for  the  Afghan  people. 

Q.  Now  that  the  Soviets  have 
left — the  military  forces  have  pulled 
out — when  are  we  going  to  stop  sup- 
plying weapons  to  the  rebel  side? 

A.  I  think  we  believe  in  the  princi- 
ple of  positive  symmetry  here,  if  I  may 
say  so. 

Q.  A  wonderful  diplomatic  term. 

A.  Yes,  it's  wonderful;  but  you 
know,  for  a  long  time  we  talked  about 
negative  symmetry — and  that's  the 
reason  I  used  the  word  "positive" 
symmetry — because  the  Soviets  have 
dumped  a  lot  of  equipment  in  there,  a  lot 
of  military  equipment,  to  prop  up  this 
puppet  regime  which  really  has  a  very 
poor  human  rights  record  and  is 
denying  the  people  of  Afghanistan  self- 
determination.  Our  view  is,  we  need  to 
do  what  we  can  to  see  that  they  have  an 
opportunity  for  self-determination. 

Q.  How  long  do  you  give  that  re- 
gime? How  long  will  it  be  necessary 
to  keep  arming  the  rebels? 


tpartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


A.  I  don't  know.  I  don't  want  to  put 
a  timeframe  on  it  because  I  would  simply 
be  guessing.  We've  got  some  intelligence 
estimates,  but  I'm  not  free  to  share 
those  with  you. 

Q.  The  matter  of  Salman  Rushdie 
and  the  book.  The  Satanic  Verses, 
broke  while  you  were  on  your  trip. 
Your  response  on  that  was  simply  to 
say  that  all  of  this,  and  especially 
putting  a  price  on  his  head,  was 
regrettable.  That  seems  a  very  mild 
response  for  such  a  serious  action. 
Why  so  mild? 

A.  What  I  said  in  addition  to  that,  if 
I'm  not  mistaken,  was  that  the  United 
States  continues  to  oppose  terrorism  in 
all  of  its  forms  and  particularly  state- 
sponsored  terrorism.  I  believe  we  added 
later,  during  the  course  of  the  trip,  that 
if  Iran  really  is  serious  about  rejoining 
the  community  of  civilized  nations,  this 
is  not  the  kind  of  behavior  that  leads  to 
that. 

Q.  But  this  is  really  an  outra- 
geous situation.  There  are  bookstores 
in  America  which  have  pulled  the 
books  off  the  shelves.  And  this  sort 
of  thing  happened  in  this  country! 

A.  Yes.  It's  not  something  that  we 
ought  to  condone  in  any  way,  and  we 
ought  to  speak  out  against  it.  I  quite 
agree. 

Q.  Are  we  trying  by  this  rela- 
tively mild  response— the  Dutch,  for 
example,  cancelled  the  visit  by  the 
Foreign  Minister  to  Iran.  Are  we  try- 
ing bv  this  response  to  encourage 
Iran? 

A.  No.  To  encourage  them  in  this 
kind  of  behavior?  Absolutely  not. 

Q.  To  move  back  into  the  family 
of  nations,  to  use  your  phrase? 

A.  Oh,  no,  no.  No.  I  think,  frankly, 
that  we  have  expressed  our  view  that 
this  is  behavior  that  is  basically  intoler- 
able now — without  passing  judgment  on 
the  book,  because  I  think  we  have  to  say 
that.  I  haven't  read  the  book;  I  haven't 
seen  the  book;  I  don't  know  what  is  said 
in  there.  So  I  don't  mean  to  be  blessing 
the  book,  on  the  one  hand,  when  I  say 
that. 

Q.  Can  I  just  take  you  to  where 
you're  going  next  week — Asia?  You, 
as  Treasury  Secretary,  talked  a  bit 
about  the  need  for  some  special  or  dif- 
ferent relationship  with  the  Japanese. 
Now  that  you're  in  this  job,  do  you 
still  think  we  should  be  seeking  some 
special  marriage  with  the  Japanese 
because  they  are  rich  and  we're  al- 
legedly poor  or — 


23 


AFRICA 


A.  I  think  we  have  a  special  rela- 
tionship with  the  Japanese.  What  I  was 
suggesting  at  Treasury,  frankly,  was 
that  w^e  find  a  way  to  a  better  dialogue 
with  not  just  the  Japanese  but  the  newly 
industrializing  democracies  of  Asia  as 
well — the  Japanese  and  those  newly  in- 
dustrializing democracies — with  respect 
to  economic  and  trade  issues  partic- 
ularly. 

I  think  we  have  a  very  good  relation- 
ship with  the  Japanese.  It's  an  extraordi- 
narily important  relationship  to  both 
countries,  and  I  think  that's  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  the  President  is  attend- 
ing the  funeral  of  Emperor  Hirohito. 

Q.  Can  I  turn  to  a  more  personal 
aspect  of  your  job".'  The  Secretary  of 
State  has  to  deal  with  crises,  goes 
dashing  around  the  world  talking 
with  leaders.  There's  also  a  thing 
called  "a  view  of  the  world,"  the 
"vision  thing,"  as  George  Bush 
has  called  it. 

Once  in  1982  you  were  quoted  as 
saying,  "I  am  not  a  man  of  vision.  I 
do  not  pretend  to  be.  That  is  not  my 
job."  Your  job  then  was  White  House 
Chief  of  Staff  and  administrator. 
Now  you're  Secretary  of  State.  Where 
is  the  vision  going  to  come  from'.' 

A.  We'll  have  a  vision,  and  it  will  be 
a  good  one.  We  have  a  President  who  will 
supply  a  good  part  of  that;  and  we  have 
very  good  people  employed  at  the  State 
Department  who  will  be  developing 
things  like  that  for  us.  We  have  28  stud- 
ies ongoing  right  now,  and  I  think  we 
know  where  we  want  to  go  and  what  we 
want  to  accomplish.  That's  the  way  I'd 
define  the  vision. 

Q.  Will  there  be  any  real  policy 
differences  with  the  Reagan  Adminis- 
tration or  simply  a  continuation  of 
the  basic  policy  line? 

A.  I  think  in  many  respects  the 
basic  policy  line  of  the  Reagan  Admin- 
istration will  continue,  and  it  should  con- 
tinue. The  "winds  of  freedom"  are  blow- 
ing around  the  world;  we're  winning 
East-West.  There  are  a  whole  host  of 
things  I  could  cite  for  you  that  I  think 
would  indicate  it  would  be  a  serious  mis- 
take to  depart  from  some  of  those  policy 
lines. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  will  be 
some  differences.  I've  already  spoken  to 
some  of  those  in  my  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions testimony.  It  may  not  amount  to  a 
vision  in  your  view,  but  I've,  neverthe- 
less, talked  about  some  of  them.  It  was  a 
fairly  comprehensive  statement,  if  I  may 
say  so. 


Peace  and  Relief  in  Sudan 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  8,  1989' 

The  U.S.  Government  remains  pro- 
foundly concerned  about  massive  hu- 
man suffering  in  Sudan.  The  cause  is 
the  civil  war,  now  in  its  sixth  year. 
Most  of  the  war's  victims  are  civilians 
who  are  displaced  and  impoverished  or 
who  starve  to  death  for  lack  of  delivery 
of  available  food.  The  death  toll  from 
starvation  in  1988  alone  is  estimated  to 
range  in  the  hundreds  of  thousands. 

Many  Sudanese  and  expatriates 
are  laboring  tirelessly  to  ensure  food 
deliveries,  and  the  cooperation  with 
these  efforts  by  both  the  Sudanese  Gov- 
ernment and  Sudanese  People's  Libera- 
tion Army  (SPLA)  has  improved  in 
recent  months.  But  much  more  needs  to 
be  done.  We  call  on  authorities  at  all 
levels  on  both  sides  to  remove  remain- 
ing obstacles  and  do  everything  possi- 
ble to  provide  emergency  relief  to 
victims  caught  in  garrison  towns  and 
other  areas  of  the  war  zone.  Failure  to 
do  so  will  mean  that  thousands  more 
will  die  in  the  coming  rainy  season. 
The  United  States  will  do  all  it  can  to 
support  this  effort.  We  call  on  other  do- 
nors also  to  undertake  or  expand  relief 
efforts. 

The  sad  reality,  however,  is  that 
starvation  will  almost  certainly  not  end 
until  the  fighting  ends.  As  friends  of 
Sudan,  we  urge  the  Sudanese  Govern- 
ment and  the  SPLA  to  put  peace  first 
and  to  agree  to  an  early  cease-fire 
which  would  promote  that  goal  and  al- 
low relief  to  reach  those  in  need. 


FACT  SHEET, 
FEB.  8,  1989 

Sudan  is  an  important  country  af- 
flicted by  years  of  civil  war,  economic 
disorder,  and  famine.  The  scale  of  suf- 
fering is  so  large  that  causes  of  the  war 
and  goals  of  the  combatants  have  be- 
come of  secondary  importance.  The 
United  States  believes  that  no  issue  is 
as  urgent  as  providing  food  to  the  inno- 
cent victims  of  this  conflict.  But  we 
recognize  that  the  famine  is  the  direct 


result  of  the  war.  The  achievement  of 
peace  is  the  real  answer  to  the  suffer- 
ing and  human  tragedy  in  Sudan. 
Hence,  our  central  objective  is  to  end 
the  war. 

Sudan's  problems  have  brought  it 
the  world's  attention.  The  urgency  for 
the  United  States  is  heightened  by  oi 
long  ties  of  friendship  with  Sudan,  ou 
support  for  its  democratic  institution; 
and  the  importance  of  its  stability  foi 
the  region.  Our  policy  thus  is  centere 
on  interrelated  issues:  support  for  Su 
dan's  democracy,  a  peaceful  solution 
to  the  war,  and  relief  for  its  victims. 

Famine  and  Relief 

Delivery  of  relief  rather  than  the  ava; 
ability  of  supplies  has  been  the  major 
problem  facing  relief  efforts.  Relief 
programs  are  maddeningly  hard  to  ir 
plement  in  the  vastness  of  southern 
Sudan,  an  area  the  size  of  France. 
Deaths  related  to  famine  during  the 
past  year  are  impossible  to  count,  but 
estimates  range  into  the  hundreds  of 
thousands.  Perhaps  over  2  million 
southern  Sudanese  have  fled  to  the 
north  or  to  Ethiopia  to  escape  the 
fighting  and  hunger.  Inefficiency  and 
opposition  by  elements  on  both  sides 
have  sometimes  hindered  delivery  of 
relief.  Even  without  a  war,  any  relief 
effort  would  be  severely  complicated 
the  inhospitable  terrain,  bandits,  anc 
the  pervasive  lack  of  reliable  informa^ 
tion  on  population  concentrations  and 
need.  The  few  existing  tracks  or  road' 
are  mined  or  otherwise  contested  by 
combatants,  many  of  whom  are  out  ol 
touch  with  any  authority. 

Despite  these  obstacles,  there  is 
progress  on  relief,  and  the  United 
States  has  been  in  the  forefront  of  ef- 
forts to  provide  it.  The  current  Inter- 
national Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC)  program  to  deliver  food  to  no 
combatants  on  both  sides  in  the  war 
zone  is  largely  a  U.S.  initiative  and  w 
accepted  by  both  sides  in  part  as  a  re- 
sult of  strong  U.S.  leadership  and  en- 
couragement. Since  both  sides  harboi 
suspicions  about  the  purpose  and  use 


'Press  release  30  of  Feb.  21,  1989. 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  191' 


ARMS  CONTROL 


od,  the  ICRC's  participation  has  been 
isential.  It  is  experienced  in  working 
ith  adversaries  in  conducting  relief 
itivities  across  battle  lines  and  in 
laranteeing  that  food  reaches  non- 
imbatants.  Deliveries  began  in  De- 
[mber  1988  to  the  government-held 

ns  of  Wau  and  Aweil  and  the  SPLA- 
:ld  towns  of  Akon  and  Yirol. 
While  the  ICRC  role  is  crucial,  it  is 
Mt  the  only  available  instrument  for 
rlief.  We  have  been  actively  soliciting 
joposals  from  private  voluntary  orga- 
F.ations  which  might  be  interested  in 
iiTving  out  relief  efforts  on  both  sides 
( the  war  zone.  As  early  as  1986,  the 
lited  States  opened  discussions  with 
■  Sudanese  Relief  and  Rehabilitation 
soeiation  (SRRA),  the  relief  arm  of 
I '  Sudanese  People's  Liberation  Move- 
I'nt  (SPLM),  to  review  the  possibility 
(American  private  voluntary  organi- 
/  ions  providing  assistance  into  the 
It  h.  While  the  SRRA  agreed  in  prin- 

■  li'  to  such  assistance,  no  established 
I  \ate  voluntary  organizations  were 
MJing  to  undertake  relief  operations 
ithe  circumstances  w^hich  existed  at 

t  it  time. 

One  serious  constraint  continues  to 
lack  of  reliable  information  on  needs 
I  tieas  controlled  by  the  Sudanese 
I  iple's  Liberation  Army  (SPLA) — 
■■  L.M's  military  wing — and  the  hesi- 
e\  of  organizations  to  begin  opera- 
l^  without  a  better  understanding  of 
lis  and  the  security  situation.  While 
1  irmation  and  appropriate  responses 
t'  those  areas  are  being  developed, 
t    r.S.  Government  is  emphasizing 
r  ief  efforts  targeted  on  government- 
1-  t lolled  garrison  towns  in  the  south 
'i-h  have  the  largest  identifiable 
ations  of  displaced  persons  in  the 
■'    zone)  and  accessible  areas  outside 
t   war  zone  in  which  large  numbers  of 
d  placed  persons  have  gathered.  These 
ii  lude  southern  Darfur,  southern  Kor- 
(1  :ui,  Khartoum,  and  the  Nile  regions. 
The  United  States  has  been  a  lead- 
contributor  to  multilateral  relief 
..>  lations  in  Sudan.  Concerned  that 
r  lef  be  gotten  into  the  war  zone  to 
irnment-controlled  towns  where 
II  needs  were  developing,  U.S.  offi- 
-  opened  discussions  with  the  Su- 

■  use  Government  and  the  SPLA  on  a 
p  sible  ICRC  program  in  November 
117.  Although  the  United  States  had 


MBFR  Talks  Conclude 


FINAL  COMMUNIQUE, 
FEB.  2.  1989 

Following  the  decision  to  open  in  March 
this  year  the  negotiation  on  convention- 
al armed  forces  in  Europe,  the  states 
participating  in  the  negotiations  on  the 
mutual  reduction  of  forces  and  arma- 
ments and  associated  measures  in  cen- 
tral Europe  have  decided  to  conclude 
these  negotiations.  The  final  meeting 
was  held  today. 

Since  1973  these  negotiations  have 
served  to  maintain  a  serious  dialogue 
between  East  and  West  on  .security  is- 
sues. They  have  provided  the  first  mul- 
tilateral forum  for  the  exploration  of 
the  complex  problems  associated  with 


been  providing  as  much  assistance  as 
possible  to  southern  Sudan,  first  signs 
of  famine  in  SPLA-controlled  territory 
appeared  in  the  spring  of  1988  when 
some  300,000  Sudanese  refugees  cross- 
ed into  Ethiopia  and  were  settled  in 
UN  camps.  The  dimensions  of  the  fam- 
ine became  clearer  by  the  summer 
when  an  estimated  200,000  war  victims 
began  to  gather  north  of  the  war  zone. 
The  war,  logistical  difficulties,  and 
flooding  impeded  relief  operations  until 
a  U.S. -financed  airlift  was  initiated  in 
September.  By  year's  end,  overland 
routes,  again  subject  to  SPLA  attacks, 
were  just  beginning  to  open.  During 
the  past  2  years,  the  U.S.  Ambassador 
has  declared  10  disasters  in  Sudan,  and 
more  than  $60  million  has  been  spent 
on  relief  This  includes  about  $30  mil- 
lion during  the  past  6  months  chan- 
neled through  the  ICRC,  bilateral 
programs,  and  private  voluntary  orga- 
nizations as  flood  waters  receded  and 
the  extent  of  needs  was  identified. 

The  War  and  Its  Resolution 

Causes  of  the  conflict  in  Sudan  are  ex- 
ceedingly complex.  Sudan  is  both  Isla- 
mic and  Christian,  African  and  Arab. 
The  civil  war  turns  on  questions  of  na- 
tional identity  and  the  nature  of  the 
Sudanese  state.  Generalizations  can  be 


efforts  to  strengthen  stability  and 
security  in  Europe.  The  extent  of 
common  ground  has  proved  to  be  insuf- 
ficient to  enable  the  participants  to 
agree  on  a  treaty.  Nevertheless  the  po- 
sitions of  the  two  sides  have  converged 
on  a  number  of  issues.  The  participants 
have  gained  valuable  experience  and  a 
clearer  picture  of  what  will  be  neces- 
sary to  achieve  mutually  agreeable  and 
verifiable  reductions  and  limitations  of 
forces  and  armaments  in  Europe. 

The  participants  wish  to  express 
their  gratitude  to  the  Republic  of  Aus- 
tria for  its  generous  assistance  and  the 
excellent  facilities  it  has  provided  for 
these  negotiations  in  Vienna.  ■ 


misleading.  Not  all  northerners  want 
Islamic  law  and  an  Islamic  state.  Not 
all  southerners  support  armed  rebel- 
lion. Both  sides  are  asserting  deeply 
held  values.  Thus  ending  the  war  while 
supporting  democracy  has  proven  to  be 
an  elusive  objective.  But  the  tragedy 
will  be  prolonged  and  enormous  if  the 
solution  is  found  on  the  battlefield  rath- 
er than  at  the  bargaining  table. 

The  United  States  has  also  taken  a 
leading  role  in  promoting  a  negotiated 
settlement.  Intensive  efforts  through- 
out 1988,  including  those  by  the  United 
States,  unfortunately  did  not  succeed 
in  bringing  Prime  Minister  Sadiq  and 
SPLA  leader  John  Garang  together. 
But  many  contacts  at  other  levels  be- 
tween the  sides  helped  prepare  the  way 
for  productive  talks  which  took  place  in 
Addis  Ababa  (Ethiopia)  in  November 
between  Sudan's  Democratic  Unionist 
Party  (DUP) — one  of  three  principal 
northern  political  parties — and  SPLA 
representatives.  The  DUP/SPLA  pro- 
posal contained  the  key  elements  of 
compromise  which  would  halt  the  fight- 
ing and  permit  both  sides  to  join  in  a 
constitutional  convention  for  discussion 
of  the  issues  separating  them  and  lead- 
ing to  a  new  constitution  for  Sudan. 


Coartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


25 


CANADA 


Ethiopian  support  and  sanctuary 
for  the  SPLA  have  been  essential  for 
the  SPLA.  The  United  States  has 
taken  the  initiative  in  discussing  Ethio- 
pia's policies  and  role  with  the  Soviets. 
We  will  continue  to  seek  an  end  to  ex- 
ternal interference  in  Sudan  and  prog- 
ress with  the  Soviets  in  pursuit  of 
negotiated  solutions  to  these  regional 
problems.  The  United  States  believes, 
however,  that  Sudan's  civil  war  involves 
fundamental  internal  issues  and  griev- 
ances which  Sudanese  themselves  must 
resolve. 

Based  on  the  stated  positions  of 
both  sides,  resolution  of  the  issues 
should  not  be  impossible.  The  SPLA 
does  not  propose  secession  but  insists 
that  the  south  share  economic  wealth 
and  political  power  on  a  negotiated  ba- 
sis. 'The  Prime  Minister  and  his  gov- 
ernment agree.  The  sticking  point  is 
the  country's  legal  system.  The  SPLA 
and  most  southerners  do  not  agree  that 
Islamic  law  should  be  applied  in  the 
non-Muslim  south  or  that  non-Muslims 
living  in  the  north  should  be  subject  to 
it;  much  less,  in  the  southerners'  view, 
should  it  be  the  basis  of  the  constitu- 
tion. Northern  parties  are  divided  on 
these  points,  although  the  extent  of  dif- 
ferences and  whether  they  are  bridge- 
able  is  not  clear.  No  party,  however,  has 
said  it  opposes  discussion  of  Islamic  law 
in  the  context  of  a  constitutional  con- 
vention of  all  Sudanese  parties. 

Despite  the  promise  of  the  DUP/ 
SPLA  peace  proposal,  the  government 
has  not  brought  about  agreement  of  the 
constituent  assembly  and  cabinet, 
which  could  lead  to  implementation  of 
the  proposal.  The  United  States  sup- 
ports all  three  fundamental  elements  of 
the  DUP/SPLA  peace  proposal:  a  con- 
stitutional convention  to  bring  the  par- 
ties togethei',  no  preemptive  moves  to 
revise  or  implement  Islamic  laws  pend- 
ing the  conference,  and  a  cease-fire 
demonstrating  the  good  will  of  both 
sides  to  engage  in  productive  talks. 

Of  these  considerations,  a  cease- 
fire, which  is  necessary  for  getting  re- 
lief to  all  those  in  need,  is  most  urgent. 


President's  Visit  to  Canada 


'Press  release  14. 


President  Bush  and  Prime  Minister  Mulroney. 


President  Bush  t'isited  Ottawa  on 
February  10, 1989.  Following  are  re- 
marks by  the  President  and  excerpts 
from  a  question-and-answer  session  he 
and  Prime  Minister  Brian  Mulroney 
held  with  reporters  after  their 
luncheon  and  a  news  conference 
Secretary  Baker  held  later  that  day. 


26 


PRESIDENT  BUSH  AND 
PRIME  MINISTER  MULRONEY 

President  Bush.  Let  me  just  say  on  1 
half  of  Mrs.  Bush,  our  Secretary  of 
State,  and  others,  this  has  been  a  gO( 
visit.  It  is  an  important  visit  becaust 
symbolizes  the  importance  that  we 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/ April  1S 


lace  on  the  relationship  with  Canada, 
fe're  each  other's  largest  trading  part- 
er.  We  are  friends.  We  share  a  long, 
aceful  border,  and  we  have  many 
)innion  interests. 

Today  we  had  an  opportunity  to 
scuss  not  just  the  bilateral  relation- 
ip  that  is  very,  very  strong  and  very 
}od  but  we  had  a  chance  to  talk  about 
le  East-West  relationship.  I  had  a 
lance  to  talk  about  the  problems  on 
ade;  indeed,  our  trade  ministers  are 
Iking  right  now,  you  might  say.  And 
),  I  felt  the  visit  was  outstanding. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  reviewed 
16  concerns  that  he  has  about  acid 
in,  and  I  referred  him  to  what  I  said 
st  night  to  the  American  people:  my 
itermination  to  move  on  forward  with 
stting  limits,  with  legislation,  and 
len  moving  to  discussions  with  Cana- 
,  leading  to  an  accord  that  I  think 
ill  be  beneficial  to  both  countries, 
lat  problem — and  it  has  been  a 
•oblem — is  one  that  we  are  both 
■termined  to  move  forward  toward 
lution. 

In  terms  of  the  trade  agreement, 
I,  of  course,  have  saluted  the  coura- 
ous  position  taken  by  the  Prime  Min- 
cer of  Canada.  We  have  great  respect 
r  that  in  the  United  States;  and  we 
int  to  now  do  our  part,  part  of  the 
aited  States,  to  follow  through  with 
iiatever  implementation  is  required. 

The  mood  was  upbeat,  the  spirit 
<od,  and  I  am  very  glad  that  this  was 
/  first  visit  outside  of  the  continental 
lited  States  as  President.  We  will 
ep  in  touch,  and  each  of  us  has 
edged  to  see  that  this  strong  relation- 
ip  becomes  even  stronger. 

Q.  To  what  degree  did  you  assure 
e  Prime  Minister  of  your  feeling  of 
nfidence  that  the  Congress  will  go 
9ng  with  you  on  your  acid  rain  re- 
est  last  night? 

President  Bush.  I  think  the  Prime 
nister  is  aware  of  the  political  divi- 
ins  and  political  waves  there  in  our 
untry  on  this  issue.  But  I  assured 
m  that  the  time  for  just  pure  study 
IS  over  and  that  we've  now  ap- 
oached  the  time  for  legislative  action. 
)ledged  that  in  the  campaign.  And  so, 
the  degree  there  is  disparity,  a  lack 
uniformity  in  the  Congress,  I  think 
e  Prime  Minister  sees  it  as  my  re- 
onsibility  to  try  to  move  forward  to 
that  which  I  said  I  wanted  to  do. 


Q.  I  Inaudible  I  afraid  that  the 
Arctic  blast  has  just  swept  across  the 
continent  following  on  last  summer's 
drought  has  created  some  permanent 
damage  in  the  agricultural  regions 
on  both  sides  of  the  border.  I  wonder 
if  you  discussed  that  at  all  and  wheth- 
er there  could  be  a  cooperative  way  of 
dealing  with  this  and  maybe  at  some 
point  making  a  proposal  to  get  some 
of  the  surplus  Canadian  water  down 
into  the  drought-stricken  regions  of 
the  United  States? 

President  Bush.  We  did  not  dis- 
cuss water  diversion.  We  did  not  dis- 
cuss the  effects  of  the  Arctic  cold  air. 
We  did  talk  about  the  need  for  a  global 
approach  to  environmental  concerns. 

Q.  Do  you  have  an  estimate  of 
how  long  it  will  take,  assuming  the 
Congress  goes  along  with  your  legis- 
lative program,  before  you  are  ready 
to  talk  about  a  bilateral  accord? 

President  Bush.  No,  but  we're 
going  to  press  forward  with  this  right 
awav.  We  have  a  brand  new  Adminis- 
trator of  EPA  [William  Reilly,  Envi- 
ronmental Protection  Agency].  We've 
got  a  legislative  team  to  propose  the 
legislation  I  talked  about  last  night. 
And  we've  gotten  some  reasonable  lev- 
els of  funding.  So  we're  on  the  move. 
But  we  (lid  not  discuss  an  exact 
timeframe.  I  would  be  misrepresenting 
or  understating  things  if  I  didn't  say 
that  the  Prime  Minister  once  again  im- 
pressed on  me  the  urgency  of  moving 
as  fast  as  we  can,  but  we  didn't  set  a 
time. 

Q.  You  were  saying  that  you 
weren't  in  a  position  yet  to  discuss  a 
specific  timetable  and  targets  for  re- 
duction of  acid  rain. 

President  Bush.  We  will  be  dis- 
cussing targets,  and  we  will  get  an 
agreement  on  that,  I'm  sure.  But  I 
have  an  obligation  now  to  recommend 
to  our  Congress  the  setting  of  certain 
limits,  so  we  will  move  forward  with 
that  much  specific. 

Q.  What  kind  of  reductions  and 
what  kind  of  timetable  do  you  have  in 
mind? 

President  Bush.  I  have  in  mind  as 
fast  as  possible. 

Q.  I  wondered  if  you  are  satisfied 
with  the  steps  that  the  President  has 
outlined  to  deal  with  the  acid  rain 
question  or  whether  you  have  asked 
for  more  here? 


CANADA 


Prime  Minister  Mulroney.  I  think 
that  this  represents  quite  substantial 
progress.  It  wasn't  so  long  ago  that 
Canada  was  sort  of  going  it  alone  in 
many  ways  in  this  area.  The  Presi- 
dent's position  puts  a  great  impetus  for 
action  domestically  in  the  United 
States,  which  is  a  condition  precedent, 
and  the  President  is  signaling,  as  well, 
subsequent  discussions  that  will  lead  to 
an  acid  rain  accord  to  benefit  both  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  This,  I 
think,  is  real  progress.  And  while  I 
suppose  I'm  like  a  lot  of  people  who 
would  like  it  done  tomorrow  in  this 
area,  I  know  it's  now  going  to  happen, 
but  this  represents  a  very  measurable 
progress.  I  view  it  as  evidence  of  the 
commitments  that  the  President  gave 
during  the  campaign  and  has  referred 
to  since,  including  his  speech  to  the 
Congress  last  night,  which  is,  for  a 
neighbor  and  friend  troubled  by  this 
problem  for  some  time,  very 
encouraging. 

Q.  Presuming  you  and  the  Presi- 
dent reach  an  agreement,  could  you 
begin  to  discuss  an  accord  before  the 
full  U.S.  program  is  in  place  on  acid 
rain,  or  will  it  be  necessary  to  wait 
until  its  legislation  is  through 
Congress? 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney.  The 
Americans  will,  of  course,  deal  with 
their  own  problems  domestically,  free 
from  any  comment  by  me  about  what 
happens  internally.  But  clearly,  what 
the  President  is  saying  is  that  he  has  a 
two-pronged  approach:  one  that  will 
summon  the  legislative  authority  of  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  to  put  in 
place  those  mechanisms  that  are  re- 
quired there,  and  secondly,  an  arrange- 
ment which  will  be  negotiated  with 
Canada  to  conclude  an  accord  which 
will  deal,  hopefully,  in  a  definitive 
manner  with  this. 

Q.  Would  you  prefer  to  undertake 
negotiations  immediately  with  the 
United  States  instead  of  waiting  for 
them  first  to  pass  laws? 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney.  First, 
it  is  necessary  for  the  President  to  talk 
about  this  with  legislators  and  that  the 
Americans  are  prepared  to  pass  their 
own  laws  for  the  purification  of  their 
atmosphere  in  this  domain.  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  as  the  President  has  just  in- 
dicated, we  are  on  the  way  to  advance, 
rapidly  I  hope,  toward  the  conclusion  of 
the  negotiations  for  a  bilateral  accord 
about  the  international  environment. 


27 


CANADA 


Therefore,  we  are  encouraged  by  the 
developments  and  the  declarations  of 
President  Bush  today. 


Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  steel  issue, 
and  did  you  make  any  mention  of 
keeping  Canada  out  of  the  voluntary 
export  program  that  the  steel  lobby 
in  the  United  States  wants? 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney.  There 
is  a  meeting  going  on  now  between  Ms. 
Hills  [U.S.  Trade  Representative]  and 
Minister  [of  International  Trade]  John 
Crosbie  in  regard  specifically  to  that. 
But  as  you  know,  Canada  is  a  fair  trad- 
er, and  we  should  not  in  any  way  be  im- 
pacted by  that  kind  of  proposition.  We 
wouldn't  deserve  in  any  way  to  be  in- 
cluded within  its  purview.  And  that 
would  be  the  position  that  Mr.  Crosbie 
will  be  explaining  to  Ms.  Hills. 

Q.  Would  you  like  1995  or  the  year 
2000  for  a  50%  cut  in  transporter 
emissions  on  acid  rain. 

President  Bush.  Too  early  to  an- 
swer that. 

Q.  Will  negotiations  start  this 
year? 

President  Bush.  I  hope  so. 

Q.  Were  you  on  the  same  wave- 
lengths on  East-West  relations  in 
your  discussions  this  morning? 

President  Bush.  We  were.  And  I 
have  great  respect  for  the  Prime  Min- 
ister's views.  I  have  great  respect  for 
his  understanding  with  his  experience 
of  the  alliance  and  its  importance.  I 
value  his  judgment  on  what's  happening 
inside  the  Soviet  Union.  And  so,  we 
had  a  long,  I  think,  productive  discus- 
sion about  that.  I  had  an  opportunity  to 
explain  to  him  that  our  review  of  our 
national  security  policies,  our  foreign 
policy  objectives — it's  a  serious  thing. 
It  is  not  a  foot-dragging  operation.  It  is 
not  trying  to  send  a  signal  to  [General] 
Secretary  Gorbachev  that  we  want  to 
move  backward.  It  is  simply  prudent.  I 
am  absolutely  convinced  that  the  Sovi- 
ets understand  this;  and  I'm  also  con- 
vinced that  the — I  don't  want  to  put 
words  in  his  mouth — but  the  Prime 
Minister  of  Canada,  a  very  important 
part  of  all  of  this,  understands  it  as 
well. 


SECRETARY  BAKERS 

As  the  President  said  just  prior  to  de- 
parture, his  view  was  that  this  was  a 
very  good  and  successful  visit.  He 
felt — he  put  it,  characterized  it — 
upbeat  about  it  and  very  pleased  that 
this  was  his  first  visit  outside  the 
United  States  as  President  of  the 
United  States. 

This  was  primarily  an  agenda- 
setting  meeting.  There  was  concen- 
tration in  the  following  major  areas: 
implementation  of  the  Free  Trade 
Agreement,  the  full  range  of  East-West 
issues,  the  question  of  acid  rain,  ques- 
tions regarding  Central  America,  mat- 
ters respecting  the  NATO  trip  that  I 
am  just  to  embark  upon  tomorrow,  and 
several  other  items  that  were  touched 
on  to  a  lesser  degree. 

Q.  How  did  Central  America 
come  up,  and  what  part  would  the 
Canadians  play  in  Central  Ameri- 
can policy? 

A.  The  Canadians,  as  you  know, 
have  been  interested  in  Central  Ameri- 
can policy,  and  they're  interested,  as  are 
others  in  this  hemisphere,  in  knowing 
what  the  policy  approach  of  the  United 
States  will  be.  The  President  made  it 
clear  that  it  was  important  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  United  States  that 
we — our  feeling  that  it  was  important 
that  we  have  a  unified  policy  in  the 
United  States;  that  is,  one  that  the  legis- 
lative and  executive  branches  of  the  gov- 
ernment are  agreed  upon.  Only  in  that 
way,  the  President  said,  can  policy  really 
be  effective. 

F\irther,  he  pointed  out  that  it 
was  his  hope  that  the  nations  of  this 
hemisphere — the  Central  American 
democracies,  some  countries  in  South 
America,  Canada,  and  the  United 
States — could  all  adopt,  or  pretty  much 
subscribe  to,  a  policy  that  represented  a 
diplomatic  approach  to  the  issues  and 
that  had  at  least  some  of  the  goals  to  be 
achieved — those  goals  that  are  stated  in 
the  Esquipulas  accords. 

Q.  Was  there  any  discussion 
about  Canadian  concerns  about  mov- 
ing toward  oil  drilling  in  the  Arctic 
National  Wildlife  Refuge? 

A.  There  was  no  discussion  of  that. 

Q.  Could  you  explain  the  failure 
of  the  President  to  give  Mr.  Mulroney 
even  vague  targets  for  acid  rain 
reductions  or  a  date  by  which  those 
reductions  might  be  achieved? 


A.  The  President  told  the  Prime 
Minister  that — called  his  attention  to  i 
statements  that  the  President  had  ma( 
during  the  campaign  where  he  said  he 
wanted  to  reduce  emissions  by,  1  think 
he  said,  millions  of  tons;  that  it  would  I 
premature  for  the  President  to  establi: 
targets  before  he  had  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  consult  with  the  Congress  wi 
respect  to  an  issue  that  will  have  high 
political  content  in  the  United  States. 

The  President  did  say,  however,  th 
he  intends  to  offer  a  comprehensive  pn 
posal  for  dealing  with  this  issue  to  oui 
Congress,  calling  for  specific  emissior 
reductions  and  a  specific  timetable.  Hi 
said  that  the  time  for  study  is  over  an( 
the  time  for  action  is  now,  and  he  said, ; 
I  think  you  heard  during  the  departur 
that  subsequently,  we  hope  we  can  beu 
discussions  bilaterally  toward  an  acid  u 
rain  accord  with  Canada. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  is  going 
be  the  impact — and  was  it  discussea 
at  all  today — with  our  NATO  ally 
Canada  of  a  zero-growth  defense 
budget  in  the  United  States? 

A.  It  was  discussed  today,  and  th- 
President  told  the  Prime  Minister,  in  c 
feet,  why  he  decided  to  depart  from  tl 
2Fli  real  growth  figure  in  the  Reagan 
budget  and  propose  a  zero  real  growtl 
budget  for  FY  1990.  There  were  discu: 
sions  as  well  of  the  importance  of  Can 
da's  contribution  to  NATO's  defense. 

Q.  I  have  two  questions.  One,  1 
wonder  if  there  was  any  discussion 
about  any  changes  in  Glass-Steagai 
the  United  States  in  light  of  the  fac 
that  American  Express  is  getting  a 
Schedule  B  bank  in  Canada.  And  ji 
as  a  follow-up  on  the  defense  ques- 
tion, whether  there  were  any  discu! 
sions  on  Canada's  plan  to  purchase 
nuclear  submarines. 

k.  The  nuclear  submarine  issue  ( 
not  come  up,  and  neither  did  the  Glass 
Steagal  issue,  although  that  may  have 
come  up  in  Ambassador  Hills'  discus- 
sions. I  think  she  was  here  having  sep 
rate  discussions  with  Minister  Crosbit 
about  implementation  of  the  Free  Tra( 
Agreement.  But  it  did  not  come  up  in 
discussions  with  the  Prime  Minister. 

Q.  Going  back  for  a  moment  to 
Central  America,  several  Central 
American  Presidents  approached  tli 
Secretary  General  recently  about  tl 
possibility  of  a  UN  peacekeeping 
force  being  set  up.  Was  there  any 
discussion  given  to  Canada's  past  pi 
ticipation  in  a  number  of  such  peac 
keeping  forces  with  the  possibility 
that  Canada  might  play  a  role  in  thi 
peacekeeping  forces? 


28 


CANADA 


A.  I  had  a  discussion  to  that  effect 
ith  Joe  Clark  (Secretary  of  State  for 

ternal  Affairs]  on  the  way  in  from  the 
■port,  and  he  and  I  are  going  to  have  a 
■eater  in-depth  meeting  this  evening.  I 
ink  we're  going  to  spend  a  couple  of 
urs  together 

I  made  the  point  to  the  Minister 
at  it  would  be  the  hope  of  the  United 
ates  that  we  would  not  depart  from 
e  requirements  of  Esquipulas  II  and 
e  Sapoa  accords:  in  other  words,  that 

should  not  substitute  for  those  goals 
lich  we  think  are  worthwhile  goals, 
me  lesser  standard  for  the  Central 
nerican  countries. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  today,  in  your 
scussions  of  East-West,  the  question 
relaxing  technology  and  other 
fade  restrictions  against  trade  with 
te  Soviet  Union?  And,  whether  or 
ft  you  discussed  it  today,  what  is  the 
jjministration's  position  now  on  the 
Inetable  of  the  change  that  takes 
I  ice  when  the  Soviets  move  out  of 
.  ghanistan? 

A.  You're  talking  about  the  "sole- 
I  -eptions"  rule?  That's  an  issue  that  I 
I  ject  to  have  discussions  about  with 
i:h  of  the  NATO  Foreign  Ministers 
( it  I'll  be  visiting  with.  The  issue  did 
I ;  come  up  today.  It  probably  will  come 
I  in  our  discussions  this  evening  with 
J  nister  Clark. 

Q.  Any  decision  on  that,  though? 

A.  The  position  is  that  we  ought  to 
>  -tainly  find  out  what  the  other  NATO 
( intries — how  they  feel  about  it,  wheth- 
I  (II'  not  it's  something  that  they  feel 
t  remely  strongly  about,  whether  it's 
s  nething  that  we  ought  to  move  on 
I  A,  or  give  some  consideration  to 
1  ving  on  at  a  later  date. 

Let  me  say  this:  I  know  some  of  you 
t  nk  my  mind  is  made  up  on  that  issue. 
1  IS  not.  I  want  you  to  know  that.  I 
t  nk  you  might  have  reference  to  the 
'.  Ill'  magazine  article  where  I  said  that 
\  ought  to  consider  getting  something 
I  that.  It  also  said  that  was  an  embry- 
( iC  thought — and  it  was. 

Generally  speaking,  I  do  think  it's  a 
I  )d  idea  in  the  relationship  to,  if  you're 
t  ng  to  give  something,  ask  for  some- 
t  ng  in  return. 

But  I'll  have  to  tell  you  this:  Our  al- 
1  <  feel  perhaps  more  strongly  about 
t  s  than  do  the  Soviets.  So  we'll  be 
'  cussing  it  with  them  in  the  context 
I  how  we  move. 


Mrs.  Bush  and  Mrs. 
Mulroney  (center). 


Mulronev  read  Owl  Moon  to  the  classmates  of  Nicholas 


President  Bush  and  Prime  Minister  Mulroney. 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


29 


CANADA 


Q.  Are  you  carrying  any  message 
from  the  President  on  this  super  tour, 
or  is  it  largely  of  good  will  and  con- 
sultations with  counterparts? 

A.  It's  a  listening  trip  and  a  consult- 
ing trip,  but  I  am  carrying  a  message 
and  the  message  is:  Look,  we  want  to 
make  it  clear  that  we  think  the  way  to 
approach  the  East-West  relationship  is 
with  prudence  and  with  realism.  We 
want  you  to  understand  we  are  not  drag- 
ging our  feet  seeking  delay  for  the  sake 
of  delay  but  that  we  want  to  hear  your 
views  with  respect  to  our  negotiating — 
matters  such  as  our  negotiating  posture 
in  START  [strategic  arms  reduction 
talks]  matters,  such  as  short-range 
nuclear  modernization,  and  the  like. 

Q.  With  reference — not  to  drag 
it  out — but  the  Cariucci-Shultz  ex- 
change of  letters  before  you  came 
on — State's  position — when  you  say 
your  mind  is  not  made  up,  should  I 
line  you  up  with  Mr.  Shultz  in  the 
sense  that  you  can  see  a  point  to  get- 
ting off  this  "no-exception"  rule? 
Because,  as  we  understood  it,  the 
Pentagon  tried  to  freeze  the  sanc- 
tions even  after  the  Soviets  leave; 
State  didn't  think  that's  wise. 

A.  That  was  the  debate  that  took 
place  up  to  and  through  noon  on 
January  20. 

Q.  Right,  I'm  trying  to  — 

A.  There  are  a  number  of  policy  is- 
sues that  we  are  taking  a  look  at,  and 
this  is  a  matter  of  quite  some  impor- 
tance to  our  allies,  and  it  will  certainly 
be  the  focus  of  some  of  our  discussions  on 
this  trip. 

I'd  like  to  hear  from  them  specifi- 
cally how  important  they  think  it  is.  We 
recognize,  as  the  State  Department  did 
in  that  letter  that  you  make  reference  to, 
that  this  doesn't  mean  that  we're  open- 
ing the  doors  to  technology  transfer,  be- 
cause COCOM  [Coordinating  Committee 
for  Multilateral  Export  Controls]  is  still 
going  to  apply. 

It  does  remain  a  fact  that  President 
Carter  put  this  "no-exceptions"  policy 
into  place  when  the  Russians  marched 
into  Afghanistan.  They  are  leaving;  in- 
deed, they  are.  The  policy  was  put  into 
place,  however,  at  a  time  when  they  were 
not  funneling  a  billion  dollars  a  year  into 
Central  America. 


Q.  Just  to  change  the  subject  a 
little  bit.  Could  you  tell  us  how  you 
think  that  your  stock  holdings  that 
we  read  about  in  the  paper  this  morn- 
ing fit  into  Bu.sh's  policy  that  people 
should  not  do  anything  that  looks 
like  it  could  be  perceived  as  a  con- 
flict of  interest,  whether  it  was  in 
actuality? 

A.  Sure.  Let  me  say  this,  with  re- 
spect to  that.  For  the  8  years  that  I  have 
been  in  government,  I  have  sought  and 
relied  upon  the  advice  and  counsel  of  ca- 
reer attorneys  at  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment, at  the  State  Department,  and  at 
the  Office  of  Government  Ethics.  I  have 
been  guided  by  their  advice  and  counsel, 
and  I  will  continue  to  be  guided  by  their 
advice  and  counsel. 

In  the  course  of  being  thereby 
guided,  I  had  created  a  blind  trust  in 
early  1981,  when  we  first  came  into  of- 
fice. That  trust  has  been  in  force  and  in 
existence  ever  since.  I  have  executed  re- 
cusal statements  at  each  of  the  govern- 
ment posts  that  I  have  served,  and  I 
have  been  very  careful  about  recusing 
myself  from  specific  issues  that  might 
constitute  a  conflict  or  an  appearance 
of  conflict. 

I  was  advised  by  career  attorneys  at 
these  departments  and  at  the  Office  of 
Government  Ethics  that  participation  in 
general  policy  issues — general  policy 
determinations — was  appropriate.  I  was 
specifically  so  advised  at  the  Treasury 
Department  in  the  summer,  I  think,  of 
1987  following  the  promulgation  of  the 
Justice  Department's  ruling  that  said 
that  there  can  be  some  cases  in  which 
participation  in  general  policy  issues  can 
constitute  an  appearance  of  conflict.  I 
sought  and  received  at  the  time  a  spe- 
cific determination  from  the  Office  of 
Government  Ethics. 

I  hope  that's  a  complete  answer  for 
you,  but  I'll  be  glad  to  respond  to  other 
questions  if  you  have  them. 

Q.  Do  you  think  it  is  necessary  at 
this  time  for  the  Bush  Administra- 
tion to  think  stricter  lines  existed  in 
the  past  Administration? 

A.  I  think  that  the  Pre.sident  has 
made  it  very  clear  that  ethics  are  a  very 
important  issue  for  him.  He  did  so  in  the 
campaign;  he's  done  so  in  speeches  since 
then.  I  think  that  it  would  be  appropri- 
ate and  in  keeping  with  his  campaign 
pledges  and  his  statements. 

Let  me  say  that  discussions  continue 
with  attorneys  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment, the  Office  of  Government  Ethics, 


and  the  White  House  counsel's  office  re 
garding  mechanisms  or  actions  that 
could  be  taken  in  my  case  that  would 
serve  to  insulate  me  from  charges  or 
suggestions  of  conflict  of  interest.  Tho: 
discussions  are  on-going.  They  have  no 
been  concluded. 

As  I  indicated  earlier  in  my  state- 
ment, I  would  tend  to  be  guided  by  the 
results  of  those  discussions. 

But  let  me  say  one  other  thing,  if  1 
might.  My  papers  could  not  have  gone 
for  confirmation  as  Secretary  of  State- 
could  not  have  gone  to  the  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee — had  not 
there  been  approval  by  the  Office  of  Gi 
ernment  Ethics  and  the  predecessor  tn 
the  White  House  counsel's  office,  whici 
is  the  Transition  Office.  They  could  not 
have  gone  up  there  had  they  not  ap- 
proved the  mechanism  that  we  suggest 
be  used  to  avoid  conflicts  or  the  appeal 
ance  of  conflicts. 

There  are  a  number  of  additional 
mechanisms  that  could  be  considered, 
ranging  from  recusals  to  creation  of  a 
different  kind  of  trust.  I  have  a  qualifi( 
blind  trust.  I  could  consider  creating  a 
diversified  blind  trust;  I  could  considei 
a  waiver.  The  discussions  now  revolve 
around  waiver. 

Q.  Why  is  Mr.  Gray  [L.  Boyden 
Gray,  General  Counsel  to  the  Presi- 
dent] seeking  a  change  from  the  sta 
tus  that  you  had  in  the  past  if  that 
was  acceptable  then?  Why  are  the 
regulations  getting  tougher? 

A.  Why  are  the  regulations  getti 
tougher?  You'll  have  to  ask  the  attorne 
in  the  Justice  Department  who  wrote 
that  opinion  in  early  1987. 

Q.  Why  did  he  decide  it's  due  fo- 
a  change?  He's  telling  you  to  divest, 
right? 

A.  That's  really  not  exactly  right. 
I've  never  had  a  conversation  with  Mr. 
Gray  at  all  on  this  subject — not  one.  H 
did  have  a  conversation  with  the  attor- 
neys that  were  i-epresenting  me  in  the 
confirmation  process.  He  never  said,  a 
understand  it,  to  Bob  Kimmitt  [Robert 
M.  Kimmitt,  Under  Secretary-designa 
for  Political  Affairs],  "The  Secretary 
should  sell  his  bank  stock."  He  raised 
that  as  an  option  in  his  discussions  wit 
Mr.  Kimmitt,  but  he  did  not  say  that  it 
was  required. 

As  I  understand  the  situation,  the 
decision  really  is  with  me  in  terms  of 
whether  or  not  I  seek  a  waiver.  I  have 
concluded  that  I  should  seek  a  waiver, 
because  that  gives  me  additional  prote^ 
tion  and  helps  avoid  the  appearance  of 
any  sort  of  a  conflict  of  interest. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  191 


CANADA 


So  I  have  concluded  to  seek  a  waiver. 
fhe  White  House  could  say,  "No,  we 
von't  grant  you  that  waiver,"  and  I 
ould  do  a  number  of  things.  I  could  say. 
Fine,  I'll  go  to  a  diversified  blind 
I'ust."  I  could  say,  "I'll  take  myself  out 
f  Third  World  debt  issues  and  not  have 
ny  even  on  a  broad  general  policy  ba- 
is."  Or  I  could  sell  stock. 

Once  those  discussions  are  over  and 
determination  has  been  made,  that's 
hen  I  will  then  be  faced  with  an  obliga- 
1111  to  take  some  action  one  way  or  the 
then 

Q.  Can  you  tell  me  how  the  Presi- 
ent's  insistence  that  the  acid-rain  is- 
ue  be  considered  domestically  right 
ow,  before  we  look  for  bilateral 
Kreements.  differs  from  President 
;eagan's  insistence  on  studying  the 
latter  for  the  past  8  years'? 

A.  It  differs  significantly,  because 
le  President  has  said  the  time  for  study 
over;  the  time  for  action  is  now.  He  has 
)id,  "I  am  going  to  pi'esent  a  proposal  to 
le  Congress  that  will  have,  as  a  part  of 
.  reduction  of  emissions." 


Q.  Is  that  the  same  policy? 
i^hat's  — 

A.  No.  it  really  isn't  the  same,  be- 
luse  if  we  go  forward  before  we  have 
lied  the  ground — after  all,  we've  been 
1  office  now,  let's  see,  21  days,  I  think — 
we  go  forward  before  we  have  tilled 
lie  ground,  we're  going  to  have  a  diffi- 
ult  enough  political  situation  in  the 
nited  States  getting  this  done  as  it  is. 
■o  we  ought  to  do  it  right. 

But  he  gave  the  Prime  Minister,  I 
(link,  firm  assurances  that  the  attitude 
f  the  United  States  on  this  issue  has 
*  hanged.  I  think  the  Prime  Minister  be- 
leves  that,  and  the  President  has  said  he 
1  going  to  move  forward  with  discus- 
ions  with  the  Congress,  and  then  we'll 
lok  forward  to  negotiating  a  bilateral 
ccord.  He  also  said — out  there  as  he 
'as  leaving — it  would  be  before  the  end 
fthe  year. 

Q.  Tell  us  what  you  mean  by 
Itilling  the  ground."  Logistically, 
'hat  things  have  to  be  decided  on  a 
omestic  level"? 


A.  What  has  to  be  decided  primari- 
ly is  what  is  the  target  for  reduction, 
and  who's  going  to  pay  the  price.  And 
that  latter  question  is  a  very,  very  im- 
portant question  that  affects  different 
regions  of  the  United  States  in  different 
ways — or  it  could  affect  different  regions 
in  different  ways,  depending  on  what 
method  you  used  to  take  care  of  the  cost. 

Q.  There  are  reports  today  of  the 
new  draft  Executive  order  that  would 
further  restrict  the  disclosure  of  clas- 
sified information  and  would  deny  se- 
curity clearances  to  people  and 
wouldn't  tell  them  why  they  had  been 
denied.  Have  you  seen  these  and  do 
you  have  any  recommendations? 

A.  What  was  the  latter  part  of  it? 

Q.  It  would  deny  people  the  rea- 
sons they've  been  refused  security 
clearance. 

A.  I  have  not  seen  that,  no. 

Q.  Do  you  have  recommenda- 
tions— 

A.  And  it  would  not  be  available  to 
them  on  a  Freedom  of  Information  basis? 

Q.  Apparently  not. 

A.  I  think  we  ought  to  at  least  look 
at  it.  I  have  not  seen  that.  I  am  aware 
of  proposals  to  re-issue  an  Executive 
order — maybe  it's  already  been  done — 
similar  to  the  order  the  Reagan  Admin- 
istration issued  with  respect  to  timely 
notification  of  covei't  action  to  the  Con- 
gress. Is  this  embraced  within  the  con- 
text of  that  E  xecutive  order? 

Q.  Your  comment  about  the  zero 
defense  budget;  was  there  anything  in 
the  discussions  today  which  might  al- 
low Mr.  Mulroney  to  take  a  similar 
kind  of  action?  He's  under  some 
spending  pressure  here.  Defense  ex- 
penditures are  — 

A.  There  was  no  discussion.  The 
meeting  took  note  of  the  respective 
percentages  of  GNP  that  are  devoted 
to  defense. 

Q.  Could  the  advanced  missile 
testing  have  brought  the  government 
here  under  some  pressure  as  a  desta- 
bilizing and  possibly  an  offensive  sys- 
tem as  differentiated  from  a  defensive 
system?  Did  that  come  up? 


A.  The  President  expressed  his  ap- 
preciation for  what's  taken  place  in  that 
regard.  Of  course,  it's  the  view  of  the 
United  States  that  it  is  defensive  and 
that  that  testing  is  extraordinarily  im- 
portant in  terms  of  the  NATO  deter- 
rence and  in  terms  of  our  national 
security  interests. 

Q.  The  NATO  allies  are  going  to 
ask  you  what  effect  the  zero  growth 
defense  budget  is  going  to  have  on 
U.S.  troop  strength  in  Europe  and  so 
forth.  What  are  you  going  to  tell 
them? 

A.  We're  going  to  tell  them  we  hope 
it  doesn't  have  any  adverse  effect  at  all 
on  force  structure  and  that  generally 
what  we  have — that's  what  we  believe  as 
a  result  of  our  consultations  with  the 
Chiefs  [of  Staff]  and  with  officials  at  the 
Department  of  Defense. 

Q.  [West  German]  Chancellor 
Kohl  said  in  an  interview  today  that 
he  didn't  think  that  Germany  had  to 
make  a  decision  on  Lance  moderniza- 
tion until  1991  or  so.  1992.  Did  you  dis- 
cuss this  with  Mr.  Mulroney,  and  how 
is  this  going  to  affect  U.S.  — 

A.  No.  What  time  did  he  make  that 
statement? 

Q.  It  was  an  interview  in  today's 

Financial  Times. 

A.  No,  that  did  not  come  up  in  the 
discussions. 

Q.  How  is  this  going  to  affect 
U.S.  policy  as  you  — 

A.  One  of  the  purposes  of  my  trip  is 
to  discuss  issues  just  such  as  that.  So  I 
can't  tell  you  how  it's  going  to  affect  U.S. 
policy  until  I  complete  the  trip. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1989. 
^Press  release  15  of  Feb.  14.  ■ 


liepartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


31 


EAST  ASIA 


Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  iVIinister 


Prime  Minister  Noborii  Takeskita 
of  Japan  made  an  official  working  visit 
to  Washington,  D.C.,  February  1-3, 
1989,  to  meet  with  President  Bush  and 
other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
after  their  meeting  on  February  2^ 

President  Bush 

Let  me  begin  by  expressing  once 
again,  on  behalf  of  the  American  peo- 
ple, the  condolences  on  the  passing  of 
Emperor  Showa,  a  most  gentle  man  of 
great  learning.  I  look  forward  to  call- 
ing on  the  new  Emperor  when  I  visit 
Japan  later  this  month. 

It  has  been  a  pleasure  and  honor 
for  Barbara  and  me  to  welcome  you, 
Mr.  Prime  Minister,  to  the  White 
House.  You  are  one  of  our  first  official 
visitors,  and  this  reflects  the  impor- 
tance I  place  on  the  relations  between 
our  two  countries,  the  strength  of  our 
nations'  ties,  and  the  promise  that  our 
relationship  holds  for  the  future  of  the 
world. 

Two  weeks  ago,  here  in  Washing- 
ton, the  United  States  conducted  a  rit- 
ual that  spoke  of  both  continuity  and 


32 


change.  For  the  41st  time  in  200  years, 
the  United  States  swore  in  a  new  Presi- 
dent. And  in  the  transition  from  one 
President  to  the  next,  we  Americans 
reaffirmed  the  strength  of  our  democ- 
racy and  our  commitment  to  values  on 
which  it  was  built.  Japan  and  the  world 
can  count  on  the  United  States  to  con- 
tinue to  work  for  peace,  democracy, 
freedom,  and  justice  around  the  world. 
The  scope  of  America's  vision  is  global, 
and  we  will  continue  to  shoulder  the 
obligations  that  belong  to  a  global 
power. 

Continuity  will  also  be  the  mark  of 
relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Japan.  On  occasion  we  may  have 
differences,  but  these  are  the  differ- 
ences of  friends.  And  in  the  last  40 
years,  our  two  nations  have  been  truly 
close  friends.  The  peace  and  prosperity 
we  both  enjoy  today  are  among  the 
fruits  of  that  friendship.  Simply  put: 
We  respect  one  another.  We  need  one 
another  And  w^e  will  continue  to  work 
together  for  the  good  of  our  peoples 
and  of  all  humanity. 

During  this  visit,  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter and  I  worked  on  the  continuing 
business  of  the  friendship  between  our 
countries.  We  confirmed  that  the  trea- 


ty of  mutual  security  and  cooperation  i 
the  foundation  of  our  relationship.  I 
noted  the  importance  of  allies  assum 
ing  greater  responsibilities  in  the 
cause  of  peace.  The  Prime  Minister  an 
I  agreed  that  these  responsibilities 
take  many  forms.  In  this  regard,  I  ap- 
plaud Japan's  pledge  to  make  further 
significant  increases  in  overseas  devel 
opment  assistance  programs.  At  the 
same  time,  we  believe  that  the  most 
powerful  engine  for  economic  develop- 
ment and  growth — in  fact,  the  only  en- 
gine that  works — is  the  entrepreneur, 
large  and  small.  And  entrepreneurshij 
is  a  product  not  of  massive  aid  package 
but  of  free  and  open  economies  that  do 
not  carry  crushing  burdens  of  ta.xation 
and  regulation  and  that  maintain  the 
rule  of  law,  including  contract  and 
property  law. 

Along  these  lines,  we  agreed  on 
the  importance  of  supporting  democra 
cy  and  sustained  growth  and  reform  ir 
the  Philippines.  Toward  this  end,  we 
pledge  to  make  every  effort  to  launch 
the  multilateral  assistance  initiative 
for  the  Philippines  this  year. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  reviewe 
the  progress  our  nations  have  achieved 
in  bringing  our  economies  into  better 
balance  and  in  further  opening  our 
markets  to  each  other's  goods  and  serv 
ices.  We  also  recognize  the  need  for 
continued  policy  efforts  in  these  areas 
The  Prime  Minister  reaffirmed  Japan' 
determination  to  promote  strong  do- 
mestic growth  and  structural  adjust- 
ments. And  I  told  him  that  I  am 
determined  to  reduce  our  budget 
deficit. 

In  the  area  of  multilateral  coopen 
tion,  we  agreed  that  we  would  continu 
to  coordinate  policies  through  estab- 
lished settings,  especially  the  econom 
summit.  We  will  look  forward  to  the 
next  summit  meeting,  which  will  be 
held  in  Paris.  We  also  agreed  on  the  in 
portance  for  continued  global  prosper 
ity  of  a  successful  Uruguay  Round. 
And  we  agreed  on  the  importance  of 
frequent  consultation  at  all  levels  on 
economic  issues. 

All  in  all,  our  talks  were  positive 
and  forthright,  befitting  close  allies. 
The  Prime  Minister  and  I  first  met 
some  time  ago,  and  this  week's  meet- 
ings have  helped  us  become  even  bette 
acquainted.  We've  laid  the  groundworl 
for  close  cooperation,  as  we  deal  with 
the  issues  and  the  opportunities  of  the 
last  decade  of  the  20th  century. 


EAST  ASIA 


•inie  Minister  Takeshita^ 

,\ish  to  convey  on  behalf  of  the  Japa- 
sc  people  my  deepest  appreciation  to 
t'  (iovernment  and  people  of  the 
lilted  States  for  their  expressions  of 
iii|iathy  and  condolences  on  the  de- 
>r  of  Emperor  Showa.  The  people  of 
1 1,1 11  are  also  deeply  touched  that  you 
il  Mrs.  Bush  will  attend  the  funeral 
d-i'iiiony. 

Looking  back  upon  the  43  years 
;Hf  the  end  of  the  war.  I  am  reminded 
,f\v  of  the  friendship  and  cooperation 
!  ■  American  people  have  consistently 
(tended  to  us  through  the  years.  I  am 
!  ily  grateful  that  you  have  so  gra- 
etisly  invited  us  to  Washington  at 
tis  busy  time,  so  soon  after  your 
iitiguration. 

1  appreciate  the  remarks  you  have 
j;t  made  on  the  thoughts  we  shared  in 
(r  first  meeting.  Our  first  meeting 
^  s  truly  promising  in  opening  the 
pspective  into  our  future.  I  believe  it 
!  iked  a  new  start  for  U.S. -Japan  co- 
(  -ration,  which  will  serve  to  help 
( >ure  peace  and  prosperity  for  the 
1  rid.  as  we  move  toward  the  21st  cen- 
t  -y.  P'ortunately  the  basis  of  our  coop- 
it  ive  relationship  is  firm  and  sound. 
e  -lapan-U.S.  security  arrangement, 
'  111  which  this  relationship  rests,  has 
I  er  been  better.  The  successful  solu- 
t  ns  we  have  been  able  to  achieve  re- 
[  (ling  bilateral  economic  issues  have 
f  iiiinstrated  the  resilience  of  our  rela- 
iiship.  Thus,  through  a  dialogue,  is- 
'^  between  our  two  countries  can  be 
I  (lived. 

In  sustaining  noninflationary 
L  iwth  of  the  international  economy 
i  I  in  reducing  e.xternal  imbalances  in 
"  economies,  the  President  and  I 
ired  the  view  that  macroeconomic 
icy  coordination  is  of  crucial  impor- 
ice.  I  stated  to  the  President  that 
Japanese  economy  will  continue  to 
)w  through  strong  domestic  demand, 
it  imports  are  expected  to  continue 
increase,  and  that  structure  adjust- 
nt  efforts  will  be  further  enhanced, 
e  President  stated  that  he  will  make 
ermined  efforts  to  reduce  the  budg- 
deficit. 

The  world  faces  a  number  of  chal- 
ges  but  is  rich  with  promises.  In 
ir  words:  The  new  breeze  is  blowing, 
u  and  I  share  the  conviction  that  now 
he  time  for  Japan  and  the  United 
ites  to  further  strengthen  policy 
irdination  and  to  joint  endeavors 
order  to  create  a  better  world. 

We  will  consult  closely  on  our  poli- 
s  toward  the  Soviet  Union,  which  of- 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


fers  new  challenges  and  opportunities 
for  East-West  relations.  We  will  work 
together  to  ensure  peace  and  prosper- 
ity in  Asia,  the  Middle  East,  Central 
and  South  America,  and  other  parts  of 
the  world.  We  will  work  together  to 
strengthen  the  free  trading  system 
and  agree  to  cooperate  closely  for  the 
progress  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations. 

No  nation  can  substitute  for  the 
United  States  as  the  leader  of  the  de- 
mocracies around  the  world.  I  look  to 
you,  Mr.  President,  for  wise  and  firm 
leadership,  and  you  will  have  my  full 
support.  For  my  part,  I  will  continue  to 


pursue  my  diplomatic  goal  of  Japan  con- 
tributing more  to  the  world. 

Japan  and  the  United  States  have  a 
number  of  common  tasks  ahead.  To- 
gether we  must  take  those  initiatives  to 
solve  the  many  problems  facing  our 
world.  Our  meeting  today  confirmed 
that  if  our  two  peoples  work  together, 
hand-in-hand,  there  is  nothing  we  can- 
not achieve. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  F^eb.  6,  1989. 

-Prime  Minister  Takeshita  spoke  in 
Japanese,  and  his  remarks  were  translated 
by  an  interpreter.  ■ 


East  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and  the  U.S.: 
An  Economic  Partnership 


Overview 

The  economies  of  the  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  region'  are  important  in  the  in- 
ternational trade  of  the  United  States 
and  play  a  large  and  growing  role  in 
the  world  economy.  During  the  past 
two  to  three  decades,  much  of  the  re- 
gion has  experienced  rapid  economic 
growth,  sometimes  more  than  10%  per 
year,  largely  because  most  East 
Asian  governments  are  committed  to 
outward-looking  and  market-oriented 
policies.  Their  combined  gross  national 
product  is  now  about  three-quarters  of 
U.S.  total  output.  Japan  is  the  major 
economic  power  in  the  region.  Other 
East  Asian  economies — such  as 
South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong,  and 
Singapore — are  emulating  its  success- 
ful model  of  high  rates  of  savings  and 
investment,  more  efficient  and  ad- 
vanced industry,  high-technology  ex- 
ports, and  increased  educational  and 
technical  training.  China  also  has  been 
attempting  to  transform  its  economy 
along  market  lines  and  has  experienced 
high  rates  of  economic  growth. 

East  Asian  exports  have  pene- 
trated almost  every  corner  of  the  globe. 
Since  1983  U.S. -East  Asian  trade 
across  the  Pacific  has  exceeded  our 
trade  across  the  Atlantic.  In  1987  U.S. 
trade  with  East  Asia,  which  accounted 
for  35%  of  our  global  commerce,  was 
greater  than  with  any  other  region.  At 
the  same  time,  the  U.S.  trade  deficit 
with  East  Asia  was  $107  billion,  more 
than  60%  of  our  worldwide  trade 
shortfall. 


East  Asian  economic  success  has 
been  accompanied  by  the  growth  of  de- 
mocracy in  the  region.  New  democratic 
governments  in  the  Philippines  and 
South  Korea  exemplify  this  trend  to- 
ward greater  popular  participation  in 
the  political  process.  This  economic 
and  political  progress  is  buttressed  by 
various  bilateral  military  arrange- 
ments with  the  United  States,  which 
provide  security  and  stability  in  the 
region. 

The  economic  growth  and  political 
development  of  East  Asian  countries 
and  areas  will  likely  give  the  region  an 
even  greater  role  in  world  affairs  in  the 
years  leading  up  to  the  21st  century. 
Their  exports,  technological  advances, 
capital,  foreign  investment,  and  eco- 
nomic assistance  will  have  an  increas- 
ing impact  on  other  regions  and  on 
international  trade  and  finance.  The 
United  States  hopes  that  the  region 
will  take  the  lead  in  further  reducing 
its  trade  barriers,  either  unilaterally 
or  in  the  current  Uruguay  Round  of 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  under 
the  auspices  of  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  A  more 
open  international  trading  system  will 
enhance  East  Asia's  future  economic 
development  and  lessen  the  U.S.  trade 
imbalance  with  the  region. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
be  the  major  power  in  the  Pacific,  even 
though  the  rapid  growth  of  the  East 
Asian  economies  has  lessened  our  rela- 
tive economic  position.  The  U.S.  mar- 
ket will  probably  remain  the  largest  for 


33 


EAST  ASIA 


INDIA  I  (.(Sr     H 

■r\^     BURMA-     ^ 
a«rGLADESH      „      ,    LAOS      Hana,    Hong  Kong 


Pacific 
Ocean 


(UK) 


^Manila 


Rangoon • 

THA,LAN.       -^^^^^ 

BangkoK .      camBODiU  •      . 

*  -iy    X  tfi?nofn  Penh         P(«IL(f*PiNES 


Philippine 
Sea 


Yaren» 
NAURU 


^^^      k  SOLOMON 
EA  VV^LANDS 

Honiara*^ 


Indian 
Ocean 


VANUATliv. 


Caledonia   ' 

(FRANCE) 


TUVALU 
Funafuti* 


Suva''^ 


Tasman 
Sea 


Names  and  boundary  represenlation 
are  not  necessarily  authoritative. 


Wellinglqn 
/      /ZEALAND 


0243  1-99  STATE  (INR/GE) 


East  Asian  exports,  but  it  is  not  likely 
to  absorb  their  future  rapid  growth  to 
the  extent  that  it  did  earlier  in  this 
decade.  The  United  States  will  contin- 
ue to  be  an  important  source  of 
investment,  high  technology,  and  man- 
ufacturing facilities  for  East  Asia,  and 
our  service  industries  are  poised  for  an 
expanded  role  in  the  region.  Addi- 
tionally, it  remains  an  educational  mag- 
net: 39%  of  all  foreign  students  in  the 
United  States  are  East  Asians.  The 
mutually  beneficial  partnership  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  East  Asia, 
both  multilaterally  and  through  many 
personal  ties  and  experiences,  contrib- 
utes to  developing  a  stronger  inter- 
national economic  system  and  the 
strengthening  of  democratic  institu- 
tions among  our  allies  and  friends. 
A  sense  of  interdependence  is 
evolving  among  the  economies  of  East 


Asia  and  the  Pacific.  The  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) 
has  fostered  cooperation  among  its 
members  and  dialogue  with  govern- 
ments in  the  Pacific  basin  and  with  oth- 
er developed  countries.  Community 
consciousness  also  has  contributed  to 
the  formation  and  development  of  other 
organizations,  such  as  the  Pacific  Basin 
Economic  Council  and  the  Pacific  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  Conference.  Future 
cooperation  in  the  region  could  come 
from  dialogue  in  some  kind  of  new  Pa- 
cific basin  forum  on  various  topics  of 
mutual  interest: 

•  Structural  economic  policies, 
such  as  privatization  of  public  enter- 
prises and  lowering  of  trade  barriers, 
that  would  promote  further  growth,  ef- 
ficiency, private  sector  initiatives,  and 
free  trade; 


•  Deregulation  and  improvement  • 
transportation  systems  to  facilitate  tli 
movement  of  goods,  people,  and  infor- 
mation throughout  the  region; 

•  Promotion  of  educational  ex- 
changes with  the  United  States;  and 

•  Protection  of  natural  resources 
and  the  environment. 

The  United  States  hopes  to  partic 
pate  with  all  market-oriented  govern- 
ments of  the  region  in  the  developmen 
of  this  dialogue  and  the  establishment 
of  a  mutually  beneficial  East  Asian/  ^ 
Pacific  agenda  in  the  coming  years. 

Japan 

Because  of  its  strength  as  the  second 
largest  economy  in  the  noncommunist 
world,  Japan  is  the  major  economic 
power  in  East  Asia.  The  combined  Gh 
of  the  United  States  and  Japan  totals 
about  35%  of  world  output.  The  two 
countries  have  close  economic,  politi- 
cal, cultural,  and  security  ties.  This  & 
liance  has  been  and  will  continue  to  b 
the  cornerstone  of  U.S.  policies  in  Ea» 
Asia. 

Japan's  strong  export  performano 
since  the  1960s  has  been  the  envy  of  d' 
veloped  and  developing  countries.  Ja- 
pan's share  of  world  exports  is  now 
more  than  10%,  about  twice  its  share 
20  years  ago.  U.S. -Japanese  trade  has^ 
grown  to  $116  billion  in  1987,  second 
only  to  U.S. -Canadian  commerce.  Ou- 
trade  deficit  with  Japan,  which  begar 
in  1965,  has  increased  to  almost  $60  b 
lion  per  year  in  1986-87,  although  it  ii 
now  coming  down  slowly. 

The  U.S.  Government  aims  to  in- 
crease U.S.  exports  to  Japan.  During, 
the  past  4  years,  U.S. -Japanese  trade 
negotiations  have  opened  Japanese  mi 
kets  for  U.S.  exports  of  such  items  as 
drugs,  medical  equipment,  semicondv 
tors,  telecommunications  equipment, 
beef,  and  citrus  products.  In  addition 
American  goods  have  become  more 
competitive  in  Japan  because  of  the  dl 
preciation  of  the  dollar  and  greater 
U.S.  attention  to  the  quality  of  our  e> 
port  products.  Although  much  progra 
has  been  made,  the  United  States  con 
tinues  to  call  upon  Japan  to  implemen 
further  trade  liberalization  and  to  ex- 
pand its  domestic  markets.  The  U.S. 
Government  has  pointed  out  that  sucl 
measures  would  benefit  Japan,  the 
United  States,  and  the  international 
trading  system. 


34 


EAST  ASIA 


According  to  U.S.  data,  the  stock 
Jirect  investment  in  each  other's 
momies  grew  rapidly  to  $43  billion 
the  end  of  1987,  almost  three  times 
re  than  in  1982.  Japan's  direct  in- 
itment  in  the  United  States  was 
rly  $31  billion  at  the  end  of  1987. 
ere  are  Japanese-owned  manufactur- 
facilities  in  40  U.S.  States,  employ- 
more  than  100,000  Americans. 
Pxluctive  foreign  investment  can 
Hnij;  better  jobs,  more  efficient  opera- 
is,  greater  choice  of  quality  goods  at 
ilH'titive  prices,  and  the  transfer  of 
liial  and  technology  to  us.  They  also 
li'ct  the  growing  linkages  between 
two  economies. 

The  United  States  and  Japan  have 
i  kt'd  to  coordinate  their  economic 
hit's  and  e.xchange  rates  to  assure 
lilc  economic  growth.  For  example, 
two  countries  agreed  in  October 
.  fi  that  Japan  should  cut  interest 
I's  while  increasing  government 
.  tiding  and  that  the  United  States 
.^  uld  continue  to  seek  reductions  in 
It  budget  deficit,  in  order  to  reduce 
t'ir  large  external  imbalances.  This 
ln'ration  has  been  bolstered  by 
littnnual  subcabinet  economic  meet- 


ings, numerous  trade  negotiations,  and 
other  official  contacts  between  the  two 
countries. 

Japan  has  become  a  major  source  of 
economic  aid,  primarily  to  other  coun- 
tries in  Asia.  At  the  Toronto  economic 
summit  in  June  1988,  Japanese  Prime 
Minister  Noboru  Takeshita  outlined  a 
new  program  of  $50  billion  in  official 
development  assistance  over  the  next  5 
years.  The  Government  of  Japan  in- 
tends to  increase  the  grant  component 
of  this  assistance,  require  fewer  condi- 
tions on  its  loans,  and  provide  $1  billion 
in  debt  relief  to  the  poorest  developing 
countries.  Japan  is  likely  to  become  the 
world's  largest  aid  donor  in  1989.  The 
United  States  welcomes  this  develop- 
ment as  part  of  our  interest  in  having 
our  allies  make  a  greater  contribution 
to  common  global  interests.  We  hope 
that  Japan  will  extend  a  greater  pro- 
portion of  its  expanded  foreign  aid  pro- 
gram on  a  grant  basis. 

China 

During  the  past  decade,  the  United 
States  and  the  People's  Republic  of  Chi- 
na (P.R.C.)  have  enjoyed  a  significant 
expansion  in  economic  relations.  The 


United  States  is  China's  third  largest 
trading  partner.  In  1988  our  bilateral 
trade  exceeded  $13  billion,  nearly  a 
seven-fold  increase  since  diplomatic  re- 
lations were  normalized  10  years  ago. 
In  the  same  period,  U.S.  investment 
committed  to  China  increased  to  more 
than  $;-5  billion  and  has  focused  on  ener- 
gy exploration,  electronics,  te.xtiles, 
food  processing,  hotels,  and  construc- 
tion. This  relationship  has  been 
achieved  without  compromising  our 
friendship  for,  or  cooperation  with,  the 
people  of  Taiwan. 

China  has  had  impressive  economic 
growth  during  the  last  decade,  averag- 
ing nearly  10%  per  year.  Under  the 
leadership  of  Chairman  Deng  Xiaoping, 
the  P.R.C.  has  undertaken  a  series  of 
far-reaching  economic  reforms,  includ- 
ing decentralizing  enterprise  manage- 
ment, relaxing  price  controls,  and 
encouraging  trade  and  investment  with 
market  economies.  As  a  result  of  these 
reforms,  industrial  production  rose 
dramatically,  and  agricultural  output 
expanded  and  diversified.  Recently, 
however,  China  postponed  further  price 
reforms  in  an  effort  to  bring  inflation 
under  control.  In  1988  the  annual  offi- 
cial inflation  rate  was  about  20%  na- 


Economic  Indicators,  1987 

(U.S.  $  millions,  unless  otherwise  indicated) 


Population 

(millions) 

GNP 

Real  GNP 
Growth 

(%) 

GNP  Per 
Capita 

(U.S.S) 

Consumer  Price 
Intiation 

(%) 

Exports 

(f.o.b.) 

imports 

(c.i.f.) 

Trade 
Balance 

U.S. 
Exports 

U.S. 
Imports 

U.S.  Trade 
Balance 

ASEAN' 

301.0 

199,827 

5.4 

663 

- 

83,354 

79,751 

3,603 

9,840 

18,052 

(8,212) 

Australia 

15.9 

195,521 

4.4 

12,100 

7.1 

26,433 

29,350 

(2,917) 

5,467 

3,287 

2,180 

Zhma 

1.074.0 

293,383 

9.4 

273 

7.3 

39.542 

43,392 

(3.850) 

3,488 

6,911 

(3.423) 

Hong  Kong'  2 

5.7 

46,196 

13.6 

8,230 

5.5 

48,478 

48,467 

11 

3,983 

10,490 

(6,507) 

ndonesia' 

170.4 

65,291 

3.0 

383 

8.0 

17.600 

13,100 

4,500 

764 

3,719 

(2,955) 

Japan 

121.1 

2,384,500 

4.2 

19,537 

0.1 

229,100 

149,200 

79,900 

28,200 

88,074 

(59,874) 

Korea 

42.1 

118,300 

12.6 

2,830 

3.0 

47,282 

41,021 

6,261 

7,665 

17,991 

(10,326) 

Vlalaysia' 

16.5 

29,800 

4.7 

1,750 

0.8 

17,897 

12,670 

5,227 

1,895 

3,053 

(1,158) 

New  Zealand '3 

3.3 

35,200 

-    0.9 

10,700 

13.5 

7,196 

7,233 

(37) 

815 

1,180 

(365) 

Philippines' 

57.7 

33,398 

5.7 

595 

7.4 

5,720 

7,715 

(1,455) 

1,584 

2,481 

(897) 

Singapore' 

2.6 

19,398 

8.8 

7,413 

0.9 

28,622 

32,487 

(3,865) 

4,023 

6.395 

(2,372) 

Taiwan 

19.7 

97,200 

11.2 

4,925 

0.2 

52,100 

33,000 

19.100 

7,186 

26.406 

(19,220) 

Thailand' 

53.7 

47,000 

6.6 

875 

2.5 

11,719 

13,023 

(1,777) 

1,483 

2,387 

(904) 

United  States 

243.9 

4,487,700 

4.0 

18,400 

4.4 

252,866 

424,082 

(171,216) 

- 

- 

- 

*'  Product  data  are  on  gross  domestic  product  (GDP),  rather  than  gross  national  product  (GNP). 

2  Total  exports  include  reexports;  total  domestic  exports  were  $19,700  million. 

3  GDP  for  fiscal  year  ending  IVlarch  31, 1988. 

Sources:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  U.S.  Embassies,  International  Monetary  Fund,  East  Asian  and  Pacific  governments 


CjDartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


35 


EAST  ASIA 


tionwide  and  25-30%  in  urban  areas. 
Despite  China's  opening  to  the  West, 
opportunities  to  trade  with  and  invest 
in  China  are  restricted  in  many  impor- 
tant ways  by  Chinese  law  and  practice. 

China  continues  to  be  strongly  in- 
terested in  acquiring  state-of-the-art 
technology  in  order  to  modernize  key 
sectors  of  its  economy.  In  recent  years, 
the  United  States  has  liberalized  con- 
trols on  the  export  of  high-technology 
items  to  China.  Chinese  imports  of 
computers  and  sophisticated  electronic 
equipment  have  increased  dramatically. 

The  United  States  and  China  have 
the  largest  bilateral  science  and  tech- 
nology cooperation  program  of  its  kind 
for  each  side,  with  some  400  coopera- 
tive activities  under  30  bilateral  agree- 
ments. For  example,  a  December  1985 
agreement  provides  for  cooperation  in 
the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy. 
More  than  30,000  Chinese  students  cur- 
rently are  enrolled  in  U.S.  universities, 
while  roughly  7,000  Americans  are 
studying  or  teaching  in  the  P.R.C. 

Four  Asian  "Tigers" 

The  newly  industrialized  economies  of 
South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong,  and 
Singapore  are  often  referred  to  as  the 
four  Asian  "tigers"  or  "dragons."  Their 
success  stems  in  large  part  from  a 
commitment  to  private  sector  and/or 
market-oriented  economic  policies  that 
have  resulted  in  very  rapid  growth  of 
industries  and  exports  as  well  as  the 
unleashing  of  human  resources. 

In  recent  years,  the  United  States 
has  played  an  important  part  in  this 
economic  development  by  providing  a 
relatively  open  market  for  their  prod- 
ucts. Our  trade  deficits  with  the  four 
"tigers"  grew  to  $38  billion  in  1987,  ac- 
counted for  primarily  by  deficits  with 
Taiwan  ($19.2  billion)  and  South  Korea 
($10.3  billion).  As  these  two  have  be- 
come stronger  economically,  they  have 
begun  to  lower  their  trade  barriers  and 
make  their  exchange  rates  more  realis- 
tic, but  they  need  to  do  more  on  both 
fronts  to  reduce  their  trade  imbalances 
with  the  United  States. 


South  Korea.  The  Republic  of  Ko- 
rea has  witnessed  astounding  economic 
changes  in  this  decade  as  real  GNP  has 
doubled.  In  the  process,  Korea  has  be- 
come America's  seventh  largest  trading 
partner  among  individual  countries.  It 
now  exports  high-technology  goods, 
such  as  automobiles  and  electronics,  to 
the  United  States,  Japan,  and  else- 
where. Soaring  per  capita  income,  de- 
clining unemployment,  and  reduced 
foreign  debt  have  allowed  Korea  to 
move  in  the  direction  of  a  more  liber- 
alized economy.  During  the  past  year. 
South  Korea  has  made  the  transition  to 
democracy  by  restoring  freedom  to  the 
media  and  providing  for  full  participa- 
tion in  elections.  A  multiparty  political 
system  has  emerged.  The  United 
States  fully  supports  these  political  de- 
velopments while  continuing  to  provide 
military  support  under  a  bilateral  secu- 
rity agreement. 

Taiwan.  The  people  of  Taiwan  have 
generated  enviable  economic  growth, 
averaging  nearly  double-digit  annual 
rates  since  the  1950s.  As  elsewhere  in 
East  Asia,  industry  has  expanded  and 
produced  higher  value-added  products. 
Taiwan's  authorities  have  lowered  tar- 
iffs, relaxed  foreign  exchange  controls, 
strengthened  the  protection  of  intellec- 
tual property,  encouraged  export  diver- 
sification, and  appreciated  the 
currency  (40%  against  the  U.S.  dollar 
since  1985).  Although  U.S.  exports  to 
Taiwan  have  increased,  our  trade  defi- 
cit with  Taiwan  was  $19  billion  in  1987. 
Taiwan's  foreign  exchange  reserves  at 
the  end  of  1988  were  about  $75  billion, 
exceeded  only  by  Japan.  Taiwan's  politi- 
cal system  has  become  more  open 
in  recent  years.  The  United  States  wel- 
comes Taiwan's  economic  and  political 
modernization  but  has  urged  its  leaders 
to  lower  trade  barriers  further  and  al- 
low a  more  realistic  exchange  rate. 

Hong  Kong  and  Singapore.  These 
two  "city  states"  also  have  experienced 
rapid  economic  development;  they  have 
the  highest  per  capita  GNPs  among  the 
newly  industrialized  economies.  Lack- 
ing natural  resources,  the  accomplish- 
ments of  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore 


have  been  largely  due  to  strong  marke 
orientation  and  hard-working  and  dist 
plined  labor  forces.  Savings  and  inves 
ment  rates  in  Singapore  are  among  th 
highest  in  the  world.  Hong  Kong  and 
Singapore  are  extremely  successful  e> 
amples  of  the  virtues  of  export-led 
growth.  Their  economies,  which  have 
almost  completely  free  markets  and 
which  center  around  very  busy  ports, 
are  totally  dependent  on  the  mainte- 
nance of  an  open  international  trading 
system.  Both  Hong  Kong's  domestic  e) 
ports  and  reexports  from  China  have 
skyrocketed  in  the  past  20  years. 

ASEAN  Countries 

More  than  300  million  people  live  in  tl' 
six  nations  which  make  up  the  Associa 
tion  of  South  East  Asian  Nations — the 
Philippines,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Tha 
land,  Singapore,  and  Brunei.  The 
ASEAN  countries  are  rich  in  natural 
resources,  possess  talented  and  hard- 
working populations,  and,  to  a  large  e 
tent,  have  pursued  market-oriented  d 
velopment  policies.  Since  1977  these 
nations  have  averaged  annual  real  GN 
growth  of  more  than  5% ,  one  of  the  ec 
nomic  success  stories  among  developii 
countries. 

The  United  States  has  maintaine 
cooperative  economic  relations  with  tl 
ASEAN  countries.  We  continue  to  be 
the  largest  consumer  for  ASEAN  mai 
ufactures.  U.S. -ASEAN  trade,  ex- 
panding rapidly,  was  about  $28  billior 
in  1987,  making  ASEAN  our  seventh 
most  important  trading  partner.  Unf( 
tunately,  most  ASEAN  countries  (not 
including  Singapore  and  Brunei)  reta 
relatively  high  tariff  barriers  and  oth 
nontariff  constraints.  U.S.  direct  in- 
vestment in  ASEAN  economies  totah 
approximately  $10  billion  at  the  end  o 
1987.  Many  U.S.  companies  manufac- 
ture increasingly  higher  technology 
products  and  components  in  ASEAN 
countries  for  reexport  to  the  United 
States  and  other  markets.  The  Unitec 
States  has  engaged  in  regular  econon 
ic  dialogue  with  ASEAN.  In  addition, 
we  are  engaged  in  the  U.S. -ASEAN 
initiative,  a  broad-gauged  study  of  ou 
economic  relationship,  including  anah 
sis  of  possible  liberalization  measures 
both  sides  can  take  to  strengthen  it. 


36 


EAST  ASIA 


The  Philippines.  After  years  of 
'dining  economic  health,  the  Philip- 
iits  increased  its  real  GNP  by  almost 
(  in  1987;  even  stronger  growth  is  an- 
•ipated  in  1988.  President  Corazon 
iiuino's  government  has  instituted  fis- 
I  and  market-opening  reforms,  but 
on'  could  be  done  to  make  the  econ- 
iiy  more  efficient  and  dynamic  and  to 
icdurage  foreign  investment.  Unem- 
iiyment  and  underemployment  remain 
liiuis  problems.  The  Philippines  has  a 
rut'  external  debt  totaling  approx- 
iiately  $30  billion.  The  United  States 
1  s  strongly  supported  the  transition 
t  democracy  in  the  Philippines  during 
le  past  3  years. 

The  U.S.  Government  is  providing 
ii'  Philippines  with  high  levels  of  eeo- 
niic  and  security  assistance — about 
:i"i  million  during  FY  1988 — as  part 
( (lur  effort  to  maintain  mutually  ben- 
(  cial  economic,  political,  and  security 
ilations.  U.S.  military  facilities  in  the 
1  ilippines  are  very  important  to  U.S. 
(feiise  interests  in  the  Pacific,  a  large 
rt  of  the  Philippines'  and  the  region's 
(tenses,  and  the  source  of  substantial 
(  inomic  benefits — employing  more 
t  m  (i8,000  Filipinos  and  injecting 
I  ndreds  of  millions  of  dollars  into  the 
1  a!  economy.  The  U.S.  Government 
;  0  has  taken  the  lead  in  calling  on  its 
I  ends  and  allies  to  increase  aid,  pro- 
I  lie  investment,  and  open  markets  to 
1  ilippine  exports. 

Indonesia.  The  Indonesian 
( jnomy — the  largest  though  least  de- 
1  oped  (in  terms  of  annual  per  capita 
i  ome)  among  ASEAN  members — has 
t  ed  the  challenge  of  lower  and  fluctu- 
1  ne  oil  prices  since  1983.  In  order  to 
(  iniote  growth,  the  Government  of  In- 
( lesia  has  undertaken  sweeping 
s  uctural  reforms,  restrained  public 
;  'nding,  maintained  currency  con- 
\  libility,  encouraged  foi'eign  invest- 
r  nt  and  capital  market  development, 
i  1  instituted  a  series  of  trade,  bank- 
i ;,  and  tax  reforms.  The  United 
;  itt's  welcomes  these  initiatives.  Indo- 
I  -ia  has  boosted  non-oil  exports, 
\  ich  now  account  for  more  than  one- 
Hf  of  its  export  earnings.  External 
(  nt  has  risen  sharply  in  recent  years 
I  about  $45  billion  at  the  end  of  1988. 


Malaysia.  The  Malaysian  economy 
is  moving  from  dependence  on  commod- 
ities (such  as  tin  and  rubber)  to  a  light 
manufacturing  base.  Electronics  prod- 
ucts have  become  the  largest  export 
earner.  Malaysia  had  a  1987  trade  sur- 
plus of  more  than  $5  billion.  Commerce 
with  the  United  States  has  grown  rap- 
idly. Real  GNP  growth  was  nearly  5% 
in  1987  and  is  expected  to  be  higher  in 
1988.  The  country's  financial  condition 
remains  solid  because  the  government 
has  pursued  responsible  fiscal  policies. 

Thailand.  Thailand  had  economic 

growth  of  almost  7%  in  1987,  and  pros- 
pects are  even  better  for  1988.  The 
government  has  promoted  export  diver- 
sification and  encouraged  foreign  in- 
vestment. Foreign  exchange  earnings 
from  tourism  soared  in  1987  to  nearly 
$2  billion.  The  United  States  is  Thai- 
land's largest  export  market.  However, 
the  Thais  are  very  concerned  about 
U.S.  agricultural  subsidies,  partic- 
ularly for  rice,  and  the  threat  of  U.S. 
import  restrictions,  especially  on  tex- 
tiles. The  main  recent  U.S.  concern 
about  our  trade  with  Thailand  has  been 
lack  of  Thai  protection  of  U.S.  intellec- 
tual property  rights,  such  as  copyrights 
and  patent  protection  of  U.S.  phar- 
maceutical products. 


South  Pacific 

Australia.  The  main  source  of  strength 
in  the  Australian  economy  is  its  export 
sector,  especially  agricultural  products 
and  raw  materials.  Exports  increased 
by  19%  in  1987.  About  one-half  of  Aus- 
tralian merchandise  exports  go  to  11 
Asian  nations,  principally  Japan.  How- 
ever, Australia  remains  an  important 
trading  partner  with  the  United 
States.  It  is  one  of  the  few  Pacific  coun- 
tries with  which  the  United  States  has 
a  sizable  and  consistent  trade  surplus. 
The  Australian  Government  has  under- 
taken significant  economic  reforms,  in- 
cluding a  program  of  phased  tariff 
reductions.  It  has  complained  about 
subsidized  U.S.  agricultural  exports 
that  restrict  Australian  sales.  Our  long 
and  cooperative  alliance  relationship 
with  Australia  is  based  on  mutual  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  security  interests. 


New  Zealand.  Prime  Minister 
David  Lange's  government  has  insti- 
tuted far-reaching  reforms,  including 
decreases  in  protectionism,  less  gov- 
ernment spending,  and  better  manage- 
ment of  the  public  sector,  in  order  to 
achieve  more  efficient  resource  alloca- 
tion and  to  reduce  inflation.  As  a  re- 
sult, real  GNP  was  down  slightly  in 
1987  and  is  expected  to  decline  further 
in  1988.  New  Zealand  remains  heavily 
dependent  on  agricultural  exports.  Ja- 
pan, Australia,  and  the  United  States 
account  for  about  one-half  of  New  Zea- 
land's trade.  For  many  years,  the 
United  States  and  New  Zealand  were 
military  allies  under  the  Australia- 
New  Zealand-United  States  (ANZUS) 
treaty.  However,  in  1986,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment suspended  its  security  guar- 
antees to  New  Zealand  under  the 
ANZUS  alliance  because  of  New  Zea- 
land's restrictive  policy  regarding  U.S. 
naval  ship  visits.  The  United  States 
hopes  that  the  New  Zealand  Govern- 
ment will  come  to  realize  the  value  of 
restoring  traditional  alliance 
cooperation. 


'Japan,  China,  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  the  Philippines,  In- 
donesia, Malaysia,  Thailand.  Australia,  and 
New  Zealand  are  considered  here.  ■ 


37 


EUROPE 


Secretary  Meets  With  NATO  Allies 


Secretary  Baker  departed  Ottawa 
o»  February  11,  1989,  to  confer  with 
NATO  allies  in  Europe.  He  returned  to 
Washington  on  February  17.  Following 
are  remarks  he  made  on  various 
occasions  during  the  trip. 


Iceland 


REYKJAVIK, 
FEB.  11,  1989' 

Foreign  Minister  Hannibalsson.  Now 

that  our  discussions  are  over,  I  think  it 
is  right  to  mention,  in  a  few  words, 
what  we  touched  upon. 

This  is  the  first  visit  by  the  Ameri- 
can Secretary  of  State  on  his  schedule 
to  visit  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  all  the 
other  NATO  countries.  What  we  main- 
ly talked  about  was  the  period  of 
change  in  the  East-West  relations  that 
we  are  now  experiencing,  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  NATO  leaders'  conference 
in  Brussels  this  spring,  and  then,  first 
and  foremost,  the  NATO  proposals  in 
disarmament  matters,  especially  as  far 
as  the  talks  that  are  now  starting  in 
the  beginning  of  March  in  Vienna  are 
concerned,  which  have  the  main  goals 
of  trying  to  obtain  an  accord  on  conven- 
tional disarmament  and  conventional 
armies  on  the  European  Continent. 

Then  we  talked  about  many  bilat- 
eral issues;  we  talked  about  defense  co- 
operation. We  talked  about  the  whaling 
issue  and  specific  issues  in  that 
conte.xt. 

These  were  very  productive  talks, 
and,  as  the  Secretary  of  State  men- 
tioned, these  talks  were  conducted  in  a 
manner  that  is  directed  at  trying  to  es- 
tablish a  personal  working  relationship 
with  his  colleagues  within  NATO,  as 
President  Bush  has  emphasized  that 
the  cooperation  within  NATO  is  one  of 
the  cornerstones  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

Secretary  Baker.  Let  me  simply 
say  that  the  minister  and  I  have  had 
very  productive  discussions,  taking 
note  of  the  fact  that  we  have  somewhat 
similar  backgrounds,  by  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  we  both  were  finance  minis- 
ters before  we  became  foreign  minis- 
ters. The  United  States  and  Iceland 
are  friends  and  allies,  and  together 
we're  founding  members  of  the  NATO 
alliance. 


We  had  wide-ranging  discussions 
on  the  full  range  of  NATO  issues — 
issues  related  to  East-West  matters 
and  the  bilateral  issues,  which  are  at 
the  forefront  of  relationships  between 
the  United  States  and  Iceland. 

I'm  glad  that  this  was  the  first 
country  that  I  was  able  to  visit  outside 
the  North  American  Continent  as  Sec- 
retary of  State  of  the  United  States.  I 
look  forward  to  a  continuing  relation- 
ship with  the  minister  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  close,  personal  rela- 
tionship between  us. 

Q.  Were  you  able  to  offer  any  as- 
surance to  the  Icelanders  on  the  ques- 
tion of  off-shore  pollution  from  the 
NATO  base  here  on  Iceland? 

Secretary  Baker.  We  were  able  to 
offei'  some  assurance  with  respect  to 
the  ground  water  problem  that  e.xists. 
The  study  that  is  being  conducted  will 
be  released  sometime  during  the  month 
of  February,  and  we  agreed  that  imme- 
diately upon  release  of  that  report,  we 
would  begin  discussions  to  see  how  we 
can  address  the  problem  together. 

Q.  Did  you  issue  [sic]  the  problem 
of  second  NATO  airport  in  Iceland? 

Secretary  Baker.  We  talked  about 
that  issue  as  well,  and  had  a  full  dis- 
cussion about  that  issue. 

Q.  And  the  results? 

Secretary  Baker.  The  matter  will 
remain  under  consideration.  I  think  the 
minister  is  disposed  to  seeing  the  alter- 
nate airport  located  at  the  best  possible 
location,  as  long  as  it  is  made  quite 
clear  that  there  will  be  no  specific  mili- 
tary requirements  with  respect  to  its 
use.  I  think  that,  ultimately,  those  as- 
surances will  be  forthcoming. 

Q.  Do  you  want  that  airport  in 
Iceland,  or  is  another  country 
possible? 

Secretary  Baker.  It  would  be  pref- 
erable if  it  were  in  Iceland. 


United  Kingdom 


LONDON. 
FEB.  12,  19892 

Foreign  Secretary  Howe.  I  would  like, 
if  I  may,  to  just  make  a  very  short 
statement  saying  that  we  have  been  de- 
lighted to  welcome  the  new  Secretary 


i  1 


of  State  here  on  his  first  visit  since  1 
appointment.  It  is  part,  of  course,  of 
his  tour  of  NATO  capitals,  so  that  th 
topics  we  have  discussed  have  been 
very  largely  concentrated  in  that 
area — the  handling  of  East-West  reli 
tions  and  the  way  in  which  the  NAT( 
alliance  addresses  itself  to  that.  We 
have  taken  the  opportunity  of  talking, 
about  as  many  other  things  as  we've 
had  time  to  do,  and  we've  had  an  ex- 
tremely useful  opportunity  of  talkini 
together. 

We're  not,  of  course,  strangers, 
cause  I  knew  Secretary  of  State  Bat 
when  he  was  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury. We  both  share  a  common  past  o: 
being  ex-finance  ministers,  which 
consolidates  the  strength  of  our 
relationship. 

Q.  Have  any  decisions  been 
reached? 

Foreign  Secretary  Howe.  This  i 
not  an  occasion  for  decision-taking;  ii 
an  occasion  for  reviewing  the  agenda 
The  Secretary  of  State  would  like  toii 
say  something  now. 

Secretary  Baker.  I  would  like  i(^ 
echo  what  Sir  Geoffrey  has  said.  Am 
as  he  has  pointed  out,  we  are,  indee( 
not  strangers.  We  have  had  an  assoc 
tion  through  my  experience  as  Secrt 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  his  as  Chancel  ■ 
of  the  Exchequer  and  as  Secretary  i 
his  current  capacity. 

We  did  concentrate  on  issues  af- 
fecting the  alliance,  but  we  talked 
about  a  whole  wide  range  of  issues  a 
well.  In  answer  to  your  initial  specit 
question,  I  thought  we  had  a  very 
productive  and,  hopefully,  fruitful 
discussion. 

Q.  Did  you  reach  any  consensu 
between  the  United  States  on  how  i 
handle  the  question  of  modernizati  i 
of  the  Lance  missiles  in  Europe? 

Foreign  Secretary  Howe.  No.  T  ■^ 
is  not  an  occasion  for  us  reaching  spt 
cific  conclusions  on  any  topic.  The  St 
retary  of  State  is  on  a  tour  to  the  wl  e 
range  of  NATO  capitals,  and  we  shal 
be  considering  continuing  our  manaj 
ment  of  that  and  other  questions  to- 
gether within  the  alliance  as  always, 
think  we  aren't  going  to  have  any  nn 
questions,  unless  you  would  like  to  si 
something. 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  19' 


EUROPE 


Secretary  Baker.  I  would  like  to 
lyjust  one  thing.  As  I  have  pointed 
it,  as  I  pointed  out  yesterday,  and  in 
)th  Canada  and  Iceland,  this  trip  of 
line  is  primarily  an  agenda-setting 
•ip.  It  gives  us  an  opportunity  to  con- 
ilt  with  our  NATO  allies  at  a  time 
hen  we  are  engaged  in  policy  formula- 
.111  in  the  United  States. 

President  Bush,  of  course,  believes 
rongly  in  the  importance  of  the  alli- 
ice.  He  would  like  to  do  everything  he 
m  to  maintain  a  strong  alliance  and, 
fact,  if  possible,  strengthen  it.  One 
ay  to  do  that  is  to  have  true  consulta- 
ons  rather  than  simply  briefings  or 
)tifications,  and  this  affords  us 
1  opportunity  to  have  those  true 
■nsultations. 


West  Germany 


ONN. 

EB.  13,  1989-* 

hought  I  would  give  you  a  readout  on 
r  meeting.  This  will  be  on  the  rec- 
d.  I  apologize  for  not  staying  too 
ig,  because  we've  got  the  Defense 
inister  waiting.  We  ran  about  15  or  20 
inutes  over. 

First  of  all,  I  want  to  say  that  our 
ssion  was  conducted  in  a  very,  very 
iendly  atmosphere,  because  this  was 
neeting  between  old  friends — and 
len  I  say  that,  I'm  using  the  Chancel- 
■'s  language  and  not  mine,  but  I  sub- 
ribe  to  it.  Fundamentally,  in  my  view, 
e  bottom  line  on  this  meeting  is  that 
e  German-American  partnership  is 
I'ong.  We  are  strong  partners,  and  we 
List  one  another. 

We  discussed  the  question  of  the 
byan  chemical  weapons  plant  and  the 
tions  that  the  Federal  Republic  has 
ken  with  respect  to  changes  in  their 
port  control  laws  relating  to  the  pun- 
iment  of  offenders,  and  with  respect 
a  statement  that  they  are  going  to  is- 
e  in  a  day  or  so,  laying  out  the  full 
.•ts  as  they  understand  them  sur- 
unding  this  incident.  I  expressed  the 
ct  that  we  were  very  pleased  with  the 
tions  that  they've  taken  as  they  have 
tlined  them  to  us.  We  spent  some 
ne  on  that.  We  spent  a  good  bit  of  our 
ne  on  discussions  regarding  Easi- 
est security. 

And  on  that  score,  I  would  say  to 
u  that  we  had  productive  discussions 


on  East-West  security  matters,  includ- 
ing the  SNF  [short-range  nuclear 
forces]  issue.  We  took  note  of,  of 
course,  and  reaffirmed  the  Brussels- 
NATO  communique  of  1988,  including 
the  importance  of  maintaining  the  for- 
ward defense  and  flexible  response 
strategy.  We  agreed  on  the  need  to 
complete  a  comprehensive  concept  for 
alliance  security  and  arms  control  at 
the  next  NATO  summit,  and  we  agreed 
that  our  discussions  on  these  matters 
will  be  continuing.  The  Chancellor  told 
us,  in  no  uncertain  terms,  that  what  he 
had  said  in  the  Financial  Times  inter- 
view was  exactly  in  line  with  what  was 
said  in  the  NATO  communique  of  May 
1988,  and  several  times  he  said  to  us,  "I 
have  not  changed  my  position."  He  au- 
thorized us  to  say  that  to  you. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  that  the  SNF 
debate  is  simply  behind  you?  That  it 
will  be  dealt  with  in  the  NATO  sum- 
mit and  it  will  no  longer  be  directed 
to— 

A.  It  means  that  there  is  commit- 
ment to  resolve  this  through  further  dis- 
cussions and  negotiations. 

Q.  And  there  won't  be  any  inter- 
im discussions;  it  will  then  be  dealt 
with  in  NATO,  I  mean— 

A.  It  will  be  dealt  with  whenever 
the  next  NATO  summit  is,  in  terms  of 
being  formally  dealt  with,  and  we  would 
expect,  of  course,  to  have  continuing  dis- 
cussions in  the  interim. 

Q.  Do  you  think  you  can  get  Con- 
gress to  support  financially  the  devel- 
opment of  modernization  of  the 
Lance  missile,  if  we  don't  get  a  deci- 
sion or  commitment  to  deploy  it  until, 
say,  1991  or  1992? 

A.  Let's  wait  and  see  what  happens 
at  the  next  NATO  summit,  because  that 
is  the  decision  meeting.  As  I  have  said 
before,  this  trip  was  not  intended  to  be  a 
decision-taking  trip.  These  are  agenda- 
setting  meetings;  they're  consultative 
meetings.  I'm  here  to  listen.  So  we  can't 
answer  that  question  until  we  actually 
have  the  summit — whenever  that's  going 
to  be. 

Q.  I  wanted  follow  up  on  some  of 
the  remarks  you  made  on  the  plane 
yesterday  about  the  START  [strategic 
arms  reduction  talks]  treaty — your 
own  feelings  about  it  and  the  ability 
to  get  it  through  Congress.  I  wonder 
if  you  could  clarify  those  remarks, 
because  there  is  some  confusion. 


A.  If  there  is  any  confusion,  let  me 
set  it  straight.  All  I  intended  to  say — 
and  I  have  said  this  before,  maybe  not  in 
the  confirmation  hearing,  although  I 
said  something  very  close  to  it  in  the 
confirmation  hearing — is  we  want  to 
reexamine  the  negotiating  positions; 
take  a  look  at  what's  on  the  table;  review 
the  bidding,  so  that  when  we  move  for- 
ward, assuming  we  do,  when  we  bring 
back  a  treaty,  we  will  bring  back  one 
that  we  can  get  ratified.  That's  all  I  was 
intending  to  say. 

Q.  You  suggested  in  that  conver- 
sation yesterday  that  there  were 
flaws  in  the  existing  outline  which 
might  not  allow  it  to  make  it  through 
Congress  if  it  were  there  in  its  pres- 
ent form. 

A.  I  think  if  you  read  the  exact  lan- 
guage, and  I  went  back  and  had  it  read 
to  me,  it  is  clear  that  I  expressed  reser- 
vations about  the  potential  ratifiability 
of  the  agreement,  that  we  want  to  make 
certain — 

Q.  — in  its  present  form? 

A.  We  do  have — and  we've  said  this 
many  times — to  make  a  strategic  mod- 
ernization decision  in  the  United  States. 
And  we  have  to  confront  that,  and  we, 
therefore,  will  have  to  take  a  look  at — 
and  I'm  not  saying  that  this  is  a  flaw  in 
our  present  negotiating  positions  or 
anything — but  we  have  taken  a  position 
against  mobile  missiles.  One  of  the 
things  that  we  will  have  to  examine  in 
our  strategic  modernization  review  is 
the  question  of  mobile  missiles.  But  what 
I  was  really  speaking  to  was  the  general 
principle  that  we  want  to  make  certain 
that  whatever  we  bring  back,  we  can  get 
ratified  and  that  we  don't  bring  back  a 
SALT  [strategic  arms  limitation  talks] 
agreement  and  have  that  kind  of  problem 
with  any  START  agreement  that  we 
negotiate. 

Q.  Back  on  SNF,  the  Germans 
are  pushing  for  commitments 
in  the  comprehensive  concept — 
commitments  to  negotiate  on  SNF. 
Are  you  willing  to  support  that? 

A.  You  see,  again,  this  was  not  a 
decision  meeting.  This  meeting  was  to 
simply  set  the  agenda.  I  have  told  you 
what  we  discussed  and  where  we  left  it. 
And  I  want  to  leave  it  there.  There  will 
be  further  discussion,  and  I'm  sure  ques- 
tions such  as  that  will  be  dealt  with  in 
those  further  discussions  as  we  move  to- 
ward a  NATO  summit. 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


39 


EUROPE 


Q.  Chancellor  Kohl  said  that  he 
wasn't  saying  anything  new.  But  you 
are  saying  that  there  will  be  further 
discussions.  That  implies  that  there 
is  still  disagreement  about  what  he 
said,  that  we  want  to  find  out  exactly 
what  he  meant — it  sounds  like  you 
haven't  yet. 

A.  I  have  found  out  that  he  was  not 
backing  off  prior  positions  as  many  peo- 
ple had  suggested.  He  said  that  and  au- 
thorized me  to  say  that  to  you.  So  it 
seems  to  me  that  we  have. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you  un- 
derstand him  to  be  saying  when  he 
says  that  he  is  in  line  with  the  May 
1988  communique?  What  does  that 
mean  to  you? 

A.  What  it  means  to  me  specifically, 
with  reference  to  paragraph  5  of  that 
communique,  just  to  pick  one  paragraph, 
is:  "Our  aim  will  be  to  continue  to  pre- 
vent any  kind  of  war  or  intimidation.  By 
maintaining  credible  deterrence  the  Al- 
liance has  secured  peace  in  Europe  for 
nearly  40  years.  Conventional  defenses 
alone  cannot  insure  this.  Therefore,  for 
the  foreseeable  future  there  is  no  alter- 
native to  the  Alliance  strategy  for  the 
prevention  of  war.  This  is  a  strategy  of 
deterrence  based  upon  an  appropriate 
mix  of  adequate  and  effective  nuclear 
and  conventional  forces  which  will  con- 
tinue to  be  kept  up-to-date  where 
necessary." 

Q.  When  was  the  decision  on 
modernizing  the  Lance  to  be  made? 
Was  it  to  be  made  this  year  or  was  it 
to  be  made  next  year? 

A.  That  decision  will  be  the  subject 
of  discussion,  as  will  others,  leading  up 
to  this  next  summit.  It  would  be,  in  our 
view,  preferable  if  the  decision  could 
be  made  at  the  next  summit.  And  we 
will  be  working  to  see  if  that  can  be 
achieved,  taking  into  consideration  the 
interests  of  all  of  our  NATO  partners. 

Q.  You  went  into  this  meeting 
with  a  rather  fuzzy  situation  with 
regard  to  the  deployment  decision 
which  you  just  mentioned.  But  clear 
differences  [exist]  between  the  two 
governments  with  regard  to  negotia- 
tions on  the  question.  Do  you  feel 
that  there  has  been  any  narrowing  of 
meaning  toward  the  meeting-of-minds 
between  you  and  Chancellor  Kohl  and 
the  German  Government  about  the  is- 
sues of  negotiating  on  these  short- 
range  missiles? 


A.  I  think  that  there  will  be  con- 
tinuing discussion  with  respect  to  both 
of  those,  although  I  have  to  say  this  was 
not  a  decision-taking  meeting.  That  was 
not  really  what  we  were  here  for.  It  did, 
I  hope,  clear  up  some  confusion  that  had 
crept  into  the  public  record  out  there. 

Q.  Having  talked  now  with  Chan- 
cellor Kohl,  and  obviously  with  some 
of  the  other  allies  as  well,  and  having 
discussed  the  political  problems  in 
Germany  which  we  did  discuss  in  Brit- 
ain, for  example,  do  you  have  a  better 
understanding  now  of  the  process 
that  NATO  ought  to  take  to  try  to 
avoid  putting  the  kind  of  pressure  on 
the  Chancellor  that  could  give  him 
trouble  next  year  in  the  elections? 

A.  I  think  it's  fair  to  say  that  after 
spending  this  much  time  here  and  in 
these  countries,  I  will  have  a  better 
understanding — hopefully  I  will;  that's 
the  purpose  of  the  trip. 


A.  We  briefly  touched  upon  that 
subject,  and  there  were  no  major  difft 
ences  between  us  in  that  regard.  It  is 
little  hard  to  respond  to  your  questioi 
the  way  that  it  was  posed. 


Denmark 


COPENHAGEN, 
FEB.  13.  1989» 

Q.     Have  you  had  a  chance  to  discuss 
with  your  Danish  counterpart  the 
German  Chancellor's  indication  that 
he  wants  to  postpone  the  moderniza- 
tion of  the  short-range  missiles? 

A.  We  have  discussed  a  wide  range 
of  issues — some  having  to  do  with  the  al- 
liance, and  bilateral  issues  as  well,  and 
we  did  touch  upon  the  SNF  issue  in  the 
context  of  the  comprehensive  concept. 

Q.  And  the  German  decision? 

A.  We  talked  about  the  SNF  issue 
in  the  context  of  the  comprehensive  con- 
cept; that's  basically  where  I'd  leave  it. 

Q.  What  did  you  say  about  it? 

A.  We  will  have  to  talk  about  that 
later. 

Q.  Is  it  acceptable  from  your  Ad- 
ministration's point  of  view  that  the 
Danes  say  "no"  to  the  nuclear  ships 
in  the  harbors  in  peace  time? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  the  minister  and 
I  have  had  a  number  of  discussions  that  I 
think  we  ought  to  keep  between  us  for 
the  time  being. 

Q.  Have  you  discussed  that 
subject? 


OSLO, 

FEB.  15, 19895 

Prime  Minister  Brundtland.  We  ha 

been  happy  to  receive  the  American 
foreign  minister  here  today  with  his 
delegation.  We  appreciate  highly  th( 
terest  in  a  broad  dialogue  with  the  1 
ropean  allies  and  that  you  so  quickl; 
visited  Oslo.  You  have  a  tight  schedi 
to  see  all  the  allies  in  such  a  short  ti 
But  we  think  it  is  a  very  important 
start  for  a  new  Administration.  Am 
will  be  working  with  you  on  all  the  \ 
tal  issues  that  we  have  to  deal  with 
togethei'. 

Secretary  Baker.  It  is  a  pleasu 
for  me  to  be  here.  This  is,  as  you  kn 
my  first  trip  to  Norway.  I  am  deligh 
to  have  the  ojjportunity  to  be  here,  i 
lighted  to  be  able  to  meet  with  my 
counterpart,  [Foreign]  Minister 
Stoltenberg.  I  look  forward  to  estat 
lishing  a  close  personal  relationship 
with  him.  We  are  going  to  meet  aga 
during  the  course  of  this  month  in 
Washington;  he  will  be  there  later  o 
this  month. 

I  might  say  that  our  relations — 
relations  between  the  United  State: 
and  Norway — are  in  such  good  shap* 
that  there  frankly  were  no  specific  1 
lateral  issues  that  we  had  to  spend 
much  of  our  time  on.  We  talked  for  t 
most  part  about,  a  broad  range  of  Ea 
West  issues  and  other  issues  respeci 
the  alliance. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  "compr 
hensive  concept"? 

Prime  Minister  Brundtland.  T 

answer  is  yes. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  Norway's  pc 

tion  on  the  "comprehensive  concep 

Prime  Minister  Brundtland.  L' 

[me]  say  it  this  way:  In  the  "compreh 
sive  concept,"  there  are  many  parts 
be  discussed  within  that  framework. 
We  believe  that  it  should  be  a  wide 
agenda  including  both  deterrence  art 
disarmament  negotiations;  a  perspec 
five  on  the  NATO  side  for  our  dealin 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  1£) 


EUROPE 


,th  and  cooperation  to  find  solutions 
,th  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  Soviet 
[lion;  and  in  that  it  means  the  SNF 
estion,  as  I  know  you  are  concerned 
th,  is  part  of  that  total  agenda. 

Q.  Should  there  be  negotiations 
1  SNF?  Should  there  be  negotiations 
I  SNF  within  the  "comprehensive 
ncept"? 

8    Prime  Minister  Brundtland.  We 
ed  to  discuss  the  content  of  the  "com- 
jehensive  concept"  even  more  before 
t?re  is  a  clear  answer  to  all  the  ques- 
t  ns  involved  as  we  see  it. 


Greece 


.;kaka. 

I;B.  14.  1989« 

■  rotary  Baiier.  Let  me  just  say  that 
.  have  had  a  very  interesting  discus- 
.<!  today  with  [Foreign]  Minister 
imaz  and  with  Prime  Minister  Ozal.  I 
a  pleased  to  be  here.  It's  my  first  trip 
t  Furkey  since  I  was  here  in  1953  when 
I  as  a  member  of  the  U.S.  Marine 

■ps. 

1  am  looking  forward  to  establish- 
1    a  close  personal  relationship  with 
•    minister.  We've  met  once  before  in 

-hington,  although  I've  had  some 
p  )r  contacts  with  Prime  Minister 
Cil. 

Foreign  Minister  Yilmaz.  We  ap- 

p  date  very  much  the  gesture  of  the 
"ri  .■  U.S.  Administration  to  consult 
'  h  the  allies  so  promptly.  Although 
o  American  friends  have  termed  this 
a  I  "get-acquainted"  visit,  we  must 
s  that  the  outstanding  qualities  of 
\  Baker  are  very  well  known  to  us, 
we  believe  that  he  will  be  an  asset 
the  further  strengthening  of  our  re- 
i;  ons  with  the  United  States. 
During  our  talks  this  afternoon, 
tiad  the  opportunity  to  briefly  cover 
i.-sues  concerning  the  alliance  and 
111  lateral  relations.  We  are  grati- 
[i  1  to  note  that  both  sides  have  the 
IV 1  to  further  enhance  these  relations 
!1  fields  and  in  a  mutual  beneficial 
and  not  to  mortgage  them  to  the 
;i  'rests  of  any  third  party. 


ATHENS. 
FEB.  14.  1989' 

Prime  Minister  Papandreou.  It  was 

with  great  pleasure  that  we  welcomed 
today  the  new  U.S.  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr  James  Baker,  who  is  making  a  tour 
of  the  European  capitals  in  order  to  es- 
tablish strong  bonds  among  the  Foreign 
Ministers  so  that  they  may  confront  the 
increasingly  complicated  problems  hu- 
manity, and  particularly  our  region, 
faces. 

I  stressed  to  the  Secretary  that  it 
is  not  only  the  desire  of  the  Greek  Gov- 
ernment but  of  all  Greek  people  to  ad- 
vance and  to  constantly  improve 
relations  between  our  two  countries 
and  to  resolve  any  existing  bilateral  is- 
sues in  a  spirit  of  goodwill  and  coopera- 
tion. At  the  same  time,  we  had 
the  opportunity  to  exchange  views  on 
issues  pertaining  to  the  "region  of 
Europe" — East  and  West — and  Latin 
America.  I  want  to  wish  Mr.  Baker  a 
good  trip  and  every  success  in  his 
work. 

Secretary  Baker.  It's  a  real  pleas- 
ure for  me  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
be  here  in  Greece.  As  I  told  you,  I  have 
been  anxious  to  return  for  many  years. 
The  only  time  I  have  spent  in  Greece 
was  way  back  in  1953  when  I  spent 
quite  a  bit  of  time  here  engaged  in  ex- 
ercises with  your  armed  forces  as  a 
part  of  the  NATO  exercises  at  the  time. 
I  recalled  to  you  the  very,  very  warm 
relationships  that  existed  in  those  days 
between  the  Greek  and  American  peo- 
ples: and  you  pointed  out  how  those  re- 
lationships, government  to  government, 
are  improving  all  the  time  and  how  we 
can  look  forward  in  the  very  near  term 
to  relationships  between  the  Greek  and 
American  people  that  are  equally  as 
warm  as  they  were  in  1953. 

As  the  Prime  Minister  indicated, 
we  had  frank  and  friendly  discussions 
of  a  wide  range  of  issues — East-West  is- 
sues, issues  affecting  the  North  Atlan- 
tic Treaty  Organization,  and  our 
bilateral  issues.  And  I  share  the  Prime 
Minister's  view  that  we  can  proceed  in 
a  spirit  of  mutual  cooperation  and 
understanding. 


ATHENS. 
FEB.  14.  1989-* 

Secretary  Baker.  I'm  pleased  to  have 
had  the  opportunity  to  come  to  Greece 
in  the  first  weeks  of  my  tenure  as  Sec- 
retary of  State,  to  meet  Prime  Minis- 
ter Papandreou  and  my  colleague, 
Foreign  Minister  Papoulias,  who,  of 
course,  was  delayed  coming  in  from 
Spain  but  did  arrive  here  in  time  for  us 
to  have  a  dialogue. 

President  Bush  is  committed  to 
two-way  communications  between  the 
United  States  and  its  allies,  and  I  view 
this  visit  as  a  first  step  in  a  process  of 
regular  high-level  consultations.  We 
held  talks  today  on  a  variety  of  matters 
of  mutual  concern;  we  had  a  chance  to 
share  views  on  NATO,  East-West  poli- 
cies, regional  issues,  and  bilateral  is- 
sues which  are  important  to  both  of  our 
governments. 

I  earlier  characterized  our  talks  as 
frank  but  friendly.  We  discussed  the  is- 
sue of  bases;  my  government  believes 
that  continuing  the  relationship  is  in 
the  interest  of  both  our  countries  and 
in  the  interest  of  the  NATO  alliance  as 
well.  We  still  have  difficult  issues  to  re- 
solve, but  I'm  very  hopeful  for  an  early 
and  successful  conclusion  of  negotia- 
tions. We  also  discussed  the  problem  of 
terrorism  and  the  need  for  very  close 
cooperation  among  democracies  to  de- 
feat this  scourge. 

Foreign  Minister  Papoulias.  I  had 

the  opportunity  to  welcome  my  col- 
league, Mr.  Baker,  in  Athens  after  a 
troika  trip  to  the  Middle  East.  I  was 
delayed  in  my  return  but  fortunately  I 
have  met  with  him.  We  will  have  the 
opportunity  to  meet  on  many  other  oc- 
casions in  the  future. 

With  the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Bak- 
er discussed  bilateral  issues,  certainly 


Secretary  Baker's 

NATO  Itinerary 

February  11 

Reykjavik,  London 

February  12 

London,  Bonn 

February  1.3 

Bonn,  Copenhagen, 

Oslo,  Bonn 

February  14 

Bonn,  Ankara, 

Athens,  Rome 

February  15 

Rome.  Madrid, 

Lisbon,  Brussels 

February  16 

Brussels. 

Luxembourg. 

The  Hague.  Brussels 

February  17 

Brussels,  Paris 

lartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


41 


EUROPE 


the  course  of  the  negotiations,  issues  of 
terrorism,  East-West  relations,  the  big 
issue  of  the  Middle  East,  Central 
America — that  is,  a  whole  range  of  in- 
ternational issues.  I,  too,  had  the  op- 
portunity to  brief  Mr.  Baker  on  the 
results  on  my  troika  tour  of  Middle 
East  capitals;  and  I  think  there  is  an 
interest — an  increased  interest — by 
the  United  States  of  America  in  assist- 
ing the  effort  of  finding  a  permanent, 
just,  and  lasting  solution  for  the  Middle 
East.  I  hope  that  I  will  be  meeting 
soon  again  with  my  colleague  in  Vienna 
and  that  we  will  have  the  opportunity 
and  a  greater  length  of  time  to  continue 
this  good  beginning  we  have  made  to- 
dav  in  Athens. 


We  talked  about  a  full  range  of 
issues — issues  involving  East-West 
matters.  We  talked  about  issues  involv- 
ing the  NATO  alliance,  about  the  fact 
the  approach  of  the  United  States  and 
Portugal  to  alliance  issues  is  quite  of- 
ten very,  very  similar. 

We" talked  as  well  about  regional 
issues — issues  involving  questions  in 
southern  Africa,  about  the  withdrawal 
of  Cuban  troops  from  Angola  and  the 
Angolan/Namibian  settlement,  and  a 
host  of  other  issues. 


MADRID, 
FEB.  15.  19899 

Let  me  say  that  we  have  had  a  very  in- 
teresting and  successful  discussion, 
and  I'm  delighted  to  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  be  here  in  Madrid  and  visit 
with  my  colleague.  I  think  that  it's  a 
particularly  appropriate  time  to  have 
consultations  with  the  minister  [For- 
eign Minister  Francisco  Fernandez- 
Ordonez]  during  the  period  of  time  that 
he  is  President  of  the  European 
Community. 

We  covered  the  bilateral  issues  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain  and 
concluded  quite  frankly  that  the  rela- 
tionship between  our  two  countries  has 
improved  considerably  over  the  past 
several  years  and  is  continuing  to  im- 
prove; we  took  note  of  that  fact.  We  dis- 
cussed briefly  East-West  issues,  issues 
affecting  the  NATO  alliance,  and  cov- 
ered, perhaps  even  more  briefly,  our 
views  on  issues  involving  regional  con- 
flicts such  as  Central  America. 


E 


^«W::i.-J:*iiSi*K»»iJSW:l«S:y^^W 


Portugal 


LISBON, 
FEB.  15,  1989>" 

The  relationship  with  Portugal  is  one  of 
the  very  closest  which  my  government 
enjoys.  I  have  had  extended  discussions 
with  the  minister  [Foreign  Minister 
Joao  de  Deus  Pinheiro]  and,  indeed, 
with  the  Prime  Minister  [Anibal 
Cavaco  Silva]  as  well. 


Luxembourg 


LUXEMBOURG, 
FEB.  16,  1989" 

Foreign  Minister  Poos.  It  was  a  great 
pleasure  and  privilege  of  the  Lu.x- 
embourg  Government  to  welcome  today 
Mr  James  Baker,  the  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States.  We  welcome 
the  wish  of  Mr.  Baker  to  have  consulta- 
tions with  the  European  allies,  espe- 
cially in  Luxembourg,  in  the  same 
spirit  of  his  predecessor.  And  our  dis- 
cussions of  today  were  conducted  in  the 
spirit  of  friendship  which  characterizes 
the  Luxembourg-American  relationship 
since  the  First  World  War. 

We  touched  [on]  several  topics  of 
transatlantic  relations,  and  I  will  let 
our  distinguished  guest  expose  the 
main  topics  of  our  bilateral  talks.  Let 
me  finish  by  stressing  that  our  dia- 
logue will  continue  and  Mr.  Baker  and 
his  [inaudible]  are  always  welcome 
guests  in  Luxembourg. 

Secretary  Baker.  It  is  a  pleasure 
and  a  privilege  to  be  here  and  have  the 
opportunity  to  visit  your  country  and 
to  have  the  opportunity  to  meet  with 
you  and  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
meet  with  the  Prime  Minister  in  the 
year  that  is  the  10th  anniversary  of 
your  independence  and  the  40th  anni- 
versary of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
alliance. 

I  might  say  for  the  benefit  of  the 
press  what  I  said  to  you  and  that  is  that 
Luxembourg  has  been  a  steadfast  alli- 
ance partner  of  the  United  States.  The 
relationship  between  our  two  countries 
has  historically  been  very  close,  and  it 


continues  to  be  close.  I  would  say  sinL  [ 
ply  that  we  had  discussions  with  the 
Prime  Minister  [Jacques  Santer]  and. 
the  Foreign  Minister  on  a  wide  rangelfi  , 
topics — alliance  topics,  topics  affecti 
regional  issues  in  various  parts  of  th 
world.  We  concluded,  quite  happily, 
that  our  bilateral  relations  are  in  exc 
lent  condition. 

Q.  How  do  you  feel  about  Aya- 
tollah  Khomeini's  offer  of  a  very  hi) 
price  of  a  million  dollars  or  more  f( 
the  assassination  of  the  author  witi 
whom  he  disagrees  [Salman  Rushdl 
author  of  The  Satanic  Verses]! 

Secretary  Baker.  I  think  that  it 
regrettable  and  that,  of  course  as  yo 
know,  the  United  States  is  firmly  co 
mitted  to  oppose  terrorism  in  all  its 
forms,  and  particularly  state-sponso 
terrorism. 


PARIS, 

FEB.  17.  1989'2 

I  might  just  say  that  we  have  had  a 
very  good  visit.  I  had  the  opportuni 
before  a  working  lunch  with  Foreign 
Minister  Dumas,  to  visit  with  Prim 
Minister  Rocard.  I  have  also  had  an 
portunity  to  see  my  good  friend  and 
former  colleague  Pierre  Beregovoy. 
spent  a  number  of  years  together  as 
nance  ministers.  We  had  a  very  prO' 
five,  I  think,  working  lunch  in  whicl 
discussed  a  wide  range  of  topics — E 
West  issues,  international  issues,  re 
gional  issues,  and  issues  affecting  tl 
alliance. 


iPress  release  17  of  Feb.  15,  1989.  Jo 
Baldvin  Hannibalsson  is  Iceland's  Minist 
of  Foreign  Affairs. 

-Press  release  16  of  Feb.  14.  Sir  Geol 
frey  Howe  is  the  U.K.'s  Secretary  of  Sta 
for" Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs. 

•'Press  release  20  of  Feb.  21. 

^Press  release  18  of  Feb.  15. 

■'iPress  release  19  of  Feb.  Ki.  Gro  Hai 
Brundtland  is  Norway's  Prime  Minister. 

'■Press  release  21  of  Feb.  15.  Mesut 
Yilmaz  is  Turkev's  Foreign  Minister. 

'Press  release  22  of  Feb.  16.  Andrea 
Papandreou  is  Greece's  Prime  Minister. 

^Press  release  23  of  Feb.  15.  Karolos 
poulias  is  Greece's  Foreign  Minister. 

■'Press  release  25  of  Feb.  17. 

"'Press  release  27  of  Feb.  Ki. 

iiPress  release  29  of  Feb.  21.  Jacque 
Poos  is  Luxembourg's  Foreign  Minister 

Impress  release  32  of  Feb.  21.  ■ 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  19 


irst  Report  on  Cyprus 


EUROPE 


'  :SSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 

VK.  1,  1989' 

iitoiTlance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I  am 
nutting  to  you  this  bimonthly  report  on 
mi'ss  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of 

t  yprus  question. 

At  this  early  point  in  my  Administra- 

1.  let  me  first  reconfirm  that  the  United 

■  tis  has  a  fundamental  interest  in  assist- 

thi-  people  of  Cyprus  in  the  search  for  a 
,  iii.u  and  just  settlement.  Over  the  years, 
Aerican  governments  have  come  to  appre- 
c^e  that  such  a  settlement  can  come  only 
thugh  a  process  of  negotiation  that  e.x- 
p  sses  the  desires  and  aspirations  of  the 
"  irjnt  people. 

.At  the  same  time,  there  is  a  legitimate 

for  outside  parties  to  play  in  supporting 

m-gotiation  process.  Under  my  Admin- 
alion,  we  will  continue  high-level  atten- 
1  to  Cyprus.  To  assure  day-to-day  senior 
ol:er  involvement  with  the  issues  and  pro- 
y  •  a  point  of  contact  with  the  Congress, 
a  Department  of  State  created  the  post  of 
S'  cial  Cyprus  Coordinator  in  1981  and  has 
ai  gned  this  responsibility  continuously  to 
a  ilicy-level  officer  since  that  time. 

To  provide  a  basic  framework  for  nego- 
ti  ions  between  the  two  communities,  the 
b' ;  and  most  viable  approach  has  been  and 
CI  inues  to  be  the  effort  led  by  the  Secre- 

Oeneral  of  the  United  Nations,  Javier 

•;:  lie  Cuellar.  The  United  Nations  has 
a  1  involved  with  the  Cyprus  question  for 
2-  ears  because  the  international  commu- 

has  recognized  that  the  United  Nations 

ihiuely  placed  to  deal  with  the  issue. 
1   current  Secretary  General,  Javier  Pe- 
rt de  Cuellar,  has  considerable  personal  ex- 
p  ence  with  the  Cyprus  question  and  a 
tr  idate  from  the  U.N.  membership  to  use 
h  Jood  offices  to  work  for  a  solution.  We 
si  -e  this  high  regard  for  his  patience  and 
al  ities,  have  given  him  unwavering  sup- 
pi  .,  and  will  continue  to  do  so. 

We  will  take  every  advantage  of  oppor- 
ti  ties  to  make  constructive  contributions 
t(  he  Secretary  General  and  to  the  parties. 
W  believe  it  is  important  that  the  parties 

'  full  participation  to  the  negotiating 


process  and  that  the  atmosphere  between 
them  be  improved  through  contacts  and 
confidence-building  measures  to  help  bring 
the  two  communities  together.  We  also  sup- 
port efforts  to  achieve  a  workable  plan  for 
reducing  military  tensions. 

We  will  continue  to  develop  our  long- 
standing relationships  of  confidence  and 
respect  with  both  parties  to  the  dispute. 
The  previous  Administration  also  consulted 
frequently  with  allies  and  friends,  partic- 
ularly such  interested  parties  as  Greece, 
Turkey,  and  the  United  Kingdom.  We  plan 
to  pursue  such  consultations  and  discussions 
vigorously. 

With  specific  reference  to  the  most  re- 
cent 60-day  period  since  the  last  report  on 
Cyprus,  Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar 
continues  his  efforts  to  help  the  Cypriot 
parties  reach  a  solution  to  the  conflict.  As 
agreed  at  the  November  22-23  New  York 
meetings  hosted  by  the  Secretary  General, 
the  two  sides  initiated  a  second  round  of 
talks  in  Nicosia  on  December  19  with  the  as- 
sistance of  the  Secretary  General's  Special 
Representative,  Oscar  Camilion.  Discus- 
sions in  Nicosia  are  continuing  and  will  be 
followed  by  another  meeting  in  April  with 
the  Secretary  General  to  review  progress. 

In  his  latest  report  to  the  Security 
Council  on  U.N.  operations  in  Cyprus  (for 
the  period  June  1  through  November  30),  a 
copy  of  which  is  attached,  the  Secretary 
General  observed  that  the  talks  that  began 
last  August  mark  "the  first  time  in  the  past 
quarter  of  a  century  that  the  leaders  of  the 
two  communities  have  committed  them- 
selves to  such  a  personal  and  sustained  ef- 
fort to  achieve  an  overall  settlement  and  to 
endeavor  to  do  this  by  a  specific  target 
date."  He  continued  that  a  "good  working 
relationship"  had  developed  between  the  two 
leaders.  The  Secretary  General  also  sug- 
gested that  the  two  sides  should  begin  ex- 
ploring "a  wide  range  of  options  for  each  of 
the  issues  that  must  be  resolved." 

Both  sides  responded  to  the  Secretary 
General's  suggestion  with  proposals.  There 
are  constructive  elements  in  the  ideas  pre- 
sented by  both  parties,  and  we  hope  that 
they  will  continue  to  examine  new  and/or  ex- 
panded options  in  a  spirit  of  constructive 
compromise. 


I  note  that  military  deconfrontation  is 
the  subject  of  one  of  the  papers  presented  by 
the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  and  that 
both  sides  have  indicated  agreement  in  prin- 
ciple with  the  concept. 

The  Secretary  General  expressed  con- 
cern that  the  "troops  of  both  sides  continue 
to  be  in  dangerous  proximity  to  each  other" 
in  Nicosia.  Such  proximity  was  the  immedi- 
ate cause  of  the  death  of  a  Turkish  Cypriot 
soldier  on  December  12,  1988,  and  a  Greek 
Cypriot  National  Guardsman  on  July  31, 
1988,  both  killed  by  gunfire  from  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  buffer  zone.  The  United  Na- 
tions is  now  working  with  the  two  parties  to 
achieve  some  adjustments  of  military  posi- 
tions in  Nicosia  to  ease  this  situation.  We 
strongly  support  this  effort  as  we  have  sup- 
ported past  efforts  to  reduce  tensions  and 
prevent  further  serious  incidents. 

The  Secretary  General's  previous  report 
also  commented  on  the  dangers  of  demon- 
strations close  to  the  buffer  zone.  In  his 
most  recent  report,  he  states  that,  in  re- 
sponse to  the  expression  of  U.N.  concerns 
about  these  events,  the  Government  of  Cy- 
prus has  given  assurances  that  "it  will  in  fu- 
ture do  whatever  is  necessary  to  ensure 
respect  for  the  status  quo  in  the  buffer 
zone." 

As  we  enter  1989,  peoples  worldwide  are 
reaching  out  for  the  wisdom  to  forge  new  un- 
derstanding with  old  foes.  Experience  has 
given  the  people  of  Cyprus  an  intimate  ap- 
preciation of  the  cost  of  bitterness  and  en- 
mity. They  are  now  engaged  in  a  difficult 
negotiation  that  is  the  only  route  to  recon- 
ciliation and  peace.  They  merit  America's 
continued  support  and  have  our  most  sincere 
wishes  of  success  in  their  endeavor. 

Sincerely, 

George  Bush 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives, and  Claiborne  Pell,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Mar.  6,  1989).  ■ 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


43 


EUROPE 


Security  Challenges  Facing  NATO  in  the  1990s 


by  Paul  H.  Nitze 

Address  before  the  Nobel  bistitute's 
Leangkollen  Seminar  in  Oslo  on  Febru- 
ary 6, 1989.  Ambassador  Nitze  is  spe- 
cial adviser  to  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  arms  control 
matters. 

I  thank  you  for  the  kind  words  of  intro- 
duction. It  is  an  honor  to  be  here  at 
this  distinguished  institute  to  partici- 
pate in  the  Leangkollen  Seminar 

I  propose  to  address  the  security 
challenges  facing  the  North  Atlantic 
alliance  as  we  enter  the  1990s  and 
lessons  NATO  can  take  from  its  recent 
experience  in  meeting  such  challenges. 

Challenges  Ahead 

As  it  prepares  to  enter  the  next  dec- 
ade, NATO  can  look  back  on  a  period 
of  substantial  success.  The  challenge  of 
Soviet  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  missiles  was  met  and,  as  a  re- 
sult, the  INF  Treaty  is  in  place;  the 
basic  outline  of  a  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion treaty  has  been  established;  impor- 
tant confidence-building  measures  have 
been  implemented;  nuclear  testing  talks 
have  moved  us  well  along  toward  com- 
pletion of  verification  protocols  for  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  and  Peaceful  Nu- 
clear Explosions  Ti-eaties,  which  would 
enable  their  ratification;  progress  has 
been  made  toward  reestablishing  sup- 
port for  the  192.5  Geneva  protocol  ban- 
ning illegal  chemical  weapons  (CW)  use 
and  toward  completing  a  comprehensive 
and  verifiable  ban  on  production  or 
possession  of  chemical  weapons;  and  a 
mandate  has  been  concluded  for  nego- 
tiations on  conventional  armed  forces 
in  Europe. 

But  this  review  is  a  litany  not  of 
tasks  completed  but  rather  of  good  be- 
ginnings yet  to  be  concluded.  Even  the 
INF  problem  will  not  be  behind  us 
until  the  treaty  has  been  fully  imple- 
mented. And,  in  the  other  areas,  there 
is  a  long  road  yet  ahead. 

As  the  alliance  travels  this  road, 
its  fundamental  goal  should  remain  un- 
changed— to  seek  collectively  to  protect 
the  ability  of  its  member  nations  to  live 
in  peace  with  freedom  and  to  do  so  by 
deterring  war. 


In  ensuring  the  maintenance  of  a 
strong  deterrent  into  the  1990s,  NATO 
must  continue  to  proceed  along  two 
fronts.  It  must  take  the  steps — through 
updating  of  its  forces — necessary  to 
sustain  a  viable  deterrent  capability, 
and  it  must  continue  to  seek  through 
dialogue  to  bound  and  reduce  the  level 
of  confrontation  between  East  and  West. 

Force  Updating  Requirements 

Force  updating  requirements  exist  in 
all  legs  of  the  NATO  triad,  and  options 
are  being  reviewed. 

With  respect  to  the  strategic  leg, 
the  United  States  is  well  along  toward 
modernizing  its  sea-based  forces — with 
the  Trident  submarine,  D-5  missile, 
and  sea-launched  cruise  missile — and 
its  air-based  forces — with  the  B-1  and 
Stealth  bombers  and  the  air-launched 
cruise  missile.  But  the  land-based  por- 
tion is  another  story,  and  this  is  where 
force  updating  efforts  must  focus  in  the 
immediate  future. 

U.S.  fixed,  land-based  missiles 
have  been  vulnerable  to  Soviet  attack 
for  some  time  now,  and  the  problem 
is  getting  worse.  Successive  U.S.  Ad- 
ministrations have  proposed  plans  for 
basing  new  ICBMs  [intercontinental 
ballistic  missiles]  in  survivable  modes, 
but  these  plans  have  not  garnered  sus- 
tained support.  The  Bush  Administra- 
tion must  resolve  this  problem,  if  this 
part  of  the  U.S.  strategic  triad  is  to 
remain  viable. 

Efforts  should  also  continue  on  the 
strategic  defensive  side.  A  robust  SDI 
[Strategic  Defense  Initiative]  research 
program  is  important  and  necessary, 
both  as  a  hedge  against  the  major 
Soviet  SDI  program,  which  has  been 
underway  for  over  two  decades,  and 
because  of  the  safer  world  that  a  more 
defense-based  deterrence  potentially 
can  provide. 

But  it  remains  crucial  that  SDI  be 
guided  by  the  criteria  of  survivability 
and  cost-effectiveness  at  the  margin, 
which  are  incorporated  into  U.S.  law. 
Deployment  of  a  space-based  defense 
system  itself  vulnerable  to  attack  would 
encourage  the  Soviets  to  attack  that 
system  early  in  a  crisis;  deployment 
of  a  system  that  was  not  cost-effective 


at  the  margin  would  encourage  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  proliferate  cheaper  offi 
sive  systems  in  response. 

With  regard  to  the  nonstrategic  lu 
clear  leg  of  NATO's  triad,  the  impo 
tant  task  is  to  update  the  aging  ai's  a, 
of  nuclear  systems  NATO  will  retai 
the  aftermath  of  the  INF  eliminaii- 
and  the  Montebello  decision,  which 
mandated  unilateral  reductions  and 
modernization  of  the  remaining  NA  i 
systems. 

Throughout  this  decade,  NAT(  a: 
emphasized  its  policy  of  maintainim 
in  Europe  only  the  minimum  numbi  oi 
nuclear  weapons  required  for  deter 
rence.  This  has  enabled  us  unilatei-;  ; 
to  reduce  the  number  of  these  wea|  ■ 
by  2,400  since  1979.  By  keeping 
NATO's  nuclear  capabilities  up-to-il  r, 
we  will  not  only  maintain  our  secui  , 
but  we  may  also  open  up  the  possil  ty 
of  further  unilateral  cuts  in  NATO'- 1- 
theater  nuclear  arsenal. 

As  for  NATO's  conventional  foi  s. 
the  alliance  continues  to  face  a  hug 
Warsaw  Pact  preponderance  in  con  i- 
tional  capabilities.  The  unilateral  ci 
announced  by  Mr  Gorbachev  last  1 
cember  are  a  step  in  the  right  direi 
tion,  and  we  welcome  them,  but  th  i 
cuts  by  no  means  eliminate  the  con  !i- 
tional  superiority  of  the  Warsaw  P: 
or  of  the  Soviet  Union  alone.  It  wn  I 
be  imprudent  to  assume  that  this  i 
balance  can  be  redressed  solely  tin  : 
arms  control  negotiations,  especial 
NATO  lacks  in  those  talks  the  le\ . 
of  significant,  ongoing  force  updati 
efforts.  One  must  also  consider  th(   !■ 
that,  given  the  record  of  past  effor  at 
conventional  arms  control,  any  reli' 
from  arms  control  in  this  area  is  111  v 
to  come  only  several  years  in  the  fui  e. 

Arms  Control  Efforts 

With  regard  to  the  alliance's  arms  ( i- 
trol  agenda  for  the  years  ahead,  N   I 
ministers  have  laid  out  a  program 
which  strikes  me  as  correct — comp 
tion  of  a  START  [strategic  arms  I'c 
tion  talks]  treaty,  a  chemical  weajn 
ban,  and  an  agreement  on  stabilizii 
conventional  arms  reductions.  We 
should  not  underestimate  the  diffic  yj 
of  the  task. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  61 


t- 


As  I  said  earlier,  the  basic  outline 
I  START  treaty  has  been  estab- 
led — approximately  50%  cuts  in  stra- 
ic  nuclear  warheads  and  in  Soviet 
listic  missile  throw-weight  to  equal 
ings,  with  somewhat  smaller  cuts  in 
ivery  vehicles  and  with  sublimits  on 
most  destabilizing  systems.  But 
ny  tough  issues  remain  in  START — 
sea-launched  cruise  missiles,  air- 
nehed  cruise  missiles,  mobile 
iMs,  verification,  and  linkage  of  a 
^RT  treaty  to  limits  on  strategic  de- 
368,  among  others — and  thus  much 
gh  negotiating  lies  ahead. 
Similarly,  we  have  established  a 
•nework  in  the  defense  and  space 
cs  for  dealing  with  the  strategic  de- 
se  programs  of  the  two  sides,  but 
eral  difficult  issues  remain. 
With  regard  to  the  chemical  weap- 
negotiations,  one  cannot  underesti- 
i.e  the  complexities  involved  in,  first, 
uring  the  participation  of  all  CW- 
sessing  and  CW-capable  states  and, 
)nd,  creating  an  effective  verifica- 
regime  in  the  face  of  new  technolo- 
1,  increasing  proliferation,  a  dual- 
ible  chemical  industry,  and  the 
i  to  protect  sensitive  nonchemical 
pons-i'elated  information  during 
sections. 

As  for  the  negotiations  on  conven- 
lal  arms,  aside  from  the  preliminary 
ies  resolved  in  the  mandate  talks, 
entire  task  lies  before  us.  As  we 
in  these  talks,  we  must  remember 
importance  of  avoiding  the  tempta- 
to  anticipate  arms  limits  and  to 
1st  our  force  structuring  and  updat- 
plans  prematurely.  Experience  and 
:  teach  us  that  such  actions,  by  re- 
ng  the  other  side's  incentives  to  pay 
ice  for  our  reductions,  reduce  the 
lihood  that  the  anticipated  limits 
ever  be  established. 
All  of  this  means  that,  in  addition 
,s  foi'ce  updating  requirements,  the 
nee  faces  a  very  full  agenda  of  arms 
rol  efforts.  There  is  opportunity  for 
it  progress  in  reducing  the  level  of 
t-West  military  confrontation  across 
board.  But  complacency  is  unjusti- 
;  much  hard  work  lies  ahead  if  this 
ntial  is  to  be  realized. 


« 


ffii 


Lessons  for  Meeting 
the  Challenges  Ahead 

As  the  alliance  approaches  its  force  up- 
dating and  arms  control  tasks,  it  can  do 
so  most  effectively  by  keeping  in  mind 
the  lessons  learned  from  the  experience 
of  the  past.  I  would  like  to  suggest  six 
such  lessons  to  guide  NATO's  efforts. 

Lesson  Number  One — the  Proper 
Role  of  Arms  Control.  First,  we 
should  always  keep  in  mind  the  proper 
role  of  arms  control,  what  arms  control 
can  accomplish  and  what  it  cannot. 

Arms  conti-ol  can  play  an  important 
role  in  enhancing  our  security  and  pro- 
ducing a  more  stable  East-West  rela- 
tionship. But  it  cannot  be  a  substitute 
or  replacement  for  adequate  defenses. 
Instead,  it  is  but  one  element  of  our 
overall  security  policy,  a  complement  to 
the  measures  we  must  take  unilaterally, 
such  as  maintaining  weapons  and  forces 
necessary  for  an  adequate  deterrent. 
Indeed,  experience  shows  that  what  we 
as  an  alliance  are  able  and  willing  to  do 
for  ourselves  is  not  only  more  impor- 
tant to  our  security  than  what  we  can 
accomplish  through  arms  control  but  is 
also  essential  to  the  success  of  our  arms 
control  efforts. 

Understanding  this  point  becomes 
particularly  important  when  one  as- 
sesses the  contribution  the  prospective 
START  treaty  would  make  to  our  se- 
curity and  how  the  Administration 
should  proceed  in  the  START 
negotiations. 

In  crafting  our  START  position,  we 
have  been  concerned  that  we  enhance 
our  force  survivability  and  thus 
strengthen  strategic  deterrence.  Of 
course,  arms  control  alone  cannot  solve 
our  force  survivability  problems.  What 
it  can  and  should  do  is  make  it  easier 
for  us  to  take  the  steps  needed  to  im- 
prove survivability  by  protecting  the 
appropriate  options  for  force  updating 
and  by  reducing  and  bounding  the  So- 
viet threat;  otherwise,  that  threat  could 
negate  the  effect  of  those  improvements. 

As  I  said  earlier,  the  U.S.  strategic 
force  survivability  problem  currently 
resides  primarily  with  the  land-based 
leg.  Our  fixed  silos  are  vulnerable 
today  and  they  will  be  tomorrow;  no 
plausible  arms  control  agreement  can 
remedy  that.  So  the  important  thing  is 


EUROPE 


to  ensure  that  arms  control  does  not 
block  steps  that  can  improve  ICBM  sur- 
vivability and,  in  fact,  makes  enhancing 
survivability  through  those  steps  easier. 

To  protect  options  for  ICBM  sur- 
vivability, we  have  been  working  with 
the  Soviets  in  the  START  negotiations 
to  develop  an  effective  verification 
regime  that  would  allow  both  rail- 
mobile  and  road-mobile  ICBMs.  Other 
options  for  survivable  ICBM  basing  are 
also  possible.  Furthermore,  by  substan- 
tially reducing  Soviet  ballistic  missile 
warheads  and  throwweight,  START 
would  greatly  constrain  Soviet  ability 
to  destroy  ICBMs  in  these  basing 
modes  through  barrage  attacks. 

Thus  START  would  not  preclude 
our  ability  to  deploy  survivable  ICBMs, 
and  it  would  make  the  job  easier  by 
reducing  the  threat  to  such  a  force. 

We  are  also  being  careful  to  protect 
the  steps  necessary  for  enhancing  the 
survivability  of  our  sea-based  leg.  We 
are  currently  deploying  Ti-ident  sub- 
marines, which  are  quieter  and  able  to 
operate  in  much  larger  ocean  areas 
than  the  Poseidons  they  replace  and 
thus  are  more  survivable.  We  will  en- 
sure that  the  START  treaty  places  no 
unacceptable  constraints  on  this  impor- 
tant program.  And  should  we  become 
concerned  that  Ti'ident  submarines  con- 
centrate too  many  missiles  on  too  few 
platforms,  there  is  no  constraint  what- 
soever in  START  that  would  preclude 
our  disti'ibuting  our  SLBM  [sea- 
launched  ballistic  missile]  warheads  on 
a  larger  number  of  platforms  by  deploy- 
ing fewer  warheads  on  each  submarine. 

With  regard  to  the  air-based  leg, 
due  largely  to  our  success  in  negotiat- 
ing the  rule  for  determining  how 
bomber  weapons  will  be  counted,  we 
have  protected  the  right  to  deploy  the 
full  force  of  strategic  bombers  that  we 
consider  necessary  for  a  robust  deter- 
rent. This  is  the  number  we  had  been 
planning  to  deploy  even  in  the  absence 
of  a  START  treaty. 

In  sum,  the  START  treaty  that 
appears  to  be  developing  would  not 
exacerbate  our  force  survivability  prob- 
lems. It  u'oiild  provide  the  leeway 
needed  to  undertake  the  force  moderni- 
zation necessary  to  redress  those  prob- 


45 


EUROPE 


lems  and  would  make  the  job  easier 
by  reducing  and  bounding  tlie  Soviet 
threat.  It  fully  satisfies  the  proper 
objectives  for  a  good  arms  control 
agreement. 

While  the  Bush  Administration  is 
justifiably  reviewing  details  and  will 
want  to  put  its  own  stamp  on  the  U.S. 
approach,  the  basic  START  outline  rep- 
resents a  prudent  course.  President 
Bush  has  promised  to  pursue  a  verifia- 
ble and  stabilizing  agreement  to  reduce 
strategic  arsenals  by  50%.  I  urge  our 
NATO  partners  to  continue  to  support 
this  approach. 

Lesson  Number  Two— The  Impor- 
tance of  Keeping  in  Mind  the  Proper 
Objective.  The  second  lesson  is  the 
need  to  always  keep  in  mind  the  pi'i- 
mary  objective  of  our  arms  control  and 
security  efforts,  that  of  enhancing 
stability. 

We  seek  to  reduce  the  incentives 
that  the  other  side  might  have  to  strike 
first  in  a  crisis  or  to  provoke  a  crisis 
that  might  lead  to  a  military  confronta- 
tion. To  dissuade  the  Warsaw  Pact  from 
contemplating  reckless  action,  our  mili- 
tary forces  as  a  whole  should  have  the 
necessary  chai-acteristics  of  effective- 
ness, fle.xibility,  diversity,  and  sur- 
vivability against  an  attack  focused 
directly  on  those  forces. 

On  occasion,  one  hears  about  force 
reductions  as  an  inherently  worthy  out- 
come of  arms  control  efforts,  as  if  this 
should  be  our  prime  objective.  But  re- 
ductions per  se  are  not  necessarily 
good.  If  the  remaining  forces  are  more 
vulnerable  to  a  first  strike,  or  the  re- 
maining force  levels  present  a  greater 
temptation  to  the  other  side  to  take 
reckless  action,  stability  is  reduced. 
Rather,  reductions  should  be  seen  as  a 
means  which,  if  properly  utilized,  can 
serve  the  goal  of  enhancing  stability. 
This  is  why,  in  START,  we  have 
insisted  on  focusing  cuts,  through  war- 
head sublimits,  on  the  most  destabiliz- 
ing systems.  It  is  also  why  we  insisted 
that  INF  reductions  be  asymmetrical  to 
equal  levels.  It  is  a  lesson  that  will  be 
especially  important  as  we  enter  the 
conventional  arms  talks. 

Some  proposals  for  reductions  in 
conventional  forces,  even  asymmetrical 
cuts  favoring  the  West,  may  look  at- 
tractive while  actually  exacerbating  our 
security  situation.  It  will  be  important 
that  the  alliance  focus  not  on  the  levels 
of  cuts  but  rather  on  the  forces  and 


capabilities  remaining  after  those  cuts, 
to  determine  whether  that  outcome 
would  be  more  or  less  stable  than  the 
situation  today. 

Lesson  Number  Three — Patience 
on  Principles,  Creativity  on  Other 
Issues.  The  third  lesson  relates  to 
the  many  issues  that  will  arise  in  any 
negotiation.  To  conduct  a  negotiation 
effectively  it  is  crucial  to  know  the  dif- 
ference between  issues  of  principle  and 
other  issues,  to  be  patient  in  adhering 
to  one's  position  on  the  former,  and  to 
be  creative  in  finding  solutions  to  the 
latter. 

Early  in  the  INF  negotiations, 
NATO  identified  the  five  principles  that 
would  guide  U.S.  efforts:  equality  of 
rights  and  limits  between  the  United 
States  and  Soviet  Union;  limits  on  U.S. 
and  Soviet  systems  only,  with  no  com- 
pensation for  third-country  systems; 
global  application  of  limits;  no  weaken- 
ing of  NATO's  conventional  deterrent; 
and  effective  verification. 

In  the  face  of  Soviet  resistance 
and  considerable  public  skepticism,  we 
clung  patiently  to  these  principles  and, 
in  the  end,  got  a  treaty  that  satisfies 
them  all.  But  such  a  treaty  would  not 
have  been  possible  if  we  had  been  un- 
willing to  work  creatively  and  fle.xibly 
on  a  broad  range  of  other  INF  issues. 
Any  negotiation  must  involve  give 
and  take.  A  good  negotiator  must  be 
not  only  a  good  advocate  but  also  a 
good  listener  We  must  recognize  the 
legitimate  security  concerns  of  the 
other  side  and  use  our  imaginations  to 
find  mutually  satisfactory  compromises. 
An  arms  control  negotiation  should 
not  be  a  zero-sum  game  but  rather  a 
search  by  the  negotiating  partners  for 
solutions  that  will  improve  the  situation 
for  both. 

Thus,  as  we  continue  ongoing  nego- 
tiations and  enter  new  ones  on  conven- 
tional arms,  we  must  be  clear  about  our 
principles,  about  the  minimum  require- 
ments to  make  an  agreement  accept- 
able. We  must  be  prepared  to  hold 
tenaciously  to  these  principles,  even  to 
see  the  negotiations  fail  if  the  only  al- 
ternative is  to  sign  an  agreement  that 
does  not  meet  those  basic  security 
needs.  But,  within  this  principled 
framework,  we  must  be  prepared  to 
work  flexibly  to  find  a  mutually  accept- 
able outcome. 


Lesson  Number  Four — The  Pr 
Approach  to  Compliance.  The  foun 
lesson  relates  to  compliance  policy, 
means  by  which  we  provide  the  oth 
side  incentives  to  comply  with  agre' 
ments.  This  consists  of  two  basic  ta 
being  able  to  verify  compliance  witl 
treaty  obligations  and  demonstratin 
the  will  to  respond  should  noncom 
pliance  be  detected. 

With  regard  to  verification,  it  i 

important  that  we  set  the  proper  st 

ard  for  negotiated  regimes  to  meet 

would  be  nice  if  we  could  attain  per 

verification,  that  is,  if  we  could  be 

of  detecting  any  violation  of  a  treat 

provision.  But  such  a  standard  is  ui 

i-eachable,  even  with  the  most  intri; 

verification  regime  we  could  devise 

Moreover,  we  must  realize  that 

rights  we  obtain  for  our  inspectors 

gain  access  to  the  other  side's  facili 

will  necessarily  create  the  same  aci 

for  their  inspectors  to  our  facilities 

And  there  are  many  highly  sensitiv 

facilities  at  which  inspections  by  th 

other  side  would  damage  our  secur: 

Thus,  in  designing  a  verificatio 

gime,  we  face  an  unavoidable  dilem 

created  by  two  countervailing  objec 

fives:  the  desire  to  have  access  to  s 

broad  range  of  facilities  on  the  oth( 

side  to  detect  and  deter  cheating  ai 

the  need  to  protect  sensitive  facilit: 

our  own  from  inspectors  of  the  oth( 

side.  No  solution  to  this  problem  c; 

be  completely  satisfactory;  we  mus 

seek  one  that  properly  balances  ve 

fication  concerns  against  other  sect 

requirements. 

We  believe  such  a  balance  was 
achieved  in  the  INF  Ti-eaty.  We  re: 
that  we  cannot  be  sure  of  detecting 
every  possible  instance  of  Soviet  cl 
ing  on  INF,  but  we  are  confident  t 
should  the  U.S.S.R.  violate  the  tre 
in  any  militarily  significant  way,  wi 
would  be  able  to  detect  the  violatio 
in  time  to  respond  effectively  and, 
thereby,  deny  the  Soviets  the  bene  r" 
the  violation.  The  risk  of  detection  SO 
helps  to  deter  violations.  We  call  tl 
standard  effective  verification;  it  i.-- 
the  guideline  we  should  follow  in  oi  ' 
negotiations  as  well. 

The  other  side  of  the  coin  is  wl . 
we  do  if  a  violation  is  detected.  Ce 
tainly,  it  is  not  enough  to  be  able  t 
detect  violations;  if  we  are  to  provi 
clear  incentives  to  the  other  side  t( 


i 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  i 


iply  with  agreements,  we  must  dem- 
trate  to  them  our  will  to  react  to 
violations  in  a  manner  that  will 
ly  them  the  benefits  they  might 
le  to  gain  from  such  noncompliance. 
Recent  compliance  problems  cen- 
gd  first  on  SALT  [strategic  arms 
itation  talks]  II  and  then  on  the 
M  [Anti-Ballistic  Missile]  Ti-eaty;  in 
h  cases,  when  the  Soviets  resisted 
efforts  to  get  them  to  redress  their 
ations,  we  found  it  difficult  to  deter- 
le  an  appropriate  and  proportionate 
ponse.  Most  options  seemed  unre- 
d  or  disproportionate  to  the  effect 
he  violations  or  politically  difficult 
sustain. 

In  response  to  Soviet  violations  of 
LT  II,  President  Reagan  finally  de- 
d  that  we  would  no  longer  be  bound 
SALT  II  restrictions  but  would  con- 
le  to  e.xercise  restraint  in  structur- 
our  strategic  forces.  This  decision 
led  out  not  to  have  the  dire  conse- 
nces  feared  by  some;  it  did  not  re- 
in a  large  buildup  beyond  SALT  II 
Is  in  the  number  of  Soviet  or  U.S. 
tegic  forces.  In  fact,  in  the  long 
.  this  decision  may  turn  out  to  have 
litated  arms  control,  if  it  drives 
le  to  the  Soviets  that  the  United 
|es  will  act  in  response  to  uncor- 
(ed  violations. 

As  we  now  face  the  problem  of  the 
snoyarsk  radar,  one  hopes  that  our 
jT  II  decision,  the  Western  consen- 
that  that  radar  is  a  clear  violation 
le  ABM  Ti-eaty,  and  our  policy  of 
jluding  no  more  strategic  arms 
feements  until  the  violation  is  cor- 
ed will  convince  the  Soviets  to  rem- 
the  problem. 

It  is  important  to  maintain  a  long- 
n  perspective  when  we  consider  re- 
ises  to  noncompliance.  The  more 
edient  course  may  be  to  wink  at  vio- 
bns,  reassuring  ourselves  that  their 
ct  is  not  that  significant.  In  the 
t  run,  this  may  be  so,  but  it  can 
i  a  message  to  the  other  side  that, 
16  long  run,  may  produce  substan- 
compliance  problems. 

Lesson  Number  Five — The  Impor- 
ce  of  Alliance  Unity  and  Parlia- 
itary  and  Public  Support.  The  fifth 
on  is  one  we  know  well,  but  one  I 
ertheless  emphasize  because  of  its 
:inuing  importance.  That  is  the  need 
stablish  programs  and  positions 
.  will  foster  alliance  unity  and  com- 
id  parliamentary  and  public  support. 


Much  of  the  INF  story  is  a  tale  of 
Soviet  attempts  to  split  the  alliance  and 
to  turn  our  publics  and  parliaments 
against  us.  Thus,  the  treaty  is  a  tribute 
to  and  a  product  of  alliance  unity — the 
determination  of  the  basing  countries  to 
proceed  with  deployments,  the  cohesion 
of  NATO  at  every  step  of  the  negotia- 
tions, and  the  solidarity  of  our  allies 
and  friends  in  Asia  who  contributed  so 
much  to  the  global  zero  outcome. 

Such  unity  and  support  will  be  no 
less  critical  in  the  conventional  arms 
talks  as  well  as  other  negotiations. 
Thus,  we  must  continually  ask  our- 
selves as  we  consider  new  positions: 
Is  this  a  stance  that  will  enable  us  to 
maintain  an  alliance  consensus  and  sus- 
tain public  and  parliamentary  support 
in  the  face  of  Eastern  efforts  to  under- 
mine it? 

Lesson  Number  Six — The  Proper 
Approach  to  Linkage.  The  final  lesson 
has  to  do  with  the  broader  perspective, 
the  linkage  of  arms  control  efforts  to 
each  other  and  to  the  other  aspects  of 
East-West  relations. 

As  you  know,  we  have  insisted  that 
U.S. -Soviet  discussions  not  focus  sim- 
ply on  arms  control  but  rather  cover 
a  broad  agenda,  including  also  human 
rights,  regional  conflicts,  bilateral  mat- 
ters, and  transnational  issues.  This  rec- 
ognizes that  relations  between  nations 
involve  much  more  than  the  level  of 
arms,  which,  in  fact,  reflect  as  much  as 
they  cause  tension  and  mistrust.  A  sim- 
ilarly broad  perspective  is  maintained 
in  the  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  process, 
where  we  insist  that  progress  be 
balanced  between  security,  economic 
and  scientific  cooperation,  and  human 
rights  concerns. 

This  approach  is  sensible,  but  one 
should  not  take  it  too  far  by  insisting 
that  conclusion  of  any  treaty  be  tightly 
linked  to  conclusion  of  treaties  in  other 
areas  or  demonstration  of  satisfactory 
behavior  by  the  other  side  in  other 
dimensions. 

For  example,  some  argued  that  we 
should  not  conclude  the  INF  Ti-eaty 
with  the  Soviets  until  they  were  out  of 
Afghanistan  or  until  they  improved 
their  human  rights  performance.  This 
missed  the  fact  that  we  were  not  ne- 
gotiating the  INF  Treaty  to  do  the 
Soviets  any  favor,  thus  requiring  a 
concession  on  some  other  issue  in 
return:  we  were  negotiating  to  do 
ourselves  a  favor  by  enhancing  our 
security.  When  we  were  able  to  con- 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


EUROPE 


elude  such  a  treaty,  there  was  no  rea- 
son to  deny  ourselves  the  immediate 
realization  of  its  benefits. 

We  have,  of  course,  pressed  ahead 
on  Afghanistan,  human  rights,  and 
other  East- West  problems,  addressing 
them  on  their  own  terms  while  mindful 
of  their  place  in  the  relationship  as  a 
whole.  And  we  have  made  progress  in 
those  areas  as  well. 

The  more  prevalent  linkage  we 
hear  of  today  is  between  START  and 
the  conventional  arms  talks,  that  the 
former  should  not  be  concluded  before 
the  latter.  Such  linkage  implies  that  a 
START  treaty  would  weaken  our  deter- 
rent against  conventional  attack  or  that 
the  Soviets  need  a  START  treaty  so 
badly  that,  to  secure  it,  they  would 
sign  a  conventional  arms  agreement 
that  they  would  not  otherwise  accept. 
But  neither  of  these  conditions  applies. 

A  good  START  treaty  and  a  good 
agreement  on  conventional  arms  are 
both  in  the  interest  of  the  West, 
whether  considered  separately  or  to- 
gether. Each  should  be  pursued  at  its 
own  pace,  even  while  ensuring  that  our 
approaches  to  the  two  are  mutually 
consistent. 

A  Final  Thought— How  NATO 
Should  React  to  Gorbachev 

To  my  six  lessons,  let  me  add  a  thought 
on  how  NATO  should  react  to  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev and  the  changes  occurring  in 
the  U.S.S.R. 

There  can  no  longer  be  doubt  that 
extraordinary  things  are  happening  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  This  has  been  evi- 
dent during  my  six  trips  there  over  the 
last  3  years.  What  is  not  clear  is  where 
these  changes  are  headed,  whether 
they  will  be  sustained,  and  how  they 
will  affect  East- West  relations  in  the 
long  run. 

Gorbachev  now  appears  to  be  un- 
der several  types  of  internal  pressure 
to  moderate  Soviet  international  behav- 
ior and  proceed  with  negotiation  of  se- 
rious arms  control  measures.  One  type 
of  pressure  comes  from  the  difficulty 
of  achieving  the  domestic  targets  of 
perestroika  while  maintaining  the  past 
burden  on  the  economy  of  truly  extra- 
ordinary military  spending.  Another 
comes  from  the  growing  realization  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  due  to  glasnost.  that 
the  threat  of  an  attack  on  the  Warsaw 
Pact  by  NATO  was  a  wholly  trumped- 
up  illusion  created  to  support  the  doc- 
trine of  the  inevitability  of  Soviet 
expansion. 


47 


SOUTH  ASIA 


Soviet  rhetoric  about  "military 
sufficiency,"  and  Gorbachev's  announce- 
ment of  arms  cuts  and  force  restructur- 
ing, provide  reason  for  hope  that  these 
pressures  will  eventually  produce  a  de- 
sirable result.  But  we  must  always  re- 
member to  base  our  security  policies  on 
Soviet  capabilities  and  behavior  rather 
than  hopes  or  expressed  intentions. 
And,  to  date,  their  military  capabilities 
have  not  changed  substantially. 

Moreover,  hopeful  signs  from  the 
Soviet  Union  are  a  result  not  only  of 
internal  pressures  but  also  of  external 
incentives,  for  example,  evidence  of 
NATO's  capability  and  will  to  resist 
unacceptable  Soviet  behavior.  If  we  are 
to  maximize  the  chances  that  hoped-for 


improvements  will  be  realized,  we  must 
keep  these  incentives  in  place. 

We  should  resist  the  entreaties  of 
some  to  "help  Gorbachev  out."  It  is  not 
clear  that  NATO  economic  aid  to  the 
U.S.S.R.  would  do  more  than  postpone 
pressures  to  implement  the  most  neces- 
sary or  difficult  parts  of  perestroika.  It 
is  also  not  clear  whether  such  help 
would  redound  to  NATO's  long-term 
advantage. 

Instead,  while  carefully  watching 
events  in  the  U.S.S.R.,  we  should  con- 
tinue vigorously  to  pursue  our  own  in- 
terests. We  should  do  what  is  necessary 
to  maintain  an  adequate  deterrent.  We 
should  continue  to  provide  the  Soviets 
incentives  to  conclude  meaningful  and 


stabilizing  arms  control  agreement.^,] 
And  we  should  seek  out  and  be  pre  ( j 
pared  to  react  creatively  to  oppor-   |j 
tunities  for  concrete  achievements  i 
East- West  relations. 

Conclusion 

Much  good  work  has  been  accompli  e( 
over  the  past  8  years.  I  think  we  c; 
safely  say  that  NATO's  lot  has  impi   . 
since  1981.  But  this  is  no  time  to  n- 
on  our  laurels.  There  is  much  work  t 
to  be  done  and  the  potential  for  mu 
accomplishment.  By  moving  forwan 
with  a  clear  sense  of  purpose,  and  \  h 
unity,  the  alliance  can  meet  the  ch:i 
lenges  of  the  years  ahead  and  creat 
even  greater  assurance  that  our  air  y 
to  live  in  peace  with  freedom  will  li 
sustained.  ■ 


Soviets  Withdraw  From  Afghanistan 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  16,  1989' 

Today  marks  the  start  of  a  new  chapter 
in  the  history  of  Afghanistan.  For  the 
first  time  in  over  9  years,  Soviet  forces 
no  longer  occupy  that  country.  This  de- 
velopment marks  an  extraordinary  tri- 
umph of  spirit  and  will  by  the  Afghan 
people,  and  we  salute  them  for  it. 

Much  remains  to  be  done,  however 
For  the  Afghan  people,  the  struggle  for 
self-determination  goes  on.  We  support 
Afghan  efforts  to  fashion  a  stable, 
broadly  based  government  responsive 
to  the  needs  of  the  Afghan  people.  We 
call  upon  Afghan  resistance  leaders  to 
work  together  toward  this  end.  As  long 
as  the  resistance  struggle  for  self- 
determination  continues,  so  too  will 
America's  support. 

Throughout  the  long  dark  years  of 
Afghanistan's  occupation,  the  interna- 
tional community  has  been  steadfast  in 


its  support  of  the  Afghan  cause.  This  is 
also  true  for  the  United  States.  U.S. 
support  for  the  Afghan  people  and  the 
subsequent  Soviet  military  withdrawal 
from  Afghanistan  constitute  a  powerful 
example  of  what  we  Americans  can  ac- 
complish when  executive  and  Congress, 
Republican  and  Democrat,  stand  to- 
gether. The  Government  and  people  of 
Pakistan  also  can  take  particular  satis- 
faction from  this  event;  their  courage 
and  solidarity  contributed  significantly 
to  the  Afghan  struggle. 

Now,  more  than  ever,  the  Afghan 
people  deserve  the  continuing  help  of 
the  international  community  as  they 
begin  the  difficult  process  of  reclaim- 
ing their  country,  resettling  their  peo- 
ple, and  restoring  their  livelihood.  The 
commitment  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Afghan  people  will  remain  firm — both 
through  our  bilateral  humanitarian  aid 
program  and  through  UN  efforts  to  re- 
move mines,  resettle  refugees,  and  re- 


construct Afghanistan's  war-torn 
economy.  We  call  upon  other  nation  o 
contribute  all  they  can  and  hope  tli 
the  United  Nations  and  the  resista 
can  come  to  mutually  acceptable  ai 
rangements  for  the  nationwide  dist 
bution  of  needed  food  supplies. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  now  fulf  .>d 
its  obligation  to  withdraw  from  Af 
ghanistan.  We  welcome  that  decisi 
We  call  upon  the  Soviet  Union  to  r( 
frain  from  other  forms  of  interfere  ? 
in  Afghan  affairs.  The  Soviet  Uni( 
has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  establ  i- 
ment  of  an  independent,  nonalignei  I 
ghanistan.  At  the  same  time,  the 
U.S.S.R.  bears  special  responsibil 
for  healing  the  wounds  of  this  war,  i 
we  call  upon  it  to  support  generous 
international  efforts  to  rebuild 
Afghanistan. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  I 
dential  Documents  of  Feb.  20,  1989.  ■ 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April ' 


I 

LMITED  NATIONS 


|SI  Narcotics  Trafficking  Conference  Adopts 
invention 


•   The  UN  Conference  for  the  Adop- 
't' a  Coiwention  Against  Illicit 
r  in  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psycho- 
Substances  was  held  in  Vienna 
,iber  ^5-December  20, 1988.  It  was 
led  by  representatives  of  106 
lies;  the  U.S.  delegation  was 
•,i,'d  by  Ann  Wrobleski,  Assistant 
^  II  tary  for  International  Narcotics 
I  tti-rs.'  ' 
Following  is  the  text  of  the  conven- 
I  adopted  by  consensus  on  Decem- 


f  Piniies  to  thix  Concentioii, 
Ih  I  ply  concerned  by  the  magnitude  of 
rising  trend  in  the  illicit  production  of, 
1  iaiid  for  and  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs  and 
;.  jhutropic  substances,  which  pose  a  seri- 
)i  threat  to  the  health  and  welfare  of 
1  laii  beings  and  adversely  affect  the  eco- 
,  cultural  and  political  foundations  of 


/'i  (/)/(/  concerned  also  by  the  steadily 
I  asing  inroads  into  various  social 
ips  made  by  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic 
:.-  and  psychotropic  substances,  and  par- 
laily  by  the  fact  that  children  are  used 
lany  parts  of  the  world  as  an  illicit  drug 
umers  market  and  for  purposes  of  illicit 
liKtion,  distribution  and  trade  in  narcot- 
uus  and  psychotropic  substances,  which 
Ills  a  danger  of  incalculable  gravity, 
Rf'cog)ii:iiig  the  links  between  illicit 
fie  and  other  related  organized  criminal 
\  ities  which  undermine  the  legitimate 
inmies  and  threaten  the  stability,  securi- 
riil  sovereignty  of  States, 
Urrogiiizing  also  that  illicit  traffic  is  an 
inational  criminal  activity,  the  suppres- 
nf  which  demands  urgent  attention  and 
highest  priority, 

.Airin-e  that  illicit  traffic  generates  large 
ncial  profits  and  wealth  enabling  trans- 
imal  criminal  organizations  to  pene- 
f,  contaminate  and  corrupt  the 
etures  of  government,  legitimate  corn- 
rial  and  financial  business  and  society  at 
Is  levels, 

lii'terinined  to  deprive  persons  engaged 
icit  traffic  of  the  proceeds  of  their  crim- 
activities  and  thereby  eliminate  their 
n  incentive  for  so  doing. 
Desiring  to  eliminate  the  root  causes  of 
indblem  of  abuse  of  narcotic  drugs  and 
'tropic  substances,  including  the  illicit 
III  for  such  drugs  and  substances  and 
■  irmous  profits  derived  from  illicit 


I  I 


Considering  that  measures  are  neces- 
sary to  monitor  certain  substances,  includ- 
ing precursors,  chemicals  and  solvents, 
which  are  used  in  the  manufacture  of  nar- 
cotic drugs  and  psychotropic  substances,  the 
ready  availability  of  which  has  led  to  an  in- 
crease in  the  clandestine  manufacture  of 
such  drugs  and  substances. 

Determined  to  improve  international  co- 
operation in  the  suppression  of  illicit  traffic 
by  sea. 

Recognizing  that  eradication  of  illicit 
traffic  is  a  collective  responsibility  of  all 
States  and  that,  to  that  end,  co-ordinated 
action  within  the  framework  of  international 
co-operation  is  necessary. 

Acknowledging  the  competence  of  the 
United  Nations  in  the  field  of  control  of  nar- 
cotic drugs  and  psychotropic  substances  and 
desirous  that  the  international  organs  con- 
cerned with  such  control  should  be  within 
the  framework  of  that  Organization, 

Reaffirming  the  guiding  principles  of 
existing  treaties  in  the  field  of  narcotic 
drugs  and  psychotropic  substances  and  the 
system  of  control  which  they  embody. 

Recognizing  the  need  to  reinforce  and 
supplement  the  measures  provided  in  the 
Single  Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs,  1961, 
that  Convention  as  amended  by  the  1972  Pro- 
tocol Amending  the  Single  Convention  on 
Narcotic  Drugs,  1961,  and  the  1971  Conven- 
tion on  Psychotropic  Substances,  in  order  to 
counter  the  magnitude  and  extent  of  illicit 
traffic  and  its  grave  consequences, 

Recognizing  also  the  importance  of 
strengthening  and  enhancing  effective  legal 
means  for  international  co-operation  in 
criminal  matters  for  suppressing  the  inter- 
national criminal  activities  of  illicit  traffic. 

Desiring  to  conclude  a  comprehensive, 
effective  and  operative  international  conven- 
tion that  is  directed  specifically  against  il- 
licit traffic  and  that  considers  the  various 
aspects  of  the  problem  as  a  whole,  in  partic- 
ular those  aspects  not  envisaged  in  the  exist- 
ing treaties  in  the  field  of  narcotic  drugs  and 
psychotropic  substances. 

Hereby  agree  as  follows: 


Article  1 


Definitions 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  indicated 
or  where  the  context  otherwise  requires, 
the  following  definitions  shall  apply 
throughout  this  Convention: 


(a)  "Board"  means  the  International 
Narcotics  Control  Board  established  by  the 
Single  Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs,  1961. 
and  that  Convention  as  amended  by  the  1972 
Protocol  Amending  the  Single  Convention 
on  Narcotic  Drugs,  1961; 

(b)  "Cannabis  plant"  means  any  plant 
of  the  genus  Cannabis; 

(c)  "Coca  bush"  means  the  plant  of  any 
species  of  the  genus  Erythroxylon; 

(d)  "Commercial  carrier"  means  any 
person  or  any  public,  private  or  other  entity 
engaged  in  transporting  persons,  goods  or 
mails  for  renumeration,  hire  or  any  other 
benefit; 

(e)  "Commission"  means  the  Commis- 
sion on  Narcotic  Drugs  of  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council  of  the  United  Nations; 

(f )  "Confiscation,"  which  includes  for- 
feiture where  applicable,  means  the  perma- 
nent deprivation  of  property  by  order  of  a 
court  or  other  competent  authority: 

(g)  "Controlled  delivery"  means  the 
technique  of  allowing  illicit  or  suspect  con- 
signments of  narcotic  drugs,  psychotropic 
substances,  substances  in  Table  I  and  Table 
II  annexed  to  this  Convention,  or  substances 
substituted  for  them,  to  pass  out  of,  through 
or  into  the  territory  of  one  or  more  coun- 
tries, with  the  knowledge  and  under  the  su- 
pervision of  their  competent  authorities, 
with  a  view  to  identifying  persons  involved 
in  the  commission  of  offences  established  in 
accordance  with  article  -3,  paragraph  1  of  the 
Convention; 

(h)  "1961  Convention"  means  the  Sin- 
gle Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs,  1961: 

(i)  "1961  Convention  as  amended" 
means  the  Single  Convention  on  Narcotic 
Drugs,  1961,  as  amended  by  the  1972  Proto- 
col Amending  the  Single  Convention  on  Nar- 
cotic Drugs,  1961; 

( j)  "1971  Convention"  means  the  Con- 
vention on  Psychotropic  Substances,  1971; 

(k)  "Council"  means  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council  of  the  United  Nations; 

(1)  "Freezing"  or  "seizure"  means  tem- 
porarily prohibiting  the  transfer,  conver- 
sion, disposition  or  movement  of  property  or 
temporarily  assuming  custody  or  control  of 
property  on  the  basis  of  an  order  issued  by  a 
court  or  a  competent  authority; 

(m)  "Illicit  traffic"  means  the  offences 
set  forth  in  article  3,  paragraphs  1  and  2,  of 
this  Convention: 

(n)  "Narcotic  drug"  means  any  of  the 
substances,  natural  or  synthetic,  in  Sched- 
ules I  and  II  of  the  Single  Convention  on 
Narcotic  Drugs,  1961,  and  that  Convention 
as  amended  by  the  1972  Protocol  Amending 
the  Single  Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs, 
1961; 


lartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


49 


UNITED  NATIONS 


(o)  "Opium  poppy"  means  the  plant  of 
the  species  Papaver  soinniferum  L; 

(p)  "Proceeds"  means  any  property 
derived  from  or  obtained,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, through  the  commission  of  an  offence 
established  in  accordance  with  article  3, 
paragraph  1; 

(q)  "Property"  means  assets  of  every 
kind,  whether  corporeal  or  incorporeal, 
movable  or  immovable,  tangible  or  intan- 
gible, and  legal  documents  or  instruments 
evidencing  title  to,  or  interest  in,  such 
assets; 

(r)  "Psychotropic  substance"  means 
any  substance,  natural  or  synthetic,  or  any 
natural  material  in  Schedules  I,  II,  III  and 
IV  of  the  Convention  on  Psychotropic  Sub- 
stances, 1971: 

(s)  "Secretary-General"  means  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations: 

(t)  "Table  I"  and  "Table  11"  mean  the 
correspondingly  numbered  lists  of  sub- 
stances annexed  to  this  Convention,  as 
amended  from  time  to  time  in  accordance 
with  article  12: 

(u)  "Transit  State"  means  a  State 
through  the  territory  of  which  illicit  narcot- 
ic drugs,  psychotropic  substances  and  sub- 
stances in  fable  I  and  Table  II  are  being 
moved,  which  is  neither  the  place  of  origin 
nor  the  place  of  ultimate  destination  thereof. 


Article  2 


Scope  of  the  Convention 

1.  The  purpose  of  this  Convention  is  to  pro- 
mote co-operation  among  the  Parties  so  that 
they  may  address  more  effectively  the  vari- 
ous aspects  of  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs 
and  psychotropic  substances  having  an  in- 
ternational dimension.  In  carrying  out 
their  obligations  under  the  Convention,  the 
Parties  shall  take  necessary  measures, 
including  legislative  and  administrative 
measures,  in  conformity  with  the  fundamen- 
tal provisions  of  their  respective  domestic 
legislative  systems. 

2.  The  Parties  shall  carry  out  their 
obligations  under  this  Convention  in  a  man- 
ner consistent  with  the  principles  of  sover- 
eign equality  and  territorial  integrity  of 
States  and  that  of  non-intervention  in  the 
domestic  affairs  of  other  States. 

3.  A  Party  shall  not  undertake  in  the 
territory  of  another  Party  the  e.xercise  of  ju- 
risdiction and  performance  of  functions 
which  are  exclusively  reserved  for  the  au- 
thorities of  that  other  Party  by  its  domestic 
law. 


Article  3 


Offences  and  Sanctions 

1.  Each  Party  shall  adopt  such  measures  as 
may  be  necessary  to  establish  as  criminal 
offences  under  its  domestic  law,  when  com- 
mitted intentionally: 


50 


(a)  (i)  The  [jroduction,  manufacture, 
extraction,  preparation,  offering,  offering 
for  sale,  distribution,  sale,  delivery  on  any 
terms  whatsoever,  brokerage,  dispatch,  dis- 
patch in  transit,  transport,  importation  or 
exportation  of  any  narcotic  drug  or  any  psy- 
chotropic substance  contrary  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  1961  Convention,  the  1961 
Convention  as  amended  or  the  1971 
Convention; 

(ii)  The  cultivation  of  opium  poppy, 
coca  bush  or  cannabis  plant  for  the  purpose 
of  the  production  of  narcotic  drugs  contrary 
to  the  provisions  of  the  1961  Convention  and 
the  1961  Convention  as  amended; 

(iii)  The  possession  or  purchase  of 
any  narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic  substance 
for  the  purpose  of  any  of  the  activities  enu- 
mei'ated  in  (i)  above; 

(iv)  The  manufacture,  transport  or 
distribution  of  equipment,  materials  or  of 
substances  listed  in  Table  I  and  Table  II, 
knowing  that  they  are  to  be  used  in  or  for 
the  illicit  cultivation,  production  or  manu- 
facture of  narcotic  drugs  or  psychotropic 
substances: 

(v)  The  organization,  management 
or  financing  of  any  of  the  offences  enumer- 
ated in  (i),  (ii),  (iii)  or  (iv)  above; 

(b)  (i)  The  conversion  or  transfer  of 
property,  knowing  that  such  property  is  de- 
rived from  any  offence  or  offences  estab- 
lished in  accordance  with  subparagraph  (a) 
of  this  paragraph,  or  from  an  act  of  partici- 
pation in  such  offence  or  offences,  for  the 
purpose  of  concealing  or  disguising  the  illic- 
it origin  of  the  property  or  of  assisting  any 
person  who  is  involved  in  the  commission  of 
such  an  offence  or  offences  to  evade  the  legal 
consequences  of  his  actions; 

(ii)  The  concealment  or  disguise  of 
the  true  nature,  source,  location,  disposi- 
tion, movement,  rights  with  respect  to,  or 
ownership  of  property,  knowing  that  such 
property  is  derived  from  an  offence  or  of- 
fences established  in  accordance  with  sub- 
paragraph (a)  of  this  paragraph  or  from  an 
act  of  participation  in  such  an  offence  or 
offences: 

(c)  Subject  to  its  constitutional  princi- 
ples and  the  basic  concepts  of  its  legal 
system; 

(i)  The  acquisition,  possession  or 
use  of  property,  knowing,  at  the  time  of  re- 
ceipt, that  such  property  was  derived  from 
an  offence  or  offences  established  in  accord- 
ance with  subparagraph  (a)  of  this  para- 
graph or  from  an  act  of  participation  in  such 
offence  or  offences; 

(ii)  The  possession  of  equipment  or 
materials  or  substances  listed  in  Table  I  and 
Table  II,  knowing  that  they  are  being  or  are 
to  be  used  in  or  for  the  illicit  cultivation, 
production  or  manufacture  of  narcotic  drugs 
or  psychotropic  substances; 

(iii)  Publicly  inciting  or  inducing 
others,  by  any  means,  to  commit  any  of  the 
offences  estaljlished  in  accordance  with  this 
article  or  to  use  narcotic  drugs  or  psycho- 
tropic substances  illicitly; 


(iv)  Participation  in,  associatio?] 
conspiracy  to  commit,  attempts  to  comr 
and  aiding,  abetting,  facilitating  and  co 
seling  the  comission  of  any  of  the  offend 
established  in  accordance  with  this  arti( 


2.  Subject  to  its  constitutional  print 
pies  and  the  basic  concepts  of  its  legal  s; 
tem,  each  Party  shall  adopt  such  measu 
as  may  be  necessary  to  establish  as  a  cr 
nal  offence  under  its  domestic  law,  when 
committed  intentionally,  the  possession 
purchase  or  cultivation  of  narcotic  drugi 
psychotropic  substances  for  personal  co: 
sumption  contrary  to  the  provisions  oft 
1961  Convention,  the  1961  Convention  as 
amended  or  the  1971  Convention. 

3.  Knowledge,  intent  or  purpose  re- 
quired as  an  element  of  an  offence  set  fc 
in  paragraph  1  of  this  article  may  be  in 
ferred  from  objective  factual  circumstai 

4.  (a)  Each  Party  shall  make  the  coi 
mission  of  the  offences  established  in  ace 
ance  with  paragraph  1  of  this  article  lial 
to  sanctions  which  take  into  account  the 
grave  nature  of  these  offences,  such  as  i 
prisonment  or  other  forms  of  deprivatio 
liberty,  pecuniary  sanctions  and 
confiscation. 

(b)  The  Parties  may  provide,  in  a< 
tion  to  conviction  or  punishment,  for  an 
fence  established  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  1  of  this  article,  that  the  offe 
shall  undergo  measures  such  as  treatmi 
education,  aftercare,  rehabilitation  or  s 
reintegration. 

(c)  Notwithstanding  the  precedit 
subparagraphs,  in  appropriate  cases  of 
minor  nature,  the  Parties  may  provide, 
alternatives  to  conviction  or  punishmer 
measures  such  as  education,  rehabilitai 
or  social  reintegration,  as  well  as,  wher 
offender  is  a  drug  abuser,  treatment  an( 
aftercare. 

(d)  The  Parties  may  provide,  eith 
an  alternative  to  conviction  or  punishm 
or  in  addition  to  conviction  or  punishm< 
an  offence  established  in  accordance  wi 
paragraph  2  of  this  article,  measures  fc 
treatment,  education,  aftercare,  rehabi 
tion  or  social  reintegration  of  the  offend 

5.  The  Parties  shall  ensure  that  the 
courts  and  other  competent  authorities 
ing  jurisdiction  can  take  into  account  fs 
circumstances  which  make  the  commiss 
of  the  offences  established  in  accordanc 
with  paragraph  1  of  this  article  particu- 
serious,  such  as: 

(a)  The  involvement  in  the  offenct 
an  organized  criminal  group  to  which  tl 
fender  belongs; 

(b)  The  involvement  of  the  offendi 
other  international  organized  criminal 
activities; 

(c)  The  involvement  of  the  offende 
other  illegal  activities  facilitated  by  cor 
mission  of  the  offence: 

(d)  The  use  of  violence  or  arms  bj 
offender; 

(e)  The  fact  that  the  offender  hole 
public  office  and  that  the  offence  is  conr 
ed  with  the  office  in  question; 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April 


UNITED  NATIONS 


(f )  The  victimization  or  use  of  minors; 

(g)  The  fact  that  the  offence  is  copi- 
ed in  a  penal  institution  or  in  an  educa- 
,1  institution  or  social  service  facility 
their  immediate  vicinity  or  in  other 

s  to  which  school  children  and  students 
Irt  for  educational,  sports  and  social 
|.'ities; 

(h)  Prior  conviction,  particularly  for 
liar  offences,  whether  foreign  or  domes- 

0  the  extent  permitted  under  the  do- 

ic  law  of  a  Party. 

'|6.  The  Parties  shall  endeavour  to  ensure 

any  discretionary  legal  powers  under 

domestic  law  relating  to  the  prosecu- 

oof  persons  for  offences  established  in 

dance  with  this  article  are  exercised  to 

mize  the  effectiveness  of  law  enforce- 
I    measures  in  respect  of  those  offences 
1  .vith  due  regard  to  the  need  to  deter  the 

iiission  of  such  offences. 

"  The  Parties  shall  ensure  that  their 
ii  ts  or  other  competent  authorities  bear 

ind  the  serious  nature  of  the  offences 
1  It-rated  in  paragraph  1  of  this  article 
1  lie  circumstances  enumerated  in  para- 

!i  .')  of  this  article  when  considering  the 
uality  of  early  release  or  parole  of  per- 
.1  Liinvicted  of  such  offences. 

;.  Each  Party  shall,  where  appropriate, 
t  ilish  under  its  domestic  law  a  long  stat- 
t  f  limitations  period  in  which  to  com- 
t  ij  proceedings  for  any  offence 
lished  in  accordance  with  paragraph  1 

,<  article,  and  a  longer  period  where  the 

I  ?d  offender  has  evaded  the  administra- 
•  if  justice. 

.  Kach  Party  shall  take  appropriate 
^  ares,  consistent  with  its  legal  system, 
-lire  that  a  person  charged  with  or  con- 
I  nf  an  offence  established  in  aceord- 
i\  ith  paragraph  1  of  this  article,  who  is 

II  within  its  territory,  is  present  at  the 
■(  sary  criminal  proceedings. 

I  For  the  purpose  of  co-operation 
II  g  the  Parties  under  this  Convention, 
ling,  in  particular,  co-operation  under 
es  5,  6,  7  and  9,  offences  established  in 
dance  with  this  article  shall  not  be  con- 
ad  as  fiscal  offences  or  as  political  of- 
s  or  regarded  as  politically  motivated, 
lut  prejudice  to  the  constitutional  lim- 
ns and  the  fundamental  domestic  law  of 
arties. 

1.  Nothing  contained  in  this  article 
affect  the  principle  that  the  descrip- 
if  the  offences  to  which  it  refers  and  of 
defences  thereto  is  reserved  to  the  do- 
c  law  of  a  Party  and  that  such  offences 
be  prosecuted  and  punished  in  conform- 
ith  that  law. 


Article  4 

idiction 

ch  Party: 

(a)  Shall  take  such  measures  as  may 
•cessary  to  establish  its  jurisdiction 
:he  offences  it  has  established  in  accord- 
iwith  article  3,  paragraph  1,  when: 


(i)  The  offence  is  committed  in  its 
territory; 

(ii)  The  offence  is  committed  on 
board  a  vessel  flying  its  flag  or  an  aircraft 
which  is  registered  under  its  laws  at  the 
time  the  offence  is  committed; 

(b)  May  take  such  measures  as  may  be 
necessary  to  establish  its  jurisdiction  over 
the  offences  it  has  established  in  accordance 
with  article  3,  paragraph  1,  when: 

(i)  The  offence  is  committed  by  one 
of  its  nationals  or  by  a  person  who  has  his 
habitual  residence  in  its  territory; 

(ii)  The  offence  is  committed  on 
board  a  vessel  concerning  which  that  Party 
has  been  authorized  to  take  appropriate  ac- 
tion pursuant  to  article  17,  provided  that 
such  jurisdiction  shall  be  exercised  only  on 
the  basis  of  agreements  or  arrangements  re- 
ferred to  in  paragraphs  4  and  9  of  that 
article; 

(iii)  The  offence  is  one  of  those  es- 
tablished in  accordance  with  article  3,  para- 
graph 1,  subparagraph  (c)  (iv),  and  is 
committed  outside  its  territory  with  a  view 
to  the  commission,  within  its  territory,  of 
an  offence  established  in  accordance  with 
article  3,  paragraph  1. 

2.  Each  Party: 

(a)  Shall  also  take  such  measures  as 
may  be  necessary  to  establish  its  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  offences  it  has  established  in 
accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1, 
when  the  alleged  offender  is  present  in  its 
territory  and  it  does  not  extradite  him  to 
another  Party  on  the  ground: 

(i)  That  the  offence  has  been  com- 
mitted in  its  territory  or  on  board  a  vessel 
flying  its  flag  or  an  aircraft  which  was  reg- 
istered under  its  law  at  the  time  the  offence 
was  committed;  or 

(ii)  That  the  offence  has  been  com- 
mitted by  one  of  its  nationals; 

(b)  May  also  take  such  measures  as 
may  be  necessary  to  establish  its  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  offences  it  has  established  in 
accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1, 
when  the  alleged  offender  is  present  in  its 
territory  and  it  does  not  extradite  him  to 
another  Party. 

3.  This  Convention  does  not  exclude  the 
exercise  of  any  criminal  jurisdiction  estab- 
lished by  a  Party  in  accordance  with  its 
domestic  law. 


Article  5 


Confiscation 

1.  Each  Party  shall  adopt  such  measures  as 
may  be  necessary  to  enable  confiscation  of: 

(a)  Proceeds  derived  from  offences  es- 
tablished in  accordance  with  article  3,  para- 
graph 1,  or  property  the  value  of  which 
corresponds  to  that  of  such  proceeds; 


(b)  Narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic 
substances,  materials  and  equipment  or  oth- 
er instrumentalities  used  in  or  intended  for 
use  in  any  manner  in  offences  established  in 
accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1. 

2.  Each  Party  shall  also  adopt  such 
measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  enable  its 
competent  authorities  to  identify,  trace  and 
freeze  or  seize  proceeds,  property,  instru- 
mentalities or  any  other  things  referred  to 
in  paragraph  1  of  this  article,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  eventual  confiscation. 

3.  In  order  to  carry  out  the  measures 
referred  to  in  this  article,  each  Party  shall 
empower  its  courts  or  other  competent  au- 
thorities to  order  that  bank,  financial  or 
commercial  records  be  made  available  or  be 
seized.  A  Party  shall  not  decline  to  act  un- 
der the  provisions  of  this  paragraph  on  the 
ground  of  bank  secrecy. 

4.  (a)  Following  a  request  made  pur- 
suant to  this  article  by  another  Party  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  over  an  offence  established 
in  accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1, 
the  Party  in  whose  territory  proceeds, 
property,  instrumentalities  or  any  other 
things  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this 
article  are  situated  shall: 

(i)  Submit  the  request  to  its  compe- 
tent authorities  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
an  order  of  confiscation  and,  if  such  order  is 
granted,  give  effect  to  it;  or 

(ii)  Submit  to  its  competent  authori- 
ties, with  a  view  to  giving  effect  to  it  to  the 
extent  requested,  an  order  of  confiscation  is- 
sued by  the  requesting  Party  in  accordance 
with  paragraph  1  of  this  article,  insofar  as  it 
relates  to  proceeds,  property,  instrumen- 
talities or  any  other  things  referred  to  in 
paragraph  1  situated  in  the  territory  of  the 
requested  Party. 

(b)  Following  a  request  made  pur- 
suant to  this  article  by  another  Party  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  over  an  offence  established 
in  accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1, 
the  requested  Party  shall  take  measures  to 
identify,  trace  and  freeze  or  seize  proceeds, 
property,  instrumentalities  or  any  other 
things  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this  ar- 
ticle for  the  purpose  of  eventual  confiscation 
to  be  ordered  either  by  the  requesting  Party 
or,  pursuant  to  a  request  under  subpara- 
graph (a)  of  this  paragraph,  by  the  re- 
quested Party. 

(c)  The  decisions  or  actions  provided 
for  in  subparagraphs  (a)  and  (b)  of  this  para- 
graph shall  be  taken  by  the  requested  Party, 
in  accordance  with  and  subject  to  the  provi- 
sions of  its  domestic  law  and  its  procedural 
rules  or  any  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaty, 
agreement  or  arrangement  to  which  it  may 
be  bound  in  relation  to  the  requesting  Party. 

(d)  The  provisions  of  article  7,  para- 
graphs 6  to  19  are  applicable  mutatis  mutan- 
dis. In  addition  to  the  information  specified 
in  article  7,  paragraph  10,  requests  made 
pursuant  to  this  article  shall  contain  the 
following: 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


51 


UNITED  NATIONS 


(i)  In  the  case  of  a  request  pertain- 
ing to  subparagraph  (a)(i)  of  this  paragraph, 
a  description  of  the  property  to  be  confis- 
cated and  a  statement  of  the  facts  relied 
upon  by  the  requesting  Party  sufficient  to 
enable  the  requested  Party  to  seek  the  order 
under  its  domestic  law; 

(ii)  In  the  ease  of  a  request  pertain- 
ing to  subparagraph  (a)(ii),  a  legally  admis- 
sible copy  of  an  order  of  confiscation  issued 
by  the  requesting  Party  upon  which  the  re- 
quest is  based,  a  statement  of  the  facts  and 
information  as  to  the  extent  to  which  the  ex- 
ecution of  the  order  is  requested; 

(iii)  In  the  case  of  a  request  pertain- 
ing to  subparagraph  (b),  a  statement  of  the 
facts  relied  upon  by  the  requesting  Party 
and  a  description  of  the  actions  requested. 

(e)  Each  Party  shall  furnish  to  the 
Secretary-General  the  text  of  any  of  its  laws 
and  regulations  which  give  effect  to  this 
paragraph  and  the  text  of  any  subsequent 
changes  to  such  laws  and  regulations. 

(f )  If  a  Party  elects  to  make  the  tak- 
ing of  the  measures  referred  to  in  subpara- 
graphs (a)  and  (b)  of  this  paragraph 
conditional  on  the  existence  of  a  relevant 
treaty,  that  Party  shall  consider  this  Con- 
vention as  the  necessary  and  sufficient  trea- 
ty basis. 

(g)  The  Parties  shall  seek  to  conclude 
bilateral  and  multilateral  treaties,  agree- 
ments or  arrangements  to  enhance  the  effec- 
tiveness of  international  co-operation 
pursuant  to  this  article. 

5.  (a)  Proceeds  or  property  confiscated 
by  a  Party  pursuant  to  paragraph  1  or  para- 
graph 4  of  this  article  shall  be  disposed  of 
by  that  Party  according  to  its  domestic  law 
and  administrative  procedures. 

(b)  When  acting  on  the  request  of  an- 
other Party  in  accordance  with  this  article, 
a  Party  may  give  special  consideration  to 
concluding  agreements  on: 

(i)  Contributing  the  value  of  such 
proceeds  and  property,  or  funds  derived 
from  the  sale  of  such  proceeds  or  property, 
or  a  substantial  part  thereof,  to  intergovern- 
mental bodies  specializing  in  the  fight 
against  illicit  traffic  in  and  abuse  of  narcotic 
drugs  and  psychotropic  substances; 

(ii)  Sharing  with  other  Parties,  on  a 
regular  or  case-by-case  basis,  such  proceeds 
or  property,  or  funds  derived  from  the  sale 
of  such  proceeds  or  property,  in  accordance 
with  its  domestic  law,  administrative  pro- 
cedures or  bilateral  or  multilateral  agree- 
ments entered  into  for  this  purpose. 

6.  (a)  If  proceeds  have  been  transformed 
or  converted  into  other  property,  such  prop- 
erty shall  be  liable  to  the  measures  referred 
to  in  this  article  instead  of  the  proceeds. 

(b)  If  proceeds  have  been  inter- 
mingled with  property  acquired  from  legiti- 
mate sources,  such  property  shall,  without 
prejudice  to  any  powers  relating  to  seizure 
or  freezing,  be  liable  to  confiscation  up  to 
the  assessed  value  of  the  intermingled 
proceeds. 


(c)  Income  or  other  benefits  derived 
from: 

(i)  Proceeds; 

(ii)  Property  into  which  proceeds 
have  been  transformed  or  converted;  or 

(iii)  Property  with  which  proceeds 
have  been  intermingled  shall  also  be  liable 
to  the  measures  referred  to  in  this  article, 
in  the  same  manner  and  to  the  same  extent 
as  proceeds. 

7.  Each  Party  may  consider  ensuring 
that  the  onus  of  proof  be  reversed  regarding 
the  lawful  origin  of  alleged  proceeds  or  oth- 
er property  liable  to  confiscation,  to  the  ex- 
tent that  such  action  is  consistent  with  the 
principles  of  its  domestic  law  and  with  the 
nature  of  the  judicial  and  other  proceedings. 

8.  The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  not 
be  construed  as  prejudicing  the  rights  of 
bona  fide  third  parties. 

9.  Nothing  contained  in  this  article 
shall  affect  the  principle  that  the  measures 
to  which  it  refers  shall  be  defined  and  im- 
plemented in  accordance  with  and  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  the  domestic  law  of  a  Party. 


Article  6 


Extradition 

1.  This  article  shall  apply  to  the  offences  es- 
tablished by  the  Parties  in  accordance  with 
article  3,  paragraph  1. 

2.  Each  of  the  offences  to  which  this  ar- 
ticle applies  shall  be  deemed  to  be  included 
as  an  extraditable  offence  in  any  extradition 
treaty  existing  between  Parties.  The  Par- 
ties undertake  to  include  such  offences  as 
extraditable  offences  in  every  extradition 
treaty  to  be  concluded  between  them. 

3.  If  a  Party  which  makes  extradition 
conditional  on  the  existence  of  a  treaty  re- 
ceives a  request  for  extradition  from  anoth- 
er Party  with  which  it  has  no  extradition 
treaty,  it  may  consider  this  Convention  as 
the  legal  basis  for  extradition  in  respect  of 
any  offence  to  which  this  article  applies. 
The  Parties  which  require  detailed  legisla- 
tion in  order  to  use  this  Convention  as  a 
legal  basis  for  extradition  shall  consider  en- 
acting such  legislation  as  may  be  necessary. 

4.  The  Parties  which  do  not  make  extra- 
dition conditional  on  the  existence  of  a  trea- 
ty shall  recognize  offences  to  which  this 
article  applies  as  extraditable  offences  be- 
tween themselves. 

5.  Extradition  shall  be  subject  to  the 
conditions  provided  for  by  the  law  of  the  re- 
quested Party  or  by  applicable  extradition 
treaties,  including  the  grounds  upon  which 
the  requested  Party  may  refuse  extradition. 

6.  In  considering  requests  received  pur- 
suant to  this  article,  the  requested  State 
may  refuse  to  comply  with  such  requests 
where  there  are  substantial  grounds  leading 
its  judicial  or  other  competent  authorities  to 
believe  that  compliance  would  facilitate  the 
prosecution  or  punishment  of  any  person  on 


account  of  his  race,  religion,  nationalit  r 
political  opinions,  or  would  cause  preju;e 
for  any  of  those  reasons  to  any  person  ; 
fected  by  the  request. 

7.  The  Parties  shall  endeavour  to  r . 
dite  extradition  procedures  and  to  siin    . 
evidentiary  requirements  relating  tluM 
in  respect  of  any  offence  to  which  thi- 
cle  applies. 

8.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  its  d  le 
tic  law  and  its  extradition  treaties,  the  - 
quested  Party  may,  upon  being  satisfit 
that  the  circumstances  so  warrant  aiv' 
urgent,  and  at  the  request  of  the  req 
Party,  take  a  person  whose  extradition 
sought  and  who  is  present  in  its  territi 
into  custody  or  take  other  appropriate  'a 
ures  to  ensure  his  presence  at  extradit  i 
proceedings. 

9.  Without  prejudice  to  the  exerci-  )i 
any  criminal  jurisdiction  established  i  ;■ 
cordance  with  its  domestic  law,  a  Part;  i 
whose  territory  an  alleged  offender  i.'i  in 
shall: 

(a)  If  it  does  not  extradite  him  i'  ^■ 
spect  of  an  offense  established  in  accni  r.i 
with  article  3,  paragraph  1,  on  the  gi^  : 
set  forth  in  article  4,  paragraph  2,  sul  ; 
graph  (a),  submit  the  case  to  its  compe  ii 
authorities  for  the  purpose  of  prosecut  ,, 
unless  otherwise  agreed  with  the  requ  i 
Party; 

(b)  If  it  does  not  extradite  him  i  ^ 
spect  of  such  an  offence  and  has  estahl  eo 
its  jurisdiction  in  relation  to  that  offii    i 
accordance  with  article  4,  paragraph  i 
subparagraph  (b),  submit  the  case  to  ii 
competent  authorities  for  the  purpose 
prosecution,  unless  otherwise  request' 
the  requesting  Party  for  the  purposes 
preserving  its  legitimate  jurisdiction. 

10.  If  extradition,  sought  for  purp 
of  enforcing  a  sentence,  is  refused  bee 
the  person  sought  is  a  national  of  the  r 
quested  Party,  the  requested  Party  sh 
its  law  so  permits  and  in  conformity  w 
the  requirements  of  such  law,  upon  ap] 
tion  of  the  requesting  Party,  consider  i 
forcement  of  the  sentence  which  has  bi 
imposed  under  the  law  of  the  requestii 
Party,  or  the  remainder  thereof. 

11.  The  Parties  shall  seek  to  conch 
bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements ' 
carry  out  or  to  enhance  the  effectivem 
extradition. 

12.  The  Parties  may  consider  ente 
into  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreemei 
whether  ad  hoc  or  general,  on  the  tran 
to  their  country  of  persons  sentenced  t 
prisonment  and  other  forms  of  depriva 
liberty  for  offences  to  which  this  artic 
plies,  in  order  that  they  may  complete 
sentences  there. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Aprillii 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Article  7 


tual  Legal  Assistance 

he  Parties  shall  afford  one  another,  pur- 
nt  to  this  article,  the  widest  measure  of 
ual  legal  assistance  in  investigations, 

I  ^ecutions  and  judicial  proceedings  in  re- 
m  to  criminal  offences  established  in  ac- 
lanee  with  article  3,  paragraph  1. 

5  2.  Mutual  legal  assistance  to  be  afforded 
ccordance  with  this  article  may  be  re- 
sted for  any  of  the  following  purposes: 

(a)  Taking  evidence  or  statements 
n  persons; 

(b)  Effecting  service  of  judicial 
iments; 

(c)  Executing  searches  and  seizures; 

(d)  Examining  objects  and  sites; 

(e)  Providing  information  and  eviden- 
y  items; 

(f)  Providing  originals  or  certified 
es  of  relevant  documents  and  records, 
iding  bank,  financial,  corporate  or  busi- 

records; 

(g)  Identifying  or  tracing  proceeds, 
lerty,  instrumentalities  or  other  things 
videntiary  purposes. 

3.  The  Parties  may  afford  one  another 
other  forms  of  mutual  legal  assistance 
ved  by  the  domestic  law  of  the  requested 

y- 

4.  Upon  request,  the  Parties  shall  facili- 
or  encourage,  to  the  extent  consistent 
their  domestic  law  and  practice,  the 

^nce  or  availability  of  persons,  includ- 

jersons  in  custody,  w'ho  consent  to  assist 

ivestigations  or  participate  in 

jeedings. 

"5.  A  Party  shall  not  decline  to  render 

aal  legal  assistance  under  this  article  on 

grounds  of  bank  secrecy. 

5.  The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  not 
It  the  obligations  under  any  other  trea- 
Blateral  or  multilateral,  which  governs 
ill  govern,  in  whole  or  in  part,  mutual 

assistance  in  criminal  matters. 
7.  Paragraphs  8  to  19  of  this  article  shall 
y  to  requests  made  pursuant  to  this  ar- 

if  the  Parties  in  question  are  not  bound 
treaty  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  If 
e  Parties  are  bound  by  such  a  treaty,  the 
^spending  provisions  of  that  treaty  shall 
if  unless  the  Parties  agree  to  apply 
jgraphs  8  to  19  of  this  article  in  lieu 

of. 

i.  Parties  shall  designate  an  authority, 
hen  necessary  authorities,  which  shall 

the  responsibility  and  power  to  execute 
ests  for  mutual  legal  assistance  or  to 
smit  them  to  the  competent  authorities 
xecution.  The  authority  or  the  authori- 
iesignated  for  this  purpose  shall 
Jtified  to  the  Secretary-General, 
smission  of  requests  for  mutual  legal 
tanee  and  any  communication  related 
Jto  shall  be  effected  between  the  au- 
ties  designated  by  the  Parties;  this  re- 
;ment  shall  be  without  prejudice  to  the 
.  of  a  Party  to  require  that  such  re- 


quests and  communications  be  addressed  to 
it  through  the  diplomatic  channel  and,  in 
urgent  circumstances,  where  the  Parties 
agree,  through  channels  of  the  International 
Criminal  Police  Organization,  if  possible. 

9.  Requests  shall  be  made  in  writing  in 
a  language  acceptable  to  the  requested  Par- 
ty. The  language  or  languages  acceptable 
to  each  Party  shall  be  notified  to  the 
Secretary-General.  In  urgent  circum- 
stances, and  where  agreed  by  the  Parties, 
requests  may  be  made  orally,  but  shall  be 
confirmed  in  writing  forthwith. 

10.  A  request  for  mutual  legal  assistance 
shall  contain: 

(a)  The  identity  of  the  authority  mak- 
ing the  request; 

(b)  The  subject  matter  and  nature  of 
the  investigation,  prosecution  or  proceeding 
to  which  the  request  relates,  and  the  name 
and  the  functions  of  the  authority  conduct- 
ing such  investigation,  prosecution  or 
proceeding; 

(c)  A  summary  of  the  relevant  facts, 
except  in  respect  of  requests  for  the  purpose 
of  service  of  judicial  documents; 

(d)  A  description  of  the  assistance 
sought  and  details  of  any  particular  pro- 
cedure the  requesting  Party  wishes  to  be 
followed; 

(e)  Where  possible,  the  identity, 
location  and  nationality  of  any  person 
concerned; 

(f )  The  purpose  for  which  the  evi- 
dence, information  or  action  is  sought. 

11.  The  requested  Party  may  request 
additional  information  when  it  appears  nec- 
essary for  the  execution  of  the  request  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  domestic  law  or  when  it 
can  facilitate  such  execution. 

12.  A  request  shall  be  executed  in 
accordance  with  the  domestic  law  of  the  re- 
quested Party  and,  to  the  extent  not  con- 
trary to  the  domestic  law  of  the  requested 
Party  and  where  possible,  in  accordance  with 
the  procedures  specified  in  the  request. 

13.  The  requesting  Party  shall  not 
transmit  nor  use  information  or  evidence 
furnished  by  the  requested  Party  for  inves- 
tigations, prosecutions  or  proceedings  other 
than  those  stated  in  the  request  without  the 
prior  consent  of  the  requested  Party. 

14.  The  requesting  Party  may  require 
that  the  requested  Party  keep  confidential 
the  fact  and  substance  of  the  request,  except 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  execute  the  re- 
quest. If  the  requested  Party  cannot  comply 
with  the  requirement  of  confidentiality,  it 
shall  promptly  inform  the  requesting  Party. 

15.  Mutual  legal  assistance  may  be 
refused: 

(a)  If  the  request  is  not  made  in  con- 
formity with  the  provisions  of  this  article; 

(b)  If  the  requested  Party  considers 
that  execution  of  the  request  is  likely  to 
prejudice  its  sovereignty,  security,  ordre 
public  or  other  essential  interests; 


(c)  If  the  authorities  of  the  requested 
Party  would  be  prohibited  by  its  domestic 
law  from  carrying  out  the  action  requested 
with  regard  to  any  similar  offence,  had  it 
been  subject  to  investigation,  prosecution  or 
proceedings  under  their  own  jurisdiction; 

(d)  If  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  legal 
system  of  the  requested  Party  relating  to 
mutual  legal  assistance  for  the  request  to  be 
granted. 

16.  Reasons  shall  be  given  for  any  refus- 
al of  mutual  legal  assistance. 

17.  Mutual  legal  assistance  may  be 
postponed  by  the  requested  Party  on  the 
grounds  that  it  interferes  with  an  ongoing 
investigation,  prosecution  or  proceeding.  In 
such  a  case,  the  requested  Party  shall  con- 
sult with  the  requesting  Party  to  determine 
if  the  assistance  can  still  be  given  subject  to 
such  terms  and  conditions  as  the  requested 
Party  deems  necessary. 

18.  A  witness,  expert  or  other  person 
who  consents  to  give  evidence  in  a  proceed- 
ing or  to  assist  in  an  investigation,  prosecu- 
tion or  judicial  proceeding  in  the  territory 
of  the  requesting  Party,  shall  not  be  pros- 
ecuted, detained,  punished  or  subjected  to 
any  other  restriction  of  his  personal  liberty 
in  that  territory  in  respect  of  acts,  omis- 
sions or  convictions  prior  to  his  departure 
from  the  territory  of  the  requested  Party. 
Such  safe  conduct  shall  cease  when  the  wit- 
ness, expert  or  other  person  having  had,  for 
a  period  of  fifteen  consecutive  days,  or  for 
any  period  agreed  upon  by  the  Parties,  from 
the  date  on  which  he  has  been  officially  in- 
formed that  his  presence  is  no  longer  re- 
quired by  the  judicial  authorities,  an 
opportunity  of  leaving,  has  nevertheless  re- 
mained voluntarily  in  the  territory  or,  hav- 
ing left  it,  has  returned  of  his  own  free  will. 

19.  The  ordinary  costs  of  executing  a  re- 
quest shall  be  borne  by  the  requested  Party, 
unless  otherwise  agreed  by  the  Parties  con- 
cerned. If  expenses  of  a  substantial  or  ex- 
traordinary nature  are  or  will  be  required 
to  fulfill  the  request,  the  Parties  shall  con- 
sult to  determine  the  terms  and  conditions 
under  which  the  request  will  be  executed  as 
well  as  the  manner  in  which  the  costs  shall 
be  borne. 

20.  The  Parties  shall  consider,  as  may 
be  necessary,  the  possibility  of  concluding 
bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  or  ar- 
rangements that  would  serve  the  purpose  of, 
give  practical  effect  to  or  enhance  the  provi- 
sions of  this  article. 


Article  8 


Transfer  of  Proceedings 

The  Parties  shall  give  consideration  to  the 
possibility  of  transferring  to  one  another 
proceedings  for  criminal  prosecution  of  of- 
fences established  in  accordance  with  arti- 
cle 3,  paragraph  1,  in  cases  where  such 
transfer  is  considered  to  be  in  the  interests 
of  a  proper  administration  of  justice. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


53 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Article  9 

Other  Forms  of  Co-operation  and  Training 

1.  The  Parties  shall  co-operate  closely  with 
one  another,  consistent  with  their  respective 
domestic  legal  and  administrative  systems, 
with  a  view  to  enhancing  the  effectiveness  of 
law  enforcement  action  to  suppress  the  com- 
mission of  offences  established  in  accord- 
ance with  article  3,  paragraph  1.  They  shall, 
in  particular,  on  the  basis  of  bilateral  or 
multilateral  agreements  or  arrangements: 

(a)  Establish  and  maintain  channels  of 
communication  between  their  competent 
agencies  and  services  to  facilitate  the  secure 
and  rapid  exchange  of  information  concern- 
ing all  aspects  of  offences  established  in 
accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1,  in- 
cluding, if  the  Parties  concerned  deem  it  ap- 
propriate, links  with  other  criminal 
activities: 

(b)  Co-operate  with  one  another  in 
conducting  inquiries,  with  respect  to  of- 
fences established  in  accordance  with  arti- 
cle 3,  paragraph  1,  having  an  international 
character,  concerning: 

(i)  The  identity,  whereabouts  and 
activities  of  persons  suspected  of  being  in- 
volved in  offences  established  in  accordance 
with  article  3.  paragraph  1: 

(ii)  The  movement  of  proceeds  or 
property  derived  from  the  commission  of 
such  offences; 

(ill)  The  movement  of  narcotic 
drugs,  psychotropic  substances,  substances 
in  Table  I  and  Table  II  of  this  Convention 
and  instrumentalities  used  or  intended  for 
use  in  the  commission  of  such  offences; 

(c)  In  appropriate  cases  and  if  not  con- 
trary to  domestic  law,  establish  joint  teams, 
taking  into  account  the  need  to  protect  the 
security  of  persons  and  of  operations,  to  car- 
ry out  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph.  Of- 
ficials of  any  Party  taking  part  in  such 
teams  shall  act  as  authorized  by  the  appro- 
priate authorities  of  the  Party  in  whose  ter- 
ritory the  operation  is  to  take  place;  in  all 
such  cases,  the  Parties  involved  shall  ensure 
that  the  sovereignty  of  the  Party  on  whose 
territory  the  operation  is  to  take  place  is 
fully  respected: 

(d)  Provide,  when  appropriate,  neces- 
sary quantities  of  substances  for  analytical 
or  investigative  purposes; 

(e)  Facilitate  effective  co-ordination 
between  their  competent  agencies  and  serv- 
ices and  promote  the  exchange  of  personnel 
and  other  experts,  including  the  posting  of 
liaison  officers. 

2.  Each  Party  shall,  to  the  extent  neces- 
sary, initiate,  develop  or  improve  specific 
training  programmes  for  its  law  enforce- 
ment and  other  personnel,  including  cus- 
toms, charged  with  the  suppression  of 
offences  established  in  accordance  with  arti- 
cle 3,  paragraph  1.  Such  programmes  shall 
deal,  in  particular,  with  the  following: 


(a)  Methods  used  in  the  detection  and 
suppression  of  offences  established  in  accord- 
ance with  article  3,  paragraph  1; 

(b)  Routes  and  techniques  used  by 
persons  suspected  of  being  involved  in  of- 
fences established  in  accordance  with  arti- 
cle 3,  paragraph  1,  particularly  in  transit 
States,  and  appropriate  countermeasures; 

(c)  Monitoring  of  the  import  and  ex- 
port of  narcotic  drugs,  psychotropic  sub- 
stances and  substances  in  Table  I  and 
Table  II; 

(d)  Detection  and  monitoring  of  the 
movement  of  proceeds  and  property  derived 
from,  and  narcotic  drugs,  psychotropic  sub- 
stances and  substances  in  Table  I  and  Table 
II,  and  instrumentalities  used  or  intended 
for  use  in,  the  commission  of  offences  estab- 
lished in  accordance  with  article  3,  para- 
graph 1; 

(e)  Methods  used  for  the  transfer,  con- 
cealment or  disguise  of  such  proceeds,  prop- 
erty and  instrumentalities; 

(f )  Collection  of  evidence; 

(g)  Control  techniques  in  free  trade 
zones  and  free  ports; 

(h)  Modern  law  enforcement 
techniques. 

3.  The  Parties  shall  assist  one  another 
to  plan  and  implement  research  and  training 
programmes  designed  to  share  expertise  in 
the  areas  referred  to  in  paragraph  2  of  this 
article  and,  to  this  end,  shall  also,  when  ap- 
propriate, use  regional  and  international 
conferences  and  seminars  to  promote  co- 
operation and  stimulate  discussion  on  prob- 
lems of  mutual  concern,  including  the  special 
problems  and  needs  of  transit  States. 


Article  10 


International  Co-operation 

and  Assistance  for  Transit  States 

1.  The  Parties  shall  co-operate,  directly  or 
through  competent  international  or  regional 
organizations,  to  assist  and  support  transit 
States  and,  in  particular,  developing  coun- 
tries in  need  of  such  assistance  and  support, 
to  the  extent  possible,  through  programmes 
of  technical  co-operation  on  interdiction  and 
other  related  activities. 

2.  The  Parties  may  undertake,  directly 
or  through  competent  international  or  re- 
gional organizations,  to  provide  financial  as- 
sistance to  such  transit  States  for  the 
purpose  of  augmenting  and  strengthening 
the  infrastructure  needed  for  effective  con- 
trol and  prevention  of  illicit  traffic. 

3.  The  Parties  may  conclude  bilateral  or 
multilateral  agreements  or  arrangements  to 
enhance  the  effectiveness  of  international 
co-operation  pursuant  to  this  article  and 
may  take  into  consideration  financial  ar- 
rangements in  this  regard. 


Article  11 


Controlled  Delivery 

1.  If  permitted  by  the  basic  principles  of 
their  respective  domestic  legal  systems. 
Parties  shall  take  the  necessary  measur 
within  their  possibilities,  to  allow  for  th 
appropriate  use  of  controlled  delivery  at 
international  level,  on  the  basis  of  agree 
ments  or  arrangements  mutually  consen 
to,  with  a  view  to  identifying  persons  in 
volved  in  offences  established  in  accords 
with  article  3,  paragraph  1,  and  to  takin 
gal  action  against  them. 

2.  Decisions  to  use  controlled  delive 
shall  be  made  on  a  case-by-case  basis  an 
may,  when  necessary,  take  into  consider 
tion  financial  arrangements  and  under 
standings  with  respect  to  the  exercise  o 
risdiction  by  the  Parties  concerned. 

3.  Illicit  consignments  whose  contro 
delivery  is  agreed  to  may,  with  the  cons 
of  the  Parties  concerned,  be  intercepted 
allowed  to  continue  with  the  narcotic  dr 
or  psychotropic  substances  intact  or  re- 
moved or  replaced  in  whole  or  in  part. 


Article  12 

Substances  Frequently  Used  in  the  III 
Manufacture  of  Narcotic  Drugs  or 
Psychotropic  Substances 

1.  The  Parties  shall  take  the  measures  t 
deem  appropriate  to  prevent  diversion  c 
substances  in  Table  I  and  Table  II  used 
the  purpose  of  illicit  manufacture  of  nai 
drugs  of  psychotropic  substances,  and  s 
co-operate  with  one  another  to  this  end. 

2.  If  a  Party  or  the  Board  has  infor 
tion  which  in  its  opinion  may  require  th 
elusion  of  a  substance  in  Table  I  or  Tabh 
it  shall  notify  the  Secretary-General  an 
furnish  him  with  the  information  in  su] 
of  that  notification.  The  procedure  de- 
scribed in  paragraphs  2  to  7  of  this  arti 
shall  also  apply  when  a  Party  or  the  Bot 
has  information  justifying  the  deletion  < 
substance  from  Table  I  or  Table  II,  or  tl 
transfer  of  a  substance  from  one  Table  t 
other. 

3.  The  Secretary-General  shall  trai 
such  notification,  and  any  information  w 
he  considers  relevant,  to  the  Parties,  to 
Commission  and.  where  notification  is  r 
by  a  Party,  to  the  Board.  The  Parties  sh 
communicate  their  comments  concernin 
the  notification  to  the  Secretary-Genen 
together  with  all  supplementary  inform 
tion  which  may  assist  the  Board  in  estal 
lishing  an  assessment  and  the  Commiss 
in  reaching  a  decision. 

4.  If  the  Board,  taking  into  account 
extent,  importance  and  diversity  of  the 
use  of  the  substance,  and  the  possibility 
ease  of  using  alternate  substances  both 
licit  purposes  and  for  the  illicit  manufac 
of  narcotic  drugs  or  psychotropic  sub- 
stances, finds: 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April  1 


UNITED  NATIONS 


(a)  That  the  subtance  is  frequently 

i  in  the  illicit  manufacture  of  a  narcotic 
or  psychotropic  substance; 

(b)  That  the  volume  and  extent  of  the 
it  manufacture  of  a  narcotic  drug  or  psy- 
ropic  substance  creates  serious  public 
th  or  social  problems,  so  as  to  warrant 
rnational  action, 

it  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission 
ssessment  of  the  substance,  including 
ikely  effect  of  adding  the  substance  to 
;r  Table  I  or  Table  II  on  both  licit  use 
illicit  manufacture,  together  with  rec- 
lendations  of  monitoring  measures,  if 
that  would  be  appropriate  in  the  light  of 
ssessment. 

5.  The  Commission,  taking  into  account 
•omments  submitted  by  the  Parties  and 
•omments  and  recommendations  of  the 
■d,  whose  assessment  shall  be  deter- 
itive  as  to  scientific  matters,  and  also 
ig  into  due  consideration  any  other  rele- 
factors,  may  decide  by  a  two-thirds  ma- 
y  of  its  members  to  place  a  substance  in 
5 1  or  Table  II. 

i.  Any  decision  of  the  Commission  taken 
uant  to  this  article  shall  be  communi- 
1  by  the  Secretary-General  to  all  States 
ither  entities  which  are.  or  which  are 
led  to  become,  Parties  to  this  Conven- 
and  to  the  Board.  Such  decision  shall 
Tie  fully  effective  with  respect  to  each 
f  one  hundred  and  eighty  days  after  the 
of  such  communication. 
'.  (a)  The  decisions  of  the  Commission 
1  under  this  article  shall  be  subject  to 
<w  by  the  Council  upon  the  request  of 
■"arty  filed  within  one  hundred  and 
y  days  after  the  date  of  notification  of 
ecision.  The  request  for  review  shall  be 
to  the  Secretary-General,  together 
all  relevant  information  upon  which  the 
ist  for  review  is  based. 

(b)  The  Secretary-General  shall 
imit  copies  of  the  request  for  review 

he  relevant  information  to  the  Commis- 

to  the  Board  and  to  all  the  Parties,  in- 

5  them  to  submit  their  comments 

n  ninety  days.  All  comments  received 

be  submitted  to  the  Council  for 

deration. 

(c)  The  Council  may  confirm  or  re- 
the  decision  of  the  Commission.  Noti- 
on of  the  Council's  decision  shall  be 
mitted  to  all  States  and  other  entities 
1  are,  or  which  are  entitled  to  become, 
es  to  this  Convention,  to  the  Commis- 
md  to  the  Board. 

:  (a)  Without  prejudice  to  the  gener- 
of  the  provisions  contained  in  para- 
T  1  of  this  article  and  the  provisions  of 
^61  Convention,  the  1961  Convention  as 
ded  and  the  1971  Convention,  the  Par- 
hall  take  the  measures  they  deem  ap- 
■iate  to  monitor  the  manufacture  and 
ibution  of  substances  in  Table  I  and  Ta- 
!  which  are  carried  out  within  their 
torv. 


(b)  To  this  end,  the  Parties  may: 

(i)  Control  all  persons  and  enter- 
prises engaged  in  the  manufacture  and  dis- 
tribution of  such  substances; 

(ii)  Control  under  license  the  estab- 
lishment and  premises  in  which  such  manu- 
facture or  distribution  may  take  place; 

(iii)  Require  that  licensees  obtain 
a  permit  for  conducting  the  aforesaid 
operations; 

(iv)  Prevent  the  accumulation  of 
such  substances  in  the  possession  of  manu- 
facturers and  distributors,  in  excess  of  the 
quantities  required  for  the  normal  conduct 
of  business  and  the  prevailing  market 
conditions. 

9.  Each  Party  shall,  with  respect  to 
substances  in  Table  I  and  Table  II,  take  the 
following  measures: 

(a)  Establish  and  maintain  a  system 
to  monitor  international  trade  in  substances 
in  Table  I  and  Table  II  in  order  to  facilitate 
the  identification  of  suspicious  transactions. 
Such  monitoring  systems  shall  be  applied  in 
close  co-operation  with  manufacturers,  im- 
porters, exporters,  wholesalers  and  re- 
tailers, who  shall  inform  the  competent 
authorities  of  suspicious  orders  and 
transactions. 

(b)  Provide  for  the  seizure  of  any  sub- 
stance in  Table  I  or  Table  II  if  there  is  suffi- 
cient evidence  that  it  is  for  use  in  the  illicit 
manufacture  of  a  narcotic  drug  or  psycho- 
tropic substance. 

(c)  Notify,  as  soon  as  possible,  the 
competent  authorities  and  services  of  the 
Parties  concerned  if  there  is  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  import,  export  or  transit  of  a 
substance  in  Table  I  or  Table  II  is  destined 
for  the  illicit  manufacture  of  narcotic  drugs 
or  psychotropic  substances,  including  in  par- 
ticular information  about  the  means  of  pay- 
ment and  any  other  essential  elements  which 
led  to  that  belief. 

(d)  Require  that  imports  and  exports 
be  properly  labelled  and  documented.  Com- 
mercial documents  such  as  invoices,  cargo 
manifests,  customs,  transport  and  other 
shipping  documents  shall  include  the  names, 
as  stated  in  Table  I  or  Table  II,  of  the  sub- 
stances being  imported  or  exported,  the 
quantity  being  imported  or  exported  and 
the  name  and  address  of  the  exporter,  the 
importer  and,  when  available,  the  consignee. 

(e)  Ensure  that  documents  referred  to 
in  subparagraph  (d)  of  this  paragraph  are 
maintained  for  a  period  of  not  less  than  two 
years  and  may  be  made  available  for  inspec- 
tion by  the  competent  authorities. 

10.  (a)  In  addition  to  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  9,  and  upon  request  to  the 
Secretary-General  by  the  interested  Party, 
each  Party  from  whose  territory  a  sub- 
stance in  Table  I  is  to  be  exported  shall  en- 
sure that,  prior  to  such  export,  the  following 
information  is  supplied  by  its  competent  au- 
thorities to  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
importing  country: 


(i)  Name  and  address  of  the  export- 
er and  importer  and,  when  available,  the 
consignee; 

(ii)  Name  of  the  substance  in 
Table  1: 

(iii)  Quantity  of  the  substance  to  be 
exported; 

(iv)  Expected  point  of  entry  and  ex- 
pected date  of  dispatch; 

(v)  Any  other  information  which  is 
mutually  agreed  upon  by  the  Parties. 

(b)  A  Party  may  adopt  more  strict  or 
severe  measures  of  control  than  those  pro- 
vided by  this  paragraph  if,  in  its  opinion, 
such  measures  are  desirable  or  necessary. 

11.  Where  a  Party  furnishes  informa- 
tion to  another  Party  in  accordance  with 
paragraphs  9  and  10  of  this  article,  the  Par- 
ty furnishing  such  information  may  require 
that  the  Party  receiving  it  keep  confidential 
any  trade,  business,  commercial  or  profes- 
sional secret  or  trade  process. 

12.  Each  Party  shall  furnish  annually  to 
the  Board,  in  the  form  and  manner  provided 
for  by  it  and  on  forms  made  available  by  it, 
information  on: 

(a)  The  amounts  seized  of  substances 
in  Table  I  and  Table  II  and,  when  known, 
their  origin; 

(b)  Any  substance  not  included  in  Ta- 
ble I  or  Table  II  which  is  identified  as  hav- 
ing been  used  in  illicit  manufacture  of 
narcotic  drugs  or  psychotropic  substances, 
and  which  is  deemed  by  the  Party  to  be  suf- 
ficiently significant  to  be  brought  to  the  at- 
tention of  the  Board; 

(c)  Methods  of  diversion  and  illicit 
manufacture. 

13.  The  Board  shall  report  annually  to 
the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of 
this  article  and  the  Commission  shall  peri- 
odicallv  review  the  adequacy  and  propriety 
of  Table  I  and  Table  II. 

14.  The  provisions  of  this  article  shall 
not  apply  to  pharmaceutical  preparations, 
nor  to  other  preparations  containing  sub- 
stances in  Table  I  or  Table  II  that  are  com- 
pounded in  such  a  way  that  such  substances 
cannot  be  easily  used  or  recovered  by  readi- 
ly applicable  means. 


Article  13 

Materials  and  Equipment 

The  Parties  shall  take  such  measures  as 
they  deem  appropriate  to  prevent  trade  in 
and  the  diversion  of  materials  and  equip- 
ment for  illicit  production  or  manufacture  of 
narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic  substances 
and  shall  co-operate  to  this  end. 


rtment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


55 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Article  14 


Measures  to  Eradicate  Illicit  Cultivation 
of  Narcotic  Plants  and  to  Eliminate  Illicit 
Demand  for  Narcotic  Drugs  and 
Psychotropic  Substances 

1.  Any  measures  taken  pursuant  to  this 
Convention  by  Parties  shall  not  be  less 
stringent  than  the  provisions  applicable  to 
the  eradication  of  illicit  cultivation  of  plants 
containing  narcotic  and  psychotropic  sub- 
stances and  to  the  elimination  of  illicit  de- 
mand for  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic 
substances  under  the  provisions  of  the  1961 
Convention,  the  1961  Convention  as  amended 
and  the  1971  Convention. 

2.  Each  Party  shall  take  appropriate 
measures  to  prevent  illicit  cultivation  of  and 
to  eradicate  plants  containing  narcotic  or 
psychotropic  substances,  such  as  opium  pop- 
py, coca  bush  and  cannabis  plants,  cultivated 
illicitly  in  its  territory.  The  measures 
adopted  shall  respect  fundamental  human 
rights  and  shall  take  due  account  of  tradi- 
tional licit  uses,  where  there  is  historic  evi- 
dence of  such  use.  as  well  as  the  protection 
of  the  environment. 

3.  (a)  The  Parties  may  co-operate  to  in- 
crease the  effectiveness  of  eradication  ef- 
forts. Such  co-operation  may,  inter  alia. 
include  support,  when  appropriate,  for  inte- 
grated rural  development  leading  to  eco- 
nomically viable  alternatives  to  illicit 
cultivation.  Factors  such  as  access  to  mar- 
kets, the  availability  of  resources  and  pre- 
vailing socio-economic  conditions  should  be 
taken  into  account  before  such  rural  devel- 
opment programmes  are  implemented.  The 
Parties  may  agree  on  any  other  appropriate 
measures  of  co-operation. 

(b)  The  Parties  shall  also  facilitate  the 
e.xchange  of  scientific  and  technical  informa- 
tion and  the  conduct  of  research  concerning 
eradication. 

(c)  Whenever  they  have  common  fron- 
tiers, the  Parties  shall  seek  to  co-operate  in 
eradication  programmes  in  their  respective 
areas  along  those  frontiers. 

4.  The  Parties  shall  adopt  appropriate 
measures  aimed  at  eliminating  or  reducing 
illicit  demand  for  narcotic  drugs  and  psycho- 
tropic substances,  with  a  view  to  reducing 
human  suffering  and  eliminating  financial 
incentives  for  illicit  traffic.  These  measures 
may  be  based,  iiiter  alia,  on  the  recommen- 
dations of  the  United  Nations,  specialized 
agencies  of  the  United  Nations  such  as  the 
World  Health  Organization,  and  other  com- 
petent international  organizations,  and  on 
the  Comprehensive  Multidisciplinary  Out- 
line adopted  by  the  International  Confer- 
ence on  Drug  Abuse  and  Illicit  Trafficking, 
held  in  1987,  as  it  pertains  to  governmental 
and  non-governmental  agencies  and  private 
efforts  in  the  fields  of  prevention,  treatment 
and  rehabilitation.  The  Parties  may  enter 
into  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  or 
arrangements  aimed  at  eliminating  or  re- 
ducing illicit  demand  for  narcotic  drugs  and 
psychotropic  substances. 


5.  The  Parties  may  also  take  necessary 
measures  for  early  destruction  or  lawful  dis- 
posal of  the  narcotic  drugs,  psychotropic 
substances  and  substances  in  Table  I  and 
Table  II  which  have  been  seized  or  confis- 
cated and  for  the  admissibility  as  evidence 
of  duly  certified  necessary  quantities  of 
such  substances. 


Article  15 


Commercial  Carriers 

1.  The  Parties  shall  take  appropriate  meas- 
ures to  ensure  that  means  of  transport  oper- 
ated by  commercial  carriers  are  not  used  in 
the  commission  of  offences  established  in  ac- 
cordance with  article  3,  paragraph  1;  such 
measures  may  include  special  arrangements 
with  commercial  carriers. 

2.  Each  Party  shall  require  commercial 
carriers  to  take  reasonable  precautions  to 
prevent  the  use  of  their  means  of  transport 
for  the  commission  of  offences  established  in 
accordance  with  article  3,  paragraph  1.  Such 
precautions  may  include: 

(a)  If  the  principal  place  of  business  of 
a  commercial  carrier  is  within  the  territory 
of  the  Party: 

(i)  Training  of  personnel  to  identify 
suspicious  consignments  or  persons; 

(ii)  Promotion  of  integrity  of 
personnel; 

(b)  If  a  commercial  carrier  is  operat- 
ing within  the  territory  of  the  Party: 

(i)  Submission  of  cargo  manifests  in 
advance  whenever  possible; 

(ii)  Use  of  tamper-resistant,  indi- 
vidually verifiable  seals  on  containers; 

(iii)  Reporting  to  the  appropriate 
authorities  at  the  earliest  opportunity  all 
suspicious  circumstances  that  may  be  re- 
lated to  the  commission  of  offences  estab- 
lished in  accordance  with  article  3, 
paragraph  1. 

3.  Each  Party  shall  seek  to  ensure  that 
commercial  carriers  and  the  appropriate  au- 
thorities at  points  of  entry  and  exit  and  oth- 
er customs  control  areas  co-operate,  with  a 
view  to  preventing  unauthorized  access  to 
means  of  transport  and  cargo  and  to  imple- 
menting appropriate  security  measures. 


Article  16 

Commercial  Documents 
and  Labelling  of  Exports 

1.  Each  Party  shall  require  that  lawful  ex- 
ports of  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic 
substances  be  properly  documented.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  requirements  for  documenta- 
tion under  article  31  of  the  1961  Convention, 
article  31  of  the  1961  Convention  as  amended 
and  article  12  of  the  1971  Convention,  com- 
mercial documents  such  as  invoices,  cargo 
manifests,  customs,  transport  and  other 


shipping  documents  shall  include  the  n:i 
of  the  narcotic  drugs  and  p.sychotropic  > 
stances  being  exported  as  set  out  in  the 
spective  Schedules  of  the  1961  Conventioi 
the  1961  Convention  as  amended  and  the 
Convention,  the  quantity  being  exported 
and  the  name  and  address  of  the  exporte 
the  importer  and,  when  available,  the 
consignee. 

2.  Each  Party  shall  require  that  con 
signments  of  narcotic  drugs  and  psycho- 
tropic substances  being  exported  be  not 
mislabelled. 


Article  17 


Illicit  Traffic  by  Sea 

1.  The  Parties  shall  co-operate  to  the  ful 
extent  possible  to  suppress  illicit  traffic 
sea,  in  conformity  with  the  Internationa 
of  the  sea. 

2.  A  Party  which  has  reasonable 
grounds  to  suspect  that  a  vessel  flying  i 
flag  or  not  displaying  a  flag  or  marks  of 
istry  is  engaged  in  illicit  traffic  may  rec 
the  assistance  of  other  Parties  in  suppre 
ing  its  use  for  that  purpose.  The  Parties 
requested  shall  render  such  assistance  v 
in  the  means  available  to  them. 

3.  A  Party  which  has  reasonable 
grounds  to  suspect  that  a  vessel  exercis 
freedom  of  navigation  in  accordance  wit 
ternational  law  and  flying  the  flag  or  di 
playing  marks  of  registry  of  another  Pa 
is  engaged  in  illicit  traffic  may  so  notify 
flag  State,  request  confirmation  of  regi 
and,  if  confirmed,  request  authorizatior 
from  the  flag  State  to  take  appropriate 
measures  in  regard  to  that  vessel. 

4.  In  accordance  with  paragraph  3  ( 
accordance  with  treaties  in  force  betwe 
them  or  in  accordance  with  any  agreem^ 
or  arrangement  otherwise  reached  bet\ 
those  Parties,  the  flag  State  may  authoi 
the  requesting  State  to,  inter  alia: 

(a)  Board  the  vessel; 

(b)  Search  the  vessel; 

(c)  If  evidence  of  involvement  in  i 
traffic  is  found,  take  appropriate  action 
respect  to  the  vessel,  persons  and  cargc 
board. 

5.  Where  action  is  taken  pursuant  t 
this  article,  the  Parties  concerned  shall 
due  account  of  the  need  not  to  endanger 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  the  security  of  the  ■ 
sel  and  the  cargo  or  to  prejudice  the  con 
mercial  and  legal  interests  of  the  flag  Si 
or  any  other  interested  State. 

6.  The  flag  State  may,  consistent  w 
its  obligations  in  paragraph  1  of  this  ari 
subject  its  authorization  to  conditions  ti 
mutually  agreed  between  it  and  the  req 
ing  Party,  including  conditions  relating 
responsibility. 

7.  For  the  purposes  of  paragraphs  3 
and  4  of  this  article,  a  Party  shall  respc 
expeditiously  to  a  request  from  another 
tv  to  determine  whether  a  vessel  that  is 


56 


UNITED  NATIONS 


ts  flag  is  entitled  to  do  so.  and  to 
ests  for  authorization  made  pursuant  to 
graph  3.  At  the  time  of  becoming  a  Par- 
this  Convention,  each  Party  shall  des- 
;e  an  authority  or,  when  necessary, 
orities  to  receive  and  respond  to  such 
ests.  Such  designation  shall  be  notified 
igh  the  Secretary-General  to  all  other 
ies  within  one  month  of  the  designation. 
i.  A  Party  which  has  taken  any  action 
cordance  with  this  article  shall 
ptly  inform  the  flag  State  concerned  of 
esults  of  that  action. 
).  The  Parties  shall  consider  entering 
bilateral  or  regional  agreements  or  ar- 
ements  to  carry  out.  or  to  enhance  the 
tiveness  of,  the  provisions  of  this 
le. 

0.  Action  pursuant  to  paragraph  4  of 
article  shall  be  carried  out  only  by  war- 
.  or  military  aircraft,  or  other  ships  or 
aft  clearly  marked  and  identifiable  as 

J  on  government  service  and  authorized 
at  effect. 

1.  Any  action  taken  in  accordance  with 
irticle  shall  take  due  account  of  the 
not  to  interfere  with  or  affect  the 

s  and  obligations  and  the  e.xercise  of  ju- 
;ation  of  coastal  States  in  accordance 
the  international  law  of  the  sea. 


Article  18 


'Trade  Zones  and  Free  Ports 

3  Parties  shall  apply  measures  to  sup- 
illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs,  psy- 

opic  substances  and  substances  in 
I  and  Table  II  in  free  trade  zones  and 

'8  ports  that  are  no  less  stringent  than 
applied  in  other  parts  of  their 

;Qries. 

.  The  Parties  shall  endeavour: 

(a)  To  monitor  the  movement  of  goods 
'arsons  in  free  trade  zones  and  free 

,  and,  to  that  end,  shall  empower  the 
etent  authorities  to  search  cargoes  and 
ling  and  outgoing  vessels,  including 
ure  craft  and  fishing  vessels,  as  well  as 
ift  and  vehicles  and,  when  appropriate, 
irch  crew  members,  passengers  and 
baggage; 

(b)  To  establish  and  maintain  a  sys- 
0  detect  consignments  suspected  of 
ining  narcotic  drugs,  psychotropic  sub- 
es  and  substances  in  Table  I  and  Ta- 

passing  into  or  out  of  free  trade  zones 
ree  ports; 

(c)  To  establish  and  maintain  surveil- 
systems  in  harbour  and  dock  areas  and 
ports  and  border  control  points  in  free 
zones  and  free  ports. 


Article  19 


The  Use  of  the  Mails 

1.  In  conformity  with  their  obligations  under 
the  Conventions  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  and  in  accordance  with  the  basic 
principles  of  their  domestic  legal  systems, 
the  Parties  shall  adopt  measures  to  sup- 
press the  use  of  the  mails  for  illicit  traffic 
and  shall  co-operate  with  one  another  to 
that  end. 

2.  The  measures  referred  to  in  para- 
graph 1  of  this  article  shall  include,  in 
particular: 

(a)  Co-ordinated  action  for  the  preven- 
tion and  repression  of  the  use  of  the  mails 
for  illicit  traffic; 

(b)  Introduction  and  maintenance  by 
authorized  law  enforcement  personnel  of  in- 
vestigative and  control  techniques  designed 
to  detect  illicit  consignments  of  narcotic 
drugs,  psychotropic  substances  and  sub- 
stances in  Table  I  and  Table  II  in  the  mails; 

(c)  Legislative  measures  to  enable  the 
use  of  appropriate  means  to  secure  evidence 
required  for  judicial  proceedings. 


Article  20 


Information  to  be  Furnished 
by  the  Parties 

1.  The  Parties  shall  furnish,  through  the 
Secretary-General,  information  to  the  Com- 
mission on  the  working  of  this  Convention  in 
their  territories  and,  in  particular: 

(a)  The  text  of  laws  and  regulations 
promulgated  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the 
Convention; 

(b)  Particulars  of  cases  of  illicit  traf- 
fic within  their  jurisdiction  which  they  con- 
sider important  because  of  new  trends 
disclosed,  the  quantities  involved,  the 
sources  from  which  the  substances  are  ob- 
tained or  the  methods  employed  by  persons 
so  engaged. 

2.  The  Parties  shall  furnish  such  infor- 
mation in  such  a  manner  and  by  such  dates 
as  the  Commission  may  request. 


Article  21 


Functions  of  the  Commission 

The  Commission  is  authorized  to  consider  all 
matters  pertaining  to  the  aims  of  this  Con- 
vention and,  in  particular: 

(a)  The  Commission  shall,  on  the  basis 
of  the  information  submitted  by  the  Parties 
in  accordance  with  article  20,  review  the  op- 
eration of  this  Convention; 

(b)  The  Commission  may  make  sug- 
gestions and  general  recommendations 
based  on  the  examination  of  the  information 
received  from  the  Parties: 


(c)  The  Commission  may  call  the  at- 
tention of  the  Board  to  any  matters  which 
may  be  relevant  to  the  functions  of  the 
Board; 

(d)  The  Commission  shall,  on  any 
matter  referred  to  it  by  the  Board  under  ar- 
ticle 22,  paragraph  Kb),  take  such  action  as 
it  deems  appropriate; 

(e)  The  Commission  may,  in  conformi- 
ty with  the  procedures  laid  down  in  arti- 
cle 12,  amend  Table  I  and  Table  II; 

(f )  The  Commission  may  draw  the  at- 
tention of  non-Parties  to  decisions  and  rec- 
ommendations which  it  adopts  under  this 
Convention,  with  a  view  to  their  considering 
taking  action  in  accordance  therewith. 


Article  22 


Functions  of  the  Board 

1.  Without  prejudice  to  the  functions  of  the 
Commission  under  article  21.  and  without 
prejudice  to  the  functions  of  the  Board  and 
the  Commission  under  the  1961  Convention, 
the  1961  Convention  as  amended  and  the  1971 
Convention: 

(a)  If,  on  the  basis  of  its  examina- 
tion of  information  available  to  it,  to  the 
Secretary-General  or  to  the  Commission,  or 
of  information  communicated  by  United  Na- 
tions organs,  the  Board  has  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  aims  of  this  Convention  in 
matters  related  to  its  competence  are  not 
being  met,  the  Board  may  invite  a  Party  or 
Parties  to  furnish  any  relevant  information; 

(b)  With  respect  to  articles  12,  13 
and  16; 

(i)  After  taking  action  under  sub- 
paragraph (a)  of  this  article,  the  Board,  if 
satisfied  that  it  is  necessary  to  do  so,  may 
call  upon  the  Party  concerned  to  adopt  such 
remedial  measures  as  shall  seem  under  the 
circumstances  to  be  necessary  for  the  execu- 
tion of  the  provisions  of  articles  12,  13 
and  16; 

(ii)  Prior  to  taking  action  under  (iii) 
below,  the  Board  shall  treat  as  confidential 
its  communications  with  the  Party  con- 
cerned under  the  preceding  subparagraphs; 

(iii)  If  the  Board  finds  that  the  Par- 
ty concerned  has  not  taken  remedial  meas- 
ures which  it  has  been  called  upon  to  take 
under  this  subparagraph,  it  may  call  the  at- 
tention of  the  Parties,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission  to  the  matter.  Any  report  pub- 
lished by  the  Board  under  this  subpara- 
graph shall  also  contain  the  views  of  the 
Party  concerned  if  the  latter  so  requests. 

2.  Any  Party  shall  be  invited  to  be  rep- 
resented at  a  meeting  of  the  Board  at  which 
a  question  of  direct  interest  to  it  is  to  be 
considered  under  this  article. 

3.  If  in  any  case  a  decision  of  the  Board 
which  is  adopted  under  this  article  is  not 
unanimous,  the  views  of  the  minority  shall 
be  stated. 


57 


UNITED  NATIONS 


4.  Decisions  of  the  Board  under  this  ar- 
ticle shall  be  taken  by  a  two-thirds  majority 
of  the  whole  number  of  the  Board. 

5.  In  carrying  out  its  functions  pur- 
suant to  subparagraph  1(a)  of  this  article, 
the  Board  shall  ensure  the  confidentiality  of 
all  information  which  may  come  into  its 
possession. 

6.  The  Board's  responsibility  under  this 
article  shall  not  apply  to  the  implementation 
of  treaties  or  agreements  entered  into  be- 
tween Parties  in  accordance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  this  Convention. 

7.  The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  not 
be  applicable  to  disputes  between  Parties 
falling  under  the  provisions  of  article  32. 


Article  2.3 


Reports  of  the  Board 

1.  The  Board  shall  prepare  an  annual  report 
on  its  work  containing  an  analysis  of  the  in- 
formation at  its  disposal  and,  in  appropriate 
eases,  an  account  of  the  e.xplanations,  if  any, 
given  by  or  required  of  Parties,  together 
with  any  observations  and  recommendations 
which  the  Board  desires  to  make.  The  Board 
may  make  such  additional  reports  as  it  con- 
siders necessary.  The  reports  shall  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Council  through  the 
Commission  which  may  make  such  com- 
ments as  it  sees  fit. 

2.  The  reports  of  the  Board  shall  be 
communicated  to  the  Parties  and  subse- 
quently published  by  the  Secretary-General. 
The  Parties  shall  permit  their  unrestricted 
distribution. 


Article  24 


Application  of  Stricter  Measures  Than 
Those  Required  by  This  Convention 

A  Party  may  adopt  more  strict  or  severe 
measures  than  those  provided  by  this  Con- 
vention if,  in  its  opinion,  such  measures  are 
desirable  or  necessary  for  the  prevention  or 
suppression  of  illicit  traffic. 


Article  25 


Non-Derogation  From  Earlier  Treaty 
Rights  and  Obligations 

The  provisions  of  this  Convention  shall  not 
derogate  from  any  rights  enjoyed  or  obliga- 
tions undertaken  by  Parties  to  this  Conven- 
tion under  the  1961  Convention,  the  1961 
Convention  as  amended  and  the  1971 
Convention. 


Article  26 


Signature 

This  Convention  shall  be  open  for  signature 
at  the  United  Nations  Office  at  Vienna,  from 
20  December  1988  to  28  February  1989,  and 
thereafter  at  the  Headquarters  of  the 
United  Nations  at  New  York,  until  20 
December  1989,  by: 

(a)  All  States: 

(b)  Namibia,  represented  by  the 
United  Nations  Council  for  Namibia: 

(c)  Regional  economic  integration  or- 
ganizations which  have  competence  in  re- 
spect of  the  negotiation,  conclusion  and 
application  of  international  agreements  in 
matters  covered  by  this  Convention,  refer- 
ences under  the  Convention  to  Parties, 
States  or  national  services  being  applicable 
to  these  organizations  within  the  limits  of 
their  competence. 


Article  27 


Ratification,  Acceptance,  Approval 
or  Act  of  Formal  Confirmation 

1.  This  Convention  is  subject  to  ratification, 
acceptance  or  approval  by  States  and  by 
Namibia,  represented  by  the  United  Na- 
tions Council  for  Namibia,  and  to  acts  of 
formal  confirmation  by  regional  economic 
integration  organizations  referred  to  in  ar- 
ticle 26,  subparagraph  (c).  The  instruments 
of  ratification,  acceptance  or  approval  and 
those  relating  to  acts  of  formal  confirmation 
shall  be  deposited  with  the  Secretary- 
General. 

2.  In  their  instruments  of  formal  con- 
firmation, regional  economic  integration  or- 
ganizations shall  declare  the  e.xtent  of  their 
competence  with  respect  to  the  matters  gov- 
erned by  this  Convention.  These  organiza- 
tions shall  also  inform  the  Secretary- 
General  of  any  modification  in  the  extent  of 
their  competence  with  respect  to  the  mat- 
ters governed  by  the  Convention. 


Article  28 


Accession 

1.  This  Convention  shall  remain  open  for  ac- 
cession by  any  State,  by  Namibia,  repre- 
sented by  the  United  Nations  Council  for 
Namibia,  and  by  regional  economic  integra- 
tion organizations  referred  to  in  article  26, 
subparagraph  (c).  Accession  shall  be  effected 
by  the  deposit  of  an  instrument  of  accession 
with  the  Secretary-General. 

2.  In  their  instruments  of  accession,  re- 
gional economic  integration  organizations 
shall  declare  the  extent  of  their  competence 
with  respect  to  the  matters  governed  by 


this  Convention.  These  organizations  s\^ 
also  inform  the  Secretary-General  of  ar 
modification  in  the  extent  of  their  comp 
tence  w'ith  respect  to  the  matters  govet 
bv  the  Convention. 


Article  29 


Entry  Into  Force 

1.  This  Convention  shall  enter  into  forci 
the  ninetieth  day  after  the  date  of  the  d 
posit  with  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
twentieth  instrument  of  ratification,  act 
ance,  approval  or  accession  by  States  oi 
Namibia,  represented  by  the  Council  fo 
Namibia. 

2.  For  each  State  or  for  Namibia,  n 
sented  by  the  Council  for  Namibia,  rati 
ing,  accepting,  approving  or  acceding  t 
this  Convention  after  the  deposit  of  the 
twentieth  instrument  of  ratification,  ace 
ance,  approval  or  accession,  the  Conver 
shall  enter  into  force  on  the  ninetieth  d 
after  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  its  instr 
ment  of  ratification,  acceptance,  appro^ 
accession. 

3.  For  each  regional  economic  intej 
tion  organization  referred  to  in  article 
subparagraph  (c)  depositing  an  instrun 
relating  to  an  act  of  formal  confirmatio 
an  instrument  of  accession,  this  Convei 
shall  enter  into  force  on  the  ninetieth  c 
after  such  deposit,  or  at  the  date  the  Ci 
vention  enters  into  force  pursuant  to  p; 
graph  1  of  this  article,  whichever  is  late 


Article  30 


Denunciation 

1.  A  Party  may  denounce  this  Conventi 
any  time  by  a  written  notification  addi 
to  the  Secretary-General. 

2.  Such  denunciation  shall  take  effi 
for  the  Party  concerned  one  year  after 
date  of  receipt  of  the  notification  by  the 
Secretary-General. 


Article  31 


Amendments 

1.  Any  Party  may  propose  an  amendmei 
to  this  Convention.  The  text  of  any  sucl 
amendment  and  the  reasons  therefore  s 
be  communicated  by  that  Party  to  the 
Secretary-General,  who  shall  communi( 
it  to  the  other  Parties  and  shall  ask  the 
whether  they  accept  the  proposed  amen 
ment.  If  a  proposed  amendment  so  circi 
lated  has  not  been  rejected  by  any  Part 
within  twentv-four  months  after  it  has 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


llated,  it  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been 
pted  and  shall  enter  into  force  in  re- 
t  of  a  Party  ninety  days  after  that  Party 
deposited  with  the  Secretary-General 
strument  expressing  its  consent  to  be 
d  by  that  amendment. 
2.  If  a  proposed  amendment  has  been 
ted  by  any  Party,  the  Secretary- 
ral  shall  consult  with  the  Parties  and, 
luijnrity  so  requests,  he  shall  bring  the 
n,  together  with  any  comments  made 
ir  Parties,  before  the  Council  which 
li  rule  to  call  a  conference  in  accord- 
H  II  h  Article  (i2,  paragraph  4,  of  the 
lit  r  of  the  United  Nations.  Any  amend- 
;  I  i  suiting  from  such  a  Conference  shall 
nilMKlied  in  a  Protocol  of  Amendment. 
Mill  to  be  bound  by  such  a  Protocol  shall 
-piired  to  be  expressed  specifically  to 
M  .  rt'tarv-General. 


Article  32 


element  of  Disputes 

there  should  arise  between  two  or  more 

a  ies  a  dispute  relating  to  the  interpreta- 
ir  application  of  this  Convention,  the 
I.  -  shall  consult  together  with  a  view  to 
icment  of  the  dispute  by  negotiation, 
,  mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration, 
ir>f  to  regional  bodies,  judicial  process 
111  I-  peaceful  means  of  their  own  choice. 
;,  .\ny  such  dispute  which  cannot  be 
111  m  the  manner  prescribed  in  para- 
li  1  nf  this  article  shall  be  referred,  at 
rijuest  of  any  one  of  the  States  Parties 
f  dispute,  to  the  International  Court  of 

1  cc  for  decision. 
i.  If  a  regional  economic  integration  or- 

1  latiiin  referred  to  in  article  26,  subpara- 
h  u)  is  a  Party  to  a  dispute  which 
It  lie  settled  in  the  manner  prescribed 
rauraph  1  of  this  article,  it  may, 

1  mil  a  State  Member  of  the  United  Na- 
.  1  ii|uest  the  Council  to  request  an  ad- 
\  opinion  of  the  International  Court  of 
' '   111  accordance  with  article  65  of  the 
:r  of  the  Court,  which  opinion  shall  be 
'liril  as  decisive. 

I,  i:ach  State,  at  the  time  of  signature 
iil'ication,  acceptance  or  approval  of 

.  I  invention  or  accession  thereto,  or 
1  luional  economic  integration  organi- 

II,  at  the  time  of  signature  or  deposit  of 
t  of  formal  confirmation  or  accession, 
ill  rlare  that  it  does  not  consider  itself 
'1  liy  paragraphs  2  and  3  of  this  article. 
't  lirr  Parties  shall  not  be  bound  by 

J    iphs  2  and  3  with  respect  to  any 
Having  made  such  a  declaration. 
).  Any  Party  having  made  a  declaration 
'  fiirdance  with  paragraph  4  of  this  arti- 
at  any  time  withdraw  the  declara- 
iiotification  to  the  Secretary- 


Article  33 


Authentic  Texts 

The  Arabic,  Chinese,  English.  French,  Rus- 
sian and  Spanish  texts  of  this  Convention 
are  equally  authentic. 


Article  34 


Depositary 

The  Secretary-General  shall  be  the  deposi- 
tary of  this  Convention. 


In  Witne.ss  Whereof  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized  thereto,  have  signed 
this  Convention. 

Done  .^t  Vienna,  in  one  original,  this 
twentieth  day  of  December  one  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  eighty-eight. 


ANNEX 


Table  I 


Table  II 


Ephedrine  Acetic  anhydride 

Ergometrine  Acetone 

Ergotamine  Anthranilic  acid 

Lysergic  acid  Ethyl  ether 

l-phenyl-2-propanone  Phenylacetic  acid 

Pseudoephedrine  Piperidine 

The  salts  of  the  sub-  The  salts  of  the  sub- 
stances in  this  Table  stances  listed  in  this 
whenever  the  exist-  Table  whenever  the 
ence  of  such  salts  is  existence  of  such 
possible.  salts  is  possible.  ■ 


Human  Rights  in  Cuba:  An  Update 


Introduction 

Since  he  came  to  power  in  1959,  Fidel 
Castro  has  sought  to  subordinate  all  as- 
pects of  Cuban  life  to  the  ideals  and 
aims  of  the  revolution.  President  Cas- 
tro set  the  tone  in  1961  when  he  said 
"within  the  revolution,  everything; 
against  the  revolution,  nothing."  The 
current  constitution  states  that  civil 
liberties  may  not  be  exercised  "con- 
trary to  the  decision  of  the  Cuban  peo- 
ple to  build  socialism  and  communism." 
Although  the  Cuban  Government  pays 
lip  service  to  civil  liberties  and  human 
rights,  it  subordinates  these  "rights"  to 
its  own  aims  and  has  become  one  of  the 
worst  human  rights  violators  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  today. 

In  the  face  of  heightened  interna- 
tional scrutiny  initiated  by  the  UN  Hu- 
man Rights  Commission  (UNHRC)  at 
its  session  last  year,  Cuba  has  taken 
steps  to  demonstrate  an  improved  hu- 
man rights  record.  These  include  per- 
mitting visits  by  international  human 
rights  monitors  and  releasing  many  po- 
litical prisoners.  Fidel  Castro  himself 
denies  there  is  a  problem  of  human 
rights  in  Cuba  and  its  officials  have 
lauded  their  government's  record  of  hu- 
man rights  olDservance.  The  interna- 
tional community  must  ensure  that 
these  statements  are  matched  by 
deeds.  The  facts  speak  for  themselves. 


Recent  Improvements 

There  has  been  positive  change  in  Cuba 
on  the  human  rights  front.  In  the  face 
of  international  pressure,  as  well  as  re- 
formist tendencies  elsewhere  in  the  so- 
cialist bloc,  the  Cuban  Government  in 
the  past  year  has  undertaken  a  number 
of  limited,  perhaps  temporary,  re- 
forms. About  250  political  prisoners 
have  been  released  and  allowed  to  emi- 
grate. Prison  conditions  have  im- 
proved. Reform  of  the  penal  code 
decriminalized  many  petty  offenses, 
although  it  made  no  significant  change 
with  regard  to  "political  crimes."  Cu- 
ban authorities,  at  least  for  the  mo- 
ment, grudgingly  tolerate  the 
e.xistence  of  domestic  human  rights 
groups. 

In  1988  the  Cuban  Government 
permitted  inspection  visits  to  Cuba 
by  outside  observers,  including  repre- 
sentatives of  Amnesty  International 
and  the  Bar  Association  of  the  City  of 
New  York.  Cuba  accepted  inspection 
visits  by  representatives  of  the  Inter- 
national Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC),  as  well  as  an  extraordinary 
visit  by  a  team  from  the  UNHRC. 
ICRC  observers  were  allowed  to  visit 
prisoners  in  Cuban  jails  and,  through 
consultations  with  the  authorities,  to 
seek  to  ensure  adherence  to  interna- 
tional norms.  Another  ICRC  inspection 
is  now  being  planned  for  early  1989. 


iartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


59 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


The  extraordinary  September  1988 
visit  to  Cuba  by  the  UNHRC's  "Cuba 
working  group"  took  place  after  Presi- 
dent Castro  earlier  that  year  extended 
an  invitation  to  the  UNHRC  to  send 
observers.  Despite  promises,  Cuban 
authorities  dragged  their  feet  on  mak- 
ing advance  public  announcements  re- 
garding the  group's  intended  visit. 
Following  its  own  agenda  during  the 
10-day  trip,  the  six-person  team  held 
detailed  discussions  with  a  range  of  Cu- 
ban officials  and  was  able  to  meet  with 
nearly  90  of  the  1,500  private  individu- 
als who  sought  to  bring  human  rights 
complaints  to  the  group's  attention.  Cu- 
ban authorities  sought  to  discourage 
contact  between  the  group  and  private 
citizens  through  police  intimidation 
around  the  group's  hotel  but  gave  as- 
surances that  no  punitive  measures 
would  be  taken  against  those  who  did 
appear  before  the  delegation. 

New  Repression 

Despite  these  assurances,  there  have 
been  credible  reports  of  repressive 
measures  directed  against  human 
rights  activists  in  Cuba  following  the 
working  group's  visit.  About  30  activ- 
ists, many  of  whom  were  seeking  to  ex- 
ercise freedom  of  speech  or  peaceful 
assembly,  have  been  subjected  to  puni- 
tive actions  ranging  from  harassment 
and  beatings  to  detentions  and 
imprisonment: 

Gustavo  Venta,  Lazaro  Linares, 
Francisco  Benitez  Ferrer,  and  Ale- 
jandro Benitez  Ferrer  were  arrested 
in  conjunction  with  the  September  20, 
1988,  demonstration  outside  the  Hotel 
Comodoro  during  the  Cuba  working 
group's  visit.  All  were  sentenced  to  3-6 
months  in  prison.  Venta  was  reportedly 
beaten  on  September  22,  1988,  by  state 
security  agents  after  his  arrest. 

Pablo  Pupo  Sanchez  and  Juan 
Garcia  Cruz — the  President  and  Vice 
President  of  the  Free  Art  Association 
(APAL)  who  testified  before  the  Cuba 
working  group — were  arrested  on  Oc- 
tober 18,  1988,  at  a  meeting  in  a  private 
home  and  are  reportedly  being  held  in 
the  Villa  Marista  detention  center. 

APAL  members  Armando  Araya 
Garcia,  Rita  Fleitas  Fernandez, 
Octavio  Garcia  Alderete,  Secundino 
Hernandez  Castro,  David  Hornedo 
Garcia,  and  Aida  Valdes  Santana  were 
arrested  on  October  20,  1988,  during  a 
peaceful  wreath-laying  ceremony  at  the 
Jose  Marti  momument  in  Havana.  They 


were  charged  with  disorderly  conduct 
for  inciting  riots  and  received  sen- 
tences ranging  from  7  to  12  months  in 
prison. 

Tania  Diaz  Castro,  Secretary 
General  of  the  Cuban  Human  Rights 
Party,  was  involved  in  a  November  29, 
1988,  altercation  with  prison  guards  at 
Combinado  del  Este  prison,  reportedly 
beaten,  and  sentenced  hours  later  to  1 
year  in  prison  on  charges  of  disturbing 
the  peace. 

Cuba  Today 

These  developments  bear  out  critics' 
charges  that  the  improvements  noted 
above  do  not  indicate  any  basic  change 
in  the  fundamental  repressive  nature  of 
the  Cuban  system  under  Fidel  Castro. 
Cuban  authorities  could  negate  recent 
gains,  particularly  if  international 
pressure  for  continued  improvement 
should  slacken. 

One-Party  System.  The  Commu- 
nist Party  is  the  only  party  permitted 
by  law  in  Cuba.  Its  leadership  com- 
pletely controls  the  political  process. 

Freedom  of  Assembly  or  Associa- 
tion. Cuba's  constitution  contains  no 
guarantees  of  freedom  of  assembly  or 
association.  The  government  deter- 
mines the  legality  of  associations  and 
has  not  acted  on  letters  applying  for 
recognition  from  the  Cuban  Human 
Rights  Committee  and  the  Cuban  Com- 
mission for  Human  Rights  and  National 
Reconciliation.  Membership  in  party- 
controlled  mass  organizations,  such  as 
the  Union  of  Communist  Youth,  is  al- 
most a  necessity. 

Right  to  Privacy.  The  Cuban  state 
monitors  private  citizens'  activities 
through  an  elaborate  system  of  inform- 
ers, block  wardens,  and  80,000  block 
committees  called  "Committees  for  the 
Defense  of  the  Revolution."  Telephones 
are  tapped,  and  mail  is  opened. 

Freedom  to  Travel  or  Emigrate. 

Internal  travel  is  not  restricted,  but 
government  permission  to  travel 
abroad  is  required.  Attempting  to 
leave  the  country  illegally  can  result  in 
fines  or  jail  sentences  of  up  to  3  years. 
Emigration  is  strictly  controlled,  and 
even  those  who  apply  to  emigrate  often 
are  dismissed  from  work,  evicted  from 
their  housing,  and  denied  access  to  con- 
sumer goods. 


Freedom  of  Speech.  No  critic: 
of  the  party  or  its  leadership  is  pei 
ted.  Those  who  do  dissent  may  be  s 
verely  punished.  Andres  Jose  Solai 
Teseiro  was  arrested  in  1981  on 
grounds  that  he  was  thinking  of  or 
nizing  a  political  party  and  had  dr; 
letters  about  this  to  foreigners  ask 
for  their  opinions.  Solares  was  con 
victed  of  "enemy  propaganda"  and 
fenced  to  8  years  imprisonment,  e\ 
though  the  letters  were  never  sent. 

Freedom  of  the  Press.  Media 
controlled  by  the  state,  owned  by  t 
government  or  party-controlled  or 
zations,  and  operate  strictly  accon 
to  party  guidelines.  Writers  must 
government  approval  and  support 
their  work.  Acceptance  of  a  manus 
is  based  on  the  political  backgroun 
the  author,  as  well  as  suitability  of 
contents. 

Academic  Freedom.  Educatio 
the  exclusive  prerogative  of  the  sti 
There  is  no  alternative  to  governm 
run  schools;  religious  or  private  sc 
and  universities  are  prohibited.  Tl 
state  school  system  follows  and 
preaches  the  guidelines  of  Marxist 
Leninism,  as  interpreted  by  the  p; 

Artistic  Freedom.  Art  is  com 

pletely  under  government  control. 
February  1988,  authorities  confisc 
the  paintings  of  Raul  Montesino,  a 
dependent  artist  not  affiliated  wit 
state-controlled  artists'  cooperativ 

Freedom  to  Worship.  Althouj, 
the  constitution  guarantees  the  ri(» 
religious  belief,  Cubans  who  pract 
their  religion  face  serious  discrim 
tion  and,  in  the  case  of  Jehovah's  V 
nesses  and  some  other  fundaments 
religions,  legal  penalties.  Churchg 
are  excluded  from  Communist  Par 
membership  and  thus  are  barred  f 
holding  high-level  positions  in  the  j 
ernment  and  most  professions.  Chi 
state  relations  are  directly  control 
by  the  party.  In  1988  Cuban  author 
made  limited  concessions  to  religi( 
denominations,  such  as  permitting 
Catholic  Church  to  purchase  a  prii 
press  and  Protestant  churches  to  i 
port  Bibles. 

Political  Killings  and  Execu- 
tions. In  the  early  years  of  the  revi 
tion,  summary  execution  of  oppone 
was  a  frequent  practice.  As  late  as 
1982,  29  people  were  executed  for  " 
ting  against  Castro."  Although  the 
death  penalty  remains  an  optional 
ishment  for  "crimes  against  the  sta 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


redible  reports  of  political  execu- 
~  have  been  received  in  the  past 


Arbitrary  Arrest  and  Detention. 

er  Article  61  of  the  constitution, 
state  may  arrest  anyone  it  consid- 
harmful  to  the  "decision  of  the  Cu- 
people  to  build  socialism  and 
munism."  Arrests  can  be  made  se- 
ly  and  without  warrants.  Arrest 
uently  is  followed  by  detention  in 
offices  of  the  security  forces,  who 
n  conduct  lengthy  interrogations 
lOut  an  attorney  present.  Preven- 
detention  may  take  the  form  of 
se  arrest,  imprisonment,  or  involun- 

psychiatric  treatment.  There  are 
erous  credible  reports  of  detainees 

for  long  periods,  frequently  incom- 
icado  and  without  judicial  hearings 
iformation  as  to  the  charges 
nst  them,  in  direct  violation  of  Cu- 
law.  Elizardo  Sanchez,  head  of  the 
ficial  Cuban  Commission  for  Hu- 

Rights  and  National  Reconcilia- 

was  held  without  charges  for  5 
Lhs  in  1986-87  after  he  gave  an  in- 
iew  to  foreign  journalists. 

Fair  Trial.  Cuban  courts  in  prac- 
are  totally  subordinate  to  the  Com- 
ist  Party.  Five-member  panels  of 
■es  preside  over  all  civil  courts.  Of 
3  judges,  three  are  professionally 
(ified;  the  other  two  are  "worker's 
psentatives"  charged  to  see  that 
interests  of  the  revolution"  are 
scted.  Political  trials,  usually  held 
cret,  typically  take  less  than  1  day, 
in  cases  where  long  prison  terms 
it  stake. 

!!ldequate  Defense.  Government- 
inted  attorneys  are  available 
i  defendants.  However,  these 
hders — government  officials — are 
1  ill-prepared  and  unsympathetic 
rd  the  defendant.  In  addition,  de- 
;  attorneys  frequently  are  not  in- 
ed  of  the  trial  until  the  day  it 
ns.  Attorneys  have  been  them- 
s  imprisoned  for  defending  per- 
charged  with  political  offenses, 
in  rules  of  evidence  do  not  meet  in- 
ational  standards. 

Prison  Conditions.  Numerous  re- 
3  characterize  the  Cuban  prison 
em  as  harsh,  wath  generally  inade- 
e  diet,  housing,  sanitary  facilities, 
medical  care.  General  prison  condi- 

including  cell  conditions  and 
,  have  improved  over  the  past  year, 
t  remains  to  be  seen  if  these  are 


permanent  changes.  Harsh  punishment 
cells — although  somewhat  improved  in 
1988  to  prepare  for  international 
visitors — continue  to  exist.  No  formal, 
effective  mechanism  exists  for  the  pro- 
tection of  prisoners'  rights.  Physical 
abuse  is  common,  and  credible  reports 
of  use  of  torture  in  the  past  exist. 

Access  to  Prisons.  Until  late  1987, 
the  Cuban  Government  refused  permis- 
sion for  international  human  rights  or- 
ganizations to  visit  Cuban  prisons.  The 
1988  visits  of  the  ICRC  and  others  are 
described  above.  When  foreign  delega- 
tions visit  Cuban  prisons,  prisoners 
have  testified  that  the  visits  are  care- 
fully organized  to  show  the  positive  as- 
pects of  Cuban  prisons — areas  that 
have  been  cleaned,  cell  blocks  that  have 
been  painted,  etc.  Once  the  visitors 
leave,  they  say,  conditions  return  to 
their  previous  state.  Relatives  and 
friends  of  prisoners  are  given  only  lim- 
ited access  to  prisoners. 

Political  Prisoners.  Amnesty  In- 
ternational's 1988  report  notes  that  po- 
litical prisoners  in  Cuba  continue  to  be 
held  for  long  periods  in  "prison  condi- 
tions amounting  to  inhuman  or  de- 
grading treatment."  Former  political 
prisoners  describe  systematic  forms  of 
abuse:  beatings  by  prison  officials;  in- 
adequate diet;  denial  of  medical  care, 
fresh  air,  and  exercise;  denial  of  family 
visits  and  mail,  sometimes  for  years; 
and  extended  periods  of  solitary  con- 
finement or  incarceration  in  inhumane 
punishment  cells.  There  are  persistent 
reports  of  political  prisoners  sent  to 
psychiatric  facilities  instead  of  prisons. 

There  are  no  precise  figures  on  the 
number  of  political  prisoners  in  Cuba, 
or  on  Cuba's  prison  population  as  a 
whole.  Amnesty  International's  report 
for  1987  estimated  some  300-400  politi- 
cal prisoners  in  Cuba  at  that  time,  of 
whom  69  were  plantados  liistoricos. 
(The  plantados,  or  "steadfast  ones," 
are  prisoners,  many  of  whom  were  ar- 
rested more  than  20  years  ago  who  re- 
fused to  accept  political  reeducation.) 
Other  estimates — which  include  per- 
sons jailed  for  their  religious  beliefs, 
for  trying  to  leave  Cuba  "illegally,"  for 
being  conscientious  objectors,  and  for 
other  reasons — are  in  the  thousands. 

In  1988  President  Castro- 
responding  to  petitions  from  the  U.S. 
Catholic  Conference  and  a  direct  re- 
quest from  Archbishop  O'Connor — 
released  some  250  political  prisoners, 
including  65  plantados  historicos.  The 


Cuban  Government  at  the  end  of  1988 
announced  it  would  also  release  the 
four  remaining  plantados  historicos 
and  40  other  prisoners.  Released  pris- 
oners report,  however,  that  "new  plan- 
tados" are  replacing  those  released. 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  estimate 
their  numbers,  these  new  prisoners, 
who  refuse  to  accept  ideological  re- 
orientation, are  housed  in  Combinado 
del  Este  prison. 

Economy.  The  government  con- 
trols the  means  of  production  and  is  ba- 
sically the  sole  employer  in  the  country. 

Rationing.  National  rationing  be- 
gan in  1962,  and  rationing  of  meat  and 
fresh  vegetables  continues  today.  Add- 
ed to  the  food  shortage  is,  for  the  aver- 
age citizen,  the  scarcity  of  consumer 
goods  and  the  very  low  average  per 
capita  income.  A  standard  pair  of 
shoes,  for  example,  can  cost  about  90% 
of  an  average  monthly  wage.  Due  to 
shortages  of  consumer  goods,  most  Cu- 
bans must  spend  many  weary  hours 
standing  in  lines  when  they  can  afford 
to  buy  such  items. 

Health  Care.  Although  the  Cuban 
Government  claims  to  have  made  signif- 
icant advances  in  health  care  since  the 
revolution,  problems  still  remain.  Un- 
availability of  drugs,  overcrowding, 
and  unsanitary  conditions  are  typical 
at  many  Cuban  hospitals.  A  confiden- 
tial 1987  report  by  the  Communist  Par- 
ty, based  on  a  public  opinion  survey  in 
Holguin  Province,  details  the  poor 
state  of  health  care  and  concludes  that 
"the  people  are  not  satisfied  with  the 
medical  care." 

Housing.  Housing,  another  area  in 
which  President  Castro  has  claimed 
great  strides,  also  remains  deficient. 
Out  of  10  million  people,  nearly  one- 
quarter  reportedly  live  in  substandard 
housing. 

The  New  Elite.  In  Cuba,  contrary 
to  Marxist  theory,  ownership  of  the 
means  of  production  does  not  mean  that 
the  upper  class  of  privileged  elites  has 
been  eliminated.  On  the  contrary; 
since  the  revolution  a  new  class  struc- 
ture has  evolved.  The  political  and  mil- 
itary leadership  lives  very  comfortably, 
with  access  to  automobiles,  luxury 
goods,  better  housing,  and  special  re- 
sorts, while  the  majority  of  Cubans 
must  cope  with  severe  scarcity  and 
poor  quality  of  housing,  food  items,  and 
basic  consumer  products. 


liartment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


61 


TREATIES 


Rights  of  Business.  For  ideological 
reasons,  a  "private  sector"  economy  is 
virtually  nonexistent.  Collectivization 
has  eliminated  almost  all  private  farm- 
ing from  the  economy.  The  1968  "revo- 
lutionary offensive"  nationalized  56,000 
small  food  and  handicrafts  shops,  re- 
pair shops,  and  even  street  stands. 

The  Right  of  Labor.  The  Cuban 
constitution  places  "the  demands  of  the 
economy  and  society"  over  individual 
choice  in  employment.  The  party  exer- 
cises absolute  control  of  organized  la- 
bor through  the  umbrella  "Confed- 
eration of  Cuban  Workers."  The  right 
to  strike  is  prohibited  and  punishable 
by  imprisonment.  Collective  bai'gain- 
ing  does  not  exist.  Workers  cannot 
change  jobs  without  permission  from 
the  Minister  of  Labor.  Independent 
unions  are  prohibited,  and,  in  the  past, 
workers  who  have  tried  to  organize  in- 
dependent unions  have  been  sentenced 
to  long  prison  terms. 

Conclusion 

The  Cuban  revolution  celebrated  its 
30th  anniversary  in  January  1989.  As 
described  above,  the  revolution  has  fail- 
ed to  guarantee  basic  civil  and  political 
rights  to  the  Cuban  people  or  to  pro- 
vide for  their  economic  and  social  well- 
being.  Recent  welcome  improvements 
in  human  rights  observance  have  come 
about  because  of  international  pres- 
sure. The  Castro  regime  continues  to 
exercise  broad  repression  and  to  deny 
political  and  civil  liberities.  Cuban  au- 
thorities' recent  actions  against  the  Cu- 
ban human  rights  community  is  clear 
evidence  that  Fidel  Castro  will  not  tol- 
erate an  independent  voice  or  any  form 
of  public  criticism  to  exist  within  Cuba. 
Given  Cuba's  current  human  rights 
situation,  the  sole  recourse  of  the 
international  community  must  be  a  con- 
tinuation of  close  scrutiny  of  the  Cuban 
Government's  human  rights  practices. 
Inside  Cuba,  Fidel  Castro  and  the  Com- 
munist Party  are  the  law,  but  the  rest 
of  the  world  can  and  must  continue  to 
watch  closely  and  judge  Cuban  authori- 
ties' behavior  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 
Cuba  who  have  no  such  opportunity.  ■ 


Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  on  the  international  recognition 
of  rights  in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June 
19,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  17,  1953. 
TIAS  2847. 

Accessions  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Jan.  6, 
1988:  Guatemala,  Aug.  9,  1988. 

Protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
of  violence  at  airports  serving  international 
civil  aviation,  supplementary  to  the  conven- 
tion of  Sept.  23,  1971  (TIAS  7.570).  Done  at 
Montreal  Feb.  24,  1988.'  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  100-19. 

Signatures:  Cameroon,  Nov  23,  1988;  Philip- 
pines, Jan.  25,  1989. 

Conservation 

Protocol  to  the  convention  on  wetlands  of  in- 
ternational importance,  especially  as  water- 
fowl habitat,  of  Feb.  2,  1971.  Done  at  Paris 
Dec.  3,  1982.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1,  1986; 
for  the  U.S.  Dec.  18,  1986.  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  99-28. 

Accessions  deposited:  Egypt,  Sept.  9,  1988; 
Greece,  June  2,  1988. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  revised. 
Done  at  Paris'july  24,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  July  10,  1974.  TIAS  7868. 
Accession  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
May  19,  1988. 

Berne  convention  for  the  protection  of  liter- 
ary and  artistic  works  of  Sept.  9,  1886;  com- 
pleted at  Paris  May  4,  1896;  revised  at 
Berlin  Nov.  13,  1908;  completed  at  Berne 
Mar  20,  1914;  revised  at  Rome  June  2,  1928, 
at  Brussels  June  26,  1948,  at  Stockholm  July 
14,  1967,  and  at  Paris  July  24,  1971,  amended 
in  1979.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-27. 
Accession  deposited:  U.S.,  Nov.  16,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  for  the  U.S.:  Mar  1,  1988. 

Cultural  Property 

Convention  on  the  means  of  prohibiting  and 
preventing  the  illicit  import,  export,  and 
transfer  of  ownership  of  cultural  property. 
Done  at  Paris  Nov.  14.  1970.  Entered  into 
force  Apr  24,  1972;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  2,  1983. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Colombia,  May  24, 
1988. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Byelorussian 
S.S.R.,2UkrainianS.S.R.,2U.S.S.R.,2 
Apr  28,  1988. 

Customs 

International  convention  on  the  harmonized 
commodity  description  and  coding  system. 
Done  at  Brussels  June  14,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1988. 


Protocol  of  amendment  to  the  internal: 
convention  on  the  harmonized  commn^l 
description  and  coding  system.  Done  :> 
Brussels  June  24,  1986.  Entered  into  In, 
Jan.  1,  1988. 

Accession  deposited:  U.S.,  Oct.  27,  19n- 
Entered  into  force  for  the  U.S.:  Jan.  1. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  civil  aspects  of  intci 
tional  child  abduction.  Done  at  The  H;u 
Oct.  25.  1980,  Entered  into  force  Dec,  1 
1983;  for  the  U.S.  July  1,  1988.  [Senate 
Treaty  Doc.  99-11. 
Signature:  Norway,  Jan.  9,  1989. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  Jan.  9, 
1989.-* 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  standards  i 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeepi 
for  seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  Jul 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr  28,  1984. 
Accession  deposited:  Algeria,  Oct.  28,  1 

Pollution 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  interna 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  polluti' 
from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb. 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2,  1983. 
Accessions  deposited:  Suriname,  Nov. 
1988;  Syria,  Nov.  9.  1988.-'-5 

Protocol  to  the  convention  on  long-ranj 
transboundary  air  pollution  of  Nov.  13, 
(TIAS  10541),  concerning  monitoring  a 
evaluation  of  long-range  transmission  < 
pollutants  in  Europe  (EMEP),  with  an 
Done  at  Geneva  Sept.  28,  1984.  Entere^ 
force  Jan.  28,  1988. 

Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Jan.  12.  1' 
Accession  deposited:  Portugal,  Jan.  19, 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  oz 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  M 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22,  1988 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Ratification  deposited:  Greece,  Dec.  2! 
1988. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  c 
plete  the  ozone  layer,  with  annex,  Doni 
Montreal  Sept.  16,  1987.  Entered  into  1 
.Jan.  1,  1989,  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100- 
Ratification  deposited:  Malta,  Dec.  29, 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  puni 
ment  of  crimes  against  internationally 
tected  persons,  including  diplomatic  ai 
Done  at  New  York  Dec,  14,  1973.  Entei 
into  force  Feb,  20,  1977,  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Bhutan,  Jan.  16,  1 

Torture 

Convention  against  torture  and  other  c 
inhuman,  or  degrading  treatment  or  p 
ment.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1984. 
tered  into  force  June  26,  1987,^  [Senate 
Treaty  Doc.  100-20, 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Jan,  12,  li 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/April 


PRESS  RELEASES 


id  Heritage 

").-ention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
|d  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Nov.  28,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Dee. 
i7.5.  TIAS8226. 
fication  deposited:  Paraguay,  Apr.  27, 


ijtance  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  Apr.  28, 


jVTERAL 


lal  cooperation  for  reducing  demand, 
nting  illicit  use,  and  combatting  illicit 
uction  and  traffic  of  drugs.  Signed  at 
lopan  Feb.  9,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
9,  1989. 


ement  extending  the  agreement  of  Jan. 

179  (TIAS  9179),  as  extended,  on  cooper- 
in  science  and  technology.  Effected  by 

inge  of  notes  at  Beijing  Jan.  25  and  27, 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  27,  1989;  effec- 

='eb.  1,  1989. 

'national  Tropical  Timber 
nization(lTTO) 

•eimbursement  agreement.  Signed  at 
5  Dec.  27,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
,27,  1988. 


wandum  of  understanding  regarding 
■ration  in  ensuring  the  safety  and 
'someness  of  fresh  and  fresh  frozen 
rs,  clams,  and  mussels  exported  to  the 
id  States  from  Mexico.  Signed  at  Aca- 
Nov.  12, 1988.  Entered  into  force 
12,  1988. 


idad  and  Tobago 

ement  for  the  exchange  of  information 
respect  to  taxes.  Signed  at  Port  of 
[Jan.  11,  1989.  Enters  into  force  upon 
change  of  notes  confirming  that  the 
3S  have  met  all  constitutional  and  stat- 
requirements. 

tda 

ement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
28,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
ics. Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  2, 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  2,  1989. 

d  Kingdom 

ement  extending  the  agreement  of 
18,  198(3,  as  extended,  concerning  the 
s  and  Caicos  Islands  and  narcotics  ac- 
es. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
ington  Jan.  19,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
9,  1989. 


Not  in  force. 

With  statement(s). 

With  reservation(s). 

Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

Does  not  accept  optional  annexes  III, 

ndV.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State.  Washington,  D.C.  20.520. 


No.  Date 

*13  2/3 

14  2/8 

1.5  2/14 

16  2/14 

17  2/15 

18  2/15 

19  2/16 

20  2/21 

21  2/15 

22  2/16 

23  2/15 


USUN 


Subject 

Baker:  luncheon  toast  in  honor 
of  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Takeshita. 

Baker:  statement  on  peace 
and  relief  in  Sudan. 

Baker:  news  conference,  Ot- 
tawa, Feb.  10. 

Baker,  Howe:  remarks,  Lon- 
don, Feb.  12. 

Baker,  Hannibalsson:  re- 
marks, Reykjavik,  Feb.  11. 

Baker:  remarks,  Copenhagen, 
Feb.  14. 

Baker,  Brundtland:  remarks, 
Oslo,  Feb.  15. 

Baker:  news  briefing,  Bonn, 
Feb.  13. 

Baker,  Yilmaz:  remarks,  An- 
kara, Feb.  14. 

Baker,  Papandreou:  state- 
ments, Athens.  Feb.  14. 

Baker,  Papoulias:  remarks, 
Athens.  Feb.  14. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*117      11/1         Reagan:  women.  Commit- 
tee III. 

*118      11/1         Gross:  law  of  the  sea, 
plenary. 
119      11/3        Walters:  Cambodia, 
plenary. 

*120      11/2        Walters:  note  to  correspond- 
ents on  meeting  with 
Afghan  resistance 
delegation. 

*121       11/3        Okun:  human  rights  in  the 
occupied  territories, 
plenary. 

*122      11/3        Walters:  note  to  correspond- 
ents on  adoption  of  Reso- 
lution A/43/20, 
Afghanistan. 

*123      11/4        Okun:  disarmament, 
Committee  I. 

*124      11/4        Wrobleski:  narcotics, 
Committee  III. 

*125      11/4        Waldrop:  program  plan- 
ning. Committee  III. 

*126      11/4        Cahill:  assistance  to  Pal- 
estinian people,  Commit- 
tee II. 

*127      11/7        Montgomery:  information, 
Special  Political 
Committee. 


*24      2/17       Baker:  statement  on  the  dis- 
position of  his  stock  hold- 
ings, Rome,  Feb.  14. 
25      2/17       Baker:  remarks  after  meeting 
with  Spanish  Foreign  Min- 
ister, Madrid,  Feb.  15. 

*26      2/16       Baker:  remarks,  Madrid, 
Feb.  15. 

27  2/16       Baker:  remarks,  Lisbon, 

Feb.  15. 

28  2/17       Foreign  Relations  of  the 

United  States,  Memoranda 
of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
1949-1951,  and'Meetings 
and  Visits  of  Foreign  Digni- 
taries, 1949-1952,  micro- 
fiche publication  released. 

29  2/21       Baker,  Poos:  remarks,  Lux- 

embourg, Feb.  16. 

30  2/21       Baker:  interview  on  "Meet 

the  Press,"  Feb.  19. 

31  2/21       Baker:  statement  before  the 

House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee. 

32  2/21       Baker:  remarks,  Paris, 

Feb.  17. 
*33      2/23       Baker:  news  briefing,  Tokyo. 
34      2/27       Baker:  interview  on  "Face  the 
Nation,"  Beijing,  Feb.  26. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


*128 

11/8 

n29 

11/9 

*130 

11/11 

n3i 

11/10 

*1.32 

11/11 

*133 

11/14 

*134 

11/15 

*135 

11/15 

*136 

11/15 

*137 

11/15 

n38 

11/15 

*139 

11/16 

*140 

11/17 

*141 

11/17 

*142      11/18 


Nygard:  personnel. 

Committee  V. 
Byrne:  human  rights, 

Committee  III. 
Hoh:  program  planning, 

Committee  V. 
Cahill:  economic  and  social 

progress.  Committee  II. 
Tyson:  development. 

Committee  II. 
Gross:  South  Atlantic, 

plenary. 
Waldrop:  property  rights, 

Committee  III. 
Schneider:  religion. 

Committee  III. 
Kates:  Nicaragua,  Commit- 
tee II. 
Tyson:  Nicaragua, 

Committee  II. 
Byrne:  Central  America, 

plenary. 
Adelman:  Bangladesh, 

Special  Meeting  on 

Assistance. 
Hoh:  budget.  Committee 

V. 
Nygard:  Iran-Iraq  Military 

Observer  Group, 

Committee  V. 
Walters:  African  economic 

development  report, 

plenary. 


63 


PUBLICATIONS 


*143 

11/17 

Boschwitz:  refugees, 
Committee  III. 

*144 

11/17 

Walters:  Namibia,  plenary. 

*145 

11/21 

Byrne:  U.S.  contributions, 
ad  Ikic  committee  for  the 
announcement  of  volun- 
tary contributions  to  the 
1989  UNHCR  program. 

*146 

11/21 

Gross:  U.S.  contributions, 
ad  hoc  committee  for  vol- 
untary contributions  to 
UNRWA. 

*147 

11/23 

Byrne:  decolonization, 
plenary. 

*148 

11/23 

Montgomery:  information, 
Special  Political 
Committee. 

*149 

11/23 

Cahill:  trade  embargo 
against  Nicaragua, 
Committee  II. 

*150 

11/23 

Immerman:  South  Africa, 
Security  Council. 

*151 

11/25 

Walters:  ECOSOC  report, 
Committee  III. 

*152 

11/28 

Walters:  international  se- 
curity. Committee  I. 

*153 

11/28 

Waldrop:  elections. 
Committee  III. 

*154 

11/28 

Byrne:  host  country  re- 
sponsibilities, Commit- 
tee on  Relations  with  the 
Host  Country. 

*155 

11/30 

Okun:  international  peace 
and  security.  Commit- 
tee I. 

*156 

12/1 

Byrne:  mercenaries.  Com- 
mittee III,  Nov.  29. 

*157 

12/2 

Nelson:  apartheid,  plenary. 

*158 

11/30 

Okun:  host  country  respon- 
sibilities, plenary. 

*159 

12/1 

Byrne:  migrant  workers, 
"Committee  III,  Nov,  29. 

*160 

12/1 

Byrne:  human  rights  in 
Chile,  Committee  III. 
Nov.  30. 

*161 

12/2 

Hume:  occupied  territo- 
ries. Special  Political 
Committee,  Nov.  29. 

*162 

12/2 

Okun:  UN  General  Assem- 
bly session  in  Geneva, 
plenary. 

*163 

12/2 

Nygard:  budget.  Commit- 
tee V. 

*164 

12/7 

Cahill:  trade  and  develop- 
ment. Committee  II, 
Dec.  6. 

*165 

12/7 

Gross:  development  as- 
sistance. Committee  II, 
Dec.  6. 

*166 

12/6 

Montgomei-y;  Middle  East, 
plenary. 

*167 

12/7 

Gross:  assistance  by  inter- 
national financial  institu- 
tions, Committee  II, 
Dec.  6. 

*168 

12/7 

Gross:  international  traffic 
in  toxic  products.  Com- 
mittee II,  Dec.  6. 

*169      12/6        Walters:  nomination  of 

Thomas  P.  Pickering  as 
U.S.  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative to  the  UN. 

*170      12/7        Byrne:  host  country  re- 
sponsibilities. Commit- 
tee on  Relations  With 
the  Host  Country, 
Dec.  6. 

*171       12/8        Byrne:  40th  anniversary  of 
the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights, 
plenary. 

*172      12/8        Byrne:  human  rights  in 
Afghanistan,  plenary. 

*173      12/9        Byrne:  human  rights, 

Committee  III,  Oct.  27. 

*174      12/14      Gross:  1990-91  budget, 
Committee  V. 

*175      12/14      Gross:  international  devel- 
opment strategy. 
Committee  II. 


"176      12/14 


*177      12/14 


*178      12/14 


*179      12/14 


"180      12/21 


181       12/22 


Byrne:  southern  Lil 
Security  Council. 

Gross:  poverty.  Con. 
II. 

Walters:  Palestine,  | 
nary,  Geneva. 

Gross:  resolution  on  ( 
Committee  II. 

Gross;  budget,  Comff 
V. 

Shultz:  tripartite  agn 
ment  among  Angoh 
Cuba,  and  South  A 
and  bilateral  agreei 
between  Angola  an 
Cuba,  signing  cerei 
at  the  UN. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  I 


Foreign  Relations  Volumes  Released 


AUSTRIAN  STATE  TREATY; 
SUMMIT,  FOREIGN 
MINISTERS-  MEETINGS, 

19551 

The  Department  of  State  on  January  19, 
1989,  i-eleased  Foreign  Relations  ofihe 
United  States,  1955-1957,  Volume "V, 
Austrian  State  Treaty;  Summit  and 
Foreign  Ministers'  Meetings,  1955.  This 
volume  presents  documentation  on 
three  efforts  by  the  United  States,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  France  to  reach 
final  decisions  on  aspects  of  the  World 
War  II  peace  settlement.  Only  in  the 
case  of  the  Austrian  State  Ti-eaty  were 
they  successful. 

Of  the  most  lasting  significance 
were  the  final  negotiations,  begun  in 
1947,  for  an  Austrian  state  treaty.  In 
these  negotiations,  the  Soviet  Union 
abandoned  its  intransigent  position  on 
restoring  Austrian  independence  and 
agreed  to  the  withdrawal  of  all  occupa- 
tion forces  from  the  country  in  return 
for  an  Austrian  declaration  of  perma- 
nent neutrality.  The  Austrian  State 
Ti'eaty  was  signed  at  Vienna  on  May  15. 

The  heads  of  govei'nment  meeting 
of  the  three  Western  powers  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  held  in  Geneva  in  July 
1955,  was  the  first  such  gathering  since 
World  War  II.  The  most  significant 
question  at  issue  for  the  West  in  these 
discussions  was  reunification  of  Ger- 
many, but  the  Soviet  Union  believed 


that  European  security  was  more 
important.  This  divergence  of  view 
the  tone  for  the  conference.  The  si 
mit  conference  is  best  known  for  P 
dent  Eisenhower's  proposal  for  mu 
aerial  inspection,  a  proposal  that  t 
came  known  as  "open  skies."  Althi 
the  President's  idea  was  summaril; 
jected  by  the  Soviet  Union,  it  rem 
an  integral  part  of  U.S.  disarmam 
proposals  for  many  years. 

The  only  result  of  the  Geneva 
ference,  other  than  the  "spirit  of  ( 
neva"  proclaimed  by  the  press,  wa 
directive  from  the  heads  of  govern 
to  their  foreign  ministers  calling  f 
further  discussions  of  the  issues  a 
other  meeting  at  Geneva  in  the  fal 

From  the  first  foreign  iTiiniste 
meeting  on  October  27,  Secretary 
State  Dulles  reported  that  the  Sov 
positions  had  remained  unchanged 
the  summit  conference.  Two  week: 
polite  wrangling  on  the  issues  gavi 
on  November  11  to  a  statement  by 
eign  Minister  Molotov,  which  DuUt 
characterized  as  one  of  the  "most 
cynical  and  uncompromising"  that 
had  heard.  Although  the  meetings 
tinued  until  November  17,  they  we 
completely  without  success. 

This  is  the  most  recent  volume 
the  Department  of  State's  official  c 
matic  documentary  series  begun  ii 
1861.  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Unii 


64 


PUBLICATIONS 


s,  1955-1957,  Volume  V,  comprises 
lages  of  government  records,  most 
lich  were  previously  classified.  The 
ne  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of 
jiistorian.  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
rtment  of  State.  This  authoritative 
lal  record  is  based  on  files  of  the 
e  House,  the  Department  of  State, 
pther  government  agencies, 
.hopies  of  Volume  V  (Department  of 
Publication  No.  9454;  GPO  Stock 
)44-000-02238-9)  may  be  pur- 
d  for  $27.00  (domestic  postpaid) 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
Government  Printing  Office, 
ington,  D.C.  20402.  Checks  or 
y  orders  should  be  made  payable 
3  Superintendent  of  Documents. 


iR  EAST:  JORDAN- 
]  MAN,  1955-1957^ 

)epartment  of  State  on  Janu- 
5,  1989,  released  Foreign  Rela- 
ofthe  United  States,  1955-1957, 
le  XIII,  Near  East:  Jordan- 
n,  an  800-page  volume  consisting 
'viously  classified  records  of  the 
?  House,  State  Department,  and 
government  agencies, 
hese  newly  released  documents 
nstrate  President  Eisenhower's  in- 
ing  concern  with  growing  Soviet 
nee  in  the  Near  East  in  the  mid- 
.  Early  in  1957,  the  President  re- 
ed and  Congress  approved  a  reso- 
authorizing  U.S.  economic  and 
iry  assistance  programs  and,  if 
sary,  the  use  of  U.S.  armed  forces 
tect  the  independence  and  terri- 
integrity  of  Near  East  countries 
st  communist  aggression.  The 
ihower  doctrine,  as  this  policy  be- 
known,  substantially  augmented 
economic  and  security  assistance 
se  countries  and  laid  the  basis  for 
erm  American  commitment 
st  Soviet  e.xpansion  in  the  area. 
er  Congressman  James  P.  Rich- 
/isited  the  Near  East  as  the  Pres- 
5  special  envoy  and  conducted 
■tant  discussions  relating  to 
itial  implementation  of  the 
hower  doctrine.  Lebanon,  Saudi 
a,  and  Yemen  were  among  the 
ries  he  visited. 

oviet  penetration  into  the  Near 
was  a  real  threat  by  1957.  In  con- 
to  good  U.S.  relations  with  Jor- 
L,ebanon,  and  Saudi  Arabia,  the 
hower  Administration  became  in- 


creasingly concerned  at  what  it  viewed 
as  an  "anti-West  and  leftist  drift"  in 
Syria.  In  August  1957,  Damascus  ac- 
cepted additional  Soviet  economic  and 
military  aid,  named  a  leftist  as  army 
commander  in  chief,  and  expelled  three 
U.S.  diplomats.  Syria's  neighbors 
shared  U.S.  fear  that  Syria  would  be- 
come a  base  for  extensive  Soviet  sub- 
version in  the  area.  President 
Eisenhower  dispatched  veteran  diplo- 
mat Loy  W.  Henderson  to  the  Middle 
East  for  discussions  with  Turkish, 
Iraqi,  Jordanian,  and  Lebanese  lead- 
ers, and  U.S.  assistance  to  those  coun- 
tries was  expedited.  In  October  Soviet 
charges  that  the  United  States  and 
Turkey  were  stirring  up  a  war  over 
Syria  heightened  the  crisis,  but  efforts 
by  King  Saud  at  mediation  and  discus- 
sions in  the  United  Nations  diffused 
the  situation. 

This  volume,  prepared  in  the  Of- 
fice of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State,  is  the 
most  recent  in  the  Department  of 
State's  official  diplomatic  documentary 
series  begun  in  1861.  It  is  the  first  of 


six  volumes  which  will  document  U.S. 
policy  toward  the  Middle  East  in  1955- 
57.  It  includes  documents  on  bilateral 
relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Saudi  Arabia, 
Syria,  and  Yemen  and  on  U.S.  policy 
concerning  Muscat  and  Oman.  Four 
volumes  will  provide  documentation 
on  U.S.  policy  concerning  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  and  the  Suez  Canal  cri- 
sis and  another  will  include  material  on 
regional  policies  as  well  as  bilateral  re- 
lations with  Iran  and  Iraq. 

Copies  of  Volume  XIII  (Depart- 
ment of  State  Publication  No.  9665, 
GPO  Stock  No.  044-000-02198-6)  may 
be  purchased  for  $24.00  (domestic  post- 
paid) from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 
Checks  or  money  orders  should  be 
made  payable  to  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents. 


'Press  release  7. 
-Press  release  8. 


Foreign  Relations  Supplement 
Microfiche  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  Febru- 
ary 17,  1989,  released  the  microfiche 
publication.  Memoranda  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  1949-1951,  and  Meetings 
and  Visits  of  Foreign  Dignitaries,  1949- 
1952,  a  supplement  to  the  Foreign  Rela- 
tions of  the  United  States  series.  This 
publication  presents  a  chronological  rec- 
ord of  memoranda  by  Secretary  of 
State  Dean  Acheson  or  one  of  his  depu- 
ties from  1949  through  1951  and  addi- 
tional material  relating  to  meetings 
between  senior  U.S.  and  foreign  offi- 
cials held  from  1949  through  1952. 

These  years  witnessed  the  rapid 
intensification  of  cold  war  tensions. 
Several  dramatic  events,  including  the 
fall  of  China  to  the  communists,  the  So- 
viet Union's  testing  of  an  atomic  weap- 
on, and  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  war, 
severely  tested  the  Truman  Adminis- 
tration's resiliency.  The  entry  of  com- 
munist China  into  the  Korean  conflict 
and  Truman's  difficulties  with  Gen. 
MacArthur  placed  additional  strains  on 
his  Administration.  These  memoranda 
show  policymakers  debating  these 
issues  and  coming  to  decisions. 


Other  major  topics  covered  in  these 
memoranda  are  the  postwar  adminis- 
tration of  Japan,  negotiation  of  the 
Japanese  Peace  Treaty,  the  peace  set- 
tlement with  Germany  and  Austria,  the 
formation  of  NATO,  the  growing  fears 
of  Soviet  aggression  in  Europe  after 
the  onset  of  the  Korean  war,  and  the 
development  of  contacts  with  Yugo- 
slavia, which  resisted  Soviet  control. 
The  documents  also  focus  on  U.S.  ini- 
tial responses  to  the  problems  of 
emerging  nations,  the  Kashmir  dis- 
pute, and  the  competing  claims  of  Ar- 
abs and  Jews  in  the  Middle  East.  Global 
topics  include  atomic  energy  and  inter- 
national economic  questions. 

The  heightened  international  ten- 
sions were  accompanied  by  mounting 
domestic  political  attacks  on  the  Tru- 
man Administration's  foreign  policies. 
A  recurrent  theme  in  many  of  the  mem- 
oranda is  the  concern  of  the  President, 
Acheson,  and  their  aides  to  respond  to 
or  ward  off  Republican  criticisms.  Sen- 
ator Joseph  McCarthy's  charges  of  com- 
munist penetration  of  the  government 
were  seen  as  of  particular  danger.  The 


Irtment  of  State  Bulletin/April  1989 


65 


PUBLICATIONS 


memoranda  also  reveal  executive 
branch  officials'  preoccupation  with  sus- 
taining congressional  support  for  the 
Marshall  Plan,  Point  Four,  and  mili- 
tary assistance  programs. 

The  material  on  meetings  with  for- 
eign dignitaries  provides  additional 
documentation  on  several  bilateral  and 
regional  relationships.  Appro.ximately 
two-thirds  of  these  documents  relate  to 
meetings  between  President  Truman 
and  British  Prime  Ministers  Churchill 
and  Attlee  and  French  Prime  Minister 
Pleven  and  President  Auriol.  Topics 
range  from  bilateral  and  colonial 
questions  to  regional  and  global  is- 
sues involving  post-World  War  II  recon- 
struction, the  movement  toward  great- 
er economic  and  political  unity  in 
Europe,  and  political  and  military 
developments  in  China  and  Korea. 
Acheson's  memoranda  relating  to  his 
conversations  with  British  Foreign  Sec- 
retary Anthony  Eden  and  French  For- 
eign Minister  Robert  Schuman  are 
particularly  comprehensive.  Other  ma- 
terials in  this  collection  relate  to  the 
Council  of  Foreign  Ministers'  meeting 
in  Paris,  a  U.S.  visit  by  New  Zealand 
Prime  Minister  Sydney  Holland,  and 
meetings  with  foreign  leaders  at  the 
seventh  UN  General  Assembly  in  1952. 

The  documents  in  this  publication 
were  maintained  by  the  Executive  Sec- 
retariat of  the  Department  of  State. 
The  Secretary's  memoranda  are  pre- 
sented chronologically,  as  filed  by  offi- 
cers of  the  Executive  Secretariat, 
followed  by  the  documents  on  the  meet- 
ings and  visits.  All  related  documents, 
including  routing  slips  and  notes,  fol- 
low the  papers  to  which  they  were  orig- 
inally attached.  Both  collections  were 


part  of  Lot  53  D  444,  which  contained 
the  Memoranda  of  the  Secretary  of 
State,  1947-1952,  an  earlier  microfiche 
supplement  to  the  Foreign  Relations 
series.  This  supplement  complements 
that  publication.  Lot  53  D  444  has  been 
transferred  to  the  National  Archives 
and  Records  Administration  where  it  is 
preserved  in  Record  Group  59. 

All  material  in  these  two  collec- 
tions has  been  reproduced  except  for  a 
few  papers  that  could  not  be  declas- 
sified in  whole  or  in  part  because  of 
continued  sensitivity  on  national  secu- 
rity or  privacy  grounds.  This  micro- 
fiche publication  is  part  of  the 
Department's  effort  to  make  the  official 
foreign  affairs  record  more  widely 
available  to  scholars  and  other  users. 
These  publications  reproduce  signifi- 
cant and  unique  collections  of  historical 
documents,  only  a  small  part  of  which 
can  be  printed  in  Foreign  Relations 
volumes. 

The  two  collections  in  this  publica- 
tion, comprising  3,471  manuscript 
pages  on  39  microfiche  cards  and  ac- 
companied by  a  66-page  printed  guide 
containing  a  comprehensive  index, 
were  prepared  by  the  Office  of  the  His- 
torian, Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  De- 
partment of  State.  Copies  of  the 
publication  (Department  of  State  Pub- 
lication No.  9672;  GPO  Stock  No.  044- 
000-02240-1)  may  be  purchased  for 
$20.00  from  the  Superintendent  of  Doc- 
uments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Checks 
or  money  orders  should  be  made  pay- 
able to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents. 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  suml 
ries  of  the  people,  history,  governmeni 
economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  aboutf 
countries  (excluding  the  United  States 
of  selected  international  organizations 
cent  revisions  are: 

Algeria  (Nov.  1988) 
Argentina  (Oct.  1988) 
Botswana  (Dec.  1988) 
Cameroon  (Nov.  1988) 
Comoros  (Oct.  1988) 
Denmark  (Nov.  1988) 
French  Antilles  and  Guiana 

(Jan.  1989) 
Hong  Kong  (Nov.  1988) 
Liechenstein  (Jan.  1989) 
Netherlands  Antilles  and  Aruba 

(Jan.  1989) 

A  free  copy  of  the  inde.x  only  may 
tained  from  the  Public  Information  Di' 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20.520. 

For  about  60  Backgroioid  Notes  a 
a  subscription  is  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  G 
ment  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D. 
20402,  for  .$14.00  (domestic)  and  $17.50 
eign).  Check  or  money  order,  made  paj 
to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
accompany  order  ■ 


Press  release  28  of  Feb.  17,  1989. 


66 


roEX 


t^ril  1989 

^j^lume  89,  No.  2145 

\'hanistan 
>i.Kiit  Holds  Session  With  News 

ipnrters  5 

-iliiit's  News  Conference  of  January  27 

Mi'i-pts)     4 

■elarv's  Interview  on 

.I.ct  the  Press" 21 

nts  Withdraw  From  Afghanistan 

.ush) 48 

uerican  Principles 

'i  Inaugural  Address  of  President  Bush  . .  1 

'tsident  Addresses  Joint  Session  of  the 

ingress 3 

tetary-Designate's  Confirmation 

earings  10 

lis  Control 

t  International  Agenda  and  the  FY  1990 

lidget  Request  (Baker)   16 

f'^'R  Talks  Conclude  (final 

mmunique)   25 

1  iiieiit's  News  Conference  of  January  27 

Kcerpts)   4 

e  etary's  Interview  on 

leet  the  Press" 21 

erity  Challenges  Facing  NATO  in  the 

•(is'(Nitze) 44 

;  ada.  President's  Visit  to  Canada  (Baker, 

ish,  Mulroney)  26 

( icress 

i  I  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

'iigress)  43 

I  International  Agenda  and  the  FY  1990 

idget  Request  (Baker)   16 

r  ident  Addresses  Joint  Session  of  the 

iigress 3 

e  etary-Designate's  Confirmation 

■arings  10 

I  1.  Human  Rights  in  Cuba: 

1  I'pdate    59 

.)  -us.  First  Report  on  Cyprus  (message 

the  Congress)  43 

;   Asia.  East  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and  the 

S.;  An  Economic  Partnership 33 

l4  lomics.  East  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and  the 

S.:  An  Economic  Partnership 33 

'il  alvador.  Vice  President  Visits 

nezuela  and  El  Salvador 7 

II  ironment.  Secretary  Addresses  Panel 

(  Global  Climate  Change 13 


Europe 

MBFR  Talks  Conclude  (final 

communique)   25 

Secretary  Meets  With  NATO  Allies 38 

Secretary's  Interview  on 

"Meet  the  Press" 21 

Security  Challenges  Facing  NATO  in  the 

1990s  (Nitze) 44 

Human  Rights.  Human  Rights  in  Cuba: 

An  Update    59 

Japan 

Secretary's  Interview  on 

"Meet  the  Press" 21 

Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  (Bush, 

Takeshita) 32 

Middle  East 

President's  News  Conference  of  January  27 

(excerpts)   4 

Secretary's  Interview  on 

"Meet  the  Press" 21 

Narcotics.  UN  Narcotics  Trafficking 

Conference  Adopts  Convention  (text  of 

convention)  49 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
President  Holds  Session  With  News 

Reporters  5 

Secretary  Meets  With  NATO  Allies 38 

Security  Challenges  Facing  NATO  in  the 

1990s  "(Nitze) 44 

Pacific.  East  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and  the 

U.S.:  An  Economic  Partnership 33 

Presidential  Documents 

James  A.  Baker,  III,  Sworn  in  as  Secretary 

of  State  (Baker,  Bush,  biographic  data)  . .  8 
First  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress)  43 

The  Inaugural  Address  of  President  Bush  . .  1 
President  Addresses  Joint  Session  of  the 

Congress 3 

President's  News  Conference  of  January  27 

(excerpts)   4 

President's  Visit  to  Canada  (Baker,  Bush, 

Mulroney)  26 

Soviets  Withdraw  From  Afghanistan  ....  48 
Visit  of  .Japanese  Prime  Minister  (Bush, 

Takeshita) 32 

Publications 

Background  Notes 66 

Foreign  Relations  Supplement  Microfiche 

Released   65 

Foreign  Relations  Volumes  Released  64 


Sudan.  Peace  and  Relief  in  Sudan  (Baker, 

fact  sheet) 24 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 62 

U.S.S.R. 

The  International  Agenda  and  the  FY  1990 

Budget  Request  (Baker)   16 

President's  News  Conference  of  .January  27 

(excerpts)   4 

Secretary's  Interview  on 

"Meet  the  Press" 21 

Soviets  Withdraw  From  Afghanistan 

(Bush) 48 

United  Nations.  UN  Narcotics  Trafficking 

Conference  Adopts  Convention  (text  of 

convention)  49 

Venezuela.  Vice  President  Visits  Venezuela 

and  El  Salvador 7 

Western  Hemisphere 

The  International  Agenda  and  the  FY  1990 

Budget  Request  (Baker)   16 

President  Holds  Session  With  News 

Reporters  5 

Secretary's  Interview  on 

"Meet  the  Press" 21 

Name  Index 

Baker,  Secretary 8,10,13,16,21,24,26,38 

Brundtland,  Gro  Harlem 38 

Bush,  President 1,3,4,5,8,26,32,43,48 

Hannibalsson,  Jon  Baldvin 38 

Howe,  Sir  Geoffrey 38 

Mulroney,  Brian   26 

Nitze,  Paul  H  44 

Papandreou,  Andreas   38 

Papoulias,  Karolos  38 

Poos,  Jacques  38 

Quayle,  Vice  President   7 

Takeshita,  Noboru  32 

Yilmaz,  Mesut  38 


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lie  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  89  /  Number  2146 


May  1989 


President's  Trip  to  Asia/1 
European  Security  Talks/33 
International  Debt  Crisis/53 


^  JUN  §   \m 


Dpparttnent  of  Staie 

bulletin 


Volume  89  /  Number  2146  /  May  1989 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major  ad- 
dresses and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
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are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


JAMES  A.  BAKER,  III 

Secretary  of  State 

MARGARET  DeB.  TUTWILER 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 


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CONTENTS 


FEATURE 

1         President's  Trip  to  Japan,  China,  and  South  Korea 

(Secretary  Baker,  President  Bush,  White  House  Statement) 


Tie  Secretary 


Interview  on  "MacNeil/Lehrer 

Newshour" 
Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley" 


/irica 


Human  Rights  Issues  in  Africa 

(Kenneth  L.  Brown, 

Robert  W.  Farrand) 
Namibian  Independence  and 

Troop  Withdrawal  From 

Angola  (Secretary  Baker) 


/>ms  Control 


I 


European  Security  Negotiations 
Open  in  Vienna  (President 
Busk,  Stephen  J.  Ledogar, 
John  J.  Maresca,  Western 
Position  Paper) 


Est  Asia 


Update  on  Cambodia  (David  F. 
Lambertson) 

Cambodia — A  Profile 

Burma:  Political  Situation  and 
Human  Rights  (David  F. 
Lambertson) 

Burma — A  Profile 

Future  Prospects  for  the  Philip- 
pines (David  F.  Lambertson) 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
(William  Clark,  Jr.) 


Economics 

53         Dealing  With  the  International 
Debt  Crisis  (Nicholas  F. 
Brady) 


Europe 

56         New  Horizons  in  Europe 

(Secretary  Baker) 
59         Secretary  Meets  With  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  (Secretary 
Baker) 

IVIiddie  East 

61         FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 
the  Middle  East  (A.  Peter 
Burleigh,  Edward  S.  Walker) 

63         Secretary  Meets  With  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister  (Moshe 
Arens,  Secretary  Baker) 

65  Continued  Fighting  in  Lebanon 

(Department  Statements) 

66  U.S.  and  PLO  Meet  in  Tunis 

(Robert  H.  Pelletreau,  Jr.) 

67  Iraq  to  Pay  Compensation 

(Department    Statement) 

Narcotics 

68  Certification  for  Narcotics 

Source  and  Transit  Countries 
(Secretary  Baker,  Ann  B. 
Wrobleski) 


Refugees 

72  FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 
Refugee  Programs  (Jonathan 
Moore) 


Terrorism 


74 


78 


Terrorism:  Its  Evolving  Nature 

(L.  Paul  Bremer,  HI) 
Iran's  Threats  Against  Author 

(Alvin  P.  Adams,  Jr.) 


United  Nations 


81 


83 


FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 
Organizations  and  Programs 
(Sandra  L.  Vogelgesang) 

UN  Human  Rights  Report  on 
Cuba  (President  Bush) 


Western  Hemisphere 

84  Presidential  Election  Held  in  El 

Salvador  (White  House 
Statement) 

85  Chilean  Fruit  Exports  to  the 

U.S.  (Secretary  Baker,  Joint 
Statement) 


Treaties 

86         Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

89         Department  of  State 

Publications 

89         Department  of  State 

Index 


President  and  Mrs.  Bush  were  among  the  many  dignitaries  attending  the  funeral  of 
Emperor  Hirohito  in  Tokyo  on  February  24.  1989.  Shown  here  are  (left  to  right):  Mrs. 
Soeharto,  President  Soeharto  of  Indonesia,  President  Kaunda  of  Zambia,  Mrs.  Bush, 
President  Bush,  President  Von  Weizsaeeker  of  West  Germany,  and  President  Mitterrand 
of  France. 


(White  House  photo  by  Carol  Powers) 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


President's  Trip 
to  Japan,  China,  and  South  Korea 


President  Bush  departed 
the  United  States  on  February  22,  1989, 

to  visit  Japan  {February  23-25), 

where  he  represented  the  JJyiited  States 

at  the  funeral  of  Emperor  Hirohito, 

Chiyia  (February  25-27), 

and  South  Korea  (February  27). 

He  returned  to  Washington 

on  February  27. 


TOKYO 


:retary  Baker's 
Jews  Briefing, 
).  23,  19891 

ant  to  just  simply  start  by  saying 
t  the  President  has  completed  eight 
terals.  Two  of  those,  as  I  under- 
id  it,  have  already  been  briefed  to 
by  Marlin  [Fitzwater,  Assistant  to 
President  and  Press  Secretary] — 
bilateral  with  President  Mitterrand 
'ranee  and  Prime  Minister  Take- 
,a.  In  addition  to  that,  he  has  com- 
;ed  bilaterals  with  Portuguese 
me  Minister  Scares,  Egyptian  Pres- 
it  Mubarak,  Thai  Prime  Minister 
itchai,  Jordanian  King  Hussein,  Is- 
li  President  Herzog,  and  the  Presi- 
it  of  India,  Mr.  Benkhataram. 

Q.  King:  Hussein,  after  his  meet- 
,  said  that  in  recent  years,  he's 
n  concerned  about  the  United 
tes  but  that  he  thinks  that  Presi- 
it  Bush  is  someone  he  can  have 
at  faith  in.  What  did  the  President 

to  change  the  King's  mind  about 
5.  intentions? 

A.  President  Bush  and  King  Hus- 
1  go  back  a  long  way.  They've  known 
h  other  for  a  long  time;  they've  been 


friends;  they've  worked  together.  I 
think  it's  fair  to  say  that  there  was  a 
recognition  on  the  part  of  both  that 
there  are  perhaps  some  opportunities 
out  there  with  respect  to  the  Middle 
East  peace  process  that  haven't  existed 
before.  There's  somewhat  of  a  dynamic 
in  the  whole  process  that  is  relatively 
new — when  you  consider  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  has  a  dialogue  with 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organi- 
zation], when  you  consider  the  fact  of 
the  recent  human  rights  report,  when 
you  consider  the  fact  that  the  conflict 
there  has  dragged  on  for  as  long  as  it 
has.  And  I  think  that  there  was  a  genu- 
ine appreciation  on  the  part  of  both  of 
those  leaders  that  perhaps  there  were 
some  opportunities  out  there  that 
should  be  carefully  looked  at,  carefully 
thought  through,  and,  if  possible,  cap- 
italized on. 

Q.  But  if  I  could  follow;  he 
seemed  to  express  that  there  was  a 
difference  in  the  attitude  of  the  Unit- 
ed States.  Is  there? 

A.  I'm  not  aware  of  any  difference. 
I  think  the  United  States  has  always 
been  committed  to  doing  whatever  it  can 
to  further  the  peace  process  in  the  Mid- 
dle East. 

Q.  Are  we  talking  about  a  new 
Middle  East  peace  plan  here? 
A.  No. 


Q.  We're  obviously  talking  about 
some  kind  of  new  initiative.  Could 
you  fill  us  in  on  what's  going  on? 

A.  It  depends  on  who  you're  talking 
to  when  you  ask  what's  going  on.  A  nu- 
mber of  people  have  some  different  ideas 
that  they're  floating.  Of  course,  there's 
the  idea  of  an  international  conference 
under  the  sponsorship  of  the  five  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council 
of  the  United  Nations.  There  are  other 
ideas,  as  there  have  been  from  time  to 
time  throughout  the  long  torturous 
course  of  this  problem  in  the  Middle 
East. 

Let  me,  if  I  might,  tell  you  what  the 
view  and  attitude  of  the  Bush  Adminis- 
tration is.  We,  too,  think  that  there  are 
perhaps  some  opportunities — perhaps. 
We  think  they  ought  to  be  explored  very 
carefully,  that  there  ought  to  be  an  ex- 
tensive amount  of  practical  groundwork 
accomplished  before  we  rush  off  to  have 
a  big,  high-visibility  conference  under 
the  television  lights.  We  think  that  it  is 
important  that  we  do  what  we  can  to 
build  the  environment  for  direct  negotia- 
tions between  the  parties  that  are  going 
to  lead  to  permanent  peace  in  the  Middle 
East. 

We  are  concerned  that  if  we  act  too 
precipitously,  we  might  preempt  promis- 
ing possibilities  that  could  surface  if  we 
adopted  a  more  reasoned  and  measured 
approach. 


liiH->artmont  nf  Qtato  RiiMotin/Mau  1  QRQ 


Q.  Did  you  make  any  kind  of  spe- 
cific proposal  to  King  Hussein  or  Mr. 
Mubarak  about  any  kind  of  meeting; 
any  new  American  proposal? 

A.  No,  we  did  not.  We  said  basically 
what  I've  just  said  to  you.  In  addition, 
we  said  we  recognize  the  important  role 
that  the  United  States  plays  in  the  peace 
process  in  the  Middle  East.  We  made  the 
point  that  the  United  States  would  e.\- 
pect  to  be  active  in  the  Middle  East 
peace  process. 

Q.  Did  you  see  any  common 
ground  among  Hussein,  Mubarak, 
and  Herzog? 

A.  Yes.  I  think  all  three  of  those 
leaders  recognize  the  fact — that  I  men- 
tioned a  moment  ago — that  there  is  a 
certain  dynamic  now  in  the  region. 
There  is  a  ree.xamination  on  the  part  of  a 
number  of  the  major  players.  I  think 
that  there's  a  genuine  sharing  of  views 
that  it  is,  in  fact,  direct  negotiations  that 
will  ultimately  lead  to  peace  and  that 
somehow  we  must  find  a  way  to  get  to 
those  direct  negotiations. 

Q.  Direct  negotiations  between 
whom? 

A.  Direct  negotiations  between  the 
Palestinians  and  the  Israelis. 


Q. 
A. 


Not  the  PLO? 

Palestinians. 


Q.  What  role,  if  any,  has  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze's  visit  to  the 
Middle  East  played  in  creating  this 
new  dynamic  that  you  see  in  the  pros- 
pects for  peace  in  the  region? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  has  played  a 
major  role,  quite  frankly,  in  creating  the 
new  dynamics.  I  think  the  dynamics 
were  there.  I  think  that  they  are  af- 
fected in  large  part  by  the  intifada  [up- 
rising] and  the  results  that  that  has  had 
on  public  opinion  around  the  world  and 
on  public  opinion,  frankly,  within  the 
countries  in  the  Middle  East.  I  think  it's 
healthy,  quite  frankly,  that  the  Soviet 
Union  would  be  interested  in  contribut- 
ing to  the  cause  of  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  I  suppose  we  would  want  to  know 
that  there  were  concrete  contributions 
that  they  had  in  mind,  rather  than  sim- 


ply rhetorical  exercises.  It's  my  under- 
standing that  when  I  meet  with  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  in  Vienna  in 
March,  we  will  have  further  discussions 
along  these  lines. 

I  might  say  one  final  thing;  it's 
obvious,  of  course,  that  the  Soviet 
Union  can  have  influence  with  Syria. 
One  thing  that  I  think  might  contribute 
in  a  way  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  would  be  if  the  Soviet  Union  could 
find  its  way  clear  to  establishing  full 
diplomatic  relations  with  Israel.  Anoth- 
er thing  that  might  contribute,  as  far 
as  action  by  the  Soviet  Union  is  con- 
cerned, is  if  the  Soviet  Union  was  to 
cease  its  support  of  radical  countries  in 
the  Middle  East  region  such  as  Libya. 

Q.  Presumably  all  the  Middle 
East  leaders  wanted  to  know  what 
the  Bush  Administration's  position 
on  an  international  peace  conference 
is  going  to  be.  What  did  the  President 
say  on  that  particular  point? 

A.  The  President  made  the  points 
that  I've  just  made  to  you;  that  we  think 
it's  very  important  to  carefully  till  the 
ground  here  and  take  advantage  of  what- 
ever opportunity  is  out  there,  don't  lose 
or  preempt  a  promising  possibility  by 
acting  too  precipitously.  That's  number 
one. 

Number  two,  the  United  States  is 
on  record  as  being  willing  to  participate 
in  an  international  conference  which  is 
properly  structured — the  key  words  are 
"properly  structured."  An  international 
conference,  to  be  helpful,  must  lead  to 
direct  negotiations  between  the  parties. 
I  think  most  everyone  agrees  that  you 
will  not  get  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
until  you  get  to  those  direct 
negotiations. 

Q.  Before  we  left  Washington, 
Gen.  Scowcroft  [Brent  Scrowcroft, 
Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs]  was  making  a 
point  that  the  President  would  be 
coming  here  with  new  ideas,  new  pro- 
posals for  the  bilateral  talks.  Can  you 
elaborate  on  those  now? 

A.  I'm  sorry — new  ideas  and  new 
proposals  during  the  course  of  these 
bilaterals? 


Q.  Yes. 

A.  The  President  outlined,  duri 
the  course  of  these  bilaterals,  his  vie 
with  respect  to  the  U.S.-  U.S.S.R.  r 
tionship,  with  respect  to  the  overall 
East-West  relationship — and  there 
quite  a  bit  of  discussion  on  that,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  during  the  course  of  1 
hour  and  a  half  with  President  Mitte 
rand.  There  were  in-depth  discussio 
the  approach  that  the  Administratiii 
will  be  taking  with  respect  to  the  pr  ■ 
lems  of  Central  America.  Again  that  1 
came  up  at  the  Mitterrand  bilateral,  i^ 
Marlin  has  already  briefed  you  on  tl 
There  was,  as  I've  just  indicated  to    , 
a  full  exposition  of  our  views  with  ri 
spect  to  how  we  think  we  should  ap- 
proach the  question  of  Middle  East 
peace. 

Q.  After  Emperor  Hirohito  d  ^ 
in  Britain.  Canada,  and  Australi 
veterans  groups  and  others  said  t  i 
were  firmly  opposed  to  any  high-l  f 
delegations  coming  to  the  funera 
That  didn't  happen  in  the  United 
States.  The  VFW  [Veterans  of  Fo 
eign  Wars]  and  the  American  Le^;  n 
raised  no  objections  to  George  Bi  ii 
coming  here.  Were  you  surprised 
that,  and  what  does  it  indicate — , 
maturity  of  the  United  States  or 
what? 

A.  Maybe  it  indicated  maturitj 
Maybe  it  indicated  that  the  wounds 
healed  as  far  as  the  United  States  i; 
cerned.  As  the  President  said  when 
announced  this  trip,  he  pointed  out 
very  important  relationship  that  ex 
today  between  the  United  States  ar 
Japan — the  security  relationship  as 
as  the  economic  relationshijj — and  n 
the  difference  in  approach  and  diffe 
in  view  is  what  you  suggest  it  is.  I  d 
know. 

Q.  Aside  from  the  meeting  w 
President  Herzog,  has  the  Presid 
discussed  these  new  approaches  v 
other  Israeli  leaders,  and  can  yoi 
us  what  they've  said? 

A.  No,  we  have  not  had  those  d 
cussions  as  yet.  I've  simply  laid  out 
you  what  our  view  is  in  terms  of  the 
the  thing  ought  to  be  approached. 


nonartmont  nf  Qtato  Riillotin/MaU 


Bilaterals 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


e  in  Japan,  President  Bush  held  bilat- 
meetings  with  a  number  of  world 
rs,  among  whom  were — 


le  Minister  Benazir  Bhutto 
kistan... 


dent  Jose  Sarney  Costa  of  Brazil. 


(White  House  photo  by  Michael  Sargent) 


(White  House  photo  ijy  Uavid  Valdez) 


Q.  The  PLO  again  today  with  a 
new — made  a  new  appeal  for  direct 
negotiations — offered  the  negotia- 
tions with  the  Israelis.  Are  those  the 
kinds  of  direct  negotiations  you'd  like 
to  see? 

A.  I  can't  speak  for  and  will  not 
presume  to  speak  for  the  Israelis,  partic- 
ularly since  the  President  has  not  as  yet 
met  with  Prime  Minister  Shamir;  he 
will  be  meeting  with  him.  I  have  not  as 
yet  met  with  Foreign  Minister  Arens;  I 
will  be  meeting  with  him.  So  I  can't  an- 
swer that  question. 

Q.  Will  these  be  the  first  times 
that  the  Israelis  will  be  hearing  the 
new  approaches,  do  you  think,  with — 

A.  I  have  spoken  of  this  approach 
in  my  trip  around  NATO  capitals  last 
week.  I'm  sure  woi-d  has  filtered  back  to 
Israel,  and  we've  had  a  very  private  and 
low-level  discussion  of  this.  But  there  has 
been  no  discussion  at  anything  like  the 
ministerial  level. 

Q.  Since  your  trip  last  week, 
have  you  spoken  to  the  President 
about  how  to  respond  to  Gorbachev 
and  this  feeling  in  Europe  about  a 
need  to  respond  to  Gorbachev?  And  in 
the  Mitterrand  meeting,  did  Presi- 
dent Bush  tell  Mitterrand  how  the 
West  might  respond  to,  particularly, 
Gorbachev's  initiatives  at  the  United 
Nations? 

A.  There  was  a  general  review  of 
the  whole  issue  the  way  I  reviewed  it,  if 
I  may  say  so,  with  foi-eign  ministers  on 
my  trip — the  salient  points  being  that 
the  NATO  alliance  is  very,  very  strong, 
substantively  we're  in  very  good  shape. 
We're  winning  the  battle  on  a  substan- 
tive basis,  politically  and  economically. 
There  is  this  public  perception  and 
public  diplomacy  aspect  of  it  that  we 
probably  are  not  winning  on.  We  need  to 
deal  with  that  but  not  just  from  a  public 
relations  standpoint;  we  need  to  deal 
with  it  in  concrete,  substantive  ways.  We 
did  not  discuss  today  the  specifics  of 
those.  I  have  suggested  before  that  such 
things  as  emphasizing  at  our  summit 
meetings — various  summit  meetings, 
NATO  summit  meetings  and  that  sort  of 


thing — the  political,  social,  and  economic 
content  of  the  relationship  as  opposed  to 
just  the  .security  relationship  might  be 
one  w'ay  to  go. 

Q.  You  said  a  little  while  ago 
that  the  United  States  believes  there 
must  be  direct  talks  between  Israel 
and  the  Palestinians.  The  President 
the  other  day  said  our  policy  was  to 
encourage  direct  talks  between  the 
Israelis  and  the  Jordanians.  Did 
somebody  misspeak?  And  might  you 
clarify  what  Palestinians  you  are 
talking  about? 

A.  I  think  the  Jordanians  would  be 
an  appropriate  party  in  these  discus- 
sions, and  I  think  you  might  well  e.xpect 
to  see  them  involved  in  such  discussions 
at  an  appropriate  time,  particularly  if 
those  discussions  took  place  in  the  con- 
text of  an  international  conference. 

Q.  Which  Palestinians  are  you 
talking  about  when  you  say  there 
should  be  talks  between  Israel  and 
the  Palestininans? 

A.  The  Palestinian  people. 

Q.  Did  King  Hussein  indicate  his 
willingness  to  be  party  to  those  dis- 
cussions under  the  right  conditions? 

A.  I  think  the  position  of  King  Hus- 
sein is  well-known  in  terms  of  being  in- 
terested in  doing  whatever  he  can  to 
forward  the  peace  process  in  the  Middle 
East  and  to  arrive  at  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  The  key  would  be  under  the  right 
circumstances  and  under  the  right 
conditions. 

Q.  You're  saying  that  you  think 
he'd  be  an  appropriate  party.  Did  he 
indicate  that  to  the  President  today? 

A.  The  President  didn't  get  into 
those  kinds  of  specifics,  quite  frankly. 
That  question  never  came  up.  I  think  his 
position  of  being  willing  to  assist  the 
peace  process  in  any  way  he  can  is 
rather  well-known. 

Q.  How  about  the  hostages?  Have 
you  heard  anything — any  new  threats 
against  them  by  Khomeini? 

Q.  Will  there  be  a  meeting  with 
Aquino? 

A.  I  don't  believe  so. 


Q.  Why  not? 

A.  Scheduling  problems. 

Q.  You're  snubbing  her. 

A.  No,  scheduling. 


President  Bush's 

News  Conference  (Excerpts), 
Feb.  25,  19892 

I  have  had  an  e.xtremely  useful  set  o 
meetings  with  leaders  familiar  with 
the  problems  and  prospects  of  the  m 
jor  geographic  areas  of  the  world.  A 
as  all  of  you  are  aware,  Internationa 
affairs  have  entered  an  e.xtraordina 
interesting  period;  a  period  of  fluidi 
in  which  several  regional  problems- 
Afghanistan,  Cambodia,  Angola,  th( 
Middle  East,  to  name  just  a  few' — ha 
renewed  prospect  for  resolution.  Ma 
of  the  parameters  of  these  complex 
regional  problems  are  in  flux.  And, 
therefore,  it  is  important  to  convers 
with  the  men  and  women  who  are  th 
most  influential  leaders  on  the  scen( 

I  enjoyed  meeting  with  the  Eui 
pean  leaders.  During  my  lunch  wit! 
President  Mitterrand  and  in  discus- 
sions with  President  Cossiga  of  Ital. 
with  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  with 
President  Soares  of  Portugal,  King 
Juan  Carlos  of  Spain,  the  President 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Prime  Minister  Ozal  of  Turkey,  1  en 
phasized  that  our  relationship  with 
rope  and  the  North  Atlantic  allianci 
remains  central  to  our  foreign  polic; 
and  our  security  interests.  They  all 
sured  me  that  their  countries  share 
this  strong  commitment  to  the  allia 
and  considered  it  the  key  to  their  pa 
and  their  future  security. 

The  meetings  with  the  Presidei 
of  Egypt  and  Israel  and  with  the  Ki 
of  Jordan  form  part  of  a  larger  effor 
bring  peace  to  the  Middle  East.  I  m 
clear  the  continuing  readiness  of  th 
United  States  to  facilitate  this  effoi 
a  manner  that's  consistent  with  the  : 
curity  of  Israel  and  the  security  of  ( 
Arab  friends  in  the  region  as  well.  "■ 
discussed  what  new  opportunities  m 


Bilaterals 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


llent  Ibrahim  Babangida 
eria... 


Hussein  I  of  Jordan 


1  ,  jj|p»'-**  m' . ^^mm-w-^ - -^---—   -.w-ww*' ■ 

1      \>^    'P^' 

1        .        .           ^ 

(White  House  photo  by  David  Valdez) 


exist  for  our  diplomacy,  the  importance 
of  moving  forward  to  take  advantage  of 
the  positive  elements  in  the  current 
situation. 

The  meeting  with  Prime  Minister 
Bhutto  of  Pakistan,  an  important  new 
leader,  addressed  a  number  of  impor- 
tant issues,  including  our  common 
interest  in  promoting  Afghan  self- 
determination  in  the  aftermath  now  of 
the  Soviet  troop  withdrawal.  The  emer- 
gence of  democracy  in  Pakistan  is 
something  that  we  Americans  all  sa- 
lute. Consistent  with  this  development, 
we  also  discussed  what  might  be  done 
to  promote  greater  prosperity  and  se- 
curity in  South  Asia  and  particularly 
between  Pakistan  and  India. 

With  the  President  of  India,  we 
talked  about  the  good  nature  of  our  re- 
lationship and  the  opportunities  for  im- 
proving the  climate  of  peace  in  the 
region.  He  expressed  to  me  his  interest 
in  the  talks  that  their  Prime  Minister 
has  had  with  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Pakistan. 

In  my  discussion  with  Prime  Min- 
ister Chatchai  of  Thailand,  with  Lee 
Kwan  Yew  of  Singapore,  and  President 
Corazon  Aquino  of  the  Philippines,  we 
had  a  chance  to  talk  about  the  latest  de- 
velopments in  the  area,  with  particular 
emphasis  on  Cambodia.  What  remains 
clear  from  these  discussions  is  the  ab- 
solute requirement  that  we  maintain 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  unity  and  support  for  a 
political  settlement  in  Cambodia  fea- 
turing an  interim  government  led  by 
Prince  Sihanouk,  with  whom  I'll  be 
meeting,  I  believe,  in  China — I  believe 
that's  set.  The  goals,  as  ever,  are  two- 
fold: full  and  permanent  Vietnainese 
withdrawal  from  Cambodia  and  the 
permanent  prevention  of  a  return  to 
power  by  the  Khmer  Rouge. 

I  also  met  with  President  Mobutu 
of  Zaire.  We  discussed  important  eco- 
nomic issues  and  the  new  prospects  for 
peace  and  self-determination  in  Angola 
and  Namibia.  I'll  shortly  be  discussing 
the  problems  and  opportunities  of  devel- 
opment with  the  President  of  Brazil — 
President  Sarney — and  the  President  of 
Nigeria — I'll  be  meeting  with  him  in 
just  a  few  minutes. 


Throughout  all  of  our  discussions 
on  a  variety  of  issues,  I  found  a  shared 
sense  of  satisfaction  that  East-West 
relations — they  all  were  interested  in 
this — are  now  clearly  proceeding  on 
the  basis  of  an  agenda  favorable  to 
the  United  States,  its  allies,  and  its 
friends.  As  a  result  of  my  discussions,  I 
feel  more  confident  than  ever  that  we 
and  our  allies  will  move  together  to 
promote  global  peace,  prosperity,  and 
security.  All  these  sessions,  though 
highly  concentrated,  have  been  very 
useful  to  me  overall  and  have  provided 
me  with  an  opportunity  to  exchange 
views  with  many  of  the  most  important 
world  leaders. 

And  then,  I  should  add,  Barbara 
and  I  and  Secretary  Baker  had  an  op- 
portunity to  pay  our  respects  just  now 
to  the  new  Emperor  and  to  express  to 
him  our  pleasure  at  being  here.  It  was 
right  and  proper  that  the  United  States 
be  represented  in  this  way  and  to  give, 
in  a  personal  sense,  our  condolences  to 
him,  to  the  Empress,  and  to  his  family. 


Q.  The  United  States  has  been 
very  firm  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  re- 
cent years  on  human  rights  issues.  Do 
you  intend  to  be  equally  firm  with  the 
Chinese?  And  are  you  taking  a  list  to 
them  of  dissidents?  And  whose  cases 
are  you  interested  in? 

A.  I  think  our  position  is  so  well- 
known  to  the  Chinese — indeed,  they 
have  had  an  opening,  a  glasnost,  if  you 
will,  that  I  wouldn't  have  thought  possi- 
ble, and — if  you  set  the  clock  back  to 
when  I  was  Ambassador  there — 
whether  there's  any  specific  list,  I'm 
not  familiar  with  that  right  now.  I'll  be 
briefed  on  the  approaches  we'll  take  as 
we  fly  to  China.  But  I  think  both  the 
Soviet  Union  and  China  know  of  our 
commitment  to  human  rights.  And  it  is 
beholden  on  any  American  President  to 
reiterate  our  commitment  to  human 
rights. 


Q.  I'm  just  curious  whether  you, 
as  a  World  War  II  veteran  who  was 
shot  down  not  all  that  far  from  here, 
felt  any  sense  of  unease  yesterday  ap- 


pearing before  the  coffin  and  bowi 
before  the  Emperor  and  the  new 
Emperor? 

A.  No,  I  didn't.  And  I  can't  say 
that  in  the  quiet  of  the  ceremony  th: 
my  mind  didn't  go  back  to  the  wondi 
of  it  all,  because  I  vividly  remembei 
my  wartime  experience.  And  I  vivic 
remember  the  personal  friends  who 
were  in  our  squadron  who  are  no  lor 
alive  as  a  result  of  combat,  a  result 
action.  But  my  mind  didn't  dwell  on 
that  at  all.  What  I  really  thought,  il 
there  was  any  connection  to  that,  w 
isn't  it  miraculous  what's  happened 
since  the  war.  I  remember  the  stori 
in  reading  as  preparation  for  this  v 
the  visit  of  MacArthur  and  the  forn 
Emperor  here.  That  was  historic,  a 
that  set  a  whole  new  direction.  And 
MacArthur's  decision  at  that  time 
proved  to  be  correct  in  terms  of  Jap 
move  toward  democracy.  I  honestly 
tell  you  that  I  did  not  dwell  on  that 
didn't  feel  any  sense  other  than  my 
mind  thinking  of  personal  relations 
and  things  of  that  nature,  but  noth: 
to  do  about  whether  it  was  right  to 
here.  I  was  certain  from  the  day  th 
committed  to  come  here  that  this  w 
correct  for  the  United  States.  And 
haps  having  been  in  combat  in  Worl 
War  II,  maybe  the  decision  was  moi 
correct:  maybe  it  was  more  profoun 
be  here.  It  leaves  out  my  experience 

I'm  representing  the  United  St; 
of  America.  We're  talking  about  a  fri 
and  we're  talking  about  an  ally.  We 
talking  about  a  nation  with  which  w 
have  constructive  relationships.  Su 
we've  got  some  problems,  but  that ' 
all  overriding — and  respect  for  the 
peror.  And  remember  back  in  World 
War  II,  if  you'd  have  predicted  that 
would  be  here  because  of  the  hard  f 
ing  and  the  symbolic  nature  of  the 
problem  back  then  of  the  former  Er 
peror's  standing,  I  would  have  said, 
"No  way."  But  here  we  are,  and  tirr 
moves  on:  and  there  is  a  very  good  1 
son  for  civilized  countries  in  all  oft 

Q.  You  referred  in  your  openi 
statement  to  your  talks  with  Midi 
East  leaders  and  new  opportunity 
a  positive  element  in  the  region.  C 


.^..A  ^*  o«««» 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


(elaborate  on  that  and  perhaps  tell 
vhen  you  conclude  your  review 
^•n  you're  going  to  take  some — 

iA.  I  think  the  whole  accej^tance  by 
0  leader  YasirJ  Arafat  of  the  condi- 
s  for  talks  is  positive,  and  I  think 
is  seen  as  a  very  positive  signal  in 
Arab  world.  I  think  that  there's  a 
gnition  on  the  part  of  Israel  that 
1  the  intifada  and  the  difficulties  on 
West  Bank  that  something  needs  to 
one.  There's  a  readiness  on  the 
of  other  Arab  states  to  get  serious 
it  negotiation  and  discussion, 
pt's  new  standing  in  the  area  is  a 
•  important  ingredient  that  could 
to  where  they  could  be  more  of  a 
lyst  for  peace.  All  of  these  are  in- 
lients  that  I  think  offer  oppor- 
:y.  Everybody  understands  that 
re  we  just  go  rushing  out  to  do 
!thing  for  the  sake  of  doing  some- 
y  that  we  take  a  step  that  is 
ent. 

I've  been  in  this  job  for  1  month, 
this  problem  has  been  there  for 
after  year  after  year.  But  when  I 
about  the  underlying  potential  for 
e,  I  think  that's  widely  accepted 
There're  still  some  very  tough  ele- 
s.  You've  got  some  radical  ele- 
,s  in,  what  I  would  say,  the  far  left 
e  PLO.  You  have  a  couple  of  coun- 
that  have  not  been  overly  con- 
tive  toward  the  peace  movement, 
hat's  overridden,  it  seems  to  me, 
lese  elements  that  I've  just 
ibed. 


3-  You  said  you  wouldn't  believe 
ipening  that  has  occurred  in 
(3  when  you  were  the  U.S.  envoy 
.  How  does  it  feel  to  be  back  as 
ident  of  the  United  States".' 
K.  I  don't  know,  but  I'm  looking  for- 
to  it.  This  will  be  my  fifth  visit  back 
leaving  China  and  Barbara's  si.xth. 
I  am  told  that  the  Chinese  leaders 
loking  forward  to  this  return  visit. 
-Kcited  about  it,  and  I  think  that  the 
ionshi])  with  China  is  strong.  We  ob- 
;ly  have  differences 
them,  and  they'll  have  something  to 
bout  that,  I'm  sure.  I  know  I  will 
■el  at  the  changes.  I  did  on  the  last 
and  i)eo]jle  have  told  me  that  just 


^*  »<  o*-%*^ 


in  the  last  2  years,  there's  been  even 
more  change.  There  is  an  openness  in 
China  today  that  I  never  would  have  pre- 
dicted 15  years  ago,  and  I  can't  wait  to 
have  the  discussions  with  these  top  lead- 
ers because  this  relationship  is  very  im- 
portant. And  we  spend  a  lot  of  time  when 
we're  back  home  properly  worrying  about 
and  being  concerned  about  NATO  and 
East-West  relations,  in  the  sense  of  U.S. 
versus  Soviet,  but  we  must  never  neglect 
our  friends  in  the  Pacific. 

This  visit  will  be  a  way  to  talk  about 
common  objectives  and  work  on  the  dif- 
ferences that  we  may  have  on  trade  or 
whatever  else  it  is.  But  we've  passed  the 
day  on  the  U.S. -China  relationship 
where  anyone  talks  about  "playing  a 
card."  That  was  a  term  that  was  highly 
offensive  to  the  Chinese,  and  properly 
so.  Our  relationship,  the  China-U.S.  re- 
lationship, stands  on  its  own  in  terms  of 
cultural  e.xchange  and  trade  and  on  com- 
mon strategic  interests  and  on  the  way 
we  view  most  of  the  world — not  all  of  it, 
because  we  have  some  big  differences 
with  them  on  some  areas.  But  what  I 
want  to  do  is  to  strengthen  that  and  to 
build  on  those  common  perceptions  and 
to  make  them  understand  that  we  will 
never  take  for  granted  this  relationship 
and  that  we  will  never  do  anything  in 
dealing  with  the  Soviets  that  would 
inure  to  the  detriment  of  our  Asian 
friends,  be  they  Chinese,  be  they 
ASEAN,  be  they  Japanese.  That's  an  im- 
portant point  to  make  because  we're 
going  to  have  some  very  interesting 
work  to  be  done  with  the  Soviet  Union.  I 
think  the  Chinese  understand  that,  but  I 
will  make  the  point  that  we're  not  going 
to  move  forward  in  a  way  that  would 
denigrate  theii'  interests  or  diminish  the 
bilateral  relationship  between  China  and 
the  United  States,  that  it  stands  on  its 
own.  So  we've  passed  the  days  of  "play- 
ing a  card"  and  where  only  discussion 
with  China  had  to  do  with  the  strategic 
equation — Moscow,  the  United  States, 
Beijing.  It's  past  that  now.  We  want  to 
find  ways  to  build. 

We  talk  to  Deng  Xiaoping  [Chair- 
man, Central  Military  Commission] 
about  this  and  Zhao  Ziyang  [General 
Secretary,  Chinese  Communist  Party] 


and  Li  Peng  [Premier  of  the  State  Coun- 
cil], President  Yang  [Yang  Shangkun, 
President  of  China],  and  then  I  can  talk 
to  you  later  on  about  what  we  might  have 
accomplished  or  what  big  problems  re- 
main out  there.  The  relationship  is 
strong,  and  I'd  like  to  strengthen  it. 

Q.  Are  you  pleased  to  see  them 
drawing  closer  to  the  Soviets 
themselves'/ 

A.  I  have  no  problem  with  this.  I 
said  this  to  Mi\  Gorbachev  before  I  be- 
came President.  And  this  visit  next 
spring  is  a  good  thing,  and  it's  nothing 
detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  in  that  regard.  Even  if  there 
was — we  should  try  to  go  about  it,  in  my 
view.  But  there  isn't.  So  if  the  question 
gets  into  this  equation:  Do  you  worry 
that  the  Soviets  and  the  Chinese  will  get 
back  to  the  Khrushchev  era,  almost  una- 
nimity on  everything'?  No,  I  don't. 
There's  a  fierce  independence  in  China 
today,  and  they've  moved  out  early  on  in 
terms  of  market  incentive  and  in  terms 
of — oh,  lots  of  things:  privatization,  no 
more  communes  in  their  agriculture,  for 
example.  These  are  dramatic  changes, 
and  they  haven't  fully  felt  the  effect  of 
these  changes.  Now  they  have  some  eco- 
nomic problems  that  go  with  fast  eco- 
nomic change.  Inflation  is  concerning 
them,  and  how  you  handle  rapid  growth 
is  concerning  them,  but  they're  moving 
in  this  market-oriented  way  that  we 
think  is  a  very  good  thing. 

So  I'm  not  concerned  about  their 
going  back  to  a  relationship  that  was  al- 
most two  against  one  automatically.  It's 
not  that  kind  of  a  thing  anymore.  I  don't 
think  that's  a  concern  we  have. 


Responses  to  Questions 

Submitted  by  the 

Kyodo  News  Service 

of  Japan, 
Feb.  16,  19893 

Q.  What  kind  of  role  will  the  Bush 
Administration  expect  Japan  to  play 
in  the  global  economic  and  Western 
national  security  spheres? 


A.  First  of  all,  a  word  about  the 
global  role  of  the  United  States  during 
my  Administration. 

Japan  and  the  world  can  count  on 
America  to  continue  to  work  for  peace, 
democracy,  freedom,  and  justice  around 
the  world.  The  sco]5e  of  America's  vision 
is  global,  and  we  will  continue  to  shoul- 
der the  obligations  that  belong  to  a 
global  power. 

At  the  same  time,  of  course,  it  is  im- 
portant that  our  allies  assume  greater 
responsibility  in  the  cause  of  global 
peace  and  prosperity.  It  is  not  for  me  to 
prescribe  Japan's  role  in  the  world.  The 
decision  is  up  to  the  Government  and 


people  of  Japan.  During  Prime  Minister 
Takeshita's  recent  visit  to  Washington, 
he  and  I  agreed  that  there  are  many 
ways  Japan  can  contribute  to  global 
peace  and  prosperity.  Our  defense  coop- 
eration is  one  of  those  ways.  Another  is 
foreign  economic  assistance.  I  welcome 
Japan's  pledge  to  make  further  signifi- 
cant increases  in  overseas  development 
assistance  programs. 

Along  these  lines.  Prime  Minister 
Takeshita  and  I  agreed  on  the  impor- 
tance of  supporting  democracy  and  sus- 
tained economic  growth  and  reform  in 
the  Philippines.  Toward  this  end,  we 
pledged  to  make  every  effort  to  launch 
the  multilateral  assistance  initiative  for 


President  Bush  and  Prime  Minister  I 
boru  Takeshita  met  in  the  .4kasaka  I 
ace.  To  the  President's  left  are  Secre 
Baker  and  Chief  of  Staff  Sununu.  To 
Prime  Minister's  rijfht  are  Chief  Cab' 
Secretary  Keigo  Obuchi  and  Ambassi 
to  the  U.S.  Nobuo  Matsunaga. 


.ii—x:..  /Kjl  — . 


ily. 


Mi 
k 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


Philippines  this  year.  I  also  welcome 
Ill's  decision  to  take  part  in  peace- 
oing  operations  and  your  generous  of- 
of  financial  support  for  the  relief 
resettlement  in  Afghanistan  and 
hern  Africa.  Those  are  also  ways  to 
ribute. 

The  United  States  and  Japan — the 
Id's  two  largest  economies — have 
ial  responsibilities  to  sustain  free 
e.  Prime  Minister  Takeshita  reaf- 
led  in  Washington  Japan's  deter- 
\diim  to  promote  strong  domestic 
vth  and  structural  adjustments.  In 
u-ea  of  multilateral  cooperation  and 
al  economic  growth,  we  agreed 
we  would  continue  to  coordinate 
■ies  through  established  fora,  espe- 
y  the  economic  summit.  We  look 
ard  to  the  ne.xt  summit  meeting, 
h  will  be  held  in  Paris.  We  also 
■ed  on  the  importance  of  a  success- 
Ji'uguay  Round  [multilateral  trade 
tiations].  And  we  agreed  on  the 
)rtance  of  frecjuent  consultations  at 
'vels  on  economic  issues. 

Q.  How  do  you  envision  U.S.- 
n  relations  under  your  Adminis- 
ion'.'  Some  of  your  advisers  have 
mmended  forming  a  "new  part- 
hip"  with  Japan.  What  are  your 
ngs  about  this  recommendation? 
.A.  We  have  used  the  word  "partner- 
'  to  describe  our  relationship  for  a 
oer  of  years  now,  and  during  the 
se  of  the  Reagan  Administration,  we 
new  meaning  to  that  term.  Our 
lershij)  is  bilateral,  regional,  and 
il.  We  consult  frequently  and  coop- 
'  closely  on  virtually  every  issue  of 
rtance.  This  is  not  a  "new  partner- 
'  but  a  continuing  one  that  has  de- 
)ed  over  40  years  of  cooperation.  I 
onfident  it  will  continue  to  develop 
icquire  new  meaning,  but  rather 
a  "new  partnership,"  it  will  be  a 
nually  "renewed  partnership." 

Q.  Defense  Secretary-designate 
ir  said  Japan  should  extend  its 
ine  defense  beyond  the  present 
)-mile  limit.  Do  you  support  this 
?  Would  you  ask  Japan  to  beef  up 
efense'/  If  so,  how  much  of  its 
'  should  Japan  allocate  for  de- 
e  spending? 


A.  We  are  fully  satisfied  with  the 
mutually  agreed  division  of  defense  roles 
and  missions  in  our  security  arrange- 
ments, under  which  Japan  has  primary 
responsibility  for  defending  its  territory, 
seas  and  skies,  and  sea  lines  of  communi- 
cation. We  are  also  encouraged  by  Ja- 
pan's continued  and  steady  progress  in 
improving  its  defense  capability  within 
the  framework  of  those  roles  and  mis- 
sions, recognizing  there  is  still  room  for 
greater  improvement,  especially  in  the 
area  of  sustainability.  Further  we  appre- 
ciate Japan's  increasing  contribution  to 
the  cost  of  maintaining  U.S.  forces  in 
Japan.  Rather  than  engage  in  a  sterile 
exercise  of  measuring  security  in  arbi- 
trary terms  such  as  GNP,  the  United 
States  and  Japan  are  putting  our  efforts 
toward  a  much  more  productive  and  im- 
portant purpose;  that  of  working  to- 
gether to  attain  defense  capabilities 
which  will  ensure  our  mutual  security. 

Q.  Would  you  support  a  U.S.- 
Japan free  trade  agreement  modeled 
after  the  U.S. -Canada  free  trade 
agreement?  The  U.S.  deficit  with  Ja- 
pan has  been  on  the  rise  again  in  re- 
cent months.  Do  you  favor  the  yen's 
further  appreciation  against  the 
dollar? 

A.  The  U.S.  and  Japanese  Govern- 
ments agree  on  the  need  to  pursue  mul- 
tilateral and  bilateral  efforts  to  create  a 
more  open  international  trading  system. 
We  will  stress  the  multilateral  approach. 

We  are  always  open  to  new  ideas. 
But  in  our  view,  the  key  now  is  to  work 
hard  for  the  success  of  the  Uruguay 
Round.  At  the  recent  G-7  meeting  [com- 
prised of  the  finance  ministers  of  Canada, 
France,  West  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States], 
the  financial  authorities  of  the  major 
countries  agreed  the  global  economic  sit- 
uation and  outlook  remain  positive  and 
that  no  changes  in  their  commitment  to 
cooperation  on  exchange  rate  policies 
were  needed. 

During  our  recent  meeting.  Prime 
Minister  Takeshita  and  I  noted  progress 
that  both  the  United  States  and  Japan 
have  made  toward  reducing  external  im- 
balances, but  we  also  agreed  that  fur- 
ther policy  efforts  are  needed.  The 


Prime  Minister  assured  me  that  Japan 
remained  determined  to  encourage 
strong  domestic  growth  and  structural 
reform.  And  I  reaffirmed  our  strong 
determination  to  reduce  our  budget 
deficit. 

Q.  A  reduction  of  conventional 
arms  is  said  to  be  the  top  priority  of 
the  Bush  Administration  in  the  U.S.- 
Soviet arms  negotiations.  What  is 
your  response  to  President  Gor- 
bachev's announcement  to  cut  500,000 
Soviet  troops?  Do  you  foresee  a  U.S.- 
Soviet summit  by  next  summer? 

A.  It  is  true  that  a  major  priority  of 
my  Administration  is  in  the  area  of  con- 
ventional arms  control.  Thus  we  welcome 
and  look  forward  to  the  negotiation  on 
conventional  armed  forces  in  Europe 
(CFE).  We,  along  with  our  NATO  allies, 
will  seek  in  CFE  to  enhance  stability 
and  security  at  a  lower  level  of  forces.  To 
that  end,  NATO  will  seek  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  Warsaw  Pact's  substantial  su- 
periority in  Europe.  Accordingly  we 
welcome  the  announcement  of  Soviet 
force  reductions  as  a  positive  step  in  the 
right  direction  and  look  forward  to  the 
full  implementation  of  the  force  cuts  de- 
scribed by  Chairman  Gorbachev.  Even 
with  these  reductions,  however,  the  War- 
saw Pact  has  far  to  go  to  correct  the  con- 
ventional forces  imbalance  in  Europe. 

Regarding  a  summit,  both  sides,  of 
course,  want  to  be  well  prepared  before 
engaging  in  a  summit.  We  are  in  the 
process  of  reviewing  elements  of  our  pol- 
icy toward  the  Soviet  Union  and  consult- 
ing closely  with  our  allies  and  friends  to 
ensure  that  we  have  a  sound  foundation 
for  long-term  progress  in  East -West  re- 
lations. Secretary  of  State  Baker  and 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  will  have 
several  opportunities  in  the  months 
ahead  to  begin  addressing  the  many  is- 
sues between  our  countries.  Thus,  while 
I  am  confident  a  summit  will  take  place 
sometime  in  the  future,  it  is  too  early  to 
discuss  a  specific  date. 


artmpnt  r>f  .(^tatp  Riillotin/Mau  IQRQ 


I 


BEIJING 


Secretary  Baker's 

Interview  on 

"Face  the  Nation" 

(Excerpts), 
Feb.  26,  1989* 


Q.  Here  we  are  in  China.  I  know  that 
you've  already  had  several  meetings 
with  Deng  Xiaoping  and  Li  Peng. 
What's  been  curious  to  a  lot  of  us  in 
the  press  is  what  the  spokesman  told 
us,  which  is  that  human  rights  hasn't 
come  up.  Every  time  our  government 
goes  to  the  Soviet  Union,  we  always 
bring  it  up;  we  make  it  a  big  issue. 
Human  rights  violations  are  just  as 
bad  in  this  country,  if  not  worse.  Why 
don't  we  bring  it  up  here? 

A.  It  has  been  brought  up  here.  It 
has  been  brought  up  in  China,  specifi- 
cally so,  and  has  been  discussed.  It 
hasn't  been  done — 

Q.  Our  spokesman  said  that  it 
wasn't. 

A.  It  hasn't  been  done  with  big  pub- 
lic fanfare  and  a  lot  of  noise  because, 
frankly,  we  think  that  sometimes  you 
make  iDetter  progress  on  human  rights 
when  it's  done  quietly  and  low  key. 

Q.  When  was  it  done? 

A.  It  was  done  during  the  course  of 
my  meeting  with  the  Foreign  Minister 
last  night. 

Q.  Why  wouldn't  the  President 
bring  it  up  with  Deng  Xiaoping  or  Li 
Peng? 

A.  Because  the  decision  was  made 
to  bring  it  up  at  the  foreign  minister 
level. 

Q.  Does  that  not  diminish  the 
significance,  the  importance,  by  hav- 
ing it— 

A.  Not  at  all. 

Q.  Why  not?  Why  doesn't  the 
President  at  the  presidential  level, 
like  President  Reagan  used  to? 


A.  I  think  the  message  got  through 
loud  and  clear,  and  we  had  a  good  discus- 
sion on  the  issue. 

Q.  Is  there  a  double  standard 
here  on  human  rights? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  there's  a  double 
standard — 

Q.  I  mean  in  terms  of  the  Soviet 
Union. 

A.  Oh,  I  don't  think  so  at  all.  If  you 
go  back  and  look  at  what's  happened,  I 
think  you'd  see  that  China  began  open- 
ing up  its  economy  and  opening  up  its 
political  system  and  opening  up  with  re- 
spect to  human  rights  a  lot  earlier  than 
the  Soviet  Union  did. 

We've  made  dramatic  progress  in 
the  last  year  or  so  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  China  started  moving  a  lot 
earlier  than  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  You  could  argue  that  that's 
true  on  the  economic  side  but  not  nec- 
essarily on  the  human  rights  side. 

A.  I  believe  it's  true  in  terms  of  the 
wide  range  of  those  issues,  I  really  do. 

Q.  You  seem  to  be  plagued  by  this 
criticism  that  you  don't  have  a  for- 
eign policy;  that  this  Administration 
has  been  very  slow  off  the  mark 
here — in  the  Middle  East,  in  Central 
America,  in  Europe.  I  don't  mean  to 
try  to  get  a  defensive  answer  because 
I  know  you've  been  asked  this  a  lot 
but  merely  to  have  you  explain  to  the 
American  people — 

A.  You  know,  I  haven't  been  asked 
yet.  That  question  has  not  come  to  me 
yet;  it's  come  to  others. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you.  then. 

A.  I'll  give  you  the  same — 

Q.  Then  let  me  put  it  to  you:  Why 
so  slow? 

A.  I'll  give  you  the  same  answer 
that  the  President  gave  the  other  day. 

Q.  No,  give  your  own  answer. 

A.  It's  an  outrageous  suggestion. 
You  know,  you  don't  change  policy  just 
because  you  change  Administrations. 
That  would  be  a  terrible  mistake. 

A  lot  of  things  are  going  well;  the 
winds  of  freedom  I'eally  are  blowing 
around  the  world,  when  vou  look  at 


what's  happening  in  Afghanistan,  in 
southern  Africa,  and  a  whole  host  of 
places. 

We  have  some  new  dynamics,  as 
mentioned  the  other  night,  in  the  Mid  \ 
East — some  opportunities.  That  does 
mean  that  it  makes  sense  to  come  cha 
ing  out  in  the  first  4  weeks  of  this  Ad 
ministration  with  some  high-visibilit. 
plan  that  might  or  might  not  succeed. 
We'd  much  rather  till  the  ground  care 
fully,  do  a  lot  of  in-depth  preparation 
and  not  run  the  risk  of  preempting  th 
real  possibility  of  success  by  moving 
quickly. 

Q.  You  have  a  President  who  r 
have  more  foreign  policy  experienc 
than  any  president  in  1.5  years. 

A.  Absolutely. 

Q.  He  was  Vice  President  for  I 
years,  and  he's  got  something  like 
dozen  foreign  policy  reviews  going 
And  every  time  there's  an  opportu 
that  comes  along — for  instance,  ii 
the  Middle  East — he's  studying.  h» 
not  seizing,  he's  not  responding  to 
Soviets. 

A.  No,  I  disagree  with  that.  Th 
simply  not  true. 

Q.  Why  so  much  study?  Why 
aren't  you  all  ready  to  just  seize  tl 
opportunities? 

A.  Because  it  makes  sense  to  re' 
policy  when  you  have  a  new  Adminisi 
tion  coming  in.  That  doesn't  mean  yo 
change  policy,  but  you  really  ought  ti 
view  it.  And  that's  what  we're  doing 
whole  host  of  areas. 

Q.  Why  don't  you  have  your  U 
in  place?  You  have  the  PLO  with  a  i 
initiative  ready,  saying  constantly 
they  want  to  talk  to  Israel;  you  ha 
the  Soviets  moving  in,  intruding  i 
what  was  our  turf,  brokering  rela 
tions  in  the  Middle  East.  .\nd,  as  I 
understand  it,  you  don't  even  have 
your  Middle  East  team  in  place  at 
State  Department. 

A.  It  would  probably  surprise  y 
to  know  that  we  hax'e  over  50 — proba 
about  .55 — presidential  appointments 
quiring  Senate  confirmation  who  hav 
been  agreen  upon;  only  15  of  those  hi 


rkn»n..«mAn*  A«  CtotA   QtillAtin/KAoif 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


n  announced  because  it  takes  an  inor- 
ate  amount  of  time  nowadays  to  get 
I  clearance.  There's  no  such  thing  as 
■hour  name  check;  it  takes  7  days. 

Q.  Why  is  that? 

A.  A  full  field  background  takes 
ut  5  weeks.  Why  is  that?  I  think  it's 
ause  the  standards  are  a  lot  tougher 
■,  and  the  scrutiny  is  much  greater. 

Q.   I  mean,  you're  picking  people 
J  are  in  government.  Some  of  the 
pie  I  know  that  you're  wanting  to 
ig  in  are  already  there. 

A.  Yes,  and  you're  going  to  ask  me 
the  FBI  says  they  have  to  have  a 
field  investigation  again?  I  can't  an- 
r  that.  Ask  the  FBI. 

Q.  Tell  me  why  you  don't  have 
leone  on  your  Middle  East  desk. 

A.  He's  been  named;  it  leaked  out 
to  3  weeks  ago.  You  know  who  it  is. 

Q.  Leaked  out  but  not  appointed. 

A.  Not  formally  announced.  Why? 

Q.  Yes. 

A.  Because  he's  waiting  on  his 

he's  a  career  Foreign  Service  offi- 
and  yet  he  has  to  go  through  a  full 
1  background  investigation  by  the 

Q.  Here's  one  of  the  accusations: 
're  all  afraid  of  [Senator]  Jesse 
ms. 

A.  And,  by  the  way,  we've  been  in 
•e  for  about  30  days,  you  know. 

Q.  [Israeli  Foreign  Minister] 
ihe  Arens,  who  just  met  with  Mr. 
vardnadze,  is  coming  to  the  Unit- 
>tates  in  less  than  a  month.  Will 
be  ready  with  initiatives  to  pre- 
t  to  him  when  he  comes?  Will  your 
Ti  be  in  place?  Will  you  be  ready 
that  meeting? 

A.  The  team  will  be  in  place,  and 
A'ill  be  very  ready  for  the  meeting 
we're  looking  forward  to  the  meet- 
As  I  said  the  other  night  in  the 
fing,  we  have  already  had  some  very 
level  discussions  with  the  Israelis, 
you  keep  talking  in  terms  of  initia- 
s  and  big  plans,  and  you  want  to  see 
ething  presented  under  the  kleig 


LortmAnt  r\t  C«4tA  Qi  illAf  in /K/I,sif   i  QQQ 


Mrs.  Bush  during  a  tour  of  the  Forbidden  City  in  Beijing. 


lights  and  in  front  of  the  cameras.  That's 
the  wrong  way  to  go.  If  you  really  want 
to  make  some  progress  in  the  Middle 
East,  that's  the  wrong  way  to  go. 

Q.  But  doesn't  it  bother  you  that 
Mr.  Gorbachev  looks  as  though  he's 
besting  you  all  over  the  world? 

A.  Not  a  bit.  Not  a  bit.  It  really 
doesn't,  because  we're  winning  on  subs- 
tance. The  NATO  alliance  is  winning  at 
every  turn  on  substance;  on  human 
rights,  on  arms  control,  on  regional.  Look 
at  what's  happening  in  Afghanistan,  look 
at  what's  happening  in  the  southern  part 
of  Africa,  look  at  what's  happening  on 
arms  control,  look  at  what's  happening  on 
human  rights.  So  we're  winning  on  subs- 
tance. He  may  be  winning  on  public  rela- 
tions and  perceptions.  So  it  doesn't  bother 
us,  not  one  bit. 


President  Bush's 

Interview  on 

Chinese  Television, 
Feb.  26,  19895 

Q.  I'm  sure  millions  of  Chinese  peo- 
ple are  watching  this  program  now.  I 
wonder  if  you  would  like  to  say  a  few 
words  to  them  first. 

A.  I  do  have  an  opening  statement, 
but  first  let  me  thank  you  for  this  unique 
opportunity.  It's  a  great  honor  for  me  to 
be  the  first  American  President  to  speak 
to  the  Chinese  people  in  a  live  broadcast. 
And  I  feel  as  if  I  were  talking  to  old 
friends  who,  while  out  of  sight,  have 
never,  never  been  out  of  heart  and  mind. 

Fourteen  years  ago,  Barbara  and  I 
came  to  your  beautiful  land  when  I  was, 
as  you  said,  Chief  of  the  U.S.  Liaison  Of- 


11 


fice.  And  for  us,  returning  to  Beijing  is 
a  homecoming.  Our  work  here  was  a 
source  of  great  personal  satisfaction,  a 
happy,  challenging  time  in  our  lives. 
Ami  we  actually  went  to  church  here:  in- 
deed, our  daughter  was  baptized  in  our 
faith  here.  We  rode  bicycles  down  the 
hutungs  [narrow  streets]  of  Beijing  and 
came  to  have  a  general  feeling  of  affec- 
tion for  the  Chinese  people.  We  knew 
then  that  the  relationship  that  we  would 
establish  between  our  two  nations  would 
be  a  special  one  indeed. 

And  we  were  right.  Today  the 
bridges  that  started  with  the  Shanghai 
communique  yeai's  ago — today  that  rela- 
tionship has  joined  our  peoples  together 
in  friendship  and  respect.  Our  two  coun- 
tries continue  to  weave  an  increasingly 
rich  fabric  of  relations  through  our  e.x- 
panding  trade  and  cultural  and  scientific 
exchanges.  American  students  study  at 
many  of  your  finest  universities,  and  we 
welcome  thousands  of  Chinese  students 
and  researchers  to  educational  institu- 
tions in  the  United  States.  The  under- 
standing and  friendship  that  these 
students  have  developed  will  only  help  to 
improve  and  deepen  relations  between 
our  two  countries  in  the  years  ahead. 

I've  spoken  to  the  American  people 
about  a  new  breeze  blowing  in  the  world 
today.  There's  a  worldwide  movement  to- 
ward greater  freedom:  freedom  of  hu- 
man creativity  and  freedom  of  economic 
opportunity.  We've  all  begun  to  feel  the 
winds  of  change  sweep  us  toward  an  ex- 
citing and  challenging  new  century. 
These  winds — new,  sometimes  gentle, 
sometimes  strong  and  powerful.  China 
was  one  of  the  first  nations  to  feel  this 
new  breeze,  and  like  a  tree  in  a  winter 
wind,  you've  learned  to  bend  and  adapt 
to  new  ways  and  new  ideas  and  reform. 

Many  challenges  lie  before  our  two 
nations.  'Together  we  must  find  political 
solutions  to  regional  conflicts.  We  must 
foster  global  growth.  And  together,  in 
order  to  make  life  better  for  future  gen- 
erations, we  must  seek  solutions  to 
woi'ldwide  concerns,  such  as  our  planet's 
environment,  the  threat  to  all  people 
from  international  terror,  the  use  and 
spread  of  chemical  and  biological  weap- 
ons, and  international  drug  trafficking.  I 


know  your  leaders  share  with  me  a  de- 
termination to  solve  these  and  other 
problems,  and  as  President  of  the  United 
States,  I  look  forward  to  continuing  to 
work  closely  with  them  as  I  have  done  in 
the  past. 

The  Americans  and  Chinese  share 
many  things,  but  perhaps  none  is  more 
important  than  our  strong  sense  of  fam- 
ily. Just  a  few  weeks  ago,  Barbara  and  I 
were  blessed  by  a  new  grandchild.  When 
I  think  of  her  and  I  think  of  the  beautiful 
children  of  China,  my  commitment  to 
peace  is  renewed  and  reaffirmed. 

I  am  confident  that  when  future 
generations  of  Chinese  and  Americans 
look  back  upon  this  time,  they'll  say  that 
the  winds  of  change  blew  favorably  upon 
our  lands.  Thank  you  for  your  friend- 
ship, your  hospitality,  and  the  many 
warm  memories  of  this  wonderful  coun- 
try that  Bai'bara  and  I  take  with  us  as 
we  return  tomorrow  to  the  United 
States. 

Q.  You've  been  in  office  for  just  a 
month,  and  many  people  are  probably 
surprised  that  you've  decided  to  come 
to  China  so  soon.  Why  now? 

A.  Now  because,  you  see,  I  view 
the  relationship  between  China  and  the 
United  States  as  highly  significant,  as 
one  of  the  very  most  important  relation- 
ships that  we  have.  And  so,  it  has  a  lot 
to  do  with  bilateralism,  with  our  trade 
and  our  cultural  exchanges,  and  what  I 
said  here  about  the  children.  But  it's 
more  than  that.  It  really  has,  because  of 
China's  importance  and  ours,  a  lot  to  do 
with  woi'ld  peace.  And  so,  before  much 
time  went  by,  I  wanted  to  reaffirm  the 
importance  that  the  United  States  places 
on  this  bilateral  relationship,  and  I 
wanted  to  pledge  to  the  Chinese 
leaders — and  I've  met  the  top  four  lead- 
ers in  the  last  day  and  a  half — that  this 
relationship  will  grow  and  it  will  pros- 
per. We  have  economic  problems,  and 
China  has  some.  But  together  we're 
going  to  solve  them,  and  we're  going 
to  move  forward. 

Q.  This  is  your  second  day  in 
China.  How  do  you  assess  your  time 
here?  What  specifically  have  you 
achieved  on  this  trip? 


A.  It's  been  a  period — just  in  thai 
short  period  of  time — to  visit  with  tln^ 
Chinese  leadership  and  Chairman  Dc 
Xiaoping  and  others — Zhao  Ziyang  ai- 
Li  Pend,  Chairman  Yang — all  of  these 
men  giving  a  lot  of  their  time  to  expla 
the  reforms  in  China,  the  new  directit 
that  China  is  taking  in  world  affairs. 
We  had  an  interesting  exchange  on  tht 
forthcoming  visit  of  General  Secretar 
Gorbachev  coming  here.  And  it  is  im- 
portant that  they  understand  what  I'n 
thinking  in  terms  of  the  Middle  East  ( 
the  subcontinent  or  our  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  on  arms  control,  anc 
it's  important  I  understand  theirs.  It 
hasn't  been  a  visit  that  has  three  poir 
on  an  agenda.  It's  a  visit  with  a  much 
broader  perspective  and  a  reaffirmat 
of  a  relationship  that's  strong. 

Q.  You  know  perhaps  as  well  a 
anyone  about  the  development  of 
relations  between  your  country  am 
China.  How  would  you  say  that  rel 
tionship  contributes  to  world  peaci 
and  development? 

A.  I  think  it  contributes  a  lot,  b( 
cause  in  the  first  place,  we  in  the  Un 
States  have  a  disproportionate  respoi 
sibility  for  discussions  on  strategic  wi 
ons,  for  example,  and  we  want  to  go 
forward  with  the  Soviet  Union,  in  thi 
instance,  on  negotiations.  But  we  don 
want  to  do  that  in  a  way  that  would  ji 
ardize  the  interests  of  any  other  couii 
And  so,  in  that  one  area,  we  can  have 
discussions  with  Chinese,  just  as  our 
Secretary  of  State,  Jim  Baker,  had  w 
the  European  leaders. 

Another  area  is  the  economy.  We 
have  some  economic  problems  at  hom 
and  I  wanted  to  assure  the  Chinese  li 
ers  that  I  am  going  to  do  my  level  bet 
get  our  deficit  down. 

The  Chinese  people  might  say, 
"What  in  the  world  does  that  have  to 
with  me  living  in  Beijing  or  down  in 
Shanghai  or  out  further  in  the  countr 
side?"  The  economies  of  the  world  are 
terlocked  in  a  way.  If  I  can  do  my  job 
properly,  that  might  mean  lower  inte 
rates.  And  what  does  that  mean  to  tl 
average  man  on  the  street  in  China? 
That  might  mean  that  eventually  his 
goods  come  to  him  at  a  lower  price.  U 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


e  back  to  the  fact  that  the  visit  is  a 
ice  to  explore  in  depth  the  compli- 
d  international  relationships  and  to 
d  on  this  bilateral  relationship. 

'  Q.  It's  said  there's  vast  potential 
iitrenjftheninjf  both  the  economic 
n  technological  cooperation  bet- 
i.ii  China  and  the  United  States. 
1    do  we  best  tap  that  potential, 

I  Ikiw  do  we  overcome  problems 

II  as  the  restrictions  on  the  trans- 
]>i  technology'? 

\.  In  the  first  place,  I  had  an  op- 
)  unity  just  a  minute  ago — I  was  al- 
L  late  for  your  program  because  I 
talking  to  Ziao  Ziyang,  a  very  im- 
sive  leader,  about  the  economy  and 
t  reforms.  We  congratulate  the  Chi- 
leaders  in  the  steps  they've  taken 
rd  economic  reform. 
In  terms  of  something  technical  like 
nological  e.xchange,  I  made  clear  to 
Chinese  leaders,  particularly  in  a 
ersation  with  Li  Peng,  that  we  are 
ared  to  go  the  extra  mile  in  terms  of 
^tment,  in  terms  of  business,  ex- 
5  and  imports.  When  I  was  here  in 
la  15  years  ago,  total  trade  was  $800 
on.  And  now,  depending  on  how  one 
ants  for  it,  we  would  say  we  would 
I  figure  of  $14  billion.  So  we're  going 
ave  forward.  We  will  advance  tech- 
ry  to  China  as  much  as  we  possibly 
inder  what  is  known  as  the  COCOM 
rdinating  Committee  for  Multi- 
al  Export  Controls]  arrangement, 
e  are  some  highly  sensitive,  highly 
isticated  military  technologies  that 
lot  even  sure  China  is  interested  in 
hat  we  are  ]:)rohibited  from  export- 
inder  the  law.  Having  said  that,  we 
exported  some  highly  sophisticated 
lology  to  China,  and  as  President,  I 
to  continue  to  do  that.  That  will 
fit  the  life  of  the  average  Chinese 
?n. 

We're  in  an  information  society  in 
V'  ways  in  the  United  States,  and 
•ly  that  is  going  to  come  to  China — 
)uter  knowledge  and  education  tech- 
es  that  are  coming  to  the  average 
ese  kid  from  computers.  We've  been 
ed  by  advanced  technology,  and  now 
ant  to  share  it  as  much  as  we  can. 


The  President  and  Chinese  leader  Deny  Xiaoping;  offered  toasts  during  their  luncheon  at 
the  Great  Hall  of  the  E'eople. 


Q.  You  know  there  are  reforms  in 
China  right  now,  and  the  Chinese 
Government  is  trying  to  attract  more 
foreign  investment.  Does  your  Admin- 
istration have  or  plan  to  have  any 
specific  measures  to  encourage 
American  businesses  to  invest  in 
China'.' 

A.  We  had  a  chance  to  talk  about 
that  here  today  with  the  Chinese  lead- 
ers, and  I  did  point  out  to  them  that 
there  are  certain  things  that  we'd  like  to 
see  China  move  forward  on  that  would  en- 
hance further  investment  here.  I'd  like 
to  see  an  investment  treaty  between  the 
two  countries  of  some  sort — an  agree- 
ment, not  a  treaty  but  a  bilateral  agree- 
ment on  trade.  We — like  we  do  not  just 
with  China  but  many  other  coun- 
tries— talk  about  copyright  and  patent 
protection,  and  yet  I  find  on  this  visit 
that  China  is  moving  forward  with  a  new 
patent  code  and  now  is  drafting  copyright 
legislation,  which  would  be  very  helpful. 


There  are  some  artificial  barriers. 
The  good  thing  about  a  visit  like  this  is 
we  can  sit  and  talk  to  the  leaders  in  a 
dispassionate  way.  Where  they  disagree 
w'ith  me,  they  will  tell  me,  and  where  I 
disagree  with  them,  I'm  obliged  to  tell 
them.  That's  what  a  good  frank  relation- 
ship can  do. 

But  I  told  them  that  I  must  work  to 
get  the  budget  deficit  in  the  United 
States  down,  because  that  does  have  an 
adverse  impact  on  international  interest 
rates.  There  are  things  that  we  can  do, 
and  there  were  things  that  I've  asked 
China  to  do  in  terms  of  facilitating  busi- 
ness. Sometimes  I  think  your  country  is 
as  bad  as  mine  is  on  red  tape.  And  to  get 
the  best  flow  of  investment,  China  needs 
to  do  better  on  red  tape,  and  so  do  we. 
It's  a  two-way  street. 


irtmont  <->{  ^tato  Riillotin/IUlaw  1QftQ 


White  House  Statement, 
Feb.  27,  19895 

The  President  and  Mrs.  Bush  were 
delighted  by  the  warm  reception  in 
China.  The  entire  range  of  Chinese 
leadership  met  with  the  President, 
showing  theii'  respect  for  him  person- 
ally and  for  the  United  States.  The 
luncheon  hosted  by  Chairman  Deng 
Xiaoping  and  the  President's  live  ap- 
pearance on  Chinese  national  television 
were  both  quite  unusual  and  under- 
scored the  Chinese  appreciation  for  the 
trip. 

The  President  feels  the  visit  was 
successful  in  several  ways.  Both  coun- 
tries underscored  their  desire  to  move 
forward  on  bilateral  issues,  noting  our 
bilateral  trade  level  up  from  $10-14  bil- 
lion, more  Chinese  students  in  the 
United  States,  a  developing  military 
relationship,  and  a  large  and  growing 
science  and  technology  relationship. 
The  President  expects  both  countries 
to  move  forward  in  all  of  these  areas. 


There  are  problems  on  both  sides, 
of  course.  They  are  concerned  about 
Taiwan  and  what  they  consider  to  be 
excessive  U.S.  export  controls.  In  addi- 
tion, we  hope  for  more  progress  in  hu- 
man rights. 

The  President  felt  the  talks  on  in- 
ternational issues  went  very  well,  espe- 
cially the  discussions  on  Cambodia. 
Both  China  and  the  United  States 
agreed  the  liberalization  of  China's  in- 
vestment regulations  is  desirable,  and 
the  Chinese  are  pursuing  this  ap- 
proach. The  Chinese  said  they  had  com- 
pleted a  patent  law  and  are  working  on 
a  new  copyright  law,  both  of  which  are 
necessary  to  protect  intellectual  prop- 
erty rights. 

The  President  and  Mrs.  Bush  also 
shared  a  personal  excitement  about  the 
private  aspects  of  the  trip.  They  were 
especially  moved  by  the  Sunday  morn- 
ing church  service,  the  warmth  of  the 
Chinese  people,  and  the  many  changes 
that  have  been  made  in  Chinese  society 
in  recent  years. 


President  and  Mrs.  Bush  greeted  local  members  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  staff  at  the 
ambassador's  residence. 


Responses  to  Questions 

Submitted  by  Xinhua 

of  China, 
Feb.  16,  19896 

Q.  What  is  the  general  assessment 
the  current  world  situation?  Since 
there  exists  a  wide  disagreement  oi 
whether  the  process  of  detente  is  ir 
versible,  I  would  like  to  know  your 
views  on  this  question. 

A.  I  am  cautiously  optimistic.  Th 
one  constant  in  today's  world  is  changi 
For  the  most  part,  the  direction  of 
change  is  positive  from  the  standpoin 
America's  values  and  interests.  Arou; 
the  globe,  I  see  increased  respect  for 
and  interest  in  democratic  values  of 
openness,  human  dignity,  pluralism,  ( 
mocracy,  individual  initiative,  and  em 
preneurship.  I  see  a  worldwide  trend 
toward  greater  recognition  of  the  nee 
for  cooperative  solutions  to  woi'idwidf 
concerns,  such  as  peaceful  resolution 
conflicts,  environmental  issues,  and  ( 
suring  global  economic  growth.  Balai 
has  been  restored  in  the  Internationa 
system  by  a  Western  policy  of  strengi 
and  realism. 

Important  differences  based  on  1 
damental  values  and  interests  contin 
to  guide  the  policies  of  nations,  both  I 
ward  their  own  citizens  and  toward  ot 
members  of  the  international  commun 
Being  fundamental,  these  differences 
must  not  be  minimized  nor  do  they  len 
themselves  to  easy  resolution.  In  addi 
tion,  our  world  still  is  a  tumultuous,  d; 
gerous  place.  Just  as  we  appear  to  be 
making  headway  in  reducing  the  thre; 
nuclear  war  through  the  arms  reductii 
process,  we  must  grapple  with  the  pro 
erating  dangers  to  civilized  society  fn 
terrorism,  the  use  and  spread  of  chem 
and  biological  weapons,  together  with 
T  sophisticated  delivery  systems,  ballis 
I  tic  missiles,  and  international  drug 
^  trafficking. 

I  Yet  I  would  argue  that  the  world 
i. significantly  less  turbulent  and  less  t 
3  gerous  today  than  it  would  otherwise 
I  thanks  to  the  farsighted  statesmen  ii 
I  cent  decades.  China's  leaders  were  st 
I  of  the  first  to  contribute  to  this  effort 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


as  Chief  of  the  U.S.  Liaison  Office  in 
ping-  in  the  1970s,  I  was  privileged  to 
e  been  part  of  this  historic  process, 
lay  we  find  ever  broader  acceptance  of 
proposition  that  in  our  increasingly 
rrelated  world,  national  security 
not  be  achieved  through  military 
ins  alone.  Moreover,  through  their 
1  e.xpei-ience,  more  and  more  nations 
realizing  that  the  freeing  of  market 
es  and  human  creativity  is  the  true 
is  for  sustained  prosperity  and  na- 
al  success. 

Nothing  in  this  world  is  irreversible 
n  a  political,  military,  economic,  or 
al  perspective.  That  is  why  Amer- 
foreign  policy  is  grounded  on  values 
abide  and  a  realistic  determination 
afeguard  our  interests  and  those  of 
allies  and  friends. 
Finally  I  would  say  that  any  man 
1 11  grandchildren  is  a  cautious  opti- 
t  by  definition.  He  has  a  big  stake  in 
future. 

Q.  With  regard  to  disarmament, 
/hich  area  do  you  think  a  break- 
'>ug:h  will  be  most  feasible — the 
lear,  conventional,  or  biochemi- 
'  And  it  is  widely  reported  here 
t  your  Administration  might  slow 
n  the  SDI  [Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
ive]  program.  If  that  is  the  case, 
m't  it  mean  the  U.S. -Soviet  talks 
■oncluding  a  START  I  strategic 
s  reduction  talks]  agreement  will 
iccelerated?  What  is  the  prospect 
<n  early  START  agreement? 
A.  The  United  States  is  committed 
•ogress  in  all  aspects  of  arms 
rol — nuclear,  conventional,  and  chem- 
Our  goals  include  a  strategic  arms 
cement  which  will  enhance  strategic 
ility  and  security;  conventional  arms 
ictions  in  Europe  which  will  result  in 
ility  at  lower  levels  of  conventional 
es;  and  a  comprehensive,  truly  global, 
effectively  verifiable  chemical  weap- 
Dan.  One  cannot  predict  which  arms 
rol  negotiations  will  meet  with  the 
lest  success,  but  I  hope  for  significant 
;-ress  in  all  fields.  My  Administration 
II  viewing  the  current  status  of  negotia- 
5  in  each  of  these  areas  even  as  I  visit 
•  country. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/Mav  1989 


Bilateral 


While  in  China,  the  President  held  a  bilateral  meeting  on  February  26  with 
Prince  Norodom  Sihanouk  of  Cambodia. 


Chemical  weapons  have  been  much 
in  the  news  recently.  Unfortunately,  over 
the  past  decade,  the  world  has  witnessed 
an  accelerated  erosion  of  respect  for  in- 
ternational norms  against  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons.  The  United  States 
seeks  to  reverse  this  trend.  Our  first 
objective  is  the  negotiation  of  a  compre- 
hensive, truly  global,  and  effectively 
verifiable  chemical  weapons  ban.  In  this 
connection,  I  am  proud  to  have  pre- 
sented to  the  Geneva  Conference  on  Dis- 
armament, in  1984,  a  U.S.  draft  treaty 
to  ban  chemical  weapons,  which  remains 
the  basis  of  the  Conference  on  Disarma- 
ment negotiations  for  such  a  ban.  The 
United  States  is  also  working  to  stem  the 
proliferation  of  chemical  weapons  and  to 
restore  respect  for  and  strengthen  the 
norms  against  illegal  chemical  weapons 
use.  The  Paris  conference  on  chemical 
weapons  use,  held  in  January,  was  a 
helpful  step  in  this  regard. 

In  the  conventional  area,  new  nego- 
tiations on  conventional  armed  forces  in 
Europe  will  begin  in  Vienna  in  March. 
At  present,  the  Warsaw  Pact  has  a  more 
than  2-to-l  advantage  in  tanks  and  artil- 


lery over  NATO.  While  I  welcome  the  re- 
cently announced  Soviet  conventional  re- 
ductions as  a  step  in  the  right  direction, 
even  with  these  cuts,  Warsaw  Pact 
forces  will  still  retain  substantial  con- 
ventional superiority  over  NATO.  Re- 
dressing this  military  imbalance  in 
forces  will  be  a  prime  objective  of  NATO 
at  the  upcoming  talks. 

In  the  START  talks,  U.S.  and  So- 
viet negotiations  have  made  solid  pro- 
gress, including  the  development  of  the 
outline  of  an  effective  verification  regi- 
me, an  absolute  necessity  for  a  success- 
ful START  agreement.  While  the 
strategic  arms  reduction  process  will  be 
a  major  focus  of  my  Administration's  re- 
view of  U.S.  arms  control  positions,  the 
United  States  is  committed  to  working 
toward  a  START  agreement  which  will 
improve  strategic  stability  and  reduce 
the  risk  of  war. 

As  to  the  Strategic  Defense  Initia- 
tive, it  is  an  important  program  which  is 
designed  to  contribute  to  stability.  We 
will  continue  our  research  in  this  area  to 
help  us  understand  how  and  when  we 
might  move  in  the  direction  of  a  greater 
reliance  on  defenses. 


1«; 


Q.  As  the  two  parts  of  Korea  are 
prepared  to  hold  hish-level  talks,  the 
protracted  tensions  on  the  peninsula 
seem  somewhat  relaxed.  Do  you  think 
the  time  is  coming  for  the  United 
States  to  respond  positively  to  the 
DPRK's  [Democratic  People's  Repub- 
lic of  Korea)  demand  for  the  with- 
drawal of  U.S.  troops  from  South 
Korea? 

A.  I  am  encouraged  by  regional 
trends  affecting  Korea,  particularly 
China's  positive  role  in  seeking  reduced 
tensions  on  the  peninsula.  While  the  at- 
mosphere has  improved  somewhat,  hard 
realities  remain.  North  Korea  has  a  very 
large  standing  army  stationed  well  for- 
ward. It  would  be  far  too  optimistic  at 
this  time  to  suggest  that  tensions  have 
been  reduced  to  the  point  where  the  de- 
terrence provided  by  U.S.  forces  in  Ko- 
rea is  no  longer  needed.  At  the  request 
of  the  Republic  of  Korea,  our  forces  ai'e 
in  Korea  to  deter  aggression  from  the 
North.  They  will  remain  as  long  as  the 
Government  and  people  of  South  Korea 
want  us  to  remain  and  as  long  as  we  be- 
lieve it  is  in  the  interest  of  peace  to  keep 
them  there. 

Q.  Thanks  to  the  efforts  made  by 
the  parties  concerned,  some  hot  spots 
in  the  world  are  cooling  off.  As  a  re- 
sult, the  world  public  opinion  is  fo- 
cusing its  attention  on  the  Middle 
East  and  Central  America,  where  the 
United  States  has  remarkable  influ- 
ence. Do  you  intend  to  make  some 
readjustment  to  the  I'.S.  policies  to- 
ward these  two  regions  and  more  ac- 
tively make  use  of  your  influence  to 
help  promote  early  and  just  solutions 
to  the  problems  there'.' 

A.  The  United  States  continues  to 
seek  a  just  solution  to  conflicts  in  Cen- 
tral America,  based  on  democracy,  re- 
spect for  human  rights,  and  security. 
In  El  Salvador,  the  popularly  elected 
government  of  President  Duarte  has 
worked,  with  our  support,  to  institu- 
tionalize democracy,  despite  an  orga- 
nized military  assault  by  communist 
forces.  There  has  been  considerable  suc- 
cess in  curbing  human  rights  abuses 
from  the  far  right  and  within  the  mili- 


1R 


tary.  We  will  continue  to  support  the 
Ciovernment  of  El  Salvador  in  its  efforts. 

In  Nicaragua,  the  Sandinistas  still 
.seek  to  consolidate  their  totalitarian 
conti'ol  and  regional  hegemony.  The 
press  and  church  remain  harassed.  Polit- 
ical opponents  are  jailed.  And  the  econ- 
omy continues  in  a  downward  spiral 
while  the  Sandinistas  maintain  by  far 
the  largest  army  in  Central  America.  A 
just  peace  can  come  to  Nicaragua  only 
when  the  Sandinistas  negotiate  in  good 
faith  with  the  democratic  resistance 
and  the  civic  opposition  and  cease  to 
threaten  the  neighboring  Central  Amer- 
ican democracies. 

In  Central  America,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment continues  to  support  the  Es- 
quipulas  II  agreement  in  all  of  its 
provisions,  which  include  provisions  call- 
ing for  democratic  freedom  of  the  press; 
labor  rights;  freedom  for  opposition 
groups  to  organize,  hold  meetings,  dem- 
onstrations, etc.  We  believe  that  all  the 
commitments,  including  those  to  democ- 
racy, must  be  complied  with  if  there  is  to 
be  lasting  peace  in  the  region.  In  verify- 
ing compliance  with  all  the  principles  of 
Esquipulas  II,  there  also  needs  to  be  an 
enforcement  mechanism  to  promote  ad- 
herence to  its  provisions,  particularly 
concerning  democracy  and  cessation  of 
support  for  subversive  groups  in  the  re- 
gion. In  this  regard,  economic  aid  to 
Nicaragua  should  be  conditioned  on  ac- 
tual performance,  not  just  on  words  but 
deeds. 

The  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is  among 
the  most  difficult  of  regional  conflicts. 
The  United  States  has  long  been  com- 
mitted to  a  just  settlement  of  this  dis- 
pute based  on  the  principles  embodied  in 
UN  Security  Council  Resolutions  242 
and  338.  Our  commitment  to  a  negoti- 
ated settlement  will  not  waver;  we  will 
continue  to  work  closely  with  the  parties 
to  forge  a  common  basis  that  will  facili- 
tate negotiations  among  them  and  a  du- 
rable settlement. 

There  are  also  a  number  of  difficult 
and  dangerous  problems  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  must  find  a  way  to  deal  with 
the  missile  proliferation,  chemical  and 
biological  weapons,  the  conventional 
arms  race,  as  well  as  other  conflicts, 


such  as  Lebanon  and  the  gulf.  These  a 
problems  in  which  the  international  co 
munity  can  play  a  leading  role. 

Q.  Your  country  is  still  playing 
leading  role  in  the  fields  of  econom 
and  technology,  but  the  challenges 
from  .lapan  and  Western  Europe  ar 
getting  serious.  How  do  you  evaluai 
the  challenges,  and  what  would  you 
do  to  handle  them  during  your 
tenure'? 

A.  The  .Japanese  and  European 
economies  are,  indeed,  growing  stronj 
as  are  the  newly  industrialized  econ- 
omies which  follow  free-market  prac- 
tices. We  regard  this  growth  as  a  higl 
positive  development.  It  has  been  a  pr 
ority  of  our  foreign  policy  since  World 
War  II  to  encourage  the  economic  de\ 
opment  of  friendly  countries.  We  take 
some  justified  satisfaction,  I  think,  in 
the  current  success  of  free  and  open 
world  trading  and  financial  systems.  ' 
vigorous  competition  in  world  market 
has  been,  and  will  continue  to  be,  a  d 
ing  force  for  the  improvement  of  worl 
living  standards.  By  keeping  world  n' 
kets  open,  we  will  reward  those  entrt 
jweneurs  and  managers  and  workers 
who  can  adapt  most  quickly  to  changi 
markets.  I  have  every  confidence  in 
American  business  and  American  lab 
They  will  handle  the  challenges,  and 
e.xpect  to  continue  to  be  the  world's  le 
ing  economy. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  should  It 
and  could  be  done  to  make  the  cur- 
rent Sino-U.S.  relationship,  which' 
healthy,  even  better  and  more  solio 

A.  First  let  me  say  that  I  certaii 
agree  that  the  current  state  of  our  re 
tionship  is  healthy.  Both  countries  ha 
come  so  far  since  my  stay  in  China  13 
years  ago.  We  now  cooperate  in  many 
areas — political,  economic,  scientific, 
cultural,  educational,  and  military.  U 
China  trade  is  booming,  and  U.S.  cor 
panies  are  making  a  strong  and  grow 
contribution  in  China.  Thousands  of  (' 
nese  and  American  students  and  pro 
fessors  are  involved  in  educational 
e.xchanges  with  some  of  the  finest  ins 
tutes  and  universities  in  both  our  cou 
tries.  American  tourists  are  visiting 
China  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands. 


rtonartmont  <->f  Qtato  Ri  illotin/Mau  1l 


ui 


I  Hi 

til- 

tl.lV 

lltii 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


1  perhaps  most  importantly,  our  two 
ernments  maintain  a  serious  and  co- 
ative  dialogue  on  a  wide  range  of  bi- 
ral  and  international  issues,  finding 
we  have  many  interests  in  common. 
To  improve  relations  further  and 
;e  them  more  solid,  I  think  we  should 
d  on  what  we  have  already  accom- 
hed.  We  need  to  keep  up  the  dialogue 
\veen  our  two  governments  on  politi- 
ssues  of  mutual  concern:  global 
e.  regional  conflicts  in  Asia  and 
where,  arms  control,  how  to  combat 
scourges  of  terrorism  and  drugs,  and 
multiple  threats  to  the  global  envi- 
nent.  We  see  eye-to-eye  on  many  of 
e.  We  also  need  to  encourage  more 
)le-to-peoi)le  contacts,  which  have 
vn  so  dramatically  in  the  last  de- 
.  These  promote  understanding  and 
t. 

We  should  also  seek  to  expand  our 
lomic  relationship.  The  opportunities 
rade  and  investment  between  our 
litries  are  enormous.  We  have  to  find 
B  of  taking  advantage  of  them.  To  do 
will  require  efforts  on  both  sides, 
tinned  steps  by  China  to  make  its 
e  practices  compatible  with  those  of 
•lajor  trading  partners  and  remove 
•iers  to  trade  and  investment  are  im- 
ant  if  China  is  to  expand  commerce 
attract  capital  for  its  modernization, 
e.xample,  improvements  in  intellec- 
property  protection,  a  less  regu- 
1  trading  system,  and  more  effective 
B  protections  for  investors  could  have 
ry  favorable  effect.  The  United 
es,  for  its  part,  must  keep  its  mar- 
open  to  Chinese  exports  and  con- 
e  to  give  China  access  to  advanced 
nology  needed  for  modernization. 
Science  and  technology  cooperation 
lid  also  expand.  We  have  developed  a 
(ue  relationship  in  this  field.  Cooper- 
ri  involves  some  of  our  best  scientists 
most  advanced  technical  facilities 
ecners  a  wide  range  of  important  en- 
ors  in  such  fields  as  fusion  enei'gy, 
ic  health,  and  the  environment.  Both 
itries  have  a  lot  to  gain  from  these 
:  activities. 


Cultural  and  educational  exchanges 
in  other  fields  should  grow  as  well.  A 
good  example  of  successful  bilateral  co- 
operation in  education  is  the  Manage- 
ment Training  Center  at  Dalian.  Since 
the  U.S.  and  Chinese  Governments  es- 
tablished the  center  in  1980,  with  the 
help  of  U.S.  corporations  and  univer- 
sities, it  has  produced  over  2,300  gradu- 
ates trained  in  modern  business  and 
management  practices.  The  Dalian  cen- 
ter has  become  a  model  for  other  man- 
agement centers  in  China.  It  can  also 
serve  as  a  model  for  bilateral  cooperation 
in  other  fields. 

In  addition  to  the  positive  develop- 
ments in  our  ])olitical  and  economic  rela- 
tions, I  think  it  is  especially  noteworthy 
that  friendly  cooperation  is  also  taking 
place  between  our  defense  forces.  We 
are  looking  forward  to  continuing  and 
expanding  these  activities  in  the  future. 

The  United  States  recognizes  that 
Taiwan  is  an  important  issue  for  the  Chi- 
nese Government  and  people.  We  are 
pleased  to  see  that  the  growing  oppor- 
tunities for  trade  and  travel  between 
both  sides  of  the  Taiwan  Strait  have  con- 
tributed to  a  climate  of  relaxed  tensions 
and  hope  these  trends  will  continue.  The 
United  States  is  committed  to  abide  by 
the  three  communiques  of  1972,  1979, 
and  1982,  which  provide  a  firm  basis  for 
the  further  development  of  our  relations. 

One  final  point  on  building  relations 
for  the  future:  When  differences  arise 
between  us,  as  they  inevitably  will,  we 
need  to  continue  to  approach  them  in  a 
constructive  spirit.  If  we  do,  I  think  we 
will  build  a  strong  foundation  for  bilat- 
eral ties  and  see  expanding  cooperation 
in  new  fields  that  will  benefit  both  our 
peoples. 


SEOUL 


Remarks  Following 

Meeting  With 

President  Roh, 
Feb.  27, 19897 

President  Roh  and  I  had  very  useful, 
wide-ranging  discussions.  We  reviewed 
the  political  situation  in  this  part  of  the 
world.  I  told  him  about  my  China  visit, 
and  we  had  a  chance  to  review  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  as  well.  We 
are  both  pleased  by  trends  toward  re- 
laxations of  tension  in  this  part  of  the 
world.  President  Roh's  vordpolitik — 
reaching  out  to  China,  the  Soviets,  and 
Eastern  Eurojje — and  his  initiatives 
toward  North  Korea  contributed  impor- 
tantly to  these  trends. 

The  United  States  fully  supports 
Korea's  creative  diplomacy.  Despite 
such  positive  policies,  some  hard  real- 
ities remain.  Among  these  is  that  Nor- 
th Korea  maintains  the  world's  fifth 
largest  military  force,  a  force  deployed 
just  25  miles  north  of  here.  The  United 
States  remains  committed  to  the  secu- 
rity and  freedom  of  the  Rejniblic  of  Ko- 
rea. And  I  had  an  opportunity  to  make 
that  point  very  clearly  to  President 
Roh.  Perhaps  some  of  the  confidence- 
building  measures  that  we've  pro- 
posed, measures  that  have  worked  well 
in  Europe,  will  also  be  applied  to  the 
Korean  Peninsula. 

Besides  the  diplomatic  and  secu- 
rity issues,  we  discussed  ways  to 
strengthen  the  free  world  economic 
system.  We  had  a  frank  discussion  of 
economic  problems — Korea  being  a 
very  important  trading  partner  with 
the  United  States.  Korea  has  benefited 
from  U.S.  open  markets,  and  I  think 
we  both  agree  we  need  to  move  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  fully  open  mar- 
kets. We  must  expect  fair  access  to  the 
markets  here.  And  I  believe  that  Presi- 
dent Roh  understands  that. 

But  all  in  all.  the  trip  has 
been  too  short.  The  hospitality  has 
been  wonderful.  And  inasmuch  as  I  do 
not  want  to  make  the  [National]  Assem- 
blv  mad — the  elected  leaders  in  the 


17 


The  President  of  the  Republic  ot  Koria,  Koh  Tae  Woo,  and  his  wife.  Kim  Ok  Sook, 
with  President  and  Mrs.  Bush  at  the  Blue  House,  the  official  residence  of  Korea's 
President. 


met 


various  parties  that  represent  Korea's 
democracy — we  should  go. 

Thanlc  you,  Mr  President,  very 
much  for  an  unfoi'gettable  visit. 


Address  Before 

the  National  Assembly, 
Feb. 27,  19895 


I  stand  in  your  assembly  as  Presidents 
Eisenhower,  .Johnson,  and  Reagan  have 
stood  before  me,  and  I  reaffirm,  as 
they  did,  America's  support,  friend- 
ship, and  respect  for  the  Republic  of 
Korea  and  its  people.  As  a  former  mem- 
ber of  a  body  like  this — of  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  United  States — 
I  take  particular  pleasure  in  coming 
back  to  this  legislative  chamber  where 
the  freely  elected  representatives  of 
Korea's  own  democratic  success  story 
meet  to  debate  and  implement  the  will 
of  the  Korean  people.  I  know  there 
must  be  times  when  this  body — just 


like  the  U.S.  Congress — is  full  of  noise 
and  contention  and  emotion.  But  that  is 
the  sound  of  democracy  at  work,  and  we 
wouldn't  have  it  any  other  way.  As  the 
great  statesman  Winston  Churchill 
once  said.  "Democracy  is  the  worst 
form  of  government,  e.xcept  for  all 
others." 

This  is  my  first  major  address  on 
foreign  soil  since  becoming  the  41st 
President  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  And  my  visit  here  today  re- 
flects the  importance  that  I  place  on 
the  relations  between  our  two  coun- 
tries, the  strength  of  our  nations'  ties, 
and  the  promise  that  our  relationship 
holds  for  the  future  of  the  world. 

My  inauguration  as  President  a 
month  ago  represented  a  tradition  in 
the  United  States  that  speaks  of  both 
continuity  and  change.  Continuity  and 
change  will  also  be  the  guideposts  of 
relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Korea  in  the  years  ahead.  Where 
change  is  needed  or  inevitable,  let  us 
be  a  positive  force  for  change.  Where 
continuity  is  our  mandate,  let  us  go  for- 


ward resolute  in  our  commitment  to 
freedom  and  democracy.  Throughou' 
let  our  close  economic  and  strategic 
relationship  remain  as  it  is — a  pillar 
of  peace  in  East  Asia. 

I  first  came  to  the  Asian  Pacific 
region  during  World  War  II,  more 
than  45  years  ago.  I  was  a  teenager- 
19  years  old.  I  was  flying  torpedo 
bombers  in  the  U.S.  Navy.  And  it  w 
then,  for  the  first  time  in  my  life,  tl 
I  truly  appreciated  the  value  of  free 
I  dom  and  the  price  that  we  pay  to  kei 
"i  it.  Believe  me,  I  have  never  forgotte 
=  In  the  early  years  following  Wo 

I  War  II,  the  future  of  Korea,  and  of; 
£  Asia,  was  very  much  in  doubt.  It  wa 
i  time  of  great  struggle  between  Kon 
^  hope  for  freedom,  Korea's  hope  for 
5  prosperity,  and  the  twin  menaces  of 
^  war  and  invasion.  On  a  .June  mornin 
%  1950,  the  communist  army  of  the  Nc 
?  smashed  into  the  Republic  of  Korea, 
tent  on  destroying  your  nation.  And 
without  hesitation  or  delay,  Americ; 
and  UN  forces  rushed  to  your  aid,  a 
together  Americans  and  Koreans 
fought  side  by  side  for  your  right  to 
termine  your  own  future. 

And  I  do  remember  the  devasta 
of  your  country.  Your  cities  lay  in  n 
ble.  Your  factories  were  in  shamblee 
Millions  of  your  people  w'andered  tl 
streets  homeless  and  hungry.  And  i 
1951,  in  the  midst  of  the  war,  Gen. 
Douglas  MacArthur  addressed  a  joi 
session  of  our  Congress;  he  spoke  o: 
Korea,  saying — here's  his  quote — "1 
magnificence  of  the  courage  and  for 
tude  of  the  Korean  people  defies  de- 
scription." And  as  he  spoke  those 
words,  our  Congress  interrupted  h 
with  applause — sustained  applause- 
you  and  your  people.  And  after  the 
war,  you  overcame  every  imaginabl 
hardship. 

History  will  long  record  your  s' 
ry;  how  in  less  than  a  generation 
you  stepped  into  the  light  of  liberty 
and  economic  opportunity.  You  can 
be  proud  of  the  miracle  that  you've 
achieved,  and  we  are  proud  to  be 
associated  with  you. 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


•ea:  A  Rising  Nation 

ay,  Korea  is  a  rising  nation;  a  vi- 
nt,  dynamic  nation;  a  nation  riding- 
crest  of  the  wave  of  tlie  future, 
never  before  has  the  pride  and  the 
2:ress  of  your  nation  been  more  evi- 
t  than  last  summer,  when  this  mag- 
cent  city  played  host  to  the  24th 
mpic  Games.  Nearly  10,000  athletes 
n  KiO  nations  were  here.  Another  3 
on  people  watched  on  television. 

I  what  they  saw,  from  the  moment 

II  Ki  Keung  carried  the  torch  into 

•  Olympic  stadium  until  the  last  em- 
;  of  the  Olympic  flames  were  extin- 
;hed  at  the  closing  ceremonies,  was 
iicredibly  spectacular  sports  festi- 
You  played  host  to  the  world,  and 
t  a  truly  gracious  host  you  were. 
2;ratulations. 

The  past  several  years  have 
essed  the  emergence  of  the 
re  Asian  Pacific  region.  My  trip — 
nning  in  Jaj^an,  stopping  in  China, 
concluding  here  in  Korea — stands 
'stimony  to  the  reality  and  what  it 
ns  to  the  future  of  the  world.  Today 
is  one  of  the  most  dynamic  areas 
arth  economically,  politically,  and 
imatically.  And  the  Republic  of  Ko- 
;tands  at  the  fore.  You're  a  world- 
;  economic  power.  Your  commit- 
:  to  democracy  is  demonstrated 
'  right  here  in  this  chamber.  And 
■bold  diplomacy,  your  iiordpolitik 
cy  of  relaxing  tensions  toward  Nor- 
orea,  China,  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
ern  Europe]  is  reshaping  relations 
id  beyond  the  Asian  Pacific  region. 

itaining  Freedom  and  Democracy 

y  meetings  with  Prime  Minister 
•shita  of  Japan,  China's  Deng 
ping  and  the  three  other  top  lead- 
and  with  you  and  your  leaders,  I've 
issed  challenging  bilateral  global 
regional  issues,  and  our  discus- 
^  have  been  marked  at  all  times  by 
rit  of  friendship  and  cooperation, 
come  here  today  as  the  leader  of  a 
ful  friend  and  a  dependable  ally. 
I'm  here  todav  to  ensure  that  we 


President  Bush  addressed  the  National  Assembly  during  his  visit  to  South  Korea. 
Behind  the  President  is  Kim  .Jai  Son,  the  spealxer  of  the  assembly. 


work  together  in  all  things.  Our  most 
important  mission  together  is  to  main- 
tain the  freedom  and  democracy  that 
you  fought  so  hard  to  win.  As  Presi- 
dent, I  am  committed  to  maintaining 
American  forces  in  Korea,  and  I  am 
committed  to  support  our  mutual  de- 
fense treaty. 

There  are  no  plans  to  reduce  U.S. 
forces  in  Korea.  Our  soldiers  and  air- 
men are  here  at  the  request  of  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  to  deter  aggression 
from  the  North,  and  their  presence 
contributes  to  the  peace  and  stability 
of  Northeast  Asia.  They  will  remain  in 
the  Republic  of  Korea  as  long  as  they 
are  needed  and  as  long  as  we  believe  it 
is  in  the  interest  of  peace  to  keep  them 
there. 


In  the  years  ahead,  we  must  work 
together  as  equal  partners  to  meet  the 
evolving  security  needs  of  the  Korean 
Peninsula.  Peace  through  strength  is  a 
policy  that  has  served  the  security  in- 
terests of  our  two  nations  well,  and  we 
must  complement  deterrence  with  an 
active  diplomacy  in  search  of  dialogue 
with  our  adversaries,  including  North 
Korea.  The  American  people  share 
your  goal  of  peaceful  unification  on 
terms  acceptable  to  the  Korean  people. 
It  is  for  that  reason  that  we  actively 
support  the  peaceful  initiatives  of 
President  Roh — to  build  bridges  to  the 
north — and  I  will  work  closely  with  the 
President  to  coordinate  our  efforts 
to  draw  the  North  toward  practical, 
peaceful,  and  productive  dialogue  to 
ensure  that  our  policies  are  comple- 
mentary and  mutually  reinforcing. 


irtmont  nt  QtotA  Ri  illAtin/ftyioif  1  QQQ 


I  have  spoken  of  the  need  for  vig- 
ilance, strength,  and  diplomacy  to  de- 
ter aggression  and  preserve  peace. 
There  is  another  source  of  strength, 
and  it  is  well  represented  in  this  as- 
sembly. The  development  of  democratic 
political  institutions  is  the  surest 
means  to  build  the  national  consensus 
that  is  the  foundation  of  true  security; 
just  as  we  must  work  together  to 
achieve  better  security  within  a  demo- 
cratic framework,  we  must  also  work 
together  to  achieve  greater  economic 
prosperity  within  the  system  of  free 
and  open  international  trade. 

Progress  of  the  Korean  Economy 

The  progress  of  the  Korean  economy  is 
an  inspiration  for  developing  countries 
throughout  the  world.  By  unleashing 
the  energies  and  creativity  of  your  tal- 
ented people,  you've  led  Korea  into  an 
era  of  unprecedented  opportunity  and 
prosperity.  Korea  has  become  an  indus- 
trial power,  a  major  trading  power,  and 
a  first-class  competitor.  You're  fulfill- 
ing the  prophecy  of  the  Indian  poet 
[Rabindranath]  Tagore  who  wrote, 
"Korea,  once  a  bright  light  of  the 
golden  age  of  Asia,  if  it  is  relit  it  will 
be  the  light  of  the  East."  Korea  has 
achieved  great  prosperity  through  par- 
ticipation in  the  international  trading 
system.  It  has  made  the  nations  of  free 
Asia  the  envy  of  the  world,  and  all  Ko- 
reans can  take  pride  in  what  you  as  a 
people  have  achieved. 

And  yet,  we  also  cannot  overlook 
that  your  economic  success  has  created 
concern  in  the  management  of  our  bi- 
lateral economic  relations.  For  the 
American  people,  and  for  the  Korean 
people  as  well,  reducing  our  bilateral 
trade  imbalance  will  be  both  a  chal- 
lenge and  an  opportunity.  The  chal- 
lenge will  be  to  resist  the  calls  for 
protectionism.  The  opportunity  will  be 
to  expand  the  prosperity  of  both  our 
countries.  And  we  both — you  and  I — 
have  a  lot  at  stake.  You  are  our  seventh 


largest  trading  partner — larger  than 
many  of  our  traditional  European 
partners — and  our  trade  is  growing. 
The  United  States  is  both  Korea's  larg- 
est market  and  second  largest  source  of 
import.  And  we're  also  a  leading  source 
of  the  investment  and  technology  that 
you  will  need  to  fuel  further  economic 
growth  and  development. 

Korea's  economy  has  benefited 
greatly  from  the  free  flow  of  trade. 
And  yet  today,  in  many  countries, 
there  is  a  call  for  greater  protection- 
ism. And  I'm  asking  you  to  join  the 
United  States  in  rejecting  these  short- 
sighted pleas.  Protectionism  is  fool's 
gold.  Protectionism  may  seem  to  be  the 
easy  way  out,  but  it  is  really  the  quick- 
est way  down.  And  nothing  will  stop 
the  engine  of  Korea's  economic  growth 
faster  than  new  barriers  to  interna- 
tional trade. 

We've  made  progress  in  this  area. 
American  e.xports  to  Korea  are  up.  Ko- 
rean tariffs  are  down,  and  its  nontariff 
barriers  are  down,  too.  And  the  service 
sector  is  opening.  But  let  me  be  candid, 
and  I  want  you  to  have  this  direct  from 
me:  if  we  are  to  keep  our  bilateral  rela- 
tionship growing  even  stronger,  much 
more  needs  to  be  done.  And  I  am  confi- 
dent that  our  two  nations,  working  to- 
gether, can  accomplish  the  tasks  still 
before  us. 

As  one  of  the  world's  major  trading 
powers,  the  Republic  of  Korea  sets 
an  e.xample  for  other  nations  which  are 
watching  what  you  do.  As  an  emerging 
economic  leader,  you  inevitably  shoul- 
der important  responsibilities  to 
ensure  the  continued  strength  and  sta- 
bility of  the  global  marketplace.  You, 
the  representatives  of  the  Korean  peo- 
ple, will  face  the  challenge  to  improve 
living  standards,  to  continue  to  open 
domestic  markets,  and  to  adopt  appro- 
priate international  financial  and  ex- 
change rate  policies  that  reflect  your 
standing  as  a  prosperous  and  powerful 
trading  nation. 


The  United  States  shares  simils 
responsibilities  for  the  well-being  of 
the  world  economy.  Our  two  peoples 
should,  at  all  times,  bear  in  mind  th: 
our  trading  system  is  truly  an  interi 
tional  joint  venture,  and  that  we  sha 
a  special  responsibility  for  its  contin 
ued  success. 

Renewing  the  U.S.  Commitment 
to  Peace 

My  friends — and  we  are  truly  frienc 
I  began  today  by  talking  about  my  ii 
guration  as  the  new  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  just  a  few 
short  weeks  ago.  The  tradition  of  pa 
ing  the  torch  of  leadei'ship  from  one 
American  president  to  another  is  a 
time  when  we  celebrate  the  strength 
of  our  democracy  and  a  time  when  w 
renew  our  commitment  to  the  values 
on  which  it  is  built. 

Today,  I  am  renewing  my  comm 
ment  to  you  as  the  leader  of  one  sove 
eign  state  to  the  elected  legislative 
body  of  another  I  am  renewing  my 
commitment  to  you  to  work  togethe 
for  the  good  of  our  peoples  and  of  all 
humanity.  And  as  I  reflect  over  the  1 
40  years  of  Asian  history,  the  trend 
remarkably  positive.  At  the  end  oft 
Second  World  War,  Asia  lay  in  ruins 
Through  the  19.50s  and  the  1960s,  the 
forces  of  radical  revolution  at  times 
peared  to  be  the  wave  of  the  future. 
And  now,  in  the  1980s,  human  aspire 
tions  for  basic  political  and  economii 
freedoms  have  become  almost  univei 
sal.  And  as  we  gather  here  in  your  > 
tional  Assembly,  these  aspirations  a 
no  longer  a  far  off  dream  for  your  gi 
country — for  Korea.  Instead,  throug 
your  devotion  and  hard  work,  they  ha^ 
become  a  reality.  And  we  celebrate 
your  triumph.  In  the  years  ahead,  th 
United  States  will  stand  with  you,  i 
we'll  stand  with  you  against  the  fon 
of  oppression  and  for  the  forces  of 
peace,  prosperity,  independence, 
and  democracy. 


rkonartmont  nf  Qtato  Rllllfitin/Mau  1 


FEATURE 
Visit  to  Asia 


sponses  to  Questions 
Submitted  by  the 
Yonhap  News  Agency 
3f  South  Korea, 
=b.  16,  19896 

,  Would  you  tell  me  your  views  on 
Mth  Korean  efforts  to  increase  eco- 
inic  cooperation  and  political  rela- 
^ns  with  socialist  countries? 

A.  I  support  these  efforts.  Presi- 
it  Roh's  opening  to  the  Soviet  Union, 
^tern  Eui-ope,  and  China  is  aimed  at 
ering  world  peace  and  understand- 
.  Today  almost  every  country  I'ecog- 
?s  South  Koreas  great  economic 
lortance.  I  am  sure  more  countries  in 
e  will  move  from  economic  ties  to  full 
tical  and  diplomatic  ties  with  the  Re- 
lic of  Korea. 

Q.  In  his  address  before  the  UN 
neral  Assembly  in  October  last 
T.  President  Roh  proposed  a  six- 
ty conference,  calling  for  South 
\  North  Korea,  the  United  States, 
an,  China,  and  the  Soviet  Union  to 
-'uss  a  peaceful  reunification  of 

divided  Korean  Peninsula.  What 
he  U.S.  position  on  the  proposal? 

A.  President  Roh's  six-party  confer- 
3  idea  is  an  imaginative  forward- 
ing proposal.  It  is  another  example 
le  Republic  of  Korea  Government's 

approach  of  reconciliation  and  ac- 
modation  in  dealing  with  jieninsular 
tical  and  security  problems.  Obvi- 
y  such  a  conference  would  require 
'ful  preparation  and  a  cooperative  at- 
de  by  all  participants. 

Q.  While  seeking  improved  rela- 
is  w  ith  China  and  the  Soviet 
on,  the  South  Korean  Government 

asked  the  United  States  to  open 
doors  to  the  isolationist  North  Ko- 
,  hoping  that  exchanges  between 
>hinglon  and  Pyongyang  will  con- 
lute  to  reduction  of  tension  on  the 
ean  Peninsula.  Have  you  seen  any 
its  of  progress  in  U.S.  efforts  to 
3  North  Korea  to  get  rid  of  its  iso- 
onist  policy? 


A.  We  have  long  supported  North- 
South  dialogue  as  the  key  to  peace  and 
reunification  of  the  peninsula.  President 
Roh's  initiatives  to  that  purpose  in  July 
1988  and  in  his  October  speech  at  the 
United  Nations  were  most  welcome.  In 
the  spirit  of  these  measures,  the  United 
States  announced  last  October  31  some 
new-  steps  to  encourage  private  aca- 
demic, cultural,  and  other  nongovern- 
mental exchanges  with  North  Korea.  We 
also  authorized  the  export  of  human- 
itarian goods  to  North  Korea  and  again 
authorized  substantive  exchanges  bet- 
ween our  diplomats  in  neutral  settings. 
Since  then  the  United  States  and  North 
Korea  have  had  substantive  contacts  in 
Beijing  on  December  6  and  -January  24. 
There  has  been  greater  academic  ex- 
change between  the  United  States  and 
North  Korea  as  well.  Several  American 
universities  plan  to  host  North  Korean 
scholars  this  year.  I  do  not  know  how  far 
these  academic  and  diplomatic  contacts 
will  go,  but  they  are  useful  first  steps. 

Q.  Radical  Korean  students  with 
anti-American  sentiment  are  demand- 
ing the  w  ithdrawal  of  U.S.  troops 
from  South  Korea.  At  the  same  time, 
I  know  that  there  are  some  American 
experts  on  Northeast  Asian  affairs 
who  speak  of  a  symbolic  or  gradual 
reduction  of  the  troops.  Do  you  envi- 
sion any  possibility  of  the  troop  with- 
drawal in  the  near  future  in  light  of 
the  security  situation  on  the  Korean 
Peninsula? 

A.  There  are  no  plans  to  reduce 
U.S.  forces  in  Korea.  Our  soldiers,  sail- 
ors, airmen,  and  marines  are  there  at 
the  request  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  to 
deter  aggression  from  the  North,  and 
their  presence  contributes  to  the  peace 
and  stability  of  Northeast  Asia.  They 
will  remain  in  the  Republic  of  Koi-ea  as 
long  as  the  Government  and  the  people  of 
South  Korea  want  us  to  remain  and  as 
long  as  we  believe  it  is  in  the  interest  of 
peace  to  keep  them  there.  Our  two  gov- 
ernments periodically  review  the  appro- 
priate strength  and  composition  of  U.S. 
forces  stationed  in  Korea  under  our  mu- 
tual defense  treaty  obligations. 


Q.  The  United  States  has  contin- 
ued to  ask  South  Korea  to  open  its 
markets  fully  for  more  U.S.  exports. 
The  Korean  people  have  an  under- 
standing of  U.S.  efforts  to  reduce  its 
large  trade  deficits,  but  they  think 
that  current  U.S.  pressure  is  exces- 
sive. I  would  like  to  hear  your  views 
on  trade  friction  existing  between  the 
two  countries. 

A.  Korea  has  enjoyed  very  open  ac- 
cess to  the  American  market,  especially 
in  cars,  consumer  electronics,  and  ma- 
chinery. This  has  been  crucial  to  Korea's 
achievement  of  the  world's  highest  eco- 
nomic growth  rate  during  the  last  3 
years.  We  seek  access  to  all  world  mar- 
kets. A  free  market  enhances  a  coun- 
try's standard  of  living.  Consumers 
benefit  from  lower  prices  and  a  wider  va- 
riety of  goods  and  services.  The  United 
States  and  Korea  have  prospered  to- 
gether on  the  strength  of  a  free  world 
trading  system.  I  believe  it  is  in  Korea's 
self-intere.st  to  w^ork  to  preserve  this 
system.  Therefore,  I  do  not  see  U.S. 
market-opening  efforts  in  Korea  or  else- 
where as  excessive. 

Q.  Your  visit  to  Beijing  will  be 
followed  by  the  visit  by  Soviet  leader 
Mikhail  Gorbachev,  which  is  expected 
in  April  or  May  for  the  first  Sino- 
Soviet  summit  talks  in  three  decades. 
Do  you  have  any  special  reasons  for 
your  decision  to  go  to  China  after  at- 
tending the  funeral  of  the  late  Japa- 
nese Emperor?  Do  your  discussions 
with  Chinese  leaders  include  the 
problem  of  the  Korean  Peninsula? 

A.  Having  represented  my  country 
in  China,  I  have  fond  memories  and  close 
ties  there.  Barbara  and  I  are  looking  for- 
ward in  a  very  personal  way  to  going 
back  to  Beijing.  We  also  have  important 
matters  to  discuss  with  the  Chinese  lead- 
ers. I  am  sure  our  talks  will  touch  on  is- 
sues affecting  the  Korean  Peninsula. 


hartment  of  State  Bulletin/Mav  1989 


ANDREWS  AIR  FORCE  BASE 


Arrival  Remarks, 
Feb.  27,  19895 

Let  me  just  say  that  it's  great  to  be 
back  home  again  at  the  conclusion  of  a 
productive  and  rewarding  trip  to  Ja- 
pan, China,  and  Korea,  a  trip  which  un- 
derscored that  America  is  and  will 
remain  a  Pacific  power. 

There  were  imjjortant  symbols.  I'll 
never  forget  that  solemn  moment  when 
we  paid  our  nation's  respect  to  the  late 
Emperor  of  Japan;  the  warm  and  genu- 
ine handshakes  between  old  friends  in 
Beijing's  Great  Hall  of  the  People;  and 
the  opportunity  for  the  freely  elected 
leader  of  a  200-year-old  nation  to  ad- 
dress the  freely  elected  legislature  of  a 
blossoming  democracy,  Korea. 

But  we  laid  out  an  important  sub- 
stantive course:  thoughtful  and  candid 
conversations  with  world  leaders,  over 
20  of  them,  leaders  from  Asia — China, 
Japan,  Korea,  Thailand,  Singapore,  In- 
dia, Pakistan,  and  the  Philippines — and 
our  allies  from  Europe — France,  Bel- 
gium, Italy,  Portugal,  Turkey,  Ger- 
many, and  Spain — and  leaders  from 
the  Middle  East— Egypt,  Israel,  and 
Jordan — and  the  Presidents  of  Brazil, 
Nigeria,  and  Zaire. 

I  return  tonight  pleased  with  the 
progress  made  toward  lasting  and  mu- 
tually beneficial  relationships  with  our 
allies  and  friends.  Of  course,  differ- 
ences remain.  Work  is  yet  to  be  done; 
opening  foreign  markets  to  U.S.  com- 
petition, continuing  to  encourage  the 
growth  of  democracy  and  human 
rights,  and  strengthening  of  our  alli- 
ances. But  common  ground  was  found. 

In  Japan  we  have  our  most  impor- 
tant Asian  ally  and  one  of  our  largest 
trading  partners.  Our  discussions 
there  emphasized  the  responsibilities 
we  share  in  the  field  of  defense.  But  we 


also  spoke  of  ways  in  which  the  world's 
strongest  and  most  innovative  econ- 
omies can  cooperate  more  closely  to 
fuel  growth  not  only  at  home  but  also  in 
the  developing  world. 

In  China  I  talked  with  the  leaders 
that  I'd  known  nearly  1-5  years  ago, 
when  I  served  as  Chief  of  the  U.S.  Liai- 
son Office.  It  is  clear  from  my  trip  that 
China  approaches  its  thaw  with  the  So- 
viets with  caution  and  realism.  We 
agreed  that  the  Soviets  must  be  judged 
not  by  their  rhetoric  but  by  their  ac- 
tions, such  as  whether  the  Soviet  Union 
actually  draws  down  its  military  forces 
along  China's  border  and  persists  in  en- 
coui-aging  Vietnam  to  completely  with- 
draw from  Cambodia.  We  also  agreed 
that  after  Cambodia  has  achieved  a 
genuine  end  to  Vietnam's  occupation, 
free  elections  should  be  held  under  a 
coalition  government  led  by  Prince 
Sihanouk,  with  whom  I  met  in  Beijing. 
The  United  States  remains  committed 
to  a  result  that  precludes  a  return  to 
power  by  the  Khmer  Rouge.  The  Chi- 
nese leaders  appreciate  our  concern 
and  are  willing  to  work  toward  a  peace- 
ful coalition. 

On  the  final  leg  of  my  journey,  I 
went  to  Korea,  where  I  saw  both  de- 
mocracy and  economic  liberty  work  in  a 
country  whose  security  is  assured  by 
our  joint  efforts  in  vigilance.  Thirty 
years  ago,  such  progress  was  unim- 
aginable, and  it  stands  as  a  testament 
to  the  Korean  people  and  our  commit- 
ment to  them. 

From  these  4  days  of  intensive  dis- 
cussions, I  return  with  one  especially 
vivid  impression:  The  world  looks  to 
America  for  leadership  not  just  because 
we're  militarily  strong,  not  just  be- 
cause we  have  the  world's  largest  econ- 
omy, but  because  the  ideas  we  have 
championed  are  now  dominant.  Free- 
dom and  democracy,  openness,  and  the 
prosperity  that  derives  from  individual 
initiatives  in  the  free  marketplace — 
these  ideas  once  thought  to  be  strictly 
American — have  now  become  the  goals 
of  mankind  all  over  Asia. 


The  success  of  our  nation's  foreig 
policy  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Pre; 
dent,  with  the  counsel  and  support  of 
the  Congress.  This  important  trip  hi 
only  underscored  for  me  what  can  be 
achieved  through  a  strong  and  bipart 
san  working  relationship  between  th( 
White  House  and  Congress.  I'm  anx- 
ious to  sit  down  with  congressional 
leadership  to  brief  them  on  details  of 
these  critical  visits,  and  together  we 
must  ensure  that  this  initial  success 
only  a  first  step  down  a  long  path  of 
peace  and  understanding  with  our 
friends  and  allies.  If  common  grounc 
can  be  found  halfway  around  the  wor 
in  the  shadow  of  Mt.  Fuji,  the  histori 
Great  Hall  of  the  People,  or  the  gard' 
of  Korea's  Blue  House,  surely  it  can  ) 
found  at  home  among  men  and  wome 
of  common  purpose.  We  must  respec 
each  other  and  join  together  as  one  i 
pursuing  a  foreign  policy  that  ensuri 
the  security  of  our  country,  its  econoi 
opportunity,  and  freedom  and  indivic 
ual  rights  around  the  world. 


'Press  release  33. 

-Held  at  the  U.S.  Ambassador's  resi- 
dence (te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Document.s  of  Mar.  6,  1989). 

'•Released  by  the  White  House  on 
Feb.  22  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  o 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  G). 

'Interview  was  conducted  by  Leslie 
Stahl  (press  release  34  of  Feb.  27). 

"Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pi 
dential  Documents  of  Mar.  6. 

'■Released  by  the  White  House  on 
Feb.  2.5  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  o 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  G). 

'Held  at  the  Blue  House,  the  official 
idence  of  the  President  of  Korea  (text  fr( 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Doeu 
ments  of  Mar.  6).  ■ 


»l 


npnnrtmpnt  nf  ^itatp  Biill(^tin/Mav  1 


HE  SECRETARY 


ecretary's  Interview 

m  "MacNeil/Lehrer  Newshour" 


Secretari/  Baker  was  interviewed 
u  the  "MacNeil/Lehrer  Newshour"  on 
\arch  2i,  1989.'^ 

First,  let's  go  through  some  of  the 
tails  to  make  sure  we  understand 
]he  aid  to  the  contras]:  the  continua- 
lon  of  non-lethal  aid,  $4.5  million  a 
lonth  until  February  1990.  Define 
'ion-lethal." 

A.  It's  basically  aid  that  just  sup- 
prts  the  existence  of  the  resistance.  It's 
othing;  it's  food;  it's  humanitarian  as- 
itance.  It's  not — 

Q.  No  guns?  No  ammunition? 

A.  No  guns.  No  ammunition.  In 
:t,  I  think  it  probably  means  no  parts 
'  vehicles.  Don't  hold  me  to  that,  be- 
use  that's  been  the  subject  of  a  lot  of 
ibate  up  there  in  the  past.  But  ba- 
ally  it's  just  humanitai'ian  assistance, 

n-lethal,  non-militarv. 

■ 

Q.  And  the  purpose  of  it  is  to  do 
iiat  for  the  contras'!  Keep  them  alive 
r  10  months? 

A.  The  purpose  of  it  is  to — yes, 
;re's  a  moral  obligation  here,  certainly 
the  part  of  the  United  States.  The 
rpose  is  to,  at  the  very  least,  keep 
;m  alive  for  this  period. 

There  is  a  provision  in  here  as  well, 
course,  that  the  assistance  can  be 
3d  for  voluntary  reintegration  or  vol- 
tary  regional  relocation  of  the  resis- 
ice  should  they  choose  to  go  back  to 
caragua,  participate  in  the  elections 
?re;  should  they  choose  to  relocate  to 
Tie  other  country  in  the  region.  But  it 
1  only  be  used  if  it's  voluntary  on  their 
rt  and  if  there  is  progress  being  made 
vard  democratization  in  Nicaragua. 

Q.  Who  makes  the  decisions  on  a 
)nthly  basis,  though,  as  to  whether 
not  this  money  is  being  used  prop- 
y  and  what  applies — I  mean, 
lether  this  kind  of  an  expenditure 
proper,  that  kind  of  expenditure  is 
t? 

A.  We  will  have  to  do  that.  Aetu- 
y,  it  will  be  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
nal  Development  (AID)  probably, 
lich  is  the  agency  which  has  been  ad- 
nistering  humanitarian  assistance  to 
>  resistance  for  (|uite  some  time.  And 
A'ill  have  to  administer  it  in  keeping 
th  the  bi])artisan  accord,  which,  of 
arse,  will  be  the  basis  for  legislation 
it  will  be  passed  by  the  Congress  to 
thorize  and  appropriate  the  money. 


Q.  In  an  ideal  world — and  I'm  not 
suggesting  for  one  minute  that  we're 
in  it — but  in  an  ideal  world,  what 
would  happen  to  the  contras  at  the 
end  of  this  10  months?  Where  would 
they  be,  and  what  would  they  be 
doing? 

A.  If  the  ideal  world  were  full  dem- 
ocratization in  Nicaragua,  full  compli- 
ance by  the  Sandinista  government  with 
the  promises  that  they  gave  in  the  Esq- 
uipulas  agreement  and  in  other  agree- 
ments, what  they  would  be  doing  is 
being  reintegrated  into  Nicaraguan 
society,  reintegrated  into  a  safe,  demo- 
cratic society.  That  would  be  ideal,  if  you 
have  performance  by  the  Nicaraguan 
Government. 

If  you  don't  have  performance  by  the 
Nicaraguan  Government,  the  resistance 
would  then,  in  that  event,  likely  be  in 
place  right  where  it  is  now,  sustained 
through  this  humanitarian  assistance. 

Q.  And  you'd  be  back  for  another 
10  months  or  a  year  for  the  same  kind 
of  thing? 

A.  Then  you'd  be  back  with  a  reex- 
amination of  the  policy,  at  least  with  re- 
spect to  what  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  would  be. 

Q.  This  agreement  is  based  on 
the  premise,  I  would  assume,  that  the 
contras  are  not  going  to  continue  the 
war.  Is  that  right? 

A.  The  agreement  is  based  on  the 
premise  that  there  is  going  to  be  an 
effort  on  the  part  of  everyone  in  the 
region — the  United  States,  perhaps 
other  countries,  hopefully  countries  in 
Europe,  maybe  in  Mexico,  Venezuela, 
Canada — to  support  a  major  diplomatic 
effort  to  get  democratization  going  in 
Nicaragua. 

So  it  doesn't  contemplate  hostilities; 
in  fact,  it  goes  in  the  other  direction.  We 
are  going  to  continue  the  policy  of  not 
making  assistance  available  for  offensive 
military  action.  We're  going  to  continue 
the  present  policy,  as  well,  of  making 
sure  that  we're  not  supporting  people 
who  are  engaged  in  human  rights 
violations. 

Q.  Was  that  part  of  the  deal 
here? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Did  you  tell  the  contras  be- 
forehand, "If  we  continue  to  give  you 
$4. .5  million  a  month  in  non-lethal 


aid,  you  have  got  to  stop  the  military 
part.?" 

A.  No.  We  didn't  tell  the  contras 
beforehand  in  connection  with  this 
agreement.  That  has  basically  been  U.S. 
policy  since  the  Congress  refused  in 
February  of  1988,  I  think  it  was,  to  vote 
any  further  military  assistance.  So  we 
are  going  to  continue  that,  and  we're 
going  to  represent  that  to  the  Congress, 
have  an  undertaking  that  we  will  not 
make  it  available  to  anybody  who  is  en- 
gaged in  offensive  military  action. 
They're  entitled  to  defend  themselves  if 
they're  attacked. 

Q.  Let's  talk  about  the  Sandi- 
nistas. First  of  all,  was  this  deal,  ei- 
ther directly  or  indirectly,  run  by  the 
Sandinista  government — today's  deal? 

A.  "Run  by  the  Sandinista" — 

Q.  The  Sandinista  government. 

A.  Oh,  you  mean,  was  it  run  by 
them  for  approval?  No. 

Q.  Not  necessarily  for  approval 
but  just  to  inform  them  that  before 
the  President  announced  today — 

A.  Not  by  the  executive  branch.  I 
can't  tell  you  what  people  in  the  legisla- 
tive branch  may  or  may  not  have  done  as 
far  as  the  Sandinistas  are  concerned. 
They  have  more  contacts  with  the  San- 
dinistas than  we  do. 

Q.  Okay.  So  there  are  no  quiet 
understandings  with  the  Sandinista 
government  in  any  way  tied  to  this 
agreement? 

A.  None. 

Q.  As  you  know,  the  Nicaraguan 
Foreign  Minister,  on  behalf  of  the 
Sandinista  government,  issued  a 
statement  awhile  ago  condemning  to- 
day's agreement,  saying  it  was  con- 
fusing and  unclear  and  that  it  goes 
against  the  regional  peace  pact  by  the 
Central  American  Presidents. 

A.  We  don't  think  it  does  go  against 
the  regional  peace  pact.  We  think  it's 
consistent  with  it.  We  did  di.scuss  this 
agreement  in  some  detail  with  the  Presi- 
dents of  the  four  Central  American  de- 
mocracies. We  think  they  support  this 
agreement.  We  think  they  will  support 
it.  We  think  the  agreement  will  enable 
us  to  work  with  them  to,  frankly,  keep 
pressure  on  the  Sandinistas  to  move  to- 
ward democratization. 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  reason  the  Sandinistas  don't 
like  this  agreement  is  because  it  will  en- 
able us  to  give  them  some  incentive  to 
keep  their  promises,  to  give  the  people 
of  Nicaragua  democracy. 

Q.  So  you're  not  upset  about  their 
reaction  to  this? 

A.  No,  not  at  all.  I'm  not  the  least 
bit  surprised  either. 

Q.  You're  not  surprised  at  all? 

A.  No  — 

Q.  Doesn't  it  take  two  to  make 
peace? 

A.  — that  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment would  not  be — no.  I'm  not;  I'm  not 
surprised  at  that. 

Q.  Was  this  idea  discussed  with 
the  Soviet  Union  before? 

A.  No,  not  this  idea,  although  in  my 
discussions  with  [Foreign]  Minister 
Shevardnadze  in  Vienna  several  weeks 
ago,  I  raised  with  him  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union  was  continuing  to  funnel 
some  $1  billion  a  year  into  Nicaragua 
and  that  the  United  States  didn't  look 
too  favorably  upon  that. 

Q.  To  which  he  replied? 

A.  To  which  he  replied  with  their 
public  position,  which  is,  "If  you  stop 
giving  any  assistance  to  any  countries  in 
Central  America,  we  will  stop  giving  as- 
sistance to  Nicaragua."  To  which  we  rep- 
lied, as  we  always  have,  "That  is  an 
absolute  non-starter." 

This  agreement,  if  I  may  say  so,  will 
give  us  a  much  stronger  hand  and  a  bet- 
ter position  from  which  to  negotiate  with 
the  Soviet  Union  on  this  issue. 

Q.  In  what  way? 

A.  We  will  now  have  a  unified  policy 

position,  as  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned.  We  will  not  have  the  legisla- 
tive branch  going  one  way  and  the  e.xecu- 
tive  branch  going  another.  We  will  have  a 
truly  bipartisan  foreign  policy;  and  when 
we  speak,  the  Soviets  will  know  we  are 
speaking  for  the  United  States. 

Q.  You  mean  they  can't  go 
around  you  right  to  the  Speaker  of  the 
House  or  others? 

A.  That's  correct. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  will  also 
help  you  in  dealing,  eventually,  with 
the  Sandinistas  in  Nicaragua? 

A.  I  would  hope  it  will  help  us  to  en- 
courage the  Sandinista  government, 
once  again,  to  simply  perform  on  the 
promises  that  they've  made  so  often  over 
a  period  of  10  years.  I  think  it  will  help 
us  with  the  Central  American  de- 
mocracies. I  think  it  will  help  us  encour- 
age countries  in  Europe  and  countries  in 
this  hemisphere  to  support  this  effort  to 
get  to  peace  and  democracy  through  a 


24 


diplomatic  approach,  because  we  are  put- 
ting the  military  approach  on  hold  for  a 
period  of  time. 

Q.  How  did  this  deal  come  about? 
Who  talked  to  whom? 

A.  As  you  know,  there  was  senti- 
ment, I  think,  in  both  parties — the  Dem- 
ocratic congressional  leadership  and  the 
Republican  executive  branch  leadership 
following  the  election — to  see  if  we  could 
get  back  to  bipartisanship  in  foreign 
policy. 

The  United  States  succeeds  many 
times  in  foreign  policy  where  we  are  uni- 
fied. When  we're  not  unified,  normally 
we've  failed.  Our  Central  American  poli- 
cy has  been  a  failure.  Without  trying  to 
pin  the  blame,  it's  been  a  failure  because 
we  haven't  been  unified.  You  can't  oper- 
ate that  way.  It  just  doesn't  work. 

Ronald  Reagan  was  fond  of  sajang — 
President  Reagan  used  to  say  partisan- 
ship ought  to  stop  at  the  waters  edge.  It 
really  should  if  you're  going  to  be  suc- 
cessful. So  I  think  there  was  a  genuine 
desire  on  the  part  of  both  the  Demo- 
cratic leadership  in  the  Congress  and 
the  President  to  try  very  hard  to  get 
back  to  bipartisanship  in  this  most 
thorny  of  foreign  policy  issues. 

Q.  To  be  very  specific  about  it, 
did  President  Bush  say  to  you, 
"Friend,  go  make  a  deal  on  Central 
America;  let's  get  this  thing  behind 
us."? 

A.  No,  not  that  way.  But  we  did  talk 
about  the  importance  of  trjdng  to  bridge 
the  gap  with  respect  to  Central  Amer- 
ica. There  were  two  areas,  frankly, 
where  we  had  not  been  unified  in  our 
foreign  policy  in  the  last  6-8,  10  years. 
One  is  Central  America  and  the  other  is 
South  Africa.  In  both  respects,  we've 
had  trouble  being  successful.  We  just 
haven't  been  successful,  because  we 
haven't  been  unified.  We'd  like  to  find  a 
way  to  get  back  to  bipartisanship  in  both 
of  those  areas. 

South  Africa  is  extraordinarily  dif- 
ficult, because  it  has  a  high  domestic  po- 
litical content  in  the  United  States.  But 
I  did  talk  to  the  President  shortly  after 
the  election  about  those  two  problem 
areas.  He  did  say,  "You  know,  if  we  can 
do  it,  fine,  but  we've  got  to  maintain  our 
principles."  He  said,  "I  do  not  want  to 
and  I  will  not  abandon  the  resistance. 
We  have  an  obligation  to  these  people." 

Q.  You  are,  of  course,  well  known 
as  a  man  who  has  made  many  suc- 
cessful deals  in  your  career.  On  your 
scale,  your  own  scale,  was  this  a  hard 
deal  to  make  or  was  it  easy? 

A.  It  was  a  hard  deal  to  make.  We 
put  in  a  lot  of  hours,  all  of  us;  but  then 
there  were  a  lot  of  people  and  it  was  not 


ju.st  the  leadership.  You're  going  to  ha\ 
a  couple  of  people  on  the  program  in  ju 
a  minute  who  were  very  instrumental 
making  this  thing  fly. 

Q.  Congressman  Bonior  and  Co 
gressman  Edwards  from  the  two  op- 
posite poles. 

A.  Two  opposite  poles  on  this  issu 
and  they  came  together.  Without  those 
two,  we  couldn't  have  had  the  support 
that  we're  going  to  have  for  this  policy 
the  House.  The  same  thing  happened 
over  on  the  Senate  side.  We  had  Senato 
John  McCain  of  the  Republicans;  Senat 
Connie  Mack,  a  freshman  Senator  who 
worked  hard  on  this;  and  Senator  Chri: 
Dodd,  again  on  the  other  pole;  and  thej 
came  together. 

Q.  What  was  it?  Was  it  just  a 
kind  of  mutual  weariness  with  this  i 
sue  that  everybody  kind  of  wanted  t^ 
get  this  thing  done? 

A.  I  think  that  was  it.  I  think  ever 
body  wanted  to  get  it  done,  and  every- 
body knew  how  destructive  it  was  to  the 
national  security  interests  of  the  Unite 
States,  to  the  national  interests  of  the 
United  States,  to  continue  this  diver- 
gence between  the  legislative  and  execi 
five  branches;  totally  counterproductiv 

Q.  As  you  know,  in  the  past  the 
reason  that  so  many  Democrats  wei 
not  supporting  the  Reagan  Adminis 
tration  policy  on  contra  aid,  etc.,  ir 
Central  America  is  because  they  dii 
not  feel  that  the  Administration 
really  wanted  peace  in  the  area.  Th 
wanted  a  military  solution.  What  d 
you  do  to  convince  the  Democrats 
this  time  that  you  really  are  suppor 
ing  the  peace  process? 

A.  What  we  said  was  basically, 
"Look,  you  have  a  new  President  and  a 
new  Secretary  of  State.  We  have  the 
same  goals,  and  we  had  the  same  goals 
the  Reagan  Administration  as  our  opp 
nents  on  the  Hill;  that  was  democratiz; 
tion  in  Nicaragua  and  peace  in  the 
region.  We  have  the  same  goals.  Let's 
trust  each  other  for  awhile  and  see  if  v 
can  achieve  those  goals  through  a  dipk 
matic  approach."  That  was  basically  tl 
pitch. 

The  fight  had  gone  on  a  long  time, 
believe  they  were  willing  and  I'eady  to 
trust  us;  we  were  willing  and  ready  to 
trust  them;  and  I  hope  we  can  make  it 
work.  I  really  believe  we  have  an  excel 
lent  chance  of  making  it  work. 

Q.  What  about  the  general  feel 
ing  also,  though,  that  what  the  Rea 
gan  .Administration  really  wanted 
was  the  elimination  of  the  Sandinis 
government  in  Nicaragua,  that  it  w 
seen  as  a  threat  to  stability  and  de- 
mocracy in  the  region?  What's  the 


THE  SECRETARY 


ush  Administration's  attitude  to- 
ard  Daniel  Ortega  and  the  Sandi- 
sta  government? 

A.  The  position  that  we  took  in  our 
gotiations  on  the  Hill  was  that  the 
)als  of  the  Esquipulas  accord  were  the 
)als  that  we  should  embrace:  democra- 
sation  in  Nicaragua,  non-interference 

the  affairs  of  neighbors — for  instance, 
le  export  of  subversion  into  El  Salvador 

Nicaragua — freedom  of  religion,  free- 
)m  of  the  press,  that  sort  of  thing;  on 
e  other  hand,  voluntary  reintegration 
the  resistance  into  a  safe,  democratic 
'Ciety.  Those  were  the  goals  of  Es- 
lipulas.  And  they  are  noble  goals:  they 
e  worthy  goals.  If  we  can  accomplish 
ose,  that's  what  we  would  like  to  do. 
nd  we  found  a  majority  of  the  Con- 
ess,  on  both  sides,  who  were  willing  to 
nbrace  those  same  goals. 

Q.  But  you  can  live  with  a  leftist 
indinista  government  in  Nicaragua, 
that  right — as  long  as  the  process 
at— 

A.  If  there  is  democracy:  if  they 
ep  the  promises  that  they  gave  us  in 
;quipulas,  which  was  to  move  to 
mocracy — freedom  of  religion,  free- 
m  of  the  press,  free  and  fair  elections, 
ley've  scheduled  an  election  for  Febru- 
y  1990.  Let's  see  if  they  live  up  to  their 
omises. 

If  they  do  [and]  if  we  really  believe 
democracy,  we  shouldn't  second-guess 
lat  comes  out  of  an  election  just  be- 
ase  we  don't  like  the  party  that  won.  If 
;  a  leftist  party  that  wins,  if  the  win 
IS  in  a  true,  open,  free,  and  fair  demo- 
itic  election,  we  ought  to  live  with  that 
^t  like  we  ought  to  live  with  the  winner 
t's  a  strong  right-wing  party  that  wins, 
has  just  happened  in  El  Salvador. 

We  should  not  be  free  to  pick  and 
oose  the  winners  if  we  truly  believe  in 
moci'acy. 

Q.  There's  been  a  lot  of  talk 
out  a  slow  start  for  you  as  Secre- 
ry  of  State.  Do  you  think  today's 
nouncement  is  going  to  stop  a  lot  of 
at  talk? 

A.  I  don't  know.  Maybe  I  would  sim- 
/  say  we  just  drifted  into  this  thing 
cause  people  have  been  saying,  "You 
ow,  you're  adrift."  We've  spent  the  last 
veeks  almost  up  on  the  Hill  working  on 
is.  So,  I  don't  know. 

Q.  But  the  very  thing  they  crit- 
ized  you  for.  as  you  know — one  of 
e  things — was  that  you  were  sur- 
ised  in  the  early  days  of  the  Bush 
Iministration  by  the  second  part  of 
e  Central  American  presidents 
ing. 

A.  Yes,  that's  correct,  and — 


Q.  They  took  the  initiative. 

A.  Yes,  but  you  see  that's  really  not 
true.  We  weren't  surprised.  The  fact  of 
the  matter  is  we  can't  be  players.  We 
can't  be  players  unless  we  have  an  agree- 
ment like  this,  unless  the  executive 
branch  is  given  what  is  supposed  to  be 
its  constitutional  right  and  obligation, 
the  right  to  go  out  and  conduct  our 
diplomacy  and  to  implement  our  foreign 


policy  without  having  it  undercut  by 
the  legislative  branch.  We're  not  going 
to  have  that  now.  We're  not  going  to 
have  that  through  February  of  next 
year,  so  it  will  enable  us  to  be  players 
and  to  shape  what  happens  in  the  re- 
gion in  favor  of  democracy  and  in  favor 
of  peace. 


iPress  release  46  of  Mar.  27,  1989.  I 


Secretary's  Interview 

on  "This  Week  With  David  Brinkley" 


Secretary  Baker  was  interviewed 
on  ABC-Ws  "This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  on  March  26,  1989,  by  David 
Brinkley  and  Sam  Donaldson,  ABC 
News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC  News 
analysts 

Q.  As  you  know,  there's  widespread 
support  for  this  new  arrangement  in 
Central  America  which  you  an- 
nounced this  week,  but  there  are  a 
few  criticisms.  One  is  this;  that  this 
goes  beyond  what  we  call  bipartisan- 
ship between  the  Republicans  and 
Democrats,  White  House  and  the 
Congress.  It  goes  into,  to  some  de- 
gree, a  surrender  of  presidential  pow- 
er to  Congress.  What  do  you  say 
about  that? 

A.  I  think  I  would  agree  with 
Elliott  Abrams  [former  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Inter-American  Affairs]  who 
said  what  this  agreement  really  does  is 
restore  presidential  power.  If  you  look  at 
the  accord  carefully,  you  will  see  that 
the  leadership  in  the  Congress  acknowl- 
edges the  President's  primary  respon- 
sibility for  implementing  foreign  policy, 
and  basically  it's  a  restoration  of  presi- 
dential power  and  not  any  diminution  of 
it. 

Q.  As  you  know,  C.  Boyden  Gray, 
the  White  House  Counsel,  is  one  of 
those  who's  made  this  complaint,  in 
effect  saying  that  you  have  negotiated 
an  agreement  that  has  diminished 
George  Bush's  power. 

A.  I  don't  agree  with  that.  There's 
no  legislative  veto  question  here,  be- 
cause there's  nothing  that  will  be  embod- 
ied in  legislation,  and  that  was  carefully 
considered  during  the  course  of  negotiat- 
ing the  agreement,  and — 

Q.  So  it's  not  embodied  in  legisla- 
tion. In  effect,  you're  saying  George 
Bush  has  given  away,  in  a  side  letter, 
what  he  wouldn't  do  in  the  law,  but 
the  end  result  is  the  same. 


A.  No.  The  end  result  simply  is  not 
the  same.  This  is  a  voluntary  agree- 
ment. You  do  not  have  the  question  arise 
here  with  respect  to  constitutional  pow- 
ers and  prerogatives,  because  the  Con- 
gress is  not  imposing  its  will,  in  effect, 
through  legislation  upon  the  executive. 
Let  me  simply  say  that  this  matter  was 
considered.  There  would  have  been  other 
options.  Other  options  would  have  in- 
volved taking  a  much  shorter  period  of 
humanitarian  assistance  for  the  resis- 
tance which  would  have  failed  to  link  the 
assistance  to  democratization  in 
Nicaragua.  And  that  really  is  what  we 
are  all  seeking  here  to  accomplish  and  to 
judge.  We  want  to  see  the  Sandinistas, 
for  a  change,  keep  their  promises. 

Q.  C.  Boyden  Gray,  a  few  weeks 
ago,  embarrassed  you  publicly  by 
calling  attention  to  your  bank  stock. 
You  sold  it  at  that  point.  Now  he  is 
complaining  that  you  have  made  a 
deal  that  is  wrong.  Is  there  room  for 
both  of  you  in  this  Administration? 

A.  Nice  try,  Sam. 

Q.  [Laughter] 

A.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  the 
President,  the  Chief  of  Staff ,  the  na- 
tional security  adviser  to  the  President, 
and  I  all  discussed  this  particular  provi- 
sion. So  good  try. 

Q.  Nice  duck,  Mr.  Secretary. 

Q.  So  you  don't  care  to  predict 
how  long  C.  Boyden  Gray  will  be  in 
the  Administration,  I  take  it? 

A.  Good  try,  David. 

Q.  What  do  you  say  to  those  who 
say  the  following;  that  the  Baker  so- 
lution to  the  Nicaraguan  problem  is  a 
solution  only  if  there  really  is  no 
problem  and  never  has  been?  That  is, 
it's  a  solution  if  Nicaragua  is  not  the 
Nicaragua  that  has  been  charac- 
terized by  the  Reagan-Bush-Baker 


;partment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


Administration  as  a  regime  bent  on 
external  expansion. 

A.  I  disagree  with  that,  because  the 
purpose  here  of  this  accord,  as  I  just  said 
a  moment  ago,  is  twofold,  really.  It  is  to 
achieve  democratization  in  Nicaragua, 
and  now  everyone  agrees  that  that  is  the 
central  focus  and  purpose  of  our  policy. 
And,  secondly,  to  permit  reintegration 
of  the  resistance  but  only  under  safe 
and  democratic  conditions.  So  there's  a 
clearly  stated  policy  and  policy  purpose 
here. 

Q.  There's  a  clearly  stated  hope, 
but  what  is  the  leverage?  What  incen- 
tives do  the  Sandinistas  have  to  nego- 
tiate now  down  to  pluralism? 

\.  There  were  in-depth  discussions 
with  the  leadership  about  carrots  and 
sticks.  The  fact  of  the  matter — 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  about  the 
sticks? 

A.  Sure.  I'll  be  glad  to  speak  to 
those  as  well.  But  let  me  simply  say  that 
what  you  have  here  is  the  legislative 
branch  saying  fine,  you  go  and  you  im- 
plement that  policy  of  incentives  and  dis- 
incentives, and  we  will  stay  out  of  it.  We 
will,  in  effect,  acknowledge  the  execu- 
tive's obligation  or  responsibility  to  im- 
plement foreign  policy. 

The  sticks  would  involve — should 
the  occasion  arise,  and  hopefully  there 
will  be  movement  toward  democratiza- 
tion in  Nicaragua,  and  we  won't  have  to 
use  stick.s — but  the  sticks  would  involve 
tightening  of  economic  sanctions,  fur- 
ther diplomatic  sanctions  if  that  was 
necessary,  and,  as  I  said  in  the  press 
briefing  room  at  the  White  House  on 
Friday,  there  is  nothing  in  this  agree- 
ment that  would  foreclose  the  President's 
future  request  for  military  assistance 
should  things  deteriorate  substantially. 

Q.  .\bout  the  Soviet  Union;  they 
are  one  regime  that  does  have  le- 
verage over  the  Nicaraguan  regime. 
What  do  you  expect,  and  what  do  you 
know,  and  how  have  you  talked  to  the 
Soviet  Union  about  how  their  behav- 
ior should  be  shaped  by  this  new 
plan? 

A.  We've  discussed,  generally 
speaking,  with  the  Soviet  Union — I  dis- 
cussed with  [Foreign]  Minister  Shev- 
ardnadze in  my  meeting  with  him  in 
Vienna  our  problems  with  their  continu- 
ing to  funnel  roughly  $1  billion  a  year 
into  Nicaragua.  About  half  of  that  is  in 
the  form  of  military  assistance.  We've 
made  known  our  problems  with  that.  So 
far  the  response  has  been  the  public  re- 


sponse which  they  give,  which  is  that 
they'll  stop  doing  this  when  the  United 
States  stops  supporting  other  regimes' 
democratic  institutions  and  governments 
in  Central  America.  And,  of  course,  we 
say  that's  a  non-starter. 

One  thing  this  agreement  does,  if  I 
may  say  so,  is  give  us,  I  think,  a  consid- 
erably stronger  position  to  advance  this 
position  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  If  the  Latin  Presidents  meet- 
ing in  May  come  up  with  a  plan  for  re- 
patriation and  disbandment  of  the 
contras  that  is  to  achieve  its  result 
before  the  10  months  are  up  for  the 
money  that  you've  just  now  won  from 
Congress,  will  you  agree,  or  will 
you  insist,  on  keeping  the  contras  to- 
gether as  a  possible  fighting  force  af- 
ter November-December? 

A.  Another  thing  this  agreement 
does  for  us  is  it  gives  us  a  leg  up  really 
in  participating  and  being  a  player  in 
the  discussions  that  will  lead  to  that 
agreement — that  is,  the  agreement  to 
repatriate  and  reintegrate.  And  you 
were  quite  right  in  your  earlier  ques- 
tioning of  the  Nicaraguan  Deputy  For- 
eign Minister  to  the  effect  generally  that 
it's  only  that  they  come  up  with  a  plan  by 
May  15. 

So  what  we  will  do  is  take  a  look  at 
that  plan.  We  will  not  necessarily  sign 
on  automatically  under  any  and  all  cir- 
cumstances. Suppose  they  come  up  with 
a  plan  to  bring  the  resistance  to  the 
United  States?  We  wouldn't  sign  onto 
that.  Let  me  just  say  this  one  final 
thing,  because  this  point  came  up  a  good 
bit  in  our  discussions  with  the  leader- 
ship. We  made  it  quite  clear  that  the 
United  States  would  not  sign  away  in  ad- 
vance its  right  to  conduct  its  own  diplo- 
macy and  its  own  foreign  policy,  and  we 
would  not,  therefore,  sign  on  to  any 
agi'eement  that  others  might  come  up 
with  without  our  participation  and 
cooperation. 

Q.  In  the  Soviet  Union  today, 
there  is  an  election.  It's  not  the  kind 
of  election  we  are  accustomed  to  with 
all  kinds  of  people  running  for  every- 
thing and  having  fundraisers  with 
chicken  and  peas  and  so  on.  But  it  is 
an  election  of  sorts.  More  than  one 
candidate  to  be  chosen  in  many,  many 
races.  What  do  you  make  of  this? 

A.  I  make  of  it  that  things  are 
changing  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
they're  changing  rather  dramatically.  We 
make  of  it  as  well  that  the  changes  that 
are  taking  place  are  probably  going  to 
last,  because  once  you  give  people  a 
taste  of  the  fruits  of  freedom,  it's  pretty 


hard  to  reverse  that  process.  In  other 
words,  there's  no  getting  the  genie  bail 
in  the  bottle. 

As  I've  said  before,  it's  the  hope  dl 
the  United  States  that  perestroika  will 
succeed,  because  we  think  that  would  L 
good  for  the  Soviet  Union  and  good  for 
the  world  as  well.  We  wish  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev success  in  this.  We  do  believe,  a 
the  same  time,  that  we  must  continue  t 
be  prudent  and  realistic  in  the  way  we 
api)roach  the  Soviets,  because  they  re- 
main a  heavily  armed  superpowei;  We 
also  believe  that  whether  or  not  per- 
csfroiku  succeeds  depends  on  what  hap 
pens  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  not  what 
we  in  the  West  might  do  or  not  do. 

Q.  Prudence  and  realism  so  far 
still  includes  in  the  .American  agene 
the  modernization  of  certain  missih 
in  Europe  that  many  Europeans  loo 
ing  at  the  Soviet  Union  say  are  just  i 
longer  necessary.  How  do  you  resist 
this  tendency  to  say  no  matter  how 
armed  the  Soviet  Union  is,  its  inten- 
tions have  so  dramatically  changed 
that  such  policies  as  the  moderniza- 
tion of  our  forces  in  Europe  are 
superfluous? 

A.  The  way  you  resist  that  is  to 
make  the  point  which  I  did  during  my 
trip  around  to  NATO  capitals  6  or  8 
weeks  ago  that  clearly  we  all  still  belie 
in  the  doctrine  of  flexible  response  in 
our  NATO  strategy.  We  believe  in  for- 
ward defense.  We  believe,  as  a  matter 
fact,  in  no  third  zero,  and  all  of  our 
NATO  partners  agree  with  us  on  that. 

So  you  have  to  sit  down,  and  you 
have  to  talk  these  things  through,  and 
in  fact,  we  do  believe  these  doctrines 
which  have  formed  the  very  basis  and 
foundation  of  NATO,  then  it  is  importg 
that  there  be  an  up-to-date,  land-base( 
missile  in  Europe.  There's  no  disagree 
ment  on  that.  What  we  need  to  do  is 
come  up  with  a  formulation  that  recog 
nizes  that,  and  at  the  same  time  recog 
nizes  the  point  you  just  made  in  your 
question,  and  that  is  that  there  are  cei 
tain  political  pressures  on  some  of  our 
NATO  allies. 

Q.  In  recent  weeks,  you  have 
made  the  point  that  some  day  the  Is 
raelis  may  want  to  talk  to — have  to 
talk  to— the  PLO  [Palestine  Libera 
tion  Organization],  for  which  you 
have  been  severely  admonished  pub- 
licly by  Israeli  officials.  Do  you  stil 
feel  that  wav? 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  19  . 


\FRICA 


A.  Here's  the  way  I  feel.  I  feel  that 
we're  ever  going  to  have  peace  in  the 
idflle  East,  that  we  will  have  to  have  at 
me  point  dialogue  between  Israelis 
id  Palestinians.  Now  then,  what  I've 
so  said,  and  I  do  believe  strongly  is 
lat  we  should  not  rule  out  categorically, 
)Solutely,  and  unconditionally  in  ad- 
ince  any  dialogue  that  would  lead  to 
ace. 

Q.  Including  the  PLO-Israeli  dia- 
gue,  I  take  it? 

A.  We  should  not  rule  out  uncondi- 
jnally  and  categorically  in  advance  any 
alogue  that  would  lead  to  peace. 

Q.  I  can  understand  your  walk- 
ig  on  egg  shells,  because  Israeli  offi- 


cials of  the  present  government,  of 
course,  are  adamantly  opposed  to 
that,  at  least  in  public.  Yet  there  are 
some  private  stories  that  some  of 
them  may  be  moving  in  that  direc- 
tion. Do  you  think  they  are"? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  speculate  on  that, 
other  than  to  take  note  of  what  you've 
just  said:  that  there  are  some  stories — 
not  just  private  but  public  stories — to 
that  effect.  But  I  don't  want  to  speculate 
on  that. 

Q.  Would  it  be  a  good  thing  if  it 
were  happening'.' 

A.  I  just  don't  want  to  hypothesize 
with  you  about  it. 


1  Press  release  47  of  Mar.  27,  1989. 


"luman  Rights  Issues  in  Africa 


Folloicing  are  statements  by 
''pntij  Assistant  Secretarif  for  African 
fairs  Kenneth  L.  Brown  and  Depatij 
isistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
■rf  Humanitarian  Affairs  Robert  W. 
'rra)id  before  the  Subconnnittee  on 
reig)i  Operations  of  the  House 
)p)'opriations  Committee  on 
brnary  7  and  8,  1989.'' 


5PUTY  ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY  BROWN, 
CB.  7,  1989 

im  pleased  to  appear  befoi-e  this  sub- 
Timittee  to  discuss  human  rights  is- 
es  in  Africa.  With  your  permission, 
v'ill  briefly  summarize  the  human 
■hts  situation  in  countries  of  particu- 

interest. 

Nearly  12%  of  America's  own  popu- 
ion  traces  its  roots  to  Africa.  Thus 

have  a  special  attachment  to  that 
itinent  and  are  deeply  committed  to 
?  advancement  of  human  rights,  eco- 
mic  freedom,  and  the  well-being  of 

people.  We  and  the  peoples  of  Africa 
0  share  an  interest  in  the  establish- 
•nt  of  pluralistic  representative 
v'erinnents  which  are  secure  from 
:ernal  threats  and  are  supported  by 
ix\  and  competitive  economies. 

Some  of  the  news  from  Africa  on 
man  rights  during  the  past  year  has 
?n  encouraging;  some  of  it,  quite 
nkly,  has  not.  On  the  "plus"  side  of 
'  ledger,  Botswana,  Mauritius,  and 
e  Gambia  continue  to  be  outstanding 
[•formers.  Each  is  a  functioning  mul- 
arty  parliamentary  democracy  with 
luman  rights  record  that  compares 


favorably  with  many  Western  democ- 
racies. However,  situations  of  civil  war 
or  ethnic  strife  in  Burundi,  Ethiopia, 
Mozambique,  Somalia,  and  Sudan  have 
produced  masses  of  refugees  and  large- 
scale  loss  of  life  over  the  past  yeaj-.  Due 
to  its  abhorrent  system  of  apartheid, 
South  Africa  remains  a  special  case. 
The  human  rights  situation  there  con- 
tinued to  deterioi-ate  in  1988,  a  matter 
of  grave  concern  to  all  of  us. 

Let  me  now  review  the  human 
rights  situation  in  some  specific 
countries. 

Burundi 

The  Government  of  Burundi  has  taken  a 
number  of  significant  steps  to  heal  that 
nation's  wounds  and  promote  national 
reconciliation  in  the  aftermath  of  inter- 
ethnic  violence  in  mid-August  1988.  In 
October  President  Buyoya  named  a  new 
cabinet  in  which  12  of  24  portfolios — 
including  that  of  prime  minister — are 
held  by  the  majority  Hutus.  In  addi- 
tion, he  brought  to  approximate  parity 
the  number  of  Hutu  and  Tutsi  gover- 
nors administering  Burundi's  15 
provinces.  He  appointed  an  ethnically 
balanced  Commission  on  National  Unity 
whose  mandate  is  to  explore  what  must 
be  done  to  solve  the  longstanding  eth- 
nic divisions  in  Burundi  society.  Re- 
cently the  President  also  pardoned  and 
released  from  prison  the  six  signatories 
of  a  protest  letter  written  after  the 
August  violence. 

The  most  dramatic  evidence  of  the 
impact  of  the  Burundi  Government's 
efforts  to  calm  tensions  and  pi'omote 


national  harmony  can  be  seen  in  the 
successful  voluntary  repatriation  to 
their  homes  in  Burundi  of  more  than 
•50,000  refugees  who  had  fled  to  Rwanda 
as  a  result  of  the  ethnic  violence.  The 
government  cooperated  closely  with 
Rwanda,  Zaire,  and  the  UNHCR 
[UN  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees] 
to  create  a  climate  of  security  and  con- 
fidence among  the  refugees.  A  key  in- 
gredient in  this  process  was  the 
government's  decision  to  grant  amnesty 
to  all  refugees.  The  effort  was  so  suc- 
cessful that  virtually  all  of  the  refugees 
had  returned  home  within  4  months 
after  the  violence. 

While  implementation  of  announced 
i-eforms  will  be  difficult,  the  Buyoya 
government  has  made  a  good  start.  We 
and  other  donors,  all  of  whom  have 
been  encouraged  by  these  develop- 
ments, will  continue  to  ui-ge  full  com- 
pliance with  government  policy  aimed 
at  promoting  national  reconciliation  and 
respect  for  human  rights.  Nonetheless, 
it  would  be  unwise  to  overlook  the  basic 
fact  of  divisions  between  the  Tutsi  and 
Hutsu,  which  hold  a  potential  for  re- 
newed conflict  and  call  for  continual 
attention  and  effort. 

Mozambique 

The  Government  of  Mozambique  also 
took  major  steps  in  1988  to  improve  hu- 
man rights  in  that  country.  Substantial 
numbers  of  exjn-opriated  church  proper- 
ties were  returned,  and  the  government 
reaffirmed,  during  a  Papal  visit  in 
September,  its  commitment  to  complete 
religious  freedom  for  the  people  of 
Mozambique.  The  military  justice  sys- 
tem was  i-evamped  to  try  political  pris- 
oners by  provincial  coui-ts  under  normal 
judicial  procedures.  Heads  of  both  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross  (ICRC)  and  Amnesty  Intei'na- 
tional  visited  Mozambique,  and  the 
ICRC  began  a  program  of  prison  visits 
and  commenced  relief  flights  into  con- 
flict areas.  Over  2,000  prisoners  were 
granted  full  amnesties,  and  pardons 
were  issued  to  hundreds  of  people  who 
had  been  jailed  under  security  laws. 

There  has  been  more  open  debate 
at  party  and  government  meetings,  and 
President  Chissano  has  been  encourag- 
ing the  citizenry  in  open  meetings  to 
voice  their  concerns.  Overall,  we  are 
seeing  a  broadening  of  participation 
within  the  established  structui-es.  In 
preparing  for  the  5th  party  congress 
and  in  drafting  a  new  constitution,  ref- 
erences to  Marxism  are  being  removed 
and  replaced  with  statements  on  de- 


27 


AFRICA 


mocratization,  the  private  market,  and 
individual  as  well  as  collective  interests. 

Despite  these  important  steps, 
serious  human  rights  problems  remain 
due  to  drought  and  civil  conflict  which 
have  caused  the  displacement  of  over 
1  million  Mozambicans  and  the  depar- 
ture of  almost  1  million  refugees.  At- 
tacks by  RENAMO  [Mozambique  Na- 
tional Resistance]  guerrillas  against  de- 
fenseless civilians  have  been  well 
documented  from  a  number  of  govern- 
ment and  nongovernmental  sources,  in- 
cluding missionaries,  international 
organizations,  and  emergency  relief 
workers.  Interviews  with  hundreds  of 
refugees  and  displaced  Mozambicans  in 
early  1988  documented  a  pattern  of 
RENAMO  atrocities  that  included  the 
murder  of  an  estimated  100,000  civil- 
ians, mass  kidnapings,  mutilation, 
rapes,  robbings,  and  forced  labor. 
There  is  no  indication  that  RENAMO 
attacks  on  civilians  have  decreased.  Our 
policy  is  to  use  whatever  influence  is 
available  to  us  to  encourage  an  end  to 
hostilities  and  peaceful  solutions  of  the 
conflict  in  Mozambique.  Mozambicans 
themselves,  however,  must  be  the  pri- 
mary architects  of  a  peaceful  future  for 
their  country. 

Liberia 

The  human  rights  situation  in  Liberia 
has  improved  in  some  respects  but  not 
in  others.  The  year  1988  saw  several 
adverse  developments.  Liberia's  system 
of  authoritarian  government  combined 
with  insecure  leadership  prevented  fur- 
ther moves  toward  greater  pluralism 
of  the  type  which  had  occurred  since 
the  end  of  the  140-year-old  Americo- 
Liberian  oligarchy  in  1980. 

The  fact  that  some  degree  of  insti- 
tutional pluralism  has  emerged  over  the 
past  few  years — in  contrast  to  many 
other  countries  in  the  region — is  at 
times  overlooked  in  the  close  scrutiny 
that  Americans  accord  human  rights  in 
Liberia.  There  are  more  press  publica- 
tions, and  the  fourth  estate  has  spo- 
radically grown  bolder  in  its  reporting 
and  editorial  content,  though  govern- 
ment closings  of  newspapers  occasion- 
ally occur.  Opposition  political  parties 
have  been  allowed  to  operate  and  prop- 
agate their  views  publicly.  A  growing 
number  of  Liberians  living  outside  the 
country — many  of  whom  left  Liberia  in 
the  wake  of  the  1980  coup  or  the  1985 
coup  attempt — are  returning,  without 
harassment  by  the  government.  The 
ruling  National  Democratic  Party 
of  Liberia  (NDPL)  has  engaged  opposi- 
tion parties  in  discussions  on  possible 
power-sharing.  Within  the  military. 


9R 


better  discipline  has  led  to  a  decrease 
in  incidents  of  harassment  of  civilians. 
The  legislature  has,  at  times,  acted 
independently  of  the  e.xecutive. 

Despite  the  positive  aspects  out- 
lined above,  over  the  past  year,  there 
have  been  a  number  of  setbacks  to  im- 
proved human  rights  observance.  In  the 
wake  of  the  discovery  of  an  alleged 
coup  plot  last  April,  the  government 
responded  by  detaining  several  jour- 
nalists and  by  suspending  two  inde- 
pendent newspapers  and  one  party 
newsletter  for  ai-ticles  critical  of  the 
government.  No  headway  has  been 
made  in  the  power-sharing  talks  with 
the  opposition.  Several  of  the  alleged 
conspirators  in  a  July  coup  plot,  includ- 
ing Nicholas  Podier,  former  vice  head  of 
state,  died  under  questionable  circum- 
stances. Others  detained  in  1988 — in- 
cluding William  Kpoleh,  a  former 
opposition  presidential  candidate,  and 
two  American  citizens — were  held  for 
weeks  without  charge  and  without  ac- 
cess to  counsel.  The  Americans  were 
released  in  November  1988.  Events  be- 
fore and  during  the  trial  of  Kpoleh  and 
nine  others  on  charges  related  to  the 
April  coup  plot  presented  a  mi.xed  pic- 
ture; there  were  some  alleged  instances 
of  government  interference  in  the  judi- 
cial process  but  other  examples,  such 
as  the  issuance  of  court  orders  in  vari- 
ance of  the  government's  wishes,  dem- 
onstrated some  separation  of  powers. 
Serious  questions  remain  about  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice  and  e.xecutive 
branch  willingness  to  respect  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  judiciary.  The  NDPL- 
controUed  legislature  demonstrated 
greater  signs  of  docility  ois-a-vis  the 
executive.  The  government  also  im- 
pinged on  the  right  of  association  by 
banning  all  student  organizations  and 
continuing  restrictions  on  worker  rights 
to  unionize. 

Our  policy  is  to  encourage  the 
growth  of  democratic  institutions  and 
the  rule  of  law  in  Liberia,  a  policy 
which  we  have  clearly  enunciated  in  our 
contacts  with  the  government.  We  have 
funded  e.xchanges  and  training  on  is- 
sues relating  to  constitutionalism  and 
democracy.  Our  embassy  has  sponsored 
seminars  on  subjects  such  as  the  inde- 
pendent press  and  the  separation  of 
powers.  We  have  also  funded  the  crea- 
tion of  a  law  library,  which  is  designed 
to  help  improve  the  quality  of  judicial 
proceedings. 

Language  in  the  fiscal  year  (FY) 
1988  and  FY  1989  foreign  assistance  ap- 
propriations acts  made  economic  sup- 
port fund  (ESF)  obligation  contingent 
upon  certification  of  improvements  in  a 
number  of  economic  and  human  rights 


areas.  For  reasons  noted  above,  we  di' 
not  consider  it  appropriate  to  certify  i 
human  i-ights  grounds  in  order  to  re- 
lease ESF  monies.  Blanket  withholdir 
of  ESF  to  all  sectors — including  the 
nongovernmental  sector — may  not, 
based  on  evidence  thus  far,  serve  as  a: 
inducement  to  the  Government  of  Lib- 
eria to  change  its  ways.  Nor,  of  course 
is  it  helpful  in  terms  of  fostering  pri- 
vate enterprise  or  meeting  basic  hums 
needs.  We  look  forward  to  working 
with  your  subcommittee  to  fashion 
ways  in  which  U.S.  concerns  can  be 
articulated  to  the  government  while  n 
penalizing  those  elements  of  society 
which  U.S.  assistance  programs  have 
historically,  and  for  good  reasons,  bee 
designed  to  assist. 

Uganda 

Since  coming  to  power  3  years  ago. 
President  Yoweri  Museveni  and  his  N 
tional  Resistance  Movement  have  mac 
impressive  progress  in  promoting  na- 
tional reconciliation  and  instilling  re- 
spect for  human  rights  in  war-torn 
Uganda.  Museveni  has  also  gradually 
begun  to  get  the  economy  back  on  its 
feet,  reaching  accommodation  with  th 
World  Bank  and  the  IMF  [Internatioi 
Monetary  FundJ.  The  remaining  obsti 
cle  to  national  unity  is  the  ongoing  in 
surgency  in  the  north  and  east. 

Perhaps  the  most  noteworthy  im 
provement  in  the  human  rights  situa- 
tion under  President  Museveni  is  the 
conduct  of  his  troops.  The  National 
Resistance  Army  (NRA)  is  a  well-dis 
plined  force  in  comparison  to  previou 
Ugandan  armies,  although  its  cohesic 
has  been  affected  by  the  number  of  f( 
mer  rebels  who  have  been  integi'ated 
into  the  NRA  after  taking  advantage 
Museveni's  amnesty  offers.  Recently, 
there  have  been  allegations  that  the 
NRA  has  committed  human  rights 
abuses  in  the  north.  As  it  has  in  the 
past,  the  government  has  stated  that 
these  charges  will  be  investigated  an( 
those  responsible  dealt  with.  Indeed, 
since  coming  to  power,  the  Museveni 
government  has  held  its  troops  to  a 
standard  of  accountability  previously 
unheard  of  in  Uganda.  We  are  con- 
cerned about  these  recent  allegations 
and  are  investigating  them.  It  is  im- 
portant to  remember  that  the  NRA  i 
engaged  in  a  struggle  against  a 
disorganized  insurgency  which  has  bf 
extremely  cruel  in  its  treatment  of  th 
local  population. 

We  are  also  impressed  by  the 
number  of  newsjjapers  operating  in 
Kampala  and  by  the  relatively  free  P' 


I 

i 


AFRICA 


;ical  debate  which  takes  place  in  the 
ational  Resistance  Council.  Another 
jmonstration  of  improved  human 
ghts  conditions  is  the  fact  that  refu- 
se repatriation  continued  at  an  accel- 
•ated  pace,  so  that  by  the  end  of  1988 
most  all  former  Ugandan  refugees 
,d  returned  home.  President  Museveni 
ilcomes  visits  by  human  rights  orga- 
zations  and,  in  past  years,  has  sought 
•portunities  to  discuss  our  annual  hu- 
an  rights  reports.  A  i-ecently  ap- 
•inted  constitutional  commission  is 
sked  with  working  with  the  public  to 
aft  a  new  constitution.  When  he  came 
power,  President  Museveni  commit- 
d  himself  to  elections  within  4  years. 

There  is  room  for  impi'ovement.  We 
vestigate,  to  the  best  of  our  ability, 

allegations  of  torture  or  other 
uses  by  the  NRA  or  other  govern- 
ent  officials,  and  we  are  concerned  by 
e  number  of  former  rebels  who  are 
Id  in  civilian  prisons  while  undergo- 
g  a  political  screening  process.  We 
e  encouraged,  however,  by  the  recent 
anting  of  access  to  militarv  barracks 

ICRC  delegates. 
On  balance,  our  relations  with 
»anda  since  President  Museveni  took 
wer  have  been  very  good.  We  believe 

is  doing  a  credible  job  of  restoring 
ganda's  shattered  economic  and  hu- 
in  infrastructure  and  is  taking  steps 

ensure  that  Uganda's  tragic  history 
mot  repeated.  The  United  States 
puld  continue  to  help  in  any  way 
tesible. 

1  nya 

I  lations  between  the  United  States 
■c  1  Kenya  have  been  close  since 
I  nya  s  independence  25  years  ago.  We 
h .e  a  deep  and  multifaceted  rela- 
t  iiship  with  this  key  country.  Over  100 
IS.  companies  are  active  there.  We 
1  .('  large  economic  assistance  and 
i  R'e  Corps  programs  and  a  significant 
curce  of  military  cooperation.  Over 
t '  years,  Kenya  has  followed  a  fi'ee- 
r  iket  approach  which  has  made  its 
einoniy  the  envy  of  many  neighbors. 
I  Kenya's  relatively  open  political  sys- 
I    the  coups  and  ethnic  strife  which 
■   |ilagued  many  other  African  coun- 
■.--  have  been  largely  absent. 

This  very  positive  environment 
•  I  rs  recent  infringements  of  human 
'  ^  in  Kenya  both  puzzling  and  dis- 
iig.  During  the  past  year,  a 
liner  of  actions  by  the  Government 
I  Kenya  have  caught  our  attention.  In 
-pi'ing  of  1988,  the  secret  ballot  was 
led  by  "queueing"  in  parliamen- 


Namibian  Independence 
and  Troop  Withdrawal  From  Angola 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  31,  1989' 

Tomorrow  marks  the  beginning  of  the 
transition  process  toward  Namibian  in- 
dependence, which  has  been  long 
awaited  by  the  people  of  Africa's  last 
colony.  For  the  United  States,  this  day 
represents  the  culmination  of  years  of 
effort — under  both  Democratic  and 
Republican  Administrations,  with 
the  broad  support  of  the  American 
people — to  achieve  the  independence 
of  Namibia  through  a  peaceful,  nego- 
tiated process  that  recognizes  the  fun- 
damental human  rights  of  the  people  of 
Namibia  to  choose  their  own  form  of 
government  democratically. 

April  1  offers  the  hope  of  new  be- 
ginnings in  Angola,  as  well.  The  proc- 
ess of  total  Cuban  troop  withdrawal 
formally  begins  on  that  day.  As  foreign 
forces  withdraw  from  that  country, 
there  are  new  and  challenging  oppor- 
tunities for  the  Popular  Movement  for 
the  Liberation  of  Angola  (MPLA)  and 
the  National  Union  for  the  Total  Inde- 
pendence of  Angola  (UNITA)  to  end  the 
tragic  civil  war  that  has  ravaged  An- 
gola since  its  independence. 

The  agreements  that  are  leading  to 
independence  for  Namibia  and  Cuban 
troop  withdrawal  from  Angola  would 
not  have  been  possible  without  the 
goodwill  and  commitment  to  tough 
choices  by  the  parties  most  directly 
involved.  In  addition,  the  support  of 
other  countries  seeking  a  peaceful  res- 
olution to  the  problems  of  the  region 
was  crucial.  In  particular,  the  active 
cooperation  of  the  United  States  and 
the  U.S.S.R.  has  been  an  example  of 


how  superpowers,  working  together, 
can  help  resolve  regional  conflicts. 

We  are  proud  of  the  American  con- 
tribution to  this  process,  and  we  re- 
main committed  to  its  successful 
completion.  The  United  States  has  al- 
ready provided,  and  will  continue  to 
provide,  aircraft  to  move  essential  UN 
personnel  and  cargo  to  Namibia.  We 
have  reopened  the  U.S.  Liaison  Office 
in  Windhoek,  with  a  small  American 
staff,  to  maintain  contact  with  the  UN 
Transition  Assistance  Group  (UNTAG) 
which  will  oversee  the  process  leading 
to  independence,  as  well  as  with  others 
involved  in  the  transition  effort. 
President  Bush  has  authorized  that 
$5  million  be  made  available  from  the 
emergency  refugee  and  migration  as- 
sistance fund  to  sup])ort  the  UN  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR) 
repatriation  program  to  return  refu- 
gees to  Namibia  by  the  start  of  the 
country's  first  election  campaign, 
scheduled  to  begin  July  1. 

In  addition,  the  United  States  to- 
day is  making  its  first  contribution  of 
$1.5  million  toward  the  e.xpenses  of 
UNTAG.  This  represents  the  first  in- 
stallment toward  our  total  assessed 
contribution  of  appro.ximately  $128  mil- 
lion. The  Administration  has  requested 
from  the  Congress  the  necessary  fund- 
ing authority  to  meet  this  obligation, 
which  will  be  crucial  in  enabling  the 
United  Nations  to  carry  out  its  man- 
date in  Namibia.  I  urge  the  Congress 
to  give  this  request  prompt  and  favor- 
able consideration. 


'Press  release  .57. 


tary  primary  elections,  and  the  use  of 
"queueing"  for  future  general  elections 
was  discussed.  In  August  1988,  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  hastily  passed  con- 
stitutional amendments  which  gave  the 
President  the  right  to  replace  judges 
and  allowed  pohce  to  detain  suspects  in 
capital  crimes  without  charge  for  up  to 
14  days  instead  of  24  hours.  A  number 
of  Kenyans  suspected  of  belonging  to 
subversive  groups  were  detained  with- 
out charge  before  being  rushed  through 
court  without  legal  representation.  Hu- 
man rights  groups  asked  a  Kenyan  law- 
yer, Gibson  Kuria,  who  had  previously 
been  detained  after  representing  politi- 


cal detainees,  to  visit  the  United 
States;  he  was  not  allowed  to  do  so. 
Another  lawyer  who  accepted  the 
Robert  F.  Kennedy  Memorial  Human 
Rights  Award  on  Kuria's  behalf  had  his 
passport  confiscated  upon  his  return 
to  Kenya. 

More  in  accordance  with  the  kind 
of  Kenya  we  are  familiar  with.  Presi- 
dent Moi  released  nine  political  de- 
tainees in  early  1988.  Soon  after  that, 
he  appointed  a  new  police  commissioner 
and  charged  him  with  cleaning  up  the 
police  force.  Despite  high  unemploy- 
ment and  population  growth,  Kenya 


tmartmpnt  nf  <>tatp  Biillptin/Mav  1Q8Q 


29 


AFRICA 


continues  to  accept  a  significant 
number  of  refugees. 

In  essence,  our  policy  challenge  is 
to  make  clear  our  concerns  on  these 
issues  while  maintaining  the  special 
friendship  with  a  country  which  re- 
mains one  of  Africa's  success  stories 
both  in  terms  of  economic  growth  and 
political  stability.  We  believe  we  should 
remain  engaged  and  continue  our  forth- 
right dialogue  on  human  rights  issues 
with  senior  Kenyan  officials. 

Ethiopia 

Our  human  rights  activities  in  Ethiopia 
have  centered  on  food  delivery  and  dis- 
tribution during  the  international  food 
relief  effort  of  the  past  year.  We  have 
also  been  concerned  about  restrictions 
on  political  freedoms  and  freedom  of 
movement  and  human  rights  violations 
occurring  in  conjunction  with  the 
northern  civil  war. 

There  has  been  little  change  in  the 
human  rights  situation  outside  the  war 
zone.  The  government  still  holds  an  es- 
timated 2,000-3,000  political  prisoners, 
detained  without  charge  or  trial.  The 
government  continues  its  resettlement 
program  but  contends  it  seeks  volun- 
tary participants.  We  are  aware  of  only 
one  incident  during  1988  in  which  peo- 
ple were  forcibly  resettled.  The  govern- 
ment is  also  pi'oceeding  quietly  with  its 
"villagization"  program  whereby  people 
are  collected  in  settlements  to  ra- 
tionalize the  delivery  of  central  services. 

We  are  unable  to  investigate  all  al- 
leged human  rights  abuses  rising  from 
the  civil  war  in  the  north  but  are  aware 
that,  on  at  least  one  occasion,  govern- 
ment planes  attacked  civilians  gathered 
at  a  food  distribution  center.  All  war- 
ring parties  impress  civilians  into  mili- 
tary service,  and  little  or  no  care  is 
shown  the  civilian  population  in  the 
conflict  areas. 

Despite  the  introduction  of  a  new 
constitution  in  September  1987,  the 
people  of  Ethiopia  have  little  or  no  ac- 
cess to  legal  due  process.  The  Mengistu 
regime  continues  to  rule  with  an  iron 
hand,  using  violence  when  deemed 
necessary. 

The  United  States  took  the  lead  in 
the  relief  effort  which  provided  more 
than  1  million  tons  of  food.  This  pre- 
vented mass  starvation  among  a  needy 
population  originally  estimated  to  be 
several  million.  Food  delivery  to  home 
areas  was  sufficiently  successful  that 
people  did  not  have  to  abandon  their 
homes  to  move  to  feeding  camps  or  to 
neighboring  countries.  All  available  in- 
dications are  that  the  rains  in  1988  were 


30 


plentiful,  and  the  people  expect  good 
harvests.  However,  we  should  not  be 
complacent,  as  Ethiopia  could  still  have 
a  shortfall  of  a  half-million  tons  of  food. 

Despite  the  overall  success  of  the 
international  effort,  donors  encountered 
many  obstacles:  Ethiopian  insurgents 
attacked  and  destroyed  several  convoys, 
the  government  often  closed  access 
roads  to  target  areas  for  security  rea- 
sons, and,  in  April  1988,  the  govern- 
ment expelled  all  foreign  relief  workers 
from  the  war-torn  and  drought-stricken 
northern  Provinces  of  Eritrea  and  Ti- 
gray.  In  general,  the  government  and 
the  insurgents  put  military  priorities 
before  humanitarian  concerns.  After 
the  expulsion  of  foreign  relief  workers, 
indigenous  organizations  picked  up  the 
slack  but  were  not  allowed  to  distribute 
food  outside  government-controlled 
areas.  Insurgent  relief  organizations 
expanded  their  food  distribution  net- 
works to  areas  under  their  control. 

Sudan 

Sudan  has  one  of  the  few  functioning 
democracies  in  Africa,  though  there  is 
little  participation  by  the  largely  non- 
Muslim  southern  population  due  to  the 
civil  war.  In  areas  not  affected  by  the 
civil  war,  there  is  wide  freedom  of 
speech  and  the  press.  Opposition  pa- 
pers in  Khartoum  can  be  sharply  criti- 
cal of  the  government.  Personal 
freedoms  are  generally  respected  out- 
side the  war  zone. 

In  the  zones  of  conflict,  the  civil 
war,  now  entering  its  sixth  year,  has 
caused  human  suffering  unparalleled  in 
Africa  last  year.  Numbers  are  only 
guesses,  but  an  estimated  1-2  million 
southern  Sudanese  have  fled  north,  los- 
ing the  ability  to  survive  on  their  own. 
About  330,000  southern  Sudanese  have 
fled  to  refugee  camps  in  Ethiopia,  often 
walking  for  months  across  southern 
Sudan  to  reach  them — many  dying  on 
the  way.  There  is  no  reliable  way  of 
knowing  the  numbers  of  victims  of 
starvation. 

The  tragic  paradox  is  that  there  is 
sufficient  food  in  Sudan  to  avert  starva- 
tion but  not  enough  is  being  delivered. 
Both  sides  have  tended  to  place  other 
considerations  ahead  of  the  delivery  of 
food.  Still,  by  late  1988,  efforts  of  the 
ICRC  and  private  voluntary  organiza- 
tions were  making  significant,  if  slow, 
progress.  Despite  ongoing  intensive  re- 
lief efforts,  thousands  more  may  starve 
unless  the  warring  parties  can  find 
their  way  to  a  cease-fii'e  which  will  per- 
mit much  larger  deliveries  of  food  into 
the  war  zone.  It  is  urgent  that  relief 


iJ 


f 


supplies  be  in  place  by  April  when  the 
rains  will  again  block  overland  routes 
and  many  airfields  for  6  months.  But  i 
cease-fire  will  not  be  achieved  absent 
greatly  enhanced  mutual  trust,  which, 
in  turn,  hinges  on  the  government's 
ability  to  deliver  assurances  to  the 
south  about  the  status  of  Islamic  laws 
during  a  constitutional  conference.  Thi 
Sudanese  People's  Liberation  Army/ 
Democratic  Unionist  Party  accord  of 
early  December  embodied  this  kind  of 
bargain,  which  is  why  the  United 
States  was  deeply  and  vocally  disap- 
pointed that  the  accord  has  not  been 
vigorously  pursued. 

Somalia 

The  Department  of  State  welcomes  co 
gressional  interest  in  Somalia  and  seel 
bipartisan  support  for  a  policy  that  is 
consistent  with  U.S.  interests.  We 
share  the  same  principal  concerns  and 
objectives:  high  among  them  are  an  er 
to  the  fighting,  national  reconciliation 
and  human  rights  improvements. 

Publicly  and  privately,  we  have 
been  urging  Somalia  to  seek  a  politica 
solution  that  will  achieve  national  rec- 
onciliation with  the  northern  Somalis 
from  whom  the  Somali  National  Move 
ment  (SNM)  draws  its  members. 
Important  to  such  a  solution  will  be 
improved  observance  of  human  rights, 
and  we  have  noted  a  change  for  the 
better  since  combat  was  at  its  most  ir 
tense  in  the  late  spring  and  early  sunn 
men  Since  that  time,  substantiated 
reports  of  atrocities  have  virtually 
stopped. 

The  government  has  announced 
measures  which,  if  implemented,  will 
go  a  long  way  toward  ending  the  fight 
ing  and  promoting  national  reconcilia- 
tion. President  Siad  has  instructed  hit 
army  to  exercise  restraint  toward  civi 
ians,  and  he  announced  that  refugees 
would  be  welcomed  back  to  their 
homes.  He  invited  all  interested  do- 
nors, including  the  ICRC,  to  aid  in  th 
relief  and  reconstruction  of  the  north. 
He  appointed  a  constitutional  commit- 
tee whose  objective  was  to  study  the 
root  cause  of  the  conflict  and  recom- 
mend corrective  measures. 

The  commission  presented  a  far- 
reaching  report  that  describes  the  wai 
as  "unwinnable"  in  military  terms  and 
calls  instead  for  a  negotiated  political 
solution  aimed  at  national  reconcilia- 
tion. To  this  end,  it  urges  the  Preside! 
to  free  all  persons  detained  since  the 
fighting  began,  restore  constitutional 
guarantees  against  arbitrary  arrest, 
demilitarize  northern  towns,  ease  rule 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  198,. 


AFRICA 


Hgainst  public  gatherings,  and  place  lo- 
jjal  people  in  positions  of  civil  authority 
,|here.  It  also  calls  for  economic  liber- 
jflization  in  the  north  plus  a  major  gov- 
rnnient-sponsored,  donor-supported 
elief  and  reconstruction  effort.  Presi- 
ent  Siad  endorsed  the  report  verbatim. 
After  releasing  over  100  prisoners 
1st  fall,  he  has  now  set  up  a  special 
ibunal  to  review  the  cases  of  all  per- 
ons  detained  since  the  fighting  began, 
•ith  instructions  to  release  all  who  are 
.■illing  to  accept  the  government's  ani- 
esty.  President  Siad  has  also  set  up 
nother  commission  to  investigate 
reader  charges  of  human  rights 
buses,  and  he  invited  Amnesty  In- 
?rnational  to  send  a  delegation  to 
I  omalia.  We  will  be  closely  watching 

Iiese  developments,  and  we  hope  the 
ositive  announcements  will  be  imple- 
lented  fully  and  quickly. 

We  believe  it  is  very  important  that 
le  United  States  remain  engaged  in 
domalia  in  order  to  keep  that  mo- 
il lentum  going.  We  need  to  show  our 
i|  ipport  for  positive  change  while  con- 
i  nuing  to  press  for  further 
iprovements. 

ijouth  Africa 

he  South  African  Government  took 
Iditional  measures  during  1988  to 
ippress  opposition  to  apartheid.  In 
?bruary,  the  government  effectively 
mned  17  antiapartheid  organizations, 
eluding  the  United  Democratic  Front 
JDf^),  a  loosely  organized  national 
ovement  of  more  than  600  anti- 
)artheid  groups,  and  prohibited  the 
rgest  labor  union,  the  black-controlled 
ongress  of  South  African  Ti-ade 
nions,  from  engaging  in  political  ac- 
uities. A  total  of  32  organizations 
ere  banned  in  1988.  In  June  the 
)vernment  renewed  for  a  third  con- 
■cutive  year  the  state  of  emergency, 
,is  time  placing  tougher  restrictions 
1  the  media,  which  further  reduced 
■ailable  information  on  the  number  of 
'tentions  and  the  extent  of  political 
olence  and  made  it  harder  for  political 
jponents  of  the  government  to  have 
leir  voices  heard. 

In  December  1988,  the  Department 

State  strongly  protested  the  convic- 
ons  of  11  UDF  activists  in  the  Delmas 
eason  trial.  The  implications  of  the 
•rdict  were  far  reaching:  although 
)ne  of  the  defendants  had  been  ac- 
ised  of  direct  instigation  of  violence, 
le  judge  asserted  that  they  were  part 

a  UDF  conspiracy  to  make  South 
frica  "ungovernable"  through  a  cam- 
liun  of  mass  action,  of  which  violence 


was  an  intended  and  inevitable 
component. 

The  African  National  Congress 
(ANC) — in  an  apparent  major  change  in 
its  policy  of  not  attacking  civilian  tar- 
gets— was  responsible  for  a  number  of 
bombings  that  resulted  in  civilian  casu- 
alties. In  addition,  violence  between 
rival  black  organizations,  particularly 
clashes  in  Natal  Province  between  UDF 
supporters  and  Chief  Buthelezi's  Zulu- 
led  Inkatha  movement,  continued  at  a 
high  level  last  year.  While  townships  in 
the  rest  of  the  country  remained  quiet, 
relative  to  the  tumultuous  1984-86 
period,  occasional  attacks  on  black 
"collaborators"  continued.  Candidates 
in  the  October  municipal  elections  were 
particular  targets.  South  African  se- 
curity forces  and/oi-  i-ightwing  vig- 
ilantes were  suspected  of  involvement 
in  a  number  of  unsolved  killings  and 
bombings  directed  against  anti- 
ajjartheid  individuals  and  groups. 

On  the  positive  side,  in  December 
1988,  the  South  African  Government 
commuted  the  death  sentences  of  the 
Sharpeville  Six,  who  had  been  present 
in  a  crowd  that  killed  a  black  township 
official  and  were  subsequently  con- 
victed of  murder.  Several  prominent 
political  prisoners  were  released, 
including  Henry  Gwala  (ANC  leader), 
Zeph  Mothopeng  (president  of  the  Pan 
African  Congress),  and  Zwelakhe  Sisulu 
(journalist).  Moses  Mayekiso,  a  promi- 
nent trade  union  official  on  trial  for 
treason,  was  granted  bail.  Three  promi- 
nent UDF  activists,  who  escaped  police 
custody  and  took  refuge  in  the  U.S. 
Consulate  General  in  Johannesburg  in 
September,  were  allowed  to  leave  the 
consulate  unmolested  and  were  subse- 
quently granted  passports  for  ti-avel 
abroad.  The  estimated  number  of  per- 
sons detained  without  charge  declined 
to  1,.500  at  the  end  of  1988,  compared  to 
1,850  at  the  end  of  1987. 


Resource  Commitments 

The  United  States  not  only  identifies 
and  protests  human  rights  violations 
wherever  they  occur  in  Africa  but  also 
directly  attacks  the  causes  and  effects 
of  human  rights  abuses  through  its  as- 
sistance programs:  in  FY  1989,  the 
U.S.  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment and  the  State  Department  are 
jointly  administering  a  .$2-million  hu- 
man rights  program  in  Africa.  These 
funds  are  being  used  to  assist  in  law 
codification,  to  promote  fair  multiparty 
elections,  upgrade  legal  facilities,  edu- 
cate people  about  civil  and  political 
rights,  and  to  assist  in  the  legal  de- 


fense of  those  charged  with  violating 
repressive  or  discriminatory  statutes. 

Refugees  and  displaced  persons  are 
often  a  manifestation  of  human  rights 
abuses.  Afi-ica  has  the  largest  number 
of  refugees — currently  over  4  million — 
of  any  continent  in  the  world.  The  U.S. 
Government  is  and  has  been,  since  the 
late  1970s,  the  largest  single  donor  of 
refugee  and  migration  assistance  aid  in 
Africa.  And  that  enables  us  to  take  a 
lead  role  in  fostering  solutions  to  these 
kinds  of  human  rights  problems.  Dur- 
ing FY  1989,  the  United  States  will 
provide  about  $55  million  in  assistance 
to  African  refugees  escaping  turmoil 
and  political  persecution  in  their  native 
countries.  Of  this  amount,  $11  million 
will  be  provided  to  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross,  which, 
among  other  things,  aids  political  pris- 
oners and  victims  of  persecution. 

The  question  of  resources  is  vital. 
This  country's  commitment  to  human 
rights  in  Africa  must  be  matched  by 
the  commitment  of  real  resources.  As 
you  are  well  aware,  we  have  witnessed 
over  the  past  half-dozen  years  a  sea 
change  in  economic  policy  in  Africa, 
as  government  after  government  has 
turned  away  from  the  intellectually  and 
empirically  bankrupt  practices  of  state 
control  to  open  up  their  economies  to 
the  invigorating  forces  of  market  com- 
petition. This  process  has  been  a  slow 
and  difficult  one,  with  more  than  its 
share  of  fits  and  starts,  involving,  in 
most  cases,  both  the  reduction  of  total 
spending  and  the  reallocation  of  re- 
sources toward  more  productive  ac- 
tivities. Both  of  these  are  necessary 
and  will  prove  beneficial  over  the  long 
term.  But  both  also  involve  a  short- 
term  cost  to  particular  elements  of  soci- 
ety, often  the  poorest  and  least  politi- 
cally influential. 

The  process  of  economic  policy  re- 
form in  Africa  is  one  of  the  most  pro- 
found developments  there  is  in  this 
generation,  and  we  wish  fervently  to 
see  it  succeed.  Only  with  the  revitaliza- 
tion  of  Africa's  economies  can  the  wel- 
fare of  its  poorest  citizens  be  improved. 
But  we  realize  that  adjustment  is  strong 
medicine,  often  resisted  by  the  patient. 
Experience  thus  far  has  shown  that  ex- 
ternal assistance  can  help  to  improve 
its  chances  for  success.  The  United 
States  has  made  a  substantial  contribu- 
tion to  this  process  through  our  bilat- 
eral assistance  effort,  and  we  would 
urge  that  this  support  be  continued, 
even  in  these  difficult  budgetary  times. 


iepartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


31 


AFRICA 


Conclusion 

We  are  both  encouraged  by  some 
trends  in  African  human  rights  per- 
formance and  undaunted  by  the  work 
still  to  be  done.  In  many  of  the  world's 
poorest  countries,  where  subsistence 
living  conditions  are  almost  beyond  the 
imagination  of  most  Americans,  we 
need  development  resources  to  assist  us 
in  urging  governments  to  allow  basic 
freedoms.  Freedom  of  the  pi-ess,  re- 
ligious tolerance,  and  free  elections  are 
vital  human  rights,  and  we  must  con- 
tinue to  assist  governments  and  peoples 
in  developing  societies  to  claim  those 
fundamental  freedoms.  We  must  con- 
tinue to  build  on  what  we  and  Africans 
have  begun  to  accomplish. 


DEPUTY  ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY  FARRANI), 
FEB.  8,  1989 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  add  to  Mr.  Brown's  remai'ks.  I  would 
like  to  comment  on  a  few  human  rights 
trends  that  affect  most,  although  not 
all,  of  the  countries  in  Africa  and  to 
elaborate  on  the  possible  roots  of  these 
problems. 

To  begin,  most  African  countries 
are  one-party  states,  with  power  con- 
centrated in  the  chief  e.xecutive.  These 
one-party  systems  often  have  strong  in- 
ternal disciplinary  mechanisms,  which 
limit  dissent  within  the  party.  In  these 
societies,  there  are  also  often  limita- 
tions on  press  freedom  and  on  public 
expression  of  opposing  political  or  re- 
ligious views,  as  well  as  restrictions 
on  freedom  of  peaceful  association 
and  assembly. 

Some  Africans  argue  that  these 
limitations  are  necessary  at  this  stage 
in  the  young  lives  of  their  nations.  They 
point  to  the  fact  that  country  bound- 
aries in  Africa  were  often  drawn  by  co- 
lonial powers  with  no  consideration 
given  to  the  various  tribes  that  were 
thrown  together. 

Some  African  leaders  see  the  task 
of  nation-building — that  is,  of  creating 
loyalty  to  the  nation  rather  than  to  a 
tribe  or  an  ethnic  group — as  the  first 
necessity  if  their  countries  are  to  have 
any  kind  of  a  stable  future.  They  fear 
that  allowing  untrammeled  dissent 
among  the  populace  will  make  it  much 
more  difficult  to  build  this  sense  of  na- 
tionhood. Indeed,  in  many  cases,  Af- 
rican leaders  feel  their  fears  have  been 
proven  justified,  as  countries  around 
them  suffer  the  continuing  instability  of 
one  military  coup  after  another.  They 
often  fail  to  see  that  repression  of  non- 
violent e.xpression  can  breed  violent 


32 


dissent,  which,  in  turn,  causes  more 
repression.  This  cycle,  once  begun,  is 
difficult  to  break. 

Second,  many  African  countries 
suffer  from  totally  inadequate  justice 
systems.  In  many  cases,  the  basic  pi'ob- 
lem  seems  to  be  that  the  e.xecutive 
branch  of  government  is  either  unwill- 
ing to  allow  an  independent  judiciary  to 
flourish  or  is  unable  to  devote  the  fi- 
nancial and  educational  resources  nec- 
essary to  establish  the  rule  of  law.  In 
some  cases,  colonial  practices  were  de- 
signed to  suppress  agitation  against 
colonial  rule  rather  than  to  protect 
individual  rights,  and  these  practices 
have,  unfortunately,  endured  in  these 
societies.  In  other  cases,  police  are  not 
well  trained  in  arrest  and  investigation 
procedures  and  consequently  feel  com- 
pelled to  extract  confessions  by  force, 
in  order  to  obtain  convictions  and  con- 
trol crime.  Court  opinions  may  go  un- 
published, so  that  each  judge  must 
decide  each  case  anew  without  the  ben- 
efit of  precedent.  Moreover,  law  en- 
forcement agents  or  employees  of  the 
court  system  may  not  be  paid  ade- 
quately enough  to  prevent  wide-scale 
corruption. 

Finally,  the  problem  of  ethnic  dis- 
crimination and  strife  persists,  as  illus- 
trated most  vividly  in  South  Africa  and 
so  tragically  in  Burundi  in  August  of 
last  year,  when  an  estimated  5,000 
Burundi  citizens,  perhaps  more,  died  in 
ethnic  violence.  Ethnic  tensions  played 
a  role — to  varying  extent — in  many  of 
the  civil  conflicts  from  which  stemmed 
so  many  of  the  major  human  rights 
abuses  in  Africa  during  1988,  particu- 
larly in  the  Hoi'n  of  Africa. 

All  of  these  concerns  and  consid- 
erations, if  true — and  we  in  the  Bureau 
of  Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian  Af- 
fairs believe  they  are  accurate  depic- 
tions of  what  is  actually  going  on  in 
many  parts  of  Africa — all  of  these  con- 
siderations lead  us  to  ask:  Wliat  can  we 
do  in  a  practical  way  to  help  African 
nations  improve  their  human  rights  re- 
cords? There  are  no  easy  answers  and 
the  tools  available  to  us  are  the  same  as 
those  we  use  elsewhere  in  the  world — 
among  them,  quiet  diplomacy,  economic 
leverage,  public  statements,  debate  in 
international  organizations,  and  threats 
to  reduce  or  withdraw  our  assistance 
jjrograms. 

We  recognize  that  our  effectiveness 
will  be  blunted  if  we  e.xcuse  the  human 
rights  abuses  of  some  African  countries 
on  the  grounds  that  the  human  rights 
records  of  their  neighbors  are  worse. 
At  the  same  time,  it  would  not  serve 
our  interest,  or  advance  our  principles, 


if  we  focused  all  of  our  attention  on 
those  countries  whose  more  liberal  at 
titude  toward  public  expression  permit 
us  to  know  more  details  of  such  abuser 
as  do  occur.  So  sometimes,  to  be  effec 
five — I  repeat,  effective — we  must 
structure  our  criticism  to  take  these 
realities  into  account. 

Finally,  we  must  be  a  bit  humble 
and  recognize — as  is  the  case  through- 
out the  world — that  only  Africans  can 
improve  human  rights  practices  in  Af- 
rica. In  that  respect,  we  have  encoura) 
ing  news.  As  you  know.  Section  116(e) 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  provides 
for  use  of  certain  assistance  funds  for 
human  rights  projects  each  year.  In  th 
past  few  years,  requests  for  funding  fc 
such  projects  from  African  countries 
show  an  increasing  awareness  of  and 
commitment  to  human  rights  issues. 
A  few  countries  have  led  the  way  in 
searching  for  African  solutions  to  the; 
human  rights  problems  by  establishin 
independent  human  rights  leagues  or 
commissions,  as  has  happened  in  Mau 
tania,  Togo,  and  Uganda,  or  have 
placed  greater  emphasis  on  human 
rights  issues  by  the  creation  of  specia* 
institutions,  such  as  the  Judicial  Com 
mission  and  the  Department  of  Citize 
Rights  and  Liberties  in  Zaire.  These 
commissions  obviously  cannot  and  do 
not  provide  all  the  answers.  It  would 
premature  to  say  that  they  have  been 
effective  in  all,  or  even  many,  respect 
but  they  are  a  start. 

Other  African  countries  are  now 
seeking  our  assistance  in  creating  siff 
ilar  organizations.  But  the  real  key  t( 
change  in  Africa  is  the  courageous  in 
dividuals — government  leaders,  civil 
servants,  lawyers,  teachers,  doctors, 
journalists,  students,  men  and  womei 
people  from  all  walks  of  life  and  all  et 
nic  groups — who  on  a  day-to-day  basi 
are  taking  risks  to  speak  out,  to  teacl 
people  about  their  basic  political  and 
civil  rights,  and  to  hold  governments 
their  international  commitments  to  hi 
man  rights.  I  am  deeply  pleased  to 
have  been  invited  to  participate  in 
these  hearings  today,  and  I  hope  this 
exchange  of  views  will  give  new  encoi 
agement  to  those  quiet  but  persistent 
and  often  unknown  heroes  of  the  hum 
rights  cause  in  Africa. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  ar 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


» 


ARMS  CONTROL 


European  Security  Negotiations 
Open  in  Vienna 


Separaie  negotiations  on  conven- 
fiiiiial  armed  forces  in  Europe  (CFE) 
'uiil  on  confidence-  and  security- 
hiiililincj  measures  (CSBMs)  opened  in 
\'ii  una  on  March  .9,  19S9. 

Following  are  a  statement  by  Pres- 
iilt')it  Bush:  a  statement  by  Ambas- 
^iiihir  Stephen  J.  Ledogar,  head  of  the 
I'.S.  delegation  to  the  CFE  talks,  that 
ijijieared  in  a  joint  USI A/State  Depart- 
iiii  lit  publication  entitled  "CFE";  the 
i(  xi  of  the  Western  position  paper  on 
'.'FE:  and  a  statement  by  Ambassador 
hilni  J.  Maresca,  head  of  the  U.S.  dele- 
liitlon  to  the  CSBMs  talks,  made  at  the 
''V.s/  plenary  session  of  the  CSBMs 

'alks. 


I'KESIDENT  BUSH, 
MAR.  9,  1989' 

Piiilay  marks  the  beginning  of  a  process 
if  great  importance  for  the  people  of 
Kiirope,  the  United  States,  and  Canada 
Hid  for  all  who  share  the  hope  of  a  safer 
uifl  more  secure  Europe.  In  Vienna  the 
nations  which  are  members  of  the  Con- 
IVi-ence  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Kiirope  (CSCE)  and  the  members  of  the 
Xnrth  Atlantic  alliance  and  Warsaw 
Pact  will  begin  two  negotiations  whose 
tidal  is  to  reduce  the  threat  of  conven- 
tiiinal  weapons  in  Eurojje — one  on  con- 
\entional  armed  forces  in  Europe 
;('FE)  and  another  separate  negotia- 
tion on  further  confidence-  and 
security-building  measures  (CSBMs). 

The  negotiation  on  conventional 
forces  in  Europe  offers  a  new  oppor- 
tunity to  redress  the  imbalance  in  mili- 
tary forces  which  strongly  favors  the 
Warsaw  Pact  and  which  has  been  a 
source  of  tension  since  the  end  of  World 
War  II.  The  NATO  allies  aim  to  elimi- 
nate the  capability  for  launching  sur- 
prise attack  and  for  initiating  large- 
scale  offensive  actions. 

The  negotiations  on  confidence- 
and  security-building  measures  will 
address  the  problem  of  mistrust  in  the 
military  and  security  spheres  and  the 
risk  of  confrontation  arising  through 
miscalculation.  Our  aim  is  to  lift  the 
veil  of  secrecy  from  certain  military 
activities  and  forces  and  thus  contrib- 
ute to  a  more  stable  Europe. 


Although  these  two  negotiations 
have  different  participants  and  aim  at 
different  kinds  of  accords,  they  share  a 
common  purpose.  That  purpose  is  to 
make  Europe  safer,  to  reduce  the  risk 
of  war,  and  to  strengthen  stability  on 
the  continent  that  has  seen  more  blood- 
shed in  this  century  than  any  other 
part  of  the  world. 

We  and  our  NATO  allies  share  a 
common  commitment  to  democratic 
values,  respect  for  each  others'  sover- 
eignty, and  support  for  a  strong  de- 
fense. NATO's  approach  to  these 
negotiations,  therefore,  rests  on  two 
important  principles:  that  maintaining 
strong  and  modern  defenses  is  essential 
to  our  security  and  freedom  and  that 
negotiated  and  effectively  verifiable 
agreements  can  enhance  our  security 
and  the  prospects  for  lasting  peace. 

Of  course,  these  negotiations  are 
part  of  a  larger  process,  one  which 
must  address  the  causes  as  well  as  the 
symptoms  of  the  current  division  in 
Europe.  Progress  in  the  military  field 
alone  is  not  enough  to  bring  enduring 
peace.  What  is  needed  is  genuine  rec- 
onciliation and  an  end  to  the  division  of 
Europe.  True  security  cannot  exist 
without  guarantees  of  human  rights 
and  basic  freedoms  for  all  people. 

The  negotiations  on  security  in  Eu- 
rope offer  new  (jromise  for  the  future. 
We  embark  on  them  with  the  hope  that 
we  can  build  a  lasting  framework  for  a 
more  stable  and  secure  future,  but  we 
are  realistic  about  the  difficulties 
ahead.  With  a  renewed  dedication 
to  a  constructive  dialogue,  we  can 
make  progress.  The  commitment  of 
the  United  States  to  this  effort  is 
unswerving. 


AMBASSADOR  LEDOGAR 

On  March  9,  representatives  of  all  23 
NATO  and  Warsaw  Pact  countries  will 
sit  down  together  and  begin  the  effort 
to  negotiate  a  conventional  arms  con- 
trol agreement  for  Europe,  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Urals.  The  comprehen- 
sive scope  of  the  negotiation  on  conven- 
tional armed  forces  in  Europe  (CFE) 
sets  it  apart  from  previous  conven- 
tional arms  talks,  which  included  only 
some  members  of  NATO  on  the  West- 
ern side  and  focused  exclusively  on  cen- 
tral Europe. 


We  begin  at  an  auspicious  time  for 
European  arms  control.  Last  year's 
INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces]  Treaty  provided  for  the  elim- 
ination of  a  whole  class  of  theater  nu- 
clear missiles.  In  doing  so,  it  focused 
renewed  attention  on  the  existing  im- 
balance of  conventional  forces  in  Euro- 
pe and  provided  a  useful  model  for 
verification  of  future  agreements.  By 
requiring  mandatory  on-site  inspec- 
tion, both  the  INF  and  the  "transpar- 
ency" measures  agreed  at  Stockholm  in 
1986  have  provided  important  prece- 
dents for  monitoring  compliance  with 
future  arms  control  agreements,  and 
they  may  have  helped  to  persuade  the 
Soviet  Union  that  vigorous  inspection 
is  beneficial,  not  damaging,  to  its 
security. 

Most  recently  several  Warsaw  Pact 
states,  including  the  Soviet  Union, 
have  announced  plans  to  make  uni- 
lateral cuts  in  their  military  forces.  If 
carried  out  as  promised,  these  will  go 
part  of  the  way  toward  reducing  the 
dangerous  imbalance  of  conventional 
forces  on  the  continent. 

We  cannot,  however,  allow  Mo- 
scow's recent  geniality  to  let  us  lose 
sight  of  the  problems  that  have  brought 
us  to  the  negotiating  table.  The  uni- 
lateral conventional  force  reductions 
announced  by  the  Warsaw  Pact — taken 
in  large  part  because  of  domestic 
imperatives — are  no  substitute  for  a  ne- 
gotiated system  of  arms  control  mea- 
sures embodied  in  formal,  verifiable, 
state-to-state  agreements. 

The  unilateral  reductions  an- 
nounced by  Moscow  and  its  allies  would 
remove  some  12,000  tanks,  9,100  artil- 
lery pieces,  and  an  unspecified  number 
of  armored  troop  carriers — as  well  as 
other  equipment — from  the  area  the 
CFE  negotiation  will  cover.  This  will 
still  leave  a  Warsaw  Pact  superiority 
of  more  than  2-to-l  in  each  of  these 
categories — a  capability  that  will 
rightly  continue  to  concern  NATO  mili- 
tary planners  and  allied  governments 
and  publics.  CFE  must  and  will  address 
this  issue. 

In  a  statement  last  December  8, 
NATO  foreign  ministers  sketched  out 
the  alliance's  main  objectives  in  the 
new  negotiations: 


1  Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


33 


ARMS  CONTROL 


•  A  limit  on  total  holdings  of  those 
armaments  most  relevant  to  offensive 
action — the  seizing  and  holding  of 
territory — at  substantially  lower  lev- 
els, with  parity  in  these  forces  between 
the  two  alliances; 

•  A  limit  on  the  holdings  of  such  ar- 
maments by  any  one  country,  set  at  a 
fixed  percentage  of  the  total  holdings  of 
the  two  sides  in  Europe; 

•  Ceilings  on  such  armaments  held 
by  forces  stationed  outside  the  borders 
of  their  own  country;  and 

•  Effective  and  rigorous  verifica- 
tion, including  exchange  of  detailed 
information  on  military  forces  and 
mandatory  inspection. 

In  combination  these  measures 
would  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  mas- 
sive forward  deployments  of  offensively 
oriented  Soviet  armored  forces  that 
have  been  stationed  in  Eastern  Europe 
for  a  generation  and  which  make  cen- 
tral Europe  the  site  of  the  heaviest  con- 
centration of  military  force  in  the 
world. 

CFE  will  not  be  the  first  effort  to 
reduce  conventional  forces  in  Europe. 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction 
(MBFR)  negotiations,  focused  on  cen- 
tral Europe,  were  held  from  1973  until 
February  1989.  These  talks  did  not  re- 
sult in  an  agreement,  but  they  enabled 
the  12  NATO  participants  and  the  War- 
saw Pact  states  to  set  forth  their  secu- 
rity and  arms  control  concerns  and  to 
define  a  range  of  possible  objectives  for 
a  conventional  agreement.  By  clearing 
away  some  of  the  "underbrush"  on  this 
exceptionally  complicated  subject  and 
giving  the  two  sides  negotiating  expe- 
rience on  conventional  forces,  MBFR 
helped  lay  the  groundwork  for  the  new 
talks. 

The  23  countries  participating  in 
the  CFE  talks  will,  of  course,  be  solely 
responsible  for  determining  their 
outcome.  The  mandate  for  the  talks 
establishes  CFE  as  an  autonomous  ne- 
gotiation "within  the  framework  of  the 
CSCE  process" — that  is,  separate  but 
with  some  links  to  the  35-country  Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe.  Representatives  to  the  CFE 
negotiation  will  meet  periodically  with 
the  12  European  neutral  and  non- 
aligned  states  for  an  update  on  CFE's 
progress.  The  23  have  pledged  to  take 
the  views  of  other  CSCE  states  into 
consideration  in  the  CFE  negotiation 
when  appropriate.  The  next  CSCE 
follow-up  meeting,  in  Helsinki  in  1992, 
will  exchange  views  on  progress  in 
CFE. 


These  arrangements,  which  all  35 
CSCE  states  have  agreed  on,  ensure 
that  the  members  of  the  two  alliances 
can  negotiate  confidentially,  out  of  the 
limelight,  and  without  artificial  dead- 
lines, while  also  ensuring  that  other 
European  states  will  be  able  to  express 
informal  views  on  CFE  issues  through- 
out the  negotiation. 

The  mandate  we  concluded  January 
10  sets  the  ground  rules  and  estab- 
lishes a  forum  for  the  United  States 
and  its  NATO  allies,  together  with  the 
Warsaw  Pact  countries,  to  make  a  new 
beginning  in  conventional  arms  control 
in  Europe.  We  and  our  allies  are  com- 
mitted to  achieving  an  agreement  that 
enhances  stability  and  lowers  force  lev- 
els. We  call  on  the  members  of  the  War- 
saw Pact  to  join  us  in  this  endeavor. 


NEGOTIATION  ON 
CONVENTIONAL  ARMED 
FORCES  IN  EUROPE  (CFE): 
WESTERN  POSITION  PAPER 

Position  paper  provided  by  the  delega- 
tions of  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
France,  Greece,  Iceland,  Italy,  Lux- 
embourg, the  Netherlands,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Turkey,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States. 

Objectives 

The  objectives  of  these  negotiations,  as 
agreed  in  the  mandate,  are: 

•  The  establishment  of  a  secure 
and  stable  balance  of  conventional 
forces  at  lower  levels; 

•  The  elimination  of  disparities 
prejudicial  to  stability  and  security: 
and 

•  The  elimination,  as  a  matter  of 
high  priority,  of  the  capability  for 
launching  surprise  attack  and  for  ini- 
tiating large-scale  offensive  action. 

Through  the  approach  outlined  be- 
low, the  Western  delegations  will  seek 
to  establish  a  situation  in  which  sur- 
prise attack  and  large-scale  offensive 
action  are  no  longer  credible  options. 
We  pursue  this  aim  on  the  basis  of 
equal  respect  for  the  security  interests 
of  all.  Our  approach  offers  a  coherent 
whole  and  is  intended  to  be  applied  si- 
multaneously and  in  its  totality  in  the 
area  of  application. 

Rationale 

The  rationale  for  our  approach  is  as 
follows. 


The  present  concentration  of  force; 
in  the  area  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Urals  is  the  highest  ever  known  in 
peacetime  and  represents  the  greatest 
destructive  potential  ever  assembled. 
Overall  levels  of  forces,  particularly 
those  relevant  to  surprise  attack  and 
offensive  action  such  as  tanks,  artil- 
lery, and  armored  troop  carriers,  musi 
therefore,  be  radically  reduced.  It  is 
the  substantial  disparity  in  the  num- 
bers of  these  systems — all  capable  of 
rapid  mobility  and  high  firepower — 
which  most  threatens  stability  in  Eu- 
rope. These  systems  are  also  central  t( 
the  seizing  and  holding  of  territory,  th 
prime  aim  of  any  aggressor. 

No  one  country  should  be  permit- 
ted to  dominate  Europe  by  force  of 
arms.  No  participant  should,  therefort 
possess  more  than  a  fixed  proportion  c 
the  total  holdings  of  all  participants  in 
each  category  of  armaments,  commen- 
surate with  its  needs  for  self-defense. 

Addressing  the  overall  number  an 
nationality  offerees  will  not,  by  itself, 
affect  the  stationing  of  armaments  out 
side  national  borders.  Additional  limit 
will  also  be  needed  on  forces  stationed 
in  other  countries'  territory. 

We  need  to  focus  on  both  the  levels 
of  armaments  and  the  state  of  readi- 
ness of  forces  in  those  areas  where  the 
concentration  of  such  forces  is  great- 
est, as  well  as  to  prevent  redeploymer 
of  forces  withdrawn  from  one  part  of 
the  area  of  application  to  another.  It 
will,  therefore,  be  necessary  to  apply 
a  series  of  interlocking  sublimits  cov- 
ering forces  throughout  the  area, 
together  with  further  limits  on  arma- 
ments in  active  units. 

Specific  Measures 

The  following  specific  measures  withi 
the  area  of  application  would  fulfill 
these  objectives: 

Rule  1:  Overall  Limit.  The  overa 
total  of  weapons  in  each  of  the  three 
categories  identified  below  will  at  no 
time  exceed: 

Main  Battle  Tanks  40,0( 

Artillery  Pieces  33, 0( 

Armored  Troop  Carriers  56, 0( 

Rule  2:  Sufficiency.  No  one  coun- 
try may  retain  more  than  30%  of  the 
overall  limits  in  these  three  categorie; 
i.e.: 

Main  Battle  Tanks  12, 0( 

Artillery  Pieces  10, 0( 

Armored  Troop  Carriers  16, 8(' 


34 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Rule  3:  Stationed  Forces.  Among 
■duiitries  belonging  to  a  treaty  of  alli- 
nice,  neither  side  will  station  arma- 
iicnts  outside  national  territory  in 
u'tive  units  exceeding  the  following 


'Is: 


3,200 

1,700 
6,000 


Main  Battle  Tanks 

l^rtillery 

'\rmored  Troop  Carriers 


Main  Battle  Tanks 
Ai-tillery  Pieces 
Ainiored  Troop  Carriers 

Rule  4:  Sublimits.  In  the  areas  in- 
licated  below,  each  group  of  countries 
jehmging  to  the  same  treaty  of  alliance 
Uiall  not  exceed  the  following  levels: 

(1)  In  the  area  consisting  of  Bel- 
gium, Denmark,  the  Federal  Republic 
)f  Cermany,  France,  Greece,  Iceland, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
N'di'way,  Portugal,  Spain,  Turkey,  the 
Liiited  Kingdom,  Bulgaria,  Czecho- 
>l((vakia,  the  German  Democratic  Re- 
nihlic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  and 
hi'  territory  of  the  Soviet  Union  west 
if  the  Urals  comprising  the  Baltic,  Byel- 
irussian,  Carpathian,  Moscow,  Volga, 
Urals,  Leningrad,  Odessa,  Kiev, 
Trans-Caucasus,  North  Caucasus  mili- 
tary districts: 


20,000 

16,500 

28,000 

(of  which  no 

more  than  12,000 

armored  infantry 

fighting  vehicles) 

(2)  In  the  area  consisting  of  Bel- 
gium, Denmark,  the  Federal  Republic 
t)f  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Luxem- 
Oourg,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Spain,  the  United  Kingdom,  Czech- 
pslovakia,  the  German  Democratic  Re- 
lt)ublic,  Hungary,  Poland,  and  the 
territory  of  the  Soviet  LTnion  west  of 
the  Urals  comprising  the  Baltic,  Byel- 
Drussian,  Carpathian,  Moscow,  Volga, 
Urals  military  districts  in  active  units: 

Main  Battle  Tanks  11,300 

Artillery  9,000 

Armored  Troop  Carriers  20,000 

(3)  In  the  area  consisting  of  Bel- 
gium, Denmark,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Luxem- 
bourg, the  Netherlands,  the  United 
Kingdom,  Czechoslovakia,  the  German 
Democratic  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
and  the  territory  of  the  Soviet  Union 
comprising  the  Baltic,  Byelorussian, 
Carpathian  military  districts  in  active 
units: 

Main  Battle  Tanks  10,300 

Artillery  7,600 

Armored  Troop  Carriers  18,000 


(4)  In  the  area  consisting  of  Bel- 
gium, the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Czechoslovakia,  the  German  Demo- 
cratic Republic,  and  Poland  in  active 
units: 

Main  Battle  Tanks  8,000 

Artillery  4, .500 

Armored  Troop  Carriers  11,000 

(5)  Rule  4  is  to  be  seen  as  an  inte- 
grated whole  which  will  only  be  applied 
simultaneously  and  across  the  entire 
area  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Urals.  It 
will  be  for  the  members  of  each  alliance 
to  decide  how  they  exercise  their  enti- 
tlement under  all  of  these  measures. 

Rule  5:  Information  Exchange. 

Each  year  holdings  of  main  battle 
tanks,  armored  troop  carriers,  and  ar- 
tillery pieces  will  be  notified,  disag- 
gregated down  to  battalion  level.  This 
measure  will  also  apply  to  personnel  in 
both  combat  and  combat-support  units. 
Any  change  of  notified  unit  structures 
above  battalion  level,  or  any  measure 
resulting  in  an  increase  of  personnel 
strength  in  such  units,  will  be  subject 
to  notification,  on  a  basis  to  be  deter- 
mined in  the  course  of  the  negotiations. 

Measures  for  Stability,  Verification, 
and  Noncircumvention 

As  an  integral  part  of  the  agreement, 
there  will  be  a  need  for: 

•  Stabilizing  Measures:  To  buttress 
the  resulting  reductions  in  force  levels 
in  the  Atlantic-to-the-Urals  area. 
These  should  include  measures  of 
transparency,  notification,  and  con- 
straint applied  to  the  deployment, 
movement,  storage,  and  levels  of  readi- 
ness of  conventional  armed  forces 
which  include  conventional  armaments 
and  equipment; 

•  Verification  Arrangements:  To 
include  the  exchange  of  detailed  data 
about  forces  and  deployments,  with  the 
right  to  conduct  on-site  inspection,  as 
well  as  other  measures  designed  to  pro- 
vide assurance  of  compliance  with  the 
agreed  provisions; 

•  Noncircumyention  Provisions:  In- 
ter alia,  to  ensure  that  the  manpower 
and  equipment  withdrawn  from  any  one 
area  do  not  have  adverse  security  im- 
plications for  any  participant;  and 

•  Provision  for  temporarily  exceed- 
ing the  limits  set  down  in  Rule  4  for 
prenotified  exercises. 


|il9epartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


The  Longer  Term 

In  the  longer  term,  and  in  the  light  of 
the  implementation  of  the  above  meas- 
ure, we  would  be  willing  to  contem- 
plate further  steps  to  enhance  stability 
and  security  in  Europe,  such  as  fur- 
ther reductions  or  limitations  of  con- 
ventional armaments  and  equipment 
and  the  restructuring  of  armed  forces 
to  enhance  defensive  capabilities  and 
further  to  reduce  offensive  capabilities. 


AMBASSADOR  MARESCA, 
MAR.  9,  1989 

Let  me  first  join  with  those  colleagues 
who  preceded  me  and  express  the  grat- 
itude of  my  government  to  our  Austrian 
hosts  for  making  these  splendid  halls 
available  for  our  negotiation  and  for 
their  magnificent  hospitality  during 
the  past  few  days.  We  can  only  hope 
that  this  historic  setting  will  inspire  us 
all  to  the  highest  purpose  and  stand- 
ards of  statecraft. 

The  negotiations  we  are  inaugurat- 
ing today  will  be  about  security.  But  as 
we  commence  our  common  effort,  we 
will  do  well  to  recall  the  breadth  of  that 
concept.  If  our  experience  in  CSCE  has 
taught  us  anything,  it  has  been  that  the 
security  of  nations  can  neither  be  fully 
measured  nor  ultimately  achieved 
through  military  means  alone.  Indeed, 
the  military  confrontation  which  has 
plagued  Europe  for  40  years  is  the 
reflection — not  the  cause — of  the  politi- 
cal and  social  divisions  of  the  continent. 

As  Secretary  Baker  suggested  in 
his  speech  on  Monday  [March  6],  true 
and  lasting  security  for  all  the  nations 
and  peoples  of  Europe  can  only  be  built 
upon  a  foundation  of  confidence — 
confidence  of  nations  in  their  neighbors 
and  confidence  of  citizens  in  their 
governments. 

The  proposal  tabled  by  the  mem- 
bers of  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  to- 
day constitutes  an  important  step 
toward  building  this  kind  of  confidence 
in  the  area  of  military  affairs.  That  is 
why  the  United  States  fully  supports 
it. 

Nations  cannot  be  expected  to  re- 
duce their  military  forces  unless  they 
have  some  measure  of  confidence  that 
their  neighbors  harbor  no  hostile  inten- 
tions toward  them.  Massive  Soviet  and 
Warsaw  Pact  deployments  of  offen- 
sively capable  forces  throughout  central 
Europe,  as  well  as  on  the  flanks  of  the 
European  Continent,  do  not  inspire 
confidence.  Add  to  that  closed  fron- 


35 


ARMS  CONTROL 


tiers,  suppression  of  political  and  labor 
movements,  and  the  suffocating  secrecy 
which  has  shrouded  virtually  all  as- 
pects of  Warsaw  Pact  military  affairs, 
and  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  West,  for 
four  decades,  has  viewed  its  neighbors 
to  the  east  with  suspicion  and  fear. 

Our  proposal  is  designed  to  con- 
tinue the  task  of  reducing  this  wall  of 
suspicion.  The  measures  we  and  our  al- 
lies have  proposed  go  to  the  heart  of 
the  confidence  problem  in  European 
military  affairs.  Put  simply,  we  pro- 
pose that  all  European  states  should 
e.xchange  on  an  annual  basis  complete 
information  on  what  conventional 
forces  and  armaments  they  have  on  the 
European  Continent  and  where  they 
are  deployed.  To  deepen  our  confidence 
in  the  information  we  receive,  we  will 
press  for  the  right  to  evaluate  it 
directly. 

Further  we  and  our  allies  propose 
to  fortify  e.xisting  regimes  of  inspec- 
tion and  observation  of  military  activ- 
ities to  buttress  our  understanding  of 
capabilities  and  intentions.  As  [British 
Foreign  Secretary]  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe 
said  on  Monday,  "A  good  idea  is  worth 
improving." 

We  have  also  proposed  an  innova- 
tive new  forum  where  representatives 
of  our  military  establishments  can  ex- 
press directly  to  each  other  their  views 
and  concerns.  I  think  we  can  be  genu- 
inely optimistic  on  the  prospects  for 
moving  in  the  direction  of  a  more  stable 
and  secure  future  for  Europe.  The  cli- 
mate of  East-West  relations  today  may 
be  more  conducive  to  advancing  the 
agenda  of  peace  and  security  than  at 
any  time  in  the  past  40  years.  The  "new 
thinking"  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  in 


some  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
holds  out  the  possibility  of  a  change  in 
the  attitudes  of  those  governments  to- 
ward their  neighbors  and  their  citizens. 

However,  our  optimism  should  be 
tempered  by  realism  and  prudence. 
Just  as  there  are  opportunities  we  must 
pursue,  there  are  realities  we  cannot 
ignore.  The  cold  war  was  not  a  mirage. 
It  was  a  real  international  situation 
with  identifiable  characteristics — the 
political  division  of  Europe,  the  mil- 
itarization of  East-West  relations,  and 
the  competition  between  two  largely 
incompatible  social  and  economic  sys- 
tems. All  of  these  characteristics,  to  a 
greater  or  lesser  extent,  remain  with 
us  today. 

Nevertheless  we  need  not  be  hos- 
tages to  an  unhappy  past,  nor  even  to  a 
complicated  present.  No  aspect  of  East- 
West  relations  is  immune  to  change  for 
the  better.  In  that  regard,  we  welcome 
the  new  wind  blowing  from  the  East. 
Glasnost  and  perestroika  are  words 
which  have  ignited  hope  in  the  hearts  of 
millions  of  Europeans. 

But  our  hopes  for  a  more  stable  and 
peaceful  European  order  have  been 
disappointed  befoi-e.  We  in  the  West 
await  with  great  anticipation  the  deeds 
which  will  give  real  meaning  and  subs- 
tance to  the  slogans. 

We  welcome  the  opportunity  to  dis- 
cuss our  conventional  forces — they  are 
defensive  forces  and  have  never  posed  a 
threat  to  the  security  of  any  state  on 
this  continent.  We  are  equally  disposed 
to  discuss  the  extension  of  openness  in 
military  affairs.  Openness  presents  no 
challenge  to  the  Western  democracies; 
it  is  a  natural  characteristic  of  our  free 
societies. 


But  at  the  same  time,  we  will  judge 
all  proposals  made  in  these  talks  by  thei 
same  rigorous  standards  which  we  have 
applied  to  the  measures  which  we  and 
our  allies  have  introduced  today.  Suc- 
cess in  our  endeavor  can  only  be  meas- 
ured in  terms  of  improved  security  for 
all  the  states  represented  here.  We  will 
not  enter  into  any  agreement  in  this 
negotiation  which  erodes  the  West's  ca- 
pacity to  defend  itself. 

The  task  at  hand — extending 
openness  and  confidence  in  military 
affairs — is  an  important  one.  But,  as  I 
noted  when  I  began,  our  efforts  are 
only  part  of  a  broader  process.  The  con- 
fidence and  openness  we  seek  in  mili- 
tary affairs  must  also  extend  to  the 
relationship  between  governments  and 
the  governed  throughout  Europe. 

Only  when  ideas,  people,  and  infor- 
mation move  freely  across  borders,  and 
individuals  everywhere  have  a  say  in 
the  decisions  which  affect  their  lives, 
will  we  be  able  to  achieve  a  Europe 
which  is  truly  stable  and  secure. 

These  thoughts  are  old  friends  to 
many  of  us;  an  attractive  alternative  to 
others;  unfortunately,  they  are  still 
perceived  as  a  threat  by  some.  Regard- 
less of  how  one  views  them,  however, 
these  simple  ideas  represent  the  fu- 
ture. It  is  our  sincere  hope  that  the  en- 
deavor which  we  are  commencing  todaj 
in  the  area  of  military  confidence- 
building  will  serve  to  advance  this 
larger  vision  of  openness  and  freedom 
for  all  Europeans. 


'Text  from  Weeklv  Compilation  of  Pres 
dential  Documents  of  Mar.  13,  1989.  ■ 


36 


;AST  ASIA 


Jpdate  on  Cambodia 


t  David  F.  Lamhertson 

Statenu'iit  before  the  Subcommittee 
A^ian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
ouae  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
arch  1,  1989.  Mr.  Lambertson  is  Dep- 
y  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian 
d  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
;fore  the  subcommittee  once  again  to 
scuss  the  curi-ent  situation  in  Cam- 
)dia  and  our  poHcies  in  support  of 
forts  to  achieve  an  acceptable  Cam- 
)dian  settlement. 


r\e  Basic  Situation 

le  United  States  and  the  vast  major- 
'  of  nations  of  the  world  have  con- 
mned  Vietnam's  illegal  occupation  of 
imbodia  and  remain  united  in  calling 
r  Hanoi  both  to  withdraw  completely 

remaining  forces  and  to  join  with  all 
the  Cambodian  parties  in  a  conscien- 
ms  effort  to  negotiate  a  settlement, 
e  are  convinced  that  only  a  compre- 
nsive  political  solution  acceptable  to 

sides  can  bring  to  an  end  the  suffer- 
y  of  the  Cambodian  people,  reestab- 
h  a  free  and  inde])endent  Cambodia, 
d  restore  i-egional  stability. 

In  this  conte.xt,  we  remain  un- 
;erably  opposed  to  a  return  to  power 
the  Khmer  Rouge,  who  left  a  legacy 
brutality  and  depravity  from  their 
le  during  the  1970s  and  whose  ac- 
'ities  to  the  pi'esent  day  recall  that 
irlier  reign  of  terror.  A  durable  settle- 
fent  in  this  conflict  must  contain  effec- 
.'e  measures  to  ensure  that  the  Khmer 
)Uge  can  never  regain  control  and 
bject  the  Cambodian  people  once 
:ain  to  the  horrors  of  the  past.  While 
e  precise  measures  to  be  adopted  re- 
ain  a  crucial  area  of  negotiation 
aong  the  Cambodian  parties  and  their 
pporters,  and  will  surely  require  di- 
et involvement  of  the  international 
immunity,  it  is  clear  that  discredited 
hmer  Rouge  leaders,  including  Pol 
)t,  should  not  be  allowed  to  play  any 
le  in  a  future  Cambodian  Government. 


ietnam's  Withdrawal 

lis  past  year  the  United  States  wel- 
med  both  Hanoi's  pledge  in  May  to 
ithdraw  50,000  troops  by  the  end  of 
e  year  and  its  subsequent  withdrawal 
a  significant  number  of  Vietnamese 


forces  from  Cambodia.  However,  we  es- 
timate that  only  3.5,000  troops  were  ac- 
tually withdrawn  in  the  second  half  of 
1988,  and  our  current  best  estimates, 
which  we  regularly  review,  are  that 
60,000-70,000  Vietnamese  troops  re- 
main in  Cambodia. 

Since  we  firmly  believe  that  Viet- 
nam's illegal  occupation  of  Cambodia — 
now  in  its  Uth  year — is  the  root  cause 
of  the  conflict,  we  continue  to  urge 
Hanoi  to  issue  a  precise  timetable  for 
the  withdrawal  of  all  its  remaining 
forces  during  1989  and  to  allow  for  the 
verification  of  their  withdrawal.  Hanoi 
has  itself  raised  a  September  with- 
drawal as  possible  under  certain  condi- 
tions; we  would  encourage  Vietnam  to 
agree  to  this  timeframe  without  condi- 
tions. However,  I  want  to  stress  that 
Hanoi  must  carry  out  a  true  and  com- 
plete withdrawal — without  Vietnamese 
soldiers  remaining  in  Cambodian  uni- 
forms or  any  other  subterfuges  de- 
signed to  allow  Vietnam  to  retain 
control. 

We  stress  the  primary  importance 
of  the  Vietnamese  withdrawal  in  a 
Cambodian  settlement  for  two  reasons. 
Obviously,  the  Cambodian  people  will 
be  unable  to  reestablish  a  truly  sov- 
ei'eign  and  independent  country  until 
Vietnam's  occupation  ends;  Cambodians 
must  be  allowed  to  determine  their  own 
future  free  from  Vietnam's  control.  In 
addition,  Vietnam's  invasion  of  Cam- 
bodia has  constituted  a  direct  threat  to 
the  security  of  Thailand — a  long-time 
friend  and  treaty  ally  of  ours — and  to 
regional  stability.  International  opposi- 
tion to  Vietnam's  aggression  is  over- 
whelming; the  vast  majority  of  the 
world  community  has  repeatedly  con- 
demned Vietnam's  actions,  most  pub- 
licly at  the  United  Nations  where  the 
annual  resolution  on  Cambodia  passes 
with  increasing  margins. 

In  addition  to  this  international 
censure,  it  is  apparent  that  the  Viet- 
namese people  have  paid  a  heavy  eco- 
nomic price  for  their  leaders'  military 
and  political  adventurism  in  Cambodia. 
The  benefits  of  stability  and  progress — 
which  other  nations  of  the  region 
enjoy — have  not  accrued  to  Vietnam, 
which  supports  the  fifth  largest  mili- 
tary force  in  the  world  but  has  become 
a  nation  in  e.xtreme  poverty  sustained 
only  by  Soviet  largesse.  Clearly,  a 
settlement  in  Cambodia  would  permit 


Hanoi  to  devote  attention  and  resources 
toward  rectifying  Vietnam's  substantial 
economic  jjroblems. 

I  would  like  to  add  that,  in  the 
context  of  an  acceptable  settlement  in 
Cambodia  which  includes  the  complete 
withdrawal  of  all  Vietnamese  troops,  we 
are  prepared  to  normalize  our  i-elations 
with  Vietnam.  The  Vietnamese  under- 
stand that  the  pace  and  scope  of  the 
development  of  oui'  relations  would  de- 
pend on  continued  progress  on  the 
POW/MIA  [prisoner  of  war/missing  in 
action]  issue.  As  we  have  said  repeat- 
edly, we  look  forward  to  normalizing 
our  relations  under  those  conditions. 
We  have  made  clear  to  Hanoi  that  co- 
operation on  the  POW/MIA  issue 
is  extremely  important  to  the  Admin- 
istration, the  Amei'ican  people,  and 
Congress  and  that,  while  this  is  a  hu- 
manitarian issue  which  should  be  pur- 
sued separately  on  its  merits,  progress 
in  this  area  must  continue  if  there  is 
to  be  political  support  in  this  country 
for  a  fully  normalized  relationship. 

The  Negotiating  Process 

The  progi-ess  made  to  date  toward  the 
eventual  complete  withdrawal  of  Viet- 
namese forces  from  Cambodia  under- 
lines the  importance  of  the  negotiating 
process  underway  to  achieve  an  accept- 
able and  comprehensive  negotiated  set- 
tlement. We  have  been  encouraged  by 
the  sustained  level  of  diplomatic  efforts 
during  the  past  year  and  have  wel- 
comed the  quickening  pace  of  the 
various  multilateral  and  bilateral 
discussions  in  the  last  3  months.  These 
have  already  resulted  in  agreements  in 
principle  on  some  of  the  elements  es- 
sential to  an  acceptable  solution — the 
coordination  of  a  Vietnamese  with- 
drawal with  reduction  of  outside  mili- 
tary assistance  to  all  parties,  for 
example. 

Nevertheless,  important  differ- 
ences remain — particularly  on  the 
formation  of  an  interim  government 
preceding  elections — and  we  continue 
to  urge  all  involved  parties  to  continue 
their  serious  efforts  to  reach  a  compre- 
hensive settlement.  We  believe  that  any 
agreement  which  fails  to  address  both 
the  external  and  internal  aspects 
of  Cambodia's  future  would  not  be 
sustainable. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


37 


EAST  ASIA 


In  this  context,  Hanoi  must  recog- 
nize its  special  responsibility  to  contrib- 
ute to  a  comprehensive  agreement. 
Having  created  the  present  situation 
through  its  invasion,  installation  of  a 
protege  regime  in  Phnom  Penh,  and  10- 
year  occupation,  Vietnam  cannot  limit 
its  participation  in  a  solution  to  its 
own  troop  withdrawal — no  mattei-  how 
important  that  step  may  be.  Hanoi 
must  play  an  active  ancl  direct  role 
in  the  settlement  process,  should  talk 
directly  with  [Cambodian]  Prince 
Sihanouk,  and  has  the  obligation  to  en- 
sure that  the  leaders  it  installed  in 
Phnom  Penh  adopt  reasonable  positions 
in  negotiations  among  the  Cambodian 
groups. 

The  U.S.  position  on  the  necessai-y 
components  of  an  acceptable  settlement 
is  clear:  the  verified  and  complete  with- 
drawal of  all  Vietnamese  forces,  effec- 
tive safeguards  against  a  Khmer  Rouge 
return  to  power,  and  the  restoration  of 
genuine  self-determination  to  the  Cam- 
bodian people.  We  believe  that  in  such 
a  solution  Pi'ince  Sihanouk's  role  is  cru- 
cial as  leader  of  an  interim  government 
preceding  elections  and  as  the  focus  for 
national  unity. 

We  realize  that  only  the  Cambo- 
dians themselves  can  resolve  the  details 
of  their  own  future — whether  the  issue 
is  the  form  of  government  they  will 
have  or  the  country's  political  orienta- 
tion. We  only  hope  that  the  Cambodian 
people  have  an  opportunity  to  choose 
their  future  leaders  through  democratic 
means.  We  believe  that  the  Cambodians 
themselves  must  also  decide  if  it  is  bet- 
ter to  include  elements  of  the  Khmer 
Rouge,  minus  their  senior  leadership, 
as  part  of  an  interim  government  or 
leave  the  Khmer  Rouge  on  the  outside 
in  any  final  settlement. 

We  are  prepared  to  support  those 
practical  and  reasonable  measures 
which  will  help  achieve  the  goal  of  a 
truly  free,  independent,  and  peaceful 
Cambodia.  We  intend  to  continue  our 
close  and  active  consultations  regarding 
a  Cambodian  settlement  with  the  non- 
communist  Cambodian  groups,  the 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  governments,  China, 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  other  interested 
parties. 


The  Noncommunists 

We  believe  that  continuity  in  our  ap- 
proach to  this  issue  is  warranted  and, 
indeed,  essential.  This  means  maintain- 
ing our  support  for  Prince  Sihanouk 
and  the  Cambodian  noncommunist 
resistance  (NCR)  in  their  valiant  strug- 
gle for  a  free  and  independent  Cam- 
bodia. The  organizations  of  Prince 
Sihanouk  and  of  former  Prime  Minister 
Son  Sann  have  improved  militarily.  Dur- 
ing the  past  year  especially,  both  the 
Sihanoukian  National  Army  (ANS)  and 
the  Khmer  People's  National  Liberation 
Front  (KPNLF)  have  strengthened 
their  forces  and  have  made  encouraging 
progress  in  expanding  their  presence  in 
the  interior  of  Cambodia.  We  believe 
that  they  could  become  an  increasingly 
viable  alternative  to  both  the  Viet- 
namese-supported People's  Republic  of 
Kampuchea  (P.R.K.)  and  the  mur- 
derous Khmer  Rouge,  and  that  they 
can  and  will  play  a  key  role  in  a  settle- 
ment which  serves  the  best  interests  of 
the  Cambodian  people. 

ASEAN  has  been  in  the  forefront 
in  supporting  the  Cambodian  NCR 
groups,  and  we  have  been  happy  to  be 
able  to  contribute  to  this  effort.  In  sup- 
port of  the  noncommunist  resistance, 
we  have  provided  for  the  supply  and 
transportation  of  nonlethal  material  as- 
sistance to  the  forces  of  both  Prince 
Sihanouk  and  Son  Sann  under  two  con- 
gressional appropriations.  Solarz  pro- 
gram assistance  consists  of  three  major 
components:  medical/malaria  preven- 
tion, training,  and  commodity  procure- 
ment. The  McCollum  program  provides 
excess  Department  of  Defense  stocks 
and  covers  administrative  and  transpor- 
tation expenses.  We  continually  evalu- 
ate and  assess  the  needs  of  the 
noncommunist  resistance  and  believe 
that  the  programs  that  are  in  place 
have  been  appi'opriate  and  effective.  In 
FY  [fiscal  year]  1989,  $5  million  has 
been  budgeted  for  nonlethal  assistance 
under  the  Solarz  program,  and  $500,000 
is  budgeted  under  the  McCollum 
program. 

However,  in  preparation  for  a  set- 
tlement in  Cambodia  and  to  strengthen 
the  noncommunist  resistance  to  help 
prevent  the  return  of  the  Khmer  Rouge 
to  power,  we  believe  that  our  assistance 
to  the  NCR  should  be  augmented.  For 
FY  1990,  we  have  recjuested  an  increase 
to  .$7  million  for  the  Solai-z  progi'am 
and  $.500,000  again  for  the  McCollum 


program.  In  this  regard,  we  hope  that 
the  current  cap  on  ESF  [economic  sup- 
port fund]  assistance  can  be  removed 
or,  if  it  remains,  that  it  will  be  set  at  a 
level  which  will  pei'mit  maximum  flexi- 
bility in  responding  to  evolving  circum- 
stances. We  will  continue  to  review  our 
level  of  support  in  close  consultation 
with  congressional  leaders.  I  want  to 
note  with  appreciation  how  well  we 
have  been  able  to  work  together  on  thi; 
important  issue. 

ASEAN's  Role 

The  United  States  has  worked  closely 
and  energetically  with  the  ASEAN  na- 
tions to  resolve  the  Cambodia  situatior 
We  have  strongly  supported  ASEAN 
efforts  to  mobilize  the  international 
community  in  opposition  to  Vietnam's 
occupation.  We  believe  that  this  broadll 
based  effort  has,  over  the  years,  dem- 
onstrated to  Hanoi  the  economic  and 
diplomatic  consequences  of  its  policy  ir 
Cambodia,  and  that  this  effort  should 
be  continued  until  Vietnam  has  ended 
its  occupation.  We  have  also  worked 
with  ASEAN  at  the  UN  General  As- 
sembly to  increase  the  margin  of  votes 
for  the  annual  resolution  on  Cambodia 

On  the  regional  level,  we  have  wel 
comed  ASEAN's  energetic  and  sus- 
tained diplomatic  efforts  to  achieve  a 
comprehensive  solution  in  Cambodia 
through  its  Jakarta  informal  meeting 
process.  The  Jakai'ta  informal  meeting 
have  brought  together  the  parties  moi 
directly  involved  in  the  Cambodian  coi 
flict — the  four  Cambodian  factions, 
Vietnam,  Laos,  and  ASEAN  members 
While  not  achieving  dramatic  break- 
throughs, the  Jakarta  informal  meetin 
process  has  helped  to  narrow  differ- 
ences on  the  wide  range  of  issues  in- 
volved in  a  comprehensive  agreement. 
The  first  Jakarta  meeting,  held  in  Jul^ 
1988,  reached  a  consensus  on  two 
points:  a  total  Vietnamese  withdrawal 
and  the  need  to  prevent  the  Khmer 
Rouge  from  regaining  control. 

Unfortunately,  it  appears  that  rel: 
tively  little  progress  was  made  at  the 
second  Jakarta  informal  meeting,  Feb- 
ruary 19-21.  The  results  made  clear 
that  it  is  now  time  for  Hanoi  and 
Phnom  Penh  to  make  a  major  effort  tc 
address  seriously  the  remaining  is- 
sues— particularly  the  formation  of  an 
interim  government  preceding  electior 
in  Cambodia  and  the  establishment  of 


38 


EAST  ASIA 


II  international  presence  sufficiently 
tiling  to  carry  out  its  duties  in  support 
I'  a  settlement.  We  urge  ASEAN  to 
iintinue  its  efforts  and  encourage  its 
u'mber  governments  to  maintain  the 
trong  sense  of  unity  characteristic  of 
hat  organization  as  they  work  together 
I  achieve  an  acceptable  solution  in 
'ainbodia.  The  United  States  will  con- 
iinie  to  su])port  fully  ASEAN's  efforts. 

)ther  Countries 

n  addition  to  our  frequent  contacts 
ith  the  ASEAN  states,  we  have  made 
anibodia  a  priority  in  our  discussions 
ith  other  interested  governments — in 
articular  with  both  the  Soviet  Union 
(nd  China.  Cambodia  was  discussed 
uring  the  President's  recent  Asian 
rip.  for  example — which  as  you  know 
Iso  included  a  meeting  with  Prince 
ihanouk  in  Beijing.  We  believe  it  is 
nportant  that  the  Chinese  and  Sovi- 
ts,  as  major  supporters  of  opposing 
let  ions,  continue  their  bilateral  di- 
logue  on  Cambodia  as  well. 

Other  governments,  such  as  those 
r  -Japan,  France,  and  the  United  King- 
om,  have  also  been,  and  will  remain, 
nportant  points  of  contact  for  us  on 
lis  subject.  These  discussions  should 
nhance  prospects  for  a  settlement  as 
e  endeavor,  singly  and  together,  to  ex- 
rt  a  constructive  influence  on  the  par- 
ies directly  concerned  to  make  the 
ecessary  decisions  to  restore  to  Cam- 
odia  peace,  security,  and  a  system  of 
overnment  which  represents  the  aspi- 
ations  of  its  people. 

The  international  community  as  a 
hole — including  the  United  States — 
-'ill  also  have  a  critical  role  to  play  in 
ustaining  a  Cambodian  settlement 
hrough  its  continued  close  attention  to 
he  evolving  situation  inside  Cambodia 
illowing  a  settlement  and  its  support 
ir  an  effective  international  monitoring 
I'fsence. 

'he  Khmer  Rouge  Problem 

Ve  fully  share  the  serious  concern  of 
he  international  community  regarding 
he  i)ossibility  that  the  withdrawal  of 
/ietnamese  troops  might  lead  to  the 
ft  urn  to  power  of  the  Khmer  Rouge — 
vhich  we  believe  is  their  long-term 
;(ial.  We  are  totally  and  categorically 
i|)|)osed  to  a  dominant  role  for  the 
\hmer  Rouge  in  Cambodia's  future.  An 
11  rt'ptable  settlement  must  contain  ef- 
ective  and  workable  safeguards  to  pre- 


Cambodia — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  181.040  sq.  km.  (69,900  sq.  mi.);  about 
the  size  of  Missouri.  Cities:  Capital — 
Phnom  Penh  (pop.  700,000  est.).  Other 
rlticK — Battambaiig,  Siem  Reap.  Kompong 
Cham.  Kumpong  Som,  Kompong  Thorn.  Ter- 
rain: Central  plain  drained  by  the  Tonle  Sap 
(Great  Lake)  and  Mekong  and  Bassac  Riv- 
ers. Heavy  forests  away  from  the  river  and 
lake,  mountains  in  the  southwest  (Card- 
amom Mountains)  and  north  (Dangrek 
Mountains)  along  the  border  with  Thailand. 
Climate:  Tropical  monsoon  with  rainy 
season  .June-(3ctober  and  dry  season 
November-May. 


People 

Nationality:  Noun  ayid  adjective — 
Cambodian(s),  Khmer  Population  (1989): 
6.84  million.  Avg.  annual  growth  rate: 
2.29c.  Density:  :37/sq.  km.  (99/sq.  mi.).  Eth- 
nic groups:  Khmer  90%,  Chinese  5%,  hill 
tribes,  small  numbers  of  Burmese  and  Viet- 
namese. Religions:  Theravada  Buddhism 
95%,  Islam,  animism,  atheism.  Languages: 
Khmer  (official)  spoken  by  more  than  95%  of 
the  population,  including  minorities.  Some 
French  still  spoken.  Education:  Literacy — 
approx.  48%.  Health:  Life  crpectancy — men 
47  yrs.;  women  50  yrs. 

Government 

Government  is  disputed  between  resistance 
coalitions  and  Vietnamese-installed  authori- 
ties in  Phnom  Penh.  No  single  authority  con- 
trols the  entire  country. 

Administrative  subdivisions:  18  prov- 
inces and  one  autonomous  municipality. 

Flag:  Democratic  Kampuchea — a  red 
field  with  three  stylized  yellow  towers 
(repre- 


sentative of  Angkor  Wat)  in  the  center 
Nonco>nmiinists — two  horizontal  blue 
bands,  divided  by  a  wider  red  band  on  which 
is  centered  a  white  stylized  representation 
of  Angkor  Wat.  People's  Repiililic  of 
Kdiiipnclica — a  red  field  with  five  stylized 
yellow  towers. 

Economy 

GNP:  $570  million  (1988).  Per  capita  GNP: 

Estimated  less  than  .$100. 

Natural  resources:  Timber,  gemstones, 
some  iron  ore,  manganese  and  phosphate, 
hydroelectric  potential  from  Mekong  River. 

Agriculture:  About  4,848.000  hectares 
(12  million  acres)  are  unforested  land;  all 
are  arable  with  irrigation  but  less  than  2 
million  hectares  are  cultivated.  Products — 
rice,  rubber,  corn,  meat,  vegetables,  dairy 
products,  sugar,  flour 

Industry:  Tiipen — rice  milling,  fishing, 
wood  and  wood  products,  textiles,  cement, 
some  rubber  production  but  largely  aban- 
doned since  1975. 

Trade:  Figures  not  available.  Exports 
(est.  at  $3  million,  1986) — dried  fish,  rubber, 
pepper,  wood.  rice.  Major  partners — 
Vietnam,  USSR,  Eastern  Europe.  Imports 
(est.  at  $17  million,  1986)— food,  petroleum 
and  lubricants,  machinery,  insecticides.  Ma- 
jor partners — Vietnam,  USSR,  Eastern 
Europe. 

Official  exchange  rate:  Approx.  100 
riel  =  US$1.  Free  market  rate  varies. 

Economic  aid:  LInknown  amounts  from 
USSR  and  Eastern  Europe  to  areas  under 
Phnom  Penh  control.  Some  humanitarian  aid 
from  the  UN  and  private  groups.  UN  relief 
efforts  coordinated  by  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral's Special  Representative  for  Human- 
itarian Assistance  to  the  Kampuchean 
People  provided  more  than  $40  million  per 
year  in  assistance,  most  of  it  for  displaced 
Khmer  along  the  Thai-Cambodian  border. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  and  some  of  its  specialized  and  re- 
lated agencies,  including  the  World  Bank 
and  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
(both  unattended  since  1975);  Asian  Devel- 
opment Bank  (ADB);  Group  of  77;  World 
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  for  Coalition 
Government  of  Democratic  Kampuchea 
(CGDK);  none  for  People's  Republic  of  Kam- 
puchea (PRK). 


Taken  from  (with  some  figures  updated)  the 
Background  Notc-i  of  April  1987,  published 
by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  State.  Editor:  .Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


39 


EAST  ASIA 


vent  this  from  happening.  This  is  not  a 
simple  requirement  since  the  Khmer 
Rouge  retain  significant  military 
strength  in  comparison  with  the  other 
Cambodian  factions.  We  also  oppose 
domination  by  the  Vietnamese-imposed 
Phnom  Penh  regime,  the  communist 
P.R.K.,  which  now  has  the  largest 
number  of  troops  of  the  four  factions. 
Its  sway,  too,  must  be  constrained 
in  a  settlement. 

ASEAN,  Prince  Sihanouk,  and  oth- 
ers— including  China — have  proposed  a 
number  of  concrete  measures  for  con- 
trolling the  Khmer  Rouge — as  well  as 
the  P.R.K. — which  merit  very  serious 
consideration. 

•  Free,  internationally  supervised 
elections  are  a  requirement  accepted  by 
all  Cambodian  parties;  we  cannot  imag- 
ine that  the  Cambodian  people  would 
willingly  vote  for  the  return  of  the 
Khmer  Rouge  to  power. 

•  The  discredited  senior  Khmer 
Rouge  leaders  most  responsible  for 
heinous  crimes  against  the  Cambodian 
people,  including  Pol  Pot,  must  be  pre- 
vented from  playing  a  role  in  a  future 
Cambodian  Government  (e.g.,  through 
their  removal  abroad). 

•  The  forces  of  the  four  Cambodian 
factions  might  be  frozen  in  location, 
reduced  to  equal  numbers,  and/or  pos- 
sibly disarmed  under  international 
monitoring. 

•  Outside  arms  shipments  to  the 
Khmer  Rouge — and  to  the  P.R.K. — 
must  be  ended. 

•  International  access  to  Khmer 
Rouge  camps  along  the  Cambodian-Thai 
border  must  be  improved — and  efforts 
made  to  allow  freedom  of  choice  to  the 
unfortunate  people  who  may  be  in  them 
involuntarily  and  to  reduce  the  Khmer 
Rouge  ability  to  impress  young  people 
as  soldiers  and  porters. 

•  An  international  conference 
should  be  held,  once  there  is  agreement 
on  the  basic  elements  of  a  settlement, 
to  mobilize  the  international  community 
to  guarantee  and  support  the  settle- 
ment agreement  with  special  attention 
to  its  provisions  relating  to  the  control 
of  the  Khmer  Rouge. 

•  There  is  a  growing  international 
consensus  that  there  must  be  an  inter- 
national presence  established  in  Cam- 
bodia sufficiently  strong  to  be  able  to 
monitor  effectively  the  Vietnamese 
withdrawal,  a  cease-fa-e,  and  other 
provisions.  By  whatever  title  this 
should  be  an  armed  peacekeeping 
force — probably  under  UN  auspices. 


•  Finally,  a  comprehensive  settle- 
ment should  provide  for  a  body  to  mon- 
itor the  human  rights  situation  and 
publicize  throughout  the  world  any 
Cambodian  human  rights  violations. 
Evidence  of  the  true  nature  of  the 
Khmer  Rouge  was  readily  available  well 
before  1975,  but  people  gave  it  insuffi- 
cient attention,  and  Cambodia  paid  a 
terrible  price.  We  must  not  let  a  similar 
situation  recur. 

China's  Support 

for  the  Khmer  Rouge 

We  have  discussed  with  China,  on  a 
regular  basis,  the  need  to  control  the 
Khmer  Rouge  in  the  context  of  a  settle- 
ment. I  would  note  that  during  the  last 
9  months  there  has  been  a  significant 
evolution  in  China's  position  regarding 
the  Khmer  Rouge.  Last  July  1,  a  Chi- 
nese statement  called  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  four-party  coalition  with 
Prince  Sihanouk  in  charge  while  Viet- 
nam withdrew  and  the  imposition  of  a 
freeze  on  Cambodian  forces,  noting 
"these  forces  should  refrain  from  get- 
ting involved  in  politics  and  interfering 
in  the  general  election."  It  asserted 
that  the  leaders  of  each  of  the  factions 
in  the  coalition  would  have  to  be  ac- 
ceptable to  the  other  factions — suggest- 
ing that  Pol  Pot  and  others  of  his  ilk 
could  have  no  role.  In  November,  for 
the  first  time,  the  Chinese  accepted,  in 
princiijle,  a  reduction  of  military  as- 


sistance simultaneous  with  a  verified 
Vietnamese  withdrawal.  Based  on  its 
public  statements  as  well  as  our  privatt 
discussions,  we  believe  that  Beijing 
does  not  support  a  return  to  power  by 
the  Khmer  Rouge. 

We  will  continue  to  work  to  define 
with  more  precision  the  elements  of  an 
acceptable,  comprehensive  Cambodian 
settlement  and  seek  to  ensure  that  it 
contains  the  safeguards  necessary  to 
assure  a  stable  and  secure  future  for 
that  country.  We  expect  continued  prog-' 
ress  toward  a  solution  in  the  months 
ahead,  although  there  are  likely  to  be 
setbacks  as  well,  and  we  cannot  predict 
just  when  this  tragic  conflict,  in  fact, 
will  end.  But  the  end  is  drawing  closer) 
and  we  are  heartened  that  this  is  so 
We  hope  that  the  Cambodian  people 
those  who  have  suffered  under  the 
Khmer  Rouge  and  Phnom  Penh  regime= 
and  those  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Cambodians  who  were  caused  to  flee  fc 
camps  along  the  Cambodian-Thai 
border — will  be  able  soon  to  return 
once  more  to  normal  lives  in  a  nation  Sf 
peace — a  free  and  independent  Cam- 
bodia. For  there  to  be  any  other  out- 
come would  be  a  tragedy  for  us  all. 


^ 


i 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  ant 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  c 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Burma:  Political  Situation 
and  Human  Rights 


by  David  F.  Lambertson 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
Honse  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  2.  1989.  Mr.  Lambertson  is  Dep- 
utij  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian 
and  Pacific  Affairs. '^ 

For  2(5  years  prior  to  September  1988, 
Burma  was  a  single-party  dictatorship 
dominated  by  the  military  which  pur- 
sued a  socialist  economic  policy.  In  a 
popular,  essentially  nonviolent  uprising 
unprecedented  in  the  nation's  postinde- 
pendence  history,  millions  of  Burmese 
demanded,  late  last  summer,  that  the 
regime  step  down  to  make  way  for  a  re- 
turn to  a  multiparty,  democratic  politi- 
cal system.  On  September  18-19,  the 


military  leadership  reasserted  contro 
when  the  military  seized  power.  In  tht 
days  following,  troops  suppressed  opei 
political  dissent,  sometimes  violently. 

Political  Situation 

Long  before  the  dramatic  events  of  Au 
gust  and  September  1988,  Burma  had 
been  gripped  by  a  variety  of  insurgen 
cies,  most  based  on  ethnic  minority 
groups  and  some  dating  as  far  back  as 
the  days  immediately  following  inde- 
pendence from  Great  Britain  in  1948. 
Some  of  the  ethnically  based  insur- 
gents are  fighting  for  a  measure  of  au- 
tonomy, if  no  longer  for  outright 
independence.  But  most  insurgent 
groups  are  no  more  than  narcotics  syn 
dicates  with  private  armies.  The  Bur- 
ma Communist  Party,  the  only 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  198^ 


EAST  ASIA 


isurgent  group  with  stated  political 
DJectives  based  in  ideology,  encour- 
jes  opium  production  and  traffics  in 
arcotics  to  sustain  itself.  Though 
lese  groups  have  been  confined  to  re- 
lote  areas  on  Burma's  periphery — for 
le  most  part — and  pose  no  serious 
ireat  to  the  central  government,  the 
e  Win  government  used  its  continued 
cistence  to  justify  in  part  the  need  for 
ithoritarian  rule,  including  the  opera- 
on  of  an  extensive  security  apparatus. 

The  upheavals  of  the  summer  of 
•88  followed  riots  by  students  and 
orkers  in  June  protesting  police  bru- 
ility  against  students  the  previous 
arch,  repression  of  political  rights, 
id  the  government's  mishandling  of 
urma's  economy.  In  late  July,  the 
ader  of  Burma  and  chairman  of  the 
iling  Burma  Socialist  Program  Party 
iSPP),  Ne  Win,  abruptly  resigned  the 
irty  chairmanship.  The  choice  of  Sein 
win — widely  regarded  as  responsible 
r  numerous  deaths  of  protestors  dur- 
g  earlier  demonstrations — as  his  suc- 
■ssor  touched  off  new  antigovernment 
■monstrations.  Efforts  to  suppress 
em  by  lethal  force  provoked  even 
rger  scale  demonstrations,  forcing 
?in  Lwin's  resignation  after  only  17 
lys  in  office. 

Sein  Lwin  was  succeeded  by 
aung  Maung,  a  moderate  and  re- 
jected civilian.  Confronted  by  con- 
nuing  demonstrations,  Maung  Maung 
edged  a  national  referendum  for  a 
ultiparty  system  to  be  followed  by 
actions  if  the  referendum  passed. 
>pular  distrust  of  the  government, 
wever,  resulted  in  a  rejection  of  this 
ncession  and  continuing  demonstra- 
)ns  and  strikes,  which  brought  the 
untry  to  a  standstill  and  disrupted 
A'  and  order.  The  army  then  swept 
aung  Maung  aside  and  formally  took 
iwer  Army  loyalties  to  Ne  Win  re- 
ain  strong,  and  most  observers  see 
e  former  ruler's  hand  behind  the  mili- 
ry  takeover  and  subseciuent  forceful 
pression  of  demonstrators.  As  it 
ppressed  opposition  by  massive  ap- 
ication  of  force,  the  military  leader- 
ip  vowed  to  hold  multiparty  elections 
id  to  relinquish  power  to  the  result- 
ii  government.  Over  180  parties  have 
nee  registered  to  contest  the  elec- 
ins,  including  the  successor  of 
e  BSPP,  the  National  Unity  Party. 

Of  this  multitude,  the  principal  po- 
ical  party  in  Burma  appears  to  be 
e  National  League  for  Democracy 
.LD),  led  by  a  former  general.  Tin  Oo, 
Mid  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi,  daughter  of  the 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


Burma — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  678,576  sq.  km.  (262,000  sq.  mi.); 
slightly  smaller  than  Texas.  Cities: 
Capital — Rangoon  (pop.  2.5  million).  Other- 
cities — Mandalay,  Moulmein.  Terrain: 
Varied.  Climate:  Tropical,  monsoon. 


South 
China  Sea 


People 

Nationality:  Noun  and  adjective — Bur- 
mese (sing,  and  pi.).  Population  (1987): 
:57, 900,000.  Annual  growth  rate:  2%. 
Ethnic  groups:  Burman  68%,  Shan  9%, 
Karen  7%,  Rakhine  4%,  Chinese  3%,  In- 
dian 2%.  Religions:  Buddhist  85%;  Mus- 
lim, traditional.  Christian,  other  13%. 
Languages:  Burmese,  ethnic  languages. 
Education:  Attendance — 84%.  Years  com- 
pulsory— 4.  Literacy — 66%.  Health:  Infant 
mortality  rate — 96/1,000.  Life  expectancy — 
57  yrs.  Work  force  (14.8  million  est.): 
Agriculture— 66.1%.  Industry— 12%. 
Trade— 9.1%.  Goi'ernment—W.6%. 

Government 

With  the  military's  assumption  of  govern- 
mental authority  on  September  18,  1988, 
all  civil  government  activities  were  sus- 
pended, including  the  executive,  legisla- 
tive, and  judicial  branches.  These  functions 
are  now  exercised  by  the  military  au- 
thorities. Military  State  Law  and  Order 
Restoration  Councils  replaced  the  previous 
civilian  Councils  of  State.  As  of  December 
1988,  military  government  remained  in  ef- 
fect pending  promised  national  multiparty 
elections  and  eventual  transfer  of  power  to 
an  elected  civilian  government. 

Type:  Interim  military  government. 
Independence:  Jan.  4,  1948.  Constitution: 
The  previously  applicable  constitution  was 
ratified  on  Jan.  3,  1974.  It  is  not  known 
which  of  the  constitution's  provisions  are 


considered  relevant  by  the  governing  mili- 
tary authorities. 

Subdivisions:  Seven  divisions  (ethnic 
Burman  majority)  and  seven  states  (non- 
Burman  majority). 

Political  parties:  As  of  December 
1988,  there  were  more  than  140  registered 
political  parties.  All  have  been  created 
since  the  military  takeover  in  September 
1988. 

Central  government  budget  (1986); 
$4,368  billion,  including  expenditures  of 
state  economic  enterprises. 

Defense  (1985  est.):  4.2%  of  GDP. 

Flag:  Red  with  blue  canton;  in  the 
canton,  a  white  cogwheel  and  rice  stalk 
encircled  with  14  white  stars. 

National  holiday:  Independence  Day, 
Jan.  4. 

Economy 

GDP  (Burmese  FY  1985-86  in  current  dol- 
lars): $8  billion.  Annual  growth  rate: 
l%-4%.  Per  capita  income:  $210.  Avg.  in- 
flation rate  (last  4  yrs.);  6%. 

Natural  resources:  Oil,  timber,  tin, 
tungsten,  copper,  lead,  precious  stones. 

Agriculture  (27%  of  GDP);  Products- 
rice,  beans  and  pulses,  maize  and  oilseeds, 
peanuts,  sugarcane. 

Industry  (10%  of  GDP);  Ti/pcs— food, 
textiles,  timber  products,  petroleum,  con- 
struction materials. 

Trade  (FY  1986);  Exports— $500  mil- 
lion f.o.b.:  rice,  teak  and  hardwoods,  base 
metals  and  ores.  Major  markets — Japan, 
Western  Europe,  ASEAN  countries. 
Imports — $620  million  f  o.b.;  machinery, 
tools,  transportation  equipment,  spare 
parts.  Major  suppliers — Japan,  Western 
Europe,  ASEAN. 

Official  exchange  rate:  lSDR  =  Kyat 
8.551;  6.9  Kyat  =  US$l  (Mar.  1988). 

Fiscal  year:  April  1-Mar.  31  (since 
April  1974). 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN  and  some  of  its  specialized  and  related 
agencies,  including  the  World  Bank,  Inter- 
national Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  Inter- 
national Development  Association  (IDA), 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT);  Seabeds  Committee;  Asian  Devel- 
opment Bank;  Colombo  Plan. 


Taken  from  the  Backciroiind  Notes  of  Feb- 
ruary 1989,  published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State. 
Editor;  Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


41 


EAST  ASIA 


founder  of  modern  Burma.  The  NLD 
appears  to  command  the  support  of  a 
great  many  Burmese  in  various  re- 
gions of  the  country  and  is  perceived  as 
the  principal  opponent  of  the  military 
regime.  While  the  NLD  has  not  offi- 
cially stated  whether  it  will  participate 
in  an  election,  most  observers  predict 
it  will. 

Former  Prime  Minister  U  Nu  is  as- 
sociated with  the  Democracy  Party;  its 
relative  strength  is  not  reckoned  to  be 
on  a  par  with  the  NLD.  The  National 
Unity  Party  is  viewed  as  essentially  a 
re-creation  of  the  old  Burma  Socialist 
Program  Party,  which  ruled  Burma 
from  1962  until  it  was  dissolved  last 
September.  The  NUP  does  appear 
to  receive  to  some  extent  preferen- 
tial treatment  from  the  military 
government. 

Of  the  185  or  so  other  parties,  the 
vast  majority  are  very  small  local 
groups,  many  of  which  are  little  more 
than  debating  societies.  We  have  re- 
ports that  some  parties,  perhaps  30  to 
40,  have  actively  discussed  an  electoral 
alliance  with  the  NLD. 

On  February  17  of  this  year,  the 
government's  election  commission  an- 
nounced a  timetable  which  calls  for  an 
election  in  April  or  May  1990.  No  pre- 
cise date  has  been  set.  The  commis- 
sion's announcement  stated  that  an 
election  law  would  be  issued  by 
March  1,  1989,  to  be  followed  by  consul- 
tation with  the  political  parties.  It  did 
not  give  any  indication  when  restric- 
tions on  public  gatherings  would  be 
lifted  or  when  political  parties  would 
be  allowed  access  to  the  news  media. 

Foreign  Assistance 

As  regards  foreign  assistance,  Burma's 
principal  bilateral  donors — Japan,  West 
Germany,  and  ourselves — suspended 
assistance  to  Burma  last  August  and 
September.  At  that  time,  we  stated 
that  we  looked  forward  to  resuming  as- 
sistance when  conditions  in  Burma  per- 
mitted us  to  do  so.  We  are  looking  for 
meaningful  political  and  economic  re- 
form in  Burma  before  resuming 
assistance. 

The  World  Bank  and  Asian  Devel- 
opment Bank  (ADB)  have  continued  to 
disburse  funds  for  previously  existing 
assistance  projects  since  the  Septem- 
ber 1988  military  takeover.  However, 
we  do  not  now  expect  either  the  World 
Bank  or  the  ADB  to  approve  any  new 
loans  for  Burma.  World  Bank  disburse- 
ments this  year  for  Burma  will  amount 


to  approximately  .$25-$30  million,  and 
ADB  funding  significantly  less. 

The  assistance  cutoffs  by  Burma's 
donors  have  no  doubt  had  a  substantial 
impact.  In  recent  years,  Burma  de- 
pended overwhelmingly  on  foreign  aid 
to  remain  solvent,  and  its  current  for- 
eign exchange  holdings  are  now  vir- 
tually nil.  The  regime  has  stopped 
servicing  much  of  its  debt,  although  it 
has  not  repudiated  any  of  it,  and  has 
had  to  resort  to  barter  arrangements 
to  secure  supplies  of  many  basic  goods 
which  must  be  imported.  In  the  circum- 
stances, we  see  the  prospect  of  a  re- 
sumption of  aid  as  an  important  incen- 
tive to  the  military  authorities  to  keep 
their  promise  of  free,  fair,  multiparty 
elections. 

In  February  of  this  yeai;  Japan  an- 
nounced its  decision  to  recognize  offi- 
cially the  Saw  Maung  government. 
With  recognition,  Japanese  law  re- 
quires resumed  funding  of  official 
aid  projects. 

We  have  no  desire  to  see  the  plight 
of  the  Burmese  people  worsened  by 
suspension  of  projects  clearly  intended 
for  their  benefit.  However,  we  are  con- 
cerned that  continued  funding  of  a  va- 
riety of  assistance  projects  may  well 
reduce  incentives  for  the  regime  to  im- 
plement both  political  and  economic 
reforms. 

Human  Rights 

With  regard  to  human  rights,  the  situa- 
tion for  many  years  has  been  far  from 
satisfactory.  The  annual  human  rights 
reports  submitted  to  Congress  have  de- 
tailed the  areas  of  particular  concern, 
and  I  will  not  repeat  all  of  them  here. 

Within  the  past  year,  there  were 
large-scale  indiscriminate  killings  of 
Burmese  citizens  by  the  regime's  secu- 
rity forces.  Official  versions  of  these  in- 
cidents have  been  widely  at  variance 
with  numerous  eyewitness  accounts  by 
foreign  diplomats,  journalists,  and  oth- 
er observers.  Observers  estimate  that 
in  Rangoon  several  hundred  were  killed 
by  police  during  antigovernment  riots 
in  March  and  June,  although  it  is  im- 
possible to  confirm  these  figures. 

During  the  week  of  August  8-13, 
troops  opened  fire  on  unarmed  citizens 
protesting  Sein  Lwin's  accession  to 
power.  At  least  several  hundred  people 
were  killed,  but  actual  numbers  can 
never  be  known. 

On  September  19,  troops  in  a 
number  of  Burmese  cities,  including 
Rangoon,  opened  fire  on  demonstrators 
protesting  the  military  takeover.  In 


one  instance,  shootings  occurred  in 
front  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  and  were  ol 
served  by  Embassy  personnel.  From 
eyewitness  accounts,  body  counts  in  tl 
hospitals,  and  photographic  evidence, 
U.S.  and  other  observers  estimate 
possibly  1,000  people  were  killed  in 
Rangoon  during  the  September  19-21 
period.  During  both  episodes  of  shoot- 
ing in  August  and  September,  the  Uiii 
ed  States  expressed  directly  to 
the  Burmese  authorities  our  concern 
and  urged  that  the  shooting  cease 
immediately. 

Following  the  September  takeove 
military  authorities  rounded  up  man\ 
young  people  in  Rangoon  and  elsewhe 
and  reportedly  pressed  them  into  ser' 
ice  as  porters  in  areas  where  the 
military  continues  to  battle  various  ii 
surgent  groups.  In  the  past,  this  prat 
tice  had  been  reported  as  common  in 
the  areas  where  insurgent  groups  ai'i 
active,  primarily  areas  inhabited  by 
minority  group  peoples.  This  was  the 
first  instance  that  we  are  aware  of, 
however,  where  the  military  pressed 
ethnic  Burmans  into  such  service. 

According  to  a  number  of  reports 
from  those  who  escaped  or  otherwise 
survived  the  experience,  treatment  o 
impressed  porters  was  harsh.  They 
were  made  to  carry  heavy  loads  of  da 
gerous  ordnance,  given  little  to  eat  oi 
drink,  and  made  to  walk  in  advance  o 
troops  when  ambushes  or  booby  trap.^ 
were  expected.  There  are  reported  ii 
stances  of  porters  who  were  wounded 
and  simjjly  being  left  to  die. 

Also  following  the  September  mi 
tary  takeover,  perhaps  as  many  as  se 
eral  thousand  students  who  had  been 
active  in  antiregime  protest  activity 
fled  Rangoon  and  other  urban  areas  i 
escape  feared  retribution.  Some  in- 
tended to  join  insurgent  groups  or  to 
form  their  own;  others  simply  sought 
save  their  lives.  The  military  govern- 
ment announced  that  those  who  re- 
turned would  not  be  harmed  and  set 
repatriation  centers  to  assist  student 
turning  themselves  in.  Some  availed 
themselves  of  these  centers  and  other 
simply  returned  on  their  own. 

Reports  began  to  surface  in  late 
1988  that  some  of  these  returning  stu 
dents  had  been  arrested,  tortured,  a 
even  executed.  While  we  have  no  ban 
evidence  to  confirm  these  reports  am 
the  military  authorities  have  denied 
them,  we  regarded  some  of  them  to  b 
at  least  sufficiently  credible  to  warra 
raising  the  matter  with  the  military 
government.  Also  in  late  1988,  the  Th 
and  Burmese  Governments  concluded 


«1 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  19< 


^ 


EAST  ASIA 


an  agreement  for  the  repatriation  of 
Istudents  wishing  to  return  home  from 
iThailand.  We  have  no  reason  to  believe 
that  any  of  these  students  to  date  have 
been  subjected  to  human  rights  abuses 
by  Burmese  authorities,  but  we  remain 
concerned  about  the  lack  of  adequate 
leans  to  monitor  their  welfare. 

We  also  have  no  reason  to  believe 
.'hai  authorities  have  forced  the  re- 
(atriation  of  Burmese  students  from 
Jhailand,  but  we  have  consulted  with 
,he  Royal  Thai  Government  to  express 
3Ur  concern  that  students  returned 
From  Thailand  not  be  mistreated  by  the 
jurmese  regime  and  about  the  lack  of 
monitoring  once  students  have  gone 
)ack. 


summary 

in  summing  up  the  situation  in  Burma, 

fve  believe  there  is  no  question  but  that 
he  majority  of  Burmese  want  a  com- 
ilete  overhaul  of  their  country's  politi- 
al  and  economic  systems.  They  took  to 
he  streets  of  Burma's  cities  and  towns 
unprecedented  numbers  last  summer 
10  demonstrate  on  behalf  of  a  return  to 
lUltiparty  democracy.  For  a  brief  mo- 
ent,  it  looked  like  they  would  succeed 
forcing  the  one-party  dictatorship  to 
Itive  them  what  they  wanted.  The  mili- 
ry's  bloody  intervention  in  September 
as  a  severe  setback  to  their  hopes  and 
,e  hopes  of  those  around  the  world 
ho  sympathized  with  their  aspira- 
l«ons.  In  the  period  since,  the  military 
gime  has  sought  retribution  against 
laany  of  those  most  active  in  the  pro- 
est  movement  and  committed  serious 
man  rights  violations  in  the  process. 
On  the  positive  side  of  the  balance 
heet,  however,  it  needs  to  be  noted 
tiat  the  regime  has  insisted  from  the 
Utset  that  it  did  not  seek  power  for 
pwer's  sake  and  that  it  would  organize 

hold  elections  once  law  and  order 
lere  restored.  It  allowed  the  registra- 
lon  of  political  parties  and  some  party 
rganizational  activity.  The  election 
""j*'   ftmmission  established  by  Maung 

iaung  was  permitted  to  continue  its 
li*  lork.  The  regime  has  now  announced 

irough  timetable  leading  up  to  an 
ml'"  lection  in  1990.  We  welcome  this  de- 
lii'S*  felopment,  although  we  would  have 
iirei    referred — as  I  am  sure  the  Burmese 
mIi'   bople  would  prefer — to  see  the  mili- 
wtfi   ^ry  government  fix  a  firm  and  earlier 
toi«   lite  for  polling. 

!««»  The  United  States  has  a  limited 
ofl"  renda  in  Burma.  We  have  an  impor- 
(nt  interest  in  eliminating  the  produc- 


iorl 


tion  of  opium  and  halting  the  traffic  in 
illicit  drugs,  and  we  look  forward  to  the 
time — hopefully  soon — when  it  will  be 
possible  to  resume  bilateral  antinarco- 
tics  cooperation.  Beyond  that,  we  want 
to  see  a  peaceful,  stable,  and  prosper- 
ous Burma  administered  by  a  govern- 
ment acceptable  to  its  people  and 
posing  no  threat  to  its  neighbors.  Bur- 
ma is  a  country  of  great  natural  wealth 
and  promise,  and  we  also  look  forward 
to  the  time  when  we  can  once  again 
contribute  toward  the  realization  of 
that  promise  through  our  bilateral  aid 
program.  All  that  needs  the  political 


and  economic  reforms  the  Burmese  so 
obviously  desire.  Once  before  in  Bur- 
mese history,  in  19(50,  a  military  gov- 
ernment peacefully  turned  over  power 
to  civilians  and  resumed  its  purely  mil- 
itary functions.  We  hope  the  current 
rulers  of  Burma  will  respond  to  the  as- 
pirations of  their  people  by  following 
this  example. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Future  Prospects  for  the  Philippines 


by  David  F.  Lambertson 

Statement  before  the  Si(bcoi)nnittee 
on  Asia7i  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  7.  1989.  Mr.  Lambertson  is  Dep- 
iitii  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian 
and  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

Our  policy  of  unequivocal  support 
for  Philippine  efforts  to  rebuild 
democracy — and  for  the  Aquino 
Administration — in  the  face  of  numer- 
ous challenges  over  the  past  3  years  has 
been  successful.  A  stable,  democratic, 
and  prosperous  Philippines — with 
friendly  ties  to  and  continued  close  se- 
curity cooperation  with  the  United 
States — is  critically  important  to  the 
peace  and  stability  of  Southeast  Asia 
and  to  U.S.  intere.sts  both  within  and 
outside  the  region.  While  it  is  the  Phil- 
ippine people  who  deserve  the  credit 
for  their  accomplishments  over  the  past 
3  years,  our  support  has  helped  the 
Aquino  government  reestablish  demo- 
cratic political  institutions,  preside 
over  an  emerging  political  consensus, 
and  recover  from  a  severe  economic  re- 
cession. As  President  Bush  said  on  the 
occasion  of  the  third  anniversary  of  the 
EDSA-  revolution: 

We  Americans  hold  a  special  place  in  our 
hearts  for  the  Filipino  people,  whose  profound 
yearning-s  for  democracy,  social  justice,  and  hu- 
man rig-hts  are  shared  by  all  Americans.  The 
democratic  government  of  the  Philippines  inher- 
ited a  faltering  economy  and  weakened  political 
institutions.  The  Philipi)ine  Government  has 
made  great  progress  in  dealing  with  these  prob- 
lems... America's  commitment  to  the  Philippines 
remains  imshaken.  President  Aquino  lias  our 
total  support  in  her  effort  to  maintain  national 
unity,  revitalize  democracy,  revive  the  economy, 
and  counter  the  comnumist  in-surgency. 


Political  Situation 

Since  I  last  testified  on  the  Philippines 
before  this  committee  in  March  1988, 
Philippine  democracy  has  become  more 
stable.  President  Aquino,  who  has 
maintained  her  personal  stature  and 
enormous  popularity,  has  further  con- 
solidated her  hold  on  the  political  cen- 
ter. There  is  an  emerging  consensus 
that  neither  the  extraeonstitutional  op- 
position of  the  extreme  left  nor  that  of 
the  far  right  offers  credible  leadership 
or  real  policy  alternatives.  As  to  the 
balance  of  forces  within  the  democratic 
framework  which  has  been  established, 
her  position  remains  strong  as  well.  A 
two-party  system  seems  to  be  gradu- 
ally emerging.  Elements  from  across 
the  political  spectrum  have  allied  them- 
selves with  the  newly  formed  pro- 
Administration  LDP  [Lahan  ng  De- 
mokratikong]  Party.  This  party  domi- 
nates the  House  of  Representatives, 
represents  almost  one-third  of  the  Sen- 
ate, and  has  incorporated  many  pro- 
vincial and  local  officials.  The  second 
major  political  party,  the  Liberal  Par- 
ty, is  also  part  of  the  pro-Aquino  coali- 
tion. When  Vice  President  Laurel 
moved  into  open  opposition  to  the  Pres- 
ident, few  public  figures  joined  him. 

The  Philippine  Congress  has  a  nu- 
mber of  important  legislative  accom- 
plishments to  its  credit  in  22  months, 
including  two  budgets,  a  military  pay 
raise  bill,  the  Comprehensive  Agrarian 
Reform  Law,  and  free  high  school  edu- 
cation legislation.  The  Congress  has 
filled  a  key  political  role  as  a  forum  for 
policy  debate  and  scrutiny  of  executive 
branch  performance  but  has  been  crit- 
icized in  the  press  for  alleged  corrup- 
tion, a  lack  of  focus,  and  excessive 


jpartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


43 


EAST  ASIA 


personality  politics.  President  Aquino 
enjoys  considerable  influence  in  the 
Congress,  especially  in  the  House 
where  over  three-fourths  of  the  Con- 
gressmen belong  to  pro-Aquino  politi- 
cal parties.  As  would  be  expected  in  a 
country  which  had  no  functionally  inde- 
pendent legislature  for  15  years,  there 
is  an  ongoing  period  of  adjustment  bet- 
ween the  executive  and  legislative 
branches.  The  differences  that  arise 
in  this  adjustment  period  some- 
times mask  the  significant  extent  of 
executive-legislative  cooperation  that 
actually  exists.  President  Aquino  in- 
volves herself  in  managing  executive- 
congressional  relations  as  necessary 
and  has  had  some  major  successes  re- 
cently on  policy  issues,  such  as  agree- 
ment to  postponement  of  the  harangaij 
[local]  elections  from  last  fall  until  later 
this  month  and  avoidance  of  a  tariff  bill 
that  would  have  violated  government 
agreements  with  the  World  Bank. 

President  Aquino  has  taken  major 
steps  to  reestablish  the  independence 
of  the  Philippine  judiciary,  but  the  judi- 
cial system  is  hampered  by  such  prob- 
lems as  inadequate  resources,  heavy 
case  loads,  and  reported  corruption 
and  intimidation  of  witnesses.  Because 
defendants  enjoy  strict  legal  safe- 
guards and  the  Philippines  follows  a 
discontinuous  trial  system,  convictions 
often  take  many  years;  even  civil  liti- 
gation can  take  years.  The  failure  to 
provide  justice  more  efficiently  has 
contributed  to  a  jjropensity  to  resort  to 
remedies  outside  the  legal  system.  An 
experiment  to  conduct  trials  on  a  con- 
tinuous basis  began  in  early  1989  and, 
if  successful,  will  be  widely  instituted. 
In  a  case  of  special  interest  to  the  Unit- 
ed States,  the  first  conviction  of 
a  major  narcotics  violator  in  at  least 
3  years  took  place  in  January  1989, 
reflecting  the  personal  efforts  of  the 
Secretary  of  Justice  to  improve  the 
Philippine  judicial  system. 

Communist  Insurgency 

The  Aquino  government  continues  to 
face  enormous  challenges  to  democratic 
rule.  The  Communist  Party  of  the  Phil- 
ippines (CPP),  its  armed  wing,  the  New- 
People's  Army  (NPA),  and  its  front 
organization,  the  National  Democratic 
Front  (NDF),  remain  the  most  serious 
long-term  threat  to  democracy  in  the 
Philippines. 

During  1988,  President  Aquino's 
continuing  popularity,  democratic  re- 
forms, strong  economic  growth,  and 


improved  military  performance  have 
challenged  the  insurgent  leadership 
and  compounded  their  serious  internal 
disagreements.  The  Armed  Forces  of 
the  Philippines  (AFP)  has  announced 
that  NPA  strength  has  declined  slight- 
ly, although  numerical  estimates  are 
extremely  unreliable.  While  there  is  a 
great  deal  of  variation  from  region  to 
region,  we  also  have  concluded  that  the 
communist  insurgency  has  stopped 
growing.  The  military  also  claims  that 
communist  areas  of  operations  have 
shrunk  and  that  it  lost  fewer  weapons 
to  the  communists  than  it  captured  in 
1988.  In  many  areas  the  communists 
are  suffering  from  serious  weapons  and 
ammunition  shortages.  Insurgency  re- 
lated deaths  are  running  about  10  per 
day — the  same  level  as  1987  but  down 
from  earlier  years.  The  AFP,  however, 
is  suffering  fewer  casualties  in  armed 
engagements  and  is  inflicting  higher 
losses  on  the  insurgents. 

In  a  series  of  raids  in  1988,  the 
AIT  captured  top  leaders,  compro- 
mised valuable  documents,  and  exposed 
communist  fronts  and  finances.  These 
i-aids  were  exploited  for  their  pi-opa- 
ganda  value  and  undoubtedly  under- 
mined the  morale  of  the  communists. 
The  Philippine  military  has  demon- 
strated its  ability  to  exploit  intel- 
ligence obtained  from  captured  cadre 
and  documents  in  the  raids.  The  Manila 
press  has  re])orted  that  several  organs 
of  the  Communist  Party  are  distracted 
by  an  ongoing  purge  of  suspected  gov- 
ernment agents. 

The  government  is  making  a  great- 
er effort  to  expose  communist  front 
groups  (including  human  rights  organi- 
zations, labor  unions,  student  groups, 
and  peasant  organizations).  Some  of 
these  groups  are  losing  members  and 
funding  sources.  Nevertheless,  they  re- 
main an  important  part  of  the  political 
scene  in  the  Philippines.  Communist 
front  groups  have  succeeded  in  garner- 
ing aid  from  foreign  humanitarian 
organizations  and  in  influencing  the 
political  debate  on  issues  such  as 
human  rights. 

Still,  it  would  be  premature  to  say 
that  the  tide  has  turned.  The  peace  and 
order  situation  is  improving  in  many 
areas  of  the  country,  but  the  insurgen- 
cy is  more  active  in  others.  The  com- 
munists maintain  large  support  bases 
in  many  isolated  rural  areas.  The 
communists  continue  to  engage  in  kid- 
napings,  extortion  attempts,  and 
assassinations.  The  escape  of  the  for- 
mer head  of  the  New  People's  Army, 
Romulo  Kintanar,  in  November  was  an 


44 


embarrassment  for  the  military  and 
a  morale  booster  for  the  communists. 
Should  the  rural  economy  deteriorate, 
the  insurgency  could  regain  momentum 
The  Muslim  insurgency  in  souther 
Mindanao  is  currently  inactive.  The 
Muslim  liberation  movements  are  di- 
vided with  some  groups  attempting  to 
resolve  their  problems  through  politic; 
solutions.  The  conflict  could  escalate, 
Muslim  leaders  decide  the  government 
is  not  seriously  negotiating  with  them. 

Civil-Military  Relations 

President  Aquino's  relations  with  the 
AFP  have  improved  considerably.  She 
acknowledges  the  essential  military 
role  in  combating  the  insurgency  and 
has  implemented  earlier  promises  of  a 
40%-60%  military  pay  raise  and  a  lar- 
ger share  of  the  budget  for  defense. 
Improved  deliveries  of  military  equip- 
ment also  have  helped  morale  and  im- 
proved the  effectiveness  of  the  force. 
The  Secretary  of  National  Defense  an' 
the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Armed  Forces 
have  repeatedly  demonstrated  their 
loyalty  to  democratic  government. 
Loyal  officers  who  understand  and  re 
spect  the  democratic  process  have  bee>^ 
assigned  to  key  command  positions. 
Many  AFP  officers  have  come  to  appr- 
ciate  that  President  Aquino  remains 
extremely  popular  and  has  deprived 
the  communists  of  a  claim  to  political 
legitimacy. 

The  military,  however,  has  yet  to 
regain  completely  its  premartial  law 
professionalism  and  apolitical  repu- 
tation, and  some  officers  in  the  AFP 
continue  to  be  discontented.  Such 
alienated  officers  criticize  the  presen 
military  leadership  and  political  dire 
tion  of  the  civilian  government.  Theii 
concerns  are  relatively  unfocused  anc 
unlikely  to  result  in  broadly  supporte 
antigovernment  military  actions  at  tl 
time.  Should  the  government  suffer  S' 
rious  reverses  against  the  insurgents 
or  should  the  AFP  perceive  its  in- 
terests to  be  threatened,  however, 
military  disenchantment  could  again 
become  a  destabilizing  factor  in  Phili 
pine  politics. 

At  the  present  time,  the  pro- 
Marcos  and  dissident  Reform  the  An 
ed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  (RAM) 
elements  suffer  from  poor  leadership, 
disunity,  and  demoralization.  Marcos 
loyalists  presently  have  little  popular 
support  outside  Marcos'  home  provini 
and  insufficient  military  support  to 
launch  a  credible  coup  attempt.  None 
theless,  elements  within  the  AFP,  as- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  19) 


EAST  ASIA 


i  well  as  some  business  representatives 
and  exmilitary  officers,  continue  to 
plot  disruptive  activities  or  to  spread 
rumors  of  antigovernment  actions. 
Much  of  the  rumors  are  part  of  a  con- 
tinuing rightwing  effort  to  discredit 
the  Aquino  Administration.  While  we 
cannot  rule  out  attempts  to  stage  an 
embarrassing  incident  and  create  an 
impression  of  instability,  Philippine 
authorities  are  taking  appropriate 
measures  to  ensure  public  safety. 

Human  Rights 

Respect  for  human  rights  in  the  Philip- 
pines has  vastly  improved  under  Presi- 
dent Aquino's  Administration.  Charges 
that  the  level  of  human  rights  abuses 
are  worse  than  under  Marcos  are  dis- 
missed by  most  knowledegable  Fili- 
pinos, including  the  leadership  of  the 
Catholic  Church.  When  President 
Aquino  assumed  power,  she  was  con- 
fronted by  a  discredited  judicial 
system,  an  active  and  violent  commu- 
nist insurgency,  and  a  culture  in  which 
personal  disputes  are  often  settled  by 
violent  means.  In  this  challenging  envi- 
ronment, she  moved  rapidly  to  release 
l)i)litical  prisoners,  remove  media  con- 
trols, restore  democratic  institutions, 
and  hold  free  and  fair  elections  for  a 
new  Congress  and  thousands  of  local  of- 
tuials.  The  government  has  largely  im- 
[ik'niented  the  1987  constitution's  jjrovi- 
■iiuns  on  political,  s(K'ial,  and  civil  rights. 
Despite  strong  ])()])ular  support  for 
Pi-esident  Aquino's  reform  agenda  and 
iier  personal  commitment  to  the  protec- 
:ii)n  of  human  rights,  however,  there 
vvere  (as  we  reported  to  the  Congress 
II  our  annual  human  rights  report  on 
he  Philippines)  continuing  problems 
ivith  human  rights  in  1988.  The  vast 
najurity  of  human  rights  violations  in 
he  Philippines  are  related  to  the  com- 
nunist  insurgency  and  government 
'fforts  to  counter  it.  Human  rights 
ibuses  by  some  members  of  the  police 
ind  military  have  undoubtedly  oc- 
■urred,  but  these  are  in  violation  of 
.government  policy.  Anticommunist  ci- 
lilian  volunteer  organizations,  some- 
imes  termed  "vigilantes,"  continued 
0  form  in  areas  where  the  NPA  pres- 
Mice  is  strong.  The  number  of  allega- 
ions  of  human  rights  abuses  by  some  of 
hese  groups  also  increased.  It  is  likely 
hat  some  anticommunist  groups  have 
)een  involved  in  human  rights  viola- 
ions;  other  allegations  are  probably 
abricated  by  communist-influenced  or- 
ganizations seeking  to  weaken  often  ef- 
'ective  anticommunist  citizen  groups  or 
0  discredit  the  Aquino  government. 


To  establish  more  effective  govern- 
ment control  over  local  security,  the 
government  is  replacing  the  dis- 
credited Marcos-era  Civilian  Home 
Defense  Forces  and  armed  civilian  vol- 
unteer organizations  with  a  civilian  mi- 
litia known  as  Citizens  Armed  Forces 
Geographical  Units  (CAFGUs).  The 
CAFGUs  are  led  by  military  officers 
and  manned  by  government-recruited 
and  trained  personnel  who  are  subject 
to  military  regulations  enforcing  re- 
spect for  human  rights. 

Reports  of  the  disappearance  of 
human  rights  activists  and  members  of 
leftist  organizations  increased  during 
the  second  half  of  1988  and  remain  a 
source  of  concern.  Some  of  these  inci- 
dents may  be  related  to  internal  NPA 
purges.  In  response  to  this  and  other 
human  rights  concerns.  President  Aq- 
uino, in  December,  strongly  reaffirmed 
her  government's  commitment  to  hu- 
man rights  and  her  determination  to 
take  stronger  steps  to  ensure  respect 
for  them.  She  established  a  special  com- 
mittee under  the  leadership  of  the 
Secretary  of  Justice  to  review  human 
rights  policy  issues.  She  also  desig- 
nated city  and  provincial  state  prosecu- 
tors to  assist  families  in  searching  for 
missing  relatives  in  military  camps 
and  detention  centers. 

To  promote  more  rigorous  obser- 
vance of  military  human  rights  regula- 
tions. Secretary  of  National  Defense 
Ramos  has  directed  that  military  com- 
manders be  held  resjjonsible  for  viola- 
tions by  their  suboi'dinates  and  ordered 
that  human  rights  records  be  an  impor- 
tant consideration  in  military  promo- 
tions. Training  of  military  personnel 
now  places  greater  emphasis  on  the  re- 
spect for  human  rights.  Aquino  has 
also  shifted  a  number  of  human  rights 
cases  against  members  of  the  armed 
forces  from  military  to  civilian  courts. 
In  February,  an  accused  assassin  of 
a  human  rights  lawyer  in  Cebu  was 
tried,  convicted  of  this  human  rights 
abuse,  and  sentenced  to  life  imprison- 
ment. The  conviction  came  less  than 
9  months  after  the  crime. 

U.S.  officials  continually  raise  our 
human  rights  concerns  in  discussions 
with  Philippine  Government  and  mili- 
tary officials.  They  are  aware  of  our 
concerns,  as  well  as  those  of  respected 
human  rights  organizations,  and  are 
committed  to  eliminating  human  rights 
violations  in  the  Philippines. 

U.S. -Philippine  Relations 

The  United  States  and  the  Philippines 
enjoy  excellent  bilateral  relations.  The 
United  States  is  the  Philippines'  larg- 


est trading  partner  (approximately 
35%  of  Philippine  trade),  largest  overall 
foreign  investor  (over  $1  billion  in  in- 
vestment), and  is  home  to  over  1  million 
ethnic  Filipinos.  Our  shared  history, 
culture,  and  language  have  made  the 
relationship  special  for  both  countries. 
We  are  committed  to  mutual  defense 
under  the  1951  mutual  defense  treaty 
and  our  security  relationship  is  strong 
and  valued.  Pursuant  to  the  1947  mili- 
tary bases  agreement,  the  United 
States  also  maintains  and  operates 
major  military  facilities  on  the  Phil- 
ippine bases  at  Clark  and  Subic. 

Our  successful  conclusion  of  the 
most  recent  review  of  the  military 
bases  agreement  in  October  1988  laid 
the  foundation  for  continuation  of  our 
mutual  security  relationship  after  1991. 
President  Aquino  has  stated  that  a  new 
agreement  will  be  required  in  1991  to 
continue  the  U.S.  military  presence  in 
the  Philippines  after  that  time.  The 
U.S.  Government  is  preparing  to  nego- 
tiate a  new  agreement,  which  would 
enter  into  effect  in  1991. 

We  are  confident  that  it  will  be 
possible  to  negotiate  a  new  arrange- 
ment, satisfactory  to  both  parties, 
based  on  our  mutual  interest  in  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  U.S.  military  presence. 
Recent  Philippine  public  opinion  polls 

indicate  that  the  Philijjpine  public  re- 
mains strongly  in  favor  of  the  U.S.  se- 
curity relationship  and  the  retention  of 
the  military  facilities.  The  August  1988 
Ateneo  poll,  taken  dui'ing  a  break  in 
the  1988  military  bases  agreement  re- 
view talks,  found  74%  of  those  polled  in 
Manila  in  favor  of  retention  (under  cer- 
tain conditions),  with  even  higher  sup- 
port outside  of  Manila.  The  results 
would  likely  have  been  even  more  favor- 
able had  the  poll  been  taken  after  con- 
clusion of  the  review.  Public  awareness 
of  the  bases,  according  to  the  poll,  has 
also  increased  sharply.  This  strong 
public  support  will  become  an  increas- 
ingly important  consideration  for  Phil- 
ippine politicians  as  the  1992  elections 
approach. 

The  Philippines  also  derives  major 
economic  benefits  from  hosting  the 
U.S.  military  facilities.  The  Philip- 
pines expects  to  receive  $481  million 
annually  in  "bases-related"  assistance 
in  FY  1990  and  FY  1991.  In  addition,  we 
estimate  the  direct  economic  flows  into 
the  Philippine  economy  resulting  from 
the  presence  of  the  U.S.  facilities  to  be 
approximately  $500  million  per  year. 
This  sum  includes  procurement  of  Phi- 
lippine products  and  use  of  Philippine 
service  contractors,  salaries  of  Filipino 
employees,  and  personal  spending  by 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


45 


EAST  ASIA 


military  and  civilian  personnel  assign- 
ed in  the  Philippines  or  there  on  a  tem- 
porary basis. 

The  Philippine  economy  would  suf- 
fer severely  from  a  precipitous  U.S. 
withdrawal.  The  U.S.  military  is  the 
second  largest  employer  in  the  Philip- 
pines after  the  Philippine  Government. 
Many  Philippine  companies  sell  sub- 
stantial amounts  to  the  U.S.  military. 
If  the  U.S.  facilities  were  foreign  coun- 
tries, they  would  be  the  Philippines 
seventh  largest  trading  partner.  The 
Philippine  Government  has  commis- 
sioned several  studies  on  how  to  adjust 
to  a  U.S.  departure,  but  we  have  seen 
no  credible  plan  to  make  the  areas 
economically  viable  without  a  U.S. 
presence.  Other  former  U.S.  military 
facilities  (for  example  at  Sangley  Point) 
are  not  being  used  in  commercial 
ventures. 

In  addition,  there  are  substantial 
intangible  economic  benefits.  Because 
of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  its  external 
defense,  the  Philippines  can  devote 
scarce  military  funding  to  combating 
the  domestic  communist  insurgency. 
The  U.S.  military  presence  also  en- 
hances the  Philippines'  image  of  politi- 
cal stability  during  this  period  of  rapid 
change  and  readjustment  to  democracy, 
thereby  increasing  its  ability  to  attract 
needed  foreign  investment. 

In  addition  to  the  economic  disloca- 
tion caused  by  the  withdrawal  of  the 
U.S.  military  from  the  Philippines, 
there  would  be  an  undeniable  political 
cost  to  both  countries  if  we  are  unable 
to  work  out  a  new  agreement.  Regard- 
less of  our  ability  to  relocate  functions 
currently  performed  at  Clark  and  Su- 
bic,  our  withdrawal  would  be  seen  by 
other  Asian  countries  as  a  diminution 
of  U.S.  power  in  the  region. 

The  United  States  also  enjoys  sig- 
nificant benefits  from  our  security  re- 
lationship. The  Philippines  is  located  at 
a  strategic  crossroads  between  the  Pa- 
cific Ocean  and  the  South  China  Sea, 
adjacent  to  the  Asian  mainland,  and 
near  the  critical  straits  that  lead  to  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  the  Middle  East.  Be- 
cause of  this  strategic  location,  U.S. 
Naval  and  Air  Force  units  deployed  in 
the  Philippines  could  effectively  pro- 
tect regional  air  and  sealanes  and 
maintain  a  counterweight  to  Soviet 
forces  in  the  South  China  Sea.  The 
U.S.  facility  at  Subic  Bay  is  the  prima- 
ry port,  training  area,  and  logistical 
support  base  for  U.S.  7th  Fleet  units 
operating  in  the  Western  Pacific  and 
the  Indian  Ocean.  It  contains  a  major 
supply  depot,  serves  as  an  important 


communications  link,  offers  ship  repair 
facilities,  and  ojjerates  an  airfield  for 
the  7th  Fleet's  carrier  force.  Clark  Air 
Base  is  the  headquarters  of  the  U.S. 
13th  Air  Force.  The  Clark  facility 
serves  as  a  staging  point  for  strategic 
airlifts  into  the  Indian  Ocean  including 
the  island  of  Diego  Garcia,  permits 
easy  surveillance  of  strategic  "choke- 
points"  in  the  region,  and  provides 
training  of  aircrews  from  the  United 
States  and  other  friendly  countries. 

We  recognize  that  negotiations  may 
be  long  and  possibly  contentious  be- 
cause the  Philippine  side  will  raise  sev- 
eral tough  issues  that  must  be  resolved. 
These  issues  include:  duration  of  the 
agreement,  assistance,  Philippine  eco- 
nomic benefits  from  the  presence  of  the 
facilities,  and  so-called  sovereignty  is- 
sues (Philippine  Government  involve- 
ment in  U.S.  military  uses  of  the 
facilities  and  criminal  jurisdiction). 

Obviously,  we  hope  and  expect  a 
successful  renegotiation.  However,  pru- 
dent planning  dictates  that  our  mili- 
tary examine  alternatives  should  we 
fail  to  reach  a  satisfactory  agreement. 
A  number  of  potential  alternatives  are 
being  pursued. 

U.S.  Assistance  to  the  Philippines 

The  Administration's  FY  1990  assis- 
tance request  ($458.6  million)  for  the 
Philippines  incorporates  the  first  half 
of  the  President's  2-year  best  efforts 
pledge  made  in  conjunction  with  the 
1988  review  of  the  military  bases 
agreement.  Failure  to  provide  any  part 
of  this  assistance  would  adversely  af- 
fect our  bilateral  relationship  and,  in 
particular,  complicate  our  efforts  to 
negotiate  continued  access  to  our  mili- 
tary facilities  on  Philippine  bases  at 
Clark  and  Subic  for  the  period  beyond 
1991.  This  level  of  assistance  is  fully 
justified  by  the  enormous  Philippine 
needs  for  economic  development  neces- 
sary to  alleviate  poverty  and  under- 
mine the  appeal  of  the  insurgents. 
Similarly  the  military  assistance  is 
necessary  to  help  the  Philippine  armed 
forces  improve  its  counterinsurgency 
capabilities  and  attain  its  professional- 
ization  goals. 

While  my  colleague  from  the  De- 
fense Department  can  go  into  more 
detail  on  our  security  assistance 
program,  let  me  just  say  that  U.S.  mil- 
itarv  assistance  to  the  Philippines — 
$200  million  FMS  [foreign  military 
sales]  financing  grant  and  $2.6  million 
IMET  [international  military  education 
and  training] — that  we  are  requesting 
for  FY  1990  will  provide  essential  re- 


sources to  the  Armed  Forces  of  the 
Philippines,  promote  military  profes- 
sionalism, and  improve  morale,  thereby 
enhancing  AFP  capability  to  support 
Philippine  democracy.  This  aid  is  tar- 
geted on  improving  the  AFP's  ability  to 
counter  a  threatening  communist  in- 
surgency by  improving  training  and  by 
upgrading  tactical  mobility  and  com- 
munications. U.S.  military  assistance 
is  also  designed  to  improve  troop  mo- 
rale by  providing  for  basic  soldier 
needs  (uniforms,  boots,  and  medical 
support). 

The  Philippine  Government  also 
confronts  serious  economic  difficulties, 
including  widespread  poverty,  under- 
employment, and  a  large  foreign  debt. 
Our  economic  assistance  supports  the 
government's  reform  programs,  which 
are  key  to  revitalizing  the  economy,  im- 
proving social  conditions,  and  provid- 
ing essential  rural  infrastructure. 
Government  reforms  contributed  to 
6.7'7f  economic  growth  in  1988,  but 
further  efforts  are  needed.  Our  FY 
1990  bilateral  economic  assistance 
program — development  assistance,  $55 
million;  PL480,  .$41  million;  and  ESF 
[economic  support  fund],  $160 
million — will  continue  to  support  the 
overall  U.S.  assistance  strategy  by 
helping  reduce  constraints  to  sustained! 
economic  growth,  particularly  in 
agriculture  and  rural  industry  and 
infrastructure. 

Economic  Situation 

Economic  recovery  in  the  Philippines 
is  continuing.  The  annual  rate  of  GNP 
growth  increased  from  5.69^  in  1987  to 
6.7%  in  1988.  Personal  consumption  and' 
markedly  increased  capital  investment 
were  almost  equal  contributors  to  eco- 
nomic expansion  in  1988.  Recent  in- 
creases in  investment  are  important 
because  only  by  increasing  the  stock  of 
investment  can  the  Philippines  sustain 
broadly  based  growth.  For  too  long  af- 
ter the  1986  change  in  government,  in- 
vestment was  at  low  levels  because  of 
the  widespread  impression  among  po- 
tential investors  that  the  political  cli- 
mate was  fragile. 

Along  with  this  growth,  company 
profits  have  increased  as  sales  of  con- 
sumer goods  have  surged.  Unemploy- 
ment has  fallen  to  under  10%,  and  there 
has  been  a  steady  increase  in  manufac- 
turing employment,  although  jobs  re- 
main a  significant  concern  with  30%  of 
the  workforce  underemployed.  The  Phi- 
lippine economy  must  create  750,000 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


new  jobs  each  year  to  keep  pace  with 
new  entrants  to  the  labor  force. 

Philippine  macroeconomic  policy 
has  contained  inflationary  pressures 
while  stimulating  this  rapid  growth. 
The  annual  inflation  rate  was  8.8%  in 
1988.  As  World  Bank  President  Barber 
Conable  recently  noted,  the  Philippines 
"...has  demonstrated  that  a  high  debt 
country  can  forge  recovery  through  a 
combination  of  enlightened  government 

'policies  and  private  initiative."  He 
went  on  to  note  that  where  the  average 
growth  for  17  high-debt  countries  in 
1988  was  less  than  3%,  the  Philippines' 
was  closer  to  19c.  Where  the  average 
rate  of  inflation  for  those  countries  was 

I  about  80%,  the  Philippines  was  less 
than  9%. 

Philippine  foreign  debt  stands  at 
$28.2  billion.  In  spite  of  the  favorable 
impact  of  rescheduling,  debt  service 
takes  30%  of  the  Philippines'  e.xport 
earnings.  The  Philippine  Government, 
in  the  face  of  tremendous  political  pres- 
sure to  limit  debt  service  payments, 
has  pursued  a  responsible  policy  of  hon- 
oring debts  incurred  under  the  Marcos 
government.  President  Aquino  recently 

I  vetoed  a  bill  that  would  have  mandated 
a  joint  legislative-executive  commission 
on  debt,  because  she  believed  this  ac- 
tion would  interfere  with  the  executive 
branch's  authority  to  set  the  Philip- 
pines' debt  policy.  Although  the  Philip- 
pine Senate  overrode  her  veto  by  a  22-0 
vote,  the  House  of  Representatives  up- 
held the  President's  veto.  Nevertheless, 
the  Philippine  Congress  will  continue 
to  review  closely  the  Philippine 
Government's  debt  policy. 

Philippine  exports  grew  25%  in 
1988.  Nontraditional  products  (gar- 
ments, textiles,  electronics,  furniture, 
and  processed  foods)  now  account  for 
77%  of  export  earnings.  In  order  to 
sustain  export  growth,  the  Philippines 
must  increase  investment,  improve  in- 
frastructure, maintain  an  appropriate 
'xchange  rate,  and  continue  other 
.■conomic  reforms. 

The  Philippine  Government's  eco- 
lomic  reform  effort,  with  important 
inigress  behind  it,  has  slowed  in  some 
Jolitically  difficult  areas.  VAT  [value 
ulded  tax]  imposition  and  enactment 
)f  the  land  reform  law  were  important 
nitiatives,  and  the  first  phase  of  trade 
iberalization  has  been  completed. 
However,  politically  sensitive  privatiza- 
iiin  has  not  been  as  rapid  as  planned, 
decentralization  has  also  been  a  partic- 
ilarly  difficult  area.  The  government's 
)o(tr  performance  in  disbursing  funds 
'or  infrastructure  projects  and  in  de- 


centralizing decisionmaking  must  be 
improved  to  sustain  economic  growth. 

Even  with  this  recent  economic 
progress,  there  continues  to  be  signifi- 
cant poverty  and  underemployment  in 
the  Philippines.  Some  52%>  of  all  house- 
holds fall  below  the  official  poverty  line 
of  $540.  Rapid  population  growth  is 
exacerbating  urban  migration  and 
straining  social  services.  A  rapidly 
expanding  labor  force  is  also  holding 
down  real  wage  rates. 

The  United  States  has  supported 
the  Philippine  economic  recovery  in  a 
number  of  ways.  We  increased  econom- 
ic and  military  assistance  immediately 
after  President  Aquino's  accession  to 
power  and  have  continued  to  provide 
high  levels  of  assistance.  A  new,  signifi- 
cantly more  liberal  textile  agreement 
has  spurred  exports  and  created  em- 
ployment. We  have  encouraged  Philip- 
pine efforts  to  attract  foreign  invest- 
ment and  have  provided  the  most 
liberal  possible  coverage  under  the 
U.S.  GSP  [general  system  of  prefer- 
ences] program.  Probably  most  im- 
portant over  the  long  term  is  our 
leadership  role  in  organizing  a  Multi- 
lateral Assistance  Initiative  (MAI)  for 
the  Philippines.  This  ambitious  pro- 
gram aims  at  putting  the  Philippines 
firmly  on  the  path  to  .'iustainable  eco- 
nomic growth  through  continuing 
economic  restructuring,  enhanced 
assistance,  and  investment. 

Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative 

The  Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative 
is  a  unique  opportunity  to  assure 
the  primary  U.S.  interest  in  the 
Philippines — long-term,  stable  Philip- 
pine democracy  with  growing  economic 
well-being  for  its  nearly  60  million 
people.  In  that  environment,  the 
traditionally  close  U.S. -Philippine  eco- 
nomic, political,  cultural,  and 
security  relationships  will  continue 
to  thrive. 

I  believe  there  are  compelling  rea- 
sons for  the  United  States  to  take  a 
leadership  role  in  this  initiative.  The 
MAI  will  make  a  major  difference  in 
the  future  of  the  Philippines.  It  will 
build  on  significant  Philippine  econom- 
ic progress  to  demonstrate  that  democ- 
racy and  private-seetor-led  economic 
development  work.  It  will  strengthen 
the  Philippine  commitment  to  sound 
economic  policies  which  will  serve  as 
a  catalyst  for  new  private  investment 
from  both  domestic  and  foreign 
sources. 


In  practical  terms,  MAI  resoui-ces 
will  be  linked  to  the  progress  of  the 
Philippine  Government  in  imjjlement- 
ing  its  appropriate,  donor-supported 
economic  reform  program.  The  avail- 
ability of  these  resources  will  give 
crucial  leverage  to  reform  advocates 
within  the  Philippine  Government. 
Such  leverage  will  help  them  win  diffi- 
cult political  approval  of  controversial 
restructuring  measures.  The  MAI  will 
also  support  administrative  reforms  to 
enable  the  Philippines  to  use  assistance 
faster  and  more  effectively,  thereby  re- 
ducing the  assistance  pipeline.  It  will 
accelerate  the  development  of  rural  in- 
frastructure. Ultimately,  we  believe 
the  MAI  will  significantly  enhance  the 
ability  of  the  Philippine  Government  to 
deliver  services,  attract  employment  to 
depressed  rural  areas,  and  undermine 
the  appeal  of  the  communist  insurgency. 

There  are  important  political  rea- 
sons for  the  United  States  to  play  an 
active  role  in  developing  the  MAI.  The 
MAI  is  a  concrete  demonstration  of  our 
unequivocal  support  for  democracy  in 
the  Philippines.  Our  fostering  of  this 
key  multilateral  program  for  the  Phil- 
ippines will  strengthen  Philippine 
political  support  for  maintenance  of 
strong,  friendly  bilateral  relations.  A 
successful  MAI  will  also  be  a  model  of 
how  the  impact  of  U.S.  assistance  can 
be  multiplied  through  cooperative  un- 
dertakings to  strengthen  emerging 
democracies. 

The  MAI  is  also  an  experiment  in 
international  assistance  cooperation. 
U.S.  leadership  of  this  multilateral 
program  will  leverage  scarce  U.S.  as- 
sistance into  much  larger  benefits  for  a 
country  of  central  importance  to  U.S. 
policy  interests — an  innovative  policy 
initiative  in  an  environment  of  shrink- 
ing assistance  resources.  This  pioneer 
effort  will  advance  U.S.  assistance  ob- 
jectives by  strengthening  the  effective- 
ness of  assistance  through  multilateral 
cooperation.  For  example,  the  MAI  has 
already  elicited  a  strong  Japanese  com- 
mitment in  favor  of  increased  support 
for  economic  reforms  in  the  Philip- 
pines. The  excellent  policy  dialogue  we 
have  established  with  -Japan  on  the  Phi- 
lippines may  have  an  important  spill- 
over effect  in  other  countries  of  mutual 
interest,  as  .Japan  assumes  its  place  as 
the  world's  largest  bilateral  donor. 

Finally,  we  have  enormous  curi-ent 
and  future  commercial  stakes  in  a  pro- 
gram that  will  help  sustain  broadly 
based,  strong  economic  growth  in  the 
Philippines.  Approximately  30%  of 
Philippine  trade  is  currently  with  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


47 


EAST  ASIA 


United  States.  Special  efforts  to  ex- 
pand the  Philippine  economy  rapidly, 
with  its  large  domestic  market,  will 
enhance  export  opportunities  for 
U.S.  industry.  The  linkage  of  the  two 
economies  is  apparent  in  last  year's 
trade  figures.  U.S.  exports  to  the  Phil- 
ippines rose  18%  (to  $1.9  billion)  as  a 
result  of  the  Philippine  recovery.  The 
orientation  of  the  MAI  toward  policies 
to  stimulate  private  investment  will 
also  directly  benefit  U.S.  enterprises 
seeking  profitable  investment 
opportunities. 

U.S.  Commitment  to  the  MAI 

President  Bush  has  strongly  endorsed 
the  concept  of  the  MAI.  In  his  video  ad- 
dress to  the  Philippine  people  on  the 
occasion  of  the  third  anniversary  of 
President  Aquino's  assumption  of  of- 
fice. President  Bush  noted  the  impor- 
tance of  the  program  and  his  hope  that 
it  will  be  launched  this  year.  President 
Bush  and  .Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Takeshita  have  twice  expressed  their 
joint  support  for  a  successful  program. 
Former  President  Reagan,  also  a 
strong  supporter  of  the  MAI,  earlier 
recommended  that  it  begin  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  original  congressional 
impetus  for  the  development  of  the  pro- 
gram, and  bipartisan  support  it  has  re- 
ceived, are  further  evidence  of  the  key 
role  it  plays  in  future  U.S.  policy  to- 
ward the  Philippines. 

The  MAI  reflects  our  dedication  to 
Phili|ipine  democracy  and  prosperity. 
The  Administration's  request  for  .$200 
million  for  the  first  U.S.  contribution 
to  the  plan  underscores  the  high  impor- 
tance we  attribute  to  this  unique  op- 
portunity in  an  extremely  tight  budget 
environment.  Without  appropriation  of 
this  $200  million,  the  United  States 
cannot  lead  the  MAI  or  obtain  pledges 
from  other  donors;  the  MAI  would  like- 
ly never  get  underway.  A  failure  of  the 
MAI  at  this  point  could  have  an  ad- 
verse impact  on  our  overall  bilateral 
ties,  including  our  security  relations. 

Special  MAI  Authorizing  Legislation 

The  Administration  will  propose  spe- 
cial authorizing  legislation  for  the  MAI. 
The  legislation  we  intend  to  propose 
will  clearly  link  use  of  FY  1990  funds 
and  subsequent  requests  for  appropria- 
tions to  an  appropriate  Philippine 
economic  reform  program.  It  will 
recognize  that  progress  in  implementa- 
tion of  that  reform  will  be  the  primary 
factor  in  Congress'  determination  of 


appropriations  in  subsequent  years. 
The  legislation  will  foresee  annual  con- 
sultations with  the  Congress  to  review 
jointly  the  progress  the  MAI  is  achiev- 
ing in  reaching  its  goals.  The  full 
involvement  of  the  Congress  in  the 
program  and  its  accomplishments  will 
be  essential  to  the  success  of  the  MAI. 

A  key  element  of  the  MAI  is  em- 
bodied in  our  request,  as  part  of  the  in- 
tended legislation,  for  "no-year"  money. 
Since  disbursements  of  assistance  and 
subsequent  requests  for  appropriations 
will  be  linked  to  Philippine  progress  in 
economic  reform,  no-year  money  will 
provide  both  the  flexibility  and  the 
leverage  to  make  that  linkage  work. 

Magnitude  of  the  MAI 

The  MAI  is  designed  to  provide  the  fi- 
nancial resources  to  maintain  strong 
economic  growth  as  Philippine  econom- 
ic restructuring  accelerates.  This 
financing  will  come  from  enhanced 
official  assistance  and  increased 
private  capital  flows,  principally  new 
investment.  The  extraordinary  assist- 
ance will  be  used  to  stimulate  the 
necessary  conditions  for  significant 
additional  private  flows,  primarily  in 
investment  in  the  Philippine  economy. 
There  is  no  firm  objective  or  yardstick 
for  gauging  the  success  of  the  program 
in  financial  terms.  The  success  of  the 
MAI  will  come  from  the  continuing 
economic  reforms  that  will  attract  the 
private  investment  necessary  to  ex- 
pand the  Philippine  economy  over  the 
medium  term.  The  magnitude  of  that 
investment  is  difficult  to  predict. 

The  Participation  of  Other 
Donors  and  Institutions 

The  MAI,  to  be  successful,  must  be  a 
truly  multilateral  program.  We  antici- 
pate that  the  United  States  and  Japan 
will  be  the  major  bilateral  donors,  with 
the  World  Bank  and  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  also  jilaying  critical 
roles.  In  addition  to  talks  with  the  Phi- 
lippine Government,  we  have  held  sev- 
eral informal  meetings  with  officials  of 
the  Government  of  Japan  and  consulted 
jointly  with  the  World  Bank  and  the 
IMF.  A  general  consensus  has  been 
reached  on  organization  of  the  plan.  We 
have  held  informal  consultations  with  a 
number  of  other  potential  participants 
in  Europe  and  Asia,  as  well  as  with  the 
Canadian  Government,  over  the  past 
year  and  have  received  indications  that 
many  wish  to  be  a  part  of  the  MAI. 
These  donors,  generally,  are  awaiting 


more  definite  information  on  the  level 
of  participation  of  the  United  States 
and  Japan — and  the  further  develop- 
ment of  the  Philippine  economic  plan — 
before  committing  to  specific  levels  of 
resources.  Therefore,  appropriation  of 
U.S.  funding  is  a  key  step  in  this  proc- 
ess. As  the  original  proponent  of  the 
MAI,  the  U.S.  Government  must  make 
a  contribution  commensurate  with  U.S. 
interest  in  its  success  in  order  to  en- 
courage other  donors  to  undertake  sim- 
ilar roles. 

In  view  of  the  large  foreign  debt 
service  burden  that  the  Philippine  Gov- 
ernment must  currently  support,  we 
believe  that  bilateral  assistance  com- 
mitted under  the  MAI  should  be  princi- 
pally grant.  The  actual  breakdown 
between  grant  assistance  and  conces- 
sional lending  will  be  determined  in 
large  part  by  each  donor's  assistance 
policies  and  domestic  legal  framework 
for  assistance.  We  anticipate  that  at 
least  some  other  donors  will  provide 
grant  assistance. 

The  Role  of  the  Private 
Sector  in  the  MAI 

The  MAI  will  be  successful  only  if  it 
promotes  a  policy  environment  in  the 
Philippines  that  will  attract  increasing 
amounts  of  private  investment,  from 
both  domestic  and  foreign  sources.  In 
view  of  this  essential  private-sector  fo- 
cus for  the  program,  we  have  been  con- 
sulting with  U.S.  business  leaders  with 
interests  in  the  Philippines  and  the 
U.S.  element  of  the  U.S. -Philippine 
Business  Committee.  We  anticipate 
more  formal  development  of  programs 
to  attract  investment  to  the  Philippines 
as  we  approach  launching  of  the  initia- 
tive, and  U.S.  funding  for  it  becomes 
available. 

The  appointment  of  a  special  U.S. 
representative  for  the  MAI  will  be  an 
important  element  in  mobilizing  the  de- 
gree of  ])rivate-sector  interest  in  the 
program  that  we  believe  is  both  possi- 
ble and  necessary.  We  recognize  the 
many  advantages  of  a  special  U.S.  rep- 
resentative and  are  now  actively  con- 
sidering how  to  structure  the  position. 
We  are  also  considering  possible  candi- 
dates but  cannot  predict  if  and  when 
such  an  appointment  might  be  made. 

Timetable  for  the  MAI 

There  is  no  definite  timetable  for  the 
MAI.  At  the  conclusion  of  Japanese 
Prime  Minister  Takeshita's  visit  to 
Washington  in  early  February,  and 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  19891 


EAST  ASIA 


again  following  their  late  February 
meeting  in  Tokyo,  President  Bush  and 
the  Prime  Minister  pledged  to  make  ev- 
ery effort  to  launch  the  MAI  this  year. 
We  are  now  actively  working  with  the 
Philippine  Government,  the  Japanese 
Government,  and  other  potential  par- 
ticipants toward  that  goal.  The  Phil- 
ippine Government  has  recently 
formulated  its  coordinating  committee 
for  the  initiative.  The  chairman  of  the 
committee,  a  widely  respected  Philip- 
pine business  leader,  Roberto  Vil- 
laneuva,  is  organizing  the  Philippine 
Government's  participation.  The  gov- 
ernment is  also  working  to  develop  its 
economic  restructuring  paper  which, 
with  the  support  of  international  finan- 
cial institutions  and  donors,  will  pro- 
vide the  framework  for  the  initiative. 
Much  remains  to  be  done  before  a 
,precise  date  can  be  set  for  launching 
the  plan. 

World  Bank  President  Conable  was 
recently  in  Manila  and  e.xpressed  the 
willingness  of  the  Bank  to  help  with  the 
MAI  and  coordinate  it  under  the  rubric 
->{  its  consultative  group  for  the  Philip- 
Dines.  The  IMF  will  also  cooperate  in 
.leveloping  the  initiative.  A  pledging 
session  may  be  held  as  part  of  an  en- 
lanced  consultative  group  meeting  lat- 
'r  this  year.  Such  a  meeting  will  be 
irranged  in  close  coordination  with  the 
^ank,  the  Philippine  Government,  and 
ither  donors,  based  on  the  pace  of 
)reparations  for  the  initiative  and  the 
levelopment  of  the  Philippine  economic 
lajjer.  Any  formal  announcement  of  the 
aunching  of  the  plan  will  be  fully  coor- 
linated  with  the  Philippine  Govern- 
nent,  the  Japanese  Government,  the 
Vorld  Bank,  the  IMF,  and  other  poten- 
ial  participants.  In  view  of  the  critical 
ole  the  Congress  has  played  in  making 
he  MAI  possible,  the  Congress  would 
le  fully  consulted  prior  to  and  involved 
n  the  announcement.  We  will  also  con- 
iiiue  to  consult  closely  with  Members 
f  Congress  as  progress  is  made  in 
eveloping  the  framework  for  the  pro- 
ram  over  the  next  several  months. 


FY  1990  Assistance  Request 
for  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ngs  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
/ill  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
)ocuments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
ice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^Military  headquarters  occupied  by  De- 
inse  Minister  Juan  Ponce  Enrile  and  Gen. 
idel  Ramos  in  February  1986.  ■ 


my 


by  William  Clark.  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  27.  1989.  Mr.  Clark  is  Acting 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian 
and  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

Since  the  bureau  was  last  represented 
before  this  committee,  the  East  Asia 
and  Pacific  region  has  continued  to 
exhibit  the  dynamism  for  which  it  is 
noted.  This  progress  is  visible  in  the 
clothes  we  wear,  the  cars  we  drive,  the 
appliances  in  our  homes,  and  the  means 
by  which  we  communicate  electron- 
ically. Less  visible  here  at  home  is  the 
growing  volume  and  value  of  American 
products  flowing  in  the  other  direction. 
Enjoying  hard-earned  purchasing  pow- 
er, the  consumers  of  the  Asia  Pacific 
are  becoming  as  eager  to  import  as 
they  have  been  to  export.  As  a  result, 
more  than  one-third  of  the  entire  inter- 
national commerce  of  the  United  States 
now  is  with  East  Asia. 

I  can  also  report  with  pleasure 
that  movement  toward  greater  democ- 
racy and  political  openness  has  contin- 
ued; indeed,  it  has  accelerated.  In  the 
Philippines,  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  and 
elsewhere,  democracy  continues  to  ad- 
vance. Reform  also  progresses  in  Chi- 
na, albeit  at  a  slower  pace.  And  in  tiny 
Fiji,  movement  has  begun  to  restore 
constitutional  democracy.  In  short,  we 
are  witnessing  a  spread  to  countries, 
large  and  small,  of  shared  values  that 
complement  and  reinforce  our  economic 
and  security  stake  in  the  region.  We 
have  also  seen  considerable  movement 
in  recent  months  toward  resolving  the 
situation  in  Cambodia,  although  many 
obstacles  remain  to  an  acceptable 
outcome. 

As  welcome  as  the  overall  trends 
and  developments  are,  we  have  no  cause 
for  complacency.  Indeed,  the  region's 
very  dynamism  poses  challenges  to 
which  we  must  respond  positively  if 
the  United  States  is  to  remain  a  key 
player.  Allow  me  to  offer  several  obser- 
vations that  are  relevant  to  our  foreign 
economic  and  security  assistance 
programs. 

First,  economic  development  has 
not  been  evenly  distributed,  even  with- 
in countries  which  have  exhibited  ex- 
emplary growth  rates.  For  example, 
the  Philippines  economy  has  begun  to 


eoartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


recover  from  years  of  mismanagement. 
But  it  will  take  a  large  and  sustained 
effort  to  overcome  widespread 
poverty,  unemployment,  and  lack  of 
infrastructure. 

Second,  except  for  Japan,  Austra- 
lia, and  New  Zealand,  democracy  is 
still  very  new  in  most  countries.  We 
rightly  applaud  the  elections  conducted 
in  the  Philippines  and  the  Republic  of 
Korea.  They  are  important  not  only  for 
the  peoples  concerned  but  as  models  for 
other  countries.  Still,  we  must  remem- 
ber that  these  trends  could  be  reversed 
if  the  elected  governments  are  unable — 
or  are  perceived  as  being  unable — to 
deal  with  the  serious  economic  and  po- 
litical problems  they  face. 

Third,  economic  and  political  pow- 
er is  becoming  more  diffuse.  The  Unit- 
ed States  is  the  predominant  security 
guarantor  in  the  region.  But  we 
no  longer  dominate  economically  and 
must  increasingly  work  in  concert  with 
friends  and  allies.  National  independ- 
ence and  economic  success  have  fos- 
tered proud  nationalisms  that  require 
from  us  more  subtle  and  flexible 
policies. 

Finally,  although  the  Asia  Pacific 
is  largely  at  peace,  serious  sources 
of  tension — both  between  states  and 
internally — remain  unresolved. 

Foreign  assistance  is  only  one  of 
the  means  at  our  disposal  to  promote 
U.S.  interests  in  this  evolving  interna- 
tional environment.  It  does  not  guaran- 
tee success,  no  matter  how  generous  it 
might  be.  Nevertheless,  adequate  lev- 
els of  economic  and  security  assistance 
remain  key  components  to  our  overall 
strategy.  The  difficult  but  successful 
review  of  our  bases  arrangements  with 
the  Philippines  is  a  clear  example  of 
how  important  foreign  assistance  can 
be  in  this  new  environment.  Our  re- 
quest for  fiscal  year  (FY)  1990  includes 
the  first  half  of  the  President's  best 
efforts  pledge  to  seek  additional  fund- 
ing. Honoring  this  pledge  is  essential 
to  continued  access  to  these  facilities. 

The  importance  of  foreign  aid  to 
our  interests  in  the  Asia  Pacific,  in  re- 
ality, goes  far  beyond  the  dollars  and 
cents.  Our  aid  programs  provide  visi- 
ble and  highly  welcome  symbols  of  our 
long-term  commitment  to  remain  en- 
gaged in  the  region's  affairs.  If  the 
countries  of  the  region  do  not  believe 
that  we  intend  to  remain  fully  en- 
gaged, it  will  seriously  hamper  our 


49 


EAST  ASIA 


efforts  in  other  areas  such  as  human 
rights,  arms  control,  or  the  settlement 
of  regional  conflicts. 

Despite  many  assurances  to  the 
contrary,  there  exists  in  East  Asia  and 
the  Pacific  concern  that  budgetary 
pressures  will  compel  the  United 
States  to  pull  back  from  our  longstand- 
ing involvement  in  the  region's  affairs. 
Declining  foreign  aid  levels  in  real 
terms  add  to  this  fear. 

For  some  years,  the  United  States 
has  been  second  to  Japan  in  providing 
economic  assistance  to  the  Asia  Pacific. 
Both  we  and  the  recipient  nations  have 
welcomed  Japan's  efforts  to  improve  the 
economic  welfare  of  its  neighbors.  But 
it  would  not  be  in  our  interest,  or  the 
interests  of  the  nations  of  the  region — 
or  of  Japan,  for  that  matter — for  Japan 
to  bear  the  entire  burden. 

You  will  find  below  a  thorough  dis- 
cussion of  our  security  and  economic 
aid  recommendations  for  each  of  the 
proposed  recipient  countries,  as  well  as 
for  two  regional  programs.  I  have  also 
appended  statistical  analyses  respon- 
sive to  your  interests.  But  in  summary, 
our  requests  come  to  a  total  of  $813.76 
million,  with  $552.85  million  going  to 
economic  assistance — development  as- 
sistance, economic  support  fund  (ESF), 
PL  480,  and  the  Philippines — and  the 
remainder  to  military  assistance — 
international  military  education  and 
training  (IMET)  and  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  credits. 

These  requests  take  into  account 
the  absolute  need  to  reduce  the  budget 
deficit  and  reflect  our  priority  con- 
cerns. Exclusive  of  the  Philippines 
Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative 
(MAI),  the  request  is  8.3%  higher  than 
in  FY  1989  and  is  5.5%  of  total  U.S.  for- 
eign economic  assistance.  This  modest 
increase  follows  several  years  of  suc- 
cessive decreases  in  economic  assist- 
ance to  the  region. 

On  the  military  side,  the  $85.47 
million  increase  requested  for  military 
assistance  is  to  provide  FMS  to  the 
Philippines. 

In  closing,  let  me  add  that,  in  view 
of  the  evolving  international  environ- 
ment in  the  Asia  Pacific,  these  requests 
are  short  of  the  amounts  required  to 
maximize  our  ability  to  promote  and 
defend  U.S.  interests  in  the  region.  As 
we  look  ahead  to  a  possible  political  set- 
tlement in  Cambodia,  new  needs  will 
appear.  We  are  holding  our  own  and  be- 
lieve that  our  requests  for  FY  1990  will 
meet  our  minimal  needs.  But  I  hope 
that  working  together  we  will  be  able 
to  enhance  the  resources  available  to 
the  Asia  Pacific  region  in  the  years  to 
come. 


50 


U.S.  Economic  Assistance  to  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  FY  1985-90 


I  will  now  turn  to  individual  coun- 
try programs. 

Philippines 

A  stable,  democratic,  and  prosperous 
Philippines — with  friendly  ties  to  and 
continued  close  security  cooperation 
with  the  United  States — is  critically 
important  to  the  peace  and  stability  of 
Southeast  Asia  and  to  U.S.  interests 
both  within  and  outside  the  region. 

The  Administration's  FY  1990  as- 
sistance request  ($481  million)  for  the 
Philippines  includes  the  first  half  of 
the  President's  2-year  best  efforts 
pledge  made  in  conjunction  with  the 
1988  review  of  the  military  bases 
agreement.  This  assistance  is  essential 
to  continued  access  to  military  facili- 
ties in  the  Philippines  after  1991.  U.S. 
military  facilities  at  Clark  Air  Force 
Base  and  Subic  Bay  are  important  to 
the  security  of  the  United  States,  the 
Asia-Pacific  region,  and  the  Philippines 
in  the  face  of  a  greatly  expanded  Soviet 
presence.  They  are  vital  to  U.S.  power 
projection  capability  into  the  Western 


Pacific  and  Indian  Ocean  regions  and  t 
protection  of  commercially  important 
sealanes. 

U.S.  military  assistance  to  the 
Philippines— $200  million  in  FY  1990- 
will  provide  essential  resources  to  the 
Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines,  pro- 
mote military  professionalism,  and  im 
prove  morale,  thereby  enhancing  their 
capability  to  support  Philippine  democ- 
racy. This  aid  is  targeted  on  improvin 
the  armed  forces'  ability  to  counter  a 
threatening  communist  insurgency  by 
improving  training  and  upgrading 
tactical  mobility  and  communications. 
U.S.  military  assistance  is  also  de- 
signed to  improve  basic  field  soldier 
morale  by  providing  for  basic  soldier 
needs  (uniforms,  boots,  and  medical 
support). 

The  Philippine  Government  also 
confronts  difficult  economic  challenge!' 
including  widespread  poverty,  unem- 
ployment, and  a  massive  foreign  debt. 
Our  economic  assistance  supports  the 
govei'nment's  reform  programs,  which 
are  key  to  revitalizing  the  economy,  in: 


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Department  of  State  BulJetin/iVlay  19t  v. 


EAST  ASIA 


t roving  social  conditions,  and  provid- 
ig  essential  rural  infrastructure, 
lovernment  reforms  contributed  to 

7%  economic  growth  in  1988,  but  fur- 
ler  efforts  are  needed.  Our  bilateral 
conomic  assistance  program  (develop- 
lent  assistance,  $55  million:  PL  480. 
41  million:  and  ESF,  $160  million)  will 
Dntinue  to  support  the  overall  U.S. 
ssistance  strategy  by  helping  reduce 
mstraints  to  sustained  economic 
rowth,  i^articularly  in  agriculture  and 

ral  industry  and  infrastructure. 

In  addition,  the  Administration 
as  requested  $200  million  as  the  ini- 
al  U.S.  contribution  to  the  MAI.  The 
iternational  Monetary  Fund  (IMF), 
'brld  Bank,  and  Japan  are  expected  to 
lay  major  roles  in  the  program.  Other 
lateral  donors  have  expressed  inter- 
it.  Broad  participation  of  donors  coor- 
inated  through  the  MAI  program  will 
ultiply  the  impact  of  scarce  assis- 
ince  resources  in  a  country  vital  to 
ir  interests.  The  MAI  will  support 
:onomic  reforms  and  provide  needed 
frastructure  to  enhance  the  invest- 
lent  climate.  This  will  encourage  the 
nergence  of  the  private  sector  as  the 
■imary  engine  of  economic  growth. 
I'ithout  the  MAI,  the  Philippines  like- 

woukl  be  unable  to  sustain  broad- 
>sed  economic  growth  which  is  essen- 
^1  to  counter  the  communist 
isurgency. 

nailand 

nailand,  the  only  U.S.  treaty  ally  on 
le  Southeast  Asian  mainland,  is  the 
He  neighboring  state  resisting  the 
letnamese  occupation  of  Cambodia, 
lie  Thai,  thus,  face  some  70,000 
letnamese  troops  in  Cambodia  and 
.other  10,000-15,000  in  Laos.  The 
etnamese  army  constitutes  the  fifth 
rgest  standing  army  in  the  world,  far 
tnumbering  the  Royal  Thai  Armed 
trees.  While  the  Vietnamese  now 
aim  to  have  withdrawn  all  but  50,000 
oops  from  Cambodia,  the  threat  to 
aailand  remains.  Diplomatic  nego- 
itions  continue,  but  nothing  on  the 
'ound  has  changed  militarily. 

Mutual  security  cooperation  is  the 
re  element  in  the  U.S. -Thailand  bilat- 
tal  relationshi]),  a  relationship  that 
;S  served  important  U.S.  interests 
tremely  well.  The  Thai,  particularly 
e  government's  military  leadership, 
ew  our  economic  and  security  assis- 
nce  ($19.5  million  in  development  as- 
stance  and  ESF,  and  $47.4  million  in 
WS  and  IMET)  as  a  measure  of  U.S. 
pport  and  commitment.  Moreover, 
ir  assistance  helps  support  the 
quisition  and  maintenance  of  U.S.- 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


U.S.  Military  Assistance  to  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  FY  1985-90 


100 


200 


$  millions 


produced  military  hardware  by 
Thailand — thereby  enhancing  sus- 
tainability  of  Thai  forces  and  inter- 
operability with  U.S.  forces  in  the 
event  of  a  contingency. 

South  Pacific  Region 

We  are  requesting  $17.7  million  in  eco- 
nomic assistance  ($11.2  million  in  ESF 
and  $6.5  million  in  development  assist- 
ance) for  the  South  Pacific  regional  pro- 
gram in  FY  1990.  The  program 
provides  assistance  to  10  island  nations: 
Niue,  Western  Samoa,  Tonga,  Tuvalu, 
Fiji,  Vanuatu,  Solomon  Islands,  Papua 
New  Guinea,  Kiribati,  and  the  Cook  Is- 
lands. In  addition,  we  are  requesting 
IMET  grants  totaling  $255,000  (Papua 
New  Guinea,  $75,000:  Solomon  Islands, 
$75,000;  Tonga,  $75,000:  and  Vanuatu, 
$.30,000).  Our  goals  are  to: 

•  Maintain  access  to  the  region's 
sealanes: 

•  Assist  friendly  governments  that 
pursue  policies  supportive  of  U.S.  in- 


terests both  in  the  region  and  in  inter- 
national forums: 

•  Restore  and  preserve  regional 
good  will  toward  the  United  States, 
which  has  suffered  from  the  lack  of 
U.S.  presence  in  the  post-World  War  II 
period:  and 

•  Preserve  U.S.  access  to  marine 
resources  in  the  region's  exclusive  eco- 
nomic zones. 

The  population  of  the  entire  re- 
gion, almost  one-eighth  of  the  Earth's 
surface,  is  approximately  5  million. 
The  area  is  in  political  transition.  Fiji, 
long  considered  a  good  example  of  a  ma- 
turing parliamentary  democracy,  is  re- 
covering in  the  aftermath  of  two  mili- 
tary coups.  Vanuatu  has  suffered  from 
a  prolonged  political  crisis,  with  one  of 
the  protagonists  enjoying  support  from 
Libyan-trained  thugs.  Papua  New- 
Guinea,  with  approximately  70%  of  the 
region's  population — while  enjoying  a 
vigorous  parliamentary  democracy — 
has  suffered  from  revolving  door  cabi- 


51 


EAST  ASIA 


nets  and  a  high  level  of  largely  non- 
political  violence. 

The  Soviet  Union,  not  a  traditional 
player  in  the  South  Pacific,  has  made 
inroads  with  now  lapsed  fisheries  pacts 
in  Kiribati  and  Vanuatu  and  with  pro- 
posals to  the  regional  oceanographic 
research  organization.  Papua  New 
Guinea  has  announced  that  it  will  per- 
mit the  Soviets  to  open  their  first  resi- 
dent mission  in  the  islands. 

Australia  and  Japan  are  the  major 
aid  donors  to  this  part  of  the  world,  but 
their  aid  is  not  a  substitute  for  Ameri- 
can participation  which  underlines  our 
continuing  humanitarian  and  strategic 
interests. 

Fiji 

We  are  requesting  $1  million  in  eco- 
nomic assistance  for  Fiji  in  FY  1990  all 
under  ESF.  Fiji's  population  of  appro.x- 
imately  718,119  persons  is  almost  equal- 
ly divided  between  indigenous  Fijians 
and  persons  of  Indian  descent.  Before 
the  1987  military  coups,  Fiji  was  con- 
sidered a  model  of  stable,  parliamen- 
tary democracy,  relative  interracial 
harmony,  and  economic  progress:  the 
Indo-Fijians  largely  dominated  the 
modern  economy  with  the  indigenous 
Fijians  enjoying  political  dominance. 
However,  elections  in  1987  brought  an 
Indian-dominated  government  to  power 
and  sparked  the  military  coups. 

In  response  to  the  overthrow  of  the 
elected  government,  U.S.  assistance  to 
Fiji  was  suspended.  In  December  1988, 
President  Reagan  e.xercised  his  author- 
ity under  Section  614(A)  of  the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  to  restore  economic 
assistance. 

U.S.  interests  in  Fiji  include: 

•  Encouraging  the  return  of  con- 
stitutional representative  government; 

•  Limiting  Soviet  influence  in  the 
South  Pacific; 

•  Maintaining  access  to  the  re- 
gion's ports  for  U.S.  warships  and 
aircraft: 

•  Preserving  access  to  the  region's 
fisheries  resources;  and 

•  Ensuring  continued  support  for 
U.S.  positions  in  regional  and  interna- 
tional forums.  Fiji  consistently  has 
been  a  strong  advocate  of  U.S.  regional 
and  global  interests,  although  its  influ- 
ence has  been  eroded  by  recent  politi- 
cal events.  Fiji  also  provides  peace- 
keeping forces  in  Lebanon,  the  Sinai, 
and  Afghanistan. 

The  restoration  of  U.S.  assistance 
is  aimed  at  strengthening  the  position 
of  moderates  who  want  a  broadly  based 


52 


democratic  solution  for  their  country, 
and  our  programs  will  focus  on  projects 
with  direct  human  needs  benefits  to  all 
of  Fiji's  ethnic  groups. 

Military  assistance  to  Fiji, 
$100,000  in  IMET  and  $300,000  in  FMS, 
remains  on  hold  under  Section  513  of 
the  Foreign  Operations,  E.xport  Fi- 
nancing, and  Related  Programs  Appro- 
priations Act  of  1989.  The  requests  for 
FY  1990  are  for  planning  purposes  only, 
and  there  is  no  intention  to  restore  mil- 
itary assistance  at  this  time. 

Cambodian  Resistance 

We  are  seeking  to  increase  in  FY  1990 
our  nonlethal  assistance  to  the  Cambo- 
dian noncommunist  resistance  from  FY 
1989's  sum  of  $5  million  to  $7  million. 
Our  primary  objective  here  is  to  en- 
hance the  noncommunist  resistance's 
ability  to  compete  with  the  communist 
Khmer  Rouge,  whose  return  to  politi- 
cal power  the  United  States  unaltera- 
bly opposes.  The  requested  sum  would 
demonstrate  tangible  American  sup- 
port for  ASEAN's  [Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations]  strategy  of  apply- 
ing political  and  military  pressure  on 
Vietnam  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion to  the  Cambodian  problem.  It 
would  be  used  for  the  training  and 
equipping  of  two  noncommunist  resis- 
tance groups  fighting  the  Vietnamese 
occupation  forces  and  the  Vietnamese- 
installed  regime  in  Phnom  Penh. 

Indonesia 

The  fifth  most  populous  nation  in  the 
world  and  a  major  voice  in  ASEAN,  In- 
donesia lies  astride  vital  air  and  sea 
lines  of  communication  between  the 
Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans  and  offers 
access  to  valuable  raw  materials  (espe- 
cially oil  and  natural  gas).  It  has  played 
a  constructive  role  in  international  af- 
fairs as  a  generally  moderate  voice  in 
the  nonaligned  movement,  ASEAN, 
OPEC,  [Organization  of  Petroleum  Ex- 
porting Countries],  and  in  Islamic  or- 
ganizations. Within  ASEAN,  Indonesia 
has  taken  a  leading  role  in  the  effort  to 
end  Vietnam's  occupation  of  Cambodia. 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  the  Indo- 
nesian Government  has  furthered  polit- 
ical stability  and  has  pursued  sound 
economic  policies.  In  the  face  of  lower 
world  prices  for  its  major  exports,  In- 
donesia has  initiated  a  major  market- 
oriented  deregulation  of  its  economy. 

The  Indonesian  Government  views 
economic  and  security  assistance  pro- 
grams as  an  important  indicator  of  U.S. 
concern  for  the  security  and  stability 
of  Indonesia  and  Southeast  Asia.  The 


Administration  is  seeking  a  total  of  $5 
million  FMS  grant  funding  and  $2  mil- 
lion in  IMET  in  FY  1990.  This  will  help 
Indonesia  to  meet  its  legitimate  de- 
fense modernization  needs,  while  at  the 
same  time  enhance  regional  stability. 
Increased  purchases  of  U.S.  defense 
articles,  following  up  on  the  F-16  pur- 
chase, will  be  assisted  by  the  availabili 
ty  of  FMS  financing.  Under  the  IMET 
program,  we  expect  to  provide  profes- 
sional military  education  and  technical 
training  to  selected  personnel  to  en- 
hance managerial  skills,  technical  capa 
bilities,  and  support  of  U.S. -origin 
equipment. 

Proposed  development  assistance 
funding  of  $43  million  will  help  to  sup- 
port a  more  open,  less  regulated,  mar- 
ket and  trade-oriented  economy.  Our 
assistance  also  helps  to  improve  long- 
term,  sustainable  employment  and  in- 
come opportunities,  in  line  with  Indo- 
nesia's search  for  jobs  for  the  20  millioi 
people  who  will  enter  the  labor  force 
over  the  next  decade.  Other  goals  in- 
clude imjjroved  agricultural  produc- 
tivity, human  resources  development, 
reduced  fertility,  and  improved  child 
and  infant  survival. 

Proposed  PL  480  funding  is  $10 
million  for  Title  I  and  $4,918  million  fc 
Title  II.  Title  I  provides  food  grains  t( 
supplement  domestic  production;  the  L 
cal  currency  proceeds  from  the  grain 
sales  provide  further  support  for  AID 
[Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment] development  programs.  Title  II 
is  particularly  focused  on  nutrition  ed 
cation  activities  in  less  developed  are; 
of  the  Indonesian  archipelago.  Title  II 
monetization  programs  create  employ 
ment  through  enterprise  development 
and  community  water  and  sanitation 
schemes. 

Singapore 

We  have  requested  $50,000  for  militar 
education  and  training.  The  program 
will  include  professional  military  edu- 
cation (with  an  emphasis  on  command 
and  staff  courses)  and  technical  train- 
ing (emphasizing  infantry  training, 
navy  explosive  ordinance  disposal,  anc 
basic  underwater  SEAL  training). 
Singapore  fully  utilizes  its  IMET  al- 
location and  makes  a  significant  con- 
tribution of  its  owm  to  maximize  the 
benefit  of  this  education  and  training 
opportunity. 

Singapore  is  a  staunch  supporter  ( 
a  continued  U.S.  role  in  East  Asia  and 
the  Pacific.  In  addition  to  being  a  vocs 
proponent  of  a  U.S.  presence  in  the  re 


fi 


ECONOMICS 


nil,  the  Government  of  Singapoi-e  al- 
\\  s  U.S.  military  elements  access  to 
'V'  facilities  and  airfields.  Singapore 
Iniated  at  a  key  crossroads  for  air 
111  nc-ean  traffic  between  the  Indian 
1(1  Pacific  Oceans.  Enjoying  strong 
(iiiomic  growth  in  1988,  Singapore 
IS  one  of  the  world's  most  open  econ- 
nies.  It  is  a  free  trading  nation  which 
ares  our  interest  in  keeping  markets 
lien.  Furthermore,  through  its  mem- 
iTship  in  ASEAN,  Singapore  makes 
;i  impoi-tant  contribution  to  stability 
i  Southeast  Asia.  Its  thoughtful  voice 
iinfluential  and  counsels  moderation 
international  organizations,  such  as 
f  I II maligned  movement.  Our  modest 
iiirity  assistance  program  with 
ngapore  reinforces  military-to- 
lilitary  cooperation  and  results  in 
listantial  commercial  benefits  to  the 
iiied  States  through  FMS  case  sales. 
.  ireiiver,  it  bolsters  Singapore  confi- 
( nee  in  our  commitment  to  the  region 
m1  enhances  the  climate  for  coopera- 
'•11  I  in  a  broad  range  of  bilateral  and 
iinational  issues. 

ilaysia 

ilaysia  has  been  an  active  participant 
i  ASEAN's  strategy  to  force  a  with- 
(  iwal  of  Vietnamese  forces  from 

iiiliodia  and  to  secure  a  negotiated 
,  tlement.  Soviet  forces  at  Cam  Ranh 
]  y  pose  a  potential  threat  to  Ma- 
I  sia's  security,  and  Soviet  naval  forces 
ixularly  transit  the  Malacca  Straits. 
]  maligned,  but  staunchly  anticommu- 
i;t,  Prime  Minister  Mahathir  and 
( ler  senior  Government  of  Malaysia  of- 
I  ials  have  publicly  endorsed  the  con- 
liued  presence  of  U.S.  facilities  in  the 
ilippines. 

The  proposed  $1  million  in  funding 
•  IMET  will  ensure  that  Malaysian 
•med  Forces  personnel  are  familiar 
th  U.S.  doctrine,  equipment,  and 
litary  management  techniques  and 
ovide  a  foundation  for  close  coopera- 
>n  between  U.S.  and  Malaysian 
•ces.  Malaysia  views  our  modest  se- 
rity  assistance  program  (the  only 
■m  of  U.S.  aid  it  now  receives)  as  tan- 
ole  evidence  of  our  commitment  to 
security  and  stability,  which  is  of 
rect  benefit  to  U.S.  interests  in 
e  region. 


Dealing  With  the 
International  Debt  Crisis 


'The  cciiii])lete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
ill  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
?  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
ashington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


by  Nicholas  F.  Brady 

Remarks  before  a  conference  on 
Third  World  debt  sponsored  by  the 
Brookings  Institution  and  the  Bretton 
Woods  Committee  on  March  10. 1989. 
Mr.  Bradij  is  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

More  than  40  years  ago,  the  represen- 
tatives of  44  nations  met  at  Bretton 
Woods,  New  Hampshire,  to  build  a  new 
international  economic  and  financial 
system.  The  lessons  learned  from  a 
devastating  world  depression  and 
global  conflict  guided  their  efforts.  At 
the  concluding  session,  the  president  of 
the  conference,  Treasury  Secretary 
Henry  Morgenthau,  described  this  les- 
son in  the  following  manner: 

We  have  come  to  recognize  that  the 
wisest  and  most  effective  way  to  protect  our 
national  interests  is  through  international 
cooperation — that  is  to  say.  through  united 
effort  for  the  attainment  of  common  goals. 
This  has  been  .  .  .  the  great  lesson  of  con- 
temporary life — that  the  peoples  of  the 
Earth  are  inseparably  linked  to  one  another 
by  a  deep,  underlying  community  of 
purpose. 

The  enduring  legacy  provided  by 
the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  is  last- 
ing testament  to  the  success  of  their  ef- 
forts. This  community  of  purpose  still 
resides  in  these  institutions  today.  We 
must  once  again  draw  on  this  special 
sense  of  purpose  as  we  renew  our  ef- 
forts to  create  and  foster  world  growth. 

These  past  7  years,  we  have  faced  a 
major  challenge  in  the  international 
debt  problem.  This  situation  is,  in  fact, 
a  complex  accumulation  of  a  myriad  of 
interwoven  problems.  It  contains  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  social  elements. 
Taken  together,  they  represent  a  truly 
international  problem,  for  which  no  one 
set  of  actions  or  circumstances  is  re- 
sponsible, and  for  which  no  one  nation 
can  provide  the  solution.  Ultimately 
resolution  depends  on  a  great  coopera- 
tive effort  by  the  international  commu- 
nity. It  requires  the  mobilization  of  the 
world's  resources  and  the  dedication  of 
its  goodwill. 

Since  1982  the  world  cominunity 
has  endeavored  to  come  to  terms  with 
international  debt.  In  1985  we  paused 
and  took  stock  of  our  progress  in  ad- 
dressing the  problem.  As  a  result  of 
that  review,  together  we  brought  forth 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


a  new  strategy,  centered  on  economic 
growth.  This  still  makes  sense.  How- 
ever, it  is  appropriate  that  now,  almost 
4  years  later,  we  again  take  stock.  Thus 
in  recent  months,  we  have  undertaken 
to  look  afresh  at  the  international  debt 
situation.  The  purpose  was  to  discover 
what  progress  has  been  made;  to  see 
where  we  as  a  community  of  nations 
have  succeeded  and  where  we  have  not. 
And  where  our  success  has  not  met  our 
expectations,  to  understand  why  we 
have  not  achieved  our  goals.  We  have 
studied  in  depth,  we  have  consulted 
widely — seeking  and  taking  into  ac- 
count the  views  of  debtor  nations,  mul- 
tilateral institutions,  commercial 
banks,  and  legislatures.  We  have  also 
consulted  closely  with  Japan  and  other 
industrial  countries  in  order  to  begin 
to  lay  the  basis  for  a  common  approach 
to  the  debt  problem  by  the  creditor 
countries. 

Let  me  share  with  you  the  results 
of  our  reassessment  as  part  of  the  on- 
going process  of  international  collab- 
oration. I  would  hope  that  the  ideas  and 
suggestions  I  put  forth  here  will  pro- 
vide a  basis  for  a  concerted  effort  by 
the  international  community  to  rein- 
vigorate  a  process  that  has  become 
debt-weary.  However,  we  must 
strengthen  the  process  without  stop- 
ping it.  As  we  move  ahead  with  these 
ideas  in  the  weeks  ahead,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  continue  working  on  individual 
debt  problems. 

Recent  Progress 

Our  review  confirmed  that  we  have  ac- 
complished much,  but  much  remains  to 
be  done.  The  experience  of  the  past  4 
years  demonstrates  that  the  fundamen- 
tal principles  of  the  current  strategy 
remain  sound. 

•  Growth  is  essential  to  the  resolu- 
tion of  debt  problems. 

•  Debtor  nations  will  not  achieve 
sufficient  levels  of  growth  without 
reform. 

•  Debtor  nations  have  a  continuing 
need  for  external  resources. 

•  Solutions  must  be  undertaken  on 
a  case-by-case  basis. 

In  recent  years,  we  have  seen  posi- 
tive growth  occur  in  many  debtor  na- 
tions. Last  year  six  major  debtor 


53 


ECONOMICS 


nations  realized  more  than  4%  positive 
growth.  This  is  primarily  due  to  the 
debtors'  own  efforts.  The  political  lead- 
ership of  many  of  these  nations  have 
demonstrated  their  cominitment  to 
implement  vital  macroeconomic  and 
structural  reforms.  In  many  countries, 
this  has  been  reflected  in  the  privatiza- 
tion of  nationalized  industries.  In  some 
countries,  there  has  also  been  a  move 
toward  opening  their  shores  to  greater 
foreign  trade  and  investment.  Current 
account  deficits  have  been  sharply  re- 
duced, and  the  portion  of  export  earn- 


Capital  flight  has  drained  resources 
from  debtor  nations'  economies.  Mean- 
while neither  investment  nor  domestic 
savings  has  shown  much  improvement. 
In  many  cases,  inflation  has  not  been 
brought  under  control.  Commercial 
bank  lending  has  not  always  been 
timely.  The  force  of  these  circum- 
stances has  overshadowed  the  progress 
achieved.  Despite  progress,  prosperity 
remains,  but  for  many,  out  of  reach. 
Other  pressures  also  exist.  The 
multilateral  institutions  and  the  Paris 
Club  have  made  up  a  portion  of  the 


.  .  .  debtor  nations  must  focus  particular  attention  on 
the  adoption  of  new  policies  which  can  better  encour- 
age new  investment  flows,  strengthen  domestic  sav- 
ings, and  promote  the  return  of  flight  capital. 


ings  going  to  pay  interest  on  external 
debt  has  declined.  These  are  signifi- 
cant achievements.  All  the  more  so, 
since  in  parallel  progress,  a  number  of 
debtor  nations  have  advanced  toward 
more  democratic  regimes.  This  has  re- 
quired great  courage  and  persistence. 
The  people  of  these  countries  have 
made  substantial  sacrifices  for  which 
they  have  earned  our  admiration.  We 
must  work  together  to  transform  these 
sacrifices  into  tangible  and  lasting 
benefits. 

In  another  positive  development, 
we  have  avoided  a  major  disruption  to 
the  global  payments  system.  Commer- 
cial banks  have  strengthened  their  capi- 
tal and  built  reserves,  placing  them  in 
a  stronger  position  to  contribute  to  a 
more  rapid  resolution  of  debt  problems. 
The  "menu"  approach  of  the  current 
strategy  has  helped  to  sustain  new  fi- 
nancial support  while  also  encouraging 
debt  reduction  efforts.  The  banks  have 
provided  loans  in  support  of  debtor 
country  economic  programs.  The  stock 
of  debt  in  the  major  debtor  countries 
has  been  reduced  by  some  $24,000  mil- 
lion in  the  past  2  years  through  various 
voluntary  debt-reduction  techniques. 

However,  despite  the  accomplish- 
ments to  date,  we  must  acknowledge 
that  serious  problems  and  impediments 
to  a  successful  resolution  of  the  debt 
crisis  remain.  Clearly  in  many  of  the 
major  debtor  nations,  growth  has  not 
been  sufficient,  nor  has  the  level  of  eco- 
nomic policy  reform  been  adequate. 


54 


shortfall  in  finance.  Commercial  bank 
exposure  to  the  major  debtors  since 
1985  has  declined  slightly,  while  the  ex- 
posure of  the  international  institutions 
has  increased  sharply.  If  this  trend  was 
to  continue,  it  could  lead  to  a  situation 
in  which  the  debt  problem  would  be 
transferred  largely  to  the  international 
institutions,  weakening  their  financial 
position. 

These  are  realities  that  we  cannot 
deny.  They  are  problems  we  must  ad- 
dress if  we  are  to  renew  progress  on 
the  international  debt  crisis. 

Let  me  reiterate  that  we  believe 
that  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
current  strategy  remain  valid.  How- 
ever, we  believe  that  the  time  has  come 
for  all  members  of  the  international 
community  to  consider  new  ways  that 
they  may  contribute  to  the  common 
effort. 

In  considering  next  steps,  a  few 
key  points  should  be  kept  in  mind. 

First,  obviously  financial  re- 
sources are  scarce.  Can  they  be  used 
more  effectively? 

Second,  we  must  recognize  that  re- 
versing capital  flight  offers  a  major  op- 
portunity, since  in  many  cases  flight 
capital  is  larger  than  outstanding  debt. 

Third,  there  is  no  substitute  for 
sound  policies. 

Fourth,  we  must  maintain  the  im- 
portant role  of  the  international  finan- 
cial institutions  and  preserve  their  fi- 
nancial integrity. 


Fifth,  we  should  encourage  debt 
and  debt  service  reduction  on  a  volun- 
tary basis,  while  recognizing  the  im- 
portance of  continued  new  lending. 
This  should  provide  an  important  step 
back  to  the  free  markets,  where  funds 
abound  and  transactions  are  enacted  i 
days,  not  months. 

Finally,  we  must  draw  together 
these  elements  to  provide  debtor  coun 
tries  with  greater  hope  for  the  future. 

Strengthening  the  Current  Strategy 

Any  new  approach  must  continue  to 
emphasize  the  importance  of  stronger 
growth  in  debtor  nations,  as  well  as  tl 
need  for  debtor  reforms  and  adequate 
financial  support  to  achieve  that 
growth.  We  will  have  success  only  if 
our  efforts  are  truly  cooperative.  And 
to  succeed,  we  must  have  the  commit- 
ment and  involvement  of  all  parties. 

First  and  foremost,  debtor  nation- 
must  focus  particular  attention  on  the 
adoption  of  new  policies  which  can  bet 
ter  encourage  new  investment  flows, 
strengthen  domestic  savings,  and  pro- 
mote the  return  of  flight  capital.  This 
requires  sound  growth  policies  which 
foster  confidence  in  both  domestic  am^ 
foreign  investors.  These  are  essential; 
ingredients  for  reducing  the  future 
stock  of  debt  and  sustaining  strong 
growth.  Specific  policy  measures  in 
these  areas  should  be  part  of  any  new 
International  Monetary  Fimd  (IMF) 
and  World  Bank  programs.  It  is  wort 
noting  that  total  capital  flight  for  moi 
major  debtors  is  roughly  comparable 
their  total  debt. 

Second,  the  creditor  community- 
the  commercial  banks,  international 
financial  institutions,  and  creditor 
governments — should  provide  more  e. 
fective  and  timely  financial  support, 
number  of  steps  are  needed  in  this 
area. 

Commercial  banks  need  to  work 
with  debtor  nations  to  provide  a  broad 
range  of  alternatives  for  financial  sup- 
port, including  greater  efforts  to 
achieve  both  debt  and  debt  service  re- 
duction and  to  provide  new  lending.  Tl 
approach  to  this  problem  must  be  real: 
tic.  The  path  toward  greater  credit- 
worthiness and  a  return  to  the 
markets  for  many  debtor  countries 
needs  to  involve  debt  reduction.  Dive 
sified  forms  of  financial  support  need 
to  flourish,  and  constraints  should  be 
relaxed.  To  be  specific,  the  sharing  a 
negative-pledge  clauses  included  in  e; 
isting  loan  agreements  are  a  substan- 


(1 


ECONOMICS 


ial  barrier  to  debt  reduction.  In  addi- 
ion,  the  banl<ing  community's  interests 
ave  become  more  diverse  in  recent 
ears.  This  needs  to  be  recognized  by 
oth  banks  and  debtors  to  take  advan- 
ige  of  various  preferences. 

A  key  element  of  this  approach, 
lerefore,  would  be  the  negotiation  of  a 
eneral  waiver  of  the  sharing  and 
Bgative-pledge  clauses  for  each  per- 
irming  debtor  to  permit  an  orderly 
rocess  whereby  banks,  which  wish  to 
3  so,  negotiate  debt  or  debt  service  re- 
jction  transactions.  Such  waivers 
ight  have  a  3-year  life  to  stimulate  ac- 
vity  within  a  short  but  measurable 
meframe.  We  e.xpect  these  waivers  to 
:celerate  sharply  the  pace  of  debt  re- 
action and  pass  the  benefits  directly  to 
le  debtor  nations.  We  would  e.xpect 
btor  nations  also  to  maintain  viable 
?bt/equity  swap  programs  for  the  du- 
Ition  of  this  endeavor  and  would  en- 
>urage  them  to  permit  domestic 
itionals  to  engage  in  such  transactions. 
Of  course,  banks  will  remain  inter- 
ted  in  providing  new  money,  espe- 
ally  if  creditworthiness  improves  over 
le  3-year  period.  They  should  be  en- 
luraged  to  do  so,  for  new  financing 
111  still  be  required.  In  this  connec- 
pn,  consideration  could  be  given  in 
ime  cases  to  ways  of  differentiating 
■w  from  old  debt. 

The  international  financial  institu- 
ms  will  need  to  continue  to  play  cen- 
al  roles.  The  heart  of  their  efforts 
)uld  be  to  promote  sound  policies  in 
p  debtor  countries  through  advice 
Id  financial  support.  With  steady  per- 
mance  under  IMF  and  World  Bank 
'.ograms,  these  institutions  can  cata- 
e  new  financing.  In  addition,  to 
jpport  and  encourage  debtor  and  com- 
srcial  bank  efforts  to  reduce  debt  and 
bt  service  burdens,  the  IMF  and 
orld  Bank  could  provide  funding,  as 
rt  of  their  policy-based  lending  pro- 
ams,  for  debt  or  debt  service  reduc- 
n  purposes.  This  financial  support 
kuld  be  available  to  countries  which 
ct  to  undertake  a  debt-reduction 
ogram.  A  portion  of  their  policy- 
sed  loans  could  be  used  to  finance 
ecific  debt-reduction  plans.  These 
nds  could  support  collateralized  debt 
bond  exchanges  involving  a  signifi- 
nt  discount  on  outstanding  debt, 
ey  could  also  be  used  to  replenish  re- 
aves following  a  cash  buyback. 


Moreover,  both  institutions  could 
offer  new,  additional  financial  support 
to  collateralize  a  portion  of  interest 
payments  for  debt  or  debt  service  re- 
duction transactions.  By  offering  di- 
rect financial  support  for  debt  and  debt 
service  operations,  the  IMF  and  the 
World  Bank  could  provide  new  incen- 
tives, which  would  act  simultaneously 
to  strengthen  prospects  for  greater 
creditworthiness  and  to  restore  volun- 
tary private  financing  in  the  future. 
This  could  lead  to  considerable  im- 
provements in  the  cash  flow  positions  of 
the  debtor  countries. 

While  the  IMF  and  World  Bank 
will  want  to  set  guidelines  on  how  their 
funds  are  used,  the  negotiation  of 
transactions  will  remain  in  the  market 
place — encouraged  and  supported,  but 
not  managed,  by  the  international 
institutions. 

It  will  be  important  that  the  IMF 
and  the  World  Bank  both  be  in  a  strong 
financial  position  to  fulfill  effectively 
their  roles  in  the  strengthened  strat- 
egy. The  Bretton  Woods  Committee 
has  provided  an  important  public  serv- 
ice in  mobilizing  capital  resources  for 
these  institutions.  The  capital  of  the 
World  Bank  has  recently  been  re- 
plenished with  the  implementation  of 
the  recent  general  capital  increase  pro- 
viding approximately  $75,000  million  in 
new  resources  to  the  World  Bank. 

With  respect  to  the  IMF,  the  im- 
plementation of  these  new  efforts  to 


financing  in  support  of  this  effort  may 
wish  to  consider  doing  so.  This  could 
contribute  significantly  to  the  overall 
success  of  this  effort.  We  believe  that 
creditor  governments  should  also  con- 
sider how  to  reduce  regulatory,  ac- 
counting, or  tax  impediments  to  debt 
reduction,  where  these  exist. 

The  third  key  element  of  our  think- 
ing involves  more  timely  and  flexible  fi- 
nancial support.  The  current  manner  in 
which  "financial  gaps"  are  estimated 
and  filled  is  cumbersome  and  rigid.  We 
should  seek  to  change  this  mentality 
and  make  the  process  work  better.  At 
the  same  time,  we  must  maintain  the 
close  association  between  economic 
performance  and  external  financial 
support. 

While  we  believe  the  IMF  should 
continue  to  estimate  debtor  financing 
needs,  we  question  whether  the  inter- 
national financial  institutions  should 
delay  their  initial  disbursements  until 
firm,  detailed  commitments  have  been 
provided  by  all  other  creditors  to  fill 
the  financing  "gap."  In  many  instances, 
this  has  served  to  provide  a  false  sense 
of  security  rather  than  meaningful  fi- 
nancial support.  The  banks  will  them- 
selves need  to  provide  diverse,  active, 
and  timely  support  in  order  to  facilitate 
servicing  of  the  commercial  debt  re- 
maining after  debt  reduction.  Debtor 
nations  should  set  goals  for  both  new 
investment  and  the  repatriation  of 
flight  capital  and  to  adopt  policy  meas- 


the  creditor  community  .  .  .  should  provide  more 
effective  and  timely  financial  support. 


strengthen  the  debt  strategy  could  help 
lay  the  basis  for  an  increase  in  IMF 
quotas.  There  are,  of  course,  other 
important  issues  that  have  to  be  ad- 
dressed in  the  quota  review,  including 
the  IMF  arrears  problem  and  a  need 
for  clear  vision  of  the  IMF's  role  in  the 
1990s.  It  is  our  hope  that  a  consensus 
can  be  reached  on  the  quota  question 
before  the  end  of  the  year. 

Creditor  governments  should  con- 
tinue to  reschedule  or  restructure  their 
own  exposure  through  the  Paris  Club 
and  to  maintain  export  credit  cover  for 
countries  with  sound  reform  programs. 
In  addition,  creditor  countries  which 
are  in  a  position  to  provide  additional 


ures  designed  to  achieve  those  targets. 
Debtor  nations  and  commercial  banks 
should  determine  through  negotiations 
the  portion  of  financing  needs  to  be 
met  via  concerted  or  voluntary  lending 
and  the  contribution  to  be  made  by  vol- 
untary debt  or  debt  service  reduction. 

Finally,  sound  policies  and  open, 
growing  markets  within  the  industrial 
nations  will  continue  to  be  an  essential 
foundation  for  efforts  to  make  progress 
on  the  debt  problem.  We  cannot  rea- 
sonably expect  the  debtor  nations  to  in- 
crease their  exports  and  strengthen 
their  economies  without  access  to 
industrial-countrv  markets.  The 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


55 


EUROPE 


Uruguay  Round  of  trade  negotiations 
provides  an  important  opportunity  to 
advance  an  open  trading  system.  We 
must  all  strive  to  make  this  a  success. 

Conclusion 

Taken  together,  the  ideas  I  have  dis- 
cussed today  represent  a  basis  on  which 
we  can  work  to  revitalize  the  current 
debt  strategy.  We  believe  that  through 
our  efforts,  we  can  provide  substantial 
benefits  for  debtor  nations  in  the  form 
of  more  manageable  debt  service  obli- 
gations, smaller  and  more  realistic  fi- 
nancing needs,  stronger  economic 
growth,  and  higher  standards  of  living 
for  their  people. 

If  we  work  together,  we  can  make 
important  progress  toward  our  key 
objectives: 

•  To  assure  that  benefits  are  avail- 
able to  any  debtor  nation  which  demon- 
strates a  commitment  to  sound  policies; 

•  To  minimize  the  cost  or  contin- 
gent shift  in  risk  to  creditor  govern- 
ments and  taxpayers; 

•  To  provide  maximum  oppor- 
tunities for  voluntary,  market-based 
transactions  rather  than  mandatory 
centralization  of  debt  restructurings; 
and 

•  To  better  tap  the  potential  for  al- 
ternative sources  of  private  capital. 

In  the  final  analysis,  our  objective 
is  to  rekindle  the  hope  of  the  people  and 
leaders  of  debtor  nations  that  their  sac- 
rifices will  lead  to  greater  prosperity  in 
the  present  and  the  prospect  of  a  future 
unclouded  bv  the  bui'dens  of  debt.  ■ 


New  Horizons  in  Europe 


Secretary  Baker's  address  at  the 
niinisterial  meeting  signaling  the 
opening  of  two  new  security  negoti- 
ations i)i  Europe — talks  on  confidence- 
and  security-huHding  measures 
(CSBMs)  and  separate  talks  on 
conventional  armed  forces  in  Europe 
(CFE)—in  Vienna  on  March  6, 1989.^ 

We  meet  here  today  in  a  historic  set- 
ting. Vienna,  of  course,  is  a  living 
monument  to  the  creativity  of  Western 
culture.  This  city  is  also  a  crossroads  of 
civilization.  It  reminds  us  that  Europe 
and  the  achievements  of  Europe  have 
always  gone  beyond  the  limits  of  geog- 
raphy to  influence  the  wider  world. 

But  Vienna  also  bears  witness  to 
vanished  hopes.  Negotiations  and 
agreements  intended  to  bring  enduring- 
peace  to  Europe  have  been  discarded 
too  often  in  war.  Too  often  the  lack  of 
security  in  Europe  has  meant  a  lack  of 
security  for  the  entire  world.  That  is 
why  we  are  meeting  here  to  negotiate. 
Our  purpose  is  to  improve  the  security 
of  Europe,  thereby  also  strengthening 
the  foundations  of  world  peace. 

I  believe  that  we  need  a  larger  per- 
spective, a  common  vision  of  where 
we  are  headed  and  why,  if  we  are  to 
succeed. 

East-West  Visions 

After  the  Second  World  War,  Europe 
and  the  world  were  confronted  by  two 
distinctly  opposing  views.  The  United 
States  and  its  allies  in  Western  Europe 
held  the  vision  of  free  peo])les,  living 
under  the  rule  of  the  law,  their  individ- 
ual freedoms  protected,  and  their  dem- 
ocratic governments  responsible  to 
those  people. 

We  believed,  and  we  continue  to 
believe,  that  freedom  of  speech  and  of 
religion,  freedom  from  fear,  and  free- 
dom of  opportunity  were  and  are  the 
natural  rights  of  free  men  everywhere. 
We  were  certain,  and  we  continue  to  be 
certain,  that  free  markets  and  individ- 
ual initiatives  are  the  surest  routes  to 
social  and  economic  progress. 

We  sought,  and  we  continue  to 
seek,  our  security  in  a  coalition  of  free 
nations  drawn  together  by  common  val- 
ues, not  only  mutual  interests.  And  we 
envisioned  then,  as  we  envision  now, 
a  Europe  at  peace — its  nations  free 
to  develop  in  diversity  but  united 
against  war. 


Our  vision  was  not  the  only  visioi 
There  was  another  view  opposed  to  th 
values  most  cherished  by  the  West. 
And  the  competition  between  the  two 
visions  gave  us  the  difficult  legacy  wii 
which  we  live  today:  a  Europe,  forcilil 
divided  against  the  will  of  its  peoples: 
Europe,  the  most  heavily  armed  conti 
nent  in  the  world. 

Now,  as  we  approach  the  end  of 
this  decade,  new  horizons  are  beckon- 
ing, horizons  that  offer  us  the  oppor- 
tunity to  go  beyond  the  conflicts  of  th 
past.  The  other  vision  is  changing.  It 
changing  because  we  in  the  West  havt 
been  faithful  to  our  own  vision.  And  i 
is  changing  because  realism  has  begi 
to  triumph  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Perestroika.  glasnost,  and  democ 
ratization  are  the  slogans  of  the  "new 
thinking."  There  are  encouraging  de 
velopments  in  human  rights  and  in  tl 
emphasis  upon  the  rule  of  law.  Econ- 
omies once  rigidly  fixed  in  the  gri])  < 
centralized  control  are  being  loosene 
and  a  role  for  individual  initiative  ha 
been  decreed.  Recently,  [Soviet]  Gei 
al  Secretary  Gorbachev  has  declare(' 
"World  politics,  too,  should  be  guide 
by  the  primacy  of  universal  human  v 
ues."  The  rhetoric  of  Soviet  foreign 
policy  is  being  reshaped  with  less 
emphasis  on  the  use  of  force;  [Foreig 
Minister  Shevardnadze  affirmed  tha 
again  today,  and  that's  very  good. 

No  one  can  foretell  where  this 
process  will  lead  or  even  whether  it 
will  endure.  Yet  we  cannot  deny  the 
ality  of  what  is  actually  happening  i 
Europe  today.  Dostoevsky,  in  his  nc 
The  Possessed,  wrote  that  "The  fire 
in  the  minds  of  men,  not  in  the  roofs 
buildings."  The  revolutionary  chang 
in  that  part  of  Europe  still  behind  a 
rusting  iron  curtain  are  changes  abo 
all  in  the  minds  of  men,  in  their  visi 
of  the  future.  People  want  freedom: 
freedom  of  the  mind;  freedom  in  the 
home;  freedom  in  the  workplace;  anc 
free  governments.  And  these  freedo 
will  heal  the  wounds  inflicted  by  sta 
nation  and  tyranny. 

A  Europe  of  Freedoms 

I  propose  that  we  dedicate  ourselve; 
creating  a  new  Europe — a  Europe 
based  on  these  freedoms: 


it 


•  The  freedom  of  all  Europeansi 
have  a  say  in  decisions  which  affect 
their  lives,  including  freedom  of  the 


56 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1!  ia 


Hi 

n 


EUROPE 


orkplace.  The  legality  of  Solidarity, 
"or  example,  should  really  be  the  norm 
nd  not  the  subject  for  negotiations. 

•  The  freedom  of  all  Europeans  to 
ixpress  their  political  differences, 
vhen  all  ideas  are  welcome  and  human 
ights  are  truly  inviolable.  Monitors  of 
he  Helsinki  agreements,  for  example, 
hould  be  honored  and  not  hunted  by 
heir  governments. 

The  freedom  of  all  Europeans  to 
xchange  ideas  and  information  and  to 
ixercise  their  right  to  freedom  of  move- 
(lent.  The  researcher  in  Prague,  for 
xample,  should  be  able  to  find  the 
■ooks  he  needs.  Barbed  wire  should  not 
eparate  cousins  in  Hamburg  from 
ousins  in  Dresden.  And  a  wall  should 
ot  divide  Berlin,  continuing,  as  we've 
een  just  in  the  past  month,  to  cost  the 
ves  of  people  seeking  freedom. 

•  Finally,  the  freedom  of  all  Euro- 
eans  to  be  safe  from  militai'y  intim- 
lation  or  attack.  Those  in  the  West 
nould  be  free  of  the  fear  that  the  mas- 
ve  forces  under  Soviet  command 
light  invade  them.  Those  in  the  East 
'lould  be  free  of  the  fear  that  armed 
oviet  intervention,  justified  by  the 
rezhnev  doctrine,  would  be  used 
gain  to  deny  them  choice. 

"New  thinking"  and  the  Brezhnev 
Bctrine  are  in  fundamental  conflict. 
e  call  today  upon  General  Secretary 
Drbachev  to  renounce  the  Brezhnev 
»etrine — beyond  any  shadow  of  a 
Bubt.  Let  the  "new  thinking"  sweep 
(vay  this  vestige  from  the  era  of 
tagnation. 

These  four  freedoms  are  insepar- 
4e.  They  are  the  principles  for  the 
w  Europe;  they  are  the  keys  that 
•en  the  door  to  the  European  house  of 

f  future.  As  the  American  President 
raham  Lincoln  said,  "A  house  divid- 
against  itself  cannot  stand."  A  con- 
lent  divided  by  a  wall  cannot  be 
cure.  A  secure  and  prosperous  Euro- 
can  never  be  built  on  the  basis  of  ar- 
'icial  barriers,  fear,  and  the  denial  of 
dependence. 

I  am  happy  to  report  that  we  have 
\de  some  jjrogress  toward  realizing 
e  new  Europe  of  the  freedoms — 
ogress  upon  which  we  all  can  build, 
le  Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
eration  in  Europe — through  the 
"sinki,  Madrid,  Stockholm,  and  now 
s  Vienna  documents — has  defined 
er  more  precisely  the  obligations  of 
ites.  We  have  em])hasized  a  new  free- 
m  for  individuals  and  the  expanded 
ticept  of  openness  and  confidence- 
ilding  measures  in  the  field  of  secu- 
y.  We  support  this  process.  The 


Helsinki  Final  Act  embodies  our  vision 
of  Europe.  And  NATO's  security  di- 
mension has  always  had  the  prevention 
of  war  as  its  only  purpose. 

Economic  and  Environmental 
Initiatives 

Economic  change  is  also  a  marked  fea- 
ture of  the  new  Europe.  The  creation  of 
a  single  market  by  1992,  looking  out- 
ward to  benefit  all  who  wish  to  trade, 
would  surely  fulfill  the  hopes  of  those 
postwar  visionaries  who  rightfully  saw 
economic  union  as  a  buttress  of  peace 
and  freedom.  Centralized  economies 
are  slowly  divesting  the  straitjacket  of 
outmoded  Marxist-Leninist  theories. 
And  the  desire  for  increased  commer- 


And  so,  as  we  eye  the  horizon,  im- 
portant questions  remain  unanswered. 
Will  the  new  rhetoric  be  translated 
into  new  actions,  or  will  we  see  a  repe- 
tition of  the  past — of  hopes  disap- 
pointed once  more? 

Will  East  and  West,  together,  be 
able  to  dismantle  the  barriers  thrown 
up  by  the  old  era  of  competing  visions? 
Will  these  barriers  finally  be  removed; 
will  the  Berlin  Wall  and  the  barbed 
wire  and  the  watch  towers  finally  be 
relegated  to  history?  Will  the  Soviet 
Union  demilitarize  its  foreign  policy  in 
Europe;  will  it  cease  to  threaten  de- 
mocracy's house  with  tens  of  thousands 
of  tanks? 

I  was  encouraged  by  what  [For- 
eign] Minister  Shevardnadze  said  ear- 
lier today  as  he  spoke  of  far-reaching 


The  current  force  levels  and  force  structures  in 
Europe  are  not  engraved  in  stone.  They  are  the 
product  of  history,  the  results  of  conflict.  And  they 
can  be  changed. 


cial  contact  is  strong  and  growing  ever 
stronger.  There  is  also  a  genuine  possi- 
bility for  all  industrialized  nations, 
both  East  and  West,  to  work  together 
on  newly  recognized  transnational 
problems. 

Dangers  to  our  environment,  for 
example,  risk  the  most  fundamental  se- 
curity of  all  the  Earth's  citizens.  Just 
last  week,  to  protect  the  globe's  ozone 
layer,  the  European  Community  and 
the  United  States  decided  to  end  the 
use  of  all  chlorofluorocarbons  (CFCs) 
by  the  year  2000,  assuming  adequate 
substitutes  can  be  found — as  we  believe 
they  can.  We  hope  the  Soviet  Union 
will  consider  joining  us  in  the  spirit  of 
"new  thinking." 

Reducing  Military  Confrontation 

This  is  progress.  But  while  the  old  era 
apparently  recedes  before  the  horizons 
of  the  new  Europe,  those  horizons  are 
still  too  distant.  The  arms  and  the  arm- 
ies still  face  each  other.  An  iron  curtain 
still  divides  this  continent.  Too  many 
governments  have  followed  their  sol- 
emn signature  on  human  rights  pledges 
with  violent  suppression  of  dissent. 


reductions.  In  recent  years,  we  have 
seen  reasons  to  be  hopeful  about  the 
new  Soviet  thinking.  But  both  realism 
and  prudence  require  that  we  test  the 
new  thinking  to  make  sure  that  it 
means  new  policy  and,  above  all, 
changes  in  military  deployments.  We 
have  sought  to  discover  whether  East 
and  West  could  take  steps  together — 
irreversible  steps — that  lead  toward 
the  Europe  of  the  freedoms.  And  we 
have  also  sought  to  reduce  the  level  of 
military  confrontation. 

Here,  too,  there  is  progress  to 
report.  Responding  to  an  American 
proposal,  the  Soviet  Union  joined 
the  United  States  in  achieving  an 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
treaty  that  provides  for  the  elimination 
of  an  entire  class  of  nuclear-capable 
missiles.  The  treaty  contains  impor- 
tant precedents,  especially  in  the  areas 
of  verification  and  asymetrical  reduc- 
tions to  equality.  We  have  also  made  en- 
couraging progress  in  the  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  talks 
toward  reducing  strategic  forces.  And 
we  look  forward,  once  our  review  is 
completed,  to  further  steps  on  the  road 
toward  arms  reduction  and  arms 
control. 


57 


EUROPE 


Chemical  Weapons  Elimination 

President  Bush  has  declared  that  the 
control  and  elimination  of  chemical 
weapons  is  a  high  priority  for  the  Unit- 
ed States.  Since  1984,  when  he  tabled  a 
draft  treaty  to  eliminate  chemical 
weapons  from  the  face  of  the  Earth  on 
an  effectively  verifiable  basis,  the 
United  States  has  exercised  leadership 
in  the  Geneva  negotiations.  We  will 
continue  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  these 
efforts  in  the  future  as  well.  However, 
until  we  eliminate  these  weapons  in  a 
verifiable  way,  the  United  States  will 
maintain  a  minimal  chemical  deterrent. 
Recently,  we  were  gratified  by  the 
response  to  President  Reagan's  call  for 
a  conference  on  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons — and  the  success  of  that  con- 
ference under  the  leadership  of  the 
Government  of  France.  Clearly,  some 
nations  are  ready  for  action. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
lead  in  dealing  with  this  problem.  And 
so  I  am  happy  to  announce  that  as  one 
of  his  first  acts.  President  Bush  has  di- 
rected our  new  Administration  to  ex- 
plore ways  to  accelerate  the  removal  of 
our  existing  chemical  weapons  from 
Germany.  The  early  removal  of  these 
weapons  will  require  available  safe 
storage  and  the  development  of  practi- 
cal plans  to  destroy  them. 

But  unilateral  action  is  not  enough. 
The  Soviet  Union  has  enormous  stocks 
of  chemical  weapons  threatening  Euro- 
pe. We,  therefore,  call  on  the  Soviets  to 
join  us,  to  accelerate  the  destruction  of 
their  enormous  stockpile  of  these 
frightening  weapons. 

Finally,  we  must  address  the 
threat  of  chemical  weapons  prolifera- 
tion. We  can  build  on  our  recent  suc- 
cess in  Paris.  We  propose  that  we  bring- 
together  governments  and  representa- 
tives of  the  international  chemical  in- 
dustry. We  have  been  discussing  with 
Australia  the  general  question  of  prolif- 
eration and  the  importance  of  holding 
such  a  conference.  For  a  number  of 
years,  Australia  has  played  a  leading 
role  internationally  in  trying  to  pre- 
vent the  spread  of  chemical  weapons, 
including  as  leader  of  the  Australia 
group  of  Western  chemical-producing 
states.  I  am  pleased  to  tell  you,  there- 
fore, that  the  Government  of  Australia 
has  agreed  to  take  the  initiative  in  or- 
ganizing such  a  conference. 

Its  purpose  will  be  to  discuss  the 
growing  problem  of  the  movement  of 
chemical  weapons  precursors  and  tech- 
nology in  international  commerce.  We 
hope  to  establish  better  means  of  com- 
munication about  this  deadlv  trade. 


58 


Conventional  Military  Imbalances 

Progress  on  nuclear  arms  control  and 
chemical  weapons,  however,  is  not  suffi- 
cient. We  shall  never  be  able  to  set 
East-West  relations  on  an  irreversible 
course  toward  enduring  improvement 
unless  we  deal  with  the  huge  conven- 
tional military  imbalances  in  Europe. 
We  can  define  the  issue  simply:  a  vast 
force,  spearheaded  by  heavily  armored 
units  and  supported  by  massive  fire- 
power, has  been  fielded  by  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies.  That  force  points 
West. 

We  in  the  West  have  faced  this 
threat  since  the  dawn  of  the  cold  war. 
Today,  Soviet  and  Warsaw  Pact  mili- 
tary forces  go  far  beyond  those  conceiv- 
ably needed  for  defense.  Wai'saw  Pact 
tanks  outnumber  NATO  tanks  by  over 
3-to-l,  Warsaw  Pact  artillery  exceeds 
NATO's  artillery  by  3-to-l,  and  the 
Warsaw  Pact  holds  more  than  a  2-to-l 
advantage  over  NATO's  armored  troop 
carriers. 

These  ratios  speak  for  themselves. 
And  as  NATO  has  pointed  out,  these 
are  forces  best  suited  to  an  invasion  of 
Western  Europe. 

It  is  this  array  of  Soviet  armed 
might  that  divides  Europe  against  its 
will  and  holds  European  hopes  hostage 
to  possibly  hostile  Soviet  intentions. 

Lately,  we  have  heard  that  Soviet 
military  doctrine  is  changing  to  meet  a 
standard  called  "reasonable  sufficien- 
cy." And  in  December  at  the  United 
Nations,  General  Secretary  Gorbachev 
declared  the  Soviet  intention  to  with- 
draw 50,000  men,  5,000  tanks,  and 
other  selected  equipment  from  certain 
areas  of  Eastern  Europe.  Several  East 
European  governments  have  also  an- 
nounced unilateral  force  reductions. 

That's  a  start,  a  very  good  start. 
It's  a  very  hopeful  start,  and,  of 
course,  we  are  watching  to  see  the 
words  become  deeds.  And  equally  clear 
is  the  necessity  to  go  further.  Even  af- 
ter these  reductions,  the  Warsaw  Pact 
would  retain  a  2-to-l  edge  in  tanks  and 
artillery.  The  Warsaw  Pact's  conven- 
tional military  preponderance,  espe- 
cially in  the  spearheads  of  attack,  is,  in 
fact,  what  makes  an  invasion  possible. 

These  are  hard  facts.  These  are 
the  facts  that  have  to  be  changed  if  our 
negotiations  are  to  be  successful  and  if 
the  foundations  of  a  new  Europe  are  to 
endure.  The  arms  control  process  must 
now  be  focused  strongly  on  this  East- 
West  imbalance. 

The  United  States,  together  with 
the  other  Western  participants  in  these 
talks,  has  developed  serious  proposals 


to  end  disparities  in  conventional 
ground  forces  and  to  introduce  far- 
reaching  confidence-building  and 
stabilizing  measures. 

Our  approach  focuses  on  the 
achievement  of  significant  reductions 
key  military  capabilities  that  are  de- 
signed for  invasion.  For  example,  we 
propose  an  overall  limit  on  the  total  ai 
mament  in  Europe  and  that  no  more 
than  40,000  tanks  should  be  deployed 
by  the  23  participating  states  in  the 
CFE  negotiations.  In  addition,  Westei 
participants  are  prepared  to  introduc 
new  confidence-building  measures  in 
the  near  future,  aimed  at  increasing 
transparency  and  reducing  the  possi- 
bility of  surprise  attack.  Ultimately,  ( 
course,  stability  will  be  achieved  whe 
no  country  is  able  to  dominate  by  fore 
of  arms. 

Let  me  emphasize  once  more,  hov 
ever,  that  change  in  the  military  bal- 
ance is  only  one  part  of  the  process. 
Only  when  the  causes  of  the  historic  c 
vision  of  Europe  have  been  removed, 
when  we  have  achieved  the  free  flow  ( 
people  and  information,  when  citizens 
everywhere  enjoy  free  expression,  on 
then  will  it  be  possible  to  eliminate  t( 
tally  the  military  confrontation.  In 
other  words,  we  cannot  remove  the 
symptoms,  unless  we  deal  fundamen- 
tally with  the  causes.  I  am  encourage 
that  increasingly  people  from  both 
East  and  West  understand  that  rela- 
tionship. We  must  all  work  to  bring 
about  far-reaching  changes  that  end 
the  division  of  this  continent. 

The  United  States  is  committed 
working  with  reasonable  men  and  wc 
men  in  all  countries  to  achieve  succe: 
We  approach  the  negotiations,  which 
will  begin  a  few  days  from  now  in  thi 
very  halls,  with  a  clear  goal,  solid  pr 
ciples,  and  well-defined  objectives. 

Our  goal  in  these  negotiations,  a 
in  all  arms  control  negotiations,  will 
to  prevent  war — any  war,  nuclear  or 
conventional — deter  aggression,  and 
increase  stability  at  lower  levels  of 
armed  forces.  We  shall  judge  every 
proposal  not  simply  by  the  numbers  i 
weapons  reduced  but  by  the  impact  c 
deterrence  and  stability. 

To  achieve  this  goal,  we  reaffirn 
the  unity  of  purpose  between  the  Un 
ed  States  and  its  European  allies.  \^ 
have  long  recognized,  as  NATO  Seer 
tary  General  Manfred  Woerner  said, 
that  "Europe  needs  America  as  Ame 

ica  needs  Europe Separate,  we 

would  become  victims  of  world  histo 
cal  development;  together  we  can  det 
mine  the  course  of  world  history  for 
better." 


EUROPE 


Our  negotiating  objectives  are  well 
fined. 

First,  as  I  mentioned  earlier,  the 
ATO  allies  have  called  for  equal  ceil- 
gs  in  key  items  of  equipment  at  levels 
low  current  NATO  forces.  This 
mid  be  the  best  step  toward  a  secure 
irope  at  lower  levels  of  arms. 

Second,  no  state  should  possess 
pabilities  designed  primarily  for 
rasion. 

Third,  a  regime  of  mutual  open- 
ss  and  transparency  about  military 
itters  should  be  expanded  which  can 
ter  confidence,  clarify  intentions, 
d  thereby  strenghten  stability. 

In  addition,  we  hope  that  all  states 
11  adopt  doctrines  and  force  struc- 
res  which  faithfully  reflect  defensive 
entions. 

As  these  negotiations  unfold,  we 
d  our  allies  will  e.xplore  every  oppor- 
(lity  for  progress.  The  current  force 
els  and  force  structures  in  Europe 
!  not  engraved  in  stone.  They  are 

product  of  history,  the  results  of 
aflict.  And  they  can  be  changed. 

If  the  past  is  any  guide,  however, 
can  expect  many  proposals  that 
)mise  the  perfection  of  disarmament 
ire  would  only  abandon  the  pragma- 
m  of  deterrence.  To  paraphrase 

ston  Churchill,  the  counsel  of  per- 
Ition  is  admirable  in  a  clergyman  but 
practical  in  a  statesman.  The  oppor- 
ities  are  too  precious  to  be  squan- 
ed  in  sweeping  but  impractical 
iposals.  Instead,  let  us  do  the  work 
jeace  carefully,  progressing  step  by 
IP  and  verifying  each  step. 

inclusion 

ave  spoken  today  of  the  new  Europe, 
he  freedoms,  of  the  new  horizons 
■koning  to  a  continent  divided  40 

rs  ago  because  of  a  conflict  of  vi- 
is.  As  that  conflict  weakens,  it  may 
possible  to  remove  the  old  obstacles 
own  up  in  Europe's  path.  That  is  our 
Ik.  We  must  remove  at  last  the  con- 
(itional  force  imbalances  and  curtains 
lecrecy  that  have  so  long  imperiled 
ropean  security  and,  with  it,  world 
ice. 

This  essential  step  will  not  be 
y.  It  will  produce  new  challenges 
'  perhaps  some  difficult  moments. 
;  we  cannot  desist  from  the  task. 


I  have  argued  that  a  clearer  under- 
standing of  the  Europe  of  the  future 
will  ease  the  burden.  Already,  we  can 
glimpse  part  of  that  horizon  of  a  peace- 
ful and  prosperous  Europe  for  which  so 
many  have  sacrificed.  Yet  though  it 
beckons,  we  know  that  nothing  can  be 
taken  for  granted.  It  falls  to  us  to  take 
the  next  step,  if  not  the  final  one,  on 
this  journey. 

Prophecy  is  God's  gift  to  but  a  few, 
yet  imagination  is  the  birthright  of  ev- 
ery human  being.  We  can  but  dimly  see 


the  future  through  the  mists  of  change, 
yet  we  can  all  imagine  the  world  we 
would  like  to  see.  That  is  the  summons 
of  our  undertaking.  Let  us,  therefore, 
go  forward  together  to  build  that  Euro- 
pe we  would  like  to  see — a  free,  open, 
secure,  and  prosperous  Europe;  a 
whole  Europe,  ennobling  by  example 
all  mankind. 


'Press  release  35. 


Secretary  Meets  With  Soviet  Foreign  IVIinister 


Following  are  Secretary  Baker's 
remarks  and  a  question-and-answer 
session  with  reporters  after  his 
meeting  with  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Shevardnadze  in  Viemia  on  March  7, 
1989  ^ 

Let  me  simply  say  that  we  had  a  very 
good  initial  meeting.  We  had  a  very 
broad  discussion,  and  I  think  it  was 
quite  substantive.  We  had  1  hour  of 
one-on-one,  and  then  we  had  another 
hour  at  a  plenary  session.  This  meeting 
generally,  I  think,  set  the  stage  for  our 
next  meeting  which  I'm  sure  the  [For- 
eign] Minister  has  told  you  will  be  in 
Moscow  sometime  during  the  first  2 
weeks  in  May. 

I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  these 
talks  were  conducted  in  a  very  positive 
atmosphere,  and  this  reflected  the 
determination  of  all  of  us  to  work  to- 
gether and  to  cooperate.  As  we  were 
walking  out,  the  [Foreign]  Minister 
characterized  our  meeting  as  a  good 
beginning,  and  I  would  certainly  agree 
with  that.  I  told  him,  as  I  had  told  our 
NATO  allies  during  the  course  of  my 
trip  around  Europe  a  couple  of  weeks 
ago,  that  we  believe  perestroika  is  good 
for  the  Soviet  Union,  and  we  think  it  is 
good  for  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  we 
hope  that  the  Soviets  succeed.  I  also 
noted  our  belief  that  the  success  of  per- 
estroika is  really  dependent  upon  what 
the  Soviets  do  and  not  what  we  in  the 
West  do. 

I  talked  about  our  desire  to  expand 
the  agenda  of  our  dialogue  to  include 
therein  those  global  issues  or  transna- 
tional issues  which  cut  across  national 
boundaries,  and  he  agreed  that  we 
could  do  that.  I  laid  out  our  desire  to 
expand  some  of  the  existing  parts  of 
our  agenda,  such  as  arms  control,  so 
that  we  can  deal  with  problems  like 
missile  and  chemical  weapons  prolifera- 


tion. He  agreed  that  we  should  try  to 
do  this.  I  think  this  is  an  example  of 
our  shared  interests  in  really  what  is 
basically  a  North-South  problem. 

We  raised  other  parts  of  our  exist- 
ing agenda  beginning  with  human 
rights,  as  we  always  do;  made  clear 
that  we  wanted  to  see  continued  prog- 
ress on  human  rights— that  we'd  seen 
good  progress  up  until  about  December 
and  then  seen  very  little  progress  over 
the  course  of  the  past  couple  of  months 
but  that  we  were  quite  confident  once 
we  had  the  dialogue  resumed  that  that 
progress  would  continue. 

I  stressed  our  continuing  disap- 
pointment with  some  of  the  actions  in 
Berlin.  I  mentioned  these  in  my  speech 
yesterday  [page  56]— these  incidents 
where  German  Democratic  Republic 
guards  recently  killed  a  would-be  es- 
capee and  caught  another  one  against 
the  western  embankment  of  the  Spree 
River  in  the  British  sector  of  Berlin. 

We  talked  about  bilateral  ties, 
about  the  importance  of  improving  and 
expanding  on  those,  on  the  intellectual 
and  cultural  e.xchanges.  I  told  him  that 
our  review  of  the  strategic  arms  talks 
was  moving  along;  that  we  would  ex- 
pect that  to  be  completed  toward  the 
end  of  April;  that  the  United  States 
had,  in  addition  to  our  review  of  our 
negotiating  position  on  the  strategic 
arms  reduction  talks  (START),  to  com- 
plete a  strategic  modernization  review 
as  well. 

With  respect  to  the  conventional 
armed  forces  in  Europe  (CFE)  talks, 
I  pointed  out  that  we  are  determined 
to  see  agreements  that  change  force 
structures,  that  emphasize  defensive 
force  structures,  minimize  those  forces 
such  as  tanks  and  artillery  that  make 
offensive  operations  thinkable.  I 
pointed  out  again,  as  I  did  in  my 


59 


EUROPE 


speech  yesterday,  that  we  believe  the 
Soviets  are  moving  in  this  direction 
and  that  that  is  encouraging. 

Yes,  there  are  differences  between 
us  with  respect  to  how  we  will  deal 
with  aircraft,  how  we  will  deal  with  na- 
val forces;  and  there  are  differences  be- 
tween us  with  respect  to  short-range 
nuclear  weapons.  I  would  point  out  to 
you  that  naval  forces  and  short-range 
nuclear  weapons  were  expressly  ex- 
cluded from  the  negotiating  mandate 
for  these  talks. 

We  talked  about  regional  conflicts. 
We  talked  about  the  fact  that  this  is  a 
part  of  our  agenda  that  requires  special 
attention,  although  I  think  it  is  fair  to 
say  that  we  have  made  some  pretty 
good  progress  working  together  on 
some  regional  conflicts,  speaking  spe- 
cifically of  what's  going  on  in  Angola 
and  Namibia  and  what  has  just  hap- 
pened in  Afghanistan. 

We  talked  of  the  Soviet  "new  think- 
ing" and  the  application  to  some  of 
these  regional  areas.  We  discussed  the 
Mideast.  We  discussed  Central  Amer- 
ica. We  discussed  cooperation  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa.  We  made  the  point  that 
with  respect  to  the  "new  thinking,"  we 
were  anxious  to  see  action  and  not  just 
rhetoric.  We  made  the  point  that  we 
really  weren't  seeing  much  sign  of  the 
"new  thinking"  insofar  as  current  So- 
viet posturing  with  Iran  is  concerned. 
We  said  we  were  looking  for  signs  of  the 
"new  thinking"  in  Central  America  as 
well. 

We  welcomed  the  Soviet  interest  in 
the  Middle  East.  We  genuinely  believe 
that  we  can  perhaps  move  toward  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  by  working  together 
but  that  it  is  important  that  we  begin  a 
process  that  has  some  real  chance  of 
success.  We  pointed  out  our  reserva- 
tions about  beginning  with  a  big  inter- 
national conference  under  the  glare  of 
the  television  lights,  and  we  said  that 
pushing  prematurely  for  such  a  confer- 
ence in  our  view  could  preempt  more 
promising  possibilities  that  might  oc- 
cur down  the  line. 

Finally  the  question  of  a  summit 
did  come  up.  The  United  States  is  not 
ready  as  yet  to  set  a  date  for  the  next 
summit,  and  I  am  sure  that  this  is  a 
matter  that  we  will  be  discussing  at 
our  next  ministerial. 

Q.  You  spoke  of  the  review  on 
START,  but  do  you  have  any  inkling; 
yet  on  when  those  talks  might 
resume — those  negotiations? 


A.  I  think  I  said  to  you,  and  I  said 
to  the  [Foreign]  Minister,  that  that  re- 
view will  be  completed  by  the  end  of 
April.  Upon  the  completion  of  that  re- 
view, we  will  then  begin  to  assess  when 
we  think  those  talks  should  resume. 
Clearly  they  can't  resume  until  we  com- 
plete the  review,  but  the  review  will  be 
completed  by  the  end  of  April. 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  agree 
on  the  Soviet  plan  of  holding  an  inter- 
national conference  on  the  Middle 
East? 

A.  No.  I've  just  spoken  to  that  in 
quite  some  detail.  We  think  that  an  inter- 
national conference  could  well,  in  fact,  be 
counterproductive.  We  believe  that  work 
at  lower  levels,  on  the  ground,  to  bring 
about  a  climate  that  can  help  lead  to  di- 
rect negotiations  between  the  parties  is 
what  is  needed.  Peace  in  the  Middle  East 
will  come  from  direct  negotiations  bet- 
ween Israelis  and  Palestinians. 

Q.  What  did  you  mean  when  you 
said  that  you  complained  to  the  Sovi- 
ets about  their  posturing  on  Iran?  Is 
that  in  connection  with  the  Rushdie 
case  [Salman  Rushdie,  author  of  The 
Satanic  Verses]  or  otIuT  mattersy  Can 
you  I'xpaiid  on  tliaty 

A.  No,  I'd  rather  leave  it  right 
there,  but  it  does  include  the  matters 
you  mentioned. 

Q.  On  the  question  of  Central 
America,  did  you  raise  the  amount  of 
Soviet  aid  to  Nicaragua? 

A.  %s. 

Q.  Did  you  ask  them  to  cut  it 
back? 

A.  That  is  a  request  that  has  been 
made  before,  but  the  answer  is  yes,  we 
did.  We  pointed  out  the  fact  that  the 
United  States  is  not  furnishing  any  mil- 
itary assistance  to  the  resistance  in 
Nicaragua,  that  the  Armed  Forces  of 
Nicaragua  are  way  out  of  proportion  to 
anything  else  that  exists  in  Central 
America  and,  in  fact,  represent  a  rather 
significant  threat  to  their  neighbors. 

Q.  Did  you  suggest  that  there 
might  be  willingness  to  move  on  high 
technology  trade  on  our  part? 

A.  I  didn't  link  it  to  anything. 

Q.  Was  there  a  Soviet  response  to 
that? 

A.  The  response  was  that  some  con- 
sideration could  be  given  to  cutting  back 
on  military  assistance  to  Nicaragua  if 
the  United  States  would  see  fit  to  elimi- 
nate any  security  assistance  to  other 
states  in  Central  America,  which,  of 
course,  is  not  acceptable  to  the  United 


States  by  virtue  of  the  imbalance  that  1. 
exists  as  far  as  Nicaragua  and  its  neighj 
bors  are  concerned.  | 

Q.  On  the  human  rights  issue,  j 
did  you  mention  specific  cases?  i 

A.  Yes,  we  did  mention  specific 
cases,  as  we  have  in  our  prior 
discussions. 

Q.  Did  you  give  names? 

A.  I  would  not  want  to  give  you  th 
names  because  that's  something  on 
which  we  can  expect  progress  if  we  dot 
put  the  names  out  there  in  the  public 
arena. 

Q.  Would  you  care  to  comment  i 
the  European  Community  iroiku  pro 
posal  regarding  the  Middle  East? 

A.  I  have  the  same  comments  on 
that  as  I  expressed  to  the  EC  troika 
ministers  yesterday  that  I've  just  givei 
you  here.  We  should  be  very  careful  th 
we  do  not  preempt  what  might  be  mort 
promising  opportunities  down  the  line 
by  rushing  to  a  high  visibility  interna- 
tional conference  on  the  Middle  East. 

The  situation  cries  out  for  some  ha 
work  on  the  ground  to  bring  about  an  ;i 
mosphere  that  will  be  conducive  ulti- 
mately to  direct  negotiations  between 
the  parties.  We  have  a  new  situation  in 
the  Middle  East.  We  have  a  dialogue  b( 
ween  the  United  States  and  the  Pal- 
estine Liberation  Organization  (PLC), 
something  that  has  not  existed  before. 
We  have  a  certain  dynamic,  I  think,  th 
may  provide  some  opportunities,  if  we 
ai'e  careful  about  how  we  go  about  ap- 
proaching those  opportunities. 

Q.  Did  you  agree  on  a  set  of 
working-level  talks  between  now 
and — 

A.  We  agreed  that  we  would  con- 
tinue the  method  of  handling  our  dia- 
logue as  we  have  in  the  past,  that  whei 
we  have  full-blown  ministerials — and, 
course,  this  was  not  one  of  those  becau 
it  was  our  initial  meeting  around  the 
edges  of  the  conference  here  in  Vienna- 
but  we  agreed  that  we  would  have  ex- 
perts accompany  us  when  we  have  our 
ministerial  meetings  in  the  future. 


'Press  release  37  of  Mar.  10,  1989. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  191 


MIDDLE  EAST 


-Y  1990  Assistance  Request 
or  the  Middle  East 


Folloirh/g  are  statements  by 
'dward  S.  Walker  and  A.  Peter 
'iirleigli.  Dcpiiti/  Assistant  Secretaries 
)r  Near  East  and  South  Asian 
Miirs,  before  the  St(bconnnittee  on 
'urope  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
'oiise  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
tarch  1,  i,  and  9,  1989. '■ 


EPUTY  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 
WALKER, 
[AR.  1.  1989 

he  search  for  a  comprehensive,  peace- 
il  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
inflict  and  the  promotion  of  U.S.  in- 
rests  and  access  in  the  Middle  East 
•e  major  objectives  of  the  Bush  Ad- 
inistration.  While  the  region  as  a 
hole  remains  volatile,  there  have  been 
gnif leant  steps  toward  peace  over  the 
ist  decade.  Above  all  the  Treaty  of 
iace  Between  Egypt  and  Israel — 
hose  10th  anniversary  occurs  at  the 
id  of  this  month — remains  the  cor- 
■rstone  and  model  of  the  peace  proc- 
s.  We  welcome  and  support  the 
mmitment  of  both  countries  to  fur- 
er  strengthening  and  deepening  their 
lateral  relationship. 

We  are  committed  to  working 
)sely  with  the  Government  of  Israel 
id  with  moderate  Arab  leaders  for  a 
solution  of  the  outstanding  issues  of 
e  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  including  the 
ilestinian  question.  This  will  involve 
i;enuine  process  of  consultation  with 
e  Israeli  leadership  at  every  stage, 
,d  we  look  forward  to  the  early  visits 

Washington  of  Foreign  Minister 
rens  and  Prime  Minister  Shamir, 
'cretary  Baker  also  is  particularly  in- 
rested  to  assure  that  our  consulta- 
)ns  extend  fully  to  the  Congress,  and 
is  in  this  spirit  that  I  appear  here 
da\-. 
The  Administration's  approach 

the  peace  process  is  based  on  the 

inciples  which  have  governed  U.S. 
ilicy  over  the  past  two  decades.  As 
'cretary  Baker  indicated  in  his  con- 
•mation  hearings,  we  believe  that  op- 
irtunities  to  move  the  peace  process 
rward  need  to  be  carefully  e.xplored. 
e  want  to  build  a  positive  environ- 
ent  for  direct  negotiations  because 
ily  such  negotiations  can  lead  to  true 

ace.  We  see  no  need  to  rush  to  a  high 


visibility  international  conference 
whose  outcome  would  be  highly 
problematic. 

The  situation  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  Strip  remains  difficult.  The  Pal- 
estinian uprising  continues,  and  the 
level  of  violence  remains  high.  An  im- 
portant step  is  to  reduce  the  level  of  vi- 
olence. The  15-month  uprising,  the 
reduction  of  Jordan's  financial  and  ad- 
ministrative involvement  since  last 
summer,  and  the  devaluation  of  the  Joi-- 
danian  dinar  have  had  serious  reper- 
cussions for  the  Palestinian  residents  of 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip. 

The  Middle  East  region  confronts 
Israel  with  a  number  of  major  security 
problems,  particularly  the  proliferation 
of  ballistic  missile  technology  and 
chemical  weapons.  The  United  States  is 
committed  to  maintaining  Israel's  qual- 
itative and  technological  capacity  to  de- 
fend itself  against  these  threats.  We 
will  not  relax  our  efforts  to  assure  Is- 
rael's ability  to  maintain  and  protect 
its  vital  security  interests. 

Israel  and  the  United  States  have 
developed  an  effective  program  of  stra- 
tegic cooperation,  including  training, 
exercises,  and  close  consultations  on 
the  regional  security  environment.  We 
will  work  to  further  strengthen  our 
strategic  cooperation  in  these  areas. 

Assistance  to  Israel 

A  fundamental  element  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy  has  been  support  for  a  strong 
and  secure  Israel.  Our  links  with  Israel 
are  broad  and  deep,  based  on  shared 
values,  common  interests,  and  a  com- 
mitment to  democracy  and  freedom.  In 
recent  years,  we  have  developed  insti- 
tutional and  commercial  links  which 
have  reinforced  these  traditional  ties. 
These  include  the  Joint  Political  Mili- 
tary Group,  which  is  concerned  with 
strategic  cooperation:  the  Joint 
Security  Assistance  Planning  Group, 
which  coordinates  U.S.  military  as- 
sistance to  Israel;  the  Joint  Economic 
Development  Group,  focusing  on  eco- 
nomic issues;  and  the  Free  Trade 
Agreement  signed  in  1985. 

Since  1948  the  United  States  has 
provided  over  $43  billion  in  assistance 
to  Israel.  We  have  made  a  major  con- 
tribution to  Israel's  security  and 
development. 


Our  proposed  assistance  program 
for  Israel  in  FY  1990  consists  of  $1.8 
billion  in  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
financing  grant  and  $1.2  billion  in  eco- 
nomic support  funds  (ESF),  all  pro- 
vided on  a  grant  basis.  These  figures 
reflect  close  consultations  between  our 
two  governments. 

Our  military  assistance  to  Israel 
will  focus  on  three  areas:  cash  flow  re- 
quirements associated  with  the  pur- 
chases of  the  advanced  fighter  aircraft 
(F-15  and  F-16);  financing  the  Israeli- 
produced  Merkava  tank;  and  naval  mod- 
ernization through  purchases  of  three 
SAAR  V  corvettes  and  two  Dolphin- 
class  submarines.  Within  the  $1.8  bil- 
lion total  for  military  assistance,  we 
are  providing  additional  benefits  to  Is- 
rael. Four  hundred  million  dollars  is 
authorized  for  offshore  procurement 
expenditures  in  Israel.  'These  funds 
are  worth  much  more  than  their  dollar 
value  since  they  provide  an  added  in- 
jection into  the  Israeli  economy  in  the 
form  of  jobs,  technology,  and  increased 
production.  This  is  also  the  case  with 
regard  to  the  $100  million  in  directed 
offsets,  mandated  purchases  of  Israeli 
defense  articles  by  the  United  States. 
Further  the  U.S.  Defense  Department 
procures  over  $2.50  million  of  Israeli 
military  items  through  our  defense  in- 
dustrial cooperation  and  procurement 
program  which  provides  additional  sup- 
port to  the  Israeli  economy. 

Israel  uses  U.S.  economic  aid  to  re- 
pay FMS  loans  made  by  the  United 
States  to  Israel  prior  to  1985  and  for 
some  commodity  imports.  In  1988  Is- 
rael refinanced  FMS  loans  under  FMS 
debt  reform  legislation.  Israel  has  re- 
quested and  received  permission  to  re- 
finance $5.45  billion  of  its  high  Interest 
FMS  debt.  To  date  it  has  refinanced 
$4.75  billion,  resulting  in  a  debt  serv- 
ice savings  of  approximately  $150  mil- 
lion annually  over  the  next  5-10  years. 

Finally  two  other  programs  will 
provide  significant  resources  to  Israel. 
Under  the  fair  pricing  initiative  passed 
last  year,  Israel  will  save  $90  million  in 
costs  associated  with  the  purchase  of 
F-16  aircraft.  The  United  States  will 
also  provide  Israel  $120  million  for 
joint  research  under  the  Arrow  anti- 
ballistic  missile  research  program,  a 
part  of  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
research. 


61 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Our  economic  assistance  of  $1.2 
billion  in  ESF  is  also  important  in  sup- 
porting economic  stability  and  struc- 
tural reform.  In  1985  Israel  faced 
soaring  inflation  (445'}^),  a  huge  govern- 
ment budget  deficit  (13%  of  GDP),  and 
rising  unemployment.  Thanks  to  far- 
reaching  economic  stabilization  meas- 
ures and  U.S.  economic  assistance, 
Israel  was  able  to  reduce  inflation  to 
16%  in  1987  and  to  restore  economic 
growth.  In  January  1989,  Finance  Min- 
ister Peres  announced  a  package  of  eco- 
nomic measures  to  improve  prospects 
for  growth  and  to  reduce  inflation,  in- 
cluding the  13.4%  devaluation  of  the 
shekel,  cuts  in  food  and  fuel  subsidies, 
a  virtual  no-growth  budget,  ta.\  reduc- 
tions, and  continued  reform  of  the  capi- 
tal market. 

West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip 

The  unrest  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
is  a  vivid  reminder  that  the  future  sta- 
tus of  the  occupied  territories  and  the 
1.6  million  Palestinians  who  live  there 
are  at  the  center  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  Jordan's  decision  in  July  1988 
to  reduce  ties  with  the  territories  has 
focused  attention  on  fundamental  is- 
sues involved  in  the  search  for  peace, 
among  them  how  the  security  concerns 
of  Israel,  Jordan,  and  other  states  in 
the  area  are  to  be  reconciled  with  Pal- 
estinian aspirations. 

Our  assistance  jirogram  in  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  was  initiated  in 
1975  with  strong  congressional  sup- 
port. The  Palestinians,  Israel,  and 
Jordan  have  welcomed  the  program.  In- 
deed it  is  more  urgently  needed  than 
ever  in  view  of  the  economic  problems 
of  the  territories.  Inadequate  infra- 
structure imjjedes  economic  progress 
in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  Unemploy- 
ment and  underemployment  cause 
hai'dships  and  contribute  to  instability 
and  violence.  Over  the  medium  term, 
economic  development  and  self-reliance 
can  give  Palestinians  a  larger  stake  in 
a  peace  settlement  and  encourage  mod- 
erate forces  within  the  Palestinian 
community. 

Notwithstanding  the  current  dif- 
ficulties, we  remain  committed  to 
fostering  economic  development  in  the 
territories  and  improving  the  condition 
of  the  residents.  The  United  States  has 
provided  over  $98  million  in  direct  as- 
sistance to  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
program  since  1975.  Private  voluntary 
organizations — such  as  Catholic  Relief 
Services,  Save  the  Children  Federa- 


tion, and  American  Near  East  Refugee 
Aid — have  pai'ticii)ated.  The  private 
voluntary  organizations,  in  recent 
years,  have  increased  their  activities 
in  the  territories  in  such  areas  as 
health,  sanitation,  agricultural  devel- 
opment, water  supply,  and  community 
development. 

For  FY  1990,  we  are  requesting 
$12  million  for  these  activities  in  the 
territories.  This  will  fund  projects  to 
impi'ove  health,  water,  and  sanitation: 
to  develop  agricultural  credit  and  pri- 
vate sector  activities:  and  to  construct 
schools  and  roads.  The  private  volun- 
tary organizations  have  continued  to 
operate  and  administer  projects  de- 
spite the  disturbances.  The  Palestin- 
ians, Israel,  and  Jordan  all  want  us  to 
continue  and  expand  the  program. 

The  U.S.  program  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  represents  our  com- 
mitment to  a  secure  future  for  the 
Palestinians  and  all  states  in  the  region 
based  on  cooperation  and  dialogue,  not 
conflict.  It  is  important  to  our  efforts 
to  engage  moderate  Palestinians  and 
Arab  governments  to  build  on  what  has 
been  achieved  since  the  Camp  David 
accords. 


DEPUTY  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

WALKER, 
MAR.  2,  1989 

I  am  pleased  to  testify  this  morning  on 
the  Administration's  proposed  FY  1990 
security  assistance  programs  for 
Egypt,  Middle  East  regional  coopera- 
tion, and  the  multinational  force  and 
observers  (MFO). 

Ejfypt 

A  strong,  stable  Egypt  is  central  to 
U.S.  strategic  interests  in  the  Middle 
East.  Egypt's  leadership  in  the  Arab- 
Israeli  peace  process,  its  influence  as  a 
force  for  moderation  in  a  turbulent  re- 
gion, and  its  support  for  peaceful  reso- 
lution of  regional  conflicts  are  all 
congruent  with  U.S.  values  and  objec- 
tives. The  broad-based  bilateral  rela- 
tionship we  enjoy  today  with  Egypt  is 
due  in  no  small  part  to  the  breadth  of 
our  economic  and  security  cooperation 
efforts  over  the  past  decade. 

Over  the  past  year,  Egypt's  re- 
integration into  the  Arab  fold  has 
continued,  as  Egypt  has  returned  to 
prominence  in  Arab  councils.  All  but 
three  Arab  countries  have  now  rees- 
tablished diplomatic  relations  with 
Cairo.  Most  important,  Egypt  has 


62 


made  no  concessions  to  regain  its  pos 
tion  in  the  Arab  world — a  clear  signal 
that  a  commitment  to  peace  can  yield 
solid  political  dividends. 

As  the  10th  anniversary  of  the 
Egypt-Israel  Peace  Treaty  approachi 
Egypt  remains  fully  committed  to 
peace  and  to  a  reasonable  bilateral  re 
lationship  with  Israel.  Two  of  the  moi 
troublesome  irritants  in  the  Israel- 
Egypt  relationship  have  recently  bee 
resolved.  In  January  an  Egyptian 
tribunal  accepted  official  Egyptian 
responsibility  for  the  tragic  1985  shm 
ings  at  Ras  Burqa  and  awarded  the 
Israeli — and  one  American — victims 
or  their  families  fair  compensation. 
Within  the  past  week,  Egypt  and  Isi' 
el  have  resolved  the  final  issues  out- 
standing following  the  September  19^ 
decision  of  an  international  arbitral 
panel  in  favor  of  Egypt's  claim  to  Tab 
Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  area  is  e 
pected  to  follow  shortly.  Resolution  o 
the  Taba  dispute — which  was  facili- 
tated by  active  U.S.  diplomacy — 
demonstrates  to  other  states  in  the  V' 
gion  that  peaceful  negotiations  can 
bear  fruit. 

Over  the  ])ast  year.  President 
Mubarak  has  promoted  U.S.  efforts  t 
move  the  Arab-Israeli  peace  process 
forward.  Egypt  backed  Secretary 
Shultz's  initiative  of  early  1988,  de- 
signed to  offer  both  sides  an  incentiv 
to  engage  in  direct  negotiations  by 
linking  interim  arrangements  with  f 
nal  status.  Egyi)t's  encouragement  C( 
tributed  to  the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organization  (PLO)  chairman  Yasir 
Arafat's  agreement  to  renounce  terr^ 
ism,  accept  negotiations  on  the  basis 
UN  Security  Council  Resolutions  24i 
and  338,  and  recognize  Israel's  right 
exist — thereby  clearing  the  way  to  a 
U.S. -PLO  dialogue.  President  Muba- 
rak's upcoming  trip  to  Washington 
should  present  a  further  opportunity 
exchange  views  on  how  to  encourage 
rael  and  responsible  Palestinians  to 
move  toward  direct  peace  negotiatioi 

Egypt  and  the  Soviet  Union  hav( 
expanded  the  scope  of  their  relations 
over  the  past  year,  culminating  in  thi 
visit  of  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnad 
to  Cairo  last  week.  Egypt's  ability  tc 
bring  the  Soviets  and  Israelis  togeth 
in  Cairo  demonstrates  an  activism  in 
Egyptian  foreign  policy  which  is  like 
to  expand.  While  we  can  expect  Egy 
to  solidify  its  Arab  ties  and  to  modes 
expand  its  political  and  economic  coo 
eration  with  the  Eastern  bloc,  Egypt 
should  continue  to  look  to  the  United 
States  as  its  key  economic  and  securi 
partner  outside  the  region. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1£ 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Internally  Egypt's  most  pressing 
roblem  remains  the  economy.  After  a 
remising  start  on  economic  reforms  in 
iid-1987,  Egypt's  leaders  adopted  a 
lore  cautious  posture,  as  inflation  and 
uggish  economic  conditions  began  to 
rain  the  social  fabric.  Discussions 
ith  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
MF)  and  the  World  Bank  on  an  eco- 
)mic  reform  package  have  been  going 
1  for  over  a  year,  after  Egypt  made 
)lid  initial  steps  toward  trimming  the 
idget,  encouraging  agricultural  liber- 
ization,  establishing  a  competitive 
tchange  rate  policy,  and  adjusting 
ices  toward  international  levels, 
gypt's  budget  and  balance  of  pay- 
ents  remain  deeply  in  deficit.  Debt 
scheduling  benefits  expired  in  June 
188,  and  arrears  on  external  debts  are 
ounting  steadily.  The  balance-of- 
yments  picture  is  especially  troub- 
ig,  with  higher  world  grain  prices, 
bt  servicing,  and  lower  oil  proceeds 
mbining  to  squeeze  available  foreign 
change  resources. 

Reform  progress  has  continued 
ross  a  number  of  areas.  Tourism  is 
oming,  reflecting  more  realistic  ex- 
ange  rate  policies  and  privatization 
management.  Agricultural  liberali- 
tion  has  been  broadened,  with 
bsidies  removed  on  feed  corn  and  re- 
ced  on  fertilizers  and  pesticides.  The 
vernment  is  also  in  the  process  of  im- 
?menting  a  substantial  increase  in 
e  price  of  bread — always  a  politically 
!'ficult  move  in  Egypt  given  the  vivid 
Emories  of  the  1977  riots.  These  all 
present  important  steps  in  the  right 
•ection. 

We  have  encouraged  Egypt  to  con- 
idate  these  and  other  reform  efforts 
0  a  comprehensive  program  that  can 
Timand  the  broad  support  of  the  IMF, 
3  World  Bank,  and  the  Western  donor 
Timunity.  The  new  IMF  program 
jld  then  pave  the  way  to  another 
bt  rescheduling  which  would  provide 
tical  relief  to  Egypt's  balance  of 
yments.  We  continue  to  use  our  as- 
tance  program  to  creatively  encour- 
e  both  macroeconomic  and  sector  re- 
■ms.  In  order  for  the  reform  effort  to 
:eeed,  the  Egyptian  Government 
1st  be  convinced  that  economic 
owth  and  better  living  conditions  for 
?  Egyptian  people  will  result. 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is 
luesting  a  total  of  $2.3  billion  in  com- 
led  military,  economic,  and  food  as- 
tance  to  Egypt.  These  levels,  while 
;h  in  an  era  of  scarce  resources,  are 
al  to  help  meet  Egypt's  most  urgent 


Secretary  Meets  With 
Israeli  Foreign  Minister 


Following  are  remarks  by 
Secrefari/  Baker  and  Israeli  Foreign 
Minister  Moslie  Arens  after  their 
meeting  at  tlie  Department  ofState  on 
March  IS.  19S9J 

Secretary  Baker.  We  affirmed  to  the 
[Foreign]  Minister  that  President  Bush 
and  I  are  firmly  committed  to  continu- 
ing the  historic  U.S. -Israeli  partner- 
ship and  to  do  all  we  can  to  assure 
Israel's  security  and  economic  well- 
being. 

These  are,  of  course,  important 
goals  for  the  United  States  because  Is- 
rael is  a  friend — and  not  only  a  friend 
but  an  ally — and  because  Israel  must 
be  secure  if  we  are  going  to  make  prog- 
ress toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Our  principal  focus  of  attention,  of 
course,  was  on  the  peace  process.  We 
both  agreed  that  need  for  progress  is 
of  the  highest  priority  and  that  we 
would  continue  to  work  together  to 
achieve  direct  negotiations.  I  made 
clear  our  view  that  movement  toward  a 
comprehensive  peace  must  be  based  on 
the  principals  of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  242. 

We  can  and  must  find  a  way  to 
move  ahead  which  at  one  and  the  same 
time  meets  Israel's  legitimate  security 
needs  and  addresses  the  legitimate  po- 
litical rights  of  the  Palestinian  people. 
We  reviewed  the  current  situation  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  we  con- 
sidered various  reinforcing  and  recip- 
rocal steps  which  might  be  taken  to 
diffuse  the  tensions  there. 

Finally,  I  reaffirmed  our  desire  in 
the  weeks  and  months  and  years  ahead 
to  continue  to  work  closely  with  Israel 
in  the  search  for  peace.  In  this  connec- 
tion. President  Bush  and  I  look  forward 
to  further  discussions  with  Prime  Min- 


ister Shamir  when  he  visits  Washing- 
ton. I'm  hopeful  that  with  goodwill  on 
both  sides,  we  can  move  forward  to- 
ward our  shared  goal  of  peace. 

Foreign  Minister  Arens.  It  was  a 

privilege  for  me  to  meet  with  the  Sec- 
retary of  State.  I  came  here  as  the  For- 
eign Minister  of  the  newly  elected 
government  in  Israel  and  have  had  the 
chance  to  meet  the  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  newly  elected  Administration 
here  in  Washington.  We  meet  after  a 
very  solid  foundation  of  friendship.  I 
would  say  our  alliance  has  been  built 
over  the  past  years  between  the  United 
States  and  Israel.  The  Secretary  of 
State  has  played  a  very  important  part 
in  building  that  foundation  in  past  posi- 
tions that  he  has  held. 

We  share  common  ideals  and  val- 
ues, common  interests,  and  certainly 
the  common  objective  of  advancing  the 
peace  process.  I  think  that  our  talk  to- 
day contributed  to  building  a  basis  of 
understanding  between  us  on  how  we 
should  proceed  in  order  to  advance  as 
expeditiously  as  possible  in  the  search 
for  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Q.  What  about  these  reciprocal 
steps'?  Are  you  receptive  to  the  idea  of 
reciprocal  steps  to  reduce  tension"? 

Foreign  Minister  Arens.  We  have 
exchanged  views  on  the  subject.  We 
certainly  want  to  reduce  tension.  That 
is  an  interest  that  we  have  quite  aside 
from  the  interest  that  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment has  on  that  subject,  and  I  think 
that  we  will  find  common  ground  on 
how  to  do  that.  It's  not  easy  to  do  that 
considering  the  violence  in  the  area  at 
the  present  time. 


'Press  release  39. 


security  and  economic  requirements, 
thereby  supporting  important  U.S. 
goals  and  interests  in  the  region. 

Our  FMS  financing  request  of 
.$1.3  billion  in  grant  assistance  will 
permit  the  Egyptians  to  continue  their 
urgent  militai-y  modernization  pro- 
gram. Designed  to  facilitate  Egypt's 
replacement  of  aging,  obsolete  Soviet 
equipment  with  fewer  but  better  quali- 
ty U.S.  items,  the  program  has  focused 


heavily  on  Egypt's  armor  and  air  re- 
quirements. In  1990  Egypt  will  con- 
tinue its  development  work  in  prepara- 
tion for  the  planned  MlAl  eoproduction 
program  which  is  aimed  at  adding  555 
advanced  U.S.  tanks  to  Egypt's  inven- 
tory during  the  1990s.  The  Egyptians 
will  also  continue  their  preparations  for 
receiving,  beginning  in  1991,  their 
thii'd  tranche  of  40  F-16  fighter  air- 
craft. A  third  major  focus  of  Egypt's 


63 


MIDDLE  EAST 


defense  spending  will  be  its  efforts  to 
improve  its  integrated  air  defense  com- 
mand, control,  and  communications 
program.  Finally  a  significant  portion 
of  the  FMS  funding  we  provide  to 
Egypt  will  continue  to  be  dedicated  to 
the  operations  and  maintenance  re- 
quirements of  equipment  already  deliv- 
ered to  its  inventories. 

The  $1.7  million  international  mili- 
tary education  and  training  (IMET) 
program  is  an  important  adjunct  to  our 
military  assistance  effort  in  Egypt. 
IMET  helps  train  Egyptian  military 
personnel  to  operate  and  maintain  the 
increasing  stock  of  U.S.  equipment  in 
the  Egyptian  military  inventory.  Fund- 
ing will  also  be  used  to  assist  Egyptian 
officers  in  mastering  U.S.  doctrine  and 
management  concepts,  enhancing  their 
use  of  U.S. -supplied  equipment,  and 
strengthening  military  ties  between 
the  two  countries. 

While  U.S.  military  assistance  to 
Egypt  has  been  on  a  grant  basis  since 
FY  1985,  Egypt  continues  to  have  diffi- 
culty meeting  payment  terms  on  the 
$4.5  billion  in  commercial  interest  rate 
FMS  loans  incurred  between  1979  and 
1984.  Egypt  was  able  to  postpone  debt 
payments  due  from  January  1987 
through  June  1988  in  the  conte.xt  of  a 
multilateral  Paris  Club  rescheduling 
agreed  to  in  the  wake  of  the  1987  IMF 
standby  arrangement.  Rescheduling 
benefits  have  expired,  however,  and 
Egypt  must  resume  payments  begin- 
ning this  July  to  avoid  a  cutoff  of 
U.S.  assistance  under  the  Brooke 
amendment.  Absent  another  debt  re- 
scheduling or  substantially  increased 
cash  inflows  from  foreign  donors,  Egypt 
will  have  difficulty  servicing  these  and 
other  debt  obligations,  given  the  diffi- 
cult prospects  for  the  country's  balance 
of  payments. 

Egypt  has  not  yet  availed  itself  of 
the  FMS  debt  restructuring  option  of- 
fered by  Congress  in  the  1987  continu- 
ing resolution.  The  benefits  to  Egypt 
could  be  substantial — up  to  $90  million 
per  year  in  interest  savings  at  current 
rates.  However,  they  are  dwarfed  by 
the  magnitude  of  Egypt's  balance-of- 
payments  financing  gap,  which  will 
total  more  than  $3  billion  before  re- 
scheduling in  1989.  An  IMF"  program, 
debt  rescheduling,  and  new  money  in- 
flows are  essential  to  close  this  gap  and 
stabilize  Egypt's  economy. 

Our  $815  million  ESF  request  for 
Egypt  balances  support  for  Egyptian 
economic  stabilization  and  development 
objectives.  For  balance-of-payments 


support,  we  plan  to  allocate  a  portion  of 
our  ESF  program  in  the  form  of  a  cash 
grant.  In  addition  our  commodity  im- 
port program  will  provide  balance-of- 
payments  support  by  funding  im])orts 
of  American  manufactured  goods  and 
other  commodities.  The  remainder  of 
our  ESF  will  be  assigned  to  project 
and  sectoral  programs  designed  to  pro- 
mote growth-oriented  development  in 
the  productive  sectors  of  the  economy. 

We  plan  to  continue  our  close  com- 
munications with  the  subcommittee  re- 
garding the  disposition  of  any  cash 
transfer  assistance  for  Egypt.  Mindful 
of  the  subcommittee's  concerns  and  the 
need  for  economic  reform  progress,  the 
Administration  has  not  yet  recom- 
mended disbursement  of  cash  transfer 
resources  from  either  FY  1988  or 
FY  1989  ESF  programs  for  Egypt.  We 
will  continue  to  encourage  the  Govern- 
ment of  Egypt  to  work  toward  signifi- 
cant economic  reforms.  At  the  same 
time,  we  believe  it  is  vitally  important 
for  our  bilateral  relationship  with 
Egypt  that  we  have  the  capacity  to  re- 
spond flexibly  to  Egypt's  needs.  Accor- 
dingly we  urge  the  subcommittee  to 
remove  existing  restrictions  on  cash 
transfer  assistance  to  Egypt  in  the  FY 
1990  legislation. 

Our  PL  480  Title  I  program  con- 
tinues to  provide  an  important  though 
diminishing  resource  for  Egypt  to  con- 
serve foreign  exchange  for  sensitive 
grain  imports.  For  F"Y  1990,  we  are  re- 
questing $160  million  in  PL  480  Title  I 
assistance,  a  decline  of  $10  million  from 
the  prior  year.  At  current  grain  prices, 
this  amount  will  finance  about  15% 
of  Egypt's  wheat  and  flour  import 
requirement. 

Multinational  Force  and  Observers 

Apart  from  the  Egypt  program,  the 
Administration  is  requesting  $24.4  mil- 
lion in  FY  1990  funding  to  support 
U.S.  participation  in  the  MFO,  the  in- 
ternational peacekeeping  organization 
which  monitors  the  security  arrange- 
ments of  the  Egypt-Israel  Peace  Trea- 
ty. After  8  years  of  successful 
operations,  both  parties  regard  the 
MFO's  continued  presence  as  an  essen- 
tial element  in  fostering  a  spirit  of  mu- 
tual eoojieration  and  confidence  and  a 
means  for  strengthening  the  peace 
process. 


DEPUTY  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

WALKER, 
MAR.  9,  1989 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  this  sii 
committee  to  describe  our  proposed 
assistance  programs  for  Jordan, 
Lebanon,  Oman,  and  Yemen  in 
FY  1990.  These  progi'ams  are  an  im- 
portant element  in  our  overall  relatic 
with  each  of  these  countries  and  are  ; 
key  factor  in  helping  us  achieve  goals 
which  benefit  us  all.  I  would  like  to  b 
gin  by  providing  an  overview  of  the  s 
uation  in  the  Middle  East  and  descril 
our  programs  in  Jordan  and  Lebanon 
My  colleague,  Mr.  Peter  Burleigh,  w 
discuss  our  programs  in  Oman  and 
Yemen. 

Middle  East  Overview 

As  we  discussed  in  hearings  this  sub 
committee  held  last  week  on  our  pro- 
grams in  Israel,  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza,  and  Egypt,  we  and  our  friends 
the  Middle  East  face  serious  chal- 
lenges. Our  close  and  cooperative  tie 
with  our  key  friends  are  probably  th 
most  important  assets  we  have  in  pr 
serving  U.S.  interests  in  the  region. 
Jordan  is  an  excellent  example.  I  am 
also  afraid  Jordan  is  an  example  of  hi 
recent  trends  in  LT.S.  security  assist 
ance  can  result  in  disproportionate  ( 
in  aid  levels  to  important  friends. 

Jordan 

The  last  15  months  have  seen  a  dranr 
ie  change  in  the  way  that  King  Huss 
has  been  moved  to  react  to  the  Pales 
tinian  problem.  The  intifada,  or  upr 
ing,  which  began  in  December  1987, 
significantly  altered  Jordan's  relatio 
ship  with  the  West  Bank  and  its  Pal- 
estinian population. 

Jordan's  links,  which  were  main 
with  the  pre-1967  traditional  leader- 
ship, became  increasingly  tenuous  a 
the  youthful  leadership  of  the  upris- 
ing consolidated  its  position.  Jordan' 
ability  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the 
Palestinians  was  based  on  its  formei 
relationships.  This  linkage  has  erod 
along  with  the  leadership  role  of  the 
older  generation  as  the  uprising  has 
continued. 

Concluding  that  he  could  no  lonj 
claim  the  lead  role  in  addressing  the 
Palestinian  element  of  the  Arab-Isrj 
conflict.  King  Hussein  took  what  he 
has  called  a  "tactical  step"  in  the  pe 
process  by  placing  the  burden  to  pei 
form  in  the  peace  process  on  the  PL' 


64 


It 


MIDDLE  EAST 


id  challenging  Arafat  to  assume  the 
isponsibilities  of  leadership. 

King  Hussein  recognized  the  real- 
'  that  Jordan  could  only  speak  for  the 
,lestinians  to  the  extent  they  both 
reed.  In  doing  so,  he  did  not  opt  out 
the  peace  process  with  Israel.  With 
18  longest  border  of  any  state  with  Is- 
lel,  Jordan  must  participate  in  this  ef- 
rt.  Indeed  peace  and  security  are  in 
irdan's  vital  interest. 

King  Hussein  continues  to  be  a 
itical  factor  in  the  peace  process. 
Illy  he  has  the  credibility  and  national 
sets  to  give  Israel  the  assurance  it 
ust  have  that  its  negotiating  partner 
n  deliver  on  its  commitments.  King 
ussein  must  play  a  major  role  in  facili- 
ting  any  Israeli-Palestinian 
commodation. 

Jordan's  importance  to  the  United 
.ates  goes  well  beyond  the  peace  proc- 
s.  The  United  States  shares  strate- 
c  interests  with  Jordan,  whose 
oderate  policies  have  supported  peace 
id  stability  in  the  region.  Our  corn- 
on  efforts  to  end  the  Iran-Iraq  con- 
ct  have  recently  seen  considerable 
ogress.  King  Hussein's  influence  in 
•ab  circles  provides  a  measure  of 
oderation  insuring,  for  example, 
aq's  development  of  a  moderate  post- 
ir  regional  role. 

Jordan  plays  a  vital  role  in  the  ef- 
•t  to  curb  worldwide  terrorism.  King 
jssein  has  vigorously  opposed  the  use 
terrorism  in  all  its  manifestations 
th  in  the  Middle  East  and  beyond. 
16  Jordanian  Armed  Forces  have 
M'ked  diligently  to  prevent  the  use  of 
rdanian  territory  as  a  base  for  raids 
Israel.  Hussein  has  consistently  and 
urageously  opposed  support  by  other 
•ab  states  for  extremist  groups. 

The  United  States  and  Jordan  have 
d  a  special  military-to-military  rela- 
)nship  for  many  years.  That  relation- 
ip  has  declined  since  the  demise  of 
e  1985  Jordan  arms  sale,  which  would 
ve  provided  F-16  fighters  to  Jordan, 
isistance  from  the  United  States  has 
en  drastically  reduced:  there  is  no 
,S.  military  equipment  in  the 
peline  for  the  first  time  in  many 
ars.  Exercises  have  been  curtailed, 
id  training  of  Jordanian  officers  in 
e  United  States  has  been  reduced 
le  to  budgetary  constraints  in  the 
rdanian  Armed  Forces.  Despite  prob- 
Tis  in  our  relationship,  good  will  re- 
nins strong,  but  it  is  not  an 
exhaustible  reserve. 

Jordan's  economy  is  in  serious  diffi- 
Ity.  It  has  been  hard  hit  by  recent 


cuts  in  subsidies  from  gulf  govern- 
ments as  well  as  remittances  from  Jor- 
danians working  abroad.  It  is  now 
suffering  a  foreign  exchange  crisis  of 
majoi'  proportions. 

Hussein's  government  has  re- 
sponded to  Jordan's  economic  problems 
with  strong  and  sound  initiatives  which 
the  United  States  strongly  supports.  It 
has  implemented  austerity  measures  to 
conserve  foreign  exchange  and  curb  do- 
mestic spending.  It  has  renewed  em- 
phasis on  privatization  of  state-owned 
firms  and  issued  appeals  for  financial 
help  from  its  Arab  neighbors.  Discus- 
sions are  also  being  held  with  the  World 
Bank  on  the  subject  of  a  loan  with  quick 
disbursement.  Jordan  has  had  a  long 


history  of  on-time  debt  payments,  and 
its  recent  economic  policy  reforms — 
including  freeing  interest  rates,  dis- 
mantling controls  on  investment,  and 
currency  devaluation — are  in  accor- 
dance with  World  Bank  structural  ad- 
justment conditions. 

These  economic  difficulties  come 
just  as  U.S.  military  aid  to  Jordan  has 
declined  sharply.  Our  military  assist- 
ance to  Jordan  averaged  $68  million  an- 
nually over  the  last  decade,  reflecting 
our  concern  for  the  security  of  Jordan, 
its  contribution  to  the  peace  process, 
and  shared  strategic  interests.  Last 
year  (FY  1989),  we  requested  $48  mil- 
lion in  FMS  credits  for  Jordan  to  pro- 
vide spare  parts  for  U.S.  equip- 


Continued  Fighting  in  Lebanon 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  16.  1989> 

The  U.S.  Government  is  deeply  con- 
cerned over  the  heavy  exchange  of  shell- 
ing and  consequent  loss  of  life  March  14 
in  Beirut.  The  fighting  illustrates  yet 
again  Lebanon's  urgent  need  to  escape 
the  downward  cycle  of  violence  and  po- 
litical disintegration. 

We  urge  all  sides  to  exercise  re- 
straint and  to  avoid  civilian  casualties 
at  all  costs.  We  call  on  Gen.  Awn  and 
Dr  Huss  [rival  prime  ministers;  Gen. 
Awn  is  Christian-backed  leader  and  Dr. 
Huss  is  Muslim-backed  leader]  to  coop- 
erate and  coordinate  directly  with  one 
another  to  work  together  to  restore 
and  invigorate  Lebanon's  legitimate 
national  institutions.  We  call  on  all 
Lebanese  to  support  these  national  in- 
stitutions. The  goal  which  we  strongly 
support  and  which  all  parties  must 
work  for  is  well-known  and  has  not 
changed — the  restoration  of  Lebanon's 
unity,  sovereignty,  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity, with  the  withdrawal  of  all  for- 
eign forces  and  the  disbandment  of  the 
militias. 

The  fighting  also  threatens  to  de- 
stroy the  Arab  League's  peace  initia- 
tive on  Lebanon.  The  United  States 
actively  supports  this  initiative  and  en- 
courages the  Arab  League  to  continue 
its  effort.  We  call  on  the  Lebanese  and 
all  other  concerned  parties  to  join  in 
this  support.  The  suffering  of  innocent 
Lebanese  civilians  has  continued  far 
too  long,  and  Lebanon's  peace  and  sta- 
bility must  be  restored. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  29.  1989^ 

The  United  States  welcomes  the  Arab 
League's  call  for  a  cease-fire  in 
Lebanon.  We  strongly  support  that 
call,  and  we  share  the  Arab  League's 
concern  about  the  grave  situation  in 
Lebanon.  The  shelling  must  stop,  and 
the  land  and  sea  blockades  must  end. 
All  parties  to  the  fighting  must  negoti- 
ate their  differences  with  one  another. 

Further,  civilian  casualties  and 
suffering  must  be  avoided  at  all  costs, 
including  all  attacks  on  residential 
areas  and  on  sources  of  civilian  food, 
water,  fuel,  and  electricity. 

The  United  States  applauds  the 
Arab  League's  continuing  efforts  to 
help  resolve  the  political  impasse  in 
Lebanon.  We  encourage  the  Arab 
League  Committee  on  Lebanon,  under 
the  leadership  of  the  Kuwaiti  Foreign 
Minister,  to  continue  its  peace  initia- 
tive. We  stand  ready  to  assist  the  ini- 
tiative however  we  can. 

The  United  States  remains  com- 
mitted to  the  restoration  of  Lebanon's 
unity,  sovereignty,  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity, with  the  withdrawal  of  all  for- 
eign forces  and  the  disbandment  of  the 
militias. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Charles  Redman. 

-Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Margaret  DeB.  Tut- 
wiler.  ■ 


spartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


65 


MIDDLE  EAST 


ment  already  in  Jordan's  inventory  and 
other  urgently  needed  supplies.  The  re- 
quest included  no  new  weapons  systems. 

Regrettably,  because  of  severe 
budget  constraints,  at  the  end  of  the 
FY  1989  security  assistance  allocations 
process,  we  were  able  to  provide  only 
$10  million  in  FMS  credits  to  Joi'dan. 
This  level  does  not  support  our  inter- 
ests in  Jordan  and,  if  continued,  would 
not  allow  us  to  pursue  the  important 
cooperative  efforts  in  which  we  have 
been  involved. 

I  am  convinced  no  one  in  the  execu- 
tive or  legislative  branches  wanted  this 
result.  And  I  realize  that  last  year's  aid 
level  for  Jordan  is  only  one  dramatic  ex- 
ample of  the  problem  we  face  as  we  try 
to  fund  high  priority  programs  while 
remaining  within  reduced  budget  lev- 
els. I  hope  that  in  the  course  of  discus- 
sions in  the  months  ahead,  we  bear  in 
mind  the  case  of  Jordan  and  work  to 
avoid  a  similar  result  in  FY  1990. 

Lebanon 

We  remain  deeply  concerned  about  con- 
ditions in  Lebanon.  Partition  has  deep- 
ened, especially  after  parliament's 
failure  last  September  to  elect  a  new 
president.  Two  cabinets  have  formed: 


one  in  Christian  east  Beirut,  led  by 
Lebanese  Army  Gen.  Michel  Awn;  the 
other  in  Muslim  west  Beirut,  led  by  Dr. 
Salim  al-Huss.  For  much  of  the  past  6 
months,  the  two  cabinets  have  been 
grappling  with  the  problem  of  con- 
trol over  institutions  of  the  central 
government. 

There  are  now  some  signs  that  co- 
ordination is  growing  between  the  two 
cabinets.  They  appear  to  be  cooperat- 
ing in  opening  more  crossing  points 
between  east  and  west  Beirut.  The 
United  States  welcomes  such  coopera- 
tion, and  we  encourage  Gen.  Awn  and 
Dr.  Huss  to  work  together  to  restore 
and  invigorate  as  many  of  the  legiti- 
mate institutions  of  the  central  govern- 
ment as  possible  on  both  sides  of  the 
"green  line." 

The  United  States  is  committed  to 
the  restoration  of  Lebanon's  unity,  sov- 
ereignty, and  territorial  integrity,  in- 
cluding the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces.  Toward  those  ends,  we  support 
the  election  of  a  consensus  president 
who  is  dedicated  to  national  reconcilia- 
tion and  to  the  immediate  implementa- 
tion of  political  reform.  We  believe  the 
fighting  last  month  in  east  Beirut,  bet- 
ween the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces  and 
the  Lebanese  Forces  militia,  further 


demonstrates  the  urgent  need  to  re- 
store Lebanon's  legitimate  national 
institutions. 

The  United  States  actively  sup- 
ports the  current  efforts  of  the  Arab 
League  to  help  Lebanon  out  of  its  po- 
litical impasse.  We  have  been  encour- 
aged by  the  Lebanese  response  to  the 
league's  initiative,  and  we  remain 
ready  to  assist  the  Arab  League  in 
its  effort.  The  suffering  of  innocent 
Lebanese  civilians  has  continued  far 
too  long,  and  Lebanon's  peace  and  sta 
bility  must  be  restored. 

Economic  conditions  in  Lebanon 
are  desperate.  Inflation  has  moder- 
ated, but  unemployment  remains  higl 
perhaps  a  third  of  the  population  regi 
larly  receives  humanitarian  relief,  in 
eluding  food  assistance.  In  FY  1989, 
the  United  States  will  help  feed  ap- 
proximately 135,000  needy  Lebanese 
families  through  our  PL  480  Title  II 
program.  Our  modest  $2  million  ESF 
program  in  FY  1990  will  help  meet  tl 
operational  costs  associated  with  the 
relief  and  rehabilitation  activities  of 
private  voluntary  organizations. 


DEPUTY  ASSISTANT  SECRETAR ' 

BURLEIGH, 
MAR.  9,  1989 


U.S.  and  PLO  Meet  in  Tunis 


AMBASSADOR  PELLETREAU'S 

STATEMENT, 
MAR.  22,  1989' 

Our  meeting  today  took  place  in  the 
context  of  our  common  objective  of 
comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  began  discussing  in  depth  the 
general  political  environment  as  well  as 
some  of  the  substantive  issues  related 
to  the  peace  process.  We  also  discussed 
developments  that  have  occurred  since 
our  first  meeting  last  December  16 
from  the  viewpoint  of  whether  they 
have  contributed  to,  or  detracted  from, 
the  atmosphere  conducive  to  negotia- 
tions. The  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  is  fully  aware  of  our 
very  strong  views  on  terrorism  and 
violence. 

For  our  part,  we  tried  to  explain 
principles  and  practical  considerations 
which  underline  U.S.  views.  We  also 
listened  to  the  authoritative  statement 


of  PLO  positions.  We  asked  a  lot  of 
questions,  and  we  answered  some  too. 

I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  much  of 
the  discussion  focused  on  practical 
steps  which  can  be  taken  to  reduce  ten- 
sions in  the  occupied  territories  and 
lead  to  direct  negotiations.  Based  on 
[UN  Security  Council]  Resolutions  242 
and  338,  those  negotiations  must  ensure 
the  legitimate  security  needs  of  Israel 
as  well  as  the  legitimate  political  rights 
of  the  Palestinian  people. 

We  believe  a  good  deal  of  prepara-  _ 
tory  work  is  necessary  before  this 
stage  is  reached.  However,  today  there 
is  clearly  a  new  dynamic  in  the  Middle 
East  of  which  this  dialogue  is  an  impor- 
tant part.  The  immediate  objective  is 
to  create  a  political  environment  in 
which  productive,  direct  negotiations 
between  Palestinians  and  Israelis  can 
be  sustained. 


■Robert  H.  Pelletreau,  Jr.,  is  the  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  Tunisia.  ■ 


Southwest  Asia-Persian  Gulf 

The  Persian  Gulf  and  Southwest  Asii 
region  are  vital  to  U.S.  and  Western 
economic  and  strategic  interests. 
About  65%  of  proven  world  oil  reserv 
and  almost  25%  of  current  world  oil 
production  are  located  in  the  gulf.  C' 
tinned  access  to  this  commodity  at 
reasonable  prices  is  vital  to  Japan,  tl 
European  Community,  and  the  world 
economy  in  general.  In  1988  Saudi 
Arabia  became  our  number  one  sourc 
of  imported  crude.  One  of  the  top  strai 
gic  priorities  of  the  United  States  ano 
its  allies  must  be  to  help  assure  that  t 
states  of  the  region  remain  free  from 
hostile  influence  and  intimidation. 

Over  the  past  year,  we  have  seen 
major  changes  in  this  part  of  the  wor 
Iran's  inability  to  continue  the  war  a 
the  cease-fire  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war  hi 
reduced  the  danger  of  Iranian  attem] 
to  threaten  the  gulf  states.  The  end  > 
the  Soviet  occupation  of  Afghanistan 
removes  Soviet  forces  from  a  positioi 
from  which  they  could  more  easily  ha 
intervened  in  the  gulf  littoral  and 
threatened  lines  of  communication  vi 
to  the  West. 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  M 


MIDDLE  EAST 


I    The  willingness  of  the  United 
lUes  t(i  stand  by  its  commitments  in 
reuion  was  a  major  factor  in  bring- 
about  the  cease-fire  in  the  Iran- 
U|  war  and  the  Soviet  withdi-awal 
m  Afghanistan.  Although  the  U.S. 
iivy  protection  regime  in  the  gulf  in 
|s7-.S8  was  controversial,  few  would 
iue  now  that  it  was  not  successful, 
e  strong  support  of  the  United 
ates,  Pakistan,  and  Saudi  Arabia  for 
'  Afghan  resistance  helped  convince 
'  Soviets  that  it  could  not  win  the 
r  in  Afghanistan. 

While  we  have  made  a  major  con- 
but  ion  to  security  and  stability  in 
Persian  Gulf  and  Southwest  Asia, 
illenges  remain.  For  e.xample, 
mian  threats  during  the  war  high- 
hted  for  Arab  gulf  states  the  impor- 
ice  of  maintaining  a  strong  self- 
fense  capability.  This  need  contin- 
5,  and  we  are  working  closely  with 
;m  to  take  appropriate  measures. 
Also  we  must  continue  to  assess 
viet  intentions  in  the  region.  Over 
'  last  decade,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
janded  diplomatic  ties  with  the  gulf 
:tes.  It  has,  for  many  years,  main- 
(ned  major  military  supply  relation- 
(ps  w'ith  several  states,  particularly 
iq  and  South  Yemen,  and  appears  to 
seeking  to  increase  militai'y  sales 
:h  others,  such  as  Kuwait  and  the 
lited  Arab  Emirates.  We  hope  the 
viets  will  take  a  more  constructive 
oroach  toward  the  region  under  Gor- 
:hev  and  not,  as  so  often  in  the  past, 
■asure  the  success  of  Soviet  policy  by 
'  degree  to  which  it  frustrates  the 
als  of  the  United  States  and  its 
ies. 

Our  relationships  with  the  mod- 
ite  states  of  Southwest  Asia  and  the 
rsian  Gulf  are  increasingly  comple.x, 
th  political,  military,  diplomatic,  and 
jnomic  dimensions.  I  think  this  will 
evident  as  I  discuss  our  relation- 
ips  with  the  two  countries  in  the  re- 
)n  under  review  today — Oman  and 
?  Yemen  Arab  Republic.  These  as- 
tance  programs  support  U.S.  secu- 
y  interests  by  assuring  access  to  im- 
rtant  military  facilities,  maintaining 
ace  and  stability  at  strategic  choke- 
ints,  and  countering  Soviet 
;Tuence. 


nan  is  one  of  the  most  durable  and 
ible  friends  of  the  United  States  in 
e  Middle  East.  It  resisted  the  region- 
tide  in  the  late  1970s  and  1980s  when 


Iraq  to  Pay 
Compensation 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  28.  19891 

On  March  27,  1989,  the  United  States 
and  Iraq  reached  agreement  regarding 
compensation  for  the  37  crewmen  who 
lost  their  lives  in  the  May  17,  1987,  at- 
tack on  the  U.S.S.  Stark  in  the  Persian 
Gulf. 

The  Government  of  Iraq  has 
agreed  to  pay  over  $27  million  as  full 
compensation  for  their  deaths.  The 
agreement  was  reached  in  Baghdad  fol- 
lowing discussions  between  the  Foreign 
Ministry  of  Iraq  and  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion headed  by  State  Department  Legal 
Adviser  Abraham  D.  Sofaer,  which  in- 
cluded Capt.  John  Geer,  Chief  of  the 
U.S.  Navy  Claims  Division. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB. 
Tutwiler.  ■ 


it  supported  Egypt's  adherence  to  the 
Camp  David  accords.  The  access  agree- 
ment that  we  concluded  with  Oman  in 
1980  became  the  keystone  of  U.S.  strat- 
egy for  the  protection  of  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  it  was  critically  important  to 
U.S.  military  activities  in  the  gulf  over 
the  past  2  years.  Without  Oman's  coop- 
eration under  the  access  agreement, 
which  allows  U.S.  military  access  to 
certain  facilities  in  Oman  under  contin- 
gency conditions,  U.S.  central  com- 
mand strategy  and  operations  would 
have  been  severely  constricted. 

The  access  agreement  has  served 
both  Omani  and  U.S.  interests,  ce- 
menting a  closer  bilateral  relationship 
and  an  e.xtensive  dialogue.  Oman,  a  na- 
tion of  no  more  than  1.5  million  inhabi- 
tants, faces  serious  threats  from  its 
neighbors  and  values  greatly  the  secu- 
rity offered  by  its  relationship  with  the 
United  States.  Iran  lies  just  across  the 
Strait  of  Hormuz,  and  the  Iran-Iraq 
war  put  all  gulf  Arab  states  on  notice 
of  Iranian  ambitions.  The  Soviet- 
supported  People's  Democratic  Repub- 
lic of  Yemen  (South  Yemen)  aided  a 
Marxist  secessionist  movement  in 
Oman's  southern  region  in  the  1960s 
and  1970s,  and  skirmishes  took  place 
along  the  Oman/South  Yemen  border  as 
recentlv  as  November  1987. 


U.S.  economic  assistance  to  Oman, 
in  the  form  of  ESF,  began  with  the  ac- 
cess agreement  in  1980.  ESF  was  $20 
million  in  1985  but  dropped  in  subse- 
quent years.  Our  FY  1990  request  for 
Oman  includes  $20  million  in  ESF  and 
$100,000  in  IMET.  Oman  views  this 
economic  assistance  as  an  integral 
component  of  the  agreement  and  of  the 
relationship.  The  10-year  agreement  is 
due  for  review  in  1990,  and  economic 
assistance  will  be  an  important  compo- 
nent in  the  review  process. 

Oman  is  a  modest  oil  exporter,  and 
its  economy  is  dependent  on  the  petro- 
leum industry.  The  fall  in  oil  prices  in 
1985-86  sent  the  Omani  economy  into  a 
recession  that  has  worsened  with  every 
passing  year;  the  projected  budget  def- 
icit for  1989  is  over  $1  billion.  Our  as- 
sistance is  aimed  at  helping  Oman  to 
diversify  its  economy  and  strengthen 
commercial  links  with  the  United 
States,  with  emphasis  on  the  manage- 
ment of  fisheries  and  scarce  water 
resources. 


Yemen  Arab  Republic  (North  Yemen) 

Our  FY  1990  request  for  the  Yemen 
Arab  Republic  includes  $2  million  of 
FMS  financing  on  a  grant  basis,  $1.1 
million  for  IMET,  $5  million  in  PL  480 
food  aid,  and  $21.15  million  in  develop- 
ment assistance. 

The  Yemen  Arab  Republic  occupies 
a  strategic  location  at  the  southwest 
corner  of  the  Arabian  Peninsula,  bet- 
ween Saudi  Arabia  and  South  Yemen.  A 
stable  North  Yemen,  able  to  defend  it- 
self and  increasingly  meet  the  needs  of 
its  people,  is  important  to  peace  and 
stability  in  this  key  region  at  the  south- 
ern end  of  the  Red  Sea. 

The  relationship  between  North 
and  South  Yemen,  although  showing  re- 
cent signs  of  improvement,  remains 
fragile  and  unpredictable.  North  Ye- 
men has  been  threatened  in  the  past 
decade  by  direct  attacks  and  attempts 
at  subversion  from  the  South.  The  lead- 
ership in  Aden  continues  to  be  firmly 
tied  to  the  Soviet  Union,  which  has 
rearmed  South  Yemen  since  the  de- 
struction caused  by  the  1986  coup. 

The  Yemen  Arab  Republic  is  one  of 
the  poorest  and  least  developed  coun- 
tries in  the  Middle  East.  The  U.S.  firm 
Hunt  Oil  discovered  oil  in  1984  and 
the  country  joined  the  ranks  of  the 
petroleum-exporting  nations  in  late 
1987.  Neither  exports  nor  reserves  are 
large,  however,  and  the  government's 
income  from  oil  exports  has  not  been 


67 


NARCOTICS 


enough  to  compensate  for  continued  de- 
clines in  worl<er  remittances  and  Arab 
donor  aid.  This  situation,  combined 
with  a  large,  rapidly  growing  popula- 
tion and  serious  lack  of  infrastructure, 
means  that  the  Yemen  Arab  Republic 
will  remain  heavily  dependent  on  out- 
side assistance  as  it  works  to  improve 
the  lives  of  its  citizens  and  become  eco- 
nomically self-sufficient. 

The  U.S.  security  assistance  pro- 
gram, while  small,  supports  equipment 
previously  provided  and  offers  an  alter- 
native to  Yemeni  dependence  on  the  So- 
viets. Despite  its  size,  our  program 
enjoys  a  high  profile  within  the  Yemeni 
military,  and  U.S.  equipment  and  as- 
sistance are  frequently  compared  favor- 
ably against  Soviet  equipment  and 
assistance.  The  FMS  funds  requested 
for  FY  1990  will  be  used  to  maintain 
U.S. -origin  equipment  and  support 
the  training  needed  for  effective  opera- 
tion of  the  equipment.  The  Yemeni  Gov- 
ernment also  is  concerned  about  the 
U.S.S.R.'s  position  in  any  future  crisi.s 
involving  South  Yemen,  given  the  large 
Soviet  investment  in  its  Mar.xist  ally. 
U.S.  assistance,  complemented  by  long- 
standing cooperative  assistance  pro- 
grams with  Saudi  Arabia,  provides 
assurances  that  North  Yemen  has  other 
friends  who  will  assist  with  the  defense 
it  needs. 


'The  complete  ti-anseript  of  the  liear- 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  aiifl 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Certification  for  Narcotics  Source 
and  Transit  Countries 


Following  are  the  text  of  identical 
letters  Secretary  Baker  sent  to  Jim 
Wright.  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  Claiborne  Pell, 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  on  March  1, 
19H9,  and  statements  by  Assistant 
Secretary  for  International  Narcotics 
Matters  Ann  B.  Wrobleski  before  the 
House  of  Representatives  Task  Force 
on  Narcotics  Control  on  March  9  and 
March  15.^ 


SECRETARY'S  LETTER 

TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  1,  1989 

Attached  is  the  President's  first  Determina- 
tion [Presidential  Determination  89-11]  re- 
garding the  certification  of  major  narcotics 
source  and  transit  countries  required  by  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act.  Quite  frankly,  he 
and  I  are  both  deeply  troubled  by  the  state 
of  affairs  upon  which  he  based  his  certifica- 
tion decisions.  Despite  the  hard  work  and 
dedication  of  many  public  servants  and  pri- 
vate citizens,  both  here  and  abroad,  the  in- 
ternational war  on  narcotics  is  clearly  not 
being  won.  In  fact,  in  some  areas  we  appear 
to  be  slipping  backwards. 

Nonetheless,  we  present  you  these  cer- 
tifications in  good  faith  in  the  hope  that  we 
can  work  together  against  the  drug  menace. 
For  six  countries,  there  are  statements  that 
explain  the  certification  while  acknowledg- 
ing that  each  of  the  six  can  and  must  do 
more  in  the  future  to  end  the  drug  trade. 
For  one  country,  we  have  provided  a  justi- 
fication statement  for  a  vital  national  inter- 
est waiver  These  certification  decisions 
have  all  been  made  after  careful  delibera- 
tion recognizing  that  the  efforts  of  foreign 
governments  to  stem  the  production  and  use 
of  drugs  have  yielded  mixed  results.  While 
there  is  need  for  much  improvement,  the 
President  and  I  believe  these  certifications 
are  an  important  element  in  working  toward 
that  goal. 

As  you  know,  the  Anti-Drug  Abuse  Act 
of  1988  established  the  Office  of  National 
Drug  Control  Policy.  Bill  Bennett  has  been 
selected  by  the  President  to  become  the 
first  director  of  this  office  and  has  been 
instructed  to  pursue  aggressively  his  new 
duties  to  revitalize  our  national  anti-drug  ef- 
fort. One  of  his  first  priorities  after  con- 
firmation will  be  to  develop  a  revised 
national  drug  control  strategy.  As  that 
strategy  is  being  formulated,  we  would  like 
to  establish  a  dialogue  on  drugs  with  the 
Congress.  A  cooperative  relationship  with 
full  exchange  of  ideas  between  the  executive 
and  legislative  branches  is  the  best  way  to 
forge  an  integrated  and  cohesive  national 


strategy  that  will  ultimately  prove  effecti\ 
in  curbing  the  availability  and  use  of  drugs 
in  America. 

Finally,  I  want  to  assure  you  that  nar- 
cotics will  remain  a  key  element  of  our  for- 
eign policy  agenda.  The  President  and  I 
intend  to  raise  this  issue  with  foreign  lead 
ers  and  express  our  personal  interest  in 
their  efforts  to  reduce  the  supply  of  illicit 
drugs  bound  for  the  U.S. 

We  look  forward  to  working  with  the 
Congress  to  establish  a  sound  drug  contro 
strategy  to  remove  the  scourge  of  drugs 
from  our  nation. 

Sincerely  yours, 

James  A.  Baker,  1 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

WROBLESKI, 
MAR.  9,  1989 

The  Department  will  provide  testi- 
mony today  on  the  President's  deter 
minations  with  respect  to  certificatio 
of  Mexico  and  countries  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean. 

In  these  regions  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  President  Bush  on 
March  1  certified  Mexico,  Belize,  The 
Bahamas,  and  Jamaica.  It  must  be 
noted  that  Secretary  Baker,  in  a  spe- 
cial letter  to  the  Speaker,  qualified  t\ 
President's  certifications,  saying  that 
he  and  the  President  "are  both  deeph 
troubled  by  the  state  of  affairs  upon 
which  he  based  his  certification  deci- 
sions .  .  .  the  international  war  on  na 
cotics  is  clearly  not  being  won.  In  fad 
in  some  areas  we  appear  to  be  slippin 
backwards." 

For  six  countries,  including  Mexi 
and  The  Bahamas,  the  Secretary  sale 
".  .  .  each  of  the  six  can  and  must  do 
more  in  the  future  to  end  the  drug 
trade." 

As  we  prepare  to  discuss  these  ai 
other  countries  today,  I  want  to  call 
special  attention  to  another  part  of  th 
Secretary's  letter,  which  I  think  cann 
be  overemphasized.  Noting  the  con- 
firmation hearings  for  the  Director  oi 
National  Drug  Control  Policy  and  the 
requirement  that  the  office  develop  a 
revised  national  drug  control  strateg; 
Mr.  Baker  said  the  Administration 
would  like  to  establish  a  dialogue  on 
drugs  with  Congress — a  cooperative  i 
lationship  with  full  exchange  of  ideas 
between  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches — in  pursuit  of  an  integratec 
and  cohesive  national  strategy.  It  is 


68 


NARCOTICS 


;lii'  spirit  of  that  letter  that  I  pre- 
iii  mir  assessment  of  the  subject 
lies.  In  doing  so,  I  will  draw  upon 
tenitttioiial  Narcotics  Control 
mil  (/I/  Report  which  was  submitted 
■A)xh  i. 


CXKO 

f\R(i  remained  the  largest  single 
aiiitry  source  for  heroin,  the  second 
j-ucst  source  for  marijuana,  and  a 
luliiig  transit  point  for  cocaine.  Mexi- 
(  expanded  the  scope  of  opium  and 
luijuana  eradication  programs,  while 
tkiiig  steps  to  improve  operational 
1  i.  u'ncy.  Still  opium  poppy  and  can- 
]\n~.  cultivation  continue  at  high 
;  il>,  and  our  concern  about  the  avail- 
aliiy  of  heroin  in  such  quantities 
.-  iir_j  our  border  is  heightened  by  our 
■  iirrrns  about  opium  production  in 
,  111  licast  and  Southwest  Asia,  largely 
I  cduntries  where  we  have  little  if  any 
|litical  access.  Production  in  Burma, 
».u^,  Iran,  and  Afghanistan  threatens 
increase  U.S.  heroin  supplies,  mak- 
y  even  more  imperative  the  need  to 
effective  in  Mexico.  There  is  concern 
long  some  domestic  drug  abuse  ex- 
rts  that  heroin  popularity  will  rise  in 
i  neai'  future,  partly  as  a  result  of 
;  highly  publicized  negative  conse- 
ences  of  crack  and  increased  Asian 
oduction.  Cocaine  seizures  rose 
arply,  but  Mexico  remains  one  of  the 
)st  critical  land  links  to  South  Amer- 
.n  sources  of  supply. 

Newly  elected  President  Carlos  Sa- 
.as  de  Gortari  has  made  antinarcoties 
ograms  a  national  priority  for  his 
w  government,  and  the  Attorney 
■neral's  budget  for  1989  will  exceed 
6  million,  up  from  $19.5  million  in 
■87.  A  strong,  positive  tone  for  bilat- 
al  relations  was  set  in  an  early  meet- 
?  between  then  President-elect  Bush 
d  Mr.  Salinas,  and  the  U.S.  Govern- 
mt,  anticipating  continued  improve- 
mts  in  the  program,  is  prepared  to 
operate  with  Salinas  on  these  en- 
ncements.  However,  U.S.  officials 
e  concerned  about  the  inhibiting  ef- 
:ts  of  corruption  throughout  the  pro- 
am.  U.S.  enforcement  agencies 
ntinue  to  monitor  instances  of  drug- 
lated  corruption  within  Mexico. 

President  Bush  noted  these  prob- 
Tis  in  his  certification  statement: 

I  am  determined  to  build  upon  this  dia- 
;ue.  Me.xico  is  a  narcotics  source  country 
which  cooperative  efforts  must  succeed, 
iwever,  there  are  problems  with  the  pro- 
am.  Opium  and  heroin  availability  did  not 
minish,  and  the  estimates  which  show  a 
ight  decline  in  marijuana  production  are 


considered  soft.  Corruption  remains  a  seri- 
ous impediment  to  program  effectiveness, 
and  many  major  trafficl<ers  remain  at  large. 
Working  together,  much  more  can  be  done. 
Mexico  must  expand  and  intensify  its 
poppy  and  cannabis  eradication  programs, 
using  aerial  surveys  to  compare  pre-  and 
posteradication  totals  to  verify  the  destruc- 
tion of  crops.  An  improved  Operation  Van- 
guard should  be  resumed  next  year.  We  will 
continue  w'orking  with  the  Government  of 
IMexico  on  the  issue  of  corruption.  Mexico  is 
capable  of  improving  its  eradication  cam- 
paign and  could  achieve  the  same  successful 
results  as  they  did  in  the  1970s;  improve- 
ments must  be  made  by  increasing  aircraft 
utilization  rates  and  alleviating  current  pi- 
lot shortages.  Cocaine  interdiction  efforts 
could  also  be  improved.  Increased  funding  is 
requested  in  the  FY  1990  budget  to  cover 
costs  of  maintenance  support  for  the  Mexi- 
can eradication  fleet  and  aerial  survey 
efforts. 


Caribbean 

The  Bahamas  continues  to  be  a  major 
transit  country  for  cocaine  and  mari- 
juana entering  the  United  States  and  is 
an  important  money-laundering  center. 
Cooperation  with  U.S.  enforcement 
agencies  in  1988  is  considered  good, 
with  numerous  joint  undercover  as 
well  as  regular  operations,  including 
OPBAT,  underway.  U.S. -assisted  oper- 
ations resulted  in  the  seizure  of  more 
than  10  metric  tons  of  cocaine  and  more 
than  13  metric  tons  of  marijuana.  Fol- 
lowing the  arrest  of  several  important 
traffickers,  the  Government  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  The  Bahamas 
imposed  new  and  more  stringent  sen- 
tencing; it  is  also  more  actively  investi- 
gating corruption,  which  continues  to 
be  a  factor  affecting  operational  effec- 
tiveness. The  Bahamas  signed  an 
agreement  in  accordance  with  the 
Chiles  amendment  on  February  17, 
1989. 

President  Bush  noted  the  very  co- 
operative relationship  we  have  with  the 
Government  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
The  Bahamas  in  his  certification  state- 


Copies  of 
the  Report 


Free,  single  copies  of  the  29-page  exec- 
utive summary  of  the  International 
Narcotics  Control  Strategy  Report  of 
March  1989  are  available  from  the  Pub- 
lic Information  Division,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


ment.  "Nonetheless,"  the  President 
said,  "the  reality  is  that  too  much  co- 
caine still  passes  through  The  Bahamas. 
And,  while  the  Government  of  the  Com- 
monwealth of  The  Bahamas  is  more  ac- 
tive in  investigating  allegations  of 
corruption,  we  are  concerned  by  re- 
ports that  corruption  still  exists. 
Prime  Minister  Pindling  and  his  minis- 
ters must  forcefully  address  this  issue. 
We  also  believe  that  noteworthy  Baha- 
mian cooperation  in  joint  antinarcoties 
efforts  should  be  accompanied  by  strong- 
er unilateral  efforts  to  curb  drug  traf- 
ficking and  consumption  within  The 
Bahamas." 

Cuba  sits  amidst  some  of  the  pri- 
mary drug  routes  into  the  United 
States,  and  aircraft  and  seacraft  are 
reportedly  eluding  U.S.  agents  by  en- 
tering Cuban  territorial  waters  or  air- 
space. In  the  past,  U.S.  officials  have 
accused  Cuban  officials  of  involvement, 
and  indictments  were  returned  against 
four  ranking  officials  in  1982.  Cuban 
authorities  have  publicly  expressed  an 
interest  in  antidrug  cooperation  with 
us  but  have  not  elaborated  on  what  kind 
of  cooperation  they  envision. 

The  Dominican  Republic  has  be- 
come an  ideal  staging  area  and  refuel- 
ing stop  for  traffickers  smuggling  co- 
caine into  the  United  States.  Some 
marijuana  is  also  transshipped  by  traf- 
fickers, who  are  attracted  by  the  is- 
land's 63  airstrips.  The  government 
ranks  the  drug  problem  as  a  major  pri- 
ority and  in  1988  passed  tough  new 
antidrug  legislation  which  imposes 
mandatory  sentences.  The  very  effec- 
tive Joint  Information  Coordination 
Center,  vital  to  the  monitoring  of  drug 
traffic  through  that  part  of  the  Carib- 
bean, can  serve  as  a  model  for  other 
countries. 

Haiti  improved  its  drug  interdic- 
tion efforts  in  1988,  despite  two  coups 
and  four  governments.  The  Avril  gov- 
ernment improved  the  climate  for 
cooperation.  Seizures  increased  sub- 
stantially in  1988,  thanks  in  part  to  a 
new  Center  for  Information  and  Coor- 
dination at  Port  au  Prince  airport,  but 
the  volume  of  trafficking  remains  be- 
yond the  capability  of  the  narcotics  po- 
lice. U.S.  enforcement  agencies  are 
concerned  that  the  uncertain  situation 
in  Haiti  and  lack  of  strong  control  by 
the  central  government  have  led  to  the 
increasing  use  of  Haitian  waters  and 
Haitian-registered  vessels  for  the 
transshipment  of  cocaine.  Although 
corruption  remains  a  problem,  the 
Avril  government  did  remove  from 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


69 


NARCOTICS 


service  a  number  of  military  officers 
suspected  of  involvement. 

Jamaica  has  reduced  marijuana 
production  dramatically,  from  a  high  of 
1,755  metric  tons  in  1986  to  405  metric 
tons  in  1988.  The  island  is  also  a  transit 
point  for  cocaine;  traffickers  are  now 
paying  for  services  in  kind,  increasing 
the  amount  of  cocaine  available  for  Ja- 
maican consumption.  Money  laundering 
does  not  appear  to  be  a  major  problem, 
with  most  drug  proceeds  being  laun- 
dered elsewhere.  Cooperation  with 
U.S.  authorities  remains  quite  good  on 
the  vigorous  eradication  campaign,  as 
well  as  interdiction  and  investigations. 
Seizures  dropped  below  1987  levels,  but 
a  number  of  improvements,  including 
new  procedures  and  expanded  training, 
are  in  place  for  1989  to  enhance  the  en- 
forcement effort.  Heavy  fines  have 
been  levied  by  U.S.  Customs  on  air- 
lines and  shipping  firms  whose  vessels 
have  been  used  to  smuggle  narcotics 
out  of  Jamaica. 

Jamaica  has  kept  down  marijuana 
production  and  should  continue  to  do  so 
through  repeated  eradication  cam- 
paigns. The  U.S.  Government  looks 
forward  to  working  with  the  govern- 
ment of  newly  elected  Prime  Minister 
Michael  Manley,  building  on  recent 
progress  in  eradication  and  enforce- 
ment. Trafficking  networks  must  be 
dismantled  and  traffickers  brought  to 
justice.  Jamaica  also  needs  to  launch  a 
comprehensive  drug  prevention  pro- 
gram aimed  at  preventing  an  increase 
in  cocaine  abuse.  Aerial  eradication  is  a 
priority  for  FY  1990,  and  funds  will  be 
used  to  provide  aircraft  support  for 
eradication  and  interdiction,  maxi- 
mizing the  efficiency  of  Jamaica's 
programs. 

Central  America 

Belize  is  no  longer  a  major  source 
country  for  cannabis,  now  producing 
only  120  metric  tons  a  year,  thanks  to  a 
successful  U.S. -assisted  aerial  eradica- 
tion program.  However,  it  is  becoming 
an  increasingly  important  transit  coun- 
try for  cocaine  from  South  America 
and  marijuana  from  Guatemala.  Law 
enforcement  resources  are  limited,  but 
enforcement  capabilities  are  improv- 
ing. Money  laundering  is  not  a  factor. 

Costa  Rica  is  increasingly  impor- 
tant as  a  cocaine  transit  country,  with 
estimates  that  6-12  metric  tons  of  co- 
caine are  being  transported  through  its 
territory  by  air  and  sea.  Authorities 
remain  vigilant  to  the  possibility  of 
labs  being  established,  but  no  new  labs 


were  found  in  the  last  2  years.  Can- 
nabis cultivation  appears  to  be  less  ex- 
tensive than  previously  estimated,  and 
the  export  trade  is  a  minor  enterprise. 
Costa  Rica  is  not  a  major  money- 
laundering  center,  although  a  highly 
publicized  money-laundering  trial  has 
focused  attention  on  the  issue. 

Guatemala  increased  in  impor- 
tance to  the  U.S.  drug  situation  as  ma- 
jor amounts  of  opium  and  marijuana 
were  produced  during  the  past  year. 
U.S.  officials  estimate  that  as  much  as 
150  kilograms  of  heroin  are  smuggled 
into  the  United  States,  probably  under 
the  control  of  Mexican  traffickers.  Gua- 
temala is  also  important  to  the  cocaine 
trade,  serving  as  a  transit  point  for 
narcotics  headed  for  Florida,  Louisi- 
ana, and  Texas  and  for  precursor  chem- 
icals destined  for  South  America. 
Guatemala  has  conducted  effective 
eradication  efforts  and  cooperates  with 
U.S.  officials  on  a  chemical  tracking 
program  and  interdiction  efforts. 
Money  laundering  is  not  a  major  factor. 

Honduras  is  a  transshipment  point 
for  Colombian  cocaine.  The  key  event  of 
1988  was  the  arrest  and  expulsion  of 
Matta  Ballesteros,  a  major  Honduran 
trafficker  with  Colombian  connections; 
he  is  now  imprisoned  in  the  United 
States.  Honduras  signed  a  bilateral  an- 
tinarcotics  agreement  with  the  United 
States  last  November,  accenting  the  co- 
operation evident  in  the  opening  of  a 
permanent  Drug  Enforcement  Admin- 
istration (DEA)  office  last  May  and  in 
cooperation  on  seizures  and  investiga- 
tions. While  there  have  not  been  the 
dramatic  seizures  that  occurred  in 
1987,  U.S.  and  Honduran  authorities 
collaborated  on  a  seizure  of  453  kilo- 
grams last  August.  There  was  also  co- 
operation on  operations  at  sea  with  the 
U.S.  Coast  Guard. 

Nicaragua  continues  to  be  men- 
tioned by  informants  and  traffickers  as 
a  cocaine  transit  point.  In  1986  there 
were  accusations  that  top  government 
officials  engaged  in  trafficking. 
Nicaragua  is  now  cooperating  with 
Costa  Rica  on  drug  matters  but  not 
with  U.S.  enforcement  agencies. 

Panama  was  denied  certification 
in  1988  following  the  indictments  of 
General  Noriega  by  two  U.S.  grand 
juries  on  charges  of  narcotics  traffick- 
ing. Despite  being  fired  by  the  lawful 
President  of  Panama  in  1988,  Noriega 
illegally  remains  in  control  of  the  Pan- 
amanian Defense  Forces.  Panama 
continues  to  be  a  principal  money- 
laundering  center  for  the  South  Ameri- 


can cocaine  trade  and  a  transit  site  io 
cocaine  and  precursor  chemical  ship- 
ments. Noriega's  defiance  of  Presiden 
Delvalle  and  continued  control  of  Pan-, 
ama's  police  forces  prevents  President 
Delvalle  from  effectively  implementir 
his  policy  of  full  cooperation  with  the 
United  States.  While  some  minimal  c 
operation  continues  between  Noriega 
and  the  DEA  on  a  limited  number  of 
enforcement  matters,  cooperation  on 
money  laundering  has  bogged  down 
since  Noriega's  indictment.  President 
Delvalle's  government  continues  to  al 
low  boarding  of  Panamanian  flag  ves- 
sels by  U.S.  narcotics  officials.  U.S. 
prohibition  on  aid  to  the  Noriega-Soli 
regime  continues. 

In  sum  these  countries  are  of  vit; 
interest  to  our  narcotics  control  strat 
egy,  not  only  because  of  the  critical 
impact  that  production  and  traffick- 
ing from  countries  like  Mexico,  The 
Bahamas,  and  Jamaica  are  having  on 
our  current  situation  but  because  oft 
potential  for  increased  production  an 
trafficking  through  the  myriad  coun- 
tries that  lie  along  the  cocaine  trail  t( 
South  America. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

WROBLESKI, 
MAR.  15,  1989 

The  Task  Force  on  International  Nar 
cotics  Control  has  asked  the  Depart- 
ment to  provide  testimony  today  on 
Southeast  Asia  and  Pacific  nations. 
This  region  includes  three  countries 
which  are  major  factors  in  the  produi 
tion  and  refining  of  opium  and  heroir 
Burma,  Laos,  and  Thailand — as  well 
key  transit  countries. 

Two  countries — Burma  and  Laos 
were  denied  certification  by  Presi- 
dent Bush  on  March  1.  Burma's  once- 
promising  aerial  eradication  effort  h; 
been  grounded;  no  eradication  effort 
has  been  made  in  1989  and  prospects 
are  for  expanded  cultivation  of  what  i 
already  the  world's  largest  supply  of  i 
licit  opium.  There  continue  to  be  re- 
ports implicating  officials  of  the  Lao 
Government  in  narcotics  production 
and  trafficking.  The  President  certi- 
fied Thailand,  which  continues  to  be 
successful  in  suppressing  opium  culti 
vation;  Hong  Kong,  a  major  financial 
center  for  the  Golden  Triangle  heroin 
trade  which  cooperates  closely  with 
U.S.  law  enforcement  agencies;  and 
Malaysia,  which  has  a  strong  record  ^ 
cooperation  in  efforts  to  curb  heroin 
trafficking. 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  19 


NARCOTICS 


With  respect  to  denial  ofcertifica- 
on,  let  me  note  that  aid  is  not  a  factor 

!  Syria,  Iran,  and  Laos  or  with  the 
overnment  of  Afghanistan;  aid  had 
>en  previously  suspended  to  Burma 
id  Panama.  Laos  is  reportedly  seek- 
g  a  loan  through  the  Asian  Develop- 
ent  Bank,  which  will  have  to  be 
iposed,  as  would  loans  sought  by  any 
untry  denied  certification.  We  do 
ive  a  continuing  interest  in  prisoner- 
-war/missing-in-action  (POW/MIA) 
vestigations  with  Laos,  which  was 
e  basis  for  the  previous  national  in- 
rest  certification.  However,  we  felt 
at  the  information  we  had  concerning 
ficial  involvement  in  drug  trafficking 
IS  compelling,  given  the  require- 
ents  under  Section  2013(b).  Trade 
nctions  are  discretionary  to  the 
■esident,  and  no  recommendations — 
firmative  or  negative — are  made  on 
ade  sanctions  for  the  six  countries  de- 
ed certification. 

The  following  regional  and  country 
mmaries  are  drawn  from  the  1989  lu- 
•national  Narcotics  Control  Strategy 
■port. 

igional  Summary 

le  civil  turmoil  in  Burma  has  re- 
Ited  in  the  suspension  of  the  Socialist 
■public  of  the  Union  of  Burma's  an- 
al aerial  o])ium  eradication  program, 
tween  .January  and  March  1988, 
irma  reported  eliminating  over 
,000  hectares  of  opium.  But  at  year's 
d,  it  was  estimated  that  Burmese 
oduction  of  opium  was  up  in  absolute 
•ms.  There  is  no  immediate  prospect 
It  the  aerial  eradication  campaign 
11  be  resumed  in  time  to  be  effective 
ainst  the  1989  cro]3.  Indeed  the  dis- 
rbances  will  most  likely  result  in  un- 
scked  o])ium  jjroduction  in  Burma. 
There  have  been  some  narcotics 
itrol  activities  undei'taken  in  Laos, 
the  summer  of  1988,  the  Lao  Govern- 
nt  raided  two  refineries  in  Oudomsai 
ovince  and  later  tried  48  traffickers 
tted  in  the  raid;  among  those  con- 
.'ted  was  the  governor  of  the  prov- 
e,  a  central  committee  member.  A 
;h-level  delegation  of  U.S.  Govern- 
nt  officials  traveled  to  Vientiane  in 
rly  1989  to  discuss  a  number  of  is- 
es,  including  narcotics  control.  Lao 
'icials  assured  the  U.S.  represen- 
Jves  that  they  had  begun  to  address 
!ir  opium  problem,  as  evidenced  by 
'ir  agreement  with  the  UN  Fund  for 
ug  Abu.se  Control  (UNFDAC)  to 
onsor  a  .$5.8  million  rui'al  integrated 
ot  program  in  an  opium-growing  re- 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


gion  in  northern  Vientiane  Province. 
This  project  is  scheduled  to  get  under- 
way before  July.  For  the  first  time,  Lao 
officials  accepted,  in  principle,  previ- 
ous offers  of  bilateral  U.S.  narcotics 
control  assistance. 

However,  there  has  been  no  reduc- 
tion in  opium  production  in  Laos,  and 
there  continues  to  be  information  about 
the  e.xtensive  involvement  of  Lao  mili- 
tary and  civilian  officials  in  the  narcot- 
ics trade. 

Thailand  was  successful  in  ensur- 
ing that  opium  production  did  not  in- 
crease during  1988.  But,  given  the 
demand  for  opium  among  the  indige- 
nous hill  tribe  addict  population,  it  is 
possible  that  no  further  reductions  will 
be  made  in  the  coming  years  in  the  es- 
timated 28  metric  tons  of  opium  pro- 
duced in  Thailand;  there  is  difficulty 
also  in  eradicating  the  remaining 
opium  poppy,  which  is  grown  increas- 
ingly in  small,  inaccessible  plots. 

Heroin  trafficking  remains  a  seri- 
ous problem  in  Southeast  Asia,  partic- 
ularly in  Thailand  where  an  excellent 
communications  infrastructure  pro- 
vides traffickers  good  access  to  inter- 
national markets.  There  is  evidence 
that  heroin  is  transported  through 
Vietnam,  notably  through  the  port  of 
Da  Nang.  During  1988,  heroin  seizures 
in  Thailand  doubled  over  the  previous 
year's  totals,  and  10  heroin  refineries 
were  immobilized. 

Country  Summaries 

Burma's  political  turmoil  has  grounded 
its  large-scale  aerial  eradication  pro- 
gram most  probably  until  a  government 
enjoying  greater  credibility  and  sup- 
port among  the  Burmese  people  than 
the  current  military  regime  is  seated 
in  Rangoon.  Traffickers  capitalized  on 
diminished  enfoi-cement  efforts  to 
smuggle  large  quantities  of  opium  and 
heroin  with  little  interference.  The 
prospect  for  1989  is  grim;  given  highly 
favorable  climatic  conditions  and  the 
suspension  of  programs  to  destroy 
crops  or  seize  shipments  of  drugs  or 
precursor  chemicals  from  China,  Thai- 
land, and  India,  traffickers  may  har- 
vest and  move  as  much  as  1,400  metric 
tons  of  opium  to  heroin  refiners  in 
Southeast  Asia.  Money  laundering  is 
not  a  factor. 

The  People's  Republic  of  China 

does  not  produce  significant  amounts  of 
illicit  narcotics.  But  U.S.  officials  are 
increasingly  concerned  about  the  trans- 
shipment of  Golden  Triangle  heroin 
through  southern  China  to  Hong  Kong 


and  ti'affic  in  precursor  chemicals  into 
the  triangle.  The  Chinese  Government 
is  responsive  to  these  developments, 
ironically  resulting  from  its  own 
"openness  policy"  and  is  particularly 
concerned  about  indications  of  rees- 
tablished "Triad"  influence  in  southern 
China.  A  new  law  controlling  precursor 
chemicals  was  enacted  in  December 
1988  as  part  of  a  reinvigorated  enforce- 
ment effort.  China  sent  police  officials 
to  the  United  States  to  give  evidence  in 
the  "Goldfish"  heroin  case. 

Hong  Kong  is  both  the  financial 
and  money-laundering  center  of  the  Far 
East  narcotics  trade  and  an  important 
transit  center  for  Golden  Triangle  her- 
oin destined  for  Australia,  Canada,  the 
United  States,  and  Europe.  Hong  Kong 
police,  who  made  record  heroin  sei- 
zures and  arrested  a  number  of  key 
traffickers  in  1988,  believe  that  as 
much  as  half  the  heroin  seized  came 
overland  through  China.  A  high  degree 
of  cooperation  exists  with  U.S.  offi- 
cials. Hong  Kong  is  moving  forward 
with  legislation  enabling  the  courts  to 
trace,  freeze,  and  seize  proceeds  of 
drug  trafficking  and  is  considering  a 
U.S. -proposed  mutual  legal  assistance 
agreement. 

Indonesia  is  a  transit  site  for  her- 
oin, opium,  hashish,  and  precursor 
chemicals.  Heroin  is  exported  to  Aus- 
tralia, New  Zealand,  and  Western 
Europe;  the  amounts  reaching  U.S. 
markets  are  not  considered  significant. 
New  interest  focuses  on  Bali.  West  Eu- 
ropeans are  heavily  involved  in  the  in- 
creasing traffic  from  this  major  resort 
area,  which  is  augmented  by  the  high 
number  of  international  flights.  Money 
laundering  is  not  a  factor. 

Laos  is  the  only  country  to  date  for 
which  the  extensive  involvement  of  mil- 
itary and  government  officials  has  led 
to  accusations  that  the  government  is 
facilitating  narcotics  trafficking  dur- 
ing the  corruption  review  required  by 
Section  2013,  PL  99-570.  The  Lao  Gov- 
ernment has  made  repeated  efforts  in 
the  past  year  to  convince  U.S.  officials 
of  its  intention  to  curb  illicit  narcotics 
production  and  trafficking.  However, 
U.S.  officials  believe  that  opium  pro- 
duction continues  to  expand  and  could 
be  approaching  the  300-metric-ton 
mark  and  that  heroin  refining  contin- 
ues. Laos  is  exporting  heroin  and  mari- 
juana through  'Thailand,  Vietnam,  and 
China.  The  government  has  welcomed 
U.S.  consultations  on  narcotics  and  a 
UN  narcotics-related  crop  substitution 
program. 


71 


REFUGEES 


Malaysia  is  an  important  heroin 
conversion  and  transit  center,  export- 
ing primarily  to  Europe  and  Australia. 
Plagued  by  drug  abuse  among  its  own 
population  and  concerned  by  the  domi- 
nance of  criminal  elements  in  the 
trade,  Malaysia  considers  drug  traffick- 
ing a  national  security  problem  and  has 
the  death  penalty  for  traffickers.  A 
strong  domestic  enforcement  program 
which  drove  heroin  seizures  up  by  li)09c 
in  1988  seems  to  have  reduced  drug 
availability,  and  a  new  property  forfei- 
ture act  provides  a  vital  new  weapon. 
But  the  e.xpected  bounty  of  opium  com- 
ing from  the  Golden  Triangle  in  1989 
will  put  the  capability  of  the  country's 
forces  to  a  test. 

The  Philippines  exports  locally 
grown  and  Thai  marijuana  and  is  also  a 
transit  point  for  Golden  Triangle  heroin 
and  South  American  cocaine  smuggled 
into  Guam,  Australia,  Europe,  and  the 
United  States.  Foreigners  are  still 
principals  in  the  trade,  but  Filipino 
groups  have  also  emerged.  Filipino  po- 
lice conducted  more  than  1,000  narcot- 
ics raids  in  1988  and  made  important 
seizures  and  arrests,  but  the  enforce- 
ment effort,  which  the  United  States 
assists,  is  hampered  by  budget  and 
structural  restraints. 

Singapore,  which  is  a  transship- 
ment point  for  Southeast  Asian  heroin 
and  has  high  potential  for  money  laun- 
dering, cooperates  with  U.S.  officials 
in  monitoring  and  intercepting  inter- 
national drug  traffic.  Singapore  offi- 
cials are  especially  worried  about 
domestic  drug  use. 

Thailand  has  reduced  opium  culti- 
vation to  about  28  metric  tons  but  re- 
mains significant  as  a  refiner  of  heroin 
and  conduit  for  opium/heroin  from 
other  sources  in  the  Golden  Triangle. 
High  quality  Thai  marijuana  is  export- 
ed to  the  United  States  and  other  mar- 
kets, and  there  is  also  an  active  trade 
in  precursor  chemicals.  The  Royal  Thai 
Government  counters  these  activities 
with  a  vigorous  enforcement  program 
that  doubled  heroin  seizures  in  1988, 
while  also  seizing  increased  amounts  of 
opium,  morphine,  and  marijuana.  Thai- 
land is  also  an  important  money-flow 
country. 


FY  1990  Assistance  Request 
for  Refugee  Programs 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  uf 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Jonathan  Moore 

Stateiueiit  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  -^2. 
1989.  Ambassador  Moore  is  Director  of 
the  Bureau  for  Refugee  Progra  ins^ 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to  pre- 
sent the  Department  of  State's  FY  1990 
request  for  migration  and  refugee 
assistance,  the  emergency  refugee  mi- 
gration and  assistance,  and  the  De- 
partment's authorization  bill. 

The  Department  of  State  is  re- 
questing authorization  for  $370  million 
for  the  migration  and  refugee  assist- 
ance appropriation  for  FY  1990.  We 
are  requesting  $10  million  for  the 
emergency  refugee  and  migration 
assist- 
ance appropriation  account. 

The  U.S.  refugee  program  is  an  es- 
sential expression  of  the  U.S.  commit- 
ment to  humanitarian  principles  as  well 
as  a  means  of  supporting  other  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives.  Our  abiding, 
bipartisan,  international  commitment 
of  assistance  to  refugees  and  ubiqui- 
tous diplomatic  advocacy  on  their  be- 
half projects  our  highest  ideals  through- 
out the  world  and  pursues  the  stability, 
which  is  in  our  national  interest, 
through  the  alleviation  of  persecution, 
violence,  and  poverty  which  breed  refu- 
gees. Through  our  programs,  the  De- 
partment allows  for  the  admission  and 
resettlement  of  refugees  who  are  of  the 
greatest  concern  to  the  United  States 
and  provides  assistance  to  1.3  million 
refugees  worldwide  for  life-sustaining 
support,  primarily  through  contribu- 
tions to  multilateral  organizations. 

The  refugee  program  is  facing 
great  challenges  and  opportunities  this 
year  On  the  one  hand,  program  needs 
for  admissions  and  assistance  are  at 
their  greatest  levels  in  recent  years — a 
challenge,  indeed,  at  a  time  when  the 
Administration  and  the  Congress  are 
focusing  on  limiting  government  ex- 
penditures. On  the  other  hand,  many  of 
these  needs  have  arisen  as  a  direct  con- 
sequence of  our  foreign  policy  successes 
and  offer  the  opportunity  to  begin  to 
resolve  longstanding  problems  that 
have  faced  the  international  community 
for  some  time.  The  FY  1990  migration 
and  refugee  assistance  request  reflects 
the  concern  for  balancing  the  need  to 


address  humanitarian  and  other  for- 
eign policy  objectives  with  the  need  t 
restrain  spending. 

Admissions  Program 

The  Department  is  requesting  $156.5 
million  for  refugee  admissions,  which 
is  estimated  to  support  admissions  oi 
about  84,000  refugee.s — the  same  leve 
of  admissions  funiled  in  the  FY  1989 
appropriation.  The  actual  admissions 
ceilings  for  FY  1990  will  be  deter- 
mined by  the  President  in  the  late  su 
mer  after  consultations  with  the 
Judiciary  Committees,  as  required  b 
the  Refugee  Act  of  1980. 

There  have  been  significant  rece 
developments  which  impact  the  admi 
sions  programs.  The  most  dramatic  ( 
velopment  is  the  continuing  increase 
the  number  of  Soviets  receiving  per- 
mission to  leave  the  Soviet  Union  an( 
applying  for  refugee  admission  to  thi 
United  States,  both  in  Moscow  and  i: 
Western  Europe.  New,  overdue,  and 
most  welcome  policies  of  liberalized  t 
igration  and  I'elaxation  of  prohibitioi 
against  departure  from  communist 
countries  challenge  us  to  review  our 
admissions  policies  in  the  context  of 
tremendous  resource  implications  th 
now  carry. 

In  the  past  few  months,  the  leve 
of  Soviet  applications  have  greatly  si 
passed  previous  estimates,  resulting 
severe  pressure  on  available  resourc 
The  Department  currently  has  FY  1 
funding  for  19,000  Soviet  admission: 
(with  funding  for  East  European/ 
Soviet  admissions  at  a  total  of  25,50(' 
The  FY  1990  budget  estimates  admi 
sions  of  22,500  East  Europeans  and 
Soviets. 

The  President  has  just  announcf 
the  Administration's  intent  to  reque 
supplemental  appropriations  to  the 
Congress  of  $100  million  for  the  mig 
tion  and  refugee  assistance  appropr 
tion  for  FY  1989.  The  primary  goal  i 
to  address  the  need  for  additional  re 
sources  for  Soviet  refugee  admissioi 
although  we  are  also  requesting  som 
funds  for  admissions  of  refugees  fro 
other  regions  and  for  certain  high  pi 
ority  refugee  assistance  needs.  The 
De])artment  is  reviewing  our  policie 
examining  alternatives  which  might 
implemented  by  FY  1990,  and  reeval 


il 


72 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/Mav  1    to 


(t! 


REFUGEES 


ing  resource  requirements  to  manage 
e  program  over  the  long  term. 

For  East  Asia,  the  FY  1990  budget 
ovides  for  a  total  of  49,500  admis- 
)ns:  25,000  from  first -asylum  coun- 
ies  and  24,500  under  the  orderly 
parture  program  from  Vietnam,  in- 
iding  13,000  Amerasians  and  their 
mily  members.  I  remain  hopeful  that 
e  Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam  will 
sume  negotiations  on  unrestricted  ac- 
ss  to  resettlement  programs  by  for- 
sr  reeducation  center  detainees  and 
eir  families  in  the  near  future. 

The  request  assumes  that  levels  of 
missions  from  the  Near  East/South 
5ia  ((3,500),  the  Western  Hemisphere 
,000),  and  Africa  (2,000)  will  be  about 
e  same  as  the  FY  1989  consultations 
.■els. 

isistance  Programs 

18  Department  is  requesting  $173.4 
llion  for  refugee  assistance  pro- 
ams,  an  increase  of  about  $1.9  mil- 
■n  from  the  FY  1989  level.  This 
quest  includes  $25.5  million  for  East 
;ia.  $58.2  million  for  Africa,  $80.3 
llion  for  the  Near  East/South  Asia, 
d  $11.2  million  for  the  Western 
miisphere.  Most  of  our  contributions 
e  channeled  through  international  or- 
nizations,  including  the  UN  High 
immissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR), 
?  International  Committee  of  the  Red 
•OSS  (ICRC),  the  UN  Relief  and 
jrks  Agency  (UNRWA)  for  Palestine 
;fugees  in  the  Near  East,  and  the  UN 
irder  Relief  Organization  (UNBRO) 
•  Khmer  on  the  Thai-Cambodian  bor- 
r.  The  Department  also  supports  ac- 
ities  of  private  voluntary 
ganizations. 

Our  assistance  program  must  deal 
th  two  problems:  the  pressure  to 
ep  e.\i:>enditui'es  down  in  the  face  of 
vere  increases  in  humanitarian  needs 
le  U.S.  percentage  of  support  to  such 
-iltilateral  organizations  as  UNHCR 
d  the  ICRC  has  slipped  over  the  last 
/ears  significantly  below  traditional 
.'elsl  and  the  tendency  of  the  admis- 
)ns  program  to  eat  up  a  larger  por- 
)n  of  the  overall  migration  and 
fugee  assistance  account  (in  FY  1984 
ughly  70%  of  this  budget  went  to  as- 
^tance  and  in  FY  1990  roughlv  57% 
41). 

A  number  of  developments  in  re- 
onal  refugee  assistance  programs  are 
iteworthy. 

Concerning  East  Asia,  there  will 
an  international  conference  on  In- 
ichinese  refugees  this  summer  in  Ge- 


neva. I  have  just  returned  from  the 
preparatory  meeting  for  this  confer- 
ence held  in  Kuala  Lumpur.  The  goal  of 
these  efforts  is  to  develop  a  comprehen- 
sive and  revitalized  approach  to  deal 
with  Indochinese  refugees,  spurred  by 
the  largest  outflow  of  Vietnamese  boat 
refugees  since  the  early  1980s.  Strong 
progress,  with  U.S.  leadership,  was  ac- 
complished at  Kuala  Lumpur  toward 
acceptance  of  an  integrated,  mutually 
reinforcing  strategy  of  balanced  na- 
tional commitments.  Its  components  in- 
clude the  preservation  of  first-asylum 
(our  foremost  concern),  screening  pro- 
cedures to  determine  refugee  status, 
assurances  of  third-country  resettle- 
ment, plans  for  repatriation  of  the 
country  of  origin,  and  strengthened 
regular  departure  programs  from 
Vietnam.  Its  commitments  will  be  un- 
dertaken together  by  source  countries 
such  as  Vietnam,  by  countries  of  refuge 
such  as  Thailand  and  Malaysia,  and  by 
resettlement  and  donor  countries  such 
as  the  United  States,  Canada,  Austra- 
lia, and  Japan.  Along  with  new  struc- 
tures and  procedures  to  address  the 
Indochinese  refugee  program,  a  suc- 
cessful Geneva  conference  will  carry- 
new  resource  implications.  In  addition 
movement  toward  an  agreement  on 
Cambodia  could  require  the  initiation 
of  programs  to  repatriate  the  300,000 
Khmer  in  Thailand. 

In  Africa  we  are  heartened  by  our 
major  foreign  policy  success  in  south- 
ern Africa  that  promises  to  lead  to  re- 
patriation of  Namibian  refugees  and 
independence.  We  hope  that  will  create 
a  climate  for  resolution  of  other  refugee 
problems  in  southern  Africa.  At  the 
same  time,  we  are  preoccupied  with  the 
growing  numbers  of  refugees  and  dis- 
placed persons  and  with  the  seeming 
intransigence  of  the  conflicts  that  gen- 
erate these  refugee  situations.  The 
number  of  African  refugees  has 
reached  4  million,  up  from  3  million 
last  year.  The  ICRC  is  providing  relief 
to  as  many  as  1  million  displaced 
persons. 

In  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia, 
we  are  concerned  with  two  major  is- 
sues. First,  the  Afghan  refugee  popula- 
tion remains  the  largest  single  refugee 
group — more  than  3  million  persons  in 
Pakistan  and  2  million  in  Iran.  Owing 
to  the  successful  conclusion  of  an 
agreement  on  the  Afghan  conflict  and 
the  Soviet  withdrawal,  the  United 
States  hopes  that  the  political  and  mili- 
tary conditions  in  Afghanistan  will  so 
improve  as  to  allow  the  repatriation  of 
refugees  in  time,  although  in  the  imme- 


diate term,  refugees  are  still  arriving 
in  Pakistan.  Second,  UNRWA,  which 
provides  assistance  primarily  through 
education  and  medical  programs  for 
Palestinian  refugees  in  the  Middle 
East,  has  increased  program  needs  in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  partic- 
ularly for  emergency  medical  care 
needed  because  of  the  Palestinian  up- 
rising and  the  Israeli  response. 

In  Central  America,  there  is  an  in- 
flux of  Nicaraguans  into  other  coun- 
tries in  the  region.  There  will  be  an 
international  refugee  conference  in 
May  to  address  Central  American  refu- 
gee needs. 

Emergency  F\ind 

The  President  recently  responded  to 
several  increased,  unforeseen  assist- 
ance needs  by  authorizing  the  use  of 
$17.5  million  from  the  emergency  fund. 
This  drawdown  included  $5  million  for 
the  UNHCR  appeal  for  funds  to  re- 
patriate refugees  to  Namibia,  $5  mil- 
lion for  the  ICRC  appeal  for  the  Horn 
of  Africa,  $5  million  for  the  ICRC  ap- 
peal for  Afghan  conflict  victims,  and 
$2.5  million  for  the  UN  Special  Coor- 
dinator for  Afghanistan.  A  sum  of  $23 
million  in  the  fund  is  available  only  for 
other  Afghan  needs  through  a  program 
of  the  Agency  for  International  Devel- 
opment (AID).  A  balance  of  $12.6  mil- 
lion is  available  for  other  refugee 
needs. 

Other  Activities 

The  Department  is  also  requesting 
$30.3  million  for  other  activities.  Of 
the  total,  we  are  requesting  $20  million 
for  the  refugees  to  Israel  program  for 
FY  1990.  The  remaining  $10.3  million 
includes  a  contribution  to  the  head- 
quarters budget  of  the  ICRC  and  the 
assessed  and  voluntary  contributions  to 
the  Intergovernmental  Committee  for 
Migration. 

The  Department  is  requesting  $8 
million  for  the  administrative  expenses 
of  the  Bureau  of  Refugee  Programs. 
This  includes  funding  for  107  perma- 
nent positions. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


73 


TERRORISM 


Terrorism:  Its  Evolving  Nature 


by  L.  Paul  Bremer.  Ill 

Statement  before  the  House  For- 
eign Affairs  Committee  on  Februarij  9, 
19S9.  Ambassador  Bremer  is  Ambas- 
sador at  Large  for  Counter-Terrorism.'^ 

The  callous  destruction  of  Pan  Am 
Flight  103  on  December  21,  1988,  was  a 
terrible  international  tragedy.  The  vic- 
tims were  not  only  the  passengers  and 
crew  on  the  plane  and  the  villagers  in 
Lockerbie  [Scotland]  but  also  their  rel- 
atives, friends,  and  all  those  who  were 
touched  by  this  horrible  act.  We  deeply 
regret  the  loss  families  and  friends  of 
those  on  Pan  Am  103  have  suffered,  and 
we  share  their  anguish.  And  we  share 
the  pain  of  the  people  of  Lockerbie  who 
also  lost  friends  and  relatives. 

We  are  determined  to  do  every- 
thing in  our  power  to  see  that  this 
cowardly,  senseless  act  will  not  go 
unpunished.  We  are  committed  to 
bringing  the  jjerpetrators  to  justice. 
Working  with  the  British  and  other 
governments,  we  will  follow  every  lead 
until  we  have  answers.  It  may  take 
time — there  are  not  always  quick  an- 
swers in  these  cases — but  I  am  confi- 
dent that  by  using  all  of  our  resources, 
we  will  succeed  in  locating  the  mur- 
derers. Then  we  will  exert  all  effoi'ts 
to  bring  them  to  justice. 

Right  now  investigators  fi'om  the 
FBI  [Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation] 
are  in  Lockerbie,  in  London,  in  Frank- 
furt, and  elsewhere  working  closely 
with  their  counterparts.  We  have  estab- 
lished a  task  force  within  the  intel- 
ligence community  to  mobilize  our  as- 
sets worldwide  to  gather  information  on 
potential  suspects.  We  have  approached 
dozens  of  other  governments  through 
intelligence  and  diplomatic  channels  for 
their  assistance. 

Because  the  case  is  under  investi- 
gation, and  hopefully  will  eventually 
lead  to  trial,  I  am  sure  you  will  under- 
stand that  I  am  not  able  to  discuss  the 
details  of  the  investigation  itself.  How- 
ever, I  am  optimistic  that  in  the  end, 
we  will  succeed. 

In  your  February  3  letter  of  invita- 
tion to  appear  before  the  committee, 
you  asked  me  to  address  a  variety  of 
topics.  Some  of  these,  including  the  ad- 
equacy of  the  Foreign  Airport  Security 
Act,  an  overall  evaluation  of  the  re- 
quired foreign  airport  security  as- 


74 


sessments,  and  several  others  can  be 
addi'essed  more  authoritatively  by  my 
colleagues  from  the  F^AA  [Federal  Avia- 
tion Administration].  Consequently,  I 
defer-  to  them  on  these  matters. 

However,  three  of  the  topics  raised 
in  your  letter  are  directly  relevant  to 
my  area  of  responsibility,  and  I  would 
like  to  respond  to  them.  They  include: 

•  An  assessment  of  the  current 
international  terrorism  threat  to  U.S. 
interests  and  civilians; 

•  An  overview  and  status  of  the 
U.S.  Government's  counterterrorism 
policy:  and 

•  The  extent  of  international  coop- 
eration with  the  U.S.  Government  on 
practical  antiterrorism  measures. 


The  Terrorist  Threat 

Let  us  begin  with  the  threat  which  ter- 
rorism poses  to  U.S.  interests  today. 

Our  preliminary  analysis  of  the 
data  for  1988  indicates  that  there  were 
almost  900  international  terrorist 
incidents  last  year,  a  new  record. 
Terrorism  clearly  remains  a  major 
international  problem. 

The  international  nature  of  the  ter- 
rorist threat  is  poignantly  highlighted 
by  the  passenger  list  from  Pan  Am  103. 
Citizens  of  almost  20  nations  died  as  a 
result  of  this  single  tragic  event.  Over- 
all, international  terrorism  claimed  the 
lives  of  almost  400  people  last  year. 

In  dealing  with  international  ter- 
rorism, we  must — and  do — constantly 
evaluate  the  nature  of  the  threat,  which 
changes  markedly  over  time.  As  we 
take  steps  to  reduce  our  vulnerability 
to  terrorist  attack,  terrorists  continue 
to  try  to  find  new  "weak  links"  in  the 
security  chain  which  they  can  exploit. 
There  are  no  quick  fixes  in  this  business. 

For  example,  as  the  committee  is 
aware,  the  international  aviation  com- 
munity has  made  considerable  progress 
in  making  it  more  difficult  for  hijackers 
to  introduce  weapons  into  the  cabin  of 
an  aircraft.  The  tightened  security  and 
inspection  procedures  envisioned  by  the 
Foreign  Airport  Security  Act  of  1985, 
which  your  committee  helped  initiate, 
played  a  useful  role  in  this  security 
effort.  As  a  result,  there  has  been  a 
significant  drop  in  the  number  of  hi- 
jackings. In  1986  and  1987,  there  was  a 
total  of  three  hijackings  worldwide. 


But  while  hijackings  are  down,  :i 
craft  sabotage  is  up.  In  1986  and  19^^ 
there  were  six  explosions  aboard  air- 
craft resulting  in  13.5  deaths.  For  tin- 
first  time,  we  have  had  more  inciden 
of  sabotage  than  hijacking.  And  now 
must  add  Pan  Am  103  to  this  tragic  t 

New  technology  makes  an  impac 
on  the  counterterrorism  front.  In  sor 
instances,  technical  advances  like  pla 
tic  explosives  help  terrorists.  On  the 
other  hand,  our  counterterrorism 
efforts  are  strengthened  by  the  avail 
ability  of  new  technology,  such  as  tht 
thermal  neutron  analyzer  machines, 
detect  such  explosives.  The  evolutior 
technology  will  go  forward.  So  we  m 
continue  to  anticipate  how  terrorists 
might  try  to  turn  technology  to  theii 
advantage. 

Our  basic  goal  is  constant.  We  s^ 
to  deter  and  prevent  terrorist  attack 
In  the  event  of  a  tei-rorist  incident,  \ 
seek  the  apprehension,  prosecution, 
and  i)unishment  of  those  responsible 
Our  government  has  developed  a  eou 
terterrorist  policy  to  deal  with  the 
broad  worldwide  terrorist  threat  anc 
its  evolving  nature. 

Overview  of  U.S. 
Counterterrorism  Policy 

American  counterterrorist  policy  stf 
on  three  solid  pillars. 

First,  we  will  not  accede  to  ter- 
rorist demands.  We  will  not  pay  ran 
som,  pardon  convicted  terrorists,  or 
pressure  other  countries  to  give  in  t 
terrorist  demands.  In  other  words,  ' 
will  make  no  deals.  But  we  will  talk 
anyone  authoritative — anywhere,  an 
time — about  the  welfare  and  uncond 
tional  release  of  our  hostages. 

Second,  we  have  taken  the  lead 
pressuring  states  which  support  ter- 
rorist groups  and  use  terrorism  as  p 
of  their  foreign  policy.  ,We  have  show 
these  states  that  they  will  be  penali; 
for  supporting  terrorism.  The  Unite- 
States  will  not  tolerate  their  aiding  ; 
abetting  terrorist  groups  by  supplyi 
them  with  weapons,  money,  passpor 
training  bases,  and  safehouses. 

Third,  we  are  imposing  the  rule 
law  on  terrorists  for  their  criminal  a 
tions.  Good  police  work  is  catching  t 
rorists,  and  they  are  being  brought 
trial.  Since  1986,  the  United  States  1 
had  a  law  which  enables  our  law  en- 


TERRORISM 


cement  agencies  to  better  combat 
Torism  overseas.  Popularly  called  a 
ng  arm"  statute,  the  law  makes  it  a 
eral  crime  to  kill,  injure,  threaten, 
ain.  or  seize  an  American  citizen 
ywhere  in  the  world  in  order  to  com- 
a  third  person  or  government  to 
:ede  to  a  terrorist's  demands. 

S.  Policy: 

iW  Is  It  Working? 

we  have  a  clear  and  comprehensive 
mterterrorist  policy.  How  is  it 
rking? 

Let  us  look  first  at  the  "no  conces- 
ns"  element  of  our  policy.  Obviously, 
s  element  of  our  policy  was  damaged 
the  Ivan-contra  affair.  However, 
ee  then,  we  have  made  crystal  clear 

governments  steadfast  commitment 
the  "no  deals"  principle.  No  country, 
group  should  believe  there  is  gain  in 
ing  to  blackmail  the  United  States. 

Based  on  my  own  meetings  with 
nterterrorism  officials  and  experts 
m  other  countries  and  in  this  coun- 
,  I  believe  we  have  largely  recovered 

credibility  lost  by  the  Iran-co»/ro 
B.ir.  The  international  counterter- 
lism  community  understands  our 
ition,  and  there  is  strong  bipartisan 
iport  here  for  our  policy  of  firmness 
lealing  with  terrorists.  I  hope  and 
ieve  that  the  new  Administration 
1  continue  to  benefit  from  this  high 
i\  of  support  by  the  American 
iple. 

We  have  enjoyed  an  important 
asure  of  success  on  the  second  ingre- 
nt  of  our  policy — pressuring  states 
ich  support  terrorism.  As  a  result, 
le  of  the  more  notorious  state  sup- 
ters  of  terrorism  have  attempted — 
)licly  at  least — to  distance  them- 
.'es  from  terrorism. 

Our  1986  airstrike  on  Libya's  ter- 
ist  cam])  was  the  watershed  event 
he  world's  fight  against  terrorist- 
iporting  states.  European  nations 
owed  our  lead  against  Libya  by 
i)osing  political,  economic,  and  se- 
ity  measures  against  the  Qadhafi  re- 
le.  European  Community  members 
)elled  more  than  100  Libyan  "diplo- 
ts"  and  restricted  the  movements  of 
er  Libyan  "diplomatic"  and  "consul- 
personnel.  These  moves  severely 
naged  Libya's  European  network 
licated  to  supporting  international 
rorism. 


Qadhafi  learned  that  his  support 
for  international  terrorism  would  not  be 
cost  free,  and  he  changed  his  behavior 
which,  after  all,  was  the  objective  of 
our  attack.  Libya's  involvement  in  ter- 
rorism declined  from  19  incidents  in 
1986  to  6  in  1987  and  another  6  in  1988. 

However,  we  must  remain  particu- 
larly vigilant  regarding  Qadhafi.  There 
is  reason  to  believe  that  Libya  con- 
tinues support  for  terrorism,  albeit  in  a 
more  subtle,  less  flagrant  fashion. 
Moreover,  Libya's  continued  work  on  a 
chemical  weapons  production  facility 
emphasizes  the  need  for  e.xtremely 
careful  monitoring  of  Qadhafi's  actions. 

Syria,  another  long-time  supporter 
of  terrorism,  also  felt  the  pressure  of 
our  counterterrorism  strategy.  In  late 
1986,  British  and  West  German  courts 
established  Syrian  complicity  in  ter- 
rorist attacks  in  London  and  West 
Berlin.  Together  with  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States  joined  an  interna- 
tional campaign  employing  diplomatic, 
political,  and  economic  sanctions  to  con- 
vince Syria  to  reduce  its  link  to  ter- 
rorists groups. 

These  efforts  worked.  In  1985, 
Syria  was  implicated  in  34  terrorists  in- 
cidents but  in  1986  only  6.  In  1987,  a 
year  after  our  pressures,  we  detected 
Syria's  hand  in  only  one  incident  and  in 
none  in  1988.  Moreover,  Syria  expelled 
the  violent  Abu  Nidal  organization 
from  Damascus  in  June  1987 — a  major 
victoiT  for  our  counterterrorist 
policies. 

These  efforts  may  not  force  these 
nations  to  cease  entirely  their  support 
for  terrorist  groups.  Indeed,  both 
Libya  and  Syria  continue  to  provide 
such  support.  But  a  concerted,  vig- 
orous Western  strategy  does  make 
them  move  more  cautiously  and  become 
more  circumspect. 

The  third  and  final  element  of  our 
counterterrorism  policy — using  the  rule 
of  law  against  terrorists  and  encourag- 
ing others  to  do  the  same — is  maturing 
into  a  potent  weapon  for  two  basic  rea- 
sons. First,  there  has  been  a  sea 
change  in  international  attitudes  toward 
terrorists.  Second,  governments  have 
decided  to  provide  law  enforcement 
agencies  the  resources  necessary  to  de- 
ter terrorism. 

Not  long  ago,  many  usually  respon- 
sible countries  granted  terrorists  dis- 
pensation for  their  crimes.  Ironically, 
terrorists  were  perceived  as  victims  of 
those  vague  forces  called  "oppression" 
and  "imperialism" — victims  oi',  worse, 
romantic  adventurers  whose  behavior 
should  be  indulged. 


No  longer  is  this  true.  Terrorists 
began  to  lose  this  international  indul- 
gence as  they  widened  their  circle  of 
targets  in  the  late  1970s.  In  some  in- 
stances, they  even  attacked  their  sym- 
pathizers and  supporters.  The  shock  of 
such  actions  turned  indulgence  to 
revulsion. 

And  as  popular  disgust  mounted, 
politicians  finally  insisted  on  action  to 
counter  the  terrorists.  Law  enforce- 
ment agencies  were  given  the  resources 
to  do  their  jobs.  National  police  depart- 
ments now  have  the  surveillance  gear, 
the  communications  equipment,  and  the 
money  for  overtime  to  gather  intel- 
ligence and  to  track  and  arrest  ter- 
rorists. As  a  result,  more  and  more 
terrorists  are  being  brought  to  trial  and 
convicted. 

•  On  November  3,  1988,  a  Maltese 
court  sentenced  the  sole  surviving  ter- 
rorist in  the  November  1985  hijacking 
of  an  Egyptian  airliner  to  25  years  im- 
prisonment— the  maximum  sentence 
under  Maltese  law.  The  surviving  hi- 
jacker belonged  to  the  Abu  Nidal 
organization. 

•  On  October  27,  1988,  a  Sudanese 
court  passed  the  death  sentence  on  five 
Palestinian  terrorists  for  their  attack 
this  year  on  Khartoum's  Acropole  Hotel 
and  the  Sudan  Club.  These  five  were 
also  members  of  the  Abu  Nidal 
organization. 

•  In  July  1988,  a  Pakistan  court 
convicted  five  terrorists  for  an  Abu 
Nidal  organization  attack  against  a  Pan 
Am  airliner  in  Karachi  in  September 
1986. 

•  A  French  court  convicted,  in  ab- 
sentia, on  October  20,  1988,  the  notori- 
ous Fatah  terrorist  Colonel  Hawari  to 
10  years — the  maximum  allowed  under 
French  law — for  complicity  to  transport 
arms,  ammunition,  and  explosives  and 
for  criminal  associations. 

•  A  West  German  court  is  cur- 
rently trying  Muhammad  Hamadei,  a 
Lebanese  terrorist  implicated  in  the 
1985  TWA  hijacking  which  resulted  in 
the  murder  of  an  innocent  American 
seaman,  Robert  Stethem. 

•  Hei-e  in  Washington,  D.C.,  Fawaz 
Younis,  a  Lebanese  terrorist  will  soon 
go  on  trial  for  holding  American  cit- 
izens hostage  when  he  led  the  1985  hi- 
jacking of  a  Roval  Jordanian  Airlines 
flight. 

•  In  Greece,  authoi'ities  will  soon 
decide  on  Muhammad  Rashid's  extradi- 
tion to  this  country  where  he  is  wanted 
for  planting  a  bomb  in  1982  on  a  Pan 
Am  airliner.  His  extradition  to  the 


75 


TERRORISM 


United  States  would  be  an  important 
indication  of  Greece's  adherence  to  its 
stated  policy  of  combating  terrorism. 

In  short,  the  United  States  has  a 
counterterrorism  policy  in  place  and  it 
works.  However,  it  is  obvious  that  we 
cannot  succeed  alone.  Many  of  the 
essential  ingredients  in  combating 
terrorism — gathering  intelligence 
information,  monitoring  the  movements 
of  suspected  terrorists,  intercepting 
and  appi-ehending  ten-orists — require 
effective  international  cooperation. 

International  Cooperation  in 
Counterterrorism 

As  terrorists  expand  their  activities, 
and  as  international  repugnance  to  ter- 
rorist acts  intensifies,  nations  in- 
creasingly regard  terrorism  as  a 
collective  threat  and  a  common  prob- 
lem. The  desire  to  promote  interna- 
tional cooperation,  already  strong,  was 
particularly  evident  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  attack  on  Pan  Am  103. 

International  condemnation  of  the 
sabotage  of  Pan  Am  103  was  swift  and 
emphatic.  Many  individual  nations  con- 
demned the  attack.  The  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  United  Nations  issued  a 
statement  in  late  December  1988  ex- 
pressing "outrage"  at  the  attack.  This 
statement  was  echoed  by  the  President 
of  the  Security  Council,  speaking  on  be- 
half of  the  council,  who  condemned  the 
attack  and  called  on  all  states  to  assist 
in  the  apprehension  and  prosecution  of 
those  responsible.  Similarly,  the  12 
members  of  the  European  Community 
released  a  joint  statement  deploring  the 
sabotage  of  Pan  Am  103. 

The  sabotage  of  Pan  Am  103  has 
emphasized  the  need  for  prompt  action 
to  strengthen  further  aviation  security 
measures.  The  FAA  immediately  issued 
orders  for  increased  security  measures 
on  American  carriers  to  deal  with  the 
new  situations.  But  we  cannot  solve  the 
problem  alone.  It  is  clear  that  we  need 
to  encourage  the  adoption  of  more 
stringent  security  measures  throughout 
the  aviation  community. 

Improving  Aviation  Security 

To  pursue  this  work,  the  international 
community  is  turning  to  the  Interna- 
tional Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO)  an  agency  of  the  UN  system 
based  in  Montreal.  ICAO  is  the  ac- 
knowledged body  responsible  for  set- 
ting standards  in  the  field  of  civil 


aviation  and  is,  therefore,  the  appropri- 
ate forum  for  international  followup  to 
Pan  Am  103. 

On  January  24,  the  United  King- 
dom and  the  United  States  jointly  an- 
nounced that,  in  response  to  the 
destruction  of  Pan  Am  103,  they  were 
requesting  a  special  session  of  the 
ICAO  council  to  pursue  ways  "to  im- 
prove international  aviation  security 
procedures."  On  January  30,  the  ICAO 
council  decided  to  hold  such  a  special 
session  on  February  15-16,  1989,  to  dis- 
cuss ways  to  counter  the  growing  trend 
of  sabotage  against  civil  aviation.  A 
number  of  ICAO  members — including 
the  United  States,  the  United  King- 
dom, the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Australia,  and  Switzerland — will  be 
represented  by  their  ministers  of  trans- 
portation at  this  meeting. 

We  expect  representatives  at  this 
special  ministerial-level  council  meeting 
to  begin  by  reviewing  briefly  the  exist- 
ing aviation  security  measures.  Avia- 
tion standards,  as  defined  and  adopted 
by  ICAO  members,  are  contained  in 
Annex  17  to  the  Chicago  convention 
(which  established  ICAO  in  1944). 

Over  the  years,  a  great  deal  of 
important  work  has  been  done  to  im- 
prove the  measures  in  Annex  17  which 
should  not  be  overlooked.  For  example, 
following  the  June  1985  hijacking  of 
TWA  847,  Annex  17  was  exhaustively 
reviewed.  In  December  1985,  Annex  17 
was  amended  to  include  a  number  of 
provisions  intended  to  prevent  the  use 
of  weapons  or  dangerous  devices  aimed 
at  causing  bodily  harm  and  damage  to 
property  aboard  aircraft. 

In  i986,  ICAO's  Unlawful  Inter- 
ference Committee  reviewed  ICAO's  se- 
curity standards  to  ensure  that  they 
were  updated  promptly  as  necessary. 
This  committee,  with  support  from  the 
ICAO  Secretariat,  identified  four  areas 
that  warranted  priority  attention  as 
particularly  vulnerable  to  placement  of 
explosive  devices.  These  included  ramp 
security,  weapons  detection,  cargo/mail/ 
small  parcel  handling,  and  courier 
service. 

Work  on  aviation  security  stand- 
ards has  continued  in  ICAO's  Aviation 
Security  Panel,  which  reports  to  the 
Unlawful  Interference  Committee.  This 
panel  has  identified  several  priorities 
for  work  in  ICAO.  These  include  se- 
curity controls  to  detect  devices  which 
might  be  carried  by  unsuspecting  par- 
ties unwittingly  acting  as  couriers  for 
terrorists  and  passenger  management 
methods  to  ensure  that  passengers 
leave  nothing  behind  on  an  aircraft. 


Much  of  this  work  will  continue  a 
intensify  as  ICAO  defines  new  ap- 
proaches to  security.  To  facilitate  this 
work,  we  hope  that  the  February  1.5-) 
ministerial  council  session  will  endors 
a  plan  of  work  that  establishes  pri- 
orities for  technical  work  in  ICAO. 
These  priorities  include: 

•  Detection  of  sabotage  devices,  i 
pecially  explosives; 

•  Comprehensive  screening  of 
checked  baggage; 

•  Comprehensive  screening  of  pas 
sengers  and  hand  baggage; 

•  Controlling  access  to  aircraft  b 
ground  personnel;  and 

•  Establishing  a  new  ICAO  servi 
available  to  members  at  their  i-equesl 
to  assess  security  at  individual  airpoi 
and  to  recommend  improvements  as 
necessary. 

We  also  expect  the  ministerial  w 
review  the  status  of  secui'ity-related 
training  provided  by  ICAO. 

Finally,  we  expect  the  ICAO  mir 
terial  will  discuss  the  need  for  in- 
creased attention  to  "tagging"  plastic 
explosives  for  detection.  Relatively  li 
tie  technical  work  has  been  pursued  t 
date  in  this  area.  However,  the  trage' 
of  Pan  Am  103  emphasizes  both  the 
urgency  and  importance  of  such  worl 

The  ICAO  council  meeting  next 
week  will  bring  together  some  of  the 
world's  foi'emost  authorities  in  aviatii 
security.  Their  meeting  underscores 
commitment  of  the  international  com 
munity  to  continue  the  worldwide  fig 
against  terrorism.  The  combination  c 
this  political  will  and  technical  exper 
tise  lends  considerable  momentum  tc 
the  important  work  in  ICAO  on  avia- 
tion security,  which  has  and  will  con- 
tinue to  make  significant  progress. 

Handling  Terrorist  Threats 

I  know  a  number  of  members  are  int' 
ested  in  our  government's  policy  on 
handling  terrorist  threats. 

Each  week,  we  receive  literally 
dozens  of  threats — most  of  them  di- 
rected at  American  officials  abroad.  ^ 
urgently  and  carefully  analyze  them, 
a  threat  is  deemed  credible,  we  take 
immediate  steps  to  counter  the  threa 
by  getting  the  information  into  the 
hands  of  people  who  can  take  steps  t( 
counter  the  threat.  For  example,  in  t 
case  of  a  threat  to  an  airline,  we  get 
that  information  into  the  hands  of  air 
port  security  officials  responsible  for 
aviation  security.  This  is  the  purpose 
the  FAA  security  alert  bulletins  sent 


76 


TERRORISM 


ine  corporate  security  officials  and 
lirport  security  officials. 
We  do  not  routinely  make  terrorist 
jats  public.  To  do  so  would  encour- 
copycat"  terrorist  threats  which 
Id  initially  cause  panic  and  disrupt 
services  and,  in  the  end,  cause  in- 
erence  to  the  alerts  themselves.  As 
,  we  already  receive  on  the  average 
e  threats  to  American  airports  or 
ines  each  day. 

Nor  is  it  our  policy  to  selectively 
■t  people  to  lerrorist  threats.  If  we 
e  a  credible  and  specific  terrorist 
at  to  an  airline  which  cannot  be 
ntered  effectively  on  the  spot,  then 
policy  is  to  recommend  that  the 
ine  cancel  the  flight.  Otherwise,  we 
lid  issue  a  public  travel  advisery  to 
American  traveling  public.  It  is  not 
policy  to  alert  government  officials 
not  the  general  public  to  such  a 
■at.  There  is,  and  can  be,  no  double 
idard. 

While  priority  attention  will  con- 
e  on  aviation  security,  we  cannot 
•look  work  in  other  vital  areas.  As 
Achille  Lauro  tragedy  demon- 
tes  all  too  clearly,  passenger  ships 
also  vulnerable  to  terrorism,  includ- 
sabotage.  The  International  Mar- 
e  Organization  (IMO)  already  has 
!n  a  number  of  steps  to  enhance 
itime  security.  IMO  security 
sures  were  analyzed  in  detail  at 
October  1988  meeting  of  the  IMO 
itiine  Safety  Committee,  which 
•ed  to  review  these  measures  an- 
ly.  During  1989,  the  IMO  will  spon- 
at  least  two  regional  security 
inar,'^ — one  in  the  Caribbean  and 
in  the  Mediterranean.  These  semi- 
1  will  offer  training  and  assistance 
;ates'  application  of  IMO  security 
sures.  We  fully  support  this  work 
■WO  and  will  participate  actively  in 
■e  seminars. 

Mr.  Chairman,  my  remarks  thus 
lave  been  addressed  to  the  topics 
identified  in  your  letter  of  invita- 
as  of  particular  interest  to  the 
mittee.  Permit  me,  however,  to  in- 
e  a  reference  to  an  indispensable 
ponent  of  our  counterterrorism 
rt,  namely  our  antiterrorist  as- 
uice  program  (ATA),  a  program  this 
mittee  was  instrumental  in 
blishing. 

iterrorist  Assistance  Program 

■e  its  inception  in  1984,  ATA  has 
ned  over  650  students  from  28  na- 
s  in  advanced  civil  aviation  security 
irport  police  management.  Both 


courses  are  offered  at  the  Transporta- 
tion Safety  Institute — a  FAA  facility  in 
Oklahoma  City — and  include  a  mi.xture 
of  classroom  instruction  supplemented 
by  on-the-scene  instruction  at  major 
U.S.  airports. 

Countering  the  e.xisting  threats  to 
international  civil  aviation  requires  an 
effective  aviation  security  program 
which  includes  well-trained  staff  sup- 
plemented by  a  variety  of  technical 
aids.  Any  such  system  has  built-in  re- 
dundancy and  recognizes  that  the  most 
critical  element  in  aviation  security  is 
the  well-motivated  employee  who  takes 
his  or  her  duties  seriously.  We  are  con- 
fident that  our  basic  ATA  teaching  pro- 
gram is  sound  and  contributes  to  the 
building  of  such  a  system.  It  teaches 
the  interdependence  and  supplemental 
effects  of  people,  dogs,  and  e.xisting 
electronic  technology  such  as  .x-rays. 
We  will  incorporate  into  our  training, 
as  they  emerge,  the  "lessons  learned" 
from  the  Pan  Am  103  bombing. 

Bomb-detector  dogs  already  hold  a 
critical  role  in  aviation  security  as  part 
of  a  comprehensive  effort  to  detect 
plastic  explosives.  There  are  limits, 
however,  to  what  can  be  done  with 
sniffer  dogs.  Dogs  are  capable  of  de- 
tecting plastic  e.xplosives,  but  they 
present  logistical  problems.  At  large 
airports  such  as  those  in  the  United 
States  and  Europe,  dogs  provide  only 
part  of  the  solution.  Since  the  ATA  pro- 
gram generally  works  with  less  devel- 
oped nations,  which  often  have  small 
international  airports,  some  of  the 
problems  presented  by  using  detector 
dogs  at  major  international  airports 
may  pose  fewer  difficulties  at  the 
smaller  airports. 

We  are  working  to  broaden  the 
scope  of  our  aviation  security  training, 
such  as  that  offered  through  the  ATA 
program.  During  FY  [fiscal  year]  1988, 
the  United  States  worked  with  the 
French  to  improve  aviation  security  in 
West  Africa,  with  the  Canadians  to  do 
the  same  at  Manila  International,  and 
with  the  British  in  broad-based  coun- 
terterrorism training  for  Pakistan.  In 
cooperation  with  South  Korea,  we  orga- 
nized a  conference  of  Pacific  rim  nations 
to  establish  enhanced  aviation  security 
standards  before  and  during  last  year's 
summer  Olympic  period. 

The  ATA  program,  with  the  range 
of  training  that  it  can  offer,  is  a  vital 
element  in  the  U.S.  response  to  the 
threat  posed  by  international  terrorism. 
For  FY  1990,  the  President  is  seeking 
$10,017  million  to  support  ATA  training. 
These  funds  will  finance  training  for 


some  1,500  recipients  from  25  nations 
and  provide  a  modest  amount  of  train- 
ing-related equipment. 

The  ATA  program  also  works  with 
the  FAA's  assessment  of  airports  as 
provided  under  the  Foreign  Airport  Se- 
curity Act.  The  Department  of  State 
and  the  FAA  cooperate  closely  in  this 
FAA  airport  assessment  program.  Em- 
bassy officials  are  routinely  involved  in 
scheduling  these  assessments  and  facili- 
tating the  work  of  the  FAA  security 
officials  during  their  visit.  When  defi- 
ciencies are  identified  in  an  airport's  se- 
curity program  by  the  FAA  officials,  as 
they  were  in  Caracas  in  the  summer  of 
1988,  State  and  FAA  work  together  to 
develop  an  effective  assistance  pro- 
gram. State,  through  its  antiterrorism 
assistance  program,  generally  offers 
training  in  advanced  civil  aviation  se- 
curity or  airport  police  management  to 
help  correct  any  such  deficiencies. 
FAA,  under  its  own  authorities,  pro- 
vides related  assistance.  In  the  case  of 
Caracas,  the  problems  identified  were 
corrected  to  FAA's  satisfaction  before 
the  90-day  notice  period  expired. 

Research  and  Development 

In  addition  to  training  under  the  ATA 
program,  we  are  continuing  our  work  in 
research  and  development.  One  priority 
is  to  identify  and  develop  new  tech- 
nology to  apply  to  the  process  of  e.xam- 
ining  baggage  so  that  materials  such  as 
plastic  explosives  can  be  more  consis- 
tently detected.  While  the  first  models 
are  only  now  in  production,  the  thermal 
neutron  analyzer  developed  for  the 
FAA  offers  real  promise  as  a  means  of 
ensuring  that  plastic  explosives  cannot 
evade  detection. 

On  behalf  of  the  U.S.  Government, 
the  State  Department  coordinates  and 
funds  a  national  counterterrorism  re- 
search and  development  program.  In 
FY  1990,  we  will  be  seeking  $6  miUion 
to  support  this  interagency  program. 
Included  in  the  research  and  develop- 
ment program  are  projects  to  develop 
new  forms  of  less  expensive  and  more 
widely  applicable  detectors  to  identify 
plastic  explosives  or  chemical/biological 
agents  in  closed  containers.  I  hope  that 
members  of  this  committee  will  con- 
tinue to  support  this  program. 

Another  example  of  our  research 
and  development  efforts  at  State  is  the 
Bureau  of  Diplomatic  Security's  funding 
for  the  development  of  a  high-tech- 
nology "sniffer"  to  detect  nitrogen  va- 
pors, such  as  those  emitted  by 


77 


TERRORISM 


explosives  in  automobiles,  packages, 
luggage,  or  persons.  The  first  operat- 
ing models  of  this  equipment,  developed 
under  contracts  with  Thermedics,  Inc. 
totaling  nearly  $7  million,  will  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  State  Department  this  sum- 
mer. This  equipment  will  be  applied  as 
part  of  our  program  to  protect  high- 
threat  posts  and  to  ensure  the  security 
of  the  Secretary  as  he  travels.  This 
equipment  offers  promise  as  the  possi- 
ble basis  for  other  prototypes  which 
would  be  applicable  for  use  in  checking 
airline  passengers,  their  luggage,  and 
carry-on  items. 

Terrorism  remains  a  major  interna- 
tional problem.  While  we  continue  to 
make  progress  in  countering  terrorism 


in  some  areas,  new  dimensions  to  this 
problem  emerge  with  dismaying  fre- 
quency. There  is  no  single  magic  solu- 
tion to  this  international  scourge.  Yet 
our  political  will  is  strong,  our  available 
resources  are  carefully  used,  and  our 
technical  expertise  is  among  the  best  in 
the  world.  We  remain  deeply  committed 
to  our  concerted  effort  to  combat  ter- 
rorism, as  are  the  members  of  the  com- 
mittee. We  greatly  appreciate  your 
support  which  is  essential  if  we  are 
to  prevail. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Iran's  Threats  Against  Author 


by  Alvin  P.  Adams,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subconimittee 
on  Terrorism,  Narcotics,  and  Interna- 
tional Operations  of  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  March  8,  1989. 
Mr.  Adams  is  Acting  Coordinator  for 
Counterterrorism.' 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  review 
the  Rushdie  affair  with  you  and  mem- 
bers of  your  subcommittee.  This  affair 
is  extremely  complex  in  its  weave  of  do- 
mestic and  foreign  dimensions  and 
highly  volatile,  given  the  profoundly 
sensitive  political  and  religious  nerves 
it  strikes. 

We  want  to  make  it  clear  from  the 
outset  that  we  are  absolutely  commit- 
ted to  freedom  of  expression,  which  we 
consider  a  fundamental  human  right. 
This  is  a  right  shared  by  people  around 
the  world.  Furthermore,  it  is  specially 
affirmed  for  Americans  in  our  Con- 
stitution. We — all  of  us  represented 
here  and  others  in  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment — will  do  whatever  we  can  to  pro- 
tect this  right. 

We  take  seriously  the  threats 
which  have  emanated  from  Tehran  con- 
cerning Salman  Rushdie's  book  The  Sa- 
tanic Verses.  The  reaction  against  the 
book  already  has  spawned  considerable 
violence  in  South  Asia  and  may  well 
have  motivated  the  February  28  fire- 
bombings  of  two  bookstores  in  Berke- 
ley, California,  and  the  Riverdale  Press 
in  New  York  City.  We  consider  the 
threats  against  Mr.  Rushdie  and  his 
book  to  be  an  invitation  to  commit  an 


78 


act  of  terrorism,  unprecedented  in  con- 
temporary international  behavior.  The 
calls  by  the  Iranian  leadership  for  Mr. 
Rushdie's  murder  are  made  all  the 
more  repugnant  by  the  specter  of  the 
offers  of  a  massive  reward. 

At  the  same  time,  in  addressing 
these  threats,  we  must  take  a  clear- 
headed view,  coolly  assessing  their  na- 
ture and  crafting  an  effective  response 
to  them.  This  is  not  the  first  time  we 
have  faced  serious  threats  from  Iran  or 
other  states  which  support  interna- 
tional terrorism.  It  will  not  be  the  last. 

What  we  need  to  do,  and  what  we 
are  doing,  is  to  apply  longstanding 
principles  and  tactics  developed  to  deal 
with  threats  of  terrorism.  They  include 
firmness  in  the  face  of  attempted  in- 
timidation and  a  measured  response  co- 
ordinated with  our  friends  and  guided 
by  an  effective  and  realistic  strategy. 

We  are  responding  to  the  Rushdie 
affair  in  a  number  of  ways.  I  will  elabo- 
rate on  them  as  well  as  discuss  the  gen- 
esis of  the  threat  later  in  my  testimony. 
The  basic  principles  which  guide  our 
responses  are: 

•  Without  regard  to  the  merits  of 
the  book,  the  threat  to  Mr.  Rushdie,  his 
publishers,  and  booksellers  constituted 
totally  unacceptable  behavior  by  the 
leader  of  a  state; 

•  While  uncertain  of  the  precise 
impact  of  these  threats  and  public  of- 
fers of  a  reward  for  murder,  we  took  the 
threats  seriously; 

•  Given  the  threat  against  Ameri- 
cans in  Pakistan,  both  diplomatic  and 
security  responses  were  in  order  on  our 
part;  and 


•  Our  responses  called  for  prior 
consultations  with  other  countries 
which  were  even  more  directly  thret 
ened  than  we,  particularly  the  Unit( 
Kingdom  as  Mr.  Rushdie  is  a  British 
citizen  and  resident. 

Public  Reactions 

As  for  the  initial  phase  of  the  affair, 
February  14,  Ayatollah  Khomeini  m 
his  infamous  statement  condemning 
The  Satanic  Verses  and  calling  sumnr 
ily  for  the  death  of  Mr.  Rushdie.  The 
statement  contained  more  general 
threats  against  enterprises  in  the  U 
ed  Kingdom  and  the  United  States 
which  published  and  sold  the  book. 
Khomeini's  statement  followed  much 
earlier  criticism  of  the  book  by  othei 
concerned  Muslims  and  the  severe  r 
ing  in  Islamabad. 

Given  the  profoundly  sensitive 
chords  this  affair  has  touched  in  We 
ern  and  Islamic  values,  the  confusec 
state  of  Iranian  politics,  and  the  enc 
mity  of  the  challenge  the  affair  pose 
we  sought  initially  to  analyze  events 
Tehran  and  confirm  Khomeini's  thre: 

Our  reaction  made  clear  our  sh; 
rejection  of  these  threats.  At  the  Fe 
ruary  16  press  briefing,  the  State  E 
partment  spokesman,  Charles  Redn 
made  a  formal  statement  which  said 

We  are  appalled  by  the  death  threat 
sued  against  Salman  Rushdie  by  the  Ay; 
toUah  Khomeini,  as  well  as  a  subsequent 
offer  of  a  rew'ard  for  his  murder  We  takt 
these  threats  very  seriously.  Such  threai 
are  completely  irresponsible  and  are  ini 
patible  with  basic  standards  of  internati 
conduct. 

Speaking  in  Luxembourg  the  sa 
day,  Secretary  Baker  reiterated  oui 
jection  of  the  death  thi'eat  and  adde 
that  ".  .  .  the  United  States  is  firnil 
committed  to  oppose  terrorism  in  a. 
its  forms  and  particularly  state- 
sponsored  terrorism." 

Also  on  February  16,  the  Euro); 
Parliament  passed  a  resolution  con- 
demning the  threats  and  calling  on 
Council  of  Europe  to  sanction  Iran  i 
they  were  carried  out. 

In  the  next  days,  there  were  coi 
flicting  statements  from  Iranian  ofl 
cials.  Some  suggested  that  Iran  mig 
withdraw  the  death  threat  if  Mr.  Ru 
die  expressed  regret  for  the  offense 
Islam.  On  February  19,  however,  a 
statement  attributed  to  Khomeini  n 
erated  the  threat  in  strong  terms,  a 
soon  the  entire  Iranian  leadership  h 
joined  the  chorus  of  those  calling  foi 
Mr.  Rushdie's  death.  In  response,  th 


II 


TERRORISM 


eign  Ministers  of  the  Eui-opean 
mmunity,  meeting  in  Brussels  on 
briiary  20,  unanimously  condemned 
Jin's  behavior.  In  a  notable  display  of 
iity,  they  decided  to  withdraw  their 
iiior  diplomats  from  Tehran.  Within  a 
U'days,  all  had  left. 
'    On  February  19  during  a  television 
erview.  Secretary  Baker  reiterated 
condemnation  of  the  death  threat 
i  offers  of  a  reward  for  Mr  Rushdie's 
irder,  as  well  as  the  U.S.  Govern- 
nt's  official  opposition  to  terrorism, 
cretary  Baker  added:  ".  .  .  that  if 
m  really  is  serious  about  rejoining 
!  community  of  civilized  nations,  this 
lot  the  kind  of  behavior  that  leads  to 
It." 

On  February  21,  President  Bush 
de  the  following  statement: 

I  strongly  support  the  EC-12  declara- 
1  in  respon.se  to  the  Iranian  threats 
inst  Rushdie.  However  offensive  that 
k  may  be,  inciting  murder  and  offering 
'ards  for  its  perpetration  are  deeply  of- 
sive  to  the  norm  of  civilized  behavior. 
:1  our  position  on  terrorism  is  well 
iwn.  In  the  light  of  Iran's  incitement, 
uld  any  action  be  taken  against  Ameri- 

interests,  the  Government  of  Iran  can 
ect  to  be  held  accountable. 

On  February  22,  the  State  Depart- 
nt  spokesman  remarked  referencing 

calls  from  Iranian  leaders  for  Rush- 
's death: 

The  .  .  .  statements  constituted  an 
tement  to  commit  an  act  of  terrorism,  an 
!r  of  money  for  Rushdie's  murder,  which 
«es  it  all  the  more  repugnant  ...  all  this 

direct  assault  on  freedom  of  expression, 
ich  is  a  fundamental  human  right.  .  .  . 

On  February  28,  after  the  two  book 
res  in  Berkeley  and  the  newspaper 
ice  in  New  York  were  bombed,  the 
f  isident  said: 

While  the  details  surrounding  these  in- 
?nts  and  the  motives  of  those  who  carried 
m  out  are  still  unclear,  I  think  that  it  is 
lortant  to  take  this  occasion  to  state 
t  5re  the  U.S.  Government  and,  I'm  con- 
ced,  the  American  people  stand  on  vio- 
ee  and  on  our  rights.  This  country  was 
I  nded  on  the  principles  of  free  speech  and 

gious  tolerance.  And  we  fought  through- 

our  history  to  protect  these  principles. 
d  I  want  to  make  unequivocally  clear  that 

United  States  will  not  tolerate  any  as- 
:lt  on  these  rights  of  American  citizens. 


The  President  added  that  should  it 
Dear  that  any  Federal  laws  have  been 
dated  in  these  bombing  attacks,  he 
J  ted  Attorney  Genei-al  Dick  Thorn- 
rgh  "to  use  all  of  the  resources  of  the 
!I  and  all  other  appropriate  resources 

It 


of  this  government  to  identify  and  bring 
to  justice  those  responsible.  We  don't 
yet  know  if  the  bombings  are  related  to 
the  book.  The  Satcuiic  Verses.  But  let 
me  be  clear:  Anyone  undertaking  acts 
of  intimidation  or  violence  aimed  at  the 
author,  the  publishers,  or  the  distribu- 
tors of  The  Satcuiic  Verses  will  be  pros- 
ecuted to  the  ma.ximum  extent  of  the 
law.  And,  yes,  some  of  the  Muslim  faith 
can  interpret  that  book  as  highly  offen- 
sive, and  I  can  be  sensitive  to  that,  but 
we  cannot  and  will  not  condone  violence 
and  lawlessness  in  this  countrjy.  And  I 
think  our  citizens  need  to  know  how 
strongly  I  feel  about  that." 

On  March  3,  Attorney  Geperal 
Thornburgh  told  a  delegation  from  the 
U.S.  publishing  industry  that  Ameri- 
can law  enforcement  officials  would 
take  every  precaution  to  help  protect 
publishers  and  booksellers  from 
threats  and  acts  of  violence  prompted 
by  the  controversy. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  the  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States.  Khomeini's 
statements  constitute  incitement  to 
commit  an  act  of  terrorism,  and  the  of- 
fer of  money  for  Mr.  Rushdie's  mui'der 
makes  this  behavior  all  the  more  reck- 
less and  callous.  Mr  Rushdie's  book  has 
clearly  offended  many  Muslims,  but 
Khomeini's  claim  to  speak  for  all  Mus- 
lims is  completely  unjustified.  I  want 
to  emphasize  that  no  other  Islamic  gov- 
ernment or  leader — except  Qadhafi — 
has  endorsed  his  death  threat.  The 
Sheikh  of  Cairo's  Al-Azhar  University, 
a  leading  institution  of  Islamic  learn- 
ing, while  condemning  the  book,  has 
rejected  Khomeini's  death  threat,  say- 
ing it  does  not  conform  with  Islamic  le- 
gal proceedings. 

There  has  been  much  talk  about  in- 
ternal political  factors  as  a  reason  for 
Khomeini's  threats  and  their  endorse- 
ment by  other  Iranian  leaders.  Obvi- 
ously this  is  the  case.  But  we  must  not 
fall  into  the  error  of  justifying  Iran's 
conduct  in  the  process  of  seeking  to  un- 
derstand it.  Although,  they  have  done 
so  with  varying  degrees  of  enthusiasm, 
all  Iranian  leaders  have  embraced  Kho- 
meini's statements.  The  Government  of 
Iran,  as  a  whole,  is  responsible  for  this 
behavior — so-called  moderates  and  rad- 
icals alike. 

Diplomatic  Responses 

The  public  statements  are  not  our  only 
reaction  to  the  threats  against  Rush- 
die. We  have  been  dealing  with  the  is- 
sue on  several  fronts,  similar  to  the 
way  we  confront  other  terrorist  threats 


through  a  combination  of  public  diplo- 
macy, private  diplomacy,  and  security 
measures. 

In  addition  to  our  public  condemna- 
tions already  reviewed,  we  are  working 
closely  with  friends  who  are  more  di- 
rectly threatened  and  approaching 
other  countries  wdiich  have  broader  re- 
lations with  Tehran  than  we  do  and 
who,  therefore,  can  give  greater  prac- 
tical effect  to  their  outrage.  Our  objec- 
tive is  to  encourage  other  states  to 
stand  up  and  be  counted  on  this  issue 
and  to  exploit  opportunities  which 
arise  in  their  dealings  with  Iran  to 
demonstrate  their  disapproval  in  a  con- 
crete way. 

We  have  raised  the  Rushdie  matter 
in  a  number  of  countries — including, 
for  example,  Japan  and  the  Soviet 
Union — to  ask  that  they  make  clear 
their  opposition  to  this  behavior.  We 
have  raised  it  elsewhere.  Our  embas- 
sies around  the  world  have  been  pro- 
vided material  for  discussions  of  the 
matter  with  host  governments. 

We  note  that  the  West  European 
countries  are  working  together  and  co- 
ordinating their  actions.  The  European 
Community,  for  example,  withdrew  its 
ambassadors  from  Iran  and  suspended 
high-level  visits.  As  mentioned  previ- 
ously, the  Council  of  Europe  strongly 
condemned  the  Iranian  threats.  Presi- 
dent Bush  has  expressed  support  for 
these  actions.  We  plan  this  week  to 
make  a  statement  at  the  UN  Human 
Rights  Commission  at  its  meeting  in 
Geneva. 

As  the  committee  is  aware,  the 
United  States  already  maintains  vari- 
ous restrictions  on  diplomatic  and 
economic  dealings  with  Iran.  U.S.  pro- 
hibitions against  the  sale  of  militarily 
useful  items  to  Iran  and  a  near  total 
ban  on  Iranian  exports  to  the  United 
States  remain  firmly  in  place.  We  con- 
tinue to  discourage  third  country  arms 
sales  to  Iran.  As  you  already  know,  we 
maintain  no  official  presence  in  Tehran, 
and  Iranian  diplomats  posted  to  the 
United  Nations  in  New  York  remain 
under  travel  controls.  We  have  strict 
security  procedures  that  must  be  fol- 
lowed before  issuing  visas  of  any  type 
to  Iranian  nationals. 

Threat  Assessment 

On  another  front,  we  also  are  dealing 
with  the  security  aspects  of  the  Iranian 
threat,  trying  to  assess  potential  threats 
more  fully,  and  taking  precautions 
where  indicated.  There  are  basically 


liiDartment  of  State  Bulletin/Mav  1989 


79 


TERRORISM 


two  dimensions  to  these  threats  raised 
by  the  Iranian  statements.  One  is  po- 
tential action  by  individuals  reacting 
on  their  own  to  the  descriptions  of  Mr. 
Rushdie's  book  but  inspired  by  the  Ira- 
nian rhetoric  and  stimulated  by  the  of- 
fer of  a  reward  for  killing  the  author. 
The  second  dimension  of  the  security 
threat  emanates  from  the  possibility  of 
more  professional  operations  organized 
by  the  Iranians  or  their  surrogates  in 
the  event  organs  of  the  Government  of 
Iran  itself  actively  follow  up  on  the 
death  threat. 

In  assessing  the  threats,  clearly 
Mr.  Rushdie  is  the  most  apparent  tar- 
get. His  life  is  in  danger;  both  he  and 
the  British  authorities  must  assume 
that  someone  may  actively  try  to  carry 
out  the  threat  against  him.  Given  Mr. 
Rushdie's  nationality  and  residence  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  British  interests 
are  perhaps  the  next  most  likely  tar- 
get, at  least  from  individuals  reacting 
to  Iran's  rhetoric. 

In  view  of  the  demonstrations 
which  already  have  taken  place  against 
the  U.S.  cultural  facilities  in  Islamabad 
and  a  number  of  threats  which  have 
been  made  against  individuals  and 
business  enterprises  in  the  United 
States,  we  are  also  a  potential  target. 
With  respect  to  overseas  facilities, 
the  State  Department  advised  all 
diplomatic  posts  in  the  most  likely 
threatened  areas  that  the  possibility  of 
anti-U.S.  activity  existed.  Posts  were 
advised  to  report  to  the  Department  on 
local  reactions  to  the  Rushdie  affair. 
U.S.  aviation  security  already  has  been 
heightened  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Pan 
Am  #103  bombing,  and  any  additional 
threats  continue  to  be  thoroughly 
evaluated. 


As  for  the  future,  it  is  difficult  to 
tell  how  this  situation  will  evolve, 
whether  the  threats  by  Iran  and  the 
violence  it  has  provoked  will  fade  or 
whether  there  will  be  attacks  actually 
linked  to  organs  of  the  Government  of 
Iran.  In  the  latter  event.  President 
Bush  already  has  made  clear  that  Iran 
will  be  held  accountable. 

As  long  as  the  Government  of  Iran 
continues  to  act  with  reckless  abandon 
and  total  irresponsibility,  Tehran  must 
continue  to  face,  at  a  minimum,  heavy 
criticism  and  isolation.  This  incident  is 
not  the  only  conduct  that  isolates  Iran 
and  disqualifies  it  from  normal  rela- 
tions with  the  rest  of  the  world.  The 
Government  of  Iran  continues  its 
broader  policy  of  support  for  interna- 
tional terrorism,  including  support  for 
those  holding  hostages  in  Lebanon.  We 
find  this  policy  abhorrent  and  unac- 
ceptable. It  will  have  to  stop  if  Iran 
wants  to  become  a  member  of  the  inter- 
national community. 

Many  Muslims  feel  offended  by  this 
work.  But  no  individual  has  the  right  to 
incite  the  murder  of  another  for  what 
he  thinks  and  writes.  Islam,  along  with 
Christianity  and  Judaism,  is  one  of  the 
world's  great  monotheistic  religions, 
with  a  deep  reverence  for  human  life. 
One  of  the  sadder  aspects  of  this  sad  af- 
fair may  be  that  it  has  tended  to  ob- 
scure some  of  the  basic  precepts  of 
Islam. 

One  final  point:  In  our  outrage 
over  Iran's  behavior,  it  is  important 
that  we  not  erroneously  assume  that  it 
involves  a  fundamental  conflict  bet- 
ween Islamic  and  Western  values.  The 
book.  The  Satcn/ic  Verses,  uses  Islamic 
themes  and  symbols  for  imaginative 
and  artistic  purposes.  In  the  process, 
its  author  has  offended  many  Muslims 


and  others.  But  the  conflict  here  is  i 
between  those  who  like  the  book  anc 
those  who  don't.  Nor  is  our  quarrel  ( 
with  Islam.  It  is  with  those  in  Iran  \ 
apparently  believe  that  in  the  name 
Islam,  they  have  the  right  to  incite  t 
murder  and  who,  by  this  repugnant 
havior,  have  isolated  themselves  froi 
the  majority  of  Muslims  and  mankin 

In  conclusion  the  responsible  mf 
bers  of  the  international  community 
are  united  in  our  condemnation  and 
outrage  against  incitement  to  murd( 
and  threats  to  bookstores  and  pub- 
lishers and  to  free  speech  itself.  Ser 
tor  Moynihan's  resolution,  S.  Res.  6! 
underscores  that  point.  We  will  not 
cannot  tolerate  threats  to  murder  ai 
efforts  to  exercise  our  fundamental 
rights. 

We  hope  that  the  Iranian  leader 
ship  will  realize  quickly  that  incitin 
violence  is  very  much  against  Iran's 
own  long-term  interest,  destructive 
its  international  image,  and  puts  at 
grave  risk  its  relationships  with  oth 
countries. 

For  our  part,  we  will  be  mon- 
itoring the  situation  closely  and  rea 
firming  our  dedication,  as  we  have 
here,  to  the  protection  of  American 
izens  and  American  rights.  We  will 
continue  to  work  to  deter  anyone  fr 
converting  threats  into  further 
violence. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hea 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintende 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


An 


Dpnartmpnt  ni  S^tatp  Biilletin/Mav  ' 


* 


INITED  NATIONS 


ff  1990  Assistance  Request 
r  Organizations  and  Programs 


Sandra  L.  Vogelgesang 

Statement  hefove  the  Subcommittee 
Fiireigii  OperaticDis.  E.rport  Fi- 
iiviiig.  cuid  Related  Programs  of  the 
».s('  Appropriations  Committee  on 
ii'ch  22,  19S9.  Dr.  Vogelgesang  is 
pull/  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
tio)ial  Organization  Affairs.'^ 

;elcome  the  o])portunity  to  appear 
ore  vou  today  to  present  the  Presi- 
it's  FY  1990  budget  request  of  $209 
Uion  for  the  international  organiza- 
ns  and  programs  account.  This 
[uest  will  fund  U.S.  voluntary  con- 
butions  for  development,  human- 
rian,  and  scientific  assistance 
)grams  and  activities  undertaken  by 

■  United  Nations  and  the  Organiza- 
n  of  American  States  (OAS). 

Across  the  UN  system,  its  develop- 
nt  and  technical  agencies  are  taking 
ck  of  past  accomplishments,  assess- 

■  their  capacity,  and  readying  them- 
ves  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  new 
.■ade  just  ahead.  The  $209  million  ap- 
)priation  request  before  you  reflects 
ee  factors: 

•  U.S.  support  for  intensified  ef- 
ts to  increase  the  coherence  of  UN 
;tem  technical  assistance  in  develop- 
:  countries  pi-ovided  by  the  UN  De- 
opment  Program  (UNDP),  the  UN 
ildren's  Fund  (UNICEF),  and  other 

I  agencies; 

•  Continued  emphasis  on  programs 
:echnical  agencies  of  the  UN  system, 
h  as  the  International  Atomic  En- 
ry  Agency  (IAEA)  and  the  World 
teorological  Organization  (WMO), 
ich  address  key  issues  facing  the 
ited  States  in  an  increasingly  com- 
X,  economically  interdependent,  and 
t-ironmentally  interrelated  world; 

>  Sizable  investments  in  the  re- 
bilitation  and  reconstruction  of 
ghanistan  following  a  decade  of  occu- 
tion  and  war. 

This  request,  like  many  others  pre- 
ited  to  this  Congress  for  FY  1990, 
"lects  a  balance  among  different 
Dices.  We  have  striven  to  make  room 

■  new  initiatives  and  yet  maintain 
pport  for  continuing  programs — such 
UNDP,  UNICEF.  and  IAEA— which 
ve  long  since  proven  their  value. 


Despite  our  concern  for  observing 
budgetary  restraint,  we  have  been  able 
to  include  two  new  line  items  of  critical 
importance  to  the  United  States.  These 
are  $16  million  for  the  UN  Afghanistan 
Emergency  Trust  Fund  and  $100,000 
for  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Cli- 
mate Change. 

I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  a  more 
specific  analysis  of  our  request. 

UN  Development  Program 

We  are  requesting  $107.8  million,  or 
over  50%  of  our  total  request  of  $209 
million,  for  UNDP.  The  size  of  the  U.S. 
contribution  is  seen  by  donors  and  re- 
cipients alike  as  a  signal  of  the  value 
and  credibility  of  UNDP's  programs 
and  U.S.  leadership.  The  U.S.  contri- 
bution is  a  key  catalyst  in  encouraging 
contributions  from  other  members. 
This  arrangement  gives  the  United 
States  substantial  influence  over  a 
large  share  of  multilateral  assistance 
around  the  world.  UNDP  has  tradi- 
tionally received  the  largest  allocation 
of  any  of  the  programs  in  the  interna- 
tional organizations  and  programs  ac- 
count, not  only  because  of  its  central 
funding  role  but  also  because  of  its  uni- 
versal character,  its  broad  geographic 
coverage,  and  our  firm  belief  that 
UNDP  serves  the  interests  of  the  Unit- 
ed States.  The  organization's  activities 
are  not  tied  to  any  particular  sector  of 
development  effort.  Its  coordinating 
role  within  the  UN  system  permits  it 
to  tackle  development  problems  with  an 
integrated  approach  that  helps  assure 
maximum  impact  from  scarce 
resources. 

Joining  with  other  major  Western 
donors,  the  United  States  has  been 
encouraging  UNDP  to  pursue  key  man- 
agement reforms  to  improve  its  pro- 
gram and  project  formulation  and 
establish  more  effective  monitoring 
and  evaluation  of  its  activities.  These 
reforms  were  begun  in  1985  by  your 
former  colleague.  Brad  Morse.  His  suc- 
cessor. Administrator  William  Draper, 
has  pursued  these  management  initia- 
tives vigorously. 

Overall  voluntary  contributions  to 
UNDP's  central  resources  for  1989  to- 
taled in  excess  of  $1  billion.  The  largest 
total  contribution  ever  recorded  from 
all  donors  was  registered  in  1989.  The 
level  of  U.S.  funding  has  fallen  from  a 


high  of  $165  million  in  FY  1985  to 
$107.5  million  in  FY  1987.  Our  request 
of  $107.8  for  FY  1990,  only  slightly  less 
than  the  previous  year's  request,  re- 
flects primarily  the  overall  constraints 
on  the  Federal  budget  rather  than  any 
diminished  commitment  to  UNDP  and 
the  fact  that  UNDP  enjoys  sufficiently 
broad  support  from  key  donors  to  per- 
form its  critical  role  in  the  UN  system. 

UN  Children's  Fund 

The  second  largest  item  in  our  request 
is  $33.9  million  for  UNICEF,  nearly  a 
6%  increase  over  our  FY  1989  request. 
UNICEF  works  closely  with  the  gov- 
ernments of  developing  countries  in 
their  efforts  to  improve  the  welfare  of 
children  and  mothers  and  to  enable 
children  to  develop  their  full  mental 
and  physical  potential.  UNICEF  fo- 
cuses particular  attention  on  the  least 
developed  countries  and  the  major 
causes  of  death  and  disease  among  chil- 
dren under  5  years  of  age.  It  comple- 
ments and  reinforces  U.S.  bilateral 
assistance  programs,  such  as  the 
Agency  for  International  Development's 
(AID)  child  survival  fund. 

More  than  most  programs  in  the 
UN  system,  UNICEF  has  earned  the 
confidence  and  admiration  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  and  Congress.  It  has  been 
immensely  successful  in  reducing  dra- 
matically infant  and  child  mortality 
rates  in  developing  countries.  The  best 
known  approach  has  been  through  well- 
publicized  mass  childhood  immuniza- 
tion and  oral  rehydration  therapy 
campaigns. 

The  1989  Slate  of  the  World's  Chil- 
dren report  estimates  that  these  basic, 
low-cost  health  interventions  save  the 
lives  of  nearly  1  million  children  every 
year.  The  year  1990,  the  target  date 
for  attaining  the  World  Health  Organi- 
zation's (WHO)  goals  of  universal  child- 
hood immunization  and  oral  rehydration 
therapy,  is  fast  approaching.  To  come  as 
close  as  possible  to  achieving  that  goal 
and  to  sustain  the  momentum  of  these 
vitally  important  activities  well  into  the 
next  decade,  UNICEF  needs  the  contin- 
ued, strong  support  of  the  United 
States. 


81 


UNITED  NATIONS 


International  Atomic  Energy  Ag-ency 

The  third  hu-gest  item  in  our  request  is 
$25.2  million  for  the  IAEA.  Histori- 
cally the  United  States  has  been  a 
strong  supporter  of  the  IAEA  and  its 
safeguards  system,  which  serve  critical 
U.S.  security  and  nonproliferation  in- 
terests. In  his  address  to  Congress  on 
February  9,  President  Bush  pledged  to 
"strengthen  the  hand"  of  the  IAEA  as  a 
central  part  of  the  Administration's  ef- 
forts to  halt  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons.  A  significant  portion  of  the 
U.S.  voluntary  contribution  to  the 
IAEA  accomplishes  this  purpose  by 
providing  direct  support  to  the  IAEA 
safeguards  system.  It  assures  that  nu- 
clear material,  intended  for  peaceful 
purposes,  is  not  diverted  for  military 
use.  U.S.  funds  designated  for  safe- 
guards and  nonjjroliferation  support 
research  and  development  activities  at 
U.S.  laboratories  and  the  provision  of 
U.S.  e.xperts'  services  to  the  IAEA 
safeguards  department . 

In  addition  the  U.S.  voluntary  con- 
tribution to  the  IAEA  supports  the 
IAEA  technical  cooperation  program, 
which  enables  many  developing  states 
to  secure — in  a  safe  manner — the  bene- 
fits of  the  [)eaceful  atom  for  the  promo- 
tion of  agriculture,  human  health, 
industi'y,  and  energy  production.  As 
with  funds  designated  for  safeguards 
activities,  a  significant  portion  of  U.S. 
funds  supporting  IAEA  technical  as- 
sistance will  be  expended  in  the  United 
States — at  laboratories  and  univer- 
sities and  in  the  commercial  sector. 


UN  Afghanistan  Emergency 
Trust  Fund 

We  have  proposed  $16  million  in  sup- 
port of  the  UN  Afghanistan  Emergency 
Trust  Fund.  With  the  recent  with- 
drawal of  Soviet  troops  from  Afghani- 
stan after  nearly  9  years  of  brutal 
occu])ation,  a  major  international  relief 
effort  must  be  undertaken  to  assist  the 
•5  million  Afghan  refugees  and  2  million 
internally  displaced  Afghans  in  return- 
ing to  their  homes.  This  movement  will 
represent  the  largest  migration  of  peo- 
ple since  World  War  II. 

We  will  continue  our  bilateral 
cross-border  humanitarian  assistance, 
but  the  enormity  of  the  problem  and 
the  demands  for  e.\])ertise,  experience, 
and  funds  compel  an  international  re- 
sponse. The  United  Nations  and  its 
technical  and  development  agencies,  if 
fully  and  effectively  managed  and  coor- 


dinated, have  the  capacity  to  lead  this 
effort.  We  are  working  directly  with 
the  UN  agencies  and  the  UN  Coordina- 
tor for  Humanitarian  Aid  to  Afghani- 
stan to  help  the  UN  effort  realize  its 
potential  and  perform  the  massive  task 
required  of  it. 

The  coordinated  UN  program  will 
provide  the  Afghan  refugees  and  dis- 
placed persons  with  emergency  sup- 
plies needed  to  restore  their  fields  and 
villages  and  begin  again  to  feed  them- 
selves. It  will  support  basic  health 
care.  Over  time  it  will  help  the  Afghans 
begin  to  reconstruct  their  local  areas 
and  ultimately  their  country.  The  pro- 
gram will  be  decentralized  and  geared 
to  provide  assistance  directly  to  the 
Afghan  people,  not  through  the  illegiti- 
mate Kabul  regime. 

The  United  States  has  a  major 
stake  in  helping  the  Afghans  win  the 
peace  now  that  they,  with  our  help, 
have  won  the  war.  The  permanent  re- 
turn of  the  Afghan  refugees  and  dis- 
placed persons  will  be  a  force  for 
stability  in  their  country  and  through- 
out the  South  Asian  region.  The  U.S. 
contribution  to  the  emergency  trust 
fund  is  a  significant  component  of  our 
overall  Afghan  strategy.  It  will  allow 
us  to  influence  significantly  the  direc- 
tion of  the  UN  effort  and  encourage 
other  donor  states  to  contribute  sub- 
stantially to  the  trust  fund  as  well. 

Organization  of  American  States 

The  $10  million  level  of  our  contribu- 
tion of  the  development  assistance  pro- 
grams of  the  OAS  represents  our 
commitment  to  the  inter-American  sys- 
tem and  our  belief  that  OAS  technical 
cooperation  activities  fill  an  important 
development  need  not  met  by  other  pro- 
grams. Specific  activities  include  basic 
education  and  education  for  work;  em- 
ployment generation  and  small  busi- 
ness promotion;  biotechnology  as 
applied  to  food,  environment,  and  natu- 
ral resources;  trade  information  and 
telecommunications  development;  and 
development  and  application  of  mate- 
rials technology. 

U.S.  voluntary  contributions  serve 
as  an  important  catalyst  to  generate 
external  resources  for  the  OAS  from 
the  private  sector,  multilateral  institu- 
tions, and  nonmember  countries.  They 
also  play  an  important  role  in  fostering 
inter-American  cooperation  for  devel- 
opment and  enhance  the  U.S.  ability  to 
work  with  OAS  members  on  programs 
of  mutual  interest. 


82 


Other  Contributions  Request 

Our  request  for  $8  million  for  the  V^d 
Environment  Program  (UNEP)  rep 

sents  a  $1.2  million  increase  over  oui 
FY  1989  request.  It  includes  .$7.7  mi 
lion  to  be  contributed  to  UNEP's  En- 
vironment Fund  and  an  estimated 
$.300,000  for  multilateral  environmei 
tally  related  activities,  such  as  the 
Vienna  Convention  for  the  Protectioi 
the  Ozone  Layer  and  the  Cartagena 
Convention  for  the  Protection  and  Di 
velopment  of  the  Marine  Environmei 
of  the  Wider  Caribbean  Region  and  i 
lated  protocols.  UNEPs  activities  cc 
plement  the  efforts  of  the  United 
States  to  improve  our  own  environ- 
ment. UNEP's  multilateral  approach 
engages  both  industrialized  and  dev( 
oping  countries  and  promotes  coopei 
tion  on  regional  problems,  such  as 
climate  change,  marine  pollution,  ai 
desertification. 

The  request  for  $2  million  foi-  th 
International  Convention  and  Sciei 
tific  Organization  (ICSO)  contribu 
tions  enables  the  United  States  to 
support  educational,  scientific,  cul- 
tural, and  communication  activities 
that  directly  benefit  U.S.  interests. 
These  benefits  were  formerly  derive 
through  membershi])  in  the  UN  Edu 
tional.  Scientific,  and  Cultural  Orga 
zation  (UNESCO).  Programs  such  a. 
the  Intergovernmental  Oceanograpl 
Commission,  the  "man  and  the  bio- 
sphere" program,  the  international 
hydrological  program,  and  the  inter 
tional  geological  correlation  prograi 
are  all  actively  supported  by  the  Un 
ed  States,  and  we  have  a  continuing 
terest  in  the  work  they  do. 

The  World  Meteorological  Org 
nization's  (WMO)  voluntary  cooper 
tion  program  i)rovides  training  and 
equipment  to  help  less  developed  coi 
tries  improve  their  national 
meteorological  and  hydrological  ser' 
ices.  U.S.  support  for  this  program 
ables  the  United  States  to  receive  m 
timely  and  reliable  data  for  the  U.S. 
National  Meteorological  Center  and 
ternational  meteorological  reports 
which  are  used  by  the  U.S.  public  ai 
private  sectors.  We  are  requesting  i 
million  for  FY  1990  to  support  the  w 
of  this  program. 

The  UN  Capital  Development 
Fund  (UNCI)f^)  jjrovides  grant  capii 
assistance  to  the  least  developed  cot 
tries  for  projects  that  are  too  small 
be  considered  by  other  multilateral  1 
nancing  institutions.  Our  request  of 
$1.5  million  will  enable  the  UNCDF 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May  1 


UNITED  NATIONS 


inue  to  focus  on  the  poorest  people 
e  grassroots  for  laborers,  small 
ers,  the  unemployed,  and  other 
ps  in  need  of  small  amounts  of  caj)- 
whether  for  a  water  pump,  a  foot 
:ge,  or  fertilizer  and  seeds. 
The  UN  Educational  and  Train- 
Program  for  Southern  Africa 
ETPSA)  is  designed  to  provide  ed- 
ion  and  training  to  students  from 
th  Africa  and  Namibia  who  are  de- 
these  opportunities  in  their  own 
itries.  Our  request  of  $800,000  for 
program  will  serve  to  demonstrate 
.  support  for  the  aspirations  of 
e  young  people  as  they  develop 
s  that  are  necessary  to  assume 
ership  roles  in  their  societies. 
Promotion  of  private  sector  devel- 
ent  is  a  major  U.S.  priority  both  in 
rnational  organization  affairs  and 
velopment  assistance.  Our  request 
iOO.OOO  to  fund  the  UN  Industrial 
elopment  Organization's  (UNIDO) 
stment  promotion  office  in  Wash- 
on,  D.C.,  will  contribute  to 
mplishing  this  objective.  The 
hington  investment  promotion  of- 
matches  U.S.  business  organiza- 
5  with  industrial  investment 
)rtunities  in  developing  countries, 
king  in  joint  ventures  between  the 
parties.  The  U.S.  parties  to  joint 
ures  have  unlimited  opportunities 
)ntribute  resources  to  the  projects, 
1  long-term  returns  on  their  invest- 
ts,  and  simultaneously  develop  new 
kets  in  both  developing  and  devel- 
I  countries.  The  sole  funding 
ce  for  FY  1990  is  our  voluntary 
ribution  from  this  account. 
The  UN  Trust  Fund  for  South  Af- 
(UNTFSA)  provides  humanitarian 
stance  to  victims  of  apartheid  and 
il  discrimination  in  South  Africa 
Namibia.  Our  request  of  $250,000 
rovide  assistance  to  black  South  Af- 
ns  persecuted  under  existing  re- 
sive  legislation  demonstrates  U.S. 
mitment  to  the  cause  of  freedom, 
ice,  and  equality  in  South  Africa 
Namibia. 

Our  contribution  of  $220,000  to  the 
Development  Fund  for  Women 
IFEM)  will  encourage  the  integra- 
of  women  as  vital  participants  in 
process  of  economic  and  social  de- 
pment.  Women  in  developing  coun- 
s  too  often  have  been  considered 
nly  marginal  to  the  essential  proe- 
ms of  development. 
The  Convention  on  International 
de  in  Endangered  Species 
TES)  of  wild  flora  and  fauna  pro- 
s  a  mechanism  for  protection  of  en- 


UN  Human  Rights  Report  on  Cuba 


PRESIDENT  BUSH, 
FEB.  27,  1989» 

I  wish  to  express  my  support  for  the 
UN  Human  Rights  Commission's  re- 
port on  human  rights  in  Cuba.  We  find 
the  report  full,  balanced,  and  objec- 
tive. Consideration  of  Cuba  marks  a 
watershed  in  the  UN  treatment  of  hu- 
man rights  abuses.  For  too  long,  the 
United  Nations  has  focused  on  small 
countries  which  lack  extensive  support 
within  the  organization.  Many  of  those 
countries  today  are  either  functioning 
democracies  or  have  taken  significant 
steps  on  the  road  toward  full  democ- 
racy. Meanwhile  longstanding  violators 
of  human  rights  have  enjoyed  immunity 
from  scrutiny  and  have  even  fostered 
human  rights  investigations  into  other 
countries. 

For  more  than  30  years,  the  people 
of  Cuba  have  languished  under  a  regi- 
me which  has  distinguished  itself  as 
one  of  the  most  repressive  in  the  world. 
Last  year  the  international  community 
won  an  important  victory  when  the  UN 
Human  Rights  Commission  decided  to 
conduct  a  full  investigation  into  the  sit- 
uation in  Cuba.  The  report  which  was 


released  in  Geneva  is  based  on  first- 
hand testimony  about  persistent  viola- 
tions of  human  rights  in  that  country  and 
is  the  culmination  of  that  investigation. 
The  United  States  firmly  believes 
that  this  report  should  begin  a  long- 
term  effort  to  bring  about  true  and 
lasting  changes  in  the  Cuban  Govern- 
ment's performance  on  human  rights. 
In  the  year  since  the  UN  Human 
Rights  Commission  decided  to  investi- 
gate Cuba,  there  have  been  slight  and 
superficial  improvements.  But  much 
more  needs  to  be  done  before  the  Cu- 
ban people  can  truly  be  said  to  enjoy 
the  rights  guaranteed  them  by  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  I 
call  upon  other  members  of  the  commis- 
sion and  all  countries  that  value  free- 
dom to  maintain  pressure  on  the  Cuban 
Government  by  continuing  UN  mon- 
itoring of  the  human  rights  situation 
in  Cuba.  The  people  of  Cuba  and  op- 
pressed people  everywhere  look  to  the 
United  Nations  as  their  last  best  hope. 
We  must  not  disappoint  them. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  6,  1989.  ■ 


dangered  species  of  wildlife  and  plants 
against  overexploitation  through  inter- 
national trade.  Our  request  of  $200,000 
for  the  CITES  trust  fund  will  support 
meetings  of  parties  to  the  conven- 
tion and  certain  operations  of  the 
secretariat. 

The  UN  Fellowship  Program 
(UNFP)  is  designed  to  compensate 
U.S.  Federal  agencies  for  the  adminis- 
trative costs  incurred  in  arranging  and 
monitoring  training  funded  by  UN  sys- 
tem agencies  in  the  amount  of  $6  mil- 
lion. Our  request  includes  $200,000  for 
this  program  for  FY  1990. 

'The  Convention  Concerning  the 
Protection  of  the  World  Cultural  and 
Natural  Heritage  officially  designates, 
as  outstanding  and  irreplaceable,  prop- 
erties of  international  significance. 
Through  the  World  Heritage  Fund,  the 
convention  provides  financial  assist- 
ance to  nations  to  protect  these  univer- 
sally acclaimed  natural  and  cultural 
sites  from  deterioration  and  destruc- 
tion. The  request  for  $200,000  will  en- 
able the  United  States  to  continue  to 


influence  the  allocation  of  the  fund  to 
projects  of  importance  to  U.S.  policies 
and  programs. 

Our  contribution  of  $100,000  to  the 
UN  Voluntary  Fund  for  Victims  of 
Torture  (UNVFVT)  furthers  our  mul- 
tilateral human  rights  objectives  in  the 
UN  Human  Rights  Commission  and 
supplements  U.S.  bilateral  human 
rights  efforts.  The  fund's  major  goal 
is  to  provide  medical  and  psycholog- 
ical assistance  to  victims  and  their 
families. 

The  International  Fund  for  Agri- 
cultural Development  (IFAD)  is  rec- 
ognized as  an  effective  development 
assistance  program.  We  have  not  re- 
quested any  funding  for  IFAD  in 
FY  1990  because  negotiations  for 
IFAD's  third  replenishment  are  still  un- 
derway. When  the  current  negotiations 
are  concluded  and  a  satisfactory  agree- 
ment is  reached,  we  intend  to  request 
funding  within  existing  resource  levels. 

The  final  item  is  our  $100,000  re- 
quest for  the  Intergovernmental  Panel 
on  Climate  Change  (IPCC).  The  IPCC 


liartment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


was  established  in  1988  to  provide  an 
international  forum  to  analyze  and  re- 
spond to  the  growing  changes  in  the 
Earth's  atmosphere  as  a  result  of  natu- 
ral and  man-made  chemicals.  As  one  of 
the  countries  likely  to  be  most  affected 
by  climate  change  and  by  decisions  as 
to  the  manner  in  which  to  respond  to 
this  global  problem,  the  United  States 
must  play  a  leading  role  in  the  deter- 
mination of  those  decisions. 

Our  total  request  is  a  little  over 
$17  million  less  than  that  appropriated 
for  FY  1989.  Overall  monetary  con- 
straints on  the  Federal  budget  have 
forced  us  to  confine  the  request  within 
these  limits.  We  have  reviewed  the  pi'o- 
grams  and  resource  situation  of  these 
agencies  and  believe  that  these  re- 
quests are  appropriate  to  their  present 
situation. 

Conclusion 

In  conclusion  I  would  like  to  mention 
that  as  we  participate  in  the  UN  sys- 
tem over  the  ne.xt  decade — for  example, 
with  UNICEF  and  the  UNDP  in  shap- 
ing the  direction  their  programs  will 
take — we  will  do  so  on  a  solid  basis  of 
managerial  improvements. 

We  will  also  shape  the  direction  of 
the  UN  system  agencies  that  strive  to 
eliminate  world  poverty,  hunger,  and 
inadequate  health  care  in  the  develop- 
ing world  within  a  framework  of  broad 
donor  consensus.  In  this  effort,  we  will 
focus  on  the  need  to  take  a  new  look  at 
the  relationships  among  the  partners  in 
the  system  to  assure  that  they  rein- 
force each  other  and  build  on  inherent 
strengths.  As  a  basic  policy,  we  contin- 
ue to  support  UNDP's  central  funding 
and  coordinating  role.  With  other  ma- 
jor donors,  we  will  seek  an  improved 
division  of  labor  between  UNDP  and 
the  technical  and  specialized  agencies 
of  the  UN  system  which  reflects  in- 
creased emphasis  on  building  institu- 
tional capacity  of  developing  countries 
and  transferring  specific  technical 
knowledge. 

Our  goals  may  sound  lofty.  How- 
ever, we  believe  that,  through  hard 
work  and  a  sincere  commitment  to  mul- 
tilateralism, we  can  succeed. 


Presidential  Election  Held  in  El  Salvador       I 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  2U402.  ■ 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEIVIENT, 
MAR.  22,  1989' 

President  Bush  spoke  earlier  today 
with  Alfredo  Cristiani,  the  winner  of 
the  Salvadoran  presidential  election,  to 
congratulate  him  on  his  victory.  The 
President  assured  iVIr.  Cristiani  that 
the  United  States  would  continue  to 
work  closely  with  El  Salvador  to  help 
the  Salvadorans  create  and  protect  a 
durable  democracy  there.  Mr.  Cristiani 
affirmed  his  recent  public  statements 
that  he  and  his  Administration  will  be 
committed  to  respect  human  rights. 
President  Bush  invited  Mr.  Cristiani  to 
visit  Washington  at  an  early  date. 

On  Sunday,  March  19,  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  Salvadoran  peasants, 
working  people,  businessmen  and  wo- 
men, and  citizens  from  every  walk  of 
life  defied  threats  of  death  and  terror 
from  Marxist  guerrillas  to  vote  in  that 
country's  presidential  election.  This 
was  the  sixth  national  election  El  Sal- 
vador has  held  under  international  su- 
pervision in  the  last  7  years. 

What  we  witnessed  last  Sunday 
should  leave  no  doubt;  the  people  of  El 
Salvador  are  passionately  committed  to 
the  democratic  rights  and  liberties  they 
have  fought  for  and  won  with  U.S.  sup- 
port in  recent  years. 

Our  policy  in  El  Salvador,  forged 
through  bipartisan  consensus  and  with 
bipartisan  support  is  clear;  we  are  com- 
mitted to  continued  democratic  prog- 
ress and  the  defense  of  human  rights. 
There  must  be  no  turning  back  to  the 
dark  and  terrible  past.  We  expect  and 
the  Salvadoran  people  clearly  desire 
continued  steady  progress  toward  es- 
tablishing the  rule  of  law,  an  effective 
judicial  system,  and  security  against 


political  violence  from  either  the  rigl 
or  the  left.  There  is  also  a  message  f( 
the  FMLN  [Farabundo  Marti  Nation 
Liberation  Front]  guerrillas  in  Sun- 
day's election;  the  Salvadoran  people 
clearly  yearn  for  an  end  to  the  terrib 
violence  to  which  they  have  been 
subjected. 

The  time  has  come  to  end  the  vii 
lence  and  secure  an  honorable  peace 
that  will  protect  the  rights  ancl  secu- 
rity of  all  Salvadorans,  regardless  of 
their  political  views,  to  participate  i 
safe  and  fair  political  process.  If  the 
FMLN  would  embrace  that  goal,  we 
are  confident  that  this  tragic  war  ca 
come  to  an  end.  The  President  wel- 
comes Mr.  Cristiani's  stated  commit- 
ment to  continue  the  dialogue  with  t 
FMLN  guerrillas  and  hope  the  guer 
rillas  accept  his  offer. 

Moreover,  the  guerrillas  will  no 
succeed  in  obtaining  the  political  vie 
tory  in  the  United  States  that  they 
cannot  win  among  the  people  of  El  S 
vador.  The  United  States  is  commiti 
to  the  defense  of  democracy  and  hun 
rights  in  El  Salvador.  So  long  as  El  i 
vador  continues  on  that  path,  the  Ui 
ed  States  will  remain  a  firm  and  ste 
ally. 

A  final  note — last  Sunday's  elecl 
heralds  the  final  months  of  the  presi 
dency  of  Jose  Napoleon  Duarte,  a  gr 
patriot  and  champion  of  democracy. 
President  salutes  President  Duarte 
his  courage,  his  patriotism,  his  stea 
fast  commitment  to  democracy,  and 
his  enormous  and  lasting  contributi' 
to  building  an  authentic  democratic 
process  in  his  country. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pi 
dential  Documents  of  Mar  27,  1989.  ■ 


84 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


liilean  Fruit  Exports  to  the  U.S. 


VT  STATEMENT, 

R.  l(i.  1989 

■etary  Baker  met  this  morning 
I  Chilean  Foreign  Minister  Hernan 
je  Errazuriz  and  with  Agriculture 
!ster  Jaime  de  la  Sotta  to  discuss 
lifficult  situation  currently  affect- 
IJhilean  fruit  exports  to  the  United 
as  and  elsewhere.  Recognizing  the 
er  to  the  Chilean  economy  and  the 
to  protect  the  safety  of  consum- 
Secretary  Baker  and  his  Chilean 
ts  agreed  that  the  two  countries 
Id  continue  to  work  together  closely 
n  urgent  basis  to  resolve  this 
lem. 

In  particular  Secretary  Baker 
ked  the  Foreign  Minister  for  the 
essive  cooperation  and  under- 
ding  the  United  States  has  re- 
d  from  the  Government  of  Chile 
from  all  those  involved  in  the  Chil- 
fruit  industry.  The  Chilean  minis- 
in  turn,  expressed  deep  concern 
he  damage  already  suffered  by 
and  emphasized  the  need  for 
action  to  avoid  further  economic 
social  costs.  In  this  regard,  they  al- 
to the  heavy  financial  losses  al- 
y  incurred  and  especially  to  the 
"that  about  200,000  Chilean  workers 
their  families  face  unemployment 
3ven  destitution.  Secretary  Baker 
onded  that  the  United  States 


shared  concern  over  the  damage  being 
suffered  in  Chile.  He  also  noted  that 
U.S.  industry  and  consumers  were  be- 
ing harmed  as  a  consequence  of  the  des- 
picable act  of  those  responsible  for  the 
poisoning  of  the  fruit. 

The  two  sides  reviewed  the  cooper- 
ative efforts  being  taken  by  the  Food 
and  Drug  Administration  (FDA),  the 
Chilean  authorities,  and  others  with  an 
active  role  in  fruit  exports  and  im- 
ports. The  goal  of  these  interdependent 
efforts  is  to  swiftly  return  the  situation 
to  normal  in  a  manner  which  serves  the 
important  interests  of  both  the  pro- 
ducers and  consumers  in  reestablishing 
the  safety  and  reliability  of  food  trade. 
Secretary  Baker  and  the  two  Chilean 
ministers  expressed  satisfaction  that  a 
team  of  experts  from  the  FDA  would 
travel  to  Santiago  immediately  to 
offer  their  services  to  their  Chilean 
counterparts. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  29,  1989' 

The  FDA  has  recently  decided  to  allow 
all  Chilean  fruit  except  melons  to  once 
again  be  released  for  sale  in  the  United 
States.  This  decision  will  certainly  be 
welcomed  by  U.S.  consumers.  FDA 
vigilance  and  quick  action  in  this  case 
reflect  a  careful  balancing  of  the  need 


to  protect  the  safety  of  our  consumers 
and  to  promote  foreign  trade.  Once 
again  our  ports  and  markets  are  open 
to  Chilean  fruit.  I  am  pleased  to  en- 
dorse FDA  Commissioner  Young's  elo- 
quent comment  that  our  own  families 
look  forward  to  eating  fresh  fruit  from 
Chile. 

This  unfortunate  episode  under- 
scores the  need  for  vigilant  interna- 
tional cooperation.  In  this  regard,  I  am 
pleased  that  we  were  able  to  work  in  a 
positive  spirit  of  teamwork  with  the 
Chileans  in  order  to  return  their  fruit 
safely  to  our  markets.  I  can  only  hope 
that  the  resumption  of  fruit  sales  will 
hold  losses  to  Chile's  economy  to  a 
minimum. 

As  a  next  and  essential  step,  those 
individuals  who  made  the  threatening 
calls  to  our  Embassy  in  Chile  and  who 
tampered  with  the  grapes  that  were 
discovered  in  Philadelphia  must  be 
found  and  brought  to  justice.  By  their 
acts,  they  jeopardized  not  only  the 
safety  of  U.S.  consumers  but  also 
caused  much  suffering  for  the  people 
of  Chile.  The  United  States  will  do  all 
that  it  can  to  assist  in  identifying  and 
prosecuting  these  criminals. 


'Press  release  54. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


85 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  tlie  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
New  York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
June  7,  U).^!);  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970. 
TIAS  6997. 

Accessions  deposited:  Algeria,  Feb.  7,  1989; 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Feb.  2,  1989;  Kenya, 
Feb.  10,  1989. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec. 
16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14.  1971. 
TIAS  7192. 

Accessions  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Feb.  22, 
1989;  Zimbabwe,  Feb.  8,  1989. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7.570. 
Accession  deposited:  Zimbabwe,  Feb.  8, 
1989. 

Protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
of  violence  at  airports  serving  international 
civil  aviation,  supplementary  to  the  conven- 
tion of  Sept.  23,  1971  (TIAS7570).  Done  at 
Montreal  Feb.  24,  1988.' 
Ratification  deposited:  United  Arab  Emi- 
rates, Mar.  9,  1989. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  wetlands  of  international  im- 
portance especially  as  waterfowl  habitat,  as 
amended.  Done  at  Ramsar  Feb.  2,  1971.  En- 
tered into  force  Dec.  21,  197.5;  for  the  U.S. 
Dec.  18,  1986. 

Accessions  deposited:  Malta,  Sept.  30,  1988; 
Vietnam,  Sept.  20,  1988. 

Protocol  to  the  convention  on  wetlands  of  in- 
ternational importance  especially  as  water- 
fowl habitat  of  Feb.  2,  1971.  Adopted  at 
Paris  Dec.  3,  1982.  Entered  into  force  Oct. 
1,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  18,  1986. 
Accession  deposited:  Venezuela,  Nov.  23, 
1988. 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  endan- 
gered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora,  with 
appendices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar.  3, 
1973.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1975.  TIAS 
8249. 

Accessions  deposited:  Chad,  Feb.  2,  1989; 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  Nov.  30, 
1988. 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973,  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  8249). 
Adopted  at  Gaborone  Apr.  30,  1983.'  [Sen- 
ate] Treaty  Doc.  98-10. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Denmark,  Jan.  10, 
1989;  India,  Jan.  11,  1989;  Sri  Lanka,  Nov.  7, 
1988. 


Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers, 

with  annexes,  as  amended.  Done  at  Geneva 

Dec.  2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  6, 

1977;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979.  TIAS  9037, 

10220. 

Accession  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Jan.  13,  1989. 

Copyright 

Berne  convention  for  the  protection  of  liter- 
ary and  artistic  works  of  Sept.  9,  1886,  as 
revised  at  Paris  July  24,  1971,  and  amended 
in  1979.  Entered  into  force  for  the  U.S. 
Mar.  1,  1989.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-27. 
Accessions  deposited:  Liberia,  Dec.  8,  1988;- 
Mauritius,  Feb.  9,  1989;^  Peru,  May  20,  1988; 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  May  16,  1988. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international 
transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  car- 
nets,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  14, 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20,  1978;  for 
the  U.S.  Mar.  18,  1982. 
Accession  deposited:  Algeria,  Feb.  28,  1989. 

Fisheries 

Protocol  to  amend  the  international  conven- 
tion of  May  14,  1966,  for  the  conservation  of 
Atlantic  tunas  (TIAS  6767).  Done  at  Paris 
July  10,  1984.1  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-4. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Cuba,  Jan.  11,  1989; 
Ghana,  Dec.  12,  1988. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Done  at  Paris 
Dec.  9,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  12, 
1951;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  23,  1989. 
Accession  deposited:  Korea,  Dem.  People's 
Rep.  of,  Jan.  31,  1989. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  International  Maritime 

Organization.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  6,  1948. 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1958.  TIAS 

4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Malawi,  Jan.  19, 

1989. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  maritime  naviga- 
tion, with  protocol  for  the  suppression  of 
unlawful  acts  against  the  safety  of  fixed 
platforms  located  on  the  Continental  Shelf. 
Done  at  Rome  Mar.  10,  1988.'  [Senate] 
Treaty  Doc.  101-1. 

Signatures:  Brunei,  Feb.  3,  1989;  Nether- 
lands, Jan.  23,  1989;  Seychelles,  Jan.  24, 
1989. 

Ratification  deposited:  Seychelles,  Jan.  24, 
1989. 

Nuclear  Accidents 

Convention  on  early  notification  of  a  nuclear 
accident.  Done  at  Vienna  Sept.  26,  1986.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  27,  1986;  definitively 
for  the  U.S.  Oct.  20^  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doe.  100-4. 

Ratification  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Feb.  8, 
1989. 


Nuclear  Material — Physical  Protectiof 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 

nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at 

Vienna  Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

Feb.  8,  1987. 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  Dec.  22, 

1988. 


86 


Patents — Plant  Varieties 

International  convention  for  the  protect! 
of  new  varieties  of  plants  of  Dec.  2,  1961 
revised.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  23,  1978.  E 
tered  into  force  Nov.  8,  1981.  TIAS  1019 
Accession  deposited:  Australia,  Feb.  1, 
1989. 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozoi 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  Mai 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22,  1988. 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Accessions  deposited:  German  Dem.  Re 
Jan.  25,  1989;  Liechtenstein,  Feb.  8,  198 
Panama,  Feb.  13,  1989;  Uruguay,  Feb.  2 
1989. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  de 
plete  the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done 
Montreal  Sept.  16,  1987.  Entered  into  fc 
Jan.  1,  1989.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-1 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Mar.  9,  19! 
Accessions  deposited:  German  Dem.  Re 
Jan.  25,  1989;  Liechtenstein,  Feb.  8,  198 
Ratifications  deposited:  Ghana,  Mar.  8, 
1989;  Panama,  Mar.  3,  1989;  Venezuela, 
6,  1989. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conve 
tions  of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363. 
3364,  3365),  and  relating  to  the  protecti 
victims  of  international  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  I),  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  ( 
neva  June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  D 
1978.-i 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conve 
tions  of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363, 
3364,  3365),  and  relating  to  the  protecti 
victims  of  noninternational  armed  conf 
(Protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.-*  [ 
ate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-2. 
Accessions  deposited:  Nigeria,  Oct.  10, 
Solomon  Islands,  Sept.  19,  1988. 

Satellite  Communications  Systems 

Agreement  relating  to  the  Internationa 
Telecommunications  Satellite  Organizal 
(INTELSAT),  with  annexes.  Done  at  W, 
ington  Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  into  fore 
Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7.532. 
Accessions  deposited:  Nepal,  Mar.  1,  19; 
Zimbabwe,  Mar.  15,  1989. 

Operating  agreement  relating  to  the  Ini 
national  Telecommunications  Satellite  C 
nization  (INTELSAT),  with  annex.  Don 
Washington  Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  F>b.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Signatures:  Nepal  Telecommunications 
Corp.,  Mar.  1,  1989;  Government  of  Zim 
babwe,  Mai".  15,  1989. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/May 


TREATIES 


/ention  on  the  International  Maritime 
llite  Organization  (INMARSAT),  with 
■X.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976.  En- 
d  into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
■ssion  deposited:  Czechoslovakia.  Dec.  8, 

•ating  agreement  on  the  Interna- 
d  Maritime  Satellite  Organization 
lARSAT),  with  annex.  Done  at  London 

3,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July  16, 

TIAS  9605. 
ature:  Czechoslovakia,  Dec.  8,  1988. 

ndments  to  the  convention  and  operat- 
igreement  on  the  International  Mar- 
3  Satellite  Organization  (INMARSAT) 
pt.  3,  1976  (TIAS  9605).  Adopted  at 
Ion  Oct.  16,  1985.1 
ptance  deposited:  Oman,  Nov.  28,  1988. 


ocol  amending  the  slavery  convention 
id  at  Geneva  on  Sept.  25,  1926,  and  an- 
TS  778).  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  7, 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1953,  for 
■rotocol;  July  7,  1955,  for  the  annex  to 
rotocol;  for 'the  U.S.  Mar.  7,  1956.  TIAS 

lementary  convention  on  the  abolition 
very,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions 
)ractices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Ge- 
Sept.  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force  Apr. 
357;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  6,  1967.  TIAS 

'ication  of  succession  deposited:  An- 
and  Barbuda,  Oct.  25,  1988;  effective 
1,  1981. 


national  sugar  agreement,  1987,  with 
>ces.  Done  at  London  Sept.  11,  1987.  En- 
I  into  force  provisionally  Mar.  24.  1988. 
'ication  of  provisional  application:  Boliv- 
?b.  2,  1989. 
ssion  deposited:  Mexico,  Feb.  22,  1989. 

arism 

■national  convention  against  the  taking 
stages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983;  for 
I.S.  Jan.  6,  1985. 
ssion  deposited:  Kuwait,  Feb.  6,  1989. 


■national  tropical  timber  agreement, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  18, 
Entered  into  force  provisionally 

1,  1985;  for  the  U.S.  Apr  26,  1985. 

ssion  deposited:  Panama,  Mar.  3,  1989. 


eiition  against  torture  and  other  cruel, 

man,  or  degrading  treatment  or  punish- 

Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1984.  En- 

into  force  June  26,  1987. •'  [Senate] 
ty  Doe.  100-20. 
Fications  deposited:  Netherlands, 

21,  1988;2  Portugal,  Feb.  9,  1989.2 


Trade 

United  Nations  convention  on  contracts  for 
the  international  sale  of  goods.  Done  at 
Vienna  Apr.  11,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1988.  [52  Fed.  Reg.  6262.] 
Ratifications  deposited:  Denmark,  Feb.  14, 
1989;  German  Deni.  Rep.,  Feb.  23,  1989. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 

discrimination  against  women.  Done  at  New 

York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

Sept.  3,  1981. •< 

Ratification  deposited:  Luxembourg,  Feb.  2, 

1989. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done 
at  Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Byelorussian 
S.S.R.,  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,"  U.S.S.R., 
Oct.  12,  1988;  Malaysia,  Dec.  7,  1988. 
Acceptances  deposited:  German  Dem.  Rep., 
Dec.  12,  1988;  Korea,  Rep.  of.,  Sept.  14, 
1988. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Arrangement  concerning  the  construction  of 
a  high  frequency  radio  communications  facil- 
ity. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Can- 
berra Dec.  16,'l988,  and  Jan.  20,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  20,  1989. 

Bahamas 

Agreement  on  the  control  of  narcotic  drugs 
and  psychotropic  substances,  with  appendix. 
Signed  at  Nassau  Feb.  17,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  17,  1989. 

Belgium 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Jan. 
7  and  19,  1981  (TIAS  9970),  in  the  field  of  ra- 
dioactive waste  management.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  and  Mol 
Jan.  5  and  24,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  24,  1989. 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  Sept.  29,  1948,  as  amended 
(TIAS  5.507,  6340).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  La  Paz  June  28  and  Aug.  23,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  23,  1988. 

Canada 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  26,  1973,  as  amended  (TIAS  7837, 
9352),  for  promotion  of  safety  on  the  Great 
Lakes  by  means  of  radio.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Ottawa  Dec.  2,  1987, 
Aug.  10  and  Oct.  24,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  Feb.  1,  1989. 

Arrangement  in  the  area  of  coal/heavy  oil 
coprocessing.  Signed  at  Washington  and  Ot- 
tawa Jan.  19  and  Feb.  14,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  14,  1989. 


China 

Memorandum  of  agreement  regarding  inter- 
national trade  in  commercial  launch  serv- 
ices, with  annex.  Signed  at  Washington  Jan. 
26,  1989.  Enters  into  force  upon  U.S.  noti- 
fication of  approval  of  a  license  for  the 
export  of  the  ASIASAT  or  AUSSAT  satel- 
lite(s),  or  any  other  satellite,  to  China  for 
launch  therein. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov. 
25  and  Dee.  14,  1987,  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex- 
tile products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  San  Jose  Dec.  2,  1988,  "and  Jan.  4,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  4,  1989. 

France 

Agreement  for  cooperation  in  high  energy 
laser-matter  interaction  physics  research 
and  development.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Paris  Dec.  12  and  19,  1988.  Entered  into  for- 
ce Dec.  19,  1988. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Jan. 
18,  1977  (TIAS  8839),  in  the  field  of 
liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder  reactors. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washing- 
ton and  Paris  Nov.  1,  1988,  and  Jan.  11, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  11,  1989. 

Gabon 

International  expi-ess  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Libreville 
and  Washington  Jan.  23  and  Mar.  8,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  17,  1989. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
June  8,  1976,  as  extended  (TIAS  8657),  in 
the  field  of  liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder 
reactors.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  and  Bonn  Nov.  1  and  Dec.  30, 
1988,  and  Feb.  8,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  8,  1989;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  11,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities.  Signed  at  Tegucigalpa 
Feb.  9,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  9, 
1989. 

Hungary 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  15  and  25,  1983,  as  amended  and  ex- 
tended (TIAS  10666),  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Budapest  Nov.  29  and  Dec.  13, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  13,  1988. 

International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA) 

Agreement  for  the  application  of  safeguards 
in  connection  with  the  treaty  for  the  prohibi- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  in  Latin  America 
(TIAS  7137).  Signed  at  Vienna  Feb.  17,  1989. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  U.S.  noti- 
fication to  IAEA  that  U.S.  statutory  and 
constitutional  requirements  for  entry  into 
force  have  been  met. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


87 


TREATIES 


Israel 

Land  lease  anri  purchase  agreement  [for 
construction  of  diplomatic  facilities],  with 
annexes.  Signed  at  Jerusalem  Jan.  18,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  18,  1989. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Aug.  27,  1986,  as  amended,  re- 
lating to  trade  in  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Kingston  Oct.  26  and  Nov.  1,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  Nov.  1,  1988. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  27,  1986,  as  amended  and  extended,  re- 
lating to  trade  in  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Kingston  Nov.  9"and  30,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  30,  1988;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  27,  1986,  as  amended  and  extended,  re- 
lating to  trade  in  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts and  the  administrative  arrangement  of 
Aug.  27,  1986,  as  amended,  relating  to  visa 
and  certification  procedures  for  exports  of 
textile  products  from  Jamaica.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Kingston  Sept.  14  and 
Dec.  19,  1988;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Japan 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  31,  1979  (TIAS  9814),  in  the  field  of 
liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder  reactors. 
Signed  at  Tokyo  Jan.  27,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  27,  1989. 

Korea 

Agreement  concerning  the  importation  and 
distribution  of  foreign  motion  pictures  in 
the  Republic  of  Korea.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Washington  Dec.  30,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Dec.  30,  1988. 

Agreement  concerning  market  access  for 
wine  and  wine  products  in  Korea,  with  an- 
nexes. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  Jan.  18,  1989.  Entered  into  for- 
ce .Jan.  18,  1989. 

Macao 

Agreement  amending  the  administrative  ar- 
rangement of  Aug.  21,  1981,  for  a  visa  sys- 
tem relating  to  trade  in  certain  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Hong  Kong  and  Macao  Nov.  2  and  Dec.  12, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  12,  1988;  ef- 
fective Jan.  1,  1989. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  28,  1983,  and  Jan.  9,  1984,  as  amended 
and  extended,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products  and  the  administrative  arrange- 
ment of  Aug.  21,  1981,  as  amended,  for  a 
visa  system  relating  to  trade  in  certain  tex- 
tile products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Hong  Kong  and  Macao  Nov.  7  and 
Dec.  30,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  30, 
1988;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 


Marshall  Islands 

Investment  incentive  agreement.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Majuro  Jan.  20, 
1988,  and  Jan.  25,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  25,  1989. 

Mauritius 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  3  and  4,  1985,  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Port  Louis  Dec.  14, 
1988,  and  Jan.  25,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  25,  1989. 

Mexico 

Agreement  modifying  the  agreement  of 

June  18,  1982  (TIAS  10.534),  concerning  land 

mobile  service  in  the  bands  470-512  MHz 

and  806-890  MHz  along  the  common  U.S.- 

Me.xico  border.  Signed  at  Mexico  Sept.  12, 

1988. 

Entered  into  force:  Feb.  8,  1989. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  air 
transport  agreement  of  Aug.  15,  1960,  as 
amended  and  extended  (TIAS  4675,  7167). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico 
Sept.  23,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  Mar.  7,  1989. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  13,  1988,  as  amended,  concerning  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Washington  Oct.  25  and  Nov. 
17,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  17,  1988. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  13,  1988,  as  amended,  concerning  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Washington  Nov.  17  and  23, 
1988.  Entei-ed  into  force  Nov.  23,  1988. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
tion in  management  and  protection  of  na- 
tional parks  and  other  protected  natural  and 
cultural  heritage  sites,  with  annex.  Signed 
at  Mexico  and  Washington  Nov.  30,  1988, 
and  Jan.  24,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
24,  1989. 

Morocco 

Agreement  regarding  joint  cooperation  in 
fighting  against  international  terrorism,  or- 
ganized crime,  and  the  illicit  production, 
trafficking,  and  abuse  of  narcotics.  Signed 
at  Rabat  Feb.  10,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  10,  1989. 

Nigeria 

Mutual  cooperation  agreement  for  reducing 
demand,  preventing  illicit  use,  and  combat- 
ting illicit  production  and  trafficking  in 
drugs.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Lagos  Jan.  13  and  24,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  24,  1989. 

Papua  New  Guinea 

Status  of  forces  agreement.  Signed  at  Port 
Moresby  Feb.  28,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  28,  1989. 


Peru 

Agreement  concerning  the  reciprocal  e. 
emption  from  income  tax  of  income  der; 
from  the  international  operation  of  ship 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Lima 
Dec.  15,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 
1988. 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  28  and  Mar.  31,  1983,  as  amended  ; 
extended,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  te 
and  the  agreement  of  Nov.  7  and  16,  19f 
amended,  relating  to  trade  in  wool  and 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  product: 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Buehare 
Nov.  28,  1988,  and  .Jan.  12,  1989.  Enter 
into  force  Jan.  12,  1989;  effective  Jan.  1 
1989. 

Agreement  amending  the  administrati 
rangement  of  Oct.  13,  1982,  and  Aug.  2 
1983,  concerning  a  visa  system  relatinj 
trade  in  certain  textile  products.  Effet 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Bucharest  Se 
16,  1988.  and  Jan.  18  and  31,  1989.  Ent. 
into  force  Jan.  31,  1989. 

St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines 

Agreement  concerning  reciprocal  exen 
from  income  tax  of  income  derived  froi 
international  operation  of  ships  and  air 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bridg 
town  and  Kingston  Oct.  11,  1988,  and 
Feb.  15,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Feb. 
1989. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  on  the  establishment  of  joi 

Loran-C  and  Chayka  radionavigation  s 

terns,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Moscow  W 

1988. 

Entered  into  force:  Mar.  2,  1989. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  ( 
Sept.  20,  1976,  as  amended  and  extend 
(TIAS  10213),  in  the  field  of  liquid  met 
cooled  fast  breeder  reactors.  Effected 
exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  and 
lev  Nov.  1  and  Dec.  14,  1988.  Entered  i 
force  Dec.  14,  1988. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  o 
May  14,  1987,  as  extended,  concerning 
Montserrat  and  narcotics  activities.  El 
ed  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
28,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  28,  li 


■Not  in  force. 
-With  declaration(s). 
■'Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 


88 


F^ESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


apartment  of  State 


ss  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
Jte.  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


Dale  Subject 

3/6         Baker:  address  at  the  opening 
of  the  CFE  negotiations, 
Vienna. 

3/10       Baker;  statement  following 
meeting  with  Austrian 
Foreign  Minister  Mock, 
Vienna,  Mar.  5. 

3/10       Baker:  remarks,  question- 
and-answer  session 
following  meeting  with 
Soviet  F'oreign  Minister 
Shevardnadze,  Vienna, 
Mar.  7. 

3/9         Richard  A.  Boucher  appointed 
deputy  spokesman 
(biographic  data). 

3/13       Baker,  Arens:  remarks 
following  meeting. 

3/14       Baker:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  House 
Appropriations  Committee. 

3/15       Baker:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee. 

3/21       Baker:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on 
International  Operations, 
House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee. 

3/23       V.  Kim  Hoggard  appointed 
Senior  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Public 
Affairs  (biographic  data). 

3/23       Baker:  remarks  at  memorial 
service  for  John  J.  McCloy, 
Brick  Presbyterian  Church, 
New  York  City,  Mar.  21. 

3/24       Thomas  R.  Pickering  sworn 
in  as  U.S.  Permament 
Representative  to  the  UN, 
Mar.  20  (biographic  data). 

3/27       Baker:  interview  on 
"MacNeil/Lehrer 
Newshour,"  Mar.  24. 

3/27       Baker:  interview  on  "This 
Week  With  David 
Brinkley,"  Mar.  26. 

3/27       Baker:  interview  on  "The 
Today  Show,"  Houston. 

3/27       Baker:  interview  on  "Good 
Morning,  America," 
Houston. 

3/28       Margaret  DeB.  Tutwiler 
sworn  in  as  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Public 
Affairs  and  Department 
spokesman.  Mar.  3 
(biographic  data). 


*51      3/29       Robert  M.  Kimmitt  sworn  in 
as  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs,  Mar.  2 
(biographic  data). 

*52      3/29      John  T  McCarthy,  U.S. 

Ambassador  to  Lebanon 
(biographic  data). 

*53      3/29       Dennis  B.  Ross,  Director, 
Policy  Planning  Staff 
(biographic  data). 
54      3/29       Baker:  Chilean  fruit  sales 
resume  in  U.S. 

*55      3/31       Program  for  the  visit  of 
Egyptian  President 
Mubarak,  Apr.  1-5. 

56  3/31       Baker:  address  at  consultation 

on  a  new  hemispheric 
agenda.  Carter  Presidential 
Center,  Atlanta,  Mar.  30. 

57  3/31       Baker:  statement  on  Namibia 

and  Angola. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Division,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

President  Bush 

Continuity  and  Change  in  U.S. -Korean 
Relations,  National  Assembly,  Seoul, 
Feb.  27,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1155). 

Secretary  Baker 

Statement  at  Senate  Confirmation  Hear- 
ings, Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee, Jan.  17,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1146). 

The  International  Agenda  and  FY  1990  Budg- 
et Request,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee, Feb.  21,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1147). 

New  Horizons  in  Europe,  ministerial  meet- 
ing signaling  Mar.  9  opening  of  CSBM  and 
CFE  talks,  Vienna,  Mar.  6,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1154). 

Africa 

The  U.S.  and  Sudan:  Peace  and  Relief  (Re- 
gional Brief,  Feb.  1989). 

Southwestern  Africa:  Blueprint  for  Peace 
(GIST,  Feb.  1989). 

Arms  Control 

Confidence-  and  Security-Building  Meas- 
ures Negotiations  (GIST,  Mar.  1989). 

Department/Foreign  Service 

Bureau  of  Public  Affairs  Services  to  the 
Public  (Public  Information  Series,  Jan. 
1989). 


East  Asia 

FY  1990  Foreign  Assistance  Requests  for 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Acting  As- 
sistant Secretary  Clark,  Subcommittee  on 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Feb.  27,  1989  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #1150). 

Burma:  Political  Situation  and  Human 
Rights,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Lam- 
bertson.  Subcommittee  on  Asian  and  Pa- 
cific Affairs,  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Mar.  2,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1153). 

Future  Prospects  for  the  Philippines,  Depu- 
ty Assistant  Secretary  Lambertson,  Sub- 
committee on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Mar.  7, 
1989  (Current  Policy  #1157). 

Update  on  Cambodia,  Deputy  Assistant  Sec- 
retary Lambertson,  Subcommittee  on 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Mar.  1,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1152). 

U.S.  E.xport  Controls  and  China  (GIST, 
Mar.  1989). 


Economics 

The  World  Bank  (GIST,  Mar. 


1989). 


Europe 

Security  Challenges  Facing  NATO  in  the 
1990s,  Ambassador  Nitze,  Nobel  Insti- 
tute's Leangkollen  Seminar,  Oslo,  Feb.  6, 
1989  (Current  Policy  #1149). 

CSCE  Vienna  FoUow-Up  Meeting,  A  Frame- 
work for  Europe's  Future  (Selected  Docu- 
ments #35,  Jan.  1989). 

25th  Semiannual  Report — Implementation  of 
Helsinki  Final  Act,  Apr.  1,  1988-Sept.  30, 
1988  (Special  Report  #181,  Feb.  1989). 

Human  Rights 

Human  Rights  Issues  in  Africa,  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretaries  Brown  and  Farrand, 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Operations, 
House  Appropriations  Committee,  Feb.  7 
and  8,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1148). 

Human  Rights  in  Cuba:  An  Update  (Public 
Information  Series,  Jan.  1989). 

Science  &  Technology 

Toward  a  Global  High-Definition  TV  Produc- 
tion Standard,  U.S.  Coordinator  Landau, 
Subcommittee  on  Telecommunications, 
Consumer  Protection,  and  Finance,  House 
Energy  and  Commerce  Committee, 
Mar.  8",  1989  (Current  Policy  #1158). 

Terrorism 

Terrorism:  Its  Evolving  Nature,  Ambas- 
sador Bremer,  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Feb.  9,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1151). 

Western  Hemisphere 

El  Salvador:  Presidential  Election  Guide, 
(Public  Information  Series,  Mar.  1989).  ■ 


li)artment  of  State  Bulletin/May  1989 


89 


^DEX 


Iy1989 

|ume89,  No.  2146 


ca.  Human  Rights  Issues  in  Africa 

rown,  Farrand)  27 

ola.  Namibian  Independence  and  Troop 

[ithdrawal  From  Angola  (Baker)   29 

s  Control 

pean  Security  Negotiations  Open  in 
enna  (Bush,  Ledogar,  Maresca,  Western 

sition  paper) 33 

Horizons  in  Europe  (Baker) 56 

etary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

ivid  Brinkley"    25 

ma 

Tia:  Political  Situation  and  Human 

ghts  (Lambertson)  40 

•na — A  Profile    41 

ibodia 

bodia— A  Profile 39 

ite  on  Cambodia  (Lambertson) 37 

,  Chilean  Fruit  Exports  to  the  U.S. 

aker,  joint  statement)   85 

la.  President's  Trip  to  Japan,  China, 
d  South  Korea  (Baker,  Bush,  White 

luse  statement )   1 

jress 

na:  Political  Situation  and  Human 

ghts  (Lambertson)  40 

ification  for  Narcotics  Source  and 
ansit  Countries  (Secretary's  letter  to 

Congress,  Wrobleski) 68 

1990  Assistance  Request  for  East  Asia 

d  the  Pacific  (Clark) 49 

990  Assistance  Request  for  the  Middle 

st  (Burleigh,  Walker)   61 

990  Assistance  Request  for 
ganizations  and  Programs 

pgelgesang) 81 

1990  Assistance  Request  for  Refugee 

ograms  (Moore)    72 

re  Prospects  for  the  Philippines 

imbertson) 43 

an  Rights  Issues  in  Africa  (Brown, 

rrand)  27 

3  Threats  Against  Author  (Adams)  . .  78 
jrism:  Its  Evolving  Nature 

•emer)  74 

ite  on  Cambodia  (Lambertson) 37 

I.  UN  Human  Rights  Report  on  Cuba 

ash) 83 

Asia 

ification  for  Narcotics  Source  and 
ansit  Countries  (Secretary's  letter  to 

;  Congress.  Wrobleski) 68 

1990  Assistance  Request  for  East  Asia 

i  the  Pacific  (Clark) 49 

lomics.  Dealing  With  the  International 

bt  Crisis  (Brady)  53 

ilvador.  Presidential  Election  Held  in 
Salvador  (White  House  statement)  . .  84 


Europe 

European  Security  Negotiations  Open  in 

Vienna  (Bush,  Ledogar,  Maresca,  Western 

position  |)aper) 33 

New  Horizons  in  Europe  (Baker) 56 

Foreign  Assistance 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for  East  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Clark) 49 

FY  199(1  Assistance  Request  for  the  Middle 

East  (Burleigh,  Walker)   61 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for  Refugee 

Programs  (Moore)    72 

Human  Rights 

Burma:  Political  Situation  and  Human 

Rights  (Lambertson)  40 

Human  Rights  Issues  in  Africa  (Brown, 

Farrand)  27 

UN  Human  Rights  Report  on  Cuba 

(Bush) 83 

Iran.  Iran's  Threats  Against  Author 

(Adams) 78 

Iraq.  Iraq  to  Pay  Compensation 

(Department  statement) 67 

Israel.  Secretary  Meets  With  Israeli 

Foreign  Minister  (Arens,  Baker)  63 

Japan.  President's  Trip  to  Japan,  China,  and 

South  Korea  (Baker,  Bush,  White  House 

statement) 1 

Korea.  President's  Trip  to  Japan,  China, 

and  South  Korea  (Baker,  Bush,  White 

House  statement)   1 

Lebanon.  Continued  Fighting  in  Lebanon 

(Department  statements) 65 

Middle  East 

FY  199U  Assistance  Request  for  the  Middle 

East  (Burleigh,  Walker)   61 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    25 

U.S.  and  PLO  Meet  in  Tunis 

(Pelletreau)    66 

Military  Affairs.  Iraq  to  Pay  Compensation 

(Department  statement) 67 

Namibia.  Namibian  Independence  and 

Troop  Withdrawal  From  Angola 

(Baker) 29 

Narcotics.  Certification  for  Narcotics 

Source  and  Transit  Countries  (Secretary's 

letter  to  the  Congress,  Wrobleski) 68 

Nicaragua 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "MacNeil/Lehrer 

Newshour"   23 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    25 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
European  Security  Negotiations  Open  in 

Vienna  (Bush,  Ledogar  Maresca,  Western 

position  paper) 33 

New  Horizons  in  Europe  (Baker) 56 

Organization  of  American  States.  FY  1990 

Assistance  Request  for  Organizations  and 

Programs  (Vogelgesang) 81 

Pacific.  FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Clark) 49 

Philippines.  Future  Prospects  for  the 

Philippines  (Lambertson) 43 


Presidential  Documents 

European  Security  Negotiations  Open  in 
Vienna  (Bush,  Ledogar,  Maresca,  Western 
position  paper) 33 

President's  Trip  to  Japan.  China,  and  South 
Korea  (Baker,  Bush,  White  House 
statement) 1 

UN  Human  Rights  Report  on  Cuba 
(Bush) 83 

Publications.  Department  of  State 89 

Refugees.  FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 
Refugee  Programs  (Moore)  72 

Security  Assistance 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  (Clark) 49 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for  the  Middle 
East  (Burleigh,  Walker)   61 

Terrorism 

Iran's  Threats  Against  Author  (Adams)  . .  78 

Terrorism:  Its  Evolving  Nature 
(Bremer)  74 

Trade.  Chilean  Fruit  Exports  to  the  U.S. 
(Baker,  joint  statement)   85 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 86 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Meets  With  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  (Baker)  59 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley"    25 

United  Nations 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for  Organiza- 
tions and  Programs  (Vogelgesang) 81 

Namibian  Independence  and  Troop 
Withdrawal  From  Angola  (Baker)   29 

UN  Human  Rights  Report  on  Cuba 
(Bush) 83 

Warsaw  Pact 

European  Security  Negotiations  Open  in 
Vienna  (Bush,  Ledogar,  Maresca,  Western 
position  paper) 33 

New  Horizons  in  Europe  (Baker) 56 

Western  Hemisphere.  Certification  for 
Narcotics  Source  and  Transit  Countries 
(Secretary's  letter  to  the  Congress, 
Wrobleski) 68 

Name  Index 

Adams,  Alvin  P. ,  Jr  78 

Arens,  Moshe 63 

Baker,  Secretary      1,23,25,29,56,59,63,68,85 

Brady,  Nicholas  F 53 

Bremer,  L.  Paul,  III 74 

Brown,  Kenneth  L   27 

Burleigh,  A.  Peter  61 

Bush,  President  1,33,83 

Clark,  William,  Jr   49 

Farrand,  Robert  W   27 

Lambertson,  David  F 37,40,43 

Ledogar,  Stephen  J 33 

Maresca,  .John  J 33 

Moore,  Jonathan  72 

Pelletreau,  Robert  H.,  Jr 66 

Vogelgesang,  Sandra  L  81 

Walker,  Edward  S 61 

Wrobleski,  Ann  B  68 


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ih^paritnvn  t 
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he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /Volume  89  /  iNumber  2147 


#- JUL- 10  1989 
pnaTQi'i  ^'Wzv.Cj  lishahy 

•-^  ,'■■     \,-   -.-',:.    .       ,   ■-T"    [■'•:■*  ^r-,","' ;•■•:■ 


June  1989 


The  President  and  the  congressional  lead- 
ership announce  the  Bipartisan  Accord  on 
Central  America. 

(White  House  photo  by  Michael  Sargent) 


Dppartntpnt  of  Stat p 

bulletin 


Volume  89  /  Number  2147  /  June  1989 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
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JAMES  A.  BAKER,  III 

Secretary  of  State 

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Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

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Director, 

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Editor 


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CONTENTS 


0 

'  le  President 

Commitment  to  Democracy  and 
Economic  Progress  in  Latin 
America 

Encouraging  Political  and 
Economic  Reforms  in  Poland 


le  Secretary 

U.S.  and  Latin  America:  A 
Shared  Destiny 

Power  For  Good:  American  For- 
eign Policy  in  the  New  Era 

Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 

Interview  for  "American 
Interests" 


Srica 


Transition  to  Independence 
Marred  in  Namibia  (Depart- 
ment Statement) 


tms  Control 

1        Chemical  Weapons  Disposal  Pro- 
gram (Max  L.  Friedersdorf) 


Eonomics 


2 


Request  for  U.S.  Contributions 
to  Multilateral  Development 
Banks  (Nicholas  F.  Brady) 

Status  of  Multilateral  Trade 
Negotiations  (Carta  A.  Hills) 

Foreign  Direct  Investment  in  a 
Global  Economy 


Europe 

35  The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of 

Soviet  Reform  (Paula  J. 
Dobriansky) 

36  NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 

Meets  in  Brussels  (Final 
Communique) 

37  Polish  Roundtable  Accords 

(White  House  Statement) 
39        President  Meets  With  Irish 
Prime  Minister  (President 
Bush) 


Middle  East 

40  Visit  of  Egyptian  President 

(President  Bush,  Mohammed 
Hosni  Mubarak) 

41  Continuation  of  Arms  Sales  to 

Saudi  Arabia  (President 
Bush) 

42  Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 

(President  Bush,  Yitzhak 
Shamir) 

43  Situation  in  Lebanon  (Depart- 

ment and  White  House  State- 
ments) 


Nuclear  Policy 

44        Nuclear  Cooperation  With 
EURATOM(Le«er  Coffee 
Congress) 


Pacific 

45  U.S. -New  Zealand  Relations: 
Some  Parting  Observations 
(Paul  M.  Cleveland) 


Security  Assistance 

52        FY  1990  Security  Assistance 
Request  (H.  Allen  Holmes) 

Western  Hemisphere 

55        U.S.  Support  for  Democracy 

and  Peace  in  Central  America 
(Secretary  Baker.  President 
Bush,  Bipartisan  Accord, 
Joint  Declarations) 

59  FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for 
Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Michael  G.  Kozak) 

66  President's  Meeting  With  El 

Salvador's  President-Elect 
(White  House  Statement) 

67  Soviet  Policy  in  Central  Amer- 

ica (White  House  Statement) 

67  Electoral  and  Media  Laws  in 

Nicaragua  (Department 
Statement) 

Treaties 

68  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

70        Department  of  State 

Publications 

70        Department  of  State 

Index 


Science  &  Technology 


48 


51 


Toward  a  Global  High-Definition 
TV  Production  Standard 
(Sonia  Landau) 

U.S.  International  Activities  in 
Science  and  Technology 
(Message  to  the  Congress) 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Commitment  to  Democracy 

and  Economic  Progress 

in  Latin  America 


President  Bush's  address  before 
Council  of  the  Americas  conference 
the  Department  of  State  on  May  2, 

oking  around  the  world  today,  in  de- 
loping  countries  and  even  in  the  com- 
inist  bloc,  we  see  the  triumph  of  two 
eat  ideas:  the  idea  of  free  govern- 
nt  and  the  idea  of  free  enterprise, 
id  certainly,  Latin  America  and  the 
ribbean  are  proving  fertile  ground 

these  ideas.  Democracy,  a  decade 
0  the  e.xception,  I  think  we  would  all 
ree,  is  today  the  rule.  And  the  sym- 

of  this  new  breeze  is  the  ballot  box. 
id  by  year's  end,  14  national  elections 
11  have  been  held  across  the  Americas. 
And  let's  remember  what  it  means 
vote  in  some  countries  when  democ- 
?y  itself  is  at  stake.  We're  not  talking 
out  people  who  may  stay  home  from 

l)oils  because  it's  raining  or  rush- 
ur  traffic  is  heavy.  We're  talking,  in 
lie  cases,  about  people  literally  risk- 

their  lives  to  exercise  their  demo- 
itic  right. 

And  listen  to  the  words  of  a  Sal- 
doran  man  on  the  eve  of  last  month's 
esidential  elections  in  that  country — 
•ctions  that  guerrilla  forces  vowed  to 
;rupt:  "Of  course,  I'm  going  to  vote, 
hough  I  have  to  admit  it's  very  scary, 
■re,  going  to  the  grocery  store  can  be 
ngerous — but  you  have  to  do  it.  And 
u  have  to  vote,  too.  We  just  can't  roll 
sr  and  play  dead  each  time  we're 

eatened."  That's  the  voice  of  democ- 
:y  speaking,  and  it's  the  voice  of  cour- 
e  and  hope. 

Economically,  although  there  is 
junting  concern  about  international 
bt,  there  are  encouraging  signs  as 
■11.  Mexico  has  joined  GATT  [General 
!;reement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  and 
moving  toward  a  more  open  and  in- 
rnationally  oriented  economy.  In  Cos- 
Rica  and  Brazil  and  Venezuela,  new 
ntures  are  creating  export  oppor- 
nities  that  promise  a  broader  eco- 
mic  base  for  those  countries.  You 

the  business  community  are  among 
e  pioneers  and  partners  in  these 
anges.  And  you're  contributing  to 


Latin  America's  increased  produc- 
tivity— you're  helping  the  region  to 
fulfill  its  potential  for  progress. 

The  historic  shift  in  political  and 
economic  thinking  now  underway  in 
Latin  America  is  good  news  for  us  all. 
Our  task  is  clear:  to  make  the  most  of 
the  new  opportunities  open  to  us,  we 
must  improve  our  working  partner- 
ships in  this  hemisphere — between 
countries  north  and  south;  between 
government,  business,  and  labor;  and, 
in  the  United  States,  between  the  dif- 
ferent branches  of  the  Federal  govern- 
ment. We  share  common  interests — we 
must  work  toward  a  common  aim. 

My  Administration  will  work  to 
build  a  new  partnership  for  the 
Americas — a  partnership  built  on  mu- 
tual respect  and  mutual  respon- 
sibilities. And  we  seek  a  partnership 
rooted  in  a  common  commitment  to 
democratic  rule. 

The  battle  for  democracy  is  far 
from  over.  The  institutions  of  free  gov- 
ernment are  still  fragile  and  in  need  of 
support.  Our  battlefield  is  the  broad 
middle  ground  of  democracy  and  popu- 
lar government — our  fight  against  the 
enemies  of  freedom  on  the  extreme 
right  and  on  the  extreme  left. 

Democracy  for  Nicaragua 

As  a  result  of  the  recent  Bipartisan  Ac- 
cord on  Central  America,  the  United 
States  is  speaking  with  one  voice  on  a 
matter  of  crucial  importance  to  peace 
in  Central  America:  bringing  democ- 
racy to  Nicaragua  and  peace  to  the 
region.  And  I  want  to  salute  our 
Secretary  of  State  [James  A.  Baker, 
III]  for  hammering  out  this  bipartisan 
accord  when  many,  2  or  3  months  ago, 
said  that  it  could  not  be  done. 

Let  me  take  this  opportunity  to 
make  several  observations  on  steps  that 
are  vital  to  peace,  security,  and  democ- 
racy in  Central  America. 

First,  Nicaragua's  effort  to  export 
violent  revolution  must  stop.  We  cannot 
tolerate  Sandinista  support — which 
continues  today — for  the  insurgencies 
in  El  Salvador  and  Guatemala  and  ter- 
rorism in  Honduras  as  well.  Peace  in 


the  region  cannot  coexist  with  attempts 
to  undermine  democracy. 

And  second,  we  call  upon  the  Sov- 
iet Union  to  end  Soviet-bloc  support  for 
the  Nicaraguan  assault  on  regional  de- 
mocracy. The  United  States  ended  mili- 
tary aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Resistance 
2  years  ago.  And  yet,  since  that  time, 
the  Soviets  continue  to  funnel  about 
$0.5  billion  worth  of  military  assist- 
ance a  year  to  the  Sandinista  regime — 
about  the  same  rate  as  before  we 
stopped  our  military  aid  to  the  con- 
tras.  Furthermore,  Cuba  and  Nicara- 
gua, supplied  by  $7  billion  in  Soviet- 
bloc  aid,  have  stepped  up  the  arms  flow 
to  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas.  Soviet- 
bloc  weapons,  such  as  AK-47s,  are 
now  being  sent  through  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  to  the  guerrillas.  And  that 
aid  must  stop. 

The  Soviet  Union  must  understand 
that  we  hold  it  accountable  for  the  con- 
sequences of  this  intervention — and  for 
progress  toward  peace  in  the  region 
and  democracy  in  Nicaragua.  As  the 
Bipartisan  Accord  makes  clear,  contin- 
ued Soviet  support  of  violence  and  sub- 
version in  Central  America  is  in  direct 
violation  of  the  Esquipulas  agreement 
concluded  by  the  nations  of  Central 
America  a  year  and  a  half  ago. 

Finally,  within  Nicaragua,  we 
want  to  see  a  promise  kept — the  prom- 
ise of  democracy,  withheld  by  the  San- 
dinista regime  for  nearly  a  decade.  To 
this  end,  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  supply  humanitarian  aid  to  the 
Nicaraguan  Resistance  through  the 
elections  scheduled  in  Nicaragua  for 
February  of  1990.  The  conduct  and  the 
outcome  of  those  elections  will  demon- 
strate to  Nicaragua's  neighbors  and  the 
international  community  whether  it 
means  to  deliver  on  democracy. 

But  the  Sandinistas'  recent  attacks 
are  ominous.  April  25th  was  the  bench- 
mark date  for  Nicaragua  to  have  in 
place  electoral  laws  consistent  with 
free  and  fair  elections.  Instead,  re- 
strictive new  election  and  press  laws 
have  been  pushed  through  the  San- 
dinista-controlled  legislature.  These 


.^»«    ^<    04««>. 


.iia*:»/  I. .ma  -laoo 


THE  PRESIDENT 


laws  have  been  unilaterally  imposed, 
and  the  proposals  of  Nicaragua's  oppo- 
sition parties  have  been  ignored.  The 
result  is  a  stacked  deck  against  the  op- 
position and  stacked  rules  of  the  game. 

The  election  law  mandates  uni- 
laterally that  half  of  all  foreign  political 
contributions  go  to  the  Supreme  Elec- 
toral Council,  which  remains  under 
Sandinista  control,  and  ignores  pro- 
posals put  forward  by  the  opposition  to 
provide  for  unlimited  freedom  of  access 
for  international  election  observers.  In 
effect,  that  is  a  stacked  deck  against 
freedom.  The  new  law  governing  press 
conduct  gives  excessive  controls  to  the 
Interior  Ministry  to  police  violations 
against  what  they  call  "national  integ- 
rity" and  continues  the  prohibition  of 
private-sector  ownership  of  television 
stations. 

If  there's  to  be  peace  in  Nicaragua, 
the  Sandinista  regime  must  work  with 
the  opposition — including  the  Resist- 
ance— to  put  in  place  election  and  press 
laws  that  are  truly  free  and  fair.  And 
that  means  to  have  free  and  fair  elec- 
tions with  outside  observers  given  un- 
fettered access  to  all  election  places 
and  to  all  proceedings.  It  means  a  se- 
cret ballot  on  election  day,  the  freedom 
to  campaign,  to  organize,  to  hold 
rallies— and  to  poll  public  opinion,  to 
operate  independent  radio  and  TV 
stations  as  well.  It  means  the  absence 
of  intimidation  either  from  a  politicized 
Sandinista  military  or  police  or  from 
those  neighborhood  block  committees 
that  control  people's  ration  cards.  It 
means  an  end  to  the  arrests  and  bully- 
ing of  opposition  leaders.  It  means 
freeing  all  political  prisoners  jailed 
under  the  Sandinista  rule,  not  just  a 
handful  of  former  Somoza  soldiers. 
And  if  the  Sandinistas  fail  this 
test,  it  will  be  a  tragic  setback— and 
a  dangerous  one.  The  consolidation  of 
tyranny  will  not  be  peace;  it  will  be 
a  crisis  waiting  to  happen. 

Current  Elections  for  Democracy 

I  want  to  mention  several  other  Latin 
American  nations  where  elections  can 
signal  positive  change. 

In  El  Salvador,  last  month's  free 
and  fair  elections  proved  another  ring- 
ing affirmation  of  that  nation's  commit- 
ment to  democracy.  We  expect  ARENA 
[National  Republican  Alliance]  to  exer- 
cise its  political  power  responsibly.  And 
I  have  conveyed  personally  to  Presi- 
dent-elect Cristiani  our  commitment  to 


human  rights  in  El  Salvador.  I  honestly 
feel  that  he  shares  my  concern,  and  he 
deserves  our  support. 

In  Paraguay,  the  only  country 
whose  dictator  had  held  power  longer 
than  Fidel  Castro,  elections  have  just 
taken  place— the  first  hopeful  sign  that 
Paraguay  is  on  its  way  to  joining  the 
democratic  mainstream.  And  we  do 
congratulate  President-elect  Rodriguez 
on  his  electoral  victory  and  look  for- 
ward to  working  with  him.  This  demo- 
cratic opening  must  continue. 

In  Panama,  however — Jim  [Secre- 
tary of  State  Baker]  spoke  to  you  all 
about  this  yesterday  [see  p.  5] — the 
forecast  for  freedom  is  less  clear.  A 
free  and  fair  vote  in  the  elections 
scheduled  for  this  Sunday  would  enable 
Panama  to  take  a  significant  step  to- 
ward ending  the  international  isolation 
and  internal  economic  crisis  brought  on 
by  the  Noriega  regime.  And,  in  spite  of 
intimidation  from  authorities,  Pan- 
ama's opposition  parties  have — with 
great  courage — taken  their  campaign 
to  the  Panamanian  people.  The  Noriega 
regime's  candidates  are  trailing  in  poll 
after  poll  by  a  margins  of  two  to  one. 

Unfortunately,  as  Secretary  Baker 
told  you  yesterday,  it  is  evident  that  the 
regime  is  ready  to  resort  to  massive 
election  fraud  in  order  to  remain  in 
power.  The  Noriega  regime  continues 
to  threaten  and  intimidate  Panama- 
nians who  believe  in  democracy.  It's 
also  attempting  to  limit  the  presence 
and  freedom  of  action  of  international 
observers  and  to  prevent  journalists 
from  reporting  on  the  election  process 
in  Panama.  Let  me  be  clear:  the  United 
States  will  not  recognize  the  results  of 
a  fraudulent  election  engineered  simply 
to  keep  Noriega  in  power. 

All  nations  that  value  democracy — 
that  understand  free  and  fair  elections 
are  the  very  heart  of  their  democratic 
system — should  speak  out  against  elec- 
tion fraud  in  Panama.  And  that  means 
the  democracies  of  Europe — they  ought 
to  be  speaking  out  about  this — as  well 
as  nations  in  this  hemisphere  strug- 
gling to  preserve  the  democratic  sys- 
tems they've  fought  so  hard  to  put  in 
place. 

It  is  time  for  the  plain  truth:  the 
day  of  the  dictator  is  over.  The  people's 
right  to  democracy  must  not  be  denied. 


l! 


It 


Principles  of  Economic  Freedom 

A  commitment  to  democracy  is  only 
element  in  the  new  partnership  that 
envision  for  the  nations  of  the  Amer: 
cas.  This  new  partnership  must  also 
aim  at  ensuring  that  the  market  eco 
omies  survive  and  prosper  and  prev; 
The  principles  of  economic  freedom 
have  not  been  applied  as  fully  as  the 
principle  of  democracy.  While  the  po 
erty  of  statism  and  protectionism  is 
more  evident  than  ever,  statist  econ 
omies  remain  in  place,  stifling  grow 
in  many  Latin  nations. 

And  that  is  why  the  United  Sta1 
has  made  a  new  initiative  to  reduce 
weight  of  the  debt,  as  Latin  govern- 
ments and  leaders  take  the  difficult 
steps  to  restructure  their  economies 
Economic  growth  requires  policies  t 
create  a  climate  for  investment — oni 
that  will  attract  new  capital,  one  th; 
will  reverse  the  flight  of  capital  out 
the  region. 

We  welcome  the  broad,  inter nat 
al  support  that  has  been  expressed  i 
our  ideas  to  strengthen  the  debt  stn 
egy.  We  urge  the  parties  involved — 
international  financial  institutions, 
debtor  countries,  commercial  banks 
to  make  a  sustained  effort  to  move  t 
process  forward.  We  recognize  the  c 
peting  claims  debtor  governments  n 
try  to  satisfy  as  they  work  to  advan 
economic  reform,  service  their  debt 
and  respond  to  the  needs  of  their  cit 
zens.  However,  we  also  understand  t 
progress  can  be  an  incremental 
process — case-by-case,  step-by-step 
provided  there  is  a  clear  commitmei 
to  economic  reform — I  want  to  say 
some  case-by-case  successes  in  this 
hemisphere.  To  that  end,  we've  star 
discussions,  as  you  know,  with  Mexi 
and  Venezuela  and  other  countries  a 
well. 

Narcotics  Traffickers 

Finally,  our  common  partnership  m 
confront  a  common  enemy:  internati 
al  drug  traffickers.  Drugs  threaten 
izens  and  civil  society  throughout  ou 
hemisphere.  Joining  forces  in  the  w; 
on  drugs  is  crucial.  There  is  nothing 
be  gained  by  trying  to  lay  blame  anc 
make  recriminations.  Drug  abuse  is 
problem  of  both  supply  and  demand- 
and  attacking  both  is  the  only  way  w 
can  face  and  defeat  the  drug  menace 
I  believe  that  there  is  much  mor 
understanding  on  this  point  in  this 
hemisphere  south  of  our  border  than 
there  used  to  be.  It  is  my  view  that 
countries  to  the  south  felt  for  many 


npnartmpnt  nf  State  Bulletin/June  1 


THE  PRESIDENT 


s  that  this  was  simply  the  problem 
1  U.S.  market  for  this  insidious 
iduct.  Now  they  see  that  their  own 
ieties  are  being  undermined  by  drug 
.  Now  they  see  that  their  own  sense 
)rder  is  being  undermined  by  those 
fficking  in  narcotics.  So  I  would  call 
much  more  cooperation  between  the 
ntries  of  this  hemisphere  to  combat 

menace  of  narcotics. 


nclusion 

=re's  a  place  in  this  new  partner- 
p  for  all  of  you  in  the  Council  of 
lericas.  Thomas  Paine  said  that, 
e  prosperity  of  any  commercial  na- 
1  is  regulated  by  the  prosperity  of 

est."  Your  efforts  do  contribute. 
3y  contribute  directly  to  the  greater 
sperity  of  all  of  the  nations  of  the 
lericas. 

The  challenge  I've  spoken  of  today 
I't  be  easy.  But  all  of  us— north  and 
th,  in  government  and  in  the  private 
tor — can  work  together  to  meet  the 
llenges  and  master  them.  We  know 
ve  got  a  lot  of  work  to  do.  And  you 
)w  you've  got  a  lot  of  work  to  do — 
•k  that  won't  wait — to  ensure  that 
the  Americas  enjoy  the  peace,  the 
edom,  and  the  prosperity  that  we 
rish. 

Thank  you  for  what  you're  doing, 
double  your  efforts.  And  I  promise 
I,  we'll  do  our  level  best  in  the  execu- 
3  branch  of  this  government. 


Encouraging  Political  and 
Economic  Reforms  in  Poland 


'Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
tial  Documents  of  May  8,  1989.  ■ 


President  Bush's  address  before 
citizens  of  Hamtramck,  Michigan,  on 
April  1?',  1989.' 

Americans  are  not  mildly  sympathetic 
spectators  of  events  in  Poland.  We  are 
bound  to  Poland  by  a  very  special 
bond — a  bond  of  blood,  of  culture,  and 
shared  values.  So  it  is  only  natural 
that,  as  dramatic  change  comes  to  Po- 
land, we  share  the  aspirations  and  ex- 
citement of  the  Polish  people. 

In  my  inaugural  address,  I  spoke 
of  the  new  breeze  of  freedom  gaining 
strength  around  the  world.  "In  man's 
heart,"  I  said,  "if  not  in  fact,  the  day 
of  the  dictator  is  over.  The  totalitarian 
era  is  passing,  its  old  ideas  blown  away 
like  leaves  from  an  ancient  lifeless 
tree."  I  spoke  of  the  spreading  recogni- 
tion that  prosperity  can  only  come  from 
a  free  market  and  the  creative  genius 
of  the  individual.  I  spoke  of  the  new 
potency  of  democratic  ideas — of  free 
speech,  free  elections,  and  the  exercise 
of  free  will. 


Resurgence  of  the 
Democratic  Ideal 

We  should  not  be  surprised  that  the 
ideas  of  democracy  are  returning  with 
renewed  force  in  Europe — the  home- 
land of  philosophers  of  freedom  whose 
ideals  have  been  so  fully  realized  in 


.  .  .  liberty  is  an  idea 
whose  time  has  come  in 
Eastern  Europe. 


America.  Victor  Hugo  said:  "An  inva- 
sion of  armies  can  be  resisted,  but  not 
an  idea  whose  time  has  come."  My 
friends,  liberty  is  an  idea  whose  time 
has  come  in  Eastern  Europe. 

For  almost  half  a  century,  the  sup- 
pression of  freedom  in  Eastern  Eu- 
rope, sustained  by  the  military  power 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  has  kept  nation 
from  nation,  neighbor  from  neighbor. 


As  East  and  West  seek  to  reduce  arms, 
it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  arms  are  a 
symptom,  not  a  source,  of  tension.  The 
true  source  of  tension  is  the  imposed 
and  unnatural  division  of  Europe. 

How  can  there  be  stability  and  se- 
curity in  Europe  and  the  world  as  long 
as  nations  and  people  are  denied  the 
right  to  determine  their  future — a 
right  explicitly  promised  them  by 
agreements  among  the  victorious  pow- 
ers at  the  end  of  World  War  11?  How 
can  there  be  stability  and  security  in 
Europe  as  long  as  nations,  which  once 
stood  proudly  at  the  front  rank  of  in- 
dustrial powers,  are  impoverished  by  a 
discredited  ideology  and  stifling  au- 
thoritarianism? The  United  States  has 
never  accepted  the  legitimacy  of  Eu- 
rope's division.  We  accept  no  spheres 
of  influence  that  deny  the  sovereign 
rights  of  nations. 

Yet  the  winds  of  change  are  shap- 
ing a  new  European  destiny.  Western 
Europe  is  resurgent.  Eastern  Europe 
is  awakening  to  yearnings  for  democra- 
cy, independence,  and  prosperity.  In 
the  Soviet  Union  itself,  we  are  encour- 
aged by  the  sound  of  voices  long  silent 
and  the  sight  of  the  rulers  consulting 
the  ruled.  We  see  "new  thinking"  in 
some  aspects  of  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
We  are  hopeful  that  these  stirrings 
presage  meaningful,  lasting,  and  more 
far-reaching  change. 

Let  no  one  doubt  the  sincerity  of 
the  American  people  and  their  govern- 
ment in  our  desire  to  see  reform  suc- 
ceed in  the  Soviet  Union.  We  welcome 
the  changes  that  have  taken  place,  and 
we  will  continue  to  encourage  greater 
recognition  of  human  rights,  market 
incentives,  and  elections. 

East  and  West  are  negotiating  on  a 
broad  range  of  issues,  from  arms  re- 
ductions to  the  environment.  But  the 
cold  war  began  in  Eastern  Europe;  if  it 
is  to  end,  it  will  end  in  this  crucible  of 
world  conflict — and  it  must  end.  The 
American  people  want  to  see  East  and 
central  Europe  free,  prosperous,  and 
at  peace.  With  prudence,  realism,  and 
patience,  we  seek  to  promote  the  evolu- 
tion of  freedom — the  opportunities 
sparked  by  the  Helsinki  accords  and 
deepening  East-West  contact. 

In  recent  years,  we  have  improved 
relations  with  countries  in  the  region. 
In  each  case,  we  looked  for  progress  in 


.M»»  ^t  o«M«A  Diiii<%*:i 


THE  PRESIDENT 


its  international  posture  and  internal 
practices — in  human  rights,  cultural 
openness,  emigration  issues,  opposition 
to  terrorism.  While  we  want  relations 
to  improve,  there  are  certain  acts  we 
will  not  condone  or  accept — behavior 
that  can  shift  relations  in  the  wrong 
direction:  human  rights  abuses,  tech- 
nology theft,  and  hostile  intelligence 
or  foreign  policy  actions  against  us. 

Some  regimes  are  now  seeking  to 
win  popular  legitimacy  through  re- 
forms. In  Hungary,  a  new  leadership  is 
experimenting  with  reforms  that  may 
permit  a  political  pluralism  that  only  a 
few  years  ago  would  have  been  unthink- 
able. And  in  Poland,  on  April  5,  Soli- 
darity leader  Lech  Walesa  and  Interior 
Minister  Kiszczak  signed  agreements 
that,  if  faithfully  implemented,  will  be 
a  watershed  in  the  postwar  history  of 
Eastern  Europe. 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  round- 
table  agreements,  the  free  trade  union. 


Reviewing  U.S.  Policies 

The  Polish  people  understand  the  mag- 
nitude of  this  challenge.  Democratic 
forces  in  Poland  have  asked  for  the 
moral,  political,  and  economic  support 
of  the  West.  And  the  West  will  respond. 
My  Administration  is  completing  a 
thorough  review  of  our  policies  toward 
Poland  and  all  of  Eastern  Europe.  I 
have  carefully  considered  ways  the 
United  States  can  help  Poland.  We  will 
not  act  unconditionally.  We  will  not  of- 
fer unsound  credits.  We  will  not  offer 
aid  without  requiring  sound  economic 
practices  in  return.  We  must  remember 
that  Poland  is  still  a  member  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact.  We  must  take  no  steps 
that  compromise  the  security  of  the 
West. 

The  Congress,  the  Polish-American 
community,  the  American  labor  move- 
ment, our  allies,  and  international  fi- 
nancial institutions  must  work  in 
concert  if  Polish  democracy  is  to  take 


We  accept  no  spheres  of  influence  that  deny  the  sover- 
eign rights  of  nations. 


Solidarity,  will  be  formally  restored;  a 
free  opposition  press  will  be  legalized; 
independent  political  and  other  free  as- 
sociations will  be  permitted;  and  elec- 
tions for  a  new  Polish  senate  will  be 
held.  These  agreements  testify  to  the 
realism  of  Gen.  [Wojciech]  Jaruzelski 
and  his  colleagues.  And  they  are  in- 
spiring testimony  to  the  spiritual  guid- 
ance of  the  Catholic  Church,  the  in- 
domitable spirit  of  the  Polish  peo- 
ple, and  the  strength  and  wisdom  of 
Lech  Walesa. 

Poland  faces,  and  will  continue  to 
face  for  some  time,  severe  economic 
problems.  A  modern  French  writer  ob- 
served that  communism  is  not  another 
form  of  economics;  it  is  the  death  of 
economics.  In  Poland,  an  economic  sys- 
tem crippled  by  the  inefficiencies  of 
central  planning  almost  proved  to  be 
the  death  of  initiative  and  enterprise. 
Almost — but  economic  reforms  can  still 
give  free  rein  to  the  enterprising  im- 
pulse and  creative  spirit  of  the  Polish 
people. 


root  anew  and  sustain  itself.  We  can 
and  must  answer  this  call  to  freedom. 
And  it  is  particularly  appropriate,  here 
in  Hamtramck,  for  me  to  salute  the 
members  and  leaders  of  the  American 
labor  movement  for  hanging  tough  with 
Solidarity  through  its  darkest  days. 

The  Poles  are  now  taking  concrete 
steps  that  deserve  our  active  support. 
I  have  decided  on  specific  steps  by  the 
United  States,  carefully  chosen  to  rec- 
ognize reforms  underway  and  to  en- 
courage reforms  yet  to  come  once 
Solidarity  is  legal. 

•  I  will  ask  Congress  to  join  me  in 
providing  Poland  access  to  our  gener- 
alized system  of  preferences,  which 
offers  selective  tariff  relief  to  bene- 
ficiary countries. 

•  We  will  work  with  our  allies  and 
friends  in  the  Paris  Club  to  develop 
sustainable  new  schedules  for  Poland  to 
repay  its  debt,  easing  a  heavy  burden 
so  that  a  free  market  can  grow. 

•  I  will  also  ask  Congress  to  join 
me  in  authorizing  the  Overseas  Private 
Investment  Corporation  to  operate  in 
Poland,  to  the  benefit  of  both  Polish 
and  U.S.  investors. 


i> 
Siiv 
;ert 

till 
11  ■ 

•J 
» 


•  We  will  propose  negotiations  fo 
private  business  agreement  with  Po- 
land to  encourage  cooperation  betwe 
U.S.  firms  and  Poland's  private  busi- 
nesses. Both  sides  can  benefit. 

•  The  United  States  will  continuflk 
to  consider  supporting,  on  their  mer 
viable  loans  to  the  private  sector  by 
International  Finance  Corporation. 

•  We  believe  that  the  roundtable 
agreements  clear  the  way  for  Poland 
be  able  to  work  with  the  Internation; 
Monetary  Fund  on  programs  that  su] 
port  sound,  new,  market-oriented  ec 
nomic  policies. 

•  We  will  encourage  business  an 
private  nonprofit  groups  to  develop  i 
novative  programs  to  swap  Polish  de 
for  equity  in  Polish  enterprises  and  ) 
charitable,  humanitarian,  and  envir 
mental  projects. 

•  We  will  support  imaginative  e< 
cational,  cultural,  and  training  pro- 
grams to  help  liberate  the  creative 
energies  of  the  Polish  people. 

When  I  visited  Poland  in  Septen 
ber  1987,  I  told  Chairman  Jaruzelski 
and  Lech  Walesa  that  the  American 
people  and  Government  would  respoi 
quickly  and  imaginatively  to  signific 
internal  reform  of  the  kind  we  see  m 
Both  of  them  valued  that  assurance, 
it  is  especially  gratifying  for  me  to  \ 
ness  the  changes  now  taking  place  ir 
Poland  and  to  announce  these  impor- 
tant changes  in  U.S.  policy.  The  Uni 
States  keeps  its  promises. 

If  Poland's  experiment  succeeds 
other  countries  may  follow.  While  w( 
must  still  differentiate  among  the  m 
tions  of  Eastern  Europe,  Poland  off( 
two  lessons  for  all.  First,  there  can  1 
no  progress  without  significant  polit 
cal  and  economic  liberalization.  Secc 
help  from  the  West  will  come  in  cone 
with  liberalization.  Our  friends  and 
European  allies  share  this  philosop? 

The  West  can  now  be  bold  in  pro 
posing  a  vision  of  the  European  futur 
We  dream  of  the  day  when  there  will 
no  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of 
people,  goods,  and  ideas.  We  dream 
the  day  when  East  European  people; 
will  be  free  to  choose  their  system  o: 
government  and  to  vote  for  the  partj 
their  choice  in  regular,  contested  ele 
tions.  We  dream  of  the  day  when  Eas 
European  countries  will  be  free  to 
choose  their  own  peaceful  course  in  1 
world,  including  closer  ties  with  Wes 
ern  Europe.  And  we  envision  an  Eat 
ern  Europe  in  which  the  Soviet  Unic 
has  renounced  military  intervention 


Honortmant  r>f  QtatO  Rllllptin/June  1 


THE  SECRETARY 


nstrument  of  its  policy — on  any  pre- 
.  We  share  an  unwavering  conviction 
one  day  all  the  peoples  of  Europe 
live  in  freedom. 

Next  month,  at  a  summit  of  the 
th  Atlantic  alliance,  the  leaders  of 
Western  democracies  will  discuss 
le  concerns.  These  are  not  bilateral 
es  between  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union.  They  are,  rather,  the 
;ern  of  all  the  Western  allies,  calling 
common  approaches.  The  Soviet 
on  should  understand,  in  turn,  that  a 
,  democratic  Eastern  Europe  as  we 
sion  it  would  threaten  no  one  and  no 
itry.  Such  an  evolution 
Id  imply,  and  reinforce,  the  further 
rovement  of  East-West  relations  in 
imensions — arms  reductions,  politi- 
relations.  trade — in  ways  that  en- 
?e  the  safety  and  well-being  of  all  of 
ope.  There  is  no  other  way. 
What  has  brought  us  to  this  open- 
The  unity  and  strength  of  the  de- 
racies,  and  something  else — the  bold 
thinking  in  the  Soviet  Union;  the 
te  desire  for  freedom  in  the  hearts  of 
len.  We  will  not  waver  in  our  dedica- 
to  freedom  now.  If  we  are  wise,  unit- 
and  ready  to  seize  the  moment,  we 
be  remembered  as  the  generation 
helped  all  of  Europe  find  its  destiny 
eedom. 

Two  centuries  ago,  a  Polish  patriot 
ed  Thaddeus  Kosciuszko  came  to 
•e  American  shores  to  stand  for  free- 
Let  us  honor  and  remember  this 
of  our  own  strugg'e  for  freedom  by 
nding  our  hand  to  those  who  work 
shipyards  of  Gdansk,  and  walk  the 
lied  streets  of  Warsaw.  Let  us  recall 
vords  of  the  Poles 

struggled  for  independence:  "For 
■  freedom  and  ours."  Let  us  support 
jeaceful  evolution  of  democ- 
in  Poland.  The  cause  of  liberty 
vs  no  limits;  the  friends  of  freedom, 
orders. 


U.S.  and  Latin  America: 
A  Shared  Destiny 


Text  from  weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
ial  Documents  of  Apr.  24,  1989.  ■ 


Secretary  Baker's  address  and 
question-and-answer  session  before  the 
Council  of  the  Americas  conference  at 
the  Department  of  State  on  May  1, 
1989.'^ 

I  do  believe  that  we  meet  at  a  rather 
historic  moment  for  Latin  America, 
and  for  that  matter,  a  rather  historic 
moment  for  the  United  States.  Across 
the  Americas  today,  from  Punta  Are- 
nas to  California,  an  old  order  is  dying, 
and  a  new  world  is  struggling  to  be 
born. 

Brazil  is  manufacturing  communi- 
cation satellites.  Mexico  has  joined  the 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade].  A  new  vision  of  regional 
trade  and  integration  is  taking  shape 
in  the  Caribbean  Basin.  And  the  winds 
of  democracy  are  blowing  across  the 
hemisphere,  from  Chile  to  Paraguay  to 
Central  America. 

The  United  States,  I'm  happy  to 
report,  does  not  stand  aloof  from  the 
historic  changes  which  are  transform- 
ing our  hemisphere — just  the  opposite. 
We  are  proudly  rediscovering  our 
shared  heritage  with  Latin  America 
and  our  shared  heritage  with  the 
Caribbean. 

Stand  in  the  Miami  airport  today, 
or  go  as  I  do  frequently  to  San  Antonio. 
Close  your  eyes  and  listen.  You  could 
easily  imagine  yourself  in  Caracas  or 
in  San  Jose.  The  fifth  largest  Spanish- 
speaking  community  in  the  world  now 
lives  in  the  United  States  of  America. 
Soon  we  will  be  entering  the  21st 
century,  and  the  hemisphere  will  face  a 
choice  between  two  very,  very  different 
futures.  Down  one  road  lies  a  vision  of 
freedom  and  opportunity  and  economic 
development.  It  is  a  vision  in  which  all 
citizens  share  as  partners  in  a  global 
economy  and  as  a  true  community  of 
democratic  nations.  Down  the  other 
road  lies  a  failed  vision  of  dictatorship, 
state  control,  and  missed  opportunity. 
We  know  which  road  we  have  to  travel, 
and  we  know  that  we've  all  got  to  travel 
that  road  together.  To  put  it  simply,  the 
United  States,  Latin  America,  and  the 
Caribbean  need  each  other  today  as 
never  before. 


Confronting  Common  Issues 

The  agenda  of  issues  before  us  con- 
firms, I  think,  the  new  reality — democ- 
racy; development;  debt;  trade:  drugs; 
migration;  the  environment;  nuclear 
proliferation.  These  are  not  respon- 
sibilities which  one  could  label  "north" 
or  "south."  They  are,  instead,  the  com- 
mon challenges  that  we  must  confront 
together  to  shape  successfully  our 
shared  destiny. 

In  recent  weeks  and  months.  Presi- 
dent Bush  and  I  have  heard  that  very 
message.  We  have  heard  it,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  in  person  from  Presidents  Sa- 
linas [Mexico],  Alfonsin  [Argentina], 
Perez  [Venezuela],  Sarney  [Brazil],  Ar- 
ias [Costa  Rica],  Azcona  [Honduras], 
Cerezo  [Guatemala],  and  Duarte  [El 
Salvador],  and  from  Prime  Ministers 
Charles  [Dominica],  Manley  [Jamaica], 
Robinson  [Trinidad  and  Tobago],  and 
Sandiford  [Barbados]. 

I  believe  the  region's  democratic 
leaders  are  reaching  out  to  the  United 
States  to  offer  a  new  partnership,  one 
based  on  mutual  respect  and  one  based 
on  shared  responsibility.  The  new  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  and  his  new 
Administration  have  an  answer.  And 
that  answer  is:  We  are  also  reaching 
out. 

The  problems  we  face  will  not  be 
resolved  through  quick  promises,  and 
they  are  not  going  to  be  resolved  with 
easy  answers.  Instead,  we've  got  to 
confront  them  together;  we've  got  to 
confront  them  with  candor;  we've  got  to 
confront  them  with  commitment;  and 
we've  got  to  confront  them  with  cour- 
age. We  can  begin  by  recognizing  a 
simple  truth  that  we  have  forgotten  too 
many  times  in  the  past,  and  that  is  that 
we  have  much  to  learn  from  each  other. 

In  recent  years,  the  people  of 
North  America  have  learned  a  lesson 
from  the  people  of  Latin  America,  a 
lesson  about  personal  courage  and 
about  the  passion  of  ordinary  people  to 
be  free.  Peasants  and  political  leaders, 
shopkeepers  and  market  ladies  have 
defied  death  threats  and  guerrilla  vio- 
lence, colonels  and  co)nandantes,  to 
stand  up  for  democracy.  We  learned 


artmant  nt  Qtata  Ri  illotin/.ll  ino  IQRQ 


THE  SECRETARY 


that  lesson  again  last  March  in  El  Sal- 
vador, and  we  will  learn  it  again  next 
Sunday  in  Panama. 

We  have  watched  far-sighted  demo- 
cratic leaders  take  the  first  vital,  and 
often  politically  difficult,  steps  to  shed 
layers  of  state  regulation  and  special 
preference  that  for  too  long  have  held  in 
check  the  creative,  productive  energies 
of  this  hemisphere.  And  we  haye 
watched  them  accentuate  values  we 
hold  dear  with  their  own  special  sense 
of  family,  friendship,  culture,  and  hos- 
pitality. We  hope  that  our  e.xperience  in 
the  United  States  with  democracy — we 
hope  that  our  experience  in  the  United 
States  with  a  free  economy — may  offer 
useful  lessons  to  our  friends  in  Latin 
America. 

The  United  States  enjoys  political 
stability,  peaceful  succession  of  power, 
unquestioned  civilian  authority,  and 
the  steady  expansion  of  human  rights. 
We  enjoy  these  blessings  because  for 
200  years — for  200  years — we  have 
struggled  to  ensure  that  every  citizen 
in  the  United  States  can  shape  his  or 
her  own  political  destiny.  We  are  com- 
mitted to  helping  our  neighbors  wage 
that  successful  democratic  struggle 
also. 

We  have  also  learned  that  a  free 
economy  releases  the  energies  of  indi- 
viduals and  entrepreneurs,  that  it  re- 
wards initiatives,  and  that  it  offers 
upward  mobility.  Economic  liberty  is 
the  surest  way  to  fulfill  the  aspirations 
of  our  citizens.  Those  nations  which 
have  turned  to  this  model  have  already 
begun  to  see  a  tangible  reward. 

During  earlier  phases  of  our  his- 
tory, we  in  the  United  States  too  often 
sought  rapid  growth  at  the  expense  of 
our  nation's  environment.  We  hope  that 
other  nations  can  learn  from  our  mis- 
takes, rather  than  repeating  them. 

While  we  have  much  to  learn  from 
each  other,  I  think  it's  fair  to  say  also 
that  we  have  much  to  expect  from  each 
other  as  well.  Together  we  must  set 
aside  the  easy  politics  of  blame  and  the 
easy  politics  of  mutual  recrimination. 
Let  us  forge  instead  a  new  bond  of  co- 
operation and  mutual  responsibility. 

Democracy:  Sweeping  Latin  America 

The  democratic  wave  sweeping  Latin 
America  today  has  been  propelled  by 
the  aspirations  of  ordinary  people  for 
freedom  and  for  a  better  life.  Now,  one 
question,  above  all  others,  confronts 
this  hemisphere:  Can  democracy 
deliver? 


Can  democratic  governments  begin 
to  satisfy  their  peoples'  basic  needs  for 
jobs,  health  care,  homes,  and  schools? 
Can  fragile,  new,  civilian  regimes  con- 
struct and  strengthen  democratic  insti- 
tutions? Can  they  protect  their  citizens 
against  organized  violence  from  both 
the  extreme  right  and  the  extreme  left? 
And  can  they  normalize  succession  of 
power  through  peaceful  electoral  proc- 
esses? The  answer  to  these  questions 
has  got  to  be  yes. 

Yet,  hanging  over  every  decision 
which  the  region's  elected  leaders  con- 
template is  the  specter  of  deep  econom- 
ic and  social  crisis  and  the  weight  of  a 
burgeoning  foreign  debt.  "The  elected 
Presidents  of  the  continent,"  The  Econ- 
omist magazine  wrote  recently,  "rule 
from  capital  cities  ringed  by  shanty- 
towns,  swollen  with  refugees  from  the 
depressed  countryside." 

That,  of  course,  is  not  our  shared 
vision  of  the  hemisphere's  future. 
Clearly,  the  countries  of  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean  must  begin  to  grow 
again,  and  the  fruits  of  that  growth 
have  got  to  be  widely  shared. 

To  grow,  the  region  cannot  contin- 
ue to  be  a  net  exporter  of  capital.  In- 
stead, it  must  create  a  climate  for 
investment  that  will  bring  capital 
flight  to  the  region,  and  that  will,  at 
the  same  time,  attract  new  capital 
flows.  Debt  is  a  problem,  but  debt, 
quite  frequently,  is  also  simply  a  symp- 
tom of  a  larger  problem.  Listen  to  the 
words  of  Carlos  Andres  Perez  to  a 
group  of  international  labor  leaders 
some  3  or  so  weeks  ago:  "If  we  say,  for 
the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  debt  dis- 
appears and  if  we  continue  managing 
our  economies  as  we  have  managed 
them  in  the  past,  inevitably  we  would 
continue  in  the  same  situation  of  unem- 
ployment and  disaster." 

Today,  democratic  governments 
must  try  to  reform  bloated  state- 
dominated  economies,  service  their 
debt,  and  satisfy  the  real  needs  to  their 
citizens — all  at  the  same  time.  We  un- 
derstand that  facing  this  challenge 
alone  is  a  nearly  impossible  juggling 
act. 


Facing  the  Challenges  Together 

We  do  not  expect  Latin  American  na- 
tions to  face  this  challenge  alone.  As 
they  move  forward  to  take  the  neces- 
sary, but  difficult,  steps  to  restructure 
and  reform  their  economies,  we  must 
be  prepared  to  hear  their  calls  for  help. 
When  a  poor  country  like  Bolivia 
makes  exemplary  market-oriented  re- 


forms and  sticks  to  them  in  the  face 
falling  export  prices  and  mounting 
litical  costs,  we  have  got  to  be  read; 
lend  a  helping  hand.  Indeed,  it  is  a  ) 
sponsibility  all  of  us — we  in  govern- 
ment and  in  the  international  financ 
institutions,  and  you  in  the  private 
tor  and  the  commercial  banks — mus 
accept  together. 

Within  its  first  5  weeks,  the  Ai 
ministration  announced  a  new  appi' 
to  help  reduce  Latin  America's  debt 
burden.  In  the  weeks  and  in  the  mo 
to  come,  we  must  negotiate,  case  by 
case,  the  details  of  that  policy  to  en 
sure  continued  economic  reform,  a  i 
reduction  in  existing  debt  burdens, 
and  new  capital  flows  in  the  future. 

If  we  ask  Latin  Americans  to  - 
away  the  layers  of  protection  that 
shield  their  economies  from  the  fre 
flow  of  trade  in  goods  and  services, 
then  we,  too,  must  confront  protect 
ism  in  the  United  States,  and  we  m 
steadily  reduce  the  barriers  to  proc 
ucts  from  the  rest  of  the  hemispheri 

If  we  ask  that  Latin  Americans 
confront  the  new  menace  of  organ  iz 
drug  cartels,  now  often  in  league  w 
guerrilla  movements,  then  we  must 
only  assist  them  in  that  effort,  but 
must  also  confront  the  terrible  dem 
that  exists  in  our  country  for  these 
drugs.  Only  by  tackling  supply  and 
mand  can  we  free  our  hemisphere  f 
the  drug  menace. 

If  we  are  engaged  in  a  joint  vei 
ture  north  and  south  to  advance  an 
defend  democracy,  then  each  of  us  i 
do  our  part — collectively  when 
possible — to  create  new  mechanism 
and  to  strengthen  existing  ones  to  ( 
fend  human  rights,  to  guarantee  th 
tegrity  of  free  elections,  and  to 
establish  sanctions  against  those  w 
threaten  democratically  elected 
governments. 

In  Panama,  free  and  fair  electi' 
this  coming  Sunday  would  end  that 
tion's  political  and  economic  crisis, 
it  would  end  its  international  isolat 
as  well.  Unfortunately,  the  Noriega 
regime's  response  has  been  to  prep: 
for  a  massive  fraud  and  to  restrict  t 
presence  of  international  observers 
press. 

If  democracy  is  to  continue  to  c 
velop  in  this  hemisphere,  practices 
such  as  this  simply  cannot  be  tolera 
The  position  of  the  United  States,  I 
think,  is  quite  clear.  And  that  simp 
that  there  can  be  and  will  be  no  aei 
modation  as  far  as  we're  concerned 
with  a  Noriega-dominated  regime. 
There  is  still  time  for  Panamanians 


.J.    _.X    0*^M.^    I 


THE  SECRETARY 


ave  their  country  from  the  increasing 
estruction  wrought  by  the  Noriega 
ictatorship.  The  key  is  in  the  hands  of 

I  he  defense  forces.  They  can  fulfill 
heir  constitutional  duty  as  professional 

Koldiers  and  allow  elections  to  proceed 
eely  and  fairly.  Or  they  can  face  the 

i  onsequences  of  the  past  on  which 
eneral  Noriega  has  placed  them. 
If  the  peoples  and  the  governments 

'Jf  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
sk  the  United  States  of  America  to 

M)rgo  unilatei-al  initiatives  and  work  in- 
tead  in  good  faith  with  the  region's  de- 
locracies  in  a  new,  cooperative  effort 

1 )  support  democracy,  then,  I  think,  it's 
Illy  fair  that  we  ask  these  same  peo- 
es  and  governments  to  join  with  us  in 
ood  faith  to  turn  the  promise  of  that 
iplomacy  into  a  reality  throughout 

fills  hemisphere. 

The  Administration,  as  you  know, 

1  as  negotiated  a  new  bipartisan  accord 
ith  the  Congress  on  Central  America 
;ee  Selected  Documents  No.  36,  "U.S. 

n  upport  for  Democracy  and  Peace  in 
entral  America"].  We  are  committed 

ih  work  with  the  democratic  leaders  of 
entral  America  and  of  the  rest  of  the 
mericas  to  translate  the  bright  prom- 
e  of  the  Esquipulas  agreement  into 
)ncrete  realities  on  the  ground.  That 
a  challenge,  but  frankly,  it  is  also  an 
Dportunity.  All  those  who  advocate  di- 
lomacy  and  political  solutions  to  the 
jgion's  conflicts  now  have  a  respon- 
bility  to  prove  that  this  is  the  best 
id  the  surest  route  to  achieve  our 
jmmon  goals.  The  promises  in  that  re- 
ional  treaty  for  democracy,  for  peace, 
id  security  must  not  only  be  kept, 
ley  must  be  verified. 

We  are  prejiared,  as  President 
ush  declared  in  announcing  the  ac- 
ird,  to  support  a  process  that  guaran- 
■es  democracy  in  Central  America. 
ut  the  United  States  cannot  support 
pai)er  agreement  that  sells  out  the 
icaraguan  people's  right  to  be  free, 
id  their  right  to  enjoy  a  free  and  hon- 
5t  democratic  election. 

Together  with  the  other  de- 
pi  locracies,  we  have  got  to  send  a  clear 
lessage  to  others  outside  this  hemi- 
ahere,  and  we  will  be  sending  this 
lessage:  This  hemisphere  is  not  a 
umping  ground  for  their  arms  or  for 
leir  failed  ideologies.  We  are  looking 

■J  )r  signs  of  new  thinking.  The  Soviet 
'nion  now  has  an  opportunity  to  dem- 
iistrate  its  so-called  new  thinking  in 

[(( Dncrete  and  tangible  ways  in  Central 
.merica.  That  is  what  Esquipulas  re- 
uires,  that  is  what  the  democratic 


community  demands,  and  that  is  what 
the  economic  integration  and  develop- 
ment of  that  war-torn  region  really 
requires. 

Some  look  at  the  crises  and  prob- 
lems facing  Latin  America  today,  and 
they  despair.  I  am  not  one  of  those.  I 
really  believe  that  if  we  seize  the  oppor- 
tunities before  us,  we  can  achieve  what 
the  pioneers  and  frontiersmen  who 
first  settled  these  lands  could  really 
only  dream. 

I  believe  the  day  will  come  when 
Carlos  Andres  Perez  and  Raul  Alfon- 
sin,  Vinicio  Cerezo,  Jose  Napoleon  Du- 
arte,  Carlos  Salinas,  Julio  Sanguinetti 
[President  of  Uruguay],  Jose  Azcona, 
Oscar  Arias — and  many,  many  others — 
will  be  seen  as  the  pioneers  who  blazed 
the  trail  that  will  lead  one  day  to  the 
world's  first  democratic  hemisphere.  I 
believe  that  the  hemisphere  can  become 
a  model  for  the  rest  of  the  planet  for  a 
true  partnership  between  the  devel- 
oped and  developing  nations,  where 
trade  is  free,  where  prosperity  is 
shared,  and  where  the  benefits  of 
technology  are  harnessed  for  all. 

And  I  believe  that  through  joint  ef- 
fort and  through  partnership,  the  day 
will  come  when  in  all  nations  of  the 
Americas  the  rule  of  law  prevails,  hu- 
man rights  are  respected,  the  strong 
are  just,  the  weak  are  secure,  and  the 
people  live  in  peace. 

Q.  If  Noriega  continues  to  con- 
trol Panama,  would  we  alter  the 
schedule  for  the  transfer  of  the  Canal 
Zone  to  the  Republic  of  Panama? 

A.  Let  me  simply  say  in  answer  to 
that  question  that,  as  I  indicated  in  my 
formal  remarks,  we  will  have  a  great 
deal  of  difficulty  normalizing  our  re- 
lations with  any  Panamanian  Gov- 
ernment that  is  controlled  by  Gen. 
Noriega.  It  would  be  premature  for  me 
to  suggest  that  we  would  take  any  ac- 
tion of  the  nature  that  you  suggest. 

The  United  States  believes  in  abid- 
ing by  its  treaty  obligations  and  abid- 
ing by  its  agreements.  So  I'm  not  going 
to  answer  the  hypothetical  that  you've 
suggested  beyond  saying  that  as  long  as 
Gen.  Noriega  retains  power,  there  will 
be  no  normalization  of  relations  bet- 
ween Panama  and  the  United  States. 

Q.  In  some  of  your  remarks  here 
today,  and  thinking  back  to  your  con- 
firmation hearings,  tends  to  continue 
the  focus  we  have,  I  think,  felt  during 
the  past  8  years.  I  remember  your 
confirmation  hearings  having  to  do 
mostly  with  Nicaragua,  El  Salvador, 
and  Cuba. 


I'm  wondering  how  you  perceive 
now  the  ability  or  the  flexibility  of 
trying  to  disburse  that  attention  a  bit 
to  the  total  hemisphere.  You've  made 
the  comments  here,  but  we're  still 
wondering  about  the  resources 
needed  in  order  to  have  this  partner- 
ship with  the  private  sector  to  ad- 
dress, really,  the  problems  of  the  total 
hemisphere. 

A.  Let  me  simply  say,  when  you 
suggested  my  confirmation  hearings 
concentrated  on  those  three  areas 
within  the  hemisphere,  you  did  not 
mean  to  suggest  that  they  didn't  con- 
centrate as  well  on  a  whole  host  of 
other  areas  outside  the  hemsiphere, 
because  they  did.  But  you're  quite  right 
that  within  the  hemisphere,  the  ques- 
tions seemed  to  come  primarily  in 
those  three  areas. 

I  would  refer  you  to  the  statement 
I  made  to  the  [Senate]  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee,  as  I  went  up  for  con- 
firmation, in  which  I  said — I  think  I 
took  pains  to  point  out — that  it's  the  en- 
tire hemisphere  that  is  important.  It's 
the  entire  hemisphere  that's  impor- 
tant as  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned. 

One  of  the  first  things,  of  course, 
that  President  Bush — one  of  the  first 
meetings  he  had  was  with  President 
Salinas  [of  Mexico]  when  President 
Bush  was  still  President-elect.  One  of 
the  first  initiatives,  of  course,  was  to 
deal  with  the  problems  of  South  Amer- 
ica and  Me.xico  and  other — well,  some 
countries  in  Central  America — was 
the  proposal  of  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment for  a  new  approach  to  the  debt 
problems. 

I  think  we  recognize  the  impor- 
tance of  Mexico,  certainly;  we  recog- 
nize the  importance  of  South  America. 
We  simply  have  some  problems  in  Cen- 
tral America  that  we  need  to  continue 
to  focus  on  and  put  behind  us,  but  that 
does  not  in  any  way  take  away  from  the 
importance  of  other  areas  in  the  hemi- 
sphere as  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned. 

Q.  The  current  evaluation  of  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI),  the 
views  as  to  its  effectiveness  have  been 
coming  from  the  congressional  side 
rather  than  the  Administration  side. 
The  new  ideas  that  are  involved  in  the 
CBI  II  legislation  are  basically  con- 
gressional initiatives  in  contrast  to 
the  Reagan  Administration  which 
sponsored  the  legislation  initially. 


...«.»...«    ^t    0«^4^    D.. 11.^4 


'  ■..»..,  HOOO 


THE  SECRETARY 


Is  that  likely  to  be  the  continu- 
ance of  the  consideration  of  that  leg- 
islation? Or  does  the  Administration 
expect  to  become  more  initiative- 
taking? 

A.  We  strongly  support  that 
legislation — most  all  aspects  of  it. 
There  are  some  aspects  that  get  us  in 
trouble  in  the  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  and  some 
other  areas  that  we  cannot  support 
for  that  reason.  But  we  do  support 
strengthening  the  Caribbean  Basin  Ini- 
tiative. After  all,  the  Caribbean  Basin 
Initiative  was  an  initiative  of  the  Rea- 
gan Administration  of  which  the  Presi- 
dent and  I  were  both  a  part.  So  we 
support  it,  and  we  support  it  strongly 
and  we  will  be  doing  what  we  can  to  see 
it  move  forward. 

Q.  Regarding  the  drug  situation 
in  Latin  America,  would  you  com- 
ment on  the  initiative  the  United 
States  and  Latin  American  countries 
are  taking  to  take  some  steps  forward 
with  this  problem? 

A.  As  you  know  and  as  I  indicated 
in  my  remarks,  it's  a  problem  that  has 
to  be  addressed  both  from  the  stand- 
point of  supply  and  demand.  I  think 
sometimes  we  up  here  have  a  tendency 
to  beat  our  chest  and  try  and  blame 
others  to  some  extent  with  some  of  our 
problems. 

At  the  same  time  it's  very,  very  im- 
portant that  countries  that  are  pro- 
ducers of  drugs,  or  countries  that  are 
transit  countries  for  drugs  coming  into 
the  United  States,  accept  their  respon- 
sibilities as  well.  We've  got  to  do  what 
we  can  to  interdict  the  supply  coming 
into  this  country,  but  we've  also  got  to 
do  what  we  can  to  address  the  demand. 
This  is  a  major  issue  in  the  United 
States,  one  of  the  most  significant  and 
substantial  political  issues  that  we  are 
debating  up  here  in  the  United  States 
today. 


You're  aware  of  the  legislation  cre- 
ating the  so-called  drug  czar  [William 
J.  Bennett]  in  the  Executive  Office  of 
the  President.  There  is  supposed  to  be 
an  overall,  comprehensive  drug  plan 
presented  by  him.  The  legislation  re- 
quires this  within  6  months.  I  think  it's 
now  about  3  or  4  months. 

I  have  visited  with  Mr.  Bennett  on 
this  and  he's  visited  with  other  cabinet 


officers  as  well  in  order  that  we  can 
come  forward  with  a  plan  that  has  the 
support  of  all  agencies  and  depart- 
ments and  that  is  integrated. 

We  will  continue  to  concentrate  o 
this  problem  because  it  represents  a 
very,  very  significant  and  major  prob- 
lem" for  the  United  States. 


'Press  release  76. 


Power  For  Good:  American 
Foreign  Policy  in  the  New  Era 


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iillt. 
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itfil 
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Secretary  Baker's  address  before 
the  1989  co7ivention  of  the  American 
Society  of  Newspaper  Editors  (ASNE) 
on  April  U,  1989.^ 

I'm  pleased  to  be  here  today,  and  I  will 
try  and  keep  my  formal  remarks  brief 
enough  that  we  have  time  for  questions 
and  answers  later  on. 

Being  brief  does  remind  me, 
though,  of  the  old  story  about  the  three 
people  that  were  sent  on  a  factfinding 
mission  to  some  remote  part  of  the 
South  Pacific.  It  happened  to  be  a  law- 
yer, a  cabinet  secretary,  and  a  news- 
paper editor.  As  luck  would  have  it, 
their  airplane  developed  engine  trou- 
ble. They  went  down.  They  were  cap- 
tured by  cannibals.  As  the  pot  started 
to  boil,  the  cannibal  chief  said,  "Every- 
body gets  one  last  wish.  What  will  it 
be?"  He  turned  to  the  lawyer,  and  he 
said,  "Yes,  indeed,  he  has  one  last 
wish."  He  said,  "May  I  give  you  my 
card,"  and  the  chief  took  the  card  and 
turned  to  the  cabinet  secretary  and 
said  he  would  very  much  like  to  deliver 
just  one  last  time  his  famous  lecture 
on  his  10  greatest  accomplishments  in 
government.  The  chief  said  okay.  He 
turned  to  the  newspaper  editor  who 
promptly  said,  "Cook  me  first.  I've 
heard  that  speech  three  times  already." 

So  I'm  going  to  try  and  keep  the 
formal  part  of  the  remarks  brief 
enough  to  avoid  that. 


Changes  and  Challenges 
Reshaping  International  Order 

I've  always  believed  that  the  media  pi 
an  essential  role  in  educating  this  de- 
mocracy of  ours,  but  the  news  as  you  a 
know  very,  very  well  is  not  always  jus 
about  what  we  in  government  do  or  fa 
to  do.  The  most  important  service,  I 
think,  that  you  can  render  the  govern 
ment  and  to  the  people  alike  is  to  help 
explain  the  most  important  changes 
which  are  transforming  this  world  of 
ours.  So  today,  I'd  like  to  discuss  thos 
changes  with  you,  and  I'd  also  like  to 
describe  the  actions  that  we've  taken 
far  to  lay  the  foundation  of  an  Americ 
foreign  policy  for  new  times. 

A  decade  ago,  the  world  beyond  c 
borders  was  a  familiar  place  but,  if  I 
may  say  so,  not  a  very  reassuring  oni 
The  Soviet  Union  was  on  the  march. 
Democracy  seemed  to  be  in  retreat, 
and  our  values  were  being  questionec 
We  and  our  allies  also  faced  severe 
economic  problems  that  undermined 
confidence  in  the  free  market  and 
undermined  confidence  in  free  trade 
as  well. 

Now,  after  a  decade  that  I  think 
will  always  be  known  as  the  Reagan 
era,  the  world  beyond  our  borders  is  i 
more  reassuring  place.  Soviet  forces 
have  left  Afghanistan.  Other  regiona 
conflicts  inflamed  by  Soviet  interver 
tion  have  begun  moving  toward  resoh 
tion  with  the  help  of  some,  I  think — 


n(>nartm(^nt  of  State  Bulletln/June  19 


THE  SECRETARY 


'rhaps  biased,  with  all  my  bias  hang- 
g  out — with  the  help  of  some  creative 
iiiiTican  diplomacy.  Once  again,  I 
ink.  it's  fair  to  say  that  democracy  is 
1  the  march.  We  have  reaffirmed  our 
lues.  And  the  international  economy, 
liih  has  been  driven  by  the  longest 
tiiii-ican  peacetime  expansion  on 
cni'd,  has  provided  new  hope  for 

[iiuress. 

This  more  reassuring  world, 

i(iui;h,  is  also,  I  think  it's  fair  to  say, 

I  loming  a  less  familiar  one.  The 
mid  has  clearly  outgrown  the  clash 

I I  \\  een  the  superpowers  that  domi- 
1  tf(l  world  politics  after  World 

\ii-  II.  Instead  we  face  a  series  of 
lallenges  that  are  reshaping  the 
i\\  international  order. 

•  We  could  advance  toward  an  in- 
easingly  democratic  world,  or,  if  new 
d  fragile  democracies  fail,  the  cause 
freedom  could  well  be  thrown  back. 

•  The  international  economy  could 
ntinue  to  grow,  or  the  stresses  of 
mpetition,  trade  imbalances,  and 

bt  could  lead  to  protectionism;  it 
uld  lead  to  rival  trading  blocs — 
timately  to  the  disadvantage  of  all 
us. 

•  The  international  community  of 
tions  could  act  to  deal  with  transna- 
)nal  dangers  such  as  envii'onmental 
zards,  terrorism,  and  the  drug 
ade,  or  these  problems  could  grow 
)rse  because  of  a  failure  to  work 
gether. 

•  A  properly  conceived  approach  by 
e  Atlantic  alliance  could  e.xtend  the 
ogress  that  we've  made  with  the  So- 
et  Union,  leading  to  far  more  cooper- 
ive  East-West  relations.  Or  through 
istakes  on  either  side  of  the  Iron  Cur- 
in,  this  opportunity  could  be  lost. 

•  Finally,  new  military  technolo- 
es  could  provide  greater  stability  at 
vver  levels  of  forces.  Or  we  could  en- 
unter  a  darker  age  if  we  cannot  halt 
e  spread  of  weapons  that  put  nations 

a  hair-trigger — particularly,  if  we 
il  to  make  progress  in  resolving  vol- 
ile  regional  conflicts. 

Unlike  the  last  40  years,  the  task 
fore  us  is,  therefore,  more  complex, 
id  it  is  more  nuanced.  It  has  become 
ss  susceptible  to  the  grand  gesture, 
e  single  solution,  or  the  overarching 
)ctrine.  We  face  a  see-saw  contest  on 
anv  fronts. 


Leadership,  Realism,  and 
Bipartisanship 

Winston  Churchill  used  to  say  that  in 
confusing  situations  it  was  always  best 
to  resort  to  first  principles.  Those 
principles,  I  think,  begin  with  the  ne- 
cessity for  continued  American  leader- 
ship. As  the  world's  most  powerful 
democracy,  and  the  world's  largest 
economy,  we're  going  to  affect  the  fu- 
ture substantially,  whether  we  do  so 
deliberately  or  not.  We  can,  therefore, 
be  a  force  for  freedom  and  peaceful 
change  unlike  any  other  country  in  the 
world.  But  if  we  fail  to  do  so,  the  conse- 
quences will  surely  seek  us  out.  There 
is  no  place  to  run,  and  there  is  no  place 
to  hide.  We  must,  therefore,  use  Amer- 
ica's power  in  the  right  way,  and  we 
must  use  it  for  good. 

Our  leadership,  however,  must  be 
attuned  to  the  times.  Common  prob- 
lems and  still  powerful  adversaries 
make  our  increasingly  influential  allies 
more  important  than  ever  before  to 
success.  New  dangers,  such  as  terror- 
ism, the  international  narcotics  trade, 
and  the  degradation  of  the  natural  en- 
vironment, cannot  be  managed  by  one 
nation  alone.  These  realities  will  not 
permit  the  United  States  a  blind  isola- 
tionism or  a  reckless  unilateralism. 
Instead,  they  remind  us  of  America's 
unique  role:  we  are,  after  all,  simul- 
taneously a  tribune  for  democracy,  a 
catalyst  for  international  cooperation, 
and  the  guardian  of  America's  national 
interest. 

The  second  principle  is  that  Ameri- 
can leadership  must  be  realistic.  By 
that  I  mean  not  only  an  understanding 
of  the  way  the  world  works  but  also  a 
willingness  to  use  that  understanding 
to  change  the  world,  guided  by  those 
values  that  we  refer  to  as  American 
values  that  are  so  important  to  us. 

The  idea  that  American  moral  val- 
ues and  an  engaged  foreign  policy  are 
somehow  in  contradiction,  I  think,  is 
clearly  incorrect.  A  democratic  society 
will  not  long  support  a  policy  which  is 
at  variance  with  its  beliefs.  And  a  poli- 
cy that  does  not  serve  our  interests, 


even  if  it  makes  us  feel  very  good,  will 
be  ultimately  self-defeating.  Realism 
today  means  not  the  exclusion  of  values 
but  their  inclusion  as  the  guiding  light 
of  our  policy. 

And  the  third  and  final  principle 
is  bipartisanship.  Now  by  this  I  don't 
mean  a  cessation  of  debate  or  the  end  to 
the  constitutionally  designed  friction 
between  the  executive  and  the  Con- 
gress. Differing  perspectives  and  dif- 
ferent responsibilities  will  often  yield 
opposing  points  of  view.  The  demo- 
cratic process  nourishes  and  safe- 
guards the  right  to  disagree. 

Yet  when  all  is  finally  said,  some- 
thing must  then  be  done.  We  must  pro- 
ceed with  the  business  of  foreign  policy, 
and  when  we  do,  it's  best  that  we  do  so 
together,  if  we're  going  to  achieve  our 
national  objectives. 

Leadership,  realism,  and  bipar- 
tisanship— those  are  the  tools,  I  think, 
with  which  we  can  build  a  new  and 
promising  era.  We've  already  begun  to 
lay  the  foundation.  In  the  80  days  since 
President  Bush's  inauguration,  we  have 
moved  to  initiate  our  agenda  and  to  lay 
the  foundation  for  future  action.  Today, 
I  want  to  discuss  some  of  our  activities 
in  more  detail,  providing,  if  I  may,  a 
sense  of  how  they  fit  our  foreign  policy 
plan  for  the  future. 

Canada  and  Mexico 

First,  as  I  noted  in  my  confirmation 
hearings,  our  agenda  begins  with  the 
neighborhood,  the  countries  of  this  con- 
tinent. The  President  has  indicated  the 
importance  we  place  on  our  relation- 
ships with  both  Canada  and  Mexico. 
That  was  emphasized  by  his  early 
meetings  with  Prime  Minister  Mul- 
roney  and  with  President  Salinas.  Our 
dealings  with  these  two  vital  neighbors 
have  gone  beyond  the  merely  symbolic. 
We've  taken  the  initiative  on  two  issues 
which  are  at  the  top  of  their  respective 
agendas.  We  are  working  with  Mexico 
to  reduce  that  nation's  burden  of  debt. 
And  the  President  has  committed 
himself  to  introduce  legislation  that 
establishes  a  definite  timetable  for 
substantial  reductions  of  the  chemicals 
that  create  acid  rain. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Central  America 

Second,  we  have  reached  a  bipartisan 
consensus  on  a  plan  designed  to  lead 
Central  America  away  from  the  conflict 
of  recent  years  and  toward  a  future  of 
democracy  and  economic  progress. 
This  plan  addresses  a  problem  that  for 
too  long  has  not  only  divided  our  neigh- 
bors abroad  but,  indeed,  has  divided 
Americans  here  at  home. 

The  bipartisan  accord  signed  in 
March  clearly  states  the  objectives  of 
our  policy  toward  Nicaragua  and  our 
policy  toward  Central  America.  Those 
objectives  are  democracy,  an  end  to 
subversion  of  neighbors,  and  an  end  to 
Soviet-bloc  military  ties  that  threaten 
U.S.  and  regional  security.  The  accord 
draws  upon  the  Esquipulas  II  agree- 
ment, which  was  authored  by  President 
Arias  of  Costa  Rica,  and  the  efforts  of 
the  Central  American  nations  to  devel- 
op their  own  principles  for  freedom  and 
peace.  And  our  policy  emphasizes  that 
the  process  which  leads  to  these  goals 
must  be  based  on  credible  standards  of 
compliance,  strict  timetables  for  enfor- 
cement, and  effective  and  ongoing 
means  of  verification. 

The  accord  also  stipulates  that 
Congress  will  extend  humanitarian  as- 
sistance at  current  levels  to  the 
Nicaragua  Resistance  through  Febru- 
ary 28,  1990,  just  after  new  interna- 
tionally supervised  elections  are  to  be 
held  in  Nicaragua. 

This  new  American  policy — our 
"new  thinking,"  to  borrow  a  phrase — 
has  already  gained  the  support  of  the 
Central  American  democracies,  of 
Canada,  of  Venezuela  and  other  de- 
mocracies in  this  hemisphere  and  in 
Europe.  In  the  weeks  ahead,  we  intend 
to  build  on  this  support. 

Through  this  agreement,  we  are 
sending  an  important  message  to  the 
world:  Americans  can  unite  on  an  issue 
of  vital  national  interest.  We're  also 
sending  another  message:  our  hemi- 
sphere is  not,  and  should  not  be,  a 
dumping  ground  for  Soviet  arms  or  for 
a  failed  Soviet  ideology. 

Frankly,  we've  been  looking  for 
signs  of  new  thinking  from  Moscow  on 
this  issue.  Recently,  we  heard  some 
promising  words.  Standing  in  the  pres- 
ence of  Fidel  Castro,  Mr.  Gorbachev  de- 
clared, and  I  quote,  "We  are  resolutely 
against  any  theories  and  doctrines 
justifying  the  export  of  revolution  or 
counterrevolution  and  all  forms  of  for- 
eign interference  in  the  affairs  of  sover- 
eign nations." 


That  certainly  sounds  promising. 
We  hope  it's  going  to  prove  to  be  true. 
But  at  this  point,  the  Soviet  Union  con- 
tinues to  reject  President  Arias'  appeal 
to  give  the  slogan  of  new  thinking 
some  content.  Soviet  aid  to  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  continues  to  support  subver- 
sion against  El  Salvador.  The  Soviet 
Union's  military  aid  to  Nicaragua  alone 
is  more  than  $.500  million  a  year — five 
times  what  the  United  States  provides 
to  El  Salvador — and  far  in  excess  of 
any  legitimate  Soviet  security  con- 
cerns. As  a  consequence  of  that  aid, 
Nicaragua  now  fields  a  military  force 
far  in  excess  of  its  neighbors — in  fact, 
it  fields  the  largest  army  in  the  entire 
history  of  Central  America. 

So  we  call  again  upon  the  Soviet 
Government  to  think  anew  about  its  ac- 
tions here  in  our  hemisphere  and  about 
the  consequences  of  those  actions  for 
the  future. 

Middle  East 

The  third  area  where  we've  begun  to 
lay  a  foundation  for  peace  and  security 
is  in  the  Middle  East.  On  March  25,  we 
celebrated  the  10th  anniversary  of  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty.  But  to 
mark  the  anniversary  is  also  really,  I 
think,  to  realize  how  much  remains  un- 
done. And  all  we  have  to  do,  if  I  may  in- 
terject here,  is  to  read  the  newspapers 
this  morning  to  see  how  very  much 
does  remain  to  be  done.  The  daily  vio- 
lence in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza — the 
stones  thrown,  the  lives  lost — are  all 
adding  to  an  already  bitter  legacy  of 
hatred  between  Arabs  and  Israelis. 

Last  week  President  Mubarak  of 
Egypt  and  [Israeli]  Prime  Minister 
Shamir  visited  Washington.  His  Majes- 
ty, King  Hussein  of  Jordan,  will  be 
visiting  us  next  week. 

I  do  not  doubt  that  after  so  many 
years  of  strife,  there  is  a  very  deep 
yearning  on  the  part  of  all  for  peace. 
But  it's  also  clear,  I  think,  that  the  sub- 
stantive gap  between  the  parties  is  far 
too  wide,  and  the  atmosphere  is  far  too 
clouded  by  violence  and  tension  and 
mistrust  to  launch  negotiations  now. 
We  have,  therefore,  been  stressing  for 
2  months  the  need  for  a  step-by-step 
process.  Its  purpose  is  to  reduce  ten- 
sions, to  promote  dialogue  between  Is- 
raelis and  Palestinians,  and  to  build  an 
environment  that  can  sustain  negotia- 
tions on  interim  arrangements  and  per- 
manent status. 


Last  week.  Prime  Minister  Sham 
responded.  He  made  clear  that  the  .s^( 
tiifi  quo  was  unacceptable.  He  also  em 
phasized  Israel's  desire  to  advance  a 
political  process  that  might  lead  ulti- 
mately to  a  settlement.  He  proposed 
elections  in  the  territories  for  Pales- 
tinian representatives  prepared  to 
negotiate  an  interim  agreement.  The 
process  would  culminate  in  negotia- 
tions on  final  status.  And  he  said  that 
in  those  negotiations,  all  options  woul 
be  open.  All  parties  could  bring  their 
preferred  positions  to  the  table,  and 
all,  of  course,  would  have  to  find  the 
ultimate  outcome  acceptable. 

This,  we  think,  is  a  positive  step 
and  a  step  that  is  worthy  of  further 
consideration  and  development.  In  co 
ing  weeks,  we  will  be  discussing  witl 
Israel  and  the  Arabs  the  details  of 
these  ideas;  how  we  might  build  on 
them;  how  they  fit  into  a  larger  pictu 
of  setting  the  stage  for  direct  negotia 
tions.  We  have  embarked,  if  I  may  sa; 
so,  on  a  step-by-step  approach  that  fi 
our  view  of  how  to  progress  on  this 
most  difficult  of  conflicts. 

East-West  Relations 

The  next  and  fourth  area  where  we'v 
focused  our  early  efforts  concerns  ou 
preparations  for  further  improvemer 
in  East-West  relations.  Of  all  of  the 
changes  we've  seen  over  the  past  de- 
cade, those  in  the  Soviet  Union  are 
truly  the  most  remarkable.  Soviet 
troops  have  left  Afghanistan.  The  Ih 
[Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 
Treaty  is  being  carried  out.  Some  po 
litical  prisoners  have  been  released. 
Emigration  has  increased,  and  it's  in 
creased  dramatically.  And  a  kind  of 
democratization — something,  I  thinl< 
that's  still  far  from  democracy,  but, 
nevertheless,  a  kind  of  democra- 
tization— has  begun. 

The  political  and  economic  refor 
undertaken  by  General  Secretary  Go 
bachev,  however,  also  have  revealed  a 
vast  sea  of  discontent.  Virtually  evei 
facet  of  Soviet  life  and  Soviet  histor; 
has  been  subjected  to  critical  comme 
A  similar  wave  of  discontent  has 
washed  over  countries  throughout  ce 
tral  and  Eastern  Europe.  The  reac- 
tions, of  course,  have  not  been  unifoi 
Some  countries  stand  against  change 
Others  have  altered  their  political  ar 
economic  systems  to  a  degree  which 
once  thought  was  unattainable. 

The  unprecedented  roundtable 
agreements  reached  in  Poland  a  week 


THE  SECRETARY 


JO  are  indicative  of  such  changes  in 
s  communist  world.  Seven  years  ago 
ndles  were  lit  in  support  of  Poland's 
pressed  free  trade  union,  Solidarity, 
iw,  I  think  we  all  agree  that  hope  has 
en  rekindled.  Poland  has  taken  an 
portant  step  away  from  totalitaria- 
m,  although  democracy  is  far  from 
ving  been  achieved. 

In  Vienna,  I  hailed  the  changes  in 
J  East  as  a  sign  above  all  that  the 
stern  vision  of  freedom,  peace,  and 
mocracy  had  prevailed.  We  and  our 
ies,  working  together,  held  this  vi- 
n  aloft  for  four  full  decades.  Now  a 
w  sense  of  realism  in  the  Kremlin 
iifirms,  I  think,  the  success  of  our 
brts. 

I  can  say  that  we  very  much  wish 
•.  Gorbachev  well  in  his  attempt  to 
form  the  Soviet  Union.  We  have  abso- 
ely  no  interest  whatsoever  in  the 
lure  of  perestroika.  We  like  the  con- 
jt  of  new  thinking  in  foreign  and  de- 
ise  policy.  And  we  look  forward  to 
;  resumption  of  negotiations  to  com- 
'te  a  new  treaty  that  reduces  strate- 
i  arms. 

Simply  stated,  our  overall  purpose 
to  deepen  and  to  broaden  our  cooper- 
ve  relationship,  especially  on  re- 
onal  issues. 

Yet  I  think  it  is  too  soon  to  con- 
de  that  the  Soviet  policies  most 
uibling  to  the  West  are,  in  fact,  gone 
•ever.  The  progress  made  so  far  on 
ms  control  has  not  changed  the  fact 
at  the  Soviet  Union  remains  a  heavi- 
armed  superpower  with  a  global  mil- 
ry  reach.  Lately,  there  have  been 
;ns  of  a  more  constructive  Soviet  ap- 
Dach,  one  which  recognizes  the  need 
eliminate  the  capabilities  for  sur- 
ise  attack.  But  I  think  this  oppor- 
lity  needs  to  be  probed,  it  needs  to 
examined,  and  it  needs  to  be  devel- 
ed.  As  real  as  the  possibilities  may 

I  don't  think  we  are  there  yet. 

Indeed,  there  remain  too  many 
eas  where  the  slogans  of  new  think- 
j  lack  content.  Let  me  cite  a  couple 
e.\am])les. 

•  Moscow  has  declared  that  every 
?mber  state  of  the  socialist  family  has 
e  right  to  pursue  its  own  way,  but 
]scow  has  refused  to  renounce  the 
•ehznev  doctrine  that  still  over- 
adows  the  countries  dominated  by 
eU.S.S.R. 

The  Soviet  Union  seeks  reduced 
ilitary  force  levels  on  the  dividing 
le  in  Europe  but  still  refuses  to  re- 
ave the  Berlin  Wall  and  other  real- 
es  of  the  division  of  Europe  imposed 
'  Soviet  force. 


•  General  Secretary  Gorbachev  has 
declared  that  the  "most  immediate  task 
now  is  to  settle  regional  conflicts,"  to 
use  his  words.  But,  as  I  noted  a  mo- 
ment ago,  Moscow  refuses  to  put  meat 
on  the  bones  of  the  new  thinking  where 
Central  America  is  concerned. 

•  General  Secretary  Gorbachev  last 
week  described  the  Middle  East  as  a 
ver'table  tinderbox.  But  what  are  we  to 
make  of  the  Soviet  sale  of  sophisticated 
high-performance  bombers  to  Libya — a 
state  which  supports  terrorism  in  Eu- 
rope as  well  as  elsewhere?  And  while 
we're  at  it,  let  me  ask,  how  does  this 
sale  assist  the  worldwide  effort,  which 
Moscow  says  they  support,  to  control 
chemical  weapons  that  Libya  is  deve- 
loping at  its  Rabta  plant? 

These  and  other  issues  will  be  on 
my  agenda  when  I  meet  with  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  in  May. 

I  believe  strongly  that  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  have  the  potential  to  become 
far  more  cooperative.  In  fact,  we  will 
be  discussing  some  new  subjects,  in- 
cluding international  environmental 
issues,  narcotics  trafficking,  and 
terrorism  at  our  ministerial  meeting  in 
May.  We  can  stimulate  more  new  think- 
ing, filling  the  slogans  with  content,  I 
think,  and  extending  the  range  of  our 
cooperation. 

The  United  States  and  Its  Allies 

That  brings  me  to  the  fifth  and  final 
area  where  we've  been  working  stead- 
ily since  January.  Ultimately,  the  suc- 
cess of  our  East-West  policy  depends  on 
our  West-West  policy — the  ability  of  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  to  work  to- 
gether. Our  collective  strength — not 
only  Soviet  domestic  weakness  but  our 
collective  strength — has  set  the  stage 
for  the  remarkable  realism  we've  seen 
in  Moscow  thus  far. 

The  Soviet  Union,  however,  is  not 
the  only  reason  for  our  alliances  and 
not  the  only  reason  for  our  friendships. 
Over  the  past  40  years,  we  have  con- 
structed strong  political,  military,  and 
economic  relationships,  bound  together 
by  common  values  and  fundamental 
interests. 

Through  the  success  of  our  poli- 
cies, enormous  changes  have  taken 
place  for  the  better.  Today,  our  allies 
are  strong  and  prosperous;  the  United 
States  is  not  the  only  source  of  initia- 
tives or  resources.  Yet  it  remains  the 
case,  as  I  stated  earlier,  that  we  play  a 
unique  role  as  a  catalyst  for  coopera- 
tion. That,  of  course,  calls  for  a  cre- 
ative and  active  leadership. 


We  have,  therefore,  begun  exten- 
sive consultations  with  our  allies  and 
friends  on  problems  of  common  inter- 
est. I  have  visited  my  counterparts  in 
all  15  NATO  capitals,  and  we  met  again 
in  Vienna  at  the  start  of  the  convention- 
al arms  control  negotiations.  The  Presi- 
dent, of  course,  has  been  to  Japan,  to 
Korea,  and  to  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  Over  the  next  2  months,  we  will 
be  going  to  Europe  again  for  NATO's 
40th  anniversary  summit  and  for  the 
annual  economic  summit  in  Paris. 
From  these  discussions  a  common 
program  will  emerge  that  will  not 
only  deal  with  East-West  issues  but 
will  deal  with  all  of  the  challenges 
before  us. 

Conclusion 

So  let  me  conclude  this  review  of  80 
days  around  the  world,  if  I  might,  with 
the  following  observation.  De  Tocque- 
ville  noted  long  ago  that  democracies 
usually  lack  secrecy,  speed,  and 
cohesion  in  the  conduct  of  their  di- 
plomacy. I  would  accept  that — and  I 
would  add  to  it — that  these  problems 
are  multiplied  in  an  alliance  of 
democracies. 

Yet  the  diplomatic  style  of  the  de- 
mocracies may  be  well-suited  to  the 
complex  age  which  is  before  us.  He- 
roes, like  miracles,  occasionally 
emerge  from  history,  but  we  cannot 
count  on  either  heroes  or  miracles  to 
safeguard  our  interests.  And  in  any 
event,  the  common  people  must  live 
with  the  consequences.  That,  of  course, 
is  America — the  adventure  of  the  com- 
mon man  and  woman.  That  is 
democracy — the  safeguarding  of  free- 
dom for  all,  not  just  for  a  few. 

Consultation  and  consensus,  the 
careful  movements  of  a  step-by-step 
program,  and  slow  but  steady  change 
for  the  better  are  the  ways  of  democ- 
racy— they  are  the  ways  that  suit 
us  best. 


'Press  release  65. 


F«Mn»4mnnt    ^t    Ct-V^M     QilllAtin/    I 


11 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Interview  on 

"This  Week  With  David  Brinkley" 


Secretari/  Baker  was  interviewed 
on  ABC-TV's  "This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  on  April  9,  1989,  by  David 
Brinkley  and  Sam  Donaldson,  ABC 
News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC  Neivs 
analysts 

Q.  You  heard  [Israeli]  Prime  Minis- 
ter Shamir  [previous  guest].  Do  you 
hear  anything  new? 

A.  I  think  it  was  interesting  that 
the  Prime  Minister  said  that  we  were 
in  the  process,  really,  of  starting  a 
political  negotiation.  He  said  that  that 
political  negotiation  ultimately  would 
consider  matters  of  permanent  status; 
and  he  said,  in  effect,  that  all  options 
would  be  considered  during  that  nego- 
tiation, particularly  the  one  involving 
permanent  status.  I  think  this  is  new.  I 
believe  it's  different,  really,  than  Camp 
David — it's  not  just  warmed-over  Camp 
David — and  I  think  it  is  a  very  useful 
first  step  that  will  enable  us,  hopefully, 
to  engage  Arabs  and  Israelis  in  a  nego- 
tiation that  might  lead  to  peace. 

Is  it  a  small  step?  Yes,  it's  a  small 
step.  But  as  someone  indicated  a  couple 
of  days  ago,  this  is  the  most  intractable 
foreign  policy  problem  that  many  U.S. 
Administrations  have  faced,  and  we 
ought  not  to  be  dissatisfied  with  small 
steps. 

Q.  Even  though  a  small  step,  the 
Palestinians  have  already  rejected  it 
or  opposed  it. 

A.  That's  correct.  We  think  it  has 
potential,  and  we  hope  that  anyone  who 
is  interested  in  peace  would  give  it  a 
chance.  There  are  positions  that  have 
been  taken  on  the  other  side  as  well 
that  some  would  characterize  as  per- 
haps too  rigid,  and  we  will  hope  that 
there  is  a  potential  for  some  of  those 
to  moderate  as  we  go  through  this 
process. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  go  back  to  this 
very  basic  question  raised  by  the 
President's  statement  about  Israel 
leaving  the  occupied  territories,  and 
that  is:  What  is  the  U.S.  position  as 
to  whom  those  territories  belong?  Is 
it  still  the  U.S.  position  that  the  West 
Bank  is  part  of  the  unallocated  por- 
tion of  the  Palestine  mandate  be- 
longing neither  to  Jordan  nor  Israel 
nor  anyone  else  until  negotiation  be- 
tween the  two  parties  directly? 


A.  It's  the  U.S.  position  that  the 
permanent  status  of  those  territories 
will  not  be  determined  except  through 
direct  negotiations  between  the  par- 
ties, and  whatever  those  direct  negotia- 
tions bring  about  that  lead  to  peace 
will  be  supported  by  the  United  States. 

Q.  The  "parties"  being? 

A.  Being  Israelis  and  the 
Palestinians. 

Q.  Jordanians? 
A.  Palestinians. 

Q.  What  happened  to  [UN  Secu- 
rity Council  Resolutions]  242  and  338? 

A.  [Resolutions]  242  and  338  we 
support. 

Q.  Then  is  it— 

A.  And  we  support — 

Q.  I  didn't  realize  that  242  said 
through  negotiations  those  territories 
may,  in  fact,  become  Israeli  land. 

A.  But  we  also  support  the  idea  of 
direct  negotiations.  We  do  support,  as 
you  know — and  we  differ  here  from  the 
position  of  Israel — we  support  terri- 
tory for  peace.  We  support  direct  nego- 
tiations, though  that  will  provide  for 
Israeli  security  and  for  Palestinian  po- 
litical rights. 

Q.  But  the  Prime  Minister  just 
indicated  that  the  intifada — the 
uprising — which  is  now  in  its  17th 
month  on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza, 
must  stop  before  he  can  proceed  with 
elections  toward  this  autonomy  plan. 
Do  you  think  that's  a  reasonable 
position? 

A.  I  think  that  what  the  Prime 
Minister  said,  if  I  could  interpret  his 
remarks,  is  that  it's  pretty  tough  to 
conduct  fair  and  democratic  elections  in 
an  atmosphere  of  violence.  I  do  not 
read  him  to  be  saying  that,  as  a  re- 
quirement for  negotiations  with  Pal- 
estinians about  how  the  elections  will 
be  handled,  what  the  details  will  be, 
what  the  modalities  will  be,  there 
somehow  has  to  be  an  end  to  the  /;(^'- 
fada  in  advance.  I  don't  think  that 
would  work,  and  I  don't  think  that  that 
is  something  the  Palestinians  would 
agree  to. 


Q.  We  didn't  ask  him  that.  As  fa. 
as  negotiating  toward  reaching  a 
process  to  hold  elections  to  find  peo- 
ple to  negotiate,  we  didn't  ask  him 
that  question. 

A.  But  you  have  to  do  that.  It  is  a 
step-by-step  process.  As  we  have  beer 
saying  for  some  time,  I  think,  we  have 
got  to  find  ways  to  improve  the  climat 
on  the  ground,  to  improve  the  atmos- 
phere if  we  are  ever  going  to  find  the 
parties  in  direct  negotiations  that 
could  lead  to  peace. 

Q.  Will  people  in  east  Jerusa- 
lem be  allowed  to  vote?  Would 
Palestinians — 

A.  That's  a  good  e.xample  of  the 
kinds  of  details  and  questions  that  wil 
have  to  be  answered — 

Q.  What  do  you  say  the  answer 

is? 

A.  — not  just  Palestinians  in  east 
Jerusalem  but  what  about  Palestinian 
outside  of  the  territories?  It's  one  of— 

Q.  What  about  them?  Let  me  as 
you  whether  you  think  they  should  t 
allowed  to  vote. 

A.  Let  me  say  that  the  only  way 
we're  going  to  make  progress  here  is 
not  to  set  hard-and-fast  preconditions 
before  we  get  this  process  of  negotia- 
tions started.  That's  one  of  the  things 
frankly,  that  Palestinians  and  Israelii 
are  going  to  have  to  decide  with  re- 
spect to  these  elections:  Who  is  eligit 
to  vote?  After  these  people  are  electe 
what  is  going  to  be  their  responsibilit; 
What  is  it  that  they're  going  to  do? 
How  will  that  fit  in  with  the  negotia- 
tions on  permanent  status?  All  these 
things  have  to  be  determined. 

Q.  A  few  minutes  ago,  in  Jerusf 
lem,  Shimon  Peres,  the  Finance  Mir 
ister  in  the  Israeli  Government,  sait 
they  are  now  negotiating  with  the 
PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organizi 
tion],  with  the  United  States  as 
mediator,  and  they  have  abandoned 
their  refusal  to  talk  to  the  PLO  so 
long  as  the  United  States  is  doing  th 
talking  for  them.  As  you  heard,  we 
asked  the  Prime  Minister  about  thai 
and  he  didn't  want  to  discuss  it.  The 
are,  of  course,  political  rivals;  you 
might  say  enemies.  What  is  your  vie 
of  it?  Is  that  actually  what's  going 
on? 

A.  I  don't  think  I  should  characte 
ize  it  and  judge  it,  if  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter of  Israel  is  unwilling  to  do  so.  It's 
not  up  to  me,  I  don't  think,  to  make  a 
judgment  about  whether  they  feel  the; 
are  negotiating  with  the  PLO.  I'm  qui 


THE  SECRETARY 


ire  they  do  not  feel  that  way,  and  they 
•e  very  adamant  in  their  determina- 
on  not  to.  Anyway,  I  don't  know  ex- 
tly  what  the  Peres  statement  said, 
ve  only  heard  what  I  just  heard  on  the 
■ogram. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  a  Pales- 

nian  state  on  the  West  Bank  would 

»  economically  or  politically  viable? 

A.  It's  the  position  of  the  United 
;ates  now  that  we  do  not  support  an 
dependent  Palestinian  state  nor  do 
e  support,  though,  the  extension  of  Is- 
lel's  sovereignty  over  the  occupied  ter- 
tories  or  their  occupation  thereof. 

Q.  I  don't  think  many  people  be- 
eve.  looking  at  the  outer  limits  of 
jssible  negotiations,  that  Israel  ever 
;ain  will  be  9  miles  wide  at  the  La- 
un  Salient  nor  do  they  believe  that 
irusalem  will  be  ever  again  divided, 
irusalem — is  that  the  capital  of 
irael'? 

A.  We  think  Jerusalem  should  re- 
ain  undivided,  and  we  think  that  its 
atus  as  such  should  be  subject  to — 

Q.  Is  it  the  capital  of  Israel? 

A.  — subject  to  negotiations. 

Q.  The  Israelis  say  it's  the 
itpital. 

A.  It  should  be  subject  to  negotia- 
on  and  determined  by  negotiation.  As 
)U  know,  we  continue  to  maintain  our 
mbassy  in  Tel  Aviv. 

Q.  Why  is  Israel  the  only  nation 
lith  which  the  United  States  has  dip- 
matic  relations  that  doesn't  get  to, 
the  eyes  of  the  American  Govern- 
ent,  say  what  its  capital  is? 

A.  It's  a  question  that  we  really 
el  can  only  be  resolved  through  nego- 
ations,  as  I  just  said.  That's  our  posi- 
Dn,  and  we're  sticking  with  it. 

Q.  You  just  heard  the  Prime  Min- 
ter  duck  the  question  as  to  whether 
ley  would  bomb  Iraq  again  if  Iraq 
as  about  to  develop  a  nuclear  poten- 
al.  What  would  be  our  view  of  such 
r\  Israeli  raid  once  more? 

A.  You'll  see  me  duck  equally 
jickly  a  question  like  that.  It's  highly 
jeculative,  and  I  really  shouldn't 
iswer. 

Q.  We  are  all  hearing,  as  you 
re — I  suppose  you  could  call  it  a  cho- 
is  of  complaint — that  the  Bush  Ad- 
nistration  is  not  being  responsive 
)  the  various  initiatives  offered  by 
likhail  Gorbachev — his  ideas,  his 
romises,  so  on  and  so  on — and  we 


seem  to  be  ignoring  them  and  not  re- 
sponding in  any  way.  What  would  you 
say  to  that? 

A.  I  think  I'd  say  the  same  thing 
the  President  said  in  his  press  confer- 
ence of  a  day  or  so  ago  where  he  said  we 
have  said  from  day  one  that  we're  going 
to  be  prudent  and  realistic  in  the  way 
that  we  approach  this  relationship;  and 
we're  going  to  conduct  certain  policy 
reviews  which  we  think  we  should  con- 
duct; and  when  we're  ready  to  talk, 
we'll  talk. 

He  said  the  day  before  yesterday, 
when  we're  ready  to  talk,  we'll  talk. 
And  when  we're  ready  to  talk,  we  will 
talk.  We  are  conducting  a  policy 
review — 

Q.  That  doesn't  seem  to  be  much 
of  a  policy,  though. 

A.  We  have  told  the  Soviets,  as 
long  ago  as  a  month,  in  my  meeting 
with  [Foreign]  Minister  Shevardnadze, 
that  we  anticipated  these  reviews 
would  be  completed  about  the  end  of 
April  and  that  we  would  be  prepared  to 
discuss  some  of  these  issues  in  the  con- 
text of  our  meeting  in  Moscow  on  the 
10th  or  11th  of  May.  They've  known  what 
our  timeframe  and  timetable  were  for 
quite  some  time.  So  it's  sort  of  interest- 
ing to  see  this  statement  only  coming 
out  now. 

Q.  Just  to  answer  some  of  the 
complaint,  the  Soviet  Union  has  been 
there  quite  a  long  time.  We  have 
known  all  about  it  for  quite  a  long 
time.  What  sort  of  review  is  taking 
place  that  is  taking  weeks,  months? 

A.  The  principal  review  is  that  we 
have  got  to  make  some  decisions  on 
strategic  modernization  with  respect  to 
the  land-based  leg  of  our  triad.  That  is 
a  matter  that  does  not  involve  the  fact 
that  the  Soviet  Union  has  been  there  a 
long  time;  it's  a  very  important  decision 
we  have  to  make,  and  it  could  impact 
the  negotiating  positions  that  we  will 
take  in  the  resumption  of  the  strategic 
arms  reduction  talks  (START).  It's  a 
very  important  review. 

Q.  Two  recent  Gorbachev  pro- 
posals that  some  people  say  have  less 
there  than  meets  the  ear:  one  is  the 
closing  of  some  plants  making 
weapons-grade  plutonium.  Is  that  a 
significant  step,  or  does  the  Soviet 
Union  have  sufficient  already? 

A.  It's  great  words.  I  don't  think 
it's  much  by  way  of  deeds.  It's  good 
rhetoric.  They've  got  plenty. 


Q.  Mr.  Gorbachev  also  said  some- 
thing about — and  it's  unclear  what  all 
the  strings  attached  were — ending 
arms  shipments  to  Latin  America. 
Some  people  say  it's  equivalent  to  say- 
ing they'll  get  out  of  our  backyard  if 
we'll  get  out  of  our  backyard.  What 
was  required  of  the  United  States  for 
them  to  stop  arms  shipments? 

A.  What  I  thought  was  significant 
with  respect  to  what  he  said  in  Cuba 
was  that  they  were  opposed  to  the  ex- 
port of  revolution.  We  hope  so.  We'd 
like  to  see  that.  We'd  like  to  see  some 
content  put  on  that  new  thinking. 

But  with  specific  reference  to  arms 
to  Nicaragua,  we  again  raised,  a  month 
ago  with  the  Soviets,  our  concern  about 
that;  and  the  response  was,  "If  you  stop 
supporting  governments  in  Central 
America — primarily  democratically 
elected  governments — we  will  stop  sup- 
porting Nicaragua."  And,  of  course, 
that  is  a  non-starter  for  us,  and  we  so 
told  them. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  ask  you  two  ques- 
tions about  topics  that  have  recently 
consumed  us  on  Sundays  and  then 
sort  of  disappeared.  Some  while  ago 
we  asked  Mr.  Noriega,  in  effect,  to  go 
away  because  we  didn't  like  him.  He 
declined  to  go.  Is  U.S.  policy  there 
now  just  flat  a  failure,  to  get  rid  of 
Noriega? 

A.  We  haven't  been  able  to  get  rid 
of  him.  Our  policy  is  still  that  we  will 
not  be  able  to  normalize  relations  with 
Panama  as  long  as  he  remains  in  power. 
But  we  are  only  about  a  month  away 
now  from  an  election  in  Panama  which 
could  provide  the  result  we're  talking 
about.  It  will  be  very  interesting  to  see 
what  Gen.  Noriega  does;  whether  he 
will  permit  free  and  fair  elections  in 
Panama  or  whether  he  will  attempt  to 
steal  this  election,  because  I  think  that 
could  change  attitudes  significantly  in 
Latin  America. 

Q.  What's  your  judgment  on  what 
he  will  do? 

A.  I'm  not  really  sure.  We  are  a 
month  away.  There  is  some  indication 
that  he  very  much  wants  to  hold  on  to 
power.  We've  known  from  experience  in 
the  past  he  would  not  be  reluctant  to 
try  and  steal  it  if  he  thought  he  could 
get  away  with  it. 

Q.  A  few  months  ago,  in  January, 
the  topic  on  everyone's  lips  in  Wash- 
ington was  the  poison  gas  plant  in 
Libya.  That  seems  also  to  have  just 


«»»«  M«  0*»«M   D. 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


gone  off  the  radar  screen.  What,  if 
anything,  are  we  going  to  do  about  it, 
or  have  we  just  reconciled  ourselves 
to  it  continuing?!  can't  give  you  any 
specific  information  on  that  other  than 
to  say  we  are  continuing  to  monitor 
that  situation.  We're  continuing  to  lool< 
into  it.  We  view  something  lil^e  that 
very,  very  seriously;  and  we  consider  it 
very  grave. 

Q.  We  had  a  report  that  we  were 
going  to  close  the  Afghan  Embassy 
here  in  Washington.  Are  you  going  to 
do  that? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Not  whatsoever? 
A.  No. 

Q.  Now  or  in  the  future? 
A.  Check  your  sources. 

Q.  I  guess  we're  coming  to  one  of 
the  best  people. 

A.  Let  me  bact;  up  and  say  to  you 
that  it's  a  matter  that  at  some  point  we 
will  have  to  consider.  But  I  think  your 
report  suggested  we  had  made  a  deci- 
sion, and  a  decision  has  not  been  made. 

Q.  Going  back  to  the  idea  that 
you're  not  going  to  answer  a  question 
as  to  what  our  attitude  would  be  if  Is- 
rael were  to  bomb  the  plant  in  Iraq, 
can  you  say  that  if  we  asked  that 
about  any  other  country,  why,  you 
would  view  with  alarm  and  you  would 
send  warnings.  Are  you  giving  Israel 
a  green  light  to  do  that? 

A.  No,  we  are  not  doing  that.  I'm 
simply  refusing  to  speculate  or  hypoth- 
esize with  you  on  something  that's  a 
very,  very  hypothetical  situation. 

Q.  It's  not  hypothetical.  They  did 
it  in  1981  or  1982. 

A.  But  it  is  hypothetical  in  the 
context  that  we're  speaking  now.  I 
think  the  important  thing  there  is  that 
Israel  is  a  close  ally  of  the  United 
States.  Our  commitment — enduring 
commitment — to  Israel's  security  and 
survival  is  very,  very  strong.  At  the 
same  time,  we  don't  e.xpect  to  surprise 
Israel,  and  we  expect  Israel  not  to  sur- 
prise us. 

Q.  The  Soviet  sub  that  has  sunk, 
do  we  have  any  more  information  as 
to  whether  there  is  any  problem  with 
radioactivity? 

A.  I  have  no  information  other 
than  what's  been  reported  this 
morning. 


Q.  There  have  been  extraordi- 
nary developments  in  Poland  and  else- 
where in  Eastern  Europe.  As  a  way  of 
encouraging  movements  toward  plu- 
ralism, might  the  President  visit 
Eastern  Europe  on  his  trip,  I  guess, 
to  France  in  July? 

A.  There  has  to,  of  course,  be  con- 
sideration of  something  like  that. 
There's  been  no  decision  made  with  re- 
spect to  whether  he  will  or  will  not  do 
so.  He's  particularly  interested,  as  you 
know,  in  Poland.  He  made  a  trip  there 
as  Vice  President. 

The  changes  that  are  taking  place 
in  Poland  are  really  very  revolutionary. 
I  think  I  may  have  mentioned  when  we 
were  in  Vienna  talking  to  the  Polish 
Foreign  Minister  and  his  team,  it  was 
fascinating  to  see  them  there  across  the 
table  from  us  having  a  friendly  debate 
about  whether  they  should  go  to  an 
American-style  presidency  or  a  French- 
style  presidency  in  Poland.  So  that's 
how  far  we've  come  in  the  space  of — 


Q.  Are  you  sure  the  Soviet  Union 
will  let  them  do  either? 

A.  — a  year.  No  one  can  be  sure. 

Q.  Is  the  Brezhnev  doctrine 
dead? 

A.  No  one  can  be  sure  about  that. 
I  hope  it's  dead.  We've  called  on  them  t 
repudiate  it,  and  so  far  they  haven't 
done  so  in  so  many  words. 

Q.  This  is  a  very  long  leap — and 
don't  expect  a  precise  answer  and  we 
won't  hold  you  to  it — but  I  would  like 
to  have  your  opinion.  Could  this  be 
the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  Rus- 
sian empire  in  central  and  Eastern 
Europe? 

A.  That  is  a  very  long  leap.  What 
hope  we're  going  to  see  is  a  continuing 
move  toward  pluralism  in  Eastern  Eu- 
rope, continuing  moves  toward  free- 
market  economics,  the  kinds  of  things 
that  we  believe  in  which  have  suc- 
ceeded so  spectacularly  in  the  West. 


IK 


'Press  release  59  of  Apr.  10,  1989. 


Secretary's  Interview 
for  "American  Interests" 


Secretary  Baker  was  interviewed 
by  Morton  Kondracke  for  the  PBS 
program.  "American  Interests" 
on  April  19,  19S9,  and  broadcast  on 
April  22 ^ 

Q.  You're  about  to  head  off  to  Mo- 
scow in  May  for  a  meeting  with  For- 
eign Minister  Shevardnadze  and 
probably  with  Mikhail  Gorbachev. 

Can  we  expect  the  scheduling  of  a 
Bush-Gorbachev  summit  to  come  out 
of  these  talks  that  you're  going  to 
have? 

A.  I  don't  think  we  ought  to  antici- 
pate that.  I  think  it  would  be  more 
likely  that  we  could  probably  discuss  in 
some  detail  the  rescheduling  of  the 
strategic  arms  negotiations. 

We're  hopeful  that  we'll  be  able  to 
do  that,  but  I'm  not  going  to  suggest 
that  we're  going  to  come  out  of  that 
meeting  with  a  summit  date.  Now  we'll 
probably  talk  about  the  possibility  of  a 
summit  and  that  sort  of  thing,  but  then 
we  talked  about  that  at  our  last  meet- 
ing as  well. 


Q.  But  are  you  flatly  saying  thai 
you're  not  going  to  come  out  after 
this  meeting  with  a  summit  date? 

A.  No.  I'm  not  saying  that.  But  I 
don't  want  to  leave  you  with  the  idea 
that  that's  something  we're  seeking  to 
accomplish  at  this  meeting.  It  really 
isn't.  I  think  that  the  subject  will  pro! 
ably  be  raised,  but  we're  not  going  ove 
there  with  the  idea  in  mind  that  we're 
going  to  set  a  summit  date. 

Q.  What  is  your  attitude  toward 
summits?  Do  you  think  they  ought  tc 
be  a  regular  thing,  or  should  they  be 
saved  for  special  business? 

A.  I  think  there's  an  argument 
both  ways,  and  I  understand  your  argi 
ment  about  regularizing  them,  so  that 
they  don't  become  such  a  big,  dramatic 
media  event  and  don't  get  the  kind  of 
hype  that  they  get  when  they're  not 
regularized.  That's  a  valid  argument. 

On  the  other  hand,  we've  regu- 
larized other  meetings  in  the  past,  anc 
sometimes  they  tended  to  degenerate 
as  a  consequence  of  that.  So  that's  the 
counterargument. 


-^<    0»»*#«    Ditllntiv^/    I 


THE  SECRETARY 


(J.  So  you  are,  thoush,  Roing  to 
ludiilc  the  resumption  of  START 
liategie  arms  reduction  talks]? 

1^    A.  We  hope  to  do  that.  That's  one 
the  things  that  we  would  like  to  be 
le  to  come  out  of  that  ministerial 
th — a  broad  range  of  dates  anyway 
resumption  of  the  strategic  arms 
gotiations. 

Q.  What  are  we  talking  about? 
ne  or — 

A.  I  don't  want  to  prejudge  that. 

need  to  really  talk  to  the  Soviets 
out  that  before  you  and  I  set  the  date 
re. 

Q.  Let  me  come  back  to  arms 
ntrol  in  a  second.  But  there  are  sto- 
!S  around  that  you  plan  to  link  the 
'ART  process  with  Central  Amer- 
i.  with  the  continuation  of  Soviet 
1  to  Nicaragua;  that  somehow  we 
luld  hold  up  START  in  order  to  get 
em  to  cut  off  aid  to  Nicaragua.  Is 
at  true? 

A.  If  we  were  going  to  do  that,  I 
uldn't  be  talking  to  you  about  it.  But 
lon't  think  that  it's  unrealistic  for  us 
talk  with  the  Soviets  across  a  broad 
•ige  of  issues.  Certainly  we're  going 
be  talking  to  them  about  their  ac- 
ins  in  Central  America.  We're  not 
ing  to  be  going  over  there  and  draw- 
r  a  specific  linkage  with  respect  to 
i  two. 

No — I  think  it's  important  that  we 
itinue  our  dialogue  with  the  Soviets 
•OSS  the  broad  range  of  issues  that 
ve  always  characterized  that  dia- 
;ue:  arms  control,  regional  issues,  bi- 
eral  issues,  human  rights.  And,  of 
jrse,  I  suggested  that  we  add  yet  an- 
ler  category — the  global  issues  or 
msnational  issues  such  as  the  envi- 
iment,  terrorism,  and  drugs — and 
3  Soviets  have  agreed  to  do  that. 

Q.  Suppose  the  Soviets  tried 
me  linkage  on  you,  and  they  say, 
tkay,  you  want  us  to  stop  giving 
litary  aid  to  Nicaragua.  Why  don't 
u  stop  giving  military  aid  to  the 
ujaliidin  in  our  back  yard  in  Af- 
anistan?"  What  would  you  say  if 
ey  do  that? 

A.  If  they  said  that,  I  would  proba- 
,'  respond  that  they're  supplying 
ughly  .$500  million  of  military  equip- 
nt  to  Nicaragua  every  year,  and 
're  not  supplying  any  military  equip- 
■nt  and  haven't  since  February  of 
88  to  the  Nicaraguan  Resistance. 

Q.  Do  you  mean  to  the  Afghan 
sistance? 

A.  No.  To  the  Nicaraguan  Resis- 
nce.  So  we  start  off  with  a  $500  mil- 


lion to  nothing  slate  there.  Further- 
more, what  they're  supplying  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  dwarfs  what 
we  might  be  giving  some  of  those  demo- 
cratic governments  in  the  region. 

As  far  as  Afghanistan  is  con- 
cerned, they  are  tunneling  massive 
amounts  of  military  assistance,  equip- 
ment, and  supplies  to  the  puppet  re- 
gime in  Kabul.  So  the  two  situations,  I 
will  argue,  are  simply  not  comparable. 
We're  not  supplying  anything  to  the 
Nicaraguan  Resistance. 

They're  supporting  this  puppet 
regime  in  Kabul,  and  we're  really  seek- 
ing, as  we  have  always  been  seeking, 
the  right  of  self-determination  for  the 
Afghan  people. 

Q.  So  you  will  flatly  refuse 
to  link  those  things — to  link 
Afghanistan — 

A.  Your  question  a  minute  ago — 
your  hypothetical  question — was, 
"What  would  you  say  if  they  link  it?" 

Q.  Yes. 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  sit  here  and 
tell  you  everything  we're  going  to  do 
when  we  go  over  there.  I  shouldn't  do 
that.  That  doesn't  mean  we're  going  to 
be  drawing  any  linkage  of  our  own.  But 
that's  what  my  response  would  be  if 
they  choose  to  link  it.  I  don't  think  the 
two  situations,  frankly,  are  comparable. 

Q.  How  do  you  plan  to  get 
the  Soviets  to  stop  supplying  $500 
million  a  year  in  military  aid  to  the 
Nicaraguans? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  it's  not  in 
their  economic  interests  really  to  con- 
tinue to  do  that.  They  are  pretty  well 
strapped  economically.  That's  why 
they're  changing  their  political  system. 
That's  why  they're  changing  their  eco- 
nomic system.  That's  why  we've  won  on 
the  political  and  economic  front  so  over- 
whelmingly, because  their  system  is  a 
failure,  and  it's  not  easy  for  them  to 
continue  to  funnel  about  $6  billion  a 
year  into  this  hemisphere  when  you 
consider  what  they  give  Cuba  and  what 
they  give  the  Nicaraguans.  So  I  think 
we  have  that  working  for  us  going  in. 

Now  it's  an  irritant  to  us,  and  they 
will  surely  want  to  get  something  for 
it,  and  we're  going  to  keep  pressing 
them.  They  talk  about  the  new  things — 
the  so-called  new  thinking — and  we 
make  the  point  consistently  that  there's 
not  much  "new  thinking"  going  on  as 
far  as  their  approach  to  Central  Amer- 
ica is  concerned. 

We're  going  to  keep  saying  that. 
We  now  have  a  unified  policy  on  Cen- 
tral America.  We've  got  the  Central 


American  democracies  behind  it.  We've 
got  Venezuela  behind  it — Canada,  some 
of  the  nations  in  the  hemisphere — and 
they  are  going  to  begin  saying  to  the 
Soviets,  "Wait  a  minute.  Why  are  you 
funneling  all  of  this  military 
assistance?" 

Q.  But  will  it  really  work  to  sort 
of  embarrass  Gorbachev  into  cutting 
off  this — 

A.  What  I'm  really  arguing  is  it's 
in  his  economic  interests  to  do  so.  I 
think  that  the  force  of  public  opinion 
worldwide  can  be  important.  It  can  be 
effective.  I'm  not  suggesting  that 
they're  going  to  reduce  their  assistance 
to  Nicaragua  in  the  near  term.  But  we 
would  make  a  serious  mistake  if  we 
didn't  keep  hammering  them  on  it,  and 
we  intend  to  do  that. 

Q.  There  were  stories  when  you 
went  on  your  whirlwind  trip  around 
Europe  that  one  of  your  objectives 
was  to  try  to  get  European  govern- 
ments to  cut  their  loans  and  assist- 
ance to  Nicaragua  as  a  pressure 
point.  Did  you  have  any  success  on 
that  score? 

A.  I  think  that  now  that  we  have  a 
unified  policy,  I  think  you're  going  to 
see  European  governments — many  of 
them;  some  of  them  won't — but  many  of 
them  will  take  the  position  with  the 
Nicaraguans,  "Okay,  the  United  States 
has  put  the  military  option  to  the  side 
here.  The  Central  American  de- 
mocracies in  the  region  support  this, 
but  let's  see  some  action  on  those  prom- 
ises that  you've  been  making  all  this 
time,  and  let's  see  some  movement  to- 
ward democratization." 

Q.  There  are  some  stories  around 
that  the  Italians  and  the  Germans  are 
preparing  something  like  a  $660  mil- 
lion loan  to  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment. Is  there  some  way  to  stop  that, 
or  are  you  going  to  intervene  with 
them  to  see  that  that  doesn't  happen? 

A.  No.  We've  made  the  case  gener- 
ally with  our  European  allies  that  we 
would  hope  they  would  look  for  perform- 
ance on  these  promises  that  are  now  10 
years  old  before  they  just  throw  this 
economic  assistance  in  the  direction  of 
Nicaragua. 

We'll  continue  to  make  that  case.  I 
think  we  can  make  it  much  more  effec- 
tively now  that  the  United  States 
speaks  with  one  voice,  and  we  have  one 
policy,  and  that  is  a  policy  that's  based 
on  a  diplomatic  approach. 


enartmpnt  nf  estate  Bulletin/June  1989 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  Ger- 
mans and  the  Italians  will  go  through 
with  those  loans? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  predict  that.  I'm 
not  going  to  predict  that  they  won't; 
I'm  not  going  to  predict  that  they  will. 

Q.  Are  we  trying  to  intervene  to 
stop  it? 

A.  We  are  trying  to  do  just  as  I 
told  you  a  moment  ago  we're  trying  to 
do,  which  is  to  get  the  Europeans  to  fo- 
cus on  the  promises  that  Nicaragua  has 
made  but  has  not  carried  out  and  to  fo- 
cus on  the  importance  of  their  moving 
toward  democracy. 

And  let  me  remind  you,  it's  more 
than  just  moving  toward  democracy. 
It's  giving  their  people  basic  human 
rights  and  freedoms  which  they  do  not 
enjoy. 

Q.  One  of  the  suspicions  around 
is  that  Gorbachev,  when  he  was  in 
Cuba,  was  prepared  to  announce  a 
cutback  in  the  aid  levels  to  Nicaragua, 
knowing  full  well  that  the  Europeans 
were  going  to  supply  it  instead,  which 
suggests  that  the  Europeans  are,  in 
effect,  bucketing  money  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  helping  out  their  foreign 
policy.  Is  that  the  way  allies  ought  to 
behave? 

A.  That  rests  on  so  many  hypo- 
theticals.  I  mean,  it's  a  story;  it's  a 
rumor  here.  Everything  you've  asked 
me  so  far  is,  "Well,  there  are  rumors 
out  here  to  this  effect  and  that  effect." 
You  can  get  rumors  about  anything,  so 
I'm  not  going  to  respond  to  rumors  or 
hypothetical  questions  like  that. 

Q.  But  I  took  it  that  you  were 
confirming  that  the  Germans  and  the 
Italians  are  considering  this  loan  and 
that  you — 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  confirm  that.  I 
will  not  confirm  that.  I  will  confirm  to 
you  that  there  are  European  govern- 
ments that  render  economic  assistance 
to  Nicaragua,  and  we  have  been  talking 
to  them  about  that  economic  system. 
I'm  not  going  to  confirm  or  deny  any 
specific  loan  or  arrangement  that's 
based  on  some  rumor  you've  heard. 

Q.  When  the  START  talks  re- 
sume, do  you  expect  that  there  will  be 
any  significant  changes  in — that  the 
Bush  Administration  will — 

A.  It's  too  early  to  say  that.  Do  you 
mean  are  there  going  to  be  changes  in 
our  negotiating  position? 

Q.  Yes.  Right. 

A.  It's  too  early  to  say  that.  We 
will  not  have  completed  our  strategic 
review  until  the  end  of  April.  We  said  it 
when  we  came  into  office;  we  will  com- 


plete that  review  along  about  the  end  of 
April.  We'll  be  in  a  position  to  have  for- 
mulated our  negotiating  positions  in 
the  middle  of  May — something  like 
that.  We  think  we're  going  to  keep  that 
timeframe. 

We  have  a  major  strategic  modern- 
ization review,  you  know,  to  complete. 
So  it's  entirely  possible.  My  own  per- 
sonal view,  I  think  there  will  be  a  sub- 
stantial degree  of  continuity,  but  that's 
not  to  say  that  some  position  couldn't 
change. 

Q.  How  about  on  the  issue  of  mo- 
bile missiles?  The  Reagan  Adminis- 
tration wanted  to  ban  them.  It 
appears  that  the  Defense  Secretary — 
Secretary  Cheney — wants  to  have  a 
rail  mobile  MX,  and  national  security 
adviser  Scowcroft  is  in  favor  of  Midg- 
etman.  So  is  it  a  lead  pipe  cinch  that 
that  mobile  missile  ban  would  be 
lifted — removed? 

A.  This  is  very  much  wrapped  in 
our  strategic  modernization  review. 
The  question  of  whether  you  go  to  a  mo- 
bile missile  is  a  question  the  President 
has  not  decided.  If  he  should  decide 
that  you  do,  clearly  that  negotiating  po- 
sition will  have  to  change.  That's  why 
the  reviews  have  to  be  completed  be- 
fore you  hammer  out  the  negotiating 
position.  I  think  there  will  be  a  sub- 
stantial degree  of  continuity. 

Q.  Have  you  weighed  in  to  the 
missile  argument?  Is  there  a  favorite 
Baker  missile? 

A.  If  I  had,  I  wouldn't  be  talking 
about  it  on  television,  because  it's 
advice  that  I  would  be  giving  the 
President. 

Q.  Okay.  What  about  SDI  [Stra- 
tegic Defense  Initiative]?  Will  this 
Administration  stick  with  the  so- 
called  narrow  interpretation  of  the 
ABM  Treaty  which  would  not  allow 
us  to  deploy  or  space-test  space-based 
missiles? 

A.  Again  that  will  depend  upon 
presidential  decisions  with  respect  to 
SDI  that  are  now  in  the  process  of  be- 
ing formulated  in  May.  That's  a  ques- 
tion that  is  premature. 

Q.  Okay.  Let's  go  on  from  your 
visit  to  Moscow  to  the  President's  vis- 
it to  the  NATO  summit  and  then  to 
the  rest  of  Europe.  Mikhail  Gor- 
bachev has  been  winning  points  all 
over  Europe  by  proposing  the  com- 
mon European  homeland,  extending 
from  the  Urals  to  the  Atlantic,  and 
it's  a  kind  of  a  vision  that  has  at- 
tracted a  lot  of  attention  and  support 
there. 


Is  there  going  to  be  a  Bush  cout 
tervision  for  the  future  of  Europe, 
and  something  that  allies  of  ours  ci 
hang  their  hats  on?  ^ 

A.  I  think  there  will  be,  and,  of 
course,  that  would  come  at  the  NATC 
summit.  It's  a  40th  anniversary  sum- 
mit. It  will  be  the  first  summit  for  th 
President,  and  it's  important,  I  think 
that  he  continue  to  demonstrate  U.S. 
leadership. 

I  think  that  the  President  might 
well  speak  about  common  values.  We, 
after  all,  will  be  celebrating  an  ex- 
traordinarily successful  alliance.  Foi 
years  of  success — success  based  on 
common  values.  Those  are  far  broade 
in  their  reach  and  scope,  it  seems  to 
me,  than  some  sort  of  a  concept  of  a 
common  European  house,  as  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev has  explained  it. 

I  mean,  I  think  there  are  some  le 
gitimate  questions  that  come  to  mine 
about  a  common  European  house,  ont 
of  which  is  if  you're  going  to  have  a 
common  European  house,  you  really 
ought  to  be  able  to  move  from  room  t 
room,  shouldn't  you?  So  we  ought  not 
have  Berlin  Walls,  and  we  ought  not ' 
have  watchtowers  and  barbed  wires. 
And  why  haven't  those  come  down? 
Why  don't  we  take  those  down?  Why 
don't  we  bring  those  down  as  evidenc 
of  the  new  thinking?  Why  don't  we 
have  an  expressed  repudiation  of  the 
Brezhnev  doctrine,  which  I  called  fo: 
frankly,  in  my  speech  at  the  CFE  [cc 
ventional  forces  in  Europe]  conferen 
in  Vienna,  and  we've  heard  no  respoi 
to  that. 

Q.  But  might  the  President  im 
the  Soviets  and  especially  the  East 
ern  Europeans  into  our  homeland, 
whatever  you  call  it — area  of 
freedom — 

A.  I  don't  want  to  prejudge  wha 
the  President  might  or  might  not  say 
his  speech.  That's  for  him  to  say.  But 
will  he  demonstrate  American  leadei 
ship?  Yes.  Will  he  have  his  vision  oft 
future  there?  Yes,  he  will. 

Q.  Is  there  a  kind  of  a  common 
democratic  homeland  idea  working 
self  around  in  the  Administration? 

A.  I  referred  to  the  idea  of  com- 
mon values.  That  is,  we  have  an  alli- 
ance here  that  has  been  based  on 
common  values,  and  that's  why  it's  bt 
so  successful.  And  common  values  ha 
a  much  broader  reach  than  the  conce] 
of  a  common  European  homeland. 

Q.  While  he's  in  Europe,  one  ol 
our  bilateral  relationships — that  is 
with  the  Federal  Republic  of 


nAnorimAnt  r\t  Ctota  Rg  illatin/.  Il  ino  14 


i 


THE  SECRETARY 


ermany — seems  to  have  lots  of  dis- 
jrdant  elements  in  it.  The  Germans 
elped  the  Libyans  establish  chemi- 
il  plants  and  sell  nuclear  materials 
»  Pakistan  and  maintain  an 
ttpolitik  that's  cozying  up  to  the 
ast-bloc. 

Is  there  trouble  in  the  U.S.- 
erman  relationship  that  somehow 
as  to  be  straightened  out? 

A.  No.  I  don't  think  there's  trouble 
ithe  U.S. -German  relationship,  no 
ore  so  than  you  might  normally  see 
cm  time  to  time.  We  do  have  some  dif- 
rences,  but  let's  face  it — the  Ger- 
lans,  when  the  evidence  was  finally 
resented  about  the  participation  of 
)me  of  their  companies  in  the  Rabta 
lemical  facility  in  Libya,  have  taken 
)me  rather  dramatic  action.  They've 
.iffened  their  export  control  laws, 
hey've  stiffened  their  criminal  laws 
jgarding  conduct  in  that  kind  of  activ- 
y.  I  mean,  they've  really  turned  to 
id  acknowledged  that  there  was  a 
"oblem,  and  they're  dealing  with  it. 
nd  that's  the  way  allies  should  deal 
ith  each  other. 

Q.  There's  also  the  issue  of  Lance 
lodernization.  You  know,  the  will- 
igness  to  deploy — 

A.  You  had  it  with  Pershings  for  a 
hile.  You  had  it  in  conjunction  with 
le  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
irces]  discussion.  These  things  happen 
■om  time  to  time.  The  Germans  are  in 
somewhat  special  situation  with  re- 
)ect  to  land-based  short-range  nuclear 
eapons.  They're  on  German  soil,  and 
lat's  where  they  ought  to  be  utilized. 
0  they  have  a  special  interest  and  con- 
;rn  there.  We  understand  that. 

They  understand,  on  the  other 
and,  our  need,  if  we're,  in  fact,  going 
)  maintain  those  weapons  up  to  date. 
'  we're  going  to  go  up  here  to  the  Con- 
ress  and  ask  for  money  to  upgrade 
lose  weapons,  we  need  to  know  that 
ley're  going  to  be  used.  We're  going  to 
ork.  We're  going  to  work  very  hard  to 
ork  that  out  with  our  friends  in  the 
ederal  Republic  before  the  NATO 
jmmit,  so  that  the  summit  doesn't  re- 
olve  strictly  around  that  issue.  It 
hould  not.  it's  a  40th  anniversary  sum- 
lit.  We  have  bigger  issues  to  talk 
bout  and  to  concentrate  on. 

Q.  So  you  do  regard  the  Federal 
Republic  as  a  fuUv  reliable  ally  in 
lATO  and— 

A.  Absolutely. 

Q.  — and  you  don't  see  them  slip- 
ng  away. 


anarfmant  r>f  Qtato  Rlllletin/.llinP  1Q89 


A.  Absolutely.  And  they  always 
have  been.  And  let  me  say  one  other 
thing. 

They're  sitting  there  right  on  the 
border  with  the  G.D.R.  [German  Dem- 
ocratic Republic],  and  the  G.D.R.  is  not 
making  the  kind  of  progress  toward 
openness  and  pluralism  and  change  in 
their  political  and  economic  assistance 
that  we  see  taking  place  in  Poland  and 
Hungary.  I,  for  one,  really,  am  not 
concerned  about  the  reliability  of  the 
Federal  Republic  as  a  strong  member  of 
NATO  and  as  a  strong  ally  of  the 
United  States. 

Q.  The  Germans  tend  to  be  in  the 
lead  of  the  lending  parade  to  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union — $9  bil- 
lion in  credits  and  loans.  Do  you 
think  that  that  sort  of  thing  is  a  good 
idea? 

A.  I  think  that  as  long  as  the 
standard  is  the  standard  that  we  all 
agreed  to  at  the  economic  summit  in 
Toronto — when  I  say  "we  all,"  the  Sum- 
mit 7  at  least — that  is,  that  trade  and 
commerce  and  economic  relations  on 
normal  commercial  and  financial  terms 
is  okay.  As  long  as  that's  the  standard — 
and  we're  not  talking  about  concession- 
ary trade  or  tying  aid  or  something  like 
that — then  I  think  it's  perfectly  appro- 
priate to  adhere  to  the  standard  that 
was  adopted  in  Toronto. 

Q.  Do  we  know  where  that  money 
is  going?  When  there's  a  loan  to  East- 
ern Europe  or  to  the  Soviet  Union,  do 
we  know  that  that  money  just  doesn't 
go  to  Nicaragua? 

A.  Money  is  fungible,  isn't  it? 

Q.  Yes. 

A.  So  I'm  sure  that  the  Soviet 
Union  could  very  well— if  it's  simply  a 
balance-of-payments  loan,  any  country 
can  use  a  balance-of-payments  loan  for 
whatever  needs  or  purposes  it  has.  But 
the  point  is  normal  commercial  transac- 
tions are  the  standard. 

Q.  Are  you  satisfied  that  the  Eu- 
ropeans are  sticking  to  normal  com- 
mercial transactions? 

A.  I  have  no  reason  to  think 
they'i-e  not.  Let  me  say  that,  if  we  had 
reason  to  believe  they  were  not,  then 
that's  something  we  would  have  a  prob- 
lem with,  because  then  they  would  be 
departing  from  the  Toronto  standard. 

Q.  But  isn't  all  new  lending  sort 
of  balance  of  payments? 

A.  Let  me  say  this:  The  Soviets 
are  reluctant  borrowers.  They're  really 
sort  of  reluctant  borrowers,  because 
they're  concerned  about  getting  too  far 


into  debt.  Now  isn't  most  lending  to 
government,  balance-of-payments  lend- 
ing? Quite  a  bit  of  it,  yes. 

Q.  So  they  received  this  money  in 
hard  currency.  They  have  a  need  for 
hard  currency  in  order  to  maintain 
their  empire.  They  can  fiddle  around 
with  it  inside  the  country  to  establish 
a  commercial  enterprise,  but  they  can 
use  the  money  on  a  short-term  at 
least  to  cause  mischief  in  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

A.  Money  is  fungible,  but  if  it's  on 
ordinary,  normal  commercial  terms, 
they're  going  to  have  to  pay  it  back.  It 
represents  an  obligation,  and  they're 
going  to  have  to  pay  it  back  in  hard 
currency. 

Let  me  say  one  final  thing  on  that 
score.  Capital  controls  are  extraordi- 
narily difficult  to  implement  and  en- 
force, if  that's  generally  the  thrust  of 
what  you  were  suggesting — if  we  ought 
to  somehow  impose  capital  controls  on 
the  Soviet  Union. 

That  would  be  very,  very  difficult 
to  enforce,  and  as  long  as  the  standard 
that  was  agreed  to  and  set  at  the 
Toronto  summit  as  recently  as  a  year 
ago  is  met,  I  think  that's  the  appropri- 
ate basis  that  we  ought  to  all  proceed 
on.  There's  practically  no  lending,  as 
you  know,  from  U.S.  lenders  to  the  So- 
viet Union. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  about  Pan- 
ama. There's  about  to  be  an  election 
there,  and  the  polls  indicate  that  the 
Noriega  regime  would  lose  a  fair  elec- 
tion, yet  everybody  expects  it  to  be 
ruthlessly  stolen.  What's  the  United 
States  going  to  do  about  that? 

A.  We  would  hope  that  there  would 
be  a  very  broad  representation  by  ob- 
servers from  all  around  the  world — 
observer  groups  from  all  around  the 
world.  And  if  they  see  that  this  election 
is  in  the  process  of  being  stolen  or  is 
stolen  and  is  fraudulent,  that  they  will 
speak  out  so  that  the  world  community 
will  know  about  this  and  will  be  in  a  po- 
sition to  condemn  this.  And  that's  very 
important. 

Q.  And  then  what? 

A.  And  then  we'll  cross  that  bridge 
at  that  time.  After  all,  we're  only  2 
weeks  away.  So  I  don't  want  to — again, 
I  don't  want  to  suggest  something  here 
that  might  prejudice  what  happens 
there  during  the  election.  Our  position 
is  there  needs  to  be  a  free,  fair,  and 
open  election. 


17 


AFRICA 


Our  further  position  is  that  it's 
going  to  be  impossible  for  us  to  normal- 
ize relations  as  long  as  Gen.  Noriega  re- 
mains in  power. 

Q.  The  normalization  of  rela- 
tions question  raises  the  issue  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty.  This  year  Pan- 
ama is  supposed  to  nominate  a  new 
Commissioner  for  the — 

A.  Correct. 

Q.  — for  the — which  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  has  got  to  ratify. 

A.  That's  correct. 

Q.  If  Noriega  sends  up  a  commis- 
sioner, will  the  Administration — 

A.  We'll  have  to  deal  with  that  at 
the  time.  Now,  I  just  said  it's  going  to 
be  impossible  for  us  to  normalize  rela- 
tions with  Panama  in  terms  of  our  eco- 
nomic sanctions,  and  all  the  rest,  as 
long  as  Gen.  Noriega  is  in  power. 

Q.  Let  me  switch  to  Latin  debt,  if 
I  could.  The  Baker  plan,  which  called 
for  new  commercial  bank  lending  to 
the  Third  World,  seems  to  have  been 
replaced  by  the  Brady  plan,  which 
calls  for  lowering  the  debt  problem. 

The  Administration  is  in  favor  of 
the  Brady  plan.  Does  that  mean  that 
the  Baker  plan  is  dead,  and  does  the 
author  declare  it  dead  and  replaced? 

A.   No,  I  don't  think  it's  that  sim- 
ple. The  proposal  that  the  Treasury 
went  with  on  the  10th  of  March — the 
Brady  proposal — starts  out  by  saying 
that  many  of  the  underlying  principles 
of  the  debt  strategy,  as  we  had  applied 
it  since  1982,  remain  valid — many  of 
them,  without  going  into  all  the  detail 
here. 

So  to  that  extent,  it  is  valid,  but  it 
is  the  right  approach;  that  is,  economic 
growth,  economic  reform,  and  so  forth. 

Further,  you  don't  solve  the  debt 
problem  just  by  debt  reduction.  You've 
got  to  accomplish  the  debt  reduction.  It 
has  to  be  voluntary.  But  you've  got  to 
accomplish  it  in  a  manner  that  will  not 
cut  off  future  financial  flows.  And 
that's  what  the  debate  has  been  in  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
and  the  World  Bank  and  in  the  G-7 
prior  to  the  adoption  of  this  approach. 

They  want  to  make  certain — Treas- 
ury wants  to  make  certain,  they  all 
want  to  make  certain — that  they  do  it 
in  a  way  that  does  not  foreclose  future 
financial  flows.  That's  future  lending, 
either  by  equity  or  debt.  I  mean,  it 
could  be  equity.  It  doesn't  have  to  be 
lending. 


Transition  to  Independence 
IVIarred  in  Namibia 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  3,  1989' 

The  beginning  of  a  long-awaited  proc- 
ess of  transition  to  independence  of 
Namibia  has  been  marred  by  a  major 
outbreak  of  violence  along  the  country's 
northern  border.  The  UN  special  repre- 
sentative's report  is  not  available  yet, 
and  some  of  the  facts  remain  to  be  es- 
tablished. All  information  available  to 
us  indicates  that  a  major  infiltration  of 
northern  Namibia  by  military  forces  of 
the  South  West  Africa  People's  Organi- 
zation (SWAPO)  is  occurring.  This  is  in 
direct  violation  of  UN  Security  Coun- 
cil Resolution  435  and  the  related 
Angolan-Namibian  accords  of  Decem- 
ber 22,  1988. 

This  serious  incident  must  not  be 
allowed  to  derail  the  process  of  decolo- 
nization which  so  many  have  labored  so 


long  and  hard  to  achieve.  The  UN  Sec 
retary  General  and  his  special  repre- 
sentative have  the  responsibility  for 
maintaining  the  cease-fire  in  Namibii 
and  for  preventing  infiltration  across 
Namibia's  borders. 

We  have  been  in  close  touch  wdth 
the  Secretary  General  on  this  issue  ai 
will  support  any  steps  he  may  take  to 
accelerate  deployment  of  UN  forces  t( 
the  troubled  area.  All  members  of  the 
Security  Council  should  give  the  Seer 
tary  General  their  full  support. 

We  urge  all  parties  to  e.xercise 
their  influence  to  ensure  that  SWAPC 
is  brought  into  prompt  compliance  wi 
Resolution  435  and  that  South  Africa 
continues  to  exercise  restraint. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB. 
Tutwiler.  ■ 


iJ 


Q.  The  Mexicans  are  saying,  for 
example,  that  they  absolutely  need  a 
very  large  package  to  be  negotiated 
by  May  or  June  at  the  latest  in  order 
for  them  to  not  have  to  resort  to  popu- 
list measures,  and  there's  even  the 
possibility  of  a  threat  of  some  sort  of 
a  moratorium. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Does  the  Brady  plan  have 
enough  money  in  it  in  order  to  get  the 
Mexicans  out  of  their  problem? 

A.  It  can.  But  that  is  always  going 
to  depend  again  upon  negotiations.  And 
another  principle,  if  I  may  say  so,  of  the 
prior  debt  strategy  that  has  been  re- 
tained is  the  idea  that  you  must  deal 
with  these  things  on  a  case-by-case 
basis. 

The  circumstances  of  each  country 
are  different,  and  there  is  no  magic 
bullet  cure  to  the  debt  problem.  You 
can't  pass  a  law  or  come  with  a  princi- 
ple that's  going  to  wipe  all  the  debt  out 
for  all  debtors  and  solve  this  problem 
overnight. 

You've  got  to  deal  with  it  case-by- 
case.  That  means  you've  got  to  have  ne- 
gotiations. That  negotiation  has  just 
begun.  Mexico  has  got  its  IMF  loan. 
Some  of  that  money  is  going  to  be  ad- 
vanced without  reference  to  whether 


they  reach  closure  with  their  banks, 
and  that  is  a  departure  from  the  old 
approach. 

So  now  they  begin  the  process  of 
negotiating  with  the  banks,  and  that 
negotiation  has  to  ripen.  You  can't  an 
swer  your  question  "yes"  or  "no"  abou 
whether  there's  enough  money  in  it. 

Q.  Let  me  switch  to  the  Middle 
East.  The  Republican  national 
platform — and  you  were  the  Presi- 
dent's campaign  manager — and  vari 
ous  Bush  statements  during  the 
campaign  said  absolutely  no  Pales- 
tinian state.  We're  into  negotiations 
with  the  PLC  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization),  and  the  PLO  wants  f 
Palestinian  state.  How  is  it  possible 
to  move  this  peace  process  along  if 
you  retain  the  pledge  that  you  made 
in  the  campaign  for  no  Palestinian 
state? 

A.  I  think  it's  possible,  because  t 
Prime  Minister  of  Israel  has  now  com 
and  he  has  said,  "We  need  to  launch,  i 
effect,  a  political  process.  We  need  to 
have  elections  which  will  serve  as  a 
launching  pad  for  a  political  dialogue 
and  a  political  process,  that  will  lead 
transitional  arrangements.  We  will 
then  debate  the  questions  of  permanei 


..«  n<  C««»a  DiillaCn/  liinn  101 


ARMS  CONTROL 


f.-Atiis.  and  all  options  should  be  on  the 
Jible,  or  all  options  are  open" — or 
lords  to  that  effect. 
.     So  that  you  can't  start  a  negotia- 
?oii  by  foreclosing  things  in  advance, 
iliat's  not  inconsistent  with  the  United 
jtates  having  as  its  policy  approach 
ertain  principles.  We  believe  in  [UN 
ecurity  Council  Resolutions]  242  and 
'38.  We  believe  in  territory  for  peace. 
fe  do  not  believe  in  an  independent 
ult'stinian  state.  We  do  not  rule  out  an 
itfniational  conference,  provided  it  is 
operly  structured  at  an  appropriate 
me. 

You  can  have  these  policy  positions 
id  still,  I  think,  make  progress  for 
;ace. 

Q.  But  if  everybody  marches 
)wn  the  road  that  you  have  sort  of  set 
r  them,  and  they  have  the  elections, 
id  they  have  the  negotiations — at  the 
id — at  some  stage,  the  Palestinians 
"6  going  to  say,  "We  want  our  flag," 
id  presumably  the  Shamir  govern- 
ent  is  going  to  say,  "You  can't  have 
)ur  flag.  We  will  not  give  you  a 
alestinian  state."  What's  the  United 
:ates  going  to  do? 

A.  You  know  what  you're  trying  to 
)?  You're  trying  to  negotiate  out  the 
?nultimate  issue  at  the  beginning, 
id  that's  not  how  you  get  to  peace,  be- 
luse  that  will  be  the  toughest  issue  of 
1  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the  par- 
es. And  what  you  need  to  do  is  negoti- 
e  out  all  the  others  and  get  to  that 
lint,  and  then  it's  only  going  to  be  re- 
lived by  direct  negotiations  between 
le  parties.  Not  by  what  you  and  I  hap- 
m  to  think. 

Q.  So,  in  fact,  you  don't  rule  out 
Palestinian  state,  though,  if  the 
urties  can  get  to  there,  and  it's  the 
ist  thing,  and  that's  where  you  had 
I  shove  them,  you  might  actually — 

A.  Suppose  the  parties,  by  direct 
'gotiation,  agreed  to  it.  Do  you  think 
e  would  step  in  and  say,  "No.  You 
m't  have  them"?  Suppose  the  parties 
V  negotiation  agreed  to  total  Israeli 
ivereignty  over  the  entire  area.  Do 
lu  think  we'd  step  in  and  say,  "No,  it 
in't  happen"?  But  our  policy  position 
)day  is  we  do  not  favor  an  independent 
alestinian  state.  So  these  things  are 
ot  mutuallv  exclusive. 


Chemical  Weapons  Disposal  Program 


'Press  release  68  of  Apr.  2.5,  1989. 


by  Max  L.  Friedersdorf 

Statement  at  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Geneva  on  April  4, 
1989.  Ambassador  Friedersdorf  is 
U.l^.  representative  to  the  conference. 

In  July  1986,  the  U.S.  delegation  intro- 
duced CD/711,  a  document  entitled 
"Chemical  Stockpile  Disposal  Pro- 
gram," prepared  by  the  U.S.  Army  Ab- 
erdeen Proving  Ground  in  the  State  of 
Maryland.  That  document  summarized 
preliminary  planning  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  U.S.  stockpile  of  lethal 
chemical  agents  and  unitary  chemical 
munitions.  We  pointed  out  then  that,  in 
planning  and  implementing  this  dis- 
posal program,  the  United  States 
would  gain  valuable  e.xperience  and 
technical  expertise  which  could  prove 
helpful  in  our  negotiations.  Today  I 
would  like  to  bring  you  up  to  date  on 
the  progress  we  have  made  in  our  de- 
struction program. 

Destruction  Facilities 

Some  of  you  will  recall  that  the  United 
States  was  weighing  its  options  as  to 
whether  U.S. -based  chemical  weapons 
should  be  destroyed  in  place  or  moved 
to  one  or  more  central  destruction  facil- 
ities for  disposal.  After  considerable 
study,  public  debate,  and  assessment  of 
environmental  impact,  the  decision  was 
made  to  destroy  these  chemicals  and 
their  munitions  at  their  stockpile  sites. 
Accordingly  chemical  weapons  de- 
struction facilities  will  be  operated  at 
nine  locations,  including  Anniston,  Ala- 
bama; Pine  Bluff,  Arkansas;  Pueblo, 
Colorado;  Newport,  Indiana;  Lex- 
ington, Kentucky;  Aberdeen,  Mary- 
land; Umatilla,  Oregon;  Tooele,  Utah; 
and  Johnston  Atoll  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  All  U.S.  unitary  chemical  weap- 
ons stocks,  including  those  located  in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  will 
be  destroyed  at  these  nine  facilities. 
Several  of  these  facilities  have  been 
constructed  already  and  have  been,  or 
are,  in  operation. 

Destruction  Program  to  Date 

The  U.S.  chemical  weapons  destruction 
program  did  not  begin  with  the  de- 
struction plan  described  in  CD/711.  In 
1970,  shortly  after  the  United  States 
began  a  moratorium  on  chemical  weap- 


ons production  that  would  last  almost 
two  decades,  we  began  systematically 
destroying  chemical  weapons  stocks. 

In  its  destruction  facility  at  Rocky 
Mountain  Arsenal  in  Colorado,  the 
United  States  began  incinerating  mus- 
tard agent  in  1970.  Neutralization  of 
nerve  agents  began  in  October  1973. 
Millions  of  pounds  of  mustard  and 
nerve  agents  were  destroyed  at  Rocky 
Mountain  Arsenal  during  the  1970s. 
The  failure  of  other  states  to  take  into 
account  this  destruction  is  perhaps  a 
partial  explanation  for  the  exaggerated 
estimates  of  the  present  size  of  the 
U.S.  chemical  weapons  stockpile. 

In  1979  a  small-scale  pilot  facility 
at  Tooele  army  depot  began  operations, 
and  its  destruction  activity  continues 
today.  This  is  the  facility  that  most 
members  of  the  Conference  on  Disar- 
mament visited  in  1983  and  that  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Soviet  Union  visited 
in  1987.  The  Tooele  facility  has  the  ca- 
pability to  perform  pilot-scale  destruc- 
tion tests  on  all  types  of  lethal  agents 
and  munitions.  The  technology  devel- 
oped at  Tooele  for  eliminating  those 
agents  and  munitions  has  been  applied 
successfully  at  other  destruction  sites, 
as  I  will  discuss  momentarily. 

It  appears  that  the  Soviet  Union  is 
taking  this  same  approach  as  it  inaugu- 
rates its  destruction  program;  as  we 
understand  Soviet  intentions,  the  tech- 
nology and  experience  gained  at  Chap- 
eyevsk  will  be  applied  to  a  number  of 
other  destruction  facilities.  Our  10 
years'  experience  at  Tooele  convinces 
us  that  this  a  sound  and  effective 
approach. 

Profiting  from  the  lessons  learned 
at  Rocky  Mountain  Arsenal  and  Tooele 
army  depot,  the  United  States  de- 
signed and  constructed  a  chemical 
weapons  destruction  facility  at  Pine 
Bluff,  Arkansas,  that  began  operation 
in  May  1988.  Using  incineration  tech- 
nology developed  at  Tooele,  the  Pine 
Bluff  facility  is  even  now  destroying  the 
incapacitating  agent  BZ.  By  the  end  of 
1989,  the  entire  U.S.  stockjiile  of  that 
agent  will  have  been  destroyed. 

On  Johnston  Atoll,  the  United 
States  has  completed  construction  of 
the  world's  first  full-scale,  modern 
chemical  weapons  destruction  facility. 
Right  now,  as  we  struggle  with  the  is- 
sues of  the  chemical  weapons  negotia- 
tions, the  Johnston  Atoll  facility  is 


*/  i.i»#^  -laan 


ARMS  CONTROL 


undergoing  final  testing,  using  chemi- 
cal simulants.  We  expect  to  begin 
actual  destruction  of  chemical  muni- 
tions this  year. 

Thus  far  the  United  States  has  de- 
stroyed about  15  million  pounds  of 
chemical  agents,  and  we  have  a  compre- 
hensive, integrated,  tested  plan  for  the 
destruction  of  the  rest  of  the  U.S.  uni- 
tary chemical  weapons  stockpile.  When 
the  job  is  completed  by  April  1997,  the 
United  States  will  have  spent  well  over 
$3  billion  implementing  the  congres- 
sionally  mandated  destruction  program 
outlined  in  CD/711.  This  figure,  of 
course,  does  not  include  money  spent 
prior  to  the  enactment  of  that  program. 
Our  experience  thus  far  demonstrates 
convincingly  that  chemical  weapons  de- 
struction is  not  easy  and  that  it  is  not 
cheap. 

Environmental  and  Safety  Concerns 

The  U.S.  chemical  weapons  disposal 
plan  conforms  to  some  of  the  strictest 
environmental  laws  ever  enacted.  But 
clean  destruction  alone  is  not  the  final 
answer  to  environmental  concerns. 
Because  of  the  fears  and  abhorrence 
associated  with  poison  gases,  it  is  im- 
portant also  that  destruction  opera- 
tions not  only  be  safe  but  that  the 
civilian  population  be  confident  that 
they  are  safe.  In  the  United  States,  the 
environmental  impact  of  every  step  of 
the  process  has  been  subjected  to  in- 
tense scrutiny  and  public  debate.  The 
incineration  technology  developed  at 
Tooele  army  depot  and  being  used  at 
Pine  Bluff,  and  which  will  be  incorpo- 
rated in  destruction  processes  at  other 
facilities,  has  been  endorsed  by  the 
U.S.  National  Academy  of  Sciences. 
Environmental  impact,  and  the  attend- 
ant public  information  and  educational 
processes,  are  matters  that  will  need 
to  be  considered  by  other  chemical 
weapons  processing  states  in  their  de- 
struction plans. 

It  appears  that  when  the  Confer- 
ence on  Disarmament  completes  its  ne- 
gotiation of  a  comprehensive  chemical 
weapons  ban,  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  will  have  in  place 
the  infrastructure  needed  to  comply 
with  their  treaty  obligations  to  destroy 
all  chemical  weapons.  Unless  planning 
begins  well  before  entry  into  force, 
however,  other  processor  states  will  not 
be  prepared.  We  urge  all  chemical 
weapons  processing  states  to  begin 
now  to  plan  and  initiate  the  destruction 
of  their  chemical  weapons  stockpiles. 


Maintaining  a  Deterrent 

As  discussed  above,  and  as  elaborated 
in  CD/711,  the  United  States  is  com- 
mitted by  law  to  destroy  its  unitary 
stocks  by  1997.  We  also  are  committed 
to  achieving  a  comprehensive,  verifia- 
ble, and  truly  global  chemical  weapons 
ban — a  commitment  the  United  States 
confirmed  last  month  in  Vienna.  In- 
deed this  global  ban  remains  our  pri- 
mary objective  with  regard  to  chemical 
weapons. 

Pending  achievement  of  that  objec- 
tive, however,  the  United  States  will 
continue  with  its  plans  to  replace  a 
small  portion  of  the  unitary  stocks 
being  destroyed  with  a  safer,  more 
modern  deterrent.  The  result  of  the 
U.S.  modernization  program  will  be  a 
greatly  diminished  stockpile  of  safer 
chemical  weapons.  Of  course,  we  are 
prepared  to  cease  all  chemical  weapons 
jiroduction  upon  entry  into  force  of  the 
chemical  weapons  convention  presently 
being  negotiated  in  the  ad  hoc  commit- 
tee on  chemical  weapons. 

Openness  on  Storage  Sites 

Our  delegation  had  a  second  objective 
when  it  tabled  CD/711  in  1986.  The  in- 
formation we  provided  to  this  confer- 
ence included  the  location  of  every 
chemical  weapons  storage  site  in  the 
United  States — the  description,  in  con- 
siderable detail,  of  the  specific  chemi- 
cal agents  located  at  each  site;  the  type 
of  weapon  or  container  used;  and  the 
percentage  of  the  total  U.S. -based 
chemical  weapons  tonnage  located  at 
each  site.  It  was  our  hope  that,  by  dem- 
onstrating the  kind  of  candor  we  sought 
from  others,  we  might  inspire  others  to 
be  similarly  open  about  their  chemical 
weapons  and  thereby  foster  the  confi- 
dence so  vital  for  a  global  chemical 
weapons  convention. 

The  following  year,  the  Soviet 
Union  admitted,  for  the  first  time,  that 
it  possessed  chemical  weapons — a  dis- 
closure that  marked  the  beginning  of 
serious,  productive  discussions  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  a  period  of  unprece- 
dented progress  in  chemical  weapons 
negotiations  in  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament. 

We  have  been  disappointed,  how- 
ever, that  no  states  have  come  forward 
to  make  the  detailed  disclosures  found 
in  CD/711  and  that  no  state  but  the  So- 
viet Union  has  even  declared  that  it 
possesses  chemical  weapons.  Much 
more  candor  will  be  necessary  before 
we  achieve  a  truly  global  convention. 


U.S.  Trial  Inspection  Exercise 

I  would  like  to  turn  to  another  aspect 
of  our  efforts  to  bring  into  being  a 
global  chemical  weapons  convention. 
That  is  the  subject  of  national  trial 
inspections,  a  subject  that  a  number 
of  other  delegations  have  already 
addressed  during  the  opening  weeks  c 
the  1989  session. 

The  United  States  has  conducted 
its  first  trial  inspection  at  the  facility 
operated  by  AKZO  Chemicals,  Inc.,  in 
Gallipolis  Ferry,  West  Virginia,  ap- 
proximately 450  kilometers  west  of 
Washington,  D.C.  The  inspection  exei 
cise  was  conducted  in  late  February  o 
this  year.  The  United  States  has  not 
completed  its  evaluation  of  this  exer- 
cise, and,  accordingly,  my  remarks  to- 
day are  of  an  informal  and  preliminar 
nature,  subject  to  the  more  detailed 
and  definitive  analysis  which  we  hope 
to  submit  to  the  conference  during  th( 
summer  half  of  the  session. 

Our  trial  inspection  exercise  was 
joint  effort  between  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  the  American  chemical  indu 
try.  It  was  our  good  fortune  to  have  tl 
help  and  close  cooperation  of  the  AKZ 
chemical  company  and  other  represen 
tatives  of  the  chemical  industry  in  the 
conduct  of  the  trial.  I  am  happy  to  ex- 
press publiclv  our  thanks  to  them. 

The  AKZO  facility  at  which  the  e: 
ercise  took  place  produces  a  schedule 
(2)  chemical,  dimethyl  methylphospho 
nate  (DMMP),  from  a  schedule  (3) 
chemical,  trimethyl  phosphite  (TMP). 
Some  of  the  DMMP  is  used  at  the  facil 
ity  to  produce  a  polymeric  flame  re  tar 
ant  that  also  falls  in  schedule  (2). 

In  carrying  out  this  first  trial, 
some  of  the  procedures  that  would  be 
necessary  during  an  actual  inspectior 
under  the  chemical  weapons  conventioi 
— such  as  notification,  transportation 
and  escort  arrangements — were  omit- 
ted in  order  to  simplify  the  exercise. 
Moreover  we  have  recognized  gaps  in 
the  inspection  procedures,  as  well  as 
some  specific  procedures  that  need  to 
be  improved.  In  our  view,  these  point 
to  the  need  for  considerable  further 
work  on  procedures  at  the  national 
level. 

The  principal  objectives  of  our  ex 
ercise  were  to  evaluate  the  ability  to 
determine  whether  schedule  (1)  chem 
cals  had  been  produced  in  the  particu- 
lar facility:  to  evaluate  the  ability  to 
determine  whether  the  facility  had 
produced  types  or  quantities  of  sched- 
ule (2)  chemicals  not  included  in  its 
declaration;  and  to  estimate  costs, 


f 


I 


ECONOMICS 


etermine  physical  constraints  on  in- 
pections,  measure  the  impact  of  an  in- 
pection  on  a  facility,  and  evaluate  the 
ireparation  needed  for  an  inspection. 

In  carrying  out  the  exercise,  the  in- 
pection  was  governed  by  a  mock  facility 
greement  that  was  based  on  the  model 
a  the  rolling  text.  A  separate  document 
ontained  detailed  inspection  pro- 
edures  for  schedule  (2)  facilities.  The 
nspection  team  consisted  of  six 
lersons — five  chemical  engineers,  and 
n  analytical  chemist.  Three  of  the  chem- 
:al  engineers  had  past  chemical  weap- 
ns  production  experience,  and  two  had 
ommercial  backgrounds. 

The  team  engaged  in  three  types  of 
ctivities  during  the  trial:  examination 
f  process  equipment,  auditing  of  rec- 
rds,  and  collection  and  analysis  of 
amples. 

An  initial  visit  was  made  during  De- 
ember  1988,  lasting  slightly  more  than 
day;  the  actual  inspection  took  2'/2 
ays.  The  analysis  of  samples  is  still  be- 
ng  carried  out,  and  the  results  of  the 
xercise  are  still  being  evaluated.  Accor- 
lingly,  our  delegation  is  not  now  in  a 
losition  to  comment  on  how  adequate  the 
irovisions  in  the  rolling  text  are  with 
egard  to  routine  inspections.  Neverthe- 
ess  some  of  our  preliminary  findings  do 
varrant  discussion. 


*reliminary  Findings 
>f  the  Trial  Inspection 

''irst,  with  regard  to  '.he  area  to  be  in- 
pected,  it  will  be  difficult  to  define 
his  area  precisely  because  of  the  com- 
)lexity  and  flexibility  of  modern  multi- 
)urpose  plants.  Our  delegation  believes 
hat  further  discussion  of  this  issue  is 
varranted. 

Second,  with  regard  to  planning 
"or  an  inspection,  the  exercise  demon- 
strated that  a  very  thorough  initial 
/isit  is  essential  for  effective  inspec- 
,ions.  This  aspect  of  the  rolling  text 
nay,  therefore,  need  to  be  strengthened. 

Third,  with  regard  to  the  general 
ipproach  to  an  inspection,  a  joint 
government-industry  trial  exercise 
ioes  not,  of  course,  reflect  the  tensions 
hat  will  undoubtedly  arise  during  the 
;ourse  of  an  actual  inspection,  making 
he  inspection  more  difficult.  The  im- 
plications of  this  difference  between 
trial  and  actual  inspection  demon- 
strated that  routine  monitoring  by  in- 
spectors must  be  supplemented,  in 
some  cases,  by  continuous  monitoring 
by  instruments  in  order  to  foil  attempts 
to  conceal  production  that  is  not  docu- 


mented in  the  permenent  records  of  the 
facility.  Also  the  cross-checking  of  rec- 
ords from  suppliers  and  customers 
need  to  be  considered. 

Fourth,  the  inspection  of  equip- 
ment proves  to  be  especially  useful  in 
assessing  whether  the  declared  areas 
of  the  facility  have  the  capability  to 
produce  schedule  (1)  chemicals. 

Fifth,  records  audit  was  the  most 
time-consuming  aspect  of  the  exercise. 
It  is  primarily  useful  in  checking 
whether  input  and  output  match.  How- 
ever, such  material  balance  is  not  suffi- 
cient basis  for  reaching  the  conclusion 
that  quantities  have  been  correctly  de- 
clared, because  unrecorded  production 
could  take  place. 

Sixth,  with  regard  to  sample  anal- 
ysis, it  is  clear  that  careful  planning  is 
needed  to  determine  what  samples 
should  be  taken  and  to  provide  for  their 
security,  transport,  and  analysis.  It  is 
essential  to  carry  out  off-site  analysis, 
with  very  sophisticated  instruments,  in 
searching  for  traces  of  schedule  (1) 
chemicals. 


Finally,  with  regard  to  confiden- 
tiality, extensive  access  to  confidential 
information  will  be  required  for  inspec- 
tions. Thus  ways  to  reduce  the  need  for 
confidential  information  should  be  re- 
viewed, and  reliable  means  to  protect 
such  information  should  be  developed. 
It  is  clear  that  when  we  arrive  at  the 
multilateral  phase  of  trial  inspections, 
confidentiality  will  be  an  important 
issues. 

Our  delegation  welcomes  the  infor- 
mation provided  by  delegations  and  the 
discussions  of  national  trial  inspections 
that  have  taken  place  this  spring.  In 
our  view,  another  series  of  such  discus- 
sions early  in  the  summer  would  also  be 
profitable.  We  believe  that  the  experi- 
ence to  date  points  to  the  utility  of  ad- 
ditional work  on  trial  inspections  on  a 
national  basis,  including  additional  na- 
tional exercises.  We  look  forward  to 
learning  about  any  other  national  trial 
inspections  during  the  closing  weeks  of 
this  part  of  the  1989  session  of  the  con- 
ference. ■ 


Request  for  U.S.  Contributions 
to  Multilateral  Development  Banks 


by  Nicholas  F.  Brady 

Statement  prepared  for  the  Sub- 
committee on  Foreign  Operations  of  the 
House  Appropriations  Committee  on 
April  17,  1989.  Mr.  Brady  is  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury.'^ 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  you  the  Administration's  FY  1990 
budgetary  proposals  for  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks  and  the  In- 
ternational Monetary  Fund's  (IMF) 
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment 
Facility. 

I  want  to  begin  by  commending  the 
committee  and  its  staff  for  your  excel- 
lent work  last  year  in  passing  a  sepa- 
rate, stand-alone  foreign  assistance 
appropriations  bill.  As  you  know  only 
too  well,  that  was  a  signal  achievement. 
The  Administration  attached  consider- 
able importance  to  that  legislation,  and 
we  recognize  and  very  much  appreciate 
the  constructive  role  played  by  you  and 
members  of  the  committee.  We  also 
value  highly  the  frank  and  informative 
bipartisan  dialogue  that  was  evident 


throughout  the  process  leading  up  to 
enactment  of  the  legislation. 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is 
requesting  $1,637  million  in  budget  au- 
thority and  $2,377  million  under  pro- 
gram limitations  for  subscriptions  to 
the  multilateral  development  banks.  It 
is  worth  emphasizing  that  exclusive  of 
U.S.  funding  shortfalls  from  previous 
years,  which  comprise  $313  million  of 
this  appropriation  request.  Adminis- 
tration requests  for  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks  have  not  increased 
since  FY  1985.  Thus  one  might  say  that 
the  multilateral  development  banks 
have  had  their  own  nominal  freeze  in 
place  for  the  past  4  years,  and  we  are 
proposing  to  continue  that  this  year. 

For  FY  1990,  we  are  also  seeking 
$150  million  in  budget  authority  to 
fund  U.S.  participation  in  the  IMF's 
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facil- 
ity. The  specific  requests  for  each  mul- 
tilateral development  bank  "window" 
and  the  Enhanced  Structural  Adjust- 
ment Facility  are  presented  in  the  an- 
nex at  the  end  of  my  testimony. 


.^»*    ^t    0«.n 


ECONOMICS 


You  have  been  an  extremely  strong 
advocate  of  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks.  You  recognize,  as  I  do, 
that  these  institutions  are  important 
vehicles  for  promoting  U.S.  economic, 
political,  security,  and  humanitarian 
interests.  Currently  the  international 
debt  problem  and  the  environment  are 
of  particular  concern  to  all  of  us. 
Therefore,  I  regret  that  in  your  infor- 
mal mark-up  of  the  Administration's 
FY  1990  foreign  assistance  budget  re- 
quest, you  suggested  cuts  of  $303  mil- 
lion from  the  multilateral  development 
banks  and  $75  million  from  the  En- 
hanced Structural  Adjustment  Facility. 
In  particular,  you  eliminated  funding 
for  the  World  Bank  and  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  be- 
cause of  dissatisfaction  with  the  debt 
strategy.  In  light  of  efforts  that  are 
now  underway  to  strengthen  the  strat- 
egy, I  hope  you  will  reconsider  the  level 
of  funding  for  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  and  the  Enhanced  Struc- 
tural Adjustment  Facility. 


PROPOSALS  TO  STRENGTHEN 
THE  DEBT  STRATEGY 

As  you  know,  the  Administration  has 
reexamined  the  international  debt  situ- 
ation and  the  strategy  for  addressing 
debt  problems.  On  March  10,  I  outlined 
a  number  of  proposals  to  strengthen  the 
strategy  at  a  meeting  of  the  Bretton 
Woods  Committee.-  The  new  ideas 
build  on  the  principles  of  the  existing 
strategy,  which  have  been  reaffirmed 
by  the  international  community  as  a 
valid  basis  for  addressing  debt  prob- 
lems. These  principles  call  for  restora- 
tion of  growth  through  debtor  economic 
reforms,  the  provision  of  external  fi- 
nancial support  by  creditors,  and  the 
treatment  of  each  country's  needs  and 
problems  on  an  individual  basis. 

In  concluding  our  review,  however, 
we  recognized  that,  despite  progress 
achieved  in  many  areas  through  the 
previous  strategy,  serious  impediments 
to  a  successful  resolution  of  debt  prob- 
lems remain.  In  many  debtor  nations, 
growth  has  not  been  sufficient  nor  has 
economic  policy  reform  been  adequate. 
Capital  flight  continues  to  drain  re- 
sources from  debtor  country  econ- 
omies, and  neither  investment  nor 
domestic  savings  have  shown  much  im- 
provement in  a  number  of  cases.  Fur- 
thermore while  some  progress  has 
been  made  in  reducing  countries'  debt 


through  market  mechanisms,  the  pace 
of  debt  reduction  has  been  constrained. 
To  be  fair,  these  are  difficulties  you 
have  pointed  out  many  times  yourself. 

Let  me  outline  for  you  our  pro- 
posals to  address  these  problems.  The 
approach  we  have  suggested  is  intended 
to  mobilize  more  effective  external 
financial  support  for  debtor  countries' 
economic  reform  efforts.  While  recog- 
nizing the  continued  importance  of  new 
commercial  bank  lending,  we  feel  that 
more  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  vol- 
untary debt  and  debt  service  reduc- 
tion, new  investment,  and  flight  capital 
repatriation. 

In  this  new  approach,  we  continue 
to  rely  upon  the  IMF  and  the  World 
Bank  to  play  central  roles  in  addressing 


[The  multilateral  develop- 
ment banksj  are  important 
vehiclea  for  promoting  U.S. 
economic,  political,  security, 
and  humanitarian  interests. 


debt  problems.  The  policy  reforms  fos- 
tered by  these  institutions  to  produce 
key  macroeconomic  and  structural 
changes  and  sustained  economic  per- 
formance remain  primary  to  any 
resolution  of  debt  problems.  In  fact  we 
believe  that  IMF  and  World  Bank  ca- 
pacity for  promoting  reform  and  mo- 
bilizing financial  resources  can  be  more 
effectively  harnessed  to  strengthen  the 
international  debt  strategy.  This  can 
be  achieved  through  additional  empha- 
sis on  policies  to  promote  foreign  direct 
investment  and  flight  capital  repatria- 
tion, as  well  as  redirection  of  some 
IMF  and  World  Bank  resources  to  sup- 
port debt  and  debt  service  reduction.  I 
will  elaborate  on  this  below. 

To  facilitate  the  debt  reduction 
process,  constraints  on  diversified 
forms  of  financial  support  from  the 
banking  community  need  to  be  relaxed. 
In  particular,  the  negotiation  of  a  gen- 
eral waiver  of  the  sharing  and  negative 
pledge  clauses  for  each  performing 
debtor  would  permit  debt  reduction  ne- 
gotiations between  debtors  and  banks 
to  go  forward.  Such  waivers  might  have 
a  3-year  life  in  order  to  stimulate  debt 
reduction  within  a  relatively  short  time 
period.  We  expect  these  waivers  to  ac- 


celerate the  pace  of  debt  reduction, 
thus  benefiting  debtor  nations  and  re- 
ducing new  financing  needs  to  more 
manageable  levels.  A  variety  of  debt 
and  debt  service  reduction  transactioi 
could  be  pursued,  including  debt/bond 
exchanges,  cash  buybacks,  and  noncol 
lateralized  interest  reduction  instru- 
ments. At  the  same  time,  effective 
debt/equity  programs  should  be  in  op- 
eration in  the  debtor  nations  in  order 
to  permit  continued  conversions  of 
external  obligations  into  investment 
instruments. 

We  look  to  the  banking  community 
to  continue  to  provide  new  lending  as 
well,  although  the  magnitudes  require 
should  be  reduced  by  the  debt  and  deb 
service  reduction  operation.  New  fi- 
nancing could  include  concerted  lend- 
ing, club  loans,  or  trade  credits — all  o 
which  could  involve  a  differentiation  o 
new  loans  from  old  debt.  Further,  new 
investment  and  flight  capital  repatria- 
tion should  play  a  role  in  meeting  fi- 
nancing needs. 


ROLE  OF  THE  MULTILATERAL 
DEVELOPMENT  BANKS  IN  THE 
DEBT  STRATEGY 

Let  me  elaborate  on  how  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks  relate  to 
this  enhanced  debt  strategy.  As  I  mer 
tioned,  the  World  Bank  will  have  to 
play  a  central  role.  This  is  true  both 
with  respect  to  its  promotion  of  policy 
reforms  and  its  mobilization  of  financi 
resources  for  the  debtors. 

Helping  countries  establish  eco- 
nomic policies  conducive  to  stronger 
growth  will  remain  paramount.  Sound 
policies  must  be  established  in  the  vai 
ous  sectors  of  debtor  economies  by,  foi 
example,  liberalizing  trade,  reforming 
parastatals,  developing  financial  mar- 
kets, and  relying  on  the  private  sectoi 
to  help  increase  employment  and  effi- 
ciency. The  World  Bank  has  built  im- 
pressive expertise  in  these  areas  and 
has  made  significant  contributions  to 
reforms  in  many  countries. 

In  addition  to  providing  advice  an 
funding  for  vital  structural  reforms, 
however,  the  World  Bank  should  place 
special  emphasis  on  measures  to  pro- 
mote overall  confidence  in  economic 
programs,  improve  the  investment  cli- 
mate, and  encourage  repatriation  of 
flight  capital.  By  establishing  sound 
economic  policies,  countries  can  make 
great  strides  in  restoring  investor  con 
fidence.  Further,  by  liberalizing  their 


ECONOMICS 


financial  sectors,  debtor  countries  can 
expand  the  scope  for  investment  by  for- 
eigners as  well  as  their  own  nationals 
holding  assets  abroad. 

We  have  proposed,  moreover,  that 
the  World  Bank  extend  its  policy-based 
lending  operations  to  provide  support 
for  voluntary  debt  reduction.  In  partic- 
ular, we  have  suggested  that  the  World 
Bank  set  aside  a  portion  of  participat- 
ing nations'  policy-based  loans  spe- 
cifically to  support  debt  reduction 
transactions — thereby  redirecting  re- 
sources available  from  the  World  Bank's 
current  capital.  These  funds  could  be 
used  to  collateralize  debt-for-bond  ex- 
changes with  a  significant  discount  on 
outstanding  debt  or  to  replenish  for- 
eign exchange  reserves  following  a  cash 
buvback. 

We  believe  that  the  World  Bank 
should  also  make  available  limited  in- 
terest support  for  transactions  involv- 
ing significant  debt  or  debt  service 
eduction.  Such  support,  which  could 
be  structured  so  as  to  safeguard  the  fi- 
nancial position  of  the  World  Bank, 
could  be  made  available  on  a  rolling 
basis  for  a  limited  period  of  time. 
Through  these  efforts,  the  Woi-ld  Bank 
should  help  catalyze  market  activity 
which  would  ease  debt  service  burdens, 
improve  debtors'  creditworthiness,  and 
provide  an  impetus  to  growth. 

Beyond  ongoing  and  enhanced  ef- 
forts to  promote  economic  reforms  and 
to  facilitate  an  easing  of  debt  burdens, 
the  World  Bank  will  continue  its 
project-lending  activities,  which  re- 
main a  key  mechanism  for  stimulating 
growth.  Such  lending  will  still  com- 
prise about  75%  of  total  lending.  These 
loans  cover  a  wide  range  of  sectoral  and 
development  projects  in  borrowing 
countries,  rehabilitating  or  restructur- 
ing existing  enterprises,  and  expand- 
ing productive  capacity.  They  have 
financed  country  projects  in  agricul- 
ture and  rural  development,  transpor- 
tation, education,  industry,  energy, 
health  and  nutrition,  water  supply  and 
sewerage,  urban  development,  and  tele- 
communications. This  type  of  capital 
transfer  complements,  on  a  microlevel, 
the  World  Bank's  efforts  to  help  coun- 
tries implement  broader  based  struc- 
tural reforms. 

This  is,  I  believe,  a  particularly  op- 
portune time  for  legislative  action  to 
support  the  activities  of  the  World 
Bank.  In  early  April,  I  conferred  with 
finance  ministers  and  central  bank  gov- 
ernors from  around  the  world  in  meet- 
ings of  the  World  Bank  and  IMF.  I  was 


an! 


greatly  heartened  by  the  broad  support 
expressed  for  our  proposals  by  the  var- 
ious groups — the  Group  of  7,  the  Group 
of  10,  and  the  Interim  and  Development 
Committees  of  the  IMF  and  World 
Bank.  The  IMF  Interim  Committee, 
for  example,  which  represents  the 
views  of  both  debtor  and  creditor  gov- 
ernments, welcomed  the  U.S.  proposals 
to  strengthen  the  debt  strategy  and 
"requested  the  executive  board  to  con- 
sider as  a  matter  of  urgency  the  issues 


to  adopt  policies  that  will  contribute  to 
their  economic  recovery. 


ENVIRONMENT 

Debt,  however,  is  not  the  only  major  is- 
sue that  needs  U.S.  leadership  and  the 
assistance  of  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks.  Global  warming  and  other 
environmental  matters  are  now  of  ma- 
jor international  concern.  The  adverse 


The  approach  we  have  suggested  is  intended  to  mobilize  more 
effective  external  financial  support  for  debtor  countries'  eco- 
nomic reform  efforts.... more  emphasis  should  be  placed  on 
voluntary  debt  and  debt  service  reduction,  new  investment, 
and  flight  capital  repatriation. 


and  actions  involved."  In  particular, 
the  committee  agreed  that  "the  Fund 
should  provide  resources  in  appropri- 
ate amounts  to  members  to  facilitate 
debt  reduction  by  setting  aside  a  por- 
tion of  members'  purchases  under 
Fund-supported  arrangements." 

It  is  critical  now  that  we  build 
upon  the  momentum  established  by 
these  meetings  and  take  the  steps  nec- 
essary to  implement  the  strengthened 
debt  strategy.  This  involves  ensuring 
that  the  international  institutions 
which  have  been  asked  to  take  leading 
roles  have  adequate  resources  to  do  the 
job. 

I  hope  that  the  United  States  will 
take  the  lead  in  this  process  by  fully 
funding  the  World  Bank  and  the  other 
development  institutions.  The  regional 
development  banks  will  also  play  an  im- 
portant role  in  the  strengthened  debt 
strategy.  The  operations  of  the  African, 
Asian,  and  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Banks  complement  and  support 
the  policy  reforms  promoted  by  the 
World  Bank  and  the  IMF.  As  the  World 
Bank  seeks  to  expand  the  array  of  sec- 
toral and  structural  adjustments  tar- 
geted by  its  lending,  the  regionally 
focused  institutions  can  help  reinforce 
the  incentives  for  debtor  countries  to 
implement  policies  that  will  lead  to  sus- 
tainable growth  and  recovery. 

In  particular,  we  expect  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank,  now  that 
agreement  has  been  reached  on  a  capi- 
tal increase,  will  undertake  lending 
programs  that  encourage  its  borrowers 


effects  of  climate  change  and  ozone 
depletion  will  not  stop  at  national 
boundaries.  These  issues  are  global  in 
nature,  and  we  must  clearly  develop 
new  and  cooperative  ways  to  deal  with 
them  more  effectively. 

You  and  members  of  this  commit- 
tee have  shown  a  great  deal  of  leader- 
ship in  galvanizing  the  multilateral 
development  banks  to  action  on  these 
matters,  working  closely  with  the  exec- 
utive branch.  Congress,  in  fact,  has 
given  the  executive  branch  a  substan- 
tial mandate  to  promote  a  heightened 
environmental  awareness  in  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks  and  to  as- 
sure that  progress  on  this  front  is 
achieved  in  the  developing  countries. 
Important  headway  on  various  levels 
has  been  made  over  the  past  year,  and 
we  are  fully  committed  to  doing  more 
in  this  important  area.  All  of  us  are 
looking  to  these  institutions  to  play  a 
critical  role  in  helping  to  keep  this 
planet  and  our  environment  habitable. 

Largely  through  U.S.  efforts,  the 
Development  Committee  communique 
of  April  4  noted  that  members  stressed 
the  increasing  importance  attached  to 
environmental  issues  and  to  the  timely 
dissemination  of  environmental  infor- 
mation on  World  Bank-supported  oper- 
ations. In  addition,  the  committee 
agreed  to  discuss  at  their  next  meeting 
the  World  Bank's  efforts  to  support  the 
environment,  including  the  integration 
of  environmental  concerns  in  World 
Bank  operations  and  measures  to  in- 


ECONOMICS 


crease  public  awareness  of  World  Bank 
environmental  activities. 

In  order  to  continue  to  influence 
this  effort,  we  must  be  prepared  not 
only  to  insist  on  a  critical  examination 
of  these  issues  but  also  be  willing  to 
provide  the  needed  financial  support. 
To  help  convince  you  that  such  support 
is  warranted,  I  would  like  to  review 
some  of  the  reforms  now  underway  to 
strengthen  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks'  effectiveness  in  addressing 
environmental  concerns. 


The  World  Bank  renewed  and 
strengthened  its  pledge  to  environmen- 
tal reform  in  the  e.xecutive  directors' 
report  on  the  general  capital  increase 
that  was  negotiated  in  1988.  Language 
in  the  report,  what  was  agreed  among 
both  developed  and  developing  coun- 
tries, called  specifically  for  "better 
management  of  natural  resources  and 
for  integration  of  environmental  work 
into  country  development  strategies, 
policies,  and  programs;  the  evaluation 
of  environmental  costs  of  projects;  and 


Congress... has  given  the  executive  branch  a  substantial 
mandate  to  promote  a  heightened  environmental  awareness 
in  the  multilateral  development  banks.... 


Recent  Reforms 

The  Inter-American  Development  Bank 
(IDB),  as  part  of  the  recently  negoti- 
ated replenishment  agreement,  is  to 
establish  an  environmental  line  unit  to 
assist  in  evaluating  environmental  as- 
pects of  projects  early  in  the  project 
cycle.  It  was  the  U.S.  Government  that 
called  publicly  for  the  establishment  of 
this  unit,  first  at  the  IDE's  annual 
meeting  in  Caracas  in  1988  and  again 
at  this  year's  annual  meeting  in  Am- 
sterdam. The  IDB  has  also  held  five  en- 
vironmental seminars  for  members  of 
its  technical  staff  and  estimates  that 
80%  of  its  operational  staff  has  now 
completed  the  training. 

The  African  Development  Bank 
(AFDB)  established  its  own  environ- 
mental line  unit  in  1988.  This  unit  is 
headed  by  a  recently  recruited  African 
e.xpert  who  is  assisted  by  three  experts 
seconded  from  industrial  countries,  in- 
cluding one  from  the  United  States 
seconded  under  the  provisions  of  an 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  technical  assistance  program. 
The  AFDB  is  also  working  with  the 
Sierra  Club,  the  Natural  Resources 
Defense  Council,  and  the  American 
Farmland  Trust  to  set  up  a  conference 
to  increase  cooperation  between  envi- 
ronmental agencies  and  nongovernmen- 
tal organizations  in  four  of  its  bor- 
rowing countries.  This  initiative,  which 
we  encouraged  at  the  AFDB's  annual 
meeting  in  Abidjan  last  year,  is  not 
proceeding  as  rapidly  as  we  had  hoped. 
However,  we  look  forward  to  the  confer- 
ence taking  place  in  the  second  half  of 
this  year. 


mitigation  or  elimination  of  adverse  ef- 
fects." Our  job  now  is  to  see  that  this 
pledge  is  fulfilled.  This  year,  the  World 
Bank  almost  doubled  last  year's  admin- 
istrative budget  for  environmental 
work,  increasing  it  to  $9.4  million  in 
FY  1989  compared  with  $4.8  million  in 
FY  1988.  We  are  working  to  assure 
that  a  further  increase  dedicated  to  en- 
vironmental work  will  be  set  aside  for 
next  year,  particularly  in  the  regional 
units  which  monitor  the  project  ap- 
praisal process. 

The  Asian  Development  Bank 
(ADB)  established  an  environmental 
line  unit  in  1987.  The  ADB  is  continu- 
ing to  work  on  refining  the  participa- 
tion of  the  unit  in  the  project  cycle.  The 
role  of  this  unit  is  set  out  in  the  ADB's 
initial  paper  on  "Preliminary  Environ- 
mental Screening  of  Loans  and  Techni- 
cal Assistance  Projects."  In  addition, 
the  ADB  has  published  other  papers 
covering  secondary  screening  proce- 
dures and  provisions  for  participation 
of  environmental  specialists  in  loan  and 
technical  assistance  appraisals.  It  is 
also  focusing  greater  attention  on  envi- 
ronmental protection  measures  in  loan 
agreements  and  in  documents  that  give 
guidance  to  missions  and  to  post- 
evaluation  and  review  operations. 

I  have  provided  only  a  very  brief 
summary  of  some  of  the  progress  we 
have  made  in  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  on  environmental  issues 
over  the  past  year.  More  information  is 
included  in  the  annual  report  that  we 
submitted  to  Congress  earlier  this 
year. 


Tropical  Forests 

No  environmental  issue  has  engaged 
more  public  concern  than  the  destruc- 
tion of  tropical  rain  forests.  The  U.S. 
Government  is  determined  that  the 
multilateral  development  banks  will 
adopt  policies  and  procedures  for  pro- 
tective measures  in  the  appraisal  of 
projects  that  may  adversely  affect 
these  forests  and  other  fragile  ecosys- 
tems. We  have  taken  several  steps  to 
increase  international  understanding  o 
the  importance  of  this  issue  and  to 
build  greater  support  for  measures  to 
protect  all  such  ecosystems  that  may  b( 
threatened  by  development  projects 
and  programs. 

In  April  of  last  year,  the  Treasury 
Department  released  its  own  standard; 
for  U.S.  evaluation  of  multilateral  de- 
velopment bank  projects  affecting  trop 
ical  moist  forests.  These  standards, 
developed  with  support  from  more  thai 
50  environmental  groups  in  this  coun- 
try, were  immediately  made  available 
to  the  management  and  staff  of  the 
World  Bank  and  to  the  regional  devel- 
opment banks.  They  were  also  tabled  a' 
an  ad  hoc  meeting  of  environmental  ex- 
perts held  under  the  auspices  of  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD)  in  Paris  last 
May.  We  have  made  arrangements  to 
see  that  they  will  be  discussed  again  a1 
a  follow-on  meeting  of  the  OECD's  De- 
velopment Assistance  Committee  that 
will  be  held  in  Paris  in  June. 

Other  Initiatives 

We  have  also  released  U.S.  standards 
for  evaluating  multilateral  developmen 
bank  projects  adversely  affecting  wet- 
lands and  sub-Saharan  savannas,  and 
we  are  now  working  with  the  Natural 
Resources  Defense  Council  and  other 
environmental  organizations  to  com- 
plete standai'ds  for  protecting  impor- 
tant marine  areas  such  as  coral  reefs 
and  seagrasses. 

In  addition,  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment has  set  up  an  informal  working 
group  with  Greenpeace  to  help  us  de- 
velop more  effective  measures  to  en- 
courage integrated  pest  management. 
Another  group  is  being  organized  to 
help  us  address  energy  efficiency  and 
conservation  issues.  I  am  hopeful  that 
we  will  have  more  progress  to  report  ii 
both  of  these  important  areas  by  the 
time  of  our  next  report. 


A    _X   Oa.X.    D..II.«4:m 


«#%  -tnot 


ECONOMICS 


Assessment  of  Environmental  Impact       OTHER  U.S.  INTERESTS 


It  is  imperative  that  appropriate  envi- 
ronmental impact  assessment  proce- 
iures  be  established  within  the 
multilateral  development  banks  and  in 
borrowing  countries.  There  is  also  a 
critical  need  for  the  multilateral  devel- 
opment banks  to  provide  environmen- 
tal information  on  projects  to  the  public 
in  advance  of  board  action.  I  stressed 
the  importance  of  environmental  issues 
at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  World 
Bank  in  Berlin  last  September.  In 
March  of  this  year,  I  wrote  a  letter  to 
President  [of  the  World  Bank  Barber] 
Conable  emphasizing  the  importance 
we  attach  to  providing  access  to  infor- 
mation and  the  need  for  the  World  Bank 
to  act  more  quickly  in  this  area.  Two 
weeks  ago,  we  made  a  statement  to  the 
World  Bank's  Development  Committee 
highlighting  once  more  the  importance 
of  prompt  action.  I  have  urged  my  col- 
leagues in  other  developed  countries  to 
support  these  efforts,  and  we  will  press 
hard  in  the  months  ahead  to  get  inter- 
national agreement  on  appropriate 
procedures. 

We  will  be  most  effective  if  we  can 
mobilize  international  support  for  envi- 
ronmental impact  assessment  proce- 
dures and  access  to  information  and 
work  with  our  colleagues  from  other 
countries,  both  developed  and  develop- 
ing, in  establishing  procedures  that 
are  acceptable  to  all  member  countries. 
We  need  to  focus  our  efforts  on  bring- 
ing about  the  changes  that  we  think  are 
important  within  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks  and  in  the  countries 
that  borrow^  from  them. 

We  have  reservations  regarding 
legislation  to  extend  National  Environ- 
mental Policy  Act  (NEPA)  procedures 
to  U.S.  votes  in  the  banks.  Extension 
of  NEPA  would  move  the  focus  of  our 
efforts  away  from  reform  of  multi- 
lateral development  bank  procedures, 
which  is  the  right  focus,  to  internal 
U.S.  Government  procedures.  We  are 
also  concerned  that  extension  of  NEPA 
could  be  viewed  as  a  unilateral  U.S.  ap- 
proach that  would  generate  opposition 
to  our  proposals  and  hold  back  our  ef- 
forts to  promote  reform.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  would  strongly  support  an  ini- 
tiative that  seeks  to  develop  appropiate 
procedures  within  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks.  Such  procedures 
might  well  be  based  on  other  proce- 
dures already  established  in  member 
countries  or  accepted  by  international 
organizations. 


I  believe  there  is  more  than  ample  rea- 
son for  the  United  States  to  support 
the  multilateral  development  banks  on 
the  international  debt  and  environmen- 
tal considerations  which  I  have  just  re- 
viewed. However,  since  U.S.  interests 
in  these  organizations  cover  many 
art  as,  as  this  committee  is  well  aware, 
let  me  quickly  review  other  dimensions 
of  U.S.  interests  in  fostering  a  strong 
foundation  for  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks. 

First,  they  support  our  geopoliti- 
cal and  strategic  interests.  The  multi- 
lateral development  banks  lend  to  coun- 
tries that  are  strategically  important 
to  the  United  States,  such  as  Turkey, 
the  Philippines,  and  Mexico.  Multi- 
lateral development  bank  involvement 
leads  to  further  cooperation  on  a  num- 
ber of  fronts,  including  controlling  in- 
ternational migration  and  promoting 
democracy  and  human  rights. 

Second,  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  advance  the  broad  U.S. 
economic  objective  of  promoting  the 
growth  of  a  free,  open,  and  stable  eco- 
nomic and  financial  system.  They  do 
this  by  encouraging  and  supporting  de- 
veloping country  movement  toward 


creased  exports.  Let  me  elaborate  on 
this  point  to  underscore  just  how  im- 
portant this  is  for  the  U.S.  economy. 

Agriculture 

The  agriculture  sector  illustrates  this 
vividly.  Six  out  of  every  10  people  in  de- 
veloping countries  depend  on  agricul- 
ture and  related  pursuits  for  their 
livelihood.  Hence,  the  most  direct  way 
to  increase  incomes  in  these  countries 
is  to  assist  agriculture.  Indeed,  the 
multilateral  development  banks  are  a 
prime  source  of  project  finance  and 
technical  advice  in  this  key  sector. 
Overall,  more  multilateral  development 
bank  lending  goes  into  the  agriculture 
sector  than  any  other — roughly  25% 
annually. 

In  poorer  countries,  up  to  60%  of 
increased  income  is  spent  on  food  and 
upgrading  the  quality  of  the  diet,  and 
this  virtually  always  translates  into 
more  animal  protein  in  the  diet.  Pro- 
duction of  more  animal  protein,  in 
turn,  requires  more  feedgrains  and 
soybean  meal — products  that  U.S. 
farmers  produce  more  efficiently  than 
anywhere  else  in  the  world.  In  fact,  the 
output  from  one  in  four  U.S.  cropland 
acres  enters  export  markets,  creating 


The  U.S.  Government  is  determined  that  the  multilateral 
development  banks  will  adopt  policies  and  procedures  for 
protective  measures  in  the  appraisal  of  projects  that  may  ad- 
versely affect  [tropical  forests]  and  other  fragile  ecosystems. 


more  open  trade  and  capital  flows,  in- 
cluding greater  reliance  on  the  private 
sector  and  free-market  pricing 
policies. 

Third,  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  support  U.S.  objectives  to 
improve  the  quality  of  life  for  impov- 
erished people  throughout  the  develop- 
ing world.  They  provide,  particularly 
through  their  soft  loan  windows,  spe- 
cial funding  for  social  programs  and 
generally  promote  overall  economic 
growth  and  productivity  in  developing 
countries. 

Finally,  stronger,  more  stable, 
growing  developing  country  economies 
directly  help  the  U.S.  economy;  they 
contribute  to  an  expansion  of  employ- 
ment in  the  United  States  through  in- 


nearly  1  million  farm  and  off-farm  jobs. 
Roughly  40%  of  U.S.  agriculture  ex- 
ports is  sold  in  developing  countries. 
Hence,  living  standards  in  the  Third 
World,  where  diets  have  ample  room  to 
grow,  will  probably  play  a  greater  role 
than  any  other  factor  in  determining 
whether  U.S.  agriculture  will  stagnate 
or  flourish. 

South  Korea's  recent  economic  per- 
formance illustrates  the  potential  for 
increased  U.S.  exports.  Since  1982  per 
capita  consumption  of  livestock  prod- 
ucts increased  from  18  to  25  kilograms 
per  year,  a  39%  increase,  which  is  very 
high  compared  to  the  relatively  flat 
consumption  patterns  in  the  United 
States  and  Europe.  The  quantity  of 
U.S.  feedgrains  and  soybean  exports 


Donartment  nf  citatp  Riillptin/.liinp  1Q89 


25 


ECONOMICS 


to  Korea  doubled  in  the  period  from 
1980  to  1987.  It  is  important  to  note  in 
this  connection  that  the  multilateral 
development  banks  played  a  key  role  in 
Korea's  economic  success — multilateral 
development  bank  loans  to  Korea  have 
totaled  over  $8,700  million. 

Information  Technology 

A  sector  that  is  becoming  increasingly 
pivotal  to  growth  in  all  countries  is  in- 
formation technology.  Within  a  matter 
of  decades,  government  and  commerce 
in  the  industrialized  world  have  become 
dependent  on  rapidly  changing  com- 
puter hardware  and  software  and  the 
new  forms  of  telecommunications — sat- 


ogy  hardware  and  software,  U.S.  pro- 
ducers should  be  well-poised  to  secure 
much  of  this  business.  In  recent  years, 
U.S.  exports  of  computers  and  business 
equipment  to  developing  countries  have 
jumped  dramatically.  Korea  went  from 
importing  $161  million  in  1984  to  $489 
million  in  1988,  a  300%  increase;  and 
Mexico  increased  from  $338  million  to 
$602  million,  almost  a  180%  increase 
during  a  period  when  their  ability  to 
import  has  been  sharply  curtailed. 

U.S.  Business  Contracts 

In  this  context,  it  is  useful  to  note  that 
business  contracts  resulting  from  mul- 
tilateral development  bank  projects  are 


Not  only  is  strengthening  the  information  technology  capa- 
bility of  developing  countries  in  their  self-interest,  it  is  in 
our  self-interest  as  well.  A  growing,  more  productive  econ- 
omy is  a  growing  market  for  U.S.  exports. 


el  lite  transmission  and  optic-fiber 
cables — that  link  computers,  tele- 
phones, and  television.  But  information 
technology  can  also  be  invaluable  in  ag- 
ricultural research,  health  services, 
and  other  traditional  development  ac- 
tivities. Proper  utilization  of  these 
technologies  can  help  economies  run 
much  more  efficiently.  Microelec- 
tronics, for  instance,  can  help  countries 
make  better  use  of  electric  power,  thus 
limiting  capital  costs;  and  computeriza- 
tion of  financial  and  economic  data  in- 
crease their  accuracy  and  utility  for 
growth  and  development  several  fold. 

The  multilateral  development 
banks  can  play  a  critical  role  in  helping 
developing  countries  gain  access  to  in- 
formation technology.  Indeed,  we  be- 
lieve that  this  is  an  area  in  which  there 
is  considerable  scope  for  greater  multi- 
lateral development  bank  activity,  par- 
ticularly the  World  Bank. 

Not  only  is  strengthening  the  infor- 
mation technology  capability  of  devel- 
oping countries  in  their  self-interest,  it 
is  in  our  self-interest  as  well.  A  grow- 
ing, more  productive  economy  is  a 
growing  market  for  U.S.  exports.  But 
more  directly,  the  United  States  is  a 
world  leader  in  this  sector.  As  the 
developing  countries  grow  and  increase 
their  purchases  of  information  technol- 


a  direct  and  tangible  benefit  stemming 
from  U.S.  participation  in  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks.  These  con- 
tracts are  composed  of  three  related 
elements. 

First,  there  is  the  procurement 
stemming  directly  from  multilateral 
development  bank-provided  finance. 
U.S.  businesses  secured  roughly  $1.9 
million  in  contracts  from  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks  last  year. 
This  compares  with  U.S.  budget  ex- 
penditures for  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  averaging  about  $1.3 
million  annually. 

Second,  since  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks  only  provide  a  portion 
of  the  finance  needed  for  a  project, 
there  are  other  procurement  possi- 
bilities generated  by  non-multilateral 
development  bank  finance  for  a  project. 

Finally,  the  business  contacts  es- 
tablished through  U.S.  business  partic- 
ipation in  bidding  on  multilateral  devel- 
opment bank  projects  leads  to  follow-on 
business.  For  instance,  Morrison- 
Knudsen,  a  U.S.  engineering  and  con- 
struction firm,  and  ECI  International, 
a  U.S.  firm  specializing  in  the  supply  of 
educational  and  vocational  training 
equipment,  have  sent  letters  to  Con- 
gress noting  that  contacts  established 
on  a  multilateral  development  bank 


project  are  helpful  in  pursuing  non- 
multilateral  development  bank  oppor-      f] 
tunities.  In  sum,  multilateral  develop- 
ment bank  projects  are  an  important 
nexus  for  the  development  of  U.S. 
exports. 

To  assist  U.S.  business  in  compet- 
ing for  multilateral  development  bank 
contracts,  the  Omnibus  Trade  Act  re- 
quired the  appointment  of  commercial 
officers  to  serve  with  each  of  the  U.S. 
executive  directors  at  the  multilateral 
development  banks.  The  Treasury  De- 
partment is  consulting  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  International  Trade 
Administration  and  the  foreign  and 
commercial  service  about  these  ap- 
pointments. It  is  expected  that  the 
positions  at  the  Asian  and  African 
Development  Banks  will  be  filled  in  the 
near  future.  In  addition.  Treasury  is 
working  with  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  to  improve  the  quality  and 
timeliness  of  information  about  con- 
tract awards  on  multilateral  develop- 
ment bank  projects. 

Burdensharing 

Fortunately  the  burden  of  financing 
the  operations  of  these  institutions  is 
shared  by  all  member  countries.  Conse 
quently  U.S.  interests  in  developing 
countries  can  be  pursued  through  these 
institutions  without  the  United  States 
bearing  the  full  burden.  This  is  partic- 
ularly important  during  periods  of  se- 
vere budgetary  constraint. 

We  currently  maintain  a  34.5% 
share  in  the  capital  of  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank.  Our 
shares  in  the  other  international  finan- 
cial institutions  is  much  lower.  In  re- 
cent years,  the  contributions  of  other 
donor  countries — including  some  deve- 
loping countries — to  these  institutions 
have  increased  relative  to  the  United 
States  as  their  respective  economies 
have  grown  and  prospered.  This  is  par- 
ticularly important  for  multilateral  de- 
velopment bank  concessional  lending 
operations  where  all  contributions  are 
fully  paid  in. 

For  their  market-related  lending 
operations,  the  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  leverage  the  callable  capi- 
tal guarantees  of  member  countries  to 
borrow  funds  on  private  capital  mar- 
kets. Hence,  the  majority  of  multi- 
lateral development  bank  loans  are 
financed  with  relatively  small  cash  out- 
lays from  multilateral  development 
bank  members  and  are  cost-effective 
when  compared  with  U.S.  bilateral  eco 
nomic  assistance. 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  198S 


ECONOMICS 


In  FY  1988,  the  United  States 
Drovided  $3,100  million  in  foreign  eco- 
lomic  assistance  {development  assist- 
ince  and  the  economic  support  fund)  to 
75  countries,  exclusive  of  Israel,  Spain, 
ind  a  few  other  higher  income  coun- 
ties. These  countries  received  U.S. 
assistance  to  engender  close  coopera- 
;ion  and  enhance  our  national  interest 
:hrough  increased  political,  economic. 
jnd  military  stability  in  the  Third 
World.  These  same  countries  received 
additional  commitments  of  $18,000  mil- 
ion  from  the  multilateral  development 
Danks — but  at  a  cost  to  the  United 
States  of  only  $1,200  million  in  budget 
authority.  Hence,  for  about  one-third 
:he  budget  cost  of  all  our  bilateral  aid 
3rograms,  U.S.  payments  to  the  multi- 
ateral  development  banks  leverage 
ending  programs  that  are  almost  six 
times  as  large  as  our  bi- 
lateral programs. 

In  addition,  the  multilateral  devel- 
Dpment  banks  provide  considerable 
finance  and  technical  assistance  to 
countries  such  as  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Mexico  that  are  of  considerable 
geopolitical  importance  to  the  United 
states  but  which  receive  virtually  no 
U.S.  economic  assistance.  The  multi- 
ateral  development  banks  made  com- 
mitments of  over  $5,000  million  to 
:hese  countries  in  FY  1988. 


ENHANCED  STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT  FACILITY 

In  addition  to  our  requests  for  funding 
af  the  multilateral  development  banks, 
the  Administration  is  seeking  authori- 
sation and  appropriation  in  FY  1990  for 
A  modest  $150  million  contribution  to 
the  interest  subsidy  account  of  the  En- 
hanced Structural  Adjustment  Facilitv 
of  the  IMF 

In  recent  years,  the  international 
community  has  adopted  a  comprehen- 
sive approach  to  help  the  poorest  coun- 
tries, particularly  those  in  sub-Sahara 
Africa,  to  implement  the  structural 
economic  reforms  which  are  essential 
for  the  increased  growth  and  develop- 
ment necessary  to  alleviate  poverty 
and  improve  basic  human  needs.  This 
approach  draws  upon  the  collective  ef- 
forts of  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank,  and 
official  creditors. 

The  Enhanced  Structural  Adjust- 
ment Facility  represents  the  center- 
piece of  the  IMF's  efforts  to  address 
the  plight  of  the  poorest  countries.  It 
was  established  in  1987  to  enable  the 
IMF  to  provide  financial  assistance  on 


concessional  terms  to  the  poorest  coun- 
tries experiencing  protracted  balance- 
of-payments  problems  and  prepared  to 
undertake  multiyear  economic  reforms. 
It  builds  upon  the  IMF's  Structural 
Adjustment  Facility,  which  was  estab- 
lished in  1986  in  response  to  U.S.  pro- 
posals to  assist  the  low-income 
countries  adopt  growth-oriented  re- 
forms. The  Enhanced  Structural  Ad- 
justment Facility  is  expected  to 
provide  new  resources  totaling  $8,000 
million  to  low-income  countries  en- 
gaged in  economic  and  structural  ad- 
justment. These  resources  will 
supplement  the  roughly  $2,500  million 
remaining  to  be  disbursed  under  the 
Structural  Adjustment  Facility. 

The  Enhanced  Structural  Adjust- 
ment Facility  is  catalyzing  significant 
additional  resources  for  the  low-income 
countries  through  its  association  with 
the  policy  framework  paper  process,  a 
unique  and  historic  step  forward  in 
strengthening  collaboration  between 
the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.  Under 
this  process,  the  two  institutions  work 
in  a  mutually  constructive  manner  in 
helping  resolve  the  special  problems  in 
the  poorest  of  the  developing  countries. 
Member  countries  eligible  to  use  the 


The  IMF  is  the  central  mone- 
tary pillar  of  U.S.  interna- 
tional economic  policy  and  a 
key  policy  instrument  to  ad- 
vance our  economic  and 
security  interests. 


Structural  Adjustment  Facility  and  the 
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Fa- 
cility develop  a  medium-term  policy 
framework  paper — a  joint  document  of 
the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank— outlining 
their  structural  and  macroeconomic 
reform  efforts  and  containing  an  as- 
sessment of  their  financing  needs,  in- 
cluding possible  IMF  and  World  Bank 
financing.  The  IMF  and  World  Bank 
are  now  conducting  joint  staff  missions 
to  prepare  the  policy  framework 
papers. 

The  World  Bank  agreed  to  ear- 
mark $3,000-3,500  million  of  the  eighth 
replenishment  of  the  International 
Development  Association  (IDA)  for  ad- 
justment programs  related  to  policy 
framework  papers.  Substantial  donor 


support  is  also  being  catalyzed  through 
cofinancing,  in  particular  for  sub- 
Sahara  Africa  under  the  World  Bank's 
special  program  of  assistance.  Further- 
more, at  the  Toronto  economic  summit, 
the  heads  of  state  or  government 
agreed  to  ease  the  debt  servicing  bur- 
dens of  the  poorest  countries  under- 
taking internationally  supported 
adjustment  programs.  The  mechanisms 
to  address  these  debt  service  burdens 
have  been  developed  by  the  Paris  Club, 
the  institution  responsible  for  re- 
scheduling debt  owed  to  official  credi- 
tors, and  are  working  smoothly. 

The  United  States  is  the  only  ma- 
jor industrial  country  that  has  not  yet 
contributed  to  the  Enhanced  Struc- 
tural Adjustment  Facility.  The  IMF  is 
the  central  monetary  pillar  of  U.S.  in- 
ternational economic  policy  and  a  key 
policy  instrument  to  advance  our  eco- 
nomic and  security  interests.  A  modest 
contribution  to  the  Enhanced  Struc- 
tural Adjustment  Facility  would  go  far 
to  maintain  our  credibility  in  the  IMF 
and  provide  the  United  States  with  a 
voice  on  issues  of  central  importance 
to  our  national  interests  and  the  well- 
being  of  the  world  economy.  It  would 
help  many  of  the  low-income  countries 
to  adopt  necessary  growth-oriented 
reforms.  Many  of  these  countries — 
including  Pakistan,  Bolivia,  Zaire,  and 
other  key  nations  in  sub-Sahara 
Africa — are  of  significant  strategic  im- 
portance to  the  United  States. 

Countries  contributing  to  the  En- 
hanced Structural  Adjustment  Facility 
are  expected  to  provide  loans  of  about 
$8,000  million.  The  United  States  is 
one  of  the  very  few  major  member 
countries  not  providing  loans.  We  have 
consistently  indicated  that  we  could 
not  provide  loans  due  to  budget  con- 
straints, and  we  are  not  now  proposing 
any  U.S.  loans  to  the  Enhanced  Struc- 
tural Adjustment  Facility.  The  neces- 
sary size  of  such  loans  would,  in  my 
view,  be  prohibitive. 

We  should,  however,  contribute 
modestly  to  an  account  which  will  help 
subsidize  Enhanced  Structural  Adjust- 
ment Facility  loans  to  developing  coun- 
tries. The  proposal  before  you  is  to 
make  a  $150  million  contribution  to  an 
interest  subsidy  account  of  the  En- 
hanced Structural  Adjustment  Facility 
which  would  make  its  loans  conces- 
sional. It  is  critical  that  loans  from  the 
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facil- 
ity be  provided  on  realistic  terms  to 
these  low-income  countries. 


27 


ECONOMICS 


Budget  authorization  and  appro- 
priation of  the  full  U.S.  contribution  is 
being  sought  in  FY  1990  to  provide  the 
IMF  with  adequate  assurance  that  re- 
sources will  be  available  to  finance  the 
interest  subsidy.  However,  actual  dis- 
bursements from  the  U.S.  contribution 
would  occur  over  the  period  through 
U.S.  FY  2001,  roughly  the  final  date 
for  interest  payments  on  Enhanced 
Structural  Adjustment  Facility  loans. 
Consequently  actual  budget  outlays 
each  year  will  be  small  and  would  not 
exceed  $3  million  in  FY  1990,  with  the 
bulk  of  the  outlays  occurring  in  the  lat- 
ter part  of  the  12-year  period. 

Such  a  contribution  would  be  par- 
ticularly cost-effective.  The  U.S.  con- 
tribution represents  only  172%  of  the 
total  resources  being  provided  to  the 
facility,  in  comparison  with  our  IMF 
quota  share  of  some  20%.  Moreover,  the 
amount  of  resources  the  Enhanced 
Structural  Adjustment  Facility  can 
bring  to  bear  in  the  poorest  countries 
often  far  exceeds  the  amounts  that  can 
be  mobilized  through  our  bilateral 
assistance. 

For  these  reasons,  I  urge  you  to 
support  enactment  of  legislation  pro- 
viding for  a  contribution  by  the  United 
States  of  $150  million  to  the  intei'est 
subsidy  account  of  the  IMF's  Enhanced 
Structural  Adjustment  Facility. 


INTERNATIONAL  FINANCE 
CORPORATION 

As  you  are  aware,  U.S.  support  for  the 
International  Finance  Corporation 
(IFC)  has  come  under  question  as  a  re- 
sult of  major  shortfalls  in  our  planned 
purchases  of  shares.  In  198.5  we  agreed 
to  a  capital  increase  of  $650  million  for 
the  IFC  but  have  been  able  to  pay  for 
only  34%  of  our  allotted  175,162  shares 
(at  $1,000  each).  We  are  at  a  critical 
juncture,  wherein  we  must  pay  our  cap- 
ital arrears  to  allow  the  IFC  to  pursue 
a  number  of  private  sector  development 
activities.  Otherwise  we  risk  a  serious 
weakening  of  the  institution's  financial 
well-being  and  a  loss  of  U.S.  leadership 
in  the  institution. 

The  IFC  is  the  arm  of  the  World 
Bank  that  makes  equity  investments  in 
and  loans  to  private  sector  enterprises 
in  the  developing  world.  It  operates 
without  government  guarantee — thus 
reducing  the  role  of  governments  in 
developing  economies.  More  signifi- 
cantly, equity  investment  by  the  IFC, 
as  well  as  loans,  allows  enterprises  to 


grow  without  increasing  their  indebt- 
edness. It  has  been  an  important  cata- 
lyst of  investment  funds,  most  recently 
attracting  $7.50  from  other  sources  of 
capital  for  every  $1.00  it  lends  and 
invests. 

The  IFC  also  plays  an  important 
role  in  advising  governments  about  how 
to  improve  the  environment  for  invest- 
ment in  their  countries.  It  has  contrib- 
uted toward  the  development  of  capital 
markets  through  advice  and  invest- 
ments. This  work  allows  countries  to 
generate  financing  from  institutional 
and  individual  investors,  both  foreign 
and  domestic,  without  the  intermedia- 
tion of  commercial  banks. 

I  would  like  to  describe  for  you 
some  of  the  most  important  initiatives 
underway  at  the  IFC — programs  that 
require  U.S.  financial  support  for  the 
institution  to  be  carried  out  in  full  over 
time. 

Sub-Sahara  Africa 

As  part  of  an  overall  plan  to  increase 
the  IFC's  involvement  in  sub-Sahara 
Africa,  the  IFC  has  undertaken  or  par- 
ticipated in  three  related  programs: 
the  African  Project  Development  Facil- 
ity, the  African  Management  Services 
Company,  and  the  Africa  Enterprise 
Fund. 

The  African  Project  Development 
Facility  was  established  2  years  ago  by 
the  IFC  with  the  AFDB  and  the  UN 
Development  Program  (UNDP).  Teams 
based  in  Abidjan  and  Nairobi  provide 
advice  to  companies  planning  invest- 
ments and  help  them  raise  finance. 

Their  work  is  complemented  by  the 
African  Management  Services  Com- 
pany, which  trains  the  personnel  neces- 
sary to  manage  companies.  The  IFC 
invested  in  the  African  Management 
Services  Company  in  1988,  as  a  logical 
extension  of  its  work  in  sub-Sahara 
Africa.  The  African  Management  Serv- 
ices Company  provides  management 
training  for  new  ventures,  existing  pri- 
vate companies,  and  parastatals  under 
privatization.  It  also  provides  back-up 
in  areas  such  as  marketing,  product  de- 
velopment, and  improved  productivity. 

The  IFC  has  rounded  out  its  role  in 
sub-Sahara  Africa  with  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Africa  Enterprise  Fund  to 
promote  IFC  investment  in  small-  and 
medium-sized  enterprises.  A  large 
number  of  IFC  professionals  have  been 
sent  into  the  field  with  authority  to 
take  decisions  autonomously  on  much 
smaller  investments  than  those  the 
IFC  normally  makes.  Despite  their 


small  size — ranging  from  $100,000  to 
$750,000 — these  investments  are  sub- 
jected to  the  same  standards  of  analy- 
sis applied  to  larger  investments.  This 
extremely  labor-intensive  program 
meets  the  financing  needs  of  small  Af- 
rican entrepreneurs  who  would  never 
be  able  to  attract  IFC  investments 
without  this  type  of  outreach.  As  the 
profits  on  this  activity  are  much  lower 
than  those  from  larger  investments, 
the  IFC's  ability  to  continue  the  pro- 
gram will  be  limited  if  U.S.  funding 
shortfalls  are  not  paid. 

Private  Sector  Development 

Among  other  efforts  to  support  devel- 
opment of  the  private  sector,  the  IFC 
pursues  three  main  activities  in  capit; 
markets  development: 

•  Advising  in  the  establishment 
and/or  strengthening  of  capital 
markets: 

•  Investing  or  lending  to  domestic 
capital  market  institutions  in  need  of 
support;  and 

•  Improving  the  access  of  compa- 
nies and  financial  institutions  to  the 
global  financial  markets. 

We  expect  these  efforts  to  pay  sal 
stantial  dividends  over  the  coming 
years.  The  most  important  effect  will 
be  lowering  the  need  for  borrowing  to 
finance  investment.  Other  positive  ef- 
fects will  be  liberalizing  financial  sys- 
tems, opening  companies  to  public 
control,  and  reducing  the  role  of  gov- 
ernments in  capital  investment. 

The  IFC's  corporate  finance  unit 
has  pursued  corporate  restructurings 
through  a  three-phase  approach.  It  co 
ducts  an  intense  review  of  a  company's 
finances  and  operations,  followed  by 
the  use  of  various  techniques  to  achie\ 
the  optimum  use  of  the  firm's  internal 
resources.  Companies  may  engage  in 
debt  buybacks,  debt-equity  conver- 
sions, or  debt-swaps  and/or  exchanges 
Finally  the  IFC,  the  company,  and  its 
creditors  negotiate  an  agreement  on 
the  restructuring,  which  usually  in- 
volves an  investment  by  the  IFC.  The; 
negotiations  are  settled  on  a  case-by- 
case  basis,  using  a  market-oriented 
approach. 

Since  1985  the  IFC  has  partici- 
pated in  about  50  corporate  restruetui 
ings,  one-half  of  which  have  been  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Th 
type  of  fee-generating  service  is  beinj 
increasingly  provided  by  the  IFC  in  it 
role  as  an  "investment  bank  for  devel- 


k 


9R 


ECONOMICS 


ANNEX 


Y  1990  Budget  Request 

/e  are  requesting  $l,(iOO  million  for  the 
lultilateral  development  banks  and  $150 
lillion  for  the  IM?"s  Enhanced  Structural 
djustment  Facility  in  FY  1990.  These  fund- 
ig  requests  reflect  both  the  need  for  budg- 
tary  restraint  and  the  financial 
equirenients  for  effective  development  pro- 
rams.  Our  multilateral  development  bank 
equest  is  comprised  of  multilateral  develop- 
lent  bank  funding  requirements  currently 
ue  for  payment,  $l,-'500  million,  and  $314 
lillion  of  the  $41-1  million  in  U.S.  funding 
hortfalls  to  the  multilateral  development 
anks.  The  stringency  of  the  budget  con- 
traint  on  international  affairs  funding  pre- 
ents  the  Administration  from  requesting 
tie  entirety  of  U.S.  funding  shortfalls  on 
arlier  scheduled  multilateral  development 
ank  payments.  These  requests  are  compos- 
d  e.xclusively  of  funding  commitments  ne- 
otiated  by  the  Administration  in  close 
onsultatinn  with  this  committee. 

nternational  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
nd  Development  (IBRD) 

'or  the  IBRD  (also  known  as  the  World 
ank)  in  f^Y  1990,  the  Administration  is  re- 
uesting:  (1)  $20.1  million  in  budget  authori- 
/  to  complete  the  first  installment  to  the 
988  GCI;  and  (2)  .$70.1  million  in  budget  au- 
lority  and  .$2,241.8  million  under  program 
mitations  for  subscription  for  the  second 
iistallment. 

The  World  Bank's  princi))al  role  today  is 
laking  long-term  credit  available  for  pro- 
uctive  projects,  which  will  lead  to  econom- 
and  social  development  in  its  less 
eveloped  members.  These  loans  carry  mar- 
et  interest  rates.  In  addition  to  project  fi- 
ance, the  IBRD  provides  policy  advice  and 
echnical  assistance  and  financing  in  sup- 
ort  of  structural  reform  and  serves  as  a  fi- 
ancial  catalyst  and  institution  builder. 

nternational  Development 
issociation  (IDA) 

or  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ng:  (1)  .$6.7  million  to  complete  the  second 
Iistallment;  and  (2)  $9.58.3  million  for  the 
bird  and  final  installment  for  the  $2,875- 
lillion  U.S.  share  of  IDA-8. 

IDA,  an  affiliate  of  the  World  Bank,  is 
he  single  largest  source  of  multilateral  de- 
elopment  assistance  for  lending  on  conces- 
ional  repayment  terms  to  the  world's 
poorest  countries.  Over  96%  of  IDA  lending 
;oes  to  countries  with  an  annual  per  capita 
ncome  of  $400  or  less. 


International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC) 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing: (1)  $79.9  million  to  fund  the  U.S.  short- 
falls in  its  subscription  to  the  $650  million 
IFC  capital  increase;  and  (2)  $35  million  for 
the  fifth  and  final  installment. 

The  IFC  provides  risk  capital  as  well  as 
long-term  loans;  plays  an  important  role  as  a 
catalyst  in  attracting  private  capital;  and 
provides  technical  assistance  to  developing 
countries  that  want  to  encourage  domestic 
and  foreign  private  investment. 

Inter-American  Development 
Bank(IDB) 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing .$31.6  million  in  budget  authority  to  com- 
plete the  U.S.  commitment  to  the  sixth  IDE 
capital  increase. 

Fund  for  Special  Operations 

For  FY'  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing $(i3.7  million  in  budget  authority  to  com- 
plete the  U.S.  commitment  to  the  si.xth 
increase  in  resources  for  the  fund  for  special 
operations.  These  funds  are  required  for  the 
1989  fund  lending  program. 

Inter-.\merican  Investment 
Corporation  (IIC) 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing .$25.5  million  in  U.S.  funding  shortfalls 
to  the  IIC.  These  funds,  for  the  third  and 
fourth  of  four  installments  to  the  IIC,  would 
complete  the  U.S.  commitment  to  this 
institution. 

The  IIC  is  linked  to  the  IDB  and  is  de- 
signed to  support  private  sector  activities  in 
Latin  America  through  equity  and  loan  in- 
vestments that  focus  primarily  on  small-  and 
medium-scale  enterprises. 

Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB) 

The  ADB  is  currently  making  lending  com- 
mitments on  the  basis  of  capital  stock  that  is 
fully  subscribed  by  ADB  member  countries, 
including  the  United  States.  Hence,  there  is 
no  need  to  request  funding  for  the  ADB  in 
FY  1990.  The  ADB  makes  loans  at  market 
rates  to  developing  member  countries  in  re- 
gions of  key  importance  to  U.S.  strategic 
and  economic  interests. 

Asian  Development  Fund  (ADF) 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing; (1)  $84.6  million  in  U.S.  funding  short- 
falls to  the  first  and  second  installments  to 
the  fourth  replenishment  of  ADF  resources; 


and  (2)  $146.1  million  for  the  third,  regu- 
larly scheduled  installment.  The  stringent 
budget  constraint  on  funding  for  interna- 
tional affairs  prevents  us  from  requesting 
the  remaining  funding  shortfall  of  $100  mil- 
lion to  the  ADF  until  FY  1991.  However,  be- 
cause of  e.xchange-rate  changes  and  lower- 
than-e.xpected  lending  levels,  it  is  e.xpected 
that  the  total  $230.7  million  requested  will 
be  sufficient  to  complete  its  project  lending 
programs  in  CY  1989. 

The  ADF  is  a  source  of  concessional  fi- 
nance to  the  poorest  member  countries  of 
the  ADF.  Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  Sri  Lanka, 
and  Nepal  are  the  major  borrowers  from  the 
ADF. 

African  Development  Bank  (AFDB) 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing; (1)  $1.6  million  in  budget  authority  to 
subscribe  to  paid-in  capital  to  complete  the 
second  of  five  installments  to  increase  the 
AFDF's  capital  base;  and  (2)  $9  million  in 
budget  authority  and  $134.8  million  under 
program  limitations  for  the  third  U.S. 
installment. 

The  AFDB  makes  loans  on  market 
terms  for  the  economic  and  social  develop- 
ment of  50  African  member  countries,  indi- 
vidually and  through  regional  cooperation. 
The  AFDB  is  an  important  part  of  the  U.S. 
commitment  to  work  with  the  countries  of 
Africa  for  the  achievement  of  their  long- 
term  development  objectives. 

African  Development  Fund  (AFDF) 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  seeking 
$105  million  in  budget  authority  for  the  sec- 
ond of  three  installments  of  the  LI.S.  contri- 
bution to  the  fifth  replenishment  of  AFDF 
resources.  The  AFDF  complements  AFDB 
operations  by  providing  concessional  financ- 
ing for  high  priority  development  projects  in 
the  poorest  African  countries.  The  United 
States  has  a  strong  humanitarian  interest  in 
aiding  the  poorest  countries  of  the  world's 
least  developed  continent  through  its  sup- 
port for  the  AFDF. 

IMF  Enhanced  Structural 
Adjustment  Facility 

For  FY  1990,  the  Administration  is  request- 
ing $150  million  in  budget  authority  for  a 
one-time  U.S.  contribution  to  the  interest 
subsidy  account  of  the  Enhanced  Structural 
Adjustment  Facility.  This  facility  provides 
financial  assistance  on  concessional  terms  to 
the  poorest  countries  experiencing  pro- 
tracted balance-of-payments  problems. 


29 


ECONOMICS 


opment."  While  this  service  is  self- 
financing,  it  does  not  generate  the  kind 
of  profits  that  the  IFC  needs  to  finance 
its  growing  investments. 


INTER-AMERICAN 
DEVELOPMENT  BANK 

As  you  are  aware,  member  countries  of 
the  Inter-American  Development  (IDB) 
have  agreed  to  increase  the  banks  capi- 
tal and  replenish  the  resources  of  the 
concessional  window,  the  fund  for  spe- 
cial operations.  Final  agreement  was 
reached  during  the  IDE's  annual  meet- 
ing in  March.  It  calls  for  a  $26, .500  mil- 
lion capital  inci-ease  and  a  .$200  million 
replenishment  of  the  fund  for  special 
operations.  The  annual  U.S.  share  of 
the  subscriptions  to  paid-in  capital  and 
contributions  to  the  fund  for  special  op- 
erations would  be  $77.9  million. 

The  agreement  is  a  good  and  fair 
one  that  reflects  the  needs  and  desires 
of  both  the  donor  and  borrowing  mem- 
ber countries.  The  result  will  be  a 
strengthened  IDB  that  can  more  effec- 
tively support  the  growth  and  develop- 
ment of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  Under  the  agreement  and 
with  the  organizational  and  procedural 
reforms  that  are  already  underway  in 
the  IDB,  it  will: 

•  Lend  $22,500  million  over  the 
1990-93  period; 

•  Continue  to  seek  ways  to  ensure 
that  half  of  its  lending  program  bene- 
fits lower  income  groups; 

•  Provide  up  to  $5,600  million  of 
fast-disbursing,  policy-based  sector 
lending; 

•  Strengthen  the  country  program- 
ming process  to  ensure  that  all  its  lend- 
ing will  support  policy  reform  and  self- 
sustaining  growth; 

•  Adopt  a  loan  approval  mechanism 
that  allows  greater  weight  to  be  given 
to  the  views  of  donor  countries;  and 

•  Reorganize  operating  depart- 
ments to  implement  sector  lending  and 
country  programming  and  to  improve 
the  overall  efficiency  of  IDB  opera- 
tions. This  will  include  enhancing  its 
environmental  analysis  by  establishing 
an  environmental  line  unit. 

With  the  replenishment  now 
agreed  and  the  organizational  and  pro- 
cedural reforms  being  implemented, 
the  IDB  will  also  be  able  to  make  its 
contribution  to  helping  resolve  Latin 
America's  debt  problems.  That  contri- 
bution will  be  to  encourage  its  bor- 


rowers to  adopt  policies  that  improve 
economic  performance,  stimulate  new 
foreign  investment,  increase  domestic 
savings,  and  encourage  the  repatria- 
tion of  flight  capital.  Private  sector  ini- 
tiatives and  the  development  of  market- 
based  economies  should  be  emphasized. 
It  will  be  critical,  therefore,  that  the 
United  States  meet  its  funding  obliga- 
tions to  the  IDB  in  order  that  this  proc- 
ess can  be  fully  implemented. 


CONCLUSION 

In  conclusion,  I  want  to  emphasize  the 
Administration's  commitment  to,  and 
full, support  for,  the  multilateral  devel- 
opment banks  and  U.S.  participation  in 
the  IMF  Enhanced  Structural  Adjust- 
ment Facility.  These  institutions  are  vi- 
tal to  our  efforts  to  strengthen  the 
international  debt  strategy.  It  is  criti- 
cal that  we  provide  full  funding  for 
U.S.  participation  in  order  to  maintain 
U.S.  leadership  on  debt  issues  and  to 
ensure  that  the  strengthened  strategy 
is  implemented. 

These  institutions  also  serve  the 
United  States  in  a  variety  of  other 
ways.  We  rely  on  the  multilateral  devel- 
opment banks  to  promote  policies 
"  which  protect  the  delicate  global  envi- 


ronment that  we  all  share.  We  depend 
on  their  role  to  promote  our  security 
and  humanitarian  interests. 

Furthermore,  the  fate  of  multi- 
lateral development  bank  activities  is 
important  to  the  U.S.  economy,  since 
success  in  promoting  sustainable 
growth  will  increase  effective  demand 
among  developing  countries  for  U.S. 
e.xports  and  reduce  the  strains  on  the 
international  financial  system.  I  also 
believe  that  successful  operation  of 
overall  multilateral  development  bank 
programs  will  make  one  additional  con 
tribution;  the  promotion  of  peace  and 
democracy  among  nations.  I  cannot 
overemphasize  the  importance  I  attach 
to  this. 

I  recognize  fully  that,  even  in  the 
best  of  circumstances,  supporting  for- 
eign assistance  is  never  popular.  Now, 
at  a  time  of  severe  budget  constraint,  i 
will  be  even  more  difficult.  It  is  imper- 
ative that  we  support  these  institutions 
in  their  important  tasks. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  am 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  o 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

-Forte.xt,  see  Bulletin  of  May  1989, 
p.  53.  ■ 


Status  of  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 


by  Carlo  A.  Hills 

Statement  before  the  Si(hcoiniiiitfee 
on  Trade  of  the  House  Wai/s  and  Means 
Committee  on  April  11.  1989.  Ambas- 
sador Hills  is  U.S.  Trade  Repre- 
sentative.''^ 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  the  committee  to  discuss  the 
status  of  the  Uruguay  Round  of  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations.  Your 
hearing  today  is  made  more  timely  be- 
cause of  the  success  achieved  last  week 
in  Geneva. 

On  Saturday  [April  8],  delegates 
from  over  100  countries  ratified  15  ne- 
gotiating texts  which  establish  the 
framework  for  the  final  stage  of  nego- 
tiations on  the  full  range  of  subjects  in- 
cluded in  the  Uruguay  Round.  The 
approval  of  these  te.xts  concludes  the 
midterm  review  begun  in  Montreal.  I 
can  honestly  say  that  we  are  now  well 


positioned  to  undertake  in  earnest  the 
final,  hard  bargaining  which  will  de- 
termine whether  the  Uruguay  Round 
succeeds. 

Having  said  that,  however,  I  want 
to  make  it  clear  to  you  that  we  have  a 
very  long  way  to  go  in  this  process.  Th 
tough  part  lies  ahead.  And  I  want  our 
trading  partners  to  realize  that  there 
will  be  no  final  concessions  from  the 
United  States  in  this  round  unless  oth- 
ers are  similarly  committed  to  sub- 
stantial reform.  Thus  far,  we  have  not 
bound  ourselves  to  final  agreements  or 
most  important  issues.  Rather  we  have 
committed  ourselves  to  a  realistic  ne- 
gotiating program  which  can  ulti- 
mately bring  about  reform  in  world 
trade  rules.  If  others  do  not  negotiate 
in  good  faith,  it  is  unlikely  the  negotia- 
tions will  result  in  final  agreements 
that  the  United  States  will  be  able  to 
sign.  As  a  result  of  last  week,  however, 
I  am  encouraged  that  others  besides 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/June  19891 


ECONOMICS 


the  United  States  are  serious  about 
this  process,  and  I  am  optimistic  about 
the  chances  for  success. 

We  now  need  to  quicl<en  the  pace  of 
nil-  work  in  Geneva  if  we  are  to  keep  to 
iijur  1990  deadline  for  concluding  the  ne- 
a;otiations.  We  also  need  to  intensify 
jur  consultations  with  the  Congress 
ind  the  private  sector  solhat  U.S.  pro- 
posals tabled  in  Geneva  have  been  de- 
k'eloped  only  after  consideration  of  the 
^fiews  of  all  interested  parties.  Let  me 
^ummarize  for  you  the  results  of  the 
Tiidterm  review  and  then  turn  to  a  dis- 
;ussion  of  the  upcoming  timetable. 

summary  of  Midterm  Review 

The  midterm  review  was  originally 
scheduled  to  conclude  with  a  meeting  of 
trade  ministers  last  December  in  Mon- 
treal. Agreement  was  reached  in  11  out 
3f  15  negotiating  areas.  Disagreements 
arose,  however,  in  four  negotiating 
ireas — agriculture,  intellectual 
property,  textiles  and  clothing,  and 

afeguards — leading  ministers  to  put 
the  results  agreed  from  the  other  11 
legotiating  groups  "on  hold"  until  the 
Trade  Negotiations  Committee  was 
able  to  work  out  differences  in  the  four 

isputed  negotiating  te.xts. 

The  meetings  last  week  were  in- 
:ended  to  break  this  impasse.  From 
this  perspective,  I  think  we  were  quite 
successful.  We  reached  agreements  on 
all  four  framework  texts.  I  believe  that 
the  language  adopted  in  these  areas 
both  protects  our  basic  interests  and 
commits  our  partners  to  a  meaningful 
negotiating  process.  Moreover  the 
Trade  Negotiations  Committee  lifted 
its  hold  on  the  other  11  te.xts,  thereby 
enabling  negotiations  to  proceed  on  the 
full  agenda  of  the  Uruguay  Round. 

I  believe  that  we  have  now  achieved 
the  objectives  first  set  forth  for  the 
midterm  review.  These  objectives  were 
to: 

•  Achieve  some  "tangible"  results 
that  could  be  implemented  prior  to  the 
conclusion  of  the  Ui'uguay  Round; 

•  Provide  clear  guidance  on  the  is- 
sues to  be  negotiated;  and 

•  Reaffirm  the  political  will  of  gov- 
ernments to  succeed  by  1990  in  all  the 
negotiating  areas. 

Let  me  discuss  in  detail  how  these 
particular  objectives  were  reached  in 
the  four  areas  negotiated  last  week. 


Agriculture.  The  agreement  on 
agriculture  lays  out  the  scope  and  the 
process  for  the  negotiations  to  take 
place  over  the  next  20  months.  The 
long-term  objective  of  these  negotia- 
tions will  be  to  provide  for  substantial 
progressive  reductions  in  agriculture 
support  and  protection  which  will  re- 
sult in  correcting  and  preventing  re- 
strictions and  distortions  in  world 
agriculture  markets.  All  measures 
which  directly  or  indirectly  affect  im- 
port access  and  export  competition  are 
to  be  put  on  the  table  for  negotiation 
during  the  final  bargaining  sessions. 
Prior  to  the  end  of  this  year,  partici- 
pants will  advance  proposals  to  achieve 
a  fair  and  market-oriented  agricultural 
trading  system  as  well  as  proposed 
rules  and  disciplines  to  govern  the  new 
system.  Participants  will  also  submit 
by  that  time  their  proposals  to  harmo- 
nize sanitary  and  phytosanitary  regu- 
lations and  proposed  methods  for 
improving  the  multilateral  dispute  set- 
tlement process  in  this  regard. 

Ministers  also  agreed  to  begin  im- 
plementation of  the  long-term  reform  in 
1991. 

For  the  short  term  (i.e.,  until  the 
conclusion  of  the  round),  there  is  agree- 
ment to  hold  overall  domestic  and  ex- 
port support  and  protection  at  or  below 
current  levels  in  1989  with  specific 
commitments  on  market  access  and 
support  prices.  By  October  of  this  year, 
ministers  will  provide  specifics  on 
their  intended  reductions  in  support 
and  protection  levels  for  1990. 

Intellectual  Property.  The  agree- 
ment is  significant  because  it  resolved 
a  key  procedural  difficulty  that  has 
hindered  the  negotiating  group  on 
trade-related  intellectual  property 
rights  since  its  inception;  that  is, 
whether  the  negotiation  is  to  cover  the 
establishment  of  adequate  and  effective 
standards  for  the  protection  of  intellec- 
tual property  rights.  The  framework 
sets  out  clear  guidance  to  negotiators 
that  it  does.  In  this  regard,  the  text 
provides  that  negotiations  toward  a 
comprehensive  agreement  on  trade- 
related  intellectual  property  rights 
include  not  only  adequate  substantive 
intellectual  property  standards  but 
also  effective  means  for  enforcement  of 
such  standards  and  effective  and  expe- 
ditious dispute  settlement  procedures. 

Negotiations  on  intellectual  prop- 
erty are  a  key  component  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  for  the  United  States. 
Our  objective  has  been  to  address, 
through  such  an  agreement,  the  distor- 


tions and  impediments  to  international 
trade  caused  by  the  lack  of  adequate 
and  effective  protection  of  intellectual 
property  rights  around  the  world. 

We  can  now  proceed  to  negotiate 
an  agreement  covering  all  areas  of  ma- 
jor concern  to  the  United  States.  This 
includes,  for  example,  patent  protec- 
tion for  pharmaceuticals  and  chemical 
products,  copyright  protection  for 
sound  recordings  and  computer  soft- 
ware, trade  secret  protection  for  pro- 
prietary manufacturing  processes  and 
data,  and  effective  enforcement  to  stop 
the  counterfeiting  of  trademarks  and 
piracy  of  copyrighted  materials  such  as 
books,  motion  pictures,  and  record- 
ings. Economic  losses  due  to  inade- 
quate protection  amounted  to  an 
estimated  $43-61  billion  in  1986,  ac- 
cording to  a  1988  study  by  the  U.S.  In- 
ternational Trade  Commission. 

The  U.S.  efforts  to  advance  these 
negotiations  have  been  strongly  sup- 
ported by  the  active  interests  and  par- 
ticipation of  the  Congress  and  the 
private  sector.  Due  to  these  combined 
efforts,  the  awareness  of  the  impor- 
tance of  adequate  and  effective  protec- 
tion of  intellectual  property  rights  has 
been  increasing  in  the  United  States 
and  abroad.  Our  insistence  that  this 
topic  be  addressed  in  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT)  is  now  supported  by  a  signifi- 
cant number  of  our  trading  partners. 

Textiles  and  Clothing.  The  agree- 
ment, which  recognizes  the  importance 
of  textiles  and  apparel  in  the  LTruguay 
Round,  calls  for  participants  to  begin 
negotiation  later  this  month  on  modal- 
ities that  could  lead  to  the  application 
of  normal  GATT  rules  to  this  sector,  as 
agreed  in  Punta  del  Este  in  1986. 

However,  in  order  to  integrate  tex- 
tiles and  apparel  into  GATT,  we  will 
need  to  strengthen  the  relevant  GATT 
rules  and  disciplines.  Negotiations  in 
this  area  should  contribute  to  the  ex- 
pansion of  textile  and  apparel  trade. 
All  countries,  developed  and  developing 
alike,  are  to  contribute  to  this  process. 

Safeguards.  GATT  Article  XIX 
contains  procedures  to  provide  tempo- 
rary import  relief  to  domestic  indus- 
tries seriously  injured  by  imports.  For 
many  years,  GATT  contracting  parties 
have  recognized  that  the  provisions  of 
Article  XIX  need  to  be  clarified 

The  framework  allows  the  work  of 
this  negotiating  group  to  go  forward 
without  prejudging  the  position  of  the 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989 


31 


ECONOMICS 


participants  with  respect  to  the  major 
issues  of  the  negotiation.  The  agree- 
ment establishes  a  June  deadline  for 
the  preparation  of  a  draft  text  which 
will  serve  as  the  basis  for  negotiations 
during  the  remainder  of  the  Uruguay 
Round.  Governments  are  encouraged  to 
submit  their  own  proposals  as  soon  as 
possible,  preferably  by  the  end  of  April. 
The  framework  stresses  the  impor- 
tance of  concluding  a  comprehensive 
agreement  which  establishes  multi- 
lateral control  over  safeguard  meas- 
ures, including  so-called  grey  area 
measures,  which  are  currently  outside 
of  multilateral  control.  The  aim  of  the 
negotiation  is  either  to  bring  such 
measures  under  multilateral  discipline 
or  to  eliminate  them. 

Achievements  in  Other  Areas 

The  understandable  focus  during  the 
past  few  months  on  the  above  four  sub- 
jects has  obscured  the  achievements 
reached  at  or  before  Montreal  on  the  11 
other  negotiating  areas.  I  will  not  men- 
tion every  group,  but  at  Montreal  we 
managed  to  achieve: 

•  Improvements  to  the  dispute  set- 
tlement procedures  of  GATT,  an  area  of 
vital  importance; 

•  A  framework  that  allows  us  to 
conduct  the  market  access  negotiations 
on  tariffs  and  nontariff  measures  on  a 
request/offer  basis; 

•  A  multilateral  package  on  tropi- 
cal products  of  major  concern  to  less 
developed  countries; 

•  A  trade  policy  review  mechanism 
to  periodically  examine  the  trade  poli- 
cies of  GATT  members; 

•  Guidance  on  negotiating  an 
agreement  on  trade  in  services  and  de- 
velopment of  a  draft  agreement  by  the 
end  of  the  year; 

•  Guidance  on  negotiating  an 
agreement  on  trade-related  investment 
measures;  and 

•  A  procedure  to  introduce  new 
discipline  in  the  areas  of  subsidies  and 
countervailing  duties. 

We  have  used  the  time  since  Mon- 
treal on  these  subjects  to  position  the 
United  States  for  the  final  20  months  of 
the  negotiating  process.  For  example, 
the  data  base  to  support  the  market  ac- 
cess negotiations  is  now  being  devel- 
oped, and  we  will  hold  public  hearings 
next  month  to  solicit  specific  advice 
about  items  for  inclusion  in  the  initial 
U.S.  request  list  for  the  reduction  or 
elimination  of  foreign  tariff  and  non- 


tariff  measures.  We  will  be  prepared 
to  submit  our  initial  request  list  to  our 
trading  partners  on  specific  market  ac- 
cess issues  on  schedule,  before  the 
summer  break. 

With  your  help,  we  intend  to  ad- 
here to  the  deadlines  imposed  on  the 
negotiating  groups  and  will  push  our 
partners  to  act  accordingly.  We  have 
been  consulting  with  your  staff  and  the 
private  sector  advisory  committees  on 
all  15  subjects,  and  we  are  now  explor- 
ing the  different  types  of  proposals  we 
want  to  table  in  Geneva.  We  expect 
that  other  participants  will  also  have 
their  negotiating  proposals  on  the  table 
by  the  end  of  the  year.  We  have  an  am- 
bitious agenda,  and  it  is  important, 
given  other  initiatives  underway,  that 
the  Uruguay  Round  be  concluded  by 
December  1990,  as  agreed. 


In  sum  I  am  delighted  to  report  to 
you  that  the  Uruguay  Round  negotia- 
tions are  advancing  once  again  after 
the  successful  outcome  of  the  midterm 
review.  We  have  much  work  to  do  and 
little  time  to  waste.  I  want  the  commit 
tee  to  know  that  I  am  committed  to 
this  effort  and  that  this  Administratioi 
will  spare  no  effort  to  achieve  a  result 
that  significantly  strengthens  world 
trade  rules  and  furthers  the  economic 
interests  of  the  United  States.  I  hope 
that  the  committee  will  continue  to 
follow  closely  developments  in  the 
Uruguay  Round  and  provide  frequent 
guidance  to  us  as  we  conclude  these 
negotiations. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  ol 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Foreign  Direct  Investment 
in  a  Global  Economy 


Since  1980,  foreign  direct  investment 
in  the  United  States  has  grown  at  a 
much  faster  rate  than  was  typical  for 
the  preceding  50  years.  Foreign  inves- 
tors have  become  much  more  visible 
throughout  this  country.  However,  for- 
eign investment  in  the  United  States 
plays  virtually  the  same  role  that  it  has 
since  the  founding  of  the  Republic. 

Foreign  investment,  both  U.S.  in- 
vestment abroad  and  foreign  invest- 
ment in  this  country,  is  important  in 
allocating  resources  to  produce  wealth. 
Foreign  investment  leads  to  more  effi- 
cient international  production  and  ben- 
efits both  home  and  host  countries. 

U.S.  Policy 

Toward  Foreign  Investment 

The  United  States  welcomes  foreign  in- 
vestment and  seeks  to  accord  foreign 
investors  the  same  fair,  equitable,  and 
nondiscriminatory  treatment  given  to 
American  investors.  U.S.  investment 
policy  is  governed  by  the  following 
principles. 

National  Treatment.  Foreign  in- 
vestors should  be  given  treatment  that 
is  no  less  favorable  in  like  situations 
than  domestic  enterprises,  except  to 
protect  national  security  and  related 
interests. 


Most-Favored-Nation  Status.  For 

eign  investors  from  different  countries 
should  be  granted  equal  treatment. 

Protection  of  Investor  Rights  in 
Accord  With  International  Legal 
Principles  and  Multilateral  Conven- 
tions. Any  expropriation  of  investment 
or  abrogation  of  an  investor's  financial, 
physical,  and  intellectual  property 
rights  should  be  done  for  a  public  pur- 
pose, in  a  nondiscriminatory  fashion 
under  due  process  of  law  without  violat 
ing  previous  contractual  arrangements 
and  accompanied  by  prompt,  adequate, 
and  effective  compensation. 

Multilaterally,  the  United  States 
has  worked  actively  to  promote  and  im 
plement  these  principles.  For  example, 
in  1976  and  1984,  the  United  States 
sought  and  achieved  two  decisions  by 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooper- 
ation and  Development  (OECD), 
consisting  of  understandings  among 
OECD  members  on  national  treatment, 
investment  incentives  and  disincen- 
tives, guidelines  for  multinational  en- 
terprises, liberalization  of  capital 
flows,  and  the  right  of  establishment 
for  foreign  (including  U.S.)  investors. 
The  U.S.  Government  now  is  pursuing 
an  initiative  in  the  current  Uruguay 
Round  of  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions to  reduce  foreign  government  re- 


ECONOMICS 


strictions  on  investment  in  the  form  of 
;rade-related  investment  measures  and 
;o  ensure  high  international  standards  of 
protection  for  intellectual  property, 
such  as  copyrights,  trademarks,  and 
patents. 

Bilaterally,  the  United  States  has 
m  investment  treaty  program  to  facili- 
tate investment  in  developing  countries. 
The  eight  treaties  already  in  force  estab- 
ish  a  bilateral  framework  of  agreed 
standards  of  conduct  in  such  areas  as 
treatment  of  investment,  expropriation 
and  compensation,  transfer  of  funds,  and 
the  settlement  of  disputes.  This  pro- 
gram complements  the  investment  pro- 
tection provisions  contained 


in  bilateral  "treaties  of  friendship,  com- 
merce, and  navigation,"  which  the  Unit- 
ed States  has  concluded  over  the  past  130 
years  with  its  major  trading  partners. 

U.S.  Investment  Abroad 

U.S.  multinational  corporations  have 
been  an  essential  element  in  the  growth 
of  the  international  economy.  They  em- 
ploy more  than  24  million  people  world- 
wide, including  6.3  million  overseas. 
U.S.  trade  in  1986  associated  with 
these  multinational  corporations 
amounted  to  $318  billion;  exports  in- 
volving U.S.  multinationals  accounted 


for  nearly  80%  of  total  U.S.  merchan- 
dise exports. 

The  United  States  is  the  largest 
foreign  direct  investor.  As  has  been 
true  through  most  of  the  period  since 
World  War  II,  Canada  is  the  favored  na- 
tion for  U.S.  investors.  West  European 
countries  and  Japan  round  out  the  list 
of  the  top  10  hosts  for  U.S.  investment. 

U.S.  multinationals  frequently  are 
accused  of  exporting  jobs  to  foreign 
lands.  However,  multinational  corpora- 
tions create  new  employment  overseas 
by  establishing  new  facilities  and  mod- 
ernizing old  ones.  By  doing  so,  they 
contribute  to  economic  development 


Foreign  Direct  Investment  in  tlie  U.S.,  1970-87 


1970       1971       1972      1973       1974      1975      1976      1977      1978      ia79      19ao       1981       1982       1983      1984      1985      1986      1987 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 


Foreign  Direct  Investment  in  the  U.S.  by  Major  Country,  1970-87 


$  billions 
80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30- 

20- 

10 

0 


■  ■■■■■  —  ■■■■■■■■■l 


-10  '       I ■ 1 ■ 1       ■       I ■       I       ■ 1       ■       I       '       I       ■       I ■ r ■       I       ■       I       ■       I ■— — T— ' 1 ■       1 ■       I ■       I       < 

1970       1971       1972       1973       1974       1975       1976       1977       1978       1979       1980      1981       1982       1983       1984       1985       1986       1987 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 


DeDartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989 


33 


ECONOMICS 


and  rising  living  standards  in  other 
countries.  Consequently,  these  e.xpand- 
ing  foreign  marl^ets  are  better  able  to 
absorb  more  U.S.  exports  of  goods  and 
services.  Similarly,  the  largest  foreign 
consumers  for  U.S.  exports  are  typ- 
ically foreign-based  subsidiaries  owned 
by  U.S.  investors.  Investment  and 
trade  in  the  global  economy  is  a  two- 
way  street  that  benefits  all  participat- 
ing countries. 

Foreign  Investment 
in  the  United  States 

Since  the  beginning  of  this  decade, 
foreign  direct  investment  here  has  in- 
creased dramatically.  There  are  several 
reasons  for  this  explosive  growth.  The 
U.S.  domestic  market  is  the  largest  in 
the  world,  and  foreign  investors  desire 
to  have  guaranteed  access  to  that  mar- 
ket. The  world's  most  imjjortant  econ- 
omy has  longstanding  economic  and 
political  stability.  The  removal  of  re- 
strictions on  the  outflow  of  capital,  es- 
pecially from  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Japan,  has  allowed  funds  from  those 
nations  to  flow  here. 

It  is  worth  noting  that  the  depreci- 
ation of  the  U.S.  dollar  since  1985  has 
not  made  it  more  attractive  for  foreign- 
ers with  appreciating  currencies,  such 
as  the  Japanese  and  the  West  Germans, 
to  invest  in  the  United  States.  While  a 
stronger  yen  or  Deutsche  mark  means 
that  U.S.  dollar  assets  are  cheaper,  it 
also  means  that  the  dollar  earnings  a 
Japanese  or  German  investor  receives 
from  U.S.  investments  are  worth  fewer 
yen  or  marks.  In  fact,  historically, 
there  has  been  little  correlation  be- 
tween the  relative  strength  of  the  dol- 
lar and  the  inflow  of  foreign  direct 
investment.  In  addition,  despite  the 
strength  of  the  yen  and  the  mark,  a  Ja- 
panese or  German  might  be  hesitant  to 
invest  in  the  United  States  if  the  inves- 
tor thought  the  dollar  might  depreciate 
further  in  the  future. 

Contrary  to  U.S.  public  percep- 
tion, the  Japanese  do  not  hold  the  larg- 
est stock  of  foreign  direct  investment 
in  this  country.  Rather,  the  British,  as 
they  have  for  most  of  America's  history, 
are  the  most  important  sources  of  for- 
eign direct  investment  here.  The 
Netherlands  is  the  second  largest  in- 
vestor, followed  by  Japan,  Canada,  and 
West  Germany.  Despite  the  growth  in 


U.S.  Direct  Investment 
Abroad,  1970-87 

(Sbillions) 


1970     1980      1987' 


Manufacturing 

32.3 

89.2 

126.6 

Petroleum 

21.7 

47.6 

66,4 

Other 

24.2 

78.8 

115.8 

Total 

78.2 

215.6 

308.8 

Major  Recipients 

Canada 

22.8 

45.0 

56.9 

United  Kingdom 

8.0 

28.6 

44.7 

West  Germany 

4.6 

15.4 

24.5 

Switzerland 

1.8 

11.3 

20.0 

Japan 

1.5 

6.2 

14.3 

'Preliminary. 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 


Foreign  Direct  Investment 
in  the  U.S.,  1970-87 


($1 

}illions) 

1970 

1980 

1987' 

Manufacturing 

6.1 

25.2 

91.0 

Wholesale  Trade 

1.0 

14.3 

37.6 

Petroleum 

3.0 

12.4 

35.4 

Other 

3.2 

16.5 

97.9 

Total 

13.3 

68.4 

261.9 

Major  Investors 

United  Kingdom 

4.1 

12.2 

74.9 

Netherlands 

2.2 

16.9 

47.0 

Japan 

.2 

4.2 

33.4 

Canada 

3.1 

10.1 

21.7 

We.st  Germany 

.7 

5.4 

19.6 

'Preliminary. 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 


International  Investment 
Position  of  the  U.S.,  1972-87 

(Sbllllons) 


1972 

1980 

1987' 

Net  Investment 

37.0 

106.3 

-368.2 

U.S.  Assets  Abroad 

198.7 

607.1 

1.167.8 

Official  Reserves 

13.2 

26.8 

45.8 

Other  U.S. 

:36.1 

63.8 

88.4 

Assets 

Private  Assets 

149.4 

516.6 

1,0:33.6 

Foreign  Assets 

161.7 

500.8 

1,. 5.36.0 

in  the  U.S. 

Official  Assets 

63.0 

176.1 

283.1 

Other  Assets 

98.7 

324.8 

1,2.52.9 

'Preliminary. 
Note:  Totals  may  not  add  due  to 
rounding. 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 


Japanese  investment,  the  bulk  of  for- 
eign investment  in  the  United  States 
continues  to  be  held  by  citizens  of  the 
member  nations  of  the  European  Com- 
munity and  Canada. 

Foreign  investment  in  the  United 
States  is  no  less  important  to  this  coun 
try  than  it  was  in  1786.  In  that  year, 
Thomas  Paine,  the  author  of  Common 
Sense,  noted  that: 

It  has  always  been  a  maxim  of  poli- 
tics... that  the  more  foreign  countries  which 
any  nation  can  interest  in  the  prosperity  of 
its  own,  so  much  the  better.  Where  the  treas 
ure  is,  there  will  the  heart  be  also;  and, 
therefore,  when  foreigners  vest  their  money 
with  us,  they  naturally  invest  their  good 
wishes  with  it;  and  it  is  we  that  obtain  an  in 
fluence  over  them,  not  they  over  us. 

Net  International  Investment 
Position  of  the  United  States 

Commentators  frequently  refer  to  the 
United  States  by  misleading  terms 
such  as  "net  debtor"  or  "the  world's 
largest  debtor  nation."  These  refer- 
ences are  to  the  U.S.  net  international 
investment  position.  This  calculation  b; 
the  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  at- 
tempts to  value  and  compare  U.S.  as- 
sets abroad  to  foreign  assets  in  the 
United  States.  Since  1982,  the  U.S.  ne' 
international  investment  position  has 
fallen  from  a  high  of  plus  $141  billion  ir 
1982  to  a  negative  $368  billion  at  the 
end  of  1987. 

Citing  the  net  international  invest 
ment  position  as  "net  debt"  is  flawed 
from  both  an  accounting  and  an  eco- 
nomic perspective.  The  net  interna- 
tional investment  position  includes  not 
only  debt  but  also  equity,  gold,  and  for- 
eign exchange  holdings.  Furthermore, 
the  components  of  the  net  international 
investment  position  are  not  valued  in  a 
consistent  fashion.  While  bonds  and 
stock  holdings  are  calculated  at  market 
value,  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad  is 
valued  at  original  cost.  Valuing  this  di- 
rect investment  at  its  market  price 
would  add  up  to  $600  billion  to  the  U.S. 
net  international  investment  position. 
Also  U.S.  gold  holdings  are  valued  at 
roughly  .$42  an  ounce;  using  a  market 
price  for  gold  would  add  $100  billion  to 
the  U.S.  position.  Consequently,  it  is 
very  possible  that  the  real  net  interna- 
tional investment  position  of  the  Unitec 
States  was  substantially  positive  at  the 
end  of  1987.  ■ 


34 


EUROPE 


the  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of  Soviet  Reform 


a\ 


ly  Paula  J.  Dohriansky 


Address  before  the  Baltic  Ameri- 
an  Freedom  League  in  Cleveland  on 
/larch  U.  19S9.  Ms.  Dohriansky  is 
^eputij  Assistant  Secretary  for  Human 
iights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs. 

am  very  pleased  to  be  here  tonight 
nd  have  an  opportunity  to  address  an 
mportant  subject — U.S.  policy  toward 
he  Baltic  states  in  an  era  of  Soviet  re- 
orm.  But  before  I  proceed  with  this 
peech,  I  would  like  to  relay  to  you 
ome  of  my  personal  e.xperiences  in 
jatvia.  I  visited  Riga  in  November 
986  as  part  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
he  Chautauqua  conference.  And  while 
ny  stay  was  brief,  I  can  honestly  say 
hat  it  ])roduced  a  lasting  impression 
md  a  real  insight  into  some  unique 
haracteristics  of  the  Baltic  people.  We 
lad  a  number  of  Latvian  Americans  on 
he  U.S.  delegation,  and  watching  them 
nteract  with  the  Latvians  in  Riga  was 
;omething  not  to  be  forgotten.  I  was 
ruly  touched  by  the  sincerity  and  the 
ntense  patriotism  of  the  Latvians, 
nanifested  by  their  pride  in  their  coun- 
rymen  who  have  accomplished  so  much 
n  America  and  came  back  to  Riga  as 
J.S.  representatives. 

Our  presence  in  Riga  was  also  a 
itrong  testament  to  our  unwavering 
•oncern  and  interest  in  the  plight  of  the 
Baltic  peoples.  I  am  sure  many  of  you 
ecall  Ambassador  Jack  Matlock's  stir- 
•ing  speech  in  which  he  opened  in  Lat- 
/ian  and  staunchly  reaffirmed  our 
lonrecognition  of  the  forced  incorpora- 
,ion  of  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania 
nto  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Baltic  countries  have  always 
leld  a  special  place  in  American  policy, 
(n  fact,  the  United  States  was  one  of 
;he  first  countries  to  recognize  the  in- 
lependence  of  Latvia,  Estonia,  and 
Lithuania  after  the  collapse  of  czarist 
Russia.  We  have,  of  course,  large  num- 
bers of  Americans  of  Estonian,  Lat- 
vian, and  Lithuanian  descent,  such  as 
yourselves,  who  retain  a  strong  inter- 
est in  the  developments  in  the  Baltic 
states.  And  the  drama  of  proud 
people — relatively  few  in  numbers  but 
high  in  spirit — fighting  to  restore  de- 
mocracy and  to  preserve  their  national 
identity  touches  the  very  foundation  of 
American  ethos. 


In  the  post-World  War  II  era,  the 
fate  of  the  Baltics  has  been  dominated 
by  a  single  stark  fact:  Soviet  anne.xa- 
tion  of  these  three  nations.  The  refusal 
to  recognize  the  legitimacy  of  the 
forced  incorporation  of  Estonia,  Lat- 
via, and  Lithuania  into  the  Soviet 
empire  has  been  a  longstanding  and 
fundamental  tenet  of  American  policy 
toward  the  Soviet  Union.  Throughout 
the  years,  we  also  have  strongly  protes- 
ted human  rights  violations  in  these 
Baltic  states  and  other  repressive  So- 
viet measures  directed  at  stifling  the 
democratic  and  nationalist  aspirations 
of  the  Baltic  people.  These  policies  have 
been  a  constant  facet  of  the  overall 
U.S.  strategy  for  dealing  with  the  So- 
viet Union  and  will  be  maintained  until 
the  free,  proud,  Baltic  people  achieve 
democracy  and  genuine  national  self- 
determination.  As  you  well  know,  how- 
ever, in  the  last  few  years  a  number  of 
positive  changes  have  taken  place  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  Such  changes  are 
part  of  the  broad  societal  and  economic 
reforms  being  carried  out  by  Soviet 
General  Secretary  Mikhail  Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev's  reforms,  dubbed  glasnost 
and  perestroika,  have  been  felt 
throughout  the  Soviet  Union  and  espe- 
cially in  the  three  Baltic  states.  These 
developments  have  spawned  a  number 
of  challenges  as  well  as  opportunities 
for  U.S.  policy — a  subject  I  want  to  ad- 
dress tonight.  However,  to  appreciate 
fully  the  events  of  today,  one  must  be- 
gin by  looking  back  at  the  evolution  of 
Soviet  policy  toward  Estonia,  Latvia, 
and  Lithuania  and  the  U.S.  response. 
So  let  me  begin  at  the  beginning. 

Baltic  History 

At  the  outset,  it  is  important  to  ac- 
knowledge that  the  Baltic  countries 
have  a  long  and  proud  tradition,  dis- 
tinctive history,  culture,  arts,  and  vi- 
brant nationalist  spirit.  In  fact,  they 
evolved  historically  as  part  of  the  West- 
ern cultural,  spiritual,  and  economic 
sphere — quite  separate  and  distinct 
from  Russian  tradition  and  culture. 
However,  occupying  a  key  piece  of  stra- 
tegic territory  along  the  Baltic  littoral, 
the  history  of  the  Baltic  people  has  not 
been  an  easy  one.  It  is  largely  the  his- 
tory of  relentless  efforts  to  maintain 
national  sovereignty  in  the  face  of  for- 
eign invasions.  Over  the  centuries, 


numerous  foreign  predators  craved  Bal- 
tic territory,  its  mineral  riches,  and 
the  fruits  of  labor  of  its  hardworking 
people.  In  fact,  I  am  struck  by  this 
theme  in  my  reading  of  Baltic  forklore, 
where  most  of  the  national  heroes  are 
leaders  of  resistance  to  foreign  in- 
vaders. And,  of  these,  the  Baltic  people 
have  seen  more  than  their  share. 

Latvians,  for  e.xample,  had  to  fight 
against  the  Livonian  Order,  as  well  as 
against  the  Poles,  Swedes,  and,  finally, 
the  Russians.  Yet,  while  the  candle 
of  Latvian  freedom  has  been  extin- 
guished many  times  by  brutal  foreign 
oppression,  it  has  rekindled  itself  time 
and  again.  And,  at  all  times,  it  has  con- 
tinued to  burn  brightly  in  the  hearts  of 
Latvian  people  everywhere.  One  of  the 
most  important  factors  in  Latvian  his- 
tory is  Latvia's  tenacious  memory  of  its 
ancient  quest  for  freedom  and  just  gov- 
ernance, symbolized  by  the  sunken 
"Castle  of  Light."  One  of  the  most  rev- 
ered national  heroes  is  "Lacplesis,"  the 
Bear  Slayer,  who  succeeded  in  raising 
for  a  while  the  Castle  of  Light,  only  to 
lose  it  again  to  the  Black  Knight  be- 
cause of  the  treachery  of  one  of  his 
lieutenants.  To  me,  it  is  a  poignant  re- 
minder of  another  tragic  moment  in 
Latvian  history,  when  the  patriots 
struggled  against  impossible  odds  to 
protect  their  national  freedom  and 
dignity. 

When  I  look  at  Lithuanian  history, 
I  am  struck  by  yet  another  larger-than- 
life  figure.  Grand  Duke  Gediminas, 
founder  of  the  Lithuanian  state  in  the 
14th  century,  who  valiantly  fought 
against  the  Teutonic  knights  and  the 
Tatars.  The  history  of  Estonia  is  also 
rich  in  heroic  deeds  and  remarkable 
feats  of  battling  foreign  invaders.  One 
such  episode — still  remembered  by  the 
Estonian  people — was  the  struggle 
with  the  Danish  King  Waldemar  II, 
who,  after  a  protracted  and  brutal 
campaign,  seized  the  Estonian  strong- 
hold of  Kalevanlinna,  located  on  the  site 
of  modern  Tallinn.  The  Estonian  na- 
tional hero,  Kalev,  also  had  more  than  a 
fair  share  of  battling  the  evil  forces. 
Yet  martial  valor  and  a  willingness  to 
die  in  the  defense  of  one's  country  are 
not  the  only  attributes  of  the  Baltic 
people.  We  also  see  remarkable  indus- 
triousness  and  a  rich  artistic  and  liter- 
ary tradition. 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989 


35 


EUROPE 


In  modern  times,  the  three  Baltic 
nations  were  able  to  enjoy  only  a  brief 
taste  of  national  independence  from 
1918  to  1940.  During  this  time,  they 
developed  genuine  democracy  and 
achieved  high  rates  of  economic 
growth.  Their  freedom  and  prosperity 
were,  however,  brutally  extinguished 
by  Moscow,  as  a  result  of  the  infamous 
Molotov-Ribbentrop  pact.  Soviet  con- 
duct violated  all  norms  of  international 
law  and  constituted  naked  aggression 
against  defenseless  and  peaceful 
neighbors. 

In  1940,  a  dark  cloud  descended 
upon  the  Baltic  nations.  Literally  thou- 
sands of  Estonians,  Latvians,  and 
Lithuanians  were  jailed,  deported,  or 
murdered  at  the  hands  of  the  Soviet  se- 
cret police.  The  Soviets  made  a  special 
effort  to  annihilate  the  Baltic  intel- 
ligentsia: scientists,  artists,  and  all 
men  and  women  who  manifested  any 
pride  in  their  heritage  or  a  sense  of  na- 
tionalism. The  years  of  World  War  II 
and  the  German  occupation  brought  ad- 
ditional suffering  to  the  Baltic  nations. 
After  the  war,  proud  patriots  from  Es- 
tonia, Latvia,  and  Lithuania  fought 
against  the  reoccupation  of  their  home- 
lands by  the  Red  Army.  They  held  out 
until  well  into  the  1950s.  In  the  end, 
massive  Soviet  military  might  crushed 
the  nationalist  movements.  Another 
wave  of  ruthless  arrests,  deportations, 
and  murders  of  the  Baltic  people  fol- 
lowed. Concomitantly,  Moscow  sought 
to  break  their  spirit  and  destroy  their 
ethnic  heritage  and  culture  by  forcing 
the  use  of  the  Russian  language  in  the 
workplace,  courts,  government  offices, 
and  institutions  of  learning. 

Efforts  to  force  russification  on  the 
Baltic  states  continued  unabated.  Even 
ethnic  Baltic  communists  were  en- 
trusted with  only  largely  ceremonial 
posts  in  the  party  and  government  ma- 
chinery. All  key  functions  were  either 
controlled  directly  from  Moscow  or  dis- 
charged by  local  Russian  officials.  Mo- 
scow also  directed  the  emigration  of  a 
large  influx  of  Russian  and  other  Slavs 
into  the  three  Baltic  nations.  As  a  re- 
sult, by  1988  the  percentage  of  ethnic 
Latvians  in  Latvia  dropped  to  less  than 
50%,  about  60%  of  the  Estonian  popula- 
tion were  ethnic  Estonians,  and  only 
Lithuanians  were  doing  somewhat 
better — 80%^^  of  their  population  re- 
mained ethnic  Lithuanians.  But  the 
Baltic  people  stubbornly  clung  to  their 
heritage,  educating  the  young  about 
their  history  and  culture.  Remarkably, 


NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 
Meets  in  Brussels 


B 
11 

rr 


The  Nuclear  Planning  Group  of 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO)  met  in  Brussels  April  19-20, 
1989.  The  United  States  was  repre- 
sented by  Secretary  of  Defense 
Richard  B.  Cheney. 

Following  is  the  final  communique 
issued  on  April  20,  1989. 

1.  The  NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 
(NPG)  met  in  ministerial  session  at  NATO 
headquarters  in  Brussels  on  19  and  20  April, 
1989.  Iceland  attended  as  an  observer. 

2.  We  reaffirmed  the  continuing  va- 
lidity of  NATO's  strategy  and  noted  with 
satisfaction  that  in  the  40  years  since  NATO 
was  formed,  peace  in  freedom  has  been  pre- 
served for  all  members  of  the  Alliance.  It 
has  long  been  one  of  NATO's  fundamental 
objectives  to  secure  an  environment  for 
peaceful  and  more  stable  relationships  be- 
tween East  and  West  on  the  basis  of  bal- 
anced forces  at  the  lowest  possible  level 
consistent  with  our  security  requirements. 
We  noted  that  the  approach  set  out  in  the 
Harmel  Report  of  1967  remains  the  founda- 
tion of  our  security  policy.  Thus  the  mainte- 
nance of  adequate  military  strength  and 
political  solidarity  is  the  basis  for  construc- 
tive dialogue  and  cooperation  with  the  East, 
including  arms  control. 

3.  For  the  foreseeable  future,  our  strat- 
egy of  deterrence  will  continue  to  require 
both  conventional  and  nuclear  forces.  At  this 
meeting,  we  again  expressed  our  deter- 
mination to  ensure  that  NATO  possesses 
diversified,  survivable  and  operationally 
fle.xible  nuclear  forces  across  the  entire 
spectrum.  These  forces  must  be  kept  up-to- 
date  where  necessary.  We  noted  that  nuclear 
forces  in  Europe  will  continue  to  play  an 
essential  role  in  Alliance  strategy.  We  re- 
emphasized  our  commitment  to  maintaining 
no  more  than  the  minimum  number  of  nu- 
clear weapons  necessary  for  our  security, 
taking  into  account  the  scale  and  quality  of 
the  threat. 

4.  We  reviewed  information  on  the  con- 
tinuing Warsaw  Pact  efforts  to  modernize 
and  restructure  their  nuclear  forces.  We 
welcomed  the  recent  announcements  of  in- 
tended unilateral  force  reductions  by  the  So- 
viet Union  and  some  of  its  allies.  However, 
their  implementation  would  have  little  effect 


on  Warsaw  Pact  nuclear  forces  or  on  the 
massive  and  unacceptable  Warsaw  Pact  su- 
periority in  European-based  short-range 
nuclear  systems.  The  size  of  these  forces  is 
inconsistent  with  their  recently  announced 
doctrine  of  "reasonable  sufficiency."  In  con- 
trast, over  the  past  decade,  NATO  has  uni- 
laterally reduced  its  own  nuclear  weapons 
inventory  in  Europe  by  over  one-third  to  it 
lowest  level  in  over  20  years. 

5.  In  line  with  our  step-by-step  ap- 
proach, under  which  decisions  will  be  taken 
when  necessary,  we  reviewed  the  program 
of  work  which  will  ensure  that  NATO's  nu- 
clear forces  across  the  spectrum  of  capa- 
bilities continue  to  provide  an  effective 
contribution  to  the  Alliance's  deterrent 
strategy.  We  also  expressed  continued  sup- 
port for  the  efforts  of  member  countries  to 
meet  requirements  stemming  from  Mon- 
tebello  to  maintain  a  credible  nuclear  deter 
rent  posture.  We  also  received  a  number  of 
reports  from  NATO's  military  authorities 
and  NPG  working  groups  on  matters  relate 
to  the  continued  effectiveness  of  NATO's  ni 
clear  forces. 

6.  In  this  context,  we  welcomed  the  sut 
mission  of  SACEUR's  ISupreme  Allied  Con- 
mander  Europe]  recent  Nuclear  Weapons 
Requirements  Study.  SACEUR's  study  con- 
cludes that,  as  a  consequence  of  measures  t 
update  and  restructure  NATO's  nuclear 
forces  which  would  maintain  the  credibility 
of  deterrence,  further  significant  reductioi 
could  be  made  in  NATO's  total  requirement 
for  nuclear  weapons  in  Europe.  It  further 
concludes  that  such  measures  would  allow  ; 
shift  in  emphasis  towards  relatively  longer 
ranges  across  the  entire  spectrum  includin 
both  ground-launched  and  air-delivered  ca- 
pabilities, in  view  of  their  greater  f  lexibilit 
and  the  contribution  this  makes  to  deter- 
rence. We  agreed  that  the  study,  which  is 
currently  under  consideration  by  Govern- 
ments, together  with  further  advice  from 
the  High-Level  Group  and  NATO  military 
authorities,  will  be  important  contribution.' 
to  future  decisions  relating  to  individual  nu 
clear  systems.  These  decisions  will  be  takei 
in  a  wider  political  context,  including  the 
Alliance's  comprehensive  concept  of  arms 
control  and  disarmament. 

7.  We  accepted  with  pleasure  the  invita 
tion  of  the  Portuguese  Government  to  hold 
our  next  NPG  ministerial  meeting  in  Portu 
gal  in  autumn  1989.  ■ 


H 


111 


1 


they  also  retained  their  industrious 
spirit  producing  the  highest  living 
standards  of  any  region  under  Soviet 
control. 

Until  most  recently,  the  Soviet  hu- 
man rights  record  in  the  Baltics  was 


abysmal.  Particularly  treated  harshly 
were  nationalists  and  religious  be- 
lievers. For  example,  brave  individuals 
who  signed  the  1979  "Baltic  Appeal" 
calling  for  a  repudiation  of  the  Molotov- 


Donartmpnt  nf  f^tntp  Riillptin/.liine  1<)8< 


tlibbentrop  pact  and  restoration  of  na- 
;ional  sovereignty  for  the  Baltic  states 
,vere  imprisoned.  Numerous  bishops, 
uiiis,  priests,  and  other  clergy  were 
irrested  or  banned  from  performing 
:heir  pastroal  duties.  Religious  proper- 
ly was  confiscated,  and  many  churches 
111(1  other  houses  of  worship  were 
.losed  or  converted  to  nonreligious 


*  U.S.  Views  on  Baltic  Independence 

The  U.S.  Government's  policy  toward 
he  Baltic  states  has  always  been  con- 
istent  and  clear.  We  never  recognized 
,he  forcible  and  unlawful  Soviet  annex- 
ition  of  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania. 
!\.s  part  of  this  policy,  we  have  contin- 
led  to  extend  full  diplomatic  privileges 
ind  immunities  to  the  lawful  diplomatic 
•epresentatives  in  the  United  States  of 
;he  last  independent  governments  of 
Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  in  the 
United  States.  These  are  not  just 
ourtesies  but  important  statements 
A'ith  significant  international  legal 
amifications. 

We  have  also  regularly  stated  our 
k'iews  on  this  subject  in  various  inter- 
lational  fora.  Thus,  for  example,  we 
Tiade  the  following  statement  during 
;he  1980  Madrid  review  meeting  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act: 

The  United  States  does  not  recognize 
;he  illegal  incorporation,  by  force  of  arms,  of 
;he  states  of  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Estonia 
ay  the  Soviet  Union.  I  [the  deputy  chief  of 
;he  U.S.  delegation]  would  also  recall  the 
statement  in  Principle  IV  [territorial  integ- 
rity of  states]  that  no  occupation  or  ac- 
quisition of  territory  in  contravention  of 
international  law  will  be  recognized  as  legal. 
And  I  would  reiterate  my  government's  con- 
sistent interpretation  that  this  provision  is 
applicable  to  the  Baltic  states. 

We  also  have  used  the  United  Na- 
tions to  articulate  our  views  regarding 
the  independence  of  the  Baltic  states. 
In  July  1983,  to  commemorate  the  61st 
anniversary  of  the  de  jure  recognition 
of  the  three  Baltic  states  by  the  United 
States,  President  Ronald  Reagan  had 
sent  a  letter  to  the  UN  Secretary 
General  stating  as  follows: 

Americans  share  the  just  aspirations  of 
the  Baltic  nations  for  national  independence. 
We  cannot  remain  silent  in  the  face  of  the 
continued  refusal  of  the  Government  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  allow  these  people  to  be  free. 
We  uphold  their  right  to  determine  their 
own  national  destiny;  a  right  contained  in 
the  Helsinki  declaration  which  affirms  that 
all  people  always  have  the  right,  in  full  free- 
dom, to  determine,  when  and  as  they  wish, 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989 


their  internal  and  e.xternal  political  status, 
without  external  interference,  and  to  pur- 
sue as  they  wish  their  political,  economic, 
social,  and  cultural  development.  For  this 
reason,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  never  recognized  the  forced  in- 
corporation of  the  Baltic  states  into  the  So- 
viet Union  and  will  not  do  so  in  the  future. 

Our  nonrecognition  policy  has  been 
expressed  in  other  substantive  and 
symbolic  ways.  Each  year,  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  sends  formal  greetings  to 
the  three  Baltic  missions  in  the  United 
States  on  their  respective  national 
days.  Secretary  Baker  has  continued 
this  practice  and  conveyed  greetings 
to  Mr.  Jaakson,  Consul  General  of  Es- 
tonia, and  Mr.  Lozoraitis,  Charge  d'Af- 
faires  of  Lithuania,  in  February  for 
their  1989  celebrations.  As  specified  in 
congressional  legislation,  June  14  is 
designated  as  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  and 
numerous  official  ceremonies  and 
events  take  place  every  year  on  that 
date.  In  1983,  we  established  a  sepa- 
rate Baltic  Service  Division  within  Ra- 
dio Free  Europe.  The  State 
Department  has  a  special  Baltic  Affairs 
Desk  in  the  European  Bureau. 

We  also  have  instituted  the  prac- 
tice of  producing  separate  reports  on 
the  three  Baltic  countries  as  a  part  of 
our  annual  country  human  rights  re- 
ports. In  general,  our  policy  has  been 
based  on  the  resolute  rejection  of  what 
former  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
Elliott  Abrams  aptly  termed  the  "real- 
ist myth" — that  the  Soviet  incorpora- 
tion of  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania 


EUROPE 


is  a  fact  of  life,  and  the  world  had  bet- 
ter reconcile  itself  to  this  reality.  We 
regret  such  cynicism.  Given  our  own 
democratic  institutions  and  American 
struggle  for  independence,  it  cannot 
be  any  other  way.  We  must  base  our 
policy  on  the  principle  of  national  self- 
determination  enshrined  in  the  Ameri- 
can Declaration  of  Independence  and 
the  UN  Charter.  We  fully  support  the 
efforts  of  the  Baltic  peoples  to  exercise 
their  inalienable  right  of  national  self- 
determination. 

Changes  in  the  Baltic  Republics 

While  our  policy  has  remained  stead- 
fast, we  are  pleased  to  note  and  ac- 
knowledge positive  changes  which  have 
recently  taken  place  in  the  Baltic  na- 
tions. These  changes  are  attributable 
to  the  Soviet  realization  that  their  po- 
litical and  economic  system  is  not  work- 
ing and  that  their  practice  of  stifling 
the  nationalist  aspirations  of  other  peo- 
ple is  morally  bankrupt  and  politically 
counterproductive.  And  we  take  some 
credit  for  helping  convince  the  Soviet 
leaders  of  these  realities — our  resolute 
policy  and  the  buildup  of  American 
strength  certainly  have  played  a  role  in 
improving  Moscow's  learning  curve. 
But  the  lion's  share  of  the  credit  goes, 
of  course,  to  the  brave  Baltic  people, 
who  have  been  fighting  for  their 
dreams  all  of  these  long  years. 

In  many  respects,  changes  in  the 
Baltic  republics  have  been  truly  dra- 


Polish  Roundtable  Accords 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
APR.  5,  1989" 

Seven  years  ago,  Americans  lit  candles 
in  support  of  Poland's  freedom  in  the 
hope  that  darkness  of  repression  would 
someday  be  lifted.  Today  Solidarity 
signed  accords  which  will  lead  to  its  re- 
legalization  and  which  will  allow  it  to 
resume  its  rightful  place  in  Polish  life. 

This  is  a  great  day  for  the  Polish 
people  and  for  freedom.  The  discus- 
sions have  been  long  and  arduous.  We 
welcome  the  roundtable  accords  and  see 
them  as  a  historic  step  toward  plural- 
ism and  freedom  which  we  hope  will 
eventually  take  Poland  far  from  total- 
itarianism and  toward  a  better  political 
and  economic  future. 


We  are  following  the  developments 
in  Poland  closely  and  are  consulting 
with  Congress  and  our  friends  and  al- 
lies on  this  issue.  In  September  1987, 
then  Vice  President  Bush  visited  with 
Lech  Walesa  and  Gen.  Jaruzelski  con- 
cerning the  Polish  political  situation. 
The  Vice  President  at  that  time  urged 
dialogue  and  reconciliation  to  bring 
about  economic  growth  and  political 
freedom. 

The  President  today  is  very 
pleased  by  the  accords  that  started  on 
this  new  path  of  reconciliation. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  10,  1989.  ■ 


37 


EUROPE 


matic.  In  Estonia,  the  hardline  chief  of 
the  Estonian  Communist  Party  (ECP), 
Karl  Vaino,  was  replaced  in  1988  with  a 
more  reasonable  Vaino  Valjas.  But  by 
far  the  most  important  and  encourag- 
ing development  has  been  the  creation 
of  the  Estonian  Popular  Front.  This 
grassroots  political  organization  has 
thousands  of  members,  and  its  rallies 
have  attracted  thousands  of  Estonians. 
The  front  has  a  strong  political  pro- 
gram aimed  at  regaining  the  right  of 
Estonians  to  control  their  own  political, 
economic,  and  cultural  affairs.  Many  of 
the  front's  proposals  have  been  adopted 
by  the  Estonian  Supreme  Soviet  and 
the  ECP.  Among  other  things,  the  Su- 
preme Soviet  passed  a  law,  declaring 
Estonian  to  be  the  official  language  of 
the  republic.  In  November  1988,  the 
Supreme  Soviet  adopted  a  resolution 
allowing  it  to  reject  any  all-union  legis- 
lation, including  constitutional  amend- 
ments. The  Supreme  Soviet  also 
declared  that  all  Estonian  national  re- 
sources belong  to  Estonia,  legalized 
private  ownership,  stated  that  any  vio- 
lations of  constitutional  rights  could  be 
brought  before  a  court  of  law,  and  de- 
clared the  UN  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights  to  be  applicable  in  Es- 
tonia. We  regret,  however,  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  Supreme  Soviet  declared  Es- 
tonia's legislation  on  the  right  to  veto 
all-union  legislation  to  be  null  and  void 
and  has  enlisted  ECP's  support.  Mo- 
scow has  also  launched  a  wave  of  denun- 
ciations in  the  Soviet  central  press  of 
actions  of  the  Estonian  Supreme  Soviet 
and  of  the  Estonian  Popular  Front. 

In  Latvia,  we  also  have  witnessed 
numerous  positive  changes.  Novem- 
ber 11  was  designated  Lacplesis'  Day  to 
honor  Latvia's  heroes.  This  holiday,  and 
the  ceremonial  raising  of  the  maroon- 
white-maroon  traditional  Latvian  flag, 
were  observed  for  the  first  time  since 
the  end  of  World  War  II.  The  authori- 
ties also  permitted  the  establishment 
of  the  People's  Front  of  Latvia  and  al- 
lowed it  to  host  an  event  at  the  National 
Theater,  where  Latvia's  independence 
was  proclaimed  some  70  years  ago.  The 
Latvian  People's  Front  now  has  more 
than  200,000  members.  It  sponsors  nu- 
merous demonstrations  celebrating 
previously  forbidden  national  events 
and  anniversaries.  The  Latvian  press 
has  published  articles  on  such  here- 
tofore forbidden  subjects  as  the  Soviet 
takeover  of  Latvia  and  mass  deporta- 
tions of  Latvians  to  Siberia.  However, 
just  as  in  the  case  of  Estonia,  the  Sovi- 
et central  press  has  continued  to  attack 


the  actions  of  the  People's  Front  of 
Latvia. 

Some  positive  developments  also 
have  taken  place  in  the  area  of  religious 
freedom.  The  Soviet  authorities  re- 
stored the  right  to  preach  of  Latvian 
Bishop  Kazimir  Dulbinskis  of  Riga, 
who  has  been  prevented  from  carrying 
out  his  ministry  for  40  years.  A  reli- 
gious publication,  banned  since  1940, 
Catholic  Life,  was  also  allowed  to  re- 
sume publication. 

In  Lithuania,  the  primary  source 
of  reforms  has  been  the  Lithunian  Re- 
structuring Movement  (sajudis).  Sa- 
judis  has  called  for  greater  economic, 
political,  and  cultural  autonomy  from 
Moscow  and  has  sponsored  numerous 
demonstrations  and  rallies.  On  Febru- 
ary 1.5-16,  it  organized  a  celebration  of 
Lithuania  Independence  Day — the  first 
such  commemoration  since  1940.  Bow- 
ing to  popular  pressure,  the  Lithua- 
nian Supreme  Soviet  declared  this  to 
be  an  official  holiday.  The  Supreme  So- 
viet has  also  declared  Lithuanian  to  be 
the  official  language  of  the  republic. 
Sajudis  has  played  an  active  role  in 
Lithuanian  political  life  by  campaign- 
ing to  elect  its  candidates  to  a  new  So- 
viet national  congress.  It  hopes  to 
capture  at  least  30  of  Lithuania's  42 
seats  in  the  congress.  As  a  conciliatory 
gesture,  however,  sajudis  withdrew 
two  candidates  who  intended  to  chal- 
lenge Lithuania's  highest  ranking 
Communist  Party  officials:  Algirdas 
Brazauskas  and  Vladimir  Berezov. 

In  July  1988,  the  Lithuanian  Free- 
dom League,  a  group  that  has  been 
operating  underground  since  1978, 
declared  that  it  would  now  function 
openly.  Its  stated  goal  is  the  re- 
establishment  of  full  national  independ- 
ence for  Lithuania.  The  group  has 
staged  numerous  rallies  and  sponsored 
a  hunger  strike  in  Gediminas  Square  in 
Vilnius,  calling  for  the  release  of  all 
Lithuanian  political  prisoners.  Mean- 
while, the  Lithuanian  Restructuring 
Movement  also  campaigned  for  legisla- 
tion, similar  to  that  adopted  by  the  Es- 
tonian Supreme  Soviet,  regarding  the 
right  to  veto  U.S.S.R.  Supreme  Soviet 
legislation. 

Considerable  progress  was  made  in 
the  area  of  religion.  In  May  1988,  Pope 
John  Paul  announced  that  the  Bishop  of 
Kaisiadorys,  Vincentas  Sladkevicius, 
would  be  elevated  to  the  College  of  Car- 
dinals. Soviet  authorities  lifted  their 
ban  on  Sladkevicius  who  had  not  been 


allowed  to  perform  his  pastoral  duties 
for  over  25  years.  The  authorities  also 
agreed  to  return  St.  Casimir's  Churcl 
in  Vilnius  and  the  Queen  of  Peace 
Church  in  Klaipeda.  It  was  also  an- 
nounced on  March  4,  1989,  that  the  rel| 
ics  of  St.  Casimir,  the  patron  saint  of 
Lithuania,  are  to  be  returned  to  the 
Vilnius  Cathedral.  Also  approved  has 
been  the  publication  of  a  Catholic  bi- 
weekly magazine — Kathiliku  Pasaulis 
(Catholic  World)— the  first  official  relll 
gious  publication  in  Lithuania  since 
1940. 

Soviet  Policy 

Despite  these  positive  changes,  some 
Soviet  authorities  have  remained  hos- 
tile to  the  popular  fronts  and  even  to- 
ward the  official  legislatures  of  the 
three  Baltic  states.  The  Soviet  central, 
press  has  published  numerous  critical 
articles  on  Baltic  activism.  There  alsO' 
appears  to  be  official  backing  for  the 
anti-Baltic  and  proethnic  Russian 
groups  now  appearing  in  the  Baltic 
states.  These  pro-Soviet  organizations- 
are  known  as  Inter-Movement  in  Es- 
tonia and  Inter-Front  in  Latvia. 

Moscow  also  has  established  a  spe 
cial  Politburo  commission,  chaired  by 
the  ideology  chief  Vadim  A.  Medvedev 
This  commission  includes  the  former 
KGB  chief  Viktor  M.  Chebrikov.  Its  ac 
tivities  have  included  calling  to  Moscc 
senior  Baltic  communists  and  pressinj 
them  to  take  a  harder  line  toward  the 
national  fronts.  Most  importantly, 
while  arbitrary  arrests,  detentions, 
and  other  human  rights  violations  in 
the  Baltic  republics  have  eased  consid- 
erably during  the  last  several  years,  n 
promised  changes  in  the  Soviet  penal 
code,  which  would  abolish  laws  used  t( 
repress  legitimate  political  activities, 
have  been  implemented  so  far. 

Where  Does  U.S.  Policy 
Go  From  Here? 

Having  said  a  lot  about  where  we  have 
been  and  where  we  presently  are,  the 
real  question  you  all  probably  have 
been  asking  yourselves  is  where  does 
U.S.  policy  go  from  here?  Let  me  as- 
sure you  of  one  thing,  the  U.S.  non- 
recognition  policy  will  continue.  As  I 
mentioned  before,  this  policy  is  based 
on  the  fundamental  principles  of  inter- 
national law  which  indicate  that  any 
acquisition  of  territory  based  on  ag- 
gression is  unlawful  and  that  all  peo- 


nonartmont  <->f  ^tato  Rllllotin/.llinp  1Qfl 


EUROPE 


pies  have  an  inalienable  right  to  self- 
determination.  It  should  be  up  to  the 
Baltic  people  to  choose  their  national 
destiny,  and  I  want  you  to  know  that 
the  Bush  Administration  remains 
I'ciinmitted  to  this  principle. 

We  also  intend  to  continue  our 
|)ifsent  policy  of  closely  monitoring  hu- 
man rights  developments  in  the  Baltics 
anil  pressing  the  Soviets  for  further 
[Kisitive  changes.  In  particular,  we  ex- 
|uct  and  would  insist  upon  the  institu- 
lionalization  of  human  rights  reforms, 
rhey  must  become  irreversible  and 
independent  of  political  winds  blowing 
from  Moscow.  We  also  believe  that  we 
should  establish  and  maintain  regular 
contacts  with  a  range  of  emerging  po- 
litical, social,  and  ecological  informal 
groups  in  the  Baltic  states,  including 
all  of  the  popular  fronts.  In  this  proc- 
ess, we  hope  that  people  like  you  will 
.■(iiitinue  to  play  an  active  role.  A  first 
mil  very  important  step  is  information 
-baring.  We  need  to  engage  these  groups 
111  dialogue  and  share  with  them  our 
idras,  our  knowledge  of  issues  concern- 
intr  them,  and  the  tenets  of  our  demo- 
I'ratic  processes. 

In  the  weeks  and  months  ahead,  we 
^■']\\  deal  with  the  challenges  and  oppor- 
:unities  presented  by  change  in  the 
Baltic  states.  Such  issues  as  that  of 
:rade  shows,  passports,  and  represen- 
:ation  in  international  organizations 
^':\l\  be  considered.  In  this  regard,  the 
Administration  is  cognizant  of  and  sen- 
sitive to  the  Baltic-American  commu- 
nity's views  and  concerns.  As  events 
unfold  in  the  Baltic  states,  we  must 
keep  in  close  touch  so  as  to  deal  most 
effectively  with  change.  We  look  for- 
ward to  receiving  your  views  and  work- 
ing together  closely  toward  realizing 
t(  our  common  objectives:  democracy, 
economic  prosperity,  and  genuine 
national  self-determination  for  the 
Baltic  people.  ■ 


President  Meets  With  Irish  Prime  Minister 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  17,  1989' 

There  are  many  e.xcellent  reasons  for 
celebrating  St.  Patrick's  Day.  Tradi- 
tionally this  happy  occasion  provides  a 
special  opportunity  to  spotlight  the 
Irish  heritage  in  America  and  to  af- 
firm the  ties  of  kinship  and  values 
which  the  American  and  Irish  people 
share.  On  this  St.  Patrick's  Day,  1989, 
we  again  pay  tribute  to  the  warm  rela- 
tionship between  Ireland  and  America. 
We  are  honored  to  welcome  to  the 
White  House  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Ireland,  the  Taoiseach,  Mr.  Charles 
Haughey,  whose  presence  adds  a  special 
significance  to  our  celebration. 

St.  Patrick's  Day  also  provides  a 
special  opportunity  to  pay  tribute  to 
U.S. -Irish  cooperation  in  the  interna- 
tional arena  in  the  cause  of  justice, 
peace,  and  progress  and  to  declare  that 
working  together  to  solve  international 
problems  encourages  the  development 
and  maturation  of  our  traditional  bilat- 
eral relationship. 

In  the  presence  of  the  Taoiseach,  I 
would  also  like  to  thank  Ireland  for  its 
contribution  to  peacekeeping  efforts 
around  the  world  and  to  extend  the  ap- 
preciation and  condolences  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  to  the  families  of  the  Irish 
soldiers  who  have  given  their  lives  to 
the  cause  of  peace. 


Today  I  express  America's  appre- 
ciation for  Ireland's  efforts  to  promote 
economic  development,  justice,  secu- 
rity, and  reconciliation  in  Northern 
Ireland.  The  United  States  supports 
the  efforts  of  the  Irish  and  British  Gov- 
ernments to  use  the  Anglo-Irish  accord 
and  the  International  Fund  for  Ireland 
to  address  the  problems  which  have  too 
long  plagued  Northern  Ireland.  We  will 
continue  to  support  efforts  to  promote 
fair  employment  and  investment  in 
Northern  Ireland. 

I  call  on  the  American  people  to 
support  all  those  who  seek  justice  and 
peaceful  settlements  to  disputes  in 
Northern  Ireland.  In  the  same  spirit,  I 
call  on  all  Americans  to  reject  those 
who  seek  to  impose  settlements  any- 
where through  terror. 

The  comprehensive  political,  diplo- 
matic, and  economic  ties  between  our 
two  countries  require  recognition  that 
U.S. -Irish  relations  are  the  respon- 
sibility of  all  Americans.  Therefore, 
millions  of  Americans  of  many  heri- 
tages and  from  all  walks  of  life  join  in 
observing  this  fine  day  and  in  paying 
tribute  to  the  friendship  and  coopera- 
tion between  Ireland  and  America. 
Americans  do  not  have  to  be  Irish  to 
treasure  Ireland's  contributions  or  to 
celebrate  St.  Patrick's  Day. 


iText  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  20,  1989.  ■ 


.J  rtnnortmont  n(  Ctato   Rl  lllotjn/.llinP   1989 


39 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Visit  of  Egyptian  President 


President  Mohauinied  Hosni 
Mubarak  of  the  Republic  of  Egypt  vis- 
ited Washington,  D.C.,  April  1-5, 
1989,  to  meet  with  President  Bush  and 
other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
the  two  Presidents  after  their  meeting 
on  April  rf.' 

President  Bush 

It  was  a  special  pleasure  for  me  to  wel- 
come our  good  friend.  President  Hosni 
Mubarak,  to  the  White  House  this 
morning.  Our  personal  relationship 
goes  back  several  years,  from  the  days 
we  were  both  Vice  Presidents,  then 
through  my  visit  to  Cairo  in  1986,  and 
then  our  most  recent  meeting  in  Tokyo 
in  February.  I  am  glad  for  this  early 
opportunity  to  discuss  with  President 
Mubarak  the  vital  interest  of  my  Ad- 
ministration in  moving  the  peace  proc- 
ess forward. 

Egypt's  pivotal  role  in  the  Middle 
East  and  our  strong  bilateral  partner- 
ship remain  key  to  achieving  that  goal. 


President  Mubarak's  visit  is  partic- 
ularly timely.  For  over  1-5  years,  Egypt 
has  been  our  partner  in  the  peace  proc- 
ess, and  10  years  ago,  Egypt  and  Israel 
signed  their  historic  treaty  of  peace. 
Egypt's  continued  commitment  to  ex- 
panding that  peace  is  a  source  of  great 
encouragement  for  all  of  us  who  seek  a 
comprehensive  resolution  to  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict.  The  reemergence  of 
Egypt  as  a  respected  leader  of  the 
Arab  world  attests  to  President 
Mubarak's  statesmanship  and  ability, 
as  well  as  to  Egypt's  wisdom  in  pursu- 
ing the  path  of  peace.  In  our  discus- 
sions, we  spent  a  considerable  amount 
of  time  talking  about  the  Middle  East 
peace  process.  We  share  a  sense  of  ur- 
gency to  move  toward  a  comprehensive 
settlement  through  direct  negotiations. 
Ten  years  of  peace  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  demonstrate  that  peace 
works,  and  it  can  work  for  Israelis  and 
Palestinians  as  well.  There  is  a  need 
now  for  creativity,  demonstrable  com- 
mitment, and  the  application  of  sound 
principles — creativity  in  order  to  look 


again  at  old  problems  and  then  devise 
imaginative  ways  of  solving  them;  com- 
mitment to  face  the  challenges  and 
risks  of  making  peace  rather  than 
throwing  up  our  hands  and  giving  up; 
and  adherence  to  sound  principles,  like 
the  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions 
242  and  338.  A  new  atmosphere  must  bi 
created  where  Israelis  and  Arabs  feel 
each  other's  willingness  to  compromise 
so  that  both  sides  can  win.  Violence  cai 
give  way  to  dialogue  once  both  sides 
understand  that  the  dialogue  will  offer 
political  gain.  Egypt  and  the  United 
States  share  the  goals  of  security  for 
Israel,  the  end  of  the  occupation,  and 
achievement  of  Palestinian  political 
rights.  These  are  the  promises  held  out 
by  a  sustained  commitment  to  a  negoti- 
ated settlement  toward  which  a  proper 
ly  structured  international  conference 
could  play  a  useful  role  at  an  appropri- 
ate time. 

We  also  had  a  chance  to  review 
-  some  important  elements  of  our  own  bi 
2  lateral  relationship.  They  have  been 
>  sealed  at  the  highest  levels,  these  spe- 
l  cial  ties  that  we  have  with  Egypt.  They 
~i,  are  forged  by  the  global  imperatives  of 
I  peace,  stability,  and  development  in  thi 
4  region.  They  are  strong  and  flexible, 
I  reaffirmed  by  every  Administration, 
I  and  resilient  to  withstand  turbulent 
^  times  for  the  region  and  for  the  world. 
I         President  Mubarak  enjoys  our  full 
support  as  he  implements  courageous 
reform  measures  to  strengthen  Egypt'; 
economy  for  future  generations.  And 
under  the  inspired  stewardship  of  Pres 
ident  Mubarak,  Egypt  has  grown  in 
stature  and  in  strength,  and  we  in  the 
United  States  welcome  this  develop- 
ment. We  are  proud  of  our  partnership 
with  Egypt,  and  I  look  forward  to 
working  closely  with  President  Mu- 
barak in  carrying  out  our  common  vi- 
sion of  peace,  stability,  and 
development  in  the  Middle  East. 

President  Mubarak 

Once  again,  I  meet  with  my  old  friend, 
President  Bush,  in  an  atmosphere  of 
genuine  friendship  and  mutual  under- 
standing. I  have  known  the  President 
for  many  years,  and  I  have  always 
found  him  a  man  of  honor  and  commit- 
ment. His  vast  experience  and  profoune 
understanding  of  international  prob- 
lems have  been  skillfully  employed  for 
the  good  of  his  country  and  the  cause  of 
world  peace. 


itei 

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Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  198S 


MIDDLE  EAST 


I,      Today  we  discussed  a  wide  range  of 
ssues  of  common  concern.  Naturally 
I'e  focused  on  matters  related  to  the  bi- 
pteral  relations  and  the  situation  in  the 
iddle  East.  I  am  happy  to  say  that  we 
oncluded  this  round  of  talks  with  a 
ote  of  optimism  and  hope.  We  are 
uite  satisfied  with  the  state  of  U.S.- 
-gyptian  cooperation.  Our  steadily  in- 
creasing interaction  between  our  two 
'peoples  constitutes  a  cornerstone  of  the 
lolicy  of  our  two  countries.  We  are 
qually  determined  to  cement  this 
riendship  even  further.  As  President 
f5ush  said,  our  commitment  to  the  pro- 
;notion  of  peace  in  the  Middle  East  is  a 
laramount  one  that  takes  priority  over 
j'.ny  other  concern.  To  us  peace  is  not 
nly  a  cherished  ideal  but  also  a  practi- 
al  necessity.  We  believe  that  the  area 
tands  at  a  historic  crossroads  that  is 
ertain  to  affect  the  future  of  many 
enerations.  It  is  our  sacred  duty  to  e.x- 
i[rt  ma.ximum  effort  in  order  to  widen 
'he  scope  of  peace  and  remove  the  re- 
naining  obstacles  to  a  just  and  a  com- 
irehensive  settlement. 

The  past  few  months  have  wit- 
liessed  several  breakthroughs.  The 
,'LO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
;ion]  has  accepted  unequivocally  the 
equirements  for  peace.  An  Arab 
onsensus  has  emerged  in  favor  of 
leace  and  reconciliation.  The  United 
States  initiated  a  dialogue  with  the 
'l.O,  thus  enabling  itself  to  communi- 
ate  directly  with  all  parties  to  the 
(inflict.  A  majority  of  the  Israeli  peo- 
ile  is  shaping  up  in  support  of  peace. 
•Vorldly  powers  are  adopting  construc- 
ive  policies  designed  to  help  the  par- 
ies reach  agreement.  In  short,  the 
ituation  is  right  for  an  active  effort 
niire  than  ever  before.  The  United 
■States  has  contributed  greatly  to  the 
inicess  of  bringing  about  this  remark- 
ilile  change.  It  remains  highly  quali- 
iiMJ  to  play  a  pivotal  role  during  the 
iiiinths  ahead. 

We  found  ourselves  in  agreement 
Dn  most  issues  at  stake.  Together  we 
Delieve  that  for  any  settlement  to  be 
iurable,  it  should  be  a  comprehensive 
Dne  that  addresses  all  aspects  of  the 
dispute,  particularly  the  Palestinian 
problem.  That  settlement  should  be 
achieved  through  direct  negotiations 
between  Israel  and  all  Arab  parties 
within  the  framework  of  the  interna- 
tional peace  conference.  The  basis  of 
the  negotiation  is  Security  Council  Res- 
olutions 242  and  338 — the  principle  of 
land  for  peace,  security  for  all  parties 
concerned,  and  the  realization  of  the  le- 


gitimate national  rights  of  the  Pales- 
tinian people.  We  are  both  opposed  to 
the  anne.xation  of  the  occupied  territo- 
ries as  firmly  as  we  stand  against  any 
irredentist  claims  and  vengeful  acts. 
We  reject  the  policies  that  result  in  the 
continuation  of  violence  and  escalation 
of  tension. 

I  discussed  with  President  Bush 
some  ideas  designed  to  activate  the 
peace  process  and  to  facilitate  starting 
the  negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
e.xpressed  deep  concern  over  recent  de- 
velopments in  Lebanon  and  agreed  to 
double  our  efforts  in  order  to  help  the 
Lebanese  people  put  an  end  to  their 


tragedy  and  resume  their  peaceful 
mission. 

Last,  but  not  least,  we  discussed 
certain  African  problems.  And  I  was 
pleased  to  find  President  Bush  aware  of 
the  urgent  need  for  a  concerted  action 
on  southern  Africa  and  the  debt 
problem. 

Again,  I  enjoyed  the  meeting  with 
our  dear  friend.  President  Bush,  today, 
and  I  am  looking  forward  to  pursuing 
with  him  our  friendly  talks  tomorrow. 


•Made  in  the  Rose  Garden  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents).  ■ 


Continuation  of  Arms  Sales 
to  Saudi  Arabia 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
APR.  13.  1989' 

Although  Saudi  Arabia  has  acquired 
intermediate-range  ballistic  missiles 
from  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
based  on  information  available  to  the 
U.S.  Government,  there  is  no  credible 
intelligence  report  indicating  that 
Saudi  Arabia  possesses  nuclear,  chemi- 
cal, or  biological  weapons.  We  are  not 
aware  of  production  facilities  for  chemi- 
cal munitions,  chemical  warfare  agents, 
or  biological  warfare  agents  in  Saudi 
Arabia.  Saudi  Arabia  possesses  no  sig- 
nificant nuclear  facilities.  In  addition, 
the  Saudis  and  the  Chinese  have  told  us 
that  the  missiles  will  not  be  equipped 
with  nuclear  warheads.  The  Saudis 
have  also  assured  us  that  the  missiles 
will  not  be  equipped  with  chemical  war- 
heads. This  commitment  is  reaffirmed 
bv  Saudi  Arabia's  adherence  to  the  Nu- 


clear Nonproliferation  Treaty,  the  1925 
Geneva  protocol,  and  the  Biological 
Weapons  Convention. 

We  remain  concerned  about  the 
possible  proliferation  of  these  types  of 
weapons  in  the  Middle  East  and  will 
continue  to  watch  developments  closely. 
Any  evidence  that  Saudi  Arabia  has  ac- 
quired chemical,  biological,  or  nuclear 
warheads  after  the  date  of  certification 
will  be  notified  to  the  Congress,  as  re- 
quired by  Section  1307(a)(2)  of  the  Na- 
tional Defense  Authorization  Act,  FY 
1989. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  17,  1989,  which 
also  includes  the  President's  letter  to  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  and 
the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  (Apr  12)  and  the  Presi- 
dent's memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of 
State — Presidential  Determination  No.  89- 
13 — (Apr  12)  certifying  the  arms  sales  to 
Saudi  Arabia.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989 


41 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Yitzhak  Shamir  of 
the  State  of  Israel  visited  Washington, 
D.C.,  April  5-7,  1989,  to  meet  with 
President  Bush  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
after  their  meeting  on  April  6.' 

President  Bush 

Prime  Minister  Shamir  and  I  have  had 
a  very  productive  meeting.  My  mes- 
sage to  him  and,  through  him,  to 
the  Government  and  the  people  of  Is- 
rael was  clear:  We  are  friends,  strate- 
gic partners,  and  allies.  And  the 
mutual  interests  that  bind  together  the 
peoples  of  the  United  States  and  Israel 
are  broad  and  deep.  The  Prime  Minis- 
ter and  I  dedicated  ourselves  to  main- 
taining and,  where  possible,  improving 
the  relationship  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. Both  of  us  are  committed  to  this 
goal. 

Throughout  the  world,  old  enemies 
are  finding  ways  to  talk  to  one  another 


and  to  end  conflicts  in  a  maimer  that 
preserves  the  basic  interests  of  all  con- 
cerned. This  can  and  must  happen  in 
the  Middle  East.  The  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict can  be  resolved.  Peace,  security, 
and  political  rights  can  be  attained 
through  direct  negotiations.  The  status 
quo  serves  the  interests  of  no  one.  In 
this  spirit,  I  reiterated  to  Prime  Minis- 
ter Shamir  the  resolve  of  the  United 
States  to  assist  the  parties  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  in  their  pursuit  of  a  compre- 
hensive settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  Our  responsibility  as  friends 
and  as  partners  in  the  search  for  peace 
is  to  help  develop  approaches  that  en- 
hance peace  prospects.  Problems  do 
not  resolve  themselves;  leaders  acting 
with  courage  and  vision  solve  prob- 
lems. Menahem  Begin  and  Anwar 
Sadat  demonstrated  this  truth  a  decade 
ago  at  Camp  David.  Today's  leaders  can 
afford  to  do  no  less. 

I  reassured  the  Prime  Minister 
that  the  fundamental  basis  of  our  ap- 
proach to  a  Middle  East  settlement  has 
not  changed.  The  United  States  is  com- 


mitted to  a  comprehensive  peace 
achieved  through  direct  negotiations 
based  on  UN  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338.  This  remains  the 
building  block  for  a  viable  negotiation 
for  a  durable  settlement.  This  is  our 
goal.  With  regard  to  final  status  issues 
I  reaffirmed  to  the  Prime  Minister 
that  we  do  not  support  an  independent 
Palestinian  state  nor  Israeli  sover- 
eignty or  permanent  occupation  of  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza. 

To  move  the  peace  process  for- 
ward, I  discussed  with  the  Prime  Min- 
ister, as  I  had  earlier  this  week  with 
President  Mubarak,  an  ambitious  but 
realistic  approach.  Progress  will  re- 
quire meaningful  steps  to  reduce  ten- 
sions, political  dialogue  between  Israel 
and  Palestinians,  and  clear  indications 
that  all  concerned  are  prepared  to 
think  creatively  about  key  substantive 
issues.  Israel  has  an  obligation  to  con- 
tribute to  this  process,  but  it  cannot  be 
expected  to  assume  the  entire  burden. 
The  Palestinians,  the  Arab  states,  and 
other  interested  parties  must  demon- 
strate that  they,  too,  are  willing  to 
make  peace  a  reality. 

I  stressed  that  no  peace  process 
can  succeed  in  a  political  vacuum.  I  be- 
lieve it  is  in  Israel's  interest  to  engage 
in  a  serious  dialogue  with  Palestinians 
that  address  their  legitimate  political 
rights.  The  United  States  believes  thai 
elections  in  the  territories  can  be  de- 
signed to  contribute  to  a  political  proc- 
ess of  dialogue  and  negotiation.  We 
urge  Israel  and  the  Palestinians  to  ar- 
rive at  a  mutually  acceptable  formula 
for  elections,  and  we  plan  in  the  days 
and  weeks  ahead  to  work  toward  that 
end. 

In  negotiations,  Israel  understand: 
that  Palestinians  will  be  free  to  bring 
their  own  positions  and  preferences  to 
the  bargaining  table.  The  Prime  Minis 
ter  assured  me  that  Israel  is  commit- 
ted to  negotiating  an  agreement  on 
final  status  that  is  satisfactory  to  all 
sides.  And  he  made  it  clear  that  in- 
terim arrangements  on  Palestinian 
self-rule  are  not  the  end  of  the  road  but 
are  directly  linked  to  a  broader  politi- 
cal process  that  includes  negotiating 
and  concluding  an  agreement  on  final 
status. 

I  am  encouraged  by  the  Prime 
Minister's  assurance  that  all  options 
are  open  for  negotiation.  The  Prime 
Minister  and  I  agreed  that  our  govern- 
ments would  remain  in  close  touch  to 
ensure  that  everything  possible  is  be- 
ing done  to  promote  the  prospects  for 


iim 


iJ 


"1 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989  ' 


MIDDLE  EAST 


ace  in  the  Middle  East.  And  speaking 
[•  myself  and  for  the  American  people, 
vant  to  assure  everyone  that  the 
nited  States  is  committed  to  promot- 
g  this  goal. 

rime  Minister  Sliamir 

;t  me  first,  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 
rael  and  on  behalf  of  my  wife  and  my- 
If,  express  our  warm  wishes  on  your 
suming  the  mantle  of  leadership  of 
e  United  States  and  the  free  world. 
e  have  cherished  your  personal 
iendship  and  warm  humanitarian 
ncern  for  many  years.  We  shall  never 
rget  the  help  you  have  e.xtended  our 
others  and  sisters  in  distress,  just 
we  shall  always  remember  the  role 
e  United  States  has  played  in  our 
story. 

Our  alliance  is  based  on  common 
dues  and  shared  interests.  Our 
jreements  on  strategic  cooperation 
id  the  free  trade  area  benefit  both 
untries.  They  help  us  continue  as  a 
mguard  of  democracy  in  the  Middle 
ast.  I  am  confident  that  under  your 
^ministration,  our  bonds  of  friend- 
ip  and  cooperation  will  grow  even 
ronger. 

Our  two  nations  share  the  values 
id  ideas  of  the  free  world  and  the 
eals  of  democracy  and  freedom.  What 
3  do  not  share  is  a  neighborhood.  For 
.  the  carnage  in  Beirut,  the  use  of  poi- 
n  gas  against  civilians,  and  acts  of 
rrorism  and  fanaticism  are  not  news 
om  afar,  for  as  they  are  events  hap- 
!ning  around  the  corner;  they  are  our 
dly  reality.  If  there  is  one  mistake 
rael  cannot  afford  to  make,  it  is  the 
istake  of  forgetting  where  we  live. 

I  would  like  to  reiterate  here  what 
said  to  you  in  private:  We  shall  make 
e  greatest  possible  efforts  to  achieve 
ace,  short  of  endangering  the  secu- 
ty  of  our  state.  We  consider  the  estab- 
^hment  of  a  Palestinian  state  west  of 
le  Jordan  River,  which  is  an  objective 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Orga- 
zation],  a  mortal  threat  to  our  secu- 
ty.  I  have  assured  you  that  we  would 
t  with  anyone,  anytime,  anywhere, 
ithout  preconditions  if  we  thought  it 
ould  advance  the  cause  of  peace.  But 
e  cannot  lend  ourselves  to  any  steps 
lat  will  result  in  a  Palestinian  state, 
hich  is  a  prescription  not  for  peace 
at  for  war.  I  can  assure  you  we  will  be 
irthcoming.  We  believe  the  Camp 
avid  accords,  based  on  Resolutions 
42  and  338,  are  the  cornerstone  of 
eace  in  our  region.  We  faithfully  abide 
y  your  agreements,  and  we  expect 
thers  to  do  so  as  well. 


To  advance  the  cause  of  peace,  we 
have  put  forwad  a  four-point  peace 
initiative. 

First,  we  propose  an  effort  to 
make  the  existing  peace  between  Israel 
and  Egypt  based  on  the  Camp  David 
accords  a  cornerstone  for  expanding 
peace  in  the  region.  We  call  upon  the 
three  signatories  of  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords at  this  10th  anniversary  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  to  reaffirm,  indeed, 
their  dedication  to  the  accords. 

Second,  we  call  upon  the  United 
States  and  Egypt  to  make  it  clear  to 
the  Arab  governments  that  they  must 
abandon  their  hostility  and  belliger- 
ency toward  Israel.  They  must  replace 
political  warfare  and  economic  boycott 
with  negotiations  and  cooperation. 

Tliird,  we  call  for  a  multinational 
effort  under  the  leadership  of  the 
United  States  and  with  substantial  Is- 
raeli participation  to  finally  solve  the 
Arab  refugee  problem  perpetuated  by 
Arab  governments  while  Israel  absorbs 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  Jewish  refu- 
gees from  Arab  countries.  All  these 
refugees  should  have  decent  housing 
and  live  in  dignity.  This  process  does 
not  have  to  await  a  political  solution  or 
to  substitute  for  it. 

Fourtli,  in  order  to  launch  a  politi- 
cal negotiating  process,  the  proposed 
free  deomocratic  elections,  free  from 
an  atmosphere  of  PLO  violence,  terror, 
and  intimidation  among  the  Palestinian 
Arabs  of  Judea,  Samaria,  and  Gaza — 
their  purpose  is  to  produce  a  delegation 
to  negotiate  an  interim  period  of  self- 
governing  administration.  To  shape 
modalities  and  participation  in  the  elec- 
tions will  have  to  be  discussed.  The  in- 
terim phase  will  provide  a  vital  test  of 
coexistence  and  cooperation.  It  will  be 
followed  by  negotiations  for  a  perma- 
nent agreement.  All  proposed  options 
will  be  examined  during  these 
negotiations. 

This  is  an  outline  of  our  compre- 
hensive plan  for  peace.  It  is  based  on 
democratic  principles.  It  addresses  the 
real  issues.  Together  I  believe  we  can 
achieve  these  goals. 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  10,  1989).  ■ 


Situation  in  Lebanon 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  3,  1989' 

The  United  States  condemns  the  con- 
tinued artillery  exchanges  by  all  sides 
in  Beirut  with  their  reckless  disregard 
to  civilian  lives  and  welfare.  All  partic- 
ipants in  the  fighting — both  foreign  and 
domestic — should  immediately  cease 
fire  and  lift  the  siege  and  blockade. 

We  continue  to  strongly  support 
the  efforts  of  the  Arab  League's  Com- 
mittee on  Lebanon  and  urge  all  parties 
to  cooperate  immediately  and  fully 
with  the  league's  call  for  a  cease-fire. 
We  also  urge  the  relevant  parties  to  re- 
ceive the  Arab  League  representative 
and  to  end  any  further  delay  in  the 
league's  peace  initiative  on  Lebanon. 

The  U.S.  Government  remains 
committed  to  the  restoration  of 
Lebanon's  unity,  sovereignty,  and  terri- 
torial integrity  with  the  restoration  of 
a  central  government,  the  withdrawal 
of  all  foreign  forces,  and  the  disband- 
ment  of  militias. 

DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  7,  1989^ 

We  welcome  the  commitment  that  Gen. 
Awn  [Christian-backed  leader]  made  in 
his  April  6  statement  to  the  goals  of 
power-sharing,  reform,  and  equal  par- 
ticipation in  the  political  system  by  all 
Lebanese — Muslims  and  Christians. 
We  applaud  his  recognition  that  all 
Lebanese  have  the  right  to  security, 
liberty,  and  dignity. 

We  particularly  support  his  call 
for  an  open,  honest,  and  free  inter- 
Lebanese  roundtable  dialogue.  The 
goals  he  affirmed  must  be  achieved  by 
dialogue,  not  military  means,  in  order 
to  reunify  a  sovereign  Lebanon  free  of 
foreign  military  forces  and  illegal 
militias. 

We  continue  to  urge  all  parties — 
foreign  and  domestic — to  respect  the 
Arab  League's  call  for  an  immediate 
cease-fire  and  the  cessation  of  all  land, 
sea,  and  air  blockades. 

Further  we  urge  all  parties  to  co- 
operate fully  with  the  Arab  League 
to  restore  security  and  stability  to 
Lebanon. 


43 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
APR.  14.  1989> 

We  condemn  the  savage  shelling  in 
Beirut  on  Thursday  [April  13].  It  was  a 
reprehensible  reminder  that  14  years  of 
armed  conflict  have  failed  to  solve 
Lebanon's  problems.  We  reprove  all 
participants  in  yesterday's  fighting, 
both  Lebanese  and  non-Lebanese.  We 
call  on  all  combatants — including  the 
Lebanese  armed  forces,  the  different 
militias,  and  the  Syrian  Army — to 
cease  fire  and  cooperate  fully  with  the 
Arab  League's  Committee  on  Lebanon. 

We  urge  Gen.  Awn  to  pursue  his 
recent  public  commitment  to  power- 
sharing,  reform,  and  equal  participa- 
tion in  the  political  system  by  all 
Lebanese — Muslim  and  Christian  alike. 
That's  an  important  step  in  the  right 
direction. 

We  also  urge  Dr.  Huss  [Muslim- 
backed  leader]  and  all  other  Lebanese 
to  accept  the  suggestion  of  an  open, 
honest,  and  free  inter-Lebanese  round- 
table  dialogue.  No  one  should  try  to 
block  such  a  dialogue.  Force  will  not 
unite  the  Lebanese.  Neither  will  it 
cause  foreign  troops  to  withdraw. 

The  election  of  a  consensus  presi- 
dent and  a  constitutional  reform  are 
the  essential  first  steps  for  restoring 
Lebanon's  unity,  sovereignty,  and  terri- 
torial integrity.  Toward  the  achieve- 
ment of  those  goals,  the  LInited  States 
supports  fully  the  efforts  of  the  Arab 
committee  to  stop  the  current  fighting 
to  resolve  the  issue  of  the  air,  land,  and 
sea  blockades  and  to  help  the  Lebanese 
in  their  political  impasse. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT. 
APR.  18,  1989^ 

President  Bush  is  deeply  concerned 
about  the  growing  violence  in  Lebanon 
and  the  escalating  suffering  of  the 
Lebanese  people.  The  President  calls 
for  all  internal  parties  and  Syria  to 
cease  shelling  and  to  step  back  from 
confrontation.  The  President  strongly 
supports  efforts  currently  underway, 
such  as  the  one  by  the  Arab  League,  to 
bring  about  a  cease-fire  and  an  end  to 
the  violence. 

In  addition,  yesterday  the  Presi- 
dent and  President  Mitterrand  of 
France  discussed  by  telephone  steps 
that  the  United  Nations  could  take  to 
calm  the  situation.  Both  Presidents 
stressed  their  concern  about  the  loss  of 
life,  injuries,  and  deterioration  of  the 
situation  in  Beirut.  The  two  Presidents 
stressed  the  need  for  international  sup- 


44 


port  for  efforts  to  bring  about  a  peace- 
ful solution. 

DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  20,  19892 

We  welcome  the  April  18  statement  by 
the  23  Christian  Lebanese  parliamen- 
tarians calling  upon  the  Syrian  Army 
and  the  Lebanese  armed  forces  to  set 
up  and  maintain  a  cease-fire.  We 
strongly  support  their  appeal  for  a  po- 
litical dialogue. 

It  is  recognition  that  Lebanon's 
current  crisis  can  only  be  resolved 
through  consultation  and  reconcilia- 
tion. This  statement,  we  believe,  repre- 
sents the  desires  of  the  vast  majority  of 
Lebanese  on  both  sides  of  the  "green 
line"  to  seek  a  peaceful  resolution  to 
Lebanon's  political  problems. 


It  underscores  the  critical  impor- 
tance of  Lebanon's  Parliament  as  a  le- 
gitimate representative  body  and  the 
crucial  role  it  must  play  in  restoring  a 
central  government  to  the  country.  It 
significant  many  Lebanese  have  al- 
ready expressed  support  for  the  parli; 
mentarians'  position,  and  we  urge  all 
sides,  including  Syria  and  Gen.  Awn, 
accept  this  call  for  a  cease-fire  and 
seek  ways  to  resume  a  political 
dialogue. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Margaret  DeB.  Tut- 
wiler. 

2Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment deputy  spokesman  Richard  A. 
Boucher. 

■'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pre 
dential  Documents  of  Apr.  24,  1989.  ■ 


Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOI\/l 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  9,  1989" 

The  United  States  has  been  engaged  in  nu- 
clear cooperation  with  the  European  Com- 
munity for  many  years.  This  cooperation 
was  initiated  under  agreements  concluded 
over  2  decades  ago  between  the  United 
States  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community  (EURATOM),  which  e.xtend  un- 
til December  31,  199.5.  Since  the  inception  of 
this  cooperation,  the  Community  has  ad- 
hered to  all  its  obligations  under  those 
agreements. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  of 
1978  amended  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of 
1954  to  establish  new  nuclear  e.xport  crite- 
ria, including  a  requirement  that  the  United 
States  has  a  right  to  consent  to  the  re- 
processing of  fuel  exported  from  the  United 
States.  Our  present  agreements  for  coopera- 
tion with  EURATOM  do  not  contain  such  a 
right.  To  avoid  disrupting  cooperation  with 
EURATOM,  a  proviso  was  included  in  the 
law  to  enable  continued  cooperation  until 
March  10,  1980,  if  EURATOM  agreed  to  ne- 
gotiations concerning  our  cooperation 
agreements,  which  it  did. 

The  law  also  provides  that  nuclear  coop- 
eration with  EURATOM  can  be  extended  on 
an  annual  basis  after  March  10,  1980,  upon 
determination  by  the  President  that  failure 
to  cooperate  would  be  seriously  prejudicial 
to  the  achievement  of  U.S.  non-proliferation 
objectives  or  otherwise  jeopardize  the  com- 
mon defense  and  security  and  after  notifica- 
tion to  the  Congress.  President  Carter  made 
such  a  determination  9  years  ago  and  signed 
E.xeeutive  Order  No.  12193.  permitting  nu- 
clear cooperation  with  EURATOM  to  con- 
tiiuie  until  March  10,  1981.  President  Reagan 
made  such  determinations  in  1981,  1982, 
1983,  1984.  1985,  1986,  1987,  and  1988,  and 
signed  Executive  Orders  Nos.  12295, 12351, 


12409,  12463,  12506,  12554,  12587,  and  126: 
permitting  nuclear  cooperation  to  continu 
through  March  10,  1989. 

In  addition  to  numerous  informal  con- 
tacts, the  United  States  has  engaged  in  IM 
rounds  of  talks  with  EURATOM  regarding 
the  renegotiation  of  the  U.S.-EURATOM 
agreements  for  cooperation.  These  were 
conducted  in  November  1978,  September 
1979,  April  1980,  January  1982,  November 
1983,  March  1984,  May,  September,  and  N 
vember  1985,  April  and  July  1986,  Septem 
ber  1987,  and  September  and  November 
1988.  Further  talks  are  anticipated  this 
year 

I  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  coope 
ation  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Community  continue,  and  likewise,  that  w 
work  closely  with  our  allies  to  counter  the 
threat  of  nuclear  explosives  proliferation, 
disruption  of  nuclear  cooperation  would  nt 
only  eliminate  any  chance  of  progress  in  o 
talks  with  EURATOM  related  to  our  agre 
ments,  it  would  also  cause  serious  problem 
in  our  overall  relationships.  Accordingly, 
I  have  determined  that  failure  to  continue 
peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  would  be  seriously  prejudicial 
the  achievement  of  U.S.  non-proliferation 
objectives  and  would  jeopardize  the  comm 
defense  and  security  of  the  United  States, 
intend  to  sign  an  Executive  order  to  exten 
the  waiver  of  the  application  of  the  rele- 
vant export  criterion  of  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act  for  an  additional  12 
months  from  March  10,  1989. 

Sincerely, 

George  Bu 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives,  and  Dan  Quayle,  President  of  the 
Senate  (text  fi-om  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents 'of  Mar  13,  1989).  II 


i 


'ACIFIC 


I.S.-New  Zealand  Relations; 
lome  Parting  Observations 


/  Paul  M.  Cleveland 

Address  before  the  New  Zealand 
istitute  of  Interyiational  Affairs 
^ZIIA)  in  Dunedin,  New  Zealand,  on 
pril  12,  1989.  Mr.  Cleveland  is  U.S. 
mbassador  to  New  Zealand. 

hree  years  ago  after  I  first  arrived  in 
e\v  Zealand,  the  Wellington  branch  of 
ZIIA  provided  me  a  platform  to  make 
ly  first  speech  in  your  country,  and  I 
m  honored  and  delighted  to  have  the 
Dportunity  to  make  my  valedictory 
om  NZIIA's  podium  here  in  Otago — 
)  join  your  local  sport:  talking  back  to 
Wellington  from  the  south.  In  between 
mes,  I  have  attended  a  number  of  out- 
.anding  presentations  put  on  by  your 
rganization  which  I  have  found  most 
seful.  So,  I  am  not  only  grateful  for 
le  use  of  your  forum,  I  am  admiring  of 
le  useful  service  you  provide. 

Indeed,  no  forums  are  more  useful 
••  greatly  needed  in  New  Zealand 
lese  days,  nor  in  any  other  country 
round  the  world,  than  our  foreign  pol- 
y  associations.  We  appear  to  be  at  the 
nd  of  an  old  and  the  beginning  of  a 
ew  international  relations  era,  and  the 
mes  call  for  e.xtensive  public  discus- 
on  of  alternative  international  goals 
nd  policies.  Perhaps  not  coinciden- 
illy.  New  Zealand,  which  has  substan- 
al  past  e.xperience  on  the  cutting 
dge  of  change,  is  undergoing  its  own 
nique,  separate  ree.xamination  of  its 
jreign  relations. 

Five  major  transformations  are  un- 
erway  in  the  world  today:  the  demo- 
ratic  revolution,  the  spread  of  free 
nterprise,  the  opening  and  restructur- 
ig  of  the  communist  world,  the  rapid 
hanges  in  information  flow  and  tech- 
ology,  and  the  resulting  changing  re- 
itions  among  nations.  Each  of  these 
hanges  holds  great  promise,  but  each 
so  has  pitfalls.  New  democracies  in 
Africa,  Asia,  and  Latin  America  are 
ragile  and  can  fall  back  into  authori- 
arian  rule;  new  free  markets  can  be 
tunted  by  protectionism:  changes  in 
he  communist  world  could  run  aground 
in  resentful  bureaucracies  and/or  mil- 
tarism;  we  could  fail  to  find  stabiliz- 
ng,  new  cooperative  arrangements 

Iimong  nations  to  replace  the  old  equi- 
ibriums;  new  technology  can  increase 
IS  well  as  diminish  our  ecological  prob- 
ems.  An  unemployed  friend  at  my  last 


university  reunion,  where  everyone 
else  seemed  to  be  thriving  as  president 
of  this  or  vice  president  of  that,  an- 
swered happily  when  asked  what  he 
was  doing:  "I  am  between  oppor- 
tunities." Despite  challenges  from 
many  directions,  we  Americans  remain 
optimistic  and  like  to  think  we  are  be- 
tween opportunities  these  days.  We 
need  to  be  realistic,  however,  if  we  are 
to  avoid  pitfalls  and  take  full  advantage 
of  the  opportunities  that  are  offered. 
Let  me  talk  briefly  about  the  implica- 
tions of  two  major  realities  in  today's 
world.  I  will  then  go  on  against  that 
background  to  discuss  our  own  two  na- 
tions' relationship. 

The  First  Reality 

The  first  of  these  realities  is  the  major 
transformation  of  the  international 
equilibrium  set  in  motion  by  changes  in 
the  Soviet  Union. 

The  key  to  understanding  this 
transformation  is  to  understand  the  in- 
formation technology  explosion  that  has 
given  so  much  additional  comparative 
advantage  to  open,  democratic,  free- 
trading  societies  which  countenance 
free  information  and  technology  flow. 
In  the  United  States,  growth  today 
comes  from  hundreds  of  new  ideas  spin- 
ning into  small-  or  medium-sized  com- 
panies, not  for  the  most  part  from  the 
Fortune  500.  In  this  environment, 
where  the  challenge  is  rapidity  of 
change  and  information  flow  rather 
than  ability  to  marshal  resources  to 
build  giant  steel  mills,  Marxist  and  so- 
cialist models  of  development  have 
proven  a  failure,  particularly  those  in 
Russia  where  secrecy  and  centralized 
control  have  historically  choked  devel- 
opment. Glas>iost  and  perestroika  are  a 
direct  result  of  this  recognition.  Gen- 
eral Secretary  Gorbachev  realized  that 
a  rigidly  centralized  statist  economy, 
totalitarian  political  system,  secrecy, 
and  the  self-imposed  isolation  from  the 
world  economy  entailed  are  incompat- 
ible with  development  and  moderni- 
zation in  an  era  of  scientific,  techno- 
logical, and  information  revolution; 
ability  to  compete  in  today's  world;  and 
avoidance  of  domestic  economic  break- 
down. Thirty-second  in  the  world  in  life 
expectancy,  fifty-second  in  infant  mor- 
tality, the  Soviets  annually  spend  $100 
per  capita  on  health,  compared  with 
$2,000  in  the  United  States. 


That  kind  of  thing  simply  does  not  befit 
a  superpower. 

Since  domestic  reform  should  re- 
duce foreign  adventurism,  the  reform 
process  initiated  in  Moscow  holds  out 
promise  for  the  West,  as  well  as  for  the 
U.S.S.R.  itself  and  for  peace  and  sta- 
bility everywhere.  We  welcome  these 
changes.  We  believe  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship's turnabout  after  70  years  is  real 
and  sincere.  We  are  hopeful  that  as 
long  as  the  Soviets  are  preoccupied 
with  reform,  they  will  have  a  strong, 
concomitant  interest  in  pursuing  cau- 
tious foreign  policies.  And  we  are  pre- 
pared to  continue  to  negotiate  in  good 
faith  with  the  U.S.S.R.,  seeking  agree- 
ment across  a  wide  spectrum  of  issues, 
including  but  not  confined  to  mutual, 
balanced,  verifiable  arms  control 
agreements. 

That  said,  however,  there  are  two 
reasons  why  it  is  necessary  for  us  to 
proceed  cautiously  with  our  guard  up, 
at  least  until  we  have  a  better  under- 
standing of  what  the  possibilities  are. 
First,  Mr.  Gorbachev  and  his  fellow  re- 
formers are  surrounded  by  tough  con- 
centric rings  of  counterdemands  that 
will  constrain  their  forward  progress, 
could  halt  it  altogether,  and  could  even 
lead  to  renewed  aggressive  behavior 
such  as  followed  Khrushchev's  abortive 
efforts  at  reform.  In  the  first  ring, 
there  are  the  Communist  Party,  the 
army,  the  KGB,  and  the  bureaucracy, 
all  potentially  formidable  foes  to  re- 
form. The  second  ring  is  comprised  of 
the  Soviet  masses'  historic  suspicion, 
conservatism,  and  fear  of  competition. 
Outside  these  first  two  constricting 
rings  are  the  emotive  feelings  of  the 
various  Soviet  nationalities  that  have 
been  unleashed  and  must  be  dealt  with. 
Armenia  and  Georgia  are  but  two  of 
many  possibilities.  Further  abroad,  a 
fourth  obstacle  to  reform  may  arise 
from  the  East  Europeans'  thirst  for 
freedom  and  independence,  which  once 
let  loose,  could  lead  to  growing  diffi- 
culties for  the  U.S.S.R.  A  final  outer 
ring  of  problems  could  develop  for  the 
Soviets  if  and  when  they  cut  back  their 
credit  lines  in  Vietnam,  Cuba,  Nica- 
ragua, and  elsewhere. 

This  reason  alone  would  seem  to  be 
sufficient  to  warrant  caution,  and  be- 
cause of  it,  the  NATO  governments, 
Australia,  and  the  United  States'  Asian 
allies  are  all  convinced  of  the  continu- 
ing need  for  collective  security  and 
nuclear,  as  well  as  conventional, 
deterrence.  There  is,  however,  a  second 
reason  to  stay  on  the  alert:  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  and  his  support- 


d.<; 


PACIFIC 


ers  are  skilled  negotiators  and  can  be 
counted  on  to  seek  every  concession 
they  can,  which  will  leave  them  in  an 
advantageous  military  position. 

It  is  central  to  resolving  the  differ- 
ence between  the  United  States  and 
New  Zealand  that  we  all  understand 
this  point:  the  United  States  is  working 
hard  to  reduce  armament,  to  back  away 
from  past  positions  and  arms  levels 
East  and  West  have  adopted,  but  we  ex- 
pect tough  bargaining  and  balanced 
reductions.  That  approach  proved  suc- 
cessful in  the  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  negotiations.  The  world 
is  safer  today  because  we  have  been 
firm  of  purpose,  not  because  we  bowed 
to  populist  pressure.  In  our  view,  uni- 
lateral disarmament  steps  have  nega- 
tive, potentially  destabilizing  effect. 
The  Western  allies  must  remain  strong 
militarily  while  negotiating,  just  as  the 
Soviets  have:  to  deter  possible  renewed 
adventurism,  to  convince  the  Soviets 
that  they  cannot  e.xpect  a  windfall  of 
military  advantage,  and  to  bring  about 
lasting  agreements  everyone  can  live 
with.  Industry  wouldn't  expect  or  prob- 
ably even  want  Council  of  Trade  Unions 
leader  Ken  Douglas  to  give  up  the  right 
to  strike  on  the  eve  of  wage  negotia- 
tions. We  are  not  going  to  give  up  ade- 
quate nuclear  deterrence  on  the  eve  of 
arms  limitation  negotiations. 

A  Second  Reality 

At  the  same  time  that  the  Soviet  Union 
is  setting  out  in  the  direction  of  mas- 
sive and  welcome,  albeit  potentially  de- 
stabilizing and  reversible,  reform,  a 
second  new  reality  is  developing  in  the 
world,  particularly  here  in  the  Asia/ 
Pacific  region.  A  new  multipolar  situa- 
tion is  emerging  wherein  to  use  Aus- 
tralian Defense  Minister  Kim  Beazley's 
words,  "real  economic  and  military 
power  is  likely  to  reside  in  the  hands  of 
nations  that  have  not  impacted  on  the 
strategic  thinking  of  countries  beyond 
their  immediate  neighbors  for  centu- 
ries." The  Asian  and  Pacific  region,  he 
continues,  "will  be  a  complexity  of 
shifting  alignments  and  arrangements 
characterized  by  an  array  of  large  and 
medium-sized  powers."  Did  you  know 
Japan  is  now  not  only  the  second  larg- 
est economic  power  but  is  also  the  third 
largest  military  power  in  the  world? 
China,  with  its  billion  people,  is  devel- 
oping its  military  forces,  including  an 
ability  to  conduct  forward  maritime  op- 
erations. India  has  exploded  a  nuclear 
device,  has  a  nuclear-powered  sub- 


marine, and  is  broadening  its  strategic 
interests  to  include  the  Indian  Ocean. 
The  other  "smaller"  powers  of  South- 
east Asia  are,  in  fact,  not  all  that 
small,  and  they  are  building  military 
forces  they  can  project  seaward  as  well 
as  on  land. 

Not  only  are  there  new  powers, 
there  are  places  power  gravitates, 
namely  key  strategic  points  and  con- 
tinuing power  vacuums,  the  largest  of 
these  being  the  vast  South  Pacific,  with 
its  dots  of  land  strategically  command- 
ing vast  areas  of  sea.  The  South  Pacific 
has  itself  entered  a  period  of  transition 
as  its  tiny  island  states  struggle  to  deal 
with  the  problems  of  economic  and  po- 
litical development  in  a  highly  competi- 
tive world.  In  some  cases,  these  nations 
will  never  be  able  to  win  the  self- 
sufficiency  they  crave.  Recent  develop- 
ments in  Fiji,  New  Caledonia,  and 
Vanuatu  are  a  portent  of  the  problems 
which  can  be  expected  to  break  out  as 
these  nations  adopt  their  traditional 
cultures  to  modern  challenges  and  pass 
through  a  generational  change  in  lead- 
ership with  an  outcome  that  remains 
uncertain. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
be  the  major  strategic  player  in  the  Pa- 
cific region,  not  only  in  its  own  interest 
as  a  global  power  in  maintaining  peace 
and  security  in  this  dynamic  region  but 
also  in  response  to  the  desires  of  vir- 
tually everyone,  except  perhaps  the  So- 
viet Union  and  Vietnam.  However, 
U.S.  power  is  limited;  we  and  our  allies 
in  the  Pacific,  just  as  in  Europe,  will 
work  out  new  arrangements  as  time 
passes  to  realign  responsibilities  for 
maintaining  security  in  accord  with 
shifts  in  power.  Japan  has  been  under- 
taking more.  Korea  has  always  as- 
sumed a  large  share  of  responsibility. 
Several  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  members  do. 
The  Australians  have  also.  The  Austra- 
lians believe,  as  we  do,  not  only  that  it 
is  vital  that  Canberra  maintain  its  alli- 
ance with  Washington  but  that  it  is  also 
desirable  to  develop  policies  and  mili- 
tary capabilities  of  its  own,  to  meet  di- 
rect military  threats,  and  "to  manage 
the  strategic  environment  in  a  way  that 
reinforces  Australia's  favorable  strate- 
gic outlook." 

Like  the  dislocations  pursuant  to 
Soviet  reform,  this  second  new  reality 
— the  emergence  of  competition  amid  a 
mix  of  emerging  new  powers — calls  for 
shared  assumption  of  responsibility  for 
security,  continuing  collective  military 
capabilities,  and  deterrence  to  prevent 
sudden,  unbalancing,  and  destabilizing 
threats  from  developing  in  the  region. 


There  is  substantial  agreement  in  the     ^ 
Asia/Pacific  region  on  this  point.  jg 

New  Zealand,  The  United  States, 
and  the  World 

What  then  can  we  say  about  U.S.-Newi  yd 
Zealand  relations  against  the  back 
ground  of  the  twin  realities  I  have 
described? 

Historically,  by  most  accounts,  ouiji 
postwar  relationship  was  close  and  mu. 
tually  rewarding.  We  agreed  on  the 
fundamentals  and  discussed  our  dif- 
ferences constructively.  As  I  have 
stressed  before,  New  Zealand  had  far 
greater  influence  in  Washington  than 
its  size  alone  might  have  warranted. 
One  of  your  Foreign  Service  officers 
once  referred  to  this  approach  as  the 
Jiminy  Cricket  policy — you  sat  and 
whispered  in  the  ear  of  the  world's 
greatest  power.  Perhaps  that  was  per- 
ceived as  demeaning.  Whatever  its  ap 
pearance  and  merits,  the  present 
government  decided,  in  effect,  that 
that  policy  was  not  worth  the  cost  of 
admitting  nuclear  capable  ships  on  a 
neither-confirm-nor-deny  basis. 

When  I  first  spoke  to  the  NZIIA 
just  3  years  ago,  our  two  governments  i 
together  with  the  British  Government 
were  still  considering  ways  and  means 
to  maintain  our  defense  ties.  Not  long   ,| 
after  that,  however,  our  efforts  failed,   ^J 
and  New  Zealand  translated  its  nuclea  [, 
ship  prohibitions  into  law,  foreclosing 
effective  military  cooperation  from  ou 
point  of  view,  so  we  suspended  our  de- 
fense commitment  to  New  Zealand.  Al 
the  same  time,  we  decided  to  limit  the 
extent  of  the  reduction  in  the  relation- 
ship to  the  political-security  area  and 
otherwise  carry  on.  There  was  no  gaii 
saying,  however,  that  despite  our 
shared  inheritance  of  cultural  values 
and  political  ideals,  our  longstanding 
trust,  friendship,  and  cooperation,  our 
governments  saw  the  world  differently 
we  placed  different  priorities  on  the 
continuing  need  for  collective  arrange  |, 
ments  and  nuclear  deterrence,  with  th 
United  States  in  favor  of  maintaining 
both  these  twin  pillars  and  New  Zea- 
land recognizing  the  first,  in  its  own 
way,  but  rejecting  the  second.  That  is  i 
major,  pronounced  difference  between 
us  that  still  exists.  Nevertheless,  beinj 
practical  peoples,  we  have  both  decidec 
to  lower  the  noise  level,  hopefully  to  al 
low  time  for  thought,  to  recognize  per- 
haps the  fundamental  nature  of  our 
close  identity  even  though  we  currentlj[[( 
disagree  on  an  important  matter,  and 
to  develop  better  understanding. 


lie 


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%/  liinA  IQflf 


PACIFIC 


Not  all  of  us  have  always  succeeded 
[using  this  time  well.  From  time  to 
ne,  an  American  has  voiced  excessive 
Isidual  anger  or  suggested  a  self- 
*feating  course  of  action,  such  as  cut- 
ng  off  trade.  Radio  New  Zealand, 
hich  sometimes  seems  to  have  little 
se  to  do  in  Washington,  loves  to  pick 
ese  stories  up.  But  I  think  you  Kiwis 
iiderstand  by  now  that  singular  Amer- 
i.in  voices  in  or  out  of  the  government 

0  not  and  never  have  represented 
.merican  foreign  policy.  The  Presi- 
cnt,  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  their 
rsignated  spokesmen  represent  Amer- 

ni  foreign  policy. 

The  facts  are  we  have  stopped 
oviding  and  will  continue  to  deny  de- 
ii.-;e  and  intelligence  help  and  cooper- 
inn  we  formerly  gave  New  Zealand 
uler  Article  II "of  the  ANZUS  treaty 
aistralia.  New  Zealand,  United 
ates  security  pact],  but  we  will  not 
ek  retributive  action  further  afield 
Antarctica,  in  trade,  or  elsewhere. 
I  the  contrary,  we  will  continue,  in  ef- 
ct,  to  aid  New  Zealand  measurably, 
r  example,  in  Antarctica,  where  coop- 
ation  has  never  been  better;  within  a 
■ar  you  intend  to  start  work  on  an  in- 
rnational  gateway  in  Christchurch 
liich  we  will  jointly  occupy.  On  the 
onomic  front,  we  will  also  continue  to 
■Ip  you  as  the  world's  major  line- 
unger  for  free  trade.  It  is,  after  all, 
e  United  States  that  purposefully 
ished  open  the  door  to  Japan's  market 
r  Australasian  grass-fed  beef  at  the 
me  time  we  opened  it  for  our  own 
■ain-fed  beef.  Most  important  our 
•essure,  together  with  that  of  others, 

1  Europe  to  reduce  agricultural  sub- 
files and  our  commitment  to  reduce 
ir  own  agricultural  support  should 
'entually  prove  of  immense  value  to 
ew  Zealand  trade.  Announcement  last 

:  eek  that  we  have  reached  agreement 

'  ith  Europe  on  the  outline  of  steps  to 

^  taken  is  momentous  news  indeed. 

There  are  also  a  few  New  Zea- 
nders  who  have  added  to  the  prob- 
ms  between  us  rather  than  to  the 
ilutions.  I  do  not  want  to  further 
nphasize  anti-Americanism  except  to 
ake  three  clarifying  points:  (a)  when 
raised  the  subject  in  an  interview 
ith  the  Neic  ZeaJivid  Herald  a  few 
eeks  ago,  I  was  talking  about  a  very 
nail  group  of  radical  people  who  often 
■i-m  to  me  to  be  "anti"  a  lot  of  things 
s  well  as  America:  (b)  good  honest 
I'iticism  of  America  is  "fair-go"  and 
ot  what  I  was  talking  about — I  engage 
1  it  myself:  and  (c)  the  great  majority 
f  Kiwis  I  know  have  been  friendly,  hos- 


pitable, and  thoughtful,  even  when  we 
have  disagreed.  As  I  like  to  think  of  my 
own  country,  you  are  fair-minded.  It 
was  not,  after  all,  Paul  Holmes'  inter- 
view with  Dennis  Conner  that  was  sig- 
nificant; the  importance  lay  in  the 
subsequent  universal  Kiwi  criticism  of 
Holmes'  attack  as  unsporting. 

Outlook 

But  what,  we  need  to  ask,  is  the  out- 
look? The  basic  fact  that  emerges  from 
all  this  is  that  the  relationship  is 
friendly,  but  diminished.  As  I  have 
said:  We  bump  along.  So  we  ask:  Can 
we  make  it  better? 

Hopeful  when  I  first  came  to  New 
Zealand,  I  am  more  convinced  after 
more  than  3  years  here  that  the  nega- 
tive views  about  our  relations  held  by  a 
few  will  not  win  out;  to  the  contrary,  I 
believed  then  and  believe  now  that  our 
basic  mutual  interests  and  common 
sense  approaches  to  public  affairs 
will,  in  the  end,  bring  us  back  closer  to- 
gether, if  not  to  the  same  relationship 
we  previously  had  to  one  that  furthers 
our  mutual  and  the  general  interest. 
However,  if  I  am  more  convinced  of  our 
ability  to  widen  the  areas  of  agree- 
ment, to  lessen  the  differences  between 
us,  I  am  also  more  mindful  of  the  need 
to  be  realistic,  not  to  be  Pollyannaish 
about  our  differences  over  security;  I 
am  more  sober  about  the  time  it  will 
take  to  bridge  them,  the  need  for  pa- 
tience; and  I  frankly  do  not  know  what 
design  that  bridge  will  have.  As  it  did  3 
years  ago,  my  speech  ends  with  ques- 
tions rather  than  answers. 

The  first  question  that  occurs, 
of  course,  is  whether  one  or  the  other 
of  us  will  change  our  stance  on  the  nu- 
clear ship  issue  and  will  we  manage  to 
do  better  than  bump  along.  I  must  tell 
you  that  no  basic  change  seems  likely  in 
U.S.  neither-confirm-nor-deny  policy. 
For  the  reasons  I  have  outlined,  the 
United  States  remains  committed, 
among  other  things,  to  nuclear  deter- 
rence. The  neither-confirm-nor-deny 
policy  is,  in  turn,  firmly  supported  as 
essential  to  nuclear  deterrence  by  lead- 
ers in  both  political  parties  and  by  an 
absolute  majority  of  Americans.  It  has 
been  carefully  constructed  and  applied 
worldwide  to  protect  our  Navy's  port 
access  and  strategic  maneuverability, 
and  the  policy  has  been  successful.  De- 
spite occasional  New  Zealand  media  re- 
ports to  the  contrary,  no  other  ally 
has  abridged  our  and  the  British  and 
French  neither-confirm-nor-deny  poli- 
cies; all  our  allies  fully  support  it.  On 


the  other  hand,  major  neutral  nations 
like  China,  Sweden,  India,  and 
Yugoslavia — plus  smaller  ones  like  the 
South  Pacific  island  nations — have 
adapted  to  it  and  regularly  admit  our 
ships  on  a  neither-confirm-nor-deny 
basis. 

So  the  question  turns  to  New  Zea- 
land: Is  there  any  chance  you  will 
change  your  ship  ban?  Frankly,  I  don't 
know  what  you  will  do  finally.  The  gov- 
ernment and  many  people  here  I  talk  to 
are  adamant  that  the  policy  on  nuclear 
ships  will  not  change,  regardless  who  is 
in  power.  Moreover  they  make  clear  no- 
body even  wants  to  hear  about  it.  They 
seem  convincing.  But  the  opposition 
and  about  as  many  other  people  we  talk 
to  insist  that  it  is  important  to  make 
the  changes  necessary  to  enable  New 
Zealand  to  rejoin  ANZUS.  Poll  results 
on  the  issure  are  not  clear  to  me.  It 
does,  on  the  other  hand,  seem  reasona- 
bly clear  that  most  people,  whatever 
their  views,  are  concerned  more  about 
the  domestic  economy  these  days  and 
wish  the  ship  problem  would  go  away. 
But  if  you  are  among  those  who  want  a 
better  relationship  with  the  United 
States,  you  realize  that  the  issue  can- 
not simply  be  dismissed.  Resolution  of 
the  issue  would  seem  to  turn  on  evolu- 
tion of  New  Zealanders'  answers  to  the 
same  old  question:  Is  the  effective  pro- 
hibition of  nuclear-capable  ships  or  full 
partnership  in  the  Western  community 
more  important  to  you?  Future  exter- 
nal events  could  reshape  people's  an- 
swers, but  even  that  is  unclear  to  me. 

If  a  clear  majority  continues  to  de- 
cide in  favor  of  maintaining  non-nuclear 
ports,  other  questions  will  arise.  First 
and  foremost:  What  kind  of  alternative 
defense  contribution  to  the  region  and 
to  the  larger  world  will  New  Zealand 
make?  Foreign  Minister  Russell  Mar- 
shall addressed  this  question  in  an  ar- 
ticle in  the  Dominion  this  week.  He 
was  right  when  he  noted  the  world  is 
watching.  The  world,  including  the 
United  States,  welcomes  your  contribu- 
tion to  international  peacekeeping.  But 
that  still  leaves  the  question:  Will  your 
efforts  be  considered  sufficient  over 
time  by  others?  Listening  to  the  vari- 
ous parties,  it  appears  to  me  there  may 
have  been  some  breakdown  in  percep- 
tions between  this  country  and  others 
on  this  point.  Some  New  Zealanders 
have  taken  the  view  that  it  owes  noth- 
ing more  to  maintaining  security  than 
it  has  given  and  that  that  view  is  ac- 
cepted internationally.  However,  some 
nations  that  are  sacrificing  considera- 
bly more,  not  surprisingly,  hold  a  dif- 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


ferent  view.  How  you  address  and  an- 
swer this  key  question  will  go  a  long 
way  to  defining  the  role  and  influence 
you  have  in  the  world.  Your  foreign  pol- 
icy clout,  including  your  influence  on 
disarmament  questions,  will  be  a  func- 
tion of  your  conclusion.  As  difficult  as 
that  question  may  be,  it  is  one  to 
which,  I  should  think,  you  would  want 
to  develop  the  most  clear-sighted  an- 
swers, in  the  interest  of  maintaining 
optimal  good-neighbor  status  and  self- 
respect. 

If  on  the  other  hand,  a  choice  to  re- 
turn to  full  membership  in  the  Western 
partnership  is  made,  the  question  be- 
comes: How  will  you  manage  that?  At  a 
minimum,  there  will  be  widespread  re- 
sistance to  readmitting  ships.  Substan- 
tial change  in  New  Zealand  attitudes 
toward  nuclear  weapons  and  foreign 
policy  will  be  necessary  if  any  such  re- 
versal is  to  remain  permanent.  How 
might  that  happen? 

At  bottom,  of  course,  the  question 
before  you  all  is  what  relationship  do 
you  want  to  have  not  just  with  the 
United  States  but  with  the  rest  of  the 
world?  I  am  sure  some  of  you  ask:  Why 
does  our  security  contribution  have  to 
figure  so  large?  We're  peaceful.  Why 
can't  we  just  be  accepted?  But  other  na- 
tions contributing  substantially  to  the 
world's  security  insurance  policy  will 
not  accept  that  view.  There  is  an  old 
cliche  that  applies:  "You  get  what  you 
bargain  for."  It  is  not  always  true.  The 
world  is  not  always  fair.  You  may  end 
up  with  more  or  less  than  you  bargain 
for.  But  prudence  argues  for  setting 
out  with  that  assumption  and  for  mak- 
ing a  realistic  assessment  of  your  bar- 
gaining strength. 

I  am  sorry  that  like  Pontius  Pilate, 
I  seem  to  be  raising  difficult  questions 
as  I  depart.  This  is  where  we  seem  to 
be,  however.  We  have  put  a  floor  under 
deterioration  of  our  relations,  lessened 
the  decibel  level  of  the  dialogue,  and 
maintained  commerce  and  cooperation 
in  non-military  areas.  But  if  the  rela- 
tionship is  to  improve,  further  repairs 
will  be  necessary  in  the  security  area. 
The  operative  questions  are  largely 
for  you  to  address.  Because  we  live  to- 
gether on  this  globe,  share  a  strategic 
interest  in  the  region,  and  have  much 
in  common,  and  because  we  care,  we 
will  be  watching  with  interest  how  you 
proceed. ■ 


Toward  a  Global  High-Definition 
TV  Production  Standard 


by  Sonia  Landau 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Telecommunications,  Consiimer 
Protection,  and  Finance  of  the  House 
Energy  and  Commerce  Committee  on 
March  8,  1989.  Ambassador  Landau  is 
U.S.  Coordinator  and  Director  of  the 
Bureau  of  International  Comynunica- 
tions  and  Information  Policy.'^ 

The  State  Department  has  been  in- 
volved in  HDTV  [high-definition  televi- 
sion] issues  for  15  years  and  has 
focused  primarily  on  the  standard  for 
production  and  international  program 
exchange.  I  would  like  to  highlight  to- 
day the  important  role  of  production 
standards  in  the  total  HDTV  equation. 
I  will  also  describe,  in  some  detail,  how 
the  State  Department,  in  close  conjunc- 
tion with  other  U.S.  Government  agen- 
cies and  the  private  sector,  has  sought 
to  promote  U.S.  interests  through 
adoption  of  a  single,  worldwide  HDTV 
production  standard  and  our  strategy 
for  the  future. 

HDTV  Production  Standards 

HDTV  standards  can  be  divided  into 
three  categories: 

•  Standards  for  the  studio  and  in- 
ternational program  exchange,  called 
"production"  standards; 

•  "Transmission"  standards  or 
standards  for  delivery  systems,  includ- 
ing terrestrial  transmission  systems, 
satellite  transmissions,  cable  systems, 
and  videotape  systems;  and 

•  Standards  for  display  systems, 
such  as  home  television  sets  and  re- 
ceivers for  public  display. 

The  issue  of  a  single  standard  for 
studio  production  and  program  ex- 
change is  extremely  important  and 
warrants  our  attention  for  several 
reasons. 

First,  the  new  high-quality  video 
technologies  have  the  potential  to  re- 
place the  current  video  technologies 
and,  more  importantly,  to  supplement 
35mm  film,  which  serves  presently  as  a 
de  facto  world  standard. 

Second,  a  worldwide  HDTV  pro- 
duction standard  would  facilitate  lower 
overall  costs  due  to  economies  of  scale 
in  equipment  manufacturing,  the  ease 


of  program  exchange  and  Internationa 
coproductions,  as  well  as  the  inter- 
operability of  equipment. 

Third,  a  worldwide  production 
standard  would  greatly  facilitate  the 
exchange  of  HDTV  motion  pictures, 
videos,  and  other  production  materials 
around  the  world.  A  market  in  which 
two  or  three  standards  operate  simul- 
taneously would  pose  the  same  diffi- 
culties that  currently  hamper  TV 
production  where  NTSC  [National  TV 
System  Committee],  PAL  [phase  alter 
nation  line],  and  SECAM  [sequential 
with  memory]  standards  now  prevail  ii 
different  parts  of  the  world. 

Finally,  a  single,  worldwide  pro- 
duction standard  would  serve  U.S. 
commercial  interests,  since  entertain- 
ment is  currently  one  of  our  largest  ex 
ports.  Presently,  the  United  States 
commands  85%  of  the  world's  export 
market  for  cinema,  broadcasting,  ca- 
ble, satellite,  and  VCR  [video  cassette 
recorder]  distribution.  The  United 
States  enjoys  a  current  annual  surplus 
of  $2.8  billion  in  the  export  of  movies 
and  television  shows.  Looking  to  the 
future,  most  observers  predict  that  th 
production  of  high-definition  program: 
will  be  a  multibillion  dollar  interna- 
tional market. 

U.S.  Policy  Formulation 

During  the  past  year  the  State  Depart 
ment  has  been  an  active  participant  in 
executive  branch  discussion  on  HDTV 
that  have  taken  place  in  the  Economic 
Policy  Council  and  the  Trade  Policy 
Review  Group.  In  addition,  for  a  much 
longer  period  of  time,  the  Bureau  of 
International  Communications  and  In- 
formation Policy  has  coordinated  U.S. 
participation  in  HDTV  activities  in  th( 
the  International  Telecommunication 
Union  (ITU).  The  State  Department— 
in  consultation  with  the  Commerce 
Department,  Federal  Communications 
Commission  (FCC),  and  other  U.S. 
Government  agencies — has  responsi- 
bility for  U.S.  participation  in  the 
ITU's  International  Radio  Consultativ< 
Committee  (CCIR),  which  serves  as  th 
global  focal  point  for  conducting  studie 
and  developing  recommendations  on 
technical  and  operational  radiocom- 
munications  questions. 

Before  discussing  the  CCIR's  work 
on  a  worldwide  HDTV  production  stand 


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SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


d,  let  me  explain  how  the  State  De- 
artment  formulates  its  CCIR  posi- 
ons.  In  our  policy  coordinating  role, 
-e  systematically  bring  together  pri- 
ate  sector  and  other  U.S.  Government 
iput  through  advisory  committees  and 
onstant  informal  monitoring  of  rele- 
ant  opinion.  Our  key  advisory  com- 
littee  for  international  broadcast 
sues  is  the  U.S.  National  CCIR  Orga- 
ization.  This  committee  is  open  to  any 
iterested  Federal  agency,  private 
ompany,  individual  consultant,  indus- 
y  group,  standards  body,  and  the 
ublic  in  general.  Its  purpose  is  to  ad- 
ise  the  Department  of  State  on  the  ap- 
ropriate  contributions  and  positions 
9  be  taken  in  the  international  CCIR 
leetings. 

The  National  CCIR  Organization  is 
haired  by  the  State  Department  with 
he  FCC  and  the  National  Telecom- 
lunications  and  Information  Adminis- 
ration  (NTIA)  of  the  Commerce 
)epartment  as  vice  chairmen.  The  De- 
3nse  Department,  the  National  Aero- 
autics  and  Space  Administration, 
Jnited  States  Information  Agency,  and 
everal  other  agencies  also  actively  par- 
icipate.  The  major  broadcasting  orga- 
izations  and  broadcasting  equipment 
lanufacturers  are  represented  and 
■rovide  valuable  input  for  policy  deci- 
ions,  such  as  our  position  on  an  inter- 
,ational  HDTV  production  standard, 
hese  positions  are  thoroughly  vetted 
n  the  national  CCIR  process,  including 
interagency  review,  before  a  final  de- 
lermination  is  made  by  the  State 
department. 

In  the  case  of  HDTV  and  other 
roadcast  matters,  the  pivotal  part 
)layed  by  the  private  sector  is  natural, 
;ince  privately  owned  and  operated 
;tations,  networks,  and  program  pro- 
lucers  are  directly  affected  by  our  pol- 
cies.  In  fact,  private-sector  studies  of 
standards  for  advanced  television  sys- 
,ems  have  been  underway  for  more 
han  a  decade.  Three  prominent  U.S. 
Drivate-sector  organizations  have 
3layed  a  decisive  role  in  the  evaluation 
and  adoption  by  the  United  States  of 
he  1,125  lines  and  60  fields  per  second 
standard  for  international  HDTV  stu- 
dio and  program  e.xchange. 

•  The  Advanced  Television  Sys- 
tems Committee  (ATSC)  was  estab- 
lished in  1982  by  the  five  members  of 
the  Joint  Committee  for  Intersociety 
Coordination.  They  are  the  National 
Association  of  Broadcasters,  the  Na- 
tional Cable  Television  Association,  the 
Electronic  Industries  Association,  the 
Society  of  Motion  Picture  and  Televi- 


sion Engineers  (SMPTE),  and  the  Insti- 
tute of  Electrical  and  Electronic  Engi- 
neers. Membership  includes  American 
companies  and  organizations  having  a 
direct,  bona  fide  interest  in  advanced 
television  standards. 

•  The  Society  of  Motion  Picture 
and  Television  Engineers,  composed 
of  technical  persons  involved  with  pro- 
duction, began  studying  advanced  tele- 
vision in  1977. 

•  The  American  National  Stand- 
ards Institute  (ANSI)  functions  as  a 
coordinating  body  for  encouraging 
worthwhile  standards  as  American  na- 
tional standards. 

The  U.S.  position  advocating  CCIR 
adoption  of  the  1,125/60  international 
production  standard  is  based  on  thor- 
ough analysis  of  industry  research  and 
recommendations  by  groups  such  as  the 
three  listed  above.  A  fundamental  U.S. 
standards  setting  principle  has  been 
the  reliance  on  voluntary  industry 
standards  to  the  maximum  extent  pos- 
sible. We  consider  this  principle  to  be 
equally  applicable  in  the  development 
of  U.S.  positions  on  international 
standards. 

CCIR  Activity 

The  CCIR  has  been  involved  since  the 
early  1970s  with  the  issue  of  proposed 
HDTV  standards  for  studio  and  inter- 
national program  exchange.  These 
standards  have  been  a  prominent  issue 
in  the  CCIR  since  1983  when  Study 
Group  11  (television)  established  a  spe- 
cialist group  to  study  all  facets  of 
HDTV  and  to  prepare  recommenda- 
tions. At  that  time,  it  was  agreed  to 
strive  for  a  draft  recommendation  for  a 
single,  worldwide  HDTV  standard  for 
the  studio  and  international  program 
exchange  within  the  4-year  work  cycle 
ending  at  the  1986  plenary  assembly  in 
Dubrovnik,  Yugoslavia.  Additionally,  it 
was  decided  that  recommendations  on 
other  aspects  of  HDTV,  such  as  trans- 
mission and  display  standards,  would 
be  finalized  during  the  following  work 
cycle,  1986-90. 

As  a  result  of  the  policy  formula- 
tion process  I  outlined  earlier,  the  U.S. 
Government,  in  September  1984,  pro- 
posed to  the  CCIR  adoption  of  a  recom- 
mendation on  the  1,125/60  production 
standard,  which  was  overwhelmingly 
supported  by  U.S.  industry.  This 
standard,  developed  by  U.S.  industry 
in  the  SMPTE,  was  based  in  part  on  re- 
search, experimentation,  and  develop- 
ment carried  out  by  NHK,  the  Japanese 


national  broadcasting  corporation.  The 
SMPTE  result  differed  from  the  Japa- 
nese work  in  several  respects.  The  dif- 
ferences from  the  original  Japanese 
parameters  involved,  among  others, 
the  aspect  ratio,  a  progressive  scan  op- 
tion, recommendations  on  colorimetry, 
and  the  digital  sample  ratio. 

The  Japanese  changed  their  own 
initial  proposal  and  supported  the  U.S. 
modifications  after  they  realized  that 
U.S.  support  for  an  1,125/60  system 
was  contingent  upon  the  adoption  of 
our  parameters.  Canada  and  Mexico 
have  also  been  strong  supporters  of  the 
1,125/60  standard.  Japanese  manufac- 
turers have  moved  to  market  equip- 
ment based  on  the  1,125/60  standard. 

In  1985,  the  U.S.-proposed  1,125/60 
standard  was  adopted  in  the  form  of  a 
draft  recommendation  presented  to 
CCIR  Study  Group  11.  The  October 
1985  Study  Group  11  meeting  saw  the 
emergence  of  two  distinct  camps.  On 
one  side,  Japan,  Canada,  and  the  Unit- 
ed States  supported  adoption  of  the 
1,125/60  standard.  On  the  other  side, 
several  European  Community  (EC) 
countries — encouraged  by  European 
consumer  electronics  manufacturers — 
mounted  a  coordinated  blocking  effort. 
After  considerable  debate.  Study  Group 
11  passed  the  proposed  recommenda- 
tion to  the  plenary  assembly  for  fur- 
ther consideration  but  not  as  a  formal 
recommendation. 

At  the  May  1986  CCIR  plenary 
assembly  in  Dubrovnik,  the  issue  of 
HDTV  production  standards  was  by  far 
the  most  contentious  and  politically 
charged  of  all  the  items  on  the  agenda. 
A  coalition  of  EC  administrations,  con- 
cerned with  problems  involving  their 
different  electrical  systems  and  con- 
cerns raised  by  European  manufac- 
turers of  home  electronics  equipment, 
tabled  an  alternative  HDTV  studio 
standard.  In  the  stalemate  that 
evolved,  the  plenary  decided  to  post- 
pone a  decision  by  agreeing  to  convene 
an  extraordinary  meeting  of  Study 
Group  11  within  2  years  to  deal  with 
the  HDTV  issue. 

Despite  the  inability  to  adopt  a 
recommendation  at  the  1986  plenary  in 
Dubrovnik,  work  has  continued  in  the 
CCIR  to  reach  consensus  on  an  interna- 
tional HDTV  production  standard, 
which  would  benefit  all  countries. 
Some  incremental  progress  has  been 
made.  In  January  1989,  a  CCIR  work- 
ing group  produced  the  outline  of  a 
draft  proposal  for  a  CCIR  recommen- 
dation on  the  single,  worldwide  HDTV 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


production  standard.  The  outline  iden- 
tifies over  30  basic  parameters  for 
which  values  must  be  approved.  Al- 
though some  fundamental  parameters 
still  remain  to  be  defined,  a  consensus 
was  reached  on  over  one-half  of  those 
already  defined.  Further  progress  is 
e.xpected  at  the  May  1989  Study  Group 
11  extraordinary  meeting. 

We  recognize  that  many  circum- 
stances have  changed  since  1985  and 
1986  when  the  United  States  first  sup- 
ported the  proposed  1,125/60  produc- 
tion standard.  Also,  we  are  aware  that 
a  broad  spectrum  of  industry  re- 
sponded to  a  NTI A  notice  of  inquiry  on 
production  standards.  The  comments, 
which  were  due  March  1,  1989,  are  be- 
ing analyzed  now. 

The  ATSC  and  SMPTE  organiza- 
tions have  also  continued  periodic  re- 
views of  the  situation,  have  further 
defined  the  1,125/60  standard,  and  con- 
tinue to  support  1,125/60  as  an  interna- 
tional production  standard.  ANSI 
approved  the  1,125/60  standard  in  Octo- 
ber 1988,  denied  an  appeal  for  recon- 
sideration by  a  member  in  February 
1989,  and  has  scheduled  a  hearing  for  a 
second  appeal  by  the  same  member.  In 
addition,  other  groups  have  signaled 
strong  support  for  the  1,125/60  proposal 
in  recent  months,  including  the  Inter- 
national Brotherhood  of  Electrical 
Workers  (March  1989);  the  Department 
for  Professional  Employees,  AFL/CIO 
[American  Federation  of  Labor  and 
Congress  of  Industrial  Organizations] 
(December  1988);  the  International 
Alliance  of  Theatrical  and  Stage  Em- 
ployees (November  1988);  and  the  Inter- 
national Photographers  Guild 
(December  1988). 

From  time  to  time,  advocates  of 
other  standards  have  requested  the 
withdrawal  of  U.S.  support  for  the 
1,125/60  standard.  Very  recently,  the 
Motion  Picture  Association  of  America 
(MPAA)  issued  a  new  statement  on 
HDTV.  Recognizing  their  earlier  en- 
dorsement of  1,125/60,  MPAA  empha- 
sized that  they  now  "believe  a  more 
thorough  and  detailed  evaluation  of  all 
HDTV  systems  is  necessary"  to  ensure 
that  potential  benefits  are  realized. 
Nevertheless,  they  repeated  their  sup- 
port for  adoption  of  a  single,  worldwide 
HDTV  studio  standard,  such  as  the 
35mm  film  standard  continues  to  serve 
in  the  film  community.  MPAA  also  ex- 
pressed support  for  the  development  of 
a  "global  multistandard  TV  set,"  capa- 
ble of  receiving  any  transmission 
standard.  For  the  present,  however, 


neither  our  advisory  groups  nor  the 
voluntary  industry  organizations  have 
recommended  any  alternative  to  the 
1,125/60  international  production 
standard. 

Our  position  is  clear:  we  will  base 
our  standards  policy  on  testing  and 
evaluation  by  voluntary  industry  stand- 
ards making  organizations.  Our  ad- 
visory committee  mechanisms  will 
continue  to  evaluate  tests,  and  we  will 
formulate  policy  taking  into  account 
private-sector  recommendations,  such 
as  those  which  emerge  from  the  NTIA 
notice  of  inquiry.  Given  the  diversity  of 
U.S.  interests  and  our  strong  mar- 
ketplace traditions,  the  private  sector 
must  play  a  determinant  role. 

Activities  by  Other  Countries 

Our  diplomatic  missions  overseas  have 
been  actively  following  HDTV  develop- 
ments in  other  countries.  The  more  in- 
formation we  can  obtain  about  HDTV 
developments  abroad,  the  better  will 
be  the  chances  for  U.S.  industry  to  find 
opportunities  to  enter  these  markets. 

The  1,125/60  standard  has  the 
backing  of  the  United  States,  Canada, 
and  Japan.  Production  equipment  based 
on  this  standard  is  available  and  in  use. 
Nearly  80  television  programs  have 
been  produced  in  the  United  States, 
Canada,  Japan,  France,  West  Germany, 
Italy,  and  Spain  using  such  equipment. 
Estimates  of  Japanese  private  and  pub- 
lic entity  spending  on  HDTV  develop- 
ment since  1970  range  as  high  as  $1 
billion.  Some  estimates  of  HDTV 
spending  by  NHK,  which  receives  pub- 
lic support,  go  as  high  as  $500  million. 

Several  EC  administrations  are  ac- 
tively promoting  the  1,250  lines  and  50 
frames  per  second  standard.  The  most 
notable  activists  are  France,  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  the  Nether- 
lands, the  United  Kingdom,  and 
Belgium.  At  last  January's  CCIR  meet- 
ing, Italy  requested  that  its  name  be 
removed  from  some  of  the  documents 
submitted  by  EC  administrations,  in- 
cluding the  document  containing  the 
recommendation  for  the  1,250/50  stand- 
ard. Spain  did  likewise.  Even  without  a 
consensus,  the  EC  is  engaged  in  a  well- 
organized  campaign  to  accelerate  the 
introduction  of  HDTV  in  Europe  and  to 
ensure  the  wide  use  and  sales  of  Euro- 
pean HDTV  systems  and  programs 
throughout  the  world.  Eight  EC  nations 
have  contributed  close  to  $70  million 
since  1986  for  HDTV  research  and  de- 
velopment under  a  "Eureka"  framework 
agreement  project. 


The  Soviet  Union  recently  pro- 
posed a  series  of  meetings  of  major 
broadcasters,  broadcasting  unions,  an 
television  and  motion  picture  pro- 
ducers. The  stated  purpose  was  to  de- 
vise a  series  of  tests  to  evaluate  the 
three  standards  proposed  to  the  CCIR 
These  include  the  1,125/60  standard 
supported  by  the  United  States,  Cana- 
da, and  Japan;  the  1,250/50  standard  fa 
vored  by  some  EC  administrations;  ani 
the  1,375/50  proposal  recently  tabled  b; 
the  Soviet  Union  at  a  January  1989 
CCIR  meeting.  The  data  to  be  derived 
from  the  tests  will  be  provided  to  the 
CCIR.  The  tests  are  to  be  conducted  ii 
Moscow  beginning  in  March  1989.  The 
U.S.  Government  was  neither  invited 
nor  does  it  intend  to  participate  in  the 
tests. 

Future  Steps 

Our  goal  remains  to  move  the  concept 
of  a  single,  worldwide  production 
standard  forward.  We  continue  to  sup- 
port the  adoption  by  the  CCIR  of  the 
1,125/60  studio  standard — the  only  one 
of  the  three  proposals  to  enjoy  wide- 
spread U.S.  industry  support.  The  ne> 
important  HDTV  meeting  of  the  CCIP 
is  the  extraordinary  meeting  of  Study 
Group  11  from  May' 10  to  16,  1989,  in' 
Geneva.  We  are  organizing  a  delegatios' 
of  public  and  private-sector  experts  in 
the  question  of  HDTV  production 
standards.  With  the  advice  provided 
through  our  National  CCIR  Organiza- 
tion and  other  sources,  we  are  formu- 
lating positions  on  the  various  agenda 
items  to  be  considered  at  this  impor- 
tant meeting.  A  final  Study  Group  11 
meeting  before  the  CCIR  plenary  will 
take  place  in  Geneva  from  October  9  tc 
25,  1989. 

The  CCIR  plenary  assembly  will 
take  up  the  recommendations  of  Study 
Group  11  in  May  of  next  year  We  hope 
that  the  CCIR  plenary  will  have  the  of 
portunity  to  adopt  a  worldwide  produc- 
tion standard.  Regardless  of  whether 
the  results  of  Study  Group  11  permit 
such  consideration,  we  will  work  both 
through  the  ITU  and  bilaterally  to  pro 
mote  adoption  of  a  worldwide  standard 
that  will  further  U.S.  interests. 

While  the  CCIR  has  only  been 
marginally  involved  so  far  in  the  ques- 
tion of  HDTV  transmission  standards, 
we  expect  work  in  this  area  will  in- 
crease significantly  in  the  future.  In 
the  meantime,  we  will  continue  to  mon 
itor  ongoing  CCIR  work  in  transmis- 
sion standards  and  testing  worldwide  o 
competing  systems.  As  we  await  a  FCC 
determination  of  a  U.S.  HDTV  trans- 


iss: 


lit 


i 


sli 


m 


.»J: 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


lission  standard,  we  will,  as  part  of 
tie  interagency  process,  offer  our  anal- 
sis  of  the  foreign  policy  implications  of 
[le  standard  to  be  adopted.  I  should 
ote  that  the  establishment  of  unique 

.S.  or  North  American  transmission 
tandards  would  not  necessarily  preju- 
ice  U.S.  leadership  in  worldwide  pro- 
uction  of  HDTV  video  programming 
nd  films.  It  is  not  critical  for  economy 
r  efficiency  that  production  and  trans- 
lission  standards  be  identical. 

We  are  prepared  to  work  bilat- 
rally  and  multilaterally  to  promote 

.S.  interests  through  both  transmis- 
on  and  production  standards.  In  con- 
mction  with  other  U.S.  Government 
^encies,  for  instance,  we  will  take  ap- 
ropriate  measures  to  discourage  the 
56  of  HDTV  transmission  and  produc- 
on  standards  as  barriers  to  the  entry 

U.S.  manufactured  products  and 

ograms. 

onclusion 

n  conclusion,  let  me  summarize  the 
lajor  points  I  would  like  to  emphasize 
ir  the  subcommittee. 

First,  adoption  of  a  single,  world- 
"]de  HDTV  production  standard  by 
lember  countries  of  the  ITU  is  highly 
nportant  for  U.S.  interests. 

Second,  the  U.S.  Government  re- 
BS  heavily  on  the  private  sector  for 
■(Commendations  on  international 
landards,  and  our  proposal  for  an  in- 
rnational  HDTV  production  standard 
as  closely  paralleled  the  industry 
'isensus. 

Third,  although  the  U.S.  proposal 
(r  an  1,125/60  world  production  stand- 

8d  has  received  a  setback  in  the 
HIR,  incremental  progress  is  being 
lade  which  has  already  narrowed  con- 
derably  the  parameters  in  dispute. 

Fourth,  the  HDTV  environment  is 
a  state  of  rapid  evolution.  Technology 
advancing,  and  governments  and 
ivate-sector  groups  around  the  world 
e  rethinking  their  policies  on  both 
oduction  and  transmission  standards, 
this  dynamic  situation,  the  State  De- 
.irtment  will  continue  to  work  with 
S.  industry  and  other  government 
jencies  to  ensure  that  our  policies  re- 
ect  the  best  judgment  of  all  relevant 
•oups. 

Fifth,  the  Administration  will  be 
viewing  the  production  standard  is- 
le as  part  of  an  overall  review  of  ad- 
inced  television  policy. 


Our  efforts  on  HDTV  production 
and  transmission  standards  clearly  will 
impact  upon  U.S.  leadership  in  the  pro- 
duction of  video  programming  and 
films,  as  well  as  our  position  in  con- 
sumer electronics.  In  this  regard,  I  am 
pleased  to  note  the  announcement  that 
AT&T  [American  Telephone  and  Tele- 
graph Company]  and  Zenith  are  consid- 
ering a  joint  venture  to  develop  a 
prototype  HDTV  set.  This  announce- 
ment is  evidence  that  significant  U.S. 


companies  are  willing  to  collaborate 
and  commit  money  to  this  new 
technology. 

Once  again,  I  commend  the  sub- 
committee for  its  foresight  in  convok- 
ing these  very  timely  hearings,  which 
should  help  U.S.  industry  and  govern- 
ment chart  a  course  for  the  future. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  International  Activities 
in  Science  and  Technology 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
APR.  .5,  1989" 

In  accordance  with  Title  V  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  Authorization  Act  for  Fiscal  Year 
1979  (Public  Law  95^26),  I  am  transmitting 
the  annual  report  on  international  activities 
in  science  and  technology  (S&T)  for  Fiscal 
Year  1988. 

I  firmly  believe  that  the  economic  ad- 
vances of  the  21st  century  are  rooted  in  the 
research  and  development  (R&D)  performed 
in  laboratories  around  the  world  today.  Inno- 
vation and  dedication  of  resources  and  peo- 
ple, both  public  and  private,  to  scientific  and 
technological  advances  are  essential  to  eco- 
nomic progress.  Our  future  well-being  as  a 
nation  is  dependent  upon  the  continuous 
transfer  of  technology  from  basic  science 
into  commercial  goods  and  services. 

Over  the  past  5  years,  this  concept — the 
linkage  of  our  science  and  technology  enter- 
prise to  our  future  global  competitiveness — 
has  become  a  dominant  theme  in  the  United 
States.  Because  of  this  linkage,  some  have 
challenged  our  historical  subscription  to  an 
open,  unimpeded  R&D  system,  claiming 
that  such  a  system  transfers  valuable  R&D 
results  to  other  countries  for  commercializa- 
tion and  eventual  sale  in  the  United  States. 
I,  and  President  Reagan  before  me,  believe 
that  the  United  States  benefits,  and  our 
global  competitive  position  is  improved,  by 
international  cooperation  in  research  and 
development  based  on  balance,  reciprocity, 
and  comparable  access.  We  have  actively 
promoted  this  policy  through  multilateral 
fora  and  bilaterally  with  our  trading  part- 
ners and  advanced  developing  countries. 

For  example,  a  major  accomplishment  of 
FY  1988  was  winning  multilateral  endorse- 
ment for  key  themes  of  President  Reagan's 
E.xecutive  Order  No.  12591  of  April  10,  1987, 
on  "Facilitating  Access  to  Science  and  Tech- 
nology." At  the  Ministerial  Meeting  of  the 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  in  Paris  in  May  1988, 
the  ministers  endorsed  a  new  framework  of 


common  principles  for  international  S&T  co- 
operation, originally  introduced  by  the 
President's  Science  Adviser,  Dr  William  R. 
Graham.  The  framework  endorses  adequate 
investment  and  excellence  in  basic  sciences; 
reciprocity  and  balanced  access  as  a  solid 
foundation  for  science  and  technology  coop- 
eration; improved  universal  protection  of 
intellectual  property  rights  (IPR);  and 
effective  protection  of  sensitive  knowledge. 
I  am  convinced  that  the  new  OECD  frame- 
work establishes  a  firm,  future-oriented 
foundation  for  sustainable  cooperation  in  sci- 
ence and  technology. 

On  the  bilateral  front,  under  the  guid- 
ance of  the  Economic  Policy  Council,  the  Ad- 
ministration developed  a  coordinated  policy 
to  reshape  our  S&T  relationship  with  .Japan 
based  on  the  principles  of  shared  respon- 
sibilities, equitable  contributions,  adequate 
protection  and  fair  disposition  of  intellectual 
property  rights,  acknowledged  security 
obligations,  and  comparable  access  to 
government-sponsored  and  -supported  R&D 
facilities  and  programs.  The  culmination  of 
this  effort  came  in  Toronto  in  .June  1988, 
when  President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Takeshita  signed  the  new  umbrella  S&T 
Agreement.  We  view  this  as  a  model  agree- 
ment and  now  are  incorporating  its  princi- 
ples into  all  our  science  and  technology 
bilateral  agreements. 

Maintenance  of  our  global  competitive- 
ness requires  adequate  and  effective  protec- 
tion and  equitable  allocation  of  intellectual 
property  rights.  The  commercial  develop- 
ment of  a  new  technology  requires  large  in- 
vestments of  time,  money,  and  talent. 
Continued  investments  in  research  and  de- 
velopment require  the  ability  to  derive  eco- 
nomic benefits  from  the  new  technology. 
Therefore,  in  FY  1988,  we  initiated  numer- 
ous bilateral  and  multilateral  dialogues  on 
the  benefits  accruing  to  all  partners  from 
effective  protection  and  equitable  disposi- 
tion of  IPR. 

With  the  view  that  balanced  and  re- 
ciprocal cooperation  in  S&T  benefits  the 
United  States  and  the  world  at  large,  at  the 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


December  1987  Washington  Summit,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  and  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev agreed  to  further  cooperation  in  the 
areas  of  transportation,  global  climate 
change,  ocean  studies,  and  nuclear  reactor 
safety,  as  well  as  to  continue  a  multilateral 
conceptual  design  effort  in  thermonuclear 
fusion.  As  a  result,  in  April  1988,  we  signed 
a  protocol  with  the  Soviets  on  cooperation  in 
maintaining  the  safety  of  civilian  reactors. 
This  agreement,  which  was  stimulated  by 
Chernobyl,  covers  the  design  and  operation, 
health,  environmental,  and  regulatory  as- 
pects of  the  reactor  safety  problem.  In  addi- 
tion, in  January  1989,  we  signed  a  U.S.- 
USSR  Framework  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion in  Basic  Scientific  Research,  which  is 
serving  as  the  model  for  other  U.S. -USSR 
agreements  to  ensure  policy  consistency 
among  all  our  extensive  interactions  with 
the  Soviets  in  science  and  technology. 

Sustainable  international  cooperation  in 
science  and  technology  is  good  for  the  Na- 
tion, particularly  when  projects  that  are  in 
the  national  interest  are  enhanced  by  or  in- 
trinsically require  multilateral  effort.  Ex- 
amples are  the  Space  Station  Freedom,  the 
superconductor  super  collider  (SSC),  AIDS 
[acquired  immune  defficiency  syndrome]  re- 
search, and  global  climate  change. 

In  December  1987,  the  Secretary  of  En- 
ergy invited  our  major  allies  to  contribute 
to  building  the  world's  most  advanced  high- 
energy  particle  accelerator,  the  SSC,  and  to 
participate  in  its  utilization.  We  now  look 
forward  to  extensive  collaboration  in  the 
project. 

In  September  1988,  a  final  agreement 
was  signed  among  the  United  States,  mem- 
ber states  of  the  European  Space  Agency 
(ESA),  and  the  Governments  of  Japan  and 
Canada  on  the  Space  Station  Freedom's  de- 
sign, development,  and  operation. 

AIDS  is  a  major  worldwide  public  health 
concern.  The  United  States  Government, 
particularly  the  Agency  for  International 
Development  and  the  Public  Health  Service, 
is  engaged  in  a  substantial  international 
program  working  with  the  World  Health  Or- 
ganization and  others  to  develop  national 
plans  to  combat  AIDS  and  to  utilize  re- 
search findings  and  technologies  as  they  be- 
come available. 

The  policy  question  of  human  impact  on 
the  global  environment  in  the  past  few  years 
has  moved  out  of  the  confines  of  scientific 
papers  and  conferences  to  become  a  front- 
page issue.  Recent  events,  such  as  the  198,5 
discovery  of  the  Antarctic  "ozone  hole"  and 
the  1988  North  American  drought,  have  cre- 
ated much  debate  regarding  the  relative 
contributions  of  human-induced  and  natural 
processes  on  global  climatic  and  environ- 
mental change.  Bearing  these  concerns  in 
mind,  in  April  1988,  the  United  States  rat- 
ified the  Montreal  Protocol  on  Substances 
that  Deplete  the  Ozone  Layer,  which  pro- 
vides for  reductions  in  production  and  con- 
sumption of  principal  ozone-depleting 
chemicals. 

Significant  uncertainties  remain  about 
the  magnitude,  timing,  and  regional  impacts 
of  global  climate  change.  During  FY  1988, 


the  United  States  has  made  major  contribu- 
tions to  international  plans  to  reduce  those 
uncertainties.  The  FCCSET  [Federal  Coor- 
dinating Council  on  Science,  Engineering, 
and  Technology]  Committee  on  Earth  Sci- 
ences prepared  a  strategy  for  the  U.S.  Global 
Change  Research  Program,  which  I  have  en- 
dorsed. Prepared  in  close  collaboration  with 
other  national  and  international  planning 
groups  and  activities,  the  U.S.  research 
strategy  calls  for  an  integrated  approach  in 
partnership  with  international  organizations 
such  as  the  World  Meteorological  Organiza- 
tion, the  United  Nations  Environment  Pro- 
gramme, and  the  International  Council  of 
Scientific  Unions.  The  Intergovernmental 
Panel  on  Climate  Change  launched  its  multi- 
lateral effort  in  November  1988  with  U.S. 
participation  and  support. 

Believing  that  the  R&D  today  is  the 
goods  and  services  of  tomorrow,  and  believ- 
ing that  further  discoveries  in  supercon- 
ductivity hold  enormous  potential  for 
applications.  President  Reagan  signed  into 
law  on  November  19,  1988,  the  "National  Su- 
perconductivity and  Competitiveness  Act  of 
1988,"  which  establishes  a  framework  for  a 
national  program  in  superconductivity.  He 
also  named  a  National  Commission  on  Su- 
perconductivity to  provide  guidance  over 
the  long  term,  as  the  real  benefits  from  su- 
perconductivity may  take  years  or  decades 
to  fully  realize.  Our  goal  as  a  nation  is  to 
lead  the  world  in  superconductivity  R&D 
and  in  translating  this  new  technology  into 
useful  products. 

Strong  U.S.  involvement  in  international 
S&T  requires  excellence  in  the  administra- 
tion and  implementation  of  our  S&T  policies 
around  the  world.  Therefore,  in  response  to 
President  Reagan's  Executive  Order  No. 


12591  of  April  10,  1987,  the  Department  of   »■ 
State  has  sought  to  strengthen  the  technic:   (d 
expertise  of  its  S&T  officer  corps  by  inten- 
sified recruitment  from  United  States  Gov 
ernment  technical  agencies,  academia,  and 
industry,  and  has  recently  established  a  sp 
cific  career  track  for  S&T  officers.  In  ad- 
dition, the  Department  of  State,  in 
cooperation  with  the  National  Science  Foui 
dation  and  the  Department  of  Commerce, 
initiated  the  S&T  Reporting  and  Informa- 
tion Dissemination  Enhancement  Project 
(STRIDE)  in  order  to  improve  internatiom 
scientific  reporting. 

As  President,  I  intend  to  continue  to 
build  on  the  solid  foundation  in  science  and 
technology  laid  by  President  Reagan  and  h 
Administration.  I  believe  that  sustainable 
cooperation  in  science  and  technology  is 
good  for  America  and  good  for  the  world. 
Therefore,  as  the  technology  gap  narrows, 
as  internationalization  of  scientific  and  tec 
nological  progress  becomes  the  accepted 
norm,  we  must  be  concerned  that  the  com- 
petitive drive  for  technological  leadership 
not  lead  to  protectionism  in  science,  even  8 
we  are  removing  barriers  to  free  and  open 
trade.  The  challenge  facing  us  in  the  years 
ahead  is  how  to  maintain  and  expand  an 
open,  mutually  beneficial  world  system  of 
exchange  and  cooperation  in  science  and 
technology  without  undercutting  our  na- 
tional competitiveness  or  jeopardizing  our 
security  interests  and  responsibilities.  Ar 
ticulating  and  responding  to  that  challenge 
is  a  high  priority  of  my  Administration. 


George  Bu 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pre 
dential  Documents  of  Apr.  10,  1989.  ■ 


FY  1990  Security  Assistance  Request 


by  H.  Allen  Holmes 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Anns  Control,  Interfiational  Secu- 
rity, and  Science  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  on  March  8,  1989. 
Ambassador  Holmes  is  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Politico-Military  Affairs.^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to  appear  before 
you  to  present  the  Administration's 
proposed  security  assistance  program 
for  fiscal  year  (F*Y)  1990.  This  is  a  very 
propitious  moment  to  be  discussing 
these  issues.  The  task  force  created  by 
you,  Mr.  Chairman  [Dante  B.  Fascell], 
has  recently  presented  its  report  on  the 
overall  foreign  assistance  program.  As 
Secretary  Baker  noted  in  his  hearing 


before  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committe 
we  think  the  Hamilton-Gilman  task 
force  report  is  a  very  good  piece  of 
work.  We  are  currently  in  the  final 
stages  of  preparing  our  own  package 
legislative  initiatives;  we  look  forwan 
to  working  with  the  Congress  in  shap 
ing  legislation  that  best  serves  our 
national  interests. 

In  this  regard,  the  President  has 
instructed  the  National  Security  Coui 
cil  (NSC)  to  review  the  range  of  foreij 
policy  and  national  security  challenge 
facing  the  nation.  The  NSC  will  recon 
mend  to  the  President,  within  90  days 
options  for  U.S.  policy  designed  to  hel 
shape  events  in  furtherance  of  U.S. 
goals  and  ideals.  These  policy  reviews 
are  underway. 


Deisartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  19{  ){ 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


Jasic  Purposes  for 
Security  Assistance 

Poday,  I  suggest  that  we  begin  by  ex- 
imining  the  basic  purposes  of  security 
issistance.  Security  assistance  is  an 
nstrument  of  our  foreign  and  national 
.ecurity  policy.  Military  assistance — 
■"MS  [foreign  military  sales]  financing, 
MET  [international  military  education 
,nd  training],  and  MAP  [military  as- 
istance  program]  general  costs — 
aid  economic  support  funds  (ESF)  pro- 
note  U.S.  interests  by  pursuing  a 
lumber  of  mutually  reinforcing  goals. 
!'hese  include: 

•  Enhancing  the  ability  of  U.S.  se- 
urity  partners  to  deter  and  defend 
.gainst  aggression  and  instability; 

•  Maintaining  the  cohesion  and 
trength  of  our  alliances; 

•  Developing  sound  military-to- 
riilitary  relations  that  support  our  dip- 
imatic  strategy  and  enhance  U.S. 
iifluence  and  prestige; 

•  Promoting  regional  stability; 

•  Contributing  to  our  access  to  mil- 
;ary  bases  and  facilities  abroad,  there- 
y  maintaining  the  strategic  mobility 

f  U.S.  forces; 

•  Strengthening  the  economies  of 
■ey  countries  that  are  attempting  to 
djust  to  heavy  debt,  depressed  com- 
lodity  export  prices,  and  startling 
Ihanges  in  the  global  economic  environ- 
nent;  and 

•  Providing  support  for  emerging 
■emocracies  while  defending  existing 
lemocratic  institutions  and  values  in 
ther  countries. 

Since  the  end  of  World  War  II, 
ecurity  assistance  has  been  a  key 
omponent  of  our  global  strategy  of  de- 
■errence,  collective  security,  and  for- 
/ard  defense.  As  challenges  and 
hreats  have  shifted,  so  has  the  focus  of 
he  security  assistance  program.  At 
resent,  of  course,  major  elements  of 
rhe  program  are  its  support  for  the 
ttiddle  East  peace  process  and  its  aid 
0  alliance  partners,  most  of  which  also 
rovide  us  with  access  to  military  facil- 
;ies  in  their  countries.  But  security 
ssistance  also  continues  to  underwrite 
J.S.  commitments  and  support  impor- 
ant  U.S.  interests  in  a  variety  of 
lations  throughout  all  geographic  re- 
;ions,  responding  to  an  ever-changing 
vforkl  environment. 

Aiding  foreign  countries  to  defend 
hemselves — and  to  counter  domestic 
hreats  from  guerrillas  and  narcotics 
raffickers — contributes  dramatically 


to  our  own  security.  At  the  same  time, 
it  is  more  effective — and  less  costly  in 
the  long  term — than  using  U.S.  mili- 
tary personnel  for  the  same  purposes. 
Assisting  America's  friends  and  allies 
to  defend  themselves  is  a  highly  effi- 
cient use  of  resources.  To  equal  the  mil- 
itary effect  of  friends  and  allies  who 
are  "on  the  scene,"  we  would  have  to 
spend  much  more  on  U.S.  force  struc- 
ture, mobility,  and  logistics. 

At  a  time  of  strained  budgets,  se- 
curity assistance  becomes  even  more 
important.  In  the  future,  the  United 
States  will  be  relying  ever  more  on 
friends  and  allies  around  the  world  to 
share  the  common  defense  burden.  Se- 
curity assistance  will  remain  a  major 
tool  for  encouraging  and  enabling  them 
to  do  so. 

But  security  assistance  is  not  a 
philanthropic  effort.  It  has  a  beneficial 
domestic  impact,  such  as  jobs  for  Amer- 
icans and  support  of  exports  which  ben- 
efit the  U.S.  economy.  Investment 
opportunities  and  access  to  raw  mate- 
rials are  additional  benefits  of  the  secu- 
rity assistance  program.  Also,  it  makes 
possible  economies  of  scale  in  procure- 
ment for  the  U.S.  Armed  Forces  (such 
as  longer  production  runs)  which  con- 
vey both  military  and  economic  bene- 
fits. Above  all,  security  assistance  is  a 
wise  investment  in  our  overall  national 
security  and  well-being. 

Responses  to  Past 
Funding  Reductions 

However,  the  U.S.  security  assistance 
program  has  suffered  a  series  of  steady 
and  deep  cuts  in  aggregate  funding  lev- 
els over  the  last  several  years,  begin- 
ning in  the  mid-1980s.  Since  1985, 
security  assistance  has  been  cut  in  the 
aggregate  by  33%.  Along  with  this  re- 
duction in  funding  has  been  an  increas- 
ing tendency  to  earmark  funds  for 
particular  countries.  In  FY  1989,  98% 
of  ESF  and  94%  of  military  aid  were 
earmarked.  This  continued  a  trend  of 
increased  earmarking  underway  since 
the  mid-1980s,  when  only  about  50%'  of 
security  assistance  funds  were  ear- 
marked. Reduction  of  earmarking  is 
one  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
Hamilton-Gilman  report — a  proposal 
we  wholeheartedly  support. 

Regrettably,  reduced  funding  for 
security  assistance  programs,  together 
with  congressional  earmarking,  has 
forced  us  to  terminate  or  under  fund 
many  unprotected  programs.  The  re- 
sults have  been  felt  most  acutely  in  Af- 


rica and  Latin  America.  Overall,  the 
Administration's  flexibility  in  using 
scarce  resources  to  meet  foreign  policy 
priorities  has  been  greatly  reduced. 

In  response  to  pressures  to  reduce 
the  budget,  the  Admministration  in  re- 
cent years  has  presented  smaller,  more 
austere  security  assistance  budgets 
and  worked  with  foreign  nations  to  plan 
activities  more  carefully  while  seeking 
from  Congress  greater  flexibility  in  or- 
der to  increase  program  impact.  Con- 
gress has  responded  by  improving  the 
financial  and  repayment  terms  of  secu- 
rity assistance  programs.  ESF,  which 
previously  included  loans,  has  recently 
been  made  an  all-grant  program,  while 
EMS  has  been  provided  either  at  con- 
cessional rates  of  interest  or  as  grants. 

Funding  Requests  and 
Legislative  Proposals 

The  Administration's  FY  1990  budget 
request  for  the  security  assistance  pro- 
gram is  the  product  of  careful  analysis. 
It  represents  an  effort  to  define  clear 
priorities  in  the  face  of  limited  fund- 
ing. We  are  focusing  on  a  few  areas  of 
priority  policy  concern.  At  the  same 
time,  our  request  maintains  the  overall 
balance  in  foreign  assistance  between 
military  and  economic  aid  programs, 
with  approximately  65%-  for  economic 
and  35%  for  military  aid. 

ESF  would  be  increased  by  less 
than  3%'  and  military  assistance  by  ?%■ 
over  FY  1989  allocation  levels.  FY  1990 
levels  for  Israel  and  Egypt  would  re- 
main the  same,  encompassing  approx- 
imately 60%  of  funding,  in  furtherance 
of  Middle  East  peace  and  stability. 

At  $5.1  billion  ($5  billion  in  EMS 
financing,  $40.4  million  for  MAP  gen- 
eral costs,  and  $54.5  million  for  IMET), 
our  FY  1990  military  assistance  bud- 
get request  represents  only  a  modest 
increase  over  last  year's  $4.9  billion  re- 
quest, of  which  Congress  appropriated 
$4.7  billion.  ESF  fared  better  last  year, 
suffering  a  cut  of  only  $22.5  million. 
This  year's  budget  proposes  a  modest 
increase  in  ESF,  to  $3.3  billion,  from 
last  year's  $3.2  billion  request. 
In  addition,  we  seek  a  small  $7.1  mil- 
lion increase  for  the  valuable  IMET 
program. 

Our  proposed  increase  for  military 
sales  financing — a  total  of  $328  million 
over  FY  1989  actual  appropriations — 
includes  funding  for  programs  we  have 
had  to  curtail  or  cut  back  severely  over 
the  last  several  years.  Examples 
include: 


Dpnartmpnt  nf  <%tntp  Riillptin/.liinp  1QR<) 


S3 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


•  $75  million  more  for  the  Philip- 
pines, to  enhance  the  Philippine 
counterinsurgency  effort  and  to 
accommodate  the  annual  $200  million 
best-efforts  commitment  under  the 
base  rights  extension  agreement; 

•  $50  million  more  for  Turkey, 
where  resources  have  been  insufficient 
for  needed  armed  forces  modernization; 

•  $38  million  more  for  Jordan,  a  key 
country  with  major  needs,  which  re- 
ceived only  $10  million  in  FY  1989; 

•  $25  million  more  for  Portugal, 
which  affords  us  critical  base  rights,  to 
support  needed  modernization; 

•  $23  million  more  for  Thailand, 
the  only  U.S.  treaty  ally  on  the  South- 
east Asian  mainland,  a  country  which 
is  turning  to  other  military  suppliers 
for  lack  of  adequate  U.S.  financing; 

•  $21  million  more  to  fight  the 
drug  war  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean; 

•  $20  million  more  for  Honduras, 
where  needed  ground  forces  improve- 
ments have  been  deferred  to  permit 
funding  of  the  priority  F-5  air  defense 
program;  and 

•  $12  million  more  for  El  Salvador, 
to  bring  that  country  back  to  the  level 
needed  to  sustain  its  military  effort. 

In  addition,  the  request  includes  an 
increase  of  $48  million  for  African 
countries,  where  our  emphasis  is  on 
promoting  professionalism  among  that 
region's  militaries  and  developing 
military-to-military  liaison  channels. 
In  Latin  America,  we  seek  an  addition- 
al $10  million,  largely  to  continue  our 
support  for  emerging  democracies 
there.  These  increases  in  military  aid, 
however,  form  only  a  small  portion  of 
overall  country  programs  in  Latin 
America  (16.7%)  and  an  even  smaller 
proportion  in  Africa  (9.4%).  The  em- 
phasis in  those  areas  remains  on  eco- 
nomic assistance;  our  military  aid  is 
limited  to  the  minimum  necessary  for 
support  of  essential  U.S.  security 
interests. 

The  FY  1990  security  assistance 
request  seeks  authority  to  provide  all 
FMS  financing  on  a  nonrepayable  basis, 
to  further  increase  the  quality  of  U.S. 
assistance  and  reduce  the  debt  burden 
of  military  aid  recipients.  As  you  are 
aware,  a  number  of  key  U.S.  friends 
and  allies  received  assistance  in  the 
form  of  high-interest  rate  loans  in  the 
late  1970s  and  early  1980s;  repayment 


fC 


of  these  loans  has  imposed  a  heavy  and 
growing  burden  on  these  countries. 
The  Administration,  with  the  support 
of  Congress,  has  moved  in  recent  years 
to  cease  adding  to  this  burden  by  pro- 
viding most  FMS  financing  in  the  form 
of  forgiven  funding,  which  does  not  re- 
quire repayment. 

The  Administration  is  also  sensi- 
tive to  congressional  concern  over  the 
uses  to  which  nonrepayable  FMS  fund- 
ing might  be  put  in  some  nations.  You 
should  be  aware  that  only  those  coun- 
tries which  previously  received  FMS 
credits  would  be  permitted  to  use  FMS 
financing  for  commercial  purchases. 
Thus,  many  countries  will  continue  to 
have  their  military  assistance  cases 
processed  entirely  through  the  highly 
professional  FMS  case  management 
system  administered  by  DSAA  [De- 
fense Security  Assistance  Agency]  and 
the  military  services. 

The  Administration  will  soon  pre- 
sent its  own  foreign  aid  authorization 
bill  on  security  assistance  and  related 
issues.  The  purpose  of  this  legislation, 
in  large  measure,  is  to  seek  greater 
flexibility  for  the  executive  branch  to 
best  serve  our  foreign  policy  and  na- 
tional security  interests  at  a  time  of  se- 
vere resource  constraints.  Among  the 
substantive  proposals  we  are  consider- 
ing in  that  bill  are: 

•  A  "fair  pricing"  proposal,  build- 
ing upon  last  year's  legislation  bene- 
fiting Israel  and  Egypt,  to  stretch 
scarce  assistance  resources  and  bolster 
U.S.  competitiveness  by  relieving  all 
FMS  customers  of  charges  for  various 
fixed  and  sunken  costs  incurred  by  the 
Department  of  Defense; 

•  An  extension  of  authority  for  the 
NATO  southern  region  amendment; 
and 

•  Authorization  for  limited 
amounts  of  excess  defense  articles 

to  be  granted  to  Western  Hemisphere 
military  and  law  enforcement  units, 
primarily  for  the  purpose  of  their  ac- 
tive participation  in  antinarcotics 
programs. 


Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  I  wish  to  emphasize  a 
point  which  I  made  at  the  beginning  o 
my  testimony.  U.S.  security  assistanc 
continues  to  play  a  vital  role  within  th 
overall  context  of  U.S.  foreign  and  na 
tional  security  policy.  Despite  the  posi 
tive  international  trends  over  the  past 
year,  dangers  and  uncertainities  con- 
front a  number  of  countries  of  impor- 
tance to  us.  Key  U.S.  friends  and  allie 
throughout  the  world  must  continue  to 
rely  on  us  to  provide  essential  assis- 
tance to  preserve  their  freedom.  The 
United  States  must  continue  to  be  see 
as  a  reliable  security  partner  to  these 
nations,  if  it  is  to  retain  their  trust  an 
cooperation. 

A  continuation  of  the  trend  towarc 
sharply  lower  and  more  politically  con 
strained  aid  programs  could  threaten 
U.S.  access  and  influence  in  many  key 
regions  over  the  coming  years,  imply- 
ing a  tacit  retreat  from  U.S.  global 
interests  and  responsibilities  and  con- 
straining U.S.  force  projection  around 
the  world.  By  contrast,  the  resource  n 
quirements  to  adequately  fund  these 
programs  remain  extraordinarily  moc 
est.  A  margin  of  a  few  hundred  millioi 
dollars  can  make  the  difference  be- 
tween an  efficient  and  effective  foreigi 
policy  and  one  which  must  struggle  at 
the  margins  to  defend  U.S.  interests. 
It  is  up  to  us  to  supply  the  needed  re- 
sources, as  and  where  necessary,  to 
help  partners  and  allies  to  defend 
themselves  against  overt  aggression, 
low-intensity  conflicts,  and  the  ever- 
growing threats  from  narcotics  traf- 
ficking and  terrorism.  In  this  endeavc 
we  need  your  help  to  obtain  more  con- 
sistent and  flexibile  assistance  fund- 
ing, so  that  the  security  of  the  United 
States  can  continue  to  be  ensured 
against  the  multiple  threats  which  fac 
us  now  and  surely  will  face  us  in  the 
years  ahead. 


itr 


1(1 
ill 


f 


■The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  an 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  ( 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  198; 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


.S.  Support  for  Democracy 
nd  Peace  in  Central  America 


TRODUCTION 


a  White  House  news  briefing  on 
u-eh  24,  1989,  President  George  Bush 
d  Secretary  of  State  James  A.  Baker, 
,  along  with  House  Speaker  James 
ight.  Senate  Majority  Leader  Geor- 
Mitchell,  Senate  Minority  Leader 
bert  Dole,  House  Majority  Leader 
onias  Foley,  and  House  Minority 
ader  Robert  Michel,  announced  a  bi- 
ftisan  accord  articulating  U.S.  sup- 
i-t  for  peace,  security,  and  the 
jcess  of  continued  democratization 
■oughout  Central  America.  The 
reement  also  calls  for  the  establish- 
nt  of  open,  representative  govern- 
nt  in  Nicaragua;  an  end  to 
?araguan  assistance  to  subversive 
)ups  in  neighboring  countries;  and  a 
t  to  Soviet-bloc  military  aid  that  im- 
iges  on  U.S.  and  regional  security. 

The  accord  parallels  regional  efforts 
.fted  by  the  five  Central  American 
'sidents,  including  the  August  7,  1987, 
ntral  American  Peace  Plan  (Es- 
pulas  II)  authored  by  Costa  Rican 
jsident  Oscar  Arias,'  and  the  joint 
;larations  of  the  Central  American 
!sidents  in  their  meetings  at  San 
•e,  Costa  Rica,  on  January  IG,  1988, 
1  at  El  Tesoro,  El  Salvador,  on  Febru- 
/  14,  1989.  Aside  from  promoting  a 
rable  regional  peace  and  political  re- 
m,  these  initiatives  sought  to  encour- 
'  democratization  in  Nicaragua  and, 
the  same  time,  promote  a  voluntary 
)atriation  of  rebel  forces  in  Central 
lerica  under  safe,  democratic 
iditions. 

The  U.S.  bipartisan  accord  is  in- 
ided  to  complement  these  regional  ef- 
ts, in  part  by  providing  humanitarian 

to  the  Nicaraguan  Resistance  while 
'  process  of  democratization  in 
;aragua  has  a  renewed  opportunity  to 
ve  forward. 


With  members  of  the  congressional  leadership,  President  Bush  announced  the  Biparti- 
san Accord  on  Central  America  on  March  24,  1989.  With  him  (left  to  right)  were  House 
Majority  Leader  Thomas  S.  Foley,  Senate  Majority  Leader  George  J.  Mitchell,  House  Re- 
publican Leader  Robert  H.  Michel,  Secretary  of  State  Baker,  Senate  Republican  Leader 
Robert  Dole,  and  Speaker  of  the  House  James  C.  Wright,  Jr. 


PRESIDENTBUSH, 
MAR.  24,  19892 

The  president  of  a  Central  American 
democracy  was  asked  recently  what  is 
the  most  important  step  the  United 
States  can  take.  He  said,  "Speak  with 
one  voice."  Today,  for  the  first  time  in 
many  years,  the  President  and  Con- 
gress, the  Democratic  and  Republican 
leadership  in  the  House  and  Senate, 
are  speaking  with  one  voice  about 
Central  America. 

In  my  inaugural  address  I  reached 
out  my  hand  to  the  leadership  of  Con- 
gress in  both  parties  asking  them  to 
join  with  me  to  rebuild  a  bipartisan  for- 
eign policy  based  on  trust  and  common 
purpose.  Today,  I  am  gratified  that  the 
Speaker  and  the  Majority  and  Minority 
Leaders  of  the  Senate  and  House  have 
extended  their  hands  back  to  me. 

We  have  signed  today  together  a 
Bipartisan  Accord  on  Central  America. 
It  sets  out  the  broad  outlines  of  U.S. 
policy  toward  that  troubled  region  and 
commits  both  the  e.xecutive  and  Con- 
gress to  work  together  to  achieve  it. 

The  goals  we  seek  are  the  goals 
which  the  people  of  Central  America 
yearn  for:  democracy,  security,  and 


peace.  Those  are  the  pledges  made  by 
the  Central  American  Presidents  in  the 
Esquipulas  II  accord.  That  agreement 
is  an  integrated  whole:  all  of  its  provi- 
sions must  move  forward  together  if 
any  of  them  is  to  be  fulfilled.  Our  chal- 
lenge now  is  to  turn  those  promises 
into  concrete  realities  on  the  ground. 

The  only  way  we  can  meet  that 
challenge  is  if  Latin  democratic  leaders 
and  the  United  States  work  together, 
with  the  support  of  our  European 
friends  and  allies,  as  true  partners 
with  candor  and  mutual  respect.  I  be- 
lieve Latin  leaders  are  asking  for  that 
kind  of  relationship  as  we  confront  to- 
gether the  many  challenges  facing  our 
hemisphere.  As  President,  I  pledge  the 
United  States  is  ready  to  respond. 

Under  this  Central  America  agree- 
ment, insurgent  forces  have  the  right 
to  reintegrate  into  their  homeland  un- 
der safe,  democratic  conditions  with 
full  civil  and  political  rights.  That  is 
the  desire  of  the  Nicaraguan  Resis- 
tance. It  is  what  they  are  fighting  for. 
We  hope  and  believe  it  can  be  achieved 
through  a  concerted  diplomatic  effort 
to  enforce  this  regional  agreement. 

To  achieve  these  goals  the  biparti- 
san leadership  of  Congress  has  agreed 
to  support  my  request  for  continued 


-•»  rxt  Ct^to  Diillc^tin/  liina  1  QRQ 


55 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


humanitarian  assistance  to  the  Nicara- 
guan  Resistance  through  the  elec- 
tions scheduled  in  Nicaragua  for  Febru- 
ary 28,  1990. 

There  will  be  extensive  consulta- 
tions and  review  with  respect  to  these 
funds  effective  November  30,  1989,  by 
the  bipartisan  leadership  and  relevant 
committees.  However,  I  have  been 
assured  that  the  leadership  in  both 
Houses  supports  the  extension  of  this 
assistance  through  the  Nicaraguan 
elections,  barring  unforeseen 
circumstances. 

There  is  no  shortcut  to  democracy; 
no  quick  fix.  The  next  weeks  and 
months  will  demand  patience  and  per- 
severance by  the  democratic  commu- 
nity and  the  hard,  technical  work 
of  ensuring  compliance  with  the 
Esquipulas  accord.  The  United  States 
will  work  in  good  faith  to  support  that 
kind  of  diplomatic  effort,  but  we  will 
not  support  a  paper  agreement  that 
sells  out  the  Nicaraguan  people's  right 
to  be  free. 

We  do  not  claim  the  right  to  order 
the  politics  of  that  country.  This  is  for 
the  people  of  Nicaragua  to  decide.  We 
support  what  the  Esquipulas  accord  re- 
quires: free,  open,  political  processes 
in  which  all  groups  can  fairly  and  safe- 
ly compete  for  political  leadership. 
That  means  the  playing  field  must  be 
level;  all,  including  the  current  govern- 
ment, must  respect  the  majority's  deci- 
sion in  the  end,  and  the  losers  must  also 
retain  the  political  rights  to  operate  as 
a  legal  opposition  and  contest  again  for 
political  authority  in  the  next  recur- 
ring election  contest. 

The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  San- 
dinista  government  to  do  something  it 
has  steadfastly  refused  to  do  from  1979 
to  1989:  to  keep  its  promises  to  the 
Nicaraguan  people  to  permit  real  de- 
mocracy; keep  its  promises  to  its  neigh- 
bors not  to  support  subversion  in 
Central  America;  and  keep  its  obliga- 
tion to  this 

hemisphere  not  to  permit  the  establish- 
ment of  Soviet-bloc  bases  in  Central 
America.  If  those  promises  are  kept, 
we  have  an  opportunity  to  start  a  new 
day  in  Central  America;  but  if  those 
pledges  continue  to  be  violated,  we 
hope  and  expect  that  other  nations  will 
find  ways  to  join  us  to  condemn  those 
actions  and  reverse  those  processes. 

The  Soviet  Union  also  has  an  obli- 
gation and  an  opportunity:  to  demon- 
strate that  its  proclaimed  commitment 
to  "new  thinking"  is  more  than  a  tacti- 
cal response  to  temporary  setbacks  but 
represents  instead  a  new  principled  ap- 
proach to  foreign  policy. 


/  GUATEWALA  ^ 

f  ,  ''  HONDURAS  /'I 

.  I  Guatemala        \       ,  .-f^-^' 

^  ^       Tegucigalpa         ^ 

San  Salvador  ^  ., ^       )     ^jicaraqua 

EL  SALVADOR     '^"^ 

V     ^Managua 


Pacific  Ocean 


Boondarv  lepresentatioii  c;  not  necessarily  authontalive 


In  other  regional  conflicts  around 
the  world,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
adopted  a  welcome  new  approach  that 
has  helped  resolve  longstanding  prob- 
lems in  constructive  ways.  In  Central 
America  what  we  have  seen  from  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Cuba  can  only  be  de- 
scribed as  "old  thinking." 

In  the  last  decade,  the  Soviet  bloc 
has  poured  at  least  .$50  billion  in  aid 
into  Cuba  and  Nicaragua.  Soviet  and 
Cuban  aid  is  building  in  Nicaragua  a 
military  machine  larger  than  all  the 
armies  of  the  other  Central  American 
nations  combined  and  continues  to  fi- 
nance violence,  revolution,  and  destruc- 
tion against  the  democratically  elected 
Government  of  El  Salvador.  Indeed, 
Soviet-bloc  military  support  for  the 
Marxist  guerrillas  [in  El  Salvador]  has 
increased  since  the  United  States 
ended  military  support  for  the 
Nicaraguan  Resistance,  and  Soviet 
military  aid  to  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  continues  at  levels  wholly 
uncalled  for  by  any  legitimate  defen- 
sive needs.  The  continuation  of  these 
levels  of  Soviet-bloc  aid  into  Central 
America  raises  serious  questions  about 
Soviet  attitudes  and  intentions  toward 
the  United  States. 


The  Soviet  Union  has  no  legitima  i(i 
security  interest  in  Central  America, 
and  the  United  States  has  many.  We 
reject  any  doctrine  of  equivalence  of 
interest  in  this  region  as  a  basis  for  n 
gotiations.  Instead,  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Cuba  have  an  obligation  to  the 
leaders  of  Central  America  to  stop  vi( 
lating  the  provisions  of  the  Esquipula 
accord,  which  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Cuba  both  pledged  to  uphold.  The  tim 
to  begin  is  now. 

In  signing  the  Esquipulas  accord. 
President  Oscar  Arias  of  Costa  Rica 
said:  "Without  democracy,  there  can  b 
no  peace  in  Central  America."  He  is 
right.  But  with  democracy  and  peace 
Central  America  can  come  new  hope  1 
economic  development  in  which  all  of 
the  people  of  the  region  can  share.  On 
can  look  at  the  terrible  violence  ravag 
ing  Central  America  and  despair,  but 
have  a  different  vision  of  its  future. 

I  can  see  a  democratic  Central 
America  in  which  all  of  the  nations  of 
the  region  live  in  peace  with  each  oth 
er;  where  the  citizens  of  the  region  ar 
safe  from  the  violence  of  the  state  or 
from  revolutionary  guerrillas;  where 
resources  now  devoted  to  military  de 
fense  could  be  channeled  to  build  hosg 
tals,  homes,  and  schools.  That  is  not  a 
dream  if  all  the  people  and  nations  of 
the  Americas  will  it  to  be  true.  I  hop( 
the  Esquipulas  accord  and  perhaps, 
also,  the  bipartisan  accord,  will  some 
day  be  seen  as  the  first  step  toward  i1 
fulfillment. 


? 


SECRETARY  BAKER. 
MAR.  24,  1989 

I  think  if  you  examine  American  for- 
eign policy  throughout  the  postwar  ei 
one  truth  certainly  shines  through. 
From  President  Truman's  support  for 
NATO  to  President  Reagan's  INF 
[intermediate  range  nuclear  forces] 
agreement,  every  important  achieve- 
ment has  enjoyed  sustained  bipartisa 
support.  A  bipartisan  foreign  policy  i 
based  on  honest  and  honorable  discus- 
sion and  debate.  It's  not  based  on  sup- 
pressing legitimate  differences.  In  th 
end,  it  is  also,  I  think,  based  on  a  rec- 
ognition that  we  are,  after  all,  one  pe 
pie;  we  are  one  nation;  and  we  must 
have  one  consistent  foreign  policy. 

Today,  we've  taken  the  first  impoi 
tant  steps  toward  building  a  successfi 
bipartisan  policy  in  Central  America. 
If  asked  to  summarize  that  policy  in 
one  word,  I  would  say  democracy.  To 


il 


^^*       ^*       C*»«:« 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


ther  we  want  the  people  of  Nicara- 
la,  as  well  as  all  others  in  Central 
merica,  to  be  able  to  participate 
eely  and  fully  in  democracy.  And 
w,  together,  the  executive  branch 
id  the  Congress  will  work  to  ensure 
at  the  promises  of  democracy  in 
icaragua  become  democracy  in  fact. 
I  want  to  salute  the  Speaker,  the 
her  leaders  here,  and  many,  many 
hers  in  the  Senate  and  the  House 
lose  dedication  and  hard  work  and 
rseverance  made  this  agreement  pos- 
)le.  They  have  performed  as  leaders 
the  very  best  sense  of  that  term. 


PARTISAN  ACCORD  ON 
ANTRAL  AMERICA, 

AR.  24,  1989^ 

le  executive  and  the  Congress  are 
ited  today  in  support  of  democracy, 
ace,  and  security  in  Central  Ameri- 

The  United  States  supports  the 
ace  and  democratization  process  and 
e  goals  of  the  Central  American  Pres- 
ints  embodied  in  the  Esquipulas  ac- 
'd.  The  United  States  is  committed 
working  in  good  faith  with  the  demo- 
fttic  leaders  of  Central  America  and 
(tin  America  to  translate  the  bright 
imises  of  Esquipulas  II  into  concrete 
dities  on  the  ground. 

With  regard  to  Nicaragua,  the 
rlted  States  is  united  in  its  goals:  de- 
icratization;  an  end  to  subversion  and 
stabilization  of  its  neighbors;  an  end 
Soviet-bloc  military  ties  that  threat- 
U.S.  and  regional  security.  Today 
i  executive  and  the  Congress  are 
ited  on  a  policy  to  achieve  those 
als. 

To  be  successful  the  Central  Amer- 
n  peace  process  cannot  be  based  on 
3mises  alone.  It  must  be  based  on 
'dible  standards  of  compliance,  strict 
letables  for  enforcement,  and  effec- 
e,  ongoing  means  to  verify  both  the 
mocratic  and  security  requirements 
those  agreements.  We  support  the 
3  of  incentives  and  disincentives  to 
lieve  these  U.S.  policy  objectives. 

We  also  endorse  an  open,  consulta- 
e  process,  with  bipartisanship  as  the 
.tchword  for  the  development  and  suc- 
3s  of  a  unified  policy  toward  Central 
nerica.  The  Congress  recognizes  the 
ed  for  consistency  and  continuity  in 
licy  and  the  responsibility  of  the  ex- 
utive  to  administer  and  carry  out 
at  policy,  the  programs  based  upon 
and  to  conduct  American  diplomacy 
the  region.  The  executive  will  con- 
It  regularly  and  report  to  the  Con- 


gress on  progress  in  meeting  the  goals 
of  the  peace  and  democratization  proc- 
ess, including  the  use  of  assistance  as 
outlined  in  this  accord. 

Under  Esquipulas  II  and  the  El 
Salvador  accord,  insurgent  forces  are 
supposed  to  voluntarily  reintegrate 
into  their  homeland  under  safe,  demo- 
cratic conditions.  The  United  States 
shall  encourage  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  and  the  Nicaraguan  Resis- 
tance to  continue  the  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities currently  in  effect. 

To  implement  our  purposes,  the  ex- 
ecutive will  propose — and  the  biparti- 
san leadership  of  the  Congress  will  act 
promptly  after  the  Easter  recess  to 
extend — humanitarian  assistance 
at  current  levels  to  the  Resistance 
through  February  28,  1990,  noting  that 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has 
agreed  to  hold  new  elections  under  in- 
ternational supervision  just  prior  to 
that  date.  Those  funds  shall  also  be 
available  to  support  voluntary  rein- 
tegration or  voluntary  regional  reloca- 
tion by  the  Nicaraguan  Resistance. 
Such  voluntary  reintegration  or  volun- 
tary regional  relocation  assistance 
shall  be  provided  in  a  manner  suppor- 
tive of  the  goals  of  the  Central  Ameri- 
can nations,  as  expressed  in  the 
Esquipulas  II  agreement  and  the  El 
Salvador  accord,  including  the  goal  of 
democratization  within  Nicaragua  and 
the  reintegration  plan  to  be  developed 
pursuant  to  those  accords. 

We  believe  that  democratization 
should  continue  throughout  Central 
America  in  those  nations  in  which  it  is 
not  yet  complete,  with  progress  toward 
strengthening  of  civilian  leadership, 
the  defense  of  human  rights,  the  rule  of 
law  and  functioning  judicial  systems, 
and  consolidation  of  free,  open,  and 
safe,  political  processes  in  which  all 
groups  and  individuals  can  fairly  com- 
pete for  political  leadership.  We  believe 
that  democracy  and  peace  in  Central 
America  can  create  the  conditions  for 
economic  integration  and  development 
that  can  benefit  all  the  people  of  the  re- 
gion and  pledge  ourselves  to  examine 
new  ideas  to  further  those  worthy 
goals. 

While  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba 
both  publicly  endorsed  the  Esquipulas 
agreement,  their  continued  aid  and 
support  of  violence  and  subversion  in 
Central  America  is  in  direct  violation 
of  that  regional  agreement.  The  United 
States  believes  that  President  Gor- 
bachev's impending  visit  to  Cuba  repre- 
sents an  important  opportunity  for 


both  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba  to  end 
all  aid  that  supports  subversion  and  de- 
stabilization  in  Central  America,  as 
President  Arias  has  requested,  and  as 
the  Central  American  peace  process 
demands. 

The  U.S.  Government  retains  ulti- 
mate responsibility  to  define  its  nation- 
al interests  and  foreign  policy,  and 
nothing  in  this  accord  shall  be  inter- 
preted to  infringe  on  that  respon- 
sibility. The  United  States  need  not 
spell  out  in  advance  the  nature  or  type 
of  action  that  would  be  undertaken  in 
response  to  threats  to  U.S.  national  se- 
curity interests.  Rather  it  should  be 
sufficient  to  simply  make  clear  that 
such  threats  will  be  met  by  any  appro- 
priate constitutional  means.  The  spirit 
of  trust,  bipartisanship,  and  common 
purpose  expressed  in  this  accord  be- 
tween the  executive  and  the  Congress 
shall  continue  to  be  the  foundation  for 
its  full  implementation  and  the  achieve- 
ment of  democracy,  security,  and  peace 
in  Central  America. 

George  Bush 

President  of  the  United  States 

James  C.  Wricht,  Jr. 
Speaker  of  the  House 

George  J.  Mitchell 
Senate  Majority  Leader 

Thomas  S.  Foley 
House  Majority  Leader 

Robert  Dole 

Senate  Republican  Leader 

Robert  H.  Michel 
House  Republican  Leader 


JOINT  DECLARATION  AT  SAN 
JOSE  (ALAJUELA),  COSTA  RICA, 
JAN.  16,  1988 

The  Presidents  have  received  the  find- 
ings of  the  report  of  the  International 
Commission  for  Verification  and 
Follow-up,  prepared  in  accordance  with 
item  11  of  Esquipulas  II,  with  the  res- 
ervations some  have  indicated. 

The  Presidents  acknowledge  the 
endeavor  and  the  enormous  work  done 
by  the  Commission,  which  it  thanks  for 
its  dedication  and  effort  in  contributing 
to  the  fulfillment  of  the  Esquipulas  II 
agreement. 


^«  0»«..*A   D.ill#. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


The  Presidents  entrust  the  Execu- 
tive Commission  with  the  task  of  exam- 
ining the  general  report  when  it  has 
been  received  and  to  make  any  perti- 
nent recommendations. 

The  Presidents  confirm  the  histor- 
ic value  and  the  importance  of  Es- 
quipulas,  the  concept  and  spirit  of 
which  they  recognize  and  renew  today 
as  vital  to  the  achievement  of  democra- 
tization and  peace  in  the  region. 

Inasmuch  as  the  commitments  of 
Esquipulas  II  have  not  been  entirely 
fulfilled,  they  [the  Presidents]  under- 
take to  fulfill  unconditional  and  uni- 
lateral obligations  for  which  total  and 
mandatory  compliance  is  required  of 
the  governments.  Among  these  obliga- 
tions are  dialogue,  talks  for  the  coor- 
dination of  a  cease-fire,  general 
amnesty  and,  above  all,  democratiza- 
tion, which  shall  include  the  lifting  of 
the  state  of  emergency,  total  freedom  of 
the  press,  political  pluralism,  and  ter- 
mination of  the  use  of  special  courts. 
The  aforementioned  commitments  yet 
to  be  fulfilled  by  the  governments  shall 
immediately  be  fulfilled  publicly  and 
openly. 

FYilfillment  of  the  agreements  of 
the  Esquipulas  II  document  involves 
commitments,  observance  of  which  by 
the  governments  is  subject  to  essential 
and  specific  verification,  especially  for 
the  suspension  of  aid  to  irregular 
groups,  the  non-use  of  territory  to  sup- 
port same,  and  genuine  freedom  of  elec- 
toral processes,  which  shall  be  verified 
by  the  National  Reconciliation  Commis- 
sion, with  special  emphasis  on  the 
elections  for  the  Central  American 
Parliament — all  of  this  "as  an  indispen- 
sable element  for  the  achievement  of  a 
stable  and  lasting  peace  in  the  region." 

The  principal  functions  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive Commission,  the  members  of 
which  are  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Re- 
lations of  the  Central  American  States, 
shall  be  verification,  control,  and 
follow-up  of  the  commitments  contained 
in  the  Guatemala  Accord  and  in  this 
declaration.  To  that  end,  it  shall  seek 
the  cooperation  of  regional  or  extra- 
regional  States  or  organizations  of  rec- 
ognized impartiality  and  technical 
capacity  that  have  manifested  a  desire 
to  assist  in  the  peace  process  in  Cen- 
tral America. 

In  addition,  the  fulfillment  of  Es- 
quipulas II  involves  the  follow-up  of 
those  obligations  that  encompass  an  al- 
ready established  strategy,  such  as  the 
regulation  of  arms  levels  and  security 
and  disarmament  agreements. 


We  should  like  to  express  our  ap- 
preciation to  the  international  commu- 
nity for  the  political  and  financial 
support  it  has  pledged  with  a  view  to 
promoting  regional  projects  directed 
toward  attaining  economic  and  social 
development  in  Central  America,  as  an 
objective  directly  related  to  achieving, 
preserving,  and  strengthening  peace. 
Because  the  primary  causes  of  this  con- 
flict are  economic  and  social,  it  is  not 
possible  to  achieve  peace  without 
development. 

The  Presidents,  conscious  of  their 
historic  responsibility  to  their  peoples, 
reaffirm  their  desire  for  fulfillment  in 
the  manner  expressed,  which  they  view 
as  irrevocable  and  inalterable,  pledg- 
ing to  fulfill  the  remaining,  unmet 
obligations  unhesitatingly  and  unequiv- 
ocally, aware  that  their  peoples  and  the 
international  community  will  judge 
their  compliance  with  obligations  un- 
dertaken in  good  faith. 


JOINT  DECLARATION  AT  EL 
TESORO.  EL  SALVADOR, 
FEB.  14,  1989 

The  Presidents  of  El  Salvador,  Guate- 
mala, Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa 
Rica,  meeting  in  the  province  of  La  Paz 
in  the  Republic  of  El  vSalvador  on  Feb- 
ruary 13  and  14,  1989,  analyzed  the  sta- 
tus of  the  Central  American  peace 
process  and  adopted  decisions  neces- 
sary for  its  effective  observance  based 
on  the  understanding  that  the  commit- 
ments assumed  under  Esquipulas  II 
and  Alajuela  Declaration  constitute  a 
harmonious  and  indivisible  whole. 

The  Presidents  of  Costa  Rica,  El 
Salvador,  Guatemala  and  Honduras 
were  informed  of  the  willingness  ex- 
pressed by  the  constitutional  President 
of  Nicaragua,  Daniel  Ortega  Saavedra, 
to  establish  an  process  of  democratiza- 
tion and  national  reconciliation  in  his 
country,  within  the  framework  of  the 
Esquipulas  II  Accords  and  in  keeping 
with  the  following  actions,  among 
others: 

Once  reforms  have  been  made  in 
electoral  legislation  and  in  laws  regu- 
lating the  expression  of  ideas,  informa- 
tion, and  the  structure  of  public  opinion 
in  such  a  way  as  to  guarantee  political 
organization  and  action  in  the  broadest 
sense  for  political  parties,  an  initial 
four-month  j^eriod  for  the  preparation, 
organization,  and  mobilization  of  the 
parties  will  be  opened.  Immediately 
following  the  expiration  of  that  period, 
a  new  six-month  period  of  political  ac- 


tivity will  begin,  at  the  end  of  which 
elections  for  President,  Vice  Presiden 
and  representatives  to  the  National  A 
sembly,  municipalities,  and  the  Centri 
American  Parliament  will  be  held. 
Elections  shall  take  place  no  later  tha 
February  25,  1990,  unless  the  Govern- 
ment and  opposition  political  parties 
mutually  agree  that  they  should  be  he 
on  another  date. 

The  Government  of  Nicaragua  wi 
form  a  Supreme  Electoral  Council  wit 
a  balanced  participation  of  representa 
fives  from  the  opposition  political  par 
ties.  In  this  respect,  the  Presidents 
call  on  the  Nicaraguan  political  partit 
to  participate  in  the  electoral  process. 

International  observers,  especial 
delegates  of  the  Secretaries  General  c 
the  United  Nations  and  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States,  will  be  invit' 
to  be  present  in  all  the  electoral  dis- 
tricts during  the  two  aforementioned 
stages  in  order  to  certify  the  integrit 
of  the  process. 

The  Government  of  Nicaragua  wi 
guarantee  the  free  functioning  of  the 
communications  media  by  reviewing 
and  modifying  the  law  on  the  media. 
Furthermore,  it  will  guarantee  equal 
access  in  terms  of  broadcasting  sched 
ules  and  air  time  on  the  state  televisi( 
and  radio  stations  for  all  parties.  The 
Government  of  Nicaragua  will  autho- 
rize all  communications  media  to  sup- 
ply themselves  from  within  the  count: 
or  abroad,  at  their  convenience,  with 
all  materials,  instruments,  and  equip 
ment  necessary  to  fully  perform  theii 
functions. 

In  accordance  with  the  proposal 
the  President  of  Nicaragua,  and  at  thi 
initiative  of  the  President  of  Hondura 
the  Central  American  Presidents  un- 
dertake to  formulate,  within  a  period 
of  no  more  than  90  days,  a  joint  plan  f 
the  voluntary  demobilization,  repatri; 
tion,  or  relocation  in  Nicaragua  and  ii 
third  countries  of  Nicaraguan  Resis- 
tance members  and  their  families.  Fo 
that  purpose  the  Presidents  will  re- 
quest technical  assistance  from  spe- 
cialized agencies  of  the  United  Nation 

In  order  to  contribute  to  the  cre- 
ation of  conditions  for  the  voluntary  d 
mobilization,  relocation,  or  repatriati( 
of  Nicaraguans  who  have  been  involve 
in  direct  or  indirect  armed  activities 
and  who  are  in  Honduran  territory,  tl 
Government  of  Nicaragua  has  decided 
to  proceed  with  the  release  of  prison-  L 
ers,  in  keeping  with  the  classification 
made  by  the  Inter-American  Commis-  j 
sion  on  Human  Rights.  .^ 


:l): 
lit 


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58 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  19£l 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Said  plan  will  also  contemplate  as- 
stance  for  the  demobilization  of  all 
lose  persons  who  were  or  are  involved 
armed  actions  in  countries  of  the  re- 
lon,  when  they  voluntai-ily  i-equest  it. 

In  order  to  comply  with  the  com- 
itments  on  verification  of  security, 
le  Executive  Committee  is  hereby 
larged  with  the  task  of  immediately 
itiating  technical  meetings  to  estab- 
sh  the  most  apjjropriate  and  efficient 
echanisms  for  verification,  in  accord- 
ice  with  the  talks  held  in  New  York 
ith  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
nited  Nations. 

The  Presidents  reaffirmed  the  au- 
lority  of  the  National  Reconciliation 
ommissions  to  continue  with  the  spe- 
fic  functions  of  verification  in  the 
eas  outlined  by  the  Guatemala  pro- 
dure  and  the  Alajuela  Declaration, 
lese  commissions  should  periodically 
form  the  E.xecutive  Committee  of  the 
suits  of  their  work. 

The  Central  American  Presidents 
iterated  as  firmly  as  possible  the  re- 
lest  contained  in  item  5  of  the  Es- 
lipulas  II  Accord  that  regional  and 
tra-regional  governments  which  ei- 
er  openly  or  covertly  supply  aid  to 
regular  forces  or  insurrectional 
ovements  in  the  area  immediately 
It  such  aid,  with  the  exception  of 
e  humanitarian  aid  that  contributes 
the  goals  of  this  document. 

The  Presidents  urge  all  sectors, 
pecially  in  the  insurrectional  move- 
^nts  and  irregular  forces  operating 
the  region,  to  join  the  constitutional 

«litical  process  in  each  country.  In 
is  spirit,  the  Presidents  appeal  to  all 
ctors  in  El  Salvador  to  participate  in 
e  next  elections. 

The  Presidents  reiterated  the  im- 
■rtance  of  the  Central  American  Par- 
iment  as  a  forum  where  all  peoples  of 
e  region,  by  means  of  free  and  direct 
sctions  of  representatives,  will  dis- 
ss and  draft  a])propriate  recom- 
sndations  regarding  the  political, 
onomic,  social,  and  cultural  problems 
Central  America. 

The  Presidents  issued  an  urgent 
ipeal  to  the  international  community 
support  the  process  of  socioeconomic 
covery  in  the  Central  American  na- 
ms,  both  in  the  short  and  medium 
rm,  given  the  seriousness  of  the  for- 
gn  debt  j^roblem  and  the  necessity  for 
covery  of  the  levels  of  intra-regional 
ade  as  the  fundamental  factor  for 
rengthening  the  process  of  integra- 
Dn.  Most  particularly,  the  Presidents 
quested  the  support  of  the  European 
ommunity  in  the  implementation  of  a 


program  of  restructuring,  reactivating 
and  strengthening  of  the  process  of  eco- 
nomic integration  on  the  Central  Amer- 
ican isthmus,  which  was  officially 
presented  in  Guatemala  this  past  Janu- 
ary. Similarly  they  received  with 
hearty  approval  the  report  by  the  In- 
ternational Commission  for  Central 
American  Recovery  and  Development, 
which  is  a  significant  contribution  to 
the  consolidation  of  democracy  and  the 
creation  of  a  system  of  social  and  eco- 
nomic well-being  and  justice  in  the 
region. 

The  Presidents  remain  primarily 
committed  to  seeking  directly  negoti- 
ated solutions  to  overcoming  the  con- 
flicts that  have  arisen  due  to  the 
Central  American  crisis. 

The  Presidents  agreed  to  create  a 
Central  American  Commission  on  the 
Environment  and  Development  as  a  re- 
gional mechanism  of  cooperation  to 
achieve  the  optimal  and  rational  use  of 
natural  resources  in  the  area,  control 
pollution,  and  reestablish  the  ecologi- 
cal balance.  The  Executive  Committee, 
at  its  next  meeting,  will  appoint  and 
immediately  convene  the  aforemen- 
tioned commission  so  that  it  may  draft 
an  agreement  to  regulate  its  character 
and  functions. 

Moreover,  the  Presidents  extended 
their  firm  support  to  the  International 


Conference  on  Central  American  Refu- 
gees to  be  held  in  Guatemala  in  May  of 
this  year.  This  conference  will  contrib- 
ute positively  to  the  search  for  solu- 
tions to  the  flow  of  refugees  and 
displaced  persons  affected  by  the  crisis 
in  the  region. 

The  Presidents  agreed  to  promote 
a  Regional  Cooperation  Accord  for  the 
elimination  of  illegal  drug  trafficking. 
To  that  end,  the  Executive  Committee 
will  draft  an  accord  to  be  delivered  to 
the  governments  concerned. 

Similarly,  the  Presidents  ex- 
pressed the  intention  of  their  govern- 
ments to  support  the  initiative  favoring 
the  drafting  of  a  convention  on  the 
rights  of  children  within  the  context  of 
the  United  Nations. 

The  Presidents  agreed  to  meet  in 
the  Republic  of  Honduras,  on  a  date  to 
be  determined  subsequently. 

The  Presidents  of  Guatemala, 
Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa  Rica 
thank  the  people  and  Government  of  El 
Salvador,  and  most  especially  its  Presi- 
dent, Jose  Napoleon  Duarte,  for  the 
hospitality  which  provided  the  appro- 
priate setting  for  this  meeting. 


1  For  text  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  1987. 
-Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Mar.  27,  1989.  ■ 


FY  1990  Assistance  Request 

for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


by  Michael  G.  Kozak 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Western  Heiniaphere  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  '2,  19S9.  Mr.  Kozak  is  Acting  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Inter-American 
Affairs  ^ 

This  is  a  time  of  challenge  and  of  some 
opportunity  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  American  interests  are  at 
stake,  and  democratic  gains  are  at  risk. 
Within  our  own  government,  it  is  also  a 
time  to  look  anew  at  programs.  The 
President  has  instructed  the  National 
Security  Council  to  review  the  range  of 
foreign  policy  and  national  security 
challenges  facing  the  nation.  The  Na- 
tional Security  Council  will  recommend 
to  the  President,  within  90  days,  op- 
tions for  U.S.  policy  designed  to  help 
shape  events  in  furtherance  of  U.S. 


goals  and  ideals.  These  policy  reviews 
are  underway.  The  President  and  Sec- 
retary of  State  will  consult  with  Con- 
gress as  they  design  and  implement 
policies  for  a  new  era.  They  recog- 
nize the  importance  of  a  bipartisan 
executive-legislative  policy  in  Central 
America. 

In  this  hemisphere,  as  we  organize 
ourselves  for  the  tasks  ahead,  we  must 
take  into  consideration  challenges  that 
cover  a  wide  spectrum. 

•  Drug  traffickers  are  better 
armed  and  organized  than  ever  before; 
their  illegal  operations  net  an  esti- 
mated $8  billion  annually.  Area  culti- 
vated grows  by  some  10%  a  year. 

•  Indebtedness  has  risen  to  over 
$400  billion,  up  from  $330  billion  when 
the  first  difficulties  were  experienced 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


in  1982.  A  market  naturally  oriented 
toward  the  United  States  is  less  able  to 
pay  for  the  exports  of  American  farms 
and  factories. 

•  Environmental  losses  from  burn- 
ing away  Amazon  rainforests  last  year 
added  up  to  80,000  square  miles  (larger 
than  the  combined  area  of  Denmark, 
Belgium,  Austria,  and  Switzei-land). 

•  Despite  important  new  peace 
openings,  political  extremism,  terror- 
ism, and  armed  conflicts  persist  in 
Central  America.  Although  U.S.  mili- 
tary aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Resistance 
ended  more  than  a  year  ago,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Cuba  have  increased  mili- 
tary aid  that  facilitates  Sandinista 
repression  at  home  and  aggression 
abroad. 

•  Insurgencies  also  plague  Peru 
and  Colombia.  Violence — political,  so- 
cial, and  criminal — has  escalated.  Mur- 
der is  the  leading  cause  of  death  for 
male  adults  (18-40)  in  Colombia  (where 
the  government  estimates  some  140  pri- 
vate groups  engage  in  murder). 

In  relation  to  the  magnitude  of 
these  challenges  and  their  importance 
to  our  interests,  U.S.  assistance  for 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  is 
very  modest.  Like  many  elements  of 
our  Federal  budget,  foreign  assistance 
levels  are  squeezed. 

In  FY  1988,  the  bilateral  assis- 
tance budget  for  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  was  the  lowest  in  years.  It 
included  $1,200.9  million  in  bilateral 
economic  aid — including  development 
assistance,  economic  support  fund 
(ESF),  PL  480,  and  narcotics  control 
activities — and  $143.9  million  in 
military  aid — including  international 
military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  and  military  assistance 
program-foreign  military  sales/grants. 
Total  economic  and  military  assistance 
for  Latin  America  in  1988  was  $1,344.8 
million— 10.09%  of  the  worldwide  assis- 
tance total. 

In  FY  1989,  available  resources  in- 
creased slightly:  estimated  obligations 
at  this  time  amount  to  $1,258.5  million 
in  economic  and  $164.9  million  in  mili- 
tary assistance  for  a  total  of  $1,423.4 
million— 10.95%  of  worldwide  funding. 
Even  so,  increased  earmarking  re- 
quired the  "zeroing  out" — complete 
elimination — of  elements  of  military  or 
economic  support  programs  in  some 
countries. 

For  FY  1990,  we  are  requesting 
$1,204.2  million  in  economic  aid  and 
$230.0  million  for  military  aid,  totaling 
$1,434.2  million,  which  would  amount 
to  9.76%  of  worldwide  assistance. 


U.S.  Bilateral  Assistance, 
FY  1990  Request 

Latin  America  and  Caribbean 
$1 .4  billion  (9.8%) 


Other 

$8  billion 

(54.4%) 


Egypt  and  Israel 
$5.3  billion  (35.8%) 


To  help  you  assess  our  FY  1990  re- 
quests, I  would  like  to  review  major  po- 
litical and  economic  trends  affecting 
U.S.  interests  in  the  hemisphere,  con- 
sider the  fundamental  principles  (sup- 
port of  democracy;  the  war  against 
illegal  narcotics;  and  the  search  for 
peace,  security,  and  development  in 
Central  America)  that  underly  our  for- 
eign assistance  requests  in  the  region, 
and  finally  focus  on  the  need  for  im- 
proved multinational  cooperation  and 
on  a  number  of  specific  cases  where  our 
approach  is  evolving  either  in  response 
to  changed  circumstances  or  to  new 
opportunities. 

Political  Trends 

The  democratic  transitions  of  the  past 
decade  in  Latin  America  and  the  Car- 
ibbean have  been  dramatic.  While 
these  transitions  have  been  the  product 
of  the  political  will  of  the  people  in  each 
country,  the  constant,  strong  biparti- 
san support  of  the  United  States  has 
been  an  important  contributing  factor. 
Through  a  joint  effort  of  the  execu- 
tive and  the  Congress,  our  message  has 
been  clear  and  constant. 


•  We  support  the  democratic  cent 
against  repression  or  threats  from  ei-  ''' 
ther  the  extreme  right  or  the  extreme 
left. 

•  We  will  not  acquiesce  in  militar 
takeovers  of  democratically  elected 
governments  regardless  of  the  short- 
term  interests  involved. 

•  We  will  support  democratic  gov- 
ernments threatened  by  insurgencies 
and  insist  on  respect  for  human  right; 

The  strength  of  this  message  has 
been  its  constancy.  We  send  the  same 
message  to  our  friends  and  to  our 
adversaries. 

The  democratic  institutions  emer 
ing  from  the  wave  of  transitions  from 
dictatorship  in  the  region  are  still  frt 
quently  strained  by  economic  crises 
that  erode  support  for  the  democratic 
center.  The  transition  from  authori- 
tarian to  democratic  rule  generated 
heightened  expectations  of  improved 
economic  as  well  as  political  conditioi 
Democratic  leaders  have  been  caught 
between  Scylla  and  Charybdis — the 
proverbial  rock  and  hard  place — as 
they  have  sought  to  adopt  responsible 
growth-oriented  policy  reforms.  Som 
have  achieved  notable  successes,  as  ii 
Colombia,  Uruguay,  and  Costa  Rica. 
But  all  too  often,  the  results  have 
ranged  from  failure  to  adopt  essentia 
reforms — thus  prolonging  the  econon 
misery — to  attempts  to  adopt  the  nee 
essary  reforms — thus  provoking  a  po] 
ular  backlash  against  the  reformers. 
The  uneven  results  have  raised  doubt 
about  the  generally  moderate  policies 
of  the  first  generation  of  democratic 
leaders. 

The  democratic  governments  of  t" 
region  also  face  active  or  potential  ch 
lenges  from  insurgents,  criminals,  or 
other  armed  minorities.  Such  condi- 
tions further  constrain  their  ability  t 
undertake  democratic  reforms  or  to 
fully  institutionalize  civilian  control 
over  the  military. 

Even  in  the  face  of  these  diffi- 
culties, however,  civilian  and  militarj 
leaders  have  both  shown  considerable 
adaptability.  In  Guatemala,  the  electa 
government  remains  under  assault 
from  a  reduced  but,  nonetheless,  leth 
insurgency,  and  civilian  and  military 
malcontents  have  produced  a  failed 
coup  attempt  and  much  talk.  But  the 
military  command  is  committed  to  ci- 
vilian rule  and  realizes  that  respect  f 
human  rights  is  critical  from  a  milita 
as  well  as  moral  standpoint.  In  El  Sal 
vador,  military  leaders  still  smart  at 
human  rights  criticism  of  their  conduc 


isn 


lur 


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m 


tlf 


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Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  19JI 


I- 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


the  war,  while  FMLN  [Farabundo 
arti  National  Liberation  Front]  atroc- 
es  receive  international  indifference, 
owever,  these  same  military  leaders, 
ow  no  evidence  of  wanting  to  reverse 
e  country's  substantial  democratic  de- 
lopment.  In  Peru,  there  has  been  no 
up  despite  deep  economic  troubles 
id  a  widening  insurgency.  And  in  Ar- 
ntina,  the  elected  government  and 
e  military  high  command  have  coop- 
ated  to  cope  with  several  military  re- 
ions  and  a  recent  attack  by  armed 
ftists  against  a  military  installation. 
The  democratic  trend,  in  fact,  still 
ows  signs  of  deepening.  The  power  of 
imocratic  aspirations  was  evident  in 
e  conduct  of  the  plebiscite  in  Chile 
5t  fall  and  the  unexpected  changes  in 
raguay  this  year.  Democratic  prac- 
e  still  typically  fails  the  ideal,  but 
e  cases  of  systematic  and  pervasive 
lure  are  becoming  increasingly  obvi- 
iS  to  everyone.  That  may  help  e.xplain 
eparations  for  a  presidential  election 
Panama  in  May  and  the  renewed 
mmitments  by  the  Ortega  regime  to 
imocratic  changes  in  Nicaragua. 

Under  these  circumstances,  un- 
ivering  U.S.  and  international  sup- 
irt  for  democratic  civilian  government 
(Critical,  both  to  avoid  potential  rever- 
Is  of  the  democratic  gains  already  in 
tiCe  and  to  promote  further  progress. 
He  security  and  economic  assistance 
tograms  proposed  for  FY  1990  are  an 
egral  part  of  that  support. 

■;onomic  Trends 

'ter  growing  rapidly  in  the  1960s  and 
70s,  Latin  America  has  experienced 
infully  low  economic  growth  during 
jis  decade:  overall  increases  in  gross 
tmestic  product  (GDP)  averaged  only 
!<%  in  real  terms  from  1980  to  1986.' 
al  per  capita  GDP  fell  by  2.1%  in  the 
me  period.  Modest  1987  recovery  was 
lowed  by  a  weaker  1988 
rformance. 

Inappropriate  economic  policies 
ve  been  the  main  cause  of  this  poor 
onomic  performance.  Despite  some 
ogress,  statist,  inward-looking  poli- 
;s  have  lowered  investor  confidence  at 
me  and  abroad.  Domestic  savings 
d  investment  have  dried  up,  and  capi- 
i  flight  exceeds  commercial  bank 
bt  in  some  countries.  Growth  also 
s  been  hindered  by  the  region's 
avy  external  debt  burden — at  year 
id  1988,  $401  billion— over  40% "of  the 
tal  debt  held  by  all  developing 
luntries. 


Forms  of  Bilateral  Aid 


Development  assistance  is  project  sup- 
port used  for  education,  management 
training,  and  some  small  business  develop- 
ment. It  also  funds  development  of  the  pri- 
vate sector  and  agriculture  and  finances 
health  and  nutrition  programs:  all  of  these 
to  increase  the  incomes  of  poor  rural  fami- 
lies to  meet  their  basic  needs. 

Food  for  Peace,  commonly  called  PL 
480,  provides  food  from  U.S.  Department 
of  Agriculture  stockpiles  to  those  nations 
that  are  too  poor  to  feed  all  of  their  people 
adequately.  The  food  provided  alleviates 
hunger  and  malnutrition  and  improves 
health.  One  of  our  most  successful  pro- 
grams, it  also  generates  local  currency,  in 
some  countries,  that  is  recycled  to  fund 
agricultural  development,  infrastructure 
improvements,  rural  education,  and  health 
programs. 

The  economic  support  fund  (ESF) 
advances  U.S.  economic  interests  by  offer- 
ing grant  or  loan  economic  assistance. 
These  funds  are  used  primarily  to  provide 
quick-disbursing  balance-of-payments  sup- 
port to  allow  time  for  local  economic  and 
financial  adjustments  to  take  effect. 

Through  the  provision  of  interna- 
tional narcotics  control  assistance,  the 
U.S.  Government  works  with  drug- 


producing  and  -trafficking  countries  to  en- 
courage cooperation  in  eradicating  crops 
at  their  source,  interdicting  narcotics  as 
they  are  trafficked,  and  in  reducing  the 
demand  for  drugs  in  foreign  countries. 

The  foreign  military  sales  financing 
program  (FMSF)  provides  grant  funds  for 
procurement  of  defense  articles  and  serv- 
ices to  help  strengthen  defense  capa- 
bilities. Without  grant  aid,  many  countries 
in  this  hemisphere  would  have  to  divert 
scarce  domestic  resources  from  economic 
development  efforts  in  order  to  purchase 
military  training  and  equipment.  FMSF 
essentially  replaces  the  military  assis- 
tance program  (MAP)  funding  in  Fy  1990. 

The  international  military  educa- 
tion and  training  (IMET)  program  is  a 
grant-aid,  low-cost  instrument  that  gives 
the  U.S.  Government  an  extremely  valuble 
channel  of  communication  and  influence 
with  foreign  military  organizations  and 
promotes  a  concept  of  professionalism  that 
includes  respect  for  democracy,  human 
rights,  and  social  justice.  Education  and 
training  for  the  professionalization  of  mili- 
tary officers  have  long  been  considered  to 
be  the  most  cost-effective  form  of  security 
assistance. 


U.S.  debt  strategy  is  based  on  re- 
newed growth,  with  increased  commer- 
cial and  official  lending  to  give  debtor 
countries  support  needed  for  politically 
difficult  economic  reforms,  the  essen- 
tial condition  for  resuming  growth.  But 
commercial  banks  have  reduced  their 
exposure  to  the  region,  and  debt  serv- 
ice payments  now  exceed  new  lending. 
Reversing  this  negative  net  resource 
transfer  is  an  essential  ingredient  of  a 
strategy  to  bring  sustainable  growth  to 
the  region. 

Low  growth  and  debt  service  bur- 
dens imperil  fragile  democracies  in  the 
region  as  key  countries  face  renewed 
populist  pressures  in  presidential  elec- 
tions this  year.  Latin  leaders,  individu- 
ally and  collectively  through  the  Group 
of  Eight  and  other  forums,  have  pushed 
for  some  form  of  negotiated  debt  relief 
to  give  debtors  more  "breathing  space" 
and  support  for  essential  economic 
reforms. 

We  will  need  to  encourage  all  gov- 
ernments of  the  region  to  undertake 
economic  policy  reform  on  an  acceler- 
ated basis  if  there  is  any  hope  that  they 
can  grow  and  cope  with  their  stagger- 
ing debt  burden. 


Our  debt  policy  review,  and  debt 
strategies  of  other  creditor  countries, 
will  have  an  important  bearing  on  the 
ultimate  economic  success  of  the  debtor 
countries.  Just  as  important,  however, 
is  the  need  to  keep  the  United  States 
and  other  import  markets  open.  We  can 
hardly  press  the  Latins  to  open  their 
economies,  and  encourage  export-led 
growth,  and  then  shut  lucrative  mar- 
kets to  them. 

The  most  important  element,  how- 
ever, of  any  economic  recovery  plan  is 
the  commitment  of  these  countries 
themselves.  Ultimately,  economic  and 
political  reforms  cannot  be  imposed 
from  outside;  the  benefits  of  such  re- 
forms need  to  be  seen  by  that  govern- 
ment itself,  and  appreciated  by  the 
people,  for  these  reforms  to  be  under- 
taken and  pursued  in  the  long  term. 

Support  for  Democracy 

Over  the  past  decade,  the  security  of 
the  United  States  and  the  security  of 
all  free  countries  of  this  hemisphere 
have  benefited  greatly  from  the  trend 
toward  democracy.  Though  further 


!!»»««■.«>«•<%«*  ««<  0*a4m 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Proposed  FY  1990  Assistance  to 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


FMSF 
(12%) 


IMET 
(2%) 


Narcotics 
Control 
(18%) 


PL  480 
(22%) 


Development 

Assistance 

(26%) 


progress  is  required,  respect  for  hu- 
man rights  has  improved  in  all  the  non- 
Marxist  and  nondictatorial  states  of 
Latin  America.  The  marked  reduction 
in  the  number  of  human  rights  abuses 
in  recent  years  parallels  the  spread  and 
consolidation  of  democracy:  where  dem- 
ocratic government  has  taken  root,  the 
human  rights  situation  has  changed  for 
the  better. 

The  democratic  trend  not  only  ac- 
cords with  our  deepest  values  but 
serves  our  national  interest.  We  enjoy 
the  most  constructive  long-term  rela- 
tionships with  countries  where  govern- 
ment is  founded  on  the  consent  of  the 
governed.  Our  ability  to  cooperate  in- 
creases in  direct  proportion  to  the  val- 
ues and  institutions  on  which  we  and 
our  partners  find  we  can  agree. 

U.S.  security  assistance  plays  an 
important  role  in  this  progress  by  help- 
ing military  institutions  develop  confi- 
dence in  democratic  systems  and  by 
increasing  military  loyalty  to  the  civil- 
ian and  constitutional  authorities  with 
whom  we  are  cooperating. 

Democracy  has  become  the  touch- 
stone of  relations  in  the  hemisphere.  A 
reversal  of  the  movement  to  democracy 
anywhere  will  be  rejected  by  us,  as  it 
will  be  by  all  the  democracies  in  the 
region. 


Narcotics  and  Narcoterrorism 

Economic  difficulties  are  not  the  only 
challenge  to  regional  democracy.  Nar- 
cotics traffickers  have  the  resources 
and  influence  to  undermine  the  stabil- 
ity and  integrity  of  these  governments. 
Terrorists,  often  in  league  with  narcot- 
ics traffickers,  prey  on  the  poor  of  the 
region  promising  what  Marxism  has 
never  been  able  to  deliver. 

Narcotics  trafficking  based  in  the 
Andes  seriously  threatens  the  stability 
of  the  governments  of  the  region  and 
the  well-being  of  families  and  neighbor- 
hoods across  the  United  States.  The 
President,  Congress,  and  the  public 
are  rightfully  demanding  that  we  do 
much  more. 

One  of  the  more  promising  new 
paths  is  more  active  involvement  by 
military  forces.  The  current,  imagina- 
tive Colombian  military  campaign 
against  combined  Revolutionary 
Armed  Forces  of  Colombia  (FARC)/ 
trafficker  bases  serves  as  a  model  for 
what  we  also  hope  will  guide  efforts  in 
other  countries  by  1990.  Bolivia  recent- 
ly adopted  sweeping  antinareotics  leg- 
islation and  exceeded  its  1988  coca 
eradication  targets.  Peru,  the  world's 
largest  coca  cultivator,  was  able  in  1988 
to  destroy  over  12,000  acres  of  coca. 


In  the  Caribbean,  small  and  ill- 
equipped  police,  military  forces,  and 
judiciaries  face  increasing  numbers  o 
traffickers  with  seemingly  unlimited 
resources.  Jamaica,  The  Bahamas, 
Haiti,  and  the  Dominican  Republic  ar 
significant  transhipment  points  for  n: 
cotics  from  South  America.  Jamaica  i 
self  is  a  major  producer  of  marijuana. 
Our  aid  must  help  Caribbean  govern- 
ments to  increase  the  level  and  effec- 
tiveness of  their  antinareotics 
activities. 

Mexico  remains  the  largest  singli 
source  for  heroin,  the  second  largest 
source  of  marijuana,  and  a  transit  poi 
for  cocaine.  Newly  elected  President 
Carlos  Salinas  has  made  narcotics  coi 
trol  a  national  priority.  Mexico  has  ex 
panded  the  scope  of  its  opium  and 
marijuana  eradication  programs  and 
taking  steps  to  improve  operational  e 
ficiency.  We  are  prepared  to  cooperat 
with  what  we  expect  will  be  a  steadil, 
improving  Mexican  antinareotics 
program. 

Development  and  Defense 
in  Central  America 

The  challenge  facing  the  United  Stati 
in  Central  America  is  to  be  consisten 
and  effective  in  support  of  human 
rights,  development,  and  the  preserv: 
tion  of  freedom. 

We  have  developed  the  frameworl 
of  our  Central  America  policy;  that  p 
icy  is  evolving.  The  President  and  Se 
retary  of  State  have  made  clear  that 
they  intend  to  develop  a  bipartisan  p( 
cy  to  implement  objectives  consistent 
with  the  principles  agreed  to  among 
the  governments  of  Central  America 
the  1987  Esquipulas  accords  and  in  tl 
various  negotiations  that  have  taken 
place  since  then.  The  principles  of  Es 
quipulas  are  democracy,  human  right 
and  security.  They  are  the  right  princ 
pies.  What  we  need  is  the  mechanisms 
verification  accompanied  by  meaning 
ful  incentives  and  disincentives — to 
ensure  that  they  work. 

We  will  be  working  to  coordinate 
to  the  maximum  possible  extent  with 
the  Central  American  democracies,  ki 
friends  in  South  America  and  Mexico, 
and  our  European  allies.  In  this  re- 
gard, we  have  welcomed  the  nonpar- 
tisan and  multinational  effort  of  the 
International  Commission  for  Central 
American  Recovery  and  Development 
(Sanford  commission)  to  explore  anew 
policy  options  for  economic  recovery 
and  development  in  Central  America. 


11 


» 


—  X  r»&_A_ 


.  /  ■ 4ncit 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


We  welcome  the  commission's  rec- 
iimendation  that  aid  and  other  rela- 
oiis  be  based  on  compliance  with 
squipulas,  for  we  believe  that  any 
ail  for  the  region  as  a  whole  requires 
lat  democracy  and  security  become 
■alities  rather  than  promises.  It  is 
Hso  important  that  the  commission 
so  recognizes  another  form  of 
nditionality — that  based  on  economic 
irformance. 

Given  the  range  of  the  commission's 
fort,  some  differences  will  inevitably 
nerge  as  we  study  its  findings.  You 
ill  recall  that  the  basic  considerations 
iderlying  our  own  assistance  policy 
ward  Central  America  were  formu- 
ted  in  1983-84  by  the  National  Bipar- 
3an  Commission  on  Central  America 
tie  Kissinger  commission).  The 
issinger  commission's  bipartisan  fo- 
s  on  democratization,  human  rights, 
onomic  stabilization,  structural 
ansformation,  and  spreading  the  ben- 
its  of  economic  growth  has  been  the 
ganizing  principle  of  U.S.  policy  ever 
nee. 

Incidentally,  on  this  point,  we  were 
eased  to  note  that  the  recently  re- 
ised  report  of  the  House  Foreign 
'fairs  Committee's  Task  Force  on 
reign  Assistance  concluded  that 
lese  original  Kissinger  commission 
als,  supplemented  by  a  clear  commit- 
3nt  to  environmental  sustainability, 
lould  be  our  principal  foreign  assist- 
ce  goals  worldwide. 

In  reviewing  our  FY  1990  assist- 
ce  requests  for  Central  America,  it  is 
iportant  to  keep  in  mind  that,  despite 
(6  many  well-known  obstacles,  signifi- 
int  progress  has  been  made  and  that 
r  assistance  is  an  important  reason 
at  most  Central  American  countries 
e  more  democratic  and  more  respect- 
1  of  human  rights  than  they  were  10 
ars  ago.  In  El  Salvador,  democracy 
s  continued  to  be  consolidated  under 
■esident  Duarte.-  In  Guatemala,  an 
jcted  civilian  president  is  in  power. 
Honduras,  power  has  been  trans- 
rred  from  one  elected  civilian  politi- 
an  to  another.  In  Costa  Rica,  honest, 
ir  elections  continue  a  long  tradition. 

U.S.  assistance  also  plays  a  critical 
le  in  helping  the  Central  American 
■mocracies  cushion  the  short-term 
onomic  pain  which  often  precedes  the 
nger  term  economic  gains  realized 
rough  policy  reform.  In  several  in- 
ances,  our  aid  has  facilitated  sound 
Ijustment  measures  to  establish  the 
tsis  for  self-sustaining  growth, 
rowth  in  nontraditional  e.xports  also 


..epartment  of  State  Bulletin/June  1989 


demonstrates  that  the  region  could 
have  a  sound  easpnomic  future  once  the 
Esquipulas  peace  process  succeeds  in 
removing  the  obstacles  created  by  po- 
litical and  physical  insecurity. 

Let  me  take  a  moment  to  provide 
some  detail  on  a  success  story — how, 
through  adopting  economic  policy  re- 
forms, cushioned  by  our  economic  sup- 
port funds,  one  Central  American 
country  was  able  to  reverse  a  severe 
economic  decline. 

In  the  early  1980s,  Costa  Rica  was 
hit  by  a  severe  recession.  The  U.S.  aid 
response  was  designed  in  part  to  help 
Costa  Rica  reform  its  economy  and  set 
it  on  the  path  to  self-sustaining,  long- 
term  growth.  Due  to  these  efforts,  and 
to  the  Costa  Rican  Government's  own 
willingness  to  reform,  progress  has 
been  impressive. 

The  Costa  Rican  Government  has 
slashed  its  fiscal  deficit  from  13.7%  of 
GDP  [gross  domestic  product]  in  1981 
to  0.3%  in  1987,  committed  itself  to  pri- 
vatization of  state-owned  companies, 
liberalized  the  banking  and  credit  sys- 
tem, and  maintained  a  realistic  ex- 
change rate.  Inflation  fell  from  82%  in 
1982  to  a  more  manageable  15%  in  1987 
(although  it  has  since  risen  to  25%). 
Similarly,  unemployment  has  come 
down  from  9.5%-  in  1982  to  5.6%  in 
1987.  Most  impressive  of  all  has  been 
the  phenomenal  growth  in  nontradition- 
al e.xports  which  jumped  from  $128  mil- 
lion in  1983  to  $361  million  in  1987,  an 
increase  of  182%'  in  just  4  years.  A  ma- 
jor reason  for  the  rapid  rise  in  non- 
traditional  exports  has  been  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI)  and 
related  legislation. 

As  a  result  of  its  aid-assisted  poli- 
cy reforms,  the  Costa  Rican  economy, 
in  the  last  6  years,  has  been  growing  at 
an  average  annual  rate  of  4.3%,  com- 
pared with  an  average  yearly  decline  of 
2.9%'  during  1980-82.  The  reforms  have 
also  led  to  agreements  with  the  IMF 
[International  Monetary  Fund]  and  the 
World  Bank  and  will  likely  result  in 
greater  aid  from  other  donors. 

Multinational  Cooperation 

Consultative  Groups.  For  several 

years  we  have  encouraged  the  World 
Bank  and  the  IMF  to  establish  consul- 
tative groups  for  countries  in  Central 
America.  Last  June,  one  was  estab- 
lished for  Costa  Rica,  in  October  for 
Honduras,  and  in  March  1989  for  Guat- 
emala. The  goals  of  a  consultative 
group  are:  to  encourage  greater  donor 


cooperation  and  coordination,  to  devel- 
op a  better  organization  and  more  visi- 
ble list  of  priority  projects,  and  to 
review  overall  structural  adjustment 
process  and  management  of  debt  issues 
in  the  country.  Looking  at  the  one  coun- 
try, Costa  Rica,  for  which  we  have  more 
than  a  half-year  experience,  we  are  en- 
couraged by  preliminary  results. 
These  include: 

•  The  completion  of  a  second  World 
Bank  structural  adjustment  loan  in 
December; 

•  Work  on  a  possible  new  IMF 
standby  to  replace  the  one  expiring 
early  in  March; 

•  The  development  of  a  list  of  prior- 
ity projects  for  donor  financing; 

•  Work  on  a  transportation  sector 
loan; 

•  Further  discussion  by  the  Bank 
Advisory  Committee  on  ways  to  miti- 
gate Costa  Rica's  debt  burden,  includ- 
ing consideration  of  use  of  AID  [Agency 
for  International  Development]  monies 
to  finance  a  Costa  Rican  buy-back  of 
debt; 

•  An  overall  understanding  not 
only  by  the  World  Bank,  IMF,  and  the 
United  States  but  also  by  Japan  (which 
has  promised  funds  to  Costa  Rica), 
Canada,  and  the  European  countries  to 
work  from  the  same  data  and  analytical 
framework. 

The  Organization  of  American 
States.  The  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS)  can  play  a  key  role  in  en- 
suring successful  cooperation  in  the 
hemisphere. 

•  Because  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Latin  American  and  Caribbean 
countries  belong,  the  OAS  is  the  logical 
locus  for  debate  on  topics  of  importance 
to  the  hemisphere. 

•  Because  it  is  a  purely  regional  or- 
ganization recognized  under  the  UN 
Charter,  the  OAS  can  take  up  regional 
issues  without  extraneous  factors.  For 
example,  multilateral  OAS  action  can 
reconcile  the  Charter  obligation  of  de- 
mocracy with  that  of  nonintervention. 
At  a  Permanent  Council  meeting  on 
February  15,  the  OAS  went  on  record 
to  support  democratization  in 
Paraguay. 

Historically,  the  OAS  has  had  a 
strong  record  of  support  for  democracy, 
human  rights,  and  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  disputes.  Recently,  however, 
the  OAS  has  been  more  active  on  hu- 
man rights,  drugs,  and  technical  assist- 
ance than  peacekeeping.  The  OAS 
operated  a  border  inspection  force  be- 
tween El  Salvador  and  Honduras  in 


63 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


1969-70  and  1976-81,  and  the  OAS  Sec- 
retary General  was  named  co-verifier 
(along  with  Cardinal  Obando  y  Bravo) 
of  the  Sapoa  accords  in  Nicaragua — but 
this  role  was  never  implemented  be- 
cause of  objections  subsequently  raised 
by  the  Sandinista  government. 

The  OAS  still  has  the  potential  to 
make  a  very  helpful  contribution  to 
peace  in  Central  America  under  Es- 
quipulas  and  Sapoa.  The  Central  Amer- 
ican summit  agreement  e.xplicitly  asks 
for  OAS  and  UN  assistance.  The  OAS 
will  be  able  to  exert  its  positive  region- 
al influence,  however,  only  if  the  Unit- 
ed States  and  other  OAS  members 
provide  the  necessary  guidance  and  al- 
low it  to  be  effective  by  giving  it  the  at- 
tention and  the  financial  resources  it 
needs. 

The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative. 

A  constructive  and  bipartisan  policy, 
the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI) 
supports  political  stability  in  the  Ca- 
ribbean Basin  by  helping  countries 
raise  their  foreign  exchange  earnings, 
diversify  their  economies,  and  employ 
their  people.  The  CBI  has  spurred  eco- 
nomic diversification  in  the  region  by 
providing  the  opportunity  to  increase 
exports  of  nontraditional  goods  such  as 
apparel,  seafood,  and  winter  produce. 
In  the  first  5  years  of  the  CBI,  non- 
traditional  exports  to  the  United 
States  grew  nearly  75%  to  over  $3.5  bil- 
lion. In  1988,  for  the  first  time,  the  re- 
gion's nontraditional  exports  to  the 
United  States  were  larger  than  the  tra- 
ditional ones,  such  as  sugar  and  coffee, 
although  the  high  U.S.  content  of  many 
nontraditional  exports  means  the  net 
foreign  exchange  earnings  from  tradi- 
tional exports  may  still  be  larger 

The  CBI  does  not  guarantee  eco- 
nomic growth  and  greater  exports;  it 
enhances  the  conditions  and  incentives 
for  growth.  Some  countries  in  the  re- 
gion have  done  particularly  well  in 
using  the  CBI.  Since  the  CBI  began, 
Jamaica's  nontraditional  exports  to  the 
United  States  have  increased  by  147%; 
Costa  Rica's  by  254%;  the  Dominican 
Republic's  by  195%.  At  the  same  time, 
lower  oil  prices  and  tighter  sugar  quo- 
tas have  meant  that  total  exports  to  the 
United  States  have  declined  some  30% 
since  the  CBI  began. 

The  original  CBI  has  some  short- 
comings. For  example,  some  products 
important  to  the  region  are  excluded 
from  duty-free  treatment.  We  thus  wel- 
come efforts  underway  in  Congress  to 
enhance  the  CBI.  We  want  to  continue 
to  work  closely  with  the  Congress  on 


Proposed  FY  1990  Assistance  Request  by  Region 


South  America 


Caribbean 


Central  America 
$  millions  0 


M    Economic 
0    Military 
■    Narcotics 


)1 

fa 

rit! 


150 


300 


450 


600 


750 


900 


such  legislation,  including  the  bill  in- 
tended to  be  introduced  on  March  2  by 
Representative  Sam  Gibbons  and  the 
bill  which  Representative  George 
Crockett  introduced  last  year  While 
there  is  yet  no  formal  Administration 
position  on  either  bill,  I  want  to  say 
that  I  appreciate  the  intent  of  that  bill 
to  promote  "equitable  and  participa- 
tory development"  in  the  region.  I  must 
also  say  that  I  have  some  concerns 
about  the  bill's  emphasis  on  regional 
self-reliance  and  its  implicit  turning 
away  from  export-led  growth  to  an  in- 
ward orientation  and  import- 
substitution  policies. 

Special  Situations  and  Opportunities 

Argentine  Military  Aid  Program.  We 

have  tried  to  support  military  profes- 
sionalism in  Argentina  while  making 
clear  to  all  concerned,  including  the 
Argentine  Armed  Forces,  that  our  co- 
operation depends  on  the  needs  ex- 
pressed by  Argentina's  constitutional 
civilian  leadership  and  requires  a  dem- 
ocratic environment.  We  believe  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  Argentines 
share  this  goal. 

Over  the  past  several  years,  at  the 
request  of  President  Alfonsin,  we  have 
developed  a  careful,  modest  program  of 
defense  cooperation.  All  aspects  are  co- 
ordinated through  the  Argentine's 
civilian-run  Ministry  of  Defense.  Ini- 
tially, we  concentrated  on  exchanges 
and  training  to  help  the  Argentine  Gov- 
ernment to  reorient  the  military  from 
politics  toward  professional  concerns. 

This  first  phase  of  our  plan  to  im- 
prove military  relations  worked  well, 
although  President  Alfonsin's  govern- 
ment has  been  constrained  in  its  ability 
to  make  military  equipment  purchases 
by  budget  limitations.  To  demonstrate 
our  continuing  interest  in  supporting 
President  Alfonsin  in  his  desire  to  fa- 


cilitate the  professional  development  o 
the  Argentine  military,  we  have  pro- 
posed an  FMSF  [foreign  military  sales 
financing]  grant  program  of  .$2  millioi 
in  the  FY  1990  budget.  This  program 
was  developed  in  full  cooperation  with 
Argentina's  civilian  Ministry  of  De- 
fense and  the  military  services.  An  in 
tial  goal  of  this  program  is  to  help  the 
Argentine  Army  undertake  the  long- 
delayed  $13-million  refurbishment  of 
their  U.S. -made  transport  helicopters 
and  armored  personnel  carriers.  It  wi 
fulfill  important  and  legitimate  army 
needs  with  a  relatively  modest  invest- 
ment and  do  so  without  threatening  n 
gional  stability.  President  Alfonsin 
personally  sought  our  support  for  this 
refurbishment  program. 

Haiti.  Our  policy  in  Haiti  has  bee 
to  encourage  a  transition  to  an  electee 
civilian  government,  respect  for  huma 
rights,  credible  development  program 
and  cooperation  on  narcotics  matters. 
We  are  encouraged  by  the  progress  th 
Avril  government  has  made  on  this 
agenda  since  assuming  power  in  Sep- 
tember 1988. 

•  On  February  23,  following  the 
recommendations  of  the  forum  of  oppo 
sition  political  and  social  leaders  it  hac 
convened,  the  government  announced  i 
decree  establishing  a  new  electoral 
council. 

•  Human  rights  abuses  continue  ir 
Haiti,  but  the  government  has  made 
progress  in  stemming  the  cycle  of  po- 
litical violence  that  has  marked  Haiti 
since  the  fall  of  the  Duvalier  regime  in 
February  1986. 

•  On  narcotics  matters,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Haiti  has  cooperated  with 
the  U.S.  authorities. 

•  Progress  on  the  economic  front 
has  been  less  noteworthy,  but  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Haiti  is  operating  under  se- 
verely restrictive  financial  constraints 


nMHn..«»*»M*   ^*   C*'>*r>    I 


iOflil 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Much  more  remains  to  be  clone,  and 
want  to  encourage  these  favorable 
nds.  We  will  continue  to  work  close- 
with  the  Congress  on  our  response 
this  evolving  situation. 

H   Guyana.  The  Government  of 
yana,  during  the  past  3  years,  has 
engthened  friendly  relations  with 

United  States  and  other  Western 
ntries.  It  has  also  initiated  several 
rket-oriented  economic  reforms.  We 
1  it  is  strongly  in  our  interests  to  en- 
rage these  developments. 

The  United  States  has  provided 
d  under  PL  480  totaling  almost  $20 
lion  since  FY  1986.  The  Government 

uyana  is  seeking  to  negotiate  a  plan 
h  the  IMF  and  others  to  clear  long- 
nding  arrears  to  multilateral  insti- 
ions  and  reschedule  obligations  to 

United  States  and  other  bilateral 
lors.  If  these  negotiations  succeed, 
should  join  other  members  of  the  in- 
national  community,  who  have  al- 
idy  expressed  willingness  to  assist 
yana  in  its  effort  to  change  its  politi- 
and  economic  direction. 

Human  Rights  in  EI  Salvador.  All 

idible  human  rights  organizations  in 
Salvador,  including  the  Catholic 
arch's  Tutela  Legal,  agree  that  po- 
cally  motivated  violence  has  dimin- 
d  significantly  over  the  past 
ade.  The  number  of  deaths  reported 
Ihe  Salvadoran  press,  which  appear 
1)8  politically  motivated,  averaged  20 
month  during  1988.  This  compares 
Ih  a  monthlv  average  of  23  in  1987,  22 
986,  28  in  1985,  64  in  1984,  140  in 
3,  219  in  1982,  444  in  1981,  and  750 
980. 

Despite  this  sustained  improve- 
nt,  however,  progress  in  bringing  to 
:ice  the  perpetrators  of  some  of  El 
vador's  major  human  rights  cases 
not  kept  pace.  The  fundamental  is- 
now  is  to  support  the  government's 
Drts  to  transform  an  archaic  and  in- 
dent judicial  system  into  one  in 
ich  the  same  standard  of  law  is 
lally  available  and  applicable  to  all. 
is  will  require  a  sustained  effort 
ir  a  long  period  of  time  working  with 
ice,  prosecutors,  judges,  and,  most 
)ortant,  the  Salvadoran  Legislative 
;embly,  which  is  constitutionally 
rged  with  reviewing  and  changing 
sting  laws. 

In  recent  times,  we  have  witnessed 
ne  disturbing  events  as  evidenced  by 
September  1988  killings  near  San 
»astian.  El  Salvador.  Vice  President 
.yle  visited  El  Salvador  recently  and 
icated  to  the  Salvadorans  that  we 


expect  a  better  human  rights  perform- 
ance, and  we  intend  to  watch  the  situa- 
tion closely. 

Our  economic  and  security  assist- 
ance is  designed  to  support  this  trans- 
formation. Economic  assistance  is 
designed  to  shore  up  the  economy  while 
the  Salvadoran  people  continue  their 
resistance  against  violent  opposition  to 
democracy.  Our  military  assistance 
supports  efforts  to  better  professional- 
ize military  forces,  including  their  em- 
brace of  respect  for  human  rights  in  a 
framework  of  loyalty  to  constitutional 
civil  authority. 

Chile.  Chile  is  on  track  for  its  De- 
cember 14,  1989,  general  elections,  the 
first  to  be  held  in  19  years.  As  in  the 
1988  plebiscite,  the  United  States  will 
continue  to  urge  the  Government  of 
Chile  to  assure  that  open  and  clean 
elections  are  conducted  in  an  atmos- 
phere conducive  to  democratic  decision- 
making. The  successful  October  5, 
1988,  plebiscite  is  a  source  of  intense 
national  pride  to  all  sectors  of  Chilean 
society  because  it  was  seen  as  a  strong 
reaffirmation  of  their  democratic  voca- 
tion. The  armed  forces  are  particularly 
proud  of  having  presided  over  an  honest 
vote.  We  in  the  executive  and  you  in  the 
Congress  will  both  be  watching  these 
developments  closely. 

Administration  of  Justice. 

Throughout  Latin  America,  justice  sys- 
tems are  starved  for  resources,  both 
human  and  material,  and  all  too  often 
present  another  obstacle  to — rather 
than  a  foundation  for — effective  democ- 
racy. By  focusing  assistance  programs 
on  the  administration  of  justice,  we 
hope  to  reinforce  the  institutional  ca- 
pacity for  democracy. 

For  example,  after  an  elected  gov- 
ernment took  office  in  Guatemala  in 
1986,  administration-of-justice  projects 
have  provided  training  for  judges  and 
police  investigators  as  well  as  technical 
assistance  for  legal  library  and 
database  development  and  analysis. 

Separate  projects  administered  re- 
spectively by  the  Latin  American  Insti- 
tute for  the  Prevention  of  Crime  and 
Treatment  of  Offenders  (ILANUD),  a 
UN  affiliate  in  San  Jose,  and  by  a 
prominent  U.S.  law  school,  have  en- 
abled the  Guatemalan  judiciary  to  em- 
bark on  a  multiyear  project  targeting 
specific  problems,  such  as  the  need  for 
administrative  reorganization,  improv- 
ing access  to  legal  information,  and  im- 
proving the  handling  of  criminal  cases. 


1 


At  the  same  time,  the  Internation- 
al Criminal  Investigative  Training  As- 
sistance Program  (ICITAP)  of  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Justice  has  been  operat- 
ing in  Guatemala  under  policy  guidance 
from  the  Department  of  State.  ICITAP 
began  by  training  police  investigators 
in  modern  investigative  techniques  but, 
at  the  request  of  the  Guatemalan  Su- 
preme Court,  soon  began  offering  simi- 
lar training  at  a  less  technical  level  to 
judges.  Under  Guatemalan  procedure, 
judges  have  responsibility  for  directing 
investigations.  'The  prosecutorial  func- 
tion as  we  know  it  in  the  United  States 
does  not  exist  in  Guatemala. 

ICITAP  training  has  already  been 
credited  with  successful  resolution  of  a 
number  of  highly  publicized  cases  in 
Guatemala,  among  them  the  kidnap- 
murder  of  two  University  of  San  Carlos 
students  by  Quetzaltenango  police  offi- 
cers in  November  1987  and  the  murder 
of  three  Chinese  in  June  1987.  ICITAP 
has  also  assisted  the  National  Police  in 
establishing  an  Office  of  Professional 
Responsibility  to  investigate  allega- 
tions of  unprofessional  conduct  by  offi- 
cers. At  the  present  time,  the  office  is 
screening  approximately  50  cases  per 
month,  with  20-30  of  them  referred  to 
the  civilian  courts  for  handling. 

Paraguay.  Reforms  have  been  the 
word  of  the  day  since  long-time  strong- 
man Alfredo  Stroessner  left  the  coun- 
try after  a  coup  on  February  2-3. 
Prospects  for  real  and  enduring  change 
must,  nonetheless,  be  tested  over  time. 
The  new  government  led  by  Provisional 
President  Rodriguez  has  begun  an- 
nouncing its  plans  for  a  transition  with 
a  number  of  positive-sounding  promises 
concerning  elections,  democratic  insti- 
tutionalization, human  rights,  and 
drugs. 

Since  Paraguay  has  no  democratic 
tradition  to  draw  upon,  establishing  a 
genuine  democracy  will  be  a  difficult, 
long-term  challenge.  All  nations  inter- 
ested in  the  welfare  of  democracy 
should  consider  a  joint  approach  to  en- 
courage a  successful  transition  to  dem- 
ocratic government  in  Paraguay.  All  of 
us  in  the  United  States,  in  the  Con- 
gress, as  well  as  the  executive  have  an 
interest  in  working  and  watching  to- 
gether to  help  realize  Paraguay's 
promises. 

Rigidities  Caused  by  Earmark- 
ing. There  is  a  final  area  I'd  like  to  tou- 
ch upon — that  of  earmarking  our 
assistance  programs.  In  our  view,  ex- 
tensive earmarking,  combined  with 


L 


.^_A  ^<  o«.M«>«  D..ii.«.4>:. 


.HA  -1  noa 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


il 


constraints  on  overall  funding  levels, 
greatly  reduce  the  flexibility  of  our  as- 
sistance programs  in  several  ways. 

•  When  cuts  are  made,  they  fall 
disportionately  on  unearmarked  pro- 
grams. These  unearmarked  programs 
serve  U.S.  interests  no  less  than  those 
that  are  specifically  legislated.  But 
efforts  to  protect  one  good  program 
through  earmarking  often  work  inad- 
vertently to  destroy  others  when  over- 
all levels  decrease. 

•  Countries  receiving  earmarks 
often  view  them  as  an  "entitlement," 
which  actually  can  make  them  less  ac- 
cessible to  entering  into  serious  discus- 
sions regarding  economic  policy 
reform. 

•  Consultations  with  international 
financial  institutions  and  political 
changes  demand  a  flexible  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment response. 

Let  me  relate  a  specific  example  of 
the  problems  earmarking  often  causes. 
The  example  relates  to  the  narcoterror- 
ism  earmark  in  the  Anti-Drug  Abuse 
Act  of  1988.  The  earmark  is  written  in 
a  way  as  to  make  planning  for  ESF 
spending  especially  difficult  and  inflex- 
ible. The  law  earmarks  (but  does  not 
appropriate)  $5  million  to  provide  pro- 
tection forjudges,  government  offi- 
cials, and  the  press. 

The  law  requires  that  these  funds 
(which  had  to  come  from  nonearmarked 
FY  1989  ESF  appropriated  via  another 
act)  shall  remain  available  until  ex- 
pended. This  means  that,  regardless  of 
whether  Colombia  seeks  any  funds  for 
this  program,  we  need  to  set  aside  $5 
million  in  ESF.  In  other  words,  this 
sort  of  earmark  requires  us  to  reserve 
money  for  a  possible  need,  while  at  the 
same  time  withhold  money  from  pro- 
grams (some  very  important  ones,  in- 
cluding strengthening  of  democracy 
initiatives)  for  which  there  is  a  current 
need. 

We  are  pleased  to  see  that  the  ear- 
mark issue  was  discussed  in  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  task  force 
report  on  foreign  assistance.  The  re- 
port, correctly  in  our  view,  also  cited 
the  need  for  increased  flexibility  in  the 
implementation  of  our  assistance  pro- 
grams. It  suggests  that  a  new  economic 
cooperation  act  would  avoid  most  of  the 
restrictions,  directives,  and  earmarks 
of  the  current  act. 


Conclusion 

As  I  stated  at  the  outset,  key  elements 
of  our  policy  in  the  region  are  under  re- 
view. I  can,  nonetheless,  assure  you 
that  we  will  remain  dedicated  to  the 
support  of  democracy  throughout  the 
hemisphere,  to  prosecuting  the  war 
against  narcotics  and  terrorism,  and  to 
the  defense  and  development  of  Central 
America — the  troubled  region  at  our 
doorstep.  We  look  forward  to  working 


with  the  Congress  in  refining  and  suj 
porting  our  policy. 


I 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  ai 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

-The  democratic  process  in  El  Salvadc 
was  reinforced  on  March  19,  1989,  when  S; 
vadorians  voted  in  the  second  set  of  free  a 
fair  presidential  elections  in  5  years.  ■ 


President's  Meeting  With 
El  Salvador's  President-Elect 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
APR.  7,  1989" 

President  Bush  met  with  Salvadoran 
President-elect  Alfredo  Cristiani  and 
Vice  President-elect  Francisco  Merino 
in  the  Oval  Office  for  30  minutes  today. 
The  President  again  congratulated  Mr 
Cristiani  for  his  first-round  electoral 
victory  on  March  19.  The  President 
said  he  looked  forward  to  establishing 
the  same  sort  of  working  relationship 
that  he  and  President  Reagan  had  with 
President  Duarte.  In  furtherance  of 
that  goal,  the  President  issued  an  invi- 
tation to  Mr.  Cristiani  to  come  to  Wash- 
ington in  late  summer  for  an  official 
working  visit.  Mr.  Cristiani  accepted 
the  President's  offer  and  expressed 
his  hope  of  enhancing  our  mutual 
cooperation. 

The  President  stated  in  strongest 
terms  his  commitment  to  support  Sal- 
vadoran democracy  and  his  admiration 
of  the  commitment  of  the  Salvadoran 
people  who  risked  death  or  injury  by 
guerrilla  threats  to  interrupt  the  vote. 
A  U.S.  observer  team  from  both  politi- 
cal parties,  as  well  as  electoral  ob- 
servers from  other  countries,  have 
certified  the  election  as  free  and  fair. 
The  President  noted  that  El  Salva- 
dor's democratic  institutions  stand  in 
marked  contrast  to  those  of  Nicaragua. 
The  Salvadoran  press  is  free.  Political 
groups  mount  demonstrations  without 
government  interference.  And  the  gov- 
ernment has  granted  a  total  amnesty. 


For  the  past  8  years,  our  commit- 
ment to  El  Salvador  has  reflected  a  b 
partisan  consensus.  Nevertheless  the 
have  been  some  voices  that  have  pre- 
judged Mr.  Cristiani  and  who  are 
pessimistic  about  the  future.  The  Pre 
ident  stated  his  view  that  Mr.  Cristia 
should  be  given  the  chance  to  prove  h 
dedication  to  democracy,  peace,  and  h 
man  rights.  Mr.  Cristiani  has  already 
proven  his  ability  to  run  a  fair  cam- 
paign, which  inspires  our  confidence 
about  the  future. 

The  President  and  Mr  Cristiani 
noted  the  importance  of  human  rights 
in  El  Salvador.  The  President  noted 
with  satisfaction  Mr.  Cristiani's  role  i 
helping  to  overturn  the  decision  of  a 
judge  who  released  rightwing  elemen 
accused  of  involvement  in  kidnapping 
The  President  offered  continued  U.S. 
assistance  to  improve  Salvadoran  jud 
cial  institutions. 

Mr  Cristiani  warmly  endorsed  tl 
bipartisan  accord  on  Central  Americ; 
as  a  contribution  to  peace  and  said  th 
the  focus  must  remain  on  Nicaraguan 
democratization.  The  President  indi- 
cated that  we  would  consult  El  Sal- 
vador, as  well  as  the  other  Central 
American  democracies,  on  peace 
issues. 


1' 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pre 
dential  Documents  of  Apr.  10,  1989.  ■ 


r%..ii_x:_/  ■ ^  A ACiH. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


loviet  Policy  in  Central  America 


(HUE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
'R.  5.  1989' 

>  listened  carefully  to  what  Presi- 
nt  Gorbachev  had  to  say  in  Havana 
sterday.  While  his  words  about  not 
porting  revolution  are  welcomed, 
;y  are  not  matched  by  deeds  which 
uld  give  those  words  credence. 

Today  we  call  upon  the  Soviets  to 
t  off  their  half-billion-dollar  annual 
litary  aid  to  Nicaragua.  The  Soviets 
itinue  to  pour  arms  into  Nicaragua, 
ountry  whose  army  is  already  larger 
in  those  of  all  their  neighbors  com- 
led.  This  is  hard  to  fathom.  It  is  a 
/  issue  in  resolving  the  conflict  in 
ntral  America.  Our  bipartisan  plan 

peace  in  Central  America  has  the 
aport  of  the  Central  American  de- 
cracies.  It  is  time  for  the  Soviet 

ion  to  join  us  in  supporting  that 
.n. 


If  President  Gorbachev  means  his 
words,  the  Soviets  should  demonstrate 
through  their  behavior  that  they  are 
adhering  to  this  principle,  and  they 
should  pressure  their  client  states  and 
revolutionary  groups  that  they  support 
to  do  the  same.  We  note  that  the  Sovi- 
ets and  Cuba  have  concluded  a  friend- 
ship treaty  that  apparently  commits 
both  parties  to  the  peaceful  resolution 
of  conflicts  in  the  region.  We  trust  that 
the  Soviets  will  follow  these  words 
with  concrete  actions. 

We  believe,  however,  that  to  dem- 
onstrate his  commitment  to  Esquip- 
ulas.  President  Gorbachev  could 
have  proposed  a  cutoff  of  military  sup- 
plies to  all  irregular  forces  in  the  re- 
gion. That  is  what  Esquipulas  calls 
for — an  end  to  outside  support  to  the 
guerrilla  forces.  This  would  have  sug- 
gested a  "new  thinking"  in  Central 
America. 


The  United  States  is  in  compliance 
with  Esquipulas.  We  are  not  providing 
military  aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Resis- 
tance. The  Soviet  bloc,  particularly 
Nicaragua  and  Cuba,  continue  to  sup- 
ply military  and  logistical  support  to 
the  FMLN'[Farabundo  Marti  National 
Liberation  Front,  El  Salvador]  and 
other  irregular  forces  in  Central 
America. 

As  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  have  said,  we  reject  the 
idea  of  equivalence  between  legitimate 
U.S.  interests  and  the  Soviet  presence 
in  Central  America.  We  provide  sup- 
port, including  military  assistance, 
to  the  democratic  governments  in  Cen- 
tral America.  These  governments  are 
not  involved  in  subversion  of  their 
neighbors. 


'Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  10,  1989.  ■ 


lectoral  and  Media  Laws  in  Nicaragua 


IPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
,1  K.  25,  1989' 

'  lay.  April  25,  marks  the  date  by 
\<  it  h  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  is 
0  iuated,  under  the  Tesoro  Beach 
1  I'ment,  to  have  in  place  electoral 
~  conducive  to  free  and  fair  elec- 
-  scheduled  to  take  place  in  Febru- 
i'  1990. 

The  Government  of  Nicaragua  has 
r  eiitly  put  into  effect  new  laws  gov- 
e  iiig  electoral  procedures  and  the 
p  ss.  Both  the  substance  of  these  laws 
i  1  the  manner  in  which  they  have 
ii  Ml  i)ut  into  effect  is  troubling. 
jj   The  electoral  law  was  not  the  re- 
t  of  good-faith  bargaining  between 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  the 


internal  opposition  groups  and  was  uni- 
laterally imposed  after  being  passed  by 
the  Sandinista-dominated  legislature. 

This  law  includes  a  provision  re- 
quiring that  the  Supreme  Electoral 
Council,  of  which  the  Sandinistas  main- 
tain control,  receive  one-half  of  any  for- 
eign political  contributions.  It  ignores 
proposals  made  by  the  internal  opposi- 
tion for  absentee  balloting  and  proce- 
dures for  ensuring  the  presence  and 
unlimited  access  of  international  elec- 
tion observers. 

The  new  law  governing  press  con- 
duct includes  penalties  for  disseminat- 
ing information  which  the  Interior 
Ministry  determines  to  be  a  violation 
of  "national  integrity"  and  allows  the 
Interior  Ministry  to  order  closures  of 
up  to  4  days. 


This  media  law  was  also  passed  by 
the  Sandinista  legislature  without  gen- 
uine dialogue  with  the  internal  opposi- 
tion, which  depends  upon  freedom  of 
expression,  or  with  the  independent 
media  in  Nicaragua. 

It  is  still  not  too  late  for  dialogue 
and  for  the  necessary  compromises  by 
all  sides  which  alone  can  create  condi- 
tions of  trust  in  which  free  elections 
can  go  forward.  We  urge  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  to  engage  in  the 
necessary  dialogue  to  revise  its  elec- 
toral and  press  laws. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Margaret  DeB.  Tut- 
wiler.  ■ 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International  plant  protection  convention. 
Done  at  Rome  Dec.  6,  1951.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  3,  1952;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  18,  1972. 
TIAS  7465. 
Adherence  deposited:  Oman,  Jan.  23,  1989. 

Antarctica 

Antarctic  treaty.  Signed  at  Washington 

Dec.  1,  1959.  Entered  into  force  June  23, 

1961.  TIAS  4780. 

Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  Jan.  31, 

1989. 

Atomic  Energy 

Amendment  of  Article  VI.  A.  1  of  the  Statute 
of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
of  Oct.  26,  1956,  as  amended  (TIAS  3873, 
5284,  7668).  Done  at  Vienna  Sept.  27,  1984.' 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-7. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Ghana,  Apr.  12, 
1989;  Italy,  Mar.  27,  1989;  Libya,  Tunisia, 
Apr.  13,  1989. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Dec.  16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14, 
1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Ratification  deposited:  Laos,  Apr.  6,  1989. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Ratification  deposited:  Laos,  Apr.  6,  1989. 

Customs 

Convention  concerning  the  formation  of  an 
International  Union  for  the  Publication  of 
Customs  Tariffs,  regulations  of  execution, 
and  final  declarations.  Signed  at  Brussels 
July  5,  1890.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  1, 
1891.  TS  384. 

Protocol  modifying  the  Convention  of  July  5, 
1890,  relating  to  the  creation  of  an  Interna- 
tional Union  for  the  Publication  of  Customs 
Tariffs.  Done  at  Brussels  Dee.  16,  1949.  En- 
tered into  force  May  5,  1950;  for  the  U.S. 
Sept.  15,  1957.  TIAS  3922. 
Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  Mar.  2,  1989. 

Fisheries 

Protocol  to  amend  the  international  conven- 
tion of  May  14.  1966  for  the  conservation  of 
Atlantic  tunas  {TIAS  6767).  Done  at  Paris 
July  10,  1984.1  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-4. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Venezuela,  Jan.  7, 
1989. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Adopted  at 
Paris  Dec.  9,  1948.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  12,  1951;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  23,  1989. 
Accession  deposited:  Yemen,  Apr.  6,  1989. 


Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  relating  to  inter- 
vention on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil 
pollution  casualties,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Brussels  Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
May  6,  1975.  TIAS  8068. 
Accession  deposited:  Egypt,  Feb.  3,  1989. 

International  convention  on  civil  liability 

for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 

Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 

1975.-' 

Accessions  deposited:  Canada,  Jan.  24,  1989; 

Egypt,  Feb.  3,  1989. 

International  convention  on  the  establish- 
ment of  an  international  fund  for  compen- 
sation for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at 
Brussels  Dec.  18,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  16,  1978. •^ 

Accessions  deposited:  Canada,  Jan.  24, 
1989;3  Vanuatu,  Jan.  13,  1989. 

Protocol  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 

seas  in  cases  of  pollution  by  substances 

other  than  oil.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973. 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  30,  1983.  TIAS 

10561. 

Accession  deposited:  Egypt,  Feb.  3,  1989. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2,  1983. 
Accession  deposited:  Algeria,  Jan.  31,  1989.-' 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  Gibraltar,  Nov.  1,  1988;  effective 
Dec.  1,  1988.-' 

Optional  Annex  V  to  the  international  con- 
vention for  the  prevention  of  pollution  from 
ships,  1973,  as  modified  by  the  protocol  of 
1978.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  31,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  100-3. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Algeria,  Jan.  31, 
1989;  Belgium,  Oct.  27,  1988;  China,  Nov. 
21,  1988;  Suriname,  Nov.  4,  1988. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  facilitation  of  international 
maritime  traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lon- 
don Apr.  9,  1965.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  5. 
1967;  for  the  U.S.  May  16,  1967.  TIAS  6251. 
Accession  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Jan.  13,  1989. 

International  convention  on  tonnage  meas- 
urement of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done 
at  London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
July  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10,  1983. 
TIAS  10490. 

Accessions  deposited:  Uruguay,  Feb.  3, 
1989;  Vanuatu,  Jan.  13,  1989. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  Gibraltar,  Dec.  7,  1988;  effective 
Dec.  1,  1988;  and  to  Guernsey,  Dec.  30,  1988; 
effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations 
for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  with  regula- 
tions, 1972.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
Accession  deposited:  Iran,  Jan.  17,  1989. 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping 


for  seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  ' 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.2 
Accession  deposited:  Ghana,  Jan.  26,  1989 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Feb.  3,  1989. 
Territorial  application:  E  xtended  by  the 
U.K.  to  Bermuda,  Dec.  30,  1988;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1989. 

Protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  ai 
against  the  safety  of  fixed  platforms  locat 
on  the  Continental  Shelf.  Done  at  Rome 
Mar.  10,  1988.1  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  101 
Signature:  Switzerland,  Feb.  27,  1989. 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozone 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  Mar. 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22,  1988. 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  de- 
plete the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  16.  1987.  Entered  into  fon 
Jan.  1,  1989.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-10 
Accession  deposited:  Singapore,  Jan.  5, 
1989. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  eliminatic 
of  all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done 
New  York  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into  for 
Jan.  4,  1969.2 
Accession  deposited:  Yemen,  Apr.  6,  1989. 


Red  Cross 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of   - 
the  condition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in 
armed  forces  in  the  field.  Done  at  Geneva  I'l 
Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21.   ■ 
1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  336; 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of 
the  condition  of  the  wounded,  sick,  and  sh 
wrecked  members  of  armed  forces  at  sea. 
Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  ir 
force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2, 
1956.  TIAS  3363. 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  treatmt 
of  prisoners  of  war.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug. 
1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3364. 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  protect 
of  civilian  persons  in  time  of  war.  Done  at 
Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956. 
TIAS  3365. 

Notification  of  succession  deposited: 
Kiribati,  Jan.  5,  1989;  effective  July  12, 
1979. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363, 
3364,  3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection 
victims  of  international  armed  conflicts 
(protocol  I),  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  Ge- 
neva June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  7,  1978.2 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363, 
3364,  3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection 
victims  of  noninternational  armed  conflic 
(protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.^  [Se 


-,c  e^A.^*.^  r>..iiM*:. 


iOk 


TREATIES 


|e]  Treaty  Doc.  100-2. 
Ccessions  deposited:  The  Gambia,  Jan.  12, 


189;  Mali,  Feb.  8,  1989. 


bber 

teniatioiial  natural  rubber  agreement, 
i87,  with  anne.xes.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  20, 
ST.  Entered  into  force  provisionally 

29,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-9. 
;cession  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,  Apr.  3,  1989. 


itellite  Communications  Systems 

mendments  to  the  convention  and  operat- 
g  agreement  on  the  International  Mar- 
me^Satellite  Organization  (INMARSAT) 
Sept.  3,  197fi  (TIAS  9605).  Adopted  at 
jndonOct.  Ki,  1985.' 
ceptance  deposited:  Gabon,  Mar.  15,  1989. 


lace 

mvention  on  registration  of  objects 
nched  into  outer  space.  Done  at  New 
rk  Jan.  14,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
pt.  15,  1976.  TIAS  8480. 
i)tification  of  succession  deposited:  An- 


ua  and  Barbuda,  Dec.  13,  1988;  effective 
ov.  1,  1981. 

irrorism 

nvention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
■int  of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
pted  persons,  including  diplomatic  agents, 
opted  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973.  Enter- 
into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  85:32. 
(Cession  deposited:  Kuwait,  Mar.  1,  1989. 


irture 

invention  against  torture  and  other  cruel, 
human,  or  degrading  treatment  or  punish- 
•mt.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1984. 
iitered  into  force  June  26,  1987.-  [Senate] 
leaty  Doc.  100-20. 
pnature:  Yugoslavia,  Apr.  18,  1989. 


lade — Textiles 

otocol  e.xtending  the  arrangement  regard- 
g  international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20, 
P3,  as  extended  (TIAS  7840).  Done  at 
tneva  July  31,  1986.  Entered  into  force 
,ig.  1,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  5,  1986. 
ceptance  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Feb.  9, 


69. 


LATERAL 


azil 


jreement  concerning  the  provision  of 
liining  related  to  defense  articles  under 
e  U.S.  international  military  education 
■d  training  (IMET)  Program.  Effected  by 
change  of  notes  at  Brasilia  Apr.  19,  1988, 
(d  Mar.  27,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
ar.  27,  1989. 

nada 

jreement  amending  Annex  IV  to  the 
eaty  concerning  Pacific  salmon  of  Jan.  28, 

«5,  as  amended.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
,es  at  Washington  Mar.  20  and  Apr.  19, 
89.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  19,  1989. 


Colombia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
Colombian  integration  into  the  Caribbean 
Basin  Radar  Network  (CBRN).  Signed  at 
Bogota  Feb.  22,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  22,  1989. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  for  the  exchange  of  information 
with  respect  to  taxes.  Signed  at  San  Jose 
Mar.  15,  1989.  Enters  into  force  upon  an  ex- 
change of  notes  confirming  that  both  sides 
have  met  all  constitutional  and  statutory  re- 
quirements necessary  to  effectuate  the 
agreement. 

Czechoslovakia 

Agreement  extending  the  schedule  and 
annex  to  the  air  transport  agreement  of 
June  29,  1987.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Prague  Feb.  6  and  24,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  24,  1989;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Egypt 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Cairo  Mar.  20,  1989.  En- 
tered into  force  Mar.  20,  1989. 

France 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  a  cooper- 
ative deep  submergence  rescue  system  pro- 
gram, with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Paris  Jan.  27  and  Feb.  21,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  21,  1989. 

Ghana 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  23,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Accra  Mar.  28  and  31, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  31,  1989. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  to  operate  the  LORAN-C  trans- 
mitting station  at  Sylt,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Hamburg 
Mar.  20,"  1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20, 
1989. 

Iraq 

Agreement  concerning  claims  resulting 
from  the  attack  on  the  U.S.S.  Stark.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Baghdad  Mar. 
27  and  28,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  28, 
1989. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  28,  1984,  concerning  acquisition  and 
production  in  Japan  of  F-15  aircraft  and  re- 
lated equipment  and  materials.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  Feb.  14,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  14,  1989. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
tion in  the  detailed  design,  development,  op- 
eration, and  utilization  of  the  permanently 
manned  civil  space  station.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Mar.  14,  1989.  Enters  into  force  upon 
written  notification  by  each  party  of  the 
completion  of  all  necessary  procedures  for 
entry  into  force. 


Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  20,  1978  (TIAS  9268),  concerning  an 
additional  program  for  the  acquisition  and 
production  in  Japan  of  the  P-3C  weapon  sys- 
tem and  related  equipment  and  materials. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo 
Mar.  24,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  24, 
1989. 

Agreement  concerning  the  acquisition  and 
production  in  Japan  of  the  HYDRA  70 
rocket  system.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Tokyo  Mar.  31,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  31,  1989. 

Agreement  concerning  the  acquisition  and 
production  in  Japan  of  the  SH-60J  and 
UH-60J  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Tokyo  Mar.  31,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  31,  1989. 

Macao 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  28,  1983,  and  Jan.  9,  1984,  as  amended 
and  extended  (TIAS  10917),  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Hong  Kong  and  Macao 
Feb.  10  and  Mar.  3,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  3,  1989. 

Malawi 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guar- 
anteed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Lilongwe  Feb.  21,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  6,  1989. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  13,  1988,  as  amended,  concerning  trade 
in  cotton,  w'ool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  Nov.  7, 

1988,  and  Jan.  3,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  3,  1989;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Romania 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  4,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  7901,  9431,  10703),  relating  to  civil 
air  transport.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Bucharest  Jan.  23  and  30  and  Feb.  18, 

1989.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  18,  1989;  effec- 
tive Jan.  31,  1989. 

Spain 

Agreement  concerning  the  continued  appli- 
cation of  provisions  of  the  space  cooperation 
agreement  of  Aug.  31  and  Sept.  4,  1984,  un- 
til entry  into  force  of  a  new  agreement. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Madrid 
Mar.  13  and  31,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  31,  1989. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
June  19,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  7651,  9349),  on  cooperation  in  studies 
of  the  world  ocean.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Moscow  Dec.  13,  1988,  and  Jan.  3, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3,  1989;  effec- 
tive Dec.  15,  1988. 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


I 


Memorandum  of  undei-standing  concerning 
the  operation  of  the  INTELPOST  service, 
with  details  of  implementation.  Signed  at 
Moscow  and  Washington  Feb.  14  and  Mar.  9, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  3,  1989. 

United  Arab  Emirates 

Administrative  arrangement  concerning  a 
[textile]  visa  system.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Abu  Dhabi  Feb.  4  and  Mar.  2, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  2,  1989. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  concerning  the  investigation  of 
drug  trafficking  offenses  and  the  seizures 
and  forfeiture  of  proceeds  and  instrumen- 
talities of  drug  trafficking,  with  attachment 
and  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  London 
Feb.  9,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  11, 
1989. 

Venezuela 

Swap  agreement  between  the  U.S.  Treas- 
ury and  the  Central  Bank  of  Venezuela/ 
Government  of  Venezuela,  with  related  let- 
ter. Signed  at  Washington  and  Caracas  Mar. 
10,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  10,  1989. 


'Not  in  force. 

2Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

^With  declaration(s). 

■•Does  not  apply  to  optional  Annex  IV. 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.         Date  Subject 

*58      4/3         Program  for  the  visit  of  Is- 
raeli Prime  Minister 
Shamir,  Apr.  5-7. 
59      4/10       Baker:  interview  on  "This 
Week  With  David 
Brinkley,"  Apr.  9. 

*60      4/11       Dr.  John  Randolph  Hubbard 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
India,  Dec.  5,  1988 
(biographic  data). 

*61      4/11       Edward  Peter  Djerejian 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Syria,  Aug.  24,  1988 
(biographic  data). 
62      4/12       Baker:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee. 

*63  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

sworn  in  as  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State,  Mar.  20 
(biographic  data). 

*64      4/13       Baker:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on 
Commerce,  State,  and 
Justice,  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee. 


65      4/14       Baker:  address  before  the 
American  Society  of 
Newspaper  Editors  1989 
convention. 

*66      4/14       Program  for  the  visit  of  King 
Hussein  I,  Apr.  17-21. 

*67      4/18       Baker:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee. 
68      4/25       Baker:  interview  by  Morton 
Kondracke  for  PBS 
"American  Interests," 
Apr.  19. 

*69      4/25       Michael  Hayden  Armacost 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Japan  (biographic  data). 

*70      4/25       Reginald  Bartholomew  sworn 
in  as  Under  Secretary  for 
Security  Assistance, 
Science,  and  Technology, 
Apr.  20  (biographic  data). 

*71      4/25       Robert  B.  Zoellick  sworn  in 
as  Counselor  of  the 
Department,  Mar.  3 
(biographic  data). 

*72      4/27      James  R.  Lilley  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  Apr.  24 
(biographic  data). 

*73      4/28      Janet  G.  Mullins  sworm  in  as 
Assistant  Secretary  for 
Legislative  Affairs 
(biographic  data). 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Division,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

President  Bush 

Encouraging  Political  and  Economic  Reform 
in  Poland,  citizens  of  Hamtramck,  Mich., 
Apr.  17,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1166). 

Secretary  Baker 

Latin  America  and  the  U.S.:  A  New  Part- 
nership, Carter  Presidential  Center's  Con- 
sultation on  a  New  Hemispheric  Agenda, 
Atlanta,  Mar.  30,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1160). 

Power  for  Good:  American  Foreign  Policy  in 
the  New  Era,  American  Society  of  News- 
paper Editors,  Apr.  14,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1162). 

Economics 

Oil  and  Energy  (GIST,  Apr.  1989). 
U.S.  Exports:  Foreign  Policy  Controls 

(GIST,  Apr.  1989). 
Foreign  Investment  in  a  Global  Economy 

(Public  Information  Series,  Apr.  1989). 


Europe 

The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of  Soviet  Re- 
form, Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Do- 
briansky,  Baltic  American  Freedom 
League,  Cleveland,  Mar.  11,  1989  (Cur- 
rent Policv  #1161). 

NATO  Alliance  at  Fortv  (GIST,  Apr.  1989) 
Soviet  Emigration:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST, 
Apr.  1989). 

Military  Confidence-  and  Security-Buildin 
Measures  (Public  Information  Series, 
Apr.  1989). 

Atlantic  Shield:  The  40th  Anniversary  of 
NATO  (Public  Information  Series,  Apr. 
1989). 

Science  &  Technology 

ITU  Plentipotentiary  Conference  (GIST, 

Apr.  1989). 
Telecommunications  as  an  Engine  of  Grow 

(Public  Information  Series,  Apr.  1989). 

Security  Assistance 

FY  1990  Security  Assistance  Program,  As 
sistant  Secretary  Holmes,  Subeommitte 
on  Arms  Control,  International  Securitj 
and  Science,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com 
mittee.  Mar.  8,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1159). 

Terrorism 

International  Terrorism  (GIST,  Apr.  1989). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Opportunity  and  Challenge  in  Latin  Amer 
ca  and  the  Caribbean,  Acting  Assistant 
Secretary  Kozak,  Subcommittee  on  Wes 
ern  Hemisphere  Affairs,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Mar.  2,  1989  (Curre 
Policy  #1156). 

Criminal  Justice  and  Democracy  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  (Public  Informatic 
Series,  Apr.  1989). 

U.S.  Support  for  Democracy  and  Peace  in 
Central  America  (Selected  Documents 
#36,  Mar.  1989).  ■ 


ii 


a 


Donartmant  nf  Qtato  Rl  lllotin/.lline  198 


'OEX 


ne  1989 
((Jume89,  No.  2147 


,„'i  iian  Principles.  Power  For  Good; 
luTican  Foreign  Policy  in  the  New  Era 

yiker) ' 8 

lis  Control 

ijiiiial  Weapons  Disposal  Pro,t;ram 
rifilers(lorl') 19 

t  t'tary's  Interview  for  "American 

tei'ests"    14 

■'■\(\;\.  Power  For  Good:  American  Foreign 

■  y  in  the  New  Era  (Baker) 8 

niunications.  Toward  a  Global  High- 
!  iiiition  TV  Production  Standard 
aiiilau)   48 

o;ress 

1  ;i|i()  Assistance  Request  for  Latin 
iirrica  and  the  Caribbean  (Kozak)  ...  59 

'  'I'M)  Security  Assistance  Request 

iiiies)   52 

.  M-  Cooperation  With  EURATOM 

:  I'r  to  the  Congress)    44 

H  ^t  for  U.S.  Contributions  to 

.  iltilateral  Development  Banks 

■a,ly)    21 

IS  (if  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 

ills) 30 

111  a  Global  High-Definition  TV 

,  iiluetion  Standard  (Landau)  48 

International  Activities  in  Science  and 
hnology  (message  to  the  Congress)  51 
.■support  for  Democracy  and  Peace  in 

I  iitral  America  (Baker,  Bush,  bipartisan 

oril,  joint  declarations)   55 

cimics 

^11  Direct  Investment  in  a  Global 

momy  32 

'■>t  for  U.S.  Contributions  to 
It  [lateral  Development  Banks 
ally)    21 

1  tai-y's  Interview  for  "American 

1  iTCSts"   14 

:  't.  Visit  of  Egyptian  President  (Bush, 
liarak) ' 40 

.  ilvador.  President's  Meeting  With  El 

-  \a(lor's  President-Elect  (White  House 

I  t-ment ) 66 

•  lia.  The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of 

;  let  Reform  (Dobriansky)   35 

w  pe.  NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 
'^  ets  in  Brussels  (final  communique)     36 
|ui  pean  Communities.  Nuclear 
(  iperatiiin  With  EURATOM  (letter  to 

(  (ingress) 44 

I  sn  Assistance 

.  ;I0()  Assistance  Request  for  Latin 

-  icrica  and  the  Caribbean  (Kozak)  ...  59 
'St  for  LI.S.  Contributions  to 

I  liilateral  Development  Banks 
ally)    21 

I  an  Rights.  The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era 
^iiviet  Reform  (Dobriansky) 35 

:  national  Organizations  & 

'  nferences.  Request  for  U.S. 
iti-ibutions  to  Multilateral 

cliiljment  Banks  (Brady)    21 

nd.  President  Meets  With  Irish  Prime 

lister  (Bush) 39 

I.  Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 

ish,  Shamir)   42 


Latvia.  The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of 

Soviet  Reform  (Dobriansky)  35 

Lebanon.  Situation  in  Lebanon 

(Dejiartment  and  White  House 

statements) 43 

Lithuania.  The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of 

Soviet  Reform  (Dobriansky)   35 

Middle  East 

Power  For  Good:  American  Foreign  Policy  in 

the  New  Era  (Baker)   '. .  S 

Secretary's  Interview  for  "American 

Interests"   14 

Secretarv's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    12 

Namibia.  Transition  to  Independence 

Marred  in  Namibia  (Department 

statement) 18 

New  Zealand.  U.S. -New  Zealand 

Relations:  Some  Parting  Observations 

(Cleveland)  45 

Nicaragua 

Electoral  and  Media  Laws  in  Nicaragua 

(Department  statement) 67 

Secretary's  Interview  for  "American 

Interests"   14 

Soviet  Policy  in  Central  America  (White 

House  statement)  67 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group  Meets  in 

Brussels  (final  communique) 36 

Secretary's  Interview  for  "American 

Interests"   14 

Nuclear  Policy.  Nuclear  Cooperation  With 

EURATOM  (letter  to  the  Congress)  ...  44 
Panama 
Secretary's  Interview  for  "American 

Interests"   14 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    12 

Poland 

Encouraging  Political  and  Economic  Re- 
forms in  Poland  (Bush)    3 

Polish  Roundtable  Accords  (White  House 

statement) 37 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    12 

Presidential  Documents 

Commitment  to  Democracy  and  Economic 

Progress  in  Latin  America   1 

Continuation  of  Arms  Sales  to  Saudi 

Arabia   41 

Encouraging  Political  and  Economic 

Reforms  in  Poland    3 

Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM 

(letter  to  the  Congress)    44 

President  Meets  With  Irish  Prime 

Minister 39 

U.S.  International  Activities  in  Science  and 

Technology  (message  to  the  Congress)     51 
U.S.  Supi)ort  for  Democracy  and  Peace  in 

Central  America  (Baker,  Bush,  bipartisan 

accord,  joint  declarations)   55 

Visit  of  Egyptian  President  (Bush, 

Mubarak') 40 

Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister  (Bush, 

Shamir)  42 

Publications.  Department  of  State 70 


Saudi  Arabia.  Continuation  of  Arms  Sales 

to  Saudi  Arabia  (Bush)   41 

Science  &  Technology 

Toward  a  Global  High-Definition  TV 

Production  Standard  (Landau)  48 

LI.S.  International  Activities  in  Science  and 

Technology  (message  to  the  Congress)      51 
Security  Assistance 
Continuation  of  Arms  Sales  to  Saudi  Arabia 

(Bush) 41 

FY  1990  Assistance  Request  for  Latin 

America  and  the  Caribbean  (Kozak)  ...  59 
FY  1990  Security  Assistance  Request 

(Holmes)   . . . ." 52 

Trade.  Status  of  Multilateral  Trade  Nego- 
tiations (Hills)  30 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 68 

U.S.S.R. 

The  Baltic  States  in  an  Era  of  Soviet 

Reform  (Dobriansky) 35 

Power  For  Good:  American  Foreign  Policy 

in  the  New  Era  (Baker) 8 

Secretary's  Interview  for  "American 

Interests"   14 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    12 

Soviet  Policy  in  Central  America  (White 

House  statement)   67 

United  Nations.  Transition  to  Independence 

Marred  in  Namibia  (Department 

statement) 18 

Western  Hemisphere 

Commitment  to  Democracy  and  Economic 

Progress  in  Latin  America  (Bush) 1 

FY'  1990  Assistance  Request  for  Latin 

America  and  the  Caribbean  (Kozak)  ...  59 
Power  For  Good:  American  Foreign  Policy 

in  the  New  Era  (Baker) 8 

LI.S.  and  Latin  America:  A  Shared  Destiny 

(Baker) 5 

U.S.  Support  for  Democracy  and  Peace  in 

Central  America  (Baker,  Bush,  bipartisan 

accord,  joint  declarations)   55 

Na»)e  hide.v 

Baker,  Secretary    5,8,12,14,55 

Bradv,  Nicholas  F 21 

Bush,  President    . . .  1,3,39,40,41,42,44,51,55 

Cleveland,  Paul  M 45 

Dobriansky,  Paula  .J  35 

Dole,  Robert 55 

Foley,  Thomas  S    55 

Friedersdorf,  Max  L  19 

Hills,  Carla  A 30 

Holmes,  H.  Allen    52 

Kozak,  Michael  G 59 

Landau,  Sonia   48 

Michel,  Robert  H    55 

Mitchell,  George  J 55 

Mubarak,  Mohammed  Hosni   40 

Shamir,  Y'itzhak   42 

Wright,  .James  C,  Jr  55 


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