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The Official Montlily Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2064

July 1982

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bulletin

Volume 82 Number 2064 / July 1982

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Secretary of State

DEAN FISCHER

Assistant Secretary lor Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director.

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Acting Chief. Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through March .^1. 1987.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Dkpartmknt of Statk Bui.i.KTiN as the
source will be appreciated. The Bui.i.ktin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.

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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 President Reagan Attends Economic and NATO Summits {Secretary Haig,
President Reagan. Secretary Regan. Final Communique. Declaration.
Documents)
15 President Reagan Visits Europe (Secretary Haig, President Mitterrand,

Pope John Paul II, Queen Elizabeth II, President Reagan, Prime Minister
Thatcher; Luncheon and Dinner Toasts, U.S. -Italy Statement)

The President

39 An Agenda for Peace
42 News Conference of May 13
(Excerpts)

The Secretary

44 Peace and Security in the Middle
East

47 Peaceful Change in Central
America (Secretary Haig,
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)

50 Developing Lasting U.S. -China
Relations (Secretary Haig,
Walter J. Stoessel. Jr.)

52 Interview on "Face the Nation"

55 Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley"

58 News Conference of June 19

Africa

61 FY 1983 Assistance Requests

for Africa (Chester A. Crocker)

Department

64 FY 1983 Authorization Request

(Secretary Haig)

East Asia

65 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for

Asia (John H. Holdridge)

Europe

70 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for
Europe (Charles H. Thomas)

IVIiddle East

72 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for
the Near East and South Asia
(Nicholas A. Veliotes)

74 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for

Israel (Morris Draper)

Refugees

75 FY 1983 Requests for Migration

and Refugee Assistance
(Richard D. Vine)

Security Assistance

77 FY 1983 Security Assistance
Requests (James L. Buckley)

United Nations

80 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for
the U.N. and the OAS
(Nicholas Piatt)

Western Hemisphere

83 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for
Latin America (Thomas 0.
Enders)

86 The Falkland Islands (Secretary
Haig. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, J.
William Middendorfll, White
House Statement, Texts of
Resolutions)

Treaties

91 Current Actions

Chronology

93 May 1983

Press Releases

94 Department of State

Index

.,.^ii^mp^»Ts

SEP I 41982

DEPOSITORY

FEATURE

Economic
and
NATO
Summits

President Reagan

Attends Economic and

NATO Summits

President Reagan attended the eighth economic summit of the in-
dustrialized nations June 5-6, 1982, in Versailles, France. The other par-
ticipants were French President Francois Mitterrand (chairman), Canadian
Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, West German Chancelkn- Helmut
Schmidt, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, Japanese Prime
Minister Zenko Suzuki, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
The European Communities was represented by Gaston Thorn, President of
the Commission, and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martins, President
of the Council.

On June 10, President Reagan attended the North Atlantic Council sum-
mit in Bonn.

Following are statements by Secretary Haig and Treasury Secretary
Donald T. Regan made at the opening of press briefings and by the Presi-
dent; the final communique issued at the conclusion of the economic summit;
the declaration and two documents issued at the conclusion of the NATO
summit; and Secretary Haig's press briefing. '

Participants of the economic Bummit pose
on steps of Grand Trianon, Versailles.
From left to right are Gaston Thorn. Presi-
dent of the Economic Community Commis-
sion, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko
Suzuki, British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, President Reagan, French Presi-
dent Francois Mitterrand (chairman). West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Cana-
dian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott
Trudeau, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni
Spadolini, and Belgian Prime Minister
Wilfried Martens.

(White House phole by Karl H. Schumacher)

ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Secretary Regan's
Statement

Versailles
June 5^

As you know, we had the first session
this morning. It opened a little before
10:00 a.m. The main subject for the first
part, lasting through the coffee break
and until about 12:30 p.m., was the sub-
ject of research, technology, employ-
ment, and growth. Each of the heads of
state spoke in regard to this. President
Mitterrand led off the discussion and

/1982

I

FEATURE

Economic
and
NATO
Summits

hen later passed out copies of his paper
n the subject.

The U.S. position was, as expressed
y President Reagan, that we welcomed
his initiative on the part of President
litterrand, that there should be a work-
ig party that should further study the
ubject of technology and how to im-
irove it.

The President cautioned, though,
hat this should be mainly in the private
ector rather than in the public sector,
lointing out that most of the innova-
ions over the past half century or more
lave been in the private sector of the
Jnited States rather than through
government. He gave out some figures
,0 the effect that we are spending in the
Jnited States about $80 billion on re-
iearch and development, half of which is
»ming from the private sector. Of the
f40-odd million that's in the public sec-
xir government spending, $5.5 billion of
;hat is pure research, has nothing to do
(vith applied research.

He also pointed out that a presiden-
tial study in this area that was reported
to President Roosevelt in the early
1930s, as to what would be the great in-
novation in research and development
over the next 25 years, failed to mention
such things as television, plastics, space
technology, jet planes, organ trans-
plants, laser beams, "and even," he said,
"such a common item," and he held up
his ballpoint pen, "as a ballpoint pen." So
he said, "There's no way we can predict
what will be happening over the next 25
years with any degree of clarity as to
what the inventions will be."

He also said that we should not fear
technology because a lot of people, a lot
of nations do fear that there will be
higher unemployment as a result of new-
ly introduced technology. And he used
the homely illustration of the dial tele-
phone, stating that when the dial tele-
phone first came in, it was thought that
all of the female telephone operators
would be thrown out of work. He went
on to say that today more than ever,
there are more women employed in the
United States than at any other time.
And were women still on the dial— still
manning the telephones — it would take
every woman in the United States to

man the telephone system of the United
States, if, indeed, that were possible.

He said, we shouldn't fear the
results of technology but rather should
welcome it. He said that it would pro-
mote growth and that it would promote
more employment.

After the subject of technology had
been pretty well exhausted, the summit
turned to the subject of macroeco-
nomics. President Mitterrand asked
Chancellor Schmidt to lead off. Schmidt
said he didn't know how he got to be a
sherpa for macroeconomics, but, never-
theless, he went ahead and described his
ideas of where the nations of the world
stood at the current moment from an
economic point of view.

Most of these facts are well-known
about high unemployment in most of the
nations involved in the summit— about
the fact that we simultaneously have
high rates of interest and a recession,
which is something very unusual. He
pointed out that the real rates of in-
terest, particularly in the United States,
were the highest they've ever been. He
thought that this was something that all
of us should work on. He said he wasn't
pointing the finger at the United States,
but all nations would have to get their
domestic policies into effect, that there
were too many transfer payments.
Deficits are running too high. There's
much too much public borrowing.

President Reagan then gave his in-
tervention and in the course of it
described our economy. Again, most of
these facts are known to you. I'll tick
them off rather quickly.

The fact that we do have high un-
employment but he pointed out that the
figures we received yesterday — that un-
employment as a percentage is up from
9.4 to 9.5— at the same time indicated
that over a million new job-seekers were
in the marketplace. Of that number,
800,000 had found employment, and at
the current moment, we were employing
over 100 million Americans. That's the
greatest number of employed Americans
in our history.

He also stated that our high rates of
interest were psychological in his judg-
ment, that inflation was down. He gave
the figures on inflation— a little over 6%
for 12 months around, a little over 2%

for 6 months, less than 1% for the last 3
months; in fact, 1 month of deflation. He
said that that indicated to him that in-
terest rates would come down as soon as
the fear of those who are loaning money
that we could have continually high
Federal deficits— those fears were
allayed. And he thought that could be
done by a budget process that would end
in the near future with Federal deficits
showing that they would be down over
the next 3 months— over the next 3
years with a balanced budget in sight.
And at that point, there was an adjourn-
ment for lunch.

Secretary Regan's
Statement

* ^Pnblicain outside Versailles Palace.

Versailles
June 5, 1982'

This afternoon the session was primarily
devoted to the wrap-up of the macro-
economic statements by the heads of
state. And then we get into trade, and
the subjects lasted most of the day. I
told you this morning earlier or early
this afternoon what the President had to
say about macro. When it came to trade,
by that time he had left for his Saturday
live radio show so I did the intervention
on trade.

Our points were that we would have
to come out strong for free trade and
less protectionism during this summit or
we might find ourselves going back-
wards; that the trade among free na-
tions was the hallmark of the post-World
War II era, and it was up to the summit
nations to preserve what had brought
prosperity to most nations over the
period since that time.

The other points that we made were
the need for promoting some type of
rules for investment. As you know,
there are rules for trade in the GATT
[General Agreement in Tariffs and
Trade]. There are rules for money in the
IMF [International Monetary Fund], but
there are no rules for international in-
vestment. And we advocated that the
heads of state consider this in their com-
munique and give instructions to the

finance ministers that they should begin
discussions leading eventually toward
some such rulemaking.

The other points that came up dur-
ing the afternoon that might be of in-
terest to you: There was quite an ex-
change among the Canadian Prime
Minister, the British Prime Minister, the
German Chancellor, and the President of
the United States. And the subject was
unemployment and inflation and whether
or not there is a trade-off. If you recall
the so-called Phillip's curve, that is
where the more that you have inflation,
the more unemployment you'll have; and
the less inflation, the less unemploy-
ment.

And the President is pretty firm,
sticking by his positions as to the fact
that while we have a high unemploy-
ment rate in the United States, we still
have, at this particular time, more
employed in the United States. We have
gotten our inflation rate down.

The German Chancellor's position
was that interest rates and inflation ac-
tually started up way back in the time of
President Lyndon Johnson and the Viet-
nam war. And oil prices were not the
immediate cause of inflation, but they
were just an additive on the road.

The other things that happened dur-
ing the afternoon: There was another
exchange in which the German
Chancellor asked the President of the
United States at what point he thought
that deficits would be coming down in
the United States, because he said that
psychologically that was, in his judg-
ment, keeping up interest rates. And
this was having an adverse effect on the
European countries, as well as the rest
of the world.

The President replied that the— it's
his understanding there'll be a vote in
the House of Representatives next
week — Wednesday probably or some-
time around that — regarding at least
two different budgets. He was hopeful,
with the passage of one of those— a
reconciliation between the House and
the Senate— that the United States
would have a budget with deficits trend-
ing down.

The British Prime Minister picked
up on that and said that in her opinion
the trend was the most important thing,
not the absolute level because we all
needed that.

Department of State Bi

growth of each country and a consequence of
that growth. We reaffirm our commitment to
strengthening the open multilateral trading
system as embodied in the GATT and to
maintaining its effective operation. In order
to promote stability and employment through
trade and growth, we will resist protectionist
pressures and trade-distorting practices. We
are resolved to complete the work of the
Tokyo Round and to improve the capacity of
the GATT to solve current and future trade
problems. We will also work towards the fur-
ther opening of our markets. We will
cooperate with the developing countries to
strengthen and improve the multilateral
system and to expand trading opportunities
in particular with the newly industrialized
countries. We shall participate fully in the
forthcoming GATT Ministerial Conference in
order to take concrete steps towards these
ends. We shall work for early agreement on
the renewal of the OECD export credit con-
sensus.

• We agree to pursue a prudent and
diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R.
and Eastern Europe, consistent with our
political and security interests. This includes
actions in three key areas. First, following in-
ternational discussions in January, our
representatives will work together to im-
prove the international system for controlling
exports of strategic goods to these countries
and national arrangements for the enforce-
ment of security controls. Second, we will ex-
change information in the OECD on all
aspects of our economic, commercial and
financial relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Third, taking into account
existing economic and financial considera-
tions, we have agreed to handle cautiously
financial relations with the U.S.S.R. and
other Eastern European countries in such a
way as to ensure that they are conducted on
a sound economic basis, including also the
need for commercial prudence in limiting ex-
port credits. The development of economic
and financial relations will be subject to
periodic ex-post review.

• The progress we have already made
does not diminish the need for continuing
efforts to economise on energy, particularly
through the price mechanism, and to promote
alternative sources, including nuclear energy
and coal, in a long-term perspective. These
efl'orts will enable us further to reduce our
vulnerability to interruptions in the supply of

energy and instability of prices. Cooperation
to develop new energy technologies, and to
strengthen our capacity to deal with disrup-
tions, can contribute to our common energy
security. We shall also work to strengfthen
our cooperation with both oil-exporting and
oil-importing developing countries.

• The growth of the developing countries
and the deepening of a constructive relation-
ship with them are vital for the political and
economic well-being of the whole world. It is,
therefore, important that a high level of
financial flows and official assistance should
be maintained and that their amount and
their effectiveness should be increased as far
as possible, with responsibilities shared
broadly among all countries capable of mak-
ing a contribution. The launching of global
negotiations is a major political objective ap-
proved by all participants in the summit. The
latest draft resolution circulated by the
Group of the 77 is helpful, and the discussion
at Versailles showed general acceptance of
the view that it would serve as a basis for
consultations with the countries concerned.
We believe that there is now a good prospect
for the early launching and success of the
global negotiations, provided that the in-
dependence of the specialized agencies is
guaranteed. At the same time, we are
prepared to continue and develop practical
cooperation with the developing countries
through innovations within the World Bank,
through our support of the work of the
regional development banks, through prog-
ress in countering instability of commodity
export earnings, through the encouragement
of private capital flows, including interna-
tional arrangements to improve the condi-
tions for private investment, and through a
further concentration of oflicial assistance on

the poorer countries. This is why we see a
need for special temporary arrangements t
overcome funding problems for IDA [Interi
tional Development Association] VI, and fo
an early start to consideration of IDA VII.
We will give special encouragement to pro-
grammes or arrangements designed to in-
crease food and energy production in devel
ing countries which have to import these
essentials, and to programmes to address t
implications of population growth.

• In the field of balance of payments s
port, we look forward to progress at the
September IMF annual meeting towards S(
tling the increase in the size of the Fund a
propriate to the coming eighth quota revie

• Revitalization and growth of the woi
economy will depend not only on our own
efforts but also to a large extent upon
cooperation among our countries and with
other countries in the exploitation of scien
tific and technological development. We ha
to exploit the immense opportunities
presented by the new technologies, par-
ticularly for creating new employment. W< ■
need to remove barriers to, and to promote
the development of the trade in new tech-
nologies both in the public sector and in tf
private sector. Our countries will need to
train men and women in the new technolo
and to create the economic, social and
cultural conditions which allow these
technologies to develop and flourish. We h
considered the report presented to us on
these issues by the President of the Frenc
Republic. In this context we have decided
set up promptly a working group of
representatives of our governments and o
the European Community to develop, in c'
consultation with the appropriate interna-
tional institutions, especially the OECD, p
posals to give help to attain these objectiv
This group will be asked to submit its repi
to us by 31 December 1982. The conclusio
the report and the resulting action will be
considered at the next economic summit t
held in 1983 in the United States of Amer

Statement of
International Monetary
Undertakings

1. We accept a joint responsibility to worl
for greater stability of the world monetar
system. We recognize that this rests prim
ly on convergence of policies designed to

Department of State B

ulleln

FEATURE

Economic
and
NATO
Summits

achieve lower inflation, higher employment
and renewed economic growth; and thus to
maintain the internal and external values of
our currencies. We are determined to dis-
charge this obligation in close collaboration
with all interested countries and monetary in-
stitutions.

2. We attach major importance to the
role of the IMF as a monetary authority and
we will give it our full support in its efforts
to foster stability.

3. We are ready to strengthen our
cooperation with the IMF in its work of
surveillance; and to develop this on a
multilateral basis taking into account par-
ticularly the currencies constituting the SDR
[special drawing rights].

4. We rule out the use of our exchange
rates to gain unfair competitive advantages.

5. We are ready, if necessary, to use in-
tervention in exchange markets to counter
disorderly conditions, as provided for under
Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement.

6. Those of us who are members of the
EMS [European Monetary System] consider
that these undertakings are complementary
to the obligations of stability which they have
already undertaken in that framework and
recognize the role of the system in the fur-
ther development of stability in the interna-
tional monetary system.

7. We are all convinced that greater
monetary stability will assist freer flows of
goods, services and capital. We are deter-
mined to see that greater monetary stability
and freer flows of trade and capital reinforce
one another in the interest of economic
growth and employment.

Secretary Haig's
Statement

Versailles
June 6, 19823

The primary purpose of this briefing, of
course, is to cover the political highlights
of the just concluded summit. But I
know that all of you are very concerned,
as are we, about the worsening situation
in Lebanon, and I thought I would say a
few words about that at the outset and
get it behind us and to take care of your
concerns.

We have been watching this situa-
tion moment by moment as it unfolds.
The President has followed it through-
out the day and has shared with his col-
leagues during the plenary session the
updates that we had as they developed
to include the fact of his communication
very early this morning with Prime
Minister Begin and the response receiv-
ed later this afternoon from Mr. Begin.

That response was consistent with
the decision made by the Israeli Cabinet
and announced in Jerusalem which reads
as follows: "The Cabinet took the follow-
ing decision, first, to instruct the Israeli
defense forces to place all civilian
population of the Galilee beyond the
range of the terrorist fire from Lebanon
where they, their bases, and their head-
quarters are concentrated. The name of
the operation is Peace for Galilee. Dur-
ing the operation, the Syrian Army will
not be attacked unless it attacks the
Israeli forces. Israel continues to aspire
to the signing of the peace treaty with
an independent Lebanon, its territorial
integrity preserved."

That is the brief text, which you
may or may not have seen from Israel.

We are, of course, extremely con-
cerned about the escalating cycle of
violence. The President, yesterday after-
noon, asked Ambassador Habib [Philip
C. Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East] to proceed
here posthaste. He met with Am-
bassador Habib this afternoon and de-
cided to send him directly to Israel as

his personal representative to conduct
discussions on an urgent basis with
Prime Minister Begin. The President
also dispatched an urgent message to
Prime Minister Begin, telling him of his
decision to do so. I anticipate that Phil
will proceed on to Rome this evening
and, hopefully, will arrive in Israel early
tomorrow morning.

In the last 48 hours at the
President's direction, we have been
engaged in an intense degree of
diplomatic activity in the United Nations
in New York, where we firmly sup-
ported the resolution urging an im-
mediate cease-fire. And as you know,
President Reagan joined this morning
with the other members of the summit
in issuing a statement urging a respon-
sive reaction to the U.N. resolution.

We have been in touch with the
Government of Israel for a prolonged
period on the situation in Lebanon,
always urging restraint, and always hop-
ing, as we continue to hope, that the
cease-fire can, even at this late date, be
reinstituted. As of now, we are informed
that there are two Israeli military col-
umns that crossed into Lebanon from
Israel, one proceeding along the coast
road in the direction of Tyre and the
other through the upper Galilee panhan-
dle. The penetration in the latter case
has been approximately 10 kilometers, in
the former case perhaps 3 or 4
kilometers.

We are extremely disturbed by the
loss of innocent lives in this fighting on
the Israeli-Lebanese border. It has in-
volved, as you know, the exchange of ar-
tillery and rockets for a prolonged
period preceding the Israeli ground
penetration. We are concerned also that
the fighting not be expanded into a
broader conflict and are acutely con-
scious of the presence of Syrian forces
in fairly close proximity to the eastern
penetration. We will do our best to con-
vey to the Government of Syria the
stated intentions of the Government of
Israel not to engage unless engaged by
Syrian forces.

I know that Don Regan has talked
to you at length about the economic

July 1982

deliberations in the summit itself, and
I'm not going to rehash them unless you
have a question. But I think the general
consensus of view on almost every topic
was evident. I think President Reagan's
interventions throughout the delibera-
tions were extensive, impressive, and
had an enormous impact on the shaping
of the communique itself and the overall
tone and direction of the deliberations;
especially was he impressive in analyzing
the various economic factors that have
contributed to the inflationary spiral,
declining levels of economic growth, and
increased unemployment. I think it was
an invaluable exchange of views between
the leaders on these subjects, which ad-
mittedly, are viewed from the perspec-
tive of the internal policies and affairs of
the member governments but which are
all affected enormously by American
policies, plans, and the progress that we
are making in our own economic
reforms.

On the political side, which is, of
course, the essence of my concerns, in
the several sessions, luncheons, evening
sessions, dinners, in the margins, as well
as some instances at the plenaries
themselves, there was a great deal of
discussion about political affairs. And I'll
touch upon some of the key issues in a
moment. I think, clearly, there is
unanimous concern, as you would ex-
pect, that the implications of the contin-
uing growth in Soviet military capa-
bilities, continuing concern about the
lack of progress in the continuing oc-
cupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union, continued repression in Poland,
as well as other Soviet interventionist
activities.

These issues, of course, will be ad-
dressed in even greater detail at the
Bonn summit which will take place early
next week. In discussing the Soviet
challenge, the President argued that
Moscow's economic problem and its im-
pending succession crisis, as I told you
the other day, provided a rich and im-
portant opportunity for Western nations
operating in concert and employing their
political, economic, and security assets
to influence a greater degree of
restraint and responsibility on the part
of the Soviet Union. It was clear that
the consensus in this direction was

broad. There are, of course, differences
in where these assets can best be ap-
plied and how they best can be applied
based again on a demography — the
demographic aspects of the country con-
cerned—and a particular role that they
can play.

We, of course, welcome agreement
on exercising prudence on handling the
finances with the Soviet Union, in-
cluding limits on export credits. You will
note that we talked about a continuing
monitorship of this. And for the first
time, the seven who are not exclusively
involved — the OECD is involved — all
Western creditor nations, and some of
the nonaligned are neutral nations — are
involved. But for the first time, we
developed a consensus for the need to
pull together all of the facts associated
with trade and credit with the East, not
just the Soviet Union but Eastern
Europe as well, to analyze and assess
and draw conclusions from this.

You will note also that there was a
reinforcement of the decision made at
Ottawa to continue to broaden the con-
trols on the transfer of sensitive
technology to the Soviet Union.

The President's decision to pursue a
new arms control approach, one that
focused on significant reductions, was
unanimously and warmly welcomed by
all the participants. The President made
it clear that the United States is, indeed,
prepared to have a serious dialogue with
the Soviet Union.

As I noted yesterday, the heads of
state addressed a number of regional
security issues, including the South
Atlantic crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. To
that was added today, of course, exten-
sive discussion on the crisis in Lebanon,
which I have already touched upon.

The margins and the luncheons pro-
vided an opportunity to discuss again
the scourge of international terrorism,
and the recent events associated with
the Lebanon crisis drew everyone's at-
tention to this continuing problem.

There were discussions, as I told you
yesterday, on the need for youth ex-
changes— youth exchanges between the
United States and Japan, Europe and
the United States, and Japan and
Europe.

Now I want to say a word about the
Falklands. That clearly was a very
heavily discussed aspect of this summit,
especially in the informal meetings of
the leaders themselves. From the U.S.
point of view, I want to restate tonight
very clearly that it is the President's
policy that aggression must not be al-
lowed to succeed, and if the Argentine
invasion of the Falklands was allowed to
stand uncontested, this would have an
impact on the security of small states
everywhere.

I want to say another word despite
my efforts last evening to dispense with
the question of the U.N. resolution; that
the difference in assessment between
veto and abstention should in no way be
interpreted as any lessening of U.S. sup-
port for the principle involved, which
Great Britian is upholding, nor has it
changed in any way the levels of support
and dedication to support that the
United States announced earlier with
respect to the conflict. We may have dif-
ferences in the context of assessments
of the particular U.N. resolution, as, in-
deed, we would expect to do from time
to time. After all, the United States
makes its decisions based on its own na-
tional interests.

I want to make it clear that we have
not asked for a military pause, consider-
ing this is a judgment, as I have said
repeatedly, for Great Britain and com-
manders on the ground to make and to
assess.

We remain confident after the dis-

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Economic
and
NATO
Summits

ssions — the extensive discussions be-
'een the President and Mrs. Thatcher
re, the discussions I've had with
)reign Minister Pym— that we share a
mmon view with Britain; that the
isis in the South Atlantic should be
solved with a minimum loss of life,
id I would like to note tonight that the
tion of a honorable withdrawal for
•gentine forces remains still available.

ATO SUMMIT

eclaration

>nn

ne 10, 1982

We, the representatives of the 16 members
;he North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm our
iication to the shared values and ideals on
ich our transatlantic partnership is based.

2. The accession of Spain to the North
antic Treaty, after its peaceful change to
liamentary democracy, bears witness to

vitality of the Alliance as a force for
ice and freedom.

3. Our Alliance has preserved peace for a
'•d of a century. It is an association of free
ions joined together to preserve their
urity through mutual guarantees and col-

1 tive self-defence as recognized by the
ited Nations Charter. It remains the
ential instrument for deterring aggression
1 means of a strong defence and strengthen-
peace by means of constructive dialogue,
r solidarity in no way conflicts with the
ht of each of our countries to choose its
n policies and internal development, and
)ws for a high degree of diversity. Therein
1 our strength. In a spirit of mutual
pect, we are prepared to adjust our aims
1 interests at all times through free and
( se consultations; these are the core of
I ;ryday Allied co-operation and will be in-
I isified appropriately. We are a partnership
( equals, none dominant and none
< Tiinated.

4. The Soviet Union, for its part, requires
I : countries associated with it to act as a

i c, in order to preserve a rigid and imposed
item. Moreover, experience shows that the
viet Union is ultimately willing to threaten
use force beyond its own frontiers,
ghanistan and the Soviet attitude with

I jard to the Polish crisis show this clearly.

ily1982

The Soviet Union has devoted over the past
decade a large part of its resources to a
massive military build-up, far exceeding its
defence needs and supporting the projection
of military power on a global scale. While
creating a threat of these dimensions,
Warsaw Pact governments condemn Western
defence efforts as aggressive. While they ban
unilateral disarmament movements in their
own countriiis, they support demands for
unilateral disarmament in the West.

5. International stability and world peace
require greater restraint and responsibility
on the part of the Soviet Union. We, for our
part, reaffirming the principles and purposes
of the Alliance, set forth our Programme for
Peace in Freedom:

(a) Our purpose is to prevent war and,
while safeguarding democracy, to build the
foundations of lasting peace. None of our
weapons will ever be used except in response
to attack. We respect the sovereignty, equali-
ty, independence and territorial integrity of
all states. In fulfillment of our purpose, we
shall maintain adequate military strength and
political solidarity. On that basis, we will
persevere in efforts to establish, whenever
Soviet behaviour makes this possible, a more
constructive East-West relationship through
dialogue, negotiation and mutually advan-
tageous co-operation.

(b) Our purpose is to preserve the securi-
ty of the North Atlantic area by means of
conventional and nuclear forces adequate to
deter aggression and intimidation. This re-
quires a sustained effort on the part of all the
Allies to improve their defence readiness and
military capabilities, without seeking military
superiority. Our countries have the necessary
resources to undertake this effort. The
presence of North American armed forces in
Europe and the United States strategic
nuclear commitment to Europe remain in-
tegral to Allied security. Of equal importance
are the maintenance and continued improve-
ment of the defence capabilities of the Euro-
pean members of the Alliance. We will seek
to achieve greater effectiveness in the ap-
plication of national resources to defence,
giving due attention to possibilities for
developing areas of practical co-operation. In
this respect the Allies concerned will urgently
explore ways to take full advantage both
technically and economically of emerging
technologies. At the same time steps will be
taken in the appropriate fora to restrict
Warsaw Pact access to Western militarily
relevant technology.

(c) Our purpose is to have a stable
balance of forces at the lowest possible level,

thereby strengthening peace and interna-
tional security. We have initiated a com-
prehensive series of proposals for militarily
significant, equitable and verifiable
agreements on the control and reduction of
armaments. We fully support the efforts of
the United States to negotiate with the
Soviet Union for substai.tial reductions in the
strategic nuclear weapons of the two coun-
tries, and for the establishment of strict and
effective limitations on their intermediate-
range nuclear weapons, starting with the
total elimination of their land-based
intermediate-range missiles, which are of
most concern to each side. We will continue
to seek substantial reductions of conventional
forces on both sides in Europe, and to reach
agreement on measures which will serve to
build confidence and enhance security in the
whole of Europe. To this end, those of us
whose countries participate in the negotia-
tions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions in Vienna have agreed on a new ini-
tiative to give fresh impetus to these negotia-
tions. We will also play an active part in
wider international talks on arms control and
disarmament; at the Second United Nations
Special Session on Disarmament which has
just opened in New York, we will work to
give new momentum to these talks.

(d) Our purpose is to develop substantial
and balanced East- West relations aimed at
genuine detente. For this to be achieved, the
sovereignty of all states, wherever situated,
must be respected, human rights must not be
sacrificed to state interests, the free move-
ment of ideas must take the place of one-
sided propaganda, the free movement of per-
sons must be made possible, efforts must be
made to achieve a military relationship
characterised by stability and openness and
in general all principles and provisions of the

Helsinki Final Act in their entirety must be
applied. We, for our part, will always be
ready to negotiate in this spirit and we look
for tangible evidence that this attitude is
reciprocated.

(e) Our purpose is to contribute to
peaceful progress worldwide; we will work to
remove the causes of instability such as
under-development or tensions which en-
courage outside interference. We will con-
tinue to play our part in the struggle against
hunger and poverty. Respect for genuine
non-alignment is important for international
stability. All of us have an interest in peace
and security in other regions of the world.
We will consult together as appropriate on
events in these regions which may have im-
plications for our security, taking into ac-
count our commonly identified objectives.
Those of us who are in a position to do so will
endeavor to respond to requests for
assistance from sovereign states whose
security and independence is threatened.

(f) Our purpose is to ensure economic and
social stability for our countries, which will
strengthen our joint capacity to safeguard
our security. Sensitive to the effects of each
country's policies on others, we attach the
greatest importance to the curbing of infla-
tion and a return to sustained growth and to
high levels of employment.

While noting the important part which
our economic relations with the Warsaw Pact
countries can play in the development of a
stable East-West relationship, we will ap-
proach those relations in a prudent and diver-
sified manner consistent with our political
and security interests. Economic relations
should be conducted on the basis of a bal-
anced advantage for both sides. We under-
take to manage financial relations with the
Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic
basis, including commercial prudence also in
the granting of export credits. We agree to
exchange information in the appropriate fora
on all aspects of our economic, commercial
and financial relations with Warsaw Pact
countries.

6. Nowhere has our commitment to com-
mon basic values been demonstrated more
clearly than with regard to the situation in
Germany and Berlin. We remain committed
to the security and freedom of Berlin and
continue to support efforts to maintain the
calm situation in and around the city. The
continued success of efforts by the Federal
Republic of Germany to improve the relation-
ship between the two German states is impor-
tant to the safeguarding of peace in Europe.
We recall that the rights and responsibilities
of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and

10

Germany as a whole remain unaffected and
confirm our support for the political objective
of the Federal Republic of Germany to work
towards a state of peace in Europe in which
the German people regains its unity through
free self-determination.

7. We condemn all acts of international
terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations
of human dignity and rights and are a threat
to the conduct of normal international rela-
tions. In accordance with our national legisla-
tion, we stress the need for the most effec-
tive co-operation possible to prevent and sup-
press this scourge.

8. We call upon the Soviet Union to abide
by internationally accepted standards of
behaviour without which there can be no
prospect of stable international relations, and
to join now with us in the search for con-
structive relations, arms reductions and
world peace.

Document on
Arms Control
and Disarmament

Bonn

June 10, 1982

As indicated in our Declaration of today, we,
the representatives of the 16 members of the
North Atlantic Alliance, hereby set out our
detailed positions on Arms Control and Disar-
mament:

Militarily significant, equitable and
verifiable agreements on arms control and
disarmament contribute to the strengthening

of peace and are an integral part of our
security policies. Western proposals offer the
possibilities of substantial reductions in
United States and Soviet strategic arms and
intermediate-range weapons and in conven-
tional forces in Europe, as well as of
confidence-building measures covering the
whole of Europe:

• In the forthcoming Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), we call on the
Soviet Union to agree on significant reduc-
tions in United States and Soviet strategic
nuclear forces, focused on the most destabiliz-
ing inter-continental systems.

• In the negotiations on Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces (INF) which are con-
ducted within the START framework and are
based on the December 1979 decision on INF
modernization and arms control,'' the United
States proposal for the complete elimination
of all longer-range land-based INF missiles of
the United States and the Soviet Union holds
promise for an equitable outcome and en-
hanced security for all.

• Those of us participating in the Vienna
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR) will soon present a draft
treaty embodying a new, comprehensive pro-
posal designed to give renewed momentum to
these negotiations and achieve the long-
standing objective of enhancing stability and
security in Europe. They stress that the
Western treaty proposal, if accepted, will
commit all participants whose forces are in-
volved— European and North American — to
participate in accordance with the principle of
collectivity in substantial manpower reduc-
tions leading to equal collective ceilings for
the forces of Eastern and Western par-
ticipants in Central Europe, based on agreed
data, with associated measures designed to
strengthen confidence and enhance verifica-
tion.

• In CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] the proposal for a
Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe as part of a balanced outcome of the
Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting would open
the way to increased transparency and
enhanced stability in the whole of Europe
from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At the same time, we are continuing our
efforts to promote stable peace on a global
scale:

• In the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva, the Allies will actively pursue efforts
to obtain equitable and verifiable agreements
including a total ban on chemical weapons.

• In the Second Special Session on Dis-
armament of the United Nations General

4

FEATURE

Economic
and
NATO
Summits

sembly now in progress, we trust that new
petus will be given to negotiations current
i in prospect, especially by promoting
litary openness and verification, that the
3d for strict observance of the principle of
lunciation of force enshrined in the United
tions Charter will be reaffirmed and that
npliance with existing agreements will be
engthened.

We appeal to all states to co-operate with
in these efforts to strengthen peace and
:urity. In particular we call on the Soviet
ion to translate its professed commitment
disarmament into active steps aimed at
lieving concrete, balanced and verifiable
;ults at the negotiating table.

ocument on
itegrated NATO
efense

ne 10, 1982

indicated in the Declaration of today, we,
• representatives of those members of the
rth Atlantic Alliance taking part in its in-
haled defence structure, hereby set out
- detailed positions on defence. We
Icome the intention of Spain to participate
the integrated defence structure, and the
idiness of the President of the Spanish
vernment to associate himself with this
:ument, while noting that the modalities of
anish participation have still to be worked

Pursuant to the principles set out in the
Programme for Peace and Freedom, we
agree that, in accordance with current NATO
defence plans, and within the context of
NATO strategy and its triad of forces, we
will continue to strengthen NATO's defence
posture, with special regard to conventional
forces. Efforts of our nations in support of
the decisions reached at Washington in 1978
have led to improved defensive capabilities.
Notwithstanding this progress, it is clear, as
documented in the recently published com-
parison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces,
that continuing efforts are essential to
Alliance security. Against this background,
we will:

• Fulfill to the greatest extent possible
the NATO Force Goals for the next sbc years,
including measures to improve the readiness
of the standing forces and the readiness and
mobilization capability of reserve forces. Note
was taken of the recently concluded agree-
ment between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany for wartime
host nation support.

• Continue to implement measures iden-
tifed in the Long-Term Defence Programme
designed to enhance our overall defence
capabilities.

• Continue to improve NATO planning
procedures and explore other ways of achiev-
ing greater effectiveness in the application of
national resources to defence, especially in
the conventional field. In that regard, we will
continue to give due attention to fair burden-
sharing and to possibilities for developing
areas of practic^ co-operation from which we
can all benefit.

• Explore ways to take full advantage
both technically and economically of emerg-
ing technologies, especially to improve con-
ventional defence, and take steps necessary
to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant
technology to the Warsaw Pact.

Noting that developments beyond the
NATO area may threaten our vital interests,
we reaffirm the need to consult with a view
to sharing assessments and identifying com-
mon objectives, taking full account of the ef-
fect on NATO security and defence capabili-
ty, as well as of the national interests of
member countries. Recognising that the
policies which nations adopt in this field are a
matter for national decision, we agree to ex-
amine collectively in the appropriate NATO
bodies the requirements which may arise for
the defence of the NATO area as a result of
deployments by individual member states out-
side that area. Steps which may be taken by
individual Allies in the light of such consulta-
tions to facilitate possible military deploy-
ments beyond the NATO area can represent
an important contribution to Western
security.

Secretary Haig's
Press Briefing

iiy

1982

Bonn

June 10, 1982^

I would describe this as a historic day
for the NATO alliance, due primarily,
but not exclusively, to Spain's formal en-
try into NATO. It is a step of vital im-
portance to both the alliance and to
Spain. The entry of Spain is a clear
demonstration of the continuing appeal
and vitality of the alliance of some 33
years' life span.

This summit meeting and the docu-
ments that were adopted by the meeting
today also demonstrated that NATO
represents Western values at their very
best. I'm particularly pleased with the
communique and associated documents
that were released on arms control and
the strengthening of our conventional
defenses. They reflect a year of very
solid work within the framework of the
alliance on a number of key areas, and, I
think, it was appropriate that they
should be in all of the considerations
contained in those documents. I would
urge you to study them carefully; they
are a keen reflection of the views of the
U.S. Government, as well as a
manifestation of a solid consensus within
the framework of the alliance itself.

I think we have here a framework
for the decade of the 1980s which has

11

been established, which is both contem-
porary in its recognition of needs in the
area of balanced defenses for the
alliance; the need for arms control, and
the integration of political, economic,
and security assets of the Western
world to elicit what we hope will be a
era of restraint and responsibility on the
part of the Soviet Union under a
framework which is coordinated, in-
tegrated, and fully accepted by all
member states. I think that is extremely
important.

I want to say a word about the sum-
mit declaration itself which sends the
strongest message in memory to the
Soviet Union— certainly in recent
memory. It clearly contrasted how
NATO is fundamentally different from
the Warsaw Pact. Our alliance is an
open partnership based on consensus
and democracy. Its diversity is also its
strength. The Warsaw Pact is a strained
association, a forced marriage domi-
nated by a single government. It is
unresponsive in many ways to the needs
of the peoples that it is designed to pro-
tect. It is afraid of freedom, wary of
diversity. The West has again called on
the U.S.S.R. to show restraint and
responsibility in its behavior, and that's
a clear message and signal throughout
the communique.

The statement on defense, which we
consider to be especially significant and
important, reaffirms NATO's strategy at
a time when it has become fashionable
to question something that has kept and
preserved the peace in Western Europe
and, indeed, in the East-West sense, for
the 33-years' life span of the alliance
itself. It reflects top-level agreement on
the needs to improve NATO's conven-
tional defense posture, including the
rapid deployment and reserve forces. It
emphasizes full employment of emerging
technologies; a need to protect our
Western technological advantage. You'll
recall that that surfaced earlier in both
Ottawa and subsequent NATO
ministerial meetings.

It emphasized the importance of
growing cooperation by the allies to in-
sure security and stability in critical
regions elsewhere in the world. And
here again, it was anathema some years

ago to speak an alliance parlance of
anything. Outside this strict geographic
confines of the alliance itself, we have
now developed a consensus of agree-
ment that, like it or not, the alliance is
increasingly influenced by events outside
of the geographic confines of the
alliance, and, therefore, those nations
with essential interest must coordinate
and consult together in dealing with
them, not within the alliance framework
but as a framework for watching briefs
and continuous exchange of information.

There is also a very important state-
ment on arms control. It makes ab-
solutely clear that it is the Western
alliance which has the ideas and the ini-
tiatives in seeking a dialogue with the
East in this very important area. The
document itself strongly endorses the
major aspects of President Reagan's
own peace program. It supports U.S. ob-
jectives in START and the U.S. ap-
proach to the Geneva negotiations on
intermediate-range nuclear forces based
on the December 1979 decision. It an-
nounces Western readiness to invigorate
the Vienna negotiations on mutual and
balanced force reductions, now in their
ninth year; through a new approach
aimed at lower and more equal force
levels in central Europe— 700,000 per
ground, 900 for the aggregate ground,
sea, and air. And, it signals a strong
Western interest in the possibilities for a
constructive dialogue offered by the
U.N. Special Session on Disarmament
and other arms control fora.

As important as these Western ini-
tiatives are, the appeal that NATO has
made today, once again, to the Soviet
Union to match its professions of
peaceful intentions with actions leading
to results, I think is a very important
theme in the overall deliberations. As
the Danish Prime Minister said today,
"the search light is now on Moscow."

I think for many of us, the highlight
of the summit which was a very well
prepared summit and, therefore, permit-
ted the heads of state and government
to make their own separate interven-
tions without a great deal of what I call
"heated dispute" about remaining con-
troversies— that says something for the

quality of the preparations that were
made. It was President Reagan's in-
tervention at the conclusion this after-
noon; it was an ad-libbed, if you will, or
unstructured personal intervention that
ran about 10 minutes, I would say, give
or take — and, it clearly summarized th(
President's own view on East- West rel;
tions. It was both powerful as it was e>
temporaneous; it reiterated in clear
terms the President's willingness to ha\
a genuine dialogue with the Soviets but
one based on Soviet restraint.

It talked about the experience we
had in the decade of the 1970s with the
1970 interpretation of detente, a for-
mula to which we witnessed increasing
Soviet interventionisms worldwide — in
Africa, the Middle East, the Yemens,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and once
again in this Western Hemisphere. You
will note the language in the communi-
que refers to something different than
the classic 1970 version. It refers to ge:
uine detente. In other words, there is n
abandonment of the principle of dialogi
and the desire to reach agreements anc
the meeting of the mind with the Sovie
Union, but to do so not with words but
by a continuous assessment of actions
with a heavy emphasis on reciprocity.

I think in the President's interven-
tion, he referred to the situation in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
He painted clearly a picture of hope fon
the future by emphasizing the
demographic assets available to the
Western world if properly integrated
and orchestrated. He referred to those
in political terms, our essential
democratic values; in economic terms,
the vast superiority of Western in-
dustrialized societies; and, of course, th
security assets of the collection of
alliance members all integrated.

I think the President drew the con-
clusion, as many of us have, that if we
abandon the self-consciousness of the r
cent decade, the sense of inadequacy oi
perhaps even inevitability, and apprisec
with full frankness and openness what
we have going for us, and apply those
assets intelligently, moderately, but wit
vision and steadiness of purpose, that
there is, indeed, hope. The President
referred to his communication with Mr.

12

Department of State Bulletip

FEATURE

Economic
and
NATO
Summits

iJrezhnev at the time that he was con-
-alescing from his wound, how he sug-
gested to Mr. Brezhnev that if the

: ;overnments themselves could step

: .side and that the peoples could com-

• nunicate each other's wishes, aspira-
ions, and desires that clearly a new
,'orld structure for peace and stability
/ould be an inevitable outcome. And he
ecried the continual manipulation of the

6 wishes and desires of the people by in-

: ensitive government.

All in all, as I would like to em-
hasize that I personally feel extremely

;, leased with the outcome of this summit
leeting. I suppose it's because of my
vvii NATO background, understandable.
s I say, it reflects a year of solid
ositive work and progress in consen-

1 isbuilding. It confirms that the alliance
. itself not only alive and healthy but
lat it has never been better.

There were other meetings today on
16 margin. There were discussions
Dout the Middle East. There was a
igistration of support for Great
ritain's actions in the Falklands. The
resident has bilaterals with the Prime
Minister of Spain, with the Prime
inister of Greece, and he met at the
inclusion of the summit with Foreign
Minister Saud of Saudi Arabia.

Q. Can you tell us anything about
le communications you received from
le Saudis today?

A. Yes. The foreign minister's visit
as one requested about 2 or 3 days ago
the wake of the Lebanon crisis.

Q. Who requested it?

A. The Saudi Government. His
ighness brought an oral communica-
Dn from King Khalid, which was essen-
illy a registration of serious concerns
)out the continued deterioration of the
tuation in Lebanon and the long-term
>nsequences of this.

Q. Did he give any examples of
)ssible consequences as it went on?

A. No. This was an exchange of
ews between friendly governments —
vo leaders who have enjoyed an
lusually cordial and frank relationship
/er the span of President Reagan's in-
, imbency.

Jly1982

Q. What progress, if any, toward
achieving a cease-fire? Has there been
any progress?

A. I would be remiss were I to sug-
gest there had been no progress. There
have been detailed discussions in
Damascus and in Jerusalem. Those
discussions continue, but it's clear that
the advance of the Israeli military forces
has become extensive. They are on the
outskirts of Beirut on the west and well
into the Bekaa Valley in the east. There
have been heavy clashes in the Bekaa
Valley in the air today. The Israeli
Government has mobilized its 880th Ar-
mored Division, moving it north. There
are some additional indications of in-
creased Syrian readiness, movement of
missile units. Eight MiGs have been
claimed today in the conflict. As you
know last night the Israeli Government
claimed to have knocked out all the
missiles in Bekaa Valley.

Q. You sound like you're describ-
ing a movement toward a general war.

A. No, I certainly don't think that,
and I don't describe it. But I do think
that an operation as extensive as this, of
course, always contains overtones that
could result in an expansion uncontem-
plated or unwanted.

Q. Is there any sign of Soviet re-
supply to S3Tia?

A. We have no evidence of it at this
time, but their resupply of Syria has
been rather steady over an extensive
period. But we don't see any dramatic
step-up that would be abnormal yet.

Q. What was the President's reac-
tion prior to Prince Saud's saying he
would provide whatever war materiel
to Yassir Arafat needed to drive out
the Israelis?

A. That did not come up in any
discussions that I sat in on, and I think I
heard it all. It may have been said to the
press later, but it was not said to the
President.

Q. Is the impatience of our
government growing because Israel is
unwilling to agree to a cease-fire?

A. We are concerned. I was asked
this morning to visit Jerusalem, and I
thought about it as I've assessed the
various positions today. I think I would
say that the discussions we had with the
Israelis today have not evidenced suffi-
cient flexibility to make a visit worth-
while at this time.

Q. What is your reaction to the
communique of the Ten Common
Market Foreign Ministers last
night— very strongly worded toward
Israel? And, what was the delibera-
tion of the NATO Council with regard
to the situation today?

A. Let me take your second ques-
tion first. Clearly, there was a great
number of expressions of concern
around the table about the situation in
Lebanon. As you know, it's not the role
of the alliance to take a position on a
crisis solely outside of its area. I talked
about that a moment ago. On the other
hand, the leaders did enfranchise the
Secretary General to express their con-
cern and their hope that the bloodshed
would soon be brought to a conclusion.
And, I would say that was the
unanimous sense of concern around the
table, but it was not dealt with.

The answer to the first part of your
question, of course, the Ten have a right
to do what they want within the con-
fines of that fora. We are not members,
and it wouldn't be appropriate for me to
indulge in any value judgments.

Q. What was the nature of Presi-
dent Brezhnev's message to the Presi-
dent? What was its tone?

A. I think it was a frank expression
of Soviet concern about the widening
military conflict in Lebanon.

Q. Did it indicate any Soviet ac-
tion?

A. I'm not going to go into any
detail. I think it is very inappropriate to
do that in diplomatic communications,
other than to give you the general
flavor.

Q. Who initiated the exchange?
Who first contacted whom?

A. The Soviet Union.

13

I

Prior to the opening ceremony of the
NATO summit, the President meets with
Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary General of
NATO and chairman of the the North
Atlantic Council.

Q. Was there an exchange, or just
one letter from Brezhnev? What was
the response?

A. The President always responds
to the correspondence. He did.

Q. Could you clarify that? What
was the response from the Presi-
dent—what was it all about?

A. Let's just say it was responsive
to the tone of the letter that came in.

Q. Was the exchange with
Brezhnev what precipitated President
Reagan's message to Begin?

A. No, not at all.

Q. Has the United States been
able to ascertain what the Israeli
goals and objectives are in this inva-
sion?

A. Go back to the public com-
munication we had which was not dif-
ferent from the original communication
from Mr. Begin to President Reagan

which talked about a zone of 40
kilometers depth in which Israel hoped
to eliminate the continuing threat from
rockets, katusha, artillery, and terrorist
activity across or infiltrations through
third countries into Israel.

Q. Do you know what their new
objectives are?
A. No.

Q. When the United States voted
to support the U.N. resolution to have
a cease-fire along —

A. 508?

Q. Yes — along with Israeli
withdrawal? My question really is, do
we still support that resolution? Do
we still insist on Israeli withdrawal
and is that the hang-up and the reason
you are not going to Jerusalem?

A. No, it's far more complex than
that, and we do still support 508. We
voted for it. We've continued through
diplomatic channels to try to assist in its
implementation.

Q. You said 2 or 3 days ago that
we were reassessing the question of
supplying arms to Israel based on
assessing their intentions, whether or
not they had gone beyond the 25-mile
zone. You have now described that
they are well beyond it. Where does
that decision stand, first place; second

place, is the United States concerned
at all, after your meeting with Prince
Saud, about American interests in the
Arab world and whether or not the
Arab world will swing toward a more
extreme position as a result of this in
vasion?

A. I wouldn't want to make any
predictions about the direction of the
Arab world, but I can certainly assure
you that, from the outset, we have beer
concerned about the impact of the crisis
in Lebanon on our relationships with
moderate Arab friends, those with
whom we have maintained traditional
ties of friendship and coordination and
cooperation. There can be no question
about that. That has become somewhat
more sharply edged in the last 48 hours

Q. Who asked you to go to
Jerusalem? Was it the Secretary of
Labor? You said you were asked to gc
Do you mean someone in their govemi
ment or someone in our government?

A. I was invited by Israel.

•Texts from press releases issued by the
White House, the Department of State, the
economic summit participants, and NATO.
The Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of June 7 and 14, 1982, contains
all material relating to the President's par-
ticipation in the two summits.

^Made at L'Orangerie Press Center, Ver
sailles.

'Press release 192 of June 16.

■•In this connection Greece reserves its
position [text in original].

'Press release 197 of June 16. ■

«

14

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

President Reagan Visits Europe

President Reagan made state visits
c several European capitals June 2-11.
The President visited Paris and Ver-
ailles to attend the eighth economic sum-
nit of the industrialized nations held
Tune 5-6 at Versailles (see previous arti-
•le); Vatican City and Rome, June 7;
jondon and Windsor, June 7-9; and
iionn and Berlin, June 9-11 to attend
\he North Atlantic Council summit held
n Bonn June 10 (see previous article).

Following are remarks, addresses,
tatements. and luncheon and dinner
oasts made by the President and other
eads of state, statements made by
ecretary Haig at the opening of press
riefings, and a joint U.S.-Italy state-
tient.^

FRANCE

ecretary Haig's
tatement

aris

ine 3, 19822

m going to make a very few remarks
Dout the first series of working
eetings today on the— our first day in
urope.

They took place at a working lunch-
in with President Mitterrand and
"esident Reagan that lasted about IV2
mrs and which covered a broad range
regional, security-related and bilateral
^ues between the two governments
■id peoples.

As you know, the summit officially
fgins tomorrow so both leaders were
luctant to deal, in any depth, with the
bjects which should be included on the
;enda when all seven leaders of the
Sestern industrialized nations, including
.pan, convene at Versailles tomorrow
ening.

Instead, they used this opportunity

to extend the very warm personal rela-
tionship and rapport that has developed
between the two leaders — this being the
fourth meeting between the two men
since they both assumed their responsi-
bilities—the last was a personal visit by
President Mitterrand to Washington last
March. They used it as an opportunity
and, of course, because of the extensive
rapport already established and the
warmth of friendship, to move to issues
of mutual concern in the domestic scene
in both countries and to exchange in-
sights on several important global situa-
tions of a regional character.

That included the Falklands ques-
tion— its near- time consequences and its
long-term consequences. It involved an
exchange of views on the Middle East
with a very special focus on the conflict
between Iran and Iraq and the concern
of both leaders that this conflict not ex-
pand, that the territorial integrity of the
countries involved be preserved, and
that international attention be focused
on international efforts to bring this con-
flict to a peaceful conclusion.

With respect to the Falklands, of
course, both leaders are concerned that
bloodshed terminate at the earliest
possible date and that the conflict be
resolved within the framework of U.N.
Resolution 502 which, from the outset,
has enjoyed the support of both govern-
ments and which has been the fun-
damental premise upon which the
United States has conducted its policies
toward this very difficult situation in the
South Atlantic.

In the exchange of domestic issues,
it is clear that both leaders approach
economic issues from a different
philosophic base. Nevertheless, they are
seeking common objectives — the reduc-
tion of excess levels of federal central
government spending, and high levels of
unemployment in the return to a cycle of
prosperity.

President Reagan noted the success
that his Administration had achieved in
bringing down the very high levels of in-
flation that he found upon assuming of-
fice. He also expressed some disappoint-
ment that he was unable to arrive in

Europe with a budget compromise in
hand— one that would have brought the
projected American deficits in the period
ahead down substantially and, thereby,
influence more substantially the interest
rates which are of such concern on both
sides of the Atlantic today.

In sum, it's important to charac-
terize these first of two series of
meetings. There'll be further meetings
this evening with President Mitterrand
at a dinner as an extension of an
unusual relationship that has developed
between the two leaders; one of in-
timacy and mutual confidence, and one
of frankness in their exchange of view-
points.

All in all, I think it was a very suc-
cessful first day of what is going to be
an increasingly busy schedule of activity
in Versailles and, subseqently, in Rome,
in Bonn, and in Berlin.

Dinner Toasts

ily1982

Paris

June 3, 1982'

President Reagan. I hope you all realize
that we know, of course, France has
great appreciation for fine wines and
that's why we decided to treat you to
some California wine tonight. [Laughter]

I speak not just for Nancy and
myself but for so many of our coun-
trymen when I express the joy that we
Americans feel in returning to France
and seeing again her special jewel —
"Paree." I am grateful to have the op-
portunity to continue our dialogue and
to meet with Madame Mitterrand,

President's Schedule

June 2 — Depart Washington, D.C.
June 2-7 — Paris and Versailles
June 7 — Vatican City and Rome
June 7-9 — London and Windsor
June 9-11 — Bonn and Berlin
June 11 — Arrive Washington, D.C.

15

members of your government, and so
many of your fine citizens.

I've enjoyed getting to know you
this past year and have benefited from
your wise counsel during our several
discussions. This will be our second
economic summit together. You may be
sure ni work with you to help make it a
success. I come to Europe and to this
summit with a spirit of confidence.

Our Administration has embarked
upon a program to bring inflationary
government spending under control,
restore personal incentives to revive
economic growth, and to rebuild our
defenses to insure peace through
strength. This has meant a fundamental
change in policies and understandably
the transition has not been without dif-
ficulties.

However, I'm pleased to report that
these policies are beginning to bear
fruit. Inflation is down, interest
rates — I'm very happy to say here— are
falling, and both personal savings and
spending are improving. We believe that
economic recovery is imminent.

We also are moving forward to
restore America's defensive strength
after a decade of neglect. Our reasons
for both actions are simple; a strong
America and a vital unified alliance are
indispensable to keeping the peace now
and in the future just as they have been
in the past. At the same time, we've in-
vited the Soviet Union to meet with us
to negotiate, for the first time in
history, substantial, verifiable reductions
in the weapons of mass destruction, and
this we are committed to do.

You and your country have also
been working to set a new course. While
the policies you've chosen to deal with,
economic problems, are not the same as
ours, we recognize they're directed at a
common goal: a peaceful and a more
prosperous world. We understand that
other nations may pursue different
roads toward our common goals, but we
can still come together and work
together for a greater good. A challenge
of our democracies is to forge a unity of
purpose and mission without sacrificing
the basic right of self-determination. At
Versailles, I believe we can do this. I
believe we will.

16

Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand meet at the Elysee Palace following a luncheon hosta
by the latter. The Presidents discuss regional, security-related, and other bilateral issue

We in the West have big problems,
and we must not pretend we can solve
them overnight. But we can solve them.
It is we, not the foes of freedom, who
enjoy the blessings of constitutional
government, rule of law, political and
economic liberties, and the right to wor-
ship God. It is we who trust our own
people rather than fear them. These
values lie at the heart of human freedom
and social progress. We need only the
spirit, wisdom, and will to make them
work. Just as our countries have

preserved our democratic institution, s^
have we maintained the world's oldest
alliance.

My true friends, who may disagree
from time to time, we know that we cai
count on each other when it really mat
ters. I think there's no more fitting wa;
to underscore this relationship than to
recall that there are more than 60,000
young Americans, soldiers, sailors, and
Marines who rest beneath the soil of
France. As the anniversary of D-Day a
proaches, let us pay homage to all the
brave men and women, French and
American, who gave their lives so that
we and future generations could live in

^
?

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

freedom. In their memory, let us remain
vigilant to the challenges we face stand-
ing tall and firm together.

If you would allow me, there was a
young American. His name was Martin
Treptow who left his job in a small town
barbershop in 1917 to come to France
with the same "Rainbow Division" of
World War I. Here on the Western
front he was killed trying to carry a
message between battalions under heavy
artillery fire. We're told that on his body
as found a diary. And on the leaflet
,nder the heading, "My Pledge," he had
ritten that we must win this war. He
rote, "Therefore I will work. I will
,ve. I will sacrifice. I will endure. I will
!ght cheerfully and do my utmost as if
he issue of the whole struggle depended
ipon me alone."

The challenges we face today do not
equire the same sacrifices that Martin
'reptow and so many thousands of
thers were called upon to make. But
hey do require our best effort, our will-
igness to believe in each other and to
elieve that together, with God's help,
fe can and will resolve the problems
onfronting us. I pledge to you my best
ffort. Let us continue working together
Dr the values and principles that permit
ttle people to dream great dreams, to
row tall, to live in peace, and one day
5 leave behind a better life for their
hildren.

St. Exupery wrote that a rock pile
3ases to be a rock pile the moment a
ngle man contemplates it bearing
ithin him the image of the cathedral,
et us raise our glasses to all the
ithedrals yet to be built. With our
•iendship, courage and determination,
ley will be built.

Vive la France et vive I'Amerique
'9S amis ce soir, demain, et toujours.
'ould you like to translate that for the
mericans. [Laughter] [Applause]

President Mitterrand [as inter-
reted]. I would like to say welcome,
elcome to our country. Our country is
country which enjoys receiving a visit
cm friends. We're also proud that you
lould be here and that you should be
jre on the occasion of your first trip to
ranee and, indeed, your first trip to
urope. So, during this visit, we will

uly1982

keep you here with us for 3 days, and
the Prime Minister and myself, we will
then have the privilege of seeing you
again in Bonn.

The French — who are here with me,
here today, during the days when you
will be here — will try to insure that this
visit, which I know is a visit dedicated to
work and activity, will also be a visit
for — of pleasure, a pleasure that one
finds among friends.

We have had several occasions
already to meet and to talk together,
and we will move forward toward — [in-
audible]—each other. We have been able
to talk of the matters which are impor-
tant for our countries and, indeed, for
the whole world. I have always ap-
preciated your wise counsel, the very
marked attention that you have devoted
to what has been said around you, and
your openmindedness. It is clear that
when the fate of mankind is at stake
and, also, mankind to some extent for
which we are responsible — you and I — it
is on those occasions that your attention
is particularly dedicated.

It is not a matter of chance that we
should, in fact, be the members of the
oldest alliance in the world. Think of the
time that has elapsed. Generations have
gone by, the events that have taken
place, the contradictions, perhaps, in our
approaches to the things of the world —
yet, despite all of these differences,
when the time and need came, we were
there, both of us, in order to defend the
cause of liberty — the liberty for the in-
dividual citizen within each country and
the liberty for all the citizens in the
whole world, and the liberty, in fact, of
friends.

It is not a matter of pure chance nor
a matter of simply a combination of
various interests which led to the
presence of French soldiers when it was
a question of fighting for the independ-
ence and liberty of your country. Nor
was it a matter of chance out of interest
merely, when many years later,
American soldiers fought side by side
with French soldiers for the independ-
ence and the liberty of France. It is
because, perhaps, tonight really realizing
[inaudible] it during those two centuries

many people reacted and reflected in the
same way as the almost synonymous
hairdresser, that you were mentioning
earlier, who later became a soldier, in
fact, felt that on their shoulders rested
the weight of the whole world.

It was simply because they felt that
they were responsible — as this man,
alone, realized in his innermost con-
science and awareness, what he decided
in his intimate knowledge of himself and
what was right in his eyes, would
govern the way the rest of the world
would think likewise.

And where else really does one learn
responsibility? Surely, it is only in the
political democracies where one entrusts
to no one else the decisions that have to
be taken by each and every individual.
And who can really be fully responsible
more than the person who realizes and
fully appreciates that it is the force of
the mind that is decisive, that it can
always win the day over the forces —
over the mechanical forces, however
powerful they may be, even the forces of
economics.

One can say that the world can be
built if the world thinks right and if one
wants it. And we have excellent oppor-
tunity of proving this in the next 3
days — without too much ambition — but
all the same we need a lot of ambition in
the positions that arise.

The least we can do, of course, is to
discuss economics. If the seven countries
which will be meeting with the Euro-
pean Economic Community are to attain
the strength that they need in order to
defend the idees which they consider to
be right, then it is important not to
divorce the economic powers from the
other resources. It is important that we
should be able to guarantee peace which,
after all, is based on agreement among
ourselves. In order to be able to do that,
it is essential that we should not fight
among ourselves.

I, as you are yourself, am confident
that we can control and dominate the
crisis that we are living. The methods
that we may employ within our coun-
tries may, indeed, be somewhat dif-
ferent. But the aims are the same, and

17

our methods can and must converge in
the form of common actions that we can
engage in together.

Yes, I am confident that we will win
the battle of peace. Although, sometimes
the methods that we would employ
within our countries may be different,
we will always agree on the essential
goals. So it is that, for over a year now,
we have, indeed, moved forward to-
gether, hand in hand, in full agreement
about the goals that we were striving to
achieve. By the presence of force and
power, we should be able to review with
equinimity and serenity the threats that
may be before us. At the same time, we
would only use force in order to insure
the protection and the appeasement of
the peace which is so necessary.

It is that force which must be there
in order to first start the necessary
negotiations. That is what you have just
done, saying what you have said just
before the opening of the very important
talks concerning disarmament, talks that
are to be held with the very great power
that— with you and with others, such as
ourselves — is responsible for the state of
the world.

I hope that we will be able to extend
our efforts, further, in order to help
those millions of human beings who are
no longer really the Third World but a
sort of world which is in the process of
moving toward development, a world
which needs us just as we need them in
order that our century should have a
future.

The remarks that you were making
yourself earlier have taken me some-
what far afield from the tone that
should be the tone of this evening. And
it is a tone, of course, of happiness, the
happiness of being together, the joy of
being together. So, in a moment, I will
be raising my glass to your health, to
the health of Mrs. Reagan. I have had
the very great pleasure of having long
talks with Mrs. Reagan. We started our
talks in London as you will recall, and,
indeed, we also talked about you —
[laughter] — I also raise my glass to the
people of the United States, friends, our
faithful friends, just as we are their

loyal allies. It is our function to say, on
all occasions, what we think just as it is
our duty to, at all times, show our
wholehearted solidarity. I also raise my
glass to the health of the Ambassador
and Mrs. Galbraith, representing the
United States here in France. It is to
you, Madame, that we owe these very
pleasant moments.

I am honored to speak on behalf of
the French guests present here tonight
who represent what you might call in
American terms— as far as the political
scene is concerned — we call them prox-
ies. [Laughter] But vis-a-vis the Presi-
dent of the United States and indeed,
the world, they are representatives of
the whole nation of France. It is on their
behalf, on behalf of everyone present,
that I would like, again, to raise my
glass to your health. I would say good
luck to your action and also good luck to
the work that we are going to undertake
in the next 2 days — the conquest of
liberty and peace. [Applause]

Secretary Haig's
Statement

Paris

June 4, 1982^

I have just left the American Embassy
with the President where the President
addressed our Embassy personnel. Dur-
ing that discussion, he commented on
the particular hazards associated with
diplomatic activity and stationing abroad
today and the exposure to terrorism. We
noted, with regret, that last night
another cowardly terrorist act was
perpetrated against the American school
here close to Paris. I received, this
morning, the official regrets and
apologies of the host government from
Foreign Minister Cheysson. We are, of
course, grateful and impressed by the
actions being taken by the French
Government against this international
plague. Of course, I am confident that
the leaders of the seven governments
meeting — starting this evening at Ver-
sailles— will continue the discussions in

this critical area that were launched at
the summit at Ottawa, so that greater
and more effective international co-
operation can be developed to stamp ou
this irresponsible plague against all
mankind.

We had a very busy day with sever
bilaterals— the first with Prime Minist«
Suzuki of Japan and the second with
Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Brit-
ain. With respect to the Suzuki bilaterg
it was a very detailed and subjective ai
tightly programed hour of discussion
between the two leaders and their
representatives. The focus was on trac
In these discussions, President Reagan
very much welcomed the recent an-
nouncement of the Government of Jap;
on the further liberalization of Japanes
trade practices. The President describ*
it as a positive step in the direction of
greater liberalization.

This involved the recent decisions '
the Japanese Government to liberalize
tariff and nontariff restrictions and an
improvement in Japanese import regu
tions. During these discussions, Prime'
Minister Suzuki pledged to support th«
further enhancement of free trade at 1i
upcoming GATT [General Agreement
Tariffs and Trade] conference next
fall— a pledge which, of course, was
welcomed by the United States as it ia
parallel to and consistent with U.S. ol
jectives and intention at that upcomin
meeting.

The President also welcomed the i
nouncement made, earlier this after-
noon, by the Japanese Government of
the completion of an interim agreeme^
on civil aviation between the United
States and Japan. As you know, this 1 1
been under discussion for an extendec i
period and a breakthrough was achiev I
largely as a result of the initiative of
Prime Minister Suzuki himself.

The President, in these discussion
this afternoon, warmly endorsed the i
cent decision of the Suzuki governmei
to increase its level of defense spendii
to almost 8%— increase real term spel-
ing for the coming year, the only sect ,
incidentally, of the current Japanese
budget to receive such an enhanced
allocation of resources.

18

Department of State Bulle i

FEATURE

Visit

''' to
Europe

During the discussions, Prime
Minister Suzuki warmly endorsed and
welcomed President Reagan's recent ini-
tiatives in arms control ranging from
the November 18 speech on INF [inter-
national-range nuclear forces] and the

^ talks at Geneva and the more recently
announced on START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks] talks which will resume
on the 29th — negotiations themselves
which will resume on the 29th in
Geneva — the 29th of this month.

Prime Minister Suzuki, of course,
welcomed the position of the United

•^States with respect to mobile, intermedi-
ate-range missiles in our Geneva discus-
sions, in which they are dealt with in

global terms. There would be great con-
cern in the Far East that missiles now
directed at Western Europe might be
shifted to the Far East.

In conclusion, there were some
detailed discussions as they wound up
their meeting of the recent visit of the
Premier of the People's Republic of
China to Tokyo and Prime Minister
Suzuki's impressions — important impres-
sions—with respect to this visit. As the
meeting broke up, the Prime Minister
described the current state of
U.S. -Japanese relations as never better
and on the highest plain in his memory,
particularly singling out the leadership
of President Reagan in this difficult time

of international crisis and confusion.

The meeting with Prime Minister
Suzuki was followed by an extensive
one-on-one meeting between Prime
Minister Thatcher and President
Reagan. They met alone for IV2 hours.
The main focus of which, of course, as I
described yesterday, was a detailed ex-
change of views between the two leaders
on the Falkland crisis, both in the con-
text of the near term and the longer
term. It was clear that the current situa-
tion is one which is best assessed by
commanders on the ground or charged
with the responsibility for the conduct of
the military operations which, unfor-
tunately, have been underway for some
time.

I think with respect to the longer
term aspect of the Falklands question, it
was clear from the exchange of views
that both leaders agreed that it was still
somewhat too early to deal finitely with
a number of the longer term questions
associated with this crisis.

It is dynamic — at 4 p.m. this after-
noon the U.N. Security Council will
meet again where various resolutions
have been considered over the last 48
hours. We are now, of course, com-
plete— have completed the Paris leg of
the President's journey. Based on the
bilaterals the President has had— my
own discussions with Foreign Minister
Cheysson and Foreign Minister Pym —
we proceed this evening to Versailles
with a sense of confidence that the Ver-
sailles summit, itself, will be one that
gives clear evidence of continued and
growing solidarity between the Western
industrialized nations and Japan in a
host of common problems primarily of
economic but also of political nature as
well. In the days ahead at Versailles, a
number of the questions which some of
you have been writing and speculating
about wUl be resolved in finite terms.

rieeting at the U.S. Ambassador's Residence, President Reagan and Japanese Prime
Minister Suzuki hold detailed talks which focus on trade.

I((uly1982

19

President Reagan's
Remarks

Versailles
June 5. 1982^

I bring to France greetings and best
wishes from the American people. I
carry their hopes for continued Western
unity to secure a prosperous and lasting
peace, and I've come to express our
commitment to policies that will renew
economic growth.

But today touches French and
American memories in a special way. It
brings to mind thoughts quite apart
from the pressing issues being discussed
at the economic summit in Versailles. On
this day, 38 years ago, our two peoples
were united in an epic struggle against
tyranny.

In 1944, as World War II raged, the
allies were battling to regain their
foothold in the continent. The French
resistance fought valiantly on, disrupting
communications and sabotaging supply
lines. But the Nazis held Europe in a
stranglehold, and Field Marshal Rommel
was building his Atlantic wall along
France's coast.

Late on the night of June 5th, as fog
enshrouded the Normandy coastline,
over 2,000 planes took off from English
fields to drop soldiers by parachute
behind enemy lines. By the early hours
of June 6th, the massive allied armada,
,5,000 ships, had begun to move across
the cold and choppy water of the
English Channel. D-Day had begun.

The code names, Omaha, Utah, gold,
Juno, and sword, are now indelibly
etched in history by the blood spilled on
that 100-mile stretch of beach. More
than 1.50,000 allied troops stormed Nor-
mandy that day, and by dusk they had
established beachheads at each of the
five invasion points. The toll was high.
More than 10,500 of our young men
were either dead, wounded, or missing.

Today, endless rows of simple white
crosses mark their seacoast graves. The
rusty helmets still buried in the sand,
and the ships and tanks still lying off the
shore are testiments to their sacrifices.

By the end of World War II, more
than 60,000 Americans had been buried
in France. Today, we remember them,
honor them, and pray for them, but we
also remember what they gave us.

D-Day was a success, and the allies
had breached Hitler's seawall. They
swept into Europe liberating towns and
cities and countrysides until the axis
powers were finally crushed. We
remember D-Day because the French,
British, Canadians, and Americans
fought shoulder-to-shoulder for
democracy and freedom, and won.

During the war, a gallant, French
leader, Charles de Gaulle, inspired his
countrymen organizing and leading the
free French forces. He entered Paris in
triumph liberating that city at the head
of a column of allied troops, a victory
made possible by the heroes of Norman-
dy. "Nothing great will ever be achieved
without great men, and men are great
only if they're determined to be so," de
Gaulle said.

Ours was a great alliance of free
people determined to remain so. I
believe it still is. The invasion of Nor-
mandy was the second time in this cen-
tury Americans fought in France to free
it from an aggressor. We're pledged to
do so again if we must. The freedom we
enjoy today was secured by great men
and at great cost. Today, let us
remember their courage and pray for
the guidance and strength to do what
we must so that no generation is ever
asked to make so great a sacrifice again.

ITALY

President Reagan's

and

Pope John Paul IPs

Remarks

s

The Vatican
June 7, 1982«

President Reagan. This is truly a city
of peace, love, and charity where the
highest to the humblest among us seek
to follow in the footsteps of the
fishermen. As you know. Your Holiness,
this is my first visit to Europe as Presi-
dent, and I would like to think of it as a
pilgrimage for peace, a journey aimed at
strengthening the forces for peace in the
free West by offering new opportunities
for realistic negotiations with those who
may not share the values and the spirit
we cherish.

This is no easy task, but I leave this
audience with a renewed sense of hope
and dedication. Hope, because one can-
not meet a man like Your Holiness
without feeling that a world that can
produce such courage and vision out of
adversity and oppression is capable, wit
God's help, of building a better future.
Dedication, because one cannot enter
this citadel of faith, the fountainhead of
so many of the values we face in
the — or that we in the free West hold
dear without coming away resolved to
do all in one's power to live up to them.

Certain common experiences we
have shared in our different walks of
life, Your Holiness, and the warm cor-
respondence we have carried on also
gave our meeting a special meaning for
me. I hope that others will follow. Let
me add that all Americans remember
with great warmth your historic visit to
our shores in 1979. We all hope that yoi|*'j'
will be back again with your timeless
message: "Ours is a nation grounded on
faith, faith in man's ability through God
given freedom to live in tolerance and
peace as faith in a Supreme Being

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guides our daily striving in this world."
Our national motto, In God We Trust,

I reflects that faith.
Many of our earlier settlers came to
America seeking a refuge where they
:ould worship God unhindered. So our
dedication to individual freedoms is wed-
ded to religious freedom as well. Liberty
nas never meant license to Americans.
We treasure it precisely because it pro-
jects the human and spiritual values that
ne hold most dear: the right to worship
IS we choose; the right to elect
lemocratic leaders; the right to choose
he type of education we want for our
ihildren; and freedom from fear, want,
ind oppression. These are God-given
reedoms, not the contrivances of man.

We also believe in helping one
.nother through our churches and
haritable institutions or simply as one
riend, one good Samaritan to another,
'he Ten Commandments and the Golden
iule are as much a part of our living
eritage as the Constitution we take
uch pride in. And we have tried, not
Iways successfully, but always in good
Dnscience, to extend those same prin-
iples to our role in the world.

We know that God has blessed
.merica with the freedom and abun-
ance many of our less fortunate
irothers and sisters around the world

,ve been denied. Since the end of
d^orld War II, we have done our best to
irovide assistance to them — assistance
mounting to billions of dollars worth of
■)od, medicine, and materials. And we'll
Dntinue to do so in the years ahead.

Americans have always believed that
1 the words of the Scripture, "Unto
■homsoever much is given, of him shall
B much required." To us in a troubled
orld, the Holy See and your pastorate
jpresent one of the world's greatest
loral and spiritual forces.

We admire your active efforts to
)ster peace and promote justice,
•eedom, and compassion in a world that
. still stalked by the forces of evil. As a

lUowing an arrival ceremony at the
itican, President Reagan meets with
ipe John Paul II.

people and as a government, we seek to
pursue the same goals of peace,
freedom, and humanity along political
and economic lines that the Church pur-
sues in its spiritual role. So, we deeply
value your counsel and support and ex-
press our solidarity with you.

Your Holiness, one of the areas of

our mutual concern is Latin America.
We want to work closely with the
Church in that area to help promote
peace, social justice, and reform and to
prevent the spread of repression and
godless tryanny. We also share your
concern in seeking peace and justice in
troubled areas of the Middle East, such

Illy 1982

21

as Lebanon. Another special area of
mutual concern is the martyred nation
of Poland— your own homeland.
Through centuries of adversity, Poland
has been a brave bastion of faith and
freedom in the hearts of her courageous
people, yet, not in those who rule her.

We seek a process of reconciliation
and reform that will lead to a new dawn
of hope for the people of Poland. We'll
continue to call for an end to martial
law, for the freeing of all political
prisoners, and to resume dialogue
among the Polish Government, the
Church, and the Solidarity movement
which speaks for the vast majority of
Poles.

Denying financial assistance to the
oppressive Polish regime, America will
continue to provide the Polish people
with as much food and commodity sup-
port as possible through church and
private organizations.

Today, Your Holiness, marks the
beginning of the U.N. special session on
disarmament. We pledge to do every-
thing possible in these discussions, as in
our individual initiatives for peace and
arms reduction, to help bring a real,
lasting peace throughout the world. To
us, this is nothing less than a sacred
trust.

Dante has written that, "The infinite
goodness has such wide arms that it
takes whatever turns to it." We ask your
prayers, Holy Father, that God will
guide us in our efforts for peace on this
journey and in the years ahead, that the
wide arms of faith and forgiveness can
some day embrace a world at peace with
justice and compassion for all mankind.

The Pope. I am particularly pleased to
welcome you today to the Vatican.
Although we have already had many
contacts, it is the first time that we have
met personally.

In you, the President of the United
States of America, I greet all the people
of your great land. I still remember
privately the warm welcome that I was
given by millions of your fellow citizens

less than 3 years ago. On that occasion,
I was once more able to witness first-
hand the vitality of your nation. I was
able to see again how the moral and
spiritual values transmitted by your
Founding Fathers find their dynamic ex-
pression in the life of modern America.

The American people are, indeed,
proud of their right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. They are proud
of civil and social progress in American
society as well as their extraordinary ad-
vances in science and technology.

As I speak to you today, it is my
hope that the entire structure of
American life will rest evermore secure-
ly on the strong foundation of moral and
spiritual values. Without the fostering
and defense of these values, all human
advancement is stunted, and the dignity
of the human person is endangered.
Throughout the course of their
history, and especially in difficult times,
the American people have repeatedly
risen to challenges presented to them.
They have given many proofs of unself-
ishness, generosity, concern for others,
concern for the poor, the needy, the op-
pressed. They have shown confidence in
that great ideal of being a united people
with a mission of service to perform.

At this present moment in the
history of the world, the United States
is called above all to fulfill its mission in
the service of world peace. The very
condition of the world today calls for a
far-sighted policy that will further those
indispensable conditions of justice and
freedom, of truth and love that are the
foundations of lasting peace. My own
greatest preoccupation is for the peace
of the world, peace in our day.

In many parts of the world, there
are centers of acute tension. This acute
tension is manifested, above all, in the
crisis of the South Atlantic, in the war
between Iran and Iraq, and now in the
grave crisis provoked by the new events
in Lebanon. This grave crisis in Lebanon
likewise merits the attention of the
world because of the danger it contains

of further provocation in the Middle
East with immense consequences for
world peace.

There are, fortunately, many factor:
in society that today positively con-
tribute to peace. This positive factor in-
cludes an increasing realization of the ir
terdependence of all peoples, the grow-
ing solidarity with those in need, and a
growth of conviction of the absurdity of
war as a means of resolving controver-
sies between nations.

During my recent visit to Britain, I
stated, in particular, that the scale and
the horror from all the warfare, whethe
nuclear or not, makes it totally unac-
ceptable as a means of settling dif-
ferences between nations. And for thosi
who profess the Christian faith, I offer
up, as motivation, the fact that when
you are in contact with the Prince of
Peace, you understand how totally op-
posed to His message are hatred and
war.

The duty of peace calls especially
upon the leaders of the world. It is up t
the representatives of governments anc
peoples to work to free humanity not o:
ly from wars and conflicts, but from thu
fear that is generated by evermore
sophisticated and deadly weapons. Peacr
is not only the absence of war; it also ir
volves reciprocal trust between nations
a trust that is manifested and proved
through constructive negotiations that
aim at ending the arms race and at
liberating immense resources that can 1
used to alleviate misery and feed
millions of hungry human beings.

All effective peacemaking requires
foresightedness, for foresightedness is
quality needed in all peacemakers.
You— your own great nation is called t-
exercise this foresightedness as far— al
the nations of the world. This quality
enables leaders to commit themselves t
those concrete programs, which are
essential to world peace— programs of
justice and development, efforts to de-
fend and protect human life, as well as
initiatives that favor human rights.
On the contrary, anything that
wounds, weakens, or dishonors human
dignity, in any aspect, imperils the cau;
of the" human person and, at the same

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time, the peace of the world. The rela-
tions between nations are greatly af-
fected by the development issue— issue,
which reserves its full relevance in this
day of ours. Success in resolving ques-
tions in the North-South dialogue will
continue to be the gates of peaceful rela-
tions between values, political com-
munities, and continue to influence the
peace of the world in the years ahead.

Economic and social advancement
linked to financial collaboration between
peoples remains an apt goal for renewed
efforts of the statesmen of this world.

A truly universal concept of the
common good for the human family is
lan incomparable instrument in building
sf Ithe edifice of the world today. It is my
own conviction that a united and con-
cerned America can contribute immense-
ly to the cause of world peace through
the efforts of our leaders and the com-
mitment of all her citizens dedicated to
the high ideals of her traditions.
America is in a splendid position to help
all humanity enjoy what it is intent upon
possessing.

With faith in God and belief in
: universal human solidarity may America
step forward in this crucial moment in
history to consolidate its rightful place
at the service of world peace. In this
sense, I repeat today those words that I
spoke when I left the United States in
1979. My final prayer is this: that God
will bless America so that she may in-
(. creasingly become, and truly be, and
long remain one nation under God, in-
divisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Luncheon Toasts

Rome

June 7, 1982'

President Reagan. It's a genuine
privilege to be here today and, most
especially, as the guest of President
Pertini. The poet Robert Browning
wrote, "Open my heart and you will see
'graved inside of it Italy."

As countless immigrants to my na-
tion's shores would confirm, Italy is

engraved inside millions of American
hearts. And, after your recent trip to
the United States, the name Pertini also
is engraved in our hearts. In my time at
the White House, I don't remember as
beautiful and moving a gesture as the
kiss you planted on our flag that March
morning. That kiss touched all the

hard but self-confident choices in recent
years. The Atlantic Alliance is firm in
large part because of Italian determina-
tion to assume major responsibilities
within NATO for our common defense.
The prospects for peace are improved
because of Italy's contribution to such
efforts as the Sinai multinational force.

citizens of my country. We were deeply
honored.

I want to say, personally, how
honored I feel to call you amico. The
word friend certainly characterizes the
relationship between Italy and the
United States. We're drawn together by
the blood of our people and the bonds of
our Western ideals. We share a devotion
to liberty and the determination to
preserve that liberty for ourselves and
our descendants.

We live in difficult times that test
our beliefs. The independence and
freedom of people the world over are
threatened by the expansion of totali-
tarian regimes and by the brutal crimes
of international terrorism. I am op-
timistic. The West simply needs to
believe in itself and in its leadership to
succeed. Italy and her people are abun-
dant in that leadership. Italy has made

After brief remarks following his meeting
with the Pope, the President meets with
Italian President Alessandro Pertini.

The free world better appreciates
human dignity and justice thanks to Ita-
ly's principled stand on Afghanistan and
Poland. And, of course, there is Italy's
integrity in the face of terrorism. Let
me cite here the brilliant operation that
freed General Dozier. These issues have
required difficult decisions. They have
required political decisiveness beyond
the ordinary. So I want to say — and pay
special tribute to you. President Pertini,
Prime Minister Spadolini, Foreign
Minister Colombo, and to the entire
Italian Government for the resolution
you've shown and the example that you
have given.

In return, I want to assure you that
the United States stands behind you in

July 1982

23

I

defending the values of the West. The
Atlantic Alliance is still the heart of our
foreign policy, and that heart beats for
peace and freedom.

The United States is fortunate to en-
joy the friendship of Italy and the Italian
people. We are wiser for your counsel
and stronger for your partnership. Like
the great Virgil, we Americans believe:
"As long as rivers shall run down to the
sea or shadows touch the mountain
slopes or stars graze in the vaulted
heavens, so long shall your honor, your
name, your praises endure."

Mr. President, amico, ladies and
gentlemen, may I propose a toast to Ita-
ly and to her honor, her name, and her
praises. May they long endure. [Ap-
plause]

U.S.-Italy
Statement

London
June 7, 19828

At the invitation of the President of the
Italian Republic, Sandro Pertini, the Presi-
dent of the United States of America, Ronald
Reagan, paid a visit to Rome on June 7th,
1982. The visit provided an opportunity for
the two Presidents to have a productive ex-
change of views. Two useful meetings were
held between President Reagan and the
President of the Council of Ministers,
Giovanni Spadolini. President Reagan took
the opportunity to thank President Pertini
for his recent state visit to the United States
and conveyed to him the warm good wishes
of the American government and the
American people. President Pertini expressed
to President Reagan his appreciation for the
warm reception he enjoyed in the United
States.

Presidents Reagan and Pertini reviewed
the threat which international terrorism
presents to the free world and noted with
satisfaction the successes of the Italian and
other Western governments in combatting
this menace. The two Presidents also review-
ed international trouble spots including
Afghanistan, Poland, and Central and South

America; the two reaffirmed their strongest
commitment to the preservation and restora-
tion of freedom and justice for all men. They
noted their shared hope for a cessation of
hostilities in the South Atlantic. The two
Heads of State concluded their meeting with
an affirmation of the strength of U.S. -Italian
bonds and a review of those common values
on which the two societies have been built.

Prime Minister Spadolini and President
Reagan, first between themselves and then
along with Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio
Colombo and Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, reviewed a number of questions facing
the two countries, including the 1979 decision
by NATO to place intermediate-range nuclear
forces in Europe, together with the offer to
the Soviet Union for simultaneous negotia-
tions on control and limitation of such
weapons, and the overall Middle East situa-
tion, with special attention to the two most
urgent questions in that area at the moment;
the Lebanese situation where it is of the ut-
most urgency to bring a cessation of the
fighting. On the Iran-Iraq conflict — the two
sides agreed on the need for a political settle-
ment respecting the territorial integrity of
both nations.

In addition they reviewed the validity of
both countries' participation in the Sinai
multinational force and the prospects for the
dialogue on Palestinian autonomy. They also
examined East-West relations, including
questions of trade and credit and issues
related to economic and monetary coopera-
tion between the two countries. The two
Heads of Government reaffirmed their com-
mitment to a policy aiming at a growing level
of economic and commercial relations be-
tween the two countries in order to fight
against inflation, promote growth and
thereby employment.

President Reagan reviewed his proposals
for the worldwide reduction of strategic
nuclear weapons and for the reduction of
intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.
Prime Minister Spadolini noted with approval
the recent announcement that the START
talks will begin in Geneva on June 29. The

two said they shared the aspirations of manj
of the young people who were marching for
peace, took note of the institutions and
policies which have kept the peace in Europt
for almost 40 years, and urged the Soviet
Union to respond positively to proposals L
which have been made by the United States. I

The Prime Minister and the President
viewed with pleasure the new initiative for
the exchange of young students between
their countries which will begin in 1982.

The two governments agreed to begin
regular meetings to discuss cultural and in-
formation matters with the desire to improv
cultural programs and in order to examine
means of strengthening relations in these
fields. The first cultural and information tall
will be held in Washington in October.

The two sides concluded their talks by
welcoming recent decisions to strengthen
mutual consultations as an expression of the
special and close relationship which Italy ant
the United States enjoy.

UNITED KINGDOM

President Reagan's
Address

London
June 8, 1982''

The journey of which this visit forms a
part is a long one. Already it has taken
me to two great cities of the West-
Rome and Paris— and to the economic
summit at Versailles. There, once agaii
our sister democracies have proved tha
even in a time of severe economic strai
free peoples can work together freely
and voluntarily to address problems as
serious as inflation, unemployment,
trade, and economic development in a
spirit of cooperation and solidarity.
Other milestones lie ahead. Later this

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week in Germany, we and our NATO
allies will discuss measures for our joint
defense and America's latest initiatives
for a more peaceful, secure world
through arms reductions.

Each stop of this trip is important,
but, among them all, this moment occu-
pies a special place in my heart and the
hearts of my countrymen— a moment of
kinship and homecoming in these hal-
lowed halls. Speaking for all Americans,
I want to say how very much at home
we feel in your house. Every American
would, because this is— as we have been
so eloquently told— one of democracy's
shrines. Here the rights of free people
and the processes of representation have
been debated and refined.

It has been said that an institution is
the lengthening shadow of a man. This
institution is the lengthening shadow of
all the men and women who have sat
here and all those who have voted to
send representatives here.

This is my second visit to Great
Britain as President of the United
States. My first opportunity to stand on
British soil occurred almost a year and a
half ago when your Prime Minister
graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at
the British Embassy in Washington.
Mrs. Thatcher said then that she hoped
that I was not distressed to find staring
down at me from the grand staircase a
portrait of His Royal Majesty King
George HI. She suggested it was best to
let bygones be bygones and— in view of
our two countries' remarkable friendship
in succeeding years— she added that
most Englishmen today would agree
with Thomas Jefferson that "a little
rebellion now and then is a very good
thing."

From here I will go on to Bonn and
then Berlin, where there stands a grim
symbol of power untamed. The Berlin
Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the
city, is in its third decade. It is the
fitting signature of the regime that built
it. And a few hundred kilometers behind
the Berlin Wall there is another symbol.
In the center of Warsaw there is a sign
that notes the distances to two capitals.
In one direction it points toward
Moscow. In the other it points toward
Brussels, headquarters of Western

July 1982

Europe's tangible unity. The marker
says that the distances from Warsaw to
Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are
equal. The sign makes this point: Poland
is not East or West. Poland is at the
center of European civilization. It has
contributed mightily to that civilization.
It is doing so today by being magnifi-
cently unreconciled to oppression.

Poland's struggle to be Poland, and
to secure the basic rights we often take
for granted, demonstrates why we dare
not take those rights for granted. Glad-
stone, defending the Reform Bill of
1866, declared: "You cannot fight
against the future. Time is on our side."
It was easier to believe in the march of
democracy in Gladstone's day, in that
high noon of Victorian optimism.

We are approaching the end of a
bloody century plagued by a terrible
political invention— totalitarianism. Op-
timism comes less easily today, not be-
cause democracy is less vigorous but be-
cause democracy's enemies have refined
their instruments of repression. Yet op-
timism is in order because, day by day,
democracy is proving itself to be a not-
at-all fragile flower.

From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna
on the Black Sea, the regimes planted
by totalitarianism have had more than
30 years to establish their legitimacy.
But none— not one regime— has yet been
able to risk free elections. Regimes
planted by bayonets do not take root.

The strength of the Solidarity move-
ment in Poland demonstrates the truth
told in an underground joke in the
Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union
would remain a one-party nation even if
an opposition party were permitted, be-
cause everyone would join the opposition
party.

America's time as a player on the
stage of world history has been brief. I
think understanding this fact has always
made you patient with your younger
cousins. Well, not always patient— I do
recall that on one occasion Sir Winston
Churchill said in exasperation about one
of our most distinguished diplomats: "He
is the only case I know of a bull who
carries his china shop with him."

Threats to Freedom

Witty as Sir Winston was, he also had
that special attribute of great states-
men—the gift of vision, the willingness
to see the future based on the experi-
ence of the past. It is this sense of
history, this understanding of the past,
that I want to talk with you about to-
day, for it is in remembering what we
share of the past that our two nations
can make common cause for the future.

We have not inherited an easy
world. If developments like the in-
dustrial revolution, which began here in
England, and the gifts of science and
technology have made life much easier
for us, they have also made it more
dangerous. There are threats now to our
freedom, indeed, to our very existence,
that other generations could never even
have imagined.

There is, first, the threat of global
war. No president, no congress, no
prime minister, no parliament can spend
a day entirely free of this threat. And I
don't have to tell you that in today's
world, the existence of nuclear weapons
could mean, if not the extinction of man-
kind, then surely the end of civilization
as we know it.

That is why negotiations on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces now under-
way in Europe and the START talks-
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks— which
will begin later this month, are not just
critical to American or Western policy;
they are critical to mankind. Our com-
mitment to early success in these negoti-
ations is firm and unshakable and our
purpose is clear: reducing the risk of
war by reducing the means of waging
war on both sides.

At the same time, there is a threat
posed to human freedom by the enor-
mous power of the modern state.
History teaches the dangers of govern-
ment that overreaches: political control
taking precedence over free economic
growth, secret police, mindless bureau-
cracy—all combining to stifle individual
excellence and personal freedom.

Now I am aware that among us here
and throughout Europe, there is legiti-
mate disagreement over the extent to
which the public sector should play a
role in a nation's economy and life. But

25

on one point all of us are united: our
abhorrence of dictatorship in all its
forms, but most particularly totalitarian-
ism and the terrible inhumanities it has
caused in our time: the great purge,
Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag and
Cambodia.

Historians looking back at our time
will note the consistent restraint and
peaceful intentions of the West. They
will note that it was the democracies
who refused to use the threat of their
nuclear monopoly in the 1940s and early
19.50s for territorial or imperial gain.
Had that nuclear monopoly been in the
hands of the Communist world, the map
of Europe— indeed, the world— would
look very different today. And certainly
they will note it was not the democracies
that invaded Afghanistan or suppressed
Polish solidarity or used chemical and
toxin warfare in Afghanistan and South-
east Asia.

If history teaches anything, it
teaches that self-delusion in the face of
unpleasant facts is folly. We see around
us today the marks of our terrible dilem-
ma—predictions of doomsday, anti-
nuclear demonstrations, an arms race in
which the West must for its own protec-
tion be an unwilling participant. At the
same time, we see totalitarian forces in
the world who seek subversion and con-
flict around the globe to further their
barbarous assault on the human spirit.

What, then, is our course? Must
civilization perish in a hail of fiery
atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet,
deadening accommodation with totali-
tarian evil? Sir Winston Churchill re-
fused to accept the inevitability of war
or even that it was imminent. He said:

I do not believe that Soviet Russia
desires war. What they desire is the fruits of
war and the indefinite expansion of their
power and doctrines. But what we have to
consider here today, while time remains, is
the permanent prevention of war and the
establishment of conditions of freedom and
democracy as rapidly as possible in all coun-
tries.

The Crisis of Totalitarianism

This is precisely our mission today: to
preserve freedom as well as peace. It
may not be easy to see, but I believe we

26

live now at a turning point. In an ironic
sense, Karl Marx was right. We are wit-
nessing today a great revolutionary
crisis— a crisis where the demands of the
economic order are conflicting directly
with those of the political order. But the
crisis is happening not in the free, non-
Marxist West but in the home of
Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It
is the Soviet Union that runs against the
tide of history by denying human free-
dom and human dignity to its citizens. It
also is in deep economic difficulty. The
rate of growth in the national product
has been steadily declining since the
1950s and is less than half of what it
was then. The dimensions of this failure
are astounding; a country which employs
one-fifth of its population in agriculture
is unable to feed its own people. Were it
not for the tiny private sector tolerated
in Soviet agriculture, the country might
be on the brink of famine. These private
plots occupy a bare 3% of the arable
land but account for nearly one-quarter
of Soviet farm output and nearly one-
third of meat products and vegetables.

Overcentralized, with little or no in-
centives, year after year the Soviet
system pours its best resources into the
making of instruments of destruction.
The constant shrinkage of economic
growth combined with the growth of
military production is putting a heavy
strain on the Soviet people.

What we see here is a political struc-
ture that no longer corresponds to its
economic base, a society where produc-
tive forces are hampered by political
ones. The decay of the Soviet experi-
ment should come as no surprise to us.
Wherever the comparisons have been
made between free and closed
societies— West Germany and East Ger-
many, Austria and Czechoslovakia,
Malaysia and Vietnam— it is the demo-
cratic countries that are prosperous and
responsive to the needs of their people.
And one of the simple but overwhelming
facts of our time is this: of all the
millions of refugees we've seen in the
modern world, their flight is always
away from, not toward, the Communist
world. Today on the NATO Hne, our
military forces face East to prevent a
possible invasion. On the other side of

the line, the Soviet forces also face
East— to prevent their people from
leaving.

The hard evidence of totalitarian
rule has caused in mankind an uprising
of the intellect and will. Whether it is
the growth of the new schools of eco-
nomics in America or England or the ap-
pearance of the so-called "new philoso-
phers" in France, there is one unifying
thread running through the intellectual
work of these groups: rejection of the
arbitrary power of the state, the refusal
to subordinate the rights of the in-
dividual to the superstate, the realiza-
tion that collectivism stifles all the best
human impulses.

Struggle Against Oppression

Since the exodus from Egypt, historians
have written of those who sacrificed and
struggled for freedom: the stand at
Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus,
the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw
uprising in World War II. More recent-
ly, we have seen evidence of this same
human impulse in one of the developing
nations in Central America. For months
and months the world news media cov-
ered the fighting in El Salvador. Day
after day we were treated to stories andi
film slanted toward the brave freedom
fighters battling oppressive government
forces in behalf of the silent, suffering
people of that tortured country.

Then one day those silent, suffering
people were offered a chance to vote, to
choose the kind of government they
wanted. Suddenly the freedom fighters
in the hills were exposed for what they
really are: Cuban-backed guerrillas who
want power for themselves and their
backers, not democracy for the people.
They threatened death to any who voted
and destroyed hundreds of busses and
trucks to keep people from getting to
the polling places. But on election day
the people of El Salvador, an unprece-
dented 1.4 million of them, braved am-
bush and gunfire and trudged miles to
vote for freedom.

They stood for hours in the hot sun
waiting for their turn to vote. Members
of our Congress who went there as
observers told me of a woman who was
wounded by rifle fire who refused to

Department of State Bulletin

11

Bis

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

leave the line to have her wound treated
until after she had voted. A grand-
mother, who had been told by the guer-
rillas she would be killed when she
returned from the polls, told the guer-
rillas: "You can kill me, kill my family,
kill my neighbors, but you can't kill us
all." The real freedom fighters of El
Salvador turned out to be the people of
that country— the young, the old, and
the in-between. Strange, but in my own
country there has been little if any news
coverage of that war since the election.

Perhaps they'll say it's because there
are newer struggles now — on distant
islands in the South Atlantic young men
are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices
have been raised protesting their sacri-
fices for lumps of rock and earth so far
away. But those young men aren't fight-
ing for mere real estate. They fight for a
cause, for the belief that armed aggres-
sion must not be allowed to succeed and
that people must participate in the deci-
sions of government under the rule of
law. If there had been firmer support
for that principle some 45 years ago,
perhaps our generation wouldn't have
suffered the bloodletting of World
War II.

In the Middle East the guns sound
Dnce more, this time in Lebanon, a coun-
try that for too long has had to endure
the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and
foreign intervention and occupation. The
Bghting in Lebanon on the part of all
oarties must stop, and Israel should
jring its forces home. But this is not
enough. We must all work to stamp out
;he scourge of terrorism that in the Mid-
dle East makes war an ever-present
;hreat.

But beyond the troublespots lies a
deeper, more positive pattern. Around
;he world today the democratic revolu-
;ion is gathering new strength. In India,
1 critical test has been passed with the
peaceful change of governing political
parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving in
"emarkable and unmistakable ways to
juild and strengthen its democratic in-
stitutions. In the Caribbean and Central
\merica, 16 of 24 countries have freely
elected governments. And in the United
Nations, 8 of the 10 developing nations
vhich have joined the body in the past 5
/ears are democracies.

In the Communist world as well.

man's instinctive desire for freedom and
self-determination surfaces again and
again. To be sure, there are grim re-
minders of how brutally the police state
attempts to snuflF out this quest for self-
rule: 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in
Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981
in Poland. But the struggle continues in
Poland, and we know that there are
even those who strive and suffer for
freedom within the confines of the
Soviet Union itself. How we conduct
ourselves here in the Western democra-
cies will determine whether this trend
continues.

Fostering Democracy

No, democracy is not a fragile flower;
still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of
this century is to witness the gradual
growth of freedom and democratic
ideals, we must take actions to assist the
campaign for democracy. Some argue
that we should encourage democratic
change in rightwing dictatorships but
not in Communist regimes. To accept
this preposterous notion — as some well-
meaning people have — is to invite the
argument that, once countries achieve a
nuclear capability, they should be al-
lowed an undisturbed reign of terror

ask only for a process, a direction, a
basic code of decency — not for an in-
stant transformation.

We cannot ignore the fact that even
without our encouragement, there have
been and will continue to be repeated
explosions against repression in dictator-
ships. The Soviet Union itself is not im-
mune to this reality. Any system is in-
herently unstable that has no peaceful
means to legitimatize its leaders. In such
cases, the very repressiveness of the
state ultimately drives people to resist
it — if necessary, by force.

WhUe we must be cautious about
forcing the pace of change, we must not
hesitate to declare our ultimate objec-
tives and to take concrete actions to
move toward them. We must be staunch
in our conviction that freedom is not the
sole prerogative of a lucky few but the
inalienable and universal right of all
human beings. So states the U.N. Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,
which, among other things, guarantees
free elections.

The objective I propose is quite sim-
ple to state: to foster the infrastructure
of democracy — the system of a free
press, unions, political parties, univer-
sities— which allows a people to choose
their own way. to develop their own

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to
foster the infrastructure of democracy — the system
of a free press, unions, political parties, univer-
sities— which allows a people to choose their own
way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile
their own differences through peaceful means.

over their own citizens. We reject this
course.

As for the Soviet view. President
Brezhnev repeatedly has stressed that
the competition of ideas and systems
must continue and that this is entirely
consistent with relaxation of tensions
and peace. We ask only that these
systems begin by living up to their own
constitutions, abiding by their own laws,
and complying with the international
obligations they have undertaken. We

culture, to reconcile their own differ-
ences through peaceful means.

This is not cultural imperialism; it is
providing the means for genuine self-
determination and protection for diversi-
ty. Democracy already flourishes in
countries with very different cultures
and historical experiences. It would be
cultural condescension, or worse, to say
that any people prefer dictatorship to

Iluly1982

27

democracy. Who would voluntarily
choose not to have the right to vote,
decide to purchase government propa-
ganda handouts instead of independent
newspapers, prefer government to
worker-controlled unions, opt for land to
be owned by the state instead of those
who till it, want government repression
of religious liberty, a single political par-
ty instead of a free choice, a rigid
cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic
tolerance and diversity?

Since 1917 the Soviet Union has
given covert political training and assist-
ance to Marxist-Leninists in many coun-
tries. Of course, it also has promoted the
use of violence and subversion by these
same forces. Over the past several
decades. West European and other
social democrats, christian democrats
and liberals have offered open assistance
to fraternal political and social institu-
tions to bring about peaceful and
democratic progress. Appropriately, for
a vigorous new democracy, the Federal
Republic of Germany's political founda-
tions have become a major force in this
effort.

U.S. Proposals

We in America now intend to take addi-
tional steps, as many of our allies have
already done, toward realizing this same
goal. The chairmen and other leaders of
the national Republican and Democratic
party organizations are initiating a study
with the bipartisan American Political
Foundation to determine how the United
States can best contribute— as a na-
tion—to the global campaign for democ-
racy now gathering force. They will
have the cooperation of congressional
leaders of both parties along with repre-
sentatives of business, labor, and other
major institutions in our society.

I look forward to receiving their
recommendations and to working with
these institutions and the Congress in
the common task of strengthening
democracy throughout the world. It is
time that we committed ourselves as a
nation— in both the public and private
sectors— to assisting democratic devel-
opment.

We plan to consult with leaders of

28

other nations as well. There is a pro-
posal before the Council of Europe to in-
vite parliamentarians from democratic
countries to a meeting next year in
Strasbourg. That prestigious gathering
would consider ways to help democratic
political movements.

This November in Washington there
will take place an international meeting
on free elections and next spring there
will be a conference of world authorities
on constitutionalism and self-govern-
ment hosted by the Chief Justice of the
United States. Authorities from a
number of developing and developed
countries— judges, philosophers, and
politicians with practical experience-
have agreed to explore how to turn prin-
ciple into practice and further the rule
of law.

At the same time, we invite the
Soviet Union to consider with us how
the competition of ideas and values—
which it is committed to support— can be
conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal
basis. For example, I am prepared to
offer President Brezhnev an opportunity
to speak to the American people on our
television, if he will allow me the same
opportunity with the Soviet people. We
also suggest that panels of our newsmen
periodically appear on each other's tele-
vision to discuss major events.

I do not wish to sound overly opti-
mistic, yet the Soviet Union is not im-
mune from the reality of what is going
on in the world. It has happened in the
past: a small ruling elite either mis-
takenly attempts to ease domestic
unrest through greater repression and
foreign adventure or it chooses a wiser
course— it begins to allow its people a
voice in their own destiny.

Even if this latter process is not
realized soon, I believe the renewed
strength of the democratic movement,
complemented by a global campaign for
freedom, will strengthen the prospects
for arms control and a world at peace.

1 have discussed on other occasions,
including my address on May 9th, the
elements of Western policies toward the
Soviet Union to safeguard our interests
and protect the peace. What I am de-
scribing now is a plan and a hope for the
long term— the march of freedom and
democracy which will leave Marxism-
Leninism on the ash heap of history as it

has left other tyrannies which stifle the
freedom and muzzle the self-expression
of the people.

That is why we must continue our
efforts to strengthen NATO even as we
move forward with our zero option in-
itiative in the negotiations on inter-
mediate-range forces and our proposal
for a one-third reduction in strategic
ballistic missile warheads.

Dedication to Western Ideals

Our military strength is a prerequisite ti
peace, but let it be clear we maintain
this strength in the hope it will never hi
used. For the ultimate determinant in
the struggle now going on for the world
will not be bombs and rockets, but a tes
of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual
resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs
we cherish, the ideals to which we are
dedicated.

The British people know that, given
strong leadership, time, and a little bit
of hope, the forces of good ultimately
rally and triumph over evil. Here amonji
you is the cradle of self-government, thi
mother of parliaments. Here is the en-
during greatness of the British contribu
tion to mankind, the great civilized
ideas: individual liberty, representative
government, and the rule of law under
God.

1 have often wondered about the
shyness of some of us in the West abou
standing for these ideals that have done
so much to ease the plight of man and
the hardships of our imperfect world.
This reluctance to use those vast re-
sources at our command reminds me of
the elderly lady whose home was
bombed in the blitz. As the rescuers
moved about they found a bottle of
brandy she'd stored behind the staircast
which was all that was left standing.
Since she was barely conscious, one of
the workers pulled the cork to give her
taste of it. She came around immediate
ly and said: "Here now, put it back,
that's for emergencies."

Well, the emergency is upon us. Le'
us be shy no longer— let us go to our
strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell
the world that a new age is not only
possible but probable.

During the dark days of the Second

Department of State Bulletii

FEATURE

Visit
yy/ to
Europe

World War when this island was incan-
descent with courage, Winston Churchill
exclaimed about Britain's adversaries:
"What kind of a people do they think we
are?" Britain's adversaries found out
what extraordinary people the British
are. But all the democracies paid a terri-
ble price for allowing the dictators to
underestimate us. We dare not make
that mistake again. So let us ask our-
selves: What kind of people do we think
we are? And let us answer: free people,
worthy of freedom, and determined not
only to remain so but to help others gain
their freedom as well.

Sir Winston led his people to great
victory in war and then lost an election
just as the fruits of victory were about
to be enjoyed. But he left office honor-
ably—and, as it turned out, temporari-
ly—knowing that the liberty of his peo-
ple was more important than the fate of
any single leader. History recalls his
greatness in ways no dictator will ever
know. And he left us a message of hope
for the future, as timely now as when he
first uttered it, as opposition leader in
the Commons nearly 27 years ago. He
said: "When we look back on all the
perils through which we have passed
and at the mighty foes we have laid low
and all the dark and deadly designs we
[lave frustrated, why should we fear for
3ur future? We have," he said, "come
safely through the worst."

'The task I have set forth will long
DUtlive our own generation. But to-
gether, we, too, have come through the
vvorst. Let us now begin a major effort
:o secure the best— a crusade for free-
dom that will engage the faith and forti-
:ude of the next generation. For the
sake of peace and justice, let us move
;oward a world in which all people are
It last free to determine their own
lestiny. ■

Dinner Toasts

London
June 8, 1982"

Her Majesty the Queen. I am so glad to
welcome you and Mrs. Reagan to Brit-
ain. Prince Philip and I are especially
delighted that you have come to be our
guests at Windsor Castle, since this has
been the home of the Kings and Queens
of our country for over 900 years.

I greatly enjoyed our ride together
this morning. And I was much im-
pressed by the way in which you coped
so professionally with a strange horse
and a saddle that must have seemed
even stranger. [Laughter]

We hope these will be enjoyable days
for you in Britain, as enjoyable as our
stays have always been in the United
States. We shall never forget the
warmth and hospitality of your people in
1976 as we walked through the crowds
in Philadelphia, Washington, New York,
and Boston to take part in the celebra-
tions of the Bicentennial of American in-
dependence. Two hundred years before
that visit one of my ancestors had
played a seemingly disastrous role in
your affairs. [Laughter] Yet, had King
George HI been able to foresee the long-
term consequences of his actions, he
might not have felt so grieved about the
loss of his colonies. Out of the war of in-
dependence grew a great nation, the
United States of America. And later,
there was forged a lasting friendship
between the new nation and the country
to whom she owed so much of her
origins. But that friendship must never
be taken for granted. And your visit
gives me the opportunity to reaffirm
and to restate it.

Our close relationship is not just
based on history, kinship, and language,
strong and binding though these are. It
is based on same values and same

beliefs, evolved over many years in these
islands since the Magna Carta and vivid-
ly stated by the Founding Fathers of the
United States.

This has meant that over the whole
range of human activity, the people of
the United States and the people of Brit-
ain are drawing on each other's ex-
perience and enriching each other's lives.
Of course, we do not always think and
act alike, but through the years our com-
mon heritage, based on the principles of
common law, has prevailed over our
diversity. And our toleration has
moderated our arguments and misunder-
standings. Above all, our commitment to
a common cause has led us to fight
together in two world wars and to con-
tinue to stand together today in the
defense of freedom.

These past weeks have been testing
ones for this country when, once again,
we have had to stand up for the cause of
freedom. The conflict in the Falkland
Islands was thrust on us by naked ag-
gression, and we are naturally proud of
the way our fighting men are serving
their country. But throughout the crisis,
we have drawn comfort from the
understanding of our position shown by
the American people. We have admired
the honesty, patience, and skill with
which you have performed your dual
role as ally and intermediary.

In return, we can offer an under-
standing of how hard it is to bear the
daunting responsibilities of world power.
The fact that your people have
shouldered that burden for so long
now — never losing the respect and affec-
tion of your friends — is proof of a brave
and generous spirit.

Our respect extends beyond the
bounds of statesmanship and diplomacy.
We greatly admire the drive and enter-
prise of your commercial life. And we,
therefore, welcome the confidence which
your business community displays in us
by your massive investment in this coun-
try's future. We also like to think we
might have made some contribution to
the extraordinary success story of
American business.

In darker days, Winston Churchill
surveyed the way in which the affairs of

Iulyig82

29

the British Empire, as it then was, and
the United States would become, in his
words, "somewhat mixed up." He
welcomed the prospect. "I could not stop
it if I wished," he said. "No one can stop
it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps roll-
ing along. Let it roll." How right he was.
There can be few nations whose
destinies have been so inextricably inter-
woven as yours and mine. Your
presence at Versailles has highlighted
the increasing importance, both to Brit-
ain and to America, of cooperation
among the industrial democracies. Your
visit tomorrow to Bonn underlines the
importance to both our countries of the
continued readiness of the people of the
Western Alliance to defend the ways of

life which we all share and cherish. Your
stay in my country reflects not only the
great traditions that hold Britain and
the United States together, but above
all, the personal affection the British
and the Americans have for one
another. This is the bedrock on which
our relationship stands.

I raise my glass to you and to Mrs.
Reagan, to Anglo-American friendship,
and to the prosperity and happiness of
the people of the United States.

President Reagan. Nancy and I are
honored to be your guests at this
beautiful and historic castle. It was from
here that Richard the Lion Hearted rode
out to the Crusades, and from here that

his brother. King John, left to sign the
Magna Carta. It is a rare privilege to be
even a momentary part of the rich
history of Windsor Castle.

As we rode over these magnificent
grounds this morning, I thought again
about how our people share, as you have
mentioned, a common past. We are
bound by much more than just language.
Many of our values, beliefs, and prin-
ciples of government were nurtured on
this soU. I also thought of how our
future security and prosperity depend on
the continued unity of Britain and
America.

This place symbolizes both tradition
and renewal, as generation after genera-
tion of your family makes it their home.

30

Department of State Bulletin *i

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

^e in America share your excitement
ibout the impending birth of a child to
he Prince and Princess of Wales. We
')ray that God will continue to bless your
amily with health, happiness, and
visdom.

It has been said that the greatest
flory of a free-born people is to transmit
hat freedom to their children. That is a
esponsibility our people share.
Together, and eager for peace, we must
ace an unstable world where violence
.nd terrorism, aggression, and tyranny
onstantly encroach on human rights,
'ogether committed to the preservation
f freedom and our way of life, we must
trengthen a weakening international
rder and restore the world's faith in
eace and the rule of law.

We, in the free world, share an
biding faith in our people and in the
jture of mankind. The challenge of
-eedom is to reject an unacceptable
resent for what we can cause the
iture to be. Together it is within our
ower to confront the threats to peace
Itid freedom and to triumph over them.

Nancy and I and all of our party are
ery grateful for your invitation to visit
reat Britain and for your gracious
ospitality. Our visit has been enormous-
' productive and has strengthened the
^es that bind our peoples. I would like
) propose that we raise our glasses to
er Majesty the Queen of the United
ingdom, to the continued unity of our
, vo nations, the preservation of our
eedom for generations to come. I pro-
Dse a toast to Her Majesty the Queen.

"The President enjoys an early morning ride
vith Her Majesty the Queen at Home Park.

White House photo by Michael Evans)

July 1982

President Reagan's

and

Prime Minister

Thatcher's Remarks

London
June 9, 1982"

Prime Minister Thatcher. May we

report to you on the talks we've had and
the way we think that this whole visit
has gone. Of course, there is always a
very great welcome in Britain for a visit
by our great ally and friend, the United
States.

This visit has been something more
than an ordinary welcome. It's been an
extraordinarily warm welcome which I
think we must attribute to the way in
which President Reagan has appealed to
the hearts and minds of our people. The
reception he's had, not only from
Parliament — which was a triumph— but
also from the people of this country who
listened to his speech before Parliament,
that reception has been one of great af-
fection and one which recognizes that
here is a leader who can put to the un-
committed nations of the world the fact
that we in Britain and the United States
have a cause in freedom and justice that
is worth striving for and worth pro-
claiming. We do, indeed, thank him for
that and congratulate him most warmly
on everything — all the speeches and
everything he's done — since he has been
with us for his very brief visit. It is a
triumph for him as well as a great joy to
have our ally and friend with us.

We have, of course, discussed mat-
ters of defense in the context of East-
West relations. Once again we take a
similar view. We cannot depend upon
the righteousness of our cause for
security; we can only depend upon our
sure defense. But we recognize, at the
same time, that it is important to try to
get disarmament talks started so that
the balance of forces and the deterrents

can be conducted at a lower level of ar-
mament. In this, again, the President
has seized the initiative and given a
lead, and we wish those talks very well
when they start. We will all be behind
him in what he is doing.

This morning we have also discussed
the question of what is happening in the
Middle East. We have discussed it in a
very wide context. As you'd expect, we
are wholly agreed on the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 508 that there must
be cessation of hostilities coupled with
withdrawal, and the United Kingdom is
wholly behind Mr. Habib in the efforts
he is making to bring that about. We
have discussed it also in the very much
wider context of the whole difficult
problems of the Middle East which
we've been striving to solve for so many
years now.

Finally, I would like once again to
record our thanks to our American
friends, to the President, and to
Secretary Haig for the staunch support
they've given us and continued to give
us over the Falkland Islands and their
realization that we must make it seem to
the world over that aggression cannot
pay. They have been most helpful, most
staunch, and not only we but the whole
of the British people thank them for it.
Altogether, if I may sum up, this has
been a tremendously successful visit,
and one which we shall long remember
both in our minds and in our hearts.
[Applause]

President Reagan. I have no words to
thank Prime Minister Thatcher for those
very kind words that she said with
regard to us. Nancy and I will be leaving
here with warm hearts and great
gratitude for the hospitality that has
been extended to us, and the pleasure
that we've had here in addition to the
worthwhile meetings and the accom-
plishments that have already been
outlined.

We did discuss a number of the trou-
ble spots in the world— Lebanon— and
found ourselves in agreement with
regard to the U.N. Resolution 508, the
hope for a ceasefire, and withdrawal of
all the hostile forces there. We had a
chance, again, to reiterate our support
of the British position in the Falklands;

31

that armed aggression cannot be allowed
to succeed in today's world.

We had what we think were worth-
while meetings at the economic summit
in Versailles, and now we go onto the
NATO meeting. Our goals there we are
also agreed upon: solidarity of the
members of the alliance; strength,
dialogue, and the urging of restraint on
the Soviet Union and responsibility and
our agreement on going forward with
realistic arms control that means arms
reduction, not just — as in the past —
some efforts to limit the increase in
those weapons, but to bring about a
realistic, verifiable decrease and, thus,
further remove the possibility of war.

This has been a most important
meeting for us and a very heartwarming
experience every minute that we've been
here. We leave strengthened with the
knowledge that the great friendship and
the great alliance that has existed for so
long between our two peoples — the
United Kingdom and the LFnited States
— remains and is, if anything, stronger
than it has ever been.

GERMANY

President Reagan's
Address

Bonn

June 9, 1982'2

I am very honored to speak to you today
and thus to all the people of Germany.
Next year we will jointly celebrate the
300th anniversary of the first German
settlement in the American colonies. The
13 families who came to our new land
were the forerunners of more than 7
million German immigrants to the
United States. Today more Americans
claim German ancestry than any other.

These Germans cleared and culti-
vated our land, built our industries, and
advanced our arts and sciences. In honor
of 300 years of German contributions in
America, President Carstens and I have

32

agreed today that he will pay an official
visit to the United States in October of
1983 to celebrate the occasion.

The German people have given us so
much; we like to think that we've repaid
some of that debt. Our American Revo-
lution was the first revolution in modern
history to be fought for the right of self-
government and the guarantee of civil
liberties. That spirit was contagious. In
1849 the Frankfurt Parliament's state-
ment of basic human rights guaranteed
freedom of expression, freedom of
religion, and equality before the law.
These principles live today in the basic
law of the Federal Republic. Many
peoples to the east still wait for such
rights.

The United States is proud of your
democracy, but we cannot take credit
for it. Heinrich Heine, in speaking of
those who built the awe-inspiring cathe-
drals of medieval times, said that "in
those days people had convictions. We
moderns have only opinions and it re-
quires something more than opinions to
build a Gothic cathedral." Over the past
30 years, the convictions of the German
people have built a cathedral of democ-
racy—a great and glorious testament to
your ideals.

We in America genuinely admire the
free society you have built in only a few
decades. And we understand all the bet-
ter what you have accomplished because
of our own history. Americans speak
with the deepest reverence of those
founding fathers and first citizens who
gave us the freedoms we enjoy today.
And even though they lived over 200
years ago, we carry them in our hearts
as well as our history books.

I believe future generations of Ger-
mans will look to you here today and to
your fellow Germans with the same pro-
found respect and appreciation. You
have built a free society with an abiding
faith in human dignity— the crowning
ideal of Western civilization. This will
not be forgotten.. You will be saluted
and honored by this republic's descend-
ants over the centuries to come.

Yesterday, before the British Parlia-
ment, I spoke of the values of Western
civilization and the necessity to help all
peoples gain the institutions of freedom.

In many ways, in many places, our
ideals are being tested today. We are
meeting this afternoon between two im-
portant summits, the gathering of lead-
ing industrial democracies at Versailles
and the assembling of the Atlantic
alliance here in Bonn tomorrow. Critical
and complex problems face us. But our
dilemmas will be made easier if we re-
member our partnership is based on a
common Western heritage and a faith in
democracy.

The Search for Peace

I believe this partnership of the Atlantic
alliance nations is motivated primarily
by the search for peace. Inner peace for
our citizens and peace among nations.
Why inner peace? Because democracy
allows for self-expression. It respects
man's dignity and creativity. It operates
by rule of law, not by terror or coercion.
It is government with the consent of the
governed. As a result, citizens of the
Atlantic alliance enjoy an unprecedented
level of material and spiritual well-being.
And they are free to find their own per-
sonal peace.

We also seek peace among nations.
The psalmist said: "Seek peace and pur-
sue it." Our foreign policies are based on
this principle and directed toward this
end. The noblest objective of our diplo-
macy is the patient and difficult task of
reconciling our adversaries to peace.
And I know we all look forward to the
day when the only industry of war will
be the research of historians.

But the simple hope for peace is not
enough. We must remember something
Friedrich Schiller said, "The most pious
man can't stay in peace if it doesn't
please his evil neighbor." So there must
be a method to our search, a method
that recognizes the dangers and realities
of the world. During Chancellor
Schmidt's state visit to Washington last
year, I said that your republic was
"perched on a cliff of freedom." I wasn't
saying anything the German people do
not already know. Living as you do in
the heart of a divided Europe, you can
see more clearly than others that there
are governments at peace neither with
their own peoples nor the world.

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

I don't believe any reasonable ob-
server can deny there is a threat to both
peace and freedom today. It is as stark
as a gash of a border that separates the
German people. We are menaced by a
power that openly condemns our values
and answers our restraint with a relent-
less military buildup.

We cannot simply assume every na-
tion wants the peace we so earnestly
desire. The Polish people would tell us
there are those who would use military
force to repress others who want only
basic human rights. The freedom
fighters of Afghanistan would tell us as
well that the threat of aggression has
not receded from the world.

iStrengthening Alliance Security

Without a strengthened Atlantic securi-
ty, the possibility of military coercion
will be very great. We must continue to
improve our defenses if we are to pre-
serve peace and freedom. This is not an
impossible task; for almost 40 years, we
have succeeded in deterring war. Our
method has been to organize our defen-
sive capabilities, both nuclear and con-
ventional, so that an aggressor could
have no hope of military victory. The
alliance has carried its strength not as a
battle flag but as a banner of peace. De-
terrence has kept that peace, and we
must continue to take the steps neces-
sary to make deterrence credible.

This depends in part on a strong
America. A national effort, entailing
sacrifices by the American people, is
now underway to make long-overdue im-
provements in our military posture. The
American people support this eff'ort be-
cause they understand how fundamental
it is to keeping the peace they so
fervently desire.

We also are resolved to maintain the
presence of well-equipped and trained
forces in Europe, and our strategic
forces will be modernized and remain
committed to the alliance. By these ac-
tions, the people of the United States
are saying, "We are with you Germany.
You are not alone." Our adversaries
would be foolishly mistaken should they
gamble that Americans would abandon
their alliance responsibilities, no matter
how severe the test.

Alliance security depends on a fully
credible conventional defense to which
all allies contribute. There is a danger
that any conflict would escalate to a
nuclear war. Strong conventional forces
can make the danger of conventional or
nuclear conflict more remote. Reason-
able strength in and of itself is not bad;
it is honorable when used to maintain
peace or defend deeply held beliefs.

One of the first chores is to fulfill
our commitments to each other by con-
tinuing to strengthen our conventional
defenses. This must include improving
the readiness of our standing forces and

member of the alliance, and this funda-
mental commitment is embodied in the
North Atlantic Treaty. But it will be an
empty pledge unless we insure that
American forces are ready to reinforce
Europe and Europe is ready to receive
them. I am encouraged by the recent
agreement on wartime host-nation sup-
port. This pact strengthens our ability to
deter aggression in Europe and demon-
strates our common determination to re-
spond to attack.

Just as each ally shares fully in the
security of the alliance, each is responsi-
ble for shouldering a fair share of the

The soil of Germany, and every other ally, is of
vital concern to each member of the alliance, and
this fundamental commitment is embodied in the
North Atlantic Treaty.

the ability of those forces to operate as
one. We must also apply the West's
technological genius to improving our
conventional deterrence.

There can be no doubt that we as an
alliance have the means to improve our
conventional defenses. Our peoples hold
values of individual liberty and dignity
that time and again they have proven
willing to defend. Our economic energy
vastly exceeds that of our adversaries.
Our free system has produced techno-
logical advantages that other systems,
with their stifling ideologies, cannot
hope to equal. All of these resources are
available to our defense.

Yes, many of our nations currently
are experiencing economic difficulties.
Yet we must, nevertheless, guarantee
that our security does not suffer as a
result. We've made strides in conven-
tional defense over the last few years
despite our economic problems, and we
have disproved the pessimists who con-
tend that our eff'orts are futile. The
more we close the conventional gap, the
less the risks of aggression or nuclear
conflict.

The soil of Germany, and every
other ally, is of vital concern to each

burden. Now that, of course, often leads
to a difference of opinion, and criticism
of our alliance is as old as the partner-
ship itself.

But voices have been raised on both
sides of the Atlantic that mistake the in-
evitable process of adjustment within
the alliance for a dramatic divergence of
interests. Some Americans think that
Europeans are too little concerned for
their own security; some would uni-
laterally reduce the number of American
troops deployed in Europe. And in
Europe itself, we hear the idea that the
American presence, rather than contri-
buting to peace, either has no deterrent
value or actually increases the risk that
our allies may be attacked.

These arguments ignore both the
history and the reality of the trans-
Atlantic coalition. Let me assure you
that the American commitment to
Europe remains steady and strong.
Europe's shores are our shores.
Europe's borders are our borders. And
we will stand with you in defense of our
heritage of liberty and dignity. The
American people recognize Europe's

July 1982

33

substantial contributions to our joint
security. Nowhere is that contribution
more evident than here in the Federal
Republic. German citizens host the
forces of six nations. German soldiers
and reservists provide the backbone of
NATO's conventional deterrent in the
heartland of Europe. Your Bundeswehr
is a model for the integration of defense
needs with a democratic way of life. And
you have not shrunk from the heavy re-
sponsibility of accepting the nuclear
forces necessan,' for deterrence.

I ask your help in fulfilling another
responsibility. Many American citizens
don't believe that their counterparts in
Europe— especially younger citizens—
really understand the U.S. presence
there. If you will work toward explain-
ing the U.S. role to people on this side
of the Atlantic, I will explain it to those
on the other side.

The Threat of Nuclear War

In recent months, both in your country
and mine, there has been renewed public
concern about the threat of nuclear war
and the arms buildup. I know it is not
easy, especially for the German people,
to live in the gale of intimidation that
blows from the East. If I might quote
Heine again, he almost foretold the
fears of nuclear war when he wrote:
"Wild, dark times are rumbling toward
us, and the prophet who wishes to write
a new apocalypse will have to invent en-
tirely new beasts, and beasts so terrible
that the ancient animal symbols . . . will
seem like cooing doves and cupids in
comparison."

"The nuclear threat is a terrible"
beast. Perhaps the banner carried in one
of the nuclear demonstrations here in
Germany said it best. The sign read, "I
am afraid." I know of no Western leader
who doesn't sympathize with that
earnest plea. To those who march for
peace, my heart is with you. I would be
at the head of your parade if I believed
marching alone could bring about a
more secure world. And to the 2,800
women in Filderstadt who sent a peti-
tion for peace to President Brezhnev

and myself, let me say I, myself, would
sign your petition if I thought it could
bring about harmony. I understand your
genuine concerns.

The women of Filderstadt and I
share the same goal. The question is
how to proceed. We must think through
the consequences of how we reduce the
dangers to peace. Those who advocate
that we unilaterally forego the moder-
nization of our forces must prove that
this will enhance our security and lead
to moderation by the other side— in
short, that it will advance, rather than
undermine, the preservation of the
peace. The weight of recent history does
not support this notion.

Those who demand that we re-
nounce the use of a crucial element of
our deterrent strategy must show how
this would decrease the likelihood of
war. It is only by comparison with a
nuclear war that the suffering caused by
conventional war seems a lesser evil.
Our goal must be to deter war of any
kind.

And to those who decry the failure
of arms control efforts to achieve sub-
stantial results must consider where the
fault lies. I would remind them it is the
United States that has proposed to ban
land-based intermediate-range nuclear
missiles— the missiles most threatening
Europe. It is the United States that has
proposed and will pursue deep cuts in
strategic systems. It is the West that
has long sought the detailed exchanges
of information on forces and effective
verification procedures. And it is dicta-
torships, not democracies, that need
militarism to control their own people
and impose their system on others.

Western Commitment to Arms Control

We in the West— Germans, Americans,
our other allies— are deeply committed
to continuing efforts to restrict the arms
competition. Common sense demands
that we persevere. I invite those who
genuinely seek effective and lasting arms
control to stand behind the far-reaching
proposals that we have put forward. In
return I pledge that we will sustain the
closest of consultations with our allies.
On November 18th, I outlined a

broad and ambitious arms control pro-
gram. One element calls for reducing
land-based intermediate-range nuclear
missiles to zero on each side. If carried
out, it would eliminate the growing
threat to Western Europe posed by the
U.S.S.R.'s modern SS-20 rockets, and it
would make unnecessary the NATO
decision to deploy American inter-
mediate-range systems. And, by the
way, I cannot understand why, among
some, there is a greater fear of weapons
which NATO is to deploy than of
weapons the Soviet Union already has
deployed. Our proposal is fair because it
imposes equal limits and obligations on
both sides and it calls for significant
reductions, not merely a capping of an
existing high level of destructive power.
As you know, we have made this pro-
posal in Geneva, where negotiations
have been underway since the end of
November last year. We intend to pur-
sue those negotiations intensively. I
regard them as a significant test of the
Soviets' willingness to enter into mean-
ingful arms control agreements.

On May 9th, we proposed to the
Soviet Union that Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks begin this month in
Geneva. The U.S.S.R. has agreed, and
talks will begin on June 29th. We in the
United States want to focus on the most
destabilizing systems, and thus reduce
the risk of war. That is why in the first
phase we propose to reduce substantial!; -
the number of ballistic missile warheads
and the missiles themselves. In the sec-
ond phase we will seek an equal ceiling
on other elements of our strategic
forces, including ballistic missile throw-
weight, at less than current American
levels. We will handle cruise missiles ano
bombers in an equitable fashion. We will
negotiate in good faith and undertake
these talks with the same seriousness of
purpose that has marked our prepara-
tions over the last several months.

Another element of the program I
outlined was a call for reductions in con-
ventional forces in Europe. From the
earliest postwar years, the Western
democracies have faced the ominous
reality that massive Soviet conventional
forces would remain stationed where

34

Department of State Bulletin

they do not belong. The muscle of Soviet
forces in Central Europe far exceeds
legitimate defense needs. Their presence
is made more threatening still by a mili-
tary doctrine that emphasizes mobility
and surprise attack. And as history
shows, these troops have built a legacy
of intimidation and repression.

In response, the NATO allies must
show they have the will and capacity to
deter any conventional attack or any at-
tempt to intimidate us. Yet we also will
continue the search for responsible ways
ito reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact mili-
Itary personnel to equal levels.

In recent weeks, we in the alliance
have consulted on how best to invigorate
the Vienna negotiations on mutual and
balanced force reductions. Based on
these consultations. Western representa-
tives in the Vienna talks soon will make
a proposal by which the two alliances
would reduce their respective ground
force personnel in verifiable stages to a
total of 700,000 men and their combined
ground and air force personnel to a level
Df 900,000 men.

While the agreement would not
eliminate the threat nor spare our
citizens the task of maintaining a
substantial defensive force, it could con-
stitute a major step toward a safer
Europe for both East and West. It could
lead to military stability at lower levels
and lessen the dangers of miscalculation
and of surprise attack. And it also would
demonstrate the political will of the two
alliances to enhance stability by limiting
their forces in the central area of their
military competition.

The West has established a clear set
of goals. We, as an alliance, will press
forward with plans to improve our own
conventional forces in Europe. At the
same time, we propose an arms control
agreement to equalize conventional
forces at a significantly lower level.

We will move ahead with our
preparations to modernize our nuclear
forces in Europe. But, again, we also
will work unceasingly to gain acceptance

in Geneva of our proposal to ban land-
based intermediate-range nuclear
missiles.

In the United States, we will move
forward with the plans I announced last
year to modernize our strategic nuclear
forces, which play so vital a role in
maintaining peace by deterring war. Yet
we also have proposed that Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks begin, and we
will pursue them determinedly.

The Need for Unity

In each of these areas our policies are
based on the conviction that a stable
military balance at the lowest possible
level will help further the cause of
peace. The other side will respond in
good faith to these initiatives only if it
believes we are resolved to provide for
our own defense. Unless convinced that
we will unite and stay united behind
these arms control initiatives and mod-
ernization programs, our adversaries
will seek to divide us from one another
and our peoples from their leaders.

I am optimistic about our relation-
ship with the Soviet Union if the
Western nations remain ti-ue to their
values and true to each other. I believe
in Western civilization and in its moral
power. I believe deeply in the principles
the West esteems. And guided by these
ideals, I believe we can find a no-
nonsense, workable, and lasting policy
that will keep the peace.

Earlier I said that the German peo-
ple had built a remarkable cathedral of
democracy. But we still have other work
ahead. We must build a cathedral of
peace, where nations are safe from war
and where people need not fear for their
liberties. I've heard the history of the
famous cathedral at Cologne— how those
beautiful soaring spires miraculously
survived the destruction all around
them, including part of the church itself.

Let us build a cathedral as the peo-
ple of Cologne built theirs— with the
deepest commitment and determination.
Let us build as they did— not just for
ourselves but for the generations
beyond. For if we construct our peace
properly, it will endure as long as the
spires of Cologne.

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

President Reagan's
Address

Berlin

June 11, 198213

It was one of Germany's greatest sons,
Goethe, who said that "There is strong
shadow where there is much light." In
our times, Berlin, more than any other
place in the world, is such a meeting
place of light and shadow, tyranny and
freedom. To be here is truly to stand on
freedom's edge and in the shadow of a
wall that has come to symbolize all that
is darkest in the world today, to sense
how shining and priceless— and how
much in need of constant vigilance and
protection our legacy of liberty is.

This day marks a happy return for
us. We paid our first visit to this great
city more than 3 years ago, as private
citizens. As with every other citizen to
Berlin or visitor to Berlin, I came away
with a vivid impression of a city that is
more than a place on the map— a city
that is a testament to what is both most
inspiring and most troubling about the
time we live in.

Thomas Mann once wrote that "A
man lives not only his personal life, as
an individual, but aiso, consciously or
unconsciously, the life of his epoch. . . ."
Nowhere is this more true than in Berlin
where each moment of everyday life is
spent against the backdrop of contend-
ing global systems and ideas. To be a
Berliner is to live the great historic
struggle of this age, the latest chapter in
man's timeless quest for freedom.

As Americans, we understand this.
Our commitment to Berlin is a lasting
one. Thousands of our citizens have
served here since the first small con-
tingent of American troops arrived on
July 4, 1945, the anniversary of our in-
dependence as a nation. Americans have
served here ever since— not as con-
querors but as guardians of the freedom
of West Berlin and its brave, proud peo-
ple.

Today I want to pay tribute to my
fellow countrymen, military and civilian,
who serve their country and the people
of Berlin and, in so doing, stand as sen-
tinals of freedom everywhere. I also

July 1982

35

wish to pay my personal respects to the
people of this great city. My visit here
today is proof that this American com-
mitment has been worthwhile. Our free-
dom is indivisible.

The American commitment to Berlin
is much deeper than our military pres-
ence here. In the 37 years since World
War II, a succession of American presi-
dents has made it clear that our role in
Berlin is emblematic of our larger search
for peace throughout Europe and the
world. Ten years ago this month, that
search brought into force the Quadri-
partite Agreement on Berlin. A decade
later, West Berliners live more securely,
can travel more freely, and, most sig-
nificantly, have more contact with
friends and relatives in East Berlin and
East Germany than was possible 10
years ago. These achievements reflect
the realistic approach of allied negotia-
tors who recognized that practical prog-
ress can be made even while basic differ-
ences remain between East and West.

As a result both sides have managed
to handle their differences in Berlin
without the clash of arms to the benefit
of all mankind. The United States re-
mains committed to the Berlin agree-
ment. We will continue to expect strict
observance and full implementation in
all aspects of this accord, including those
which apply to the eastern sector of
Berlin. But if we are heartened by the
partial progress achieved in Berlin,
other developments made us aware of
the growing military power and expan-
sionism of the Soviet Union.

Challenge for Peace

Instead of working with the West to
reduce tensions and erase the danger of
war, the Soviet Union is engaged in the
greatest military buildup in the history
of the world. It has used its new-found
might to ruthlessly pursue its goals
around the world. As the sad case of
Afghanistan proves, the Soviet Union
has not always respected the precious
right of national sovereignty it is com-
mitted to uphold as a signatory of the
U.N. Charter. And only 1 day's auto ride
from here, in the great city of Warsaw,
a courageous people suffer because they
dare to strive for the very fundamental

36

human rights which the Helsinki Final
Act proclaimed.

The citizens of free Berlin appreciate
better than anyone the importance of
allied unity in the face of such chal-
lenges. Ten years after the Berlin agree-
ment, the hope it engendered for lasting
peace remains a hope rather than a cer-
tainty. But the hopes of free people— be
they German or American— are stubborn
things. We will not be lulled or bullied
into fatalism, into resignation. We
believe that progress for just and lasting
peace can be made— that substantial
areas of agreement can be reached with
potential adversaries— when the forces
of freedom act with firmness, unity, and
a sincere willingness to negotiate.

To succeed at the negotiating table,
we allies have learned that a healthy
military balance is a necessity. Yester-
day, the other NATO heads of govern-
ment and I agreed that it is essential to
preserve and strengthen such a military
balance. And let there be no doubt: The
United States will continue to honor its
commitment to Berlin. Our forces will
remain here as long as necessary to
preserve the peace and protect the free-
dom of the people of Berlin. For us the
American presence in Berlin, as long as
it is needed, is not a burden. It is a
sacred trust.

Ours is a defensive mission. We pose
no threat to those who live on the other
side of the wall. But we do extend a
challenge— a new Berlin initiative to the
leaders of the Soviet bloc. It is a chal-
lenge for peace. We challenge the men
in the Kremlin to join with us in the
quest for peace, security, and a lowering
of the tensions and weaponry that could
lead to future conflict.

We challenge the Soviet Union, as
we proposed last year, to eliminate their
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. If
President Brezhnev agrees to this, we
stand ready to forego all of our ground-
launched cruise missiles and Pershing II
missiles.

We challenge the Soviet Union, as
NATO proposed yesterday, to slash the
conventional ground forces of the War-
saw Pact and NATO in Central Europe
to 700,000 men each and the total
ground and air forces of the two
alliances to 900,000 men each. And we

challenge the Soviet Union to live up to
its signature its leader placed on the
Helsinki treaty so that the basic human
rights of Soviet and East European pei
pie will be respected.

A positive response to these sincert
and reasonable points from the Soviets,
these calls for conciliation instead of
confrontation, could open the door for ;
conference on disarmament in Europe.
We Americans are optimists, but we ar
also realists. We're a peaceful people,
but we're not a weak or gullible people.
So we look with hope to the Soviet
Union's response. But we expect positiv
actions rather than rhetoric as the first
proof of Soviet good intentions. We ex-
pect that the response to my Berlin initg
ative for peace will demonstrate finally
that the Soviet Union is serious about
working to reduce tensions in other
parts of the world as they have been
able to do here in Berlin.

Reducing Human Barriers

Peace, it has been said, is more than th'
absence of armed conflict. Reducing mill
tary forces alone will not automatically
guarantee the long-term prospects for
peace. Several times in the 1950s and
1960s the world went to the brink of
war over Berlin. Those confrontations
did not come because of military forces
or operations alone. They arose because
the Soviet Union refused to allow the
free flow of peoples and ideas between
East and West. And they came because
the Soviet authorities and their minionS'
repressed millions of citizens in Eastern
Germany who did not wish to live under
a Communist dictatorship.

So I want to concentrate the second
part of America's new Berlin initiative
on ways to reduce the human barriers-
barriers as bleak and brutal as the
Berlin Wall itself— which divide Europe
today. If I had only one message to urg'
on the leaders of the Soviet bloc, it
would be this: think of your own coming
generations. Look with me 10 years intc
the future when we will celebrate the
20th anniversary of the Berlin agree-
ment. What then will be the fruits of ou;
efforts? Do the Soviet leaders want to b>
remembered for a prison wall, ringed
with barbed wire and armed guards
whose weapons are aimed at innocent

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

to

Europe

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civilians— their own civilians? Do they
want to conduct themselves in a way
that will earn only the contempt of free
peoples and the distrust of their own
citizens? Or do they want to be remem-
bered for having taken up our offer to
rri use Berlin as a starting point for true
efforts to reduce the human and political
divisions which are the ultimate cause of
every war.

We in the West have made our
choice. America and our allies welcome
peaceful competition in ideas, in eco-
nomics, and in all facets of human activi-
ty. We seek no advantage. We covet no
territory. And we wish to force no
ideology or way of life on others.

The time has come, 10 years after
the Berlin agreement, to fulfill the prom-
ise it seemed to offer at its dawn. I call
oil on President Brezhnev to join me in a
q sincere effort to translate the dashed
hopes of the 1970s into the reality of a
safer and freer Europe in the 1980s.
I am determined to assure that our

civilization averts the catastrophe of a
nuclear war. Stability depends primarily
on the maintenance of a military balance
which offers no temptation to an ag-
gressor. And the arms control proposals
which I have made are designed to
enhance deterrence and achieve stability
at substantially lower and equal force
levels. At the same time, other measures
might be negotiated between the United
States and the Soviet Union to reinforce
the peace and help reduce the possibility
of a nuclear conflict. These include
measures to enhance mutual confidence
and to improve communication both in
time of peace and in a crisis.

Past agreements have created a hot
line between Moscow and Washington,
established measures to reduce the
danger of nuclear accidents, and provid-
ed for notification of some missile
launches. We are now studying other

A visit to the Berlin Wall with the govern-
ing Mayor of Berlin Richard von Weiz-
saecker and Chancellor Schmidt.

concrete and practical steps to help fur-
ther reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict
which I intend to explore with the
Soviet Union.

It is time we went further to avert
the risk of war through accidents or mis-
understanding. We shortly will approach
the Soviet Union with proposals in such
areas as notification of strategic exer-
cises, of missile launches, and expanded
exchange of strategic forces data. Taken
together, these steps would represent a
qualitative improvement in the nuclear
environment. They would help reduce
: the chances of misinterpretation in the
case of exercises and test launches. And
they would reduce the secrecy and am-
biguity which surround military activity.
We are considering additional measures
as well.

We will be making these proposals
in good faith to the Soviet Union. We
hope that their response to this Berlin
initiative, so appropriate to a city that is
acutely conscious of the costs and risks
of war, will be positive.

A united, resolute Western alliance
stands ready to defend itself if
necessary. But we are also ready to
work with the Soviet bloc in peaceful
cooperation if the leaders of the East
are willing to respond in kind.

Let them remember the message of
Schiller that only "He who has done his
best for his own time has lived for all
times." Let them join with us in our time
to achieve a lasting peace and a better
life for tomorrow's generations on both
sides of that blighted wall. And let the
Brandenburg Gate become a symbol not
of two separate and hostile worlds but
an open door through which ideas, free
ideas, and peaceful competition flourish.

My final message is for the people of
Berlin. Even before my first visit to

tiiJuly1982

37

your city, I felt a part of you, as all free
men and women around the world do.
We lived through the blockade and air-
lift with you. We witnessed the heroic
reconstruction of a devastated city and
we watched the creation of your strong
democratic institutions.

When I came here in 1978, I was
deeply moved and proud of your success.
What finer proof of what freedom can
accomplish than the vibrant, prosperous
island you've created in the midst of a
hostile sea? Today, my reverence for
your courage and accomplishment has
grown even deeper.

You are a constant inspiration for us
all — for our hopes and ideals and for the
human qualities of courage, endurance,
and faith that are the one secret weapon
of the West no totalitarian regime can
ever match. As long as Berlin exists,
there can be no doubt about the hope for
democracy.

Yes, the hated wall still stands. But
taller and stronger than that bleak bar-
rier dividing East from West, free from
oppressed, stands the character of the
Berliners themselves. You have endured
in your spendid city on the Spree, and
my return visit has convinced me, in the
words of the beloved old song that
"Berlin bleibt doch Berlin" — Berlin is
still Berlin.

We all remember John Kennedy's
stirring words when he visited Berlin. I
can only add that we in America and in
the West are still Berliners, too, and
always will be. And I am proud to say
today that it is good to be home again.

President Reagan's
Remarks

Bonn

June 11. 1982^^

President Reagan. Nancy and I are
grateful for the warmth and the friend-
ship that v/e have encountered through-
out our short visits to Bonn and Berlin.
In BerUn, this morning, I looked across
that tragic Wall and saw the grim conse-
quences of freedom denied. But I was
deeply inspired by the courage and
dedication to liberty which I saw in so
many faces on the western side of that
city.

The purpose of my trip to Bonn was
to consult both with leaders of the Ger-
man Government and our colleagues
from other nations. Both aspects of the
visit have been a great success. We
didn't seek to avoid the problems facing
the West in the coming years. We met
them head-on and discovered that, as
always, what unites us is much deeper
and more meaningful than any dif-
ferences which might exist.

We leave with renewed optimism
about the future of the Western world.
We also leave with a very warm feeling
about the people of Bonn, Berlin, and
the Federal Republic.

Diplomacy is important, but friend-
ship leaves an even more lasting impres-
sion. Your friendship for us has been an
especially moving experience. Nancy and
I are personally very touched by your
hospitality. We know, however, that this
greeting was meant not only for us but
for the entire American people.

These trips, these meetings, have
been arduous, they have been long,
they've been tiring to all of us. But I
think they've been successful. Here, to-
day, is an evidence of why they have to
be successful — because what was at
issue and what is at stake in all that we
were trying to accomplish in those
meetings is visible here in these young
people. We must deliver to them a world

of opportunity and peace. [Applause]
With that as a goal and with that as our
inspiration, we cannot fail.

German-American friendship is truly
one of the lasting foundations of
Western cooperation and peace and
freedom in the world. This visit has con-
vinced me that ours is a friendship that
cannot be shaken.

I thank you all from the bottom of
my heart. Good-bye and until we meet
again, auf wiedersehen.

'Texts from press releases issued by the
White House. The Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 7 and 14,
1982, contain all material relating to the
President's participation in the two summits.

^Made following the President's meeting
with President Mitterrand, the Press Center,
Meridien Hotel. Press release 189 of June 11,
1982.

^Exchange of toasts made at reception
and dinner hosted by U.S. Ambassador
Galbraith.

*Made following meetings between Presi-
dent Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister
Suzuki, and President Reagan and British
Prime Minister Thatcher, press center, Meri-
dien Hotel. Press release 191 of June 16,
1982

f'Taped May 31, 1982, at the White House
for French television and released 12:00 p.m.
Paris time and 6:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight
Time.

'Made in the Papal Library, The Vatican.

'Made in the Room of Mirrors, Quirinale
Palace.

"Released in London.

'Made to members of both Houses of
Parliament, the Palace of Westminster.

'"Made at State Dinner hosted by Her
Majesty the Queen, Windsor Castle.

"Made at breakfast meeting hosted by
Prime Minister Thatcher at 10 Downing
Street.

'^Made to the Bundestag, The
Bundeshaus, Bonn.

"Made to the people of Berllin, Charlot-
tenburg Palace.

'*Made upon departure from Germany,
Cologne/Bonn Airport. ■

38

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

An Agenda for Peace

President Reagan's address to the
Second U.N. General Assembly's Special
Session on Disarmament held in New
York on June 17, 1982.^

I speak today as both a citizen of the
United States and of the world. I come
with the heartfelt wishes of my people
for peace, bearing honest proposals, and
looking for genuine progress.

Dag Hammarskjold said 24 years
ago this month, "We meet in a time of
peace which is no peace." His words are
as true today as they were then. More
than 100 disputes have disturbed the
peace among nations since World War
II, and today the threat of nuclear
disaster hangs over the lives of all our
peoples. The Bible tells us there will be a
time for peace, but so far this century
mankind has failed to find it.

The United Nations is dedicated to
world peace and its charter clearly pro-
hibits the international use of force. Yet,
the tide of belligerence continues to rise.
The charter's influence has weakened
even in the 4 years since the first
Special Session on Disarmament. We
must not only condemn aggression, we
must enforce the dictates of our charter
and resume the struggle for peace.

The record of history is clear: Citi-
zens of the United States resort to force
reluctantly and only when they must.
Our foreign policy, as President Eisen-
hower once said, ". . . is not difficult to
state. We are for peace, first, last, and
always, for very simple reasons. We
know that it is only in a peaceful atmo-
sphere, a peace with justice, one in
which we can be confident, that America
can prosper as we have known prosperi-
ty in the past."

To those who challenge the truth of
those words let me point out that at the
end of World War II, we were the only
undamaged industrial power in the
world. Our military supremacy was un-
questioned. We had harnessed the atom
and had the ability to unleash its de-
structive force anywhere in the world.
In short, we could have achieved world
domination, but that was contrary to the
character of our people.

Instead, we wrote a new chapter in
the history of mankind. We used our
power and wealth to rebuild the war-
ravaged economies of the world, both
East and West, including those nations

who had been our enemies. We took the
initiative in creating such international
institutions as this United Nations,
where leaders of goodwill could come to-
gether to build bridges for peace and
prosperity.

America has no territorial ambitions,
we occupy no countries, and we have
built no walls to lock our people in. Our
commitment to self-determination, free-
dom, and peace is the very soul of
America. That commitment is as strong
today as it ever was.

The United States has fought four
wars in my lifetime. In each we strug-
gled to defend freedom and democracy.
We were never the aggressors. Ameri-
ca's strength and, yes, her military
power have been a force for peace, not
conquest; for democracy, not despotism;
for freedom, not tyranny.

Watching, as I have, succeeding
generations of American youth bleed
their lives onto far-flung battlefields to
protect our ideals and secure the rule of
law, I have known how important it is to
deter conflict. But since coming to the
Presidency, the enormity of the respon-
sibility of this ofl5ce has made my com-
mitment even deeper. I believe that re-
sponsibility is shared by all of us here to-
day.

On our recent trip to Europe, my
wife Nancy told me of a bronze statue,
22 feet high, that she saw on a cliff on
the coast of France. The beach at the
base of that cliff is called Saint Laurent,
but countless American families have it
written in the flyleaf of their Bibles and
know it as Omaha Beach. The pastoral
quiet of that French countryside is in
marked contrast to the bloody violence
that took place there on a June day 38
years ago when the allies stormed the
Continent. At the end of just 1 day of
battle, 10,500 Americans were wounded,
missing, or killed in what became known
as the Normandy landing.

The statue atop that cliff is called
"The Spirit of American Youth Rising
From the Waves." Its image of sacrifice
is almost too powerful to describe. The
pain of war is still vivid in our national
memory. It sends me to this special ses-
sion of the United Nations eager to com-
ply with the plea of Pope Paul VI when
he spoke in this chamber nearly 17 years
ago. "If you want to be brothers," His
Holiness said, "let the arms fall from
your hands."

We Americans yearn to let them go.
But we need more than mere words,
more than empty promises, before we
can proceed. We look around the world
and see rampant conflict and aggression.
There are many sources of this
conflict — expansionist ambitions, local
rivalries, the striving to obtain justice
and security. We must all work to
resolve such discords by peaceful means
and to prevent them from escalation.

The Soviet Record

In the nuclear era, the major powers
bear a special responsibility to ease
these sources of conflict and to refrain
from aggression. And that's why we're
so deeply concerned by Soviet conduct.
Since World War II, the record of tyran-
ny has included Soviet violation of the
Yalta agreements leading to domination
of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the
Berlin Wall — a grim, gray monument to
repression that I visited just a week ago.
It includes the takeovers of Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan and
the ruthless repression of the proud peo-
ple of Poland. Soviet-sponsored guer-
rillas and terrorists are at work in Cen-
tral and South America, in Africa, the
Middle East, in the Caribbean, and in
Europe, violating human rights and un-
nerving the world with violence. Com-
munist atrocities in Southeast Asia,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere continue to
shock the free world as refugees escape
to tell of their horror.

The decade of so-called detente wit-
nessed the most massive Soviet buildup
of military power in history. They in-
creased their defense spending by 40%
while American defense spending actual-
ly declined in the same real terms.
Soviet aggression and support for
violence around the world have eroded
the confidence needed for arms negotia-
tions. While we exercised unilateral re-
straint, they forged ahead and, today,
possess nuclear and conventional forces
far in excess of an adequate deterrent
capability.

Soviet oppression is not limited to
the countries they invade. At the very
time the Soviet Union is trying to ma-
nipulate the peace movement in the
West, it is stifling a budding peace
movement at home. In Moscow, banners
are scuttled, buttons are snatched, and
demonstrators are arrested when even a
few people dare to speak about their
fears.

Eleanor Roosevelt, one of our first
ambassadors to this body, reminded us
that the high-sounding words of tyrants

July 1982

THE PRESIDENT

stand in bleak contradiction to their
deeds. "Their promises," she said, "are in
deep contrast to their performances."

U.S. Leadership in Disarmament
and Arms Control Proposals

My countrymen learned a bitter lesson
in this century: The scourge of tyranny
cannot be stopped with words alone. So,
we have embarked on an effort to renew
our strength that had fallen dangerously
low. We refuse to become weaker while
potential adversaries remain committed
to their imperialist adventures.

My people have sent me here today
to speak for them as citizens of the
world, which they truly are, for we
Americans are drawn from every na-
tionality represented in this chamber to-
day. We understand that men and
women of every race and creed can and
must work together for peace. We stand
ready to take the next steps down the
road of cooperation through verifiable
arms reduction. Agreements on arms
control and disarmament can be useful
in reinforcing peace, but they're not
magic. We should not confuse the sign-
ing of agreements with the solving of
problems. Simply collecting agreements

• In 1955, President Eisenhower
made his "open skies" proposal, under
which the United States and the Soviet
Union would have exchanged blueprints
of military establishments and provided
for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets
rejected this plan.

• In 1963, the Limited Test Ban
Treaty came into force. This treaty end-
ed nuclear weapons testing in the atmos-
phere, outer space, or underwater by
participating nations.

• In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-
Froliferation of Nuclear Weapons took
effect. The United States played a major
role in this key effort to prevent the
spread of nuclear explosives and to pro-
vide for international safeguards on civil
nuclear activities. My country remains
deeply committed to those objectives to-
day and to strengthening the nonpro-
liferation framework. This is essential to
international security.

• In the early 1970s, again at U.S.
urging, agreements were reached be-
tween the United States and the
U.S.S.R. providing for ceilings on some
categories of weapons. They could have
been more meaningful if Soviet actions
had shown restraint and commitment to
stability at lower levels of force.

We understand that men and women of every
race and creed can and must work together for
peace. We stand ready to take the next steps down
the road of cooperation through verifiable arms
reduction. Agreements on arms control and disar-
mament can be useful in reinforcing peace, but
they're not magic.

will not bring peace. Agreements genu-
inely reinforce peace only when they are
kept. Otherwise, we are building a paper
castle that will be blown away by the
winds of war. Let me repeat, we need
deeds, not words, to convince us of
Soviet sincerity should they choose to
join us on this path.

Since the end of World War II, the
United States has been the leader in
serious disarmament and arms control
proposals.

• In 1946, in what became known as
the Baruch Plan, the United States sub-
mitted a proposal for control of nuclear
weapons and nuclear energy by an inter-
national authority. The Soviets rejected
this plan.

40

An Agenda for Peace

The United Nations designated the
1970s as the First Disarmament Decade,
but good intentions were not enough. In
reality, that 10-year period included an
unprecedented buildup in military
weapons and the flaring of aggression
and use of force in almost every region
of the world. We are now in the Second
Disarmament Decade. The task at hand
is to assure civilized behavior among
nations, to unite behind an agenda for
peace.

Over the past 7 months, the United
States has put forward a broad-based
comprehensive series of proposals to

reduce the risk of war. We have pro-
posed four major points as an agenda
for peace:

• Elimination of land-based inter-
mediate-range missiles;

• A one-third reduction in strategic
ballistic missile warheads;

• A substantial reduction in NATO
and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces;
and

• New safeguards to reduce the risk
of accidental war.

We urge the Soviet Union today to
join with us in this quest. We must act
not for ourselves alone but for all man-
kind.

On November 18 of last year, I an-
nounced U.S. objectives in arms control
agreements: They must be equitable and
militarily significant, they must stabilize
forces at lower levels, and they must be
verifiable.

The United States and its allies have
made specific, reasonable, and equitable
proposals. In February, our negotiating
team in Geneva offered the Soviet Union
a draft treaty on intermediate-range
nuclear forces. We offered to cancel
deployment of our Pershing II ballistic
missiles and ground-launched cruise
missiles in exchange for Soviet elimina-
tion of their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5
missiles. This proposal would eliminate,
with one stroke, those systems about
which both sides have expressed the
greatest concern.

The United States is also looking
forward to beginning negotiations on
strategic arms reductions with the
Soviet Union in less than 2 weeks. We
will work hard to make these talks an
opportunity for real progress in our
quest for peace.

On May 9, I announced a phased ap-
proach to the reduction of strategic
arms. In a first phase, the number of
ballistic missile warheads on each side
would be reduced to about 5,000. No
more than half the remaining warheads
would be on land-based missiles. All bal-
listic missiles would be reduced to an
equal level at about one-half the current
U.S. number.

In the second phase, we would
reduce each side's overall destructive
power to equal levels, including a mutual
ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight
below the current U.S. level. We are
also prepared to discuss other elements
of the strategic balance.

Before I returned from Europe last
week, I met in Bonn with the leaders of

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
We agreed to introduce a major new
Western initiative for the Vienna negoti-
' ations on mutual balanced force reduc-
tions. Our approach calls for common
collective ceilings for both NATO and
the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After
7 years, there would be a total of
700,000 ground forces and 900,000
ground and air force personnel com-
bined. It also includes a package of
associated measures to encourage co-
operation and verify compliance.

We urge the Soviet Union and
members of the Warsaw Pact to view
our Western proposal as a means to
reach agreement in Vienna after 9 long
years of inconclusive talks. We also urge
them to implement the 1975 Helsinki
agreement on security and cooperation
in Europe.

Let me stress that for agreements
to work, both sides must be able to veri-
fy compliance. The building of mutual
confidence in compliance can only be
achieved through greater openness. I en-
courage the Special Session on Disarma-
ment to endorse the importance of these
principles in arms control agreements.

I have instructed our representatives
at the 40-nation Committee on Disarma-
ment to renew emphasis on verification
and compliance. Based on a U.S. pro-
posal, a committee has been formed to
examine these issues as they relate to
restrictions on nuclear testing. We are
also pressing the need for effective veri-
fication provisions in agreements ban-
ning chemical weapons.

The use of chemical and biological
weapons has long been viewed with re-
vulsion by civilized nations. No peace-
making institution can ignore the use of
these dread weapons and still live up to
its mission. The need for a truly effec-
tive and verifiable chemical weapons
agreement has been highlighted by re-
cent events. The Soviet Union and their
allies are violating the Geneva Protocol
of 1925, related rules of international
law, and the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention. There is conclusive evidence
that the Soviet Government has provid-
ed toxins for use in Laos and Kampu-
chea and are themselves using chemical
weapons against freedom fighters in
Afghanistan.

We have repeatedly protested to the
Soviet Government, as well as the
governments of Laos and Vietnam, their
use of chemical and toxin weapons. We
call upon them now to grant full and

free access to their countries or to ter-
ritories they control so that U.N. ex-
perts can conduct an effective, independ-
ent investigation to verify cessation of
these horrors.

Evidence of noncompliance with ex-
isting arms control agreements under-
scores the need to approach negotiation
of any new agreements with care. The
democracies of the West are open
societies. Information on our defenses is
available to our citizens, our elected
officials, and the world. We do not hesi-
tate to inform potential adversaries of
our military forces and ask in return for
the same information concerning theirs.
The amount and type of military spend-
ing by a country are important for the
world to know, as a measure of its in-
tentions, and the threat that country
may pose to its neighbors. The Soviet
Union and other closed societies go to
extraordinary lengths to hide their true
military spending not only from other
nations but from their own people. This
practice contributes to distrust and fear
about their intentions.

Today, the United States proposes
an international conference on military
expenditures to build on the work of this
body in developing a common system for
accounting and reporting. We urge the
Soviet Union, in particular, to join this
effort in good faith, to revise the uni-
versally discredited official figures it
publishes, and to join with us in giving
the world a true account of the re-
sources we allocate to our armed forces.

Last Friday in Berlin, I said that I
would leave no stone unturned in the
effort to reinforce peace and lessen the
risk of war. It's been clear to me that
steps should be taken to improve mutual
communication and confidence and
lessen the likelihood of misinterpreta-
tion.

I have, therefore, directed the ex-
ploration of ways to increase under-
standing and communication between
the United States and the Soviet Union
in times of peace and of crisis. We will
approach the Soviet Union with pro-
posals for reciprocal exchanges in such
areas as advance notification of major
strategic exercises that otherwise might
be misinterpreted; advance notification
of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile] launches within, as well as
beyond, national boundaries; and an ex-
panded exchange of strategic forces
data.

While substantial information on
U.S. activities and forces in these areas
already is provided, I believe that jointly
and regularly sharing information would
represent a qualitative improvement in
the strategic nuclear environment and
would help reduce the chance of mis-
understandings. I call upon the Soviet
Union to join the United States in ex-
ploring these possibilities to build con-
fidence, and I ask for your support of
our efforts.

Call for International Support

One of the major items before this con-
ference is the development of a compre-
hensive program of disarmament. We
support the effort to chart a course of
realistic and effective measures in the
quest for peace. I have come to this hall
to call for international recommitment to
the basic tenet of the U.N. Charter-
that all members practice tolerance and
live together in peace as good neighbors
under the rule of law, forsaking armed
force as a means of settling disputes be-
tween nations. America urges you to
support the agenda for peace that I have
outlined today. We ask you to reinforce
the bilateral and multilateral arms con-
trol negotiations between members of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to re-
dedicate yourselves to maintaining inter-
national peace and security and remov-
ing threats to peace.

We, who have signed the U.N.
Charter, have pledged to refrain from
the threat or use of force against the
territory or independence of any state.
In these times when more and more law-
less acts are going unpunished— as some
members of this very body show a grow-
ing disregard for the U.N. Charter— the
peace-loving nations of the world must
condemn aggression and pledge again to
act in a way that is worthy of the ideals
that we have endorsed. Let us finally
make the charter live.

In late spring, 37 years ago, repre-
sentatives of 50 nations gathered on the
other side of this continent, in the San
Francisco Opera House. The League of
Nations had crumbled and World War II
still raged, but those men and nations
were determined to find peace. The
result was this charter for peace that is
the framework of the United Nations.

President Harry Truman spoke of
the revival of an old faith— the ever-
lasting moral force of justice prompting
that U.N. conference. Such a force re-
mains strong in America and in other

July 1982

41

THE PRESIDENT

countries where speech is free and citi-
zens have the right to gather and make
their opinions known.

President Truman said, "If we
should pay merely lip service to inspir-
ing ideals, and later do violence to sim-
ple justice, we would draw down upon
us the bitter wrath of generations yet
unborn." Those words of Harry Truman
have special meaning for us today as we
live with the potential to destroy civiliza-
tion.

"We must learn to live together in
peace," he said. "We must build a new
world— a far better world."

What a better world it would be if
the guns were silent; if neighbor no
longer encroached on neighbor and all
peoples were free to reap the rewards of
their toil and determine their own
destiny and system of government-
whatever their choice.

During my recent audience with His
Holiness Pope John Paul H, I gave him
the pledge of the American people to do
everything possible for peace and arms
reduction. The American people believe
forging real and lasting peace to be their
sacred trust.

Let us never forget that such a
peace would be a terrible hoax if the
world were no longer blessed with free-
dom and respect for human rights. The
United Nations, Hammarskjold said, was
born out of the cataclysms of war. It
should justify the sacrifices of all those
who have died for freedom and justice.
"It is our duty to the past," Hammar-
skjold said, "and it is our duty to the
future, so to serve both our nations and
the world."

As both patriots of our nations and
the hope of all the world, let those of us
assembled here in the name of peace
deepen our understandings, renew our
commitment to the rule of law, and take
new and bolder steps to calm an uneasy
world. Can any delegate here deny that
in so doing he would be doing what the
people— the rank and file of his own
country or her own country— want him
or her to do?

Isn't it time for us to really repre-
sent the deepest, most heartfelt yearn-
ings of all of our people? Let no nation
abuse this common longing to be free of
fear. We must not manipulate our peo-
ple by playing upon their nightmares;
we must serve mankind through genuine
disarmament. With God's help we can
secure life and freedom for generations
to come.

News Conference of May 13
(Excerpts)

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 21, 1982. 1

42

Four times in my life, I have seen
America plunged into war— twice as
part of tragic global conflicts that cost
the lives of millions. Living through that
experience has convinced me that
America's highest mission is to stand as
a leader among the free nations in the
cause of peace. And that's why, hand-in-
hand with our efforts to restore a credi-
ble national defense, my Administration
has been actively working for a reduc-
tion in nuclear and conventional forces
that can help free the world from the
threat of destruction.

In Geneva, the United States is now
negotiating with the Soviet Union on a
proposal I set forward last fall to reduce
drastically the level of nuclear armament
in Europe. In Vienna, we and our NATO
allies are negotiating with the Warsaw
Pact over ways to reduce conventional
forces in Europe.

Last Sunday, I proposed a far-
reaching approach to nuclear arms con-
trol— a phased reduction in strategic
weapons beginning with those that are
most dangerous and destabilizing — the
warheads on ballistic missiles, and
especially those on intercontinental
ballistic missiles.

Today, the United States and the
Soviet Union each have about 7,500
nuclear warheads poised on missiles that
can reach their targets in a matter of
minutes. In the first phase of negotia-
tions, we want to focus on lessening this
imminent threat. We seek to reduce the
number of ballistic missile warheads to
about 5,000 — one-third less than today's
levels, limit the number of warheads on
land-based missiles to half that number,
and cut the total number of all ballistic
missiles to an equal level— about one-
half that of the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we'll seek
reductions to equal levels of throw-
weight — a critical indicator of overall
destructive potential of missiles. To be
acceptable, a new arms agreement with
the Soviets must be balanced, equal, and
verifiable. And most important, it must
increase stability and the prospects of
peace.

I have already written President
Brezhnev and instructed Secretary Haig
to approach the Soviet Government so
that we can begin START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks] talks at the
earliest opportunity. And we hope that
these negotiations can begin by the end

of June and hope to hear from President
Brezhnev in the near future.

Reaching an agreement with the
Soviets will not be short or easy work.
We know that from the past. But I
believe that the Soviet people and their
leaders understand the importance of
preventing war. And I believe that a
firm, forthright American position on
arms reductions can bring us closer to a
settlement.

Tonight, I want to renew my pledge
to the American people and to the peo-
ple of the world that the United States
will do everything we can to bring such
an agreement about.

Q. If wiping out the nuclear threat
is so important to the world, why do
you choose to igfnore 7 long years of
negotiations in which two Republican
Presidents played a part? I speak of
SALT II. We abide by the terms the
Soviet Union does; why not push for a
ratification of that treaty as a first
step and then go on to START?

A. I remind you that a Democratic-
controlled Senate refused to ratify it.
And the reason for refusing to ratify, I
think, is something we can't —

Q. —Republican Senate now.

A. But we can't ignore that. The
reason why it was refused ratifica-
tion— SALT stands for strategic arms
limitation. And the limitation in that
agreement would allow, in the life of the
treaty, for the Soviet Union to just
about double their present nuclear
capability. It would allow — and does
allow us — to increase ours. In other
words, it simply legitimizes an arms
race.

The parts that we're observing of
that have to do with the monitoring of
each other's weaponry; so both sides are
doing that. What we're striving for is to
reduce the power, the number — and par-
ticularly those destabilizing missiles that
can be touched off by the push of a but-
ton— to reduce the number of those.
There just is no ratio between that and
what SALT was attempting to do. I
think SALT was the wrong course to
follow.

Q. You may know that former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
said yesterday that your approach

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

might take far longer than the 7 years
it took to require— to negotiate SALT
II. What sort of time frame do you an-
ticipate it would take to negotiate
these limits on warheads?

A. I don't know that you could pro-
ject a time frame on that, when you look
back at the history all the way back to
the end of World War II with the Soviet
Union on the negotiations. But I do
think there is one thing present now
that was not present before, and that is
the determination of the United States
to rebuild its national defenses. The very
fact that we have shown the will and are
going forward on the rebuilding pro-
gram is something that, I think, offers
an inducement to the Soviet Union to
come to that table and legitimately
negotiate with us.

In the past several years, those
negotiations took place with them hav-
ing a superiority over us and us actually
unilaterally disarming. Every time some-
one wanted a little more money for
another program, they took it away
from defense. That isn't true anymore.

Q. There have been calls in recent
days for the United States to renounce
the existing NATO treaty policy under
which we would retaliate against the
Soviets with nuclear weapons if they
attack Western Europe with conven-
tional arms. Under what conditions
could we pledge that we will never be
the first to introduce nuclear weapons
in any conflict in Western Europe?

A. I just don't think this proposal
that has been made to renounce the first
use of weapons — certainly, there's none
of us who want to see them — but I don't
think that any useful purpose is served
in making such a declaration. Our
nuclear — strategic nuclear weapons, un-
fortunately, are the only balance or
deterrent that we have to the massive
buildup of conventional arms that the
Soviet Union has on the Western
Front— on the NATO front. This is why,
in Vienna, we're trying to negotiate with
them on a reduction of conventional
arms, also, because they have an over-
powering force there.

Q. What can you tell us about the
progress or lack of progress concern-
ing the negotiated settlement on the
Falkland Islands? Could you explain a
little bit what role the United States
is playing, and if you could elaborate a
little bit about what our situation is
now with respect to other allies in
Latin America and in South America,
since we have so firmly come down on
the side of the British?

July 1982

A. I think there's a tendency on the
part of many of the countries of South
America to feel that their sympathies
are more with Argentina than ours. I
don't think there has been irreparable
damage done. The negotiations continue
to go on. They have been moved to the
United Nations now, and the Secretary
General there is very much involved in
them. This morning, yesterday, in my
talks with President Figueiredo of
Brazil, he, too, is interested and has
volunteered his good offices to try and
help. And all we— those of us who want
to be brokers for a peaceful settle-
ment— can do is stand by and try to be
helpful in that.

There are reports that some of the
issues between the two have been
agreed upon. Basically, it is down to a
situation of withdrawal, of what will be
the interim administration on the island
itself, and what will be the period of
negotiations, then, of what the ultimate
settlement is supposed to be.

Up until now the intransigence had
been on one side, that is, in wanting a
guarantee of sovereignty before the
negotiations took place— which doesn't
make much sense. I understand that
there's been some agreement now on
awaiting negotiations on that. So we'll
continue to hope and pray.

Q. Do you intend to reactivate the
memorandum of understanding with
Israel, and do you believe Egypt
should agree to hold a meeting of the
autonomy talks in Jerusalem?

A. I'm not going to comment on
that last part of the question because we
want to stand by and be of help there,
and this is one to be worked out be-
tween them. But I do have faith that
both President Mubarak and Prime
Minister Begin intend to pursue the
talks in the framework of Camp
David— the autonomy talks— and we
stand by ready to help them.

In the thing that you mentioned that
has temporarily been suspended, we
regretted having to do that, and we look
forward to when that will be imple-
mented again.

Q. What is the United States doing
to keep the peace along the Lebanese
border?

A. With some minor flurries, our
ceasefire has held for 9 months now.
The word we get from both sides is that
they want it to continue, and I could
probably answer your question better
when I get an assessment — I'll be seeing
Ambassador Habib this, I think, Satur-
day.

Q. In your arms proposals, you
focus on a central intercontinental
missile system to the two sides. If the
Soviets were to come back and say
they wanted to talk about bombers,
about cruise missiles, about other
weapons systems, would you be will-
ing to include those, or are those ex-
cluded?

A. No, nothing is excluded. But one
of the reasons for going at the ballistic
missile— that is the one that is the most
destabilizing. That one is the one that is
the most frightening to most people.
And let me just give you a little reason-
ing on that— of my own on that score.

That is the missile sitting in its silo
in which there could be the possibility of
miscalculation. That is the one that peo-
ple know that once that button is
pushed, there is no defense; there is no
recall. And it's a matter of minutes, and
the missiles reach the other country.

Those that are carried in bombers,
those that are carried in ships of one
kind or another, or submersibles— you
are dealing with a conventional type of
weapon or instrument, and those in-
struments can be intercepted. They can
be recalled if there has been a
miscalculation. So they don't have the
same, I think, psychological effect that
the presence of the others have that,
once launched, they're on their way, and
there's no preventing, no stopping them.

Q. There are many arms
specialists, however, who say that the
multiplication of cruise missiles, in
particular, those that can be put on
land, can be put on ships, submarines,
and so forth, also have that same ef-
fect. You can't call them back once
they are launched. They have a very
short flight time, and there will be
thousands of them.

A. They have a much longer flight
time, actually, a matter of hours.
They're not the speed of the ballistic
missiles that go up into space and come
back down again. But this doesn't mean
that we ignore anything. As I said,
we're negotiating now on conventional
weapons.

But I think you start with first
things first. You can't bite it all off in
one bite. So our decision was to start
with the most destabilizing and the most
destructive.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of May 17, 1982. ■

43

THE SECRETARY

Peace and Security in the Middle East

Secretary Haig's address before the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,
Chicago, Illinois, on May 26, 1982^

The Middle East today is a severe
testing ground for constructive
diplomacy. Deeply rooted rivalries and
historic animosities mark its politics.
The region's strategic value as a bridge
linking three continents is amplified by
its vast natural wealth. And in the
nuclear age, the interplay of local and
superpower competition takes on a
special edge of danger.

As a consequence, no other region is
less forgiving of political passivity than
the Middle East. So many interests are
at stake and so many factors are at
work that the alternative to shaping
events is to suffer through them. We are
at such a juncture today. We must shape
events in the Middle East if we are to
continue to hope for a more peaceful in-
ternational order, one characterized by
peoples living in peace and the resolu-
tion of conflicts without resort to force.

Ever since the 1973 war, the daunt-
ing task of achieving peace between the
Arabs and Israel has been among
America's highest priorities. Despite the
reluctance of the American people to ex-
pand their international commitments
during the decade of the 1970s, the ef-
forts of our diplomats were supported
by an increasing volume of economic and
military assistance. Clearly, the safe-
guarding of our interests in the Middle
East through the peace process has
merited and enjoyed both bipartisan sup-
port and popular consensus.

The efforts launched by the United
States in those years have borne
substantial fruit. Two American
presidents and Secretary of State
Kissinger laid the groundwork for pro-
gress through the disengagement
agreements. The Camp David accords
became the living testimony to the vision
of the late President Sadat, Prime
Minister Begin, and President Carter
that the cycle of war and hatred could
be broken. The United States will
always be proud of its crucial role in this
process.

By 1981, however, the challenges to
American policy had multiplied far
beyond the self-evident necessity to pre-
vent another Arab-Israeli war.

• The Soviet Union and its allies in-
creased their influence, particularly

along the sea lanes and vital approaches
to the region. Local conflicts and ambi-
tions ranging from North Africa to the
Horn of Africa, the Yemens to
Afghanistan, offered the context. Arms,
Cuban mercenaries, and Soviet soldiers
themselves in Afghanistan were the in-
struments. The United States seemed
slow to recognize that this pattern of
events was undermining the regional
security of our friends, prospects for
peace, and vital Western interests.

• Iran, a close American ally and a
force for stability in the Persian Gulf,
was convulsed by revolution as the
Islamic republic rejected the diplomacy
and modernizing program of the Shah.
In the face of this upheaval, the United
States found it difficult to pursue its in-
terests or to achieve a constructive rela-
tionship with the new government.
Meanwhile, Iraq invaded Iran. Fueled by
Soviet arms to both countries, this con-
flict threatened ominous consequences
for the future security of the area and
Western interests in the flow of oil.

• The once prosperous and peaceful
State of Lebanon was shattered by civil
conflict and the intervention of outside
forces. Continuous tension sapped the
authority of the Lebanese Government,
aggravated inter-Arab relations, and
threatened to involve Israel and Syria in
war.

• Meanwhile, the peace process
itself had reached a dangerous impasse.
Egypt and Israel were divided over the
role and composition of the multinational
force and observers, crucial to the
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the
peace treaty itself. The negotiations for
Palestinian autonomy were in recess.
The other Arab states, American friends
in Saudi Arabia and Jordan among
them, were opposed to the Camp David
accords and Egypt's peace with Israel.
The Palestinian Arabs themselves were
still adamantly against either joining the
peace process or recognizing explicitly
Israel's right to live in peace.

An American Approach

These developments required an
American approach to the problems of
the Middle East that not only pressed
the peace process forward but also
enlarged the security dimension of our
relations with the states of the area.
Peace and security had to move in

44

parallel. Local leaders understood that
the inevitable risk-taking for peace
would be vitally affected by the strategic
context of the region. Lack of con-
fidence in the United States and fear of
the Soviet Union or radical forces would
paralyze the prospects for progress, not
only in the Arab-Israeli conflict but
other regional problems as well.

Our previous policies had to be
strengthened by building on a consensus
of strategic concern over Soviet and
radical activities that already existed
among our friends in the Middle East. It
was not enough to say that we opposed
Soviet intervention and Soviet proxies.
We had to demonstrate our ability to
protect our friends and to help them to
defend themselves. We had to take in-
itiatives on the peace process and other
regional conflicts that would prevent the
Soviet Union from exploiting local tur-
moil and troublemakers for its own
strategic purposes. In short, the United
States had to be receptive, useful, and
reliable in helping our friends to counter
threats to their security.

The President, therefore, set in mo-
tion a broad-ranging attempt to create
more effective security cooperation in
the Middle East.

• We established a fresh basis for
cooperation with Pakistan, a traditional
American friend, a key state on the
northern tier of the Middle East, and,
with the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, at the front line of danger.

• We have improved relations with
Turkey, a staunch member of NATO
and long a barrier to Soviet expansion.

• We have worked together with
our friends to counter the activities of
Libya in Africa and the Middle East.

In addition, the United States has
sought and will continue to seek prac-
tical arrangements with such countries
as Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Jor-
dan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia that
enhance security. We are also working
with Israel, a strategic ally, to whose
security and qualitative military
superiority we have long been com-
mitted.

In undertaking these efforts, we
recognize that for many countries for-
mal and elaborate security structures
are no longer appropriate. We have not
tried to create interests where none ex-
ist. Though we shall take full account of
local sensitivities, no country can be
given a veto over the pursuit of our best
interests or necessary cooperation with
others.

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

The United States, working with its
local friends despite their sometimes
conflicting concerns, can be a responsive
partner in the achievement of greater
security for all. Our strong naval forces
and the determination of the President
and the American people to improve our
defense posture, despite economic
austerity, are also essential to our
credibility in the Middle East.

Three Issues

Greater cooperation in the field of
security will increase measurably the
confidence that our local friends repose
in the United States. If properly man-
aged, such cooperation reinforces
American diplomacy. And today the
United States must address three issues:
first, the Iraq-Iran war; second, the
autonomy negotiations; and third, the
crisis in Lebanon.

Each of these issues is characterized
by a mixture of danger and opportunity.
Moreover, they have begun already to
affect each other. If we are to succeed
in advancing our goals throughout the
region, then we must coordinate our ap-
proaches to all of them.

First, the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq has

justified its invasion and seizure of
Iranian territory by referring to
longstanding border claims and Iranian
calls for the overthow of its government.
Iran has responded that the 1975
Algiers agreement settled such claims
and accuses Iraq of deliberate aggres-
sion intended to bring down the Islamic
republic. It is clear that disregard for
the principle that international disputes
should be settled peacefully has brought
the region into great danger, with
ominous implications for Western in-
terests.

Both Iran and Iraq, though wealthy
in oil, have been badly drained of vital
resources. There is great risk that the
conflict may spill over into neighboring
states, and it has already aggravated
inter-Arab relations. It may lead to un-
foreseen and far-reaching changes in the
regional balance of power, offering the
Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge
its influence in the process.

The United States does not have
diplomatic relations with either Iraq or
Iran. From the beginning of the war we
have stressed our neutrality. We have
refused and we shall continue to refuse
to allow military equipment under U.S.
controls to be provided to either party.

Neutrality, however, does not mean
that we are indifferent to the outcome.
We have friends and interests that are
endangered by the continuation of

July 1982

hostilities. We are committed to defend-
ing our vital interests in the area. These
interests— and the interests of the
world— are served by the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of all
countries in the Persian Gulf. The
United States, therefore, supports con-
structive efforts to bring about an end
to the fighting and the withdrawal of
forces behind international borders
under conditions that will preserve the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of
both Iran and Iraq. In the weeks ahead,
we shall take a more active role with
other concerned members of the interna-
tional community as efforts are inten-
sified to end this tragic war.

Second, the autonomy negotia-
tions. President Sadat of Egypt, who
gave his life for peace, once described
the barriers to Arab-Israeli peace as
primarily psychological. He recognized
that the profound antagonisms dividing
Arab and Israeli were deeply reinforced
by lasting suspicion. Politics— the art of

Both Iran and Iraq,
though wealthy in oil,
have been badly drained
of vital resources. There
is great risk that the
conflict may spill over
into neighboring states,
and it has already ag-
gravated inter-Arab
relations.

the possible— could succeed only after
psychology— the science of perceptions-
had done its work.

Our initial task was to make sure
that both the psychology and the politics
of the peace process continued. While
we were prepared to take the initative
on the autonomy negotiations, it soon
became evident as the Sinai withdrawal
date approached that the best way to
sustain confidence in the peace process
was to help both Egypt and Israel fulfill
the terms of their peace treaty. After
prolonged American diplomatic effort,
the multinational force and observers
(MFO) was established: It is safeguard-
ing the peace in Sinai today. The Presi-
dent's decision to offer U.S. troops for
the force was a tangible recognition of
the interrelationship between peace and

security. Such a demonstration of our
commitment to the treaty helped to
secure broader participation, including
units from some of our European allies.
This truly multinational peacekeeping
force testifies to international support
for peace.

Only 1 month ago, the final ar-
ragements were put into place. On that
occasion. President Reagan spoke for all
Americans when he praised the courage
of both Egypt and Israel. Sinai, so often
the corridor for armies on the way to
war, was at last a zone of peace. But we
cannot allow the peace process to end in
the desert.

The signatories of the Camp David
accords, of which we are the witness
and full partners, wisely entitled their
work, "A Framework for Peace in the
Middle East." Basing their diplomacy on
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338, which provide for peace be-
tween Israel and all of its neighbors, in-
cluding Jordan and Syria, both Egypt
and Israel were not content to establish
peace only with each other. They
recognized the necessity to go beyond
their bilateral achievement in the search
for a just, comprehensive, and durable
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
They have, therefore, been engaged for
over 3 years, not only in the execution
of the treaty of peace but also in
negotiations aimed eventually at the
resolution of the Palestinian problem in
all its aspects.

These negotiations, known as the
autonomy talks, have been the subject of
much misunderstanding and criticism.
For many Israelis the process threatens
to go too far, leadmg toward a Palestin-
ian state which they fear would deny
Jews access to the historic areas of an-
cient Israel, threaten Israeli security,
and offer the Soviet Union a fresh op-
portunity for influence. For many
Arabs, including until now the Palestin-
ians themselves, autonomy does not
seem to go far enough. In their view, it
is only a formula for an Israeli domina-
tion that they resist and they fear will
lead to further radicalization of the en-
tire region. Israeli settlement activities
in the occupied territories have exacer-
bated these fears.

We must all face the reality that
autonomy in and of itself cannot entirely
alleviate the fears on either side. But we
should also realize that autonomy is only
one stage of a process: It is an oppor-
tunity, not a conclusion. The beginning
of autonomy actually initiates a transi-
tional period to last no longer than 5
years, in which a freely elected self-
governing authority would replace the

45

THE SECRETARY

Israeli military government and civilian
administration. Futhermore, negotia-
tions are to commence not later than the
third year of the transitional period on
the final status of the West Bank and
Gaza and its relationship with its
neighbors. A peace treaty between
Israel and Jordan is also an objective of
this negotiation.

Ample opportunity is provided in
every phase for the participation, in ad-
dition to the present partners in the
peace process, of Jordan and the Palesti-
nian Arabs. These arrangements are to
reflect both the principle of self-
government by the inhabitants and the
legitimate security concerns of all the
parties involved.

The Camp David process, which is
based firmly on U.N. Resolutions 242
and 338, remains the only practical
route toward a more comprehensive
Middle East peace between Israel and
all of its neighbors, including Jordan and
Syria. No other plan provides for move-
ment despite the conflicting interests
and fears of the parties. No other plan

Israelis and Palestinians to work
together. Public statements that fail to
recognize the temporary nature of
autonomy and negotiating positions that
mistake autonomy for final status do
nothing but hinder forward movement.

• Unilateral actions by any party
that attempt to prejudge or bias the
final outcome of the process serve only
to raise suspicions and aggravate rela-
tionships. Truly all of our ultimate hopes
for peace depend in the end upon the
achievement of mutual respect and
friendly relations between Arab and
Israeli. A heavy responsibility wOl be
borne by those who darken these hopes
without regard for either Israel's long-
term interests or legitimate Palestinian
aspirations.

• Refusal to participate in the talks
by those most affected by the conflict
risks the loss of the best chance for the
achievement of a lasting peace. Fifteen
years have passed since the 1967 war
and the initiation of Israel's military
government over the West Bank and
Gaza. Autonomy is the vital first step in

The peace process has already accomplished
what would have been considered a Utopian fan-
tasy only a few short years ago. But none of us
should he under any illusions. The failure to
negotiate an autonomy agreement, and to negotiate
one soon, will squander the best chance to act in
the best interests of all parties.

embodies so well the necessity for prog-
ress despite the inherent imperfections
of a transitional arrangement. As
Churchill put it, "The maxim — nothing
avails but perfection— spells paralysis."
The United States has been heart-
ened by the public and private declara-
tions of both President Mubarak of
Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of
Israel to press forward toward the early
and successful conclusion of an
autonomy agreement. As we proceed, it
is important that we conduct ourselves
with several considerations in mind.

• Autonomy is transitional, not the
final word. The genius of Camp David
was to provide for the possibility of
progress, despite crucial, unresolved
issues such as the ultimate status of
Jerusalem. These, too, must be
negotiated, but first we must establish a
self-governing authority that will enable

46

the historic opportunity to change this
situation and to begin the painful but
necessary process of resolving the
Palestinian problem. A settlement can-
not be imposed, but peace can be
negotiated. History will judge harshly
those who miss this opportunity.

Despite all of the obstacles confront-
ing a broader Middle East peace, there
has been a change in the polemic over
the Arab-Israeli conflict in recent
months. Many are recognizing at last
that "no war, no peace" is not good
enough. Increasingly, disagreement con-
cerns the terms of peace, not the fact
that peace itself must come.

The United States long has believed
that the risks and sacrifices required for
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict do
not admit of any ambiguity on the basic
issue that genuine peace is the objective.
That is why, for example, we shall

neither recognize nor negotiate with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
until it accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 anc
338, and recognizes Israel's right to live
in peace.

Now is the time to redouble our ef-
forts to make the peace process under
the Camp David framework continue to
work. I have said that great intellectual
ingenuity and political courage will be
required by all parties if an autonomy
agreement is to be reached. Our delega-
tion, led by Ambassador Fairbanks
[special adviser to the Secretary Richan
Fairbanks], will continue to work closelj
with Egypt and Israel as we intensify
our effort to achieve success.

The peace process has already ac-
complished what would have been con-
sidered a Utopian fantasy only a few
short years ago. But none of us should
be under any illusions. The failure to
negotiate an autonomy agreement, and
to negotiate one soon, will squander the
best chance to act in the best interests
of all parties. Inevitably, such a failure
will invite more dangerous alternatives.

Third, and finally, the crisis in
Lebanon. Lebanon today is a focal poin
of danger. All of those conditions are
present in abundance that might be ig-
nited into a war with far-reaching conse
quences. The lives of the people of
Lebanon are at stake. The life of the
state itself is at stake. And the stability
of the region hangs in the balance.

The recent history of Lebanon is a
grim tale. Over the last 6 years, many c
the country's most striking achievement
have been lost. Once stable enough to b-
the center of Middle Eastern finance, it
economy has been wracked by in-
ternecine warfare and foreign interven-
tion. Tragically, Lebanon, once extolled
as a model in a region of suffering
minorities, is now a byword for violence

Lebanon's unique position as a
marketplace for the ideas of the Arab
world has given way instead to a
marketplace for the violent conflicts of
inter-Arab and regional rivalries. Its
representative government has been en-
dangered. The Arab deterrent force,
now consisting entirely of Syrian troops
with its mission to protect the integrity
of Lebanon has not sUibilized the situa-
tion.

The story on the Lebanese-Israeli
border is no different. Once the most
peaceful point of Arab-Israeli contact,
southern Lebanon turned into a bat-
tleground between Israel and the PLO
even as the peace process proceeded. In
this part of the country as well, inter-
communal relations have suffered badly.

L

THE SECRETARY

The central government's authority has
been challenged by the variety and
military strength of contesting groups.
The brave units of the U.N. force, faced
with an enormously difficult and
dangerous task, have saved many lives
but have not succeeded entirely in
establishing the security of daily life.

Over the past year, deteriorating
conditions in Lebanon have required ex-
traordinary efforts to avoid war. In
April of 1981, Ambassador Habib [Presi-
dent's special emissary to the Middle
East Philip C. Habib], at the President's
direction, worked successfully to avoid
military confrontation in Lebanon. His
efforts culminated in the cessation of
hostilities in the Lebanese-Israeli area.
A fragile cease-fire has survived for
more than 10 months. While all parties
remain fundamentally interested in
maintaining it, the danger is ever pre-
sent that violations could escalate into
major hostilities.

These measures have deterred war.
But conflict cannot be managed
perpetually while the problems at the
root of the conflict continue to fester.
The world cannot stand aside, watching
in morbid fascination, as this small na-
tion with its creative and cultured people
slides further into the abyss of violence
and chaos. The time has come to take
concerted action in support of both
Lebanon's territorial integrity within its
internationally recognized borders and a
strong central government capable of
promoting a free, open, democratic, and
traditionally pluralistic society. The
President has, therefore, directed Am-
bassador Habib to return to the Middle
East soon to discuss our ideas for such
action with the cooperation of concerned
states.

America's Moment in the Middle East

The Middle East today is a living
laboratory for the political experiments
of the 20th century. A multitude of na-
tions have emerged from the disintegra-
tion of empires, their dreams of a better
future sustained by memories of a
glorious past. The modern nation-state
has been imposed upon traditions that
transcend both secular loyalties and
well-defined borders. The quest for
modernization competes uneasily with
religious and ethnic identities that long
predate the Industrial Revolution of the
West.

Clearly, the peoples of the Middle
East are embarked upon the most rapid
social transformations in their history.

July 1982

Nonetheless, the past strongly
permeates both their attitudes toward
the future and the texture of their daily
life. The ruins of ancient times remind
them and us that the region has always
played a vital part in the advance of
civilization.

There are other ruins, too, that re-
mind us of another aspect of the Middle
East. Philosophers and artists, mer-
chants and travelers, statesmen and
scholars have made their impact
throughout the ages. But the soldier,
with his vast monuments to destruction,
is perhaps overly represented in the ar-
chaeology of this region. The violence of
war is all too often the point of contact

between the history of the Middle East
and its contemporary struggles.

By the standards of this ancient
region, the United States is a country
still in its infancy. But by virtue of our
power and our interests, our relation-
ships and our objectives, we are uniquely
placed to play a constructive role in
helping the nations of the area in their
quest for peace and security. Now is
America's moment in the Middle East.
As Americans, let us hope to be
remembered by the peoples of the Mid-
dle East not for the monuments of war
but for the works of peace.

iPress release 177.

Peaceful Change in Central America

by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Address given on behalf of Secretary
Haig before the Pittsburgh World Affairs
Council, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on
May 27, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is
Deputy Secretary ofState.^

It is a pleasure to appear here today
before the Pittsburgh World Affairs
Council and to deliver, on behalf of
Secretary Haig, his remarks on "Peace-
ful Change in Central America." I know
how much the Secretary wanted to be
here today himself to deliver this impor-
tant statement, and yet it is the very
theme of his speech — peaceful change —
which necessitates his presence in Wash-
ington today to attend the Organization
of American States' (OAS) special ses-
sion on the Falklands.

As the fighting has grown more in-
tense over the past few days in the
Falklands, diplomatic efforts have been
renewed by several parties. Today's
meeting of the organ of consultation of
the Organization of American States is a
pivotal event in this process, at which
further definition may be given to the
OAS position on this crisis. Owing to the
vital American interests which are in-
volved and to the tragic cost of this
crisis in terms of human life. Secretary
Haig felt it necessary to personally lead
the U.S. delegation to the meeting. His
involvement today is, as it has been
from the outset, an expression of our
willingness to aid in the search for a
peaceful solution to this dispute between
two friends.

As we meet today to discuss our
hemisphere, the war between Great Bri-
tain and Argentina can only cause
Americans the greatest of anguish. We
in the United States must recognize that
much is at stake. Britain is a country to
which we are bound by unique ties of
friendship, values, and alliance. Argen-
tina is an old friend, a country of immi-
grants like our own, with which we
share the adventure of the new world
experience.

For these relationships alone, we
would have been deeply concerned about
the tragic events that began so short a
time ago. But there are additional and
even more compelling reasons for our
anguish. This hemisphere has been more
than just a place to dream of a "new
world": For two generations and more,
it has also been the world's best haven
from war. The inter-American system
and the Rio treaty have contained and
almost eliminated armed conflict among
the states of the Americas. Our neigh-
bors have the lowest rate of expenditure
for arms of any area of the world. These
unique achievements must not be lost.

When two friends are at war with
each other, American policy cannot be
guided simply by friendship. Nor can we
be guided simply by fear that the very
expression of our position will damage
our long-term interests. In this critical
situation, the only sure guide for Ameri-
can action is principle.

The President has set forth as a
basic principle of American foreign
policy that historic change should occur
peacefully and under the rule of law.
The United States favors the peaceful

47

THE SECRETARY

settlement of international disputes
without resort to force or the threat of
force. Only in this way can we advance
in the Western Hemisphere and else-
where toward more free, more peaceful,
and more productive societies.

Our policy toward the South Atlantic
has been designed to support this cen-
tral principle of our foreign policy. If we
disregard it, conflict will continue, creat-
ing an opportunity for the Soviet Union
and its allies to gain the influence they
have long sought. At the request of both
parties we have, therefore, tried hard to
prevent war. We remain ready to help
or to support any realistic diplomatic in-
itiative which will bring a just peace.

The South Atlantic is not the only
place in this hemisphere where the proc-
ess of peaceful change has been
challenged. The peoples of Central
America are confronted by severe
economic and social problems. They
want to remain faithful to the authentic
vision of the Americas — the liberty and
dignity of man. But self-appointed revo-
lutionaries supported by Nicaragua,
Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. are attempting
to manipulate the problems of Central
America in order to impose new dicta-
torships by force. If they should succeed,
peace and progress in the hemisphere
will surely be among the victims.

Despite the efforts of such forces,
the advocates of democratic reform and
international cooperation have recently
registered impressive advances. The
March 28 constituent assembly election
in El Salvador provided a decisive exam-
ple. Neither the local guerrillas nor the
international skeptics prevented the
courageous people of El Salvador from
reaffirming their faith in a democratic
solution to their problems.

El Salvador was not alone. Costa
Rica and Honduras, members with El
Salvador in the Central American Demo-
cratic Community, were resisting suc-
cessfully Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts
to destabilize the region. In January,
Honduras completed its own transition
to democratic rule with the inauguration
of an elected president and legislative
assembly. At the same time, Costa
Rica's 30-year-old democratic tradition
withstood the double shock of hard eco-
nomic times and the political and mili-
tary turmoil of its neighbors.

The democratic experience also ex-
tended to the Dominican Republic and
Colombia. Only 10 days ago, the presi-
dential election in the Dominican Repub-
lic marked a new milestone in that coun-
try's inspiring progress in building
democratic institutions. And despite

48

violence by Cuban-trained guerrillas,
Colombia's voters elected a new legisla-
ture on March 14. They return to the
polls this Sunday to elect a president.

These affirmations of freedom have
reverberated throughout the region and
the world. They demonstrate that
totalitarian victory over democracy in
the Caribbean Basin is far from in-
evitable. Quite to the contrary: 18 of the
25 states in the basin now have govern-
ments elected by the people. Recognition
is growing that armed insurrection and
extremism, whatever the ideology, are
unwanted and unworkable. The security
for every citizen that is essential to
development can be provided best within
the framework of democracy.

America's Responsibility

The United States, as the advocate of
democratic reform and peaceful change,
cannot stand aloof from the challenges
of Central America. Our neighbors' fate
will have far-reaching consequences for
the stability of the region and our hemi-
sphere. The world is watching to see
whether we are careful enough and
determined enough to meet these
challenges.

We can no longer afford our histori-
cal tendency to oscillate between utter
neglect of Central America and direct
intervention. Instead, the United States
must pursue a balanced approach, one
that takes into account the realities of
local conditions but that also appreciates
the regional and global context. We
know that the United States cannot
"cure" Central America's longstanding
problems by itself. Still less does our
policy envisage the use of American
troops, who are neither wanted nor
needed. But we can promote democracy
and reform, while protecting our vital
interests. We can do so if we mount the
sustained political, economic, and securi-
ty cooperation with Central America and
other friends in Latin America that is
demanded by our democratic values and
essential to our own security.

The time has come for Americans to
work with unity and determination
toward the goal of a region at peace
with itself, free from outside threats,
and able to devote its energies to eco-
nomic progress and the development of
democratic political institutions.

Threefold Commitment

What is required of America today is a
threefold commitment to support

democracy, economic development, and
security cooperation in Central America.

First, we must commit ourselves
to the support of democracy in every
country of the area. Democracy is not
an abstract value but an indispensable
means through which political, economic,
and social issues can be addressed in a
peaceful manner. Democratic institutions
offer the chance to redress grievances
and the flexibility to resolve problems in
a rational way before dangerous
pressures explode in violence. And
responsible democratic institutions are
the best protection against the repeated
violation of individual rights.

A key part of our commitment to
democracy must be the determination to
use our influence to help our neighbors
secure the human rights of each of their
citizens. Intimidation, fear, and denial of
liberty are unacceptable barriers to
progress. Only the political framework
of democracy strengthens lasting eco-
nomic and social development.

Second, we must support sus-
tained economic development. Presi-
dent Reagan's Caribbean Basin pro-
posals— developed in concert with Mex-
ico, Canada, Venezuela, and Colombia —
will provide the opportunity for long-
term prosperity to the small economies
of the area. The President's program is
designed to encourage future economic
development by granting duty-free treat
ment to the region's imports, by pro-
viding tax incentives for investment in
the region, and by offering assistance
and training to help the private sector.
Emergency financial assistance is also
provided to relieve critical short-term
pressures. The Caribbean Basin in-
itiative offers hope of a different future
for the region — a better future for so
many who have known only destitution.
We must support this program which is
so much in our own national interest as
well as that of our neighbors.

Third, we must offer our coopera-
tion in security matters. Military train-
ing and supplies can help local forces to
repel guerrilla violence against the
political process, the economic infra-
structure, and national institutions. Cen-
tral American armed forces face a diffi-
cult task against experienced enemies
who receive substantial and sophisti-
cated support from abroad. Their ability
to respond in an effective and discrimi-
nating manner can be increased by our
assistance and training.

THE SECRETARY

Our Priorities

Guided by these reaffirmations of our in-
terest in the freedom, prosperity, and
security of our neighbors, we must set
our priorities for the months ahead. It is
critical that we maintain the momentum
of recent steps toward democracy in El
Salvador. Salvadoran political parties
and the constituent assembly have
shown the ability to make the comprom-
ises necessary to form a government of
reconciliation with a mandate to build a
functioning democracy. Those opposition
elements capable of accommodating to
democracy should seriously consider re-
joining the pohtical process. Now that El
Salvador's civilian and military leaders
have faced the elections and abided by
the results, other governments can also
encourage steps toward national recon-
ciliation which can rally El Salvador's
fragmented society around democratic
standards.

For our part, we will support the
continuation of El Salvador's reforms,
particularly its land reform program.
Considerable confusion has arisen
recently over constituent assembly
legislation affecting this program. We
have been assured that the purpose of
the legislation is to improve agricultural
efficiency while reaffirming the rights of
land-reform beneficiaries. We are watch-
ing the practical effects of this change
very carefully, to see that progress will
continue. Salvadorans should know that
we will support no less. We shall also
look forward to further efforts to curb
abuses of authority by the security
forces, and we shall help to sustain
progress toward the establishment of
democratic institutions. All of these ele-
ments of change are important in fulfill-
ing the desires expressed by the Salva-
doran people so clearly in the elections.

The United States will also help
efforts to facilitate the reentry of dissi-
dent Salvadoran political forces into the
country's democratic life. We shall will-
ingly enter into contacts to facUitate
discussions or negotiations on how to
broaden the democratic process and to
provide an opportunity for those who
can accept democratic rules to reenter
the mainstream. But we will neither en-
dorse nor promote negotiations over
powersharing, which would give the
guerrillas a special place at the bargain-
ing table because they bear arms. This
would defeat the very principle of the
democratic process. It would dishonor
the courage of the Salvadoran people.

Elsewhere in Central America, the
newly elected governments of Costa

Rica and Honduras have embarked upon
tough austerity programs to prevent
economic disaster. At the same time,
they are working to improve their
capacity to prevent terrorist infiltration
from undermining their institutions and
stability. The United States will provide
the economic and security assistance
needed by these countries, and newly in-
dependent Belize as well, to set their
economies back on the road to develop-
ment and to protect their democratic in-
stitutions from attack.

For the first time in years, the
outlook is also promising in Guatemala,
where political development has long
been paralyzed. In the wake of a mili-
tary coup led by young officers, a new
government has pledged to end human
rights abuses, to eliminate corruption,
and to institute a free and open demo-
cratic system. We hope that the steps
already taken toward fulfilling these
commitments will continue and that they
will enable Guatemala to deal more
effectively with its socioeconomic, politi-
cal, and security problems. Cuba's guer-
rilla allies in Guatemala have been con-
sistently unresponsive to the new
government's pleas to lay down their
arms and join in a process of national
reconciliation. But they are unlikely to
gain power by force if Guatemala con-
tinues on its new course of orderly
reform. Now that Guatemala has begun
to change, we must seize this oppor-
tunity to encourage the return to democ-
racy and law through electoral reforms
and safeguards for individual rights.

Our approach to Central America
has focused on those societies embarked
on the road to democratic reform, but
we must also address the problems
posed by Nicaragua. Under the San-
dinistas, Nicaragua has been instrumen-
tal in the campaign to obstruct
democratic progress in El Salvador. We
and other countries have repeatedly ex-
pressed concern over these activities and
developments in Nicaragua itself that
endanger both pluralism and economic
progress.

Marxist-Leninist leaders in Nicar-
agua would have been greatly strength-
ened had El Salvador collapsed this
spring as they predicted. They did more
than just predict it. They sought to in-
sure it by providing arms, propaganda,
and logistical support. Now, in the wake
of the Salvadoran elections, we are ex-
ploring once again whether the Nicar-
aguan leadership is prepared to change
its ways, to cease its intervention in the

affairs of its neighbor, to stop the mili-
tarization of its society, and to fulfill its
promises of pluralism and genuine non-
alignment.

Progress will not be possible unless
the Sandinistas end their support for in-
surgencies in other countries. We are
discussing with the Sandinista govern-
ment several proposals which could ad-
dress their neighbors' concerns, our con-
cerns, and the complaints of the Sandin-
istas themselves. We must hope that the
Nicaraguans will understand that their
future and that of Central America does
not lie in imitating Cuba but in demo-
cratic government with the support of
the people.

Finally, a word is in order about our
policy toward Cuba itself. Over two
decades have passed since Fidel Castro
took power. In Cuba, as in other coun-
tries, it has become clear that while
Marxist-Leninist ideology may be a vehi-
cle to seize power, it is an obstacle to
progress. Today, the Cuban people see
the fruits of their labor poured into
armaments and adventures abroad.
Their economy stagnates and a huge
Soviet subsidy of $3 billion a year has
become essential for survival. Like other
Communist states, Cuba has also pro-
duced a flood of refugees.

A better relationship between Cuba
and the United States is both possible
and desirable, but it cannot take place in
the context of aggression and subver-
sion. The Salvadorans and others have
shown that they reject the latest at-
tempt by Cuba, abetted by the U.S.S.R.,
to determine their destinies by force.
Sooner or later, the determination of the
peoples of Central America to win a
democratic future must impress the
Cuban leadership with the futility of
their current policies.

Democracy and Peaceful Change

History, wrote Valery, is the science of
events that never recur. As we enter the
final decades of the 20th century, we are
conscious that our relations with our
neighbors in the Western Hemisphere
have entered a new stage. Neither we
nor they can afford benign neglect in
any field. Neither they nor we can afford
to ignore the principles of peaceful
change and the resolution of disputes
without resort to force.

U.S. relations with the nations of
Central America, the Caribbean, and in-
deed the rest of Latin America are
changing, but the democratic vocation

July 1982

49

THE SECRETARY

endures. It is democracy alone that
recognizes government's responsibility to
the people, thus providing the funda-
mental political stability necessary for
both individual freedom and social prog-
ress. This stability, however, should not
be confused with the status quo. To the
contrary, the bloodless balance of social
forces offered by democracy is the only
sure framework for lasting and bene-
ficial economic and social change. By ad-
ding our strength to the will of our
neighbors, we can realize together a new
world of opportunities for self-develop-
ment in freedom.

•Press release 180 of May 28, 1982. ■

Developing Lasting

U.S.-China

Relations

by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Address given on behalf of Secretary
Haig before the National Council on
U.S.-China Trade, Washington, D.C., on
June 1, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is
Deputy Secretary of State.

It is a great pleasure to be here today. I
know that you and the other members of
the National Council on U.S.-China
Trade have been deeply involved in de-
veloping a strong, mutually beneficial
relationship between the United States
and China. I can honestly say that with-
out your constructive approach and per-
sistent efforts, we would not have come
as far as we have in our bilateral rela-
tions.

Fostering a lasting relationship be-
tween the United States and China has
been a vitally important bipartisan objec-
tive for the last four administrations. A
strong U.S.-China relationship is one of
the highest goals of President Reagan's
foreign policy.

Strong U.S.-China relations are not
only critical for our long-term security
but also contribute to Asian stability and
global harmony. The United States and
China are both great countries, strong
and vigorous, with tremendous potential
for promoting world peace and pros-
perity. As President Reagan noted in his
letter to Premier Zhao commemorating
the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai

50

communique, "our contacts have em-
braced almost all areas of human
endeavor."

We view China as a friendly country
with which we are not allied but with
which we share many common interests.
Strategically, we have no fundamental
conflicts of interest, and we face a com-
mon challenge from the Soviet Union. In
areas such as trade, tourism, banking,
and agriculture and in scientific, techno-
logical, and educational exchanges, a
close, cooperative relationship has re-
sulted in a productive flow of people and
ideas between our two societies. It is for
these reasons that the Reagan Admini-
stration believes it essential that we
develop a strong and lasting relation-
ship.

During the decade-long process of
normalizing our relations, a number of
principles upon which we base our China
policy have emerged. These principles,
which President Reagan has strongly en-
dorsed, include our recognition that the
Government of the People's Republic of
China is the sole legal government of
China and our acknowledgment of the
Chinese position that there is but one
China and that Taiwan is a part of
China.

They also include a firm acceptance
that the U.S.-China relationship, like all
relationships between equal, sovereign
nations, should be guided by the funda-
mental principles of respect for each
other's sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity and noninterference in each
other's internal affairs. The relationship
should be based on a spirit of consulta-
tion, cooperation, and strong efforts to
achieve mutual understanding on the
wide range of issues of interest to both
of our countries.

The Reagan Administration is com-
mitted to pursuing a durable relationship
with China based on these principles.
President Reagan values the relationship
highly and believes it is important to
work together to expand the benefits to
both countries. As he said in a recent
letter to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping,
"China and America are two great na-
tions destined to grow stronger through
cooperation, not weaker through divi-
sion."

It is because of the importance that
President Reagan places on the
U.S.-China relationship that Vice Presi-
dent Bush recently visited Beijing as the
President's personal emissary. We were
highly pleased with the outcome of the
Vice President's trip, both in terms of
the reception he received and in terms
of the clarity and quality of the high-
level communication which it produced.

We believe that both the United States
and China saw in this visit the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate the high value
each places on the relationship. We also
believe that good progress was made in
addressing the one serious issue that
threatened good relations — Taiwan arms
sales.

We are continuing our discussions
with the Chinese on this complex, his-
torical issue. We believe that so long as
both sides demonstrate the statesman-
ship, vision, and goodwill that have
characterized our relationship, we will
be able to overcome our difficulties. In-
deed, anything other than a successful
outcome would be a great misfortune foi
both sides. The only beneficiary would
be our common adversaries.

Reagan Administration Initiatives

It is not my purpose to address the
Taiwan arms sale issue today. Indeed,
public attention on this issue has tended
to obscure the continuing progress
which this Administration has made in
carrying out important China policy in-
itiatives. These steps play an important
role in removing residual impediments
to a relationship based on mutual trust.
They will further strengthen the foundai
tion for a durable long-term partnership
between the United States and China.

These initiatives grew out of a
thorough review of all aspects of
U.S.-China relations conducted during
the first 5 months of the Reagan Ad-
ministration. They were launched just 1
year ago, when Secretary Haig visited
Beijing. During his meetings, the Secre-
tary reaffirmed our common strategic
perceptions and announced new steps
aimed at deepening our bilateral rela-
tionship. The subsequent implementatioi'
of this policy focused on four main
areas — technology transfer, arms trans-
fers, legislative restrictions, and con-
sular relations. In the 11 months since
the Secretary's visit, important progresn
has been made on all fronts.

We have substantially liberalized on.
export control policy toward China. Thii
initiative has reflected not only a desire
to expand business opportunities but
also our strong national interest in con-
tributing to China's modernization. We
recognize that a secure, modernizing
China is important to the United States
from a global and strategic perspective.
We strongly believe in supporting Bei-
jing's ambitious efforts to improve the
quality of life of more than one-quarter
of the world's population.

Over the past year, there has been i

Department of State Bulletir

THE SECRETARY

dramatic rise in approvals of export
licenses for China. Since July of 1981
through March of this year, 1,203
license applications were approved. This
represented an increase of nearly 40%
over the prior 9-month period.

A recent White House directive
reaffirmed this policy of substantial
liberalization, emphasizing that U.S. ex-
port policy "should support a secure,
friendly, and modernizing China" and
underscoring the importance of "prompt
and full implementation" of the Presi-
dent's June 4, 1981 decision. This new
directive should give additional impetus
to our efforts to expand trade relations.
I fully expect that as U.S. -China rela-
tions continue to advance, there will be
important further progress.

Another area in which we have
opened the way to future cooperation is
in arms transfer policy. During his June
1981 visit to Beijing, Secretary Haig an-
nounced that we were prepared to
cooperate with China in this area on the
same case-by-case basis governing U.S.
arms transfers to all other nations. In
December 1981, we lifted the historical
bars on munitions sales to China.

The Administration also recognized
that the increasing flow of businessmen,
tourists, and students between the
United States and China made it
imperative that we establish regular con-
sular relations. Accordingly, Secretary
Haig rapidly concluded negotiations on a
consular convention which was ratified
last fall and came into force this year.
Since the diflfering social systems of the
two countries at times lead us to take
differing views on some issues involving
our citizens, the convention provides im-
portant protections for Americans in
China. We intend vigorously to uphold
its provisions, not only in letter but in
spirit.

The Administration conducted a
thorough review of legislation aflFecting
our relationship with China. The review
identified three areas in which outdated
laws discriminated against China in
ways inconsistent with our current
strategic relationship. These were:
eligibility for foreign assistance, PL 480,
and the importation of seven previously
banned furskins.

Congressional reaction to these pro-
posals has been positive. We have no
plans to extend PL 480 and are only
contemplating limited technical assist-
ance through Chinese involvement in
established programs. However, these
are important symbolic gestures, which
we hope will contribute to a relationship
based on equality, mutual benefit, and
mutual respect.

The Growing Relationship

I would now like to share with you some
of my thoughts about the value of the
U.S. -China relationship, both past and
future. We have made tremendous
strides and will seek continued progress
in the years ahead.

To start with, the strategic benefits
that we see now — some 10 years after
the beginning of rapprochement — have
been substantial. It is an obvious but
often overlooked and vitally important
fact that the United States and China no
longer face each other as hostile adver-
saries and no longer need to deploy
forces against one another. This has
made a tremendous difference to both
nations and will continue to be of critical
importance to planners on both sides.

The relationship has been important
to our entire global strategy. U.S. and
Chinese secimty policies are basically
compatible. The relationship has sup-
ported our alliance structure and en-
hanced China's ability to deal vdth
challenges to its security. In many areas
of the world our economic assistance
and political relationships have been
mutually reinforcing.

To turn to specific areas, our consul-
tations with the Chinese on Kampuchea
have been an important complement to
our cooperation with the ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] nations in attempting to turn back
Vietnamese aggression. In Afghanistan
and Southwest Asia, the United States
and China have maintained closely
parallel policies, recognizing that the en-
tire region is threatened by a southern
thrust from the Soviet Union.

Indeed, even where we disagree, the
very fact that we can maintain a high-
quality dialogue on international issues
is an important byproduct of the rela-
tionship. In one area which we approach
in different ways— the Korean Penin-
sula— our good relations have been an
important factor fostering regional
stability.

Bilaterally, of course, there have
been major benefits. U.S. -China trade is
of tremendous importance to our nation.
Its volume has increased dramatically,
and its potential for further expansion
remains great. We were pleased, for ex-
ample, to see Premier Zhao Ziyang re-
ceiving important American business-
men recently even at a time of difficulty
elsewhere in U.S.-China relations. The
Premier's reception of Mr. Phillips
[Christopher H. Phillips, President, Na-
tional Council of U.S.-China Trade] and
Mr. Tappan [David S. Tappan, Jr.,
President and Chief Operating OflBcer,

Fluor Corporation] are strong indicators
that the importance we continue to at-
tach to building a long-term commercial
relationship is reciprocated at the
highest levels in China.

It is impressive to note the levels of
cooperation that ab-eady exist between
our two countries.

• The volume and value of bilateral
trade have been increasing dramatically.
China is now our 14th largest trading
partner.

• U.S. agricultural sales to China
were around $2 billion in 1981. China
has thus become our fifth largest market
for agricultural products.

• There are currently over 8,000
Chinese students in the United States.
They are now the largest group of
students from another country to be
studying here. Hundreds of Americans
have also studied or done research in
China.

• Tourism and other travels be-
tween the two countries have grown to
massive dimensions. Tens of thousands
of Americans visit China annually.
Official delegations are already numer-
ous and are increasing.

• At last count some 80 American
companies have established permanent
offices in Beijing. Many companies with
representatives in Hong Kong or Tokyo
are also involved in frequent business
discussions with the Chinese.

• Opportunities for joint ventures
are grovnng. The Chinese recently
adopted a joint venture law that estab-
lishes a legal framework for such under-
takings. Under the auspices of the U.N.
Industrial Development Organization,
the Chinese have announced 130 joint
ventures open to foreign participation.

• Our two governments have begun
to explore the possibility of a bilateral
investment treaty which would further
facilitate U.S. investment in China.

• We have also been conducting dis-
cussions with the Chinese on the
possibility of an agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation, which would enable
us to compete commercially in the de-
velopment of China's nuclear power pro-
gram.

• Exchanges have increased sub-
stantially in the science and technology
area. During 1981 dozens of delegations
were exchanged, and three new proto-
cols were signed — bringing the total
number of protocols under our bilateral
science and technology agreement to 17.
The benefits to both sides in this area,

July 1982

51

THE SECRETARY

which span a wide variety of fields rang-
ing from health to earthquake studies,
have proven to be even more impressive
than we had foreseen.

ConcluBion

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize
again that the Reagan Administration
values the U.S.-China relationship very
highly. That relationship must be based
on the principles of equality and mutual
respect. We will continue to work closely
with the Chinese leadership with the ob-
jective of resolving the Taiwan arms
sales issue. We will seek to expand
cooperation with China in areas where
our interests are parallel or comple-
mentary.

American foreign policy is some-
times accused of being shortsighted and

of operating in a 4-year context. It is
clear from the record of four admmi-
strations that this is not the case with
China. U.S. foreign policymakers clearly
recognize that it is not in our interest to
perpetuate the hostility that existed be-
tween the United States and China but
to look ahead to decades of close Smo-
American cooperation.

I believe that the coming years will
see the development of an even deeper
and more extensive relationship between
our two great countries. We at the State
Department would welcome your
thoughts on areas that remain to be ex-
plored and initiatives for the future.
With your help we can forge a lasting
relationship of mutual benefit to both
the United States and China that will
take us well into the 21st century.

withdrawal of the Argentine forces from
the islands; and a political solution. I
think those three essential elements are
as important today as they were at the
outset of the crisis.

Secretary Interviewed on
"Face the Nation"

Secretary Haig was interviewed on
CBS TVs "Face the Nation" by George
Herman. CBS News; Bernard
Gwertzman, The New York Times; and
Robert Pierpoint. CBS Neu!s.
Wnshimiton. D.C.. nnMay'2S. 1982.''

Q. In this morning's news, the
British troops in the Falklands seem
to be consolidating their hold on their
bridgehead following some air strikes
on Argentinian positions. Since you've
been a military commander as well as
a diplomat, what would you say would
have to happen in the fighting in the
Falklands to make new negotiations
possible and profitable?

A. We, of course, would hope that
there would be a renewed round of
negotiations at any point, but it's clear
that until some evidence of some change
in the military situation is available,
there may be continued stalemate.

Q. Remembering America's
military experiences in Korea and in
Vietnam, in which you had a role, is
this situation now in the Falklands
the kind of thing which is productive
of good negotiations, or does it have
to wait until one side or the other
takes a black eye or gains some kind
of a face-saving victory?

A. 1 don't think that one can make a
real value judgment on that. There is
much to be said on both sides of the

[lot

DJ
li
fi
lie

issue— for example, that frustration,
stalemate, and continuing sacrifices on
both sides do present auspicious oppor-
tunities for negotiation. On the other
hand, the extensive efforts that have
been applied by the U.S. Government,
by the Peruvian Government, and more
recently by the U.N. Secretary General
in a period before real sacrifices— and I
don't belittle those incidents that were
already involved— did not seem to bring
about the necessary compromise on the
part of the parties. So one might be in-
clined to feel that today the landing of
the British forces, the establishment of a
strong bridgehead on the Falklands in
itself constitutes a rather remarkable
change in the situation. For that reason,
I would hope that efforts would continue
on the part of all parties to arrive at an
early solution.

Q. Now that the British flag has
been hoisted in the Falklands, why
not support the growing pressure in
the United Nations for an immediate
cease-fire?

A. I think the answer to that ques-
tion is very clear. The United Nations
has passed a resolution, 502, which has
three components. Those three com-
ponents constitute a very strong en-
dorsement of rule of law in international
affairs, and that is that aggression must
not be rewarded. The three components
involve a cease-fire, as you suggest; the

Q. As of the moment, what you
seem to be saying is that there is no
foreseeable negotiating position that
could be successful— that is, right
now. In that case, it appears that the
fighting is going to go on for a while.
Do you see the Soviet Union in any
way getting involved on the side of
Argentina, and, particularly, do you
see the danger of a superpower con-
frontation over this?

A. It is clear that we have made
clear to the Soviets that we do not
believe that this crisis should take on
East- West overtones, and I am encour-
aged that thus far the Argentine
Government has repeatedly stated that
it will not accept assistance, so to speak
from the Soviet Union or its proxies. I
would hope that situation would prevail,
but the danger of its turning the other
way is, of course, a very active danger,
and one that we are quite concerned
about.

Q. There have been reports that
the Soviet Union has been giving at
least intelligence information to the
Argentines through Soviet satellites.
Could you clarify that?

A. We've been exposed to the same
assurances that the world community
has from Argentina that they are not a(
cepting assistance, so I prefer to accept
their word on face value.

Q. You say you would hope there
would be no East-West overtones, bull
already we're hearing North-South
overtones. How about the U.S. posi-
tion vis-a-vis not only Argentina but
its increasing number of friends
among those who used to be not so
friendly to Argentina? Are we in
trouble?

A. It goes without saying that this
crisis, from the outset, endangered a
number of longstanding American in-
terests in this hemisphere and, indeed,
woridwide. We, for that reason, became
active from the outset foreseeing these
complications, and we certainly didn't
misjudge them. On the other hand, we
recognize as well that the United Statee
has been guided in this crisis by a funds
mental principle, and that is that we
must support those forces that support
the rule of law and no first use of force.
If we were to permit that to be violated
there are a number of situations in the

up

la

52

Department of State Bullet!'

THE SECRETARY

hemisphere which could immediately ex-
plode into similarly serious crises.

Q. Are we sending an envoy down
to Argentina, another General Walters
[Ambassador at Large Vernon A.
Walters] or is General Walters going
back down there? There has been a
report this morning to that effect.

A. There is only one General
Walters.

Q. Is he going back?

A. There is no emissary en route to
Buenos Aires at this time.

Q. On that same country, is there
a fear that Argentina might go
nuclear, not right now, but would this
war propel Argentina or other Latin
countries to step up their military
spending or even to go nuclear?

A. I think on the nuclear question,
the incentives for that we must recog-
nize are longstanding worldwide. That's
why we have been such avid proponents
of nonproliferation. I've always made
the point that insecurity, isolation, and
security dangers are the key incentives
for the acquisition of nuclear capabili-
ties. We have been concerned about
Argentina's activities in this area, and
we've discussed it with the Argentine
Government. I'm reasonably confident
that will not be a direct outgrowth of
this.

With respect to the conflict at large,
of course, it whets the appetites for
higher levels of armaments throughout
the hemisphere, and we hope this inci-
dent will not have that consequence.

Q. You have indicated that you ac-
(cept the Argentine assurance that they
are not getting help from the Soviet
Union, but the United States is giving
help to Great Britain. For some
reason, so far, this Administration,
while admitting we're giving some
help, has not been willing to say what
we're doing to help Britain. Is this a
kind of a pre-World War II "destroy-
ers to Britain" on a secret basis, or
can you tell us really what we are do-
ing?

A. I think the President has been
very clear on that, and that is there will
be no active American military involve-
ment in this crisis; and the President
meant precisely what he said. On the
other hand, we've had a longstanding
military relationship with a key ally and
a special relationship with Great Britain.
Within the confines of that, we have
provided certain levels of assistance.

They do not include direct military in-
volvement of any kind by U.S. forces,
and they will not.

Q. But what do they include?

A. 1 think we have pursued a policy
of not providing a day-to-day checklist of
such items. It serves no useful purpose,
and I'm not going to depart from that
policy this morning.

Q. Is there a parallel on the other
side? Are any of the Latin American
countries and neighbors of Argentina
providing her with materiel or help?

A. Yes, there is some evidence of
that.

Q. What?

A. There again, I don't think it
serves any purpose to go into that.

Q. Can you tell me what countries
or what kinds of aid are being given?

A. No, but Argentina has a number
of historically close neighbors who have
been providing assistance, of course, but
I don't think at substantial levels.

Q. There is a report that Presi-
dent Brezhnev has replied to Presi-
dent Reagan's letter about the start of
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START). Could you tell us if that let-
ter goes much beyond what he said in
his public speech?

A. I don't think it serves a useful
purpose to lay out detailed exchanges in
diplomatic channels between heads of
state and heads of government. I will
confirm there has been a reply. I will
also suggest that we anticipate through
diplomatic channels— that's at State
Department level— to confirm, hopefully
before too long, a date for the resump-
tion of our START negotiations.

Q. The letter did not, then, con-
tain a date in itself?

A. Now you're dragging me into
disclosures which I don't think, as a mat-
ter of practice, is good diplomacy.

Q. What about your possible
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko? Would you expect that by
that time or at that time you would
set a date for the start of these
START talks?

A. It's too early to say, and I don't
want to even suggest there has been a
meeting confirmed with Foreign
Minister Gromyko in New York at the
disarmament conference, which I'm sure
you're referring to.

Q. Yes.

A. There have been some informal
discussions at diplomatic levels about the

etllluly1982

possibility of such a meeting. We, on our
part, would welcome it. But that itself
has not been fixed.

Q. I'm not exactly trying to drag
you into disclosure, but would like to
try on another level something which
I'm sure every American is concerned
about, and that is, in these inter-
changes, do you detect some motion
on the part of the Soviet Union, some-
thing that gfives the United States
reason to be somewhat more sanguine
than in the past about arms reduction?

A. I think the response of the
Soviets to the President's speech at
Eureka College, the public response, Mr.
Brezhnev's speech to the Komsomol, was
basically encouraging. It was also
replete with a number of self-serving
posturing statements of a propagandistic
character.

Q. Soviet boilerplate.

A. Yes, especially as we get into the
European-American mutual interest on
so-called INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] talks.

Q. But you see some reason, some
psychological movement, so to speak?

A. Yes, I think from two points of
view. Mr. Brezhnev in his speech
welcomed the early resumption of talks
in general and also accepted the princi-
ple of substantial reductions in levels of
armaments. One can only be encouraged
by that.

Q. You were critical, as was the
Administration as a whole, about his
proposal for a freeze in strategic
weapons at the time the START talks
would begin. Some people have sug-
gested that, actually, since the Soviets
have a very active program right now,
a freeze would not hurt the United
States but, in fact, might help it hold
off further Soviet programs. But you
don't see the logic in that?

A. Not only don't we see the logic,
why, we see the counterlogic. The sim-
ple facts are that a freeze would lock the
United States into positions of inferiori-
ty in key areas. No place is that more
true than in the Western European
nuclear environment, where we are fac-
ing some 900 warheads on 300 new
mobile systems, with the West having
no counterpart whatsoever. Anyone who
would suggest that entering into
negotiations under such a frozen dis-
advantage would be an incentive for
progress in the arms control I think has
somewhat misplaced his logic.

Q. I don't want to get locked into

53

THE SECRETARY

initials here, but the talks you just re-
ferred to are on medium-range
missiles. As I understood Mr.
Brezhnev's proposal, it was for a
freeze in the strategic or longer range
systems.

A. He has proposed both, as you
know— for both systems. As a matter of
fact, his speech seemed almost to pre-
occupy itself with the European arms
control question.

Q. Let me ask you something, as
an amateur. I mean, these two gentle-
men cover the State Department a
good deal, and they are used to the
language which is somewhat foreign
to me. I'm a little bit puzzled-

A. Sometimes it's foreign to me,
too. [Laughter]

Q. Foreign to you. Very well. On
one hand, I hear you say that SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] II
is dead in the water; on the other
hand. I hear you say that we're observ
ing SALT II. And I'm a little puzzled
as to what it means.

A. It means simply that there are
certain restraints associated with the
SALT II discussions and the draft treaty
which both sides continue to abide by.

Q. Not all of them?

A. Not at all. Neither side has
entered into the reductions that were
visualized. And I made the point in my
recent Senate testimony. There is no
contradiction in such a thing. Clearly,
there were many good aspects of SALT
II, and it's In the interest of the United
States-and it has thus far been in the
Soviets' interest— to maintain those re-
straints because it provides an interna-
tional backdrop of greater confidence on
which to proceed into the START
negotiations.

Q. Why, then, would it not make
some sense to go ahead and ratify
SALT II, start from there and move
on to what you want, which is reduc-
tions?

A. For the simple reason that we
felt that SALT II is badly flawed, badly
flawed in a number of areas. It permit-
ted the Soviet Union unusual advantage
in the heavy intercontinental missile
area. Secondly, there were deficiencies
in the verification aspects. Thirdly, there
was no Backfire bomber restraint— in
other words, it ran free for the Soviet
Union.

To go through the processes of rati-
fying this controversial, flawed treaty
would be a detriment to our ability to
move on promptly and rapidly with the

START negotiations. Beyond that, it
would lock in these flaws. And it's a
very different thing to start a new kind
of negotiation against a backdrop of
unresolved issues than to have these dis-
advantages locked into a formal treaty
and then have to work back, as SALT II
would seek to do.

Q. If I understand you correctly,
then you are willing to accept certain
parts of SALT II as having already
been negotiated, not necessarily take
those in treaty form, but incorporate
those parts that are acceptable to you
into the START talks. Is that correct?

A. No, that's not correct. What I
am saying is that there are certain con-
straints that were visualized and agreed
to in SALT II, and that as long as the
Soviet Union continues to abide by those
constraints-and thus far they seem to
be— we are inclined to do the same
thing. But it does not mean that this is
an inherent aspect of the START
negotiations, which are clear and clean
in their own right, and visualize, as the
President said, substantial reductions on
both sides.

Q. You may have noticed my
abstracted expression as I listened to
some news on my little earphone. Let
me tell you that it is reported— Argen-
tine radio is saying that President
Galtieri has sent a letter to the Pope
saying that President Galtieri agrees
with the Pope that there should be a
cease-fire. Can you read anything into
this? Is this politeness? Is this move-
ment? Can one guess from this brief
headline what this might mean?

A. I think there has been a great
deal of well-meaning and more-than-
justified diplomatic activity. We've seen
a great deal of it here. The Peruvian
Government is attempting to launch
another effort. The Pope himself, as he
should be, is seriously concerned about
this bloodshed.

What the position of the Argentine
Government is with respect to one or
more of these depends, in its character,
as to what it is the Argentine Govern-
ment is prepared to accept. If it's a
cease-fire and that the conditions for a
resumption of conflict are violations of
fundamental principles that we are seek-
ing to preserve and strengthen, then
clearly it doesn't offer much hope.

Q. To go back to the discussion of
our relations with the Soviet Union,
you obviously have to take into ac-
count domestic problems within the
Soviet Union when you are evaluating

lti(
»l

i

I

how much they are willing to give in
certain areas. Today, the Washington
Post has a very interesting report,
which I'm sure you've seen, saying
that Soviet agriculture is once again,
still, and yet in deep trouble, and that
as a result of this, they expect some
changes at the higher levels of the
Kremlin during Politburo meetings
that start tomorrow. What is your
evaluation of this report and of the
possible changes in the Soviet hier-
archy?

A. This is an historic, almost
organic, failure of the Marxist-Leninist
system and the Soviet model. From the
outset, the Soviet Union has been unabl
to meet the food requirements of its
people— this despite the fact that they
have placed greater and greater concen
tration on that sector of their society.
They have applied more human effort
and more technology, but they still,
through systematic failure, have failed
to "turn the corner," so to speak.

I think that it is perfectly natural
that there are always scapegoats m sue
failures, and periodic meetings provide
an opportuni^ to make some changes.
It's just that simple.

Q. Speaking of the hierarchy,
what do you see about the impact on
the Soviet Union's relations with the
West if it's going to be so dependent
for food on the outside world?

A. I've always made the point that
the United States and the West at largj
if they maintain especially their unity i:i
their dealings with the Soviet Union,
have a great deal of political and eco-
nomic leverage with which and througl
which to insist on greater restraint anc
responsibility on the part of the Soviet
leaders.

Q. Do you think we're sending tB
wrong signal by agreeing or even urg
ing the start of the strategic arms
talks without any conditions attache*
to it— in other words, without any
direct linkage?

A. No. I think we've made it very
clear that linkage continues to be an a(
tive aspect of American foreign policy-
indeed, it does. But the President has
also made it clear that arms control is
very special area of East-West relatior
and one in which we seek our own vita
interests to be realized.

Q. You're really saying that
linkage is dead.

A. Not at all. I said just the oppo-
site. I said it is not dead; it remains a
very active part and will remain an ac-
tive part. It's a fact of life. It's not a

54

Department of State Bullet

THE SECRETARY

question of an option of policy. It is a
fact of life that international behavior of
nations that have relationships with one
another affect the full range of their
relationships in all —

Q. Let me adopt [the previous
questioner's] rather dramatic phrase
and apply it to another situation. Are
parts two and three of our Camp
David agreement dead— Palestinian
autonomy?

A. Not at all. People are rather
short of memory. Here we have just had
an event of major historic significance —
the return of the Sinai on the 25th of
April. A year and a half ago the skepti-
l^cism as to whether or not that would
ever happen was growing daily. It has
been the product of cooperation between
the Government of Egypt and the

overnment of Israel — and in some
/ery, very remarkable ways.

Now that is behind us, and the time
las come to turn to the other aspects of
Damp David. These are the autonomy
alks. Ambassador Fairbanks [Special
\.dviser to the Secretary Richard Fair-
)anks] has just now returned from his
hird trip to the area, and I believe we
ire ready to get moving.

Q. Have you got agreement on the
ilace?

A. No. The venue question is still
pen, but I'm optimistic that it lends
;self to a reasonably early solution.

Q. At Camp David?

A. Not necessarily, no.

Q. Do you think that when Mr.
legin comes to see Mr. Reagan these
roblems will be shoved aside, and
fell make some progress?

A. The President is very actively
ngaged in the whole range of our
Dreign policy, but especially he has
hown an exceptional interest in the
liddle East situation. Clearly, this and
ther matters wDl be discussed with Mr.
egin when he comes for the disarma-
lent conference.

Q. Do you know for sure when
i*fhat is, by the way?

A. I don't have the precise date,
/e're still working on it. It will be about
le time of the President's speech at the
isarmament conference, and it might
iclude some other discussions beyond
lat.

Q. That's next month, then?

A. Early next month, after return-
^g from Europe.

Interview on
"This Week With
David Brinkley'

."

iPress release 176 of May 24, 1982.

Secretary Haig was interviewed on
ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley"
on June 13, 1982, by Sam Donaldson;
Sander Vanocur, ABC's chief diplomatic
correspondent; and George Will, ABC
news analysts

Q. Israel says it will not withdraw
immediately from Lebanon, as
demanded by U.N. Resolution 508 that
we voted for. So let's just say it out
loud, if we mean it: Is that all right
with us, or do we want an immediate
withdrawal?

A. It's too early to say. I think the
key aspects of the resolution you refer
to are, for the moment, to get a cessa-
tion of the hostilities and the bloodshed,
and the President's focus thus far has
been on that. Clearly, no one would
welcome a return to status quo ante in
Lebanon with all of the instabilities ;hat
we've experienced since 1976.

Q. It's too early to say, as you put
it, because you don't believe the cease-
fire has been tested long enough.
After a cease-fire clearly is in place,
do we want an immediate Israeli
withdrawal?

A. I think we are going to wait and
to work to achieve adjustments in the
withdrawal of all foreign elements from
Lebanon. After all, this has been a coun-
try that's been wracked by internal
elements not under the authority and
control of the Lebanese Government, as
well as a nation that's been occupied by
Syrian forces for too long.

Q. You ducked the question.

A. I'm sometimes very good at that,
but why don't you ask it again?

Q. I'm really trying to find out if
we want to back up our vote in the
U.N. Security Council.

A. Of course.

Q. Do we want an immediate
Israeli withdrawal?

A. Of course. The vote that the
United States stood behind and joined
the other nations in putting forward was
a very clear picture that ultimately there
must be a withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Lebanon.

Q. To facilitate an Israeli
withdrawal, to fill the vacuum that

J, ulyl982

has been their objective to create in
that part of Lebanon, would you be
willing to see American troops put in-
to a peacekeeping force?

A. I think it's still a hypothetical
question. We have not given serious
thought to U.S. participation in the
peacekeeping in Lebanon. However, I
think in the hours and days ahead, we're
going to have to look very, very careful-
ly at what will be necessary to provide a
stable situation in southern Lebanon to
relieve the tensions which have brought
about this disaster in the first place.

Q. Might it be useful, as a precon-
dition to having whatever settlement
we come to in that area, to have a
referendum in which the people of
that part of Lebanon are asked if they
want the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization] and the Syrians back?

A. I wouldn't discount a referen-
dum. I wouldn't discount any step that
would strengthen the authority of the
central government and bring about a
rapprochement, if you will, of the
various factions in Lebanon — that is, the
Lebanese factions — toward a strength-
ened central government.

Q. I take it from the tenor of your
remarks today and in the past week
that the U.S. Government and, indeed,
most of the countries involved, are not
too unhappy about the developments.
In other words, the dirty little secret
which has existed for some time is
that nobody really wants the PLO in
Lebanon.

A. I wouldn't suggest there's a dirty
Uittle secret because the next question
that would be asked is, "Did the United
States collude, were we acquiescing in
the actions?"

Nothing could be farther from the
truth. We regret very much that the
situation has resulted in the violence
that we've witnessed. On the other hand,
I think it's very clear that you must not
and cannot have enclaves of separate
authority in a sovereign nation and ex-
pect the seeds for stability to grow.
They will not.

Q. No. I wasn't suggesting collu-
sion, but I'm suggesting now a ques-
tion that goes to the heart of what
happens next. Is the United States
willing to see whatever Israel is try-
ing to do, whether it's playing the Jor-
danian option or a homeland for the
Palestinians? How far is the United
States going in symmetry in what
seems to be Israeli objectives in the
Middle East?

A. It's too early to say. I think our

55

THE SECRETARY

first priority must continue to be a
cessation of the hostilities, and the
humanitarian aspects of this problem
have got to be dealt with on a most
urgent basis. We've got to work with all
of the nations in the region. There are
some of those in Western Europe who
are concerned to seek to provide a long-
term solution in which the sovereignty
of Lebanon will again be established.

Q. Work with other European na-
tions. Does that mean Camp David is
dead and you're back to the Geneva
conference which would include the
Russians?

A. No, not at all. Camp David is not
dead. As a matter of fact, I would hope
that these tragic circumstances in
Lebanon today would offer new oppor-
tunities for a reinvigorating of the Camp
David process and to moving forward as
we intend to do.

Q. When the fighting first broke
out, you and the other American of-
ficials were worried that somehow the
Soviets might come in. that the whole
thing could escalate into that kind of
a very dangerous confrontation. This
morning can you say that that now has
receded— that danger— that it looks
like we'll have a situation where the
Soviets will not in any way intervene?

A. Of course, we've been concerned
about that from the outset. There have
been exchanges between the President
and Mr. Brezhnev— exactly two sets of
exchanges during the period. I would
describe the Soviet attitude thus far as
being encouragingly cautious.

The holding of the cease-fire which
started 2 days ago— it broke down
yesterday with respect to the PLO,
which we worked on all night and again
this morning— it appears that the local
collapse of the cease-fire in the Beirut
area has again been reestablished — the
cease-fire has.

I would hope that all of these cir-
cumstances would make it clear to the
Soviet leadership that they have no
business in intervening or becoming in-
volved in this situation other than to
urge those with whom they exercise in-
fluence to exercise restraint.

Q. I didn't realize there were two
sets of exchanges. Can you describe
them? When did they come? I thought
Mr. Brezhnev sent a letter to Presi-
dent Reagan and he replied. When
was the second exchange?

A. There was a subsequent com-
munication and reply. A reply went out
last night.

56

Q. What kind? Can you char-
acterize it?

A. I would characterize it as essen-
tially concerned, but cautiously con-
cerned.

Q. Concerned but cautiously in
what sense? In other words, does this
second exchange mean that the Rus-
sians were telling us. and we were
telling the Russians, "Okay, we've
cooled it. it looks like the heat's off?

A. No, not in the context of that
question. I think it was a continuing ex-
pression of concern on the part of the
Soviet leadership about the potential
dangers of a spreading of the violence,
and we share that concern ourselves. It
doesn't mean that we accept the Soviet
view as to why these conditions oc-
curred, but thus far I would say that the
situation is cautious on both sides.

Q. I'm struck by the fact that you
said earlier that no one really wants
the status quo ante. When you add to
this the fact that two Soviet clients,
armed by the Soviet Union and trained
by the Soviet Union, have been
decisively bested in battle by an
American ally with American training
and American arms, isn't this a
tremendous thing? I mean, aren't you
really pleased? How can we possibly
be displeased about that?

A. No one is pleased when cir-
cumstances involve the loss of innocent
lives, and there's been too much of that
in Lebanon today. The longer term
strategic aspects of this question remain
to be seen.

Q. A little more than a year ago
you went to the Middle East, pursu-
ing—not without reason— something
that was called a "strategic
consensus." President Reagan sent
you on that trip to establish this. Now
we've had a change of the reality in
the Middle East. We have a resurgent
Iranian nationalism backed by the
force of arms with Arab nations, at
least fearing Iran as much as they pro-
claim to fear Israel; we have a change
in leadership in Saudi Arabia with a
King who is supposed to be pro-
American, but is subject to a lot of
pressures both within the family and
in the country and in the Muslim
world.

What is your sense today of this
new reality in the Middle East, its op-
portunities, its pitfalls, and the U.S.
national interest in the Middle East?

A. First, I want to make clear that

the President didn't send me to the Mid-
dle East to establish a strategic consen-
sus but rather to recognize that a
strategic consensus was emerging for
precisely the reasons you just described
It involved not only the growing concern
of moderate Arab states about Soviet in-
terventionism in the wake of the col-
lapse of Iran and the invasion of
Afghanistan but also the potential ex-
ploitation of the radical Arab move-
ment—the fundamentalist movement in
Islam, especially in the Shi'ite sect.
The fact that we described the
phenomena a year ago should underline
the fact that we recognize these forces
were underway. Now they are impor-
tantly underway. It means also, as I saii
in Chicago during my speech in May, w(
have three interrelated areas of concern
with which the United States must deal
and effectively cope in the months
ahead— the peace process under Camp
David, the situation in Lebanon which I
described before recent events as highly
volatile and likely to collapse in the con-
flict, and perhaps the even more per-
vasive and worrisome aspects of the fur
damentalist movement emerging
through Khomeini's Iran and casting a
shadow of threat through the gulf state
into Saudi Arabia and as far as the
North African continent — Morocco,
Tunisia, and Egypt itself.

All of these factors must be dealt
with in an integrated mosaic, which
they, indeed, are. They are replete with
contradictions, also.

Q. Could I just cut through and
ask at this point what differences, if
any, King Khalid's death makes?

A. Of course, as a friend and a col-
laborator, it's viewed as a loss here. On
the other hand, we're encouraged that
the transition has proceeded, apparentl
smoothly; that His Majesty King Fahd
now in place. He, too, is a close friend
and collaborator of the United States, s
I view the situation as one of steady im
provement in the relationships between
the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Q. Last week on this program.
Secretary Regan— the Treasury
Secretary— was a very good soldier.
He came on and said that the agree-
ment at Versailles to limit credits to
the East bloc really implied that
credits would be cut. Is it your
understanding that the Versailles con
munique will be violated unless
credits will be cut to the East bloc by
our allies?

A. Not necessarily. I don't think th
seven at Versailles control the full

THE SECRETARY

mechanism of credit management with
the East, let alone the Soviet Union. As
you know, the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] put forward some proposals
recently which involve an increase in the
interest rates and, in effect, on the time
for repayment.

They visualize that by moving the
Soviet Union into a Category I recipient,
that will have the effect of raising the
price of credits to the Soviet Union, and
we hope that by the 15th — the time the
mandate would run out for the imple-
mentation of that by the OECD— it will
be implemented.

What was done at Versailles was to
put together for the first time a com-
prehensive mechanism to begin to assess
the whole range of East- West trade,
credit transfer, and to do so with
lassessments on 6-month intervals so
that we can be sure that we are not
overexposed.

Q. But 2 days after the Versailles
meeting ended. The New York Times
earried a headline reporting that the
" iPoles are now threatening us with de-
fault, that they will go into default
unless they get more loans to pay the
* interest on their old loans. When you
iwere on the show about 6 months ago,
Ithe question was asked, "What in the
Kvorld could be done by the Poles to
iprovoke the United States into calling
their default, default?" Your answer
was that, "Unless things get better,
we will get tougher." Things have not
gotten better, and we have not gotten
tougher. Is there any likelihood that
kvell call them into default?

A. It's still too early to say. I
wouldn't suggest we haven't gotten
xjugher because the pervasive impact of
;he cutoff of credits to Poland has been
substantial and has had a grievous effect
Dn the economic development of Poland
;oday, and we hear it every day.

Q. One other bit of lobbying that
was done at Versailles and has gone
' ill over this town is that the Japanese
ire lobbying for a waiver from the
sanctions against the Soviet Union im-
posed after Poland so that they can
sell energy technology for yet another
Soviet energy project. Is the Reagan
\dministration going to grant this
tvaiver?

A. We're talking about some $2
•nillion of energy-related equipment to
;his Sakhalin pipeline?

Q. Yes.

A. The President has not made a
Biecision on this question, just as he has

not made a decision on the spare parts
associated with the East- West pipeline
and the extraterritoriality question on
existing contracts. I would anticipate he
will make this in the very near future in
the wake of his assessment of —

Q. Is it a hard call? I mean, this is
punching holes in sanctions that are
fairly porous to begin with.

A. It is a hard call. It's a hard call
because I think the President's been
very, very strong in attempting to exer-
cise leadership in Western Europe and
in Japan. And, incidentally, we've had
very good cooperation on the whole
from Japan on this question and the
question of whether or not the results of
the decision really have a meaningful im-
pact as a sanction against the Soviet
Union to influence their behavior at the
price of considerable sacrifice to
American industry, jobs, and future
markets. It's not an easy problem, and,
of course, that's why it's been prolonged
for so long. Easy ones are settled very
easily.

Q. There are reports from London
that Prime Minister Thatcher, once
the Falklands have been retaken from
Argentina — assuming that hap-
pens—wants to fortify them and
perhaps give eventual independence to
those islands. I thought our position
was that there should be negotiations,
including Argentina, to try to deter-
mine the ultimate future. Is that our
position?

A. I think our position goes back to
U.N. Resolution 502, and that resolution
calls for the withdrawal of Argentine
forces, the cessation of hostilities, and a
diplomatic or political solution to the
problem.

Q. Including Argentina? Will it
have a voice?

A. Clearly, in controversies where
two nations are involved, it can't be a
unilateral thing. On the other hand —

Q. Yes. But when one is defeated,
they very seldom have the chance to
decide who rolls the next dice.

A. There's no question about that.
That makes it somewhat of a different
ballgame than it was before the violence
began.

Q. What do you want to see?
When you got off the plane on your
second and last trip there — that
Thursday or Friday night— the first
thing you hit the Argentinians with
was that you were proceeding under

U.N. Resolution 502. Are you still pro-
ceeding under Resolution 502, and is
the British Government? I have doubts
about Mrs. Thatcher. Is she?

A. I think it's too early to say. I
think her first order of priority
now — once the conflict has started — is
either to have Argentina withdraw
without conditions, which has not oc-
curred and it doesn't look like it will, or
to take military action to see that it does
withdraw.

Follownng that, I think we have an
open menu. There are certain things
Britain has discussed that they want.
They want to rehabilitate the island.
They want to reestablish the conditions
of self-government, if you will, of the
island population. Beyond that, I think it
remains to be seen.

Q. What's this going to do to
NATO, keeping a force down there?
How are they going to take care of the
island? If they can't fly into Buenos
Aires any more or any of the ports in
the south, they have to fly into
Montevideo. This is an untenable
situation for NATO, is it not?

A. I wouldn't describe it as unten-
able for NATO. I would describe it as a
situation which must be viewed in the
context of the long-term relationships of
Great Britain and the United States
with the Southern Hemisphere, the need
to bring about an outcome that has
stability and justice. In the case of
justice, that means that the views of the
inhabitants on the island are considered
in the ultimate outcome.

Q. About Mrs. Kirkpatrick, our
U.N. Ambassador. We saw a clip
earlier of her saying that the U.S.
foreign policy was inept and that
many people conducting it are
amateurs. Why is she still in the Ad-
ministration, because she's talking
about this Administration apparently?

A. Too much has been said, too
much has been written, and too much
has been speculated on this subject.

Q. But she said it.

A. I'm not going to add to that.

Q. She said too much has been
said. She said it.

A. She gave a speech which has
been given several times before by her,
which was, of course, because of its jux-
taposition on other events propelled into
great national attention by you gentle-
men.

Iuly1982

57

THE SECRETARY

Q. No, she said it. We didn't do it.

A. And you will find that she said it
earlier as well. I want you to know —

Q. She must believe it then. She
must believe that amateurs run our
foreign policy if she says it so often.

A. I don't think that's what she
said. I think she said that our foreign
policy in recent years has been some-
what amateurish, and I think someone
could make an objective observation that
on certain occasions that that might be
true.

Q. But your bottom line is forgive
and forget?

A. My bottom line is that we have
important things to do and personal pec-
cadilloes which tantalize you gentlemen
so much, I understand, but I'm not go-
ing to be a part of it.

•Press release 198 of June 16, 1982. ■

News Conference
of June 19

Secretary Haig keld a news con-
ference at the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations in New York on June 19, 1982.^

We have just completed 9V4 hours of
discussions with Foreign Minister
Gromyko; 5 yesterday and AV* this
morning and early this afternoon. I'll
just say a few words about those discus-
sions and then touch upon some issues
related both to the discussions and the
activities of this past week here in New
York.

I would describe the meeting itself
as full, frank, and useful. The topics
ranged from the broad principles that
should seek to underline East- West rela-
tions in general and U.S. -Soviet rela-
tions in particular. We went through the
full range of global and regional issues
of mutual importance and interest to
both governments. And we also con-
ducted discussions on a number of
bilateral issues between the United
States and the Soviet Union. One of the
major areas of the discussions of yester-
day was on the broad subject of arms
control.

In that regard, I would like to make
some broad observations about the ac-
tivities of the past week here at the
disarmament conference: the position of
President Reagan on this vitally impor-
tant subject.

The President's policies, as you

58

know, are based firmly on deeply rooted
principles— and I'm talking now in the
broad sense of East-West relationships
and then arms control— of international
conduct, in order. As a people, we
Americans have always believed in rule
of law, the settlement of disputes by
peaceful means, and non-use of force ex-
cept for self-defense. These are the prin-
ciples that guide our approach to the
various regional conflicts that confront
us as a nation today.

It is the President's sincere desire to
put the U.S. -Soviet relationship on a
stable, constructive, long-term basis. We
see important potential advantages for
both countries in every area of our rela-
tionship, but this cannot be achieved
without Soviet willingness to conduct its
international affairs with responsibility
and restraint.

It is clearly, squarely up to the
Soviets to determine what sort of rela-
tionship they want to have with the
United States in the months and years
ahead. The United States, for its part, is
prepared for constructive and mutually
beneficial relations if the Soviet Union is
prepared to join us in acting with the
responsibility necessary in the nuclear
age. We have made serious and realistic
proposals to achieve this end. The objec-
tive of the United States remains an
overriding interest in the maintenance of
peace and stability.

I would like to say a word about
arms control, in particular. With the
negotiations on strategic arms reduction
beginning later this month, the topic of
arms control is clearly very high on the
agenda of U.S. -Soviet relations. The full
range of President Reagan's arms con-
trol initiatives are now well known.
They're all on the table. They are pro-
posals which mark the way to the first
significant reductions in the arsenals of
the two major superpowers.

With respect to START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks] first. The Presi-
dent's proposals provide an equitable
basis for real and significant reductions
of strategic nuclear weapons, beginning
with the most destabilizing systems.

East and West — especially the
United States and the Soviet Union —
have important reasons to curb weapons
that threaten their retaliatory capa-
bilities. We will consider most seriously
the Soviet proposals, and the President
has stated that nothing — and I repeat,
nothing — is excluded from the upcoming
START negotiations.

In short, our approach to START is
not one-sided, but it is designed with
mutual benefit and mutual stability in
mind. Now is the time to get on with

serious negotiations devoid of public
posturing. Similarly, on the inter-
mediate-range missile question — the
INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces]
talks — the seriousness of the President'
proposals for total elimination of land-
based intermediate-range missiles is
very clear. It is our conviction that this
proposal is an equitable and realistic ap-
proach to the threat to peace created !>>
the imbalance in such systems which
now favors the Soviet Union.

Last week's discussions, and the
week before in Europe, underlined the
fact and confirmed that the entire
NATO alliance stands four-square
behind the proposals put forth and
underscores the alliance's commitment
to proceed with the deployment of the
1979 decision— that's for the Pershing
lis and the GLCMs [ground-launched
cruise missiles] — in the absence of an
arms control solution.

Finally, President Reagan's initiativ
to reinvigorate the long-stalled negotia-
tions on reducing conventional forces in
Europe, his proposals to reduce the rist
of accidental nuclear war and to conver
an international conference on arms ex-
penditures are now on the table for
prompt responsive action by the Soviet
Union.

Together, all of these proposals
represent a carefully thought through,
integrated approach to arms control,
and it is fitting that it has come togeth^
at a time of the U.N. Special Session oi
Disarmament. It certainly stands in
sharp contrast to the various cosmetic
arms control proposals such as that as
the non-first-use proposal made this
week. Our position on this proposal re-
mains clear: The United States stands
for the non-use of force of any form ex
cept in legitimate self-defense.

The United States, together with it
allies, intends to deter all war, conven-
tional or nuclear. As the President saic
in his speech on November 18th: "No
NATO weapons, conventional or
nuclear, will ever be used in Europe ex
cept in response to attack."

So, in sum, the President has now
put forward a comprehensive agenda i<
arms control which is balanced and
equitable and which, for the first time,
offers a way to reducing the burden of
armaments at every level. We hope the
the Soviet Union will negotiate serious
with us on the agenda now before us.
We will do our part, and we look to th<
Soviet Union to turn from posturing tc
serious talks in the interest of peace. V
also call upon the Soviet Union to maU

i

THE SECRETARY

ts words about arms control with con-
a-ete actions demonstrating its
ieriousness.

I would note, for example, that only
'sk few days after the speech here at the
Jnited Nations given by Mr. Gromyko,
vith emphasis on arms control in outer
;pace, the Soviet Union has undertaken
) in unusually high level of strategic ac-
! ivity, including an antisatellite test, two
CBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
aunches, an SS-20 launch, an SLBM
sea-launched ballistic missile] launch,
,nd two AMB [antiballistic missile] in-
ercepts. Such activity belies, by specific
xition, the words put forth to the world
udience here in New York this week.

Q. Do you have any apparent ex-
ilanation for this increased strategic
ictivity you just talked about, and did
ou discuss with the foreign minister
he possibility of a summit meeting
letween Presidents Brezhnev and
leagan?

A. I have no explanation with
espect to the first part of your question
ther than to suggest that the best
leasure of the real state of relation-
lips between East and West and the
oviet Union and the United States is
le criteria of action and not words, as
le President has repeated in the recent
ast, especially in his recent trip to
ATO, Europe.

The question of summitry was
iscussed in the meetings with Foreign
'inister Gromyko, but I have nothing to
it forward on that subject today.

Q. You addressed arms control
'hich presumably occupied you yester-
ay. Could you take us through today
I any greater detail?

A. There was some discussion today
1 the topic, but the bulk of today's
scussions dealt with a range of
!gional problems and a very extensive
mge.

Q. The strategic activity you
iferred to, I understand these are in
le area of tests. Are any of them pro-
ibited by treaties or other agree-
■ents?

A. I would leave that observation
itil later. It's clear that they are not
)nsistent with the words that are being
;ed.

Q. In these strategic tests, what
ind of activity does this compare to
! the past? We have no basis for
hich to say this is heavier or lighter
lan usual.

A. Unprecedented.

Q. You said that you discussed

regional issues. Was anything said
about what is going on in Lebanon?
Also, in the last talks there was said
to be some stress because of the
Soviets' imposing martial law in
Poland. Was there any —

A. Yes. I'm very happy to tell you
the topics that were touched upon. By
mutual agreement with my counterpart,
I will not go into the character of the
substance. That is the position we have
followed — this is the third of the series
of the discussions we've had. Of course,
the Middle East was discussed, as was
the other topic you mentioned.

Q. Do you think that this strategic
activity relates to any particular situa-
tion in the world, in Lebanon, for ex-
ample?

A. No.

Q. Did you discuss this strategic
activity with Mr. Gromyko?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I think there are several reasons
for it. We have had very extensive
discussions on the topic of arms control.
Some of the details of the activity I've
described were not clear at the time I
went into the discussions — they have
become clear since. I believe they do
underline the character of the difference
sometimes between words and actions.

Q. Your discussions began with
him, as you know, yesterday. Do you
mean that the evidence of this
strategic activity was just within the
last 24 hours?

A. I mean it is very recent activity,
and the integration of the various com-
ponents of it have just been pulled
together this morning — overnight.

Q. To clarify an earlier response,
did you mean to give the impression
that there is some possibility that
some of these tests may have been in
violation of either of —

A. No. I meant to give an indication
that they run rather counter to the
speech given here this week —

Q. And nothing else.

A. And repeated calls for restraint
in outer space.

Q. When you say "it runs counter
to what was said," what was said at
the speech was that the Soviet Union
would like arms control agreements,
and they made a pledge not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons. Could
you just embroider what you mean —

why it runs counter to Gromyko's
speech?

A. I prefer not to go into an exten-
sive "Who shot John?" on this. I put this
information forward because it does
represent a significant first in both the
scope and integration of activity and
capability.

Q. Has there ever been any period
of American testing that compares to
this? To put this thing in further
perspective, is there a way to put it in
percentages?

A. No, I prefer not to do that other
than to suggest that this is a first in the
context of the activities by either the
East or the West.

Q. Could you help us understand
the way these meetings go? If you are
clearly troubled by the evidence that
you are presenting to us here — you
tell us it came together in the middle
of the night, you've been talking to
them for iVt hours this morning — why
didn't you raise it with them?

A. I think the point I just made was
that it was not available to me in its en-
tirety before I started these meetings
but rather subsequent thereto. That is
not to suggest I would have raised it in
the meeting, in any event.

Q. Is this the kind of thing that
does get raised?

A. Probably, but not necessarily.

Q. I get the feeling that your hav-
ing come out of this meeting, and
made this rather discouraging — from
your standpoint— announcement, that
the meeting itself didn't accomplish
much. Is that right?

A. No. I described the meeting as
useful, and I think it is always useful to
conduct far-ranging discussions with my
counterpart in the Soviet Union. They
inevitably bring about consequences
which are favorable, and I don't view
this meeting as any exception.

Q. Just prior to the meeting, you
had described the Soviet's approach to
the Middle East in the communica-
tions you have had as cautious. On the
basis of the last 2 days, would you
still say that that is their general ap-
proach to the situation?

A. Concerned and cautious, yes.

Q. I'm still not quite clear on what
you mean by the integration of these
various strategic tests. What —

A. I think I called them "strategic
activity."

Q. What relationship is there be-
tween these? For example, are the two

le|jiy1982

59

THE SECRETARY

ABM intercepts related to the two
ICBM launches?

A. Integrated.

Q. Did they involve [inaudible] or
explosions?

A. I didn't hear —

Q. Can you tell us which test
ranges?

A. No. No, no, I can't do that.

Q. How do you interpret this?
What does it mean, this activity?

A. It shows the level of interest,
skill, and technological advancement
that should be of concern.

Q. Is a summit meeting between
the two leaders likely by the end of
the year, would you say?

A. I don't want to comment on that.
I'm sure the President will comment on
the subject in the months ahead. I think
both sides clearly have made their posi-
tion clear on summitry, and they are
surprisingly convergent, and that is that
summitry' for summitry's sake is to be
avoided; but rather summitry that has
been well prepared, that will result in a
positive movement forward is far
preferable to an ad hoc kind of summitry
in which expectations rise
before — sometimes in the past, we have
seen even euphoric expectations that
were only dashed following such ill-
prepared summits. I don't think either
side wants to go into such [inaudible].

Q. You said that the United States
favors the rule of law in the settle-
ment of disputes except in legitimate
self-defense. Would you include the
Israeli actions in Lebanon this past
week to be covered by that rubric?

A. Clearly, there is a great deal in
support of that. A number of objective
observers might question the scope of
the counteraction and the character of
it. We have, as a government, not made
a ruling on that as yet.

Q. Would you expect to either pro-
test or to inquire about these strategic
activities once you are —

A. I would like to wait until we
have had an opportunity to consider
what we will do with respect to it. It
might be a decision to do nothing.

Q. There is a possible further
response to it?
A. Possibly.

Q. Can you run through with us
what progress, if any, has been made
in your effort to strengthen the cease-
fire in Lebanon?

A. Phil Habib [Ambassador Philip
C. Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East] has been
intensely engaged in the whole
framework of the crisis in Lebanon, both
in search of a permanent and lasting
cease-fire and in creating the conditions
by which the sovereignty of the central
Government of Lebanon will be en-
hanced and strengthened as a conse-
quence of this tragedy. I think while this
activity is underway, it sometimes is
counterproductive to become too specific
on how; but he has been in touch with
all the internal parties and with the ex-
ternal parties involved as well. And we
have been back-stopping here in
Washington on an hourly basis and
throughout the night.

That situation has not changed from
the beginning of this crisis; especially
the President has personally followed it
moment by moment. I just spoke to him
at Camp David, and it is clear that the
United States is doing all within its
power to have a situation in which the
bloodshed terminates, and the conditions
for a long-term settlement are enhanced.

Q. Do you find that the Soviet
policy, as best you understand it now,
works in the same direction as
America's?

A. I would not describe it that way.
On the other hand, I would not indict re-
cent Soviet activity as particularly
troublesome or counterproductive.

Q. On that strategic activity, do
you regard that as an acceleration of
some of the past activities that they've
had, or is this, given the integrated
nature as you characterized it,
something that involved an entirely
new effort by the Soviets?

A. 1 think there has been enough
said on this subject. Clearly, I wanted
you to have the information as quickly
as it was available and releasable. We've
done that, and I think I'd just like to let
it drop there.

Q. Would you be kind enough, so
we don't botch this up, could you run

through exactly what you said about
this strategic activity?

A. All right, and I do refer to it as

"activity."

Q. You didn't answer the questioi
about the nuclear explosions.

A. I'm about to. Oh, no; no nuclear
no.

I will repeat what I said on this sut
ject. I would note, for example, that
only a few days after the speech at the
United Nations which touched upon
outer space arms control, the Soviet
Union has undertaken an unusually hig
level of strategic activity, including an
antisatellite test, two ICBM launches, ;
SS-20 launch, an SLBM launch, and tv
ABM intercepts.

Q. You mentioned earlier that yoi
had not taken a position on whether
this Israeli activity in Lebanon is in
self-defense or not. Can you say, firs
of all, why you have not taken a posi
tion on that? And secondly, the Unitt
States has maintained that it wants :
the foreign troops out of Lebanon.
Was that a similar Soviet point of
view? And is the United States think
ing of a particular timeframe on the
withdrawal of such troops from
Lebanon?

A. I don't know what the Soviet
view is on the subject of foreign forcet
in Lebanon. The U.S. view is, of coursi
that we would like to see ultimately al!
foreign forces out of Lebanon so that
the central government can conduct th
sovereign affairs of a sovereign goveri'
ment within internationally recognized
borders.

With respect to the other question
it is clear that there was a sequence o
events that has been going on for an e
tended period involving actions and
counter-actions, terrorist activity,
across-the-border shelling and rocket u
tacks, and a series of air- and counter
actions. Clearly, this recent crisis is thi
culmmation of a long period of unaccei
table instability in southern Lebanon a
perhaps throughout Lebanon. I think
there will have to be a very careful
analysis of events associated with this
recent crisis before the kind of value
judgment you've asked for would be a
propriate.

1
i

'Press release 203 of June 21, 1982. ■!

60

Department of State Bulla

AFRICA

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Chester A. Crocker

Statement before the Subcornmittee
tkn Foreign Operations of the House Ap-

oropriations Committee on March 25,
it 1982. Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary

for African Affairs. '

[ appreciate this opportunity to discuss
vith you the integrated foreign
issistance budget for Africa which the
President has proposed for fiscal year
a|L983. We view this budget as vitally im-
jortant since it represents the principal
;ool the U.S. Government has at its
iisposal for effecting its goals in the
'oreign policy area.

About 1 year ago, this Administra-
ion initially defined its foreign policy
)bjectives for Africa. I would like to
■eview those objectives for you and what
believe are our accomplishments to
late, and then take a look at the un-
inished agenda which remains —
■specially in relation to the assistance
irograms the President has proposed to
he Congress.

J.S. Objectives

nd Accomplishments

'rom the outset we have sought to pro-
lote peace and regional security in
ifrica and to deny opportunities to all
tiose who pursue contrary objectives.
^e promised to support proven friends
nd to be a reliable partner, in Africa as
Isewhere. We stated our interest in
laintaining access to key resources and
icreasing mutually advantageous trade
nd investment. We said that we sup-
ort peaceful solutions to the problems
f southern Africa, and, as you know,
le search for that goal has been one of
ur major activities over the past year,
/e pledged ourselves to make a special
ffort on behalf of that group of nations
1 Africa whose development policies
roduce genuine economic progress and
'hich have working democratic institu-
ons. And we promised to do our share
1 meeting Africa's humanitarian needs
nd in supporting basic human liberties,
1 keeping both with American prin-
iples and American interests.

In the first year of the Reagan Ad-
linistration we have made a good
leasure of progress. We have actively
'nt support to various efforts, especially
lose initiated by the African states
lemselves, designed to stop hostilities
nd establish the structures necessary

Wuly1982

for peace in several parts of Africa. The
Organization of African Unity (OAU),
under the positive and energetic leader-
ship of Kenya's President Daniel arap
Moi, has undertaken a number of ini-
tiatives which we supported either
politically or materially. In Chad we pro-
vided nonlethal equipment and supplies
for the Nigerian and Zairian contingents
of the OAU peacekeeping force. We con-
tinue to give full diplomatic support to
the OAU peace effort in the Western
Sahara.

In southern Africa our efforts as a
member of the contact group have been
instrumental in bringing the peace proc-
ess there close to the point where phase
one of the three-phase Namibia negotia-
tions is almost complete. Good friends in
Africa have had ample demonstrations
throughout this year that the support
and friendship of the United States is
not in doubt, and we have thus made
considerable progress in strengthening
the resolve of a number of these states
in resisting the pressures and ex-
periments in adventurism which the
Soviets and their surrogates continue.

The private sector, both in the
United States and in Africa, has been
engaged in a serious effort to expand
our commercial links in ways which are
genuinely beneficial to both parties and
which we believe will ultimately
strengthen African economies where the
private sector is still nascent and fragile
or discouraged by the negative ex-
periences of the past two decades. The
Agency for International Development
(AID) has initiated new programs
designed both to stimulate additional in-
vestment opportunities and to assist in a
variety of ways the further development
of African entrepreneurship. Our most
dramatic recent initiative in this area
was a high-level trade and investment
mission to a numbei' of African countries
led by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm
Baldrige and Secretary of Agriculture
John R. Block.

In short, we have made solid prog-
ress on several fronts, not as the key
player in the African drama and certain-
ly not as either Africa's principal "angel
of mercy" or as its policeman, but rather
as one important member of a team of
like-minded nations which have the con-
tinent's long-term interests at heart.

Of course, much remains to be done.
Africa still faces a range of problems,
some resulting from natural causes and
others manmade. A number of African

countries have what I can only describe
as dangerously troubled economies.
Others live in the shadow of different
threats, such as those posed by hostile
neighbors. Only a few seem to be
holding their own.

Assistance Proposals

The assistance programs which we are
proposing are designed to address both
economic and security goals, for we
recognize that sooner or later peace and
development are interdependent sides of
the same coin. We expect that our ef-
forts, combined with those of other
Western and multilateral donors, will
achieve further progress. Clearly the
process will not be quick or easy, for
reasons that are well known. Africa has
the worst economic growth rate of any
continent. It contains two-thirds of those
countries certified by the United Nations
as being the very poorest. It is also the
only continent with declining per capita
food production. Last year Africa's food
import bill alone rose by 17%, or $1
billion, an amount equivalent to our total
aid program. Many African nations are
caught in the merciless squeeze of high
oil prices, stagnating export production,
and ever-mounting debt. All too often
governments have opted for economic
policies which work against sustained,
real economic growth. We are encour-
aged, however, by a growing awareness
among Africans themselves that an im-
proved economic policy climate, com-
bined with increased trade and invest-
ment, is the real key to economic growth
and that without growth, equity will re-
main elusive.

We are not proposing charity pro-
grams. In every case, the development
and security measures which we support
with our aid require resource com-
mitments and often tough decisions by
the Africans themselves. Our economic
programs, funded by development
assistance, economic support funds
(ESF), and PL 480, encourage and sup-
port the self-help efforts of the Africans
and are designed to complement the
much larger resource flows provided by
multilateral institutions — chiefly the
World Bank — as well as the economic
stabilization programs of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). Our securi-
ty assistance programs, constituting less
than one-quarter of our total request,
provide a minimum level of response to
those of our friends who face armed
enemies. We recognize that security pro-
grams cost money which, in a perfect
world, could be devoted to economic pro-
grams. We are requesting $210 million

61

AFRICA

of our $234 million foreign military sales
(FMS) in direct credits so that we can
ease the repayment burden by offering
concessional terms. Nevertheless, in
Africa, as in the United States where
security needs exist, they must be ad-
dressed.

Our total proposed FY 1983 Africa
assistance program is divided as follows:

Development Assistance $324 niillion

Economic Support Funds 325

PL 480, Title I & III 117

PL 480, Title II 75

Foreign Military Sales 234

International Military 9

Education and Training

Program
TOTAL $1,084 million

Our program is focused on regions
where U.S. economic interests and
security interests are greatest. For ex-
ample, in FY 1981, 41% of the total
budget was allocated to six key coun-
tries— Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Zim-
babwe, Liberia, and Zaire. For FY 1983,
the same six account for 62%. We
believe the quantitative increase I have
just cited is indicative of a qualitative in-
crease in both the country specific pro-
grams and in the African assistance pro-
gram as a whole.

Sudan. Sudan is a country of great
strategic importance which lives under
constant threat from Libyan efforts at
subversion and has a dangerously
troubled economy. Its location on the
Red Sea, between Libya and Ethiopia,
and south of Egypt makes its impor-
tance and its major problems quite evi-
dent. Our proposed programs there in-
clude $25 million in development
assistance — focused on integrated rural
development— $100 million in FMS, $70
million in ESF, $30 million in PL-480
Title I and III, and $1.5 million in
IMET.

Horn of Africa and the Indian
Ocean. Here we are proposing programs
for five African states: Kenya, Somalia,
Djibouti, Seychelles, and Mauritius. The
countries of this region face unprec-
edented economic difficulties and must
consider their security needs in the light
of Soviet and Cuban military presence in
Ethiopia, South Yemen, and the Indian
Ocean. Kenya and Somalia also provide
critical facilities for the use of U.S.
forces temporarily in that area. For

FY 1983 ASSISTAI
(

PL 480

PL 480

Development

(Titles

(Title

Assistance

ESF

I/III)

II)'

FMS

IMET2

Total

Angola

-

-

-

.4

-

-

.4

Benin

_

—

—

.5

-

_

.5

Botswana

-

10

—

1.1

5

.125

16.2

Burundi

5.6

-

-

2.4

-

.03

8

Cameroon

17

_

_

1

10

.150

28.2

Cape Verde

2.2

-

-

.8

-

.035

3

Central African

1

-

-

-

_

—

1

Republic

Chad

-

—

_

.2

_

_

.2

Comoros

—

—

-

.3

_

_

.3

Congo

2

-

-

.3

-

.035

2.3

Dijibouti

-

2

-

2.6

1.5

.100

6.2

Equatorial Guinea

1

-

-

.3

_

.05

1.4

Ethiopia

-

-

-

1.9

-

-

1.9

Gabon

_

_

_

_

3

.100

3.1

The Gambia

5.1

_

_

.9

_

_

6

Ghana

4.6

_

7

6.2

_

.45

18.3

Guinea

2

-

2.5

.3

_

.035

4.8

Guinea-Bissau

2

-

-

.4

-

.035

2.4

Ivory Coast

Kenya

Lesotho
Liberia

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mozambique

28

10.8
12

7

9.7

6.8

30

32

15
11

3.5

8.8
.4

4.2
.7
.6

35

15

.05

1.5

.80

.02
.06
.125
.05

.05

112.5

19.6
71.2

1

7.7

9.8

11.1

6.2

.6

these five countries our suggested pro-
gram levels total:

Development Assistance $ 45 million
Foreign Military Sales 66.5

(of which $21 million

is concessional)
Economic Support Funds 61
PL 480, Titles I and III 33.5

International Military 2.1

Education and Training

Program
TOTAL $208.1 million

West Africa. This area contains a
number of states where adequate aid is
essential to prevent economic instability
and Libyan adventurism from damaging
U.S. interests. This danger is real.
Declining economic conditions in Ghana
were major factors leading to last
December's coup. The Libyans moved
rapidly to try to take advantage of the

situation. Other potential danger spots
include Cameroon, Gabon, Niger,
Senegal, and Liberia. In Liberia, a coun
try in which we have important strategi
interests and substantial American in-
vestment, our aid is part of a carefully
structured program aimed at promoting
the economic recovery which is vital to
political stability. West Africa is an ares
which rarely captures the headlines but
is susceptible to destabilization of the
type in which Libya is fast becoming an
expert. The poverty of the Sahel pro-
vides Libya its main opportunity there.
Our aid will help to insure continued ac-
cess to important facilities and to build
economically and politically self-
confident states around Nigeria — our
second largest source of imported oil.

I

on

Si

'U
|ile

E(
Tr

Hi
m

It

62

Department of State Bulletii

k

L

>TS FOR AFRICA

[iger
figeria

.wanda

ao Tome

enegal

eychelles

ierra Leone

omalia

udan

waziland

'anzania
ogo

fganda
fpper Volta

aire

ambia

imbabwe

Subtotal

ahel Regional
outhern Africa
Regional
irica Regional

•OTAL

Development
Assistance

15.7
5.3

ESF

PL 480
(Titles
I/III)

PL 480

(Title

II)'

.1
3.3

FMS IMET2 Totals

1.5

.45

.075

26.3

10.4

_

-

-

.06

-

-

.06

16.9

10

8

8.9

5

.45

49.3

-

2

-

.4

-

-

2.4

1

-

3

1.3

-

.025

5.3

17

25

15

3.7

30

.055

91.3

25

70

30

3.4

100

1.5

229.9

6.5

-

-

.7

-

-

7.2

10.2

_

5

2.5

—

.075

17.8

2.9

-

-

1.6

-

.075

4.6

5.5

_

_

_

_

.050

5.6

9.8

-

-

7.7

-

.135

17.6

10

15

10

2.1

20

1.3

58.4

—

20

7

-

-

.150

27.2

-

75

-

-

3

.150

78.2

242.8

298

117

74.7

234

8.7

975.5

27.6

_

_

_

_

_

27.6

3

27

-

-

-

-

30

50

-

-

-

-

-

50

323.4

325

117

74.7

234

8.7

1,083.1

' Includes world food program, voluntary agency and government programs; does not
iclude emergency feeding programs that may be necessary in 1983.

2 Includes military assistance program ($.175).

s Does not include Peace Corps, military assistance program, or international narcotics
antrol.

'he totals for this category are as
dUows:

•evelopment
Assistance

$ 62 million

oreign Military
Sales

38

Iconomic Support
Funds

47

•L 480, Titles I & III

19

nternational Military
Education and

1.950

Training Progam
:OTAL

$167,950 million

Southern Africa. We propose pro-
-ams for seven nations — Botswana,
jesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire,
'imbabwe, and Zambia and the southern
Africa regional program. The totals are:

Jevelopment

Assistance $ 34.3 million

foreign Military Sales 28

Economic Support

Funds 147

(including $27 million for

the southern Africa

regional prog^ram)
PL 480, Title I 17

International Military 1.785

Education and

Training Program
TOTAL $228.1 million

In Southern Africa our policy is
designed to insure continued Western
access to Itey strategic minerals, to pro-
mote regional stability, to reduce oppor-
tunities for Soviet and Cuban exploita-
tion, and to seek negotiated solutions to
the key problems of the region. The
historic conflicts in southern Africa have
provided the greatest opportunities to
date for malign exploitation. We also
have commitments to assist in the
development of the front-line states

AFRICA

whose participation is essential to a suc-
cessful Namibia peace agreement. I can-
not stress too strongly the importance of
our assistance programs in relation to
our ongoing southern Africa strategy
which is, as you know, a major focal
point of this Administration's Africa
policy. Our commitments and the overall
level and thrust of these assistance pro-
grams are watched very carefully by the
countries of the region as the real test
of our sincerity and seriousness of pur-
pose there. In Zaire our continuing
assistance helps to promote economic
and other reforms and to forestall a
repetition of events like the 1978 Shaba
invasion.

A substantial portion of our aid is
proposed for countries which rank
among the world's poorest. Some of
these countries are of high strategic im-
portance, and like Somalia and Sudan,
are among those mentioned in the
categories I have just described. Many,
despite current problems, have great
economic potential. In all cases, our
assistance reflects President Reagan's
pledge at Cancun to maintain a generous
level of assistance to the poorer coun-
tries. Typically, our aid to these coun-
tries is provided through small, sharply
focused development assistance pro-
grams, complemented where necessary
by PL 480.

I know you share with me a deep
and serious concern for the goals we
pursue through the means of these pro-
posed programs even though some of
you may differ with us over some of the
details. We live in a time when the
United States and its friends and those
who would be our friends find them-
selves assaulted on several fronts by
problems of enormous scale and enemies
as dangerous as they are implacable. I
believe the programs outlined in this
presentation help address those prob-
lems and meet the challenge those
enemies present in a thoughtful, con-
structive, and effective manner.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

uly1982

63

DEPARTMENT

n

FY 1983 Authorization
Request

by Secretary Haig

Statement before the Subcommittee
on State, Justice, Commerce, and the
Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations
Committee on May U, 1982}

It is a great pleasure to be here today to
begin hearings on the President's FY
1983 budget for the Department of
State.

The international challenges and op-
portunities facing the United States to-
day have placed the Foreign Service and
the Department of State in the front-line
defense of our national interests. Ac-
curate and clear reporting are critical if
we are to anticipate political and
economic events. Intellectual and
diplomatic creativity are essential if we
are to establish and sustain the trust,
friendship, and understanding of other
countries. A strong and vital Foreign
Service enables us to handle the
multitude of foreign policy problems, in-
cluding the preservation of peace.

The President recognizes that suc-
cessful diplomacy rests on a solid foun-
dation of strength and resolve. But
renewed military strength serves its
true purpose of preserving peace when
it is accompanied by diplomatic efforts
to settle disputes, strengthen alliances,
promote development, and reduce the
risks of war. As a soldier as well as a
diplomat, I can tell you that diplomacy is
an investment in deterrence itself.
The task of statesmanship is to
shape events, not merely to react to
them. In a world marked by many
powers and interests, the President has
established a transcending objective for
the United States— to create an interna-
tional environment hospitable to
American values, especially the freedom
and creativity of the individual. To ac-
complish this task, we have emphasized
the strengthening of our traditional
alliances and the nurturing of new part-
nerships, the promotion of peaceful
progress in the developing world, and
the achievement of a relationship with
the Soviet Union based on restraint and
reciprocity. We can influence interna-
tional events if we have the knowledge
and the sensitivity to appreciate regional
realities and the unique circumstances of
every country. This can only be done if

64

we have the informed reporting and the
understanding of our professional
Foreign Service.

The budget before you is necessary
to sustain the excellence of the Foreign
Service. We put it forward fully
recognizing the requirements of these
austere times, and we are committed to
the President's program of fiscal
restraint. The Department has done its
full share to meet the reductions re-
quired by this program. In FY 1982
alone, the Department has reduced more
than $200 million from our March 1981
request. As a consequence, there have
also been substantial reductions in the
Department's activities. The 1983 budget
request is, therefore, critical if we are to
continue to meet U.S. foreign policy
goals.

Operational funding in the 1983
budget is approximately equal in con-
stant dollars to the 1974 appropriations.
During this same period, the respon-
sibilities of the Department have grown,
and the complexities of diplomacy have
increased. However, our key resource-
people— has declined in numbers. The
Department has also been forced to
reduce expenditures for a number of ma-
jor activities in order to absorb many
new programs. All too frequently, we
have failed to make the provisions
necessary today to insure a better serv-
ice tomorrow.

This dangerous trend must be
reversed. The 1983 budget proposes pru-
dent increases that constitute a long-
term investment in both personnel and
property. Even with these modest
changes, we will have the smallest
budget outlays of any cabinet-level agen-
cy. With the full support of this commit-
tee and the Congress, the Department
will be able to make major cost-effective
strides toward meeting its objectives.

Under Secretary Kennedy [for
Management Richard T.] and other rep-
resentatives of the Department will ad-
dress the specifics of the budget, but
allow me to mention certain items which
are of particular significance.

• About 82% of our total 1983 in-
crease is needed just to operate at cur-
rent levels. Most of this increase offsets
the effects of overseas wage and price
increases in countries abroad where in-
flation is often substantially higher than
in the United States. Also, burgeoning
passport and consular requirements will

din

jrffl

)B-i

Iff

ion

in

fc

alone require over 100 new positions in
1983.

• The remaining 18% of our 1983
increase is for several programs of key
importance. This includes resources as
part of a continuing program supportec
by the Congress to strengthen substan-
tive political and economic reporting an
analysis in critical regions such as the
Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia.

• A lean and efficient cadre of pro-
fessional officers is required to perform
effectively a myriad of foreign policy
responsibilities. As a step in implement
ing the Foreign Service Act of 1980, th
1983 budget includes a modest incre
ment of new positions and funds to
carry out a mandatory midlevel trainin]
program for career officers. This invest
ment in education will strengthen our
capacity to manage U.S. foreign policy
by insuring that officers achieve high
standards of professional excellence.

The budget also funds the first
phase of construction for our new em-
bassy complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
This project is imperative physically an.
politically. The upcoming shift of the
Saudi diplomatic capital from Jidda to
Riyadh in the fall of 1983— a distance c
800 miles— makes this project
necessary. Without it, relations betwee:
the United States and our Saudi allies
will be hampered as they proceed to
establish formally this new diplomatic
capital. In addition, further delaying
construction of the chancery and em-
bassy residences to 1984 will increase
the total cost of this project by some $'
million because of inflation and rental
costs.

The 1983 budget also provides for
necessary efficiencies and economies in
areas throughout the Department.

• We want to enhance communica-
tions and computer capacity, particular
by updating obsolete systems. This will
include continuing development of the
new financial management system so
policymakers in the Department can
make sound decisions on resource alloc
tions.

• Additional resources are needed
for the President's program to combat
waste, fraud, and mismanagement.

• Strengthened administrative
capacity is required in underdeveloped
countries where our workload has
dramatically increased.

These efforts, while requiring
relatively small investments, will more
than pay for themselves through the
cost-savings they will achieve. Delay on

Department of State Bullet

£AST ASIA

uch matters will not only aggravate
urrent inefficiencies but mean higher
tart-up costs in the future.

These additional resource re-
uirements are necessary to maintain
he Department's institutional respon-
ibilities. But our foreign service and
ther employees are also facing real
angers abroad. I must reemphasize to
he committee that security for our per-
onnel remains the Department's highest
riority. Indeed, because of the recent
idividual acts of terrorism directed
gainst specific officers abroad, such as
Iharge Chapman, General Dozier, and
issistant Military Attache Ray, we are
loving rapidly to blunt this growing
nreat to the safety of our employees.
lU urgent request to meet 1982 sup-
lemental security requirements has
ecently been transmitted to Congress
hich will provide additional armored
ehicles and guard services and improve
ublic access controls and communica-
ons.

In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy
lUst provide a broad framework to
)ster respect for individual liberty, to

preserve peace, to increase security, and
to promote development. But if the
United States is to conduct an effective
policy directed toward the goals, then
the State Department must have the
necessary resources; we simply cannot
carry out our foreign policy initiatives,
including programs of military and
developmental aid, unless we have an
adequate infrastructure. I am confident
that we will continue to receive your
support for this infrastructure in the
crucial times ahead.

This budget is the product of
rigorous effort. It constitutes a sound
program for the conduct of current
operations, and, just as important, it of-
fers an investment for the future. The
American people and the foreign policy
professionals who serve them so well
deserve no less.

'Press release 156. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■

=Y 1983 Assistance Requests

,1 John H. Holdridge

Statement before the Subcommittee
I Government Operations of the House
^ypropriations Committee on March 30,
>S2. Ambassador Holdridge is Assistant
zcretary for East Asian and Pacific Af-

am pleased with the opportunity to ex-
ain our FY 1983 budget request and
s relationship to U.S. interests in the
acific and how it serves these interests
/ meeting the needs of regional states
id institutions.

.S. Interests

he U.S. assistance programs to East
-sian and Pacific countries are designed
3 serve the many U.S. interests in this
ighly important region. It is important
:>r us to strengthen the ties with our
•lends and allies in East Asia and help
nem maintain their independence and
;rritorial integrity in the face of cur-
ent and potential threats.

East Asia contains some of the
/orld's most rapidly growing economies,
nd the economic ties of these nations to
he United States are of increasing im-
lortance to our economy. In fact, for 10

consecutive years our Asian Pacific
trade has surpassed that with Western
Europe. We must maintain access to
vital raw materials for which the region
is a significant source.

Protection of key sea lanes of com-
munications in the region and those that
link East Asia to the Indian Ocean and
the Middle East is crucial to U.S. secu-
rity. This aspect of U.S. security war-
rants special attention considering the
increased Soviet ability to threaten the
sea lanes and thereby deny Middle
Eastern petroleum to our major East
Asian allies, as well as other vital trade
among regional states such as exists be-
tween Japan and Australia.

Enhancing the stability of friendly
governments of the area facilitates their
serving as forces for peace and develop-
ment in the region and permits them to
act in ways that further our common
global security and other interests. We
also believe that stable, self-confident
governments will be more inclined to
undertake actions which will improve
the human rights situation and the
humanitarian services in their countries,
thereby serving the U.S. global interests
in furthering human rights. Human
rights abuses undermine governmental

legitimacy and thereby may become a
destabilizing factor tending to vitiate
other components of our strategy to
foster peace, prosperity, and stability.

The increasing strength of the
Soviet Union's military forces in East
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle
East prompts some of our particular
concerns, and the continuing threat to
South Korea from North Korea and to
Thailand from Vietman are the source of
special assistance efforts. In this con-
text, a strong U.S. military presence in
East Asia is essential, and unhampered
use of military facilities such as those in
the Phillippines are an essential compo-
nent of this presence. In turn, our
assistance program is an integral part of
our good relations with the Philippines
on which effective use of these facilities
depends.

Maintenance of stability on the
Korean Peninsula depends upon
strengthening the South Korean Armed
Forces to balance the large and well-
equipped forces of North Korea. The
security of the entire North Pacific
would be seriously impaired if the
Korean balance were upset.

The strengthening of Thailand's
armed forces is essential at this point
considering Vietnam's continued mOitary
occupation of Kampuchea and its recent
force improvements in that country.
Confidence in the effectiveness of the
U.S. contribution of Thailand's defense
is a key factor in ASEAN [Association
of South East Asian Nations] percep-
tions of a positive and effective U.S.
policy in the area. In the wake of Viet-
nam's invasion of Kampuchea, the
ASEAN members have also wisely
undertaken military modernization pro-
grams which we are supporting.

Unfortunately, U.S. interests and
East Asian needs must be addressed in
the context of severe economic con-
straints which affect both our friends
and ourselves. High petroleum prices,
the inflated cost of hardware, sharp
limits on grant aid or concessional fi-
nancing, and growing debt servicing
problems are among the factors which
hamper the defense procurement pro-
grams of our East Asian allies and
friends.

Regional Program Overview

Conceptually, FY 1983's military and
economic development assistance pro-
grams are integrated components of a
single strategic package. All components
are directly related to U.S. strategic in-
terests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
but my remarks today concern primarily

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65

EAST ASIA

military assistance— the foreign nnilitary
sales (FMS), international miliUry
education and training (IMET), and
economic support funds (ESF) programs
which we have proposed for FY 1983.

The preponderance of security
assistance program resources is
allocated to countries facing the greatest
and most immediate military threats-
Korea and Thailand— or, in the case of
the Philippines, providing military
facilities from which to deter or resist
aggression. Thus, these three countries
receive some $416.4, or 86% of the total
$482.7 FMS, ESF, and IMET funds pro-
posed for East Asia. Inclusion of the
$950,000 in military assistance program
(MAP) funds to meet the costs of com-
pleting former MAP programs would
not change the percentages since the
same three countries should receive all
but $100,000 of the total funding pro-
posed.

The largest recipients of economic
assistance— development assistance and
PL 480— include the Philippines and
Thailand, as well as Indonesia, which oc-
cupies a i<ey strategic location and is the
poorest country in ASEAN. They
receive some $175.8, or approximately
65% of the $270.4 proposed for the
region.

The total amount of U.S. assistance
proposed for East Asian countries in FY
1983— FMS, ESF, MAP, IMET, devel-
opment assistance, and PL 480— is ap-
proximately $677.7, an increase of $93.6
million over FY 1982. Most— that is,
$87.4 of the increase, is for security
assistance— FMS, ESF, and IMET.
Most of this increase is for FMS credits
to assist Korea and Thailand, the two
most threatened countries, to cope with
the combination of serious military
threats and increasing defense procure-
ment difficulties. Some additional
specifics may help put the request in
perspective.

• Our FMS request of $413.5 million
for the region is an increase of $80.5
million over the final FY 1982 allocation
of $333 million. However, it exceeds our
original congressional presentation docu-
ment request of $355 million by only
$58.5 million, and by less than this in
real terms, of course. As I will discuss
shortly, these modest increases afford
minimum levels to redress risky short-
falls in two principal strategic areas-
Northeast and Southeast Asia.

• Our IMET proposal of $9.2 million
is an increase of $2.4 million over the
final FY 1982 level of $6.8 million but a
much smaller increase of only $230,000
over the original congressional presenta-
tion document request of $8.9 million.

• Our ESF request of $60 million
represents an increase of $4.5 million
over the $55.5 million in the final alloca-
tion for FY 1982. Actually this is an in-
crease of $4 million in country programs
since $500,000 of the FY 1982 program
is for a one-time oceanographic project.

I should mention that straight cash
sales far exceed our assistance pro-
grams. The estimated level of such sales
for FY 1982 is $4.5 billion and for FY
1983 is $2.3 billion.

Northeast Asia

Korea. The continuation of peace and
stability in Northeast Asia is very impor-
tant to the security and prosperity of
the United States. Deterrence of North
Korean aggression against South Korea
is essential to the maintenance of that
peace and stability. The fact that we
have had peace in the area during the
past 25 years is due in no small measure
to our determination to resist aggres-
sion. That resolve has also enabled the
people of the Republic of Korea to
devote needed efforts to development.
These efforts have been rewarded by un-
precedented levels of economic growth
and corresponding improvements in
their living standards.

Despite this record of success, the
need for continued U.S. support re-
mains. The steady buildup of military
force by North Korea, which has been in
progress since the late 1960s, continued
unabated during the past 12 months.
Because we have taken steps during
that same period to improve the
capabilities of our own forces and to
assist the South Koreans to do the
same, we have not fallen further behind
the North. Nevertheless, an imbalance
persists on the peninsula and is likely to
persist despite our best efforts for a
number of years to come. North Korea
now has a decided advantage in numbers
of combat divisions, tanks, artillery and
armored personnel carriers, and a two-
to-one numerical superiority in fighter
aircraft. Moreover, it has shown an in-
creasingly sophisticated ability to mount
the sort of complex, large-scale
maneuvers which would be required for
an invasion of the South. In sum. North
Korean capabilities have become steadily
more formidable, and continuing efforts
on our part are required.

During the past year, we have seen
steady progress in South Korea toward
a more open political system. Martial
law was lifted early in 1981. The curfew
in effect since the end of the Korean
war was removed in January of this
year. There has been increasing activity

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on the part of the National Assembly ii i"S
asserting a significant role for itself vii
a-vis the government. There have been
number of amnesties during the past
year, the most recent on March 2,
affecting nearly 3,000 prisoners, almos
300 of whom could be termed political
prisoners. As you know. President Chu
in January of last year commuted Kim
Dae Jung's death sentence to life im-
prisonment. On March 2 that sentence
was reduced to 20 years. Other
prisoners associated with Kim and witl
the events in Kwanju in May 1980 wen
released or had their sentences reducec

Korea, nonetheless, remains an
authoritarian society. We believe,
however, that the Korean Government
intends to move in the direction of fur-
ther liberalization, and they know that
this they would have our full support.
Korean leaders are aware of our con-
cerns about human rights in their coun
try, as elsewhere, and we are hopeful
that the situation will continue to im-
prove.

During the past 12 months there
have been several efforts on the part o
President Chun to stimulate a dialogue
with the North, most recently on
January 22. This was the most com-
prehensive set of measures ever pro-
posed by either side, addressing both tl
fundamental question of reunification s
well as the need to take steps to reduc
tension in the period before reunificatii
could be accomplished. We believe this
was a reasonable, realistic, and forwar
looking proposal for which we have
declared our full support. The North
Korean response has been disappointim
if predictable. Pyongyang, in essence,
has repeated its call for American
withdrawal and change of government
in the South as a prerequisite to any
progress. President Chun's proposal
deserved a more considered response
and we believe the ball clearly remains
in North Korea's court.

North Korea remains an enigma to
the United States. As I indicated earlie
there is no sign of a constructive North
Korean approach to relations with the
South in the short term. This may,
however, change in time. Given the
dramatic growth in South Korea's
economic strength, its increasing inter-
national influence, and its continued
domestic stability, Pyongyang may
ultimately recognize that over the long
term, the balance of power and influen
on the peninsula will shift inexorably
toward the South. This may eventually
become clear on the military front as
well, where North Korea's industrial

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Department of State Bulleti

EAST ASIA

ase is increasingly strained by the
iirden of its military buildup, while the
outh Korean economic infrastructure
jntinues to be enhanced, increasing
outh Korea's ability to support its own
)rces. Logic would suggest, therefore,
lat the North might one day— perhaps
jlatively soon— conclude that South
:orea must be recognized as a viable en-
ty with which it must deal peacefully,
in the other hand, however, we have no
jason to believe that Kim II Sung, in
ict, is approaching this realization. In-
;ead, his strategy appears to remain
ne of waiting for an opportunity to
junite Korea on his own terms,
irough whatever means— including
lilitary— that may be required.

There is no sign that our assistance
) South Korea has generated an anti-
imerican backlash. We undoubtedly
ave seen fewer manifestations of anti-
mericanism there than in any other
)untry in which we have a large
lilitary presence. You may be aware
lat the U.S. International Communica-
on Agency office in Pusan was the
irget of arsonists last week, who
istributed anti- American leaflets as
ley left the scene. While this was
seply disturbing, it was, we are confi-
ent, an aberration. It promoted a
2art-warming display of concern and
;gret among Koreans of all walks of
fe in Pusan and elsewhere, for whom
le U.S. -Korean relationship remains, as
has been for the past 30 years, a
)urce of reassurance.

Our proposed program of $210
lillion in FMS credits for Korea— an in-
i, rease of $44 mUlion over FY 82— is the
Irgest dollar increase requested for any
ast Asian country and retains Korea's
Dsition as the largest East Asian FMS
jcipient. Nevertheless, it is a very
lodest program if one considers Korea's
irge military purchasing requirements
nd the funding shortfalls of previous
ears. The FMS credits proposed
eretofore to support the force improve-
lent program have consistently fallen

lort.

The major systems which Seoul is
.xpected to purchase with FMS financ-
ig in order to help redress the military
uildup include a further increment in
he F-5E/F corporation program, a tac-
ical air control package, an indigenous
ank production program, M-88A1 tank
,5« recovery vehicles, TOW [tube-launched,
.ptically tracked, wire-guided] missiles,
,nd hawk surface-to-air missile modifica-
ion equipment.

The proposed IMET program of
)1.85 million is an increase of $450,000,
tir 32% and is essential to improve the
nteroperability of Korean with U.S.

forces and commonality of U.S. -Korea
tactics and doctrine. Moreover, the
Republic of Korea has urgent re-
quirements to develop managerial exper-
tise for its complex defense establish-
ment. Korea also needs to improve its
indigenous training capability.

China. In light of the significant
progress that the United States and
China have made toward establishment
of a normal and mutually beneficial rela-
tionship, the President last year decided
to seek legislative change to laws which
link China with the Soviet bloc and
which are no longer consistent with our
strategic relationship.

China has not been considered to be
part of the Soviet bloc since the 1960s.
U.S. laws should reflect this fact and
our policy which is to treat China as a
friendly but nonallied country with
which we share important interests. We
believe it is no longer in U.S. interests
to treat China as if it continued to be
part of a monolithic Soviet bloc.

This year's foreign assistance bill
contains two proposals that would end
such past discrimination against China:

• Amendment of the Foreign
Assistance Act to eliminate the blanket
prohibition on assistance to China and

• Amendment to the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act
to clarify that China would be eligible
for PL 480.

I would emphasize that we have no
plans to establish bilateral development
assistance or PL 480 programs for
China. Our principal interest in amend-
ing these laws is to insure that, in prin-
ciple, we treat China in the same way
we treat other friendly, nonallied coun-
tries. We do not plan to ask for addi-
tional funds for China as a result of
these amendments.

Amendment of the Foreign As-
sistance Act would allow China to par-
ticipate in ongoing Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) technical
assistance programs, under current
funding levels, in the same manner as do
most other countries. For example,
China could participate in ongoing
agricultural research programs funded
by the United States at the International
Rice Research Institute in the Philip-
pines or in fertilizer development pro-
grams at the International Fertilizer
Development Center in Muscle Shoals,
Alabama. We have not discussed any of
these ideas with the Chinese and will not
do so until the law is amended.

We would, of course, consult closely
with the Congress if, in the future, we
should decide that bilateral PL 480 or

development assistance programs for
China were in the interest of the United
States.

Southeast Asia

Because Southeast Asia is poorer and
more heterogeneous than the Northeast,
U.S. assistance is spread among a
number of recipients, and the various
kinds of aid available have to be careful-
ly adapted to a variety of requirements.

Philippines. Our close relations
with the Philippines are of long stand-
ing. They have demonstrated their
durability. This is especially true in the
security field. The United States and the
Philippines are treaty allies and share
similar views on the strategic challenges
to peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

U.S. military facilities at Subic
Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base
are of major strategic importance to us.
Their advantageous geographical posi-
tion helps facilitate our military opera-
tions in two areas of the world of impor-
tance to us— the western Pacific and the
Indian Ocean.

ESF and FMS levels for FY 1983
are the same as for FY 1982. They
reflect President Carter's pledge to
President Marcos at the time of the
1979 amendment to our Military Bases
Agreement that the U.S. Administration
would make its best effort to secure
$500 million in security assistance for
the Philippines during the period FY
1980-84. We have honored this commit-
ment, and we continue to appreciate the
cooperation of the Congress over the
past 3 years in giving currency to this
pledge. We consider your support for
our FY 1983 request for $100 million in
FMS and ESF to be most important.

The 1979 amendment to our Military
Bases Agreement has worked well. As
called for in the amendment, the United
States and the Philippines will hold a
formal review of the entire bases agree-
ment in 1983-84.

In addition to military assistance, we
have requested $38.8 million in develop-
ment assistance and $14.3 million in PL
480. Any decline in economic assistance
would have serious political and
economic consequences for us. At the
time we negotiated the 1979 bases
amendment, we implicitly committed
ourselves to maintain development
assistance at the 1979 level through
1984.

A significant portion of the Philip-
pine population subsists at levels below
the World Bank's poverty line. Rural
problems are being exploited by the
Communist New People's Army. The

67

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EAST ASIA

government is attempting to improve
living standards and generate employ-
ment in rural areas. Our assistance pro-
gram focuses on agricultural production,
rural employment, and family planning
and, thus, complements the govern-
ment's efforts.

The only proposed MAP increase for
the Philippines is in IMET— an increase
of $300,000 to a total of $1.3 million.
While not a part of our Military Bases
Agreement with the Philippines, IMET
is closely related to it. At the time of the
1979 bases amendment. Secretary Vance
wrote Foreign Minister Romulo that
"We will support those efforts [to
achieve military self-reliance] by means
of our security assistance programs, in-
cluding the important training compo-
nent." The Armed Forces of the
Phillipines have always put a premium
on IMET training. Moreover, the Philip-
pine Armed Forces face a growing
challenge from the New People's Army
insurgency which, if unchecked, could
jeopardize our strategic military
facilities at Clark and Subic. It is
especially important to respond
favorably to Philippine desires for in-
creased IMET to help set the stage for
the Military Bases Agreement review
coming in 1983-84.

Thailand. We have requested $50
million in direct credits and $41 million
in guaranteed credits for Thailand's
FMS program. This is an increase of
36%, or $24 million, in overall FMS
levels and would increase the conces-
sionality of the FY 1982 Thai program.
However, the increases requested for
FY 1983 represent a mere $10 million
over the original FY 1982 congressional
presentation document levels with the
same level of concessional financing as
originally requested for FY 82. Although
we were able to increase assistance in
FY 82, we were able to provide only
$101 million of the $132 million re-
quested in FMS, ESF, IMET, and
development assistance funds.

Thailand has long faced a military
threat from larger, better armed Viet-
namese forces. However, during the
past year, the Vietnamese forces in
Kampuchea have improved their com-
mand and control capabilities and have
increased their operations in the border
area against Kampuchean resistance
forces. Thus, Thailand's force moderni-
zation requirements have become even
more urgent, in both the military and
political sense.

Militarily, the proposed FMS pro-
gram will make a significant contribu-
tion toward the purchase of artillery,
tanks, antitank weapons, coastal patrol

boats, transport aircraft, helicopters, air
defense systems, and mortar locating
radars. These are practical items that
can have an immediate effect in deter-
ring or raising the costs of encroach-
ments into Thai territory.

The political effect of the proposed
program is at least as significant as the
military benefits that should accrue to
Thailand. This is because Thailand's
security, as our own for that matter,
depends not on its Armed Forces alone
but also on its international position and
relationship with friends and allies. The
ASEAN countries regard our support
for Thailand, their front-line state, as
the litmus test of our commitment to
support them and to maintain our status
as a Pacific power. By assisting
Thailand, we are promoting our relation-
ship with ASEAN and our overall posi-
tion in the region as well. Inadequate
assistance levels could undermine
ASEAN unity and give the wrong
signals to the countries of the area, in-
cluding the Vietnamese.

Thailand is expected to incur serious
debt servicing problems by 1985 unless
current account adjustments are made.
The Royal Thai Government has had to
forego commercial borrowing for
defense purposes and, instead, rely on
internal revenues and government-to-
government loans. Concessional financ-
ing will reinforce the sound decision to
avoid commercial borrowing.

Failure to provide adequate conces-
sional financing and sufficient overall
levels of FMS to Thailand risks un-
acceptable military and political costs to
U.S. interests. Militarily, it would force
Thailand to choose between foregoing
needed force modernization on one hand
or impairment of the sound economy
needed to cope with protracted internal
and external threats. Politically,
Thailand and other ASEAN states
would receive the wrong signal, i.e., that
the United States lacks the resolve to
give adequate assistance to the country
perceived by the entire region as the
front-line state at a time that Hanoi is
improving its forces in Kampuchea.

Our FMS concerns for Thailand
focus on two factors:

• Overall levels— the importance of
which I have just discussed.

• The degree of concessionality — in
order to assist Thailand to cope with a
short-term balance-of-payments problem
while sustaining sufficient economic
growth to maintain internal stability.

The requested increase of $750,000,
or 52%, in Thailand's IMET program to

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a level of $2.2 million is essential to su 0
port the crucial military modernization
efforts undertaken by the Thai Govern Jaii
ment. Historically, Thailand makes ful d
use of its IMET funds: during the first
quarter of FY 1982, it has already
obligated over $1.2 million of its $1.45
million allocation.

The $10 million in ESF requested
for Thailand equals the original congref^
sional presentation document request
FY 1982. Thai cooperation with our
refugee and Khmer relief efforts are
pillars of U.S. strategy on Kampuchea
ESF monies provide an important par
of the funding levels needed to induce
continued Thai cooperation on refugee
and Khmer relief-related issues.

The $28 million development
assistance proposed for Thailand is
designed to promote growth in the
private sector as well as to assist Thai
Government efforts to reduce poverty
and accelerate rural development in
politically sensitive backward areas, pg
ticularly northeast Thailand. The Thai
Government recognizes that underde-
velopment and unacceptable income
disparities are a threat to Thai securit;
and accords the highest priority in its
budget to development.

Thailand is a less developed countr
which exports raw materials and basic
manufactures — rice, tapioca, rubber, t
and textiles — and which imports capiti
goods and most of its fuel. Internation
market conditions, together with great
needs for public and private investmer
have resulted in growing current ac-
count deficits financed by rapidly risin
public and private debt. Inflation was
very high in 1979 and 1980 and only
somewhat moderated to around 15% ii
1981. Prudent management requires
that the government takes steps to hai f«
the growth of debt in order to avoid
serious debt-service problems in the n€
term. Support in the form of "stand-by
arrangements with International
Monetary Fund and World Bank lendh
and increased concessional financing o:
military expenditures are all essential
elements in the Thai program.

Thailand's continued independence,
territorial integrity, and stability, free
any dominating influence by an un-
friendly power, are central to the stabi
ty of Southeast Asia and to the unity o
ASEAN and is a prime objective of U.I
policy in the region. U.S. leaders, in-
cluding President Reagan, have restate
our commitment to Thailand under the
Manila pact and have made clear our
continued support for Thai security
needs.

Our proposed assistance program

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Department of State Bulletil

EAST ASIA

'/" tihances and encourages Thai coopera-
on with other U.S. policy objectives in
hailand, including more rapid economic
nd social development, narcotics con-
ol, and assistance to Indochinese
ifugees using Thailand as a country of
rst asylum.

'd Indonesia. We are proposing in-
'm reasing our FMS and military training
1 1 Indonesia because of its strategic im-
ortance and to bolster its defenses
gainst an increasing Soviet military
leajresence in Southeast Asia and
ietnam's invasion of Kampuchea.
Indonesia has the world's fifth
irgest population, a strategic location,
rovides 6% of U.S. petroleum imports,
nd generally plays a moderate and
iendly role in the nonaligned move-
lent, the Islamic Conference, and the
'rganization of Petroleum Exporting
ountries. The Suharto Government is
:rongly anti-Communist, plays a key
3le in ASEAN's resistance to expand-
ig Soviet and Vietnamese influence in
le region, and supports the U.S. posi-
on on many global and regional issues.
idonesia's leaders view our assistance
3 an important indicator of the
;rength of our relationship. Despite its
il resources, Indonesia remains one of
le poorest countries in the world, with
per capita GNP of $431 annually. The
juntry faces difficult problems of a
rowing work force, very high popula-
on density on Java, and the probable

I.id of oil exports in the 1990's. In-
onesia is the key to stability in
outheast Asia, and we need to do all
'6 can to help it continue the impressive
lonomic progress it has achieved since
uharto took power in 1965.

The $50 million requested in FMS
redits represents an increase of $10
lillion over the FY 1982 allocation but
nly $5 million over the originally re-
uested congressional presentation docu-
lent level. This assistance plays a
ignificant role in developing Indonesian
apabilities to patrol and defend the
trategic waterways surrounding this
iland nation. Moreover, this expendi-
are is a modest investment to make in
ne largest member of ASEAN.

Their FMS credits will be used to
inance a small portion of Indonesia's
lilitary modernization including the pur-
hase of MlOl howitzers, MK-46
orpedoes, ship overhaul, and possible
lew aircraft acquisitions.

The IMET program of $2.6 million
/ill permit about 270 students to receive
raining in U.S. military schools. The
raining will cover a wide spectrum of
rofessional, managerial, advanced, and

technical courses. Moreover, the Indone-
sians have begun placing more emphasis
on in-country training through the use of
mobile training teams in order to in-
crease the number of students who
benefit from the training. Thirteen
teams are programmed for FY 1983,
covering naval operations, resource
management, and artillery operations
and maintenance.

We are attempting to maintain the
level of development assistance because
it makes a crucial contribution to In-
donesia's development and long-run
political and economic stability. We have
reduced PL 480 Title I substantially
since FY 1980 because of budget strin-
gencies and Indonesia's improved food
situation, but a small program remains
in our political and commercial interest.

Our proposed $65 million in develop-
ment assistance and $27.3 million in PL
480 Titles I and II will help the Indone-
sian Government deal with a chronic
food deficit and severe shortage of
trained and skilled manpower and a dif-
ficult balance-of-payments situation
caused by world recession and oil glut.

Malaysia. The Malaysian Armed
Forces are continuing with plans to dou-
ble in size within the next several years
and are shifting from a counterinsur-
gency to a conventional warfare orienta-
tion in response to regional political
developments.

Our modest FMS credit program of
$12.5 million is a recommended increase
of $2.5 million to help relieve a small
portion of a much larger defense budget.
FMS credits in FY 1983 will finance
only a small portion of the U.S. military
equipment Malaysia will buy as it ex-
pands its armed forces; the remainder
will be purchased through FMS and
commercial sales. Equipment scheduled
for purchases includes Chaparral air
defense missiles, communications equip-
ment, ammunition, and spare parts for
A-4 aircraft refurbishing. The IMET
program will provide technical and pro-
fessional training for an estimated 223
students. Malaysia will pay all travel
costs.

The larger IMET increase is in
response to a specific request from the
prime minister for an increased U.S.
military training. This is the most ap-
propriate way for the United States to
help nonaligned and relatively pros-
perous Malaysia meet its increased
security needs. Thus, our proposal to in-
crease the IMET program to $850,000
from $500,000 is the largest percentage
increase recommended for any East
Asian country.

Singapore. Singapore is a good
friend and strong supporter of increased
U.S. involvement in Asia. Singapore
provides access to its excellent and
strategically located air and seaport
facilities for U.S. forces operating in the
Indian Ocean. U.S. training and equip-
ment, also purchased for cash, enhance
military effectiveness and promote
equipment commonality among the
ASEAN countries.

A small ($50,000) IMET program
was begun by the Administration in FY
1981 as a gesture of support for
Singapore and ASEAN in the face of
Vietnamese hostility on the Thai border
and a growing Soviet presence in the
region. We anticipate that this will re-
main only a token program in view of
Singapore's relative wealth. Most
military training in the United States
will continue to be purchased through
FMS sales procedures. There is no other
military or economic assistance for
Singapore.

The $50,000 IMET grant for Singa-
pore will be used for professional train-
ing for the best officers from all three
services. Singapore will continue to buy
other professional and technical training.

Burma. Burma is gradually moving
from almost total isolation into the
world community, has increased con-
tacts with the United States, and has
turned away from the Soviet Union.
Although we recognize Burma's commit-
ment to strict neutrality, it is in our in-
terest to encourage this trend.

The proposed increase in U.S.
assistance to Burma should promote the
continuing warming :n our bilateral rela-
tions, support our broader interests, in-
cluding narcotics cooperation, and re-
spond to specific Burmese requests.

Burma is one of the world's poorest
countries with a per capita income of
only $174. It has significant mineral and
agricultural resources which, if properly
developed, could insure increased inter-
nal prosperity and contribute to the
economic strengthening of the region as
a whole. Our development assistance
concentrates on two of the most needy
sectors — agriculture and health — where
even small inputs will provide large in-
creases in food production, incomes, and
better health care countrywide.

U.S. AID and IMET programs were
recommended in Burma in FY 1980
after a 16-year hiatus. The proposed in-
crease in development assistance to
$12.5 million for FY 1983 will permit ex-
pansion of the key agricultural develop-
ment program, as well as the second

uly1982

69

phase of a public health project. The in-
crease to $200,000 for IMET will pro-
vide for about 32 trainees to attend U.S.
military schools in FY 1983 up from an
estimated 25 students in FY 1982.

ASEAN. ASEAN has developed in-
to a major force for stability in
Southeast Asia and is of central impor-
tance to U.S. interests in the region.
The ASEAN states have taken a united
stand in opposing Soviet-backed Viet-
namese aggression in Kampuchea and
are resisting expanding Soviet military
presence in the region; Soviet port calls
are denied by all member countries, for
example. The ASEAN nations look to us
for support, and our small regional
economic assistance programs are im-
portant signals of our help.

ASEAN is formally an economic
organization, and economic cooperation
among its members is the foundation of
their political cooperation. It is now our
fifth largest trading partner, a moderate
influence on North-South issues, and
home to $5 billion of U.S. investment.
Continued cooperation, especially in the
training area, benefits expanded trade
and investment opportunities for the
U.S. private sector, as well as reinforces
ASEAN's moderate North-South stand.

The proposed $4.05 million program
funds scholarships and training in
Southeast Asia studies and regional pro-
grams in agricultural planning, plant
quarantine, watershed conservation, and
tropical medicine.

Japan and the European Com-
munities have recently announced in-
creased economic support for ASEAN
programs. However, our decrease from
$4.5 million in FY 1982 to our proposed
$4.05 million for FY 1983 does not in-
dicate a reduced priority for the
ASEAN program. Our original FY 1982
proposal was for $4 million, but an addi-
tional $500,000 became available at the
last minute, after the FY 1983 proposed
levels had become final.

Pacific Islands

We learned during World War II the
value of the Pacific Islands to the secu-
rity of the United States and our
sealines of communication. We should
not have to relearn this lesson. The
Soviet Union continues its efforts to
make inroads in the area which have
been repeatedly rebuffed. This is a situa-
tion in which relatively little money goes
a long way in safeguarding U.S. in-
terests. On the other hand, any real
decrease in the proposed $5.1 million

EUROPE

program would be very noticeable by the
countries involved.

Our proposed levels would serve as
an effective counter to Soviet offers of
assistance, particularly in hydrographic
research, and would be much ap-
preciated by Pacific countries whose
support for our policies should be
rewarded by some assistance to them.

Fiji. The $55,000 IMET program
requested for Fiji is East Asia's only
new program for the fiscal year. The
Government of Fiji is pro- Western and
broadly supportive of U.S. policy goals
in international fora. Fiji was the first
government publicly to support U.S.^
peace initiatives in the Sinai, and Fiji's
participation was instrumental in
demonstrating broad international sup-
port for a multinational peacekeeping
force effort. Fiji has also participated in
the U.N. peacekeeping forces in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978. The re-
quested IMET program would provide a
mix of professional and technical train-
ing to assist the Royal Fijian Military
Forces to acquire the skills needed to
operate their own defense establishment
and to maintain their role in UNIFIL
and the peacekeeping force in the Sinai.

Papua New Guinea. The United
States has enjoyed friendly relations
with Papua New Guinea before and
since its independence from Australia in
1975. Papua New Guinea's strategic
location, size, and resource base give it
the potential to become a major actor in
the South Pacific.

The proposed FY 1983 IMET pro-
gram of $20,000 will assist Papua New

Guinea in its continuing effort to
upgrade its defense forces by providing
technical training to two or three of-
ficers. Areas of continuing interest are
expected to be U.S. naval entry-on-duty
training, coastal surveillance courses,
and the repair and maintenance of
various kinds of equipment. Perhaps an
nual IMET programs will lead to Papua
New Guinea sending officers to attend
the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College.

Conclusion

In short, we have tried to balance the
need for budgetary restraint with the
strategic realities of increasing Soviet,
Vietnamese, and North Korean pres-
sures against our increasingly resource
constrained East Asian friends and
allies. Accordingly, we have devised a
military assistance package that we
believe will help meet our foreign policj
objectives in the Pacific. As you can set
relatively small increases for FY 1983,
particularly considering the cuts made i
requested FY 1982 levels, are going to
have to do heavy duty in shoring up oui
strategic position in both Northeast anc
Southeast Asia. We believe, however,
that these levels together with the
development assistance requested will
maintain our defense and security in-
terests in the Pacific.

if
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'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaikble from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

ii

by Charles H. Thomas

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
Hmise Foreign Affairs Committee on
April 1, 1982. Mr. Thomas is Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Euro-
pean Affairs. '

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee in support of
the European portions of the Admin-
istration's proposals for security
assistance in FY 1983.

As Secretary Haig emphasized to
the full committee on March 2, 1982, to-
day's foreign assistance programs have
been redirected to specific and vitally
important strategic objectives including

military threats from the Soviets. He
further singled out our aid to Turkey,
which strengthened a strategically vital
ally who contributes decisively to
Western security along NATO's south-
ern region, and the aid to Spain in-
volving vital base facilities. I would like
to describe each of our major program;-
in Europe.

Spain

The reentry of Spain into the Western
community of democratic states was
crowned (luring the past year by the
Spanish decision to seek entry into
NATO. Spain's people, its young and
healthy democratic institutions, and its
strategic location will add important

70

Department of State Bulleti

trength to NATO capabilities and con-
ribute to the security of the West. We
re pleased that Spain has taken this
tep.

Under the terms of the 1976 treaty
if friendship and cooperation, we enjoy
,ccess to several important military
lases in Spain. We are currently
legotiating a successor to that treaty.
^s always the process is complex, and
irogress is slower than we would like,
lut we hope to reach agreement before
ummer. Although our FY 1983
ssistance proposal is not tied to the
greement, it reflects our expectation
hat our security cooperation with Spain
vill continue to be of major importance.

Our proposed assistance program
or Spain of $400 million in foreign
nilitary sales (FMS) credits will help
ipain undertake major modernization
irojects for its armed forces, including
.cquisition of an air defense missile
ystem and advanced fighter aircraft,
^hree million dollars in international
nilitary and education training (IMET)
vill help Spain to develop the expertise
,nd systems necessary for effective
nanagement of its defense establish-
nent, while $12 million in economic sup-
port funds (ESF) will support a wide
ange of education, cultural, and scien-
ific exchanges.

The proposed program carries with
t a wide range of strategic and political
lenefits. It will assist Spain in its im-
pressive effort to upgrade Spanish
lefenses to levels more compatible with
ither NATO forces. It will lend visible
upport to a young democracy opting to
'esume its Western vocation. Finally, it
vill strengthen the important bilateral
lies between the United States and
Bpain.

'ortugal

Portugal has come a long way in
istablishing a working democracy since
he 1974 revolution. It has successfully
nade the difficult and delicate transition
rom an authoritarian state to one in
vhich fundamental political liberties are
•espected. Prime Minister Pinto
Balsemao leads the ruling coalition
government with a substantial
Darliamentary majority.

Portugal is an important NATO ally.
[t shares our commitment to strengthen-
ng Western security, particularly
through NATO, and has made available
the strategically located airfield at Lajes
in the Azores for this purpose. Both the
governing coalition and the socialist-led
democratic opposition agree that Por-
tugal should participate as much as
possible in NATO activities. However,

Iuly1982

Portuguese economic resources are in-
adequate to support the modernization
necessary to render such participation
meaningful.

Portugal, therefore, looks to the
United States and other NATO allies for
security assistance. Providing such aid
facilitates cooperation with a valued and
reliable ally and reassures the Govern-
ment of Portugal of our commitment to
a substantive role for Portugal in
NATO.

For FY 1983, we are proposing $20
million in grant ESF assistance. The
Government of Portugal will use these
funds to support development programs
in the mainland and in the Azores, a
relatively underdeveloped part of the
country. We are also proposing $90
million in FMS credits and $2.6 million
in IMET. As we begin talks on renewal
of our Lajes base agreement, this pro-
gram will help meet basic needs in all
three service branches and continue to
aid the economically depressed region of
the Azores.

Cyprus

Based on the discussion of the
November 18, 1981, U.N. evaluation of
the Cyprus intercommunal negotiations,
the Cypriot communities are continuing
their negotiating efforts. Along with
defining points of coincidence between
the positions of the communities, the
evaluation offers ideas and concepts for
bridging some of the major differences.
Although there are many outstanding
points of difference, we believe the U.N.
evaluation, within the context of the in-
tercommunal talks, offers an historic op-
portunity for progress.

As a reflection of the entrepre-
neurial efforts and economic energy of
the Cypriot people, the island has made
very significant economic strides.
Recognizing this economic health, we
are not recommending economic assist-
ance for FY 1983, as Cyprus is now
fully capable of sustaining economic
growth through standard international
financial mechanisms. An already
funded scholarship program, however,
will continue to bring Cypriot students
to the United States for several years.

The United States fully supports the
U.N. effort to secure a just, fair, and
lasting settlement of the Cyprus prob-
lem. We have repeatedly emphasized our
concern over this issue and reemphasize
our strong commitment to assist in pro-
moting a mutually acceptable solution to
the Cyprus dilemma.

EUROPE

Greece

Our proposed program for Greece in FY
1983 reflects an appreciation of the key
role Greece plays in NATO for the pro-
tection of the crucial southern region,
especially when there are critical
developments in areas bordering on the
eastern Mediterranean.

Greece has been an active member
of the Alliance fully participating in
NATO activities since its relinking to the
military structure in October 1980. As
an integral part of U.S. policy toward
Greece, our program provides a continu-
ing indication of American support for a
democratic Greece and is designed to
enable Greece to supplement inadequate
economic resources for the moderniza-
tion of Greek armed forces and the
fulfillment of NATO responsibilities.

Furnishing security assistance to
Greece is consistent with U.S. policy to
encourage the peaceful resolution of its
differences with Turkey and to support
the search for a solution to the Cyprus
problem.

Accordingly, the Administration has
requested $280 million in FMS credits to
assist Greece in purchasing spare parts
and upgrading its defense capabilities,
and $1.7 million in IMET grants to im-
prove professional and technical exper-
tise.

Turkey

Spiraling terrorism and paralysis of
civilian authority led Turkey's military
leaders to take over the government on
September 12, 1980. In the ensuing 18
months, the generals have restored law
and order, curbed political violence,
bolstered public confidence, continued
the economic recovery program, and
begun a process for return to stable
democratic government. They retain the
overwhelming support of the Turkish
people. A consultative assembly was
convened last October to draft a new
constitution and to serve as a de facto
parliament. Head of State Gen. [Kenan]
Evren has announced a timetable for
return to full democracy— completion of
the constitution this summer, referen-
dum on that constitution in November,
and general elections in the fall of
1983 — alternatively, in the spring of
1984. We are confident that the Turkish
Government will meet that timetable.

Strongly committed to NATO and to
western values, Turkey remains a
staunch ally of the United States. The
1980 defense and economic cooperation
agreement, by which the United States
pledged best efforts to help Turkey with

71

MIDDLE EAST

security and economic resources, is func-
tioning snnoothly. All allies share our
desire to help Turkey upgrade its armed
forces to carry out essential NATO tasks
more effectively. Turkey has made great
progress under the economic reform
program adopted in January 1980. For
the past 3 years, the United States has
worked with other OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] nations and international financial
institutions to support that program. We
believe that Turkey continues to need
fast-disbursing, concessional assistance
to achieve self-sustaining economic
growth.

Our security assistance proposals for
FY 1983 address these requirements. To
make Turkey a more effective member
of the vital southern flank of NATO, we
propose a total military assistance pro-
gram of $468.5 million— $465 million in
(FMS) credits and $3.5 million in IMET.
Of the $465 million FMS credits, $300
million would be direct credit, reflecting
Turkey's still severe economic con-
straints and debt burden. These FMS
funds will enable Turkey to begin to

modernize some of its weapons systems
and to acquire spares and support equip-
ment for systems already in its inven-
tory. Our request is extremely modest
when compared to Turkey's overall
needs for military support. We also pro-
pose $350 million in ESF assistance to
help Turkey consolidate the momentum
toward economic recovery. Of the total
ESF assistance, $250 million would be
grant and $100 million soft-term loans.

In formulating our security
assistance proposals for Greece and
Turkey, we have been guided by the
"Statement of Principles" contained in
section 620C(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
The formal certification to this effect,
required by section 620C(d) of that Act,
will be contained in the formal letter
transmitting the Administration's
foreign assistance legislative proposals
for FY 1983.

Themes in U.S. Approach

' The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaikble from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Nicholas A. Veliotes

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap-
propriations Committee on March 31,
1982. Ambassador Veliotes is Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs.^

I welcome this opportunity to discuss
with you our policy toward the Near
East-South Asian region in the context
of the Administration's FY 1983 budget
requests. I shall concentrate my brief
opening remarks on a political overview
into which our requests fit. This can
serve as a framework for our subse-
quent discussion.

Under Secretary [for Security
Assistance, Science, and Technology
James L.J Buckley in his appearance
before you March 1 1 sketched the
overall foreign policy framework into
which our Near East-South Asian policy
fits. He spoke of the need for a safer
future in which all nations can live in
peace free from pressures such as that
exerted by Soviet presence in Afghan-
istan. He has also spoken of our desire
to promote peaceful solutions to regional

72

rivalries and hostilities. There is no
question that persistent pursuit of a
comprehensive and balanced U.S. policy
in the Near East-South Asian region is
critical to these goals. It is critical to:

• Preserving a global strategic
balance which will permit free and in-
dependent societies to pursue their
aspirations;

• Checking the spread of Soviet in-
fluence in this strategic region;

• Fulfilling our responsibility to
assist in the resolution of conflicts which
threaten international security and the
well-being of the nations and peoples in
the region;

• Assuring the security and welfare
of Israel and other friendly nations in
the region;

• Preserving free world access to
the region's oil; and

• Supporting other major economic
interests, such as assisting the orderly
economic development of some of the
needy countries in the region, cooperat-
ing with wealthier states to maintain a
sound international financial order, and
generally maintaining access to markets
for American goods and services.

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There are two central themes to our ap |j,i
proach which can be summarized in the
words "peace" and "security" for the
region. Both promote our own policy
and the welfare of the region's people.
In this context, we are continuing to
pursue vigorously a just and comprehen L
sive Middle East peace within the
framework of the Camp David agree-
ments, which in turn derive from U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242. Ar-
rangements are nearly complete for
emplacement of the multinational force
and observers (MFO) and its assumption Tjj
of responsibility to monitor the security
provisions of the Peace Treaty between
Egypt and Israel. We are confident thai
both Egypt and Israel are committed to
the continued strengthening of their
relationship.

We are also continuing with negotia
tions on the establishment of an
autonomy regime for the West Bank an'
Gaza. These negotiations look to
achievement of an agreement which will
serve as the basis for the Palestinian
participation necessary for successful
conclusion of arrangements to permit
establishment of a transitional regime ir
the West Bank and Gaza.

We are continuing our support for
the Government and people of Lebanon
in working their way— with help from
other Arab states— toward national
reconciliation and greater security. We
are committed to the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of
Lebanon and strongly support the con-
stitutional process which calls for the
election of a new president later this
year. As you know, Ambassador Habib
[Philip C. Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East] has just re
turned from another trip to the region,
and his discussions encourage us to
believe that the cease-fire agreement he
worked out last July can and will con-
tinue to hold, thus winning time for the
internal conciliation process in Lebanon,
which offers the best prospect for a
phased, orderly withdrawal of Syrian
forces.

Moving to another serious conflict ir
the area, we support the resolution of
the war between Iraq and Iran, which
has already caused so many human
casualities and extensive physical
destruction. The continuation of this
war, we believe, serves the interests of
neither Iraq nor Iran. It endangers the
peace and security of all nations in the
gulf region. Consistent with our policy
of neutrality toward this conflict, we
have refused to sell or authorize the

Department of State Bulletini

fl

i

MIDDLE EAST

insfer of U.S. controled defense ar-
iles and services to either Iran or Iraq,
id we have urged that others avoid ac-
)ns which will have the effect of pro-
iging or expanding the conflict. We
,ve welcomed responsible international
forts to bring the fighting to an end
id the parties to negotiations. We con-
ier a peaceful settlement— reaffirming
e independence and territorial integri-
of both Iran and Iraq— to be essential
the security and well-being of the
gion.
We also support the return of peace
the suffering peoples of Afghanistan,
it this must be peace in the context of
e withdrawal of Soviet military forces,
e restoration of Afghanistan's in-
pendence and nonaligned status, the
rht of the Afghan people to form a
vernment of their own choosing, and
sation of conditions which will permit
e 3 million refugees to return to their
mes.

This brings me to my second theme
security. Under Secretary Buckley in
i own presentation spoke of the impor-
ice of Southwest Asian security and
3 relationship of this concern to Mid-
p East peace. We share with friendly
fttes their concern about threats to
zurity throughout this region posed by
:tors such as the Soviet invasion of
■ghanistan, the uncertainty surround-
T Iran, the Soviet position in the Horn
Africa and in South Yemen, Libyan
pport for terrorism and pressures
ainst neighboring states, and efforts
magnify such threats through the
byan alliance with Ethiopia and South
;men.

Indeed, both in our efforts to move
irther with the Middle East peace proc-
13 and in our efforts to encourage the
(turn of peace with security and na-
mal sovereignty elsewhere in the
v^ion, we recognize that the necessary
"' ! irit of accommodation can grow more
1 sily if the states concerned feel secure
; d confident of U.S. support.

We have taken important steps to

I ild the confidence of key states in our

immitment to their security. At a time

budgetary stringencies, we have, with

nsiderable sacrifice, increased the na-

)nal resources for our own military to

ivelop their capability to deter threats

the region.

We have at the same time signifi-
,ntly increased our security and
'.onomic assistance to friendly and
irategically located states in the region
> that they can better provide for their
vn defense, resist external pressures,
aprove their own economies, and thus

enhance the prospects for orderly prog-
ress. I shall briefly list for you the
highlights of our assistance programs
for the countries in the Near East-South
Asian region.

The Foreign Assistance Programs

The FY 1983 foreign assistance request
will fund six major programs. These in-
clude:

• Development assistance totaling
$287.2 million for the region to seven
countries, of which over $200 million
goes to the three poorer countries of
South Asia— India, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka;

• PL 480 totaling $619.5 million—
$420 million Title I and $99.5 million
Title II— provided to 13 of the 15
foreign assistance recipient countries;

• Economic support fund (ESF) of
$1,768 million, of which a substantial
proportion goes to Israel and Egypt, our
partners in peace;

• Foreign military sales (FMS)
financing totaling $3,660 million—
$1,030 million of it in direct concessional
loans, $500 million and $400 million as
forgiven loans for Israel and Egypt
respectively;

• International military education
and training (IMET) totaling $11.1
million; and

• Peacekeeping operations totaling
$34.5 million in support of the Middle
East peace process.

These programs total $6,380.33
million for FY 1983, which the Ad-
ministration believes is the minimal re-
quired to the United States to protect its
interests and achieve its policy goals in
this vital region.

I would now like to offer a few com-
ments on each of our FY 83 proposals.

Israel. We are committed to Israel's
security and well-being. Security support
for Israel is central to our Middle
Eastern policy. The $1.7 billion in FMS
that we are proposing will help Israel
maintain its technological edge in overall
military capability in the region. We are
also requesting $785 million in ESF to
reflect U.S. support tangibly and
facilitate a modest rate of economic
growth.

Egypt. Egypt is key to much of
what we hope to accomplish in the Mid-
dle East, in terms of both regional peace
and regional security. The $1.4 billion
FMS program contributes to Egypt's
ability to defend itself and help its
neighbors in the face of the various
threats I have mentioned. It replaces a
small portion of Egypt's aging,

deteriorating military materiel. The ESF
request for Egypt totals $785 million,
which is designed to provide direct sup-
port for economic stability in the near
term while building the base for im-
proved economic productivity and equity
upon which long-term stability must de-
pend. The requested PL 480 program
consists of $250 million in PL 480 Title I
and $9.9 million Title II in support of
private voluntary agencies.

Pakistan. Pakistan is a key front-
line state which remains steadfast in
resisting great pressures from the
Soviets in Afghanistan. Our FY 1983
proposal of $275 million in FMS loans is
the first FMS increment of the $3.2
billion 5-year assistance package. This
will help fund F-16 aircraft, armored
vehicles, artillery, and associated equip-
ment ordered in FY 1982, as well as
follow-on orders for additional quantities
of similar equipment later. Our as-
sistance to Pakistan is in no way in-
tended against India, good and mutually
beneficial relations with which remain
our high priority goal. A total of $200
million in development assistance and
ESF will be concentrated in the agricul-
tural sector with activities also in the
fields of population, health, energy, and
private sector development. We are re-
questing $50 million for PL 480 Title I.

Morocco. The proposal of $100
million in FMS credits to Morocco would
permit support of major U.S. combat
systems which Morocco has already ac-
quired, together with an ongoing
modernization program. Concessional
terms for 50% of this FMS are recom-
mended to alleviate a heavy debt burden
related to economic difficulties largely
beyond Morocco's ability to control-
drought and world inflation. Develop-
ment assistance of $13.5 million will
fund programs in agriculture, family
planning, renewable energy resource
development, and low-cost housing. The
requested level of PL 480 is $25 million
for Title I and $10.5 million for Title II.

Tunisia. Tunisia, under direct threat
from Libya, requires a military modern-
ization program with heavy initial costs.
Our FMS credits of $140 million, half of
which we are requesting in concessional
terms, are intended to cushion the shock
of such large expenditures. The FY 1983
levels would help fund the acquisition of
F-5 aircraft, M60 tanks, and Chaparral
missiles which the Tunisians intend to
order in FY 1982. We are requesting
$10 million for PL 480 Title I and $1.8
million for Title II.

Jordan. We propose an increase in
FMS for Jordan by $25 million to a total

Jly1982

73

MIDDLE EAST

of $75 million. We seek, through our
continued support, to enhance Jordan's
security and ability to remain a vdable,
independent, and constructive actor in
the region. A stable Jordan supports our
objective of building peace in the region
and assisting countries in acquiring the
capability of resisting outside aggression
and regional subversion. We are also
preparing $20 million in ESF to assist
the development of critical water and
waste water programs, health programs,
and agricultural and irrigation projects.
There is also a $256,000 PL 480 Title II
program.

Yemen. North Yemen is presently
being challenged militarily by an armed,
Marxist-led insurgent group backed by
Soviet-sponsored South Yemen. The
North Yemeni military requires essential
additional training and operational
assistance to utilize effectively U.S.
equipment funded by Saudi Arabia. Fur-
ther, it requires increased and sustained
economic and military assistance if we
are going to provide credible support to
the central government in the face of
this persistent outside threat. We are
asking for an additional $5 million in
FMS to a total of $15 million and a
modest increase in IMET over FY 1982.
Development assistance of $27.5 million
is requested to meet basic human needs
in one of the poorest nations of the
region.

Oman. The $40 million in FMS will,
in part, be applied against continuing
payment for U.S. equipment acquired
over the past 2 years. In light of a
tightening internal budget, the remain-
ing amount will be used to offset the
cost of the continuing and essential
Omani force modernization effort. Oman
continues to play an important role in
regional security and in the defense of
the southern gulf-Indian Ocean region.
And we are requesting $15 million in
ESF which will support dam construc-
tion, fisheries, and other projects iden-
tified by the U.S.-Oman Joint Commis-
sion.

Lebanon. Small increases in our
proposed FMS loan program for
Lebanon of $15 million, up $5 million
from the FY 1982 level, reflect our con-
tinued desire to see the Lebanese
Government develop the capability to
reduce and eventually eliminate civil
conflict and work for restoration of
essential public services and a return to
normalcy of life in that very troubled
country. An ESF program of $8 million
will include support for humanitarian
purposes and will assist the programs of

74

the Council of Redevelopment and Con-
struction.

For the poorer countries of South
Asia we are proposing development
assistance of $87 million for India, $76
million for Bangladesh, $40.3 million for
Sri Lanka, and $13.5 million for Nepal.
In general their programs seek to in-
crease food production and rural
employment as well as health and family
planning programs. As for PL 480, we
are requesting $111 million in Title II
for India, $60 million in Title I and $20.5
million in Title II for Bangladesh, and
$2.5 million Title I and $5.8 million Title
II for Sri Lanka.

In short, both through our FMS
credits and through our economic
assistance to the countries of this
region, we seek to strengthen security
and stability, promote the peaceful solu-
tion of old or new conflicts, and assist
those countries to provide a better life
for their peoples. To these goals we re-
main committed.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance
Requests for Israel

by Morris Draper

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
March 23, 1982. Mr. Draper is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs.^

I am here today to testify in support of
our military and economic assistance
programs in Israel for FY 1983. The Ad-
ministration is proposing a funding level
of $1.7 billion— up $300 million from last
year— in foreign military sales (FMS)
financing and $785 million in economic
support funds (ESF). If approved by the
Congress, the overall level of $2.5 billion
in combined military and economic
assistance for Israel would be the
largest U.S. bilateral assistance pro-
gram.

iliii
F

SIC

reii

Military Assistance •"'

and Economic Assistance

In a fundamental sense, our proposal f( J'
$1.7 billion in military assistance reflec
our intention that Israel be assisted so
as to maintain its technological edge ar
its qualitative military advantage in the
region. We expect that Israel would usi
some of the $300 million in added fund;
primarily to purchase U.S. -produced ail
craft, although in the end Israel may
make other choices. The bulk of the
military assistance funding would be
used to purchase artillery, missiles,
tanks, antipersonnel carriers, and air-
craft engines from the United States.
We are proposing that $500 million of
this total financing be in the form of
forgiven credits and that the remain-
der—$1.2 billion— be in the form of a
30-year loan.

We are proposing for FY 1983 a
level of $785 million in ESF, which is
identical to the pattern of the past few
years; actual amounts programed in the
past 2 years have fluctuated, owing to
"borrowings" by the United States and
"pay backs." The program is essentially
a cash transfer program, although we
are proposing a return to the traditiona
mix of two-thirds grants and one-third
concessional loans, rather than the full
grant programs of the last 2 fiscal
years.

Israel's political and economic stabil
ty is important to U.S. policy. Our
economic assistance program in effect
provides balance-of-payments support ii
order to meet short term balance-of-
payments requirements and to import
certain civilian goods and services
without undue reliance on high-cost con
mercial borrowing and drawdowns of
essential foreign exchange reserves.

m

Israel's Debt Burden

Israel's growing debt repayments to the
United States have been a source of con
cern to many Israeli officials, who
naturally would prefer that the grant
component of our assistance program bt
much larger. We carefully reviewed the
debt burden before submitting the
security assistance proposals to Con-
gress. Our review also had to take into
account our own budget stringencies. In
reaching our conclusions, we attempted
to put all factors — including needs,
priorities, and resources — into sensible
balance. As our separate report to the
Congress should make clear, we believe
Israel will be able to handle the addi-
tional debt burdens implicit in the FY
1983 funding levels.

w

«■•

i'k

snceptual Approach

t me outline briefly some of the major
ements of the conceptual framework
eti ithin which our assistance proposals
r Israel have been formulated.

First of all, our support for Israel's
curity and economic well-being is a
SI isic and unshakable tenet of American

reign policy in the Middle East. It is
iff so a critical element in our strategy
[ward the region as a whole. While
Irael cannot hope to keep up with its
)tential adversaries in quantitative
ilitary terms, with U.S. assistance at
ir proposed levels, it can continue to
aintain its qualitative and technological
iperiority over any potential combina-
)n of regional forces.

Our support for Israel grows out of
longstanding moral commitment to a
ee and democratic nation which has
en a haven and which shares many of
ir own social and democratic tradi-
)ns. Israel has been a steady friend of
e United States.

The perennial Arab-Israeli conflict
id the need to achieve a broad, just,
id lasting peace in the region have
ten at the forefront of U.S. foreign
)licy concerns for many years. Israel
is sought peace and in the process has
jreed to the Camp David understand-
Igs and signed the historic Treaty of
eace with Egypt.

Our large military and economic
sistance programs for Israel tangibly
pport the unfinished business of the
!ace process and give Israel the con-
ience to continue. Israel is making im-
)rtant sacrifices for peace— including
e forthcoming full withdrawal from
•e Sinai Peninsula in the last week of
pril — and our materiel as well as moral
id political support over the years have
•ovided some compensation.

Our assistance programs for Israel
implement the two mutually reinforc-
g goals of American policy in the
tgion: first, the search for a just and
Bting peace; and, second, the assurance
»at our friends in the region will be
ole to maintain their security against
treats from the outside and from
iidical forces within the region. These
ograms are also consistent with the
•emise that economic progress and ad-
incement of the welfare of the peoples
' the region will help promote stability.
In addition a strong Israel has been
Igood investment as we look to the
srategic picture and to potential Soviet
id Soviet-supported challenges to our
terests in the region. We know that
e can count on Israel for cooperation
ad understanding.

REFUGEES

We are, however, in the midst of an
extremely tense period, affecting not on-
ly Israel but the entire region. The
political and security environment in the
region has changed, and mostly for the
worse. The Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet oc-
cupation of Afghanistan, the tripartite
pact among Libya, South Yemen, and
Ethiopia, and continued Russian mis-
chiefmaking— directly and through prox-
ies— present threats and challenges.
Lebanon remains a powder-keg. Israel's
full cooperation has been indispensable
in preserving and strengthening the
cease-fire in the Israeli-Lebanese arena,
which has held since last July and which
has seen no loss of life yet through
cease-fire violations.

The presentation and examination of
our foreign assistance proposals are tak-
ing place at a particularly sensitive junc-

ture in Israel itself. Israel is experienc-
ing a genuine domestic crisis in the proc-
ess of completing preparations for its
final withdrawal from the Sinai next
month. The Israeh Government has been
facing tremendous pressure from many
of its own citizens, yet is faithfully car-
rying out its commitment to bring back
into Israel the settlers and squatters
from the settlements in the Sinai before
Israel's final withdrawal.

These tensions show why it is so im-
portant that Israel continue to have con-
fidence in our determination, in our
policies, and in the quality and credibili-
ty of our friendship.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be publisned by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Requests for Migration
and Refugee Assistance

by Richard D. Vine

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the Senate Ap-
propriations Co7nmittee on May 20,
1982. Ambassador Vine is Director of the
Bureau for Refugee Programs. ^

A principal State Department policy is
to favor solutions to refugee problems
that minimize the number of persons
resettled in this country. While we can-
not deny our special concern and respon-
sibility for refugees from certain areas,
we recognize that refugee problems are
an international concern and should be
resolved, where at all possible, by volun-
tary repatriation and resettlement in
countries of first asylum. Given this in-
ternational responsibility, we continue to
hold the view that the responsibility for
refugee assistance and resettlement is to
be shared by the international commu-
nity as a whole through the services of
international organizations, especially
the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR
received the 1981 Nobel Peace Prize in
recognition of its efforts to deal with in-
ternational refugee problems. As a ma-
jor donor, it is our responsibility to press
for continued programmatic and opera-
tional improvements in this organization
so that it can meet the basic needs of
refugees for protection, food, shelter,
and medical care while other, more

lasting solutions to their plight are being
worked out.

Resettlement in the United States

The budget request before you is a con-
crete expression of this philosophy.
Whereas, in FY 1980 over 60% of our
expenditures were for resettlement in
the United States, only 38% of the FY
1983 budget request is directed toward
U.S. resettlement. The number of
refugees to be resettled in the United
States has fallen over 210,000 in FY
1980, to an FY 1982 consultations level
of 140,000, and to a projected total of
only 103,500 in the coming fiscal year.
At the same time, we are increasing the
proportion of our funding for programs
which assist refugees in nations of
asylum and for programs of voluntary
repatriation and of resettlement in third
countries which have not traditionally
been engaged in resettlement.

I would like to emphasize, however,
that the downward trend in admissions
is being managed in a way that is consis-
tent with the humanitarian traditions of
the United States and with U.S. respon-
sibilities for refugees of particular con-
cern to this country. At the same time,
we are continuing to provide support for
the protection, care, and maintenance of
refugees abroad, in accordance with the

uly 1982

75

REFUGEES

level of need and with U.S. foreign
policy interests in the particular pro-
gram area.

The State Department fully under-
stands the significant impacts that
refugee resettlement have on some com-
munities in this country. It is our inten-
tion to continue to manage refugee
resettlement to this country in such a
fashion that the concerns of State and
local governments are fully considered.
We do not accept the faulty premise
that the only viable solution to refugee
situations is resettlement in a third
country, chiefly the United States. We
will continue to pursue other alter-
natives which promise to help resolve
refugee situations in a humanitarian
manner.

The FY 1983 request for the migra-
tion and refugee assistance appropria-
tion totals $419 million, $84 million less
than the FY 1982 appropriation. Recent-
ly, the President has requested that FY
1982 funding for this program be re-
duced by $50 million. This proposal was
made because of major cost savings in
our refugee resettlements program — re-
settlements to the United States are
running lower than the FY 1982 con-
sultations level provides and the enacted
appropriation finances. The Department
is requesting a supplemental for protec-
tive security improvements for Amer-
ican diplomats at selected overseas
posts. Because that supplemental and
the deferral of refugee appropriation
funds coincide, the President proposed
to the Congress that transfer authority
language be enacted to mitigate the
financing of the protective security sup-
plemental. If that language is not
enacted, the Administration will request
a rescission of these funds at a later
date.

Projected FY 1983 Admissions

For U.S. resettlement activities in FY
1983, we are seeking $158,188,000 to
finance the resettlement of up to
103,500 refugees, including 72,000 from
Southeast Asia. I must stress that this
level of refugee admissions is only a pro-
jection. The President will determine the
admission ceiling after consultations
with the Congress prior to the beginning
of FY 1983, as required by the Refugee
Act. Furthermore, due to such uncer-
tainties as the situation in Eastern
Europe, refinements of these admission
projections may be required. However, it
is my expectation that, unless the
refugee situation in the world changes
fundamentally between now and when
we have our consultations in September,

76

the total admissions ceiling will not ex-
ceed this figure, which is 36,500 persons
lower than that for the current fiscal
year.

Among the 31,500 refugees other
than Indochinese, we have projected ad-
missions of 23,000 Soviets and East
Europeans, 4,000 from the Near East,
2,000 from the Western Hemisphere and
2,500 from Africa. We are, of course,
concerned about the current situation in
Poland, and the levels of admissions
which we request in September will take
into account all factors relevant to this
problem.

Relief Assistance

With respect to funding of relief
assistance for refugees, the Department
of State is seeking $29,400,000 to sup-
port refugee relief operations in
Southeast Asia. These funds will support
the care and maintenance operations of
the UNHCR, as well as the international
efforts to care for the 200,000 Khmer
who have sought sanctuary along the
Thai-Kampuchean border. This funding
level is $20,435,000 less than that ap-
propriated for FY 1982, reflecting con-
tinued reductions in the number of In-
dochinese refugees in Southeast Asia, as
well as a reduced food program inside
Kampuchea. We expect a phaseout of
extensive multilateral assistance to the
interior of Kampuchea by FY 1983.

Resettlement Assistance

The next activity in our budget is reset-
tlement assistance. This program re-
quest is a concrete expression of the in-
terest of the Department in resolving
refugee problems through means other
than resettlement in the United States.
We are seeking $10 million for this pro-
gram in FY 1983, an increase of $9
million above the FY 1982 appropria-
tion. The program will finance various
voluntary repatriation, local resettle-
ment, and third country resettlement
projects. We expect that programs
funded under this initiative will be or-
ganized under the auspices of interna-
tional organizations or private voluntary
agencies.

Among the innovative activities
funded will be projects involving local
permanent settlement in nations of
asylum, as well as initiatives to resettle
refugees in certain developing nations
which are willing to accept refugees for
permanent resettlement, but which
would be unable to do so without inter-
national financial support. These pro-
grams are intended to help reduce the

number of refugees requiring resettle-
ment in the United States.

0

fttt

Tl

llie

(iei

irit

P

Israel. The Department is seeking
$12.5 million, the same amount as ap-
propriated in FY 1982, for a contribu-
tion to the United Israel Appeal. The
contribution will help finance assistance|kist
to Soviet and Eastern European ref-
ugees who resettle in Israel. Regret-
tably, the Soviet Union continues to
reduce the rate of emigration for its
Jewish citizens, but this program con-
tinues at this level in recognition of the
long-term costs incurred by Israel in ca
ing for refugees who have arrived in re
cent years.

Africa. For assistance to refugees i
Africa, we seek $76.9 million, which is
$30,100,000 below the FY 1982 ap-
propriation. This decrease is accounted ^'"
for by the one-time appropriation of $3(' "^
million to the migration and refugee
assistance appropriation in FY 1982 for
longer term projects to aid refugees ano *
displaced persons in Africa. It was
recognized that such longer term proj-
ects are properly the responsibility of
the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID). In fact, the Congress
specified that the FY 1982 appropriatio
be administered by AID.

Within the $76.9 million that we are
requesting for the Africa program, we
will continue our current policy of fi-
nancing one-third of the UNHCR's pro-
gram in Africa and will make a $7.9
million contribution to the African pro-
grams of the International Committee c
the Red Cross (ICRC). We will also pro-
vide up to $8 million for a variety of
bilateral and voluntary agency initiative
to address those aspects of refugee
problems that are not adequately dealt
with by the involved international
organizations.

Middle East. Refugee assistance is
provided by this government for both
humanitarian and political purposes.
These concerns are clearly combined in
the Middle East where we are con-
fronted with the human needs of the
Palestinians and the Afghans as well as
the worldwide political and economic im
plications of those problems. In order to
deal with the needs of the Palestinians,
the Department is seeking $72 million sa
a contribution to the U.N. Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA). This organiza
tion, which provides basic services to th«
nearly 2 million Palestinian refugees,
contributes toward a political atmos-
phere within the Mideast which is con-
ducive to the long-term peace process.
The proposed UNRWA contribution, an

Department of State Bulletin

f'j

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

^Sl

crease of $5 million over the FY 1982
)propriation, will help UNRWA deal
ith the effects of inflation and a con-
antly increasing population.

The Afghan refugees in Pakistan
imprise the largest refugee population
the world. The Government of

!''* ikistan is currently providing asylum
well over 2 million refugees who have
id Afghanistan into Pakistan during
e past 3 years. Thousands of refugees
ntinue to flee from Afghanistan
;cause of the ongoing fighting between
)viet forces and the Afghan resistance.

^ ikistan, I must add, serves as an
itstanding example of a nation meeting
5 international responsibility to provide
;ylum to refugees. Pakistan has willing-
granted asylum with the expectation
at the international community will
lance the care and maintenance of the
fugees, a program expected to require
)proximately $110 million in FY 1983.

The Department requests $38
illion to meet our share of this relief
fort. Up to $33 million will be provided
the UNHCR to meet 30% of the cost
its care and maintenance program,
le remaining $5 million will finance a
.riety of initiatives to meet essential
;alth, relief, and transportation needs
it addressed through the UNHCR's
ogram. Medical care for persons in-
red in the fighting in Afghanistan pro-
ded by the ICRC is one example. The
1 million will be used to finance grants
the ICRC, private voluntary agencies,
id possibly the Pakistani Government.

Latin America. Latin America, until
cently, was one of the few areas of the
Drld not confronted with a major
fugee problem. However, continuing
A\ disturbances in Central America are
ircing increasing numbers of persons to
ee across international frontiers to
•cape fighting and persecution. The
epartment is requesting $5 million to
lip meet the costs of the international
tforts to provide assistance to refugees
Central America. These funds are $1
illion less than the amount appro-
•iated in FY 1982 due to nonrecurring
ists in the 1982 program. However,
ven the volatility of the political situa-
Dn in Central America, these needs are
articularly difficult to project. It is
Bar that we must keep this problem
ider close review as events unfold.

nternational Organizations

he State Department requests
^,450,000 in FY 1983 for contributions
I various activities of international
•ganizations, an increase of $1 million

over FY 1982. We propose to provide a
total of $4.7 million to the Intergovern-
mental Committee for Migration in sup-
port of that organization's assessed and
operational budgets. We will also pro-
vide $3.75 million to the ICRC in sup-
port of the ordinary budget of the
organization and the Political Detainee
Protection and Assistance Program. In
the case of the ordinary budget we will
provide $2 million, an increase of
$500,000 above the amount provided in
the current year. We are seeking
$1,750,000 as a contribution to the pro-
gram.

Previously, U.S. contributions to this
activity were obtained through re-
programing of other funds in this ap-
propriation. However, because of the im-
portance of this program as an expres-
sion of concern by this Administration
for political prisoners, we are including
this item in our FY 1983 appropriation
request. We are also seeking $1 million,
the same amount appropriated in FY
1982, to support programs of the
UNHCR in areas of the world other
than those dealt with in the geographic
segments of this budget.

Administrative Expenses

The administrative expenses of this pro-
gram are expected to increase to
$7,562,000 in 1983. This is a net in-
crease of only $136,000. This request
will finance the salary and operating
costs associated with our staff of 98 per-
manent employees.

This budget request does not include
a request for new funding for the U.S.
Emergency Refugee and Migration As-
sistance Fund. Unobligated carryover
balances available in that fund should be
sufficient to finance appropriate
responses to refugee and migration
emergencies during FY 1983.

As you are well aware, refugee sit-
uations frequently change between the
time that this budget is developed and
the new fiscal year. Should any such
changes occur affecting our 1983 appro-
priation, we will attempt to reprogram
funds to meet the higher priority needs.
I wish to thank this subcommittee for its
support during the past 2 years for our
reprograming efforts in order to real-
locate our funds to meet new and chang-
ing requirements.

' The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B

FY 1983
Security
Assistance
Requests

by James L. Buckley

Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April U, 1982.
Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, Science, and
Technology.^

I am pleased to be here today to have
the opportunity to present an FY 1983
foreign assistance program. The Ad-
ministration is mindful that the Con-
gress passed a 2-year authorization bill
last year. But as the committee report
recognized, the authorizations for 1983
were made without the benefit of the
Administration's views, and it antici-
pated that the Administration would be
submitting requests for additional funds
in due course.

We wish we could stay within the
amounts already authorized, but we
have no responsible choice but to pre-
sent the additional levels of security
assistance the Administration is asking
for FY 1983. They reflect the hard
necessity of responding effectively to
events occurring outside our borders
which have the most direct impact on
our ultimate safety and well-being.

Close to home and in distant lands,
our nation's most important military,
political, and economic interests are
being challenged. Security assistance is
the most cost-efficient investment we
can make both to meet today's
challenges and \.o enhance the prospects
for a safer future in which all nations
observe the maxim of "live and let live."
At present, however, strategically
located friends and allies are under
growing pressure from the Soviets and
their stand-ins. Afghanistan has been
taken. The bid for greater freedom has
been crushed in Poland. With Soviet
arms and support, Vietnamese troops
continue to occupy Kampuchea. In
Africa and in the Caribbean Basin,
Cuban troops or Cuban-supported forces
pose a direct threat to our most vital in-
terest.

Weakness attracts the predator.
Hence, it is understandable that the
arena of global challenge has increasing-
ly shifted from the industrialized states

uly1982

77

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

of Europe and Asia to the less-developed
nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa,
and, closer to home, the Caribbean. A
failure to achieve viable economies,
credible defenses, and stable political in-
stitutions makes these less-developed na-
tions inviting targets for subversion.

A New Approach

To meet these urgent challenges abroad
and to minimize the cost to taxpayers at
home, this Administration has adopted a
fundamentally new approach in arriving
at our security assistance program for
FY 1983. We have explicitly defined our
nation's vital foreign policy objectives
and painstakingly allocated all foreign
assistance resources against our priority
goals. As many of you can appreciate,
this has necessarily prolonged the proc-
ess and delayed the submission of some
congressional presentation materials.
However, we believe the resulting pro-
gram contains the minimum required
resources to:

• Promote peaceful solutions to
regional rivalries;

• Assure U.S. access to critical
military facilities and basic raw
materials;

• Confront growing military threats
from, and subversive efforts by, the
Soviets; and

• Reduce the economic and social
degradation that breeds domestic
violence and invites external interven-
tion.

The entire program has been
carefully scrutinized by the President to
insure that our resources are, in fact,
directed toward our most important
goals. The final scrutiny, of course, will
be yours. But given the care with which
this request has been constructed and
the pressing needs it has been designed
to meet, I urge your committee and the
Congress to approve it in full.

I would invite your attention to the
Department's booklet, "International
Security and Economic Cooperation Pro-
gram, Fiscal Year 1983," which has been
made available to the Congress. Since
the details of our FY 1983 program are
set forth in this document, I will forego
a listing of all the specific levels and, in-
stead, summarize the major regional
elements.

Overall, our FY 1983 request is for
$8.7 billion in total program authority;
the necessary budget authorization
would come to $4.8 billion. This
represents a program increase of $1.65
billion and a budget increase of $1 billion
over the amounts you have already
authorized for FY 1983. Given our

worldwide responsibilities, and the prob-
lems with which we have to deal, the in-
crease we seek is modest.

Foreign Policy Objectives

I would now like to review briefly the
major foreign policy objectives toward
which our proposed program has been
tailored and explain why the requested
security assistance is necessary to attain
our goals. I will also summarize the few
changes to the legislation which we will
seek.

Middle East. Over 53% of the en-
tire FY 1983 security assistance pro-
gram will be directed in support of our
Middle East objectives, namely, the
search for a just and lasting peace and
the urgent requirement that friends in
the region be secure against external
threats. These objectives are mutually
reinforcing. No peace is possible unless
the nations of the region are secure
from outside coercion, and security will
not be achieved if we fail to address the
underlying sources of conflict and in-
stability.

Our security assistance serves both
of these objectives. It seeks to advance
economic well-being and political stabil-
ity in the region. The security and
economic health of Israel and Egypt are
requisite for further broadening the
peace of the Middle East. U.S.
assistance programs tangibly reflect our
support and help give these nations the
confidence to continue on the path
toward peace begun at Camp David. Our
assistance to Israel and Egypt, along
with our aid to Jordan, Lebanon, and
the regional programs, provides a
security and economic base essential to
ultimate stability and peace within the
region.

Europe. The President is allocating
19% of the program— $1.6 billion to sup-
port our interests in Europe. The
strategic importance to NATO of
Europe's southern flank has been
dramatically underlined by events this
past year. With neighboring regions fac-
ing a growing challenge, our efforts to
assist Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Por-
tugal have assumed increasing impor-
tance. Helping these nations, through
our security assistance programs, is an
important contribution to our common
defense, not only against threats to
Europe but against challenges to our
common interests beyond the geographic
bounds of the Alliance.

Turkey, for example, lies at the in-
tersection of our NATO, Middle East,
and Persian Gulf security concerns. A

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militarily and economically stronger
Turkey cannot only contribute
significantly more to a strengthened
NATO deterrent but can move more
rapidly to the full return of civilian
government. Spain and Portugal, the
other major security assistance recipi-
ents, are important not only to our
NA'TO posture, but to our capabilities
project military forces from the United
States to Africa and the Middle East.

Southwest Asia and the Persian
Gulf. Ten percent of the FY 1983
security assistance program is directed
to insuring our continued access to
Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf
and to their critically important
resources. Almost all nations in the are
stretching from Pakistan in the east to
Morocco in the west face serious
economic problems and potential subve
sion or regional threats, in many cases,
supported by the Soviets or their prox-
ies. Our proposal for military moderniz
tion and economic assistance will help
Pakistan to deter attacks from
Afghanistan and facilitate the economit
development essential to internal stabil
ity. Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia all
face, to one degree or another, threats
of subversion or aggression emanating
from Libya. All are important not only
to our strategy for the security of the
Persian Gulf but, potentially to the pro
pects for peace in the Middle East as
well.

Latin America and the Caribbean
Basin. Our plan for restoring stability
and improving economic prospects in tl
Caribbean Basin will require $433
million in security assistance for 1983.
Here, we face a major challenge from
Cuba's efforts to exploit economic,
social, and military voilnerabilities. Our
assistance programs are designed to ac
dress the underlying causes of socio-
political instability and restore stability
within the region as a whole. We must
help provide the concessional resources
essential to the task until increased in-
vestment, a strengthened private secto
and expanded export markets enable
these countries to achieve economic sel
sufficiency.

Of this amount, El Salvador will
need $166 million in economic support
fund (ESF) and military assistance to
thwart the outright drive by insurgents
to destroy the economy. Jamaica will
continue to need substantial assistance
in order to restore the vitality of its
shattered private sector. Costa Rica's
rapidly deteriorating economy will re-
quire substantial assistance while fun-
damental reforms are effected. Hon-

f

'i

78

Department of State Bulletil

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

ras faces an economic decline and a
litical-military crisis on its borders.
;teriorating conditions in other coun-
es in the region may well require
lergency assistance during the year,
nee the critical importance of at least
e modest contingency funds we are
oposing. The amounts allocated for
litary assistance represent just 16% of
r total program for the Caribbean
isin.

East Asia and the Pacific. Re-

ests in support of our important
icific interests represent a modest
iction, only 6%, but nevertheless, a
al part of our FY 1983 security
sistance program. This region is of
ijor political, strategic, and economic
portance to the United States. We
ve significant treaty relationships with
pan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand,
d our ANZUS partners. We also have
^rowing economic and commercial
ike in the area, with petroleum both
ginating and passing through the
jion. U.S. trade with the area now
rpasses that with Western Europe.

The Philippines, Indonesia, and
ilaysia are located astride strategic
I lanes that are vital to U.S. and
jstern interests. Indonesia is an im-
rtant source of petroleum. The Philip-
les provide the United States with
iential military facilities. Our security
i economic assistance contributes to
! stability of these nations, their
)nomic progress and political develop-
mt, and to our own defense and
)nomic well-being.

In Northeast Asia, a strong and
)nomically vital South Korea is essen-
1 to deter its northern neighbor from
litary adventures. A Soviet-supported
3,000-man Vietnamese army remains
Kampuchea and threatens Thailand's
■,urity.

The importance of our interests in
. Western Pacific is beyond dispute,
d the only reason our proposal is not
ger, is that our partners in the Far
,st are somewhat better off
)nomically, and in security terms,
in are many of our friends and allies
ewhere.

Africa. To help assure stability and
zess in the Indian Ocean and Persian
ilf area, we must provide economic
d military assistance to Kenya,
malia, Djibouti, Mauritius, and the
ychelles. Most of these nations are ex-
riencing severe economic difficulties,
d several face serious threats from
.hiopia or South Yemen.

Both Kenya and Somalia require
Ip in achieving economic self-reliance
d improved defense capabilities. In

Jiy1982

turn, both nations provide U.S. forces
with access to facilities, thus con-
tributing significantly to our ability to
sustain a credible deterrent posture in
the region.

Our proposed $177 million security
assistance program for Southern Africa
is designed to advance the peaceful
establishment of an independent
Namibia, to help insure continued
Western access to key strategic
minerals, and to support the develop-
ment process from Zaire to the Cape.
We must fulfill our undertaking to assist
the economic development of the
frontline states of Southern Africa,
whose participation is essential to the
stability of a region rich in minerals
essential to our economic well-being. The
alternative, a new escalation of conflict,
would only provide irresistible oppor-
tunities for the Cubans and Soviets.

In West Africa, modest levels of
security assistance are essential to main-
tain economic and political resilience and
to discourage further Libyan attempts
to exploit the financial difficulties faced
by several nations. In addition, our aid
to Liberia is designed to insure con-
tinued U.S. access to key transportation
and communications facilities.

In sum, the President is requesting
and is committed to defending a total
$8.7 billion security assistance program
for FY 1983. I reiterate that only $4.8
billion requires budget authority; $3.9
billion is in the form of off-budget
foreign military sales (FMS) guarantees.
The foreign policy objectives I have just
outlined are those we strive to attain
with these resources. The President's
program has, as never before, been
carefully structured to address only our
most critical needs. For example, 87% of
the entire FY 1983 FMS guarantee pro-
gram is allocated to only seven coun-
tries: Egypt, Greece, Israel, Pakistan,
Spain, and Turkey. Seventy-seven per-
cent of the FY 1983 ESF program is for
six vital countries: Egypt, El Salvador,
Israel, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey.
Almost 80% of the FMS direct credit
program will go to Israel, Egypt, Por-
tugal, Sudan, and Turkey.

Concessional Assistance

We again seek authority to provide con-
cessional assistance to key countries in
order to make it possible to purchase
defense equipment and services that we
believe it is in our interests for them to
have. We are asking this because we
believe that concessional rates provide
us with maximum flexibility in meeting
the specific needs of security assistance

recipients. Over the long term, they also
lower the net cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

The two adverse trends of increas-
ing debt burdens among recipient coun-
tries and high Federal Financing Bank
interest rates have created a situation in
which many countries, with particularly
weak economies, are facing serious dif-
ficulties in financing their purchases
through FMS guaranteed loans. Under
our proposal, we will plan to offer $950
million in the form of forgiven credits to
three countries only— $500 million for
Israel, $400 million for Egypt, and $50
million for Sudan. In addition, we pro-
pose to furnish $789 million of conces-
sional credits to 19 countries— including
an added $50 million for Sudan — at an
interest rate as low as 3%. The coun-
tries selected are those facing particular-
ly difficult economic situations and those
in which we have important security and
foreign policy interests. For example,
we are planning to provide $300 million
at concessional rates to Turkey for its
modernization program. Seventy percent
of the remaining $489 million would go
to six countries: Thailand, Tunisia,
Sudan, Morocco, Portugal, and El
Salvador.

The programs we are submitting
have been carefully weighed, debated,
and made to answer the question, "Is
the need critical?" We have had to make
trade-offs between what we— and you —
would like to do and the minimum that
must be done to protect our national in-
terests. We conclude that there is simply
no alternative but to seek the additional
resources if we are to support our
varied and important goals. Without the
increases over the levels appropriated
for the current year:

• We would be unable to provide
sufficient FMS guaranteed financing to
launch the Pakistan program we dis-
cussed in such detail last year, increase
the Egypt and Israel programs, or sup-
port our negotiations for the Spanish
bases;

• We would be unable to provide
the concessional credit terms required to
enable Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand,
Morocco, Tunisia, El Salvador, and Por-
tugal to upgrade their defenses; and

• The ESF level would fall far short
of the needs of Turkey and countries in
the Caribbean Basin.

Modification of Current Legislation

Let me now summarize the modifica-
tions we will seek to current legislation.
Seven of them involve minor changes
that will enhance the effectiveness of

79

UNITED NATIONS

our security assistance program. In ad-
dition, we seek new authority to
establish an antiterrorism law enforce-
ment assistance program.

The proposed revisions to the law
are:

• An emergency peacekeeping
drawdown authority for the President of
$10 million in commodities and services,
if he determines that unforeseen cir-
cumstances have developed necessitating
immediate assistance;

• Elimination of certain prohibitions
on foreign assistance to the People's
Republic of China, ending the discrim-
inatory treatment of that country based
on its past association with the Soviet
bloc;

• A clarification to permit full-cost
recovery of all additional expenses in-
curred in carrying out administrative
functions under the Arms Export Con-
trol Act;

• Exemption from the present
15-day notification to the Congress on
reprograming funds up to $.50,000 for
international military and education
training and international narcotics con-
trol programs;

• Provision for a "one-to-one" ex-
change of U.S. and foreign mOitary
students at professional military schools
in accordance with bilateral agreements
to be negotiated with foreign countries
and international organizations after
enactment;

• Allowance of funds collected for
administrative surcharges to be used for
representation purposes; and finally,

• An allowance for the executive to

sell government-furnished equipment, in-
cluding components and spares, to U.S.
firms acting as prime contractors for
foreign governments or international
organizations for incorporation into end
items.

Conclusion

I assure you that, in this most difficult
year, the President would not be asking
for additional security assistance if he
were not absolutely convinced that these
resources were essential to enhance the
prospects for peace and protect essential
American interests around the globe.
Without them, the President would be
forced to decide which objectives of our
foreign policy to pursue and which to
abandon or neglect. For example, he
would be forced to face such damaging
choices as scaling back our Spanish
bases in order to finance our Caribbean
initiative, or of shifting resources away
from Turkey to address our needs in
Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia, or abandon-
ing our undertakings and initiatives in
such important areas as Southern Africa
and Southeast Asia in order to meet our
commitments in the Middle East.

Unless we are willing to make these
investments for peace and security to-
day, we risk far greater costs to both
our safety and national treasure tomor-
row.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Nicholas Piatt

Statement before the Sicbcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap-
propriations Committee on May 5, 1982.
Mr. Piatt is Acting Assistant Secretary
for Inte'tfiational Organization Affairs. '

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before you to present the President's FY
1983 request for contributions to certain
voluntarily funded programs of the
United Nations and the Organization of
American States (OAS).

This request is made at a time of
stringent budgetary requirements and
reflects the overriding need to curtail

80

Federal spending. We have been assess-
ing all U.N. programs in which we par-
ticipate, and this request is the result of
our rigorous analysis.

We have arrived at this request
under the weight of other national
priorities but not unmindful of the actual
and symbolic consequences that reduced
U.S. contributions might have for the
U.N. family of agencies and programs.
Certainly, needs worldwide have not
diminished; the programs we support re-
main importiint to U.S. foreign policy
goals, and the benefits accruing to our
country and our economy are no less
welcome. We are, however, conscious of
the equity and fairness of our request
and of the compensating qualities that

more efficient and better managed pr(
grams can produce under enhanced
fiscal and budgetary discipline.

We hope the Congress will author
and appropriate the entire amount re-
quested as a concrete signal of sustain'
U.S. commitment to the United Natior
and the Organization of American Stat
and as a practical measure for facilitat
ing the conduct of U.S. foreign policy
through these multilateral agencies.

i

U.S. Position

Before discussing the different items ii
eluded in this request, I want to explai
the Administration's position regarding
the United Nations and its affiliated
agencies.

It has been the proud tradition of
this country that in asserting our powt
in the modern world we have always
sought the cooperation of other nation
to oppose aggression, to uphold the ru
of law, and to help the poor and the
weak. We have persisted in the belief,
and we continue to pursue the ideal th
the maintenance of stable institutions <
global cooperation are essential for the
effective pursuit of American foreign
policy goals.

As it has developed over the four
decades of its existence, the U.N.
system has been a source of both
satisfaction and disappointment. The
United Nations has grown into a ver-
satile global conglomerate whose con-
cerns range from keeping the peace to
exchanging scientific knowledge, from
the production of food to the protectio
of fundamental freedoms. Today, it ha
three times as many members as it ha
on its day of birth. Its expenditures he
multiplied manyfold, and its programs
touch all countries on the Earth.

In the intervening 37 years, how-
ever, we have also learned that biggei
not necessarily better— that while the
United Nations has grown it has not j
matured, and while it has become the
sounding board for new and unfamilia
voices, it does not always echo the tru

The role of the United States as o
of the U.N.'s principal supporters for :
these years earns us the right to critic
it when warranted and defend it when
deserved. We have gained the wisdom
experience to discern and distingfuish
between what is wrong with the Unite
Nations and what is right, and the
responsibility to right the wrongs.

Frankly, we are not happy with a
number of developments at the United
Nations including:

• The perennial crop of one-sided,
polemical Mideast resolutions;

K

tS

iai

Bl

UNITED NATIONS

The adoption of propagandistic
ind unrealistic stands on arms control
. ind disarmament;

Extreme resolutions on South
Africa which are also abusive of the
Jnited States; and

The tendency of the nonaligned
rroup in the United Nations to criticize
^he United States and the other in-
lustrialized democracies for the woes of
;he Third World, and to demand un-
•ealistic solutions.

ii klajor U.N. Accomplishments

' But this is not the entire picture, the
vhole story. Permit me to highlight
ome of the major U.N. accomplish-
nents in 1981-82. These included:

Adoption of resolutions demand-
ng an end to aggression in Kampuchea
md Afghanistan by increased majorities;

• Adoption of a strong resolution by
he U.N. Commission on Human Rights
ixpressing concern over the violation of
Luman rights in Poland;

• Strong rebuke in the International
jabor Organization to Poland and the
loviet Union because of the suppression
'f Solidarity;

• Extension, by an increased major-
:y, of the mandate to the special U.N.
Chemical Weapons Experts Group for
nother year;

• Defeat of the Cuban-inspired at-
empt to place Puerto Rico on the agen-
a of the Special Committee on
)ecolonization;

• Adoption by the General Assembly
f important resolutions on religious in-
olerance and on the causes of mass
efugee movements;

Formulation in UNESCO [United
Jations Educational, Scientific, and
Jultural Organization] of a moderate
nd practical program for the develop-
lent of communications in the less
eveloped countries with less emphasis
n the radical call for a New World In-
ormation Order;

• Preservation of vital peacekeeping
perations in South Lebanon, the Golan
leights, and Cyprus;

Adoption by the Security Council
if Resolution 502 on the Falkland
slands which provides the best
ramework for a peaceful settlement
lased on the U.N. Charter; and

• Continued performance by U.N.
pecialized agencies of a host of func-
ions essential to the United States in
nany fields.

h

I drew this balance sheet to put into
relief the paradoxical reasons why— as
revealed by the most recent polls — most
Americans, while critical of certain U.N.
actions, are also in favor of continued
U.S. participation in the many construc-
tive activities of that world organization
and its affiliated agencies.

Over the years, it has been consis-
tent U.S. policy to moderate the ex-
cessive expenditures of international
organizations and to urge the acceptance
of more efficient operation methods.
Over the years we have resisted
simplified solutions, quick fixes, and
shouldering a disproportionate share of
the burden for the U.N.'s social,
economic, and humanitarian undertak-
ings. And over the years, we have main-
tained that the United Nations must
complement, but never substitute for,
the self-reliant efforts of the countries,
themselves, in the path of their develop-
ment.

While continuing to hold to these
positions as a matter of practicality and
principle, we must also weigh the limits
imposed on the size of our voluntary
contributions by our own budgetary
restraints. More importantly, we must
also reemphasize certain principles.
First, expenditures of the public sector
for major U.N. development programs
should be designed to engender com-
plementary efforts by the private sector
where the greatest potential of exper-
tise, capital, and technology required for
the economic growth of the LDCs [less
developed countries] can be found. And
secondly, if we are to bring under better
control an overgrown international
bureaucracy that spends progressively
more energy on its own maintenance
and less and less on accomplishing its
mission, the time has come to acknowl-
edge that there are limits to the U.N.'s
institutional capacity to attend to every
problem.

In striving to maintain a proper
balance between these considerations
and the promotion of U.S. interests
through multilateral organizations, we
cannot escape the leading role we have
in shaping the activities of the U.N.
agencies and programs. There are over-
riding rationales for a continued high
level of U.S. commitment and voluntary
contributions to international organiza-
tions that embrace political, strategic,
economic, and cultural considerations.
Our voluntary contributions to the U.N.
agencies and programs undeniably affect
the international environment in which
we pursue our goals. More specifically.

U.S. contributions to these organizations
and programs

• Provide an opportunity for
advancing American ideals and ideas af-
fecting the evolution of the international
system;

• Are critical for advancing the
development of all countries, especially
the poorer ones;

• Demonstrate, in specific terms,
American humanitarian concerns;

• Are often warranted because of
the strategic importance of given
geographic areas in which U.N. pro-
grams are active;

• Act as catalysts for use of U.S.
expertise, technologies, and supplies;

• Sponsor foreign students to U.S.
institutions of higher learning;

• Are, in a large part, returned to
the U.S. economy in the forms of rent-
als, salaries, services, purchases, and
other expenditures;

• Encourage the recognition that
certain international responsibilities,
which cannot rest on one or a few coun-
tries alone, devolve upon the entire
world community;

• Substitute for the uneconomical
proliferation of bilateral agreements be-
tween the United States and other na-
tions;

• Permit these organizations to
coordinate their activities with U.S.
bilateral assistance programs and to
serve in areas too sensitive for, or out-
side the reach of, U.S. bilateral aid; and
finally,

• Strengthen these organizations as
preferred alternatives for many LDCs to
entering into entanghng "mutual
assistance" arrangements with the
Soviet Union.

Few if any of these organizations
and programs would continue at the
level of activity or with the impact they
now have without substantial U.S. par-
ticipation. Withdrawal from these
organizations would harm our
diplomacy; our economy; and our own
scientific, educational, cultural, and
business communities.

The remainder of my statement
describes briefly the activities and opera-
tions of the organizations and programs
our voluntary contributions support.
How, for example, the International
Atomic Energy Agency promotes
nuclear nonproliferation through its
safeguards program; how the World
Meteorological Organization doubles the
data available to U.S. weather services;

81

UNITED NATIONS

or how the U.N. Environmental Pro-
gram helps tackle the problem of trans-
boundary air pollution.

The U.N. Development Program
(UNDP)

Financed entirely through voluntary con-
tributions from governments, UNDP is
the main channel for technical coopera-
tion in the U.N. system. It administers
projects valued over $600 million in
some 150 countries covering a g^eat
diversity of fields ranging from
stimulating capital investment to voca-
tional and professional training. It has a
coordinating and primary role in
development efforts, particularly in the
poorest of the developing countries.

The requested U.S. contribution of
$106.8 million is $21.4 million less than
the U.S. contribution for FY 1982. This
major cut does not reflect, in any way, a
lessened U.S. commitment to UNDP or
depreciation of its achievements but is in
harmony with the Administration's ef-
fort to improve our domestic economy
while maintaining our leadership posi-
tion overseas.

The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Since its creation in 1946, UNICEF has
evolved into a major long-term
humanitarian development fund aimed
at improving the condition of children
everywhere, particularly in the develop-
ing countries. Often, in cooperation with
other multilateral and bilateral organiza-
tions, UNICEF provides both goods and
services for projects that have direct
bearing on the welfare of children and
their immediate community.

The United States has been a leader
in UNICEF and has been its largest
single donor. The $26 million requested
for UNICEF for FY 1983 reflects gen-
eral U.S. budgetary reductions and in no
way reflects a declining interest in the
program.

The Organization of American States
(OAS)

The OAS is the principal hemisphere
organization in which the United States
seeks solutions to inter-American prob-
lems. Its importance is particularly
highlighted by recent events in the
Caribbean Basin, for it offers a regional
mechanism to advance U.S. security and
political objectives.

The OAS is especially attuned to the
development needs of the region and to
the promotion of technical cooperation
among its members through its four

82

voluntary funds: the Special Multilateral
Fund, the Special Projects Fund, the
Special Development Assistance Fund,
and the Special Cultural Fund.

The maintenance of the level of U.S.
contributions in FY 1983 at the magni-
tude of $15.5 million, in view of other
reductions, reflects the strong commit-
ment of the United States to regional
stability and economic growth and the
high stakes that are involved in resolv-
ing the present conflicts in Central
America. Our participation in the OAS
was essential to prevent action by this
organization in the current Falkland
Islands crisis to impose sanctions on the
United Kingdom or to take other con-
crete steps adverse to our interests.

World Food Program (WFP)

The purpose of this WFP contribution is
to provide administrative and other cash
costs in dispensing food aid for economic
and social development and for food
emergencies worldwide.

The WFP uses its resources in a
variety of development and rehabilita-
tion programs. There are "food-for-
work" projects where food is provided as
payment to workers planting trees, dig-
ging irrigation canals, etc. WFP food is
also used in hospitals, child care centers,
school feeding programs, and resettle-
ment programs for refugees. The U.S.
$1 million contribution for FY 1983 will
provide administrative support needed
to disburse our contribution of PL 480
foods. WFP estimated 1983 expendi-
tures are $608 million. Over 70% of
these funds will be channeled into
agricultural development projects. Low-
income, food deficit countries will
receive approximately 80% of the overall
total.

U.N. Capital Development Fund
(UNCDF)

The UNCDF provides, on a grant basis,
seed money for preinvestment activities
for both private and public sector proj-
ects too small for financing by
multilateral banks. The fund concen-
trates almost entirely on the least
developed countries with particular em-
phasis on the drought-stricken Sahelian
Zone and Africa's poorest and neediest
nations. Projects are executed by the
U.N. specialized agencies, working with
host country government, bank, private
groups, and entrepreneurs. Projects con-
centrate on food production, village self-
help initiatives, and the development of
alternate sources of energy.

The U.S. annual contribution of $2
million for FY 1981 and 1982 represents

approximately 5% of the total receipts
for each of those years. The proposed
million contribution for 1983 reflects <i
continued U.S. interest in encouraging;
locally run activity involving simple to
intermediate-level technology. The woig
of the UNCDF enhances self-reliance,
creates markets for American equip-
ment and services, and promotes
political stability and economic growth

International Atomic Energy Agencj
(IAEA)

The voluntary U.S. contribution to the
IAEA demonstrates U.S. support of tl
IAEA and strengthens IAEA safe-
guards in accordance with U.S. nucleai
nonproliferation policy. The voluntary
safeguards support program is com-
plementary to nonproliferation and
safeguards activities which are coverei
under the regular budget of the IAEA
The FY 1983 program will focus on th
development and field-testing of in-
struments and the implementation of
systems which have been developed
through the U.S. program of technical
assistance to IAEA safeguards. Work
will continue on the development of
techniques for verification testing of
safeguards on spent fuel. U.S. assistai
to the technical cooperation program
will be in the form of cash contributioi
plus equipment, services of U.S. exper
fellowships, and training courses, in-
cluding preferential programs for LD(
party to the nonproliferation treaty. T
U.S. contribution request for FY 1983
$14,500,000.

U.N. Environment Program (UNEP)

i

The United States has been a major p
ticipant in UNEP since its beginning i
1972, contributing 30% of its total
resources for the period 1978-1981. C
proposed contribution for FY 1983 is
million, down from $7.85 million in V.
1982.

A principal goal of UNEP's progr:
is to stimulate monitoring and assess-
ment of major global and regional env
ronmental trends and to coordinate pi
grams to improve environmental
management. The organization providi
a means through which the United
States and other countries can stimuh
action through the U.N. system on pn
lems of global dimensions such as the
building of toxic substance in rivers ai
oceans, the depletion of ozone in the a
mosphere, and the loss of tropical for<
arable soil, and genetic resources of tl
land. UNEP's multilateral approach is
the preferable means of preventing

(3

'i

t

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

' iplication and managing international
rograms of such global dimensions.

onvention on International Trade
1 Endangered Species (CITES)

he Convention on International Trade
Endangered Species was ratified in
?73 at U.S. congressional initiative to
hieve concerted action on the conser-
ition of endangered species of wild
luna and flora. Support of the conven-
on is a major element of U.S. conserva-
on policy. CITES achievements include
le establishment of guidelines for safe

It lipping of live specimens of plants and
limals; approval of a prototype iden-
fication manual for use by customs of-
cials to identify protected species at
Drts of entry; adoption of a stand-
•dized universal format for information

r« ;quired to amend listings of endan-
ired species; standardization of permit
irms and other documentation; and
^hter controls on trade in elephant
ory, rhinoceros horn, and whale prod-
its. The U.S. contribution request for
Y 1983 is $150,000, which is needed
"imarily to meet the U.S. share of the
ennium budget and to provide a small
nount for development of a CITES
jarbook of international wildlife trade.

.N. Educational and Training Program
T Southern Africa (UNETPSA)

le U.N. Educational and Training Pro-
•am for Southern Africa provides scholar-
dps for secondary college level education
id advanced technical and vocational
aining to students from Namibia and the
epublic of South Africa who are denied
ich education and training in their own
luntries. The objective of this program is
)t only to enable these young people to
ay a fuU role in the society of their
spective countries as they become in-
jpendent or as majority rule is achieved, it
also to provide general support for the
incept of peaceful transition in Southern
frica. Approximately 30% of scholarship
)lders study in the United States and
lother 15% study in Europe. The FY
)83 request, like the U.S. contribution ap-
-opriated for FY 1982, is $1,000,000.

r.N. Institute for Namibia

'he purpose of the U.N. Institute for
lamibia located in Lusaka, Zambia, is to
ijrain young Namibians for mid-level civil
J ervice positions in preparation for the
1 idependence of Namibia so that they
1 an lead the country through peaceful

iiuly1982

means during its first few sovereign
years. The current student enrollment
numbers over 400. Some of the salient
projects carried out by the Institute are
in the fields of manpower, health, educa-
tion, rural, and urban surveys, and in
the study of the constitutional options
available for an independent Namibia.
The U.S. contribution request for FY
1983 is the same as that appropriated
for FY 1982-$500,000.

U.N. Voluntary Fund for the
Decade for Women

The U.N. Voluntary Fund for the
Decade for Women was created to im-
prove significantly the status of and op-
portunities for women worldwide
through greater participation in the
economic and social development proc-
ess. The fund's goal is to provide seed
money for innovative and catalytic proj-
ects which will grow and become self-
supporting or, once evaluated, will be
adopted or emulated by larger devel-
opmental funds. Since its inception, the
fund has financed over 220 projects with
priority attention being placed on the
least developed countries and on pro-
grams and projects which benefit rural
women and the poorest women in urban
areas. The FY 1983 request for a U.S.
contribution is $500,000.

World Meteorological Organization
(WMO)/Voluntary Cooperation
Program (VCP)

The WMO/Voluntary Cooperation Pro-
gram assists developing countries to
participate in WMO's World Health
Watch which provides the United States
access to important meteorological and
climatic information collected on a global
scale. The U.S. National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration relies on the
World Weather Watch for meteoro-
logical, hydrolog^cal, and ocean-related
services. Through VCP efforts, e.g.,
greatly improved telecommunications,
there has been nearly a doubling of sur-
face and upper air data received at the
U.S. National Meteorological Center.
The FY 1983 contribution request is for
$2.3 million, the same as in FY 1981 and
1982.

As you can see, there are some very
practical reasons and arguments for our
continued support of international
organizations and programs. Our mental
image of a flawed United Nations — as
one huge, expensive, and overpoliticized,
international bureaucracy — gets a
dramatic jolt of reality if we examine,
individually, the constructive work of
the many constituting parts that make

up this global institution. We find that
together they spell "U.S. interests," and
our interests are in harmony with our
ideals. At the same time, we have made
every effort to assure that our reduced
request for voluntary contributions is
consonant with overall Administration
policy to hold down Federal spending.
We hope, therefore, that Congress will
support in full our request.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1 983

Assistance

Requests

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21,
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. '

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
discuss with the committee our request
for security assistance for FY 1983 for
Latin America and the Caribbean. The
Administration is requesting $326
million in economic support funds (ESF),
which with $274.6 million in develop-
ment assistance and $183 million of PL
480 from the separate AID appropria-
tion, would bring our proposed FY 1983
economic assistance for the region to a
total of $783 million. We are also asking
for $138.6 million in funds for foreign
military sales (FMS) financing and inter-
national military and education training
(IMET).

The bulk of this projected assistance
is for the countries of the Caribbean and
Central America. These FY 1983 re-
quests are substantially higher than
those provided for in the FY 1982
budget. As such, they reflect the high
priority the Administration attaches to
U.S. interests in Central America and
the Caribbean. They are essential
elements of an integrated approach to
the economic, political, and security
problems of the region.

Let me summarize briefly the overall
framework of U.S. interests, analysis.

83

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

and objectives within which the Ad-
ministration's assistance requests should
be addressed.

President Reagan, in his address at
the Organization of American States on
February 24, outlined the U.S. national
interests in the Caribbean Basin region.
As the President said, the "well being
and security of our neigbors in the
region are in our own vital interest."

Economic progress, peace, and
security are in serious danger in the
Caribbean Basin. Almost without excep-
tion, the countries of the region face
economic difficulties of a potentially
catastrophic nature. Their economies
are, for the most part, small, fragile,
and extremely vulnerable to disruption.
Developments in the international
economic system can seriously exacer-
bate longstanding internal problems.
The current slowdown in the world
economy is a case in point. Prices for
raw materials which are the principal
exports of these countries — sugar, cof-
fee, bananas, and bauxite— have fallen
sharply. Simultaneously, most of the
region is still struggling with the need to
adjust to increases in the costs of essen-
tial imports, particularly petroleum.
High interest rates have imposed a new
burden in countries needing to borrow
money or refinance existing debt.
Tourism, important to many, has
stagnated. Certain economies of Central
America, particularly in El Salvador and
Guatemala, have been further damaged
by guerrilla-sponsored violence and the
general political instability of the area.
At the same time, Cuba and, now,
Nicaragua are both seeking to exploit
the regionwide economic crisis for their
own political objectives. Their in-
struments are antidemocratic minorities
predisposed to extremism, violence, and
systematic armed conflict. Cuba and
Nicaragua are providing political
organization, guerrilla training, and
other support to insurgent groups in El
Salvador and Guatemala, and there are
disquieting signs of their aggressive in-
tent in several other countries.

We do not, for our part, seek to in-
volve our neighbors in the political and
military competition between East and
West. And, certainly, they do not want
to be involved. They are independent,
and they hope their countries and the
waters of the Caribbean can be free of
international tension and conflict. They
need our help to overcome economic dif-
ficulties, to defend themselves, and to
keep alive their faith in freedom and
democracy. With our assistance, they
can manage their own affairs and find

their way out of their present troubles.
The complexity and urgency of the
problems which I have outlined make
clear that our response must be com-
prehensive. It must respond to both im-
mediate and longer term needs, and it
must address all aspects— economic,
political, and security— in their separate
individual requirements while recogniz-
ing that, in fact, these aspects are also
interdependent in important ways. The
overall strategy will not succeed unless
we move forward in all areas.

Economic Strategy

On March 17, the President sent to the
Congress a set of integrated proposals
for a major new program of economic
cooperation for the Caribbean Basin. As
you are aware, the President's program
includes three major elements:

• Authority to extend duty-free
treatment in the United States for
agricultural and industrial products, ex-
cept textiles, from countries of the
Caribbean Basin;

• Authority to extend tax incentives
to U.S. investors in Basin countries; and

• Substantial increases in levels of
U.S. economic assistance to countries of
the region, including a requested $350
million supplemental in ESF funds for
FY 1982.

Over the medium term, the trade
and investment authorities requested by
the President will make a major con-
tribution to the economic well-being of
the region. Together with the self-help
efforts of these countries, we can con-
tribute to an economic climate of ex-
panded production, new employment,
and rising exports. These measures will
also convey a political message. The
United States is saying, in effect, that
the economic well-being and political
health of these countries is of such
direct importance to us that we are will-
ing to extend special treatment to them
on a long-term basis. Our commitment is
both serious and sustained.

The President's program also
recognizes that many of these countries
face major short-term problems which
must be addressed if they are going to
be able to benefit from the trade and in-
vestment initiatives. In some countries,
including El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica, major balance-of-payments
problems threaten, immediately, their
ability to import foodstuffs and critical
raw materials for industry and agri-
culture. Jamaica will need increased
assistance to sustain a still vulnerable
economic recovery. Other countries, for

ijotri

1ft

net
in.

iiiii
■elei
ifvi

example, the small nations of the
Eastern Caribbean, need additional
assistance to develop the economic in-
frastructure required to capitalize on t
new trade and investment opportuniti«

Because of the urgency of these
problems the President has requested
additional $350 million in ESF in the
current fiscal year to supplement the
funds already approved by the Congre
But that $350 million, vital though it is
will not be enough to meet the needs c
the next few years. Therefore, we hav
requested $326 million in ESF for FY
1983. Combined with development
assistance and PL 480, our economic
assistance for the region would total
$783 million. This is a 47% increase ov
the amount budgeted for the current
fiscal year. It reflects both the large ai
urgent needs of these countries and th
high priority which the Administration
attaches to our interests in the Carib-
bean Basin area.

A large share of our FY 1983 ESI f
request, $105 million, would go to El
Salvador. Its economy has been broug
to the point of collapse by terrorism a
economic sabotage directed against ih
country's transportation and power
systems, businesses, and workers. In-
vestment has dried up, and the privat
sector cannot even obtain the credits
essential to its survival. Output decline
10% in 1980, and 10% again in 1981.
With the assistance we and other don^
plan for this year, this decline should
significantly reduced by the end of tht
year. We expect further improvement
next year with the economic assistanc
we are requesting in FY 1983.

Other major recipients of ESF
would include:

• $55 million to Jamaica to suppo
[Prime Minister Edward] Seaga's effo
to revitalize his nation's economy;

• $60 million for Costa Rica to he
that country address one of the most
severe crises in its history;

• $25 million for Honduras to hel]
bolster confidence and provide critical
needed credits to the struggling priva
sector; and

• $30 million to the Eastern Caril
bean to stimulate economic activity ai
generate employment.

Political Strategy

The Caribbean Basin is not, as some
suppose, a region of repressive, right-
wing military dictatorships. Of the 24
governments in the Basin, not includii
the United States, 16 have democratic
ly elected governments. Support for tl

k

IK

lit
iCli

nil

11
if
,1'

84

Department of State Bulle

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

tablishment and consolidation of
mocratic institutions is a central ele-
;nt of our approach. Not just because
is our own system of government but
;o because we believe it is the system
st able to produce social justice,
jnomic progress, and political stability
the Caribbean Basin itself.

We have been encouraged by last
ar's electoral success in Honduras. We
■re similarly heartened by February's
aceful elections in Costa Rica as the
Dple of that country demonstrated,
ain, the strength of their commitment
democratic institutions. Now the
minican Republic is preparing again
• elections, extending the democratic
lievements made during the last
leration.
In Guatemala, the military coup last
nth may have ended the political
-alysis which had gripped that coun-
. It was led by junior officers ap-
•ently seeking to give the Guatemalan
)ple a better government. General
)S Montt, who has emerged as leader
the junta, was the presidential can-
ate of the Christian Democratic coali-
1 in 1974. Since the coup, violence not
ectly connected to the insurgency has
•n brought virtually to an end. Con-
te measures have been taken against
ruption. All political forces have been
ed to join in national reconciliation.
are watching these developments
5ely. We hope that the new govern-
at of Guatemala will continue to
ke progress in these areas and that
in turn, will be able to establish a
ier, more collaborative relationship
h this key country that faces both
nomic difficulty and an active Cuban-
iported insurgency.
In El Salvador, the elections of
rch 28 were a fundamental first step
he democratic process, but it was on-
he beginning. Discussions are now
lerway among the political parties
cerning the organization of a new
visional government and the launch-
of the work of the newly elected
istituent Assembly. That Assembly
st carry forward political reform and,
)ortantly, establish procedures for the
ition of a President.
Discussions on the composition of
provisional government and the ac-
1 form of the political reforms are
;s which can only be made by the
vadorans themselves. We have made
if our desire to continue to support
Salvador in their programs of
•nomic recovery and in their battle
iinst the guerrillas of the extreme
•'* ;. We have also made clear, however,
■^ t our continued support must not be

A

taken for granted. In particular, we
have emphasized our expectation that
the new provisional government will
carry forward political and economic
reform, including land reform, and con-
tinue to make substantial progress in
controlling violence.

On March 28, the people of El
Salvador massively signaled their choice
for a democratic process of elections as
the method for resolving political con-
flict and ending the violence. They did
this despite a concerted attempt by the
guerrillas, first, to dissuade people from
voting and, then, to intimidate them.
Thus, the results of the March 28 elec-
tion clearly stand as a massive political
defeat for the FMLN/FDR [Farabundo
Marti's People's Liberation Front/
Revolutionary Democratic Front]. The
guerrillas have advocated, as an alter-
native to these elections, direct negotia-
tion of an overall division of political
power, the results of which could later,
perhaps, be submitted to a plebiscite.

In light of the March 28 results and
in view of the ongoing political process
in El Salvador, we hope that elements of
the FMLN/FDR which can accommodate
to democracy will now decide to par-
ticipate peacefully in that process. Such
a decision would be in the interests of El
Salvador. We believe that mechanisms
could be found to facilitate the entry of
these groups into the democratic proc-
ess. We will be prepared to assist in
discussions or negotiations which might
be required. However, we remain firmly
and unalterably opposed to negotiations
on division of political power in El
Salvador outside the democratic process.

Security Assistance

Freedom and prosperity are impossible
without security. The purpose of our
FMS and IMET programs is quite sim-
ply to help small countries defend
themselves against an immediate threat.
Many of our neighbors have neither the
resources nor a long-term need to
develop and maintain large military
establishments. Faced with a sudden
threat, they need help from friends in
the form of equipment and training.
We do not believe that only the
strong should be secure. With ap-
propriate help, our neighbors all have
the capability and will to turn back out-
side threats. They do not want us to do
their fighting for them. That would not
serve anyone's interest and is not
needed. All they ask is to be provided
the training and equipment they cannot
afford.

l|y1982

We are requesting $125.3 million in
FMS financing for FY 1983. To keep
this in perspective, this is less than 2%
of our global FMS program. The in-
creases over our request last year are
largely for El Salvador, Honduras, and
Jamaica. We are, again, requesting a
portion of the FMS— $74 million— in
direct concessional credits for those
countries facing severe economic prob-
lems and where high interest guaranteed
loans would further add to their heavy
debt burden.

About one-half of our FMS request
for the region— $60 million— is for El
Salvador. Of this amount $50 million is
being requested on concessional terms.
This program is critically important to
provide the resources to enable the
Salvadoran Government to protect the
people's right to choose their own future
and carry forward the important
economic, political, and social reforms
underway. Our military assistance pro-
gram is designed, in part, to enable the
Salvadoran armed forces to employ
small unit tactics, considered more effec-
tive against the guerrillas and less likely
to cause casualties among noncom-
batants in the battle zone. The growing
effectiveness of El Salvador's armed
forces was evident in the exemplary way
in which they turned back the guerrilla's
effort to launch a major preelection of-
fensive. They protected voters, polling
places, and election officials from guer-
rilla attacks and harassment last March
28.

We are also seeking an increase in
our FMS program for Honduras to
$14.5 million, $9 million of which would
be on concessional terms. The demo-
cratic Government of Honduras is
threatened by the illegal use of its ter-
ritory by those supporting the insur-
gencies in El Salvador and Guatemala as
well as by the unprecedented military
buildup in Nicaragua. Honduras needs
additional help to develop its transporta-
tion, patrol, and communications
capabilities to defend itself from these
threats.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin,
we are requesting an increase in our
program in Jamaica — $6.5 million in
concessional credits — to help the
democratic, pro- Western Seaga govern-
ment modernize its defense force to deal
with potential subversion and to protect
its coastal waters from illegal traffic.
We are also seeking concessional credits
and training for the small democratic
states of the Eastern Caribbean to im-
prove their coast guards.

Finally, a small part of the FMS

85

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

program is for South America. We pro-
pose $12 million for Colombia and $6
million each for Peru and Ecuador to
enable them to meet essential millitary
needs.

Our request for $13.3 million in
IMET includes 23 country programs and
our regional program for the Eastern
Caribbean. We believe that training and
education under the IMET program will
strengthen the professional qualities of
defense forces, improve our military-to-
military relations, and insure continued
orientation toward U.S. doctrine and
security goals. We have asked for
$250,000 in IMET for Guatemala in the
expectation that conditions there may
improve sufficiently for us to consider a
small training program.

Cooperation

The strategy I have outlined cannot rest
on our efforts alone. We neither can nor
should try to carry the burden by
ourselves. Solutions designed exclusively
in Washington are not desired and
would probably not work. Our response
must be in cooperation with our
neighbors. We find, today, a consensus
among the nations of the hemisphere
over the danger of foreign intervention,
the importance of democracy and free
market policies, and the need to take
collective responsibility. At this point I
would like to make some remarks on our
policies toward Nicaragua and Cuba.

Over the past several months, we
have tried to establish a dialogue with
Nicaragua. As members of this commit-
tee are aware, the United States is
acutely concerned by several of the
policies and activities being pursued by
the Sandinista government. First and
foremost, like countries in the region
themselves, we are concerned by
Nicaragua's continuing large-scale sup-
port for the guerrillas in El Salvador
and its similar activities in other Central
American countries. This, together with
Nicaragua's extraordinary arms buildup
and the large-scale presence of Cuban
military advisers, is the fundamental
cause of tension within the region.

On April 8, our Ambassador in
Managua conveyed to the Nicaraguan
Government several proposals which
would address our concerns and, we
believe, address the alleged concerns of
the Sandinistas. On April 14, the
Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington
presented to us a response. We are now
evaluating that response and expect to
decide soon our possible next steps.

I would stress, however, as we have
stressed to the Nicaraguans that no

progress is possible in the areas of our
relationship of concern and interest to
them unless and until they cease their
active support for insurgencies in the
region.

In the case of Cuba, we continue to
oppose fundamentally all efforts to ex-
port subversion and terrorism in Central
America and the Caribbean. In this con-
nection, Senator Symms [Steve Symms,
R. -Idaho] has introduced a resolution
reaffirming the resolution adopted in
1962 on the U.S. determination to op-
pose the efforts of Cuba to expand its
sphere of influence. The resolution
reflects the policy of six administrations,
certainly, this one. As we told Senator
Symms, we have always endorsed the
thrust of his resolution. While we sup-
ported the tabling motion on the Senate
floor, we did so only because we believed
it was appropriate that the resolution be
fully addressed in committee before
coming to the Senate floor. After it has
been given the appropriate committee
consideration, we fully intend to support
the Symms resolution.

We will not accept that the future of
the Caribbean Basin be manipulated
from Havana. Support for self-
determination and democracy was evi-
dent at the OAS meeting in St. Lucia
and in the hemisphere's wide support for
the elections in El Salvador. It was evi-
dent in the formation this year of the
Central American Democratic Communi-
ty by Costa Rica, Honduras, and El

Salvador to cooperate toward the com
mon goals of economic development,
democracy, and mutual security again:
outside threats.

The momentum for greater cooper
tion is in our interest, and we will seel
to strengthen and widen it. That is wh;
we have joined Colombia and Venezue
in supporting the Central American
Democratic Community. This was the
spirit in which we discussed with Mex:
the Mexican President's proposals aim
at reducing tensions throughout Centr
America.

The Caribbean Basin program is, i
many ways, a model of the types of
regional cooperation we seek. The
overall program and the U.S. contribu
tion to it was developed over a period
some 8 months of intensive consultatic
and joint analysis. The United States,
Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada, later
joined by Colombia, recognizing our
common interest in the economic heal
of the region, are each undertaking m
jor efforts under a common set of obj
tives. This is what we are asking the
Congress to support: programs that v
make cooperation possible in support
an emerging democratic consensus
among our closest neighbors.

'The complete transcript of the hearin
will be published by the committee and wi
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The Falkland Islands

Following are statements by Secre-
tary Haig; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S.
Representative to the U.N.. J. William
Middendorfll; U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the OAS; the White House;
and texts of the U.N. and OAS resolu-
tions.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 21, 1982'

The President and this Administration
have been intensely involved in the
search for peace since the beginning of
the dispute in the South Atlantic. Our
deep concern over the threat of conflict
has been evident to the international
community. We have made bilateral and
multilateral efforts in support of that ef-
fort. We continue today to be in contact

with those at the United Nations and
elsewhere who are also striving for a
peaceful solution under U.N. Security
Council Resolution 502 and the U.N.
Charter.

Let me emphasize, there will be r
involvement whatsoever of U.S. milit
personnel in the conflict in the South
Atlantic. As the President and Secret
Haig have said, we will meet our com
mitments to Great Britain. Any re-
sponses made to requests for assistar
will be carefully evaluated on a case-l
case basis. We will, however, not ad-
dress reports of specific requests for
sistance or how we respond.

Our position throughout this disp
has been to do whatever we can to at
vance the chances for a peaceful reso
tion, and that remains our stance. Ev
step, every action of the President ar

G
!1

86

Department of State Bullel

m

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

tier

le U.S. Government shall be taken with
le thought in mind — a peaceful solu-
an. We stand ready to assist in any
ay we can.

ECURITY COUNCIL
ESOLUTION 505,
AY 26, 19822

1D(

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982) of
April 1982,
Noting with the deepest concern that the
s, i tuation in the region of the Falkland Islands
las Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the
jcretary-General to the Security Council at
2360th meeting on 21 May 1982, as well
the statements in the debate of the
presentatives of Argentina and of the
nited Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
n Ireland,

Concerned to achieve as a matter of the
eatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and
end to the present conflict between the
med forces of Argentina and of the United
ngdom of Great Britain and Northern
eland.

11 1. Expresses appreciation to the Secre-
ry-General for the efforts which he has
eady made to bring about an agreement
tween the parties, to ensure the implemen-
tion of Security Council resolution 502

"i 982), and thereby to restore peace to the
gion;

2. Requests the Secretary -General, on the
sis of the present resolution, to undertake
renewed mission of good offices bearing in
ind Security Council resolution 502 (1982)
id the approach outlined in his statement of

May 1982;

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-
lerate fully with the Secretary-General in

3 mission with a view to ending the present
'Stilities in and around the Falkland Islands
ilas Malvinas);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to
ter into contact immediately with the par-
;s with a view to negotiating mutually ac-
ptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if
■cessary, arrangements for the dispatch of
lited Nations observers to monitor compli-
ice with the terms of the cease-fire;

5. Requests the Secretary -General to sub-
it an interim report to the Security Council

soon as possible and, in any case, not later
an seven days after the adoption of the
esent resolution.

MBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK,

[AY 26, 19823

should like once again to express the
dmiration and appreciation of my
Dvernment for the skill and judgment
ith which you have conducted and are
)ntinuing to conduct the affairs of this
ouncil while we are dealing with this
rribly difficult problem.

The United States has already ex-
plained here that this conflict is par-
ticularly poignant and painful for us. We
have already expressed our intense
desire to reduce, to isolate, and to end
this tragic conflict. I believe we have
given evidence of the seriousness of our
desire. My government, in the person of
the Secretary of State, made sustained
efforts to avoid the conflict and, subse-
quently, offered full support to the ef-
forts of Peru's President Belaunde and,
of course, to the efforts of our
distinguished Secretary General, Javier
Perez de Cuellar.

The United States ardently desires
an end to this tragic war. We welcome
this resolution and pledge our continued
support for the Secretary General's ef-
forts to find a just and enduring peace. I
should like to take this opportunity to
assure the distinguished representative
of Panama and any other interested par-
ties that my country has deep respect
for all of our neighbors in the hemi-
sphere, that we desire greatly to live in
peace with them, that we are, ourselves,
part of this hemisphere, that we desire
to put an end to this conflict so that we
can get on with the business of living in
peace in the hemisphere.

As I said earlier this week, the
quicker we put this tragic conflict behind
us the quicker we can begin building our
future — and there, as always, the na-
tions of Latin America will find how
deeply the United States is committed to
the cause of peace and prosperity for
our hemisphere.

SECRETARY HAIG,
OAS, MAY 27, 1982*

As the fighting intensifies and the cost
in lives mounts in the South Atlantic, I
think we all share a sense of anguish
that it has not been possible to prevent
this terrible conflict. It touches tradi-
tions and sympathies that run deep in
our past and our national experiences. It
is a loss and a failure of our generation.

We grieve over the heartbreak and
the bereavement that the conflict brings
to so many families in Argentina and
Great Britain. We too share the emo-
tions and pain of those families. Is there
a country among us that has not count-
ed itself a friend of both countries? Our
hemisphere and the Western society of
nations would be far poorer without
their notable contributions to our com-
mon civilization. When friends fight, it is
truly tragic.

It is from Great Britain that the
United States drew the inspiration for
many of its most cherished institutions.

Jly1982

Most of us stood at the side of Great
Britain in two world wars in this cen-
tury. Great Britain is a vital partner in
the alliance with Europe which is the
first line of defense for Western civiliza-
tion against the dangers of Soviet ag-
gression.

Argentina is an American republic,
one of us. It is a nation, like the United
States, founded on the republican ideal
that all men are created equal. Like my
country it is a nation of immigrants and
settlers whose own culture and civiliza-
tion have long had the respect of my
countrymen and the world. President
Reagan moved early in his Administra-
tion to make clear the high value we
place on our relations with the Govern-
ment of Argentina and the high esteem
in which we hold the Argentine people.

Preserving the Inter-American System

It is not only our friendship and our ties
with the two countries that are at stake.
This festering dispute has suddenly be-
come a violent conflict that poses
dangers to the very institutions and
principles which bring us here and that
have made this hemisphere, in many
ways, the envy of the world.

The war puts the inter- American
system under stress. Some say that this
is an "anticolonial war" because the
islands were formally administered as a
British colony. Some say that since this
is a war that pits an American republic
against an outside power, the Rio treaty
requires that all its members come to
the assistance of the American republic.

Others say that it is impossible to
speak of colonialism when a people is
not subjugated to another and, as we all
know, there was no such subjugation on
the island. Others say there is no way in
which the inter-American system — which
protects regional order based on law and
the peaceful settlement of disputes — can
be interpreted as sanctioning the first use
of armed force to settle a dispute.

With full respect for the views of
others, the U.S. position is clear: Since
the first use of force did not come from
outside the hemisphere, this is not a
case of extracontinental aggression
against which we are all committed to
rally.

As we deal with this crisis, let us
agree that there is far more to unite the
nations of this hemisphere than to divide
us. We must keep the future in mind. If
we are to learn anything from the grim
events of recent weeks, it is that conflict
might have been averted if there had
been better communication and confi-
dence among American states. We

87

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

should take as our guide the work of the
generations of statesmen who gave us
an inter-American system that is both
visionary and practical. Their legacy is
statecraift that is calm, reasoned, and
just.

The very presence in this hall of so
many distinguished statesmen indicates
that we do agree— all of us— that the
inter-American system is important. It
has served us well. For two generations
and more this hemisphere has been the
region in the world most free of the
scourges of war. The inter-American
system and the Rio treaty have con-
strained and almost eliminated armed
conflict between states of the Americas.
The countries of Latin America spend
less of their national resources for arms
than any other area in the world. They
have suffered less from Communist infil-
tration or aggression than any other
part of the developing world. None of
that would have been possible without
the inter-American system of security.

The post- World War II achieve-
ments of the Organization of American
States (OAS), now in its 92d year as the
world's oldest regional international
body, are largely responsible for our col-
lective record as the world's haven from
war. The contributions of the OAS to
regional peace and harmony are almost
too numerous to mention. Let me cite a
few.

• This organization helped restore
peace along the borders between Nicar-
agua and Costa Rica on four separate
occasions (1948, 1955, 1959, and 1978).

• Similar OAS efforts helped con-
tribute to calming disputes, as between
Ecuador and Peru (in 1955 and again in
1980) or Honduras and Nicaragua
(1957), or to diminishing tensions, as be-
tween Bolivia and Chile (1962) and be-
tween Haiti and the Dominican Republic
(1963).

• In 1971, the OAS successfully
urged Ecuador and the United States to
avoid widening their differences over in-
ternational fishing boundary rights. As
one Ecuadoran writer noted at that mo-
ment, this OAS action proved that "the
inter-American system functions and
that its most powerful member did not
vacillate one instant in recognizing the
equality of its weaker associated part-
ner."

• By taking an early and steadfast
stand against violations of diplomatic
staffs and premises, the organization
played a vital humanitarian role in 1980
in ending terrorist takeovers. One of

88

these situations was a diplomatic mis-
sion (Colombia) and the other an OAS
office (El Salvador).

• During the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis, the legal position of the OAS had
a major psychological and practical
effect on the Russians.

• In another serious instance, the
OAS imposed sanctions on a member
state when it was proved that the inten-
tions of that regime (Trujillo in the
Dominican Republic) were aimed at
assassination of the president of another
OAS country (Romulo Betancourt of
Venezuela).

• When riots broke out in the
Panama Canal Zone in 1964, an OAS
team assisted in stopping bloodshed; the
organization's principled solidarity even-
tually helped bilateral negotiations to
resolve what President Woodrow Wilson
called the greatest problem dividing the
United States and Latin America from
each other.

• In the Dominican Republic in
1965, after the outbreak of civil war, the
organization acted decisively to restore
peace, setting the stage for an im-
pressive democratic evolution.

• When fighting between Honduras
and El Salvador broke out in 1969, OAS
action helped put a quick stop to the
bloodshed and fighting. Within 48 hours
the OAS arranged a cease-fire, with con-
tending forces withdrawing to statiLS quo
ante helium.

For me the inter-American system is
one of the unique forces that have
helped the new world realize its special
and privileged destiny, a hemisphere
with almost unlimited human and
material potential, yet with the means to
prevent or control the conflicts that have
prevented other continents from realiz-
ing their potential.

The South Atlantic conflict could put
into danger the principles and institu-
tions we have constructed so laboriously
and which have served us so well. We
must protect the integrity of our institu-
tions so that they can serve us as well in
future crises, which could affect any of
us, as they have served us in the past.

Efforts to Resolve the ConHict

We face a conflict that involves us all,
but to which the Rio treaty does not well
apply. It is a dispute over competing
claims of sovereignty, each with pro-
found historical and emotional sources.

We know how deep is the Argentine
commitment to recover islands Argen-
tines believe were taken from them by
illegal force. This is not some sudden

passion but a longstanding national co
cern that reaches back 150 years and
heightened by the sense of frustratior
over what Argentina feels were nearl,
20 years of fruitless negotiation.

We know, too, how deeply Britain
in peaceful possession of the disputed
territory for 150 years, has been
devoted to the proposition that the
rights and views of the inhabitants
should be considered in any future
disposition of the islands. No one can
say that Britain's attitude is simply a
colonial reflex to retain possession of
distant islands. In the last 20 years nr
less than nine of the members of the
Organization of American States re-
ceived their independence in peace an
goodwill from Great Britain.

For its part, the United States ha:
not taken— and will not take— any pos
tion on the substance of the dispute. \
are completely neutral on the questioi
of who has sovereignty. Indeed, 35 ye
ago, at the 1947 signing of the final a<
of the Rio conference which created tl
Rio treaty, the U.S. delegation made
this clear at the same time it set fortl^
our position that the treaty is without
effect upon outstanding territorial dis-
putes between American and Europea
states.

Faced with a conflict for which thi
inter-American system was not de-
signed, American republics have turm
instinctively to that fundamental prini
pie of world order, the encouragemen
of the peaceful settlement of disputes
That was what the United States did.
Our effort began even before April 2,
when we offered to the two sides our
good offices to help find a solution to
South Georgia incident. Argentina de
clined.

Then, when it became apparent tl
Argentina was preparing to land troo
on the islands, President Reagan calk
President Galtieri to urge him not to
ahead. We told President Galtieri in t
most friendly but serious terms what
consequences would be. I can hardly
take any satisfaction in knowing that
our predictions have proved prescient

After April 2, both President
Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher
asked the United States to see whethi
it could be of assistance. At President
Reagan's direction, I undertook two
rounds of intense discussions in each
capital.

The first meeting of the organ of
consultation also promoted peaceful
negotiation. Meeting in this very hall,
we, the foreign ministers of the

Department of State Bulle

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

lericas, ui-ged that peace be main-
ned and that law prevail as the foun-
ion of our international relations.

Immediately afterward, President
launde of Peru took the initiative to
t forward a peace plan, drawing also
the fundamental elements of Resolu-
n 502. We worked in close consulta-
n with him.

Let me now report to you some of

specific elements involved in our
Drts to resolve this dispute, which has
)ved so extraordinarily difficult to
olve. On April 27, as prospects for
re intense hostilities arose, the
ited States put forward a proposal of
own. It represented our best estimate
what the two parties could reasonably
expected to accept. It was founded
larely on Resolution 502.

That proposal called for negotiations
the removal of the islands from the

of non-self-governing territories. It
'cified that the definitive status of the
.nds must be mutually agreed, with
! regard for the rights of the inhabi-
ts and for the principle of territorial
3grity. And it referred both to the
■poses and principles of the charter
i to the relevant resolution of the
^I. General Assembly.

Those negotiations were to be com-
ted by the end of the year. Pending
t, an interim authority composed of
jentina, Britain, and the United
.tes was to oversee the traditional
il administration, to be sure that no
ision was taken contrary to the
eement. Argentine residents of the
nds were to participate in the coun-

for this purpose, in proportion to
ir numbers. During the interim
iod, travel, transportation, and move-
nt of persons between the islands and

mainland were to be promoted and
ilitated without prejudice to the
hts and guarantees of the inhabitants.

The proposed interim authority of
ee countries was to make proposals
how to take into account the wishes
1 interests of the inhabitants and on
at the role of the Falkland Islands
npany should be. Should the negotia-
is not succeed in the time afforded.

United States was to be asked to
jage in a formal mediation/concilia-
T effort in order to resolve the dispute
3 months.

The British Government indicated
it it would give the most serious con-
eration to acceptance of our proposal,
hough it presented certain real diffi-
ties for it. However, Foreign Minister
sta Mendez informed me that the pro-
sal was not acceptable to Argentina.

On May 5 a simplified text was for-
warded by Peru to Buenos Aires at the
initiative of President Belaunde. It
called for:

• An immediate cease-fire;

• Concurrent withdrawal and non-
introduction of forces;

• Administration of the Falklands
Islands by a contact group pending
definitive settlement in consultation with
the elected representatives of the
islands;

• Acknowledgement of conflicting
claims;

• Acknowledgement of the aspira-
tions and interests of the islanders
would be included in the final settle-
ment;

• An undertaking by the contact
group to insure that the two parties
reached a definitive agreement by
April 30, 1983.

Britain made clear that it could
seriously consider accepting the pro-
posal. Argentina declined to consider it,
asking, instead, for the U.N. Secretary
General to use his good offices as, of
course, it was Argentina's full privilege
to do.

To promote negotiations is also what
the Security Council and the U.N. Secre-
tary General have done. We are heart-
ened that the two parties — and the
Security Council as a whole — have now
been able to agree to give a new man-
date to the Secretary General to find a
basis for peace.

The Collective Search for Peace

What has been the approach of the in-
ternational community as a whole must
remain the policy of this body. We must
strive to resolve the conflict, not seek to
widen it. We must work to use the rule
of law and the principle of non-use of
force to settle the conflict, not seek to
challenge these vital principles. We must
search for ways in which we can all join
to help bring about peace, not ask the
Rio treaty mechanism to adjudicate a
conflict for which it was not conceived.

It is right and proper that signa-
tories to the Rio treaty should convoke a
meeting of foreign ministers when they
perceive a threat to peace in the hemi-
sphere. It is this right which has served
so well in preserving peace in this hemi-
sphere. In times of danger we need the
collective wisdom of all members of this
body. This is of critical importance to
the smallest among us who cannot
afford large standing armies to defend
their independence. It is this principle of
collective security on which rests that

other principle — nonintervention — which
is vital to our relations.

We here have a special responsibility
to insure the peace of the hemisphere,
as signatories of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, of the
Charter of the Organization of American
States, and of the Charter of the United
Nations, and as nations of the Western
Hemisphere. We should take no action
and make no decisions which increase
tensions without enhancing the pros-
pects for a negotiated settlement of the
struggle in the South Atlantic.

Resolution 502 embodies the prin-
ciples which must govern our search for
peace. We must have the strength to
seek a solution, described well to us by
[Brazilian] President Figueiredo, in
which there is neither victor nor van-
quished.

The Secretary General of the United
Nations has now been given a new man-
date to search for peace. The most im-
portant thing we could do here would be
to give our unanimous collective support
to that effort. We should reassert the
validity of Resolution 502 as the indis-
pensable framework in which a peaceful
solution has been sought and will ulti-
mately be found. And we should call on
both parties to reach a peaceful negoti-
ated solution.

As the Secretary General of the
United Nations proceeds, I would hope
he would give particular attention to the
ideas put forward by the President of
Peru 10 days ago, as well as those ad-
vanced by the Government of Brazil on
May 24. Although they may require
completion and adjustment, these pro-
posals contain much that is equitable
and fair; they merit careful attention.

For our part, the United States has
remained in touch with both parties
throughout the crisis. We have tried in
countless ways to help Argentina and
Britain find a peaceful solution. We are
actively engaged in working with the
Secretary General in support of his most
recent mandate for peace.

This conflict has by now proven that
the young men of Argentina and Great
Britain can fight with skill and determi-
nation. They have the courage to die for
the dignity of their nations. They have
the strength and valor to endure in
desperate struggle in a desolate climate.

Now the time has come for older
heads to accept the risks of compromise
and the hazards of conciliation to bring
the suffering and dying to an end.
Wisdom as well as struggle is a test of
valor. The dignity of a nation is honored
not only with sacrifices but with peace.

Iy1982

89

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The South Atlantic has reverberated
with the fury of war. It must now be
calmed by the wisdom and courage of
peace.

AMBASSADOR MIDDENDORF,
OAS, MAY 28, 1982=

I would like to explain my delegation's
abstention on the resolution before us.

When we began our deliberations
yesterday, Secretary of State Haig, in
his address to this distinguished assem-
bly, made clear our commitment to the
inter-American system. He suggested
that we search for ways in which we all
can join to help bring about peace. Here,
yesterday and today, my delegation has
worked and cooperated in that effort.

Regretfully, my delegation does not
feel that the resolution which this
assembly is asked to approve serves that
purpose.

We believe the resolution before us
to be one-sided. It charges some; it ig-
nores the actions of others. It ignores
what the legal effects of first use of
force should be. Further, there is no rec-
ognition that there must be compliance
by both parties with all the elements of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 502, to
govern this search for peace in which we
are engaged.

We are pleased, however, that the
resolution carefully avoids language
which would seek to force observation of
its parts by the signatory states.

With respect to that section of the
present resolution which calls upon the
United States, we have listened very
attentively to our colleagues here in this
forum. The United States will lift the
measures announced with regard to
Argentina immediately when the provi-
sions of Security Council Resolution 502
have been implemented.

Finally, we wish to assure all here
that we will continue vigorously to pur-
sue, in cooperation with others in this
hemisphere, the search for a formula
which will lead to an early, equitable,
and peaceful settlement.

My delegation hopes that the two
parties will find peace. We remain heart-
ened that they have agreed in giving the
Secretary General of the United Nations
his new mandate for peace. We firmly
support that effort.

My delegation also firmly believes,
as Secretary Haig so wisely said, that
there is far more to unite nations of this
hemisphere than to divide us. We believe
that all in this distinguished assembly,
with whom we have worked so closely in

90

the past and with whom we will work
closely in the days and years to come,
share our determination to preserve
what we already have in order to
achieve our future potential. My delega-
tion remains committed to that very
practical and real ideal.

OAS RESOLUTION II,
MAY 29, 1982«

Whereas:

Resolution I of the Twentieth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
adopted on April 28, 1982, decided "to keep
the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation open,
especially to oversee faithful compliance with
this resolution, and to take such additional
measures as are deemed necessary to restore
and preserve peace and settle the conflict by
peaceful means";

That resolution urged the Government of
the United Kingdom "immediately to cease
the hostilities it is carrying on within the
security region defined by Article 4 of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance, and also to refrain from any act that
may affect inter-American peace and secu-
rity," and urged the Government of the Re-
public of Argentina "to refrain from taking
any action that may exacerbate the
situation";

The same resolution urged the govern-
ments of the United Kingdom and the Argen-
tine Republic "to call a truce that will make it
possible to resume and proceed normally with
the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict, taking into account the
rights of sovereignty of the Republic of
Argentina over the Malvinas Islands and the
interests of the islanders";

While the Government of the Argentine
Republic informed the Organ of Consultation
of its full adherence to Resolution I and acted
consistently therewith, the British forces pro-
ceeded to carry out serious and repeated
armed attacks against the Argentine Repub-
lic in the zone of the Malvinas Islands, within
the security region defined by Article 4 of
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As-
sistance, which means that the United King-
dom lias ignored the appeal made to it by the
Twentieth Meeting of Consultation;

Following the adoption of Resolution 1,
the Government of the United States of
America decided to apply coercive measures
against the Argentine Republic and is giving
its support, including material support, to the
United Kingdom, which contravenes the
spirit and the letter of Resolution I;

As a culmination of its repeated armed
attacks, beginning on May 21, 1982, the Brit-
ish forces launched a broad-scale military at-
tack against the Argentine Republic in the
area of the Malvinas Islands which affects the
peace and security of the hemisphere;

The deplorable situation raised by the ap-
plication of political and economic coercive
measures that are not based on present inter-
national law and are harmful to the Argen-
tine people, carried out by the European Eco-
nomic Community — with the exception of Ire-

a

X

land and Italy— and by other industrialized
states, is continuing; and

The purpose of the Inter-American Trei
ty of Reciprocal Assistance is to "assure
peace, through adequate means, to provide
for effective reciprocal assistance to meet
armed attacks against any American State,
and in order to deal with threats of aggres-
sion against any of them,"

The Twentieth Meeting of Consultation (
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Resolves:

1. To condemn most vigorously the un-
justified and disproportionate armed attack
perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and itslj
decision, which affects the security of the ei
tire American hemisphere, of arbitrarily de-
claring an extensive area of up to 12 miles
from the American coasts as a zone of hosti
ties, which is aggravated by the circumstani
that when these actions were taken all
possibilities of negotiation seeking a peacefi
settlement of the conflict had not been ex-
hausted.

2. To reiterate its firm demand upon thi
United Kingdom that it cease immediately i
act of war against the Argentine Republic
and order the immediate withdrawal of all i
armed forces detailed there and the return
its task force to its usual stations.

3. To deplore the fact that the attitude
the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate
the negotiations for a peaceful settlement
that were conducted by Mr. Javier Perez de
Cuellar, the Secretary General of the Unite
Nations.

4. To express its conviction that it is
essential to reach with the greatest urgencj
peaceful and honorable settlement of the cc
flict, under the auspices of the United Na-
tions, and in that connection, to recognize t
praiseworthy efforts and good offices of Mi
Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary Gen
eral of the United Nations, and to lend its i
support to the task entrusted to him by the
Security Council.

5. To urge the Government of the Unit
States of America to order the immediate
lifting of the coercive measures applied
against the Argentine Republic and to refn
from providing material assistance to the
United Kingdom, in observance of the prim
pie of hemispheric solidarity recognized in 1
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As-
sistance.

6. To urge the members of the Europej
Economic Community, and the other states
that have taken them, to lift immediately tl
coercive economic or political measures tak-
against the Argentine Republic.

7. To request the states parties of the I
Treaty to give the Argentine Republic the
support that each judges appropriate to asS' sF
it in this serious situation, and to refrain
from any act that might jeopardize that ob-
jective. If necessary, such support may be
adopted with adequate coordination.

8. To reaffirm the basic constitutional
principles of the Charter of the Organizatio
of American States and of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
particular those that refer to peaceful settU i
ment of disputes. fia

Department of Slate Bullet »t9

sill

TREATIES

9. To keep the Organ of Consultation
idlable to assist the parties in conflict with

i' ir peace-making efforts in any way it may
iport the mission entrusted to the United
tions Secretary General by the Security
ancil, and to instruct the President of the
leting of Consultation to keep in con-
|ious contact with the Secretary General of
I United Nations.

Is 10. To keep the Twentieth Meeting of
isultation open to see to it that the provi-
is of this resolution are faithfully and
nediately carried out and to take, if neces-
y, any additional measures that may be
eed upon to preserve inter-American
darity and cooperation.

'Made at the White House news briefing
Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes
;t trom Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
Documents of May 24, 1982).
^Adopted unanimously on May 26, 1982.
SU.N. press release 38.
■•Adopted at the 20th meeting of Consul-
on of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS,
a vote of 17-0, with 4 abstentions (U.S.).
sPress release 178 of May 28, 1982.
«Made at the 20th meeting of the Con-
ation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
S. ■

urrent Actions

LTILATERAL

■iculture

^national agreement for the creation at
is of an International Office for Epi-
;ics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25,
4. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for
U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141.
ession deposited: Libya, Apr. 7, 1982.

arctica

Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington
. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1. TIAS 4780.
ession deposited: Spain, Mar. 31, 1982.

ommendations relating to the furtherance
he principles and objectives of the Ant-
;ic Treaty. Adopted at Buenos Aires
I 7, 1981.'
ification of approval: Australia, Feb. 23,

2.

ation

srnational air services transit agreement,
ned at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
:e Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
rffication of denunciation: Sweden,

r. 29, 1982, eflfective Apr. 29, 1983.

ivention for the suppression of unlawful
s against the safety of civil aviation. Done
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
ce Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
tification deposited: Luxembourg, May 18,

!2.

tification of succession: Solomon Islands,

y 3, 1982.

Coffee

Extension of the international coffee agree-
ment 1976. Done at London Sept. 25, 1981.
Enters into force Oct. 1, 1982.
Acceptances deposited: Brsizi], Apr. 22, 1982;
Ethiopia, May 10, 1982; Guatemala, Apr. 28,
1982.

Collisions

Convention on the international regulations
for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with
regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972.
Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.
Accessions deposited: Colombia, July 27,
1981; Gabon, Jan. 21, 1982,
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Mar. 12, 1982, effective July 7, 1978.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.'
Ratifications deposited: Botswana, Apr. 22,
1982; Ecuador, May 4, 1982.
Signature: Pakistan, May 4, 1982.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in en-
dangered species of wild fauna and flora,
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
1973. TIAS 8249.

Accessions deposited: Malawi, Feb. 5, 1982;
Austria, Jan. 27, 1982.

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS
10204.

Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Apr. 23,
1982.2

Accession deposited: European Economic
Community, Apr. 21, 1982.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,
1972. TIAS 7502.
Notification of succession deposited: Kiribati,

Apr. 2, 1982.

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmon in
the North Atlantic Ocean. Open for signature
at Reykjavik Mar. 2 to Aug. 31, 1982. Enters
into force on the first day of the month
following the deposit of instruments of ratifi-
cation, approval or accession by four parties
meeting certain requirements.
Signatures: U.S., EC, Norway, Iceland,
Mar. 3, 1982; Canada, Mar. 18, 1982.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force May 22,
1982, except for Article 51 which enters into
force July 28, 1982.
Accession deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 12, 1982.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.1
Accession deposited: Hungary, May 3, 1982.

International convention on standards of

training, certification, and watchkeeping for

seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7,

1978.1

Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 31, 1982.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11,
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950.
TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Belize, May 25, 1982.

North Atlantic Treaty (Protocol)— Spain

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the

accession of Spain. Done at Brussels Dec. 10,

1981.

Acceptances deposited: France, Netherlands,

Turkey, May 13, 1982; Italy, May 18, 1982;

Portugal, May 28, 1982; Greece, May 29,

1982.

Entered into force: May 29, 1982.

Postal

General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final proto-
col and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1, 1981, except for Article 124 of the
General Regulations which became effective
Jan. 1, 1981.

Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, Feb. 8, 1982;
United Arab Emirates, Mar. 15, 1982; Yugo-
slavia, Mar. 23, 1982.
Approvals deposited: Hungary, Mar. 17,
1982; Lesotho, Mar. 29, 1982.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks
agreement with detailed regulations and final
protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26,
1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, Feb. 8, 1982;
Yugoslavia, Mar. 23, 1982.
Approval deposited: Hungary, Mar. 17, 1982.

Program-Carrying Signals

Convention relating to the distribution of pro-
gram-carrying signals transmitted by satel-
lite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. Entered
into force Aug. 25, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 6, 1982.

Safety at Sea

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009.
Accessions deposited: Argentina, Feb. 24,
1982; Switzerland, Apr. 1, 1982.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, with
annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977.
Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978;

Iy1982

91

TREATIES

definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.
Notification that it assumes the rights and
obligations of a contracting party deposited:
Belize, Dec. 17, 1981.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982 except for (1)
Articles 25 and 66 and appendix 43 which
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981 and (2) certain
provisions concerning aeronautical mobile
service which shall enter into force Feb. 1,
1983.
Approvals deposited: Belize, Mar. 1, 1982;

F.R.G., Jan. 8, 1982.^^

Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1982.

Acceptances: Brazil, Feb. 9, 1982<; Egypt,
Feb. 22, 1982^ EEC, Mar. 15, 1982; Finland,
Mar. 5, 1982^ Hungary, Feb. 10, 1982; India,
Dec. 31, 1981; Japan, Dec. 25, 1981; Republic
of Korea, Mar. 12, 1982; Mexico. Mar. 4,
1982; Pakistan, Dec. 29, 1981; Philippines,
Feb. 16, 1982; Poland, Mar. 10, 1982; Sri
Lanka, Dec. 29, 1981; Switzerland, Mar. 3,
1982^^; U.K. on behalf of Hong Kong, Jan. 21,
1982.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Turkey, May 5, 1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with
annexed Protocols. Done at Geneva Oct. 10,
1981.'
Ratification and acceptances deposited:

Ecuador, May 4, 1982.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sbcth extension of the

wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).

Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered

into force July 1, 1981.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, May 25, 1982.

Ratification deposited: Finland, Apr. 19,

1982.

1981 protocol for the first extension of the
food aid convention, 1980. Done at Washing-
ton Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into force July 1,
1981.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, May 25, 1982.

Ratification deposited: Finland, Apr. 19,
1982.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the
29th World Health Assembly.'

Acceptances deposited: Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe, Apr. 12, 1982; U.S.S.R., Apr. 1, 1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the constitution
of the World Health Organization, as amend-
ed. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the
31st World Health Assembly.'
Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., Apr. 1, 1982.

BILATERAL

Barbados

Air transport agreement, with exchange of
letters. Signed at Bridgetown Apr. 8, 1982.
Entered into force Apr. 8, 1982.

Supersedes understanding concerning air
transport relations of Apr. 14 and 27, 1972,
as amended (TIAS 7363, 7998).

Canada

Arrangement on mutual assistance in fighting
forest fires. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ottawa May 4 and 7, 1982. Entered into
force May 7, 1982.

Egypt

Project grant agreement for the rehabilita-
tion and modernization of the Aswan High
Dam Power Station. Signed at Cairo Apr. 12,
1982. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1982.

El Salvador

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Jan. 22, 1981. Signed at San Salvador
Mar. 15, 1982. Enters into force upon notifi-
cation that the legal requirements of each
country have been satisfied; effective Mar. 15,
1982.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement concerning host nation support
during crisis of war, with annexes. Signed at
Bonn Apr. 15, 1982. Entered into force
Apr. 15, 1982.

Haiti

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Port-au-Prince Mar. 25 and Apr. 1,
1982. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1982; effec-
tive Mar. 1, 1982.

Hungary

Memorandum of understanding for scientific
and technical cooperation in the earth
sciences. Signed at Washington Mar. 23,
1982. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1982.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036,
9232), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of letters at Washing-
ton Mar. 31 and Apr. 7, 1982. Entered into
force Apr. 7, 1982.

Indonesia

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Dec. 2,

1980 (TIAS 10063), with agreed minutes.
Signed at Jakarta Mar. 20, 1982. Entered
to force Mar. 20, 1982.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, with memorandum of understand
ing. Signed at Kingston Apr. 30, 1982.
Entered into force Apr. 30, 1982.

Liberia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com
modities, relating to the agreement of
Aug. 13, 1980 (TIAS 9841). Signed at
Monrovia Apr. 6, 1982. Entered into force
Apr. 6, 1982.

Mexico

Agreement extending the agreement of
Feb. 16, 1979, as extended (TIAS 9444), oi
cooperation to improve the management ol
arid and semiarid lands and control deserti
cation. Effected by exchange of notes at M
ico and Tlatelolco Apr. 15 and May 6. 1982
Entered into force May 6, 1982; effective
Apr. 16, 1982.

Morocco

Agreement establishing a Binational Comr
sion for Educational and Cultural Exchang
Signed at Marrakech Feb. 12, 1982.
Entered into force: May 20, 1982.

Netherlands

Agreement establishing a television trans-
mitter at Soesterberg Airfield. Effected bj
exchange of notes at The Hague Dec. 7, 1'
and Mar. 4, 1982. Entered into force Mar.
1982.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement of
Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 90E
9661, 9804, 10268), relating to trade in co
ton textiles. Effected by exchange of lette
at Washington Dec. 30, 1981 and Jan. 6,
1982. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1982.

Commodity import grant and loan agjeen-
for agricultural commodities and equipmei
Signed at Islamabad Apr. 13, 1982. Enter
into force Apr. 13, 1982.

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Mar. 25, 1980 (TIAS 9782). Signed at
Islamabad Apr. 15, 1982. Entered into for
Apr. 15, 1982.

Peru

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Apr. 26, 1978 (TIAS 9604). Signed at Lin
Apr. 5, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 5,
1982.

Agreement for cooperation concerning pe:
ful uses of nuclear energy, with annex anc
agreed minute. Signed at Washington
June 26, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 15, 1982.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement amending the agreement of

92

Department of State Bullei

CHRONOLOGY

ov. 26, 1976, concerning fisheries off the
)asts of the U.S. (TIAS 8528). Effected by
cchange of notes at Washington Apr. 22 and
) and May 3. 1982. Entered into force
ay 3, 1982.

greement extending the agreement of
ov. 26, 1976. as amended, concerning
iheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS
)28). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Apr. 22 and 29, 1982. Enters in-
. force following written notification of the
)mpletion of internal procedures of both
jvernments.

greement for sales of agricultural com-
odities, relating to the agreement of
ay 30, 1980. Signed at Kinshasa Apr. 3,
)82. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1982.

imbabwe

eneral agreement for economic, technical,
id related assistance. Effected by exchange
notes at Salisbury Feb. 10 and Mar. 22,
•82. Entered into force Mar. 22, 1982.

rant agreement for commodity imports,
gned at Sahsbury Apr. 7, 1982. Entered in-
force Apr. 7, 1982.

'Not in force.

^Applicable to Berlin (West).
'Not in force for the U.S.
*Ad referendum.
^Subject to ratification. ■

May 1982

ay 1

ritish bombers attack airfields on the
' irgentine-occupied Falkland Islands— the
ret such attack since the Argentine invasion.

■ay 2

ritish Foreign Secretary Francis Pym meets
ith Secretary Haig and Secretary of De-
•nse Weinberger to review political, mili-
iry, and economic aspects of the crisis in the
3uth Atlantic. He later visits U.N. Secretary
eneral, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to discuss
le Secretary General's offer of his good
Ices to resolve the dispute.

In Rome, Pope John Paul II calls on Brit-
m and Argentina to restore peace in their
ispute over the islands.

lay 2-3

ritish sink Argentine cruiser Gen. Balgrano.

lay 3

jgentina does not accept peace plan put for-
* ^ard by Peru's President Belaunde, calling
roposals similar to previous U.S. proposals.
ielaunde continues efforts.

lay 4

'oreign Minister Mohammed Benyahia of
Algeria, who played a key role in freeing the

Jly1982

U.S. hostages held in Iran, is killed in a plane
crash on a flight to Tehran.

At Ireland's request, U.N. Security Coun-
cil schedules consultations on U.K.-Argentine
dispute for May 5 as Britain and Argentina
consider the Secretary General's proposal.

U.S. authorizes all nonessential personnel
and some dependents of officials of the mis-
sion to leave Argentina temporarily.

U.S. House of Representatives adopts, by
voice vote, a resolution urging Argentina to
withdraw from the Falklands and calling for
"full diplomatic support" for Great Britain.

Argentina severely damages the British
HMS Sheffield, which later sinks.

May 5

At Ireland's request, U.N. Security Council
meets in an informal session to assess the
situation in the South Atlantic. Ireland is
seeking an immediate halt to the fighting and
a negotiated settlement under U.N. auspices.

May 6

NATO Defense Planning Committee ministe-
rial meeting is held in Brussels May 6-7. The
Committee issues a final communique agree-
ing on the "validity of the alliance strategy of
deterrence and defense, coupled with a
strong commitment to arms control and dis-
armament."

Argentina accepts U.N. intervention and
calls for a cease-fire.

May 7

Britain announces that Argentina warships or

military aircraft found more than 12 miles

from Argentina's coast will be regarded as

hostile.

U.K. announces Peruvian peace plan is
dead due to "Argentine intransigence."

May 8

U.N. Secretary General begins indirect
negotiations on the South Atlantic crisis,
meeting separately with Sir Anthony Par-
sons, head of the British mission to the U.N.,
and Enrique Ros, Argentina's Deputy For-
eign Minister.

May 10

U.N. Special Session on the Human Environ-
ment is held in Nairobi, Kenya May 10-18 to
assess progress made during the past decade
in safeguarding the world's environment.

Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) ministerial meeting
is held in Paris May 10-11.

Polish Government demands that two
American diplomats— John Zerolis, Scientific
Attache, and J. Daniel Howard, Cultural
Affairs Officer— leave Poland by May 14, for
allegedly "promoting destabilizing activity in
Poland." The diplomats were accosted by
Polish security forces while visiting a Polish
scientist who had been recently released from
detention.

May 11

Brazilian President Joao Baptista de Oliveira
Figueiredo makes official visit to Washington,
D.C. May 11-13.

May 12

Secretary Haig makes official visits to
Ankara, May 13-15, and Athens May 15-16
for discussions with heads of state; and Lux-
embourg, May 16-18, to attend the North
Atlantic Council ministerial meeting. While in
Luxembourg, Secretary Haig meets with
British Foreign Minister Pym to discuss the
crisis in the South Atlantic.

May 13

State Department releases report showing
"conclusive evidence" that toxins and chemi-
cal warfare agents have been used, in recent
months, in Laos and Kampuchea.

In retaliation for the expulsion of two
U.S. diplomats from Poland, the U.S. tells
the Polish Embassy that Andrzej Koroscik,
Attache for Science and Technology, and
Mariusz Wozniak, Political Officer, would
have to leave the U.S. by May 17.

May 14

After 6 consecutive days of indirect negotia-
tions conducted by the Secretary General,
U.N. talks on the South Atlantic crisis are
temporarily interrupted when Sir Anthony
Parsons is called to London for consultations.

May 16

European Common Market fails to agree to
extend economic sanctions against Argentina.
The sanctions are scheduled to expire at mid-
night.

Yugoslav Parliament elects a woman,
Milka Planinc, as the country's first female
Prime Minister. Mrs. Planinc succeeds
Veselin DJuranovic.

May 17

European Common Market— except Ireland
and Italy— extends its sanctions against
Argentina for another week.

U.N. talks resume after a 2-day break.
Sir Anthony, the British delegate, returns
with close to final British proposal to con-
tinue negotiations.

Paul Nitze, Chief U.S. negotiator to the
Geneva negotiations on Limiting Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) departs
for Geneva for resumption of talks with the
Soviet Union.

North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting is held in Luxembourg May 17-18. A
final communique is issued May 18:

• Welcoming the accession of Spain to
NATO;

• Citing examples of Soviet actions in
Poland and Afghanistan which contradict
Soviet claims to peaceful intentions;

• Expressing an allied determination to
maintain adequate military strength and
political solidarity, perseverance in their
efforts to establish a more constructive East-
West relationship, including progress in arms
control, and welcoming President Reagan's
START proposals;

• Addressing the situation in and around
Berlin, economic exchanges, the Falklands

93

PRESS RELEASES

situation, terrorism, and third world sover-
eignty and independence; and

• Agreeing to intensify their consulta-
tions.

May 18

King Hassan II of Morocco makes official
working visit to Washington, D.C.
May 18-21.

May 19

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar makes a
personal appeal to Argentine and British
leaders to consider new ideas as negotiations
begin to collapse.

May 20

U.N. talks break down. Prime Minister
Thatcher reports Argentina's rejection of
British proposals and withdraws them.
Argentina blames the U.K. U.N. Secretary
General suspends his efforts.

May 22

U.S. Presidential Delegation to commemorate
the Centennial of U.S. -Korean Relations par-
ticipate in groundbreaking for the Centennial
Memorial at Inchon, Republic of Korea. Gen.
Lyman L. Lemnitzer (USA Ret.), heads the
delegation.

At the Vatican, Pope John Paul II re-
iterates his calls for both countries to cease
hostilities and resume negotiations.

May 23

U.N. Secretary General is urged by Security
Council speakers to renew his efforts to
negotiate a peaceful settlement in the South
Atlantic crisis.

Argentine President Galtieri, in a reply
to the Pope, says that Argentina is willing to
join in a ceasefire.

May 24

All members of the European Common
Market except Ireland and Italy agree to ex-
tend indefinitely economic sanctions against
Argentina.

Prime Minister Thatcher rejects a cease-
fire appeal by the Pope in the absence of
Argentine withdrawal.

May 26

By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil adopts Resolution .505 reaffirming Resolu-
tion 502 of April 3. The Resolution

• Expresses "appreciation to the Secre-
tary General" for his efforts to implement
Resolution 502;

• Requests the "Secretary General, on
the basis of the present resolution, to under-
take a renewed mission;"

• Urges both parties "to cooperate fully"
with the Secretary General, and

• Requests the Secretary General "to
enter into contact immediately with the par-
ties with a view to negotiating mutually ac-
ceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if
necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of
United Nations observers to monitor com-
pliance with the terms of the cease-fire."

94

May 27

U.S. -Morocco formally complete an agree-
ment which will allow U.S. military planes to
use airbases in Morocco during emergencies
in the Middle East and Africa. The document
is initialed by Secretary Haig and Foreign
Minister Mohammed Boucetta.

Twentieth meeting of Rio treaty Foreign
Ministers reconvenes at the OAS.

May 29

By a vote of 17 to 0 with 4 abstentions —
U.S., Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and
Tobago — the OAS adopts a resolution con-
demning Britain's attack on the Falkland
Islands and urging the U.S. to halt its aid to
the British.

May 30

Spain, depositing an instrument of ratifica-
tion with the Department of State, formally
becomes the 16th member of NATO.

Colombia holds presidential elections. The
leading contenders are former President
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of the ruling Liberal
Party and his Conservative Party opponent,
Belisario Betancur Cuartas.

May 31

Belisario Betancur Cuartas, the Conservative
Party candidate, is elected President of Co-
lumbia. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

155 5/3 Haig, Hunt: remarks upon

signing MFD, Mar. 25.

156 5/4 Haig: statement before Sub-

committee for State, Justice,
Commerce, and related
agencies of the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee.

Increased processing time for
passports.

Franklin statue dedicated.

Program for the State visit of
Brazilian President Joao
Baptista de Oliveira
Figueiredo, May 11-13.

Haig: remarks at the AFSA
memorial ceremony.

U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), study group
A, May 26.
•162 5/10 Shipping Coordinating

Committee (SCC), Subcom-
mittee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working group
on ship design and equip-
ment, May 26.
'163 5/10 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on fire protection. May 27.

157

5/4

158

5/7

159

5/7

160

5/7

161

5/10

•164 5/10 SCC, SOLAS, working grni

on carriage of dangerou.s

goods, June 3.
'165 5/10 Haig: special briefing, Was!

ington, D.C.
166 5/11 Haig: statement before the

Senate Foreign Relations

Committee.
*167 5/17 Program for the official woi

ing visit to Washington, 1 "

of King Hassan II of Mor

CO, May 18-21.
*168 5/17 Haig: arrival statement; F'l I

eign Minister liter Turkn

welcoming statement,

Ankara, May 13.
•169 5/19 U.S., Maldives establish texe

visa system, Dec. 29, 198

and Mar. 22, 1982.
170 5/18 Haig, Turkmen: remarks u[ i

the Secretary's departure

May 15.
'171 5/18 Haig: arrival statement,

Athens, May 15.
172 5/19 Haig: press conference,

Athens, May 16.
'173 5/19 Haig, Pym: remarks after

their meeting, Luxembou ,

May 16.
174 5/20 Haig: press conference, Lu;

embourg. May 18.
'175 5/24 Selwa Roosevelt sworn in a

Chief of Protocol (biograp c

data).

176 5/26 Haig: interview on "Face tl

Nation," May 23.

177 5/26 Haig: address before Chica;

Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, Chicago.

178 5/28 Haig: statement before the

20th meeting of Foreign
Ministers of the Rio treal
OAS, May 27.

179 5/28 Haig: question-and-answer

session following speech
fore Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, Chicaj
May 26.

180 5/28 Stoessel: address at World

Affairs Council of Pitts-
burgh, Pittsburgh, May 2

•Not printed in the Bulletin. R

Department of State Built n

INDEX

«;,

July 1982

/olume 82, No. 2064

Vfrica

Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa
(Crocker) 61

Y 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee
Assistance (Vine) 75

Lrgentina

he Fali<iand Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrictc,
Middendorf, Wliite House statement,

texts of resolutions) 86

ifresident Reagan's News Conference of

May 13 (excerpts) .42

ieeretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

J (Haig) 52

1(1 ieeretary Interviewed on "This Week With

° David Brinkley" (Haig) 55

Irms Control

^n Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39

resident Reagan's News Conference of

May 13 (excerpts) 42

secretary Haig s News Conference of

June 19 58

Vsia. FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia

(Holdridge) 65

]hina. Developing Lasting U.S. -China

Relations 50

ongress

Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa
(Crocker) 61

"■"Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia

(Holdridge) 65

""Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Europe

(Thomas) 70

1983 Assistance Requests for Israel

(Draper) 74

1983 Assistance Requests for Latin

America (Enders) 83

1983 Assistance Requests for the Near

East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72

^Y 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N.

and the OAS (Piatt) 80

^'Y 1983 Authorization Request (Haig) 64

''Y 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee

Assistance (Vine) 75

?Y 1983 Security Assistance Requests

(Buckley) 77

Department and Foreign Service. FY 1983

Authorization Request (Haig) 64

economics

Peaceful Change in Central America (Haig,

Stoessel) 47

President Reagan Attends Economic and

NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan,

final communique, declaration, docu-
ments) 1

President Reagan Visits Eurooe (Haig,

Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the

Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and

dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15
Secretary Interviewed on "This Week With

David Brinkley" (Haig) 55

Egypt. Peace and Security in the Middle

East (Haig) ". 44

Foreign Aid

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa

(Crocker) 61

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia

(Holdridge) 65

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Europe

(Thomas) 70

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel

(Draper) 74

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Latin

America (Enders) 83

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the Near

East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N. and

the OAS (Piatt) 80

FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee
Assistance (Vine) . .' 75

FY' 1983 Security Assistance Requests
(Buckley) 77

France

President Reagan Attends Economic and
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan,
final communique, declaration, docu-
ments) 1

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig,
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Maiesty the
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15

Germany

President Reagan Attends Economic and
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan,
final communique, declaration, docu-
ments) 1

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig,
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15

International Organizations and Confer-
ences. FY 1983 Assistance Requests for
the U.N. and the OAS (Piatt) 80

Iran. Peace and Security in the Middle East
(Haig) 44

Iraq. Peace and Security in the Middle East
(Haig) 44

Israel

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel
(Draper) 74

Peace and Security in the Middle East
(Haig) 44

Italy. President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig,
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Maiesty the
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15

Latin America and the Caribbean

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Latin
America (Enders) 83

FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee
Assistance (Vine) 75

Peaceful Change in Central America (Haig,
Stoessel) ,..47

Lebanon. Peace and Security in the Middle
East (Haig) ! 44

Middle East

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the Near
East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72

FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee
Assistance (Vine) 75

Peace and Security in the Middle East
(Haig) ." .....44

President Reagan Attends Economic and
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan,
final communique, declaration, docu-
ments) 1

President Reagan's News Conference of
May 13 (excerpts) 42

Secretary Haig s News Conference of
June 19 .58

Secretary Interviewed on "This Week With
David Brinkley" (Haig) 55

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

President Reagan Attends Economic and
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan,
final communique, declaration, docu-
ments) 1

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig,
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) . . .15

Organization of American States

The Falkland Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrick,
Middendorf, White House statement, texts
of resolutions) 86

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N.
and the OAS (Piatt) 80

Pacific. FY' 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia
(Holdridge) 65

Presidential Documents

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39

President Reagan Attends Economic and

NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan,

final communique, declaration, docu-
ments) 1

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig,

Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the

Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and

dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) . . . 15
President Reagan's News Conference of

May 13 (excerpts) 42

Refugees. FY 1983 Requests for Migration

and Refugee Assistance (Vine) 75

Security Assistance

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa

(Crocker) 61

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia

(Holdridge) 65

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Europe

(Thomas) 70

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel

(Draper) 74

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the Near

East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72

FY 1983 Security Assistance Requests

(Buckley) 77

Peaceful Change in Central America (Haig,

Stoessel) 47

South Asia. FY 1983 Assistance Requests for

the Near East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72
Trade. Developing Lasting U.S. -China

Relations 50

Treaties. Current Actions 91

U.S.S.R.

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39

President Reagan's News Conference of

May 13 (excerpts) 42

Secretary Haig s News Conference of

June 19 58

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

(Haig) 52

United Kingdom

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39

The Falkland Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrick,

Middendorf, White House statement,

texts of resolutions) 86

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig,

Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the

Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and

dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15
President Reagan's News Conference of

May 13 (excerpts) 42

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

(Haig) 52

Secretary Interviewed on "This Week With

David Brinkley" (Haig) 55

United Nations

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39

The Falkland Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrick,

Middendorf, White House statement, texts

of resolutions) 86

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N.

and the 0A3 (Piatt) 80

Name Index

Buckley, James L 77

Crocker, Chester A 61

Draper, Morris 74

Enders, Thomas 0 83

Haig, Secretary 1, 15, 44, 47, 50, 52, 55,

58, 64, 86

Holdridge, John H 65

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 86

Middendorf, J. William II 86

Mitterrand, Francois 15

Piatt, Nicholas 80

Pope John Paul II 15

Queen Ehzabeth II 15

Regan, Donald T 1

Reagan, President 1, 15, 39, 42

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 47, 50

Thatcher, Margaret 15

Thomas, Charles H 70

Veliotes, Nicholas A 72

Vine, Richard D 75

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Mh*pai'iitivn t

/'

buUetEn

rhe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2065

OC! 61982 j

August 1982

Ih»ptirintvnt of SittU*

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2065 / August 1982

The Departmknt of Statp; Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secreiar\ nl Stale

DEAN FISCHER

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director.

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Acting Chief, iiditorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

f-ditor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through March 31, I4S7,

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
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may be reprinted. Citation of the
Dki'artmk.nt of Statk Bui.lktin as the
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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization (RobeH M. Sayre)

9 Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981

23 Terrorist Target: The Diplomat (Frank H. Perez)

31 Armenian Terrorism: A Profile (Andrew Corsun)

ie President

News Conference of June 30
(Excerpts)

ie Vice President

Visit to East Asia and
the Pacific (Remarks, Toasts,
Statements, President Reagan's
Letters to Chinese Leaders)

The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty
and Council (Edward C. Keefer)

lie Secretary

Secretary-Designate Shultz Ap-
pears Before Senate Committee

Secretary Haig Resigns (Exchange
of Letters)

rms Control

NATO Allies Table Draft MBFR
Treaty (Eugene V. Rostow)

START Negotiations (President
Reagan, White House Statement)

ianada

Alaska Gas Pipeline (Secretaries'
Haig and MacGuigan Letters)

ast Asia

Allied Responses to the Soviet
Challenge in East Asia and the
Pacific (Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)
I Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy
(John H. Holdridge)

Europe

60 Secretary Haig Visits Turkey,

Greece; Attends North Atlantic
Council (Remarks, News Con-
ferences, Final Communique)

62 Eighth Report on Cyprus (Mes-
sage to the Congress)

64 Situation in Poland (President
Reagan)

68 North Atlantic Council Meets in
Brussels (Final Communique,
Declaration)

Middle East

70 Visit of Moroccan King

Hassan H (Department State-
ment)

Oceans

71 U.S. Votes Against Law of the

Sea Treaty (President Reagan)

Science & Technology

71 Control of Technology Trans-
fers to the Soviet Union
(James L. Buckley)

Western Hemisphere

73 Cuban Support for Terrorism and
Insurgency in the Western
Hemisphere (Thomas 0. Enders)
Commitment to Democracy in
Central America (Thomas 0.
Enders)

Treaties

77 Current Actions

Chronology

80 June 1981

Press Releases

81 Department of State

81 U.S.U.N.

Publications

82 Department of State

82 Foreign Relations Volume Re-
leased

Index

SUI

Miia^bifcmTs

76

OCT 6 1982

DEPOSITORY

SPECIAL (See Center Section)

Atlas of U.S. Foreign Relations: Foreign Relations Machinery

rhe Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed
t)y a car bomb on December 15, 1981; 20
people were killed and another 100 were
injured.

FEATURE

Terrorism

Combatting Terrorism;
American Policy
and Organization

by Ambassador Robert M. Sayre

Address before the
Third International Civil Aviation Security Conference
Washington, D.C., July 21, 1982

Political violence and terrorism are not
new. They have been with us since the
dawn of recorded history. What is new
is the speed with which people and ideas
move. You can be in Washington tonight
and Paris tomorrow morning. You can
sit at your television set and have a
front-row seat at the world soccer
matches in Madrid. An assassin can at-
tempt to kill the President of the United
States on the streets in Washington or
the Pope on the streets in Rome, and
the television networks will bring the
event to you simultaneously and in living
color. Political terrorism used to be a na-
tional event that seldom had ramifica-
tions beyond national borders. Now any
attack against any prominent figure or
against a commercial aircraft or against
an embassy is an international media
event. Our ability to travel and com-
municate rapidly has made it so. Ter-
rorism is international, and, as many
say, it is theater.

I would like to be able to tell you
that we are doing as well on controlling
political violence generally as you are
doing in controlling terrorist attacks
against commercial aviation. But you
are, in a sense, fortunate because you
can put people and baggage through a
single checkpoint. You can, of course,
still be and are the victim of human er-

rors and poor procedures. You have
done a remarkable job, at considerable
expense, to maintain your safety record.

Unfortunately this is not the case
for political violence and terrorism
generally. We have no way of running
all terrorists through a checkpoint or
x-raying their baggage. Their methods
of attack are myriad, they are
clandestine, and they are elusive. They
frequently change the names of their
organizations and their passports,
recruit new faces, send old faces off to
different parts of the world, and
generally try to confound and confuse
the police and security organizations
that governments create as defensive
mechanisms.

The number of actual terrorist acts
increases daily. Every day that passes
brings to my desk in the Department of
State a new batch of reports about
planned terrorist attacks or attacks ac-
tually carried out. Diplomats are once
again the principal target; and American
diplomats are particularly high on the
list of victims or intended victims. Some
15% of the operating budget of the
Department of State goes to pay for
protection of our personnel and facilities
overseas, and the cost is rising. So while
I would like to tell you that the situation

leiJsti9e2

is getting better, I must honestly and
candidly tell you that it is getting worse.
What are we doing about it?

In truth our problems are not that
much different from yours. We have a
worldwide operating network and so do
the airlines. The difference may be that
we are in almost every country,
sometimes in several places, whereas
your networks are not as extensive.
That is a difference in degree and not
substance.

We must have an international con-
sensus, and cooperation on security
threats to our operation, and so must
you.

We must have an understanding
with individual governments on how ter-
rorist attacks against us will be handled
and so must you. There must be an un-
derstanding within our organizations
from the President to the security man
in the field on how we will react, both in
a policy and operational sense, and I am
certain that is the case with the airlines.

American Policy

The first action required of the Reagan
Administration was a clear and un-
equivocal statement of policy.

At the very beginning of this Admin-
istration, President Reagan, in welcom-
ing the Tehran hostages home, ar-
ticulated U.S. policy on terrorism. He
said: "Let terrorists be aware that when
the rules of international behavior are
violated, our policy will be one of swift
and effective retribution."

We have publicly and repeatedly
noted that the United States, when
faced with an act of terrorism at home
or abroad, will take all possible lawful
measures to resolve the incident and to
bring to justice the perpetrators of the
crime. This policy is based upon the con-
viction that to allow terrorists to suc-
ceed only leads to more terrorism; if
they are successful, they will be en-
couraged to commit more such acts.

We firmly believe that terrorists
should be denied benefits from acts such
as hostage-holding or kidnapping; thus
the U.S. Government does not make
concessions to blackmail. We will not
pay ransom or release prisoners in
response to such demands.

When a terrorist incident occurs out-
side the United States, we look to the
host government to exercise its respon-
sibility to protect persons within its
jurisdiction and to enforce the law in its
territory. During such incidents, we con-
sult closely with the responsible govern-
ment, and we offer all practical support
to the government concerned.

When a terrorist incident against us
is sponsored or directed by a nation, as
an instrument of its own policy in an at-
tempt to intimidate or coerce us, we will
take all appropriate measures — be they
diplomatic, political, economic, or
military — to resolve the incident and to
resist this form of international
blackmail. So the United States has a
clearly stated policy.

But a policy is no better than the
determination or will to carry it out ar
the organization established to do so.
The problem is international, so the fir
question is, how effective and deter-
mined is the international community?

International Cooperation

International organizations, including
the United Nations, have sponsored a
number of multilateral conventions
which deal with particular terrorist
crimes to bring them within the crimin
law. The United States has strongly su
ported these efforts over the years.

The most widely accepted conven-
tions are The Hague convention agains

Director, Office for
Combatting Terrorism

Ambassador Robert M. Sayre became the
Director of the Department of State's Office
for Combatting Terrorism in May 1982. He is
also chairman of the Department's policy
group on security policies and programs and
contingency planning.

Mr. Sayre was born in Hillsboro, Oregon,
on August 18, 1924. He received a bachelor's
degree from Willamette (1949), a doctorate in
law from George Washington University
(1956), a master's degree from Stanford
(1960), and an honorary doctorate in laws
from Willamette (1966).

He joined the Department in 1949 as an
intern. He later held assignments as interna-
tional economist in the Bureau of Economic
Affairs and the Bureau of Inter-American Af-
fairs (1950-.'>2). international relations officer
in the latter bureau (1952-56), officer in
charge of inter-American security and
military assistance affairs (1956-57), chief of
the political section in Lima (1957-60), and
financial officer in Havana (1960-61).

He returned to Washington in 1961 to
become President Kennedy's executive
secretary of the task force on Latin America
and also assisted in efforts that put together
the Alliance for Progress. Other positions
Ambassador Sayre has held have been officer
in charge of Mexican affairs (1961-64), senior
staff member of the National Security Coun-
cil (1964-65), Deputy AssisUint Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs (1965-67). Acting
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-

fairs (1967-68), and a Foreign Service ins|
tor (1974-75 and 1976-78).

He has held three ambassadorial posts
Uruguay (1968-69). Panama (1969-74), am
Brazil (1978-82). Ambassador Sayre twice
has been awarded the Department's Superi
Honor Award (1964 and 1976). ■

Department of State Bullei

FEATURE
Terrorism

jacking and the Montreal convention
f; gainst aircraft sabotage, which are now
Ihered to by over 100 states. The inter-
I itional community, through these con-
sntions, has established the principle
at aircraft piracy and sabotage, like
e maritime piracy they so closely
semble, are universally abhorred inter-
itional crimes.

Other conventions dealing with addi-
)nal aspects of the terrorism problem
e the New York convention on crimes
jainst internationally protected per-
ns, the Convention Against the Taking
Hostages, and the Convention on the
lysical Protection of Nuclear
aterials. These agreements establish
e obligation among states party to
em to submit for prosecution or ex-
adition those alleged to have com-
itted particular crimes.

The United States strongly supports
e principle established in these conven-
)ns that those who commit terrorist
dmes should be brought to justice in
icordance with the law, and we con-
lue to urge other nations to become
.rties to these important agreements.

The United Nations has also con-
dered the effectiveness of the New
ork convention on attacks against
plomats and other internationally pro-
cted persons. The Secretary General
IS invited member states to submit
sports this year for consideration by
le United Nations on actions they have
,ken to carry out the convention. We
elcome this continuing focus on attacks
1 diplomats which now account for
ore than half of all terrorist attacks.

In addition to these eiforts in the in-
■rnational organizations, the economic
immit seven— the United States,
anada, France, the Federal Republic of
ermany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
id Japan — enunciated a course of ae-
on against hijacking. In 1978 the heads
state and government of these seven
ations adopted a declaration against hi-
cking. It was a commitment to take
int action by terminating air service to
ates which fail to live up to their
oligations under The Hague convention
a hijackers. Last year the Bonn
eclaration was implemented against
fghanistan for its conduct during and
libsequent to the hijacking of a
akistani aircraft in March 1981. The

No Concessions!

The Reagan Administration has adopted a
firm policy to combat international terrorism.
We will resist terrorist blackmail and pursue
terrorists with the full force of the law. We
will not pay ransom, nor release prisoners,
and we will not bargain for the release of
hostages. To make concessions to terrorist
blackmail only jeopardizes the lives and
freedom of additional innocent people. We en-
courage other governments to take a similar-
ly strong stance. When U.S. citizens are
taken hostage, we look to the host govern-
ment to exercise its responsibility under in-
ternational law to protect them, but at the
same time we urge the government not to
give in to terrorist blackmail. We are
prepared to assist the host government
should our aid be requested.

The basic philosophy underlying this
policy is that concessions to terrorists only
serve to encourage them to resort to more
terror to obtain their political objectives,
thereby endangering still more innocent lives.
If terrorists understand that a government
steadfastly refuses to give in to their
demands and is prepared to live up to its in-
ternational obligations to prosecute or ex-
tradite them, this will serve as a strong
deterrent. We also encourage other govern-
ments to adopt a no-concessions policy since
international terrorism is a phenomenon
which crosses national boundaries. Our no-
concessions policy is of little avail if
Americans are taken hostage abroad and the
host government concedes to the terrorists
demands.

The current policy in dealing with
hostage incidents involving U.S. diplomats
and other officials represents an evolution
from the handling of the first incidents in
1969 and 1970. Although our policy was not
to give in to terrorists demands, there is a
feeling by those who have analyzed those
cases that the principal concern then was the
safe release of the hostages, and any host
government concessions to the terrorists
were acceptable if they contributed to that
goal.

By the time the U.S. Ambassador in Haiti
was kidnapped by local terrorists in January
1973 and the U.S. Ambassador and the Depu-
ty Chief of Mission were held hostage in
Khartoum in March 1973 by Palestinian ter-
rorists, a considerable hardening in the U.S.
policy was apparent. Although the Am-
bassador to Haiti was released after local

authorities had made concessions to the ter-
rorists, it is apparent that the United States
had not been in favor of giving in to their
demands. In connection with the Khartoum
case, while it was still in progress. President
Nixon said that "as far as the United States
as a government giving in to blackmail
demands, we cannot do so and we will not do
so." He went on to say, "We will do
everything that we can to get them released
but we will not be blackmailed." One of the
terrorist demands had been to release Sirhan
Sirhan. the convicted assassin of Robert F.
Kennedy.

The Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of
Mission, and the Belgian Charge were killed
in the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum by the
terrorists. Among the terrorists' other
demands had been the release of some par-
ticularly important terrorist leaders who had
been captured and were being tried in Jor-
dan. The terrorists in Khartoum repeatedly
called for the release of these men, and, in
the view of some analysts, the failure of the
terrorists to obtain their release was the
basic reason for the brutal assassination of
these diplomats.

If a foreign government engages in acts
of terrorism against the United States, the
Administration has made it clear that the
United States would respond effectively and
vigorously using all appropriate resources at
its disposal — diplomatic, political, economic,
and military.

Because international terrorism affects
most countries around the world, it is essen-
tial that all responsible governments adopt a
common policy of not giving in to terrorist
blackmail. This principle is already embodied
in international conventions such as the wide-
ly accepted Hague convention on hijacking
which establishes an obligation to either pros-
ecute or extradite hijackers. Although there
is a temptation to give in to the terrorists
demands on humanitarian grounds to avoid
the possibility of violence against the
hostages, such a moral compromise is fleeting
since a terrorist victory only encourages
more acts which endanger additional innocent
lives. No responsible government can allow
itself to be dictated to by ruthless, criminal
acts which endanger the lives of its citizens,
citizens of other countries, and which
threaten its authority. Compromise will prove
transitory and over the long run will be
detrimental to a country's efforts to cope
effectively with the problem. ■

\ugust1982

United Kingdom, France, and West Ger-
many, the countries of the summit seven
with bilateral air service with
Afghanistan, gave notice that air links
would be terminated this November. We
continue to monitor the actions of coun-
tries during hijacking incidents and will

urge such actions in future cases where
it would be appropriate.

At the bilateral level, we have con-
sulted many countries on sharing infor-
mation on terrorists and their plans.
Such exchanges occur systematically,
but we need to do more to assure that

Antiterrorism
Cooperation Program

In April and May of 1982, Ambassador
Robert M. Sayre, the Department of State's
Director for Combatting Terrorism, testified
before both Houses of Congress in support of
a new program intended to be a major ele-
ment of the President's program to combat
and deter political terrorism. The proposal
asks Congress to provide authority and fund-
ing for assistance to selected friendly govern-
ments by providing them with antiterrorism
training, specialized equipment where ap-
propriate, and by generally expanding the
scope and type of intergovernmental coopera-
tion. Specifically the Department asked the
Congress to amend the Foreign Assistance
Act to authorize antiterrorism assistance up
to a level of $5 million in FY 1983.

Both the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee and the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee responded encouragingly to this pro-
posal and recommended to their respective
bodies that the program be approved. Ed-
ward Marks, a career Foreign Service officer
and formerly U.S. Ambassador to Guinea-
Bissau and Cape Verde and most recently of
the National War College, was designated in
December 1981 as the Department's Coor-
dinator for Antiterrorism Programs.

As presently conceived, the program will
begin by providing training courses in various
antiterrorism skills and management tech-
niques for the civil and police authorities of
friendly developing countries subject to a ter-
rorist threat. Training will be offered at ex-
isting U.S. Government institutions such as
the FBI Academy (Quantico, Virginia), the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(Glynco, Georgia), and the Federal Aviation
Administration's Transportation Safety In-
stitute (Oklahoma City). The training will in-
clude antiterrorist policy, government crisis
management organization, incident manage-
ment, hostage and barricade negotiations, air-
port security measures, bomb disposal, and
dignitary and facility protection. The training
and orientation will be designated primarily
for senior officials responsible for antiter-
rorism policy and incident management, plus
senior training personnel.

In addition, the U.S. Government will
provide a limited amount of appropriate an-
titerrorist equipment to complement specific
training programs.

The antiterrorism cooperation program
has a number of objectives, all revolving
around the perception that political terrorism
is an international phenomenon which
threatens individual countries as well as in-
ternational society. Thus, it must be met by
an international effort much in the way in
which piracy was challenged and finally
eliminated. The U.S. Government has a
multifaceted antiterrorism program, impor-
tant parts of which are directed toward
creating the necessary international consen-
sus. The antiterrorism assistance program
shares that objective but is specifically
directed toward enhancing the antiterrorist
operating skills of relatively inexperienced
governments and to expanding cooperation
among all concerned governments.

This program will serve broader U.S.
policy interests:

• Strengthen bilateral ties with friendly
governments by offering this concrete
assistance in an area of mutual concern;

• Assist governments, by improving their
capabilities, to better protect U.S. diplomatic
missions and other interests, including the
American tourist; and

• Increase respect for human rights and
improve the climate for them by reducing the
terrorist threat to innocent third parties on
the one hand, while helping governments deal
with the terrorist threat by means of modern,
humane, and effective antiterrorist tech-
niques on the other.

Pending final authorization and approval
by Congress for FY 1983, the Office for
Combatting Terrorism is preparing im-
plementation of the new program. By the
time this article appears, selected posts will
have been queried about the feasibility of
their host governments participating in pilot
projects. That inquiry will be followed by a
circular telegram to approximately 15 other
posts, initiating the participating country
selection process for the antiterrorism
assistance program's first full year of opera-
tion (FY 1983). ■

all members of the world community a
aware of specific dangers. I wish to tal
this opportunity to assure you that wh
the United States learns that a terrori
act is being planned in any country
around the world, we immediately in-
form the appropriate authorities of the
country involved so that innocent lives
may be saved. We do not and will not
hold back such information. We hope
that other countries will adopt a simila
policy.

We have also discussed the coordir
tion of policy responses to terrorism. \
have urged other countries to adopt a
policy similar to ours to deny terrorist;
the benefits they seek from their crime
and to bring the full force of law en-
forcement measures to bear on them.

Consultation and coordination of
policies are only part of the solution. \'
have recently submitted legislation to
the U.S. Congress which would
authorize a program of antiterrorism
assistance for foreign government law
enforcement personnel. The Congress
now considering this proposal. If
authorized, this program would enable
us to off"er training in antiterrorism
security and management skills at our
training facilities and to provide equip-
ment, such as security screening devici
for airports. Once legislation is passed,
we will be contacting selected countrie
about the possibility of participation in
this program. We consider this progra
as a way to assist countries that may
want to learn our techniques of dealing
with terrorists. But we also see it as a;
opportunity to learn by exchanging ex-
periences with all countries that have
been victims of terrorist attacks.

As I stated early in my remarks, a
principal target of terrorists is the
diplomat. Terrorists have recently
turned their attention to foreign
diplomats in the United States. We are
therefore, strengthening the protection
we provide to foreign diplomats. We
have introduced new legislation which
will enable the Department of State to
carry out its responsibilities more effec
tively and efficiently in cooperation wit!
State and local authorities. We are
hopeful that the Congress will act
promptly on this proposal.

Although we have a strong set of
policies and laws on terrorism agreed t
by the international community, the in-
ternational community has not been as

ti

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Terrorism

jcessful in working out arrangements
give effect to these policies and laws.
e countries in Europe have their own
rking arrangements, and there are
;asional conferences such as this one.
t multilateral cooperation is extreme-

ly limited. If the world community is
serious about combatting terrorism, then
it needs to give more attention to work-
ing arrangements that will do that. For
its part, the United States stands ready
to cooperate to the fullest extent.

i. employees in Tripoli poured motor oil on the embassy's marble staircases to delay
tyan mobs from gaining access in December 1979.

State-Supported Terrorism

Unfortunately there are states which are
directly involved in carrying out interna-
tional terrorist acts. There are also
states which find it in their interest to
provide arms, training, and logistical
support to terrorist organizations.
Another problem, then, is that the com-
munity of nations needs to face forth-
rightly the fact that some of its mem-
bers are promoting terrorism and others
have a certain sympathy for terrorist
organizations and condone what they do
because they are of the same political
philosophy and consider terrorism as an
effective way to undermine their adver-
saries.

Bonn Declaration

In 1978 at the economic summit in Bonn, the
heads of state and government of the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and
Japan expressed their resolve to effectively
combat international hijackings when they
issued the Bonn antihijacking delcaration.* In
essence, the declaration states that any na-
tion which does not prosecute or extradite hi-
jackers in its territory will face the termina-
tion of air service by the seven nations. It
does not specify what se.itence a hijacker
must receive but does require that he be tried
under the laws of the apprehending nation (or
extradited).

There is good reason to believe that the
declaration has had a positive effect in reduc-
ing the number of international terrorist hi-
jackings by its reaffirmation of the need of
governments to li/e up to their international
responsibilities to either prosecute or ex-
tradite hijackers. Obviously any multinational
undertaking of this type faces differences in
interpretation due to the different approaches
and policies regarding terrorism. However, at
the 1981 Ottawa summit, the seven govern-
ments provided a clear expression of resolve
by giving Afghanistan notice that it faced
sanctions due to the harboring of the hi-
jackers of a Pakistani International Airlines
aircraft.** This action will serve to place
potential hijackers on notice that it will be
difficult for them to find sanctuary.

.«»^'-/*"V

*The Bonn declaration was published in

the Bulletin of Sept. 1978, p. 5.

**The Ottawa statement was published in
the Bulletin of Aug. 1981, p. 16. ■

jgust1982

U.S. Government Organization for

Antiterrorism, Planning, Coordination,

and Policy Formulation

National Security
Council

Senior Interdepartmental
Group

Chairman, Deputy Secretary of State

Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism

Dsputy Chairman
Justice

"^

Advisory Group on Terrorism

Agency for International Development

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Center for Disease Control

Central Intelligence Agency

Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Department of Energy

Department of Interior

Department of Justice

Department of State

Department of the Treasury

Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Federal Protective Service
Immigration and Naturalization Service
International Communications Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
fkletropolitan Police Department
National Security Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Justice Assistance, Research

and Statistics
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Undersecretary of Defense
United States Coast Guard
United States Customs Service
United States Postal Service
United States Secret Service

The U.S. Government is organized in
separate but parallel ways to deal with two
distinct aspects of the problem of interna-
tional terrorism — policy and incident manag
ment.

The principal vehicle for coordinating
policy and programs is the Interdepartment
Group on Terrorism, the senior executive
branch organization devoted solely to the
problem of terrorism. Chaired by the Depar
ment of State, it is made up of representa-
tives of the Departments of Justice /FBI
(deputy chairman). Defense /JCS, Energy,
Treasury, and Transportation; Central In-
telligence Agency; National Security Counc;
and the office of the Vice President. The
group meets frequently, generally twice a
month, to insure full coordination among th
agencies of the Federal Government di recti
involved in antiterrorism programs. The
State Department representative, and chair
man, is the Director of the Office for Com-
batting Terrorism.

The executive branch's response to the
management of terrorist incidents is based
the "lead agency" concept. State has the lef
in overseas incidents, Justice/FBI the lead i
incidents of domestic terrorism, and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pla
a key role in skyjackings of U.S. flag carrie
within the United States.

When a terrorist incident occurs
overseas, the State Department immediate!
convenes a task force under the direction o
the Office for Combatting Terrorism to
manage the U.S. response. The task force i
physically located in the Operations Center
the State Department and is in operation
24-hours a day until the incident is resolvec
It is composed of representatives from the
appropriate geographic and functional
bureaus in the State Department and from
other agencies as necessary.

When Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier was
kidnapped in Verona, Italy, on December 1
i;tSl, for example, an interagency task fore
was convened by the State Department
within hours after the news of the abductio
In addition to the normal members of the
task force, the Department of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented
because of Gen. Dozier's military position.
That task force remained in operation until
(it'll. Dozier's rescue on .lanuary 28, 1982. I

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Terrorism

^.S. Government
organization

'hat is the U.S. Government doing in
)th its operations and organizations to
irry out the strong policy enunciated
J President Reagan?

First, I am sure that you would
jree that a key to dealing with the ter-
)rist threat is good intelligence. We
ive recently strengthened significantly
vc ability to collect, analyze, and use in-
:lligence on terrorism. We have also
.ken steps to improve the exchange of
formation with our friends and allies.

It is one thing to have intelligence; it
another to get policy officers to act on
. We have made organizational changes
lat improve our alert system and
!Sponse capability. Certainly, on the in-
I -lligence side, we are in much better
lape today than we were a year or two

Second, soon after the Reagan Ad-
inistration assumed office, it created
1 Interdepartmental Group on Ter-
)rism — most of you would say inter-
inisterial — to serve as the policy for-
\ ulation and coordination body for the
' jvernment. It is composed of repre-
■ntatives of Federal agencies with
rect responsibilities for combatting in-
■rnational terrorism. I am the chairman
: that group. Since its inception it con-
icted a complete review of U.S. policy
id proposed several initiatives. One of
le gaps that needed to be filled was a
ear operational arrangement to pro-
>de support to the President and other
ey decisionmakers during a major ter-
jrist incident. This has been remedied,
nd we believe that we are now better
rganized to get prompt policy guidance
3 that we can respond swiftly and ef-
jctively to a terrorist incident.

The possible use of force to resolve
n incident is another important aspect
f our response capability. In the United
itates, most major cities have SWAT
special weapons and tactics] teams.
Cach district of the Federal Bureau of
nvestigation (FBI) has its own SWAT
earn. The rescue missions which were
enducted at Entebbe, Mogadishu, and
he Iranian Embassy in London last
ear, as well as a number of aircraft in-
idents, emphasize the need for an effec-
ive assault capability. The United

States has dedicated military forces for
such a purpose. Although we consider
the use of force in resolving a terrorist
incident a measure of last resort, it is
important to have these capabilities
should they be needed.

Role of the Department
of State

To many of you, terrorism is a domestic
problem and you may wonder why the
foreign office would head the Federal
Government group on terrorism. The
answer is quite simple: For the United
States, most of the terrorist incidents
have been directed against our diplomats
or American interests overseas. The
Department of State is the "ministry" in
the United States most directly affected
and best able to respond. We do have
terrorist incidents in the United States
and when they occur, it is the respon-
sibility of the Department of Justice to
take the lead and respond. As all of you
attending this conference know, when it
is the unique case of an aircraft, it is the
responsibility of our Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).

As you might expect, the Depart-
ment of State has taken many steps
over the years to improve our security,
especially overseas. We are now en-
gaged in major improvements to many
of our embassies which will provide bet-
ter protection to both personnel and
physical facilities. Some 15« out of every
$1.00 the Department spends on opera-
tions is for security. So it is no small
matter to us. And other governments
which have the responsibility for pro-
tecting American Embassies are spend-
ing again collectively as much as we do.
It is my responsibility to assure that we
recommend security policies and pro-
grams that provide a prudent level of
protection. We are doing that.

Conclusion

We believe we have in place the policies,
programs, and organization to deal with
terrorism, but we are fully aware that
there is much more to be done.

The international community must
continue and strengthen its efforts to

cooperate more fully on terrorism. The
international organizations in par-
ticular—the United Nations and the
regional organizations— might consider
additional conventions to outlaw ter-
rorist tactics, such as assassinations and
bombings, and bring these additional
tactics under the "prosecute or
extradite" obligation. The international
community must give special emphasis
to working arrangements that will give
full effect to these policies and conven-
tions. We are hopeful that we can imple-
ment our proposed antiterrorism train-
ing program beginning in 1983 and that
it will make a significant contribution to
more effective working relationships
among civil authorities responsible for
dealing with terrorism.

Individual countries should redouble
their efforts to make clear that ter-
rorism is an unacceptable method for
achieving change. No matter what one's
ideological preferences, a bomb in a
train station or a threat of death against
a plane load of civil air passengers is not
an acceptable way to bring one's causes
to public attention or to overthrow a
government. An adequate response re-
quires not only a better intelligence
capability so that we are warned of
possible terrorist acts, but that the
machinery of government is organized
from top to bottom so that we act
promptly when a terrorist incident oc-
curs. I believe that we in the U.S.
Government are now prepared, but it
will require constant vigilance, planning,
and the exercise of our organizational
system to have confidence that we can
deal effectively with terrorist incidents.
We must work to establish a world
in which peaceful change can occur
without violence and terror. We must
also be vigilant in our mutual efforts to
prevent terrorist attacks. You have a
particularly important part to play in
prevention. I know that we will continue
to work together toward this goal. In
that effort, you can be certain that the
United States is prepared to be a full
and reliable partner. ■

ugust 1982

A Jewish synagogue in Antwerp was
bombed by the PFLP/SC on October 20.
1981, causing 2 deaths and 95 injuries.

Department of Stat

^C^?i=^^ FEATURE

Terrorism

Patterns of

International Terrorism;

1981

Overview

Both the number of international ter-
rorist incidents and the number of
casualties resulting from incidents fell in
1981 (figure 1). Deaths caused by ter-
rorist attacks dropped dramatically from
642 in 1980 to 173 in 1981. Despite this
decline in the number of casualties, the
long-term trend is toward more serious
threats to human life. In 1970 about half
the international terrorist incidents were
directed against people and half were
directed against property. In 1981, 80%
of such incidents were directed against
people.

Attacks against U.S. citizens also
declined in number with fewer
casualties, but all the U.S. fatalities in
1981 (as in 1980) were killed because of
their nationality. In earlier years, most
were victims of indiscriminate terrorist
attacks that had little or nothing to do
with their citizenship.

The trend toward a broader
geographic spread of international ter-

Figure 1

Internalional Terrorist Incidents

Number orincidenti Toul IncUcnti. T.4ZS

1968 69 10 71

I I I ' t 1 I I

rorism continued in 1981; incidents oc-
curred in 91 countries, more than in any
previous year. Government- sponsored in-
ternational terrorist attacks were mainly
directed against Middle Easterners in
the Middle East.

Key Patterns in 1981

Types of Attacks. In 1981 international
terrorists used a variety of methods to
achieve their goals — including kidnap-
ping, hostage taking, assassination,
bombing, threats, and hoaxes (table 1).
The number of serious incidents — kid-
nappings, major bombings, assassina-
tions, and skyjackings— dropped. Al-
though assassinations and assassination
attempts dropped from HI in 1980 to
70 last year, 1981 still had the second-
highest total since 1968, when the
United States began to record such in-
cidents.

In the first part of 1981, the number
of skyjackings was high, but after a few
well-publicized failures, their incidence
declined. In March a Pakistani commer-
cial airliner was hijacked first to
Afghanistan and then to Syria by the
Pakistan Liberation Army (PLA). The
resulting release of prisoners in
Pakistan, combined with publicity and
eventual freedom for the terrorists,
probably encouraged other, less-
successful attempts. An Indonesian
plane was also seized in March and
taken to Thailand where all the ter-
rorists were killed by Indonesian forces,
and the hijacking of a Turkish plane to
Bulgaria was foiled by the pilot and
passengers. Fewer incidents occurred
during the rest of the year, apart from
several attempts by East Europeans to
hijack planes to the West. One dramatic
exception was tlie simultaneous hijack-

eBull^ '8^sti982

ing of three planes from Venezuela via
Central America to Cuba, where the
hostages were released. The total
number of skyjackings reported in 1981
was 32, four less than the previous year.
Caution is indicated in using these
figures, however, as the United States
suspects far more incidents may have
occurred in Eastern Europe than the
United States has recorded.

Location of Attacks. Figures for
1981 confirm a clear trend toward a
greater geographic spread of interna-
tional terrorism.

1970

48 countries

1975

57 countries

1980

76 countries

1981

91 countries

The great majority of incidents,
however, continued to occur in a few
areas where conditions facilitate publici-
ty and in some cases provide greater
safety for the perpetrators — Western
Europe, Latin America, the Middle
East, and North America. More in-
cidents occurred in the United States
than in any other country, but Argen-
tina, Lebanon, West Germany, France,
and Italy were also sites of frequent ter-
rorism.

Victims. In 1981 citizens of 77 coun-
tries were the victims of international
terrorist incidents, more than in any
previous year since January 1968. As in
past years, U.S. citizens were the
primary target, followed by those of the
United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France,
Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Attacks or
threats against citizens of these seven
countries accounted for more than 60%
of the 709 incidents (including threats
and hoaxes) recorded in 1981. Incidents
directed against U.S. citizens or facilities
totaled 258 last year.

In terms of who or what is attacked,
there are several clear and ominous
trends. In 1970 about half of the in-
cidents were against people, the rest
against property. Now, 80% are directed
against people. Diplomats are the
foremost category; the number of at-
tacks against them rose from an average
165 per year during 1975-79 to 409 in
1980 and then dropped to 368 in 1981,
when they constituted more than half of
all victims. This is due in part to the ris-
ing number of attacks sponsored by

10

Table 1

Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Incidents, 1981, by Category

Type of Event

North
America

Latin
America

Western
Europe

Kidnapping
Barricade-hostage
Bombing*
Armed attack

0

3

12

0

10
13
2.5

7

6
12
89

2

Hijacking''
Assassination"^

4
2

9
7

2
30

Sabotage
Exotic pollution
Subtotal

0

0

21

0

1
72

1

0

142

Bombing (minor)
Threat

Theft, break-in
Hoax
Other"*
Subtotal

Total

Type of Event

Kidnapping
Barricade-hostage
Bombing*
Armed attack
Hijacking''
Assassination"'
Sabotage
Exotic pollution
Subtotal

Bombing (minor)
Threat

Theft, break-in
Hoax
Other''
Sublotiil

Total

12
15

1
34

5
67

88

33

18
4

17
12
84

156

Middle East/

North Africa

Asi<

5

0

3

0

33

1

15

0

3

5

20

3

0

0

0

0

79

9

13

4

7

6

2

1

6

5

22

2

50

18

52

15

5

18

17

107

249

Pacific

0
0
0
0
0

1

0
0

1

0
0
0

1

0

1

U.S.S.R./
Eastern
Europe

0
0

1

0
8
4
0
0
13

2
6
0
3

1
12

25

Unkown

129

27

1
1
9
1
1
3
0
0
16

6
6
0
1
3
16

32

Total

0

22

0

32

0

170

0

25

0

32

0

70

0

1

0

1

0

353

0

122

0

73

0

13

0

85

1

63

1

356

709

"Bombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility

''Hijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

"Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by

name.

d

Includes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms
smuggling.

governments, which tend to single out
enemy diplomats, dissidents, and promi-
nent exiles living abroad. Businessmen,
mostly U.S. citizens in Latin America,

were the victims in 12% of the incident
and military personnel were involved ir
about 9%. Attacks against military per-
sonnel constitute one of the fastest
growing categories.

FEATURE
Terrorism

Terrorist Groups. A total of 113
roups claimed credit for international
jrrorist incidents in 1981, down slightly
■om the high of 128 in 1980. These
umbers are undoubtedly inflated: some
roups create cover names to avoid
esponsibility for a particular action,
thers use them to commemorate an an-
iversary, and common criminals create
till others to mislead investigators. The
rrorists represented 86 nationalities,
ut, as in the past, Palestinians, Arme-
ians, West Germans, and Central
mericans were responsible for the ma-
rity of incidents.

Terrorist Events Causing Death
Injury. Only about one-fourth as
lany people were killed in terrorist at-
icks in 1981 as in the previous
ear— 173 compared with 642. The
umber injured also dropped, but not as
ramatically (figure 2). The patterns
ere, however, similar to previous
ears. Assassination attempts and bomb-
igs accounted for the majority of at-
icks that involved casualties, and most
f these incidents occurred in Western
Europe and the Middle East. Terrorists
ppear to have been more careful in
electing their targets, and more than
■alf of such attacks resulted in harm on-
to the intended victim, whereas in the
est innocent bystanders were much
acre often the victims.

Attacks that produced casualties oc-
urred in 56 countries. The greatest
lumber took place in Lebanon, where
nany of the Middle Eastern terrorist
roups are headquartered and where

Categories of Terrorist Incidents

Kidnapping

Seizure of one or more victims, who are then
moved to a hideout.

Barricade-Hostage

Seizure of a facility with whatever hostages
are available; their release is made contingent
on meeting terrorists' demands.

Bombing

Major bombing— use of any type of explosive
or incendiary device for terrorist purposes,
including those delivered through the mail,
when significant damage or casualties occur
or a terrorist group claims responsibility.
Minor bombing — same as above except that
there are no casualties and little or no
damage, and no group claims responsibility.

Armed Attack

An attempt to seize or damage a facility,
with no intent to hold it for negotiating pur-
poses.

Hijacldng

An attempt to seize an airplane, ship, or
other vehicle, with whatever hostages may be
in it, to force some action — movement to
another country and /or agreement by the
authorities involved to some terrorist de-
mand.

Assassination

An attempt, whether or not successful, to kill
a preselected victim, usually with small arms
or bombs. Letter bombs are excluded from
this category, although, in at least some
cases, there probably is a specific intended
victim.

Igure 2

eaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks

I Tolal WiiundC'd: K.2VK
iToIal Killed: 3.841

Sabotage

Intentional destruction of property by means
other than bombing.

Exotic Pollution

Use of exotic substances — atomic, chemical,
or biological — to contaminate material; for
example, the introduction of mercury into
oranges shipped from Israel.

Threat Hoax

The stated intent by a terrorist group to
carry out an attack, or a false alert to
authorities about a coming terrorist attack by
a named group.

These incidents serve terrorists' purposes
in that they tend to alarm and intimidate
potential victims, their parent states and
organizations, and often the local populace.
They usually cause facilities to be evacuated,
absorb the time of investigative authorities,
and generally disrupt the work of the
threatened group.

Well over half the recorded threats and
hoaxes are directed against U.S. citizens —
673 out of a total of 1,081 threats and 78 out
of 143 hoaxes. This is at least partially at-
tributable to the fact that the United States
has much more information about such inci-
dents than it does about threats or hoaxes di-
rected against other nations' citizens. More-
over, much of the information on such inci-
dents directed against foreigners is derived
from their reports to U.S. authorities about
such attacks in the United States — frequently
at the United Nations.

Theft, Break-In

Illegal entry into a facility to intimidate or
harass its owners.

Other

Includes sniping, shootouts with police, arms
smuggling, and credible reports of plotting a
terrorist attack that is subsequently foiled or
aborted. In all cases a terrorist group is
named. ■

\ugust 1982

11

responsibility for security is fragmented.
Included in the Lebanese total are a
number of Iraqi and Iranian attacks on
each other's diplomats.

Fifty-eight terrorist groups claimed
responsibility for attacks that produced
casualties in 1981, compared with 49 in
1980. The Armenian and Palestinian
groups were responsible for most of
these attacks. Nationalities most vic-
timized changed little from 1980:
Americans were most numerous among
casualties, followed by Israelis, Britons,
Iraqis, and Iranians.

Attacks Against U.S. Citizens. A

total of 258 international terrorist in-
cidents were directed against U.S.
citizens or property during 1981— slight-
ly more than in most previous years but
not as many as in 1978 and 1980. There
were nine kidnappings, 14 assassination
attacks, and 91 bombings of U.S. prop-
erty—about the same as in 1980.
Threats dropped significantly from 50 to
29, but hoaxes rose from 25 to 51 (tables
2 and 3 and figure 3).

A new and ominous development is
that all the Americans killed by interna-
tional terrorist attacks in 1980 and 1981
were assassinated because of their na-
tionality. In earlier years, most
Americans killed in such incidents were
victims of indiscriminate attacks that
had little or nothing to do with their na-
tionality. Moreover, at least one ter-
rorist group, the Red Brigades, is
known to have shifted to less well-
protected U.S. officials after initially
planning to attack a closely guarded
target.

Seventy-two international terrorist
groups took credit for attacks against
Americans in 1981. The Colombian left-
ist group— April 19 Movement
(M-19)— claimed the largest number.
The Red Army Faction (RAF) and its
sympathizers in West Germany and ter-
rorist groups in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Peru also carried out a significant
number of attacks against Americans.

In addition to nongovernment-
sponsored terrorist attacks in 1981, the
United States was confronted by Libyan
leader Qadhafi's threat to assassinate
President Reagan and other senior U.S.
Government officials and to attack U.S.
facilities abroad.

Table 2

Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens
and Property, 1981, by Category

U.S.S.R./

Sub-

North

Latin

Western

Eastern

Saharai

Type of Event

America

America

Europe

Europe

Africa

Kidnapping

0

8

1

0

0

Barricade-hostage

0

2

0

0

0

Bombing'

4

21

21

0

1

Armed attack

0

5

0

0

0

Hijacking''

4

6

2

4

0

Assassination'^

0

5

3

0

0

Sabotage

0

0

1

0

0

Subtotal

8

47

28

4

1

Bombing (minor)

5

16

17

0

1

Threat

3

8

7

2

2

Theft, break-in

0

1

2

0

0

Hoax

6

15

15

3

1

Other''

1

8

8

1

2

Subtotal

15

48

49

6

6

Total

23

95

77

10

Middle East/

Type of Event

North Africa

Asia

Pacific

Unkown

Tota

Kidnapping
Barricade-hostage
Bombing^
Armed attack

0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

0

0
0
0

0

9
2

47

7

Hijacking**
Assassination''

1
5

4

1

0
0

0
0

21
14

Sabotage
Subtotal

0
8

0
5

0
0

0
0

1
101

Bombing (minor)
Threat

2
3

3
4

0
0

0
0

44
29

Theft, break-in

2

1

0

0

6

Hoax

6

4

1

0

51

Other''

6

1

0

0

27

Subtotal

19

13

1

0

157

Total

27

18

1

0

258

"Bombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility

''Hijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

"■Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by
name.

''includes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms
smuggling.

In 1981, 17% of incidents directed
against Americans resulted in at least
one casualty. Six Americans were killed
and 31 wounded in international ter-
rorist attacks in 1981. These numbers

are slightly lower than in the last few
years. This is partially due to good for
tune; the number of attemped violent .
tacks has not decreased.

12

Department of State Bullet

FEATURE
Terrorism

All six U.S. citizens killed in 1981
vere assassinated in Latin America,
vhere more than one-third of the in-
idents directed against Americans oc-
urred. While the attacks were no more
requent than in 1980, the number in
lach year was higher than in any
)revious year. Five assassination at-
acks, eight kidnappings, 37 bombings,
md four skyjackings that involved U.S.
■itizens were recorded in Latin America
luring the year.

• In El Salvador 15 incidents took
)lace, including a series of armed at-
acks against the U.S. Embassy in
/[arch and April and the murder of two
Vmericans in January.

• In Guatemala there were 14 at-
acks, including five kidnappings and the
nurder of three U.S. citizens.

• In Costa Rica a bomb destroyed a
an carrying Marine guards to the U.S.
embassy, injuring three guards and
heir driver.

• In Colombia the M-19 carried out
ight attacks on Americans during the
-ear, including the murder of a kid-
lapped missionary.

• In Peru the U.S. chancery and the
mbassador's residence were bombed on
Vugiist 31.

A total of 30 attacks were directed
.gainst U.S. personnel and property in
Vest Germany during 1981— more than
n any other year. They were carried out
)y RAF members or sympathizers and
ncluded an attempt to assassinate Gen.
■■rederick Kroesen (commander, U.S.
orces in Europe) as well as numerous
)ombings of U.S. facilities. The last
)ombing of the year, on August 31 at
lamstein AFB, damaged the head-
luarters building and injured 18 people,
ncluding a U.S. brigadier general.

The Broader Picture

since the United States began recording
nternational terrorist incidents in 1968,
i number of broad patterns have
emerged. Some are relatively unchang-
ing, such as the distribution of terrorist
neidents — where Western Europe,
Latin America, and the Middle East con-
;inue to account for about three-fourths
Df all incidents (figure 4). Almost half of
the incidents recorded since 1968 have
occurred in only nine countries. The

Figure 3

Inlernalioiial Terrorist Allaclis on US Personnel and Facililies, 1981

Nunihcr of Incidents

l.ocalitiii uf Fit'nl

Midcisl .ini) North
Alma

Sub-Sjharan Africa

Asia

Norlh America

Weslern Furope

Lalin America

Type of Victiir

Olher LIS
Covernnienl-'

Tourists,
Missionaric

Diplomats

T>pe of Attack
Barricade-Hostage I

Armed Attack |

Sniping I

Kidnaping H

Assassination |

llijackinB

Ttireat. Iloas

Bombing

''Kvcludine milildrv and dipiii

Natiotiaiilt of Tcrrorisl

Italian

Peruvian

Palestinian

Turkish

Guatemalan

Colombian

Salvadoran

West German

Figure 4

Geographic Distribution of International

Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81

Number ul Attacks

Total Incidents; 7,425

Other 767

USSR/Eastern Europe

Africa ^^^ -~^^/<^

^\^ Weslern Europe
\ 2,452

North America-/
7bl p""-

^

\

Middle East and V
North Africa \
1.512 \

7\

Ljlin America \.>^^

August 1982

greatest number were recorded in the
United States (partly because informa-
tion is better); other nations with a large
number of incidents include Argentina,
Italy, France, West Germany, Iran,
Turkey, Greece, and Israel. These are
convenient locations for terrorist opera-
tions, and in many cases the incident did
not even involve citizens of the country
in which the event occurred. Fewer than
20% of the events in France involved
French terrorists, for example, and an
even smaller portion of the victims were
French nationals.

Over the past 14 years, more than
20% of all international terrorist in-
cidents occurred in Latin America, and
the number in that region has been in-
creasing faster than in other parts of
the world. More attacks were recorded
in 1980-81 than in any other 2-year

13

period since 1968, primarily reflecting
the spillover of increased domestic
violence into the international arena. In
most cases, the attacks were carried out
by indigenous groups against foreigners
in an attempt to discredit or undermine
the local regime. In some cases the at-
tacks were by rightwing groups against
foreigners who were thought to sym-
pathize with antigovernment forces.

From 1968 through 1981, the United
States recorded 1,512 international ter-
rorist incidents in the Middle East and
North Africa. The number of attacks in
the region was highest in 1978 (reflect-
ing increased anti- American activity in
Iran), remained high in 1979 and 1980,
and declined somewhat in 1981. As in
Latin America, much of the interna-
tional terrorism is a spillover from
domestic violence; Iran in 1978 is a good
example. Most of the attacks in that
region were carried out by Middle
Eastern terrorists, and about half were
directly at other Middle Eastern citizens.
Responsibility was claimed by 151 dif-
ferent terrorist groups — mostly Pales-
tinian.'

While citizens of almost every coun-
try have been victimized by international
terrorism, most incidents have been
directed against those of only a few
countries (figure 5). U.S. records show
that between 1968 and 1981, citizens of
131 different countries were victimized
by international terrorism; attacks
against U.S., Israeli, U.K., West Ger-
man, French, and U.S.S.R. nationals ac-

Kigiiri' 6

T>pi- (if \ iciim of liilcrnatinnal lerrorist

Allatks. I96S-S1

Number of Adacks

Total Incidenls: 7.435

Promincnl Opinion
Leaders 309

Govcrnmcnl Ollk-ijls
Vlihuiry 657

Private Parties

I Tourists, students,

missKinaries.

1,415

Diplomals 2.85(.

Corporale OlHeials 1.688

count for more than 60% of all the in-
cidents. Americans were by far the most
often targeted.2 Of the 7,425 attacks
recorded, 38% were directed against
U.S. citizens. This reflects the wide
geographic spread of American interests
and the fact that U.S. citizens are
regarded as symbols of Western wealth
and power.

Each year, between 35% and 45% of
all the international terrorist incidents
are directed against U.S. personnel or
property. The second-highest number of
incidents against any single country has
consistently been far less — about 10% of
the total. Usually either Israel or the
United Kingdom has been the second
most victimized country. In 1979,

Kigure .^

Nationality of Victims oflnternationa! Terrorist Attaclis, 1968-81

Number of Incidents

Total Incidents: 7,425

Oceania I

Sub-Saharan Alrica H

Transregional H

Asia H

USSR/Fastcrn
F.urope

Latin Americ.i

Midillc F-asI anti
North Africa

Western Europe
North America

.l.OOli

14

however, it was France and in 1980, tl
Soviet Union.

Diplomats have been the foremost
target of terrorist incidents, accountinj
for nearly 40% of the total (figure 6).
Businesses and businessmen are the se
ond most frequent victims. Since 1968
almost one-fourth of the incidents wert
directed against business, especially U.
business in Latin America. The numbe
reached a high in 1978 and declined
thereafter — in part because of increase
security, improved operating procedun
in high-risk areas, and, most important
ly, a shift in focus by many terrorist
groups.

Although military personnel are nc
as large a segment of the victim popul;
tion as diplomats or businessmen, the
United States has recorded 600 terrori
attacks (fewer than 10% of the total)
against them. The number of attacks
against the military is increasing at th<
greatest rate.

The pattern of terrorist events tha
produce casualties appears to be chang
ing. In 1,614 such incidents (figure 7),
3,841 people were killed and 8,298
wounded. Bombings and assassinations
account for more than 70% of the at-
tacks that produced casualties. Bomb-
ings have always been the most
prevalent, perhaps the most serious be
ing the December 15, 1981, bombing o
the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, which
killed at least 55 and injured another
100.

In recent years, however, assassin
tion attempts have increased dramat-
ically, especially from 1977 to 1980.

1968-76 20 (annual average)

1977 34

1978 54

1979 65

1980 1 1 1

1981 70

This increase is attributable to the
fact that several countries — Libya,
Syria, and Iran among them — have in-
creasingly used their military and in-
telligence services to carry out terroris
attacks against foreign diplomats or
their own exiles.

U.S. citizens have been the victims
of only 20% of all attacks that produce
casualties, while suffering more than
40% of all international terrorist in-
cidents. U.S. businessmen have been tl
primary target of casualty-producing a

Department of State Bullet «

FEATURE
Terrorism

jure 7

ernational Terrorist Incidents Thai

used Casualties

nhcr ol Incidents

Total Incidents: 1. 614

1168 61 ^0 'l

78 T) 80 81

.cks, but attacks on U.S. diplomats and
ilitary personnel have increased at a
tster rate in recent years.

Over the period 1968-81, attacks on
mericans that produced casualties oc-
irred in 69 countries, most frequently
Argentina, Iran, and the Philippines.
ore than 155 terrorist groups claimed
■sponsibility for one or more attacks.
le Argentine Montoneros and Iranian
lid Palestinian groups have been the
lost prominent perpetrators.

In 1981, for the first time, the
•nited States has grouped terrorist in-
dents into more serious and less
irious categories. As shown in figure 8,
>e number of serious incidents — such
kidnappings, the taking of hostages,
ssassination attacks, and major bomb-
gs— rose rapidly in the early 1970s, re-
ained fairly steady between 1974 and
•79, then jumped to new highs in
i80-81. Less serious incidents have
ictuated more widely. The peak year
r relatively minor incidents, 1978, saw
drop in serious incidents. Minor bomb-
gs and threats account for more than
)% of the less serious incidents.

The trend of serious international
Trorist incidents involving U.S. citizens
" property has shown little variation
igure 9). It peaked in 1975, declined
lereafter, only to rise somewhat in the
ast 2 years. Less serious incidents ac-
junt for most of the year-to-year varia-
on in total incidents involving the
nited States.

Terrorist Groups

More than 670 groups have claimed
credit for at least one international at-
tack since the United States began keep-
ing statistics in 1968. This number is un-
doubtedly inflated: some of these are
cover names for organizations wishing
to deny responsibility for a particular ac-
tion, and some have probably been used
by common criminals to throw off in-
vestigators or by psychotics seeking
pubhc recognition. The list includes the
names of nations that conduct interna-
tional terrorism such as Libya and
Syria, insurgency groups that use ter-
rorist tactics, separatist groups such as
the ETA (a Basque group), and nihilist
groups such as the RAF and the
Japanese Red Army. It includes leftwing
groups, rightwing groups, anti- American
groups, anti-Soviet groups, environmen-
talist groups, and even religious groups.
They represent the spectrum of
ideologies, classes, cultures, and races.

The annual number of groups that
claim credit for attacks has increased
markedly since the United States began
keeping statistics. For example, 49
groups claimed credit for attacks in
1970, rising to 111 groups by 1975, and
128 groups by 1980. It dropped slightly
to 113 in 1981.

While some terrorist groups have
dropped out of sight during the 14-year
period, a large number have persisted.
They are well organized, with a
dedicated core of well-trained and highly
motivated terrorists. Moreover, they
usually have at least some popular sup-

Figure 8

International Terrorist Incidents. 1968-81

Number ol Incidents

Figure 9

International Terrorist Attacks on US

Personnel and Facilities. 1968-81

Number ol Attacks

1168 61 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 71 80 81

port. Although the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) is primarily a
domestic terrorist group that conducts
operations in Northern Ireland, U.S.
records show that the PIRA and its
sympathizers have conducted more in-
ternational terrorism than any other
group. The PIRA has launched attacks
from several countries, and the attacks
have involved citizens from at least 15
countries, although the majority were
against British nationals.

The Black September Organization
has carried out the second-largest
number of attacks, most of them in
Europe and the Middle East, targeted
against Israelis and moderate Palestin-
ians. Other Palestinian groups— par-
ticularly the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the
PFLP-General Command, and the Black
June Organization (BJO)— have con-
ducted terrorise incidents during the
past 14 years. Together, the Palestinian
groups perpetrated more international
attacks than any other movement. U.S.
records show 9% of all terrorist attacks
(almost 700) have been carried out by
Palestinians.

Other significant groups that have
been active in international terrorism
are the Montoneros, the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA), the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty, the M-19, and
the RAF. Among the states most active
in carrying out international terrorist at-
tacks are Libya, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

1968 61 70 71 72 7! 74 75 76 77 78 71 80 81

tugust 1982

15

Activities of Significant
Groups in 1981

The United States recorded 113 ter-
rorist groups that claimed credit for in-
ternational attacks during 1981. The ter-
rorists represented 86 nationalities, and,
as in the past, Palestinians, Armenians,
Germans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans
carried out the most attacks.

Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia. ASALA carried
out more international attacks during
1981 than any other terrorist organiza-
tion. Its primary targets in the past
have been Turkish diplomats and
diplomatic facilities, but, under cover
names, ASALA has attacked Swiss in-
terests in retaliation for the arrest of
ASALA members, and, using the name
Orly Organization, it has attacked
French interests in retaliation for the
November arrest of an Armenian carry-
ing a false passport at Orly Airport.
ASALA carried out 40 attacks in 11
countries during the year. Although
most of the attacks were bombings
against French and Swiss property, the
most serious were attacks against
Turkish diplomats. These included the
September 24 seizure of the Turkish
Consulate in Paris and the assassination
of Turkish diplomats in Switzerland,
Denmark, and France.

Palestinian Terrorists. Palestinian
terrorists have not been as active in in-
ternational terrorism in recent years as
during the mid-1970s. In 1981 some
radical Palestinian groups resumed in-
ternational terrorist att<icks. Palestinian
terrorists carried out a total of 49 at-
tacks during 1981; groups such as the
May 15 Organization, Black June
Organization, and the PF^LP-SC (Special
Command) were the most active. This is
far more than recorded in 1979 or 1980
but about the same as during the
mid-1970s. The attacks were committed
in 14 countries. Most of the incidents
were bombings, six were assassination
attempts, five were armed attacks, and
one was a rocket attack.

The May 15 Organization and the
PFLP-SC were active in 1981. The
former carried out attacks against
Israeli targets in Europe, including
bomb attacks on the embassies in Vien-

16

Table 3

International Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens
and Property, 1968-81, by Category

Type of Event

Kidnapping
Barricade-hostage
Bombing^
Armed attack
Hijacking''
Assassination'^
Sabotage
Subtotal

Bombing (minor)
Threat

Theft, break-in
Hoax
Other''
Subtotal

Total

Type of Event

Kidnapping
Barricade-hostage
Bombing^
Armed attack
Hijacking''
Assassination'^
Sabotage
Subtotal

Bombing (minor)
Threat

Theft, break-in
Hoax
Other''
Subtotal

Total

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974

1975

1

3

25

19

5

22

14

23

1

0

4

0

1

3

2

1

13

31

29

37

44

28

80

71

1

4

3

5

10

8

6

7

1

5

12

4

4

0

1

2

3

3

10

2

4

4

2

8

0

0

0

3

3

1

0

1

20

46

83

70

71

66

105

113

36

62

106

105

100

79

79

41

11

12

51

51

71

77

19

19

0

3

15

8

1

3

4

3

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

4

1

10

'J

12

11

9

5

51

78

183

173

184

170

111

68

71

124

266

243

255

236

216

181

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Tola

8

7

8

8

10

9

162

2

3

0

6

7

2

32

54

63

42

35

39

47

613

8

5

12

10

11

7

97

5

4

3

15

20

21

97

15

6

7

10

18

14

106

1

0

0

1

0

1

11

93

88

72

85

105

101

1,118

71

72

133

91

58

44

1,077

53

22

161

47

50

29

673

1

0

7

4

13

6

68

0

0

0

1

25

51

78

13

13

23

28

27

27

192

138

107

324

171

173

157

2,088

231

195

396

256

278

258

3.206

"Bombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility

''Hijackings of air, sea. or land transport.

'Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by

name.

d

Includes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms
smuggling.

na and Athens and on El Al offices in
Italy and Turkey. It also claimed credit
for the bombing of a Cypriot cruise ship
in Haifa, Israel. The PFLP-SC carried
out a series of bombings in the Middle
East and is believed responsible for the
October 20 bombing of a synagogue in
Belgium.

The Black June Organization (BJO)
a radical Palestinian group which op-
poses political settlement with Israel ar
Palestine Liberation Organization leade
Arafat's moderate policies, was also vei
active during 1981. It targeted moderal
Palestinians, Israelis, and non-Israeli
Jews. On September 23, BJO launched
hand grenade attack on the offices of a:

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Terrorism

raeli shipping line in Cyprus. BJO
lied moderate Palestinian leaders on
ine 1 in Brussels and on October 9 in
Dme. (This is the group that attempted
assassinate the Israeli Ambassador in
3ndon on June 3, 1982, an incident
at preceded the Israeli invasion of
jbanon.)

Provisional Irish Republican
rmy. The PIRA was more active in
)81 than in most previous years. It
taliated for the attempted assassina-
Dn of Bernadette Devlin McAliskey
ith the murder of Sir Norman Stronge
id his son.

PIRA expanded the tactic of
-isoner hunger strikes. After a 66-day
.st, Bobby Sands died on May 5. He
as the first and most wridely publicized
IRA militant to die in 1981. Nine other
IRA and Irish National Liberation Ar-
y (INLA) members died after unsuc-
'ssful attempts to gain prisoner-of-war
"atus for the terrorist inmates. After
le failure of the hunger strikes, the
IRA intensified its campaign of
olence in England. In October and
ovember it claimed credit for bombing
.cilities in London, mailed several
3mbs to British facilities, kidnapped the
)n of a wealthy Irish businessman, and
;tempted to assassinate the Command-
ig General of the British Royal
(arines. PIRA sympathizers destroyed
ritish cars in West Germany, bombed a
ritish cultural center in Greece, at-
icked British targets in Portugal, and
ireatened British facilities in
witzerland.

Red Army Faction. The RAF in

)81 launched a series of attacks against
le U.S. presence in West Germany
jspite a series of setbacks in 1980. The
AF had been rebuilding its operational
.ructure for some time, and in an at-
!mpt to capitalize on the controversy
/er NATO nuclear weapons moderniza-
on plans and "squatters' rights" in
lest Berlin, the RAF and its sym-
athizer groups carried out numerous
ttacks.

The RAF or its supporters claimed
redit for numerous attacks during the
ear. It firebombed U.S. military
icilities in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. It
ttempted to bomb the U.S. library in
^est Berlin and the Dow chemical plant
1 Dusseldorf. On August 31, the RAF

exploded a car bomb at the U.S. Air
Force Headquarters at Ramstein. It at-
tempted to assassinate U.S. Gen.
Frederick Kroesen on September 15, fir-
ing two rocket-propelled antitank
weapons at Kroesen's car; one missed,
and the other hit the trunk. The car was
severely damaged, but no one was
seriously injured. Sympathizer groups

During 1981 Irish terrorists imprisoned in
Northern Ireland carried out hunger
strikes "to the death." Ten prisoners died.

August 1982

17

Skyjacking

Since January 1968, there have been 684 at-
tempted skyjackings, representing about 9%
of all terrorist attacks since that date. Ac-
cording to U.S. records, those attempts have
resulted in at least 50 fatalities and 400 in-
juries. More than one-third of the hijackers
demanded passage to Cuba. Nearly 40% of
the planes hijacked belonged to U.S. carriers
(such as Eastern, National, and TWA).

The number of attempted skyjackings
reached a high in 1969-70, declined slightly
in 1971-72, then decreased by half in 1973,
and has remained fairly constant since then.
These decreases are easily traced to in-
creased public awareness of and concern for
this threat. The 1970 multiple skyjacking by
Palestinian terrorists was the catalyst for in-
ternational concern which resulted in The
Hague and Montreal conventions on aerial hi-

jacking. In January 1973, the full screening
of boarding passengers and luggage inspec-
tion was instituted in the United States and,
to a lesser e.xtent, at international airports in
other countries; that year the number of sky-
jacking attempts was half that of the
previous year. The U.S. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) reports that more than
20,000 firearms have been confiscated since
the institution of these security measures.
Of the 684 skyjacking attempts since
1968, 108 have been designated terrorist sky-
jackings, meaning they were politically moti-
vated. More than one-third of these resulted
in casualties (212 dead and 186 wounded).
Terrorist skyjackings originated in 43 coun-
tries and terminated in 47 countries, most of
them in Latin America, Western Europe, and
the Middle East. Forty-eight terrorist groups

claimed the credit, almost half of them Pales
tinians and Latin Americans.

Between 1973 and 1980, terrorists
averaged five skyjacking attempts a year.
There was a significant increase in 1981,
partly attributable to the Pakistan Liberatioi
Army's (PLA) successful skyjack in March,
which probably encouraged other attempts.
As of May 31, 1982, there have been four
terrorist skyjackings, suggesting a decrease
from the 1981 total.

Terrorists achieved logistic success in
70% of their attempts between January 196f
and June 1982. (Logistic success does not
mean that ancillary demands were met; it
simply notes whether the skyjacker was able
to divert the plane to a destination selected
by the terrorist.) ■

Terrorist Skyjackings by Region, January 1968-June 1982*

^rclic Ocean

\

r ., V ; USSR/

North America ;

8 <-^- ^-^

IX S^ J " Eastern Europe
Europe " '*'

(7.4%;- C>--y ~

22
(20.1°o) „.^^, ^

Nenh Paeihc

No-It' Ailanl.c

Middle East

0««*'i

Ocean

21

Africa

7

North Pmc-t
Oc««n

Latin America

)

29

V (29-9%) :

50urA Pacific

V" -■-■■--. ^

South All

Ocaan

!' -.^ r

Oc«*

E:'"^^-..

^.-i ^

>

'figures Indicate Ihe

o( Incidents per region and percent ol total

18

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE
Terrorism

also attacked West German and U.S.
targets in Germany and other European
countries. The Black Block bombed two
U.S. military facilities near Frankfurt
and attempted to bomb the railroad line
to the Rhein / Main airbase. Others
bombed the U.S. Consul General's office
and a military base near Frankfurt and
U.S. military facilities in Kassal,
Wiesbaden, and West Berlin. They also
attacked a West German Consulate in
Switzerland and the U.S. Embassy in
Sofia.

Red Brigades. Despite some set-
backs early in the year, the Red
Brigades broadened their targets to in-
clude foreign nationals in 1981. The con-
fessions of Patrizio Feci, the arrest of
RB planner Mario Moretti, and in-
creased government antiterrorist activi-
ty contributed to pressure on the RB.

The RB claimed credit for numerous
attacks during the past year— the
assassination of a hospital director in
Milan, a prison warden in Rome, and
four police officials. The RB kidnapped
three individuals, murdering one and
releasing the other two after holding
them for lengthy periods. In retaliation
for Peci's testimony, the RB kidnapped
and killed his brother and shot one of his
defense attorneys. During the year, the
RB also wounded 12 victims, bombed
four facilities, and robbed a bank in
Rome.

On December 17, RB kidnapped
U.S. Army Brig. Gen. James Dozier
from his home in Verona, Italy. Italian
authorities subsequently arrested more
than 300 suspects and uncovered large
amounts of weapons and supplies in the
search for Dozier and subsequent
counterterrorist operations. On Janu-
ary 28, 1982, Italian officers rescued
Dozier from a safehouse in Padua.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty.

In Spain, the ETA-PM (Political-
Military) and the ETA-M (Military),
both Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque
separatist organizations, continued their
campaign of violence against the
Spanish Government. They also targeted
citizens from six other countries in
Spain, including threats to bomb the
U.S. airbase near Torrejon.

Early in January the government
granted greater autonomy for the
Basque region in an attempt to decrease

tension, but this did not stop the ter-
rorists; they claimed credit for many at-
tacks during the next few months. Near
the end of January, the terrorists fired
antitank weapons at government
buildings in two Basque cities, kid-
napped a prominent citizen in Bilbao,
and kidnapped and murdered the chief
nuclear engineer at the Lemoniz power
plant in northern Spain. During the
same month, the Spanish police rescued
unharmed a prominent doctor who had
been kidnapped in Madrid and was being
held in northeast Spain by ETA-PM for
a U.S. $2 million ransom.

On February 20, in a coordinated
operation, the ETA kidnapped the
honorary consuls to Spain from Austria,
El Salvador, and Uruguay. The consuls
were held for a week, and the attack
received widespread publicity.

On February 23, the ETA-PM an-
nounced its intention to abandon ter-
rorism. Shortly thereafter the ETA-M
increased its terrorist campaign. In
February and March, it bombed
facilities, attacked police patrols, and
assassinated prominent members of the
Spanish Government. A few months
later the ETA-M carried out another
series of attacks, which included assaults
on police and Civil Guard facilities and
bombings of the Spanish electric com-
pany.

April 19 Movement. The Colombian
April 19 Movement (M-19) carried out
1 1 international terrorist operations in
1981, including bombings, hijackings,
and one kidnapping. All of the incidents
occurred in Colombia and almost all
were targeted against the United States.
A faction of the group kidnapped a U.S.
citizen, and after weeks of negotiations
and threats his body was found in an
abandoned bus in Bogota.

The M-19 attempted large-scale
military operations on March 8 and 11,
launching amphibious attacks on three
remote villages in southern Colombia.
Government forces killed or captured
most of the terrorists. M-19 suffered
another major setback when a truckload
of sophisticated weapons, including
rocket grenades and machineguns, was
captured by the Colombian border
guard.

Marxist-Leninist Armed Propagan-
da Unit. In Turkey the MLAPU, a fac-
tion of the Turkish People's Liberation
Party/Front, the most anti-U.S. of all
the leftist groups in Turkey, was respon-
sible for the deaths of seven Americans
in 1979 and one in 1980. MLAPU killed
no Americans in 1981 and had very little
success in other terrorist attacks during
the year.

Since imposition of martial law in
September 1980, the Turkish military
government has killed or arrested a
number of MLAPU members, raided
safehouses, and executed convicted
MLAPU members. Although the group
suffered setbacks during the year, it was

U.S. Business Can
Call for Help

The Department of State's Threat Analysis
Group can provide brief unclassified oral
evaluations to U.S. business representatives
on the potential terrorist threat in countries
around the world. Call (202) 632-6308.

During an international terrorist incident
involving U.S. interests, a State Department
task force coordinates the U.S. response.
Businessmen, whose operations may be
affected by that crisis, may telephone the
Office for Combatting Terrorism to be put in
direct contact with the task force. Call (202)
632-9892. ■

able to conduct some terrorist opera-
tions, both against the U.S. presence in
Turkey and against the Turkish Govern-
ment. On January 22, the MLAPU at-
tempted to assassinate two U.S. soldiers
as they walked to a bus stop. On April
6, the MLAPU claimed credit for an at-
tack on a U.S. military vehicle. Although
the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a
number of times, no one was seriously
injured. The terrorists who carried out
this attack were arrested in a raid on a
safehouse the following day.

Special Cases— Guatemala and
El Salvador. In Guatemala and El
Salvador, prolonged domestic strife has
created fertile soil for terrorism, both
domestic and international. Terrorism is
a major tactic of both leftwing and
rightwing groups in El Salvador. Of the

August 1982

19

five leftwing groups forming the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN), the Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL) is the strongest and
largest. Groups operating under the
rubric FMLN or FPL claimed respon-
sibility for most of the attacks in 1981,
including 18 attacks on U.S. personnel
or facilities and 10 attacks on the em-
bassies or private facilities of other Cen-
tral American countries. Among the in-
cidents involving U.S. citizens was a
series of attacks on the U.S. Embassy
during March and April. Other attacks
on Americans in El Salvador included
the bombing of the Exxon compound, a
Hardees restaurant, and the Citibank
facilities.

Rightwing terrorists were also ac-
tive in El Salvador, with most attacks
against other Salvadoran citizens. On
January 3, the head of the agrarian
reform program and two U.S. advisers
were assassinated by three terrorists
while at a dinner meeting at the
Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. Two
men arrested in connection with this
case have ties with extreme rightwing
groups opposed to Salvadoran land
reform.

In Guatemala terrorism figured as a
major tactic of the right, the left, and
the Guatemalan Government. U.S. files
contain records of 27 international ter-
rorist attacks in 1981. These include
bombings, kidnappings, and four
assassination attempts. While most of
the international attacks were carried
out by leftwing groups such as the Guer-
rilla Army of the Poor, two U.S. citizens
were assassinated by rightwing groups.
Thirteen of the attacks were directed at
American personnel and property. Other
victims of international terrorism in
Guatemala included citizens of Japan,
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Spain, and Honduras.

Among the most publicized assas-
sinations were two U.S. missionaries
working in Guatemala and a U.S.
businessman, who had been kidnapped
in December 1980 by leftwing guerrillas
during an attempted rescue by the
Guatemalan police. Numerous bombings
of foreign facilities were recorded, in-
cluding the Pan American headquarters,
the Honduran airline office, the
American Chamber of Commerce office,
an Eastern Airlines plane on the
ground, the Chevron oil depot in

Guatemala City, the British Consul's of-
fice, and a U.S. -owned hotel. Other in-
cidents included the murders of an
Italian and a Spanish priest working in
the area and the kidnapping of an
Australian and a U.S. citizen for ran-
som.

State-Sponsored
International Terrorism

Nations support international terrorist
groups or engage in terrorist attacks to
influence policies of other countries, to
establish or strengthen regional or
global influence, and, in some cases, to
eliminate or terrorize dissident exiles
and nationals from adversary countries.

Many countries are reluctant to con-
demn states that support or engage in
international terrorist activities when
those activities are cloaked in the mantle
of anti-imperialism. Other countries
tolerate state-sponsored terrorist ac-
tivities because they fear economic or
other forms of retaliation by the spon-
soring states.

U.S. records list 129 terrorist at-
tacks conducted directly by national
governments, but this figure almost cer-
tainly understates the incidence of state-
sponsored terrorism. More than 80% of
the 129 attacks took place in 1980 and
1981, and almost 40% were assassina-
tions or attempted assassinations. This
is roughly six times the percentage of
assassinations recorded in non-state-
sponsored terrorist attacks. State-spon-
sored attacks were more lethal than
other terrorist incidents, 44% resulting
in casualties— a total of 60 persons in-
jured and 61 killed. A majority of these
attacks occurred in the Middle East,
were carried out by Middle East nations,
and were directed against expatriates
and diplomats from Middle Eastern
countries.

The pattern of state-sponsored inter-
national terrorist incidents in 1981 was
similar to that of 1980. The 44 attacks
occurred in 20 different countries, but
almost half were in Lebanon. The at-
tacks were directed against citizens
from 17 countries, half of them from the
Middle East. Incidents included kidnap-
pings, bombings, assassinations, and
armed attacks against embassies or
other facilities. During 1981, 21 victims
were killed and 28 wounded in state-

sponsored international terrorist at-
tacks.

Soviet Union. The Soviets provide
training, arms, and other direct and in-
direct support to a variety of national in
surgent and separatist groups. Many of
these groups commit international ter-
rorist attacks as part of their program
of revolutionary violence. Moreover,
some of the individuals trained and
equipped by the Soviets make their way
into strictly terrorist groups with little
revolutionary potential.

Moscow maintains close relations
with and furnishes aid to governments
and organizations that directly support
terrorist groups. In the Middle East, for
example, the Soviets sell large quantities
of arms to Libya. The Soviets also back
a number of Palestinian groups that
openly conduct terrorist operations. In
Latin America, the Soviet Union and
Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term
coordinated campaign to establish sym-
pathetic Latin American regimes. The
Cubans, and more recently the Soviets,
clearly support organizations and groups
in Latin America that use terrorism as a
basic technique to undermine existing
regimes. In other parts of the world,
especially Africa, the Soviets have sup-
ported guerrilla movements and national
liberation organizations that engage in
terrorism.

Libya. Support of terrorist groups
has been an element of Libya's foreign
policy under Qadhafi since the
mid-1970s. Qadhafi has been linked by
overwhelming evidence to terrorist at-
tacks and assassinations in Western
Europe, the United States, and the Mid-
dle East and is known to support ter-
rorist groups and liberation movements
worldwide. After the Gulf of Sidra inci-
dent, when the United States shot down
two Libyan fighters which were attack-
ing U.S. naval forces in international
waters, Qadhafi threatened to assas-
sinate President Reagan and other
senior U.S. Government officials. The
1981 records contain information on 13
attacks by Libyan assassination squads.

South Yemen. The Government of
the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen has supported international ter-
rorism since the late 1960s. It provides
camps and other training facilities for a
number of leftist terrorist groups.

20

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Terrorism

The Government of South Yemen
has not participated directly in interna-
tional terrorist attacks, however, and
South Yemeni citizens have been in-
volved in only six incidents since 1968.

Syria. As a major supporter of
radical Palestinian groups, Syria has
provided training, logistic support, and
use of diplomatic facilities to groups that
are willing to do its bidding. Syria sup-
ports Palestinian elements that engage
in international terrorism, including the
BJO, which targets moderate Palestin-
ian leaders as well as Israeli interests.

Iraq. During the past 3 years, the
Iraqi Government has reduced support
to non-Palestinian terrorists and placed
restrictions on many Palestinian groups,
moving closer to its moderate Arab
neighbors.

Iran. Despite its radical, anti-
Western policies, its support for Islamic
fundamentalists, and widespread govern-
ment terrorism within Iran, the
Khomeini regime provides only limited
support to international terrorist
groups. U.S. records list 24 international
terrorist attacks carried out directly by
the Iranian Government in 1980 and five
in 1981. All of the attacks in 1981 occur-
red in Beirut and were directed primari-
ly against Iraqi diplomats. Most Iranian-
sponsored attacks on Iraqi targets in
Lebanon not undertaken by the Iranian
Government were carried out by
Lebanese Shiite militia members.

Cuba. Havana openly supports and
advocates armed revolution as the only
means for leftist forces to gain power in
Latin America. Cuba also supports
organizations and groups in Latin
America that use terrorism to under-
mine existing regimes. The Cubans have
played an important role in facilitating
the movement of men and weapons into
Central and South America, providing
direct support in the form of training,
arms, safe havens, and advice to a wide
variety of guerrilla groups.

U.S. Business as a Target

'These groups were more active in the
early 1970s.

^The proportions are skewed by the fact
that mucn better information exists on in-
cidents that involve the United States. ■

Types of Attacks

International terrorists have used almost
every type of violence against U.S. business
personnel and facilities, ranging from tele-
phone threats to murder. The United States
has recorded 645 bombings, 61 kidnappings,
29 assassination attempts, and 23 armed at-
tacks since January 1968.

Bombing. This is a preferred terrorist
method in part because explosives are rela-
tively easy to obtain, difficult to trace, and
normally involve little personal risk to the
perpetrators. This common type of attack oc-
curred in 38 countries — the greatest number
in Argentina, Iran, Italy, and Mexico. While
almost 70% of all incidents recorded were
bombings, the majority of them did not cause
significant damage.

Seizure. Since 1968 there have been 94
attacks in which U.S. business personnel
were taken hostage against the satisfaction
of monetary or political demands. Almost
two-thirds of these seizures were kidnap-
pings, but such incidents also included sky-
jackings and hostage-barricade situations.
The largest annual total of kidnappings and
hostage seizures was 21 in 1981, almost four
times the annual average for the 1968-81
period. Almost 60% of them occurred in
Latin America, with the greatest number of
incidents in Argentina, Guatemala, and Co-
lombia. Financial demands were most often
made for the release of the hostages, but
other ultimatums included the release of im-
prisoned terrorists, publicity for a political
statement, and /or a safe getaway for the
captors. In over 75% of the hostage takings,
the terrorists were able to achieve at least
some of their demands.

Assassination. Although handgun assas-
sinations of U.S. business representatives
overseas are rare, they attract media atten-
tion, require a response from the local
government, and have a strong impact on
local business operations. Most incidents of
this type have teken place in Argentina and
Guatemala.

Types of Companies Targeted

The U.S. companies that have been the
targets of terrorism range from well-known
giants of international business to small
enterprises. They included oil companies
(Chevron, Mobil, Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco),
Isanks and financial enterprises (Chase Man-
hattan, Chemical Bank of New York, Bankers
Trust, Citibank, Bank of America, and
American Express), and companies associated
in the public mind with the "American way of

life" (Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Colgate-
Palmolive, Ford, Chrysler, Macy's, Sears
Roebuck, and McDonald's). Slightly less
popular targets were airlines (Pan American),
engineering firms (Bechtel), agricultural
equipment companies (John Deere), and high-
technology enterprises (IBM, Burroughs, and
Honeywell).

Incidents Resulting in Casualties

Attacks that cause casualties are almost
always perpetrated by experienced terrorist
organizations, provoke a response from the
highest levels of government and corporate
management, and command worldwide media
attention.

The United States recorded 144 terrorist
attacks on U.S. business personnel in
1968-81 that caused injuries or death. Such
incidents occurred in 31 countries, mostly
Argentina, Iran, the United States, the
Philippines, Mexico, and Guatemala. Sixty
terrorist groups claimed credit. Bombings
and assassinations accounted for 75% of the
attacks resulting in casualties.

Location of Incidents

Since 1968 incidents of international terror-
ism against U.S. business personnel and
facilities have occurred in 56 countries, more
than 40% of them in only six countries. The
greatest number were in Argentina, primari-
ly because the Montoneros routinely targeted
U.S. business interests during the early and
mid-1970s. In the Umted States and Italy,
the attacks were usually carried out by
foreign terrorists, while in Argentina, Iran,
Mexico, and Guatemala, the incidents were
almost always the work of indigenous groups.
Terrorist groups in Latin America carried out
attacks as symbolic action against U.S.
power, wealth, and influence in the region or
in an attempt to undermine the local regime.
As with all terrorist attacks, incidents in-
volving U.S. business are often carried out
where they will receive the most publicity,
and the large urban areas of Western Europe
provide the perfect setting.

International Terrorist Groups

A total of 98 terrorist groups have claimed
credit for attacks against U.S. businesses
during the past 14 years. The Montoneros
have claimed more responsibility than any
other group.

The People's Revolutionary Army (Argen-
tina) also conducted numerous attacks during
the mid-1970s, but this group has not carried
out an attack against U.S. business since
1976. ■

August 1982

21

These cars, belonging to U.S. employees,
were burned inside the embassy compound
in Islamabad, Pakistan, when mobs over-
ran that facility in November 1979.

(Department of State)

22

FEATURE
Terrorism

Terrorist Target:
The Diplomat

by Frank H. Perez

Address before the

conference on terrorism sponsored

by the Instituto de Cuestiones Intemacionales,

Madrid, Spain, June 10, 1982

The worldwide terrorism phenomenon of
the past decade and a half has impacted
most severely on our Western demo-
cratic societies. The brutal tactics of ter-
rorist groups, whether from the far left
or right, have served to erode demo-
cratic institutions and civil liberties in
many parts of the world. Democracies
have found it difficult to cope with the
tactics of terrorism and in some cases
have been tempted to respond by a turn
to authoritarian political structures. Ter-
rorism also has adversely impacted dip-
lomatic relations between nations — even
friendly ones.

Attacks on the Rise

In Beirut the French Ambassador is
gunned down by terrorists. Several
months later, a French employee of the
embassy and his pregnant wife are
found shot to death in their apartment.
A car bomb explodes in the French Em-
bassy compound killing 12 and injuring
25. Turkish officials are killed in Los
Angeles and Boston and another is
wounded in Ottawa. The Turkish Consu-
late in Paris is seized. The U.S. Charge
in Paris narrowly escapes assassination.

Department of State Bullelllugust iggg

An Israeh attache is assassinated in
Paris only 3 months after an American
military attache is shot to death while on
his way to the embassy. In London the
Israeh Ambassador lies critically wound-
ed in the hospital after being shot
through the head by a terrorist. In
Guatemala the Brazilian Embassy is
seized. These are only some of the more
recent e.xamples of growing terrorist at-
tacks against diplomats.

The dramatic worldwide increase in
both the number and seriousness of ter-
rorist attacks against diplomatic person-
nel and facilities during the past decade
has adversely atfected the conduct of
diplomacy. In 1970 there were 213 at-
tacks on diplomats from 31 countries.
By 1980 this number had risen to 409
attacks on diplomats from 60 coun-
tries— an increase of almost 100%. The
number of attacks on diplomats as a
percentage of total terrorist attacks has
also increased from 30% in 1975 to 54%
in 1980. Unfortunately this trend ex-
hibits no sign of abating.

World attention has focused on the
fact that diplomacy has become a high-
risk profession. Some 20 ambassadors
from 12 countries have been assassi-
nated (including five U.S. Ambassa-
dors— more than the number of U.S.
generals killed in the Vietnam war). Be-
tween 1968 and mid-1981 there were
370 international terrorist attacks which

23

caused death or personal injury. During
1980 alone, there were 50 such in-
cidents, more than in any previous year.
All together, 381 diplomats have been
killed and 824 wounded between 1968
and 1982. Even more ominously,
assassination attempts, which have been
increasing steadily over the past 10
years, reached an alltime high in 1980.
The number of kidnappings and hostage
barricade situations has also increased.
Bombings are still the most frequent
form of attack, however, since they in-
volve little risk of capture to the ter-
rorist, and explosives can be acquired
fairly easily.

The number of groups carrying out
terrorist attacks has also grown almost
every year. Since 1968 a total of 102
terrorist groups have claimed responsi-
bility for terrorist attacks. In all,
diplomats from 108 countries have been
victims of attacks, and the embassies of
38 countries have been seized by terror-
ists. The level of violence of attacks has
also increased.

During the early years of the 1970s
the terrorist threat to diplomats was
primarily from low-level, small-scale
violence. In recent years we have also
witnessed an increase in mob violence.
Between 1970 and 1980 there were
some 70 forcible incursions into diplo-
matic facilities. However, more than

50% of these occurred after the take-
over of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran,
which suggests that the success achieved
there created a model for other terrorist
groups to emulate. The potential
dangers of such acts were borne out
when 39 people, including several
Spanish diplomats, were killed when the
Spanish Embassy in Guatemala was
seized in 1980.

Why the Diplomat?

All terrorist attacks involve the use of
violence for purposes of political extor-
tion, coercion, and publicity for a politi-
cal cause. The terrorist uses his victims
as tools to achieve these goals, regard-
less of the fact that those targeted are
rarely directly associated with the area
of political conflict. Although some may
argue that attacks against diplomats are
senseless, in the mind of the terrorist it
is a calculated act with deliberate politi-
cal goals and objectives.

Diplomats are highly visible and de-
sirable targets for several reasons, in-
cluding their symbolic value and the
psychological impact created. Attacks
against diplomats evoke a response from
the highest levels of two governments—

Deputy Director,

Office for

Combatting

Terrorism

Frank H. Perez is the Deputy Director of the
Office for Combatting Terrorism. He was
born in Washington, D.C. He received his
M.A. in foreign affairs from George
Washington University (19.52).

His most recent overseas service was in
Brussels as the Political Adviser to the U.S.
Mission to NATO and in Geneva as the State
Department member of the SALT II delega-
tion with the rank of minister. Earlier he
served as a member of the Department of
State's Policy Planning Staff and as an office
director in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. He was in the National War Col-
lege class of 1966. Mr. Perez retired from the
U.S. Air Force Reserve in 1968 with the rank
of Lt. Col. ■

that of the diplomat attacked and that o
the host country. Terrorists are also abl
to command worldwide media attention
for the duration of the incident. Terror-
ist groups single out diplomats perhaps
because they perceive that in order to
obtain the publicity they seek, they musi
strike at these increasingly more visible
and symbolic targets.

Terrorist attacks on diplomats
almost always are perpetrated by well-
trained and experienced terrorist organi
zations. These groups are well organizec
and are seeking specific political goals.
For example, two Armenian terrorist
groups have conducted a campaign of
terror directed against Turkish diplo-
mats in revenge for alleged atrocities
which were committed over 60 years
ago. Some 20 Turkish diplomats and
members of their families have been
killed in recent years by Armenian ter-
rorists in numerous countries, for exam-
ple in Spain, where in 1978 the Turkish
Ambassador's wife, her brother, and
their chauffeur were killed. We in the
United States have not been immune to
the violence perpetrated by Armenian
terrorist organizations. In January of
this year the Turkish Consul General in
Los Angeles was gunned down and the
honorary Turkish Consul in Boston was
murdered in a similar fashion in early
May. Earlier a car bomb was detonated
in front of the Turkish U.N. mission in-
juring several people.

An Increasing Toll

Terrorism unfortunately has taken its
toll on state-to-state relations. Relations
between countries can be adversely
aff'ected if one country believes that
another is failing to provide adequate
protection to its diplomats or to live up
to its responsibilities. For example,
Franco-Turkish and Franco-Spanish
relations have suffered because of a
perceived laxity in French prosecution
and extradition of terrorists. The
Dominican Republic Embassy seizure in
Bogota in 1980 by the April 19th Move-
ment (M-19), in which 15 senior
diplomats were held for 61 days, caused
considerable strains in relations between
the Government of Colombia and some
of the countries whose ambassadors

24

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Terrorism

were held hostage. The recent slayings
of Turkish officials in the United States
interject strain in an otherwise close
U.S. -Turkish relationship.

Also, sponsorship of terrorist acts by
one country against another can serious-
ly disrupt diplomatic intercourse and
normal relations. Last year, for exam-
ple, Colombia suspended diplomatic rela-
tions with Cuba because of its training
in Cuba of Colombian M-19 terrorists.
One of the principal reasons for expel-
ling Libyan representatives from Wash-
ington was the continuing support by
the Qadhafi regime to international ter-
rorist activities, including those directed
against U.S. officials. U.S. relations with
other countries and groups have been
adversely afi'ected by their sponsorship
of acts of international terrorism, such
as the Letelier assassination in Washing-
ton carried out by Chilean agents and
the continued resort to international ter-
rorism by various elements of the Pale-
stine Liberation Organization (PLO).
The disastrous effects of the seizure of
American diplomats on U.S. -Iranian
relations need no further elaboration.

Countries whose diplomats have
been victimized represent a wide range
of ideologies, geographic locations, sizes,
and wealth. However, all attacks on
diplomats have one element in common:
All terrorist attacks are acts of political
violence. The terrorist is seeking to
redress a political grievance, overthrow
a political system, or publicize a political
point of view. I was a firsthand witness
to the events in Bogota which occurred
when the M-19 held diplomats from 15
countries hostage in the Embassy of the
Dominican Republic for 61 days, de-
manding publicity for their cause, free-
dom for imprisoned members of their
organization, and ransom. Although the
Government of Colombia did not accede
to the major terrorist demands, the ter-
rorists did obtain widespread publicity
for their cause. A relatively obscure ter-
rorist organization was suddenly cata-
pulted into the international spotlight
and thereby increased greatly its prom-
inence within Colombia and interna-
tionally.

It is the symbolism of the individual
terrorist act, and not necessarily the act
itself, which gives it significance. The
terrorist uses the act to make a political
statement to the target (which is not the

ROCKET ATTACK

ON U.S. AMBASSADOR'S MOTORCADE

BEIRUT, LEBANON - 1940 Hrs, AUGUST 27, 1980

DARKNESS

NO ARTIFICIAL LIGHT

AT ATTACK SITE

(SY/Threat Analysis Group)

August 1982

25

victim) and to the world at large. Thus,
U.S. diplomats who were held in Tehran
for 444 days were used as pawns to ad-
vance political objectives internally of
the group that held them as well as to
achieve objectives with regard to the
U.S. Government and to the rest of the
world.

While the functions of representa-
tion, negotiation, and intelligence
gathering continue, embassies are now
conducting diplomacy in the face of an
increasingly violent environment under
conditions never before experienced. The
level of security surrounding diplomatic
personnel and facilities has been in-
creased to unprecedented levels in an at-
tempt to deter terrorist attacks. As em-
bassy security has become more string-
ent, it has become more difficult to con-
duct diplomatic business in a normal
fashion. Many embassies now resemble
military installations, surrounded by
high walls and barbed wire. Buildings
are equipped with automatic tear gas
dispensers, ballistic glass, and closed-
circuit TV. Visitors are searched and
made to pass through metal detectors
under the scrutiny of armed guards.
Embassy personnel are often trans-
ported in armored vehicles.

The cost of protecting diplomats
abroad has also soared. The Department
of State now spends annually about 14%
(around $140 million) of its entire budget
on security, and this figure has been ris-
ing steadily. This is in addition to pro-
tection provided to U.S. diplomatic
facilities and personnel overseas by host
governments which would cost us an ad-
ditional $200 million annually if the U.S.
Government had to provide it.

While precautions are certainly
necessary, the effect has been a reduc-
tion in access and a corresponding
reduction in the level of communications
between diplomats and the host country,
in particular, the people of the country.
Diplomats are finding it increasingly
difficult to function well in this environ-
ment.

Enhanced Security
Measures

In 1980, for the first time since 1968
when the U.S. Government first began
keeping statistics on terrorism, U.S.
diplomats surpassed U.S. businessmen

Security Enhancement Program

A dimension has been added to the problem
of securing U.S. Embassies in the 1980s — the
need to cope with the threat of mob violence.
The Department of State's security enhance-
ment program must be aimed at preventing
U.S. Embassies from being destroyed, per-
sonnel taken hostage or killed, and national
security information compromised. Security
planning must take into account the possibili-
ty that the host government will not provide
meaningful protection before the attack or
send timely relief during the attack but may
even encourage, support, or sponsor the
hostile action. Public access controls alone
are not sufficient to deny rapid mob penetra-
tion into buildings.

In addition to the threat of overt action,
U.S. diplomatic installations must be
recognized as prime targets of espionage ac-
tivity by hostile intelligence services. Surrep-
titious entry into a mission is a constant
threat, as is the danger of the placement of
electronic surveillance equipment.

The main thrust of the security enhance-
ment program is to establish, at those posts
considered most threatened, an environment
that will provide the greatest possible degree
of safety and security — control barriers;
guards and receptionists; bullet-resistant
materials, electronically operated locks.

alarms, and communications equipment;
package inspection equipment, defensive
equipment, and closed circuit TV; perimeter
protection in the form of fences, walls, and
gates; lighting; reinforcement of entrances,
windows, walls, and other exterior features
of the building; internal controls; tear gas
systems; safe havens which are fire resistant
and resist forced penetrations; fire safety
equipment; and emergency power and
destruction equipment.

Initially proposed as a 5-year program
which would cost approximately $200 million,
the Congress appropriated a total of $42
million for FY 1980 and 1981. Additional ap-
propriations have been requested of $25
million each for FY 1982 and 1983. Im-
provements at several posts have already
been completed. Major security im-
provements are to be made at a total of 70 of
the most threatened U.S. diplomatic missions
and significant steps are being taken on
security at another 55 posts. ■

The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador is
heavily fortified — a bunker is on the roof,
steel plates reinforce the balconies, a high
wall surrounds the building, and armed
guards patrol the area. Another high wall
circles the entire compound.

26

Deparfment of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Terrorism

* IS the most frequent victims of terrorist
ittacks overseas, in spite of the fact that
U.S. businessmen greatly outnumber
U.S. diplomats. To deal with this prob-
lem, the United States has undertaken a
rigorous campaign to enhance the
security of our personnel and facilities
Dverseas. Primarily we are attempting
to reduce the vulnerability of our diplo-
matic missions by constructing
perimeter defenses, building secure safe-
havens to which staff can retreat in the
event of an attack, improving access
controls, and installing nonlethal entry
denial systems. Other protective
measures involve added guards, armored
cars, and the like. All State Department
employees are also required to attend a
seminar on "Coping with Violence
Abroad" in order to make them aware of
security problems and educate them on
how to reduce their vulnerability. Intelli-
gence collection and analysis on terrorist
groups has been accorded a much higher
priority and has paid off in terms of
alerting us to possible attacks against
our diplomatic personnel and facilities.

Need for International
Cooperation

If we are to deal more effectively with
this problem over the long run, better
international cooperation will be re-
quired. While diplomats from the United
States, Israel, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, Cuba, and Turkey
have been the most frequent targets,
terrorism is a complex and universal
problem shared by all nations of the
world. Virtually no state has been left
unaffected by terrorism. Nations must
work together to take steps to deter and
prevent terrorist violence from escalat-
ing. Such necessary steps include a
greater exchange of information on ter-
rorists and their movements, tighter
controls on the movement of weapons
and explosives, and more efficient extra-
dition procedures for accused terrorists.

The international community must
also develop a consensus that acts of ter-
rorism should be outlawed and that
those who commit them should be
brought to justice. The international
community took a major step in this
regard in 1973 when it adopted the U.N.
Convention on the Prevention and

Terrorism and the Foreign Service

In 1981 more than 13,000 people took the
written examination for entry into the
Foreign Service — about 1,000 more than in
1980. The number of applicants for the 1982
exam, to be given in December, indicates that
the numbers will continue to increase.
Despite the fact that the U.S. diplomat is a
prime target of international terrorists,
thousands of talented and able young
Americans have not been deterred from seek-
ing a career in the Foreign Service.

Terrorism is, however, a fact of life for
those in the service. Families may not accom-
pany employees to some diplomatic posts
because of the danger of terrorism. It may be
too dangerous to travel in certain areas of
other countries because of the threat of ter-

rorism. Obviously assignments to such posts
are not always desired — but the posts are
staffed.

Foreign Service personnel understand
that they are members of a disciplined serv-
ice and agree that they will serve where they
are needed. In addition efforts are made to
compensate them for the dangers. They may
receive as much as 25% additional pay for
assignments to designated high-risk areas.
They also benefit from the protection of the
Department's security program.

The Department of State recognizes its
obligation to provide the most effective
representation abroad of the interests of the
United States, regardless of terrorism or any
other obstacle. ■

'Coping With Violence Abroad"

Most U.S. Government civilian employees
serving abroad share one common ex-
perience— attendance at the Department of
State's seminar on "Coping With Violence
Abroad." Presented by the Department's
Foreign Service Institute 37 times annually,
it attracted more than 3,000 persons in 1981;
attendance in 1982 certainly will be higher.

The seminar represents a program which
has been in effect since the early 1970s. At
that time, when terrorism was first recog-
nized as a problem for U.S. Government
operations abroad, the State Department sent
mobile training teams to a number of diplo-
matic posts to brief employees on techniques
to minimize the risk of becoming a victim of
terrorist acts. The Department then
developed a 1-day program in Washington,
"The Terrorism Course," for its employees
going overseas. That program evolved into a
2-day seminar on "Coping With Violence
Abroad" in January 1981.

Early in 1982 it was determined that the
seminar could be presented more effectively
by splitting it into two parts. One day (in
Washington) addresses problems of general
concern, such as government policy with
regard to terrorism, the effect of terrorism
on families, surveillance recognition, hostage

survival, and explosive devices. The second
segment, to be in operation by October 1982,
will be taken at the employee's post and will
deal with more specific problems in the par-
ticular area using video cassette training aids
prepared by the Foreign Service Institute.
This new approach is designed to give new
arrivals (all U.S. Government employees and
their adult families, regardless of parent
agency) at the 253 Foreign Service posts
useful information directly related to cir-
cumstances where thty live and work.

In its various forms, the seminar has
been taken by more than 5,000 people. Their
comments and reactions have been a major
impetus to the continuing reappraisal of the
seminar from the point of view of both form
and content. A number of persons who took
the course and later found themselves in a
terrorist situation have stated that they
found the information they received in the
seminar to have been particularly helpful.
Those of the hostages held in Tehran who
had taken some version of the earlier course
reported that they remembered vividly
hostage survival techniques and stated that
the information was beneficial to them during
their captivity. ■

Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, commonly referred
to as the New York convention. Adher-
ing states must either extradite or pros-
ecute persons alleged to have committed
violations of the convention. The conven-

tion's effectiveness, however, has been
hampered by the fact that only 53 na-
tions have ratified it.

Recognition of the problem has con-
tinued with the adoption of the 1979
U.N. Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, which now has been ratified

August 1982

27

by 17 nations; 22 ratifications are re-
quired before the convention enters into
force. In 1980 the General Assembly
adopted a Resolution on Measures to
Enhance the Protection, Security and
Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Mis-
sions and Representatives, which was
reaffirmed last year.

The New York convention and other
international agreements relating to the
protection of diplomatic personnel and
premises are steps in the right direction
of establishing an international consen-
sus and body of law outlawing crimes
against diplomats. However, they must
be strengthened and built on to establish
norms of behavior by seeking to
discourage nations who would condone
and support terrorists and terrorism and
to encourage nations to take more
seriously their obligations to protect
diplomats.

Obligation of Nations

All nations have an obligation to provide
protection for diplomats accredited to
them. The universally accepted Vienna
convention requires states to "take all
appropriate steps to prevent attack" on
the "person, freedom or dignity" of
foreign diplomatic and consular person-
nel. A violation of this obligation, re-
gardless of the cause, is always disturb-
ing. Of particular concern, however, is
state complicity or acquiescence in acts
of terrorism directed against diplomatic
personnel and facilities. State-sponsored
and -supported terrorism, whatever the
target, is the most egregious form of
terrorism. But when the target is the
representative of another country, the
act takes on an entirely new dimension
and we see an erosion of the principle of
diplomatic inviolability.

The Libyan Government is one
which has engaged in targeting for
violence the diplomats of other coun-
tries, specifically the United States. For
example, the Government of Libya was
behind the sacking of the U.S. Embassy
in Tripoli. Last November, Sudanese
authorities successfully thwarted a Lib-
yan plot to plant explosive devices in the
American Club in Khartoum. The
bombs, consisting of two stereo speakers
each packed with 20 kilograms of plastic
explosives, were intended to explode on
a weekend evening when the club would
be filled with the families of U.S. Em-

28

Department of State Security Program

The operational arm of the Department of
State against terrorism is the Office of
Security. Its primary function is to provide
protective security for the personnel and
facilities of the agency and the Foreign Serv-
ice in the United States and abroad and for
the protection of certain high-level foreign
dignitaries. (Protection of visiting chiefs of
state and heads of government is the respon-
sibility of the Secret Service.)

The Office of Security is headed by a
Deputy Assistant Secretary, assisted in
Washington by a deputy director and four
assistant directors. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary is assisted abroad by associate
directors in specific geographical regions.

Domestic Concerns

Domestic Operations Division plans and ad-
ministers security programs designed to pro-
tect the property and personnel of the
Department of State. It conducts security
surveys on buildings (guards, alarm systems,
access control systems, and closed circuit TV
systems); makes arrangements for high-level
diplomatic functions, conferences, news
events, and high-level visits to the Depart-
ment of State; oversees preparation of con-
tingency plans; conducts surveys of foreign
diplomatic missions, as requested, and at the
residences of certain high-ranking State
Department officials; and investigates any
threats or incidents that occur within the
Department or Foreign Service buildings.

Secretary's Detail is responsible for the

protection of the Secretary of State any-
where in the world. It is also responsible for
the protection of his residence(s) and family,
as required.

Dignitary Protection Division provides
protection to foreign dignitaries (other than
chiefs of state or heads of government) and
their families while they are visiting the
United States. It also protects selected U.S.
officials traveling or assigned abroad, in-
cluding certain ambassadors in high-threat
areas. (The protection of foreign consular
personnel in the United States would becomi
an added duty of this division under legisla-
tion now pending before the Congress. The
legislation would authorize the Department t
reimburse State or local police when they ar
requested to provide extraordinary protectio
to foreign consular personnel. The Secret
Service now provides protection for foreign
diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C.,
and, under an arrangement between the
Secret Service and the New York City Polici
Department, the latter provides protection ti
diplomatic missions in New York City on a
reimbursable basis.)

Command Center has two functional
sections which provide a 24-hour, 7-day-a-
week emergency operations center, com-
munications to and from protective details, a
worldwide security communications network
and threat assessment capability. (1) The
Watch Officer Group disseminates in-

Marine Corps guards are vital elements to the security of U.S. diplomatic missions.

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE
Terrorism

telligence information concerning potential
terrorist activities or other threats directed
against U.S. Government employees or in-
stallations, coordinates protective detail
movements throughout the Washington,
D.C., area, and provides details with threat-
related intelligence concerning the people
under protection. (2) The Threat Analysis
Group researches and analyzes intelligence
produced by the U.S. intelligence and
counterintelligence communities and monitors
terrorist activities and related security prob-
lems. It also provides intelligence
assessments for security planning, selection
of preventive and protective measures, and
overall security decisionmaking.

Protective Liaison maintains liaison
"1 with local, State, and Federal law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies and the
foreign diplomatic and consular corps. It also
conducts physical security surveys of foreign
diplomatic facilities, when requested, and pro-
tective security briefings for foreign
dignitaries and security personnel; notifies
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and the U.S. Customs Service of the travel of
foreign dignitaries, particularly if they are ac-
companied by armed security personnel; and
arranges for the special security needs of
foreign diplomatic missions arising from
threats, incidents, or official diplomatic func-
tions.

Overseas Operations

Foreign Operations Division develops and
implements security programs for the protec-
tion of personnel, property, and classified and
controlled information at U.S. Foreign Serv-
ice posts. This includes coordinating post
security programs; serving as the point of
contact for the regional security officers;
reviewing and critiquing emergency planning
documents, security surveys, and serious inci-
d<nt reports; and preparing briefings for am-
bassadors and other senior U.S. Government
personnel. It also supervises the U.S. Navy
Seabees and the Marine security guards.

Regional Security Officers formulate
contingency plans to cope with bomb threats,
acts of terrorism, riots and demonstrations,
and internal defense; conducts security
surveys of official office buildings and
residences; provides protective services for
potential targets of terrorist organizations,
maintaining liaison with local and U.S. law
enforcement and intelligence authorities; con-
ducts counterterrorist training and indoc-
trination programs; and provides operational
supervision of the Marine security guards.

Marine Security Guards are enhsted
members of the U.S. Marine Corps who are
specifically selected and trained for duty at

U.S. diplomatic posts. There are presently
119 Marine security guards detachments
located throughout the world. Their primary
function is the protection of personnel, prop-
erty, and classified material. They are also
responsible for controlling access by the
public to those diplomatic or consular
establishments, often using sophisticated
technical equipment; for serving as key
members of a post's internal defense team;
and for maintaining control of emergency
communications networks, particularly after
normal office hours.

Seabees (U.S. Navy Construction Per-
sonnel) are assigned to the Department of
State to perform surveillance over construc-
tion work and for performing maintenance
and construction in sensitive areas.

Tecfinical Services Division plans and
administers programs related to the technical
defense of Foreign Service establishments
against electronic penetration, surreptitious
entry, and terrorist attack (utilizing security
equipment such as alarms, closed circuit TV
systems, locking hardware and remote-
controlled locking systems, bullet-resistant
materials, intercom systems, metal detectors,
package inspection, document destruction
equipment, tear gas dispensing systems, and
other special protective equipment). It also
provides the expertise to formulate policy for
technical and physical security, weapons, and
personnel protective measures.

.A,rnied Department of State security agents
accompany U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton
in El Salvador.

Security Enhancement Group provides
continuity for all physical security im-
provements to be made under the security
enhancement program. In general it provides
trained and experienced personnel for the
survey teams that determine what is needed
and make recommendations for improvement,
develops and tests improved physical security
materials and equipment, establishes physical
security standards, and coordinates with
other offices of the Department concerning
these projects.

Education and Training Staff conducts
counterterrorism courses for security profes-
sionals and other U.S. Government
employees, including terrorism, hostage
negotiations, and hostage rescue operations;
the senior officers counterterrorism briefing;
firearms training; counterterrorism, security
enhancement, investigations, and guard
forces; dignitary protection; and instruction
for foreign national guard forces, chauffeurs,
and police escorts on dignitary protection,
firearms, explosives recognition and
emergency response, and emergency driving
techniques. It also provides professional
training to new special agents of the Office of
Security, regional security officers. Marine
security guards, and Seabees and is a major
contributor to the Department's seminar on
"Coping With Violence Abroad." ■

August 1982

29

bassy staff and other Americans. Bombs
of this size could have completely
destroyed the club, killing or maiming
scores of people, including third-country
diplomats who use the club. We know
that these devices were prepared by Lib-
yan intelligence officers assigned to a
Libyan People's Bureau in a neighboring
country and that a Libyan intelligence
officer personally insured that the bombs
were loaded on a flight to Khartoum.

Outlook

This is a bleak picture of the current
situation regarding diplomats and ter-
rorism. What can be done to alleviate
this problem? The problem is one of in-
creasing intensity and the future, unfor-
tunately, does not look any brighter.
Attacks on diplomats have proven to be
extremely cost effective for the amount
of worldwide attention they generate
and for that reason they are likely to
continue.

Obviously, we will have to continue
to do more of what we have been doing
(e.g., more and better intelligence and
more effective security measures and
procedures), although one eventually
reaches the point of diminishing returns.
At the same time, like-minded nations
must intensify ways of improving
cooperation among themselves with a
view to reducing the disruption caused
by terrorism to international relations
and stability, particularly with regard to
the protection of diplomatic premises
and staff.

Governments which sponsor or con-
done acts of terrorism against diplomats
must be made to understand that such
conduct will not be tolerated by the
international community. Likewise,
everything possible must be done to
bring to justice swiftly those perpetra-
tors of heinous crimes against the civil-
ized world. The challenge of preventing
attacks against diplomats and the
disruption of diplomatic intercourse
must be a topic high on the agenda of
the world community. ■

Guidelines for U.S. Government
Employees Taken Hostage

U.S. Government personnel serving abroad
are expected to be mature, responsible, and
patriotic individuals for whom the concept of
service has a real and personal meaning.

Individuals who are taken hostage should
be aware that their captors may seek to ex-
ploit them. Their captors may be seeking in-
formation to be used to the detriment of the
United States or of their fellow hostages, and
are likely to use information obtained from
one captive when interrogating another. In-
dividuals should consequently be guided by
the knowledge that whatever they say may
be used to mislead or punish their colleagues
and that their actions may result in reprisals.

Captured individuals should not discuss
sensitive aspects of the work of their fellow
hostages. They should not divulge classified

or sensitive information. They should not sig
or make statements or take actions which
they believe might bring discredit to the
United States.

The decision to attempt escape rests will
the individual concerned. However, the deci-
sion should be consistent with the considera-
tions set above.

Hard and fast rules are not always
helpful, and the U.S. Government recognizes
that the ability of individuals to resist ex-
treme pressure differs. But to the extent
possible one must help one's colleagues and
avoid exploitation. Sound judgment is essen-
tial.

Approved June 24, 1982
bv the Seeretarv of State I

30

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Terrorism

September 24, 1981, Paris.
Four Armenian terrorists seized the
Turkish Consulate and threatened to kill
more than 20 hostages. A Turkish security
gfuard was killed and three others were
wounded (one of the terrorists, a Turkish
Vice Consul, and a French security guard).
The terrorists, who claimed to be members
of the Yeghia Keshishian Commando of
ASALA, demanded that all Armenian
political prisoners be released from
Turkish jails within 12 hours. As the
deadline passed and the terrorists realized
that the Turkish Government would not
negotiate, the terrorists decided to accept
a French Government offer of political
asylum. Once in custody, however, the
French Government stated that their offer
was a ploy and that the terrorists would be
treated as criminals. During a news con-
ference in Beirut following this incident.
ASALA leaders stated that their com-
mandos were willfully deceived and that
the promise made by the French Govern-
ment must be kept or "there is no doubt
that there will be a confrontation between
them and us." (As of this publication date,
the political/criminal status of the terror-
ists remains undetermined.) This was the
first incident of Armenian terrorists seiz-
ing a diplomatic mission.

Armenian Terrorism;
A Profile

by Andrew Corsun

Threat Analysis Group

Office of Security

Introduction

Since the advent of modern Armenian
terrorism in 1975, the world has
witnessed a terrorist campaign that has
resulted in at least 170 attacks directed
primarily against Turkish installations
and diplomatic personnel outside of
Turkey's borders.

Enraged over the alleged massacre
of 1.5 million Armenians by Turkey dur-
ing World War I, and the loss of their
homeland, Armenians unlike Jews tried
and failed as propagandists to focus the
world's attention on their grievances. ^
By resorting to terrorism, Armenian ex-
tremists were able to accomplish in 7
years what legitimate Armenian orga-
nizations have been trying to do for
almost 70 years — internationalize the
Armenian cause.

Terrorism may not be able to ease
the pain of past agonies, but it is an ef-
fective tactic in evoking international
sympathy for a previously unknown (or
forgotten) cause. How many people had
heard of the Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) or their
cause before they bombed the head-
quarters of the World Council of
(ilhurches in Beirut on January 20, 1975?
The same can be said for the Justice
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
(JCAG) who gained "prominence" on Oc-
tober 22, 1975, with the assassination of
the Turkish Ambassador to Vienna,
Dennis Tunaligil. Since then, Armenian
extremists have waged a successful cam-
paign against Turkish interests that in
recent years has expanded to include
Western targets as well.

The Seeds of Conflict

According to historians, Armenia is
believed to be not only the oldest of the

civilized races of Western Asia (dating
to pre-1200 B.C.), but eventually grew
to become one of the strongest king-
doms in that region. Geographically,
Armenia was straddling the crossroads
of the world and thus became the victim
of many invasions. With the fall of Con-
stantinople in 1453, the Turks finally
ruled all the lands that once belonged to
Armenians and held them for 465 years.

Since we are interested in the cause-
and-effect relationship history has
played regarding the recent outbreak of
Armenian terrorist activities against
Turkish diplomats and establishments,
we will jump ahead in time to the Ot-
toman Empire of the late 19th century.

With the rise of nationalism
throughout Europe, the Armenian strug-
gle for autonomy and modernization
took on new vigor in the 1880s, and the
Armenians began to form political or-
ganizations for self-protection and as a
vehicle to voice their desire for a free
Armenia. One such organization was the
Dashnaksutiun (Armenian Revolutionary
Federation) which was founded in 1890
in Tiflis, Georgia.

In a multiethnic state, such as the
Ottoman Empire, nationalism was
viewed by the Turks as a serious inter-
nal threat. The result was harsher
repression by the Ottoman government
which led to thousands of Armenian
deaths in 1895. With the rise of the
Young Turks in 1908, its policy of pan-
Turanism led to even harsher measures
in suppressing Armenian nationalism.
On April 17 and 24, 1909, over 30,000
Armenians were massacred in Adana
and other villages along the Cilician
plains in order to suppress the national
ambitions of the Armenian people.

With the advent of World War I, the
stage was set for what was later alleged
to be called the first "genocide" of the

August 1982

31

20th century. Turkey entered the war on
the side of Germany and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire on October 31, 1914,
and offered autonomy to the Armenians
if they would foment dissension behind
the Russian hnes. Partly out of distrust
of the Young Turks, and encouraged by
the principle of self-determination, they
refused.

Turkey viewed this attitude as
treasonous, especially in light of the fact
that it (Turkey) was suffering heavy
military reversals. Minister of Interior
Taalat Bey ordered "the elimination of
the Armenian element, which had been
trying for centuries to undermine the
foundation of the state." By 1915 the
Turks ordered a mass deportation of
Armenians from Turkish Armenia to
Syria and Iraq. It was later alleged that
1.5 million people (approximately 60% of
the Turkish Armenian population) were
killed or died on the journey.

With the conclusion of the war, the
Western Powers established the In-
dependent Republic of Armenia on May
28, 1918, which was later guaranteed by
the treaty of Sevres, and signed on
August 10, 1920, by Turkey, the Allied
Powers, and Armenia. But due to the
pressures exerted by the Turks and
Communists, the new republic collapsed,
and by December 2, 1920, Armenia was
Sovietized and its territories to the west
were awarded to Turkey.

The basis for their grievances, as
perceived by the Armenians, is not only
the restoration of their homeland but to
seek justice for the alleged mass
murders (1894-96, 1909, 1915) of more
than 1.5 million people. It is these issues
that have fostered the armed struggle
by Armenian extremists against Turkish
diplomats and establishments around the
world.

During the diaspora of 1915, many
Armenians fled to Lebanon which has
long been regarded as a refuge for
dispossessed minorities. Although the
Armenian community (approximately
200,000) in Lebanon had flourished and
played a vital role in Lebanese life, by
the 1970s they became caught-up in the
internecine fighting that had overtaken
Lebanon. When the Phalangists
(Catholic Christian rightists) decided to
use the Armenian section of east Beirut,
known as Bourj Hammoud, to launch
their attacks against the adjacent
Muslim section called Naba'a, a split

resulted within the Armenian communi-
ty. Some Armenians felt that they had a
duty to take up arms on behalf of their
Christian brothers, while others, mainly
left-wing Armenian youth through their
close contact (via the universities and
the proximity of their neighborhoods)
with their Palestinian counterparts,
realized they shared a similar situa-
tion— they had lost their land, had a
large diaspora community, and the use
of legal methods to bring their cause to
world attention had failed. The left-wing
Armenian youth began to form their
own groups (e.g., AS ALA) with the aid
of the Palestinians, and links between
the two were formed. Many of these
youths also moved to the Palestinian
section of west Beirut. With the political
success that the Palestinians have
achieved through terrorism, it is not sur-
prising that these left-wing Armenian
youths would choose the same path. The
growing sympathy and support that
these youths have gained within the
worldwide Armenian community had
forced the right-wing Armenians to set
up their own group (JCAG), but for dif-
ferent goals and objectives.

Terrorist Activities

Terrorism is certainly not a new tactic
for Armenian extremists. At the end of
World War I, the Dashnag decided it
would carry out its own executions of
those Ottoman leaders they believed
were responsible for the "genocide" of
the Armenian people. As a result, a net-
work called Nemesis was established to
track down and execute those Ottoman
leaders.

On March 15, 1921, the former Ot-
toman Minister of Interior Taalat
Bey— who was living in Berlin under the
pseudonym Ali Sayi Bey— was shot and
killed at point-blank range after being
under surveillance for 2 weeks by
Soghoman Tehlirian. Others who met
the same fate at the hands of Nemesis
were the Ottoman Foreign Minister Said
Halim, who was assassinated in Rome in
December 1921, and Behaeddin Shakir
and Djimal Azmi, two Ottoman officials
who were killed a year later in Berlin. It
is unknown what became of Nemesis
following the incidents of the early
1920s. Yet one must wonder why Arme-
nian extremists have waited over 60

years to carry out their armed struggle.
Were they perhaps fulfilling the proph-
ecy of Taalat who in 1915 said, "There
will be no Armenian question for 50
years," or (a more plausible explanation)
are the times such that terrorism has
become an acceptable vehicle for pro-
test?

Whatever the reason, since return-
ing to the scene in 1975, Armenian ter-
rorists have claimed responsibility for
over 170 incidents which includes the
assassination of 21 Turkish diplomats
and / or family members, and 10 at-
tempted assassinations of Turkish diplo-
mats. Although the tactic of assassina-
tion has been used repeatedly, the
majority of their operations have been
bombings which are simple in construc-
tion and design. Unlike the Irish Repub-
lican Army [IRA], which favors remote-
control devices, Armenian terrorists
have been partial to a Czechoslovakian-
manufactured plastic called Semtex-H.
In the overwhelming majority of cases,
this device is set at such an hour to
cause property damage and not cost
lives.

Operationally Armenian terrorists
must be viewed as unsophisticated in
comparison with other groups since they
have never shown the inclination or
ability to hit a hard target. The only ex-
ceptions were the seizure of the Turkish
Consulate in Paris on September 24,
1981, and the attempted assassination of
the Turkish Consul General in Rotter-
dam on July 21, 1982, both of which
failed. In the seizure of the consulate,
the four terrorists eventually sur-
rendered without any of their demands
being met. In Rotterdam the consul
general, who was traveling to work in
an armored car and escorted by two
police vehicles, was attacked by four ter-
rorists. The assailants opened fire with
automatic weapons— which proved inef-
fective against the armored car— and as
they attempted to flee the area, one of
the attackers was shot and captured.
Their bombings and assassinations re-
quired the minimum of logistical plan-
ning.

While no one can dispute their suc-
cess, nevertheless, it is such spectacular
operations as airport attacks, kidnap-
pings, and assassinations of well-
protected political officials that generate
maximum publicity and impact which is
so important to the terrorists raison
d'etre.

32

Department of State Bulletin'

FEATURE
Terrorism

Of the 21 Turkish diplomats / family
members slain between 1975-July 1982,
14 were killed while in their car which
was stopped at a light, slowing before
entering a busy intersection, or parked.
And of the 10 attempted assassinations
of Turkish diplomats, 8 took place while
the diplomat was in his vehicle. These
vehicle attacks were carried out by
assassination teams armed primarily
with 9mm automatic weapons. The
teams varied in size from a lone gunman
used in eight attacks to two assailants
with a third member in a waiting car.
With the exception of the July 21 attack
in Rotterdam, the diplomatic vehicles
that were involved in these attacks were
not armored, and the only protective
security (if any) was a driver/bodyguard.

JCAG and ASALA

While Armenian extremists have carried
attacks under 19 operational names, the
main terrorists groups are the Justice
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
(JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA). 2 On the surface these two
groups appear to be united by a common
goal. However, a closer look at their
communiques, and targeting, reveals
that their methods and objectives are
quite different.

Justice Commandos of the Arme-
nian Genocide. Unlike ASALA, which
is Marxist oriented and adheres to the
philosophy of Scientific Socialism, JCAG
appears more closely aligned with the
policies of the right-wing Dashnag party.
The goals of the Dashnag are to reclaim
their lost homeland, as specified in the
treaty of Sevres, and to seek reparations
and recognition of the crimes committed
against their people by Turkey; and they
seek a solution similar to Germany's ad-
mission of guilt and reparations to Israel
after World War II. JCAG, in its com-
muniques, appears to strive for these
same goals. Following the assassination
of the Turkish Ambassadors to Vienna
and Paris in October and December of
1975 respectively, JCAG, in a follow-up
communique entitled "To all the Peoples
and Governments" wrote:

Let the world realize that we will lay down
our arms only when the Turkish Government
officially denounces the genocide perpetrated

ARMENIAN TERRORISM:

INCIDENTS, BY YEAR

1973

1975

1976

1977 1

m»

1978 1

■ '

1979 ■

j^^^l

|»

1980 ■

^^^B

I.

1981 ■

^IBI

|.

1982 -July 26 ^

^^H

^1 22

AREAS OF OPERATIONS:

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, 1973 - JULY 26, 1982

SWITZERLAND |

■^■■^H

1^^^

■ 25

ITALY 1

■^■I^^^H

^^^H

■ ^0

LEBANON 1

^^^^^^^M

^M Ki

UNITED STATES |

■^^^■■H

■ 1^

SPAIN 1

^^^^IHBH

HH 11

TURKEY 1

■■^^■I^H

^m 11

ENGLAND |

^^^^H 5

IRAN 1

■^^H s

DENMARK |

^^^H '*

BELGIUM 1

^^H i

CANADA 1

^^M 3

GREECE 1

^^H 3

WEST GERMANY |

^^M 3

AUSTRALIA

IRAQ

NETHERLANDS

August 1982

33

by Turkey in 1915 against the Armenian peo-
ple and agrees to negotiate with Armenian
representatives in order to reinstate justice.

And following the bombings in New
York City and Los Angeles on October
12, 1980, JCAG stated:

We make clear that our struggle today
against the Turkish Government is not to be
regarded as revenge for the 1915 genocide in
which 1.5 million Armenian men, women, and
children were massacred. Our struggle today
is directed to have the Turkish Government
to admit to its responsibility for that
murderous act, as well as to return to the
Armenian people the lands taken forceably
and today occupied by the imperialist Turkish
Government since the genocide. We demand
once again that the Turkish Government ad-
mit its responsibility for the genocide of 1915
and make appropriate territorial and financial
reparations to the long-suffering Armenian
people.

This theme remains constant in all
their communiques to February 1982
with the assassination of the honorary
Turkish Consul to Boston, Orhan
Gunduz. In Paris JCAG said that:

The shooting was to reaffirm the permanence
of our demands. The Turkish Government
must recognize the responsibility of its
predecessors in 1915 in the execution and
genocide perpetrated against the Armenian
people, and it must clearly condemn it.
Secondly, the Turkish Government must
recognize the right of the Armenian people to
constitute a free and independent state of
Armenian land which Turkey illegally oc-
cupies.

Because ideology affects the opera-
tional strategy of a terrorist group,
JCAG concentrated its operation solely
on Turkish interests. The one possible
exception was the January 1980 triple
bombing of the offices of Swiss Air,
TWA, and British Airlines in Madrid. At
first JCAG claimed credit for the bomb-
ing, but in a later phone call to the local
press, the caller said that JCAG was not
responsible for the bombing and, in fact,
condemned it.

As the group name implies, of the
22 operations carried out by JCAG, 10
of the operations were assassinations
(resulting in 12 deaths), 6 were attempt-
ed assassinations, and 6 were bombings.

Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia. Whereas
■ICAG's stance on the Armenian question
appears compatible with traditional
Armenian political beliefs, ASALA,

whose communiques are replete with
Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, considers the
Armenian question part of the interna-
tional revolutionary movement, and they
seek closer ties with Soviet Armenia.

For the first 4V2 years of its ex-
istence, ASALA concentrated its attacks
(the sole exception being the bombing of
the headquarters of the World Council
of Churches in Beirut in January 1975)
on Turkish installations and diplomatic
personnel. During this period, ASALA
was in the process of enlarging its
organization and base of operations in

preparation for entering its second and
current phase.

Our second step was only possible due to the
successful completion of our first step which
had politicized the Armenian youth enough to
gain their support in the second step. This
second step contains four new developments:
(1) heavy assault on imperialist and Zionist
and reactionary forces; (2) a much greater
frequency of attacks; (3) direct communica-
tion with the Armenian masses and interna-
tional opinion; and (4) strong ties with other
revolutionary organizations including opera-
tional ties with the Kurdish Workers Party
[of Turkey].'

No doubt this "second step," which
began on November 13, 1979, in Paris
with the triple bombing of the airline of-
fices of KLM, Lufthansa, and Turkish
Airlines, was influenced by ASALA's
close cooperation with the Palestinians,
most notably the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP). In a follow-up com-

munique to this attack, ASALA set the
theme for future operations.

Let imperialism and its collaborators all over
the world know that their institutions are
targets for our heros and will be destroyed.
We will kill and destroy because that is the
only language understood by imperialism.

While ASALA has done its share of
assassinating Turkish officials (nine),
nevertheless, half of their bombings are
directed against Western targets. The
group, operating under various ad hoc
commando names, has taken it upon
itself to carry out "military operations"
against any country which attempts to
jail or try one of its commandos. Ex-
amples of this can be seen with the ar-
rest on October 3, 1980, in Geneva of
two Armenian extremists — Suzy
Mahseredjian and Alex
Yenikomechian — who were arrested
after a bomb they were making acciden-
tally exploded in their hotel room. Until
their eventual release on January 12,
1981, and February 9, 1981, respective-
ly, ASALA— using the name October 3
Organization — in a 4-month period car-
ried out 18 bombings against Swiss in-
terests worldwide in an effort to force
the Swiss to release their comrades. The
two extremists received 18-month
suspended sentences and were barred
from Switzerland for 15 years.

On June 9, 1981, Mardiros
Jamgotchian was caught in the act of
assassinating a Turkish diplomat —
Mehmet-Savas Yorguz — outside the
Turkish Consulate in Geneva. From the
time of his arrest on June 9 to his trial
on December 19 (he was sentenced to 15
years imprisonment), ASALA, using the
name June 9 Organization, perpetrated
15 bombings against Swiss targets
worldwide. After Jamgotchian's trial,
ASALA, again using the name Swiss
Armenian Group 15, has, to date, car-
ried out five bombings against Swiss
targets.

Switzerland is not the only country
that has been targeted by ASALA; Ita-
ly, France, and most recently Canada
have been victims of ASALA's wrath.
On May 31, 1982, three alleged ASALA
members were arrested for attempting
to bomb the Air Canada cargo building
at Los Angeles International Airport. It
is suspected that this bombing was in
retaliation for the May 18 and 20 arrests

34

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Terrorism

of four alleged ASALA members / sym-
pathizers by the Toronto police for ex-
tortion.

It is interesting to note that JCAG
has two alleged members in jail in the
United States, and they have never
launched any terrorist campaign against
the United States. The two alleged
members are Harout Sassounian, who
was arrested and found guilty of the Oc-
tober 1980 firebombing of the home of
the Turkish Consul to Los Angeles,
Kemal Arikan, and Harout's brother
Harry, who was arrested and charged as
being one of the assailants in the
assassination of Kemal Arikan on
January 28, 1982. At this writing, he is
awaiting trial.

No terrorist group is monotheistic,
and neither are the Armenians. Both
groups share a common bond, yet they
are quite different when it comes to
achieving their goals. This difference is
also mentioned in their communiques.
Following the assassination of the
Turkish Consul General by JCAG in
Sydney, Australia, on December 17,
1980, a woman called the local
Australian press to emphasize that her
group had no connection with the so-
called Armenian Secret Army (aka
ASALA) and that the group's attacks
were aimed at Turkish diplomats and
Turkish institutions. On April 4, 1981,
Le Reveil, Beirut's Rightist Christian
daily, received a phone call from an
alleged JCAG member who claimed that
his group was not connected with
ASALA and that JCAG's attacks are
"reprisal measures for the injustice com-
mitted against the Armenians; our
targets are the Turks, and Turkish in-
stitutions."

Even ASALA has made reference to
this difference. Hagop Hagopian (the
ASALA spokesman) in an interview for
Panorama magazine said:

The Dashnag party is trying to imitate us
[ASALA] in order to regain lost ground. The
April 18, 1980, operation in Rome against the
Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican was
organized by the Dashnags who use the name
of a revolutionary group, the Avenger Com-
mandos of the Armenian Genocide.

As for international connections
with other groups, it appears that only
ASALA, through its relationship with
the PFLP and the DFLP, has benefited
from any training and logistical support

that the Palestinians can provide. When
asked if Palestinians used to train
Turkish terrorists in their camps, Mr.
Abu Firas, the chief Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) representative in
Turkey replied:

In our camps, we train them to be terrorists
in their countries but to fight against Israel.
For this reason, we cannot be held responsi-
ble for training them. Since Armenians are
citizens of Lebanon, we also train them to
fight for the liberation of Palestine.

Although there have been reports of
links between Armenian terrorists and
Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and even the
Soviets, outside of the assistance that
ASALA has received from the Palestin-
ians, there is no proof that Armenian
terrorists are plugged into any interna-
tional terrorist network.

Conclusion

While Armenian terrorism has evoked a
greater interest in and awareness of the
Armenian question throughout the
world, the chances of Armenians attain-
ing their major objectives through ter-
rorism are nebulous at best. This has
been exemplified by the PLO, IRA,
Croatians, etc. A viable solution to the
Armenian question will only come about
through political means (e.g., United Na-
tions, lobbyist groups, etc.) and / or com-
promise on both sides. Yet, until such a
path is followed — if ever — the issues
will be kept fresh in the public's mind
through acts of terrorism.

Although ASALA is based in west
Beirut and JCAG in east Beirut, on the
surface it would appear that the recent
Israeli invasion of Lebanon has not af-
fected the operational capabilities of
Armenian terrorists as witnessed by the
July 20 and 24 bombings of two Paris
cafes by the Orly Organization and the
July 21 attempted assassination of the
Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam by
the Armenian Red Army.

Yet on closer examination, the
bombings of the two cafes are the types
of low-level operations that can be car-
ried out by indigenous cells independent
of instructions from Beirut. While an at-
tempted assassination of an individual
traveling in an armored car with a police
escort requires detailed planning, the at-
tack against the consul general appeared

hastily organized and very amateurish in
its execution. One possible explanation
for its failure was that Beirut was
unable to provide the hit team with
proper guidance and logistical coordina-
tion.

Although ASALA's attack on
Ankara's airport on August 7, 1982, was
the first airport attack by Armenian ex-
tremists, this suicide operation was
designed to obtain maximum publicity
and did not require elaborate planning
or execution.

JCAG has emerged virtually
unscathed from the invasion, and it is
only a matter of time before ASALA
can regroup in another country. France,
with its large Armenian population and
geostrategic location in Western
Europe, has been mentioned as a possi-
ble base of operation for ASALA. Wher-
ever they find a "home," what remains
to be seen is the type of strategy and
tactics they pursue once they are able to
fully renew their operations.

NOTE

Because the historical record of the 1915
events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the
Department of State does not endorse
allegations that the Turkish Government
committed a genocide against the Arme-
nian people. Armenian terrorists use
this allegation to justify in part their
continuing attacks on 'Turkish diplomats
and installations.

'The number of Armenians killed in 1915
is a central issue in the dispute between
Armenians and Turkey. The Armenian com-
munity contends that those killed in 1915
were part of a genocide against Armenians
orchestrated by the Turkish Government.
Turkey on the other hand states that, at
most. 200,000 Armenians died, and their
deaths were not the result of a planned
massacre but rather the tragedies of war in
which many Turks also lost their lives. It is
for this reason that Turkey refuses to
acknowledge any guilt or make any sort of
restitution / compensation to descendants or
survivors, as Germany did for Israel after
World War II.

^By operating under many different
names, the terrorists hope to give the impres-
sion of the existence of numerous ^oups, im-
plying a broader base of support within the
worldwide Armenian community.

'The Kurds, who were pressed into
military service under the Ottoman Empire,
played an important role in the liquidation
and massacre of Armenians through World
War I. ■

August 1982

35

THE PRESIDENT

News Conference of June 30
(Excerpts)

Q. There are some who say that by
failing to condemn the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon and refusing to cut off
arms to the invading armies, U.S. and
Israeli policies and goals have become
identical. If there is a difference,
what is it? Also, is there a difference
between the Soviet slaughter of
Afghans, which the United States has
condemned so often, and the killing of
Lebanese and the displaced people of
Palestine? If so, what's the difference?

A. You've asked several questions
that I have to walk a very narrow line in
answering. There's no question but that
we had hoped for a diplomatic settle-
ment and believed there could have been
a diplomatic settlement in the Middle
East, in that situation. We were not
warned or notified of the invasion that
was going to take place.

On the other hand, there had been a
breaking of the cease-fire, which had
held for about 1 1 months in that area.

I think there are differences be-
tween some of these things that are go-
ing on and things like just the outright
invasion of Afghanistan by a foreign
power determined to impose its will on
another country. We have a situation in
Lebanon in which there was a
force— the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization]— literally a government
within a government and with its own
army. And they had pursued aggression
themselves across a border by way of
rocket firing and artillery barrages.

But the situation is so complicated
and the goals that we would like to pur-
sue are what are dictating our conduct
right now. We want the bloodshed to
end, there's no question about that. We
didn't want it to start. But we've seen
Lebanon for 7 years now divided into
several factions, each faction with its
own militia, not a government in con-
trol. We have seen, as I've said, this
PLO and we've seen the invasion of
other forces — the presence of the
Syrians as well in Lebanon.

Right now, our goals are — as for the
first time in 7 years the Lebanese seem
to be trying to get together, and their
factions have come together seeking a
way to have a central government and
have control of their own country and to
have a single Lebanese Army. That is
one of the goals we would like to see.

The other goal would be the guaran-
teeing of the southern border with
Israel, that there would be no longer a
force in Lebanon that could, when it
chose, create acts of terror across that
border.

And the third goal is to get all the
foreign forces — Syrians, Israelis, and
the armed PLO— out of Lebanon. And
we're —

Q. People have been displaced in
Palestine.

A. Yes, and I signed a bill this
morning for $50 million in aid for
Lebanon there, where several hundred
thousand of those Palestinians are. I
don't think they were all displaced from
one area, and they have been refugees
now into ongoing generations.

I think, when I say PLO, one has to
differentiate between the PLO and the
Palestinians. And out of this, also we
have another goal, and it's been our goal
for quite some time. And that is to, once
and for all— when these other things are
accomplished— to deal with the problem
of the Palestinians and settle that prob-
lem within the proposals and the sugges-
tions that were made in the Camp David
accords.

Q. By all accounts Secretary of
State Haig offered to resign several
times. Why did you accept his offer
this time? And what are you going to
be doing to make sure that the sort of
problems that led to his resignation
don't occur again?

A. Once again you ask a question
upon which, when I accepted his
resignation, I made a statement that I
would have no further comments on that
or take no questions on it. He only once
offered to, or came in with a resignation
and submitted his resignation to me.
Whatever else has been heard was
never — that was never in any conversa-
tion between us. And he presented his
resignation and I, with great regret and
sorrow — and that's not just a platitude;
I really mean it — accepted that resigna-
tion.

I must say at the same time I also
stated, and I will state again, his service
to his country and his service to our Ad-
ministration has been all that could be
desired. And I have profited and
benefited by his wisdom and his sugges-
tions, and he made his letter of resigna-

tion plain. And to save further time
from any of you, as I said the first day,
I will comment no further on that.

Q. Looking to the future, there
were some problems in the foreign
policy area. Can you say if there are
going to be any changes or if anything
will be done differently so that the
sort of problems that led to his
resignation won't reoccur?

A. There's going to be no change in
policy. Foreign policy comes from the
Oval Office and with the help of a fine
Secretary of State. And I've had that
fine Secretary of State. And I must say,
fortunately for the country, for the Ad-
ministration, as Secretary Haig leaves,
his replacement is a man with great ex-
perience and a man of unquestioned in-
tegrity, and I think we're all fortunate
that we have been able to have such a
replacement [George P. Shultz].

My system has been one, and always
has been one, not having a synthesis
presented to me of where there are con-
flicting ideas and then it's boiled down
and I get a single option to approve or
disapprove. I prefer debate and discus-
sion. I debate all those who have an in-
terest in a certain issue and a reason for
that interest, to have their say, not sit
around as "yes" men. And then I make
my decision based on what I have heard
in that discussion, and that will be the
procedure we'll follow.

Q. What I wanted to ask you is
whether you felt— even though you
won't discuss the reasons for Sec-
retary Haig's resignation or why you
accepted it — whether you feel that
coming at the time of this crisis in the
Middle East, that you should have ac-
cepted his resignation. What could
have propelled you to accept the
resignation in the middle of such a
crisis, and do you think it has under-
mined our ability to conduct foreign
policy with confidence abroad?

A. No, I don't l)elieve it has, and I
think part of this is because the conti-
nuity that anyone can see with the
replacement by — or nominee, George
Shultz. I just have to say that there is
no easy time for a Secretary of State to
resign. 1 don't know of a time that we've
been here in which there has not been
some crisis, something of that kind go-
ing on, and there are several hot spots
in the world other than these that we've
touched upon. So there just is no easy
time for that to happen.

36

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

Q. How do you reply to those who
say that there is confusion in your
foreign policy?

A. I would respond by saying that I
think that we've been pursuing a foreign
policy that is sound, that we've had
some great successes in a number of
areas with this. Granted, we have some
problems in the world that we would like
to be helpful in and we've not secured —
or been the help that we would like to
have been. But when we came here, our
own national defenses were in disarray.
We have started the rebuilding of those
defenses.

There was great question, with the
terrible tragedy in Egypt, that the
Camp David first-call for the return of
the Sinai might not be carried out. It
was carried out. We have just had 11
months of cease-fire, thanks to the her-
culean efforts of Phil Habib [Am-
bassador Philip C. Habib, the President's
special emissary to the Middle East] who
has been there and performing yeoman
service keeping the lid on that situation.
We offered our help and, again,
Secretary Haig did a superhuman job in
trying to prevent bloodshed in the South
Atlantic situation regarding the
Falklands. We were unable to succeed in
that to persuade the aggressive party to
leave the islands and then have a
peaceful solution to the problem. But I
wouldn't refuse to do it again in a like
situation. I thought we had a proper
place in trying to solve that.

But in the southern part of Africa,
the independence of Namibia— this was
dead in the water — we have made great
progress there, and we are very op-
timistic about what might take place. I
think there was disarray with our Euro-
pean allies. I think that has been largely
eliminated, and they have confidence in
us once again. So I think we're progress-
ing very well with what it is we're trying
to accomplish.

Q. What steps are you prepared to
take if Israel resumes fighting in
Lebanon, moves in on the FLO and
West Beirut? And what is the United
States prepared to do for the Palestin-
ians whose legal rights you apparently
told President Mubarak of Egypt the
United States supports?

A. This is a question, again, where I
have to beg your tolerance — with the
delicacy of the negotiations that are try-
ing to achieve those three major points
that I mentioned. There's just no way
that I could comment on or speculate
about what might happen because I
don't want anything that might in any

way affect those negotiations, all of
which involve the very things that you're
asking about, and I just have to remain
silent on those.

Q. In 1976, when another
Secretary of State left under another
President, you were critical of the ex-
planations given and called for a fuller
explanation. With all due respect,
don't you think that the American peo-
ple deserve to know more of the
reasons that led to the departure of
Secretary Haig?

A. If I thought that there was
something involved in this that the
American people needed to know, with
regard to their own welfare, then I
would be frank with the American peo-
ple and tell them. And I think if we're
recalling the same previous resignation,
I think there were some things that in-
dicated that maybe there was something
where the — there were sides in which
the American people needed to know for
their own judgment.

Q. Then you think that the entire
explanation has been g^ven as far as is
necessary?

A. Yes, I don't think there's
anything that in any way would benefit
the people to know or that will in any
way effect their good judgment.

Q. Many Arab states are sa3ing
that if Israel invades Beirut — west
Beirut — it can only be because you
have given Israel a green light to do
so. Have you done so? Will you? And
what will be your attitude if Israel
goes into west Beirut?

A. Again this is the type of question
in which, with the negotiations at the
point they are, that I can't answer. I
would like to say this: No, I've given no
green light whatsoever. And an impres-
sion that I know some of the neighbor-
ing states there have had from the
beginning is that somehow we were
aware of this and we gave permission or
something. No, we were caught as much
by surprise as anyone, and we wanted a
diplomatic solution and believe there
could have been one.

Q. But, if I may, last week your
deputy press secretary said that when
Prime Minister Begin was here, he
promised you that Israel would go no
further into Beirut.

A. I think also — his not having
heard the conversation between Prime
Minister Begin and myself, that what he

called a promise actually was in a discus-
sion in which, to be more accurate, the
Prime Minister had said to me that they
didn't want to and that they had not
wanted to from the beginning.

Q. So it was not a promise not to
doit?

A. No.

Q. The British Government today
took steps to enable British companies
to get around the U.S. embargo on the
sale of gas pipeline equipment to the
Soviet Union. Some of your advisers,
including Mr. Haig, have argued all
along that this embargo is going to be
counterproductive and is going to be
damaging to U.S. interests in Europe.
I'm wondering if you have any second
thoughts about the U.S. embargo or if
you intend to take any additional steps
to force our European allies to go
along with this.

A. There aren't any additional
steps. We were well aware that there
might be legalities concerned with the
contracts of the licensing of foreign
countries. This is simply a matter of
principle. We proposed that embargo
back at the time when the trouble began
in Poland, as we believe firmly that the
Soviet Union is the supporter of the
trouble in Poland and is the one to deal
with on that. We said that these sanc-
tions were imposed until — and we
specified some things that we felt should
be done to relax the oppression that is
going on of the people of Poland by their
military government.

If that is done, we'll lift those sanc-
tions. But I don't vee any way that, in
principle, we could back away from that
simply because the Soviet Union has sat
there and done nothing. And this is the
reason for it. I understand that it's a
hardship. We tried to persuade our allies
not to go forward with the pipeline for
two reasons. One, we think there is a
risk that they become industrially de-
pendent on the Soviet Union for energy,
and all the valves are on the Soviet side
of the border, that the Soviet Union can
engage in a kind of blackmail when that
happens.

The second thing is, the Soviet
Union is very hard pressed financially
and economically today. They have put
their people literally on a starvation diet
with regard to consumer items while
they poured all their resources into the
most massive military buildup the world
has ever seen. And that buildup is ob-
viously aimed at the nations in the
alliance. They — the Soviet Union — now
hard-pressed for cash because of its own

August 1982

37

THE PRESIDENT

actions, can perceive anywhere from
$10-$12 billion a year in hard cash
payments in return for that energy
when the pipeline is completed which, I
assume, if they continue the present
policies, would be used to arm further
against the rest of us and against our
allies and thus force more cost for ar-
maments for the rest of the world.

And for these two reasons we tried
to persuade our allies not to go forward.
In some instances they claim that the
Administrations before them — see, there
are others that have had Administra-
tions before them— had made contracts
which they felt were binding on their
countries and so forth. We offered to
help them with a source of energy closer
to home— Norway and the Netherlands
and gas fields that apparently have a
potential that could meet their needs.
We weren't able to get that agreement.
We did have some success with regard
to credits where the Soviet Union is con-
cerned.

But this — our sanctions — as I say,
have to do with actions taken by the
Soviet Union and our response to those
actions.

Q. Do you intend to keep or in the
near future remove the sanctions you
imposed on Argentina in the
Falklands crisis?

A. I can't give you an answer on
that, what is going on right now. We did
our best, as I said before, to try to bring
about a peaceful settlement. It didn't
happen. And there was armed conflict,
and there has been a victor and a van-
quished, and now it's hardly the place
for us to intervene in that. We'll stand
by ready to help if our help is asked for.
We just haven't had a discussion on that
matter as yet.

Q. I don't know if HI succeed
where others have failed before. I
understand your reluctance to discuss
the Haig resignation. But two specific
questions have seemed to arise from
that resignation. Do you think that
there were mixed signals sent to the
Middle East which resulted in the
PLO getting one impression — that you
were pressing the Israelis to with-
draw— while the rest of the Ad-
ministration was trying to maintain
pressure on the PLO to evacuate and
disarm?

And the second one is, did you
sort of blind-side your own State
Department when you suddenly made
the decision to take your most severe

option on the pipeline, leaving the
State Department dangling to explain
to Western Europe?

A. No, there was no blind-siding on
that; that was fully discussed and has
been several times in the Cabinet. There
were differences of opinion about the ex-
tent to which we would do it or whether
we would do it at all. And I had to come
down, as I did at the first, on the side of
what I thought was principle.

As to conflicting signals, no. I know
there have been rumors about that. No,
we have been in constant communication
through the State Department with Phil
Habib and taking much of our lead from
his reporting of what's going on there
and what we can or can't do that might
be helpful. And, naturally there are
times such as I've had conversations
with ambassadors. But everything that
is discussed is then related to whoever
was not present — National Security
Council, the National Security Adviser,
State Department — so that at all times
and there has never been any dual track
or confusion with regard to our com-
munications.

Q. Some Israeli officials have
acknowledged in recent days the use
of cluster bombs in the war in
Lebanon. How much does this concern
you?

A. It concerns me very much, as the
whole thing does. We have a review go-
ing now, as we must by law, of the use
of weapons and whether American
weapons sold there were used offensive-
ly and not defensively, and that situation
is very ambiguous. The only statement
that we have heard so far with regard to
the cluster bomb was that one military
official — Israeli military official — has ap-
parently made that statement publicly,
and we know no more about it than
what we ourselves have read in the
press. But the review is going forward
and the review that would lead to what
the law requires — that we must inform
the Congress as to whether we believe
there was a question of this being an of-
fensive attack or whether it was in self-
defense.

When I said ambiguous you must
recall that prior to this attack, Soviet-
built rockets and 180-millimeter cannons
were shelling villages across the border
in Israel and causing civilian casualties.

Text from White House press release. I

38

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Vice President Bush Visits
East Asia and the Pacific

Vice President Bush departed
Washington, D.C., April 22. 1982, to
visit Japan (April 23-25). Korea
(April 25-27). Singapore (April 27-29),
Australia (April 29-May 3), New
Zealand (May 3-5), and China
(May 5-9). He returned to the United
States on May 9.

Following are the Vice President's
remarks before the Foreign Correspond-
ents' Club of Japan in Tokyo and the Na-
tional Assembly in Seoul, his dinner
toasts in Singapore and Melbourne, his
arrival statement in Wellington, and his
departure statement in Beijing. '

REMARKS BEFORE THE
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS'
CLUB OF JAPAN, TOKYO.
APR. 24, 1982

I've come to Japan in the interests of
harmony, friendship, and peace. I've
come to learn, and I've come to hsten.
The day is past when America seeks to
dominate the agenda of the countries of
the free world.

The free world will survive, as a
concept and reality, only if the partner-
ships that make it up remain intact and
vibrant. As we enter the 1980s and ap-
proach the millennium, America will
guard its old friendships carefully, even
as it seeks new partners in the free
world.

If I come in the interests of har-
mony, it is a time when the affairs of
the world are increasingly dishar-
monious. The Soviet Union's appetite for
the freedom of other peoples is as
rapacious as ever. Lech Walesa
languishes in confinement as his coun-
trymen contend with martial law, having
only the fleeting encouragement of the
broadcast of Radio Solidarity.

An army of occupation continues its
ruthless campaign against the Afghan
people— continues to kill innocent men,
women, and children with chemicals
outlawed by all decent societies. Soviet
leaders have given homilies on their
desire for nuclear disarmament as
SS-20 missiles sprouted overnight like
fields of asparagus. Old wounds persist
in the Middle East, though tomorrow
will witness a decisive, historic, and
courageous step for peace when Israel
completes its withdrawal from the Sinai.

We are reminded every day that
liberty is on trial and that darkness has
descended over many parts of the world.
In Eastern Asia, it has descended on
North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Soviet
Asia, and Kampuchea. One of the most
enduring symbols of the injustices of the
20th century may be those people who
have braved the dangers of the sea in
open boats. There is much to mourn.
But there is also much to celebrate,
which brings me to my visit.

In the next 3 weeks, Japan and the
United States will observe two impor-
tant anniversaries — April 28th, just a
few days from now, will mark the 30th
anniversary of the San Francisco peace
treaty and the end of postwar occupa-
tion. The last 30 years have seen the
historically unprecedented boom of
postwar Japan. Not surprisingly is this
known as "the miracle of Japan." No
Eastern bloc countries will be
celebrating such anniversaries this
year — or next year or the year after.
That is a sad fact, and the heart of the

Vice President and Mrs. Bush ring a tem-
ple bell at the Zojoji temple in Tokyo.

,vtsV(>.y« V fWfrf'^f!

August 1982

39

THE VICE PRESIDENT

West goes out to those milllions of peo-
ple who will continue to live under the
threat of Soviet armies and under the
blight of Marxist mismanagement.

On May 15th, Japan and the United
States will observe the 10th anniversary
of the reversion of the Island of
Okinawa. Many brave men fought and
died there. The soil that absorbed their
blood is now a shrine to their memory. I
hope Okinawa will now be remembered
not so much as a battleground but as a
symbol of how our two nations worked
together to heal the wounds of war.

It's true that these two anniversaries
come at a time of some bilateral prob-
lems between our two countries. But I
haven't come here to emphasize them or
to dramatize them. If my presence here
today dramatizes anything, it's what
joins us, not what separates us.

Obviously, problems exist. They are
no secret, and they are important prob-
lems for us both, but just as obviously,
we're all anxious to work out solu-
tions— together. Partners consult; they
don't dictate to each other. We've got a
vigorous dialogue going, and there's no
need to suspect it will grow any less
vigorous over the years.

Our Japanese friends can expect
from us what all our friends can expect
from us — open lines of communication, a
determination to overcome obstacles,
and consistency. To them I would say:
There will be no unpleasant surprises in
your relations with us.

Japan now enjoys an unquestioned
prominence among the nations of the
world. It has a global role to play in the
affairs of the 20th century — a role that
will expand in the 21st. As it assumes a
greater role, its responsibilities will
grow in proportion. There are clear in-
dications the Japanese people have a
growing awareness of their country's
new global role and of the obligation and
responsibilities that accompany great
economic strength.

To paraphrase penetrating analysis
by the present Chief Cabinet Secretary,
Kiichi Miyazawa, the Japanese were not
ready in the 1970s to assume their full
share of global responsibility; even
though Japan, as Mr. Miyazawa pointed
out, "became increasingly conscious of
the need to play a large role in the inter-
national economy and made considerable
efforts to do so." Japan's performance
should be measured in its context as the
second largest economic power among
the industrialized democracies. Today,
its political role is growing — as it
should. As a pillar of the industrialized
democracies, Japan cannot avoid that

role, and I for one can think of no nation
more qualified to assume it.

Japan, meanwhile, has been
demonstrating that it is willing to
cooperate with its Western friends in all
areas, including matters of defense and
trade. Prime Minister Suzuki's
statements on behalf of increased
defense goals, along with recent in-
creases in Japan's defense budget, attest
to Japan's good faith. We are conscious,
too, that the question of Japan's defense
spending is much more complex than the
black-and-white terms in which it is too
often discussed. Let me say that the
United States is grateful for the prog-
ress so far on the defense issue.

We would, of course, be grateful for
continued progress, knowing as we do
that Japan will make its own decisions.
We have confidence in the wisdom and
global perspective of Japan's leaders and
its people, just as we have confidence
that we will continue to cooperate in this
crucial area. At the same time, we
recognize the contributions of Japan's
foreign aid program, much of which
goes to critical parts of the world, where
both our countries are working toward
the same goals.

There is no question that some fric-
tion exists between the United States
and Japan in the matter of trade. Many
visitors from Japan, as well as my and
Japan's great friend, former Am-
bassador Robert Ingersoll, have recently
remarked on the danger of protec-
tionism and the extent to which senti-
ment has been aroused in all quarters on
trade issues. My own sense is that we
both want to achieve the same goals —
free trade and fair trade. But here I
want to make a point that I cannot em-
phasize enough, namely, that we cannot
allow trade disagreements to dominate
our dialogue. Some newspapers have
drawn the conclusion that our two coun-
tries are moving toward a "head-on colli-
sion" on trade. I disagree. I think, happi-
ly, that we're moving toward some head-
on decisions on trade.

Long before the dilemmas of the
postmodern age, Simon Bolivar said that
"... the majority of men hold as a truth
the humiliating principle that it is harder
to maintain the balance of liberty than
to endure the weight of tyranny."
However vexatious our disagreements
may be, we live at a time when we
ought never to take for granted the
special comfort of our friendship.

The difficulties abound, but we have
the will and the wherewithal to over-
come them. The historical imperative
demands that we do. It is, for instance,

no secret that the United States has had
difficulties pursuing our relations with
the People's Republic of China. But we
are absolutely resolved to strengthen
our relationship with the People's
Republic and in cooperating in its
development. We thoroughly appreciate
the importance of that relationship to all
Asia. Strengthening it will, of course,
require the efforts on both sides. But I
am greatly confident of a successful out-
come.

There are many other challenges
facing the United States. President
Reagan is deeply committed to arms
reduction. He is willing to explore all
reasonable — and verifiable — approaches
to the question of how to reduce the
world's arsenal of nuclear weapons. His
zero-option proposal of last November
was the single most sincere and
dramatic overture to the Soviet Union in
a long, long while. He's been earnest
and aggressive in pursuing talks with
the Soviets. But there has been a great
deal of confusion and misunderstanding
on the matter.

No one is more interested in main-
taining peace between the Soviet Union
and the United States than Ronald
Reagan. He seeks no confrontation
there. He seeks to reduce tensions — ten-
sions caused in no small part by the
Soviet Union's international behavior.
President Reagan will do everything he
can to convince the Soviet Union to
cooperate with the United States in
agreeing to arms reduction. And he will
keep America strong. To pursue new
policies does not mean old ones will be
abandoned. Make no mistake: He will
maintain our deterrence.

Our secret weapon in the protracted
conflict against totalitarianism lies not in
underground silos but in our free
marketplaces. I say secret because the
leaders of the totalitarian regimes can-
not afford to impart the knowlege of the
triumph of capitalism to their people.
What Russian worker, fully informed of
the status, condition, and rights of his
counterpart in the United States or
Japan or in any of the other industrial-
ized democracies, would not run to the
nearest Aeroflot office and get himself
and his family on the next flight out?
But alas, Pravda does not print the
whole story; Aeroflot does not accept
reservations from just anyone.

Irving Kristol once addressed the
question of why democracies live and
die. For over 2,000 years, he said,
political philosophers rejected democracy
because they believed that it inevitably
degenerated into chaos and dictatorship.

40

Department of State Bulletin

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™ E S

THE VICE PRESIDENT

But, "what changed the attitude of
pohtical philosophers," wrote Kristol,
"was the emergence of modern
capitalism, with its promise of economic
growth — of an economic system in
which everyone could improve his condi-
tion without having to do so at someone
else's expense. It is the expectation of
tomorrow's bigger pie, from which
everyone will receive a larger slice, that
prevents people from fighting to the bit-
ter end over the division of today's pie."

Japan and the United States need
each other to grow. We depend on each
other to grow. Our combined national
products account for one-third of the
world's output. That is a formidable
weapon against the adversaries of
freedom. We owe it to ourselves, to our
friends in the free world, and moreover
to those who may someday be free to
resolve our differences, so that,
together, we can build on a past that
promises great things to come.

ADDRESS BEFORE

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,

SEOUL, APR. 26, 1982

This is my first visit to Korea. I hope it
will not be my last. On arriving I was
struck by two things. The first was how
close we are here to the DMZ [demil-
itarized zone] and the realization of how
much a part of everyday life in Seoul
that proximity is. The second was how
amazed and touched I was by the
warmth of the public reception. I have
always heard about Korean hospitality
and graciousness. Yesterday, what had
only been general knowledge became a
first-hand experience. Please thank the
people you represent. They made me
feel very welcome, just as you have by
inviting me to speak to you today.

We celebrate this year a century of
friendship between the government and
peoples of the United States and Korea
—100 years. That is not such a long
time, perhaps, in the march of human
history; but a hundred years is one-half
of the U.S. life as a nation. That we
have been friends so long, in a world
that, in those 100 years has seen enough
conflict and hatred to last a millennium,
is cause for great joy.

I carry with me the greetings and
the friendship of the people of the
United States and of President Reagan.
What I have to say here today I say on
their behalf. I am glad to be able to give
my message to you, representing as you
do the Korean people. I am honored that

you called this body into special session
in order to hear it.

Legislative bodies such as this Na-
tional Assembly are where the people's
business should be conducted. I myself
am well enough acquainted with
legislative branches to know that they
are not always tranquil. Indeed,
sometimes they are rather noisy.

Long ago, Simon Bolivar, one of the
great liberators of the Western Hemi-
sphere, said that "... the majority of
men hold as a truth the humiliating prin-
ciple that it is harder to maintain the
balance of liberty than to endure the
weight of tyranny." This is ever true of
our own times. Our own Congress is
sometimes full of noise. But we would
have it no other way.

In the North, there is no truly repre-
sentative Congress. Instead only a great
silence — the silence of despotism and
one-man rule. This silence is broken by
the occasional sounds of violence, as it

Near the demilitarized zone in Korea, Vice
President Bush received a briefing from
Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., commander in
chief of the U.N. command, U.S forces in
Korea, and the combined forces command.

was last week when four who sought
freedom were killed by their own coun-
trymen as they made their way to freer
soil.

The occasion of 100 years of rela-
tions is a fitting time to emphasize the
continuity of our friendship. We will re-
main a faithful ally. We will remain a
reliable ally. We are partners in the non-
Communist world. That especially makes
our bond a sacred one. If America once
lectured its friends and apologized to its
adversaries, that day is over.

During the height of the Vietnam
war, a message was passed to President
Nixon. It was from Henry Kissinger,
then a professor at Harvard. The
message said, "The word is going out
that it may be dangerous to be

August 1982

41

THE VICE PRESIDENT

America's enemy, but it is fatal to be its
friend." As long as Ronald Reagan sits
in the Oval Office of the White House,
no one will be able to say this about the
United States.

We live in a world full of tension-
tensions which complicate our search for
a lasting peace. The United States is a
Pacific power, and Korea is one of our
most vital allies. The purpose of
America's presence in Korea is to pro-
tect and preserve the peace which both
our countries fought so liard to bring
about. The United States will remain a
power in Korea only as long as we are
welcome. It is not our desire to
dominate the non-Communist world,
only to be a vital partner in it and to be
a friend upon whom our friends can
rely.

The United States is proud to have
as its friend and ally a country such as
Korea, where economic miracles occur.
Twenty years ago, this was a poor coun-
try. Political scientists study South
Korea as a model for economic develop-
ment. Kim Kyung Won has explained
part of the Korean success this way. "It
is," he said, ''the culture of discipline and
postponing immediate satisfaction for
the future— even for posterity."

According to an international labor
organization study, South Koreans work
longer hours than any other people on
Earth. This industriousness has given
you one of the most dynamic economies
of the 20th century. Between 1970 and
1980, the volume of trade between our
two countries has increased hugely:
from $531 million to $10 billion.

The United States is, of course, a
vital market for Korean goods, and vice
versa. President Reagan has made it
clear that he will do all he can to keep
the U.S. market open. There are few
other advocates of free trade as ardent
as he. And naturally his job in per-
suading those who regulate the market
to keep it open will be made easier if our
trading partners are prepared to make
the same pledge. Korea is our ninth
largest trading partner, and we expect it
will become even more important in the
years ahead. Because, among other
things, your economy is expanding so
rapidly. Your growth rate last year was
14%. By sharp contrast, the North has
one-fourth the output of the South. One-
half of the North's work force is re-
quired to feed its people; in the South,
little more than one-third are needed to
fulfill that task. Your hard work and
determination to bring about these
economic successes have validated, in

the eyes of the world community, the
U.S. decision to help you sustain your
freedom.

Against this background of extra-
ordinary economic achievement, the op-
portunities for pluralism are strong.
President Chun, the first head of state
President Reagan received at the White
House, spoke of a new era in the
Republic of Korea, an era of "renewal of
the spirit of national harmony, replacing
the old chronic and internecine battles
between those who take rigid and ex-
treme positions." He spoke of an era of
"dialogue" and "consensus building." He
spoke of a "freer, more abundant, and
democratic society in our midst." We
support this philosophy with all our
heart. And we look to President Chun
and to this assembly to build on such a
commitment, the foundation stones of
which have already been laid.

In a democracy, legislatures are the
only true means of determining the will
of the people. Democracy, as President
Abraham Lincoln defined it for us long
ago, consists of " . . . government of the
people, by the people, for the people."
To be sure, the people speak with many
voices; but in free countries, as someone
once observed, every man is entitled to
express his opinions, and every man is
entitled not to listen.

Some countries have a fear of
pluralism, and only the preordained few
control the destinies of the many. One
country in our own hemisphere— Nica-
ragua—overthrew an autocratic,
repressive regime, promising that the
new order would be pluralistic and
democratic, promising that all Nica-
raguans would have a voice in their new
government. Unfortunately, the rulers
of that new Nicaragua subsequently
found one excuse after another for post-
poning elections, closing down the news-
papers, and jailing the opposition. The
United States regrets this, just as it
regrets the suppression of democratic
practices in all countries, friend or foe.
We see political diversity as a source of
strength not weakness.

There is an ancient Chinese curse
that says, "May you live in interesting
times." We live today in interesting
times— though I think that is more a
challenge than a curse. The most impor-
tant task facing us as partners is
preserving peace. The very close
cooperation between the United States
and Korea is a matter of record. The
United States will try to build on new
relations, such as the one we have with
the People's Republic of China, but not

at the expense of our longstanding
friendships.

A great American poet once wrote,
"Most of the change we think we see in
life is due to truths being in and out of
favor." The policy of deterrence has
served us well in the past; why should it
not continue to serve us well in the
future? I sympathize with those intellec-
tual quarters who devote themselves to
the search for new solutions. But that
does not mean the old solutions are no
longer valuable. The essence of deter-
rence is that where there is balance,
there is safety. This policy has kept the
peace in Korea since 1954. The world
has seen a great many wars in our time.
Since NATO was founded in 1948, for
instance, about 150 wars have broken
out. In this troubled century, 28 years of
peace on this peninsula amounts to a
proud legacy.

The quest for lasting peace involves
more than merely maintaining the statics
quo. This is why President Reagan has
been trying hard to encourage the
Soviet Union to work with the United
States in finding a way to bring about
real and verifiable nuclear arms reduc-
tion. And that is also why the United
States so strongly supports the bold and
imaginative initiative of President Chun
toward a reunification of the two
Koreas.

I would take this opportunity to
urge Kim Il-song to respond to Presi-
dent Chun in the same spirit. The
United States will be glad to discuss
new ideas with the North, in conjunction
with the South. We have no intentions
of talking to the North alone.

Here let me make an important
point about the foreign policy of Ronald
Reagan. He is anxious to pursue all
avenues toward dialogue, believing as he
does that the best way to bring about
dialogue is to seek it from a position of
strength. It is a truism of foreign policy
that an adversary is more likely to
negotiate if it is to his advantage to
negotiate. If, for instance, the United
States were to remove its military forces
from all over the world, what incentive
for restraint in international behavior
would remain for the Soviets? Thus, un-
til the day comes when the Soviet
Union, and other Communist nations
such as Vietnam, decide to respect inter-
national law and to reduce international
tension, the United States has little
choice but to remain strong. And so we
shall.

Kim Il-song, to judge from his
rather lengthy speeches— lengthier,
even, than my own— is adamant on the

42

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

subject of withdrawal of the United
States peacekeeping forces from Korea.
I should like to take this opportunity to
admonish him to redirect his rhetorical
energies elsewhere. Too many men and
women — Korean and American — have
already given their lives protecting this
land from his troops. He desires
reunification, but as we saw all too
recently in Vietnam, reunification, in
Communist terms, means the horrors of
new wars, "reeducation," camps, and
hundreds of thousands of people driven
to the sea in open boats. The United
States has no intention of stepping aside
in Korea so Kim Il-song can launch
another invasion and set the clock back
32 years.

It is our earnest hope that he even-
tually will see the logic of negotiations.
But we in the United States as you in
the Republic of Korea are prepared to
wait for that day patiently and to pros-
per in the meantime as we begin our
second 100 years of friendship.

DINNER TOAST,
SINGAPORE,
APR. 27, 1982

I'm very honored to be here this even-
ing. It's been too long since my last visit
to Singapore in the mid-1970s. You've
undergone remarkable changes, under-
taken remarkable achievements. In the
midst of an uncertain world, you've
created a society that has excited the ad-
miration and respect of many nations.
This is obviously a source of great pride
for those who have taken part in the
Singapore adventure.

The Vice President and Singapore's Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew offer toasts.

The world looks to Singapore, and
especially to your leadership, Mr. Prime
Minister [Lee Kuan Yew]. Your vision,
you ingenuity, your range of ac-
complishments are known throughout
the world. You have shown boldness,
that quality so valued by Disraeli, who
told us that "success is the child of
audacity."

We are good friends, Singapore and
the United States. We share the same
view on many matters. We both believe
in free enterprise as a stabilizing in-
fluence. We are not allies in a formal
sense, but we both believe in the need
for the United States to maintain a
strong and steady influence in the
Pacific region. The United States, as I
have told audiences in all the East Asian
countries I've visited on this trip, has no
desire to dominate; only to be a good
and faithful friend and a dependable
ally.

We live, as the traditional Chinese
curse has it, in the interesting times.
Soviet aggression is on the loose in
many parts of the world. Here, their
proxy, Vietnam, continues its war
against Kampuchea. Its occupation of
that country is a profoundly destabiliz-
ing influence in Southeast Asia, filling
refugee camps of Thailand, just as the
rulers of the new Vietnam have filled
the sea with hundreds and thousands of
homeless souls.

We deplore these tragedies. We are
both anxious for withdrawal from
beleaguered Kampuchea. We are both
anxious for increased respect for inter-
national law. ASEAN [Association of
South East Nations] plays an enormous-
ly important role as a stabilizing and
progressive influence in this region. And
we recognize the crucial role that

Singapore plays in that organization.
I look forward most to eagerly to
my meeting with you tomorrow, Mr.
Prime Minister, to hearing first-hand
your perspective on questions pertaining
to Southeast Asia and the world. I also
look forward to hearing your views on
world affairs, inasmuch as you are, by
virtue of your leadership of this interna-
tionally minded country, a man of the
world. I'll be ready to address the issues
you have so forthrightly expressed in
your remarks.

DINNER REMARKS,
MELBOURNE,
MAY 1, 1982

Barbara and I have been the recipients

of so many kindnesses since we arrived
here 2 days ago. The hospitality seems
to go on and on; seems to be as endless
as the great stretches of territory we
flew over since our first stop in Darwin
and here. Once again, so many thanks.

I want to tell you how pleased Bar-
bara and I are to have had the chance to
visit Melbourne, your city, Mr. Prime
Minister [Malcolm Fraser]. I see why it
is called Australia's "Garden City." On
our visit here we've seen one beautiful
city after another. I must say, I think
John Batman knew a bargain when he
saw one — if he bought all this for 200
pounds of trinkets. When your great
past Prime Minister and fellow Vic-
torian, Robert Menzies, visited us in the
United States back in 1950, he said that
except in the jaundiced eye of the law,
Americans are not regarded as for-
eigners in Australia. I have managed on
my visit to keep out of the way of your
law. You've made us feel wonderfully at
home.

Our two countries have passed so
many tests in this century. We fought
together in four wars — World Wars I
and II, Korea, and Vietnam. If, as
Hazlitt said, prosperity is a great
teacher, but adversity is a greater one,
then we've learned much, both from our
hardships and from the way we shared
them.

For the past 30 years, our ANZUS
[Australia, New Zealand, United States]
mutual defense treaty has helped to
keep the peace. That treaty is the cor-
nerstone of our security in the South-
west Pacific and the foundation for our
search for peaceful resolutions to heated
conflict worldwide.

Thirty years later, it has endured in
a way far beyond the vision of those

August 1982

43

THE VICE PRESIDENT

In Sydney, Vice President Bush reviews the honor guard.

who put their signatures to that docu-
ment. The cooperation of AustraHan and
U.S. forces in contributing to the Sinai
peace force shows how far our collabora-
tion has taken us. In a world in which
there are too few peace processes, our
standing together in that part of the
world, far from our own shores, should
give us great satisfaction. In these
perilous times. President Reagan is
determined to do all he can to maintain
the intimacy between our countries on
which ANZUS thrives.

It was Sir Percy Spencer, the
Australian statesman, who once told our
House of Representatives that, "So far
as it is possible, it is our objective to
build up with the United States
somewhat the same relationship that ex-
ists within the British Commonwealth.
That is to say, we desire a full exchange
of information and experience on all
matters of mutual interest."

Our discussions of the past 2 days
can only be described as very friendly
and productive. Yesterday in Canberra,
we had a long and straightforward ses-
sion around the cabinet table with the
Prime Minister and members of his
cabinet. Many subjects were raised with
so few disagreements. It's not the stuff
that banner headlines are made of, but
that's the way it is with friends. That's
the way it must be in this dangerous
world. And for the free nations of the
world, that's big news.

Our talks ranged around the entire
world— Japan, China, the Falklands, the
Soviet Union, the ASEAN nations, the
nations that comprise the Caribbean. We
discussed President Reagan's deep and
abiding desire to reduce nuclear
weapons throughout the world. And as
the Prime Minister said in the meeting,
we saved to the last the sweetest subject
of all — sugar.

There is very little going on in our
world today that is not of mutual in-
terest to both our countries. As partners
in the free world, we have done and will
continue to do our all to insure that
those who have given everything they
had in the defense of freedom shall not
have done so in vain and that those who
come after us will be able to say that we
worked for peace on their behalf.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT,

WELLINGTON.

MAY 3, 1982

It's very good, finally, to be in New
Zealand, Mr Prime Minister [Robert
Muldoon], and I want to thank you for
your kind invitation. Barbara and I have
been looking forward very much to this
part of our journey for a long, long
time. I've never been here before, but
back home the beauty of New Zealand is
well known, as is the innate and legend-
ary graciousness of New Zealanders. I'm
looking forward enormously to our talks

and to those with other members of
your government.

I've come to New Zealand to reaf-
firm the friendship between our two
countries. Just a few days ago, we
marked the 30th anniversary of the en-
try into force of the ANZUS treaty,
which marked the beginning of our for-
mal, postwar alliance. The spirit of AN-
ZUS is strong — stronger even than the
vision of those who put their signatures
to the document in 1951. As the world
has evolved, so has our friendship. The
United States has learned that as Emer-
son put it long ago, "the best way to
have a friend is to be one."

Ours is much more than a security
alliance. Our ties are cultural and
economic and grounded in the conviction
that democracy has given us the means
and the power to attain our pros-
perity— and our peace.

Our friendship goes back long before
ANZUS. I've come not only to celebrate
our past but, I hope, to inaugurate our
future. In America we place great value
on the comradeship and the self-sacrifice
that characterized the origins of our
partnership. And we place equally great
value on a friend who continues to stand
for those values that sustain and nourish
the free world.

Lest I overstay my welcome within
only minutes of my landing here in Wel-
lington, let me conclude by simply say-
ing, thank you for this warm welcome.
Thank you for having us here, Mr.
Prime Minister.

Vice President Bush lays a wreath at New
Zealand's National War Memorial in Well-
ingrton; he is accompanied by Lt. Col.
Michael Fry, a member of the Vice Presi-
dent's staff.

44

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

President Reagan's Letters

TO VICE CHAIRMAN
DENG XIAOPING,
APR. 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The establishment of diplomatic relations
between the United States and China was an
historic event which improved the prospects
for peace and served the interests of both our
peoples. Yet we now find ourselves at a dif-
ficult juncture in those relations.

I am writing to you because it is impor-
tant for the leadership of both our countries
to resume the broad advance to which you
have contributed so much. This is particularly
important today, as we face a growing threat
from the Soviet Union and its satellite na-
tions throughout the world. Though our in-
terests and thus our policies are not identical,
in Afghanistan and Iran, in Southeast Asia,
in my own hemisphere, and in the field of
nuclear weaponry, your nation and mine face
clear and present dangers, and these should
impel us toward finding a firm basis for
cooperation.

We have come far together in a very
short time. I strongly support the continua-
tion of this progress. We must work together
to expand the benefits to both our countries.
My Administration had taken a number of in-
itiatives to further this process, and we in-
tend to do more.

Clearly, the Taiwan issue has been a most
difficult problem between our governments.
Nonetheless, vision and statesmanship have
enabled us in the past to reduce our dif-
ferences over this issue while we have built a
framework of long-term friendship and
cooperation.

The United States firmly adheres to the
positions agreed upon in the Joint Com-
munique on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations between the United States and
China. There is only one China. We will not
permit the unofficial relations between the
American people and the people of Taiwan to
weaken our commitment to this principle.

I fully understand and respect the posi-
tion of your government with regard to the
question of arms sales to Taiwan. As you
know, our position on this matter was stated
in the process of normalization: the United
States has an abiding interest in the peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan question.

We fully recognize the significance of the
nine-point proposal of September 30, 1979.
The decisions and the principles conveyed on
my instructions to your government on
January 11, 1982 reflect our appreciation of
the new situation created by these
developments.

In this spirit, we wish to continue our ef-
forts to resolve our differences and to create
a cooperative and enduring bilateral and
strategic relationship. China and America are
two great nations destined to grow stronger

through cooperation, not weaker through
division.

In the spirit of deepening the understand-
ing between our two countries, I would like
to call your attention to the fact that Vice
President Bush will be traveling to East Asia
toward the end of April. The Vice President
knows and admires you. He is also fully
aware of my thinking about the importance
of developing stronger relations between our
two countries. If it would be helpful, I would
be delighted to have the Vice President pay a
visit to Beijing, as part of his Asian trip, so
that these matters can be discussed directly
and personally with you and other key
leaders of the People's Republic of China.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

TO PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG,
APR. 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Premier:

The present state of relations between
our two countries deeply concerns me. We
believe significant deterioration in those rela-
tions would serve the interests of neither the
United States of America nor the People's
Republic of China.

As the late Premier Zhou Enlai said in
welcoming President Nixon to China in 1972,
"The Chinese people are a great people, and
the American people are a great people." We
are strong, sovereign nations sharing many
common interests. We both face a common
threat of expanding Soviet power and
hegemonism. History has placed upon us a
joint responsibility to deal with this danger.

The differences between us are rooted in
the long-standing friendship between the
American people and the Chinese people who
live on Taiwan. We will welcome and support
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In
this connection, we appreciate the policies
which your government has followed to pro-
vide a peaceful settlement.

As I told Vice Premier Huang in
Washington, we welcome your nine-point ini-
tiative.

As I also told the Vice Premier, we ex-
pect that in the context of progress toward a
peaceful solution, there would naturally be a
decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan. Our
positions over the past two months have
reflected this view. We are prepared, indeed
welcome, further exchanges of view in the
months to come. I hope you share my convic-
tion that the United States and China should
work together to strengthen the prospects
for a peaceful international order. While our
interests, and thus our policies, will not
always be identical, they are complementary
and thus should form a firm basis for
cooperation.

In my letter to Vice Chairman Deng, I
have suggested that a visit to Beijing by Vice

President Bush at the end of April could be a
useful step in deepening the understanding
between our two countries. The Vice Presi-
dent will be traveling in Asia at the time, and
could visit Beijing if you feel it would be
useful.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

TO CHAIRMAN HU YAOBANG,
MAY 3, 1982

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The visit of Vice President Bush to China
affords a welcome opportunity to convey my
regards to you.

As sovereign nations, our two countries
share a common responsibility to promote
world peace. We face a grave challenge from
the Soviet Union which directly threatens our
peoples and complicates the resolution of
problems throughout the globe. It is vital that
our relations advance and our cooperation be
strengthened.

Vice President Bush is visiting China as
my personal emissary. He is prepared to
discuss a wide range of issues of mutual con-
cern. My sincere hope is that we can achieve,
through discussions, enhanced mutual
understanding, at the highest levels of our
governments.

Among the issues the Vice President will
address is the question of United States arms
sales to Taiwan. This remains an area of
residual disagreement, as our governments
acknowledged at the time of US-China nor-
malization. I believe, so long as we exercise
the statesmanship and vision which have
characterized our approach to differences
over the past decade, we will be able to make
progress toward the removal of this issue as
a point of bilateral contention.

In the meantime, as stated in my recent
letters to Vice Chairman Deng and Premier
Zhao, the United States will continue to
adhere firmly to the positions agreed upon in
the joint communique on the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China.
Our policy will continue to be based on the
principle that there is but one China. We will
not permit the unofficial relations between
the American people and the Chinese people
on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this
principle.

On this basis, and with good faith on both
sides, we are confident that a means can be
found to resolve current differences and
deepen our bilateral and strategic coopera-
tion. It is my hope that you and I will have
an opportunity to meet soon. Please accept
my best wishes in your efforts to build a
secure and modernizing China.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan I

August 1982

45

THE VICE PRESIDENT

DEPARTURE STATEMENT,

BEIJING,

MAY 9, 1982

During the past 3 days, in private
discussions and public statements, I
have stated again and again that my
visit to China is a symbol of the Reagan
Administration's good faith in seeking to
build upon the strength of our friendship
and the strength of our important
strategic relationship.

I have attempted to impress upon
the leaders of China the depth of Presi-
dent Reagan's commitment to building
an enduring relationship — a relationship
based on mutual trust and understand-
ing. Frankly, I feel good about the
discussions I have had during the past
days. I feel that some progress has been
made, and I believe that recent personal
correspondence by the President to the
Chinese leaders has done much to help
advance the process.

Differences between us remain, to
be sure. But as we seek to resolve them
we must be certain that the positive
elements in our relationship are rein-
forced and that the problems do not
determine the course of our relationship.

We have a clarification of thinking
on both sides on the Taiwan issue and
other bilateral and global concerns. And
we have agreed that U.S. and Chinese
representatives will continue to hold
talks on the main question before us. I
am also pleased by the positive way in
which the Chinese leaders have
presented my visit and the talks to the
Chinese people. These are good signs.

When I came to China, I came with
the purpose of conveying and explaining
in detail the President's position on
bilateral, regional, and global issues. I
believe that has been accomplished. I am
confident that in the weeks and months
ahead, the friendship and relations be-
tween our governments will grow. I
know that the President, and thoee of-
ficials of the United States who work
constantly to enhance our relationship,
will do everything to insure that.

'Texts from the Vice President's Office of
the Press Secretary. ■

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping met with Vice President Bush in Beijing.

The Origins of the
ANZUS Treaty and Council

by Edward C. Keefer
Office of the Historian

The foreign ministers who made up the
council created by the ANZUS
(Australia, New Zealand, United States)
Security Treaty met for their first ses-
sion on August 4, 1952, at Kaneohe
Marine Corps Air Station in Hawaii.
This initial gathering was evidence of a
significant shift in the security relations
of the three countries, a change which
began with the signing of the ANZUS
Security Treaty on September 1, 1951,
and which was completed on April 29,
1932, when the agreement came into
force.

For Australia and New Zealand, the
ANZUS treaty was the first time those
Commonwealth nations had entered into
a major international agreement which
did not also include the United
Kingdom, and, henceforth, they would
look east to the United States to fulfill
the role of protecting superpower rather
than west to the United Kingdom.
Canberra and Wellington saw this for-
mal security pact as a guarantee against
a possible threat from a resurgent Japan
as well as other potential adversaries.

For the United States, the ANZUS pact
was an integral part of a series of new
American security arrangements in the
Pacific which also included bilateral
security treaties with the Philippines
and Japan.

The ANZUS treaty reflected impor-
tant changes in the international en-
vironment in the area — the reduction of
British power, the fear of isolation by
Australia and New Zealand from deci-
sions which would affect their security,
the growing threat from the Soviet
Union, conflicts in Korea and Southeast
Asia, the emergence of the People's
Republic of China, and the potential role
of a rearmed Japan.

ANZUS was also the product of the
persistence and efforts of two men — Sir
Percy Spender, former Foreign Minister
of Australia, and John Foster Dulles,
former Special Consultant to the
Department of SUite. As Canberra's
Ambassador to the United States, Sir
Percy was a member of the delegation
to the first ANZUS Council meeting.
John Foster Dulles was not associated
with the Department of State at that
time but, instead, actively involved in
the presidential campaign of Dwight D.

46

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Eisenhower. While Spender and Dulles
played a primary role in creating
ANZUS, they did so for different
reasons.

The Proponents

Sir Percy Spender was a tireless pro-
moter of the idea of a Pacific pact
modeled organizationally along the lines
of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1950, in
Australia and during his visit to the
United States, he argued forcefully for a
security pact which would include
Australia, New Zealand, the United
States, and possibly the United
Kingdom. One historian characterized
Spender's role in the shaping of a Pacific
pact as "a political obsession."

In speeches before the Australian
parliament and public groups and in con-
fidential discussions with President
TiTiman and his advisers and leading
members of the U.S. Congress, Spender
preached one sermon: the security of
Australia now depended on American
power. Since the United States was
making the important decisions on inter-
national developments in Asia, Australia
should have a formal say in those deci-
sions which affected its security. A
Pacific pact with consultative machinery
and collective planning was Sir Percy's
remedy.

While the Truman Administration
was aware of Australia's security needs,
it had been unenthusiastic for some time
about a Pacific alliance, especially one
on the model of NATO. Truman and his
advisers gave Spender a sympathetic
hearing but made no commitments. One
member of the Administration, however,
came to favor the concept of a Pacific
pact, but on his own terms and for his
own reasons. John Foster Dulles inter-
preted the rise of the Soviet Union as a
Pacific power, alignment of the People's
Republic of China with the Soviet Union,
the Korean conflict, and the war in In-
dochina as part of a "comprehensive
plan" by the Communists to eliminate all
Western influence on the Asian
mainland and the islands of Japan, For-
mosa, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
Dulles saw a Pacific Ocean pact, in-
cluding Australia and New Zealand— in
his view the most "dependable countries"
in the area — as the best response to this
perceived threat to non-Communist
Asia. Dulles' proposal also com-
plemented his principal foreign policy
task — a Japanese peace treaty flexible
enough to allow Japan to defend itself.

In January 1951, President Truman
asked Dulles to negotiate a peace treaty

with Japan and to explore "other poten-
tial defense arrangements in the
Pacific." With the President's blessing,
Dulles traveled to the Far East to test
the waters for his idea of a defensive
chain starting with the Aleutians, pro-
ceeding through Japan, the Ryukyus,

Sir Percy Spender

the Philippines, and Indonesia, and end-
ing in Australia and New Zealand. It
was to be "composed of links so inter-
connected that an attack on one link
would jeopardize the entire chain." The
British Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice, however, was unalterably opposed
to this concept — it would send the
wrong signals to Moscow and Beijing
about British intentions to defend Hong
Kong and Malaya and about the West's
determination to support the French in
Indochina and non-Communist govern-
ments in Thailand and Burma. At the
onset of his trip, the British told Dulles
of their fears and the Special Consultant
abandoned the idea of a single Pacific
Ocean pact.

Negotiating the Treaty

When Dulles arrived in Canberra in mid-
February 1951 for discussions with the
Australian and New Zealand Foreign
Ministers, he knew that British opposi-
tion to the island chain concept meant
that he would have to achieve his objec-

tives by other means. Dulles was open to
suggestions but was now considering a
series of separate security arrangements
which, in effect, would replace his grand
scheme. A tripartite agreement among
Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States, with the possible inclusion of the
Philippines, was one possibility.

While prospective security ar-
rangements were a principal concern at
Canberra, the proposed Japanese peace
treaty was a related topic. Spender and
New Zealand's Foreign Minister, F.W.
Doidge, informed Dulles that their
governments were unwilling to accept a
peace treaty with Japan which did not
limit Japanese rearmament unless there
was "an accompanying arrangement" on
security among the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand. While it is
an over-simplification to say that Dulles
paid for Canberra's and Wellington's ac-
ceptance of a so-called soft peace with
Japan by American acceptance of
ANZUS, U.S. records of the meetings
give clear evidence that a bargain was
struck. While Doidge and Spender
feared Japanese rearmament, Dulles
worried about the consequences if Japan
was not allowed to maintain adequate
armed forces. Thus, the ANZUS pact
allowed Australia and New Zealand to
accept the American view of peace with
Japan and still insure their security.

The draft treaty which emerged
from the Canberra discussions was in
most provisions the same treaty signed
later in 1951 and ratified in 1952.
Dulles, Doidge, and Spender worked out
the details of the agreement, but by all
accounts, Dulles was the master drafts-
man who wrote with an eye toward
Senate confirmation. The language in
Article II of the draft was carefully
drawn from the Vandenburg resolution
passed by the Senate in June 1948 call-
ing for the development of regional and
individual collective security based on
self-help and mutual aid. Article IV,
which Dulles characterized to General
Douglas MacArthur "as the meat of the
treaty," drew its inspiration for the
phraseology from the Monroe Doctrine.
Article IV reads in part: "Each Party
recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific area on any of the Parties would
be dangerous to its own peace and safe-
ty and declares that it would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional processes." Dulles
clearly had in mind the problems en-
countered in securing Senate acceptance
in 1949 of Article V of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty. As he told MacArthur, the

August 1982

47

THE VICE PRESIDENT

treaty was also flexible: "While it [Arti-
cle IV of the ANZUS Treaty] commits
each party to take action — presumably
to go to war— it does not commit any
nation to action in any particular part of
the world. In other words, the United
States can discharge its obligations by
action against a common enemy in any
way and in any area that it sees fit." Ar-
ticle VII had provisions for the creation
of a council of the signatories' foreign
ministers. By the terms of Article VIII,
the council was authorized to maintain a
"consultative relationship" with other
states, regional organizations, and
associations in the Pacific.

The language in Article VIII of the
draft treaty reflected the longstanding
desire of Australia, and to some extent
New Zealand, to be included in global
military planning, which Australia was
convinced was centered in the Pentagon.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson later
recalled that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
"broke into a sustained tantrum of nega-
tion" over the bureaucratic and organiza-
tional responsibilities involved in this
proposal. Truman and Acheson had
specifically enjoined Dulles to inform the
Australians and New Zealanders of
American unwillingness to establish a
direct and permanent link between their
military staffs and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff or with NATO. Acheson believed
that in letting them down too easily at
Canberra, Dulles gave the Australians
and New Zealanders the impression that
an informal relationship with the Joint
Chiefs might still be possible.

The question of just what was im-
plied in the provisions for consultation in
Article VIII was the principal issue in
Washington's interagency deliberations
over the agreement, which was made
public in July 1951. The idea of creating
a Pacific NATO on even a limited or in-
formal scale occasioned formal protests
from the Joint Chiefs and the Depart-
ment of Defense during the summer. It
was not so much the language of Article
VIII that was the concern but the im-
plication behind the words. Having made
their protest and received assurances
that the consultative provisions would
not grow into a formalized planning link,
the military was satisfied but still wary.

On September 1, 1951, the three
countries signed the Security Treaty in
San Francisco. Just 1 week before, the
United States and the Philippines had
signed a treaty of mutual defense. A
week later Japan and the United States
signed a security treaty. All three
agreements were made in conjunction
with the conclusion of the Japanese

peace treaty that same week, and
together they provided a framework for
American security in the Pacific which,
while not as comprehensive as Dulles'
original concept for a single Pacific
Islands pact, accomplished virtually the
same objectives. The ANZUS treaty pro-
ceeded smoothly through the Senate,
due in no small part to Dulles' careful
drafting, and President Truman ratified
it on April 15, 1952. It came into force 2
weeks later.

The First Council Meeting

The first council meeting of ANZUS was
scheduled for Hawaii in August 1952, in
order that the anniversary of the signing
of the treaty should not predate the first
session of foreign ministers. In those
hectic summer months of 1952, ANZUS
did not loom large on the list of dif-
ficulties and crises faced by the Truman
Administration. Acheson predicted that
there would be no problems requiring
"soul searching" at the council and that
there would be certainly "no spectacular
results." He promised to guard against
giving Australia and New Zealand the

Lord Casey

impression that the treaty could lead to
a future NATO in the Pacific or of giv-
ing Asians the view that the treaty
organization was in any way a private
club among Canberra, Wellington, and
Washington.

The flight to Hawaii by the U.S.
delegation almost proved more difficult
than any of the issues raised at the
council session. Mechanical trouble
grounded the delegation's plane at an
Air Force base in Denver. Acheson and
his colleagues spent the night in the
base hospital, which alarmed President
Truman until he was informed the
delegates were there as guests, not pa-
tients. The American party arrived at
Kaneohe after 3 days of difficult travel,
stoically endured the formal landing
ceremonies, and then, according to
Acheson, headed for the bar!

Acheson met with Australian
Foreign Minister Richard Casey to
discuss informally two problems facing
all the delegates — a British request for
observer status at the council and a
lingering Australian desire for joint
military planning. Acheson told Casey
frankly that the British could not be
given observer status without encourag-
ing other interested nations also to ap-
ply. Such a state of affairs would
seriously complicate the ANZUS Council
machinery in which simplicity and in-
timacy were the key elements. Casey
agreed and offered to enlist the support
of New Zealand Foreign Minister
T. Clifton Webb to inform London that
its request was denied.

Acheson also informed Casey that
the Department of State, not the Pen-
tagon, was the best point of contact for
Australia and New Zealand with the
U.S. Government on issues of mutual
concern in the Pacific. Though no closer
contact with the Pentagon was possible,
Acheson suggested that Admiral Arthur
W. Radford, Commander in Chief
Pacific (CINCPAC), and his staff at
Honolulu would be the appropriate chan-
nel for discussing military planning.
Acheson identified CINCPAC as an
organization responsible for the formula-
tion as well as implementation of
regional strategic policy.

When the formal sessions began the
participants officially approved the term
"ANZUS" as the acronym for the treaty
organization, mainly because they felt
the use of "Pacific" implied a broader
outlook than was warranted. Acheson
correctly sensed that the desire of the
Australia and New Zealand represent-
atives for joint military planning and

48

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

global strategy sessions with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and with NATO stemmed
in part from their feelings of
geographical isolation. As Acheson
reported to Truman at the end of the
Council meetings, "both countries suf-
fered from the knowledge that they had
little knowledge of what was going on
and our attitude toward the appraisal of
current situations. They felt remote and
worried by the unknown." Acheson and
Radford decided that "rather than to
starve the Australians and New
Zealanders, we would give them indiges-
tion." For 2 days, Acheson and Radford
gave their ANZUS colleagues a
thorough and frank assessment of every
major issue and situation in the world
affecting American national security.
Acheson informed Truman that the
Australian and New Zealand delegates
seemed satisfied with these briefings,
were convinced that Admiral Radford
could provide liasion to American
strategic planners, and were reconciled
to the idea that ANZUS could not be
linked with other military treaty
organizations.

The first ANZUS Council meeting
concluded with mutual agreement on the
Council's basic organization and func-
tions, an understanding which has in-
fluenced the workings of the security ar-
rangement during its many years of
operation. The vitality and importance
of ANZUS are evident in the fact
that the Council met in Canberra,
June 21-22, 1982, in its 31st session.
This account of the origins of the pact
commemorates those Americans,
Australians, and New Zealanders
responsible for the creation of the
ANZUS Security Treaty. ■

Secretary-Designate Shultz
Appears Before Senate Committee

Secretary-designate George P.
Shultz's statement before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on July IS,
1982. He was confirmed by the Senate on
July 15 and sworn in as the 60th
Secretary of State on July 16.^

President Reagan honors me by his
nomination to be the Secretary of State
for the United States of America. I
regard service in this post as a high
privilege and a grave duty. If I am con-
firmed by the Senate and have the op-
portunity to serve, I will muster what-
ever energy, intelligence, and dedication
I have and pour all of it into the per-
formance of this job. I recognize and ac-
cept the responsibilities that will be
placed upon me. But I say this too: I will
need and I will expect help and coopera-
tion all around; and, judging from the
many assurances already extended
voluntarily to me, I will get it. I look
especially to members of this committee
and your counterparts in the House of
Representatives. But my appeal reaches
much farther, to every corner of our
land and to our friends throughout the
world.

President Reagan has expressed his
confidence in me by making this nomina-
tion; I will strive mightily to merit that
confidence. I will do so fully conscious
that the conduct of our foreign policy is,
in accordance with the Constitution, a
presidential duty to be performed in col-
laboration with the Congress. My job is
to help the President formulate and exe-
cute his policies. I shall be ever faithful
to that trust.

I have appeared before a Senate
committee for confirmation to a Cabinet
post on two previous occasions. Thirteen
years ago I was the nominee to be
Secretary of Labor before the Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare. Both
Senators Cranston and Pell, who sit be-
fore me today, sat on that panel and
voted favorably on that nomination. I
was accompanied to that hearing by a
friend of long standing and Senator
from my then home state of Illinois,

Senator Percy. His wise and informed
counsel, in government and out, has
always been available and most helpful
to me. I deeply appreciate his assurance
that I will continue to have that counsel.

The biographical material available
to you shows that I brought to my
government service two decades of ex-
perience in university activities, teach-
ing, and doing research and administra-
tion at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and the University of
Chicago. After serving as the Secretary
of Labor, I went on to be Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and
then Secretary of the Treasury. For the
last 8 years, I have been with Bechtel,
most recently as President of Bechtel
Group, Inc. Bechtel is a truly remark-
able organization, astonishing in the
range of its capabilities and impressive
in the quality of its people, who bring in-
tegrity, intelligence, enthusiasm, and
drive to their work. I feel privileged to
have played a part in Bechtel's activities.
During this period, I have also served
part time on the faculty of Stanford
University, from which I plan to be on
leave in the period of my government
service.

During the last few days, a number
of Senators have asked me to address
myself to the question of my relationship
to Bechtel should I become Secretary of
State. To those questions, I see only one
possible answer: none. If I am con-
firmed, agreements already executed by
me will result in my resignation from
my officerships in all Bechtel entities. I
will retire as an employee, retaining only
vested rights to medical and insurance
benefits and to assets already accumu-
lated under Bechtel trust and thrift
plans. I will sell, at a price determined
by an established process, all my
Bechtel-related investments. Although I
understand that these steps leave me
with no legal conflict of interest, I will,
if I become Secretary of State, execute a
statement removing myself from any
"particular matter" involving Bechtel. In
the words of my counsel, concurred in
by the Office of Government Ethics,
these steps "will assure your full compli-
ance, while serving as Secretary of
State, with the terms of the Federal
conflict of interest laws.

August 1982

49

THE SECRETARY

U.S. Global Involvement

For those of us who have spent the bet-
ter part of our lives watching America's
deepening involvement in the world
around us, it is easy to forget that the
United States has, throughout most of
its history, only episodically been con-
cerned with foreign affairs. The world of
40 or so years ago seems almost nostal-
gically simple in comparison to the com-
plexities we confront today. In the
decades that have passed, scores of new
nations— many with frustrated aspira-
tions—have achieved independence. The
international economy is no longer
managed from a few world capitals but
has developed into a global network of
mutually dependent partners. Extensive
trade in goods and services, the inter-
national flow of critical raw materials,
the emergence of new technologies, and
the revolution in communications have
created a world in which no nation is im-
mune from the influence of the interna-
tional economy.

Forty years ago we could not even
glimpse the enormous dangers of
nuclear weapons or the complexities we
would face today in our efforts to con-
trol them. And 40 years ago few could
foresee that the collapse of the old order
would bring with it the spread of in-
creasingly sophisticated military arms to
new and contending nations, so that to-
day regional conflicts carry with them
the constant threat of escalation.
General Douglas MacArthur saw these
broad interrelationships and put the
point succinctly and eloquently in 1951:
"The issues are global and so interlocked
that to consider the problems of one sec-
tor, oblivious to those of another, is but
to court disaster for the whole."

Today most Americans recognize
that the nature and strength of our
diplomacy and our strategic posture are
linked to, and heavily dependent on, our
performance at home. Our economy is
fundamentally strong and will strength-
en further as economic policies now in
place and in prospect take hold. A
strong and productive America makes
us a strong trading partner and a re-
sourceful ally, giving to our friends a
confidence that strengthens their will to
resist those who would deprive us of our
freedoms.

Today most Americans are uncom-
fortable with the fact that we must
spend so much of our substance on de-
fense—and rightly so. Yet most Ameri-
cans also recognize that we must deal
with reality as we find it. And that reali-
ty, in its simplest terms, is an uncertain
world in which peace and security can be

assured only if we have the strength and
will to preserve them. We have passed
through a decade during which the
Soviet Union expanded its military capa-
bility at a steady and rapid rate while
we stood still. President Reagan has
given us the leadership to turn that
situation around— and just in time.
The past decade taught us once
again an important lesson about the
U.S. -Soviet relationship. In brief, it is
that diminished American strength and
resolve are an open invitation for Soviet
expansion into areas of critical interest
to the West and provide no incentive for
moderation in the Soviet military build-
up. Thus it is critical to the overall suc-
cess of our foreign policy that we per-
severe in the restoration of our
strength. But it is also true that the will-
ingness to negotiate from that strength
is a fundamental element of strength
itself.

The President has put forward arms
control proposals in the strategic,
theater, and conventional arms areas
that are genuinely bold and that will, if
accepted, reduce the burdens and the
dangers of armaments. Let no one doubt
the seriousness of our purpose. But let
no one believe that we will seek agree-
ment for its own sake, without a bal-
anced and constructive outcome.

We recognize that an approach to
the Soviet Union limited to the military
dimension will not satisfy the American
people. Our efforts in the area of arms
reduction are inevitably linked to re-
straint in many dimensions of Soviet be-
havior. And as we enter a potentially
critical period of transition in Soviet
leadership, we must also make it clear
that we are prepared to establish
mutually beneficial and safer relation-
ships on the basis of reciprocity.

Today most Americans recognize
that a steady and coherent involvement
by the United States in the affairs of the
world is a necessary condition for peace
and prosperity. Over and over again
since the close of the Second World
War, the United States has been the
global power to which others have
turned for help, whether it be to assist
in the process of economic development
or in finding peaceful solutions to con-
flicts. Our help continues as, in Presi-
dent Reagan's Caribbean Basin initia-
tive, an example of America's commit-
ment to a more prosperous world. It
must be an example, as well, of the key
role in economic development of private
markets and private enterprise. As the
President said in his address in Cancun:

History demonstrates that time and
again, in place after place, economic growth
and human progress make their greatest
strides in countries that encourage economic
freedom. . . . Individual farmers, laborers,
owners, traders, and managers — they are the
heart and soul of development. Trust them.
Because whenever they are allowed to create
and build, wherever they are given a personal
stake in deciding economic policies in bene-
fiting from their success, then societies be-
come more dynamic, prosperous, progressive,
and free.

In our international endeavors, we
are strengthened by a structure of
alliances that is of central importance.
Ours is not a hegemonic world but a
diverse and pluralistic one, reflecting the
complexity of the free, independent, and
democratic societies with which we are
associated. Just as we expect others to
act in partnership with us, so we must
conduct ourselves as responsible part-
ners. Friction and differences are in-
evitable among allies, and we can never
assume complacently that they will auto-
matically disappear. Tolerance of the
needs and perspectives of others is
essential. So is candid recognition of our
difficulties and challenges. Above all,
there has to be a commitment to the
common values and interests on which
the truly unique multilateral institutions
of the last three and a half decades have
been based. Our commitment is firm — as
President Reagan made clear during his
recent European trip. I am confident
that the same is true of our allies.

If we are strong, we buttress our
allies and friends and leave our adver-
saries in no doubt about the conse-
quences of aggression. If we provide
assistance to help others to be strong,
oiu- own strength can be husbanded and
brought to bear more effectively. If we
are confident, we give confidence to
those who seek to resolve disputes
peacefully. If we are engaged, we give
hope to those who would otherwise have
no hope. If we live by our ideals, we can
argue their merit to others with confi-
dence and conviction.

Middle East

During my individual visits with
members of this committee, many ex-
pressed a strong interest in my views on
problems and opportunities in the Mid-
dle East, particularly as related to the
conflict between Israel and the Arabs.
Responsive to this interest, but even
more to the importance of developments
in this area, I will conclude my state-
ment today by a brief discussion of my
views.

50

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

I start with the terrible human
tragedy now taking place in Lebanon.
Violence on a large scale has come once
again to a region whose strategic im-
portance inevitably guarantees that any
local conflict will receive global atten-
tion—with all the dangers for world
peace that implies.

In late 1974 I visited Beirut, at the
time a beautiful and thriving city, even
then marked by the presence of Pales-
tinian refugees. But since then Lebanon
has been racked by destruction, endur-
ing the presence of the armed and asser-
tive Palestine Liberation Organization
and other forces.

Coherent life and government are
impossible under those conditions and in-
evitably Lebanon became a state in dis-
repair. The Lebanese deserve a chance
to govern themselves, free from the
presence of the armed forces of any
other country or group. The authority of
the Government of Lebanon must ex-
tend to all its territory.

The agony of Lebanon is on the
minds and in the hearts of us all. But in
a larger sense Lebanon is but the latest
chapter in a history of accumulated grief
stretching back through decades of con-
flict. We are talking here about a part of
the globe that has had little genuine
peace for generations. A region with
thousands of victims— Arab, Israeli, and
other families torn apart as a conse-
quence of war and terror. What is going
on now in Lebanon must mark the end

George P. Shultz was sworn in as Secretary of State by Attorney General William French
Smith as President Reagan watched; Mrs. Shultz held the Bible.

George P. Shultz

George P. Shultz was sworn in on
July 16, 1982, as the 60th U.S. Secretary of
State. He was nominated by President
Reagan on July 1 and confirmed by the
Senate on July 15.

Mr. Shultz graduated from Princeton
University in 1942, receiving a B.A. degree
in economics. That year he joined the U.S.
Marine Corps and served until 1945. In 1949
Mr. Shultz earned a Ph.D. degree in in-
dustrial economics from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. He taught at M.I.T.
from 1948 to 1957, taking a year's leave of
absence in 1955 to serve as a senior staff
economist on the President's Council of
Economic Advisers during the Administration
of President Eisenhower.

In 1957 Mr. Shultz was appointed Pro-
fessor of Industrial Relations at the Universi-
ty of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
He was named Dean of the Graduate School
of Business in 1962. From 1968 to 1969
Mr. Shultz was a Fellow at the Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
at Stanford.

Mr. Shultz served in the Administration
of President Nixon as Secretary of Labor for
18 months, from 1969 to June 1970, at which
time he was appointed the Director to the Of-
fice of Management and Budget. He became
Secretary of the Treasury in May 1972, serv-
ing until 1974. During that period Mr. Shultz
served also as Chairman of the Council on
Economic Policy. As Chairman of the East-
West Trade Policy Committee, Mr. Shultz
traveled to Moscow in 1972 and negotiated a
series of trade protocols with the Soviet

Union. He also represented the United States
at the Tokyo meeting of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In 1974 Mr. Shultz joined the Bechtel
Corporation. Until his appointment as
Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz was President
and a director of Bechtel Group, Inc. During
this period he also served part-time on the
faculty of Stanford University.

Prior to his appointment, Mr. Shultz was
Chairman of President Reagan's Economic
Policy Advisory Board. At President
Reagan's request, Mr. Shultz met with
leaders in Europe, Japan, and Canada in May
1982 to assist in preparations for the
Versailles economic summit.

Secretary Shultz's publications include
Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines
(1978), Workers and Wages in the Urban
Labor Market (1970), Guidelines, Informal
Controls, and the Market Place (1966),
Strategies for the Displaced Worker (1966),
Management Organization and the Computer
(1960), Labor Problems: Cases and Readings
(1953). The Dynamics of a Labor Market
(1951), and Pressures on Wage Decisions
(1950). He holds honorary degrees from
Notre Dame, Loyola, Pennsylvania,
Rochester, Princeton, Carnegie-Mellon, and
Baruch College, New York.

Mr. Shultz was born in New York City on
December 13, 1920, and spent his childhood
in Englewood, New Jersey. He is married to
the former Helena M. O'Brien of Nashua,
New Hampshire. They have five children.

Press release 232 of July 30, 1982. I

August 1982

51

THE SECRETARY

of this cycle of terror rather than simply
the latest in a continuing series of sense-
less and violent acts.

We cannot accept the loss of life
brought home to us every day, even at
this great distance, on our television
screens; but at the same time we can, as
Americans, be proud that once again it
is the United States, working most
prominently through President Reagan's
emissary. Ambassador Philip Habib, that
is attempting to still the guns, achieve
an equitable outcome, and alleviate the
suffering.

The crisis in Lebanon makes pain-
fully and totally clear a central reality of
the Middle East: The legitimate needs
and problems of the Palestinian people
must be addressed and resolved—
urgently and in all their dimensions.
Beyond the suffering of the Palestinian
people lies a complex of political prob-
lems which must be addressed if the
Middle East is to know peace. The
Camp David framework calls as a first
step for temporary arrangements which
will provide full autonomy for the Pales-
tinians of the West Bank and Gaza. That
same framework then speaks eloquently
and significantly of a solution that "must
also recognize the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people."

The challenge of the negotiations, in
which the United States is, and during
my tenure will remain, a full partner, is
to transform that hope into reality. For
these talks to succeed, representatives
of the Palestinians themselves must par-
ticipate in the negotiating process. The
basis must also be found for other coun-
tries in the region, in addition to Israel
and Egypt, to join in the peace process.

Our determined effort to stop the
killing in Lebanon, resolve the conflict,
and make the Government of Lebanon
once again sovereign throughout its ter-
ritory underscores the degree to which
our nation has vital interests throughout
the Arab world. Our friendly relations
with the great majority of Arab states
have served those interests and, I be-
lieve, assisted our efforts to deal with
the current Lebanon crisis.

But beyond the issues of the mo-
ment, the importance to our own securi-
ty of wide and ever-strengthening ties
with the Arabs is manifest. It is from
them that the West gets much of its oil;
it is with them that we share an interest
and must cooperate in resisting Soviet
imperialism; it is with them, as well as
Israel, that we will be able to bring
peace to the Middle East. The brilliant

Secretary Haig Resigns

Following is the exchange of letters
between Secretary Haig and President
Reagan of June 25. 1982.''

Dear Mr. President:

Your accession to office on Januarj' 20, 1981,
brought an opportunity for a new and for-
ward looking foreign policy resting on the
cornerstones of strength and compassion. I
believe that we shared a view of America's
role in the world as the leader of free men
and an inspiration for all. We agreed that
consistency, clarity and steadiness of purpose
were essential to success. It was in this spirit
that I undertook to serve you as Secretary of
State.

In recent months, it has become clear to
me that the foreign policy on which we em-
barked together was shifting from that
careful course which we had laid out. Under
these circumstances, I feel it necessary to re-
quest that you accept my resignation. I shall
always treasure the confidence which you
reposed in me. It has been a great honor to
serve in your Administration, I wish you
every success in the future.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Dear Al:

It is with the most profound regret that I ac-
cept your letter of resignation. Almost forty

years ago you committed yourself to the serv-
ice of your country. Since that time your
career has been marked by a succession of
assignments demanding the highest level of
personal sacrifice, courage and leadership. As
a soldier and statesman facing challenges of
enormous complexity and danger, you have
established a standard of excellence and
achievement seldom equalled in our history.
On each occasion you have reflected a quality
of wisdom which has been critical to the
resolution of the most anguishing problems
we have faced during the past generation —
the conclusion of the Vietnam war, the
transfer of executive authority at a time of
national trauma and most recently, advancing
the cause of peace among nations.

The nation is deeply in your debt. As you
leave I want you to know of my deep per-
sonal appreciation, and in behalf of the
American people I express my gratitude and
respect. You have been kind enough to offer
your continued counsel and you may be confi-
dent that I will call upon you in the years
ahead. Nancy joins me in extending our
warmest personal wishes to you and Pat.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 28, 1982.

Arab heritage of science, culture, and
thought has a fresh dynamism. Working
together with us, our Arab friends can
contribute much, not only to our bilater-
al interests and those of the region, but
to the global future and the world
economy as well. I will do all in my
power to sustain these relationships and
to further them.

Finally, and most important, the
Lebanese situation is intimately linked
to the vital question of Israel's security.
Israel, our closest friend in the Middle
East, still harbors a deep feeling of in-
security. In a region where hostility is
endemic, and where so much of it is di-
rected against Israel, the Tightness of its
preoccupation with matters of security
cannot be disputed. Nor should anyone
dispute the depth and durability of
America's commitment to the security of
Israel or our readiness to assure that
Israel has the necessary means to de-
fend itself. I share in this deep and en-
during commitment — and more. I recog-
nize that democratic Israel shares with
us a deep commitment to the security of
the West.

Beyond that, however, we owe it to
Israel, in the context of our special rela-
tionship, to work with it to bring about
a comprehensive peace — acceptable to
all the parties involved — which is the on-
ly sure guarantee of true and durable
security.

America has many often competing
concerns and interests in the Middle
East. It is no secret that they present us
with dilemmas and difficult decisions.
Yet we must, using all the wit and com-
passion we possess, reconcile those in-
terests and erase those contradictions,
for it is, in the last analysis, peace we
are seeking to create and nurture.

Today's violence should not cause us
to forget that the Middle East is a land
of deep spirituality where three great
religions of our time were born and
come together even today. Some have
suggested that it was only natural, in a
land of such vast, harsh, and open
space, that men should be drawn toward
the heavens and toward a larger sense
of life's meaning. Whatever the reasons,
the force of religion in this region is as
powerful today as ever, and our plans

52

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

for peace will be profoundly incomplete
if they ignore this reality.

Let me close by recalling to you
President Reagan's definition of
America's duty to this region: "Our
diplomacy," he said, "must be sensitive
to the legitimate concerns of all in the
area. Before a negotiated peace can ever
hope to command the loyalty of the
whole region, it must be acceptable to
Israelis and Arabs alike."

I pledge to you and this committee
that if I am confirmed as Secretary of
State I will do my best to help the Presi-
dent carry out the task so clearly de-
fined in his statement. We must dare to
hope that, with effort and imagination,
we can arrive at an agreement that will
satisfy the vital security interests of
Israel and the political aspirations of the
Palestinians, meet the concerns of the
other parties directly involved, and win
the endorsement of the international
community.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

NATO Allies Table
Draft MBFR Treaty

Following is a statement by
Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), of July 8, 1982.

President Reagan, in his speech to the
Bundestag in Bonn on June 9, stated
that the alliance had agreed on a new
proposal designed to give new life to the
Vienna negotiations on mutual and
balanced force reductions (MBFR) in
central Europe. At their recent summit
meeting, NATO leaders announced that
the Western participants in MBFR "will
soon present a draft treaty embodying a
new, comprehensive proposal designed
to give renewed momentum to these
negotiations and achieve the long-
standing objective of enhancing stability
and security in Europe."

This morning in Vienna's Hofburg
Palace, where the MBFR plenary ses-
sions take place, the West formally
tabled its draft treaty. This new ini-
tiative is the result of an effort by this

Administration to develop an arms con-
trol approach on the question of conven-
tional forces in central Europe which
calls for substantial reductions— reduc-
tions which, if implemented, could
reduce the risk of war in central
Europe. The U.S. delegation in Vienna
is headed by Ambassador Richard Staar.

As the President stressed in his
speech to the Bundestag, this new
Western proposal on conventional force
reductions is an important complement
to previous U.S. initiatives taken in the
talks on intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) and in the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), both of which
are now in session in Geneva. Thus, the
comprehensive arms control program
launched by President Reagan in his
November 18th speech of last year has
now culminated in three specific pro-
posals in the categories he listed. The
proposals all meet the criteria set forth
in that speech; namely, that there must
be substantial, militarily-significant
reductions in forces, equal ceilings for
similar types of forces, and adequate
provisions for verification.

The primary Western objective in
MBFR continues to be the establishment
of parity at significantly lower levels of
forces in central Europe.

Currently, the Warsaw Pact has
some 170,000 more ground forces in
central Europe than the West. This
disparity is one of the most destabilizing
factors in the military situation in
Europe. Its elimination, through the
establishment of parity, could reduce the
capability for sudden aggression and
thereby lessen the risk of war, including
nuclear war, in Europe.

The new initiative differs from
previous Western proposals in that it
provides for one comprehensive agree-
ment in which all direct participants
would undertake, from the outset, a
legally binding commitment to take the
reductions required for each side to
decrease to the common collective ceil-
ing of 700,000 ground force personnel
for each side. This reduction would take
place in stages and would be completed
within 7 years. Each stage of reductions
would have to be fully verified. Under
this new approach, the West will be
making stronger reduction commitments
than we have ever proposed before.

There is no change in the Western
position that the sides must agree on the
number of troops present in the area
and subject to reduction before
signature of any treaty. Without agree-
ment on the size of the forces to be

reduced and limited, an MBFR treaty
would be neither verifiable nor en-
forceable. In the draft treaty, starting
force levels for each side would be iden-
tified at time of signature.

The Western draft treaty incor-
porates the package of confidence-
building and verification measures pro-
posed by the West in 1979. These
measures are designed to help verify
reductions and limitations and to
enhance security and stability by reduc-
ing the risks of miscalculation and
misperception.

In sum, the draft treaty tabled by
the West in Vienna takes into account
Eastern arguments and interests while
meeting this Administration's require-
ment that arms control agreements
result in real reductions to equal levels.
It offers the opportunity of achieving
concrete results in the negotiations in
furtherance of the agreed objectives of
enhancing stability and security in
Europe and complements our efforts in
other arms reduction negotiations.

This is the first time that a Western
proposal in the MBFR negotiations has
been tabled in the form of a draft trea-
ty. Doing so underscores Western
seriousness in the negotiations and
readiness to bring about substantial
reductions. ■

START Negotiations

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 18, 1982'

We welcome President Brezhnev's an-
nounced willingness to begin negotia-
tions on substantial reductions in
strategic nuclear arms. We will study
Brezhnev's statement in detail, which we
have not yet had a chance to do.

With regard to President Brezhnev's
proposal to freeze strategic arms as
soon as the talks begin, as we have said
before, a freeze now would codify ex-
isting Soviet military advantages and
remove Soviet incentives to agree to the
substantial reductions which President
Reagan has identified as our primary ob-
jective in START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks].

With regard to Brezhnev's proposal
to limit additional deployments of
intermediate-range missiles, this appears
to be little more than a reiteration of an
earlier Soviet proposal to freeze the cur-
rent nuclear imbalance in Europe. As

August 1982

53

CANADA

such, it falls far short of President
Reagan's proposal for the total elimina-
tion of longer range land-based INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces]
missiles on both sides.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 25, 19822

This afternoon we held the latest in a
series of National Security Council
meetings focused on arms control. At
the conclusion of the meeting, I gave
final approval to the instructions the
American negotiating team will carry to
Greneva, where negotiations will begin
next Tuesday, June 29, on Strategic
Arms Reduction Tali<s.

Our team will be headed by Am-
bassador Edward L. Rowny, an
outstanding soldier-diplomat, who has
participated actively in developing the
far-reaching START proposals we have
made, and in which the entire world is
placing so much hope.

An historic opportunity exists to
reverse the massive buildup of nuclear
arsenals that occurred during the last
decade. We must do all we possibly can
to achieve substantial reductions in the
numbers and the destructive potential of
the nuclear forces. As our proposals em-
phasize, we must seek especially to
reduce the most destabilizing elements
of the strategic arsenals. We must in-
sure reductions that are verifiable, that
go to equal levels, and that enhance
stability and deterrence and thereby
reduce the risk of nuclear war.

I do not underestimate the for-
midable nature of this task. But I
believe it is in the interest of the peoples
of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the entire world to engage fully in
this effort. I have the highest confidence
that Ed Rowny and his team will work
faithfully and tirelessly toward this goal.

Alaska Gas Pipeline

'Made by Larry Speakes, Principal Depu-
ty Press Secretary to the President (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of May 24, 1982).

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June 28, 1982. ■

Following is an exchange of letters
between Secretary Haig and Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Mark MacGuigan regarding financing
for the Alaska natural gas transporta-
tion system. '

SECRETARY MacGUIGAN'S LETTER,
APR. 23, 1982

Dear Al,

I have been alerted to what could become a
critical impasse in the discussions on financ-
ing of the Alaskan segment of the Alaska
Natural Gas Transportation System.

As you well know, in addition to the
bilateral agreement of 1977, our two Govern-
ments have jointly invested substantial ef-
forts in support of this pipeline, which we
have agreed is in the long-term security and
energy interests of both our countries. The
Canadian Government remains committed to
the early completion of the project, based on
private financing, but I am concerned that
the various parties involved in the financing
negotiations may fail to appreciate fully the
implications of any significant delay on the
willingness or ability of the Canadian Govern-
ment and the Canadian companies involved to
proceed with it at some later date.

The Canadian Northern Pipeline Commis-
sioner, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, is
planning to convene a meeting of the pro-
ducers and the sponsors of the Alaska portion
next week in order to apprise them of the
views and concerns of the Canadian Govern-
ment. I am sure that a reiteration by you of
the USA Government's support of the proj-
ect, preferably in a public statement, would
have a positive influence.

I am prepared to release this letter as a
clear statement for the public record of our
Government's position.

Yours sincerely,

Mark MacGuiGAN

SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER,
APR. 27, 1982

Dear Mark:

Thank you for your letter of April 23 regard-
ing the financing of the Alaska Natural Gas
Transportation System (ANGTS).

We shared the Government of Canada's
concerns about recent developments which
could delay significantly completion of the
pipeline. The United States Government re-
mains fully committed to the Alaska Natural
Gas Transportation System based upon
private financing, and believes it would be
unfortunate if its construction were subject
to another, perhaps indefinite postponement.

As you know, this Administration has
taken an active role in reducing legal and
regulatory impediments that have com-
plicated efforts in the private sector to ar-
range the necessary financing. Upon submis-
sion of the waiver of law to Congress October
15, 1981, President Reagan reaffirmed this
government's basic commitment to ANGTS
when he stated,

"My Administration supports the comple-
tion of this project through private finan-
cing, and it is our hope that this action
will clear the way to moving ahead with
it. I believe that this project is important
not only in terms of its contribution to
the energy security of North America. It
is also a symbol of U.S. -Canadian ability
to work together cooperatively in the
energy area for the benefit of both coun-
tries and peoples,"

Through the cooperative efforts of the Ad-
ministration and Congress, the waiver was
approved December 15, 1981.

We continue to believe ANGTS offers
Americans the most realistic option to obtain
secure and reliable access to some 13 percent
of America's natural gas reserves which is
currently inaccessible. Once in operation, the
project promises to provide the energy
equivalent to some 400,000 barrels of oil a
day which will help Americans lessen their
energy dependence on uncertain foreign
sources. Moreover, the pipeline's early com-
pletion would be an important step toward
further reduction of our energj' vulnerability.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

'Released jointly by the U.S. and Cana-
dian Governments. ■

54

Department of State Bulletin

EAST ASIA

Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge
In East Asia and the Pacific

by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on June 10, 1982.
Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary
of Stat eJ

I am delighted with your invitation to
discuss allied responses to the Soviet
threat in East Asia and the Pacific. My
remarks will focus, as the chairman's
[Senator Charles A. Percy] letter re-
quested, primarily on the Japanese,
Australian, and New Zealand contribu-
tions to the region's defense with some
remarks about the role of South Korea
in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and
how we see China's future role. I will
also share some of our thoughts about
the nature of the Soviet threat in the
Pacific.

Security Interests and Assets
in the Area

The contributions of East Asia and
Pacific nations to the vitality and
strength of the free world have grown
enorm.ously over the last 10 years. All
evidence indicates that they will con-
tinue to do so over the next decade.

The dramatic rise of the Japanese
and South Korean economies from the
ruins of war is, of course, among the
world's best known success stories. Less
well known perhaps is the role these two
nations and the quite diff'erent, but simi-
larly impressive, role the Australian and
New Zealand economies have played in
stimulating growth in other parts of
Asia and the Pacific by transferring re-
sources and technology through assist-
ance programs, investment, and trade.
The largest and longest sustained
growth rates for both advanced and less
developed countries are now found in
Asia.

Asian and Pacific nations are in turn
playing an increasingly important role in
strengthening more distant parts of the
free world. Japanese aid programs are
now directed not only to East Asia but
to far away Middle East and African na-
tions. Korean construction companies
are carrying badly needed skills and
assets to the Middle East and Southwest
Asia, and Korea has begun a modest aid

program. Australia and New Zealand
have continued to assume critical inter-
national economic, political, and peace-
keeping responsibilities.

The economic success stories of
Pacific, Northeast Asian, and most re-
cently Southeast Asian nations are
based to great extent, I believe, on the
fact that each nation has been free to
carve out its own place in the world's
market economy without sacrificing
values and traditions important to the
identity of their societies. Together they
comprise a highly cooperative, also com-
petitive, and, therefore, efficient central
element of what we have come to call
the free market system.

In attempting to describe in broad
terms the extremely valuable free world
assets which must be defended in East
Asia and the Pacific, I hope I have also
pointed to some of its intrinsic defense
strengths. The stark contrast between
the thriving, dynamic, free economies of
the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] states with the stagnant, rigidly
controlled, and highly unproductive
systems of the neighboring North
Korean and Indochinese Communist
states has not gone unnoticed. The prag-
matic cooperative approach China is now
taking in charting its own course toward
modernization, a change which has im-
mense strategic implications, undoubted-
ly stems in part from observation of
these diiferences. The export market for
revolution among lesser developed coun-
tries in the region has virtually col-
lapsed.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and
some of its friends have taken to a more
direct and blatant course to their objec-
tives. The Soviet occupation of Afghani-
stan and the Soviet-supported Vietna-
mese invasion of Kampuchea are clear
examples. The strength of the Viet-
namese and North Korean armed forces,
which greatly exceed defensive needs,
and the marked buildup of Soviet power
in the Pacific raise the threat of further
actions of this sort.

Soviet Threat

The Soviet objective in East Asia, as in
other regions, is to seek positions of

maximum geopolitical strength from
which to project power and influence. As
is implicit in the Soviet force buildup to
be summarized today by the Department
of Defense, the Soviets put a premium
on military force as an instrument of
geopolitical strength. The Soviet force
buildup— globally and in the Pacific— far
exceeds any legitimate defense require-
ments.

Soviet objectives which directly
aflFect the countries on which our dis-
cussion is focused today include:

Neutralizing Japan in any conflict,
weakening existing defense ties, and
ultimately isolating Japan. Incidental-
ly, during the past 3 years the Soviets
have increased their forces in the Kuril
Islands they occupy north of Hokkaido
to approximately 10,000 personnel.
Moreover, Soviet strong points in the
islands overlook strategic sea lanes link-
ing the seas of Japan and Okhotsk with
the northern Pacific. In time of war,

The Soviet objective
in East Asia . . . is to
seek positions of max-
imum geopolitical
strength from which to
project power and in-
fluence.

Soviet forces could stage from the
islands for attacks on Hokkaido to
secure these vital sea lanes and prevent
the Soviet fleet from being bottled up in
Vladivostok.

Threatening the security of the sea
lanes, thereby putting themselves in a
position to interdict Middle Eastern
petroleum to our major allies during a
period of international crisis. This
would also permit the Soviets to
threaten vital trade among regional
states, such as exists between Japan and
Australia. In a crisis the Soviets might
also seek to deny East Asian routes of

August 1982

55

EAST ASIA

access to the Indian Ocean to the United
States or anyone else for that matter.
As is apparent from the Defense Depart-
ment's description of the Soviet naval
forces in the Far East, much of the in-
creased threat to sea lanes of communi-
cations derives from the following Soviet
naval trends:

• Diversity and improvement in
warship, aircraft, and weapons capa-
bility;

• Large increases in at-sea and
distant-deployment operations and
commitments by the Soviets to strive for
naval superiority; and

• Increased awareness by the Soviet
leadership of the leverage which accrues
to a nation with sizeable and strong
maritime resources, especially a large,
modern na\7.

Soviet objectives which represent a
significant longer term but less direct
threat to Northeast Asia include:

Increasing and maintaining access
to Vietnamese air and naval facilities
as a means of projecting Soviet mili-
tary power and political influence
throughout the region, especially
among ASEAN countries. Access to
these facilities greatly extends the
Soviet military reach in the Pacific.
From airfields in Vietnam, Soviet
bombers could attack much of southern
China now out of range of aircraft based
in the Soviet Far East (with the excep-
tion of the Backfire bomber). Access to
Vietnamese facilities increases the
threat to the Philippines, which current-
ly have the only U.S. bases near main-
land Asia which are not vulnerable to
combined Soviet air and naval attack
from existing bases in the Soviet Far
East.

Reduction of ASEAN's links with
the West. The establishment of ties to
ASEAN states is a long-term Soviet ob-
jective. As one means of loosening
U.S. -ASEAN ties, as well as ties among
ASEAN states, the U.S.S.R. seeks to
undermine resolution of the Kam-
puchean problem based on the declara-
tion of the U.N. -sponsored international
conference on Kampuchea, which called
for Vietnamese withdrawal and Khmer
self-determination.

Limit external assistance to
China's modernization efforts by ex-
ploiting trade links to discourage
Western Europe and Japan from close
economic and defense ties with China.
The Soviets are also employing diplo-
matic overtures to draw the Chinese
away from Western relationships.

In short, the increasingly formidable
Soviet mOitary capabilities in East Asia
combined with objectives inimical to
U.S. and allied interests present a
challenge.

The East Asian and Pacific states
are adapting their defenses to respond
to these changes in the security environ-
ment. Some may not proceed at times
with the dispatch that we desire but
most are doing much more with less as-
sistance from us than has ever been the
case in the past. While our increased
foreign military sales (FMS) credits to
Korea, for example, are highly import-
ant in a real as well as a symbolic sense,
they do not, in fact, cover yearly pay-
ments on past debts to us and the Re-
public of Korea is dipping deep into its
own resources to finance its military
modernization. In working out with our
friends and allies our separate contribu-
tions to the area's defense, it is import-
ant that we do not inadvertently neglect
our greatest source of strength, which is
the cooperative, competitive, and highly
productive system we have built up
among our societies over the past two
decades.

I will now turn to some of the
efforts being taken by some important
treaty allies of the United States to cope
with the Soviet threat.

Japan

The Soviet military buildup in East Asia
and the significant strengthening in the
past 2 or 3 years of Soviet military
forces in the Japanese islands north of
Hokkaido have reinforced the traditional
suspicion with which most Japanese re-
gard the Soviets. Aggressive use of
power over the past decade by the
U.S.S.R. has increased Japanese aware-
ness of the danger that Soviet actions
pose for their interests. While few
Japanese believe Japan should respond
in kind to the growth of Soviet military
power, responsible Japanese in and out
of government recognize the need for
closer cooperation with the West. A con-
sensus has grown for steady improve-
ments in Japan's self-defense forces
while at the same time the nation con-
tinues to rely on the U.S. -Japan security
treaty and the nuclear umbrella associ-
ated with it. There is growing recogni-
tion that the defense responsibilities
assumed by the United States in areas
such as the Middle East serve Japan's
security as well, thereby arguing for
enhanced Japanese defense efforts.

Recent Japanese governments, in-
cluding that of Prime Minister Suzuki,
have maintained that Japan can most

usefully contribute to stability and peace
in the Asia-Pacific region through a com-
bination of political, economic, and de-
fense measures designed to strengthen
Japan's security posture at home and
improve its cooperation with both the in-
dustrial democracies and the Third
World. This approach has come to be
labeled "comprehensive security." Rather
than emphasizing percentages of gross
national product and other conten-
tious—and often misleading — measures
of defense performance, our security
dialogue v/ith Japan has, in turn,
stressed a more rational and appropriate
division of labor to meet our common
strategic concerns. This concept of
burdensharing is evident in the following
areas:

Strengthened self-defense force
capabilities that will allow Japan to
assume primary responsibilities for its
local defense as well as protect the
sea lanes in the northwest Pacific
upon which its economic security de-
pends. I should emphasize our view that
such capabilities remain within Japan's
well-known constitutional constraints on
the projection overseas of offensive mili-
tary power, are consistent with the pro-
visions of our Mutual Security Treaty
with the Japanese, and should not cause
undue concern among Japan's neighbors.
There have already been substantial im-
provements in the self-defense forces,
but the Japanese Government itself
acknowledges that there are still signifi-
cant shortcomings in such essential
areas as air defense, antisubmarine war-
fare, logistics, and communications.
Both Secretaries Haig and Weinberger
have urged their Japanese counterparts
to accelerate their government's efforts
to rectify these weaknesses.

More effective cooperation be-
tween U.S. and Japanese forces.

Under the Mutual Security Treaty,
Japan provides the U.S. bases that are
all but indispensable to our strategy of
forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific
region. Japan has made increasing con-
tributions to the maintenance and im-
provement of these facilities — their
direct and indirect support of U.S.
forces this year will exceed $1 billion. In
recent years this support, which in-
creased 25% in the current budget, has
embraced new areas such as partial
assumption of our local labor costs and
the construction of new operational
facilities.

Joint planning. Since the adoption
of the "U.S. -Japan Guidelines for De-
fense Cooperation" in 1978, U.S. and
Japanese military staffs have worked to-

56

Department of State Bulletin

EAST ASIA

gether in formulating specific plans for
not only the defense of Japan but,
recently, for Japanese facilitative assist-
ance to our forces in meeting emergen-
cies elsewhere in the Far East.

Joint exercises. Joint exercises in-
volving all three services have grown in
frequency and scope each year. Naval
forces, for exam.ple, participate with us
in the annual miiltinational RIMPAC
exercises.

Technological cooperation. We
have been working closely with the
Japanese in regard to weapons develop-
ment in meetings of the systems and
technology forum and look forward to
Japan's adoption of a policy that will
permit a full two-way flow of defense
technology.

Efforts in related areas of common
interest. Japan's positions on such inter-
national issues as Afghanistan, Poland,
refugees, and arms control have been
close to our own. In undertaking a more
assertive foreign policy, Japan has made
increasingly clear its identification with
Western interests. We are, of course, in-
terested in Japan's expanding foreign
aid programs, particularly to such coun-
tries of strategic importance as Thai-
land, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan, Egypt,
and the Persian Gulf states. Recently
Japan has voiced support for the Carib-
bean Basin initiative. Japan is commit-
ted to doubling its overseas aid level be-
tween 1979 and 1984.

Japan's commitment to greater
security efforts is evident in the increase
of its 1982 defense budget ($11.8 billion)
by 7.75%, a decision made in the face of
severe budgetary pressures which
j resulted in cutbacks of most domestic
programs of the Japanese Government.
We give due credit to this and other
steps the Japanese have taken to
strengthen their defense posture, but we
have pointed out— most recently during
Secretary Weinberger's visit to Tokyo
last month — that the United States and
its other allies also face serious domestic
problems in taking necessary defense
measures. We will continue to urge that
Japan accelerate its security efforts so
that we can cooperate effectively in cop-
ing with the Soviet challenge.

Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand anchor the
southern end of the Western line of
defense in East Asia and the Pacific.
They also stand guard over a secure, if
lengthy, line of communication between
the Pacific and Indian Oceans which was
of great value in World War II and

would be today in the event of war.
Both are old allies that have fought in
every war involving the United States in
this century, from World War I to Viet-
nam. Since 1951 we have been formally
linked with them through the ANZUS
[Australia, New Zealand, United States
pact] mutual defense treaty and the
Manila pact.

Both countries continue contribu-
tions to peace, security, and economic
development of contiguous regions that
have been vital to the free world.
Through the five power defense ar-
rangement, the two ANZUS allies are
linked with Malaysia, Singapore, and
Great Britain. Australia currently main-
tains air force units in Malaysia, while
New Zealand has an infantry battalion
at Singapore. Joint exercises, training,
and consultations are undertaken.

Both countries also maintain close
economic and security assistance links
with the other three members of the
ASEAN countries— Indonesia, Thailand,
and the Philippines. Finally, New
Zealand and Australia have played im-
portant roles in assisting the new island
nations of the southwest Pacific to
develop peacefully and, through the
Commonwealth, have played a construc-
tive role in countries like Zimbabwe and,
most recently, Uganda.

From the defense standpoint,
Australia, with a larger population and a
more prosperous economy than New
Zealand, makes a quantitatively greater
contribution to both security and eco-
nomic development in contiguous
regions. Australia's defense budget is
projected at U.S.$4.4 billion in 1982-83
or about 2.9% of gross domestic prod-
uct. Moreover, in 1980 a 5-year defense
modernization and buildup was adopted
calling for an increase of 7% in defense
expenditures in real terms and procure-
ment of over U.S. $500 million annually,
mainly from the United States.

When this expansion is completed,
Australia will have 75 F-18 aircraft to
supplement and then replace its aging
Mirage Ills; it is purchasing 10 new
P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft to
replace an earlier model, giving it a total
of about 20 such aircraft; and it is
modernizing its RF/F-lllC strike and
reconnaissance squadron. The Royal
Australian Navy has agreed to purchase
the British aircraft carrier Invincible to
replace its aging H.M.A.S. Melbourne
and has ordered a fourth FFG
guided missile frigate from the United
States. With its six Oberon class sub-
marines and River class destroyer
escorts, it will soon have one of the most

potent naval forces in its region. These
air and sea forces, backed by a small but
well-trained and -equipped army, make
Australia's contribution to the alliance
an important one, both in terms of de-
fending its island continent and of main-
taining peace in the region.

New Zealand's forces are proportion-
ally smaller than Australia's— roughly
12,640 regulars compared to 71,000
Australians— but they, too, are excep-
tionally well-trained and effective. In ad-
dition to the contribution of helicopters,
pilots, and ground crew that the New
Zealand Government has contributed
with Australia to the Sinai peace-
keeping force and its role in Singapore
and Malaysia, New Zealand plays an im-
portant civic action role among the small
nations of the southwest Pacific such as
the Kingdom of Tonga, Fiji, and
Western Samoa. Most recently. New
Zealand and Australian forces rendered
critical aid to Tonga following a deva-
stating hurricane. New Zealand has also
provided military and civilian advisers
and equipment to the armed forces of
these countries. With a military budget
of about $400 million and facing difficult
economic circumstances, there has been
little opportunity for the New Zealand
Government to undertake an ambitious
program of defense modernization. The
government is doing all it can; it will,
for example, purchase two Leander class
frigates to replace the two oldest of the
four in its navy.

South Korea

The maintenance of a credible deterrent
to North Korean aggression against the
south is a key element in preserving
peace and security in Northeast Asia. It
is this objective to which our assistance
to the Republic of Korea (R. O.K.)— as
well as that country's own very substan-
tial efforts— has been devoted. Our own
contribution to that shared objective has
frequently been reviewed by this and
other committees of the Congress. It is
substantial. We maintain as you know
some 39,000 military personnel in the
R.O.K., including the 2d Infantry Divi-
sion just south of the demilitarized zone.
We have recently taken steps to improve
the capability of those forces by pro-
viding them with more modern weapons
and aircraft. We have also maintained a
high level of military assistance, in the
form of FMS credits, to the R.O.K.
Although Congress has appropriated
$166 million in FMS credits for fiscal
year (FY) 1982, we recently forwarded a
request for a $29 million supplemental.

August 1982

57

EAST ASIA

We have proposed a $210 million pro-
gram for FY 1983. These levels of as-
sistance are in our view essential in view
of the persisting military imbalance on
the peninsula and the steady and con-
tinuing buildup of North Korean forces.

Our assistance is also justified when
placed in the context of South Korea's
own efforts to meet the threat from the
north. The R.O.K. maintains an armed
force of more than 600,000 with a ready
reserve several times that number. To
support this level of military prepared-
ness, it spends some 6% of its gross na-
tional product on defense. While Korea
has achieved remarkable economic prog-
ress over the past 20 years, it nonethe-
less remains a developing country,
whose domestic economic requirements
remain, in many respects, unfulfilled.
The burden imposed by its military ex-
penditures has been especially heavy
during the past 2 years of economic
recession and gradual recovery. Never-
theless, the R.O.K. has not faltered in
its commitment to redress gradually the
unfavorable balance with the north and
to deter aggression.

Our alliance with the Republic of
Korea and both Korean and U.S. efforts
to strengthen the military forces at the
disposal of that alliance are directed
only toward deterring an attack upon
the south by the north and repelling
such an attack if it should ever come.
Nevertheless, while this is a narrowly
defined geographic objective, its import-
ance extends far beyond the peninsula
and is, as I have suggested, vital to the
peace and security of the entire region.
In this important sense, R.O.K. defense
efforts and our support of them figure
prominently in our broader objectives
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in East Asia.

China

China is a friendly, nonallied country
with which we share imporUmt strategic
interests, including a common perception
of threatening Soviet ambitions world-
wide. In the Pacific area specifically, the
People's Republic of China plays a sig-
nificant international role by maintaining
consistent pressure on the Vietnamese
to withdraw from Kampuchea and Laos
and on the Soviets to leave Afghanistan.
China's opposition to Soviet and Soviet-
proxy aggression, which results in the
tying down of nearly .500,000 Soviet and
2,50,000 Vietnamese troops on Chinese
borders, is an important factor in main-
taining regional and global peace and
stability.

Beijing, moreover, strongly supports
our security ties with Japan and the con-
cept of strengthening Japanese defen-
sive rearmament. China also supports
the presence of U.S. bases in Asia and a
strong U.S. naval presence in the Pacific
as a counter to further Soviet moves in-
to the area. For the same reason, China
shares our interest in maintaining
stability on the Korean Peninsula and
has parallel security commitments to
such U.S. friends as Thailand and Paki-
stan.

Our friends and allies in Asia attach
great importance to development of a
healthy Sino-U.S. relationship. Close
U.S. ties with China are considered a
key element in China's economic devel-
opment and thus to China's continuing
progress as a responsible participant in
the Asian and world economic order.
U.S. relations with China are also seen
by our Asian friends as a positive in-
fluence on the future direction of China's
foreign policy and as a stimulus to
regional cooperation and development.

We believe that continued good U.S.
relations with China greatly enhance
security and stability in East Asia.
U.S. -China relations are currently at a
sensitive juncture due to the Taiwan
arms sales issue. We are attempting to
resolve this problem through continuing
dialogue with Beijing. The recent visit of
Vice President Bush to China demon-

strated this Administration's desire to
bridge our differences and preserve and
strengthen the important relations and
cooperation between the United States
and China. The Chinese welcomed Mr.
Bush and showed a spirit of willingness
to work toward resolution of our differ-
ences. The visit last week by Senate Ma-
jority Leader Baker further contributed
to this spirit and certainly enhanced
Chinese understanding of congressional
views on this sensitive issue.

Conclusion

In summary, while our defense burdens
are heavy and we continue by necessity
to make the largest single contribution
of any country, our allies and friends are
continuing to assume an ever-increasing
share of the burden. Given the increas-
ing Soviet threat to our common in-
terests, it is essential that we, our allies,
and our friends transmit an unremitting
signal of resolve to protect these in-
terests for so long as they continue to be
threatened.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be publisned by the committee and will
be available from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy

by John H. Holdridge

Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
June 8, 1982. Ambassador Holdridge is
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. '

I greatly welcome your invitation to
speak on U.S. policy toward Southeast
Asia. This hearing is timely as Deputy
Secretary Stoessel and I will next week
be meeting with the ASEAN [Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations]
Foreign Ministers in Singapore, where
many of the issues I will mention today
will undoubtedly be addressed.

Favorable Trends

Few would have thought 20 years or
even 10 years ago that Southeast Asia
would be described this year in the

financial section of the New York Times
as "the most upbeat area of the world."
Although I have not measured Southeast
Asia's claims to this distinction against
those of other parts of the globe, several
important developments in my view
justify an overall positive assessment
both of developments in the region and
of our relationships there.

Particularly encouraging is the suc-
cessful manner in which many Southeast
Asian nations have carved out for
themselves increasingly important roles
in the world's free market. The
economic growth of most of our
Southeast Asian friends, to which I
drew attention in my appearence before
this subcommittee last summer, has con-
tinued despite a less than favorable in-
ternational environment, particularly as
regards demand for their principal ex-
port commodities. The ASEAN states in
particular have both drawn strength
from — and lent strength to — the world
market economy.

58

Department of State Bulletin

EAST ASIA

Another positive feature is the effec-
tiveness with which ASEAN countries
continue to rally international support
for resolution of the Kampuchean prob-
lem. They have met continued Viet-
namese intransigence with resolution
and resourcefulness. ASEAN's success
has been reflected in another decisive
vote on Kampuchea in the U.N. General
Assembly last fall, equally broad support
for its approach to a political solution to
the Kampuchea problem spelled out in
the declaration of last July's interna-
tional conference on Kampuchea, and
broad cooperation in applying strong
economic pressure on Vietnam to help
persuade it to negotiate a comprehen-
sive political solution in Kampuchea as
outlined by ASEAN in the international
conference.

We can also point to favorable
trends in popular political participation
paralleling the emphasis that a market-
economy approach places on freeing in-
dividual initiative. Three of the five
ASEAN states held national elections
this year, and the other two held impor-
tant bielections, adding to the founda-
tion of democratic development. While
progress in this area may be regarded
by some as uneven, the trend is encour-
aging when viewed over the long term.
Certainly prospects are bright when con-
trasted with conditions in Indochina,
which possesses the region's principal
alternative governing system.

Current Challenges

When we meet with ASEAN Foreign
Ministers in Singapore later this month,
the focus will be less on past accomplish-
ments, of course, than on challenges
that lie before us — and there are many.
The ASEAN governments are par-
ticularly concerned about the current
state of the world economy, which has
placed strains on them and on their rela-
tionship with us. As we are all aware,
economic growth such as many ASEAN
countries have experienced often in-
creases popular expectations faster than
actual incomes, and the depressed
market for certain export commodities
has had a widespread effect within their
domestic economies. Some governments
are under pressure to withdraw from
competition through restrictive and thus
ultimately self-defeating trade ar-
rangements. There is a widespread fear
that the United States itself might turn
to protectionism. We will stress our
commitment to get our own economy in-

to order, to resolve trade and invest-
ment problems in a manner which will
deepen attachments to the market
economy, and to contribute to balanced
growth through investment, trade, and
development assistance programs.

Improving the global economic
climate will also be important in this
respect, and I think that we will soon be
able to point to some positive movement
arising from the Versailles summit. We
will ask in return for ASEAN's con-
tinued cooperation in assuring that the
world market, from which we all have
drawn our strength, remains competitive
and thus efficient.

Continued Vietnamese intransigence
on Kampuchea and the threat Viet-
namese forces pose to our good friend,
Thailand, are also matters of immediate
and great concern to ASEAN and the
United States alike. The repressive
measures used by the Indochinese
regimes to control their own people, in-
cluding the use of lethal chemical agents
against civilian populations, is an addi-
tional disturbing element. Pressing for a
political solution to the Kampuchea
problem while strengthening the military
forces of Thailand and its friends in the
area are parallel, complementary meas-
ures to meet this challenge. We will
reassure the ASEAN states that they
can rely on our firm support for their ef-
forts to promote a Kampuchean settle-
ment based on the declaration of the in-
ternational conference on Kampuchea.
We believe ASEAN governments should
continue to take the lead on this issue
because of their demonstrated success in
marshaling international support and
because of their sound approach to the
problems involved. At the same time, we
will stress the reliability of the United
States as a treaty ally to Thailand, as a
counterweight to the growing Soviet
military presence in Indochina, and as a
reliable supplier of credit, equipment,
and training for the modest military
modernization programs of friendly
Southeast Asian countries.

While Indochinese refugee flows
have fortunately diminished markedly in
past months, they remain a problem for
the first-asylum countries. It is impor-
tant that the residual refugee population
in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia
continue to decrease, and we will work
with other resettlement countries
toward this end.

The lack of a complete accounting
for U.S servicemen missing in action in
Vietnam and Laos is a bilateral problem
to which we assign highest priority. We
will continue strenuous efforts to obtain

the cooperation of the Governments of
Vietnam and Laos on this matter, as a
humanitarian issue to be handled ex-
peditiously and separately from other
concerns.

Conclusions

Southeast Asia has for many years been
knovim as the home of some of the
world's most intractable and dangerous
problems. Many of them are still with
us. Today, however, Southeast Asia is
also the home of some of the world's
more effective problem-solving govern-
ments— and this has made a difference.
I think we might sum up the sources
of favorable developments in Southeast
Asia by singling out three characteristics
of our friends there.

• They have strived hard to com-
pete in the world market economy.
Their overall growth rates, which are
far above the world average, testify to
the efficiency and strength they have
gained from such competition.

• They have sought to cooperate in
preserving the economic system which
gives them this growth. ASEAN, which
found common economic goals for coun-
tries whose economies are not com-
plementary and which has now become a
potent constructive force in world
political councils, is proof of their suc-
cess in this field.

• They have recognized and
demonstrated that local initiative is the
basic buildingblock for economic develop-
ment, social progress, and security.

The United Sta*"es has great interest
in assuring that this competitive spirit,
cooperative attitude, and local initiative
continue to thrive. Our objectives,
therefore, remain much as I described
them to you in last year's hearing. In
cooperation with our ASEAN friends,
we will seek to curb the security threat
posed by Vietnamese aggression and the
Soviet military presence and to alleviate
the economic pressures caused by the
current world slump and imbalances
within our system. The progress and
stability of our friends and allies in
ASEAN are the heart of our policy since
they form the foundation for the
favorable trends we have thus far
witnessed in Southeast Asia.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B

August 1982

59

EUROPE

Secretary Visits Turkey, Greece;
Attends North Atlantic Council

Secretary Haig departed
Washington, D.C., May 12 to visit
Turkey (May 13-15), Athens
(May ir>-16), and Luxembourg
(May 16-18), where he attended the
regular semiannual session of the North
Atlantic Council ministerial meeting
(May 17-18). He returned to the United
States on May 18.

Following are the Secretary's
remarks and news conferences in
Ankara, Athens, and Luxembourg and
the North Atlantic Council final com.-
munique.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY HAIG

AND

FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN.

ANKARA, MAY 15. 1982'

Foreign Minister Turkmen. I wish to
speak very briefly and leave the floor as
soon as possible to the Secretary of
State.

May I say, first of all, that we are
extremely pleased with the visit of
Mr. Haig to our country. I think that the
talks we have had here have shown that
there is a complete mutual understand-
ing and mutual trust between Turkey
and the United States. Secretary Haig
also visited our Prime Minister, an old
friend, again. He visited the President of
the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Irmak,
and we had extensive talks on many sub-
jects with the Secretary. The Secretary
of State had the opportunity to meet
and to talk with the members of the Na-
tional Security Council; he had a chance
to talk to Deputy Prime Minister Ozal,
Minister of State Aztrak, and Defense
Minister Bayulken.

We have, of course, taken up with
priority the bilateral relations between
Turkey and the United States. We have
dealt extensively with the defense and
economic cooperation between the two
countries. I think we agree that the
high-level committee on defense and
cooperation is a very useful and effec-
tive instrument for promoting our
defense cooperation. We have explored
the possibilities of furthering our
economic, commercial, technological, and
scientific cooperation.

We have had a large exchange of
views on international problems, par-
ticularly on the sources of tension today.

I think that we are in full agreement on
the broad principles and the main ap-
proaches toward these problems. We
have reiterated together our strong sup-
port for NATO solidarity. We discussed
the problem of international terrorism,
and there is an agreement between us
that there should be an effective fight
against this evil. We reviewed the situa-
tion in the Middle East with particular
emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the war between Iraq and Iran.

We have, naturally, discussed the
relations between Turkey and Greece
and the Cyprus problem. On Turkish-
Greek relations we have explained our
point of view to the Secretary. We have
emphasized that we are always ready to
negotiate our differences with Greece
but that, of course, we are equally op-
posed to any fait a^complis or unilateral
acts. On the Cyprus problem we have
reiterated our strong support for the in-
tercommunal talks, and we have
underlined to the Secretary that we
were ready to deploy all efforts in order
to facilitate and promote these talks. I
think on the whole we can say, as the
Secretary pointed out yesterday, that
the relations between Turkey and the
United States are excellent, that we
have reached in our relationship the age
of maturity and that we are looking for-
ward to increased cooperation and part-
nership between Turkey and the United
States.

Secretary Haig. I want to reiterate
and underline the great sense of en-
thusiasm and satisfaction that I feel as a
result of this all-too-brief visit here in
Turkey. This is the first time I've had an
opportunity to return to Turkey since
my days as Supreme Commander in the
spring of 1979, and I was especially
gratified that it could be in the year of
the centennial of the great Ataturk who
is the founder of modern Turkey and
whose influence is so pervasive today in
all that is Turkish.

I think I was able to use the oppor-
tunity of this visit to underline once
again the great sense of dedication that
the United States feels to its relation-
ship with Turkey and its recognition
that Turkey is the vital anchor of the
southeastern flank of the alliance.
Turkey also plays an indispensable role

in the stability of the eastern Mediterra-
nean region and, indeed, Southwest Asia
as well. This visit afforded me an oppor-
tunity to convey to General Evren, an
old friend, President Reagan's deter-
mination to continue the level of
economic and military assistance to
Turkey and to build and strengthen our
ties in the months and years ahead.

As Foreign Minister Turkmen men-
tioned, during the visit we had an oppor-
tunity to exchange views on the blight of
international terrorism, and I, of course,
used the opportunity to convey the deep
sense of regret and sorrow that every
American feels for the recent tragedies
in our own country as a result of ter-
rorist— vile terrorist — acts against
Turkish officials. In this sense we are
working now at the Federal, state, and
local levels to deal with this situation, to
bring prompt and firm justice to
perpetrators of these acts. One of the
most encouraging aspects of the visit for
me was to see the changes that have oc-
curred here in Turkey since my last
visit. I speak of the return to law and
order, the suppression of terrorist activi-
ty that Turkey was plagued by in the
late 1970s, and early 1980s, which I had
an opportunity to witness firsthand as
the Supreme Allied Commander. To see
the elimination of that kind of activity is
very encouraging to me.

And it goes without saying I was
also able to witness firsthand, through
the briefings and information that were
provided to me and my party, the high
level of improvement that has occurred
as a result of Turkey's economic reform
program, both in the area of internal
economic inflation, where the reductions
have been very encouraging, and in the
increase in exports that Turkey is realiz-
ing as a result of the disciplined and ef-
fective and visionary planning of the
Evren regime. We, of course, had an op-
portunity to discuss the timetable for
the return to representative democracy
here in Turkey, and I was able to
reassure General Evren that the United
States has full, total, and unquestioning
confidence in the adherence to the
schedule which we support and believe is
wholly reasonable and practicable.

We did not have an opportunity also
to discuss Greek-Turkish relationships,
the Cyprus question, and problems in

60

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

the Aegean. As you know, it is U.S.
policy to favor a peaceful solution of
whatever disputes occur by the parties.
And I will go on to Athens where I am
sure there will be further discussions
about these subjects.

All in all, I want to emphasize and
reiterate the deep sense of satisfaction I
had with this visit. It is especially so
because I have known and respected
Turkey so well over the years. To see
the kind of progress that is so evident
today, and to a visitor who has been
away for some time, I think this prog-
ress is even more sharply evident.
Agfain, I want to thank you, Mr.
Minister, General Evren, Prime Minister
Ulusu, and the general staff, with whom
I've worked in the past, as well as the
other officials of the government, for
the hospitality and great benefit that
this visit afforded me and my colleagues.

Q. It is reported that you advised
the Turkish Government to improve its
lomewhat strained ties with the Euro-
pean countries. In your opinion, what
sould and should Turkey do to im-
prove them?

Secretary Haig. As a matter of
fact, I did not advise my Turkish hosts
to improve their ties. I have encouraged
Dur European friends to continue their
ligh level of support and cooperation
ivith Turkey. I don't think it is the role
3f a friend and ally to be pedantic in the
context of your question. I have no ques-
rion that the overwhelming membership
of the alliance is fully cognizant of the
vital role and indispensable role that
Turkey plays today, and they will con-
tinue their high level of cooperation with
Turkey.

Q. In 1976 the Greek Govern-
ment's demand for a guarantee against
Turkey was answered by a letter
signed by Mr. Kissinger. Today the
present Greek Government seems to
be asking for the same type of a letter
from the American side. I wonder
whether you consider this Kissinger
letter still valid, and whether you will
make a reference to it when asked.

Secretary Haig. I think that U.S.
policy on this subject is well-known and
longstanding. It involves our interest in
seeing disputes in the Aegean between
Greece and Turkey solved through
peaceful means through communication
among the parties. That has been and
remains American policy, and I am con-
fident that these two valuable members
of the NATO alliance have willingly
joined the alliance to meet their own

securities through that partnership and
the participation in the alliance.

Q. Are you still committed to the
Rogers plan for the allocation of
defense responsibilities in the
Aegean?

Secretary Haig. As you know, I
have a certain degree of my own
energies and activities involved in the
Rogers plan, if that's what the proper
term is these days. We, of course, feel
that it is vitally important to be full,
total participants in the alliance, full
members. Whatever the vehicle that's
employed to achieve that in the light of
recent history is something that would
have our support.

Q. How does your Administration
interpret these European misconcep-
tions about Turkey, and how valid are
these perceptions in Europe and the
United States toward Turkey?

Secretary Haig. I think that it's not
for me to be the official observer of
these things. I can speak for my own
government and reemphasize again our
full confidence in the leadership here in
Turkey and the great admiration we
have for what this leadership has ac-
complished. I sometimes regret that
memories are too short. All of which has
happened is a source of satisfaction to
me, and I am fully confident and I have
no reservation about the return of
Turkey to representative democracy
under the time schedule announced by
the Evren government last year. I would
hope that our European partners would
share that sense of confidence.

Q. Can you please bring us up to
date on the situation around the
Falkland Islands and the efforts of the
United Nations to bring about a settle-
ment?

Secretary Haig. No, I think the
Secretary General had a very detailed
statement on this subject last night. As
you know, the British Government has
recalled its Ambassador from the United
Nations and its representative from
Washington, Ambassador Henderson,
for a high-level review of the situation in
London over the weekend. I will be see-
ing British Foreign Minister Pym in
Luxembourg and look forward to de-
tailed talks on the situation. As you
know. President Reagan commented in
his press conference day before yester-
day expressing some slight degree of op-
timism that some progress had been
made, and I think that parallels the
observation of the Secretary General.
The United States stands prepared to do
all that it can in what the Secretary

General has described as the critical
hours, which we now find ourselves in,
in this very difficult issue.

Q. It seems like the Greek Govern-
ment's policies are against NATO prin-
ciples—asking for guarantees against
another NATO ally and putting reser-
vations in the joint declarations. Do
you think that Greece is causing a
crack in NATO right now?

Secretary Haig. I would not. I don't
think it's appropriate for me to make
any observations along these lines. As
you know, I will be moving from here
this morning to Athens, and I'm sure
there will be further discussions there. I
have outlined for you the general policy
of the United States on this subject. I
am aware that there is a letter of the
kind referred to in the files, and that's
where it is.

Q. Turkey is ready to start
negotiations again. Do you believe
that you will be able to convince the
Greek Prime Minister to start the
negotiations between Turkey and
Greece?

Secretary Haig. I understand there
is some discussion already underway in
a sporadic sense on some of the nar-
rower issues. There is some underway
on the question of territorial waters.
We, of course, think these are matters
to be discussed and resolved either
bilaterally or under international agree-
ment.

Q. In light of Deputy Prime
Minister Mr. Turgut Ozal's statement
on Thursday that political parties in
Turkey will be allowed to start func-
tioning as from the middle or end of
1983, are you still confident that the
regime can stick to its timetable of
holding elections in late 1983 or early
1984?

Secretary Haig. My discussions
here convinced me that the timetable
established by the government is
satisfactory, is on schedule, and is pro-
ceeding as anticipated. I have no basis
for questioning that. I have no doubt
that it will be pursued as outlined.

Q. Did you discuss specifically the
case of Mr. Ecevit? There is a lot of
opinion in Europe that he should be
released from prison.

Secretary Haig. It's not my role
nor would it be appropriate for me to
make any public comment on an internal
matter which is being pursued in accord-
ance with existing Turkish law, and I'm
not going to do that this morning.

61

EUROPE

Q. Did you discuss the question of
Mr. Ecevit with the Turkish
authorities?

Secretary Haig. I didn't discuss it,
but it was discussed with me by Turkish
officials.

Q. Is the Kissinger-Bitsios letter
valid or not?

Secretary Haig. Almost in dental
fashion, you have tried to extract
everything you can on the subject. I said
it's a letter that's in the files. I told you
what our policy is in the Administration
today. That is that these are matters to
be worked out peacefully by the govern-
ments concerned, and I'm talking about
tensions in the Aegean. Only last week
somebody said I feel like a lemon in
service to 20 martinis.

Q. Are you satisfied with the ex-
planation you received concerning
Turkey's close ties with Libya?

Secretary Haig. I certainly under-
stand clearly the Turkish-Libyan rela-
tionship. It is somewhat different than
that between the United States and
Libya. The great strength of this
alliance is that we are all different and
we pursue sovereign policies of the
member states, and that's as it should
be. We are not a Warsaw Pact where all
march in tandem — most of the time.

Eighth Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
MAY 25, 1982'

In accordance with the provisions of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress niade during the past 60
days toward reaching a negotiated settlement
of the Cyprus problem.

In the course of continuing discussion of
the United Nations "evaluation" of the inter-
communal negotiations, the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot negotiators met on April
14, 21, and 30 and May 4, 6, 11, 13, and 18.
The negotiators have continued to focus their
discussion on elements of the United Nations
"evaluation" of the intercommunal negotia-
tions. Having completed their initial review
of many of the "points of coincidence," the
communities are now beginning examination
of "points of equidistance" including such
issues as the freedoms of movement, settle-
ment and property ownership in any future
agreement. The negotiating sessions continue
to be useful and constructive discussions with
good relations between the participants.

United Nations Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar met in Rome on April 4 with
Cypriot President Kyprianou and in Geneva
on April 9 with Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash. These meetings provided a
thorough review of the status of the negotia-

tions and both sides agreed to accelerate the
pace of the talks and hold two meetings per
week. The negotiating parties also agreed to
meet again with the Secretary General in
New York in June for a further review of the
negotiating process.

We believe that the intercommunal
negotiations are firmly established as a
strong and effective too! to promote progress
toward resolving the Cyprus problem. I wish
to congratulate both the United Nations
Secretary General and his Special Represent-
ative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi,
for their commitment to bringing the Cyprus
problem to a just and lasting settlement.
They have my full support for their efforts.
We hope that the negotiators will seize the
opportunities offered by the United Nations
"evaluations" to make progress toward
resolving outstanding differences between
the communities.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of May 31, 1982). ■

SECRETARY HAIG,
NEWS CONFERENCE,
ATHENS, MAY 16, 1982^

I think at the outset I want to express a
SOS efharisto to President Karamanlis,
Prime Minister Papandreou, and to my
counterpart, the distinguished Foreign
Minister of Greece.

I think in reflecting back on what
has been a very busy although a very
compressed schedule that I would
describe our visit here in Greece as be-
ing a very good one marked by cordiali-
ty, constructive, and far-reaching discus-
sions, all of which set a very positive
tone and framework for which to deal
with a number of longstanding and dif-
ficult questions.

Yesterday was a very busy one. We
started out with 3V2 hours of discus-
sion— in the first hour with the Prime
Minister alone followed by 2'/2 hours
with our respective teams, concluded by
a 3-hour dinner last night in which
substantive discussions continued. Of
course, a very special privilege for me
was a 1-hour meeting with President
Karamanhs, an individual 1 have known
over many years and who is rapidly

becoming the elder statesman of
Europe, based both on his vast ex-
perience, his adherence to the demo-
cratic values of the Western world, and
his unusual contributions over many,
many years.

I think the trip itself underscores
President Reagan's and his Administra-
tion's attachment to the importance of
our relationships with the Government
and the people of Greece. These relation-
ships of over a century standing involve
a deep mutual respect and are built on
the shared values, the historic Greek
perception of the role of the individual,
his dignity, his creativity, and the need
to preserve the freedom of the citizens
within the state. These shared percep-
tions and values have always generated
mutual benefits for the American and
Greek peoples as manifested by a con-
tinuing alliance in two conflicts in this
century and understanding relationships
in peace as well.

I think in summary the visit itself,
while not focused on making specific
decisions on particular questions, did
establish a very positive framework for
the improvement of our bilateral rela-
tionships, including the defense sector.

They underlie Greece's vital role in
assuring peace and stability in the
southern region of the Atlantic alliance.
Specific topics included a number of
global issues, East-West issues, the topic
of arms control, and the recent initiative
taken by President Reagan to achieve
for the first time substantial reductions
in nuclear armament.

We had an opportunity to discuss
the ongoing and continuing crisis in
Poland, the Falklands crisis, and, of
course, the question of Cyprus. I em-
phasized the support for the continua-
tion of the intercommunal talks under
the auspices of the U.N. Secretary
General. We discussed the Greek-
Turkish question, and this was par-
ticularly valuable because I have, as you
know, just proceeded from Ankara
where similar discussions were held,
and, as always, I encouraged a resolu-
tion of these questions on a bilateral
basis.

We also discussed what the Prime
Minister referred to as the triangular
question — Greece, Turkey, and NATO
related issues. Here, of course, these are
appropriately dealt with in NATO itself,
but as a member of the alliance and as a

62

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

good friend to both Greece and Turkey,
we have always some constructive con-
tributions to make.

We, of course, focused on Greek-
American bilateral relationships to in-
clude our defense relationships and the
issue of U.S. facilities in Greece. Again,
not to seek to make decision but I think
we arrived at a concensus of view on
how to deal with this issue in the period
ahead. So all in all, the visit was very
positive, and I think its results justify
optimism. There will be progress in the
days ahead on a number of longstanding
and difficult questions in the areas that I
touched upon.

Q. What is your line on Mr.
Papandreou's request for a guarantee
for the eastern frontier of Greece?

A. The question was how was the
topic of a guarantee to Greece, a
longstanding question, dealt with in our
discussions, and I think it suffices to say
that this question arose in both capitals.
We are sensitive to the issue. We
believe, regardless of the future treat-
ment of this question, that its fundamen-
tal character is best assured by a full
participation of the member states in the
alliance of a resolution of longstanding
questions among member states on a
bilateral basis.

I know yesterday the question came
up on certain letters that have been ex-
changed in the past between both Presi-
dent Carter and the Government of
Greece and the Foreign Ministers of the
United States and Greece in an earlier
period. We recognize those letters are in
the file, and the task ahead now is to
get on to resolve the issues which create
understandable concerns. We intend to
work as actively as we can to be a
catalyst in that effort.

Q. You have stressed the need for
peaceful resolutions between the two
parties— Greece and Turkey— on the
Aegean question. Would the United
States actively and unequivoeably op-
pose military action by either side in
resolving that dispute?

A. I think it goes without saying
that the U.S. view is no different than it
is in the Falklands question. We reject
and oppose, first, use of force to resolve
disputes, no matter what their nature,
except the reaffirmation of U.N. Charter
Article 51 which provides for the right
of self-defense. This is a matter of prin-
ciple, and just as the United States has
subscribed to that principle in the
Falklands crisis — although, we have and
seek to maintain good relationships
with, of course. Great Britain and

Argentina— we cannot recoil from
stating unequivoeably our adherence to
the rule of law and peaceful change in
the resolution of political disputes.

Q. Since the United States re-
quested departure from the Falkland
Islands of the Argentine troops, why
do they not ask the departure of the
Turkish troops from the island of
Cyprus where they have been for 8
years?

A. It has been the U.S. position-
continues to be the U.S. position— that
the best way to deal with the non-
Cypriot forces on the Island of Cyprus
is — with active movement on the side of
the two communities— to arrive at a set-
tlement through the intercommunal
talks. We believe that progress in that
area will necessarily include progress in
dealing with the subject of non-Cypriot
forces. I am very pleased that the
discussions I had in both Ankara and
Athens suggest that both parties are
willing to subscribe to progress under
the auspices of the U.N. Secretary
General shortly after my return to
Washington this week.

Q. In your discussion here you
said you have arrived at a consensus
of view dealing with the question of
U.S. facilities and bases in Greece.
What do you mean by that?

A. I think the consensus was on
how to deal with this subject in the
period ahead, primarily with respect to
timing and initial discussions. I don't
want to go beyond that because it would
suggest that we actually got into the
substance of these discussions. We did
not. We merely discussed how to treat
them in the period ahead.

Q. Concerning Greece's participa-
tion in the military wing of NATO,
Mr. Papandreou said recently "for the
time being we are neither in nor out."
I would like to know your opinion to-
day after the talks with Papandreou.

A. I am not a novice on this subject.
But there is danger, because I am not a
novice, of portraying myself as an active
official in the resolution of the remaining
questions on the command structure
here in the Aegean. I am not. This is a
NATO question. It should be dealt with
within the NATO framework. We did,
however, have a very good exchange of
views on the subject, and as the Prime
Minister pointed out yesterday, this is
not an area in which I have a lack of
background. I know specifically what the
remaining questions are. I believe they
are resolvable within the NATO

framework and am optimistic they will
be lesolved in the period ahead. This is
going to take some careful work as in
the past it has as well, but I think
enough said.

Q. Can you say after your visit to
Ankara and Athens now whether or
not as a result of your visit, the ten-
sions between Greece and Turkey have
somewhat been ameliorated?

A. I think it would be wrong to
make such a suggestion as a result of a
brief visit of the kind we have just had,
and I wouldn't even presume to draw
such a conclusion. However, I think I
leave the visits in both capitals with an
enhanced sense of optimism. In the
period ahead these questions can be
positively resolved.

Q. You have stated that the United
States believes that the only solution
for the Cyprus issue is the dialogue
that will take in the withdrawal of the
Turkish military forces. But at the
present time it has been accepted that
the dialogue is between Nicosia and
Ankara. In case the dialogue between
the two is not successful, what do you
see as being the alternative to this?

A. I think it serves no useful pur-
pose to indulge in speculations about
failure on a political effort that should
be undertaken with increased vigor. It is
still underway, as you know. There has
been the U.N. assessment of the situa-
tion. There was some movement some
months ago. I think it is very important
that we do not indulge in speculation
which visualizes failure because
sometimes it contributes to failure.
What we are after is a successful out-
come that will meet the interests of the
communities not only in a contemporary
sense but in the future as well. And this
is an important and delicate issue as it
has been for a number of years.

What is important is to establish a
broad political framework and to get
progress within that framework. When
one becomes too preoccupied with con-
temporary aspects — and incidentally,
the Falklands question is much the
same, and it isn't quite as simple as the
question that was posed to me earlier.
We are not just talking about the with-
drawal of forces from the Falkland
Islands. We are not just talking about
the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces
from the island, as desirable as that is.
We are talking about a broad framework
which will meet the fundamental in-
terests of the peoples on Cyprus and
their children, and this is going to take,
as it always does in such difficult ques-
tions, patience and care.

August 1982

63

EUROPE

Q. I wonder if you could make
some general observations about the
kind of welcome the Greek Communist
Party had prepared for you, particular-
ly at a time when the President has
called for an initiative on nuclear af-
fairs and you are about to proceed into
discussions with your NATO col-
leagues.

A. I think that since I had not been
exposed to the demonstration and only
had access to the Greek press on that, I
prefer to take my lead from them. I
think their descriptions of the situation
covering a broad spectrum of political
views give a very adequate reply to you,
and I would not presume to.

Q. Could you tell us what dates
the talks about the bases will start
and whether there will be a special
meeting between Papandreou and
President Reagan in Bonn?

A. With respect to the first ques-
tion, I would prefer to let events unfold
on that. I think we have a general com-
monality of view on how to approach
these questions on timing and venue.
But I tiiink it is preferable to let that
unfold.

With respect to the upcoming sum-
mit in Bonn, of course, I think there is
only one set of bilaterals discussed that
are now scheduled between President
Reagan and the Chancellor of West Ger-
many as the host government for the
summit. This does not preclude
whatever discussions will occur on the
margins and during the frequent oppor-
tunities that occur during breaks and
social events which I am quite confident
will afford an opportunity for discussion.

SECRETARY HAIG,
NEWS CONFERENCE,
LUXEMBOURG, MAY 18, 19823

I think I want to underline some of the
basic themes and conclusions that
emerged from this ministerial meeting
here in Luxembourg.

It is very clear to all of us that the
meeting once again demonstrated
Western resolve to deal with the
challenges of this decade, and I can
state unequivocally that there was
substantial agreement on the full range
of substance that was discussed during
this meeting. As a first example, the
free choice of democratic Spain to join
the alliance should be cited. Spanish en-
try has been welcomed heartily by all
the allies, and it is the clearest evidence
of the continued vitality and attraction
of the North Atlantic alliance today.

Situation in Poland

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
MAY 1, 1982'

May 1 is celebrated as Labor Day in
many parts of the world. Although this
celebration originated in the United
States, recently the Communist world
has paid it special attention. This takes
on ironic significance in the wake of the
brutal actions by Polish authorities to
crush Solidarity, the only free trade
union in a Communist country.

Poland is no longer on the front
pages every day, but we must not allow
its people to be forgotten. We must con-
tinue to honor the unbroken spirit of the
Polish people and to call upon Poland's
leaders to recognize their commitments.
The Polish leaders must take positive ac-
tion if there is to be hope for either
economic recovery or a healing of the
hatred and bitterness that the political
repression has generated.

On December 23, we imposed a
broad range of economic sanctions
against Warsaw in response to the
government's declaration of martial law.
We made it clear that these sanctions
are reversible if and when Polish
authorities restore the internationally
recognized human rights of the Polish
people. When that happens, we stand
ready to provide assistance to help in
Poland's economic recovery.

The actions taken earlier this week
by the Polish Government are a welcome
step in the right direction but are not
enough. By their own count, over 2,000
citizens, including Lech Walesa, are still
imprisoned. I would like to lift our sanc-
tions and help Poland, but not until the
Polish Government has ended martial
law, released the detainees, and re-
opened a genuine dialogue with Solidar-
ity, led by Lech Walesa.

So on this day. Law Day in the
United States, when we commemorate
our principles of liberty and individual
rights, we reflect upon the Polish
people's lack of such freedoms and upon
their struggle to gain them.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 13, 19822

Sk months ago today, darkness
descended on Poland as the Warsaw
Government declared a "state of war" on
its own people. Today the Polish people's
spirit remains unbroken, and as the
widespread popular demonstrations in
early May indicate, the gap between the
Polish people and their leaders has
widened since December 13, 1981.

The broad range of economic sanc-
tions which we introduced against the
Warsaw government last December has
had a strong impact on the Polish
economy, a fact which is acknowledged
by Polish officials. With each passing
day, the impact of these sanctions
grows, particularly in light of the unwill-
ingness of Warsaw's allies to provide
substantial assistance. We made it clear
when we introduced these sactions that
they were reversible if and when Polish
authorities restored the internationally
recognized human rights of the Polish
people. In addition, we stated that the
U.S. Government stands ready to pro-
vide assistance to such a Poland to help
its economic recovery. But the United
States cannot and will not take these
steps until the Polish Government has
ended martial law, released all political
prisoners, and reopened a genuine
dialogue with the church and Solidarity.

Our hearts go out to the brave
Polish people who have suffered so
much through the years. The United
States will continue to help provide
humanitarian assistance to the Polish
people through such organizations as
Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and
Project HOPE. Let us hope that the
authorities in Warsaw will move to bring
about a genuine process of reconciliation
in Poland before the gap between the
authorities and the people becomes even
more threatening.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of May 10. 1982.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 21. ■

Secondly, the meeting very vigorous-
ly reaffirmed the alliance's strong deter-
mination to do all that is necessary to
maintain a strong and credible defense.
The communique which you will be
receiving shortly recognizes that peace
can be preserved only if the alliance has

the ability to defend itself at any and
every level. It notes that this requires a
wide range of conventional and nuclear
forces. We also agreed that it is essen-
tial to insist on restraint and respon-
sibility on the part of the Soviet Union
in all parts of the world as the necessary

64

Department of State Bulletin

condition for a more constructive East-
West relationship. We agreed that it is
necessary to take account of security
considerations in East- West economic
dealings, particularly export credits, and
the danger in transferring militarily
relevant technologies to the Warsaw
Pact is clearly understood by all member
states. The meeting condemned the con-
tinuing and increasing Soviet aggression
against the people of Afghanistan and
called for a political solution based on
total Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan.

We also agreed that the ongoing
repression of the Polish people violates
the principles of the U.N. Charter and
the Helsinki Final Act, and we reaf-
firmed the three Western criteria for a
restoration of normal relations — the lift-
ing of martial law; the release of
political prisoners; and the restoration of
a genuine dialogue with the church and
the trade unions. It is clear that there is
a firm and continuing consensus by the
alliance and a recognition that Poland
continues to cast a dark shadow over
East-West relations today. The alliance
concern remains unified and undimin-
ished on this important question. The
allies remain concerned about the threat
to security interests outside the NATO
treaty area. We have reaffirmed the
need to consult on security issues out-
side of the area.

We also condemned the Argentine
aggression against the Falkland Islands
and called for a continued effort to
achieve a negotiated settlement in
accordance with U.N. Resolution 502.
We agreed that it is essential to uphold
the fundamental principle that the use of
force to resolve international disputes is
unacceptable.

There was enthusiastic support both
in the formal discussions and along the
margins for the U.S. position put forth
by President Reagan in his speech in
Eureka on May 9. I had an opportunity
to explain the elements of our proposals
in considerable detail, and I am very
confident that we now have a solid basis
of allied understanding and support for
a goal of achieving significant reductions
in strategic forces all designed to en-
chance stability and security for all na-
tions.

There was also a very strong reaffir-
mation of the validity of the U.S.
negotiating position in the Geneva talks
on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF) and a consensus that these pro-
posals offer a change for a fair and ef-
fective agreement. Both our INF and
START [Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks] initiatives confirm beyond the
point of speculation that it is the United
States and the West that have put forth
specific meaningful proposals for reduc-
tions in levels of nuclear armament, and
we sincerely hope — and I know there
has been a speech made today by Chair-
man Brezhnev — that the Soviet Union
will respond positively to these ap-
proaches and others associated with the
question of worldwide armaments.

In our discussions, I also explained
the long-term U.S. objective in relations
with the Soviet Union. We have, as I
have stated before, for some time been
maintaining a high-level dialogue with
the Soviet Union on a very broad range
of subjects, not just confined to arms
control.

We hope in the days ahead to
develop and expand that dialogue. Presi-
dent Reagan is, as he has stated
repeatedly, prepared to meet with Presi-
dent Brezhnev, but it remains our con-
sidered view — and I believe that of the
Soviet leadership as well — that such a
meeting must be justified by the overall
state of our relations, and there would
have to be reasonable prospects for
positive results from such a meeting. As
I have indicated, the discussions and
conclusions of this ministerial are of
great importance in their own right;
first and foremost, as a living
demonstration of the continuing vitality
and unity of the alliance. Moreover, I
believe that the deliberations here have
paved the way for what we can an-
ticipate will be an extremely successful
and productive outcome at the NATO
summit meeting next month in Bonn. It
wUl, indeed, be this meeting that will set
the tone for the security of free societies
for the decade to come.

Q. Do you have any early observa-
tions on the statement made today by
Soviet leader Brezhnev on his reaction
to what the President said at Eureka?

A. First, I want to emphasize that I
have not had the chance to study the full
text of Chairman Brezhnev's remarks,
and I am always cautious about making
observations on abbreviated, simplified
news reporting which is all we have
available at the moment.

We do know that the question of a
freeze — a freeze at current levels of
nuclear armament — was again raised. It
has been our conviction, a very strongly
held conviction, that nuclear freezes do
not promote effective arms control. In
the first place, merely to freeze at ex-
isting levels of forces would codify ex-
isiting Soviet advantages, especially in

EUROPE

the nuclear threat facing our allies here
in Western Europe, but also among cer-
tain elements of the strategic equation.
It would leave the United States and the
West at a disadvantage to the Soviet
Union to join in such proposal.

Secondly, were we to accept this ap-
proach— to agree to their freeze — it is
clear that the Soviet Union would then
be relieved of any incentive to make
rapid progress for substantial reduc-
tions, and it is reductions that constitute
the main objective of President Reagan's
arms control policy. Such a freeze pro-
posal would affect immediately our
negotiations in Geneva on INF and
would have equally deleterious impact on
the START proposals that the President
just made at Eureka. I think that Presi-
dent Reagan has outlined an effective
approach calling for significant reduc-
tions to equal levels on both sides. This
is our goal in arms control. As we have
said, a freeze is not sound arms control,
because it results in unequal levels at
the starting point as you seek to achieve
and provide incentive for reductions.

Q. [Inaudible] up to the day that
he was ready to reopen talks, that this
was a correct step?

A. Absolutely. I am merely singling
out one aspect of the reported content
of Mr. Brezhnev's talk. I understand
there were also discussions of the objec-
tive on the Soviet side of the achieve-
ment of reductions — that we wel-
come— that coincides with our position.
There was reference to respecting the
security needs of each side and clearly
that is not incompatible with a balanced
approach to arms control. There was
reference to the fact that the upcoming
negotiations should keep all the positive
elements achieved in the previous
Soviet-American agreements. We are, as
we have stated repeatedly, prepared to
retain parts of previous accords — defini-
tions, mutually accepted data, and a host
of other approaches. You know the
President, in his first phase, has talked
about reductions in warheads and
launchers; that in itself is a reflection of
compatibility with work that has taken
place under SALT I, Vladivostock, and
the now discarded SALT II.

Q. As your spokesman said yester-
day, the United States is also ready to
make proposals for equitable levels of
bombers and cruise missiles and, of
course, Brezhnev in his speech re-
ferred to what he called the unilater-
alism of the U.S. approach only deal-
ing with, I guess, what he meant was
warheads and missiles. Can you

August 1982

65

EUROPE

clarify? Is the United States prepared
in the first phase to also discuss
reductions in bombers and missiles or
is that in the U.S. proposal for the
second phase?

A. I think it is important to
recognize as a result of your question
and observations made that we not con-
duct arms control negotiations from
propaganda platform or from a public
relations point of view. It always lends
itself to distortion and misunderstand-
ing. We have felt that the details of the
U.S. proposal are best reserved for ex-
change at the conference table outside
the glare of publicity and public postur-
ing.

To answer your question, we are, as
the President stated in his recent press
conference, prepared to put everything
on the table; that includes negotiations
leading toward equitable levels in
bombers and cruise missiles. Beyond
that it is not appropriate for me to go
into a public dissertation on the finite
proposals that have been approved by
President Reagan as our going-in posi-
tion which will involve give-and-take in
negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Q. Is it right to assume that the
support which the U.S. Government
has given to the United Kingdom in
the Falklands crisis so far will be
maintained if Mrs. Thatcher's govern-
ment decides that, reluctantly, there is
no option but to invade the islands
since the Argentine junta refuses to
accept 502?

A. I think the United States had
made its position clear on this issue and
that involves both the judgment we
made at the time the U.S. peace effort
and the formal efforts that we had been
making to exercise good offices were
abandoned. It was at that time that in-
sufficient flexibility had been demon-
strated in Buenos Aires and that we
were going to support Great Britain in
its efforts. We intend to abide fully by
the commitments made.

Q. I know that you condemn
Argentine aggression; was there any
condemnation or any criticism at all of
the British military action in the
South Atlantic?

A. No, there was not. I believe that
the member states recognize the rights
of governments under Article 50 of the
U.N. charter to utilize whatever means
are necessary to protect their sovereign
interests. The United States, as you
know, has never taken a position on the
juridical question of sovereignty. We
have not done that, but it is very clear

that we have taken one in opposition to
first use of force in this instance. We
continue to maintain that position. I
refer you to the language of the com-
munique, because it is very precise, and
you can answer your own question by
reading it when it is in your hands.
There was no criticism whatsoever of
Great Britain.

Q. As the centra! figure in the
negotiating process over the Falklands
crisis, I wonder if you could give us
your assessment now of what impact
the EEC [European Economic Com-
munity] decision to extend sanctions
only for 1 week will have on the
diplomatic atmosphere; whether it
adds or detracts from the possibilities
for a settlement.

A. I think it would be highly inap-
propriate for me to engage in value
judgments on the actions of the Ten.
These actions are based on the sovereign
viewpoints of the member nations of the
Ten. I think it is significant that a
substantial majority remain fully united
behind the steps taken in support of the
British position. Whether that has an ef-
fect on the negotiations that are under-
way by the Secretary General, and
which he described as being at a critical
stage, is a subjective judgment. I would
avoid making such a judgment on my
part publicly.

Q. Would you judge that in a few
days rather than weeks, it is in-
evitable that the United Kingdom
would have to invade the Falklands?

A. I would not presume to specu-
late. Our concerns are that U.N. Resolu-
tion 502 be implemented as quickly as
possible. This involved not only
withdrawal of Argentine forces from the
Falklands but also a political solution.

Q. I wonder whether you could
give us your views on the state of war
between Iran and Iraq, and the impact
that it is having on the states in the
g^lf area.

A. There was considerable discus-
sion of the subject in the ministerial
meeting as there should be because this
is a very important situation that could
affect an already unstable Middle
Eastern situation. I think all are very
concerned that the territorial integrity
of the nations involved be preserved.
There is a growing sense of concern
among many of the moderate Arab
states in the gulf and beyond the penin-
sula to northern Africa. I think this is an
extremely sensitive subject on which we
have consulted fully among the members

of the alliance. In the days and weeks
ahead we will have to give this minute-
by-minute our most serious attention.

Q. Is it possible that the United
States will change its policy of —

A. Impartiality?

Q. Yes, and no arms to either
side?

A. That has been and continues to
be the position of the U.S. Government
as it is the position of many of our allied
governments in the NATO family. Clear-
ly, this is a position which serves the
best prospects for negotiating a settle-
ment of this conflict and which we hope
will be achieved in the very near future.

Q. Why are you not going to
Madrid this afternoon as expected?

A. No, it was not as expected. We
had a contingency plan that if the ongo-
ing base negotiations were completed
before my scheduled return to Wash-
ington, then I would have stopped off in
Madrid and hopefully would have ini-
tialed the agreement. It is no surprise to
me that there are still details to be
worked out. But I would not want that
to be interpreted as an indication of any
serious problems. These are difficult and
complex discussions, and they are con-
tinuing at a rapid pace — a great deal of
progress has been made— but there are
still a few details to be worked out.

Q. Are you trying to say that you
are going to meet Perez-Llorca before
next Saturday?

A. That is our anticipation, and we
are working toward that objective. Were
it not to happen, it would be a matter of
a very, very brief period of time, I
believe, to complete the talks.

Q. Will you sign the agreement
with Perez-Llorca or will your Am-
bassador in Madrid?

A. I don't want to prejudge that
question yet until we complete the talks.
In coordination with my counterpart.
Minister Perez-Llorca, we'll decide the
best way to do it. It is not a matter of
substantive difference between us.

Q. What is your reaction to an ac-
cusation made inside the European
Parliament Strasbourg Chamber last
week that had the United States got-
ten off the fence earlier in the
Falklands crisis — imposed economic
sanctions against Argentina im-
mediately after invasion — lives could
have been saved and a peaceful solu-
tion could have been achieved earlier?
This accusation was made by Mrs.
Barbara Castle, leader of the British
Labor Party in Europe.

66

Department of State Bulletin

A. First, I don't make it a habit of
commenting substantively on third-hand
reported or second-hand reported obser-
vations by public officials identified or
unidentified. That does not cause me to
recoil from responding to the substance
of your question. But I would not want
it portrayed as a response to one or
another individual that I don't even
know and didn't even have the benefit of
hearing first-hand, but I think anyone
that reviews the U.S. position on the
Falklands crisis knows well, as did the
British Government, that we were asked
to portray a good office's role at the
highest levels in the British Government,
as well as at the highest levels in the
Argentinian Government. Our ability to
do so clearly involved certain restraints
in value judgments with respect to the
conflict day-to-day.

There was no question on where the
United States stood on U.N. Resolution
502 where we cast an affirmative and
supportive vote. That already moots the
question.

Secondly, were there any validity to
such an allegation, it should have long
since been dispelled as we see the
Secretary General anguishing with the
same issues that we anguished with dur-
ing the period when the United States
was involved— and even having enjoyed
the benefits of what we were able to ac-
complish in that effort. Let me assure
you that the British Government was
fully aware of the supportive position
taken by the United States, or my com-
munications with my counterpart and
the Prime Minister are befogged with
sophistry.

Q. Could you comment on the fact
that the Portuguese Government has
not allowed some American planes to
land on the Lajes Base in the Azores
recently?

A. I don't want to comment on that
too lavishly because on every occasion
that Portuguese sovereign territory has
been put at the disposal of U.S. forces,
it involves prior consultation and coor-
dination. There is nothing unusual or un-
precedented about recent events. I make
no bones about the dissatisfaction in
Portugal with the level of American
military and economic support this past
year and that programmed for FY 1983.
This is a matter of utmost concern to
the U.S. Government. It is especially dif-
ficult at a time of very, very serious
economic difficulties in the United
States.

Those concerns which are felt by a
longstanding and close friend and ally of
the United States will be resolved in the

months ahead, but no one will ever be
fully satisfied when it comes to levels of
support. We understand that. It doesn't
mean we are not sympathetic with the
need because we are. We are vitally in-
terested in Portugal's economic develop-
ment and growth and, above all, in
security terms, in alliance terms in their
enhancement of their security capa-
bilities. We have participated in that in
the past, and we will continue to in the
future to the highest level that we are
capable of doing it and having it ap-
proved by the American Congress.

Q. Do you think the attitude of
the Irish Government, in particular, in
pulling back from the EEC trade sanc-
tions against Argentina and in its
situation as a temporary member of
the Security Council has been helpful
or unhelpful in the search for a
peaceful solution to the Falklands
crisis?

A. I wouldn't presume to label the
sovereign judgments of anyone of the
Ten. It would be inappropriate for me to
do it, especially since I am half Irish
myself.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE,
MAY 18, 1982

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
session in Luxembourg on 17th and 18th May
1982 and agreed as follows:

1. The Allies welcome the impending ac-
cession of Spain to the North Atlantic
Treaty, which offers fresh evidence of the en-
during vitality of the Alliance — a community
of free countries inspired by the shared
values of pluralistic democracy, individual
liberty, human dignity, self-determination and
the rule of law in conformity with the prin-
ciples and purposes of the United Nations
Charter.

2. The Allies are determined to maintain
adequate military strength and political
solidarity in order to assure a balance of
forces and to deter aggression and other
forms of pressure. On this base, in the in-
terest of peace and international stability, the
Allies will persevere in their efforts to
establish a more constructive East-West rela-
tionship aiming at genuine detente through
dialogue and negotiation and mutually advan-
tageous exchanges. Arms control and disar-
mament, together with deterrence and
defense, are integral parts of Alliance securi-
ty policy.

Substantial improvements in East-West
relations depend, however, on the readiness
of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw
Pact countries to exercise restraint and
responsibility in deeds as well as in words.
The continued build-up of Soviet forces
across the full spectrum of military capabili-
ty, the Soviet Union's aggression against the

EUROPE

people of Afghanistan, its encouragement and
support for martial law in Poland and its
destabilizing activities elsewhere in the world
contradict Soviet claims to peaceful inten-
tions and weigh heavily on East- West rela-
tions.

3. The continued oppression of the Polish
people violates the United Nations Charter
and the Helsinki Final Act. The Allies recall
their declaration of 11th January 1982 and
again urge the Polish authorities to end of
the state of martial law, release all those de-
tained and restore genuine dialogue with the
church and Solidarity. Hopes for progress in
this direction were disappointed when recent
limited relaxation of certain measures taken
under martial law was followed so quickly by
new repressive measures. The Polish author-
ities should refrain from forcing Polish
citizens into exile.

4. The increasing Soviet aggression
against Afghanistan is meeting growing
resistance by the Afghan people. The toll of
death and destruction is mounting, more than
three million Afghans are refugees and the
stability of the region is endangered; this
Soviet behavior is unacceptable. The Allies
again emphasize their support for the pro-
posals, put forward by the United Nations
and other international bodies and repeatedly
ignored by the Soviet Union, for a political
solution based on the total withdrawal of
Soviet troops and respect for the in-
dependence, sovereignty and non-alignment
of Afghanistan. They express the hope that
the mission of the United Nations Secretary
General's Personal Representative for
Afghanistan will help to find a solution in ac-
cordance with these principles.

5. Soviet policies confirm the need for
the Allies to make all necessary efforts to
maintain a strong and credible defense. The
Allies can preserve peace only if they have
the capability and the will to defend
themselves at any level in any region of the
North Atlantic Treaty- area. This requires a
wide range of conventional and nuclear forces
designed to persuade any potential aggressor
that an attack would be repulsed and would
expose him to risks out of all proportion of
any advantages he might hope to gain. Deter-
rence has kept the peace in Europe for over
thirty years, and this policy is still valid to-
day. Moreover this policy is essential to bring
the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on the
reduction and control of armaments.

6. Members of the Alliance have put for-
ward a broad series of proposals aimed at
achieving concrete and far-reaching progress
in a number of arms control and disarmament
negotiations:

• In the context of CSCE [Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe], to seek
confidence and security-building measures
covering the whole of Europe from the Atlan-
tic to the Urals;

• In the framework of MBFR [mutual
and balanced force reductions], to establish
equal collective ceilings to be achieved by
manpower reductions on the basis of agreed
data;

August 1982

67

EUROPE

• As regards negotiations on nuclear
arms, to eliminate totally United States and
Soviet intermediate-range land-based missiles
and to make substantial reductions in their
intercontinental strategic nuclear systems.

The Allies urge the Soviet Union to re-
spond without further delay, in a positive
way to these proposals which are designed to
improve security and achieve a military
balance at the lowest possible level of forces.

7. The Allies welcome President Reagan's
proposal to President Brezhnev to begin the
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) by
the end of June and urge the Soviet Union to
respond positively. The United States inten-
tion to seek signijficant reductions in the
strategic armaments of the two countries,
particularly in the most destabilizing systems,
is a far-reaching but realistic offer that would
lead to a significant increase in strategic
stability and thereby strengthen peace and in-
ternational security. Within the START
framework, and pursuant to the December
1979 decision on intermediate-range nuclear
forces modernization and arms control,*" the
United States is continuing to negotiate with
the Soviet Union in Geneva on the basis of an
imaginative proposal for the limitation of
their respective intermediate-range system.

The United States negotiating approach
offers the chance for fair and effective
agreements. The Allies, who remain in close
consultation with the United States, support
its efforts to reach such agreements.

8. The Allies participating in the Vienna
talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions reaffirm their determination to work
for an agreement that strengthens security
and peace in Europe through force reductions
to equal collective manpower levels in the
area of reductions. For negotiations to suc-
ceed, it will be necessary for the East to co-
operate in reaching agreement on existing
force levels, and on adequate associated
measures to enhance stability and to verify
compliance.

9. The Allies remain committed to
developing and strengthening the CSCE
process but recognize the severe obstacles
posed by persistent Eastern violations of the
principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final
Act, most recently and flagrantly in Poland.

They hope that by the time the Madrid
CSCE follow-up meeting reconvenes in
November, faith will have been restored in
the implementation of the Final Act and that
it will be possible to adopt a substantive and
balanced concluding document covering all
areas of the Final Act, including human
rights, human contacts and information. They
reaffirm their support for a Conference on
Security and Disarmament in Europe and for
adoption at the Madrid meeting of a precise
mandate for negotiations in an initial phase
of confidence and security-building measures
that are militarily significant, binding,
verifiable and applicable throughout the
whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals.

10. The Allies intend to play a construc-
tive part at the forthcoming Second United
Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

They hope that discussion there will take full
account of the need for openness and ade-
quate verification provisions of all areas of
arms control and disarmament. In the Com-
mittee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies
will continue to work for concrete and
verifiable agreements, including a total ban
on all chemical weapons.

11. The maintenance of the stable situa-
tion in and around Berlin remains for the
Allies an essential factor in East-West rela-
tions.

The Allies recall their statement in the
Rome Communique of 5th May 1981 and ex-
press the hope that the continuation of the
dialogue between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic
Republic will lead to increased direct benefits
for Berlin and for the people in the two Ger-
man States.

12. Economic exchanges have an impor-
tant role in the development of a stable East-
West relationship. The Allies reaffirm their
intention which they expressed in their
Declaration of 11th January 1982'' to review
East- West economic relations, bearing in
mind the need for such relations to be
mutually advantageous and to take full ac-
count of security considerations, particularly
in the technological, economic and financial
areas, including export credits. In particular,
they acknowledge the dangers involved in
transfer of militarily relevant technology to
the Warsaw Pact countries.

13. The recovery of the economic health
of Allied countries is essential and integral to
their defense effort. Allied Governments will
work together both bilaterally and through
competent organizations to further the pros-
perity of their peoples and the world
economy. The Allies recognize the need for
continued support for programmes intended
to benefit the economies of the less favored
Allied partners in keeping with Article 2 of
the North Atlantic Treaty.

14. In view of the fundamental impor-
tance which they attach to the principle that
the use of force to resolve international
disputes should be resolutely opposed by the
international community, the Allies condemn
Argentina for its aggression against the
Falkland Islands and dependencies and
deplore the fact that after more than six
weeks has still not withdrawn her forces in
compliance with mandatory Resolution 502 of
the Security Council. They call for a contin-
uation of the efforts to achieve a satisfactory
negotiated settlement in accordance with this
resolution in its entirety.

15. The Allies are profoundly concerned
over the acts of terrorism which recur in
several of their countries. They strongly con-
demn all such acts and solemnly appeal to all
governments to wage an effective struggle
against this scourge and to intensify their ef-
fort to this end.

16. The Allies recognize that certain
developments outside the treaty area can
have consequences for their common in-
terests. They will consult together as ap-
propriate, taking into account their commonly
identified objectives. Member countries of the

Alliance, in a position to do so, are ready to
help other sovereign nations to resist threats
to their security and independence.

17. The Allies will work together with
others to strengthen and maintain the
sovereignty and independence of countries ir
the Third World. They respect genuine non-
alignment and support economic and social
development in the Third World which con-
tributes to world stability and can help to
provide protection against outside in-
terference. The Allied countries will continue
to struggle against hunger, poverty and
under-development.

18. Ministers agreed to intensify their
consultations. They will hold an informal
meeting in autumn 1982, taking advantage o
their presence in North America on the occa-
sion of the next regular session of the Unite(
Nations General Assembly. In this connec-
tion, they noted with pleasure the invitation
of the Canadian Government to hold that
meeting in Canada.

19. The next regular meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session
wdll be held in Brussels in December 1982.
Ministers accepted with pleasure the invita-
tion of the Government of France for the
spring 1983 ministerial council meeting to
take place in Paris.

'Press release 170 of May 18, 1982.

2Press release 172 of May 19.

'Press release 174 of May 20.

■•In this connection, Greece reserved its
position and expressed its views which were
recorded in the minutes [text in original]. ■

North Atlantic

Council

Meets in Brussels

Secretary Haig departed Wash-
ington, D.C., December 8, 1981, to attem.
the regular semiannual session of the
North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting (December 10-11).

Following are the texts of the North
Atlantic Council final communique and
the declaration on intermediate-range
nuclear force modernization and arms
control.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE,
DEC. 11, 1981

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministeria
session in Brussels on 10th and 11th
December 1981. On this occasion Ministers
signed the Protocol of Accession of Spain to
the North Atlantic Treaty which will now be
submitted for ratification in accordance with
the constitutional procedures in their respec-
tive countries. They welcomed the decision of

68

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

Spain to seek entry into the Alliance and
thereby to play its part in Allied collective
security in accordance with the principles of
the North Atlantic Treaty, This decision of-
fers new evidence of the enduring vitality of
the Alliance.

Resolved to pursue peace and security
through a stable balance of forces, reduced
tensions and more constructive East-West
relations, Ministers agreed on the following:

1, The Alliance is committed to safe-
guarding the peace and thus allowing the
peoples of its member countries to preserve
the values and way of life they share. In the
interest of lasting peace the Allies will con-
tinue to work unremittingly to establish
through a constructive dialogue the essential
climate of confidence and mutual restraint in
East-West relations with the aim of achieving
genuine detente and substantial progress in
arms control and disarmament. But in the
light of the Soviet Union's continued military
build-up and as long as a solid foundation of
trust has not been established, the Allies
have no choice but to dissuade any potential
aggressor by making it clear that they have
the strength and the will to resist. The peace
that Europe has enjoyed for the last 36 years
is a measure of the success of the Alliance
and its policy of deterrence and defense. An
adequate deterrent does not jeopardize peace,
it makes it safer. The unity and strength of
the Alliance provide the best guarantee that
its peoples can remain free from the fear of
war.

The role of nuclear weapons has attracted
great attention in the Western political
debate, in particular among the younger
generation. The fact is, however, that nuclear
weapons have thus far been an essential ele-
ment in preventing war, in the face of the
Warsaw Pact's massive conventional and
nuclear forces. The Alliance has to maintain a
nuclear capability, since disarmament has not
reached a satisfactory level. The Alliance
could not reduce the risk of war by divesting
itself unilaterally of nuclear weapons. The
Soviet Union has greatly increased its forces
throughout the period of detente. Unilateral
nuclear disarmament would give the Soviet
Union, which could not be relied upon to
follow suit, an overwhelming military advan-
tage. The only sure way of preventing in-
timidation and war is to ensure a stable
balance of forces between East and West.
This should be done at the lowest possible
level.

2. Restraint and responsibility are essen-
tial for the conduct of international relations.
But Soviet destabilising activities of all kinds
persist in various parts of the world and cast
doubt on their readiness to work for a real
reduction of tension. While invoking exag-
gerated security requirements to justify its
huge armaments development and production
programme, the Soviet Union condemns as
unwarranted the defensive measures taken
by the Western countries. At the same time,
it tries to exploit for its own purposes
genuine concerns often expressed in the
West, while prohibiting any free debate of
this kind among its own people.

The Soviet Union also seems to further
its own interests by the use of force. The oc-
cupation of Afghanistan continues, against
the increasing resistance of the Afghan peo-
ple and in the face of repeated international
demands for Soviet withdrawal. Soviet
refusal to respond to these demands con-
stitutes a menace to the stability of the
region, endangers international peace and
security and seriously impedes improvements
in East- West relations.

3. In these circumstances the Alliance is
resolved to strengthen — without seeking
military superiority — its capacity to deter ag-
gression and defend peace. Improvements in
Allied defense readiness and military
capabilities contribute to this end. Ministers
expressed their support for the determination
of the United States to ensure the deterrent
capabilities of its strategic forces. An effec-
tive defense is also the essential basis for
fruitful negotiations on arms control and
disarmament.

4. The Allies remain committed to
vigorous efforts in all appropriate fora to
achieve substantial, balanced and verifiable
arms limitations and reductions. Recalling
President Reagan's historic speech of 18th
November 1981 they registered their full sup-
port for his far-reaching and constructive
programme for the achievement of a stable
peace. They share the United States' resolve
to work for the establishment of a military
balance at lower levels of forces, and wel-
comed the four-point agenda which President
Reagan conveyed to President Brezhnev.

On this basis as well as on the basis of
restraint and responsibility, the Allies offer
the Soviet Union comprehensive negotiation
with the aim of effective arms control and
disarmament. Soviet acceptance of this offer
would benefit the peoples in East and West
and in the Third World and promote peace
and security worldwide.

The US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduc-
tions Talks (START), which the United
States has proposed to begin as early as
possible in 1982, will constitute an important
new step towards reinforcing security and
peace. These negotiations should lead to
significant reductions in the US and Soviet
strategic arsenals. The Allies also welcomed
negotiations on US and Soviet intermediate-
range nuclear forces which opened in Geneva
on 30th November 1981 at the initiative of
the United States; they expressed the hope
that these negotiations will lead to a positive
result in the START framework. The Allies
look forward to continued close consultations
with the United States in the Council on
these matters.

Those Allies participating in the mutual
and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna
continue to seek genuine manpower parity, in
the form of a common collective ceiling based
on agreed data and adequate verification
measures. They again call upon Eastern
participating states to contribute construc-
tively to clarifying these problems.

5. The establishment of relations based
on trust and co-operation in Europe depends
on the full compliance by all the signatories

with the provisions and principles of the 1974
Helsinki Finsil Act. These principles, to which
the Allies are firmly committed, are of the ut-
most importance with respect to Poland; the
Polish people must be free to solve their
problems without outside interference or
pressure of any kind. The Allies remain
deeply attached to the human dimension of
detente and thus to the tangible benefits
which it must offer to the individual.

The Allies will continue their efforts to
achieve a balanced and substantive result at
the Madrid CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] follow-up
meeting, in the form of progress in all areas
covered by the Final Act, including human
rights, human contacts and information. They
call upon the Soviet Union to live up to the
Final Act and urge it to join in establishing a
Conference on Disarmament in Europe and
to agree now on a precise mandate for
negotiations on confidence-building measures
applicable to the whole of Europe.

6. Those Allies who are members of the
Committee on Disarmament will contribute to
work in that forum for the adoption of
balanced and verifiable agreements on
specific issues. The Allies reaffirm the impor-
tance they attach to the Second Special Ses-
sion of the United Nations General Assembly
on Disarmament to be held in 1982 in which
they will play an active part.

7. The Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd
September 1971 has made a decisive con-
tribution to stabilizing the Berlin situation
during the 10 years since its signature. The
Allies stress the continuing importance they
attach to the maintenance of the calm situa-
tion in and around the city.

The Allies note with satisfaction the
forthcoming meeting between the Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Chairman of the Council of State of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic. They recall their
statement in the Ronr.s communique of 5th
May 1981, and expressed their hope that this
meeting will contribute to the further
development of relations between the two
German States.

8. Bearing in mind the close relationship
between their defense and economic posture
the Allies will continue to give full support to
the programmes to strengthen the economies
of the less favored partners in the spirit of
Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

9. International stability is vital to
Western interests. Political settlements must
be found to crises or conflicts. Genuine non-
alignment can make an important contribu-
tion towards these goals. 'The Allies will con-
tinue to consult among themselves and work
together with others to encourage the main-
tenance of stability and the independence of
sovereign nations, to which they attach great
importance, and to reduce the risks of crisis
in the Third Worid. They will take the
necessary political and economic measures to
support efforts by such nations to defend
their sovereignty and territorial integrity and
to enhance stability worldwide. In their con-
sultations. Allies will seek to identify common
objectives, taking full account of the pohtical,

August 1982

69

MIDDLE EAST

economic and military situation in the area
concerned. Those Allies in a position to do so
will be ready to take steps outside the treaty
area to deter aggression and to respond to
requests by sovereign nations for help in
resisting threats to their security or in-
dependence.

10. Peace and economic and social
development are increasingly becoming in-
terdependent. The Allies will work together
with other nations to assist countries who
fight against hunger, poverty and under-
development.

11. The next meeting of the North Atlan-
tic Council in Ministerial session will be held
in Luxembourg on the 17th and 18th May
1982.

DECLARATION,
DEC. 11, 1981

Ministerial Declaration on Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Force Modernization
and Arms Control

The Allies who participated in the December
1979 decisions on intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) modernization and arms control
welcomed the opening of the United States-
Soviet negotiations on INF arms control in
the strategic arms control framework on 30th
November. They expressed their conviction
that a positive outcome of these negotiations
would contribute to greater East-West
stability and progress in other East-West
arms control negotiations. They fully support
the US negotiating approach, which was de-
veloped in the course of intensive consulta-
tions among them.

The decision of December 1979 was taken
against the background of a growing threat
to Alliance security posed by Soviet long-
range INF missiles, in particular the SS-20,
each with three independently targetable
warheads. Since that time the number of
Soviet long-range missiles has grown rapidly.
Deployments of SS-20 missiles continue. The
Soviet Union now possesses some 1,100
warheads on long-range INF missiles which
threaten the Alliance.

The dual-track decision of December 1979
opened the way to reducing the threat
through arms control negotiations. Based on
that decision, and with the full support of its
Allies, the US has made a far-reaching pro-
posal to eliminate all US and Soviet long-
range land-based INF missiles. It has offered
to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets
will dismantle their SS-20 missiles, and
retire their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This
historic offer is straightforward and
equitable, and would eliminate the systems of
greatest concern to both sides. If the Soviet
Union shows a similar willingness to secure
far-reaching measures of disarmament,
elimination of these long-range missiles on
both sides can be a reality. Reductions in
other US and Soviet nuclear systems could be
sought in subsequent phases.

Determination in implementing both
tracks of the December 1979 decision has
been a key factor in convincing the Soviet
Union to negotiate without preconditions,
thus creating the opportunity to achieve gen-
uine arms control. This same resolve will re-
main essential in reaching concrete results in
the negotiations. Implementation of the
modernization program is continuing and can
be altered only by a fair and effective arms
control agreement.

The Allies welcomed the US commitment
to make every effort to bring the negotia-
tions to a successful conclusion within the
shortest possible time. They also noted that
the US intends to negotiate in good faith, and
will listen to and consider Soviet proposals,
with the objective of reaching an equitable,

effective and verifiable agreement that will
enhance the security of the Alliance, and thu;
contribute to a more stable military relation-
ship between East and West. The achieve-
ment of such an agreement requires a
similarly constructive approach on the part o
the Soviet Union.

US consultations with its Allies in the
Special Consultative Group on INF arms con
trol contributed significantly to the prepara-
tions for the negotiations and will continue a.
the negotiations progress. These consulta-
tions are an expression of Alliance solidarity
and reflect the US commitment to take Alliec
views into account as well as the close
association of the Allies with the US
negotiating effort. ■

Visit of IVIoroccan King hiassan II

His Majesty King Hassan H of the
Kingdom of Morocco made an official
working visit to Washington, D.C., May
18-22, 1982, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following is a Department statement of
May 21.^

The discussions with His Majesty King
Hassan H have been most satisfying and
thorough, covering a broad range of sub-
jects. Perhaps the most important out-
come of the visit was the opportunity for
the President and King Hassan to have
face-to-face discussions on the major
issues of common concern and our
respective positions on them. Secretary
Haig and Foreign Minister Boucetta, in
the presence of the King, exchanged the
instruments of ratification of the agree-
ment establishing a binational cultural
and educational commission on May 20.
Secretary Haig signed the agreement in
Marrakech in February, and the rapidity
with which the whole process was com-
pleted testifies to its importance to both
countries.

We also had a chance to review
economic issues of common interest. In
order to promote U.S. investment in
Morocco, an investment working group
in the U.S. -Moroccan Economic Commis-
sion will be established, to begin opera-
tions soon, and we have held discussions
on the possibility of negotiating on a
bilateral investment treaty. We also
discussed a cooperative venture in
dryland agricultural development. It is
our hope to be able to provide around
$200 million in assistance over the next
5 years for this effort, which could
cushion Morocco against the effects of
another devastating drought.

We reviewed the important security
aspects of our relationship. Morocco anc
the United States have had a long tradi-
tion of close cooperation on security
issues, which has been strengthened
recently with an expanded strategic
dialogue. The Joint Military Commissioi
is an important vehicle for continuing
discussions between our respective
military establishments.

Both sides also stressed the impor-
tance of our security assistance relation
ship. We are proceeding with negotia-
tions in which Morocco will grant U.S.
forces access to Moroccan transit
facilities in special contingencies of con-
cern to both countries. A detailed ar-
rangement will now be worked out, and
we expect agreement on a text before
His Majesty departs the United States.

We discussed the implications of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) ac
tions taken toward the Western Sahara.
The King's initiative taken at Nairobi
last year, calling for a cease-fire and
referendum, continues to be the basis ol
our policy. After the excellent begin-
nings of the implementation committee
this year, we hope that the OAU will
persist in its activities.

Finally, we had a productive ex-
change on the Middle East situation. Wi
very much value the views of King
Hassan and the constructive approach
that he has traditiotially taken toward
this issue. We reiterated U.S. deter-
mination to press forward with
autonomy talks. We look forward to a
continuing dialogue with Morocco on
this vital matter.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment Spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

70

Department of State Bulletin

OCEANS

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

U.S. Votes Against
Law of the Sea Treaty

'RESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
fULY 9, 1982'

The United States has long recognized
low critical the world's oceans are to
nankind and how important interna-
;ional agreements are to the use of
;hose oceans. For over a decade, the
Jnited States has been working with
nore than 150 countries at the Third
J.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
;o develop a comprehensive treaty.

On January 29, 1982, I reaffirmed
;he U.S. commitment to the multilateral
Drocess for reaching such a treaty and
innounced that we would return to the
legotiations to seek to correct unaccept-
ible elements in the deep seabed mining
jart of the draft convention. I also an-
lounced that my Administration would
support ratification of a convention
Tieeting six basic objectives.

On April 30, the conference adopted
1 convention that does not satisfy the
)bjectives sought by the United States.
X was adopted by a vote of 130 in favor,
vith four against (including the United
States), and 17 abstentions. Those
Voting "no" or abstaining appear small in
lumber but represent countries which
produce more than 60% of the world's
jross national product and provide more
;han 60% of the contributions to the
Jnited Nations.

We have now completed a review of
;hat convention and recognize that it
lontains many positive and very signifi-
cant accomplishments. Those extensive
aarts dealing with navigation and
Dverflight and most other provisions of
;he convention are consistent with U.S.
nterests and, in our view, serve well the
nterests of all nations. That is an impor-
Lant achievement and signifies the
Denefits of working together and effec-
tively balancing numerous interests. The
United States also appreciates the ef-
forts of the many countries that have
worked with us toward an acceptable
agreement, including efforts by friends
and allies at the session that concluded
on April 30.

Our review recognizes, however,
that the deep seabed mining part of the
convention does not meet U.S. objec-
tives. For this reason, I am announcing
today that the United States will not
sign the convention as adopted by the
conference, and our participation in the

remaining conference process will be at
the technical level and will involve only
those provisions that serve U.S. in-
terests.

These decisions reflect the deep con-
viction that the United States cannot
support a deep seabed mining regime
with such major problems. In our view,
those problems include:

• Provisions that would actually
deter future development of deep seabed
mineral resources, when such develop-
ment should serve the interest of all
countries;

• A decisionmaking process that
would not give the United States or
others a role that fairly reflects and pro-
tects their interests;

• Provisions that would allow
amendments to enter into force for the
United States without its approval; this

is clearly incompatible with the U.S. ap-
proach to such treaties;

• Stipulations relating to mandatory
transfer of private technology and the
possibility of national liberation
movements sharing in benefits; and

• The absence of assured access for
future qualified deep seabed miners to
promote the development of these
resources.

We recognize that world demand
and markets currently do not justify
commerical development of deep seabed
mineral resources, and it is not clear
when such development will be justified.
When such factors become favorable,
however, the deep seabed represents a
potentially important source of strategic
and other minerals. The aim of the
United States in this regard has been to
establish with other nations an order
that would allow exploration and
development under reasonable terms
and conditions.

^Text from White House press release.

Control of Technology Transfers
to the Soviet Union

by James L. Buckley

Statement before the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigation of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee on
May 6, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Under
Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology.''^

I am delighted at this opportunity to
respond to your invitation to testify on
the role of the State Department in con-
trolling the transfer of militarily critical
technology to the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc. Whatever the record of
prior Administrations — Republican as
well as Democratic — it is clear that this
Administration has placed a very high
priority on improving the effectiveness
of the executive branch in enforcing ex-
port controls. It has launched important
initiatives which we believe will greatly
improve their overall effectiveness while
sharpening the focus on those elements
of advanced technology and process
know-how which are of the most critical
importance to the Soviet bloc. We freely
acknowledge that much more needs to
be done; and we are actively working
with other agencies to improve coordina-

tion over a range of issues. It will take
time, however, for all these efforts to
take hold in particular areas, especially
because of the large amount of new data
that has had to be gathered by various
agencies and the analytical work that
has to be done.

National security export controls are
a basic element in overall U.S. policy
toward the Warsaw Pact countries. To
put it bluntly, these controls are a
recognition of the fact that the global
objectives of the Soviet bloc are inimical
to our own and threaten every value for
which our nation stands. Therefore, it is
simply harmful for us to provide those
nations with Western, militarily useful
technologies to be turned against us.

The Role of COCOM

As most of these sensitive technologies
are not within the sole control of the
United States, it has been essential from
the outset to achieve among the major
Western industrialized powers fun-
damental agreement as to what tech-
nologies are militarily critical and how
their transfer to the Soviet bloc should
be controlled.

August 1982

71

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

i;

The instrument that has been
developed for this purpose is the Coor-
dinating Committee for Multilateral
Security Export Controls (COCOM) to
which Japan and all NATO countries,
with the exception of Iceland, belong.
COCOM was created in 1949 by informal
agreement among its members and has
thus been in existence for more than
three decades.

COCOM has three major functions.
The first is to establish and update
the lists of embargoed products and
technologies. Although COCOM lists
are not published, they become the basis
for the national control lists ad-
ministered by each member government.
The member governments are now pre-
paring for a major review of these em-
bargo lists, which will begin in October.
Second, COCOM acts as the clear-
inghouse for requests submitted by
the member governments to ship
specific items to specified end-users in
the proscribed countries. The COCOM-
proscribed countries are the Soviet
Union, the other Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, China, and the other Communist
countries in Asia.

Third, COCOM serves as a means
of coordinating the administration and
enforcement activities of the member
governments.

The COCOM lists set up fairly
specific limits on the technical
characteristics above which member
governments agree that they will pro-
hibit exports to proscribed countries,
unless COCOM itself approves excep-
tions.

In agreeing to a national request to
export items on one of the control lists,
COCOM works on the principle of
unanimity. No application, in short, is
approved if any member state objects.
One of the evolved strengths of COCOM
is that in over 30 years of operation,
there have been very few cases in which
a government has exercised its
sovereign right to go ahead with exports
over COCOM objections. This is all the
more remarkable given the absence of
any treaty or executive agreement
undergirding the organization.

Over those decades, COCOM has
generally been successful in inhibiting
the overt flow of strategic technology to
our adversaries. During the 1970s,
however, in the honeymoon days of
detente, the United States and the West
relaxed controls over a number of em-
bargoed commodities. It was believed
that wideranging trade would somehow
alter the international behavior of the
Soviets and moderate their military in-

72

vestment. During this period, the United
States went from being the least to the
most frequent seeker of exceptions to
multilateral controls. COCOM itself
came to reflect such attitudes, and ex-
ceptions to the embargo were allowed to
thrive. We now know this was a

[National security ex-
port] controls are a
recognition . . . that the
global objectives of the
Soviet bloc are inimical
to our own and threaten
every value for which
our nation stands.

mistake. During the period of detente,
the world stood witness to the greatest
military buildup in history, along with
the increased Soviet adventurism that
grew out of an increased self-confidence.

Stemming the Flow of Technology

The Reagan Administration came into
office 15 months ago determined to stem
the flow of the technology that the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies
were using to improve their already vast
warmaking capabilities. It was clear
that the West's crucial qualitative edge
in military systems was being under-
mined by the Soviet's increasingly ag-
gressive efforts to buy or steal our
militarily relevant technologies and
equipment.

More precisely, we saw this well-
orchestrated acquisition program giving
the Soviets:

• A very significant savings in time
and money in their military research and
development programs;

• Rapid modernization of their
defense industrial infrastructure;

• The opportunity to accelerate the
closing of gaps between our weapons
systems and theirs; and

• The chance to develop, with
alarming speed, neutralizing counter-
measures to our own technological in-
novations.

sprt

iiea.

As a consequence, the Administra-
tion has initiated efforts to fill in gaps ir
the multilateral export control system.
At the Ottawa summit meeting in July
1981, President Reagan raised the prob
lem of Western technology transfer to
the Soviet Union. An agreement at Ot-
tawa to consult on this issue culminated
in a high-level meeting in Paris during
January, the first ministerial level
COCOM meeting since the late 1950s.
The other COCOM governments have
asked that the results of that meeting be
kept confidential, as, indeed, are all
COCOM proceedings. I chaired the U.S.
delegation to that meeting, however,
and I can say that there was a concrete
consensus that the member government
should renew their efforts to improve
COCOM effectiveness. We have been en
couraged by what appears to be a new
and more constructive attitude of other
COCOM governments and feel that this
meeting forms a basis for a revitaliza-
tion of the COCOM system.

Such a revitalization will take much
hard work, and it will take time, among
other reasons because COCOM depends
on the national administration of con-
trols by 15 individual governments. But
some specific steps are underway. EfFec
tiveness, for example, requires precise
definitions of many complex tech-
nologies. We have made progress
toward agreement on a number of
specific, technical proposals in this area
to tighten the embargo.

The United States is now working
on proposals that will expand COCOM
control lists into previously uncovered
priority industries. These include gas
turbine engines, large floating drydocks
certain metallurgical processes, elec-
tronic grade silicon, printed circuit boar ■ s:
technology, space launch vehicles and
spacecraft, robotics, ceramic materials
for engines, certain advanced com-
posites, and communications switching
and computer hardware and software
technology and know-how. This process
will continue into the triennial COCOM
list review, which will take place this Oc
tober, when a general reappraisal of
everything on the control lists will take
place.

We have developed workable pro-
posals for harmonizing the expert licens
ing procedures of the 15 member states
so as to make COCOM decisionmaking
more efficient. What we are seeking are
ways to bring national enforcement
practices to a level of equal eifec-
tiveness. These Uvo questions will be ad
dressed at a special COCOM meeting
which will convene in Paris later this

Department of State Bulletir

ffl
1"!
«
«■;
fO
■k
M

iT!

h

i

»i

ii

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

spring— and the fact that all partners
lave agreed to that special meeting is
testament to our shared goals.

Illegal diversion activities are a
problem overseas as well as at home.
We have been cooperating with our
COCOM allies to improve enforcement
ind investigative capabilities in this
irea. The State Department, working
:losely with our intelligence and in-
restigative agencies, has been channel-
ing appropriate information to other
governments to alert them to potentially
Uegal activities within their borders. We
have also encouraged them to increase
the investigative resources and the sanc-
tions available for export control en-
forcement. The Department of Com-
nerce, and in turn the U.S. Customs
Service, have detailed officers to the
Department of State to support this
overseas compliance effort.

COCOM has thus, we believe, made
measurable progress toward strength-
;ning strategic export controls since this
Mministration came into office. But it is
ilso clear that the continuing revitaliza-
:ion process will be long and hard. In at-
«mpting to strengthen strategic export
;ontrols on exports to the Soviet Union
ind the other Warsaw Pact countries,
we are faced with the perennial problem
of securing agreement with all the other
30C0M allies on just where to establish
he technical cutoffs for commodities and
echnologies under embargo. Determin-
ng in many scores of different technical
ireas what is sufficiently strategic to
varrant control is not an easy task. We
lo not always agree on what are
nilitarily critical technologies, yet the
)urpose of the organization is limited to
;uch technologies. Members exercise
■onsiderable care to avoid controls
vhose principal impact would be
'Genomic rather than military, and each
las its own views and perspective. West
iiuropean and Japanese economies
vould, generally speaking, be affected
nore than the U.S. economy by sweep-
ng controls on manufactured products.
3ut such differences between ourselves
md our COCOM allies should not be
overemphasized. We should remember
;hat our allies have cooperated with us
'or over 30 years to control significant
imounts of equipment, material, and
;echnologies through COCOM. That is,
5rst and foremost, because we share a
common belief that such controls con-
stitute an important element in our
nutual defense.

As you know, the State Department
s also responsible for administering
Tiunitions export controls which cover

August 1982

defense articles and services. Munitions
are not approved for export to Warsaw
Pact countries. Accordingly, the main
issue in administering these controls
relates to security concerns and our
foreign relations with other countries.

Your letter of invitation mentions
that, in an executive branch more effec-
tively organized to shape and enforce ex-
port control policy, you envisage a prin-
cipal and expanded role for the Depart-
ment of State. We, too, envisage such a
role for the Department.

Upon taking office, this Administra-
tion undertook a full review of our
policy concerning the transfer of
strategic technology to the Soviet Union
and the other Warsaw Pact countries.
The State Department was a major par-
ticipant in this review, which culminated
in the COCOM high-level meeting. The
State Department led our delegation to

that meeting. Since then, on a number
of occasions, senior officials at State
have discussed with our allies security
concerns related to technology transfers.
We are persuaded that improved allied
cooperation on sensitive technology
transfer issues is a realistic objective.
There will, of course, continue to be
some differences on the details of con-
trols and their application to individual
cases. But, with hard work to identify
clearly and to justify persuasively what
needs to be controlled and how controls
should be enforced and administered,
such differences, we believe, will be the
exception rather than the rule.

^The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Cuban Support for Terrorism and
Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Security and Terrorism of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on March 12, 1982.
Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.^

The Administration shares your concern
about the growth of terrorism and
violence in today's world. I welcome this
opportunity to address the issue of
Cuban terrorism and promotion of
violent revolution in Latin America and
the Caribbean.

For some 10 years following the
death of Che Guevara on an Andean hill-
side, Cuba attempted to portray itself as
a member of the international communi-
ty not unlike others, carrying on state-
to-state relations through embassies,
and emphasizing trade and cultural con-
tacts.

Cuba, however, never stopped glori-
fying violent revolution. During an en-
tire generation, Cuba carefully nurtured
agents and contacts with groups com-
mitted to violence, often providing ideo-
logical and military training to several
groups in the same country. Then, in
1978, almost without notice, Castro
began to implement a strategy of
uniting the left in the countries of the
hemisphere, with the purpose of using it
as a tool for the violent overthrow of ex-
isting governments and the establish-

ment of more Marxist-Leninist regimes
in this hemisphere.

In 1978, Cuba helped unite three
Sandinista factions, then committed
itself militarily to the rebellion in
Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent
to many that a new Cuban strategy was
in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like
a unique case. But then Cuba began to
try the same thing in El Salvador, in
Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is re-
peating the pattern in Honduras. Even
Costa Rica is now exposed to the threat
of externally backed terrorism.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not
the only source of terrorism in the
hemisphere. Violent conflict in Latin
America has many origins, including
historical social and economic inequities
which have generated frustrations.
Especially in the Caribbean Basin, eco-
nomic crisis has recently subjected
fragile institutions to additional stresses,
increasing their vulnerability to radical-
ism as well as violence.

Clearly, however, Cuba's readiness
to foment violence to exploit such situa-
tions imposes serious obstacles to eco-
nomic progress, democratic develop-
ment, and self-determination. On
December 14, I delivered to the Con-
gress a special report on Cuban covert
activities in key countries [see Special
Report No. 90 -"Cuba's Renewed Sup-
port for Violence in Latin America'']. I

73

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

would like to take this opportunity to
review and update some specific cases of
Cuban export of violence.

South America

The immediate danger, it is evident, is
in Central America. But the pattern is
present in South America as well. In
Chile, Cuban training of MIR [Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left] guer-
rillas has increased substantially in the
past 18 months. In January, the Chilean
Communist Party leadership met in
Havana. A handful of senior Cuban
officials attended and pressed hard for
unity of all opposition forces in Chile
and intensification of all forms of strug-
gle, including violence.

The most prominent South Ameri-
can case, however, is Colombia. In
February 1980, Colombian M-19 terror-
ists seized the Dominican Embassy,
holding 18 diplomats— including the
American, Mexican, and Venezuelan am-
bassadors and the Papal Nuncio— hos-
tage for 61 days. As part of the
negotiated settlement, the terrorists
were flown to Cuba and given asylum.
That summer, Cuban intelligence officers
arranged a meeting among M-19
members with representatives of two
other Colombian extremist organiza-
tions, the ELN [Army of National
Liberation] and the FARC [Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. Full
unification was not achieved but practi-
cal cooperation increased.

In November 1980, the M-19 sent
100-200 activists to Cuba for military
training. This group was joined by M-19
terrorists already in Cuba, including
Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the leader of
the Dominican Embassy takeover. The
Colombians were trained by Cuban in-
structors in explosives, automatic
weapons, hand-to-hand combat, com-
munications, and rural guerrilla tactics.
In February 1981, their Cuban training
completed, these guerrillas infiltrated in-
to Colombia by boat along the Pacific
coast. The attempt of these urban ter-
rorists at an armed uprising in the coun-
tryside failed. Pabon himself was cap-
tured. Cuba denied involvement in the
arming and landing of the M-19 guer-
rillas but not in training them.

The clear evidence of Cuba's role led
Colombia to suspend relations with Cuba
on March 23. President Turbay com-
mented in an August 13 New York
Times interview:

. . . when we found that Cuba, a country
with which we had diplomatic relations, wa.s
using those relations to prepare a group of
guerrillas, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for
us. It was like sending ministers to
Washington at the same time you are about
to bomb ships in Hawaii.

In an interview published in Septem-
ber 1981, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the
Cuban Vice President, told the German
news magazine Der Spiegel, "we did not
deny" that we trained the M-19 guer-
rillas. This, he said, "holds true for the
Salvadorans as well."

Neither the anger of President Tur-
bay nor the M-19's failure has deterred
Cuba. A new and sizeable group of
M-19 guerrillas are today in Cuba
receiving military training. We don't
know that they will go back to Colombia
to attempt new acts of terrorism,
perhaps directed against the presidential
elections this coming May, but such a
pattern seems a reasonable speculation.
The M-19 has already gone on record-
in a declaration distributed to the media
in January— condemning the elections
and claiming that "civil resistance,
popular combat, and armed warfare are
the only roads left open to the
people. . . ." This document, which was
distributed under the signatures of the
M-19's national directorate, pledged that
the M-19 would oppose the elections
"with all our force." This statement was
repeated in late February when M-19
leaders rejected the government's latest
amnesty proposal.

For the first time, we now also have
detailed and reliable information linking
Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as
arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has
been using a Colombian narcotics ring to
funnel arms as well as funds to Colom-
bian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring
was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colom-
bian drug trafficker now in custody in
Mexico. He has admitted to working for
Havana in purchasing arms for the
M-19. We have information that Guillot
traveled twice to Cuba since October
1981 and that on the second visit he
received $700,000 from the Cuban
Government to purchase arms for the
M-19 guerrillas. Last October he played
a principal role in transferring the arms
he purchased from a ship to a Colombian
plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition
to arms, Guillot reportedly also trans-
ferred funds to the guerrillas through an
employee of a Panamanian bank. He
maintained contact with the Cuban dip-
lomatic mission in BogoUi, including the
ambassador, until that mission was
closed.

In return for Guillot's services, the
Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking
by permitting mother ships carrying
marijuana to take sanctuary in Cuban
waters while awaiting feeder boats from
the Bahamas and Florida. According to
a relative of Guillot, one such mother
ship detained by Cuban authorities was
released when Guillot protested to the
Cuban ambassador in Bogota.

Guillot himself has also admitted
that a future shipment of arms was to
be sent to an unspecified group in
Bolivia. These arms, according to
Guillot, were to be supplied by an in-
dividual in Miami named Johnny. Johnm
has been identified as Johnny Crump, a
narcotics and arms trafficker now de-
tained in Miami on narcotics charges.

We will continue to follow this case
with extreme interest since it is the first
firm information we have which impli-
cates Cuba in narcotics trafficking. It
also confirms through an independent
source what we have suspected, that
despite Cuban denials, Cuba has provid-
ed arms to the Colombian M-19 guer-
rillas in addition to training them.

Central America

In Central America, the pattern we
know well from Nicaragua and El
Salvador can be seen now from
Guatemala to Honduras and Costa Rica^
Guatemala exemplifies Cuba's syste-
matic efforts to unify, assist, and advise
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. In the fall o
1980, the four major Guatemalan guer-
rilla groups met in Managua to negotiat
a unity agreement. Cuban and San-
dinista officials attended the signing
ceremony. We have obtained copies of
the actual secret agreements which
make clear that the four guerrilla
groups consider themselves a revolu-
tionary vanguard, and believe that
Marxism-Leninism establishes the
ideological parameters of the
Guatemalan revolution. The secret
agreements emphasize the importance c
creating a national front, whose leader-
ship would be approved by the self-
proclaimed revolutionary vanguard, and
the necessity of building international
solidarity for the Guatemalan revolutioi
They spell out the intention of the guer-
rillas to control decisive political and
military power, and fundamentiil eco-
nomic power, should the Guatemalan
Government be overthrown.

Later last fall, the leadership of the
four Guatemalan guerrilla organizations
were called to Havana to work further
on developing effective unity. In Januar

74

Department of State Bulletir

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

)82, they issued a public statement to
le people of Guatemala and world opin-
n, calling for a broad national patriotic
nity front. They laid out a deceptively
loderate program for a new revolu-
onary government which would be
onaligned, guarantee freedom of ex-
ression, and respect the people's right
) elect their own representatives. But
le front, they made clear, would be
nder their leadership as the revolu-
onary vanguard.

The Marxist-Leninist parameters of
16 Guatemalan revolution laid out in
le secret accords are not mentioned in
lis declaration. Nor is the intention of
16 revolutionary vanguard to control
scisive political and military power. It
Des not take a great deal of imagina-
on to see why the class struggle and
[arxist-Leninist ideas so prominent in
;cret agreements were deleted from
16 public declaration.

A similar process appears underway
Honduras. The Cubans currently are
sing Honduran leftists to transport
-ms and provide support to insurgents
. El Salvador and Guatemala. Never-
leless, the Cubans are looking to the
iy when guerrilla warfare can be in-
iated in Honduras itself. Honduran
ithorities raided several guerrilla safe-
)uses in late November 1981. Captured
jcuments and declarations from de-
dned guerrillas, including several
icaraguans, revealed that the group
as formed in Nicaragua at the instiga-
on of high-level Sandinista leaders, its
lief of operations resided in Managua,
id members of the group had received
lilltary training in Nicaragua and Cuba,
mong the captured documents were
assroom notebooks from a 1-year train-
;g course held in Cuba in 1980. The
jcuments also revealed that one of the
iree guerrilla bases discovered was
^sponsible for transporting arms and
[unitions from Esteli, Nicaragua, into
onduras. We can expect to see the
imiliar ritual repeated in an effort to
ring down the new democratic govern-
lent which was inaugurated barely 2
lonths ago.

In Costa Rica, terrorism had been
irtually unknown until March 1981
'hen a vehicle bearing three U.S. Em-
assy guards was blown apart. In June
iree Costa Rican policemen were shot
own. This year an investigation by the
olice uncovered at least 20 terrorist
ells of the Central American Party of
Revolutionary Workers, one of which
/as involved in an attempted kidnap-
ing in January of the Salvadoran busi-
essman Roberto Palomo. Also un-

covered was a "people's prison" well sup-
plied with arms, food, and other stores.
According to documents found during
the investigation, the purpose of the ter-
rorists was to undermine Costa Rica's
democratic institutions. Two Salva-
dorans and one Costa Rican were ar-
rested; they told police they had been
given extensive training in Nicaragua
and false identity documents.

New Cuban Approach

Cuba's covert strategy for exporting
armed revolution and terrorism is more
sophisticated than Cuban efforts in the
1960s. The new Cuban approach no
longer centers support solely on armed
focos but combines support for revolu-
tionary groups with propaganda, youth
training courses, scholarships, and bi-
lateral economic/technical assistance.
Despite some flexibility in tactics, the
mainspring of Cuba's policy remains the
development of strong paramilitary
forces in target countries like Colombia
to provide the muscle for revolutionary
groups regardless of the path to power
they choose.

And now Nicaragua is collaborating
in the attempt to impose new Cuban-
style regimes in Central America. Such
regimes are so incompetent economically
and so repressive of individual liberties
that their citizens will see their only
hope in flight, often to the United
States. The rapidly growing number of
Indian refugees— now more than
12,000— who have fled Nicaragua to
Honduras are just the most recent mani-
festation of the despair which moves
people to abandon their communities for
safety elsewhere.

We know the human tragedy of
refugee movements. We also know the
enormous social and economic burdens
they place on the societies which receive
them. We, ourselves, have seen the
crime, the skyjackings, the huge welfare
costs, and social tensions the Mariel
migration brought to the communities of
this country. For small countries in Cen-
tral America or even Mexico the conse-
quences could be too much to accommo-
date. The pressures can easily destabi-
lize the weak, creating the chaos that
gives revolutionaries new opportunities.
Whether or not it is part of the design
to export revolution, it at least serves
that purpose.

Cuba's investment of energy, money,
and agents would not be possible with-
out Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now
totaling well over $3 billion a year,
equivalent to a quarter of Cuba's GNP,

enables Cuba to maintain the second
largest and the best equipped military
force in Latin America and to channel
significant resources to insurgencies and
terrorism abroad. Cuba's new offensive
since 1978 has been accompanied by
ever-increasing Soviet arms buildup in
Cuba including MiG-23/Floggers and
66,000 tons of supplies in 1981 alone.
Having such a sophisticated military
establishment enhances Cuba's ability to
foster and export revolution.

Conclusion

We must be clear about Cuba. It is a
Soviet surrogate. But it is not simply a
Soviet surrogate. Its support for sub-
version derives from its own deeply
based ideological conviction. It is a
fundamental tenet of the Cuban revolu-
tion.

The Cuban leadership today is made
up largely of the veterans who 23 years
ago came to power through violent
revolution. They have developed "armed
struggle" into an ideological precept and
way of life. Promoting "armed struggle"
is not just a tactic of foreign policy, it is
what reassures them that they are still
revolutionaries.

This deep-seated drive to recreate
their own guerrilla experience elsewhere
is strengthened by hopes of creating
allies and keeping Washington's atten-
tion focused away from Havana. Hoping
that the United States will be domesti-
cally and internationally hamstrung on
El Salvador, Cuba seeks to compound
our problems by creating new ones— for
example, in Guatemala or Colombia.
This drive, however, makes Cuba in-
creasingly prone to rash decisions and
tactical mistakes and more willing to
sacrifice the lives and resources of
foreign guerrilla groups in operations
that may prove disastrous to the guer-
rillas but advantageous to Havana.

Make no mistake: The Castro regime
has made a business of violent revolu-
tion. Our response is also clear. We will
not accept, we do not believe the coun-
tries of the region will accept, that the
future of the Caribbean Basin be manip-
ulated from Havana. It must be deter-
mined by the countries themselves.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

ugust 1982

75

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Commitment to Democracy in
Central America

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
cm Inter-American Affairs of the House
Foreign AJfairs Committee on April 21,
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter- American Affairs.^

Whatever else it settled, the election in
El Salvador destroyed the myth that
Central America is moving inexorably
leftward. After Somoza fell to a vast,
Marxist-led coalition, many had believed
that the only question was how soon and
how far Central American politics would
go toward Marxism-Leninism. The
massive turnout in El Salvador ir-
refutably repudiated the claim of the
violent left that it has the people behind
it. Even if you attribute all of the
spoiled and null ballots to left opposi-
tion, you have a total of only 11% of the
vote. And remember that this happened
after massive turnouts in elections in
Honduras and Costa Rica in the last 6
months gave leftwing parties in-
finitesimally small votes.

Why is this important? It's impor-
tant because policy recommendations
have often been based on the explicit or
implicit assumption that what happened
in Nicaragua was inevitably going to
happen elsewhere. Some of our best
friends in the area — and some of your
witnesses here — have repeatedly and
sincerely told us that we should find con-
cessions to make to the left or it would
radicalize even further and move to
Stalinist extremism. Some of the pro-
posals for negotiations in El Salvador or
for reconciliation with Nicaragua
presented before this committee seem to
stem from that premise. The argument
was: coopt the left before it's too late.

If that analysis has been invalidated,
another has proven right. That is, that if
only given the opportunity to choose.
Central Americans will choose
democracy over authoritarianism and
reform over revolution. Without the
political and land reforms pursued by
two U.S. Administrations with broad
support from the Congress, El Salvador
might today be where Somoza's
Nicaragua was 3 years ago, on the verge
of collapse. If we have learned anything
from the March 28 elections, it is that
we must not waver in our support for

76

reforms in El Salvador. The fact that a
prominent leader of the original San-
dinista movement has now challenged
Managua — charging that the San-
dinistas' original commitment to
pluralism has been betrayed — under-
scores the point.

There's another lesson to learn from
the last months. We have spent a lot of
time debating whether the United States
was getting into another Vietnam,
escalating from military assistance to
military trainers to military advisers to
the introduction of American troops —
right into another "quagmire." The
debate was inevitable, given our history,
and probably a good thing. It has helped
to make clear to the public that such an
escalation is unlikely, that American
troops are not wanted, needed, or ap-
propriate to the struggles going on in
Central America.

Yet, I'm not sure that we've come to
terms with another — and maybe more
relevant — reference point: our tradi-
tional approach to the area. Usually we
have neglected Central America only —
when the going got rough — to send in
the Marines. What we have to do now is
to find a way out of that dilemma and
mount the kind of sustained political,
economic, and military cooperation that
our strategic interests and our simple
proximity require.

The basic policies required are these:

• A relatively tight but indispen-
sable program of military assistance. We
are requesting $125.3 million in foreign
military sales (FMS) financing for fiscal
year (FY) 1983 for Latin America and
the Caribbean. Of this amount, which is
less than 2% of our global FMS pro-
gram, $75 million is for direct conces-
sional credits for those countries with
severe economic problems and heavy
debt burdens. In addition, we are re-
questing $13.3 million for military train-
ing and education under the interna-
tional military education program
(IMET) program. We are getting good
value for these military assistance ef-
forts, as the professional performance of
the Salvadoran Army in defeating the
insurgents' offensive against the election
shows. I expect further improvement
when the 1,500 Salvadorans now
undergoing training in the United States

return to their country over the next
month.

• A substantial program of eco-
nomic assistance. The total we are re-
questing for Latin America and the
Caribbean— including economic support
fund (ESF), PL-480, and development
assistance — is $783 million. This is
somewhat less in what we hope will be
the improving economic climate of FY
1983 than in this emergency year, but is
still large and vital to the success of our
neighbors.

• A new proposal for long-term
trade and investment measures, devel-
oped in concert with other regional
powers, to provide the opportunity for
long-term prosperity to the small
economies of the area.

• A commitment to democracy in
every country of the area, not as an
abstract value to pay lip service to, but
as an indispensable element in resolving
the political problems of the area.

• The determination to use the in-
fluence our military and economic
assistance gives us to help our neighbor
overcome human rights abuses.

Three new opportunities may now
be open to us:

• In El Salvador, the constitution-
writing and electoral processes now
underway will provide numerous oppor-
tunities for national reconciliation. We
remain firmly and unalterably opposed
to negotiations on the division of
political power in El Salvador outside
the democratic process. But we will be
prepared to be of assistance in discus-
sions or negotiations which might be re
quired to facilitate the peaceful
reintegration into national life of those
elements of the FMLM/FDR [Farabund
Marti National Liberation Front/
Democratic Revolutionary Front] which
can accommodate to democracy.

• In Nicaragua we are probing, for
the second time, to see whether there
can be a negotiated settlement to the
threat the Niciiraguan arms buildup an(
heavy Cuban/Communist military
presence poses to neighbors. Progress
will not be possible unless and until the
cease their active support for insurgen-
cies in the region. Even so, our Am-
bassador in Managua has conveyed to
the Nicaraguan Government several pn
posals which would address both our
concerns and, we believe, those the Sar
dinistas allege. We are now evaluating
response given to us by the Nicaraguan
Ambassador in Washington.

• In Guatemala, which faces both
economic difficulties and an active
Cuban-supported insurgency, a prom-

Department of State Bulleti

■REATIES

ing evolution may have begun. Since
st month's coup led by junior officers,
olence not directly connected to the in-
irgency has been brought virtually to
1 end. Concrete measures have been
ken against corruption. All political
rces have been called to join in na-
)nal reconciliation. We hope that the
>w government of Guatemala will con-
nue to make progress in these areas
id that we in turn will be able to
tablish a closer, more collaborative
lationship with this key country.

We would not, of course, have these
)portunities without the commitment
e have made to the underlying policies.
Guatemala we carefully refrained
om backing a regime with a record of
rious rights violations; otherwise, we
ight never have had a government that
oposed to do something about it. I
)n't know whether or not Nicaragua is
ady to negotiate our differences. But I
) know that if El Salvador hadn't
ild — politically and militarily — this
iring, the Sandinistas would surely not
ive been prepared to talk. And without
onomic and military assistance, the
iters in El Salvador would never have
\d a chance to express their will. So I
>pe we can sustain the effort. It's
:ginning to work.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
1 be publisned by the committee and will
available from the Superintendent of
cuments, U.S. Government Printing Of-
8, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

urrent Actions

JLTILATERAL

itarctica

commendations relating to the furtherance
the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at London
t. 7, 1977.'
itification of approval: Norway, May 25,

82.

commendations relating to furtherance of
; principles and objectives of the Antarctic
eaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Washington
t. 5, 1979.'
)tification of approval: Norway, May 25,

82.

commendations relating to the furtherance
the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenos
res July 7, 1981.'
itification of approval: New Zealand,

ay 28, 1982; Norway, May 25, 1982.

1982

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.
TIAS 6997.
Ratification deposited: Monaco, June 2, 1982.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.
TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1982.

Coffee

Extension of the international coffee agree-
ment 1976. Done at London Sept. 25, 1981.
Enters into force Oct. 1, 1982.'
Acceptances deposited: Colombia, June 14,
1982; Rwanda, May 13, 1982; Spain, June 2,
1982.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund

for Commodities, with schedules. Done at

Geneva June 27, 1980.'

Ratifications deposited: Burundi, June 1,

1982; Egypt, Tanzania, June 11, 1982.

Signature: United Arab Emirates, June 8,

1982.

Conservation

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Apr. 28,
1982.2

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations.
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the
U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, June 4, 1982.

Containers

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with

annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva

Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 6,

1975.3

Ratification deposited: Poland, Apr. 29, 1982.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised,
and additional protocols I and II. Done at
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force
July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Austria, May 14, 1982.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton
Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966.
Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Notification of withdrawal: Argentina,
June 18, 1982; effective Dec. 31, 1982.

Customs

Customs convention on the international
transport of goods under cover of TIR
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20,
1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
Accession deposited: U.S.S.R. June 8, 1982.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,
1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, June 4, 1982.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.
TIAS 9614.
Accession deposited: Japan, June 9, 1982.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International
Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force
Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accession deposited: Tonga, Apr. 12, 1982.

Judicial Procedure

Additional protocol to the inter-American
convention on letters rogatory, with annex.
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered in-
to force June 14, 1980.'
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, May 18,
1982.

Law

Statute of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law. Done at Rome
Mar. 15, 1940. Entered into force Apr. 21,
1940; for the U.S. Mar. 13, 1964. TIAS 5743.
Accession deposited: Chile, May 12, 1982.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,

1948, as amended, on the International
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15,
1979.'

Acceptance deposited: Djibouti, June 1, 1982.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done

at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force

Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.

TIAS 9725.

Ratification deposited: Australia, May 19,

1982.

North Atlantic Treaty

North Atlantic Treaty. Signed at Washington
Apr. 4, 1949. Entered into force Aug. 24,

1949. TIAS 1964.

Accession deposited: Spain, May 30, 1982.

77

TREATIES

Nuclear Material— Physical Protection

Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.'
Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia,
Apr. 23, 1982;* Korea, Apr. 7, 1982.''

Phonoi^ams

Convention for the protection of producers of
phonograms against unauthorized duplication
of their phonograms. Done at Geneva
Oct 29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18,
1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. HAS 7808.
Notification of ratification: Austria, May 21,

1982.

Pollution

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international

convention for the prevention of pollution

from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17,

1978.'

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of

Germany, Jan. 21, 1982.^

Accession deposited: Colombia, July 27, 1982.

Approval deposited: France, Sept. 25, 1981. ^

Convention on the prevention of marine
pollution by dumping of wastes and other
matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mex-
ico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29,
1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975.
TIAS 8165.

Ratification deposited: Ireland, Feb. 17, 1982.
Accession deposited: Gabon, Feb. 5, 1982.
Notification of succession: Kiribati, June 3,
1982.

Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.'
Ratifications deposited: German Democratic
Republic, June 7, 1982; Spain, June 15, 1982.

Property-Industrial-Classification

Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the
purposes of the registration of marks of
June 15, 1957, as revised (TIAS 7419). Done
at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force
Feb. 6, 1979.3
Notification of ratifications: Austria, May 21,

1982; Hungary, May 21, 1982; Portugal,
Apr. 30, 1982.

Property-Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Mali, May 14, 1982.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention
for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS
9700). Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1981.
Enters into force Sept. 1, 1984, unless, prior
to Mar. 1, 1984, more than one-third of the
parties to the convention, or parties meeting
certain requirements, have notified their ob-
jections to the amendments.

Amendments to the protocol of 1978 (TIAS
10009) relating to the international conven-
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS
9700). Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1981.
Enters into force Sept. 1, 1984, unless, prior
to Mar. 1, 1984, more than one-third of the
parties to the protocol, or parties meeting
certain requirements, have notified their ob-
jections to the amendments.

Telecommunications

Final Acts of the Worid Administrative Radio
Conference for the planning of the broad-
casting-satellite service in frequency bands
11.7-12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and
11.7-12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes.
Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1979.^
Approval deposited: German Democratic

Republic, Mar. 29, 1982.

Trade . .

Agreement on interpretation and application
of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT
(subsidies and countervailing duties). Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619.
Acceptance: Spain, Apr. 14, 1982.*

International dairy arrangement. Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.
Acceptance: Poland, Apr. 23, 1982.

Agreement on implementation of article VI
of the GATT (antidumping code). Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9650.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Mar. 25,

1982.

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, June 1,

1982; Yugoslavia, Mar. 25, 1982.

Agreement on import licensing procedures.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Mar. 25,

1982.

Agreement on implementation of article VII

of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (customs valuation). Done at Geneva

Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,

1981.

Acceptance: New Zealand, June 1, 1982.*

Protocol to the agreement on implementation
of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation). Done
at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptance: New Zealand, June 1, 1982.^

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323.

Acceptances: Argentina, Apr. 27, 1982;' jjj
Austria, Mar. 25, 1982;' Colombia, Apr. 27, t
1982; Indonesia, May 19, 1982; Malaysia,
Apr. 28, 1982: Portugal, on behalf of Macao.
June 9, 1982; Singapore, Apr. 20, 1982;
Thailand, Apr. 15, 1982; Turkey, Apr. 5,
1982.

Proces-verbal of rectification to third cer-
tification of changes to schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
Oct. 23, 1974 (TIAS 8214). Signed at Genevi
Apr. 20, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 20,
1982.

U.N Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted a
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.'
Signature: Dominica, June 8, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Dominica, June 8,
1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions oi'
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or" to have indiscriminate effects, wit
annexed protocols. Done at Geneva Oct. 10,
1980.'
Ratifications and acceptances deposited:

Japan, June 9, 1982; Hungary, June 14, 198
Mongolia, June 8, 1982.

Wheat

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the Intel
national Wheat Agreement, 1971, as ex-
tended (TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington
Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1,
1980. TIAS 10015.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, June 10,

1982; Italy, June 30, 1982.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the Worid Health Organiza-
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by t
29th Worid Health Assembly.'
Acceptances deposited: Bhutan, Mar. 8, 19^
China, May 20, 1982; Gabon, May 11, 1982;
Mauritania, Apr. 28, 1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitutici
of the Worid Health Organization, as
amended. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978
by the 31st Worid Health Assembly.'
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, May 19,
1982; Bhutan. Mar. 8, 1982.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of th(

world cultural and natural heritage. Done a

Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force

Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.

Acceptance deposited: Spain, May 4, 1982.

Ratification deposited: Burundi, May 19,

1982.

World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11,

78

Department of State Bullet!

TREATIES

J47. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950.

IAS 2052.

ccession deposited: Vanuatu, June 24. 1982.

ILATERAL

ntig^a and Barbuda

rrangement relating to radio communica-
ons between amateur stations on behalf of
lird parties. Effected by exchange of notes
: St. John's Apr. 30 and May 24, 1982.
ntered into force June 23, 1982.

ustralia

rrangement relating to radio communica-
ons between amateur stations on behalf of
lird parties. Effected by exchange of notes
; Canberra May 21 and 26, 1982. Entered
to force June 25, 1982.

ustria

:onvention for the avoidance of double taxa-
3n and the prevention of fiscal evasion with

I'spect to taxes on estates, inheritances,
fts, and generation-skipping transfers.

' gned at Vienna June 21, 1982. Enters into
rce on the first day of the third month
Uowing that month in which the in-
ruments of ratification have been ex-
langed.

irbados

jreement relating to the establishment of a
;ace Corps program in Barbados. Effected
exchange of notes at Bridgetown and
istings May 10 and June 8, 1982. Entered
to force June 8, 1982.

ipersedes agreement of July 15 and Aug. 9,
•65 (TIAS 5887).

jreement concerning provision of mutual
jistic support, with annexes. Signed at
•ussels and Stuttgart May 6 and 11, 1982.
ntered into force May 11, 1982.

razil

jreement amending and extending the
7-eement of Nov. 14, 1978, and Jan. 24,
i79 (TIAS 9403), concerning atmospheric
search sounding rockets and balloon
operation. Effected by exchange of notes at
i-asilia May 7, 1982. Entered into force
ay 7, 1982; effective Jan. 24, 1981.

Dlombia

greement amending the air transport agree-
^ent of Oct. 24, 1956, as amended (TIAS
!38, 6593). Effected by exchange of notes at
ogota Oct. 16 and 22, 1981, and Apr. 21,
)82. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1982.

enmark

utual support agreement, with annex,
gned June 1 and 4, 1982. Entered into
rce June 4, 1982.

ominican Republic

greement for the sale of agricultural
)mmodities, relating to the agreement of
ept. 28, 1977 (TIAS 8944), with memoran-

dum of understanding. Signed at Santo
Domingo May 21, 1982. Entered into force
May 21, 1982.

Egypt

Agreement to transfer title of the U.S. Sinai
Field Mission base camp at Umm Khusheib
from the U.S. Sinai Support Mission to the
Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Signed at Umm Khusheib Apr. 22, 1982.
Entered into force Apr. 22, 1982.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 20, 1979
(TIAS 9683). Effected by exchange of notes
at Cairo May 24, 1982. Entered into force
May 24, 1982.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Apr, 21, 1976 (TIAS 8378), with memoran-
dum of understanding. Signed at Conakry
June 7, 1982. Entered into force Jure 7,
1982.

India

Agreement extending the memorandum of
understanding of Jan. 3, 1978 (TIAS 9074),
concerning access by an Indian ground sta-
tion to NASA's LANDSAT satellites and
availability to NASA and others of data ac-
quired. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington and Andhra Pradesh Apr. 6 and
19, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 19, 1982;
effective Jan. 3, 1982.

Japan

Arrangement implementing the agreement of
May 2, 1979 (TIAS 9463), on cooperation in
research and development in energy and
related fields. Signed at Tokyo May 7, 1982.
Entered into force May 7, 1982.

Amendment to memorandum of understand-
ing of Aug. 5, 1980, on participation and
cooperation of Japan in the international
phase of ocean drilling of the deep sea drill-
ing project (TIAS 9925). Signed at
Washington May 21, 1982. Entered into force
May 21, 1982.

Mexico

Agreement relating to assignments and usage
of television broadcasting channels in the fre-
quency range 470-806 MHz (channels 14-69)
along the U.S.-Mexico border. Signed at Mex-
ico June 18, 1982. Enters into force upon
receipt by the U.S. of notification from Mex-
ico that the formalities required by national
legislation have been completed.

Agreement concerning land mobile service in
the bands 470-512 MHz and 806-890 MHz
along the common U.S.-Mexico border.
Signed at Mexico June 18, 1982. Enters into
force upon receipt by the U.S. of notification
from Mexico that the formalities required by
the national legislation have been completed.

Morocco

Agreement concerning mapping, charting,
and geodesy cooperation. Signed at Rabat
•Apr. 29, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 29,
1982.

Agreement concerning the use of certain
facilities in Morocco by the U.S. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington May 27,
1982. Entered into force May 27, 1982.

Panama

Agreement extending and modifying the
agreement of Sept. 7, 1977 (TIAS 10033),
relating to use of commissary and post ex-
change facilities. Effected by exchange of
notes at Panama Mar. 1 and 24, 1982.
Entered into force Mar. 24, 1982.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement extending the agreement of
May 24 and June 5, 1965, as extended (TIAS
5830, 9590), relating to the construction of
certain military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Jidda Nov, 25,
1981 and May 10, 1982. Entered into force
May 10, 1982.

Sierra Leone

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
international military education and training
(IMET) program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Freetown Apr. 1 and May 26, 1982.
Entered into force May 26, 1982.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
and textile products. Effected by exchange of
letters at Singapore May 17 and 20, 1982.
Entered into force May 20, 1982,

South Africa

Agreement for the establishment and opera-
tion of an OMEGA navigation system
monitoring facility. Signed at Pretoria and
Washington May 17 and June 4, 1982.
Entered into force June 4, 1982.

South Pacific CommisBion

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S.
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Suva and Noumea
Dec. 21, 1981, and Apr. 28, 1982. Entered in-
to force Apr. 28, 1982; effective Jan. 1, 1982.
Supersedes agreement of Mar. 31 and
Apr. 15, 1980 (TIAS 9752).

Sri Lanka

Agreement amending the agreement of
July 7, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9869,
10168), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo
Apr. 20 and 29, 1982. Entered into force
Apr. 29, 1982.

Agreement extending the agreement of
May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and ex-
tended (TIAS 2259, 4436, 5037), relating to
the facilities of Radio Ceylon. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Colombo Apr. 21 and
May 10, 1982. Entered into force May 10,
1982.

ugust 1982

79

CHRONOLOGY

Sudan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 1979.
Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum
Apr. 29, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 29,
1982.

Tanzania

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, with minutes of negotiation. Signed
at Dar es Salaam June 8, 1982. Entered into
force June 8, 1982.

Tunisia

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
June 7, 1976 (TIAS 8506), with minutes of
negotiation. Signed at Tunis May 17, 1982.
Entered into force May 17, 1982.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement on cooperation in the field of
energy, as amended and extended (TIAS
7899, 9648). Signed at Moscow June 28,
1974. Entered into force June 28, 1974.
Terminated: June 28, 1982.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income. Signed at
Washington Apr. 16, 1945, as amended
(TIAS 1546, 3165, 4124, 6089).
Notification by the United States of
termination of extension to the British Virgin
Islands: June 30, 1982; effective Jan. 1, 1983.

'Not in force.
^With declaration.
^Not in force for the U.S.
*With reservation.
'Applies to Berlin (West).
*With statement.
'Subject to ratification. ■

June 1982

June 1

The State Department announces that the
United States has begun talks with China
about possible trade cooperation that would
enable American companies to develop
China's nuclear power industry.

June 2

President Reagan makes official state visits
to several European capitals June 2-11. The
President visited Paris and Versailles to at-
tend the eighth economic summit of in-
dustrialized nations; Vatican City and Rome,
June 7; London and Windsor, June 7-9; Bonn
(to attend the North Atlantic Council summit)
and Berlin, June 9-11.

June 4

By a vote of 9-2 (U.S. and U.K.) with 4
abstentions, the U.N. Security Council calls
for an immediate cease-fire in the Falkland
Islands. Reporting a delay in communication.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick discloses that the
American position actually favored absten-
tion.

June 5

Eighth economic summit of the industrial-
ized nations is held in Versailles, France,
June 5-6.

By unanimous vote (15-0) the U.N.
Security Council adopts Resolution 508 aimed
at ending the conflict in Lebanon.

June 6

By unanimous vote the U.N. Security Council
adopts Resolution 509 aimed at ending the
fighting in Lebanon.

June 7

The U.N. General Assembly's Second Special
Session on Disarmament opens in New York.
President Reagan, Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt of West Germany, and Prime
Ministers Margaret Thatcher of the U.K. and
Zenko Suzuki of Japan are among the 14
world leaders scheduled to address the
5-week conference.

At the direction of the President, Am-
bassador Philip C. Habib, special emissary to
the Middle East, travels to Israel to begin
discussions aimed at bringing an end to the
hostilities in Lebanon.

June 9

President Reagan announces that the U.S.
will provide immediate humanitarian
assistance to those suffering as a result of
the conflict in Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib arrives in Damascus
for talks with Syrian leaders on the Lebanon

June 10

By a vote of 219-206, the U.S. House of
Representatives approves a Republican
budget which provides the largest peace-time
increase in military spending.

June 11

Commerce Department announces plans to
levy stiff penalties on steel imports from nine
countries, including seven European Common
Market members.

June 13

King Khalid of Saudi Arabia dies in Taif. His
half-brother, Crown Prince Fahd, succeeds
him.

June 14

White House announces that Vice President
Bush will head the official U.S. delegation to
Saudi Arabia to represent the President at a
memorial service held for King Khalid.

Ambassador Habib arrives in Beiinit to
begin talks with Lebanese leaders.

June 15

Argentine forces surrender at Stanley and
reach a cease-fire with the U.K.

June 17

Leopoldo Galtieri resigns as Argentine PresiJ
dent and Commander in Chief of the Army.
The Cabinet also resigns, and Maj. Gen.
Alfredo Oscar Saint Jean is temporarily
named President.

Speaking in New York, President Reagai
presents the U.S. position at the U.N.
General Assembly's Second Special Session
on Disarmament.

June 18

By a vote of 13 to 0 with 2 abstentions
(Poland and Soviet Union), the U.N. Securitj.
Council adopts Resolution 511 extending the
present mandate of the U.N. Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until August 19, 1982.

June 19

By unanimous vote the U.N. Security Counc
adopts Resolution 512 expressing deep con-
cern at "the sufferings of the Lebanese and
Palestinian civilian populations."

June 20

European Common Market members lift the
trade embargo against Argentina.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin makes an o
ficial working visit to Washington, D.C.,
June 20-22.

June 21

President Luis Alberto Monge of Costa Rica
makes an official working visit to
Washington, D.C., June 21-24. During his
stay, he meets with President Reagan and
other Administrative officials.

June 22

Gen. Reynaldo Benito Antonia Bignone is aj
pointed President of Argentina.

June 25

Secretary of State Haig resigns. George Pla
Shultz accepts the President's nomination a;
the new Secretary-designate.

The following newly appointed Am-
bassadors present their credentials to Presi-
dent Reagan: Juan Argureia Ewing of Hon-
duras; Edmund O.Z. Chipamaunga of Zim-
babwe; Mircea Malita of Romania;
Abdourahmane Dia of Senegal; Lancelot
Raymond Adams-Schneider of New Zealand
and Aquilino E. Boyd of Panama.

June 26

By a vote of 14-1 (U.S. veto) the U.N.
Security Council rejects a resolution demani
ing steps toward "complete withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the
simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian
armed forces from Beirut."

June 29

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START) between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union open in Geneva. Ambassador Edwarc
Rowney heads the U.S. delegation, which in
eludes Ambassador James Goodby, Michael
Mobbs of the Department of Defense, Rear
Admiral William A. Williams III representir

80

Department of State Bullet!

3RESS RELEASES

le Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Jack W.
[endelsohn and Donald C. Tice of the Arms
ontrol and Disarmament Agency. ■

)epartment of State

ress releases may be obtained from the
ffice of Press Relations, Department of
tate, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Versailles economic summit.
; issued.

Appointment of Gweneth
Gayman to the Board of
Governors of the East-West
Center.
Appointment of Gregory J.
Newell as Assistant
Secretary for International
Organization Affairs (bio-
graphic data).
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee (CCIR)
and the International
Telegraph and Telephone
Consultative Committee
(CCITT), joint working par-
ty, June 23.

Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommittee
on Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group on
radiocommunications,
July 14

CCIR, study group 7, July 7.

INTELSAT, Department of
State sign lease, June 8.

Haig: press briefing, Paris,
June 3.

Department of State cele-
brates the 200th anniversary
of the Great Seal of the
United States of America,
June 20.

Haig: press briefing, Paris,
June 4.

Haig: press briefing, Ver-
sailles, June 6.

Haig: press briefing, aboard
Air Force One between
Rome and London, June 7.

Haig: news conference,
London, June 8.

Haig: press briefing aboard
Air Force One between Lon-
don and Bonn, June 9.

Haig: press briefing, Bonn,

June 9.

Haig: press briefing, Bonn,
June 10.

Haig: press briefing between
Bonn and West Berlin,
June 11.

Haig: press briefing between
West Berlin and Bonn.

Haig: interview on "This Week
With David Brinkley,"
June 13.

Robert Anderson sworn in as
Ambassador to the

Dominican Republic

(biographic data).
•200 6/18 Haig: interview on the "Today

Show."
*201 6/21 Program for the working

visit of Israeli Prime

Minister Begin, June 20-22.
*202 6/21 Program for the official visit

of Costa Rican President

Luis Alberto Monge,

June 21-24.
203 6/21 Haig: news conference, USUN,

June 19.
•204 6/23 CCIR, study group 6, July 29.
•205 6/23 CCITT, modem working party

of study group D, July 14

and 15.
*206 6/25 Blair House closed for repairs.
•207 6/28 Advisory Committee on the

Law of the Sea, July 14 and

15 (partially closed).

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.

Date

•1

1/20

•2

1/28

♦3

2/5

•4

2/11

•5

2/25

•6

3/1

3/11

3/24

9

3/25

10

3/26

11

4/2

12

3/31

13

4/1

14

4/1

15

4/2

16

4/2

Subject

Kirkpatrick: Golan Heights,
Security Council.

Lichenstein: Golan Heights,
Security Council.

Kirkpatrick: Golan Heights,
General Assembly.

Sorzano: Khmer relief,
ECOSOC.

Kirkpatrick: UNIFIL, Security
Council.

Kirkpatrick: human rights in
Nicaragua, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Sub-
committee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

Ratiner: LOS draft convention.
Committee I of the LOS
Conference.

Helman: outer space. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space.

Kirkpatrick: Nicaragua Securi-
ty Council.

Kirkpatrick: Central America,
Security Council.

Kirkpatrick: Nicaragua, Se-
curity Council.

Dewey: Kampuchean relief,
donors' meeting.

Announcement of Malone
remarks.

Malone: LOS treaty. LOS
Conference.

Lichenstein: Nicaragua, Se-
curity Council.

Lichenstein: West Bank, Se-
curity Council.

•17

4/3

•18

4/9

•19

4/13

•20

4/20

•21

4/22

•22

4/23

•23

4/23

•24

4/28

•25

4/30

•26

4/30

•27

5/7

•28

5/7

•29

5/7

•30

5/7

•31

5/12

•32

5/17

•33

5/17

•34

5/18

•35

5/18

•36

5/18

•37

5/22

•38

5/26

•39

5/27

•40

6/1

•41

6/4

•42

6/6

43

6/8

•44

6/11

45

6/18

46

6/19

•47

6/24

48

6/26

49

6/26

Lichenstein: South Atlantic,

Security Council.
Lichenstein: African National

Congress in South Africa ap-
peal. Security Council.
LOS Conference.
Kirkpatrick: Dome of the Rock

incident. Security Council.
Reynolds: U.N. Decade for

Women, ECOSOC.
Kirkpatrick: resumption of the

seventh emergency special

session of the General

Assembly.
Duggan: relief assistance,

ECOSOC.
Sherman: Middle East,

seventh emergency special

session of the General

Assembly.
Malone: LOS treaty, LOS

Conference.
Gershman: human rights,

ECOSOC.
Gershman: human rights,

ECOSOC.
Gershman: human rights,

ECOSOC.
Gershman: human rights,

ECOSOC.
Gershman: human rights,

ECOSOC.
Benton: UNICEF, general

debate.
Sherman: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
McCoy: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
Oiterong: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
Salii: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
Takesy: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
Kirkpatrick: Falkland Islands,

Security Council.
Kirkpatrick: Falkland Islands,

Security Council.
Dewey: Kampuchean relief,

donors' conference.
Sherman: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
Ki'kpatrick: Falkland Islands,

Security Council.
Lichenstein: Middle East,

Security Council.
Kirkpatrick: Middle East, Se-
curity Council.
Sherman: TTPI, Trusteeship

Council.
Kirkpatrick: UNIFIL, Security

Council.
Lichenstein: Middle East, Se-
curity Council.
Lichenstein: information, U.N.

Committee on Information.
Lichenstein: Middle East,

Security Council.
Lichenstein: question of

Palestine, seventh emergen-
cy special session of the

General Assembly.

•Not printed in the Bulletin.

ugust 1982

81

PUBLICATIONS

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following
Department of State publications are avail-
able from the Public Information Service,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

Agenda for Peace, Second Special Session on
Disarmament, U.N. General Assembly,
June 17, 1982 (Current Policy #405).

Preserving Freedom, Berlin, June 11, 1982
(Current Policy #404).

Alliance Security and Arms Control,
Bundestag, Bonn, June 9, 1982 (Current
Policy 400).

Promoting Democracy and Peace, Parlia-
ment, London, June 8, 1982 (Current Policy
#399).

Arms control and the Future of East-West
Relations, Eureka College, Peoria, 111.,
May 9, 1982 (Current Policy #387).

Secretary Haig

Peace and Security in the Middle East,
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,
Chicago, 111., May 26, 1982 (Current
Policy #395).

Interview on "Face the Nation," May 23,
1982 (Current Policy #394).

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, May 11,
1982 (Current Policy #389).

Africa

Background Notes on Madagascar, May 1982.
Southern Africa (GIST, June 1982).

East Asia

Developing Lasting U.S. -China Relations,
Deputy Secretary Stoessel, National Coun-
cil on U.S.-China Trade, June 1, 1982 (Cur-
rent Policy #398).

Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in
East Asia and the Pacific, Deputy
Secretary Stoessel, Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, June 10, 1982 (Current
Policy #403).

Economics

Elements of the World Economy, Atlas of
U.S. Foreign Relations, July 1982 {Bulletin
Reprint).

Environment

International Environmental Issues, Under
Secretary Buckley, International
Environment/Development lecture series
sponsored by the International Institute
for Environment and Development,
Washington, D.C, May 3, 1982 (Current
Policy #391).

Europe

Background Notes on the Federal Republic
of Germany (May 1982).

82

General

International Organizations, Atlas of U.S.

Foreign Relations, June 1982 {Bulletin

Reprint).
Background Notes Index, May 1982.

Human Rights

Human Rights and the Refugee Crisis,
Assistant Secretary Abrams, Tiger Bay
Club, Miami, June 2, 1982 (Current Policy
#401).

Middle East

U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, Assist-
ant Secretary Veliotes, Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East, House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Joint
Economic Committee, May 10, 1982 (Cur-
rent Policy #390).

Background Notes on Morocco, May 1982.

Background Notes on Egypt (June 1982).

Terrorism

Terrorist Target: The Diplomat, Deputy
Director Perez, conference on terrorism
sponsored by the Instituto de Cuestiones
Internacionales, Madrid, June 10, 1982
(Current Policy #402).

Western Hemisphere

Prospects for Peace in the South Atlantic,
Secretary Haig, 20th meeting of foreign
ministers of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty), May 27,
1982 (Current Policy #397).
Peaceful Change in Central America,
Deputy Secretary Stoessel, Pittsburgh
World Affairs Council, May 27, 1982 (Cur-
rent Policy #396).
Maintaining Momentum Toward an Open
World Economy, Assistant Secretary
Enders, Chamber of Commerce and
Brazil-U.S. Business Council, Washing-
ton, D.C, May 13, 1982 (Current Policy
#393).
Radio Marti and Cuban Interference, Assist-
ant Secretary Enders, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Finance, House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, May 10, 1982
(Current Policy #392).
El Salvador (GIST, June 1982).
U.S. Interests in the Caribbean Basin (GIST,

May 1982).
Background Notes on Belize (May 1982).
Background Notes on Honduras (May
1982). ■

Foreign Relations
Volume Released

The Department of State released on
February 18, 1982, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1951, vol. Ill,
"Western European Security and the
German Question," in two parts. This is
the fourth volume to be released of

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1982- 361-924/13

seven volumes scheduled for the year
1951. The Foreign Relations series has
been published continuously since 1861
as the official record of U.S. foreign
pohcy.

This volume presents 2,029 pages of
previously classified high-level documen-
tation on the questions of European
security and Germany. Part 1 (pages
1-1,316) documents the U.S. participa-
tion in NATO, including the accession of
Greece and Turkey, the development of
the NATO command structure, and the
seventh and eighth sessions of the North
Atlantic Council. In addition to NATO
developments, this volume presents
documentation on the U.S. attitude
toward the Conference for the Organiza-
tion of a European Defense Community
and the participation of the United
States in quadripartite talks at Bonn to
consider a German contribution to
Western defense. Part 1 closes with
documentation on the preparation for a
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in
the spring and the meetings of the
Foreign Ministers of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France in
September and November.

Part 2 (pages 1,317-2,029) presents
documentation on the German question.
Following materials on general policy
toward Germany, the volume documents
Western efforts to resolve several prob-
lems arising from the wartime set-
tlements. Documentation on the work ol
the intergovernmental study group on
Germany and on the attempt to establis
a contractual relationship between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the
three Western allies comprises this sec-
tion. The volume also documents U.S.
concern over the economic situation in
Germany, U.S. policy toward reunifica-
tion, and U.S. participation in the tripai
tite group on Germany. The volume con
eludes with sections on Berlin, the Saar
and the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. Ill,
was prepared in the Office of the
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Listed as Depart-
ment of State Publications 8982 (Part 1
and 9113 (Part 2), this volume may be
obtained for $19.00 (Part 1) and $15.00
(Part 2). The inde.x to both parts is con-
tained in F'art 2. Checks or money
orders should be made payable to the
Superintendent of Documents and sent
to the U.S. Government Book Store,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520. ■

Department of State Bulletii

NDEX

lugust 1982
olume 82, No. 2065

gentina. Secretary Visits Turkey. Greece;
Attends North Atlantic Council (remarks,
news conferences, final communique) . . 60

ms Control

LTO Allies Table Draft MBFR Treaty
(Rostow) 53

cretary-Designate Shultz Appears Before
Senate Committee 48

eretary Visits Turkey, Greece; Attends
North Atlantic Council (remarks, news
conferences, final commimique) 60

'ART Negotiations (Reagan, White
House statement) 53

ia

lied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in
East Asia and the Pacific (Stoessel) .... 55

utheast Asia and U.S. Policy (Holdridge) . 58

tstralia

e Origins of the ANZUS Treaty and Council
(Keefer) 46

ce President Bush Visits East Asia and the
Pacific (remarks, toasts, statements. Presi-
dent's letters to Chinese leaders) 39

inada. Alaska Gas Pipeline (Haig,
MacGuigan letters) 54

lina. Vice President Bush Visits East Asia
and the Pacific (remarks, toasts, state-
ments. President's letters to Chinese

leaders) 39

(ingress

i;lied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in
East Asia and the Pacific (Stoessel) .... 55

■mmitment to Democracy in Central Amer-
ica (Enders) 76

ntrol of Technology Transfers to the Soviet
Union (Buckley) VI

[ban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency
in the Western Hemisphere (Enders) . .73

ghth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 62

cretary-Designate Shultz Appears Before
Senate Committee 48

utheast Asia and U.S. Policy (Holdridge) . 58
Mba
hmmitment to Democracy in Central Amer-

I ica (Enders) 76

i iban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency
in the Western Hemisphere (Enders) . . 73
"prus

ghth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 62

■eretary Visits Turkey, Greece; Attends
Nortn Atlantic Council (remarks, news
conferences, final communique) 60

jpartment and Foreign Service

;las of U.S. Foreign Relations: Foreign
Relations Machinery A

■esident Reagan's News Conference of
June 30 (excerpts) 36

acretary-Designate Shultz Appears Before
Senate Committee 48

jcretary Haig Resigns (exchange of let-
ters) &2

jrrorist Target: The Diplomat (Perez) .... 23

conomics. Secretary-Designate Shultz Ap-
pears Before Senate Committee 48

1 Salvador. Commitment to Democracy in
Central America (Enders) 76

nergy

laska Gas Pipeline (Haig, MacGuigan let-
ters) 54

resident Reagan's New Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 36

Europe

NATO Allies Table Draft MBFR Treatv
(Rostow) 53

President Reagan's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 36

Greece. Secretary Visits Turkey, Greece; At-
tends North Atlantic Council (remarks,
news conferences, final communique) . . 60

Guatemala. Commitment to Democracy in
Central America (Enders) 76

Japan. Vice President Bush Visits East Asia
and the Pacific (remarks, toasts, state-
ments. President's letters to Chinese
leaders) 39

Korea. Vice President Bush Visits East Asia
and the Pacific (remarks, toasts, state-
ments. President's letters to Chinese
leaders) 39

Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuban
Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in
the Western Hemisphere (Enders) ... .73

Middle East

President Reagan's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 36

Secretary-Designate Shultz Appears Before
Senate Committee 48

Morocco. Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II
(Department statement) 70

New Zealand. The Origins of the ANZUS
Treaty and Council (Keefer) 46

Nicaragua. Commitment to Democracy in
Central America (Enders) 76

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

North Atlantic Council Meets in Brussels (final
communique, declaration) 68

Secretary Visits Turkey, Greece; Attends
North Atlantic Council (remarks, news
conferences, final communique) 60

Oceans. U.S. Votes Against Law of the
Sea Treaty (Reagan) 71

Pacific. Allied Responses to the Soviet Chal-
lenge in East Asia and the Pacific
(Stoessel) 55

Poland. Situation in Poland (Reagan) 64

Presidential Documents

Eighth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 62

News Conference of June 30 (excerpts) .... 36

Secretary Haig Resigns (exchange of let-
ters) 52

Situation in Poland (Reagan) 64

START Negotiations (Reagan, White House
statement) 53

U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty
(Reagan) 71

Vice President Bush Visits East Asia and the
Pacific (remarks, toasts, statements. Presi-
dent's letters to Chinese leaders) 39

Publications

Department of State 82

Foreign Relations Volume Released 82

Science & Technology. Control of Tech-
nology Transfers to the Soviet Union
(Buckley) 71

Singapore. Vice President Bush Visits East
Asia and the Pacific (remarks, toasts,
statements. President's letters to Chinese
leaders) 39

Terrorism

Armenian Terrorism: A Profile (Corsun) ... 31

Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and
Organization (Sayre) 1

Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency

in the Western Hemisphere (Enders) . .73

Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981 . .9

Terrorist Target: The Diplomat (Perez) .... 23
Treaties

Current Actions 77

The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty and Council
(Keefer) 46

Turkey. Secretary Visits Turkey, Greece; At-
tends North Atlantic Council (remarks,
news conferences, final communique) . .60

U.S.S.R.

Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in
East Asia and the Pacific (Stoessel) .... 55

Control of Technology Transfers to the
Soviet Union (Buckley) 71

NATO Allies Table Draft MBFR Treaty
(Rostow) 53

President Reagan's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 36

Secretary-Designate Shultz Appears Before
Senate Committee 48 '

START Negotiations (Reagan, White House
statement) 53

United Kingdom. Secretary Visits Turkey,
Greece; Attends North Atlantic Council
(remarks, news conferences, final com-
munique) 60

United Nations. U.S. Votes Against Law of
the Sea Treaty (Reagan) 71

Name Index

Buckley, James L 71

Bush, Vice President 39

Corsun. Andrew 31

Enders, Thomas 0 73, 76

Haig, Secretary 52, 54, 60

Holdridge, John H 58

Keefer, Edward C 46

MacGuigan, Mark 54

Perez, Frank H 23

Reagan. President . . .36, 39, 52, 53, 62, 64, 71

Rostow, Eugene V 53

Sayre, Robert M 1

Shultz, Secretary-designate 48

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 55

Turkmen, liter 60

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
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Dvpai'intvitt

'2iy(do

buUetEn

heOfficial Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2066

■ I L'.'.iJ'Ciil 'iJ:' UUij J

September 1982

M04*purinteni of Sintv

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2066 / September 1982

Cover:

President Reagan meets with Ambassador
Philip C. Habib at Versailles Palace
prior to Ambassador Habib's departure
to the Middle East. The President
appointed Ambassador Habib as his
special emissary to explore ways to
reduce tensions produced by developments
surrounding the situation in Lebanon.

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
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special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assisiant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Puhhc Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Acting Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

tditor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Lditor

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CONTENTS

FEATURE

Lebanon

1 Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut (President Reagan, Text of
Departure Plan, Fact Sheets, White House Statement, Letters to the U.N.
Secretary General and the Congress)

8 Secretary Shultz's News Conference of August 20 (Excerpts)

14 U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Charles M.

Lichenstein, Resolutions, Draft Resolutions)

15 Lebanon— A Profile

19 UNIFIL— U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (James E. Miller)
22 Maintaining a Cease-Fire in Lebanon (President Reagan, White House State-
ments)

he President

3 A New Opportunity for Peace in

the Middle East
J News Conference of

July 28 (Excerpts)

he Secretary

J U.S. Approach to Problems in the
Caribbean Basin

conomics

U.S. Approach to East-West
Economic Relations (Charles
Meissner)

inergy

I Export Sanctions on Gas and Oil
Equipment (President Reagan)

urope

I Preserving Nuclear Peace in the

1980s (Paul Wolfowitz)
The Case for Sanctions Against

the Soviet Union (James L.

Buckley)
Situation in Poland (Department

Statement)
Ninth Report on Cyprus (Message

to the Congress)

luman Rights

I Human Rights Conditions in El
Salvador (Elliott Abrams)

i Human Rights and the Refugee
Crisis (Elliott Abrams)

liddie East

5 Visit of Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Begin (Menahem Begin,
President Reagan)

Narcotics

46 U.S. Policy on International Nar-
cotics Control (Walter J.
Stoessel, Jr.)

Nuclear Policy

49 The Challenge of Nuclear Tech-
nology (Harry R. Marshall, Jr. )

52 Reprocessing and Plutonium Use
(Department Statement)

South Asia

54

56

Visit of Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi (Indira Gandhi, Presi-
dent Reagan)

India— A Profile

United Nations

59 I ran- Iraq War (William C.

Sherman, Department and
White House Statements, Text of
Resolution)

Western Hemisphere

60 Certification of Progress in El

Salvador (Thomas 0. Enders)
64 Cuban Armed Forces and the
Soviet Military Presence

68

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

(Thomas 0. Enders)

70

Radio Marti and Cuban Inter-

ference (Thomas 0. Enders)

72

U.S. -Latin American Relations

(Thomas 0. Enders)

75

Maintaining Momentum Toward

an Open World Economy

(Thomas 0. Enders)

78

U.S., Mexico Implement Visa

Agreement for Businessmen

Treaties

79

Current Actions

80

1982 Edition of Treaties in Force

Released

Chronology

81

March 1982

Press Releases

82 Department of State

Publications

82 Department of State

Index

SPECIAL (See Center Section)

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin

EDITOR'S NOTE

The article, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," which appeared in the feature on ter-
rorism in the August 1982 issue of the Bulletin, does not necessarily reflect an official
position of the Department of State, and the interpretive comments in the article are
solely those of the author.

j-«tne^:«t*"-' """"•""

Feature
Lebanon

LEBANON

Plan for the PLO

Evacuation From

West Beirut

On August 20. 1982, President Reagan
announced the agreement by the Govern-
ments of Lebanon, the United States,
France, Italy, and Israel and by the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
to a plan for the departure from
Lebanon of PLO leaders, offices, and
combatants in Beirut.

Following are the President's state-
ment, text of the departure plan, fact
sheets concerning details of the agreed
upon arrangements, a White House state-
ment, and President Reagan's letters to
the U.N. Secretary General and the

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
AUG. 20, 1982'

Thank you all and let me just say in ad-
vance I'll be taking no questions because
Secretary Shultz, a little later in the
day, will be having a full press con-
ference, so you can take everything up
with him.

Ambassador Habib (Philip C. Habib,
President's special emissary to the Mid-
dle East] has informed me that a plan to
resolve the west Beirut crisis has been
agreed upon by all the parties involved.
As part of this plan, the Government of
Lebanon has requested, and I have ap-
proved, the deployment of U.S. forces to
Beirut as part of a multinational force
(MNF). The negotiations to develop this
plan have been extremely complex and
have been conducted in the most
arduous circumstances. At times it was

"ember

1982

difficult to imagine how agreement could
be reached and yet it has been reached.
The statesmanship and the courage of
President SarWs and his colleagues in
the Lebanese Government deserve
special recognition as does the magnifi-
cent work of Ambassador Habib. Phil
never lost hope and. in the end, his
spirit and determination carried the day.
We all owe him a debt of gratitude.

The parties who made this plan
possible have a special responsibility for
insuring its successful completion, or im-
plementation. I expect its terms to be
carried out in good faith and in accord-
ance with the agreed timetable. This will
require meticulous adherence to the
cease-fire. Violations by any party would
imperil the plan and bring renewed
bloodshed and tragedy to the people of
Beirut, and under no circumstances
must that be allowed to happen. As you
know, my agreement to include U.S.
forces in a multinational force was
essential for our success. In the days
ahead, they and forces from France and
Italy will be playing an important but
carefully limited noncombatant role. The
parties to the plan have agreed to this
role and have provided assurances on
the safety of our forces.

Our purpose will be to assist the
Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out
their responsibility for insuring the de-
parture of PLO leaders, offices, and
combatants in Beirut from Lebanese ter-
ritory under safe and orderly conditions.
The presence of U.S. forces also will
facilitate the restoration of the

1

sovereignty and authority of the
Lebanese Government over the Beirut
area. In no case will our troops stay
longer than 30 days. The participation of
France and Italy in this effort is further
evidence of the sense of responsibility of
these good friends of the United States.

Successful resolution of the west
Beirut crisis by responsible implementa-
tion of the plan now agreed will set the
stage for the urgent international action
required to restore Lebanon's full
sovereignty, unity, and territorial in-
tegrity; obtain the rapid withdrawal of
all foreign forces from that country; and
help insure the security of northern
Israel. We must also move quickly in the
context of Camp David to resolve the
Palestinian issue in all its aspects, as
well as the other unresolved problems in
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only when all
these steps are accomplished can true
and lasting peace and security be
achieved in the Middle East.

DEPARTURE PLAN^

Plan FOR THE Departure from Lebanon of
THE Plo Leadership, Offices, and
Combatants in Beirut

1. Basic Concept. All the PLO leader-
ship, offices, and combatants in Beirut
will leave Lebanon peacefully for pre-
arranged destinations in other countries,
in accord with the departure schedules
and arrangements set out in this plan.
The basic concept in this plan is consist-
ent with the objective of the Govern-
ment of Lebanon that all foreign mili-
tary forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Cease-fire. A cease-fire in place
will be scrupulously observed by all in
Lebanon.

3. U.N. Observers. The U.N.
Observer Group stationed in the Beirut
area will continue its functioning in that
area.

4. Safeguards. Military forces pre-
sent in Lebanon — whether Lebanese,
Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, or any
other — will in no way interfere with the
safe, secure, and timely departure of the
PLO leadership, offices, and combatants.
Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants
left behind in Beirut, including the
families of those who have departed, will

be subject to Lebanese laws and regula-
tions. The Governments of Lebanon and
the United States will provide appropri-
ate guarantees of safety in the following
ways.

• The Lebanese Government will
provide its guarantees on the basis of
having secured assurances from armed
groups with which it has been in touch.

• The United States will provide its
guarantees on the basis of assurances
received from the Government of Israel
and from the leadership of certain
Lebanese groups with which it has been
in touch.

5. "Departure Day" is defined as the
day on which advance elements of the
multinational force (MNF) deploy in the
Beirut area, in accordance with arrange-
ments worked out in advance among all
concerned, and on which the initial
group or groups of PLO personnel com-
mence departure from Beirut in accord
with the planned schedule (see page 9).

6. The Multinational Force. A tem-
porary multinational force, composed of
units from France, Italy, and the United
States, will have been formed — at the
request of the Lebanese Govern-
ment— to assist the Lebanese Armed
Forces in carrying out their respon-
sibilities in this operation. The Lebanese
Armed Forces will assure the departure
from Lebanon of the PLO leadership,
offices, and combatants, from whatever
organization in Beirut, in a manner
which will:

(A) Assure the safety of such de-
parting PLO personnel;

(B) Assure the safety of other per-
sons in the Beirut area; and

(C) Further the restoration of the
sovereignty and authority of the Govern-
ment of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

7. Schedule of Departures and
Other Arrangements. The attached
schedule of departures is subject to revi-
sion as may be necessary because of
logistical requirements and because of
any necessary shift in the setting of
Departure Day. Details concerning the
schedule will be forwarded to the Israeli
Defense Forces through the Liaison and
Coordination Committee. Places of
assembly for the departing personnel
will be identified by agreement between
the Government of Lebanon and the

PLO. The PLO will be in touch with
governments receiving personnel to co-
ordinate arrival and other arrangements
there. If assistance is required the PLO
should notify the Government of
Lebanon.

8. MNF Mandate. In the event that
the departure from Lebanon of the PLO
personnel referred to above does not
lake place in accord with the agreed and
predetermined schedule, the mandate of
the MNF will terminate immediately and
all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon
forthwith.

9. Duration of MNF. It will be
mutually agreed between the Lebanese
Government and the governments con-
tributing forces to the MNF that the
forces of the MNF will depart Lebanon
not later than 30 days after arrival, or
sooner at the request of the Government
of Lebanon or at the direction of the in-
dividual government concerned, or in ac-
cord with the termination of the man-
date of the MNF provided for above.

10. The PLO leadership will be re-
sponsible for the organization and
management of the assembly and the
final departure of PLO personnel, from
beginning to end, at which time the
leaders also will all be gone. Departure
arrangements will be coordinated so tha
departures from Beirut take place at a
steady pace, day by day.

11. Lebanese Armed Forces Con-
tribution. The Lebanese Army will con-
tribute between seven and eight army
battalions to the operation, consisting ol |.,j
between 2,500-3,500 men. In addition,
the internal security force will con-
tribute men and assistance as needed.

12. ICRC. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will be
able to assist the Government of
Lebanon and Lebanese Armed Forces ii
various ways, including in the organiza-
tion and management of the evacuation
of wounded and ill Palestinian and
Syrian personnel to appropriate destina
tions, and in assisting in the chartering
and movement of commercial vessels fo
use in departure by sea to other coun-
tries. The Liaison and Coordination
Committee will insure that there will be
proper coordination with any ICRC ac-
tivities in this respect.

13. Departure bv Air. While presen

il

'■'

■^

'^

8:

Feature
Lebanon

gust 21, 1982— Departure Day

The advance elements of the MNF
iproximately 350 men) land at the
rt of Beirut at about 0500 and deploy
the Beirut port area in preparation
the initial departures of PLO groups
sea.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Armed
rces deploy to previously agreed posi-
ns in the Beirut area, primarily in the
called demarcation line area, to assist
the departure of PLO personnel. The
banese Armed Forces will take over
iitions occupied by the PLO.
The PLO will insure that National
vement Forces [collection of
Danese militias] which had occupied
se positions jointly with the PLO
.11 also withdrav/.

' As the day proceeds, the Lebanese
Smed Forces will take up such other
ijdtions as necessary to assist in the
ll)arture of PLO personnel.

Meanwhile, the initial group of PLO
Ksonnel assemble in preparation for
ll)arture by sea later in the day (or on
Si gust 22). The vessel or vessels to be
td for this purpose will arrive at pier
II August 21.

The initial groups could include the
sanded and ill, who would be trans-
ited in accordance with agreed ar-
1 gements— by sea or land, or both— to

I ir destinations in other countries.

The initial group or groups of PLO
)i sonnel destined for Jordan and Iraq
vjld move from their assembly point
( ;he waiting commercial vessel or

II sels for onward transport by sea.

kgust 22

: All groups destined for Jordan or
iq will have boarded ship and will
li'e sailed from Beirut.

Schedule of Departures

Duplicating the model followed on
August 21, PLO groups destined for
Tunisia assemble and move to the Port
of Beirut for departure by sea.

August 23

All PLO personnel destined for
Tunisia complete their assembly and em-
bark on commercial vessel for Tunisia.

PLO personnel destined for South
Yemen assemble and move to a vessel
for departure then or on August 24.

August 24-25

Assembly and departure by sea of
PLO personnel destined for North
Yemen.

August 25

Provided that satisfactory logistical
arrangements have been completed, the
initial groups of PLO personnel destined
for Syria assemble and move overland
via the Beirut-Damascus highway to
Syria.

The advance French elements of the
MNF already in the port area will have
taken up such other agreed positions on
the land route in the Beirut area as
necessary to assist in the overland
departure of the PLO personnel for
Syria.

The Lebanese Armed Forces join
with the French in occupying such posi-
tions.

(If it should be agreed that these in-
itial groups should go by sea to Syria
rather than by land, this departure
schedule also is subject to amendment to
assure that logistical requirements are
met.)

August 26-28 (Approximately)

The remaining forces of the MNF

(from the United States, France, and
Italy) arrive in the Beirut area and
deploy to agreed locations as determined
through the Liaison and Coordinating
Committee. This movement may be ac-
companied by the transfer of the ad-
vance French elements previously in the
port area and elsewhere to other loca-
tions in the Beirut area.

August 26-27-28

PLO groups destined for Syria con-
tinue to move— by land or sea— to Syria.

August 22-September 4

Turnover to the Lebanese Armed
Forces of PLO weaponry, military equip-
ment, and ammunition in a continuing
and orderly fashion.

August 29-30-31

Redployment out of Beirut of the
Syrian elements of the ADF.

September 1-4

Completion of the departure to
Syria — by land or sea— of all PLO or
Palestine Liberation Army personnel
destined for Syria.

September 2-3

Assembly and departure by sea of
all PLO personnel destined for the
Sudan.

Assembly and movement by sea of
all PLO personnel destined for Algeria.

September 4-21

The MNF assists the Lebanese
Armed Forces in arrangements, as may
be agreed between governments con-
cerned, to insure good and lasting
security throughout the area of opera-
tion.

September 21-26

Departure of MNF.

ns call for departure by sea and land,
lartures by air are not foreclosed.
14. Liaison and Coordination:

• The Lebanese Armed Forces will
the primary point of contact for
son with the PLO as well as with
er armed groups and will provide
essary information.

• The Lebanese Armed Forces and
MNF will have formed prior to Depar-
ture Day a Liaison and Coordination
Committee, composed of representatives
of the MNF participating governments
and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The
committee will carry out close and effec-
tive liaison with, and provide continuous

and detailed information to, the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF). On behalf of the
committee, the Lebanese Armed Forces
will continue to carry out close and ef-
fective liaison with the PLO and other
armed groups in the Beirut area. For

•tember1982

Lebanese Note Requesting
U.S. Contribution to MNF

Beirut

August the 18th, 1982

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon
U.S. Embassy, Beirut

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to the many
conversations between their Excellencies the
President of the Republic of Lebanon, the
Prime Minister and myself on the one hand,
and with Ambassador Philip C. Habib,
Special Emissary to the President of the
United States of America, on the other hand,
as well as to the resolution of the Council of
Ministers passed today. I have the honor to
refer to the schedule set up by the Govern-
ment of Lebanon, after consultations with in-
terested parties, in order to assure the
withdrawal from Lebanese territory of the
Palestinian leaders, offices and combatants
related to any organization now in the Beirut
area, in a manner which will:

(1) assure the safety of such departing
persons;

(2) assure the safety of the persons in the
area; and

(3) further the restoration of the
sovereignty and authority of the Government
of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

In this context, the Government of
Lebanon is proposing to several nations that
they contribute forces to serve as a tem-
porary Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut.
The mandate of the MNF will be to provide
appropriate assistance to the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out the
foregoing responsibilities, in accordance with
the annexed schedule. The MNF may under-
take other functions only by mutual agree-
ment. It is understood that, in the event that
the withdrawal of the Palestinian personnel
referred to above does not take place in ac-
cord with the predetermined schedule, the
mandate of the MNF will terminate im-
mediately and all MNF personnel will leave
Lebanon forthwith.

In the foregoing context, I have the
honor to propose that the United States of
America deploy a force of approximately 800
personnel to Beirut, subject to the following
terms and conditions:

Exchange of Notes

• The American military force shall carry
out appropriate activities consistent with the
mandate of the MNF.

• Command authority over the American
force will be exercised exclusively by the
United States Government through existing
American military channels.

• The American force will operate in
close coordination with the LAF. To assure
effective coordination with the LAF, the
American force will assign liaison officers to
the LAF and the Government of Lebanon
will assign liaison officers to the American
force. The LAF liaison officers to the
American force will, inter alia, perform
liaison with the civilian population and
manifest the authority of the Lebanese
Governement in all appropriate situations.

• In carrying out its mission, the
American force will not engage in combat. It
may, however, exercise the right of self-
defense.

• The American force will depart
Lebanon not later than thirty days after its
arrival, or sooner at the request of the Presi-
dent of Lebanon or at the direction of the
United States Government, or according to
the termination of the mandate provided for
above.

• The Government of Lebanon and the
LAF will take all measures necessary to en-
sure the protection of the American force's
personnel, to include securing the assurances
from all armed elements not now under the
authority of the Lebanese Government that
they will comply with the cease-fire and
cessation of hostilities.

• The American force will enjoy both the
degree of freedom of movement and the right
to undertake those activities deemed
necessary for the performance of its mission
or for the support of its personnel. Accord-
ingly, it shall enjoy all facilities necessary for
the accomplishment of these purposes. Per-
sonnel in the American force shall enjoy the
privileges and immunities accorded the ad-
ministrative and technical staff of the
American Embassy in Beirut, and shall be ex-
empt from immigration and customs require-
ments, and restrictions on entering or depart-
ing Lebanon. Personnel, property and equip-
ment of the American force introduced into

Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of
tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honor to propose, if
the foregoing is acceptable to your Excel-
lency's government, that your Excellency's
reply to that effect, together with this note,
shall constitute an agreement between our
two governments, to enter into force on the
date of your Excellency's reply.

Please accept, your Excellency, the
assurances of my highest consideration.

FUAD BOUTROS

Deputy Prime Minister/
Minister of Foreign Affair

U.S. Reply to Lebanese Note
Requesting U.S. Contribution to MNF

August 20, 198

I have the honor to refer to your Excellency'
note of 18 August 1982 requesting the
deployment of an American force to Beirut. '
am pleased to inform you on behalf of my
government that the United States is
prepared to deploy temporarily a force of ap-
proximately 800 personnel as pairt of a
Multinational Force (MNF) to provide ap-
propriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) as they carry out their respon-
sibilities concerning the withdrawal of
Palestinian personnel in Beirut from
Lebanese territory under safe and orderly
conditions, in accordance with the schedule
annexed to your Excellency's note. It is
understood that the presence of such an
American force will in this way facilitate the
restoration of Lebanese Government
sovereignty and authority over the Beirut
area, an objective which is fully shared by m
government.

I have the further honor to inform you
that my government accepts the terms and
conditions concerning the presence of the
American force in the Beirut area as set
forth in your note, and that your Excellency
note and this reply acccordingly constitute a>i ID
agreement between our two governments.

Robert S. Dillon
Ambassador of the
United States of Ameri(y|l>

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Deoartment of State Bulletl

Hen

Feature
Lebanon

ivenience, the Liaison and Coordina-
n Committee will have two essential
•nponents:

(A) Supervisory liaison; and

(B) Military and technical liaison
d coordination.

e Liaison and Coordination Commit-
! will act collectively; however, it may
ignate one or more of its members
primary liaison contact who would of
irse act on behalf of all.

• Liaison arrangements and con-
tations will be conducted in such a
.y as to minimize misunderstandings
i to forestall difficulties. Appropriate
lans of communications between the
nmittee and other groups will be
ireloped for this purpose.

• The Liaison and Coordination
mmittee will continually monitor and
ip all concerned currently informed
yarding the implementation of the

J n, including any revisions to the
J)arture schedule as may be necessary
J^ause of logistical requirements.

15. Duration of Departure. The

I )arture period shall be as short as
3;sible and, in any event, no longer
J.n 2 weeks.

16. Transit Through Lebanon. As

J -t of any departure arrangement, all

I vements of convoys carrying PLO
D-sonnel must be conducted in daylight
jirs. When moving overland from

E irut to Syria, the convoys should cross
;i border into Syria with no stops en
• ite. In those instances when convoys
) departing PLO personnel pass
i ough positions of the Israeli Defense
F rces, whether in the Beirut area or
jewhere in Lebanon, the Israeli
C fense Forces will clear the route for
■} temporary period in which the con-
.' :' is running. Similar steps will be
:; en by other armed groups located in
;1 area of the route the convoy will
:j.e.

17. Arms Carried by PLO Person-
n . On their departure, PLO personnel
fl 1 be allowed to carry with them one

II ividual side weapon (pistol, rifle, or
j)marine gun) and ammunition.

18. Heavy and Spare Weaponry

ti Munitions. The PLO will turn over
tithe Lebanese Armed Forces as gifts

all remaining weaponry in their posses-
sion, including heavy, crew-served, and
spare weaponry and equipment, along
with all munitions left behind in the
Beirut area. The Lebanese Armed
Forces may seek the assistance of
elements of the MNF in securing and
disposing of the military equipment. The
PLO will assist the Lebanese Armed
Forces by providing, prior to their
departure, full and detailed information
as to the location of this military equip-
ment.

19. Mines and Booby Traps. The
PLO and the Arab Deterrent Force
(ADF) will provide to the Lebanese
Armed Forces and the MNF (through
the Lebanese Armed Forces) full and
detailed information on the location of
mines and booby traps.

20. Movement of PLO Leadership.
Arrangements will be made so that
departing PLO personnel will be accom-
panied by a proportionate share of the
military and political leadership
throughout all stages of the departure
operation.

21. Turnover of Prisoners and Re-
mains. The PLO will, through the
ICRC, turn over to the Israeli Defense
Forces, all Israeli nationals whom they
have taken in custody, and the remains,
or full and detailed information about
the location of the remains, of all Israeli
soldiers who have fallen. The PLO will
also turn over to the Lebanese Armed
Forces all other prisoners whom they
have taken in custody and the remains,
or full and detailed information about
the location of the remains, of all other
soldiers who have fallen. All arrange-
ments for such turnovers shall be
worked out with the ICRC as required
prior to Departure Day.

22. Syrian Military Forces. It is
noted that arrangements have been
made between the Governments of
Lebanon and Syria for the deployment
of all military personnel of the Arab
Deterrent Force from Beirut during the
departure period. These forces will be
allowed to take their equipment with
them, except for that — under mutual
agreement between the two govern-
ments— which is turned over to the
Lebanese Armed Forces. All elements of
the Palestinian Liberation Army,

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 19, 19821

We are, of course, extremely gratified
by the Israeli Cabinet's approval of the
plan, which is a tribute to the
remarkable diplomatic achievement of
the President's personal emissary. Am-
bassador Philip Habib. It sets the stage
for implementation of the plan, which
we expect to start as early as this
weekend. We urge the parties to make
every effort to clear up the remaining
matters so that implementation can go
forward as soon as possible.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 23, 1982. I

whether or not they now or in the past
have been attached to the Arab Deter-
rent Force, will withdraw from
Lebanon.

FACT SHEETS ON THE
DEPARTURES

Plan for the Departure of the PLO

A plan for the departure from Lebanon
of the PLO leaders, offices, and com-
batants in Beirut has been accepted by
the Governments of Lebanon, the troop-
contributing countries, and Israel and by
the PLO. That plan includes a schedule
of departures which is also attached to
the bilateral notes exchanged between
the Government of Lebanon and the
troop-contributing countries.

■The PLO will go to various countries
in the region including Jordan, Iraq,
Tunisia, North Yemen, South Yemen,
Syria, Sudan, and Algeria.

Departing PLO personnel will be ac-
companied by a proportionate share of
the military and political leadership
throughout all stages of the departure
arrangements.

The PLO will turn over to the
Lebanese Armed Forces their heavy and

|Dtember1982

crew-served weapons, spare weaponry
and equipment along with all munitions
left behind in the Beirut area. They and
the Arab Deterrent Force will also pro-
vide detailed information on the location
of mines and booby traps to the
Lebanese Armed Forces. On departure,
PLO personnel may carry with them an
individual side weapon and ammunition.
The Arab Deterrent Force (i.e., the
Syrians) and those forces attached to the
Arab Deterrent Force will also redeploy
from Beirut during the period of the
PLO departure. The Syrian military
forces will take their equipment with
them except for that which, by mutual
agreement, is turned over to the
Lebanese Armed Forces.

MNF Composition, Area of
Operations, and Mission

Force Composition. The multinational
force, which will be deployed to the
Beirut area at the request of the
Government of Lebanon, will be com-
prised of approximately 400 Italian, 800
French, and 800 U.S. military personnel.
The U.S. portion of the MNF will be
comprised of Marines of the 32d Marine
Amphibious Unit presently serving with
elements of the Sixth Fleet on duty in
the eastern Mediterranean.

Area of Operations. The MNF will
operate in and around the Beirut area.
It will take up positions and operate
from locations determined by mutual
agreement between the various national
contingents and the Lebanese Armed
Forces through the mechanism of a
Liaison and Coordination Committee.

Mission. The multinational force
will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces
in carrying out its responsibilities for in-
suring the safe and orderly departure
from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, of-
fices, and combatants in a manner which
will insure the safety of other persons in
the area, and which will further the
restoration of the sovereignty and
authority of the Government of Lebanon
over the Beirut area.

Duration of the MNF Mandate. It
has been mutually agreed between the
Government of Lebanon and those
governments contributing forces to the
MNF that these forces will depart
Lebanon not later than 30 days after ar-
rival, or sooner at the request of the

Government of Lebanon or at the direc-
tion of the individual government con-
cerned. There is also provision for the
immediate termination of the mandate
of the MNF and for its withdrawal from
Beirut in the event that the departure
from Lebanon of PLO personnel does
not take place in accord with the
predetermined schedule.

Role and Mission of
U.S. Forces in Beirut

U.S. forces will be deployed to Beirut as
part of the multinational force based on
an agreement between the U.S. Govern-
ment and the Government of Lebanon.

The U.S. contingent of the multina-
tional force will provide appropriate
assistance to the Lebanese Armed
Forces as they carry out their respon-
sibilities concerning the withdrawal of
PLO personnel in Beirut from Lebanese
territory under safe and orderly condi-
tions. The presence of U.S. forces also
will facilitate the restoration of
Lebanese Government sovereignty and
authority over the Beirut area.

U.S. forces will enter Beirut after
the evacuation is well underway (prob-
ably 5 or 6 days thereafter) in concert
with the Italian MNF contingent and the
remainder of the French force. Approx-
imately 800 Marines from Sixth Fleet
units will be deployed. Command
authority for the Marines will be exer-
cised by the National Command Authori-
ty (NCA) through normal American mili-
tary channels (EUCOM). These forces
will not engage in combat by may exer-
cise the right of self-defense. They will
have freedom of movement and the
right to undertake actions necessary to
perform their mission or to support their
personnel. U.S. personnel will be armed
with usual infantry weapons.

Close coordination will be main-
tained with the Lebanese Armed P'orces.
There will be an exchange of liaison of-
ficers among the elements of the MNF
and the Lebanese Armed Forces. A
Liaison and Coordination Committee
composed of representatives from the
U.S., French, Italian, and Lebanese
armed forces will assist this process.
The Government of Lebanon and the
Lebanese Armed Forces are taking

V

measures necessary to insure the protec
tion of U.S. forces including having
secured assurances from armed
elements that they will comply with the
cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

The U.S. contingent will be in Beiru
for no more than 30 days.

War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution requires a
report to Congress within 48 hours afte
the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces:
(1) into foreign territory while equipped'"'
for combat; or (2) into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.

There is no intention or expectation
that U.S. forces will become involved in
hostilities in Beirut. They will be in
Lebanon at the formal request of the
Government of Lebanon; we will have
assurances regarding the safety and
security of the multinational force.
Although we cannot rule out isolated
acts of violence, all appropriate precau-
tions will be taken to assure the safety
of U.S. military personnel during their
brief assignment to Lebanon.

These matters will, in any event, bt
kept under constant review, and the
President will report to Congress con-
sistent with the reporting requirements
of the War Powers Resolution.

1

Agreements and Assurances

U.S. forces will participate in the
multinational force in Beirut pursuant i
an agreement between the U.S. Goverr
ment and the Government of Lebanon.
That agreement is in the form of an ex
change of notes signed by Ambassador
Dillon on behalf of the U.S. Governmer
and Deputy Prime Minister and Ministt
of Foreign Affairs Boutros on behalf oi
the Lebanese Government.

The agreement describes the mis-
sions of the Lebanese Armed Forces,
the MNF, and the U.S. forces par-
ticipating in the MNF. It contains prov
sions concerning command authority fo
U.S. forces, coordination with the
Lebanese Armed Forces and immunitie
of U.S. personnel. Annexed to the
agreement is the schedule for the PLO
departure from Beirut.

Feature
Lebanon

In accordance with the agreement,
e Government of Lebanon has secured
surances from all armed elements not
w under the authority of the Lebanese
ivernment that they will comply with

cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
le Government of Israel has provided
propriate assurances.

i.le of the ICRC in Moving the PLO
i)m West Beirut

|e role envisaged for the International
Immittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in
i)ving the PLO from west Beirut is
111 being finalized on the basis of
icussions in Geneva and Beirut.

In accordance with its charter, the
'. RC will be expected to care for the
ik and wounded combatants while in
J.nsit. Initially, the ICRC will arrange
: n sport and provide medical care for
■ sick and wounded PLO personnel
j ng to Greece.

i lancing the Departure of the PLO
S9m West Beirut

[ e cost of chartering transport of the
r 0 combatants to receiving countries
» 1 be funded through international
) ^anizations. The United States is
J -pared to provide initial funding from
: ite Department funds.

Estimates regarding the cost of
5 icuating PLO forces from west Beirut
: Tently range from $2 to $4 million.
[ is figure could be increased, however,
I the number of people to be trans-
1 'ted and their ultimate destinations
t finalized.

? ESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE
j*f. SECRETARY GENERAL,
\ G. 20, 1982<

- 'er dated August 20, 1982, from the Charge
I'fjaires a.i. of the U.S. Permanent Mission
oke United Nations addressed to the
tfetary General

: ive the honour to transmit the following
^;sage from the President of the United
Sites:

"Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

"As you know, the Government of the
Republic of Lebanon has requested the
deployment of a multinational force in Beirut
to assist the Lebanese armed forces as they
carry out the orderly and safe departure of
Palestinian personnel now in the Beirut area
in a manner which will further the restora-
tion of the sovereignty and authority of the
Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.
The Lebanese Grovemment has asked for the
participation of United States military per-
sonnel in this force, together with military
personnel from France and Italy.

"I wish to inform you that the United
States Government has agreed, in response
to this request from the Lebanese Govern-
ment, to deploy a force of about 800 person-
nel to Beirut for a period not exceeding 30
days. It is my firm intention and belief that
these troops will not be involved in hostilities
during the course of this operation.

"The deployment of this United States
force is consistent with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations as set forth
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. It furthers
the goals of Security Council resolutions 508
(1982) and 509 (1982) adopted in June at the
beginning of the Lebanese conflict. The force
will plan to work closely with the United Na-
tions observer group stationed in the Beirut
area.

"This agreement will support the objec-
tive of helping to restore the territorial in-
tegrity, sovereignty and political in-
dependence of Lebanon. It is part of the con-
tinuing efforts of the United States Govern-
ment to bring lasting peace to that troubled
country, which has too long endured the
trials of civil strife and armed conflict.

Ronald Reagan"

I have the honour to request that the present
letter be circulated as an official document of
the General Assembly, under item 34 of the
provisional agenda, and of the Security
Council.

Kenneth L. Adelman
Ambassador

PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO THE CONGRESS,
AUG. 24, 1982^

On August 18, 1982, the (Jovemment of
Lebanon established a plan for the departure
from Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation
Organization leadership, offices, and com-
batants in Beirut. This plan has been ac-
cepted by the Government of Israel. The
Palestine Liberation Organization has in-
formed the Government of Lebanon that it

also has accepted the plan. A key element of
this plan is the need for a multinational force,
including a United States component, to
assist the Government of Lebanon in carry-
ing out its responsibilities concerning the
withdrawal of these personnel under safe and
orderly conditions. This will facilitate the
restoration of Lebanese Government
sovereignty and authority over the Beirut
area.

In response to the formal request of the
Government of Lebanon, and in view of the
requirement for such a force in order to
secure the acceptance by concerned parties of
the departure plan, I have authorized the
Armed Forces of the United States to par-
ticipate on a limited and temporary basis. In
accordance with my desire that the Congress
be fully informed on this matter, and consis-
tent with the War Powers Resolution, I am
hereby providing a report on the deployment
and mission of these members of the United
States Armed Forces.

On August 21, in accordance with the
departure plan, approximately 350 French
military personnel — the advance elements of
the multinational force — were deployed in
Beirut together with elements of the
Lebanese Armed Forces, and the departure
of Palestinian personnel began. To date,
Palestinian personnel have departed Lebanon
in accordance with the terms of the plan.

On August 25, approximately 800
Marines began to arrive in Beirut. These
troops are equipped with weapons consistent
with their non-combat mission, including
usual infantry weapons.

Under our agreement with the Govern-
ment of Lebanon, these U.S. military person-
nel will assist the Government of Lebanon in
carrying out its responsibilities concerning
the withdrawal of Palestinian personnel
under safe and orderly conditions. The
presence of our forces will in this way
facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Govern-
ment sovereignty and authority in the Beirut
area. Our forces will operate in close coor-
dination with the Lebanese Armed Forces,
which will have 2,500-3,500 personnel as-
signed to this operation, as well as with a
total of approximately 800 French and 400
Italian military personnel in the multinational
force. Transportation of the personnel depar-
ting is being carried out by commercial air
and sea transport, and by land. According to
our agreement with the Government of
Lebanon, the United States military person-
nel will be withdrawn from Lebanon within
thirty days.

I want to emphasize that there is no in-
tention or expectation that U.S. Armed
Forces will become involved in hostilities.
They are in Lebanon at the formal request of

tember 1982

the Government of Lebanon. Our agreement
with the Government of Lebanon expressly
rules out any combat responsibilities for the
U.S. forces. All armed elements in the area
have given assurances that they will take no
action to interfere with the implementation of
the departure plan or the activities of the
multinational force. (The departure has been
underway for some days now, and thus far
these assurances have been fulfilled.) Finally,
the departure plan makes it clear that in the
event of a breakdown in its implementation,
the multinational force will be withdrawn.
Although we cannot rule out isolated acts of
violence, all appropriate precautions have
thus been taken to assure the safety of U.S.
military personnel during their brief assign-
ment to Lebanon.

This deployment of the United States
Armed Forces to Lebanon is being under-
taken pursuant to the President's constitu-
tional authority with respect to the conduct
of foreign relations and as Commander-in-
Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

This step will not, by itself, resolve the
situation in Lebanon, let alone the problems
which have plagued the region for more than
thirty years. But I believe that it will im-
prove the prospects for realizing our objec-
tives in Lebanon:

• a permanent cessation of hostilities;

• establishment of a strong, represen-
tative central government;

• withdrawal of all foreign forces;

• restoration of control by the Lebanese
Government throughout the country; and

• establishment of conditions under
which Lebanon no longer can be used as a
launching point for attacks against Israel.

I also believe that progress on the Lebanon
problem will contribute to an atmosphere in
the region necessary for progress towards
the establishment of a comprehensive peace
in the region under Camp David, based
firmly on U.N. Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338.
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Secretary Shultz's News
Conference of August 20 (Excerpts)

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 23, 1982.

^Made available to news correspondents
by Acting Department spokesman Alan
Romberg.

'Made available to news correspondents
by Acting Department spokesman Alan
Romberg.

'Circulated as a document of the U.N.
General Assembly and Security Council
(Ay37/393-S/15371, Aug. 21, 1982).

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Strom Thurmond,
President Pro Tempore of the Senate. ■

8

Following are excerpts from a news
conference given by Secretary Shultz
shortly after President Reagan's state-
ment on the PLO departure plan.^

The President today announced that a
plan to resolve the crisis in west Beirut
has been agreed upon by all the parties,
and that in connection with that plan the
(Government of Lebanon has asked the
United States, and the President has
agreed, to the deployment of U.S. forces
as part of a multinational force to help
the Government of Lebanon to imple-
ment the plan.

He also expressed his admiration
and his thanks to Phil Habib, and I
would like to take this occasion to add
my thanks to Phil, a truly great Ameri-
can.

The President also said that I would
answer the questions, so here I am.

Q. Have American-Israeli rela-
tions suffered because of the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon, and on a broader
scale, how do you judge the impact of
the fighting on American-Arab rela-
tions?

A. The Israeli-U.S. relationship re-
mains a strong one. We are completely
committed to the support of the security
of Israel. Certainly, there have been
some strains during this period. The
United States opposed the entry of
Israeli troops into Lebanon. There were
some occasions when it seemed to us
that the Israeli military actions were ex-
cessive, and we said so. So those times
presented great strains. But underneath
it all the relationship between the
United States and Israel remains a
strong one.

There's no question about the fact —
turning to the second part of your ques-
tion— that our relationships with our
friends in the Arab world have been
strained, and understandably so, as they
have seen the suffering in Lebanon and
the great destruction in Beirut. We seek

to resolve those issues. I think the con^
structive role that the United States han
played in the development of this plan,
and Phil Habib's actions, show the
fimdamental commitment of the United
States to peaceful solutions and the
abOity of the United States to be a con-
structive force in the region.

Q. Following withdrawal of Palen
tinian forces from west Beirut, do W'l
expect the Israelis to attack other
Palestinian and Syrian forces in the
country, and what, if anything, are v
trying to do to prevent that from hap
pening?

A. What we expect and what we
hope for is that as this process imfolds-
the Government of Lebanon will be ab»
to take control, first in Beirut, then in-
creasingly throughout the country. An.
that the forces of Israel, the forces of
Syria, the forces of other armed group:
in the country will withdraw or lay do'
their arms and Lebanon will become a
country free of foreign forces.

I might note that in the plan, if yc
look at the first section, which is label ■
"Basic Concept," you'll see that this n<
tion is explicitly stated as being consis
ent with the objectives of the plan.

il
Q. I wonder if you could amplif}
what the President said. He said thi<
if American forces were shot at, the fa
would be a recall of U.S. forces. In
that sort of violent environment, it : la
possible for stray bullets to be flyinji ft
Would a single shot result in an
American call-back?

A. The President was not referrii
to some stray shot by some kook that
might be fired. We're talking about a |ii(
situation in which all the parties have
agreed to a cease-fire and have agreei
to establish the conditions under whic
the departure of the PLO can take pli Biii
with safety. We are there to help in t t
process, help the Government of ml

Lebanon in that process. We will stay le
there as long as that process is going )},

Departmentof State Bulk 9

Feature
Lebanon

orward and as long as the basic condi-
ions envisaged for our forces remain in
iffect.

Q. We've heard a lot about Am-
.tassador Habib's role in all of this.
¥hat do you envision as his role in
he next phase which is the evacuation
if all foreign troops from Lebanon?

A. He's a very skillful man. He's
leen over there since early June, and I
hink he deserves a good night's sleep.
5ut he's very skillful and very capable,
nd he told me on one occasion that he
lever says no to a President. So I im-
gine his talents vi^ill be called upon from
ime to time in the future.

Q. Has the Government of Israel
iven you any assurances that they in-
end to withdraw from Lebanon in the
lear future?

A. When Foreign Minister Shamir
'as here, I asked him that question
irectly. He told me that Israel does not
Dvet one inch of Lebanese territory and
lans to withdraw from Lebanese terri-
ory. I looked at him and I said, "We
'ill take you at your word."

Q. On the previous question on
[r. Habib— is it contemplated that
Ir. Habib will conduct the next round
f negotiations on the withdrawal of
11 foreign forces from Lebanon, and

0 you have any time frame in mind,
nd the venue, on how and when these
ilks should begin?

A. I think that it is important to be
orking strongly not only for the with-
rawal of foreign forces from Lebanon,
^t for that to happen in such a manner
hat the Government of Lebanon has
:rength and the security concerns of
jrael and its northern border are ade-
tiately safeguarded.

Beyond that, I think, we must recog-
ize that there has been a tremendous
mount of destruction and displacement

1 Lebanon. The extent of it varies wide-
' in peoples' estimates, but even the
lost modest estimates show that it's
jnsiderable. We and others around the
'orld need to address ourselves to those
roblems and start thinking in construc-
ve terms about what needs to be done

D help the people of Lebanon recon-
truct their land and bring it back to the
Dnditions that it once enjoyed.

Q. Will Mr. Habib actually do the
negotiating for the United States?

A. Phil's precise role has not been
determined. As I said, he has been at it
for a couple of months of very tiring
work, and it's time for him to get a good
night's sleep. We do plan to have a
Lebanon task force in the government
and Morris Draper, who has been Phil's
assistant, will head that up; Peter
McPherson, the head of the Agency for
International Development, is going to
take on the special concern of the recon-
struction and development aspects of
this plan. Some other people are being
put in place to work on this. I don't say
that Phil will have no role in it. He's a
very constructive and able person, but I
do think at this point that he'll obviously
want to see the departure go on in a
good way. But at some stage of the
game, as I say, we have to give him a
good night's sleep.

Q. It's not clear to me, in the way
you answered some of the earlier
questions, whether you expect further
negotiations to take place to obtain
the withdrawal of the Syrians and the
Israelis or whether you expect them to
do that voluntarily, without any fur-
ther diplomatic activity. Could you
clarify that a little bit?

A. I'm sure that the Syrians must
feel that they, having been invited in by
the Government of Lebanon, would ex-
pect to hear from the Government of
Lebanon about its wishes. Again, I was
told by the Syrian Foreign Minister that
they were there at the request of the
Government of Lebanon and when the
Government of Lebanon requested them
to leave, they would do so.

So I think what we are looking at
here is a process in which the Govern-
ment of Lebanon increasingly takes con-
trol; and as that happens and as security
arrangements on Israel's northern
border can be adequately developed, we
should expect to see these forces with-
draw. I can't tell you that all that can
take place in an easy, uncomplicated
way. There's no doubt about the fact
that it will be complicated and difficult.

Q. How long do you think it will
take?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. There is talk of an Israeli-
Lebanese peace treaty as the next step
after withdrawal. Will the United
States actively support such a peace
treaty?

A. I think it is constructive to have
peace in that part of the world. With the
emergence of a strong and legitimate
Government of Lebanon, that is certain-
ly something we would hope they would
consider very strongly.

Q. But will we actively support it?

A. Sure.

Q. What is the possibility of the
use of American troops in some type
of multinational force such as is going
into Beirut now to facilitate the with-
drawal of Israeli and Syrian troops
from Lebanon itself?

A. We don't have any plan for that
at all.

Q. Will this be used as a prece-
dent, do you think?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Do you foresee the formation
of a Palestinian state at some point? If
so, when, and what are you going to
do with all these Palestinians that you
are splitting up and sending to all
these various countries, just leave
them there?

A. The Palestinians who are depart-
ing from west Beirut probably number
in the range of 6,000-7,000, and that is
a number that can be assimilated.
Where they go eventually, of course, re-
mains to be seen. I do think, and have
emphasized before — and practically
everybody who talks about the subject
emphasizes — the importance of turning
to the problems of the legitimate rights
of the Palestinian people, working at
that, and negotiating about that.

My own observation is that the
language of Camp David is quite worth
reading in that regard. So we would ex-
pect to be moving on that front, as I'm
sure others will too, because it repre-
sents an underlying issue of great im-
portance and is one that is at the center
of all this.

Q. Since you brought up Camp
David, could you give us, as best you
can foresee it now, the startup again
of the autonomy talks, the timetable,

eptember1982

including whether or not you are go-
ing to appoint a new special negotia-
tor at any time in the near future?

A. I can't really comment with any
clarity on those questions. Obviously, the
parties to those talks are heavily en-
gaged in their thinking in the west
Beirut problem. It will take some time
and a lot of effort to construct a suitable
negotiating situation, and I don't want
to put down some sort of marker on it.

Q. Ambassador Habib is quoted as
telling Prime Minister Begin that he
thought it was Israel's military pres-
sure which brought the PLO to agree
finally to leave Beirut. Do you agree
with that assessment?

A. I'm not going to try to analyze
what may or may not have brought the
PLO to agree to leave west Beirut. Fair-
ly early on, they had made a statement
in principle that they would withdraw.
We went through a long period of trying
to identify where they would go, and
during that period there were many
doubts expressed about whether in the
end they would go. We felt that they
had said they would, and we would take
them at their word and expect that they
would.

Q. But the greatest progress was
made in the negotiations, wasn't it,
after August 1 when the heaviest
Israeli bombings took place?

A. The discussions that gave more
and more assurance as to where they
would go materialized obviously as these
negotiations went on. It was quite a
struggle at first and became more
definite.

Q. How do you intend to try to
blend, or what is your own sense of
priorities about resolving the rest of
the issues in Lebanon, getting the
foreign forces out, etc., and dealing
with the Palestinian problem on the
West Bank and Gaza?

A. Both issues are important. There
is, obviously, some connection between
them, but they are also separate issues.
I think we, obviously, have to work — it's
my opinion anyway— on both. It is
difficult to lay down a timetable, but
both are matters of urgency. I think
that this moment in time — with the
bloodshed and the damage done in

10

Lebanon freshly in peoples' minds — is a
time to work hard on this, because peo-
ple must be able to see that the alterna-
tive to a reasonably peaceful situation in
the Middle East is not a pleasant thing
to contemplate at all. So, perhaps, it is a
moment when people can turn their eyes
from the problems of war to the prob-
lems of peace — at least I hope so — and
that is going to be our effort.

Q. Specifically, what steps is the
United States prepared to take to get
the autonomy talks moving again?

A. We are working on that, think-
ing about it, and trying to develop our
own thinking, as I'm sure others are.
When we have gotten our thoughts
properly constructed, we will be able to
tell you what they are. I have been
thinking about that myself, before I
came into the government and ever
since I've been here at the President's
direction. I've had several meetings with
the President about it. At his instruc-
tion, I've been meeting with Members of
the Congress; we have had people come
in from outside, and we've had lots of
discussion about this as various
ministers from Israel and Arab countries
have visited here. So we are actively
thinking about it. And we expect to be
moving on it.

Q. Along those lines, the biggest
and most dramatic impact of all this,
at least for the moment, is the break-
ing up of the PLO into composite
groups moving into different parts of
the Middle East. What effect do you
think this is going to have on the
peace prospects in the region? And do
you agree with those who feel that
makes it less urgent for the Pales-
tinian issue to be addressed?

A. I think that it makes it more
urgent because to the extent the armed
and, I think, disruptive presence of the
PLO and their impact on Israel and
perhaps on some of the problems in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip is less,
then perhaps the opportunities are
more. Rather than feel— if that particu-
lar pressure is off— you should relax, my
attitude would be exactly the opposite:
If the opportunity is greater, you should
move in harder and faster and try to
take advantage of it.

Q. What is your position on
Jewish settlements, either new settle
ments or the expansion of the existing
ones in the occupied territories?

A. The President has said to me
recently, when a question arose about
their legality, the question isn't whether
they are legal or illegal; the question is
are they constructive in the effort to ar-
range a situation that may, in the end,
be a peaceful one and be one in which
the people of the region can live in a
manner that they prefer. His answer to
that is no, expansion of those set-
tlements is not a constructive move. I
agree with the President. I really do
agree with it. I'm not just following his
lead.

Q. Next month is the deadline
within the Lebanese constitutional
framework for a presidential election
Security is one of the reasons cited
why the election was put off until nex^
week and might be put off again. Ob-
viously, in general, the United States
has a lot of influence in a situation
like this right now. It has gained
more influence; it's having forces com
ing in there which will help provide
security. What are your views on the
holding of the Lebanese presidential
election? Should it be in the next
month, as originally planned?

A. I think, basically, the conduct o
an election in a country, the develop-
ment of its own governmental processe
and the identification of the president
and other officials of the country are
matters for that country. The role of tl
United States is, as we are, to be helpf
to the Government of Lebanon, at theii
request, as they seek to take control of
Beirut and the country generally. Be-
yond that, I think the issue of the elec-
tion of a new president and other re-
lated matters are essentially a matter
for the Government of Lebanon, not fo

lit
!egi

Jft

tkoi

Kll

Hon,

UIVO,

Q. In the wake of what Menaheiv be,

tesi

m

Begin calls a great victory, what
would make you believe that Israel
would become more flexible in terms
of dealing with the Palestinian prob-
lem? And has the Government of
Israel given us any assurances that
they would be willing to discuss thiS'
more amenably?

Department of State Bulle ieptei

Feature
Lebanon

A. What the outcome of discussions
will be and how much flexibility will be
shown by various parties to it remains
to be seen. I think that the prospect of
peace, particularly in the light of the
:onflict in Lebanon that we've seen re-
cently— and for that matter, the conflict
in Lebanon that has been going on since
1975 — should convince people that if
Jiere is any genuine prospect of peace,
t should be seized. Perhaps that will be
m incentive for everyone to give and
take and try to construct something that
night work.

Q. Do you believe that the PLO
tias any role to play in the negotia-
:ions process, or do you think that it
ioes not represent the Palestinian
jeople and is better not involved?

A. As far as the United States is
•oiicerned, the President has set out
veil-known conditions for any contacts

: letween the United States and the PLO
lirectly, and we stand by those condi-
iiiiis. If the PLO meets those condi-
iiins, obviously, the United States would
)e willing to talk with them. Whether

: ithers would be willing to talk with
hem, those others will have to say for
hemselves.

I think it is quite clear that, if there
s to be a negotiation, that has as one of
ts center objectives meeting the
legitimate concerns of the Palestinian
Deople, there have to be representatives
i)f the Palestinian people involved in
.hose negotiations. No one accepts a
'esult that they didn't have any part in.
Who that should be remains to be seen,
don't know the answer to that ques-
;ion, but I know that an answer to it
leeds to be found.

Q. Could you give us an idea of
low much U.S. funding is going to be
nvolved in the evacuation and
ivhether or not we will be reimbursed?

A. I don't think that what funding
ffe supply we will be reimbursed for. We
lave, I think, committed around $2
Tiillion by now for the chartering of
5hips and things of that kind, and
Derhaps we will spend a little bit more
Tioney on that sort of thing. Others will
ilso bear some expense as they receive
:he PLO contingents that come to their
:ountries, so it will be a shared expense.

Jeptember 1982

That is the order of magnitude, and I
don't see where any reimbursement
would come from.

Q. Your fact sheet states U.S.
troops will go in probably 5 or 6 days
after the evacuation begins.

A. That's right.

Q. Is there a trigger mechanism
for that to happen? Is there some con-
dition to be met before those U.S.
troops go in?

A. Just that we observe that the
conditions precedent to the whole opera-
tion are in force, the departures are tak-
ing place as scheduled, and there is a
basically nonhostile environment.

Q. You have had talks with the
Danish Foreign Minister these days,
and he has invited you to go to
Brussels, primarily, I understand, to
assess the trouble about the pipeline.
Are you intending to go to Brussels
pretty soon? And what will be the
next steps of the Administration in
case European countries start delivery
of pipeline technology very soon?

A. I don't have any immediate
travel plans. I looked the other day at
the little statement that is hanging up in
my office now that says when the Senate
voted my confirmation — that was
July 15. It seems like about 10 years
ago. But I am trying to assemble my
thoughts and haven't made any plans to
travel. There is a NATO meeting, I
think, in early December, so presumably,
I would go to that. At that time, other
consultations could take place. Of
course, I've seen many people from
European governments during the
month or so that I have been in office.
But I don't have any immediate plan to
go to Brussels.

As far as the pipeline is concerned,
the President's position is firm. We don't
see that anything that has happened in
Poland recently meets the conditions
that have been set out, not only by our-
selves but by our allies. So there is no
intention to change but, rather, to push
ahead with the sanctions as they have
been put in place.

Q. [Inaudible] what you said to us
just now? If the deliveries start,
would the Administration then come
up with measures against the allies?

A. Not measures against the
allies — these are not measures against
the allies. They are measures taken to
demonstrate to the Polish Government
and the Soviet Union that the behavior
that we see — explicitly in Poland, but
also in other countries — is behavior that
we deplore, and to the degree that we
are willing to take steps that are hard to
take.

I think it should be noted that these
sanctions, while I believe they are caus-
ing problems in the construction of that
pipeline— and the problems they are
causing for our allies abroad are heavily
publicized — they also cause problems for
firms here in the United States. We
know that. But to an extent, I suppose,
it shows the depth of the President's
conviction that the behavior that we see
in Poland and elsewhere has to be noted,
and a response to it needs to be put in
place and kept in place.

Q. The remarks that you made to-
day on opportunities for negotiating a
broader settlement in the Middle East
echo those made last night on national
television by Dr. Henry Kissinger.
Tomorrow you're meeting with a
number of so-called foreign policy ex-
perts, most of whom at some point or
another have worked as assistants to
Dr. Kissinger. You've met with him
personally several times over the last
few weeks. The Executive Intelligence
Review has reported that Dr. Kissin-
ger is, in fact, becoming the primary
foreign policy adviser of this Ad-
ministration. To what extent is that
true?

A. As I understand it, according to
the National Security Council directives,
the Secretary of State is the principal
foreign policy adviser. And it's easy
enough to be Secretary of State — you
have to get the President to nominate
you and the Senate to confirm you. So
that's me.

Dr. Kissinger is a wonderful person
and a great friend, a person who has
tremendous knowledge and comprehen-
sion of what is going on. I have enjoyed
the benefit of his friendship and his
ideas over many years, and I expect to

11

continue to have that. One of the first
visitors to me after I became Secretary
of State was Dr. Kissinger, along with
Irving Shapiro and Larry Silberman, to
tali< about the Middle East, and I'll con-
tinue to benefit from his advice. But it's
my job to be the principal adviser to the
President.

Q. Dr. Kissinger has been named
in a number of criminal investigations
in Italy and —

A. Oh, come on; come on.

Q. What is going to happen now
to Yasser Arafat and other PLO lead-
ers, and have you received any assur-
ances from the PLO indirectly that
there will not be any further terrorist
attacks on Israel, either through Jor-
dan or perhaps through Syria? What
assurances?

A. I think, by this time, perhaps
people can see that what terrorism
evokes is not so much fear but abhor-
rence from the world community. It is
unfortunate that there is such an
amount of terrorism. But I think, by this
time, people are pretty well convinced
that it's something bad all around, and
very strong measures increasingly are
being taken against it. I would imagine
that any capable analytical person would
be able to see that.

Q. During this news conference
I've been informed that President
Carter has charged that—

A. I think it's a little tough on me —

Q. I know.

A. —that you get some informa-
tion—

Q. — I apologize that it's only hap-
pened—

A. —that comes in while I'm here
that I don't have access to it. It's like sit-
ting in front of the Senate for confirma-
tion. All those fellows are going in and
out — and ladies — all the time, and I'm
just sitting there. I don't know what has
happened.

Q. I will explain to you what has
happened, as far as I know —

A. You're blind siding me.

Q. —and 1 don't think you'll be
totally blind sided because it's not the
first time we've heard this charge, but

12

I've been told that President Carter—
and I cannot vouch for the truth of
whether he actually said it or not — has
charged that Washington gave the go-
ahead to Israel for the invasion of
Lebanon. I'm sure that I'm not blind
siding you because that you've heard
from other sources before. Can you
answer that charge?
A. It is not correct.

Q. Did not Secretary of State
Haig, your predecessor, know in ad-
vance that Israel was going to strike
into Lebanon?

A. My understanding is that the
U.S. Government was not informed, and
the U.S. Government was and is on the
record as having opposed that invasion.
Whether somebody came through here
and talked about it as a possibility, I
don't know. People talk about all kinds
of possibilities.

Q. Who goes in first? Who's the
advance element that's spoken of, if
it's not American forces?

A. You mean in the Beirut situa-
tion?

Q. In Beirut, right.

A. I think that's in al! the fact
material. The first element of the multi-
national force is the French with about
350. Let me correct that. It basically is
the responsibility of the Government of
Lebanon and their armed forces to pro-
vide for the safety of these departures
and, of course, to take control of the
city and their country. The multinational
force is there to assist the Government
of Lebanon.

The first contingent is the French
contingent of about 350 who will be sta-
tioned, I think, in the immediate port
area in the beginning. The U.S. troops,
the balance of the French, and the
Italian will enter about 5 days after the
departures start.

Q. You just talked about the
necessity of addressing the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people in the
next phase after Beirut. Are you will-
ing to tell us whether those legitimate
rights include the rights for self-
determination and independence? In
other words, what's your definition of
these legitimate rights for the Pale-
stinians?

It

A. Precisely what that will wind up
meaning will have to emerge from a
negotiation, I'm sure. The words "self-
determination" seem to have taken on
terms of art. But I would say, as I've in-
dicated earlier, if people are going to ac-
cept some solution, they have to have a
part in forming it. Certainly one would
expect, as the language of Camp David
makes clear, that the Palestinians shoulc
have a role in determining the conditions
under which they will be governed.

Q. In going through the agree-
ment, I don't see anything mentioned
about verifying that the PLO has, in
fact, left Beirut. Maybe I just passed
over it, but I wondered if you could
address that problem?

A. Arrangements have been made
to, in efi"ect, check off people as they
leave so that there is a verification of
how many people have left and so on,
and where they have gone. That process
will be undertaken, and I believe that is
basically a responsibility of the Govern-
ment of Lebanon to do.

Q. You just mentioned in one of
your answers that Arab-American
relations are now strained. It doesn't
seem to have passed on to some of
those Arab governments that when th
United States made clear to Israel
what the United States wanted, Israe
did stop the bombing. Looking to the
future, do you intend again to make
clear to Israel to really pursue a
negotiated solution which will be ac-
ceptable to all parties in the Middle
East?

A. My hope is that everyone will
look at what has happened in the last
few weeks and feel that it means that
we must all concentrate on creating a
just peace. This shining objective will b
the principal motivating force for every
one.

Q. Can I just come back to Camp
David? You've talked a lot about peac
and rights of Palestinians, and you
also talked about Camp David. Before
the Lebanon crisis erupted. Secretary
Haig was about to launch into an in-
tensified effort to revive the talks be-
tween Egypt and Israel on the grouni
rules for the self-governing authority
as it's called, as well as other leftove:
points that hadn't been negotiated.

Department of State Bullet H

ud

Feature
Lebanon

Are you looking for ways beyond
this, or are you willing to continue
that negotiating track which has been
on and oflf for the last several years as
a first step toward this interim solu-
tion which is called for in Camp
David? I'm not sure whether you want
to stay with Camp David or not.

A. The language of Camp David, as
I read it, has lots of room for ideas as to
how the situation might be arranged. I
have been listening to many people. You
mentioned Dr. Kissinger and
others — Sol Linowitz, Irving Shapiro,
Larry Silberman, Members of Con-
gress—talking with the President. We're
trying to form our ideas about what we
think in a general way should be a
reasonable outcome and what kind of
process will get us there. As I said at
the beginning of this statement, there is
a lot of room within the Camp David
language, and I think when you see a
situation like that it's worthwhile to
ipreserve that.

\ Q. A lot of room for what?

A. A lot of room for many different
interpretations as to what that language
means, but it's just the kind of language
that is generally used, and I recognize
that different people put different mean-
ings on it.

Q. Your fact sheet that your de-
partment handed out about the send-
ing of these forces suggests strongly
I that you plan to report to Congress
under the War Powers Act under a
provision which is not binding in the
sense that the troops are not required
to be out after 60 days. As you know,
the Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Mr. Zablocki, and
of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. Mr. Percy, argue that it should
be under the more binding provision
because of both the situation and the
precedent involved. In that view is it
correct that you're planning, as this
suggests, but doesn't exactly say, to
o under the nonbinding provision
nd, if so, why?

A. The President will make a deci-
sion about what section of the War
Powers Act to use at the time of the in-
troduction of American forces. I believe,
under the law, he's required to make

5eptember1982

that statement within 48 hours of their
deployment, and I'm sure that he will do
so. He'll have to decide at the time what
is the right section.

I would say this: that, first of all, the
President has stated explicitly that we
have a 30-day time limit here, and that
is right in the plan, rather than 60 days
as your question suggested. Second, if
we have a basically peaceful departure
situation in west Beirut and this govern-
ment announces that its forces are going
in under what it considers conditions of
imminent hostility, I wonder what the
message is?

I think we have to be cognizant of
what the real facts are on the ground
and suit our determination to that. I
believe the President will certainly be
doing that, and I don't want to prejudge
what decision he will make. But I think
the basis for the decision should be the
conditions on the ground rather than
some notion about the number of days
or something of that kind. The President
has already specified the limit on the
number of days.

Q. Would you just finish up the
Camp David questions that have been
brought up? What evidence is there to-
day that President Mubarak is as anx-
ious to proceed along the framework
of Camp David, no matter how you
work within this large framework, as
was his predecessor? There's some evi-
dence he is not that keen, is there
not?

A. I think that, as we noted earlier,
people throughout the Arab world are
very upset about the events in Lebanon,

and it has had a profound effect on their
attitudes. I know that. That will repre-
sent a problem that we'll have to con-
tend with. As we go along here we cer-
tainly expect to work with President
Mubarak and the Egyptians. They have
been an essential part of this whole
peace process, and I would have every
expectation that in the end they will still
want to be a part of the peace process.

'Press release 257. 1

13

U.N. Adopts Resolutions
on Lebanon Situation

Following are texts of Security Coun-
cil and General Assembly resolutions
and draft resolutions and statements by
Ambassadors Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, and Charles M. Lichenstein,
Alternate U.S. Representative to the
United Nations for Special Political
Affairs.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 508,
JUNE 5, I982>

The Security Council.

Recalling Security Council resolutions
425 (1978), 426 (1978) and the ensuing resolu-
tions, and more particularly. Security Council
resolution 501 (1982),

Taking note of the letters of the Perma-
nent Representatives of Lebanon dated 4
June 1982 (S/15161 and S/15162),

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of
the present situation in Lebanon and in the
Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its conse-
quences for peace and security in the region.

Gravely concerned at the violation of the
territorial integrity, independence, and
sovereignty of Lebanon,

Reaffirming and supporting the state-
ment made by the President and the
members of the Security Council on 4 June
1982 (S/15163), as well as the urgent appeal
issued by the Secretary-General on 4 June
1982,

Taking note of the report of the
Secretary -General ,

1. Ccdls upon all the parties to the
conflict to cease immediately and simul-
taneously all military activities within
Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli
border and no later than 0600 hours local
time on Sunday, 6 June 1982.

2. Requests all Member States which are
in a position to do so to bring their influence
to bear upon those concerned so that the
cessation of hostilities declared by Security
Council resolution 490 (1981) can be
respected;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to
undertake all possible efforts to ensure the
implementation of and compliance with this

resolution and to report to the Security Coun-
cil as early as possible and not later than
forty-eight hours after the adoption of this
resolution.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 509.
JUNE 6, 1982'

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) of
19 March 1978 and 503 (1982) of
5 June 1982,

Gravely concerned at the situation as
described by the Secretary-General in his
report to the Council,

Reaffirming the need for strict respect
for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
political independence of Lebanon within its
internationally recognized boundaries,

1. Demands that Israel withdraw all its
military forces forthwith and unconditionally
to the internationally recognized boundaries
of Lebanon;

2. Demands that all parties observe
strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of resolu-
tion 508 (1982) which called on them to cease
immediately and simultaneously all military
activities within Lebanon and across the
Lebanese-Israeli border;

3. Calls on all parties to communicate to
the Secretary-General their acceptance of the
present resolution within 24 hours;

4. Decides to remain seized of the ques-
tion.

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JUNE 6, 1982

This resolution focuses on two elements
as a means of ending the present
military confrontation in Lebanon — a
cessation of hostilities by all of the par-
ties and the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Lebanon.

Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
resolution seek to accomplish these two
interrelated objectives. We wish to em-
phasize that these two objectives are, in
fact, inextricably linked and that their

implementation must be simultaneous.
This, in our view, is the clear, logical,
and necessary meaning of the resolution.
I need only add that it is the fervent
hope of my government, which has
devoted so much effort to the resolution
of this conflict — and which even at this
very moment is carrying forward its
commitment to the task — that the blood-
shed be ended immediately and that the
conditions be established for a just and
enduring peace in the region.

SECURITY COUNCIL

DRAFT RESOLUTION (S/15185),

JUNE 8, 19822

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 508 (1982) and
509 (1982),

Taking note of the report of the
Secretary-General (S/15178) of 7 June 1982,

Also taking note of the two positive
replies to the Secretary-General of the
Government of Lebanon and the Palestine
Liberation Organization contained in docu-
ment S/15178.

1. Condemns the non-compliance with
resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) by
Israel;

2. Urges the parties to comply strictly
with the regulations attached to the Hague
Convention of 1907;

3. Reiterates its demand that Israel
withdraw all its military forces forthwith anc
unconditionally to the internationally
recogfnized boundciries of Lebanon;

4. Reiterates also its demand that all par
ties observe strictly the terms of paragraph
of resolution 508 (1982) which called on then-
to cease immediately and simultaneously all
military activities within Lebanon and across
the Lebanese-Israeli border;

5. Demands that within six hours all
hostilities must be stopped in compliance wit
Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and
509 (1982) and decides, in the event of non-
compliance, to meet again to consider prac-
tical ways and means in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.

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15;
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14

Department of State Bulletir

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Feature
Lebanon

EMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
rUNE 8, 19823

[ desire to offer an explanation of vote
)n behalf of my government. The objec-
;ive of my government is to end the
)loodshed and the cycle of violence in
Lebanon and to restore full respect for
he sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
ndependence of that troubled land.

Two previous resolutions of this
ouncil — Resolutions 508 and 509 — con-
fined balancing language that took ac-
lount of the fact that the conflict in
ebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli
xjrder is complex in its origins and that
ts resolution will require compliance in
leed as well as in word with the resolu-
lions of the Security Council.

Unfortunately, the resolution now
lefore us is not sufficiently balanced to
iccomplish the objectives of ending the
:ycle of violence and establishing the
;onditions for a just and lasting peace in
-.ebanon. For that reason, Mr. Presi-
dent, the United States voted against
his resolution.

My government is now currently
engaged in every possible effort to bring
khe violence to an end. We shall continue
Ihose efforts.

SECURITY COUNCIL
lESOLUTION 511,

TUNE 18, 1982^

''he Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426
1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450
1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 483 (1980), 488
1981), 490 (1981), 498 (1981), and 501
1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982)
nd 509 (1982),

Having studied the report of the
iecretary-General on the United Nations In-
erim Force in Lebanon (S/15194 and Add.l
.nd 2) and taking note of the conclusions and
ecommendations expressed therein.

Bearing in mind the need to avoid any
levelopments which could further aggravate
he situation and the need, pending an ex-
.mination of the situation by the Council in
.11 its aspects, to preserve in place the capaci-
y of the United Nations to assist in the
lestoration of the peace.

Lebanon— A Profile

Geography

Area: 10,400 sq. km. (4,015 sq. mi.); about
the size of Connecticut. Capital: Beirut (pop.
1.1 million). Other Cities: Tripoli (240,000),
Zahlah (55,000), Sidon (110,000), and Tyre
(60,000). Terrain: Narrow coastal plain
backed by high Lebanese Mountains, the fer-
tile Bekaa Valley, and the Anti-Lebanon
Mountains extending to the Syrian border.
Land — 64% urban, desert, or waste; 27%
agricultural; 9% forested. Climate: Typically
Mediterranean, resembling that of southern
California. Temperatures rarely exceed 30°C
(85°F) during the summer, but humidity is
high.

People

Population (1981 est.): 3 million. Annual
Growth Rate: 2.6%. Ethnic Groups: 93%

Arab, 6% Armenian. Religions: Christian
(Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Catholic,
Roman Catholic, Protestant), Muslim (Sunni
and Shi'a), Druze. Languages: Arabic (of-
ficial), Armenian, French, English. Educa-
tion: Years compulsory — 5. Attendance:
93%. Literacy— 75%. Health: Infant mortali-
ty rate— 45/1,000 (1980). Life expectancy— 65
yrs.

Government

Type: Parliamentary Republic. Constitution:
May 26, 1926 (amended). Date of Independ-
ence: 1943. Branches: Executive — president
(chief of state, elected by simple majority of
Parliament for 6-yr. term), Cabinet of
Ministers (appointed). Legislative — Uni-
cameral Parliament (99-member Chamber of
Deputies elected for 4-yr. terms).
Judicial — secular and religious courts; com-
bination of Ottoman, civil, and canon law; no
judicial review of legislative acts. Ad-
ministrative Subdivisions: 5 provinces, each
headed by a governor: Beirut, North
Lebanon, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon,
and Bekaa. Political Parties: Organized

along sectarian lines around individuals
whose followers are motivated by religious,
clan, and ethnic considerations. Suffrage:
Males over 21, females over 21 with elemen-
tary educations. Central Government
Budget (1981): $1.3 billion. Defense (1981):
$250.3 million or 19% of government budget.
Deficit— $S28A million or 25% of budget.

Economy

GDP (1977): $2.6 billion. Annual Growth
Rate: Varies with security situation but
thought to be negligible over the 1974-81
period. Per Capita Income: $884. Avg. In-
flation Rate (1981): 20%— 25% est. Natural
Resources: Limestone. Agriculture (8.5% of
GDP): Products — citrus fruit, produce.
Land — 400,000 hectares under cultivation.
Industry (13% of GDP): cement production,
light industry, refining. Trade (1979): Ex-
ports—$664 million: chemicals, $113 million;
metal products, $100 million; agricultural
products, $93 million; textiles, $73 million.
Major m/irkets—Arah states 88%; non-Arab,
12%. Imports — $2.1 billion: commodity
breakdown not available. Major sup-
pliers— Western Europe, U.S. Official Ex-
change Rate (Oct. 31, 1981): 4,597 Lebanese
pounds = U.S.$l.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and several of its specialized agencies,
Arab League, Organization of the Islamic
Conference, Nonaligned Movement, Group of
77, INTELSAT.

The information on this country is taken
from the July 1982 Background Notes, one
of a series of Notes on about 165 countries
of the world, edited by Joanne Reppert
Reams of the Bureau of Public Affairs.

A 1-year subscription (about 60 Notes)
is available for $18 a year (domestic);
$22.50 (foreign) from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

1. Decides as an interim measure, to ex-
tend the present mandate of the Force for a
period of two months, that is, until 19 August
1982;

2. Authorizes the Force during that
period, to carry out, in addition, the interim
tasks referred to in paragraph 17 of the
Secretary-General's report (S/15194/Add.2);

eptember1982

3. Calls on all concerned to extend full
co-operation to the Force in the discharge of
its tasks;

4. Reqmests the Secretary-CJeneral to
keep the Security Council regularly informed
of the implementation of resolutions 508
(1982) and 509 (1982) and the present resolu-
tion.

15

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JUNE 18, 1982^

The United States is pleased that this
Council is extending the mandate of
UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon] for a period of 2 months. We
are likewise pleased and grateful that
the troop-contributing countries are
prepared to continue to so materially
assist this organization in carrying out
its responsibilities. Obviously, the situa-
tion in Lebanon is fraught with uncer-
tainty, as well as with pain and turmoil.

The United States has voted today
to extend this mandate without any ex-
tension of responsibilities, functions, or
territorial scope because we believe that
this course will contribute most directly
and clearly to the restoration of peace
and well-being of the area and to the
restoration of the authority and the
sovereignty of the Government of
Lebanon. The mandate has been extend-
ed for 2 months. During that period,
while the situation stabilizes, we in the
Council will have the opportunity to col-
lectively study what best serves the com-
mon good of the people of Lebanon and
the peace of the region.

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JUNE 19, 1982«

My government, in consultation with the
governments of Lebanon and Israel and
with U.N. authorities, wholly supports
the positive efforts now going forward
in the field to provide humanitarian
services to the people of Lebanon. Each
day this humanitarian effort is more ef-
fective, reaching more of those needing
special services. We believe that such
progress will continue.

As an earnest of our commitment,
President Reagan has appointed the Ad-
ministrator of the U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development as his personal
representative to coordinate all U.S. ef-
forts to assist in this process. Fifteen

million dollars have already been com-
mitted to the effort. We anticipate the
authorization of an additional $20
million.

Our principal concern remains the
restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty
and authority throughout its territory.
As I have said, we are wholly committed
to serving the human needs of the peo-
ple of Lebanon. We hope, and we trust,
that no party and no government will
exploit these fundamental humanitarian
concerns for narrow, political purposes.

In the context of these considera-
tions and reflections, my delegation has
supported the draft resolution.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 512,
JUNE 19, 19821

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the
Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations,

Referring to the humanitarian principles
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the
obligations arising from the regulations an-
nexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and
509 (1982),

1. Calls upon all the parties to the
conflict to respect the rights of the civilian
populations, to refrain from all acts of
violence against those populations and to take
all appropriate measures to alleviate the
suffering caused by the conflict, in particular,
by facilitating the dispatch and distribution of
aid provided by United Nations agencies and
by non-governmental organizations, in par-
ticular, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC);

2. Appeals to Member States to continue
to provide the most extensive humanitarian
aid possible;

3. Stresses the particular humanitarian
responsibilities of the United Nations and its
agencies, including the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA), towards civilian
populations and calls upon the parties to the
conflict not to hamper the exercise of those
responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian
efforts;

4. Takes note of the measures taken by
the Secretary-General to co-ordinate the ac-
tivities of the international agencies in this
field and requests him to make every effort

J£_

to ensure the implementation of and com-
pliance with this resolution and to report on
these efforts to the Council as soon as
possible.

SECURITY COUNCIL
DRAFT RESOLUTION

(S/15255/Rev.2),
JUNE 25, 19822

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) an(
509 (1982),

Reaffirming also its resolution 512 (1982)
which, inter alia, calls upon all the parties tc
the conflict to respect the rights of the
civilian populations.

Seriously concerned at the constant
deterioration of the situation in Lebanon,
resulting from the violation of the sovereign-
ty, integrity, independence and unity of that
country.

Profoundly apprehensive of the dangers
of extension of the fighting within Beirut, its
capital,

1. Demands that all the parties observe
an immediate cessation of hostilities
throughout Lebanon;

2. Demands the immediate withdrawal c
the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a
distance of 10 kilometres from the peripherj
of that city, as a first step towards the com-
plete withdrawal of Israeli forces from
Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal (
the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut,
which shall retire to the existing camps;

3. Supports all efforts by the Govern-
ment of Lebanon to ensure Lebanese
sovereignty throughout the territory and thi
integrity and independence of Lebanon
within its internationally recognized frontier

4. Calls upon all armed elements in the
Beirut area to respect and abide by the ex-
clusive authority of the Government of
Lebanon;

5. Supports the Government of Lebanor
in its will to regain exclusive control of its
capital and, to that end, to install its armed
forces which shall take up positions within
Beirut and interpose themselves on its
periphery;

6. Requests the Secretary -General, as ar
immediate measure, to station United Na-
tions military observers, by agreement with
the Government of Lebanon, with instruc-
tions to supervise the cease-fire and
disengagement in and round Beirut;

7. Further requests the Secretary-
General to study any request by the Govern
ment of Lebanon for the installation of a
United Nations force which could, within thi

nonarfmon* r\f Qtato Riilloti

Feature
Lebanon

Philip C. Habib— The
President's special
emissary to the Middle East

Philip Charles Habib was born on
February 25, 1920, in Brooklyn, New
York. He graduated from the University
of Idaho in 1942 and in 1952 received a
Ph.D. in agricultural economics from the
University of California (Berkeley).

In 1947, following service in the
U.S. Army during the Second World
War, Ambassador Habib became a
teaching research assistant at the
University of California. In 1949, he was
appointed a Foreign Service officer and
was assigned to the American Embassy
In Ottawa as an economic officer. He
then served in WeUington (1951-54) and
in the Department (1955-57). He subse-
quently became political officer at Port-
of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and the
Department's officer-in-charge of
underdeveloped areas in the office of the
Under Secretary's Special Assistant for
Communist Economic Affairs (1960-61).

Ambassador Habib was Counselor
for Political Affairs in Seoul (1962-65)
where he served as political officer (with
the personal rank of minister) in Saigon
(1965-67). He served as Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (1967-69) and was senior

President Reagan presents Ambassador
Habib with the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the nation's highest civilian
award.

adviser to the U.S. delegation in Paris
at the peace negotiations on Vietnam
(1968-71).

He was Ambassador to Korea
(1971-74), Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs (1974-76), and
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
(1976-78); beginning in June 1979 he
became a senior adviser to the
Secretary.

Ambassador Habib retired from the
Foreign Service on February 29, 1980.
He was appointed the President's special
emissary to the Middle East on May 5,
1981. ■

framework of the implementation of the
preceding paragraphs, take up positions
besides the Lebanese interposition forces, or
for the use of the forces available to the
United Nations in the region;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Council on an urgent and sus-
tained basis not later than 1 July 1982 on the
Status of implementation of the present
resolution and of resolution 508 (1982), 509
(1982) and 512 (1982);

9. Requests all Member States to co-
operate fully with the United Nations in the
implementation of the present resolution;

10. Decides to remain seized of the
question.

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JUNE 26, 1982'

The fundamental basis of the policy of
the United States is now and has con-
sistently been to contribute to the
restoration of the Government of
Lebanon's full authority throughout its
land and its sovereignty and territorial
integrity. My government is deeply
moved by the suffering of the Lebanese
people in the present crisis.

We had hoped that the draft resolu-
tion before the Security Council tonight
would have reflected this basic concern.
Unfortunately, the draft resolution.

3ptember1982

while containing many elements we sup-
port, fails to call for the essential req-
uisite for the restoration of the authority
of the Government of Lebanon — that is,
the elimination from Beirut and
elsewhere of the presence of armed
Palestinian elements who neither submit
to nor respect the sovereign authority of
the Lebanese Government. The omission
of this requisite, in our view, thus, is in-
consistent with the essential goal of
restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.
This, we believe, is a fatal flaw.

The resolution does contain many
elements that we support — namely, a
call for an immediate cease-fire, a call
for simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli
and Palestinian forces from the area of
Beirut, and the proposal that U.N.
observers, upon the request of the
Government of Lebanon, monitor the
cease-fire.

The members of this Council are
well aware of the threat which armed
foreign elements pose to the authority of
the Government of Lebanon and to
stability throughout the region. We
deeply regret that this essential factor
was not accorded the weight we believed
it must have in the draft resolution
before us.

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S
STATEMENT,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
JUNE 26, 19828

The United States wishes to stress once
again its deep and abiding commitment
to the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
unity, and political independence of
Lebanon within its internationally
recognized boundaries. We are also
deeply — and, at this very moment, ac-
tively— committed to helping bring the
tragic conflict now taking place in
Lebanon to a just and lasting end as
rapidly as possible.

The United States fully recognizes
that the resolution before us reflects the
profound emotional anguish felt by
everyone of goodwill at the continuing
loss of life and human suffering in
Lebanon. Nonetheless, the resolution
regretfully is an unhelpful gesture at
this most delicate stage. The United

17

States cannot be a party to an unbal-
anced statement which may well have
the effect of heightening the underlying
animosities in Lebanon and actually in-
creasing the danger of a wider conflict.
A just and lasting settlement cannot be
achieved by issuing declarations and
ultimata — motivated sometimes by vin-
dictiveness, even by hatred — but re-
quires an urgent effort by all nations
committed to the principles of the U.N.
Charter to lessen the tensions and find a
path to peace.

The humanitarian task of aiding the
victims of the conflict in Lebanon is
surely no less urgent than the goal of
bringing the conflict to an end. The con-
cern of the U.S. Government was
demonstrated by President Reagan
when he made an immediate initial
allocation of $15 million for
humanitarian aid in Lebanon and also
requested from the U.S. Congress an ad-
ditional appropriation of $20 million. The
Congress, reflecting the deep human
concern of the entire American people,
not only approved the President's re-
quest but indicated its wish to provide
yet an additional $20 million of assist-
ance. The United States, of course,
stands ready to provide further assist-
ance as and where needed.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION A/ES-7/5,
JUNE 26, 1982^

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of
Palestine at its resumed seventh emergency
special session.

Having heard the statement of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, the
representative of the Palestinian people,

Alarmed by the worsening situation in
the Middle East as a result of Israel's acts of
aggression against the sovereignty of
Lebanon and the Palestinian people in
Lebanon,

Recalling Security Council resolutions
508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of
6 June 1982 and 512 (1982) of 19 June 1982,

Taking note of the reports of the
Secretary-General relevant to this situation,
particularly his report of 7 June 1982,

Taking note of the two positive replies to
the Secretary-General by the Government of
Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation
Organization,

18

by James E. Miller
General and European Division
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

On the evening of March 14, 1978,
Israeli Armed Forces invaded southern
Lebanon after terrorist attacks on
March 1 1 along the Tel- Aviv and Haifa
road had left 34 Israelis and one U.S.
citizen dead. The Government of Israel
announced that its military action was
aimed at destroying the bases used by
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
terrorists for the March 11 and previous
raids.

On March 15, Israeli Prime Minister
[Menahem] Begin announced that his
forces would halt after they had
established a 6-mile security zone and
would withdraw as soon as Israel had
guarantees that southern Lebanon
would no longer serve as a base for PLO
attacks on Israel. However, as a result
of continuing Palestinian resistance, the
Israeli army advanced beyond the 6-mile
limit in an effort to destroy the PLO's
military capacity.

The U.S. (kivernment expressed its
horror at the attacks on Israeli citizens
but opposed the use of military force by
Israel. On March 16, in conjunction with
its European allies, the United States
called for the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from Lebanon. Two days later, it
introduced a resolution at a special
meeting of the U.N. Security Council
calling for the establishment of a U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
which would permit the rapid
withdrawal of Israeli forces and the
reestablishment of the authority of the
Government of Lebanon in the southern
part of that nation. The U.S. draft pro-

UNIFIL

posal was approved as U.N. Resolution
425 (78) on March 19 by a vote of 12-0
with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia and
the Soviet Union).

After hearing a report by the U.N.
Secretary (Jeneral on the terms under
which UNIFIL could operate in southern
Lebanon, the Security Council adopted
this report as U.N. Resolution 426 (78)
by an identical vote, thus establishing
UNIFIL for a period of 6 months. The
costs of this peacekeeping force were to
be apportioned among U.N. member
states. Major General Emmanuel S.
Erskine of Ghana, Chief of Staff of the
U.N. Troop Supervision Organization,
was given command of UNIFIL. The
new peacekeeping force was composed
of troops assigned to the Troop Supervi-
sion Organization together with Iranian,
Canadian, and Swedish personnel
detached from U.N. forces stationed on
the Golan Heights and the Sinai and
contingents supplied by Norway, Nepal,
and France. The United Kingdom,
Nigeria, and Senegal also offered to sup
ply contingents to UNIFIL.

A special session of the U.N.
General Assembly subsequently ap-
proved a credit of $54 million for the
maintenance of a 4,000-man peacekeep-
ing force in southern Lebanon —
April 21, 1978 — and has assigned the
major share of the cost of UNIFIL to
the five permanent members of the
Security Council: the United Kingdom,
France, the People's Republic of China,
the Soviet Union, and the United States

Meanwhile, on March 21, Israeli
forces declared a unilateral cease-fire
after reaching a line along the Litani
River. The first contingents of UNIFIL
troops arrived in the war zone on
March 22 and attempted to take up posi ■'•

J

lii

Noting rvith regret that the Security
Council has, so far, failed to take effective
and practical measures, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure
implementation of its resolutions 508 (1982)
and 509 (1982),

Referring to the humanitarian principles

of the Geneva Convention relative to the Pro
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, o
12 August 1949, and to the obligations aris-
ing from the regulations annexed to the
Hague Conventions of 1907,

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the
Palestinian and Lebanese civilian populations

Reaffirming once again its conviction thai ^

Department of State Bulletir Her

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'1(4

&

Feature
Lebanon

.N. Interim Force in Lebanon

ons between the Israeli Army and the
LO forces. However, elements of the
LO rejected the Israeli cease-fire and
)ntinued to carry out attacks on Israeli
jsitions. The Palestinians refused to
icognize UNIFIL's mandate, and the
lacekeeping forces came under fire
om both PLO troops and from
embers of Lebanese Christian militia
rmations who opposed the
alestinian's presence in Lebanon. Israel
formed the Secretary General that its
ithdrawal from southern Lebanon
ould depend on the size of the U.N.
rce and its ability to keep PLO guer-
llas out of the area south of the Litani
iver.

On May 3, in response to the
;mands of the Israeli Government, the
ecurity Council approved an increase in
16 size of UNIFIL to 6,000 men in
jesolution 427 (78) by a vote of 12-0
th Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
nion again abstaining. Israel an-
Dunced on May 21 that it would
ithdraw from Lebanon by June 28.
nree days later, PLO Chairman Yassir
rafat agreed to cooperate with
"NIFIL in the establishment of their
introl in southern Lebanon and to quell
ttacks on Israel. However, Arafat was
bable to enforce compliance within the
LO. Palestinian infiltration into
mthern Lebanon and attacks on
NIFIL troops continued. As a result,
ithdrawing Israeli forces turned over
■ntrol of a buffer zone along the
sbanon-Israel border to a Christian
sbanese militia as they retired behind
eir borders on June 13, 1978.

UNIFIL now began serving as a
;acekeeping force between the PLO
id the Christian Lebanese as well as
>tween Palestinian forces and Israel. In

view of the instability of the southern
Lebanon region, the Security Council, on
September 19, 1978, extended the life of
UNIFIL for 4 additional months.

The period between January 1979
and the spring of 1981 was marked by a
series of military operations interrupted
by short-lived truces between Palestin-
ians, Christians, and Israelis. UNIFIL
forces attempted to carry out their
peacekeeping role and were involved in
a series of clashes with PLO and Chris-
tian militia forces as well as a number of
ambushes in which soldiers of the forces
were killed. The Security Council, noting
the continuing instability in southern
Lebanon, regularly renewed UNIFIL's
mission at 6-month intervals, but the
composition of the peacekeeping forces
changed. U.N. troops who had originally
been assigned to UNIFIL from other
peacekeeping missions were withdrawn.
Iranian soldiers who had comprised a
large portion of UNIFIL troops were
withdrawn after the 1979 revolution in
that nation. Other nations provided
troops to fill in the gaps, and by late
1980, UNIFIL numbered 7,000 men and
was composed of national contingents
from Fiji, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal,
the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, and
Senegal. In addition, small contingents
of the Army of the Republic of Lebanon
were attached to UNIFIL forces as part
of the effort to reestablish the control of
the Government of Lebanon in the
south. On February 5, 1981, Major
General William Callaghan of the
Republic of Ireland succeeded Major
Gen. Erskine as commander of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its mis-
sion of ending the warfare in southern
Lebanon. In addition to continuing
Palestinian infiltration and clashes be-

tween UNIFIL troops and the PLO and
Lebanese Christian militia, Israeli impa-
tience with the inability of the peace-
keeping forces to prevent PLO infiltra-
tion grew.

Israeli officials charged that some
UNIFIL troops collaborated with PLO
terrorists. By early 1981, Israel had
adopted a policy of preventive raids
against Palestinian positions in Lebanon.
At the same time, Syrian forces in
Lebanon aided by the PLO were at-
tempting to reduce the power of the
Christian Lebanese forces.

In order to prevent a widening of
the hostilities in Lebanon and the Middle
East, President Reagan appointed Am-
bassador Philip C. Habib as his special
emissary to the Middle East on May 5,

1981. As a part of the settlement which
Habib negotiated over the ensuing sum-
mer, the PLO agreed to cease using
southern Lebanon as a base for raids in-
to Israel while Israel agreed to a
ceasefire. Despite occasional breaches,
this ceasefire held until June 1982.

On June 6, 1982, Israeli forces again
crossed into Lebanon following the at-
tempted assassination of the Israeli Am-
bassador in the United Kingdom. Once
again, Israeli leaders stated that the
purpose of the operation was to clean
out terrorist bases in southern Lebanon.
The commander of UNIFIL ordered his
men not to resist the invasion. After the
Israeli advance pushed north of the
Litani River, UNIFIL forces remained
in position. On June 19, the Security
Council decided on another extension of
UNIFIL's mandate through August 19,

1982. On August 17, the UNIFIL man-
date was renewed for another 2 months,
until October 18. ■

e question of Palestine is the core of the
•ab-Israeli conflict and that no comprehen-
'6, just and lasting peace in the region will

achieved without the full exercise by the
ilestinian people of its inalienable national
jhts,

Reaffirming further that a just and com-
ehensive settlement of the situation in the

Middle East cannot be achieved without the
participation on an equal footing of all the
parties to the conflict, including the Palestine
Liberation Organization as the representative
of the Palestinian people,

1. Reaffirms the fundamental principle of
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter-
ritory by force;

2. Demands from all Member States and
other parties to observe strict respect for
Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity,
unity and political independence within its in-
ternationally recognized boundaries;

3. Decides to support fully the provisions
in Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and

ptember1982

19

509 (1982) with, inter alia, demand that:

(a) Israel withdraw all its military forces
forthwith and unconditionally to the interna-
tionally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

(b) All parties to the conflict cease im-
mediately and simultaneously all military ac-
tivities within Lebanon and across the
Lebanese-Israeli borders;

4. Cmdemns Israel for its non-
compliance with resolutions 508 (1982) and
509(1982);

5. Demands that Israel comply with all
the above provisions no later than 0600
hours, Beirut time, on Sunday 27 June 1982;

6. Calls upon the Security Council to
authorize the Secretary-General to undertake
necessary endeavours and practical steps to
implement the provisions of resolutions 508
(1982), 509 (1982) and 512 (1982);

7. Urges the Security Council, in the
event of continued failure by Israel to comply
with the demands contained in resolutions
508 (1982) and 509 (1982), to meet in order
to consider practical ways and means in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions;

8. Calls upon all States and international
agencies and organizations to continue to pro-
vide the most extensive humanitarian aid
possible to the victims of the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to
delegate a high-level commission to in-
vestigate and assess the extent of loss of
human life and material damage and to
report, as soon as possible, on the result of
this investigation to the General Assembly
and the Security Council;

10. Decides to adjourn the seventh
emergency special session temporarily and to
authorize the President of the latest regular
session of the (ieneral Assembly to resume
its meetings upon request from Member
States.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 513,
JULY 4, 1982'

The Security Council

Alarmed by the continued sufferings of
the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian popula-
tions in South Lebanon and in West Beirut,

Referring to the humanitarian principles
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the
obligations arising from the Regulations an-
nexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982),
509 (1982) and 512 (1982),

1. CaJ-ls for respect for the rights of the

civilian populations without any discrimina-
tion and repudiates all acts of violence
against those populations;

2. Calls further for the restoration of the
normal supply of vital facilities such as water,
electricity, food and medical provisions, par-
ticularly in Beirut;

3. Commends the efforts of the
Secretary-General and the action of interna-
tional agencies to alleviate the sufferings of
the civilian population and requests them to
continue their efforts to ensure their success.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 515.
JULY 29, 1982'"

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the situation of the
civilian population of Beirut,

Referring to the humanitarian principles
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the
obligations arising from the regulations an-
nexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

Recalling its resolutions 512 (1982) and
513 (1982),

1. Demands that the Government of
Israel lift immediately the blockade of the ci-
ty of Beirut in order to permit the dispatch
of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the
civilian population and allow the distribution
of aid provided by United Nations agencies
and by non-governmental organizations, par-
ticularly the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC);

2. Requests the Secretary-General to
transmit the text of this resolution to the
Government of Israel and keep the Security
Council informed of its implementation.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JULY 29, 1982^'

The United States is never indifferent to
the sufferings, insecurity, or depriva-
tions of human beings caught in war, oc-
cupation, or natural disasters. Certainly,
we have been deeply concerned with the
hardships visited on the people of
Lebanon during the ciurent conflict. The
Lebanese people, we know, have too
long suffered violence at the hands of
unwanted intruders, unwelcomed in-
vaders, and occupiers. The concern of
my government for the people of
Lebanon has been, and is being actively

expressed in the large contributions for
emergency humanitarian aid made by
my government, and by the appointment
of a special administrator for aid, and by
implementation of extensive, humani-
tarian aid programs in the region.

President Reagan has asked the
Congress to provide a total of some $65
million in humanitarian emergency aid
for the people of Lebanon. The Presi-
dent's special envoy, Ambassador Philip
Habib, has worked indefatigably in his
efforts to restore peace to Lebanon and
a degree of territorial integrity and
sovereignty that the government has no
enjoyed for too many years.

There is no room for doubt among
reasonable men and women, I believe,
about the commitment of the U.S.
(Government to the peace, independence ^
and sovereignty of Lebanon; indeed, for
our commitment to peace, national in-
dependence, and sovereignty of all na-
tions. Yet, we see serious problems with
the resolution proposed by my friend
and distinguished colleague, the
representative of the (^vernment of
Spain, for the following reasons:

First, because of inadequate time
either to gather or confirm the facts
about the situation in Beirut and the
problems of access;

Second, because of an inadequate
opportunity to consult with our govern-
ment; and

Third, because this resolution, we
believe, is lacking in a certain, serious
balance which would give it greater
weight.

It is surely, in the first instance, the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLC)
that imposes itself on the civilian popula
tion of Beirut. But, the resolution pro-
posed by my distinguished colleague
from Spain does not ask that that arme«
force abandon its occupation of Beirut
or desist in its military activities. It calls
only on Israel. Yet, everyone under-
stands that Israel seeks to affect sup-
plies to the PLC forces, not to the
civilian population of Beirut.

The United States welcomes the cor
cern of the Security Council and of the
humanitarian agencies of the United Na
tions for the suffering in Lebanon, as w

20

Department of State Bulletl

Feature
Lebanon

welcome the concern of this body for an
end to human suffering everywhere. But
we feel that a one-sided appeal in a two-
sided conflict suggests purposes that are
political as well as humanitarian, and we
cannot support these. Certainly, we can-
not support them on the basis of inade-
quate notice and inadequate information.
We call, therefore, upon the Council to
take the time necessary for more
careful, balanced consideration of this
most serious, wrenching problem. I ask
the suspension of this session to permit
consideration and consultation with our
governments.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 516,
AUG. 1, 198212

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982),
509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982) and 513
1982),

Recalling its resolution 515 (1982) of
!9 July 1982,

Alarmed by the continuation and inten-
sification of military activities in and around
Beirut,

Taking note of the latest massive viola-
ions of the cease-fire in and around Beirut,

1. Confirms its previous resolutions and
Bemands an immediate cease-fire, and a
tessation of all military activities within
^ebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli
)order;

2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to
leploy immediately on the request of the
government of Lebanon, United Nations
bservers to monitor the situation in and
iround Beirut;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to
eport back to the Council on compliance
vith this resolution as soon as possible and
•lot later than four hoiu-s from now.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 517,
AUG. 4, 198213

rhe Security Council,

Deeply shocked and alarmed by the
ieplorable consequences of the Israeli inva-
;ion of Beirut on 3 August 1982,

1. Reconfirms its resolutions 508 (1982),
i09 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982)
md 516 (1982);

2. Confirms once again its demand for an
immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Lebanon;

3. Censures Israel for its failure to com-
ply with the above resolutions;

4. Calls for the prompt return of Israeli
troops which have moved forward subsequent
to 1325 hours EDT on 1 August 1982;

5. Takes note of the decision of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to move
the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut;

6. Expresses its appreciation for the ef-
forts and steps taken by the Secretary-
General to implement the provisions of
Security Council resolution 516 (1982), and
authorizes him, as an immediate step, to in-
crease the number of United Nations
observers in and around Beirut;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Security CouncU on the im-
plementation of the present resolution as
soon as possible and not later than 1000
hours EDT on 5 August 1982;

8. Decides to meet at that time if
necessary in order to consider the report of
the Secretary-General and, in case of failure
to comply by any of the parties to the con-
flict, to consider adopting effective ways and
means in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 518,
AUG. 12, 19821^

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolutions 508 (1982), 509
(1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515
(1982), 516 (1982), 517 (1982),

Expressing its most serious concerns
about Israel's continued military activities in
Lebanon and particularly in and around
Beirut,

1. Demands that Israel and all parties to
the conflict observe strictly the terms of
Security Council resolutions relevant to the
immediate cessation of all military activities
within Lebanon and particularly in and
around Beirut;

2. Demands the immediate lifting of all
restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to
permit the free entry of supplies to meet the
urgent needs of the civilian population in
Beirut;

3. Requests the United Nations observers
in and in the vicinity of Beirut to report on
the situation;

4. Demands that Israel cooperate fully in
the effort to secure effective deployment of
the United Nations observers as requested by
the Government of Lebanon and in such a
manner as to insure their safety;

5. Requests the Secretary General to
report soonest on the implementation of the
present resolution to the Security Council;

6. Decides to meet if necessary in order
to consider the situation upon receipt of the
report of the Secretary General.

1 Adopted unanimously.

"U.S. vetoed; therefore the draft resolu-
tion was not adopted.

^USUN press release 43.

^Adopted by a vote of 13 for (U.S.), with
2 abstentions.

^USUN press release 45.

*USUN press release 46.

'USUN press release 48.

'USUN press release 49.

'Adopted by a vote of 127 for and 2
against (U.S.).

'"Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0. The U.S.
did not participate.

"USUN press release 59.

'^Adopted unanimously.

"Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1
abstention (U.S.).

"Adopted unanimously. ■

21

Maintaining a Cease-Fire in Lebanon

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 2, 19821

The President met with Israeli Foreign
Minister Shamir this morning. The focus
of the discussion was Lebanon. The
President reaffirmed his support for
Ambassador Habib and his mission,
which is based on the policies, expecta-
tions, and hopes of the Government of
Lebanon. The President emphasized that
an early diplomatic settlement of the
current problem of west Beirut is the
essential first step in ending the trauma
of Lebanon, beginning the process for a
better future for this ravaged country,
and moving on to the broader peace
process. The President stressed the need
for a complete end by all parties to the
hostilities in and around Beirut as a
prerequisite to allow Ambassador Habib
to pursue his urgent work. The world
can no longer accept a situation of con-
stantly escalating violence. The Presi-
dent highlighted the humanitarian needs
of the large civilian population of west
Beirut, with emphasis on the need to
maintain essential services and to assure
adequate supplies of food and medicines.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
AUG. 4, 19822

Last night, Israeli forces moved forward
on several fronts from their ceasefire
lines around Beirut. These movements
were accompanied by heavy Israeli shell-
ing and came only a day after I had
made clear to the Israeli Government, in
my meeting with Foreign Minister
[Yitzhak] Shamir, that the United States
placed great importance on the sus-
tained maintenance of a ceasefire in
place — to avoid further civilian
casualties and to secure the prompt
withdrawal of the PLO forces in Beirut.

This is a necessary first step toward
our goal of restoring the authority of the
Government of Lebanon, a goal Am-
bassador Habib [PhUip C. Habib, the
President's special emissary to the Mid-
dle East] is earnestly working toward
with full cooperation of the Lebanese
Government.

Through governments which have
direct contact with the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization], I have ex-
pressed my strong conviction that the
PLO must not delay further its with-
drawal from Lebanon. At the same time,
I have expressed to the Israel Govern-
ment the absolute necessity of
reestablishing and maintaining a strict
ceasefire in place so that this matter can
be promptly resolved.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 10, 1982^

We welcome the Israeli assessment as
an essential element in getting the prob-
lem solved in Beirut. We are encouraged
that the momentimi of the peace process
continues to build. Ambassador Habib is
in Israel, having left Beirut early this
morning, where he will discuss with
Israeli officials the several amendments
that the Israeli Government has sug-
gested as a result of their Cabinet
meeting, as well as other issues in the
peace process.

We remain cautiously optimistic that
the outstanding issues can be worked
out. We are hopeful that there can be
rapid movement toward the implementa-
tion of the full peace plan. It is our
belief that negotiations can best move
forward when a cease-fire is carefully
observed by all parties.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 12, 1982*

The President was shocked this morning
when he learned of the new heavy
Israeli bombardment of west Beirut. As
a result, the President telephoned Prime
Minister Begin concerning the most re-
cent bombing and shelling in Beirut.

The President expressed his outrage
over this latest round of massive
military action. He emphasized that
Israel's action halted Ambassador
Habib's negotiations for the peaceful
resolution of the Beirut crisis when they
were at the point of success. The result
has been more needless destruction and
bloodshed.

The President made it clear that it is
imperative that the cease-fire in place be
observed absolutely in order for negotia-
tions to proceed. We understand the
Israeli cabinet has approved a new
cease-fire, which is in effect. It must
hold.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 9, 1982.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 9, 1982.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 16, 1982.

*Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 16, 1982.

22

Department of State Bulletii

THE PRESIDENT

A New Opportunity for Peace
in the IVIiddle East

Following is President Reagan's ad-
dress to the nation, broadcast from Bur-
bank, California, on September 1 , 1982.^

My fellow Americans, today has been a
day that should make us proud. It
marked the end of the successful evacua-
tion of the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) from Beirut, Lebanon. This
peaceful step could never have been
taken without the good offices of the
United States and, especially, the truly
heroic work of a great American diplo-
mat, Ambassador Philip Habib [Presi-
dent's special emissary to the Middle
East]. Thanks to his efforts, I am happy
to announce that the U.S. Marine con-
tingent helping to supervise the evacua-
tion has accomplished its mission. Our
young men should be out of Lebanon
within 2 weeks. They, too, have served
the cause of peace with distinction, and
we can all be very proud of them.

But the situation in Lebanon is only
part of the overall problem of conflict in
the Middle East. So, over the past 2
weeks, while events in Beirut dominated
the front page, America was engaged in
a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to lay
the groundwork for a broader peace in
the region. For once, there were no
premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic mis-
sions traveled to Mid-East capitals, and
I met here at home with a wide range of
experts to map out t n American peace
initiative for the long-suffering peoples
of the Middle East, Arab and Israeli
alike.

It seemed to me that, with the
agreement in Lebanon, we had an op-
portunity for a more far-reaching peace
effort in the region, and I was deter-
mined to seize that moment. In the
words of the scripture, the time had
come to "follow after the things which
make for peace."

U.S. Involvement

Tonight, I want to report to you on the
steps we have taken and the prospects
they can open up for a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East. America has

long been committed to bringing peace
to this troubled region. For more than a
generation, successive U.S. administra-
tions have endeavored to develop a fair
and workable process that could lead to
a true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace.
Our involvement in the search for Mid-
East peace is not a matter of prefer-
ence, it is a moral imperative. The stra-
tegic importance of the region to the
United States is well known.

But our policy is motivated by more
than strategic interests. We also have an
irreversible commitment to the survival
and territorial integrity of friendly
states. Nor can we ignore the fact that
the well-being of much of the world's
economy is tied to stability in the strife-
torn Middle East. Finally, our tradi-
tional humanitarian concerns dictate a
continuing effort to peacefully resolve
conflicts.

When our Administration assumed
office in January 1981, I decided that the
general framework for our Middle East
policy should follow the broad guidelines
laid down by my predecessors. There
were two basic issues we had to address.
First, there was the strategic threat to
the region posed by the Soviet Union
and its surrogates, best demonstrated by
the brutal war in Afghanistan; and, sec-
ond, the peace process between Israel
and its Arab neighbors. With regard to
the Soviet threat, we have strengthened
our efforts to develop with our friends
and allies a joint policy to deter the
Soviets and their surrogates from fur-
ther expansion in the region and, if
necessary, to defend against it. With
respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we
have embraced the Camp David frame-
w'ork as the only way to proceed. We
have also recognized, however, that solv-
ing the Arab-Israeli conflict, in and of
itself, cannot assure peace throughout a
region as vast and troubled as the Mid-
dle East.

Our first objective under the Camp
David process was to insure the suc-
cessful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty. This was achieved with
the peaceful return of the Sinai to Egypt

in April 1982. To accomplish this, we
worked hard with our Egyptian and
Israeli friends, and eventually with other
friendly countries, to create the multi-
national force which now operates in the
Sinai.

Throughout this period of difficult
and time-consuming negotiations, we
never lost sight of the next step of
Camp David: autonomy talks to pave the
way for permitting the Palestinian peo-
ple to exercise their legitimate rights.
However, owing to the tragic assassina-
tion of President Sadat and other crises
in the area, it was not until January
1982 that we were able to make a major
effort to renew these talks. Secretary of
State Haig and Ambassador Fairbanks
[Richard Fairbanks, Special Negotiator
for the Middle East Peace Process]
made three visits to Israel and Egypt
early this year to pursue the autonomy
talks. Considerable progress was made
in developing the basic outline of an
American approach which was to be
presented to Egypt and Israel after
April.

The successful completion of Israel's
withdrawal from Sinai and the courage
shown on this occasion by Prime
Minister Begin and President Mubarak
in living up to their agreements con-
vinced me the time had come for a new
American policy to try to bridge the re-
maining differences between Egypt and
Israel on the autonomy process. So, in
May, I called for specific measures and a
timetable for consultations with the
Governments of Egypt and Israel on the
next steps in the peace process. How-
ever, before this effort could be
launched, the conflict in Lebanon pre-
empted our efforts. The autonomy talks
were basically put on hold while we
sought to untangle the parties in
Lebanon and still the guns of war.

The Lebanon war, tragic as it was,
has left us with a new opportunity for
Middle East peace. We must seize it
now and bring peace to this troubled
area so vital to world stability while
there is still time. It was with this
strong conviction that over a month ago,
before the present negotiations in Beirut
had been completed, I directed Secre-
tary of State Shultz to again review our
policy and to consult a wide range of

September 1982

23

THE PRESIDENT

outstanding Americans on the best ways
to strengthen chances for peace in the
Middle East. We have consulted with
many of the officials who were historical-
ly involved in the process, with Members
of the Congress, and with individuals
from the private sector; and I have held
extensive consultations with my own ad-
visers on the principles I will outline to
you tonight.

The evacuation of the PLO from
Beirut is now complete. And we can
now help the Lebanese to rebuild their
war-torn country. We owe it to our-
selves, and to posterity, to move quickly
to build upon this achievement. A stable
and revived Lebanon is essential to all
our hopes for peace in the region. The
people of Lebanon deserve the best
efforts of the international community to
turn the nightmares of the past several
years into a new dawn of hope.

Resolving the Root Causes of Conflict

But the opportunities for peace in the
Middle East do not begin and end in
Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild,
we must also move to resolve the root
causes of conflict between Arabs and
Israelis. The war in Lebanon has demon-
strated many things, but two conse-
quences are key to the peace process:

First, the military losses of the PLO
have not diminished the yearning of the
Palestinian people for a just solution of
their claims; and

Second, while Israel's military suc-
cesses in Lebanon have demonstrated
that its armed forces are second to none
in the region, they alone cannot bring
just and lasting peace to Israel and her
neighbors.

The question now is how to reconcile
Israel's legitimate security concerns with
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.
And that answer can only come at the
negotiating table. Each party must
recognize that the outcome must be ac-
ceptable to all and that true peace will
require compromises by all.

So, tonight I am calling for a fresh
start. This is the moment for all those
directly concerned to get involved— or
lend their support— to a workable basis
for peace. The Camp David agreement

remains the foundation of our policy. Its
language provides all parties with the
leeway they need for successful negotia-
tions.

• I call on Israel to make clear that
the security for which she yearns can
only be achieved through genuine peace,
a peace requiring magnanimity, vision,
and courage.

• I call on the Palestinian people to
recognize that their own political aspira-
tions are inextricably bound to recogni-
tion of Israel's right to a secure future.

• And I call on the Arab states to
accept the reality of Israel and the reali-
ty that peace and justice are to be
gained only through hard, fair, direct
negotiation.

In making these calls upon others, I
recognize that the United States has a
special responsibility. No other nation is
in a position to deal with the key parties
to the conflict on the basis of trust and
reliability.

The time has come for a new realism
on the part of all the peoples of the Mid-
dle East. The State of Israel is an ac-
complished fact; it deserves unchal-
lenged legitimacy within the community
of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has
thus far been recognized by too few
countries and has been denied by every
Arab state except Egypt. Israel exists; it
has a right to exist in peace behind
secure and defensible borders; and it has
a right to demand of its neighbors that
they recognize those facts.

I have personally followed and sup-
ported Israel's heroic struggle for sur-
vival ever since the founding of the
State of Israel 34 years ago. In the
pre-1967 borders, Israel was barely 10
miles wide at its narrowest point. The
bulk of Israel's population lived within
artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I
am not about to ask Israel to live that
way again.

The war in Lebanon has
demonstrated another reality in the
region. The departure of the Pales-
tinians from Beirut dramatizes more
than ever the homelessness of the Pales-
tinian people. Palestinians feel strongly
that their cause is more than a question
of refugees. I agree. The Camp David
agreement recognized that fact when it
spoke of the legitimate rights of the

Palestinian people and their just re-
quirements. For peace to endure, it
must involve all those who have been
most deeply affected by the conflict.
Only through broader participation in
the peace process— most immediately by
Jordan and by the Palestinians— will
Israel be able to rest confident in the
knowledge that its security and integrity
will be respected by its neighbors. Only
through the process of negotiation can
all the nations of the Middle East
achieve a secure peace.

New Proposals

These then are our general goals. What
are the specific new American positions,
and why are we taking them?

In the Camp David talks thus far,
both Israel and Egypt have felt free to
express openly their views as to what
the outcome should be. Understandably,
their views have differed on many
points.

The United States has thus far
sought to play the role of mediator; we
have avoided public comment on the key
issues. We have always recognized— and
continue to recognize— that only the
voluntary agreement of those parties
most directly involved in the conflict can
provide an enduring solution. But it has
become evident to me that some clearer
sense of America's position on the key
issues is necessary to encourage wider
support for the peace process.

First, as outlined in the Camp David
accords, there must be a period of time
during which the Palestinian inhabitants
of the West "Bank and Gaza will have
full autonomy over their own affairs.
Due consideration must be given to the
principle of self-government by the in-
habitants of the territories and to the
legitimate security concerns of the par-
ties involved.

The purpose of the 5-year period of
transition, which would begin after free
elections for a self-governing Palestinian
authority, is to prove to the Palestinians
that they can run their own affairs and
that such Palestinian autonomy poses no
threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support
the use of any additional land for the
purpose of settlements during the transi-
tion period. Indeed, the immediate adop-
tion of a settlement freeze by Israel,

24

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

more than any other action, could create
the confidence needed for wider par-
ticipation in these talks. Further settle-
ment activity is in no way necessary for
the security of Israel and only
diminishes the confidence of the Arabs
that a final outcome can be freely and
fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American posi-
tion well understood: The purpose of
this transition period is the peaceful and
orderly transfer of authority from Israel
to the Palestinian inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza. At the same time,
such a transfer must not interfere with
Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we
look to the future of the West Bank and
Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot
be achieved by the formation of an in-
dependent Palestinian state in those ter-
ritories. Nor is it achievable on the basis
of Israeli sovereignty or permanent con-
trol over the West Bank and Gaza.

So the United States will not sup-
port the establishment of an indepen-
dent Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza, and we will not support an-
nexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to
peace. The final status of these lands
must, of course, be reached through the
give-and-take of negotiations. But it is
the firm view of the United States that
self-government by the Palestinians of
the West Bank and Gaza in association
with Jordan offers the best chance for a
durable, just and lasting peace.

We base our approach squarely on
the principle that the Arab-Israeli con-
flict should be resolved through nego-
tiations involving an exchange of ter-
ritory for peace. This exchange is en-
shrined in U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, which is, in turn, incorporated
in all its parts in the Camp David agree-
ments. U.N. Resolution 242 remains
wholly valid as the foundation stone of
America's Middle East peace effort.

It is the United States' position
that— in return for peace— the with-
drawal provision of Resolution 242 ap-
plies to all fronts, including the West
Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated be-
tween Jordan and Israel, our view on
the extent to which Israel should be
asked to give up territory will be heavily
affected by the extent of true peace and
normalization and the security ar-
rangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that
Jerusalem must remain undivided, but
its final status should be decided
through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to
come, the United States will support
positions that seem to us fair and
reasonable compromises and likely to
promote a sound agreement. We will
also put forward our own detailed pro-
posals when we believe they can be
helpful. And, make no mistake, the
United States will oppose any pro-
posal—from any party and at any point
in the negotiating process— that
threatens the security of Israf 1. Ameri-
ca's commitment to the security of Israel
is ironclad. And, I might add, so is mine.

U.S. Commitment to Peace

During the past few days, our ambassa-
dors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia have presented to their host gov-
ernments the proposals in full detail that
I have outlined here today. Now I am
convinced that these proposals can bring
justice, bring security, and bring
durability to an Arab-Israeli peace. The
United States will stand by these prin-
ciples with total dedication. They are ful-
ly consistent with Israel's security re-
quirements and the aspirations of the
Palestinians. We will work hard to
broaden participation at the peace table
as envisaged by the Camp David ac-
cords. And I fervently hope that the
Palestinians and Jordan, with the sup-
port of their Arab colleagues, v^dll accept
this opportunity.

Tragic turmoil in the Middle East
runs back to the dawn of history. In our
modern day, conflict after conflict has
taken its brutal toll there. In an age of
nuclear challenge and economic in-
terdependence, such conflicts are a
threat to all the people of the world, not
just the Middle East itself. It is time for
us all— in the Middle East and around
the world— to call a halt to conflict,
hatred, and prejudice; it is time for us
all to launch a common effort for
reconstruction, peace, and progress.

It has often been said— and regret-
tably too often been true— that the story
of the search for peace and justice in the
Middle East is a tragedy of oppor-
tunities missed. In the aftermath of the
settlement in Lebanon we now face an
opportunity for a broader peace. This
time we must not let it slip from our
grasp. We must look beyond the dif-
ficulties and obstacles of the present and
move with fairness and resolve toward a
brighter future. We owe it to our-
selves—and to posterity— to do no less.
For if we miss this chance to make a
fresh start, we may look back on this
moment from some later vantage point
and realize how much that failure cost
us all.

These, then, are the principles upon
which American policy toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict will be based. I have
made a personal commitment to see that
they endure and, God willing, that they
will come to be seen by all reasonable,
compassionate people as fair, achievable,
and in the interests of all who wish to
see peace in the Middle East.

Tonight, on the eve of what can be a
dawning of new hope for the people of
the troubled Middle East— and for all
the world's people who dream of a just
and peaceful future— I ask you, my
fellow Americans, for your support and
your prayers in this great undertaking.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 6, 1982.

I

eptember 1982

25

THE PRESIDENT

}

News Conference of July 28
(Excerpts)

Q. Chancellor Schmidt [German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt] says that
the allies— Western allies— are united
against your ban on equipment for the
Siberian pipeline, and they're going
ahead with it anyway. Since you seem
to be about to make a new deal with
the Soviets on grain and want to con-
tinue that, what do you think is hap-
pening to the allied relationship, and
do you have any second thoughts
about the pipeline?

A. No, no second thoughts. I know
that we— we discussed this at great
length in both the [economic] summit
and NATO meetings when I was in
Europe with them. We know their posi-
tion. We know that several of their— or
some of their governments insist that
contracts had been made before the
Polish situation and that, therefore, they
felt obligated to go forward with them.

In December, we announced that,
from our standpoint, this would be one
of the steps that we would take because
of what we think is Soviet pressure
causing this repressive government in
Poland and the actions that have taken
place there.

We have made it clear that there are
things that if the military government
should soften and go away, if the
military government should release all of
the people, including Lech Walesa, if
they should reopen conversations with
Solidarity, we'd be very happy to review
our position with regard to the pipeUne.
You mentioned grain in connection
with that. Let me point out that there
are a couple of very important dif-
ferences in the two situations. We re-
fused to enter into negotiations for the
renewal of a long-term grain compact
with the Soviet Union because of the
Polish situation. We continued simply on
a year-to-year basis selling it. But the
differences that I mentioned are that,
first the technology for the pipeline is
mainly only obtainable from the United
States. Grain, the Soviet Union can get
in other places, if they want it. So, we
wouldn't be achieving very much if we
had used that as it was used back a cou-
ple of years ago by the previous admini-
stration with regard to the Afghanistan
invasion. It didn't hurt the Soviet Union,
but it was a terrible economic blow to
our farmers. The other element is that
grain will result in the Soviet Union hav

OR

ing to pay out hard cash, and they're not
too flush with that right now.

The pipeline, when finished, will
result in the Soviet Union getting hard
cash, which it does not now have and
which it can then use to further build up
its military might. Now, we think that
these are two very important differences
with regard to both of these, and we will
very shortly be announcing our position
with regard to grain, in case that might
be—

Q. What about the allies' relation-
ship, though?

A. Yes. Let me say also that that
same Helmut Schmidt has made a re-
mark even on his visit back here that in-
dicates that— just what I feel. When I
say we have a better relationship, we
do. This is kind of like a fight inside a
family, but the family is still a family.
We know that we're bound together in a
great many ways. And in these— the re-
cent European trip— we solidified agree-
ments having to do with protectionism,
having to do with curbing low-interest
loans to the Soviet Union that were
literally subsidizing their ability to con-
tinue their military buildup, and so
forth. No, I feel that we do have a fine
relationship. We know, and we came
home knowing, that there was disagree-
ment on this particular thing.

Q. I would like to stay with
foreign policy but turn to the Middle
East. I wondered what effect you
believe the constant, day-after-day
bombing by the Israelis and shelling
by the Israelis in Beirut is having on
your efforts and your special envoy
Mr. Habib's [Ambassador Philip C.
Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East] efforts
to try to bring some kind of a settle-
ment? And. secondly, Mr. Habib has
been there nearly 7 weeks. Can you
give us some idea what progress, if
any, he is making?

A. There is nothing we would like
more than to see an end to the blood-
shed and the shelling. But I must re-
mind you it has also been two-way. The
FLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]
has been, and in some instances, has
been the first to break the cease-fire.
That we would like to see ended, of
course. And we still stay with our
original purpose— that we want the ex-
odus of the armed PLO out of Beirut

and out of Lebanon. Mr. Habib has been
making a tour of countries to see if we
can get some help in temporary staging
areas for those people. We want the cen-
tral government of Lebanon to once
again— after several years of almost
dissolution— to once again be the
authority with a military force, not
several militias belonging to various fac-
tions in Lebanon. Then we want the
foreign forces, Israeli and Syrian both,
out of Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib has been doing a
magnificent job. I don't comment on
specifics because I know how sensitive
these negotiations are, and sometimes
you lose some ground that you think you
gained; sometimes you gain again. I still
remain optimistic that the solution is go-
ing to be found.

As I say, he has returned from that
trip to other countries, some of the
other Arab states and to Tel Aviv. Con-
trary to some reports or rumors today,
there are no deadlines that have been
set of any kind. There is an unsubstan-
tiated report now that another cease-fire
has gone into effect. Let's hope it will
hold. He continues to believe it is worth-
while to continue the negotiations, and I
think he's entitled to our support.

Q. You said that you wanted the
bombing stopped, if I understood you
correctly. Have you conveyed your
feelings to Prime Minister [Menahem]
Begin?

A. What I should say is: We want
the bloodshed and the conflict to stop. I
hesitate to say anything further about
where we are in those on who might be
providing the stumbhng block, now, to
the steps that I just outlined that are
necessary to bring peace there. So I
can't go beyond that except to say that
unless and until Ambassador Habib tells
me that there is nothing more to be
negotiated and that he can't solve it, I'n
going to continue to be optimistic.

Q. A question concerning a
member of your Cabinet, Secretary [ol
the Interior James] Watt. You recentl
had to disavow some comments by bin
when he suggested that U.S. support
for Israel might be curtailed if
American Jews do not support your
energy policy. Mr. Watt, in a letter to
Congress, suggests that American
troops might have to fight in the Mid-
dle East if there is any interference
with the vast new offshore oil drill-
ing. Is Secretary Watt reflecting your
views? Is he reflecting the foreign
policy of the Administration? Or, as
Senator [Daniel P. of New York]

Department of State Bulletli

THE PRESIDENT

Moynihan suggests, has he embar-
rassed your Administration and is
someone who should be fired?

A. No, he should not be fired. As I
say, the whole context of his letter and
the opening statement you made from
that letter, or paraphrasing of it, was
the result of a conversation with Am-
bassador Arens, a lengthy discussion of
this subject at a social gathering the
night before. As many of us do, you go
home and you think of a couple of points
you haven't made, and he made them.
What he was suggesting, with regard to
the danger to Israel, was our vulnerabili-
ty as long as we are dependent on oil
energy from insecure sources; that if
there should be, as we once had, an em-
bargo, we should find ourselves without
the energy needed to turn the wheels in
this country, the wheels of industry. We
wouldn't be much of an ally to our
friends, and that would certainly include
Israel. He was making it very plain that
we are morally obligated to the support
of Israel.

Today, he made a speech to a group
in New York; I believe it was B'nai
B'rith. I understand that in outlining his
whole position and where he stands, that
this audience was most enthusiastic and
supportive of what he had to say. His
letter to the Congressmen — I think he
was only trying to make the example
that some of those who had been the
most outspoken up there have also been
the — had the most objections to us try-
ing to improve our energy situation.
What he was pointing out is — where
would the Western world be if someday
our source of supply was purely there in
the Persian Gulf and it was denied to us.
So, this was his dramatic statement
about the other. But I think he's also ex-
pressed the wish that he had second
thoughts.

Q. What role do you envision for
mainland China in American strategic
planning in East Asia and along the
Soviet border, and what are your
plans for arms sales to Taiwan?

A. We want to continue developing
the relationship that was started some
years ago by President [Richard] Nixon
with the People's Republic of China. But
at the same time, they know very well
our position, and it has not changed. We
are not going to abandon our long time
friends and allies on Taiwan, and I'm go-
ing to carry out the terms of the Taiwan
Relations Act. This has been made clear.
We have no secret agreements of any
other kind or anything that should cause
the government or the people of Taiwan
to have any concern about that. It is a
moral obligation that we'll keep.

Q. Earlier this year there was a
good deal of discussion about a possi-
ble summit with Mr. [Leonid]
Brezhnev. On one occasion you said it
was, "in the works." Now, this issue
seems to have faded, and I wondered
what you anticipate in the way of a
summit this year?

A. I don't know whether it's going
to be this year or next or at all. That's
going to depend on— it takes two to
tango. I had suggested— with the belief
that he was possibly coming to the U.N.
meeting, as you know — that while he
was here that we have a meeting just as
I had with some of the other Heads of
State who were here. It developed he
wasn't coming. And this led to the talk
of a possible summit.

A summit isn't the answer or the
cure for everything that's wrong in the
world. But it has to be carefully
planned. An agenda has to be set and
that begins with foreign ministers
meeting. When I say that it's in the
works, I can only tell you that our State
Department has been communicating
with the Soviet Union with regard to
this. There have been no positive replies
or steps. Indication of interest is all. We
continue, and if at such time we know
that there is an agenda — and there is a
real purpose in having this — we'll have a
summit.

Q. As you've said before and as
your spokesmen have been saying, the
FLO Chief [Yasir] Arafat has not yet
met the conditions that the U.S.
Government has set for direct talks
with you. However, do you think that
Mr. Arafat is moving in that direc-
tion? And would you welcome such a
development?

A. I think it would be a step for-
ward in progress if the PLO would
change the position it has had; that is,
that Israel must be destroyed or that it
has no right to exist as a nation. What
that would require is agreeing to abide
by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, agree-
ing that Israel is a nation and does have
a right to exist. Then I would feel that
the United States could enter into
discussions with the PLO. I'm not speak-
ing for Israel. That's up to them, and we
could not speak for them. But we're
there as an intermediary offering our
services to try and help bring about
peace in the Middle East.

Q. Would you also, then, support
an independent Palestinian state,
which is what the PLO wants?

A. That, again, I think is up to the
negotiators. We wouldn't impose
anything on them, but Egypt and
Israel — under the Camp David agree-
ment— are supposed to enter into now
an area of talking of autonomy for the
Palestinians. That, again, is something
that has been delayed because of this
tragedy in Lebanon. I think that is up to
them as to how that autonomy develops
and what they see as a proper solution
to the Palestinian problem.

Q. Critics have said that there is
no progress on human rights in El
Salvador nor progress on land reform.
The government there has yet to
cooperate in the investigation of the
four American missionaries who were
killed there. Can you explain why you
decided to go ahead with the certifica-
tion, the approval for continued
military aid to El Salvador, and why
people should not think you're sending
the wrong message to the right-wing
forces there?

A. The State Department issued the
certification, and in the next few days,
they will be having witnesses, observers,
who will be testifying as to why they
certified that the Salvadoran Govern-
ment is making progress in improving
the human rights situation there.

I grant you that things — I'm quite
sure that there are unfortunate things
that are going on and that are happen-
ing. The idea is, are they legitimately
and in good faith making progress in
trying to solve that — resolve that?
That's what the testimony vnll be, that
they are.

With regard to land reform, yes,
there was a flurry when the new govern-
ment first took over. But I, again, would
like to call your attention to the great
turnaround and the exposure of what
has been disinformation and outright
false propaganda for so long about El
Salvador and the fight down there. That
was exposed in the turnout of people,
who in the face of guerrilla ambushes,
guerrilla threats against their lives,
went to the polls to vote for order in
government. I said there was a flurry
about land reform. I understand that
that has turned around, that there are
thousands of people who have been
given the deeds to their plots of land
now, and that there are several hundred
pending.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Aug. 2, 1982. ■

September 1982

27

THE SECRETARY

U.S. Approach to Problems
in the Caribbean Basin

Secretary Shultz's statement before
the Senate Finance Committee on August
2, 1982.^

We all know we live in a troubled world.
We also know that the United States as
a great nation must face up to these
troubles and do its part to try to resolve
them. I am here to testify today about
an innovative and creative program
which this Administration is proposing
to address the problems of our im-
mediate neighbors to the south — the
Caribbean Basin.

The security and well-being of the
countries of the Caribbean and Central
America are vital to the United States
and to the Western Hemisphere as a
whole. Their crisis today is many sided
and involves both emergency and long-
term problems. Our response is com-
prehensive and integrated with regard
to the problems and needs of individual
countries and also with regard to the
contributions they and their other
neighbors — Canada, Colombia, Mexico,
and Venezuela — can make to resolve
their problems. The President's Carib-
bean Basin initiative is an outstanding
example of the steadiness and serious-
ness with which we view our relations
with the other countries of the
Americas.

Urgent Need for the Initiative

When I learned of the President's in-
itiative, I was in the private sector. At
the time, I thought it was the right
medicine. Since then I have seen that
the problems are even more severe than
I imagined. The program is not just
good medicine; it is vital.

We are talking about an area which
is of crucial and immediate concern to
our own self-interest. You need only
glance at a map to see that it is indeed
our third border. If this area should be
dominated by regimes hostile to us or if
it becomes the scene of prolonged social
upheavals, the impact on our own
economy and society would, indeed, be
of major proportions. Let me give just a
few examples of how closely we are
linked with the basin countries.

First, the sea lanes of the Carib-
bean are a lifeline of our trade — one-half
of all our imports and exports pass
through this region, including three-
quarters of our oil imports.

Second, many of our people have

roots in the area. One out of five people
alive today who were born in Barbados
live in the United States; the same is
true for one out of six Jamaicans, and
one out of ten Salvadorans.

Third, given proximity and existing
ties, the United States is a natural
safehaven for those fleeing social and
economic pressures in the basin. These
pressures create illegal immigration,
itself a great problem for us. The basin
area is now the second largest place of
origin of illegal immigration.

Fourth, the Caribbean is now a $7
billion market.

Clearly then, we have an enormous
stake in helping our neighbors achieve
economic and political stability.

When President Reagan announced
this program on February 24 before the
Organization of American States, and
when he transmitted this legislation to
the Congress on March 17, he stressed
that there is an economic crisis in the
Caribbean Basin that threatened our
own well-being and the peace and pros-
perity of the whole hemisphere. That
crisis has not gone away. In fact, it has
deepened. These small countries to our
south are acutely vulnerable to
developments in the world economy.
Over the last few years they have seen
dramatic reversals in their terms of
trade, as their oil and other imports
have increased in price and their tradi-
tional exports have fallen in price. The
worldwide slowdown in economic growth
has choked off opportunities for develop-
ing new types of exports to the world
market, as well as cut into tourism
which has been an important source of
foreign exchange for them.

As a result they are not able to earn
enough foreign exchange to pay for the
imports they need. The productive base
in these countries, already inadequate to
provide the jobs and products which
their populations need, is being eroded
by acute shortages of spare parts and by
the lack of raw materials and agricul-
tural inputs. The result is a rise in
unemployment and underemployment
which is of truly major propor-
tions— 25% to 40% in many countries.
Added to the evils of inflation, spiraling
foreign debt, and major balance-of-
payments problems, it amounts to an
almost classic recipe for social discon-
tent and loss of confidence in the future.

This is the kind of environment upon

which the extreme and violent minorities
on both sides of the political spectrum
can feed and produce major political and
social upheavals. It is an extraordinary
tribute to the strength of democratic
and humane traditions in the region that
the vast majority of countries in the
area are governed by democratically
elected governments. In the last 5
months, since the time that the Presi-
dent announced the program on
February 24, elections have been held
and new democratic governments chosen
in six countries. Many of the countries
in this region have strong new leader-
ship which is committed to adjusting the
structure of their economies to reflect
the hard new economic realities which
they face. The Caribbean Basin initiative
is aimed at helping these countries to
implement the painful but unavoidable
reforms which can reverse the deteriora-
tion and lead to self-sustaining growth.
Its purpose is to help restore the faith of
their peoples in their countries' ability to
provide them with a better future.

Integration of Economic Programs

The program which the Administration
has proposed to the Congress for the
Caribbean Basin addresses the enormous
economic problems in the area in a com-
prehensive way. It is an innovative pro-
gram in several ways.

First, it integrates three types of
economic programs — trade oppor-
tunities, investment incentives, and aid.
Each of these elements provides signifi-
cant benefits. Even more importantly,
each element reinforces the other. The
emergency financial assistance will help
countries cope with their short-term
balance-of-payments and liquidity prob-
lems. The one-way free trade area and
the investment tax credit will give long-
term incentives for new investment to
promote self-sustaining growth. The pro-
gram as a whole is greater than the sum
of its parts. We need to maintain the in-
tegrity of each element to insure the ef-
fectiveness of the program as a whole.

Second, this program is part of a
major multilateral effort, particularly by
Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and
Venezuela. These four countries have
already implemented improved pro-
grams of financial and technical
assistance, as well as expanded new
trade opportunities to the countries of
this region. Their effort is impressive. It
is particularly impressive since three of
these countries are still developing coun-
tries themselves. Their effort is based on
the perception— which we all share-

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

that we cannot ignore the events in our
neighborhood and that— to insure our
own long-term prosperity and stabihty—
we must assist our neighbors to achieve
the same goals themselves.

Third, this program was developed
out of a continuing process of consulta-
tions with the countries in the region. It
reflects their own priorities and assess-
ments of their particular needs, as well
as their own efforts and programs. It is
thus very much a cooperative program
and not a unilateral plan imposed by
Washington.

The program was also developed in
close cooperation with Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands and includes impor-
tant features to assure that the ter-
ritories share fully in the renewed
economic growth in the region. For this
reason I am deeply concerned about the
potential impact on the territories of the
curtailment of tax benefits recently
adopted by this committee.

Trade and Investment Provisions

Let me spend just a few minutes on the
trade and investment provisions in the
legislation since these aspects are of par-
ticular interest to the committee. We
already provide liberal entry into our
market for much of the trade from basin
countries. But there are several impor-
tant limitations. First, some of the
duties which remain in place are in sec-
tors of special interest to the basin coun-
tries. And in other cases the duties
which remain in place limit expansion in-
to new and nontraditional export prod-
ucts. Second, a large part of the basin's
present duty-free entry into our market
comes from the generalized system of
preferences (GSP). However, the GSP
has ceilings on duty-free benefits, as
well as product exclusions; these were
established in the program largely for
global reasons that are not relevant to
the Caribbean Basin. These limitations,
and the whole complex structure of the
GSP, limits the ability of small and
relatively inexperienced traders— which
is often the case for the Caribbean
Basin— to take advantage of the GSP
opportunities.

The Administration's proposal asks
for duty-free treatment for all products
from the basin except textiles and ap-
parel. The proposal includes safeguards
to provide relief to any U.S. industry
seriously injured by increased basin im-
ports. There are also provisions to pro-
tect the U.S. domestic sugar price sup-
port program where necessary. The pro-
posal also includes a requirement for
minimum local content to insure that the
free trade area does not encourage mere

"pass-through" operations involving little
value added in the basin countries.

This proposal is a carefully balanced
package which provides major benefits
to the Caribbean Basin countries but
also safeguards essential U.S. economic
interests. It is dramatic and simple.
While the economic benefits of the free-
trade area are long term, the offer of an
unimpeded U.S. market to those small
nations is a major political commitment
with immediate impact. It will strongly
encourage sound internal economic
policies in order to take full advantage
of this offer. This proposal relies on the
market and not on artificial incentives.
It eliminates duty barriers to our
market, and thus it allows the enormous
size of the U.S. market in itself to pro-
vide enormous and continuing incentives
for investment, innovation, and risk tak-
ing in the Caribbean Basin.

The Administration is also proposing
extension of the domestic tax credit to
the Caribbean Basin. U.S. investors
would receive a credit up to 10% of the
amount of new fixed asset investment in
the basin countries. The system would
operate in much the same fashion as
does the credit granted domestically. We
would grant this benefit for a 5-year
period to countries which enter into ex-
ecutive agreements with the United
States for tax administration purposes.

This incentive, particularly when
combined with the free-trade proposal,
should have an important impact on
U.S. investors' perceptions about the
Caribbean Basin. In some cases the risks
of investment in the basin have been
perceived as high, especially when
coupled with the startup costs of devel-
oping new markets and marketing chan-
nels, training new local employees and
managers, and overcoming transporta-
tion bottlenecks. The tax incentive
promises a better return to U.S.
business which undertakes investment in
the basin and thus should increase in-
vestment there.

I know that there is some concern
that these proposals will damage produc-
tion and employment opportunities in
the United States. I can understand that
concern, particularly given the period of
slow economic growth and budget
austerity through which we are passing
at present. But I believe these concerns
are exaggerated. First, we are such a
big economy compared to those of the
Caribbean Basin that what looms large
in the basin will still have a small impact
here. The combined gross national prod-
uct (GNP) of all of the Caribbean Basin
countries amounts to less than 2% of
our GNP. Our imports from the Carib-
bean Basin account for less than 4% of

our total imports worldwide. The im-
ports that would be affected by our free-
trade proposal are at present less than
one-half of 1% of our total imports— or
two-hundreths of 1% (.0002) of our
GNP. I really do not expect that this
region will have a serious negative im-
pact on our producers and workers even
if imports from that region should grow
at explosive rates. Nevertheless, as I
noted before, we have proposed in the
legislation certain safeguard provisions
to deal with those cases where serious
injury might occur or might be
threatened.

Second, I also want to emphasize
that the long-term benefits of this in-
itiative are far greater than the short-
term costs. The region already buys
nearly $7 billion of goods from the
United States. A stable, democratic, and
prosperous Caribbean Basin means a
much larger and growing market for our
exports and consequently significantly
greater job opportunities for our
workers.

Conclusion

I appreciate that the legislation we have
proposed is complex and controversial. I
appreciate that the legislative process on
such a bill is necessarily time consuming
and complicated. I also appreciate that
the Congress is carrying a heavy burden
of important, indeed urgent, legislative
work. Nevertheless, I urge that this
piece of legislation be given priority at-
tention. The needs of the Caribbean
Basin are urgent. The United States has
an opportunity to play a constructive
role in helping these countries shape a
better future. That opportunity is there
now, but it will not be there forever. We
cannot afford to wait. We have already
waited too long.

Our security and our credibility are
at stake. The tragic war in the South
Atlantic has led some hemispheric
friends — mistakenly I believe — to
challenge our commitment to them as a
partner. We must show them this is not
so. We must do our part. If we do not,
the problems will escalate, not only in
the Caribbean Basin but elsewhere in
the hemisphere as well.

I ask for your own strong leader-
ship, as well as the leadership and com-
mitment of all the distinguished
members of this committee, to insure
rapid passage of this program.

'Press release 234. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and mil be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■

September 1982

29

ECONOMICS

U.S. Approach to

East-West Economic Relations

by Charles Meissner

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the Hoiise Ap-
propriations Committee on July 21,
1982. Ambassador Meissner is Special
Negotiator for Economic Matters for the
Bureau of Economic and Business Af-
fairs. '

I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before your committee to discuss our ap-
proach to East- West economic relations
and help put these in the broader con-
text of overall U.S. foreign policy objec-
tives toward the Warsaw Pact countries
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.

Many of the Warsaw Pact countries
are experiencing major economic
difficulties that are not likely to be re-
solved over the short-term: sharply
reduced growth rates, mounting produc-
tion and administrative bottlenecks, fall-
ing exports, rising inflation, and declin-
ing standards of living. Some of the
problems are the result of government
mismanagement and poor investment
choices, as in Poland. Others can be
traced to recession in the major Western
markets and rising commodity prices,
particularly oil. The economic difficulties
were masked for a while by the increas-
ing flow of Western private bank and
government-backed credits into the
region which permitted Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union to maintain crucial
import levels and public consumption.
The Polish financial crisis and sub-
sequent private bank retrenchment have
removed this source of support, leaving
a number of Eastern European coun-
tries, dependent like many debtors on
new borrowing to pay ofi" old debts, with
acute debt service problems. These coun-
tries now have no choice but to under-
take necessary economic adjustment
measures to help bolster hard currency
earning power and bring debt levels
under control. The speed and effec-
tiveness of their reform efforts is of
major importance to the West as prin-
cipal creditor.

Current Policy

While the Warsaw Pact countries belong
to a common alliance and are, thus, fre-
quently viewed as a monolithic bloc, it is
important to point out that there are

30

great differences of history, language,
culture, natural endowment, and
economic development distinguishing
first, the Soviet Union from Eastern
Europe, and secondly, the Eastern
European countries themselves.

For more than 20 years, our foreign
policy has reflected this diversity. The
Soviet military presence in many of the
countries, the close economic links, and
the longstanding ties between the Soviet
Communist Party and the Eastern Euro-
pean parties put the Soviet Union in a
unique position. But the United States
has sought to encourage Eastern Euro-
pean countries to pursue their own na-
tional identities and more liberal
economic, political, and social policies in-
dependent of the Soviet Union. We
believe the U.S. Government can have
an important impact on the region pro-
vided it tailors its political and economic
policies to individual country circum-
stances and deals with each country on
its own merits. Our experience shows
that U.S. and allied security interests
are best served by a prudent overall ap-
proach to East- West relations.

On the economic front, the U.S.
discriminates against all the Warsaw
Pact countries in comparison with the
trade and economic benefits accorded
other nations. However, we grant more
favorable treatment to those Eastern
European countries which either
demonstrate independence vis-a-vis the
Soviets in their foreign policies —
Romania, or in domestic policies —
Hungary.

Based on these two criteria, it is our
policy to grant certain economic benefits
like most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff
treatment, export licensing, and the ex-
tension of official Export-Import Bank
and Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) credits to encourage more liberal
policies, and deny preferential treatment
and /or impose specific economic sanc-
tions on countries which either pose a
threat to U.S. security interests or
whose policies are repugnant to us.

This Administration came into office
believing— and it continues to
believe — that East- West relations must
be a two-way street. Neither the Soviet
Union nor any of its Eastern European
allies can expect to continue business-as-
usual with us in the economic realm if
they attempt to solve political problems
in other sovereign countries by force or
encourage violations of human rights in

disregard of their obligations as
signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

We have sought wherever possible
to coordinate our foreign economic
policies toward the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe with those of our Euro-
pean and Japanese allies, whose
economic ties with the East are more
extensive than our own. This has not
always been easy, but without coor-
dinated economic policies that are
perceived to serve Western interests as
a whole, U.S. action will probably not
prove effective. The Versailles summit
constituted a significant, positive step
forward in better allied management of
East- West economic relations. The sum-
mit countries agreed to "pursue a pru-
dent and diversified economic approach
to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe,
consistent with our political and security
interests," and to "handle cautiously
financial relations with the U.S.S.R. and
other East European countries in such a
way as to ensure that they are con-
ducted on a sound economic basis . . . ."
We and our allies pledged specifically to:

• Improve— within COCOM [Coor-
dinating Committee for East- West
Trade Policy] — the international system
for controlling exports of strategic
goods to Warsaw Pact countries and na-
tional arrangements for the enforcement
of security controls;

• Strengthen the exchange of infor-
mation in the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] on all aspects of allied economic,
commercial, and financial relations with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;
and

• Review periodically developments
in Western economic and financial rela-
tions with the East.

Of course, much work remains to be
done to strengthen Western cooperation
on economic issues, reduce self-defeatinj
competition for Eastern markets, and
protect Western economic-financial in-
terests in the face of the severe
economic crisis now afflicting the War-
saw Pact countries. We are heartened,
however, by the progress that has
already been made.

Polish Sanctions

I would like to turn briefly to a review
of recent U.S. foreign policy measures
involving Poland, which, more than any
other country, illustrates our approach
to East- West economic relations. Until
the Polish Government's declaration of
martial law December 1981, Poland had
received the great preponderance of

Department of State Bulletii

k.

itiS
IB

U.S. assistance to the Warsaw Pact
lountries, including access to substantial
XC and Exim direct credits and
guarantees. This assistance was based
3n our longstanding close and friendly
•elations with the Polish nation and was
;onsidered vital in support of the reform
ind renewal process spearheaded by
Solidarity, but it was halted December
JO when the President imposed
conomic sanctions against the Polish
Tiilitary government and the Soviet
Jnion following the martial law
rackdown. Our NATO allies subse-
quently joined the United States in im-
posing sanctions on both countries.
\mong measures taken multilaterally ^
igainst Poland were cessation of new
)fficial credits and suspension of con-
sideration of 1982 debt rescheduling
legotiations.

We and our allies have continued
lumanitarian assistance to the Polish
jeople, however, and the President has
nade it clear from the outset that we
ire ready to end our sanctions and pro-
ride substantial new economic and finan-
;ial assistance to Poland if the regime
;atisfies the three NATO conditions:
■eleasing the political detainees, ending
nartial law, and reopening a meaningful
lialogue with the church and Solidarity.
Jnfortunately, we have seen little in-
iication thus far that the government is
)repared to make meaningful steps
lither toward reconciliation or toward
einvigorating the faltering economy.

Polish Debt

deanwhile, allied sanctions toward
'oland have been highly effective in
naintaining economic pressure on both
he Polish Government and the Soviet
eadership. With no new Western credits
joing to Poland, and with Poland being
)ressed to repay its debt, there is a new
inancial flow from Poland to the West,
ind the Soviets have been obliged to
ransfer significant amounts of real
esources to Poland to prevent further
economic deterioration.

With hard currency debt service
ibligations to Western governments and
)rivate banks amounting to some $11.0
)01ion in 1982, or 160% of Poland's ex-
)ected foreign exchange earnings in
982, Poland is in dire need of both new
A'^estern credits and debt relief if it is to
ivoid either further sharp cutbacks in
■.rucial imports and an accelerated
lecline in economic growth, or a
substantial accumulation of debt arrear-
iges. It is, thus, clearly in Poland's
economic interest to take steps to satisfy
A^estern political demands.

Some have suggested that we could
exert even more pressure on Poland and
the Soviet Union by declaring official
Polish debts in default. While this option
remains in reserve, a declaration of
default against Poland, at this time, is
clearly contrary to both our economic
and foreign policy interests:

• Poland could view a declaration of
default as a political act to be countered
with a politically motivated repudiation
of its debt to those creditors which had
called default. Accordingly, declaring
default would take economic pressure off
the Polish Government. Moreover, a
declaration of default would have no im-
pact on the flow of private or govern-
ment credits to Poland since leaders
have already shut off the loan tap.

• Our NATO allies strongly agree
with our rationale for not declaring
Poland in default at the present time.
Should the United States unilaterally
declare Poland in default, it is highly un-
likely that the Europeans would follow
suit. The result would be another fissure
in allied unity at a time when the
alliance is wrestling to resolve several
contentious financial and trade issues.

• A U.S. declaration of default
could also increase the U.S. budget
deficit and have an adverse impact on
the sales of U.S. agricultural com-
modities abroad at a time of record U.S.
surpluses. U.S. banks, for example,
could request immediate payment from
the CCC on all government-guaranteed
loans and would .probably also write off
their nonguaranteed Polish loans, thus
reducing their Federal tax liabilities. In
addition, banks might become increas-
ingly reluctant to participate in the CCC
export program at a time when our
major agricultural competitors are pur-
suing highly aggressive marketing
strategies.

Extension of Sanctions Toward
Soviet Union

In order to increase indirectly the
pressure on Poland and advance our ob-
jective of reconciliation, the President
announced June 18 his decision to ex-
tend the December sanctions imposed on
the export of oil and gas equipment to
the Soviet Union to include equipment
produced by subsidiaries of U.S. com-
panies abroad as well as equipment pro-
duced abroad under licenses issued by
U.S. companies. The Soviet Union bears
a heavy responsibility for the repressive

ENERGY

policies of the Polish regime, and we
hope by this action to put further
pressure on the Soviets to restore the
reform and renewal process in Poland.

While the extension of U.S. sanc-
tions has been unpopular in Western
Europe and Japan, we hope our allies
will come to view this action as a con-
crete demonstration of our resolve to
take a firm position with respect to our
economic relations with the Soviets as
long as there is no improvement in the
situation in Poland. We have assured
our allies that the United States does
not desire to promote economic warfare
against either the Soviet Union or other
Warsaw Pact countries. But we do be-
lieve that because of shared political and
security objectives, neither the U.S.
foreign economic policy nor that of our
allies should treat Warsaw Pact nations
on a business-as-usual basis.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Export Sanctions
on Gas and Oil
Equipment

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 18. 19821

I have reviewed the sanctions on the ex-
port of oil and gas equipment to the
Soviet Union imposed on December 30,
1981, and have decided to extend these
sanctions through adoption of new
regulations to include equipment pro-
duced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies
abroad, as well as equipment produced
abroad under licenses issued by U.S.
companies.

The objective of the United States in
imposing the sanctions has been and
continues to be to advance reconciliation
in Poland. Since December 30, 1981, lit-
tle has changed concerning the situation
in Poland; there has been no movement
that would enable us to undertake
positive, reciprocal measures.

The decision taken today will, we
believe, advance our objective of recon-
ciliation in Poland.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 21, 1982.

31

EUROPE

Preserving Nuclear Peace in the 1980s

ill

by Paul Wolfowitz

Address at the U.S. Naval War Col-
lege in Newport, Rhode Island, on
June 22, 1982. Mr. Wolfowitz is Director
of the Policy Planning Staff.

I have been asked to talk today about
prospects for the 1980s. Talking about
the future, however, is a hazardous
business. Imagine, for example, a similar
discussion here at the Naval War Col-
lege 40 years ago in 1942. The speaker
no doubt discussed our prospects in the
war we had just entered. He perhaps
speculated on the world order that
would follow the hoped-for Allied vic-
tory. If he were particularly prescient,
he might even have foreseen that the
great fact of the postwar era would be
the U.S. -Soviet rivalry.

But there is no way that he could
have foretold how decisions that were
being made almost as he spoke would
transform the history of the 1940s and
of every decade thereafter, including our
own. Forty years ago last Thursday, on
June 17, 1942, President Roosevelt re-
ceived a report from Vannevar Bush de-
scribing the possibilities of producing a
nuclear weapon that could be employed
decisively in combat. Under any of four
possible methods. Bush told the Presi-
dent, such a weapon might be produced
in time to influence the outcome of the
ongoing war. The next day. President
Roosevelt approved Bush's report and
the Army Engineer Corps was directed
to create a new unit that has become
familiar in history as the Manhattan
Project.

Neither Roosevelt nor Bush could
have foreseen just how the project they
undertook that day would alter the way
the world would think of war — and the
way it would think of peace. It was the
source of a concern that has become
most urgent today, a concern that will
affect the rest of human history. It is
the question that I would like to address
today: What are the prospects of pre-
serving the nuclear peace?

That question is not only a matter of
intense current debate; it is also as im-
portant as any other question we can
ask about the future. And it is a much
broader question than might be im-
mediately apparent. In fact, if there is
one thought that I would like to leave

you with today, it is this: The prospects
for preventing nuclear war depend on
far more than just what we do about
nuclear weapons themselves. They de-
pend also on what we do to reduce the
many local sources of conflict in the
world and on what we do to promote
possibilities of peaceful change. And
they depend on what we do to restrain
the Soviet use of force to exploit these
sources of conflict.

The Problems of a Nuclear Freeze

Recently it has become almost common-
place to contemplate the horror of the
nuclear threat. And the reaction has
been, appropriately enough, a strong ex-
pression of revulsion and dread. But
along with that reaction there is often a
corollary suspicion, a suspicion that
those who attempt to analyze nuclear
policies — who deal in such abstractions
as "balance," "vulnerability," and "sur-
vivability"—must be somehow blind to
the awful reality of nuclear war. The
idea seems to be that the solution is
clear and simple. It does not require
painstaking analysis of the complexities
of nuclear deterrence or the hard
lessons of the old problem of war and
peace.

The deep yearning for simple solu-
tions is understandable, but it is danger-
ous. Concern about nuclear war is not
what divides us, and concern alone is
not a license to ignore the complexities
of nuclear deterrence or the realities of
international relations. For example, the
current call for negotiating a freeze on
the production, testing, and deployment
of nuclear weapons (and their delivery
systems) is an appealingly simple idea
but, unfortunately, one which danger-
ously fails to answer the complexities of
our situation. What divides the op-
ponents of a nuclear freeze from the
proponents is not disagreement about
the danger of nuclear war but disagree-
ment about how best to avert that
danger. The question to ask about a
nuclear freeze, as about any other pro-
posal, is: Will it make us safer, or will it
actually increase the danger?

Proponents of the freeze often tend
to assume that the situation is growing
more dangerous with each passing day.
Therefore, the reasoning goes, a freeze
will at least keep things from getting
worse.

The hostility to new military tech-
nology is understandable. After all, it is
technology that brought us nuclear
weapons. But not all technological de-
velopments have increased our peril.
Technological changes have actually
made nuclear weapons less prone to ac-
cident, less vulnerable to terrorists, and
less susceptible to unauthorized use. By
making nuclear delivery systems less
vulnerable, new technology can reduce
the danger of hair-trigger responses or
surprise attack, as nuclear propulsion
for submarines has done in the past and
as advanced aircraft technology may do
in the future.

Is the purpose of the freeze to stop
nuclear forces from becoming ever more
destructive? In fact, changes in our
nuclear forces have made it possible to
reduce the total megatonnage of our
strategic nuclear forces by almost 30%
in the last 10 years and by roughly 60%
from the peak levels of 1960.

Is the purpose of negotiating a
freeze to stop those changes that could
make our deterrent forces more vulner-
able? Our land-based missiles are alread
vulnerable, and a nuclear freeze would
do nothing to stop improvements in
Soviet conventional air defense or anti-
submarine warfare capabilities that
could threaten our bombers and sub-
marines. But a freeze would prevent us
from replacing those forces that are
already viilnerable, or those that might
become vulnerable in the future, with
different, more secure ones.

In sum, the hard and complex ques-
tion is whether a freeze would increase
or decrease the chances of war. Just as
there can be stabilizing as well as de-
stabilizing weapons, so there can be bot
stabilizing and destabilizing arms contn
proposals.

What Could Cause a Nuclear War?

The desire for a simple solution to the
danger of nuclear war, however, pro-
duces not only an overly simple version
of arms control but perhaps the greater [,■
oversimplification of all— the preoccupa
tion with nuclear weapons themselves.
Nuclear weapons have transformed

Department of State Bulleti

it

i

EUROPE

uman history by transforming the
ature and consequences of war. But
hey have changed the basic causes of
lar very little, if at all. Nuclear
/eapons have raised the possibility that
war might start because of an acci-
ental use of weapons, something that
as no parallel in history. And nuclear
weapons have made the age-old problem
f surprise attack far more dangerous
ban in previous periods of history. Mak-
ig these weapons safer and less vulner-
ble is, therefore, of the greatest
Tiportance.

But if we concentrate too much on
he weapons themselves, we may neglect
.^hat I believe is an even greater
anger. The danger that a conventional
/ar between the Soviet Union and the
Jnited States, perhaps one very local in
s origins, might escalate into a nuclear
atastrophe. Even complete, verifiable
uclear disarmament could not remove
he knowledge that nuclear weapons can
e built. Global conventional war, there-
Dre, will always raise the nuclear
anger. The genie is out of the bottle. It
lay, we hope, be tamed and controlled,
ut it can never be put back in.

What we do to prevent war of any
ind between the superpowers is, there-
Dre, as important as what we do about
uclear weapons themselves. In fact,
ecisions about nuclear weapons — both
1 our own military planning and in
rms control negotiations — should be
idged as much by how they affect the
■kelihood of such a conventional war as
y any other standard.

There is, unfortunately, plenty of
historical evidence about how conven-
onal wars begin and how they escalate.

• The train of events that led from
terrorist incident at Sarajevo to the

Dnflagration called World War I shows
lat small wars between minor countries
an become much bigger ones when out-
de powers have a stake in the out-
Dme.

• Misunderstandings also lead to
'ar, whether by communicating exag-
erated threats or by conveying inade-
uate warnings (as in the British failure
-> make clear their determination to
ght in 1914).

• The examples of Korea and
Lfghanistan, to name just two cases, are
eminders that military weakness can
reate opportunities for expansionist
owers to commit aggression.

• And the disastrous history of the
930s— strewn with broken com-
litments from the Rhineland to Austria

to Munich— provides tragic evidence that
failure to maintain commitments can
both mislead adversaries into confronta-
tion and force potential allies to make
dangerous accommodations.

The evidence from the past about
how wars are started or prevented is
not rendered obsolete by the nuclear
threat. Indeed, it is made more urgent.

Models of East- West Relations

The past decade has seen increasing
Soviet use of force, both directly and by
proxy. Constructing effective restraints
on that use of force is the central task
we face as we work to preserve peace in
the 1980s. For that reason, let me con-
centrate today on the problem of East-
West relations. This Administration has
been criticized both for paying too much
attention to East- West relations and for
paying too little attention to preventing
nuclear war. But the successful manage-
ment of East- West relations is the key
to preventing nuclear war.

Over the past 40 years Americans
have sought to structure East- West rela-
tions around a number of different
abstract models, starting with our initial
disappointed expectations about Soviet
participation in an international order
based on the United Nations.

Spheres of Influence. At the end of

World War II, many thought that a
stable division of the world into spheres
of influence might be possible, in which
conflict would be avoided because in-
terests would not overlap. But dividing
the world into spheres of influence can-
not end the competition because the
dividing line itself would become the
crucial point of contention.

In particular, the countries of
Europe and Asia are not mere pieces of
territory but are themselves crucial fac-
tors in the global balance. We recognize
this when we say that one of our
greatest strengths is the strength of our
allies. For reasons that are Russian as
well as Communist, defensive as well as
oflFensive, the Soviets regard the inde-
pendence of these countries as a threat
and domination over them as essential
to security.

This quest for absolute security
leads the Soviets to exploit Western talk
of spheres of influence only when it
gives them something they do not have
already. It is as if they say: "What's in
my sphere is mine; what's in yours is up
for grabs."

More fundamentally, the notion of
spheres of influence faOs to recognize
that the competition is not only about

territory or material interests but about
political principles as well. Soviet prin-
ciples are meant to be universal, and,
despite the dreary record of Communist
performance, they still attract those who
seek the violent transformation of socie-
ty. Western principles too are universal.
For instance, Poland shows the univer-
sal attractiveness of democratic ideals.
Indeed, the greatest failing of the
spheres-of-influence approach is that it
assumes the right and ability of super-
powers to control the fate of others. The
stability it seems to offer is illusory not
only because the superpowers cannot
agree on how to divide the world but be-
cause the peoples of the world cannot be
bound by any such agreement. Curious-
ly, no one in the West would claim for

What divides the op-
ponents of a nuclear
freeze from the pro-
ponents is not disagree-
ment about the danger
of nuclear war but
disagreement about how
best to avert that
danger.

his country the right to deprive others
of their independence, but we are often
too willing to concede that right to the
Soviet Union. No one in the West would
give up his country's right to self-
government, but we are often too willing
to concede that right for the people of
Eastern Europe or the Third World.

It has usually taken Soviet actions—
in Korea, in Hungary, or in Afghani-
stan—to remind us that such a division
does not produce a natural self-enforcing
equilibrium among nations. But our own
principles should remind us as well, for
the notion of spheres of influence vio-
lates the very principle of self-govern-
ment for which the West stands. And
the examples of Yugoslavia, Romania,
and Austria demonstrate, each in differ-
ent ways, that pressure on the Soviets
to accommodate to that principle, even
within areas they dominate, can con-
tribute to global stability.

Containment. The second major
concept that influenced American policy
toward the Soviet Union was contain-

33

EUROPE

ment. It did not make the mistake of
thinking that an agreed self-enforcing
division of the world could be stable. On
the contrary, it claimed that the Soviet
Union would move to fill every vacuum
and required us to meet every such
move with "unalterable counterforce."
North Korea's invasion of the south lent
a note of prophecy to these predictions
and prescriptions which gave the doc-
trine of containment added force.

Nor did containment ignore the
potential international consequences of
domestic changes. In fact, it counted on
Soviet economic and ideological weak-
ness and the looming post-Stalin succes-
sion struggle to change the Soviet Union
overnight from one of the strongest to
one of the weakest and most pitiable of
national societies.

Perhaps being too sanguine about in-
ternal developments within the Soviet
Union led to a short-term perspective
that underestimated the importance of
internal developments within other coun-
tries that might create opportunities for
Soviet expansion. Still less did it reckon
that the Soviets might acquire radical
allies far from their borders whose ideo-
logical enthusiasm and zeal for spread-
ing violent revolution might far exceed
their own.

Perhaps because containment under-
estimated the staying power of the

Technological changes
have actually made
nuclear weapons less
prone to accident, less
vulnerable to terrorists,
and less susceptible to
unauthorized use.

Soviet Union, it tended to take our own
for granted. Assuming a favorable
balance and practically unlimited re-
sources made it possible to contemplate
meeting every Soviet attempt at expan-
sion with unalterable counterforce. But
such an assumption is not suitable to a
long-term competition in which costs
must be proportionate to the stakes at
risk and in which we must exploit areas
of our strength or of Soviet weakness.

Detente. The third major concept
that governed U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union was that of detente. It is
perhaps not surprising that the exhaus-
tion produced by the Vietnam ex-
perience led to exaggerated hopes that
the nature of the U.S. -Soviet relation-
ship could be transformed from one of
competition to one of cooperation. Un-
like containment, detente did not look to
a transformation of the Soviet system in
order to achieve this change. Detente
considered internal change in Soviet
society a secondary concern, though it
held out the hope that such changes
could best go forward in an environment
of decreasing international tensions.

Instead, detente concentrated on the
prospect that Soviet internal problems
and desire for Western trade and tech-
nology to cope with them could be the
basis for a network of relationships and
vested interests that would give the
Soviets a stake in restraint and coopera-
tion. Soviet foreign policy would be
transformed because the economic prob-
lems of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe would lead them to acknowledge
an economic interdependence that would
add an element of stability to the politi-
cal equation. It was thought that posi-
tive economic incentives for restraint
could powerfully complement resistance
to expansion. It was even hoped that the
advent of military parity would temper
Soviet militancy rather than tempt
Moscow to use its increasing military
capability to expand.

Detente failed for several basic
reasons. We could not reshape the
Soviet leaders' fundamental views of
their interests simply through negotia-
tions. Nor could we reach agreement
with them on an operative code of con-
duct, given the deep differences between
democratic and Soviet views of interna-
tional morality, popular consent, and
governmental legitimacy. As a promi-
nent Soviet analyst of foreign affairs
recently wrote, the "elaboration of cer-
tain more specific rules of conduct
stands little practical chance of success
in view of the objective factors leading
to revolutionary changes in the Third
World, and in light of the conflicting
evaluations given to these phenomena by
the capitalist and socialist countries."

Nor could we produce restraint in
Soviet conduct by creating networks of
relationships or webs of interdependen-
cy. The positive incentives we have to
offer are not of sufficient weight to sub-
stitute for negative constraints on Soviet
expansion. It is hardly surprising that
this should be so with a regime as

autarchic and as revolutionary in its in-
ternational aims as the Soviet Union,
when we recall that the much more ex-
tensive trading relationships among the
European nations failed to prevent two
devastating wars. Nor do the Soviets
have such a need for external legitima-
tion that the mere fact of negotiations
themselves can exert effective leverage
on Soviet conduct.

Moreover, the positive aspects of
East-West relations are not simply
levers that we can control. Trade
creates dependencies on our side as well
as theirs and is something the West can
regulate less easily than can the totali-
tarian East. Negotiations serve our in-
terests as well as theirs.

Most importantly, however, detente
failed because it undercut the negative
constraints on Soviet expansion by en-
couraging the very hope that helped giv
rise to detente, the hope that the Unitec
States could retreat from the rigors anc
responsibilities of leadership.

The Reality of East-West Relations

Beneath the shifting theories and
slogans, the reality of East- West rela-
tions has changed much less. As one
commentator jokingly put it, detente
often seemed to be merely the pursuit c
cold war by other means— and even the
means were often the same. Even at th
height of the cold war, constructive and
enduring agreements were made.
Austria today is an independent and
united country, free of Soviet occupying
forces, because of the 1955 treaty. Suc-
cessful arms control agreements, such i
the Limited Test Ban Treaty, were
achieved without the benefit of an "era
of negotiations." Even at the height of
detente, crises have been resolved not
by codes of conduct, webs of interde-
pendence, or Soviet desires for trade
and cultural exchanges, but rather by
communications and negotiations, the
basic tools of diplomacy, backed up by
the common desire to avoid war and by
effective credible deterrence. That basic
incentive for cooperation has been with
us since the advent of nuclear weapons.
For all of their differences, each of
those three models of U.S. -Soviet rela-
tions reflected a hope that the competi-
tion could be definitively ended, that w€
could stop shouldering the terrible
burdens of world leadership, that we
could stop depending on the terrible

■.;

1:

*

34

Department of State Bulleti

EUROPE

ircat of nuclear weapons. But the reali-
is that neither the U.S. -Soviet compe-
ti'Ui nor nuclear weapons can be
islied away.

The wish for a less competitive rela-
iiiship with the Soviet Union is more

!ian understandable. But wishing will
it make it so. To the contrary, un-
■alistic hopes can make the competition
ore dangerous. To think that Soviet
ms may change in the near future
ails us to neglect those actions neces-

»ry to maintain favorable balances and
)mpete effectively over the long haul.
D think that we can harmonize Soviet
)jectives with our own— whether by
rreements and negotiations or by a
idden weakening of Soviet power and
isolve— leads us to neglect both the
ndamental differences that underlie
,e competition and the balances that
iderlie agreements.

The reality is that the competition is
ndamental; it is long-term and
Tiamic, not short-term and static; and
is governed by the facts of the balance

I power rather than regulated by

indeed norms. There is, first of all, the

• ntral fact of our time — nuclear
'eapons. A stable nuclear balance gives
)ith sides a vital interest in avoiding
irect confrontation and seeking safer
•odes of competition. Other important
:cts that shape how the competition is

■ aged include global and regional

1 .lances of conventional military forces.
But the balance of power, or what

■ e Soviets call "the correlation of
:rces," is not just military. It includes

• e strengths and strains in each side's
;liances, the openings and barriers to
ither side's influence in specific coun-

ies and regions, each side's economic
•eds and resources, and the domestic
ilitical support or opposition for their
; ilicies. It is these facts, often even
; ore than military advantages, that
I !termine which side makes decisive
; lins. Great changes have occurred

■ ithout armies crossing borders: the

■ iumph of communism in Cuba; the
no-Soviet split; the expulsion of the
)viets from Egypt; the fall of the Shah

Iran.

It is these facts of the balance of
)wer that constrain the competition,
'en in the absence of agreements, that
■e essential for successful negotiations,
id that make agreements endure. Both
hich side gains in the competition and
DW safely it is conducted are deter-
lined by the constantly shifting facts of
le balance of power. Agreements can
3 reached to make the competition
ifer so long as they are based on the

facts, and they will be kept so long as
the facts are maintained that make it in
the interest of both sides to do so.

A recognition that the U.S. -Soviet
competition is fundamentally constrained
by facts rather than regulated by agreed
norms enables us to adopt a businesslike
and productive tone in communications

achieve safer and more favorable
balances, we must address two crucial
adverse trends of the past decade:

First, increased instability in the
developing world, particularly in areas
on which we have become dependent for
energy, strategic raw materials, and

. . . the balance of power . . . includes the strengths
and strains of each side's alliances, the openings
and barriers of either side's influence in specific
countries and regions, each side's economic needs
and resources, and the domestic political support
or opposition for their policies.

with the Soviets. As the President said
on Memorial Day, "We must strive to
speak of them not belligerently but firm-
ly and frankly. And that's why we must
never fail to note, as frequently as
necessary, the true, the wide gulf be-
tween our codes of morality." At the
same time as we strive to alert world
opinion to the moral character of Soviet
conduct, in our dealings with the Soviets
we must bear in mind that what we con-
sider episodes of their misconduct occur
not from sudden impulses of immorality
but from our failure to maintain or
establish conditions that effectively con-
strain their conduct. We will persuatle
them not through denunciations or ap-
peals to shared norms but through ap-
peal to our common interest in survival
and through establishing secure military
balances and regional situations as well
as other eflFective factual constraints. As
Secretary Haig has said:

The renewal of our economic and military
strength, the reinvigoration of our traditional
alliances, and the promotion of peaceful prog-
ress and new friendships will help to make
restraint and reciprocity the most realistic
options for Moscow.

Recent Trends in the East- West
Balance

The fundamental reality of the East-
West relationship — as a long-term
dynamic competition governed by the
facts of the balance of power— has not
changed. But specific facts of the
balance have shifted over the past
decade in ways both adverse to the West
and dangerous to world peace. To

vital sea routes; and

Second, two decades of steadily in-
creasing Soviet military investment that
have permitted the Soviets not only to
eliminate and, in some cases, reverse
U.S. strategic advantages but also:

• To increase their previous conven-
tional superiority in Europe and Asia;
and

• To develop their capability to pro-
ject power far beyond their borders,
especially through exploiting the radical
allies they have acquired in Cuba, Libya,
Vietnam, and elsewhere.

Either one of these two trends —
Western dependence on unstable areas
and the growth in Soviet military
power — would be dangerous by itself.
But the interaction of the two has pro-
duced the most dangerous phenomenon
of the past decade: the increasing Soviet
tendency not merely to accumulate mili-
tary force but to use it, directly and by
proxy, in unstable regions of the world
where the West has vital interests. The
Soviets supported the use of force by
their allies in Angola, Ethiopia, Kampu-
chea, Chad, and Central America. Most
disturbingly of all, they themselves in-
vaded and occupied Afghanistan when
their clients there proved unable to pre-
vail over the opposition of the vast ma-
jority of the population.

Meeting the Challenge

If we are serious about preventing
nuclear war, nothing is more important
than reversing this trend toward the use
of force by the Soviet Union and its
proxies. That challenge requires a three-
fold effort.

!ptember1982

35

EUROPE

First, we must work to reduce the
underlying causes of instability in the
developing world. This requires a
multiplicity of wide-ranging efforts,
efforts to which we would be committed
even were there no East- West competi-
tion:

• Diplomatic efforts to achieve
peaceful settlements of disputes, as in
the Middle East and southern Africa;

• Economic programs such as the
Caribbean Basin initiative to encourage
free economic development and to
reduce the poverty and injustice that
help to cause instability; and

• Political programs to encourage
free political development and build the
"infrastructure of democracy" that the
President called for in his London
speech.

Second, we must strengthen the
restraints against Soviet use of force.

For even with the greatest possible suc-
cess in reducing the sources of instabili-
ty, they will continue to offer the Soviets
opportunities over the next decade. Suc-
cess in promoting peaceful development
depends on our ability to provide securi-
ty against Soviet intervention.

To do so, we must first of all im-
prove and preserve the credibility of our
nuclear deterrent. But we must also
urgently remedy the conventional de-
ficiencies that we tolerated for too
long — and even allowed to get worse —
under the shield of a vanishing nuclear
superiority. The recent fighting between

If we are serious
about preventing nuclear
war, nothing is more im-
portant than reversing
[the] trend toward the
use of force by the
Soviet Union and its
proxies.

Britain and Argentina shows most clear-
ly that even complete nuclear superiority
is not a substitute for conventional
forces tailored for and clearly committed
to crucial missions.

Conventional deterrence also
depends critically on strengthening tra-
ditional alliances in Europe and Asia and

on building new partnerships with de-
veloping countries that share our in-
terest in restraining Soviet use of force.
To do so requires the global strengthen-
ing of our own conventional forces. It
also requires the ability to project force
in support of threatened allies, for no
ally can relish the prospect of enduring
an attack while being "defended" some-
where else.

It requires security assistance to
countries that are the potential targets
of Soviet or proxy aggression, and it re-
quires strategic cooperation to permit
our forces to operate effectively with
others. Above all, it requires the restora-
tion of confidence in American consist-
ency and American reliability. That is
why the President thought it so import-
ant to make good on our warnings over
Poland by imposing sanctions.

We must also strengthen restraints
against Soviet indirect use of force. The
network of Soviet proxies enables the
Soviets to strike at Western interests
with much less cost, blame, or risk than
if they acted directly. Western policy in
the 1980s, therefore, must raise the
costs for these regimes at as many
points as possible to counteract the ad-
vantages that they possess as a net-
work. In the long run we can work to
create conditions that will make it in the
interests of these regimes to adopt more
independent policies, since we generally
have less fundamental divergence of in-
terests and more leverage with them
than we do with the Soviets.

The third element in our response,
besides reducing sources of instability
and strengthening restraints on Soviet
use of force, must be to seek agree-
ments that make the competition
safer. We can't end the competition and
should not promise to do so. But
through agreements (like the one on in-
cidents at sea [Agfreement on the Pre-
vention of Incidents on and over the
High Seas]), we can make it safer.
Through arms control, we can strength-
en some of the inhibitions on the use of
force. Through agreements like the
Austrian treaty and the Berlin agree-
ment, we can reduce some of the specific
sources of conflict. Unfortunately, inter-
vention by the Soviet Union and its
clients in recent years has added to the
agenda of international concerns a large
number of new regional issues: Afghani-
stan, Kampuchea, Angola, Central
America, and the Horn of Africa.
Efforts to resolve such problems are as
important as arms control for prevent-
ing nuclear war.

We should treat negotiations neither
as a favor to the Soviets nor as a means
of fundamentally altering the nature of

their regime or their relationship with u
but as an opportunity for making agree-
ments in our interest. We cannot expect
arms control negotiations and agree-
ments in themselves to stop the Soviet
Union from continuing to pursue and ex
ploit a favorable military balance. But
we can and must use them to constrain
the military competition in specific ways
that make both sides safer and lessen
the possibility of the use of force and
threats. Similarly, we cannot expect
either the denial or the expansion of
East- West trade to work a radical
change in Soviet objectives or Soviet
society. But we can make economic ar
rangements that are in both sides' in-
terests, and we can avoid arrangementS'js
that expand their capacity to wage a
military competition or that constrain
the capacity of the West to compete
effectively.

In the coming decade, we may face
some exceptional opportunities to make
progress on these difficult issues. A
generational change in leadership may
lead to greater flexibility in Soviet
policy. Soviet economic problems may
constrain their ability to compete and ir
crease the weight of some of our levers
if we can succeed in getting them undei
control.

In considering these opportunities,
however, there is also a need for cau-
tion. Although it is almost un-American
not to be optimistic, we need to recog-
nize that the possibility of change in tht'^
Soviet Union in the 1980s presents us
with a mixture of dangers as well as op
portunities. As in the past, change in tl
Soviet Union need not be for the better
New leadership may be more flexible
and moderate, but it could instead be
bolder, more sophisticated, and more
dangerous. Internal problems may cauf |ti
the Soviets to relent in their military
efforts, as people have predicted they
will do for decades. Or they could pro
duce attempts to compensate through
military advantages. Moreover, as we
saw so clearly with Khrushchev, there In
no necessary connection between inter- u
nal reform and moderation in Soviet
foreign policy.

Despite its problems, the Soviet
Union may today be even harder to re
form than in the past. Ten or fifteen
years ago, many observers thought thaj in
the increasingly bureaucratic evolution
of the Soviet Union would make changf
easier. But this trend seems instead to
have made it harder to reform a deeply
entrenched and institutionalized systenr
in which important centers of power ca
oppose initiatives from the top. We

i

((

36

EUROPE

should not base our policies on the ex-
jectation of near-term change.

A new Soviet leadership might prove
Tiore flexible in negotiations, and we
should be prepared to build on such flex-
bility if it appears. But we should not
;hink that we can use negotiations to
Tianipulate the succession struggle to
)ur advantage. Whether we view the
soviet leadership at a particular time as
•eputed hawks with room to maneuver,
)r as supposed moderates under
pressure from hardliners, we must
ilways be willing to make any agree-
■nent that would leave us safer and
lever be willing to accept one that
vould leave us — and world peace — less
secure. We should not believe that we
;an turn what may be a Soviet "tactical
naneuver" into a "lasting transforma-
aon" or we will find ourselves unpre-
pared for and inviting a tactical shift
)ack from accommodation to aggression.
[liere is a great deal of difference be-
ween expecting to establish a per-
nanently difi'erent pattern of conduct
ind simply creating and maintaining
;onditions which make the use of force
uiattractive for the Soviets.

Without fundamentally and perman-
ently changing the objectives and atti-
udes of the Soviet regime, we can
levertheless produce an improvement in
heir conduct by policies that make such
m improvement in their interest. That
mprovement will last only so long as
lur policies continue to maintain condi-
ions conducive to it in an inevitably
hanging world. Policies of Western
veakness that establish an environment
ir balance more favorable to Soviet ag-
ression are likely to undo such
mprovement.

We owe it to ourselves, however, as
veil as to our principles to work for
hange within the Soviet empire. For
he competition will end only when there
3 a transformation of the Soviet regime
hat secures the rights of its citizens.
>Iot only our own dedication to freedom
)ut also solemn international obligations,
mdertaken by the Soviets themselves,
iblige us to do all we can for the cause
>f human rights within the Soviet Union
md Eastern Europe. Ultimately the
ause of peace demands as much. As
Andrei Sakharov has said, human rights
ire "part and parcel of international
lecurity — the most important conditions
or international trust and security are
he openness of society, the observation
)f the civil and political rights of man."

But while we must work for such
change, we cannot expect it soon to
transform the nature of East- West rela-
tions. And we cannot base our policies
on the expectation that it will do so.

Conclusion

Here then is what I believe: We can do
more to build a just world and a safer
world:

• If we are strong, than if we are
weak;

• If we are respected, than if we
are dismissed; and

• If we proceed with reason and
courage, than if we hang back until
forced to act.

Thus, the path I believe we must
follow, is an arduous — and dangerous —
one. But then few routes are quicker,
and none are safer. I have not offered

any shortcuts, because I do not believe
that any exist.

The choice before us is not between
peace and freedom. We do not choose
freedom at the expense of peace. By
promoting freedom we build what is ulti-
mately the most secure foundation for
peace as well. Nor can we choose peace
at the expense of freedom. Even sur-
render would not prevent wars between
the totalitarian powers that would in-
herit the Earth. Peace and freedom are
inseparable. As President Reagan said
last November:

The American concept of peace goes well
beyond the absence of war. We foresee a
flowering of economic growth and individual
Hberty in a world at peace.

And only in such a world can man-
kind live at peace with its terrible
nuclear secret. ■

The Case for Sanctions Against
the Soviet Union

by James L. Buckley

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
July 30, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Under
Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology.^

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the President's decision of June 18 to ex-
pand sanctions to prevent the export of
oil and gas equipment and technology to
the Soviet Union. I intend to address the
basis of the President's decision, the ef-
fect of the decision, and the reaction of
our Western European allies.

Basis of the President's Decision

On December 29, 1981, the President
imposed selected economic sanctions
against the Soviet Union because of its
role in the imposition of martial law and
suppression of human rights in Poland.
Those sanctions included the expansion
of export controls on the sale of U.S.
origin oil and gas equipment and tech-
nology and the suspension of all Hcens-
ing of controlled exports to the Soviet
Union. At that time, the President made
it clear that if the repression in Poland
continued, the United States would take
further concrete economic and political

actions affecting our relationship. Now,
some 7 months later, martial law re-
mains in effect, political detainees con-
tinue to be held, and the free trade
union movement is still suppressed.

As a consequence, the President
decided on June 18 to take the further
concrete steps he had warned the
Soviets about last December. Therefore,
he expanded the December sanctions
covering oil and gas equipment and tech-
nology to foreign subsidiaries and
licensees of American firms. This is an
area of crucial importance to the
economy of the Soviet Union because of
its dependence on exports of petroleum
and natural gas for hard currency earn-
ings, as well as the significance it places
on development of a vastly expanded in-
ternal gas delivery system.

The June 18 decision to expand con-
trols to U.S. foreign subsidiaries and
licensees was based on the authority
granted the President, under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, to prohibit
exports where necessary to further,
significantly, U.S. foreign policy. The act
gives the President the power to pro-
hibit exports of goods or technology that
are subject to U.S. jurisdiction or ex-
ported by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.

eptember1982

37

EUROPE

We have taken note of the subse-
quent announcement of a slight relaxa-
tion of repression in Poland, as an-
nounced last week by the Polish regime.
This does not meet our minimum
requirements. We are, however, con-
sulting with our allies on the implica-
tions of the Polish announcement.

Effect of the June 18 Decision

The actions taken last December had im-
mediate effect on manufacturers and

amounts of critical Western technology
for the modernization of the industrial
base on which its military power
depends, as well as continue to engage
in foreign adventurism. It will roughly
double European gas dependence on the
Soviet Union, and gas is a particularly
difficult fuel to replace on short notice.
As you know, the Administration,
over the last year, has encouraged the
allies to develop alternatives to Soviet
gas to avoid any undue dependence
which could make them vulnerable to

. . . let me emphasize that this impact on the Soviet
economy was not . . . our primary goal We are not
engaged in economic warfare with the Soviet
Union . . . we seek an end to the repression of the
Polish people.

workers in the United States. U.S. firms
have lost at least $800 million worth of
potential business with the Soviet
Union— the impact being spread across
a variety of industries supplying parts
for the Yamal pipeline, as well as heavy
machinery and technology for other con-
struction projects.

However, by only reaching
U.S.-manufactured equipment, the
December controls left open an impor-
tant loophole which allowed the Soviet
Union to obtain U.S. -designed equip-
ment from foreign subsidiaries and
licensees of American companies which
were subject to the December sanctions.
Thus, the recent expansion of those
sanctions not only makes them more
effective but more equitable as well.

The obvious focus of the expanded
sanctions has been on exports destined
for the pipeline project. Clearly, the U.S.
export control actions of December 29
and June 18 have had a major impact on
equipment and the construction time-
table for the Siberian gas pipeline to
Europe. The U.S. position on the project
is well known: We believe European par-
ticipation in this project is ill-advised
and potentially harmful to our joint
security interests.

Upon completion, the pipeline will
allow the Soviets to earn, through gas
sales, some $8-$10 billion a year in hard
currency. Such earnings will allow the
Soviets to continue purchasing large

Soviet pressures. The President's deci-
sion will clearly impede the construction
of the pipeline, which is already behind
schedule, and it will increase its cost, as
well as delay the Soviet Union's plans
for a dramatic expansion of its internal
gas distribution system.

But let me emphasize that this im-
pact on the Soviet economy was not, in
and of itself, our primary goal. We are
not engaged in economic warfare with
the Soviet Union.

Above all, we seek an end to the
repression of the Polish people. The
sanctions imposed against the sale of oil
and gas equipment increase the internal
costs to the Soviet Union of the project
and cause an additional strain on
already thinly stretched Soviet re-
sources. The President wants to make
clear that the Soviets will bear those
costs until there is real progress toward
a restoration of basic human rights in
Poland.

Reaction of Our Western Allies

The extension of the sanctions obviously
concerns our allies and affects our rela-
tionships with them. When the President
made his decision to expand the con-
trols, it was clear that it would not be
welcomed by key allied governments.
Since their expansion, our European

allies have voiced their concerns in-
dividually and through the commission
of the European Community. The gist of
their complaints has centered around
their contention that our sanctions will
not produce desired changes in Poland,
that our actions exceed our legal
jurisdiction, and that we have failed to
consult with them on the sanctions.

Our allies, of course, attach greater
significance to trade with the Soviet
Union than we do. In addition, all of
Europe has felt the pinch of the current
recession. Jobs and investment related
to the pipeline project were expected to
provide a significant boost for hard-hit,
heavy industry firms.

The President took those considera-
tions into account in coming to his deci-
sion. He clearly recognized the effect of
the economic sanctions both in Europe
and in the United States. Nevertheless,
the President decided that, in the face o)
the continuing Soviet support of the
repression of the Polish people, the cost;
of U.S. inaction simply outweighed the
sacrifices that we would have to make tc
bring home to the Soviets our serious-

Situation in Poland

Itai
ake
P(

asii
:ver

Blif

id
i
riv
om
ira
i
■a

eci

K
HI

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 21. 1982'

We have taken note of the steps recent-
ly announced by the Polish authorities.
We have not yet had an opportunity to
e^ iluate these moves.

We note, however, that in their
declaration of January 11, 1982, the
foreign ministers of the Atlantic allianc«
called upon the Polish leadership to
reestablish civil liberties and the process
of reform. Specifically they urged:

An end to the state of martial

law;

The release of those arrested; anc
• Restoration of a dialogue with the-
church and Solidarity.

Our response to the most recent ac-
tions of the Polish authorities vnll re-
quire our common evaluation, together
with our partners in the Atlantic
alliance, of the relationship between the
measures announced and the goals citec
above.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

38

Department of State BulletK

ess of purpose. The President had
early stated that he would be forced to
ike additional measures if the situation
1 Poland did not improve. It did not,
tid he kept his word.

Our allies have questioned the legal
asis of our actions. We believe, how-
ver, that our sanctions are proper
nder international law. We believe that
le United States can properly prescribe
nd enforce controls over exports and
;-exports of U.S. goods and technology
id over the actions of foreign sub-
diaries of U.S. firms. The provisions in
rivate licensing contracts regarding
jmpliance with U.S. controls demon-
rate that these controls are a familiar
id accepted part of international com-
lerce.

With respect to our relations with
or allies, many have cited the pipeline
3cision as the proverbial straw that will
'eak the camel's back and lead to a
imaging policy of retaliation through
gher tariflFs or other measures. We dis-
jree and believe that our diflFerences
ith our allies can be resolved through
)ntinued constructive consultations. We
tend to work hard toward that end. I
ould also stress that, despite our much
iblicized differences, we still share a
immunity of interests much more sub-
antial than the issues which are in
spute at the moment. We certainly
tare the common goals of helping
jland achieve an end to martial law,
e release of all detainees, and a re-
tablishment of the dialogue among the
)veminent, Solidarity, and the church.

' anclusion

*iope this overview has provided some
■ leful background regarding the context
: id effect of the President's decision to
1 .pand the sanctions against the Soviet
nion for their role in the repression of
e Polish people. I would also like to
: ake a few observations. There was
: )thing capricious about the imposition
I sanctions against the Soviet Union,
'ley were a deliberate and measured
: sponse to Soviet actions that violate
• e most basic norms of international
l^havior. Therefore, any totaling up of

economic gains and losses misses a ma-
jor point, and that is the political impor-
tance of dramatizing, in a tangible way,
the depth of Western disapproval and
condemnation of Soviet behavior in in-
vading, tyrannizing, and subverting
other societies. In my own view, this
factor alone would justify sanctions even
if, in pure economic terms, the dollar
costs to the West outweighed those to
the Soviets.

Nor should we be surprised that our
European allies have a different perspec-
tive on the utility of the sanctions we
have announced. Their security concerns
center on Europe and have a narrower
focus than ours. We hope that the costs
imposed on the Soviet Union will
influence that country's attitude toward

EUROPE

Poland; but whether they do or not, they
represent a severity of response that can
help discourage Soviet adventurism
elsewhere in the world, a point of great
interest to the United States in view of
our broader responsibilities for Western
security interests.

Finally, if we are not willing to
utilize timely and effective economic
measures to punish aggression and
thereby deter future adventurism, the
ultimate cost in defense spending may
be infinitely larger than the losses we
are discussing today.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaimble from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Ninth Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JULY 21, 19821

In accordance with the provisions of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past 60
days toward reaching a negotiation settle-
ment of the Cyprus problem.

In the course of continuing discussion of
the United Nations "evaluation" of the inter-
communal negotiations, the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot negotiators met on
May 18, 25 and 27, June 1, 3, 24 and 29 and
July 1, 6 and 8. The negotiations are now in
recess with the next session scheduled for
early August. Throughout recent discussions,
the negotiators have carefully reviewed
elements of the United Nations "evaluation"
dealing with inter alia the possible organiza-
tion of the executive structure of a federal
system and the organs and powers of a
federal government. The intercommunal
negotiations are continuing in a serious and
constructive manner.

United Nations Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar met in New York on June 8 and
10 with Cypriot President Kyprianou and on
June 9 with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.
These meetings provided a further opportuni-
ty for useful discussion of the status of and
developments in the intercommunal talks.

The United Nations continues to pay
close attention to the Cyprus problem. In his
June 1, 1982 report to the Security Council
on Cyrpus, a copy of which is attached, the
Secretary General reviewed recent develop-

ments and emphasized that "the intercom-
munal talks continue to represent the best
available method for pursuing a concrete and
effective negotiating process." He noted that
negotiations are proceeding at "a deliberate
but reasonable pace" and while major
substantial problems are stiU to be resolved,
"they are being systematically reconsidered,
reformulated and reduced." The Secretary
General also noted the prospective need for
devising solutions to unresolved constitutional
and territorial issues and urged the com-
munities to give "earnest thought" to the re-
quirements for an agreement. We fully en-
dorse the efforts and observations of the
Secretary General and his Special Represen-
tative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi.

I also note with pleasure that on June 15,
1982, the Security Council unanimously
passed a resolution extending the mandate of
the UN Peace-keeping Force on Cyprus (UN-
FICYP) to December 15, 1982. We share
with other Security Council members the
judgment that the continued presence of UN-
FICYP adds a valuable dimension of security
and stability conducive to productive inter-
communal negotiations.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 26, 1982. ■

iptember 1982

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.■2 "o

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Conditions
in El Salvador

i

by Elliott Abrams

Statement svimiitted to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29,
1982. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary
for Humxin Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs. '

tVhen I last appeared before the Con-
gress to discuss the human rights situa-
;ion in El Salvador, I mentioned that
our annual Country Reports on Human
lights Practices documented the good
md bad conduct of a beleaguered
government, that human rights viola-
;ions of a very serious nature had oc-
:urred, and that innocent civilians have
)een murdered by forces contesting this
nost bitter of ci\^ conflicts. I deeply
vish that I could state that these viola-
nons had ceased, that murder and
aolence in El Salvador are not common
)ccurrences, and that tremendous prog-
ress had been made in restoring peace
ind prosperity to that unfortunate na-
non. I cannot make these claims, how-
ever. Violations of human rights con-
dnue, people are murdered or abducted
)r otherwise abused by terrorists of
-ightwing and leftwing groups or com-
non criminals, and, at times, by
■nembers of El Salvador's security and
military forces.

The new government, like the pre-
vious government of President Duarte,
remains under siege. Salvadoran society
is gravely ill. The country's judicial
system, generally ineffective since the
1970s, now— burdened by threats and
intimidation — barely functions. El Salva-
dor's promising industrial plants have
reduced their activity, and land lies
fallow because the agricultural popula-
tion fears to work the soil. Concerted at-
tacks by Marxist-Leninist insurgents
have destroyed large parts of the coun-
try's public utilities and transportation
systems. Unemployment and economic
distress afflict tiie Salvadoran people.
Two hundred thousand people are inter-
nally displaced and survive only through
the efforts of the government, which
tries, despite great obstacles, to provide
for their precarious welfare. Tens of
thousands have fled to neighboring coun-
tries.

This is an extremely bleak picture,
but it is not the complete picture. To
understand where things stand today in
El Salvador, we must also examine
where El Salvador has been and where
it is going. Three years ago, El Salvador
had a government that came to power
through probable fraud, that did not
represent the will of the Salvadoran peo-
ple, and from which the majority of the
population was alienated. There is now a
government in El Salvador that has
come into power as a result of a fair,
honest, national election, in which the
overwhelming majority of the electorate
freely participated. Three years ago, the
government of El Salvador served an
oligarchy that controlled the vast majori-
ty of productive agricultural land as well
as the means of finance and credit. Now,
almost 20% of El Salvador's arable land
has been distributed to its tillers, and
the banking system has been national-
ized.

While violence has been endemic in
El Salvador's history, 2 years ago politi-
cal killings may have been at an all-time
high. Political violence is always difficult
to quantify, but a decline seems to have
occurred over the past year. During the
last 6 months, this trend has continued.
As the certification states, a significant
number of security force personnel have
been disciplined for abuses. Five sus-
pected killers of the four American
churchwomen have been officially
charged with murder. The case against
these individuals continues, and we fully
expect they will be brought to trial. Of
course, we have not seen all the prog-
ress we would like to have seen concern-
ing control of violence, but the signs
have been positive. Not only do embassy
reports show this trend, but other moni-
toring groups, regardless of pohtical
orientation, show a similar trend.

The National Elections

Moreover, and more importantly, on
March 28 the Salvadoran people went to
the polls and experienced an historical
event unique in their troubled and
violent history. They participated in a
free and honest election that brought
them the government they collectively
desired. Almost 1.5 million people voted.

probably more than 80% of the eligible
electorate.

The people frequently voted under
tremendously difficult conditions. The
leadership of the Marxist guerrillas de-
cided to conduct a concerted and bloody
campaign to prevent the exercise of the
popular will. Guerrillas blew up scores of
buses during the 2 weeks before the
election, sought to prevent distribution
of gasoline to the eastern part of the
country, and threatened to kill any bus
or truck drivers who were so bold as to
carry voters to the polls. The guerrillas
attacked polling places and the Electoral
Commission's headquarters and in-
creased bombings of electrical power in-
stallations. Guerrilla radio stations
ordered voters to stay home and threat-
ened, through letters, printed propa-
ganda, and wall slogans, to kill or muti-
late any voter who exercised his rights
on election day. Guerrillas controlled the
streets of the departmental capital of
Usulutan and prevented voting in that
city. Still, despite all obstacles, the
Salvadoran people went to the polls in
numbers that surprised the experts. Be-
cause of guerrilla violence, voters often
walked miles to safer polling places or
waited in line under fire for the chance
to make their choice for El Salvador's
future.

This popular reaction constituted a
rejection of the guerrilla attempt to pre-
vent the election. Of the 1.5 million
Salvadorans who voted, more than 88%
cast their ballots for one of the six par-
ticipating parties. Everyone now knows
that the Christian Democratic Party re-
ceived the largest single percentage—
40%— of the vote, with the five parties
to its right receiving the collective ma-
jority. As a result of agreement between
El Salvador's political parties, a Govern-
ment of National Unity was formed, and
the Constituent Assembly chose as pro-
visional president the independent and
highly respected banking expert, Alvaro
Magana. "Three provisional vice presi-
dents, representing the three largest
parties, were also chosen. It is President
Magana's freely elected government that
must now face the threat of violent
overthrow by well-armed, externally
supported Marxist guerrillas.

The election has been attacked.
Given the highly charged political atmos-
phere in El Salvador and persistent
misperceptions about events in that
country, criticism was to be expected.
Such criticism that has arisen, however,
with charges of massive fraud and in-
flated voting, is entirely unfounded and
recognized as such by serious observers

September 1982

41

HUMAN RIGHTS

I

of the situation in El Salvador. Jose
Napoleon Duarte, who did not retain
office as a result of the vote, has stated
that these allegations are part of a cam-
paign to denigrate the elections and are
false. International observers were in-
vited to monitor the campaign and elec-
tion. More than 200 observers from
more than 40 countries were present
and more than 700 journalists served as
de facto observers as well. These
observers uniformly found that the elec-
toral process was orderly and, except
for the guerrilla attacks I mentioned
previously, peaceful. WhUe charges of
government pressure have been made,
Msgr. Rivera y Damas, acting Arch-
bishop, remarked of the voting that, "U
there was any pressure, it was not from
the government but from those who did
not want the elections." WhOe there
were technical difficulties, as might have
been expected, there was absolutely no
indication of fraud. When we would like
to see free elections in so many coun-
tries that do not have them, it is unfor-
tunate to see the first free election deni-
grated or minimized for political
reasons.

The results of the election are sig-
nificant in many ways. They show that
the vast majority of the Salvadoran peo-
ple desperately want peace and reject
the violent alternatives offered by the
Marxist-Leninist insurgents. The elec-
tion also shows that the Salvadoran peo-
ple have taken the first step to integrate
themselves into a political system in
which they have not previously had a
chance to participate significantly. The
results of the election indicate that the
vast majority of the Salvadoran people
believe that an elected government
offers the best possible hope for greater
respect for basic human rights.

U.S. Support for Human Rights

Respect for human rights has been at
the core of our policy toward El Salva-
dor for some time, and intensely so dur-
ing the past 6 months. Our concerns for
human rights have been repeatedly
stressed to Salvadoran officials, both
military and civilian. Our policy toward
El Salvador has been formulated in such
a way as to seek tangible, positive
changes in human rights practices in El
Salvador. We are working for meaning-
ful structural changes, not simply cos-
metic rearrangement or resolution of in-
dividual cases. Respect for human rights
and proper conduct toward the civilian
population has been a principal part of

our training of Salvadoran military per-
sonnel. Salvadoran leaders have been re-
ceptive to our concerns and agree with
our basic objectives.

One can justifiably ask why progress
has been so slow and why things have
not more markedly improved in El
Salvador over the last 6 months, if a ma-
jor power like the United States has
brought all its efforts to bear, and if the
leadership of El Salvador has been so re-
ceptive to our concerns. I believe I was
able to discover the answer during my
recent trip to that country. I am frankly
surprised, after my visit, not that prog-
ress has been so slow, but that the Sal-
vadorans have moved as far as they
have.

Obstacles to Improvement

El Salvador is desperately poor. The
gross national product has declined by at
least 25% in the last 2 years, due to the
insurgency. Population growth is 3.5%
per year in an already overpopulated
land. There is no way of financing any
number of necessary projects. Land re-
form is resisted, in part because owners
have not received compensation for their
losses. Statistical information is unre-
liable or unavailable. Road travel is ex-
tremely hazardous. The judicial system,
never strong, has broken down. Judges
and legal officials are regularly intimi-
dated. Very few of us would have the
courage to stand up to the threats that
have been made against the safety of
judicial officials and their families.

Communications within the country
are extremely poor. A typical National
Guard post, for example, consists of
10-15 men, under the command of a
poorly educated corporal or subsergeant,
stationed in a village somewhere in rural
El Salvador. There is no telephone com-
munication with national headquarters,
sometimes no radio contact with even
the commander of the department in
which they are stationed. If their non-
commissioned officer (NONCOM) is
conscientious, they will patrol on foot,
with no support from any other unit,
and beyond any kind of control or
regulation except that of their unit
leader. If the NONCOM is a decent man,
perhaps his men will enjoy good rela-
tions with the people of the area they
patrol. But in an atmosphere of guerrilla
threats and violence, abuses occur. Ade-
quate means of redress for the victims
are virtually nonexistent, since the unit
is effectively a power unto itself. This is
the kind of situation we are trying to
change on the government side.

There has been no tradition of tak-
ing prisoners during the fighting in El

Salvador. The government has several
hundred prisoners captured off the
battlefield and the guerrillas have about
40. Both sides have killed opposing com-
batants and quarter is rarely given or
expected. As might be expected, the
prisoner issue remains one of our most
important areas of concern on the
government side.

All in all, given El Salvador's violent
tradition and bitter internal divisions,
conditions for seeking human rights im-
provements could hardly be worse.

The Human Rights Outlook

Accordingly, the struggle to achieve
progress in El Salvador's human rights
situation has been an uphill one for both
the previous government and the cur-
rent administration under President
Magana, which is definitely committed
to respect human rights. Progress has
been measured in inches, not miles; and
more importantly, in the lives and physi-
cal integrity of individuals who, in the
past, would have suffered but for the
decision by responsible Salvadoran
officials to work for a change in the way
the security and military forces treat the
civilian population. We have seen no
similar effort on the part of the guer-
rillas.

I must return to one of the points I
made when I testified before the Con-
gress last winter: How can the United
States effectively work for lasting im-
provements in respect to democracy,
human rights, and reform in El Salva-
dor? Were the Congress to terminate
our security assistance to this be-
leaguered government, we would greatly
reduce our ability to work to restrain
those narrow and often brutal elements
who want to see not even a return to
the status quo ante, but further retro-
gression into repression and violence. A
vacuum left by our termination of
security assistance would lead to acceler-
ation of the insurgency and consequent
violent backlash. It is certainly possible
that after such a prolonged bloodbath,
those forces that want to impose a
totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist system
would, after further strugjgle, take
power. Let us make no mistake about
the nature of the insurgents in El Salva-
dor. They are as violent a group of men
and women as any we have seen in the
Western Hemisphere. It is bad enough
that they see as their means to victory
the destruction of factories, power
systems, bridges, roads, and buses— that
is, the creation of economic hardship for

42

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

ithe people of El Salvador. It is worse
ithat they destroy lives, nurturing
iviolence and assassinating those who
■would oppose them. Their hostility to
Ithe efforts of the people of El Salvador

I to exercise their right to vote is a mat-
Jter of record.

The leaders of the FMLN [Fara-
bundo Marti National Liberation Front]
|do not offer a viable alternative in El

II Salvador. Their assumption of power by
•,i force in El Salvador would only lead to

(dictatorship and increased misery and
death. The vast majority of the Salva-
■ doran people reject this possibility. What
they have now is a government freely
elected, committed to democratic
' reform, including further free elections,
and attempting, under incredible provo-
cations, to make significant improve-
ments in the human rights situation in
their country. President Magana has
stated that the goals of his government
are pacification, democratization, restor-
ation of confidence and security,
economic recuperation, and respect for
human rights. In the midst of a cruel
civil conflict and within a short time
span since the elections, he has moved
his government in those directions.

On April 15, 1982, I visited Fort
Benning to observe the training of Sal-
vadoran Army cadets, young men who
now are fighting and dying for their
country's freedom. We had undertaken
to train almost 500 of these cadets for
an army that is critically short of trained
officers. The number of trainees was
almost 10 times the number of men who
would graduate from El Salvador's mili-
tary academy this year. They were
young, bright, eager, and receptive to
their American instructors' emphasis on
the need to respect and protect the
civilian population — as their brothers in
arms had done over 2 weeks earlier, de-
fending the voters and the electoral
process against insurgent attacks. We
hope they will have a tremendously posi-
tive impact on their army's performance,
not only in battle, but also in their re-
sponse to the needs of the civilian popu-
lation. If we refuse in the future to
undertake such efforts, we will be com-
mitting a blunder of immense propor-
tions. We must assist the Government of
El Salvador to continue those steps it
has taken to broaden popular support
and eliminate abuses. If we do not, we
will not only imperil our own national
security over the long term, but we will
help to condemn the Salvadoran people
to a nightmare more frightening than
the one they are now experiencing — and
from which it will be hard to awake.

I said at the outset of this statement
that to understand where El Salvador is
today, we must consider where it has
been and where it is going. I think that,
thanks in large part to the beginning
made by the March 28 elections. El
Salvador is moving ahead toward a
democratic system of accoimtable
government, which will create the condi-
tions necessary for increasing respect
for human rights, including free elec-
tions, a functioning judiciary, due proc-
ess, improved discipline, and greater
professionalism in the military. These
efforts are supported by the Salvadoran

Armed Forces, who are playing a very
constructive role in encouraging and
protecting a very new democratic
system. Democracy is the central issue
in El Salvador. Its strengthening will
lead to a further reduction of human
rights violations. The current govern-
ment in El Salvador must be given the
opportunity to complete what it has be-
gun.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaimble from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Human Rights and the Refugee Crisis

by Elliott Abrama

Address before the Tiger Bay ClvJb in
Miami, Florida, on June 2, 1982. Mr.
Abrams is Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Af-
fairs.

As you know, I am in charge of the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs. As you may not know, in
that capacity I am charged with oversee-
ing for the State Department the grant-
ing of asylum to people from all around
the world who seek asylum in the
United States. Both responsibilities-
human rights and the asylum aspect of
U.S. immigration policy— obviously give
me a great deal to do with Latin
America and the Caribbean. What I
want to do today is talk about our
human rights policy and our foreign
policy, and, I hope, help explain our
views on a number of problems which
face south Florida.

Our human rights policy is, basically,
easy to explain: We try to improve the
respect for human rights in countries
around the world, so that we can im-
prove the lives of the people who live
there and so that we continue to make
clear America's historic commitment to
the cause of liberty. Of course, this is
easier said than done, for the problem of
human rights violations around the
world is profoundly complex. The causes
of human rights problems vary from
race (as in South Africa) to religion (the
Ba'hai in Iran), to factional strife (as be-
tween Christians and Muslims in
Lebanon), to a wide variety of usually
military dictatorships. And the kinds of

human rights violations vary from denial
of free elections to elimination of the
free press or freedom of religion, to
arbitrary arrests, to torture and murder.

Needless to say, each situation calls
for different tactics for an American
effort in the area of human rights.
Furthermore, our tactics will vary de-
pending on our relationship with the
country in question: whether it is a
friend or a foe, whether there exists be-
tween us distant relations or a dense
network of ties. The tools we use range,
of course, from straight diplomatic dis-
cussions, to public denunciations, to
U.N. votes, to denial of economic or
military assistance, and so on.

Often this Administration is accused
of doing too little for human rights or of
"coddling" friendly regimes while we at-
tack enemies. In fact this accusation is
false. We use whatever we think will be
the most effective tactic. Where we have
good diplomatic ties, common sense tells
us to use them. Where we do not have
friendly relations, but a regime is very
sensitive to its public reputation, we find
that public discussions and criticisms are
most effective, and we use them — as in
the case of the Soviet Union. Our goal,
in every case, is to be effective, not to
give good speeches but to have a good
effect in the real world.

If we are to achieve our human
rights goals, it is clear that American
power and influence are essential. Few
governments around the world are
greatly moved by preaching from the
United States or anyone else. They
change their behavior when American
power, American assistance, American
commitments, persuade them that it is
in their interest to do so. Above all, the
intangible force of the American exam-

5eptember1982

43

HUMAN RIGHTS

pie as a successful example inevitably
affects the willingness of other countries
to pay attention to our concerns on
human rights. The Reagan Administra-
tion has, it is correctly noted, improved
relations between our country and such
countries as South Africa and South
Korea. It is our view that isolating these
countries, driving them away from us,
would do nothing but decrease our
influence there. Our ability to obtain cm-
goals, including our human rights goals,
is sufficient only when America is under-
stood to be an important force.

Role of Communism and Soviet Power

Thrown into the many complexities I
have mentioned is another major one—
the role of communism and Soviet
power. Why do I single out communism
and the Soviet bloc countries, among all
the world's dictatorships?

First, because once a Communist
government is established, the Soviets
make sure that it endures permanently.
No efforts by the people of that country
will be allowed to win them freedom, as
we have just seen in Poland. Unlike
Greece or Spain or Portugal, which were
dictatorships but are now free, today
Communist countries are not permitted
to leave the grasp of the Soviet Union
and seek freedom.

Second, Communist dictatorships
are aggressive. Compare Paraguay and
Nicaragua, or Haiti and Cuba, or North
Vietnam with the now disappeared
South Vietnam. Communist countries
not only destroy the human rights of
their own population but threaten to ex-
port repression to their neighbors and
around the world. Most recently we
have seen this in Afghanistan, and even
now Cuba and Nicaragua are engaged in
a massive supply of arms to fuel sub-
version in Central America.

Third, Communist regimes are in-
credibly brutal. Let me take but one ex-
ample. The French group. Doctors With-
out Frontiers, has sent doctors to
Afghanistan to help injured Afghans.
They have reported, and these items
have been published in several of the
leading journals in Paris, that the
Soviets drop small mines from planes.
They don't explode on landing, but only
when picked up by a passerby. They are
made to look like matchboxes, and some
to look like children's toys. The French
doctors report that much of their work
in hospitals on the border of Pakistan is
surgery performed on children who have
lost limbs. And of course, even now the

Soviet Union is providing chemical and
biological weapons to its proxies and
allies in Afghanistan and Southeast
Asia — the infamous yellow rain which is
outlawed by international treaty and by
any sense of human decency.

Obviously, we must take care in our
human rights policy to make situations
better and not worse. South Vietnam
under General Thieu, or South Korea to-
day, present serious human rights prob-
lems, but they are as nothing compared
to their Communist alternatives. We
want to be very sure that in a situation
such as that in El Salvador, we do not
trade the serious but solvable human
rights problems of today for a perman-
ent Communist dictatorship. Resisting
the expansion of communism is a key
human rights goal.

And here again, American influence
in the world is essential to our goals. A
strong, confident, vigorous America will
be able to help countries resist Soviet
subversion. And it will provide a power-
ful alternative model of a successful,
confident people whose freedom leads to
prosperity and unity. Needless to say,
economic and military strength are
essential elements in this picture, which
is why President Reagan is determined
to restore both.

Relevance to Refugee Flows

Now the relevance of all this to the
refugee flows you have seen here in
south Florida, and to the greater ones
you may fear is, I think, clear. People do
not flee free, prosperous countries. The
largest refugee flows of recent years
have come from Indochina and Afghani-
stan, where, quite simply, people are
fleeing communism. The same is true of
Cuba. Perhaps the greatest source of
refugees throughout history has been,
not natural disasters, but misgovem-
ment. When governments have de-
stroyed people's rights and freedoms,
and have destroyed the economy, people
have voted with their feet.

Our response to the refugee problem
of today and the potential problems of
tomorrow is necessarily complex.
Neither we nor any other wealthy coun-
try can accept all of the refugees and
immigrants who come to our borders.
Neither can we accept immigrants who
will constitute a servile class, a class of
permanently unequal people such as ex-
ists in many countries around the world.
Yet our response must have in it a
substantial amount of humanitarianism,
and we are bound (by international

treaty and our own law) to grant asylum
to genuine refugees who reach our
shores.

But humanitarianism alone will not
enable us to deal with a ruler such as
Fidel Castro, who with unbelievable
cynicism uses his own people as a
weapon against foreign countries. He
shoots streams of refugees at nearby
countries in the way a cannonball is shot
out of a cannon. Think of the cynicism,
think of the viciousness, of a ruler who
would take mentally retarded people and
drag them off and shove them into boats
to be sent away from their home coun-
try. Our foreign policy must make it
clear that such behavior is simply un-
acceptable to us and will not ever again
be tolerated.

It is obvious, of course, that this
country has many immigration problems
that have nothing to do with commu-
nism, such as the problem of Haitian
migrants you face here in south Florida.
But our experience has shown that the
most serious refugee problems have
political causes and— even more import-
ant—that these refugee problems devel-
op much more suddenly than those that
have their origin in poverty. Compare
the steady flow of migrants from Haiti
to the sudden waves from Cuba. Thus
they present us with a challenge that th<
international community has trouble pre
paring for ahead of time.

In fact, it is Communist rule that
has caused the greatest refugee flows of
recent years. We can, therefore, have a
very firm notion of what the expansion
of communism to El Salvador and
Guatemala would mean. It has the
potential to create a Southeast Asian
refugee crisis right here on our door-
steps. Indeed, we have every reason to
think that the expansion of communism
in Central America would create this
kind of incredible problem. I am always
amazed when people come to me to
voice their concern about refugees from
El Salvador, yet who oppose the Ad-
ministration's effort to avoid enlarge-
ment of that refugee problem by giving
El Salvador the aid it needs to defeat
Communist-led guerrillas.

Addressing the Problem

Obviously, the problem of migration anc
refugee flows is enormously complex,
and we must address it in a number of
ways. One way is economic assistance. 1
will help in cases such as Haiti, where
poverty leads people to leave home, and
it will help in the long run to reduce the
opportunities that those seeking politica
disorder can exploit.

44

DeDartment of State Bulletii

MIDDLE EAST

Another way is military assistance.
Such aid is essential, for the Soviet
Union, through Cuba and now Nicar-
agua, is deeply engaged in promoting
and arming subversion in our hemi-
sphere. If we do not help those who
wish to fight and defend themselves,
then chances of success are greatly di-
minished. And if they fail, we can pre-
dict that many of their countrymen will
flee to our shores.

A third way is our human rights
policy, where we seek, by the pressure
of America's military and economic
power and its reputation in the world, to
advance the cause of liberty. We seek to
bring about political reforms within
many friendly countries, and it is an
essential part of this policy to oppose
the expansion of communism. In a world
of democracies, where human rights
were respected, refugee flows would vir-
tually disappear.

A fourth way is our effort to stop
the illegal flow of aliens to this country.
This involves an improvement in our
own enforcement mechanisms, including
most recently the interdiction program
now in effect writh regard to Haiti.

Finally, our laws do not, and none of
us would wish them to, exclude all
aliens. We have been accepting 800,000
immigrants a year, and we have an ac-
tive asylum program. When someone
who is truly fleeing persecution comes to
lus, we do not want to send him or her
back to the land where the persecution
■occurred. We cooperate through the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
Ithe Red Cross, and other international
organizations to help the international
community deal with refugee flows.
And, of course, we do our share in tak-
ing care of the world's refugees. We do
30 financially, and obviously, as in the
case of Indochinese and Cubans, we
meet our responsibilities and take a
leadership role in the international com-
munity.

There is one thing that ties all of
these efforts together. There is one
thing that will help our human rights
policy succeed, help friendly govern-
ments resist subversion, help create a
safer international climate, and help
avoid the creation of new refugee flows.
It is, quite simply, American influence.
There was a time after the Vietnam war
when some Americans came to believe
that American power was a force for ill
in the world, not for good. I believe
most Americans have now come to
realize this is a false and dangerous
view. Anyone who is seeking to promote
iljand defend freedom, anyone who is
wondering whether the future will bring

Visit of Israeli
Prime Minister Begin

Prime Minister Menahem Begin of
Israel made an official working visit to
Washington, D.C., June 20-21, 1982.
Following are rermarks made by
President Reagan and Pnme Minister
Begin after their meeting on June 21.^

PRESIDENT REAGAN

It's been worthwhile to have Prime
Minister Begin at the White House
again.

All of us share a common under-
standing of the need to bring peace and
security to the Middle East. Today,
we've had an opportunity to exchange
views on how this cause can be ad-
vanced. On Lebanon, it's clear that we
and Israel both seek an end to the
violence there and a sovereign, inde-
pendent Lebanon under the authority of
a strong central government.

We agree that Israel must not be
subjected to violence from the north,
and the United States will continue to
work to achieve these goals and to
secure the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Lebanon.

PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

I'm deeply grateful to my friend, the
President of the United States, for his
invitation to come to visit with him
again — after my first visit in September

1981, in the White House— and hold a
discussion, a very fruitful discussion
with the President and his advisers.

Everyone knows that we face now a
situation in the Middle East which calls
for activity, great attention, and under-
standing. I have read in some
newspapers in this great country that
Israel invaded Lebanon. This is a mis-
nomer. Israel did not invade any coun-
try. You do invade a land when you
want to conquer it or to annex it or, at
least, to conquer part of it. We don't
covet even 1 inch of Lebanese territory.
And, willingly, we will withdraw our
troops, all of our troops, and bring them
back home as soon as possible. "As soon
as possible" means as soon as arrange-
ments are made that never again will
our citizens — men, women, and
children — be attacked, mainied, and
killed by armed bands operating from
Lebanon, armed and supported by the
Soviet Union and its satellites.

There is hope to believe that such
arrangements will be made and that all
foreign forces, without exception, will be
withdrawn from Lebanon; there will be
an independent, free Lebanon based on
its territorial integrity. The day is near
that such a Lebanon and Israel wdll sign
a peace treaty and live in peace forever.

iMade on the South Grounds of the White
House (text from Weeidy Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 28, 1982). ■

economic and political progress in the
Caribbean Basin or will bring more sub-
version, more violence, more poverty,
and more refugee flows, will surely
understand that American strength is
the essential ingredient. A panacea? No,
of course, for the world is not that sim-
ple. But let us not be deluded by false
complexities. This country remains the
greatest friend of freedom in the world,
and wherever we go — as with Germany
and Japan after the Second World
War — we attempt to instill democratic
values. An expansion of Communist in-
fluence in the Caribbean Basin will inevi-
tably create greater refugee flows. As
we know, communism combines political
repression with economic failure. It is
the perfect recipe for the creation of

refugees, and we have only to look at
the world around us to see that that
recipe has worked only too well.

So for you here in south Florida con-
cerned about the potential refugees of
the 1980s and 1990s, for those dealing
with human rights issues and concerned
about how to promote democratic values
and procedures abroad, for those con-
cerned about the fate of liberty in the
world at large, let us recall again the
common thread that links these issues
together: a prosperous and strong
America, an America willing to maintain
its jnilitary strength and willing to make
clear to friendly nations and to foes the
strength of our values and our commit-
ment to defend them. ■

45

NARCOTICS

U.S. Policy on International
Narcotics Control

by Walter J. Stoesael, Jr.

Statement submitted to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on May 3,
1982. Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy
Secretary ofState.^

As requested by the committee, I will
address policy issues related to mterna-
tional narcotics control. This testimony
will complete the review of Department
of State activities begun April 21, when
Assistant Secretary [for International
Narcotics Matters, Dominick] DiCarlo
discussed the programs and strategies
conducted by the Bureau of Interna-
tional Narcotics Matters. At that time
Ambassador [to Colombia, Thomas D.]
Boyatt discussed specific policies and
programs with respect to Colombia, and
Administrator Mullen discussed the
diverse assistance rendered by the Drug
Enforcement Administration.

The committee also took testimony
from officials of the Department of
Justice, the Treasury, Health and
Human Services, the Central In-
telligence Agency, and the White House
Drug Abuse Policy Office— who pro-
vided information on domestic consump-
tion, trafficking, enforcement and pros-
ecution efforts, and other international
policy aspects. I will, therefore, confine
my remarks to the responsibilities and
policies of the Department of State,
although I will note our numerous col-
laborations with these other U.S. Agen-
cies.

Last September, President Reagan
said he would establish "a foreign policy
that vigorously seeks to interdict and
eradicate illicit drugs, wherever
cultivated, processed or transported.

The authority for our efforts, which
Secretary Haig has affirmed as a high
priority for the Department, is section
481 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
which established an international nar-
cotics control function under the direc-
tion of the President and the Depart-
ment of State, on the basis that effective
international cooperation is required to
eliminate illicit production, trafficking
in, and consumption of dangerous drugs.

International Control

No nation can cope with drug abuse by
relying only on treatment, prevention,
and domestic enforcement. The supply

of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and other
drugs is so great that we simply must
reduce production before we can sub-
stantially reduce availability. We must
break the grower-to-user chains which
stretch across five continents. To do
this, we must have a comprehensive pro-
gram of international control.

The international control function
was conferred upon the President and
has been delegated through the
Secretary of State to the Assistant
Secretary for International Narcotics
Matters. I note that the Department of
State is the only foreign ministry in
which narcotics control has been
elevated to the level of a senior policy
branch. This function was assigned to
the Department because the United
States believes that other governments
should understand that we regard drug
abuse as not just a health problem, or an
enforcement issue, but as a matter prop-
erly integrated into our foreign pohcy as
an issue of government responsibility
under international treaties— that
should be dealt with as a matter of in-
ternational obligation and concern.

U.S. Policy

Accordingly, as the first tenet of its in-
ternational narcotics control policy, the
Department has stressed, through
diplomatic and program channels, that
each country has the responsibility for
demand and supply i-eduction within its
borders.

By virture of the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances, signatory
nations are required to establish control
limiting the production, manufacture,
and distribution of scheduled drugs to
recognize, legitimate purposes. The
Single Convention requires each sig-
natory nation to declare and enforce
prohibitions on the cultivation, produc-
tion, and distribution of opium, cocaine,
cannabis, and their derivatives. All of
the major producer nations are
signatories to the Single Convention.

This Administration rejects the con-
tention that drug abuse is particularly
an American problem, or a problem of
Western civilization, and rejects the con
tention that the United States has the

primary reponsibility for solving this

problem.

We recognize that, because of
political and economic considerations,
some countries cannot do the job alone,
and the second tenet of our narcotics
policy is that the international communi-
ty has an obligation to assist those na-
tions which require help.

As a concerned member of the world
community, and as a severely impacted
nation, the U.S. Government supports a
program of bilateral and multOateral
assistance for crop control, interdiction,
and demand reduction programs, and we
encourage other governments, especially
the governments of other industrialized
nations, to participate fully in these in-
ternational control efforts.

As the third tenet of our interna-
tional control policy, the Bureau is ap-
plying more emphasis on crop control at
the source in both our bilateral pro-
grams and in programs conducted by in-
ternational organizations which we fund.
Current production capability and
stockpiles of heroin, cocaine, and man-
juana or their base materials well exceed
known consumption. Interdiction
through various law enforcement ac-
tivities is simply not sufficient by itself
to reduce availability, given current
levels of production.

The fourth tenet is that narcotics-
related economic assistance, whether
rendered by the U.S. Government or an
international organization, should be
conditions on concurrent agreements on
control of narcotics production.

Strategic Consideration

There are a number of strategic con-
siderations which link our principal
policy positions and our program

StrS-tGETV .

• While there have been notable
achievements in control efforts, success
in recent years has been marginal in
terms of reducing woridwide availability
of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.

• Interdiction efforts are not ade-
quate in terms of woridwide effort,
given current levels of production and
profitability.

• Comprehensive control programs
are not now politically negotiable or
operationally feasible in every producer

country.

• Both producer and transit nations
are increasingly impacted by domestic
drug abuse problems, as are the major
industrialized, consumer nations— fac-
tors which present improved oppor-
tunities for both control agreements am
increased international support.

Department of State Bulletii

NARCOTICS

We believe our four fundamental
Dolicies— acceptance by governments of
producer and transit countries of their
lational responsibilities under treaties;
the need for international assistance
from more of the wealthy and in-
iustrialized nations; the increased em-
phasis on crop control; and the in-
sistence on linkage between narcotics-
•elated economic assistance and
igreements on reducing production—
•espond correctly to these strategic con-
siderations.

Our ultimate objective is that pro-
iuction be controlled in all geographic
ireas, simultaneously. Our first priority,
■or both our direct assistance programs
ind for the projects of international
igencies which we fund, is on reducing
cultivation and production. Trafficking
)r interdiction is our second priority,
jecause we are convinced that crop con-
;rol at the source is the most effective
md economical method of reducing sup-
ply-
As U.S. enforcement agencies can

jonfirm, the problems of interdicting
irugs in transit are such that only a
small fraction is interrupted. Production
Facilities, financial assets, and drug
Droducts are highly mobile and cross
-nany national frontiers. Experience has
shown that when production declines in
)ne area, drugs from other areas are
Tioved into the market— as has hap-
Dened with both heroin and marijuana.

However, reductions in cultivation
ind production through crop con-
trol— which can take the form of
government bans on cultivation, as in
Turkey, or manual destruction as ear-
ned out in Peru, or chemical eradication
IS conducted by the Mexican Govern-
-nent- are very difficult propositions,
country to country, and present dif-
ferent degrees of complexity.

While there have been notable suc-
cesses in crop control— like in Turkey
md Mexico, and there are promising
control efforts in Peru, Pakistan, and
Burma, which we are assisting— the
first-hand reality is that worldwide crop
control is a long-term objective. The con-
ditions which are considered ideal for
mounting and sustaining an effective
crop control program include:

• an awareness of and acceptance
by the central government of the na-
tional and international impacts of their
domestic cultivation and production;

• a strong central government
which has the political will to enforce
control;

• the capability to achieve control of
the growing areas; and

• adequate resources.

With their own material inputs and
our resource assistance, Turkey and
Mexico met these conditions. But one or
more limitations have to be overcome in
other countries. For example, major
opium producers like Iran, Afghanistan,
and Laos are currently inaccessible
politically to the United States. In other
instances, like Burma and Pakistan, the
central governments do not now have
complete control over all the key grow-
ing areas.

In certain countries, considerations
of local economic and political impacts of
crop control are such that alternative
financial incentives, or control disincen-
tives that create risk for the growers,
producers, and traffickers, or both, must
be offered before an effective control
program can be negotiated or im-
plemented.

Therefore, while the Department
believes that crop control should be the
end objective sought in all negotiations
with producer countries— and we active-
ly seek to assist them in overcoming
these limitations, directly or through
multilateral assistance, such as U.N.
projects— the second reality is that we
must have a balanced program of crop
control and interdiction.

The third reality that must be con-
sidered in any assessment of our effort
is that the international narcotics control
program of the United States— whether
the focus be on crop control or interdic-
tion—can only be as effective and com-
prehensive as are the programs of the
governments with whom we negotiate.
The fourth reality is that we face a
variety of problems which must be over-
come before the problem can be brought
under control. I have already mentioned
such problems as the political inac-
cessibility of certain producer nations;
the lack of central government control
over growing areas; the political and
economic problems encountered by pro-
ducer and transit nations attempting to
exercise control over production and
trafficking; and the difficulties inherent
in interdiction. Let me add to our prob-
lem list.

First, market profiles change. In
just a decade, Turkey, Mexico, and
Pakistan have been the major sources,
in succession, for heroin entering the
United States. While agreements must
be negotiated country by country, the
control effort must be truly international
in scope.

Second, we encounter in dealing
with some foreign governments not only
a reluctance to accept responsibility for
production and trafficking, but we are
also challenged by statements that drug
abuse is an American problem.

Third, this "American responsibility"
syndrome is reflected in international
support. It is disturbing to read the list
of contributors to the U.N. Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and
realize that some industrialized and
wealthy nations contribute little or
nothing to the support of the multi-
lateral international projects sponsored
by UNFDAC in critical producer and
transit nations.

Fourth, the economics of drug abuse
currently favor illicit drug cultivation
and production and present us with
some of the most challenging problems.
Not only do the profits from the drug
trade provide incentives to growers, pro-
ducers, and traffickers, but they impact
heavily on local economies in producer
and transit nations, as well as the
United States, such as in south Florida.

Program Strategy

With those realities and problems in
mind, I will explain how our principal
policies translate into program
strategies.

Our diplomatic challenge is to raise
international consciousness of the illicit
narcotics issue to a level where
heightened acceptance of national re-
sponsibility becomes an international
reality, seen in increased action by af-
fected governments— producer nations,
transit nations, and consumer nations.

President Reagan, Vice President
Bush, Secretary Haig, the senior officers
of the Department, and our Ambas-
sadors are pressing the narcotics issue.
They have communicated to the leaders
and ministries of key nations the genu-
ine intention of this Administration to
reduce drug abuse impacts upon the
American people. This activity takes
many forms— the personal communica-
tions by Ambassador [John G.] Dean to
the King and Prime Minister of Thai-
land; the private talks between Vice
President Bush and President [Julio
Cesar] Turbay of Colombia; the discus-
sions between Ambassador [Edwin G.]
Corr and Bolivian President [Maj. Gen.
Celso] Torrelio, the talks Ambassador

47

NARCOTICS

Boyatt has described with the Colombian
Government, and the very recent discus-
sions between the Deputy Secretary and
the Jamaican Government. At another
level, there are activities such as the re-
cent meetings inaugurated by our Depu-
ty Chief of Mission in Pakistan with key
Ambassadors accredited to Pakistan to
share information and develop coopera-
tion with the Government of Pakistan on
narcotics control.

Assistant Secretary DiCarlo main-
tains an active continuing dialogue with
the leadership of key producer and tran-
sit countries. In March, Mr. DiCarlo and
Ambassador Coor obtained a commit-
ment from President Torrelio for a coca
leaf eradication project in Bolivia which
is being developed now. Earlier this
year, Mr. DiCarlo met with major
donors to UNFDAC to discuss funding
priorities and to make explicit the U.S.
position that economic assistance to nar-
cotics producers should be linked to crop
reductions. And the Assistant Secretary
and other U.S. officials this year com-
municated to the members of the U.N.
Commission on Narcotic Drugs that we
have every intention of urging govern-
ments to live up to their commitments,
both for their domestic production and
trafficking responsibilities and for their
support of the international program.
There are indications that foreign im-
pacts of drug abuse — human, economic,
and political — are improving the climate
for increased responsiveness by certain
governments on both counts.

Because of the diversity of the prob-
lems we face, the international effort
which the Department coordinates is a
program of many parts. Through our
Bureau of International Narcotics Mat-
ters, the Department is responsible for
coordinating international narcotics ac-
tivities of the U.S. Government; for
coordinating the Government's interna-
tional with its domestic activities; for
negotiating international agreements;
and for insuring cooperation with the ac-
tivities of international organizations
and foreign governments.

As Dominick DiCarlo and Peter
McPherson explained, the Bureau col-
laborates with the Agency for Interna-
tional Development on economic
development projects in such producer
nations as Peru, Pakistan, and Thailand.
The Bureau works quite closely with the
Drug Enforcement Administration on
technical assistance and training of
foreign professionals — a function in
which Customs [U.S. Customs Service]
also participates. The Bureau cooperates
with our Bureau of International
Organization Affairs in dealings with
U.N. drug control agencies and other in-
ternational organizations. And, still
within the Department, our Bureau's
programs are integrated in country
policies through close collaboration with
our regional bureaus and with the nar-
cotics coordinators in U.S. embassies.

Secretary Haig is a member of the
Cabinet Council on Legal Policy which is
addressing the objectives of drug supply
reduction. The Secretary is also a
member of the South Florida Task
Force, chaired by Vice President Bush,
which is focused on reducing problems
caused by Latin American production
and trafficking in cocaine and mari-
juana.

The Departments of State and
Justice work together on obtaining
bilateral agreements on the gathering of
information and evidence and rendering
it admissable in courts of law in other
nations. These two departments are also
negotiating treaties with the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, and Italy,
similar to the extradition and mutual
legal assistance treaties with Colombia
and the Netherlands, which the Senate
ratified in December. And agreements
have been negotiated permitting flag
vessels of other nations to be searched if
these ships are suspected of transport-
ing drugs to the United States.

Obviously, this diversity of program
activity requires close policy coordina-
tion. The Department interacts on nar-
cotics policy development with Justice,
Treasury, Commerce, Defense, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, and other
Departments through standing and ad
hoc committees.

Similarly, it meets regularly with the
Oversight Working Group assembled by
the White House Drug Abuse Policy Of-

fice; these meetings are designed to
coordinate the activities of State,
Treasury, Commerce, Justice, the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse, and
other agencies involved in both interna-
tional and domestic drug programs.

Conclusion

We have a policy, and we have a
strategy, with both short- and long-
range programs. It is a policy that is
designed to insure that the United
States is focusing upon all aspects of the
problem internationally— the cultivation,
production, and distribution of drugs,
the flow of profits, the impacts upon
other countries as well as our own, and
the development of broad-based,
multinationally supported control pro-
grams.

Recent events in several countries,
including both new agreements, reduc-
tions in crops, and major interdictions,
give reason to be optimistic — not that
we are solving or eliminating drug
abuse — but that we are making signifi-
cant progress in our more realistic objec-
tive of establishing the base for potential
control of the production and distribu-
tion of major illicit substances. I choose
these words carefully; we do not have
control, but we have improved the
possibility that the world community can>i
gain control.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be publisned by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B

ri^^r^P^W

^f CtotA □■•lla*ir

AIUCLEAR POLICY

The Challenge of Nuclear Technology

iy Harry R. Marshall, Jr.

Remarks before the Science Policy
Foundation in London on April 29,
1982. Mr. Marshall is Acting Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

Exactly 100 years ago, there appeared
in article in Scientific American which
considered the possibility that flying
■nachines would be invented one day and
then put to use in warfare. The article
discussed the revolutionary conse-
quences of such a development in quite
surprisingly accurate detail more than
30 years before aircraft first began to
nake their presence felt in battle. But
ivhat is even more striking from a con-
temporary point of view is that the
luthor of the article, forseeing the
potentially destructive impact of the
lirplane, called upon inventors, "as their
demn duty," not to employ their time
ind talents by inventing flying machines
Dut to turn their energies in other direc-
tions.

I think you would agree that, despite
lis prescience, the writer could no more
ielay the advent of the airplane by ex-
aortation than he could cancel the laws
of physics. But this is not to suggest a
fatalism in the face of the challenges
that inevitably accompany technological
progress. I do, however, want to sug-
gest in the course of my remarks today
that our responses to such challenges
3an only be effective if they are realistic.

Now the specter of nuclear con-
flagration has periodically stirred the
gmotions of citizens on both sides of the
Atlantic. Whatever the particular causes
of the current outbreak of public unease,
the desolation that would accompany a
full-scale nuclear exchange between the
weapons powers is a prospect that
should continually evoke nothing but
profound apprehension on all sides. For
policymakers in the NATO countries,
and evidently for their counterparts in
Moscow as well, the question of nuclear
war has remained the central point of
reference in the calculus of the strategic
competition between East and West.
The nuclear arsenals, especially of the
two superpowers, have represented not
only the preeminent politico-military fact
of this competition but also a constant
threat to the physical survival of the na-
tions involved. It is, therefore, only

proper and sane that a decent respect
for our own well-being and that of our
neighbors should fix the attention of
governments and public alike on the
danger latent in nuclear stockpiles, par-
ticularly those of the United States and
the Soviet Union.

While we have struggled for more
than three decades to avoid a nuclear
showdown between ourselves and the
Soviets, a new threat has arisen that
could increase geometrically the risk of
nuclear disaster— the possibility that
nuclear weapons could now spread to
nations in some of the most unstable
areas in the world.

To cope with these fundamentally
linked dangers— the fragility of the
nuclear balance between the major
powers and the possibility of further
nuclear weapons proliferation — various
simple, straightforward but unrealistic
proposals have been put forward. Faced
with the prospect of developments that
could so clearly be life-threatening, it is
understandable that recourse has been
sought to remedies that promise low-
cost relief of our tensions. Whether the
nostrum be a unilateral banning of the
bomb or nuclear freeze or a proscription
of all nuclear commerce or a halt to
development of advanced nuclear tech-
nology, history does not condone the im-
pulse to substitute wishful thinking or a
drastic quick fix for painstaking, step-
by-step labor to alleviate our ills in a
realistic manner.

In this light I would like to discuss
with you today that part of the nuclear
weapons problem with which I am
directly involved — nuclear proliferation
and its relationship to peaceful nuclear
development and international trade.

Nuclear Development and Trade

Since the beginning of the Atomic Age,
a central concern of successive
American Governments has been to min-
imize the danger that nuclear weapons
would ever be used again. As part of
that effort, and recognizing that nuclear
knowledge would spread in any event,
the United States long ago decided to
exchange its technological know-how in
the commercial uses of nuclear energy
for the opportunity to assist in guiding

this development toward exclusively
peaceful ends. Consistent with this goal,
we have developed a very careful and
strict nuclear export policy, particularly
with regard to countries of proliferation
concern. Like our pursuit of nuclear
peace through deterrence, our policy of
preventing nuclear weapons spread
while fostering commercial relations
with countries that share our concerns
has traditionally enjoyed strong support
from all sectors of responsible American
opinion.

However, from time to time, there
have been minority views that have
variously urged the United States to set
an example by banning nuclear exports
altogether or by proclaiming a slowdown
in the arrival of new nuclear tech-
nologies. One may sympathize with this
impulse to banish our troubles by fiat.
But what is less acceptable is when
those who favor these Utopian methods
try to identify proponents of a more
practical approach as enemies of arms
control and nonproliferation. In their
view, those who do not share their
orientation must be headed straight to
the opposite pole and perdition.

It is certainly easier to sit on the
sidelines and establish unassailable
credentials as a supporter of non-
proliferation by proclaiming an ab-
solutist position. If, however, the objec-
tive is to obtain the best possible inter-
national nonproliferation situation, then
you have to engage yourself on behalf of
initiatives that realistically fit the needs
and intentions of the dozens of other
sovereign nations which are also impor-
tant factors in these matters.

Although the credit must be
shared — especially with countries like
yours — it is, nevertheless, true that the
United States played a key role in the
creation of the existing international
nonproliferation system — the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) with its safeguards proce-
dures— a system which constitutes a
significant and wide-ranging compromise
of national sovereignty in the cause of
nonproliferation. Whatever the system's
shortcomings — real or imagined — it
gives one pause to consider where we
would be without it. But the point I
want to make right now is that a major
factor enabling the United States to
make a decisive contribution to the erec-
tion of a world nonproliferation regime
was not only, or even primarily, that we

49

NUCLEAR POLICY

and others perceived a need for such a
system, but rather that, as a leading
participant in nuclear trade and
repository of nuclear energy technology,
we were able to bring significant in-
fluence to bear on this issue. To the ex-
tent in recent years that we withdrew
from world commerce in this area, we
risked the progressive erosion, not just
of our industry's competitiveness but,
more to the point, of our ability to
secure sympathetic attention for our
views.

So while we maintain a restrictive
policy with regard to transfer of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology,
both to insure that U.S. exports are not

. . . as a matter of
policy as well as a re-
quirement of our law,
we would not consider
nuclear trade with a
country that did not
provide satisfactory
nonproliferation
assurances.

turned to nonpeaceful purposes and as
an inducement to encourage adherence
to reasonable nonproliferation principles
on the part of our trading partners, we
now have a full awareness of the limits
of unilaterally imposed requirements. As
with any policy instrument, effective
utilization of our export restrictions re-
quires careful recognition of their limits.
In particular, we now recognize that na-
tions are unlikely to agree to com-
prehensive nonproliferation com-
mitments solely for the sake of
American nuclear exports. There must
be other factors at work which serve to
enhance the national interest calcula-
tions of nuclear suppliers and potential
customers alike. Among those factors I
would stress the following.

• Nations must feel that their
legitimate needs in the area of peaceful
nuclear energy are assured.

• They must have a significant
degree of confidence that neighboring
countries and rivals are not clandestine
ly developing nuclear weapons under
cover of a nuclear energy or research
program.

• Perhaps most importantly, region-
al security situations must not be al-
lowed to deteriorate to a point where a
country might feel compelled to seek a
nuclear deterrent to preserve its integri
ty.

With regard to that first point, a
failure among the nuclear supplier na-
tions to reach substantial agreement, in
their trade with one another and with
less technologically developed nations,
on the conditions under which they will
export nuclear technology, can serve to
undermine the cause of nonproliferation.
In particular, it can lead to a situation
where the less responsible are encour-
aged to undercut nonproliferation con-
siderations in an unseemly competition
for reactor contracts. At the same time,
driven by an alarmed public opinion,
other nations may be moved to impose
conditions that jeopardize even the most
legitimate uses of nuclear energy. Both
tendencies work to discredit the non-
proliferation endeavor and destabilize
the consensus on which it depends. For
the question is not whether nuclear
energy will develop but how.

More specifically, when the Reagan
Administration took office, the question
before us was whether international
nuclear commerce was going to proceed
with or without a significant American
presence. As this Administration has
repeatedly stressed we are determined
to restore the competitiveness of U.S.
fu-ms in nuclear trade.

In pursuit of this goal, we will
distinguish among the countries of the
world according to their nonproliferation
merit just as, in our exports of military
equipment, for example, we differentiate
among potential recipients according to
similar assessments of how they are like-
ly to use these items of U.S. supply. It
should go without saying that, as a mat-
ter of policy as well as a requirement of
our law, we would not consider nuclear
trade with a country that did not pro-
vide satisfactory nonproliferation
assurances.

For our traditional allies and nuclear
trading partners, we have already
signaled a sharp break from some of the
policies of the last Administration—
which often seemed to treat all nations
with equal suspicion on nuclear mat-
ters—and a return to a more traditional
and common sense approach.

For other countries with the req-
uisite credentials on the proliferation

:

question, our task has been to
demonstrate with concrete commitments
that the United States wUl be a reliable
source of nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes in projects that will
stretch out to the end of this decade and
beyond. To that end we have opened an
extensive dialogue with a number of na-
tions which are contemplating initiation
or expansion of peaceful nuclear power
projects. For example, with the en-
couragement and participation of the
U.S. Government, American nuclear
vendors have been actively involved m
discussions with the Government of
Mexico on its extensive plans for the
long-range development of nuclear
power. While no decisions have yet been
made by the Mexican authorities, the
talks have proceeded in an increasingly
positive vein on both sides and have
been an important indication to us that
we are on the right track.

China is another country in the proc
ess of making decisions on possible
foreign involvement in projects under
consideration for the commercial produc
tion of nuclear energy. Although its
plans for economic development are in a
process of evolution, China clearly has
significant potential to expand its in-
volvement in world nuclear commerce
both as an exporter of nuclear materials
and an importer of modem reactor
technology. In our discussions with the
Chinese Government over the past year,
we have declared our willingness to
make appropriate American technology
available if suitable arrangements can b
worked out. Over time, China has the
potential to be a major participant in
nuclear trade, and its support of the in-
ternational nonproliferation regime
could be correspondingly important.
Therefore, one of our primary purposes
in our dialogue is to encourage the
Chinese Government in this direction.

The nuclear cooperation agreement
which the United States and Egypt
signed last year is a striking example of
how a concern for proliferation can be
accommodated in arrangements that
provide a nuclear power development.
With the electrical utilities in Korea anc
Taiwan, also, our traditional association
with the safe development of nuclear
power has been reaffirmed in recent
months. In all of these cases, and a
number of others as well, we are en-
couraged that, although its implementa
tion is still incomplete, the Reagan Ad-
ministration's new approach to nuclear
cooperation is beginning to bear visible
fruit.

Department of State Bullet

NUCLEAR POLICY

[echanisms of the
onprofileration Consensus

[y second point concerns the
lechanisms of the nonproliferation con-
snsus I mentioned a moment ago— the
IPT, its Latin American analogue (the
reaty of Tlatelolco), the IAEA, and the
greements of the members of the
uclear suppUers group.

A great deal of public attention has
ecently been focused on the adequacy
f the IAEA to monitor effectively
luclear operations in the countries
ifhere its safeguards inspections are in
orce. At one extreme of this issue,
here are those who are content to state
hat, if IAEA safeguards are being ap-
)lied in a given situation, all must, by
lefinition, be in perfect order and that
lothing further need be said. At the op-
i)Osite extreme are critics of the IAEA
ystem who reason that, since there are
mdeniable flaws at least in some parts
.f the apparatus, we should reject it en-
tirely or, at best, we should halt nuclear
ommerce across the board until the
J.S. Government has dictated the
lecessary corrections to the rest of the

VOT\d. . ,

Our approach is to be realistic and
)ractical. While we must squarely face
he real problems of the IAEA, we are
lot going to let our awareness of its
hortcomings displace our recognition of
he vital role it successfully accomplishes
a scores of nations. The fact that
egitimate questions might be raised
ibout safeguards at particular facilities
n countries of serious proliferation cr)n-
■ern does not, in fact, call into question
he whole safeguards undertaking. Any
;ecurity monitoring system is theo-
•etically liable to subversion and could,
n practice, be defeated at some level of
)robability. But the confidence placed by
' veil over 100 nations in the ability of
his inspections system to warn of a
luclear materials diversion has turned
>ut to have been justified by experience.
The objective, of course, is to deter an
■ ittempt at diversion by posing a
significantly high risk of detection.
These procedures have been proven ef-
fective, and this has been of immeas-
irable importance in assuring countries
ihat their security is not being threat-
ened by unseen developments of nuclear
weapons at these facilities. For these
reasons the current American Ad-
ministration, in word and deed, has been
at pains to assure the international com-
munity of our continued full support for
the IAEA.

As many of you are aware, the proc-
ess of selecting a new IAEA Director
General last fall was a long and
laborious one. The diplomatic efforts ex-
pended by my government and by others
who share our commitment to the effec-
tiveness of this agency were successful
and are indicative of the importance of
the objective. Director General Blix
[Hans Blix of Sweden] is continuing the
agency's tradition of impartial devotion
to the cause of nonproliferation and has
our firm support.

Beyond the scope of the IAEA and
its associated international nonprolifera-
tion treaties, the agreements among the
nuclear suppliers group also have a key
role in our efforts to contain the spread
of nuclear weapons. In keeping with the
Administration's preference for quiet
diplomacy, we have been consulting on a
bilateral basis with other nuclear ex-
porters on the full range of nuclear sup-
ply topics. It should come as no surprise
to those who watch these matters close-
ly that this approach gives greater
promise of success than U.S. attempts
to prescribe unilaterally the shape and
content of the group's nuclear com-
merce.

Similarly, past U.S. efforts to deter
international reprocessing and use of
Plutonium in advanced reactors by pro-'
hibiting or delaying such use in the
United States and other advanced
nuclear power states has been aban-
doned. But that is not at all to say that
we encourage all conceivable devel-
opments along this line. Rather, we fully
recognize that plutonium is extremely
sensitive material because it can be used
to make explosives and that its use,
therefore, should be carefully controlled
and monitored. As long as countries are
concerned about their energy security
and independence, we will have to face
the likelihood that these nations will pro-
ceed to seek to develop plutonium fuels.

As in other questions of nuclear
cooperation, just as in every other area
of foreign policy, this Administration
will base its decisions on an evaluation
of the concrete facts in each cir-
cumstance. In other words, we will
decide the issue on the basis of the non-
proliferation merits of the country in-
volved. With regard to plutonium use,
this means restricting use of U.S. -origin
materials to countries with advanced
nuclear programs where it does not pose
a proliferation danger. A safe regime for
plutonium use, like other nonprolifera-
tion measures, is not one that can be im-
posed by the United States on an other-
wise unwilling world but rather one that

would require a consensus composed of
multiple decisions by individual
sovereign nations.

Factors that figure prominently in
our deliberations on this sensitive issue
are the following.

• What is the country's overall
record on nonproliferation? This is ob-
viously the key indicator.

• Is such use justified economically?
If this is not the case, a serious question
may be raised about other ends the ac-
tivity may be intended to serve.

• It may be desirable to confine
plutonium fuel cycle facilities to as few
locations as possible. With this in view,
the United States remains seriously in-
terested in exploring cooperative ar-
rangements for the establishment of
multilateral facilities where the economic
need might exist.

• Plutonium use is needed for
breeder development and may become a
valuable energy source for some coun-
tries. In our relations with these coun-
tries, we must be able to provide a large
measure of predictability about how we
intend to exercise our consent rights
regarding plutonium produced from U3
material.

• Reprocessing, besides its need tor
breeder reactors, may be a useful waste
management tool. In any event, reproc-
essing for waste management should be
considered an option only where it does
not pose a proliferation risk.

In accordance with the instructions
contained in President Reagan's July 16

As long as countries are
concerned about their
energy security and in-
dependence, we will
have to face the
likelihood that these na-
tions will proceed to
seek to develop
plutonium fuels.

statement on nuclear cooperation and
nonproliferation, the agencies of the
U.S. Government are conducting a study
to develop a policy for considering the
exercise of consent rights for reprocess-
ing and plutonium use on a more long-

September 1982

51

NUCLEAR POLICY

term and predictable basis. We started
this review in the United States last
summer. Our initial consideration re-
vealed a number of complex factors, and
much more time and energy was
necessary for completion of this task
than originally envisaged. The work, for
the most part, has been completed now,
and this policy should be forthcoming
very soon. This approach will recognize
that countries with large programs re-
quire long-term confidence and predicta-
bility in their supply arrangements. We
are aiming at developing policies which
will facilitate long-term planning by our
cooperating partners. In the interim, we
have been promptly approving, subject
to statutory requirements, requests for
retransfer of spent fuel to the United
Kingdom and France and will consider
requests for plutonium use on a case-by
case basis.

Related to this question of foreign
reprocessing and use of U.S. -origin
material is the issue of military use by
the United States of the plutonium in
spent commercial reactor fuel. While
this question was examined as part of
the new Administration's overall review,
the decision has been to continue the
traditional American policy, we have no
plans to employ nuclear material
generated in the civil nuclear sector in
the U.S. military program. Given the im-
portance of maintaining a clear distinc-
tion between the peaceful and the
mDitary uses of nuclear energy, as well
as the serious domestic international and
nonproliferation implications of such a
step, we would consider military use of
U.S. material in civil use only if ab-
solutely essential for our national securi-
ty and that of our allies — which is
precisely where American policy has
stood for decades. Such a decision would
require a decision at the highest level of
the U.S. Government and consultations
with the U.S. Congress. When the
United States imports nuclear material
under a peaceful use assurance, such
material must remain dedicated for
civilian applications only. It could be
removed from this category only with
the agreement of the supplier nation.

Security Concerns

After everything has been said about
safeguarding nuclear facilities, supplier
guidelines, controlling plutonium use and
so forth, the fact remains that the prob-
lem of nuclear weapons is, in the final
analysis, an international political prob-
lem, a problem of national security. As

Reprocessing and Plutonium Use

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 9, 1982'

You will recall that the presidential
policy statement on nuclear cooperation
and nonproliferation of July 16, 1981,
directed the Secretary of State, in
cooperation with other responsible agen-
cies, to give priority attention to efforts
to reduce proliferation risks, to enhance
the international nonproliferation
regime, and, consistent with U.S. securi-
ty interests, to reestablish a leadership
role for the United States in interna-
tional nuclear affairs. Under this man-
date, one of the follow-on reviews has
focused on approaches for a more
predictable policy for exercising U.S.
rights to approve reprocessing and use
of plutonium subject to U.S. control
under our peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreements.

That review has now been com-
pleted, and the President has decided
that in certain cases, the United States
will offer to work out predictable, pro-
grammatic arrangements for reprocess-
ing and plutonium use for civilian power

and research needs, in the context of
seeking new or amended agreements as
required by law. These agreements
would involve only countries with effec-
tive commitments to nonproliferation,
where there are advanced nuclear power
programs, and where such activities do
not constitute a proliferation risk and
are under effective safeguards and con-
trols.

U.S. approval will be given only if
U.S. statutory criteria are met and will
be valid only as long as these criteria
and other conditions in the agreements
continue to apply.

It should be noted that the United
States has been approving reprocessing
requests on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis
under existing agreements for many
years. What the President has now ap-
proved is a new approach to granting
long-term approvals in certain cases for
the life of specific, carefully defined pro-
grams, as long as the conditions I have
described are met.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

important as all the measures being
discussed are to delaying, deterring, or
discouraging the spread of nuclear
weapons over the near term, there are
simply too many nations that, given the
political will, can hardly be prevented
from acquiring the necessary technical
and industrial wherewithal to build
nuclear arms in the long run. This
brings me to my final point — the need to
address the security concerns that may
often motivate a government to seek a
nuclear explosives option in the first
place.

In this connection, the case of
Pakistan is illustrative. In 1979 the
United States terminated all assistance
—military and economic— to this long-
time ally as a result of its nuclear pro-
gram intended to put Pakistan in posi-
tion to make nuclear explosives.
However, our aid cutoff did not have the
intended result of dissuading Pakistan
from its pursuit of this nuclear weapons
option.

But for the unprovoked Soviet ag-
gression in Afghanistan, matters might
have continued as they were, with
Pakistan proceeding toward the testing

of a nuclear device and our two coun-
tries fundamentally estranged over the
issue. However, just over 2 years ago at
the time of the Soviet invasion, the
Carter Administration recognized that
the situation had been fundamentally
altered. It became necessary to attempt
to address Pakistan's legitimate and
urgent security concerns, most directly
by assisting it to improve its conven-
tional military capabilities.

Although the Carter Administra-
tion's efforts in this direction were not
successful, the Reagan Administration
moved decisively last year to work out
an assistance package with the Govern-
ment of Pakistan. We believe that this
assistance— which is in the strategic in-
terest of the United States— will make a
significant contribution to the well-being
and security of Pakistan and that it will
be recognized as such by that govern-
ment. We also believe that, for this
reason, it offers the best prospect of
deterring the Pakistanis from pro-
ceeding to the testing or acquisition of
nuclear explosives, for we have left the

52

Department of State Bulletin

NUCLEAR POLICY

lakistanis in no doubt that such a move
1 their part would necessarily and fun-
imentally alter the premises of our
pw security relationship with them.

The task of addressing all the
jgional security concerns which are the
•ound in which the impulse to seek
iclear armaments can germinate is one
at not only goes beyond the scope of
:;y remarks here today but also one that
;i quires the active involvement of a
;!rge body of nations. In particular, I
live in mind the members of NATO and
1e other nations of the Organization of
leonomic Cooperation and Development
fECD). The friendly cooperation that
( ists among this group is already a
] omising example to the rest of the
orld, but a great deal more remains to
t done.

In recent weeks and months, some
i' you may have seen articles from the
imerican press criticizing, in tones of
iinsiderable alarm, the new directions
id out by the Reagan Administration in
liclear cooperation and nonproliferation
;)licy.

First, it has once again been sug-
isted, for example, that the United
ates should ban all commercial use of
utonium fuel and prohibit the use
)road of such fuel from American
lurces. Not surprisingly, the writer
ils to demonstrate how an American
ish can be transformed into a universal
ality any more than an order to
•ound all U.S. airlines and close down
ic Boeing Corporation would bring the
re of the airplane to an end. Clearly
le United States and the other ad-
mced nuclear power nations have a
jed to develop and utilize plutonium for
lergy production.

Second, we are told we should pro-
bit the export of highly enriched
■anium for research reactors, forget-
ng that such U.S. exports go only to
)untries with excellent nonproliferation
•edentials, including some of our
osest allies and trading partners. Such
move would only punish the most
^sponsible governments while leaving
le less-so unaffected. It seems to me
I lat the fallacy in the thinking of those

I ho advocate these self-defeating
jurses of action is that they imagine
le world to be a small New England
)wn where everyone can be treated
:jually before the law and can,
lerefore, logically demand fuU benefit
f any precedent. In the real world, this
. manifestly not the case. The especially
lose relationship between the United

States and the United Kingdom in
nuclear, as well as in other, matters
does not logically set a precedent on
how we or other countries should act in
basically different circumstances, nor
should it.

Third, among the proposals for set-
tling international issues like nuclear
proliferation, there is always a sugges-
tion that we call an international con-
ference— in this case reconvening the
nuclear suppliers group. Such con-
ferences have their uses — and we have
had no lack of them in recent years—
but at the moment the clear preference
of the nuclear suppliers is for quiet
diplomacy. We, therefore, feel that such
a multilateral meeting of the suppliers
would be counterproductive.

Fourth, it is likewise easy to
prescribe remedies for the IAEA. We
have been told, for example, that there
should be more numerous and unan-
nounced inspections and that inspection
reports should be published. All of this,
and much more, would be fine in
another world than the one that exists.
The fact is that the IAEA is an entirely
voluntary association of sovereign na-
tions.

Unannounced inspections already
are a component of the IAEA system
but, because of the complexity of the
facilities to be visited, they cannot serve
as the primary means of inspection. In-
spections are carried out pursuant to an
agreed arrangement — something called
a facility attachment. What nation, in-
cluding Britain or the United States,
would confer an open license to an inter-
national inspector to simply wander
through any private or government
facility he happened upon? Finally, na-
tions make much information available
to the IAEA for one reason— because it
is to be kept confidential. This is for
valid proprietary and national security
reasons. Publishing IAEA inspection
reports would obviously destroy this con-
fidence.

The inspection system of that agen-
cy already involves a unique delegation
of sovereignty achieved after long ef-
fort. A move to extend dramatically this
delegation of sovereignty by relying en-
tirely on unannounced inspections, giv-
ing inspectors authority to roam around
the countryside, or publishing reports on
what countries consider proprietary and
national security matters is simply
unrealistic.

Fifth, a perennial component of
recipes for addressing a difficult prob-
lem seems to be that we should turn the

matter over to an independent agency.
In the current case, we have heard that
we should consolidate all U.S. nuclear
export and retransfer authority in the
independent Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC). While such bodies can
have a useful role in government — and,
indeed, in the United States the NRC
has an established statutory respon-
sibility— issuance of nuclear export ac-
tions are largely foreign policy matters.
In recent years much has been done in
the executive branch to insure the prop-
er review of requested export action.
Considerable effort is extended before
favorable action is taken. Vesting such
authority in a largely technical, domestic
agency would have the effect of divorc-
ing foreign policy from the decisionmak-
ing.

Sixth, we have been criticized for
not living up to our NPT obligations to
pursue immediate strategic arms reduc-
tions with the Soviet Union. For over a
decade, the two superpowers have
engaged in this pursuit. There have been
some achievements and some disappoint-
ments, but we certainly will not agree to
measures which do not reflect balanced
reductions or which cannot be adequate-
ly verified. Nevertheless, as the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State have
clearly said, we remain ready to proceed
in good faith toward the objective of
arms control and reduction.

After everything has
been said about
safeguarding nuclear
facilities . . . the fact re-
mains that the problem
of nuclear weapons
is ... a problem of na-
tional security.

WhUe I very much sympathize with
the motives of those who offer these
criticisms of our policy and I entirely
share their goal of a more secure world,
I must, nevertheless suggest that this
kind of exaggerated and unbalanced ap-
proach is not a positive contribution to
an intelligent dialogue on this vital sub-
ject.

sntemhor 1Qfl9

53

SOUTH ASIA

The Administration welcomes and
encourages public discussion of nuclear
nonproliferation issues. In a democracy
such as ours, policies related to national
security matters, as well as success in
negotiating effective agreements to con-
trol the spread of nuclear weapons, de-
pend upon popular support. Over the
past several months, these vital ques-
tions have become the subjects of re-
newed interest and examination. We are
certain that as public discussion pro-
ceeds, and as the Administration's
policies in this area become more widely
understood, they will win broad support
at home and abroad.

In conclusion, I hope that, in my talk
here today, I have been able to indicate
that the government in Washington fully
shares the concerns on this nuclear issue
that naturally worry any reflective per-
son and that some of these criticisms we
have seen are based on a fundamental
misconception of our policy. I hope, also,
that I have made plain my belief that,
while there is little cause for complacen-
cy on the matter of nonproliferation,
there are, by the same token, strong
grounds for rejecting extreme and im-
practical solutions that could only be
counterproductive. ■

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of In-
dia made an official visit to the United
States July 28-August U. 1982. While in
Washington, D.C., July 28-31, she met
with President Reagan and other govern-
ment officials.

Following are remarks made at the
welcoming ceremony, toasts made at the
state dinner, and Department state-
ments.

WELCOMING CEREMONY,
JULY 29. 19821

President Reagan

Prime Minister Gandhi, Nancy and I are
delighted to welcome you to the White
House. Let me add a personal note. It is
good to see you here again as leader of
the great Indian democracy, which pro-
vides a unique opportunity for us to
broaden and deepen the dialog we began
last autumn in Mexico. Through our
talks, we can help to reach a renewed
recognition of the mutual importance of
strong, constructive ties between India
and the United States.

In searching for words to describe
the focus of your visit to Washington
this week, I came upon a statement that
you had made in Delhi when Roy
Jenkins visited in 1980. At that time,
you said, "The great need in the world
today is to so define national interest
that it makes for greater harmony,
greater equality and justice, and greater
stability in the world." That is more than
an eloquent description of enlightened
national interest. It can also serve to

describe the foundation of the relation-
ship between the United States and In-
dia, a relationship we seek to reaffirm
this week. A strengthening of that rela-
tionship, based on better understanding,
is particularly important at this time.

Your father once said that the basic
fact of today is the tremendous pace of
change in human life. The conflicts and
the tensions of the 1980's pose new
challenges to our countries and to all na-
tions which seek, as India and the
United States do, freedom in a more
stable, secure, and prosperous world. As
leaders of the world's two largest
democracies, sharing common ideals and
values, we can learn much from one
another in discussing concerns and ex-
ploring national purposes. From this
understanding can come greater con-
fidence in one another's roles on the
world's stage and a rediscovery of how
important we are to one another.

We recognize that there have been
differences between our countries, but
these should not obscure all that we
have in common, for we are both strong,
proud, and independent nations guided
by our own perceptions of our national
interests. We both desire the peace and
stability of the Indian Ocean area and
the early end of the occupation of
Afghanistan. We both seek an equitable
peace in the Middle East and an honor-
able settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

We both seek a constructive ap-
proach to international economic
cooperation, building on the strong links
even today being forged between the
economies of the United States and In-
dia. Beyond that, India and the United
States are bound together by the

strongest, most sacred ties of all — the
practice of democratic freedoms denied
to many peoples by their governments.
My devout hope is that, during this
visit, we can weave together all these
threads of common interest into a new
and better understanding between our
two countries.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan, to me
every journey is an adventure; I can say
that this one is an adventure in search
of understanding and friendship.

It is difficult to imagine two nations!
more different than ours. As history
goes, your country is a young one. Ovepj
the years, it has held unparalleled at- |
traction for the adventurous and daring !
for the talented as well as for the perse
cuted. It has stood for opportunity and
freedom. The endeavors of the early
pioneers, the struggle for human values
the coming together of different races
have enabled it to retain its elan and
dynamism of youth. With leadership anti
high ideals, it has grown into a great
power. Today, its role in world affairs i!i|
unmatched. Every word and action of
the President is watched and weighed
and has global repercussions.

India is an ancient country, and
history weighs heavily on us. The
character of its people is formed by the
palimpsest of its varied experiences. Thi
circumstances of its present develop-
ment are shadowed by its years of co-
lonialism and exploitation. Yet, our an-
cient philosophy has withstood all
onslaughts, absorbing newcomers,
adapting ideas and cultures. We have
developed endurance and resilience.

In India, our preoccupation is with
building and development. Our problem
is not to influence others but to con-
solidate our political and economic inde-
pendence. We believe in freedom with a
passion that only those who have been
denied it can understand. We believe in
equality, because many in our country
were so long deprived of it. We believe
in the worth of the human being, for
that is the foundation of our democracy
and our work for development. That is
the framework of our national pro-
grams.

We have no global interests, but we
are deeply interested in the world and
its affairs. Yet, we cannot get involved
in power groupings. That would be
neither to our advantage, nor would it
foster world peace. Our hand of friend-

^t 0«A*.^ Di.llntlr

SOUTH ASIA

|hip is stretched out to all. One friend-
ship does not come in the way of
linother. This is not a new stand; that
lias been my policy since I became Prime
Vlinister in 1966.

No two countries can have the same
ingle of vision, but each can try to ap-
jreciate the points of view of the others,
lur effort should be to find a common
irea, howsoever small, on which to build
ind to enhance cooperation. I take this
ipportunity to say how much we in In-
iia value the help we have received from
he United States in our stupendous
asks.

I look forward to my talks with you
ind getting to know the charming
virs. Reagan. I thank you for your kind
nvitation, for your welcome, and your
^acious words. I bring to you, to the
•"irst Lady, and to the great American
)eople the sincere greetings and good
vishes of the government and people of
ndia.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS,
ULY 29, 19822

'resident Reagan

t has been a personal pleasure for me
0 welcome Prime Minister Gandhi back
0 this city and to this house today.

The Prime Minister and I and
lecretary Shultz and other members of
'ur Government have had a long and
neaningful discussion on a wide range
>f subjects. Often, we came at these sub-
sets from different perspectives born of
lifferent national experiences and roles
n the world. But throughout, I have
leen struck by the strength, the in-
elligence, and the determination of the
'rime Minister, not only in explaining
ler views but in seeking a clear under-
tanding of ours. The dialog of discovery
hat we began at Cancun matured in our
liscussions today and will, I trust, bear
mportant fruit in the days and years
ihead.

During our recent visit to Europe I
lad the honor of addressing a joint ses-
iion of the British Parliament. It seemed
'itting to build my speech around the
;oncept of democracy which that Mother
)f Parliaments represents. We sought to
irticulate the deep and abiding faith of
;he American people placed in our demo-
;ratic institutions and the idea that an
mmutable bond draws democratic coun-
;ries together.

One of the nations I singled out was
India. I chose India in that speech for
two reasons. India's experience since in-
dependence exemplifies the gathering
strength of the democratic revolution.
And India stands in eloquent refutation
of all those who argue that democratic
institutions are not equal to the task of
dealing with today's problems, or are ir-
relevant to the needs of today's develop-
ing nations. For these reasons, India
serves as a beacon not only to develop-
ing nations which seek to emulate its ex-
perience but to all of us who seek
renewal of our faith in democracy.

You can understand why we are
honored to have you here. It is not only
because you're the leader of a great na-
tion— one whose history, civilization,
size, and influence on the world com-
mand our attention and respect — but
also because you're the representative of
a family which has been, in so many
ways, the architect of that nation.

The contributions which your family
has made to India most closely parallel,
in our history, the Adams family. They
came from Massachusetts, not Kashmir.
They came — by coincidence they were
often referred to as Boston Brahmins.
[Laughter] And theirs, too, was a tradi-
tion of scholarship, sacrifice, and public
service. Successive generations of
Adamses contributed to our national
development — first, by struggling for in-
dependence and articulating our national
ideals, then through years of selfless ef-
fort toward their attainment. So you,
your father, and each of your sons have
served India.

Lord Bolingbroke's description of
the Adams family is equally appropriate
for your family's contribution to India.
"They are the guardian angels of the
country they inhabit, studious to avert
the most distant evil and to procure
peace, plenty, and the greatest of human
blessings, liberty."

The recent summit at Versailles
proved once again, as I told the British
Parliament, that even in times of severe
economic strain, free peoples can work
together freely and voluntarily to ad-
dress problems as serious as inflation,
unemployment, trade, and economic
development in a spirit of cooperation
and solidarity. In our bilateral relation-
ship as well, democratic principles are
the foundation on which we can build
the framework of a lasting and durable
friendship. The day-to-day reality of our
close ties, whether in the fields of educa-
tion, the arts, science, or commerce, all

flow from the same basic understanding
that although our countries may travel
separate paths from time to time, our
destination remains the same.

For my part, our talks today were
particularly useful in reaffirming the in-
herent strength of our relationship. Our
frank discussions have contributed
greatly to the stripping away of stereo-
types which have sometimes surrounded
our relations. We look forward now to a
renewal of cooperation based on the
shared understanding of our common
values and our common aspirations.

In this spirit, I raise my glass to you
as the distinguished leader of a great
sister democracy and to the friendship
between our two proud, free peoples.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Entering the White House, one cannot
but think of the men of vision and
energy and the women of character and
grace who have lived here, who have in-
fluenced people's minds and the course
of world events. Awesome, indeed, are
the responsibilities of the United States
and its President. In far-off India, at a
time when communications were not as
satisfactory, our own freedom struggle
drew inspiration from the makers of
your nation. How farseeing and wise
they were, and how well they built.

The first President, who chose this
site had a simple wish, and I quote: "I
hope ever to see America amongst the
foremost nations in examples of justice
and liberality." Since those words were
uttered, the United States has become
the world's foremost country in wealth,
in technology, and in vigor of intellect.
The combination of these qualities is, in-
deed, something of which you can be
justifiably proud.

America has grown through chal-
lenge, not conformism. To quote a
historian: "America was born of revolt,
flourished in dissent, and became great
through experimentation."

Our challenges in India have not
been less. We have charted our own
course, fortunate in leaders who took
sustenance from our timeless
philosophy, as well as modern concepts,
putting them to work as instruments of
action.

Our national movement reinforced
the age-old unity which had held our
country together through the ups and
downs of history, across the shifting

Fientcrnhpr 1Qft9

55

SOUTH ASIA

India— A Profile

Geography

Area: 3,287,590 sq. km. (1,269,340 sq. mi.);
about twice the size of Alaska. Capital: New
Delhi (pop. 5.2 milHon). Other Major Cities:
Calcutta (9 million), Bombay (8 million),
Madras (4 million). Bangalore (3 million),
Hyderabad (2.6 million), Ahmedabad (2.5
million). Terrain: Varies from Himalaya
mountains to flat Gangetic Plain. Climate:
Temperate to subtropical monsoon.

People

Population: 684 million; urban 21.5% (1981
census). Annual Growth Rate: 2.24%. Densi-
ty: 221/sq. km. (572/sq. mi.). Ethnic Groups:
72% Indo-Aryan, 25% Dravidian, 2%
Mongoloid, others. Religions: Hindu 83%,
Muslim 11%, Christian 2.6%, Sikh, Jain, Bud-
dhist, Parsi. Languages: Hindi, English, and
14 other official languages. Education: Years
compulsory — 9 (to age 14). Literacy — 36%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (1978 est.)—
139/1,000. Life expectancy— 5A yrs.

Government

Type: Federal Republic. Date of In-
dependence: August 15, 1947. Constitution:
January 26, 1950. Branches: Executive —
president (chief of state), prime minister
(head of government). Council of Ministers
(cabinet). Legislative — bicameral Parliament
(Rajya Sahha or Council of States and Lok
Sabha or House of the People). Judicial —
Supreme Court. Political Parties: Congress
(I), Congress (S), Lok Dal, Bharatiya Party,
Janata Party, Communist Parties (CPI and
CPM). Suffrage: Universal over 21. Political
Subdivisions: 22 states, 9 imion territories.
Central Government Budget (1981-82 est.):
$21.85 billion. Defense Expenditures
(1972-80 est.): 3.1% of GNP.

Economy*

GNP: $167 billion. Real Growth Rate: 4%.
Per CapiU GNP: $245. Real Per Capita
GNP Growth Rate: 2%. Annual Inflation
Rate 1981: 10%. Natural Resources: Coal,
iron ore, manganese, mica, bauxite, chromite,
limestone, barite. Agriculture (43% of GNP):
Products — textiles, jute, processed food,
steel, machinery, transport equipment, ce-
ment, aluminum, fertilizers. Trade: Ex-
ports— $9.1 billion: engineering goods, cotton
apparel and fabrics, precious stones, handi-
crafts, tea. Imports — $16.1 billion: petroleum,
edible oils, machinery and transport equip-

India

International boundary

® National capital

Railroad

Road
.f* International airiiort

- 10

NICOBAI'
ISt»NDS

ment, fertilizer. Major partners — U.S.,
U.S.S.R., Japan, U.K., Iraq, Iran. Currency:
Rupee, divided into 100 paise. Official Ex-
change Rate (1981-82): 8.8 rupees = U.S.$l.
Economic Aid (1947-80): Total— %Zb.\
billion: multinational lending agencies and
OECD, Communist, and OPEC countries.
U.S. aid—%\\.l billion, of which AID $4
billion, PL 480 $6.1 billion, Exim Bank loans
$614 million, wheat loans $244 million.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Nonaligned Movement, Commonwealth,
Colombo Plan, Asian Development Bank

(ADB), International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank, INTELSAT.

•All figures are 1981-82 estimates. I

56

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

)orders of hundreds of kingdoms, and
bridging succeeding dynasties. After in-
iependence it was our task to usher in a
nore egalitarian society which would in-
sure social and economic justice to all
■egardless of religion, caste, language,
)r sex. For us economic progress means
lot only material well-being but moving
learly 500 million from one age to
mother, with the minimum dislocation
)r alienation from their roots.

Few things are good or bad in
;hemselves. Their effect and importance
ies in what one makes of them. Tradi-
;ion, especially ours, which has been a
"actor for unity, for tolerance, and har-
nony, and for our people's cultural
iteracy, can be used as a tool, paradox-
cal though it may sound, for change and
Tiodernity. Life for a person or a coun-
;ry is a series of choices, not between
;he correct and the incorrect, which a
lomputer can make, but in terms of opt-
ng for a course which will be consistent
ffith our ethos and individuality, our
Dast history and future aspirations.

Our struggle for independence was
lonviolent. We chose democracy based
)n the British system but with some
■nodifications, and the American Con-
3titution influenced the shaping of our
•)wn constitution. Our planning is not for
•egimentation but to help us to take ra-
;ional decisions and meet the competing
iemands of different sections of society
md regions.

In India, as in the U.S.A., we have a
orivate sector as well as a public sector.
[ see no conflict between the two. We
lave persevered in the face of criticism,
Df aggression, of different types of in-
terferences. We are not satisfied with
Dur success; we could have done better.
^et, notwithstanding the tremendous
Ddds, we have moved forward.

There has been significant progress
n agriculture and industry, in science
ind technology, and in the social serv-
ces. The very fact that life expectancy
las gone up by 20 years indicates im-
DFOvement in living and working condi-
;ions. We aim at self-reliance. So, it is
Defitting that 90% of the resources need-
;d for this gigantic endeavor of modern-
zing the country have come from our
3wn people, impoverished though they
ire thought to be. But the remaining
10% or so is important, for that
represents the inflow of modem
technology.

In this, we have been helped by the
United States, by countries of Western

Prime Minister Gandhi attends dinner in her honor hosted by the President and
Mrs. Reagan.

September 1982

57

SOUTH ASIA

and Eastern Europe, and several inter-
national institutions. We particularly ap-
preciate American technical assistance.
In consonance with our independent
stand, we take cooperation in science,
trade, or defense requirements from
wherever it suits our national interest.

If India were considered in economic
or military terms, it would not count.
Yet, our voice is heard, because in spite
of our poverty and economic backward-
ness and often looking beyond our im-
mediate interests, we have fearlessly
spoken up for the rights of the under-
privileged and the threatened and have
championed the cause of peace and
freedom. We have always viewed our
problems in the much larger perspective
of global problems.

Our foreign policy is one of friend-
ship for all, hence our nonalignment. We
are against the involvement of foreign
troops or any other interference in the
internal affairs of other countries. We
believe in negotiations rather than the
use of arms in settling disputes.

India is a large area of stability in
South Asia. Undoubtedly, its strengthen-
ing will help to stabilize and strengthen
the entire region.

It is good that meetings between
heads of state and government, in-
dividually and at conferences, are taking
place more often. They do take us away
from urgent tasks at home, but national
and international problems are increas-
ingly interlinked. Canciin dealt with
various global issues, VersaOles with the
economic and other problems of the
North, touching also on North-South
questions. At the New Delhi Meeting of
Developing Countries, the focus was on
cooperation between themselves.

On earlier occasions I have pointed
out that the future of advanced and
developing countries is so closely inter-
twined that cooperation would benefit
both. This is not merely a question of
social justice and equity. My own view is
that developing countries can contribute
significantly to the emerging world
economic order. Theirs are the potential-
ly large markets which would help devel-
oped countries like the United States to
maintain higher profitability on their in-
vestment, higher rates of growth, and to
generate more employment.

To our minds there are three main
causes of the present disturbing situa-
tion: the growth of armaments; the in-
creasing disparity between the rich and
the poor — both between and within na-
tions; and the thoughtless wounding of
our Earth.

The world is one, yet we treat it as
many, giving different names to the
segments. As they are politically used,
the words. East and West, North and
South, are not even geographically apt.
More than 3,000 years ago, when the
world was greener, the sages of my
country wrote an ode to the Earth. It is
so pertinent today that I should like to
share some lines with you.

"Do not push me from the west or from
the east, or from the north or the south;

Be gracious to us, 0 Earth; let not those
find us who waylay people on the road;

Take deadly weapons far away from us."

May I say how much I appreciate
your invitation to me. In a world where
crises so swiftly follow one another, it is
important to keep in touch and exchange
views even if one cannot agree on all
points.

We have had, as you have just told
us, discussions which have been impor-
tant and useful to us and, I think, which
have created better understanding. I
thank you once again, and Mrs. Reagan,
for your gracious hospitality, for this
delightful evening in such elegant and
impressive surroundings.

May I now ask you all, ladies and
gentlemen, to join me in a toast to the
health of the President and the gracious
First Lady, to the well-being of the
American people, and to friendship be-
tween our two countries.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 29,19823

In the context of Prime Minister
Gandhi's visit this week the Govern-
ments of India and the United States
have significantly enhanced the friendly
relations between the two countries by
agreeing to resolve the matter of supply
of low enriched uranium to India's
Tarapur atomic power station.

The two governments, after con-
sulting with the Government of France,
have reached a solution which envisages
the use of French-supplied low enriched

uranium at Tarapur while keeping the
1963 agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation in effect in all other
respects, including provision for IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards. This solution will serve non
proliferation interests and meet India's
need for nuclear fuel for the Tarapur
station.

An exchange of notes formalizing
this solution will take place during the
forthcoming visit to the United States o
Dr. H. N. Sethna, Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission of India.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 30, 1982*

As a result of Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi's meetings with President
Reagan and other Administration of-
ficials, the Indian and the American
sides have agreed upon additional initia
tives that will supplement the extensive
ongoing activities linking our two na-
tions. Among these is the establishment
of a Blue Ribbon panel of eminent scier
tists from both countries to determine
priorities for expanded collaboration in
agricultural research, biomass energy,
and health.

They also agreed that 1984 and 198
would be designated a period of special
focus to intensify and highlight cultural:
and educational exchange. In addition
they have decided to:

• Reinstitute annual official-level
talks between the Department of State
and the Ministry of External Affairs;

• Promote commercial relations
through trade missions and an OPIC
[Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion] mission in early 1983 to study op-
portunities for joint business ventures;
and

• Consult closely to insure the suc-
cess of the GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade] Ministerial to be
held in November 1982.

'Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982).

^Made at the dinner in the State Dining
Room (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982).

'Made to news correspondents by Assist
ant Secretary Veliotes.

'Made to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

58

Department of State Bulleti

JNITED NATIONS

ran-lraq War

Following are Department and
%ite House statements, the text of the
ecurity Council resolution, and a state-
i/Snt by Ambassador William C.
herman, U.S. Deputy Representative to
le Security Council.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
ULY 9, 1982^

I.S. policy with regard to the Iran-Iraq
fSLT has been clear and consistent since
lie outbreak of hostilities 20 months
go. The policy enunciated when Iraqi
orces entered Iran remains our policy
oday.

The United States supports the in-
ependence and territorial integrity of
oth Iran and Iraq, as well as the other
tates in the region. In keeping with our
lolicy worldwide, we oppose the seizure
f territory by force.

We see the continuation of the war,
s we have repeatedly said, as a danger
0 the peace and security of all nations
a the Gulf region, and we have,
herefore, consistently supported an im-
lediate cease fire and a negotiated set-
lement.

We have maintained a firm policy of
lot approving the sale or transfer of
American military equipment and sup-
ilies to either belligerent.

We have welcomed constructive in-
emational efforts to bring an end to the
(rar on the basis of each state's respect
or the territorial integrity of its
leighbors and each state's freedom from
external coercion.

VHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
ULY 14, 19822

."■he U.S. Government has remained
rom the beginning, and will remain,
leutral in the war between Iran and
raq. We remain deeply concerned,
lowever, about the continuation of this
tonflict and the attendant loss of life
md destruction. The United States sup-
)orts the independence and territorial
ntegrity of both Iran and Iraq, as well
is that of other states in the region. In
ceeping with our policy worldwide, we
jppose the seizure of territory by force.

We urge an immediate end to hostilities
and a negotiated settlement.

We support constructive interna-
tional efforts for a peaceful solution to
the conflict on the basis of each state's
respect for the territorial integrity of its
neighbors and each state's freedom from
external coercion. In keeping with this
policy we have joined with other
members of the U.N. Security Council in
1980 and on July 12 of this year in
resolutions calling for an end to the con-
flict.

Our support for the security of
friendly states in the region which might
feel threatened by the conflict is well
known, and the United States is
prepared to consult with these states on
appropriate steps to support their
security.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 514,
JULY 12, 19823

The Security Council,

Having considered again the question en-
titled "The situation between Iran and Iraq",

Deeply concerned about the prolongation
of the conflict between the two countries,
resulting in heavy losses of human lives and
considerable material damage, and endanger-
ing peace and security,

Recalling the provisions of Article 2 of
the Charter of the United Nations, and that
the establishment of peace and security in the
region requires strict adherence to these pro-
visions.

Recalling that by virtue of Article 24 of
the Charter the Security Council has the
primary responsibility for maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security,

Recalling its resolution 479 (1980),
adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980,
as well as the statement of its President of
5 November 1980 (S/14244),

Taking note of the efforts of mediation
pursued notably by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations and his representative, as
well as by the Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference,

1. Calls for a cease-fire and an immediate
end to aU military operations;

2. Calls further for a withdrawal of
forces to internationally recognized bound-
aries;

3. Decides to dispatch a team of United
Nations observers to verify, confirm and
supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal, and
requests the Secretary-General to submit to
the Council a report on the arrangements re-
quired for that purpose;

4. Urges that the mediation efforts be
continued in a co-ordinated manner through
the Secretary-General with a view to achiev-
ing a comprehensive, just and honourable set-
tlement acceptable to both sides of all the
outstanding issues, on the basis of the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations,
including resjject for sovereignty, in-
dependence, territorial integrity and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States;

5. Requests all other States to abstain
from all actions which could contribute to the
continuation of the conflict and to facilitate
the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council within three
months on the implementation of this resolu-
tion.

AMBASSADOR SHERMAN'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JULY 12, 1982*

Since the beginning of this unhappy con-
flict the United States has held the posi-
tion that a solution must be found which
preserves the independence and ter-
ritorial integrity of both Iraq and Iran.
We have, therefore, been prepared to
support any constructive and equitable
action by the Council which works
toward that end.

The present text meets that test. It
is a balanced resolution and calls for a
comprehensive, just, and honorable set-
tlement. It seeks negotiation of all out-
standing issues between the two coun-
tries, and it does not prejudge. In sup-
porting it, the United States hopes that
both sides will agree on mutually accept-
able means for working toward a settle-
ment and will cooperate fully with the
ceasefire and withdrawal arrangements
to be established, and the continuing
mediation efforts to be coordinated
through the Secretary General, as called
for by this resolution.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 19, 1982.

'Adopted unanimously.

*USUN press release 57. ■

59

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Certification of Progress in El Salvador

by Thomas O. Endera

Statement submitted to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29,
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.^

I appreciate the opportunity to review
with your committee the certification re-
quired pursuant to Section 728 (b) and
(d) of the International Security and
Cooperation Act of 1981.

Two successive U.S. administrations
have pursued a three-pronged strategy
in El Salvador:

• Active support for democracy as
the only practical means of building
peace, reconciling internal divisions, and
protecting human rights;

• Economic assistance to relieve
human suffering and promote equitable
development, including land reform; and

• Military assistance to counter the
violence of guerrillas who are supported
by Cuba and Nicaragua and attempting
to seize power by force.

The essential elements of this policy
are bipartisan. It has been implemented
in close consultation with the Congress.
It is important that we also recognize,
however, that this continuity of U.S.
policy toward El Salvador, including its
original adoption, was made possible by
internal changes in El Salvador. Though
besieged by violent forces of extreme
left and extreme right, the governments
that have held office there since October
1979 have consistently sought to ad-
vance democratic objectives.

In the midst of explosive conditions
of instability and injustice, and not a lit-
tle international skepticism, the Salva-
doran people have launched a new begin-
ning. The spring of 1980 marked the
start of an ambitious program of
agrarian reform that has, so far, redis-
tributed more than 20% of El Salvador's
farmlands to the campesinos who work
them. In the spring of 1981, after guer-
rilla forces backed by Nicaragua and
Cuba had attempted to impose a military
solution and failed. President Duarte in-
vited all political parties and groups to
renounce violence and prepare for elec-
tions. This past spring, on March 28, na-
tionwide Constituent Assembly elections
were held. More than 1.5 million Salva-
dorans voted. In doing so, they rejected

political violence and demonstrated that
nonparticipatory politics have no place in
El Salvador's future.

Perhaps the most striking measure
of change — and it is a change that goes
far to explain why social and human
rights progress in El Salvador is taking
place despite unremitting, externally
supported guerrilla warfare — is the
political reorientation of the armed
forces. The military has been trans-
formed from an institution tied to the
oligarchy and dedicated to a continua-
tion of the status quo to an institution
supportive of land reform and constitu-
tional order.

The Secretary of State, acting on
authority delegated to him by the Presi-
dent, has certified that, despite continu-
ing concerns about the human rights
situation and parts of the reform pro-
gram, we believe that progress has been
made in each of the areas specified by
law. Let me, therefore, cover each ele-
ment of the certification in the order
specified in the law.

Human Rights

The law requires us to certify whether
the Government of El Salvador is mak-
ing "a concerted and significant effort to
comply with internationally recognized
human rights." In addition, the Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs has asked that we
specify in this testimony how many peo-
ple had been killed during the past 6
months as compared to the previous 6
months and the last year.

This question addresses the ultimate
violation of human rights, the deprival
of life. All available estimates — from our
embassy in El Salvador and from four
different Salvadoran organizations, in-
cluding groups sympathetic toward the
guerrillas — suggest a rough but unmis-
takable downward trend in the monthly
total of deaths attributable to political
causes. For the period of this certifica-
tion, February-June 1982, reported
deaths range from between a low of
1,500 and a high of 2,600 (July figures
are not yet available). For the period of
the original certification, August 1981-
January 1982, the range is from 2,000 to
6,000. If the period meant by "the last
year" is August 1981-June 1982, the

range reported by any one organization
is from 3,500 to 8,000. If the period
meant is February 1981-January 1982,
the date of the original certification, the
range would be higher still, from 5,000
to 15,000.

Keeping in mind that we are talking
about a small country, and that the
figures I have just cited claim to address
only politically motivated deaths, there
is no question that serious violations of
basic human rights are taking place. The
decline suggests progress is being made,
but there is a long way to go.

From this standpoint, the transition
from a civilian-mUitary governing junta
to a representative civilian governing
system rooted in the popular vote may
be the most important development of
the past 6 months. The continued evolu-
tion of democratic order and account-
ability in El Salvador is ultimately the
best guarantee of human rights improve
ments. That lesson has not been lost on
the Constituent Assembly or the new
government of national unity. Alvaro
Magana, the new President of El
Salvador, committed his government in
a June address to the nation to a pro-
gram of democratization, confidence,
security, economic recovery, reform, an(
respect for human rights. With regard
to this last objective, the government is
developing an amnesty program that
will seek to return dissident elements in
to the political process and guarantee
their safety and security.

But problems obviously remain.
Although violence has decreased, it is
still unacceptably high. In April and
May, a newly elected ARENA [National
Republican Alliance] deputy and 14
Christian Democratic Party members
were assassinated. Unlike many
previous murders, these killings were
formally and publicly condemned by the
armed forces. They were condemned as
well by a unanimous vote of the Consti-
tuent Assembly. Arrests were made in
two of these cases. In March, the Na-
tional Police arrested 12 civil defense
force members accused of murdering 24
civilians in Cuscatlan Department. In an j
earlier case, the National Police on
January 28 arrested a former army ma-
jor, Guillermo Roeder. Roeder had de-
veloped a private security business
which was suspected of being little mor(
than a cover for criminal activities. Witl
six associates, he was formally charged

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

lith kidnapping. Despite his wealth and
)nnections, Roeder is today in custody,
vaiting trial.

In contrast to the progress evi-
jnced by elections, however. El Salva-
Dr's judicial system has been unable to
se above the country's unsettled state,
he conditions that existed at the last
jrtification— including intimidation of
idges, witnesses, and officials — con-
nue largely unchanged. The selection
r a new Supreme Court by the Consti-
lent Assembly was an important first
«p, but the institutionalization of a
lore viable system of day-to-day justice
;mains a fundamental task. Addressing
idicial reforms will clearly be a major
;st of the new constitution.

In sum, progress on human rights
as not been as great as we would have
ked. Serious violations of human rights
intinue. As I have indicated before this
jmmittee in the past, the U.S. embassy
ivestigates every report it receives of
iolence to the best of its ability. There
1 evidence of a reduction in overall
•vels of violence, and we can report
lat the government is making a con-
3rted and significant effort to comply
■ith internationally recognized hxmian
ghts.

ontrol of the Armed Forces

hat the Salvadoran Government has
lade progress in "achieving substantial
DHtrol over all elements of its ovro
rmed forces, so as to bring to an end
le indiscriminate torture and murder of
alvadoran citizens by these
jrces"— the language of the law— was
vident in the professionalism and
estraint shovim by all elements of El
alvador's forces in protecting voters
nder guerrilla attack. Higher standards
re evident daily in most military and
ecurity units.

Preventing human rights abuses by
ovemment forces is a major govem-
lent priority. In March, enforcing an
arlier code of conduct decree, Minister
f Defense Garcia issued orders to field
ommanders that they wall be held ac-
ountable for the violations of human
ights by their subordinates. In an ac-
ion unprecedented in Salvadoran
listory, Garcia then publicly disclosed
he names of military and security per-
onnel arrested, disciplined, or dismissed
or human rights violations. One hun-
ired nine members of the armed forces
lave been disciplined during this certifi-
cation period for abuses of authority, as
lave at least 20 members of the civil
ilefense forces.

This observation leads directly to the
additional question in the invitation to
testify, namely, whether the nature of
government control over various
branches of the military and security
services differs, and if so, how. There
are, in fact, major differences in the
degree of central control over the
various branches of the military and
security forces. These differences reflect
differences in training, mission, com-
munications, and personnel.

• The army has the strongest tradi-
tion of central control and greatest
autonomy from local authorities. The
Treasury Police, National Police, and
National Guard are all widely dispersed
throughout the country. The National
Police's mission in major cities and high-
ways means it is somewhat less dis-
persed than the other two services. The
Treasury Police have traditionally
specialized in customs and border con-
trol missions, and the National Guard
has traditionally served as a rural con-
stabulary. The missions and location of
all three services have become blurred
due to the civil strife.

• Civil defense forces and
patrulleros occupy a level further re-
moved from a central control entity.
These elements are loosely subordinated
to municipal or departmental guard
authorities, rather than directly to the
capital. All are ill-equipped and ill-
trained, and their salaries are derived
from local contributions. While some are
professional and effective, others are
less so, and the exigencies of civil strife
require that they be used to provide
security for rural localities, freeing up
regular forces for combat against orga-
nized guerrilla units.

• The Armed Forces General Staff
is convinced that stronger central com-
mand and control of individual units is
essential to curbing human rights viola-
tions by isolated units of the police and
security forces. Military leaders have
made a concerted effort to make it clear
to remote rural security force con-
tingents that abuses must be stopped.

We agree with this diagnosis, and
although U.S. law prohibits U.S. train-
ing of police personnel, U.S. training of
El Salvador military personnel has be-
come essential to our joint strategy for
overcoming abuses of the civilian popula-
tion. The 477 ofBcers and 957 enlisted
personnel who trained in the United
States during the last 6 months received

39 hours of instruction in handling pris-
oners and protecting noncombatants.
Human rights themes were injected into
informal as weU as formal instruction.

We conclude that the Govenunent of
El Salvador is slowly but unmistakably
achieving substantial control over all
elements of its armed forces so as to
bring to an end abuses of civilians. We
are convinced that their program and
our training complement each other in
this vital area.

Reforms

The law requires that we certify
whether the Government of El Salvador
"is making continued progress in imple-
menting essential economic and political
reforms, including the land reform pro-
gram." 'The invitation to testify also asks
that we measure progress in the bank-
ing, export, labor, and judicial sectors.

Almost 20% of all Salvadoran farm-
land has now been redistributed through
the agrarian reform. Events after the
elections placed the land-reform pro-
gram in center stage, both in El Salva-
dor and in this country. Phase I of the
agrarian reform — the transfer of the
countrjr's largest estates to their
workers — has remained in place
throughout the certification period, but a

. . . it is in the interest
of the United States to
remain involved in the
resolution of El Salva-
dor's problems. El Sal-
vador is our neighbor.
We cannot ignore its
turmoil.

major attack was mounted on Phase III,
the Land-to-the-Tiller Program, under
which renters can claim ownership of up
to 7 hectares of land they rent and
work.

Opponents of Phase III launched
their attack in the Constituent

keDtember1982

61

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Assembly, exploiting the widespread
view that land had been lying fallow and
that improving agricultural productivity
in a country whose economy has been
battered by falling commodity prices and
guerrilla warfare was essential to restor-
ing the economic system. The assembly's
Decree 6 did not abrogate Phase III but
did allow rental of unoccupied lands. In
the countryside, a wave of evictions by
emboldened landowners took place. Title
applications stopped.

The government, caught between
the need to put unproductive land to
work to restore the economy and its
commitment to make land reform work,
chose to insure that, whatever the modi-
fications, present and potential Phase III
beneficiaries would have their rights pro-
tected. The armed forces supported con-
tinuing the reform and backed reinstate-
ment of evicted peasant claimants.
Deputy Defense Minister Castillo, origi-
nally reported lost in Perquin military
action, was, in fact, shot down while re-
turning from a ceremony to distribute
land-reform titles. His loss is stark evi-
dence of the key role of the Salvadoran
Armed Forces in reaffirming Phase III.

Identifying the number of illegal
evictions is difficult. While some organi-
zations estimate higher numbers, the
land-reform implementing agency
FINATA had received a total of 3,822
complaints of illegal evictions as of
July 1. The government has advertised
widely in an effort to bring forth all
complaints of illegal eviction. Since
June 1, 1982, 1,995 Phase III bene-
ficiaries have been restored to their

erties has been deferred since its concep-
tion, both by the Duarte government
and by the current government, because
of the ongoing economic crisis in El
Salvador. In the Phase III Land-to-the-
Tiller Program, more than 32,000 provi-
sional titles have been issued, including
almost 5,000 since the March election.
Even more important, since the elec-
tions, the first final titles have been
issued.

President Magana and members of
his cabinet have personally participated
in title ceremonies. Almost 3,400 titles
were given out in May, June, and July.
The President has also appointed a
government committee composed of pea-
sant, government, mOitary, and private-
sector representatives to make recom-
mendations to improve the framework
and implementation of the program.

The slow pace of compensation in
Phase III has been a major cause of
landowner resistance in the program.
Their resistance is understandable.
Many former Phase III landowners are
small farmers themselves. The govern-
ment is moving to correct this situation
by making available $32 million from a
very tight budget for cash payments in
1982, but that by itself will not do the
job. I am delighted that the House
Foreign Affairs Committee has autho-
rized up to $20 million in counterpart
funds for compensation. Once this addi-
tional cash becomes available, final
titling — which is contingent on compen-
sation to the former owner — can be ac-
celerated.

Carrying out a land-reform program

. . . the transition from a civilian-military govern-
ing junta to a representative civilian governing
system rooted in the popular vote may be the most
important development of the past 6 months.

land. Our conclusion is that despite the
serious challenge to Phase III, the
agrarian reform process is today back
on track.

Phase I land distribution is nearly
completed: 287 peasant cooperatives
have evolved out of former large
estates, and $46.5 million in production
and investment credits is available to the
cooperatives in the current crop year.
The Phase II reform of middle-size prop-

under present conditions in El Salvador
is at best a diflBcult task, requiring a
long-term commitment by the Govern-
ment of El Salvador and by the various
affected private groups, such as the
campesino organizations. I think we can
and should expect the Salvadoran
Government in the next 6 months:

62

• To mount a vigorous drive to get
tfie remaining likely claimants to apply;

• To keep on restoring those that
have been evicted;

• To prevent further evictions on
any significant scale; and

• To accelerate all the other opera-
tions— the provisional titles, the defini-
tive titles, the compensation — so that
the Land-to-the-Tiller Program can be
completed before the end of 1983.

To this end we will propose to the
Salvadoran Government that it develop
a specific plan, including perhaps a
special focus on three or four depart-
ments. For El Salvador, such a plan
would help the government organize the
final push. For us, it would provide a
framework in which to consider the next
certification.

With regard to the banking and ex-
port reforms, there is little to report
since the last certification. The nation-
alizations of banking and export market-
ing were complementary to the agrarian
reform. They were meant to reduce con-
centration of power previously in the
hands of a few privileged individuals anc
make credit more widely available. Both
reforms remain in place.

During 1980 and 1981, three drafts
of a proposed new labor code were circu
lated. None was adopted. Since being re
confirmed as Minister of Labor in the
present government, Julio Samayoa —
who previously served as Minister of
Labor under President Duarte and is
now also Secretary General of the Chris
tian Democratic Party — has indicated
that he will submit new proposals after
consulting with both management and
labor. On June 28, the Constituent
Assembly unanimously extended both
price and wage controls.

As noted earlier, the most importani
change aflfecting the judicial system was
the designation of a new Supreme Court
by the Constituent Assembly. The Salva
doran Government, recognizing the
urgent need to improve the judicial
system so that it can function better in
time of civil strife, acted to improve the
standing and integrity of the judicial
process by moving several major cases
into the civilian judicial system, in-
cluding that of civil defense and security
force members in the murders of Chris-
tian Democratic mayors; the Roeder
case mentioned earlier; and the case of
the four U.S. churchwomen, in which
five members of the National Guard
were dismissed from the service and re-
manded to civilian judicial authorities fo*
prosecution.

Department of State Bulletlm

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ections

are required to certify whether the
ivemment of El Salvador

is committed to the holding of free elec-
tions at an early date and to that end has
demonstrated its good faith efforts to
begin discussions with all major political
factions in El Salvador which have de-
clared their willingness to find and imple-
ment an equitable political solution to the
conflict, with such solution to involve a
commitment to:

(A) a renouncement of further military or
paramilitary activity; and

(B) the electoral process with internation-
ally recognized observers.

I have been asked in addition
lether the next presidential elections
e "still planned for 1983." Constituent
ssembly elections were held March 28,
i82. The campaign and the voting were
ipervised by an independent Central
Ilections Commission and monitored by
<er 200 observers from over 40 coun-
lies and the Organization of American
lates (OAS) as well as an international
jess corps of well over 700.

Prior to the March 28 elections,
laders of political parties belonging to
I e Revolutionary Democratic Front
I'DR) were repeatedly invited by Presi-
■ !nt Duarte and other government
ificials, as well as by independent Cen-
al Elections Commission President
jstamante, to participate in the elec-
3ns. Other candidates ran for office at
•eat personal risk with no security
larantees. But the representatives of
le guerrillas refused even to discuss —
ther directly or through the good
Bees of others — ways in which they
ight participate. Instead, they tried to
srupt the election by attempting to in-
midate voters and politicians, calling
)r a boycott, and conducting armed at-
icks on election day itself.

The guerrillas' efforts were rejected
y over 1.5 million Salvadorans who
ent to the poUs in a courageous out-
ouring of support for peace and
emocracy. Six parties contested the
lection; four won seats in the Constitu-
nt Assembly. Since no party received a
lajority, a period of difficult negotia-
lons ensued, resulting in the formation
f a provisional government of national
nity, headed by the independent Alvaro
lagana and consisting of cabinet
fiembers from the three largest parties
n the assembly as well as independents.

The government of national unity
dll govern until presidential elections
je held in late 1983 or early 1984. The

Constituent Assembly will draft a new
constitution, establish the timing and
ground rules for the presidential elec-
tion, and function as an interim legis-
lative body.

The elections, the peaceful replace-
ment of a civilian-military junta with a
representative civilian governing system,
and constitution making are all steps in
the beginning of the democratic process
in El Salvador. President Magana and
other government officials are working
on an amnesty program. The constitu-
tion and the presidential elections will
provide additional opportunities for
those elements associated with the guer-
rillas who can accommodate to democ-
racy to join in the democratic process
and influence the future of their country
through the ballot box rather than
through force of arms. We hope they
will.

Murders and Disappearance of
American Citizens

Section 728 (e) of the International
Security and Cooperation Act required
that last January's certification contain a
determination that the Government of
El Salvador was then making "good
faith efi'orts" to investigate the murders
of the four American churchwomen and
the two American labor advisers and to
bring those responsible to justice. We
address these cases in this certification
because we remain concerned that those
accused of these reprehensible crimes
have not yet been tried. We are also
concerned about the case of Mr. John J.
Sullivan, an American freelance journal-
ist who disappeared while on assignment
in San Salvador in December 1980.

In the case of the four church-
women, five former members of the Na-
tional Guard have been charged with ag-
gravated homicide. In accordance with
Salvadoran law, they have been dis-
missed from military service and
remanded to the custody of a civilian
judge. In June, the judge stated to
members of the press that he feels suffi-
cient evidence now exists to order the
case to trial and that he will set a trial
date in the near future.

The investigation into the murder of
the American labor advisers has made
less progress. The Salvadoran Court of
Appeals upheld the suspension of the
case against two suspects on groimds of

insufficient evidence. In April, the Salva-
doran Government established an in-
vestigative working group to seek
evidence sufficient to reopen the case.
The investigative group, following pro-
cedures similar to those used to break
the churchwomen's case, has independ-
ently confirmed a number of points un-
covered earlier. Preliminary results are
encouraging.

The case of Mr. Sullivan remains un-
solved. During the certification period, a
number of leads were followed without
developing any credible information.
Acting on one such lead, the Gk)vern-
ment of El Salvador exhumed a body
which had been identified by anonymous
tips as possibly that of Mr. Sullivan. It
proved not to be. Then two Salvadorans
associated with the guerrillas claimed to
have information on the case, but our
contacts with them failed to turn up any
evidence. We are satisfied that we have
been accorded the cooperation of the
Salvadoran authorities in this case. We
will continue to pursue every lead.

Conclusion

Even though the record of the Govern-
ment of El Salvador during the past 2V2
years has not been all any one of us
might wish it to be, it is our firm belief
that El Salvador meets the standards
for continued U.S. assistance. Progress
toward a more democratic, more
equitable, and more humane society has
been substantial — even remarkable in
light of the circumstances.

This is ultimately why it is in the in-
terest of the United States to remain in-
volved in the resolution of El Salvador's
problems. El Salvador is our neighbor.
We cannot ignore its turmoil. We know
from recent developments in Nicaragua
that a guerrilla force dominated by
Marxist-Leninists does not create a
democratic future for its people but
spawns a state apparatus that is intern-
ally repressive and internationally ag-
gressive. And we know from ample
documentation the degree to which
Nicaragua is interfering in the affairs of
El Salvador and Guatemala under the
banner of "revolutionary interna-
tionalism." Nicaraguan Junta Coor-
dinator Daniel Ortega stated in a July 15
Madrid newspaper interview that Nicar-
agua is even supporting guerrillas in
democratic Honduras.

If we do not help those in Central
America who are committed to demo-
cratic institutions, we risk abandoning

ieptember 1982

63

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

them to the designs of violent minorities
trained and armed by Cuba and Nicar-
agua. The Central American Democratic
Community has cited the military
danger which Nicaragua poses for them
and has endorsed Honduras' proposal to
hold discussions on ways to halt both the
regional arms race and illegal arms
movements in the region through inter-
national supervision of ports, airports,
borders, and strategic sectors. The
United States favors peaceful solutions
to Central America's problems and op-
poses the military solution which Nica-
ragua and Cuba are promoting.

Oiu- policies have strongly and con-
sistently supported a political solution to
problems in El Salvador. Military pre-
paredness must be sufficient to protect
the people and their sources of livelihood
from attack. The economy must be
capable of rebounding from sabotage
and providing reasonable returns to

labor and management. But if El Salva-
dor needs our economic and military as-
sistance, to overcome what a recent
Radio Venceremos broadcast boasted
were 207 guerrilla actions in July alone
"to destabilize the regime economically,"
the fundamental problem in El Salvador
is political — the need to establish demo-
cratic institutions representative of all
citizens. We believe that an impressive
start has been made. But it is not
enough to have surprised the far left
with the degree of popular support for
peace and democracy. What is needed
now is the consolidation of aspirations
into reality. That is what our policy is all
about.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be publisned by the committee and will
be avaimble from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

effectively in aiding a regional ally
against an external invasion or in sup-
pressing internal conflict.

Cuba does not have the ability to
conduct an outright invasion of another
country in the region except for the
Caribbean microstates. Nor does Havan;
possess sufficient amphibious assault
landing craft or aircraft capable of
transporting heavy equipment.

On occasion Cuba has been reckless
in using its capabilities. The most recent
example occurred on May 10, 1980,
when Cuban Air Force fighters, in broac
daylight, attacked and sank a clearly
marked Bahamian patrol vessel inside
Bahamian territorial waters, killing four
crewmembers. The following day, Cubar '■
MiGs buzzed a populated island belong-
ing to The Bahamas, and a Cuban heli-
copter carrying Cuban troops landed on
the island in pursuit of the surviving
crewmembers.

Cuban Armed Forces and
the Soviet Military Presence

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy,
to be complete, would have to devote
special attention to the challenge Cuba
presents to U.S. interests, especially in
the Third World. Cuba has developed an
extraordinary capacity to influence
events in such diverse regions as sub-
Saharan Africa and Central America in
spite of serious economic problems at
home. Its ability to project power far out
of proportion to its size is directly
related to its association with the Soviet
Union and the Soviet support for the
develojyment of its military machine.

This study is bein^ issued in the in-
terests of contributing to better public
understanding of the nature of Cuba's
massive military buildup and how it
contributes to Castro's ability to
challenge orderly political and economic
development in this hemisphere and
elsewhere.

Summary

Cuba has by far the most formidable and
largest military force in the Caribbean
Basin with the exception of the United
States. In all of Latin America, only
Brazil — with a population more than 12
times that of Cuba — has a larger mUi-
tary establishment. Increasing Soviet-
Cuban military ties and the improve-

ment of the Cuban Armed Forces have
enabled Cuba to assume a far more in-
fluential world role than its size and re-
sources would otherwise dictate.

Since 1975, the U.S.S.R. has under-
taken a major modernization of all
branches of the Cuban military, trans-
forming it from a home defense force in-
to the best equipped military establish-
ment in Latin America and one possess-
ing significant offensive capabOities.
Equipment delivered to the ground
forces has enhanced both their mobility
and firepower. The Air Force, with
some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet
fighters, now is probably the best
equipped in Latin America. The Navy
has acquired two torpedo attack sub-
marines and a Koni-class frigate, which
will be able to sustain operations
throughout the Caribbean Basin and will
enable Castro to project power well be-
yond Cuba's shores.

As a result of this modernization
program and Cuba's combat experience
in Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro
reg^ime possesses a substantial regfional
intervention capability. Havana has in-
creased its airborne-trained forces to a
level of some 3,000-4,000 troops and
also has improved its airUft and sealift
capability. Although modest by Western
standards, this capability is impressive
in the Central American and Caribbean
context. It would be employed most

The Cuban Military

Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba inter-
vened in Angola on a large scale and tht
Soviet Union began to modernize Cuba's
Armed Forces, the Cuban military has
evolved from a predominantly home de-
fense force into a formidable power
relative to its Latin American neighbors
The cost of Soviet arms delivered to
Castro since 1960 exceeds $2.5 billion.
These arms deliveries, plus the annual
$3 billion economic subsidy, are tied to
Cuba's ongoing military and political rol«
abroad in support of Soviet objectives.
The recent deliveries of Soviet military
equipment to Cuba are the latest in a
surge of deliveries over the past year.
Since January 1981, Soviet merchant
ships have delivered some 66,000 tons oi
military equipment, compared with the
previous 10-year annual average of
15,000 tons. These weapons represent
the most significant Soviet militarj' sup-
ply effort to Cuba since a record 250,00(
tons was shipped in 1962. There are
several reasons for this increase:

• The beginning of a new 5-year up-
grading and replacement cycle;

• Additional arms to equip the new
territorial militia, which Cuba now
claims to be 500,000 strong but which it
expects to reach 1 million;

• Increasing stockpiles, much of
which is passed to regional supporters;
and

• A convincing demonstration of
Moscow's continuing support for the
Havana regime.

64

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

yM In addition to major weapons
stems, large quantities of ammunition,
lall arms, spares, and support equip-
snt probably were delivered.

Cuba's Armed Forces total more
an 225,000 personnel— 200,000 Army,
1,000 Air Force and Air Defense, and
',000 Navy — including those on active
ity either in Cuba or overseas and
ose belonging to the ready reserves,
liich are subject to immediate mobiliza-
m. With a population of just under 10
illion, Cuba has the largest military
roe in the Caribbean Basin and the
cond largest in Latin America after
razil, with a population of more than
!0 million. More than 2% of the Cuban
)pulation belongs to the active-duty
ilitary and ready reserves, compared
ith an average of less than 0.4% in
her countries in the Caribbean Basin.

In addition, Cuba's large paramilitary
organizations and reserves would be
available to provide internal support to
the military.

The quantitative and qualitative
upgrading of the armed forces and their
recent combat experience in Africa give
the Cuban military definite advantages
over its Latin American neighbors. Cuba
is the only country in Latin America to
have undertaken a major overseas mili-
tary effort since World War II, giving
both Army and Air Force personnel re-
cent combat experience in operating
many of the weapons in their inven-
tories. About 70% of Cuban troops who
have served in Africa have been reserv-
ists. Reservists generally spend about 45
days per year on active duty and can be
integrated quickly into the armed forces.
Cuba's civilian enterprises, such as

.S.S.R.

Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba

1962
1963

Thousand Metric Tons

A/ 1250

|40

1964

m 20

1965

no

1966

■11:1111 20

1967

:.'...... iiii40

1968

Us

1969

i 10

1970

no

1971

1 ' .1 10

1972

:r-. -ino

1973

;L,:.,,.„,,jno

1974

iiiiii'ii 10

1975

. .:.Jii5

1976

;:li 20

1977

m 20

1978

I 20

1979

.. l-il20

1980

::vii 20

1981

11111166*

Cubana Airlines and the merchant
marine, have been used effectively in
support of military operations. Havana
has dedicated significant resources to
modernize and professionalize its armed
forces and to maintain a well-prepared
reserve. Cuba has demonstrated that,
when supported logistically by the Soviet
Union, it has both the capability and the
will to deploy large numbers of troops
and can be expected to do so whenever
the Castro government believes it to be
in Cuba's best interest.

Equipment delivered to the Army
since the mid-1970s, including T-62
tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles,
BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles,
antitank guns, towed field guns, BM-21
multiple rocket launchers, and
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft
guns, have begun to alleviate earlier de-
ficiencies in Cuba's mechanized capabili-
ty and to provide increased firepower. In
addition to its qualitative advantage, the
Cuban Army has an overwhelming
numerical superiority in weapons over
its Latin American neighbors.

The Cuban Air Force is one of the
largest and probably the best equipped
in Latin America. Its inventory includes
some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet
fighters, with two squadrons of FLOG-
GERs (the exact model of the second
squadron recently delivered is not yet
determined). The MiG-23s have the
range to reach portions of the south-
eastern United States, most of Central
America, and most Caribbean nations.
On a round-trip mission, however,
Cuban-based aircraft would be capable
of conducting only limited air engage-
ments in Central America. If based on
Central American soil — a feasible option
given the closeness of Cuban-Nicaraguan
relations — Cuba's fighter aircraft could
be efiectively employed in either a
ground-attack or air-superiority role. A
similar arrangement would be possible in
Grenada once Cuban workers complete
the construction of an airfield with a
9,000-foot runway there. If the MiG-23s
were to stage from Nicaragua and
Grenada, their combat radius would be
expanded to include all of Central
America, including the northern tier of
South America.

Cuban defenses have been strength-
ened by the additions of mobile SA-6
launchers and related radars for air
defense, SA-2 transporters, SA-2
missile canisters, new early warning and
height-finding radar stations, and elec-
tronic warfare vans.

"Approximate figure

^AntAmKAr IQQO

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

For Selected Caribbean Countries

Relative Military Strength

For Selected Latin American Countries

Country

Cuba

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

Donninican Republic
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico

^^*

ry

1-^

/ <^'' / ^^

P*opl« In

%ol

Population

Mllltiry

Population

(thousands)

(Ihoutandt)

In Military

9,800

227.0

2.32

28,000

185.5

.66

5,500

26.6

.48

124,780

272.6

.22

11,180

92.0

.82

27,310

70.0

.26

8,250

38.8

.47

3,270

16.0

.49

18.075

130.0

.72

2,945

29.7

1.01

16,459

40.8

.25

5,835

22.5

.39

7,200

15.1

.21

3,900

11.2

.29

69,000

119.5

.17

Source: Military Balance, 1981-1982.

The Cuban Navy, with a strength of
about 10,000 personnel, remains essen-
tially a defensive force. However, its
two recently acquired Foxtrot-class sub-
marines and single Koni-class frigate,
once fully integrated into the operational
force, will be able to sustain operations
through the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of
Mexico and, to a limited extent, the
Atlantic Ocean.' The primary vessels for
carrying out the Navy's defensive mis-
sions are Osa- and Komar-class missile
attack boats, whose range can extend
well into the Caribbean. They are armed
writh SS-N-2 STYX ship-to-ship
missiles. Cuba has received, in addition,
Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boats,
Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers,
and a Sonya-class minesweeper. Al-
though not equipped for sustained
operations away from its main bases,
the Cuban Navy could conduct limited
interdiction missions in the Caribbean.
Cuba also has a 3,000-man coast guard
organization.

By Western standards, Cuba's capa-
bility to intervene in a hostile environ-
ment using its indigenous transport
equipment is modest, but it is consider-
ably more formidable in the Central
American context. As in 1975, when a
single battalion of Cuban airborne troops
airlifted to Luanda, Angola, at a critical
moment and played a role far out of pro-
portion to its size, a battle-tested Cuban
force interjected quickly into a combat
situation in Central America could prove
to be decisive. Moreover, since the
Angolan experience, Havana has in-
creased the training of airborne forces,
which now consist of a special troops
contingent and a landing and assault
brigade, and has improved its air and
sealift capacity. Introduction of sophisti-
cated Soviet weapons geared toward
mobility and offensive missions has im-
proved Cuban ability to conduct military
operations off the island.

Cuba still lacks sufficient transport

aircraft capable of supporting long-
range, large-scale troop movements anc
would have to turn to the Soviets to
achieve such a capability. Cuba is able t
transport large numbers of troops and
supplies within the Caribbean, however,,,
using its military and civilian aircraft.
Since 1975, the Cuban commerical air
fleet has acquired seven IL-62 long-
range jet transport aircraft and some
TU-154 medium-to-long-range transpon
aircraft, each capable of carrying
150-200 combat-equipped troops. By
comparison, Cuba conducted the 1975
airlift to Luanda with only five medium-
range aircraft, each having a maximum
capacity of 100 troops.

Cuba has recently acquired the
AN-26 short-range transport. The most*
effective use of this aircraft from Cuban
bases would be in transporting troops oii
supplies to a friendly country, but it is
capable, with full payload, of airdrop-
ping troops on portions of Florida and
Belize; Jamaica, Haiti, and The

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Bahamas; and most of the Dominican
;epublic. If based in Nicaragua, the
iN-26s could reach virtually all of Cen-
1^ America in either a transport or air-
rop role. In addition, more than 30
mjiller military and civilian transport
lanes, including those used in Angola,
ould be used to fly troops and muni-
ions to Central America.

The Soviet military deliveries also
ould improve Cuban ability to conduct
lilitary operations abroad. In Angola,
or example, the mobOe SA-6 surface-to-
ir missile system operated by the
lubans could provide a valuable comple-
ment to other less effective air defense
ystems. The new equipment would
nable Havana to continue assistance to
Nicaragua. The MiG-23 and MiG-21
ighters probably would be most effec-
ive in aiding the Sandinista regime.
)eployment of a few dozen MiGs would
lot seriously reduce Cuba's defenses,
,nd Cuban-piloted MiGs would enable
^'icaragua to counter virtually any
hreat from within the region.

In early 1982 Cuba also received
ome Mi-24 HIND-D helicopters, the
irst assaut helicopters in Cuba's inven-
ory which also includes the Mi-8 HIP.
Tie Mi-24— armed with a 57mm can-
Lon, minigun, and rocket pods and
arrying a combat squad — will provide

Cuba with improved offensive capability.

Cuba's abUity to mount an amphibi-
ous assault is constrained both by the
small number of naval infantry and by a
dearth of suitable landing craft. Cuba
would, however, be capable of transport-
ing large numbers of troops and sup-
plies— using ships belonging to the mer-
chant marine and the navy — to ports
secured by friendly forces, if the United
States did not become involved.

Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations

Cuba's several paramilitary organiza-
tions involve hundreds of thousands of
civilian personnel during peacetime and
would be available to support the
military during times of crisis. Although
these groups would be far less combat
capable than any segment of the mili-
tary, they do provide the civilian popula-
tion with at least rudimentary military
training and discipline. Their primary
orientation is internal security and local
defense.

The extent to which the military is
involved in the civilian sector is further
indicated by its activity within the eco-
nomic sphere. In addition to uniformed
personnel, the Ministry of the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces (MINFAR)

;trength and Missions of Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations

'r^anlzation

'outh Labor
>rmy

)ivil Defense
•orce

erritorial Troop
n^ilitia

3order Guard
Troops

"National Revolu-
:ionary Police

Department of
State Security

SubonJInatlon

MINFAR
(Ministry of the
Revolutionary
Armed Forces)

MINFAR

Strenfltli

100,000

100,000

MINFAR More than 500,000

at present; still
forming

MININT (Ministry 3,000 full-time, plus
of the Interior) unl<nown number of

civilian auxiliaries

MININT

MININT

10,000, plus 52,000
civilian auxiliaries

10,000-15,000

Mission

Civic action force, receiving little
military training in peacetime.
One wartime mission v^rould be
to operate and protect the
railroads.

"Military" units would assist in
providing local defense; non-
military would provide first aid
and disaster relief.

Regional security/local defense.

Help guard Cuban coastline.

Responsible for public order in
peacetime; could help provide
rear area security during war-
time.

Counterintelligence and preven-
tion of counter-revolutionary ac-
tivities.

employs more than 30,000 civilian
workers in factories and repair facilities
in Cuba and in building roads and air-
fields in Africa. Many of them are em-
ployees of MINFAR's Central Director-
ate for Housing and Construction which,
in addition to military construction,
builds housing and apartment complexes
for military and civilian personnel of
both MINFAR and the Ministry of the
Interior. The Youth Labor Army also
contributes to economic development by
engaging in agricultural, industrial, con-
struction, transportation, and other proj-
ects.

The Soviet Presence

The Soviet military presence in Cuba in-
cludes a ground forces brigade of about
2,600 men, a military advisory group of
2,000, and an intelligence-collection
facility. There also are 6,000-8,000
Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba. Military
deployments to Cuba consist of periodic
visits by Soviet naval reconnaissance air-
craft and task groups.

Soviet ground forces have been in
Cuba since shortly before the 1962
missile crisis. Located near Havana, the
ground forces brigade consists of one
tank and three motorized rifle battalions
as well as various combat and support
units. Likely missions include providing
a small symbolic Soviet commitment to
Castro — implying a readiness to defend
Cuba — and probably providing secimty
for Soviet personnel and key Soviet
facilities, particularly for the Soviets'
large intelligence-collection facility. The
brigade almost certainly would not have
a role as an intervention force, although
it is capable of tactical defense and
offensive operations in Cuba. Unlike
imits such as airborne divisions, it is not
structured for rapid deployment, and no
transport aircraft able to carry its
armed vehicles and heavy equipment are
stationed in Cuba.

The Soviet military advisory group
provides technical advice in support of
weapons such as the MiGs, surface-to-air
missiles, and the FOXTROT submarines;
some also are attached to Cuban ground
vmits. The Soviets' intelligence-collection
facility — their largest outside the
U.S.S.R.— monitors U.S. military and
civilian communications.

Since the naval ship visit program
began in 1969, 21 Soviet naval task
groups have deployed to the Caribbean,
virtually all of them visiting Cuban
ports. "The most recent visit occurred in

September 1982

67

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

April and May 1981 and included the
first by a Kara-class cruiser— the largest
Soviet combatant ever to have visited
the island. Soviet intelligence-collection
ships operating off the east coast of the
United States regularly call at Cuba, as
do hydrographic research and space-
support ships operating in the region. In
addition, the Soviet Navy maintains a
salvage and rescue ship in Havana for
emergency operations.

Since 1975, Soviet TU-95 Bear D re-
connaissance aircraft have deployed
periodically to Cuba. Typically, these air-
craft are deployed in pairs and stay in
Cuba for several weeks at a time. The
flights traditionally have been associated
with U.S., NATO, and Soviet exercises;
the transit of U.S. ships to and from the
Mediterranean; and periods of increased
international tension.

The Soviets apparently sent a con-
siderable number of pilots to augment

Cuban Advisers

Total Number (Eitlmatcd)

Nation

Military

civilian

Angola

20.000-25.000

6,000

Ethiopia

11,000-13,000

600

Nicaragua

2,000

4,000

South Yemen

200-300

100

Grenada

30

300

Cuba's air defense during two periods —
early 1976 and during 1978 — when
Cuban pilots were sent to Angola and
Ethiopia. They filled in for the Cuban
pilots deployed abroad and provided the
Cuban Air Force with sufficient person-
nel to perform its primary mission of air
defense of the island.

Threat to Hemispheric Strategic
Defense

Cuban miliary ties with the Soviet
Union, the Soviet presence in Cuba, a
large Soviet intelligence-collection facili-
ty, and the periodic Soviet air and naval
presence pose not inconsiderable mili-
tary threats to U.S. security interests in
the hemisphere. Because of Cuba's prox-
imity to vital sea lanes, the Soviets or
Cubans in wartime could attempt to in-
terdict the movement of troops, sup-
plies, and raw materials in the Gulf of
Mexico and Caribbean Sea and could
strike key facilities in the area.

'The Koni has an operating range of
2,000 nautical miles without refueling or re-
plenishment. The Foxtrots have a range of
9,000 nautical miles at 7 knots per hour and i
patrol duration of 70 days. ■

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

by Thomas O. Endera

Statement before the Subcommittee
on State, Justice, Commerce, the
Jvdidary of the Senate Appropriations
Committee on May i, 1982. Ambassador
Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs.^

I appreciate the opportunity to present
to you our FY 1982 and 1983 budget re-
quest for radio broadcasting to Cuba, a
new program to provide to the Cuban
people an alternate, reliable source of
news and commentary about events tak-
ing place in their homeland. But before I
get into the details of this request, per-
haps I should begin with Cuban society
itself.

The Cuban Society

There is nothing quite like it. The
economy, organized in the familiar
Soviet command model, has registered a
general failure. Despite growing Soviet
assistance in oil sales at low prices and
sugar purchases at high prices— the
whole Soviet aid effort is now equivalent
to one-quarter of Cuba's GNP— per
capita income in Cuba has been stagnant
and steadily falling relative to much of
Latin America.

Yet, Cuba projects power in the
world. The Soviet Union subsidizes Cuba

with over $3 billion in economic aid an-
nually. In addition, Cuba's armed
forces — augmented by 66,000 tons of
Soviet military deliveries in 1981
alone — are stronger than any in the
Western Hemisphere other than the
United States. It maintains 40,000
soldiers in Africa, dominating two coun-
tries, and doing for the Soviet Union
what the Gurkha mercenaries did for
19th century England. In Central
America, Cuba is attempting to unite
the left in search of the violent over-
throw of established government and
maintains no less than 1,800-2,000
military and security personnel in
Nicaragua.

In other words, a would-be foreign
policy giant is allied to an economic
pygmy, whose peoples have had to
sacrifice all hope for a rising standard of
living in order to gain advantages in
foreign affairs.

Most countries cannot overcommit
to state interests in this manner,
because the people force them to ad-
dress their concerns. But Cubans lack
the means to hold their government ac-
countable.

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc.

The proposal we discuss today — Radio
Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc.— is intended

to supply what the Cuban public is miss-
ing: reliable news about Cuban life,
features, sports, and entertainment
alternatives to the distorted, censored
news that is being offered by a govern-
ment that rules not for the people but
for itself.

No, this is not a project to tell the
Cuban people about the United States.
The Voice of America — whose charter v.'
international news and American
features and culture — already does that
It can be heard in Spanish. So, also, can
Florida radio stations broadcasting in
Spanish to Cuban-Americans. These sta-
tions can tell Cubans much about us, bu
they are not an adequate source of infor
mation about what is going on in Cuba
itself.

Nor is it a project to incite Cubans
to revolt against their own society.
There is provocation enough in the
redistributed poverty, in the depressing
austerity, in the unemployment and
underemployment of educated Cubans,
in the rigid regimentation and in
Castro's speeches that only further
sacrifice lies ahead. But it would be im-
moral and irresponsible to set a people
against a government that monopolizes
the means of coercion.

This radio is a proposal to give
Cubans the means they now lack to
know what kind of a society has been

66

Dfinartrnfint of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

nposed on them, to furnish them with a
ource of news and entertainment that
; not manipulated by the state, to let
hem find out what is really happening
1 their country, to inform them why so
lany have gone off to foreign military
uty not always to return, and to learn
/hat the state really does with the
v'ealth of the Cuban people.

The radio — like Radio Free Europe
,nd Radio Liberty before it— is intended
jadually to earn its audience through
's special sensitivity to needs the state
JTiores. It will speak to young people of
he sports and music they love. It will
peak to adults of the great Cuban and
iispanic-American heritage they ad-
nire, which so often the state
lenig^ates. And it will give news on the
ruth of which the listeners can rely.

We know that in Eastern Europe it
ook years for Radio Free Europe to
arn an audience. Little by little that au-
lience expanded. Radio Free Europe
low has perhaps 70% of the Polish radio
.udience. Is there any doubt that the
hanges of the last decade could have
iccurred without that honest, trust-
worthy, humane, outside contact?

Oiir proposal is, thus, to begin a sus-
ained effort, over many years, to help
he Cubans know more about their coun-
ry and, thus, to hold their government
iccountable in ways it is not now.

J.S. Diplomatic Efforts

'eople say: Wouldn't it be better to
legotiate with the Cubans, or it isn't like
IS to engage in propaganda, or Cuban
^ountermeasures will hurt us too much.
Ne have tried to talk with Cuba in the
)ast, and it would be wrong to rule out
;rying again. But the record is daunting.

In 1977, we started talking seriously
,0 the Cubans, saying we wanted to
;reate conditions in which the legacy of
he past— the embargo and the political
:ension — could be overcome. We sug-
gested a gradual withdrawal of the more
;han 20,000 Cuban troops from Angola.
Mter all, the civil war was over. While
vve talked, Cuba went into Ethiopia.

Conversations continued. In
mid-1978, Cuba launched upon a new ag-
gressive strategy in Central America,
uniting the left parties of first,

Nicaragua, then El Salvador, then
Guatemala — committing them to the
destruction of their established govern-
ment.

Talks went on. In 1980, Castro
turned the desire of many of his coun-
trymen to flee Cuba into a hostile act
against the United States— the Mariel
boatlift. It is not wrong to talk to adver-
saries. Often it is only prudent. But
what counts is not the medium, but the
message. Talks cannot be a complete
Cuban policy, any more than diplomatic
exchanges are a complete Soviet or
Polish policy. Diplomacy enables us to
talk to the government. We must also
talk to the people.

Others ask: Should we be associated
with "propaganda?" No, we should not.
We wUl not succeed in attracting an au-
dience in Cuba if we offer them prop-
aganda. If there are false reports, the
listeners will soon realize the reports are
false — if false reports continue, they will
turn off. Only by respecting its audience
can a project like this succeed.

So it must be the creature of no
political tendency, of no action group, of
no vested interest. We have acquired ex-
perience— in Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty — of how to do that, even
though the beginnings were difficult.

To assist the Administration in for-
mulating its plan for broadcasting to
Cuba, a Presidential commission was
established last September. The
members of the commission were ap-
pointed in mid-January. They include
F. Clifton White, its chairman, as well
as former Senator from Florida, Richard
Stone, and Jorge L. Mas, among others.

As a result of its first two meetings,
the commission has strongly endorsed
the concept of radio broadcasting to
Cuba as well as much of the preparatory
work already undertaken by various
agencies of this Administration.

Specifically, the commission has
recommended that broadcasting to Cuba
be undertaken by an independent, non-
profit entity. Radio Broadcasting to
Cuba, Inc., which will operate Radio
Marti in much the same manner that
RFE/RL, Inc. now operates Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty. RBC, Inc.,
has already been incorporated as a pre-
liminary step. The bill, as approved by
the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
amends the board for International

Broadcasting Act (BIB) of 1973 to
authorize BIB to further "the open com-
munication of information and ideas to
the people of Cuba." Accordingly, RBC,
Inc. is available if BIB wishes to use it.

In order to establish Radio Marti,
we are requesting $10 million for FY
1982. Of this amount, $4.2 million will
be devoted to the construction of trans-
mission facilities and $7.2 million will be
used for operating expenses to cover
programming, engineering, and adminis-
trative costs. For FY 1983, we require
$7.7 million, a reduction of $2.3 million
from the 1982 request. This decrease is
a result of nonrecurring construction
and administrative costs.

Conclusion

Radio Marti is designed to respond to a
basic human need — the need to have ac-
cess to information on events and
policies that affect the lives of in-
dividuals. Freedom of information is
what we are talking about here— funda-
mental freedom recognized by every re-
sponsible individual and government in
the world. This right, this freedom, has
been consistently denied to the Cuban
people since Castro came to power in
1959. Radio Marti will help fill this long-
standing information gap.

Those of us who have lived in a
Communist state will know just how
much Radio Marti can affect the lives of
Cubans. For those of us who have not, it
is an opportunity to offer the Cuban peo-
ple hope and the means to make in-
formed judgments on the actions of their
own government. For a people bottled
up in a system of oppression which they
did not seek and cannot remove, that
can be precious.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaikble from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

September 1982

69

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Radio Marti and
Cuban Interference

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications, Consumer Pro-
tection, and Finance of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce on
May 10, 1982. Ambassador Enders is
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs. Radio Marti is a U.S. Govern-
ment proposal to establish radio broad-
casting to Cuba.^

I would like to set the record straight
concerning Cuban interference with
American broadcasting. The serious
problem of Cuban interference with the
radio broadcasting of its neighbors, in-
cluding the United States, is separate
and distinct from the Radio Marti ques-
tion. Serious Cuban interference has
been going on for over a decade, long
before Radio Marti was even an idea.
More recently, 2 years and one ad-
ministration before Radio Marti was an-
nounced, Cuba made known plans for
stations that would cause much added
interference. Today Cuba is continuing
its interference, and Radio Marti is not
even on the air. In fact, Cuba's broad-
casting plans that will result in in-
creased interference for American
broadcasters will probably be imple-
mented with or without Radio Marti as a
scapegoat. And if Cuba did not have
Radio Marti it would find another pre-
text.

Radio Marti

Radio Marti is intended to provide the
Cuban people with an alternate, reliable
source of news and commentary about
events taking place in their homeland. It
is intended to supply what the Cuban
public is missing — reliable news about
Cuban life, features, sports and enter-
tainment; alternatives to the distorted,
censored news and programming that is
being offered by a government that rules
not for the people but for itself.

Radio Marti is a proposal to give
Cubans the means they now lack to
know what kind of a society has been
imposed on them, to furnish them with a
source of news and entertainment that
is not manipulated by the state, to let

them find out what is really happening
in their country, to inform them why so
many have gone off to foreign military
duty not always to return, and to learn
what the state really does with the
wealth of the Cuban people.

Cuban Radio Interference

But long before Radio Marti, in the
mid-1960s the Castro government em-
barked on a program to redesign its
domestic AM broadcasting system and
to initiate broadcasting directed toward
the United States and other neighboring
countries. Most of the new stations were
in direct violation of its treaty obliga-
tions under the North American regional
broadcasting agreement and resulted in
harmful interference to long-established
stations in the United States, Mexico,
and other countries in the Caribbean.

From the mid-1960s through 1979,
the level of interference caused to AM
stations in the United States by Cuban
stations steadily increased. This inter-
ference primarily affected AM stations
in Florida and along the gulf coast.
Since 1967, WQBA, a Spanish-language
station in Miami, has been and still is be-
ing intentionally jammed by Cuba, using
tones offset from the carrier frequency
of WQBA. This jamming has also
adversely affected WRVA, a co-channel
station in Richmond, Virginia.

In late 1979, in preparation for the
regional broadcasting conference, Cuba
submitted an inventory of radio station
requirements to the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) which, if
implemented, would greatly increase the
level of interference which would be
caused to AM broadcasting stations in
the United States and most other coun-
tries within the region. Included in this
inventory were two 500 kilowatt (kw)
stations — 10 times the amount of power
authorized in the United States and else-
where in North America — plus a
number of other moderate and high-
power stations also capable of causing
considerable interference in the United
States. The Cubans have never ex-
plained why they wanted such enormous
power, but the reason is obvious — since
1979 they have planned to increase their
ability to propagandize their neighbors.

Beginning in 1980, more and more
complaints of harmful interference were
received from AM stations in the United
States as Cuba began implementing this
inventory. Stations as far north as New
England and as far west as Indiana
were recording serious interference
from Cuban stations. Part of this inter-
ference resulted from Cuban rebroad-

casting of Radio Moscow in English us-
ing transmitter powers of up to 150 kw.

Prior to the second session of the
regional AM broadcasting conference in
Rio de Janeiro last fall, the United
States held three rounds of technical-
level discussions with the Government ol
Cuba in an attempt to explore means to
reduce our mutual interference prob-
lems. While it appeared that some of the
problems could be resolved, throughout
the discussions it was very clear that
both countries had stations in their in-
ventory that were not negotiable. For
the United States this was our existing
Voice of America (VOA) station in Mara
thon, Florida, and for Cuba it was their
two planned 500 kw stations. At the last
of these three meetings, in Washington,
D.C., in August of 1981, Cuba remained
firm in its intention to implement these
500 kw stations and further informed us
that they would be shifting the frequen-
cies of these stations to 1040 and 1160
kilohertz (kHz). This preceded announce-
ment of Radio Marti on September 23
and formal identification on October 29
of 1040 kHz as the best frequency for
Radio Marti.

While we were aware of Cuban in-
terest in 1040, accepting Cuba's plan
would have meant accepting destruction
of WHO Des Moines by a 500 kw super-
station. Our own plans were carefully
crafted to cause no such damage. We,
therefore, took our case to the relevant
international forum, the regional con-
ference, where we were vindicated.

During that conference in Rio we
held discussions with the Cubans and
reached an agreement on a procedure ir
which the engineers on our respective
delegations would get together to begin
working out the resolution of specific in
terference problems. However, the
Cubans refused to follow through with
bilateral meetings, paralleling the con-
ference approach, a procedure which all
other delegations were using to resolve
incompatibilities between stations.

Instead, Cuba submitted to the plan
ning committee of the conference, on a
"take it or leave it basis," 48 frequency
changes which, while resolving some of
the incompatibilities between Cuban sta-
tions and those of some of its neighbors
shifted the remaining incompatibilities
onto frequencies occupied by U.S. sta-
tions, resulting in an increased level of
interference to U.S. stations. Two im-
portant U.S. stations aflFected would be
KSL in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 1160
kHz and WHO in Des Moines, Iowa, on

70

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1040 kHz. The U.S. delegation was suc-
cessful in getting the Rio conference to
reject this proposal but the Cuban dele-
gation refused to accept the conference's
decisions and withdrew.

Later, Cuba notified the ITU that it
would ignore the assignment plan
adopted by the conference and the deci-
sions made there which rejected their 48
frequency changes. Cuba said it would
implement its 48 changes regardless of
its international obligations.

Cuba has, in fact, implemented im-
portant parts of its plan. Cuba's second
superstation on 1160 kHz has been on
the air using at least 100 kw of its
planned 500 kw power and has severely
reduced KSL Salt Lake's secondary
nighttime service area from 750 to
50-60 miles. WHO, on 1040, has thus
far been spared, perhaps in hope that
this Cuban threat would incite an active
campaign by interested parties to kill
Radio Marti.

We are seriously concerned about
Cuban damage to all U.S. stations and,
indeed, when Cuba threatens any U.S.
interest. But we cannot allow Cuban
threats of outlaw behavior to dictate our
foreign policy.

The Federal Communications Com-
mission can comment on the effect the
Cuban inventory of stations as modified
by their 48 frequency changes would
have on U.S. domestic broadcasting.

The National Association of Broad-
casters (NAB) has done its own analysis
of these 48 frequency changes and has
found that AM radio stations in 32
states plus the District of Columbia will
experience interference and reduced
listening areas should Cuba implement
in full its proposed inventory. Alto-
gether, over 200 U.S. stations will be
affected. The NAB study shows that 10
clear channel radio stations will lose
their nighttime coverage, 37 clear chan-
nel stations would lose large portions of
their wide area coverage, and only 6
clear channel stations would continue to
provide interference-free service.

Some people say that the threat
from Cuba is too great; Radio Marti will
invite massive Cuban jamming, inter-
ference, retaliation. They say, change
frequencies and hurt someone else, not
me, or they suggest using another
system — FM, short wave, TV, out-of-
band AM, anything. Some even seem to
imply we should abandon our plans out
of fear.

Cuban interference is a problem, a
serious problem, because international

radio broadcasting is based on coopera-
tion. But Cuban interference is not a
new problem because Cuba long ago
chose to act as an outlaw. Cuba's law-
lessness predates Radio Marti and will
continue to exist in the future — with or
without this new station.

The truth is that we do not know for
certain what Cuba will do to interfere
further with U.S. radio. Cuban plans to
put a high-powered station on 1040 kHz
would seriously interfere with WHO Des
Moines and even more with any Radio
Marti broadcasts on that frequency.
However, this would also cause major
problems for broadcasters in other coun-
tries in the region and could cause the
Cuban station itself to lose effectiveness
because of mutual interference with
WHO and Radio Marti.

The Cuban delegation to the Region
II medium frequency broadcasting con-
ference acknowledged that inclusion of

authoritative statement was by Fidel
Castro himself to the Union of Young
Communists in Cuba on April 4. Speak-
ing of Radio Marti, Castro said he hopes
it won't go on the air but "... if in the
end there is to be a dialectic confronta-
tion between them and us, they with
their subversive station and we with our
[arguments in] response ... we are pre-
pared to give a suitable response. . . ."
This suggests that Castro himself is
threatening a stepped-up campaign of
broadcasting to the United States.

Thus, while we cannot say for cer-
tain just what Cuba will, in fact, do, the
stage seems set for counterbroadcasting
rather than jamming. And we have no
fear of anything Castro might say. That
is the major difference between com-
munism and democracy. Democracy
thrives in the light of controversy; com-
munism panics at the sound of truth.

Quite apart from the question of

We are seriously concerned about Cuban
damage to all U.S. stations and, indeed, when
Cuba threatens any U.S. interest. But we cannot
allow Cuban threats of outlaw behavior to dictate
our foreign policy.

1040 kHz for Radio Marti in list B as a
U.S. station granted it international
recog^tion and legitimacy. The opera-
tion of Radio Marti and WHO can be
technically compatible. I don't believe
that there is any argument on this point.

It is possible that the Castro regime
might attempt to jam Radio Marti with
low-powered stations situated in the
main cities and towns of Cuba. This
would badly interfere with reception of
Radio Marti, but might have a minimal
effect on WHO. It is also possible that
Cuba may do nothing. The VOA has
been directing broadcasts to Cuba for
more than 21 years, and Castro has
rarely seriously tried to jam these broad-
casts.

While some American observers may
have doubts as to the possible effective-
ness of Radio Marti, Cuban authorities
have none. They fully recognize the
potential impact of Radio Marti and take
it very seriously, indeed.

Cuba can moimt a jamming effort.
Many reports indicate preparation of
stations, including a so-called Radio Lin-
coln, which could either jam or counter-
broadcast. But the most recent and most

Radio Marti, we need to study the much
broader problem posed by outlaw Cuban
interference with U.S. radio. We sup-
port a proposal that has been made to
assign a task force to study this prob-
lems and recommend what we might do
in response. Deliberate, Cuban-caused
damage to U.S. broadcasting in violation
of international agreements should be
considered an unfriendly act to which we
should respond. The technical means ex-
ist to do that.

Those of us who have lived in a
Communist state will know just how
much Radio Marti can affect the lives of
Cubans. For those of us who have not, it
is an opportimity to offer the Cuban peo-
ple hope and the means to make in-
formed judgments on the actions of their
own government. For a people bottled
up in a system of oppression which they
did not seek and cannot remove, that
can be precious.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

September 1982

71

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

U.S.-Latin American Relations

by Thomas O. Endera

Address before the Council of the
Americas in Washington, D.C., on June
21, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assist-
ant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs.

We were shocked — all of us — when war
broke out in the South Atlantic; in part
because we knew that brave men on
both sides would risk and lose their
lives; in part because the two countries
in conflict were both bound in friendship
to us. But the shock also came because
war between states has been virtually
unknown in the Americas in our time.

True, Honduras and El Salvador
fought each other in the so-called
soccer war of 1969. Peru and Ecuador
have clashed over their Amazonian
frontier. Costa Rica and Nicaragua skir-
mished in the immediate aftermath of
the Second World War. But war in the
Western Hemisphere has been on a
small scale compared to elsewhere.
Since the Second World War, some 4
mOlion persons have lost their lives in
armed action between states. Counting
action in the South Atlantic, fewer than
4,000 have died in the Western
Hemisphere. Military expenditures in
the developing countries of the hemi-
sphere come to only 1.4% of gross na-
tional product — a quarter of the average
in the Third World as a whole.

Freed thus from the threat of war
among its members, the inter- American
system has been able to concentrate on
three great tasks. One is the fostering of
democratic institutions. For all the
failures and setbacks, there is no more
powerful political idea in the hemisphere
than democracy. In the New World
there is no enduring legitimacy for
governments outside of democracy. Re-
peatedly the peoples of the Americas
come back to it as the only valid solu-
tion.

A second is the struggle for eco-
nomic development. We have always
been aware that the New World con-
tains much of the globe's potential for
the creation of wealth — yet this has but
dramatized how far its nations must still
go to overcome poverty. Repeatedly
efforts have been made — the Alliance
for Progress, the Inter-American
Development Bank, various common
markets, the Latin American economic
system — to mobilize the strength of
several states or many to achieve faster
growth.

A third is security from outside in-
tervention. For if state-to-state wars are
rare, there have been wars of subversion
in abundance, internal struggles aided or
launched from outside. How to respond
to them has been a recurring theme in
the inter-American system. There have
been terrorist movements, insurgencies,
or revolutions in Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, EI Salvador,
Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela,
Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.
On countless occasions, the states of the
Americas have cooperated to keep or re-
store the peace, prevent intervention,
and support freedom.

I have no doubt that these three
tasks — democracy, economic develop-
ment, and security — will go on being the
central focus of policy for the Americas.
Certainly they will be for the United
States. But the South Atlantic war sug-
gests that we must now add a fourth —
how to keep the peace among states in
the hemisphere. We must review the
lessons of the tragic war between
Argentina and the United Kingdom. We
must draw the conclusions for the future
conduct of relations among American
states.

Democracy

First let me report on democracy in the
hemisphere. It has made gains in the
last year. In many places it is strikingly
well. Last month we saw Colombians go
to the polls in a massive turnout and
vote the opposition party into power.
Earlier in the month, 74% of the voters
in a country that was once a model of
authoritarianism — the Dominican Re-
public— took part in an impressive
demonstration of civic maturity. Prior to
that, St. Lucia, Costa Rica (despite a
brutal economic crisis). El Salvador, and
Honduras all held elections with over-
whelming turnouts.

All told, 20 of the 30 members of the
Organization of American States now
have governments chosen through open,
competitive elections — a gain of 2 since
last year. And in those still short of full
democracy there is progress to report.
Uruguay is moving to restore full
democracy. In Brazil, which is virtually
a universe itself, the process of ahertura
continues to move forward, with state
and city elections scheduled for later this
year.

I am aware that in the past there
have been long cycles in the Americas
away from democracy as well as toward
it. It would be rash to project indefinite-
ly today's positive trend. But the curren
now flowing is deep as well as broad.
The task for the United States and for
other democracies in the hemisphere is
to encourage it by every means that is
effective.

Clearly, for all its recent success,
democracy in the hemisphere has a lot
of enemies — political absolutists and
militarist factions, gTierrilleros of the
left, and death squads of the right — tha
seek democracy's destruction and ridi-
cule. Part of the role of the United
States is to make sure that they do not
believe that we will condone, or easily
accommodate, the destruction of rep-
resentative institutions — a role we must
play without arrogance, yet true to our-
selves.

El Salvador is a particularly
poignant case. Who was not moved to
see the long, long lines of determined
citizens waiting to vote, often at much
personal danger? If ever a people gave a
mandate to create representative institt.
tions, it was in El Salvador on
March 28.

Yet El Salvador has no experience
with the practice of representative in-
stitutions. Each party still dreams of nu
ing alone, and the skills of negotiation
and compromise, the need for comity,
are all to be learned.

This nascent Salvadoran democracy
is now facing two searching tests.

Land Reform. The first big test is
land reform. All parties say they sup-
port land reform, but each doubts the
other's intentions. Immediately after th
election there came what is perhaps bee
characterized as an attack on land
reform: ambiguous legislation was
passed, titling suspended, and a politica i
signal sent through the country that thf
reform was dead. Although we don't
know how many there were, evictions
surged. Then came a counterattack: the
resumption of provisional titling, distri-
bution of the first definitive titles, and
the start of compensation. Orders are
now being issued to the departmental
commanders to restore evicted tenants
in each department.

For the United States, it is vital to
carry the agrarian reform through.
Campesinos who have become land-
owners will be a strong bulwark against
the guerrilleros.

Much more has been done since the
election than is widely known here —
4,700 provisional titles have been given

72

Department of State Bulletir

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

out in 2 months, as against 27,000 the
previous 24 months. The first definitive
titles have been granted; the first com-
pensation paid.

Compensation is a particularly
serious issue. It is not surprising that
owners resist when they are not paid.
The original plan gave it little attention.
Indeed, U.S. law rules out assistance for
compensation. Maybe we should look at
this again as we debate our aid eflFort.

I want to make this clear: In July
the President will certify El Salvador
for continued military assistance only if
there are strong month-by-month indica-
tions of progress in land reform: titles,
protection against eviction, and compen-
sation.

Reconciliation. The second big test
for Salvadoran democracy will be recon-
ciliation. With that huge mandate behind
them, democratic parties can afford to
reach out to adversaries. Assembly
President D'Aubuisson has called for a
dialogue with left factions affiliated with
the ffuerrilleros. ARENA [National Re-
publican Alliance] and other parties are
working on an amnesty. These are all
very positive signs. The important thing
is to do them seriously. The amnesty
must offer genuine security, with the
participation of the church and interna-
tional organizations. The dialogue must
involve listening as well as talking, giv-
ing an opportunity to adversaries to ex-

, plain how they could participate in the
new democratic institutions. The United
States very much hopes the new govern-
ment will act with speed and imagina-

I tion in this area.

I It would be wrong to expect El
Salvador's leaders to acquire overnight

i the ability to work togetiier that has for

I generations eluded their predecessors.
They will make mistakes. But we know
too from Venezuela's example in the

I early 1960s that a history of dictatorship
and Cuban subversion can be overcome
by skilled leaders willing to practice
democracy. And we can help by our
presence and support— by keeping our
faith in democracy as the political
system most suited to the reconciliation
of divided societies.

Economic Development

Second, economic development — this
year the focus is on the small, fragile
countries of the Caribbean and Central
America, not because they are the only

ones to suffer in the current sharp reces-
sion but because they are so overwhelm-
ingly dependent on ^e outside world.
Without help they really have no chance
of generating the domestic growth or
making the internal corrections that will
pull them out of the slump.

President Reagan joined with the
leaders of Mexico, Venezuela, Canada,
and Colombia to propose for these coun-
tries a comprehensive program of
assistance and new economic opportuni-
ty, the Caribbean Basin initiative.

The contributions of others are
significant. In spite of serious economic
difficulties at home, Mexico and
Venezuela are maintaining their oil
facility, which sells petroleum partly for
mediimi- and long-term credit, worth
$700 million last year. Canada is doub-
ling its aid program. Colombia — itself a
developing country — is making available
trade credits and preferences and cen-
tral bank deposits.

Our own contribution is before the
Congress. It consists of a major new
economic opportunity — duty-free access
to the U.S. market for 12 years, but-
tressed by incentives to U.S. in-
vestment— along with a one-time
emergency appropriation of $350 million
to help the countries of the area get
started again.

When we drew up this proposal, we
never doubted that it would be difficult
to pass in a recession year, a budget-
cutting year, and an election year: But it
seemed to us that the United States had
already delayed too long doing
something serious, long-term, and truly
helpful about economic distress in our
closest neighbors.

A great many members of Congress
share that view. Yet many of the coun-
tries of the area are beginning to
wonder whether our contribution to the
Caribbean Basin initiative will ever come
forth. Clearly if it were not to carry, the
deep concerns these countries now have
about their future would turn to despair.
So it is now up to the United States to
deliver, just as Mexico, Venezuela,
Canada, and Colombia have delivered. I
am confident that we will, but to do so
will take a massive effort over the next
2 months.

While we seek an innovative solution
to the problems of the small coimtries
immediately to our south, we must also
pay attention to what is happening to
the big ones. Each of the major
economies of the Western Hemisphere is
in a slump: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil,
Argentina, as well as the United States.

The problems vary: In some countries a
very sharp correction is still necessary.
Each depends heavily on intemationaJ
trade and on access to international
financial markets. But the South Atlan-
tic crisis has crystallized doubts about all
borrowers in the area. There is a risk
that normal access to markets may be
interrupted.

This is, then, a particularly sensitive
moment in the management of economic
relations in the hemisphere. Two-way
communication — both about the need to
maintain access to markets and about
necessary corrective steps — is more im-
portant than ever. The Americas are
basically very credit worthy; the impor-
tant thing is to keep them that way and
to make sure that perceptions track
reality.

Internal Security

Third, internal security— there are some
incipient signs of progress in Centa-al
America. "The myth tiiat the revolution
begun in Nicaragua 3 years ago was go-
ing to sweep the isthmus has now been
shattered. "The once broad coalition sup-
porting the Sandinistas has now shrunk
to a narrow elite. A Djilas-like "new
class" has emerged. To offset their fail-
ing popularity, the Sandinistas are rely-
ing ever more heavily on foreign mili-
tary advisers — some 2,000 Cubans
among others— and developing the big-
gest army in Central America. But their
leadership has split. And the economy is
floundering. Perhaps as a result, Nicar-
agua now says it wants to take up our
offer of negotiatiors on normalizing our
relationship. We are probing to see
whether it is serious.

The ffuerrilleros in El Salvador—
Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega once
told me that they were to be the "shield"
of the revolution — retain military punch,
as the heavy action in Morazan Province
these last days shows. They continue to
receive large amounts of supplies from
Nicaragua, and their headquarters and
training grounds are located there. But
they are not gaining. They must now
face a Salvadoran Army that still has
many deficiencies but is now better
trained and equipped. The result could
well be gains this year for the Salva-
doran Government and for the legally
maintained order that democratic prog-
ress requires.

In Guatemala there is also a new op-
portunity. The new government has im-
mediately set about to end urban death

September 1982

73

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

squad activity, tx) campaign against cor-
ruption, and to organize niral self-
defense forces. The guerrilleros are
reacting by increasing the violence. They
are massacring in some cases whole
villages, perhaps in an effort to provoke
the government into a new policy of
repression. This new government has a
long way to go, but its openness has
struck a responsive chord among Guate-
malans, and we will start to work with
it, prudently but supportively.

In Honduras the new democratic
government of President Suazo Cordoba
is dealing vigorously with its financial
problems, with incipient terrorist prob-
lems, and with the security problems
posed by the conflict in El Salvador and
the mOitary buildup in Nicaragua. But it
will need more resources, mOitary and
economic, if it is to continue.

So the isthmus isn't going Com-
munist. Indeed 1982 could prove a turn-
ing point for Central America. The turn
will not materialize, however, unless we
sustain the effort we have been making.
We will need to keep up the resource
flows for 2 or 3 years more. We will
have to maintain our political involve-
ment to complete the democratic
transformation and reforms. And we
must keep searching for a way in which
Nicaragua can live with its neighbors
without threatening them.

It used to be that the United States
either neglected Central America or,
when things went wrong, sent in the
troops. U.S. troops are not needed,
wanted, or appropriate to Central
America now. But neither is neglect. We
need to keep up the effort long enough
to help the countries there emerge as
secure, democratic neighbors.

Peace Among States

Finally, let me say a word or two about
the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas
war. We all know the roots of the con-
flict. The United Kingdom, in peaceful
possession of the islands for 150 years,
has always been concerned that the
wishes of the islanders be paramount in
their future disposition. Argentina,
believing that the islands had been taken
from it by unlawful force and frustrated
by years of fruitless negotiation, has a
deep national commitment to their
recovery.

Perhaps the friends of the two coun-
tries should have put themselves at their
disposition much earlier to assist the
search for a solution. The point is more
than historical. The hemisphere is laced
with territorial conflicts. The United

States and other countries of the area
have at one time or another been in-
volved in calming or negotiating most of
them. But perhaps this branch of
hemispheric diplomacy should receive
even more attention, if it can be man-
aged without conveying an impression of
interfering or busybodying.

A second lesson has to do with
avoiding miscalculation. Repeated ef-
forts were made by us and by
others — before the landing on the
islands, again when the British fleet was
approaching, and again when the U.S.
and Peruvian and U.N. peace plans were
advanced — to explain to Argentine
leaders what would happen if they did
what they proposed to do. Although
they consistently proved accurate, the
predictions were not believed. Com-
munication failed utterly.

Of course, it takes two to com-
municate. But I ask myself whether the
lack of close ties with Argentina — not
only by us but by most other American
states — and the effects of the long
period of self-isolation and isolation by
others did not also play a role. It is dif-
ficult to have credibOity in a country
unless one has strong links to it.

A third lesson concerns the correct
anticipation of future contingencies. The
contingency of the Falklands/Malvinas
was not envisaged when our peacekeep-
ing machinery was designed. To be sure,
the Rio treaty calls for common action
when an American state is attacked,
notably by a non- American power. But
the treaty manifestly didn't envisage
that its protection would extend to the
case when an American state starts the
conflict. Most Rio treaty members seem
to accept this fundamental point implicit-
ly, for they resisted calls to invoke the
treaty's sanctions.

We should not conclude from this
case that the Rio treaty or the inter-
America system won't work. What we
have to be sure of is that we have cor-
rectly anticipated possible future con-
flicts and that our institutions and
diplomacy are ready to deal with them.

In the aftermath of the South Atlan-
tic war, it is already apparent that
military expenditures in South America
will accelerate. Governments will look
for advanced weapons, for greater self-
sufficiency in defense industries, and for
bigger stocks of weapons. Budgets will,
of course, constrain purchases, but it
would be vain to expect modem arms
purchases to be deferred as has so often
happened in the past.

The interest of American states is
dearly to avoid arms races. Even where
competitive procurement cannot be
avoided altogether, they will want to see
that existing disputes are not needlessly
exacerbated. For many years the United
States has applied restraints on our
arms exports to South America that
were in practice tighter than to any
other part of the world. In the past
decade, our share of arms sales to South
America has fallen from 25% to 7%. It
is important now that the United States
use the full authorities of current arms
export guidelines to join others in main-
taining the balance of power throughout
South America.

A fourth lesson is that we must be
vigilant to prevent regional conflicts
from having strategic consequences,
changing the East-West balance. Cuba
(and Nicaragua) rushed forward to ex-
ploit the crisis. In Argentina some
talked of playing the Cuban card. But it
would be unwise to believe Argentina
will turn to the country that in its
capital harbors the extremely violent
Argentine terrorist organization — the
Montoneros.

But all American states should be
aware of the costs we might face should
the U.S.S.R. gain access to the strategic
southern cone. Cape Horn is a main
shipping route, the alternate route for
Middle Eastern oil, the link for big ships
between the two coasts of the United
States.

The point is that we all share a com-
pelling interest in an Argentina that is
true to hemispheric traditions and free
of Communist influence. We all should
be prepared to help Argentina maintain
conditions in which its people can realize
their free-world vocation.

A fifth lesson has to do with sen-
sibOities. When forced to choose, when
our possibilities of mediation had been
exhausted, we came down squarely on
the side of the principle of non-first-use
of force, self-defense, and the rule of
law. Many in Latin America agreed with
us. But a great many were wounded by
what they saw as a choice of East- West
over North-South loyalties, of Anglos
over Latinos, of Europeans over
Americans. Resentments against the
United States that may have existed
anyway welled up. Ironically the
sharpest reactions came from two
friendly democracies: Venezuela and
Peru.

It would be wrong to conclude from
this reaction that the United States
should not have chosen as it did. There
can be no position for the United States
other than to oppose the use of force to

74

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ittle disputes. It is not surprising that
ursuit of principle can have real costs.
le would only compound these costs
ere we to try to have it both ways by
■ying now to buy friendship or support.

But it would equally be wrong to
onclude that the pursuit of our unique
elationships with the other American
bates is no longer realistic or desirable,
or the underlying bonds remain: We
re all immigrant societies, countries of
tie frontier, where personal equality and
ersonal freedom are the ideal. We are
11 countries of believers, countries com-
litted to the rule of law. We are all
ountries determined to prevent Com-
tiunist inroads in our societies. We are
H free-enterprise countries. And our
rade and financial markets depend vital-
y on each other.

Perhaps indeed what this crisis tells
s not so much something about our cur-
rent decisions but about what we have
ione in the past. Perhaps all too often
ve North Americans have been unwill-
ng to make a sustained commitment to
Jie hemisphere, pursuing instead an a to
:arte approach, ignoring our friends
Afhen it suited us, yet demanding their
lelp or acquiescence when it served our
nterest.

I see this as a time for steadiness of
purpose rather than for grandiose
gestures, commissions, statements, or
proposals.

• We have started to achieve with
Mexico a relationship that reflects its ex-
ceptional importance to the United
States and its role in world affairs. Now
comes the harshest test of that new rela-
tionship, as the economic slowdown in
both countries threatens to aggravate all
our joint accounts: trade, finance, im-
migration.

• We have made a commitment to
help the countries of the Caribbean
Basin protect themselves against outside
intervention, strengthen or develop
democratic institutions, and overcome
economic disasters. Now we must
deliver.

• We were beginning to respond to
the new realities in South America,
building close bilateral relations with
each country for the first time in a
decade, when the shadow of the South
Atlantic crisis fell across our efforts.
Now we must relaunch those efforts,
notably joining others in helping to
maintain the networks of constructive
relationships that are essential to peace.

After all, when a fight in distant
islands can cause such a ripple effect,
the fundamental lesson is not how little
we need each other but how closely
interlinked we are. The task now is to
make our interdependence work, not
against us, but for us. ■

Maintaining IVIomentum Toward
n Open World Economy

f

by Thomas 0. Enders

Address before the Chamber of Com-
merce and Brazil-U.S. Btisiness Council,
Washington, D.C., on May IS, 1982. Am-
bassador Enders is Assistant Secretary
for Inter- American Affairs.

For much of the postwar period the
great engines of growth in the world
economy have been international trade
and international investment. I am not
saying that there was no impulse to
growth in individual domestic econo-
mies. Brazilians and Americans — above
all others — know how much there was.

And yet, even in the case of our two
great continental economies, interna-
tional trade regularly outperformed
domestic trade. In the period 1963-73,
U.S. international trade grew twice as

fast as domestic trade. If you include
services as well as goods, the share of
U.S. gross national product (GNP) enter-
ing international exchange more than
doubled in the last generation, rising to
fully 12% or roughly the same propor-
tion as in that great exporting cham-
pion, Japan. In dynamic Brazil, interna-
tional trade has recently followed the
same trajectory. It rose one-and-a-half
times faster than domestic trade in the
1970s. By 1980 some 10% of all goods
and services produced in Brazil were
traded abroad.

Yet in the past 2 years, the stimulus
to growth from international trade has
flagged. In 1981 world trade stagnated
in volume, as compared with a 1%
growth for GNP. In 1982 first returns
are even less encouraging.

As far as we can decipher the statis-
tics, it's the same story with investment
flows, that other great engine of growth.
Up to the early 1970s there was a rapid
development of direct foreign invest-
ment relative to the growth of trade,
domestic investment, and GNP. The
average annual growth rate of total out-
ward international direct investment
from the 13 largest OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] countries was over 12% a year.
Most of this investment was channeled
to developed countries which accounted
for some 70% of the total.

Since then foreign investment has
flagged. The average annual increase in
direct foreign investment from the 13
OECD countries was roughly the same
in nominal terms (12.6%). But consider-
ing the markedly higher rates of infla-
tion, there has been a sharp deceleration
in real terms. The United States pro-
vides much less of the outgoing flow and
has become a strong competitor for the
incoming flows.

If statistics were available for 1981
and 1982 — which they are not — the
story would be even more depressing.
Moreover, sharp differences have recent-
ly developed in the ability of developing
nations to attract investment. Although
the flow of investment capital to devel-
oping countries has increased over the
last few years in current and real terms,
this investment has been concentrated
heavily in a few economies — in par-
ticular Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, and Brazil. Direct investment in
other developing economies has tended
to stagnate.

To date the oil-importing countries
of the developing world have been able
to maintain their growth rates fairly
well, in spite of the stagnation of inter-
national trade and investment. The an-
nual rate of increase in their combined
gross domestic product declined only
slightly from 5.5% on average per year
between 1963 and 1973 to about 5% be-
tween 1973 and 1980. The comparable
figures for the industrial countries are
5% and 2.5% respectively. This general-
ly encouraging performance was possible
because these countries channeled the
burden created by the deterioration in
their terms of trade and slowdown in in-
dustrial countries' growth into increased
foreign indebtedness and a sharp slow-
down in the growth of per capita con-
sumption.

It is uncertain whether developing
countries will be able to continue financ-
ing the growth of investment at past
rates. Rising debt and higher interest
rates have substantially raised debt-

September 1982

75

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

service ratios, making new borrowing
more difficult. As a result, there is a
growing uncertainty about the ability of
the oil-importing developing countries to
maintain, let alone improve, their
1973-80 performance.

I would hesitate to extrapolate these
trends through the decade. That is what
used to be known as the Brookings
paradigm— find a trend in three consecu-
tive quarters of economic data and claim
to have discovered a new law. And yet it
is not obvious to me— I wonder whether
it is obvious to you— how these trends
are to be reversed. No one can find the
advance signs of new booms led by
domestic trade. And as export growth
slows down, the danger is that too many
countries will succumb to the temptation
to adjust imports to fit current earnings
and thus accelerate the downward trend.

The jeopardies in the field of capital
are different but no less deadly. Heavily
indebted countries may impose new
capital controls— in an effort to retain
the funds they have— or fail to meet
payments and thus put all flows at risk.
At a time when world competition for
capital is intensifying, either can be
disabling. In a capital-short world, the
open economies will attract a dispropor-
tionate share of available funds.

What this means is that the old
problems of protectionism and barriers
to investment have acquired a new
urgency. When international trade and
investment were growing explosively,
we could afford some lapses from ra-
tional economic practice. Now that they
are stagnating, we can afford much
less— but risk many more.

U.S. Commitment to an Open
International Economy

This Administration will not join the
trend for restriction. For a long time the
United States has been in the lead of the
struggle for an open international econo-
my. Our average tariffs have come down
to 7% from their high point in 1930 of
35%. More than half (53%) of all U.S.
imports from Brazil entered free of
duty. On the remainder, the actual duty
paid was 8%. I will confess that on some
occasions in the past, we have attempted
to channel foreign investment flows. But
we did not persist, nor were we success-
ful. President Reagan is deeply and per-
sonally committed to open trading and
investment policies.

There has been a lot of talk about
protectionism and, indeed, the pressures
to take protectionist actions have been
strong, as they always are, particularly

during periods of slow growth. But the
record of this Administration in avoiding
trade-restrictive actions has in practice
been a good one. With the exception of
sugar, this Administration has imposed
no new restraints on trade. Indeed, even
in as politically sensitive an area as foot-
wear, the President decided to remove
those restraints which existed prior to
his assumption of office. He did so also
with the steel trigger price mechanism,
when countervailing duty petitions were
filed.

Another indicator of this Admini-
stration's commitment to increased
trade opportunities is the Caribbean
Basin initiative. The fact that the region
to which it applies is economically small
sometimes obscures the startling sweep
of the concepts which it embodies— elim-
ination of all U.S. duties (with the single
exception of the textile sector) combined
with an investment tax credit and
balance-of-payments support. The funda-
mental focus of the initiative is to
enhance the productivity and dynamism
of the private sector in these economies.
We expect that the U.S. portion of the
initiative— the trade, investment, and aid
measures I've just alluded to— will be
matched by basin countries' own efforts
to reduce internal constraints to eco-
nomic growth. In addition, U.S. efforts
are being complemented by major con-
tributions from Canada, Mexico, Vene-
zuela, and Colombia, which have all
significantly expanded trade and finan-
cial assistance to the basin region.

I know that some Latin American
leaders, and probably some of you in the
audience, are troubled by the prefer-
ential aspect of the Caribbean Basin in-
itiative. We recognize that this is a
departure from our traditional nondis-
criminatory trade policy. But I want to
emphasize that this is not a reversal of
that policy. The initiative was designed
to deal with a crisis situation, and one so
g^ave and so important that unprece-
dented actions were called for. However,
the initiative is not a permanent pro-
gram but is limited to a specific 12-year
period. It seeks to help countries achieve
self-sustaining growth so that they need
not depend on preferences indefinitely.

A moment ago I mentioned sugar,
and many among you undoubtedly are
troubled by our recent actions in this
area. This has, indeed, been one of my
own serious preoccupations in the eco-
nomic area. But I want to make several
points. First, our recent imposition of
quotas on U.S. sugar imports was an ac-
tion taken only as a measure of last

resort in defense of the domestic sup-
port program passed by the Congress
last fall. Quotas were forced upon us by
the declining world price for sugar. The
situation was further aggravated by un-
usually low U.S. demand for sugar in
1982, due in part to higher than average
imports last year. We expect that our
demand for imported sugar will revert
to a more normal level in 1983. At that
time we would expect country quota
levels to reflect more fully traditional
levels of sugar exports to the United
States.

Secondly, there will be some positive
impact on exporters' revenues derived
from the imposition of quotas. Because
the U.S. support program will no longer
have to be protected solely by duties anc
fees, imported sugar will get a price
closer to the internal U.S. price than it
had. The higher price will help to offset
the reduced quantities allowed into the
U.S. market. Export earnings will,
therefore, be higher for many, if not all,
foreign suppliers than under the fee-
based system.

Finally, the U.S. action is not an iso-
lated incident but part of a pattern of
worldwide and deeply rooted imbalances
in the international sugar economy— im-
balances which have had serious results
for both developing-country and U.S.
producers. U.S. sugar policy has been
aimed at addressing some of the funda-
mental conditions which account for
these imbalances. We have been working
to make the International Sugar Agree-
ment function effectively so as to
dampen the violent supply and price
fluctuations which have long character-
ized the so-called "free" sugar market.
The cooperation of the European Com-
munity in those efforts was crucial to
their success. I regret that we were
unable to persuade the Community to
reduce or end its subsidized sugar ex-
ports nor to cooperate effectively with
the sugar agreement. However, we will
continue to work with the Community
and with other major sugar producers tc
try to devise a workable international
system for sugar.

I think I should say a few words at
this juncture about our GSP "gradua-
tion" policy, because I understand that it
is sometimes improperly characterized
as a protectionist measure. First, the
generalized system of preferences (GSP)
authorizes a country to grant duty-free
treatment to products of developing
countries on the assumption that devel-
oping countries need a temporary pref-
erential advantage to get a firm foothold
in the international market place for

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

leir nontraditional products. The "com-
etitive need" feature in the U.S. GSP
;curately reflects that philosophy. If a
roduct exported by a country reaches a
rtain dollar value or percentage share
f U.S. imports, it is assumed that par-
cular export no longer needs the
aecial privilege of duty-free treatment,
think those of you who are in business
ither in Brazil or in the United States
'ould agree that those are reasonable
riteria. They assure that preferential
•ade opportunities for any particular
roduct are not dominated by those de-
eloping countries which have already
ained a firm foothold in the U.S.
■ fiarket.

There has been some controversy
ver certain cases where GSP treatment
'as not restored for products which
rst exceeded the competitive need cri-
aria and subsequently fell below those
mits. But two striking aspects of this
ssue are often overlooked. First, the
umber of products involved is a minis-
ule part of the GSP program— this year
nly two items in the case of Brazil, for
otal exports to the United States of
27.8 million. Secondly, this policy helps
0 preserve preferential advantages
vhere they are needed to promote fur-
her export diversification rather than
)reserve preferential advantages to in-
lustries clearly beyond the infant stage.

Seneral Agreement on
rarififs and Trade

But it is not enough to resist imposing
restrictions— however important that is.
The powerful and yet delicate machine
which is the international economic sys-
tem needs constantly to be serviced and
repaired even in the best of times but
especially now when its power appears
to be diminishing. This is a time for
fresh thinking and forward-looking ap-
proaches. We in the United States have
some ideas. But the international eco-
nomic system also needs the creative
participation of other countries of this
hemisphere. Brazil has long played a
constructive role in international eco-
nomic institutions. I hope that it will ex-
ercise a strong and positive leadership
role in preserving and strengthening the
international trade and investment
system for the future.

The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) is the crucial part of
the international machine when it comes
to trade and many aspects of invest-
ment. At a time when the world trading

system is under severe strain, it is well
to recall the benefits the GATT has
brought to the international economy.
The GATT has provided the underpin-
ning for an unparalleled expansion of
trade and international investment. The
GATT has achieved a major success in
promoting a dramatic reduction in
tariffs, to the point that in most sectors
these are now of minimal importance as
a barrier to trade. Yet, as tariffs have
been lowered, more complex and
troublesome obstacles have become
prominent.

Given the complex problems before
us and our economic stake in a healthy
trade system, the 1982 GATT minis-
terial takes on a special importance. The
lack of a consensus on many issues
within and among developed countries,
or between developed and developing
countries, means that this meeting is the
essential beginning of a necessary
process.

Of particular importance is a recog-
nition that the current safeguards
system is not working and that a
prompt acceleration of efforts to reach
agreement is necessary. The increasing
lack of discipline on safeguard actions
taken to restrict imports is a serious
threat to the GATT.

Services are particularly important
to the U.S. economy but also to the
economies of our trading partners. Serv-
ices encompass a broad range of cate-
gories from banking to insurance, to
data processing and construction. Some
service issues concern the right of estab-
lishment; others involve the flow of in-
formation or people across borders. We
need to work within the GATT to estab-
lish principles and rules governing
specific types of services, including the
possible amendment of some existing
codes to apply to services.

The importance of trade in high
technology requires that trade in this
sector remain open and fair. There is a
tendency toward national aids to sup-
port promising industries. These tend to
distort trade and often shield firms from
the competition which has so often been
the inducement to innovation. The minis-
terial should agree on GATT studies for
procedures to avoid domestic distortions
in high-technology trade, particularly in
the areas of government procurement,
transborder data flows, and subsidies.

Finally, we hope the GATT will also
address, quickly and effectively, an area
which the United States has already pro-
posed for GATT action— trade-related
performance requirements and minimum

export quotas which can seriously
distort trade and investment flows. It is
time to develop better multilateral
understandings on investment so as to
limit the potential for distortion caused
by government intervention in private
investment decisions. Broad interna-
tional acceptance of the principle of na-
tional treatment, greater discipline over
the use of incentives, and agreement to
limit, or better yet eliminate, the use of
performance requirements would pro-
mote more efficient allocation of re-
sources and economic growth. In the
short run, narrowly nationalistic actions
can be very tempting. In the long run,
we all benefit from an open, well-func-
tioning international economy.

Foreig^n Investment Climate
in the Western Hemisphere

The leaders of many developing coun-
tries who met at Cancun recognized that
increased foreign direct investment will
be vital to their prosperity in the 1980s,
particularly as the prospects for in-
creased aid appear less promising. Their
success will depend largely on the steps
they take to insure favorable investment
climates. As President Reagan stated in
his speech at Philadelphia on October
15th, improving the climate for private
capital flows is critically important, for
investment— both domestic and
foreign— is the lifeblood of development.
Clear and consistent investment laws
and regulations, in conformity with the
principles of international law, will be
determining factors in the decisions of
many investors. Such practices attract
new investment and inhibit the outflow
of domestic funds which now plague
many developing countries.

In this connection, I am heartened
by what I believe is an increased sophis-
tication and realism with regard to
foreign investment in this hemisphere.
We have all learned from experience.
Multinational corporations today are far
more sensitive to the development pro-
grams and needs of their host countries
and take seriously their responsibility to
be good citizens of their host countries.
For their part, Latin American economic
leaders and governments are beginning
to see through the old shibboleths about
the inevitability of exploitation by
foreign investors and the automatic
superiority of government decisions over
private decisions.

The result has been a rather remark-
able absence in recent years of the acri-
monious and politically charged invest-

September 1982

77

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ment disputes which seemed to domi-
nate U.S. -Latin American relations in
the 1960s and early 1970s. In the first
half of the 1970s, we had about 80 new
expropriations in Latin America involv-
ing U.S. companies. In the second half
of the decade, the number of such cases
dropped almost by half to 45. Moreover,
there is a growing realization in the
region of the value of international
mechanisms for resolving these types of
cases, as well as other types of invest-
ment disputes. For example, in 1981,
three countries in the hemisphere (Bar-
bados, Costa Rica, and Paraguay) joined
the World Bank's International Center
for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, thereby doubling the number
of hemispheric members. There are now
16 members of the Inter-American Con-
vention on International Commercial Ar-
bitration.

Moreover, a number of governments
are reexamining their existing legisla-
tion and practices with a view to in-
creasing the incentives for investment.
Several countries in the Caribbean
Basin, for example, are exploring the
possibility of negotiating bilateral invest-
ment treaties with the United States.
An even more striking example is the in-
terest of several countries, Peru among
them, to increase incentives to attract
foreign capital and technology for petro-
leum exploration.

The Need for Close Cooperation

The concept of an open world economy
was not discovered by accident. We
learned in the 1930s the terrible conse-
quences—not only economic but political
and most horribly of all military— that
restrictionism could have. The vision of
the destructiveness of the prewar
decade sustained makers of policy for a
generation after the war. Other things,
not planned or even anticipated, added
enormously to the growth of interna-
tional transactions. Transportation costs
fell drastically; communications im-
proved radically; trade but, above all,
capital benefited from less regulated and
more profitable free international
markets. The result was the greatest
period of economic growth the world has
known.

We will not come easily by such suc-
cess again. We're going to have to work
a lot harder for it than in the past. More
than ever before, our future prosperity
in the United States, in Brazil, in
Europe, depends on our ability to main-
tain momentum toward an open interna-
tional economy. No country has a bigger
stake in such an economy than the
United States or Brazil. So the closest
cooperation in trade and investment
policy— always desirable between our
two countries— is now indispensable. ■

U.S., Mexico Implement Visa
Agreement for Businessmen

Thirty-one billion dollars commands a lot
of corporate attention, and well it
should. This figure represents the
volume of trade between the United
States and Mexico in 1981. Mexico has
become our third largest international
trading partner— behind Canada and
Japan— as the Mexican Government,
engaged in ambitious national develop-
ment plans, scours world markets for
materials and technical expertise.

Fortunately for corporate America,
U.S. industry remains the primary con-
tact of choice for Mexican firms. In
1981, 53% of Mexican exports were
destined for the United States, while
64% of Mexican imports, representing
over $17 billion in sales for American
firms, originated in the United States.

The Governments of the United
States and Mexico have long recognized

that our histories, cultures, and
economies are intricately linked.
Acknowledging the importance of our
growing volume of trade, the United
States and Mexico agreed in March 1982
to simplify visa procedures for business-
men traveling between the two nations.
The result is that no competitor from
any other country has the quick and
easy access to his Mexican counterparts
that the U.S. businessman now enjoys.
Although of mutual benefit to both
trading nations, the agreement is viewed
by U.S. negotiators as the most recent
example of the Department of State's
ongoing effort to give vigorous support
to the U.S. business community by
facilitating U.S. sales abroad.

The new business visa policy is the
indirect result of negotiations launched

by Presidents Reagan and Lopez Portillo' sai
in 1981. The two leaders agreed last
year to establish several working groups
to analyze specific problems and arrive
at mutually agreeable courses of action.
One is the consular and immigration ac-
tion group, chaired on the U.S. side by
Diego Asencio, former Ambassador to
Colombia and currently Assistant
Secretary of State for Consular Affairs.
His group tackles the wide-ranging and
highly diverse questions of travel
facilitation; the new visa policy is one of
several successfully concluded
agreem.ents in recent months designed
to strengthen economic ties and improve
relations. The new agreement was im-
plemented in the remarkable time of 5
weeks— a testament to its popularity in
both countries.

Travel Distinctions Eliminated

The Mexican Government previously
distinguished between the U.S. traveler
entering Mexico for tourism and the
traveler entering for business purposes.
The tourist found entry procedures ex-
tremely simple— obtaining a tourist card
(the Mexican Government's form FMT)
upon entry to Mexico with proof of U.S. 1
citizenship, such as a birth certificate or
a passport. The business traveler,
however, had to obtain a business visa ir
advance through a Mexican Consulate.
This procedure was normally timecon-
suming, difficult, and costly— the U.S.
businessman paid $42 for the visa.
On April 5, 1982, the Mexican
Government eliminated, for the most
part, the distinction between the tourist
and business traveler. Now the majority
of U.S. citizens entering Mexico for
business purposes (exceptions are noted
below) will simply obtain a form FMT
upon entry to Mexico, using the same
procedure as the tourist. The FMT
issued by Mexican immigration
authorities will be valid for 180 days and
allow multiple entries on the same form
free of charge to the traveler. Although
U.S. businessmen will obviously benefit
from the streamlined application pro-
cedure, the greatest commercial advan-
tage of the new system may well be the
businessman's ability to travel to Mexico
for meetings and consultations on short
notice, with no advance visa application
necessary. This will provide a distinct
competitive edge.

The U.S. Government, in a
reciprocal move, acted to allow the freer
travel of Mexican businessmen to the
United States by extending the validity
of business visas issued to Mexican
citizens. As of April 15, 1982, business

Departnnent of State Bulletir

TREATIES

ias issued to Mexican businessmen can
valid indefinitely instead of limited to
e 5-year maximum which previously
isted. This means that the Mexican
sinessman, once documented with an
definite business visa, need never
;ain apply for such a visa, because he
ill be documented to travel to the
nited States on business for the rest of
s life.

isa Restrictions

Ithough the Mexican Government's
iw regulations regarding business visas
ive made U.S. business travel to Mex-
0 considerably easier, there are two
iportant restrictions. Only U.S.
tizens can enter Mexico on the form
MT to conduct business; resident aliens
dng in the United States must still ap-
y through a Mexican Consulate for the
idard business visa. Of more general
.terest, U.S. businessmen cannot sign
ntracts whOe in Mexico on the form
'MT. Entry into Mexico to engage in
Ivities requiring prior authorization
om the Mexican Government (i.e., the
' igning of contracts) must comply with
ertain formalities set forth in laws ap-
lying to foreign citizens in Mexico. The
t.S. businessman traveling to Mexico to
ign contracts must do so on the stand-
rd business visa in order to avoid
elays and legal complications.

ictivities Permitted

Lside from these restrictions, the Mex-
:^n Government permits the U.S.
lusinessman in Mexico on the form
^MT to perform a wide range of ac-
ivities. Listed below are permitted ac-
ivities as specifically cited in the official
)rder modifying visa procedures:

• Conduct business talks with Mex-
can citizens or legal aliens resident in
viexico;

• Participate with Mexican citizens
n the discussion and development of
3lans regarding the economic, technical,
.'inancial, marketing, or engineering
feasibility of investments in Mexico;

• Participate in preliminary pro-
ceedings connected with the formation
of new enterprises or the expansion of
existing ones, if the U.S. businessmen
are going to provide capital or form part
of the administrative bodies of such com-
panies;

• Participate in the discussion and
drafting of proposed contracts involving
financing, consultation, or technical
assistance for present or future business
entities;

• Perform tasks inherent in the
transfer, delivery, installation, or opera-
tion of machinery and equipment on
behalf of foreign business entities, in
fulfillment of contracts entered into for
that purpose;

• Engage in intermittent activities
involving visits or administrative, ac-
counting, technical, operating, sales, or
other supervision in enterprises in which
the businessmen have an investment or
in representation of the foreign business
entity that owns stock in such enter-
prises;

• Participate in activities related to
the managerial and executive bodies of
such enterprises in representation of
foreign business entities holding capital
therein;

• Participate in activities connected
with the management, administration,
operation, and supervision of enterprises
established under the regime covering
the inbond assembly industry in Mexico;

• Attend meetings of the executive
bodies of inbond assembly firms if the
latter do not have independent legal
status as Mexican companies but are af-
filiates, branches, etc., of a foreign firm,
and the foreigner is a member or repre-
sentative of the executive or admin-
istrative bodies of the United States
parent firm; and

• Attend and participate in non-
profit events of an economic, scientific,
technological, educational, cultural,
social welfare, sports, etc., nature.

In sum, the activities permitted the
U.S. businessman in Mexico on the form
FMT encompass the normal range of
business contact and negotiation, except
the signing of contracts. Questions
regarding the new visa procedures, as
they relate to a specific trip to Mexico
or intended activity, should be directed
to the Mexican Embassy in Washington,
D.C., (telephone 202-293-1710) or any
of the 39 consulates or 17 travel offices
the Mexican Government maintains
throughout the United States.

Press release 235 of Aug. 3, 1982.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Revised text of the international plant protec-
tion convention of Dec. 6, 1951 (TIAS 7465).
Adopted at Rome Nov. 28, 1979. Enters into
force on the 30th day after acceptance by
two-thirds of the contracting parties.'
Acceptance deposited: U.S., June 11, 1982.

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenos
Aires July 7, 1981. i

Notification of approval: Belgium, July 15,
1982.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Uganda, July 19, 1982.

Bills of Lading

International convention for the unification of
certain rules relating to bills of lading and
protocol of signature. Done at Brussels
Aug. 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2,
1931; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1937. 51 Stat.
233.

Adherence deposited: Bolivia, May 28, 1982.
Denunciation deposited: Netherlands,
Apr. 26, 1982; effective Apr. 26, 1983.

Protocol to amend the international conven-
tion for the unification of certain rules of law
relating to bills of lading (51 Stat. 233). Done
at Brussels Feb. 23, 1968. Entered into force
June 23, 1977."

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 26,
1982.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations.

Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into

force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24,

1969. TIAS 6820.

Notification of succession: Kiribati, Apr. 2,

1982.

Customs

Convention concerning the international
union for the publication of customs tariffs.
Signed at Brussels July 5, 1890. Entered into
force Apr. 1, 1981. 26 Stat. 1518.
Withdrawal: Australia, Mar. 31, 1977;
effective Mar. 31, 1982.

Education— UNESCO

Convention on the recognition of studies,
diplomas, and degrees concerning higher
education in the states belonging to the
Europe region. Done at Paris, Dec. 21, 1979.
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982.^
Ratification deposited: Holy See, June 10,
1982.

September 1982

79

TREATIES

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered
into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and Acceptance: Hungary, May 6,
1982.

Articles of agreement of the International

Bank for Reconstruction and Development

formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference

July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27,

1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and Acceptance: Hungary, July 7,

1982.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force
Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Ratification deposited: Italy, June 22, 1982.^''

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the Convention of Mar. 6,

1948, as amended, on the International

Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,

6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15,

1979.1

Acceptance deposited: Oman, May 24, 1982.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement to amend the protocol of
signature to the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959,
to supplement the agreement between the
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regard-
ing the status of their forces with respect to
foreign forces stationed in the F.R.G. as
amended by the agreement of Oct. 21, 1971
(TIAS 5351, 7759). Signed at Bonn May 18,
1981.

Ratification deposited: F.R.G., July 9, 1982.
Entered into force: Aug. 8, 1982.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force
March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Vietnam, Jime 14, 1982.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine
pollution by dumping of wastes and other
matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mex-
ico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29,
1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975.
TIAS 8165.
Accession deposited: Brazil, July 26, 1982.

Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Denmark, June 18,
1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with
annexed Protocols.'

Ratifications and acceptances deposited:
Byelorussian Soviet Soc. Rep., Ukrainian
Soviet Soc. Rep., June 23, 1982; Denmark,
Sweden, July 7, 1982.

Whaling

International whaling convention and

schedule of whaling regulations, as amended

by 1956 protocol. Done at Washington

Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10,

1948. TIAS 1849, 4228.

Notification of adherence deposited: Belize,

July 15, 1982; F.R.G., July 2, 1982;^ Senegal,

July 15, 1982.

Notification of withdrawal: Dominica, July 6,

1982; effective June 30, 1983.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the
29th World Health Assembly.'
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, May 25, 1982;
Libya, June 16, 1982; Yemen (Aden), May 3,
1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitution
of the World Health Organization, as a-
mended. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by
the 31st World Health Assembly.'
Acceptance deposited: Mauritania, May 27,
1982.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to cooperation on an-
titrust matters. Signed at Washington
June 29, 1982. Entered into force June 29,
1982.

Bangladesh

Agreement for cooperation concerning

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex

and agreed minute. Signed at Dacca Sept. 17,

1981.

Entry into force: June 24, 1982.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 8, 1982.
Effected by exchange of letters at Dacca
July 9 and 13, 1982. Entered into force
July 13, 1982.

Brazil

Agreement extending the agreement of
Dec. 1, 1971 (TIAS 7221), as amended and
extended, relating to a program of scientific
and technological cooperation. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Brasilia May 19 and June
1, 1982. Entered into force June 1, 1982.

Agreement for use of the geostationary
operational environmental satellite in the
Brazilian national plan for data collection
platforms. Signed at Brasilia June 14, 1982.
Entered into force June 14, 1982.

Interim agreement on air transport services.
Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia
June 23, 1982. Entered into force June 23,
1982.

1982 Edition of

Treaties in Force

Released

The Department of State has released
Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and
Other International Agreements of the United
States in Force on January 1, 1982.

This publication reflects the bilateral rela-
tions of the United States with 225 countries
or other political entities and the multilateral
relations of the United States with other con-
tracting parties to more than 600 treaties
and agreements.

The bilateral treaties and other agree-
ments are arranged by country or other
political entity; the multilateral treaties and
agreements are arranged by subject with a
listing of the parties to the agreements. Cita-
tions to the text, as well as information on
dates of signature and entry into force for
the United States, are given for each agree-
ment.

Information on current treaty actions,
supplementing the information contained in
Treaties in Force is published monthly in the
Department of State Bulletin.

The 1982 edition of Treaties in Force
(324 pp.) is Department of State publication
9285. It is for sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402 for $9.00. ■

European Space Agency

Agreement extending the memorandum of
understanding of Oct. 7, 1978, concerning us«^
of European Space Agency's EARTHNET
system to receive and process National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's
Landsat data. Effected by exchange of let-
ters at Washington and Paris June 17, 1982.
Entered into force June 17, 1982.

Greece

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at
Athens May 7 and 12, 1982. Entered into
force May 12, 1982.

Honduras

Agreement relating to the military assistance
agreement of May 20, 1954 (TIAS 2975), con-
cerning the use of certain facilities in Hon-
duras by the U.S., with annex. Effected by
exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa May 6 and
7, 1982. Entered into force May 7, 1982.

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, with annexes. Signed at
Tegucigalpa June 11, 1982. Entered into
force June 11, 1982.

CHRONOLOGY

I

g Kong

Afeement relating to trade in cotton, wool,

ijl manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-

/s, with annexes. Effected by exchange of

ts at Hong Kong June 23, 1982. Entered

' force June 23, 1982; effective Jan. 1,

Iban

Jjnt determination for reprocessing of
ipcial nuclear material of U.S. origin, with
-at I'd note. Signed at Washington July 23,
-L' Entered into force July 23, 1982.

I>rea

.iiTet'ment extending the agreement of
h 4, 1977, concerning fisheries off the
asts of the U.S. (TIAS 8526). Effected by
e'hange of notes at Washington June 30,
182. Entered into force June 30, 1982.

/^eement concerning fisheries off the coasts

cthe U.S., with annexes and agreed

mutes. Signed at Washington July 26,

182. Enters into force on a date to be

J reed upon by exchange of notes, following

te completion of internal procedures of both

ivemments.

alta

jreement with respect to taxes on income,
amended, with related exchange of notes,
gned at Valletta March 21, 1980.
itifications exchanged: May 18, 1982'
itered into force: May 18, 1982

auritiuB

^cement amending the agreement for sales
agricultural commodities of May 27, 1981

IAS 10221). Effected by exchange of notes
Port Louis June 25, 1981. Entered into

irce June 25, 1981.

lew Zealand

Dnvention for the avoidance of double taxa-
on and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
espect to taxes on income, with protocol,
igned at WeUington July 23, 1982. Enters
to force upon the exchange of instruments
ratification.

lingapore

agreement amending the agreement of
ug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade
1 cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
nd textile products. Effected by exchange of
jtters at Singapore May 17 and June 14,
982. Entered into force June 14, 1982.

iomalia

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
nodities, relating to the agreement of
irtarch 20, 1978 (TIAS 9222). Signed at
•logadishu June 17, 1982. Entered into force
lune 17, 1982.

Spain

\greement extending the agreement of
Feb. 16, 1977, concerning fisheries off the
Masts of the U.S. (TIAS 8523). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington June 30
md July 2, 1982. Entered into force July 2,
1982; effective June 30, 1982.

Agreement on friendship, defense, and
cooperation, with complementary
agreements, and exchanges of notes. Signed
at Madrid July 2, 1982. Enters into force
upon written communication between the
parties that they have satisfied their respec-
tive constitutional requirements.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
March 25, 1975 (TLAS 8107), with agreed
minutes. Signed at Colombo June 30, 1982.
Entered into force June 30, 1982.

Sweden

Convention supplementary to the extradition
convention of Oct. 24, 1961 (TIAS 5496).
Signed at Stockholm June 22, 1982. Enters
into force upon exchange of ratifications.

Switzerland

Agreement establishing rights, privileges,
and immunities of the delegation to the
negotiations concerning limitation and reduc-
tion of strategic arms (START). Effected by
exchange of letters at Bern Jime 9, 1982.
Entered into force June 9, 1982.

Uganda

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Kampala May 10, 1982. Entered Into force
June 21, 1982.

Zambia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Aug. 4, 1978, with minutes of negotiation.
Signed at Lusaka June 20, 1982. Entered in-
to force June 20, 1982.

'Not in force.

2Not in force for the U.S.

'With declaration.

*With designation.

^AppUcable to Berlin (West).

"With understanding. ■

July 1982

July 1

Dominican Republic President Antonio
Guzman, after his pistol discharges, dies from
a gunshot wound in the head. Vice President
Jacobo Majluta Azar is sworn into office as
President.

Voters elect Institutional Revolutionary
Party candidate Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
as the new President of Mexico.

July 6

Reversing its policy, the State Department
proposes that Ethiopian exiles remain in the
U.S. and not face deportation hearings.

President Reagan announces that he
agrees "in principle to contribute a small con-
tingent" of U.S. troops as part of a multi-
national force for "temporary peacekeeping"
in Beirut.

July 12

The U.S. lifts economic sanctions imposed
April 30 on Argentina at the outbreak of the
Falkland Islands war.

July 14

By unanimous vote (17-0) the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee approves George Pratt
Shultz as Secretary of State.

President Roberto Suazo Cordova of Hon-
duras makes an official working visit to
Washington, D.C., July 13-15. During his
stay President Suazo discusses military aid
with President Reagan.

July 15

By unanimous vote (97-0) the Senate con-
firms George Shultz as Secretary of State.

Voters elect ZaU Singh as the new Presi-
dent of India.

July 16

George Shultz is sworn in as the 60th
Secretary of State by Attorney General
William French Smith.

The Reagan Administration announces
suspension of shipments of cluster artillery
shells to Israel pending a review of Israeli
use of cluster bombs (CBUs) in Lebanon in
possible violation of U.S.-Israeli arms
agreements.

July 18

Israel officially acknowledges to the U.S. its
use of American-made cluster bomb weapons
in its Lebanon invasion.

July 19

An Arab League Delegation composed of
Foreign Ministers Abdel Halim Khaddam of
Syria and Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi
Arabia visit Washington, D.C., July 19-20 to
present Arab League views on the fighting in
Lebanon.

July 22

The French Government rejects the U.S. ban
on the sale of American-licensed technology
for a Soviet pipeline. Prime Minister Pierre
Mauroy instructs French companies to fulfill
their contracts supplying Western Europe
with Soviet natural gas.

July 24

The State Department confirms that the U.S.
is airlifting military equipment and weapons
to Somalia to help that nation repel Ethiopian
attacks eicross its border.

The Italian Foreign Ministry announces
that "signed contracts will be honored" to
supply equipment for a Soviet natural gas
pipeline, defying the U.S. ban on the use of
American-developed technology in the
project.

seotember 1982

81

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

July 25

President Ahmadou Ahidjou of Cameroon
makes an official working visit to
Washington, D.C., July 25-28. During his
stay President Ahidjou meets with President
Reagan and other Administration officials.

July 27

President Reagan certifies to Congress that
despite "severe civil strife," the Salvadoran
Government is making "tangible signs of
progress" on human rights. The Administra-
tion is requesting $61.3 million in military aid
for El Salvador next year.

July 28

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi begins
an official visit to the U.S. During her 8-day
trip. Prime Minister Gandhi meets with
President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and
other Administration and congjessional of-
ficials.

July 29

The following newly appointed Ambassadors
present their credentials to President
Reagan: Jaroslav Zantovsky of
Czechoslovakia; Benjamin Razafintseheno of
Madagascar; Bemardus Fourie of South
Africa; Soto Harrison of Costa Rica; Jorge
Luis Zelaya Coronado of Guatemala; and
Humayim Rasheed Choudhury of Bangladesh.

July 30

President Aristedes Royo of Panama resigns,
2 years before his term ends. Vice President
Ricardo de la Espriella succeeds him. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

•208 7/1 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy
Secretary of State
(biographic data).

•209 7/1 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), study group
A and B, July 20.

•210 7/1 CCITT, group A, July 28.

•211 7/1 Elliott Abrams sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs,
Dec. 10, 1981 (biographic
data).

•212 7/1 Program for the official

working visit of Honduran
President Roberto Suazo
Cordova, July 13-15.

•213 7/14 Powell A. Moore, Assistant

Secretary for Congressional
Relations (biographic data).

•214
•215

7/14

7/14

•216 7/14

•217 7/14

•218
•219
•220

7/14

7/14

7/16

•221 7/19

•222

7/20

•223

7/20

•224

7/20

•225 7/22

•226 7/26

•227 7/26

•228
•229

7/26
7/26

•230 7/30

•231

232

7/29
7/30

Peter H. Dailey sworn in as

Ambassador to Ireland

(biographic data).
John L. Loeb, Jr., sworn in as

Ambassador to Denmark

(biographic data).
Marshall Brement sworn in as

Ambassador to Iceland

(biographic data).
David Anderson sworn in as

Ambassador to Yugoslavia

(biographic data).
Mark Evens Austad sworn in

as Ambassador to Norway

(biographic data).
David Funderbunk sworn in as

Ambassador to Romania

(biographic data).
Shultz: remarks at swearing in

ceremony. White House

Rose Garden.
Lawrence S. Eagleburger

sworn in as Under Secretary

for Political Affairs

(biographic data).
U.S., Singapore amend textile

agreement, June 11 and 22.
U.S., Hong Kong sign bilateral

textile agreement, June 23.
Stoessel, Shultz: remarks

before State Department

employees at Secretary's of-
ficial arrival, July 19.
Program for the official

working visit of Cameroon

President Ahmadou Ahidjo,

July 25-28.
Program for the official visit

of Indian Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi, July 28-

August 4.
Raymond G. H. Seitz —

Executive Assistant to the

Secretary (biographic data).
U.S., Korea sign new fisheries

agreement.
U.S., China amend bilateral

textile agreement, July 16

and 19.
Nicholas Piatt sworn in as

Ambassador to Zambia

(biographic data).
U.S., Spain sign new fisheries

agreement.
George P. Shultz sworn in as

the 60th Secretary of State,

July 16 (biographic data).

•Not printed in the Bulletin.

Department off State

IDI

«P'

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available fror
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary-Designate Shultz

Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearings
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
July 13, 1982 (Current PoUcy #408).

Africa

Background Notes on Benin (May 1982),
Djibouti (June 1982), Guinea-Bissau (July
1982), Zambia (May 1982).

Arms Control

Arms Control and NATO INF Modemizatio;

(GIST, July 1982).
US Arms Control Policy (GIST, July 1982).
START Proposal (GIST, July 1982).

Europe

Preserving Nuclear Peace in the 1980s,
Director of the Policy Planning Staff
Wolfowitz, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, R.I., June 22, 1982 (Current
Policy #406).

Soviet Active Measures: An Update, July
1982 (Special Report #101).

Background Notes on Finland (May 1982).

Middle East

Background Notes on Iran (May 1982),
Lebanon (July 1982).

Military Affairs

Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and
Deterrence, Director of the Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs Howe, Subcommi^
tee on International Security and Scientifi
Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 13, 1982 (Current Policy #409).

Security Assistance

Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third
Worid, 1972-81, released by Under
Secretary Buckley, August 1982 (Special
Report #102).

South Asia

Background Notes on India (June 1982),
Nepal (April 1982).

United Nations

UNISPACE '82 (GIST, July 1982).
UN Special Session on Disarmament (GIST,
June 1982).

I*'

ft
liii

(I

82

IDEX

sptember 1982
Diume 82, No. 2066

it-

•" ;entina. U.S.-Latin American Relations

oi (Enders) 72

ms Control. Preserving Nuclear Peace in

the 1980s (Wolfowitz) 32

ozil. Maintaining Momentum Toward an

Open World Economy (Enders) 75

siness. U.S., Mexico Implement Visa

Agreement for Businessmen 78

mmodities. Maintaining Momentum To-
ward an Open World Economy (Enders) 75
nununication

dio Broadcasting to Cuba (Enders) 68

dio Marti and Cuban Interference

(Enders) 70

ingress

e Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet

Union (Buckley) 37

rtification of Progress in El Salvador

(Enders) 60

rman Rights Conditions in El Salvador

(Abrams) 41

nth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 39

idio Broadcasting to Cuba (Enders) 68

idio Marti and Cuban Interference

(Enders) 70

S. Approach to East-West Economic Re-
lations (Meissner) 30

S. Approach to Problems in the Carib-
bean Basin (Shultz) 28

S. Policy on International Narcotics Control

(Stoessel) 46

9n8ular Affairs. U.S., Mexico Implement

Visa Agreement for Businessmen 78

uba

uban Armed Forces and the Soviet Mili-

taiT Presence 64

adio Broadcasting to Cuba (Enders) 68

ladio Marti and Cuban Interference

(Enders) 70

Tprus. Ninth Report on Cyprus (message to

the Congress) 39

iconomics

he Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet

Union (Buckley) 37

ertification of Progress in El Salvador

(Enders) 60

laintaining Momentimi Toward an Open

World Economy (Enders) 75

r.S. Approach to East-West Economic Re-

I lations (Meissner) 30

I.S. Approach to Problems in the Carib-
bean Basin (Shultz) 28

J. S. -Latin American Relations (Enders) ... 72

CI Salvador

Certification of Progress in El Salvador

(Enders) 60

luman Rights Conditions in El Salvador

(Abrams) 41

-"resident Reagan's News Conference of July

28 (excerpts) 26

Snergy. Export Sanctions on Gas and Oil

Equipment (Reagan) 31

Surope

rhe Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet

Union (Buckley) 37

iCxport Sanctions on Gas and Oil Equip-
ment (Reagan) 31

Human Rights

^Certification of Progress in El Salvador

(Enders) 60

iluman Rights Conditions in El Salvador

(Abrams) 41

iluman Rights and the Refugee Crisis
(Abrams) 43

India

India— A Profile 56

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi (Gandhi,
Reagan, Department statements) 54

Iran. Iran-Iraq War (Sherman, Department
and White House statements, text of
resolution) 59

Iraq. Iran-Iraq War (Sherman, Department
and White House statements, text of
resolution) 59

Israel

Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From
West Beirut (Reagan, text of departure
plan, fact sheets. White House statement,
letters to the U.N. Secretary General and
the Congress) 1

Maintaining a Cease-Fire in Lebanon (Reagan,
White House statements) 22

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle
East (Reagan) 23

Secretary Shmtz s News Conference of Au-
gust 20 (excerpts) 8

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Begin,
Reagan) 45

Latin America and the Caribbean

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin A

Maintaining Momentum Toward an Open
World Economy (Enders) 75

U.S. Approach to Problems in the Caribbean
Basin (Shultz) 28

U.S.-Latin American Relations
(Enders) 72

Lebanon

Lebanon — A Profile 15

Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From
West Beirut (Reagan, text of departure
plan, fact sheets. White House statement,
letters to the U.N. Secretary General and
the Congress) 1

Maintaining a Cease-Fire in Lebanon (Reagan,
White House statements) 22

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle
East (Reagan) 23

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon
Situation (Kirkpatrick, Lichenstein, reso-
lutions, draft resolutions) 14

UNIFIL — U.N. Interim Force in Leb-
anon 19

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of Au-
gust 20 (excerpts) 8

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Begin,
Reagan) 45

Mexico. U.S., Mexico Implement Visa Agree-
ment for Businessmen 78

Middle East

Iran-Iraq War (Sherman, Department and
White House statements, text of res-
olution) 59

Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From
West Beirut (Reagan, text of departure
plan, fact sheets. White House statement,
letters to the U.N. Secretary General and
the Congress) 1

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle
East (Reagan) 23

President Reagan's News Conference of July
28 (excerpts) 26

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of Au-
gust 20 (excerpts) 8

Military A^airs. Cuban Armed Forces and
the Soviet Military Presence 64

Narcotics. U.S. Policy on International Nar-
cotics Control (Stoessel) 46

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

President Resigan's News Conference of July
28 (excerpts) 26

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of Au-
gust 20 (excerpts) 8

Nuclear Policy

The Challenge of Nuclear Technology
(Marshall) 49

Reprocessing and Plutonium Use (Department
statement) 52

Poland

The Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet

Union (Buckley) 37

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of Au-
gust 20 (excerpts) 8

Situation in Poland (Department statement) 3

U.S. Approach to East-West Economic Rela-
tions (Meissner) 30

Presidential Documents

Export Sanctions on Gas and Oil Equipment
(Reagan) 31

Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From
West Beirut (Reagan, text of departure
plan, fact sheets. White House statement,
letter to the U.N. Secretary General and
the Congress) 1

Maintaining a Cease-Fire in Lebanon (Reagan,
White House statements) 22

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle
East (Reagan) 23

Ninth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress 39

President Reagan's News Conference of July
28 (excerpts) 26

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi (Gandhi,
Reagan, Department statements) 54

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Begin,
Reagan) 45

Publications

Department of State 82

1982 Edition of Treaties in Force Released . 80

Refugees. Human Rights and the Refugee
Crisis (Abrams) 43

Trade. Maintaining Momentimi Toward an
Open World Economy (Enders) 75

Treaties

Current Actions 79

1982 Edition of Treaties in Force Released . 80

U.S.S.R.

The Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet
Union (Buckley) 37

Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military
Presence 64

Export Sanctions on Gas and Oil Equipment
(Reagan) 31

Preserving Nuclear Peace in the 1980s
(Wolfowitz) 32

President Reagan's News Conference of July
28 (excerpts) 26

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of Au-
gust 20 8

U.S. Approach to East-West Economic Re-
lations (Meissner) 30

United Kingdom. U.S.-Latin American Re-
lations (Enders) 72

United Nations

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon Situ-
ation (Kirkpatrick, Lichenstein, resolu-
tions, draft resolutions) 14

UNIFIL-U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon
(Miller) 19

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 41, 43

Begin, Menahem 45

Buckley, James L 37

Enders, Thomas 0 60, 68, 70, 72, 75

Gandhi, Indira 54

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 14

Lichenstein, Charles M 14

Marshall, Harry R. Jr 49

Meissner, Charles 30

Reagan, President 1, 23, 26, 31, 39, 45, 54

Sherman, William C 59

Shultz, Secretary 8, 28

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 46

Wolfowitz, Paul 32

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