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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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The Official Montlily Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2064 



July 1982 




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bulletin 



Volume 82 Number 2064 / July 1982 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. 

Secretary of State 

DEAN FISCHER 

Assistant Secretary lor Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Acting Chief. Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through March .^1. 1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Dkpartmknt of Statk Bui.i.KTiN as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bui.i.ktin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, US Government Printing 
OfTice. Washmgton, DC. 20402 Price: 12 
issues plus annual mdex — $21 00 (domestic) 
J26 25 (foreign) Single copy— $3.75 
(domestic) $4 70 (foreign) Index, single 
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CONTENTS 




FEATURE 

1 President Reagan Attends Economic and NATO Summits {Secretary Haig, 
President Reagan. Secretary Regan. Final Communique. Declaration. 
Documents) 
15 President Reagan Visits Europe (Secretary Haig, President Mitterrand, 

Pope John Paul II, Queen Elizabeth II, President Reagan, Prime Minister 
Thatcher; Luncheon and Dinner Toasts, U.S. -Italy Statement) 



The President 

39 An Agenda for Peace 
42 News Conference of May 13 
(Excerpts) 

The Secretary 

44 Peace and Security in the Middle 
East 

47 Peaceful Change in Central 
America (Secretary Haig, 
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.) 

50 Developing Lasting U.S. -China 
Relations (Secretary Haig, 
Walter J. Stoessel. Jr.) 

52 Interview on "Face the Nation" 

55 Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 

58 News Conference of June 19 

Africa 

61 FY 1983 Assistance Requests 

for Africa (Chester A. Crocker) 

Department 

64 FY 1983 Authorization Request 

(Secretary Haig) 

East Asia 

65 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 

Asia (John H. Holdridge) 

Europe 

70 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 
Europe (Charles H. Thomas) 

IVIiddle East 

72 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 
the Near East and South Asia 
(Nicholas A. Veliotes) 



74 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 

Israel (Morris Draper) 

Refugees 

75 FY 1983 Requests for Migration 

and Refugee Assistance 
(Richard D. Vine) 

Security Assistance 

77 FY 1983 Security Assistance 
Requests (James L. Buckley) 

United Nations 

80 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 
the U.N. and the OAS 
(Nicholas Piatt) 

Western Hemisphere 

83 FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 
Latin America (Thomas 0. 
Enders) 

86 The Falkland Islands (Secretary 
Haig. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, J. 
William Middendorfll, White 
House Statement, Texts of 
Resolutions) 

Treaties 

91 Current Actions 

Chronology 

93 May 1983 

Press Releases 

94 Department of State 



Index 



.,.^ii^mp^»Ts 




SEP I 41982 



DEPOSITORY 





FEATURE 

Economic 
and 
NATO 
Summits 



President Reagan 

Attends Economic and 

NATO Summits 



President Reagan attended the eighth economic summit of the in- 
dustrialized nations June 5-6, 1982, in Versailles, France. The other par- 
ticipants were French President Francois Mitterrand (chairman), Canadian 
Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, West German Chancelkn- Helmut 
Schmidt, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, Japanese Prime 
Minister Zenko Suzuki, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 
The European Communities was represented by Gaston Thorn, President of 
the Commission, and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martins, President 
of the Council. 

On June 10, President Reagan attended the North Atlantic Council sum- 
mit in Bonn. 

Following are statements by Secretary Haig and Treasury Secretary 
Donald T. Regan made at the opening of press briefings and by the Presi- 
dent; the final communique issued at the conclusion of the economic summit; 
the declaration and two documents issued at the conclusion of the NATO 
summit; and Secretary Haig's press briefing. ' 



Participants of the economic Bummit pose 
on steps of Grand Trianon, Versailles. 
From left to right are Gaston Thorn. Presi- 
dent of the Economic Community Commis- 
sion, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko 
Suzuki, British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, President Reagan, French Presi- 
dent Francois Mitterrand (chairman). West 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Cana- 
dian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott 
Trudeau, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni 
Spadolini, and Belgian Prime Minister 
Wilfried Martens. 

(White House phole by Karl H. Schumacher) 



ECONOMIC SUMMIT 



Secretary Regan's 
Statement 

Versailles 
June 5^ 



As you know, we had the first session 
this morning. It opened a little before 
10:00 a.m. The main subject for the first 
part, lasting through the coffee break 
and until about 12:30 p.m., was the sub- 
ject of research, technology, employ- 
ment, and growth. Each of the heads of 
state spoke in regard to this. President 
Mitterrand led off the discussion and 



/1982 



I 




FEATURE 

Economic 
and 
NATO 
Summits 



hen later passed out copies of his paper 
n the subject. 

The U.S. position was, as expressed 
y President Reagan, that we welcomed 
his initiative on the part of President 
litterrand, that there should be a work- 
ig party that should further study the 
ubject of technology and how to im- 
irove it. 

The President cautioned, though, 
hat this should be mainly in the private 
ector rather than in the public sector, 
lointing out that most of the innova- 
ions over the past half century or more 
lave been in the private sector of the 
Jnited States rather than through 
government. He gave out some figures 
,0 the effect that we are spending in the 
Jnited States about $80 billion on re- 
iearch and development, half of which is 
»ming from the private sector. Of the 
f40-odd million that's in the public sec- 
xir government spending, $5.5 billion of 
;hat is pure research, has nothing to do 
(vith applied research. 

He also pointed out that a presiden- 
tial study in this area that was reported 
to President Roosevelt in the early 
1930s, as to what would be the great in- 
novation in research and development 
over the next 25 years, failed to mention 
such things as television, plastics, space 
technology, jet planes, organ trans- 
plants, laser beams, "and even," he said, 
"such a common item," and he held up 
his ballpoint pen, "as a ballpoint pen." So 
he said, "There's no way we can predict 
what will be happening over the next 25 
years with any degree of clarity as to 
what the inventions will be." 

He also said that we should not fear 
technology because a lot of people, a lot 
of nations do fear that there will be 
higher unemployment as a result of new- 
ly introduced technology. And he used 
the homely illustration of the dial tele- 
phone, stating that when the dial tele- 
phone first came in, it was thought that 
all of the female telephone operators 
would be thrown out of work. He went 
on to say that today more than ever, 
there are more women employed in the 
United States than at any other time. 
And were women still on the dial— still 
manning the telephones — it would take 
every woman in the United States to 



man the telephone system of the United 
States, if, indeed, that were possible. 

He said, we shouldn't fear the 
results of technology but rather should 
welcome it. He said that it would pro- 
mote growth and that it would promote 
more employment. 

After the subject of technology had 
been pretty well exhausted, the summit 
turned to the subject of macroeco- 
nomics. President Mitterrand asked 
Chancellor Schmidt to lead off. Schmidt 
said he didn't know how he got to be a 
sherpa for macroeconomics, but, never- 
theless, he went ahead and described his 
ideas of where the nations of the world 
stood at the current moment from an 
economic point of view. 

Most of these facts are well-known 
about high unemployment in most of the 
nations involved in the summit— about 
the fact that we simultaneously have 
high rates of interest and a recession, 
which is something very unusual. He 
pointed out that the real rates of in- 
terest, particularly in the United States, 
were the highest they've ever been. He 
thought that this was something that all 
of us should work on. He said he wasn't 
pointing the finger at the United States, 
but all nations would have to get their 
domestic policies into effect, that there 
were too many transfer payments. 
Deficits are running too high. There's 
much too much public borrowing. 

President Reagan then gave his in- 
tervention and in the course of it 
described our economy. Again, most of 
these facts are known to you. I'll tick 
them off rather quickly. 

The fact that we do have high un- 
employment but he pointed out that the 
figures we received yesterday — that un- 
employment as a percentage is up from 
9.4 to 9.5— at the same time indicated 
that over a million new job-seekers were 
in the marketplace. Of that number, 
800,000 had found employment, and at 
the current moment, we were employing 
over 100 million Americans. That's the 
greatest number of employed Americans 
in our history. 

He also stated that our high rates of 
interest were psychological in his judg- 
ment, that inflation was down. He gave 
the figures on inflation— a little over 6% 
for 12 months around, a little over 2% 




for 6 months, less than 1% for the last 3 
months; in fact, 1 month of deflation. He 
said that that indicated to him that in- 
terest rates would come down as soon as 
the fear of those who are loaning money 
that we could have continually high 
Federal deficits— those fears were 
allayed. And he thought that could be 
done by a budget process that would end 
in the near future with Federal deficits 
showing that they would be down over 
the next 3 months— over the next 3 
years with a balanced budget in sight. 
And at that point, there was an adjourn- 
ment for lunch. 



Secretary Regan's 
Statement 



* ^Pnblicain outside Versailles Palace. 



Versailles 
June 5, 1982' 



This afternoon the session was primarily 
devoted to the wrap-up of the macro- 
economic statements by the heads of 
state. And then we get into trade, and 
the subjects lasted most of the day. I 
told you this morning earlier or early 
this afternoon what the President had to 
say about macro. When it came to trade, 
by that time he had left for his Saturday 
live radio show so I did the intervention 
on trade. 

Our points were that we would have 
to come out strong for free trade and 
less protectionism during this summit or 
we might find ourselves going back- 
wards; that the trade among free na- 
tions was the hallmark of the post-World 
War II era, and it was up to the summit 
nations to preserve what had brought 
prosperity to most nations over the 
period since that time. 

The other points that we made were 
the need for promoting some type of 
rules for investment. As you know, 
there are rules for trade in the GATT 
[General Agreement in Tariffs and 
Trade]. There are rules for money in the 
IMF [International Monetary Fund], but 
there are no rules for international in- 
vestment. And we advocated that the 
heads of state consider this in their com- 
munique and give instructions to the 



finance ministers that they should begin 
discussions leading eventually toward 
some such rulemaking. 

The other points that came up dur- 
ing the afternoon that might be of in- 
terest to you: There was quite an ex- 
change among the Canadian Prime 
Minister, the British Prime Minister, the 
German Chancellor, and the President of 
the United States. And the subject was 
unemployment and inflation and whether 
or not there is a trade-off. If you recall 
the so-called Phillip's curve, that is 
where the more that you have inflation, 
the more unemployment you'll have; and 
the less inflation, the less unemploy- 
ment. 

And the President is pretty firm, 
sticking by his positions as to the fact 
that while we have a high unemploy- 
ment rate in the United States, we still 
have, at this particular time, more 
employed in the United States. We have 
gotten our inflation rate down. 

The German Chancellor's position 
was that interest rates and inflation ac- 
tually started up way back in the time of 
President Lyndon Johnson and the Viet- 
nam war. And oil prices were not the 
immediate cause of inflation, but they 
were just an additive on the road. 

The other things that happened dur- 
ing the afternoon: There was another 
exchange in which the German 
Chancellor asked the President of the 
United States at what point he thought 
that deficits would be coming down in 
the United States, because he said that 
psychologically that was, in his judg- 
ment, keeping up interest rates. And 
this was having an adverse effect on the 
European countries, as well as the rest 
of the world. 

The President replied that the— it's 
his understanding there'll be a vote in 
the House of Representatives next 
week — Wednesday probably or some- 
time around that — regarding at least 
two different budgets. He was hopeful, 
with the passage of one of those— a 
reconciliation between the House and 
the Senate— that the United States 
would have a budget with deficits trend- 
ing down. 

The British Prime Minister picked 
up on that and said that in her opinion 
the trend was the most important thing, 
not the absolute level because we all 
needed that. 



Department of State Bi 



growth of each country and a consequence of 
that growth. We reaffirm our commitment to 
strengthening the open multilateral trading 
system as embodied in the GATT and to 
maintaining its effective operation. In order 
to promote stability and employment through 
trade and growth, we will resist protectionist 
pressures and trade-distorting practices. We 
are resolved to complete the work of the 
Tokyo Round and to improve the capacity of 
the GATT to solve current and future trade 
problems. We will also work towards the fur- 
ther opening of our markets. We will 
cooperate with the developing countries to 
strengthen and improve the multilateral 
system and to expand trading opportunities 
in particular with the newly industrialized 
countries. We shall participate fully in the 
forthcoming GATT Ministerial Conference in 
order to take concrete steps towards these 
ends. We shall work for early agreement on 
the renewal of the OECD export credit con- 
sensus. 

• We agree to pursue a prudent and 
diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R. 
and Eastern Europe, consistent with our 
political and security interests. This includes 
actions in three key areas. First, following in- 
ternational discussions in January, our 
representatives will work together to im- 
prove the international system for controlling 
exports of strategic goods to these countries 
and national arrangements for the enforce- 
ment of security controls. Second, we will ex- 
change information in the OECD on all 
aspects of our economic, commercial and 
financial relations with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. Third, taking into account 
existing economic and financial considera- 
tions, we have agreed to handle cautiously 
financial relations with the U.S.S.R. and 
other Eastern European countries in such a 
way as to ensure that they are conducted on 
a sound economic basis, including also the 
need for commercial prudence in limiting ex- 
port credits. The development of economic 
and financial relations will be subject to 
periodic ex-post review. 

• The progress we have already made 
does not diminish the need for continuing 
efforts to economise on energy, particularly 
through the price mechanism, and to promote 
alternative sources, including nuclear energy 
and coal, in a long-term perspective. These 
efl'orts will enable us further to reduce our 
vulnerability to interruptions in the supply of 





energy and instability of prices. Cooperation 
to develop new energy technologies, and to 
strengthen our capacity to deal with disrup- 
tions, can contribute to our common energy 
security. We shall also work to strengfthen 
our cooperation with both oil-exporting and 
oil-importing developing countries. 

• The growth of the developing countries 
and the deepening of a constructive relation- 
ship with them are vital for the political and 
economic well-being of the whole world. It is, 
therefore, important that a high level of 
financial flows and official assistance should 
be maintained and that their amount and 
their effectiveness should be increased as far 
as possible, with responsibilities shared 
broadly among all countries capable of mak- 
ing a contribution. The launching of global 
negotiations is a major political objective ap- 
proved by all participants in the summit. The 
latest draft resolution circulated by the 
Group of the 77 is helpful, and the discussion 
at Versailles showed general acceptance of 
the view that it would serve as a basis for 
consultations with the countries concerned. 
We believe that there is now a good prospect 
for the early launching and success of the 
global negotiations, provided that the in- 
dependence of the specialized agencies is 
guaranteed. At the same time, we are 
prepared to continue and develop practical 
cooperation with the developing countries 
through innovations within the World Bank, 
through our support of the work of the 
regional development banks, through prog- 
ress in countering instability of commodity 
export earnings, through the encouragement 
of private capital flows, including interna- 
tional arrangements to improve the condi- 
tions for private investment, and through a 
further concentration of oflicial assistance on 



the poorer countries. This is why we see a 
need for special temporary arrangements t 
overcome funding problems for IDA [Interi 
tional Development Association] VI, and fo 
an early start to consideration of IDA VII. 
We will give special encouragement to pro- 
grammes or arrangements designed to in- 
crease food and energy production in devel 
ing countries which have to import these 
essentials, and to programmes to address t 
implications of population growth. 

• In the field of balance of payments s 
port, we look forward to progress at the 
September IMF annual meeting towards S( 
tling the increase in the size of the Fund a 
propriate to the coming eighth quota revie 

• Revitalization and growth of the woi 
economy will depend not only on our own 
efforts but also to a large extent upon 
cooperation among our countries and with 
other countries in the exploitation of scien 
tific and technological development. We ha 
to exploit the immense opportunities 
presented by the new technologies, par- 
ticularly for creating new employment. W< ■ 
need to remove barriers to, and to promote 
the development of the trade in new tech- 
nologies both in the public sector and in tf 
private sector. Our countries will need to 
train men and women in the new technolo 
and to create the economic, social and 
cultural conditions which allow these 
technologies to develop and flourish. We h 
considered the report presented to us on 
these issues by the President of the Frenc 
Republic. In this context we have decided 
set up promptly a working group of 
representatives of our governments and o 
the European Community to develop, in c' 
consultation with the appropriate interna- 
tional institutions, especially the OECD, p 
posals to give help to attain these objectiv 
This group will be asked to submit its repi 
to us by 31 December 1982. The conclusio 
the report and the resulting action will be 
considered at the next economic summit t 
held in 1983 in the United States of Amer 



Statement of 
International Monetary 
Undertakings 

1. We accept a joint responsibility to worl 
for greater stability of the world monetar 
system. We recognize that this rests prim 
ly on convergence of policies designed to 



Department of State B 



ulleln 




FEATURE 

Economic 
and 
NATO 
Summits 



achieve lower inflation, higher employment 
and renewed economic growth; and thus to 
maintain the internal and external values of 
our currencies. We are determined to dis- 
charge this obligation in close collaboration 
with all interested countries and monetary in- 
stitutions. 

2. We attach major importance to the 
role of the IMF as a monetary authority and 
we will give it our full support in its efforts 
to foster stability. 

3. We are ready to strengthen our 
cooperation with the IMF in its work of 
surveillance; and to develop this on a 
multilateral basis taking into account par- 
ticularly the currencies constituting the SDR 
[special drawing rights]. 

4. We rule out the use of our exchange 
rates to gain unfair competitive advantages. 

5. We are ready, if necessary, to use in- 
tervention in exchange markets to counter 
disorderly conditions, as provided for under 
Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 




6. Those of us who are members of the 
EMS [European Monetary System] consider 
that these undertakings are complementary 
to the obligations of stability which they have 
already undertaken in that framework and 
recognize the role of the system in the fur- 
ther development of stability in the interna- 
tional monetary system. 

7. We are all convinced that greater 
monetary stability will assist freer flows of 
goods, services and capital. We are deter- 
mined to see that greater monetary stability 
and freer flows of trade and capital reinforce 
one another in the interest of economic 
growth and employment. 



Secretary Haig's 
Statement 



Versailles 
June 6, 19823 



The primary purpose of this briefing, of 
course, is to cover the political highlights 
of the just concluded summit. But I 
know that all of you are very concerned, 
as are we, about the worsening situation 
in Lebanon, and I thought I would say a 
few words about that at the outset and 
get it behind us and to take care of your 
concerns. 

We have been watching this situa- 
tion moment by moment as it unfolds. 
The President has followed it through- 
out the day and has shared with his col- 
leagues during the plenary session the 
updates that we had as they developed 
to include the fact of his communication 
very early this morning with Prime 
Minister Begin and the response receiv- 
ed later this afternoon from Mr. Begin. 

That response was consistent with 
the decision made by the Israeli Cabinet 
and announced in Jerusalem which reads 
as follows: "The Cabinet took the follow- 
ing decision, first, to instruct the Israeli 
defense forces to place all civilian 
population of the Galilee beyond the 
range of the terrorist fire from Lebanon 
where they, their bases, and their head- 
quarters are concentrated. The name of 
the operation is Peace for Galilee. Dur- 
ing the operation, the Syrian Army will 
not be attacked unless it attacks the 
Israeli forces. Israel continues to aspire 
to the signing of the peace treaty with 
an independent Lebanon, its territorial 
integrity preserved." 

That is the brief text, which you 
may or may not have seen from Israel. 

We are, of course, extremely con- 
cerned about the escalating cycle of 
violence. The President, yesterday after- 
noon, asked Ambassador Habib [Philip 
C. Habib, the President's special 
emissary to the Middle East] to proceed 
here posthaste. He met with Am- 
bassador Habib this afternoon and de- 
cided to send him directly to Israel as 



his personal representative to conduct 
discussions on an urgent basis with 
Prime Minister Begin. The President 
also dispatched an urgent message to 
Prime Minister Begin, telling him of his 
decision to do so. I anticipate that Phil 
will proceed on to Rome this evening 
and, hopefully, will arrive in Israel early 
tomorrow morning. 

In the last 48 hours at the 
President's direction, we have been 
engaged in an intense degree of 
diplomatic activity in the United Nations 
in New York, where we firmly sup- 
ported the resolution urging an im- 
mediate cease-fire. And as you know, 
President Reagan joined this morning 
with the other members of the summit 
in issuing a statement urging a respon- 
sive reaction to the U.N. resolution. 

We have been in touch with the 
Government of Israel for a prolonged 
period on the situation in Lebanon, 
always urging restraint, and always hop- 
ing, as we continue to hope, that the 
cease-fire can, even at this late date, be 
reinstituted. As of now, we are informed 
that there are two Israeli military col- 
umns that crossed into Lebanon from 
Israel, one proceeding along the coast 
road in the direction of Tyre and the 
other through the upper Galilee panhan- 
dle. The penetration in the latter case 
has been approximately 10 kilometers, in 
the former case perhaps 3 or 4 
kilometers. 

We are extremely disturbed by the 
loss of innocent lives in this fighting on 
the Israeli-Lebanese border. It has in- 
volved, as you know, the exchange of ar- 
tillery and rockets for a prolonged 
period preceding the Israeli ground 
penetration. We are concerned also that 
the fighting not be expanded into a 
broader conflict and are acutely con- 
scious of the presence of Syrian forces 
in fairly close proximity to the eastern 
penetration. We will do our best to con- 
vey to the Government of Syria the 
stated intentions of the Government of 
Israel not to engage unless engaged by 
Syrian forces. 

I know that Don Regan has talked 
to you at length about the economic 



July 1982 



deliberations in the summit itself, and 
I'm not going to rehash them unless you 
have a question. But I think the general 
consensus of view on almost every topic 
was evident. I think President Reagan's 
interventions throughout the delibera- 
tions were extensive, impressive, and 
had an enormous impact on the shaping 
of the communique itself and the overall 
tone and direction of the deliberations; 
especially was he impressive in analyzing 
the various economic factors that have 
contributed to the inflationary spiral, 
declining levels of economic growth, and 
increased unemployment. I think it was 
an invaluable exchange of views between 
the leaders on these subjects, which ad- 
mittedly, are viewed from the perspec- 
tive of the internal policies and affairs of 
the member governments but which are 
all affected enormously by American 
policies, plans, and the progress that we 
are making in our own economic 
reforms. 

On the political side, which is, of 
course, the essence of my concerns, in 
the several sessions, luncheons, evening 
sessions, dinners, in the margins, as well 
as some instances at the plenaries 
themselves, there was a great deal of 
discussion about political affairs. And I'll 
touch upon some of the key issues in a 
moment. I think, clearly, there is 
unanimous concern, as you would ex- 
pect, that the implications of the contin- 
uing growth in Soviet military capa- 
bilities, continuing concern about the 
lack of progress in the continuing oc- 
cupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union, continued repression in Poland, 
as well as other Soviet interventionist 
activities. 

These issues, of course, will be ad- 
dressed in even greater detail at the 
Bonn summit which will take place early 
next week. In discussing the Soviet 
challenge, the President argued that 
Moscow's economic problem and its im- 
pending succession crisis, as I told you 
the other day, provided a rich and im- 
portant opportunity for Western nations 
operating in concert and employing their 
political, economic, and security assets 
to influence a greater degree of 
restraint and responsibility on the part 
of the Soviet Union. It was clear that 
the consensus in this direction was 



broad. There are, of course, differences 
in where these assets can best be ap- 
plied and how they best can be applied 
based again on a demography — the 
demographic aspects of the country con- 
cerned—and a particular role that they 
can play. 

We, of course, welcome agreement 
on exercising prudence on handling the 
finances with the Soviet Union, in- 
cluding limits on export credits. You will 
note that we talked about a continuing 
monitorship of this. And for the first 
time, the seven who are not exclusively 
involved — the OECD is involved — all 
Western creditor nations, and some of 
the nonaligned are neutral nations — are 
involved. But for the first time, we 
developed a consensus for the need to 
pull together all of the facts associated 
with trade and credit with the East, not 
just the Soviet Union but Eastern 
Europe as well, to analyze and assess 
and draw conclusions from this. 

You will note also that there was a 
reinforcement of the decision made at 
Ottawa to continue to broaden the con- 
trols on the transfer of sensitive 
technology to the Soviet Union. 

The President's decision to pursue a 
new arms control approach, one that 
focused on significant reductions, was 
unanimously and warmly welcomed by 
all the participants. The President made 
it clear that the United States is, indeed, 
prepared to have a serious dialogue with 
the Soviet Union. 

As I noted yesterday, the heads of 
state addressed a number of regional 
security issues, including the South 
Atlantic crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. To 
that was added today, of course, exten- 
sive discussion on the crisis in Lebanon, 
which I have already touched upon. 

The margins and the luncheons pro- 
vided an opportunity to discuss again 
the scourge of international terrorism, 
and the recent events associated with 
the Lebanon crisis drew everyone's at- 
tention to this continuing problem. 

There were discussions, as I told you 
yesterday, on the need for youth ex- 
changes — youth exchanges between the 
United States and Japan, Europe and 
the United States, and Japan and 
Europe. 



Now I want to say a word about the 
Falklands. That clearly was a very 
heavily discussed aspect of this summit, 
especially in the informal meetings of 
the leaders themselves. From the U.S. 
point of view, I want to restate tonight 
very clearly that it is the President's 
policy that aggression must not be al- 
lowed to succeed, and if the Argentine 
invasion of the Falklands was allowed to 
stand uncontested, this would have an 
impact on the security of small states 
everywhere. 

I want to say another word despite 
my efforts last evening to dispense with 
the question of the U.N. resolution; that 
the difference in assessment between 
veto and abstention should in no way be 
interpreted as any lessening of U.S. sup- 
port for the principle involved, which 
Great Britian is upholding, nor has it 
changed in any way the levels of support 
and dedication to support that the 
United States announced earlier with 
respect to the conflict. We may have dif- 
ferences in the context of assessments 
of the particular U.N. resolution, as, in- 
deed, we would expect to do from time 
to time. After all, the United States 
makes its decisions based on its own na- 
tional interests. 

I want to make it clear that we have 
not asked for a military pause, consider- 
ing this is a judgment, as I have said 
repeatedly, for Great Britain and com- 
manders on the ground to make and to 
assess. 

We remain confident after the dis- 




Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 

Economic 
and 
NATO 
Summits 



ssions — the extensive discussions be- 
'een the President and Mrs. Thatcher 
re, the discussions I've had with 
)reign Minister Pym— that we share a 
mmon view with Britain; that the 
isis in the South Atlantic should be 
solved with a minimum loss of life, 
id I would like to note tonight that the 
tion of a honorable withdrawal for 
•gentine forces remains still available. 



ATO SUMMIT 



eclaration 

>nn 

ne 10, 1982 



We, the representatives of the 16 members 
;he North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm our 
iication to the shared values and ideals on 
ich our transatlantic partnership is based. 

2. The accession of Spain to the North 
antic Treaty, after its peaceful change to 
liamentary democracy, bears witness to 

vitality of the Alliance as a force for 
ice and freedom. 

3. Our Alliance has preserved peace for a 
'•d of a century. It is an association of free 
ions joined together to preserve their 
urity through mutual guarantees and col- 

1 tive self-defence as recognized by the 
ited Nations Charter. It remains the 
ential instrument for deterring aggression 
1 means of a strong defence and strengthen- 
peace by means of constructive dialogue, 
r solidarity in no way conflicts with the 
ht of each of our countries to choose its 
n policies and internal development, and 
)ws for a high degree of diversity. Therein 
1 our strength. In a spirit of mutual 
pect, we are prepared to adjust our aims 
1 interests at all times through free and 
( se consultations; these are the core of 
I ;ryday Allied co-operation and will be in- 
I isified appropriately. We are a partnership 
( equals, none dominant and none 
< Tiinated. 

4. The Soviet Union, for its part, requires 
I : countries associated with it to act as a 

i c, in order to preserve a rigid and imposed 
item. Moreover, experience shows that the 
viet Union is ultimately willing to threaten 
use force beyond its own frontiers, 
ghanistan and the Soviet attitude with 

I jard to the Polish crisis show this clearly. 



ily1982 



The Soviet Union has devoted over the past 
decade a large part of its resources to a 
massive military build-up, far exceeding its 
defence needs and supporting the projection 
of military power on a global scale. While 
creating a threat of these dimensions, 
Warsaw Pact governments condemn Western 
defence efforts as aggressive. While they ban 
unilateral disarmament movements in their 
own countriiis, they support demands for 
unilateral disarmament in the West. 

5. International stability and world peace 
require greater restraint and responsibility 
on the part of the Soviet Union. We, for our 
part, reaffirming the principles and purposes 
of the Alliance, set forth our Programme for 
Peace in Freedom: 

(a) Our purpose is to prevent war and, 
while safeguarding democracy, to build the 
foundations of lasting peace. None of our 
weapons will ever be used except in response 
to attack. We respect the sovereignty, equali- 
ty, independence and territorial integrity of 
all states. In fulfillment of our purpose, we 
shall maintain adequate military strength and 
political solidarity. On that basis, we will 
persevere in efforts to establish, whenever 
Soviet behaviour makes this possible, a more 
constructive East-West relationship through 
dialogue, negotiation and mutually advan- 
tageous co-operation. 

(b) Our purpose is to preserve the securi- 
ty of the North Atlantic area by means of 
conventional and nuclear forces adequate to 
deter aggression and intimidation. This re- 
quires a sustained effort on the part of all the 
Allies to improve their defence readiness and 
military capabilities, without seeking military 
superiority. Our countries have the necessary 
resources to undertake this effort. The 
presence of North American armed forces in 
Europe and the United States strategic 
nuclear commitment to Europe remain in- 
tegral to Allied security. Of equal importance 
are the maintenance and continued improve- 
ment of the defence capabilities of the Euro- 
pean members of the Alliance. We will seek 
to achieve greater effectiveness in the ap- 
plication of national resources to defence, 
giving due attention to possibilities for 
developing areas of practical co-operation. In 
this respect the Allies concerned will urgently 
explore ways to take full advantage both 
technically and economically of emerging 
technologies. At the same time steps will be 
taken in the appropriate fora to restrict 
Warsaw Pact access to Western militarily 
relevant technology. 

(c) Our purpose is to have a stable 
balance of forces at the lowest possible level, 











thereby strengthening peace and interna- 
tional security. We have initiated a com- 
prehensive series of proposals for militarily 
significant, equitable and verifiable 
agreements on the control and reduction of 
armaments. We fully support the efforts of 
the United States to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union for substai.tial reductions in the 
strategic nuclear weapons of the two coun- 
tries, and for the establishment of strict and 
effective limitations on their intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons, starting with the 
total elimination of their land-based 
intermediate-range missiles, which are of 
most concern to each side. We will continue 
to seek substantial reductions of conventional 
forces on both sides in Europe, and to reach 
agreement on measures which will serve to 
build confidence and enhance security in the 
whole of Europe. To this end, those of us 
whose countries participate in the negotia- 
tions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions in Vienna have agreed on a new ini- 
tiative to give fresh impetus to these negotia- 
tions. We will also play an active part in 
wider international talks on arms control and 
disarmament; at the Second United Nations 
Special Session on Disarmament which has 
just opened in New York, we will work to 
give new momentum to these talks. 

(d) Our purpose is to develop substantial 
and balanced East- West relations aimed at 
genuine detente. For this to be achieved, the 
sovereignty of all states, wherever situated, 
must be respected, human rights must not be 
sacrificed to state interests, the free move- 
ment of ideas must take the place of one- 
sided propaganda, the free movement of per- 
sons must be made possible, efforts must be 
made to achieve a military relationship 
characterised by stability and openness and 
in general all principles and provisions of the 



Helsinki Final Act in their entirety must be 
applied. We, for our part, will always be 
ready to negotiate in this spirit and we look 
for tangible evidence that this attitude is 
reciprocated. 

(e) Our purpose is to contribute to 
peaceful progress worldwide; we will work to 
remove the causes of instability such as 
under-development or tensions which en- 
courage outside interference. We will con- 
tinue to play our part in the struggle against 
hunger and poverty. Respect for genuine 
non-alignment is important for international 
stability. All of us have an interest in peace 
and security in other regions of the world. 
We will consult together as appropriate on 
events in these regions which may have im- 
plications for our security, taking into ac- 
count our commonly identified objectives. 
Those of us who are in a position to do so will 
endeavor to respond to requests for 
assistance from sovereign states whose 
security and independence is threatened. 

(f) Our purpose is to ensure economic and 
social stability for our countries, which will 
strengthen our joint capacity to safeguard 
our security. Sensitive to the effects of each 
country's policies on others, we attach the 
greatest importance to the curbing of infla- 
tion and a return to sustained growth and to 
high levels of employment. 

While noting the important part which 
our economic relations with the Warsaw Pact 
countries can play in the development of a 
stable East-West relationship, we will ap- 
proach those relations in a prudent and diver- 
sified manner consistent with our political 
and security interests. Economic relations 
should be conducted on the basis of a bal- 
anced advantage for both sides. We under- 
take to manage financial relations with the 
Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic 
basis, including commercial prudence also in 
the granting of export credits. We agree to 
exchange information in the appropriate fora 
on all aspects of our economic, commercial 
and financial relations with Warsaw Pact 
countries. 

6. Nowhere has our commitment to com- 
mon basic values been demonstrated more 
clearly than with regard to the situation in 
Germany and Berlin. We remain committed 
to the security and freedom of Berlin and 
continue to support efforts to maintain the 
calm situation in and around the city. The 
continued success of efforts by the Federal 
Republic of Germany to improve the relation- 
ship between the two German states is impor- 
tant to the safeguarding of peace in Europe. 
We recall that the rights and responsibilities 
of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and 



10 



Germany as a whole remain unaffected and 
confirm our support for the political objective 
of the Federal Republic of Germany to work 
towards a state of peace in Europe in which 
the German people regains its unity through 
free self-determination. 

7. We condemn all acts of international 
terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations 
of human dignity and rights and are a threat 
to the conduct of normal international rela- 
tions. In accordance with our national legisla- 
tion, we stress the need for the most effec- 
tive co-operation possible to prevent and sup- 
press this scourge. 

8. We call upon the Soviet Union to abide 
by internationally accepted standards of 
behaviour without which there can be no 
prospect of stable international relations, and 
to join now with us in the search for con- 
structive relations, arms reductions and 
world peace. 




Document on 
Arms Control 
and Disarmament 



Bonn 

June 10, 1982 



As indicated in our Declaration of today, we, 
the representatives of the 16 members of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, hereby set out our 
detailed positions on Arms Control and Disar- 
mament: 

Militarily significant, equitable and 
verifiable agreements on arms control and 
disarmament contribute to the strengthening 



of peace and are an integral part of our 
security policies. Western proposals offer the 
possibilities of substantial reductions in 
United States and Soviet strategic arms and 
intermediate-range weapons and in conven- 
tional forces in Europe, as well as of 
confidence-building measures covering the 
whole of Europe: 

• In the forthcoming Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START), we call on the 
Soviet Union to agree on significant reduc- 
tions in United States and Soviet strategic 
nuclear forces, focused on the most destabiliz- 
ing inter-continental systems. 

• In the negotiations on Intermediate- 
range Nuclear Forces (INF) which are con- 
ducted within the START framework and are 
based on the December 1979 decision on INF 
modernization and arms control,'' the United 
States proposal for the complete elimination 
of all longer-range land-based INF missiles of 
the United States and the Soviet Union holds 
promise for an equitable outcome and en- 
hanced security for all. 

• Those of us participating in the Vienna 
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR) will soon present a draft 
treaty embodying a new, comprehensive pro- 
posal designed to give renewed momentum to 
these negotiations and achieve the long- 
standing objective of enhancing stability and 
security in Europe. They stress that the 
Western treaty proposal, if accepted, will 
commit all participants whose forces are in- 
volved — European and North American — to 
participate in accordance with the principle of 
collectivity in substantial manpower reduc- 
tions leading to equal collective ceilings for 
the forces of Eastern and Western par- 
ticipants in Central Europe, based on agreed 
data, with associated measures designed to 
strengthen confidence and enhance verifica- 
tion. 

• In CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] the proposal for a 
Conference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe as part of a balanced outcome of the 
Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting would open 
the way to increased transparency and 
enhanced stability in the whole of Europe 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. 

At the same time, we are continuing our 
efforts to promote stable peace on a global 
scale: 

• In the Committee on Disarmament in 
Geneva, the Allies will actively pursue efforts 
to obtain equitable and verifiable agreements 
including a total ban on chemical weapons. 

• In the Second Special Session on Dis- 
armament of the United Nations General 



4 




FEATURE 

Economic 
and 
NATO 
Summits 



sembly now in progress, we trust that new 
petus will be given to negotiations current 
i in prospect, especially by promoting 
litary openness and verification, that the 
3d for strict observance of the principle of 
lunciation of force enshrined in the United 
tions Charter will be reaffirmed and that 
npliance with existing agreements will be 
engthened. 

We appeal to all states to co-operate with 
in these efforts to strengthen peace and 
:urity. In particular we call on the Soviet 
ion to translate its professed commitment 
disarmament into active steps aimed at 
lieving concrete, balanced and verifiable 
;ults at the negotiating table. 



ocument on 
itegrated NATO 
efense 

ne 10, 1982 



indicated in the Declaration of today, we, 
• representatives of those members of the 
rth Atlantic Alliance taking part in its in- 
haled defence structure, hereby set out 
- detailed positions on defence. We 
Icome the intention of Spain to participate 
the integrated defence structure, and the 
idiness of the President of the Spanish 
vernment to associate himself with this 
:ument, while noting that the modalities of 
anish participation have still to be worked 







Pursuant to the principles set out in the 
Programme for Peace and Freedom, we 
agree that, in accordance with current NATO 
defence plans, and within the context of 
NATO strategy and its triad of forces, we 
will continue to strengthen NATO's defence 
posture, with special regard to conventional 
forces. Efforts of our nations in support of 
the decisions reached at Washington in 1978 
have led to improved defensive capabilities. 
Notwithstanding this progress, it is clear, as 
documented in the recently published com- 
parison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, 
that continuing efforts are essential to 
Alliance security. Against this background, 
we will: 

• Fulfill to the greatest extent possible 
the NATO Force Goals for the next sbc years, 
including measures to improve the readiness 
of the standing forces and the readiness and 
mobilization capability of reserve forces. Note 
was taken of the recently concluded agree- 
ment between the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany for wartime 
host nation support. 

• Continue to implement measures iden- 
tifed in the Long-Term Defence Programme 
designed to enhance our overall defence 
capabilities. 

• Continue to improve NATO planning 
procedures and explore other ways of achiev- 
ing greater effectiveness in the application of 
national resources to defence, especially in 
the conventional field. In that regard, we will 
continue to give due attention to fair burden- 
sharing and to possibilities for developing 
areas of practic^ co-operation from which we 
can all benefit. 

• Explore ways to take full advantage 
both technically and economically of emerg- 
ing technologies, especially to improve con- 
ventional defence, and take steps necessary 
to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant 
technology to the Warsaw Pact. 

Noting that developments beyond the 
NATO area may threaten our vital interests, 
we reaffirm the need to consult with a view 
to sharing assessments and identifying com- 
mon objectives, taking full account of the ef- 
fect on NATO security and defence capabili- 
ty, as well as of the national interests of 
member countries. Recognising that the 
policies which nations adopt in this field are a 
matter for national decision, we agree to ex- 
amine collectively in the appropriate NATO 
bodies the requirements which may arise for 
the defence of the NATO area as a result of 
deployments by individual member states out- 
side that area. Steps which may be taken by 
individual Allies in the light of such consulta- 
tions to facilitate possible military deploy- 
ments beyond the NATO area can represent 
an important contribution to Western 
security. 




Secretary Haig's 
Press Briefing 



iiy 



1982 



Bonn 

June 10, 1982^ 



I would describe this as a historic day 
for the NATO alliance, due primarily, 
but not exclusively, to Spain's formal en- 
try into NATO. It is a step of vital im- 
portance to both the alliance and to 
Spain. The entry of Spain is a clear 
demonstration of the continuing appeal 
and vitality of the alliance of some 33 
years' life span. 

This summit meeting and the docu- 
ments that were adopted by the meeting 
today also demonstrated that NATO 
represents Western values at their very 
best. I'm particularly pleased with the 
communique and associated documents 
that were released on arms control and 
the strengthening of our conventional 
defenses. They reflect a year of very 
solid work within the framework of the 
alliance on a number of key areas, and, I 
think, it was appropriate that they 
should be in all of the considerations 
contained in those documents. I would 
urge you to study them carefully; they 
are a keen reflection of the views of the 
U.S. Government, as well as a 
manifestation of a solid consensus within 
the framework of the alliance itself. 

I think we have here a framework 
for the decade of the 1980s which has 



11 



been established, which is both contem- 
porary in its recognition of needs in the 
area of balanced defenses for the 
alliance; the need for arms control, and 
the integration of political, economic, 
and security assets of the Western 
world to elicit what we hope will be a 
era of restraint and responsibility on the 
part of the Soviet Union under a 
framework which is coordinated, in- 
tegrated, and fully accepted by all 
member states. I think that is extremely 
important. 

I want to say a word about the sum- 
mit declaration itself which sends the 
strongest message in memory to the 
Soviet Union— certainly in recent 
memory. It clearly contrasted how 
NATO is fundamentally different from 
the Warsaw Pact. Our alliance is an 
open partnership based on consensus 
and democracy. Its diversity is also its 
strength. The Warsaw Pact is a strained 
association, a forced marriage domi- 
nated by a single government. It is 
unresponsive in many ways to the needs 
of the peoples that it is designed to pro- 
tect. It is afraid of freedom, wary of 
diversity. The West has again called on 
the U.S.S.R. to show restraint and 
responsibility in its behavior, and that's 
a clear message and signal throughout 
the communique. 

The statement on defense, which we 
consider to be especially significant and 
important, reaffirms NATO's strategy at 
a time when it has become fashionable 
to question something that has kept and 
preserved the peace in Western Europe 
and, indeed, in the East-West sense, for 
the 33-years' life span of the alliance 
itself. It reflects top-level agreement on 
the needs to improve NATO's conven- 
tional defense posture, including the 
rapid deployment and reserve forces. It 
emphasizes full employment of emerging 
technologies; a need to protect our 
Western technological advantage. You'll 
recall that that surfaced earlier in both 
Ottawa and subsequent NATO 
ministerial meetings. 

It emphasized the importance of 
growing cooperation by the allies to in- 
sure security and stability in critical 
regions elsewhere in the world. And 
here again, it was anathema some years 



ago to speak an alliance parlance of 
anything. Outside this strict geographic 
confines of the alliance itself, we have 
now developed a consensus of agree- 
ment that, like it or not, the alliance is 
increasingly influenced by events outside 
of the geographic confines of the 
alliance, and, therefore, those nations 
with essential interest must coordinate 
and consult together in dealing with 
them, not within the alliance framework 
but as a framework for watching briefs 
and continuous exchange of information. 

There is also a very important state- 
ment on arms control. It makes ab- 
solutely clear that it is the Western 
alliance which has the ideas and the ini- 
tiatives in seeking a dialogue with the 
East in this very important area. The 
document itself strongly endorses the 
major aspects of President Reagan's 
own peace program. It supports U.S. ob- 
jectives in START and the U.S. ap- 
proach to the Geneva negotiations on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces based 
on the December 1979 decision. It an- 
nounces Western readiness to invigorate 
the Vienna negotiations on mutual and 
balanced force reductions, now in their 
ninth year; through a new approach 
aimed at lower and more equal force 
levels in central Europe— 700,000 per 
ground, 900 for the aggregate ground, 
sea, and air. And, it signals a strong 
Western interest in the possibilities for a 
constructive dialogue offered by the 
U.N. Special Session on Disarmament 
and other arms control fora. 

As important as these Western ini- 
tiatives are, the appeal that NATO has 
made today, once again, to the Soviet 
Union to match its professions of 
peaceful intentions with actions leading 
to results, I think is a very important 
theme in the overall deliberations. As 
the Danish Prime Minister said today, 
"the search light is now on Moscow." 

I think for many of us, the highlight 
of the summit which was a very well 
prepared summit and, therefore, permit- 
ted the heads of state and government 
to make their own separate interven- 
tions without a great deal of what I call 
"heated dispute" about remaining con- 
troversies — that says something for the 



quality of the preparations that were 
made. It was President Reagan's in- 
tervention at the conclusion this after- 
noon; it was an ad-libbed, if you will, or 
unstructured personal intervention that 
ran about 10 minutes, I would say, give 
or take — and, it clearly summarized th( 
President's own view on East- West rel; 
tions. It was both powerful as it was e> 
temporaneous; it reiterated in clear 
terms the President's willingness to ha\ 
a genuine dialogue with the Soviets but 
one based on Soviet restraint. 

It talked about the experience we 
had in the decade of the 1970s with the 
1970 interpretation of detente, a for- 
mula to which we witnessed increasing 
Soviet interventionisms worldwide — in 
Africa, the Middle East, the Yemens, 
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and once 
again in this Western Hemisphere. You 
will note the language in the communi- 
que refers to something different than 
the classic 1970 version. It refers to ge: 
uine detente. In other words, there is n 
abandonment of the principle of dialogi 
and the desire to reach agreements anc 
the meeting of the mind with the Sovie 
Union, but to do so not with words but 
by a continuous assessment of actions 
with a heavy emphasis on reciprocity. 

I think in the President's interven- 
tion, he referred to the situation in 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. 
He painted clearly a picture of hope fon 
the future by emphasizing the 
demographic assets available to the 
Western world if properly integrated 
and orchestrated. He referred to those 
in political terms, our essential 
democratic values; in economic terms, 
the vast superiority of Western in- 
dustrialized societies; and, of course, th 
security assets of the collection of 
alliance members all integrated. 

I think the President drew the con- 
clusion, as many of us have, that if we 
abandon the self-consciousness of the r 
cent decade, the sense of inadequacy oi 
perhaps even inevitability, and apprisec 
with full frankness and openness what 
we have going for us, and apply those 
assets intelligently, moderately, but wit 
vision and steadiness of purpose, that 
there is, indeed, hope. The President 
referred to his communication with Mr. 



12 



Department of State Bulletip 




FEATURE 

Economic 
and 
NATO 
Summits 



iJrezhnev at the time that he was con- 
-alescing from his wound, how he sug- 
gested to Mr. Brezhnev that if the 

: ;overnments themselves could step 

: .side and that the peoples could com- 

• nunicate each other's wishes, aspira- 
ions, and desires that clearly a new 
,'orld structure for peace and stability 
/ould be an inevitable outcome. And he 
ecried the continual manipulation of the 

6 wishes and desires of the people by in- 

: ensitive government. 

All in all, as I would like to em- 
hasize that I personally feel extremely 

;, leased with the outcome of this summit 
leeting. I suppose it's because of my 
vvii NATO background, understandable. 
s I say, it reflects a year of solid 
ositive work and progress in consen- 

1 isbuilding. It confirms that the alliance 
. itself not only alive and healthy but 
lat it has never been better. 

There were other meetings today on 
16 margin. There were discussions 
Dout the Middle East. There was a 
igistration of support for Great 
ritain's actions in the Falklands. The 
resident has bilaterals with the Prime 
Minister of Spain, with the Prime 
inister of Greece, and he met at the 
inclusion of the summit with Foreign 
Minister Saud of Saudi Arabia. 

Q. Can you tell us anything about 
le communications you received from 
le Saudis today? 

A. Yes. The foreign minister's visit 
as one requested about 2 or 3 days ago 
the wake of the Lebanon crisis. 

Q. Who requested it? 

A. The Saudi Government. His 
ighness brought an oral communica- 
Dn from King Khalid, which was essen- 
illy a registration of serious concerns 
)out the continued deterioration of the 
tuation in Lebanon and the long-term 
>nsequences of this. 

Q. Did he give any examples of 
)ssible consequences as it went on? 

A. No. This was an exchange of 
ews between friendly governments — 
vo leaders who have enjoyed an 
lusually cordial and frank relationship 
/er the span of President Reagan's in- 
, imbency. 



Jly1982 



Q. What progress, if any, toward 
achieving a cease-fire? Has there been 
any progress? 

A. I would be remiss were I to sug- 
gest there had been no progress. There 
have been detailed discussions in 
Damascus and in Jerusalem. Those 
discussions continue, but it's clear that 
the advance of the Israeli military forces 
has become extensive. They are on the 
outskirts of Beirut on the west and well 
into the Bekaa Valley in the east. There 
have been heavy clashes in the Bekaa 
Valley in the air today. The Israeli 
Government has mobilized its 880th Ar- 
mored Division, moving it north. There 
are some additional indications of in- 
creased Syrian readiness, movement of 
missile units. Eight MiGs have been 
claimed today in the conflict. As you 
know last night the Israeli Government 
claimed to have knocked out all the 
missiles in Bekaa Valley. 

Q. You sound like you're describ- 
ing a movement toward a general war. 

A. No, I certainly don't think that, 
and I don't describe it. But I do think 
that an operation as extensive as this, of 
course, always contains overtones that 
could result in an expansion uncontem- 
plated or unwanted. 

Q. Is there any sign of Soviet re- 
supply to S3Tia? 

A. We have no evidence of it at this 
time, but their resupply of Syria has 
been rather steady over an extensive 
period. But we don't see any dramatic 
step-up that would be abnormal yet. 

Q. What was the President's reac- 
tion prior to Prince Saud's saying he 
would provide whatever war materiel 
to Yassir Arafat needed to drive out 
the Israelis? 

A. That did not come up in any 
discussions that I sat in on, and I think I 
heard it all. It may have been said to the 
press later, but it was not said to the 
President. 

Q. Is the impatience of our 
government growing because Israel is 
unwilling to agree to a cease-fire? 



A. We are concerned. I was asked 
this morning to visit Jerusalem, and I 
thought about it as I've assessed the 
various positions today. I think I would 
say that the discussions we had with the 
Israelis today have not evidenced suffi- 
cient flexibility to make a visit worth- 
while at this time. 

Q. What is your reaction to the 
communique of the Ten Common 
Market Foreign Ministers last 
night— very strongly worded toward 
Israel? And, what was the delibera- 
tion of the NATO Council with regard 
to the situation today? 

A. Let me take your second ques- 
tion first. Clearly, there was a great 
number of expressions of concern 
around the table about the situation in 
Lebanon. As you know, it's not the role 
of the alliance to take a position on a 
crisis solely outside of its area. I talked 
about that a moment ago. On the other 
hand, the leaders did enfranchise the 
Secretary General to express their con- 
cern and their hope that the bloodshed 
would soon be brought to a conclusion. 
And, I would say that was the 
unanimous sense of concern around the 
table, but it was not dealt with. 

The answer to the first part of your 
question, of course, the Ten have a right 
to do what they want within the con- 
fines of that fora. We are not members, 
and it wouldn't be appropriate for me to 
indulge in any value judgments. 

Q. What was the nature of Presi- 
dent Brezhnev's message to the Presi- 
dent? What was its tone? 

A. I think it was a frank expression 
of Soviet concern about the widening 
military conflict in Lebanon. 

Q. Did it indicate any Soviet ac- 
tion? 

A. I'm not going to go into any 
detail. I think it is very inappropriate to 
do that in diplomatic communications, 
other than to give you the general 
flavor. 

Q. Who initiated the exchange? 
Who first contacted whom? 

A. The Soviet Union. 



13 




I 



Prior to the opening ceremony of the 
NATO summit, the President meets with 
Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary General of 
NATO and chairman of the the North 
Atlantic Council. 



Q. Was there an exchange, or just 
one letter from Brezhnev? What was 
the response? 

A. The President always responds 
to the correspondence. He did. 

Q. Could you clarify that? What 
was the response from the Presi- 
dent—what was it all about? 

A. Let's just say it was responsive 
to the tone of the letter that came in. 

Q. Was the exchange with 
Brezhnev what precipitated President 
Reagan's message to Begin? 

A. No, not at all. 

Q. Has the United States been 
able to ascertain what the Israeli 
goals and objectives are in this inva- 
sion? 

A. Go back to the public com- 
munication we had which was not dif- 
ferent from the original communication 
from Mr. Begin to President Reagan 



which talked about a zone of 40 
kilometers depth in which Israel hoped 
to eliminate the continuing threat from 
rockets, katusha, artillery, and terrorist 
activity across or infiltrations through 
third countries into Israel. 

Q. Do you know what their new 
objectives are? 
A. No. 

Q. When the United States voted 
to support the U.N. resolution to have 
a cease-fire along — 

A. 508? 

Q. Yes — along with Israeli 
withdrawal? My question really is, do 
we still support that resolution? Do 
we still insist on Israeli withdrawal 
and is that the hang-up and the reason 
you are not going to Jerusalem? 

A. No, it's far more complex than 
that, and we do still support 508. We 
voted for it. We've continued through 
diplomatic channels to try to assist in its 
implementation. 

Q. You said 2 or 3 days ago that 
we were reassessing the question of 
supplying arms to Israel based on 
assessing their intentions, whether or 
not they had gone beyond the 25-mile 
zone. You have now described that 
they are well beyond it. Where does 
that decision stand, first place; second 



place, is the United States concerned 
at all, after your meeting with Prince 
Saud, about American interests in the 
Arab world and whether or not the 
Arab world will swing toward a more 
extreme position as a result of this in 
vasion? 

A. I wouldn't want to make any 
predictions about the direction of the 
Arab world, but I can certainly assure 
you that, from the outset, we have beer 
concerned about the impact of the crisis 
in Lebanon on our relationships with 
moderate Arab friends, those with 
whom we have maintained traditional 
ties of friendship and coordination and 
cooperation. There can be no question 
about that. That has become somewhat 
more sharply edged in the last 48 hours 

Q. Who asked you to go to 
Jerusalem? Was it the Secretary of 
Labor? You said you were asked to gc 
Do you mean someone in their govemi 
ment or someone in our government? 

A. I was invited by Israel. 



•Texts from press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department of State, the 
economic summit participants, and NATO. 
The Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of June 7 and 14, 1982, contains 
all material relating to the President's par- 
ticipation in the two summits. 

^Made at L'Orangerie Press Center, Ver 
sailles. 

'Press release 192 of June 16. 

■•In this connection Greece reserves its 
position [text in original]. 

'Press release 197 of June 16. ■ 



« 



14 



Department of State Bulletir 




FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



President Reagan Visits Europe 



President Reagan made state visits 
c several European capitals June 2-11. 
The President visited Paris and Ver- 
ailles to attend the eighth economic sum- 
nit of the industrialized nations held 
Tune 5-6 at Versailles (see previous arti- 
•le); Vatican City and Rome, June 7; 
jondon and Windsor, June 7-9; and 
iionn and Berlin, June 9-11 to attend 
\he North Atlantic Council summit held 
n Bonn June 10 (see previous article). 

Following are remarks, addresses, 
tatements. and luncheon and dinner 
oasts made by the President and other 
eads of state, statements made by 
ecretary Haig at the opening of press 
riefings, and a joint U.S.-Italy state- 
tient.^ 



FRANCE 



ecretary Haig's 
tatement 



aris 

ine 3, 19822 



m going to make a very few remarks 
Dout the first series of working 
eetings today on the— our first day in 
urope. 

They took place at a working lunch- 
in with President Mitterrand and 
"esident Reagan that lasted about IV2 
mrs and which covered a broad range 
regional, security-related and bilateral 
^ues between the two governments 
■id peoples. 

As you know, the summit officially 
fgins tomorrow so both leaders were 
luctant to deal, in any depth, with the 
bjects which should be included on the 
;enda when all seven leaders of the 
Sestern industrialized nations, including 
.pan, convene at Versailles tomorrow 
ening. 

Instead, they used this opportunity 



to extend the very warm personal rela- 
tionship and rapport that has developed 
between the two leaders — this being the 
fourth meeting between the two men 
since they both assumed their responsi- 
bilities—the last was a personal visit by 
President Mitterrand to Washington last 
March. They used it as an opportunity 
and, of course, because of the extensive 
rapport already established and the 
warmth of friendship, to move to issues 
of mutual concern in the domestic scene 
in both countries and to exchange in- 
sights on several important global situa- 
tions of a regional character. 

That included the Falklands ques- 
tion — its near- time consequences and its 
long-term consequences. It involved an 
exchange of views on the Middle East 
with a very special focus on the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq and the concern 
of both leaders that this conflict not ex- 
pand, that the territorial integrity of the 
countries involved be preserved, and 
that international attention be focused 
on international efforts to bring this con- 
flict to a peaceful conclusion. 

With respect to the Falklands, of 
course, both leaders are concerned that 
bloodshed terminate at the earliest 
possible date and that the conflict be 
resolved within the framework of U.N. 
Resolution 502 which, from the outset, 
has enjoyed the support of both govern- 
ments and which has been the fun- 
damental premise upon which the 
United States has conducted its policies 
toward this very difficult situation in the 
South Atlantic. 

In the exchange of domestic issues, 
it is clear that both leaders approach 
economic issues from a different 
philosophic base. Nevertheless, they are 
seeking common objectives — the reduc- 
tion of excess levels of federal central 
government spending, and high levels of 
unemployment in the return to a cycle of 
prosperity. 

President Reagan noted the success 
that his Administration had achieved in 
bringing down the very high levels of in- 
flation that he found upon assuming of- 
fice. He also expressed some disappoint- 
ment that he was unable to arrive in 



Europe with a budget compromise in 
hand— one that would have brought the 
projected American deficits in the period 
ahead down substantially and, thereby, 
influence more substantially the interest 
rates which are of such concern on both 
sides of the Atlantic today. 

In sum, it's important to charac- 
terize these first of two series of 
meetings. There'll be further meetings 
this evening with President Mitterrand 
at a dinner as an extension of an 
unusual relationship that has developed 
between the two leaders; one of in- 
timacy and mutual confidence, and one 
of frankness in their exchange of view- 
points. 

All in all, I think it was a very suc- 
cessful first day of what is going to be 
an increasingly busy schedule of activity 
in Versailles and, subseqently, in Rome, 
in Bonn, and in Berlin. 



Dinner Toasts 



ily1982 



Paris 

June 3, 1982' 



President Reagan. I hope you all realize 
that we know, of course, France has 
great appreciation for fine wines and 
that's why we decided to treat you to 
some California wine tonight. [Laughter] 

I speak not just for Nancy and 
myself but for so many of our coun- 
trymen when I express the joy that we 
Americans feel in returning to France 
and seeing again her special jewel — 
"Paree." I am grateful to have the op- 
portunity to continue our dialogue and 
to meet with Madame Mitterrand, 



President's Schedule 



June 2 — Depart Washington, D.C. 
June 2-7 — Paris and Versailles 
June 7 — Vatican City and Rome 
June 7-9 — London and Windsor 
June 9-11 — Bonn and Berlin 
June 11 — Arrive Washington, D.C. 



15 



members of your government, and so 
many of your fine citizens. 

I've enjoyed getting to know you 
this past year and have benefited from 
your wise counsel during our several 
discussions. This will be our second 
economic summit together. You may be 
sure ni work with you to help make it a 
success. I come to Europe and to this 
summit with a spirit of confidence. 

Our Administration has embarked 
upon a program to bring inflationary 
government spending under control, 
restore personal incentives to revive 
economic growth, and to rebuild our 
defenses to insure peace through 
strength. This has meant a fundamental 
change in policies and understandably 
the transition has not been without dif- 
ficulties. 

However, I'm pleased to report that 
these policies are beginning to bear 
fruit. Inflation is down, interest 
rates — I'm very happy to say here— are 
falling, and both personal savings and 
spending are improving. We believe that 
economic recovery is imminent. 

We also are moving forward to 
restore America's defensive strength 
after a decade of neglect. Our reasons 
for both actions are simple; a strong 
America and a vital unified alliance are 
indispensable to keeping the peace now 
and in the future just as they have been 
in the past. At the same time, we've in- 
vited the Soviet Union to meet with us 
to negotiate, for the first time in 
history, substantial, verifiable reductions 
in the weapons of mass destruction, and 
this we are committed to do. 

You and your country have also 
been working to set a new course. While 
the policies you've chosen to deal with, 
economic problems, are not the same as 
ours, we recognize they're directed at a 
common goal: a peaceful and a more 
prosperous world. We understand that 
other nations may pursue different 
roads toward our common goals, but we 
can still come together and work 
together for a greater good. A challenge 
of our democracies is to forge a unity of 
purpose and mission without sacrificing 
the basic right of self-determination. At 
Versailles, I believe we can do this. I 
believe we will. 



16 




Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand meet at the Elysee Palace following a luncheon hosta 
by the latter. The Presidents discuss regional, security-related, and other bilateral issue 



We in the West have big problems, 
and we must not pretend we can solve 
them overnight. But we can solve them. 
It is we, not the foes of freedom, who 
enjoy the blessings of constitutional 
government, rule of law, political and 
economic liberties, and the right to wor- 
ship God. It is we who trust our own 
people rather than fear them. These 
values lie at the heart of human freedom 
and social progress. We need only the 
spirit, wisdom, and will to make them 
work. Just as our countries have 



preserved our democratic institution, s^ 
have we maintained the world's oldest 
alliance. 

My true friends, who may disagree 
from time to time, we know that we cai 
count on each other when it really mat 
ters. I think there's no more fitting wa; 
to underscore this relationship than to 
recall that there are more than 60,000 
young Americans, soldiers, sailors, and 
Marines who rest beneath the soil of 
France. As the anniversary of D-Day a 
proaches, let us pay homage to all the 
brave men and women, French and 
American, who gave their lives so that 
we and future generations could live in 



^ 
? 



Department of State Bulleti 







FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



freedom. In their memory, let us remain 
vigilant to the challenges we face stand- 
ing tall and firm together. 

If you would allow me, there was a 
young American. His name was Martin 
Treptow who left his job in a small town 
barbershop in 1917 to come to France 
with the same "Rainbow Division" of 
World War I. Here on the Western 
front he was killed trying to carry a 
message between battalions under heavy 
artillery fire. We're told that on his body 
as found a diary. And on the leaflet 
,nder the heading, "My Pledge," he had 
ritten that we must win this war. He 
rote, "Therefore I will work. I will 
,ve. I will sacrifice. I will endure. I will 
!ght cheerfully and do my utmost as if 
he issue of the whole struggle depended 
ipon me alone." 

The challenges we face today do not 
equire the same sacrifices that Martin 
'reptow and so many thousands of 
thers were called upon to make. But 
hey do require our best effort, our will- 
igness to believe in each other and to 
elieve that together, with God's help, 
fe can and will resolve the problems 
onfronting us. I pledge to you my best 
ffort. Let us continue working together 
Dr the values and principles that permit 
ttle people to dream great dreams, to 
row tall, to live in peace, and one day 
5 leave behind a better life for their 
hildren. 

St. Exupery wrote that a rock pile 
3ases to be a rock pile the moment a 
ngle man contemplates it bearing 
ithin him the image of the cathedral, 
et us raise our glasses to all the 
ithedrals yet to be built. With our 
•iendship, courage and determination, 
ley will be built. 

Vive la France et vive I'Amerique 
'9S amis ce soir, demain, et toujours. 
'ould you like to translate that for the 
mericans. [Laughter] [Applause] 

President Mitterrand [as inter- 
reted]. I would like to say welcome, 
elcome to our country. Our country is 
country which enjoys receiving a visit 
cm friends. We're also proud that you 
lould be here and that you should be 
jre on the occasion of your first trip to 
ranee and, indeed, your first trip to 
urope. So, during this visit, we will 



uly1982 



keep you here with us for 3 days, and 
the Prime Minister and myself, we will 
then have the privilege of seeing you 
again in Bonn. 

The French — who are here with me, 
here today, during the days when you 
will be here — will try to insure that this 
visit, which I know is a visit dedicated to 
work and activity, will also be a visit 
for — of pleasure, a pleasure that one 
finds among friends. 

We have had several occasions 
already to meet and to talk together, 
and we will move forward toward — [in- 
audible]— each other. We have been able 
to talk of the matters which are impor- 
tant for our countries and, indeed, for 
the whole world. I have always ap- 
preciated your wise counsel, the very 
marked attention that you have devoted 
to what has been said around you, and 
your openmindedness. It is clear that 
when the fate of mankind is at stake 
and, also, mankind to some extent for 
which we are responsible — you and I — it 
is on those occasions that your attention 
is particularly dedicated. 

It is not a matter of chance that we 
should, in fact, be the members of the 
oldest alliance in the world. Think of the 
time that has elapsed. Generations have 
gone by, the events that have taken 
place, the contradictions, perhaps, in our 
approaches to the things of the world — 
yet, despite all of these differences, 
when the time and need came, we were 
there, both of us, in order to defend the 
cause of liberty — the liberty for the in- 
dividual citizen within each country and 
the liberty for all the citizens in the 
whole world, and the liberty, in fact, of 
friends. 

It is not a matter of pure chance nor 
a matter of simply a combination of 
various interests which led to the 
presence of French soldiers when it was 
a question of fighting for the independ- 
ence and liberty of your country. Nor 
was it a matter of chance out of interest 
merely, when many years later, 
American soldiers fought side by side 
with French soldiers for the independ- 
ence and the liberty of France. It is 
because, perhaps, tonight really realizing 
[inaudible] it during those two centuries 



many people reacted and reflected in the 
same way as the almost synonymous 
hairdresser, that you were mentioning 
earlier, who later became a soldier, in 
fact, felt that on their shoulders rested 
the weight of the whole world. 

It was simply because they felt that 
they were responsible — as this man, 
alone, realized in his innermost con- 
science and awareness, what he decided 
in his intimate knowledge of himself and 
what was right in his eyes, would 
govern the way the rest of the world 
would think likewise. 

And where else really does one learn 
responsibility? Surely, it is only in the 
political democracies where one entrusts 
to no one else the decisions that have to 
be taken by each and every individual. 
And who can really be fully responsible 
more than the person who realizes and 
fully appreciates that it is the force of 
the mind that is decisive, that it can 
always win the day over the forces — 
over the mechanical forces, however 
powerful they may be, even the forces of 
economics. 

One can say that the world can be 
built if the world thinks right and if one 
wants it. And we have excellent oppor- 
tunity of proving this in the next 3 
days — without too much ambition — but 
all the same we need a lot of ambition in 
the positions that arise. 

The least we can do, of course, is to 
discuss economics. If the seven countries 
which will be meeting with the Euro- 
pean Economic Community are to attain 
the strength that they need in order to 
defend the idees which they consider to 
be right, then it is important not to 
divorce the economic powers from the 
other resources. It is important that we 
should be able to guarantee peace which, 
after all, is based on agreement among 
ourselves. In order to be able to do that, 
it is essential that we should not fight 
among ourselves. 

I, as you are yourself, am confident 
that we can control and dominate the 
crisis that we are living. The methods 
that we may employ within our coun- 
tries may, indeed, be somewhat dif- 
ferent. But the aims are the same, and 



17 



our methods can and must converge in 
the form of common actions that we can 
engage in together. 

Yes, I am confident that we will win 
the battle of peace. Although, sometimes 
the methods that we would employ 
within our countries may be different, 
we will always agree on the essential 
goals. So it is that, for over a year now, 
we have, indeed, moved forward to- 
gether, hand in hand, in full agreement 
about the goals that we were striving to 
achieve. By the presence of force and 
power, we should be able to review with 
equinimity and serenity the threats that 
may be before us. At the same time, we 
would only use force in order to insure 
the protection and the appeasement of 
the peace which is so necessary. 

It is that force which must be there 
in order to first start the necessary 
negotiations. That is what you have just 
done, saying what you have said just 
before the opening of the very important 
talks concerning disarmament, talks that 
are to be held with the very great power 
that— with you and with others, such as 
ourselves — is responsible for the state of 
the world. 

I hope that we will be able to extend 
our efforts, further, in order to help 
those millions of human beings who are 
no longer really the Third World but a 
sort of world which is in the process of 
moving toward development, a world 
which needs us just as we need them in 
order that our century should have a 
future. 

The remarks that you were making 
yourself earlier have taken me some- 
what far afield from the tone that 
should be the tone of this evening. And 
it is a tone, of course, of happiness, the 
happiness of being together, the joy of 
being together. So, in a moment, I will 
be raising my glass to your health, to 
the health of Mrs. Reagan. I have had 
the very great pleasure of having long 
talks with Mrs. Reagan. We started our 
talks in London as you will recall, and, 
indeed, we also talked about you — 
[laughter] — I also raise my glass to the 
people of the United States, friends, our 
faithful friends, just as we are their 



loyal allies. It is our function to say, on 
all occasions, what we think just as it is 
our duty to, at all times, show our 
wholehearted solidarity. I also raise my 
glass to the health of the Ambassador 
and Mrs. Galbraith, representing the 
United States here in France. It is to 
you, Madame, that we owe these very 
pleasant moments. 

I am honored to speak on behalf of 
the French guests present here tonight 
who represent what you might call in 
American terms— as far as the political 
scene is concerned — we call them prox- 
ies. [Laughter] But vis-a-vis the Presi- 
dent of the United States and indeed, 
the world, they are representatives of 
the whole nation of France. It is on their 
behalf, on behalf of everyone present, 
that I would like, again, to raise my 
glass to your health. I would say good 
luck to your action and also good luck to 
the work that we are going to undertake 
in the next 2 days — the conquest of 
liberty and peace. [Applause] 



Secretary Haig's 
Statement 

Paris 

June 4, 1982^ 



I have just left the American Embassy 
with the President where the President 
addressed our Embassy personnel. Dur- 
ing that discussion, he commented on 
the particular hazards associated with 
diplomatic activity and stationing abroad 
today and the exposure to terrorism. We 
noted, with regret, that last night 
another cowardly terrorist act was 
perpetrated against the American school 
here close to Paris. I received, this 
morning, the official regrets and 
apologies of the host government from 
Foreign Minister Cheysson. We are, of 
course, grateful and impressed by the 
actions being taken by the French 
Government against this international 
plague. Of course, I am confident that 
the leaders of the seven governments 
meeting — starting this evening at Ver- 
sailles — will continue the discussions in 



this critical area that were launched at 
the summit at Ottawa, so that greater 
and more effective international co- 
operation can be developed to stamp ou 
this irresponsible plague against all 
mankind. 

We had a very busy day with sever 
bilaterals— the first with Prime Minist« 
Suzuki of Japan and the second with 
Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Brit- 
ain. With respect to the Suzuki bilaterg 
it was a very detailed and subjective ai 
tightly programed hour of discussion 
between the two leaders and their 
representatives. The focus was on trac 
In these discussions, President Reagan 
very much welcomed the recent an- 
nouncement of the Government of Jap; 
on the further liberalization of Japanes 
trade practices. The President describ* 
it as a positive step in the direction of 
greater liberalization. 

This involved the recent decisions ' 
the Japanese Government to liberalize 
tariff and nontariff restrictions and an 
improvement in Japanese import regu 
tions. During these discussions, Prime' 
Minister Suzuki pledged to support th« 
further enhancement of free trade at 1i 
upcoming GATT [General Agreement 
Tariffs and Trade] conference next 
fall— a pledge which, of course, was 
welcomed by the United States as it ia 
parallel to and consistent with U.S. ol 
jectives and intention at that upcomin 
meeting. 

The President also welcomed the i 
nouncement made, earlier this after- 
noon, by the Japanese Government of 
the completion of an interim agreeme^ 
on civil aviation between the United 
States and Japan. As you know, this 1 1 
been under discussion for an extendec i 
period and a breakthrough was achiev I 
largely as a result of the initiative of 
Prime Minister Suzuki himself. 

The President, in these discussion 
this afternoon, warmly endorsed the i 
cent decision of the Suzuki governmei 
to increase its level of defense spendii 
to almost 8%— increase real term spel- 
ing for the coming year, the only sect , 
incidentally, of the current Japanese 
budget to receive such an enhanced 
allocation of resources. 



18 



Department of State Bulle i 




FEATURE 

Visit 

''' to 
Europe 



During the discussions, Prime 
Minister Suzuki warmly endorsed and 
welcomed President Reagan's recent ini- 
tiatives in arms control ranging from 
the November 18 speech on INF [inter- 
national-range nuclear forces] and the 

^ talks at Geneva and the more recently 
announced on START [Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks] talks which will resume 
on the 29th — negotiations themselves 
which will resume on the 29th in 
Geneva — the 29th of this month. 

Prime Minister Suzuki, of course, 
welcomed the position of the United 

•^States with respect to mobile, intermedi- 
ate-range missiles in our Geneva discus- 
sions, in which they are dealt with in 



global terms. There would be great con- 
cern in the Far East that missiles now 
directed at Western Europe might be 
shifted to the Far East. 

In conclusion, there were some 
detailed discussions as they wound up 
their meeting of the recent visit of the 
Premier of the People's Republic of 
China to Tokyo and Prime Minister 
Suzuki's impressions — important impres- 
sions—with respect to this visit. As the 
meeting broke up, the Prime Minister 
described the current state of 
U.S. -Japanese relations as never better 
and on the highest plain in his memory, 
particularly singling out the leadership 
of President Reagan in this difficult time 




of international crisis and confusion. 

The meeting with Prime Minister 
Suzuki was followed by an extensive 
one-on-one meeting between Prime 
Minister Thatcher and President 
Reagan. They met alone for IV2 hours. 
The main focus of which, of course, as I 
described yesterday, was a detailed ex- 
change of views between the two leaders 
on the Falkland crisis, both in the con- 
text of the near term and the longer 
term. It was clear that the current situa- 
tion is one which is best assessed by 
commanders on the ground or charged 
with the responsibility for the conduct of 
the military operations which, unfor- 
tunately, have been underway for some 
time. 

I think with respect to the longer 
term aspect of the Falklands question, it 
was clear from the exchange of views 
that both leaders agreed that it was still 
somewhat too early to deal finitely with 
a number of the longer term questions 
associated with this crisis. 

It is dynamic — at 4 p.m. this after- 
noon the U.N. Security Council will 
meet again where various resolutions 
have been considered over the last 48 
hours. We are now, of course, com- 
plete — have completed the Paris leg of 
the President's journey. Based on the 
bilaterals the President has had— my 
own discussions with Foreign Minister 
Cheysson and Foreign Minister Pym — 
we proceed this evening to Versailles 
with a sense of confidence that the Ver- 
sailles summit, itself, will be one that 
gives clear evidence of continued and 
growing solidarity between the Western 
industrialized nations and Japan in a 
host of common problems primarily of 
economic but also of political nature as 
well. In the days ahead at Versailles, a 
number of the questions which some of 
you have been writing and speculating 
about wUl be resolved in finite terms. 



rieeting at the U.S. Ambassador's Residence, President Reagan and Japanese Prime 
Minister Suzuki hold detailed talks which focus on trade. 



I((uly1982 



19 



President Reagan's 
Remarks 



Versailles 
June 5. 1982^ 



I bring to France greetings and best 
wishes from the American people. I 
carry their hopes for continued Western 
unity to secure a prosperous and lasting 
peace, and I've come to express our 
commitment to policies that will renew 
economic growth. 

But today touches French and 
American memories in a special way. It 
brings to mind thoughts quite apart 
from the pressing issues being discussed 
at the economic summit in Versailles. On 
this day, 38 years ago, our two peoples 
were united in an epic struggle against 
tyranny. 

In 1944, as World War II raged, the 
allies were battling to regain their 
foothold in the continent. The French 
resistance fought valiantly on, disrupting 
communications and sabotaging supply 
lines. But the Nazis held Europe in a 
stranglehold, and Field Marshal Rommel 
was building his Atlantic wall along 
France's coast. 

Late on the night of June 5th, as fog 
enshrouded the Normandy coastline, 
over 2,000 planes took off from English 
fields to drop soldiers by parachute 
behind enemy lines. By the early hours 
of June 6th, the massive allied armada, 
,5,000 ships, had begun to move across 
the cold and choppy water of the 
English Channel. D-Day had begun. 

The code names, Omaha, Utah, gold, 
Juno, and sword, are now indelibly 
etched in history by the blood spilled on 
that 100-mile stretch of beach. More 
than 1.50,000 allied troops stormed Nor- 
mandy that day, and by dusk they had 
established beachheads at each of the 
five invasion points. The toll was high. 
More than 10,500 of our young men 
were either dead, wounded, or missing. 

Today, endless rows of simple white 
crosses mark their seacoast graves. The 
rusty helmets still buried in the sand, 
and the ships and tanks still lying off the 
shore are testiments to their sacrifices. 



By the end of World War II, more 
than 60,000 Americans had been buried 
in France. Today, we remember them, 
honor them, and pray for them, but we 
also remember what they gave us. 

D-Day was a success, and the allies 
had breached Hitler's seawall. They 
swept into Europe liberating towns and 
cities and countrysides until the axis 
powers were finally crushed. We 
remember D-Day because the French, 
British, Canadians, and Americans 
fought shoulder-to-shoulder for 
democracy and freedom, and won. 

During the war, a gallant, French 
leader, Charles de Gaulle, inspired his 
countrymen organizing and leading the 
free French forces. He entered Paris in 
triumph liberating that city at the head 
of a column of allied troops, a victory 
made possible by the heroes of Norman- 
dy. "Nothing great will ever be achieved 
without great men, and men are great 
only if they're determined to be so," de 
Gaulle said. 

Ours was a great alliance of free 
people determined to remain so. I 
believe it still is. The invasion of Nor- 
mandy was the second time in this cen- 
tury Americans fought in France to free 
it from an aggressor. We're pledged to 
do so again if we must. The freedom we 
enjoy today was secured by great men 
and at great cost. Today, let us 
remember their courage and pray for 
the guidance and strength to do what 
we must so that no generation is ever 
asked to make so great a sacrifice again. 



ITALY 

President Reagan's 

and 

Pope John Paul IPs 

Remarks 



s 



The Vatican 
June 7, 1982« 

President Reagan. This is truly a city 
of peace, love, and charity where the 
highest to the humblest among us seek 
to follow in the footsteps of the 
fishermen. As you know. Your Holiness, 
this is my first visit to Europe as Presi- 
dent, and I would like to think of it as a 
pilgrimage for peace, a journey aimed at 
strengthening the forces for peace in the 
free West by offering new opportunities 
for realistic negotiations with those who 
may not share the values and the spirit 
we cherish. 

This is no easy task, but I leave this 
audience with a renewed sense of hope 
and dedication. Hope, because one can- 
not meet a man like Your Holiness 
without feeling that a world that can 
produce such courage and vision out of 
adversity and oppression is capable, wit 
God's help, of building a better future. 
Dedication, because one cannot enter 
this citadel of faith, the fountainhead of 
so many of the values we face in 
the — or that we in the free West hold 
dear without coming away resolved to 
do all in one's power to live up to them. 

Certain common experiences we 
have shared in our different walks of 
life, Your Holiness, and the warm cor- 
respondence we have carried on also 
gave our meeting a special meaning for 
me. I hope that others will follow. Let 
me add that all Americans remember 
with great warmth your historic visit to 
our shores in 1979. We all hope that yoi|*'j' 
will be back again with your timeless 
message: "Ours is a nation grounded on 
faith, faith in man's ability through God 
given freedom to live in tolerance and 
peace as faith in a Supreme Being 

Do« 



)t 



1 

K 

Be 



fie 
W 



20 



Departnnent of State BulletiiilS 




FEATURE 

Visit 

yy/ to 

Europe 



guides our daily striving in this world." 
Our national motto, In God We Trust, 

I reflects that faith. 
Many of our earlier settlers came to 
America seeking a refuge where they 
:ould worship God unhindered. So our 
dedication to individual freedoms is wed- 
ded to religious freedom as well. Liberty 
nas never meant license to Americans. 
We treasure it precisely because it pro- 
jects the human and spiritual values that 
ne hold most dear: the right to worship 
IS we choose; the right to elect 
lemocratic leaders; the right to choose 
he type of education we want for our 
ihildren; and freedom from fear, want, 
ind oppression. These are God-given 
reedoms, not the contrivances of man. 

We also believe in helping one 
.nother through our churches and 
haritable institutions or simply as one 
riend, one good Samaritan to another, 
'he Ten Commandments and the Golden 
iule are as much a part of our living 
eritage as the Constitution we take 
uch pride in. And we have tried, not 
Iways successfully, but always in good 
Dnscience, to extend those same prin- 
iples to our role in the world. 

We know that God has blessed 
.merica with the freedom and abun- 
ance many of our less fortunate 
irothers and sisters around the world 

,ve been denied. Since the end of 
d^orld War II, we have done our best to 
irovide assistance to them — assistance 
mounting to billions of dollars worth of 
■)od, medicine, and materials. And we'll 
Dntinue to do so in the years ahead. 

Americans have always believed that 
1 the words of the Scripture, "Unto 
■homsoever much is given, of him shall 
B much required." To us in a troubled 
orld, the Holy See and your pastorate 
jpresent one of the world's greatest 
loral and spiritual forces. 

We admire your active efforts to 
)ster peace and promote justice, 
•eedom, and compassion in a world that 
. still stalked by the forces of evil. As a 



lUowing an arrival ceremony at the 
itican, President Reagan meets with 
ipe John Paul II. 



people and as a government, we seek to 
pursue the same goals of peace, 
freedom, and humanity along political 
and economic lines that the Church pur- 
sues in its spiritual role. So, we deeply 
value your counsel and support and ex- 
press our solidarity with you. 

Your Holiness, one of the areas of 



our mutual concern is Latin America. 
We want to work closely with the 
Church in that area to help promote 
peace, social justice, and reform and to 
prevent the spread of repression and 
godless tryanny. We also share your 
concern in seeking peace and justice in 
troubled areas of the Middle East, such 




Illy 1982 



21 



as Lebanon. Another special area of 
mutual concern is the martyred nation 
of Poland— your own homeland. 
Through centuries of adversity, Poland 
has been a brave bastion of faith and 
freedom in the hearts of her courageous 
people, yet, not in those who rule her. 

We seek a process of reconciliation 
and reform that will lead to a new dawn 
of hope for the people of Poland. We'll 
continue to call for an end to martial 
law, for the freeing of all political 
prisoners, and to resume dialogue 
among the Polish Government, the 
Church, and the Solidarity movement 
which speaks for the vast majority of 
Poles. 

Denying financial assistance to the 
oppressive Polish regime, America will 
continue to provide the Polish people 
with as much food and commodity sup- 
port as possible through church and 
private organizations. 

Today, Your Holiness, marks the 
beginning of the U.N. special session on 
disarmament. We pledge to do every- 
thing possible in these discussions, as in 
our individual initiatives for peace and 
arms reduction, to help bring a real, 
lasting peace throughout the world. To 
us, this is nothing less than a sacred 
trust. 

Dante has written that, "The infinite 
goodness has such wide arms that it 
takes whatever turns to it." We ask your 
prayers, Holy Father, that God will 
guide us in our efforts for peace on this 
journey and in the years ahead, that the 
wide arms of faith and forgiveness can 
some day embrace a world at peace with 
justice and compassion for all mankind. 

The Pope. I am particularly pleased to 
welcome you today to the Vatican. 
Although we have already had many 
contacts, it is the first time that we have 
met personally. 

In you, the President of the United 
States of America, I greet all the people 
of your great land. I still remember 
privately the warm welcome that I was 
given by millions of your fellow citizens 



less than 3 years ago. On that occasion, 
I was once more able to witness first- 
hand the vitality of your nation. I was 
able to see again how the moral and 
spiritual values transmitted by your 
Founding Fathers find their dynamic ex- 
pression in the life of modern America. 

The American people are, indeed, 
proud of their right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness. They are proud 
of civil and social progress in American 
society as well as their extraordinary ad- 
vances in science and technology. 

As I speak to you today, it is my 
hope that the entire structure of 
American life will rest evermore secure- 
ly on the strong foundation of moral and 
spiritual values. Without the fostering 
and defense of these values, all human 
advancement is stunted, and the dignity 
of the human person is endangered. 
Throughout the course of their 
history, and especially in difficult times, 
the American people have repeatedly 
risen to challenges presented to them. 
They have given many proofs of unself- 
ishness, generosity, concern for others, 
concern for the poor, the needy, the op- 
pressed. They have shown confidence in 
that great ideal of being a united people 
with a mission of service to perform. 

At this present moment in the 
history of the world, the United States 
is called above all to fulfill its mission in 
the service of world peace. The very 
condition of the world today calls for a 
far-sighted policy that will further those 
indispensable conditions of justice and 
freedom, of truth and love that are the 
foundations of lasting peace. My own 
greatest preoccupation is for the peace 
of the world, peace in our day. 

In many parts of the world, there 
are centers of acute tension. This acute 
tension is manifested, above all, in the 
crisis of the South Atlantic, in the war 
between Iran and Iraq, and now in the 
grave crisis provoked by the new events 
in Lebanon. This grave crisis in Lebanon 
likewise merits the attention of the 
world because of the danger it contains 



of further provocation in the Middle 
East with immense consequences for 
world peace. 

There are, fortunately, many factor: 
in society that today positively con- 
tribute to peace. This positive factor in- 
cludes an increasing realization of the ir 
terdependence of all peoples, the grow- 
ing solidarity with those in need, and a 
growth of conviction of the absurdity of 
war as a means of resolving controver- 
sies between nations. 

During my recent visit to Britain, I 
stated, in particular, that the scale and 
the horror from all the warfare, whethe 
nuclear or not, makes it totally unac- 
ceptable as a means of settling dif- 
ferences between nations. And for thosi 
who profess the Christian faith, I offer 
up, as motivation, the fact that when 
you are in contact with the Prince of 
Peace, you understand how totally op- 
posed to His message are hatred and 
war. 

The duty of peace calls especially 
upon the leaders of the world. It is up t 
the representatives of governments anc 
peoples to work to free humanity not o: 
ly from wars and conflicts, but from thu 
fear that is generated by evermore 
sophisticated and deadly weapons. Peacr 
is not only the absence of war; it also ir 
volves reciprocal trust between nations 
a trust that is manifested and proved 
through constructive negotiations that 
aim at ending the arms race and at 
liberating immense resources that can 1 
used to alleviate misery and feed 
millions of hungry human beings. 

All effective peacemaking requires 
foresightedness, for foresightedness is 
quality needed in all peacemakers. 
You— your own great nation is called t- 
exercise this foresightedness as far— al 
the nations of the world. This quality 
enables leaders to commit themselves t 
those concrete programs, which are 
essential to world peace— programs of 
justice and development, efforts to de- 
fend and protect human life, as well as 
initiatives that favor human rights. 
On the contrary, anything that 
wounds, weakens, or dishonors human 
dignity, in any aspect, imperils the cau; 
of the" human person and, at the same 



r 



ii 



22 



Department of State Bullet 




FEATURE 



Visit 

yy/ to 

Europe 



time, the peace of the world. The rela- 
tions between nations are greatly af- 
fected by the development issue— issue, 
which reserves its full relevance in this 
day of ours. Success in resolving ques- 
tions in the North-South dialogue will 
continue to be the gates of peaceful rela- 
tions between values, political com- 
munities, and continue to influence the 
peace of the world in the years ahead. 

Economic and social advancement 
linked to financial collaboration between 
peoples remains an apt goal for renewed 
efforts of the statesmen of this world. 

A truly universal concept of the 
common good for the human family is 
lan incomparable instrument in building 
sf Ithe edifice of the world today. It is my 
own conviction that a united and con- 
cerned America can contribute immense- 
ly to the cause of world peace through 
the efforts of our leaders and the com- 
mitment of all her citizens dedicated to 
the high ideals of her traditions. 
America is in a splendid position to help 
all humanity enjoy what it is intent upon 
possessing. 

With faith in God and belief in 
: universal human solidarity may America 
step forward in this crucial moment in 
history to consolidate its rightful place 
at the service of world peace. In this 
sense, I repeat today those words that I 
spoke when I left the United States in 
1979. My final prayer is this: that God 
will bless America so that she may in- 
(. creasingly become, and truly be, and 
long remain one nation under God, in- 
divisible, with liberty and justice for all. 



Luncheon Toasts 



Rome 

June 7, 1982' 



President Reagan. It's a genuine 
privilege to be here today and, most 
especially, as the guest of President 
Pertini. The poet Robert Browning 
wrote, "Open my heart and you will see 
'graved inside of it Italy." 

As countless immigrants to my na- 
tion's shores would confirm, Italy is 



engraved inside millions of American 
hearts. And, after your recent trip to 
the United States, the name Pertini also 
is engraved in our hearts. In my time at 
the White House, I don't remember as 
beautiful and moving a gesture as the 
kiss you planted on our flag that March 
morning. That kiss touched all the 



hard but self-confident choices in recent 
years. The Atlantic Alliance is firm in 
large part because of Italian determina- 
tion to assume major responsibilities 
within NATO for our common defense. 
The prospects for peace are improved 
because of Italy's contribution to such 
efforts as the Sinai multinational force. 




citizens of my country. We were deeply 
honored. 

I want to say, personally, how 
honored I feel to call you amico. The 
word friend certainly characterizes the 
relationship between Italy and the 
United States. We're drawn together by 
the blood of our people and the bonds of 
our Western ideals. We share a devotion 
to liberty and the determination to 
preserve that liberty for ourselves and 
our descendants. 

We live in difficult times that test 
our beliefs. The independence and 
freedom of people the world over are 
threatened by the expansion of totali- 
tarian regimes and by the brutal crimes 
of international terrorism. I am op- 
timistic. The West simply needs to 
believe in itself and in its leadership to 
succeed. Italy and her people are abun- 
dant in that leadership. Italy has made 



After brief remarks following his meeting 
with the Pope, the President meets with 
Italian President Alessandro Pertini. 



The free world better appreciates 
human dignity and justice thanks to Ita- 
ly's principled stand on Afghanistan and 
Poland. And, of course, there is Italy's 
integrity in the face of terrorism. Let 
me cite here the brilliant operation that 
freed General Dozier. These issues have 
required difficult decisions. They have 
required political decisiveness beyond 
the ordinary. So I want to say — and pay 
special tribute to you. President Pertini, 
Prime Minister Spadolini, Foreign 
Minister Colombo, and to the entire 
Italian Government for the resolution 
you've shown and the example that you 
have given. 

In return, I want to assure you that 
the United States stands behind you in 



July 1982 



23 



I 



defending the values of the West. The 
Atlantic Alliance is still the heart of our 
foreign policy, and that heart beats for 
peace and freedom. 

The United States is fortunate to en- 
joy the friendship of Italy and the Italian 
people. We are wiser for your counsel 
and stronger for your partnership. Like 
the great Virgil, we Americans believe: 
"As long as rivers shall run down to the 
sea or shadows touch the mountain 
slopes or stars graze in the vaulted 
heavens, so long shall your honor, your 
name, your praises endure." 

Mr. President, amico, ladies and 
gentlemen, may I propose a toast to Ita- 
ly and to her honor, her name, and her 
praises. May they long endure. [Ap- 
plause] 



U.S.-Italy 
Statement 



London 
June 7, 19828 



At the invitation of the President of the 
Italian Republic, Sandro Pertini, the Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, Ronald 
Reagan, paid a visit to Rome on June 7th, 
1982. The visit provided an opportunity for 
the two Presidents to have a productive ex- 
change of views. Two useful meetings were 
held between President Reagan and the 
President of the Council of Ministers, 
Giovanni Spadolini. President Reagan took 
the opportunity to thank President Pertini 
for his recent state visit to the United States 
and conveyed to him the warm good wishes 
of the American government and the 
American people. President Pertini expressed 
to President Reagan his appreciation for the 
warm reception he enjoyed in the United 
States. 

Presidents Reagan and Pertini reviewed 
the threat which international terrorism 
presents to the free world and noted with 
satisfaction the successes of the Italian and 
other Western governments in combatting 
this menace. The two Presidents also review- 
ed international trouble spots including 
Afghanistan, Poland, and Central and South 



America; the two reaffirmed their strongest 
commitment to the preservation and restora- 
tion of freedom and justice for all men. They 
noted their shared hope for a cessation of 
hostilities in the South Atlantic. The two 
Heads of State concluded their meeting with 
an affirmation of the strength of U.S. -Italian 
bonds and a review of those common values 
on which the two societies have been built. 

Prime Minister Spadolini and President 
Reagan, first between themselves and then 
along with Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio 
Colombo and Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig, reviewed a number of questions facing 
the two countries, including the 1979 decision 
by NATO to place intermediate-range nuclear 
forces in Europe, together with the offer to 
the Soviet Union for simultaneous negotia- 
tions on control and limitation of such 
weapons, and the overall Middle East situa- 
tion, with special attention to the two most 
urgent questions in that area at the moment; 
the Lebanese situation where it is of the ut- 
most urgency to bring a cessation of the 
fighting. On the Iran-Iraq conflict — the two 
sides agreed on the need for a political settle- 
ment respecting the territorial integrity of 
both nations. 

In addition they reviewed the validity of 
both countries' participation in the Sinai 
multinational force and the prospects for the 
dialogue on Palestinian autonomy. They also 
examined East-West relations, including 
questions of trade and credit and issues 
related to economic and monetary coopera- 
tion between the two countries. The two 
Heads of Government reaffirmed their com- 
mitment to a policy aiming at a growing level 
of economic and commercial relations be- 
tween the two countries in order to fight 
against inflation, promote growth and 
thereby employment. 

President Reagan reviewed his proposals 
for the worldwide reduction of strategic 
nuclear weapons and for the reduction of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. 
Prime Minister Spadolini noted with approval 
the recent announcement that the START 
talks will begin in Geneva on June 29. The 



two said they shared the aspirations of manj 
of the young people who were marching for 
peace, took note of the institutions and 
policies which have kept the peace in Europt 
for almost 40 years, and urged the Soviet 
Union to respond positively to proposals L 
which have been made by the United States. I 

The Prime Minister and the President 
viewed with pleasure the new initiative for 
the exchange of young students between 
their countries which will begin in 1982. 

The two governments agreed to begin 
regular meetings to discuss cultural and in- 
formation matters with the desire to improv 
cultural programs and in order to examine 
means of strengthening relations in these 
fields. The first cultural and information tall 
will be held in Washington in October. 

The two sides concluded their talks by 
welcoming recent decisions to strengthen 
mutual consultations as an expression of the 
special and close relationship which Italy ant 
the United States enjoy. 



UNITED KINGDOM 



President Reagan's 
Address 

London 
June 8, 1982'' 



The journey of which this visit forms a 
part is a long one. Already it has taken 
me to two great cities of the West- 
Rome and Paris— and to the economic 
summit at Versailles. There, once agaii 
our sister democracies have proved tha 
even in a time of severe economic strai 
free peoples can work together freely 
and voluntarily to address problems as 
serious as inflation, unemployment, 
trade, and economic development in a 
spirit of cooperation and solidarity. 
Other milestones lie ahead. Later this 



24 



Department of State Bulletil 




FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



week in Germany, we and our NATO 
allies will discuss measures for our joint 
defense and America's latest initiatives 
for a more peaceful, secure world 
through arms reductions. 

Each stop of this trip is important, 
but, among them all, this moment occu- 
pies a special place in my heart and the 
hearts of my countrymen— a moment of 
kinship and homecoming in these hal- 
lowed halls. Speaking for all Americans, 
I want to say how very much at home 
we feel in your house. Every American 
would, because this is— as we have been 
so eloquently told— one of democracy's 
shrines. Here the rights of free people 
and the processes of representation have 
been debated and refined. 

It has been said that an institution is 
the lengthening shadow of a man. This 
institution is the lengthening shadow of 
all the men and women who have sat 
here and all those who have voted to 
send representatives here. 

This is my second visit to Great 
Britain as President of the United 
States. My first opportunity to stand on 
British soil occurred almost a year and a 
half ago when your Prime Minister 
graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at 
the British Embassy in Washington. 
Mrs. Thatcher said then that she hoped 
that I was not distressed to find staring 
down at me from the grand staircase a 
portrait of His Royal Majesty King 
George HI. She suggested it was best to 
let bygones be bygones and— in view of 
our two countries' remarkable friendship 
in succeeding years— she added that 
most Englishmen today would agree 
with Thomas Jefferson that "a little 
rebellion now and then is a very good 
thing." 

From here I will go on to Bonn and 
then Berlin, where there stands a grim 
symbol of power untamed. The Berlin 
Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the 
city, is in its third decade. It is the 
fitting signature of the regime that built 
it. And a few hundred kilometers behind 
the Berlin Wall there is another symbol. 
In the center of Warsaw there is a sign 
that notes the distances to two capitals. 
In one direction it points toward 
Moscow. In the other it points toward 
Brussels, headquarters of Western 



July 1982 



Europe's tangible unity. The marker 
says that the distances from Warsaw to 
Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are 
equal. The sign makes this point: Poland 
is not East or West. Poland is at the 
center of European civilization. It has 
contributed mightily to that civilization. 
It is doing so today by being magnifi- 
cently unreconciled to oppression. 

Poland's struggle to be Poland, and 
to secure the basic rights we often take 
for granted, demonstrates why we dare 
not take those rights for granted. Glad- 
stone, defending the Reform Bill of 
1866, declared: "You cannot fight 
against the future. Time is on our side." 
It was easier to believe in the march of 
democracy in Gladstone's day, in that 
high noon of Victorian optimism. 

We are approaching the end of a 
bloody century plagued by a terrible 
political invention— totalitarianism. Op- 
timism comes less easily today, not be- 
cause democracy is less vigorous but be- 
cause democracy's enemies have refined 
their instruments of repression. Yet op- 
timism is in order because, day by day, 
democracy is proving itself to be a not- 
at-all fragile flower. 

From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna 
on the Black Sea, the regimes planted 
by totalitarianism have had more than 
30 years to establish their legitimacy. 
But none— not one regime— has yet been 
able to risk free elections. Regimes 
planted by bayonets do not take root. 

The strength of the Solidarity move- 
ment in Poland demonstrates the truth 
told in an underground joke in the 
Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union 
would remain a one-party nation even if 
an opposition party were permitted, be- 
cause everyone would join the opposition 
party. 

America's time as a player on the 
stage of world history has been brief. I 
think understanding this fact has always 
made you patient with your younger 
cousins. Well, not always patient— I do 
recall that on one occasion Sir Winston 
Churchill said in exasperation about one 
of our most distinguished diplomats: "He 
is the only case I know of a bull who 
carries his china shop with him." 



Threats to Freedom 

Witty as Sir Winston was, he also had 
that special attribute of great states- 
men—the gift of vision, the willingness 
to see the future based on the experi- 
ence of the past. It is this sense of 
history, this understanding of the past, 
that I want to talk with you about to- 
day, for it is in remembering what we 
share of the past that our two nations 
can make common cause for the future. 

We have not inherited an easy 
world. If developments like the in- 
dustrial revolution, which began here in 
England, and the gifts of science and 
technology have made life much easier 
for us, they have also made it more 
dangerous. There are threats now to our 
freedom, indeed, to our very existence, 
that other generations could never even 
have imagined. 

There is, first, the threat of global 
war. No president, no congress, no 
prime minister, no parliament can spend 
a day entirely free of this threat. And I 
don't have to tell you that in today's 
world, the existence of nuclear weapons 
could mean, if not the extinction of man- 
kind, then surely the end of civilization 
as we know it. 

That is why negotiations on inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces now under- 
way in Europe and the START talks- 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks— which 
will begin later this month, are not just 
critical to American or Western policy; 
they are critical to mankind. Our com- 
mitment to early success in these negoti- 
ations is firm and unshakable and our 
purpose is clear: reducing the risk of 
war by reducing the means of waging 
war on both sides. 

At the same time, there is a threat 
posed to human freedom by the enor- 
mous power of the modern state. 
History teaches the dangers of govern- 
ment that overreaches: political control 
taking precedence over free economic 
growth, secret police, mindless bureau- 
cracy—all combining to stifle individual 
excellence and personal freedom. 

Now I am aware that among us here 
and throughout Europe, there is legiti- 
mate disagreement over the extent to 
which the public sector should play a 
role in a nation's economy and life. But 



25 



on one point all of us are united: our 
abhorrence of dictatorship in all its 
forms, but most particularly totalitarian- 
ism and the terrible inhumanities it has 
caused in our time: the great purge, 
Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag and 
Cambodia. 

Historians looking back at our time 
will note the consistent restraint and 
peaceful intentions of the West. They 
will note that it was the democracies 
who refused to use the threat of their 
nuclear monopoly in the 1940s and early 
19.50s for territorial or imperial gain. 
Had that nuclear monopoly been in the 
hands of the Communist world, the map 
of Europe— indeed, the world— would 
look very different today. And certainly 
they will note it was not the democracies 
that invaded Afghanistan or suppressed 
Polish solidarity or used chemical and 
toxin warfare in Afghanistan and South- 
east Asia. 

If history teaches anything, it 
teaches that self-delusion in the face of 
unpleasant facts is folly. We see around 
us today the marks of our terrible dilem- 
ma—predictions of doomsday, anti- 
nuclear demonstrations, an arms race in 
which the West must for its own protec- 
tion be an unwilling participant. At the 
same time, we see totalitarian forces in 
the world who seek subversion and con- 
flict around the globe to further their 
barbarous assault on the human spirit. 

What, then, is our course? Must 
civilization perish in a hail of fiery 
atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, 
deadening accommodation with totali- 
tarian evil? Sir Winston Churchill re- 
fused to accept the inevitability of war 
or even that it was imminent. He said: 

I do not believe that Soviet Russia 
desires war. What they desire is the fruits of 
war and the indefinite expansion of their 
power and doctrines. But what we have to 
consider here today, while time remains, is 
the permanent prevention of war and the 
establishment of conditions of freedom and 
democracy as rapidly as possible in all coun- 
tries. 

The Crisis of Totalitarianism 

This is precisely our mission today: to 
preserve freedom as well as peace. It 
may not be easy to see, but I believe we 



26 



live now at a turning point. In an ironic 
sense, Karl Marx was right. We are wit- 
nessing today a great revolutionary 
crisis— a crisis where the demands of the 
economic order are conflicting directly 
with those of the political order. But the 
crisis is happening not in the free, non- 
Marxist West but in the home of 
Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It 
is the Soviet Union that runs against the 
tide of history by denying human free- 
dom and human dignity to its citizens. It 
also is in deep economic difficulty. The 
rate of growth in the national product 
has been steadily declining since the 
1950s and is less than half of what it 
was then. The dimensions of this failure 
are astounding; a country which employs 
one-fifth of its population in agriculture 
is unable to feed its own people. Were it 
not for the tiny private sector tolerated 
in Soviet agriculture, the country might 
be on the brink of famine. These private 
plots occupy a bare 3% of the arable 
land but account for nearly one-quarter 
of Soviet farm output and nearly one- 
third of meat products and vegetables. 

Overcentralized, with little or no in- 
centives, year after year the Soviet 
system pours its best resources into the 
making of instruments of destruction. 
The constant shrinkage of economic 
growth combined with the growth of 
military production is putting a heavy 
strain on the Soviet people. 

What we see here is a political struc- 
ture that no longer corresponds to its 
economic base, a society where produc- 
tive forces are hampered by political 
ones. The decay of the Soviet experi- 
ment should come as no surprise to us. 
Wherever the comparisons have been 
made between free and closed 
societies— West Germany and East Ger- 
many, Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam— it is the demo- 
cratic countries that are prosperous and 
responsive to the needs of their people. 
And one of the simple but overwhelming 
facts of our time is this: of all the 
millions of refugees we've seen in the 
modern world, their flight is always 
away from, not toward, the Communist 
world. Today on the NATO Hne, our 
military forces face East to prevent a 
possible invasion. On the other side of 



the line, the Soviet forces also face 
East— to prevent their people from 
leaving. 

The hard evidence of totalitarian 
rule has caused in mankind an uprising 
of the intellect and will. Whether it is 
the growth of the new schools of eco- 
nomics in America or England or the ap- 
pearance of the so-called "new philoso- 
phers" in France, there is one unifying 
thread running through the intellectual 
work of these groups: rejection of the 
arbitrary power of the state, the refusal 
to subordinate the rights of the in- 
dividual to the superstate, the realiza- 
tion that collectivism stifles all the best 
human impulses. 

Struggle Against Oppression 

Since the exodus from Egypt, historians 
have written of those who sacrificed and 
struggled for freedom: the stand at 
Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, 
the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw 
uprising in World War II. More recent- 
ly, we have seen evidence of this same 
human impulse in one of the developing 
nations in Central America. For months 
and months the world news media cov- 
ered the fighting in El Salvador. Day 
after day we were treated to stories andi 
film slanted toward the brave freedom 
fighters battling oppressive government 
forces in behalf of the silent, suffering 
people of that tortured country. 

Then one day those silent, suffering 
people were offered a chance to vote, to 
choose the kind of government they 
wanted. Suddenly the freedom fighters 
in the hills were exposed for what they 
really are: Cuban-backed guerrillas who 
want power for themselves and their 
backers, not democracy for the people. 
They threatened death to any who voted 
and destroyed hundreds of busses and 
trucks to keep people from getting to 
the polling places. But on election day 
the people of El Salvador, an unprece- 
dented 1.4 million of them, braved am- 
bush and gunfire and trudged miles to 
vote for freedom. 

They stood for hours in the hot sun 
waiting for their turn to vote. Members 
of our Congress who went there as 
observers told me of a woman who was 
wounded by rifle fire who refused to 



Department of State Bulletin 



11 

Bis 




FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



leave the line to have her wound treated 
until after she had voted. A grand- 
mother, who had been told by the guer- 
rillas she would be killed when she 
returned from the polls, told the guer- 
rillas: "You can kill me, kill my family, 
kill my neighbors, but you can't kill us 
all." The real freedom fighters of El 
Salvador turned out to be the people of 
that country— the young, the old, and 
the in-between. Strange, but in my own 
country there has been little if any news 
coverage of that war since the election. 

Perhaps they'll say it's because there 
are newer struggles now — on distant 
islands in the South Atlantic young men 
are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices 
have been raised protesting their sacri- 
fices for lumps of rock and earth so far 
away. But those young men aren't fight- 
ing for mere real estate. They fight for a 
cause, for the belief that armed aggres- 
sion must not be allowed to succeed and 
that people must participate in the deci- 
sions of government under the rule of 
law. If there had been firmer support 
for that principle some 45 years ago, 
perhaps our generation wouldn't have 
suffered the bloodletting of World 
War II. 

In the Middle East the guns sound 
Dnce more, this time in Lebanon, a coun- 
try that for too long has had to endure 
the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and 
foreign intervention and occupation. The 
Bghting in Lebanon on the part of all 
oarties must stop, and Israel should 
jring its forces home. But this is not 
enough. We must all work to stamp out 
;he scourge of terrorism that in the Mid- 
dle East makes war an ever-present 
;hreat. 

But beyond the troublespots lies a 
deeper, more positive pattern. Around 
;he world today the democratic revolu- 
;ion is gathering new strength. In India, 
1 critical test has been passed with the 
peaceful change of governing political 
parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving in 
"emarkable and unmistakable ways to 
juild and strengthen its democratic in- 
stitutions. In the Caribbean and Central 
\merica, 16 of 24 countries have freely 
elected governments. And in the United 
Nations, 8 of the 10 developing nations 
vhich have joined the body in the past 5 
/ears are democracies. 

In the Communist world as well. 



man's instinctive desire for freedom and 
self-determination surfaces again and 
again. To be sure, there are grim re- 
minders of how brutally the police state 
attempts to snuflF out this quest for self- 
rule: 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in 
Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 
in Poland. But the struggle continues in 
Poland, and we know that there are 
even those who strive and suffer for 
freedom within the confines of the 
Soviet Union itself. How we conduct 
ourselves here in the Western democra- 
cies will determine whether this trend 
continues. 

Fostering Democracy 

No, democracy is not a fragile flower; 
still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of 
this century is to witness the gradual 
growth of freedom and democratic 
ideals, we must take actions to assist the 
campaign for democracy. Some argue 
that we should encourage democratic 
change in rightwing dictatorships but 
not in Communist regimes. To accept 
this preposterous notion — as some well- 
meaning people have — is to invite the 
argument that, once countries achieve a 
nuclear capability, they should be al- 
lowed an undisturbed reign of terror 



ask only for a process, a direction, a 
basic code of decency — not for an in- 
stant transformation. 

We cannot ignore the fact that even 
without our encouragement, there have 
been and will continue to be repeated 
explosions against repression in dictator- 
ships. The Soviet Union itself is not im- 
mune to this reality. Any system is in- 
herently unstable that has no peaceful 
means to legitimatize its leaders. In such 
cases, the very repressiveness of the 
state ultimately drives people to resist 
it — if necessary, by force. 

WhUe we must be cautious about 
forcing the pace of change, we must not 
hesitate to declare our ultimate objec- 
tives and to take concrete actions to 
move toward them. We must be staunch 
in our conviction that freedom is not the 
sole prerogative of a lucky few but the 
inalienable and universal right of all 
human beings. So states the U.N. Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which, among other things, guarantees 
free elections. 

The objective I propose is quite sim- 
ple to state: to foster the infrastructure 
of democracy — the system of a free 
press, unions, political parties, univer- 
sities — which allows a people to choose 
their own way. to develop their own 



The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to 
foster the infrastructure of democracy — the system 
of a free press, unions, political parties, univer- 
sities — which allows a people to choose their own 
way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile 
their own differences through peaceful means. 



over their own citizens. We reject this 
course. 

As for the Soviet view. President 
Brezhnev repeatedly has stressed that 
the competition of ideas and systems 
must continue and that this is entirely 
consistent with relaxation of tensions 
and peace. We ask only that these 
systems begin by living up to their own 
constitutions, abiding by their own laws, 
and complying with the international 
obligations they have undertaken. We 



culture, to reconcile their own differ- 
ences through peaceful means. 

This is not cultural imperialism; it is 
providing the means for genuine self- 
determination and protection for diversi- 
ty. Democracy already flourishes in 
countries with very different cultures 
and historical experiences. It would be 
cultural condescension, or worse, to say 
that any people prefer dictatorship to 



Iluly1982 



27 



democracy. Who would voluntarily 
choose not to have the right to vote, 
decide to purchase government propa- 
ganda handouts instead of independent 
newspapers, prefer government to 
worker-controlled unions, opt for land to 
be owned by the state instead of those 
who till it, want government repression 
of religious liberty, a single political par- 
ty instead of a free choice, a rigid 
cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic 
tolerance and diversity? 

Since 1917 the Soviet Union has 
given covert political training and assist- 
ance to Marxist-Leninists in many coun- 
tries. Of course, it also has promoted the 
use of violence and subversion by these 
same forces. Over the past several 
decades. West European and other 
social democrats, christian democrats 
and liberals have offered open assistance 
to fraternal political and social institu- 
tions to bring about peaceful and 
democratic progress. Appropriately, for 
a vigorous new democracy, the Federal 
Republic of Germany's political founda- 
tions have become a major force in this 
effort. 

U.S. Proposals 

We in America now intend to take addi- 
tional steps, as many of our allies have 
already done, toward realizing this same 
goal. The chairmen and other leaders of 
the national Republican and Democratic 
party organizations are initiating a study 
with the bipartisan American Political 
Foundation to determine how the United 
States can best contribute— as a na- 
tion—to the global campaign for democ- 
racy now gathering force. They will 
have the cooperation of congressional 
leaders of both parties along with repre- 
sentatives of business, labor, and other 
major institutions in our society. 

I look forward to receiving their 
recommendations and to working with 
these institutions and the Congress in 
the common task of strengthening 
democracy throughout the world. It is 
time that we committed ourselves as a 
nation— in both the public and private 
sectors— to assisting democratic devel- 
opment. 

We plan to consult with leaders of 



28 



other nations as well. There is a pro- 
posal before the Council of Europe to in- 
vite parliamentarians from democratic 
countries to a meeting next year in 
Strasbourg. That prestigious gathering 
would consider ways to help democratic 
political movements. 

This November in Washington there 
will take place an international meeting 
on free elections and next spring there 
will be a conference of world authorities 
on constitutionalism and self-govern- 
ment hosted by the Chief Justice of the 
United States. Authorities from a 
number of developing and developed 
countries— judges, philosophers, and 
politicians with practical experience- 
have agreed to explore how to turn prin- 
ciple into practice and further the rule 
of law. 

At the same time, we invite the 
Soviet Union to consider with us how 
the competition of ideas and values— 
which it is committed to support— can be 
conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal 
basis. For example, I am prepared to 
offer President Brezhnev an opportunity 
to speak to the American people on our 
television, if he will allow me the same 
opportunity with the Soviet people. We 
also suggest that panels of our newsmen 
periodically appear on each other's tele- 
vision to discuss major events. 

I do not wish to sound overly opti- 
mistic, yet the Soviet Union is not im- 
mune from the reality of what is going 
on in the world. It has happened in the 
past: a small ruling elite either mis- 
takenly attempts to ease domestic 
unrest through greater repression and 
foreign adventure or it chooses a wiser 
course— it begins to allow its people a 
voice in their own destiny. 

Even if this latter process is not 
realized soon, I believe the renewed 
strength of the democratic movement, 
complemented by a global campaign for 
freedom, will strengthen the prospects 
for arms control and a world at peace. 

1 have discussed on other occasions, 
including my address on May 9th, the 
elements of Western policies toward the 
Soviet Union to safeguard our interests 
and protect the peace. What I am de- 
scribing now is a plan and a hope for the 
long term— the march of freedom and 
democracy which will leave Marxism- 
Leninism on the ash heap of history as it 



has left other tyrannies which stifle the 
freedom and muzzle the self-expression 
of the people. 

That is why we must continue our 
efforts to strengthen NATO even as we 
move forward with our zero option in- 
itiative in the negotiations on inter- 
mediate-range forces and our proposal 
for a one-third reduction in strategic 
ballistic missile warheads. 

Dedication to Western Ideals 

Our military strength is a prerequisite ti 
peace, but let it be clear we maintain 
this strength in the hope it will never hi 
used. For the ultimate determinant in 
the struggle now going on for the world 
will not be bombs and rockets, but a tes 
of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual 
resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs 
we cherish, the ideals to which we are 
dedicated. 

The British people know that, given 
strong leadership, time, and a little bit 
of hope, the forces of good ultimately 
rally and triumph over evil. Here amonji 
you is the cradle of self-government, thi 
mother of parliaments. Here is the en- 
during greatness of the British contribu 
tion to mankind, the great civilized 
ideas: individual liberty, representative 
government, and the rule of law under 
God. 

1 have often wondered about the 
shyness of some of us in the West abou 
standing for these ideals that have done 
so much to ease the plight of man and 
the hardships of our imperfect world. 
This reluctance to use those vast re- 
sources at our command reminds me of 
the elderly lady whose home was 
bombed in the blitz. As the rescuers 
moved about they found a bottle of 
brandy she'd stored behind the staircast 
which was all that was left standing. 
Since she was barely conscious, one of 
the workers pulled the cork to give her 
taste of it. She came around immediate 
ly and said: "Here now, put it back, 
that's for emergencies." 

Well, the emergency is upon us. Le' 
us be shy no longer— let us go to our 
strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell 
the world that a new age is not only 
possible but probable. 

During the dark days of the Second 



Department of State Bulletii 




FEATURE 

Visit 
yy/ to 
Europe 



World War when this island was incan- 
descent with courage, Winston Churchill 
exclaimed about Britain's adversaries: 
"What kind of a people do they think we 
are?" Britain's adversaries found out 
what extraordinary people the British 
are. But all the democracies paid a terri- 
ble price for allowing the dictators to 
underestimate us. We dare not make 
that mistake again. So let us ask our- 
selves: What kind of people do we think 
we are? And let us answer: free people, 
worthy of freedom, and determined not 
only to remain so but to help others gain 
their freedom as well. 

Sir Winston led his people to great 
victory in war and then lost an election 
just as the fruits of victory were about 
to be enjoyed. But he left office honor- 
ably—and, as it turned out, temporari- 
ly—knowing that the liberty of his peo- 
ple was more important than the fate of 
any single leader. History recalls his 
greatness in ways no dictator will ever 
know. And he left us a message of hope 
for the future, as timely now as when he 
first uttered it, as opposition leader in 
the Commons nearly 27 years ago. He 
said: "When we look back on all the 
perils through which we have passed 
and at the mighty foes we have laid low 
and all the dark and deadly designs we 
[lave frustrated, why should we fear for 
3ur future? We have," he said, "come 
safely through the worst." 

'The task I have set forth will long 
DUtlive our own generation. But to- 
gether, we, too, have come through the 
vvorst. Let us now begin a major effort 
:o secure the best— a crusade for free- 
dom that will engage the faith and forti- 
:ude of the next generation. For the 
sake of peace and justice, let us move 
;oward a world in which all people are 
It last free to determine their own 
lestiny. ■ 



Dinner Toasts 

London 
June 8, 1982" 



Her Majesty the Queen. I am so glad to 
welcome you and Mrs. Reagan to Brit- 
ain. Prince Philip and I are especially 
delighted that you have come to be our 
guests at Windsor Castle, since this has 
been the home of the Kings and Queens 
of our country for over 900 years. 

I greatly enjoyed our ride together 
this morning. And I was much im- 
pressed by the way in which you coped 
so professionally with a strange horse 
and a saddle that must have seemed 
even stranger. [Laughter] 

We hope these will be enjoyable days 
for you in Britain, as enjoyable as our 
stays have always been in the United 
States. We shall never forget the 
warmth and hospitality of your people in 
1976 as we walked through the crowds 
in Philadelphia, Washington, New York, 
and Boston to take part in the celebra- 
tions of the Bicentennial of American in- 
dependence. Two hundred years before 
that visit one of my ancestors had 
played a seemingly disastrous role in 
your affairs. [Laughter] Yet, had King 
George HI been able to foresee the long- 
term consequences of his actions, he 
might not have felt so grieved about the 
loss of his colonies. Out of the war of in- 
dependence grew a great nation, the 
United States of America. And later, 
there was forged a lasting friendship 
between the new nation and the country 
to whom she owed so much of her 
origins. But that friendship must never 
be taken for granted. And your visit 
gives me the opportunity to reaffirm 
and to restate it. 

Our close relationship is not just 
based on history, kinship, and language, 
strong and binding though these are. It 
is based on same values and same 



beliefs, evolved over many years in these 
islands since the Magna Carta and vivid- 
ly stated by the Founding Fathers of the 
United States. 

This has meant that over the whole 
range of human activity, the people of 
the United States and the people of Brit- 
ain are drawing on each other's ex- 
perience and enriching each other's lives. 
Of course, we do not always think and 
act alike, but through the years our com- 
mon heritage, based on the principles of 
common law, has prevailed over our 
diversity. And our toleration has 
moderated our arguments and misunder- 
standings. Above all, our commitment to 
a common cause has led us to fight 
together in two world wars and to con- 
tinue to stand together today in the 
defense of freedom. 

These past weeks have been testing 
ones for this country when, once again, 
we have had to stand up for the cause of 
freedom. The conflict in the Falkland 
Islands was thrust on us by naked ag- 
gression, and we are naturally proud of 
the way our fighting men are serving 
their country. But throughout the crisis, 
we have drawn comfort from the 
understanding of our position shown by 
the American people. We have admired 
the honesty, patience, and skill with 
which you have performed your dual 
role as ally and intermediary. 

In return, we can offer an under- 
standing of how hard it is to bear the 
daunting responsibilities of world power. 
The fact that your people have 
shouldered that burden for so long 
now — never losing the respect and affec- 
tion of your friends — is proof of a brave 
and generous spirit. 

Our respect extends beyond the 
bounds of statesmanship and diplomacy. 
We greatly admire the drive and enter- 
prise of your commercial life. And we, 
therefore, welcome the confidence which 
your business community displays in us 
by your massive investment in this coun- 
try's future. We also like to think we 
might have made some contribution to 
the extraordinary success story of 
American business. 

In darker days, Winston Churchill 
surveyed the way in which the affairs of 



Iulyig82 



29 



the British Empire, as it then was, and 
the United States would become, in his 
words, "somewhat mixed up." He 
welcomed the prospect. "I could not stop 
it if I wished," he said. "No one can stop 
it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps roll- 
ing along. Let it roll." How right he was. 
There can be few nations whose 
destinies have been so inextricably inter- 
woven as yours and mine. Your 
presence at Versailles has highlighted 
the increasing importance, both to Brit- 
ain and to America, of cooperation 
among the industrial democracies. Your 
visit tomorrow to Bonn underlines the 
importance to both our countries of the 
continued readiness of the people of the 
Western Alliance to defend the ways of 



life which we all share and cherish. Your 
stay in my country reflects not only the 
great traditions that hold Britain and 
the United States together, but above 
all, the personal affection the British 
and the Americans have for one 
another. This is the bedrock on which 
our relationship stands. 

I raise my glass to you and to Mrs. 
Reagan, to Anglo-American friendship, 
and to the prosperity and happiness of 
the people of the United States. 

President Reagan. Nancy and I are 
honored to be your guests at this 
beautiful and historic castle. It was from 
here that Richard the Lion Hearted rode 
out to the Crusades, and from here that 



his brother. King John, left to sign the 
Magna Carta. It is a rare privilege to be 
even a momentary part of the rich 
history of Windsor Castle. 

As we rode over these magnificent 
grounds this morning, I thought again 
about how our people share, as you have 
mentioned, a common past. We are 
bound by much more than just language. 
Many of our values, beliefs, and prin- 
ciples of government were nurtured on 
this soU. I also thought of how our 
future security and prosperity depend on 
the continued unity of Britain and 
America. 

This place symbolizes both tradition 
and renewal, as generation after genera- 
tion of your family makes it their home. 




30 



Department of State Bulletin *i 




FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



^e in America share your excitement 
ibout the impending birth of a child to 
he Prince and Princess of Wales. We 
')ray that God will continue to bless your 
amily with health, happiness, and 
visdom. 

It has been said that the greatest 
flory of a free-born people is to transmit 
hat freedom to their children. That is a 
esponsibility our people share. 
Together, and eager for peace, we must 
ace an unstable world where violence 
.nd terrorism, aggression, and tyranny 
onstantly encroach on human rights, 
'ogether committed to the preservation 
f freedom and our way of life, we must 
trengthen a weakening international 
rder and restore the world's faith in 
eace and the rule of law. 

We, in the free world, share an 
biding faith in our people and in the 
jture of mankind. The challenge of 
-eedom is to reject an unacceptable 
resent for what we can cause the 
iture to be. Together it is within our 
ower to confront the threats to peace 
Itid freedom and to triumph over them. 

Nancy and I and all of our party are 
ery grateful for your invitation to visit 
reat Britain and for your gracious 
ospitality. Our visit has been enormous- 
' productive and has strengthened the 
^es that bind our peoples. I would like 
) propose that we raise our glasses to 
er Majesty the Queen of the United 
ingdom, to the continued unity of our 
, vo nations, the preservation of our 
eedom for generations to come. I pro- 
Dse a toast to Her Majesty the Queen. 



"The President enjoys an early morning ride 
vith Her Majesty the Queen at Home Park. 

White House photo by Michael Evans) 



July 1982 



President Reagan's 

and 

Prime Minister 

Thatcher's Remarks 

London 
June 9, 1982" 

Prime Minister Thatcher. May we 

report to you on the talks we've had and 
the way we think that this whole visit 
has gone. Of course, there is always a 
very great welcome in Britain for a visit 
by our great ally and friend, the United 
States. 

This visit has been something more 
than an ordinary welcome. It's been an 
extraordinarily warm welcome which I 
think we must attribute to the way in 
which President Reagan has appealed to 
the hearts and minds of our people. The 
reception he's had, not only from 
Parliament — which was a triumph— but 
also from the people of this country who 
listened to his speech before Parliament, 
that reception has been one of great af- 
fection and one which recognizes that 
here is a leader who can put to the un- 
committed nations of the world the fact 
that we in Britain and the United States 
have a cause in freedom and justice that 
is worth striving for and worth pro- 
claiming. We do, indeed, thank him for 
that and congratulate him most warmly 
on everything — all the speeches and 
everything he's done — since he has been 
with us for his very brief visit. It is a 
triumph for him as well as a great joy to 
have our ally and friend with us. 

We have, of course, discussed mat- 
ters of defense in the context of East- 
West relations. Once again we take a 
similar view. We cannot depend upon 
the righteousness of our cause for 
security; we can only depend upon our 
sure defense. But we recognize, at the 
same time, that it is important to try to 
get disarmament talks started so that 
the balance of forces and the deterrents 



can be conducted at a lower level of ar- 
mament. In this, again, the President 
has seized the initiative and given a 
lead, and we wish those talks very well 
when they start. We will all be behind 
him in what he is doing. 

This morning we have also discussed 
the question of what is happening in the 
Middle East. We have discussed it in a 
very wide context. As you'd expect, we 
are wholly agreed on the U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 508 that there must 
be cessation of hostilities coupled with 
withdrawal, and the United Kingdom is 
wholly behind Mr. Habib in the efforts 
he is making to bring that about. We 
have discussed it also in the very much 
wider context of the whole difficult 
problems of the Middle East which 
we've been striving to solve for so many 
years now. 

Finally, I would like once again to 
record our thanks to our American 
friends, to the President, and to 
Secretary Haig for the staunch support 
they've given us and continued to give 
us over the Falkland Islands and their 
realization that we must make it seem to 
the world over that aggression cannot 
pay. They have been most helpful, most 
staunch, and not only we but the whole 
of the British people thank them for it. 
Altogether, if I may sum up, this has 
been a tremendously successful visit, 
and one which we shall long remember 
both in our minds and in our hearts. 
[Applause] 

President Reagan. I have no words to 
thank Prime Minister Thatcher for those 
very kind words that she said with 
regard to us. Nancy and I will be leaving 
here with warm hearts and great 
gratitude for the hospitality that has 
been extended to us, and the pleasure 
that we've had here in addition to the 
worthwhile meetings and the accom- 
plishments that have already been 
outlined. 

We did discuss a number of the trou- 
ble spots in the world— Lebanon— and 
found ourselves in agreement with 
regard to the U.N. Resolution 508, the 
hope for a ceasefire, and withdrawal of 
all the hostile forces there. We had a 
chance, again, to reiterate our support 
of the British position in the Falklands; 



31 



that armed aggression cannot be allowed 
to succeed in today's world. 

We had what we think were worth- 
while meetings at the economic summit 
in Versailles, and now we go onto the 
NATO meeting. Our goals there we are 
also agreed upon: solidarity of the 
members of the alliance; strength, 
dialogue, and the urging of restraint on 
the Soviet Union and responsibility and 
our agreement on going forward with 
realistic arms control that means arms 
reduction, not just — as in the past — 
some efforts to limit the increase in 
those weapons, but to bring about a 
realistic, verifiable decrease and, thus, 
further remove the possibility of war. 

This has been a most important 
meeting for us and a very heartwarming 
experience every minute that we've been 
here. We leave strengthened with the 
knowledge that the great friendship and 
the great alliance that has existed for so 
long between our two peoples — the 
United Kingdom and the LFnited States 
— remains and is, if anything, stronger 
than it has ever been. 



GERMANY 



President Reagan's 
Address 



Bonn 

June 9, 1982'2 



I am very honored to speak to you today 
and thus to all the people of Germany. 
Next year we will jointly celebrate the 
300th anniversary of the first German 
settlement in the American colonies. The 
13 families who came to our new land 
were the forerunners of more than 7 
million German immigrants to the 
United States. Today more Americans 
claim German ancestry than any other. 

These Germans cleared and culti- 
vated our land, built our industries, and 
advanced our arts and sciences. In honor 
of 300 years of German contributions in 
America, President Carstens and I have 



32 



agreed today that he will pay an official 
visit to the United States in October of 
1983 to celebrate the occasion. 

The German people have given us so 
much; we like to think that we've repaid 
some of that debt. Our American Revo- 
lution was the first revolution in modern 
history to be fought for the right of self- 
government and the guarantee of civil 
liberties. That spirit was contagious. In 
1849 the Frankfurt Parliament's state- 
ment of basic human rights guaranteed 
freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion, and equality before the law. 
These principles live today in the basic 
law of the Federal Republic. Many 
peoples to the east still wait for such 
rights. 

The United States is proud of your 
democracy, but we cannot take credit 
for it. Heinrich Heine, in speaking of 
those who built the awe-inspiring cathe- 
drals of medieval times, said that "in 
those days people had convictions. We 
moderns have only opinions and it re- 
quires something more than opinions to 
build a Gothic cathedral." Over the past 
30 years, the convictions of the German 
people have built a cathedral of democ- 
racy—a great and glorious testament to 
your ideals. 

We in America genuinely admire the 
free society you have built in only a few 
decades. And we understand all the bet- 
ter what you have accomplished because 
of our own history. Americans speak 
with the deepest reverence of those 
founding fathers and first citizens who 
gave us the freedoms we enjoy today. 
And even though they lived over 200 
years ago, we carry them in our hearts 
as well as our history books. 

I believe future generations of Ger- 
mans will look to you here today and to 
your fellow Germans with the same pro- 
found respect and appreciation. You 
have built a free society with an abiding 
faith in human dignity— the crowning 
ideal of Western civilization. This will 
not be forgotten.. You will be saluted 
and honored by this republic's descend- 
ants over the centuries to come. 

Yesterday, before the British Parlia- 
ment, I spoke of the values of Western 
civilization and the necessity to help all 
peoples gain the institutions of freedom. 



In many ways, in many places, our 
ideals are being tested today. We are 
meeting this afternoon between two im- 
portant summits, the gathering of lead- 
ing industrial democracies at Versailles 
and the assembling of the Atlantic 
alliance here in Bonn tomorrow. Critical 
and complex problems face us. But our 
dilemmas will be made easier if we re- 
member our partnership is based on a 
common Western heritage and a faith in 
democracy. 

The Search for Peace 

I believe this partnership of the Atlantic 
alliance nations is motivated primarily 
by the search for peace. Inner peace for 
our citizens and peace among nations. 
Why inner peace? Because democracy 
allows for self-expression. It respects 
man's dignity and creativity. It operates 
by rule of law, not by terror or coercion. 
It is government with the consent of the 
governed. As a result, citizens of the 
Atlantic alliance enjoy an unprecedented 
level of material and spiritual well-being. 
And they are free to find their own per- 
sonal peace. 

We also seek peace among nations. 
The psalmist said: "Seek peace and pur- 
sue it." Our foreign policies are based on 
this principle and directed toward this 
end. The noblest objective of our diplo- 
macy is the patient and difficult task of 
reconciling our adversaries to peace. 
And I know we all look forward to the 
day when the only industry of war will 
be the research of historians. 

But the simple hope for peace is not 
enough. We must remember something 
Friedrich Schiller said, "The most pious 
man can't stay in peace if it doesn't 
please his evil neighbor." So there must 
be a method to our search, a method 
that recognizes the dangers and realities 
of the world. During Chancellor 
Schmidt's state visit to Washington last 
year, I said that your republic was 
"perched on a cliff of freedom." I wasn't 
saying anything the German people do 
not already know. Living as you do in 
the heart of a divided Europe, you can 
see more clearly than others that there 
are governments at peace neither with 
their own peoples nor the world. 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



I don't believe any reasonable ob- 
server can deny there is a threat to both 
peace and freedom today. It is as stark 
as a gash of a border that separates the 
German people. We are menaced by a 
power that openly condemns our values 
and answers our restraint with a relent- 
less military buildup. 

We cannot simply assume every na- 
tion wants the peace we so earnestly 
desire. The Polish people would tell us 
there are those who would use military 
force to repress others who want only 
basic human rights. The freedom 
fighters of Afghanistan would tell us as 
well that the threat of aggression has 
not receded from the world. 

iStrengthening Alliance Security 

Without a strengthened Atlantic securi- 
ty, the possibility of military coercion 
will be very great. We must continue to 
improve our defenses if we are to pre- 
serve peace and freedom. This is not an 
impossible task; for almost 40 years, we 
have succeeded in deterring war. Our 
method has been to organize our defen- 
sive capabilities, both nuclear and con- 
ventional, so that an aggressor could 
have no hope of military victory. The 
alliance has carried its strength not as a 
battle flag but as a banner of peace. De- 
terrence has kept that peace, and we 
must continue to take the steps neces- 
sary to make deterrence credible. 

This depends in part on a strong 
America. A national effort, entailing 
sacrifices by the American people, is 
now underway to make long-overdue im- 
provements in our military posture. The 
American people support this eff'ort be- 
cause they understand how fundamental 
it is to keeping the peace they so 
fervently desire. 

We also are resolved to maintain the 
presence of well-equipped and trained 
forces in Europe, and our strategic 
forces will be modernized and remain 
committed to the alliance. By these ac- 
tions, the people of the United States 
are saying, "We are with you Germany. 
You are not alone." Our adversaries 
would be foolishly mistaken should they 
gamble that Americans would abandon 
their alliance responsibilities, no matter 
how severe the test. 



Alliance security depends on a fully 
credible conventional defense to which 
all allies contribute. There is a danger 
that any conflict would escalate to a 
nuclear war. Strong conventional forces 
can make the danger of conventional or 
nuclear conflict more remote. Reason- 
able strength in and of itself is not bad; 
it is honorable when used to maintain 
peace or defend deeply held beliefs. 

One of the first chores is to fulfill 
our commitments to each other by con- 
tinuing to strengthen our conventional 
defenses. This must include improving 
the readiness of our standing forces and 



member of the alliance, and this funda- 
mental commitment is embodied in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. But it will be an 
empty pledge unless we insure that 
American forces are ready to reinforce 
Europe and Europe is ready to receive 
them. I am encouraged by the recent 
agreement on wartime host-nation sup- 
port. This pact strengthens our ability to 
deter aggression in Europe and demon- 
strates our common determination to re- 
spond to attack. 

Just as each ally shares fully in the 
security of the alliance, each is responsi- 
ble for shouldering a fair share of the 



The soil of Germany, and every other ally, is of 
vital concern to each member of the alliance, and 
this fundamental commitment is embodied in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. 



the ability of those forces to operate as 
one. We must also apply the West's 
technological genius to improving our 
conventional deterrence. 

There can be no doubt that we as an 
alliance have the means to improve our 
conventional defenses. Our peoples hold 
values of individual liberty and dignity 
that time and again they have proven 
willing to defend. Our economic energy 
vastly exceeds that of our adversaries. 
Our free system has produced techno- 
logical advantages that other systems, 
with their stifling ideologies, cannot 
hope to equal. All of these resources are 
available to our defense. 

Yes, many of our nations currently 
are experiencing economic difficulties. 
Yet we must, nevertheless, guarantee 
that our security does not suffer as a 
result. We've made strides in conven- 
tional defense over the last few years 
despite our economic problems, and we 
have disproved the pessimists who con- 
tend that our eff'orts are futile. The 
more we close the conventional gap, the 
less the risks of aggression or nuclear 
conflict. 

The soil of Germany, and every 
other ally, is of vital concern to each 



burden. Now that, of course, often leads 
to a difference of opinion, and criticism 
of our alliance is as old as the partner- 
ship itself. 

But voices have been raised on both 
sides of the Atlantic that mistake the in- 
evitable process of adjustment within 
the alliance for a dramatic divergence of 
interests. Some Americans think that 
Europeans are too little concerned for 
their own security; some would uni- 
laterally reduce the number of American 
troops deployed in Europe. And in 
Europe itself, we hear the idea that the 
American presence, rather than contri- 
buting to peace, either has no deterrent 
value or actually increases the risk that 
our allies may be attacked. 

These arguments ignore both the 
history and the reality of the trans- 
Atlantic coalition. Let me assure you 
that the American commitment to 
Europe remains steady and strong. 
Europe's shores are our shores. 
Europe's borders are our borders. And 
we will stand with you in defense of our 
heritage of liberty and dignity. The 
American people recognize Europe's 



July 1982 



33 



substantial contributions to our joint 
security. Nowhere is that contribution 
more evident than here in the Federal 
Republic. German citizens host the 
forces of six nations. German soldiers 
and reservists provide the backbone of 
NATO's conventional deterrent in the 
heartland of Europe. Your Bundeswehr 
is a model for the integration of defense 
needs with a democratic way of life. And 
you have not shrunk from the heavy re- 
sponsibility of accepting the nuclear 
forces necessan,' for deterrence. 

I ask your help in fulfilling another 
responsibility. Many American citizens 
don't believe that their counterparts in 
Europe— especially younger citizens— 
really understand the U.S. presence 
there. If you will work toward explain- 
ing the U.S. role to people on this side 
of the Atlantic, I will explain it to those 
on the other side. 

The Threat of Nuclear War 

In recent months, both in your country 
and mine, there has been renewed public 
concern about the threat of nuclear war 
and the arms buildup. I know it is not 
easy, especially for the German people, 
to live in the gale of intimidation that 
blows from the East. If I might quote 
Heine again, he almost foretold the 
fears of nuclear war when he wrote: 
"Wild, dark times are rumbling toward 
us, and the prophet who wishes to write 
a new apocalypse will have to invent en- 
tirely new beasts, and beasts so terrible 
that the ancient animal symbols . . . will 
seem like cooing doves and cupids in 
comparison." 

"The nuclear threat is a terrible" 
beast. Perhaps the banner carried in one 
of the nuclear demonstrations here in 
Germany said it best. The sign read, "I 
am afraid." I know of no Western leader 
who doesn't sympathize with that 
earnest plea. To those who march for 
peace, my heart is with you. I would be 
at the head of your parade if I believed 
marching alone could bring about a 
more secure world. And to the 2,800 
women in Filderstadt who sent a peti- 
tion for peace to President Brezhnev 



and myself, let me say I, myself, would 
sign your petition if I thought it could 
bring about harmony. I understand your 
genuine concerns. 

The women of Filderstadt and I 
share the same goal. The question is 
how to proceed. We must think through 
the consequences of how we reduce the 
dangers to peace. Those who advocate 
that we unilaterally forego the moder- 
nization of our forces must prove that 
this will enhance our security and lead 
to moderation by the other side— in 
short, that it will advance, rather than 
undermine, the preservation of the 
peace. The weight of recent history does 
not support this notion. 

Those who demand that we re- 
nounce the use of a crucial element of 
our deterrent strategy must show how 
this would decrease the likelihood of 
war. It is only by comparison with a 
nuclear war that the suffering caused by 
conventional war seems a lesser evil. 
Our goal must be to deter war of any 
kind. 

And to those who decry the failure 
of arms control efforts to achieve sub- 
stantial results must consider where the 
fault lies. I would remind them it is the 
United States that has proposed to ban 
land-based intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles— the missiles most threatening 
Europe. It is the United States that has 
proposed and will pursue deep cuts in 
strategic systems. It is the West that 
has long sought the detailed exchanges 
of information on forces and effective 
verification procedures. And it is dicta- 
torships, not democracies, that need 
militarism to control their own people 
and impose their system on others. 

Western Commitment to Arms Control 

We in the West— Germans, Americans, 
our other allies— are deeply committed 
to continuing efforts to restrict the arms 
competition. Common sense demands 
that we persevere. I invite those who 
genuinely seek effective and lasting arms 
control to stand behind the far-reaching 
proposals that we have put forward. In 
return I pledge that we will sustain the 
closest of consultations with our allies. 
On November 18th, I outlined a 



broad and ambitious arms control pro- 
gram. One element calls for reducing 
land-based intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles to zero on each side. If carried 
out, it would eliminate the growing 
threat to Western Europe posed by the 
U.S.S.R.'s modern SS-20 rockets, and it 
would make unnecessary the NATO 
decision to deploy American inter- 
mediate-range systems. And, by the 
way, I cannot understand why, among 
some, there is a greater fear of weapons 
which NATO is to deploy than of 
weapons the Soviet Union already has 
deployed. Our proposal is fair because it 
imposes equal limits and obligations on 
both sides and it calls for significant 
reductions, not merely a capping of an 
existing high level of destructive power. 
As you know, we have made this pro- 
posal in Geneva, where negotiations 
have been underway since the end of 
November last year. We intend to pur- 
sue those negotiations intensively. I 
regard them as a significant test of the 
Soviets' willingness to enter into mean- 
ingful arms control agreements. 

On May 9th, we proposed to the 
Soviet Union that Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks begin this month in 
Geneva. The U.S.S.R. has agreed, and 
talks will begin on June 29th. We in the 
United States want to focus on the most 
destabilizing systems, and thus reduce 
the risk of war. That is why in the first 
phase we propose to reduce substantial!; - 
the number of ballistic missile warheads 
and the missiles themselves. In the sec- 
ond phase we will seek an equal ceiling 
on other elements of our strategic 
forces, including ballistic missile throw- 
weight, at less than current American 
levels. We will handle cruise missiles ano 
bombers in an equitable fashion. We will 
negotiate in good faith and undertake 
these talks with the same seriousness of 
purpose that has marked our prepara- 
tions over the last several months. 

Another element of the program I 
outlined was a call for reductions in con- 
ventional forces in Europe. From the 
earliest postwar years, the Western 
democracies have faced the ominous 
reality that massive Soviet conventional 
forces would remain stationed where 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



they do not belong. The muscle of Soviet 
forces in Central Europe far exceeds 
legitimate defense needs. Their presence 
is made more threatening still by a mili- 
tary doctrine that emphasizes mobility 
and surprise attack. And as history 
shows, these troops have built a legacy 
of intimidation and repression. 

In response, the NATO allies must 
show they have the will and capacity to 
deter any conventional attack or any at- 
tempt to intimidate us. Yet we also will 
continue the search for responsible ways 
ito reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact mili- 
Itary personnel to equal levels. 

In recent weeks, we in the alliance 
have consulted on how best to invigorate 
the Vienna negotiations on mutual and 
balanced force reductions. Based on 
these consultations. Western representa- 
tives in the Vienna talks soon will make 
a proposal by which the two alliances 
would reduce their respective ground 
force personnel in verifiable stages to a 
total of 700,000 men and their combined 
ground and air force personnel to a level 
Df 900,000 men. 

While the agreement would not 
eliminate the threat nor spare our 
citizens the task of maintaining a 
substantial defensive force, it could con- 
stitute a major step toward a safer 
Europe for both East and West. It could 
lead to military stability at lower levels 
and lessen the dangers of miscalculation 
and of surprise attack. And it also would 
demonstrate the political will of the two 
alliances to enhance stability by limiting 
their forces in the central area of their 
military competition. 

The West has established a clear set 
of goals. We, as an alliance, will press 
forward with plans to improve our own 
conventional forces in Europe. At the 
same time, we propose an arms control 
agreement to equalize conventional 
forces at a significantly lower level. 

We will move ahead with our 
preparations to modernize our nuclear 
forces in Europe. But, again, we also 
will work unceasingly to gain acceptance 




in Geneva of our proposal to ban land- 
based intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles. 

In the United States, we will move 
forward with the plans I announced last 
year to modernize our strategic nuclear 
forces, which play so vital a role in 
maintaining peace by deterring war. Yet 
we also have proposed that Strategic 
Arms Reduction Talks begin, and we 
will pursue them determinedly. 

The Need for Unity 

In each of these areas our policies are 
based on the conviction that a stable 
military balance at the lowest possible 
level will help further the cause of 
peace. The other side will respond in 
good faith to these initiatives only if it 
believes we are resolved to provide for 
our own defense. Unless convinced that 
we will unite and stay united behind 
these arms control initiatives and mod- 
ernization programs, our adversaries 
will seek to divide us from one another 
and our peoples from their leaders. 

I am optimistic about our relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union if the 
Western nations remain ti-ue to their 
values and true to each other. I believe 
in Western civilization and in its moral 
power. I believe deeply in the principles 
the West esteems. And guided by these 
ideals, I believe we can find a no- 
nonsense, workable, and lasting policy 
that will keep the peace. 

Earlier I said that the German peo- 
ple had built a remarkable cathedral of 
democracy. But we still have other work 
ahead. We must build a cathedral of 
peace, where nations are safe from war 
and where people need not fear for their 
liberties. I've heard the history of the 
famous cathedral at Cologne— how those 
beautiful soaring spires miraculously 
survived the destruction all around 
them, including part of the church itself. 

Let us build a cathedral as the peo- 
ple of Cologne built theirs— with the 
deepest commitment and determination. 
Let us build as they did— not just for 
ourselves but for the generations 
beyond. For if we construct our peace 
properly, it will endure as long as the 
spires of Cologne. 



FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



President Reagan's 
Address 



Berlin 

June 11, 198213 



It was one of Germany's greatest sons, 
Goethe, who said that "There is strong 
shadow where there is much light." In 
our times, Berlin, more than any other 
place in the world, is such a meeting 
place of light and shadow, tyranny and 
freedom. To be here is truly to stand on 
freedom's edge and in the shadow of a 
wall that has come to symbolize all that 
is darkest in the world today, to sense 
how shining and priceless— and how 
much in need of constant vigilance and 
protection our legacy of liberty is. 

This day marks a happy return for 
us. We paid our first visit to this great 
city more than 3 years ago, as private 
citizens. As with every other citizen to 
Berlin or visitor to Berlin, I came away 
with a vivid impression of a city that is 
more than a place on the map— a city 
that is a testament to what is both most 
inspiring and most troubling about the 
time we live in. 

Thomas Mann once wrote that "A 
man lives not only his personal life, as 
an individual, but aiso, consciously or 
unconsciously, the life of his epoch. . . ." 
Nowhere is this more true than in Berlin 
where each moment of everyday life is 
spent against the backdrop of contend- 
ing global systems and ideas. To be a 
Berliner is to live the great historic 
struggle of this age, the latest chapter in 
man's timeless quest for freedom. 

As Americans, we understand this. 
Our commitment to Berlin is a lasting 
one. Thousands of our citizens have 
served here since the first small con- 
tingent of American troops arrived on 
July 4, 1945, the anniversary of our in- 
dependence as a nation. Americans have 
served here ever since— not as con- 
querors but as guardians of the freedom 
of West Berlin and its brave, proud peo- 
ple. 

Today I want to pay tribute to my 
fellow countrymen, military and civilian, 
who serve their country and the people 
of Berlin and, in so doing, stand as sen- 
tinals of freedom everywhere. I also 



July 1982 



35 



wish to pay my personal respects to the 
people of this great city. My visit here 
today is proof that this American com- 
mitment has been worthwhile. Our free- 
dom is indivisible. 

The American commitment to Berlin 
is much deeper than our military pres- 
ence here. In the 37 years since World 
War II, a succession of American presi- 
dents has made it clear that our role in 
Berlin is emblematic of our larger search 
for peace throughout Europe and the 
world. Ten years ago this month, that 
search brought into force the Quadri- 
partite Agreement on Berlin. A decade 
later, West Berliners live more securely, 
can travel more freely, and, most sig- 
nificantly, have more contact with 
friends and relatives in East Berlin and 
East Germany than was possible 10 
years ago. These achievements reflect 
the realistic approach of allied negotia- 
tors who recognized that practical prog- 
ress can be made even while basic differ- 
ences remain between East and West. 

As a result both sides have managed 
to handle their differences in Berlin 
without the clash of arms to the benefit 
of all mankind. The United States re- 
mains committed to the Berlin agree- 
ment. We will continue to expect strict 
observance and full implementation in 
all aspects of this accord, including those 
which apply to the eastern sector of 
Berlin. But if we are heartened by the 
partial progress achieved in Berlin, 
other developments made us aware of 
the growing military power and expan- 
sionism of the Soviet Union. 

Challenge for Peace 

Instead of working with the West to 
reduce tensions and erase the danger of 
war, the Soviet Union is engaged in the 
greatest military buildup in the history 
of the world. It has used its new-found 
might to ruthlessly pursue its goals 
around the world. As the sad case of 
Afghanistan proves, the Soviet Union 
has not always respected the precious 
right of national sovereignty it is com- 
mitted to uphold as a signatory of the 
U.N. Charter. And only 1 day's auto ride 
from here, in the great city of Warsaw, 
a courageous people suffer because they 
dare to strive for the very fundamental 



36 



human rights which the Helsinki Final 
Act proclaimed. 

The citizens of free Berlin appreciate 
better than anyone the importance of 
allied unity in the face of such chal- 
lenges. Ten years after the Berlin agree- 
ment, the hope it engendered for lasting 
peace remains a hope rather than a cer- 
tainty. But the hopes of free people— be 
they German or American— are stubborn 
things. We will not be lulled or bullied 
into fatalism, into resignation. We 
believe that progress for just and lasting 
peace can be made— that substantial 
areas of agreement can be reached with 
potential adversaries— when the forces 
of freedom act with firmness, unity, and 
a sincere willingness to negotiate. 

To succeed at the negotiating table, 
we allies have learned that a healthy 
military balance is a necessity. Yester- 
day, the other NATO heads of govern- 
ment and I agreed that it is essential to 
preserve and strengthen such a military 
balance. And let there be no doubt: The 
United States will continue to honor its 
commitment to Berlin. Our forces will 
remain here as long as necessary to 
preserve the peace and protect the free- 
dom of the people of Berlin. For us the 
American presence in Berlin, as long as 
it is needed, is not a burden. It is a 
sacred trust. 

Ours is a defensive mission. We pose 
no threat to those who live on the other 
side of the wall. But we do extend a 
challenge— a new Berlin initiative to the 
leaders of the Soviet bloc. It is a chal- 
lenge for peace. We challenge the men 
in the Kremlin to join with us in the 
quest for peace, security, and a lowering 
of the tensions and weaponry that could 
lead to future conflict. 

We challenge the Soviet Union, as 
we proposed last year, to eliminate their 
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. If 
President Brezhnev agrees to this, we 
stand ready to forego all of our ground- 
launched cruise missiles and Pershing II 
missiles. 

We challenge the Soviet Union, as 
NATO proposed yesterday, to slash the 
conventional ground forces of the War- 
saw Pact and NATO in Central Europe 
to 700,000 men each and the total 
ground and air forces of the two 
alliances to 900,000 men each. And we 



challenge the Soviet Union to live up to 
its signature its leader placed on the 
Helsinki treaty so that the basic human 
rights of Soviet and East European pei 
pie will be respected. 

A positive response to these sincert 
and reasonable points from the Soviets, 
these calls for conciliation instead of 
confrontation, could open the door for ; 
conference on disarmament in Europe. 
We Americans are optimists, but we ar 
also realists. We're a peaceful people, 
but we're not a weak or gullible people. 
So we look with hope to the Soviet 
Union's response. But we expect positiv 
actions rather than rhetoric as the first 
proof of Soviet good intentions. We ex- 
pect that the response to my Berlin initg 
ative for peace will demonstrate finally 
that the Soviet Union is serious about 
working to reduce tensions in other 
parts of the world as they have been 
able to do here in Berlin. 

Reducing Human Barriers 

Peace, it has been said, is more than th' 
absence of armed conflict. Reducing mill 
tary forces alone will not automatically 
guarantee the long-term prospects for 
peace. Several times in the 1950s and 
1960s the world went to the brink of 
war over Berlin. Those confrontations 
did not come because of military forces 
or operations alone. They arose because 
the Soviet Union refused to allow the 
free flow of peoples and ideas between 
East and West. And they came because 
the Soviet authorities and their minionS' 
repressed millions of citizens in Eastern 
Germany who did not wish to live under 
a Communist dictatorship. 

So I want to concentrate the second 
part of America's new Berlin initiative 
on ways to reduce the human barriers- 
barriers as bleak and brutal as the 
Berlin Wall itself— which divide Europe 
today. If I had only one message to urg' 
on the leaders of the Soviet bloc, it 
would be this: think of your own coming 
generations. Look with me 10 years intc 
the future when we will celebrate the 
20th anniversary of the Berlin agree- 
ment. What then will be the fruits of ou; 
efforts? Do the Soviet leaders want to b> 
remembered for a prison wall, ringed 
with barbed wire and armed guards 
whose weapons are aimed at innocent 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 



Visit 

to 

Europe 



ALLIED 

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civilians— their own civilians? Do they 
want to conduct themselves in a way 
that will earn only the contempt of free 
peoples and the distrust of their own 
citizens? Or do they want to be remem- 
bered for having taken up our offer to 
rri use Berlin as a starting point for true 
efforts to reduce the human and political 
divisions which are the ultimate cause of 
every war. 

We in the West have made our 
choice. America and our allies welcome 
peaceful competition in ideas, in eco- 
nomics, and in all facets of human activi- 
ty. We seek no advantage. We covet no 
territory. And we wish to force no 
ideology or way of life on others. 

The time has come, 10 years after 
the Berlin agreement, to fulfill the prom- 
ise it seemed to offer at its dawn. I call 
oil on President Brezhnev to join me in a 
q sincere effort to translate the dashed 
hopes of the 1970s into the reality of a 
safer and freer Europe in the 1980s. 
I am determined to assure that our 



civilization averts the catastrophe of a 
nuclear war. Stability depends primarily 
on the maintenance of a military balance 
which offers no temptation to an ag- 
gressor. And the arms control proposals 
which I have made are designed to 
enhance deterrence and achieve stability 
at substantially lower and equal force 
levels. At the same time, other measures 
might be negotiated between the United 
States and the Soviet Union to reinforce 
the peace and help reduce the possibility 
of a nuclear conflict. These include 
measures to enhance mutual confidence 
and to improve communication both in 
time of peace and in a crisis. 

Past agreements have created a hot 
line between Moscow and Washington, 
established measures to reduce the 
danger of nuclear accidents, and provid- 
ed for notification of some missile 
launches. We are now studying other 



A visit to the Berlin Wall with the govern- 
ing Mayor of Berlin Richard von Weiz- 
saecker and Chancellor Schmidt. 



concrete and practical steps to help fur- 
ther reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict 
which I intend to explore with the 
Soviet Union. 

It is time we went further to avert 
the risk of war through accidents or mis- 
understanding. We shortly will approach 
the Soviet Union with proposals in such 
areas as notification of strategic exer- 
cises, of missile launches, and expanded 
exchange of strategic forces data. Taken 
together, these steps would represent a 
qualitative improvement in the nuclear 
environment. They would help reduce 
: the chances of misinterpretation in the 
case of exercises and test launches. And 
they would reduce the secrecy and am- 
biguity which surround military activity. 
We are considering additional measures 
as well. 

We will be making these proposals 
in good faith to the Soviet Union. We 
hope that their response to this Berlin 
initiative, so appropriate to a city that is 
acutely conscious of the costs and risks 
of war, will be positive. 

A united, resolute Western alliance 
stands ready to defend itself if 
necessary. But we are also ready to 
work with the Soviet bloc in peaceful 
cooperation if the leaders of the East 
are willing to respond in kind. 

Let them remember the message of 
Schiller that only "He who has done his 
best for his own time has lived for all 
times." Let them join with us in our time 
to achieve a lasting peace and a better 
life for tomorrow's generations on both 
sides of that blighted wall. And let the 
Brandenburg Gate become a symbol not 
of two separate and hostile worlds but 
an open door through which ideas, free 
ideas, and peaceful competition flourish. 

My final message is for the people of 
Berlin. Even before my first visit to 



tiiJuly1982 



37 



your city, I felt a part of you, as all free 
men and women around the world do. 
We lived through the blockade and air- 
lift with you. We witnessed the heroic 
reconstruction of a devastated city and 
we watched the creation of your strong 
democratic institutions. 

When I came here in 1978, I was 
deeply moved and proud of your success. 
What finer proof of what freedom can 
accomplish than the vibrant, prosperous 
island you've created in the midst of a 
hostile sea? Today, my reverence for 
your courage and accomplishment has 
grown even deeper. 

You are a constant inspiration for us 
all — for our hopes and ideals and for the 
human qualities of courage, endurance, 
and faith that are the one secret weapon 
of the West no totalitarian regime can 
ever match. As long as Berlin exists, 
there can be no doubt about the hope for 
democracy. 

Yes, the hated wall still stands. But 
taller and stronger than that bleak bar- 
rier dividing East from West, free from 
oppressed, stands the character of the 
Berliners themselves. You have endured 
in your spendid city on the Spree, and 
my return visit has convinced me, in the 
words of the beloved old song that 
"Berlin bleibt doch Berlin" — Berlin is 
still Berlin. 

We all remember John Kennedy's 
stirring words when he visited Berlin. I 
can only add that we in America and in 
the West are still Berliners, too, and 
always will be. And I am proud to say 
today that it is good to be home again. 



President Reagan's 
Remarks 



Bonn 

June 11. 1982^^ 



President Reagan. Nancy and I are 
grateful for the warmth and the friend- 
ship that v/e have encountered through- 
out our short visits to Bonn and Berlin. 
In BerUn, this morning, I looked across 
that tragic Wall and saw the grim conse- 
quences of freedom denied. But I was 
deeply inspired by the courage and 
dedication to liberty which I saw in so 
many faces on the western side of that 
city. 

The purpose of my trip to Bonn was 
to consult both with leaders of the Ger- 
man Government and our colleagues 
from other nations. Both aspects of the 
visit have been a great success. We 
didn't seek to avoid the problems facing 
the West in the coming years. We met 
them head-on and discovered that, as 
always, what unites us is much deeper 
and more meaningful than any dif- 
ferences which might exist. 

We leave with renewed optimism 
about the future of the Western world. 
We also leave with a very warm feeling 
about the people of Bonn, Berlin, and 
the Federal Republic. 

Diplomacy is important, but friend- 
ship leaves an even more lasting impres- 
sion. Your friendship for us has been an 
especially moving experience. Nancy and 
I are personally very touched by your 
hospitality. We know, however, that this 
greeting was meant not only for us but 
for the entire American people. 

These trips, these meetings, have 
been arduous, they have been long, 
they've been tiring to all of us. But I 
think they've been successful. Here, to- 
day, is an evidence of why they have to 
be successful — because what was at 
issue and what is at stake in all that we 
were trying to accomplish in those 
meetings is visible here in these young 
people. We must deliver to them a world 



of opportunity and peace. [Applause] 
With that as a goal and with that as our 
inspiration, we cannot fail. 

German-American friendship is truly 
one of the lasting foundations of 
Western cooperation and peace and 
freedom in the world. This visit has con- 
vinced me that ours is a friendship that 
cannot be shaken. 

I thank you all from the bottom of 
my heart. Good-bye and until we meet 
again, auf wiedersehen. 



'Texts from press releases issued by the 
White House. The Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 7 and 14, 
1982, contain all material relating to the 
President's participation in the two summits. 

^Made following the President's meeting 
with President Mitterrand, the Press Center, 
Meridien Hotel. Press release 189 of June 11, 
1982. 

^Exchange of toasts made at reception 
and dinner hosted by U.S. Ambassador 
Galbraith. 

*Made following meetings between Presi- 
dent Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister 
Suzuki, and President Reagan and British 
Prime Minister Thatcher, press center, Meri- 
dien Hotel. Press release 191 of June 16, 
1982 

f'Taped May 31, 1982, at the White House 
for French television and released 12:00 p.m. 
Paris time and 6:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight 
Time. 

'Made in the Papal Library, The Vatican. 

'Made in the Room of Mirrors, Quirinale 
Palace. 

"Released in London. 

'Made to members of both Houses of 
Parliament, the Palace of Westminster. 

'"Made at State Dinner hosted by Her 
Majesty the Queen, Windsor Castle. 

"Made at breakfast meeting hosted by 
Prime Minister Thatcher at 10 Downing 
Street. 

'^Made to the Bundestag, The 
Bundeshaus, Bonn. 

"Made to the people of Berllin, Charlot- 
tenburg Palace. 

'*Made upon departure from Germany, 
Cologne/Bonn Airport. ■ 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



An Agenda for Peace 



President Reagan's address to the 
Second U.N. General Assembly's Special 
Session on Disarmament held in New 
York on June 17, 1982.^ 

I speak today as both a citizen of the 
United States and of the world. I come 
with the heartfelt wishes of my people 
for peace, bearing honest proposals, and 
looking for genuine progress. 

Dag Hammarskjold said 24 years 
ago this month, "We meet in a time of 
peace which is no peace." His words are 
as true today as they were then. More 
than 100 disputes have disturbed the 
peace among nations since World War 
II, and today the threat of nuclear 
disaster hangs over the lives of all our 
peoples. The Bible tells us there will be a 
time for peace, but so far this century 
mankind has failed to find it. 

The United Nations is dedicated to 
world peace and its charter clearly pro- 
hibits the international use of force. Yet, 
the tide of belligerence continues to rise. 
The charter's influence has weakened 
even in the 4 years since the first 
Special Session on Disarmament. We 
must not only condemn aggression, we 
must enforce the dictates of our charter 
and resume the struggle for peace. 

The record of history is clear: Citi- 
zens of the United States resort to force 
reluctantly and only when they must. 
Our foreign policy, as President Eisen- 
hower once said, ". . . is not difficult to 
state. We are for peace, first, last, and 
always, for very simple reasons. We 
know that it is only in a peaceful atmo- 
sphere, a peace with justice, one in 
which we can be confident, that America 
can prosper as we have known prosperi- 
ty in the past." 

To those who challenge the truth of 
those words let me point out that at the 
end of World War II, we were the only 
undamaged industrial power in the 
world. Our military supremacy was un- 
questioned. We had harnessed the atom 
and had the ability to unleash its de- 
structive force anywhere in the world. 
In short, we could have achieved world 
domination, but that was contrary to the 
character of our people. 

Instead, we wrote a new chapter in 
the history of mankind. We used our 
power and wealth to rebuild the war- 
ravaged economies of the world, both 
East and West, including those nations 



who had been our enemies. We took the 
initiative in creating such international 
institutions as this United Nations, 
where leaders of goodwill could come to- 
gether to build bridges for peace and 
prosperity. 

America has no territorial ambitions, 
we occupy no countries, and we have 
built no walls to lock our people in. Our 
commitment to self-determination, free- 
dom, and peace is the very soul of 
America. That commitment is as strong 
today as it ever was. 

The United States has fought four 
wars in my lifetime. In each we strug- 
gled to defend freedom and democracy. 
We were never the aggressors. Ameri- 
ca's strength and, yes, her military 
power have been a force for peace, not 
conquest; for democracy, not despotism; 
for freedom, not tyranny. 

Watching, as I have, succeeding 
generations of American youth bleed 
their lives onto far-flung battlefields to 
protect our ideals and secure the rule of 
law, I have known how important it is to 
deter conflict. But since coming to the 
Presidency, the enormity of the respon- 
sibility of this ofl5ce has made my com- 
mitment even deeper. I believe that re- 
sponsibility is shared by all of us here to- 
day. 

On our recent trip to Europe, my 
wife Nancy told me of a bronze statue, 
22 feet high, that she saw on a cliff on 
the coast of France. The beach at the 
base of that cliff is called Saint Laurent, 
but countless American families have it 
written in the flyleaf of their Bibles and 
know it as Omaha Beach. The pastoral 
quiet of that French countryside is in 
marked contrast to the bloody violence 
that took place there on a June day 38 
years ago when the allies stormed the 
Continent. At the end of just 1 day of 
battle, 10,500 Americans were wounded, 
missing, or killed in what became known 
as the Normandy landing. 

The statue atop that cliff is called 
"The Spirit of American Youth Rising 
From the Waves." Its image of sacrifice 
is almost too powerful to describe. The 
pain of war is still vivid in our national 
memory. It sends me to this special ses- 
sion of the United Nations eager to com- 
ply with the plea of Pope Paul VI when 
he spoke in this chamber nearly 17 years 
ago. "If you want to be brothers," His 
Holiness said, "let the arms fall from 
your hands." 



We Americans yearn to let them go. 
But we need more than mere words, 
more than empty promises, before we 
can proceed. We look around the world 
and see rampant conflict and aggression. 
There are many sources of this 
conflict — expansionist ambitions, local 
rivalries, the striving to obtain justice 
and security. We must all work to 
resolve such discords by peaceful means 
and to prevent them from escalation. 

The Soviet Record 

In the nuclear era, the major powers 
bear a special responsibility to ease 
these sources of conflict and to refrain 
from aggression. And that's why we're 
so deeply concerned by Soviet conduct. 
Since World War II, the record of tyran- 
ny has included Soviet violation of the 
Yalta agreements leading to domination 
of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the 
Berlin Wall — a grim, gray monument to 
repression that I visited just a week ago. 
It includes the takeovers of Czechoslo- 
vakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan and 
the ruthless repression of the proud peo- 
ple of Poland. Soviet-sponsored guer- 
rillas and terrorists are at work in Cen- 
tral and South America, in Africa, the 
Middle East, in the Caribbean, and in 
Europe, violating human rights and un- 
nerving the world with violence. Com- 
munist atrocities in Southeast Asia, 
Afghanistan, and elsewhere continue to 
shock the free world as refugees escape 
to tell of their horror. 

The decade of so-called detente wit- 
nessed the most massive Soviet buildup 
of military power in history. They in- 
creased their defense spending by 40% 
while American defense spending actual- 
ly declined in the same real terms. 
Soviet aggression and support for 
violence around the world have eroded 
the confidence needed for arms negotia- 
tions. While we exercised unilateral re- 
straint, they forged ahead and, today, 
possess nuclear and conventional forces 
far in excess of an adequate deterrent 
capability. 

Soviet oppression is not limited to 
the countries they invade. At the very 
time the Soviet Union is trying to ma- 
nipulate the peace movement in the 
West, it is stifling a budding peace 
movement at home. In Moscow, banners 
are scuttled, buttons are snatched, and 
demonstrators are arrested when even a 
few people dare to speak about their 
fears. 

Eleanor Roosevelt, one of our first 
ambassadors to this body, reminded us 
that the high-sounding words of tyrants 



July 1982 



THE PRESIDENT 



stand in bleak contradiction to their 
deeds. "Their promises," she said, "are in 
deep contrast to their performances." 

U.S. Leadership in Disarmament 
and Arms Control Proposals 

My countrymen learned a bitter lesson 
in this century: The scourge of tyranny 
cannot be stopped with words alone. So, 
we have embarked on an effort to renew 
our strength that had fallen dangerously 
low. We refuse to become weaker while 
potential adversaries remain committed 
to their imperialist adventures. 

My people have sent me here today 
to speak for them as citizens of the 
world, which they truly are, for we 
Americans are drawn from every na- 
tionality represented in this chamber to- 
day. We understand that men and 
women of every race and creed can and 
must work together for peace. We stand 
ready to take the next steps down the 
road of cooperation through verifiable 
arms reduction. Agreements on arms 
control and disarmament can be useful 
in reinforcing peace, but they're not 
magic. We should not confuse the sign- 
ing of agreements with the solving of 
problems. Simply collecting agreements 



• In 1955, President Eisenhower 
made his "open skies" proposal, under 
which the United States and the Soviet 
Union would have exchanged blueprints 
of military establishments and provided 
for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets 
rejected this plan. 

• In 1963, the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty came into force. This treaty end- 
ed nuclear weapons testing in the atmos- 
phere, outer space, or underwater by 
participating nations. 

• In 1970, the Treaty on the Non- 
Froliferation of Nuclear Weapons took 
effect. The United States played a major 
role in this key effort to prevent the 
spread of nuclear explosives and to pro- 
vide for international safeguards on civil 
nuclear activities. My country remains 
deeply committed to those objectives to- 
day and to strengthening the nonpro- 
liferation framework. This is essential to 
international security. 

• In the early 1970s, again at U.S. 
urging, agreements were reached be- 
tween the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. providing for ceilings on some 
categories of weapons. They could have 
been more meaningful if Soviet actions 
had shown restraint and commitment to 
stability at lower levels of force. 



We understand that men and women of every 
race and creed can and must work together for 
peace. We stand ready to take the next steps down 
the road of cooperation through verifiable arms 
reduction. Agreements on arms control and disar- 
mament can be useful in reinforcing peace, but 
they're not magic. 



will not bring peace. Agreements genu- 
inely reinforce peace only when they are 
kept. Otherwise, we are building a paper 
castle that will be blown away by the 
winds of war. Let me repeat, we need 
deeds, not words, to convince us of 
Soviet sincerity should they choose to 
join us on this path. 

Since the end of World War II, the 
United States has been the leader in 
serious disarmament and arms control 
proposals. 

• In 1946, in what became known as 
the Baruch Plan, the United States sub- 
mitted a proposal for control of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear energy by an inter- 
national authority. The Soviets rejected 
this plan. 



40 



An Agenda for Peace 

The United Nations designated the 
1970s as the First Disarmament Decade, 
but good intentions were not enough. In 
reality, that 10-year period included an 
unprecedented buildup in military 
weapons and the flaring of aggression 
and use of force in almost every region 
of the world. We are now in the Second 
Disarmament Decade. The task at hand 
is to assure civilized behavior among 
nations, to unite behind an agenda for 
peace. 

Over the past 7 months, the United 
States has put forward a broad-based 
comprehensive series of proposals to 



reduce the risk of war. We have pro- 
posed four major points as an agenda 
for peace: 

• Elimination of land-based inter- 
mediate-range missiles; 

• A one-third reduction in strategic 
ballistic missile warheads; 

• A substantial reduction in NATO 
and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces; 
and 

• New safeguards to reduce the risk 
of accidental war. 

We urge the Soviet Union today to 
join with us in this quest. We must act 
not for ourselves alone but for all man- 
kind. 

On November 18 of last year, I an- 
nounced U.S. objectives in arms control 
agreements: They must be equitable and 
militarily significant, they must stabilize 
forces at lower levels, and they must be 
verifiable. 

The United States and its allies have 
made specific, reasonable, and equitable 
proposals. In February, our negotiating 
team in Geneva offered the Soviet Union 
a draft treaty on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces. We offered to cancel 
deployment of our Pershing II ballistic 
missiles and ground-launched cruise 
missiles in exchange for Soviet elimina- 
tion of their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 
missiles. This proposal would eliminate, 
with one stroke, those systems about 
which both sides have expressed the 
greatest concern. 

The United States is also looking 
forward to beginning negotiations on 
strategic arms reductions with the 
Soviet Union in less than 2 weeks. We 
will work hard to make these talks an 
opportunity for real progress in our 
quest for peace. 

On May 9, I announced a phased ap- 
proach to the reduction of strategic 
arms. In a first phase, the number of 
ballistic missile warheads on each side 
would be reduced to about 5,000. No 
more than half the remaining warheads 
would be on land-based missiles. All bal- 
listic missiles would be reduced to an 
equal level at about one-half the current 
U.S. number. 

In the second phase, we would 
reduce each side's overall destructive 
power to equal levels, including a mutual 
ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight 
below the current U.S. level. We are 
also prepared to discuss other elements 
of the strategic balance. 

Before I returned from Europe last 
week, I met in Bonn with the leaders of 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
We agreed to introduce a major new 
Western initiative for the Vienna negoti- 
' ations on mutual balanced force reduc- 
tions. Our approach calls for common 
collective ceilings for both NATO and 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After 
7 years, there would be a total of 
700,000 ground forces and 900,000 
ground and air force personnel com- 
bined. It also includes a package of 
associated measures to encourage co- 
operation and verify compliance. 

We urge the Soviet Union and 
members of the Warsaw Pact to view 
our Western proposal as a means to 
reach agreement in Vienna after 9 long 
years of inconclusive talks. We also urge 
them to implement the 1975 Helsinki 
agreement on security and cooperation 
in Europe. 

Let me stress that for agreements 
to work, both sides must be able to veri- 
fy compliance. The building of mutual 
confidence in compliance can only be 
achieved through greater openness. I en- 
courage the Special Session on Disarma- 
ment to endorse the importance of these 
principles in arms control agreements. 

I have instructed our representatives 
at the 40-nation Committee on Disarma- 
ment to renew emphasis on verification 
and compliance. Based on a U.S. pro- 
posal, a committee has been formed to 
examine these issues as they relate to 
restrictions on nuclear testing. We are 
also pressing the need for effective veri- 
fication provisions in agreements ban- 
ning chemical weapons. 

The use of chemical and biological 
weapons has long been viewed with re- 
vulsion by civilized nations. No peace- 
making institution can ignore the use of 
these dread weapons and still live up to 
its mission. The need for a truly effec- 
tive and verifiable chemical weapons 
agreement has been highlighted by re- 
cent events. The Soviet Union and their 
allies are violating the Geneva Protocol 
of 1925, related rules of international 
law, and the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention. There is conclusive evidence 
that the Soviet Government has provid- 
ed toxins for use in Laos and Kampu- 
chea and are themselves using chemical 
weapons against freedom fighters in 
Afghanistan. 

We have repeatedly protested to the 
Soviet Government, as well as the 
governments of Laos and Vietnam, their 
use of chemical and toxin weapons. We 
call upon them now to grant full and 



free access to their countries or to ter- 
ritories they control so that U.N. ex- 
perts can conduct an effective, independ- 
ent investigation to verify cessation of 
these horrors. 

Evidence of noncompliance with ex- 
isting arms control agreements under- 
scores the need to approach negotiation 
of any new agreements with care. The 
democracies of the West are open 
societies. Information on our defenses is 
available to our citizens, our elected 
officials, and the world. We do not hesi- 
tate to inform potential adversaries of 
our military forces and ask in return for 
the same information concerning theirs. 
The amount and type of military spend- 
ing by a country are important for the 
world to know, as a measure of its in- 
tentions, and the threat that country 
may pose to its neighbors. The Soviet 
Union and other closed societies go to 
extraordinary lengths to hide their true 
military spending not only from other 
nations but from their own people. This 
practice contributes to distrust and fear 
about their intentions. 

Today, the United States proposes 
an international conference on military 
expenditures to build on the work of this 
body in developing a common system for 
accounting and reporting. We urge the 
Soviet Union, in particular, to join this 
effort in good faith, to revise the uni- 
versally discredited official figures it 
publishes, and to join with us in giving 
the world a true account of the re- 
sources we allocate to our armed forces. 

Last Friday in Berlin, I said that I 
would leave no stone unturned in the 
effort to reinforce peace and lessen the 
risk of war. It's been clear to me that 
steps should be taken to improve mutual 
communication and confidence and 
lessen the likelihood of misinterpreta- 
tion. 

I have, therefore, directed the ex- 
ploration of ways to increase under- 
standing and communication between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
in times of peace and of crisis. We will 
approach the Soviet Union with pro- 
posals for reciprocal exchanges in such 
areas as advance notification of major 
strategic exercises that otherwise might 
be misinterpreted; advance notification 
of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile] launches within, as well as 
beyond, national boundaries; and an ex- 
panded exchange of strategic forces 
data. 



While substantial information on 
U.S. activities and forces in these areas 
already is provided, I believe that jointly 
and regularly sharing information would 
represent a qualitative improvement in 
the strategic nuclear environment and 
would help reduce the chance of mis- 
understandings. I call upon the Soviet 
Union to join the United States in ex- 
ploring these possibilities to build con- 
fidence, and I ask for your support of 
our efforts. 

Call for International Support 

One of the major items before this con- 
ference is the development of a compre- 
hensive program of disarmament. We 
support the effort to chart a course of 
realistic and effective measures in the 
quest for peace. I have come to this hall 
to call for international recommitment to 
the basic tenet of the U.N. Charter- 
that all members practice tolerance and 
live together in peace as good neighbors 
under the rule of law, forsaking armed 
force as a means of settling disputes be- 
tween nations. America urges you to 
support the agenda for peace that I have 
outlined today. We ask you to reinforce 
the bilateral and multilateral arms con- 
trol negotiations between members of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to re- 
dedicate yourselves to maintaining inter- 
national peace and security and remov- 
ing threats to peace. 

We, who have signed the U.N. 
Charter, have pledged to refrain from 
the threat or use of force against the 
territory or independence of any state. 
In these times when more and more law- 
less acts are going unpunished— as some 
members of this very body show a grow- 
ing disregard for the U.N. Charter— the 
peace-loving nations of the world must 
condemn aggression and pledge again to 
act in a way that is worthy of the ideals 
that we have endorsed. Let us finally 
make the charter live. 

In late spring, 37 years ago, repre- 
sentatives of 50 nations gathered on the 
other side of this continent, in the San 
Francisco Opera House. The League of 
Nations had crumbled and World War II 
still raged, but those men and nations 
were determined to find peace. The 
result was this charter for peace that is 
the framework of the United Nations. 

President Harry Truman spoke of 
the revival of an old faith— the ever- 
lasting moral force of justice prompting 
that U.N. conference. Such a force re- 
mains strong in America and in other 



July 1982 



41 



THE PRESIDENT 



countries where speech is free and citi- 
zens have the right to gather and make 
their opinions known. 

President Truman said, "If we 
should pay merely lip service to inspir- 
ing ideals, and later do violence to sim- 
ple justice, we would draw down upon 
us the bitter wrath of generations yet 
unborn." Those words of Harry Truman 
have special meaning for us today as we 
live with the potential to destroy civiliza- 
tion. 

"We must learn to live together in 
peace," he said. "We must build a new 
world— a far better world." 

What a better world it would be if 
the guns were silent; if neighbor no 
longer encroached on neighbor and all 
peoples were free to reap the rewards of 
their toil and determine their own 
destiny and system of government- 
whatever their choice. 

During my recent audience with His 
Holiness Pope John Paul H, I gave him 
the pledge of the American people to do 
everything possible for peace and arms 
reduction. The American people believe 
forging real and lasting peace to be their 
sacred trust. 

Let us never forget that such a 
peace would be a terrible hoax if the 
world were no longer blessed with free- 
dom and respect for human rights. The 
United Nations, Hammarskjold said, was 
born out of the cataclysms of war. It 
should justify the sacrifices of all those 
who have died for freedom and justice. 
"It is our duty to the past," Hammar- 
skjold said, "and it is our duty to the 
future, so to serve both our nations and 
the world." 

As both patriots of our nations and 
the hope of all the world, let those of us 
assembled here in the name of peace 
deepen our understandings, renew our 
commitment to the rule of law, and take 
new and bolder steps to calm an uneasy 
world. Can any delegate here deny that 
in so doing he would be doing what the 
people— the rank and file of his own 
country or her own country— want him 
or her to do? 

Isn't it time for us to really repre- 
sent the deepest, most heartfelt yearn- 
ings of all of our people? Let no nation 
abuse this common longing to be free of 
fear. We must not manipulate our peo- 
ple by playing upon their nightmares; 
we must serve mankind through genuine 
disarmament. With God's help we can 
secure life and freedom for generations 
to come. 



News Conference of May 13 
(Excerpts) 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 21, 1982. 1 



42 



Four times in my life, I have seen 
America plunged into war— twice as 
part of tragic global conflicts that cost 
the lives of millions. Living through that 
experience has convinced me that 
America's highest mission is to stand as 
a leader among the free nations in the 
cause of peace. And that's why, hand-in- 
hand with our efforts to restore a credi- 
ble national defense, my Administration 
has been actively working for a reduc- 
tion in nuclear and conventional forces 
that can help free the world from the 
threat of destruction. 

In Geneva, the United States is now 
negotiating with the Soviet Union on a 
proposal I set forward last fall to reduce 
drastically the level of nuclear armament 
in Europe. In Vienna, we and our NATO 
allies are negotiating with the Warsaw 
Pact over ways to reduce conventional 
forces in Europe. 

Last Sunday, I proposed a far- 
reaching approach to nuclear arms con- 
trol — a phased reduction in strategic 
weapons beginning with those that are 
most dangerous and destabilizing — the 
warheads on ballistic missiles, and 
especially those on intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. 

Today, the United States and the 
Soviet Union each have about 7,500 
nuclear warheads poised on missiles that 
can reach their targets in a matter of 
minutes. In the first phase of negotia- 
tions, we want to focus on lessening this 
imminent threat. We seek to reduce the 
number of ballistic missile warheads to 
about 5,000 — one-third less than today's 
levels, limit the number of warheads on 
land-based missiles to half that number, 
and cut the total number of all ballistic 
missiles to an equal level— about one- 
half that of the current U.S. level. 

In the second phase, we'll seek 
reductions to equal levels of throw- 
weight — a critical indicator of overall 
destructive potential of missiles. To be 
acceptable, a new arms agreement with 
the Soviets must be balanced, equal, and 
verifiable. And most important, it must 
increase stability and the prospects of 
peace. 

I have already written President 
Brezhnev and instructed Secretary Haig 
to approach the Soviet Government so 
that we can begin START [Strategic 
Arms Reduction Talks] talks at the 
earliest opportunity. And we hope that 
these negotiations can begin by the end 



of June and hope to hear from President 
Brezhnev in the near future. 

Reaching an agreement with the 
Soviets will not be short or easy work. 
We know that from the past. But I 
believe that the Soviet people and their 
leaders understand the importance of 
preventing war. And I believe that a 
firm, forthright American position on 
arms reductions can bring us closer to a 
settlement. 

Tonight, I want to renew my pledge 
to the American people and to the peo- 
ple of the world that the United States 
will do everything we can to bring such 
an agreement about. 



Q. If wiping out the nuclear threat 
is so important to the world, why do 
you choose to igfnore 7 long years of 
negotiations in which two Republican 
Presidents played a part? I speak of 
SALT II. We abide by the terms the 
Soviet Union does; why not push for a 
ratification of that treaty as a first 
step and then go on to START? 

A. I remind you that a Democratic- 
controlled Senate refused to ratify it. 
And the reason for refusing to ratify, I 
think, is something we can't — 

Q. —Republican Senate now. 

A. But we can't ignore that. The 
reason why it was refused ratifica- 
tion — SALT stands for strategic arms 
limitation. And the limitation in that 
agreement would allow, in the life of the 
treaty, for the Soviet Union to just 
about double their present nuclear 
capability. It would allow — and does 
allow us — to increase ours. In other 
words, it simply legitimizes an arms 
race. 

The parts that we're observing of 
that have to do with the monitoring of 
each other's weaponry; so both sides are 
doing that. What we're striving for is to 
reduce the power, the number — and par- 
ticularly those destabilizing missiles that 
can be touched off by the push of a but- 
ton — to reduce the number of those. 
There just is no ratio between that and 
what SALT was attempting to do. I 
think SALT was the wrong course to 
follow. 

Q. You may know that former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
said yesterday that your approach 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



might take far longer than the 7 years 
it took to require— to negotiate SALT 
II. What sort of time frame do you an- 
ticipate it would take to negotiate 
these limits on warheads? 

A. I don't know that you could pro- 
ject a time frame on that, when you look 
back at the history all the way back to 
the end of World War II with the Soviet 
Union on the negotiations. But I do 
think there is one thing present now 
that was not present before, and that is 
the determination of the United States 
to rebuild its national defenses. The very 
fact that we have shown the will and are 
going forward on the rebuilding pro- 
gram is something that, I think, offers 
an inducement to the Soviet Union to 
come to that table and legitimately 
negotiate with us. 

In the past several years, those 
negotiations took place with them hav- 
ing a superiority over us and us actually 
unilaterally disarming. Every time some- 
one wanted a little more money for 
another program, they took it away 
from defense. That isn't true anymore. 

Q. There have been calls in recent 
days for the United States to renounce 
the existing NATO treaty policy under 
which we would retaliate against the 
Soviets with nuclear weapons if they 
attack Western Europe with conven- 
tional arms. Under what conditions 
could we pledge that we will never be 
the first to introduce nuclear weapons 
in any conflict in Western Europe? 

A. I just don't think this proposal 
that has been made to renounce the first 
use of weapons — certainly, there's none 
of us who want to see them — but I don't 
think that any useful purpose is served 
in making such a declaration. Our 
nuclear — strategic nuclear weapons, un- 
fortunately, are the only balance or 
deterrent that we have to the massive 
buildup of conventional arms that the 
Soviet Union has on the Western 
Front— on the NATO front. This is why, 
in Vienna, we're trying to negotiate with 
them on a reduction of conventional 
arms, also, because they have an over- 
powering force there. 

Q. What can you tell us about the 
progress or lack of progress concern- 
ing the negotiated settlement on the 
Falkland Islands? Could you explain a 
little bit what role the United States 
is playing, and if you could elaborate a 
little bit about what our situation is 
now with respect to other allies in 
Latin America and in South America, 
since we have so firmly come down on 
the side of the British? 



July 1982 



A. I think there's a tendency on the 
part of many of the countries of South 
America to feel that their sympathies 
are more with Argentina than ours. I 
don't think there has been irreparable 
damage done. The negotiations continue 
to go on. They have been moved to the 
United Nations now, and the Secretary 
General there is very much involved in 
them. This morning, yesterday, in my 
talks with President Figueiredo of 
Brazil, he, too, is interested and has 
volunteered his good offices to try and 
help. And all we— those of us who want 
to be brokers for a peaceful settle- 
ment — can do is stand by and try to be 
helpful in that. 

There are reports that some of the 
issues between the two have been 
agreed upon. Basically, it is down to a 
situation of withdrawal, of what will be 
the interim administration on the island 
itself, and what will be the period of 
negotiations, then, of what the ultimate 
settlement is supposed to be. 

Up until now the intransigence had 
been on one side, that is, in wanting a 
guarantee of sovereignty before the 
negotiations took place— which doesn't 
make much sense. I understand that 
there's been some agreement now on 
awaiting negotiations on that. So we'll 
continue to hope and pray. 



Q. Do you intend to reactivate the 
memorandum of understanding with 
Israel, and do you believe Egypt 
should agree to hold a meeting of the 
autonomy talks in Jerusalem? 

A. I'm not going to comment on 
that last part of the question because we 
want to stand by and be of help there, 
and this is one to be worked out be- 
tween them. But I do have faith that 
both President Mubarak and Prime 
Minister Begin intend to pursue the 
talks in the framework of Camp 
David— the autonomy talks— and we 
stand by ready to help them. 

In the thing that you mentioned that 
has temporarily been suspended, we 
regretted having to do that, and we look 
forward to when that will be imple- 
mented again. 

Q. What is the United States doing 
to keep the peace along the Lebanese 
border? 

A. With some minor flurries, our 
ceasefire has held for 9 months now. 
The word we get from both sides is that 
they want it to continue, and I could 
probably answer your question better 
when I get an assessment — I'll be seeing 
Ambassador Habib this, I think, Satur- 
day. 



Q. In your arms proposals, you 
focus on a central intercontinental 
missile system to the two sides. If the 
Soviets were to come back and say 
they wanted to talk about bombers, 
about cruise missiles, about other 
weapons systems, would you be will- 
ing to include those, or are those ex- 
cluded? 

A. No, nothing is excluded. But one 
of the reasons for going at the ballistic 
missile— that is the one that is the most 
destabilizing. That one is the one that is 
the most frightening to most people. 
And let me just give you a little reason- 
ing on that— of my own on that score. 

That is the missile sitting in its silo 
in which there could be the possibility of 
miscalculation. That is the one that peo- 
ple know that once that button is 
pushed, there is no defense; there is no 
recall. And it's a matter of minutes, and 
the missiles reach the other country. 

Those that are carried in bombers, 
those that are carried in ships of one 
kind or another, or submersibles— you 
are dealing with a conventional type of 
weapon or instrument, and those in- 
struments can be intercepted. They can 
be recalled if there has been a 
miscalculation. So they don't have the 
same, I think, psychological effect that 
the presence of the others have that, 
once launched, they're on their way, and 
there's no preventing, no stopping them. 

Q. There are many arms 
specialists, however, who say that the 
multiplication of cruise missiles, in 
particular, those that can be put on 
land, can be put on ships, submarines, 
and so forth, also have that same ef- 
fect. You can't call them back once 
they are launched. They have a very 
short flight time, and there will be 
thousands of them. 

A. They have a much longer flight 
time, actually, a matter of hours. 
They're not the speed of the ballistic 
missiles that go up into space and come 
back down again. But this doesn't mean 
that we ignore anything. As I said, 
we're negotiating now on conventional 
weapons. 

But I think you start with first 
things first. You can't bite it all off in 
one bite. So our decision was to start 
with the most destabilizing and the most 
destructive. 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of May 17, 1982. ■ 



43 



THE SECRETARY 



Peace and Security in the Middle East 



Secretary Haig's address before the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 
Chicago, Illinois, on May 26, 1982^ 

The Middle East today is a severe 
testing ground for constructive 
diplomacy. Deeply rooted rivalries and 
historic animosities mark its politics. 
The region's strategic value as a bridge 
linking three continents is amplified by 
its vast natural wealth. And in the 
nuclear age, the interplay of local and 
superpower competition takes on a 
special edge of danger. 

As a consequence, no other region is 
less forgiving of political passivity than 
the Middle East. So many interests are 
at stake and so many factors are at 
work that the alternative to shaping 
events is to suffer through them. We are 
at such a juncture today. We must shape 
events in the Middle East if we are to 
continue to hope for a more peaceful in- 
ternational order, one characterized by 
peoples living in peace and the resolu- 
tion of conflicts without resort to force. 

Ever since the 1973 war, the daunt- 
ing task of achieving peace between the 
Arabs and Israel has been among 
America's highest priorities. Despite the 
reluctance of the American people to ex- 
pand their international commitments 
during the decade of the 1970s, the ef- 
forts of our diplomats were supported 
by an increasing volume of economic and 
military assistance. Clearly, the safe- 
guarding of our interests in the Middle 
East through the peace process has 
merited and enjoyed both bipartisan sup- 
port and popular consensus. 

The efforts launched by the United 
States in those years have borne 
substantial fruit. Two American 
presidents and Secretary of State 
Kissinger laid the groundwork for pro- 
gress through the disengagement 
agreements. The Camp David accords 
became the living testimony to the vision 
of the late President Sadat, Prime 
Minister Begin, and President Carter 
that the cycle of war and hatred could 
be broken. The United States will 
always be proud of its crucial role in this 
process. 

By 1981, however, the challenges to 
American policy had multiplied far 
beyond the self-evident necessity to pre- 
vent another Arab-Israeli war. 

• The Soviet Union and its allies in- 
creased their influence, particularly 



along the sea lanes and vital approaches 
to the region. Local conflicts and ambi- 
tions ranging from North Africa to the 
Horn of Africa, the Yemens to 
Afghanistan, offered the context. Arms, 
Cuban mercenaries, and Soviet soldiers 
themselves in Afghanistan were the in- 
struments. The United States seemed 
slow to recognize that this pattern of 
events was undermining the regional 
security of our friends, prospects for 
peace, and vital Western interests. 

• Iran, a close American ally and a 
force for stability in the Persian Gulf, 
was convulsed by revolution as the 
Islamic republic rejected the diplomacy 
and modernizing program of the Shah. 
In the face of this upheaval, the United 
States found it difficult to pursue its in- 
terests or to achieve a constructive rela- 
tionship with the new government. 
Meanwhile, Iraq invaded Iran. Fueled by 
Soviet arms to both countries, this con- 
flict threatened ominous consequences 
for the future security of the area and 
Western interests in the flow of oil. 

• The once prosperous and peaceful 
State of Lebanon was shattered by civil 
conflict and the intervention of outside 
forces. Continuous tension sapped the 
authority of the Lebanese Government, 
aggravated inter-Arab relations, and 
threatened to involve Israel and Syria in 
war. 

• Meanwhile, the peace process 
itself had reached a dangerous impasse. 
Egypt and Israel were divided over the 
role and composition of the multinational 
force and observers, crucial to the 
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the 
peace treaty itself. The negotiations for 
Palestinian autonomy were in recess. 
The other Arab states, American friends 
in Saudi Arabia and Jordan among 
them, were opposed to the Camp David 
accords and Egypt's peace with Israel. 
The Palestinian Arabs themselves were 
still adamantly against either joining the 
peace process or recognizing explicitly 
Israel's right to live in peace. 

An American Approach 

These developments required an 
American approach to the problems of 
the Middle East that not only pressed 
the peace process forward but also 
enlarged the security dimension of our 
relations with the states of the area. 
Peace and security had to move in 



44 



parallel. Local leaders understood that 
the inevitable risk-taking for peace 
would be vitally affected by the strategic 
context of the region. Lack of con- 
fidence in the United States and fear of 
the Soviet Union or radical forces would 
paralyze the prospects for progress, not 
only in the Arab-Israeli conflict but 
other regional problems as well. 

Our previous policies had to be 
strengthened by building on a consensus 
of strategic concern over Soviet and 
radical activities that already existed 
among our friends in the Middle East. It 
was not enough to say that we opposed 
Soviet intervention and Soviet proxies. 
We had to demonstrate our ability to 
protect our friends and to help them to 
defend themselves. We had to take in- 
itiatives on the peace process and other 
regional conflicts that would prevent the 
Soviet Union from exploiting local tur- 
moil and troublemakers for its own 
strategic purposes. In short, the United 
States had to be receptive, useful, and 
reliable in helping our friends to counter 
threats to their security. 

The President, therefore, set in mo- 
tion a broad-ranging attempt to create 
more effective security cooperation in 
the Middle East. 

• We established a fresh basis for 
cooperation with Pakistan, a traditional 
American friend, a key state on the 
northern tier of the Middle East, and, 
with the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, at the front line of danger. 

• We have improved relations with 
Turkey, a staunch member of NATO 
and long a barrier to Soviet expansion. 

• We have worked together with 
our friends to counter the activities of 
Libya in Africa and the Middle East. 

In addition, the United States has 
sought and will continue to seek prac- 
tical arrangements with such countries 
as Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Jor- 
dan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia that 
enhance security. We are also working 
with Israel, a strategic ally, to whose 
security and qualitative military 
superiority we have long been com- 
mitted. 

In undertaking these efforts, we 
recognize that for many countries for- 
mal and elaborate security structures 
are no longer appropriate. We have not 
tried to create interests where none ex- 
ist. Though we shall take full account of 
local sensitivities, no country can be 
given a veto over the pursuit of our best 
interests or necessary cooperation with 
others. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



The United States, working with its 
local friends despite their sometimes 
conflicting concerns, can be a responsive 
partner in the achievement of greater 
security for all. Our strong naval forces 
and the determination of the President 
and the American people to improve our 
defense posture, despite economic 
austerity, are also essential to our 
credibility in the Middle East. 

Three Issues 

Greater cooperation in the field of 
security will increase measurably the 
confidence that our local friends repose 
in the United States. If properly man- 
aged, such cooperation reinforces 
American diplomacy. And today the 
United States must address three issues: 
first, the Iraq-Iran war; second, the 
autonomy negotiations; and third, the 
crisis in Lebanon. 

Each of these issues is characterized 
by a mixture of danger and opportunity. 
Moreover, they have begun already to 
affect each other. If we are to succeed 
in advancing our goals throughout the 
region, then we must coordinate our ap- 
proaches to all of them. 

First, the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq has 

justified its invasion and seizure of 
Iranian territory by referring to 
longstanding border claims and Iranian 
calls for the overthow of its government. 
Iran has responded that the 1975 
Algiers agreement settled such claims 
and accuses Iraq of deliberate aggres- 
sion intended to bring down the Islamic 
republic. It is clear that disregard for 
the principle that international disputes 
should be settled peacefully has brought 
the region into great danger, with 
ominous implications for Western in- 
terests. 

Both Iran and Iraq, though wealthy 
in oil, have been badly drained of vital 
resources. There is great risk that the 
conflict may spill over into neighboring 
states, and it has already aggravated 
inter-Arab relations. It may lead to un- 
foreseen and far-reaching changes in the 
regional balance of power, offering the 
Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge 
its influence in the process. 

The United States does not have 
diplomatic relations with either Iraq or 
Iran. From the beginning of the war we 
have stressed our neutrality. We have 
refused and we shall continue to refuse 
to allow military equipment under U.S. 
controls to be provided to either party. 

Neutrality, however, does not mean 
that we are indifferent to the outcome. 
We have friends and interests that are 
endangered by the continuation of 



July 1982 



hostilities. We are committed to defend- 
ing our vital interests in the area. These 
interests— and the interests of the 
world— are served by the territorial in- 
tegrity and political independence of all 
countries in the Persian Gulf. The 
United States, therefore, supports con- 
structive efforts to bring about an end 
to the fighting and the withdrawal of 
forces behind international borders 
under conditions that will preserve the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
both Iran and Iraq. In the weeks ahead, 
we shall take a more active role with 
other concerned members of the interna- 
tional community as efforts are inten- 
sified to end this tragic war. 

Second, the autonomy negotia- 
tions. President Sadat of Egypt, who 
gave his life for peace, once described 
the barriers to Arab-Israeli peace as 
primarily psychological. He recognized 
that the profound antagonisms dividing 
Arab and Israeli were deeply reinforced 
by lasting suspicion. Politics— the art of 



Both Iran and Iraq, 
though wealthy in oil, 
have been badly drained 
of vital resources. There 
is great risk that the 
conflict may spill over 
into neighboring states, 
and it has already ag- 
gravated inter-Arab 
relations. 



the possible— could succeed only after 
psychology— the science of perceptions- 
had done its work. 

Our initial task was to make sure 
that both the psychology and the politics 
of the peace process continued. While 
we were prepared to take the initative 
on the autonomy negotiations, it soon 
became evident as the Sinai withdrawal 
date approached that the best way to 
sustain confidence in the peace process 
was to help both Egypt and Israel fulfill 
the terms of their peace treaty. After 
prolonged American diplomatic effort, 
the multinational force and observers 
(MFO) was established: It is safeguard- 
ing the peace in Sinai today. The Presi- 
dent's decision to offer U.S. troops for 
the force was a tangible recognition of 
the interrelationship between peace and 



security. Such a demonstration of our 
commitment to the treaty helped to 
secure broader participation, including 
units from some of our European allies. 
This truly multinational peacekeeping 
force testifies to international support 
for peace. 

Only 1 month ago, the final ar- 
ragements were put into place. On that 
occasion. President Reagan spoke for all 
Americans when he praised the courage 
of both Egypt and Israel. Sinai, so often 
the corridor for armies on the way to 
war, was at last a zone of peace. But we 
cannot allow the peace process to end in 
the desert. 

The signatories of the Camp David 
accords, of which we are the witness 
and full partners, wisely entitled their 
work, "A Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East." Basing their diplomacy on 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338, which provide for peace be- 
tween Israel and all of its neighbors, in- 
cluding Jordan and Syria, both Egypt 
and Israel were not content to establish 
peace only with each other. They 
recognized the necessity to go beyond 
their bilateral achievement in the search 
for a just, comprehensive, and durable 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
They have, therefore, been engaged for 
over 3 years, not only in the execution 
of the treaty of peace but also in 
negotiations aimed eventually at the 
resolution of the Palestinian problem in 
all its aspects. 

These negotiations, known as the 
autonomy talks, have been the subject of 
much misunderstanding and criticism. 
For many Israelis the process threatens 
to go too far, leadmg toward a Palestin- 
ian state which they fear would deny 
Jews access to the historic areas of an- 
cient Israel, threaten Israeli security, 
and offer the Soviet Union a fresh op- 
portunity for influence. For many 
Arabs, including until now the Palestin- 
ians themselves, autonomy does not 
seem to go far enough. In their view, it 
is only a formula for an Israeli domina- 
tion that they resist and they fear will 
lead to further radicalization of the en- 
tire region. Israeli settlement activities 
in the occupied territories have exacer- 
bated these fears. 

We must all face the reality that 
autonomy in and of itself cannot entirely 
alleviate the fears on either side. But we 
should also realize that autonomy is only 
one stage of a process: It is an oppor- 
tunity, not a conclusion. The beginning 
of autonomy actually initiates a transi- 
tional period to last no longer than 5 
years, in which a freely elected self- 
governing authority would replace the 



45 



THE SECRETARY 



Israeli military government and civilian 
administration. Futhermore, negotia- 
tions are to commence not later than the 
third year of the transitional period on 
the final status of the West Bank and 
Gaza and its relationship with its 
neighbors. A peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan is also an objective of 
this negotiation. 

Ample opportunity is provided in 
every phase for the participation, in ad- 
dition to the present partners in the 
peace process, of Jordan and the Palesti- 
nian Arabs. These arrangements are to 
reflect both the principle of self- 
government by the inhabitants and the 
legitimate security concerns of all the 
parties involved. 

The Camp David process, which is 
based firmly on U.N. Resolutions 242 
and 338, remains the only practical 
route toward a more comprehensive 
Middle East peace between Israel and 
all of its neighbors, including Jordan and 
Syria. No other plan provides for move- 
ment despite the conflicting interests 
and fears of the parties. No other plan 



Israelis and Palestinians to work 
together. Public statements that fail to 
recognize the temporary nature of 
autonomy and negotiating positions that 
mistake autonomy for final status do 
nothing but hinder forward movement. 

• Unilateral actions by any party 
that attempt to prejudge or bias the 
final outcome of the process serve only 
to raise suspicions and aggravate rela- 
tionships. Truly all of our ultimate hopes 
for peace depend in the end upon the 
achievement of mutual respect and 
friendly relations between Arab and 
Israeli. A heavy responsibility wOl be 
borne by those who darken these hopes 
without regard for either Israel's long- 
term interests or legitimate Palestinian 
aspirations. 

• Refusal to participate in the talks 
by those most affected by the conflict 
risks the loss of the best chance for the 
achievement of a lasting peace. Fifteen 
years have passed since the 1967 war 
and the initiation of Israel's military 
government over the West Bank and 
Gaza. Autonomy is the vital first step in 



The peace process has already accomplished 
what would have been considered a Utopian fan- 
tasy only a few short years ago. But none of us 
should he under any illusions. The failure to 
negotiate an autonomy agreement, and to negotiate 
one soon, will squander the best chance to act in 
the best interests of all parties. 



embodies so well the necessity for prog- 
ress despite the inherent imperfections 
of a transitional arrangement. As 
Churchill put it, "The maxim — nothing 
avails but perfection— spells paralysis." 
The United States has been heart- 
ened by the public and private declara- 
tions of both President Mubarak of 
Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of 
Israel to press forward toward the early 
and successful conclusion of an 
autonomy agreement. As we proceed, it 
is important that we conduct ourselves 
with several considerations in mind. 

• Autonomy is transitional, not the 
final word. The genius of Camp David 
was to provide for the possibility of 
progress, despite crucial, unresolved 
issues such as the ultimate status of 
Jerusalem. These, too, must be 
negotiated, but first we must establish a 
self-governing authority that will enable 



46 



the historic opportunity to change this 
situation and to begin the painful but 
necessary process of resolving the 
Palestinian problem. A settlement can- 
not be imposed, but peace can be 
negotiated. History will judge harshly 
those who miss this opportunity. 

Despite all of the obstacles confront- 
ing a broader Middle East peace, there 
has been a change in the polemic over 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in recent 
months. Many are recognizing at last 
that "no war, no peace" is not good 
enough. Increasingly, disagreement con- 
cerns the terms of peace, not the fact 
that peace itself must come. 

The United States long has believed 
that the risks and sacrifices required for 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict do 
not admit of any ambiguity on the basic 
issue that genuine peace is the objective. 
That is why, for example, we shall 



neither recognize nor negotiate with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
until it accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 anc 
338, and recognizes Israel's right to live 
in peace. 

Now is the time to redouble our ef- 
forts to make the peace process under 
the Camp David framework continue to 
work. I have said that great intellectual 
ingenuity and political courage will be 
required by all parties if an autonomy 
agreement is to be reached. Our delega- 
tion, led by Ambassador Fairbanks 
[special adviser to the Secretary Richan 
Fairbanks], will continue to work closelj 
with Egypt and Israel as we intensify 
our effort to achieve success. 

The peace process has already ac- 
complished what would have been con- 
sidered a Utopian fantasy only a few 
short years ago. But none of us should 
be under any illusions. The failure to 
negotiate an autonomy agreement, and 
to negotiate one soon, will squander the 
best chance to act in the best interests 
of all parties. Inevitably, such a failure 
will invite more dangerous alternatives. 

Third, and finally, the crisis in 
Lebanon. Lebanon today is a focal poin 
of danger. All of those conditions are 
present in abundance that might be ig- 
nited into a war with far-reaching conse 
quences. The lives of the people of 
Lebanon are at stake. The life of the 
state itself is at stake. And the stability 
of the region hangs in the balance. 

The recent history of Lebanon is a 
grim tale. Over the last 6 years, many c 
the country's most striking achievement 
have been lost. Once stable enough to b- 
the center of Middle Eastern finance, it 
economy has been wracked by in- 
ternecine warfare and foreign interven- 
tion. Tragically, Lebanon, once extolled 
as a model in a region of suffering 
minorities, is now a byword for violence 

Lebanon's unique position as a 
marketplace for the ideas of the Arab 
world has given way instead to a 
marketplace for the violent conflicts of 
inter-Arab and regional rivalries. Its 
representative government has been en- 
dangered. The Arab deterrent force, 
now consisting entirely of Syrian troops 
with its mission to protect the integrity 
of Lebanon has not sUibilized the situa- 
tion. 

The story on the Lebanese-Israeli 
border is no different. Once the most 
peaceful point of Arab-Israeli contact, 
southern Lebanon turned into a bat- 
tleground between Israel and the PLO 
even as the peace process proceeded. In 
this part of the country as well, inter- 
communal relations have suffered badly. 



L 



THE SECRETARY 



The central government's authority has 
been challenged by the variety and 
military strength of contesting groups. 
The brave units of the U.N. force, faced 
with an enormously difficult and 
dangerous task, have saved many lives 
but have not succeeded entirely in 
establishing the security of daily life. 

Over the past year, deteriorating 
conditions in Lebanon have required ex- 
traordinary efforts to avoid war. In 
April of 1981, Ambassador Habib [Presi- 
dent's special emissary to the Middle 
East Philip C. Habib], at the President's 
direction, worked successfully to avoid 
military confrontation in Lebanon. His 
efforts culminated in the cessation of 
hostilities in the Lebanese-Israeli area. 
A fragile cease-fire has survived for 
more than 10 months. While all parties 
remain fundamentally interested in 
maintaining it, the danger is ever pre- 
sent that violations could escalate into 
major hostilities. 

These measures have deterred war. 
But conflict cannot be managed 
perpetually while the problems at the 
root of the conflict continue to fester. 
The world cannot stand aside, watching 
in morbid fascination, as this small na- 
tion with its creative and cultured people 
slides further into the abyss of violence 
and chaos. The time has come to take 
concerted action in support of both 
Lebanon's territorial integrity within its 
internationally recognized borders and a 
strong central government capable of 
promoting a free, open, democratic, and 
traditionally pluralistic society. The 
President has, therefore, directed Am- 
bassador Habib to return to the Middle 
East soon to discuss our ideas for such 
action with the cooperation of concerned 
states. 

America's Moment in the Middle East 

The Middle East today is a living 
laboratory for the political experiments 
of the 20th century. A multitude of na- 
tions have emerged from the disintegra- 
tion of empires, their dreams of a better 
future sustained by memories of a 
glorious past. The modern nation-state 
has been imposed upon traditions that 
transcend both secular loyalties and 
well-defined borders. The quest for 
modernization competes uneasily with 
religious and ethnic identities that long 
predate the Industrial Revolution of the 
West. 

Clearly, the peoples of the Middle 
East are embarked upon the most rapid 
social transformations in their history. 



July 1982 



Nonetheless, the past strongly 
permeates both their attitudes toward 
the future and the texture of their daily 
life. The ruins of ancient times remind 
them and us that the region has always 
played a vital part in the advance of 
civilization. 

There are other ruins, too, that re- 
mind us of another aspect of the Middle 
East. Philosophers and artists, mer- 
chants and travelers, statesmen and 
scholars have made their impact 
throughout the ages. But the soldier, 
with his vast monuments to destruction, 
is perhaps overly represented in the ar- 
chaeology of this region. The violence of 
war is all too often the point of contact 



between the history of the Middle East 
and its contemporary struggles. 

By the standards of this ancient 
region, the United States is a country 
still in its infancy. But by virtue of our 
power and our interests, our relation- 
ships and our objectives, we are uniquely 
placed to play a constructive role in 
helping the nations of the area in their 
quest for peace and security. Now is 
America's moment in the Middle East. 
As Americans, let us hope to be 
remembered by the peoples of the Mid- 
dle East not for the monuments of war 
but for the works of peace. 



iPress release 177. 



Peaceful Change in Central America 



by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

Address given on behalf of Secretary 
Haig before the Pittsburgh World Affairs 
Council, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 
May 27, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is 
Deputy Secretary ofState.^ 

It is a pleasure to appear here today 
before the Pittsburgh World Affairs 
Council and to deliver, on behalf of 
Secretary Haig, his remarks on "Peace- 
ful Change in Central America." I know 
how much the Secretary wanted to be 
here today himself to deliver this impor- 
tant statement, and yet it is the very 
theme of his speech — peaceful change — 
which necessitates his presence in Wash- 
ington today to attend the Organization 
of American States' (OAS) special ses- 
sion on the Falklands. 

As the fighting has grown more in- 
tense over the past few days in the 
Falklands, diplomatic efforts have been 
renewed by several parties. Today's 
meeting of the organ of consultation of 
the Organization of American States is a 
pivotal event in this process, at which 
further definition may be given to the 
OAS position on this crisis. Owing to the 
vital American interests which are in- 
volved and to the tragic cost of this 
crisis in terms of human life. Secretary 
Haig felt it necessary to personally lead 
the U.S. delegation to the meeting. His 
involvement today is, as it has been 
from the outset, an expression of our 
willingness to aid in the search for a 
peaceful solution to this dispute between 
two friends. 



As we meet today to discuss our 
hemisphere, the war between Great Bri- 
tain and Argentina can only cause 
Americans the greatest of anguish. We 
in the United States must recognize that 
much is at stake. Britain is a country to 
which we are bound by unique ties of 
friendship, values, and alliance. Argen- 
tina is an old friend, a country of immi- 
grants like our own, with which we 
share the adventure of the new world 
experience. 

For these relationships alone, we 
would have been deeply concerned about 
the tragic events that began so short a 
time ago. But there are additional and 
even more compelling reasons for our 
anguish. This hemisphere has been more 
than just a place to dream of a "new 
world": For two generations and more, 
it has also been the world's best haven 
from war. The inter-American system 
and the Rio treaty have contained and 
almost eliminated armed conflict among 
the states of the Americas. Our neigh- 
bors have the lowest rate of expenditure 
for arms of any area of the world. These 
unique achievements must not be lost. 

When two friends are at war with 
each other, American policy cannot be 
guided simply by friendship. Nor can we 
be guided simply by fear that the very 
expression of our position will damage 
our long-term interests. In this critical 
situation, the only sure guide for Ameri- 
can action is principle. 

The President has set forth as a 
basic principle of American foreign 
policy that historic change should occur 
peacefully and under the rule of law. 
The United States favors the peaceful 



47 



THE SECRETARY 



settlement of international disputes 
without resort to force or the threat of 
force. Only in this way can we advance 
in the Western Hemisphere and else- 
where toward more free, more peaceful, 
and more productive societies. 

Our policy toward the South Atlantic 
has been designed to support this cen- 
tral principle of our foreign policy. If we 
disregard it, conflict will continue, creat- 
ing an opportunity for the Soviet Union 
and its allies to gain the influence they 
have long sought. At the request of both 
parties we have, therefore, tried hard to 
prevent war. We remain ready to help 
or to support any realistic diplomatic in- 
itiative which will bring a just peace. 

The South Atlantic is not the only 
place in this hemisphere where the proc- 
ess of peaceful change has been 
challenged. The peoples of Central 
America are confronted by severe 
economic and social problems. They 
want to remain faithful to the authentic 
vision of the Americas — the liberty and 
dignity of man. But self-appointed revo- 
lutionaries supported by Nicaragua, 
Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. are attempting 
to manipulate the problems of Central 
America in order to impose new dicta- 
torships by force. If they should succeed, 
peace and progress in the hemisphere 
will surely be among the victims. 

Despite the efforts of such forces, 
the advocates of democratic reform and 
international cooperation have recently 
registered impressive advances. The 
March 28 constituent assembly election 
in El Salvador provided a decisive exam- 
ple. Neither the local guerrillas nor the 
international skeptics prevented the 
courageous people of El Salvador from 
reaffirming their faith in a democratic 
solution to their problems. 

El Salvador was not alone. Costa 
Rica and Honduras, members with El 
Salvador in the Central American Demo- 
cratic Community, were resisting suc- 
cessfully Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts 
to destabilize the region. In January, 
Honduras completed its own transition 
to democratic rule with the inauguration 
of an elected president and legislative 
assembly. At the same time, Costa 
Rica's 30-year-old democratic tradition 
withstood the double shock of hard eco- 
nomic times and the political and mili- 
tary turmoil of its neighbors. 

The democratic experience also ex- 
tended to the Dominican Republic and 
Colombia. Only 10 days ago, the presi- 
dential election in the Dominican Repub- 
lic marked a new milestone in that coun- 
try's inspiring progress in building 
democratic institutions. And despite 



48 



violence by Cuban-trained guerrillas, 
Colombia's voters elected a new legisla- 
ture on March 14. They return to the 
polls this Sunday to elect a president. 

These affirmations of freedom have 
reverberated throughout the region and 
the world. They demonstrate that 
totalitarian victory over democracy in 
the Caribbean Basin is far from in- 
evitable. Quite to the contrary: 18 of the 
25 states in the basin now have govern- 
ments elected by the people. Recognition 
is growing that armed insurrection and 
extremism, whatever the ideology, are 
unwanted and unworkable. The security 
for every citizen that is essential to 
development can be provided best within 
the framework of democracy. 

America's Responsibility 

The United States, as the advocate of 
democratic reform and peaceful change, 
cannot stand aloof from the challenges 
of Central America. Our neighbors' fate 
will have far-reaching consequences for 
the stability of the region and our hemi- 
sphere. The world is watching to see 
whether we are careful enough and 
determined enough to meet these 
challenges. 

We can no longer afford our histori- 
cal tendency to oscillate between utter 
neglect of Central America and direct 
intervention. Instead, the United States 
must pursue a balanced approach, one 
that takes into account the realities of 
local conditions but that also appreciates 
the regional and global context. We 
know that the United States cannot 
"cure" Central America's longstanding 
problems by itself. Still less does our 
policy envisage the use of American 
troops, who are neither wanted nor 
needed. But we can promote democracy 
and reform, while protecting our vital 
interests. We can do so if we mount the 
sustained political, economic, and securi- 
ty cooperation with Central America and 
other friends in Latin America that is 
demanded by our democratic values and 
essential to our own security. 

The time has come for Americans to 
work with unity and determination 
toward the goal of a region at peace 
with itself, free from outside threats, 
and able to devote its energies to eco- 
nomic progress and the development of 
democratic political institutions. 

Threefold Commitment 

What is required of America today is a 
threefold commitment to support 



democracy, economic development, and 
security cooperation in Central America. 

First, we must commit ourselves 
to the support of democracy in every 
country of the area. Democracy is not 
an abstract value but an indispensable 
means through which political, economic, 
and social issues can be addressed in a 
peaceful manner. Democratic institutions 
offer the chance to redress grievances 
and the flexibility to resolve problems in 
a rational way before dangerous 
pressures explode in violence. And 
responsible democratic institutions are 
the best protection against the repeated 
violation of individual rights. 

A key part of our commitment to 
democracy must be the determination to 
use our influence to help our neighbors 
secure the human rights of each of their 
citizens. Intimidation, fear, and denial of 
liberty are unacceptable barriers to 
progress. Only the political framework 
of democracy strengthens lasting eco- 
nomic and social development. 

Second, we must support sus- 
tained economic development. Presi- 
dent Reagan's Caribbean Basin pro- 
posals — developed in concert with Mex- 
ico, Canada, Venezuela, and Colombia — 
will provide the opportunity for long- 
term prosperity to the small economies 
of the area. The President's program is 
designed to encourage future economic 
development by granting duty-free treat 
ment to the region's imports, by pro- 
viding tax incentives for investment in 
the region, and by offering assistance 
and training to help the private sector. 
Emergency financial assistance is also 
provided to relieve critical short-term 
pressures. The Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative offers hope of a different future 
for the region — a better future for so 
many who have known only destitution. 
We must support this program which is 
so much in our own national interest as 
well as that of our neighbors. 

Third, we must offer our coopera- 
tion in security matters. Military train- 
ing and supplies can help local forces to 
repel guerrilla violence against the 
political process, the economic infra- 
structure, and national institutions. Cen- 
tral American armed forces face a diffi- 
cult task against experienced enemies 
who receive substantial and sophisti- 
cated support from abroad. Their ability 
to respond in an effective and discrimi- 
nating manner can be increased by our 
assistance and training. 



THE SECRETARY 



Our Priorities 

Guided by these reaffirmations of our in- 
terest in the freedom, prosperity, and 
security of our neighbors, we must set 
our priorities for the months ahead. It is 
critical that we maintain the momentum 
of recent steps toward democracy in El 
Salvador. Salvadoran political parties 
and the constituent assembly have 
shown the ability to make the comprom- 
ises necessary to form a government of 
reconciliation with a mandate to build a 
functioning democracy. Those opposition 
elements capable of accommodating to 
democracy should seriously consider re- 
joining the pohtical process. Now that El 
Salvador's civilian and military leaders 
have faced the elections and abided by 
the results, other governments can also 
encourage steps toward national recon- 
ciliation which can rally El Salvador's 
fragmented society around democratic 
standards. 

For our part, we will support the 
continuation of El Salvador's reforms, 
particularly its land reform program. 
Considerable confusion has arisen 
recently over constituent assembly 
legislation affecting this program. We 
have been assured that the purpose of 
the legislation is to improve agricultural 
efficiency while reaffirming the rights of 
land-reform beneficiaries. We are watch- 
ing the practical effects of this change 
very carefully, to see that progress will 
continue. Salvadorans should know that 
we will support no less. We shall also 
look forward to further efforts to curb 
abuses of authority by the security 
forces, and we shall help to sustain 
progress toward the establishment of 
democratic institutions. All of these ele- 
ments of change are important in fulfill- 
ing the desires expressed by the Salva- 
doran people so clearly in the elections. 

The United States will also help 
efforts to facilitate the reentry of dissi- 
dent Salvadoran political forces into the 
country's democratic life. We shall will- 
ingly enter into contacts to facUitate 
discussions or negotiations on how to 
broaden the democratic process and to 
provide an opportunity for those who 
can accept democratic rules to reenter 
the mainstream. But we will neither en- 
dorse nor promote negotiations over 
powersharing, which would give the 
guerrillas a special place at the bargain- 
ing table because they bear arms. This 
would defeat the very principle of the 
democratic process. It would dishonor 
the courage of the Salvadoran people. 

Elsewhere in Central America, the 
newly elected governments of Costa 



Rica and Honduras have embarked upon 
tough austerity programs to prevent 
economic disaster. At the same time, 
they are working to improve their 
capacity to prevent terrorist infiltration 
from undermining their institutions and 
stability. The United States will provide 
the economic and security assistance 
needed by these countries, and newly in- 
dependent Belize as well, to set their 
economies back on the road to develop- 
ment and to protect their democratic in- 
stitutions from attack. 

For the first time in years, the 
outlook is also promising in Guatemala, 
where political development has long 
been paralyzed. In the wake of a mili- 
tary coup led by young officers, a new 
government has pledged to end human 
rights abuses, to eliminate corruption, 
and to institute a free and open demo- 
cratic system. We hope that the steps 
already taken toward fulfilling these 
commitments will continue and that they 
will enable Guatemala to deal more 
effectively with its socioeconomic, politi- 
cal, and security problems. Cuba's guer- 
rilla allies in Guatemala have been con- 
sistently unresponsive to the new 
government's pleas to lay down their 
arms and join in a process of national 
reconciliation. But they are unlikely to 
gain power by force if Guatemala con- 
tinues on its new course of orderly 
reform. Now that Guatemala has begun 
to change, we must seize this oppor- 
tunity to encourage the return to democ- 
racy and law through electoral reforms 
and safeguards for individual rights. 

Our approach to Central America 
has focused on those societies embarked 
on the road to democratic reform, but 
we must also address the problems 
posed by Nicaragua. Under the San- 
dinistas, Nicaragua has been instrumen- 
tal in the campaign to obstruct 
democratic progress in El Salvador. We 
and other countries have repeatedly ex- 
pressed concern over these activities and 
developments in Nicaragua itself that 
endanger both pluralism and economic 
progress. 

Marxist-Leninist leaders in Nicar- 
agua would have been greatly strength- 
ened had El Salvador collapsed this 
spring as they predicted. They did more 
than just predict it. They sought to in- 
sure it by providing arms, propaganda, 
and logistical support. Now, in the wake 
of the Salvadoran elections, we are ex- 
ploring once again whether the Nicar- 
aguan leadership is prepared to change 
its ways, to cease its intervention in the 



affairs of its neighbor, to stop the mili- 
tarization of its society, and to fulfill its 
promises of pluralism and genuine non- 
alignment. 

Progress will not be possible unless 
the Sandinistas end their support for in- 
surgencies in other countries. We are 
discussing with the Sandinista govern- 
ment several proposals which could ad- 
dress their neighbors' concerns, our con- 
cerns, and the complaints of the Sandin- 
istas themselves. We must hope that the 
Nicaraguans will understand that their 
future and that of Central America does 
not lie in imitating Cuba but in demo- 
cratic government with the support of 
the people. 

Finally, a word is in order about our 
policy toward Cuba itself. Over two 
decades have passed since Fidel Castro 
took power. In Cuba, as in other coun- 
tries, it has become clear that while 
Marxist-Leninist ideology may be a vehi- 
cle to seize power, it is an obstacle to 
progress. Today, the Cuban people see 
the fruits of their labor poured into 
armaments and adventures abroad. 
Their economy stagnates and a huge 
Soviet subsidy of $3 billion a year has 
become essential for survival. Like other 
Communist states, Cuba has also pro- 
duced a flood of refugees. 

A better relationship between Cuba 
and the United States is both possible 
and desirable, but it cannot take place in 
the context of aggression and subver- 
sion. The Salvadorans and others have 
shown that they reject the latest at- 
tempt by Cuba, abetted by the U.S.S.R., 
to determine their destinies by force. 
Sooner or later, the determination of the 
peoples of Central America to win a 
democratic future must impress the 
Cuban leadership with the futility of 
their current policies. 

Democracy and Peaceful Change 

History, wrote Valery, is the science of 
events that never recur. As we enter the 
final decades of the 20th century, we are 
conscious that our relations with our 
neighbors in the Western Hemisphere 
have entered a new stage. Neither we 
nor they can afford benign neglect in 
any field. Neither they nor we can afford 
to ignore the principles of peaceful 
change and the resolution of disputes 
without resort to force. 

U.S. relations with the nations of 
Central America, the Caribbean, and in- 
deed the rest of Latin America are 
changing, but the democratic vocation 



July 1982 



49 



THE SECRETARY 



endures. It is democracy alone that 
recognizes government's responsibility to 
the people, thus providing the funda- 
mental political stability necessary for 
both individual freedom and social prog- 
ress. This stability, however, should not 
be confused with the status quo. To the 
contrary, the bloodless balance of social 
forces offered by democracy is the only 
sure framework for lasting and bene- 
ficial economic and social change. By ad- 
ding our strength to the will of our 
neighbors, we can realize together a new 
world of opportunities for self-develop- 
ment in freedom. 



•Press release 180 of May 28, 1982. ■ 

Developing Lasting 

U.S.-China 

Relations 

by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

Address given on behalf of Secretary 
Haig before the National Council on 
U.S.-China Trade, Washington, D.C., on 
June 1, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is 
Deputy Secretary of State. 

It is a great pleasure to be here today. I 
know that you and the other members of 
the National Council on U.S.-China 
Trade have been deeply involved in de- 
veloping a strong, mutually beneficial 
relationship between the United States 
and China. I can honestly say that with- 
out your constructive approach and per- 
sistent efforts, we would not have come 
as far as we have in our bilateral rela- 
tions. 

Fostering a lasting relationship be- 
tween the United States and China has 
been a vitally important bipartisan objec- 
tive for the last four administrations. A 
strong U.S.-China relationship is one of 
the highest goals of President Reagan's 
foreign policy. 

Strong U.S.-China relations are not 
only critical for our long-term security 
but also contribute to Asian stability and 
global harmony. The United States and 
China are both great countries, strong 
and vigorous, with tremendous potential 
for promoting world peace and pros- 
perity. As President Reagan noted in his 
letter to Premier Zhao commemorating 
the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai 



50 



communique, "our contacts have em- 
braced almost all areas of human 
endeavor." 

We view China as a friendly country 
with which we are not allied but with 
which we share many common interests. 
Strategically, we have no fundamental 
conflicts of interest, and we face a com- 
mon challenge from the Soviet Union. In 
areas such as trade, tourism, banking, 
and agriculture and in scientific, techno- 
logical, and educational exchanges, a 
close, cooperative relationship has re- 
sulted in a productive flow of people and 
ideas between our two societies. It is for 
these reasons that the Reagan Admini- 
stration believes it essential that we 
develop a strong and lasting relation- 
ship. 

During the decade-long process of 
normalizing our relations, a number of 
principles upon which we base our China 
policy have emerged. These principles, 
which President Reagan has strongly en- 
dorsed, include our recognition that the 
Government of the People's Republic of 
China is the sole legal government of 
China and our acknowledgment of the 
Chinese position that there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of 
China. 

They also include a firm acceptance 
that the U.S.-China relationship, like all 
relationships between equal, sovereign 
nations, should be guided by the funda- 
mental principles of respect for each 
other's sovereignty and territorial in- 
tegrity and noninterference in each 
other's internal affairs. The relationship 
should be based on a spirit of consulta- 
tion, cooperation, and strong efforts to 
achieve mutual understanding on the 
wide range of issues of interest to both 
of our countries. 

The Reagan Administration is com- 
mitted to pursuing a durable relationship 
with China based on these principles. 
President Reagan values the relationship 
highly and believes it is important to 
work together to expand the benefits to 
both countries. As he said in a recent 
letter to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, 
"China and America are two great na- 
tions destined to grow stronger through 
cooperation, not weaker through divi- 
sion." 

It is because of the importance that 
President Reagan places on the 
U.S.-China relationship that Vice Presi- 
dent Bush recently visited Beijing as the 
President's personal emissary. We were 
highly pleased with the outcome of the 
Vice President's trip, both in terms of 
the reception he received and in terms 
of the clarity and quality of the high- 
level communication which it produced. 



We believe that both the United States 
and China saw in this visit the oppor- 
tunity to demonstrate the high value 
each places on the relationship. We also 
believe that good progress was made in 
addressing the one serious issue that 
threatened good relations — Taiwan arms 
sales. 

We are continuing our discussions 
with the Chinese on this complex, his- 
torical issue. We believe that so long as 
both sides demonstrate the statesman- 
ship, vision, and goodwill that have 
characterized our relationship, we will 
be able to overcome our difficulties. In- 
deed, anything other than a successful 
outcome would be a great misfortune foi 
both sides. The only beneficiary would 
be our common adversaries. 

Reagan Administration Initiatives 

It is not my purpose to address the 
Taiwan arms sale issue today. Indeed, 
public attention on this issue has tended 
to obscure the continuing progress 
which this Administration has made in 
carrying out important China policy in- 
itiatives. These steps play an important 
role in removing residual impediments 
to a relationship based on mutual trust. 
They will further strengthen the foundai 
tion for a durable long-term partnership 
between the United States and China. 

These initiatives grew out of a 
thorough review of all aspects of 
U.S.-China relations conducted during 
the first 5 months of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration. They were launched just 1 
year ago, when Secretary Haig visited 
Beijing. During his meetings, the Secre- 
tary reaffirmed our common strategic 
perceptions and announced new steps 
aimed at deepening our bilateral rela- 
tionship. The subsequent implementatioi' 
of this policy focused on four main 
areas — technology transfer, arms trans- 
fers, legislative restrictions, and con- 
sular relations. In the 11 months since 
the Secretary's visit, important progresn 
has been made on all fronts. 

We have substantially liberalized on. 
export control policy toward China. Thii 
initiative has reflected not only a desire 
to expand business opportunities but 
also our strong national interest in con- 
tributing to China's modernization. We 
recognize that a secure, modernizing 
China is important to the United States 
from a global and strategic perspective. 
We strongly believe in supporting Bei- 
jing's ambitious efforts to improve the 
quality of life of more than one-quarter 
of the world's population. 

Over the past year, there has been i 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE SECRETARY 



dramatic rise in approvals of export 
licenses for China. Since July of 1981 
through March of this year, 1,203 
license applications were approved. This 
represented an increase of nearly 40% 
over the prior 9-month period. 

A recent White House directive 
reaffirmed this policy of substantial 
liberalization, emphasizing that U.S. ex- 
port policy "should support a secure, 
friendly, and modernizing China" and 
underscoring the importance of "prompt 
and full implementation" of the Presi- 
dent's June 4, 1981 decision. This new 
directive should give additional impetus 
to our efforts to expand trade relations. 
I fully expect that as U.S. -China rela- 
tions continue to advance, there will be 
important further progress. 

Another area in which we have 
opened the way to future cooperation is 
in arms transfer policy. During his June 
1981 visit to Beijing, Secretary Haig an- 
nounced that we were prepared to 
cooperate with China in this area on the 
same case-by-case basis governing U.S. 
arms transfers to all other nations. In 
December 1981, we lifted the historical 
bars on munitions sales to China. 

The Administration also recognized 
that the increasing flow of businessmen, 
tourists, and students between the 
United States and China made it 
imperative that we establish regular con- 
sular relations. Accordingly, Secretary 
Haig rapidly concluded negotiations on a 
consular convention which was ratified 
last fall and came into force this year. 
Since the diflfering social systems of the 
two countries at times lead us to take 
differing views on some issues involving 
our citizens, the convention provides im- 
portant protections for Americans in 
China. We intend vigorously to uphold 
its provisions, not only in letter but in 
spirit. 

The Administration conducted a 
thorough review of legislation aflFecting 
our relationship with China. The review 
identified three areas in which outdated 
laws discriminated against China in 
ways inconsistent with our current 
strategic relationship. These were: 
eligibility for foreign assistance, PL 480, 
and the importation of seven previously 
banned furskins. 

Congressional reaction to these pro- 
posals has been positive. We have no 
plans to extend PL 480 and are only 
contemplating limited technical assist- 
ance through Chinese involvement in 
established programs. However, these 
are important symbolic gestures, which 
we hope will contribute to a relationship 
based on equality, mutual benefit, and 
mutual respect. 



The Growing Relationship 

I would now like to share with you some 
of my thoughts about the value of the 
U.S. -China relationship, both past and 
future. We have made tremendous 
strides and will seek continued progress 
in the years ahead. 

To start with, the strategic benefits 
that we see now — some 10 years after 
the beginning of rapprochement — have 
been substantial. It is an obvious but 
often overlooked and vitally important 
fact that the United States and China no 
longer face each other as hostile adver- 
saries and no longer need to deploy 
forces against one another. This has 
made a tremendous difference to both 
nations and will continue to be of critical 
importance to planners on both sides. 

The relationship has been important 
to our entire global strategy. U.S. and 
Chinese secimty policies are basically 
compatible. The relationship has sup- 
ported our alliance structure and en- 
hanced China's ability to deal vdth 
challenges to its security. In many areas 
of the world our economic assistance 
and political relationships have been 
mutually reinforcing. 

To turn to specific areas, our consul- 
tations with the Chinese on Kampuchea 
have been an important complement to 
our cooperation with the ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] nations in attempting to turn back 
Vietnamese aggression. In Afghanistan 
and Southwest Asia, the United States 
and China have maintained closely 
parallel policies, recognizing that the en- 
tire region is threatened by a southern 
thrust from the Soviet Union. 

Indeed, even where we disagree, the 
very fact that we can maintain a high- 
quality dialogue on international issues 
is an important byproduct of the rela- 
tionship. In one area which we approach 
in different ways— the Korean Penin- 
sula— our good relations have been an 
important factor fostering regional 
stability. 

Bilaterally, of course, there have 
been major benefits. U.S. -China trade is 
of tremendous importance to our nation. 
Its volume has increased dramatically, 
and its potential for further expansion 
remains great. We were pleased, for ex- 
ample, to see Premier Zhao Ziyang re- 
ceiving important American business- 
men recently even at a time of difficulty 
elsewhere in U.S.-China relations. The 
Premier's reception of Mr. Phillips 
[Christopher H. Phillips, President, Na- 
tional Council of U.S.-China Trade] and 
Mr. Tappan [David S. Tappan, Jr., 
President and Chief Operating OflBcer, 



Fluor Corporation] are strong indicators 
that the importance we continue to at- 
tach to building a long-term commercial 
relationship is reciprocated at the 
highest levels in China. 

It is impressive to note the levels of 
cooperation that ab-eady exist between 
our two countries. 

• The volume and value of bilateral 
trade have been increasing dramatically. 
China is now our 14th largest trading 
partner. 

• U.S. agricultural sales to China 
were around $2 billion in 1981. China 
has thus become our fifth largest market 
for agricultural products. 

• There are currently over 8,000 
Chinese students in the United States. 
They are now the largest group of 
students from another country to be 
studying here. Hundreds of Americans 
have also studied or done research in 
China. 

• Tourism and other travels be- 
tween the two countries have grown to 
massive dimensions. Tens of thousands 
of Americans visit China annually. 
Official delegations are already numer- 
ous and are increasing. 

• At last count some 80 American 
companies have established permanent 
offices in Beijing. Many companies with 
representatives in Hong Kong or Tokyo 
are also involved in frequent business 
discussions with the Chinese. 

• Opportunities for joint ventures 
are grovnng. The Chinese recently 
adopted a joint venture law that estab- 
lishes a legal framework for such under- 
takings. Under the auspices of the U.N. 
Industrial Development Organization, 
the Chinese have announced 130 joint 
ventures open to foreign participation. 

• Our two governments have begun 
to explore the possibility of a bilateral 
investment treaty which would further 
facilitate U.S. investment in China. 

• We have also been conducting dis- 
cussions with the Chinese on the 
possibility of an agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation, which would enable 
us to compete commercially in the de- 
velopment of China's nuclear power pro- 
gram. 

• Exchanges have increased sub- 
stantially in the science and technology 
area. During 1981 dozens of delegations 
were exchanged, and three new proto- 
cols were signed — bringing the total 
number of protocols under our bilateral 
science and technology agreement to 17. 
The benefits to both sides in this area, 



July 1982 



51 



THE SECRETARY 



which span a wide variety of fields rang- 
ing from health to earthquake studies, 
have proven to be even more impressive 
than we had foreseen. 

ConcluBion 

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize 
again that the Reagan Administration 
values the U.S.-China relationship very 
highly. That relationship must be based 
on the principles of equality and mutual 
respect. We will continue to work closely 
with the Chinese leadership with the ob- 
jective of resolving the Taiwan arms 
sales issue. We will seek to expand 
cooperation with China in areas where 
our interests are parallel or comple- 
mentary. 

American foreign policy is some- 
times accused of being shortsighted and 



of operating in a 4-year context. It is 
clear from the record of four admmi- 
strations that this is not the case with 
China. U.S. foreign policymakers clearly 
recognize that it is not in our interest to 
perpetuate the hostility that existed be- 
tween the United States and China but 
to look ahead to decades of close Smo- 
American cooperation. 

I believe that the coming years will 
see the development of an even deeper 
and more extensive relationship between 
our two great countries. We at the State 
Department would welcome your 
thoughts on areas that remain to be ex- 
plored and initiatives for the future. 
With your help we can forge a lasting 
relationship of mutual benefit to both 
the United States and China that will 
take us well into the 21st century. 



withdrawal of the Argentine forces from 
the islands; and a political solution. I 
think those three essential elements are 
as important today as they were at the 
outset of the crisis. 



Secretary Interviewed on 
"Face the Nation" 



Secretary Haig was interviewed on 
CBS TVs "Face the Nation" by George 
Herman. CBS News; Bernard 
Gwertzman, The New York Times; and 
Robert Pierpoint. CBS Neu!s. 
Wnshimiton. D.C.. nnMay'2S. 1982.'' 

Q. In this morning's news, the 
British troops in the Falklands seem 
to be consolidating their hold on their 
bridgehead following some air strikes 
on Argentinian positions. Since you've 
been a military commander as well as 
a diplomat, what would you say would 
have to happen in the fighting in the 
Falklands to make new negotiations 
possible and profitable? 

A. We, of course, would hope that 
there would be a renewed round of 
negotiations at any point, but it's clear 
that until some evidence of some change 
in the military situation is available, 
there may be continued stalemate. 

Q. Remembering America's 
military experiences in Korea and in 
Vietnam, in which you had a role, is 
this situation now in the Falklands 
the kind of thing which is productive 
of good negotiations, or does it have 
to wait until one side or the other 
takes a black eye or gains some kind 
of a face-saving victory? 

A. 1 don't think that one can make a 
real value judgment on that. There is 
much to be said on both sides of the 



[lot 

DJ 
li 
fi 
lie 



issue— for example, that frustration, 
stalemate, and continuing sacrifices on 
both sides do present auspicious oppor- 
tunities for negotiation. On the other 
hand, the extensive efforts that have 
been applied by the U.S. Government, 
by the Peruvian Government, and more 
recently by the U.N. Secretary General 
in a period before real sacrifices— and I 
don't belittle those incidents that were 
already involved— did not seem to bring 
about the necessary compromise on the 
part of the parties. So one might be in- 
clined to feel that today the landing of 
the British forces, the establishment of a 
strong bridgehead on the Falklands in 
itself constitutes a rather remarkable 
change in the situation. For that reason, 
I would hope that efforts would continue 
on the part of all parties to arrive at an 
early solution. 

Q. Now that the British flag has 
been hoisted in the Falklands, why 
not support the growing pressure in 
the United Nations for an immediate 
cease-fire? 

A. I think the answer to that ques- 
tion is very clear. The United Nations 
has passed a resolution, 502, which has 
three components. Those three com- 
ponents constitute a very strong en- 
dorsement of rule of law in international 
affairs, and that is that aggression must 
not be rewarded. The three components 
involve a cease-fire, as you suggest; the 



Q. As of the moment, what you 
seem to be saying is that there is no 
foreseeable negotiating position that 
could be successful— that is, right 
now. In that case, it appears that the 
fighting is going to go on for a while. 
Do you see the Soviet Union in any 
way getting involved on the side of 
Argentina, and, particularly, do you 
see the danger of a superpower con- 
frontation over this? 

A. It is clear that we have made 
clear to the Soviets that we do not 
believe that this crisis should take on 
East- West overtones, and I am encour- 
aged that thus far the Argentine 
Government has repeatedly stated that 
it will not accept assistance, so to speak 
from the Soviet Union or its proxies. I 
would hope that situation would prevail, 
but the danger of its turning the other 
way is, of course, a very active danger, 
and one that we are quite concerned 
about. 

Q. There have been reports that 
the Soviet Union has been giving at 
least intelligence information to the 
Argentines through Soviet satellites. 
Could you clarify that? 

A. We've been exposed to the same 
assurances that the world community 
has from Argentina that they are not a( 
cepting assistance, so I prefer to accept 
their word on face value. 

Q. You say you would hope there 
would be no East-West overtones, bull 
already we're hearing North-South 
overtones. How about the U.S. posi- 
tion vis-a-vis not only Argentina but 
its increasing number of friends 
among those who used to be not so 
friendly to Argentina? Are we in 
trouble? 

A. It goes without saying that this 
crisis, from the outset, endangered a 
number of longstanding American in- 
terests in this hemisphere and, indeed, 
woridwide. We, for that reason, became 
active from the outset foreseeing these 
complications, and we certainly didn't 
misjudge them. On the other hand, we 
recognize as well that the United Statee 
has been guided in this crisis by a funds 
mental principle, and that is that we 
must support those forces that support 
the rule of law and no first use of force. 
If we were to permit that to be violated 
there are a number of situations in the 



up 



la 



52 



Department of State Bullet!' 



THE SECRETARY 



hemisphere which could immediately ex- 
plode into similarly serious crises. 

Q. Are we sending an envoy down 
to Argentina, another General Walters 
[Ambassador at Large Vernon A. 
Walters] or is General Walters going 
back down there? There has been a 
report this morning to that effect. 

A. There is only one General 
Walters. 

Q. Is he going back? 

A. There is no emissary en route to 
Buenos Aires at this time. 

Q. On that same country, is there 
a fear that Argentina might go 
nuclear, not right now, but would this 
war propel Argentina or other Latin 
countries to step up their military 
spending or even to go nuclear? 

A. I think on the nuclear question, 
the incentives for that we must recog- 
nize are longstanding worldwide. That's 
why we have been such avid proponents 
of nonproliferation. I've always made 
the point that insecurity, isolation, and 
security dangers are the key incentives 
for the acquisition of nuclear capabili- 
ties. We have been concerned about 
Argentina's activities in this area, and 
we've discussed it with the Argentine 
Government. I'm reasonably confident 
that will not be a direct outgrowth of 
this. 

With respect to the conflict at large, 
of course, it whets the appetites for 
higher levels of armaments throughout 
the hemisphere, and we hope this inci- 
dent will not have that consequence. 

Q. You have indicated that you ac- 
(cept the Argentine assurance that they 
are not getting help from the Soviet 
Union, but the United States is giving 
help to Great Britain. For some 
reason, so far, this Administration, 
while admitting we're giving some 
help, has not been willing to say what 
we're doing to help Britain. Is this a 
kind of a pre-World War II "destroy- 
ers to Britain" on a secret basis, or 
can you tell us really what we are do- 
ing? 

A. I think the President has been 
very clear on that, and that is there will 
be no active American military involve- 
ment in this crisis; and the President 
meant precisely what he said. On the 
other hand, we've had a longstanding 
military relationship with a key ally and 
a special relationship with Great Britain. 
Within the confines of that, we have 
provided certain levels of assistance. 



They do not include direct military in- 
volvement of any kind by U.S. forces, 
and they will not. 

Q. But what do they include? 

A. 1 think we have pursued a policy 
of not providing a day-to-day checklist of 
such items. It serves no useful purpose, 
and I'm not going to depart from that 
policy this morning. 

Q. Is there a parallel on the other 
side? Are any of the Latin American 
countries and neighbors of Argentina 
providing her with materiel or help? 

A. Yes, there is some evidence of 
that. 

Q. What? 

A. There again, I don't think it 
serves any purpose to go into that. 

Q. Can you tell me what countries 
or what kinds of aid are being given? 

A. No, but Argentina has a number 
of historically close neighbors who have 
been providing assistance, of course, but 
I don't think at substantial levels. 

Q. There is a report that Presi- 
dent Brezhnev has replied to Presi- 
dent Reagan's letter about the start of 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START). Could you tell us if that let- 
ter goes much beyond what he said in 
his public speech? 

A. I don't think it serves a useful 
purpose to lay out detailed exchanges in 
diplomatic channels between heads of 
state and heads of government. I will 
confirm there has been a reply. I will 
also suggest that we anticipate through 
diplomatic channels— that's at State 
Department level— to confirm, hopefully 
before too long, a date for the resump- 
tion of our START negotiations. 

Q. The letter did not, then, con- 
tain a date in itself? 

A. Now you're dragging me into 
disclosures which I don't think, as a mat- 
ter of practice, is good diplomacy. 

Q. What about your possible 
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko? Would you expect that by 
that time or at that time you would 
set a date for the start of these 
START talks? 

A. It's too early to say, and I don't 
want to even suggest there has been a 
meeting confirmed with Foreign 
Minister Gromyko in New York at the 
disarmament conference, which I'm sure 
you're referring to. 

Q. Yes. 

A. There have been some informal 
discussions at diplomatic levels about the 



etllluly1982 



possibility of such a meeting. We, on our 
part, would welcome it. But that itself 
has not been fixed. 

Q. I'm not exactly trying to drag 
you into disclosure, but would like to 
try on another level something which 
I'm sure every American is concerned 
about, and that is, in these inter- 
changes, do you detect some motion 
on the part of the Soviet Union, some- 
thing that gfives the United States 
reason to be somewhat more sanguine 
than in the past about arms reduction? 

A. I think the response of the 
Soviets to the President's speech at 
Eureka College, the public response, Mr. 
Brezhnev's speech to the Komsomol, was 
basically encouraging. It was also 
replete with a number of self-serving 
posturing statements of a propagandistic 
character. 

Q. Soviet boilerplate. 

A. Yes, especially as we get into the 
European-American mutual interest on 
so-called INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] talks. 

Q. But you see some reason, some 
psychological movement, so to speak? 

A. Yes, I think from two points of 
view. Mr. Brezhnev in his speech 
welcomed the early resumption of talks 
in general and also accepted the princi- 
ple of substantial reductions in levels of 
armaments. One can only be encouraged 
by that. 

Q. You were critical, as was the 
Administration as a whole, about his 
proposal for a freeze in strategic 
weapons at the time the START talks 
would begin. Some people have sug- 
gested that, actually, since the Soviets 
have a very active program right now, 
a freeze would not hurt the United 
States but, in fact, might help it hold 
off further Soviet programs. But you 
don't see the logic in that? 

A. Not only don't we see the logic, 
why, we see the counterlogic. The sim- 
ple facts are that a freeze would lock the 
United States into positions of inferiori- 
ty in key areas. No place is that more 
true than in the Western European 
nuclear environment, where we are fac- 
ing some 900 warheads on 300 new 
mobile systems, with the West having 
no counterpart whatsoever. Anyone who 
would suggest that entering into 
negotiations under such a frozen dis- 
advantage would be an incentive for 
progress in the arms control I think has 
somewhat misplaced his logic. 

Q. I don't want to get locked into 



53 



THE SECRETARY 



initials here, but the talks you just re- 
ferred to are on medium-range 
missiles. As I understood Mr. 
Brezhnev's proposal, it was for a 
freeze in the strategic or longer range 
systems. 

A. He has proposed both, as you 
know— for both systems. As a matter of 
fact, his speech seemed almost to pre- 
occupy itself with the European arms 
control question. 

Q. Let me ask you something, as 
an amateur. I mean, these two gentle- 
men cover the State Department a 
good deal, and they are used to the 
language which is somewhat foreign 
to me. I'm a little bit puzzled- 

A. Sometimes it's foreign to me, 
too. [Laughter] 

Q. Foreign to you. Very well. On 
one hand, I hear you say that SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] II 
is dead in the water; on the other 
hand. I hear you say that we're observ 
ing SALT II. And I'm a little puzzled 
as to what it means. 

A. It means simply that there are 
certain restraints associated with the 
SALT II discussions and the draft treaty 
which both sides continue to abide by. 

Q. Not all of them? 

A. Not at all. Neither side has 
entered into the reductions that were 
visualized. And I made the point in my 
recent Senate testimony. There is no 
contradiction in such a thing. Clearly, 
there were many good aspects of SALT 
II, and it's In the interest of the United 
States-and it has thus far been in the 
Soviets' interest— to maintain those re- 
straints because it provides an interna- 
tional backdrop of greater confidence on 
which to proceed into the START 
negotiations. 

Q. Why, then, would it not make 
some sense to go ahead and ratify 
SALT II, start from there and move 
on to what you want, which is reduc- 
tions? 

A. For the simple reason that we 
felt that SALT II is badly flawed, badly 
flawed in a number of areas. It permit- 
ted the Soviet Union unusual advantage 
in the heavy intercontinental missile 
area. Secondly, there were deficiencies 
in the verification aspects. Thirdly, there 
was no Backfire bomber restraint— in 
other words, it ran free for the Soviet 
Union. 

To go through the processes of rati- 
fying this controversial, flawed treaty 
would be a detriment to our ability to 
move on promptly and rapidly with the 



START negotiations. Beyond that, it 
would lock in these flaws. And it's a 
very different thing to start a new kind 
of negotiation against a backdrop of 
unresolved issues than to have these dis- 
advantages locked into a formal treaty 
and then have to work back, as SALT II 
would seek to do. 

Q. If I understand you correctly, 
then you are willing to accept certain 
parts of SALT II as having already 
been negotiated, not necessarily take 
those in treaty form, but incorporate 
those parts that are acceptable to you 
into the START talks. Is that correct? 

A. No, that's not correct. What I 
am saying is that there are certain con- 
straints that were visualized and agreed 
to in SALT II, and that as long as the 
Soviet Union continues to abide by those 
constraints-and thus far they seem to 
be— we are inclined to do the same 
thing. But it does not mean that this is 
an inherent aspect of the START 
negotiations, which are clear and clean 
in their own right, and visualize, as the 
President said, substantial reductions on 
both sides. 

Q. You may have noticed my 
abstracted expression as I listened to 
some news on my little earphone. Let 
me tell you that it is reported— Argen- 
tine radio is saying that President 
Galtieri has sent a letter to the Pope 
saying that President Galtieri agrees 
with the Pope that there should be a 
cease-fire. Can you read anything into 
this? Is this politeness? Is this move- 
ment? Can one guess from this brief 
headline what this might mean? 

A. I think there has been a great 
deal of well-meaning and more-than- 
justified diplomatic activity. We've seen 
a great deal of it here. The Peruvian 
Government is attempting to launch 
another effort. The Pope himself, as he 
should be, is seriously concerned about 
this bloodshed. 

What the position of the Argentine 
Government is with respect to one or 
more of these depends, in its character, 
as to what it is the Argentine Govern- 
ment is prepared to accept. If it's a 
cease-fire and that the conditions for a 
resumption of conflict are violations of 
fundamental principles that we are seek- 
ing to preserve and strengthen, then 
clearly it doesn't offer much hope. 

Q. To go back to the discussion of 
our relations with the Soviet Union, 
you obviously have to take into ac- 
count domestic problems within the 
Soviet Union when you are evaluating 



lti( 
»l 



i 



I 



how much they are willing to give in 
certain areas. Today, the Washington 
Post has a very interesting report, 
which I'm sure you've seen, saying 
that Soviet agriculture is once again, 
still, and yet in deep trouble, and that 
as a result of this, they expect some 
changes at the higher levels of the 
Kremlin during Politburo meetings 
that start tomorrow. What is your 
evaluation of this report and of the 
possible changes in the Soviet hier- 
archy? 

A. This is an historic, almost 
organic, failure of the Marxist-Leninist 
system and the Soviet model. From the 
outset, the Soviet Union has been unabl 
to meet the food requirements of its 
people— this despite the fact that they 
have placed greater and greater concen 
tration on that sector of their society. 
They have applied more human effort 
and more technology, but they still, 
through systematic failure, have failed 
to "turn the corner," so to speak. 

I think that it is perfectly natural 
that there are always scapegoats m sue 
failures, and periodic meetings provide 
an opportuni^ to make some changes. 
It's just that simple. 

Q. Speaking of the hierarchy, 
what do you see about the impact on 
the Soviet Union's relations with the 
West if it's going to be so dependent 
for food on the outside world? 

A. I've always made the point that 
the United States and the West at largj 
if they maintain especially their unity i:i 
their dealings with the Soviet Union, 
have a great deal of political and eco- 
nomic leverage with which and througl 
which to insist on greater restraint anc 
responsibility on the part of the Soviet 
leaders. 

Q. Do you think we're sending tB 
wrong signal by agreeing or even urg 
ing the start of the strategic arms 
talks without any conditions attache* 
to it— in other words, without any 
direct linkage? 

A. No. I think we've made it very 
clear that linkage continues to be an a( 
tive aspect of American foreign policy- 
indeed, it does. But the President has 
also made it clear that arms control is 
very special area of East-West relatior 
and one in which we seek our own vita 
interests to be realized. 

Q. You're really saying that 
linkage is dead. 

A. Not at all. I said just the oppo- 
site. I said it is not dead; it remains a 
very active part and will remain an ac- 
tive part. It's a fact of life. It's not a 



54 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



question of an option of policy. It is a 
fact of life that international behavior of 
nations that have relationships with one 
another affect the full range of their 
relationships in all — 

Q. Let me adopt [the previous 
questioner's] rather dramatic phrase 
and apply it to another situation. Are 
parts two and three of our Camp 
David agreement dead— Palestinian 
autonomy? 

A. Not at all. People are rather 
short of memory. Here we have just had 
an event of major historic significance — 
the return of the Sinai on the 25th of 
April. A year and a half ago the skepti- 
l^cism as to whether or not that would 
ever happen was growing daily. It has 
been the product of cooperation between 
the Government of Egypt and the 

overnment of Israel — and in some 
/ery, very remarkable ways. 

Now that is behind us, and the time 
las come to turn to the other aspects of 
Damp David. These are the autonomy 
alks. Ambassador Fairbanks [Special 
\.dviser to the Secretary Richard Fair- 
)anks] has just now returned from his 
hird trip to the area, and I believe we 
ire ready to get moving. 

Q. Have you got agreement on the 
ilace? 

A. No. The venue question is still 
pen, but I'm optimistic that it lends 
;self to a reasonably early solution. 

Q. At Camp David? 

A. Not necessarily, no. 

Q. Do you think that when Mr. 
legin comes to see Mr. Reagan these 
roblems will be shoved aside, and 
fell make some progress? 

A. The President is very actively 
ngaged in the whole range of our 
Dreign policy, but especially he has 
hown an exceptional interest in the 
liddle East situation. Clearly, this and 
ther matters wDl be discussed with Mr. 
egin when he comes for the disarma- 
lent conference. 

Q. Do you know for sure when 
i*fhat is, by the way? 

A. I don't have the precise date, 
/e're still working on it. It will be about 
le time of the President's speech at the 
isarmament conference, and it might 
iclude some other discussions beyond 
lat. 

Q. That's next month, then? 

A. Early next month, after return- 
^g from Europe. 



Interview on 
"This Week With 
David Brinkley' 



." 



iPress release 176 of May 24, 1982. 



Secretary Haig was interviewed on 
ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley" 
on June 13, 1982, by Sam Donaldson; 
Sander Vanocur, ABC's chief diplomatic 
correspondent; and George Will, ABC 
news analysts 

Q. Israel says it will not withdraw 
immediately from Lebanon, as 
demanded by U.N. Resolution 508 that 
we voted for. So let's just say it out 
loud, if we mean it: Is that all right 
with us, or do we want an immediate 
withdrawal? 

A. It's too early to say. I think the 
key aspects of the resolution you refer 
to are, for the moment, to get a cessa- 
tion of the hostilities and the bloodshed, 
and the President's focus thus far has 
been on that. Clearly, no one would 
welcome a return to status quo ante in 
Lebanon with all of the instabilities ;hat 
we've experienced since 1976. 

Q. It's too early to say, as you put 
it, because you don't believe the cease- 
fire has been tested long enough. 
After a cease-fire clearly is in place, 
do we want an immediate Israeli 
withdrawal? 

A. I think we are going to wait and 
to work to achieve adjustments in the 
withdrawal of all foreign elements from 
Lebanon. After all, this has been a coun- 
try that's been wracked by internal 
elements not under the authority and 
control of the Lebanese Government, as 
well as a nation that's been occupied by 
Syrian forces for too long. 

Q. You ducked the question. 

A. I'm sometimes very good at that, 
but why don't you ask it again? 

Q. I'm really trying to find out if 
we want to back up our vote in the 
U.N. Security Council. 

A. Of course. 

Q. Do we want an immediate 
Israeli withdrawal? 

A. Of course. The vote that the 
United States stood behind and joined 
the other nations in putting forward was 
a very clear picture that ultimately there 
must be a withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Lebanon. 

Q. To facilitate an Israeli 
withdrawal, to fill the vacuum that 



J, ulyl982 



has been their objective to create in 
that part of Lebanon, would you be 
willing to see American troops put in- 
to a peacekeeping force? 

A. I think it's still a hypothetical 
question. We have not given serious 
thought to U.S. participation in the 
peacekeeping in Lebanon. However, I 
think in the hours and days ahead, we're 
going to have to look very, very careful- 
ly at what will be necessary to provide a 
stable situation in southern Lebanon to 
relieve the tensions which have brought 
about this disaster in the first place. 

Q. Might it be useful, as a precon- 
dition to having whatever settlement 
we come to in that area, to have a 
referendum in which the people of 
that part of Lebanon are asked if they 
want the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] and the Syrians back? 

A. I wouldn't discount a referen- 
dum. I wouldn't discount any step that 
would strengthen the authority of the 
central government and bring about a 
rapprochement, if you will, of the 
various factions in Lebanon — that is, the 
Lebanese factions — toward a strength- 
ened central government. 

Q. I take it from the tenor of your 
remarks today and in the past week 
that the U.S. Government and, indeed, 
most of the countries involved, are not 
too unhappy about the developments. 
In other words, the dirty little secret 
which has existed for some time is 
that nobody really wants the PLO in 
Lebanon. 

A. I wouldn't suggest there's a dirty 
Uittle secret because the next question 
that would be asked is, "Did the United 
States collude, were we acquiescing in 
the actions?" 

Nothing could be farther from the 
truth. We regret very much that the 
situation has resulted in the violence 
that we've witnessed. On the other hand, 
I think it's very clear that you must not 
and cannot have enclaves of separate 
authority in a sovereign nation and ex- 
pect the seeds for stability to grow. 
They will not. 

Q. No. I wasn't suggesting collu- 
sion, but I'm suggesting now a ques- 
tion that goes to the heart of what 
happens next. Is the United States 
willing to see whatever Israel is try- 
ing to do, whether it's playing the Jor- 
danian option or a homeland for the 
Palestinians? How far is the United 
States going in symmetry in what 
seems to be Israeli objectives in the 
Middle East? 

A. It's too early to say. I think our 



55 



THE SECRETARY 



first priority must continue to be a 
cessation of the hostilities, and the 
humanitarian aspects of this problem 
have got to be dealt with on a most 
urgent basis. We've got to work with all 
of the nations in the region. There are 
some of those in Western Europe who 
are concerned to seek to provide a long- 
term solution in which the sovereignty 
of Lebanon will again be established. 

Q. Work with other European na- 
tions. Does that mean Camp David is 
dead and you're back to the Geneva 
conference which would include the 
Russians? 

A. No, not at all. Camp David is not 
dead. As a matter of fact, I would hope 
that these tragic circumstances in 
Lebanon today would offer new oppor- 
tunities for a reinvigorating of the Camp 
David process and to moving forward as 
we intend to do. 

Q. When the fighting first broke 
out, you and the other American of- 
ficials were worried that somehow the 
Soviets might come in. that the whole 
thing could escalate into that kind of 
a very dangerous confrontation. This 
morning can you say that that now has 
receded— that danger— that it looks 
like we'll have a situation where the 
Soviets will not in any way intervene? 

A. Of course, we've been concerned 
about that from the outset. There have 
been exchanges between the President 
and Mr. Brezhnev— exactly two sets of 
exchanges during the period. I would 
describe the Soviet attitude thus far as 
being encouragingly cautious. 

The holding of the cease-fire which 
started 2 days ago— it broke down 
yesterday with respect to the PLO, 
which we worked on all night and again 
this morning— it appears that the local 
collapse of the cease-fire in the Beirut 
area has again been reestablished — the 
cease-fire has. 

I would hope that all of these cir- 
cumstances would make it clear to the 
Soviet leadership that they have no 
business in intervening or becoming in- 
volved in this situation other than to 
urge those with whom they exercise in- 
fluence to exercise restraint. 

Q. I didn't realize there were two 
sets of exchanges. Can you describe 
them? When did they come? I thought 
Mr. Brezhnev sent a letter to Presi- 
dent Reagan and he replied. When 
was the second exchange? 

A. There was a subsequent com- 
munication and reply. A reply went out 
last night. 



56 



Q. What kind? Can you char- 
acterize it? 

A. I would characterize it as essen- 
tially concerned, but cautiously con- 
cerned. 

Q. Concerned but cautiously in 
what sense? In other words, does this 
second exchange mean that the Rus- 
sians were telling us. and we were 
telling the Russians, "Okay, we've 
cooled it. it looks like the heat's off? 

A. No, not in the context of that 
question. I think it was a continuing ex- 
pression of concern on the part of the 
Soviet leadership about the potential 
dangers of a spreading of the violence, 
and we share that concern ourselves. It 
doesn't mean that we accept the Soviet 
view as to why these conditions oc- 
curred, but thus far I would say that the 
situation is cautious on both sides. 

Q. I'm struck by the fact that you 
said earlier that no one really wants 
the status quo ante. When you add to 
this the fact that two Soviet clients, 
armed by the Soviet Union and trained 
by the Soviet Union, have been 
decisively bested in battle by an 
American ally with American training 
and American arms, isn't this a 
tremendous thing? I mean, aren't you 
really pleased? How can we possibly 
be displeased about that? 

A. No one is pleased when cir- 
cumstances involve the loss of innocent 
lives, and there's been too much of that 
in Lebanon today. The longer term 
strategic aspects of this question remain 
to be seen. 

Q. A little more than a year ago 
you went to the Middle East, pursu- 
ing—not without reason— something 
that was called a "strategic 
consensus." President Reagan sent 
you on that trip to establish this. Now 
we've had a change of the reality in 
the Middle East. We have a resurgent 
Iranian nationalism backed by the 
force of arms with Arab nations, at 
least fearing Iran as much as they pro- 
claim to fear Israel; we have a change 
in leadership in Saudi Arabia with a 
King who is supposed to be pro- 
American, but is subject to a lot of 
pressures both within the family and 
in the country and in the Muslim 
world. 

What is your sense today of this 
new reality in the Middle East, its op- 
portunities, its pitfalls, and the U.S. 
national interest in the Middle East? 

A. First, I want to make clear that 



the President didn't send me to the Mid- 
dle East to establish a strategic consen- 
sus but rather to recognize that a 
strategic consensus was emerging for 
precisely the reasons you just described 
It involved not only the growing concern 
of moderate Arab states about Soviet in- 
terventionism in the wake of the col- 
lapse of Iran and the invasion of 
Afghanistan but also the potential ex- 
ploitation of the radical Arab move- 
ment—the fundamentalist movement in 
Islam, especially in the Shi'ite sect. 
The fact that we described the 
phenomena a year ago should underline 
the fact that we recognize these forces 
were underway. Now they are impor- 
tantly underway. It means also, as I saii 
in Chicago during my speech in May, w( 
have three interrelated areas of concern 
with which the United States must deal 
and effectively cope in the months 
ahead— the peace process under Camp 
David, the situation in Lebanon which I 
described before recent events as highly 
volatile and likely to collapse in the con- 
flict, and perhaps the even more per- 
vasive and worrisome aspects of the fur 
damentalist movement emerging 
through Khomeini's Iran and casting a 
shadow of threat through the gulf state 
into Saudi Arabia and as far as the 
North African continent — Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Egypt itself. 

All of these factors must be dealt 
with in an integrated mosaic, which 
they, indeed, are. They are replete with 
contradictions, also. 

Q. Could I just cut through and 
ask at this point what differences, if 
any, King Khalid's death makes? 

A. Of course, as a friend and a col- 
laborator, it's viewed as a loss here. On 
the other hand, we're encouraged that 
the transition has proceeded, apparentl 
smoothly; that His Majesty King Fahd 
now in place. He, too, is a close friend 
and collaborator of the United States, s 
I view the situation as one of steady im 
provement in the relationships between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia. 

Q. Last week on this program. 
Secretary Regan— the Treasury 
Secretary— was a very good soldier. 
He came on and said that the agree- 
ment at Versailles to limit credits to 
the East bloc really implied that 
credits would be cut. Is it your 
understanding that the Versailles con 
munique will be violated unless 
credits will be cut to the East bloc by 
our allies? 

A. Not necessarily. I don't think th 
seven at Versailles control the full 



THE SECRETARY 



mechanism of credit management with 
the East, let alone the Soviet Union. As 
you know, the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] put forward some proposals 
recently which involve an increase in the 
interest rates and, in effect, on the time 
for repayment. 

They visualize that by moving the 
Soviet Union into a Category I recipient, 
that will have the effect of raising the 
price of credits to the Soviet Union, and 
we hope that by the 15th — the time the 
mandate would run out for the imple- 
mentation of that by the OECD— it will 
be implemented. 

What was done at Versailles was to 
put together for the first time a com- 
prehensive mechanism to begin to assess 
the whole range of East- West trade, 
credit transfer, and to do so with 
lassessments on 6-month intervals so 
that we can be sure that we are not 
overexposed. 

Q. But 2 days after the Versailles 
meeting ended. The New York Times 
earried a headline reporting that the 
" iPoles are now threatening us with de- 
fault, that they will go into default 
unless they get more loans to pay the 
* interest on their old loans. When you 
iwere on the show about 6 months ago, 
Ithe question was asked, "What in the 
Kvorld could be done by the Poles to 
iprovoke the United States into calling 
their default, default?" Your answer 
was that, "Unless things get better, 
we will get tougher." Things have not 
gotten better, and we have not gotten 
tougher. Is there any likelihood that 
kvell call them into default? 

A. It's still too early to say. I 
wouldn't suggest we haven't gotten 
xjugher because the pervasive impact of 
;he cutoff of credits to Poland has been 
substantial and has had a grievous effect 
Dn the economic development of Poland 
;oday, and we hear it every day. 

Q. One other bit of lobbying that 
was done at Versailles and has gone 
' ill over this town is that the Japanese 
ire lobbying for a waiver from the 
sanctions against the Soviet Union im- 
posed after Poland so that they can 
sell energy technology for yet another 
Soviet energy project. Is the Reagan 
\dministration going to grant this 
tvaiver? 

A. We're talking about some $2 
•nillion of energy-related equipment to 
;his Sakhalin pipeline? 



Q. Yes. 

A. The President has not made a 
Biecision on this question, just as he has 



not made a decision on the spare parts 
associated with the East- West pipeline 
and the extraterritoriality question on 
existing contracts. I would anticipate he 
will make this in the very near future in 
the wake of his assessment of — 

Q. Is it a hard call? I mean, this is 
punching holes in sanctions that are 
fairly porous to begin with. 

A. It is a hard call. It's a hard call 
because I think the President's been 
very, very strong in attempting to exer- 
cise leadership in Western Europe and 
in Japan. And, incidentally, we've had 
very good cooperation on the whole 
from Japan on this question and the 
question of whether or not the results of 
the decision really have a meaningful im- 
pact as a sanction against the Soviet 
Union to influence their behavior at the 
price of considerable sacrifice to 
American industry, jobs, and future 
markets. It's not an easy problem, and, 
of course, that's why it's been prolonged 
for so long. Easy ones are settled very 
easily. 

Q. There are reports from London 
that Prime Minister Thatcher, once 
the Falklands have been retaken from 
Argentina — assuming that hap- 
pens—wants to fortify them and 
perhaps give eventual independence to 
those islands. I thought our position 
was that there should be negotiations, 
including Argentina, to try to deter- 
mine the ultimate future. Is that our 
position? 

A. I think our position goes back to 
U.N. Resolution 502, and that resolution 
calls for the withdrawal of Argentine 
forces, the cessation of hostilities, and a 
diplomatic or political solution to the 
problem. 

Q. Including Argentina? Will it 
have a voice? 

A. Clearly, in controversies where 
two nations are involved, it can't be a 
unilateral thing. On the other hand — 

Q. Yes. But when one is defeated, 
they very seldom have the chance to 
decide who rolls the next dice. 

A. There's no question about that. 
That makes it somewhat of a different 
ballgame than it was before the violence 
began. 

Q. What do you want to see? 
When you got off the plane on your 
second and last trip there — that 
Thursday or Friday night— the first 
thing you hit the Argentinians with 
was that you were proceeding under 



U.N. Resolution 502. Are you still pro- 
ceeding under Resolution 502, and is 
the British Government? I have doubts 
about Mrs. Thatcher. Is she? 

A. I think it's too early to say. I 
think her first order of priority 
now — once the conflict has started — is 
either to have Argentina withdraw 
without conditions, which has not oc- 
curred and it doesn't look like it will, or 
to take military action to see that it does 
withdraw. 

Follownng that, I think we have an 
open menu. There are certain things 
Britain has discussed that they want. 
They want to rehabilitate the island. 
They want to reestablish the conditions 
of self-government, if you will, of the 
island population. Beyond that, I think it 
remains to be seen. 

Q. What's this going to do to 
NATO, keeping a force down there? 
How are they going to take care of the 
island? If they can't fly into Buenos 
Aires any more or any of the ports in 
the south, they have to fly into 
Montevideo. This is an untenable 
situation for NATO, is it not? 

A. I wouldn't describe it as unten- 
able for NATO. I would describe it as a 
situation which must be viewed in the 
context of the long-term relationships of 
Great Britain and the United States 
with the Southern Hemisphere, the need 
to bring about an outcome that has 
stability and justice. In the case of 
justice, that means that the views of the 
inhabitants on the island are considered 
in the ultimate outcome. 

Q. About Mrs. Kirkpatrick, our 
U.N. Ambassador. We saw a clip 
earlier of her saying that the U.S. 
foreign policy was inept and that 
many people conducting it are 
amateurs. Why is she still in the Ad- 
ministration, because she's talking 
about this Administration apparently? 

A. Too much has been said, too 
much has been written, and too much 
has been speculated on this subject. 

Q. But she said it. 

A. I'm not going to add to that. 

Q. She said too much has been 
said. She said it. 

A. She gave a speech which has 
been given several times before by her, 
which was, of course, because of its jux- 
taposition on other events propelled into 
great national attention by you gentle- 
men. 



Iuly1982 



57 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. No, she said it. We didn't do it. 

A. And you will find that she said it 
earlier as well. I want you to know — 

Q. She must believe it then. She 
must believe that amateurs run our 
foreign policy if she says it so often. 

A. I don't think that's what she 
said. I think she said that our foreign 
policy in recent years has been some- 
what amateurish, and I think someone 
could make an objective observation that 
on certain occasions that that might be 
true. 

Q. But your bottom line is forgive 
and forget? 

A. My bottom line is that we have 
important things to do and personal pec- 
cadilloes which tantalize you gentlemen 
so much, I understand, but I'm not go- 
ing to be a part of it. 



•Press release 198 of June 16, 1982. ■ 

News Conference 
of June 19 



Secretary Haig keld a news con- 
ference at the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations in New York on June 19, 1982.^ 

We have just completed 9V4 hours of 
discussions with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko; 5 yesterday and AV* this 
morning and early this afternoon. I'll 
just say a few words about those discus- 
sions and then touch upon some issues 
related both to the discussions and the 
activities of this past week here in New 
York. 

I would describe the meeting itself 
as full, frank, and useful. The topics 
ranged from the broad principles that 
should seek to underline East- West rela- 
tions in general and U.S. -Soviet rela- 
tions in particular. We went through the 
full range of global and regional issues 
of mutual importance and interest to 
both governments. And we also con- 
ducted discussions on a number of 
bilateral issues between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. One of the 
major areas of the discussions of yester- 
day was on the broad subject of arms 
control. 

In that regard, I would like to make 
some broad observations about the ac- 
tivities of the past week here at the 
disarmament conference: the position of 
President Reagan on this vitally impor- 
tant subject. 

The President's policies, as you 



58 



know, are based firmly on deeply rooted 
principles— and I'm talking now in the 
broad sense of East-West relationships 
and then arms control— of international 
conduct, in order. As a people, we 
Americans have always believed in rule 
of law, the settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means, and non-use of force ex- 
cept for self-defense. These are the prin- 
ciples that guide our approach to the 
various regional conflicts that confront 
us as a nation today. 

It is the President's sincere desire to 
put the U.S. -Soviet relationship on a 
stable, constructive, long-term basis. We 
see important potential advantages for 
both countries in every area of our rela- 
tionship, but this cannot be achieved 
without Soviet willingness to conduct its 
international affairs with responsibility 
and restraint. 

It is clearly, squarely up to the 
Soviets to determine what sort of rela- 
tionship they want to have with the 
United States in the months and years 
ahead. The United States, for its part, is 
prepared for constructive and mutually 
beneficial relations if the Soviet Union is 
prepared to join us in acting with the 
responsibility necessary in the nuclear 
age. We have made serious and realistic 
proposals to achieve this end. The objec- 
tive of the United States remains an 
overriding interest in the maintenance of 
peace and stability. 

I would like to say a word about 
arms control, in particular. With the 
negotiations on strategic arms reduction 
beginning later this month, the topic of 
arms control is clearly very high on the 
agenda of U.S. -Soviet relations. The full 
range of President Reagan's arms con- 
trol initiatives are now well known. 
They're all on the table. They are pro- 
posals which mark the way to the first 
significant reductions in the arsenals of 
the two major superpowers. 

With respect to START [Strategic 
Arms Reduction Talks] first. The Presi- 
dent's proposals provide an equitable 
basis for real and significant reductions 
of strategic nuclear weapons, beginning 
with the most destabilizing systems. 

East and West — especially the 
United States and the Soviet Union — 
have important reasons to curb weapons 
that threaten their retaliatory capa- 
bilities. We will consider most seriously 
the Soviet proposals, and the President 
has stated that nothing — and I repeat, 
nothing — is excluded from the upcoming 
START negotiations. 

In short, our approach to START is 
not one-sided, but it is designed with 
mutual benefit and mutual stability in 
mind. Now is the time to get on with 



serious negotiations devoid of public 
posturing. Similarly, on the inter- 
mediate-range missile question — the 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
talks — the seriousness of the President' 
proposals for total elimination of land- 
based intermediate-range missiles is 
very clear. It is our conviction that this 
proposal is an equitable and realistic ap- 
proach to the threat to peace created !>> 
the imbalance in such systems which 
now favors the Soviet Union. 

Last week's discussions, and the 
week before in Europe, underlined the 
fact and confirmed that the entire 
NATO alliance stands four-square 
behind the proposals put forth and 
underscores the alliance's commitment 
to proceed with the deployment of the 
1979 decision— that's for the Pershing 
lis and the GLCMs [ground-launched 
cruise missiles] — in the absence of an 
arms control solution. 

Finally, President Reagan's initiativ 
to reinvigorate the long-stalled negotia- 
tions on reducing conventional forces in 
Europe, his proposals to reduce the rist 
of accidental nuclear war and to conver 
an international conference on arms ex- 
penditures are now on the table for 
prompt responsive action by the Soviet 
Union. 

Together, all of these proposals 
represent a carefully thought through, 
integrated approach to arms control, 
and it is fitting that it has come togeth^ 
at a time of the U.N. Special Session oi 
Disarmament. It certainly stands in 
sharp contrast to the various cosmetic 
arms control proposals such as that as 
the non-first-use proposal made this 
week. Our position on this proposal re- 
mains clear: The United States stands 
for the non-use of force of any form ex 
cept in legitimate self-defense. 

The United States, together with it 
allies, intends to deter all war, conven- 
tional or nuclear. As the President saic 
in his speech on November 18th: "No 
NATO weapons, conventional or 
nuclear, will ever be used in Europe ex 
cept in response to attack." 

So, in sum, the President has now 
put forward a comprehensive agenda i< 
arms control which is balanced and 
equitable and which, for the first time, 
offers a way to reducing the burden of 
armaments at every level. We hope the 
the Soviet Union will negotiate serious 
with us on the agenda now before us. 
We will do our part, and we look to th< 
Soviet Union to turn from posturing tc 
serious talks in the interest of peace. V 
also call upon the Soviet Union to maU 



i 



THE SECRETARY 



ts words about arms control with con- 
a-ete actions demonstrating its 
ieriousness. 

I would note, for example, that only 
'sk few days after the speech here at the 
Jnited Nations given by Mr. Gromyko, 
vith emphasis on arms control in outer 
;pace, the Soviet Union has undertaken 
) in unusually high level of strategic ac- 
! ivity, including an antisatellite test, two 
CBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
aunches, an SS-20 launch, an SLBM 
sea-launched ballistic missile] launch, 
,nd two AMB [antiballistic missile] in- 
ercepts. Such activity belies, by specific 
xition, the words put forth to the world 
udience here in New York this week. 

Q. Do you have any apparent ex- 
ilanation for this increased strategic 
ictivity you just talked about, and did 
ou discuss with the foreign minister 
he possibility of a summit meeting 
letween Presidents Brezhnev and 
leagan? 

A. I have no explanation with 
espect to the first part of your question 
ther than to suggest that the best 
leasure of the real state of relation- 
lips between East and West and the 
oviet Union and the United States is 
le criteria of action and not words, as 
le President has repeated in the recent 
ast, especially in his recent trip to 
ATO, Europe. 

The question of summitry was 
iscussed in the meetings with Foreign 
'inister Gromyko, but I have nothing to 
it forward on that subject today. 

Q. You addressed arms control 
'hich presumably occupied you yester- 
ay. Could you take us through today 
I any greater detail? 

A. There was some discussion today 
1 the topic, but the bulk of today's 
scussions dealt with a range of 
!gional problems and a very extensive 
mge. 

Q. The strategic activity you 
iferred to, I understand these are in 
le area of tests. Are any of them pro- 
ibited by treaties or other agree- 
■ents? 

A. I would leave that observation 
itil later. It's clear that they are not 
)nsistent with the words that are being 
;ed. 

Q. In these strategic tests, what 
ind of activity does this compare to 
! the past? We have no basis for 
hich to say this is heavier or lighter 
lan usual. 

A. Unprecedented. 

Q. You said that you discussed 



regional issues. Was anything said 
about what is going on in Lebanon? 
Also, in the last talks there was said 
to be some stress because of the 
Soviets' imposing martial law in 
Poland. Was there any — 

A. Yes. I'm very happy to tell you 
the topics that were touched upon. By 
mutual agreement with my counterpart, 
I will not go into the character of the 
substance. That is the position we have 
followed — this is the third of the series 
of the discussions we've had. Of course, 
the Middle East was discussed, as was 
the other topic you mentioned. 

Q. Do you think that this strategic 
activity relates to any particular situa- 
tion in the world, in Lebanon, for ex- 
ample? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you discuss this strategic 
activity with Mr. Gromyko? 

A. No. 

Q. Why not? 

A. I think there are several reasons 
for it. We have had very extensive 
discussions on the topic of arms control. 
Some of the details of the activity I've 
described were not clear at the time I 
went into the discussions — they have 
become clear since. I believe they do 
underline the character of the difference 
sometimes between words and actions. 

Q. Your discussions began with 
him, as you know, yesterday. Do you 
mean that the evidence of this 
strategic activity was just within the 
last 24 hours? 

A. I mean it is very recent activity, 
and the integration of the various com- 
ponents of it have just been pulled 
together this morning — overnight. 

Q. To clarify an earlier response, 
did you mean to give the impression 
that there is some possibility that 
some of these tests may have been in 
violation of either of — 

A. No. I meant to give an indication 
that they run rather counter to the 
speech given here this week — 

Q. And nothing else. 

A. And repeated calls for restraint 
in outer space. 

Q. When you say "it runs counter 
to what was said," what was said at 
the speech was that the Soviet Union 
would like arms control agreements, 
and they made a pledge not to be the 
first to use nuclear weapons. Could 
you just embroider what you mean — 



why it runs counter to Gromyko's 
speech? 

A. I prefer not to go into an exten- 
sive "Who shot John?" on this. I put this 
information forward because it does 
represent a significant first in both the 
scope and integration of activity and 
capability. 

Q. Has there ever been any period 
of American testing that compares to 
this? To put this thing in further 
perspective, is there a way to put it in 
percentages? 

A. No, I prefer not to do that other 
than to suggest that this is a first in the 
context of the activities by either the 
East or the West. 

Q. Could you help us understand 
the way these meetings go? If you are 
clearly troubled by the evidence that 
you are presenting to us here — you 
tell us it came together in the middle 
of the night, you've been talking to 
them for iVt hours this morning — why 
didn't you raise it with them? 

A. I think the point I just made was 
that it was not available to me in its en- 
tirety before I started these meetings 
but rather subsequent thereto. That is 
not to suggest I would have raised it in 
the meeting, in any event. 

Q. Is this the kind of thing that 
does get raised? 

A. Probably, but not necessarily. 

Q. I get the feeling that your hav- 
ing come out of this meeting, and 
made this rather discouraging — from 
your standpoint— announcement, that 
the meeting itself didn't accomplish 
much. Is that right? 

A. No. I described the meeting as 
useful, and I think it is always useful to 
conduct far-ranging discussions with my 
counterpart in the Soviet Union. They 
inevitably bring about consequences 
which are favorable, and I don't view 
this meeting as any exception. 

Q. Just prior to the meeting, you 
had described the Soviet's approach to 
the Middle East in the communica- 
tions you have had as cautious. On the 
basis of the last 2 days, would you 
still say that that is their general ap- 
proach to the situation? 

A. Concerned and cautious, yes. 

Q. I'm still not quite clear on what 
you mean by the integration of these 
various strategic tests. What — 

A. I think I called them "strategic 
activity." 

Q. What relationship is there be- 
tween these? For example, are the two 



le|jiy1982 



59 



THE SECRETARY 



ABM intercepts related to the two 
ICBM launches? 

A. Integrated. 

Q. Did they involve [inaudible] or 
explosions? 

A. I didn't hear — 

Q. Can you tell us which test 
ranges? 

A. No. No, no, I can't do that. 

Q. How do you interpret this? 
What does it mean, this activity? 

A. It shows the level of interest, 
skill, and technological advancement 
that should be of concern. 

Q. Is a summit meeting between 
the two leaders likely by the end of 
the year, would you say? 

A. I don't want to comment on that. 
I'm sure the President will comment on 
the subject in the months ahead. I think 
both sides clearly have made their posi- 
tion clear on summitry, and they are 
surprisingly convergent, and that is that 
summitry' for summitry's sake is to be 
avoided; but rather summitry that has 
been well prepared, that will result in a 
positive movement forward is far 
preferable to an ad hoc kind of summitry 
in which expectations rise 
before — sometimes in the past, we have 
seen even euphoric expectations that 
were only dashed following such ill- 
prepared summits. I don't think either 
side wants to go into such [inaudible]. 

Q. You said that the United States 
favors the rule of law in the settle- 
ment of disputes except in legitimate 
self-defense. Would you include the 
Israeli actions in Lebanon this past 
week to be covered by that rubric? 

A. Clearly, there is a great deal in 
support of that. A number of objective 
observers might question the scope of 
the counteraction and the character of 
it. We have, as a government, not made 
a ruling on that as yet. 

Q. Would you expect to either pro- 
test or to inquire about these strategic 
activities once you are — 

A. I would like to wait until we 
have had an opportunity to consider 
what we will do with respect to it. It 
might be a decision to do nothing. 

Q. There is a possible further 
response to it? 
A. Possibly. 



Q. Can you run through with us 
what progress, if any, has been made 
in your effort to strengthen the cease- 
fire in Lebanon? 

A. Phil Habib [Ambassador Philip 
C. Habib, the President's special 
emissary to the Middle East] has been 
intensely engaged in the whole 
framework of the crisis in Lebanon, both 
in search of a permanent and lasting 
cease-fire and in creating the conditions 
by which the sovereignty of the central 
Government of Lebanon will be en- 
hanced and strengthened as a conse- 
quence of this tragedy. I think while this 
activity is underway, it sometimes is 
counterproductive to become too specific 
on how; but he has been in touch with 
all the internal parties and with the ex- 
ternal parties involved as well. And we 
have been back-stopping here in 
Washington on an hourly basis and 
throughout the night. 

That situation has not changed from 
the beginning of this crisis; especially 
the President has personally followed it 
moment by moment. I just spoke to him 
at Camp David, and it is clear that the 
United States is doing all within its 
power to have a situation in which the 
bloodshed terminates, and the conditions 
for a long-term settlement are enhanced. 

Q. Do you find that the Soviet 
policy, as best you understand it now, 
works in the same direction as 
America's? 

A. I would not describe it that way. 
On the other hand, I would not indict re- 
cent Soviet activity as particularly 
troublesome or counterproductive. 

Q. On that strategic activity, do 
you regard that as an acceleration of 
some of the past activities that they've 
had, or is this, given the integrated 
nature as you characterized it, 
something that involved an entirely 
new effort by the Soviets? 

A. 1 think there has been enough 
said on this subject. Clearly, I wanted 
you to have the information as quickly 
as it was available and releasable. We've 
done that, and I think I'd just like to let 
it drop there. 

Q. Would you be kind enough, so 
we don't botch this up, could you run 



through exactly what you said about 
this strategic activity? 

A. All right, and I do refer to it as 

"activity." 

Q. You didn't answer the questioi 
about the nuclear explosions. 

A. I'm about to. Oh, no; no nuclear 
no. 

I will repeat what I said on this sut 
ject. I would note, for example, that 
only a few days after the speech at the 
United Nations which touched upon 
outer space arms control, the Soviet 
Union has undertaken an unusually hig 
level of strategic activity, including an 
antisatellite test, two ICBM launches, ; 
SS-20 launch, an SLBM launch, and tv 
ABM intercepts. 

Q. You mentioned earlier that yoi 
had not taken a position on whether 
this Israeli activity in Lebanon is in 
self-defense or not. Can you say, firs 
of all, why you have not taken a posi 
tion on that? And secondly, the Unitt 
States has maintained that it wants : 
the foreign troops out of Lebanon. 
Was that a similar Soviet point of 
view? And is the United States think 
ing of a particular timeframe on the 
withdrawal of such troops from 
Lebanon? 

A. I don't know what the Soviet 
view is on the subject of foreign forcet 
in Lebanon. The U.S. view is, of coursi 
that we would like to see ultimately al! 
foreign forces out of Lebanon so that 
the central government can conduct th 
sovereign affairs of a sovereign goveri' 
ment within internationally recognized 
borders. 

With respect to the other question 
it is clear that there was a sequence o 
events that has been going on for an e 
tended period involving actions and 
counter-actions, terrorist activity, 
across-the-border shelling and rocket u 
tacks, and a series of air- and counter 
actions. Clearly, this recent crisis is thi 
culmmation of a long period of unaccei 
table instability in southern Lebanon a 
perhaps throughout Lebanon. I think 
there will have to be a very careful 
analysis of events associated with this 
recent crisis before the kind of value 
judgment you've asked for would be a 
propriate. 



1 
i 



'Press release 203 of June 21, 1982. ■! 



60 



Department of State Bulla 



AFRICA 



FY 1983 Assistance Requests 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Statement before the Subcornmittee 
tkn Foreign Operations of the House Ap- 

oropriations Committee on March 25, 
it 1982. Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary 

for African Affairs. ' 

[ appreciate this opportunity to discuss 
vith you the integrated foreign 
issistance budget for Africa which the 
President has proposed for fiscal year 
a|L983. We view this budget as vitally im- 
jortant since it represents the principal 
;ool the U.S. Government has at its 
iisposal for effecting its goals in the 
'oreign policy area. 

About 1 year ago, this Administra- 
ion initially defined its foreign policy 
)bjectives for Africa. I would like to 
■eview those objectives for you and what 
believe are our accomplishments to 
late, and then take a look at the un- 
inished agenda which remains — 
■specially in relation to the assistance 
irograms the President has proposed to 
he Congress. 

J.S. Objectives 

nd Accomplishments 

'rom the outset we have sought to pro- 
lote peace and regional security in 
ifrica and to deny opportunities to all 
tiose who pursue contrary objectives. 
^e promised to support proven friends 
nd to be a reliable partner, in Africa as 
Isewhere. We stated our interest in 
laintaining access to key resources and 
icreasing mutually advantageous trade 
nd investment. We said that we sup- 
ort peaceful solutions to the problems 
f southern Africa, and, as you know, 
le search for that goal has been one of 
ur major activities over the past year, 
/e pledged ourselves to make a special 
ffort on behalf of that group of nations 
1 Africa whose development policies 
roduce genuine economic progress and 
'hich have working democratic institu- 
ons. And we promised to do our share 
1 meeting Africa's humanitarian needs 
nd in supporting basic human liberties, 
1 keeping both with American prin- 
iples and American interests. 

In the first year of the Reagan Ad- 
linistration we have made a good 
leasure of progress. We have actively 
'nt support to various efforts, especially 
lose initiated by the African states 
lemselves, designed to stop hostilities 
nd establish the structures necessary 



Wuly1982 



for peace in several parts of Africa. The 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
under the positive and energetic leader- 
ship of Kenya's President Daniel arap 
Moi, has undertaken a number of ini- 
tiatives which we supported either 
politically or materially. In Chad we pro- 
vided nonlethal equipment and supplies 
for the Nigerian and Zairian contingents 
of the OAU peacekeeping force. We con- 
tinue to give full diplomatic support to 
the OAU peace effort in the Western 
Sahara. 

In southern Africa our efforts as a 
member of the contact group have been 
instrumental in bringing the peace proc- 
ess there close to the point where phase 
one of the three-phase Namibia negotia- 
tions is almost complete. Good friends in 
Africa have had ample demonstrations 
throughout this year that the support 
and friendship of the United States is 
not in doubt, and we have thus made 
considerable progress in strengthening 
the resolve of a number of these states 
in resisting the pressures and ex- 
periments in adventurism which the 
Soviets and their surrogates continue. 

The private sector, both in the 
United States and in Africa, has been 
engaged in a serious effort to expand 
our commercial links in ways which are 
genuinely beneficial to both parties and 
which we believe will ultimately 
strengthen African economies where the 
private sector is still nascent and fragile 
or discouraged by the negative ex- 
periences of the past two decades. The 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) has initiated new programs 
designed both to stimulate additional in- 
vestment opportunities and to assist in a 
variety of ways the further development 
of African entrepreneurship. Our most 
dramatic recent initiative in this area 
was a high-level trade and investment 
mission to a numbei' of African countries 
led by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm 
Baldrige and Secretary of Agriculture 
John R. Block. 

In short, we have made solid prog- 
ress on several fronts, not as the key 
player in the African drama and certain- 
ly not as either Africa's principal "angel 
of mercy" or as its policeman, but rather 
as one important member of a team of 
like-minded nations which have the con- 
tinent's long-term interests at heart. 

Of course, much remains to be done. 
Africa still faces a range of problems, 
some resulting from natural causes and 
others manmade. A number of African 



countries have what I can only describe 
as dangerously troubled economies. 
Others live in the shadow of different 
threats, such as those posed by hostile 
neighbors. Only a few seem to be 
holding their own. 

Assistance Proposals 

The assistance programs which we are 
proposing are designed to address both 
economic and security goals, for we 
recognize that sooner or later peace and 
development are interdependent sides of 
the same coin. We expect that our ef- 
forts, combined with those of other 
Western and multilateral donors, will 
achieve further progress. Clearly the 
process will not be quick or easy, for 
reasons that are well known. Africa has 
the worst economic growth rate of any 
continent. It contains two-thirds of those 
countries certified by the United Nations 
as being the very poorest. It is also the 
only continent with declining per capita 
food production. Last year Africa's food 
import bill alone rose by 17%, or $1 
billion, an amount equivalent to our total 
aid program. Many African nations are 
caught in the merciless squeeze of high 
oil prices, stagnating export production, 
and ever-mounting debt. All too often 
governments have opted for economic 
policies which work against sustained, 
real economic growth. We are encour- 
aged, however, by a growing awareness 
among Africans themselves that an im- 
proved economic policy climate, com- 
bined with increased trade and invest- 
ment, is the real key to economic growth 
and that without growth, equity will re- 
main elusive. 

We are not proposing charity pro- 
grams. In every case, the development 
and security measures which we support 
with our aid require resource com- 
mitments and often tough decisions by 
the Africans themselves. Our economic 
programs, funded by development 
assistance, economic support funds 
(ESF), and PL 480, encourage and sup- 
port the self-help efforts of the Africans 
and are designed to complement the 
much larger resource flows provided by 
multilateral institutions — chiefly the 
World Bank — as well as the economic 
stabilization programs of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). Our securi- 
ty assistance programs, constituting less 
than one-quarter of our total request, 
provide a minimum level of response to 
those of our friends who face armed 
enemies. We recognize that security pro- 
grams cost money which, in a perfect 
world, could be devoted to economic pro- 
grams. We are requesting $210 million 



61 



AFRICA 



of our $234 million foreign military sales 
(FMS) in direct credits so that we can 
ease the repayment burden by offering 
concessional terms. Nevertheless, in 
Africa, as in the United States where 
security needs exist, they must be ad- 
dressed. 

Our total proposed FY 1983 Africa 
assistance program is divided as follows: 

Development Assistance $324 niillion 

Economic Support Funds 325 

PL 480, Title I & III 117 

PL 480, Title II 75 

Foreign Military Sales 234 

International Military 9 

Education and Training 

Program 
TOTAL $1,084 million 

Our program is focused on regions 
where U.S. economic interests and 
security interests are greatest. For ex- 
ample, in FY 1981, 41% of the total 
budget was allocated to six key coun- 
tries — Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Zim- 
babwe, Liberia, and Zaire. For FY 1983, 
the same six account for 62%. We 
believe the quantitative increase I have 
just cited is indicative of a qualitative in- 
crease in both the country specific pro- 
grams and in the African assistance pro- 
gram as a whole. 

Sudan. Sudan is a country of great 
strategic importance which lives under 
constant threat from Libyan efforts at 
subversion and has a dangerously 
troubled economy. Its location on the 
Red Sea, between Libya and Ethiopia, 
and south of Egypt makes its impor- 
tance and its major problems quite evi- 
dent. Our proposed programs there in- 
clude $25 million in development 
assistance — focused on integrated rural 
development— $100 million in FMS, $70 
million in ESF, $30 million in PL-480 
Title I and III, and $1.5 million in 
IMET. 

Horn of Africa and the Indian 
Ocean. Here we are proposing programs 
for five African states: Kenya, Somalia, 
Djibouti, Seychelles, and Mauritius. The 
countries of this region face unprec- 
edented economic difficulties and must 
consider their security needs in the light 
of Soviet and Cuban military presence in 
Ethiopia, South Yemen, and the Indian 
Ocean. Kenya and Somalia also provide 
critical facilities for the use of U.S. 
forces temporarily in that area. For 



FY 1983 ASSISTAI 
( 









PL 480 


PL 480 










Development 




(Titles 


(Title 










Assistance 


ESF 


I/III) 


II)' 


FMS 


IMET2 


Total 


Angola 


- 


- 


- 


.4 


- 


- 


.4 


Benin 


_ 


— 


— 


.5 


- 


_ 


.5 


Botswana 


- 


10 


— 


1.1 


5 


.125 


16.2 


Burundi 


5.6 


- 


- 


2.4 


- 


.03 


8 


Cameroon 


17 


_ 


_ 


1 


10 


.150 


28.2 


Cape Verde 


2.2 


- 


- 


.8 


- 


.035 


3 


Central African 


1 


- 


- 


- 


_ 


— 


1 


Republic 
















Chad 


- 


— 


_ 


.2 


_ 


_ 


.2 


Comoros 


— 


— 


- 


.3 


_ 


_ 


.3 


Congo 


2 


- 


- 


.3 


- 


.035 


2.3 


Dijibouti 


- 


2 


- 


2.6 


1.5 


.100 


6.2 


Equatorial Guinea 


1 


- 


- 


.3 


_ 


.05 


1.4 


Ethiopia 


- 


- 


- 


1.9 


- 


- 


1.9 


Gabon 


_ 


_ 


_ 


_ 


3 


.100 


3.1 


The Gambia 


5.1 


_ 


_ 


.9 


_ 


_ 


6 


Ghana 


4.6 


_ 


7 


6.2 


_ 


.45 


18.3 


Guinea 


2 


- 


2.5 


.3 


_ 


.035 


4.8 


Guinea-Bissau 


2 


- 


- 


.4 


- 


.035 


2.4 



Ivory Coast 

Kenya 

Lesotho 
Liberia 

Madagascar 

Malawi 

Mali 

Mauritania 

Mauritius 

Mozambique 



28 

10.8 
12 



7 

9.7 

6.8 



30 

32 



15 
11 

3.5 



8.8 
.4 



4.2 
.7 
.6 



35 



15 



.05 

1.5 

.80 

.02 
.06 
.125 
.05 



.05 

112.5 

19.6 
71.2 

1 

7.7 

9.8 

11.1 

6.2 

.6 



these five countries our suggested pro- 
gram levels total: 

Development Assistance $ 45 million 
Foreign Military Sales 66.5 

(of which $21 million 

is concessional) 
Economic Support Funds 61 
PL 480, Titles I and III 33.5 

International Military 2.1 

Education and Training 

Program 
TOTAL $208.1 million 

West Africa. This area contains a 
number of states where adequate aid is 
essential to prevent economic instability 
and Libyan adventurism from damaging 
U.S. interests. This danger is real. 
Declining economic conditions in Ghana 
were major factors leading to last 
December's coup. The Libyans moved 
rapidly to try to take advantage of the 



situation. Other potential danger spots 
include Cameroon, Gabon, Niger, 
Senegal, and Liberia. In Liberia, a coun 
try in which we have important strategi 
interests and substantial American in- 
vestment, our aid is part of a carefully 
structured program aimed at promoting 
the economic recovery which is vital to 
political stability. West Africa is an ares 
which rarely captures the headlines but 
is susceptible to destabilization of the 
type in which Libya is fast becoming an 
expert. The poverty of the Sahel pro- 
vides Libya its main opportunity there. 
Our aid will help to insure continued ac- 
cess to important facilities and to build 
economically and politically self- 
confident states around Nigeria — our 
second largest source of imported oil. 



I 

on 

Si 



'U 
|ile 

E( 
Tr 



Hi 
m 

It 



62 



Department of State Bulletii 



k 



L 



>TS FOR AFRICA 



[iger 
figeria 

.wanda 

ao Tome 

enegal 

eychelles 

ierra Leone 

omalia 

udan 

waziland 

'anzania 
ogo 

fganda 
fpper Volta 

aire 

ambia 

imbabwe 

Subtotal 

ahel Regional 
outhern Africa 
Regional 
irica Regional 

•OTAL 



Development 
Assistance 

15.7 
5.3 



ESF 



PL 480 
(Titles 
I/III) 



PL 480 

(Title 

II)' 

.1 
3.3 



FMS IMET2 Totals 



1.5 



.45 



.075 



26.3 



10.4 



_ 


- 


- 


.06 


- 


- 


.06 


16.9 


10 


8 


8.9 


5 


.45 


49.3 


- 


2 


- 


.4 


- 


- 


2.4 


1 


- 


3 


1.3 


- 


.025 


5.3 


17 


25 


15 


3.7 


30 


.055 


91.3 


25 


70 


30 


3.4 


100 


1.5 


229.9 


6.5 


- 


- 


.7 


- 


- 


7.2 


10.2 


_ 


5 


2.5 


— 


.075 


17.8 


2.9 


- 


- 


1.6 


- 


.075 


4.6 


5.5 


_ 


_ 


_ 


_ 


.050 


5.6 


9.8 


- 


- 


7.7 


- 


.135 


17.6 


10 


15 


10 


2.1 


20 


1.3 


58.4 


— 


20 


7 


- 


- 


.150 


27.2 


- 


75 


- 


- 


3 


.150 


78.2 


242.8 


298 


117 


74.7 


234 


8.7 


975.5 


27.6 


_ 


_ 


_ 


_ 


_ 


27.6 


3 


27 


- 


- 


- 


- 


30 


50 


- 


- 


- 


- 


- 


50 


323.4 


325 


117 


74.7 


234 


8.7 


1,083.1 



' Includes world food program, voluntary agency and government programs; does not 
iclude emergency feeding programs that may be necessary in 1983. 

2 Includes military assistance program ($.175). 

s Does not include Peace Corps, military assistance program, or international narcotics 
antrol. 



'he totals for this category are as 
dUows: 



•evelopment 
Assistance 


$ 62 million 


oreign Military 
Sales 


38 


Iconomic Support 
Funds 


47 


•L 480, Titles I & III 


19 


nternational Military 
Education and 


1.950 


Training Progam 
:OTAL 


$167,950 million 



Southern Africa. We propose pro- 
-ams for seven nations — Botswana, 
jesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire, 
'imbabwe, and Zambia and the southern 
Africa regional program. The totals are: 

Jevelopment 

Assistance $ 34.3 million 

foreign Military Sales 28 



Economic Support 

Funds 147 

(including $27 million for 

the southern Africa 

regional prog^ram) 
PL 480, Title I 17 

International Military 1.785 

Education and 

Training Program 
TOTAL $228.1 million 

In Southern Africa our policy is 
designed to insure continued Western 
access to Itey strategic minerals, to pro- 
mote regional stability, to reduce oppor- 
tunities for Soviet and Cuban exploita- 
tion, and to seek negotiated solutions to 
the key problems of the region. The 
historic conflicts in southern Africa have 
provided the greatest opportunities to 
date for malign exploitation. We also 
have commitments to assist in the 
development of the front-line states 



AFRICA 



whose participation is essential to a suc- 
cessful Namibia peace agreement. I can- 
not stress too strongly the importance of 
our assistance programs in relation to 
our ongoing southern Africa strategy 
which is, as you know, a major focal 
point of this Administration's Africa 
policy. Our commitments and the overall 
level and thrust of these assistance pro- 
grams are watched very carefully by the 
countries of the region as the real test 
of our sincerity and seriousness of pur- 
pose there. In Zaire our continuing 
assistance helps to promote economic 
and other reforms and to forestall a 
repetition of events like the 1978 Shaba 
invasion. 

A substantial portion of our aid is 
proposed for countries which rank 
among the world's poorest. Some of 
these countries are of high strategic im- 
portance, and like Somalia and Sudan, 
are among those mentioned in the 
categories I have just described. Many, 
despite current problems, have great 
economic potential. In all cases, our 
assistance reflects President Reagan's 
pledge at Cancun to maintain a generous 
level of assistance to the poorer coun- 
tries. Typically, our aid to these coun- 
tries is provided through small, sharply 
focused development assistance pro- 
grams, complemented where necessary 
by PL 480. 

I know you share with me a deep 
and serious concern for the goals we 
pursue through the means of these pro- 
posed programs even though some of 
you may differ with us over some of the 
details. We live in a time when the 
United States and its friends and those 
who would be our friends find them- 
selves assaulted on several fronts by 
problems of enormous scale and enemies 
as dangerous as they are implacable. I 
believe the programs outlined in this 
presentation help address those prob- 
lems and meet the challenge those 
enemies present in a thoughtful, con- 
structive, and effective manner. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



uly1982 



63 



DEPARTMENT 



n 



FY 1983 Authorization 
Request 



by Secretary Haig 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on State, Justice, Commerce, and the 
Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee on May U, 1982} 

It is a great pleasure to be here today to 
begin hearings on the President's FY 
1983 budget for the Department of 
State. 

The international challenges and op- 
portunities facing the United States to- 
day have placed the Foreign Service and 
the Department of State in the front-line 
defense of our national interests. Ac- 
curate and clear reporting are critical if 
we are to anticipate political and 
economic events. Intellectual and 
diplomatic creativity are essential if we 
are to establish and sustain the trust, 
friendship, and understanding of other 
countries. A strong and vital Foreign 
Service enables us to handle the 
multitude of foreign policy problems, in- 
cluding the preservation of peace. 

The President recognizes that suc- 
cessful diplomacy rests on a solid foun- 
dation of strength and resolve. But 
renewed military strength serves its 
true purpose of preserving peace when 
it is accompanied by diplomatic efforts 
to settle disputes, strengthen alliances, 
promote development, and reduce the 
risks of war. As a soldier as well as a 
diplomat, I can tell you that diplomacy is 
an investment in deterrence itself. 
The task of statesmanship is to 
shape events, not merely to react to 
them. In a world marked by many 
powers and interests, the President has 
established a transcending objective for 
the United States— to create an interna- 
tional environment hospitable to 
American values, especially the freedom 
and creativity of the individual. To ac- 
complish this task, we have emphasized 
the strengthening of our traditional 
alliances and the nurturing of new part- 
nerships, the promotion of peaceful 
progress in the developing world, and 
the achievement of a relationship with 
the Soviet Union based on restraint and 
reciprocity. We can influence interna- 
tional events if we have the knowledge 
and the sensitivity to appreciate regional 
realities and the unique circumstances of 
every country. This can only be done if 



64 



we have the informed reporting and the 
understanding of our professional 
Foreign Service. 

The budget before you is necessary 
to sustain the excellence of the Foreign 
Service. We put it forward fully 
recognizing the requirements of these 
austere times, and we are committed to 
the President's program of fiscal 
restraint. The Department has done its 
full share to meet the reductions re- 
quired by this program. In FY 1982 
alone, the Department has reduced more 
than $200 million from our March 1981 
request. As a consequence, there have 
also been substantial reductions in the 
Department's activities. The 1983 budget 
request is, therefore, critical if we are to 
continue to meet U.S. foreign policy 
goals. 

Operational funding in the 1983 
budget is approximately equal in con- 
stant dollars to the 1974 appropriations. 
During this same period, the respon- 
sibilities of the Department have grown, 
and the complexities of diplomacy have 
increased. However, our key resource- 
people— has declined in numbers. The 
Department has also been forced to 
reduce expenditures for a number of ma- 
jor activities in order to absorb many 
new programs. All too frequently, we 
have failed to make the provisions 
necessary today to insure a better serv- 
ice tomorrow. 

This dangerous trend must be 
reversed. The 1983 budget proposes pru- 
dent increases that constitute a long- 
term investment in both personnel and 
property. Even with these modest 
changes, we will have the smallest 
budget outlays of any cabinet-level agen- 
cy. With the full support of this commit- 
tee and the Congress, the Department 
will be able to make major cost-effective 
strides toward meeting its objectives. 

Under Secretary Kennedy [for 
Management Richard T.] and other rep- 
resentatives of the Department will ad- 
dress the specifics of the budget, but 
allow me to mention certain items which 
are of particular significance. 

• About 82% of our total 1983 in- 
crease is needed just to operate at cur- 
rent levels. Most of this increase offsets 
the effects of overseas wage and price 
increases in countries abroad where in- 
flation is often substantially higher than 
in the United States. Also, burgeoning 
passport and consular requirements will 



din 



jrffl 

)B-i 



Iff 



ion 

in 



fc 



alone require over 100 new positions in 
1983. 

• The remaining 18% of our 1983 
increase is for several programs of key 
importance. This includes resources as 
part of a continuing program supportec 
by the Congress to strengthen substan- 
tive political and economic reporting an 
analysis in critical regions such as the 
Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia. 

• A lean and efficient cadre of pro- 
fessional officers is required to perform 
effectively a myriad of foreign policy 
responsibilities. As a step in implement 
ing the Foreign Service Act of 1980, th 
1983 budget includes a modest incre 
ment of new positions and funds to 
carry out a mandatory midlevel trainin] 
program for career officers. This invest 
ment in education will strengthen our 
capacity to manage U.S. foreign policy 
by insuring that officers achieve high 
standards of professional excellence. 

The budget also funds the first 
phase of construction for our new em- 
bassy complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
This project is imperative physically an. 
politically. The upcoming shift of the 
Saudi diplomatic capital from Jidda to 
Riyadh in the fall of 1983— a distance c 
800 miles— makes this project 
necessary. Without it, relations betwee: 
the United States and our Saudi allies 
will be hampered as they proceed to 
establish formally this new diplomatic 
capital. In addition, further delaying 
construction of the chancery and em- 
bassy residences to 1984 will increase 
the total cost of this project by some $' 
million because of inflation and rental 
costs. 

The 1983 budget also provides for 
necessary efficiencies and economies in 
areas throughout the Department. 

• We want to enhance communica- 
tions and computer capacity, particular 
by updating obsolete systems. This will 
include continuing development of the 
new financial management system so 
policymakers in the Department can 
make sound decisions on resource alloc 
tions. 

• Additional resources are needed 
for the President's program to combat 
waste, fraud, and mismanagement. 

• Strengthened administrative 
capacity is required in underdeveloped 
countries where our workload has 
dramatically increased. 

These efforts, while requiring 
relatively small investments, will more 
than pay for themselves through the 
cost-savings they will achieve. Delay on 



Department of State Bullet 



£AST ASIA 



uch matters will not only aggravate 
urrent inefficiencies but mean higher 
tart-up costs in the future. 

These additional resource re- 
uirements are necessary to maintain 
he Department's institutional respon- 
ibilities. But our foreign service and 
ther employees are also facing real 
angers abroad. I must reemphasize to 
he committee that security for our per- 
onnel remains the Department's highest 
riority. Indeed, because of the recent 
idividual acts of terrorism directed 
gainst specific officers abroad, such as 
Iharge Chapman, General Dozier, and 
issistant Military Attache Ray, we are 
loving rapidly to blunt this growing 
nreat to the safety of our employees. 
lU urgent request to meet 1982 sup- 
lemental security requirements has 
ecently been transmitted to Congress 
hich will provide additional armored 
ehicles and guard services and improve 
ublic access controls and communica- 
ons. 

In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy 
lUst provide a broad framework to 
)ster respect for individual liberty, to 



preserve peace, to increase security, and 
to promote development. But if the 
United States is to conduct an effective 
policy directed toward the goals, then 
the State Department must have the 
necessary resources; we simply cannot 
carry out our foreign policy initiatives, 
including programs of military and 
developmental aid, unless we have an 
adequate infrastructure. I am confident 
that we will continue to receive your 
support for this infrastructure in the 
crucial times ahead. 

This budget is the product of 
rigorous effort. It constitutes a sound 
program for the conduct of current 
operations, and, just as important, it of- 
fers an investment for the future. The 
American people and the foreign policy 
professionals who serve them so well 
deserve no less. 



'Press release 156. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



=Y 1983 Assistance Requests 



,1 John H. Holdridge 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
I Government Operations of the House 
^ypropriations Committee on March 30, 
>S2. Ambassador Holdridge is Assistant 
zcretary for East Asian and Pacific Af- 



am pleased with the opportunity to ex- 
ain our FY 1983 budget request and 
s relationship to U.S. interests in the 
acific and how it serves these interests 
/ meeting the needs of regional states 
id institutions. 

.S. Interests 

he U.S. assistance programs to East 
-sian and Pacific countries are designed 
3 serve the many U.S. interests in this 
ighly important region. It is important 
:>r us to strengthen the ties with our 
•lends and allies in East Asia and help 
nem maintain their independence and 
;rritorial integrity in the face of cur- 
ent and potential threats. 

East Asia contains some of the 
/orld's most rapidly growing economies, 
nd the economic ties of these nations to 
he United States are of increasing im- 
lortance to our economy. In fact, for 10 



consecutive years our Asian Pacific 
trade has surpassed that with Western 
Europe. We must maintain access to 
vital raw materials for which the region 
is a significant source. 

Protection of key sea lanes of com- 
munications in the region and those that 
link East Asia to the Indian Ocean and 
the Middle East is crucial to U.S. secu- 
rity. This aspect of U.S. security war- 
rants special attention considering the 
increased Soviet ability to threaten the 
sea lanes and thereby deny Middle 
Eastern petroleum to our major East 
Asian allies, as well as other vital trade 
among regional states such as exists be- 
tween Japan and Australia. 

Enhancing the stability of friendly 
governments of the area facilitates their 
serving as forces for peace and develop- 
ment in the region and permits them to 
act in ways that further our common 
global security and other interests. We 
also believe that stable, self-confident 
governments will be more inclined to 
undertake actions which will improve 
the human rights situation and the 
humanitarian services in their countries, 
thereby serving the U.S. global interests 
in furthering human rights. Human 
rights abuses undermine governmental 



legitimacy and thereby may become a 
destabilizing factor tending to vitiate 
other components of our strategy to 
foster peace, prosperity, and stability. 

The increasing strength of the 
Soviet Union's military forces in East 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle 
East prompts some of our particular 
concerns, and the continuing threat to 
South Korea from North Korea and to 
Thailand from Vietman are the source of 
special assistance efforts. In this con- 
text, a strong U.S. military presence in 
East Asia is essential, and unhampered 
use of military facilities such as those in 
the Phillippines are an essential compo- 
nent of this presence. In turn, our 
assistance program is an integral part of 
our good relations with the Philippines 
on which effective use of these facilities 
depends. 

Maintenance of stability on the 
Korean Peninsula depends upon 
strengthening the South Korean Armed 
Forces to balance the large and well- 
equipped forces of North Korea. The 
security of the entire North Pacific 
would be seriously impaired if the 
Korean balance were upset. 

The strengthening of Thailand's 
armed forces is essential at this point 
considering Vietnam's continued mOitary 
occupation of Kampuchea and its recent 
force improvements in that country. 
Confidence in the effectiveness of the 
U.S. contribution of Thailand's defense 
is a key factor in ASEAN [Association 
of South East Asian Nations] percep- 
tions of a positive and effective U.S. 
policy in the area. In the wake of Viet- 
nam's invasion of Kampuchea, the 
ASEAN members have also wisely 
undertaken military modernization pro- 
grams which we are supporting. 

Unfortunately, U.S. interests and 
East Asian needs must be addressed in 
the context of severe economic con- 
straints which affect both our friends 
and ourselves. High petroleum prices, 
the inflated cost of hardware, sharp 
limits on grant aid or concessional fi- 
nancing, and growing debt servicing 
problems are among the factors which 
hamper the defense procurement pro- 
grams of our East Asian allies and 
friends. 

Regional Program Overview 

Conceptually, FY 1983's military and 
economic development assistance pro- 
grams are integrated components of a 
single strategic package. All components 
are directly related to U.S. strategic in- 
terests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
but my remarks today concern primarily 



uly1982 



65 



EAST ASIA 



military assistance— the foreign nnilitary 
sales (FMS), international miliUry 
education and training (IMET), and 
economic support funds (ESF) programs 
which we have proposed for FY 1983. 

The preponderance of security 
assistance program resources is 
allocated to countries facing the greatest 
and most immediate military threats- 
Korea and Thailand— or, in the case of 
the Philippines, providing military 
facilities from which to deter or resist 
aggression. Thus, these three countries 
receive some $416.4, or 86% of the total 
$482.7 FMS, ESF, and IMET funds pro- 
posed for East Asia. Inclusion of the 
$950,000 in military assistance program 
(MAP) funds to meet the costs of com- 
pleting former MAP programs would 
not change the percentages since the 
same three countries should receive all 
but $100,000 of the total funding pro- 
posed. 

The largest recipients of economic 
assistance— development assistance and 
PL 480— include the Philippines and 
Thailand, as well as Indonesia, which oc- 
cupies a i<ey strategic location and is the 
poorest country in ASEAN. They 
receive some $175.8, or approximately 
65% of the $270.4 proposed for the 
region. 

The total amount of U.S. assistance 
proposed for East Asian countries in FY 
1983— FMS, ESF, MAP, IMET, devel- 
opment assistance, and PL 480— is ap- 
proximately $677.7, an increase of $93.6 
million over FY 1982. Most— that is, 
$87.4 of the increase, is for security 
assistance— FMS, ESF, and IMET. 
Most of this increase is for FMS credits 
to assist Korea and Thailand, the two 
most threatened countries, to cope with 
the combination of serious military 
threats and increasing defense procure- 
ment difficulties. Some additional 
specifics may help put the request in 
perspective. 

• Our FMS request of $413.5 million 
for the region is an increase of $80.5 
million over the final FY 1982 allocation 
of $333 million. However, it exceeds our 
original congressional presentation docu- 
ment request of $355 million by only 
$58.5 million, and by less than this in 
real terms, of course. As I will discuss 
shortly, these modest increases afford 
minimum levels to redress risky short- 
falls in two principal strategic areas- 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. 

• Our IMET proposal of $9.2 million 
is an increase of $2.4 million over the 
final FY 1982 level of $6.8 million but a 
much smaller increase of only $230,000 
over the original congressional presenta- 
tion document request of $8.9 million. 



• Our ESF request of $60 million 
represents an increase of $4.5 million 
over the $55.5 million in the final alloca- 
tion for FY 1982. Actually this is an in- 
crease of $4 million in country programs 
since $500,000 of the FY 1982 program 
is for a one-time oceanographic project. 

I should mention that straight cash 
sales far exceed our assistance pro- 
grams. The estimated level of such sales 
for FY 1982 is $4.5 billion and for FY 
1983 is $2.3 billion. 

Northeast Asia 

Korea. The continuation of peace and 
stability in Northeast Asia is very impor- 
tant to the security and prosperity of 
the United States. Deterrence of North 
Korean aggression against South Korea 
is essential to the maintenance of that 
peace and stability. The fact that we 
have had peace in the area during the 
past 25 years is due in no small measure 
to our determination to resist aggres- 
sion. That resolve has also enabled the 
people of the Republic of Korea to 
devote needed efforts to development. 
These efforts have been rewarded by un- 
precedented levels of economic growth 
and corresponding improvements in 
their living standards. 

Despite this record of success, the 
need for continued U.S. support re- 
mains. The steady buildup of military 
force by North Korea, which has been in 
progress since the late 1960s, continued 
unabated during the past 12 months. 
Because we have taken steps during 
that same period to improve the 
capabilities of our own forces and to 
assist the South Koreans to do the 
same, we have not fallen further behind 
the North. Nevertheless, an imbalance 
persists on the peninsula and is likely to 
persist despite our best efforts for a 
number of years to come. North Korea 
now has a decided advantage in numbers 
of combat divisions, tanks, artillery and 
armored personnel carriers, and a two- 
to-one numerical superiority in fighter 
aircraft. Moreover, it has shown an in- 
creasingly sophisticated ability to mount 
the sort of complex, large-scale 
maneuvers which would be required for 
an invasion of the South. In sum. North 
Korean capabilities have become steadily 
more formidable, and continuing efforts 
on our part are required. 

During the past year, we have seen 
steady progress in South Korea toward 
a more open political system. Martial 
law was lifted early in 1981. The curfew 
in effect since the end of the Korean 
war was removed in January of this 
year. There has been increasing activity 



(Jer 





Btl 




iS 

[1 



on the part of the National Assembly ii i"S 
asserting a significant role for itself vii 
a-vis the government. There have been 
number of amnesties during the past 
year, the most recent on March 2, 
affecting nearly 3,000 prisoners, almos 
300 of whom could be termed political 
prisoners. As you know. President Chu 
in January of last year commuted Kim 
Dae Jung's death sentence to life im- 
prisonment. On March 2 that sentence 
was reduced to 20 years. Other 
prisoners associated with Kim and witl 
the events in Kwanju in May 1980 wen 
released or had their sentences reducec 

Korea, nonetheless, remains an 
authoritarian society. We believe, 
however, that the Korean Government 
intends to move in the direction of fur- 
ther liberalization, and they know that 
this they would have our full support. 
Korean leaders are aware of our con- 
cerns about human rights in their coun 
try, as elsewhere, and we are hopeful 
that the situation will continue to im- 
prove. 

During the past 12 months there 
have been several efforts on the part o 
President Chun to stimulate a dialogue 
with the North, most recently on 
January 22. This was the most com- 
prehensive set of measures ever pro- 
posed by either side, addressing both tl 
fundamental question of reunification s 
well as the need to take steps to reduc 
tension in the period before reunificatii 
could be accomplished. We believe this 
was a reasonable, realistic, and forwar 
looking proposal for which we have 
declared our full support. The North 
Korean response has been disappointim 
if predictable. Pyongyang, in essence, 
has repeated its call for American 
withdrawal and change of government 
in the South as a prerequisite to any 
progress. President Chun's proposal 
deserved a more considered response 
and we believe the ball clearly remains 
in North Korea's court. 

North Korea remains an enigma to 
the United States. As I indicated earlie 
there is no sign of a constructive North 
Korean approach to relations with the 
South in the short term. This may, 
however, change in time. Given the 
dramatic growth in South Korea's 
economic strength, its increasing inter- 
national influence, and its continued 
domestic stability, Pyongyang may 
ultimately recognize that over the long 
term, the balance of power and influen 
on the peninsula will shift inexorably 
toward the South. This may eventually 
become clear on the military front as 
well, where North Korea's industrial 



a 



: 



66 



Department of State Bulleti 



EAST ASIA 



ase is increasingly strained by the 
iirden of its military buildup, while the 
outh Korean economic infrastructure 
jntinues to be enhanced, increasing 
outh Korea's ability to support its own 
)rces. Logic would suggest, therefore, 
lat the North might one day— perhaps 
jlatively soon— conclude that South 
:orea must be recognized as a viable en- 
ty with which it must deal peacefully, 
in the other hand, however, we have no 
jason to believe that Kim II Sung, in 
ict, is approaching this realization. In- 
;ead, his strategy appears to remain 
ne of waiting for an opportunity to 
junite Korea on his own terms, 
irough whatever means— including 
lilitary— that may be required. 

There is no sign that our assistance 
) South Korea has generated an anti- 
imerican backlash. We undoubtedly 
ave seen fewer manifestations of anti- 
mericanism there than in any other 
)untry in which we have a large 
lilitary presence. You may be aware 
lat the U.S. International Communica- 
on Agency office in Pusan was the 
irget of arsonists last week, who 
istributed anti- American leaflets as 
ley left the scene. While this was 
seply disturbing, it was, we are confi- 
ent, an aberration. It promoted a 
2art-warming display of concern and 
;gret among Koreans of all walks of 
fe in Pusan and elsewhere, for whom 
le U.S. -Korean relationship remains, as 
has been for the past 30 years, a 
)urce of reassurance. 

Our proposed program of $210 
lillion in FMS credits for Korea— an in- 
i, rease of $44 mUlion over FY 82— is the 
Irgest dollar increase requested for any 
ast Asian country and retains Korea's 
Dsition as the largest East Asian FMS 
jcipient. Nevertheless, it is a very 
lodest program if one considers Korea's 
irge military purchasing requirements 
nd the funding shortfalls of previous 
ears. The FMS credits proposed 
eretofore to support the force improve- 
lent program have consistently fallen 

lort. 

The major systems which Seoul is 
.xpected to purchase with FMS financ- 
ig in order to help redress the military 
uildup include a further increment in 
he F-5E/F corporation program, a tac- 
ical air control package, an indigenous 
ank production program, M-88A1 tank 
,5« recovery vehicles, TOW [tube-launched, 
.ptically tracked, wire-guided] missiles, 
,nd hawk surface-to-air missile modifica- 
ion equipment. 

The proposed IMET program of 
)1.85 million is an increase of $450,000, 
tir 32% and is essential to improve the 
nteroperability of Korean with U.S. 



forces and commonality of U.S. -Korea 
tactics and doctrine. Moreover, the 
Republic of Korea has urgent re- 
quirements to develop managerial exper- 
tise for its complex defense establish- 
ment. Korea also needs to improve its 
indigenous training capability. 

China. In light of the significant 
progress that the United States and 
China have made toward establishment 
of a normal and mutually beneficial rela- 
tionship, the President last year decided 
to seek legislative change to laws which 
link China with the Soviet bloc and 
which are no longer consistent with our 
strategic relationship. 

China has not been considered to be 
part of the Soviet bloc since the 1960s. 
U.S. laws should reflect this fact and 
our policy which is to treat China as a 
friendly but nonallied country with 
which we share important interests. We 
believe it is no longer in U.S. interests 
to treat China as if it continued to be 
part of a monolithic Soviet bloc. 

This year's foreign assistance bill 
contains two proposals that would end 
such past discrimination against China: 

• Amendment of the Foreign 
Assistance Act to eliminate the blanket 
prohibition on assistance to China and 

• Amendment to the Agricultural 
Trade Development and Assistance Act 
to clarify that China would be eligible 
for PL 480. 

I would emphasize that we have no 
plans to establish bilateral development 
assistance or PL 480 programs for 
China. Our principal interest in amend- 
ing these laws is to insure that, in prin- 
ciple, we treat China in the same way 
we treat other friendly, nonallied coun- 
tries. We do not plan to ask for addi- 
tional funds for China as a result of 
these amendments. 

Amendment of the Foreign As- 
sistance Act would allow China to par- 
ticipate in ongoing Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID) technical 
assistance programs, under current 
funding levels, in the same manner as do 
most other countries. For example, 
China could participate in ongoing 
agricultural research programs funded 
by the United States at the International 
Rice Research Institute in the Philip- 
pines or in fertilizer development pro- 
grams at the International Fertilizer 
Development Center in Muscle Shoals, 
Alabama. We have not discussed any of 
these ideas with the Chinese and will not 
do so until the law is amended. 

We would, of course, consult closely 
with the Congress if, in the future, we 
should decide that bilateral PL 480 or 



development assistance programs for 
China were in the interest of the United 
States. 

Southeast Asia 

Because Southeast Asia is poorer and 
more heterogeneous than the Northeast, 
U.S. assistance is spread among a 
number of recipients, and the various 
kinds of aid available have to be careful- 
ly adapted to a variety of requirements. 

Philippines. Our close relations 
with the Philippines are of long stand- 
ing. They have demonstrated their 
durability. This is especially true in the 
security field. The United States and the 
Philippines are treaty allies and share 
similar views on the strategic challenges 
to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. 

U.S. military facilities at Subic 
Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base 
are of major strategic importance to us. 
Their advantageous geographical posi- 
tion helps facilitate our military opera- 
tions in two areas of the world of impor- 
tance to us— the western Pacific and the 
Indian Ocean. 

ESF and FMS levels for FY 1983 
are the same as for FY 1982. They 
reflect President Carter's pledge to 
President Marcos at the time of the 
1979 amendment to our Military Bases 
Agreement that the U.S. Administration 
would make its best effort to secure 
$500 million in security assistance for 
the Philippines during the period FY 
1980-84. We have honored this commit- 
ment, and we continue to appreciate the 
cooperation of the Congress over the 
past 3 years in giving currency to this 
pledge. We consider your support for 
our FY 1983 request for $100 million in 
FMS and ESF to be most important. 

The 1979 amendment to our Military 
Bases Agreement has worked well. As 
called for in the amendment, the United 
States and the Philippines will hold a 
formal review of the entire bases agree- 
ment in 1983-84. 

In addition to military assistance, we 
have requested $38.8 million in develop- 
ment assistance and $14.3 million in PL 
480. Any decline in economic assistance 
would have serious political and 
economic consequences for us. At the 
time we negotiated the 1979 bases 
amendment, we implicitly committed 
ourselves to maintain development 
assistance at the 1979 level through 
1984. 

A significant portion of the Philip- 
pine population subsists at levels below 
the World Bank's poverty line. Rural 
problems are being exploited by the 
Communist New People's Army. The 



67 



uly1982 



EAST ASIA 



government is attempting to improve 
living standards and generate employ- 
ment in rural areas. Our assistance pro- 
gram focuses on agricultural production, 
rural employment, and family planning 
and, thus, complements the govern- 
ment's efforts. 

The only proposed MAP increase for 
the Philippines is in IMET— an increase 
of $300,000 to a total of $1.3 million. 
While not a part of our Military Bases 
Agreement with the Philippines, IMET 
is closely related to it. At the time of the 
1979 bases amendment. Secretary Vance 
wrote Foreign Minister Romulo that 
"We will support those efforts [to 
achieve military self-reliance] by means 
of our security assistance programs, in- 
cluding the important training compo- 
nent." The Armed Forces of the 
Phillipines have always put a premium 
on IMET training. Moreover, the Philip- 
pine Armed Forces face a growing 
challenge from the New People's Army 
insurgency which, if unchecked, could 
jeopardize our strategic military 
facilities at Clark and Subic. It is 
especially important to respond 
favorably to Philippine desires for in- 
creased IMET to help set the stage for 
the Military Bases Agreement review 
coming in 1983-84. 

Thailand. We have requested $50 
million in direct credits and $41 million 
in guaranteed credits for Thailand's 
FMS program. This is an increase of 
36%, or $24 million, in overall FMS 
levels and would increase the conces- 
sionality of the FY 1982 Thai program. 
However, the increases requested for 
FY 1983 represent a mere $10 million 
over the original FY 1982 congressional 
presentation document levels with the 
same level of concessional financing as 
originally requested for FY 82. Although 
we were able to increase assistance in 
FY 82, we were able to provide only 
$101 million of the $132 million re- 
quested in FMS, ESF, IMET, and 
development assistance funds. 

Thailand has long faced a military 
threat from larger, better armed Viet- 
namese forces. However, during the 
past year, the Vietnamese forces in 
Kampuchea have improved their com- 
mand and control capabilities and have 
increased their operations in the border 
area against Kampuchean resistance 
forces. Thus, Thailand's force moderni- 
zation requirements have become even 
more urgent, in both the military and 
political sense. 

Militarily, the proposed FMS pro- 
gram will make a significant contribu- 
tion toward the purchase of artillery, 
tanks, antitank weapons, coastal patrol 



boats, transport aircraft, helicopters, air 
defense systems, and mortar locating 
radars. These are practical items that 
can have an immediate effect in deter- 
ring or raising the costs of encroach- 
ments into Thai territory. 

The political effect of the proposed 
program is at least as significant as the 
military benefits that should accrue to 
Thailand. This is because Thailand's 
security, as our own for that matter, 
depends not on its Armed Forces alone 
but also on its international position and 
relationship with friends and allies. The 
ASEAN countries regard our support 
for Thailand, their front-line state, as 
the litmus test of our commitment to 
support them and to maintain our status 
as a Pacific power. By assisting 
Thailand, we are promoting our relation- 
ship with ASEAN and our overall posi- 
tion in the region as well. Inadequate 
assistance levels could undermine 
ASEAN unity and give the wrong 
signals to the countries of the area, in- 
cluding the Vietnamese. 

Thailand is expected to incur serious 
debt servicing problems by 1985 unless 
current account adjustments are made. 
The Royal Thai Government has had to 
forego commercial borrowing for 
defense purposes and, instead, rely on 
internal revenues and government-to- 
government loans. Concessional financ- 
ing will reinforce the sound decision to 
avoid commercial borrowing. 

Failure to provide adequate conces- 
sional financing and sufficient overall 
levels of FMS to Thailand risks un- 
acceptable military and political costs to 
U.S. interests. Militarily, it would force 
Thailand to choose between foregoing 
needed force modernization on one hand 
or impairment of the sound economy 
needed to cope with protracted internal 
and external threats. Politically, 
Thailand and other ASEAN states 
would receive the wrong signal, i.e., that 
the United States lacks the resolve to 
give adequate assistance to the country 
perceived by the entire region as the 
front-line state at a time that Hanoi is 
improving its forces in Kampuchea. 

Our FMS concerns for Thailand 
focus on two factors: 

• Overall levels— the importance of 
which I have just discussed. 

• The degree of concessionality — in 
order to assist Thailand to cope with a 
short-term balance-of-payments problem 
while sustaining sufficient economic 
growth to maintain internal stability. 

The requested increase of $750,000, 
or 52%, in Thailand's IMET program to 



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1 

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ier 
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a level of $2.2 million is essential to su 
port the crucial military modernization 
efforts undertaken by the Thai Govern Jaii 
ment. Historically, Thailand makes ful d 
use of its IMET funds: during the first 
quarter of FY 1982, it has already 
obligated over $1.2 million of its $1.45 
million allocation. 

The $10 million in ESF requested 
for Thailand equals the original congref^ 
sional presentation document request 
FY 1982. Thai cooperation with our 
refugee and Khmer relief efforts are 
pillars of U.S. strategy on Kampuchea 
ESF monies provide an important par 
of the funding levels needed to induce 
continued Thai cooperation on refugee 
and Khmer relief-related issues. 

The $28 million development 
assistance proposed for Thailand is 
designed to promote growth in the 
private sector as well as to assist Thai 
Government efforts to reduce poverty 
and accelerate rural development in 
politically sensitive backward areas, pg 
ticularly northeast Thailand. The Thai 
Government recognizes that underde- 
velopment and unacceptable income 
disparities are a threat to Thai securit; 
and accords the highest priority in its 
budget to development. 

Thailand is a less developed countr 
which exports raw materials and basic 
manufactures — rice, tapioca, rubber, t 
and textiles — and which imports capiti 
goods and most of its fuel. Internation 
market conditions, together with great 
needs for public and private investmer 
have resulted in growing current ac- 
count deficits financed by rapidly risin 
public and private debt. Inflation was 
very high in 1979 and 1980 and only 
somewhat moderated to around 15% ii 
1981. Prudent management requires 
that the government takes steps to hai f« 
the growth of debt in order to avoid 
serious debt-service problems in the n€ 
term. Support in the form of "stand-by 
arrangements with International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank lendh 
and increased concessional financing o: 
military expenditures are all essential 
elements in the Thai program. 

Thailand's continued independence, 
territorial integrity, and stability, free 
any dominating influence by an un- 
friendly power, are central to the stabi 
ty of Southeast Asia and to the unity o 
ASEAN and is a prime objective of U.I 
policy in the region. U.S. leaders, in- 
cluding President Reagan, have restate 
our commitment to Thailand under the 
Manila pact and have made clear our 
continued support for Thai security 
needs. 

Our proposed assistance program 



M 



a 



68 



Department of State Bulletil 



EAST ASIA 



'/" tihances and encourages Thai coopera- 
on with other U.S. policy objectives in 
hailand, including more rapid economic 
nd social development, narcotics con- 
ol, and assistance to Indochinese 
ifugees using Thailand as a country of 
rst asylum. 

'd Indonesia. We are proposing in- 
'm reasing our FMS and military training 
1 1 Indonesia because of its strategic im- 
ortance and to bolster its defenses 
gainst an increasing Soviet military 
leajresence in Southeast Asia and 
ietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. 
Indonesia has the world's fifth 
irgest population, a strategic location, 
rovides 6% of U.S. petroleum imports, 
nd generally plays a moderate and 
iendly role in the nonaligned move- 
lent, the Islamic Conference, and the 
'rganization of Petroleum Exporting 
ountries. The Suharto Government is 
:rongly anti-Communist, plays a key 
3le in ASEAN's resistance to expand- 
ig Soviet and Vietnamese influence in 
le region, and supports the U.S. posi- 
on on many global and regional issues. 
idonesia's leaders view our assistance 
3 an important indicator of the 
;rength of our relationship. Despite its 
il resources, Indonesia remains one of 
le poorest countries in the world, with 
per capita GNP of $431 annually. The 
juntry faces difficult problems of a 
rowing work force, very high popula- 
on density on Java, and the probable 

I.id of oil exports in the 1990's. In- 
onesia is the key to stability in 
outheast Asia, and we need to do all 
'6 can to help it continue the impressive 
lonomic progress it has achieved since 
uharto took power in 1965. 

The $50 million requested in FMS 
redits represents an increase of $10 
lillion over the FY 1982 allocation but 
nly $5 million over the originally re- 
uested congressional presentation docu- 
lent level. This assistance plays a 
ignificant role in developing Indonesian 
apabilities to patrol and defend the 
trategic waterways surrounding this 
iland nation. Moreover, this expendi- 
are is a modest investment to make in 
ne largest member of ASEAN. 

Their FMS credits will be used to 
inance a small portion of Indonesia's 
lilitary modernization including the pur- 
hase of MlOl howitzers, MK-46 
orpedoes, ship overhaul, and possible 
lew aircraft acquisitions. 

The IMET program of $2.6 million 
/ill permit about 270 students to receive 
raining in U.S. military schools. The 
raining will cover a wide spectrum of 
rofessional, managerial, advanced, and 



technical courses. Moreover, the Indone- 
sians have begun placing more emphasis 
on in-country training through the use of 
mobile training teams in order to in- 
crease the number of students who 
benefit from the training. Thirteen 
teams are programmed for FY 1983, 
covering naval operations, resource 
management, and artillery operations 
and maintenance. 

We are attempting to maintain the 
level of development assistance because 
it makes a crucial contribution to In- 
donesia's development and long-run 
political and economic stability. We have 
reduced PL 480 Title I substantially 
since FY 1980 because of budget strin- 
gencies and Indonesia's improved food 
situation, but a small program remains 
in our political and commercial interest. 

Our proposed $65 million in develop- 
ment assistance and $27.3 million in PL 
480 Titles I and II will help the Indone- 
sian Government deal with a chronic 
food deficit and severe shortage of 
trained and skilled manpower and a dif- 
ficult balance-of-payments situation 
caused by world recession and oil glut. 

Malaysia. The Malaysian Armed 
Forces are continuing with plans to dou- 
ble in size within the next several years 
and are shifting from a counterinsur- 
gency to a conventional warfare orienta- 
tion in response to regional political 
developments. 

Our modest FMS credit program of 
$12.5 million is a recommended increase 
of $2.5 million to help relieve a small 
portion of a much larger defense budget. 
FMS credits in FY 1983 will finance 
only a small portion of the U.S. military 
equipment Malaysia will buy as it ex- 
pands its armed forces; the remainder 
will be purchased through FMS and 
commercial sales. Equipment scheduled 
for purchases includes Chaparral air 
defense missiles, communications equip- 
ment, ammunition, and spare parts for 
A-4 aircraft refurbishing. The IMET 
program will provide technical and pro- 
fessional training for an estimated 223 
students. Malaysia will pay all travel 
costs. 

The larger IMET increase is in 
response to a specific request from the 
prime minister for an increased U.S. 
military training. This is the most ap- 
propriate way for the United States to 
help nonaligned and relatively pros- 
perous Malaysia meet its increased 
security needs. Thus, our proposal to in- 
crease the IMET program to $850,000 
from $500,000 is the largest percentage 
increase recommended for any East 
Asian country. 



Singapore. Singapore is a good 
friend and strong supporter of increased 
U.S. involvement in Asia. Singapore 
provides access to its excellent and 
strategically located air and seaport 
facilities for U.S. forces operating in the 
Indian Ocean. U.S. training and equip- 
ment, also purchased for cash, enhance 
military effectiveness and promote 
equipment commonality among the 
ASEAN countries. 

A small ($50,000) IMET program 
was begun by the Administration in FY 
1981 as a gesture of support for 
Singapore and ASEAN in the face of 
Vietnamese hostility on the Thai border 
and a growing Soviet presence in the 
region. We anticipate that this will re- 
main only a token program in view of 
Singapore's relative wealth. Most 
military training in the United States 
will continue to be purchased through 
FMS sales procedures. There is no other 
military or economic assistance for 
Singapore. 

The $50,000 IMET grant for Singa- 
pore will be used for professional train- 
ing for the best officers from all three 
services. Singapore will continue to buy 
other professional and technical training. 

Burma. Burma is gradually moving 
from almost total isolation into the 
world community, has increased con- 
tacts with the United States, and has 
turned away from the Soviet Union. 
Although we recognize Burma's commit- 
ment to strict neutrality, it is in our in- 
terest to encourage this trend. 

The proposed increase in U.S. 
assistance to Burma should promote the 
continuing warming :n our bilateral rela- 
tions, support our broader interests, in- 
cluding narcotics cooperation, and re- 
spond to specific Burmese requests. 

Burma is one of the world's poorest 
countries with a per capita income of 
only $174. It has significant mineral and 
agricultural resources which, if properly 
developed, could insure increased inter- 
nal prosperity and contribute to the 
economic strengthening of the region as 
a whole. Our development assistance 
concentrates on two of the most needy 
sectors — agriculture and health — where 
even small inputs will provide large in- 
creases in food production, incomes, and 
better health care countrywide. 

U.S. AID and IMET programs were 
recommended in Burma in FY 1980 
after a 16-year hiatus. The proposed in- 
crease in development assistance to 
$12.5 million for FY 1983 will permit ex- 
pansion of the key agricultural develop- 
ment program, as well as the second 



uly1982 



69 



phase of a public health project. The in- 
crease to $200,000 for IMET will pro- 
vide for about 32 trainees to attend U.S. 
military schools in FY 1983 up from an 
estimated 25 students in FY 1982. 

ASEAN. ASEAN has developed in- 
to a major force for stability in 
Southeast Asia and is of central impor- 
tance to U.S. interests in the region. 
The ASEAN states have taken a united 
stand in opposing Soviet-backed Viet- 
namese aggression in Kampuchea and 
are resisting expanding Soviet military 
presence in the region; Soviet port calls 
are denied by all member countries, for 
example. The ASEAN nations look to us 
for support, and our small regional 
economic assistance programs are im- 
portant signals of our help. 

ASEAN is formally an economic 
organization, and economic cooperation 
among its members is the foundation of 
their political cooperation. It is now our 
fifth largest trading partner, a moderate 
influence on North-South issues, and 
home to $5 billion of U.S. investment. 
Continued cooperation, especially in the 
training area, benefits expanded trade 
and investment opportunities for the 
U.S. private sector, as well as reinforces 
ASEAN's moderate North-South stand. 

The proposed $4.05 million program 
funds scholarships and training in 
Southeast Asia studies and regional pro- 
grams in agricultural planning, plant 
quarantine, watershed conservation, and 
tropical medicine. 

Japan and the European Com- 
munities have recently announced in- 
creased economic support for ASEAN 
programs. However, our decrease from 
$4.5 million in FY 1982 to our proposed 
$4.05 million for FY 1983 does not in- 
dicate a reduced priority for the 
ASEAN program. Our original FY 1982 
proposal was for $4 million, but an addi- 
tional $500,000 became available at the 
last minute, after the FY 1983 proposed 
levels had become final. 

Pacific Islands 

We learned during World War II the 
value of the Pacific Islands to the secu- 
rity of the United States and our 
sealines of communication. We should 
not have to relearn this lesson. The 
Soviet Union continues its efforts to 
make inroads in the area which have 
been repeatedly rebuffed. This is a situa- 
tion in which relatively little money goes 
a long way in safeguarding U.S. in- 
terests. On the other hand, any real 
decrease in the proposed $5.1 million 



EUROPE 

program would be very noticeable by the 
countries involved. 

Our proposed levels would serve as 
an effective counter to Soviet offers of 
assistance, particularly in hydrographic 
research, and would be much ap- 
preciated by Pacific countries whose 
support for our policies should be 
rewarded by some assistance to them. 

Fiji. The $55,000 IMET program 
requested for Fiji is East Asia's only 
new program for the fiscal year. The 
Government of Fiji is pro- Western and 
broadly supportive of U.S. policy goals 
in international fora. Fiji was the first 
government publicly to support U.S.^ 
peace initiatives in the Sinai, and Fiji's 
participation was instrumental in 
demonstrating broad international sup- 
port for a multinational peacekeeping 
force effort. Fiji has also participated in 
the U.N. peacekeeping forces in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978. The re- 
quested IMET program would provide a 
mix of professional and technical train- 
ing to assist the Royal Fijian Military 
Forces to acquire the skills needed to 
operate their own defense establishment 
and to maintain their role in UNIFIL 
and the peacekeeping force in the Sinai. 

Papua New Guinea. The United 
States has enjoyed friendly relations 
with Papua New Guinea before and 
since its independence from Australia in 
1975. Papua New Guinea's strategic 
location, size, and resource base give it 
the potential to become a major actor in 
the South Pacific. 

The proposed FY 1983 IMET pro- 
gram of $20,000 will assist Papua New 



Guinea in its continuing effort to 
upgrade its defense forces by providing 
technical training to two or three of- 
ficers. Areas of continuing interest are 
expected to be U.S. naval entry-on-duty 
training, coastal surveillance courses, 
and the repair and maintenance of 
various kinds of equipment. Perhaps an 
nual IMET programs will lead to Papua 
New Guinea sending officers to attend 
the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College. 



Conclusion 

In short, we have tried to balance the 
need for budgetary restraint with the 
strategic realities of increasing Soviet, 
Vietnamese, and North Korean pres- 
sures against our increasingly resource 
constrained East Asian friends and 
allies. Accordingly, we have devised a 
military assistance package that we 
believe will help meet our foreign policj 
objectives in the Pacific. As you can set 
relatively small increases for FY 1983, 
particularly considering the cuts made i 
requested FY 1982 levels, are going to 
have to do heavy duty in shoring up oui 
strategic position in both Northeast anc 
Southeast Asia. We believe, however, 
that these levels together with the 
development assistance requested will 
maintain our defense and security in- 
terests in the Pacific. 



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'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be avaikble from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1983 Assistance Requests 



ii 



by Charles H. Thomas 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
Hmise Foreign Affairs Committee on 
April 1, 1982. Mr. Thomas is Acting 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Euro- 
pean Affairs. ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before the subcommittee in support of 
the European portions of the Admin- 
istration's proposals for security 
assistance in FY 1983. 

As Secretary Haig emphasized to 
the full committee on March 2, 1982, to- 
day's foreign assistance programs have 
been redirected to specific and vitally 
important strategic objectives including 



military threats from the Soviets. He 
further singled out our aid to Turkey, 
which strengthened a strategically vital 
ally who contributes decisively to 
Western security along NATO's south- 
ern region, and the aid to Spain in- 
volving vital base facilities. I would like 
to describe each of our major program;- 
in Europe. 

Spain 

The reentry of Spain into the Western 
community of democratic states was 
crowned (luring the past year by the 
Spanish decision to seek entry into 
NATO. Spain's people, its young and 
healthy democratic institutions, and its 
strategic location will add important 



70 



Department of State Bulleti 



trength to NATO capabilities and con- 
ribute to the security of the West. We 
re pleased that Spain has taken this 
tep. 

Under the terms of the 1976 treaty 
if friendship and cooperation, we enjoy 
,ccess to several important military 
lases in Spain. We are currently 
legotiating a successor to that treaty. 
^s always the process is complex, and 
irogress is slower than we would like, 
lut we hope to reach agreement before 
ummer. Although our FY 1983 
ssistance proposal is not tied to the 
greement, it reflects our expectation 
hat our security cooperation with Spain 
vill continue to be of major importance. 

Our proposed assistance program 
or Spain of $400 million in foreign 
nilitary sales (FMS) credits will help 
ipain undertake major modernization 
irojects for its armed forces, including 
.cquisition of an air defense missile 
ystem and advanced fighter aircraft, 
^hree million dollars in international 
nilitary and education training (IMET) 
vill help Spain to develop the expertise 
,nd systems necessary for effective 
nanagement of its defense establish- 
nent, while $12 million in economic sup- 
port funds (ESF) will support a wide 
ange of education, cultural, and scien- 
ific exchanges. 

The proposed program carries with 
t a wide range of strategic and political 
lenefits. It will assist Spain in its im- 
pressive effort to upgrade Spanish 
lefenses to levels more compatible with 
ither NATO forces. It will lend visible 
upport to a young democracy opting to 
'esume its Western vocation. Finally, it 
vill strengthen the important bilateral 
lies between the United States and 
Bpain. 

'ortugal 

Portugal has come a long way in 
istablishing a working democracy since 
he 1974 revolution. It has successfully 
nade the difficult and delicate transition 
rom an authoritarian state to one in 
vhich fundamental political liberties are 
•espected. Prime Minister Pinto 
Balsemao leads the ruling coalition 
government with a substantial 
Darliamentary majority. 

Portugal is an important NATO ally. 
[t shares our commitment to strengthen- 
ng Western security, particularly 
through NATO, and has made available 
the strategically located airfield at Lajes 
in the Azores for this purpose. Both the 
governing coalition and the socialist-led 
democratic opposition agree that Por- 
tugal should participate as much as 
possible in NATO activities. However, 

Iuly1982 



Portuguese economic resources are in- 
adequate to support the modernization 
necessary to render such participation 
meaningful. 

Portugal, therefore, looks to the 
United States and other NATO allies for 
security assistance. Providing such aid 
facilitates cooperation with a valued and 
reliable ally and reassures the Govern- 
ment of Portugal of our commitment to 
a substantive role for Portugal in 
NATO. 

For FY 1983, we are proposing $20 
million in grant ESF assistance. The 
Government of Portugal will use these 
funds to support development programs 
in the mainland and in the Azores, a 
relatively underdeveloped part of the 
country. We are also proposing $90 
million in FMS credits and $2.6 million 
in IMET. As we begin talks on renewal 
of our Lajes base agreement, this pro- 
gram will help meet basic needs in all 
three service branches and continue to 
aid the economically depressed region of 
the Azores. 



Cyprus 

Based on the discussion of the 
November 18, 1981, U.N. evaluation of 
the Cyprus intercommunal negotiations, 
the Cypriot communities are continuing 
their negotiating efforts. Along with 
defining points of coincidence between 
the positions of the communities, the 
evaluation offers ideas and concepts for 
bridging some of the major differences. 
Although there are many outstanding 
points of difference, we believe the U.N. 
evaluation, within the context of the in- 
tercommunal talks, offers an historic op- 
portunity for progress. 

As a reflection of the entrepre- 
neurial efforts and economic energy of 
the Cypriot people, the island has made 
very significant economic strides. 
Recognizing this economic health, we 
are not recommending economic assist- 
ance for FY 1983, as Cyprus is now 
fully capable of sustaining economic 
growth through standard international 
financial mechanisms. An already 
funded scholarship program, however, 
will continue to bring Cypriot students 
to the United States for several years. 

The United States fully supports the 
U.N. effort to secure a just, fair, and 
lasting settlement of the Cyprus prob- 
lem. We have repeatedly emphasized our 
concern over this issue and reemphasize 
our strong commitment to assist in pro- 
moting a mutually acceptable solution to 
the Cyprus dilemma. 



EUROPE 



Greece 

Our proposed program for Greece in FY 
1983 reflects an appreciation of the key 
role Greece plays in NATO for the pro- 
tection of the crucial southern region, 
especially when there are critical 
developments in areas bordering on the 
eastern Mediterranean. 

Greece has been an active member 
of the Alliance fully participating in 
NATO activities since its relinking to the 
military structure in October 1980. As 
an integral part of U.S. policy toward 
Greece, our program provides a continu- 
ing indication of American support for a 
democratic Greece and is designed to 
enable Greece to supplement inadequate 
economic resources for the moderniza- 
tion of Greek armed forces and the 
fulfillment of NATO responsibilities. 

Furnishing security assistance to 
Greece is consistent with U.S. policy to 
encourage the peaceful resolution of its 
differences with Turkey and to support 
the search for a solution to the Cyprus 
problem. 

Accordingly, the Administration has 
requested $280 million in FMS credits to 
assist Greece in purchasing spare parts 
and upgrading its defense capabilities, 
and $1.7 million in IMET grants to im- 
prove professional and technical exper- 
tise. 



Turkey 

Spiraling terrorism and paralysis of 
civilian authority led Turkey's military 
leaders to take over the government on 
September 12, 1980. In the ensuing 18 
months, the generals have restored law 
and order, curbed political violence, 
bolstered public confidence, continued 
the economic recovery program, and 
begun a process for return to stable 
democratic government. They retain the 
overwhelming support of the Turkish 
people. A consultative assembly was 
convened last October to draft a new 
constitution and to serve as a de facto 
parliament. Head of State Gen. [Kenan] 
Evren has announced a timetable for 
return to full democracy— completion of 
the constitution this summer, referen- 
dum on that constitution in November, 
and general elections in the fall of 
1983 — alternatively, in the spring of 
1984. We are confident that the Turkish 
Government will meet that timetable. 

Strongly committed to NATO and to 
western values, Turkey remains a 
staunch ally of the United States. The 
1980 defense and economic cooperation 
agreement, by which the United States 
pledged best efforts to help Turkey with 



71 



MIDDLE EAST 



security and economic resources, is func- 
tioning snnoothly. All allies share our 
desire to help Turkey upgrade its armed 
forces to carry out essential NATO tasks 
more effectively. Turkey has made great 
progress under the economic reform 
program adopted in January 1980. For 
the past 3 years, the United States has 
worked with other OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] nations and international financial 
institutions to support that program. We 
believe that Turkey continues to need 
fast-disbursing, concessional assistance 
to achieve self-sustaining economic 
growth. 

Our security assistance proposals for 
FY 1983 address these requirements. To 
make Turkey a more effective member 
of the vital southern flank of NATO, we 
propose a total military assistance pro- 
gram of $468.5 million— $465 million in 
(FMS) credits and $3.5 million in IMET. 
Of the $465 million FMS credits, $300 
million would be direct credit, reflecting 
Turkey's still severe economic con- 
straints and debt burden. These FMS 
funds will enable Turkey to begin to 



modernize some of its weapons systems 
and to acquire spares and support equip- 
ment for systems already in its inven- 
tory. Our request is extremely modest 
when compared to Turkey's overall 
needs for military support. We also pro- 
pose $350 million in ESF assistance to 
help Turkey consolidate the momentum 
toward economic recovery. Of the total 
ESF assistance, $250 million would be 
grant and $100 million soft-term loans. 

In formulating our security 
assistance proposals for Greece and 
Turkey, we have been guided by the 
"Statement of Principles" contained in 
section 620C(b) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 
The formal certification to this effect, 
required by section 620C(d) of that Act, 
will be contained in the formal letter 
transmitting the Administration's 
foreign assistance legislative proposals 
for FY 1983. 



Themes in U.S. Approach 



' The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be avaikble from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1983 Assistance Requests 



by Nicholas A. Veliotes 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee on March 31, 
1982. Ambassador Veliotes is Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs.^ 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
with you our policy toward the Near 
East-South Asian region in the context 
of the Administration's FY 1983 budget 
requests. I shall concentrate my brief 
opening remarks on a political overview 
into which our requests fit. This can 
serve as a framework for our subse- 
quent discussion. 

Under Secretary [for Security 
Assistance, Science, and Technology 
James L.J Buckley in his appearance 
before you March 1 1 sketched the 
overall foreign policy framework into 
which our Near East-South Asian policy 
fits. He spoke of the need for a safer 
future in which all nations can live in 
peace free from pressures such as that 
exerted by Soviet presence in Afghan- 
istan. He has also spoken of our desire 
to promote peaceful solutions to regional 



72 



rivalries and hostilities. There is no 
question that persistent pursuit of a 
comprehensive and balanced U.S. policy 
in the Near East-South Asian region is 
critical to these goals. It is critical to: 

• Preserving a global strategic 
balance which will permit free and in- 
dependent societies to pursue their 
aspirations; 

• Checking the spread of Soviet in- 
fluence in this strategic region; 

• Fulfilling our responsibility to 
assist in the resolution of conflicts which 
threaten international security and the 
well-being of the nations and peoples in 
the region; 

• Assuring the security and welfare 
of Israel and other friendly nations in 
the region; 

• Preserving free world access to 
the region's oil; and 

• Supporting other major economic 
interests, such as assisting the orderly 
economic development of some of the 
needy countries in the region, cooperat- 
ing with wealthier states to maintain a 
sound international financial order, and 
generally maintaining access to markets 
for American goods and services. 



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There are two central themes to our ap |j,i 
proach which can be summarized in the 
words "peace" and "security" for the 
region. Both promote our own policy 
and the welfare of the region's people. 
In this context, we are continuing to 
pursue vigorously a just and comprehen L 
sive Middle East peace within the 
framework of the Camp David agree- 
ments, which in turn derive from U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 242. Ar- 
rangements are nearly complete for 
emplacement of the multinational force 
and observers (MFO) and its assumption Tjj 
of responsibility to monitor the security 
provisions of the Peace Treaty between 
Egypt and Israel. We are confident thai 
both Egypt and Israel are committed to 
the continued strengthening of their 
relationship. 

We are also continuing with negotia 
tions on the establishment of an 
autonomy regime for the West Bank an' 
Gaza. These negotiations look to 
achievement of an agreement which will 
serve as the basis for the Palestinian 
participation necessary for successful 
conclusion of arrangements to permit 
establishment of a transitional regime ir 
the West Bank and Gaza. 

We are continuing our support for 
the Government and people of Lebanon 
in working their way— with help from 
other Arab states— toward national 
reconciliation and greater security. We 
are committed to the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
Lebanon and strongly support the con- 
stitutional process which calls for the 
election of a new president later this 
year. As you know, Ambassador Habib 
[Philip C. Habib, the President's special 
emissary to the Middle East] has just re 
turned from another trip to the region, 
and his discussions encourage us to 
believe that the cease-fire agreement he 
worked out last July can and will con- 
tinue to hold, thus winning time for the 
internal conciliation process in Lebanon, 
which offers the best prospect for a 
phased, orderly withdrawal of Syrian 
forces. 

Moving to another serious conflict ir 
the area, we support the resolution of 
the war between Iraq and Iran, which 
has already caused so many human 
casualities and extensive physical 
destruction. The continuation of this 
war, we believe, serves the interests of 
neither Iraq nor Iran. It endangers the 
peace and security of all nations in the 
gulf region. Consistent with our policy 
of neutrality toward this conflict, we 
have refused to sell or authorize the 



Department of State Bulletini 



fl 



i 



MIDDLE EAST 



insfer of U.S. controled defense ar- 
iles and services to either Iran or Iraq, 
id we have urged that others avoid ac- 
)ns which will have the effect of pro- 
iging or expanding the conflict. We 
,ve welcomed responsible international 
forts to bring the fighting to an end 
id the parties to negotiations. We con- 
ier a peaceful settlement— reaffirming 
e independence and territorial integri- 
of both Iran and Iraq— to be essential 
the security and well-being of the 
gion. 
We also support the return of peace 
the suffering peoples of Afghanistan, 
it this must be peace in the context of 
e withdrawal of Soviet military forces, 
e restoration of Afghanistan's in- 
pendence and nonaligned status, the 
rht of the Afghan people to form a 
vernment of their own choosing, and 
sation of conditions which will permit 
e 3 million refugees to return to their 
mes. 

This brings me to my second theme 
security. Under Secretary Buckley in 
i own presentation spoke of the impor- 
ice of Southwest Asian security and 
3 relationship of this concern to Mid- 
p East peace. We share with friendly 
fttes their concern about threats to 
zurity throughout this region posed by 
:tors such as the Soviet invasion of 
■ghanistan, the uncertainty surround- 
T Iran, the Soviet position in the Horn 
Africa and in South Yemen, Libyan 
pport for terrorism and pressures 
ainst neighboring states, and efforts 
magnify such threats through the 
byan alliance with Ethiopia and South 
;men. 

Indeed, both in our efforts to move 
irther with the Middle East peace proc- 
13 and in our efforts to encourage the 
(turn of peace with security and na- 
mal sovereignty elsewhere in the 
v^ion, we recognize that the necessary 
"' ! irit of accommodation can grow more 
1 sily if the states concerned feel secure 
; d confident of U.S. support. 

We have taken important steps to 

I ild the confidence of key states in our 

immitment to their security. At a time 

budgetary stringencies, we have, with 

nsiderable sacrifice, increased the na- 

)nal resources for our own military to 

ivelop their capability to deter threats 

the region. 

We have at the same time signifi- 
,ntly increased our security and 
'.onomic assistance to friendly and 
irategically located states in the region 
> that they can better provide for their 
vn defense, resist external pressures, 
aprove their own economies, and thus 



enhance the prospects for orderly prog- 
ress. I shall briefly list for you the 
highlights of our assistance programs 
for the countries in the Near East-South 
Asian region. 

The Foreign Assistance Programs 

The FY 1983 foreign assistance request 
will fund six major programs. These in- 
clude: 

• Development assistance totaling 
$287.2 million for the region to seven 
countries, of which over $200 million 
goes to the three poorer countries of 
South Asia— India, Bangladesh, and Sri 
Lanka; 

• PL 480 totaling $619.5 million— 
$420 million Title I and $99.5 million 
Title II— provided to 13 of the 15 
foreign assistance recipient countries; 

• Economic support fund (ESF) of 
$1,768 million, of which a substantial 
proportion goes to Israel and Egypt, our 
partners in peace; 

• Foreign military sales (FMS) 
financing totaling $3,660 million— 
$1,030 million of it in direct concessional 
loans, $500 million and $400 million as 
forgiven loans for Israel and Egypt 
respectively; 

• International military education 
and training (IMET) totaling $11.1 
million; and 

• Peacekeeping operations totaling 
$34.5 million in support of the Middle 
East peace process. 

These programs total $6,380.33 
million for FY 1983, which the Ad- 
ministration believes is the minimal re- 
quired to the United States to protect its 
interests and achieve its policy goals in 
this vital region. 

I would now like to offer a few com- 
ments on each of our FY 83 proposals. 

Israel. We are committed to Israel's 
security and well-being. Security support 
for Israel is central to our Middle 
Eastern policy. The $1.7 billion in FMS 
that we are proposing will help Israel 
maintain its technological edge in overall 
military capability in the region. We are 
also requesting $785 million in ESF to 
reflect U.S. support tangibly and 
facilitate a modest rate of economic 
growth. 

Egypt. Egypt is key to much of 
what we hope to accomplish in the Mid- 
dle East, in terms of both regional peace 
and regional security. The $1.4 billion 
FMS program contributes to Egypt's 
ability to defend itself and help its 
neighbors in the face of the various 
threats I have mentioned. It replaces a 
small portion of Egypt's aging, 



deteriorating military materiel. The ESF 
request for Egypt totals $785 million, 
which is designed to provide direct sup- 
port for economic stability in the near 
term while building the base for im- 
proved economic productivity and equity 
upon which long-term stability must de- 
pend. The requested PL 480 program 
consists of $250 million in PL 480 Title I 
and $9.9 million Title II in support of 
private voluntary agencies. 

Pakistan. Pakistan is a key front- 
line state which remains steadfast in 
resisting great pressures from the 
Soviets in Afghanistan. Our FY 1983 
proposal of $275 million in FMS loans is 
the first FMS increment of the $3.2 
billion 5-year assistance package. This 
will help fund F-16 aircraft, armored 
vehicles, artillery, and associated equip- 
ment ordered in FY 1982, as well as 
follow-on orders for additional quantities 
of similar equipment later. Our as- 
sistance to Pakistan is in no way in- 
tended against India, good and mutually 
beneficial relations with which remain 
our high priority goal. A total of $200 
million in development assistance and 
ESF will be concentrated in the agricul- 
tural sector with activities also in the 
fields of population, health, energy, and 
private sector development. We are re- 
questing $50 million for PL 480 Title I. 

Morocco. The proposal of $100 
million in FMS credits to Morocco would 
permit support of major U.S. combat 
systems which Morocco has already ac- 
quired, together with an ongoing 
modernization program. Concessional 
terms for 50% of this FMS are recom- 
mended to alleviate a heavy debt burden 
related to economic difficulties largely 
beyond Morocco's ability to control- 
drought and world inflation. Develop- 
ment assistance of $13.5 million will 
fund programs in agriculture, family 
planning, renewable energy resource 
development, and low-cost housing. The 
requested level of PL 480 is $25 million 
for Title I and $10.5 million for Title II. 

Tunisia. Tunisia, under direct threat 
from Libya, requires a military modern- 
ization program with heavy initial costs. 
Our FMS credits of $140 million, half of 
which we are requesting in concessional 
terms, are intended to cushion the shock 
of such large expenditures. The FY 1983 
levels would help fund the acquisition of 
F-5 aircraft, M60 tanks, and Chaparral 
missiles which the Tunisians intend to 
order in FY 1982. We are requesting 
$10 million for PL 480 Title I and $1.8 
million for Title II. 

Jordan. We propose an increase in 
FMS for Jordan by $25 million to a total 



Jly1982 



73 



MIDDLE EAST 



of $75 million. We seek, through our 
continued support, to enhance Jordan's 
security and ability to remain a vdable, 
independent, and constructive actor in 
the region. A stable Jordan supports our 
objective of building peace in the region 
and assisting countries in acquiring the 
capability of resisting outside aggression 
and regional subversion. We are also 
preparing $20 million in ESF to assist 
the development of critical water and 
waste water programs, health programs, 
and agricultural and irrigation projects. 
There is also a $256,000 PL 480 Title II 
program. 

Yemen. North Yemen is presently 
being challenged militarily by an armed, 
Marxist-led insurgent group backed by 
Soviet-sponsored South Yemen. The 
North Yemeni military requires essential 
additional training and operational 
assistance to utilize effectively U.S. 
equipment funded by Saudi Arabia. Fur- 
ther, it requires increased and sustained 
economic and military assistance if we 
are going to provide credible support to 
the central government in the face of 
this persistent outside threat. We are 
asking for an additional $5 million in 
FMS to a total of $15 million and a 
modest increase in IMET over FY 1982. 
Development assistance of $27.5 million 
is requested to meet basic human needs 
in one of the poorest nations of the 
region. 

Oman. The $40 million in FMS will, 
in part, be applied against continuing 
payment for U.S. equipment acquired 
over the past 2 years. In light of a 
tightening internal budget, the remain- 
ing amount will be used to offset the 
cost of the continuing and essential 
Omani force modernization effort. Oman 
continues to play an important role in 
regional security and in the defense of 
the southern gulf-Indian Ocean region. 
And we are requesting $15 million in 
ESF which will support dam construc- 
tion, fisheries, and other projects iden- 
tified by the U.S.-Oman Joint Commis- 
sion. 

Lebanon. Small increases in our 
proposed FMS loan program for 
Lebanon of $15 million, up $5 million 
from the FY 1982 level, reflect our con- 
tinued desire to see the Lebanese 
Government develop the capability to 
reduce and eventually eliminate civil 
conflict and work for restoration of 
essential public services and a return to 
normalcy of life in that very troubled 
country. An ESF program of $8 million 
will include support for humanitarian 
purposes and will assist the programs of 



74 



the Council of Redevelopment and Con- 
struction. 

For the poorer countries of South 
Asia we are proposing development 
assistance of $87 million for India, $76 
million for Bangladesh, $40.3 million for 
Sri Lanka, and $13.5 million for Nepal. 
In general their programs seek to in- 
crease food production and rural 
employment as well as health and family 
planning programs. As for PL 480, we 
are requesting $111 million in Title II 
for India, $60 million in Title I and $20.5 
million in Title II for Bangladesh, and 
$2.5 million Title I and $5.8 million Title 
II for Sri Lanka. 

In short, both through our FMS 
credits and through our economic 
assistance to the countries of this 
region, we seek to strengthen security 
and stability, promote the peaceful solu- 
tion of old or new conflicts, and assist 
those countries to provide a better life 
for their peoples. To these goals we re- 
main committed. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1983 Assistance 
Requests for Israel 

by Morris Draper 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 23, 1982. Mr. Draper is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs.^ 

I am here today to testify in support of 
our military and economic assistance 
programs in Israel for FY 1983. The Ad- 
ministration is proposing a funding level 
of $1.7 billion— up $300 million from last 
year— in foreign military sales (FMS) 
financing and $785 million in economic 
support funds (ESF). If approved by the 
Congress, the overall level of $2.5 billion 
in combined military and economic 
assistance for Israel would be the 
largest U.S. bilateral assistance pro- 
gram. 



iliii 
F 

SIC 

reii 



Military Assistance •"' 

and Economic Assistance 

In a fundamental sense, our proposal f( J' 
$1.7 billion in military assistance reflec 
our intention that Israel be assisted so 
as to maintain its technological edge ar 
its qualitative military advantage in the 
region. We expect that Israel would usi 
some of the $300 million in added fund; 
primarily to purchase U.S. -produced ail 
craft, although in the end Israel may 
make other choices. The bulk of the 
military assistance funding would be 
used to purchase artillery, missiles, 
tanks, antipersonnel carriers, and air- 
craft engines from the United States. 
We are proposing that $500 million of 
this total financing be in the form of 
forgiven credits and that the remain- 
der— $1.2 billion— be in the form of a 
30-year loan. 

We are proposing for FY 1983 a 
level of $785 million in ESF, which is 
identical to the pattern of the past few 
years; actual amounts programed in the 
past 2 years have fluctuated, owing to 
"borrowings" by the United States and 
"pay backs." The program is essentially 
a cash transfer program, although we 
are proposing a return to the traditiona 
mix of two-thirds grants and one-third 
concessional loans, rather than the full 
grant programs of the last 2 fiscal 
years. 

Israel's political and economic stabil 
ty is important to U.S. policy. Our 
economic assistance program in effect 
provides balance-of-payments support ii 
order to meet short term balance-of- 
payments requirements and to import 
certain civilian goods and services 
without undue reliance on high-cost con 
mercial borrowing and drawdowns of 
essential foreign exchange reserves. 



m 



Israel's Debt Burden 

Israel's growing debt repayments to the 
United States have been a source of con 
cern to many Israeli officials, who 
naturally would prefer that the grant 
component of our assistance program bt 
much larger. We carefully reviewed the 
debt burden before submitting the 
security assistance proposals to Con- 
gress. Our review also had to take into 
account our own budget stringencies. In 
reaching our conclusions, we attempted 
to put all factors — including needs, 
priorities, and resources — into sensible 
balance. As our separate report to the 
Congress should make clear, we believe 
Israel will be able to handle the addi- 
tional debt burdens implicit in the FY 
1983 funding levels. 



w 



«■• 



i'k 



snceptual Approach 

t me outline briefly some of the major 
ements of the conceptual framework 
eti ithin which our assistance proposals 
r Israel have been formulated. 

First of all, our support for Israel's 
curity and economic well-being is a 
SI isic and unshakable tenet of American 

reign policy in the Middle East. It is 
iff so a critical element in our strategy 
[ward the region as a whole. While 
Irael cannot hope to keep up with its 
)tential adversaries in quantitative 
ilitary terms, with U.S. assistance at 
ir proposed levels, it can continue to 
aintain its qualitative and technological 
iperiority over any potential combina- 
)n of regional forces. 

Our support for Israel grows out of 
longstanding moral commitment to a 
ee and democratic nation which has 
en a haven and which shares many of 
ir own social and democratic tradi- 
)ns. Israel has been a steady friend of 
e United States. 

The perennial Arab-Israeli conflict 
id the need to achieve a broad, just, 
id lasting peace in the region have 
ten at the forefront of U.S. foreign 
)licy concerns for many years. Israel 
is sought peace and in the process has 
jreed to the Camp David understand- 
Igs and signed the historic Treaty of 
eace with Egypt. 

Our large military and economic 
sistance programs for Israel tangibly 
pport the unfinished business of the 
!ace process and give Israel the con- 
ience to continue. Israel is making im- 
)rtant sacrifices for peace— including 
e forthcoming full withdrawal from 
•e Sinai Peninsula in the last week of 
pril — and our materiel as well as moral 
id political support over the years have 
•ovided some compensation. 

Our assistance programs for Israel 
implement the two mutually reinforc- 
g goals of American policy in the 
tgion: first, the search for a just and 
Bting peace; and, second, the assurance 
»at our friends in the region will be 
ole to maintain their security against 
treats from the outside and from 
iidical forces within the region. These 
ograms are also consistent with the 
•emise that economic progress and ad- 
incement of the welfare of the peoples 
' the region will help promote stability. 
In addition a strong Israel has been 
Igood investment as we look to the 
srategic picture and to potential Soviet 
id Soviet-supported challenges to our 
terests in the region. We know that 
e can count on Israel for cooperation 
ad understanding. 



REFUGEES 



We are, however, in the midst of an 
extremely tense period, affecting not on- 
ly Israel but the entire region. The 
political and security environment in the 
region has changed, and mostly for the 
worse. The Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet oc- 
cupation of Afghanistan, the tripartite 
pact among Libya, South Yemen, and 
Ethiopia, and continued Russian mis- 
chiefmaking— directly and through prox- 
ies — present threats and challenges. 
Lebanon remains a powder-keg. Israel's 
full cooperation has been indispensable 
in preserving and strengthening the 
cease-fire in the Israeli-Lebanese arena, 
which has held since last July and which 
has seen no loss of life yet through 
cease-fire violations. 

The presentation and examination of 
our foreign assistance proposals are tak- 
ing place at a particularly sensitive junc- 



ture in Israel itself. Israel is experienc- 
ing a genuine domestic crisis in the proc- 
ess of completing preparations for its 
final withdrawal from the Sinai next 
month. The Israeh Government has been 
facing tremendous pressure from many 
of its own citizens, yet is faithfully car- 
rying out its commitment to bring back 
into Israel the settlers and squatters 
from the settlements in the Sinai before 
Israel's final withdrawal. 

These tensions show why it is so im- 
portant that Israel continue to have con- 
fidence in our determination, in our 
policies, and in the quality and credibili- 
ty of our friendship. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be publisned by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1983 Requests for Migration 
and Refugee Assistance 



by Richard D. Vine 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the Senate Ap- 
propriations Co7nmittee on May 20, 
1982. Ambassador Vine is Director of the 
Bureau for Refugee Programs. ^ 

A principal State Department policy is 
to favor solutions to refugee problems 
that minimize the number of persons 
resettled in this country. While we can- 
not deny our special concern and respon- 
sibility for refugees from certain areas, 
we recognize that refugee problems are 
an international concern and should be 
resolved, where at all possible, by volun- 
tary repatriation and resettlement in 
countries of first asylum. Given this in- 
ternational responsibility, we continue to 
hold the view that the responsibility for 
refugee assistance and resettlement is to 
be shared by the international commu- 
nity as a whole through the services of 
international organizations, especially 
the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR 
received the 1981 Nobel Peace Prize in 
recognition of its efforts to deal with in- 
ternational refugee problems. As a ma- 
jor donor, it is our responsibility to press 
for continued programmatic and opera- 
tional improvements in this organization 
so that it can meet the basic needs of 
refugees for protection, food, shelter, 
and medical care while other, more 



lasting solutions to their plight are being 
worked out. 



Resettlement in the United States 

The budget request before you is a con- 
crete expression of this philosophy. 
Whereas, in FY 1980 over 60% of our 
expenditures were for resettlement in 
the United States, only 38% of the FY 
1983 budget request is directed toward 
U.S. resettlement. The number of 
refugees to be resettled in the United 
States has fallen over 210,000 in FY 
1980, to an FY 1982 consultations level 
of 140,000, and to a projected total of 
only 103,500 in the coming fiscal year. 
At the same time, we are increasing the 
proportion of our funding for programs 
which assist refugees in nations of 
asylum and for programs of voluntary 
repatriation and of resettlement in third 
countries which have not traditionally 
been engaged in resettlement. 

I would like to emphasize, however, 
that the downward trend in admissions 
is being managed in a way that is consis- 
tent with the humanitarian traditions of 
the United States and with U.S. respon- 
sibilities for refugees of particular con- 
cern to this country. At the same time, 
we are continuing to provide support for 
the protection, care, and maintenance of 
refugees abroad, in accordance with the 



uly 1982 



75 



REFUGEES 



level of need and with U.S. foreign 
policy interests in the particular pro- 
gram area. 

The State Department fully under- 
stands the significant impacts that 
refugee resettlement have on some com- 
munities in this country. It is our inten- 
tion to continue to manage refugee 
resettlement to this country in such a 
fashion that the concerns of State and 
local governments are fully considered. 
We do not accept the faulty premise 
that the only viable solution to refugee 
situations is resettlement in a third 
country, chiefly the United States. We 
will continue to pursue other alter- 
natives which promise to help resolve 
refugee situations in a humanitarian 
manner. 

The FY 1983 request for the migra- 
tion and refugee assistance appropria- 
tion totals $419 million, $84 million less 
than the FY 1982 appropriation. Recent- 
ly, the President has requested that FY 
1982 funding for this program be re- 
duced by $50 million. This proposal was 
made because of major cost savings in 
our refugee resettlements program — re- 
settlements to the United States are 
running lower than the FY 1982 con- 
sultations level provides and the enacted 
appropriation finances. The Department 
is requesting a supplemental for protec- 
tive security improvements for Amer- 
ican diplomats at selected overseas 
posts. Because that supplemental and 
the deferral of refugee appropriation 
funds coincide, the President proposed 
to the Congress that transfer authority 
language be enacted to mitigate the 
financing of the protective security sup- 
plemental. If that language is not 
enacted, the Administration will request 
a rescission of these funds at a later 
date. 

Projected FY 1983 Admissions 

For U.S. resettlement activities in FY 
1983, we are seeking $158,188,000 to 
finance the resettlement of up to 
103,500 refugees, including 72,000 from 
Southeast Asia. I must stress that this 
level of refugee admissions is only a pro- 
jection. The President will determine the 
admission ceiling after consultations 
with the Congress prior to the beginning 
of FY 1983, as required by the Refugee 
Act. Furthermore, due to such uncer- 
tainties as the situation in Eastern 
Europe, refinements of these admission 
projections may be required. However, it 
is my expectation that, unless the 
refugee situation in the world changes 
fundamentally between now and when 
we have our consultations in September, 



76 



the total admissions ceiling will not ex- 
ceed this figure, which is 36,500 persons 
lower than that for the current fiscal 
year. 

Among the 31,500 refugees other 
than Indochinese, we have projected ad- 
missions of 23,000 Soviets and East 
Europeans, 4,000 from the Near East, 
2,000 from the Western Hemisphere and 
2,500 from Africa. We are, of course, 
concerned about the current situation in 
Poland, and the levels of admissions 
which we request in September will take 
into account all factors relevant to this 
problem. 

Relief Assistance 

With respect to funding of relief 
assistance for refugees, the Department 
of State is seeking $29,400,000 to sup- 
port refugee relief operations in 
Southeast Asia. These funds will support 
the care and maintenance operations of 
the UNHCR, as well as the international 
efforts to care for the 200,000 Khmer 
who have sought sanctuary along the 
Thai-Kampuchean border. This funding 
level is $20,435,000 less than that ap- 
propriated for FY 1982, reflecting con- 
tinued reductions in the number of In- 
dochinese refugees in Southeast Asia, as 
well as a reduced food program inside 
Kampuchea. We expect a phaseout of 
extensive multilateral assistance to the 
interior of Kampuchea by FY 1983. 

Resettlement Assistance 

The next activity in our budget is reset- 
tlement assistance. This program re- 
quest is a concrete expression of the in- 
terest of the Department in resolving 
refugee problems through means other 
than resettlement in the United States. 
We are seeking $10 million for this pro- 
gram in FY 1983, an increase of $9 
million above the FY 1982 appropria- 
tion. The program will finance various 
voluntary repatriation, local resettle- 
ment, and third country resettlement 
projects. We expect that programs 
funded under this initiative will be or- 
ganized under the auspices of interna- 
tional organizations or private voluntary 
agencies. 

Among the innovative activities 
funded will be projects involving local 
permanent settlement in nations of 
asylum, as well as initiatives to resettle 
refugees in certain developing nations 
which are willing to accept refugees for 
permanent resettlement, but which 
would be unable to do so without inter- 
national financial support. These pro- 
grams are intended to help reduce the 



number of refugees requiring resettle- 
ment in the United States. 







fttt 



Tl 



llie 



(iei 



irit 



P 






Israel. The Department is seeking 
$12.5 million, the same amount as ap- 
propriated in FY 1982, for a contribu- 
tion to the United Israel Appeal. The 
contribution will help finance assistance|kist 
to Soviet and Eastern European ref- 
ugees who resettle in Israel. Regret- 
tably, the Soviet Union continues to 
reduce the rate of emigration for its 
Jewish citizens, but this program con- 
tinues at this level in recognition of the 
long-term costs incurred by Israel in ca 
ing for refugees who have arrived in re 
cent years. 

Africa. For assistance to refugees i 
Africa, we seek $76.9 million, which is 
$30,100,000 below the FY 1982 ap- 
propriation. This decrease is accounted ^'" 
for by the one-time appropriation of $3(' "^ 
million to the migration and refugee 
assistance appropriation in FY 1982 for 
longer term projects to aid refugees ano * 
displaced persons in Africa. It was 
recognized that such longer term proj- 
ects are properly the responsibility of 
the Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID). In fact, the Congress 
specified that the FY 1982 appropriatio 
be administered by AID. 

Within the $76.9 million that we are 
requesting for the Africa program, we 
will continue our current policy of fi- 
nancing one-third of the UNHCR's pro- 
gram in Africa and will make a $7.9 
million contribution to the African pro- 
grams of the International Committee c 
the Red Cross (ICRC). We will also pro- 
vide up to $8 million for a variety of 
bilateral and voluntary agency initiative 
to address those aspects of refugee 
problems that are not adequately dealt 
with by the involved international 
organizations. 

Middle East. Refugee assistance is 
provided by this government for both 
humanitarian and political purposes. 
These concerns are clearly combined in 
the Middle East where we are con- 
fronted with the human needs of the 
Palestinians and the Afghans as well as 
the worldwide political and economic im 
plications of those problems. In order to 
deal with the needs of the Palestinians, 
the Department is seeking $72 million sa 
a contribution to the U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine refugees in 
the Near East (UNRWA). This organiza 
tion, which provides basic services to th« 
nearly 2 million Palestinian refugees, 
contributes toward a political atmos- 
phere within the Mideast which is con- 
ducive to the long-term peace process. 
The proposed UNRWA contribution, an 



Department of State Bulletin 



f'j 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



^Sl 



crease of $5 million over the FY 1982 
)propriation, will help UNRWA deal 
ith the effects of inflation and a con- 
antly increasing population. 

The Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
imprise the largest refugee population 
the world. The Government of 

!''* ikistan is currently providing asylum 
well over 2 million refugees who have 
id Afghanistan into Pakistan during 
e past 3 years. Thousands of refugees 
ntinue to flee from Afghanistan 
;cause of the ongoing fighting between 
)viet forces and the Afghan resistance. 

^ ikistan, I must add, serves as an 
itstanding example of a nation meeting 
5 international responsibility to provide 
;ylum to refugees. Pakistan has willing- 
granted asylum with the expectation 
at the international community will 
lance the care and maintenance of the 
fugees, a program expected to require 
)proximately $110 million in FY 1983. 

The Department requests $38 
illion to meet our share of this relief 
fort. Up to $33 million will be provided 
the UNHCR to meet 30% of the cost 
its care and maintenance program, 
le remaining $5 million will finance a 
.riety of initiatives to meet essential 
;alth, relief, and transportation needs 
it addressed through the UNHCR's 
ogram. Medical care for persons in- 
red in the fighting in Afghanistan pro- 
ded by the ICRC is one example. The 
1 million will be used to finance grants 
the ICRC, private voluntary agencies, 
id possibly the Pakistani Government. 

Latin America. Latin America, until 
cently, was one of the few areas of the 
Drld not confronted with a major 
fugee problem. However, continuing 
A\ disturbances in Central America are 
ircing increasing numbers of persons to 
ee across international frontiers to 
•cape fighting and persecution. The 
epartment is requesting $5 million to 
lip meet the costs of the international 
tforts to provide assistance to refugees 
Central America. These funds are $1 
illion less than the amount appro- 
•iated in FY 1982 due to nonrecurring 
ists in the 1982 program. However, 
ven the volatility of the political situa- 
Dn in Central America, these needs are 
articularly difficult to project. It is 
Bar that we must keep this problem 
ider close review as events unfold. 

nternational Organizations 

he State Department requests 
^,450,000 in FY 1983 for contributions 
I various activities of international 
•ganizations, an increase of $1 million 



over FY 1982. We propose to provide a 
total of $4.7 million to the Intergovern- 
mental Committee for Migration in sup- 
port of that organization's assessed and 
operational budgets. We will also pro- 
vide $3.75 million to the ICRC in sup- 
port of the ordinary budget of the 
organization and the Political Detainee 
Protection and Assistance Program. In 
the case of the ordinary budget we will 
provide $2 million, an increase of 
$500,000 above the amount provided in 
the current year. We are seeking 
$1,750,000 as a contribution to the pro- 
gram. 

Previously, U.S. contributions to this 
activity were obtained through re- 
programing of other funds in this ap- 
propriation. However, because of the im- 
portance of this program as an expres- 
sion of concern by this Administration 
for political prisoners, we are including 
this item in our FY 1983 appropriation 
request. We are also seeking $1 million, 
the same amount appropriated in FY 
1982, to support programs of the 
UNHCR in areas of the world other 
than those dealt with in the geographic 
segments of this budget. 

Administrative Expenses 

The administrative expenses of this pro- 
gram are expected to increase to 
$7,562,000 in 1983. This is a net in- 
crease of only $136,000. This request 
will finance the salary and operating 
costs associated with our staff of 98 per- 
manent employees. 

This budget request does not include 
a request for new funding for the U.S. 
Emergency Refugee and Migration As- 
sistance Fund. Unobligated carryover 
balances available in that fund should be 
sufficient to finance appropriate 
responses to refugee and migration 
emergencies during FY 1983. 

As you are well aware, refugee sit- 
uations frequently change between the 
time that this budget is developed and 
the new fiscal year. Should any such 
changes occur affecting our 1983 appro- 
priation, we will attempt to reprogram 
funds to meet the higher priority needs. 
I wish to thank this subcommittee for its 
support during the past 2 years for our 
reprograming efforts in order to real- 
locate our funds to meet new and chang- 
ing requirements. 



' The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



FY 1983 
Security 
Assistance 
Requests 

by James L. Buckley 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on April U, 1982. 
Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for 
Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology.^ 

I am pleased to be here today to have 
the opportunity to present an FY 1983 
foreign assistance program. The Ad- 
ministration is mindful that the Con- 
gress passed a 2-year authorization bill 
last year. But as the committee report 
recognized, the authorizations for 1983 
were made without the benefit of the 
Administration's views, and it antici- 
pated that the Administration would be 
submitting requests for additional funds 
in due course. 

We wish we could stay within the 
amounts already authorized, but we 
have no responsible choice but to pre- 
sent the additional levels of security 
assistance the Administration is asking 
for FY 1983. They reflect the hard 
necessity of responding effectively to 
events occurring outside our borders 
which have the most direct impact on 
our ultimate safety and well-being. 

Close to home and in distant lands, 
our nation's most important military, 
political, and economic interests are 
being challenged. Security assistance is 
the most cost-efficient investment we 
can make both to meet today's 
challenges and \.o enhance the prospects 
for a safer future in which all nations 
observe the maxim of "live and let live." 
At present, however, strategically 
located friends and allies are under 
growing pressure from the Soviets and 
their stand-ins. Afghanistan has been 
taken. The bid for greater freedom has 
been crushed in Poland. With Soviet 
arms and support, Vietnamese troops 
continue to occupy Kampuchea. In 
Africa and in the Caribbean Basin, 
Cuban troops or Cuban-supported forces 
pose a direct threat to our most vital in- 
terest. 

Weakness attracts the predator. 
Hence, it is understandable that the 
arena of global challenge has increasing- 
ly shifted from the industrialized states 



uly1982 



77 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



of Europe and Asia to the less-developed 
nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, 
and, closer to home, the Caribbean. A 
failure to achieve viable economies, 
credible defenses, and stable political in- 
stitutions makes these less-developed na- 
tions inviting targets for subversion. 

A New Approach 

To meet these urgent challenges abroad 
and to minimize the cost to taxpayers at 
home, this Administration has adopted a 
fundamentally new approach in arriving 
at our security assistance program for 
FY 1983. We have explicitly defined our 
nation's vital foreign policy objectives 
and painstakingly allocated all foreign 
assistance resources against our priority 
goals. As many of you can appreciate, 
this has necessarily prolonged the proc- 
ess and delayed the submission of some 
congressional presentation materials. 
However, we believe the resulting pro- 
gram contains the minimum required 
resources to: 

• Promote peaceful solutions to 
regional rivalries; 

• Assure U.S. access to critical 
military facilities and basic raw 
materials; 

• Confront growing military threats 
from, and subversive efforts by, the 
Soviets; and 

• Reduce the economic and social 
degradation that breeds domestic 
violence and invites external interven- 
tion. 

The entire program has been 
carefully scrutinized by the President to 
insure that our resources are, in fact, 
directed toward our most important 
goals. The final scrutiny, of course, will 
be yours. But given the care with which 
this request has been constructed and 
the pressing needs it has been designed 
to meet, I urge your committee and the 
Congress to approve it in full. 

I would invite your attention to the 
Department's booklet, "International 
Security and Economic Cooperation Pro- 
gram, Fiscal Year 1983," which has been 
made available to the Congress. Since 
the details of our FY 1983 program are 
set forth in this document, I will forego 
a listing of all the specific levels and, in- 
stead, summarize the major regional 
elements. 

Overall, our FY 1983 request is for 
$8.7 billion in total program authority; 
the necessary budget authorization 
would come to $4.8 billion. This 
represents a program increase of $1.65 
billion and a budget increase of $1 billion 
over the amounts you have already 
authorized for FY 1983. Given our 



worldwide responsibilities, and the prob- 
lems with which we have to deal, the in- 
crease we seek is modest. 

Foreign Policy Objectives 

I would now like to review briefly the 
major foreign policy objectives toward 
which our proposed program has been 
tailored and explain why the requested 
security assistance is necessary to attain 
our goals. I will also summarize the few 
changes to the legislation which we will 
seek. 

Middle East. Over 53% of the en- 
tire FY 1983 security assistance pro- 
gram will be directed in support of our 
Middle East objectives, namely, the 
search for a just and lasting peace and 
the urgent requirement that friends in 
the region be secure against external 
threats. These objectives are mutually 
reinforcing. No peace is possible unless 
the nations of the region are secure 
from outside coercion, and security will 
not be achieved if we fail to address the 
underlying sources of conflict and in- 
stability. 

Our security assistance serves both 
of these objectives. It seeks to advance 
economic well-being and political stabil- 
ity in the region. The security and 
economic health of Israel and Egypt are 
requisite for further broadening the 
peace of the Middle East. U.S. 
assistance programs tangibly reflect our 
support and help give these nations the 
confidence to continue on the path 
toward peace begun at Camp David. Our 
assistance to Israel and Egypt, along 
with our aid to Jordan, Lebanon, and 
the regional programs, provides a 
security and economic base essential to 
ultimate stability and peace within the 
region. 

Europe. The President is allocating 
19% of the program— $1.6 billion to sup- 
port our interests in Europe. The 
strategic importance to NATO of 
Europe's southern flank has been 
dramatically underlined by events this 
past year. With neighboring regions fac- 
ing a growing challenge, our efforts to 
assist Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Por- 
tugal have assumed increasing impor- 
tance. Helping these nations, through 
our security assistance programs, is an 
important contribution to our common 
defense, not only against threats to 
Europe but against challenges to our 
common interests beyond the geographic 
bounds of the Alliance. 

Turkey, for example, lies at the in- 
tersection of our NATO, Middle East, 
and Persian Gulf security concerns. A 



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militarily and economically stronger 
Turkey cannot only contribute 
significantly more to a strengthened 
NATO deterrent but can move more 
rapidly to the full return of civilian 
government. Spain and Portugal, the 
other major security assistance recipi- 
ents, are important not only to our 
NA'TO posture, but to our capabilities 
project military forces from the United 
States to Africa and the Middle East. 

Southwest Asia and the Persian 
Gulf. Ten percent of the FY 1983 
security assistance program is directed 
to insuring our continued access to 
Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf 
and to their critically important 
resources. Almost all nations in the are 
stretching from Pakistan in the east to 
Morocco in the west face serious 
economic problems and potential subve 
sion or regional threats, in many cases, 
supported by the Soviets or their prox- 
ies. Our proposal for military moderniz 
tion and economic assistance will help 
Pakistan to deter attacks from 
Afghanistan and facilitate the economit 
development essential to internal stabil 
ity. Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia all 
face, to one degree or another, threats 
of subversion or aggression emanating 
from Libya. All are important not only 
to our strategy for the security of the 
Persian Gulf but, potentially to the pro 
pects for peace in the Middle East as 
well. 

Latin America and the Caribbean 
Basin. Our plan for restoring stability 
and improving economic prospects in tl 
Caribbean Basin will require $433 
million in security assistance for 1983. 
Here, we face a major challenge from 
Cuba's efforts to exploit economic, 
social, and military voilnerabilities. Our 
assistance programs are designed to ac 
dress the underlying causes of socio- 
political instability and restore stability 
within the region as a whole. We must 
help provide the concessional resources 
essential to the task until increased in- 
vestment, a strengthened private secto 
and expanded export markets enable 
these countries to achieve economic sel 
sufficiency. 

Of this amount, El Salvador will 
need $166 million in economic support 
fund (ESF) and military assistance to 
thwart the outright drive by insurgents 
to destroy the economy. Jamaica will 
continue to need substantial assistance 
in order to restore the vitality of its 
shattered private sector. Costa Rica's 
rapidly deteriorating economy will re- 
quire substantial assistance while fun- 
damental reforms are effected. Hon- 



f 



'i 



78 



Department of State Bulletil 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



ras faces an economic decline and a 
litical-military crisis on its borders. 
;teriorating conditions in other coun- 
es in the region may well require 
lergency assistance during the year, 
nee the critical importance of at least 
e modest contingency funds we are 
oposing. The amounts allocated for 
litary assistance represent just 16% of 
r total program for the Caribbean 
isin. 

East Asia and the Pacific. Re- 

ests in support of our important 
icific interests represent a modest 
iction, only 6%, but nevertheless, a 
al part of our FY 1983 security 
sistance program. This region is of 
ijor political, strategic, and economic 
portance to the United States. We 
ve significant treaty relationships with 
pan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, 
d our ANZUS partners. We also have 
^rowing economic and commercial 
ike in the area, with petroleum both 
ginating and passing through the 
jion. U.S. trade with the area now 
rpasses that with Western Europe. 

The Philippines, Indonesia, and 
ilaysia are located astride strategic 
I lanes that are vital to U.S. and 
jstern interests. Indonesia is an im- 
rtant source of petroleum. The Philip- 
les provide the United States with 
iential military facilities. Our security 
i economic assistance contributes to 
! stability of these nations, their 
)nomic progress and political develop- 
mt, and to our own defense and 
)nomic well-being. 

In Northeast Asia, a strong and 
)nomically vital South Korea is essen- 
1 to deter its northern neighbor from 
litary adventures. A Soviet-supported 
3,000-man Vietnamese army remains 
Kampuchea and threatens Thailand's 
■,urity. 

The importance of our interests in 
. Western Pacific is beyond dispute, 
d the only reason our proposal is not 
ger, is that our partners in the Far 
,st are somewhat better off 
)nomically, and in security terms, 
in are many of our friends and allies 
ewhere. 

Africa. To help assure stability and 
zess in the Indian Ocean and Persian 
ilf area, we must provide economic 
d military assistance to Kenya, 
malia, Djibouti, Mauritius, and the 
ychelles. Most of these nations are ex- 
riencing severe economic difficulties, 
d several face serious threats from 
.hiopia or South Yemen. 

Both Kenya and Somalia require 
Ip in achieving economic self-reliance 
d improved defense capabilities. In 

Jiy1982 



turn, both nations provide U.S. forces 
with access to facilities, thus con- 
tributing significantly to our ability to 
sustain a credible deterrent posture in 
the region. 

Our proposed $177 million security 
assistance program for Southern Africa 
is designed to advance the peaceful 
establishment of an independent 
Namibia, to help insure continued 
Western access to key strategic 
minerals, and to support the develop- 
ment process from Zaire to the Cape. 
We must fulfill our undertaking to assist 
the economic development of the 
frontline states of Southern Africa, 
whose participation is essential to the 
stability of a region rich in minerals 
essential to our economic well-being. The 
alternative, a new escalation of conflict, 
would only provide irresistible oppor- 
tunities for the Cubans and Soviets. 

In West Africa, modest levels of 
security assistance are essential to main- 
tain economic and political resilience and 
to discourage further Libyan attempts 
to exploit the financial difficulties faced 
by several nations. In addition, our aid 
to Liberia is designed to insure con- 
tinued U.S. access to key transportation 
and communications facilities. 

In sum, the President is requesting 
and is committed to defending a total 
$8.7 billion security assistance program 
for FY 1983. I reiterate that only $4.8 
billion requires budget authority; $3.9 
billion is in the form of off-budget 
foreign military sales (FMS) guarantees. 
The foreign policy objectives I have just 
outlined are those we strive to attain 
with these resources. The President's 
program has, as never before, been 
carefully structured to address only our 
most critical needs. For example, 87% of 
the entire FY 1983 FMS guarantee pro- 
gram is allocated to only seven coun- 
tries: Egypt, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, 
Spain, and Turkey. Seventy-seven per- 
cent of the FY 1983 ESF program is for 
six vital countries: Egypt, El Salvador, 
Israel, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey. 
Almost 80% of the FMS direct credit 
program will go to Israel, Egypt, Por- 
tugal, Sudan, and Turkey. 

Concessional Assistance 

We again seek authority to provide con- 
cessional assistance to key countries in 
order to make it possible to purchase 
defense equipment and services that we 
believe it is in our interests for them to 
have. We are asking this because we 
believe that concessional rates provide 
us with maximum flexibility in meeting 
the specific needs of security assistance 



recipients. Over the long term, they also 
lower the net cost to the U.S. taxpayer. 

The two adverse trends of increas- 
ing debt burdens among recipient coun- 
tries and high Federal Financing Bank 
interest rates have created a situation in 
which many countries, with particularly 
weak economies, are facing serious dif- 
ficulties in financing their purchases 
through FMS guaranteed loans. Under 
our proposal, we will plan to offer $950 
million in the form of forgiven credits to 
three countries only— $500 million for 
Israel, $400 million for Egypt, and $50 
million for Sudan. In addition, we pro- 
pose to furnish $789 million of conces- 
sional credits to 19 countries— including 
an added $50 million for Sudan — at an 
interest rate as low as 3%. The coun- 
tries selected are those facing particular- 
ly difficult economic situations and those 
in which we have important security and 
foreign policy interests. For example, 
we are planning to provide $300 million 
at concessional rates to Turkey for its 
modernization program. Seventy percent 
of the remaining $489 million would go 
to six countries: Thailand, Tunisia, 
Sudan, Morocco, Portugal, and El 
Salvador. 

The programs we are submitting 
have been carefully weighed, debated, 
and made to answer the question, "Is 
the need critical?" We have had to make 
trade-offs between what we— and you — 
would like to do and the minimum that 
must be done to protect our national in- 
terests. We conclude that there is simply 
no alternative but to seek the additional 
resources if we are to support our 
varied and important goals. Without the 
increases over the levels appropriated 
for the current year: 

• We would be unable to provide 
sufficient FMS guaranteed financing to 
launch the Pakistan program we dis- 
cussed in such detail last year, increase 
the Egypt and Israel programs, or sup- 
port our negotiations for the Spanish 
bases; 

• We would be unable to provide 
the concessional credit terms required to 
enable Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, 
Morocco, Tunisia, El Salvador, and Por- 
tugal to upgrade their defenses; and 

• The ESF level would fall far short 
of the needs of Turkey and countries in 
the Caribbean Basin. 

Modification of Current Legislation 

Let me now summarize the modifica- 
tions we will seek to current legislation. 
Seven of them involve minor changes 
that will enhance the effectiveness of 



79 



UNITED NATIONS 



our security assistance program. In ad- 
dition, we seek new authority to 
establish an antiterrorism law enforce- 
ment assistance program. 

The proposed revisions to the law 
are: 

• An emergency peacekeeping 
drawdown authority for the President of 
$10 million in commodities and services, 
if he determines that unforeseen cir- 
cumstances have developed necessitating 
immediate assistance; 

• Elimination of certain prohibitions 
on foreign assistance to the People's 
Republic of China, ending the discrim- 
inatory treatment of that country based 
on its past association with the Soviet 
bloc; 

• A clarification to permit full-cost 
recovery of all additional expenses in- 
curred in carrying out administrative 
functions under the Arms Export Con- 
trol Act; 

• Exemption from the present 
15-day notification to the Congress on 
reprograming funds up to $.50,000 for 
international military and education 
training and international narcotics con- 
trol programs; 

• Provision for a "one-to-one" ex- 
change of U.S. and foreign mOitary 
students at professional military schools 
in accordance with bilateral agreements 
to be negotiated with foreign countries 
and international organizations after 
enactment; 

• Allowance of funds collected for 
administrative surcharges to be used for 
representation purposes; and finally, 

• An allowance for the executive to 



sell government-furnished equipment, in- 
cluding components and spares, to U.S. 
firms acting as prime contractors for 
foreign governments or international 
organizations for incorporation into end 
items. 



Conclusion 

I assure you that, in this most difficult 
year, the President would not be asking 
for additional security assistance if he 
were not absolutely convinced that these 
resources were essential to enhance the 
prospects for peace and protect essential 
American interests around the globe. 
Without them, the President would be 
forced to decide which objectives of our 
foreign policy to pursue and which to 
abandon or neglect. For example, he 
would be forced to face such damaging 
choices as scaling back our Spanish 
bases in order to finance our Caribbean 
initiative, or of shifting resources away 
from Turkey to address our needs in 
Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia, or abandon- 
ing our undertakings and initiatives in 
such important areas as Southern Africa 
and Southeast Asia in order to meet our 
commitments in the Middle East. 

Unless we are willing to make these 
investments for peace and security to- 
day, we risk far greater costs to both 
our safety and national treasure tomor- 
row. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1983 Assistance Requests 



by Nicholas Piatt 

Statement before the Sicbcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee on May 5, 1982. 
Mr. Piatt is Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Inte'tfiational Organization Affairs. ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before you to present the President's FY 
1983 request for contributions to certain 
voluntarily funded programs of the 
United Nations and the Organization of 
American States (OAS). 

This request is made at a time of 
stringent budgetary requirements and 
reflects the overriding need to curtail 



80 



Federal spending. We have been assess- 
ing all U.N. programs in which we par- 
ticipate, and this request is the result of 
our rigorous analysis. 

We have arrived at this request 
under the weight of other national 
priorities but not unmindful of the actual 
and symbolic consequences that reduced 
U.S. contributions might have for the 
U.N. family of agencies and programs. 
Certainly, needs worldwide have not 
diminished; the programs we support re- 
main importiint to U.S. foreign policy 
goals, and the benefits accruing to our 
country and our economy are no less 
welcome. We are, however, conscious of 
the equity and fairness of our request 
and of the compensating qualities that 



more efficient and better managed pr( 
grams can produce under enhanced 
fiscal and budgetary discipline. 

We hope the Congress will author 
and appropriate the entire amount re- 
quested as a concrete signal of sustain' 
U.S. commitment to the United Natior 
and the Organization of American Stat 
and as a practical measure for facilitat 
ing the conduct of U.S. foreign policy 
through these multilateral agencies. 



i 



U.S. Position 

Before discussing the different items ii 
eluded in this request, I want to explai 
the Administration's position regarding 
the United Nations and its affiliated 
agencies. 

It has been the proud tradition of 
this country that in asserting our powt 
in the modern world we have always 
sought the cooperation of other nation 
to oppose aggression, to uphold the ru 
of law, and to help the poor and the 
weak. We have persisted in the belief, 
and we continue to pursue the ideal th 
the maintenance of stable institutions < 
global cooperation are essential for the 
effective pursuit of American foreign 
policy goals. 

As it has developed over the four 
decades of its existence, the U.N. 
system has been a source of both 
satisfaction and disappointment. The 
United Nations has grown into a ver- 
satile global conglomerate whose con- 
cerns range from keeping the peace to 
exchanging scientific knowledge, from 
the production of food to the protectio 
of fundamental freedoms. Today, it ha 
three times as many members as it ha 
on its day of birth. Its expenditures he 
multiplied manyfold, and its programs 
touch all countries on the Earth. 

In the intervening 37 years, how- 
ever, we have also learned that biggei 
not necessarily better— that while the 
United Nations has grown it has not j 
matured, and while it has become the 
sounding board for new and unfamilia 
voices, it does not always echo the tru 

The role of the United States as o 
of the U.N.'s principal supporters for : 
these years earns us the right to critic 
it when warranted and defend it when 
deserved. We have gained the wisdom 
experience to discern and distingfuish 
between what is wrong with the Unite 
Nations and what is right, and the 
responsibility to right the wrongs. 

Frankly, we are not happy with a 
number of developments at the United 
Nations including: 

• The perennial crop of one-sided, 
polemical Mideast resolutions; 



K 



tS 



iai 



Bl 



UNITED NATIONS 



The adoption of propagandistic 
ind unrealistic stands on arms control 
. ind disarmament; 

Extreme resolutions on South 
Africa which are also abusive of the 
Jnited States; and 

The tendency of the nonaligned 
rroup in the United Nations to criticize 
^he United States and the other in- 
lustrialized democracies for the woes of 
;he Third World, and to demand un- 
•ealistic solutions. 

ii klajor U.N. Accomplishments 

' But this is not the entire picture, the 
vhole story. Permit me to highlight 
ome of the major U.N. accomplish- 
nents in 1981-82. These included: 

Adoption of resolutions demand- 
ng an end to aggression in Kampuchea 
md Afghanistan by increased majorities; 

• Adoption of a strong resolution by 
he U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
ixpressing concern over the violation of 
Luman rights in Poland; 

• Strong rebuke in the International 
jabor Organization to Poland and the 
loviet Union because of the suppression 
'f Solidarity; 

• Extension, by an increased major- 
:y, of the mandate to the special U.N. 
Chemical Weapons Experts Group for 
nother year; 

• Defeat of the Cuban-inspired at- 
empt to place Puerto Rico on the agen- 
a of the Special Committee on 
)ecolonization; 

• Adoption by the General Assembly 
f important resolutions on religious in- 
olerance and on the causes of mass 
efugee movements; 

Formulation in UNESCO [United 
Jations Educational, Scientific, and 
Jultural Organization] of a moderate 
nd practical program for the develop- 
lent of communications in the less 
eveloped countries with less emphasis 
n the radical call for a New World In- 
ormation Order; 

• Preservation of vital peacekeeping 
perations in South Lebanon, the Golan 
leights, and Cyprus; 

Adoption by the Security Council 
if Resolution 502 on the Falkland 
slands which provides the best 
ramework for a peaceful settlement 
lased on the U.N. Charter; and 

• Continued performance by U.N. 
pecialized agencies of a host of func- 
ions essential to the United States in 
nany fields. 



h 



I drew this balance sheet to put into 
relief the paradoxical reasons why— as 
revealed by the most recent polls — most 
Americans, while critical of certain U.N. 
actions, are also in favor of continued 
U.S. participation in the many construc- 
tive activities of that world organization 
and its affiliated agencies. 

Over the years, it has been consis- 
tent U.S. policy to moderate the ex- 
cessive expenditures of international 
organizations and to urge the acceptance 
of more efficient operation methods. 
Over the years we have resisted 
simplified solutions, quick fixes, and 
shouldering a disproportionate share of 
the burden for the U.N.'s social, 
economic, and humanitarian undertak- 
ings. And over the years, we have main- 
tained that the United Nations must 
complement, but never substitute for, 
the self-reliant efforts of the countries, 
themselves, in the path of their develop- 
ment. 

While continuing to hold to these 
positions as a matter of practicality and 
principle, we must also weigh the limits 
imposed on the size of our voluntary 
contributions by our own budgetary 
restraints. More importantly, we must 
also reemphasize certain principles. 
First, expenditures of the public sector 
for major U.N. development programs 
should be designed to engender com- 
plementary efforts by the private sector 
where the greatest potential of exper- 
tise, capital, and technology required for 
the economic growth of the LDCs [less 
developed countries] can be found. And 
secondly, if we are to bring under better 
control an overgrown international 
bureaucracy that spends progressively 
more energy on its own maintenance 
and less and less on accomplishing its 
mission, the time has come to acknowl- 
edge that there are limits to the U.N.'s 
institutional capacity to attend to every 
problem. 

In striving to maintain a proper 
balance between these considerations 
and the promotion of U.S. interests 
through multilateral organizations, we 
cannot escape the leading role we have 
in shaping the activities of the U.N. 
agencies and programs. There are over- 
riding rationales for a continued high 
level of U.S. commitment and voluntary 
contributions to international organiza- 
tions that embrace political, strategic, 
economic, and cultural considerations. 
Our voluntary contributions to the U.N. 
agencies and programs undeniably affect 
the international environment in which 
we pursue our goals. More specifically. 



U.S. contributions to these organizations 
and programs 

• Provide an opportunity for 
advancing American ideals and ideas af- 
fecting the evolution of the international 
system; 

• Are critical for advancing the 
development of all countries, especially 
the poorer ones; 

• Demonstrate, in specific terms, 
American humanitarian concerns; 

• Are often warranted because of 
the strategic importance of given 
geographic areas in which U.N. pro- 
grams are active; 

• Act as catalysts for use of U.S. 
expertise, technologies, and supplies; 

• Sponsor foreign students to U.S. 
institutions of higher learning; 

• Are, in a large part, returned to 
the U.S. economy in the forms of rent- 
als, salaries, services, purchases, and 
other expenditures; 

• Encourage the recognition that 
certain international responsibilities, 
which cannot rest on one or a few coun- 
tries alone, devolve upon the entire 
world community; 

• Substitute for the uneconomical 
proliferation of bilateral agreements be- 
tween the United States and other na- 
tions; 

• Permit these organizations to 
coordinate their activities with U.S. 
bilateral assistance programs and to 
serve in areas too sensitive for, or out- 
side the reach of, U.S. bilateral aid; and 
finally, 

• Strengthen these organizations as 
preferred alternatives for many LDCs to 
entering into entanghng "mutual 
assistance" arrangements with the 
Soviet Union. 

Few if any of these organizations 
and programs would continue at the 
level of activity or with the impact they 
now have without substantial U.S. par- 
ticipation. Withdrawal from these 
organizations would harm our 
diplomacy; our economy; and our own 
scientific, educational, cultural, and 
business communities. 

The remainder of my statement 
describes briefly the activities and opera- 
tions of the organizations and programs 
our voluntary contributions support. 
How, for example, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency promotes 
nuclear nonproliferation through its 
safeguards program; how the World 
Meteorological Organization doubles the 
data available to U.S. weather services; 



81 



UNITED NATIONS 



or how the U.N. Environmental Pro- 
gram helps tackle the problem of trans- 
boundary air pollution. 

The U.N. Development Program 
(UNDP) 

Financed entirely through voluntary con- 
tributions from governments, UNDP is 
the main channel for technical coopera- 
tion in the U.N. system. It administers 
projects valued over $600 million in 
some 150 countries covering a g^eat 
diversity of fields ranging from 
stimulating capital investment to voca- 
tional and professional training. It has a 
coordinating and primary role in 
development efforts, particularly in the 
poorest of the developing countries. 

The requested U.S. contribution of 
$106.8 million is $21.4 million less than 
the U.S. contribution for FY 1982. This 
major cut does not reflect, in any way, a 
lessened U.S. commitment to UNDP or 
depreciation of its achievements but is in 
harmony with the Administration's ef- 
fort to improve our domestic economy 
while maintaining our leadership posi- 
tion overseas. 



The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) 

Since its creation in 1946, UNICEF has 
evolved into a major long-term 
humanitarian development fund aimed 
at improving the condition of children 
everywhere, particularly in the develop- 
ing countries. Often, in cooperation with 
other multilateral and bilateral organiza- 
tions, UNICEF provides both goods and 
services for projects that have direct 
bearing on the welfare of children and 
their immediate community. 

The United States has been a leader 
in UNICEF and has been its largest 
single donor. The $26 million requested 
for UNICEF for FY 1983 reflects gen- 
eral U.S. budgetary reductions and in no 
way reflects a declining interest in the 
program. 

The Organization of American States 
(OAS) 

The OAS is the principal hemisphere 
organization in which the United States 
seeks solutions to inter-American prob- 
lems. Its importance is particularly 
highlighted by recent events in the 
Caribbean Basin, for it offers a regional 
mechanism to advance U.S. security and 
political objectives. 

The OAS is especially attuned to the 
development needs of the region and to 
the promotion of technical cooperation 
among its members through its four 



82 



voluntary funds: the Special Multilateral 
Fund, the Special Projects Fund, the 
Special Development Assistance Fund, 
and the Special Cultural Fund. 

The maintenance of the level of U.S. 
contributions in FY 1983 at the magni- 
tude of $15.5 million, in view of other 
reductions, reflects the strong commit- 
ment of the United States to regional 
stability and economic growth and the 
high stakes that are involved in resolv- 
ing the present conflicts in Central 
America. Our participation in the OAS 
was essential to prevent action by this 
organization in the current Falkland 
Islands crisis to impose sanctions on the 
United Kingdom or to take other con- 
crete steps adverse to our interests. 

World Food Program (WFP) 

The purpose of this WFP contribution is 
to provide administrative and other cash 
costs in dispensing food aid for economic 
and social development and for food 
emergencies worldwide. 

The WFP uses its resources in a 
variety of development and rehabilita- 
tion programs. There are "food-for- 
work" projects where food is provided as 
payment to workers planting trees, dig- 
ging irrigation canals, etc. WFP food is 
also used in hospitals, child care centers, 
school feeding programs, and resettle- 
ment programs for refugees. The U.S. 
$1 million contribution for FY 1983 will 
provide administrative support needed 
to disburse our contribution of PL 480 
foods. WFP estimated 1983 expendi- 
tures are $608 million. Over 70% of 
these funds will be channeled into 
agricultural development projects. Low- 
income, food deficit countries will 
receive approximately 80% of the overall 
total. 



U.N. Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF) 

The UNCDF provides, on a grant basis, 
seed money for preinvestment activities 
for both private and public sector proj- 
ects too small for financing by 
multilateral banks. The fund concen- 
trates almost entirely on the least 
developed countries with particular em- 
phasis on the drought-stricken Sahelian 
Zone and Africa's poorest and neediest 
nations. Projects are executed by the 
U.N. specialized agencies, working with 
host country government, bank, private 
groups, and entrepreneurs. Projects con- 
centrate on food production, village self- 
help initiatives, and the development of 
alternate sources of energy. 

The U.S. annual contribution of $2 
million for FY 1981 and 1982 represents 



approximately 5% of the total receipts 
for each of those years. The proposed 
million contribution for 1983 reflects <i 
continued U.S. interest in encouraging; 
locally run activity involving simple to 
intermediate-level technology. The woig 
of the UNCDF enhances self-reliance, 
creates markets for American equip- 
ment and services, and promotes 
political stability and economic growth 

International Atomic Energy Agencj 
(IAEA) 

The voluntary U.S. contribution to the 
IAEA demonstrates U.S. support of tl 
IAEA and strengthens IAEA safe- 
guards in accordance with U.S. nucleai 
nonproliferation policy. The voluntary 
safeguards support program is com- 
plementary to nonproliferation and 
safeguards activities which are coverei 
under the regular budget of the IAEA 
The FY 1983 program will focus on th 
development and field-testing of in- 
struments and the implementation of 
systems which have been developed 
through the U.S. program of technical 
assistance to IAEA safeguards. Work 
will continue on the development of 
techniques for verification testing of 
safeguards on spent fuel. U.S. assistai 
to the technical cooperation program 
will be in the form of cash contributioi 
plus equipment, services of U.S. exper 
fellowships, and training courses, in- 
cluding preferential programs for LD( 
party to the nonproliferation treaty. T 
U.S. contribution request for FY 1983 
$14,500,000. 



U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) 



i 



The United States has been a major p 
ticipant in UNEP since its beginning i 
1972, contributing 30% of its total 
resources for the period 1978-1981. C 
proposed contribution for FY 1983 is 
million, down from $7.85 million in V. 
1982. 

A principal goal of UNEP's progr: 
is to stimulate monitoring and assess- 
ment of major global and regional env 
ronmental trends and to coordinate pi 
grams to improve environmental 
management. The organization providi 
a means through which the United 
States and other countries can stimuh 
action through the U.N. system on pn 
lems of global dimensions such as the 
building of toxic substance in rivers ai 
oceans, the depletion of ozone in the a 
mosphere, and the loss of tropical for< 
arable soil, and genetic resources of tl 
land. UNEP's multilateral approach is 
the preferable means of preventing 



(3 



'i 

t 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



' iplication and managing international 
rograms of such global dimensions. 

onvention on International Trade 
1 Endangered Species (CITES) 

he Convention on International Trade 
Endangered Species was ratified in 
?73 at U.S. congressional initiative to 
hieve concerted action on the conser- 
ition of endangered species of wild 
luna and flora. Support of the conven- 
on is a major element of U.S. conserva- 
on policy. CITES achievements include 
le establishment of guidelines for safe 

It lipping of live specimens of plants and 
limals; approval of a prototype iden- 
fication manual for use by customs of- 
cials to identify protected species at 
Drts of entry; adoption of a stand- 
•dized universal format for information 

r« ;quired to amend listings of endan- 
ired species; standardization of permit 
irms and other documentation; and 
^hter controls on trade in elephant 
ory, rhinoceros horn, and whale prod- 
its. The U.S. contribution request for 
Y 1983 is $150,000, which is needed 
"imarily to meet the U.S. share of the 
ennium budget and to provide a small 
nount for development of a CITES 
jarbook of international wildlife trade. 



.N. Educational and Training Program 
T Southern Africa (UNETPSA) 

le U.N. Educational and Training Pro- 
•am for Southern Africa provides scholar- 
dps for secondary college level education 
id advanced technical and vocational 
aining to students from Namibia and the 
epublic of South Africa who are denied 
ich education and training in their own 
luntries. The objective of this program is 
)t only to enable these young people to 
ay a fuU role in the society of their 
spective countries as they become in- 
jpendent or as majority rule is achieved, it 
also to provide general support for the 
incept of peaceful transition in Southern 
frica. Approximately 30% of scholarship 
)lders study in the United States and 
lother 15% study in Europe. The FY 
)83 request, like the U.S. contribution ap- 
-opriated for FY 1982, is $1,000,000. 

r.N. Institute for Namibia 

'he purpose of the U.N. Institute for 
lamibia located in Lusaka, Zambia, is to 
ijrain young Namibians for mid-level civil 
J ervice positions in preparation for the 
1 idependence of Namibia so that they 
1 an lead the country through peaceful 



iiuly1982 



means during its first few sovereign 
years. The current student enrollment 
numbers over 400. Some of the salient 
projects carried out by the Institute are 
in the fields of manpower, health, educa- 
tion, rural, and urban surveys, and in 
the study of the constitutional options 
available for an independent Namibia. 
The U.S. contribution request for FY 
1983 is the same as that appropriated 
for FY 1982-$500,000. 

U.N. Voluntary Fund for the 
Decade for Women 

The U.N. Voluntary Fund for the 
Decade for Women was created to im- 
prove significantly the status of and op- 
portunities for women worldwide 
through greater participation in the 
economic and social development proc- 
ess. The fund's goal is to provide seed 
money for innovative and catalytic proj- 
ects which will grow and become self- 
supporting or, once evaluated, will be 
adopted or emulated by larger devel- 
opmental funds. Since its inception, the 
fund has financed over 220 projects with 
priority attention being placed on the 
least developed countries and on pro- 
grams and projects which benefit rural 
women and the poorest women in urban 
areas. The FY 1983 request for a U.S. 
contribution is $500,000. 

World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO)/Voluntary Cooperation 
Program (VCP) 

The WMO/Voluntary Cooperation Pro- 
gram assists developing countries to 
participate in WMO's World Health 
Watch which provides the United States 
access to important meteorological and 
climatic information collected on a global 
scale. The U.S. National Oceanic and At- 
mospheric Administration relies on the 
World Weather Watch for meteoro- 
logical, hydrolog^cal, and ocean-related 
services. Through VCP efforts, e.g., 
greatly improved telecommunications, 
there has been nearly a doubling of sur- 
face and upper air data received at the 
U.S. National Meteorological Center. 
The FY 1983 contribution request is for 
$2.3 million, the same as in FY 1981 and 
1982. 

As you can see, there are some very 
practical reasons and arguments for our 
continued support of international 
organizations and programs. Our mental 
image of a flawed United Nations — as 
one huge, expensive, and overpoliticized, 
international bureaucracy — gets a 
dramatic jolt of reality if we examine, 
individually, the constructive work of 
the many constituting parts that make 



up this global institution. We find that 
together they spell "U.S. interests," and 
our interests are in harmony with our 
ideals. At the same time, we have made 
every effort to assure that our reduced 
request for voluntary contributions is 
consonant with overall Administration 
policy to hold down Federal spending. 
We hope, therefore, that Congress will 
support in full our request. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



FY 1 983 

Assistance 

Requests 

by Thomas O. Enders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21, 
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
discuss with the committee our request 
for security assistance for FY 1983 for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
Administration is requesting $326 
million in economic support funds (ESF), 
which with $274.6 million in develop- 
ment assistance and $183 million of PL 
480 from the separate AID appropria- 
tion, would bring our proposed FY 1983 
economic assistance for the region to a 
total of $783 million. We are also asking 
for $138.6 million in funds for foreign 
military sales (FMS) financing and inter- 
national military and education training 
(IMET). 

The bulk of this projected assistance 
is for the countries of the Caribbean and 
Central America. These FY 1983 re- 
quests are substantially higher than 
those provided for in the FY 1982 
budget. As such, they reflect the high 
priority the Administration attaches to 
U.S. interests in Central America and 
the Caribbean. They are essential 
elements of an integrated approach to 
the economic, political, and security 
problems of the region. 

Let me summarize briefly the overall 
framework of U.S. interests, analysis. 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



and objectives within which the Ad- 
ministration's assistance requests should 
be addressed. 

President Reagan, in his address at 
the Organization of American States on 
February 24, outlined the U.S. national 
interests in the Caribbean Basin region. 
As the President said, the "well being 
and security of our neigbors in the 
region are in our own vital interest." 

Economic progress, peace, and 
security are in serious danger in the 
Caribbean Basin. Almost without excep- 
tion, the countries of the region face 
economic difficulties of a potentially 
catastrophic nature. Their economies 
are, for the most part, small, fragile, 
and extremely vulnerable to disruption. 
Developments in the international 
economic system can seriously exacer- 
bate longstanding internal problems. 
The current slowdown in the world 
economy is a case in point. Prices for 
raw materials which are the principal 
exports of these countries — sugar, cof- 
fee, bananas, and bauxite— have fallen 
sharply. Simultaneously, most of the 
region is still struggling with the need to 
adjust to increases in the costs of essen- 
tial imports, particularly petroleum. 
High interest rates have imposed a new 
burden in countries needing to borrow 
money or refinance existing debt. 
Tourism, important to many, has 
stagnated. Certain economies of Central 
America, particularly in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, have been further damaged 
by guerrilla-sponsored violence and the 
general political instability of the area. 
At the same time, Cuba and, now, 
Nicaragua are both seeking to exploit 
the regionwide economic crisis for their 
own political objectives. Their in- 
struments are antidemocratic minorities 
predisposed to extremism, violence, and 
systematic armed conflict. Cuba and 
Nicaragua are providing political 
organization, guerrilla training, and 
other support to insurgent groups in El 
Salvador and Guatemala, and there are 
disquieting signs of their aggressive in- 
tent in several other countries. 

We do not, for our part, seek to in- 
volve our neighbors in the political and 
military competition between East and 
West. And, certainly, they do not want 
to be involved. They are independent, 
and they hope their countries and the 
waters of the Caribbean can be free of 
international tension and conflict. They 
need our help to overcome economic dif- 
ficulties, to defend themselves, and to 
keep alive their faith in freedom and 
democracy. With our assistance, they 
can manage their own affairs and find 



their way out of their present troubles. 
The complexity and urgency of the 
problems which I have outlined make 
clear that our response must be com- 
prehensive. It must respond to both im- 
mediate and longer term needs, and it 
must address all aspects— economic, 
political, and security— in their separate 
individual requirements while recogniz- 
ing that, in fact, these aspects are also 
interdependent in important ways. The 
overall strategy will not succeed unless 
we move forward in all areas. 



Economic Strategy 

On March 17, the President sent to the 
Congress a set of integrated proposals 
for a major new program of economic 
cooperation for the Caribbean Basin. As 
you are aware, the President's program 
includes three major elements: 

• Authority to extend duty-free 
treatment in the United States for 
agricultural and industrial products, ex- 
cept textiles, from countries of the 
Caribbean Basin; 

• Authority to extend tax incentives 
to U.S. investors in Basin countries; and 

• Substantial increases in levels of 
U.S. economic assistance to countries of 
the region, including a requested $350 
million supplemental in ESF funds for 
FY 1982. 

Over the medium term, the trade 
and investment authorities requested by 
the President will make a major con- 
tribution to the economic well-being of 
the region. Together with the self-help 
efforts of these countries, we can con- 
tribute to an economic climate of ex- 
panded production, new employment, 
and rising exports. These measures will 
also convey a political message. The 
United States is saying, in effect, that 
the economic well-being and political 
health of these countries is of such 
direct importance to us that we are will- 
ing to extend special treatment to them 
on a long-term basis. Our commitment is 
both serious and sustained. 

The President's program also 
recognizes that many of these countries 
face major short-term problems which 
must be addressed if they are going to 
be able to benefit from the trade and in- 
vestment initiatives. In some countries, 
including El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Costa Rica, major balance-of-payments 
problems threaten, immediately, their 
ability to import foodstuffs and critical 
raw materials for industry and agri- 
culture. Jamaica will need increased 
assistance to sustain a still vulnerable 
economic recovery. Other countries, for 



ijotri 



1ft 

net 
in. 



iiiii 
■elei 
ifvi 



example, the small nations of the 
Eastern Caribbean, need additional 
assistance to develop the economic in- 
frastructure required to capitalize on t 
new trade and investment opportuniti« 

Because of the urgency of these 
problems the President has requested 
additional $350 million in ESF in the 
current fiscal year to supplement the 
funds already approved by the Congre 
But that $350 million, vital though it is 
will not be enough to meet the needs c 
the next few years. Therefore, we hav 
requested $326 million in ESF for FY 
1983. Combined with development 
assistance and PL 480, our economic 
assistance for the region would total 
$783 million. This is a 47% increase ov 
the amount budgeted for the current 
fiscal year. It reflects both the large ai 
urgent needs of these countries and th 
high priority which the Administration 
attaches to our interests in the Carib- 
bean Basin area. 

A large share of our FY 1983 ESI f 
request, $105 million, would go to El 
Salvador. Its economy has been broug 
to the point of collapse by terrorism a 
economic sabotage directed against ih 
country's transportation and power 
systems, businesses, and workers. In- 
vestment has dried up, and the privat 
sector cannot even obtain the credits 
essential to its survival. Output decline 
10% in 1980, and 10% again in 1981. 
With the assistance we and other don^ 
plan for this year, this decline should 
significantly reduced by the end of tht 
year. We expect further improvement 
next year with the economic assistanc 
we are requesting in FY 1983. 

Other major recipients of ESF 
would include: 

• $55 million to Jamaica to suppo 
[Prime Minister Edward] Seaga's effo 
to revitalize his nation's economy; 

• $60 million for Costa Rica to he 
that country address one of the most 
severe crises in its history; 

• $25 million for Honduras to hel] 
bolster confidence and provide critical 
needed credits to the struggling priva 
sector; and 

• $30 million to the Eastern Caril 
bean to stimulate economic activity ai 
generate employment. 

Political Strategy 

The Caribbean Basin is not, as some 
suppose, a region of repressive, right- 
wing military dictatorships. Of the 24 
governments in the Basin, not includii 
the United States, 16 have democratic 
ly elected governments. Support for tl 



k 

IK 

lit 
iCli 



nil 



11 
if 
,1' 



84 



Department of State Bulle 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



tablishment and consolidation of 
mocratic institutions is a central ele- 
;nt of our approach. Not just because 
is our own system of government but 
;o because we believe it is the system 
st able to produce social justice, 
jnomic progress, and political stability 
the Caribbean Basin itself. 

We have been encouraged by last 
ar's electoral success in Honduras. We 
■re similarly heartened by February's 
aceful elections in Costa Rica as the 
Dple of that country demonstrated, 
ain, the strength of their commitment 
democratic institutions. Now the 
minican Republic is preparing again 
• elections, extending the democratic 
lievements made during the last 
leration. 
In Guatemala, the military coup last 
nth may have ended the political 
-alysis which had gripped that coun- 
. It was led by junior officers ap- 
•ently seeking to give the Guatemalan 
)ple a better government. General 
)S Montt, who has emerged as leader 
the junta, was the presidential can- 
ate of the Christian Democratic coali- 
1 in 1974. Since the coup, violence not 
ectly connected to the insurgency has 
•n brought virtually to an end. Con- 
te measures have been taken against 
ruption. All political forces have been 
ed to join in national reconciliation. 
are watching these developments 
5ely. We hope that the new govern- 
at of Guatemala will continue to 
ke progress in these areas and that 
in turn, will be able to establish a 
ier, more collaborative relationship 
h this key country that faces both 
nomic difficulty and an active Cuban- 
iported insurgency. 
In El Salvador, the elections of 
rch 28 were a fundamental first step 
he democratic process, but it was on- 
he beginning. Discussions are now 
lerway among the political parties 
cerning the organization of a new 
visional government and the launch- 
of the work of the newly elected 
istituent Assembly. That Assembly 
st carry forward political reform and, 
)ortantly, establish procedures for the 
ition of a President. 
Discussions on the composition of 
provisional government and the ac- 
1 form of the political reforms are 
;s which can only be made by the 
vadorans themselves. We have made 
if our desire to continue to support 
Salvador in their programs of 
•nomic recovery and in their battle 
iinst the guerrillas of the extreme 
•'* ;. We have also made clear, however, 
■^ t our continued support must not be 



A 



taken for granted. In particular, we 
have emphasized our expectation that 
the new provisional government will 
carry forward political and economic 
reform, including land reform, and con- 
tinue to make substantial progress in 
controlling violence. 

On March 28, the people of El 
Salvador massively signaled their choice 
for a democratic process of elections as 
the method for resolving political con- 
flict and ending the violence. They did 
this despite a concerted attempt by the 
guerrillas, first, to dissuade people from 
voting and, then, to intimidate them. 
Thus, the results of the March 28 elec- 
tion clearly stand as a massive political 
defeat for the FMLN/FDR [Farabundo 
Marti's People's Liberation Front/ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front]. The 
guerrillas have advocated, as an alter- 
native to these elections, direct negotia- 
tion of an overall division of political 
power, the results of which could later, 
perhaps, be submitted to a plebiscite. 

In light of the March 28 results and 
in view of the ongoing political process 
in El Salvador, we hope that elements of 
the FMLN/FDR which can accommodate 
to democracy will now decide to par- 
ticipate peacefully in that process. Such 
a decision would be in the interests of El 
Salvador. We believe that mechanisms 
could be found to facilitate the entry of 
these groups into the democratic proc- 
ess. We will be prepared to assist in 
discussions or negotiations which might 
be required. However, we remain firmly 
and unalterably opposed to negotiations 
on division of political power in El 
Salvador outside the democratic process. 

Security Assistance 

Freedom and prosperity are impossible 
without security. The purpose of our 
FMS and IMET programs is quite sim- 
ply to help small countries defend 
themselves against an immediate threat. 
Many of our neighbors have neither the 
resources nor a long-term need to 
develop and maintain large military 
establishments. Faced with a sudden 
threat, they need help from friends in 
the form of equipment and training. 
We do not believe that only the 
strong should be secure. With ap- 
propriate help, our neighbors all have 
the capability and will to turn back out- 
side threats. They do not want us to do 
their fighting for them. That would not 
serve anyone's interest and is not 
needed. All they ask is to be provided 
the training and equipment they cannot 
afford. 



l|y1982 



We are requesting $125.3 million in 
FMS financing for FY 1983. To keep 
this in perspective, this is less than 2% 
of our global FMS program. The in- 
creases over our request last year are 
largely for El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Jamaica. We are, again, requesting a 
portion of the FMS— $74 million— in 
direct concessional credits for those 
countries facing severe economic prob- 
lems and where high interest guaranteed 
loans would further add to their heavy 
debt burden. 

About one-half of our FMS request 
for the region— $60 million— is for El 
Salvador. Of this amount $50 million is 
being requested on concessional terms. 
This program is critically important to 
provide the resources to enable the 
Salvadoran Government to protect the 
people's right to choose their own future 
and carry forward the important 
economic, political, and social reforms 
underway. Our military assistance pro- 
gram is designed, in part, to enable the 
Salvadoran armed forces to employ 
small unit tactics, considered more effec- 
tive against the guerrillas and less likely 
to cause casualties among noncom- 
batants in the battle zone. The growing 
effectiveness of El Salvador's armed 
forces was evident in the exemplary way 
in which they turned back the guerrilla's 
effort to launch a major preelection of- 
fensive. They protected voters, polling 
places, and election officials from guer- 
rilla attacks and harassment last March 
28. 

We are also seeking an increase in 
our FMS program for Honduras to 
$14.5 million, $9 million of which would 
be on concessional terms. The demo- 
cratic Government of Honduras is 
threatened by the illegal use of its ter- 
ritory by those supporting the insur- 
gencies in El Salvador and Guatemala as 
well as by the unprecedented military 
buildup in Nicaragua. Honduras needs 
additional help to develop its transporta- 
tion, patrol, and communications 
capabilities to defend itself from these 
threats. 

Elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, 
we are requesting an increase in our 
program in Jamaica — $6.5 million in 
concessional credits — to help the 
democratic, pro- Western Seaga govern- 
ment modernize its defense force to deal 
with potential subversion and to protect 
its coastal waters from illegal traffic. 
We are also seeking concessional credits 
and training for the small democratic 
states of the Eastern Caribbean to im- 
prove their coast guards. 

Finally, a small part of the FMS 



85 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



program is for South America. We pro- 
pose $12 million for Colombia and $6 
million each for Peru and Ecuador to 
enable them to meet essential millitary 
needs. 

Our request for $13.3 million in 
IMET includes 23 country programs and 
our regional program for the Eastern 
Caribbean. We believe that training and 
education under the IMET program will 
strengthen the professional qualities of 
defense forces, improve our military-to- 
military relations, and insure continued 
orientation toward U.S. doctrine and 
security goals. We have asked for 
$250,000 in IMET for Guatemala in the 
expectation that conditions there may 
improve sufficiently for us to consider a 
small training program. 

Cooperation 

The strategy I have outlined cannot rest 
on our efforts alone. We neither can nor 
should try to carry the burden by 
ourselves. Solutions designed exclusively 
in Washington are not desired and 
would probably not work. Our response 
must be in cooperation with our 
neighbors. We find, today, a consensus 
among the nations of the hemisphere 
over the danger of foreign intervention, 
the importance of democracy and free 
market policies, and the need to take 
collective responsibility. At this point I 
would like to make some remarks on our 
policies toward Nicaragua and Cuba. 

Over the past several months, we 
have tried to establish a dialogue with 
Nicaragua. As members of this commit- 
tee are aware, the United States is 
acutely concerned by several of the 
policies and activities being pursued by 
the Sandinista government. First and 
foremost, like countries in the region 
themselves, we are concerned by 
Nicaragua's continuing large-scale sup- 
port for the guerrillas in El Salvador 
and its similar activities in other Central 
American countries. This, together with 
Nicaragua's extraordinary arms buildup 
and the large-scale presence of Cuban 
military advisers, is the fundamental 
cause of tension within the region. 

On April 8, our Ambassador in 
Managua conveyed to the Nicaraguan 
Government several proposals which 
would address our concerns and, we 
believe, address the alleged concerns of 
the Sandinistas. On April 14, the 
Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington 
presented to us a response. We are now 
evaluating that response and expect to 
decide soon our possible next steps. 

I would stress, however, as we have 
stressed to the Nicaraguans that no 



progress is possible in the areas of our 
relationship of concern and interest to 
them unless and until they cease their 
active support for insurgencies in the 
region. 

In the case of Cuba, we continue to 
oppose fundamentally all efforts to ex- 
port subversion and terrorism in Central 
America and the Caribbean. In this con- 
nection, Senator Symms [Steve Symms, 
R. -Idaho] has introduced a resolution 
reaffirming the resolution adopted in 
1962 on the U.S. determination to op- 
pose the efforts of Cuba to expand its 
sphere of influence. The resolution 
reflects the policy of six administrations, 
certainly, this one. As we told Senator 
Symms, we have always endorsed the 
thrust of his resolution. While we sup- 
ported the tabling motion on the Senate 
floor, we did so only because we believed 
it was appropriate that the resolution be 
fully addressed in committee before 
coming to the Senate floor. After it has 
been given the appropriate committee 
consideration, we fully intend to support 
the Symms resolution. 

We will not accept that the future of 
the Caribbean Basin be manipulated 
from Havana. Support for self- 
determination and democracy was evi- 
dent at the OAS meeting in St. Lucia 
and in the hemisphere's wide support for 
the elections in El Salvador. It was evi- 
dent in the formation this year of the 
Central American Democratic Communi- 
ty by Costa Rica, Honduras, and El 



Salvador to cooperate toward the com 
mon goals of economic development, 
democracy, and mutual security again: 
outside threats. 

The momentum for greater cooper 
tion is in our interest, and we will seel 
to strengthen and widen it. That is wh; 
we have joined Colombia and Venezue 
in supporting the Central American 
Democratic Community. This was the 
spirit in which we discussed with Mex: 
the Mexican President's proposals aim 
at reducing tensions throughout Centr 
America. 

The Caribbean Basin program is, i 
many ways, a model of the types of 
regional cooperation we seek. The 
overall program and the U.S. contribu 
tion to it was developed over a period 
some 8 months of intensive consultatic 
and joint analysis. The United States, 
Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada, later 
joined by Colombia, recognizing our 
common interest in the economic heal 
of the region, are each undertaking m 
jor efforts under a common set of obj 
tives. This is what we are asking the 
Congress to support: programs that v 
make cooperation possible in support 
an emerging democratic consensus 
among our closest neighbors. 



'The complete transcript of the hearin 
will be published by the committee and wi 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



The Falkland Islands 



Following are statements by Secre- 
tary Haig; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. 
Representative to the U.N.. J. William 
Middendorfll; U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the OAS; the White House; 
and texts of the U.N. and OAS resolu- 
tions. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAY 21, 1982' 

The President and this Administration 
have been intensely involved in the 
search for peace since the beginning of 
the dispute in the South Atlantic. Our 
deep concern over the threat of conflict 
has been evident to the international 
community. We have made bilateral and 
multilateral efforts in support of that ef- 
fort. We continue today to be in contact 



with those at the United Nations and 
elsewhere who are also striving for a 
peaceful solution under U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 502 and the U.N. 
Charter. 

Let me emphasize, there will be r 
involvement whatsoever of U.S. milit 
personnel in the conflict in the South 
Atlantic. As the President and Secret 
Haig have said, we will meet our com 
mitments to Great Britain. Any re- 
sponses made to requests for assistar 
will be carefully evaluated on a case-l 
case basis. We will, however, not ad- 
dress reports of specific requests for 
sistance or how we respond. 

Our position throughout this disp 
has been to do whatever we can to at 
vance the chances for a peaceful reso 
tion, and that remains our stance. Ev 
step, every action of the President ar 



G 
!1 



86 



Department of State Bullel 



m 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



tier 



le U.S. Government shall be taken with 
le thought in mind — a peaceful solu- 
an. We stand ready to assist in any 
ay we can. 



ECURITY COUNCIL 
ESOLUTION 505, 
AY 26, 19822 



1D( 



The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982) of 
April 1982, 
Noting with the deepest concern that the 
s, i tuation in the region of the Falkland Islands 
las Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated, 

Having heard the statement made by the 
jcretary-General to the Security Council at 
2360th meeting on 21 May 1982, as well 
the statements in the debate of the 
presentatives of Argentina and of the 
nited Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
n Ireland, 

Concerned to achieve as a matter of the 
eatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and 
end to the present conflict between the 
med forces of Argentina and of the United 
ngdom of Great Britain and Northern 
eland. 



11 1. Expresses appreciation to the Secre- 
ry-General for the efforts which he has 
eady made to bring about an agreement 
tween the parties, to ensure the implemen- 
tion of Security Council resolution 502 

"i 982), and thereby to restore peace to the 
gion; 

2. Requests the Secretary -General, on the 
sis of the present resolution, to undertake 
renewed mission of good offices bearing in 
ind Security Council resolution 502 (1982) 
id the approach outlined in his statement of 

May 1982; 

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co- 
lerate fully with the Secretary-General in 

3 mission with a view to ending the present 
'Stilities in and around the Falkland Islands 
ilas Malvinas); 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to 
ter into contact immediately with the par- 
;s with a view to negotiating mutually ac- 
ptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if 
■cessary, arrangements for the dispatch of 
lited Nations observers to monitor compli- 
ice with the terms of the cease-fire; 

5. Requests the Secretary -General to sub- 
it an interim report to the Security Council 

soon as possible and, in any case, not later 
an seven days after the adoption of the 
esent resolution. 



MBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, 

[AY 26, 19823 

should like once again to express the 
dmiration and appreciation of my 
Dvernment for the skill and judgment 
ith which you have conducted and are 
)ntinuing to conduct the affairs of this 
ouncil while we are dealing with this 
rribly difficult problem. 



The United States has already ex- 
plained here that this conflict is par- 
ticularly poignant and painful for us. We 
have already expressed our intense 
desire to reduce, to isolate, and to end 
this tragic conflict. I believe we have 
given evidence of the seriousness of our 
desire. My government, in the person of 
the Secretary of State, made sustained 
efforts to avoid the conflict and, subse- 
quently, offered full support to the ef- 
forts of Peru's President Belaunde and, 
of course, to the efforts of our 
distinguished Secretary General, Javier 
Perez de Cuellar. 

The United States ardently desires 
an end to this tragic war. We welcome 
this resolution and pledge our continued 
support for the Secretary General's ef- 
forts to find a just and enduring peace. I 
should like to take this opportunity to 
assure the distinguished representative 
of Panama and any other interested par- 
ties that my country has deep respect 
for all of our neighbors in the hemi- 
sphere, that we desire greatly to live in 
peace with them, that we are, ourselves, 
part of this hemisphere, that we desire 
to put an end to this conflict so that we 
can get on with the business of living in 
peace in the hemisphere. 

As I said earlier this week, the 
quicker we put this tragic conflict behind 
us the quicker we can begin building our 
future — and there, as always, the na- 
tions of Latin America will find how 
deeply the United States is committed to 
the cause of peace and prosperity for 
our hemisphere. 



SECRETARY HAIG, 
OAS, MAY 27, 1982* 

As the fighting intensifies and the cost 
in lives mounts in the South Atlantic, I 
think we all share a sense of anguish 
that it has not been possible to prevent 
this terrible conflict. It touches tradi- 
tions and sympathies that run deep in 
our past and our national experiences. It 
is a loss and a failure of our generation. 

We grieve over the heartbreak and 
the bereavement that the conflict brings 
to so many families in Argentina and 
Great Britain. We too share the emo- 
tions and pain of those families. Is there 
a country among us that has not count- 
ed itself a friend of both countries? Our 
hemisphere and the Western society of 
nations would be far poorer without 
their notable contributions to our com- 
mon civilization. When friends fight, it is 
truly tragic. 

It is from Great Britain that the 
United States drew the inspiration for 
many of its most cherished institutions. 



Jly1982 



Most of us stood at the side of Great 
Britain in two world wars in this cen- 
tury. Great Britain is a vital partner in 
the alliance with Europe which is the 
first line of defense for Western civiliza- 
tion against the dangers of Soviet ag- 
gression. 

Argentina is an American republic, 
one of us. It is a nation, like the United 
States, founded on the republican ideal 
that all men are created equal. Like my 
country it is a nation of immigrants and 
settlers whose own culture and civiliza- 
tion have long had the respect of my 
countrymen and the world. President 
Reagan moved early in his Administra- 
tion to make clear the high value we 
place on our relations with the Govern- 
ment of Argentina and the high esteem 
in which we hold the Argentine people. 

Preserving the Inter-American System 

It is not only our friendship and our ties 
with the two countries that are at stake. 
This festering dispute has suddenly be- 
come a violent conflict that poses 
dangers to the very institutions and 
principles which bring us here and that 
have made this hemisphere, in many 
ways, the envy of the world. 

The war puts the inter- American 
system under stress. Some say that this 
is an "anticolonial war" because the 
islands were formally administered as a 
British colony. Some say that since this 
is a war that pits an American republic 
against an outside power, the Rio treaty 
requires that all its members come to 
the assistance of the American republic. 

Others say that it is impossible to 
speak of colonialism when a people is 
not subjugated to another and, as we all 
know, there was no such subjugation on 
the island. Others say there is no way in 
which the inter-American system — which 
protects regional order based on law and 
the peaceful settlement of disputes — can 
be interpreted as sanctioning the first use 
of armed force to settle a dispute. 

With full respect for the views of 
others, the U.S. position is clear: Since 
the first use of force did not come from 
outside the hemisphere, this is not a 
case of extracontinental aggression 
against which we are all committed to 
rally. 

As we deal with this crisis, let us 
agree that there is far more to unite the 
nations of this hemisphere than to divide 
us. We must keep the future in mind. If 
we are to learn anything from the grim 
events of recent weeks, it is that conflict 
might have been averted if there had 
been better communication and confi- 
dence among American states. We 



87 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



should take as our guide the work of the 
generations of statesmen who gave us 
an inter-American system that is both 
visionary and practical. Their legacy is 
statecraift that is calm, reasoned, and 
just. 

The very presence in this hall of so 
many distinguished statesmen indicates 
that we do agree— all of us— that the 
inter-American system is important. It 
has served us well. For two generations 
and more this hemisphere has been the 
region in the world most free of the 
scourges of war. The inter-American 
system and the Rio treaty have con- 
strained and almost eliminated armed 
conflict between states of the Americas. 
The countries of Latin America spend 
less of their national resources for arms 
than any other area in the world. They 
have suffered less from Communist infil- 
tration or aggression than any other 
part of the developing world. None of 
that would have been possible without 
the inter-American system of security. 

The post- World War II achieve- 
ments of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), now in its 92d year as the 
world's oldest regional international 
body, are largely responsible for our col- 
lective record as the world's haven from 
war. The contributions of the OAS to 
regional peace and harmony are almost 
too numerous to mention. Let me cite a 
few. 

• This organization helped restore 
peace along the borders between Nicar- 
agua and Costa Rica on four separate 
occasions (1948, 1955, 1959, and 1978). 

• Similar OAS efforts helped con- 
tribute to calming disputes, as between 
Ecuador and Peru (in 1955 and again in 
1980) or Honduras and Nicaragua 
(1957), or to diminishing tensions, as be- 
tween Bolivia and Chile (1962) and be- 
tween Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
(1963). 

• In 1971, the OAS successfully 
urged Ecuador and the United States to 
avoid widening their differences over in- 
ternational fishing boundary rights. As 
one Ecuadoran writer noted at that mo- 
ment, this OAS action proved that "the 
inter-American system functions and 
that its most powerful member did not 
vacillate one instant in recognizing the 
equality of its weaker associated part- 
ner." 

• By taking an early and steadfast 
stand against violations of diplomatic 
staffs and premises, the organization 
played a vital humanitarian role in 1980 
in ending terrorist takeovers. One of 



88 



these situations was a diplomatic mis- 
sion (Colombia) and the other an OAS 
office (El Salvador). 

• During the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis, the legal position of the OAS had 
a major psychological and practical 
effect on the Russians. 

• In another serious instance, the 
OAS imposed sanctions on a member 
state when it was proved that the inten- 
tions of that regime (Trujillo in the 
Dominican Republic) were aimed at 
assassination of the president of another 
OAS country (Romulo Betancourt of 
Venezuela). 

• When riots broke out in the 
Panama Canal Zone in 1964, an OAS 
team assisted in stopping bloodshed; the 
organization's principled solidarity even- 
tually helped bilateral negotiations to 
resolve what President Woodrow Wilson 
called the greatest problem dividing the 
United States and Latin America from 
each other. 

• In the Dominican Republic in 
1965, after the outbreak of civil war, the 
organization acted decisively to restore 
peace, setting the stage for an im- 
pressive democratic evolution. 

• When fighting between Honduras 
and El Salvador broke out in 1969, OAS 
action helped put a quick stop to the 
bloodshed and fighting. Within 48 hours 
the OAS arranged a cease-fire, with con- 
tending forces withdrawing to statiLS quo 
ante helium. 

For me the inter-American system is 
one of the unique forces that have 
helped the new world realize its special 
and privileged destiny, a hemisphere 
with almost unlimited human and 
material potential, yet with the means to 
prevent or control the conflicts that have 
prevented other continents from realiz- 
ing their potential. 

The South Atlantic conflict could put 
into danger the principles and institu- 
tions we have constructed so laboriously 
and which have served us so well. We 
must protect the integrity of our institu- 
tions so that they can serve us as well in 
future crises, which could affect any of 
us, as they have served us in the past. 

Efforts to Resolve the ConHict 

We face a conflict that involves us all, 
but to which the Rio treaty does not well 
apply. It is a dispute over competing 
claims of sovereignty, each with pro- 
found historical and emotional sources. 

We know how deep is the Argentine 
commitment to recover islands Argen- 
tines believe were taken from them by 
illegal force. This is not some sudden 



passion but a longstanding national co 
cern that reaches back 150 years and 
heightened by the sense of frustratior 
over what Argentina feels were nearl, 
20 years of fruitless negotiation. 

We know, too, how deeply Britain 
in peaceful possession of the disputed 
territory for 150 years, has been 
devoted to the proposition that the 
rights and views of the inhabitants 
should be considered in any future 
disposition of the islands. No one can 
say that Britain's attitude is simply a 
colonial reflex to retain possession of 
distant islands. In the last 20 years nr 
less than nine of the members of the 
Organization of American States re- 
ceived their independence in peace an 
goodwill from Great Britain. 

For its part, the United States ha: 
not taken— and will not take— any pos 
tion on the substance of the dispute. \ 
are completely neutral on the questioi 
of who has sovereignty. Indeed, 35 ye 
ago, at the 1947 signing of the final a< 
of the Rio conference which created tl 
Rio treaty, the U.S. delegation made 
this clear at the same time it set fortl^ 
our position that the treaty is without 
effect upon outstanding territorial dis- 
putes between American and Europea 
states. 

Faced with a conflict for which thi 
inter-American system was not de- 
signed, American republics have turm 
instinctively to that fundamental prini 
pie of world order, the encouragemen 
of the peaceful settlement of disputes 
That was what the United States did. 
Our effort began even before April 2, 
when we offered to the two sides our 
good offices to help find a solution to 
South Georgia incident. Argentina de 
clined. 

Then, when it became apparent tl 
Argentina was preparing to land troo 
on the islands, President Reagan calk 
President Galtieri to urge him not to 
ahead. We told President Galtieri in t 
most friendly but serious terms what 
consequences would be. I can hardly 
take any satisfaction in knowing that 
our predictions have proved prescient 

After April 2, both President 
Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher 
asked the United States to see whethi 
it could be of assistance. At President 
Reagan's direction, I undertook two 
rounds of intense discussions in each 
capital. 

The first meeting of the organ of 
consultation also promoted peaceful 
negotiation. Meeting in this very hall, 
we, the foreign ministers of the 



Department of State Bulle 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



lericas, ui-ged that peace be main- 
ned and that law prevail as the foun- 
ion of our international relations. 

Immediately afterward, President 
launde of Peru took the initiative to 
t forward a peace plan, drawing also 
the fundamental elements of Resolu- 
n 502. We worked in close consulta- 
n with him. 

Let me now report to you some of 

specific elements involved in our 
Drts to resolve this dispute, which has 
)ved so extraordinarily difficult to 
olve. On April 27, as prospects for 
re intense hostilities arose, the 
ited States put forward a proposal of 
own. It represented our best estimate 
what the two parties could reasonably 
expected to accept. It was founded 
larely on Resolution 502. 

That proposal called for negotiations 
the removal of the islands from the 

of non-self-governing territories. It 
'cified that the definitive status of the 
.nds must be mutually agreed, with 
! regard for the rights of the inhabi- 
ts and for the principle of territorial 
3grity. And it referred both to the 
■poses and principles of the charter 
i to the relevant resolution of the 
^I. General Assembly. 

Those negotiations were to be com- 
ted by the end of the year. Pending 
t, an interim authority composed of 
jentina, Britain, and the United 
.tes was to oversee the traditional 
il administration, to be sure that no 
ision was taken contrary to the 
eement. Argentine residents of the 
nds were to participate in the coun- 

for this purpose, in proportion to 
ir numbers. During the interim 
iod, travel, transportation, and move- 
nt of persons between the islands and 

mainland were to be promoted and 
ilitated without prejudice to the 
hts and guarantees of the inhabitants. 

The proposed interim authority of 
ee countries was to make proposals 
how to take into account the wishes 
1 interests of the inhabitants and on 
at the role of the Falkland Islands 
npany should be. Should the negotia- 
is not succeed in the time afforded. 

United States was to be asked to 
jage in a formal mediation/concilia- 
T effort in order to resolve the dispute 
3 months. 

The British Government indicated 
it it would give the most serious con- 
eration to acceptance of our proposal, 
hough it presented certain real diffi- 
ties for it. However, Foreign Minister 
sta Mendez informed me that the pro- 
sal was not acceptable to Argentina. 



On May 5 a simplified text was for- 
warded by Peru to Buenos Aires at the 
initiative of President Belaunde. It 
called for: 

• An immediate cease-fire; 

• Concurrent withdrawal and non- 
introduction of forces; 

• Administration of the Falklands 
Islands by a contact group pending 
definitive settlement in consultation with 
the elected representatives of the 
islands; 

• Acknowledgement of conflicting 
claims; 

• Acknowledgement of the aspira- 
tions and interests of the islanders 
would be included in the final settle- 
ment; 

• An undertaking by the contact 
group to insure that the two parties 
reached a definitive agreement by 
April 30, 1983. 

Britain made clear that it could 
seriously consider accepting the pro- 
posal. Argentina declined to consider it, 
asking, instead, for the U.N. Secretary 
General to use his good offices as, of 
course, it was Argentina's full privilege 
to do. 

To promote negotiations is also what 
the Security Council and the U.N. Secre- 
tary General have done. We are heart- 
ened that the two parties — and the 
Security Council as a whole — have now 
been able to agree to give a new man- 
date to the Secretary General to find a 
basis for peace. 

The Collective Search for Peace 

What has been the approach of the in- 
ternational community as a whole must 
remain the policy of this body. We must 
strive to resolve the conflict, not seek to 
widen it. We must work to use the rule 
of law and the principle of non-use of 
force to settle the conflict, not seek to 
challenge these vital principles. We must 
search for ways in which we can all join 
to help bring about peace, not ask the 
Rio treaty mechanism to adjudicate a 
conflict for which it was not conceived. 

It is right and proper that signa- 
tories to the Rio treaty should convoke a 
meeting of foreign ministers when they 
perceive a threat to peace in the hemi- 
sphere. It is this right which has served 
so well in preserving peace in this hemi- 
sphere. In times of danger we need the 
collective wisdom of all members of this 
body. This is of critical importance to 
the smallest among us who cannot 
afford large standing armies to defend 
their independence. It is this principle of 
collective security on which rests that 



other principle — nonintervention — which 
is vital to our relations. 

We here have a special responsibility 
to insure the peace of the hemisphere, 
as signatories of the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, of the 
Charter of the Organization of American 
States, and of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and as nations of the Western 
Hemisphere. We should take no action 
and make no decisions which increase 
tensions without enhancing the pros- 
pects for a negotiated settlement of the 
struggle in the South Atlantic. 

Resolution 502 embodies the prin- 
ciples which must govern our search for 
peace. We must have the strength to 
seek a solution, described well to us by 
[Brazilian] President Figueiredo, in 
which there is neither victor nor van- 
quished. 

The Secretary General of the United 
Nations has now been given a new man- 
date to search for peace. The most im- 
portant thing we could do here would be 
to give our unanimous collective support 
to that effort. We should reassert the 
validity of Resolution 502 as the indis- 
pensable framework in which a peaceful 
solution has been sought and will ulti- 
mately be found. And we should call on 
both parties to reach a peaceful negoti- 
ated solution. 

As the Secretary General of the 
United Nations proceeds, I would hope 
he would give particular attention to the 
ideas put forward by the President of 
Peru 10 days ago, as well as those ad- 
vanced by the Government of Brazil on 
May 24. Although they may require 
completion and adjustment, these pro- 
posals contain much that is equitable 
and fair; they merit careful attention. 

For our part, the United States has 
remained in touch with both parties 
throughout the crisis. We have tried in 
countless ways to help Argentina and 
Britain find a peaceful solution. We are 
actively engaged in working with the 
Secretary General in support of his most 
recent mandate for peace. 

This conflict has by now proven that 
the young men of Argentina and Great 
Britain can fight with skill and determi- 
nation. They have the courage to die for 
the dignity of their nations. They have 
the strength and valor to endure in 
desperate struggle in a desolate climate. 

Now the time has come for older 
heads to accept the risks of compromise 
and the hazards of conciliation to bring 
the suffering and dying to an end. 
Wisdom as well as struggle is a test of 
valor. The dignity of a nation is honored 
not only with sacrifices but with peace. 



Iy1982 



89 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The South Atlantic has reverberated 
with the fury of war. It must now be 
calmed by the wisdom and courage of 
peace. 



AMBASSADOR MIDDENDORF, 
OAS, MAY 28, 1982= 

I would like to explain my delegation's 
abstention on the resolution before us. 

When we began our deliberations 
yesterday, Secretary of State Haig, in 
his address to this distinguished assem- 
bly, made clear our commitment to the 
inter-American system. He suggested 
that we search for ways in which we all 
can join to help bring about peace. Here, 
yesterday and today, my delegation has 
worked and cooperated in that effort. 

Regretfully, my delegation does not 
feel that the resolution which this 
assembly is asked to approve serves that 
purpose. 

We believe the resolution before us 
to be one-sided. It charges some; it ig- 
nores the actions of others. It ignores 
what the legal effects of first use of 
force should be. Further, there is no rec- 
ognition that there must be compliance 
by both parties with all the elements of 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 502, to 
govern this search for peace in which we 
are engaged. 

We are pleased, however, that the 
resolution carefully avoids language 
which would seek to force observation of 
its parts by the signatory states. 

With respect to that section of the 
present resolution which calls upon the 
United States, we have listened very 
attentively to our colleagues here in this 
forum. The United States will lift the 
measures announced with regard to 
Argentina immediately when the provi- 
sions of Security Council Resolution 502 
have been implemented. 

Finally, we wish to assure all here 
that we will continue vigorously to pur- 
sue, in cooperation with others in this 
hemisphere, the search for a formula 
which will lead to an early, equitable, 
and peaceful settlement. 

My delegation hopes that the two 
parties will find peace. We remain heart- 
ened that they have agreed in giving the 
Secretary General of the United Nations 
his new mandate for peace. We firmly 
support that effort. 

My delegation also firmly believes, 
as Secretary Haig so wisely said, that 
there is far more to unite nations of this 
hemisphere than to divide us. We believe 
that all in this distinguished assembly, 
with whom we have worked so closely in 



90 



the past and with whom we will work 
closely in the days and years to come, 
share our determination to preserve 
what we already have in order to 
achieve our future potential. My delega- 
tion remains committed to that very 
practical and real ideal. 



OAS RESOLUTION II, 
MAY 29, 1982« 

Whereas: 

Resolution I of the Twentieth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
adopted on April 28, 1982, decided "to keep 
the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation open, 
especially to oversee faithful compliance with 
this resolution, and to take such additional 
measures as are deemed necessary to restore 
and preserve peace and settle the conflict by 
peaceful means"; 

That resolution urged the Government of 
the United Kingdom "immediately to cease 
the hostilities it is carrying on within the 
security region defined by Article 4 of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist- 
ance, and also to refrain from any act that 
may affect inter-American peace and secu- 
rity," and urged the Government of the Re- 
public of Argentina "to refrain from taking 
any action that may exacerbate the 
situation"; 

The same resolution urged the govern- 
ments of the United Kingdom and the Argen- 
tine Republic "to call a truce that will make it 
possible to resume and proceed normally with 
the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settle- 
ment of the conflict, taking into account the 
rights of sovereignty of the Republic of 
Argentina over the Malvinas Islands and the 
interests of the islanders"; 

While the Government of the Argentine 
Republic informed the Organ of Consultation 
of its full adherence to Resolution I and acted 
consistently therewith, the British forces pro- 
ceeded to carry out serious and repeated 
armed attacks against the Argentine Repub- 
lic in the zone of the Malvinas Islands, within 
the security region defined by Article 4 of 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As- 
sistance, which means that the United King- 
dom lias ignored the appeal made to it by the 
Twentieth Meeting of Consultation; 

Following the adoption of Resolution 1, 
the Government of the United States of 
America decided to apply coercive measures 
against the Argentine Republic and is giving 
its support, including material support, to the 
United Kingdom, which contravenes the 
spirit and the letter of Resolution I; 

As a culmination of its repeated armed 
attacks, beginning on May 21, 1982, the Brit- 
ish forces launched a broad-scale military at- 
tack against the Argentine Republic in the 
area of the Malvinas Islands which affects the 
peace and security of the hemisphere; 

The deplorable situation raised by the ap- 
plication of political and economic coercive 
measures that are not based on present inter- 
national law and are harmful to the Argen- 
tine people, carried out by the European Eco- 
nomic Community — with the exception of Ire- 



a 



X 



land and Italy— and by other industrialized 
states, is continuing; and 

The purpose of the Inter-American Trei 
ty of Reciprocal Assistance is to "assure 
peace, through adequate means, to provide 
for effective reciprocal assistance to meet 
armed attacks against any American State, 
and in order to deal with threats of aggres- 
sion against any of them," 

The Twentieth Meeting of Consultation ( 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Resolves: 

1. To condemn most vigorously the un- 
justified and disproportionate armed attack 
perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and itslj 
decision, which affects the security of the ei 
tire American hemisphere, of arbitrarily de- 
claring an extensive area of up to 12 miles 
from the American coasts as a zone of hosti 
ties, which is aggravated by the circumstani 
that when these actions were taken all 
possibilities of negotiation seeking a peacefi 
settlement of the conflict had not been ex- 
hausted. 

2. To reiterate its firm demand upon thi 
United Kingdom that it cease immediately i 
act of war against the Argentine Republic 
and order the immediate withdrawal of all i 
armed forces detailed there and the return 
its task force to its usual stations. 

3. To deplore the fact that the attitude 
the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate 
the negotiations for a peaceful settlement 
that were conducted by Mr. Javier Perez de 
Cuellar, the Secretary General of the Unite 
Nations. 

4. To express its conviction that it is 
essential to reach with the greatest urgencj 
peaceful and honorable settlement of the cc 
flict, under the auspices of the United Na- 
tions, and in that connection, to recognize t 
praiseworthy efforts and good offices of Mi 
Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary Gen 
eral of the United Nations, and to lend its i 
support to the task entrusted to him by the 
Security Council. 

5. To urge the Government of the Unit 
States of America to order the immediate 
lifting of the coercive measures applied 
against the Argentine Republic and to refn 
from providing material assistance to the 
United Kingdom, in observance of the prim 
pie of hemispheric solidarity recognized in 1 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As- 
sistance. 

6. To urge the members of the Europej 
Economic Community, and the other states 
that have taken them, to lift immediately tl 
coercive economic or political measures tak- 
against the Argentine Republic. 

7. To request the states parties of the I 
Treaty to give the Argentine Republic the 
support that each judges appropriate to asS' sF 
it in this serious situation, and to refrain 
from any act that might jeopardize that ob- 
jective. If necessary, such support may be 
adopted with adequate coordination. 

8. To reaffirm the basic constitutional 
principles of the Charter of the Organizatio 
of American States and of the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
particular those that refer to peaceful settU i 
ment of disputes. fia 



Department of Slate Bullet »t9 



sill 



TREATIES 



9. To keep the Organ of Consultation 
idlable to assist the parties in conflict with 

i' ir peace-making efforts in any way it may 
iport the mission entrusted to the United 
tions Secretary General by the Security 
ancil, and to instruct the President of the 
leting of Consultation to keep in con- 
|ious contact with the Secretary General of 
I United Nations. 

Is 10. To keep the Twentieth Meeting of 
isultation open to see to it that the provi- 
is of this resolution are faithfully and 
nediately carried out and to take, if neces- 
y, any additional measures that may be 
eed upon to preserve inter-American 
darity and cooperation. 



'Made at the White House news briefing 
Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes 
;t trom Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
Documents of May 24, 1982). 
^Adopted unanimously on May 26, 1982. 
SU.N. press release 38. 
■•Adopted at the 20th meeting of Consul- 
on of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS, 
a vote of 17-0, with 4 abstentions (U.S.). 
sPress release 178 of May 28, 1982. 
«Made at the 20th meeting of the Con- 
ation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
S. ■ 



urrent Actions 



LTILATERAL 

■iculture 

^national agreement for the creation at 
is of an International Office for Epi- 
;ics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 
4. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for 
U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141. 
ession deposited: Libya, Apr. 7, 1982. 

arctica 

Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington 
. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1. TIAS 4780. 
ession deposited: Spain, Mar. 31, 1982. 

ommendations relating to the furtherance 
he principles and objectives of the Ant- 
;ic Treaty. Adopted at Buenos Aires 
I 7, 1981.' 
ification of approval: Australia, Feb. 23, 

2. 

ation 

srnational air services transit agreement, 
ned at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
:e Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
rffication of denunciation: Sweden, 

r. 29, 1982, eflfective Apr. 29, 1983. 

ivention for the suppression of unlawful 
s against the safety of civil aviation. Done 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 
ce Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
tification deposited: Luxembourg, May 18, 

!2. 

tification of succession: Solomon Islands, 

y 3, 1982. 



Coffee 

Extension of the international coffee agree- 
ment 1976. Done at London Sept. 25, 1981. 
Enters into force Oct. 1, 1982. 
Acceptances deposited: Brsizi], Apr. 22, 1982; 
Ethiopia, May 10, 1982; Guatemala, Apr. 28, 
1982. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations 
for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with 
regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 
Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. 
Accessions deposited: Colombia, July 27, 
1981; Gabon, Jan. 21, 1982, 
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, 
Mar. 12, 1982, effective July 7, 1978. 

Commodities 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980.' 
Ratifications deposited: Botswana, Apr. 22, 
1982; Ecuador, May 4, 1982. 
Signature: Pakistan, May 4, 1982. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
1973. TIAS 8249. 

Accessions deposited: Malawi, Feb. 5, 1982; 
Austria, Jan. 27, 1982. 

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources, with annex for an ar- 
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 
1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS 
10204. 

Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Apr. 23, 
1982.2 

Accession deposited: European Economic 
Community, Apr. 21, 1982. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into 
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 
1972. TIAS 7502. 
Notification of succession deposited: Kiribati, 

Apr. 2, 1982. 

Fisheries 

Convention for the conservation of salmon in 
the North Atlantic Ocean. Open for signature 
at Reykjavik Mar. 2 to Aug. 31, 1982. Enters 
into force on the first day of the month 
following the deposit of instruments of ratifi- 
cation, approval or accession by four parties 
meeting certain requirements. 
Signatures: U.S., EC, Norway, Iceland, 
Mar. 3, 1982; Canada, Mar. 18, 1982. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force May 22, 
1982, except for Article 51 which enters into 
force July 28, 1982. 
Accession deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 12, 1982. 



Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979.1 
Accession deposited: Hungary, May 3, 1982. 

International convention on standards of 

training, certification, and watchkeeping for 

seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 

1978.1 

Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 31, 1982. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological 
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. 
TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Belize, May 25, 1982. 

North Atlantic Treaty (Protocol)— Spain 

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the 

accession of Spain. Done at Brussels Dec. 10, 

1981. 

Acceptances deposited: France, Netherlands, 

Turkey, May 13, 1982; Italy, May 18, 1982; 

Portugal, May 28, 1982; Greece, May 29, 

1982. 

Entered into force: May 29, 1982. 

Postal 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final proto- 
col and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981, except for Article 124 of the 
General Regulations which became effective 
Jan. 1, 1981. 

Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, Feb. 8, 1982; 
United Arab Emirates, Mar. 15, 1982; Yugo- 
slavia, Mar. 23, 1982. 
Approvals deposited: Hungary, Mar. 17, 
1982; Lesotho, Mar. 29, 1982. 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement with detailed regulations and final 
protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26, 
1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981. 
Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, Feb. 8, 1982; 
Yugoslavia, Mar. 23, 1982. 
Approval deposite d: Hungary, Mar. 17, 1982. 

Program-Carrying Signals 

Convention relating to the distribution of pro- 
gram-carrying signals transmitted by satel- 
lite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. Entered 
into force Aug. 25, 1979.' 
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 6, 1982. 

Safety at Sea 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. 
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. 
Accessions deposited: Argentina, Feb. 24, 
1982; Switzerland, Apr. 1, 1982. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977, with 
annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. 
Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; 



Iy1982 



91 



TREATIES 



definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664. 
Notification that it assumes the rights and 
obligations of a contracting party deposited: 
Belize, Dec. 17, 1981. 

Telecommunications 

Radio regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982 except for (1) 
Articles 25 and 66 and appendix 43 which 
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981 and (2) certain 
provisions concerning aeronautical mobile 
service which shall enter into force Feb. 1, 
1983. 
Approvals deposited: Belize, Mar. 1, 1982; 

F.R.G., Jan. 8, 1982.^^ 

Trade 

Protocol extending the arrangement regard- 
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done 
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1982. 

Acceptances: Brazil, Feb. 9, 1982<; Egypt, 
Feb. 22, 1982^ EEC, Mar. 15, 1982; Finland, 
Mar. 5, 1982^ Hungary, Feb. 10, 1982; India, 
Dec. 31, 1981; Japan, Dec. 25, 1981; Republic 
of Korea, Mar. 12, 1982; Mexico. Mar. 4, 
1982; Pakistan, Dec. 29, 1981; Philippines, 
Feb. 16, 1982; Poland, Mar. 10, 1982; Sri 
Lanka, Dec. 29, 1981; Switzerland, Mar. 3, 
1982^^; U.K. on behalf of Hong Kong, Jan. 21, 
1982. 

U.N. Industrial Development Organization 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 
Ratification deposited: Turkey, May 5, 1982. 

Weapons 

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on 
the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively in- 
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with 
annexed Protocols. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 
1981.' 
Ratification and acceptances deposited: 

Ecuador, May 4, 1982. 

Wheat 

1981 protocol for the sbcth extension of the 

wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 

Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered 

into force July 1, 1981. 

Acceptance deposited: Japan, May 25, 1982. 

Ratification deposited: Finland, Apr. 19, 

1982. 

1981 protocol for the first extension of the 
food aid convention, 1980. Done at Washing- 
ton Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into force July 1, 
1981. 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, May 25, 1982. 

Ratification deposited: Finland, Apr. 19, 
1982. 

World Health Organization 

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Constitution of the World Health Organiza- 
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 
29th World Health Assembly.' 



Acceptances deposited: Sao Tome and Prin- 
cipe, Apr. 12, 1982; U.S.S.R., Apr. 1, 1982. 

Amendment to Article 74 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization, as amend- 
ed. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 
31st World Health Assembly.' 
Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., Apr. 1, 1982. 



BILATERAL 

Barbados 

Air transport agreement, with exchange of 
letters. Signed at Bridgetown Apr. 8, 1982. 
Entered into force Apr. 8, 1982. 

Supersedes understanding concerning air 
transport relations of Apr. 14 and 27, 1972, 
as amended (TIAS 7363, 7998). 

Canada 

Arrangement on mutual assistance in fighting 
forest fires. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ottawa May 4 and 7, 1982. Entered into 
force May 7, 1982. 

Egypt 

Project grant agreement for the rehabilita- 
tion and modernization of the Aswan High 
Dam Power Station. Signed at Cairo Apr. 12, 
1982. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1982. 

El Salvador 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Jan. 22, 1981. Signed at San Salvador 
Mar. 15, 1982. Enters into force upon notifi- 
cation that the legal requirements of each 
country have been satisfied; effective Mar. 15, 
1982. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement concerning host nation support 
during crisis of war, with annexes. Signed at 
Bonn Apr. 15, 1982. Entered into force 
Apr. 15, 1982. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Port-au-Prince Mar. 25 and Apr. 1, 
1982. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1982; effec- 
tive Mar. 1, 1982. 

Hungary 

Memorandum of understanding for scientific 
and technical cooperation in the earth 
sciences. Signed at Washington Mar. 23, 
1982. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1982. 

India 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 
9232), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Washing- 
ton Mar. 31 and Apr. 7, 1982. Entered into 
force Apr. 7, 1982. 

Indonesia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Dec. 2, 



1980 (TIAS 10063), with agreed minutes. 
Signed at Jakarta Mar. 20, 1982. Entered 
to force Mar. 20, 1982. 

Jamaica 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand 
ing. Signed at Kingston Apr. 30, 1982. 
Entered into force Apr. 30, 1982. 

Liberia 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 13, 1980 (TIAS 9841). Signed at 
Monrovia Apr. 6, 1982. Entered into force 
Apr. 6, 1982. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Feb. 16, 1979, as extended (TIAS 9444), oi 
cooperation to improve the management ol 
arid and semiarid lands and control deserti 
cation. Effected by exchange of notes at M 
ico and Tlatelolco Apr. 15 and May 6. 1982 
Entered into force May 6, 1982; effective 
Apr. 16, 1982. 

Morocco 

Agreement establishing a Binational Comr 
sion for Educational and Cultural Exchang 
Signed at Marrakech Feb. 12, 1982. 
Entered into force: May 20, 1982. 

Netherlands 

Agreement establishing a television trans- 
mitter at Soesterberg Airfield. Effected bj 
exchange of notes at The Hague Dec. 7, 1' 
and Mar. 4, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 
1982. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 90E 
9661, 9804, 10268), relating to trade in co 
ton textiles. Effected by exchange of lette 
at Washington Dec. 30, 1981 and Jan. 6, 
1982. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1982. 

Commodity import grant and loan agjeen- 
for agricultural commodities and equipmei 
Signed at Islamabad Apr. 13, 1982. Enter 
into force Apr. 13, 1982. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Mar. 25, 1980 (TIAS 9782). Signed at 
Islamabad Apr. 15, 1982. Entered into for 
Apr. 15, 1982. 

Peru 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Apr. 26, 1978 (TIAS 9604). Signed at Lin 
Apr. 5, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 5, 
1982. 

Agreement for cooperation concerning pe: 
ful uses of nuclear energy, with annex anc 
agreed minute. Signed at Washington 
June 26, 1980. 
Entered into force: Apr. 15, 1982. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 



92 



Department of State Bullei 



CHRONOLOGY 



ov. 26, 1976, concerning fisheries off the 
)asts of the U.S. (TIAS 8528). Effected by 
cchange of notes at Washington Apr. 22 and 
) and May 3. 1982. Entered into force 
ay 3, 1982. 

greement extending the agreement of 
ov. 26, 1976. as amended, concerning 
iheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 
)28). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Apr. 22 and 29, 1982. Enters in- 
. force following written notification of the 
)mpletion of internal procedures of both 
jvernments. 



greement for sales of agricultural com- 
odities, relating to the agreement of 
ay 30, 1980. Signed at Kinshasa Apr. 3, 
)82. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1982. 

imbabwe 

eneral agreement for economic, technical, 
id related assistance. Effected by exchange 
notes at Salisbury Feb. 10 and Mar. 22, 
•82. Entered into force Mar. 22, 1982. 

rant agreement for commodity imports, 
gned at Sahsbury Apr. 7, 1982. Entered in- 
force Apr. 7, 1982. 



'Not in force. 

^Applicable to Berlin (West). 
'Not in force for the U.S. 
*Ad referendum. 
^Subject to ratification. ■ 



May 1982 



ay 1 

ritish bombers attack airfields on the 
' irgentine-occupied Falkland Islands— the 
ret such attack since the Argentine invasion. 

■ay 2 

ritish Foreign Secretary Francis Pym meets 
ith Secretary Haig and Secretary of De- 
•nse Weinberger to review political, mili- 
iry, and economic aspects of the crisis in the 
3uth Atlantic. He later visits U.N. Secretary 
eneral, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to discuss 
le Secretary General's offer of his good 
Ices to resolve the dispute. 

In Rome, Pope John Paul II calls on Brit- 
m and Argentina to restore peace in their 
ispute over the islands. 

lay 2-3 

ritish sink Argentine cruiser Gen. Balgrano. 

lay 3 

jgentina does not accept peace plan put for- 
* ^ard by Peru's President Belaunde, calling 
roposals similar to previous U.S. proposals. 
ielaunde continues efforts. 

lay 4 

'oreign Minister Mohammed Benyahia of 
Algeria, who played a key role in freeing the 



Jly1982 



U.S. hostages held in Iran, is killed in a plane 
crash on a flight to Tehran. 

At Ireland's request, U.N. Security Coun- 
cil schedules consultations on U.K.-Argentine 
dispute for May 5 as Britain and Argentina 
consider the Secretary General's proposal. 

U.S. authorizes all nonessential personnel 
and some dependents of officials of the mis- 
sion to leave Argentina temporarily. 

U.S. House of Representatives adopts, by 
voice vote, a resolution urging Argentina to 
withdraw from the Falklands and calling for 
"full diplomatic support" for Great Britain. 

Argentina severely damages the British 
HMS Sheffield, which later sinks. 

May 5 

At Ireland's request, U.N. Security Council 
meets in an informal session to assess the 
situation in the South Atlantic. Ireland is 
seeking an immediate halt to the fighting and 
a negotiated settlement under U.N. auspices. 

May 6 

NATO Defense Planning Committee ministe- 
rial meeting is held in Brussels May 6-7. The 
Committee issues a final communique agree- 
ing on the "validity of the alliance strategy of 
deterrence and defense, coupled with a 
strong commitment to arms control and dis- 
armament." 

Argentina accepts U.N. intervention and 
calls for a cease-fire. 

May 7 

Britain announces that Argentina warships or 

military aircraft found more than 12 miles 

from Argentina's coast will be regarded as 

hostile. 

U.K. announces Peruvian peace plan is 
dead due to "Argentine intransigence." 

May 8 

U.N. Secretary General begins indirect 
negotiations on the South Atlantic crisis, 
meeting separately with Sir Anthony Par- 
sons, head of the British mission to the U.N., 
and Enrique Ros, Argentina's Deputy For- 
eign Minister. 

May 10 

U.N. Special Session on the Human Environ- 
ment is held in Nairobi, Kenya May 10-18 to 
assess progress made during the past decade 
in safeguarding the world's environment. 

Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) ministerial meeting 
is held in Paris May 10-11. 

Polish Government demands that two 
American diplomats— John Zerolis, Scientific 
Attache, and J. Daniel Howard, Cultural 
Affairs Officer— leave Poland by May 14, for 
allegedly "promoting destabilizing activity in 
Poland." The diplomats were accosted by 
Polish security forces while visiting a Polish 
scientist who had been recently released from 
detention. 

May 11 

Brazilian President Joao Baptista de Oliveira 
Figueiredo makes official visit to Washington, 
D.C. May 11-13. 



May 12 

Secretary Haig makes official visits to 
Ankara, May 13-15, and Athens May 15-16 
for discussions with heads of state; and Lux- 
embourg, May 16-18, to attend the North 
Atlantic Council ministerial meeting. While in 
Luxembourg, Secretary Haig meets with 
British Foreign Minister Pym to discuss the 
crisis in the South Atlantic. 

May 13 

State Department releases report showing 
"conclusive evidence" that toxins and chemi- 
cal warfare agents have been used, in recent 
months, in Laos and Kampuchea. 

In retaliation for the expulsion of two 
U.S. diplomats from Poland, the U.S. tells 
the Polish Embassy that Andrzej Koroscik, 
Attache for Science and Technology, and 
Mariusz Wozniak, Political Officer, would 
have to leave the U.S. by May 17. 

May 14 

After 6 consecutive days of indirect negotia- 
tions conducted by the Secretary General, 
U.N. talks on the South Atlantic crisis are 
temporarily interrupted when Sir Anthony 
Parsons is called to London for consultations. 

May 16 

European Common Market fails to agree to 
extend economic sanctions against Argentina. 
The sanctions are scheduled to expire at mid- 
night. 

Yugoslav Parliament elects a woman, 
Milka Planinc, as the country's first female 
Prime Minister. Mrs. Planinc succeeds 
Veselin DJuranovic. 

May 17 

European Common Market— except Ireland 
and Italy— extends its sanctions against 
Argentina for another week. 

U.N. talks resume after a 2-day break. 
Sir Anthony, the British delegate, returns 
with close to final British proposal to con- 
tinue negotiations. 

Paul Nitze, Chief U.S. negotiator to the 
Geneva negotiations on Limiting Inter- 
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) departs 
for Geneva for resumption of talks with the 
Soviet Union. 

North Atlantic Council ministerial 
meeting is held in Luxembourg May 17-18. A 
final communique is issued May 18: 

• Welcoming the accession of Spain to 
NATO; 

• Citing examples of Soviet actions in 
Poland and Afghanistan which contradict 
Soviet claims to peaceful intentions; 

• Expressing an allied determination to 
maintain adequate military strength and 
political solidarity, perseverance in their 
efforts to establish a more constructive East- 
West relationship, including progress in arms 
control, and welcoming President Reagan's 
START proposals; 

• Addressing the situation in and around 
Berlin, economic exchanges, the Falklands 



93 



PRESS RELEASES 



situation, terrorism, and third world sover- 
eignty and independence; and 

• Agreeing to intensify their consulta- 
tions. 

May 18 

King Hassan II of Morocco makes official 
working visit to Washington, D.C. 
May 18-21. 

May 19 

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar makes a 
personal appeal to Argentine and British 
leaders to consider new ideas as negotiations 
begin to collapse. 

May 20 

U.N. talks break down. Prime Minister 
Thatcher reports Argentina's rejection of 
British proposals and withdraws them. 
Argentina blames the U.K. U.N. Secretary 
General suspends his efforts. 

May 22 

U.S. Presidential Delegation to commemorate 
the Centennial of U.S. -Korean Relations par- 
ticipate in groundbreaking for the Centennial 
Memorial at Inchon, Republic of Korea. Gen. 
Lyman L. Lemnitzer (USA Ret.), heads the 
delegation. 

At the Vatican, Pope John Paul II re- 
iterates his calls for both countries to cease 
hostilities and resume negotiations. 

May 23 

U.N. Secretary General is urged by Security 
Council speakers to renew his efforts to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement in the South 
Atlantic crisis. 

Argentine President Galtieri, in a reply 
to the Pope, says that Argentina is willing to 
join in a ceasefire. 

May 24 

All members of the European Common 
Market except Ireland and Italy agree to ex- 
tend indefinitely economic sanctions against 
Argentina. 

Prime Minister Thatcher rejects a cease- 
fire appeal by the Pope in the absence of 
Argentine withdrawal. 

May 26 

By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Coun- 
cil adopts Resolution .505 reaffirming Resolu- 
tion 502 of April 3. The Resolution 

• Expresses "appreciation to the Secre- 
tary General" for his efforts to implement 
Resolution 502; 

• Requests the "Secretary General, on 
the basis of the present resolution, to under- 
take a renewed mission;" 

• Urges both parties "to cooperate fully" 
with the Secretary General, and 

• Requests the Secretary General "to 
enter into contact immediately with the par- 
ties with a view to negotiating mutually ac- 
ceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if 
necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of 
United Nations observers to monitor com- 
pliance with the terms of the cease-fire." 



94 



May 27 

U.S. -Morocco formally complete an agree- 
ment which will allow U.S. military planes to 
use airbases in Morocco during emergencies 
in the Middle East and Africa. The document 
is initialed by Secretary Haig and Foreign 
Minister Mohammed Boucetta. 

Twentieth meeting of Rio treaty Foreign 
Ministers reconvenes at the OAS. 

May 29 

By a vote of 17 to with 4 abstentions — 
U.S., Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and 
Tobago — the OAS adopts a resolution con- 
demning Britain's attack on the Falkland 
Islands and urging the U.S. to halt its aid to 
the British. 

May 30 

Spain, depositing an instrument of ratifica- 
tion with the Department of State, formally 
becomes the 16th member of NATO. 

Colombia holds presidential elections. The 
leading contenders are former President 
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of the ruling Liberal 
Party and his Conservative Party opponent, 
Belisario Betancur Cuartas. 

May 31 

Belisario Betancur Cuartas, the Conservative 
Party candidate, is elected President of Co- 
lumbia. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

155 5/3 Haig, Hunt: remarks upon 

signing MFD, Mar. 25. 

156 5/4 Haig: statement before Sub- 

committee for State, Justice, 
Commerce, and related 
agencies of the Senate Ap- 
propriations Committee. 

Increased processing time for 
passports. 

Franklin statue dedicated. 

Program for the State visit of 
Brazilian President Joao 
Baptista de Oliveira 
Figueiredo, May 11-13. 

Haig: remarks at the AFSA 
memorial ceremony. 

U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Com- 
mittee (CCITT), study group 
A, May 26. 
•162 5/10 Shipping Coordinating 

Committee (SCC), Subcom- 
mittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working group 
on ship design and equip- 
ment, May 26. 
'163 5/10 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on fire protection. May 27. 



157 


5/4 


158 


5/7 


159 


5/7 


160 


5/7 


161 


5/10 



•164 5/10 SCC, SOLAS, working grni 

on carriage of dangerou.s 

goods, June 3. 
'165 5/10 Haig: special briefing, Was! 

ington, D.C. 
166 5/11 Haig: statement before the 

Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee. 
*167 5/17 Program for the official woi 

ing visit to Washington, 1 " 

of King Hassan II of Mor 

CO, May 18-21. 
*168 5/17 Haig: arrival statement; F'l I 

eign Minister liter Turkn 

welcoming statement, 

Ankara, May 13. 
•169 5/19 U.S., Maldives establish texe 

visa system, Dec. 29, 198 

and Mar. 22, 1982. 
170 5/18 Haig, Turkmen: remarks u[ i 

the Secretary's departure 

May 15. 
'171 5/18 Haig: arrival statement, 

Athens, May 15. 
172 5/19 Haig: press conference, 

Athens, May 16. 
'173 5/19 Haig, Pym: remarks after 

their meeting, Luxembou , 

May 16. 
174 5/20 Haig: press conference, Lu; 

embourg. May 18. 
'175 5/24 Selwa Roosevelt sworn in a 

Chief of Protocol (biograp c 

data). 

176 5/26 Haig: interview on "Face tl 

Nation," May 23. 

177 5/26 Haig: address before Chica; 

Council on Foreign Rela- 
tions, Chicago. 

178 5/28 Haig: statement before the 

20th meeting of Foreign 
Ministers of the Rio treal 
OAS, May 27. 

179 5/28 Haig: question-and-answer 

session following speech 
fore Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, Chicaj 
May 26. 

180 5/28 Stoessel: address at World 

Affairs Council of Pitts- 
burgh, Pittsburgh, May 2 

•Not printed in the Bulletin. R 



Department of State Built n 



INDEX 



«;, 



July 1982 

/olume 82, No. 2064 



Vfrica 

Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa 
(Crocker) 61 

Y 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee 
Assistance (Vine) 75 

Lrgentina 

he Fali<iand Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrictc, 
Middendorf, Wliite House statement, 

texts of resolutions) 86 

ifresident Reagan's News Conference of 

May 13 (excerpts) .42 

ieeretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 

J (Haig) 52 

1(1 ieeretary Interviewed on "This Week With 

° David Brinkley" (Haig) 55 

Irms Control 

^n Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39 

resident Reagan's News Conference of 

May 13 (excerpts) 42 

secretary Haig s News Conference of 

June 19 58 

Vsia. FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia 

(Holdridge) 65 

]hina. Developing Lasting U.S. -China 

Relations 50 

ongress 

Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa 
(Crocker) 61 

"■"Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia 

(Holdridge) 65 

""Y 1983 Assistance Requests for Europe 

(Thomas) 70 

1983 Assistance Requests for Israel 

(Draper) 74 

1983 Assistance Requests for Latin 

America (Enders) 83 

1983 Assistance Requests for the Near 



East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72 

^Y 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N. 

and the OAS (Piatt) 80 

^'Y 1983 Authorization Request (Haig) 64 

''Y 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee 

Assistance (Vine) 75 

?Y 1983 Security Assistance Requests 

(Buckley) 77 

Department and Foreign Service. FY 1983 

Authorization Request (Haig) 64 

economics 

Peaceful Change in Central America (Haig, 

Stoessel) 47 

President Reagan Attends Economic and 

NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan, 

final communique, declaration, docu- 
ments) 1 

President Reagan Visits Eurooe (Haig, 

Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the 

Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 

dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15 
Secretary Interviewed on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" (Haig) 55 

Egypt. Peace and Security in the Middle 

East (Haig) ". 44 

Foreign Aid 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa 

(Crocker) 61 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia 

(Holdridge) 65 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Europe 

(Thomas) 70 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel 

(Draper) 74 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Latin 

America (Enders) 83 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the Near 

East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N. and 

the OAS (Piatt) 80 



FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee 
Assistance (Vine) . .' 75 

FY' 1983 Security Assistance Requests 
(Buckley) 77 

France 

President Reagan Attends Economic and 
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan, 
final communique, declaration, docu- 
ments) 1 

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig, 
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Maiesty the 
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15 

Germany 

President Reagan Attends Economic and 
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan, 
final communique, declaration, docu- 
ments) 1 

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig, 
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the 
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15 

International Organizations and Confer- 
ences. FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 
the U.N. and the OAS (Piatt) 80 

Iran. Peace and Security in the Middle East 
(Haig) 44 

Iraq. Peace and Security in the Middle East 
(Haig) 44 

Israel 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel 
(Draper) 74 

Peace and Security in the Middle East 
(Haig) 44 

Italy. President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig, 
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Maiesty the 
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Latin 
America (Enders) 83 

FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee 
Assistance (Vine) 75 

Peaceful Change in Central America (Haig, 
Stoessel) ,..47 

Lebanon. Peace and Security in the Middle 
East (Haig) ! 44 

Middle East 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the Near 
East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72 

FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee 
Assistance (Vine) 75 

Peace and Security in the Middle East 
(Haig) ." .....44 

President Reagan Attends Economic and 
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan, 
final communique, declaration, docu- 
ments) 1 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
May 13 (excerpts) 42 

Secretary Haig s News Conference of 
June 19 .58 

Secretary Interviewed on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" (Haig) 55 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

President Reagan Attends Economic and 
NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan, 
final communique, declaration, docu- 
ments) 1 

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig, 
Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the 
Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 
dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) . . .15 

Organization of American States 

The Falkland Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrick, 
Middendorf, White House statement, texts 
of resolutions) 86 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N. 
and the OAS (Piatt) 80 

Pacific. FY' 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia 
(Holdridge) 65 

Presidential Documents 

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39 

President Reagan Attends Economic and 



NATO Summits (Haig, Reagan, Regan, 

final communique, declaration, docu- 
ments) 1 

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig, 

Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the 

Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 

dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) . . . 15 
President Reagan's News Conference of 

May 13 (excerpts) 42 

Refugees. FY 1983 Requests for Migration 

and Refugee Assistance (Vine) 75 

Security Assistance 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Africa 

(Crocker) 61 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Asia 

(Holdridge) 65 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Europe 

(Thomas) 70 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel 

(Draper) 74 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the Near 

East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72 

FY 1983 Security Assistance Requests 

(Buckley) 77 

Peaceful Change in Central America (Haig, 

Stoessel) 47 

South Asia. FY 1983 Assistance Requests for 

the Near East and South Asia (Veliotes) 72 
Trade. Developing Lasting U.S. -China 

Relations 50 

Treaties. Current Actions 91 

U.S.S.R. 

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39 

President Reagan's News Conference of 

May 13 (excerpts) 42 

Secretary Haig s News Conference of 

June 19 58 

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 

(Haig) 52 

United Kingdom 

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39 

The Falkland Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrick, 

Middendorf, White House statement, 

texts of resolutions) 86 

President Reagan Visits Europe (Haig, 

Mitterrand, The Pope, Her Majesty the 

Queen, Reagan, Thatcher, luncheon and 

dinner toasts, U.S. -Italy statement) ... 15 
President Reagan's News Conference of 

May 13 (excerpts) 42 

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 

(Haig) 52 

Secretary Interviewed on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" (Haig) 55 

United Nations 

An Agenda for Peace (Reagan) 39 

The Falkland Islands (Haig, Kirkpatrick, 

Middendorf, White House statement, texts 

of resolutions) 86 

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for the U.N. 

and the 0A3 (Piatt) 80 



Name Index 

Buckley, James L 77 

Crocker, Chester A 61 

Draper, Morris 74 

Enders, Thomas 83 

Haig, Secretary 1, 15, 44, 47, 50, 52, 55, 

58, 64, 86 

Holdridge, John H 65 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 86 

Middendorf, J. William II 86 

Mitterrand, Francois 15 

Piatt, Nicholas 80 

Pope John Paul II 15 

Queen Ehzabeth II 15 

Regan, Donald T 1 

Reagan, President 1, 15, 39, 42 

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 47, 50 

Thatcher, Margaret 15 

Thomas, Charles H 70 

Veliotes, Nicholas A 72 

Vine, Richard D 75 



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Mh*pai'iitivn t 



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buUetEn 



rhe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2065 



OC! 61982 j 



August 1982 




Ih»ptirintvnt of SittU* 

bulletin 



Volume 82 / Number 2065 / August 1982 



The Departmknt of Statp; Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secreiar\ nl Stale 

DEAN FISCHER 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Acting Chief, iiditorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

f-ditor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through March 31, I4S7, 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
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may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Dki'artmk.nt of Statk Bui.lktin as the 
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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 

1 Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization (RobeH M. Sayre) 

9 Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981 

23 Terrorist Target: The Diplomat (Frank H. Perez) 

31 Armenian Terrorism: A Profile (Andrew Corsun) 




ie President 

News Conference of June 30 
(Excerpts) 

ie Vice President 

Visit to East Asia and 
the Pacific (Remarks, Toasts, 
Statements, President Reagan's 
Letters to Chinese Leaders) 

The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty 
and Council (Edward C. Keefer) 

lie Secretary 

Secretary-Designate Shultz Ap- 
pears Before Senate Committee 

Secretary Haig Resigns (Exchange 
of Letters) 

rms Control 

NATO Allies Table Draft MBFR 
Treaty (Eugene V. Rostow) 

START Negotiations (President 
Reagan, White House Statement) 

ianada 

Alaska Gas Pipeline (Secretaries' 
Haig and MacGuigan Letters) 

ast Asia 

Allied Responses to the Soviet 
Challenge in East Asia and the 
Pacific (Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.) 
I Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy 
(John H. Holdridge) 



Europe 

60 Secretary Haig Visits Turkey, 

Greece; Attends North Atlantic 
Council (Remarks, News Con- 
ferences, Final Communique) 

62 Eighth Report on Cyprus (Mes- 
sage to the Congress) 

64 Situation in Poland (President 
Reagan) 

68 North Atlantic Council Meets in 
Brussels (Final Communique, 
Declaration) 

Middle East 

70 Visit of Moroccan King 

Hassan H (Department State- 
ment) 

Oceans 

71 U.S. Votes Against Law of the 

Sea Treaty (President Reagan) 

Science & Technology 

71 Control of Technology Trans- 
fers to the Soviet Union 
(James L. Buckley) 

Western Hemisphere 

73 Cuban Support for Terrorism and 
Insurgency in the Western 
Hemisphere (Thomas 0. Enders) 
Commitment to Democracy in 
Central America (Thomas 0. 
Enders) 



Treaties 

77 Current Actions 

Chronology 

80 June 1981 

Press Releases 

81 Department of State 

81 U.S.U.N. 

Publications 

82 Department of State 

82 Foreign Relations Volume Re- 
leased 

Index 



SUI 



Miia^bifcmTs 



76 



OCT 6 1982 



DEPOSITORY 



SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

Atlas of U.S. Foreign Relations: Foreign Relations Machinery 




rhe Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed 
t)y a car bomb on December 15, 1981; 20 
people were killed and another 100 were 
injured. 




FEATURE 



Terrorism 



Combatting Terrorism; 
American Policy 
and Organization 

by Ambassador Robert M. Sayre 



Address before the 
Third International Civil Aviation Security Conference 
Washington, D.C., July 21, 1982 



Political violence and terrorism are not 
new. They have been with us since the 
dawn of recorded history. What is new 
is the speed with which people and ideas 
move. You can be in Washington tonight 
and Paris tomorrow morning. You can 
sit at your television set and have a 
front-row seat at the world soccer 
matches in Madrid. An assassin can at- 
tempt to kill the President of the United 
States on the streets in Washington or 
the Pope on the streets in Rome, and 
the television networks will bring the 
event to you simultaneously and in living 
color. Political terrorism used to be a na- 
tional event that seldom had ramifica- 
tions beyond national borders. Now any 
attack against any prominent figure or 
against a commercial aircraft or against 
an embassy is an international media 
event. Our ability to travel and com- 
municate rapidly has made it so. Ter- 
rorism is international, and, as many 
say, it is theater. 

I would like to be able to tell you 
that we are doing as well on controlling 
political violence generally as you are 
doing in controlling terrorist attacks 
against commercial aviation. But you 
are, in a sense, fortunate because you 
can put people and baggage through a 
single checkpoint. You can, of course, 
still be and are the victim of human er- 



rors and poor procedures. You have 
done a remarkable job, at considerable 
expense, to maintain your safety record. 

Unfortunately this is not the case 
for political violence and terrorism 
generally. We have no way of running 
all terrorists through a checkpoint or 
x-raying their baggage. Their methods 
of attack are myriad, they are 
clandestine, and they are elusive. They 
frequently change the names of their 
organizations and their passports, 
recruit new faces, send old faces off to 
different parts of the world, and 
generally try to confound and confuse 
the police and security organizations 
that governments create as defensive 
mechanisms. 

The number of actual terrorist acts 
increases daily. Every day that passes 
brings to my desk in the Department of 
State a new batch of reports about 
planned terrorist attacks or attacks ac- 
tually carried out. Diplomats are once 
again the principal target; and American 
diplomats are particularly high on the 
list of victims or intended victims. Some 
15% of the operating budget of the 
Department of State goes to pay for 
protection of our personnel and facilities 
overseas, and the cost is rising. So while 
I would like to tell you that the situation 



leiJsti9e2 



is getting better, I must honestly and 
candidly tell you that it is getting worse. 
What are we doing about it? 

In truth our problems are not that 
much different from yours. We have a 
worldwide operating network and so do 
the airlines. The difference may be that 
we are in almost every country, 
sometimes in several places, whereas 
your networks are not as extensive. 
That is a difference in degree and not 
substance. 

We must have an international con- 
sensus, and cooperation on security 
threats to our operation, and so must 
you. 

We must have an understanding 
with individual governments on how ter- 
rorist attacks against us will be handled 
and so must you. There must be an un- 
derstanding within our organizations 
from the President to the security man 
in the field on how we will react, both in 
a policy and operational sense, and I am 
certain that is the case with the airlines. 



American Policy 

The first action required of the Reagan 
Administration was a clear and un- 
equivocal statement of policy. 

At the very beginning of this Admin- 
istration, President Reagan, in welcom- 
ing the Tehran hostages home, ar- 
ticulated U.S. policy on terrorism. He 
said: "Let terrorists be aware that when 
the rules of international behavior are 
violated, our policy will be one of swift 
and effective retribution." 

We have publicly and repeatedly 
noted that the United States, when 
faced with an act of terrorism at home 
or abroad, will take all possible lawful 
measures to resolve the incident and to 
bring to justice the perpetrators of the 
crime. This policy is based upon the con- 
viction that to allow terrorists to suc- 
ceed only leads to more terrorism; if 
they are successful, they will be en- 
couraged to commit more such acts. 

We firmly believe that terrorists 
should be denied benefits from acts such 
as hostage-holding or kidnapping; thus 
the U.S. Government does not make 
concessions to blackmail. We will not 
pay ransom or release prisoners in 
response to such demands. 



When a terrorist incident occurs out- 
side the United States, we look to the 
host government to exercise its respon- 
sibility to protect persons within its 
jurisdiction and to enforce the law in its 
territory. During such incidents, we con- 
sult closely with the responsible govern- 
ment, and we offer all practical support 
to the government concerned. 

When a terrorist incident against us 
is sponsored or directed by a nation, as 
an instrument of its own policy in an at- 
tempt to intimidate or coerce us, we will 
take all appropriate measures — be they 
diplomatic, political, economic, or 
military — to resolve the incident and to 
resist this form of international 
blackmail. So the United States has a 
clearly stated policy. 



But a policy is no better than the 
determination or will to carry it out ar 
the organization established to do so. 
The problem is international, so the fir 
question is, how effective and deter- 
mined is the international community? 



International Cooperation 

International organizations, including 
the United Nations, have sponsored a 
number of multilateral conventions 
which deal with particular terrorist 
crimes to bring them within the crimin 
law. The United States has strongly su 
ported these efforts over the years. 

The most widely accepted conven- 
tions are The Hague convention agains 



Director, Office for 
Combatting Terrorism 



Ambassador Robert M. Sayre became the 
Director of the Department of State's Office 
for Combatting Terrorism in May 1982. He is 
also chairman of the Department's policy 
group on security policies and programs and 
contingency planning. 

Mr. Sayre was born in Hillsboro, Oregon, 
on August 18, 1924. He received a bachelor's 
degree from Willamette (1949), a doctorate in 
law from George Washington University 
(1956), a master's degree from Stanford 
(1960), and an honorary doctorate in laws 
from Willamette (1966). 

He joined the Department in 1949 as an 
intern. He later held assignments as interna- 
tional economist in the Bureau of Economic 
Affairs and the Bureau of Inter-American Af- 
fairs (1950-.'>2). international relations officer 
in the latter bureau (1952-56), officer in 
charge of inter-American security and 
military assistance affairs (1956-57), chief of 
the political section in Lima (1957-60), and 
financial officer in Havana (1960-61). 

He returned to Washington in 1961 to 
become President Kennedy's executive 
secretary of the task force on Latin America 
and also assisted in efforts that put together 
the Alliance for Progress. Other positions 
Ambassador Sayre has held have been officer 
in charge of Mexican affairs (1961-64), senior 
staff member of the National Security Coun- 
cil (1964-65), Deputy AssisUint Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs (1965-67). Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af- 




fairs (1967-68), and a Foreign Service ins| 
tor (1974-75 and 1976-78). 

He has held three ambassadorial posts 
Uruguay (1968-69). Panama (1969-74), am 
Brazil (1978-82). Ambassador Sayre twice 
has been awarded the Department's Superi 
Honor Award (1964 and 1976). ■ 



Department of State Bullei 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



jacking and the Montreal convention 
f; gainst aircraft sabotage, which are now 
Ihered to by over 100 states. The inter- 
I itional community, through these con- 
sntions, has established the principle 
at aircraft piracy and sabotage, like 
e maritime piracy they so closely 
semble, are universally abhorred inter- 
itional crimes. 

Other conventions dealing with addi- 
)nal aspects of the terrorism problem 
e the New York convention on crimes 
jainst internationally protected per- 
ns, the Convention Against the Taking 
Hostages, and the Convention on the 
lysical Protection of Nuclear 
aterials. These agreements establish 
e obligation among states party to 
em to submit for prosecution or ex- 
adition those alleged to have com- 
itted particular crimes. 

The United States strongly supports 
e principle established in these conven- 
)ns that those who commit terrorist 
dmes should be brought to justice in 
icordance with the law, and we con- 
lue to urge other nations to become 
.rties to these important agreements. 

The United Nations has also con- 
dered the effectiveness of the New 
ork convention on attacks against 
plomats and other internationally pro- 
cted persons. The Secretary General 
IS invited member states to submit 
sports this year for consideration by 
le United Nations on actions they have 
,ken to carry out the convention. We 
elcome this continuing focus on attacks 
1 diplomats which now account for 
ore than half of all terrorist attacks. 

In addition to these eiforts in the in- 
■rnational organizations, the economic 
immit seven— the United States, 
anada, France, the Federal Republic of 
ermany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
id Japan — enunciated a course of ae- 
on against hijacking. In 1978 the heads 
state and government of these seven 
ations adopted a declaration against hi- 
cking. It was a commitment to take 
int action by terminating air service to 
ates which fail to live up to their 
oligations under The Hague convention 
a hijackers. Last year the Bonn 
eclaration was implemented against 
fghanistan for its conduct during and 
libsequent to the hijacking of a 
akistani aircraft in March 1981. The 



No Concessions! 



The Reagan Administration has adopted a 
firm policy to combat international terrorism. 
We will resist terrorist blackmail and pursue 
terrorists with the full force of the law. We 
will not pay ransom, nor release prisoners, 
and we will not bargain for the release of 
hostages. To make concessions to terrorist 
blackmail only jeopardizes the lives and 
freedom of additional innocent people. We en- 
courage other governments to take a similar- 
ly strong stance. When U.S. citizens are 
taken hostage, we look to the host govern- 
ment to exercise its responsibility under in- 
ternational law to protect them, but at the 
same time we urge the government not to 
give in to terrorist blackmail. We are 
prepared to assist the host government 
should our aid be requested. 

The basic philosophy underlying this 
policy is that concessions to terrorists only 
serve to encourage them to resort to more 
terror to obtain their political objectives, 
thereby endangering still more innocent lives. 
If terrorists understand that a government 
steadfastly refuses to give in to their 
demands and is prepared to live up to its in- 
ternational obligations to prosecute or ex- 
tradite them, this will serve as a strong 
deterrent. We also encourage other govern- 
ments to adopt a no-concessions policy since 
international terrorism is a phenomenon 
which crosses national boundaries. Our no- 
concessions policy is of little avail if 
Americans are taken hostage abroad and the 
host government concedes to the terrorists 
demands. 

The current policy in dealing with 
hostage incidents involving U.S. diplomats 
and other officials represents an evolution 
from the handling of the first incidents in 
1969 and 1970. Although our policy was not 
to give in to terrorists demands, there is a 
feeling by those who have analyzed those 
cases that the principal concern then was the 
safe release of the hostages, and any host 
government concessions to the terrorists 
were acceptable if they contributed to that 
goal. 

By the time the U.S. Ambassador in Haiti 
was kidnapped by local terrorists in January 
1973 and the U.S. Ambassador and the Depu- 
ty Chief of Mission were held hostage in 
Khartoum in March 1973 by Palestinian ter- 
rorists, a considerable hardening in the U.S. 
policy was apparent. Although the Am- 
bassador to Haiti was released after local 



authorities had made concessions to the ter- 
rorists, it is apparent that the United States 
had not been in favor of giving in to their 
demands. In connection with the Khartoum 
case, while it was still in progress. President 
Nixon said that "as far as the United States 
as a government giving in to blackmail 
demands, we cannot do so and we will not do 
so." He went on to say, "We will do 
everything that we can to get them released 
but we will not be blackmailed." One of the 
terrorist demands had been to release Sirhan 
Sirhan. the convicted assassin of Robert F. 
Kennedy. 

The Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of 
Mission, and the Belgian Charge were killed 
in the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum by the 
terrorists. Among the terrorists' other 
demands had been the release of some par- 
ticularly important terrorist leaders who had 
been captured and were being tried in Jor- 
dan. The terrorists in Khartoum repeatedly 
called for the release of these men, and, in 
the view of some analysts, the failure of the 
terrorists to obtain their release was the 
basic reason for the brutal assassination of 
these diplomats. 

If a foreign government engages in acts 
of terrorism against the United States, the 
Administration has made it clear that the 
United States would respond effectively and 
vigorously using all appropriate resources at 
its disposal — diplomatic, political, economic, 
and military. 

Because international terrorism affects 
most countries around the world, it is essen- 
tial that all responsible governments adopt a 
common policy of not giving in to terrorist 
blackmail. This principle is already embodied 
in international conventions such as the wide- 
ly accepted Hague convention on hijacking 
which establishes an obligation to either pros- 
ecute or extradite hijackers. Although there 
is a temptation to give in to the terrorists 
demands on humanitarian grounds to avoid 
the possibility of violence against the 
hostages, such a moral compromise is fleeting 
since a terrorist victory only encourages 
more acts which endanger additional innocent 
lives. No responsible government can allow 
itself to be dictated to by ruthless, criminal 
acts which endanger the lives of its citizens, 
citizens of other countries, and which 
threaten its authority. Compromise will prove 
transitory and over the long run will be 
detrimental to a country's efforts to cope 
effectively with the problem. ■ 



\ugust1982 



United Kingdom, France, and West Ger- 
many, the countries of the summit seven 
with bilateral air service with 
Afghanistan, gave notice that air links 
would be terminated this November. We 
continue to monitor the actions of coun- 
tries during hijacking incidents and will 



urge such actions in future cases where 
it would be appropriate. 

At the bilateral level, we have con- 
sulted many countries on sharing infor- 
mation on terrorists and their plans. 
Such exchanges occur systematically, 
but we need to do more to assure that 



Antiterrorism 
Cooperation Program 



In April and May of 1982, Ambassador 
Robert M. Sayre, the Department of State's 
Director for Combatting Terrorism, testified 
before both Houses of Congress in support of 
a new program intended to be a major ele- 
ment of the President's program to combat 
and deter political terrorism. The proposal 
asks Congress to provide authority and fund- 
ing for assistance to selected friendly govern- 
ments by providing them with antiterrorism 
training, specialized equipment where ap- 
propriate, and by generally expanding the 
scope and type of intergovernmental coopera- 
tion. Specifically the Department asked the 
Congress to amend the Foreign Assistance 
Act to authorize antiterrorism assistance up 
to a level of $5 million in FY 1983. 

Both the House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee and the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee responded encouragingly to this pro- 
posal and recommended to their respective 
bodies that the program be approved. Ed- 
ward Marks, a career Foreign Service officer 
and formerly U.S. Ambassador to Guinea- 
Bissau and Cape Verde and most recently of 
the National War College, was designated in 
December 1981 as the Department's Coor- 
dinator for Antiterrorism Programs. 

As presently conceived, the program will 
begin by providing training courses in various 
antiterrorism skills and management tech- 
niques for the civil and police authorities of 
friendly developing countries subject to a ter- 
rorist threat. Training will be offered at ex- 
isting U.S. Government institutions such as 
the FBI Academy (Quantico, Virginia), the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(Glynco, Georgia), and the Federal Aviation 
Administration's Transportation Safety In- 
stitute (Oklahoma City). The training will in- 
clude antiterrorist policy, government crisis 
management organization, incident manage- 
ment, hostage and barricade negotiations, air- 
port security measures, bomb disposal, and 
dignitary and facility protection. The training 
and orientation will be designated primarily 
for senior officials responsible for antiter- 
rorism policy and incident management, plus 
senior training personnel. 



In addition, the U.S. Government will 
provide a limited amount of appropriate an- 
titerrorist equipment to complement specific 
training programs. 

The antiterrorism cooperation program 
has a number of objectives, all revolving 
around the perception that political terrorism 
is an international phenomenon which 
threatens individual countries as well as in- 
ternational society. Thus, it must be met by 
an international effort much in the way in 
which piracy was challenged and finally 
eliminated. The U.S. Government has a 
multifaceted antiterrorism program, impor- 
tant parts of which are directed toward 
creating the necessary international consen- 
sus. The antiterrorism assistance program 
shares that objective but is specifically 
directed toward enhancing the antiterrorist 
operating skills of relatively inexperienced 
governments and to expanding cooperation 
among all concerned governments. 

This program will serve broader U.S. 
policy interests: 

• Strengthen bilateral ties with friendly 
governments by offering this concrete 
assistance in an area of mutual concern; 

• Assist governments, by improving their 
capabilities, to better protect U.S. diplomatic 
missions and other interests, including the 
American tourist; and 

• Increase respect for human rights and 
improve the climate for them by reducing the 
terrorist threat to innocent third parties on 
the one hand, while helping governments deal 
with the terrorist threat by means of modern, 
humane, and effective antiterrorist tech- 
niques on the other. 

Pending final authorization and approval 
by Congress for FY 1983, the Office for 
Combatting Terrorism is preparing im- 
plementation of the new program. By the 
time this article appears, selected posts will 
have been queried about the feasibility of 
their host governments participating in pilot 
projects. That inquiry will be followed by a 
circular telegram to approximately 15 other 
posts, initiating the participating country 
selection process for the antiterrorism 
assistance program's first full year of opera- 
tion (FY 1983). ■ 



all members of the world community a 
aware of specific dangers. I wish to tal 
this opportunity to assure you that wh 
the United States learns that a terrori 
act is being planned in any country 
around the world, we immediately in- 
form the appropriate authorities of the 
country involved so that innocent lives 
may be saved. We do not and will not 
hold back such information. We hope 
that other countries will adopt a simila 
policy. 

We have also discussed the coordir 
tion of policy responses to terrorism. \ 
have urged other countries to adopt a 
policy similar to ours to deny terrorist; 
the benefits they seek from their crime 
and to bring the full force of law en- 
forcement measures to bear on them. 

Consultation and coordination of 
policies are only part of the solution. \' 
have recently submitted legislation to 
the U.S. Congress which would 
authorize a program of antiterrorism 
assistance for foreign government law 
enforcement personnel. The Congress 
now considering this proposal. If 
authorized, this program would enable 
us to off"er training in antiterrorism 
security and management skills at our 
training facilities and to provide equip- 
ment, such as security screening devici 
for airports. Once legislation is passed, 
we will be contacting selected countrie 
about the possibility of participation in 
this program. We consider this progra 
as a way to assist countries that may 
want to learn our techniques of dealing 
with terrorists. But we also see it as a; 
opportunity to learn by exchanging ex- 
periences with all countries that have 
been victims of terrorist attacks. 

As I stated early in my remarks, a 
principal target of terrorists is the 
diplomat. Terrorists have recently 
turned their attention to foreign 
diplomats in the United States. We are 
therefore, strengthening the protection 
we provide to foreign diplomats. We 
have introduced new legislation which 
will enable the Department of State to 
carry out its responsibilities more effec 
tively and efficiently in cooperation wit! 
State and local authorities. We are 
hopeful that the Congress will act 
promptly on this proposal. 

Although we have a strong set of 
policies and laws on terrorism agreed t 
by the international community, the in- 
ternational community has not been as 



ti 



Department of State Bulleti 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



jcessful in working out arrangements 
give effect to these policies and laws. 
e countries in Europe have their own 
rking arrangements, and there are 
;asional conferences such as this one. 
t multilateral cooperation is extreme- 



ly limited. If the world community is 
serious about combatting terrorism, then 
it needs to give more attention to work- 
ing arrangements that will do that. For 
its part, the United States stands ready 
to cooperate to the fullest extent. 



i. employees in Tripoli poured motor oil on the embassy's marble staircases to delay 
tyan mobs from gaining access in December 1979. 




State-Supported Terrorism 

Unfortunately there are states which are 
directly involved in carrying out interna- 
tional terrorist acts. There are also 
states which find it in their interest to 
provide arms, training, and logistical 
support to terrorist organizations. 
Another problem, then, is that the com- 
munity of nations needs to face forth- 
rightly the fact that some of its mem- 
bers are promoting terrorism and others 
have a certain sympathy for terrorist 
organizations and condone what they do 
because they are of the same political 
philosophy and consider terrorism as an 
effective way to undermine their adver- 
saries. 



Bonn Declaration 



In 1978 at the economic summit in Bonn, the 
heads of state and government of the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and 
Japan expressed their resolve to effectively 
combat international hijackings when they 
issued the Bonn antihijacking delcaration.* In 
essence, the declaration states that any na- 
tion which does not prosecute or extradite hi- 
jackers in its territory will face the termina- 
tion of air service by the seven nations. It 
does not specify what se.itence a hijacker 
must receive but does require that he be tried 
under the laws of the apprehending nation (or 
extradited). 

There is good reason to believe that the 
declaration has had a positive effect in reduc- 
ing the number of international terrorist hi- 
jackings by its reaffirmation of the need of 
governments to li/e up to their international 
responsibilities to either prosecute or ex- 
tradite hijackers. Obviously any multinational 
undertaking of this type faces differences in 
interpretation due to the different approaches 
and policies regarding terrorism. However, at 
the 1981 Ottawa summit, the seven govern- 
ments provided a clear expression of resolve 
by giving Afghanistan notice that it faced 
sanctions due to the harboring of the hi- 
jackers of a Pakistani International Airlines 
aircraft.** This action will serve to place 
potential hijackers on notice that it will be 
difficult for them to find sanctuary. 



.«»^'-/*"V 



*The Bonn declaration was published in 

the Bulletin of Sept. 1978, p. 5. 

**The Ottawa statement was published in 
the Bulletin of Aug. 1981, p. 16. ■ 



jgust1982 



U.S. Government Organization for 

Antiterrorism, Planning, Coordination, 

and Policy Formulation 




National Security 
Council 




Senior Interdepartmental 
Group 

Chairman, Deputy Secretary of State 



Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism 






Dsputy Chairman 
Justice 



"^ 








Advisory Group on Terrorism 



Agency for International Development 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

Center for Disease Control 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Department of the Army 

Department of Energy 

Department of Interior 

Department of Justice 

Department of State 

Department of the Treasury 

Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 



Federal Protective Service 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
International Communications Agency 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
fkletropolitan Police Department 
National Security Agency 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Office of Justice Assistance, Research 

and Statistics 
Office of Management and Budget 
Office of Undersecretary of Defense 
United States Coast Guard 
United States Customs Service 
United States Postal Service 
United States Secret Service 



The U.S. Government is organized in 
separate but parallel ways to deal with two 
distinct aspects of the problem of interna- 
tional terrorism — policy and incident manag 
ment. 

The principal vehicle for coordinating 
policy and programs is the Interdepartment 
Group on Terrorism, the senior executive 
branch organization devoted solely to the 
problem of terrorism. Chaired by the Depar 
ment of State, it is made up of representa- 
tives of the Departments of Justice /FBI 
(deputy chairman). Defense /JCS, Energy, 
Treasury, and Transportation; Central In- 
telligence Agency; National Security Counc; 
and the office of the Vice President. The 
group meets frequently, generally twice a 
month, to insure full coordination among th 
agencies of the Federal Government di recti 
involved in antiterrorism programs. The 
State Department representative, and chair 
man, is the Director of the Office for Com- 
batting Terrorism. 

The executive branch's response to the 
management of terrorist incidents is based 
the "lead agency" concept. State has the lef 
in overseas incidents, Justice/FBI the lead i 
incidents of domestic terrorism, and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pla 
a key role in skyjackings of U.S. flag carrie 
within the United States. 

When a terrorist incident occurs 
overseas, the State Department immediate! 
convenes a task force under the direction o 
the Office for Combatting Terrorism to 
manage the U.S. response. The task force i 
physically located in the Operations Center 
the State Department and is in operation 
24-hours a day until the incident is resolvec 
It is composed of representatives from the 
appropriate geographic and functional 
bureaus in the State Department and from 
other agencies as necessary. 

When Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier was 
kidnapped in Verona, Italy, on December 1 
i;tSl, for example, an interagency task fore 
was convened by the State Department 
within hours after the news of the abductio 
In addition to the normal members of the 
task force, the Department of Defense and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented 
because of Gen. Dozier's military position. 
That task force remained in operation until 
(it'll. Dozier's rescue on .lanuary 28, 1982. I 



Department of State Bulleti 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



^.S. Government 
organization 

'hat is the U.S. Government doing in 
)th its operations and organizations to 
irry out the strong policy enunciated 
J President Reagan? 

First, I am sure that you would 
jree that a key to dealing with the ter- 
)rist threat is good intelligence. We 
ive recently strengthened significantly 
vc ability to collect, analyze, and use in- 
:lligence on terrorism. We have also 
.ken steps to improve the exchange of 
formation with our friends and allies. 

It is one thing to have intelligence; it 
another to get policy officers to act on 
. We have made organizational changes 
lat improve our alert system and 
!Sponse capability. Certainly, on the in- 
I -lligence side, we are in much better 
lape today than we were a year or two 

Second, soon after the Reagan Ad- 
inistration assumed office, it created 
1 Interdepartmental Group on Ter- 
)rism — most of you would say inter- 
inisterial — to serve as the policy for- 
\ ulation and coordination body for the 
' jvernment. It is composed of repre- 
■ntatives of Federal agencies with 
rect responsibilities for combatting in- 
■rnational terrorism. I am the chairman 
: that group. Since its inception it con- 
icted a complete review of U.S. policy 
id proposed several initiatives. One of 
le gaps that needed to be filled was a 
ear operational arrangement to pro- 
>de support to the President and other 
ey decisionmakers during a major ter- 
jrist incident. This has been remedied, 
nd we believe that we are now better 
rganized to get prompt policy guidance 
3 that we can respond swiftly and ef- 
jctively to a terrorist incident. 

The possible use of force to resolve 
n incident is another important aspect 
f our response capability. In the United 
itates, most major cities have SWAT 
special weapons and tactics] teams. 
Cach district of the Federal Bureau of 
nvestigation (FBI) has its own SWAT 
earn. The rescue missions which were 
enducted at Entebbe, Mogadishu, and 
he Iranian Embassy in London last 
ear, as well as a number of aircraft in- 
idents, emphasize the need for an effec- 
ive assault capability. The United 



States has dedicated military forces for 
such a purpose. Although we consider 
the use of force in resolving a terrorist 
incident a measure of last resort, it is 
important to have these capabilities 
should they be needed. 

Role of the Department 
of State 

To many of you, terrorism is a domestic 
problem and you may wonder why the 
foreign office would head the Federal 
Government group on terrorism. The 
answer is quite simple: For the United 
States, most of the terrorist incidents 
have been directed against our diplomats 
or American interests overseas. The 
Department of State is the "ministry" in 
the United States most directly affected 
and best able to respond. We do have 
terrorist incidents in the United States 
and when they occur, it is the respon- 
sibility of the Department of Justice to 
take the lead and respond. As all of you 
attending this conference know, when it 
is the unique case of an aircraft, it is the 
responsibility of our Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). 

As you might expect, the Depart- 
ment of State has taken many steps 
over the years to improve our security, 
especially overseas. We are now en- 
gaged in major improvements to many 
of our embassies which will provide bet- 
ter protection to both personnel and 
physical facilities. Some 15« out of every 
$1.00 the Department spends on opera- 
tions is for security. So it is no small 
matter to us. And other governments 
which have the responsibility for pro- 
tecting American Embassies are spend- 
ing again collectively as much as we do. 
It is my responsibility to assure that we 
recommend security policies and pro- 
grams that provide a prudent level of 
protection. We are doing that. 

Conclusion 

We believe we have in place the policies, 
programs, and organization to deal with 
terrorism, but we are fully aware that 
there is much more to be done. 

The international community must 
continue and strengthen its efforts to 



cooperate more fully on terrorism. The 
international organizations in par- 
ticular—the United Nations and the 
regional organizations— might consider 
additional conventions to outlaw ter- 
rorist tactics, such as assassinations and 
bombings, and bring these additional 
tactics under the "prosecute or 
extradite" obligation. The international 
community must give special emphasis 
to working arrangements that will give 
full effect to these policies and conven- 
tions. We are hopeful that we can imple- 
ment our proposed antiterrorism train- 
ing program beginning in 1983 and that 
it will make a significant contribution to 
more effective working relationships 
among civil authorities responsible for 
dealing with terrorism. 

Individual countries should redouble 
their efforts to make clear that ter- 
rorism is an unacceptable method for 
achieving change. No matter what one's 
ideological preferences, a bomb in a 
train station or a threat of death against 
a plane load of civil air passengers is not 
an acceptable way to bring one's causes 
to public attention or to overthrow a 
government. An adequate response re- 
quires not only a better intelligence 
capability so that we are warned of 
possible terrorist acts, but that the 
machinery of government is organized 
from top to bottom so that we act 
promptly when a terrorist incident oc- 
curs. I believe that we in the U.S. 
Government are now prepared, but it 
will require constant vigilance, planning, 
and the exercise of our organizational 
system to have confidence that we can 
deal effectively with terrorist incidents. 
We must work to establish a world 
in which peaceful change can occur 
without violence and terror. We must 
also be vigilant in our mutual efforts to 
prevent terrorist attacks. You have a 
particularly important part to play in 
prevention. I know that we will continue 
to work together toward this goal. In 
that effort, you can be certain that the 
United States is prepared to be a full 
and reliable partner. ■ 



ugust 1982 




A Jewish synagogue in Antwerp was 
bombed by the PFLP/SC on October 20. 
1981, causing 2 deaths and 95 injuries. 



Department of Stat 



^C^?i=^^ FEATURE 



Terrorism 



Patterns of 

International Terrorism; 

1981 



Overview 

Both the number of international ter- 
rorist incidents and the number of 
casualties resulting from incidents fell in 
1981 (figure 1). Deaths caused by ter- 
rorist attacks dropped dramatically from 
642 in 1980 to 173 in 1981. Despite this 
decline in the number of casualties, the 
long-term trend is toward more serious 
threats to human life. In 1970 about half 
the international terrorist incidents were 
directed against people and half were 
directed against property. In 1981, 80% 
of such incidents were directed against 
people. 

Attacks against U.S. citizens also 
declined in number with fewer 
casualties, but all the U.S. fatalities in 
1981 (as in 1980) were killed because of 
their nationality. In earlier years, most 
were victims of indiscriminate terrorist 
attacks that had little or nothing to do 
with their citizenship. 

The trend toward a broader 
geographic spread of international ter- 



Figure 1 

Internalional Terrorist Incidents 

Number orincidenti Toul IncUcnti. T.4ZS 




1968 69 10 71 



I I I ' t 1 I I 



rorism continued in 1981; incidents oc- 
curred in 91 countries, more than in any 
previous year. Government- sponsored in- 
ternational terrorist attacks were mainly 
directed against Middle Easterners in 
the Middle East. 



Key Patterns in 1981 

Types of Attacks. In 1981 international 
terrorists used a variety of methods to 
achieve their goals — including kidnap- 
ping, hostage taking, assassination, 
bombing, threats, and hoaxes (table 1). 
The number of serious incidents — kid- 
nappings, major bombings, assassina- 
tions, and skyjackings— dropped. Al- 
though assassinations and assassination 
attempts dropped from HI in 1980 to 
70 last year, 1981 still had the second- 
highest total since 1968, when the 
United States began to record such in- 
cidents. 

In the first part of 1981, the number 
of skyjackings was high, but after a few 
well-publicized failures, their incidence 
declined. In March a Pakistani commer- 
cial airliner was hijacked first to 
Afghanistan and then to Syria by the 
Pakistan Liberation Army (PLA). The 
resulting release of prisoners in 
Pakistan, combined with publicity and 
eventual freedom for the terrorists, 
probably encouraged other, less- 
successful attempts. An Indonesian 
plane was also seized in March and 
taken to Thailand where all the ter- 
rorists were killed by Indonesian forces, 
and the hijacking of a Turkish plane to 
Bulgaria was foiled by the pilot and 
passengers. Fewer incidents occurred 
during the rest of the year, apart from 
several attempts by East Europeans to 
hijack planes to the West. One dramatic 
exception was tlie simultaneous hijack- 



eBull^ '8^sti982 



ing of three planes from Venezuela via 
Central America to Cuba, where the 
hostages were released. The total 
number of skyjackings reported in 1981 
was 32, four less than the previous year. 
Caution is indicated in using these 
figures, however, as the United States 
suspects far more incidents may have 
occurred in Eastern Europe than the 
United States has recorded. 

Location of Attacks. Figures for 
1981 confirm a clear trend toward a 
greater geographic spread of interna- 
tional terrorism. 



1970 


48 countries 


1975 


57 countries 


1980 


76 countries 


1981 


91 countries 



The great majority of incidents, 
however, continued to occur in a few 
areas where conditions facilitate publici- 
ty and in some cases provide greater 
safety for the perpetrators — Western 
Europe, Latin America, the Middle 
East, and North America. More in- 
cidents occurred in the United States 
than in any other country, but Argen- 
tina, Lebanon, West Germany, France, 
and Italy were also sites of frequent ter- 
rorism. 

Victims. In 1981 citizens of 77 coun- 
tries were the victims of international 
terrorist incidents, more than in any 
previous year since January 1968. As in 
past years, U.S. citizens were the 
primary target, followed by those of the 
United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, 
Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Attacks or 
threats against citizens of these seven 
countries accounted for more than 60% 
of the 709 incidents (including threats 
and hoaxes) recorded in 1981. Incidents 
directed against U.S. citizens or facilities 
totaled 258 last year. 

In terms of who or what is attacked, 
there are several clear and ominous 
trends. In 1970 about half of the in- 
cidents were against people, the rest 
against property. Now, 80% are directed 
against people. Diplomats are the 
foremost category; the number of at- 
tacks against them rose from an average 
165 per year during 1975-79 to 409 in 
1980 and then dropped to 368 in 1981, 
when they constituted more than half of 
all victims. This is due in part to the ris- 
ing number of attacks sponsored by 



10 



Table 1 

Geographic Distribution of International 
Terrorist Incidents, 1981, by Category 



Type of Event 



North 
America 



Latin 
America 



Western 
Europe 



Kidnapping 
Barricade-hostage 
Bombing* 
Armed attack 




3 

12 




10 
13 
2.5 

7 


6 
12 
89 

2 


Hijacking'' 
Assassination"^ 


4 
2 


9 
7 


2 
30 


Sabotage 
Exotic pollution 
Subtotal 






21 




1 
72 


1 



142 



Bombing (minor) 
Threat 

Theft, break-in 
Hoax 
Other"* 
Subtotal 

Total 



Type of Event 

Kidnapping 
Barricade-hostage 
Bombing* 
Armed attack 
Hijacking'' 
Assassination"' 
Sabotage 
Exotic pollution 
Subtotal 

Bombing (minor) 
Threat 

Theft, break-in 
Hoax 
Other'' 
Sublotiil 

Total 



12 
15 

1 
34 

5 
67 

88 



33 

18 
4 

17 
12 
84 

156 



Middle East/ 




North Africa 


Asi< 


5 





3 





33 


1 


15 





3 


5 


20 


3 














79 


9 


13 


4 


7 


6 


2 


1 


6 


5 


22 


2 


50 


18 



52 

15 

5 

18 

17 

107 

249 



Pacific 







1 




1 





1 



1 



U.S.S.R./ 
Eastern 
Europe 




1 


8 
4 


13 

2 
6 

3 

1 
12 

25 



Unkown 



129 



27 



1 
1 
9 
1 
1 
3 


16 

6 
6 

1 
3 
16 

32 



Total 






22 





32 





170 





25 





32 





70 





1 





1 





353 





122 





73 





13 





85 


1 


63 


1 


356 



709 



"Bombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility 

''Hijackings of air, sea, or land transport. 

"Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by 



name. 

d 



Includes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms 
smuggling. 



governments, which tend to single out 
enemy diplomats, dissidents, and promi- 
nent exiles living abroad. Businessmen, 
mostly U.S. citizens in Latin America, 



were the victims in 12% of the incident 
and military personnel were involved ir 
about 9%. Attacks against military per- 
sonnel constitute one of the fastest 
growing categories. 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



Terrorist Groups. A total of 113 
roups claimed credit for international 
jrrorist incidents in 1981, down slightly 
■om the high of 128 in 1980. These 
umbers are undoubtedly inflated: some 
roups create cover names to avoid 
esponsibility for a particular action, 
thers use them to commemorate an an- 
iversary, and common criminals create 
till others to mislead investigators. The 
rrorists represented 86 nationalities, 
ut, as in the past, Palestinians, Arme- 
ians, West Germans, and Central 
mericans were responsible for the ma- 
rity of incidents. 



Terrorist Events Causing Death 
Injury. Only about one-fourth as 
lany people were killed in terrorist at- 
icks in 1981 as in the previous 
ear— 173 compared with 642. The 
umber injured also dropped, but not as 
ramatically (figure 2). The patterns 
ere, however, similar to previous 
ears. Assassination attempts and bomb- 
igs accounted for the majority of at- 
icks that involved casualties, and most 
f these incidents occurred in Western 
Europe and the Middle East. Terrorists 
ppear to have been more careful in 
electing their targets, and more than 
■alf of such attacks resulted in harm on- 
to the intended victim, whereas in the 
est innocent bystanders were much 
acre often the victims. 

Attacks that produced casualties oc- 
urred in 56 countries. The greatest 
lumber took place in Lebanon, where 
nany of the Middle Eastern terrorist 
roups are headquartered and where 



Categories of Terrorist Incidents 



Kidnapping 

Seizure of one or more victims, who are then 
moved to a hideout. 

Barricade-Hostage 

Seizure of a facility with whatever hostages 
are available; their release is made contingent 
on meeting terrorists' demands. 

Bombing 

Major bombing— use of any type of explosive 
or incendiary device for terrorist purposes, 
including those delivered through the mail, 
when significant damage or casualties occur 
or a terrorist group claims responsibility. 
Minor bombing — same as above except that 
there are no casualties and little or no 
damage, and no group claims responsibility. 

Armed Attack 

An attempt to seize or damage a facility, 
with no intent to hold it for negotiating pur- 
poses. 

Hijacldng 

An attempt to seize an airplane, ship, or 
other vehicle, with whatever hostages may be 
in it, to force some action — movement to 
another country and /or agreement by the 
authorities involved to some terrorist de- 
mand. 

Assassination 

An attempt, whether or not successful, to kill 
a preselected victim, usually with small arms 
or bombs. Letter bombs are excluded from 
this category, although, in at least some 
cases, there probably is a specific intended 
victim. 



Igure 2 

eaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks 



I Tolal WiiundC'd: K.2VK 
iToIal Killed: 3.841 




Sabotage 

Intentional destruction of property by means 
other than bombing. 

Exotic Pollution 

Use of exotic substances — atomic, chemical, 
or biological — to contaminate material; for 
example, the introduction of mercury into 
oranges shipped from Israel. 

Threat Hoax 

The stated intent by a terrorist group to 
carry out an attack, or a false alert to 
authorities about a coming terrorist attack by 
a named group. 

These incidents serve terrorists' purposes 
in that they tend to alarm and intimidate 
potential victims, their parent states and 
organizations, and often the local populace. 
They usually cause facilities to be evacuated, 
absorb the time of investigative authorities, 
and generally disrupt the work of the 
threatened group. 

Well over half the recorded threats and 
hoaxes are directed against U.S. citizens — 
673 out of a total of 1,081 threats and 78 out 
of 143 hoaxes. This is at least partially at- 
tributable to the fact that the United States 
has much more information about such inci- 
dents than it does about threats or hoaxes di- 
rected against other nations' citizens. More- 
over, much of the information on such inci- 
dents directed against foreigners is derived 
from their reports to U.S. authorities about 
such attacks in the United States — frequently 
at the United Nations. 

Theft, Break-In 

Illegal entry into a facility to intimidate or 
harass its owners. 

Other 

Includes sniping, shootouts with police, arms 
smuggling, and credible reports of plotting a 
terrorist attack that is subsequently foiled or 
aborted. In all cases a terrorist group is 
named. ■ 



\ugust 1982 



11 



responsibility for security is fragmented. 
Included in the Lebanese total are a 
number of Iraqi and Iranian attacks on 
each other's diplomats. 

Fifty-eight terrorist groups claimed 
responsibility for attacks that produced 
casualties in 1981, compared with 49 in 
1980. The Armenian and Palestinian 
groups were responsible for most of 
these attacks. Nationalities most vic- 
timized changed little from 1980: 
Americans were most numerous among 
casualties, followed by Israelis, Britons, 
Iraqis, and Iranians. 

Attacks Against U.S. Citizens. A 

total of 258 international terrorist in- 
cidents were directed against U.S. 
citizens or property during 1981— slight- 
ly more than in most previous years but 
not as many as in 1978 and 1980. There 
were nine kidnappings, 14 assassination 
attacks, and 91 bombings of U.S. prop- 
erty—about the same as in 1980. 
Threats dropped significantly from 50 to 
29, but hoaxes rose from 25 to 51 (tables 
2 and 3 and figure 3). 

A new and ominous development is 
that all the Americans killed by interna- 
tional terrorist attacks in 1980 and 1981 
were assassinated because of their na- 
tionality. In earlier years, most 
Americans killed in such incidents were 
victims of indiscriminate attacks that 
had little or nothing to do with their na- 
tionality. Moreover, at least one ter- 
rorist group, the Red Brigades, is 
known to have shifted to less well- 
protected U.S. officials after initially 
planning to attack a closely guarded 
target. 

Seventy-two international terrorist 
groups took credit for attacks against 
Americans in 1981. The Colombian left- 
ist group— April 19 Movement 
(M-19)— claimed the largest number. 
The Red Army Faction (RAF) and its 
sympathizers in West Germany and ter- 
rorist groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Peru also carried out a significant 
number of attacks against Americans. 

In addition to nongovernment- 
sponsored terrorist attacks in 1981, the 
United States was confronted by Libyan 
leader Qadhafi's threat to assassinate 
President Reagan and other senior U.S. 
Government officials and to attack U.S. 
facilities abroad. 



Table 2 

Geographic Distribution of International 
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens 
and Property, 1981, by Category 











U.S.S.R./ 


Sub- 




North 


Latin 


Western 


Eastern 


Saharai 


Type of Event 


America 


America 


Europe 


Europe 


Africa 


Kidnapping 





8 


1 








Barricade-hostage 





2 











Bombing' 


4 


21 


21 





1 


Armed attack 





5 











Hijacking'' 


4 


6 


2 


4 





Assassination'^ 





5 


3 








Sabotage 








1 








Subtotal 


8 


47 


28 


4 


1 


Bombing (minor) 


5 


16 


17 





1 


Threat 


3 


8 


7 


2 


2 


Theft, break-in 





1 


2 








Hoax 


6 


15 


15 


3 


1 


Other'' 


1 


8 


8 


1 


2 


Subtotal 


15 


48 


49 


6 


6 



Total 



23 



95 



77 



10 





Middle East/ 










Type of Event 


North Africa 


Asia 


Pacific 


Unkown 


Tota 


Kidnapping 
Barricade-hostage 
Bombing^ 
Armed attack 





2 






















9 
2 

47 

7 


Hijacking** 
Assassination'' 


1 
5 


4 

1 










21 
14 


Sabotage 
Subtotal 



8 



5 










1 
101 


Bombing (minor) 
Threat 


2 
3 


3 
4 










44 
29 


Theft, break-in 


2 


1 








6 


Hoax 


6 


4 


1 





51 


Other'' 


6 


1 








27 


Subtotal 


19 


13 


1 





157 


Total 


27 


18 


1 





258 



"Bombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility 

''Hijackings of air, sea, or land transport. 

"■Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by 
name. 

''includes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms 
smuggling. 



In 1981, 17% of incidents directed 
against Americans resulted in at least 
one casualty. Six Americans were killed 
and 31 wounded in international ter- 
rorist attacks in 1981. These numbers 



are slightly lower than in the last few 
years. This is partially due to good for 
tune; the number of attemped violent . 
tacks has not decreased. 



12 



Department of State Bullet 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



All six U.S. citizens killed in 1981 
vere assassinated in Latin America, 
vhere more than one-third of the in- 
idents directed against Americans oc- 
urred. While the attacks were no more 
requent than in 1980, the number in 
lach year was higher than in any 
)revious year. Five assassination at- 
acks, eight kidnappings, 37 bombings, 
md four skyjackings that involved U.S. 
■itizens were recorded in Latin America 
luring the year. 

• In El Salvador 15 incidents took 
)lace, including a series of armed at- 
acks against the U.S. Embassy in 
/[arch and April and the murder of two 
Vmericans in January. 

• In Guatemala there were 14 at- 
acks, including five kidnappings and the 
nurder of three U.S. citizens. 

• In Costa Rica a bomb destroyed a 
an carrying Marine guards to the U.S. 
embassy, injuring three guards and 
heir driver. 

• In Colombia the M-19 carried out 
ight attacks on Americans during the 
-ear, including the murder of a kid- 
lapped missionary. 

• In Peru the U.S. chancery and the 
mbassador's residence were bombed on 
Vugiist 31. 

A total of 30 attacks were directed 
.gainst U.S. personnel and property in 
Vest Germany during 1981— more than 
n any other year. They were carried out 
)y RAF members or sympathizers and 
ncluded an attempt to assassinate Gen. 
■■rederick Kroesen (commander, U.S. 
orces in Europe) as well as numerous 
)ombings of U.S. facilities. The last 
)ombing of the year, on August 31 at 
lamstein AFB, damaged the head- 
luarters building and injured 18 people, 
ncluding a U.S. brigadier general. 



The Broader Picture 

since the United States began recording 
nternational terrorist incidents in 1968, 
i number of broad patterns have 
emerged. Some are relatively unchang- 
ing, such as the distribution of terrorist 
neidents — where Western Europe, 
Latin America, and the Middle East con- 
;inue to account for about three-fourths 
Df all incidents (figure 4). Almost half of 
the incidents recorded since 1968 have 
occurred in only nine countries. The 



Figure 3 

Inlernalioiial Terrorist Allaclis on US Personnel and Facililies, 1981 

Nunihcr of Incidents 



l.ocalitiii uf Fit'nl 

Midcisl .ini) North 
Alma 

Sub-Sjharan Africa 

Asia 

Norlh America 

Weslern Furope 

Lalin America 



Type of Victiir 

Olher LIS 
Covernnienl-' 



Tourists, 
Missionaric 




Diplomats 




T>pe of Attack 
Barricade-Hostage I 

Armed Attack | 

Sniping I 

Kidnaping H 

Assassination | 

llijackinB 

Ttireat. Iloas 

Bombing 



''Kvcludine milildrv and dipiii 




Natiotiaiilt of Tcrrorisl 

Italian 

Peruvian 

Palestinian 

Turkish 

Guatemalan 

Colombian 

Salvadoran 

West German 




Figure 4 

Geographic Distribution of International 

Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81 



Number ul Attacks 






Total Incidents; 7,425 




Other 767 




USSR/Eastern Europe 






Africa ^^^ -~^^/<^ 






^\^ Weslern Europe 
\ 2,452 


North America-/ 
7bl p""- 


^ 




\ 


Middle East and V 
North Africa \ 
1.512 \ 


7\ 


Ljlin America \.>^^ 



August 1982 



greatest number were recorded in the 
United States (partly because informa- 
tion is better); other nations with a large 
number of incidents include Argentina, 
Italy, France, West Germany, Iran, 
Turkey, Greece, and Israel. These are 
convenient locations for terrorist opera- 
tions, and in many cases the incident did 
not even involve citizens of the country 
in which the event occurred. Fewer than 
20% of the events in France involved 
French terrorists, for example, and an 
even smaller portion of the victims were 
French nationals. 

Over the past 14 years, more than 
20% of all international terrorist in- 
cidents occurred in Latin America, and 
the number in that region has been in- 
creasing faster than in other parts of 
the world. More attacks were recorded 
in 1980-81 than in any other 2-year 



13 



period since 1968, primarily reflecting 
the spillover of increased domestic 
violence into the international arena. In 
most cases, the attacks were carried out 
by indigenous groups against foreigners 
in an attempt to discredit or undermine 
the local regime. In some cases the at- 
tacks were by rightwing groups against 
foreigners who were thought to sym- 
pathize with antigovernment forces. 

From 1968 through 1981, the United 
States recorded 1,512 international ter- 
rorist incidents in the Middle East and 
North Africa. The number of attacks in 
the region was highest in 1978 (reflect- 
ing increased anti- American activity in 
Iran), remained high in 1979 and 1980, 
and declined somewhat in 1981. As in 
Latin America, much of the interna- 
tional terrorism is a spillover from 
domestic violence; Iran in 1978 is a good 
example. Most of the attacks in that 
region were carried out by Middle 
Eastern terrorists, and about half were 
directly at other Middle Eastern citizens. 
Responsibility was claimed by 151 dif- 
ferent terrorist groups — mostly Pales- 
tinian.' 

While citizens of almost every coun- 
try have been victimized by international 
terrorism, most incidents have been 
directed against those of only a few 
countries (figure 5). U.S. records show 
that between 1968 and 1981, citizens of 
131 different countries were victimized 
by international terrorism; attacks 
against U.S., Israeli, U.K., West Ger- 
man, French, and U.S.S.R. nationals ac- 



Kigiiri' 6 

T>pi- (if \ iciim of liilcrnatinnal lerrorist 

Allatks. I96S-S1 



Number of Adacks 



Total Incidenls: 7.435 



Promincnl Opinion 
Leaders 309 

Govcrnmcnl Ollk-ijls 
Vlihuiry 657 



Private Parties 

I Tourists, students, 

missKinaries. 

1,415 




Diplomals 2.85(. 



Corporale OlHeials 1.688 



count for more than 60% of all the in- 
cidents. Americans were by far the most 
often targeted.2 Of the 7,425 attacks 
recorded, 38% were directed against 
U.S. citizens. This reflects the wide 
geographic spread of American interests 
and the fact that U.S. citizens are 
regarded as symbols of Western wealth 
and power. 

Each year, between 35% and 45% of 
all the international terrorist incidents 
are directed against U.S. personnel or 
property. The second-highest number of 
incidents against any single country has 
consistently been far less — about 10% of 
the total. Usually either Israel or the 
United Kingdom has been the second 
most victimized country. In 1979, 



Kigure .^ 

Nationality of Victims oflnternationa! Terrorist Attaclis, 1968-81 



Number of Incidents 



Total Incidents: 7,425 



Oceania I 

Sub-Saharan Alrica H 

Transregional H 

Asia H 

USSR/Fastcrn 
F.urope 

Latin Americ.i 

Midillc F-asI anti 
North Africa 

Western Europe 
North America 




.l.OOli 



14 



however, it was France and in 1980, tl 
Soviet Union. 

Diplomats have been the foremost 
target of terrorist incidents, accountinj 
for nearly 40% of the total (figure 6). 
Businesses and businessmen are the se 
ond most frequent victims. Since 1968 
almost one-fourth of the incidents wert 
directed against business, especially U. 
business in Latin America. The numbe 
reached a high in 1978 and declined 
thereafter — in part because of increase 
security, improved operating procedun 
in high-risk areas, and, most important 
ly, a shift in focus by many terrorist 
groups. 

Although military personnel are nc 
as large a segment of the victim popul; 
tion as diplomats or businessmen, the 
United States has recorded 600 terrori 
attacks (fewer than 10% of the total) 
against them. The number of attacks 
against the military is increasing at th< 
greatest rate. 

The pattern of terrorist events tha 
produce casualties appears to be chang 
ing. In 1,614 such incidents (figure 7), 
3,841 people were killed and 8,298 
wounded. Bombings and assassinations 
account for more than 70% of the at- 
tacks that produced casualties. Bomb- 
ings have always been the most 
prevalent, perhaps the most serious be 
ing the December 15, 1981, bombing o 
the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, which 
killed at least 55 and injured another 
100. 

In recent years, however, assassin 
tion attempts have increased dramat- 
ically, especially from 1977 to 1980. 

1968-76 20 (annual average) 

1977 34 

1978 54 

1979 65 

1980 1 1 1 

1981 70 

This increase is attributable to the 
fact that several countries — Libya, 
Syria, and Iran among them — have in- 
creasingly used their military and in- 
telligence services to carry out terroris 
attacks against foreign diplomats or 
their own exiles. 

U.S. citizens have been the victims 
of only 20% of all attacks that produce 
casualties, while suffering more than 
40% of all international terrorist in- 
cidents. U.S. businessmen have been tl 
primary target of casualty-producing a 



Department of State Bullet « 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



jure 7 

ernational Terrorist Incidents Thai 

used Casualties 



nhcr ol Incidents 



Total Incidents: 1. 614 




1168 61 ^0 'l 



78 T) 80 81 



.cks, but attacks on U.S. diplomats and 
ilitary personnel have increased at a 
tster rate in recent years. 

Over the period 1968-81, attacks on 
mericans that produced casualties oc- 
irred in 69 countries, most frequently 
Argentina, Iran, and the Philippines. 
ore than 155 terrorist groups claimed 
■sponsibility for one or more attacks. 
le Argentine Montoneros and Iranian 
lid Palestinian groups have been the 
lost prominent perpetrators. 

In 1981, for the first time, the 
•nited States has grouped terrorist in- 
dents into more serious and less 
irious categories. As shown in figure 8, 
>e number of serious incidents — such 
kidnappings, the taking of hostages, 
ssassination attacks, and major bomb- 
gs— rose rapidly in the early 1970s, re- 
ained fairly steady between 1974 and 
•79, then jumped to new highs in 
i80-81. Less serious incidents have 
ictuated more widely. The peak year 
r relatively minor incidents, 1978, saw 
drop in serious incidents. Minor bomb- 
gs and threats account for more than 
)% of the less serious incidents. 

The trend of serious international 
Trorist incidents involving U.S. citizens 
" property has shown little variation 
igure 9). It peaked in 1975, declined 
lereafter, only to rise somewhat in the 
ast 2 years. Less serious incidents ac- 
junt for most of the year-to-year varia- 
on in total incidents involving the 
nited States. 



Terrorist Groups 

More than 670 groups have claimed 
credit for at least one international at- 
tack since the United States began keep- 
ing statistics in 1968. This number is un- 
doubtedly inflated: some of these are 
cover names for organizations wishing 
to deny responsibility for a particular ac- 
tion, and some have probably been used 
by common criminals to throw off in- 
vestigators or by psychotics seeking 
pubhc recognition. The list includes the 
names of nations that conduct interna- 
tional terrorism such as Libya and 
Syria, insurgency groups that use ter- 
rorist tactics, separatist groups such as 
the ETA (a Basque group), and nihilist 
groups such as the RAF and the 
Japanese Red Army. It includes leftwing 
groups, rightwing groups, anti- American 
groups, anti-Soviet groups, environmen- 
talist groups, and even religious groups. 
They represent the spectrum of 
ideologies, classes, cultures, and races. 

The annual number of groups that 
claim credit for attacks has increased 
markedly since the United States began 
keeping statistics. For example, 49 
groups claimed credit for attacks in 
1970, rising to 111 groups by 1975, and 
128 groups by 1980. It dropped slightly 
to 113 in 1981. 

While some terrorist groups have 
dropped out of sight during the 14-year 
period, a large number have persisted. 
They are well organized, with a 
dedicated core of well-trained and highly 
motivated terrorists. Moreover, they 
usually have at least some popular sup- 



Figure 8 

International Terrorist Incidents. 1968-81 

Number ol Incidents 



Figure 9 

International Terrorist Attacks on US 

Personnel and Facilities. 1968-81 

Number ol Attacks 





1168 61 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 71 80 81 



port. Although the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) is primarily a 
domestic terrorist group that conducts 
operations in Northern Ireland, U.S. 
records show that the PIRA and its 
sympathizers have conducted more in- 
ternational terrorism than any other 
group. The PIRA has launched attacks 
from several countries, and the attacks 
have involved citizens from at least 15 
countries, although the majority were 
against British nationals. 

The Black September Organization 
has carried out the second-largest 
number of attacks, most of them in 
Europe and the Middle East, targeted 
against Israelis and moderate Palestin- 
ians. Other Palestinian groups— par- 
ticularly the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the 
PFLP-General Command, and the Black 
June Organization (BJO)— have con- 
ducted terrorise incidents during the 
past 14 years. Together, the Palestinian 
groups perpetrated more international 
attacks than any other movement. U.S. 
records show 9% of all terrorist attacks 
(almost 700) have been carried out by 
Palestinians. 

Other significant groups that have 
been active in international terrorism 
are the Montoneros, the Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA), the Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty, the M-19, and 
the RAF. Among the states most active 
in carrying out international terrorist at- 
tacks are Libya, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. 



1968 61 70 71 72 7! 74 75 76 77 78 71 80 81 



tugust 1982 



15 



Activities of Significant 
Groups in 1981 

The United States recorded 113 ter- 
rorist groups that claimed credit for in- 
ternational attacks during 1981. The ter- 
rorists represented 86 nationalities, and, 
as in the past, Palestinians, Armenians, 
Germans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans 
carried out the most attacks. 

Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia. ASALA carried 
out more international attacks during 
1981 than any other terrorist organiza- 
tion. Its primary targets in the past 
have been Turkish diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities, but, under cover 
names, ASALA has attacked Swiss in- 
terests in retaliation for the arrest of 
ASALA members, and, using the name 
Orly Organization, it has attacked 
French interests in retaliation for the 
November arrest of an Armenian carry- 
ing a false passport at Orly Airport. 
ASALA carried out 40 attacks in 11 
countries during the year. Although 
most of the attacks were bombings 
against French and Swiss property, the 
most serious were attacks against 
Turkish diplomats. These included the 
September 24 seizure of the Turkish 
Consulate in Paris and the assassination 
of Turkish diplomats in Switzerland, 
Denmark, and France. 

Palestinian Terrorists. Palestinian 
terrorists have not been as active in in- 
ternational terrorism in recent years as 
during the mid-1970s. In 1981 some 
radical Palestinian groups resumed in- 
ternational terrorist att<icks. Palestinian 
terrorists carried out a total of 49 at- 
tacks during 1981; groups such as the 
May 15 Organization, Black June 
Organization, and the PF^LP-SC (Special 
Command) were the most active. This is 
far more than recorded in 1979 or 1980 
but about the same as during the 
mid-1970s. The attacks were committed 
in 14 countries. Most of the incidents 
were bombings, six were assassination 
attempts, five were armed attacks, and 
one was a rocket attack. 

The May 15 Organization and the 
PFLP-SC were active in 1981. The 
former carried out attacks against 
Israeli targets in Europe, including 
bomb attacks on the embassies in Vien- 



16 



Table 3 

International Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens 
and Property, 1968-81, by Category 



Type of Event 

Kidnapping 
Barricade-hostage 
Bombing^ 
Armed attack 
Hijacking'' 
Assassination'^ 
Sabotage 
Subtotal 

Bombing (minor) 
Threat 

Theft, break-in 
Hoax 
Other'' 
Subtotal 

Total 



Type of Event 

Kidnapping 
Barricade-hostage 
Bombing^ 
Armed attack 
Hijacking'' 
Assassination'^ 
Sabotage 
Subtotal 

Bombing (minor) 
Threat 

Theft, break-in 
Hoax 
Other'' 
Subtotal 

Total 



1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 



1975 



1 


3 


25 


19 


5 


22 


14 


23 


1 





4 





1 


3 


2 


1 


13 


31 


29 


37 


44 


28 


80 


71 


1 


4 


3 


5 


10 


8 


6 


7 


1 


5 


12 


4 


4 





1 


2 


3 


3 


10 


2 


4 


4 


2 


8 











3 


3 


1 





1 


20 


46 


83 


70 


71 


66 


105 


113 


36 


62 


106 


105 


100 


79 


79 


41 


11 


12 


51 


51 


71 


77 


19 


19 





3 


15 


8 


1 


3 


4 


3 








1 

















4 


1 


10 


'J 


12 


11 


9 


5 


51 


78 


183 


173 


184 


170 


111 


68 



71 



124 



266 



243 



255 



236 



216 



181 



1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Tola 



8 


7 


8 


8 


10 


9 


162 


2 


3 





6 


7 


2 


32 


54 


63 


42 


35 


39 


47 


613 


8 


5 


12 


10 


11 


7 


97 


5 


4 


3 


15 


20 


21 


97 


15 


6 


7 


10 


18 


14 


106 


1 








1 





1 


11 


93 


88 


72 


85 


105 


101 


1,118 


71 


72 


133 


91 


58 


44 


1,077 


53 


22 


161 


47 


50 


29 


673 


1 





7 


4 


13 


6 


68 











1 


25 


51 


78 


13 


13 


23 


28 


27 


27 


192 


138 


107 


324 


171 


173 


157 


2,088 


231 


195 


396 


256 


278 


258 


3.206 



"Bombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility 

''Hijackings of air, sea. or land transport. 

'Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by 



name. 

d 



Includes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms 
smuggling. 



na and Athens and on El Al offices in 
Italy and Turkey. It also claimed credit 
for the bombing of a Cypriot cruise ship 
in Haifa, Israel. The PFLP-SC carried 
out a series of bombings in the Middle 
East and is believed responsible for the 
October 20 bombing of a synagogue in 
Belgium. 



The Black June Organization (BJO) 
a radical Palestinian group which op- 
poses political settlement with Israel ar 
Palestine Liberation Organization leade 
Arafat's moderate policies, was also vei 
active during 1981. It targeted moderal 
Palestinians, Israelis, and non-Israeli 
Jews. On September 23, BJO launched 
hand grenade attack on the offices of a: 

Department of State Bulleti 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



raeli shipping line in Cyprus. BJO 
lied moderate Palestinian leaders on 
ine 1 in Brussels and on October 9 in 
Dme. (This is the group that attempted 
assassinate the Israeli Ambassador in 
3ndon on June 3, 1982, an incident 
at preceded the Israeli invasion of 
jbanon.) 

Provisional Irish Republican 
rmy. The PIRA was more active in 
)81 than in most previous years. It 
taliated for the attempted assassina- 
Dn of Bernadette Devlin McAliskey 
ith the murder of Sir Norman Stronge 
id his son. 

PIRA expanded the tactic of 
-isoner hunger strikes. After a 66-day 
.st, Bobby Sands died on May 5. He 
as the first and most wridely publicized 
IRA militant to die in 1981. Nine other 
IRA and Irish National Liberation Ar- 
y (INLA) members died after unsuc- 
'ssful attempts to gain prisoner-of-war 
"atus for the terrorist inmates. After 
le failure of the hunger strikes, the 
IRA intensified its campaign of 
olence in England. In October and 
ovember it claimed credit for bombing 
.cilities in London, mailed several 
3mbs to British facilities, kidnapped the 
)n of a wealthy Irish businessman, and 
;tempted to assassinate the Command- 
ig General of the British Royal 
(arines. PIRA sympathizers destroyed 
ritish cars in West Germany, bombed a 
ritish cultural center in Greece, at- 
icked British targets in Portugal, and 
ireatened British facilities in 
witzerland. 



Red Army Faction. The RAF in 

)81 launched a series of attacks against 
le U.S. presence in West Germany 
jspite a series of setbacks in 1980. The 
AF had been rebuilding its operational 
.ructure for some time, and in an at- 
!mpt to capitalize on the controversy 
/er NATO nuclear weapons moderniza- 
on plans and "squatters' rights" in 
lest Berlin, the RAF and its sym- 
athizer groups carried out numerous 
ttacks. 

The RAF or its supporters claimed 
redit for numerous attacks during the 
ear. It firebombed U.S. military 
icilities in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. It 
ttempted to bomb the U.S. library in 
^est Berlin and the Dow chemical plant 
1 Dusseldorf. On August 31, the RAF 




exploded a car bomb at the U.S. Air 
Force Headquarters at Ramstein. It at- 
tempted to assassinate U.S. Gen. 
Frederick Kroesen on September 15, fir- 
ing two rocket-propelled antitank 
weapons at Kroesen's car; one missed, 
and the other hit the trunk. The car was 
severely damaged, but no one was 
seriously injured. Sympathizer groups 



During 1981 Irish terrorists imprisoned in 
Northern Ireland carried out hunger 
strikes "to the death." Ten prisoners died. 



August 1982 



17 



Skyjacking 



Since January 1968, there have been 684 at- 
tempted skyjackings, representing about 9% 
of all terrorist attacks since that date. Ac- 
cording to U.S. records, those attempts have 
resulted in at least 50 fatalities and 400 in- 
juries. More than one-third of the hijackers 
demanded passage to Cuba. Nearly 40% of 
the planes hijacked belonged to U.S. carriers 
(such as Eastern, National, and TWA). 

The number of attempted skyjackings 
reached a high in 1969-70, declined slightly 
in 1971-72, then decreased by half in 1973, 
and has remained fairly constant since then. 
These decreases are easily traced to in- 
creased public awareness of and concern for 
this threat. The 1970 multiple skyjacking by 
Palestinian terrorists was the catalyst for in- 
ternational concern which resulted in The 
Hague and Montreal conventions on aerial hi- 



jacking. In January 1973, the full screening 
of boarding passengers and luggage inspec- 
tion was instituted in the United States and, 
to a lesser e.xtent, at international airports in 
other countries; that year the number of sky- 
jacking attempts was half that of the 
previous year. The U.S. Federal Aviation Ad- 
ministration (FAA) reports that more than 
20,000 firearms have been confiscated since 
the institution of these security measures. 
Of the 684 skyjacking attempts since 
1968, 108 have been designated terrorist sky- 
jackings, meaning they were politically moti- 
vated. More than one-third of these resulted 
in casualties (212 dead and 186 wounded). 
Terrorist skyjackings originated in 43 coun- 
tries and terminated in 47 countries, most of 
them in Latin America, Western Europe, and 
the Middle East. Forty-eight terrorist groups 



claimed the credit, almost half of them Pales 
tinians and Latin Americans. 

Between 1973 and 1980, terrorists 
averaged five skyjacking attempts a year. 
There was a significant increase in 1981, 
partly attributable to the Pakistan Liberatioi 
Army's (PLA) successful skyjack in March, 
which probably encouraged other attempts. 
As of May 31, 1982, there have been four 
terrorist skyjackings, suggesting a decrease 
from the 1981 total. 

Terrorists achieved logistic success in 
70% of their attempts between January 196f 
and June 1982. (Logistic success does not 
mean that ancillary demands were met; it 
simply notes whether the skyjacker was able 
to divert the plane to a destination selected 
by the terrorist.) ■ 



Terrorist Skyjackin gs by R egion, January 1968-June 1982* 



^rclic Ocean 



\ 




r ., V ; USSR/ 


North America ; 

8 <-^- ^-^ 


IX S^ J " Eastern Europe 
Europe " '*' 




(7.4%;- C>--y ~ 


22 
(20.1°o) „.^^, ^ 


Nenh Paeihc 


No-It' Ailanl.c 


Middle East 


0««*'i 


Ocean 


21 






Africa 

7 



North Pmc-t 
Oc««n 






Latin America 


) 






29 








V (29-9%) : 






50urA Pacific 


V" -■-■■--. ^ 




South All 


Ocaan 


!' -.^ r 




Oc«* 



E:'"^^-.. 



^.-i ^ 



> 



'figures Indicate Ihe 



o( Incidents per region and percent ol total 



18 



Department of State Bulletir 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



also attacked West German and U.S. 
targets in Germany and other European 
countries. The Black Block bombed two 
U.S. military facilities near Frankfurt 
and attempted to bomb the railroad line 
to the Rhein / Main airbase. Others 
bombed the U.S. Consul General's office 
and a military base near Frankfurt and 
U.S. military facilities in Kassal, 
Wiesbaden, and West Berlin. They also 
attacked a West German Consulate in 
Switzerland and the U.S. Embassy in 
Sofia. 

Red Brigades. Despite some set- 
backs early in the year, the Red 
Brigades broadened their targets to in- 
clude foreign nationals in 1981. The con- 
fessions of Patrizio Feci, the arrest of 
RB planner Mario Moretti, and in- 
creased government antiterrorist activi- 
ty contributed to pressure on the RB. 

The RB claimed credit for numerous 
attacks during the past year— the 
assassination of a hospital director in 
Milan, a prison warden in Rome, and 
four police officials. The RB kidnapped 
three individuals, murdering one and 
releasing the other two after holding 
them for lengthy periods. In retaliation 
for Peci's testimony, the RB kidnapped 
and killed his brother and shot one of his 
defense attorneys. During the year, the 
RB also wounded 12 victims, bombed 
four facilities, and robbed a bank in 
Rome. 

On December 17, RB kidnapped 
U.S. Army Brig. Gen. James Dozier 
from his home in Verona, Italy. Italian 
authorities subsequently arrested more 
than 300 suspects and uncovered large 
amounts of weapons and supplies in the 
search for Dozier and subsequent 
counterterrorist operations. On Janu- 
ary 28, 1982, Italian officers rescued 
Dozier from a safehouse in Padua. 

Basque Fatherland and Liberty. 

In Spain, the ETA-PM (Political- 
Military) and the ETA-M (Military), 
both Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque 
separatist organizations, continued their 
campaign of violence against the 
Spanish Government. They also targeted 
citizens from six other countries in 
Spain, including threats to bomb the 
U.S. airbase near Torrejon. 

Early in January the government 
granted greater autonomy for the 
Basque region in an attempt to decrease 



tension, but this did not stop the ter- 
rorists; they claimed credit for many at- 
tacks during the next few months. Near 
the end of January, the terrorists fired 
antitank weapons at government 
buildings in two Basque cities, kid- 
napped a prominent citizen in Bilbao, 
and kidnapped and murdered the chief 
nuclear engineer at the Lemoniz power 
plant in northern Spain. During the 
same month, the Spanish police rescued 
unharmed a prominent doctor who had 
been kidnapped in Madrid and was being 
held in northeast Spain by ETA-PM for 
a U.S. $2 million ransom. 

On February 20, in a coordinated 
operation, the ETA kidnapped the 
honorary consuls to Spain from Austria, 
El Salvador, and Uruguay. The consuls 
were held for a week, and the attack 
received widespread publicity. 

On February 23, the ETA-PM an- 
nounced its intention to abandon ter- 
rorism. Shortly thereafter the ETA-M 
increased its terrorist campaign. In 
February and March, it bombed 
facilities, attacked police patrols, and 
assassinated prominent members of the 
Spanish Government. A few months 
later the ETA-M carried out another 
series of attacks, which included assaults 
on police and Civil Guard facilities and 
bombings of the Spanish electric com- 
pany. 

April 19 Movement. The Colombian 
April 19 Movement (M-19) carried out 
1 1 international terrorist operations in 
1981, including bombings, hijackings, 
and one kidnapping. All of the incidents 
occurred in Colombia and almost all 
were targeted against the United States. 
A faction of the group kidnapped a U.S. 
citizen, and after weeks of negotiations 
and threats his body was found in an 
abandoned bus in Bogota. 

The M-19 attempted large-scale 
military operations on March 8 and 11, 
launching amphibious attacks on three 
remote villages in southern Colombia. 
Government forces killed or captured 
most of the terrorists. M-19 suffered 
another major setback when a truckload 
of sophisticated weapons, including 
rocket grenades and machineguns, was 
captured by the Colombian border 
guard. 



Marxist-Leninist Armed Propagan- 
da Unit. In Turkey the MLAPU, a fac- 
tion of the Turkish People's Liberation 
Party/Front, the most anti-U.S. of all 
the leftist groups in Turkey, was respon- 
sible for the deaths of seven Americans 
in 1979 and one in 1980. MLAPU killed 
no Americans in 1981 and had very little 
success in other terrorist attacks during 
the year. 

Since imposition of martial law in 
September 1980, the Turkish military 
government has killed or arrested a 
number of MLAPU members, raided 
safehouses, and executed convicted 
MLAPU members. Although the group 
suffered setbacks during the year, it was 



U.S. Business Can 
Call for Help 



The Department of State's Threat Analysis 
Group can provide brief unclassified oral 
evaluations to U.S. business representatives 
on the potential terrorist threat in countries 
around the world. Call (202) 632-6308. 

During an international terrorist incident 
involving U.S. interests, a State Department 
task force coordinates the U.S. response. 
Businessmen, whose operations may be 
affected by that crisis, may telephone the 
Office for Combatting Terrorism to be put in 
direct contact with the task force. Call (202) 
632-9892. ■ 



able to conduct some terrorist opera- 
tions, both against the U.S. presence in 
Turkey and against the Turkish Govern- 
ment. On January 22, the MLAPU at- 
tempted to assassinate two U.S. soldiers 
as they walked to a bus stop. On April 
6, the MLAPU claimed credit for an at- 
tack on a U.S. military vehicle. Although 
the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a 
number of times, no one was seriously 
injured. The terrorists who carried out 
this attack were arrested in a raid on a 
safehouse the following day. 

Special Cases— Guatemala and 
El Salvador. In Guatemala and El 
Salvador, prolonged domestic strife has 
created fertile soil for terrorism, both 
domestic and international. Terrorism is 
a major tactic of both leftwing and 
rightwing groups in El Salvador. Of the 



August 1982 



19 



five leftwing groups forming the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front (FMLN), the Popular Liberation 
Forces (FPL) is the strongest and 
largest. Groups operating under the 
rubric FMLN or FPL claimed respon- 
sibility for most of the attacks in 1981, 
including 18 attacks on U.S. personnel 
or facilities and 10 attacks on the em- 
bassies or private facilities of other Cen- 
tral American countries. Among the in- 
cidents involving U.S. citizens was a 
series of attacks on the U.S. Embassy 
during March and April. Other attacks 
on Americans in El Salvador included 
the bombing of the Exxon compound, a 
Hardees restaurant, and the Citibank 
facilities. 

Rightwing terrorists were also ac- 
tive in El Salvador, with most attacks 
against other Salvadoran citizens. On 
January 3, the head of the agrarian 
reform program and two U.S. advisers 
were assassinated by three terrorists 
while at a dinner meeting at the 
Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. Two 
men arrested in connection with this 
case have ties with extreme rightwing 
groups opposed to Salvadoran land 
reform. 

In Guatemala terrorism figured as a 
major tactic of the right, the left, and 
the Guatemalan Government. U.S. files 
contain records of 27 international ter- 
rorist attacks in 1981. These include 
bombings, kidnappings, and four 
assassination attempts. While most of 
the international attacks were carried 
out by leftwing groups such as the Guer- 
rilla Army of the Poor, two U.S. citizens 
were assassinated by rightwing groups. 
Thirteen of the attacks were directed at 
American personnel and property. Other 
victims of international terrorism in 
Guatemala included citizens of Japan, 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, and Honduras. 

Among the most publicized assas- 
sinations were two U.S. missionaries 
working in Guatemala and a U.S. 
businessman, who had been kidnapped 
in December 1980 by leftwing guerrillas 
during an attempted rescue by the 
Guatemalan police. Numerous bombings 
of foreign facilities were recorded, in- 
cluding the Pan American headquarters, 
the Honduran airline office, the 
American Chamber of Commerce office, 
an Eastern Airlines plane on the 
ground, the Chevron oil depot in 



Guatemala City, the British Consul's of- 
fice, and a U.S. -owned hotel. Other in- 
cidents included the murders of an 
Italian and a Spanish priest working in 
the area and the kidnapping of an 
Australian and a U.S. citizen for ran- 
som. 

State-Sponsored 
International Terrorism 

Nations support international terrorist 
groups or engage in terrorist attacks to 
influence policies of other countries, to 
establish or strengthen regional or 
global influence, and, in some cases, to 
eliminate or terrorize dissident exiles 
and nationals from adversary countries. 

Many countries are reluctant to con- 
demn states that support or engage in 
international terrorist activities when 
those activities are cloaked in the mantle 
of anti-imperialism. Other countries 
tolerate state-sponsored terrorist ac- 
tivities because they fear economic or 
other forms of retaliation by the spon- 
soring states. 

U.S. records list 129 terrorist at- 
tacks conducted directly by national 
governments, but this figure almost cer- 
tainly understates the incidence of state- 
sponsored terrorism. More than 80% of 
the 129 attacks took place in 1980 and 
1981, and almost 40% were assassina- 
tions or attempted assassinations. This 
is roughly six times the percentage of 
assassinations recorded in non-state- 
sponsored terrorist attacks. State-spon- 
sored attacks were more lethal than 
other terrorist incidents, 44% resulting 
in casualties— a total of 60 persons in- 
jured and 61 killed. A majority of these 
attacks occurred in the Middle East, 
were carried out by Middle East nations, 
and were directed against expatriates 
and diplomats from Middle Eastern 
countries. 

The pattern of state-sponsored inter- 
national terrorist incidents in 1981 was 
similar to that of 1980. The 44 attacks 
occurred in 20 different countries, but 
almost half were in Lebanon. The at- 
tacks were directed against citizens 
from 17 countries, half of them from the 
Middle East. Incidents included kidnap- 
pings, bombings, assassinations, and 
armed attacks against embassies or 
other facilities. During 1981, 21 victims 
were killed and 28 wounded in state- 



sponsored international terrorist at- 
tacks. 

Soviet Union. The Soviets provide 
training, arms, and other direct and in- 
direct support to a variety of national in 
surgent and separatist groups. Many of 
these groups commit international ter- 
rorist attacks as part of their program 
of revolutionary violence. Moreover, 
some of the individuals trained and 
equipped by the Soviets make their way 
into strictly terrorist groups with little 
revolutionary potential. 

Moscow maintains close relations 
with and furnishes aid to governments 
and organizations that directly support 
terrorist groups. In the Middle East, for 
example, the Soviets sell large quantities 
of arms to Libya. The Soviets also back 
a number of Palestinian groups that 
openly conduct terrorist operations. In 
Latin America, the Soviet Union and 
Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term 
coordinated campaign to establish sym- 
pathetic Latin American regimes. The 
Cubans, and more recently the Soviets, 
clearly support organizations and groups 
in Latin America that use terrorism as a 
basic technique to undermine existing 
regimes. In other parts of the world, 
especially Africa, the Soviets have sup- 
ported guerrilla movements and national 
liberation organizations that engage in 
terrorism. 

Libya. Support of terrorist groups 
has been an element of Libya's foreign 
policy under Qadhafi since the 
mid-1970s. Qadhafi has been linked by 
overwhelming evidence to terrorist at- 
tacks and assassinations in Western 
Europe, the United States, and the Mid- 
dle East and is known to support ter- 
rorist groups and liberation movements 
worldwide. After the Gulf of Sidra inci- 
dent, when the United States shot down 
two Libyan fighters which were attack- 
ing U.S. naval forces in international 
waters, Qadhafi threatened to assas- 
sinate President Reagan and other 
senior U.S. Government officials. The 
1981 records contain information on 13 
attacks by Libyan assassination squads. 

South Yemen. The Government of 
the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen has supported international ter- 
rorism since the late 1960s. It provides 
camps and other training facilities for a 
number of leftist terrorist groups. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



The Government of South Yemen 
has not participated directly in interna- 
tional terrorist attacks, however, and 
South Yemeni citizens have been in- 
volved in only six incidents since 1968. 

Syria. As a major supporter of 
radical Palestinian groups, Syria has 
provided training, logistic support, and 
use of diplomatic facilities to groups that 
are willing to do its bidding. Syria sup- 
ports Palestinian elements that engage 
in international terrorism, including the 
BJO, which targets moderate Palestin- 
ian leaders as well as Israeli interests. 

Iraq. During the past 3 years, the 
Iraqi Government has reduced support 
to non-Palestinian terrorists and placed 
restrictions on many Palestinian groups, 
moving closer to its moderate Arab 
neighbors. 

Iran. Despite its radical, anti- 
Western policies, its support for Islamic 
fundamentalists, and widespread govern- 
ment terrorism within Iran, the 
Khomeini regime provides only limited 
support to international terrorist 
groups. U.S. records list 24 international 
terrorist attacks carried out directly by 
the Iranian Government in 1980 and five 
in 1981. All of the attacks in 1981 occur- 
red in Beirut and were directed primari- 
ly against Iraqi diplomats. Most Iranian- 
sponsored attacks on Iraqi targets in 
Lebanon not undertaken by the Iranian 
Government were carried out by 
Lebanese Shiite militia members. 

Cuba. Havana openly supports and 
advocates armed revolution as the only 
means for leftist forces to gain power in 
Latin America. Cuba also supports 
organizations and groups in Latin 
America that use terrorism to under- 
mine existing regimes. The Cubans have 
played an important role in facilitating 
the movement of men and weapons into 
Central and South America, providing 
direct support in the form of training, 
arms, safe havens, and advice to a wide 
variety of guerrilla groups. 



U.S. Business as a Target 



'These groups were more active in the 
early 1970s. 

^The proportions are skewed by the fact 
that mucn better information exists on in- 
cidents that involve the United States. ■ 



Types of Attacks 

International terrorists have used almost 
every type of violence against U.S. business 
personnel and facilities, ranging from tele- 
phone threats to murder. The United States 
has recorded 645 bombings, 61 kidnappings, 
29 assassination attempts, and 23 armed at- 
tacks since January 1968. 

Bombing. This is a preferred terrorist 
method in part because explosives are rela- 
tively easy to obtain, difficult to trace, and 
normally involve little personal risk to the 
perpetrators. This common type of attack oc- 
curred in 38 countries — the greatest number 
in Argentina, Iran, Italy, and Mexico. While 
almost 70% of all incidents recorded were 
bombings, the majority of them did not cause 
significant damage. 

Seizure. Since 1968 there have been 94 
attacks in which U.S. business personnel 
were taken hostage against the satisfaction 
of monetary or political demands. Almost 
two-thirds of these seizures were kidnap- 
pings, but such incidents also included sky- 
jackings and hostage-barricade situations. 
The largest annual total of kidnappings and 
hostage seizures was 21 in 1981, almost four 
times the annual average for the 1968-81 
period. Almost 60% of them occurred in 
Latin America, with the greatest number of 
incidents in Argentina, Guatemala, and Co- 
lombia. Financial demands were most often 
made for the release of the hostages, but 
other ultimatums included the release of im- 
prisoned terrorists, publicity for a political 
statement, and /or a safe getaway for the 
captors. In over 75% of the hostage takings, 
the terrorists were able to achieve at least 
some of their demands. 

Assassination. Although handgun assas- 
sinations of U.S. business representatives 
overseas are rare, they attract media atten- 
tion, require a response from the local 
government, and have a strong impact on 
local business operations. Most incidents of 
this type have teken place in Argentina and 
Guatemala. 

Types of Companies Targeted 

The U.S. companies that have been the 
targets of terrorism range from well-known 
giants of international business to small 
enterprises. They included oil companies 
(Chevron, Mobil, Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco), 
Isanks and financial enterprises (Chase Man- 
hattan, Chemical Bank of New York, Bankers 
Trust, Citibank, Bank of America, and 
American Express), and companies associated 
in the public mind with the "American way of 



life" (Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Colgate- 
Palmolive, Ford, Chrysler, Macy's, Sears 
Roebuck, and McDonald's). Slightly less 
popular targets were airlines (Pan American), 
engineering firms (Bechtel), agricultural 
equipment companies (John Deere), and high- 
technology enterprises (IBM, Burroughs, and 
Honeywell). 

Incidents Resulting in Casualties 

Attacks that cause casualties are almost 
always perpetrated by experienced terrorist 
organizations, provoke a response from the 
highest levels of government and corporate 
management, and command worldwide media 
attention. 

The United States recorded 144 terrorist 
attacks on U.S. business personnel in 
1968-81 that caused injuries or death. Such 
incidents occurred in 31 countries, mostly 
Argentina, Iran, the United States, the 
Philippines, Mexico, and Guatemala. Sixty 
terrorist groups claimed credit. Bombings 
and assassinations accounted for 75% of the 
attacks resulting in casualties. 

Location of Incidents 

Since 1968 incidents of international terror- 
ism against U.S. business personnel and 
facilities have occurred in 56 countries, more 
than 40% of them in only six countries. The 
greatest number were in Argentina, primari- 
ly because the Montoneros routinely targeted 
U.S. business interests during the early and 
mid-1970s. In the Umted States and Italy, 
the attacks were usually carried out by 
foreign terrorists, while in Argentina, Iran, 
Mexico, and Guatemala, the incidents were 
almost always the work of indigenous groups. 
Terrorist groups in Latin America carried out 
attacks as symbolic action against U.S. 
power, wealth, and influence in the region or 
in an attempt to undermine the local regime. 
As with all terrorist attacks, incidents in- 
volving U.S. business are often carried out 
where they will receive the most publicity, 
and the large urban areas of Western Europe 
provide the perfect setting. 

International Terrorist Groups 

A total of 98 terrorist groups have claimed 
credit for attacks against U.S. businesses 
during the past 14 years. The Montoneros 
have claimed more responsibility than any 
other group. 

The People's Revolutionary Army (Argen- 
tina) also conducted numerous attacks during 
the mid-1970s, but this group has not carried 
out an attack against U.S. business since 
1976. ■ 



August 1982 



21 




These cars, belonging to U.S. employees, 
were burned inside the embassy compound 
in Islamabad, Pakistan, when mobs over- 
ran that facility in November 1979. 



(Department of State) 



22 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



Terrorist Target: 
The Diplomat 



by Frank H. Perez 



Address before the 

conference on terrorism sponsored 

by the Instituto de Cuestiones Intemacionales, 

Madrid, Spain, June 10, 1982 



The worldwide terrorism phenomenon of 
the past decade and a half has impacted 
most severely on our Western demo- 
cratic societies. The brutal tactics of ter- 
rorist groups, whether from the far left 
or right, have served to erode demo- 
cratic institutions and civil liberties in 
many parts of the world. Democracies 
have found it difficult to cope with the 
tactics of terrorism and in some cases 
have been tempted to respond by a turn 
to authoritarian political structures. Ter- 
rorism also has adversely impacted dip- 
lomatic relations between nations — even 
friendly ones. 



Attacks on the Rise 

In Beirut the French Ambassador is 
gunned down by terrorists. Several 
months later, a French employee of the 
embassy and his pregnant wife are 
found shot to death in their apartment. 
A car bomb explodes in the French Em- 
bassy compound killing 12 and injuring 
25. Turkish officials are killed in Los 
Angeles and Boston and another is 
wounded in Ottawa. The Turkish Consu- 
late in Paris is seized. The U.S. Charge 
in Paris narrowly escapes assassination. 



Department of State Bullelllugust iggg 



An Israeh attache is assassinated in 
Paris only 3 months after an American 
military attache is shot to death while on 
his way to the embassy. In London the 
Israeh Ambassador lies critically wound- 
ed in the hospital after being shot 
through the head by a terrorist. In 
Guatemala the Brazilian Embassy is 
seized. These are only some of the more 
recent e.xamples of growing terrorist at- 
tacks against diplomats. 

The dramatic worldwide increase in 
both the number and seriousness of ter- 
rorist attacks against diplomatic person- 
nel and facilities during the past decade 
has adversely atfected the conduct of 
diplomacy. In 1970 there were 213 at- 
tacks on diplomats from 31 countries. 
By 1980 this number had risen to 409 
attacks on diplomats from 60 coun- 
tries — an increase of almost 100%. The 
number of attacks on diplomats as a 
percentage of total terrorist attacks has 
also increased from 30% in 1975 to 54% 
in 1980. Unfortunately this trend ex- 
hibits no sign of abating. 

World attention has focused on the 
fact that diplomacy has become a high- 
risk profession. Some 20 ambassadors 
from 12 countries have been assassi- 
nated (including five U.S. Ambassa- 
dors — more than the number of U.S. 
generals killed in the Vietnam war). Be- 
tween 1968 and mid-1981 there were 
370 international terrorist attacks which 



23 



caused death or personal injury. During 
1980 alone, there were 50 such in- 
cidents, more than in any previous year. 
All together, 381 diplomats have been 
killed and 824 wounded between 1968 
and 1982. Even more ominously, 
assassination attempts, which have been 
increasing steadily over the past 10 
years, reached an alltime high in 1980. 
The number of kidnappings and hostage 
barricade situations has also increased. 
Bombings are still the most frequent 
form of attack, however, since they in- 
volve little risk of capture to the ter- 
rorist, and explosives can be acquired 
fairly easily. 

The number of groups carrying out 
terrorist attacks has also grown almost 
every year. Since 1968 a total of 102 
terrorist groups have claimed responsi- 
bility for terrorist attacks. In all, 
diplomats from 108 countries have been 
victims of attacks, and the embassies of 
38 countries have been seized by terror- 
ists. The level of violence of attacks has 
also increased. 

During the early years of the 1970s 
the terrorist threat to diplomats was 
primarily from low-level, small-scale 
violence. In recent years we have also 
witnessed an increase in mob violence. 
Between 1970 and 1980 there were 
some 70 forcible incursions into diplo- 
matic facilities. However, more than 



50% of these occurred after the take- 
over of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, 
which suggests that the success achieved 
there created a model for other terrorist 
groups to emulate. The potential 
dangers of such acts were borne out 
when 39 people, including several 
Spanish diplomats, were killed when the 
Spanish Embassy in Guatemala was 
seized in 1980. 



Why the Diplomat? 

All terrorist attacks involve the use of 
violence for purposes of political extor- 
tion, coercion, and publicity for a politi- 
cal cause. The terrorist uses his victims 
as tools to achieve these goals, regard- 
less of the fact that those targeted are 
rarely directly associated with the area 
of political conflict. Although some may 
argue that attacks against diplomats are 
senseless, in the mind of the terrorist it 
is a calculated act with deliberate politi- 
cal goals and objectives. 

Diplomats are highly visible and de- 
sirable targets for several reasons, in- 
cluding their symbolic value and the 
psychological impact created. Attacks 
against diplomats evoke a response from 
the highest levels of two governments— 



Deputy Director, 

Office for 

Combatting 

Terrorism 



Frank H. Perez is the Deputy Director of the 
Office for Combatting Terrorism. He was 
born in Washington, D.C. He received his 
M.A. in foreign affairs from George 
Washington University (19.52). 

His most recent overseas service was in 
Brussels as the Political Adviser to the U.S. 
Mission to NATO and in Geneva as the State 
Department member of the SALT II delega- 
tion with the rank of minister. Earlier he 
served as a member of the Department of 
State's Policy Planning Staff and as an office 
director in the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research. He was in the National War Col- 
lege class of 1966. Mr. Perez retired from the 
U.S. Air Force Reserve in 1968 with the rank 
of Lt. Col. ■ 




that of the diplomat attacked and that o 
the host country. Terrorists are also abl 
to command worldwide media attention 
for the duration of the incident. Terror- 
ist groups single out diplomats perhaps 
because they perceive that in order to 
obtain the publicity they seek, they musi 
strike at these increasingly more visible 
and symbolic targets. 

Terrorist attacks on diplomats 
almost always are perpetrated by well- 
trained and experienced terrorist organi 
zations. These groups are well organizec 
and are seeking specific political goals. 
For example, two Armenian terrorist 
groups have conducted a campaign of 
terror directed against Turkish diplo- 
mats in revenge for alleged atrocities 
which were committed over 60 years 
ago. Some 20 Turkish diplomats and 
members of their families have been 
killed in recent years by Armenian ter- 
rorists in numerous countries, for exam- 
ple in Spain, where in 1978 the Turkish 
Ambassador's wife, her brother, and 
their chauffeur were killed. We in the 
United States have not been immune to 
the violence perpetrated by Armenian 
terrorist organizations. In January of 
this year the Turkish Consul General in 
Los Angeles was gunned down and the 
honorary Turkish Consul in Boston was 
murdered in a similar fashion in early 
May. Earlier a car bomb was detonated 
in front of the Turkish U.N. mission in- 
juring several people. 



An Increasing Toll 

Terrorism unfortunately has taken its 
toll on state-to-state relations. Relations 
between countries can be adversely 
aff'ected if one country believes that 
another is failing to provide adequate 
protection to its diplomats or to live up 
to its responsibilities. For example, 
Franco-Turkish and Franco-Spanish 
relations have suffered because of a 
perceived laxity in French prosecution 
and extradition of terrorists. The 
Dominican Republic Embassy seizure in 
Bogota in 1980 by the April 19th Move- 
ment (M-19), in which 15 senior 
diplomats were held for 61 days, caused 
considerable strains in relations between 
the Government of Colombia and some 
of the countries whose ambassadors 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



were held hostage. The recent slayings 
of Turkish officials in the United States 
interject strain in an otherwise close 
U.S. -Turkish relationship. 

Also, sponsorship of terrorist acts by 
one country against another can serious- 
ly disrupt diplomatic intercourse and 
normal relations. Last year, for exam- 
ple, Colombia suspended diplomatic rela- 
tions with Cuba because of its training 
in Cuba of Colombian M-19 terrorists. 
One of the principal reasons for expel- 
ling Libyan representatives from Wash- 
ington was the continuing support by 
the Qadhafi regime to international ter- 
rorist activities, including those directed 
against U.S. officials. U.S. relations with 
other countries and groups have been 
adversely afi'ected by their sponsorship 
of acts of international terrorism, such 
as the Letelier assassination in Washing- 
ton carried out by Chilean agents and 
the continued resort to international ter- 
rorism by various elements of the Pale- 
stine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
The disastrous effects of the seizure of 
American diplomats on U.S. -Iranian 
relations need no further elaboration. 

Countries whose diplomats have 
been victimized represent a wide range 
of ideologies, geographic locations, sizes, 
and wealth. However, all attacks on 
diplomats have one element in common: 
All terrorist attacks are acts of political 
violence. The terrorist is seeking to 
redress a political grievance, overthrow 
a political system, or publicize a political 
point of view. I was a firsthand witness 
to the events in Bogota which occurred 
when the M-19 held diplomats from 15 
countries hostage in the Embassy of the 
Dominican Republic for 61 days, de- 
manding publicity for their cause, free- 
dom for imprisoned members of their 
organization, and ransom. Although the 
Government of Colombia did not accede 
to the major terrorist demands, the ter- 
rorists did obtain widespread publicity 
for their cause. A relatively obscure ter- 
rorist organization was suddenly cata- 
pulted into the international spotlight 
and thereby increased greatly its prom- 
inence within Colombia and interna- 
tionally. 

It is the symbolism of the individual 
terrorist act, and not necessarily the act 
itself, which gives it significance. The 
terrorist uses the act to make a political 
statement to the target (which is not the 



ROCKET ATTACK 

ON U.S. AMBASSADOR'S MOTORCADE 

BEIRUT, LEBANON - 1940 Hrs, AUGUST 27, 1980 



DARKNESS 

NO ARTIFICIAL LIGHT 

AT ATTACK SITE 




(SY/Threat Analysis Group) 



August 1982 



25 



victim) and to the world at large. Thus, 
U.S. diplomats who were held in Tehran 
for 444 days were used as pawns to ad- 
vance political objectives internally of 
the group that held them as well as to 
achieve objectives with regard to the 
U.S. Government and to the rest of the 
world. 

While the functions of representa- 
tion, negotiation, and intelligence 
gathering continue, embassies are now 
conducting diplomacy in the face of an 
increasingly violent environment under 
conditions never before experienced. The 
level of security surrounding diplomatic 
personnel and facilities has been in- 
creased to unprecedented levels in an at- 
tempt to deter terrorist attacks. As em- 
bassy security has become more string- 
ent, it has become more difficult to con- 
duct diplomatic business in a normal 
fashion. Many embassies now resemble 
military installations, surrounded by 
high walls and barbed wire. Buildings 
are equipped with automatic tear gas 
dispensers, ballistic glass, and closed- 
circuit TV. Visitors are searched and 
made to pass through metal detectors 
under the scrutiny of armed guards. 
Embassy personnel are often trans- 
ported in armored vehicles. 

The cost of protecting diplomats 
abroad has also soared. The Department 
of State now spends annually about 14% 
(around $140 million) of its entire budget 
on security, and this figure has been ris- 
ing steadily. This is in addition to pro- 
tection provided to U.S. diplomatic 
facilities and personnel overseas by host 
governments which would cost us an ad- 
ditional $200 million annually if the U.S. 
Government had to provide it. 

While precautions are certainly 
necessary, the effect has been a reduc- 
tion in access and a corresponding 
reduction in the level of communications 
between diplomats and the host country, 
in particular, the people of the country. 
Diplomats are finding it increasingly 
difficult to function well in this environ- 
ment. 



Enhanced Security 
Measures 

In 1980, for the first time since 1968 
when the U.S. Government first began 
keeping statistics on terrorism, U.S. 
diplomats surpassed U.S. businessmen 



Security Enhancement Program 



A dimension has been added to the problem 
of securing U.S. Embassies in the 1980s — the 
need to cope with the threat of mob violence. 
The Department of State's security enhance- 
ment program must be aimed at preventing 
U.S. Embassies from being destroyed, per- 
sonnel taken hostage or killed, and national 
security information compromised. Security 
planning must take into account the possibili- 
ty that the host government will not provide 
meaningful protection before the attack or 
send timely relief during the attack but may 
even encourage, support, or sponsor the 
hostile action. Public access controls alone 
are not sufficient to deny rapid mob penetra- 
tion into buildings. 

In addition to the threat of overt action, 
U.S. diplomatic installations must be 
recognized as prime targets of espionage ac- 
tivity by hostile intelligence services. Surrep- 
titious entry into a mission is a constant 
threat, as is the danger of the placement of 
electronic surveillance equipment. 

The main thrust of the security enhance- 
ment program is to establish, at those posts 
considered most threatened, an environment 
that will provide the greatest possible degree 
of safety and security — control barriers; 
guards and receptionists; bullet-resistant 
materials, electronically operated locks. 



alarms, and communications equipment; 
package inspection equipment, defensive 
equipment, and closed circuit TV; perimeter 
protection in the form of fences, walls, and 
gates; lighting; reinforcement of entrances, 
windows, walls, and other exterior features 
of the building; internal controls; tear gas 
systems; safe havens which are fire resistant 
and resist forced penetrations; fire safety 
equipment; and emergency power and 
destruction equipment. 

Initially proposed as a 5-year program 
which would cost approximately $200 million, 
the Congress appropriated a total of $42 
million for FY 1980 and 1981. Additional ap- 
propriations have been requested of $25 
million each for FY 1982 and 1983. Im- 
provements at several posts have already 
been completed. Major security im- 
provements are to be made at a total of 70 of 
the most threatened U.S. diplomatic missions 
and significant steps are being taken on 
security at another 55 posts. ■ 

The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador is 
heavily fortified — a bunker is on the roof, 
steel plates reinforce the balconies, a high 
wall surrounds the building, and armed 
guards patrol the area. Another high wall 
circles the entire compound. 




26 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 



Terrorism 



* IS the most frequent victims of terrorist 
ittacks overseas, in spite of the fact that 
U.S. businessmen greatly outnumber 
U.S. diplomats. To deal with this prob- 
lem, the United States has undertaken a 
rigorous campaign to enhance the 
security of our personnel and facilities 
Dverseas. Primarily we are attempting 
to reduce the vulnerability of our diplo- 
matic missions by constructing 
perimeter defenses, building secure safe- 
havens to which staff can retreat in the 
event of an attack, improving access 
controls, and installing nonlethal entry 
denial systems. Other protective 
measures involve added guards, armored 
cars, and the like. All State Department 
employees are also required to attend a 
seminar on "Coping with Violence 
Abroad" in order to make them aware of 
security problems and educate them on 
how to reduce their vulnerability. Intelli- 
gence collection and analysis on terrorist 
groups has been accorded a much higher 
priority and has paid off in terms of 
alerting us to possible attacks against 
our diplomatic personnel and facilities. 



Need for International 
Cooperation 

If we are to deal more effectively with 
this problem over the long run, better 
international cooperation will be re- 
quired. While diplomats from the United 
States, Israel, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, Cuba, and Turkey 
have been the most frequent targets, 
terrorism is a complex and universal 
problem shared by all nations of the 
world. Virtually no state has been left 
unaffected by terrorism. Nations must 
work together to take steps to deter and 
prevent terrorist violence from escalat- 
ing. Such necessary steps include a 
greater exchange of information on ter- 
rorists and their movements, tighter 
controls on the movement of weapons 
and explosives, and more efficient extra- 
dition procedures for accused terrorists. 

The international community must 
also develop a consensus that acts of ter- 
rorism should be outlawed and that 
those who commit them should be 
brought to justice. The international 
community took a major step in this 
regard in 1973 when it adopted the U.N. 
Convention on the Prevention and 



Terrorism and the Foreign Service 



In 1981 more than 13,000 people took the 
written examination for entry into the 
Foreign Service — about 1,000 more than in 
1980. The number of applicants for the 1982 
exam, to be given in December, indicates that 
the numbers will continue to increase. 
Despite the fact that the U.S. diplomat is a 
prime target of international terrorists, 
thousands of talented and able young 
Americans have not been deterred from seek- 
ing a career in the Foreign Service. 

Terrorism is, however, a fact of life for 
those in the service. Families may not accom- 
pany employees to some diplomatic posts 
because of the danger of terrorism. It may be 
too dangerous to travel in certain areas of 
other countries because of the threat of ter- 



rorism. Obviously assignments to such posts 
are not always desired — but the posts are 
staffed. 

Foreign Service personnel understand 
that they are members of a disciplined serv- 
ice and agree that they will serve where they 
are needed. In addition efforts are made to 
compensate them for the dangers. They may 
receive as much as 25% additional pay for 
assignments to designated high-risk areas. 
They also benefit from the protection of the 
Department's security program. 

The Department of State recognizes its 
obligation to provide the most effective 
representation abroad of the interests of the 
United States, regardless of terrorism or any 
other obstacle. ■ 



'Coping With Violence Abroad" 



Most U.S. Government civilian employees 
serving abroad share one common ex- 
perience — attendance at the Department of 
State's seminar on "Coping With Violence 
Abroad." Presented by the Department's 
Foreign Service Institute 37 times annually, 
it attracted more than 3,000 persons in 1981; 
attendance in 1982 certainly will be higher. 

The seminar represents a program which 
has been in effect since the early 1970s. At 
that time, when terrorism was first recog- 
nized as a problem for U.S. Government 
operations abroad, the State Department sent 
mobile training teams to a number of diplo- 
matic posts to brief employees on techniques 
to minimize the risk of becoming a victim of 
terrorist acts. The Department then 
developed a 1-day program in Washington, 
"The Terrorism Course," for its employees 
going overseas. That program evolved into a 
2-day seminar on "Coping With Violence 
Abroad" in January 1981. 

Early in 1982 it was determined that the 
seminar could be presented more effectively 
by splitting it into two parts. One day (in 
Washington) addresses problems of general 
concern, such as government policy with 
regard to terrorism, the effect of terrorism 
on families, surveillance recognition, hostage 



survival, and explosive devices. The second 
segment, to be in operation by October 1982, 
will be taken at the employee's post and will 
deal with more specific problems in the par- 
ticular area using video cassette training aids 
prepared by the Foreign Service Institute. 
This new approach is designed to give new 
arrivals (all U.S. Government employees and 
their adult families, regardless of parent 
agency) at the 253 Foreign Service posts 
useful information directly related to cir- 
cumstances where thty live and work. 

In its various forms, the seminar has 
been taken by more than 5,000 people. Their 
comments and reactions have been a major 
impetus to the continuing reappraisal of the 
seminar from the point of view of both form 
and content. A number of persons who took 
the course and later found themselves in a 
terrorist situation have stated that they 
found the information they received in the 
seminar to have been particularly helpful. 
Those of the hostages held in Tehran who 
had taken some version of the earlier course 
reported that they remembered vividly 
hostage survival techniques and stated that 
the information was beneficial to them during 
their captivity. ■ 



Punishment of Crimes Against Interna- 
tionally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, commonly referred 
to as the New York convention. Adher- 
ing states must either extradite or pros- 
ecute persons alleged to have committed 
violations of the convention. The conven- 



tion's effectiveness, however, has been 
hampered by the fact that only 53 na- 
tions have ratified it. 

Recognition of the problem has con- 
tinued with the adoption of the 1979 
U.N. Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, which now has been ratified 



August 1982 



27 



by 17 nations; 22 ratifications are re- 
quired before the convention enters into 
force. In 1980 the General Assembly 
adopted a Resolution on Measures to 
Enhance the Protection, Security and 
Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Mis- 
sions and Representatives, which was 
reaffirmed last year. 

The New York convention and other 
international agreements relating to the 
protection of diplomatic personnel and 
premises are steps in the right direction 
of establishing an international consen- 
sus and body of law outlawing crimes 
against diplomats. However, they must 
be strengthened and built on to establish 
norms of behavior by seeking to 
discourage nations who would condone 
and support terrorists and terrorism and 
to encourage nations to take more 
seriously their obligations to protect 
diplomats. 



Obligation of Nations 

All nations have an obligation to provide 
protection for diplomats accredited to 
them. The universally accepted Vienna 
convention requires states to "take all 
appropriate steps to prevent attack" on 
the "person, freedom or dignity" of 
foreign diplomatic and consular person- 
nel. A violation of this obligation, re- 
gardless of the cause, is always disturb- 
ing. Of particular concern, however, is 
state complicity or acquiescence in acts 
of terrorism directed against diplomatic 
personnel and facilities. State-sponsored 
and -supported terrorism, whatever the 
target, is the most egregious form of 
terrorism. But when the target is the 
representative of another country, the 
act takes on an entirely new dimension 
and we see an erosion of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. 

The Libyan Government is one 
which has engaged in targeting for 
violence the diplomats of other coun- 
tries, specifically the United States. For 
example, the Government of Libya was 
behind the sacking of the U.S. Embassy 
in Tripoli. Last November, Sudanese 
authorities successfully thwarted a Lib- 
yan plot to plant explosive devices in the 
American Club in Khartoum. The 
bombs, consisting of two stereo speakers 
each packed with 20 kilograms of plastic 
explosives, were intended to explode on 
a weekend evening when the club would 
be filled with the families of U.S. Em- 



28 



Department of State Security Program 



The operational arm of the Department of 
State against terrorism is the Office of 
Security. Its primary function is to provide 
protective security for the personnel and 
facilities of the agency and the Foreign Serv- 
ice in the United States and abroad and for 
the protection of certain high-level foreign 
dignitaries. (Protection of visiting chiefs of 
state and heads of government is the respon- 
sibility of the Secret Service.) 

The Office of Security is headed by a 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, assisted in 
Washington by a deputy director and four 
assistant directors. The Deputy Assistant 
Secretary is assisted abroad by associate 
directors in specific geographical regions. 

Domestic Concerns 

Domestic Operations Division plans and ad- 
ministers security programs designed to pro- 
tect the property and personnel of the 
Department of State. It conducts security 
surveys on buildings (guards, alarm systems, 
access control systems, and closed circuit TV 
systems); makes arrangements for high-level 
diplomatic functions, conferences, news 
events, and high-level visits to the Depart- 
ment of State; oversees preparation of con- 
tingency plans; conducts surveys of foreign 
diplomatic missions, as requested, and at the 
residences of certain high-ranking State 
Department officials; and investigates any 
threats or incidents that occur within the 
Department or Foreign Service buildings. 



Secretary's Detail is responsible for the 

protection of the Secretary of State any- 
where in the world. It is also responsible for 
the protection of his residence(s) and family, 
as required. 

Dignitary Protection Division provides 
protection to foreign dignitaries (other than 
chiefs of state or heads of government) and 
their families while they are visiting the 
United States. It also protects selected U.S. 
officials traveling or assigned abroad, in- 
cluding certain ambassadors in high-threat 
areas. (The protection of foreign consular 
personnel in the United States would becomi 
an added duty of this division under legisla- 
tion now pending before the Congress. The 
legislation would authorize the Department t 
reimburse State or local police when they ar 
requested to provide extraordinary protectio 
to foreign consular personnel. The Secret 
Service now provides protection for foreign 
diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C., 
and, under an arrangement between the 
Secret Service and the New York City Polici 
Department, the latter provides protection ti 
diplomatic missions in New York City on a 
reimbursable basis.) 

Command Center has two functional 
sections which provide a 24-hour, 7-day-a- 
week emergency operations center, com- 
munications to and from protective details, a 
worldwide security communications network 
and threat assessment capability. (1) The 
Watch Officer Group disseminates in- 



Marine Corps guards are vital elements to the security of U.S. diplomatic missions. 




Department of State Bulletir 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



telligence information concerning potential 
terrorist activities or other threats directed 
against U.S. Government employees or in- 
stallations, coordinates protective detail 
movements throughout the Washington, 
D.C., area, and provides details with threat- 
related intelligence concerning the people 
under protection. (2) The Threat Analysis 
Group researches and analyzes intelligence 
produced by the U.S. intelligence and 
counterintelligence communities and monitors 
terrorist activities and related security prob- 
lems. It also provides intelligence 
assessments for security planning, selection 
of preventive and protective measures, and 
overall security decisionmaking. 

Protective Liaison maintains liaison 
"1 with local, State, and Federal law enforce- 
ment and intelligence agencies and the 
foreign diplomatic and consular corps. It also 
conducts physical security surveys of foreign 
diplomatic facilities, when requested, and pro- 
tective security briefings for foreign 
dignitaries and security personnel; notifies 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
and the U.S. Customs Service of the travel of 
foreign dignitaries, particularly if they are ac- 
companied by armed security personnel; and 
arranges for the special security needs of 
foreign diplomatic missions arising from 
threats, incidents, or official diplomatic func- 
tions. 

Overseas Operations 

Foreign Operations Division develops and 
implements security programs for the protec- 
tion of personnel, property, and classified and 
controlled information at U.S. Foreign Serv- 
ice posts. This includes coordinating post 
security programs; serving as the point of 
contact for the regional security officers; 
reviewing and critiquing emergency planning 
documents, security surveys, and serious inci- 
d<nt reports; and preparing briefings for am- 
bassadors and other senior U.S. Government 
personnel. It also supervises the U.S. Navy 
Seabees and the Marine security guards. 

Regional Security Officers formulate 
contingency plans to cope with bomb threats, 
acts of terrorism, riots and demonstrations, 
and internal defense; conducts security 
surveys of official office buildings and 
residences; provides protective services for 
potential targets of terrorist organizations, 
maintaining liaison with local and U.S. law 
enforcement and intelligence authorities; con- 
ducts counterterrorist training and indoc- 
trination programs; and provides operational 
supervision of the Marine security guards. 

Marine Security Guards are enhsted 
members of the U.S. Marine Corps who are 
specifically selected and trained for duty at 




U.S. diplomatic posts. There are presently 
119 Marine security guards detachments 
located throughout the world. Their primary 
function is the protection of personnel, prop- 
erty, and classified material. They are also 
responsible for controlling access by the 
public to those diplomatic or consular 
establishments, often using sophisticated 
technical equipment; for serving as key 
members of a post's internal defense team; 
and for maintaining control of emergency 
communications networks, particularly after 
normal office hours. 

Seabees (U.S. Navy Construction Per- 
sonnel) are assigned to the Department of 
State to perform surveillance over construc- 
tion work and for performing maintenance 
and construction in sensitive areas. 

Tecfinical Services Division plans and 
administers programs related to the technical 
defense of Foreign Service establishments 
against electronic penetration, surreptitious 
entry, and terrorist attack (utilizing security 
equipment such as alarms, closed circuit TV 
systems, locking hardware and remote- 
controlled locking systems, bullet-resistant 
materials, intercom systems, metal detectors, 
package inspection, document destruction 
equipment, tear gas dispensing systems, and 
other special protective equipment). It also 
provides the expertise to formulate policy for 
technical and physical security, weapons, and 
personnel protective measures. 



.A,rnied Department of State security agents 
accompany U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton 
in El Salvador. 

Security Enhancement Group provides 
continuity for all physical security im- 
provements to be made under the security 
enhancement program. In general it provides 
trained and experienced personnel for the 
survey teams that determine what is needed 
and make recommendations for improvement, 
develops and tests improved physical security 
materials and equipment, establishes physical 
security standards, and coordinates with 
other offices of the Department concerning 
these projects. 

Education and Training Staff conducts 
counterterrorism courses for security profes- 
sionals and other U.S. Government 
employees, including terrorism, hostage 
negotiations, and hostage rescue operations; 
the senior officers counterterrorism briefing; 
firearms training; counterterrorism, security 
enhancement, investigations, and guard 
forces; dignitary protection; and instruction 
for foreign national guard forces, chauffeurs, 
and police escorts on dignitary protection, 
firearms, explosives recognition and 
emergency response, and emergency driving 
techniques. It also provides professional 
training to new special agents of the Office of 
Security, regional security officers. Marine 
security guards, and Seabees and is a major 
contributor to the Department's seminar on 
"Coping With Violence Abroad." ■ 



August 1982 



29 



bassy staff and other Americans. Bombs 
of this size could have completely 
destroyed the club, killing or maiming 
scores of people, including third-country 
diplomats who use the club. We know 
that these devices were prepared by Lib- 
yan intelligence officers assigned to a 
Libyan People's Bureau in a neighboring 
country and that a Libyan intelligence 
officer personally insured that the bombs 
were loaded on a flight to Khartoum. 



Outlook 

This is a bleak picture of the current 
situation regarding diplomats and ter- 
rorism. What can be done to alleviate 
this problem? The problem is one of in- 
creasing intensity and the future, unfor- 
tunately, does not look any brighter. 
Attacks on diplomats have proven to be 
extremely cost effective for the amount 
of worldwide attention they generate 
and for that reason they are likely to 
continue. 

Obviously, we will have to continue 
to do more of what we have been doing 
(e.g., more and better intelligence and 
more effective security measures and 
procedures), although one eventually 
reaches the point of diminishing returns. 
At the same time, like-minded nations 
must intensify ways of improving 
cooperation among themselves with a 
view to reducing the disruption caused 
by terrorism to international relations 
and stability, particularly with regard to 
the protection of diplomatic premises 
and staff. 

Governments which sponsor or con- 
done acts of terrorism against diplomats 
must be made to understand that such 
conduct will not be tolerated by the 
international community. Likewise, 
everything possible must be done to 
bring to justice swiftly those perpetra- 
tors of heinous crimes against the civil- 
ized world. The challenge of preventing 
attacks against diplomats and the 
disruption of diplomatic intercourse 
must be a topic high on the agenda of 
the world community. ■ 



Guidelines for U.S. Government 
Employees Taken Hostage 



U.S. Government personnel serving abroad 
are expected to be mature, responsible, and 
patriotic individuals for whom the concept of 
service has a real and personal meaning. 

Individuals who are taken hostage should 
be aware that their captors may seek to ex- 
ploit them. Their captors may be seeking in- 
formation to be used to the detriment of the 
United States or of their fellow hostages, and 
are likely to use information obtained from 
one captive when interrogating another. In- 
dividuals should consequently be guided by 
the knowledge that whatever they say may 
be used to mislead or punish their colleagues 
and that their actions may result in reprisals. 

Captured individuals should not discuss 
sensitive aspects of the work of their fellow 
hostages. They should not divulge classified 



or sensitive information. They should not sig 
or make statements or take actions which 
they believe might bring discredit to the 
United States. 

The decision to attempt escape rests will 
the individual concerned. However, the deci- 
sion should be consistent with the considera- 
tions set above. 

Hard and fast rules are not always 
helpful, and the U.S. Government recognizes 
that the ability of individuals to resist ex- 
treme pressure differs. But to the extent 
possible one must help one's colleagues and 
avoid exploitation. Sound judgment is essen- 
tial. 

Approved June 24, 1982 
bv the Seeretarv of State I 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 





FEATURE 
Terrorism 



September 24, 1981, Paris. 
Four Armenian terrorists seized the 
Turkish Consulate and threatened to kill 
more than 20 hostages. A Turkish security 
gfuard was killed and three others were 
wounded (one of the terrorists, a Turkish 
Vice Consul, and a French security guard). 
The terrorists, who claimed to be members 
of the Yeghia Keshishian Commando of 
ASALA, demanded that all Armenian 
political prisoners be released from 
Turkish jails within 12 hours. As the 
deadline passed and the terrorists realized 
that the Turkish Government would not 
negotiate, the terrorists decided to accept 
a French Government offer of political 
asylum. Once in custody, however, the 
French Government stated that their offer 
was a ploy and that the terrorists would be 
treated as criminals. During a news con- 
ference in Beirut following this incident. 
ASALA leaders stated that their com- 
mandos were willfully deceived and that 
the promise made by the French Govern- 
ment must be kept or "there is no doubt 
that there will be a confrontation between 
them and us." (As of this publication date, 
the political/criminal status of the terror- 
ists remains undetermined.) This was the 
first incident of Armenian terrorists seiz- 
ing a diplomatic mission. 



Armenian Terrorism; 
A Profile 



by Andrew Corsun 

Threat Analysis Group 

Office of Security 



Introduction 

Since the advent of modern Armenian 
terrorism in 1975, the world has 
witnessed a terrorist campaign that has 
resulted in at least 170 attacks directed 
primarily against Turkish installations 
and diplomatic personnel outside of 
Turkey's borders. 

Enraged over the alleged massacre 
of 1.5 million Armenians by Turkey dur- 
ing World War I, and the loss of their 
homeland, Armenians unlike Jews tried 
and failed as propagandists to focus the 
world's attention on their grievances. ^ 
By resorting to terrorism, Armenian ex- 
tremists were able to accomplish in 7 
years what legitimate Armenian orga- 
nizations have been trying to do for 
almost 70 years — internationalize the 
Armenian cause. 

Terrorism may not be able to ease 
the pain of past agonies, but it is an ef- 
fective tactic in evoking international 
sympathy for a previously unknown (or 
forgotten) cause. How many people had 
heard of the Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) or their 
cause before they bombed the head- 
quarters of the World Council of 
(ilhurches in Beirut on January 20, 1975? 
The same can be said for the Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide 
(JCAG) who gained "prominence" on Oc- 
tober 22, 1975, with the assassination of 
the Turkish Ambassador to Vienna, 
Dennis Tunaligil. Since then, Armenian 
extremists have waged a successful cam- 
paign against Turkish interests that in 
recent years has expanded to include 
Western targets as well. 



The Seeds of Conflict 

According to historians, Armenia is 
believed to be not only the oldest of the 



civilized races of Western Asia (dating 
to pre-1200 B.C.), but eventually grew 
to become one of the strongest king- 
doms in that region. Geographically, 
Armenia was straddling the crossroads 
of the world and thus became the victim 
of many invasions. With the fall of Con- 
stantinople in 1453, the Turks finally 
ruled all the lands that once belonged to 
Armenians and held them for 465 years. 

Since we are interested in the cause- 
and-effect relationship history has 
played regarding the recent outbreak of 
Armenian terrorist activities against 
Turkish diplomats and establishments, 
we will jump ahead in time to the Ot- 
toman Empire of the late 19th century. 

With the rise of nationalism 
throughout Europe, the Armenian strug- 
gle for autonomy and modernization 
took on new vigor in the 1880s, and the 
Armenians began to form political or- 
ganizations for self-protection and as a 
vehicle to voice their desire for a free 
Armenia. One such organization was the 
Dashnaksutiun (Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation) which was founded in 1890 
in Tiflis, Georgia. 

In a multiethnic state, such as the 
Ottoman Empire, nationalism was 
viewed by the Turks as a serious inter- 
nal threat. The result was harsher 
repression by the Ottoman government 
which led to thousands of Armenian 
deaths in 1895. With the rise of the 
Young Turks in 1908, its policy of pan- 
Turanism led to even harsher measures 
in suppressing Armenian nationalism. 
On April 17 and 24, 1909, over 30,000 
Armenians were massacred in Adana 
and other villages along the Cilician 
plains in order to suppress the national 
ambitions of the Armenian people. 

With the advent of World War I, the 
stage was set for what was later alleged 
to be called the first "genocide" of the 



August 1982 



31 



20th century. Turkey entered the war on 
the side of Germany and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire on October 31, 1914, 
and offered autonomy to the Armenians 
if they would foment dissension behind 
the Russian hnes. Partly out of distrust 
of the Young Turks, and encouraged by 
the principle of self-determination, they 
refused. 

Turkey viewed this attitude as 
treasonous, especially in light of the fact 
that it (Turkey) was suffering heavy 
military reversals. Minister of Interior 
Taalat Bey ordered "the elimination of 
the Armenian element, which had been 
trying for centuries to undermine the 
foundation of the state." By 1915 the 
Turks ordered a mass deportation of 
Armenians from Turkish Armenia to 
Syria and Iraq. It was later alleged that 
1.5 million people (approximately 60% of 
the Turkish Armenian population) were 
killed or died on the journey. 

With the conclusion of the war, the 
Western Powers established the In- 
dependent Republic of Armenia on May 
28, 1918, which was later guaranteed by 
the treaty of Sevres, and signed on 
August 10, 1920, by Turkey, the Allied 
Powers, and Armenia. But due to the 
pressures exerted by the Turks and 
Communists, the new republic collapsed, 
and by December 2, 1920, Armenia was 
Sovietized and its territories to the west 
were awarded to Turkey. 

The basis for their grievances, as 
perceived by the Armenians, is not only 
the restoration of their homeland but to 
seek justice for the alleged mass 
murders (1894-96, 1909, 1915) of more 
than 1.5 million people. It is these issues 
that have fostered the armed struggle 
by Armenian extremists against Turkish 
diplomats and establishments around the 
world. 

During the diaspora of 1915, many 
Armenians fled to Lebanon which has 
long been regarded as a refuge for 
dispossessed minorities. Although the 
Armenian community (approximately 
200,000) in Lebanon had flourished and 
played a vital role in Lebanese life, by 
the 1970s they became caught-up in the 
internecine fighting that had overtaken 
Lebanon. When the Phalangists 
(Catholic Christian rightists) decided to 
use the Armenian section of east Beirut, 
known as Bourj Hammoud, to launch 
their attacks against the adjacent 
Muslim section called Naba'a, a split 



resulted within the Armenian communi- 
ty. Some Armenians felt that they had a 
duty to take up arms on behalf of their 
Christian brothers, while others, mainly 
left-wing Armenian youth through their 
close contact (via the universities and 
the proximity of their neighborhoods) 
with their Palestinian counterparts, 
realized they shared a similar situa- 
tion — they had lost their land, had a 
large diaspora community, and the use 
of legal methods to bring their cause to 
world attention had failed. The left-wing 
Armenian youth began to form their 
own groups (e.g., AS ALA) with the aid 
of the Palestinians, and links between 
the two were formed. Many of these 
youths also moved to the Palestinian 
section of west Beirut. With the political 
success that the Palestinians have 
achieved through terrorism, it is not sur- 
prising that these left-wing Armenian 
youths would choose the same path. The 
growing sympathy and support that 
these youths have gained within the 
worldwide Armenian community had 
forced the right-wing Armenians to set 
up their own group (JCAG), but for dif- 
ferent goals and objectives. 



Terrorist Activities 

Terrorism is certainly not a new tactic 
for Armenian extremists. At the end of 
World War I, the Dashnag decided it 
would carry out its own executions of 
those Ottoman leaders they believed 
were responsible for the "genocide" of 
the Armenian people. As a result, a net- 
work called Nemesis was established to 
track down and execute those Ottoman 
leaders. 

On March 15, 1921, the former Ot- 
toman Minister of Interior Taalat 
Bey— who was living in Berlin under the 
pseudonym Ali Sayi Bey— was shot and 
killed at point-blank range after being 
under surveillance for 2 weeks by 
Soghoman Tehlirian. Others who met 
the same fate at the hands of Nemesis 
were the Ottoman Foreign Minister Said 
Halim, who was assassinated in Rome in 
December 1921, and Behaeddin Shakir 
and Djimal Azmi, two Ottoman officials 
who were killed a year later in Berlin. It 
is unknown what became of Nemesis 
following the incidents of the early 
1920s. Yet one must wonder why Arme- 
nian extremists have waited over 60 



years to carry out their armed struggle. 
Were they perhaps fulfilling the proph- 
ecy of Taalat who in 1915 said, "There 
will be no Armenian question for 50 
years," or (a more plausible explanation) 
are the times such that terrorism has 
become an acceptable vehicle for pro- 
test? 

Whatever the reason, since return- 
ing to the scene in 1975, Armenian ter- 
rorists have claimed responsibility for 
over 170 incidents which includes the 
assassination of 21 Turkish diplomats 
and / or family members, and 10 at- 
tempted assassinations of Turkish diplo- 
mats. Although the tactic of assassina- 
tion has been used repeatedly, the 
majority of their operations have been 
bombings which are simple in construc- 
tion and design. Unlike the Irish Repub- 
lican Army [IRA], which favors remote- 
control devices, Armenian terrorists 
have been partial to a Czechoslovakian- 
manufactured plastic called Semtex-H. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, 
this device is set at such an hour to 
cause property damage and not cost 
lives. 

Operationally Armenian terrorists 
must be viewed as unsophisticated in 
comparison with other groups since they 
have never shown the inclination or 
ability to hit a hard target. The only ex- 
ceptions were the seizure of the Turkish 
Consulate in Paris on September 24, 
1981, and the attempted assassination of 
the Turkish Consul General in Rotter- 
dam on July 21, 1982, both of which 
failed. In the seizure of the consulate, 
the four terrorists eventually sur- 
rendered without any of their demands 
being met. In Rotterdam the consul 
general, who was traveling to work in 
an armored car and escorted by two 
police vehicles, was attacked by four ter- 
rorists. The assailants opened fire with 
automatic weapons— which proved inef- 
fective against the armored car— and as 
they attempted to flee the area, one of 
the attackers was shot and captured. 
Their bombings and assassinations re- 
quired the minimum of logistical plan- 
ning. 

While no one can dispute their suc- 
cess, nevertheless, it is such spectacular 
operations as airport attacks, kidnap- 
pings, and assassinations of well- 
protected political officials that generate 
maximum publicity and impact which is 
so important to the terrorists raison 
d'etre. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin' 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



Of the 21 Turkish diplomats / family 
members slain between 1975-July 1982, 
14 were killed while in their car which 
was stopped at a light, slowing before 
entering a busy intersection, or parked. 
And of the 10 attempted assassinations 
of Turkish diplomats, 8 took place while 
the diplomat was in his vehicle. These 
vehicle attacks were carried out by 
assassination teams armed primarily 
with 9mm automatic weapons. The 
teams varied in size from a lone gunman 
used in eight attacks to two assailants 
with a third member in a waiting car. 
With the exception of the July 21 attack 
in Rotterdam, the diplomatic vehicles 
that were involved in these attacks were 
not armored, and the only protective 
security (if any) was a driver/bodyguard. 



JCAG and ASALA 

While Armenian extremists have carried 
attacks under 19 operational names, the 
main terrorists groups are the Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide 
(JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army 
for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA). 2 On the surface these two 
groups appear to be united by a common 
goal. However, a closer look at their 
communiques, and targeting, reveals 
that their methods and objectives are 
quite different. 

Justice Commandos of the Arme- 
nian Genocide. Unlike ASALA, which 
is Marxist oriented and adheres to the 
philosophy of Scientific Socialism, JCAG 
appears more closely aligned with the 
policies of the right-wing Dashnag party. 
The goals of the Dashnag are to reclaim 
their lost homeland, as specified in the 
treaty of Sevres, and to seek reparations 
and recognition of the crimes committed 
against their people by Turkey; and they 
seek a solution similar to Germany's ad- 
mission of guilt and reparations to Israel 
after World War II. JCAG, in its com- 
muniques, appears to strive for these 
same goals. Following the assassination 
of the Turkish Ambassadors to Vienna 
and Paris in October and December of 
1975 respectively, JCAG, in a follow-up 
communique entitled "To all the Peoples 
and Governments" wrote: 

Let the world realize that we will lay down 
our arms only when the Turkish Government 
officially denounces the genocide perpetrated 



ARMENIAN TERRORISM: 

INCIDENTS, BY YEAR 



1973 



1975 



1976 




1977 1 


m» 










1978 1 


■ ' 










1979 ■ 


j^^^l 




|» 














1980 ■ 


^^^B 






I. 
















1981 ■ 


^IBI 








|. 




1982 -July 26 ^ 


^^H 


^1 22 











AREAS OF OPERATIONS: 

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, 1973 - JULY 26, 1982 



SWITZERLAND | 


■^■■^H 




1^^^ 




■ 25 


ITALY 1 


■^■I^^^H 




^^^H 


■ ^0 




LEBANON 1 


^^^^^^^M 




^M Ki 






UNITED STATES | 


■^^^■■H 




■ 1^ 






SPAIN 1 


^^^^IHBH 


HH 11 








TURKEY 1 


■■^^■I^H 


^m 11 








ENGLAND | 


^^^^H 5 










IRAN 1 


■^^H s 










DENMARK | 


^^^H '* 










BELGIUM 1 


^^H i 










CANADA 1 


^^M 3 










GREECE 1 


^^H 3 










WEST GERMANY | 


^^M 3 











AUSTRALIA 



IRAQ 



NETHERLANDS 



August 1982 



33 



by Turkey in 1915 against the Armenian peo- 
ple and agrees to negotiate with Armenian 
representatives in order to reinstate justice. 

And following the bombings in New 
York City and Los Angeles on October 
12, 1980, JCAG stated: 

We make clear that our struggle today 
against the Turkish Government is not to be 
regarded as revenge for the 1915 genocide in 
which 1.5 million Armenian men, women, and 
children were massacred. Our struggle today 
is directed to have the Turkish Government 
to admit to its responsibility for that 
murderous act, as well as to return to the 
Armenian people the lands taken forceably 
and today occupied by the imperialist Turkish 
Government since the genocide. We demand 
once again that the Turkish Government ad- 
mit its responsibility for the genocide of 1915 
and make appropriate territorial and financial 
reparations to the long-suffering Armenian 
people. 

This theme remains constant in all 
their communiques to February 1982 
with the assassination of the honorary 
Turkish Consul to Boston, Orhan 
Gunduz. In Paris JCAG said that: 

The shooting was to reaffirm the permanence 
of our demands. The Turkish Government 
must recognize the responsibility of its 
predecessors in 1915 in the execution and 
genocide perpetrated against the Armenian 
people, and it must clearly condemn it. 
Secondly, the Turkish Government must 
recognize the right of the Armenian people to 
constitute a free and independent state of 
Armenian land which Turkey illegally oc- 
cupies. 

Because ideology affects the opera- 
tional strategy of a terrorist group, 
JCAG concentrated its operation solely 
on Turkish interests. The one possible 
exception was the January 1980 triple 
bombing of the offices of Swiss Air, 
TWA, and British Airlines in Madrid. At 
first JCAG claimed credit for the bomb- 
ing, but in a later phone call to the local 
press, the caller said that JCAG was not 
responsible for the bombing and, in fact, 
condemned it. 

As the group name implies, of the 
22 operations carried out by JCAG, 10 
of the operations were assassinations 
(resulting in 12 deaths), 6 were attempt- 
ed assassinations, and 6 were bombings. 

Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia. Whereas 
■ICAG's stance on the Armenian question 
appears compatible with traditional 
Armenian political beliefs, ASALA, 



whose communiques are replete with 
Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, considers the 
Armenian question part of the interna- 
tional revolutionary movement, and they 
seek closer ties with Soviet Armenia. 

For the first 4V2 years of its ex- 
istence, ASALA concentrated its attacks 
(the sole exception being the bombing of 
the headquarters of the World Council 
of Churches in Beirut in January 1975) 
on Turkish installations and diplomatic 
personnel. During this period, ASALA 
was in the process of enlarging its 
organization and base of operations in 




preparation for entering its second and 
current phase. 

Our second step was only possible due to the 
successful completion of our first step which 
had politicized the Armenian youth enough to 
gain their support in the second step. This 
second step contains four new developments: 
(1) heavy assault on imperialist and Zionist 
and reactionary forces; (2) a much greater 
frequency of attacks; (3) direct communica- 
tion with the Armenian masses and interna- 
tional opinion; and (4) strong ties with other 
revolutionary organizations including opera- 
tional ties with the Kurdish Workers Party 
[of Turkey].' 

No doubt this "second step," which 
began on November 13, 1979, in Paris 
with the triple bombing of the airline of- 
fices of KLM, Lufthansa, and Turkish 
Airlines, was influenced by ASALA's 
close cooperation with the Palestinians, 
most notably the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP). In a follow-up com- 



munique to this attack, ASALA set the 
theme for future operations. 

Let imperialism and its collaborators all over 
the world know that their institutions are 
targets for our heros and will be destroyed. 
We will kill and destroy because that is the 
only language understood by imperialism. 

While ASALA has done its share of 
assassinating Turkish officials (nine), 
nevertheless, half of their bombings are 
directed against Western targets. The 
group, operating under various ad hoc 
commando names, has taken it upon 
itself to carry out "military operations" 
against any country which attempts to 
jail or try one of its commandos. Ex- 
amples of this can be seen with the ar- 
rest on October 3, 1980, in Geneva of 
two Armenian extremists — Suzy 
Mahseredjian and Alex 
Yenikomechian — who were arrested 
after a bomb they were making acciden- 
tally exploded in their hotel room. Until 
their eventual release on January 12, 
1981, and February 9, 1981, respective- 
ly, ASALA— using the name October 3 
Organization — in a 4-month period car- 
ried out 18 bombings against Swiss in- 
terests worldwide in an effort to force 
the Swiss to release their comrades. The 
two extremists received 18-month 
suspended sentences and were barred 
from Switzerland for 15 years. 

On June 9, 1981, Mardiros 
Jamgotchian was caught in the act of 
assassinating a Turkish diplomat — 
Mehmet-Savas Yorguz — outside the 
Turkish Consulate in Geneva. From the 
time of his arrest on June 9 to his trial 
on December 19 (he was sentenced to 15 
years imprisonment), ASALA, using the 
name June 9 Organization, perpetrated 
15 bombings against Swiss targets 
worldwide. After Jamgotchian's trial, 
ASALA, again using the name Swiss 
Armenian Group 15, has, to date, car- 
ried out five bombings against Swiss 
targets. 

Switzerland is not the only country 
that has been targeted by ASALA; Ita- 
ly, France, and most recently Canada 
have been victims of ASALA's wrath. 
On May 31, 1982, three alleged ASALA 
members were arrested for attempting 
to bomb the Air Canada cargo building 
at Los Angeles International Airport. It 
is suspected that this bombing was in 
retaliation for the May 18 and 20 arrests 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 
Terrorism 



of four alleged ASALA members / sym- 
pathizers by the Toronto police for ex- 
tortion. 

It is interesting to note that JCAG 
has two alleged members in jail in the 
United States, and they have never 
launched any terrorist campaign against 
the United States. The two alleged 
members are Harout Sassounian, who 
was arrested and found guilty of the Oc- 
tober 1980 firebombing of the home of 
the Turkish Consul to Los Angeles, 
Kemal Arikan, and Harout's brother 
Harry, who was arrested and charged as 
being one of the assailants in the 
assassination of Kemal Arikan on 
January 28, 1982. At this writing, he is 
awaiting trial. 

No terrorist group is monotheistic, 
and neither are the Armenians. Both 
groups share a common bond, yet they 
are quite different when it comes to 
achieving their goals. This difference is 
also mentioned in their communiques. 
Following the assassination of the 
Turkish Consul General by JCAG in 
Sydney, Australia, on December 17, 
1980, a woman called the local 
Australian press to emphasize that her 
group had no connection with the so- 
called Armenian Secret Army (aka 
ASALA) and that the group's attacks 
were aimed at Turkish diplomats and 
Turkish institutions. On April 4, 1981, 
Le Reveil, Beirut's Rightist Christian 
daily, received a phone call from an 
alleged JCAG member who claimed that 
his group was not connected with 
ASALA and that JCAG's attacks are 
"reprisal measures for the injustice com- 
mitted against the Armenians; our 
targets are the Turks, and Turkish in- 
stitutions." 

Even ASALA has made reference to 
this difference. Hagop Hagopian (the 
ASALA spokesman) in an interview for 
Panorama magazine said: 

The Dashnag party is trying to imitate us 
[ASALA] in order to regain lost ground. The 
April 18, 1980, operation in Rome against the 
Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican was 
organized by the Dashnags who use the name 
of a revolutionary group, the Avenger Com- 
mandos of the Armenian Genocide. 

As for international connections 
with other groups, it appears that only 
ASALA, through its relationship with 
the PFLP and the DFLP, has benefited 
from any training and logistical support 



that the Palestinians can provide. When 
asked if Palestinians used to train 
Turkish terrorists in their camps, Mr. 
Abu Firas, the chief Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) representative in 
Turkey replied: 

In our camps, we train them to be terrorists 
in their countries but to fight against Israel. 
For this reason, we cannot be held responsi- 
ble for training them. Since Armenians are 
citizens of Lebanon, we also train them to 
fight for the liberation of Palestine. 

Although there have been reports of 
links between Armenian terrorists and 
Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and even the 
Soviets, outside of the assistance that 
ASALA has received from the Palestin- 
ians, there is no proof that Armenian 
terrorists are plugged into any interna- 
tional terrorist network. 



Conclusion 

While Armenian terrorism has evoked a 
greater interest in and awareness of the 
Armenian question throughout the 
world, the chances of Armenians attain- 
ing their major objectives through ter- 
rorism are nebulous at best. This has 
been exemplified by the PLO, IRA, 
Croatians, etc. A viable solution to the 
Armenian question will only come about 
through political means (e.g., United Na- 
tions, lobbyist groups, etc.) and / or com- 
promise on both sides. Yet, until such a 
path is followed — if ever — the issues 
will be kept fresh in the public's mind 
through acts of terrorism. 

Although ASALA is based in west 
Beirut and JCAG in east Beirut, on the 
surface it would appear that the recent 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon has not af- 
fected the operational capabilities of 
Armenian terrorists as witnessed by the 
July 20 and 24 bombings of two Paris 
cafes by the Orly Organization and the 
July 21 attempted assassination of the 
Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam by 
the Armenian Red Army. 

Yet on closer examination, the 
bombings of the two cafes are the types 
of low-level operations that can be car- 
ried out by indigenous cells independent 
of instructions from Beirut. While an at- 
tempted assassination of an individual 
traveling in an armored car with a police 
escort requires detailed planning, the at- 
tack against the consul general appeared 



hastily organized and very amateurish in 
its execution. One possible explanation 
for its failure was that Beirut was 
unable to provide the hit team with 
proper guidance and logistical coordina- 
tion. 

Although ASALA's attack on 
Ankara's airport on August 7, 1982, was 
the first airport attack by Armenian ex- 
tremists, this suicide operation was 
designed to obtain maximum publicity 
and did not require elaborate planning 
or execution. 

JCAG has emerged virtually 
unscathed from the invasion, and it is 
only a matter of time before ASALA 
can regroup in another country. France, 
with its large Armenian population and 
geostrategic location in Western 
Europe, has been mentioned as a possi- 
ble base of operation for ASALA. Wher- 
ever they find a "home," what remains 
to be seen is the type of strategy and 
tactics they pursue once they are able to 
fully renew their operations. 



NOTE 

Because the historical record of the 1915 
events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the 
Department of State does not endorse 
allegations that the Turkish Government 
committed a genocide against the Arme- 
nian people. Armenian terrorists use 
this allegation to justify in part their 
continuing attacks on 'Turkish diplomats 
and installations. 



'The number of Armenians killed in 1915 
is a central issue in the dispute between 
Armenians and Turkey. The Armenian com- 
munity contends that those killed in 1915 
were part of a genocide against Armenians 
orchestrated by the Turkish Government. 
Turkey on the other hand states that, at 
most. 200,000 Armenians died, and their 
deaths were not the result of a planned 
massacre but rather the tragedies of war in 
which many Turks also lost their lives. It is 
for this reason that Turkey refuses to 
acknowledge any guilt or make any sort of 
restitution / compensation to descendants or 
survivors, as Germany did for Israel after 
World War II. 

^By operating under many different 
names, the terrorists hope to give the impres- 
sion of the existence of numerous ^oups, im- 
plying a broader base of support within the 
worldwide Armenian community. 

'The Kurds, who were pressed into 
military service under the Ottoman Empire, 
played an important role in the liquidation 
and massacre of Armenians through World 
War I. ■ 



August 1982 



35 



THE PRESIDENT 



News Conference of June 30 
(Excerpts) 



Q. There are some who say that by 
failing to condemn the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon and refusing to cut off 
arms to the invading armies, U.S. and 
Israeli policies and goals have become 
identical. If there is a difference, 
what is it? Also, is there a difference 
between the Soviet slaughter of 
Afghans, which the United States has 
condemned so often, and the killing of 
Lebanese and the displaced people of 
Palestine? If so, what's the difference? 

A. You've asked several questions 
that I have to walk a very narrow line in 
answering. There's no question but that 
we had hoped for a diplomatic settle- 
ment and believed there could have been 
a diplomatic settlement in the Middle 
East, in that situation. We were not 
warned or notified of the invasion that 
was going to take place. 

On the other hand, there had been a 
breaking of the cease-fire, which had 
held for about 1 1 months in that area. 

I think there are differences be- 
tween some of these things that are go- 
ing on and things like just the outright 
invasion of Afghanistan by a foreign 
power determined to impose its will on 
another country. We have a situation in 
Lebanon in which there was a 
force— the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]— literally a government 
within a government and with its own 
army. And they had pursued aggression 
themselves across a border by way of 
rocket firing and artillery barrages. 

But the situation is so complicated 
and the goals that we would like to pur- 
sue are what are dictating our conduct 
right now. We want the bloodshed to 
end, there's no question about that. We 
didn't want it to start. But we've seen 
Lebanon for 7 years now divided into 
several factions, each faction with its 
own militia, not a government in con- 
trol. We have seen, as I've said, this 
PLO and we've seen the invasion of 
other forces — the presence of the 
Syrians as well in Lebanon. 

Right now, our goals are — as for the 
first time in 7 years the Lebanese seem 
to be trying to get together, and their 
factions have come together seeking a 
way to have a central government and 
have control of their own country and to 
have a single Lebanese Army. That is 
one of the goals we would like to see. 



The other goal would be the guaran- 
teeing of the southern border with 
Israel, that there would be no longer a 
force in Lebanon that could, when it 
chose, create acts of terror across that 
border. 

And the third goal is to get all the 
foreign forces — Syrians, Israelis, and 
the armed PLO— out of Lebanon. And 
we're — 

Q. People have been displaced in 
Palestine. 

A. Yes, and I signed a bill this 
morning for $50 million in aid for 
Lebanon there, where several hundred 
thousand of those Palestinians are. I 
don't think they were all displaced from 
one area, and they have been refugees 
now into ongoing generations. 

I think, when I say PLO, one has to 
differentiate between the PLO and the 
Palestinians. And out of this, also we 
have another goal, and it's been our goal 
for quite some time. And that is to, once 
and for all— when these other things are 
accomplished— to deal with the problem 
of the Palestinians and settle that prob- 
lem within the proposals and the sugges- 
tions that were made in the Camp David 
accords. 

Q. By all accounts Secretary of 
State Haig offered to resign several 
times. Why did you accept his offer 
this time? And what are you going to 
be doing to make sure that the sort of 
problems that led to his resignation 
don't occur again? 

A. Once again you ask a question 
upon which, when I accepted his 
resignation, I made a statement that I 
would have no further comments on that 
or take no questions on it. He only once 
offered to, or came in with a resignation 
and submitted his resignation to me. 
Whatever else has been heard was 
never — that was never in any conversa- 
tion between us. And he presented his 
resignation and I, with great regret and 
sorrow — and that's not just a platitude; 
I really mean it — accepted that resigna- 
tion. 

I must say at the same time I also 
stated, and I will state again, his service 
to his country and his service to our Ad- 
ministration has been all that could be 
desired. And I have profited and 
benefited by his wisdom and his sugges- 
tions, and he made his letter of resigna- 



tion plain. And to save further time 
from any of you, as I said the first day, 
I will comment no further on that. 

Q. Looking to the future, there 
were some problems in the foreign 
policy area. Can you say if there are 
going to be any changes or if anything 
will be done differently so that the 
sort of problems that led to his 
resignation won't reoccur? 

A. There's going to be no change in 
policy. Foreign policy comes from the 
Oval Office and with the help of a fine 
Secretary of State. And I've had that 
fine Secretary of State. And I must say, 
fortunately for the country, for the Ad- 
ministration, as Secretary Haig leaves, 
his replacement is a man with great ex- 
perience and a man of unquestioned in- 
tegrity, and I think we're all fortunate 
that we have been able to have such a 
replacement [George P. Shultz]. 

My system has been one, and always 
has been one, not having a synthesis 
presented to me of where there are con- 
flicting ideas and then it's boiled down 
and I get a single option to approve or 
disapprove. I prefer debate and discus- 
sion. I debate all those who have an in- 
terest in a certain issue and a reason for 
that interest, to have their say, not sit 
around as "yes" men. And then I make 
my decision based on what I have heard 
in that discussion, and that will be the 
procedure we'll follow. 

Q. What I wanted to ask you is 
whether you felt— even though you 
won't discuss the reasons for Sec- 
retary Haig's resignation or why you 
accepted it — whether you feel that 
coming at the time of this crisis in the 
Middle East, that you should have ac- 
cepted his resignation. What could 
have propelled you to accept the 
resignation in the middle of such a 
crisis, and do you think it has under- 
mined our ability to conduct foreign 
policy with confidence abroad? 

A. No, I don't l)elieve it has, and I 
think part of this is because the conti- 
nuity that anyone can see with the 
replacement by — or nominee, George 
Shultz. I just have to say that there is 
no easy time for a Secretary of State to 
resign. 1 don't know of a time that we've 
been here in which there has not been 
some crisis, something of that kind go- 
ing on, and there are several hot spots 
in the world other than these that we've 
touched upon. So there just is no easy 
time for that to happen. 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Q. How do you reply to those who 
say that there is confusion in your 
foreign policy? 

A. I would respond by saying that I 
think that we've been pursuing a foreign 
policy that is sound, that we've had 
some great successes in a number of 
areas with this. Granted, we have some 
problems in the world that we would like 
to be helpful in and we've not secured — 
or been the help that we would like to 
have been. But when we came here, our 
own national defenses were in disarray. 
We have started the rebuilding of those 
defenses. 

There was great question, with the 
terrible tragedy in Egypt, that the 
Camp David first-call for the return of 
the Sinai might not be carried out. It 
was carried out. We have just had 11 
months of cease-fire, thanks to the her- 
culean efforts of Phil Habib [Am- 
bassador Philip C. Habib, the President's 
special emissary to the Middle East] who 
has been there and performing yeoman 
service keeping the lid on that situation. 
We offered our help and, again, 
Secretary Haig did a superhuman job in 
trying to prevent bloodshed in the South 
Atlantic situation regarding the 
Falklands. We were unable to succeed in 
that to persuade the aggressive party to 
leave the islands and then have a 
peaceful solution to the problem. But I 
wouldn't refuse to do it again in a like 
situation. I thought we had a proper 
place in trying to solve that. 

But in the southern part of Africa, 
the independence of Namibia— this was 
dead in the water — we have made great 
progress there, and we are very op- 
timistic about what might take place. I 
think there was disarray with our Euro- 
pean allies. I think that has been largely 
eliminated, and they have confidence in 
us once again. So I think we're progress- 
ing very well with what it is we're trying 
to accomplish. 

Q. What steps are you prepared to 
take if Israel resumes fighting in 
Lebanon, moves in on the FLO and 
West Beirut? And what is the United 
States prepared to do for the Palestin- 
ians whose legal rights you apparently 
told President Mubarak of Egypt the 
United States supports? 

A. This is a question, again, where I 
have to beg your tolerance — with the 
delicacy of the negotiations that are try- 
ing to achieve those three major points 
that I mentioned. There's just no way 
that I could comment on or speculate 
about what might happen because I 
don't want anything that might in any 



way affect those negotiations, all of 
which involve the very things that you're 
asking about, and I just have to remain 
silent on those. 

Q. In 1976, when another 
Secretary of State left under another 
President, you were critical of the ex- 
planations given and called for a fuller 
explanation. With all due respect, 
don't you think that the American peo- 
ple deserve to know more of the 
reasons that led to the departure of 
Secretary Haig? 

A. If I thought that there was 
something involved in this that the 
American people needed to know, with 
regard to their own welfare, then I 
would be frank with the American peo- 
ple and tell them. And I think if we're 
recalling the same previous resignation, 
I think there were some things that in- 
dicated that maybe there was something 
where the — there were sides in which 
the American people needed to know for 
their own judgment. 

Q. Then you think that the entire 
explanation has been g^ven as far as is 
necessary? 

A. Yes, I don't think there's 
anything that in any way would benefit 
the people to know or that will in any 
way effect their good judgment. 

Q. Many Arab states are sa3ing 
that if Israel invades Beirut — west 
Beirut — it can only be because you 
have given Israel a green light to do 
so. Have you done so? Will you? And 
what will be your attitude if Israel 
goes into west Beirut? 

A. Again this is the type of question 
in which, with the negotiations at the 
point they are, that I can't answer. I 
would like to say this: No, I've given no 
green light whatsoever. And an impres- 
sion that I know some of the neighbor- 
ing states there have had from the 
beginning is that somehow we were 
aware of this and we gave permission or 
something. No, we were caught as much 
by surprise as anyone, and we wanted a 
diplomatic solution and believe there 
could have been one. 

Q. But, if I may, last week your 
deputy press secretary said that when 
Prime Minister Begin was here, he 
promised you that Israel would go no 
further into Beirut. 

A. I think also — his not having 
heard the conversation between Prime 
Minister Begin and myself, that what he 



called a promise actually was in a discus- 
sion in which, to be more accurate, the 
Prime Minister had said to me that they 
didn't want to and that they had not 
wanted to from the beginning. 

Q. So it was not a promise not to 
doit? 

A. No. 

Q. The British Government today 
took steps to enable British companies 
to get around the U.S. embargo on the 
sale of gas pipeline equipment to the 
Soviet Union. Some of your advisers, 
including Mr. Haig, have argued all 
along that this embargo is going to be 
counterproductive and is going to be 
damaging to U.S. interests in Europe. 
I'm wondering if you have any second 
thoughts about the U.S. embargo or if 
you intend to take any additional steps 
to force our European allies to go 
along with this. 

A. There aren't any additional 
steps. We were well aware that there 
might be legalities concerned with the 
contracts of the licensing of foreign 
countries. This is simply a matter of 
principle. We proposed that embargo 
back at the time when the trouble began 
in Poland, as we believe firmly that the 
Soviet Union is the supporter of the 
trouble in Poland and is the one to deal 
with on that. We said that these sanc- 
tions were imposed until — and we 
specified some things that we felt should 
be done to relax the oppression that is 
going on of the people of Poland by their 
military government. 

If that is done, we'll lift those sanc- 
tions. But I don't vee any way that, in 
principle, we could back away from that 
simply because the Soviet Union has sat 
there and done nothing. And this is the 
reason for it. I understand that it's a 
hardship. We tried to persuade our allies 
not to go forward with the pipeline for 
two reasons. One, we think there is a 
risk that they become industrially de- 
pendent on the Soviet Union for energy, 
and all the valves are on the Soviet side 
of the border, that the Soviet Union can 
engage in a kind of blackmail when that 
happens. 

The second thing is, the Soviet 
Union is very hard pressed financially 
and economically today. They have put 
their people literally on a starvation diet 
with regard to consumer items while 
they poured all their resources into the 
most massive military buildup the world 
has ever seen. And that buildup is ob- 
viously aimed at the nations in the 
alliance. They — the Soviet Union — now 
hard-pressed for cash because of its own 



August 1982 



37 



THE PRESIDENT 



actions, can perceive anywhere from 
$10-$12 billion a year in hard cash 
payments in return for that energy 
when the pipeline is completed which, I 
assume, if they continue the present 
policies, would be used to arm further 
against the rest of us and against our 
allies and thus force more cost for ar- 
maments for the rest of the world. 

And for these two reasons we tried 
to persuade our allies not to go forward. 
In some instances they claim that the 
Administrations before them — see, there 
are others that have had Administra- 
tions before them— had made contracts 
which they felt were binding on their 
countries and so forth. We offered to 
help them with a source of energy closer 
to home— Norway and the Netherlands 
and gas fields that apparently have a 
potential that could meet their needs. 
We weren't able to get that agreement. 
We did have some success with regard 
to credits where the Soviet Union is con- 
cerned. 

But this — our sanctions — as I say, 
have to do with actions taken by the 
Soviet Union and our response to those 
actions. 

Q. Do you intend to keep or in the 
near future remove the sanctions you 
imposed on Argentina in the 
Falklands crisis? 

A. I can't give you an answer on 
that, what is going on right now. We did 
our best, as I said before, to try to bring 
about a peaceful settlement. It didn't 
happen. And there was armed conflict, 
and there has been a victor and a van- 
quished, and now it's hardly the place 
for us to intervene in that. We'll stand 
by ready to help if our help is asked for. 
We just haven't had a discussion on that 
matter as yet. 

Q. I don't know if HI succeed 
where others have failed before. I 
understand your reluctance to discuss 
the Haig resignation. But two specific 
questions have seemed to arise from 
that resignation. Do you think that 
there were mixed signals sent to the 
Middle East which resulted in the 
PLO getting one impression — that you 
were pressing the Israelis to with- 
draw — while the rest of the Ad- 
ministration was trying to maintain 
pressure on the PLO to evacuate and 
disarm? 

And the second one is, did you 
sort of blind-side your own State 
Department when you suddenly made 
the decision to take your most severe 



option on the pipeline, leaving the 
State Department dangling to explain 
to Western Europe? 

A. No, there was no blind-siding on 
that; that was fully discussed and has 
been several times in the Cabinet. There 
were differences of opinion about the ex- 
tent to which we would do it or whether 
we would do it at all. And I had to come 
down, as I did at the first, on the side of 
what I thought was principle. 

As to conflicting signals, no. I know 
there have been rumors about that. No, 
we have been in constant communication 
through the State Department with Phil 
Habib and taking much of our lead from 
his reporting of what's going on there 
and what we can or can't do that might 
be helpful. And, naturally there are 
times such as I've had conversations 
with ambassadors. But everything that 
is discussed is then related to whoever 
was not present — National Security 
Council, the National Security Adviser, 
State Department — so that at all times 
and there has never been any dual track 
or confusion with regard to our com- 
munications. 

Q. Some Israeli officials have 
acknowledged in recent days the use 
of cluster bombs in the war in 
Lebanon. How much does this concern 
you? 

A. It concerns me very much, as the 
whole thing does. We have a review go- 
ing now, as we must by law, of the use 
of weapons and whether American 
weapons sold there were used offensive- 
ly and not defensively, and that situation 
is very ambiguous. The only statement 
that we have heard so far with regard to 
the cluster bomb was that one military 
official — Israeli military official — has ap- 
parently made that statement publicly, 
and we know no more about it than 
what we ourselves have read in the 
press. But the review is going forward 
and the review that would lead to what 
the law requires — that we must inform 
the Congress as to whether we believe 
there was a question of this being an of- 
fensive attack or whether it was in self- 
defense. 

When I said ambiguous you must 
recall that prior to this attack, Soviet- 
built rockets and 180-millimeter cannons 
were shelling villages across the border 
in Israel and causing civilian casualties. 



Text from White House press release. I 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President Bush Visits 
East Asia and the Pacific 



Vice President Bush departed 
Washington, D.C., April 22. 1982, to 
visit Japan (April 23-25). Korea 
(April 25-27). Singapore (April 27-29), 
Australia (April 29-May 3), New 
Zealand (May 3-5), and China 
(May 5-9). He returned to the United 
States on May 9. 

Following are the Vice President's 
remarks before the Foreign Correspond- 
ents' Club of Japan in Tokyo and the Na- 
tional Assembly in Seoul, his dinner 
toasts in Singapore and Melbourne, his 
arrival statement in Wellington, and his 
departure statement in Beijing. ' 



REMARKS BEFORE THE 
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS' 
CLUB OF JAPAN, TOKYO. 
APR. 24, 1982 

I've come to Japan in the interests of 
harmony, friendship, and peace. I've 
come to learn, and I've come to hsten. 
The day is past when America seeks to 
dominate the agenda of the countries of 
the free world. 

The free world will survive, as a 
concept and reality, only if the partner- 
ships that make it up remain intact and 
vibrant. As we enter the 1980s and ap- 
proach the millennium, America will 
guard its old friendships carefully, even 
as it seeks new partners in the free 
world. 

If I come in the interests of har- 
mony, it is a time when the affairs of 
the world are increasingly dishar- 
monious. The Soviet Union's appetite for 
the freedom of other peoples is as 
rapacious as ever. Lech Walesa 
languishes in confinement as his coun- 
trymen contend with martial law, having 
only the fleeting encouragement of the 
broadcast of Radio Solidarity. 

An army of occupation continues its 
ruthless campaign against the Afghan 
people— continues to kill innocent men, 
women, and children with chemicals 
outlawed by all decent societies. Soviet 
leaders have given homilies on their 
desire for nuclear disarmament as 
SS-20 missiles sprouted overnight like 
fields of asparagus. Old wounds persist 
in the Middle East, though tomorrow 
will witness a decisive, historic, and 
courageous step for peace when Israel 
completes its withdrawal from the Sinai. 



We are reminded every day that 
liberty is on trial and that darkness has 
descended over many parts of the world. 
In Eastern Asia, it has descended on 
North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Soviet 
Asia, and Kampuchea. One of the most 
enduring symbols of the injustices of the 
20th century may be those people who 
have braved the dangers of the sea in 
open boats. There is much to mourn. 
But there is also much to celebrate, 
which brings me to my visit. 



In the next 3 weeks, Japan and the 
United States will observe two impor- 
tant anniversaries — April 28th, just a 
few days from now, will mark the 30th 
anniversary of the San Francisco peace 
treaty and the end of postwar occupa- 
tion. The last 30 years have seen the 
historically unprecedented boom of 
postwar Japan. Not surprisingly is this 
known as "the miracle of Japan." No 
Eastern bloc countries will be 
celebrating such anniversaries this 
year — or next year or the year after. 
That is a sad fact, and the heart of the 



Vice President and Mrs. Bush ring a tem- 
ple bell at the Zojoji temple in Tokyo. 




,vtsV(>.y« V fWfrf'^f! 



August 1982 



39 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



West goes out to those milllions of peo- 
ple who will continue to live under the 
threat of Soviet armies and under the 
blight of Marxist mismanagement. 

On May 15th, Japan and the United 
States will observe the 10th anniversary 
of the reversion of the Island of 
Okinawa. Many brave men fought and 
died there. The soil that absorbed their 
blood is now a shrine to their memory. I 
hope Okinawa will now be remembered 
not so much as a battleground but as a 
symbol of how our two nations worked 
together to heal the wounds of war. 

It's true that these two anniversaries 
come at a time of some bilateral prob- 
lems between our two countries. But I 
haven't come here to emphasize them or 
to dramatize them. If my presence here 
today dramatizes anything, it's what 
joins us, not what separates us. 

Obviously, problems exist. They are 
no secret, and they are important prob- 
lems for us both, but just as obviously, 
we're all anxious to work out solu- 
tions — together. Partners consult; they 
don't dictate to each other. We've got a 
vigorous dialogue going, and there's no 
need to suspect it will grow any less 
vigorous over the years. 

Our Japanese friends can expect 
from us what all our friends can expect 
from us — open lines of communication, a 
determination to overcome obstacles, 
and consistency. To them I would say: 
There will be no unpleasant surprises in 
your relations with us. 

Japan now enjoys an unquestioned 
prominence among the nations of the 
world. It has a global role to play in the 
affairs of the 20th century — a role that 
will expand in the 21st. As it assumes a 
greater role, its responsibilities will 
grow in proportion. There are clear in- 
dications the Japanese people have a 
growing awareness of their country's 
new global role and of the obligation and 
responsibilities that accompany great 
economic strength. 

To paraphrase penetrating analysis 
by the present Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
Kiichi Miyazawa, the Japanese were not 
ready in the 1970s to assume their full 
share of global responsibility; even 
though Japan, as Mr. Miyazawa pointed 
out, "became increasingly conscious of 
the need to play a large role in the inter- 
national economy and made considerable 
efforts to do so." Japan's performance 
should be measured in its context as the 
second largest economic power among 
the industrialized democracies. Today, 
its political role is growing — as it 
should. As a pillar of the industrialized 
democracies, Japan cannot avoid that 



role, and I for one can think of no nation 
more qualified to assume it. 

Japan, meanwhile, has been 
demonstrating that it is willing to 
cooperate with its Western friends in all 
areas, including matters of defense and 
trade. Prime Minister Suzuki's 
statements on behalf of increased 
defense goals, along with recent in- 
creases in Japan's defense budget, attest 
to Japan's good faith. We are conscious, 
too, that the question of Japan's defense 
spending is much more complex than the 
black-and-white terms in which it is too 
often discussed. Let me say that the 
United States is grateful for the prog- 
ress so far on the defense issue. 

We would, of course, be grateful for 
continued progress, knowing as we do 
that Japan will make its own decisions. 
We have confidence in the wisdom and 
global perspective of Japan's leaders and 
its people, just as we have confidence 
that we will continue to cooperate in this 
crucial area. At the same time, we 
recognize the contributions of Japan's 
foreign aid program, much of which 
goes to critical parts of the world, where 
both our countries are working toward 
the same goals. 

There is no question that some fric- 
tion exists between the United States 
and Japan in the matter of trade. Many 
visitors from Japan, as well as my and 
Japan's great friend, former Am- 
bassador Robert Ingersoll, have recently 
remarked on the danger of protec- 
tionism and the extent to which senti- 
ment has been aroused in all quarters on 
trade issues. My own sense is that we 
both want to achieve the same goals — 
free trade and fair trade. But here I 
want to make a point that I cannot em- 
phasize enough, namely, that we cannot 
allow trade disagreements to dominate 
our dialogue. Some newspapers have 
drawn the conclusion that our two coun- 
tries are moving toward a "head-on colli- 
sion" on trade. I disagree. I think, happi- 
ly, that we're moving toward some head- 
on decisions on trade. 

Long before the dilemmas of the 
postmodern age, Simon Bolivar said that 
"... the majority of men hold as a truth 
the humiliating principle that it is harder 
to maintain the balance of liberty than 
to endure the weight of tyranny." 
However vexatious our disagreements 
may be, we live at a time when we 
ought never to take for granted the 
special comfort of our friendship. 

The difficulties abound, but we have 
the will and the wherewithal to over- 
come them. The historical imperative 
demands that we do. It is, for instance, 



no secret that the United States has had 
difficulties pursuing our relations with 
the People's Republic of China. But we 
are absolutely resolved to strengthen 
our relationship with the People's 
Republic and in cooperating in its 
development. We thoroughly appreciate 
the importance of that relationship to all 
Asia. Strengthening it will, of course, 
require the efforts on both sides. But I 
am greatly confident of a successful out- 
come. 

There are many other challenges 
facing the United States. President 
Reagan is deeply committed to arms 
reduction. He is willing to explore all 
reasonable — and verifiable — approaches 
to the question of how to reduce the 
world's arsenal of nuclear weapons. His 
zero-option proposal of last November 
was the single most sincere and 
dramatic overture to the Soviet Union in 
a long, long while. He's been earnest 
and aggressive in pursuing talks with 
the Soviets. But there has been a great 
deal of confusion and misunderstanding 
on the matter. 

No one is more interested in main- 
taining peace between the Soviet Union 
and the United States than Ronald 
Reagan. He seeks no confrontation 
there. He seeks to reduce tensions — ten- 
sions caused in no small part by the 
Soviet Union's international behavior. 
President Reagan will do everything he 
can to convince the Soviet Union to 
cooperate with the United States in 
agreeing to arms reduction. And he will 
keep America strong. To pursue new 
policies does not mean old ones will be 
abandoned. Make no mistake: He will 
maintain our deterrence. 

Our secret weapon in the protracted 
conflict against totalitarianism lies not in 
underground silos but in our free 
marketplaces. I say secret because the 
leaders of the totalitarian regimes can- 
not afford to impart the knowlege of the 
triumph of capitalism to their people. 
What Russian worker, fully informed of 
the status, condition, and rights of his 
counterpart in the United States or 
Japan or in any of the other industrial- 
ized democracies, would not run to the 
nearest Aeroflot office and get himself 
and his family on the next flight out? 
But alas, Pravda does not print the 
whole story; Aeroflot does not accept 
reservations from just anyone. 

Irving Kristol once addressed the 
question of why democracies live and 
die. For over 2,000 years, he said, 
political philosophers rejected democracy 
because they believed that it inevitably 
degenerated into chaos and dictatorship. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



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THE VICE PRESIDENT 



But, "what changed the attitude of 
pohtical philosophers," wrote Kristol, 
"was the emergence of modern 
capitalism, with its promise of economic 
growth — of an economic system in 
which everyone could improve his condi- 
tion without having to do so at someone 
else's expense. It is the expectation of 
tomorrow's bigger pie, from which 
everyone will receive a larger slice, that 
prevents people from fighting to the bit- 
ter end over the division of today's pie." 

Japan and the United States need 
each other to grow. We depend on each 
other to grow. Our combined national 
products account for one-third of the 
world's output. That is a formidable 
weapon against the adversaries of 
freedom. We owe it to ourselves, to our 
friends in the free world, and moreover 
to those who may someday be free to 
resolve our differences, so that, 
together, we can build on a past that 
promises great things to come. 

ADDRESS BEFORE 

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 

SEOUL, APR. 26, 1982 

This is my first visit to Korea. I hope it 
will not be my last. On arriving I was 
struck by two things. The first was how 
close we are here to the DMZ [demil- 
itarized zone] and the realization of how 
much a part of everyday life in Seoul 
that proximity is. The second was how 
amazed and touched I was by the 
warmth of the public reception. I have 
always heard about Korean hospitality 
and graciousness. Yesterday, what had 
only been general knowledge became a 
first-hand experience. Please thank the 
people you represent. They made me 
feel very welcome, just as you have by 
inviting me to speak to you today. 

We celebrate this year a century of 
friendship between the government and 
peoples of the United States and Korea 
—100 years. That is not such a long 
time, perhaps, in the march of human 
history; but a hundred years is one-half 
of the U.S. life as a nation. That we 
have been friends so long, in a world 
that, in those 100 years has seen enough 
conflict and hatred to last a millennium, 
is cause for great joy. 

I carry with me the greetings and 
the friendship of the people of the 
United States and of President Reagan. 
What I have to say here today I say on 
their behalf. I am glad to be able to give 
my message to you, representing as you 
do the Korean people. I am honored that 




you called this body into special session 
in order to hear it. 

Legislative bodies such as this Na- 
tional Assembly are where the people's 
business should be conducted. I myself 
am well enough acquainted with 
legislative branches to know that they 
are not always tranquil. Indeed, 
sometimes they are rather noisy. 

Long ago, Simon Bolivar, one of the 
great liberators of the Western Hemi- 
sphere, said that "... the majority of 
men hold as a truth the humiliating prin- 
ciple that it is harder to maintain the 
balance of liberty than to endure the 
weight of tyranny." This is ever true of 
our own times. Our own Congress is 
sometimes full of noise. But we would 
have it no other way. 

In the North, there is no truly repre- 
sentative Congress. Instead only a great 
silence — the silence of despotism and 
one-man rule. This silence is broken by 
the occasional sounds of violence, as it 



Near the demilitarized zone in Korea, Vice 
President Bush received a briefing from 
Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., commander in 
chief of the U.N. command, U.S forces in 
Korea, and the combined forces command. 

was last week when four who sought 
freedom were killed by their own coun- 
trymen as they made their way to freer 
soil. 

The occasion of 100 years of rela- 
tions is a fitting time to emphasize the 
continuity of our friendship. We will re- 
main a faithful ally. We will remain a 
reliable ally. We are partners in the non- 
Communist world. That especially makes 
our bond a sacred one. If America once 
lectured its friends and apologized to its 
adversaries, that day is over. 

During the height of the Vietnam 
war, a message was passed to President 
Nixon. It was from Henry Kissinger, 
then a professor at Harvard. The 
message said, "The word is going out 
that it may be dangerous to be 



August 1982 



41 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



America's enemy, but it is fatal to be its 
friend." As long as Ronald Reagan sits 
in the Oval Office of the White House, 
no one will be able to say this about the 
United States. 

We live in a world full of tension- 
tensions which complicate our search for 
a lasting peace. The United States is a 
Pacific power, and Korea is one of our 
most vital allies. The purpose of 
America's presence in Korea is to pro- 
tect and preserve the peace which both 
our countries fought so liard to bring 
about. The United States will remain a 
power in Korea only as long as we are 
welcome. It is not our desire to 
dominate the non-Communist world, 
only to be a vital partner in it and to be 
a friend upon whom our friends can 
rely. 

The United States is proud to have 
as its friend and ally a country such as 
Korea, where economic miracles occur. 
Twenty years ago, this was a poor coun- 
try. Political scientists study South 
Korea as a model for economic develop- 
ment. Kim Kyung Won has explained 
part of the Korean success this way. "It 
is," he said, ''the culture of discipline and 
postponing immediate satisfaction for 
the future— even for posterity." 

According to an international labor 
organization study, South Koreans work 
longer hours than any other people on 
Earth. This industriousness has given 
you one of the most dynamic economies 
of the 20th century. Between 1970 and 
1980, the volume of trade between our 
two countries has increased hugely: 
from $531 million to $10 billion. 

The United States is, of course, a 
vital market for Korean goods, and vice 
versa. President Reagan has made it 
clear that he will do all he can to keep 
the U.S. market open. There are few 
other advocates of free trade as ardent 
as he. And naturally his job in per- 
suading those who regulate the market 
to keep it open will be made easier if our 
trading partners are prepared to make 
the same pledge. Korea is our ninth 
largest trading partner, and we expect it 
will become even more important in the 
years ahead. Because, among other 
things, your economy is expanding so 
rapidly. Your growth rate last year was 
14%. By sharp contrast, the North has 
one-fourth the output of the South. One- 
half of the North's work force is re- 
quired to feed its people; in the South, 
little more than one-third are needed to 
fulfill that task. Your hard work and 
determination to bring about these 
economic successes have validated, in 



the eyes of the world community, the 
U.S. decision to help you sustain your 
freedom. 

Against this background of extra- 
ordinary economic achievement, the op- 
portunities for pluralism are strong. 
President Chun, the first head of state 
President Reagan received at the White 
House, spoke of a new era in the 
Republic of Korea, an era of "renewal of 
the spirit of national harmony, replacing 
the old chronic and internecine battles 
between those who take rigid and ex- 
treme positions." He spoke of an era of 
"dialogue" and "consensus building." He 
spoke of a "freer, more abundant, and 
democratic society in our midst." We 
support this philosophy with all our 
heart. And we look to President Chun 
and to this assembly to build on such a 
commitment, the foundation stones of 
which have already been laid. 

In a democracy, legislatures are the 
only true means of determining the will 
of the people. Democracy, as President 
Abraham Lincoln defined it for us long 
ago, consists of " . . . government of the 
people, by the people, for the people." 
To be sure, the people speak with many 
voices; but in free countries, as someone 
once observed, every man is entitled to 
express his opinions, and every man is 
entitled not to listen. 

Some countries have a fear of 
pluralism, and only the preordained few 
control the destinies of the many. One 
country in our own hemisphere— Nica- 
ragua— overthrew an autocratic, 
repressive regime, promising that the 
new order would be pluralistic and 
democratic, promising that all Nica- 
raguans would have a voice in their new 
government. Unfortunately, the rulers 
of that new Nicaragua subsequently 
found one excuse after another for post- 
poning elections, closing down the news- 
papers, and jailing the opposition. The 
United States regrets this, just as it 
regrets the suppression of democratic 
practices in all countries, friend or foe. 
We see political diversity as a source of 
strength not weakness. 

There is an ancient Chinese curse 
that says, "May you live in interesting 
times." We live today in interesting 
times— though I think that is more a 
challenge than a curse. The most impor- 
tant task facing us as partners is 
preserving peace. The very close 
cooperation between the United States 
and Korea is a matter of record. The 
United States will try to build on new 
relations, such as the one we have with 
the People's Republic of China, but not 



at the expense of our longstanding 
friendships. 

A great American poet once wrote, 
"Most of the change we think we see in 
life is due to truths being in and out of 
favor." The policy of deterrence has 
served us well in the past; why should it 
not continue to serve us well in the 
future? I sympathize with those intellec- 
tual quarters who devote themselves to 
the search for new solutions. But that 
does not mean the old solutions are no 
longer valuable. The essence of deter- 
rence is that where there is balance, 
there is safety. This policy has kept the 
peace in Korea since 1954. The world 
has seen a great many wars in our time. 
Since NATO was founded in 1948, for 
instance, about 150 wars have broken 
out. In this troubled century, 28 years of 
peace on this peninsula amounts to a 
proud legacy. 

The quest for lasting peace involves 
more than merely maintaining the statics 
quo. This is why President Reagan has 
been trying hard to encourage the 
Soviet Union to work with the United 
States in finding a way to bring about 
real and verifiable nuclear arms reduc- 
tion. And that is also why the United 
States so strongly supports the bold and 
imaginative initiative of President Chun 
toward a reunification of the two 
Koreas. 

I would take this opportunity to 
urge Kim Il-song to respond to Presi- 
dent Chun in the same spirit. The 
United States will be glad to discuss 
new ideas with the North, in conjunction 
with the South. We have no intentions 
of talking to the North alone. 

Here let me make an important 
point about the foreign policy of Ronald 
Reagan. He is anxious to pursue all 
avenues toward dialogue, believing as he 
does that the best way to bring about 
dialogue is to seek it from a position of 
strength. It is a truism of foreign policy 
that an adversary is more likely to 
negotiate if it is to his advantage to 
negotiate. If, for instance, the United 
States were to remove its military forces 
from all over the world, what incentive 
for restraint in international behavior 
would remain for the Soviets? Thus, un- 
til the day comes when the Soviet 
Union, and other Communist nations 
such as Vietnam, decide to respect inter- 
national law and to reduce international 
tension, the United States has little 
choice but to remain strong. And so we 
shall. 

Kim Il-song, to judge from his 
rather lengthy speeches— lengthier, 
even, than my own— is adamant on the 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



subject of withdrawal of the United 
States peacekeeping forces from Korea. 
I should like to take this opportunity to 
admonish him to redirect his rhetorical 
energies elsewhere. Too many men and 
women — Korean and American — have 
already given their lives protecting this 
land from his troops. He desires 
reunification, but as we saw all too 
recently in Vietnam, reunification, in 
Communist terms, means the horrors of 
new wars, "reeducation," camps, and 
hundreds of thousands of people driven 
to the sea in open boats. The United 
States has no intention of stepping aside 
in Korea so Kim Il-song can launch 
another invasion and set the clock back 
32 years. 

It is our earnest hope that he even- 
tually will see the logic of negotiations. 
But we in the United States as you in 
the Republic of Korea are prepared to 
wait for that day patiently and to pros- 
per in the meantime as we begin our 
second 100 years of friendship. 



DINNER TOAST, 
SINGAPORE, 
APR. 27, 1982 

I'm very honored to be here this even- 
ing. It's been too long since my last visit 
to Singapore in the mid-1970s. You've 
undergone remarkable changes, under- 
taken remarkable achievements. In the 
midst of an uncertain world, you've 
created a society that has excited the ad- 
miration and respect of many nations. 
This is obviously a source of great pride 
for those who have taken part in the 
Singapore adventure. 

The Vice President and Singapore's Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew offer toasts. 



The world looks to Singapore, and 
especially to your leadership, Mr. Prime 
Minister [Lee Kuan Yew]. Your vision, 
you ingenuity, your range of ac- 
complishments are known throughout 
the world. You have shown boldness, 
that quality so valued by Disraeli, who 
told us that "success is the child of 
audacity." 

We are good friends, Singapore and 
the United States. We share the same 
view on many matters. We both believe 
in free enterprise as a stabilizing in- 
fluence. We are not allies in a formal 
sense, but we both believe in the need 
for the United States to maintain a 
strong and steady influence in the 
Pacific region. The United States, as I 
have told audiences in all the East Asian 
countries I've visited on this trip, has no 
desire to dominate; only to be a good 
and faithful friend and a dependable 
ally. 

We live, as the traditional Chinese 
curse has it, in the interesting times. 
Soviet aggression is on the loose in 
many parts of the world. Here, their 
proxy, Vietnam, continues its war 
against Kampuchea. Its occupation of 
that country is a profoundly destabiliz- 
ing influence in Southeast Asia, filling 
refugee camps of Thailand, just as the 
rulers of the new Vietnam have filled 
the sea with hundreds and thousands of 
homeless souls. 

We deplore these tragedies. We are 
both anxious for withdrawal from 
beleaguered Kampuchea. We are both 
anxious for increased respect for inter- 
national law. ASEAN [Association of 
South East Nations] plays an enormous- 
ly important role as a stabilizing and 
progressive influence in this region. And 
we recognize the crucial role that 




Singapore plays in that organization. 
I look forward most to eagerly to 
my meeting with you tomorrow, Mr. 
Prime Minister, to hearing first-hand 
your perspective on questions pertaining 
to Southeast Asia and the world. I also 
look forward to hearing your views on 
world affairs, inasmuch as you are, by 
virtue of your leadership of this interna- 
tionally minded country, a man of the 
world. I'll be ready to address the issues 
you have so forthrightly expressed in 
your remarks. 



DINNER REMARKS, 
MELBOURNE, 
MAY 1, 1982 

Barbara and I have been the recipients 

of so many kindnesses since we arrived 
here 2 days ago. The hospitality seems 
to go on and on; seems to be as endless 
as the great stretches of territory we 
flew over since our first stop in Darwin 
and here. Once again, so many thanks. 

I want to tell you how pleased Bar- 
bara and I are to have had the chance to 
visit Melbourne, your city, Mr. Prime 
Minister [Malcolm Fraser]. I see why it 
is called Australia's "Garden City." On 
our visit here we've seen one beautiful 
city after another. I must say, I think 
John Batman knew a bargain when he 
saw one — if he bought all this for 200 
pounds of trinkets. When your great 
past Prime Minister and fellow Vic- 
torian, Robert Menzies, visited us in the 
United States back in 1950, he said that 
except in the jaundiced eye of the law, 
Americans are not regarded as for- 
eigners in Australia. I have managed on 
my visit to keep out of the way of your 
law. You've made us feel wonderfully at 
home. 

Our two countries have passed so 
many tests in this century. We fought 
together in four wars — World Wars I 
and II, Korea, and Vietnam. If, as 
Hazlitt said, prosperity is a great 
teacher, but adversity is a greater one, 
then we've learned much, both from our 
hardships and from the way we shared 
them. 

For the past 30 years, our ANZUS 
[Australia, New Zealand, United States] 
mutual defense treaty has helped to 
keep the peace. That treaty is the cor- 
nerstone of our security in the South- 
west Pacific and the foundation for our 
search for peaceful resolutions to heated 
conflict worldwide. 

Thirty years later, it has endured in 
a way far beyond the vision of those 



August 1982 



43 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




In Sydney, Vice President Bush reviews the honor guard. 



who put their signatures to that docu- 
ment. The cooperation of AustraHan and 
U.S. forces in contributing to the Sinai 
peace force shows how far our collabora- 
tion has taken us. In a world in which 
there are too few peace processes, our 
standing together in that part of the 
world, far from our own shores, should 
give us great satisfaction. In these 
perilous times. President Reagan is 
determined to do all he can to maintain 
the intimacy between our countries on 
which ANZUS thrives. 

It was Sir Percy Spencer, the 
Australian statesman, who once told our 
House of Representatives that, "So far 
as it is possible, it is our objective to 
build up with the United States 
somewhat the same relationship that ex- 
ists within the British Commonwealth. 
That is to say, we desire a full exchange 
of information and experience on all 
matters of mutual interest." 

Our discussions of the past 2 days 
can only be described as very friendly 
and productive. Yesterday in Canberra, 
we had a long and straightforward ses- 
sion around the cabinet table with the 
Prime Minister and members of his 
cabinet. Many subjects were raised with 
so few disagreements. It's not the stuff 
that banner headlines are made of, but 
that's the way it is with friends. That's 
the way it must be in this dangerous 
world. And for the free nations of the 
world, that's big news. 



Our talks ranged around the entire 
world— Japan, China, the Falklands, the 
Soviet Union, the ASEAN nations, the 
nations that comprise the Caribbean. We 
discussed President Reagan's deep and 
abiding desire to reduce nuclear 
weapons throughout the world. And as 
the Prime Minister said in the meeting, 
we saved to the last the sweetest subject 
of all — sugar. 

There is very little going on in our 
world today that is not of mutual in- 
terest to both our countries. As partners 
in the free world, we have done and will 
continue to do our all to insure that 
those who have given everything they 
had in the defense of freedom shall not 
have done so in vain and that those who 
come after us will be able to say that we 
worked for peace on their behalf. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT, 

WELLINGTON. 

MAY 3, 1982 

It's very good, finally, to be in New 
Zealand, Mr Prime Minister [Robert 
Muldoon], and I want to thank you for 
your kind invitation. Barbara and I have 
been looking forward very much to this 
part of our journey for a long, long 
time. I've never been here before, but 
back home the beauty of New Zealand is 
well known, as is the innate and legend- 
ary graciousness of New Zealanders. I'm 
looking forward enormously to our talks 



and to those with other members of 
your government. 

I've come to New Zealand to reaf- 
firm the friendship between our two 
countries. Just a few days ago, we 
marked the 30th anniversary of the en- 
try into force of the ANZUS treaty, 
which marked the beginning of our for- 
mal, postwar alliance. The spirit of AN- 
ZUS is strong — stronger even than the 
vision of those who put their signatures 
to the document in 1951. As the world 
has evolved, so has our friendship. The 
United States has learned that as Emer- 
son put it long ago, "the best way to 
have a friend is to be one." 

Ours is much more than a security 
alliance. Our ties are cultural and 
economic and grounded in the conviction 
that democracy has given us the means 
and the power to attain our pros- 
perity — and our peace. 

Our friendship goes back long before 
ANZUS. I've come not only to celebrate 
our past but, I hope, to inaugurate our 
future. In America we place great value 
on the comradeship and the self-sacrifice 
that characterized the origins of our 
partnership. And we place equally great 
value on a friend who continues to stand 
for those values that sustain and nourish 
the free world. 

Lest I overstay my welcome within 
only minutes of my landing here in Wel- 
lington, let me conclude by simply say- 
ing, thank you for this warm welcome. 
Thank you for having us here, Mr. 
Prime Minister. 

Vice President Bush lays a wreath at New 
Zealand's National War Memorial in Well- 
ingrton; he is accompanied by Lt. Col. 
Michael Fry, a member of the Vice Presi- 
dent's staff. 




44 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



President Reagan's Letters 



TO VICE CHAIRMAN 
DENG XIAOPING, 
APR. 5, 1982 

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman: 

The establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and China was an 
historic event which improved the prospects 
for peace and served the interests of both our 
peoples. Yet we now find ourselves at a dif- 
ficult juncture in those relations. 

I am writing to you because it is impor- 
tant for the leadership of both our countries 
to resume the broad advance to which you 
have contributed so much. This is particularly 
important today, as we face a growing threat 
from the Soviet Union and its satellite na- 
tions throughout the world. Though our in- 
terests and thus our policies are not identical, 
in Afghanistan and Iran, in Southeast Asia, 
in my own hemisphere, and in the field of 
nuclear weaponry, your nation and mine face 
clear and present dangers, and these should 
impel us toward finding a firm basis for 
cooperation. 

We have come far together in a very 
short time. I strongly support the continua- 
tion of this progress. We must work together 
to expand the benefits to both our countries. 
My Administration had taken a number of in- 
itiatives to further this process, and we in- 
tend to do more. 

Clearly, the Taiwan issue has been a most 
difficult problem between our governments. 
Nonetheless, vision and statesmanship have 
enabled us in the past to reduce our dif- 
ferences over this issue while we have built a 
framework of long-term friendship and 
cooperation. 

The United States firmly adheres to the 
positions agreed upon in the Joint Com- 
munique on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations between the United States and 
China. There is only one China. We will not 
permit the unofficial relations between the 
American people and the people of Taiwan to 
weaken our commitment to this principle. 

I fully understand and respect the posi- 
tion of your government with regard to the 
question of arms sales to Taiwan. As you 
know, our position on this matter was stated 
in the process of normalization: the United 
States has an abiding interest in the peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question. 

We fully recognize the significance of the 
nine-point proposal of September 30, 1979. 
The decisions and the principles conveyed on 
my instructions to your government on 
January 11, 1982 reflect our appreciation of 
the new situation created by these 
developments. 

In this spirit, we wish to continue our ef- 
forts to resolve our differences and to create 
a cooperative and enduring bilateral and 
strategic relationship. China and America are 
two great nations destined to grow stronger 



through cooperation, not weaker through 
division. 

In the spirit of deepening the understand- 
ing between our two countries, I would like 
to call your attention to the fact that Vice 
President Bush will be traveling to East Asia 
toward the end of April. The Vice President 
knows and admires you. He is also fully 
aware of my thinking about the importance 
of developing stronger relations between our 
two countries. If it would be helpful, I would 
be delighted to have the Vice President pay a 
visit to Beijing, as part of his Asian trip, so 
that these matters can be discussed directly 
and personally with you and other key 
leaders of the People's Republic of China. 



Sincerely, 



Ronald Reagan 



TO PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG, 
APR. 5, 1982 

Dear Mr. Premier: 

The present state of relations between 
our two countries deeply concerns me. We 
believe significant deterioration in those rela- 
tions would serve the interests of neither the 
United States of America nor the People's 
Republic of China. 

As the late Premier Zhou Enlai said in 
welcoming President Nixon to China in 1972, 
"The Chinese people are a great people, and 
the American people are a great people." We 
are strong, sovereign nations sharing many 
common interests. We both face a common 
threat of expanding Soviet power and 
hegemonism. History has placed upon us a 
joint responsibility to deal with this danger. 

The differences between us are rooted in 
the long-standing friendship between the 
American people and the Chinese people who 
live on Taiwan. We will welcome and support 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In 
this connection, we appreciate the policies 
which your government has followed to pro- 
vide a peaceful settlement. 

As I told Vice Premier Huang in 
Washington, we welcome your nine-point ini- 
tiative. 

As I also told the Vice Premier, we ex- 
pect that in the context of progress toward a 
peaceful solution, there would naturally be a 
decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan. Our 
positions over the past two months have 
reflected this view. We are prepared, indeed 
welcome, further exchanges of view in the 
months to come. I hope you share my convic- 
tion that the United States and China should 
work together to strengthen the prospects 
for a peaceful international order. While our 
interests, and thus our policies, will not 
always be identical, they are complementary 
and thus should form a firm basis for 
cooperation. 

In my letter to Vice Chairman Deng, I 
have suggested that a visit to Beijing by Vice 



President Bush at the end of April could be a 
useful step in deepening the understanding 
between our two countries. The Vice Presi- 
dent will be traveling in Asia at the time, and 
could visit Beijing if you feel it would be 
useful. 



Sincerely, 



Ronald Reagan 



TO CHAIRMAN HU YAOBANG, 
MAY 3, 1982 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The visit of Vice President Bush to China 
affords a welcome opportunity to convey my 
regards to you. 

As sovereign nations, our two countries 
share a common responsibility to promote 
world peace. We face a grave challenge from 
the Soviet Union which directly threatens our 
peoples and complicates the resolution of 
problems throughout the globe. It is vital that 
our relations advance and our cooperation be 
strengthened. 

Vice President Bush is visiting China as 
my personal emissary. He is prepared to 
discuss a wide range of issues of mutual con- 
cern. My sincere hope is that we can achieve, 
through discussions, enhanced mutual 
understanding, at the highest levels of our 
governments. 

Among the issues the Vice President will 
address is the question of United States arms 
sales to Taiwan. This remains an area of 
residual disagreement, as our governments 
acknowledged at the time of US-China nor- 
malization. I believe, so long as we exercise 
the statesmanship and vision which have 
characterized our approach to differences 
over the past decade, we will be able to make 
progress toward the removal of this issue as 
a point of bilateral contention. 

In the meantime, as stated in my recent 
letters to Vice Chairman Deng and Premier 
Zhao, the United States will continue to 
adhere firmly to the positions agreed upon in 
the joint communique on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China. 
Our policy will continue to be based on the 
principle that there is but one China. We will 
not permit the unofficial relations between 
the American people and the Chinese people 
on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this 
principle. 

On this basis, and with good faith on both 
sides, we are confident that a means can be 
found to resolve current differences and 
deepen our bilateral and strategic coopera- 
tion. It is my hope that you and I will have 
an opportunity to meet soon. Please accept 
my best wishes in your efforts to build a 
secure and modernizing China. 



Sincerely, 



Ronald Reagan I 



August 1982 



45 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 

BEIJING, 

MAY 9, 1982 

During the past 3 days, in private 
discussions and public statements, I 
have stated again and again that my 
visit to China is a symbol of the Reagan 
Administration's good faith in seeking to 
build upon the strength of our friendship 
and the strength of our important 
strategic relationship. 

I have attempted to impress upon 
the leaders of China the depth of Presi- 
dent Reagan's commitment to building 
an enduring relationship — a relationship 
based on mutual trust and understand- 
ing. Frankly, I feel good about the 
discussions I have had during the past 
days. I feel that some progress has been 
made, and I believe that recent personal 
correspondence by the President to the 
Chinese leaders has done much to help 
advance the process. 

Differences between us remain, to 
be sure. But as we seek to resolve them 
we must be certain that the positive 
elements in our relationship are rein- 
forced and that the problems do not 
determine the course of our relationship. 

We have a clarification of thinking 
on both sides on the Taiwan issue and 
other bilateral and global concerns. And 
we have agreed that U.S. and Chinese 
representatives will continue to hold 
talks on the main question before us. I 
am also pleased by the positive way in 
which the Chinese leaders have 
presented my visit and the talks to the 
Chinese people. These are good signs. 

When I came to China, I came with 
the purpose of conveying and explaining 
in detail the President's position on 
bilateral, regional, and global issues. I 
believe that has been accomplished. I am 
confident that in the weeks and months 
ahead, the friendship and relations be- 
tween our governments will grow. I 
know that the President, and thoee of- 
ficials of the United States who work 
constantly to enhance our relationship, 
will do everything to insure that. 




'Texts from the Vice President's Office of 
the Press Secretary. ■ 



Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping met with Vice President Bush in Beijing. 

The Origins of the 
ANZUS Treaty and Council 



by Edward C. Keefer 
Office of the Historian 

The foreign ministers who made up the 
council created by the ANZUS 
(Australia, New Zealand, United States) 
Security Treaty met for their first ses- 
sion on August 4, 1952, at Kaneohe 
Marine Corps Air Station in Hawaii. 
This initial gathering was evidence of a 
significant shift in the security relations 
of the three countries, a change which 
began with the signing of the ANZUS 
Security Treaty on September 1, 1951, 
and which was completed on April 29, 
1932, when the agreement came into 
force. 

For Australia and New Zealand, the 
ANZUS treaty was the first time those 
Commonwealth nations had entered into 
a major international agreement which 
did not also include the United 
Kingdom, and, henceforth, they would 
look east to the United States to fulfill 
the role of protecting superpower rather 
than west to the United Kingdom. 
Canberra and Wellington saw this for- 
mal security pact as a guarantee against 
a possible threat from a resurgent Japan 
as well as other potential adversaries. 



For the United States, the ANZUS pact 
was an integral part of a series of new 
American security arrangements in the 
Pacific which also included bilateral 
security treaties with the Philippines 
and Japan. 

The ANZUS treaty reflected impor- 
tant changes in the international en- 
vironment in the area — the reduction of 
British power, the fear of isolation by 
Australia and New Zealand from deci- 
sions which would affect their security, 
the growing threat from the Soviet 
Union, conflicts in Korea and Southeast 
Asia, the emergence of the People's 
Republic of China, and the potential role 
of a rearmed Japan. 

ANZUS was also the product of the 
persistence and efforts of two men — Sir 
Percy Spender, former Foreign Minister 
of Australia, and John Foster Dulles, 
former Special Consultant to the 
Department of SUite. As Canberra's 
Ambassador to the United States, Sir 
Percy was a member of the delegation 
to the first ANZUS Council meeting. 
John Foster Dulles was not associated 
with the Department of State at that 
time but, instead, actively involved in 
the presidential campaign of Dwight D. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Eisenhower. While Spender and Dulles 
played a primary role in creating 
ANZUS, they did so for different 
reasons. 

The Proponents 

Sir Percy Spender was a tireless pro- 
moter of the idea of a Pacific pact 
modeled organizationally along the lines 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1950, in 
Australia and during his visit to the 
United States, he argued forcefully for a 
security pact which would include 
Australia, New Zealand, the United 
States, and possibly the United 
Kingdom. One historian characterized 
Spender's role in the shaping of a Pacific 
pact as "a political obsession." 

In speeches before the Australian 
parliament and public groups and in con- 
fidential discussions with President 
TiTiman and his advisers and leading 
members of the U.S. Congress, Spender 
preached one sermon: the security of 
Australia now depended on American 
power. Since the United States was 
making the important decisions on inter- 
national developments in Asia, Australia 
should have a formal say in those deci- 
sions which affected its security. A 
Pacific pact with consultative machinery 
and collective planning was Sir Percy's 
remedy. 

While the Truman Administration 
was aware of Australia's security needs, 
it had been unenthusiastic for some time 
about a Pacific alliance, especially one 
on the model of NATO. Truman and his 
advisers gave Spender a sympathetic 
hearing but made no commitments. One 
member of the Administration, however, 
came to favor the concept of a Pacific 
pact, but on his own terms and for his 
own reasons. John Foster Dulles inter- 
preted the rise of the Soviet Union as a 
Pacific power, alignment of the People's 
Republic of China with the Soviet Union, 
the Korean conflict, and the war in In- 
dochina as part of a "comprehensive 
plan" by the Communists to eliminate all 
Western influence on the Asian 
mainland and the islands of Japan, For- 
mosa, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 
Dulles saw a Pacific Ocean pact, in- 
cluding Australia and New Zealand— in 
his view the most "dependable countries" 
in the area — as the best response to this 
perceived threat to non-Communist 
Asia. Dulles' proposal also com- 
plemented his principal foreign policy 
task — a Japanese peace treaty flexible 
enough to allow Japan to defend itself. 

In January 1951, President Truman 
asked Dulles to negotiate a peace treaty 



with Japan and to explore "other poten- 
tial defense arrangements in the 
Pacific." With the President's blessing, 
Dulles traveled to the Far East to test 
the waters for his idea of a defensive 
chain starting with the Aleutians, pro- 
ceeding through Japan, the Ryukyus, 




Sir Percy Spender 

the Philippines, and Indonesia, and end- 
ing in Australia and New Zealand. It 
was to be "composed of links so inter- 
connected that an attack on one link 
would jeopardize the entire chain." The 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Of- 
fice, however, was unalterably opposed 
to this concept — it would send the 
wrong signals to Moscow and Beijing 
about British intentions to defend Hong 
Kong and Malaya and about the West's 
determination to support the French in 
Indochina and non-Communist govern- 
ments in Thailand and Burma. At the 
onset of his trip, the British told Dulles 
of their fears and the Special Consultant 
abandoned the idea of a single Pacific 
Ocean pact. 

Negotiating the Treaty 

When Dulles arrived in Canberra in mid- 
February 1951 for discussions with the 
Australian and New Zealand Foreign 
Ministers, he knew that British opposi- 
tion to the island chain concept meant 
that he would have to achieve his objec- 



tives by other means. Dulles was open to 
suggestions but was now considering a 
series of separate security arrangements 
which, in effect, would replace his grand 
scheme. A tripartite agreement among 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
States, with the possible inclusion of the 
Philippines, was one possibility. 

While prospective security ar- 
rangements were a principal concern at 
Canberra, the proposed Japanese peace 
treaty was a related topic. Spender and 
New Zealand's Foreign Minister, F.W. 
Doidge, informed Dulles that their 
governments were unwilling to accept a 
peace treaty with Japan which did not 
limit Japanese rearmament unless there 
was "an accompanying arrangement" on 
security among the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand. While it is 
an over-simplification to say that Dulles 
paid for Canberra's and Wellington's ac- 
ceptance of a so-called soft peace with 
Japan by American acceptance of 
ANZUS, U.S. records of the meetings 
give clear evidence that a bargain was 
struck. While Doidge and Spender 
feared Japanese rearmament, Dulles 
worried about the consequences if Japan 
was not allowed to maintain adequate 
armed forces. Thus, the ANZUS pact 
allowed Australia and New Zealand to 
accept the American view of peace with 
Japan and still insure their security. 

The draft treaty which emerged 
from the Canberra discussions was in 
most provisions the same treaty signed 
later in 1951 and ratified in 1952. 
Dulles, Doidge, and Spender worked out 
the details of the agreement, but by all 
accounts, Dulles was the master drafts- 
man who wrote with an eye toward 
Senate confirmation. The language in 
Article II of the draft was carefully 
drawn from the Vandenburg resolution 
passed by the Senate in June 1948 call- 
ing for the development of regional and 
individual collective security based on 
self-help and mutual aid. Article IV, 
which Dulles characterized to General 
Douglas MacArthur "as the meat of the 
treaty," drew its inspiration for the 
phraseology from the Monroe Doctrine. 
Article IV reads in part: "Each Party 
recognizes that an armed attack in the 
Pacific area on any of the Parties would 
be dangerous to its own peace and safe- 
ty and declares that it would act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with 
its constitutional processes." Dulles 
clearly had in mind the problems en- 
countered in securing Senate acceptance 
in 1949 of Article V of the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty. As he told MacArthur, the 



August 1982 



47 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



treaty was also flexible: "While it [Arti- 
cle IV of the ANZUS Treaty] commits 
each party to take action — presumably 
to go to war— it does not commit any 
nation to action in any particular part of 
the world. In other words, the United 
States can discharge its obligations by 
action against a common enemy in any 
way and in any area that it sees fit." Ar- 
ticle VII had provisions for the creation 
of a council of the signatories' foreign 
ministers. By the terms of Article VIII, 
the council was authorized to maintain a 
"consultative relationship" with other 
states, regional organizations, and 
associations in the Pacific. 

The language in Article VIII of the 
draft treaty reflected the longstanding 
desire of Australia, and to some extent 
New Zealand, to be included in global 
military planning, which Australia was 
convinced was centered in the Pentagon. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson later 
recalled that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
"broke into a sustained tantrum of nega- 
tion" over the bureaucratic and organiza- 
tional responsibilities involved in this 
proposal. Truman and Acheson had 
specifically enjoined Dulles to inform the 
Australians and New Zealanders of 
American unwillingness to establish a 
direct and permanent link between their 
military staffs and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff or with NATO. Acheson believed 
that in letting them down too easily at 
Canberra, Dulles gave the Australians 
and New Zealanders the impression that 
an informal relationship with the Joint 
Chiefs might still be possible. 

The question of just what was im- 
plied in the provisions for consultation in 
Article VIII was the principal issue in 
Washington's interagency deliberations 
over the agreement, which was made 
public in July 1951. The idea of creating 
a Pacific NATO on even a limited or in- 
formal scale occasioned formal protests 
from the Joint Chiefs and the Depart- 
ment of Defense during the summer. It 
was not so much the language of Article 
VIII that was the concern but the im- 
plication behind the words. Having made 
their protest and received assurances 
that the consultative provisions would 
not grow into a formalized planning link, 
the military was satisfied but still wary. 

On September 1, 1951, the three 
countries signed the Security Treaty in 
San Francisco. Just 1 week before, the 
United States and the Philippines had 
signed a treaty of mutual defense. A 
week later Japan and the United States 
signed a security treaty. All three 
agreements were made in conjunction 
with the conclusion of the Japanese 



peace treaty that same week, and 
together they provided a framework for 
American security in the Pacific which, 
while not as comprehensive as Dulles' 
original concept for a single Pacific 
Islands pact, accomplished virtually the 
same objectives. The ANZUS treaty pro- 
ceeded smoothly through the Senate, 
due in no small part to Dulles' careful 
drafting, and President Truman ratified 
it on April 15, 1952. It came into force 2 
weeks later. 

The First Council Meeting 

The first council meeting of ANZUS was 
scheduled for Hawaii in August 1952, in 
order that the anniversary of the signing 
of the treaty should not predate the first 
session of foreign ministers. In those 
hectic summer months of 1952, ANZUS 
did not loom large on the list of dif- 
ficulties and crises faced by the Truman 
Administration. Acheson predicted that 
there would be no problems requiring 
"soul searching" at the council and that 
there would be certainly "no spectacular 
results." He promised to guard against 
giving Australia and New Zealand the 

Lord Casey 




impression that the treaty could lead to 
a future NATO in the Pacific or of giv- 
ing Asians the view that the treaty 
organization was in any way a private 
club among Canberra, Wellington, and 
Washington. 

The flight to Hawaii by the U.S. 
delegation almost proved more difficult 
than any of the issues raised at the 
council session. Mechanical trouble 
grounded the delegation's plane at an 
Air Force base in Denver. Acheson and 
his colleagues spent the night in the 
base hospital, which alarmed President 
Truman until he was informed the 
delegates were there as guests, not pa- 
tients. The American party arrived at 
Kaneohe after 3 days of difficult travel, 
stoically endured the formal landing 
ceremonies, and then, according to 
Acheson, headed for the bar! 

Acheson met with Australian 
Foreign Minister Richard Casey to 
discuss informally two problems facing 
all the delegates — a British request for 
observer status at the council and a 
lingering Australian desire for joint 
military planning. Acheson told Casey 
frankly that the British could not be 
given observer status without encourag- 
ing other interested nations also to ap- 
ply. Such a state of affairs would 
seriously complicate the ANZUS Council 
machinery in which simplicity and in- 
timacy were the key elements. Casey 
agreed and offered to enlist the support 
of New Zealand Foreign Minister 
T. Clifton Webb to inform London that 
its request was denied. 

Acheson also informed Casey that 
the Department of State, not the Pen- 
tagon, was the best point of contact for 
Australia and New Zealand with the 
U.S. Government on issues of mutual 
concern in the Pacific. Though no closer 
contact with the Pentagon was possible, 
Acheson suggested that Admiral Arthur 
W. Radford, Commander in Chief 
Pacific (CINCPAC), and his staff at 
Honolulu would be the appropriate chan- 
nel for discussing military planning. 
Acheson identified CINCPAC as an 
organization responsible for the formula- 
tion as well as implementation of 
regional strategic policy. 

When the formal sessions began the 
participants officially approved the term 
"ANZUS" as the acronym for the treaty 
organization, mainly because they felt 
the use of "Pacific" implied a broader 
outlook than was warranted. Acheson 
correctly sensed that the desire of the 
Australia and New Zealand represent- 
atives for joint military planning and 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



global strategy sessions with the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and with NATO stemmed 
in part from their feelings of 
geographical isolation. As Acheson 
reported to Truman at the end of the 
Council meetings, "both countries suf- 
fered from the knowledge that they had 
little knowledge of what was going on 
and our attitude toward the appraisal of 
current situations. They felt remote and 
worried by the unknown." Acheson and 
Radford decided that "rather than to 
starve the Australians and New 
Zealanders, we would give them indiges- 
tion." For 2 days, Acheson and Radford 
gave their ANZUS colleagues a 
thorough and frank assessment of every 
major issue and situation in the world 
affecting American national security. 
Acheson informed Truman that the 
Australian and New Zealand delegates 
seemed satisfied with these briefings, 
were convinced that Admiral Radford 
could provide liasion to American 
strategic planners, and were reconciled 
to the idea that ANZUS could not be 
linked with other military treaty 
organizations. 

The first ANZUS Council meeting 
concluded with mutual agreement on the 
Council's basic organization and func- 
tions, an understanding which has in- 
fluenced the workings of the security ar- 
rangement during its many years of 
operation. The vitality and importance 
of ANZUS are evident in the fact 
that the Council met in Canberra, 
June 21-22, 1982, in its 31st session. 
This account of the origins of the pact 
commemorates those Americans, 
Australians, and New Zealanders 
responsible for the creation of the 
ANZUS Security Treaty. ■ 



Secretary-Designate Shultz 
Appears Before Senate Committee 



Secretary-designate George P. 
Shultz's statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on July IS, 
1982. He was confirmed by the Senate on 
July 15 and sworn in as the 60th 
Secretary of State on July 16.^ 

President Reagan honors me by his 
nomination to be the Secretary of State 
for the United States of America. I 
regard service in this post as a high 
privilege and a grave duty. If I am con- 
firmed by the Senate and have the op- 
portunity to serve, I will muster what- 
ever energy, intelligence, and dedication 
I have and pour all of it into the per- 
formance of this job. I recognize and ac- 
cept the responsibilities that will be 
placed upon me. But I say this too: I will 
need and I will expect help and coopera- 
tion all around; and, judging from the 
many assurances already extended 
voluntarily to me, I will get it. I look 
especially to members of this committee 
and your counterparts in the House of 
Representatives. But my appeal reaches 
much farther, to every corner of our 
land and to our friends throughout the 
world. 

President Reagan has expressed his 
confidence in me by making this nomina- 
tion; I will strive mightily to merit that 
confidence. I will do so fully conscious 
that the conduct of our foreign policy is, 
in accordance with the Constitution, a 
presidential duty to be performed in col- 
laboration with the Congress. My job is 
to help the President formulate and exe- 
cute his policies. I shall be ever faithful 
to that trust. 

I have appeared before a Senate 
committee for confirmation to a Cabinet 
post on two previous occasions. Thirteen 
years ago I was the nominee to be 
Secretary of Labor before the Commit- 
tee on Labor and Public Welfare. Both 
Senators Cranston and Pell, who sit be- 
fore me today, sat on that panel and 
voted favorably on that nomination. I 
was accompanied to that hearing by a 
friend of long standing and Senator 
from my then home state of Illinois, 



Senator Percy. His wise and informed 
counsel, in government and out, has 
always been available and most helpful 
to me. I deeply appreciate his assurance 
that I will continue to have that counsel. 

The biographical material available 
to you shows that I brought to my 
government service two decades of ex- 
perience in university activities, teach- 
ing, and doing research and administra- 
tion at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and the University of 
Chicago. After serving as the Secretary 
of Labor, I went on to be Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, and 
then Secretary of the Treasury. For the 
last 8 years, I have been with Bechtel, 
most recently as President of Bechtel 
Group, Inc. Bechtel is a truly remark- 
able organization, astonishing in the 
range of its capabilities and impressive 
in the quality of its people, who bring in- 
tegrity, intelligence, enthusiasm, and 
drive to their work. I feel privileged to 
have played a part in Bechtel's activities. 
During this period, I have also served 
part time on the faculty of Stanford 
University, from which I plan to be on 
leave in the period of my government 
service. 

During the last few days, a number 
of Senators have asked me to address 
myself to the question of my relationship 
to Bechtel should I become Secretary of 
State. To those questions, I see only one 
possible answer: none. If I am con- 
firmed, agreements already executed by 
me will result in my resignation from 
my officerships in all Bechtel entities. I 
will retire as an employee, retaining only 
vested rights to medical and insurance 
benefits and to assets already accumu- 
lated under Bechtel trust and thrift 
plans. I will sell, at a price determined 
by an established process, all my 
Bechtel-related investments. Although I 
understand that these steps leave me 
with no legal conflict of interest, I will, 
if I become Secretary of State, execute a 
statement removing myself from any 
"particular matter" involving Bechtel. In 
the words of my counsel, concurred in 
by the Office of Government Ethics, 
these steps "will assure your full compli- 
ance, while serving as Secretary of 
State, with the terms of the Federal 
conflict of interest laws. 



August 1982 



49 



THE SECRETARY 



U.S. Global Involvement 

For those of us who have spent the bet- 
ter part of our lives watching America's 
deepening involvement in the world 
around us, it is easy to forget that the 
United States has, throughout most of 
its history, only episodically been con- 
cerned with foreign affairs. The world of 
40 or so years ago seems almost nostal- 
gically simple in comparison to the com- 
plexities we confront today. In the 
decades that have passed, scores of new 
nations— many with frustrated aspira- 
tions—have achieved independence. The 
international economy is no longer 
managed from a few world capitals but 
has developed into a global network of 
mutually dependent partners. Extensive 
trade in goods and services, the inter- 
national flow of critical raw materials, 
the emergence of new technologies, and 
the revolution in communications have 
created a world in which no nation is im- 
mune from the influence of the interna- 
tional economy. 

Forty years ago we could not even 
glimpse the enormous dangers of 
nuclear weapons or the complexities we 
would face today in our efforts to con- 
trol them. And 40 years ago few could 
foresee that the collapse of the old order 
would bring with it the spread of in- 
creasingly sophisticated military arms to 
new and contending nations, so that to- 
day regional conflicts carry with them 
the constant threat of escalation. 
General Douglas MacArthur saw these 
broad interrelationships and put the 
point succinctly and eloquently in 1951: 
"The issues are global and so interlocked 
that to consider the problems of one sec- 
tor, oblivious to those of another, is but 
to court disaster for the whole." 

Today most Americans recognize 
that the nature and strength of our 
diplomacy and our strategic posture are 
linked to, and heavily dependent on, our 
performance at home. Our economy is 
fundamentally strong and will strength- 
en further as economic policies now in 
place and in prospect take hold. A 
strong and productive America makes 
us a strong trading partner and a re- 
sourceful ally, giving to our friends a 
confidence that strengthens their will to 
resist those who would deprive us of our 
freedoms. 

Today most Americans are uncom- 
fortable with the fact that we must 
spend so much of our substance on de- 
fense—and rightly so. Yet most Ameri- 
cans also recognize that we must deal 
with reality as we find it. And that reali- 
ty, in its simplest terms, is an uncertain 
world in which peace and security can be 



assured only if we have the strength and 
will to preserve them. We have passed 
through a decade during which the 
Soviet Union expanded its military capa- 
bility at a steady and rapid rate while 
we stood still. President Reagan has 
given us the leadership to turn that 
situation around— and just in time. 
The past decade taught us once 
again an important lesson about the 
U.S. -Soviet relationship. In brief, it is 
that diminished American strength and 
resolve are an open invitation for Soviet 
expansion into areas of critical interest 
to the West and provide no incentive for 
moderation in the Soviet military build- 
up. Thus it is critical to the overall suc- 
cess of our foreign policy that we per- 
severe in the restoration of our 
strength. But it is also true that the will- 
ingness to negotiate from that strength 
is a fundamental element of strength 
itself. 

The President has put forward arms 
control proposals in the strategic, 
theater, and conventional arms areas 
that are genuinely bold and that will, if 
accepted, reduce the burdens and the 
dangers of armaments. Let no one doubt 
the seriousness of our purpose. But let 
no one believe that we will seek agree- 
ment for its own sake, without a bal- 
anced and constructive outcome. 

We recognize that an approach to 
the Soviet Union limited to the military 
dimension will not satisfy the American 
people. Our efforts in the area of arms 
reduction are inevitably linked to re- 
straint in many dimensions of Soviet be- 
havior. And as we enter a potentially 
critical period of transition in Soviet 
leadership, we must also make it clear 
that we are prepared to establish 
mutually beneficial and safer relation- 
ships on the basis of reciprocity. 

Today most Americans recognize 
that a steady and coherent involvement 
by the United States in the affairs of the 
world is a necessary condition for peace 
and prosperity. Over and over again 
since the close of the Second World 
War, the United States has been the 
global power to which others have 
turned for help, whether it be to assist 
in the process of economic development 
or in finding peaceful solutions to con- 
flicts. Our help continues as, in Presi- 
dent Reagan's Caribbean Basin initia- 
tive, an example of America's commit- 
ment to a more prosperous world. It 
must be an example, as well, of the key 
role in economic development of private 
markets and private enterprise. As the 
President said in his address in Cancun: 



History demonstrates that time and 
again, in place after place, economic growth 
and human progress make their greatest 
strides in countries that encourage economic 
freedom. . . . Individual farmers, laborers, 
owners, traders, and managers — they are the 
heart and soul of development. Trust them. 
Because whenever they are allowed to create 
and build, wherever they are given a personal 
stake in deciding economic policies in bene- 
fiting from their success, then societies be- 
come more dynamic, prosperous, progressive, 
and free. 

In our international endeavors, we 
are strengthened by a structure of 
alliances that is of central importance. 
Ours is not a hegemonic world but a 
diverse and pluralistic one, reflecting the 
complexity of the free, independent, and 
democratic societies with which we are 
associated. Just as we expect others to 
act in partnership with us, so we must 
conduct ourselves as responsible part- 
ners. Friction and differences are in- 
evitable among allies, and we can never 
assume complacently that they will auto- 
matically disappear. Tolerance of the 
needs and perspectives of others is 
essential. So is candid recognition of our 
difficulties and challenges. Above all, 
there has to be a commitment to the 
common values and interests on which 
the truly unique multilateral institutions 
of the last three and a half decades have 
been based. Our commitment is firm — as 
President Reagan made clear during his 
recent European trip. I am confident 
that the same is true of our allies. 

If we are strong, we buttress our 
allies and friends and leave our adver- 
saries in no doubt about the conse- 
quences of aggression. If we provide 
assistance to help others to be strong, 
oiu- own strength can be husbanded and 
brought to bear more effectively. If we 
are confident, we give confidence to 
those who seek to resolve disputes 
peacefully. If we are engaged, we give 
hope to those who would otherwise have 
no hope. If we live by our ideals, we can 
argue their merit to others with confi- 
dence and conviction. 

Middle East 

During my individual visits with 
members of this committee, many ex- 
pressed a strong interest in my views on 
problems and opportunities in the Mid- 
dle East, particularly as related to the 
conflict between Israel and the Arabs. 
Responsive to this interest, but even 
more to the importance of developments 
in this area, I will conclude my state- 
ment today by a brief discussion of my 
views. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 




I start with the terrible human 
tragedy now taking place in Lebanon. 
Violence on a large scale has come once 
again to a region whose strategic im- 
portance inevitably guarantees that any 
local conflict will receive global atten- 
tion—with all the dangers for world 
peace that implies. 

In late 1974 I visited Beirut, at the 
time a beautiful and thriving city, even 
then marked by the presence of Pales- 
tinian refugees. But since then Lebanon 
has been racked by destruction, endur- 
ing the presence of the armed and asser- 
tive Palestine Liberation Organization 
and other forces. 

Coherent life and government are 
impossible under those conditions and in- 
evitably Lebanon became a state in dis- 
repair. The Lebanese deserve a chance 
to govern themselves, free from the 
presence of the armed forces of any 
other country or group. The authority of 
the Government of Lebanon must ex- 
tend to all its territory. 

The agony of Lebanon is on the 
minds and in the hearts of us all. But in 
a larger sense Lebanon is but the latest 
chapter in a history of accumulated grief 
stretching back through decades of con- 
flict. We are talking here about a part of 
the globe that has had little genuine 
peace for generations. A region with 
thousands of victims— Arab, Israeli, and 
other families torn apart as a conse- 
quence of war and terror. What is going 
on now in Lebanon must mark the end 



George P. Shultz was sworn in as Secretary of State by Attorney General William French 
Smith as President Reagan watched; Mrs. Shultz held the Bible. 



George P. Shultz 



George P. Shultz was sworn in on 
July 16, 1982, as the 60th U.S. Secretary of 
State. He was nominated by President 
Reagan on July 1 and confirmed by the 
Senate on July 15. 

Mr. Shultz graduated from Princeton 
University in 1942, receiving a B.A. degree 
in economics. That year he joined the U.S. 
Marine Corps and served until 1945. In 1949 
Mr. Shultz earned a Ph.D. degree in in- 
dustrial economics from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. He taught at M.I.T. 
from 1948 to 1957, taking a year's leave of 
absence in 1955 to serve as a senior staff 
economist on the President's Council of 
Economic Advisers during the Administration 
of President Eisenhower. 

In 1957 Mr. Shultz was appointed Pro- 
fessor of Industrial Relations at the Universi- 
ty of Chicago Graduate School of Business. 
He was named Dean of the Graduate School 
of Business in 1962. From 1968 to 1969 
Mr. Shultz was a Fellow at the Center for 
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences 
at Stanford. 

Mr. Shultz served in the Administration 
of President Nixon as Secretary of Labor for 
18 months, from 1969 to June 1970, at which 
time he was appointed the Director to the Of- 
fice of Management and Budget. He became 
Secretary of the Treasury in May 1972, serv- 
ing until 1974. During that period Mr. Shultz 
served also as Chairman of the Council on 
Economic Policy. As Chairman of the East- 
West Trade Policy Committee, Mr. Shultz 
traveled to Moscow in 1972 and negotiated a 
series of trade protocols with the Soviet 



Union. He also represented the United States 
at the Tokyo meeting of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 

In 1974 Mr. Shultz joined the Bechtel 
Corporation. Until his appointment as 
Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz was President 
and a director of Bechtel Group, Inc. During 
this period he also served part-time on the 
faculty of Stanford University. 

Prior to his appointment, Mr. Shultz was 
Chairman of President Reagan's Economic 
Policy Advisory Board. At President 
Reagan's request, Mr. Shultz met with 
leaders in Europe, Japan, and Canada in May 
1982 to assist in preparations for the 
Versailles economic summit. 

Secretary Shultz's publications include 
Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines 
(1978), Workers and Wages in the Urban 
Labor Market (1970), Guidelines, Informal 
Controls, and the Market Place (1966), 
Strategies for the Displaced Worker (1966), 
Management Organization and the Computer 
(1960), Labor Problems: Cases and Readings 
(1953). The Dynamics of a Labor Market 
(1951), and Pressures on Wage Decisions 
(1950). He holds honorary degrees from 
Notre Dame, Loyola, Pennsylvania, 
Rochester, Princeton, Carnegie-Mellon, and 
Baruch College, New York. 

Mr. Shultz was born in New York City on 
December 13, 1920, and spent his childhood 
in Englewood, New Jersey. He is married to 
the former Helena M. O'Brien of Nashua, 
New Hampshire. They have five children. 



Press release 232 of July 30, 1982. I 



August 1982 



51 



THE SECRETARY 



of this cycle of terror rather than simply 
the latest in a continuing series of sense- 
less and violent acts. 

We cannot accept the loss of life 
brought home to us every day, even at 
this great distance, on our television 
screens; but at the same time we can, as 
Americans, be proud that once again it 
is the United States, working most 
prominently through President Reagan's 
emissary. Ambassador Philip Habib, that 
is attempting to still the guns, achieve 
an equitable outcome, and alleviate the 
suffering. 

The crisis in Lebanon makes pain- 
fully and totally clear a central reality of 
the Middle East: The legitimate needs 
and problems of the Palestinian people 
must be addressed and resolved— 
urgently and in all their dimensions. 
Beyond the suffering of the Palestinian 
people lies a complex of political prob- 
lems which must be addressed if the 
Middle East is to know peace. The 
Camp David framework calls as a first 
step for temporary arrangements which 
will provide full autonomy for the Pales- 
tinians of the West Bank and Gaza. That 
same framework then speaks eloquently 
and significantly of a solution that "must 
also recognize the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people." 

The challenge of the negotiations, in 
which the United States is, and during 
my tenure will remain, a full partner, is 
to transform that hope into reality. For 
these talks to succeed, representatives 
of the Palestinians themselves must par- 
ticipate in the negotiating process. The 
basis must also be found for other coun- 
tries in the region, in addition to Israel 
and Egypt, to join in the peace process. 

Our determined effort to stop the 
killing in Lebanon, resolve the conflict, 
and make the Government of Lebanon 
once again sovereign throughout its ter- 
ritory underscores the degree to which 
our nation has vital interests throughout 
the Arab world. Our friendly relations 
with the great majority of Arab states 
have served those interests and, I be- 
lieve, assisted our efforts to deal with 
the current Lebanon crisis. 

But beyond the issues of the mo- 
ment, the importance to our own securi- 
ty of wide and ever-strengthening ties 
with the Arabs is manifest. It is from 
them that the West gets much of its oil; 
it is with them that we share an interest 
and must cooperate in resisting Soviet 
imperialism; it is with them, as well as 
Israel, that we will be able to bring 
peace to the Middle East. The brilliant 



Secretary Haig Resigns 



Following is the exchange of letters 
between Secretary Haig and President 
Reagan of June 25. 1982.'' 

Dear Mr. President: 

Your accession to office on Januarj' 20, 1981, 
brought an opportunity for a new and for- 
ward looking foreign policy resting on the 
cornerstones of strength and compassion. I 
believe that we shared a view of America's 
role in the world as the leader of free men 
and an inspiration for all. We agreed that 
consistency, clarity and steadiness of purpose 
were essential to success. It was in this spirit 
that I undertook to serve you as Secretary of 
State. 

In recent months, it has become clear to 
me that the foreign policy on which we em- 
barked together was shifting from that 
careful course which we had laid out. Under 
these circumstances, I feel it necessary to re- 
quest that you accept my resignation. I shall 
always treasure the confidence which you 
reposed in me. It has been a great honor to 
serve in your Administration, I wish you 
every success in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 



Dear Al: 

It is with the most profound regret that I ac- 
cept your letter of resignation. Almost forty 



years ago you committed yourself to the serv- 
ice of your country. Since that time your 
career has been marked by a succession of 
assignments demanding the highest level of 
personal sacrifice, courage and leadership. As 
a soldier and statesman facing challenges of 
enormous complexity and danger, you have 
established a standard of excellence and 
achievement seldom equalled in our history. 
On each occasion you have reflected a quality 
of wisdom which has been critical to the 
resolution of the most anguishing problems 
we have faced during the past generation — 
the conclusion of the Vietnam war, the 
transfer of executive authority at a time of 
national trauma and most recently, advancing 
the cause of peace among nations. 

The nation is deeply in your debt. As you 
leave I want you to know of my deep per- 
sonal appreciation, and in behalf of the 
American people I express my gratitude and 
respect. You have been kind enough to offer 
your continued counsel and you may be confi- 
dent that I will call upon you in the years 
ahead. Nancy joins me in extending our 
warmest personal wishes to you and Pat. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 28, 1982. 



Arab heritage of science, culture, and 
thought has a fresh dynamism. Working 
together with us, our Arab friends can 
contribute much, not only to our bilater- 
al interests and those of the region, but 
to the global future and the world 
economy as well. I will do all in my 
power to sustain these relationships and 
to further them. 

Finally, and most important, the 
Lebanese situation is intimately linked 
to the vital question of Israel's security. 
Israel, our closest friend in the Middle 
East, still harbors a deep feeling of in- 
security. In a region where hostility is 
endemic, and where so much of it is di- 
rected against Israel, the Tightness of its 
preoccupation with matters of security 
cannot be disputed. Nor should anyone 
dispute the depth and durability of 
America's commitment to the security of 
Israel or our readiness to assure that 
Israel has the necessary means to de- 
fend itself. I share in this deep and en- 
during commitment — and more. I recog- 
nize that democratic Israel shares with 
us a deep commitment to the security of 
the West. 



Beyond that, however, we owe it to 
Israel, in the context of our special rela- 
tionship, to work with it to bring about 
a comprehensive peace — acceptable to 
all the parties involved — which is the on- 
ly sure guarantee of true and durable 
security. 

America has many often competing 
concerns and interests in the Middle 
East. It is no secret that they present us 
with dilemmas and difficult decisions. 
Yet we must, using all the wit and com- 
passion we possess, reconcile those in- 
terests and erase those contradictions, 
for it is, in the last analysis, peace we 
are seeking to create and nurture. 

Today's violence should not cause us 
to forget that the Middle East is a land 
of deep spirituality where three great 
religions of our time were born and 
come together even today. Some have 
suggested that it was only natural, in a 
land of such vast, harsh, and open 
space, that men should be drawn toward 
the heavens and toward a larger sense 
of life's meaning. Whatever the reasons, 
the force of religion in this region is as 
powerful today as ever, and our plans 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



for peace will be profoundly incomplete 
if they ignore this reality. 

Let me close by recalling to you 
President Reagan's definition of 
America's duty to this region: "Our 
diplomacy," he said, "must be sensitive 
to the legitimate concerns of all in the 
area. Before a negotiated peace can ever 
hope to command the loyalty of the 
whole region, it must be acceptable to 
Israelis and Arabs alike." 

I pledge to you and this committee 
that if I am confirmed as Secretary of 
State I will do my best to help the Presi- 
dent carry out the task so clearly de- 
fined in his statement. We must dare to 
hope that, with effort and imagination, 
we can arrive at an agreement that will 
satisfy the vital security interests of 
Israel and the political aspirations of the 
Palestinians, meet the concerns of the 
other parties directly involved, and win 
the endorsement of the international 
community. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



NATO Allies Table 
Draft MBFR Treaty 



Following is a statement by 
Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA), of July 8, 1982. 

President Reagan, in his speech to the 
Bundestag in Bonn on June 9, stated 
that the alliance had agreed on a new 
proposal designed to give new life to the 
Vienna negotiations on mutual and 
balanced force reductions (MBFR) in 
central Europe. At their recent summit 
meeting, NATO leaders announced that 
the Western participants in MBFR "will 
soon present a draft treaty embodying a 
new, comprehensive proposal designed 
to give renewed momentum to these 
negotiations and achieve the long- 
standing objective of enhancing stability 
and security in Europe." 

This morning in Vienna's Hofburg 
Palace, where the MBFR plenary ses- 
sions take place, the West formally 
tabled its draft treaty. This new ini- 
tiative is the result of an effort by this 



Administration to develop an arms con- 
trol approach on the question of conven- 
tional forces in central Europe which 
calls for substantial reductions— reduc- 
tions which, if implemented, could 
reduce the risk of war in central 
Europe. The U.S. delegation in Vienna 
is headed by Ambassador Richard Staar. 

As the President stressed in his 
speech to the Bundestag, this new 
Western proposal on conventional force 
reductions is an important complement 
to previous U.S. initiatives taken in the 
talks on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) and in the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START), both of which 
are now in session in Geneva. Thus, the 
comprehensive arms control program 
launched by President Reagan in his 
November 18th speech of last year has 
now culminated in three specific pro- 
posals in the categories he listed. The 
proposals all meet the criteria set forth 
in that speech; namely, that there must 
be substantial, militarily-significant 
reductions in forces, equal ceilings for 
similar types of forces, and adequate 
provisions for verification. 

The primary Western objective in 
MBFR continues to be the establishment 
of parity at significantly lower levels of 
forces in central Europe. 

Currently, the Warsaw Pact has 
some 170,000 more ground forces in 
central Europe than the West. This 
disparity is one of the most destabilizing 
factors in the military situation in 
Europe. Its elimination, through the 
establishment of parity, could reduce the 
capability for sudden aggression and 
thereby lessen the risk of war, including 
nuclear war, in Europe. 

The new initiative differs from 
previous Western proposals in that it 
provides for one comprehensive agree- 
ment in which all direct participants 
would undertake, from the outset, a 
legally binding commitment to take the 
reductions required for each side to 
decrease to the common collective ceil- 
ing of 700,000 ground force personnel 
for each side. This reduction would take 
place in stages and would be completed 
within 7 years. Each stage of reductions 
would have to be fully verified. Under 
this new approach, the West will be 
making stronger reduction commitments 
than we have ever proposed before. 

There is no change in the Western 
position that the sides must agree on the 
number of troops present in the area 
and subject to reduction before 
signature of any treaty. Without agree- 
ment on the size of the forces to be 



reduced and limited, an MBFR treaty 
would be neither verifiable nor en- 
forceable. In the draft treaty, starting 
force levels for each side would be iden- 
tified at time of signature. 

The Western draft treaty incor- 
porates the package of confidence- 
building and verification measures pro- 
posed by the West in 1979. These 
measures are designed to help verify 
reductions and limitations and to 
enhance security and stability by reduc- 
ing the risks of miscalculation and 
misperception. 

In sum, the draft treaty tabled by 
the West in Vienna takes into account 
Eastern arguments and interests while 
meeting this Administration's require- 
ment that arms control agreements 
result in real reductions to equal levels. 
It offers the opportunity of achieving 
concrete results in the negotiations in 
furtherance of the agreed objectives of 
enhancing stability and security in 
Europe and complements our efforts in 
other arms reduction negotiations. 

This is the first time that a Western 
proposal in the MBFR negotiations has 
been tabled in the form of a draft trea- 
ty. Doing so underscores Western 
seriousness in the negotiations and 
readiness to bring about substantial 
reductions. ■ 



START Negotiations 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAY 18, 1982' 

We welcome President Brezhnev's an- 
nounced willingness to begin negotia- 
tions on substantial reductions in 
strategic nuclear arms. We will study 
Brezhnev's statement in detail, which we 
have not yet had a chance to do. 

With regard to President Brezhnev's 
proposal to freeze strategic arms as 
soon as the talks begin, as we have said 
before, a freeze now would codify ex- 
isting Soviet military advantages and 
remove Soviet incentives to agree to the 
substantial reductions which President 
Reagan has identified as our primary ob- 
jective in START [Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks]. 

With regard to Brezhnev's proposal 
to limit additional deployments of 
intermediate-range missiles, this appears 
to be little more than a reiteration of an 
earlier Soviet proposal to freeze the cur- 
rent nuclear imbalance in Europe. As 



August 1982 



53 



CANADA 



such, it falls far short of President 
Reagan's proposal for the total elimina- 
tion of longer range land-based INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
missiles on both sides. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JUNE 25, 19822 

This afternoon we held the latest in a 
series of National Security Council 
meetings focused on arms control. At 
the conclusion of the meeting, I gave 
final approval to the instructions the 
American negotiating team will carry to 
Greneva, where negotiations will begin 
next Tuesday, June 29, on Strategic 
Arms Reduction Tali<s. 

Our team will be headed by Am- 
bassador Edward L. Rowny, an 
outstanding soldier-diplomat, who has 
participated actively in developing the 
far-reaching START proposals we have 
made, and in which the entire world is 
placing so much hope. 

An historic opportunity exists to 
reverse the massive buildup of nuclear 
arsenals that occurred during the last 
decade. We must do all we possibly can 
to achieve substantial reductions in the 
numbers and the destructive potential of 
the nuclear forces. As our proposals em- 
phasize, we must seek especially to 
reduce the most destabilizing elements 
of the strategic arsenals. We must in- 
sure reductions that are verifiable, that 
go to equal levels, and that enhance 
stability and deterrence and thereby 
reduce the risk of nuclear war. 

I do not underestimate the for- 
midable nature of this task. But I 
believe it is in the interest of the peoples 
of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and the entire world to engage fully in 
this effort. I have the highest confidence 
that Ed Rowny and his team will work 
faithfully and tirelessly toward this goal. 



Alaska Gas Pipeline 



'Made by Larry Speakes, Principal Depu- 
ty Press Secretary to the President (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of May 24, 1982). 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 28, 1982. ■ 



Following is an exchange of letters 
between Secretary Haig and Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Mark MacGuigan regarding financing 
for the Alaska natural gas transporta- 
tion system. ' 



SECRETARY MacGUIGAN'S LETTER, 
APR. 23, 1982 

Dear Al, 

I have been alerted to what could become a 
critical impasse in the discussions on financ- 
ing of the Alaskan segment of the Alaska 
Natural Gas Transportation System. 

As you well know, in addition to the 
bilateral agreement of 1977, our two Govern- 
ments have jointly invested substantial ef- 
forts in support of this pipeline, which we 
have agreed is in the long-term security and 
energy interests of both our countries. The 
Canadian Government remains committed to 
the early completion of the project, based on 
private financing, but I am concerned that 
the various parties involved in the financing 
negotiations may fail to appreciate fully the 
implications of any significant delay on the 
willingness or ability of the Canadian Govern- 
ment and the Canadian companies involved to 
proceed with it at some later date. 

The Canadian Northern Pipeline Commis- 
sioner, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, is 
planning to convene a meeting of the pro- 
ducers and the sponsors of the Alaska portion 
next week in order to apprise them of the 
views and concerns of the Canadian Govern- 
ment. I am sure that a reiteration by you of 
the USA Government's support of the proj- 
ect, preferably in a public statement, would 
have a positive influence. 

I am prepared to release this letter as a 
clear statement for the public record of our 
Government's position. 

Yours sincerely, 

Mark MacGuiGAN 



SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER, 
APR. 27, 1982 

Dear Mark: 

Thank you for your letter of April 23 regard- 
ing the financing of the Alaska Natural Gas 
Transportation System (ANGTS). 

We shared the Government of Canada's 
concerns about recent developments which 
could delay significantly completion of the 
pipeline. The United States Government re- 
mains fully committed to the Alaska Natural 
Gas Transportation System based upon 
private financing, and believes it would be 
unfortunate if its construction were subject 
to another, perhaps indefinite postponement. 



As you know, this Administration has 
taken an active role in reducing legal and 
regulatory impediments that have com- 
plicated efforts in the private sector to ar- 
range the necessary financing. Upon submis- 
sion of the waiver of law to Congress October 
15, 1981, President Reagan reaffirmed this 
government's basic commitment to ANGTS 
when he stated, 

"My Administration supports the comple- 
tion of this project through private finan- 
cing, and it is our hope that this action 
will clear the way to moving ahead with 
it. I believe that this project is important 
not only in terms of its contribution to 
the energy security of North America. It 
is also a symbol of U.S. -Canadian ability 
to work together cooperatively in the 
energy area for the benefit of both coun- 
tries and peoples," 

Through the cooperative efforts of the Ad- 
ministration and Congress, the waiver was 
approved December 15, 1981. 

We continue to believe ANGTS offers 
Americans the most realistic option to obtain 
secure and reliable access to some 13 percent 
of America's natural gas reserves which is 
currently inaccessible. Once in operation, the 
project promises to provide the energy 
equivalent to some 400,000 barrels of oil a 
day which will help Americans lessen their 
energy dependence on uncertain foreign 
sources. Moreover, the pipeline's early com- 
pletion would be an important step toward 
further reduction of our energj' vulnerability. 

Sincerely, 

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 



'Released jointly by the U.S. and Cana- 
dian Governments. ■ 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge 
In East Asia and the Pacific 



by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on June 10, 1982. 
Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary 
of Stat eJ 

I am delighted with your invitation to 
discuss allied responses to the Soviet 
threat in East Asia and the Pacific. My 
remarks will focus, as the chairman's 
[Senator Charles A. Percy] letter re- 
quested, primarily on the Japanese, 
Australian, and New Zealand contribu- 
tions to the region's defense with some 
remarks about the role of South Korea 
in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and 
how we see China's future role. I will 
also share some of our thoughts about 
the nature of the Soviet threat in the 
Pacific. 

Security Interests and Assets 
in the Area 

The contributions of East Asia and 
Pacific nations to the vitality and 
strength of the free world have grown 
enorm.ously over the last 10 years. All 
evidence indicates that they will con- 
tinue to do so over the next decade. 

The dramatic rise of the Japanese 
and South Korean economies from the 
ruins of war is, of course, among the 
world's best known success stories. Less 
well known perhaps is the role these two 
nations and the quite diff'erent, but simi- 
larly impressive, role the Australian and 
New Zealand economies have played in 
stimulating growth in other parts of 
Asia and the Pacific by transferring re- 
sources and technology through assist- 
ance programs, investment, and trade. 
The largest and longest sustained 
growth rates for both advanced and less 
developed countries are now found in 
Asia. 

Asian and Pacific nations are in turn 
playing an increasingly important role in 
strengthening more distant parts of the 
free world. Japanese aid programs are 
now directed not only to East Asia but 
to far away Middle East and African na- 
tions. Korean construction companies 
are carrying badly needed skills and 
assets to the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia, and Korea has begun a modest aid 



program. Australia and New Zealand 
have continued to assume critical inter- 
national economic, political, and peace- 
keeping responsibilities. 

The economic success stories of 
Pacific, Northeast Asian, and most re- 
cently Southeast Asian nations are 
based to great extent, I believe, on the 
fact that each nation has been free to 
carve out its own place in the world's 
market economy without sacrificing 
values and traditions important to the 
identity of their societies. Together they 
comprise a highly cooperative, also com- 
petitive, and, therefore, efficient central 
element of what we have come to call 
the free market system. 

In attempting to describe in broad 
terms the extremely valuable free world 
assets which must be defended in East 
Asia and the Pacific, I hope I have also 
pointed to some of its intrinsic defense 
strengths. The stark contrast between 
the thriving, dynamic, free economies of 
the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] states with the stagnant, rigidly 
controlled, and highly unproductive 
systems of the neighboring North 
Korean and Indochinese Communist 
states has not gone unnoticed. The prag- 
matic cooperative approach China is now 
taking in charting its own course toward 
modernization, a change which has im- 
mense strategic implications, undoubted- 
ly stems in part from observation of 
these diiferences. The export market for 
revolution among lesser developed coun- 
tries in the region has virtually col- 
lapsed. 

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and 
some of its friends have taken to a more 
direct and blatant course to their objec- 
tives. The Soviet occupation of Afghani- 
stan and the Soviet-supported Vietna- 
mese invasion of Kampuchea are clear 
examples. The strength of the Viet- 
namese and North Korean armed forces, 
which greatly exceed defensive needs, 
and the marked buildup of Soviet power 
in the Pacific raise the threat of further 
actions of this sort. 

Soviet Threat 

The Soviet objective in East Asia, as in 
other regions, is to seek positions of 



maximum geopolitical strength from 
which to project power and influence. As 
is implicit in the Soviet force buildup to 
be summarized today by the Department 
of Defense, the Soviets put a premium 
on military force as an instrument of 
geopolitical strength. The Soviet force 
buildup— globally and in the Pacific— far 
exceeds any legitimate defense require- 
ments. 

Soviet objectives which directly 
aflFect the countries on which our dis- 
cussion is focused today include: 

Neutralizing Japan in any conflict, 
weakening existing defense ties, and 
ultimately isolating Japan. Incidental- 
ly, during the past 3 years the Soviets 
have increased their forces in the Kuril 
Islands they occupy north of Hokkaido 
to approximately 10,000 personnel. 
Moreover, Soviet strong points in the 
islands overlook strategic sea lanes link- 
ing the seas of Japan and Okhotsk with 
the northern Pacific. In time of war, 



The Soviet objective 
in East Asia . . . is to 
seek positions of max- 
imum geopolitical 
strength from which to 
project power and in- 
fluence. 



Soviet forces could stage from the 
islands for attacks on Hokkaido to 
secure these vital sea lanes and prevent 
the Soviet fleet from being bottled up in 
Vladivostok. 

Threatening the security of the sea 
lanes, thereby putting themselves in a 
position to interdict Middle Eastern 
petroleum to our major allies during a 
period of international crisis. This 
would also permit the Soviets to 
threaten vital trade among regional 
states, such as exists between Japan and 
Australia. In a crisis the Soviets might 
also seek to deny East Asian routes of 



August 1982 



55 



EAST ASIA 



access to the Indian Ocean to the United 
States or anyone else for that matter. 
As is apparent from the Defense Depart- 
ment's description of the Soviet naval 
forces in the Far East, much of the in- 
creased threat to sea lanes of communi- 
cations derives from the following Soviet 
naval trends: 

• Diversity and improvement in 
warship, aircraft, and weapons capa- 
bility; 

• Large increases in at-sea and 
distant-deployment operations and 
commitments by the Soviets to strive for 
naval superiority; and 

• Increased awareness by the Soviet 
leadership of the leverage which accrues 
to a nation with sizeable and strong 
maritime resources, especially a large, 
modern na\7. 

Soviet objectives which represent a 
significant longer term but less direct 
threat to Northeast Asia include: 

Increasing and maintaining access 
to Vietnamese air and naval facilities 
as a means of projecting Soviet mili- 
tary power and political influence 
throughout the region, especially 
among ASEAN countries. Access to 
these facilities greatly extends the 
Soviet military reach in the Pacific. 
From airfields in Vietnam, Soviet 
bombers could attack much of southern 
China now out of range of aircraft based 
in the Soviet Far East (with the excep- 
tion of the Backfire bomber). Access to 
Vietnamese facilities increases the 
threat to the Philippines, which current- 
ly have the only U.S. bases near main- 
land Asia which are not vulnerable to 
combined Soviet air and naval attack 
from existing bases in the Soviet Far 
East. 

Reduction of ASEAN's links with 
the West. The establishment of ties to 
ASEAN states is a long-term Soviet ob- 
jective. As one means of loosening 
U.S. -ASEAN ties, as well as ties among 
ASEAN states, the U.S.S.R. seeks to 
undermine resolution of the Kam- 
puchean problem based on the declara- 
tion of the U.N. -sponsored international 
conference on Kampuchea, which called 
for Vietnamese withdrawal and Khmer 
self-determination. 

Limit external assistance to 
China's modernization efforts by ex- 
ploiting trade links to discourage 
Western Europe and Japan from close 
economic and defense ties with China. 
The Soviets are also employing diplo- 
matic overtures to draw the Chinese 
away from Western relationships. 



In short, the increasingly formidable 
Soviet mOitary capabilities in East Asia 
combined with objectives inimical to 
U.S. and allied interests present a 
challenge. 

The East Asian and Pacific states 
are adapting their defenses to respond 
to these changes in the security environ- 
ment. Some may not proceed at times 
with the dispatch that we desire but 
most are doing much more with less as- 
sistance from us than has ever been the 
case in the past. While our increased 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits to 
Korea, for example, are highly import- 
ant in a real as well as a symbolic sense, 
they do not, in fact, cover yearly pay- 
ments on past debts to us and the Re- 
public of Korea is dipping deep into its 
own resources to finance its military 
modernization. In working out with our 
friends and allies our separate contribu- 
tions to the area's defense, it is import- 
ant that we do not inadvertently neglect 
our greatest source of strength, which is 
the cooperative, competitive, and highly 
productive system we have built up 
among our societies over the past two 
decades. 

I will now turn to some of the 
efforts being taken by some important 
treaty allies of the United States to cope 
with the Soviet threat. 

Japan 

The Soviet military buildup in East Asia 
and the significant strengthening in the 
past 2 or 3 years of Soviet military 
forces in the Japanese islands north of 
Hokkaido have reinforced the traditional 
suspicion with which most Japanese re- 
gard the Soviets. Aggressive use of 
power over the past decade by the 
U.S.S.R. has increased Japanese aware- 
ness of the danger that Soviet actions 
pose for their interests. While few 
Japanese believe Japan should respond 
in kind to the growth of Soviet military 
power, responsible Japanese in and out 
of government recognize the need for 
closer cooperation with the West. A con- 
sensus has grown for steady improve- 
ments in Japan's self-defense forces 
while at the same time the nation con- 
tinues to rely on the U.S. -Japan security 
treaty and the nuclear umbrella associ- 
ated with it. There is growing recogni- 
tion that the defense responsibilities 
assumed by the United States in areas 
such as the Middle East serve Japan's 
security as well, thereby arguing for 
enhanced Japanese defense efforts. 

Recent Japanese governments, in- 
cluding that of Prime Minister Suzuki, 
have maintained that Japan can most 



usefully contribute to stability and peace 
in the Asia-Pacific region through a com- 
bination of political, economic, and de- 
fense measures designed to strengthen 
Japan's security posture at home and 
improve its cooperation with both the in- 
dustrial democracies and the Third 
World. This approach has come to be 
labeled "comprehensive security." Rather 
than emphasizing percentages of gross 
national product and other conten- 
tious—and often misleading — measures 
of defense performance, our security 
dialogue v/ith Japan has, in turn, 
stressed a more rational and appropriate 
division of labor to meet our common 
strategic concerns. This concept of 
burdensharing is evident in the following 
areas: 

Strengthened self-defense force 
capabilities that will allow Japan to 
assume primary responsibilities for its 
local defense as well as protect the 
sea lanes in the northwest Pacific 
upon which its economic security de- 
pends. I should emphasize our view that 
such capabilities remain within Japan's 
well-known constitutional constraints on 
the projection overseas of offensive mili- 
tary power, are consistent with the pro- 
visions of our Mutual Security Treaty 
with the Japanese, and should not cause 
undue concern among Japan's neighbors. 
There have already been substantial im- 
provements in the self-defense forces, 
but the Japanese Government itself 
acknowledges that there are still signifi- 
cant shortcomings in such essential 
areas as air defense, antisubmarine war- 
fare, logistics, and communications. 
Both Secretaries Haig and Weinberger 
have urged their Japanese counterparts 
to accelerate their government's efforts 
to rectify these weaknesses. 

More effective cooperation be- 
tween U.S. and Japanese forces. 

Under the Mutual Security Treaty, 
Japan provides the U.S. bases that are 
all but indispensable to our strategy of 
forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Japan has made increasing con- 
tributions to the maintenance and im- 
provement of these facilities — their 
direct and indirect support of U.S. 
forces this year will exceed $1 billion. In 
recent years this support, which in- 
creased 25% in the current budget, has 
embraced new areas such as partial 
assumption of our local labor costs and 
the construction of new operational 
facilities. 

Joint planning. Since the adoption 
of the "U.S. -Japan Guidelines for De- 
fense Cooperation" in 1978, U.S. and 
Japanese military staffs have worked to- 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



gether in formulating specific plans for 
not only the defense of Japan but, 
recently, for Japanese facilitative assist- 
ance to our forces in meeting emergen- 
cies elsewhere in the Far East. 

Joint exercises. Joint exercises in- 
volving all three services have grown in 
frequency and scope each year. Naval 
forces, for exam.ple, participate with us 
in the annual miiltinational RIMPAC 
exercises. 

Technological cooperation. We 
have been working closely with the 
Japanese in regard to weapons develop- 
ment in meetings of the systems and 
technology forum and look forward to 
Japan's adoption of a policy that will 
permit a full two-way flow of defense 
technology. 

Efforts in related areas of common 
interest. Japan's positions on such inter- 
national issues as Afghanistan, Poland, 
refugees, and arms control have been 
close to our own. In undertaking a more 
assertive foreign policy, Japan has made 
increasingly clear its identification with 
Western interests. We are, of course, in- 
terested in Japan's expanding foreign 
aid programs, particularly to such coun- 
tries of strategic importance as Thai- 
land, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan, Egypt, 
and the Persian Gulf states. Recently 
Japan has voiced support for the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative. Japan is commit- 
ted to doubling its overseas aid level be- 
tween 1979 and 1984. 

Japan's commitment to greater 
security efforts is evident in the increase 
of its 1982 defense budget ($11.8 billion) 
by 7.75%, a decision made in the face of 
severe budgetary pressures which 
j resulted in cutbacks of most domestic 
programs of the Japanese Government. 
We give due credit to this and other 
steps the Japanese have taken to 
strengthen their defense posture, but we 
have pointed out— most recently during 
Secretary Weinberger's visit to Tokyo 
last month — that the United States and 
its other allies also face serious domestic 
problems in taking necessary defense 
measures. We will continue to urge that 
Japan accelerate its security efforts so 
that we can cooperate effectively in cop- 
ing with the Soviet challenge. 

Australia and New Zealand 

Australia and New Zealand anchor the 
southern end of the Western line of 
defense in East Asia and the Pacific. 
They also stand guard over a secure, if 
lengthy, line of communication between 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans which was 
of great value in World War II and 



would be today in the event of war. 
Both are old allies that have fought in 
every war involving the United States in 
this century, from World War I to Viet- 
nam. Since 1951 we have been formally 
linked with them through the ANZUS 
[Australia, New Zealand, United States 
pact] mutual defense treaty and the 
Manila pact. 

Both countries continue contribu- 
tions to peace, security, and economic 
development of contiguous regions that 
have been vital to the free world. 
Through the five power defense ar- 
rangement, the two ANZUS allies are 
linked with Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Great Britain. Australia currently main- 
tains air force units in Malaysia, while 
New Zealand has an infantry battalion 
at Singapore. Joint exercises, training, 
and consultations are undertaken. 

Both countries also maintain close 
economic and security assistance links 
with the other three members of the 
ASEAN countries— Indonesia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines. Finally, New 
Zealand and Australia have played im- 
portant roles in assisting the new island 
nations of the southwest Pacific to 
develop peacefully and, through the 
Commonwealth, have played a construc- 
tive role in countries like Zimbabwe and, 
most recently, Uganda. 

From the defense standpoint, 
Australia, with a larger population and a 
more prosperous economy than New 
Zealand, makes a quantitatively greater 
contribution to both security and eco- 
nomic development in contiguous 
regions. Australia's defense budget is 
projected at U.S.$4.4 billion in 1982-83 
or about 2.9% of gross domestic prod- 
uct. Moreover, in 1980 a 5-year defense 
modernization and buildup was adopted 
calling for an increase of 7% in defense 
expenditures in real terms and procure- 
ment of over U.S. $500 million annually, 
mainly from the United States. 

When this expansion is completed, 
Australia will have 75 F-18 aircraft to 
supplement and then replace its aging 
Mirage Ills; it is purchasing 10 new 
P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft to 
replace an earlier model, giving it a total 
of about 20 such aircraft; and it is 
modernizing its RF/F-lllC strike and 
reconnaissance squadron. The Royal 
Australian Navy has agreed to purchase 
the British aircraft carrier Invincible to 
replace its aging H.M.A.S. Melbourne 
and has ordered a fourth FFG 
guided missile frigate from the United 
States. With its six Oberon class sub- 
marines and River class destroyer 
escorts, it will soon have one of the most 



potent naval forces in its region. These 
air and sea forces, backed by a small but 
well-trained and -equipped army, make 
Australia's contribution to the alliance 
an important one, both in terms of de- 
fending its island continent and of main- 
taining peace in the region. 

New Zealand's forces are proportion- 
ally smaller than Australia's— roughly 
12,640 regulars compared to 71,000 
Australians— but they, too, are excep- 
tionally well-trained and effective. In ad- 
dition to the contribution of helicopters, 
pilots, and ground crew that the New 
Zealand Government has contributed 
with Australia to the Sinai peace- 
keeping force and its role in Singapore 
and Malaysia, New Zealand plays an im- 
portant civic action role among the small 
nations of the southwest Pacific such as 
the Kingdom of Tonga, Fiji, and 
Western Samoa. Most recently. New 
Zealand and Australian forces rendered 
critical aid to Tonga following a deva- 
stating hurricane. New Zealand has also 
provided military and civilian advisers 
and equipment to the armed forces of 
these countries. With a military budget 
of about $400 million and facing difficult 
economic circumstances, there has been 
little opportunity for the New Zealand 
Government to undertake an ambitious 
program of defense modernization. The 
government is doing all it can; it will, 
for example, purchase two Leander class 
frigates to replace the two oldest of the 
four in its navy. 

South Korea 

The maintenance of a credible deterrent 
to North Korean aggression against the 
south is a key element in preserving 
peace and security in Northeast Asia. It 
is this objective to which our assistance 
to the Republic of Korea (R. O.K.)— as 
well as that country's own very substan- 
tial efforts— has been devoted. Our own 
contribution to that shared objective has 
frequently been reviewed by this and 
other committees of the Congress. It is 
substantial. We maintain as you know 
some 39,000 military personnel in the 
R.O.K., including the 2d Infantry Divi- 
sion just south of the demilitarized zone. 
We have recently taken steps to improve 
the capability of those forces by pro- 
viding them with more modern weapons 
and aircraft. We have also maintained a 
high level of military assistance, in the 
form of FMS credits, to the R.O.K. 
Although Congress has appropriated 
$166 million in FMS credits for fiscal 
year (FY) 1982, we recently forwarded a 
request for a $29 million supplemental. 



August 1982 



57 



EAST ASIA 



We have proposed a $210 million pro- 
gram for FY 1983. These levels of as- 
sistance are in our view essential in view 
of the persisting military imbalance on 
the peninsula and the steady and con- 
tinuing buildup of North Korean forces. 

Our assistance is also justified when 
placed in the context of South Korea's 
own efforts to meet the threat from the 
north. The R.O.K. maintains an armed 
force of more than 600,000 with a ready 
reserve several times that number. To 
support this level of military prepared- 
ness, it spends some 6% of its gross na- 
tional product on defense. While Korea 
has achieved remarkable economic prog- 
ress over the past 20 years, it nonethe- 
less remains a developing country, 
whose domestic economic requirements 
remain, in many respects, unfulfilled. 
The burden imposed by its military ex- 
penditures has been especially heavy 
during the past 2 years of economic 
recession and gradual recovery. Never- 
theless, the R.O.K. has not faltered in 
its commitment to redress gradually the 
unfavorable balance with the north and 
to deter aggression. 

Our alliance with the Republic of 
Korea and both Korean and U.S. efforts 
to strengthen the military forces at the 
disposal of that alliance are directed 
only toward deterring an attack upon 
the south by the north and repelling 
such an attack if it should ever come. 
Nevertheless, while this is a narrowly 
defined geographic objective, its import- 
ance extends far beyond the peninsula 
and is, as I have suggested, vital to the 
peace and security of the entire region. 
In this important sense, R.O.K. defense 
efforts and our support of them figure 
prominently in our broader objectives 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in East Asia. 

China 

China is a friendly, nonallied country 
with which we share imporUmt strategic 
interests, including a common perception 
of threatening Soviet ambitions world- 
wide. In the Pacific area specifically, the 
People's Republic of China plays a sig- 
nificant international role by maintaining 
consistent pressure on the Vietnamese 
to withdraw from Kampuchea and Laos 
and on the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. 
China's opposition to Soviet and Soviet- 
proxy aggression, which results in the 
tying down of nearly .500,000 Soviet and 
2,50,000 Vietnamese troops on Chinese 
borders, is an important factor in main- 
taining regional and global peace and 
stability. 



Beijing, moreover, strongly supports 
our security ties with Japan and the con- 
cept of strengthening Japanese defen- 
sive rearmament. China also supports 
the presence of U.S. bases in Asia and a 
strong U.S. naval presence in the Pacific 
as a counter to further Soviet moves in- 
to the area. For the same reason, China 
shares our interest in maintaining 
stability on the Korean Peninsula and 
has parallel security commitments to 
such U.S. friends as Thailand and Paki- 
stan. 

Our friends and allies in Asia attach 
great importance to development of a 
healthy Sino-U.S. relationship. Close 
U.S. ties with China are considered a 
key element in China's economic devel- 
opment and thus to China's continuing 
progress as a responsible participant in 
the Asian and world economic order. 
U.S. relations with China are also seen 
by our Asian friends as a positive in- 
fluence on the future direction of China's 
foreign policy and as a stimulus to 
regional cooperation and development. 

We believe that continued good U.S. 
relations with China greatly enhance 
security and stability in East Asia. 
U.S. -China relations are currently at a 
sensitive juncture due to the Taiwan 
arms sales issue. We are attempting to 
resolve this problem through continuing 
dialogue with Beijing. The recent visit of 
Vice President Bush to China demon- 



strated this Administration's desire to 
bridge our differences and preserve and 
strengthen the important relations and 
cooperation between the United States 
and China. The Chinese welcomed Mr. 
Bush and showed a spirit of willingness 
to work toward resolution of our differ- 
ences. The visit last week by Senate Ma- 
jority Leader Baker further contributed 
to this spirit and certainly enhanced 
Chinese understanding of congressional 
views on this sensitive issue. 

Conclusion 

In summary, while our defense burdens 
are heavy and we continue by necessity 
to make the largest single contribution 
of any country, our allies and friends are 
continuing to assume an ever-increasing 
share of the burden. Given the increas- 
ing Soviet threat to our common in- 
terests, it is essential that we, our allies, 
and our friends transmit an unremitting 
signal of resolve to protect these in- 
terests for so long as they continue to be 
threatened. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be publisned by the committee and will 
be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy 



by John H. Holdridge 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
June 8, 1982. Ambassador Holdridge is 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I greatly welcome your invitation to 
speak on U.S. policy toward Southeast 
Asia. This hearing is timely as Deputy 
Secretary Stoessel and I will next week 
be meeting with the ASEAN [Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations] 
Foreign Ministers in Singapore, where 
many of the issues I will mention today 
will undoubtedly be addressed. 

Favorable Trends 

Few would have thought 20 years or 
even 10 years ago that Southeast Asia 
would be described this year in the 



financial section of the New York Times 
as "the most upbeat area of the world." 
Although I have not measured Southeast 
Asia's claims to this distinction against 
those of other parts of the globe, several 
important developments in my view 
justify an overall positive assessment 
both of developments in the region and 
of our relationships there. 

Particularly encouraging is the suc- 
cessful manner in which many Southeast 
Asian nations have carved out for 
themselves increasingly important roles 
in the world's free market. The 
economic growth of most of our 
Southeast Asian friends, to which I 
drew attention in my appearence before 
this subcommittee last summer, has con- 
tinued despite a less than favorable in- 
ternational environment, particularly as 
regards demand for their principal ex- 
port commodities. The ASEAN states in 
particular have both drawn strength 
from — and lent strength to — the world 
market economy. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



Another positive feature is the effec- 
tiveness with which ASEAN countries 
continue to rally international support 
for resolution of the Kampuchean prob- 
lem. They have met continued Viet- 
namese intransigence with resolution 
and resourcefulness. ASEAN's success 
has been reflected in another decisive 
vote on Kampuchea in the U.N. General 
Assembly last fall, equally broad support 
for its approach to a political solution to 
the Kampuchea problem spelled out in 
the declaration of last July's interna- 
tional conference on Kampuchea, and 
broad cooperation in applying strong 
economic pressure on Vietnam to help 
persuade it to negotiate a comprehen- 
sive political solution in Kampuchea as 
outlined by ASEAN in the international 
conference. 

We can also point to favorable 
trends in popular political participation 
paralleling the emphasis that a market- 
economy approach places on freeing in- 
dividual initiative. Three of the five 
ASEAN states held national elections 
this year, and the other two held impor- 
tant bielections, adding to the founda- 
tion of democratic development. While 
progress in this area may be regarded 
by some as uneven, the trend is encour- 
aging when viewed over the long term. 
Certainly prospects are bright when con- 
trasted with conditions in Indochina, 
which possesses the region's principal 
alternative governing system. 

Current Challenges 

When we meet with ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers in Singapore later this month, 
the focus will be less on past accomplish- 
ments, of course, than on challenges 
that lie before us — and there are many. 
The ASEAN governments are par- 
ticularly concerned about the current 
state of the world economy, which has 
placed strains on them and on their rela- 
tionship with us. As we are all aware, 
economic growth such as many ASEAN 
countries have experienced often in- 
creases popular expectations faster than 
actual incomes, and the depressed 
market for certain export commodities 
has had a widespread effect within their 
domestic economies. Some governments 
are under pressure to withdraw from 
competition through restrictive and thus 
ultimately self-defeating trade ar- 
rangements. There is a widespread fear 
that the United States itself might turn 
to protectionism. We will stress our 
commitment to get our own economy in- 



to order, to resolve trade and invest- 
ment problems in a manner which will 
deepen attachments to the market 
economy, and to contribute to balanced 
growth through investment, trade, and 
development assistance programs. 

Improving the global economic 
climate will also be important in this 
respect, and I think that we will soon be 
able to point to some positive movement 
arising from the Versailles summit. We 
will ask in return for ASEAN's con- 
tinued cooperation in assuring that the 
world market, from which we all have 
drawn our strength, remains competitive 
and thus efficient. 

Continued Vietnamese intransigence 
on Kampuchea and the threat Viet- 
namese forces pose to our good friend, 
Thailand, are also matters of immediate 
and great concern to ASEAN and the 
United States alike. The repressive 
measures used by the Indochinese 
regimes to control their own people, in- 
cluding the use of lethal chemical agents 
against civilian populations, is an addi- 
tional disturbing element. Pressing for a 
political solution to the Kampuchea 
problem while strengthening the military 
forces of Thailand and its friends in the 
area are parallel, complementary meas- 
ures to meet this challenge. We will 
reassure the ASEAN states that they 
can rely on our firm support for their ef- 
forts to promote a Kampuchean settle- 
ment based on the declaration of the in- 
ternational conference on Kampuchea. 
We believe ASEAN governments should 
continue to take the lead on this issue 
because of their demonstrated success in 
marshaling international support and 
because of their sound approach to the 
problems involved. At the same time, we 
will stress the reliability of the United 
States as a treaty ally to Thailand, as a 
counterweight to the growing Soviet 
military presence in Indochina, and as a 
reliable supplier of credit, equipment, 
and training for the modest military 
modernization programs of friendly 
Southeast Asian countries. 

While Indochinese refugee flows 
have fortunately diminished markedly in 
past months, they remain a problem for 
the first-asylum countries. It is impor- 
tant that the residual refugee population 
in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
continue to decrease, and we will work 
with other resettlement countries 
toward this end. 

The lack of a complete accounting 
for U.S servicemen missing in action in 
Vietnam and Laos is a bilateral problem 
to which we assign highest priority. We 
will continue strenuous efforts to obtain 



the cooperation of the Governments of 
Vietnam and Laos on this matter, as a 
humanitarian issue to be handled ex- 
peditiously and separately from other 
concerns. 

Conclusions 

Southeast Asia has for many years been 
knovim as the home of some of the 
world's most intractable and dangerous 
problems. Many of them are still with 
us. Today, however, Southeast Asia is 
also the home of some of the world's 
more effective problem-solving govern- 
ments — and this has made a difference. 
I think we might sum up the sources 
of favorable developments in Southeast 
Asia by singling out three characteristics 
of our friends there. 

• They have strived hard to com- 
pete in the world market economy. 
Their overall growth rates, which are 
far above the world average, testify to 
the efficiency and strength they have 
gained from such competition. 

• They have sought to cooperate in 
preserving the economic system which 
gives them this growth. ASEAN, which 
found common economic goals for coun- 
tries whose economies are not com- 
plementary and which has now become a 
potent constructive force in world 
political councils, is proof of their suc- 
cess in this field. 

• They have recognized and 
demonstrated that local initiative is the 
basic buildingblock for economic develop- 
ment, social progress, and security. 

The United Sta*"es has great interest 
in assuring that this competitive spirit, 
cooperative attitude, and local initiative 
continue to thrive. Our objectives, 
therefore, remain much as I described 
them to you in last year's hearing. In 
cooperation with our ASEAN friends, 
we will seek to curb the security threat 
posed by Vietnamese aggression and the 
Soviet military presence and to alleviate 
the economic pressures caused by the 
current world slump and imbalances 
within our system. The progress and 
stability of our friends and allies in 
ASEAN are the heart of our policy since 
they form the foundation for the 
favorable trends we have thus far 
witnessed in Southeast Asia. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



August 1982 



59 



EUROPE 



Secretary Visits Turkey, Greece; 
Attends North Atlantic Council 



Secretary Haig departed 
Washington, D.C., May 12 to visit 
Turkey (May 13-15), Athens 
(May ir>-16), and Luxembourg 
(May 16-18), where he attended the 
regular semiannual session of the North 
Atlantic Council ministerial meeting 
(May 17-18). He returned to the United 
States on May 18. 

Following are the Secretary's 
remarks and news conferences in 
Ankara, Athens, and Luxembourg and 
the North Atlantic Council final com.- 
munique. 



REMARKS BY SECRETARY HAIG 

AND 

FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN. 

ANKARA, MAY 15. 1982' 

Foreign Minister Turkmen. I wish to 
speak very briefly and leave the floor as 
soon as possible to the Secretary of 
State. 

May I say, first of all, that we are 
extremely pleased with the visit of 
Mr. Haig to our country. I think that the 
talks we have had here have shown that 
there is a complete mutual understand- 
ing and mutual trust between Turkey 
and the United States. Secretary Haig 
also visited our Prime Minister, an old 
friend, again. He visited the President of 
the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Irmak, 
and we had extensive talks on many sub- 
jects with the Secretary. The Secretary 
of State had the opportunity to meet 
and to talk with the members of the Na- 
tional Security Council; he had a chance 
to talk to Deputy Prime Minister Ozal, 
Minister of State Aztrak, and Defense 
Minister Bayulken. 

We have, of course, taken up with 
priority the bilateral relations between 
Turkey and the United States. We have 
dealt extensively with the defense and 
economic cooperation between the two 
countries. I think we agree that the 
high-level committee on defense and 
cooperation is a very useful and effec- 
tive instrument for promoting our 
defense cooperation. We have explored 
the possibilities of furthering our 
economic, commercial, technological, and 
scientific cooperation. 

We have had a large exchange of 
views on international problems, par- 
ticularly on the sources of tension today. 



I think that we are in full agreement on 
the broad principles and the main ap- 
proaches toward these problems. We 
have reiterated together our strong sup- 
port for NATO solidarity. We discussed 
the problem of international terrorism, 
and there is an agreement between us 
that there should be an effective fight 
against this evil. We reviewed the situa- 
tion in the Middle East with particular 
emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the war between Iraq and Iran. 

We have, naturally, discussed the 
relations between Turkey and Greece 
and the Cyprus problem. On Turkish- 
Greek relations we have explained our 
point of view to the Secretary. We have 
emphasized that we are always ready to 
negotiate our differences with Greece 
but that, of course, we are equally op- 
posed to any fait a^complis or unilateral 
acts. On the Cyprus problem we have 
reiterated our strong support for the in- 
tercommunal talks, and we have 
underlined to the Secretary that we 
were ready to deploy all efforts in order 
to facilitate and promote these talks. I 
think on the whole we can say, as the 
Secretary pointed out yesterday, that 
the relations between Turkey and the 
United States are excellent, that we 
have reached in our relationship the age 
of maturity and that we are looking for- 
ward to increased cooperation and part- 
nership between Turkey and the United 
States. 

Secretary Haig. I want to reiterate 
and underline the great sense of en- 
thusiasm and satisfaction that I feel as a 
result of this all-too-brief visit here in 
Turkey. This is the first time I've had an 
opportunity to return to Turkey since 
my days as Supreme Commander in the 
spring of 1979, and I was especially 
gratified that it could be in the year of 
the centennial of the great Ataturk who 
is the founder of modern Turkey and 
whose influence is so pervasive today in 
all that is Turkish. 

I think I was able to use the oppor- 
tunity of this visit to underline once 
again the great sense of dedication that 
the United States feels to its relation- 
ship with Turkey and its recognition 
that Turkey is the vital anchor of the 
southeastern flank of the alliance. 
Turkey also plays an indispensable role 



in the stability of the eastern Mediterra- 
nean region and, indeed, Southwest Asia 
as well. This visit afforded me an oppor- 
tunity to convey to General Evren, an 
old friend, President Reagan's deter- 
mination to continue the level of 
economic and military assistance to 
Turkey and to build and strengthen our 
ties in the months and years ahead. 

As Foreign Minister Turkmen men- 
tioned, during the visit we had an oppor- 
tunity to exchange views on the blight of 
international terrorism, and I, of course, 
used the opportunity to convey the deep 
sense of regret and sorrow that every 
American feels for the recent tragedies 
in our own country as a result of ter- 
rorist — vile terrorist — acts against 
Turkish officials. In this sense we are 
working now at the Federal, state, and 
local levels to deal with this situation, to 
bring prompt and firm justice to 
perpetrators of these acts. One of the 
most encouraging aspects of the visit for 
me was to see the changes that have oc- 
curred here in Turkey since my last 
visit. I speak of the return to law and 
order, the suppression of terrorist activi- 
ty that Turkey was plagued by in the 
late 1970s, and early 1980s, which I had 
an opportunity to witness firsthand as 
the Supreme Allied Commander. To see 
the elimination of that kind of activity is 
very encouraging to me. 

And it goes without saying I was 
also able to witness firsthand, through 
the briefings and information that were 
provided to me and my party, the high 
level of improvement that has occurred 
as a result of Turkey's economic reform 
program, both in the area of internal 
economic inflation, where the reductions 
have been very encouraging, and in the 
increase in exports that Turkey is realiz- 
ing as a result of the disciplined and ef- 
fective and visionary planning of the 
Evren regime. We, of course, had an op- 
portunity to discuss the timetable for 
the return to representative democracy 
here in Turkey, and I was able to 
reassure General Evren that the United 
States has full, total, and unquestioning 
confidence in the adherence to the 
schedule which we support and believe is 
wholly reasonable and practicable. 

We did not have an opportunity also 
to discuss Greek-Turkish relationships, 
the Cyprus question, and problems in 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



the Aegean. As you know, it is U.S. 
policy to favor a peaceful solution of 
whatever disputes occur by the parties. 
And I will go on to Athens where I am 
sure there will be further discussions 
about these subjects. 

All in all, I want to emphasize and 
reiterate the deep sense of satisfaction I 
had with this visit. It is especially so 
because I have known and respected 
Turkey so well over the years. To see 
the kind of progress that is so evident 
today, and to a visitor who has been 
away for some time, I think this prog- 
ress is even more sharply evident. 
Agfain, I want to thank you, Mr. 
Minister, General Evren, Prime Minister 
Ulusu, and the general staff, with whom 
I've worked in the past, as well as the 
other officials of the government, for 
the hospitality and great benefit that 
this visit afforded me and my colleagues. 

Q. It is reported that you advised 
the Turkish Government to improve its 
lomewhat strained ties with the Euro- 
pean countries. In your opinion, what 
sould and should Turkey do to im- 
prove them? 

Secretary Haig. As a matter of 
fact, I did not advise my Turkish hosts 
to improve their ties. I have encouraged 
Dur European friends to continue their 
ligh level of support and cooperation 
ivith Turkey. I don't think it is the role 
3f a friend and ally to be pedantic in the 
context of your question. I have no ques- 
rion that the overwhelming membership 
of the alliance is fully cognizant of the 
vital role and indispensable role that 
Turkey plays today, and they will con- 
tinue their high level of cooperation with 
Turkey. 

Q. In 1976 the Greek Govern- 
ment's demand for a guarantee against 
Turkey was answered by a letter 
signed by Mr. Kissinger. Today the 
present Greek Government seems to 
be asking for the same type of a letter 
from the American side. I wonder 
whether you consider this Kissinger 
letter still valid, and whether you will 
make a reference to it when asked. 

Secretary Haig. I think that U.S. 
policy on this subject is well-known and 
longstanding. It involves our interest in 
seeing disputes in the Aegean between 
Greece and Turkey solved through 
peaceful means through communication 
among the parties. That has been and 
remains American policy, and I am con- 
fident that these two valuable members 
of the NATO alliance have willingly 
joined the alliance to meet their own 



securities through that partnership and 
the participation in the alliance. 

Q. Are you still committed to the 
Rogers plan for the allocation of 
defense responsibilities in the 
Aegean? 

Secretary Haig. As you know, I 
have a certain degree of my own 
energies and activities involved in the 
Rogers plan, if that's what the proper 
term is these days. We, of course, feel 
that it is vitally important to be full, 
total participants in the alliance, full 
members. Whatever the vehicle that's 
employed to achieve that in the light of 
recent history is something that would 
have our support. 

Q. How does your Administration 
interpret these European misconcep- 
tions about Turkey, and how valid are 
these perceptions in Europe and the 
United States toward Turkey? 

Secretary Haig. I think that it's not 
for me to be the official observer of 
these things. I can speak for my own 
government and reemphasize again our 
full confidence in the leadership here in 
Turkey and the great admiration we 
have for what this leadership has ac- 
complished. I sometimes regret that 
memories are too short. All of which has 
happened is a source of satisfaction to 
me, and I am fully confident and I have 
no reservation about the return of 
Turkey to representative democracy 
under the time schedule announced by 
the Evren government last year. I would 
hope that our European partners would 
share that sense of confidence. 

Q. Can you please bring us up to 
date on the situation around the 
Falkland Islands and the efforts of the 
United Nations to bring about a settle- 
ment? 

Secretary Haig. No, I think the 
Secretary General had a very detailed 
statement on this subject last night. As 
you know, the British Government has 
recalled its Ambassador from the United 
Nations and its representative from 
Washington, Ambassador Henderson, 
for a high-level review of the situation in 
London over the weekend. I will be see- 
ing British Foreign Minister Pym in 
Luxembourg and look forward to de- 
tailed talks on the situation. As you 
know. President Reagan commented in 
his press conference day before yester- 
day expressing some slight degree of op- 
timism that some progress had been 
made, and I think that parallels the 
observation of the Secretary General. 
The United States stands prepared to do 
all that it can in what the Secretary 



General has described as the critical 
hours, which we now find ourselves in, 
in this very difficult issue. 

Q. It seems like the Greek Govern- 
ment's policies are against NATO prin- 
ciples—asking for guarantees against 
another NATO ally and putting reser- 
vations in the joint declarations. Do 
you think that Greece is causing a 
crack in NATO right now? 

Secretary Haig. I would not. I don't 
think it's appropriate for me to make 
any observations along these lines. As 
you know, I will be moving from here 
this morning to Athens, and I'm sure 
there will be further discussions there. I 
have outlined for you the general policy 
of the United States on this subject. I 
am aware that there is a letter of the 
kind referred to in the files, and that's 
where it is. 

Q. Turkey is ready to start 
negotiations again. Do you believe 
that you will be able to convince the 
Greek Prime Minister to start the 
negotiations between Turkey and 
Greece? 

Secretary Haig. I understand there 
is some discussion already underway in 
a sporadic sense on some of the nar- 
rower issues. There is some underway 
on the question of territorial waters. 
We, of course, think these are matters 
to be discussed and resolved either 
bilaterally or under international agree- 
ment. 

Q. In light of Deputy Prime 
Minister Mr. Turgut Ozal's statement 
on Thursday that political parties in 
Turkey will be allowed to start func- 
tioning as from the middle or end of 
1983, are you still confident that the 
regime can stick to its timetable of 
holding elections in late 1983 or early 
1984? 

Secretary Haig. My discussions 
here convinced me that the timetable 
established by the government is 
satisfactory, is on schedule, and is pro- 
ceeding as anticipated. I have no basis 
for questioning that. I have no doubt 
that it will be pursued as outlined. 

Q. Did you discuss specifically the 
case of Mr. Ecevit? There is a lot of 
opinion in Europe that he should be 
released from prison. 

Secretary Haig. It's not my role 
nor would it be appropriate for me to 
make any public comment on an internal 
matter which is being pursued in accord- 
ance with existing Turkish law, and I'm 
not going to do that this morning. 



61 



EUROPE 



Q. Did you discuss the question of 
Mr. Ecevit with the Turkish 
authorities? 

Secretary Haig. I didn't discuss it, 
but it was discussed with me by Turkish 
officials. 

Q. Is the Kissinger-Bitsios letter 
valid or not? 

Secretary Haig. Almost in dental 
fashion, you have tried to extract 
everything you can on the subject. I said 
it's a letter that's in the files. I told you 
what our policy is in the Administration 
today. That is that these are matters to 
be worked out peacefully by the govern- 
ments concerned, and I'm talking about 
tensions in the Aegean. Only last week 
somebody said I feel like a lemon in 
service to 20 martinis. 

Q. Are you satisfied with the ex- 
planation you received concerning 
Turkey's close ties with Libya? 

Secretary Haig. I certainly under- 
stand clearly the Turkish-Libyan rela- 
tionship. It is somewhat different than 
that between the United States and 
Libya. The great strength of this 
alliance is that we are all different and 
we pursue sovereign policies of the 
member states, and that's as it should 
be. We are not a Warsaw Pact where all 
march in tandem — most of the time. 



Eighth Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAY 25, 1982' 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress niade during the past 60 
days toward reaching a negotiated settlement 
of the Cyprus problem. 

In the course of continuing discussion of 
the United Nations "evaluation" of the inter- 
communal negotiations, the Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot negotiators met on April 
14, 21, and 30 and May 4, 6, 11, 13, and 18. 
The negotiators have continued to focus their 
discussion on elements of the United Nations 
"evaluation" of the intercommunal negotia- 
tions. Having completed their initial review 
of many of the "points of coincidence," the 
communities are now beginning examination 
of "points of equidistance" including such 
issues as the freedoms of movement, settle- 
ment and property ownership in any future 
agreement. The negotiating sessions continue 
to be useful and constructive discussions with 
good relations between the participants. 

United Nations Secretary General Perez 
de Cuellar met in Rome on April 4 with 
Cypriot President Kyprianou and in Geneva 
on April 9 with Turkish Cypriot leader 
Denktash. These meetings provided a 
thorough review of the status of the negotia- 



tions and both sides agreed to accelerate the 
pace of the talks and hold two meetings per 
week. The negotiating parties also agreed to 
meet again with the Secretary General in 
New York in June for a further review of the 
negotiating process. 

We believe that the intercommunal 
negotiations are firmly established as a 
strong and effective too! to promote progress 
toward resolving the Cyprus problem. I wish 
to congratulate both the United Nations 
Secretary General and his Special Represent- 
ative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, 
for their commitment to bringing the Cyprus 
problem to a just and lasting settlement. 
They have my full support for their efforts. 
We hope that the negotiators will seize the 
opportunities offered by the United Nations 
"evaluations" to make progress toward 
resolving outstanding differences between 
the communities. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair- 
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 31, 1982). ■ 



SECRETARY HAIG, 
NEWS CONFERENCE, 
ATHENS, MAY 16, 1982^ 

I think at the outset I want to express a 
SOS efharisto to President Karamanlis, 
Prime Minister Papandreou, and to my 
counterpart, the distinguished Foreign 
Minister of Greece. 

I think in reflecting back on what 
has been a very busy although a very 
compressed schedule that I would 
describe our visit here in Greece as be- 
ing a very good one marked by cordiali- 
ty, constructive, and far-reaching discus- 
sions, all of which set a very positive 
tone and framework for which to deal 
with a number of longstanding and dif- 
ficult questions. 

Yesterday was a very busy one. We 
started out with 3V2 hours of discus- 
sion — in the first hour with the Prime 
Minister alone followed by 2'/2 hours 
with our respective teams, concluded by 
a 3-hour dinner last night in which 
substantive discussions continued. Of 
course, a very special privilege for me 
was a 1-hour meeting with President 
Karamanhs, an individual 1 have known 
over many years and who is rapidly 



becoming the elder statesman of 
Europe, based both on his vast ex- 
perience, his adherence to the demo- 
cratic values of the Western world, and 
his unusual contributions over many, 
many years. 

I think the trip itself underscores 
President Reagan's and his Administra- 
tion's attachment to the importance of 
our relationships with the Government 
and the people of Greece. These relation- 
ships of over a century standing involve 
a deep mutual respect and are built on 
the shared values, the historic Greek 
perception of the role of the individual, 
his dignity, his creativity, and the need 
to preserve the freedom of the citizens 
within the state. These shared percep- 
tions and values have always generated 
mutual benefits for the American and 
Greek peoples as manifested by a con- 
tinuing alliance in two conflicts in this 
century and understanding relationships 
in peace as well. 

I think in summary the visit itself, 
while not focused on making specific 
decisions on particular questions, did 
establish a very positive framework for 
the improvement of our bilateral rela- 
tionships, including the defense sector. 



They underlie Greece's vital role in 
assuring peace and stability in the 
southern region of the Atlantic alliance. 
Specific topics included a number of 
global issues, East-West issues, the topic 
of arms control, and the recent initiative 
taken by President Reagan to achieve 
for the first time substantial reductions 
in nuclear armament. 

We had an opportunity to discuss 
the ongoing and continuing crisis in 
Poland, the Falklands crisis, and, of 
course, the question of Cyprus. I em- 
phasized the support for the continua- 
tion of the intercommunal talks under 
the auspices of the U.N. Secretary 
General. We discussed the Greek- 
Turkish question, and this was par- 
ticularly valuable because I have, as you 
know, just proceeded from Ankara 
where similar discussions were held, 
and, as always, I encouraged a resolu- 
tion of these questions on a bilateral 
basis. 

We also discussed what the Prime 
Minister referred to as the triangular 
question — Greece, Turkey, and NATO 
related issues. Here, of course, these are 
appropriately dealt with in NATO itself, 
but as a member of the alliance and as a 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



good friend to both Greece and Turkey, 
we have always some constructive con- 
tributions to make. 

We, of course, focused on Greek- 
American bilateral relationships to in- 
clude our defense relationships and the 
issue of U.S. facilities in Greece. Again, 
not to seek to make decision but I think 
we arrived at a concensus of view on 
how to deal with this issue in the period 
ahead. So all in all, the visit was very 
positive, and I think its results justify 
optimism. There will be progress in the 
days ahead on a number of longstanding 
and difficult questions in the areas that I 
touched upon. 

Q. What is your line on Mr. 
Papandreou's request for a guarantee 
for the eastern frontier of Greece? 

A. The question was how was the 
topic of a guarantee to Greece, a 
longstanding question, dealt with in our 
discussions, and I think it suffices to say 
that this question arose in both capitals. 
We are sensitive to the issue. We 
believe, regardless of the future treat- 
ment of this question, that its fundamen- 
tal character is best assured by a full 
participation of the member states in the 
alliance of a resolution of longstanding 
questions among member states on a 
bilateral basis. 

I know yesterday the question came 
up on certain letters that have been ex- 
changed in the past between both Presi- 
dent Carter and the Government of 
Greece and the Foreign Ministers of the 
United States and Greece in an earlier 
period. We recognize those letters are in 
the file, and the task ahead now is to 
get on to resolve the issues which create 
understandable concerns. We intend to 
work as actively as we can to be a 
catalyst in that effort. 

Q. You have stressed the need for 
peaceful resolutions between the two 
parties— Greece and Turkey— on the 
Aegean question. Would the United 
States actively and unequivoeably op- 
pose military action by either side in 
resolving that dispute? 

A. I think it goes without saying 
that the U.S. view is no different than it 
is in the Falklands question. We reject 
and oppose, first, use of force to resolve 
disputes, no matter what their nature, 
except the reaffirmation of U.N. Charter 
Article 51 which provides for the right 
of self-defense. This is a matter of prin- 
ciple, and just as the United States has 
subscribed to that principle in the 
Falklands crisis — although, we have and 
seek to maintain good relationships 
with, of course. Great Britain and 



Argentina— we cannot recoil from 
stating unequivoeably our adherence to 
the rule of law and peaceful change in 
the resolution of political disputes. 

Q. Since the United States re- 
quested departure from the Falkland 
Islands of the Argentine troops, why 
do they not ask the departure of the 
Turkish troops from the island of 
Cyprus where they have been for 8 
years? 

A. It has been the U.S. position- 
continues to be the U.S. position— that 
the best way to deal with the non- 
Cypriot forces on the Island of Cyprus 
is — with active movement on the side of 
the two communities— to arrive at a set- 
tlement through the intercommunal 
talks. We believe that progress in that 
area will necessarily include progress in 
dealing with the subject of non-Cypriot 
forces. I am very pleased that the 
discussions I had in both Ankara and 
Athens suggest that both parties are 
willing to subscribe to progress under 
the auspices of the U.N. Secretary 
General shortly after my return to 
Washington this week. 

Q. In your discussion here you 
said you have arrived at a consensus 
of view dealing with the question of 
U.S. facilities and bases in Greece. 
What do you mean by that? 

A. I think the consensus was on 
how to deal with this subject in the 
period ahead, primarily with respect to 
timing and initial discussions. I don't 
want to go beyond that because it would 
suggest that we actually got into the 
substance of these discussions. We did 
not. We merely discussed how to treat 
them in the period ahead. 

Q. Concerning Greece's participa- 
tion in the military wing of NATO, 
Mr. Papandreou said recently "for the 
time being we are neither in nor out." 
I would like to know your opinion to- 
day after the talks with Papandreou. 

A. I am not a novice on this subject. 
But there is danger, because I am not a 
novice, of portraying myself as an active 
official in the resolution of the remaining 
questions on the command structure 
here in the Aegean. I am not. This is a 
NATO question. It should be dealt with 
within the NATO framework. We did, 
however, have a very good exchange of 
views on the subject, and as the Prime 
Minister pointed out yesterday, this is 
not an area in which I have a lack of 
background. I know specifically what the 
remaining questions are. I believe they 
are resolvable within the NATO 



framework and am optimistic they will 
be lesolved in the period ahead. This is 
going to take some careful work as in 
the past it has as well, but I think 
enough said. 

Q. Can you say after your visit to 
Ankara and Athens now whether or 
not as a result of your visit, the ten- 
sions between Greece and Turkey have 
somewhat been ameliorated? 

A. I think it would be wrong to 
make such a suggestion as a result of a 
brief visit of the kind we have just had, 
and I wouldn't even presume to draw 
such a conclusion. However, I think I 
leave the visits in both capitals with an 
enhanced sense of optimism. In the 
period ahead these questions can be 
positively resolved. 

Q. You have stated that the United 
States believes that the only solution 
for the Cyprus issue is the dialogue 
that will take in the withdrawal of the 
Turkish military forces. But at the 
present time it has been accepted that 
the dialogue is between Nicosia and 
Ankara. In case the dialogue between 
the two is not successful, what do you 
see as being the alternative to this? 

A. I think it serves no useful pur- 
pose to indulge in speculations about 
failure on a political effort that should 
be undertaken with increased vigor. It is 
still underway, as you know. There has 
been the U.N. assessment of the situa- 
tion. There was some movement some 
months ago. I think it is very important 
that we do not indulge in speculation 
which visualizes failure because 
sometimes it contributes to failure. 
What we are after is a successful out- 
come that will meet the interests of the 
communities not only in a contemporary 
sense but in the future as well. And this 
is an important and delicate issue as it 
has been for a number of years. 

What is important is to establish a 
broad political framework and to get 
progress within that framework. When 
one becomes too preoccupied with con- 
temporary aspects — and incidentally, 
the Falklands question is much the 
same, and it isn't quite as simple as the 
question that was posed to me earlier. 
We are not just talking about the with- 
drawal of forces from the Falkland 
Islands. We are not just talking about 
the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces 
from the island, as desirable as that is. 
We are talking about a broad framework 
which will meet the fundamental in- 
terests of the peoples on Cyprus and 
their children, and this is going to take, 
as it always does in such difficult ques- 
tions, patience and care. 



August 1982 



63 



EUROPE 



Q. I wonder if you could make 
some general observations about the 
kind of welcome the Greek Communist 
Party had prepared for you, particular- 
ly at a time when the President has 
called for an initiative on nuclear af- 
fairs and you are about to proceed into 
discussions with your NATO col- 
leagues. 

A. I think that since I had not been 
exposed to the demonstration and only 
had access to the Greek press on that, I 
prefer to take my lead from them. I 
think their descriptions of the situation 
covering a broad spectrum of political 
views give a very adequate reply to you, 
and I would not presume to. 

Q. Could you tell us what dates 
the talks about the bases will start 
and whether there will be a special 
meeting between Papandreou and 
President Reagan in Bonn? 

A. With respect to the first ques- 
tion, I would prefer to let events unfold 
on that. I think we have a general com- 
monality of view on how to approach 
these questions on timing and venue. 
But I tiiink it is preferable to let that 
unfold. 

With respect to the upcoming sum- 
mit in Bonn, of course, I think there is 
only one set of bilaterals discussed that 
are now scheduled between President 
Reagan and the Chancellor of West Ger- 
many as the host government for the 
summit. This does not preclude 
whatever discussions will occur on the 
margins and during the frequent oppor- 
tunities that occur during breaks and 
social events which I am quite confident 
will afford an opportunity for discussion. 



SECRETARY HAIG, 
NEWS CONFERENCE, 
LUXEMBOURG, MAY 18, 19823 

I think I want to underline some of the 
basic themes and conclusions that 
emerged from this ministerial meeting 
here in Luxembourg. 

It is very clear to all of us that the 
meeting once again demonstrated 
Western resolve to deal with the 
challenges of this decade, and I can 
state unequivocally that there was 
substantial agreement on the full range 
of substance that was discussed during 
this meeting. As a first example, the 
free choice of democratic Spain to join 
the alliance should be cited. Spanish en- 
try has been welcomed heartily by all 
the allies, and it is the clearest evidence 
of the continued vitality and attraction 
of the North Atlantic alliance today. 



Situation in Poland 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAY 1, 1982' 

May 1 is celebrated as Labor Day in 
many parts of the world. Although this 
celebration originated in the United 
States, recently the Communist world 
has paid it special attention. This takes 
on ironic significance in the wake of the 
brutal actions by Polish authorities to 
crush Solidarity, the only free trade 
union in a Communist country. 

Poland is no longer on the front 
pages every day, but we must not allow 
its people to be forgotten. We must con- 
tinue to honor the unbroken spirit of the 
Polish people and to call upon Poland's 
leaders to recognize their commitments. 
The Polish leaders must take positive ac- 
tion if there is to be hope for either 
economic recovery or a healing of the 
hatred and bitterness that the political 
repression has generated. 

On December 23, we imposed a 
broad range of economic sanctions 
against Warsaw in response to the 
government's declaration of martial law. 
We made it clear that these sanctions 
are reversible if and when Polish 
authorities restore the internationally 
recognized human rights of the Polish 
people. When that happens, we stand 
ready to provide assistance to help in 
Poland's economic recovery. 

The actions taken earlier this week 
by the Polish Government are a welcome 
step in the right direction but are not 
enough. By their own count, over 2,000 
citizens, including Lech Walesa, are still 
imprisoned. I would like to lift our sanc- 
tions and help Poland, but not until the 
Polish Government has ended martial 
law, released the detainees, and re- 
opened a genuine dialogue with Solidar- 
ity, led by Lech Walesa. 

So on this day. Law Day in the 
United States, when we commemorate 
our principles of liberty and individual 
rights, we reflect upon the Polish 
people's lack of such freedoms and upon 
their struggle to gain them. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JUNE 13, 19822 

Sk months ago today, darkness 
descended on Poland as the Warsaw 
Government declared a "state of war" on 
its own people. Today the Polish people's 
spirit remains unbroken, and as the 
widespread popular demonstrations in 
early May indicate, the gap between the 
Polish people and their leaders has 
widened since December 13, 1981. 

The broad range of economic sanc- 
tions which we introduced against the 
Warsaw government last December has 
had a strong impact on the Polish 
economy, a fact which is acknowledged 
by Polish officials. With each passing 
day, the impact of these sanctions 
grows, particularly in light of the unwill- 
ingness of Warsaw's allies to provide 
substantial assistance. We made it clear 
when we introduced these sactions that 
they were reversible if and when Polish 
authorities restored the internationally 
recognized human rights of the Polish 
people. In addition, we stated that the 
U.S. Government stands ready to pro- 
vide assistance to such a Poland to help 
its economic recovery. But the United 
States cannot and will not take these 
steps until the Polish Government has 
ended martial law, released all political 
prisoners, and reopened a genuine 
dialogue with the church and Solidarity. 

Our hearts go out to the brave 
Polish people who have suffered so 
much through the years. The United 
States will continue to help provide 
humanitarian assistance to the Polish 
people through such organizations as 
Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and 
Project HOPE. Let us hope that the 
authorities in Warsaw will move to bring 
about a genuine process of reconciliation 
in Poland before the gap between the 
authorities and the people becomes even 
more threatening. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 10. 1982. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 21. ■ 



Secondly, the meeting very vigorous- 
ly reaffirmed the alliance's strong deter- 
mination to do all that is necessary to 
maintain a strong and credible defense. 
The communique which you will be 
receiving shortly recognizes that peace 
can be preserved only if the alliance has 



the ability to defend itself at any and 
every level. It notes that this requires a 
wide range of conventional and nuclear 
forces. We also agreed that it is essen- 
tial to insist on restraint and respon- 
sibility on the part of the Soviet Union 
in all parts of the world as the necessary 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



condition for a more constructive East- 
West relationship. We agreed that it is 
necessary to take account of security 
considerations in East- West economic 
dealings, particularly export credits, and 
the danger in transferring militarily 
relevant technologies to the Warsaw 
Pact is clearly understood by all member 
states. The meeting condemned the con- 
tinuing and increasing Soviet aggression 
against the people of Afghanistan and 
called for a political solution based on 
total Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. 

We also agreed that the ongoing 
repression of the Polish people violates 
the principles of the U.N. Charter and 
the Helsinki Final Act, and we reaf- 
firmed the three Western criteria for a 
restoration of normal relations — the lift- 
ing of martial law; the release of 
political prisoners; and the restoration of 
a genuine dialogue with the church and 
the trade unions. It is clear that there is 
a firm and continuing consensus by the 
alliance and a recognition that Poland 
continues to cast a dark shadow over 
East-West relations today. The alliance 
concern remains unified and undimin- 
ished on this important question. The 
allies remain concerned about the threat 
to security interests outside the NATO 
treaty area. We have reaffirmed the 
need to consult on security issues out- 
side of the area. 

We also condemned the Argentine 
aggression against the Falkland Islands 
and called for a continued effort to 
achieve a negotiated settlement in 
accordance with U.N. Resolution 502. 
We agreed that it is essential to uphold 
the fundamental principle that the use of 
force to resolve international disputes is 
unacceptable. 

There was enthusiastic support both 
in the formal discussions and along the 
margins for the U.S. position put forth 
by President Reagan in his speech in 
Eureka on May 9. I had an opportunity 
to explain the elements of our proposals 
in considerable detail, and I am very 
confident that we now have a solid basis 
of allied understanding and support for 
a goal of achieving significant reductions 
in strategic forces all designed to en- 
chance stability and security for all na- 
tions. 

There was also a very strong reaffir- 
mation of the validity of the U.S. 
negotiating position in the Geneva talks 
on intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF) and a consensus that these pro- 
posals offer a change for a fair and ef- 
fective agreement. Both our INF and 
START [Strategic Arms Reduction 



Talks] initiatives confirm beyond the 
point of speculation that it is the United 
States and the West that have put forth 
specific meaningful proposals for reduc- 
tions in levels of nuclear armament, and 
we sincerely hope — and I know there 
has been a speech made today by Chair- 
man Brezhnev — that the Soviet Union 
will respond positively to these ap- 
proaches and others associated with the 
question of worldwide armaments. 

In our discussions, I also explained 
the long-term U.S. objective in relations 
with the Soviet Union. We have, as I 
have stated before, for some time been 
maintaining a high-level dialogue with 
the Soviet Union on a very broad range 
of subjects, not just confined to arms 
control. 

We hope in the days ahead to 
develop and expand that dialogue. Presi- 
dent Reagan is, as he has stated 
repeatedly, prepared to meet with Presi- 
dent Brezhnev, but it remains our con- 
sidered view — and I believe that of the 
Soviet leadership as well — that such a 
meeting must be justified by the overall 
state of our relations, and there would 
have to be reasonable prospects for 
positive results from such a meeting. As 
I have indicated, the discussions and 
conclusions of this ministerial are of 
great importance in their own right; 
first and foremost, as a living 
demonstration of the continuing vitality 
and unity of the alliance. Moreover, I 
believe that the deliberations here have 
paved the way for what we can an- 
ticipate will be an extremely successful 
and productive outcome at the NATO 
summit meeting next month in Bonn. It 
wUl, indeed, be this meeting that will set 
the tone for the security of free societies 
for the decade to come. 

Q. Do you have any early observa- 
tions on the statement made today by 
Soviet leader Brezhnev on his reaction 
to what the President said at Eureka? 

A. First, I want to emphasize that I 
have not had the chance to study the full 
text of Chairman Brezhnev's remarks, 
and I am always cautious about making 
observations on abbreviated, simplified 
news reporting which is all we have 
available at the moment. 

We do know that the question of a 
freeze — a freeze at current levels of 
nuclear armament — was again raised. It 
has been our conviction, a very strongly 
held conviction, that nuclear freezes do 
not promote effective arms control. In 
the first place, merely to freeze at ex- 
isting levels of forces would codify ex- 
isiting Soviet advantages, especially in 



EUROPE 



the nuclear threat facing our allies here 
in Western Europe, but also among cer- 
tain elements of the strategic equation. 
It would leave the United States and the 
West at a disadvantage to the Soviet 
Union to join in such proposal. 

Secondly, were we to accept this ap- 
proach — to agree to their freeze — it is 
clear that the Soviet Union would then 
be relieved of any incentive to make 
rapid progress for substantial reduc- 
tions, and it is reductions that constitute 
the main objective of President Reagan's 
arms control policy. Such a freeze pro- 
posal would affect immediately our 
negotiations in Geneva on INF and 
would have equally deleterious impact on 
the START proposals that the President 
just made at Eureka. I think that Presi- 
dent Reagan has outlined an effective 
approach calling for significant reduc- 
tions to equal levels on both sides. This 
is our goal in arms control. As we have 
said, a freeze is not sound arms control, 
because it results in unequal levels at 
the starting point as you seek to achieve 
and provide incentive for reductions. 

Q. [Inaudible] up to the day that 
he was ready to reopen talks, that this 
was a correct step? 

A. Absolutely. I am merely singling 
out one aspect of the reported content 
of Mr. Brezhnev's talk. I understand 
there were also discussions of the objec- 
tive on the Soviet side of the achieve- 
ment of reductions — that we wel- 
come — that coincides with our position. 
There was reference to respecting the 
security needs of each side and clearly 
that is not incompatible with a balanced 
approach to arms control. There was 
reference to the fact that the upcoming 
negotiations should keep all the positive 
elements achieved in the previous 
Soviet-American agreements. We are, as 
we have stated repeatedly, prepared to 
retain parts of previous accords — defini- 
tions, mutually accepted data, and a host 
of other approaches. You know the 
President, in his first phase, has talked 
about reductions in warheads and 
launchers; that in itself is a reflection of 
compatibility with work that has taken 
place under SALT I, Vladivostock, and 
the now discarded SALT II. 

Q. As your spokesman said yester- 
day, the United States is also ready to 
make proposals for equitable levels of 
bombers and cruise missiles and, of 
course, Brezhnev in his speech re- 
ferred to what he called the unilater- 
alism of the U.S. approach only deal- 
ing with, I guess, what he meant was 
warheads and missiles. Can you 



August 1982 



65 



EUROPE 



clarify? Is the United States prepared 
in the first phase to also discuss 
reductions in bombers and missiles or 
is that in the U.S. proposal for the 
second phase? 

A. I think it is important to 
recognize as a result of your question 
and observations made that we not con- 
duct arms control negotiations from 
propaganda platform or from a public 
relations point of view. It always lends 
itself to distortion and misunderstand- 
ing. We have felt that the details of the 
U.S. proposal are best reserved for ex- 
change at the conference table outside 
the glare of publicity and public postur- 
ing. 

To answer your question, we are, as 
the President stated in his recent press 
conference, prepared to put everything 
on the table; that includes negotiations 
leading toward equitable levels in 
bombers and cruise missiles. Beyond 
that it is not appropriate for me to go 
into a public dissertation on the finite 
proposals that have been approved by 
President Reagan as our going-in posi- 
tion which will involve give-and-take in 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. 

Q. Is it right to assume that the 
support which the U.S. Government 
has given to the United Kingdom in 
the Falklands crisis so far will be 
maintained if Mrs. Thatcher's govern- 
ment decides that, reluctantly, there is 
no option but to invade the islands 
since the Argentine junta refuses to 
accept 502? 

A. I think the United States had 
made its position clear on this issue and 
that involves both the judgment we 
made at the time the U.S. peace effort 
and the formal efforts that we had been 
making to exercise good offices were 
abandoned. It was at that time that in- 
sufficient flexibility had been demon- 
strated in Buenos Aires and that we 
were going to support Great Britain in 
its efforts. We intend to abide fully by 
the commitments made. 

Q. I know that you condemn 
Argentine aggression; was there any 
condemnation or any criticism at all of 
the British military action in the 
South Atlantic? 

A. No, there was not. I believe that 
the member states recognize the rights 
of governments under Article 50 of the 
U.N. charter to utilize whatever means 
are necessary to protect their sovereign 
interests. The United States, as you 
know, has never taken a position on the 
juridical question of sovereignty. We 
have not done that, but it is very clear 



that we have taken one in opposition to 
first use of force in this instance. We 
continue to maintain that position. I 
refer you to the language of the com- 
munique, because it is very precise, and 
you can answer your own question by 
reading it when it is in your hands. 
There was no criticism whatsoever of 
Great Britain. 

Q. As the centra! figure in the 
negotiating process over the Falklands 
crisis, I wonder if you could give us 
your assessment now of what impact 
the EEC [European Economic Com- 
munity] decision to extend sanctions 
only for 1 week will have on the 
diplomatic atmosphere; whether it 
adds or detracts from the possibilities 
for a settlement. 

A. I think it would be highly inap- 
propriate for me to engage in value 
judgments on the actions of the Ten. 
These actions are based on the sovereign 
viewpoints of the member nations of the 
Ten. I think it is significant that a 
substantial majority remain fully united 
behind the steps taken in support of the 
British position. Whether that has an ef- 
fect on the negotiations that are under- 
way by the Secretary General, and 
which he described as being at a critical 
stage, is a subjective judgment. I would 
avoid making such a judgment on my 
part publicly. 

Q. Would you judge that in a few 
days rather than weeks, it is in- 
evitable that the United Kingdom 
would have to invade the Falklands? 

A. I would not presume to specu- 
late. Our concerns are that U.N. Resolu- 
tion 502 be implemented as quickly as 
possible. This involved not only 
withdrawal of Argentine forces from the 
Falklands but also a political solution. 

Q. I wonder whether you could 
give us your views on the state of war 
between Iran and Iraq, and the impact 
that it is having on the states in the 
g^lf area. 

A. There was considerable discus- 
sion of the subject in the ministerial 
meeting as there should be because this 
is a very important situation that could 
affect an already unstable Middle 
Eastern situation. I think all are very 
concerned that the territorial integrity 
of the nations involved be preserved. 
There is a growing sense of concern 
among many of the moderate Arab 
states in the gulf and beyond the penin- 
sula to northern Africa. I think this is an 
extremely sensitive subject on which we 
have consulted fully among the members 



of the alliance. In the days and weeks 
ahead we will have to give this minute- 
by-minute our most serious attention. 

Q. Is it possible that the United 
States will change its policy of — 

A. Impartiality? 

Q. Yes, and no arms to either 
side? 

A. That has been and continues to 
be the position of the U.S. Government 
as it is the position of many of our allied 
governments in the NATO family. Clear- 
ly, this is a position which serves the 
best prospects for negotiating a settle- 
ment of this conflict and which we hope 
will be achieved in the very near future. 

Q. Why are you not going to 
Madrid this afternoon as expected? 

A. No, it was not as expected. We 
had a contingency plan that if the ongo- 
ing base negotiations were completed 
before my scheduled return to Wash- 
ington, then I would have stopped off in 
Madrid and hopefully would have ini- 
tialed the agreement. It is no surprise to 
me that there are still details to be 
worked out. But I would not want that 
to be interpreted as an indication of any 
serious problems. These are difficult and 
complex discussions, and they are con- 
tinuing at a rapid pace — a great deal of 
progress has been made— but there are 
still a few details to be worked out. 

Q. Are you trying to say that you 
are going to meet Perez-Llorca before 
next Saturday? 

A. That is our anticipation, and we 
are working toward that objective. Were 
it not to happen, it would be a matter of 
a very, very brief period of time, I 
believe, to complete the talks. 

Q. Will you sign the agreement 
with Perez-Llorca or will your Am- 
bassador in Madrid? 

A. I don't want to prejudge that 
question yet until we complete the talks. 
In coordination with my counterpart. 
Minister Perez-Llorca, we'll decide the 
best way to do it. It is not a matter of 
substantive difference between us. 

Q. What is your reaction to an ac- 
cusation made inside the European 
Parliament Strasbourg Chamber last 
week that had the United States got- 
ten off the fence earlier in the 
Falklands crisis — imposed economic 
sanctions against Argentina im- 
mediately after invasion — lives could 
have been saved and a peaceful solu- 
tion could have been achieved earlier? 
This accusation was made by Mrs. 
Barbara Castle, leader of the British 
Labor Party in Europe. 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



A. First, I don't make it a habit of 
commenting substantively on third-hand 
reported or second-hand reported obser- 
vations by public officials identified or 
unidentified. That does not cause me to 
recoil from responding to the substance 
of your question. But I would not want 
it portrayed as a response to one or 
another individual that I don't even 
know and didn't even have the benefit of 
hearing first-hand, but I think anyone 
that reviews the U.S. position on the 
Falklands crisis knows well, as did the 
British Government, that we were asked 
to portray a good office's role at the 
highest levels in the British Government, 
as well as at the highest levels in the 
Argentinian Government. Our ability to 
do so clearly involved certain restraints 
in value judgments with respect to the 
conflict day-to-day. 

There was no question on where the 
United States stood on U.N. Resolution 
502 where we cast an affirmative and 
supportive vote. That already moots the 
question. 

Secondly, were there any validity to 
such an allegation, it should have long 
since been dispelled as we see the 
Secretary General anguishing with the 
same issues that we anguished with dur- 
ing the period when the United States 
was involved— and even having enjoyed 
the benefits of what we were able to ac- 
complish in that effort. Let me assure 
you that the British Government was 
fully aware of the supportive position 
taken by the United States, or my com- 
munications with my counterpart and 
the Prime Minister are befogged with 
sophistry. 

Q. Could you comment on the fact 
that the Portuguese Government has 
not allowed some American planes to 
land on the Lajes Base in the Azores 
recently? 

A. I don't want to comment on that 
too lavishly because on every occasion 
that Portuguese sovereign territory has 
been put at the disposal of U.S. forces, 
it involves prior consultation and coor- 
dination. There is nothing unusual or un- 
precedented about recent events. I make 
no bones about the dissatisfaction in 
Portugal with the level of American 
military and economic support this past 
year and that programmed for FY 1983. 
This is a matter of utmost concern to 
the U.S. Government. It is especially dif- 
ficult at a time of very, very serious 
economic difficulties in the United 
States. 

Those concerns which are felt by a 
longstanding and close friend and ally of 
the United States will be resolved in the 



months ahead, but no one will ever be 
fully satisfied when it comes to levels of 
support. We understand that. It doesn't 
mean we are not sympathetic with the 
need because we are. We are vitally in- 
terested in Portugal's economic develop- 
ment and growth and, above all, in 
security terms, in alliance terms in their 
enhancement of their security capa- 
bilities. We have participated in that in 
the past, and we will continue to in the 
future to the highest level that we are 
capable of doing it and having it ap- 
proved by the American Congress. 

Q. Do you think the attitude of 
the Irish Government, in particular, in 
pulling back from the EEC trade sanc- 
tions against Argentina and in its 
situation as a temporary member of 
the Security Council has been helpful 
or unhelpful in the search for a 
peaceful solution to the Falklands 
crisis? 

A. I wouldn't presume to label the 
sovereign judgments of anyone of the 
Ten. It would be inappropriate for me to 
do it, especially since I am half Irish 
myself. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
MAY 18, 1982 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
session in Luxembourg on 17th and 18th May 
1982 and agreed as follows: 

1. The Allies welcome the impending ac- 
cession of Spain to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which offers fresh evidence of the en- 
during vitality of the Alliance — a community 
of free countries inspired by the shared 
values of pluralistic democracy, individual 
liberty, human dignity, self-determination and 
the rule of law in conformity with the prin- 
ciples and purposes of the United Nations 
Charter. 

2. The Allies are determined to maintain 
adequate military strength and political 
solidarity in order to assure a balance of 
forces and to deter aggression and other 
forms of pressure. On this base, in the in- 
terest of peace and international stability, the 
Allies will persevere in their efforts to 
establish a more constructive East-West rela- 
tionship aiming at genuine detente through 
dialogue and negotiation and mutually advan- 
tageous exchanges. Arms control and disar- 
mament, together with deterrence and 
defense, are integral parts of Alliance securi- 
ty policy. 

Substantial improvements in East-West 
relations depend, however, on the readiness 
of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw 
Pact countries to exercise restraint and 
responsibility in deeds as well as in words. 
The continued build-up of Soviet forces 
across the full spectrum of military capabili- 
ty, the Soviet Union's aggression against the 



EUROPE 



people of Afghanistan, its encouragement and 
support for martial law in Poland and its 
destabilizing activities elsewhere in the world 
contradict Soviet claims to peaceful inten- 
tions and weigh heavily on East- West rela- 
tions. 

3. The continued oppression of the Polish 
people violates the United Nations Charter 
and the Helsinki Final Act. The Allies recall 
their declaration of 11th January 1982 and 
again urge the Polish authorities to end of 
the state of martial law, release all those de- 
tained and restore genuine dialogue with the 
church and Solidarity. Hopes for progress in 
this direction were disappointed when recent 
limited relaxation of certain measures taken 
under martial law was followed so quickly by 
new repressive measures. The Polish author- 
ities should refrain from forcing Polish 
citizens into exile. 

4. The increasing Soviet aggression 
against Afghanistan is meeting growing 
resistance by the Afghan people. The toll of 
death and destruction is mounting, more than 
three million Afghans are refugees and the 
stability of the region is endangered; this 
Soviet behavior is unacceptable. The Allies 
again emphasize their support for the pro- 
posals, put forward by the United Nations 
and other international bodies and repeatedly 
ignored by the Soviet Union, for a political 
solution based on the total withdrawal of 
Soviet troops and respect for the in- 
dependence, sovereignty and non-alignment 
of Afghanistan. They express the hope that 
the mission of the United Nations Secretary 
General's Personal Representative for 
Afghanistan will help to find a solution in ac- 
cordance with these principles. 

5. Soviet policies confirm the need for 
the Allies to make all necessary efforts to 
maintain a strong and credible defense. The 
Allies can preserve peace only if they have 
the capability and the will to defend 
themselves at any level in any region of the 
North Atlantic Treaty- area. This requires a 
wide range of conventional and nuclear forces 
designed to persuade any potential aggressor 
that an attack would be repulsed and would 
expose him to risks out of all proportion of 
any advantages he might hope to gain. Deter- 
rence has kept the peace in Europe for over 
thirty years, and this policy is still valid to- 
day. Moreover this policy is essential to bring 
the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on the 
reduction and control of armaments. 

6. Members of the Alliance have put for- 
ward a broad series of proposals aimed at 
achieving concrete and far-reaching progress 
in a number of arms control and disarmament 
negotiations: 

• In the context of CSCE [Conference on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe], to seek 
confidence and security-building measures 
covering the whole of Europe from the Atlan- 
tic to the Urals; 

• In the framework of MBFR [mutual 
and balanced force reductions], to establish 
equal collective ceilings to be achieved by 
manpower reductions on the basis of agreed 
data; 



August 1982 



67 



EUROPE 



• As regards negotiations on nuclear 
arms, to eliminate totally United States and 
Soviet intermediate-range land-based missiles 
and to make substantial reductions in their 
intercontinental strategic nuclear systems. 

The Allies urge the Soviet Union to re- 
spond without further delay, in a positive 
way to these proposals which are designed to 
improve security and achieve a military 
balance at the lowest possible level of forces. 

7. The Allies welcome President Reagan's 
proposal to President Brezhnev to begin the 
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) by 
the end of June and urge the Soviet Union to 
respond positively. The United States inten- 
tion to seek signijficant reductions in the 
strategic armaments of the two countries, 
particularly in the most destabilizing systems, 
is a far-reaching but realistic offer that would 
lead to a significant increase in strategic 
stability and thereby strengthen peace and in- 
ternational security. Within the START 
framework, and pursuant to the December 
1979 decision on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces modernization and arms control,*" the 
United States is continuing to negotiate with 
the Soviet Union in Geneva on the basis of an 
imaginative proposal for the limitation of 
their respective intermediate-range system. 

The United States negotiating approach 
offers the chance for fair and effective 
agreements. The Allies, who remain in close 
consultation with the United States, support 
its efforts to reach such agreements. 

8. The Allies participating in the Vienna 
talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions reaffirm their determination to work 
for an agreement that strengthens security 
and peace in Europe through force reductions 
to equal collective manpower levels in the 
area of reductions. For negotiations to suc- 
ceed, it will be necessary for the East to co- 
operate in reaching agreement on existing 
force levels, and on adequate associated 
measures to enhance stability and to verify 
compliance. 

9. The Allies remain committed to 
developing and strengthening the CSCE 
process but recognize the severe obstacles 
posed by persistent Eastern violations of the 
principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final 
Act, most recently and flagrantly in Poland. 

They hope that by the time the Madrid 
CSCE follow-up meeting reconvenes in 
November, faith will have been restored in 
the implementation of the Final Act and that 
it will be possible to adopt a substantive and 
balanced concluding document covering all 
areas of the Final Act, including human 
rights, human contacts and information. They 
reaffirm their support for a Conference on 
Security and Disarmament in Europe and for 
adoption at the Madrid meeting of a precise 
mandate for negotiations in an initial phase 
of confidence and security-building measures 
that are militarily significant, binding, 
verifiable and applicable throughout the 
whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals. 

10. The Allies intend to play a construc- 
tive part at the forthcoming Second United 
Nations Special Session on Disarmament. 



They hope that discussion there will take full 
account of the need for openness and ade- 
quate verification provisions of all areas of 
arms control and disarmament. In the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies 
will continue to work for concrete and 
verifiable agreements, including a total ban 
on all chemical weapons. 

11. The maintenance of the stable situa- 
tion in and around Berlin remains for the 
Allies an essential factor in East-West rela- 
tions. 

The Allies recall their statement in the 
Rome Communique of 5th May 1981 and ex- 
press the hope that the continuation of the 
dialogue between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic will lead to increased direct benefits 
for Berlin and for the people in the two Ger- 
man States. 

12. Economic exchanges have an impor- 
tant role in the development of a stable East- 
West relationship. The Allies reaffirm their 
intention which they expressed in their 
Declaration of 11th January 1982'' to review 
East- West economic relations, bearing in 
mind the need for such relations to be 
mutually advantageous and to take full ac- 
count of security considerations, particularly 
in the technological, economic and financial 
areas, including export credits. In particular, 
they acknowledge the dangers involved in 
transfer of militarily relevant technology to 
the Warsaw Pact countries. 

13. The recovery of the economic health 
of Allied countries is essential and integral to 
their defense effort. Allied Governments will 
work together both bilaterally and through 
competent organizations to further the pros- 
perity of their peoples and the world 
economy. The Allies recognize the need for 
continued support for programmes intended 
to benefit the economies of the less favored 
Allied partners in keeping with Article 2 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. 

14. In view of the fundamental impor- 
tance which they attach to the principle that 
the use of force to resolve international 
disputes should be resolutely opposed by the 
international community, the Allies condemn 
Argentina for its aggression against the 
Falkland Islands and dependencies and 
deplore the fact that after more than six 
weeks has still not withdrawn her forces in 
compliance with mandatory Resolution 502 of 
the Security Council. They call for a contin- 
uation of the efforts to achieve a satisfactory 
negotiated settlement in accordance with this 
resolution in its entirety. 

15. The Allies are profoundly concerned 
over the acts of terrorism which recur in 
several of their countries. They strongly con- 
demn all such acts and solemnly appeal to all 
governments to wage an effective struggle 
against this scourge and to intensify their ef- 
fort to this end. 

16. The Allies recognize that certain 
developments outside the treaty area can 
have consequences for their common in- 
terests. They will consult together as ap- 
propriate, taking into account their commonly 
identified objectives. Member countries of the 



Alliance, in a position to do so, are ready to 
help other sovereign nations to resist threats 
to their security and independence. 

17. The Allies will work together with 
others to strengthen and maintain the 
sovereignty and independence of countries ir 
the Third World. They respect genuine non- 
alignment and support economic and social 
development in the Third World which con- 
tributes to world stability and can help to 
provide protection against outside in- 
terference. The Allied countries will continue 
to struggle against hunger, poverty and 
under-development. 

18. Ministers agreed to intensify their 
consultations. They will hold an informal 
meeting in autumn 1982, taking advantage o 
their presence in North America on the occa- 
sion of the next regular session of the Unite( 
Nations General Assembly. In this connec- 
tion, they noted with pleasure the invitation 
of the Canadian Government to hold that 
meeting in Canada. 

19. The next regular meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session 
wdll be held in Brussels in December 1982. 
Ministers accepted with pleasure the invita- 
tion of the Government of France for the 
spring 1983 ministerial council meeting to 
take place in Paris. 

'Press release 170 of May 18, 1982. 

2Press release 172 of May 19. 

'Press release 174 of May 20. 

■•In this connection, Greece reserved its 
position and expressed its views which were 
recorded in the minutes [text in original]. ■ 



North Atlantic 

Council 

Meets in Brussels 



Secretary Haig departed Wash- 
ington, D.C., December 8, 1981, to attem. 
the regular semiannual session of the 
North Atlantic Council ministerial 
meeting (December 10-11). 

Following are the texts of the North 
Atlantic Council final communique and 
the declaration on intermediate-range 
nuclear force modernization and arms 
control. 

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
DEC. 11, 1981 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministeria 
session in Brussels on 10th and 11th 
December 1981. On this occasion Ministers 
signed the Protocol of Accession of Spain to 
the North Atlantic Treaty which will now be 
submitted for ratification in accordance with 
the constitutional procedures in their respec- 
tive countries. They welcomed the decision of 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



Spain to seek entry into the Alliance and 
thereby to play its part in Allied collective 
security in accordance with the principles of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, This decision of- 
fers new evidence of the enduring vitality of 
the Alliance. 

Resolved to pursue peace and security 
through a stable balance of forces, reduced 
tensions and more constructive East-West 
relations, Ministers agreed on the following: 

1, The Alliance is committed to safe- 
guarding the peace and thus allowing the 
peoples of its member countries to preserve 
the values and way of life they share. In the 
interest of lasting peace the Allies will con- 
tinue to work unremittingly to establish 
through a constructive dialogue the essential 
climate of confidence and mutual restraint in 
East-West relations with the aim of achieving 
genuine detente and substantial progress in 
arms control and disarmament. But in the 
light of the Soviet Union's continued military 
build-up and as long as a solid foundation of 
trust has not been established, the Allies 
have no choice but to dissuade any potential 
aggressor by making it clear that they have 
the strength and the will to resist. The peace 
that Europe has enjoyed for the last 36 years 
is a measure of the success of the Alliance 
and its policy of deterrence and defense. An 
adequate deterrent does not jeopardize peace, 
it makes it safer. The unity and strength of 
the Alliance provide the best guarantee that 
its peoples can remain free from the fear of 
war. 

The role of nuclear weapons has attracted 
great attention in the Western political 
debate, in particular among the younger 
generation. The fact is, however, that nuclear 
weapons have thus far been an essential ele- 
ment in preventing war, in the face of the 
Warsaw Pact's massive conventional and 
nuclear forces. The Alliance has to maintain a 
nuclear capability, since disarmament has not 
reached a satisfactory level. The Alliance 
could not reduce the risk of war by divesting 
itself unilaterally of nuclear weapons. The 
Soviet Union has greatly increased its forces 
throughout the period of detente. Unilateral 
nuclear disarmament would give the Soviet 
Union, which could not be relied upon to 
follow suit, an overwhelming military advan- 
tage. The only sure way of preventing in- 
timidation and war is to ensure a stable 
balance of forces between East and West. 
This should be done at the lowest possible 
level. 

2. Restraint and responsibility are essen- 
tial for the conduct of international relations. 
But Soviet destabilising activities of all kinds 
persist in various parts of the world and cast 
doubt on their readiness to work for a real 
reduction of tension. While invoking exag- 
gerated security requirements to justify its 
huge armaments development and production 
programme, the Soviet Union condemns as 
unwarranted the defensive measures taken 
by the Western countries. At the same time, 
it tries to exploit for its own purposes 
genuine concerns often expressed in the 
West, while prohibiting any free debate of 
this kind among its own people. 



The Soviet Union also seems to further 
its own interests by the use of force. The oc- 
cupation of Afghanistan continues, against 
the increasing resistance of the Afghan peo- 
ple and in the face of repeated international 
demands for Soviet withdrawal. Soviet 
refusal to respond to these demands con- 
stitutes a menace to the stability of the 
region, endangers international peace and 
security and seriously impedes improvements 
in East- West relations. 

3. In these circumstances the Alliance is 
resolved to strengthen — without seeking 
military superiority — its capacity to deter ag- 
gression and defend peace. Improvements in 
Allied defense readiness and military 
capabilities contribute to this end. Ministers 
expressed their support for the determination 
of the United States to ensure the deterrent 
capabilities of its strategic forces. An effec- 
tive defense is also the essential basis for 
fruitful negotiations on arms control and 
disarmament. 

4. The Allies remain committed to 
vigorous efforts in all appropriate fora to 
achieve substantial, balanced and verifiable 
arms limitations and reductions. Recalling 
President Reagan's historic speech of 18th 
November 1981 they registered their full sup- 
port for his far-reaching and constructive 
programme for the achievement of a stable 
peace. They share the United States' resolve 
to work for the establishment of a military 
balance at lower levels of forces, and wel- 
comed the four-point agenda which President 
Reagan conveyed to President Brezhnev. 

On this basis as well as on the basis of 
restraint and responsibility, the Allies offer 
the Soviet Union comprehensive negotiation 
with the aim of effective arms control and 
disarmament. Soviet acceptance of this offer 
would benefit the peoples in East and West 
and in the Third World and promote peace 
and security worldwide. 

The US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduc- 
tions Talks (START), which the United 
States has proposed to begin as early as 
possible in 1982, will constitute an important 
new step towards reinforcing security and 
peace. These negotiations should lead to 
significant reductions in the US and Soviet 
strategic arsenals. The Allies also welcomed 
negotiations on US and Soviet intermediate- 
range nuclear forces which opened in Geneva 
on 30th November 1981 at the initiative of 
the United States; they expressed the hope 
that these negotiations will lead to a positive 
result in the START framework. The Allies 
look forward to continued close consultations 
with the United States in the Council on 
these matters. 

Those Allies participating in the mutual 
and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna 
continue to seek genuine manpower parity, in 
the form of a common collective ceiling based 
on agreed data and adequate verification 
measures. They again call upon Eastern 
participating states to contribute construc- 
tively to clarifying these problems. 

5. The establishment of relations based 
on trust and co-operation in Europe depends 
on the full compliance by all the signatories 



with the provisions and principles of the 1974 
Helsinki Finsil Act. These principles, to which 
the Allies are firmly committed, are of the ut- 
most importance with respect to Poland; the 
Polish people must be free to solve their 
problems without outside interference or 
pressure of any kind. The Allies remain 
deeply attached to the human dimension of 
detente and thus to the tangible benefits 
which it must offer to the individual. 

The Allies will continue their efforts to 
achieve a balanced and substantive result at 
the Madrid CSCE [Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] follow-up 
meeting, in the form of progress in all areas 
covered by the Final Act, including human 
rights, human contacts and information. They 
call upon the Soviet Union to live up to the 
Final Act and urge it to join in establishing a 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe and 
to agree now on a precise mandate for 
negotiations on confidence-building measures 
applicable to the whole of Europe. 

6. Those Allies who are members of the 
Committee on Disarmament will contribute to 
work in that forum for the adoption of 
balanced and verifiable agreements on 
specific issues. The Allies reaffirm the impor- 
tance they attach to the Second Special Ses- 
sion of the United Nations General Assembly 
on Disarmament to be held in 1982 in which 
they will play an active part. 

7. The Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd 
September 1971 has made a decisive con- 
tribution to stabilizing the Berlin situation 
during the 10 years since its signature. The 
Allies stress the continuing importance they 
attach to the maintenance of the calm situa- 
tion in and around the city. 

The Allies note with satisfaction the 
forthcoming meeting between the Chancellor 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Chairman of the Council of State of the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic. They recall their 
statement in the Ronr.s communique of 5th 
May 1981, and expressed their hope that this 
meeting will contribute to the further 
development of relations between the two 
German States. 

8. Bearing in mind the close relationship 
between their defense and economic posture 
the Allies will continue to give full support to 
the programmes to strengthen the economies 
of the less favored partners in the spirit of 
Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 

9. International stability is vital to 
Western interests. Political settlements must 
be found to crises or conflicts. Genuine non- 
alignment can make an important contribu- 
tion towards these goals. 'The Allies will con- 
tinue to consult among themselves and work 
together with others to encourage the main- 
tenance of stability and the independence of 
sovereign nations, to which they attach great 
importance, and to reduce the risks of crisis 
in the Third Worid. They will take the 
necessary political and economic measures to 
support efforts by such nations to defend 
their sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
to enhance stability worldwide. In their con- 
sultations. Allies will seek to identify common 
objectives, taking full account of the pohtical, 



August 1982 



69 



MIDDLE EAST 



economic and military situation in the area 
concerned. Those Allies in a position to do so 
will be ready to take steps outside the treaty 
area to deter aggression and to respond to 
requests by sovereign nations for help in 
resisting threats to their security or in- 
dependence. 

10. Peace and economic and social 
development are increasingly becoming in- 
terdependent. The Allies will work together 
with other nations to assist countries who 
fight against hunger, poverty and under- 
development. 

11. The next meeting of the North Atlan- 
tic Council in Ministerial session will be held 
in Luxembourg on the 17th and 18th May 
1982. 



DECLARATION, 
DEC. 11, 1981 

Ministerial Declaration on Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Force Modernization 
and Arms Control 

The Allies who participated in the December 
1979 decisions on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) modernization and arms control 
welcomed the opening of the United States- 
Soviet negotiations on INF arms control in 
the strategic arms control framework on 30th 
November. They expressed their conviction 
that a positive outcome of these negotiations 
would contribute to greater East-West 
stability and progress in other East-West 
arms control negotiations. They fully support 
the US negotiating approach, which was de- 
veloped in the course of intensive consulta- 
tions among them. 

The decision of December 1979 was taken 
against the background of a growing threat 
to Alliance security posed by Soviet long- 
range INF missiles, in particular the SS-20, 
each with three independently targetable 
warheads. Since that time the number of 
Soviet long-range missiles has grown rapidly. 
Deployments of SS-20 missiles continue. The 
Soviet Union now possesses some 1,100 
warheads on long-range INF missiles which 
threaten the Alliance. 

The dual-track decision of December 1979 
opened the way to reducing the threat 
through arms control negotiations. Based on 
that decision, and with the full support of its 
Allies, the US has made a far-reaching pro- 
posal to eliminate all US and Soviet long- 
range land-based INF missiles. It has offered 
to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and 
ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets 
will dismantle their SS-20 missiles, and 
retire their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This 
historic offer is straightforward and 
equitable, and would eliminate the systems of 
greatest concern to both sides. If the Soviet 
Union shows a similar willingness to secure 
far-reaching measures of disarmament, 
elimination of these long-range missiles on 
both sides can be a reality. Reductions in 
other US and Soviet nuclear systems could be 
sought in subsequent phases. 



Determination in implementing both 
tracks of the December 1979 decision has 
been a key factor in convincing the Soviet 
Union to negotiate without preconditions, 
thus creating the opportunity to achieve gen- 
uine arms control. This same resolve will re- 
main essential in reaching concrete results in 
the negotiations. Implementation of the 
modernization program is continuing and can 
be altered only by a fair and effective arms 
control agreement. 

The Allies welcomed the US commitment 
to make every effort to bring the negotia- 
tions to a successful conclusion within the 
shortest possible time. They also noted that 
the US intends to negotiate in good faith, and 
will listen to and consider Soviet proposals, 
with the objective of reaching an equitable, 



effective and verifiable agreement that will 
enhance the security of the Alliance, and thu; 
contribute to a more stable military relation- 
ship between East and West. The achieve- 
ment of such an agreement requires a 
similarly constructive approach on the part o 
the Soviet Union. 

US consultations with its Allies in the 
Special Consultative Group on INF arms con 
trol contributed significantly to the prepara- 
tions for the negotiations and will continue a. 
the negotiations progress. These consulta- 
tions are an expression of Alliance solidarity 
and reflect the US commitment to take Alliec 
views into account as well as the close 
association of the Allies with the US 
negotiating effort. ■ 



Visit of IVIoroccan King hiassan II 



His Majesty King Hassan H of the 
Kingdom of Morocco made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., May 
18-22, 1982, to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 
Following is a Department statement of 
May 21.^ 

The discussions with His Majesty King 
Hassan H have been most satisfying and 
thorough, covering a broad range of sub- 
jects. Perhaps the most important out- 
come of the visit was the opportunity for 
the President and King Hassan to have 
face-to-face discussions on the major 
issues of common concern and our 
respective positions on them. Secretary 
Haig and Foreign Minister Boucetta, in 
the presence of the King, exchanged the 
instruments of ratification of the agree- 
ment establishing a binational cultural 
and educational commission on May 20. 
Secretary Haig signed the agreement in 
Marrakech in February, and the rapidity 
with which the whole process was com- 
pleted testifies to its importance to both 
countries. 

We also had a chance to review 
economic issues of common interest. In 
order to promote U.S. investment in 
Morocco, an investment working group 
in the U.S. -Moroccan Economic Commis- 
sion will be established, to begin opera- 
tions soon, and we have held discussions 
on the possibility of negotiating on a 
bilateral investment treaty. We also 
discussed a cooperative venture in 
dryland agricultural development. It is 
our hope to be able to provide around 
$200 million in assistance over the next 
5 years for this effort, which could 
cushion Morocco against the effects of 
another devastating drought. 



We reviewed the important security 
aspects of our relationship. Morocco anc 
the United States have had a long tradi- 
tion of close cooperation on security 
issues, which has been strengthened 
recently with an expanded strategic 
dialogue. The Joint Military Commissioi 
is an important vehicle for continuing 
discussions between our respective 
military establishments. 

Both sides also stressed the impor- 
tance of our security assistance relation 
ship. We are proceeding with negotia- 
tions in which Morocco will grant U.S. 
forces access to Moroccan transit 
facilities in special contingencies of con- 
cern to both countries. A detailed ar- 
rangement will now be worked out, and 
we expect agreement on a text before 
His Majesty departs the United States. 

We discussed the implications of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) ac 
tions taken toward the Western Sahara. 
The King's initiative taken at Nairobi 
last year, calling for a cease-fire and 
referendum, continues to be the basis ol 
our policy. After the excellent begin- 
nings of the implementation committee 
this year, we hope that the OAU will 
persist in its activities. 

Finally, we had a productive ex- 
change on the Middle East situation. Wi 
very much value the views of King 
Hassan and the constructive approach 
that he has traditiotially taken toward 
this issue. We reiterated U.S. deter- 
mination to press forward with 
autonomy talks. We look forward to a 
continuing dialogue with Morocco on 
this vital matter. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment Spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



OCEANS 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



U.S. Votes Against 
Law of the Sea Treaty 



'RESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
fULY 9, 1982' 

The United States has long recognized 
low critical the world's oceans are to 
nankind and how important interna- 
;ional agreements are to the use of 
;hose oceans. For over a decade, the 
Jnited States has been working with 
nore than 150 countries at the Third 
J.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea 
;o develop a comprehensive treaty. 

On January 29, 1982, I reaffirmed 
;he U.S. commitment to the multilateral 
Drocess for reaching such a treaty and 
innounced that we would return to the 
legotiations to seek to correct unaccept- 
ible elements in the deep seabed mining 
jart of the draft convention. I also an- 
lounced that my Administration would 
support ratification of a convention 
Tieeting six basic objectives. 

On April 30, the conference adopted 
1 convention that does not satisfy the 
)bjectives sought by the United States. 
X was adopted by a vote of 130 in favor, 
vith four against (including the United 
States), and 17 abstentions. Those 
Voting "no" or abstaining appear small in 
lumber but represent countries which 
produce more than 60% of the world's 
jross national product and provide more 
;han 60% of the contributions to the 
Jnited Nations. 

We have now completed a review of 
;hat convention and recognize that it 
lontains many positive and very signifi- 
cant accomplishments. Those extensive 
aarts dealing with navigation and 
Dverflight and most other provisions of 
;he convention are consistent with U.S. 
nterests and, in our view, serve well the 
nterests of all nations. That is an impor- 
Lant achievement and signifies the 
Denefits of working together and effec- 
tively balancing numerous interests. The 
United States also appreciates the ef- 
forts of the many countries that have 
worked with us toward an acceptable 
agreement, including efforts by friends 
and allies at the session that concluded 
on April 30. 

Our review recognizes, however, 
that the deep seabed mining part of the 
convention does not meet U.S. objec- 
tives. For this reason, I am announcing 
today that the United States will not 
sign the convention as adopted by the 
conference, and our participation in the 



remaining conference process will be at 
the technical level and will involve only 
those provisions that serve U.S. in- 
terests. 

These decisions reflect the deep con- 
viction that the United States cannot 
support a deep seabed mining regime 
with such major problems. In our view, 
those problems include: 

• Provisions that would actually 
deter future development of deep seabed 
mineral resources, when such develop- 
ment should serve the interest of all 
countries; 

• A decisionmaking process that 
would not give the United States or 
others a role that fairly reflects and pro- 
tects their interests; 

• Provisions that would allow 
amendments to enter into force for the 
United States without its approval; this 



is clearly incompatible with the U.S. ap- 
proach to such treaties; 

• Stipulations relating to mandatory 
transfer of private technology and the 
possibility of national liberation 
movements sharing in benefits; and 

• The absence of assured access for 
future qualified deep seabed miners to 
promote the development of these 
resources. 

We recognize that world demand 
and markets currently do not justify 
commerical development of deep seabed 
mineral resources, and it is not clear 
when such development will be justified. 
When such factors become favorable, 
however, the deep seabed represents a 
potentially important source of strategic 
and other minerals. The aim of the 
United States in this regard has been to 
establish with other nations an order 
that would allow exploration and 
development under reasonable terms 
and conditions. 



^Text from White House press release. 



Control of Technology Transfers 
to the Soviet Union 



by James L. Buckley 

Statement before the Permanent Sub- 
committee on Investigation of the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee on 
May 6, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, 
Science, and Technology.''^ 

I am delighted at this opportunity to 
respond to your invitation to testify on 
the role of the State Department in con- 
trolling the transfer of militarily critical 
technology to the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc. Whatever the record of 
prior Administrations — Republican as 
well as Democratic — it is clear that this 
Administration has placed a very high 
priority on improving the effectiveness 
of the executive branch in enforcing ex- 
port controls. It has launched important 
initiatives which we believe will greatly 
improve their overall effectiveness while 
sharpening the focus on those elements 
of advanced technology and process 
know-how which are of the most critical 
importance to the Soviet bloc. We freely 
acknowledge that much more needs to 
be done; and we are actively working 
with other agencies to improve coordina- 



tion over a range of issues. It will take 
time, however, for all these efforts to 
take hold in particular areas, especially 
because of the large amount of new data 
that has had to be gathered by various 
agencies and the analytical work that 
has to be done. 

National security export controls are 
a basic element in overall U.S. policy 
toward the Warsaw Pact countries. To 
put it bluntly, these controls are a 
recognition of the fact that the global 
objectives of the Soviet bloc are inimical 
to our own and threaten every value for 
which our nation stands. Therefore, it is 
simply harmful for us to provide those 
nations with Western, militarily useful 
technologies to be turned against us. 

The Role of COCOM 

As most of these sensitive technologies 
are not within the sole control of the 
United States, it has been essential from 
the outset to achieve among the major 
Western industrialized powers fun- 
damental agreement as to what tech- 
nologies are militarily critical and how 
their transfer to the Soviet bloc should 
be controlled. 



August 1982 



71 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



i; 



The instrument that has been 
developed for this purpose is the Coor- 
dinating Committee for Multilateral 
Security Export Controls (COCOM) to 
which Japan and all NATO countries, 
with the exception of Iceland, belong. 
COCOM was created in 1949 by informal 
agreement among its members and has 
thus been in existence for more than 
three decades. 

COCOM has three major functions. 
The first is to establish and update 
the lists of embargoed products and 
technologies. Although COCOM lists 
are not published, they become the basis 
for the national control lists ad- 
ministered by each member government. 
The member governments are now pre- 
paring for a major review of these em- 
bargo lists, which will begin in October. 
Second, COCOM acts as the clear- 
inghouse for requests submitted by 
the member governments to ship 
specific items to specified end-users in 
the proscribed countries. The COCOM- 
proscribed countries are the Soviet 
Union, the other Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries, China, and the other Communist 
countries in Asia. 

Third, COCOM serves as a means 
of coordinating the administration and 
enforcement activities of the member 
governments. 

The COCOM lists set up fairly 
specific limits on the technical 
characteristics above which member 
governments agree that they will pro- 
hibit exports to proscribed countries, 
unless COCOM itself approves excep- 
tions. 

In agreeing to a national request to 
export items on one of the control lists, 
COCOM works on the principle of 
unanimity. No application, in short, is 
approved if any member state objects. 
One of the evolved strengths of COCOM 
is that in over 30 years of operation, 
there have been very few cases in which 
a government has exercised its 
sovereign right to go ahead with exports 
over COCOM objections. This is all the 
more remarkable given the absence of 
any treaty or executive agreement 
undergirding the organization. 

Over those decades, COCOM has 
generally been successful in inhibiting 
the overt flow of strategic technology to 
our adversaries. During the 1970s, 
however, in the honeymoon days of 
detente, the United States and the West 
relaxed controls over a number of em- 
bargoed commodities. It was believed 
that wideranging trade would somehow 
alter the international behavior of the 
Soviets and moderate their military in- 



72 



vestment. During this period, the United 
States went from being the least to the 
most frequent seeker of exceptions to 
multilateral controls. COCOM itself 
came to reflect such attitudes, and ex- 
ceptions to the embargo were allowed to 
thrive. We now know this was a 



[National security ex- 
port] controls are a 
recognition . . . that the 
global objectives of the 
Soviet bloc are inimical 
to our own and threaten 
every value for which 
our nation stands. 



mistake. During the period of detente, 
the world stood witness to the greatest 
military buildup in history, along with 
the increased Soviet adventurism that 
grew out of an increased self-confidence. 

Stemming the Flow of Technology 

The Reagan Administration came into 
office 15 months ago determined to stem 
the flow of the technology that the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies 
were using to improve their already vast 
warmaking capabilities. It was clear 
that the West's crucial qualitative edge 
in military systems was being under- 
mined by the Soviet's increasingly ag- 
gressive efforts to buy or steal our 
militarily relevant technologies and 
equipment. 

More precisely, we saw this well- 
orchestrated acquisition program giving 
the Soviets: 

• A very significant savings in time 
and money in their military research and 
development programs; 

• Rapid modernization of their 
defense industrial infrastructure; 

• The opportunity to accelerate the 
closing of gaps between our weapons 
systems and theirs; and 

• The chance to develop, with 
alarming speed, neutralizing counter- 
measures to our own technological in- 
novations. 



sprt 



iiea. 



As a consequence, the Administra- 
tion has initiated efforts to fill in gaps ir 
the multilateral export control system. 
At the Ottawa summit meeting in July 
1981, President Reagan raised the prob 
lem of Western technology transfer to 
the Soviet Union. An agreement at Ot- 
tawa to consult on this issue culminated 
in a high-level meeting in Paris during 
January, the first ministerial level 
COCOM meeting since the late 1950s. 
The other COCOM governments have 
asked that the results of that meeting be 
kept confidential, as, indeed, are all 
COCOM proceedings. I chaired the U.S. 
delegation to that meeting, however, 
and I can say that there was a concrete 
consensus that the member government 
should renew their efforts to improve 
COCOM effectiveness. We have been en 
couraged by what appears to be a new 
and more constructive attitude of other 
COCOM governments and feel that this 
meeting forms a basis for a revitaliza- 
tion of the COCOM system. 

Such a revitalization will take much 
hard work, and it will take time, among 
other reasons because COCOM depends 
on the national administration of con- 
trols by 15 individual governments. But 
some specific steps are underway. EfFec 
tiveness, for example, requires precise 
definitions of many complex tech- 
nologies. We have made progress 
toward agreement on a number of 
specific, technical proposals in this area 
to tighten the embargo. 

The United States is now working 
on proposals that will expand COCOM 
control lists into previously uncovered 
priority industries. These include gas 
turbine engines, large floating drydocks 
certain metallurgical processes, elec- 
tronic grade silicon, printed circuit boar ■ s: 
technology, space launch vehicles and 
spacecraft, robotics, ceramic materials 
for engines, certain advanced com- 
posites, and communications switching 
and computer hardware and software 
technology and know-how. This process 
will continue into the triennial COCOM 
list review, which will take place this Oc 
tober, when a general reappraisal of 
everything on the control lists will take 
place. 

We have developed workable pro- 
posals for harmonizing the expert licens 
ing procedures of the 15 member states 
so as to make COCOM decisionmaking 
more efficient. What we are seeking are 
ways to bring national enforcement 
practices to a level of equal eifec- 
tiveness. These Uvo questions will be ad 
dressed at a special COCOM meeting 
which will convene in Paris later this 



Department of State Bulletir 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



spring— and the fact that all partners 
lave agreed to that special meeting is 
testament to our shared goals. 

Illegal diversion activities are a 
problem overseas as well as at home. 
We have been cooperating with our 
COCOM allies to improve enforcement 
ind investigative capabilities in this 
irea. The State Department, working 
:losely with our intelligence and in- 
restigative agencies, has been channel- 
ing appropriate information to other 
governments to alert them to potentially 
Uegal activities within their borders. We 
have also encouraged them to increase 
the investigative resources and the sanc- 
tions available for export control en- 
forcement. The Department of Com- 
nerce, and in turn the U.S. Customs 
Service, have detailed officers to the 
Department of State to support this 
overseas compliance effort. 

COCOM has thus, we believe, made 
measurable progress toward strength- 
;ning strategic export controls since this 
Mministration came into office. But it is 
ilso clear that the continuing revitaliza- 
:ion process will be long and hard. In at- 
«mpting to strengthen strategic export 
;ontrols on exports to the Soviet Union 
ind the other Warsaw Pact countries, 
we are faced with the perennial problem 
of securing agreement with all the other 
30C0M allies on just where to establish 
he technical cutoffs for commodities and 
echnologies under embargo. Determin- 
ng in many scores of different technical 
ireas what is sufficiently strategic to 
varrant control is not an easy task. We 
lo not always agree on what are 
nilitarily critical technologies, yet the 
)urpose of the organization is limited to 
;uch technologies. Members exercise 
■onsiderable care to avoid controls 
vhose principal impact would be 
'Genomic rather than military, and each 
las its own views and perspective. West 
iiuropean and Japanese economies 
vould, generally speaking, be affected 
nore than the U.S. economy by sweep- 
ng controls on manufactured products. 
3ut such differences between ourselves 
md our COCOM allies should not be 
overemphasized. We should remember 
;hat our allies have cooperated with us 
'or over 30 years to control significant 
imounts of equipment, material, and 
;echnologies through COCOM. That is, 
5rst and foremost, because we share a 
common belief that such controls con- 
stitute an important element in our 
nutual defense. 

As you know, the State Department 
s also responsible for administering 
Tiunitions export controls which cover 



August 1982 



defense articles and services. Munitions 
are not approved for export to Warsaw 
Pact countries. Accordingly, the main 
issue in administering these controls 
relates to security concerns and our 
foreign relations with other countries. 

Your letter of invitation mentions 
that, in an executive branch more effec- 
tively organized to shape and enforce ex- 
port control policy, you envisage a prin- 
cipal and expanded role for the Depart- 
ment of State. We, too, envisage such a 
role for the Department. 

Upon taking office, this Administra- 
tion undertook a full review of our 
policy concerning the transfer of 
strategic technology to the Soviet Union 
and the other Warsaw Pact countries. 
The State Department was a major par- 
ticipant in this review, which culminated 
in the COCOM high-level meeting. The 
State Department led our delegation to 



that meeting. Since then, on a number 
of occasions, senior officials at State 
have discussed with our allies security 
concerns related to technology transfers. 
We are persuaded that improved allied 
cooperation on sensitive technology 
transfer issues is a realistic objective. 
There will, of course, continue to be 
some differences on the details of con- 
trols and their application to individual 
cases. But, with hard work to identify 
clearly and to justify persuasively what 
needs to be controlled and how controls 
should be enforced and administered, 
such differences, we believe, will be the 
exception rather than the rule. 



^The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Cuban Support for Terrorism and 
Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere 



by Thomas O. Enders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Security and Terrorism of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on March 12, 1982. 
Ambassador Enders is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.^ 

The Administration shares your concern 
about the growth of terrorism and 
violence in today's world. I welcome this 
opportunity to address the issue of 
Cuban terrorism and promotion of 
violent revolution in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 

For some 10 years following the 
death of Che Guevara on an Andean hill- 
side, Cuba attempted to portray itself as 
a member of the international communi- 
ty not unlike others, carrying on state- 
to-state relations through embassies, 
and emphasizing trade and cultural con- 
tacts. 

Cuba, however, never stopped glori- 
fying violent revolution. During an en- 
tire generation, Cuba carefully nurtured 
agents and contacts with groups com- 
mitted to violence, often providing ideo- 
logical and military training to several 
groups in the same country. Then, in 
1978, almost without notice, Castro 
began to implement a strategy of 
uniting the left in the countries of the 
hemisphere, with the purpose of using it 
as a tool for the violent overthrow of ex- 
isting governments and the establish- 



ment of more Marxist-Leninist regimes 
in this hemisphere. 

In 1978, Cuba helped unite three 
Sandinista factions, then committed 
itself militarily to the rebellion in 
Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent 
to many that a new Cuban strategy was 
in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like 
a unique case. But then Cuba began to 
try the same thing in El Salvador, in 
Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is re- 
peating the pattern in Honduras. Even 
Costa Rica is now exposed to the threat 
of externally backed terrorism. 

Cuban intervention is, of course, not 
the only source of terrorism in the 
hemisphere. Violent conflict in Latin 
America has many origins, including 
historical social and economic inequities 
which have generated frustrations. 
Especially in the Caribbean Basin, eco- 
nomic crisis has recently subjected 
fragile institutions to additional stresses, 
increasing their vulnerability to radical- 
ism as well as violence. 

Clearly, however, Cuba's readiness 
to foment violence to exploit such situa- 
tions imposes serious obstacles to eco- 
nomic progress, democratic develop- 
ment, and self-determination. On 
December 14, I delivered to the Con- 
gress a special report on Cuban covert 
activities in key countries [see Special 
Report No. 90 -"Cuba's Renewed Sup- 
port for Violence in Latin America'']. I 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



would like to take this opportunity to 
review and update some specific cases of 
Cuban export of violence. 

South America 

The immediate danger, it is evident, is 
in Central America. But the pattern is 
present in South America as well. In 
Chile, Cuban training of MIR [Move- 
ment of the Revolutionary Left] guer- 
rillas has increased substantially in the 
past 18 months. In January, the Chilean 
Communist Party leadership met in 
Havana. A handful of senior Cuban 
officials attended and pressed hard for 
unity of all opposition forces in Chile 
and intensification of all forms of strug- 
gle, including violence. 

The most prominent South Ameri- 
can case, however, is Colombia. In 
February 1980, Colombian M-19 terror- 
ists seized the Dominican Embassy, 
holding 18 diplomats— including the 
American, Mexican, and Venezuelan am- 
bassadors and the Papal Nuncio— hos- 
tage for 61 days. As part of the 
negotiated settlement, the terrorists 
were flown to Cuba and given asylum. 
That summer, Cuban intelligence officers 
arranged a meeting among M-19 
members with representatives of two 
other Colombian extremist organiza- 
tions, the ELN [Army of National 
Liberation] and the FARC [Revolu- 
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. Full 
unification was not achieved but practi- 
cal cooperation increased. 

In November 1980, the M-19 sent 
100-200 activists to Cuba for military 
training. This group was joined by M-19 
terrorists already in Cuba, including 
Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the leader of 
the Dominican Embassy takeover. The 
Colombians were trained by Cuban in- 
structors in explosives, automatic 
weapons, hand-to-hand combat, com- 
munications, and rural guerrilla tactics. 
In February 1981, their Cuban training 
completed, these guerrillas infiltrated in- 
to Colombia by boat along the Pacific 
coast. The attempt of these urban ter- 
rorists at an armed uprising in the coun- 
tryside failed. Pabon himself was cap- 
tured. Cuba denied involvement in the 
arming and landing of the M-19 guer- 
rillas but not in training them. 

The clear evidence of Cuba's role led 
Colombia to suspend relations with Cuba 
on March 23. President Turbay com- 
mented in an August 13 New York 
Times interview: 



. . . when we found that Cuba, a country 
with which we had diplomatic relations, wa.s 
using those relations to prepare a group of 
guerrillas, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for 
us. It was like sending ministers to 
Washington at the same time you are about 
to bomb ships in Hawaii. 

In an interview published in Septem- 
ber 1981, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the 
Cuban Vice President, told the German 
news magazine Der Spiegel, "we did not 
deny" that we trained the M-19 guer- 
rillas. This, he said, "holds true for the 
Salvadorans as well." 

Neither the anger of President Tur- 
bay nor the M-19's failure has deterred 
Cuba. A new and sizeable group of 
M-19 guerrillas are today in Cuba 
receiving military training. We don't 
know that they will go back to Colombia 
to attempt new acts of terrorism, 
perhaps directed against the presidential 
elections this coming May, but such a 
pattern seems a reasonable speculation. 
The M-19 has already gone on record- 
in a declaration distributed to the media 
in January— condemning the elections 
and claiming that "civil resistance, 
popular combat, and armed warfare are 
the only roads left open to the 
people. . . ." This document, which was 
distributed under the signatures of the 
M-19's national directorate, pledged that 
the M-19 would oppose the elections 
"with all our force." This statement was 
repeated in late February when M-19 
leaders rejected the government's latest 
amnesty proposal. 

For the first time, we now also have 
detailed and reliable information linking 
Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as 
arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has 
been using a Colombian narcotics ring to 
funnel arms as well as funds to Colom- 
bian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring 
was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colom- 
bian drug trafficker now in custody in 
Mexico. He has admitted to working for 
Havana in purchasing arms for the 
M-19. We have information that Guillot 
traveled twice to Cuba since October 
1981 and that on the second visit he 
received $700,000 from the Cuban 
Government to purchase arms for the 
M-19 guerrillas. Last October he played 
a principal role in transferring the arms 
he purchased from a ship to a Colombian 
plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition 
to arms, Guillot reportedly also trans- 
ferred funds to the guerrillas through an 
employee of a Panamanian bank. He 
maintained contact with the Cuban dip- 
lomatic mission in BogoUi, including the 
ambassador, until that mission was 
closed. 



In return for Guillot's services, the 
Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking 
by permitting mother ships carrying 
marijuana to take sanctuary in Cuban 
waters while awaiting feeder boats from 
the Bahamas and Florida. According to 
a relative of Guillot, one such mother 
ship detained by Cuban authorities was 
released when Guillot protested to the 
Cuban ambassador in Bogota. 

Guillot himself has also admitted 
that a future shipment of arms was to 
be sent to an unspecified group in 
Bolivia. These arms, according to 
Guillot, were to be supplied by an in- 
dividual in Miami named Johnny. Johnm 
has been identified as Johnny Crump, a 
narcotics and arms trafficker now de- 
tained in Miami on narcotics charges. 

We will continue to follow this case 
with extreme interest since it is the first 
firm information we have which impli- 
cates Cuba in narcotics trafficking. It 
also confirms through an independent 
source what we have suspected, that 
despite Cuban denials, Cuba has provid- 
ed arms to the Colombian M-19 guer- 
rillas in addition to training them. 

Central America 

In Central America, the pattern we 
know well from Nicaragua and El 
Salvador can be seen now from 
Guatemala to Honduras and Costa Rica^ 
Guatemala exemplifies Cuba's syste- 
matic efforts to unify, assist, and advise 
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. In the fall o 
1980, the four major Guatemalan guer- 
rilla groups met in Managua to negotiat 
a unity agreement. Cuban and San- 
dinista officials attended the signing 
ceremony. We have obtained copies of 
the actual secret agreements which 
make clear that the four guerrilla 
groups consider themselves a revolu- 
tionary vanguard, and believe that 
Marxism-Leninism establishes the 
ideological parameters of the 
Guatemalan revolution. The secret 
agreements emphasize the importance c 
creating a national front,