Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

See other formats 


BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 


iivpartmvni 


\  ,3- 


bulletin 

ie  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  83  /  Number  2077 

p£)£/'       ■•■■ 


Southern  Africa/8 
Philippines/19,  21 
NATO/38 


y    sin     o <;;:::^  ^1*. • 


I 


August  1983 


BPi'fHirtmvtit  of  Slulv 

bulletin 


Volume  83  /  Number  2077  /  August  1983 


Cover:  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

( Iffice  of  Public  ( lommunication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief',  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
( Iffii'i'  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
ami  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Department  of  Si  mi  Bui  letin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington,  D.C 
20402 


CONTENTS 


he  President 

Saving  Freedom  in  Central 

America 
News  Conference  of  June  28 

(Excerpts) 

he  Secretary 


News  Conference  of  June  22 


frica 

I       Southern  Africa:  America's  Re- 
sponsibility for  Peace  and 
Change  (Lawrence  S. 
Eagleburger) 

I       Namibia  (Contact  Group  Statt 
ment) 

\       Visit  of  Ivory  Coast  President 
(Felix  Houphouet-Boigny, 
President  Reagan) 
20th  Anniversary  of  the  OAU 
(Message  From  the  President , 
Secretary  Shultz) 

rms  Control 

Strategic  Modernization:  Foreign 
Policy  and  Arms  Control  Impli- 
cations (Ken  neth  W.  Dam) 

ast  Asia 

i       U.S.,  Philippines  Conclude  Bases 
Agreement  Review  (Depart nu  nt 
Announcement,  Joint  Statement, 
Memorandum  of  Agreement, 
President  Reagan's  Letter) 
U.S. -Philippine  Relations  and  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement  Re- 
view (Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

conomics 

I       The  Challenge  of  Economic 
Growth  (Kenneth  W.  Dam.) 

American  Policy  To  Promote 
World  Development  (W.  Allen 
Wallis) 

A  Collective  Approach  to  East- 
West  Economic  Relations 
(W.  Allen  Wallis) 

The  World  Economy  After  Wil- 
liamsburg ( W.  Allen  Wallis) 

Building  Trade  With  Africa 
(Denis  Lamb,  Leonard  H. 
Robinson,  Jr.) 


Europe 

38        North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in 

Paris  (Secretary  Shultz,  Final 

Communique) 
45        Unacceptable  Intervention:  Soviet 

Active  Measures  (Lawrence  S. 

Eagleburger) 

49  1  ltd  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message  to 

tin-  ( 'ongress) 

50  A  Critical  Juncture  for  the  Atlan- 

tic Alliance  (Richard  R.  Burt) 

51  President  Meets  With  NATO  Sec- 

retary General  (White  House 
Statement) 

53  Elections  in  Turkey  (President 

Reagan) 

54  Visit  of  Spanish  President  (Felipe 

Marquez  Gonzalez,  President 
Reagan) 

Human  Rights 

56       Soviet  Jewry  (Elliott  Abrams) 

International  Law 

58  U.S.  Submits  Pleading  to  ICJ 

Concerning  Canadian  Maritime 
Boundary 

Middle  East 

59  Israel-Lebanon  Peace  Agreement 

(President  Reagan) 
59       The  Lebanon  Emergency  As- 
sistance Act  (President  Reagan) 

59  Persecutions  and  Repression  in 

Iran  (President  Reagan) 

Nuclear  Policy 

60  Challenges  of  the  Nuclear  Non- 

proliferation  Regime  (Richard 
T.  Kennedy) 

Pacific 

62  Visit  of  Australian  Prime 

Minister  (Robert  J.  L.  Hawke, 
President  Reagan) 

63  Micronesia  Approves  Free  As- 

sociation With  U.S. 

64  U.S. -Marshall  Islands  Call 

Plebiscite 


Population 

65       U.S.  Population  Policy  and  the 
United  Nations  (Richard  Elliot 
Benedick) 


Refugees 


66       Refugees:  A  Continuing  Concern 
(James  N.  Purcell,  Jr.) 

South  Asia 

70  Recent  Soviet  Actions  in  Afghan- 

istan (Depart went  Statement) 

United  Nations 

71  Nicaragua  (Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick, 

Text  of  Resolution) 
75       Namibia  (Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick, 

Charles  M.  L ichenstein.  Text  of 
Resolution) 

78  UNICEF  (President  Reagan) 

Western  Hemisphere 

79  Caribbean  Basin  Recovery  Act 

(Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger) 

80  U.S.  Medical  Team  to  El  Salvador 

(White  House  Statement) 

82  Visit  of  Belize  Prime  Minister 

(George  C.  Price,  President 
Reagan) 

83  Visit  of  Salvadoran  President 

(Alvaro  Borja  Magaha,  Presi- 
dent Reagan) 

84  El  Salvador  Commission  An- 

nounces Peace  Initiative  (De- 
partment Statement) 

85  Sugar  Imports  From  Central 

America  (White  House 
A  n  nouncement) 

86  Cuban  Involvement  in  Narcotics 

Trafficking  (James  H.  Michel) 

86  Return  of  Certain  Mariel  Cubans 

Treaties 

87  Current  Actions 

Chronology 


91 


June  1983 


Press  Releases 

92  Department  of  State 

Publications 

93  Department  of  State 

94  Documents  on  German  Foreign 

Policy  Released 

Index 


President  Reagan  meets  with  Henry  Kissinger  whom  he  recently  appointed  Chairman  of 
the  12-member  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central  America.  Also  present  are 
(clockwise  from  left):  Chief  of  Staff  and  Assistant  to  the  President,  James  A.  Baker  III, 
Secretary  Shultz,  and  Vice  President  Bush. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Saving  Freedom 
in  Central  America 


by  President  Reagan 


Address  before  the 

International  Longshoremen's  Association  (ILA) 

in  Hollywood,  Florida, 

on  July  18,  1983. l 


Our  democracy  encompasses  many 
freedoms — freedom  of  speech,  of 
religion,  of  assembly,  and  of  so  many 
other  liberties  that  we  often  take  for 
granted.  These  are  rights  that  should  be 
shared  by  all  mankind.  This  union  has 
always  patriotically  stood  up  for  those 
freedoms.  And  that's  why  I  want  to  talk 
to  you  today  about  freedom  not  in  the 
United  States  but  in  a  part  of  the  world 
that's  very  close  and  very  important  to 
us — Central  America. 

We  all  know  that  Central  America 
suffers  from  decades  of  poverty,  social 
deprivation,  and  political  instability.  And 
because  these  problems  weren't  dealt 
with  positively,  they  are  now  being  ex- 
ploited by  the  enemies  of  freedom.  We 
cannot  afford  the  luxury  of  turning 
away  from  our  neighbors'  struggles  as  if 
they  didn't  matter.  If  we  do  turn  away, 
we'll  pay  a  terrible  price  for  our  neglect. 

In  April,  I  reported  to  the  Congress 
that  the  problems  in  Central  America 
have  the  potential  to  affect  our  national 
security.  This  is  still  the  case,  and  I 
want  to  reinforce  it.  Many  of  our 
citizens  don't  fully  understand  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation,  so  let  me 
put  it  bluntly:  There  is  a  war  in  Central 
America  that  is  being  fueled  by  the 


Soviets  and  the  Cubans.  They  are  arm- 
ing, training,  supplying,  and  encourag- 
ing a  war  to  subjugate  another  nation  to 
communism,  and  that  nation  is  El 
Salvador.  The  Soviets  and  the  Cubans 
are  operating  from  a  base  called 
Nicaragua.  And  this  is  the  first  real 
communist  aggression  on  the  American 
mainland.  And  we  must  never  forget 
that  here  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  we 
are  Americans  in  every  country  from 
pole  to  pole. 

This  Florida  community  where  we 
meet  today  is  closer  to  Nicaragua  than  it 
is  to  Washington,  D.C.  Two-thirds  of 
our  foreign  trade  and  nearly  half  of  our 
petroleum  pass  through  the  Caribbean. 
It's  well  to  remember  that  in  early  1942, 
a  handful  of  Hitler's  submarines  sank 
more  tonnage  in  that  area  than  in  all  of 
the  Atlantic  Ocean.  And  they  did  this 
without  a  single  naval  base  anywhere 
nearby.  Today,  Cuba  is  home  to  a  Soviet 
combat  brigade,  a  submarine  base 
capable  of  servicing  Soviet  subs,  and 
military  air  bases  visited  regularly  by 
Soviet  military  aircraft.  If  the  Nazis  dur- 
ing World  War  II  and  the  Soviets  today 
have  recognized  that  the  Caribbean  and 
Central  America  are  vital  to  our  in- 
terests, don't  you  think  it's  about  time 
that  we  recognized  that,  too? 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Some  people  throw  up  their  hands 
and  say,  well,  there's  not  much  we  can 
do  down  there.  They  say  poverty  and 
violence  and  repression  in  Central 
America  are  just  the  way  of  life,  that 
democracy  can't  work.  I  say  baloney, 
and  I  think  we'd  all  say  something 
stronger  if  we  were  down  on  the  docks. 
Costa  Rica  is  as  strong  a  democracy  as 
you  will  find  anywhere  with  a  long 
history  of  peace,  free  elections,  and 
stability.  They  don't  even  have  an  army. 
If  democracy  can  work  in  Costa  Rica 
and  Honduras,  it  can  work  in  El 
Salvador  and  Nicaragua  and  Guatemala. 
There  is  still  time  for  the  people  of  Latin 
America  to  build  a  prosperous,  peaceful, 
and  free  future.  And  we  have  an  obliga- 
tion to  help  them— for  our  own  sake  as 
well  as  theirs. 

People  throughout  Latin  America 
are  waiting  to  see  if  Republicans  and 
Democrats  in  this  country  can  work 
together  to  make  the  United  States 
what  it  should  be:  a  loyal  friend  and 
reliable  defender  of  democracy  and 
human  decency.  I  believe  that  we  must 
exercise  that  leadership.  And  the  time  is 
now. 

Since  I  spoke  to  the  Congress  in 
April,  Cuba  has  sent  one  of  its  best 
known  combat  generals  to  Nicaragua. 
More  Cuban  soldiers  and  Soviet  sup- 
pliers have  arrived  in  Nicaragua.  This 
cannot  be  allowed  to  continue. 

Tomorrow,  July  19th,  is  the  fourth 
anniversary  of  the  Sandinista  revolution. 
This  was  a  revolution  that  promised  to 
bring  freedom  to  the  Nicaraguan  people; 
history  will  call  it  the  revolution  of 
broken  promises.  Tomorrow  the  nine 
military  commanders  who  rule  Nica- 
ragua with  Cuban  and  Soviet  power  will 
indulge  in  boastful  revolutionary 
rhetoric.  But  there  are  few  left  who  will 
believe  them.  The  consensus  throughout 
the  hemisphere  is  that  while  the  San- 
dinistas promised  their  people  freedom, 
all  they've  done  is  replace  the  former 
dictatorship  with  their  own — a  dictator- 
ship of  counterfeit  revolutionaries  who 
wear  fatigues,  and  drive  around  in 
Mercedes  sedans  and  Soviet  tanks,  and 
whose  current  promise  is  to  spread  their 
brand  of  "revolution"  throughout  Central 
America. 

What  kind  of  freedom  have  the  San- 
dinistas established?  Just  ask  the  1,300 
stevedores  at  the  Nicaraguan  port  of 
Corinto.  Last  month,  their  union 
assembly  was  packed  with  Sandinistas 
and  six  union  leaders  were  arrested. 
Their  presumed  crime  was  trying  to 
develop  ties  with  independent  trade 


unions,  including  some  here  affiliated 
with  the  AFL-CIO.  I  can  tell  you  one 
thing.  If  all  the  longshoremen  in  Corinto 
are  like  Teddy  Gleason  [ILA  president], 
the  Sandinistas  have  got  a  real  fight  on 
their  hands.  Matter  of  fact,  if  they've 
got  one  like  you,  Teddy,  they  may  be 
like  those  two  fellows  who  were  up  saw- 
ing on  a  limb,  and  one  of  them  fell  off. 
And  there  was  a  wildcat  down  below, 
and  there  were  sounds  of  struggle  com- 
ing up,  and  the  one  still  up  on  the  limb 
called  down  and  said,  "Hold  on."  And  he 
said,  "Hold  on?"  He  said,  "Come  down 
and  tell  me  how  to  let  him  go." 

What  kind  of  democracy  is  it?  Ask 
the  Nicaraguan  refugees  who've  risked 
starvation  and  attack  to  escape  to  Hon- 
duras. Let  me  read  to  you  directly  from 
a  newspaper  article:  "...  one 
Nicaraguan  man — still  filthy,  ragged, 
and,  above  all,  hungry  after  an  odyssey 
that  began  5  weeks  ago — breathed  a 
note  of  thanks:  'God  has  smiled  on  us.'  " 
Imagine,  with  barely  clothes  on  his  back 
and  nothing  in  his  stomach,  he  believed 
God  had  smiled  on  him  because  he  had 
arrived  in  free,  democratic  Honduras. 

This  man  fled  Nicaragua  in  May 
with  many  others  when  they  learned  the 
Sandinistas  planned  to  relocate  their 
villages.  Let  me  quote  again  what  one  of 
the  refugees  had  to  say:  "We  left 
everything.  We  left  the  pigs,  the  corn, 
the  animals.  .  .  .  This  year  they  wouldn't 
let  us  plant,  because  they  wanted  us  to 
move  closer  to  the  military  bases,  they 
wanted  us  to  be  in  the  militia,  and  we 
did  not  want  to  be  executioners." 

When  the  Sandinistas  first  took 
power,  all  their  neighbors  hoped  that 
they  would  embrace  democracy  as  they 
promised.  In  the  first  year  and  a  half 
after  the  revolution,  the  United  States 
sent  $118  million  worth  of  emergency 
relief  and  recovery  aid  to  Nicaragua, 
more  than  provided  by  any  other  coun- 
try in  the  world.  But  the  Sandinistas 
had  lied.  They  rejected  their  pledges  to 
their  own  people,  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS),  and  to  the 
world. 

Let  me  say  a  few  more  words  about 
those  specific  promises.  The  Sandinistas 
had  promised  the  Organization  of 
American  States  that  they  would  hold 
elections  and  grant  all  human  rights  that 
go  with  a  democracy.  In  short,  they 
literally  made  a  contract  to  establish  a 
true  democracy.  The  dictator  Somoza 
was  then  persuaded  by  the  OAS  to 
resign,  and  the  government  was  turned 
over  to  the  revolutionaries  and  recog- 
nized officially  by  the  OAS. 


So  far  so  good.  But  then,  one  fad 
of  the  revolutionaries— backed  by  Cul 
and  the  Soviet  Union — seized  total 
power  and  ousted  their  revolutionary 
comrades  who'd  been  fighting  to 
establish  a  real  democracy.  Nicaragu; 
today  a  nation  abusing  its  own  people 
and  its  neighbors.  The  guerrilla  band; 
fighting  in  Nicaragua  are  trying  to 
restore  the  true  revolution  and  keep  t 
promises  made  to  the  OAS.  Isn't  it  til 
that  all  of  us  in  the  Americas  worked 
together  to  hold  Nicaragua  accountab 
for  the  promises  made  and  broken  4 
years  ago? 

The  Link  Between  Nicaragua 
and  El  Salvador 

There  is  a  vital  link  between  what's  h 
pening  in  Nicaragua  and  what's  happ 
ing  in  El  Salvador.  And  the  link  is  ve 
simple:  The  dictators  of  Nicaragua  ar 
actively  trying  to  destroy  the  budding 
democracy  in  neighboring  El  Salvado 
El  Salvador  is  moving  toward  a  more 
open  society  and  government  in  the 
midst  of  a  foreign-supported  guerrilla 
war.  National  presidential  elections  ai 
planned.  Through  their  Peace  Commi 
sion,  they've  offered  to  talk  even  to  tl 
violent  opposition  about  participation 
the  forthcoming  elections.  They  have 
plemented  an  effective  land  reform  pi 
gram  which  has  provided  land  for  ove 
half  a  million  Salvadorans,  and  they'v 
given  amnesty  to  former  guerrillas. 

This  is  El  Salvador's  revolution- 
is  one  that  is  building  democracy.  Cor 
trast  this  with  the  corrupted  revolutk 
in  Nicaragua — one  which  has  repress' 
human  liberties,  denied  free  unions  ai 
free  elections,  censored  the  press, 
threatened  its  neighbors,  and  violated 
public  pledges. 

It's  time  El  Salvador  is  recognize! 
for  what  they're  trying  to  do.  And  it's 
true  that  their  path  has  been  a  hard  c 
Peaceful  change  has  not  always  been 
easy  or  quick.  We  realize  the  human 
rights  progress  in  El  Salvador  is  not ; 
we  would  like  it  to  be.  The  killing  mus 
stop.  But  you  have  to  realize  much  of 
the  violence  there— whether  from  the 
extreme  right  or  left — is  beyond  the 
control  of  the  government.  El  Salvadi 
is  moving  in  the  right  direction.  Its 
elected  government  is  committed  to  ft 
ther  improvement.  They  need  and  the 
deserve  our  help. 

Just  remember  that  scene  last  yea 
when,  after  months  of  campaigning  b) 
variety  of  candidates,  the  people  of  E 
Salvador  were  offered  a  chance  to  vot 
to  choose  the  kind  of  government  the) 


Department  of  State  Bulletr 


THE  PRESIDENT 


nnted.  The  guerrillas  threatened  death 
1  anyone  who  voted.  They  destroyed 
lindreds  of  buses  and  trucks  to  keep 
<e  people  from  getting  to  the  polling 
jices.  Their  slogan  was  brutal:  "Vote 
jday  and  die  tonight."  But  on  election 
ly,  an  unprecedented  80%  of  the  elec- 
(rate  braved  ambush  and  gunfire  and 

I,lany  of  them  trudged  for  miles  to  vote 
r  freedom. 
Members  of  our  Congress  who  went 
ere  as  observers  told  me  of  a  woman 
lio  was  wounded  by  rifle  fire  on  the 
Iiy  to  the  polls.  She  refused  to  leave 
I  j  line  to  have  her  wound  treated  until 
l;er  she  had  voted.  Another  woman 
|d  been  told  by  the  guerrillas  that  she 
l>uld  be  killed  when  she  returned  from 
i  ?  polls.  She  was  a  grandmother,  and 
Be  told  the  guerrillas,  "You  can  kill  me, 
lu  can  kill  my  family,  you  can  kill  my 
lighbors.  You  can't  kill  us  all."  The  real 
j'edom  fighters  of  El  Salvador  turned 
It  to  be  the  people  of  that  country.  The 
I  irld  should  respect  this  courage  and 
j  t  allow  it  to  be  belittled  or  forgotten. 
I  id  I  say  that  we  can  never  turn  our 
I  :ks  on  that. 


S.  Role 

■e  United  States  has  only  recently  at- 
npted  to  correct  past  neglect  so  that 

could  help  Central  America's  strug- 
•  for  freedom.  We  are  working  for 
itical  and  economic  development. 
«ist  of  our  aid  is  not  military  at  all. 
venty-seven  cents  out  of  every  dollar 

will  spend  there  this  year  will  go  for 
>nomic  assistance— food,  fertilizers, 
d  other  essentials  to  help  break  the 
ious  cycle  of  poverty.  And  make  no 
stake  about  this— of  all  the  words  I've 
)ken  today,  let  me  underline  these 
jecially:  America's  emphasis  in  Cen- 
il  America  is  on  economic  and  social 
)gress,  not  on  a  purely  military  solu- 
n. 

But  to  give  democracy  and  develop- 
bt  a  chance  to  work  in  the  face  of  in- 
casing attacks,  we  are  providing  a 
ield  of  military  training  and  assistance 
help  our  neighbors  protect  them- 
ves.  Meanwhile,  the  trade  provisions 
the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI) 
11  stimulate  production  and  employ- 
snt.  Last  week's  congressional  vote  on 
3  CBI  is  a  step  toward  more  work  for 
sir  longshoremen  and  ours. 

Nor  is  that  all.  We  are  actively  sup- 
rting  the  search  for  political  solution 
d  dialogue  among  and  within  these  na- 
ins.  We  know  that  ultimately  peace 
n  come  only  if  people  talk  to  each 


other  and  learn  to  accommodate  in  an 

atmosphere  of  freedom.  To  this  end  I 
dispatched  my  special  emissary  to  the 
region.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  guer- 
rillas rejected  our  offer,  we  remain 
ready  to  facilitate  free  and  open  elec- 
tions. We  also  support  the  process 
started  at  Contadora  for  a  multilateral 
approach  to  peace. 

In  my  speech  to  the  joint  session,  I 
asked  the  Congress  to  join  me  in  a  bold, 
generous  bipartisan  approach  to  the 
problems  of  peace  and  poverty, 
democracy  and  dictatorship  in  this 
region.  Many  Members  of  the  Congress 
have  responded  in  a  genuine  spirit  of 
cooperation  despite  divergent  views  on 
specific  strategy.  Senators  Jackson  and 
Mathias,  Congressmen  Barnes  and 
Kemp,  have  suggested  the  formation  of 
a  national  commission  to  build  on  our 
bipartisan  concern  for  these  key  issues. 

I  agree  with  them  that  this  is  a  good 
idea.  So,  today,  I  am  announcing  a 
bipartisan  national  commission  on  Cen- 
tral America.  The  commission  will  lay 
the  foundation  for  a  long-term  unified 
national  approach  to  the  freedom  and  in- 
dependence of  the  countries  of  Central 
America.  The  commission  will  be 
honored  by  a  very  distinguished 
American,  outstanding  in  the  field  of 
diplomacy— virtually  a  legend  in  that 
field— it  will  be  headed  by  Dr.  Henry 
Kissinger,  who  will  present  recommen- 
dations to  me  later  this  year.  Their  focus 
will  be  long  term,  looking  to  what  it  is 
that  we  want  and  what  we  must  do  in 
the  years  ahead  to  meet  the  underlying 
problems  of  the  region. 


In  the  meantime,  we  must  not  allow 
totalitarian  communism  to  win  by 
default.  But  we  cannot  succeed  unless 
the  Congress  approves  the  necessary 
resources.  All  that  our  neighbors  ask  is 
for  the  tools  to  do  the  job  themselves. 
And  I  ask  you  and  every  American 
regardless  of  political  party  to  join  in  a 
common  effort  to  promote  freedom  for 
all  the  people  of  this  hemisphere.  Just  as 
you  work  so  your  children  will  have  a 
better  future,  the  United  States  must 
work  so  that  the  fledgling  democracies 
of  this  hemisphere  will  have  a  better 
future  and  so  that  our  own  future  can  be 
more  secure.  The  legislative  branch 
must  bear  its  share  of  responsibility  for 
ensuring  this  promise. 

You  know,  I  was  down  in  that  area 
on  a  trip.  I  met  with  the  heads  of 
several  of  the  states  of  Central  and 
South  America.  And  I  pointed 
something  out  to  them  that  very  often 
we  tend  to  forget.  This  Western 
Hemisphere  is  unique.  We  are,  as  I  said 
before,  30  countries  down  there,  3  here 
on  the  northern  continent,  but  we  all  are 
Americans.  We  cross  the  line  into 
another  country;  it  is  still  North  and 
South  and  Central  America.  And  we 
haven't  gotten  together  the  way  we 
should.  We  don't  know  enough  about 
that  area.  And  we  need  to  do  more.  Can 
you  imagine  what  a  power  for  good  in 
the  world  these  two  continents,  linked 
by  the  isthmus  of  Central  America— we 
worship  from  North  Pole  to  South  Pole 
the  same  God,  we  have  the  same 
heritage  of  coming  here  as  pioneers  to 


Commission  on  Central  America 


Chairman 

Dr.  Henry  A.  Kissinger 

Members 

Nicholas  F.  Brady,  Managing  Director,  Dillon 

Read  &  Co.,  Inc. 
Henry  G.  Cisneros,  Mayor  of  San  Antonio 
William  P.  Clements,  Jr.,  former  Governor  of 

Texas 
Dr.  Carlos  F.  Diaz-Alejandro,  professor  of 

economics,  Yale  University 
Wilson  S.  Johnson,  President,  National  Fed- 
eration of  Independent  Business 
Joseph  Lane  Kirkland,  President,  AFL-CIO 
Dr.  Richard  M.  Scammon,  political  scientist 
Dr.  John  R.  Silber,  President,  Boston 
University 


Potter  Stewart,  Associate  Justice,  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  (retired) 

Ambassador  Robert  S.  Strauss,  Attorney  at 
Law 

William  B.  Walsh,  President,  Project  Hope 

President's  Representative 
to  the  Commission 

Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick,  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations 

Executive  Director 
of  the  Commission 

Harry  Schlaudeman,  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Argentina  ■ 


igust  1983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


these  virtually  undiscovered  continents. 
And  what  a  power  for  good  we  could  be 
with  all  the  resources  available  to  these 
continents  if  we  help  them  in  achieving 
what  we  have  achieved  here  in  this  land 
in  freedom,  in  economic  progress,  in 
standard  of  living. 

Human  rights  means  working  at 
problems,  not  walking  away  from  them. 
Without  the  necessary  funds,  there's  no 
way  for  us  to  prevent  the  light  of 
freedom  from  being  extinguished  in  Cen- 
tral America,  and  then  it  will  move  on 
from  there.  A  truly  bipartisan  approach 
to  these  problems  can  produce  the  kind 
of  progress  that  will  help  the  people  of 
the  region  help  themselves. 

You  know  I've  heard  already  and 
before— knowing  Teddy  Gleason,  you 
know  I've  heard— that  ILA  stands  for  I 
love  America.  And  that's  true.  I  don't 
think  America  has  a  more  patriotic 
union  than  this  one.  This  union  is  great 
for  the  same  reason  America  is 
great— because  so  many  different  groups 
are  working  together,  pulling  together 
toward  a  common  goal.  The  cultural 
diversity  of  this  union  and  this  country 
make  us  both  strong  and  free. 

President  Harrison  once  said: 

In  America,  a  glorious  fire  has  been 
lighted  upon  the  altar  of  liberty.  .  .  .  Keep  it 
burning;  and  let  the  sparks  that  continually 
go  up  from  it  fall  on  other  altars,  and  light  up 
in  distant  lands  the  fire  of  freedom. 

Today,  I  ask  you  to  join  me  in  an  ef- 
fort to  keep  the  light  of  liberty  alive  in 
Central  America.  We  must  never  let 
freedom  fade  where  there  is  a  chance  to 
save  it.  We  must  never  let  the  embers  of 
human  dignity  die  out  simply  because 
it's  easier  to  turn  the  other  way.  With  a 
timely  investment  now,  we  can  save 
freedom  in  Central  America.  I  believe 
we  must  make  that  investment.  I  believe 
we  have  a  moral  responsibility  to  do  so. 
And  I  believe  with  the  help  of  organiza- 
tions like  the  ILA  we  will  succeed  in  ex- 
panding freedom  for  the  people  of  Cen- 
tral America. 


News  Conference  of  June  28  (Excerpt 


JText  from  White  House  press  release. 


Q.  Jim  Wright  said  at  the  White 
House  today  that  there  are  some  in 
Congress  who  don't  believe  that  this 
Administration  wants  peace  in  Central 
America.  And  your  aides  acknowledge 
that  the  polls  supporting  your  Central 
American  policy  have  gone  down  and 
the  people  seem  to  be  moving  away 
from  that.  But  how  do  you  account  for 
this? 

A.  I  think  there's  a  great  lack  of  in- 
formation on  the  part  of  the  people.  I  do 
know  that  after  I  addressed  the  joint 
session  of  Congress  and  the  people  on 
television  on  that  subject,  there  was  a 
decided  shift  in  favor  of  our  position.  I 
guess  that  proves  the  power  of  advertis- 
ing. There  has  been  a  constant  drumbeat 
ever  since.  I  made  one  speech,  but  the 
drumbeat  ever  since,  to  the  people,  is 
somehow  denigrating  our  position  there 
and  indicating  that  there's  something 
wrong  in  that  position. 

Maybe  we  haven't  done  what  we 
should  have  done  in  keeping  the  people 
informed  of  what  is  going  on  because 
there — very  definitely — are  thousands 
of  Soviets  and  Cubans — Soviets  in  Cuba. 
There  is  a  great  number  of  them  also  in 
Nicaragua.  There  are  thousands  of 
Cubans,  including  one  of  their  top 
generals,  most  experienced  generals,  in 
Nicaragua. 

Several  Congressmen  have  just 
come  back  from  there  and  have  told  me 
that  in  speaking  to  people  on  the  sides 
that  we're  against— high-ranking 
people — that  they  have  told  them  that 
this  is  a  revolution,  not  just  for  one 
country;  this  is  a  revolution  that  is 
aimed  at  all  of  Central  America.  And  I 
think  some  of  you  should  seek  out  those 
Congressmen  and  hear  some  of  the 
things  they  had  to  say  because  of  what 
they  heard  from  these  people — one  in- 
dividual even  suggested  that  in  a  limited 
period  of  time  they  would  be  at  the 
Arizona-Mexican  border.  I  think  the 
United  States  has  a  stake  in  what  is  go- 
ing on  there  and  we've  got  to  do  a  bet- 
ter job  of  letting  the  people  know  what 
is  at  stake. 

Q.  What  is  it  that  prevents  your 
Administration  from  talking  to 
Castro,  to  the  Sandinistas,  to  the 
representatives  of  the  rebels  in  El 
Salvador?  I  mean,  to  at  least  explore 
negotiations,  and  would  it  really  harm 


the  Salvadoran  Government  if  you 
made  that  approach? 

A.  That  is  a  little  bit  not  our 
business  either.  The  Salvadorans  hav 
appointed  a  Peace  Commission  that  i 
trying  to  make  contact — maybe  has 
made  contact — but  trying  to  persuad 
the  revolutionaries,  the  Marxists  in  t 
country  to  come  in  and  discuss  with 
them  how  they  can  accept  amnesty  a 
join  in  the  electoral  democratic  proce 
that  will  be  taking  place  soon.  So  far 
they've  had  nothing  but  turndowns.  ( 
the  other  side  in  Nicaragua,  it  is  simj 
reversed.  It  is  the  democratic  revolu- 
tionaries who  were  ousted  once  the 
revolution  was  successful  while  the 
Marxists  took  over  and  created  their 
totalitarian  form  of  government.  Anc 
they  want,  all  they're  fighting  for  is  t 
return  to  the  principles  of  the  revolut 
that  overthrew  Somoza — free  electio 
human  rights,  free  press,  all  those 
things. 

It  isn't  a  case  of  us  not  wanting  t 
talk.  Early  on  in  my  Administration, 
made  contact  with  Mr.  Castro.  Nothi: 
came  of  it,  and  we  haven't  had  much 
success  since. 


Q.  You  have  said  that  you  are  i 
going  to  send  any  combat  troops  in 
Central  America.  But  at  the  same 
time,  you  have  said  that  El  Salvadc 
and  the  rest  of  the  region  are  vital 
national  security  and  are  of  crucial 
portance  to  our  country.  Isn't  there  | 
therefore,  an  inconsistency  in  thosi6 
two  statements?  If  you  think  it  is  ol 
that  much  importance  to  our  counti  t 
why  do  you  say  you  will  never  send 
combat  troops  in? 

A.  Presidents  never  say  never.  I  I 
have  said  that  we  have  no  plans  to  sel 
combat  troops  nor  are  they  needed  orl 
wanted.  President  Magana  here  said,  j 
that  he  would  not  ask  for  them.  He 
doesn't  want  them.  And  I  don't  think  I 
other  countries  do.  I  think  they  want 
create  their  own  democracies  and  con  I 
tinue  on  the  path  they're  on.  But  they  | 
do,  frankly,  need  our  help  in  two  areaf 
They  need  us  to  help  them  with  trainii) 
to  provide  arms  and  munitions  so  that; 
they  can  defend  themselves  while  theyp 
instituting  these  democratic  programs 
And  they  need  our  economic  help. 

So  far  our  help  has  been  three  to   i 
one — three- fourths  of  our  help  has  bee' 


Department  of  State  B 


u  l  let 


THE  SECRETARY 


j  the  area  of  economic  relief  and  only 
Le-fourth  military.  And  those  in  the 
Ongress  who  want  to  whittle  this  down 
i  where  it  is  a  pittance — they  don't  say, 
jlo,  we  won't  give  you  anything — give 
u  a  few  dollars  here  and  a  few  dollars 
ere."  In  my  opinion,  what  they're  do- 
y  is  choosing  between  instant  death 
d  letting  those  countries  bleed  to 
ath.  Then  they  want  to  be  able  to 
ime  somebody  else  because  they 
ssed  a  nickel  instead  of  a  dollar.  All 
at  those  countries  want  from  us  is  this 
onomic  help  and  the  help  that  we're 
ring  them.  You  know,  it's  a  funny 
ng.  There's  1,500  Cubans  training  in 
caragua  and  there's  55  Americans  in 
Salvador  and  all  everyone  seems  to 
nk  is  a  sin  is  our  55. 

Q.  You  say,  though,  that  you'll 
ver  say  never.  You're  not  giving  a 
:dge  to  the  American  people  then 
it  you  will  not  send  combat  troops 
'  Is  that  right? 

A.  You  were  asking  a  kind  of  a 
pothetical  question  so  I  gave  a 
pothetical  answer,  and  it's  an  old  say- 
;  that  "Presidents  should  never  say 
/er."  They  blew  up  the  Maine.  But, 

I  see  no  need  for  it.  They've  never 
;n  asked  for.  Nor  do  we  have  any 
ns  or  intention  of  sending  troops  to 
>se  countries. 


Q.  On  Poland,  do  you  think  that  at 
s  point  Lech  Walesa  ought  to  step 
|  :k  from  the  leadership  role  he  has 
I  ;en?  And  do  you  have  any  reason  to 
I  ieve  that  if  he  does  step  back  from 
I :  limelight  in  the  Solidarity  leader- 
i  p  position  that  martial  law  in 
I  land  would  improve  to  the  point 
l  ere  you  could  come  through  with  a 
I  id  of  relief  for  the  Polish  economy 
j  i  mentioned  last  week? 

A.  I  wouldn't  be  able  to  answer  that 
k  ause  I  know  that  the  conversations 
t  ween  General  Jaruzelski  and  His 
I  liness  were  private  and  no  one 
t  )ws,  and  I  know  that  also  with  the 
I  iversations  with  Lech  Walesa.  I  don't 
D  >w  what  that  situation  is.  I  only  know 
'.  at  the  Pope  himself  has  stated,  and 
■  .t  is  that  he  has  urged  the  Govern- 
Int  of  Poland  to  allow  a  free  union 
I  .t  is  not  subject  to  government  con- 
1 1.  And  if  they  did  that,  I  think  that 
would  review  what  we  were  doing 
1  turn  back  from  some  of  those 
ngs. 


News  Conference  of  June  22 


!  ct  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
i  Documents  of  July  4,  1983.  ■ 


jgust  1983 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  news  con- 
ference at  the  Department  of  State  on 
June  22,  1983. l 

Q.  Are  U.S.  efforts  to  obtain  a 
withdrawal  of  Syrian  forces  from 
Lebanon  at  an  impasse?  If  not,  what  is 
our  next  step,  and  do  you  or  Am- 
bassador Habib  [Philip  C.  Habib, 
representative  of  the  President  to  the 
Middle  East]  or  Deputy  Secretary  Dam 
plan  to  meet  with  Syrian  officials  in 
the  near  future? 

A.  We  have  been  meeting  with  the 
Israelis  and  with  the  Lebanese.  We  have 
been  consulting  with  the  Saudi  Arabians 
and  other  friends  in  the  region.  We  have 
had  contact  with  the  Syrians. 

We  continue  to  be  fully  engaged  in 
this  very  important  issue.  I  recall  to  you 
the  President's  objectives  of  the  removal 
of  all  foreign  forces  from  Lebanon,  of 
the  emergence  of  Lebanon  as  a 
sovereign  country  able  to  rule  itself  and 
develop,  and  to  provide  measures  that 
ensure  the  security  of  Israel's  northern 
frontier.  We  continue  to  work  for  those 
objectives.  Ambassadors  Habib  and 
Draper  [Morris  Draper,  special 
negotiator  for  Lebanon]  will  be  return- 
ing to  the  area  probably  the  day  after 
tomorrow,  and  we  will  continue  to  be 
fully  engaged  and  work  on  it. 

Q.  What  if  the  Israelis  redeploy 
their  forces  to  the  south?  Would  that 
be  a  setback  in  terms  of  a  total 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces,  and 
is  there  any  deadline  inherent  in  that? 

A.  There  are  no  particular  dead- 
lines, although,  obviously,  the  sooner  a 
withdrawal  process  can  start,  the  better. 
I'm  speaking  of  a  full  withdrawal  proc- 
ess. That  is  what  we  want.  I  say  the 
sooner  the  better  because  it's  a  very 
tense  area.  When  you  have  tension,  the 
sooner  you  relieve  it,  the  more  you 
reduce  the  risks. 

One  would  hope  that  if  there  is  any 
move  in  the  direction  of  withdrawal,  it 
would  be  part  of  an  overall  program.  In 
any  case,  whatever  happens,  I'm  sure 
there  will  be  intensive  discussion  be- 
tween the  parties  most  directly 
concerned. 

Q.  But  if  there  were  a  partial 
redeployment  of  the  Israelis,  would 
that  be  a  setback  in  terms  of  the  full 
withdrawal? 

A.  That  depends  upon  the  condi- 
tions under  which  it  takes  place.  There 
is,  of  course,  inherently  a  sense  that 
when  one  of  the  foreign  forces  with- 


draws, that  is  part  of  the  territory  of 
Lebanon  they  can  take  control  over. 
Nevertheless,  we  have  to  come  back  and 
judge  anything  that  happens  according 
to  these  major  objectives,  not  only  of  the 
President  but  of  the  others  that  we  have 
been  working  with  in  the  area. 

Q.  The  situation  in  Lebanon  itself, 
with  the  Syrians  apparently  trying  to 
take  control  of  the  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization]  in  the  Bekaa 
Valley  and  with  the  Syrians  also  at- 
tempting to  set  up  local  autonomous 
rule  in  part  of  the  Bekaa  Valley, 
doesn't  lend  itself  to  much  optimism 
in  terms  of  a  Syrian  withdrawal  at  any 
time  soon.  Do  you  have  any  reason  to 
believe  that  ultimately  the  United 
States  may  be  successful  in  getting 
the  Syrians  to  withdraw? 

A.  We  certainly  are  going  to  con- 
tinue to  work  on  that  problem.  As  you 
point  out,  I  think  quite  correctly,  there 
are  obvious  indications  that  the  prob- 
lems are  real.  Nevertheless,  there  is 
great  importance  throughout  the  world, 
and  the  Arab  world,  on  the  emergence 
of  Lebanon  again  as  a  country  that  is 
free  of  foreign  forces  and  great  support 
for  that  idea.  I  think  and  hope  in  the 
end  we'll  have  success  and  the  Lebanese 
will  succeed. 

Q.  A  debate  is  raging  in  the  press 
about  the  central  message  that  you 
meant  to  convey  in  your  statement  on 
Soviet-American  relations  to  the 
[Senate]  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
last  week.  Would  you  care  to  join  and 
maybe  settle  that  debate? 

A.  I've  been  asked  that  question  a 
lot.  I  have,  after  trying  a  variety  of 
answers,  settled  on  this  one.  My  advice 
is:  Read  the  statement  and  draw  your 
own  conclusions.  Don't  depend  on 
somebody  else. 

Q.  Can  you  give  us  any  details  on 
the  deaths  of  the  two  American  jour- 
nalists today  in  Central  America,  and 
have  you  determined  as  yet  where  the 
fire  came  from  that  hit  their  car? 

A.  I  understand  that  the  fire  came 
from  Nicaragua,  and  it  hit  their  car. 
They  were  in  a  zone  which  was  known 
to  be  a  dangerous  zone,  and  they  had 
been  warned,  as  I  understand  it,  before 
they  went  there.  But  the  fire  did  come 
from  Nicaragua,  and  I  want  to  take  the 
occasion  to  express  my  sorrow  and  my 
condolences  to  their  families. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  I  would  like  to  give  you 
another  chance  on  Dan  Shorr's  ques- 
tion. 

A.  1  thought  that  might  come  hack. 
There  is  a  fundamental  point  when  peo- 
ple complain  about  news  stories  of  one 
kind  or  another,  that  they  should  read 
something  and  then  figure  it  out  for 
themselves  and  not  depend  on  the  opin 
ion  of  someone  else. 

Q.  In  the  carpentry  of  that  par- 
ticular speech,  clearly,  there  must 
have  been  an  emphasis  in  your  mind  of 
some  sort  of  signal  you  wanted  to  get 
to  the  Kremlin,  and  we  have  in  fact 
had  mixed  interpretations.  We  would 
like  a  little  background  guidance  from 
you. 

A.  I  think  there  are  two  signals,  if 
you  want  to  use  that  terminology: 
strength  and  diplomacy.  We  want  to 
make  it  clear  that  we  are  determined  to 
be  strong,  to  be  able  to  defend  our  in- 
terests. We  have  strong  allies.  We're 
working  effectively  with  them;  there  is 
cohesion,  and  we  are  determined.  At  the 
same  time,  we  and  our  allies  both  would 
prefer  a  more  constructive  dialogue  and 
set  of  arrangements  with  the  Soviet 
Union  than  we  now  have. 

In  the  statement  I  say  that  we  are 
prepared  to  engage  in  that  kind  of 
discussion.  I  think  it's  a  question  of  both 
sides  of  the  coin.  They're  both  there. 

Q.  Since  you  made  that  statement, 
and  given  the  statements  made  by 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko,  do  you 
sense,  in  what  the  Soviets  have  been 
saying,  any  indication  of  a  Soviet 
response  to  the  diplomatic  side  of  your 
two-signal  approach? 

A.  You  can  take  a  statement 
like  the  full  text  which  I  read  of 
Mr.  Gromyko's  speech  a  few  days  ago 
and,  for  the  most  part,  it  is,  I  would  say, 
a  very  tough  and  categorical  kind  of 
speech  and  set  of  statements.  However, 
it  is  interlarded  with  comments  about 
the  desire  for — his  term  was,  at  least,  as 
translated — smoother  relations,  and  so 
you  find  that  intermixture. 

It's  fair  to  say  that  this  combination 
of  strength  and  diplomacy  has  been 
present  in  statements  made  by  a  variety 
of  people,  including  General 
Secretary  —  or  now  President — An- 
dropov and  President  Reagan.  The  ques 
tion  is,  will  there  be  a  development  in 
terms  of  substance';' 

There   arc  a  wide  variety  of  places  in 
which  discussions  are  going  on  between 
ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Union  and  our 
allies  in  the  Soviet  I'nion.  There  are 
many  fora  where  substantive  issues  can 
in   explored.  And  in  those  fora,  we  are 


prepared  with  reasonable  positions  and  a 

spirit  of  give-and-take.  So  we'll  see 
whether  or  not  we  have  a  kind  of 
response  that  can  allow  the  diplomatic 
side  of  this  to  develop. 

Q.  Have  you  decided  yet  whether 
or  not  the  United  States  will  engage 
in  a  direct  dialogue  with  representa- 
tives of  the  left  in  El  Salvador,  and 
whether  that  dialogue  will  be  con- 
ducted with  Ambassador  Stone 
[Richard  B.  Stone,  special  represent- 
ative of  the  President  to  Central 
America)  here,  there,  under  what  con- 
ditions? 

A.  The  basic  dialogue  that  has  been 
put  forward  has  been  put  forward  bj 
the  Peace  Commission  in  El  Salvador, 
which  has  stated  its  willingness  to 
discuss  with  the  left  conditions  under 
which  they  might  enter  the  electoral 
process.  That  is  the  right  body  to  con 
duct  those  discussions,  and  the  right 
way  for  it  to  go.  If  we  can  facilitate 
that,  and  I  think  if  that  is  to  happen,  it 
would  undoubtedly  be  through  Am- 
bassador Stone's  efforts.  If  we  can 
facilitate  that,  we're  glad  to  do  so  but, 
fundamentally,  I  think  the  responsibility 
rests  with  the  people  of  El  Salvador, 
and  they  have  designated  the  Peace 
Commission  as  the  body  to  engage  in 
that  discussion. 

Q.  There  seems  to  be  some  confu- 
sion about  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
under  which  the  MX  missile  might  be 
abandoned.  Is  this  meant  as  a  serious 
negotiating  offer,  or  is  it  meant  to 
simply  convey  the  idea  that  it  would 
be  very,  verv  difficult  to  talk  us  out  of 
the  MX? 

A.  This  blowup  today  about  that 
subject  is  puzzling  because  I  don't  think 
that  there's  anything  particularly  new  to 
be  said  on  the  subject.  Let  me  just 
review  where  we  are.  The  first  point  to 
remember  is  that  the  Peacekeeper,  or 
MX,  as  it  is  deployed,  will  be  a  very  im- 
portant modernization  of  the  land-based 
leg  of  our  triad  deterrent  force.  That's 
the  fundamental  reason  why  the  Presi- 
dent is  recommending  it,  the  Scowcroft 
commission  recommended  it,  and  why 
it's  being  funded  and  put  there. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  in  the 
process  of  a  wide-ranging  discussion 
with  the  Soviet  Union  aiming  at  reduc- 
tions in  strategic  arms.  That's  including 
the  whole  variety  of  arms  that  fall  under 
that  category.  So  all  of  these  things  are 
under  discussion.  Hut  I  don't  think  there 
is  anything  particular  to  recommend, 
picking  out  a  particular  element  in  that 
bargaining  and  trying  to  place  it  against 


some  other  element  in  that  hargainir 
If  we  are  able  to  reach  a  result,  l  hi 
hope  very  much  that  we  are,  then 
lie  a  package  of  things  that  will  be 
worked  out  between  the  parties,  and 
that'-  always  the  way  it  is  in  any  cor 
plicated  bargain,  not  an  equation  of, 
one  thing. 

Q.  On  that  point  a  number  of  p 
pie  in  Congress  have  said  that  the} 
believe  the  MX  was  essentially  put 
forth  as  a  bargaining  chip.  But 
General  Scowcroft,  himself,  has  sa 
that  is  not  the  case,  that  there  are 
conditions  under  which  it  would  m 
be  deployed.  Was  it  meant  to  be  a 
bargaining  chip? 

A.  I've  just  answered  that  quest 
but  I'll  trj   it  again.  The  reason  for  tl 
proposed  deployment  and  eventually  I 
deployment  of  the  MX  or  PeacekeepJ 
missile  is  that  it  constitutes  a  key  in  J 
dieiit  in  the  land-based  leg  of  the  tritl 
of  deterrent  forces.  That  is  the  basic  ; 
sum  ami  substance  of  it.  We  are  en-  I 
gaged  in  a  bargaining  process,  at 
bargaining  process  is  about  strategic 
forces.  The  MX,  or  Peacekeeper,  is  (I 
of  those  strategic  forces,  so  it's 
something  that  has  to  be  taken  accot| 
of  in  those  discussions.  It's  basically 
simple  as  that. 

Q.  If  I  can  come  back  to  the 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Co 
you  give  us  some  of  the  flavor  of  tl 
talks?  What  I  mean  is  aside  from  t 
arms  control  forums,  which  we  all 
know  about.  Now,  you've  been,  I 
gather,  talking  to  [Soviet]  Ambass; 
Dobrynin,  and  presumably  [U.S.]  A 
bassador  Hartman  had  some  talks 
Moscow.  Are  these  more  in  the  wa> 
each  side  reading  its  own  brief,  or 
there  actually  any  proposals  put  on 
table,  or  is  it  a  kind  of  a  sterile 
discussion?  We  don't  get  any  sense 
any  give  and  take  here. 

A.  1  can't  point  to  results  that  st 
that  somehow  we're  making  genuine 
progress  from  the  variety  of  talks  we 
involved  in,  and  by  and  large  you  kno 
them  well.  There  are  the  INF  [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  forces]  talks  ir 
Geneva;  there  are  the  START  |strate 
arms  reduction  talks)  talks  in  Geneva 
there  are  the  chemical  warfare  talks 
Geneva;  there  are  the  MBFR  [mutual 
and  balanced  force  reductions]  talks  i 
Vienna;  there  are  Max  Kampelman'si 
cussioiis  in  Madrid;  there  are  the  am- 
bassadorial discussions  that  you  men- 
tioned; there  are  a  wide  variety  of  int 
national  agencies  in  which  both  coun- 
tries are  represented  and  which  our 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


THE  SECRETARY 


preservatives  sometimes  get  together 
the  venue  of  those  talks.  So  there  are 
.vide  variety  of  things,  and  there  are 
me  areas  where  there  has  been  some 
Ogress  made. 

Of  course,  we  have  positions  that  we 
press,  and  they  do,  too.  At  the  same 
le  there  are  occasions — and  I've  been 
olved  in  some  myself — in  which  there 
a  kind  of  a  personal  give-and-take  to 
But  barring  substantive  results  that 

can  point  to  that  are  significant.  I 
n't  think  that  you  can  say  the  process 
leading  us  somewhere.  In  other 
rds,  I  say  you  really  have  to  judge  it 
results.  There's  a  lot  of  input;  there's 
ot  of  activity,  but  we  have  to  keep 
king  at  the  substance  and  asking 
^selves  in  those  terms  whether  or  not 

re  getting  anywhere,  and  so  far  we 

n't.  But  we  will  keep  at  it,  and  I  hope 
it  we  will  get  somewhere. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  value  in  a 
eting  with  Foreign  Minister 
omyko  to  try  to  get  to  some  of  these 
ues  at  a  higher  level  in  advance  of 
en  you'd  see  him  normally  at  the 
ited  Nations? 

A.  If  it  turns  out,  if  there  is  a  judg- 
nt  that  it  is  desirable  to  do  that  — 
en  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  and  I 
ne  to  the  end  of  our  meeting  in  New 
•k,  we  agreed  that  if  it  appeared  to 
lesirable  to  us,  we  would  arrange  a 
gting.  So  far  it  hasn't  seemed  worth- 
,le,  but  that  doesn't  mean  that  it 
ildn't  be  arranged.  But  as  of  now, 
re  is  no  plan  for  such  a  meeting. 
:re's  nothing  to  bar  it,  however,  and 

possibility  of  it  is  always  present,  of 
rse. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  that  a  meeting  will 
ttnight  take  place  in  Damascus  be- 
;en  you  and  President  Assad  at  the 
1 1  of  your  upcoming  trip  to  the 
ion  since  you  said  that  you  are  in 
tact  with  the  Syrians  and  consulta- 
ns  with  [inaudible]? 

A.  We're  in  contact  in  the  sense 
t  we  have  exchanged  cables.  Our  Am- 
sador  has  met  with  them.  They  have 
\  they  are  ready  for  and  want  to  see 
dialogue  with  us.  We  feel  the  same 
/  about  it,  and  we  hope  that  such  will 
arranged.  But  I  don't  have  any  plan 
any  schedule  to  stop  in  the  Middle 
it  on  my  way  back  from  Pakistan. 

Q.  In  your  talks  and  discussions 
h  the  Saudi  Arabians  and  their  in- 
cession,  have  you  felt  that  the 
ians  perhaps  would  be  more  ame- 
nde to  a  withdrawal  from  Lebanon 
Iv  since  the  Saudis  may  be  involved 
H;ome  of  those  talks? 


Also  you  mentioned  that  Am- 
bassador Habib  will  be  going  out  to 
the  region.  Is  he  welcome  in 
Damascus?  Will  he  be  stopping  over  in 
Damascus? 

A.  First,  we  observe  a  very  con- 
structive effort  on  the  part  of  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  what  precisely  will  come  out 
of  that  remains  to  be  seen.  Other  coun- 
tries also  have  expressed  themselves  and 
are  being  helpful.  Beyond  that,  I  don't 
have  any  comment  to  make  on  the  Saudi 
effort.  As  far  as  Ambassador  Habib  in 
Damascus  is  concerned,  they  have  stated 
that  they  don't  want  to  receive  him 
there,  so  he  won't  go,  and  we  will  find 
other  people  who  we  hope  will  be  accept- 
able to  them  and  be  able  to  carry  on  a 
discussion  with  them. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  take  you  back 
to  the  Honduran-Nicaraguan  border 
where  some  of  our  colleagues  were 
killed  yesterday.  That  area  has  been 
heating  up  in  recent  months  with 
military  action  around  that  border. 
Recently,  General  Alverez,  who  is  the 
head  of  the  Honduran  military,  was  in 
Washington,  and  he  said  he  would  like 
assurance  from  the  United  States  that 
if  there  were  a  major  attack  by 
Nicaragua  into  Honduras,  the  United 
States  would  come  to  the  aid  of  Hon- 
duras. Can  you  tell  us  what  the  U.S. 
attitude  is  about  that,  and  how  likely 
do  you  think  such  a  thing  might  be? 

A.  We  consider  the  situation  in  Cen- 
tral America  to  be  of  great  importance 
to  the  people  there  and  to  ourselves. 
And  because  of  that,  we  are  extending 
great  efforts  there.  The  very  large-scale 
shipment  of  arms  into  Nicaragua  from 
the  Soviet  Union,  sometimes  directly 
ami  through  Cuba,  is  not  appreciated  by 
us.  It's  a  very  unfriendly  thing  to  do.  So 
we  would  take  a  major  outbreak  of  war 
there  very  seriously.  Beyond  that,  I 
don't  want  to  make  a  comment, 

Q.  Do  you  have  the  impression  yet 
that  the  Soviets  want  to  negotiate  a 
way  to  get  their  troops  out  of  Afghan- 
istan? And  what  would  you  hope  to  ac- 
complish on  that  front  and  on  the 
Cambodian  problem  during  your  trip? 

A.  The  United  Nations  has  been 
conducting,  for  some  time  now,  negotia- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  Af- 
ghanistan matter.  Just  how  much  prog- 
ress they've  made  is  a  little  difficult  to 
interpret.  The  Pakistanis  have  been  in- 
volved and,  of  course,  have  been  taking 
a  part  there.  I've  had  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  that  with  Foreign  Minister 
Yaqub  Kahn,  and  I  look  forward  to  talk- 
ing with  him  again.  But  I  don't  really 


have  anything  to  point  to  that  says  that 
genuine  progress  has  been  made.  There 
is  a  large  contingent — over  100,000,  we 
understand — of  Soviet  troops  in 
Afghanistan. 

For  there  to  be  a  genuine  resolution 
of  that  problem,  which  we  very  much 
favor,  it  would  have  to  include  the 
removal  of  those  troops;  it  would  have 
to  include  the  emergence  of  a  non- 
aligned  Government  of  Afghanistan;  it 
would  have  to  provide  for  the  creation 
of  a  government  that  is  responsive  to 
the  people  of  Afghanistan;  and,  in  some 
way,  the  refugees  would  have  to  come 
back  with  honor  and  without  prejudice. 
Those  are  the  things,  I  think,  that  are 
pretty  well  agreed  that  we  need  to  work 
for.  There  is  a  lot  of  effort  going  on,  but 
it's  hard  to  identify  progress. 

So  far  as  Kampuchea  is  concerned, 
we  have  been  supporting  the  efforts  of 
the  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  countries.  I  will  be  very 
interested  to  be  talking  with  them  in  a 
few  days  in  Bangkok.  Again  I  think 
what  we  would  like  to  see — the  ASEAN 
countries  would  like  to  see,  the  Chinese 
would  like  to  see — is  the  removal  of  the 
Vietnam  forces,  Soviet  proxy  forces 
from  Kampuchea,  and  a  chance  for  that 
country  to  revive  'tself. 

There  are  al<  .of  interim  things  be- 
ing talked  about.  Of  course,  the  Thais 
are  very  close  to  that  situation,  so  their 
views  have  to  get  some  special  weight. 
That  is,  again,  something  that  I'll  be 
discussing. 

Q.  Also,  on  that  general  region, 
does  your  trip  to  Asia  signal  an  in- 
creased American  commitment  to  the 
Pacific  and  Asian  region,  both  in 
terms  of  defense  and  trade? 

A.  It  is  a  fact  that  our  trade  with 
the  nations  of  Asia  has  been  increasing 
rapidly  over  quite  a  period  of  time.  And 
if  you  look  at  the  patterns  of  economic 
development,  population,  and  so  forth,  I 
don't  see  how  you  can  expect  anything 
else  but  a  continuation  of  that  trend  into 
the  future.  So  it's  a  very  important  area 
for  us  from  the  standpoint  of  economics, 
and,  of  course,  it  has  great  strategic  and 
security  importance  as  well.  So  when  we 
say  we  should  be  global  in  our  outlook,  it 
certainly  means  that  we  should  be  pay- 
ing attention  to  developments  in  Asia, 
and  I  have  been  very  conscious  of  that 
personally,  both  before  being  in  this  job 
and  since  being  in  the  job. 


■gust  1983 


AFRICA 


Q.  What  do  you  make  of  the  cur- 
rent struggle  within  the  PLO?  How  do 
you  interpret  the  Syrian  involvement 
in  that?  And  if  Yassir  Arafat  was  to 
be  overthrown,  would  that  necessarily 
be  a  bad  thing? 

A.  We  don't  have  a  lot  of  contacts 
with  the  PLO,  so  our  intelligence  is  all 
secondhand  and  thirdhand.  I  shouldn't 
say  we  don't  have  a  lot:  We  don't  have 
any  direct  contacts  with  the  PLO.  That 
always  leaves  you  a  little  less  well  in- 
formed than  you  might  otherwise  be. 

But  there  is,  clearly,  a  struggle  go- 
ing on,  and  it  has  probably  some 
elements  of  policy.  There  may  be  some 
elements  of  the  results  of  indecisiveness 
involved  and  control  over  funds  and 
bureaucracy — I  don't  know.  The  basic 
issue  is  how  can  it  be  brought  about  that 
more  attention  is  paid  to  the  problems 
of  the  human  beings  called  Palestinians 
who  live  there,  whose  lot  is  a  poor  one, 
and  whose  prospects,  not  just  taking  it 
from  year  to  year  but  almost  from 
generation  to  generation,  are  not  that 
great. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  do  have  to 
pay  attention — not  just  us  but  the  PLO 
and  everybody — to  the  legitimate  rights 
and  aspirations  of  these  human  beings, 
and  see  if  we  can't  do  better  by  them.  It 
must  be  so  that  one  of  the  reasons  why 
there  has  been  such  difficulty  with  con- 
flict in  the  Middle  East  is  the  fact  that 
we,  as  an  international  group  of  coun- 
tries, have  not  been  able  to  come  to 
"grips"  satisfactorily  with  the  human 
condition  of  the  Palestinian  people,  and 
we  really  have  to  bear  down  on  it.  It's  a 
very  difficult  problem,  I  know.  That's 
the  reason  it  hasn't  been  solved.  But,  I 
think,  that  is  the  heart  of  the  matter 
more  than  internal  PLO  politics. 

Q.  But  would  Arafat's  coming  or 
going  bode  ill  or  well  for  your 
ultimate  objectives,  do  you  think? 

A.  It's  a  question  of  the  degree  of 
unity  in  the  PLO  and  the  extent  to 
which  there  are  factions  and  what  orien- 
tation the  PLO  might  have,  and  whether 
or  not,  in  the  end,  whatever  happens 
might  make  it  more  possible  for  King 
Hussein  to  have  a  non-PLO,  legitimate 
Palestinian  delegation  that  was  endorsed 
with  him  in  entering  the  peace  process. 
That's  what  we  have  been  trying  to 
achieve. 

The  extent  to  which  Syria  comes  to 
dominate  the  organization,  which  may 
be  happening — you  read  that  a 
lot — makes  it  questionable,  whether  or 
not  these  developments  would  ease  that 


problem.  So  we  have  to  look  elsewhere 
for  our  method;  or,  perhaps,  in  our 
discussions  with  the  Syrians,  we  might 
find  some  answers. 

Q.  Do  you  know  of  any  material  of 
American  origin  or  American  license 
being  used  by  one  side  or  the  other  in 
the  war  between  Iraq  and  Iran?  And  if 
that  were  to  happen,  what  would  be 
your  attitude  toward  it? 

A.  We  have  had  an  attitude  of 
neutrality  in  that  war,  and  we  haven't 
made  sales  directly  ourselves.  We  have 


also  prevented  sales  of  American- 
licensed  or  American  parts  flowing 
through  in  somebody  else's  equipmer 
In  saying  that,  I  don't  say  that    ' 
nothing  could  possibly  have  slipped 
through  our  efforts — maybe  you  havg 
example  in  mind  or  something.  But  Ut 
has  been  our  policy,  and  we  have  trie 
to  follow  through  on  it  with  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  argument  with  si 
of  the  countries  that  have  wanted  to  h 
make  those  sales. 


'Press  release  221. 1 


Southern  Africa: 
America's  Responsibility  for 
Peace  and  Change 


by  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

Address  before  the  National  Con- 
ference of  Editorial  Writers  in  San 
Francisco  on  June  23,  1983.  Ambassador 
Eagleburger  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs. 

I  am  grateful  for  this  opportunity  to 
speak  to  you  who  are  so  involved  in 
helping  to  shape  this  nation's  considera- 
tion of  critical  choices.  I  have  come  to 
speak  to  an  issue  that  has  occupied  an 
important  place  on  this  Administration's 
agenda— an  issue  of  common  interest  to 
the  Western  world,  an  issue  central  to 
international  stability. 

From  this  podium,  spokesmen  from 
the  several  administrations  of  recent 
times  have  addressed  the  responsibilities 
which  the  United  States  bears  for  the 
great  crisis  areas  of  the  globe— Europe, 
the  Middle  East,  Asia,  Latin  America. 
Tonight  I  invite  you  to  join  me  in  con- 
sidering what  is  at  stake  in  southern 
Africa  and  what  role  we  can  play  in 
shaping  that  region's  future.  My 
message  is  not  an  easy  one.  It  is  a 
message  of  responsibility — responsibility 
for  the  use  of  American  influence  and 
power  in  dealing  with  a  question  of 
substantial  and  growing  national  in- 
terest. 

I  do  not  have  to  tell  this  audience 
that  there  is  a  crisis  in  southern  Africa. 
Nearly  a  decade  ago,  as  we  stood 
mesmerized  by  our  engagement  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  by  escalating  war- 
fare in  the  Middle  East,  Portugal's  em- 


pire in  Africa  collapsed.  In  its  wake,  1 
southern  Africa's  conflicts,  rooted  asl 
they  were  in  longstanding  struggles  I 
decolonization  and  racial  equality, 
became  world  issues— issues  that  wo  \ 
engage  our  national  interests  and  tea 
our  resolve.  Angola  became  an  area  I 
intense  civil  strife  and  contest  betwe  I 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  West;  the  A 
for  Zimbabwe's  independence  intensi  I 
Mozambique  was  caught  up  in  regior 
conflict;  and  the  struggle  for  change 
South  Africa  assumed  more  violent  e 
polarized  forms.  Wars  which  had  bee 
more  or  less  contained  within  nation, 
boundaries  spread  across  frontiers,  e 
the  cycle  of  violence  which  has  come 
plague  the  region  took  root. 

In  retrospect,  Western  indifferer 
to  change  in  southern  Africa  played 
part  in  creating  this  situation.  As  a  r 
tion  we  were  not  well  equipped  to  de 
with  the  region.  Our  involvement  hac 
been  superficial;  we  knew  little  of  its 
actors  or  its  dynamics.  Our  body  poli 
was  polarized.  The  left  was  transfixe 
by  the  issue  of  racism,  while  the  righ 
was  too  often  prepared  to  interpret 
events  only  in  the  light  of  the  East-W 
competition.  In  spite  of  these  domest 
divisions,  three  administrations  have 
tempted  to  catch  up  with  fast-moving 
events,  define  our  national  interests, 
decide  how  to  use  our  influence. 

The  divisions  of  the  past,  I  regret 
say,  still  linger.  There  are  those  who 
would  assure  our  irrelevance.  As  we 
meet  here  tonight,  voices  in  our  Cong 
ress,  media,  and  public  call  for  punitp 
measures  against  governments  which 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


AFRICA 


jt  please  us— banning  bank  loans  to 
outh  Africa  or  Krugerrand  imports 
•om  South  Africa,  denying  access  to  the 
abilization  programs  of  the  Interna- 
onal  Monetary  Fund  or  escalating 
*tty  trade  control,  banning  food  aid  to 
ozambique  or  development  assistance 
i  Zimbabwe.  Others  repeat  the  slogans 
'  liberation,  while  denying  us  the  ability 
i  add  an  ounce  of  political  will  or 
iplomatic  investment  to  solving  the 
igion's  problems.  At  a  time  when  we 
eed  all  the  leverage  available  to  us, 
ime  argue  for  disinvestment  and 
wipe.  They  confuse  the  making  of 
atements  with  the  ability  to  influence 
rents. 

There  are  those  outside  Africa 
| hose  motives  are  more  cynical.  They 
|-e  the  advocates  of  violence,  who  would 
irn  the  landscape  of  southern  African 
to  an  enlarged  version  of  Lebanon 
ith  the  sovereignty,  independence,  and 
tonomic  viability  of  the  states  in  the 
;gion  subordinated  to  a  battle  between 
I  juth  Africa  and  its  neighbors.  These 
•rces  would  welcome  such  an  outcome, 
nee  it  would  present  new  opportunities 
r  neocolonial  exploitation.  They  are 
ore  than  willing  to  shed  African  blood 
ad  to  supply  copious  quantities  of 
eapons,  even  though  they  know 
olence  cannot  create  anything  of  value 
southern  Africa.  Violence,  for  these 
itsiders,  is  not  a  means  to  achieve  na- 
mal  self-determination  or  to  end  apar- 
eid.  Rather,  it  is  an  end  in  itself,  a 
Ktical  vehicle  to  enhance  external  in- 
oence  and  permit  the  political  and 
eological  subjugation  of  independent 
frica.  The  United  States,  on  the  other 
.nd,  proceeds  from  the  conviction  that 
tr  national  interest  and  the  interests  of 
e  West  demand  an  engagement — con- 
nective and  peaceful— in  the  affairs  of 
uthern  Africa.  The  United  States  is,  I 
lieve,  uniquely  situated  to  speak  to  all 
les  in  the  conflict. 

The  region  has  enormous  poten- 
ll — positive  and  negative.  Historically, 
is  a  zone  of  Western  influence  and  has 
ten  so  for  300  years.  But  direct 
estern  control  has  ended.  Decoloniza- 
>n,  peaceful  and  violent,  left  a  legacy 
weak  institutions,  conflicting  na- 
malisms,  fear,  and  loss  of  confidence 
any  reliable  hand. 

The  implications  are  clear.  If  we 
ish  to  shape  events,  we  must  be 
■epared  to  take  initiatives,  make  in- 
istments,  support  those  things  we 
ilieve  in,  build  institutions  and  bridges. 
'e  must,  in  short,  be  involved.  And  we 
ust,  as  well,  be  prepared  to  opppose 
ose  from  outside  Africa  who  claim  a 
edit  to  violent  intervention. 


To  succeed  in  southern  Africa,  we 
must  define  a  coherent  regional 
strategy.  Apart  from  Namibia,  we  are 
talking  about  a  community  of  sovereign 
states.  Southern  Africa  is  interdepend- 
ent economically  in  its  infrastructure,  its 
populations,  markets,  its  natural  links 
and,  to  an  important  degree,  in  its  ex- 
ternal orientation.  The  region,  unfor- 
tunately, suffers  from  a  current  and 
aggravated  temptation  to  depend  upon 
the  instruments  of  violence. 

One  way  or  another  the  states  of 
southern  Africa  have  to  evolve  explicit 
or  tacit  ground  rules  for  cooperation  and 
coexistence,  for  the  alternatives  are  all 
too  obvious.  Both  South  Africa  and  the 
independent  African  states  to  its  north 
have  enunciated  at  different  times  a  vi- 
sion of  coexistence.  Regional  coex- 
istence, the  only  path  to  peace  and 
stability,  has  an  additional  meaning. 
Unless  there  is  peace  and  stability  in 
southern  Africa,  it  will  prove  impossible 
to  encourage  essential  change  in  South 
Africa — and  by  change  I  mean  a  basic 
shift  away  from  apartheid. 

At  present,  the  issue  of  Namibia, 
and  South  Africa's  continuing  control 
there,  the  presence  of  Cuban  forces  in 
Angola,  and  the  practice  of  harboring 
guerrillas  and  dissident  movements  to 
strike  at  targets  across  borders,  pose 
severe  challenges  to  regional  security 
and  Western  diplomacy.  As  a  region 
southern  Africa  contains  parallels  to  the 
tragedies  of  the  Middle  East.  A  cycle  of 


undermined,  distorted,  and  perhaps 
destroyed.  No  amount  of  Western  or  in- 
ternational support  and  solidarity  with 
these  states  will  be  productive  if  the 
politics  of  development  and  coexistence 
continue  to  be  subordinated  to  the 
politics  of  survival  and  war. 

It  is  for  all  these  reasons  that  this 
Administration  has  committed  its 
prestige  and  energy  to  defining  a 
regional  strategy  and  using  our  in- 
fluence to  shape  events.  The  under- 
taking has  several  aspects  which,  taken 
together,  are  directed  at  encouraging 
enhanced  regional  security,  economic 
development,  and  peaceful  change. 

Namibia 

The  quest  for  Namibia's  independence 
remains  for  this  Administration,  as  it 
was  for  our  predecessors,  a  key  object 
of  American  diplomacy.  The  unresolved 
status  of  Namibia  creates  a  dangerous 
vacuum  in  the  area  and  serves  as  a 
magnet  for  violence  and  external  med- 
dling. Namibia  remains  Africa's  last 
colony  and  a  focal  point  of  the 
continent's  and  the  nonaligned  world's 
attention.  Its  people  suffer  from  war 
and  outside  domination.  The  United 
States  long  ago  accepted  responsibility 
for  helping  to  secure  Namibia's  in- 
dependence. We  have,  since  then,  made 
a  considerable  contribution  toward 
achieving  that  goal.  Under  President 


The  position  of  the  United  States  is  clear.  The 
President  is  committed  to  Namibia's  independence. 
He  wants  to  assist  in  creating  a  peaceful  and  in- 
dependent Angola  in  a  peaceful  and  prosperous 
region.  He  is  prepared  to  use  his  full  influence  to 
achieve  these  ends. 


violence  has  begun:  unless  it  is  reversed, 
the  interests  of  the  region  and  the  West 
will  be  severely  damaged.  If  southern 
Africa  is  at  war,  the  consequences  for 
South  Africa  will  be  clear:  increased 
spending  on  war;  reduced  political  will 
for  addressing  the  domestic  agenda  of 
negotiated,  evolutionary  change;  and  a 
heightened  polarization  of  attitudes  that 
can  only  distort  the  internal  South 
African  debate  about  the  means  and 
forms  of  change.  Similarly,  if  the  region 
is  at  war,  the  economies  and  institutions 
of  the  neighboring  African  states  will  be 


Ford  we  defined  the  first  procedure  for 
a  peaceful  move  to  independence.  Under 
the  Carter  Administration,  we  joined 
with  our  allies — France,  Canada,  Great 
Britain,  and  Germany— in  negotiating 
UN  Security  Council  Resolution  435,  a 
document  of  seminal  importance  which 
defines  how  transition  to  independence 
under  UN  authority  will  occur. 

During  the  Reagan  Administration 
we  have  faced  squarely  the  need  to 
secure  conditions  which  will  make  it 


jgust 1983 


AFRICA 


politically  possible  for  South  Africa  to 
relinquish  its  position  in  a  territory  it 
has  controlled  since  1916. 

We  inherited  a  stalemated  negotiat- 
ing process.  Since  that  time  we  and  our 
allies,  working  through  what  we  call  the 
contact  group,  have  elaborated  constitu- 
tional principles  to  guide  the  framers  of 
the  constitution  for  an  independent 
Namibia.  We  have  successfully  resolved 
a  series  of  troublesome  issues  related  to 
the  role  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
fruits  of  this  intensive  diplomacy  are  im- 
pressive. Through  sustained  and  coor- 
dinated effort  with  our  allies,  the  front- 
line states  and  SWAPO  [South  West 
Africa  People's  Organization],  the  South 
Africans,  the  internal  Namibian  parties, 
and  the  UN  Secretary  General  and  his 
officials,  we  have  virtually  all  elements 
in  place  for  the  implementation  of 
Resolution  435. 

There  is,  admittedly,  some  frustra- 
tion over  the  time  it  has  taken  to  move 
as  far  as  we  have.  But  these  are  com- 
plex and  delicate  questions  which  have 
required  months  of  quiet  negotiation. 
There  is  today  virtually  unanimous 
agreement  on  the  basis  for  resolving  this 
intricate  and  important  problem.  We  are 
at  the  point  where  the  transition  to  in- 
dependence can  begin  as  soon  as  the  key 
parties  are  prepared  to  take  the  neces- 
sary political  decisions. 

Angola 

With  the  Government  of  Angola  we 
have  undertaken  a  separate  but  parallel 
negotiation  which,  if  successful,  will  pro- 
vide for  the  departure  of  Cuban  forces, 
thus  opening  the  way  to  a  South  African 
decision  to  implement  the  international 
agreements  so  painstakingly  developed 
on  Namibia's  transition  to  independence 
while  setting  the  stage  for  peace  in 
Angola  itself.  In  IV2  years  of  talks,  we 
have  sought  to  build  confidence  in  our 
objectives  and  to  establish  a  principle  of 
broad  applicability  to  the  region  at  large. 

That  principle  is  reciprocity.  Prog- 
ress in  the  area  can  be  achieved  only  if 
all  parties  make  a  contribution  and  only 
if  the  security  and  sovereignty  of  each 
are  respected.  South  Africa  must  leave 
Angola's  southern  provinces,  and  it  must 
leave  Namibia.  Angola,  on  the  other 
hand,  can  make  such  steps  possible, 
while  remaining  true  to  its  principles,  by 
assuring  as  a  separate  sovereign  act  the 
withdrawal  of  Cuban  combat  forces 
from  its  territory. 

The  position  of  the  United  States  is 
clear.  The  President  is  committed  to 
Namibia's  independence.  He  wants  to 


assist  in  creating  a  peaceful  and  in- 
dependent Angola  in  a  peaceful  and 
prosperous  region.  He  is  prepared  to  use 
his  full  influence  to  achieve  these  ends. 

A  Framework  for  Regional  Security 

The  quest  for  peace  in  southern  Africa 
does  not  stop  with  Namibia  and  Angola. 
Our  diplomacy  has  consciously  sought 
broader  regional  security.  We  have 
moved  to  rebuild  our  relations  with 
strife-torn  Mozambique.  We  have 
responded  to  Mozambique's  difficult 
economic  circumstances  with  food  aid 


Our  policy  of  con- 
structive engagement  re- 
jects simplistic  stereo- 
types based  on  race  and 
ideology  as  inadequate 
guidelines  for  U.S. 
policy. 


and  will  shortly  send  an  ambassador 
there.  We  have  pressed  for  dialogue  be- 
tween South  Africa  and  Mozambique 
and  an  end  to  cross-border  violence.  Our 
efforts  have  been  rewarded  with  two 
rounds  of  talks  at  ministerial  level  be- 
tween the  governments  and  a  commit- 
ment to  a  continued  search  for  under- 
standing despite  the  pressures  of  recurr- 
ing violence.  The  dialogue  is  fragile,  but 
we  will  continue  to  do  what  we  can  to 
foster  it. 

Similarly,  between  South  Africa  and 
Zimbabwe  and  South  Africa  and  Lesotho 
we  have  quietly  urged  patience,  re- 
straint, and  dialogue.  Here  again  our  ef- 
forts have  achieved  a  measure  of  suc- 
cess. But,  I  repeat,  the  framework  is 
new:  It  is  vulnerable,  and  only  through 
good  will  and  reciprocal  undertakings 
will  it  survive. 

This  concept  of  regional  security  in 
southern  Africa  rests  on  several  key 
premises. 

First,  we  are  talking  about 
sovereignty.  Apart  from  Namibia,  the 
region  consists  of  sovereign  states  which 
recognize  the  rights  and  obligations  of 
that  statehood.  Respect  for  international 
boundaries  and  renunciation  of  the  use 
of  violence  across  them  are  central  to 
any  framework  for  international  securi- 


ty.  There  can  be  no  double  standards  n 
either  South  Africa  or  its  neighbors.  Te 
obligations  of  statehood,  in  southern  || 
Africa  as  elsewhere,  are  basic  and 
reciprocal. 

Second,  the  United  States  cate- 
gorically reaffirms  the  principle  that 
states  have  a  duty  to  refrain  from 
tolerating  or  acquiescing  in  organized 
activities  within  their  territory  by  gue  I 
rillas  or  dissidents  planning  acts  of 
violence  in  the  territory  of  another 
state.  This  applies  equally  to  South 
Africa  and  its  neighbors. 

Third,  regional  security  cannot  re: 
solely  on  the  activity,  the  vision,  or  thJ 
influence  of  outsiders.  Our  task  is  not 
impose  a  structure  of  security.  The 
structure  must  rest  on  regional  realitii] 
mutual  interests,  and  direct  channels  ( 
communication.  Our  role  is  to  foster  a 
climate  conducive  to  building  it.  We 
have  made  a  beginning  by  stressing  01 
readiness  to  work  for  reduced  violencel 
to  facilitate  contact  and  communicatio  I 
to  build  bridges,  and  to  serve  as  hones1 
broker.  To  be  effective,  our  stance  mm 
rest  on  a  capacity  to  speak  credibly  to 
all  states.  We  are  uniquely  qualified  to 
play  this  role,  and  we  intend  to  play  it 
But  it  is  up  to  the  governments  directl 
concerned — in  South  Africa,  Mozambi- 
que, Zimbabwe,  Lesotho,  Botswana, 
Zambia,  and  others — to  make  the  basi< 
choice  between  the  temptations  of 
violence  and  the  challenge  of  coex- 
istence. 

Fourth,  we  recognize  that  it  is  no' 
realistic  to  speak  of  regional  security 
without  reference  to  the  domestic 
political  dimension  of  coexistence  be- 
tween states.  The  dilemma  we  face  is 
that  peaceful  domestic  change  in 
southern  Africa  and  regional  security 
are  both  urgently  needed  if  the  risks  c 
growing  international  strife  are  to  be 
avoided. 

In  South  Africa,  about  which  I  will' 
speak  further  in  a  moment,  the  im- 
perative of  peaceful  change  is  domesti< 
South  Africa  has  enjoyed  sovereign 
statehood  for  over  70  years.  Yet,  a 
structure  of  regional  stability  in 
southern  Africa  is  unlikely  to  take  root) 
in  the  absence  of  basic  movement  awa; 
from  a  system  of  legally  entrenched  ru 
by  the  white  minority  in  South  Africa. 
By  the  same  token,  peaceful  change 
toward  social  justice  and  equality  for  a 
South  Africans  is  unlikely  to  happen  in 
regional  climate  of  escalating  strife  an( 
polarization. 

In  Namibia,  we  and  our  contact 
group  allies  are  working  effectively  as 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


AFRICA 


natter  of  highest  priority  to  bring  about 
[egotiated  peaceful  change  to  interna- 
ionally  recognized  independence.  Sue- 
ess  would  directly  benefit  in  many  ways 
i.ur  goals  of  building  regional  security, 
ddressing  the  issues  of  cross-border 
iolence  and  foreign  intervention. 

he  Dimensions  of  U.S.  Regional 
nvolvement 

"here  are  those  who  see  in  southern 
Africa's  political  tensions  an  opportunity 
or  the  West  to  identify  the  good  guys 
nd  the  bad  guys  and  then  to  align  itself 
ccordingly.  Others  argue  that  the 
Jnited  States  cannot  maintain  construc- 
ive  ties  based  on  principle  and  mutual 
iterest  with  both  South  Africa  and  its 
drican-ruled  neighbors.  Our  policy  of 
onstructive  engagement  rejects  sim- 
listic  stereotypes  based  on  race  and 
leology  as  inadequate  guidelines  for 
I.S.  policy.  From  the  outset  of  this  Ad- 
linistration,  we  have  signaled  our  hope 
3r  constructive  relations  with  all 
overnments  in  southern  Africa.  No 
sgional  state  or  external  power  can  or 
hould  define  our  relations  for  us. 

Accordingly,  if  we  are  to  be  effective 
1  this  region,  we  must  maintain  a 
alanced  policy  that  is  relevant  to  its 
eeds  and  that  fully  reflects  its  diversity 
nd  divisions.  Politically,  we  seek  to 
olster  those  whose  development  policies 
nd  external  actions  warrant  that  sup- 
ort.  But  we  have  also  consciously  held 
ut  the  option  to  others  to  diversify 
neir  external  orientation  and  to  pursue 
oser  economic  ties  with  the  West.  Our 
^operative  diplomacy  on  Namibia  has 
rought  us  into  intensive  contact  with 
le  front-line  states,  a  grouping  that 
oans  a  wide  range  of  African  political 
loices— some  of  them  still  evolving. 
ice  President  Bush's  travel  last 
ovember  to  Zimbabwe,  Zambia,  and 
aire— and  return  visits  here  by  their 
•aders— enable  us  to  nurture  these  im- 
ortant  ties.  Our  substantial  commit- 
ment to  the  success  and  health  of  newly 
idependent  Zimbabwe  is  another 
imension  of  our  effort  to  help  this 
:rategically  important  region  find 
Lability  and  growth.  While  Zimbabwe 
aces  serious  difficulties,  its  leadership 
as  committed  itself  to  the  principles  of 
olitical  reconciliation  and  a  mixed 
conomy.  Because  of  its  key  geographic 
osition  and  relatively  strong  economic 
<ase,  it  is  important  that  Zimbabwe  not 
ail  as  a  new  nation. 

Economically,  some  25%  of  U.S. 
ilateral  assistance  to  sub-Saharan 
vfrica  goes  to  southern  African  states, 


six  of  which  are  landlocked.  Though  rich 
in  minerals  and  human  potential,  most 
states  of  the  area  share  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  degree  in  Africa's  current 
economic  crisis.  As  part  of  our  effort  to 
deal  with  the  region's  economic  crisis, 
we  are  working  to  support  Zambia's  ef- 
forts to  restructure  its  economy  and 
stimulate  its  promising  agricultural  sec- 
tor. The  recent  visit  of  President  Kaun- 
da  to  the  United  States  and  subsequent 
intensive  consultations  have  given  im- 
petus to  this  process. 

Southern  Africa's  current  drought — 
the  worst  in  decades — represents  a 
serious  challenge  to  economic  security 
and  human  well-being  in  the  region. 
After  careful  review  of  this  potential 
food  disaster,  we  have  recently  in- 
creased by  $25  million  our  PL-480  food 
aid  programs  for  affected  nations, 
beyond  the  $79  million  for  fiscal  years 
1983-84  already  programmed.  Over  the 
longer  term,  even  as  political  tensions 
threaten  to  divide  southern  Africa,  there 
are  potent  factors  of  geography,  history, 
and  economics  that  pull  these  states 
together.  Transport  links,  the  pattern  of 
interstate  boundaries,  and  the  natural 
flow  of  goods  and  people  all  point  in  the 
direction  of  regional  cooperation.  We 
are  supporting  the  regional  efforts  in 
transport  and  food  security  of  the 
Southern  African  Development  Coor- 


therefore,  we  must  reject  the  legal  and 
political  premises  and  consequences  of 
apartheid.  Indeed,  it  is  increasingly 
recognized  as  impossible  to  maintain  by 
a  growing  number  of  South  Africans  of 
all  races. 

We  reject  unequivocally  attempts  to 
denationalize  the  black  South  African 
majority  and  relegate  them  to  citizen- 
ship in  the  separate  tribal  homelands. 
We  do  not  and  will  not  recognize  these 
areas.  All  Americans  are  repelled  by  the 
sight  of  long-settled,  stable  black  com- 
munities being  uprooted  and  their  in- 
habitants forcibly  removed  to  barren 
sites  in  far  away  "homelands"  they  have 
never  seen  before.  Neither  can  we 
countenance  repression  of  organizations 
and  individuals  by  means  of  administra- 
tive measures  like  banning  and  detention 
without  due  process  of  law. 

By  one  means  or  another,  South 
Africa's  domestic  racial  system  will  be 
changed.  Black  South  Africans  will  gain 
fuller  participation  in  all  aspects  of 
South  African  society  and  politics.  Our 
policy  is  directed,  therefore,  not  at 
whether  a  nonracial  order  is  in  South 
Africa's  future  or  what  the  shape  of  that 
nonracial  order  will  be,  but  how  that 
nonracial  order  will  be  arrived  at. 
Western  policy  toward  South  Africa 
today  must  focus  on  how  various  black 
groups  acquire  the  basis  and  influence 


The  political  system  in  South  Africa  is  morally 
wrong.  We  stand  against  injustice,  and,  therefore, 
we  must  reject  the  legal  and  political  premises  and 
consequences  of  apartheid  ....  Our  policy  is 
directed,  therefore,  not  at  whether  a  nonracial 
order  is  in  South  Africa 's  future  or  what  the  shape 
of  that  nonracial  order  will  be,  but  how  that 
nonracial  order  will  be  arrived  at. 


dination  Conference,  while  also  quietly 
urging  South  Africa  and  its  neighbors  to 
maintain  pragmatic  trade  and  customs 
agreements  based  on  mutual  benefit. 

South  Africa 

It  is  essential  that  South  Africans  get  on 
with  the  business  of  deciding  and  shap- 
ing their  own  future.  The  political 
system  in  South  Africa  is  morally 
wrong.  We  stand  against  injustice,  and, 


necessary  to  participate  in  a  genuine 
bargaining  process  that  produces  change 
acceptable  to  all.  The  future  of  South 
Africa  depends  on  those  who  participate 
in  shaping  it.  A  peaceful  process  of 
change  depends  on  support  from  those 
who  reject,  as  we  do,  both  alignment 
with  the  current  racial  order  and 
violence  as  a  means  of  ending  it. 

We  believe  that  South  African  and 
U.S.  interests  are  best  served  by  en- 
couraging the  change  that  is  now  under 


ugust 1983 


11 


AFRICA 


way  in  South  Africa.  We  are  committed 
to  strengthening  the  capacity  of  black 
South  Africans  to  participate  in  their 
country's  society  as  equals— economical- 
ly, culturally,  and  politically.  It  is  our 
view  thai  such  "power  to  participate" 
can  only  be  made;  it  cannot  be  taken. 
This  is  not  and  cannot  be  a  zero-sum 
game  since  power  taken  by  force  or  a 
revolutionary  upheaval  will  likely  leave 
little  worth  fighting  over. 

American  efforts  should,  therefore, 
concentrate  on  positive  steps  which  back 
constructive  change  and  those  who  are 
working  for  it.  We  applaud  the  steps 
which  arc  being  taken  to  expand  home 
ownership  opportunities,  trade  union 
rights,\and  access  to  education.  The 
structure  and  substance  of  apartheid  are 
inevitably  affected  as  education  budgets 
grow  dramatically  and  blacks  find  new 
opportunities  and  new  influence  as 
workers  and  consumers.  The  recent 
South  African  court  decision  to  confirm 
urban  residency  rights  of  blacks  is  an 
important  development.  Equally,  the 
findings  of  the  de  Lange  Education 
Commission  underline  the  necessity  of  a 
sustained  expansion  of  opportunity  on  a 
basis  of  greater  equity.  The  commis- 
sion's findings  and  recommendations 
deserve  recognition  and  support. 

South  Africa  retains  an  independent 
judiciary  and  a  distinguished  bar— two 
institutions  which  tie  it  to  the  finest 
traditions  of  Western  democracy.  In- 
deed, the  rule  of  law  is  for  South  Africa, 
as  for  any  country,  a  precious  in- 
heritance. In  recent  years  the  power  of 
the  court  has  been  circumscribed  by  new 
acts  of  parliament  and  police  practices 
which  remove  from  the  courts  the  ability 
to  review  executive  action.  Nowhere  is 
this  more  apparent  than  in  the  system  of 
detention,  where  the  right  of  access  to 
those  in  the  hands  of  the  police  has  been 
limited.  Such  a  system  leads  to  abuse. 
There  are  few  things  Americans  should 
be  prouder  of  than  the  rule  of  law  in  our 
society.  Similarly,  we  admire  efforts  by 
South  Africans  to  retain  an  independent 
judiciary.  Those  who  work  to  rebuild  the 
rule  of  law  are  forging  anew  South 
Africa's  more  important  links  to 
Western  democracy.  We  wish  them  well. 

Our  policy— constructive  engage- 
ment—supports those  inside  and  outside 
government  in  South  Africa  who  are 
committed  to  peaceful  change  away 
from  apartheid.  Our  support  is  both 
tangible  and  political.  It  is  essential  that 
we  in  the  West,  who  have  the  most  to 
offer  toward  peaceful  change  and  much 
to  lose  if  it  fails,  send  an  unambiguous 
message  to  the  people  of  this  increasing- 
ly important  country.  The  message  is, 


first,  that  we  agree  with  those  South 
Africans  who  recognize  that  change  is 
imperative  and.  second,  that  we  are 
determined  to  permit  them  the  oppor- 
tunity to  shape  and  define  that  change 
free  of  the  threat  of  foreign  interven- 
tion. 

Constuctive  engagement  seeks  to 
support  trade  unionists,  students,  en- 
trepreneurs, government  leaders. 


It  is  essential  that 
we  in  the  West  who  have 
the  most  to  offer  toward 
peaceful  change  and 
much  to  lose  if  it  fails, 
send  an  unambiguous 
message  to  the  people  of 
this  increasingly  impor- 
tant country. 


cultural-political  movements,  civic- 
associations,  and  religious  organizations 
which,  through  their  commitment  to 
peaceful  change  away  from  apartheid, 
can  help  make  a  better  future  for  all 
citizens  of  South  Africa.  Such  groups 
and  individuals  must  prosper  if  there  is 
to  be  multiracial  bargaining  leading  to  a 
government  based  on  the  consent  of  the 
governed. 

To  support  the  positive  aspects  of 
change  in  South  Africa,  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration, with  the  support  of  Con- 
gress, has  initiated  new  programs  over 
the  past  2  years. 

•  A  $4  million-a-year  scholarship 
program  which  brings  approximately 
100  black  South  African  students  a  year 
to  the  United  States  for  undergraduate 
and  graduate  degrees.  The  majority  of 
these  students  are  studying  in  the  hard 
sciences.  By  1985  there  will  be  some  400 
black  South  Africans  enrolled  in  U.S.  in- 
stitutions of  higher  education,  and  we 
will  begin  graduating  more  black  engi- 
neers, chemists,  and  computer  engineers 
than  now  exist  in  South  Africa. 

•  In  cooperation  with  the  AFL-OIO, 
programs  of  support  are  being  initiated 
to  train  labor  leaders  in  South  Africa  in 
skills  which  will  improve  the  collective 
bargaining  ability  of  black  and  mixed 
trade  unions  anil  enhance  the  dialogue 
between  the  American  and  South 
African  labor  communities.  The  U.S. 


contribution  to  this  program  will  in- 
crease from  $190,000  this  fiscal  year  t'| 
$875,000  next  year. 

•  In  cooperation  with  the  National 
African  Federated  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  South  Africa,  we  are  beginnir 
this  year  a  projecl  to  support  small 
business  development  in  the  black  con 
munity.  Over  the  next  2  years,  some  J 
million  will  be  invested  in  this  project  a 
designed  to  enhance  tin'  economic  lev-l 
erage  of  the  black  community. 

•  In  conjunction  with  black  com- 
munity groups  throughout  South  Afrkfl 
we  have  underway  a  tutorial  program  H 
assist  black  high  school  students  preptl 
ing  for  the  matriculation  examination  I 
which  will  determine  their  professional 
futures.  ( >ver  the  next  2  years  this  S2  i 
million  project  should  significantly  booj 
the  number  of  blacks  eligible  for  unive 
sity  admission. 

•  Moreover,  the  U.S.  Senate  has  i 
cently  expressed  its  interest  in  setting 
aside  $5  million  for  an  internal  scholar 
ship  program  as  a  counterpart  to  the 
program  now  bringing  black  South 
African  students  to  the  United  States. 
This  program,  implemented  through 
private  South  African  institutions,  cou 
provide  scholarship  support  to  some  4(' 
black  South  African  students  per  year 

I  do  not  pretend  that  these  pro- 
grams, in  and  of  themselves,  are  the 
answer  to  apartheid.  But  they  are  in- 
dicative of  an  approach  that  fully 
justifies  the  term  "constructive"  We  a 
tangibly  backing  the  things  we  believe 
in.  By  strengthening  the  educational 
standards  of  the  black  population,  by 
enhancing  the  organizational  ability  of 
labor,  and  by  expanding  the  business 
base  of  the  black  community,  we  are 
engaged  in  institution  building  for 
change  away  from  apartheid  while  helji 
ing  to  encourage  the  alternative  to  it. 

In  terms  of  supporting  change  in 
South  Africa,  the  American  business 
community  has  considerably  more  ex- 
perience than  the  U.S.  Government. 
<  >vor  the  past  decade,  American  corpoi 
tations  with  subsidiaries  and  affiliates 
South  Africa  have  become  a  force  for 
change.  The  activities  of  these  firms 
have  had  an  impact  far  beyond  the  boG 
v-alue  of  U.S.  investment  in  South  Afrii 
and  far  greater  than  is  commonly  recog 
nized.  U.S.  firms  have  led  the  way 
toward  equal  employment  opportunities 
in  South  Africa.  Corporate  initiative, 
both  foreign  and  domestic,  helped  brill 
about  changes  in  South  African  labor 
law  permitting  blacks  to  organize  trade 
unions  and  bargain  collectively.  U.S. 
firms,  acting  through  the  voluntary 


12 


AFRICA 


Sullivan  Code  of  Fair  Employment  Prac- 
iees.  have  had  a  significant  impact  on 
he  well-being  of  black  South  Africans 
i>n  the  job.  We  strongly  believe  that 
,'oluntarv  adherence  to  the  Sullivan  code 
s  one  of  the  best  ways  to  go  beyond 
■heturic  about  apartheid.  Equally  impor- 
ant,  so  do  the  great  majority  of  our  cor- 
lorate  leaders. 

The  record  of  U.S.  corporate  citizen- 
ship in  South  Africa,  though  not  perfect, 
s  clear  and  impressive.  Our  firms  have 
teen  pacesetters  for  change.  Those  in 
;he  United  States  and  other  Western  na- 
:ions  who  would  have  our  firms  dis- 
nvest  not  only  ignore  this  record  of 
ichievement  but  propose  measures  that 
•est  on  no  discernible  philosophic  or 


Namibia 


ONTACT  GROUP  STATEMENT, 

UNE  8,  19831 

1  continuation  of  the  meeting  we  had  at 
Williamsburg,  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
anada,  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
ermany,  the  United  States,  and  the 
olitical  Director  of  the  United  Kingdom 
^presenting  the  British  State  Secretary 
ir  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs 
•et  to  pursue  the  efforts  to  achieve  an 
irly  settlement  of  the  question  of 
amibia  in  accordance  with  U.N.  Securi- 
■  Council  Resolution  435. 

They  welcome  the  constructive  spirit 
which  the  recent  Security  Council 
;bate  was  conducted.  In  particular, 
tey  noted  that  the  spirit  has  made 
)ssible  the  unanimous  adoption  of 
acurity  Council  Resolution  532.  They 
elcomed,  in  addition,  the  Security 
ouncil's  reaffirmation  of  Resolution  435 
;  a  basis  for  the  settlement  of  the  con- 
ct  on  the  mandate  given  to  the  Secre- 
.ry  General  to  undertake  consultations 
ith  a  view  to  its  speedy  implementa- 
Dn.  The  Secretary  General  may  count 
i  their  final  support. 

In  view  of  the  increasing  violence  in 
luthern  Africa,  they  agreed  that  it  is 
ore  necessary  than  ever  for  all  con- 
>rned  to  promote  a  peaceful  solution, 
hey  reaffirmed  in  this  respect  their  in- 
ntion  to  pursue  their  efforts  to  this 
id. 


■Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
acting  Department  spokesman  Alan 
omberg.  ■ 


policy  promise.  Disinvestment  by  U.S. 
firms  would  undo  an  avenue  of  positive 
effort.  Proponents  of  corporate  disin- 
vestment—and of  stockholder  or  pension 
manager  sales  of  stock  of  firms 
operating  in  South  Africa— would  have 
Americans  wash  their  hands  of  any 
association  with  that  country.  This  ap- 
parent quest  for  symbolic  dissociation  is, 
in  reality,  a  formula  guaranteed  to 
assure  America's  irrelevance  to  South 
Africa's  future. 

In  the  final  analysis,  however,  South 
Africans  themselves— both  black  and 
white— will  have  to  meet  the  challenge 
of  their  society,  drawing  for  inspiration 
primarily  on  their  own  resources  and 
their  own  history.  Movement  toward 
change  in  South  Africa  is  taking  place. 
In  the  economy,  blacks  have  been  gain- 
ing ever  more  bargaining  power  as  pro- 
ducers; they  are  moving  into  more 
skilled  and  responsible  positions.  As  con- 
sumers, their  purchasing  power  has 
become  essential  to  the  South  African 
economy.  Black  trade  unions  have 
become  a  major  new  reality.  Politically, 
Prime  Minister  Botha  put  his  own 
political  base  in  jeopardy  with  his  pro- 
posal to  extend  a  limited  and  ethnically 
based  franchise  to  the  colored  and  Asian 
communities.  What  some  South  Africans 
see  as  too  much,  others  see  as  too  little. 
I  do  not  see  it  as  our  business  to  enter 
into  this  debate  or  to  endorse  the  con- 
stitutional proposals  now  under  con- 
sideration for  South  Africa.  Nor  do  we 
offer  tactical  advice  to  any  of  the  in- 
terested parties.  Yet  the  indisputable 
fact  which  we  must  recognize  is  that  the 
South  African  Government  has  taken 
the  first  step  toward  extending  national 
political  rights  beyond  the  white 
minority. 

Many  are  quick  to  point  out  that 
these  proposals  make  no  provision  for 
the  national  political  participation  of  the 
black  African  majority  in  South  Africa, 
except  via  the  separate  tribal  home- 
lands. More  generally,  there  is  a  tenden- 
cy to  reject  all  incremental  improve- 
ments in  whatever  sector  of  life  in  South 
Africa  that  are  not  explicitly  linked  to  a 
full-blown  democratic  blueprint.  We 
recognize  the  limits  of  current  change 
and  for  this  reason  do  not  make  a  prac- 
tice of  endorsing  individual  steps  as,  in 
themselves,  an  adequate  response  to  the 
dead  end  of  apartheid.  At  the  same 
time,  we  believe  it  is  incumbent  on  us  to 
avoid  the  arrogance  of  rejecting  such 


steps.  Nor,  if  we  would  be  credible,  can 
we  expect  South  Africa's  would-be 
reformers  to  announce  their  game  plan 
and  their  bottom  line  to  the  world  at 
large. 

We  state  clearly  and  unequivocally 
our  belief  in  the  concept  of  government 
based  on  the  consent  of  the  governed. 
We  do  not  presume  to  offer  a  formula  to 
South  Africa  for  resolving  its  unsettled 
political  agenda  other  than  to  state  that 
all  South  Africans  must  have  a  say  in 
determining  their  political  system. 

Conclusion 

Let  me  conclude  by  drawing  your  atten- 
tion to  a  little  recognized  fact.  Our 
southern  African  policy  of  constructive 
engagement — extending  the  hand  of 
friendship,  cooperation,  and  support  to 
all  states  and  peoples  of  the  area  who 
wish  it— has  occasioned  controversy. 
Some,  it  appears,  have  misunderstood 
the  message  or  chosen  for  their  own 
reasons  to  misunderstand  it.  Less 
noticed  is  the  encouraging  evidence  of  a 
growing  consensus  across  party  lines 
around  the  core  principles  of  more  ac- 
tive involvement  in  this  increasingly  im- 
portant region.  Many  Americans  are 
coming  to  recognize  that  without  a 
strong  Western  leadership  role,  it  could 
become  a  turbulent  zone  of  tragedy. 
They  are  pleased  to  see  the  United 
States  striving  diplomatically  to  build 
regional  peace,  to  achieve  independence 
for  Namibia,  to  create  conditions  for  the 
departure  of  Cuban  troops  from  Angola. 
I  detect  a  common  sense  public  aware- 
ness that  we  can  do  these  things  only  if 
we  develop  close  and  credible  working 
relations  with  all  the  parties  in  the 
region.  Whatever  tactical  debates  may 
exist,  I  perceive  a  growing  consensus  in 
Congress,  among  businessmen,  church 
leaders,  trade  unionists,  and  the  media 
that  it  is  right  for  Americans  to  do  more 
than  preach  about  apartheid.  The  time 
has  come  to  support  what  we  believe  in, 
not  to  walk  away  in  self-righteous  in- 
dignation. ■ 


ugust 1983 


13 


AFRICA 


Visit  of  Ivory  Coast  President 


President  Felix  Houjihouet-Boigny  of 
the  Ivory  <  'mist  made  a  state  visit  to  the 
United  States  June  6-20,  1983,  and  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  meet  withPresi- 
dent  Reagan  and  other  government  of- 
ftcials  June  6-12. 

Following  are  remarks  made  at  the 
arrival  ceremony  and  dinner  toasts 
made  by  Presidents  Reagan  and 
Houphouet-Boigny  on  June  7.1 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY 

President  Reagan 

We're  privileged  to  welcome  to 
Washington  today  one  of  the  world's 
senior  statesmen,  a  man  of  outstanding 
stature  and  the  father  of  his  coun- 
try—His Excellency  President  Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny  of  Ivory  Coast. 

On  the  African  Continent  and 
throughout  the  world,  he  is  known  as  a 
spokesman  for  reason  and  open  com- 
munications as  the  means  for  resolving 
conflict  and  ensuring  a  better  world.  We 
share  with  President  Houphouet  this 
belief  in  dialogue.  I  look  forward  to  our 
discussion  today,  and  in  many  days  to 
come,  on  the  vital  issues  which  face  the 
African  Continent  and  the  world. 

Ivory  Coast  itself  is  an  outstanding 
example  of  the  progress  and  prosperity 
that  can  be  achieved  in  an  atmosphere 
of  peace,  security,  and  individual  liberty. 
The  President  has  often  emphasized 
these  as  the  fundamental  ingredients  of 
economic  well-being  and  advancement. 
And  we  share  his  conviction — that  only 
in  conditions  of  peace  and  liberty  can  a 
nation  achieve  lasting  economic  and 
social  progress. 

It's  a  particular  pleasure  for  me  to 
welcome  today  the  leader  of  a  nation 
which  has  so  warmly  and  graciously 
welcomed  so  many  of  our  own  repre- 
sentatives. I  have  received  enthusiastic 
reports  about  Ivory  Coast  and  its 
economic  vitality  and  vast  potential  from 
Secretaries  Baldrige  [of  Commerce]  and 
Block  [of  Agriculture],  several  Senators, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  [for  African 
Affairs]  Crocker,  and  others.  And  all  of 
them  were  struck  by  the  advances  your 
country  has  made— advances  reflecting 
your  commitment  to  a  free  economy 
which  encourages  producers  through  a 
philosophy  of  hard  work  and  self-help. 

There  is  a  saying  in  Ivory  Coast,  "If 
your  stomach  is  empty,  ask  your  hands 
why."  You  and  your  countrymen  have 
worked  hard,  and  in  doing  so,  you've  im- 


ffvr^' 


(White  House  photo  hy  Michael  Evansl 

proved  your  lives  and  gained  the  respect 
of  the  world.  The  remarkable  progress 
of  your  country's  agricultural  endeavors 
is  a  tribute  to  your  enlightened  leader- 
ship. By  making  it  possible  for  your 
farmers  to  get  a  fair  return  for  their 
work  and  by  recognizing  the  importance 
of  this  sector  of  your  economy,  you've 
spared  the  people  the  deprivation  that 
has  befallen  many  others. 

Ivory  Coast  has  built  one  of  the 
richest  economies  in  Africa  by 
understanding  that  before  wealth  can  be 
divided,  it  must  be  created.  Ivorians  can 
be  proud  of  their  solid  record  of 
economic  improvement  since  independ- 
ence. At  the  same  time,  your  income 
distribution  is  among  the  fairest  on  the 
continent. 

I'm  pleased  that  the  American 
private  sector  has  been  able  to  plaj  a 
role  in  realizing  what  you  refer  to  as 
Ivorian  well-being. 

As  we  welcome  you  once  again  to 
our  country,  we  note  that  many  changes 
have  occurred  since  your  last  visit  to  the 
White  House  in  1973.  Nations  around 
the  globe,  including  Ivory  Coast  and  the 
United  States,  are  struggling  to  over- 
come a  period  of  severe  economic  prob- 
lems and  uncertainty.  But  together,  we 
can  face  the  future  with  confidence. 

Our  two  peoples  share  a  desire  for 
liberty  and  progress  that  can  and  will 
triumph  over  adversity.  So  today,  let  us 
renew  our  pledge  to  each  other  that  as 
we  walk  the  road  to  the  future,  we,  the 
people  of  the  I  'nited  States  and  Ivory 
( 'oast,  will  do  so  as  friends. 


President  Houphouet 

It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  I  return  t 
your  magnificent  country,  where  each 
my  stays  has  been  a  source  of  discovel 
and  admiration,  and  has  strengthened 
my  confidence  in  the  future. 

Your  thoughtful  words  of  welcome  ai 
to  my  pleasure,  because  they  are 
evidence  of  your  friendly  interest  in  m; 
country,  and  of  the  strength  of  the  ties 
that  have  developed  between  the  Unite 
States  and  Ivory  Coast  over  more  thai 
20  years. 

In  extending  to  me  your  invitation 
which  honored  me  greatly,  you  were 
kind  enough  to  tell  me  how  much  you 
value  personal  contacts  between  heads 
of  state.  I  share  your  view  entirely  am 
look  forward  to  being  able  to  discuss 
with  you  the  problems  that  concern  mt 
and  which  I  cannot  conceive  of  being 
resolved  without  effective  and  forceful 
steps  by  the  United  States  of  America. 
That  is  why  I  am  so  keenly  interested 
hearing  your  views  in  regard  to  the 
various  areas  where  the  fate  of 
humankind  is  being  played  out. 

I  thank  you  most  warmly  for  havin 
afforded  me  the  opportunity,  once  aga 
to  greet  the  American  people  through 
you  and  to  express  to  them  the  great  a 
miration  and  friendship  of  the  people  0 
Ivor)'  Coast,  who  share  their  commit 
ment  to  the  timeless  values  of  peace  ai 
justice. 

Long  live  the  United  States  of 
America;  long  live  our  friendship. 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


AFRICA 


VNER  TOASTS 

isident  Reagan 

isident  and  Mrs.  Houphouet-Boigny, 
:inguished  ladies  and  gentlemen,  it's  a 
cial  pleasure  for  me  to  welcome  our 
st  of  honor  this  evening. 
During  the  1980  campaign,  I  sug- 
ted  that  the  United  States  should 
irn  to  some  of  the  basics  of  free 
erprise — policies  that  would  en- 
rage individual  responsibility,  hard 
•k,  and  investment.  It's  taken  time, 
we're  at  last  overcoming  the 
nomic  uncertainty  that  we  inherited, 
have  to  admit,  I've  always  been  confi- 
t  that  we  would.  I  just  kept  telling 
self,  "It  worked  in  Ivory  Coast,  didn't 
[Laughter] 

Your  many  successes  haven't  gone 
oticed  here  in  the  United  States, 
ike  many  other  countries,  some  of 
ch  are  far  richer  in  natural 
mrces,  you  chose  the  high  road  of 
tical  and  economic  freedom.  In  doing 
you've  made  Ivory  Coast  a  shining 
mple  to  the  rest  of  Africa  and  the 
Id. 

Your  wisdom  has  been  a  guiding 
t  for  your  people  and  a  beacon  of 
;on  and  modernization  in  the  world 
ia.  You  are  a  leader  who  stresses 
ague  as  a  means  of  solving  even  the 
t  vexing  problems.  You  advocate 
promise  over  confrontation,  concilia- 
over  conflict.  Your  humane  and 
ocratic  values  reflect  well  on  the 
jle  of  Ivory  Coast. 
During  our  discussions  today,  we 
:hed  on  many  mutual  areas  of  con- 
I  especially  those  dealing  with  the 
notion  of  economic  growth.  The 
sident  had  been  forced  to  make 
^h  decisions  concerning  government 
iding.  I  can  identify  with  that, 
ighter]  I  deeply  admire  his  far- 
ted commitment  to  the  long-range 
rests  of  his  people.  Today  we're  con- 
nt  that  closeness  and  interaction  be- 
en our  two  peoples  can  be  nothing 
a  blessing  for  us  all. 
I  ask  you  now  to  join  me  in  a  toast 
resident  Houphouet-Boigny  and  to 
continued  friendship  between  our 
peoples  that  his  visit  attests  to. 

sident  Houphouet 

President,  allow  me  first  of  all  to 
ak  you  for  your  warm  welcome  and 
all  the  thoughtfulness  that  has  been 
vvn  us  since  our  arrival  here.  I  should 

like  to  express  to  you  our  sincere 
titude  for  your  kind  words  describing 


Ivory  Coast  policies  and  for  having  af- 
firmed so  clearly  your  desire  to  develop 
our  cooperation. 

One  of  your  predecessors  remarked 
that  history  has  given  the  United  States 
the  role  of  being  either  a  witness  to  the 
failure  of  freedom  or  the  architect  of  its 
triumph.  I  can  only  subscribe  to  that 
fine  thought.  Yet  the  extent  of  your 
commitments,  the  immense  responsibili- 
ty they  imply,  even  for  the  most  power- 
ful nation  in  the  world,  might  have  led 
me  to  fear  that  in  a  time  of  crisis,  when, 
especially  in  your  own  hemisphere  as 
well  as  in  Asia  and  the  Middle  East, 
problems  as  worrisome  as  they  are  sen- 
sitive require  all  of  your  vigilance  and 
that  of  the  team  around  you.  I  might 
have  feared  that  your  attention  might 
have  been  diverted  from  the  seemingly 
less  pressing  problems  of  Africa.  It  was, 
therefore,  most  reassuring  for  me  to 
note  your  determination  to  help  Africa 
to  regain  its  peace  and  to  achieve  a 
prosperity  that  seems  discouragingly 
ever  more  remote. 

You  said  on  February  13,  1980,  that 
the  United  States  has  an  obligation  to 
its  citizens  and  to  the  people  of  the 
world  never  to  let  those  who  would 
destroy  freedom  dictate  the  future 
course  of  human  existence  on  our 
planet.  There  is  no  lack  of  opportunity 
for  the  enemies  of  freedom  who  find,  in 
poverty  and  ignorance,  the  best  fuel  for 
their  sinister  designs.  It  is,  therefore, 
important  not  to  neglect  any  political, 
social,  economic,  educational,  or  cultural 
sector — any  country,  any  region,  any 
society  where  there  may  develop  and  ex- 
plode the  kind  of  conflicts  that  the 
enemies  of  freedom  provoke  or  sustain. 
And  since  prevention  is  better  than 
cure,  one  must  also  be  certain  not  to 
allow  the  perpetuation  of  unjust  situa- 
tions that  foster  them. 

To  be  sure,  you  have  consistently 
stressed  the  need  for  individuals,  like  na- 
tions, to  take  their  problems  into  their 
own  hands,  to  assume  responsibility  for 
their  own  future,  and  to  cease  to  rely 
solely  on  assistance,  as  some  at  times 
are  all  too  pleased  to  do. 

In  Ivory  Coast  we  have  always 
urged  our  fellow  citizens  to  rely  first 
and  foremost  on  themselves.  But  no  one 
can  deny  that  there  are  individuals  and 
there  are  nations  that  are  handicapped 
and  cannot  emerge  from  their  tragic 
situation  without  aid— extended  aid.  Nor 
can  anyone  deny  that  the  world  today 
finds  itself  in  the  absurd  situation  of 
wasting  money  on  ever  more  costly 
weapons — sums  of  money  which,  com- 


pared to  which  the  amounts  of  money 
that  go  for  development  assistance,  are 
pitifully  small. 

And  the  situation  is  aggravated  by 
the  constant  threat  of  insecurity,  which 
compels  the  developing  nations  that 
have  modest,  indeed,  even  inadequate 
resources  to  fight  simultaneously  on  two 
fronts:  the  development  front  and  the 
security  front,  with  development  too 
often  having  to  be  sacrified  for  the  sake 
of  security.  So,  what  the  developing 
countries  and  Africa,  in  particular,  need 
most  are  peace  and  stability,  the  precon- 
ditions for  any  harmonious  development. 

You,  the  American  people,  are  the 
best  equipped  to  recognize  the  lack  of 
progress  of  countries  that  do  not  enjoy 
political  stability  and  which  are  becom- 
ing increasingly  serious  threats  to  world 
peace.  The  best  factor  for  peace  is  the 
well-being,  the  happiness  of  peoples. 
Peace  and  well-being  are  inseparable. 

The  West  has  the  means  to  lend  ef- 
fective assistance  to  Africa,  but  that  aid 
will  be  for  naught  if  our  own  production 
efforts  are  constantly  ruined  by 
speculators.  To  be  sure,  Africa  at  pres- 
ent only  accounts  for  2%  of  world  trade. 
That  is  not  a  great  deal;  we  recognize 
that.  But  that  is  the  Africa  of  today.  It 
is  not  the  Africa  of  tomorrow,  the 
Africa  of  the  future,  the  Africa  we  want 
to  build  with  the  West,  drawing  on  our 
own  efforts.  Our  potential  is  great. 

I  should  like  to  quote  here  that 
masterpiece  of  Alexis  de  Tocqueville, 
Democracy  in  America,  In  his  conclusion 
he  wrote,  "I  am  filled  with  fears  and 
filled  with  hopes.  I  see  great  evils  that 
can  be  avoided  or  contained,  and  I  am 
becoming  ever  more  firm  in  my  convic- 
tion that  in  order  to  be  honest  and  pros- 
perous, the  democratic  nations  have  only 
to  determine  that  they  will  be  so." 

I  could  not  conclude  more  fittingly 
than  by  expressing  our  confidence  in  the 
democratic  nations,  among  which  the 
United  States  holds  the  most  important 
place. 

I  would  ask  you  to  please  join  me  in 
a  toast  to  President  Ronald  Reagan  and 
to  Mrs.  Reagan  to  whom  I  present  my 
most  respectful  and  heartfelt  com- 
pliments, and  also  to  the  happiness  and 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  great  people  of 
the  United  States  and  to  the  friendship 
between  the  United  States  and  Ivory 
Coast. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  13,  1983. 


15 


AFRICA 


20th  Anniversary  of  the  OAU 


Secretary  Shultz  s  remarks  at  a 
reception  in  honor  of  the  20th  anniver- 
sary of  the  Organization  of  African  Uni- 
ty (OAU)  on  May  25,  1983. > 

This  is  an  important  event,  the  20th  an- 
niversary of  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity.  And  I  am  very  pleased,  en- 
thusiastic, for  the  opportunity  to  be  here 
on  this  occasion. 

As  President  Reagan  made  clear  in 
his  message  to  your  chairman,  President 
Arap  Moi  of  Kenya,  the  United  States 
knows  well  the  positive  contribution  that 
the  OAU  has  made  to  stability  and  prog- 
ress in  Africa  over  the  past  20  years  and 
the  potential  it  has  for  even  greater  ac- 
complishments in  the  years  to  come.  It 
is  clear  to  us  that  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  OAU  deserve  the  support 
not  only  of  the  members  of  the  OAU  but 
all  peace-loving  nations.  They  certainly 
have  our  support. 

Not  long  after  I  became  Secretary,  I 
met  with  many  of  your  foreign  ministers 
and  permanent  representatives  in  New 
York  at  a  special  OAU  luncheon. 
Africa's  prominence  in  the  international 
community  was  much  on  my  mind  then 
and  has  remained  so  ever  since. 

The  Administration  attaches  great 
importance  to  our  relations  with  Africa. 
Namibian  independence  under  interna- 
tionally acceptable  terms  constitutes  one 
of  our  principal  foreign  policy  objectives. 
And,  I  might  say,  [Assistant  Secretary 
for  African  Affairs]  Chester  Crocker  has 
been  working  his  heart  out  on  that  as 
have  many  others  of  us  in  the  Depart- 
ment, and  the  President  has  spent  a 
great  deal  of  time  and  effort  and  energy 
on  this.  And,  as  I  plan  to  say  to  several 
of  your  colleagues  in  New  York  this 
week,  we  remain  fully  committed  to  the 
work  of  the  contact  group  and  are 
hopeful  that  its  negotiations,  and  those 
in  which  we  are  engaged  on  related 
regional  issues  of  peace,  will  prove  suc- 
cessful. 

In  connection  with  southern  Africa 
and  in  connection  with  the  apartheid 
system,  I  would  say  unambiguously,  une- 
quivocally, with  no  qualifications 
whatever,  that  the  system  of  apartheid 
is  unjust  and  unacceptable. 

The  OAU  has  a  noble  tradition  of 
promoting  the  peaceful  resolution  of 
conflict  on  the  continent.  The  United 
States  seeks  the  same  objective,  whether 
in  southern  Africa,  the  Western  Sahara, 
or  the  Horn.  We  are  particularly  pleased 
to  be  able  to  work  together  in  making  a 
modest  contribution  to  the  deployment 
of  the  OAU's  first  peacekeeping  force 


last  year.  Strengthened  regional  security 
is  a  cardinal  objective  of  U.S.  policy  in 
Africa.  It  has  been  a  cornerstone  of  the 
OAU's  role  and  objectives  for  20  years. 
This  simple  fact  explains  why  we  attach 
importance  to  the  health  and  vitality  of 
Africa's  regional  organization. 

We  are  all  aware  of  the  terrible 
economic  crises  much  of  Africa  is  en- 
countering. We  know,  too,  that  these 
provoke  political  turmoil  both  as  their 
effects  are  felt  and  as  your  governments 
take  the  corrective  measures  required  to 
restructure  your  economies  on  a  sounder 
footing.  We  are  working  hard  to  restore 
the  conditions  of  sound  growth  in  the 
world  economy.  And  I  am  sure  that  this 
will  be  a  matter  of  central  attention  at 
the  Williamsburg  summit.  Hard  deci- 
sions and  strong  leadership  are  required 
in  this  effort.  We  admire  the  courage 
many  African  leaders  are  displaying  in 
making  difficult  decisions  to  restore 
their  economies,  and  I  can  assure  you 
that  the  U.S.  Government  will  continue 
to  support  those  governments  which 
come  to  grips  with  their  economic  prob- 
lems realistically. 

Tomorrow  in  New  York,  I  plan  to 
make  a  talk  on  the  subject  of  economic 
development  and  the  U.S.  stake  in  the 
development  of  the  developing 
economies  of  the  world. 


It  has  been  the  President's  pleasujij 
to  receive  more  than  a  dozen  African!  J 
chiefs  of  state  in  Washington,  and  we, « 
look  forward  to  the  state  visit  next    w 
month  of  one  of  the  continent's  most 
distinguished  statesmen,  President 
Houphouet-Boigny  of  the  Ivory  Coast 
Vice  President  Bush  and  other  Cabin' 
members  have  visited  your  continent, 
and  I  hope  to  have  the  opportunity  tc 
so  myself.  I  have  visited  but  not  as 
Secretary  of  State;  it  doesn't  count 
when  you  visited  there  as  a  private 
citizen,  I  discovered  that.  But  you  lea 
more  that  way  oftentimes.  You  get 
around  among  people  and  you  find  oi 
what's  on  their  minds. 

There  are  enormous  problems  fac 
Africa  today.  I  do  not  need  to  tell  yoi 
the  suffering,  poverty,  denials  of  basi 
human  rights,  refugee  flows,  armed  c 
flicts,  and  economic  woes  facing  your 
region.  I  do  want  you  to  know  that  w 
respect  the  substantial  strides  made  i 
many  countries  and  the  constructive  I 
played  by  the  OAU  itself  in  building  i 
climate  for  peace  and  development.  T 
United  States  cannot  solve  Africa's 
problems,  nor  would  Africans  want  u 
to.  But  we  can  and  are  determined  to 
support  a  regional  organization  whos< 
goals  and  founding  principles  are  full 
consistent  with  our  national  interests 


•Press  release  194. 


President's  Message  to 

OAU  Chairman  Daniel  T.  Arap  Moi, 

May  25,  19832 


On  the  occasion  of  the  Twentieth  Anniver- 
sary of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity,  it 
is  both  a  pleasure  and  an  honor  for  me  to  ex- 
press the  congratulations  and  good  wishes  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  you  as 
Chairman  of  the  OAU  and  to  the  member  na- 
tions of  the  organization.  The  United  States 
shares  with  the  OAU  its  objectives  of 
"freedom,  equality,  justice  and  dignity  for  all 
African  peoples." 

We  also  support  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  OAU,  embodied  in  Article  111  of 
your  charter:  sovereign  equality  of  all 
member  states;  non-interference  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  states;  territorial  integrity; 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes;  condemna- 
tion of  political  assassination  and  subversion; 
dedication  to  the  total  emancipation  of  still 
dependent  African  territories;  and  genuine 
nonalignment.  We  believe  the  OAU  has  made 
a  positive  contribution  to  stability  and  prog- 
ress in  Africa  over  the  past  twenty  years, 
and  that  it  has  the  potential  for  even  greater 
accomplishments  in  the  years  to  come. 


The  United  States  remains  supportive 
African  efforts  to  seek  a  cessation  of  conf 
and  violence,  as  well  as  efforts  aimed  at 
meaningful  economic  progress.  And  we  fit 
ly  agree  that  African  problems  can  best  bi 
solved  by  African  solutions.  We  applaud 
when  your  Organization  moves  forward  to 
meet  serious  challenges  on  the  African  Co 
nent.  as  was  demonstrated  by  the  OAU's 
peace-keeping  force  in  Chad. 

The  OAU  has  experienced  a  difficult 
twentieth  year,  perhaps  the  most  difficult 
year  in  its  history.  We  are  confident, 
however,  as  most  OAU  member  states  mu 
be,  that  the  Organization  can  and  will  con- 
tinue to  provide  the  unique  forum  for  con- 
tinental cooperation.  We  wish  the  OAU  we 
on  this  important  day  marking  the  Organii 
tion's  first  two  decades,  and  we  wish  it  we 
in  all  the  years  ahead. 

Konai  1 1  Kr,v 


2Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  30,  1983.1 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


RMS  CONTROL 


Strategic  Modernization: 

Foreign  Policy  and  Arms  Control  Implications 


1  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
\Foreiijn  Opt  rations  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
mpriations  Committee  on  May  4,  1983. 
I'.  Dam  is  Deputy  Secretary  of  State.1 

intaining  an  effective  and  stable 
■lear  deterrent  presents  the  President 
1  the  Congress  with  difficult  and  com- 
x  choices.  As  the  chairman  of  the 
Bident's  bipartisan  Commission  on 
ategie  Forces,  Gen.  Scowcroft  has 
i:  "There  are  no  simple  solutions  to 
questions  that  must  be  answered  in 
ing  our  forces,  achieving  equitable 
is  control  agreements  and  improving 
itegic  stability." 
As  this  committee  knows,  the 
cific  issue  of  a  new  American  ICBM 
ercontinental  ballistic  missile]  has 
n  debated  hotly  for  almost  a  decade. 
3  time  that  we  made  a  decision.  And, 
ny  view,  that  decision  should  be  to 
ceed  with  production  and  deployment 
he  Peacekeeper  missile. 
There  has  been  consensus  on  the 
d  for  a  new  ICBM  for  many  years 
'.  Each  of  the  past  four  Presidents 
supported  the  development  of  a  new 
:M,  and  the  Congress  has  been  sup- 
:ive  as  well.  It  is  the  choice  of  a  bas- 
mode  for  that  new  ICBM  that  has 
plicated  the  production  and  deploy- 
it  decision. 

The  President's  bipartisan  Commis- 
on  Strategic  Forces  has  completed 
•eview  of  the  overall  U.S.  strategic 
;ure.  The  commission  studied  a 
iber  of  alternative  basing  modes  for 
■w  ICBM,  consulted  with  Congress, 
presented  unanimous  conclusions 
•erning  U.S.  strategic  forces  and 
s  control.  The  commission  conclu- 
s  have  now  been  accepted  by  the 
sident,  and  the  President's  recom- 
'dations  are  before  the  Congress, 
se  recommendations  provide  the 
«  for  developing  a  broad  national 


eign  Policy 
the  Strategic  Balance 

most  important  goals  of  our  defense 
foreign  policy  are  to  prevent  war 
to  maintain  a  just  peace.  The  foun- 
on  of  peace  in  the  nuclear  age  has 


been  America's  strategy  of  deterrence. 
Since  we  first  acquired  nuclear  weapons, 
the  United  States  has  sought  to  prevent 
war  by  discouraging  aggression  against 
the  United  States  and  its  allies.  By 
presenting  any  potential  aggressor  with 
the  prospect  of  certain  retaliation,  peace 
has  been  maintained  for  nearly  40  years. 
The  history  of  the  20th  century  makes  it 
sadly  clear  that  peaceful  intentions  and 
good  motives  alone  will  not  stop  ag- 
gressors. Adequate  military  strength 
does  do  so,  and  the  strategy  of  deter- 
rence has  been  successful  in  protecting 
the  security  of  America  and  Western 
Europe  since  the  end  of  World  War  II. 

The  strategic  balance,  however,  has 
dimensions  beyond  deterrence.  That 
balance  shapes  the  global  context  in 
which  Ameican  foreign  policy  operates. 
As  Deputy  Secretary  of  State,  I  am 
acutely  aware  that  America's  military 
strength  is  vital  to  the  conduct  of 
foreign  policy.  Our  perceived  strengths 
and  weaknesses  directly  affect  our  abili- 
ty to  achieve  our  goals.  Therefore,  the 
decisions  we  make  or  fail  to  make  on 
weapons  programs  are  bound  to  in- 
fluence the  judgments  not  only  of  our 
adversaries  but  also  of  our  allies  and 
friends  around  the  world. 

The  growth  of  Soviet  military  power 
relative  to  the  United  States  over  the 
past  10  years  has  had  a  direct  effect  on 
Soviet  willingness  to  challenge  America's 
interests  around  the  world.  Moscow  is 
using  its  power  directly  in  Syria,  Poland, 
and  Afghanistan  and  indirectly  through 
its  proxies  in  Angola  and  closer  to  home 
in  Central  America.  These  are  the  tangi- 
ble manifestations  of  growing  Soviet 
power.  Our  concern  is  that  unless  we 
maintain  a  strategic  nuclear  balance  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  problem  of  Soviet  adven- 
turism will  persist  and  may  get  even 
worse. 

If  for  example,  the  Soviets  are  able 
to  strike  effectively  at  our  land-based 
ICBMs  while  we  do  not  have  comparable 
capability,  Moscow  might  believe  it  could 
gain  political  leverage  by  a  threat  of 
nuclear  blackmail.  Without  arguing  the 
question  of  whether  the  Soviets  are 
prepared  to  launch  a  nuclear  first-strike, 
one  can  recognize  that  such  a  crucial  im- 
balance in  strategic  capabilities  could 
well  make  them  bolder  in  a  regional  con- 


flict or  in  a  major  crisis.  That  situation 
cannot  be  in  the  interest  of  either  this 
nation  or  of  world  peace. 

Our  visible  commitment  to  maintain- 
ing the  strategic  balance  is  also  essential 
to  sustain  the  confidence  of  our  friends 
and  cohesion  of  our  alliances.  While  we 
have  debated  among  ourselves  and 
tabled  serious  arms  control  initiatives  at 
the  negotiating  table,  the  Soviets  have 
deployed— repeatedly.  Over  the  past 
decade  the  Soviets  have  deployed  three 
new  ICBMs.  They  have  tested  two  more 
in  the  last  6  months  and  have,  at  least, 
two  additional  new  types  of  ICBMs  in 
development. 

What  would  our  allies  and  other  na- 
tions conclude  about  American  strength, 
resolve,  and  reliability  if  we  were  to  fail 
to  deploy  a  new  ICBM  in  the  face  of 
these  Soviet  developments?  Our  foreign 
policy  and  our  ability  to  defend  our  in- 
terests and  our  most  cherished  values 
will  be  decisively  strengthened  if  the 
Congress  gives  strong  backing  to  the 
program  the  President  announced  last 
month.  Modernization  of  our  deterrent, 
and  of  our  land-based  ICBM  force  in 
particular,  is  essential  to  the  goals  of 
preventing  conflict,  reducing  the  risk  of 
war,  and  demonstrating  our  resolve  to 
adversaries  and  allies  alike.  At  the  same 
time,  it  will  also  increase  Moscow's  in- 
centive to  negotiate  seriously  in  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  and 
other  arms  reduction  talks. 

Arms  Reduction 

and  the  Strategic  Balance 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the 
Scowcroft  commission  did  not  consider 
the  ICBM  problem,  or  even  our  overall 
strategic  posture,  in  isolation  from  other 
issues.  They  also  considered  the  relation- 
ship between  strategic  programs  and 
arms  control.  The  commission  made 
clear  that  there  was  a  necessary  com- 
plementary between  strategic  programs 
and  arms  control.  Both  arms  control  and 
modernization  programs  can  affect  the 
strategic  balance.  Vigorous  pursuit  of 
both  is  the  best  course  to  pursue.  To 
quote  the  Scowcroft  commission  report: 
"Our  arms  control  proposals  and  our 
strategic  arms  programs  should  thus  be 
integrated  and  be  mutually  reinforcing. 
They  should  work  together  to  permit  us, 


just  1983 


17 


ARMS  CONTROL 


and  encourage  the  Soviets,  to  move  in 
directions  that  reduce  or  eliminate  the 
advantage  of  aggression  and  also  reduce 
the  risk  of  war  by  accident  or 
miscalculation." 

President  Reagan  adopted  this  dual 
approach  early  in  his  Administration. 
When  he  announced  his  modernization 
program,  he  also  announced  that  the 
United  States  would  negotiate  with  the 
Soviet  Union  to  achieve  mutual  and  deep 
nuclear  arms  reductions.  We  are  now 
negotiating  seriously  with  the  Soviets  in 
Geneva  on  both  intermediate-range  and 
strategic  nuclear  weapons. 

If  we  have  learned  anything  from 
our  experience  in  arms  control  negotia- 
tions over  the  last  two  decades,  we 
should  have  learned  this  fundamental 
truth:  The  process  of  arms  control 
depends  on  the  demonstrated  ability  of 
the  United  States  to  maintain  an  effec- 
tive strategic  force.  This,  in  turn, 
depends,  as  it  always  has,  on  maintain- 
ing a  modern,  capable  triad  of  strategic 
forces.  The  Peacekeeper  ICBM  is  a 
critical  component  of  that  modernized 
triad. 

As  a  lawyer,  I  know  that  negotia- 
tions begin  only  when  both  parties 
believe  they  have  something  to  gain  by 
talking  or  something  to  lose  by  failing  to 
talk.  Without  the  incentive  of  gain  or 
loss  provided  by  our  modernization  pro- 
gram, the  Soviets  would  see  no  advan- 
tage in  negotiating  seriously  to  reduce 
their  own  nuclear  force. 

The  Peacekeeper  represents  the 
response  that  each  of  the  past  four  ad- 
ministrations has  considered  necessary 
to  offset,  at  least  partially,  the  for- 
midable Soviet  ICBM  arsenal.  The  ques- 
tion now  before  us  is  whether  we  shall 
abandon  this  decade-long  modernization 
program. 

As  the  Scowcroft  commission  report 
reasoned:  "It  is  illusory  to  believe  that 
we  would  obtain  a  satisfactory  agree- 
ment with  the  Soviets  limiting  ICBM 
deployments  if  we  unilaterally  ter- 
minated the  only  new  U.S.  ICBM  pro- 
gram that  could  lead  to  deployment  in 
this  decade.  .  .  .  Abandoning  the  MX  at 
this  time  in  search  of  a  substitute  would 
jeopardize,  not  enhance,  the  likelihood  of 
reaching  a  stabilizing  and  equitable 
agreement." 

The  commission's  recommendations 
included  more  than  support  for  deploy- 
ing the  Peacekeeper  missile.  The  com- 
mission also  recommended,  and  the 
President  agreed,  that  the  full  modern- 
ization program  begun  in  1981  be  con- 
tinued. It  also  recommended  develop- 
ment of  a  new  small  single-warhead 


missile  and  continuation  of  research  on 
survivability  improvements  for  our 
ICBMs,  including  active  defense  and  silo 
hardening. 

Questions  have  been  raised  about 
whether  the  proposed  modernization 
program  is  consistent  with  our  arms 
control  objectives  and  our  obligations 
under  past  arms  control  agreements. 
Let  me  assure  you  that  the  proposed 
program  is  fully  consistent  with  those 
objectives  and  obligations.  The 
Peacekeeper  is  consistent  with  all 
specific  provisions  of  existing  SALT 
[strategic  arms  limitation  talks] 
agreements.  Deploying  100  of  the  new 
missiles  in  existing  Minuteman  silos,  as 
the  President  proposed,  would  involve 
no  construction  of  new  fixed  launchers, 
no  increase  in  silo  volume,  and  no  in- 
crease in  MIRVed  [multiple  independent- 
ly targetable  reentry  vehicle]  ICBM 
launchers.  Moreover,  the  100  new 
Peacekeeper  missiles  in  Minuteman  silos 
are,  obviously,  far  too  small  a  force  to 
be  destabilizing. 

Some  have  wondered,  however,  how 
the  development  of  a  small  ICBM  in  ad- 
dition to  the  Peacekeeper  would  be  con- 
sistent with  either  SALT  II  or  a  possible 
START  agreement.  The  SALT  II  Treaty 
would  have  permitted  deployment  of  no 
more  than  one  new  ICBM  on  each  side. 
On  our  side,  the  new  missile  would  be 
the  Peacekeeper.  But  that  treaty,  even 
if  it  had  been  ratified,  would  have  ex- 
pired at  the  end  of  1985.  The  President's 
proposal  calls  for  the  start  of  engineer- 
ing development  of  a  new  small  ICBM, 
but  no  deployment  would  be  possible  un- 
til after  1990— long  after  the  SALT  II 
time  period  had  expired.  And  long 
before  that  time,  we  would  hope  that  a 
START  agreement  will  have  established 
a  new  regime  for  maintaining  a  stable 
strategic  balance. 

Beyond  this,  the  new  small  missile, 
if  it  proves  feasible,  would  have  broader, 
positive  implications  for  arms  control.  It 
would  enhance  stability,  because  it 
would  be  more  survivable,  and  stability 
has  always  been  a  central  objective  of 
arms  control  since  the  process  began.  As 
[Defense]  Secretary  Weinberger  has  ex- 
plained, it  may  move  the  evolution  of 
strategic  systems  in  a  stabilizing  direc- 
tion over  the  long  term.  The  basic  con- 
cepts underlying  our  START  proposals 
are  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  this 
small  missile. 

The  U.S. -Soviet  strategic  competi- 
tion will  continue  into  the  long-term 
future.  And  there  is  no  guarantee  that  a 


w 


restructuring  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  fore 
in  the  direction  of  single  warheads 
take  place  in  the  near  future.  But  we 
believe  both  sides  have  real  incentive 
move  in  this  direction.  In  the  meanti 
we  need  now  to  take  the  hard  decisk 
necessary  to  ensure  a  safe  strategic 
tionship  for  the  years  immediately 
ahead. 

Conclusion 

I  share  with  the  Secretary  of  State  a 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  the  convicti 
that  modernization  of  our  strategic 
forces  is  a  matter  of  the  highest  prio 
ty.  A  credible,  flexible  strategic  force 
not  only  vital  to  the  balance  of  powei 
but  is  the  essential  foundation  of  our 
role  as  leader  and  defender  of  free  n; 
tions.  The  fundamental  goal  of  nucle; 
deterrence  depends  on  a  credible  fore 
Our  goal  of  deterring  non-nuclear  wa 
nuclear  blackmail  also  depends  on  it. 
The  Peacekeeper  missile  is  indis- 
pensable to  our  near-term  goals  of 
restoring  the  strategic  balance,  achie' 
ing  deterrence,  and  providing  an  ince 
tive  to  the  Soviets  for  serious  negotia 
tions  on  arms  reductions.  Developmei 
of  a  small  ICBM  may  well  enhance 
strategic  stability  in  the  longer  term. 
But  as  the  Scowcroft  commission 
stressed,  neither  of  the  two  systems 
ensure  security  alone;  they  are  com- 
plementary. Strength  and  peace  are  i\ 
complementary.  Both  must  be  pursue 
with  determination.  And  with  that  de 
mination,  both  can  be  achieved. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing: 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  wi 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


18 


Department  of  State  Bullel 


AST  ASIA 


J.S.,  Philippines  Conclude 
Jases  Agreement  Review 


lEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 

IUNE  1.  1983 

1  Manila  today,  June  1,  U.S.  ami  Philip- 
lie  Government  representatives  signed 
Memorandum  of  Agreement  coll- 
uding our  review  of  the  U.S.-Philippine 
ilitary  Bases  Agreement.  Review 
scussions  started  on  April  11  between 
le  U.S.  panel,  led  by  U.S.  Ambassador 
>  the  Philippines,  Michael  H.  Armacost, 
id  the  Philippine  panel,  headed  by  Am- 
issador  to  the  United  States,  Benjamin 
.  Romualdez.  Ambassadors  Armacost 
id  Romualdez  signed  the  Memorandum 
'  Agreement  for  their  respective  coun- 
ies.  The  review  was  conducted  in  a 
irdial  and  cooperative  atmosphere.  The 
jreement  enters  into  force  immedi- 
.ely. 

The  review  confirmed  the  continuing 
ilue  of  the  Military  Bases  Agreement 
both  countries  in  maintaining  the 
■ace  and  security  of  the  region.  The 
jeement  maintains  the  current  U.S. 
•e  of  military  facilities  at  Clark  Air 
ise  and  Subic  Bay  Naval  Base  and 
fleets  Philippine  sovereignty  over  the 
ses.  Several  items  in  the  agreement 
e  intended  to  improve  administrative 
rangements  concerning  the  bases, 
nong  these  are  the  establishment  of  a 
nt  committee,  similar  to  ones  we  have 
th  Japan  and  Korea,  to  address  ques- 
>ns  relating  to  the  implementation  of 
e  Military  Bases  Agreement;  pro- 
dures  for  access  by  Philippine  base 
thorities  to  the  U.S.  facilities  within 
e  bases;  and  procedures  for  supplying 
formation  on  levels  of  U.S.  forces  per- 
inently  stationed  at  the  facilities,  as 
ell  as  on  their  equipment  and  weapons 
stems;  the  withholding  of  Philippine 
;ome  tax  from  the  salaries  of  Philip- 
ne  national  employees  working  for  the 
S.  Armed  Forces;  and  procedures  for 
curing  exemption  of  U.S.  Armed 
>rces  personnel  from  Philippine  travel 
x  and  modification  of  automobile 
gistration  fees  paid  by  U.S.  forces. 

In  the  light  of  the  satisfactory  coll- 
ision of  the  review  of  the  Military 
ises  Agreement  and  with  a  view 
ward  enhancing  the  Philippine  con- 
ibution  to  regional  peace  and  stability, 
letter  from  President  Reagan  has  been 
ansmitted  to  President  Marcos  stating 
at  the  executive  branch  will  make  its 
•st  effort  to  obtain  a  total  of  $900 
illion  in  security  assistance  for  the 
lilippines  for  the  FY  1985-89  period, 
lis  assistance  will  enable  the  United 


States  to  help  the  Philippines  in  its 
economic  development  and  military 
modernization  efforts. 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  1.  1983 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  have 
completed  the  scheduled  fifth  anniver- 
sary review  of  the  1947  Military  Bases 
Agreement  as  called  for  in  the  1979 
amendment.  Ambassador  of  the  Philip- 
pines to  the  United  States,  Benjamin  T. 
Romualdez,  and  Ambassador  of  the 
United  States  to  the  Philippines,  Michael 
H.  Armacost,  headed  the  two  panels 
which,  in  a  spirit  of  close  and  friendly 
cooperation,  conducted  discussions  in 
Manila  from  April  11,  1983,  to  June  1, 
1983. 

Accordingly,  a  complete  and  through 
reassessment  of  the  Military  Bases 
Agreement  and  the  manner  of  its  im- 
plementation was  accomplished  to  en- 
sure that  the  agreement  continues  to 
serve  the  interests  of  both  parties.  The 
review  resulted  in  the  signing  of  a 
Memorandum  of  Agreement  between 
the  two  governments  amending  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement. 

The  Memorandum  of  Agreement 
contains  provisions  on: 

A.  Procedures  for  access  of  the 
Philippine  Base  Commander  to  the  U.S. 
facilities  and  for  the  submission  of  infor- 
mation regarding  U.S.  force  levels  and 
their  equipment  and  weapons  systems  in 
the  Philippines; 

B.  The  obligation  of  the  U.S.  Armed 
Forces  personnel  to  respect  Philippine 
law  and  to  abstain  from  any  political  ac- 
tivity; 

C.  The  U.S.  pledge  to  cooperate 
with  the  Philippine  Government  in  im- 
proving economic  and  social  conditions 
in  Angeles  City  and  Olongapo  City  and 
surrounding  areas; 

D.  The  procurement  of  Philippine 
goods  and  services  by  the  U.S.  forces  to 
the  maximum  extent  feasible; 

E.  The  modification  of  criminal 
jurisdiction  arrangements  in  the  event  of 
war; 

F.  The  review  of  the  Base  Labor 
Agreement  within  6  months; 

G.  The  withholding  of  income  tax 
from  Filipino  employees  working  for  the 
U.S.  Armed  Forces  at  U.S.  facilities; 

H.  Procedures  for  securing  exemp- 


tion of  U.S.  Armed  Forces  personnel 
from  Philippine  travel  tax  and  modifica- 
tion of  automobile  registration  fees; 

I.  The  establishment  of  a  joint  com- 
mittee to  facilitate  more  effective  im- 
plementation of  the  Military  Bases 
Agreement  on  a  continuing  basis.  In  ad- 
dition, the  joint  committee  will  have  the 
authority  to  review  base  areas  that 
might  be  returned  to  the  Philippines; 
study  social,  health,  and  other  problems 
with  a  view  to  recommending  programs 
and  activities  to  improve  conditions  and 
enhance  cordial  relations  between 
American  personnel  in  the  U.S.  facilities 
and  the  surrounding  Filipino  com- 
munities; and  address  other  topics 
relating  to  the  implementation  of  the 
agreement. 

The  United  States  will  allow  the 
Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  to  pro- 
cure fuel  from  the  pipeline  between 
Subic  Bay  Naval  Base  and  Clark  Air 
Base  in  accordance  with  existing  U.S. 
procedures  and  policies  regarding  the 
acquisition  of  military  items. 

During  the  review,  both  parties  took 
note  of  the  importance  of  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement  in  serving  the  security 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Philippines  and  in  furthering  the  strong 
traditional  ties  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. In  the  light  of  the  satisfactory  con- 
clusion of  the  review  of  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement  and  with  the  view 
toward  enhancing  the  Philippine  con- 
tribution to  regional  peace  and  stability, 
President  Reagan  has  conveyed  in  a  let- 
ter to  President  Marcos  the  intent  of  the 
executive  branch  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment to  make  its  best  effort  to  obtain 
appropriations  for  the  Philippines  of 
$900  million  in  security  assistance,  in- 
cluding economic  support  funds.  The  ap- 
propriations, which  are  subject  to  U.S. 
congressional  approval,  will  be  sought 
over  a  5-year  period  beginning  in  U.S. 
FY  1985  in  the  following  amounts:  grant 
economic  support  funds  $475  million; 
foreign  military  sales  credits  $300 
million;  and  grant  military  assistance 
$125  million. 


MEMORANDUM  OF  AGREEMENT, 
JUNE  1,  1983 

The  exchange  of  notes  between  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Philippines  and  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  amending  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement,  dated  January  7,  1979, 
provides:  "In  every  fifth  anniversary  year 
from  the  date  of  this  modification  and  until 
the  termination  of  the  Military  Bases  Agree- 
ment, there  shall  be  begun  and  completed  a 
complete  and  thorough  review  and  reassess- 
ment of  the  agreement,  including  its  objec- 


ugust 1983 


19 


EAST  ASIA 


tives,  its  provisions,  its  duration,  and  the 
manner  of  implementation,  to  assure  that  the 
agreement  continues  to  serve  the  mutual  in- 
terests of  both  parties." 

Accordingly,  discussions  between 
representatives  of  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  were  conducted  in  Manila  from 
April  11,  1983,  to  June  1,  1983.  Pursuant  to 
the  understanding  reached  during  the  review, 
the  Government  of  the  Philippines  and  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  agree  to 
the  following; 

I.  Operational  Use  of  the  Bases 

Within  the  context  of  Philippine  sovereignty, 
the  operational  use  of  the  bases  for  military 
combat  operations  other  than  those  con- 
ducted in  accordance  with  the  Philippines- 
United  States  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  and  the 
Southeast  Asia  Collective  Defense  Treaty 
(Manila  Pact),  or  the  establishment  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  long- 
range  missiles  in  the  bases,  shall  be  the  sub- 
ject of  prior  consultation  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  not- 
withstanding the  provision  of  the  1979 
amendment  to  the  Military  Bases  Agreement 
assuring  the  United  States  of  unhampered 
military  operations  involving  its  forces  in  the 
Philippines. 

II.  Access  and  Information 

With  a  view  to  keeping  the  Government  of 
the  Philippines  fully  informed  about  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  United  States  forces  in  the 
Philippines,  the  following  shall  be  established; 

(1)  The  Base  Commander  and  his 
designated  representative  shall  have  access 
to  all  areas  of  the  United  States  facilities  ex- 
cept cryptographic  areas  and  areas  where 
classified  equipment  or  information  is  located. 
Access  to  areas  where  classified  equipment  or 
information  is  located  shall  be  in  accordance 
with  mutually  agreed  procedures. 

(2)  The  Government  of  the  United  States 
shall,  within  a  reasonable  period,  inform  the 
Government  of  the  Philippines  of  the  current 
level  of  the  United  States  forces  permanently 
stationed  in  the  Philippines,  and  their  equip- 
ment and  weapons  systems.  Thereafter,  the 
United  States  Government  shall  notify  the 
Government  of  the  Philippines  of  any  major 
change  in  United  States  forces  permanently 
stationed  in  the  Philippines,  and  major 
changes  in  their  equipment  and  weapons 
systems. 

III.  Respect  for  Philippine  Law 

It  is  the  duty  of  members  of  the  United 
States  forces,  the  civilian  component,  and 
their  dependents,  to  respect  the  laws  of  the 
Republic  of  the  Philippines  and  to  abstain 
from  any  activity  inconsistent  with  the  spirit 
of  the  Military  Bases  Agreement  and,  in  par- 
ticular, from  any  political  activity  in  the 
Philippines.  The  United  States  shall  take  all 
measures  within  its  authority  to  ensure  thai 
this  is  done. 

The  appropriate  authorities  of  the 


Government  of  the  Philippines  and  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  shall 
cooperate  in  taking  such  steps  as  are 
necessary  to  prevent  abuse  of  importation 
privileges  granted  to  the  United  States  per- 
sonnel and  their  dependents  pursuant  to  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement. 

In  this  connection,  the  two  Governments 
wish  to  reaffirm  existing  arrangements 
established  in  t  he  prior  agreements  w  Inch 
provide  for  cooperation  between  the  United 
States  Armed  Forces  and  Philippine 
authorities. 

IV.  Economic  and  Social  Improvement 
of  Areas  Surrounding  the  Bases 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  reaf- 
firms the  statements  made  by  Secretary  of 
State  Cyrus  Vance  in  his  letter  of  January  6, 
1979,  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  Carlos 
P.  Romulo  to  the  effect  that  the  two  Govern- 
ments shall  take  steps  to  promote  suitable 
projects  in  the  base  lands  outside  the  United 
States  facilities  and  the  areas  surrounding 
them  and  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  consider,  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  United  States  Congress,  ap- 
propriate assistance  for  improving  economic 
and  social  conditions  in  Angeles  City  and 
Olongapo  City  and  surrounding  areas  and  to 
relate  these  efforts  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  plans  of  the  Government  of 
the  Philippines  for  the  utilization  of  returned 
base  land  areas.  Moreover,  the  United  States 
Forces  shall  procure  goods  and  services  in 
the  Philippines  to  the  maximum  extent  feasi- 
ble. 

V.  Criminal  Jurisdiction 

Paragraph  6  of  the  agreed  official  minutes 
regarding  Article  XIII  of  the  Military  Bases 
Agreement  as  revised  by  the  Mendez-Blair 
agreement  of  August  10,  1965,  is  amended  to 
read: 

"In  the  event  of  hostilities  to  which  the 
provisions  of  Article  V  of  the  Mutual  Defense 
Treaty  apply,  either  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines  or  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  shall  have  the  right,  by  giving  sixty 
days  notice  to  the  other,  to  suspend  the  ap- 
plication of  any  provision  of  Article  XIII  of 
the  Military  Bases  Agreement.  If  such  notice 
is  given,  the  two  Governments  shall  im- 
mediately consult  with  a  view  to  agreeing  on 
suitable  arrangements  to  replace  the  provi- 
sions suspended.  Until  new  arrangements  are 
concluded,  the  provisions  of  Article  XIII  shall 
continue  to  apply  in  full." 

VI.  Labor  and  Taxation 

Representatives  of  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  shall  meet  to  discuss  possible 
revisions  of  or  alterations  in  the  Agreement 
of  May  27,  19t>8,  concerning  the  employment 
of  Philippine  nationals  by  the  United  States 
Forces  in  the  Philippines  in  light  of  the 
critical  contribution  made  by  the  Philippine 
national  work  force  to  the  effective  operation 
of  the  United  States  facilities  and  with  a  view 


to  ensuring  that  labor  relations  involving  j 
Philippine  national  work  force  remain  harl 
monious  and  productive.  These  discussion;! 
shall  begin  within  six  months  after  the  coil 
elusion  of  the  1983  review  of  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement  or  on  another  date  agrel 
upon.  The  discussions  shall  be  conducted  cl 
the  basis  of  the  principles  of  equality  of  trl 
ment,  the  right  to  organize  and  bargain  ccl 
lectively,  and  respect  for  the  sovereignty  (I 
the  Republic  of  the  Philippines. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States 
shall  make  arrangements  for  the  withhold] 
beginning  October  1,  1983,  of  Philippine  ir 
come  tax  from  the  salaries  of  Philippine  n; 
tionals  employed  by  the  Armed  Forces  of  I 
United  States  in  connection  with  the  con- 
struction, maintenance,  and  operation  of  tl 
United  States  facilities,  in  accordance  with 
applicable  Philippine  laws  and  regulations, 
except  employees  whose  income  is  exempt 
from  Philippine  income  taxation  or  who  ar 
members  of  the  United  States  Armed  Fort 
The  Government  of  the  Philippines  shall 
notify  such  employees  of  the  United  States 
that  withholding  has  been  initiated  at  the  : 
quest  of  the  Government  of  the  Philippines 
and  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  in  complying  with  that  request,  inc 
no  obligation  with  respect  to  any  reduction 
net  compensation  or  payment  which  may 
result. 

The  Government  of  the  Philippines  sha 
adopt  a  simplified  procedure  to  facilitate  tl 
travel  of  members  of  the  United  States 
Armed  Forces,  the  civilian  component,  and 
their  dependents,  who  shall  continue  to  be 
empt  from  the  payment  of  the  travel  tax  ir 
posed  under  Presidential  Decree  No.  1183 
August  21,  1977. 

With  regard  to  automobiles  imported  ir 
the  Philippines  under  the  Military  Bases 
Agreement  by  members  of  the  United  Stat 
Armed  Forces,  the  civilian  component,  and 
their  dependents,  charges  imposed  for  the 
registration  of  those  automobiles  shall  inch 
only  the  actual  registration  and  license  plat 
fees. 

VII.  Joint  Committee 

A  Military  Bases  Agreement  Joint  Commit 
tee  shall  be  established  as  a  means  of  con- 
sultation between  the  two  Governments  on 
matters  regarding  the  implementation  of  th> 
Military  Bases  Agreement  which  cannot  be 
resolved  between  the  Philippine  Base  Com- 
mander and  the  United  States  Facilities  Co; 
manders  or  any  other  matter  regarding  im- 
plementation of  the  Military  Bases  Agree- 
ment which  either  side  wishes  to  bring  befo 
the  Committee.  The  Military  Bases  Agree- 
ment Joint  Committee  will  assume  respon- 
sibility for  matters  relating  to  that  agree- 
ment referred  to  in  paragraph  4A  of  Annex 
A  of  the  exchange  of  notes  of  May  15.  1958 
establishing  the  Philippine-United  States 
Mutual  Defense  Board.  In  view  of  its  special 
character  and  composition,  the  Criminal 
Jurisdiction  Implementation  Committee  will 
remain  as  presently  constituted. 

The  Military  Bases  Agreement  Joint 
Committee  shall  be  composed  of  a  represent 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


EAST  ASIA 


five  of  the  Government  of  Philippines  and  a 

jepresentative  of  the  Government  of  the 
iJnited  States,  each  of  whom  shall  have  one 
r  more  deputies  and  staff.  The  Committee 
hail  determine  its  own  procedures  and  ar- 
ange  for  such  auxiliary  organs  and  ad- 
Bnistrative  services  as  may  be  required.  The 
'ommittee  shall  be  so  organized  that  it  may 
heet  at  any  time  at  the  request  of  the 
lepresentative  of  either  Government. 

If  the  Military  Bases  Agreement  Joint 
'ommittee  is  unable  to  resolve  any  matter,  it 
hall  refer  that  matter  to  the  respective 
rovernments  for  further  consideration. 

This  agreement  shall  enter  into  force 
pon  signature.  In  witness  whereof,  the 
ndersigned,  being  duly  authorized  by  their 
espective  Governments,  have  signed  this 
greement. 

Done  at  Manila,  in  duplicate,  this  1st  day 
f  June,  1983. 

'or  the  Government  of  the 
Inited  States  of  America 

IICHAEL  H.  ARMACOST 

'or  the  Government  of  the 
lepublic  of  the  Philippines 

lENJAMIN  T.  ROMUALDEZ 


RESIDENT  REAGAN'S 
,ETTER  TO 
RESIDENT  MARCOS 

May  31,  1983 

'ear  Mr.  President: 

was  pleased  to  learn  that  our  representa- 
ves  have  completed  the  review  of  the 
lilitary  Bases  Agreement  which  was  agreed 
>  during  your  state  visit  to  the  United 
tates  last  year. 

In  light  of  this  development,  I  wish  to 
,ate  that  the  Executive  Branch  of  the 
nited  States  Government  will,  during  the 
ve  fiscal  years  beginning  on  October  1, 
084,  make  its  best  efforts  to  obtain  ap- 
ropriation  of  security  assistance  for  the 
hilippines  in  the  following  amounts: 

lilitary  Assistance $125,000,000 

oreign  Military  Sales  Credits  .  .$300,000,000 
conomic  Support  Fund 
Assistance $475,000,000 

In  this  connection  the  United  States 
overnment  will  seek  to  provide  the  Foreign 
lilitary  Sales  Credit  on  the  basis  of  a  grace 
eriod  of  ten  years  and  a  repayment  period 
f  twenty  years.  As  you  are  aware,  under  our 
onstitutional  system,  the  Congress  has  sole 
uthority  to  appropriate  funds. 

I  was  also  pleased  to  note  that  the 
lilitary  Bases  Agreement  review  confirmed 
hat  the  Agreement  continues  to  meet  our 
nutual  needs  and  interests.  I  believe  that  this 
eview  has  again  underlined  the  close  and 
listoric  ties  linking  our  two  countries  and  will 
ontribute  to  further  strengthening  the  peace 
ind  security  of  the  western  Pacific  region. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan  ■ 


U.S.-Philippine  Relations  and  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement  Review 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
June  16,  1983.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs. : 

I  am  pleased  to  address  today  our 
overall  relations  with  the  Philippines  and 
the  recently  concluded  5-year  review  of 
our  1947  Military  Bases  Agreement 
(MBA).  This  review,  completed  in  the 
relatively  short  period  of  7  weeks, 
reflects  the  excellent  state  of  our 
bilateral  relations  and  the  important  role 
Subic  Bay  Naval  Base  and  Clark  Air 
Base  play  in  furthering  our  mutual 
security  interests. 

Long-Term  Bilateral 
Relationship 

The  close  ties  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Philippines  span  the  20th  cen- 
tury. It  is  a  long  and  deep  relationship. 
The  U.S.  influence  in  the  Philippines  has 
been  a  strong  and  positive  one.  And  our 
own  culture  and  society  have  been 
enriched,  in  turn,  by  our  relationship 
with  the  Philippines  and  by  the  presence 
of  the  roughly  1  million  Filipino- 
Americans  and  Filipinos  who  live  in  the 
United  States.  Our  longstanding 
economic  ties  are  healthy,  also.  The 
United  States  is  still  the  largest  market 
for  Philippine  goods  and  the  primary 
source  of  its  foreign  investment. 

In  addition  to  these  shared  personal 
and  economic  interests,  our  countries 
have  been  partners  for  decades  in  the  ef- 
fort to  promote  our  common  interest  in 
regional  stability  and  security.  We  were 
comrades-in-arms  during  World  War  II, 
and  we  have  continued  a  close  security 
partnership  after  the  Philippines  became 
independent  in  1946.  The  treaty  cover- 
ing our  bases  dates  back  to  1947,  our 
Mutual  Defense  Treaty  to  1952. 

Role  of  the  U.S.  Military  Presence 

U.S.  military  forces  in  the  Philippines 
are  evidence  of  our  abiding  commitment 
to  the  Philippines  under  our  Mutual 
Defense  Treaty.  This  security  relation- 
ship is,  in  turn,  a  key  element  of  our 
policies  toward  Southeast  Asia,  which 


have  contributed  significantly  to  the 
peace,  security,  and  remarkable 
economic  growth  and  political  stability 
of  the  entire  region. 

Our  facilities  at  Subic  Bay  and  Clark 
Air  Field  play  a  crucial  role  in  further- 
ing our  efforts: 

•  To  provide  an  effective  counter- 
balance in  the  area  to  the  growing 
military  power  of  the  Soviet  Union  and 
its  surrogates; 

•  To  support  our  treaty  com- 
mitments in  East  Asia; 

•  To  support  ASEAN  [Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  and 
strengthen  U.S.  ties  to  ASEAN  coun- 
tries; 

•  To  protect  the  sea  and  air  lanes  in 
and  around  an  area  that  occupies  an  im- 
portant place  in  world  trade;  and 

•  To  provide  the  logistic  support  of 
U.S.  forces  in  the  Indian  Ocean  and 
Southwest  Asia  that  help  to  maintain 
peace  and  stability  and  to  protect  vital 
interests  of  the  United  States — and  of 
U.S.  allies— in  that  important  part  of 
the  world. 

As  President  [Ferdinand  E.]  Marcos 
stated  recently,  all  the  countries  in  the 
region  friendly  to  the  United  States  ap- 
prove of  U.S.  naval  and  air  facilities  in 
the  Philippines,  because  they  ensure  the 
balance  of  power  in  Southeast  Asia.  A 
U.S.  military  withdrawal  would  only 
benefit  those  who  wish  to  fill  the  result- 
ant power  vacuum. 

Political  Situation 
in  the  Philippines 

Both  teams  of  negotiators  were  well 
aware  of  these  benefits  as  we  entered 
the  recent  review  of  our  bases  agree- 
ment. But  security  factors  were  not  the 
only  concerns  on  our  agenda.  Major 
military  facilities,  such  as  those  we  have 
in  the  Philippines,  can  only  be  effectively 
operated  with  the  support  of  the  host 
country's  government  and  people.  Main- 
taining needed  support  and  warm  rela- 
tions between  our  countries,  through 
due  regard  for  Philippine  sensitivities, 
was  thus  a  major  concern  in  our  discus- 
sions on  basing  arrangements. 

Unfortunately,  some  criticism  of  the 
U.S.  military  presence  has  been  an  in- 
gredient of  Philippine  politics  for  many 


<^ugust  1983 


21 


EAST  ASIA 


years.  In  gauging  the  extent  of  such  op- 
position, however,  it  is  worth  noting 
that,  despite  the  considerable  public 
scrutiny  recently  focused  on  the  bases, 
our  continued  role  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  a  major  matter  of  contention. 
We  believe  the  support  we  have  enjoyed 
through  various  Philippine  governments 
since  World  War  II  will  continue. 

Given  our  long-term  security  rela- 
tionship with  the  Philippines,  we  also 
pay  close  attention  to  other  domestic 
political  developments,  including  human 
rights  issues.  The  ending  of  martial  law 
in  1981  brought  with  it  some  im- 
provements in  the  civil  liberties  situa- 
tion. However,  progress  has  been 
uneven.  In  recent  months,  the  Marcos 
government  has  again  introduced  con- 
straints. Controls  on  public  assembly 
and  the  press  have  been  eased,  although 
at  times  controls  on  the  press  were 
reasserted.  For  example,  the  leading  op- 
position newspaper  was  shut  down,  but 
another  opposition  newspaper  recently 
started  publishing.  There  is  criticism  of 
the  government  and  of  government 
policies  in  the  media,  but  it  is  subdued. 
One  respected  moderate  opposition 
leader,  the  mayor  of  a  large  city  in 
Mindanao,  has  been  jailed.  On  balance, 
however,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  in  some 
respects  the  situation  is  improved  over 
1978,  when  we  last  discussed  our 
military  presence  with  the  Philippine 
Government. 

The  increase  in  armed  insurgent  ac- 
tions, however,  has  caused  a  serious 
problem  of  military  excesses  against 
civilians.  The  government  knows  that 
this  is  a  problem  and  has  attempted  to 
remedy  it  but,  so  far,  with  little  success. 
Recently,  however,  in  the  first  action  of 
its  kind,  two  high-ranking  officers  were 
convicted  of  abuses. 

Human  rights  and  church  groups 
regularly  bring  these  problems  to  the 
government's  attention.  The  Catholic 
church's  recent  pastoral  letter  on  this 
and  other  problems  was  met  with  a 
declaration  of  the  government's  intent  to 
engage  in  dialogue. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part, 
welcomes  any  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
government  and  concerned  groups  of 
Filipinos  to  address  their  problems 
through  dialogue.  We  look  toward  the 
scheduled  parliamentary  elections  in 
1984,  in  which  it  is  our  expectation  that 
all  legitimate  groups  will  have  a  fair 
chance  to  participate.  These  elections 
promise  significant  progress  toward  a 
more  open  political  system.  Meanwhile, 
we  will  continue  to  deal  with  human 
rights  issues  and  problems  in  the  Philip- 
pines through  a  policy  of  quiet  dialogue 


with  the  government  and  extensive  con- 
tact with  a  wide  spectrum  of  Philippine 
society,  including  the  legitimate  opposi- 
tion. This  active  policy  is  a  fundamental 
part  of  our  overall  approach  in  the 
Philippines. 

Terms  of  the  1983  MBA  Review 

Against  this  background  of  concerns,  we 
conducted  the  recent  5-year  review  of 
the  MBA.  The  key  U.S.  objectives  were 
to  enhance  our  two  nations'  mutual 
security;  to  ensure  the  continuation  of 
unhampered  use  of  the  U.S.  facilities 
consistent  with  the  respect  due  to  Philip- 
pine sovereignty;  and  to  facilitate  resolu- 
tion of  practical  problems — all  with  an 
eye  to  limited  U.S.  resources.  I  am 
pleased  to  report  that  we  were  able  to 
accomplish  these  objectives.  For  its  part, 
the  Philippine  Government  stressed,  as 
did  we,  its  continuing  sovereignty  over 
the  U.S.  facilities. 

While  maintaining  the  essential 
structure  of  our  current  agreement,  the 
review  resulted  in  a  series  of  new  pro- 
cedures and  administrative  ar- 
rangements to  deal  with  the  practical 
problems  which  inevitably  arise  in  a 
close  bilateral  undertaking  of  this  sort. 
The  most  important  new  provision  is  the 
establishment  of  a  joint  committee, 
similar  to  the  one  we  have  with  Japan 
and  Korea,  to  facilitate  implementation 
of  the  MBA.  In  addition,  other  note- 
worthy points  included: 

•  Procedures  for  access  of  the 
Philippine  Base  Commander  to  the  U.S. 
facilities; 

•  Procedures  for  the  submission  of 
information  on  U.S.  force  levels  and 
their  equipment  and  weapons  systems; 
and 

•  Procedures  for  securing  exemp- 
tion of  U.S.  Armed  Forces  personnel 
from  Philippine  travel  tax  and  modifica- 
tion of  automobile  registration  fees. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  review, 
President  Reagan  transmitted  a  letter  to 
President  Marcos  conveying  the  pledge 
of  the  executive  branch  to  make  its  best 
efforts  to  provide  $900  million  in  securi- 
ty assistance  during  the  5  fiscal  years 
beginning  October  1,  1984.  The  figure  of 
$900  million  was  reached  after  con- 
sideration of  the  Philippine  Govern- 
ment's economic  development  needs,  its 
defense  modernization  goals,  our  current 
assistance  efforts  in  the  Philippines,  and 
the  decline  in  the  real  purchasing  power 
of  our  assistance  levels  since  the  time  of 
the  last  base  review  in  1979. 

Subject  to  the  authorization  and  ap- 
propriation of  funds  by  the  Congress, 


the  intention  of  the  executive  branch  il 
to  provide  more  than  half  of  the 
package:  $475  million  in  economic  supl 
port  funds  (ESF).  We  shall  soon  begin! 
planning  with  the  Philippine  Govern-  I 
ment  on  ESF  projects  and  programs.  I 
These  will  be  submitted  to  the  Congrel 
for  approval  during  the  normal 
budgetary  process.  We  expect  that  soil 
of  the  funds  will  be  used  to  improve  til 
social  and  economic  conditions  of  areal 
adjacent  to  the  bases,  while  most  of  til 
funds  will  be  used  on  a  nationwide  basl 
in  support  of  Philippine  economic 
development  priorities. 

The  rest  of  the  proposed  5-year 
security  assistance  is  military:  $125 
million  in  the  military  assistance  pro- 
gram (MAP)  and  $300  million  in  foreig 
military  sales  (FMS)  credit  guarantees 
This  assistance  would  enable  the  Phili] 
pine  military  to  begin  to  address  serio< 
ly  its  modernization  efforts,  which  in  r 
cent  years  have  been  affected  adverse 
by  Philippine  Government  budgetary 
constraints.  We  are  committed  to  re- 
quest the  Congress  for  FMS  credits  h; 
ing  a  10-year  grace  period,  and  repay- 
ment over  20  years.  Although  we  have 
not  discussed  specific  Philippine  milita 
needs  in  connection  with  this  assistanc 
package,  we  would  expect  it,  on  the 
basis  of  past  practice,  to  be  used  to  pu 
chase  aircraft,  helicopters,  ground 
vehicles,  engineering  equipment,  surfa 
vessels,  communications  equipment,  ai 
other  defense  articles. 


Conclusion 

The  U.S. -Philippine  relationship  has  o^ 
the  years  benefited  the  Philippines,  th> 
entire  Southeast  Asian  region,  and — b 
no  means  least — ourselves.  We  can  tai 
great  pride  in  the  contributions  we  ha1 
made  to  the  area  and  the  positive  role 
we  have  played.  I  would  hope  that  we 
will  continue  to  be  an  active  player  in 
this  important  part  of  the  world  for  a 
long  time  to  come.  That  is  also  the  wis- 
of  leaders  and  people  of  the  Philippine: 
and  of  the  peace-loving  countries  of  th> 
entire  region. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  he  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


ICONOMICS 




he  Challenge  of 
Economic  Growth 

r  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Address  before  the  sixth  UN  <  'on- 
rence  on  Trade  and  Development 
'NCTAD  VI)  in  Belgrade  on  June  13, 
SS.  Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy  Secretary  of 
ate. 

S.  participation  in  UNCTAD  VI  is 
tided  by  four  principles. 

First,  economic  progress  and 
velopment  is  a  common  goal.  The 
hievement  of  that  goal  will  require  a 
rious,  sustained  effort  on  the  part  of 
countries,  both  North  and  South.  As 
•cretary  of  State  Shultz  noted  recently: 

The  reality  of  mutual  interest  between 
■  Northern  and  Southern  Hemispheres  is 
:  at  all  reflected  in  either  the  doctrinaire 
ird  World  theory  of  debilitating  dependen- 
nor  the  aid  giver's  obsolete  sense  of 
;ronage.  There  is  now  a  relationship  of 
tual  responsibility.  Our  common  task  is  to 
ke  this  link  a  spur  to  growth  in  both 
rions.  .  .  . 

Second,  solutions  to  the  problems 
at  we  face  will  be  found  in  a  construc- 
e  and  cooperative  environment.  It  is 
this  context  that  President  Reagan 
ongly  supported  a  continuing  North- 
uth  dialogue  at  the  summit  in  Cancun, 
?xico.  The  seriousness  of  the  situation 

face  makes  it  imperative  that  we 
>rk  together  in  the  common  pursuit  of 
Elistic  and  workable  solutions. 

Third,  UNCTAD  has  an  important 
>e  to  play,  as  defined  by  its  mandate, 
the  challenge  of  economic  develop- 
•nt.  Our  efforts,  therefore,  should  con- 
ltrate  on  reaching  conclusions  that 

attainable  within  the  context  of 
■JCTAD.  This  conference  can  best 
•ve  the  interests  of  its  members  by 
.ping,  through  debate  and  discussion, 
create  greater  consensus  on  how  to 
;ure  sustained  economic  recovery  and 
velopment. 

Fourth,  the  central  focus  of  interna- 
nal  cooperation  should  be  strengthen- 
r  an  open  international  trading,  finan- 
.1,  investment  system  that  nurtures 
Dwth  for  all  countries. 

I  should  like  now  to  outline  for  you  a 
3gram  of  action  based  on  these  four 
mciples.  In  so  doing,  I  shall  discuss 


the  roles  in  development  of  economic 
growth,  trade  expansion,  and  interna- 
tional finance,  as  well  as  the  important 
interrelationships  of  savings,  aid,  and  in- 
vestment. 

Growth  and  Global  Recovery 

We  are  now  emerging  from  the  longest 
recession  of  the  postwar  period.  North 
America  and  Europe  have  experienced 
outright  declines  in  economic  activity; 
Japan's  industrial  production  has 
stagnated;  unemployment  has  soared— 
32  million  people  are  out  of  work  in  the 
24  industrial  countries  of  the  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD). 

The  growth  of  the  oil-importing 
developing  countries,  which  averaged 
5%  annually  in  the  1970s,  slackened 
from  1980  to  1982  to  a  2%  annual 
rate— the  lowest  since  1950.  The 
dynamic  progress  of  several  large 
developing  countries  was  stalled  under 
the  weight  of  large  international  debts. 
Total  world  exports  declined  7%  from 
1980  to  1982,  from  almost  $2.1  trillion 
to  well  under  $2  trillion. 


the  Consumer  Price  Index)  has  plunged 
from  over  12%  in  1980  to  just  under  4% 
in  the  12  months  ending  this  April.  The 
prime  interest  rate  is  now  at  10.5% — 
about  half  its  peak  in  1981  of  21.5%.  In 
April,  industrial  production  jumped 
2.1%;  it  has  been  rising  at  an  annual 
rate  above  10%  since  its  low  point  in 
November. 

Growth  with  low  inflation  has 
resumed  also  in  the  economies  of  Japan, 
Germany,  Britain,  and  others  which, 
together  with  the  United  States,  account 
for  about  three-quarters  of  the  produc- 
tion of  the  industrial  countries.  The 
challenge  now  is  to  turn  this  revival  into 
a  global  recovery  and  sustained  growth 
for  the  rest  of  the  1980s— and  beyond. 

Trade  and  Commodities 

World  trade  is  the  key  to  this  revival.  In 
the  near  term,  trade  is  the  transmission 
belt  by  which  recovery  in  the  developed 
countries  will  produce  faster  growth  in 
the  developing  countries.  For  all  coun- 
tries, trade  is  the  dominant  source  of  ex- 
ternal resources,  and  for  developing 
countries  trade  is  the  dominant  impetus 
to  growth.  In  1980,  the  developing  coun- 
tries' export  earnings  of  $580  billion 
were  17  times  as  much  as  their  net 
receipts  of  aid.  Acceleration  of  growth 
in  the  industrial  nations  from  about  2% 
this  year  (the  forecast  of  the  OECD 
Secretariat)  to  4%  the  next  year  and 


For  the  developing  countries,  the  worldwide 
recession  has  led  to  a  serious  income-earning  prob- 
lem. The  only  lasting  solution  to  that  problem,  and 
also  to  the  problems  of  the  industrial  countries,  is 
sustained  economic  growth — without  renewed 
inflation. 


For  the  developing  countries,  the 
worldwide  recession  has  led  to  a  serious 
income-earning  problem.  The  only 
lasting  solution  to  that  problem,  and  also 
to  the  problems  of  the  industrialized 
countries,  is  sustained  economic 
growth— without  renewed  inflation. 

The  industrialized  countries  have 
now  begun  to  lead  an  expansion  of  the 
world  economy.  In  the  United  States, 
for  example,  inflation  (as  measured  by 


beyond  would  itself  add  $20-$25  billion 
annually  to  the  export  earnings  of  non- 
oil  developing  countries. 

The  United  States,  whose  market  is 
the  world's  largest  and  one  of  the  most 
open,  has  contributed  significantly  to  the 
growth  and  diversification  of  developing 
countries'  exports.  In  1981  the  United 
States  purchased  more  than  $120  billion 
in  goods  and  services  from  developing 
countries,  of  which  $70  billion  consists  of 


ugust 1983 


23 


ECONOMICS 


imports  from  non-oil  developing  coun- 
tries. U.S.  purchases  absorbed  almost 
one-quarter  of  all  exports  of  those  non- 
oil  developing  countries  and  more  than 
half  of  their  exports  of  manufactured 
goods  to  OECD  countries.  The  growth 
in  U.S.  imports  of  manufactured  goods 
from  the  developing  countries  has  been 


on  proposals  for  a  new  negotiating 
round  in  the  GATT." 

The  United  States  believes  that 
major  cooperative  efforts  are  needed  to 
assure  an  open  international  trading 
system  for  all,  with  particular  emphasis 
on  the  growth  of  developing  countries 
during  the  rest  of  this  century.  A  pro- 


The  United  States  believes  that  major 
cooperative  efforts  are  needed  to  assure  an  open  in- 
ternational trading  system  for  all,  with  particular 
emphasis  on  the  growth  of  developing  countries 
during  the  rest  of  this  century. 


especially  strong.  During  the  1970s 
these  imports  grew  at  an  average  rate 
of  27%  per  year.  Our  market  remains 
largely  open.  The  average  U.S.  tariff  on 
dutiable  exports  of  developing  countries 
is  less  than  5%;  our  nontariff  obstacles 
to  trade  are  relatively  few. 

Large,  growing,  open  markets  are 
the  main  hope  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries for  dealing  with  their  debt  burdens 
and  growth  problems.  The  United  States 
is  committed  to  maintaining  and  expand- 
ing open  markets. 

Last  November's  ministerial  meeting 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT)  did  not  accomplish  all 
that  we  desired,  but  it  did  keep  the 
GATT  system  moving  in  a  positive  direc- 
tion. The  meeting  ended  with  a  declara- 
tion in  which  the  ministers  pledged  "to 
refrain  from  taking  or  maintaining  any 
measures  inconsistent  with  the  GATT." 
The  OECD  ministerial  in  early  May 
went  even  further,  with  the  ministers 
pledging  to  "reverse  protectionist 
trends." 

The  heads  of  state  who  met  recently 
at  Williamsburg  agreed  to  translate 
these  pledges  on  open  trade  from  words 
to  concrete  actions.  The  summit  part- 
ners agreed  "to  halt  protectionism,  and 
as  recovery  proceeds  to  reverse  it  by 
dismantling  trade  barriers."  They  also 
agreed  to  "work  to  achieve  further  trade 
liberalization  negotiations  in  the  GATT, 
with  particular  emphasis  on  expanding 
trade  with  and  among  developing  coun- 
tries .  .  .  [and]  to  continue  consultations 


gram  equal  to  the  challenge  of  assuring 
an  open  trading  system  should  include 
the  following  actions. 

•  First  of  all,  nations  should 
strengthen  their  commitments  to  resist 
protectionism.  Developed  countries  have 
particularly  serious  responsibilities  here, 
because  their  constructive  actions  great- 
ly benefit  other  countries  as  well  as 
themselves. 

•  Furthermore,  preparations  should 
begin  now  under  GATT  auspices  for  a 
major  new  international  trade  liberaliza- 
tion, with  emphasis  on  reducing  barriers 
to  North-South  trade  through  mutual  ex- 
change of  concessions. 

•  Expansion  of  trade  among  devel- 
oping countries  can  also  be  promoted 
through  trade-creating  tariff  reductions 
among  developing  countries  themselves. 

•  Generalized  preferences  in  devel- 
oped countries  should  be  continued  and 
refined.  In  the  United  States  we  expect 
to  move  forward  shortly  with  legislation 
renewing  our  system  of  generalized 
trade  preferences  for  developing  coun- 
tries. We  hope  to  provide  special 
measures  to  improve  the  use  of  our 
generalized  preferences  scheme  by  those 
countries  most  in  need  of  benefits. 

•  The  GATT  should  be  strengthened 
to  spearhead  new  trade  liberalization, 
particularly  with  developing  countries, 
bring  greater  discipline  to  the  use  of 
safeguards,  improve  dispute  settlement, 
and  improve  the  ground  rules  for 
agricultural  trade. 


•  Finally,  technical  assistance 
should  be  provided  to  the  least 
developed  countries  to  promote  their 
trading  capacity. 

This  program  will  increase  trade, 
promote  growth,  and  provide  a  found: 
tion  for  the  resolution  of  many  of  our 
present  problems. 

Our  efforts  to  promote  a  better 
climate  for  trade  have  particular 
relevance  to  the  expansion  of  developi 
country  participation  in  the  processing 
marketing,  and  distribution  of  com- 
modities. Achieving  our  objectives  in  t 
trade  area  will  accelerate  the  developi 
country  role  in  these  commodity-relate 
activities,  where  they  have  already 
demonstrated  impressive  growth. 

Nevertheless,  the  United  States 
recognizes  the  difficult  problems  faced 
by  many  developing  countries  heavily 
dependent  upon  commodity  exports.  T 
fact  is  that  commodity  prices  fell  by  ai 
average  of  20%  from  1980  to  1982.  Tr 
long-term  answer  to  this  problem  is  si 
tained,  noninflationary  growth  over  th 
coming  years. 

Commodity  agreements  have  not 
been  successful,  by  and  large,  in 
ameliorating  wide  swings  in  commodit 
prices.  It  is  not,  therefore,  in  anyone's 
interest  to  raise  unrealistic  expectatioi 
about  the  usefulness  of  new  commodit 
agreements.  While  the  United  States 
will  continue  to  consider  such 
agreements  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  w> 
see  a  limited  role  for  price  stabilizatioi 
agreements. 

More  effective,  in  our  opinion,  hav 
been  arrangements  to  provide  financii 
to  commodity-exporting  countries  wht 
their  earnings  temporarily  fell.  The  Ir 
ternational  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  has 
compensatory  financing  facility  of  this- 
kind.  We  will  join  other  members  of  tl' 
IMF  in  a  constructive  review  of  this 
facility.  The  United  States  supports  th 
proven  approach  rather  than  the  crea- 
tion of  new  institutions  with  overlappi 
purposes  and  smaller  capital. 

We  will  consider  participation  in 
"other  measures"  commodity  agreemei 
if  it  appears  that  they  serve  a  useful 
function  and  meet  appropriate  criteria 
For  example,  we  have  just  decided  to 
join  the  International  Jute  Agreement 
The  U.S.  Government  also  is  willing  tc 
explore  the  possibility  of  establishing 
producer-consumer  fora  for  com- 
modities, unless  they  involve  efforts  to 
establish  price  stabilization  agreements 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


ECONOMICS 


In  sum,  the  program  I  have  outlined 
Sr  growth  and  trade  can  work.  The 
(stribution  of  its  benefits,  however,  will 
ppend  on  the  domestic  policies  pursued 
V  individual  developing  countries.  Some 
f  the  fastest  growing  economies  in  the 
orld  are  those  of  East  and  Southeast 
Isian  states  which  have  followed  a 
l-ade-oriented  strategy.  These  states 
pve  liberal  import  regimes;  adequate  in- 
ntives  for  producers;  and  realistic 
rices,  interest  rates,  and  exchange 
ttes.  The  experience  of  these  states 
jmonstrates  that  the  most  critical  con- 
ibution  a  country  can  make  to  its  own 
jvelopment  lies  in  pursuing  appropriate 
)mestie  economic  policies.  This,  I  might 
dd,  is  as  true  for  the  United  States  and 
;veloped  countries  as  it  is  for  develop- 
g  countries. 

iternational  Finance 

Ike  the  GATT  in  the  area  of  trade 
;gotiations,  strong  international  in- 
itutions  exist  to  foster  cooperation  in 
oviding  essential  financial  support  to 
veioping  countries.  The  IMF,  with  its 
oposed  expansion  of  resources,  will  be 
lengthened  in  its  role  of  assisting 
untries  with  balance-of-payments  dif- 
ulties.  The  World  Bank  has  a  large 
pital  base  to  support  its  essential  role 
intermediation  between  international 
pital  markets  and  developing  countries 
th  limited  access  to  those  markets, 
ese  institutions,  contrary  to  the 
.ims  of  their  critics,  are  proving  in  the 
rrent  difficult  period  that  they  are 
al  and  flexible  instruments  for  sup- 
rting  global  recovery  and  economic 
1  velopment. 

The  United  States  sees  international 
i  titutions  such  as  the  IMF,  the  World 
I  nk,  and  the  regional  development 
I  nks  as  being  essential  to  the  needs  of 
I '  deficit  and  developing  countries. 
I  ice  recent  lending  by  the  IMF  has 
%  lined  Fund  liquidity,  the  Reagan  Ad- 
1  nistration  strongly  supports  the  pro- 
l-sed  47.4%  quota  increase  and  the  ex- 
I  asion  of  the  General  Arrangements  to 
trrow  (GAB)  from  $7  to  $19  billion. 
1st  week  the  $8.4  billion  U.S.  contribu- 
<n  to  these  increases  was  approved  on 
I  ■  floor  of  the  U.S.  Senate,  and  action 
I  the  House  is  pending.  We  are  con- 
1  iced  that  by  providing  both  good 
I  icy  advice  and  supplementary  financ- 
I ;  to  ease  the  process  of  adjustment, 
I*  IMF  contributes  to  the  maintenance 
•  economic  and  political  stability. 

A  more  effective  role  for  the  IMF, 
Ijether  with  the  multilateral  banks,  will 
« uire  a  resilient  international  financial 


system  in  (he  1980s.  Working  together, 
these  institutions  can  help  developing 
countries  move  beyond  short-term 
stabilization  to  long-term  policies  that 
strengthen  market  forces  and  allocate 
resources  more  efficiently.  The  result 
should  be  accelerated  growth,  not  just 
stabilization. 

The  United  States  and  other  in- 
dustrial countries  have  been  actively 
cooperating  over  the  past  12  months 
with  developing  countries  which  face 
serious  debt  problems.  Several  Latin 
American  countries,  for  example,  have 
seen  their  progress  halted  by  a  burden 
of  debt  service.  Initial  steps  have  been 
taken  to  stabilize  their  financial  situation 
through  emergency  international  financ- 
ing through  the  IMF  and  austerity 
measures.  A  comprehensive  strategy, 
which  was  endorsed  at  Williamsburg, 
has  been  pursued.  This  strategy  contains 
the  following  elements:  effective  adjust- 
ment and  development  policies  by  debtor 
nations;  adequate  private  and  official 
financing;  more  open  markets;  and 
worldwide  economic  recovery.  A  prin- 
cipal objective  of  this  approach  has  been 
to  preserve  the  affected  countries' 
creditworthiness  and  ability  to  attract 
new  private  capital  to  help  finance 
growth  over  the  coming  years.  Any 


Savings,  Aid,  and  Investment 

An  open  trading  system  and  a  strong  in- 
ternational financial  system  will  help 
provide  a  framework  to  nurture  growth 
in  all  countries.  Such  growth  will  be 
fueled  in  each  instance  by  savings,  aid, 
and  investment. 

The  predominant  source  of  produc- 
tive investment  in  all  countries  is 
domestic  savings.  This  is  as  true  for 
developing  countries  as  for  industrial 
countries.  Adequate  incentives  for  peo- 
ple to  produce,  save,  and  invest  are  the 
heart  of  effective  policies  for  sustained 
growth.  The  same  incentives  are  essen- 
tial to  limit  the  capital  flight  which  has 
hurt  some  developing  countries  and  has 
complicated  their  debt  service  problems. 

Saving  is  an  area  where  the  record 
of  many  developing  countries  over  the 
past  decade  has  been  especially  strong. 
As  Prime  Minister  Gandhi  pointed  out  at 
this  conference  last  week,  over  87%  of 
the  $193  billion  India  has  invested  in 
development  since  1951  came  from 
domestic  savings.  On  the  average, 
developing  countries  have  devoted  about 
one-quarter  of  their  gross  national  prod- 
uct (GNP)  to  investment,  with  80%  of 
that  investment  financed  by  domestic 
savings. 


Foreign  assistance  is  not  a  substitute  for 
domestic  savings.  There  is,  in  a  sense,  a  pool  of 
world  savings.  Foreign  aid  is  taken  from  that  pool. 
Such  assistance  has  an  important  but  limited  role 
in  economic  development  as  a  supplement  to  effec- 
tively mobilized  domestic  savings. 


alternative  generalized  approach  which 
would  sacrifice  this  objective  would  be  a 
wasteful  one  for  all  parties. 

Achieving  these  results  may  require 
more  emphasis  on  problems  of  economic 
management  by  the  IMF  and  more  in- 
volvement of  the  World  Bank  in  sound 
adjustment  programs.  Such  an  approach 
helps  attract  increased  private  direct  in- 
vestment and  other  financing  to  provide 
part  of  the  capital  the  developing  coun- 
tries will  need  over  the  next  decade.  It 
augments  the  direct  role  of  the  World 
Bank  as  intermediator  between  interna- 
tional capital  markets  and  developing 
countries  with  limited  direct  access  to 
those  markets. 


Foreign  assistance  is  not  a 
substitute  for  domestic  savings.  There 
is,  in  a  sense,  a  pool  of  world  savings. 
Foreign  aid  is  taken  from  that  pool. 
Such  assistance  has  an  important  but 
limited  role  in  economic  development  as 
a  supplement  to  effectively  mobilized 
domestic  savings.  In  the  case  of  the  low- 
income  developing  countries,  where 
governments  have  little  or  no  direct  ac- 
cess to  international  capital  markets,  the 
role  of  foreign  assistance  is  especially 
important. 

The  United  States  continues  to  be 
the  largest  provider  of  official  develop- 
ment aid.  Last  year  the  U.S.  economic 


igust  1983 


25 


ECONOMICS 


assistance  program  totaled  $8.2  billion, 
having  risen  from  an  average  of  $6.5 
billion  in  1980-81.  Our  assistance  efforts 
are  focused  on  concrete  development 
problems.  At  this  moment,  for  example, 
we  have  assembled  in  Washington  a 
worldwide  conference  on  a  treatment, 
developed  with  U.S.  technology,  to  com- 
bat infant  mortality  stemming  from 
dehydration.  This  treatment  may  save 
the  lives  of  5  million  children  per  year  in 
the  developing  world. 

In  addition  to  the  United  States,  the 
other  16  members  of  the  Development 
Assistance  Committee  of  the  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  provided  official 
development  assistance  of  $20  billion  in 


other  economic  sectors,  portend  human 
tragedy  and  prolonged  turmoil  in  many 
African  societies  unless  these  tendencies 
are  reversed. 

A  prominent  aspect  of  the  economic 
crisis  in  Africa  is  the  impact  of  drought 
on  food  production.  As  a  part  of  a  policy 
to  help  affected  nations  deal  with 
drought  and  other  severe  emergencies, 
the  United  States  regularly  supplies 
emergency  food  aid  to  many  countries  in 
Africa.  Indeed,  just  this  past  week  the 
U.S.  Government  announced  that,  in 
response  to  the  disastrous  drought  and 
crop  failure  in  southern  Africa,  it  has 
approved  a  special,  additional  $25 
million  drought  relief  program  for  that 
stricken  region  in  the  year  ahead.  This 


Economic  development  is  a  complex  process. 
Many  people  think  of  it  only  in  terms  of  tangible 
things,  such  as  the  possession  of  resources.  But  the 
possession  of  resources  will  not  in  itself  ensure 
development.  The  resources  must  be  effectively 
used. 


1982.  The  combined  contributions  of  all 
members  support  a  current  lending  level 
of  $18  billion  annually  by  the 
multilateral  development  banks.  Plans 
call  for  a  rate  of  annual  increase  ranging 
from  12%  to  15%,  depending  on  the  par- 
ticular bank,  during  the  current 
replenishment  cycles. 

The  World  Bank's  International 
Development  Association  (IDA)  is  seen 
by  the  United  States  as  a  vital  institu- 
tion for  aiding  the  poorest  developing 
countries.  President  Reagan  has  pledged 
his  support  to  meet  the  full  U.S.  com- 
mitment to  IDA's  current  replenishment. 
The  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  has 
responded  to  the  President's  appeal  by 
approving  for  this  fiscal  year  the  full 
amount  requested  by  the  Administration 
toward  meeting  the  U.S.  commitment  to 
IDA. 

In  our  efforts  to  meet  the  special 
needs  of  the  lower  income  developing 
countries,  we  have  viewed  with  great 
concern  the  economic  crisis  that  has 
spread  across  much  of  Africa.  President 
Mitterrand  of  France  has  justifiably 
urged  special  attention  to  this  problem, 
posing  the  danger,  in  his  words,  that 
Africa  will  become  "the  lost  continent  of 
development."  Falling  per  capita  food 
production,  and  low  productivity  in  the 


addition  brings  our  total  food  aid  to  the 
affected  countries  in  southern  Africa, 
during  fiscal  1983,  to  just  under  $100 
million. 

Emergency  measures,  however,  are 
not  enough  to  resolve  the  situation  in 
Africa.  Improvement  will  require  ini- 
tiatives such  as  the  World  Bank's 
"Cooperation  for  Development  in  Africa" 
and  donor  participation  in  the  Southern 
Africa  Development  Coordinating  Con- 
ference. New  efforts  on  the  part  of  aid 
donors  are  also  needed  to  encourage  and 
support  urgent  reform,  particularly  in 
agriculture.  In  addition,  turning  around 
Africa's  economic  problems  will  require 
new  approaches  by  Africans  themselves. 
For  Africa,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the 
developing  world,  this  means  instituting 
reforms  such  as  market  prices  for 
farmers,  exchange  rate  policies  that  en- 
courage domestic  food  production,  and 
elimination  of  biases  against  agriculture 
in  domestic  investment  and  credit.  In 
the  absence  of  such  reforms,  develop- 
ment assistance  and  emergency 
measures  can  have  no  lasting  productive 
impact. 

One  of  the  goals  of  such  reforms 
should  be  the  encouragement  of  foreign 
direct  private  investment.  The  combined 


effects  of  growth  in  many  dynamic 
developing  economies  and  of  budgetarl 
pressures  on  industrial  countries  is  thJ 
the  roie  of  investment  is  growing 
relative  to  concessional  aid.  In  recent  I 
years  U.S.  aid  has  increased  at  a  rate  I 
about  6%  a  year.  In  contrast,  both  earl 
ings  from  exports  to  the  United  State] 
and  the  flow  of  U.S.  direct  investmentl 
in  developing  countries  grew  during  til 
1970s  by  about  20%  per  year.  By  the  I 
end  of  1981  U.S.  direct  investment  in  I 
developing  countries  totaled  $56  billioil 

Indeed,  international  private  direcl 
investment  presents  an  important  opjl 
tunity  for  developing  countries  to  supl 
plement  domestic  savings  and  official  I 
assistance.  International  direct  invest! 
ment  can  provide  many  economic  beml 
fits  to  developing  countries,  such  as 
capital,  know-how  and  technology,  as 
well  as  expanded  employment  and  ex- 
ports. Most  direct  investment  con- 
tributes to  domestic  productive  capaci 
without  the  debt  service  implications 
which  come  with  commercial  borrowir 

One  way  to  expand  the  flow  of 
private  investment  to  the  developing 
world  is  for  developed  and  developing 
countries  to  establish  ground  rules  thi 
create  favorable  conditions  for  it.  Ex- 
amples are  bilateral  tax  treaties,  in- 
surance understandings,  and  investme 
agreements  worked  out  or  being  nego 
tiated  between  the  United  States  and 
growing  number  of  countries.  We  star 
ready,  as  well,  to  consider  a  program 
multilateral  insurance  of  investment,  ; 
suggested  by  the  President  of  the  Wo 
Bank. 

In  addition,  we  urge  other  govern 
merits  to  consider  the  adverse  effects 
that  government  intervention,  such  as 
performance  requirements,  can  have  c 
their  own  and  the  world  economies.  T 
United  States  will  encourage  and  acth 
ly  participate  in  continued  work  in 
multilateral  institutions  to  address  the 
questions.  Further,  we  encourage 
adherence  by  all  countries  to  the  Pari? 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  In- 
dustrial Property  and  enactment  of  ef- 
fective intellectual  property  laws 
guaranteeing  recognition  of  patent, 
copyright,  trademark,  and  other  rights 
to  intellectual  property.  Such  laws  are 
essential  to  assure  the  flow  of  foreign 
direct  investment  and  of  related 
technology  and  other  benefits  into  hot! 
developed  and  developing  countries.  Tl 
lack  of  adequate  property  rights  is  a 
major  disincentive  to  investment  in 
manufacturing  facilities,  to  research  ar 
development,  and  to  the  transfer  of 
technologies. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bullei 


ECONOMICS 


ooperation  for  Development 

|.*onomic  development  is  a  complex 
locess.  Many  people  think  of  it  only  in 
|rms  of  tangible  things,  such  as  the 
ssession  of  resources.  But  the  posses- 
in  of  resources  will  not  in  itself  ensure 
velopment.  The  resources  must  be  ef- 
tively  used. 

The  differences  in  rates  of  economic 
Dgress  among  countries  do  not  result 
marily  from  lack  of  natural  resources, 
tories  of  oppression,  or  differences  in 
late  abilities  among  human  beings, 
ey  result  in  the  main  from  policies 
rsued  by  individual  countries.  Unfor- 
lately  there  are  cases  in  which  coun- 
s  have  dissipated  precious  resources 
questionable  investments  or  in  sub- 
izing  consumption.  In  other  cases,  the 
st  precious  resource  of  all,  human  ini- 
ive,  has  not  been  given  the  incentives 
Droductivity  or  the  freedom  to  make 
kinds  of  economic  decisions  which 
lead  to  dynamic  and  durable  growth. 
As  President  Reagan  said  in  his 
tember  1981  speech  to  the  IMF  and 
rid  Bank: 

Only  when  the  human  spirit  is  allowed  to 
nt  and  create,  only  when  individuals  are 
n  a  personal  stake  in  deciding  economic 
•ies  and  benefiting  from  their  success- 
then  can  societies  remain  economically 
',  dynamic,  prosperous,  progressive,  and 

A  society  develops  also  by  the  free 
iciation  of  individuals,  working 
!ther  in  voluntary  and  productive 
javors  of  every  kind.  Government 
an  undeniable  role— as  the  account- 
servant  of  the  people;  as  the  pro- 
r  of  public  safety  and  the  common 
nse;  as  the  guarantor  of  human 
ts,  due  process  of  law,  and  equal  op- 
unity. 

Governments  and  nations  working 
ether  have  a  vital  role,  because  our 
sperity  and  progress  today  depend 
n  the  health  of  the  global  economy  as 
1  as  that  of  our  own  societies.  All  the 
ensions  of  development— trade 
ralization,  revived  commodity 
-kets,  strengthened  financial  support, 
•eased  investment,  and  the  more  effi- 
nt  use  of  aid— require  our  col- 
)rative  efforts. 
This  UNCTAD  conference  has  a 

role  in  advancing  these  efforts. 
CTAD  is  an  important  forum  for 
•ussion  of  development  issues.  In 

regard,  we  are  convinced  that 
CTAD's  effectiveness  could  be 
fhtened  by  the  adoption  of  more 
tematic  and  transparent  management 


methods.  The  results  of  deliberations  at 
this  conference  can  be  reflected  in 
specific  negotiations  which  lake  place  in 
the  many  specialized  institutions  in 
which  our  countries  work  together.  In 
sum,  I  am  confident  that  our  discussions 
can  make  significant  progress  toward 
resolving  real  problems  in  an  at- 
mosphere of  cooperation  and  genuine 
dialogue. 


In  our  time,  the  developing  and  in- 
dustrial countries  have  found  their  fate 
linked  in  a  truly  global  economy.  The 
reality  of  North  and  South  is  now  that 
all  of  us  are  in  one  boat,  rising  and  fall- 
ing together.  We  now  have  in  prospect  a 
rising  tide— and  calmer  seas— to  speed 
us  on  a  course  of  recovery  and  growth. 
Working  together  we  can  catch  that 
tide.  ■ 


American  Policy  To  Promote 
World  Development 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  a  session  sponsored 
by  the  International  Development  Con- 
ference on  May  18,  1983.  Mr.  Wallis  is 
Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs. 

I  am  honored  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
address  you.  Clearly,  the  focus  of  this 
conference— World  Development  In 
Perspective:  What  Can  America  Do?— is 
significant  and,  judging  from  the  size  of 
this  evening's  group,  generates  con- 
siderable interest.  It  is  also  particularly 
timely,  since  the  Williamsburg  economic 
summit  and  the  UNCTAD  VI  [UN  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development]  con- 
ference are  fast  approaching. 

Many  people  respond  to  the  ques- 
tion, what  can  America  do  about  world 
development,  by  talking  only  of  the 
tangible  things  we  do,  especially  em- 
phasizing foreign  aid.  It  is  easy  to  make 
that  mistake  if  one  sees  development 
only  in  terms  of  money.  Others  make 
the  mistake  of  relating  it  only  to  com- 
passion and  believe  that  aid  will  cause 
deserts  to  bloom,  industries  to  spring 
up,  commerce  to  flourish,  and  well-being 
to  rise  miraculously.  Still  others  see  the 
only  path  to  rapid  development  in  collec- 
tivism, through  which  they  can  impose 
social,  religious,  or  national  goals, 
regardless  of  the  cost  in  individual 
liberty  and  cultural  traditions. 

Individual  Worth 

The  real  essence  of  development  is  dif- 
ferent from  all  of  these  things.  The 
foundation  of  development  lies  in  the 
meaning,  aspirations,  and  worth  of  each 
individual.  Its  realization  is  in  human 
fulfillment,  in  the  opportunity  for  all 
men  and  women  to  realize  freely  their 
full  potential— to  make  the  most  of  their 
God-given  talents.  President  Reagan  put 


it  this  way  in  his  October  1981  speech  to 
the  Philadelphia  World  Affairs  Council: 

We  Americans  can  speak  from  experience 
on  this  subject.  When  the  original  settlers  ar- 
rived here,  they  faced  a  wilderness  where 
poverty  was  their  daily  lot,  danger  and  star- 
vation their  close  companions.  But  through 
all  the  dangers,  disappointments,  and  set- 
backs, they  kept  their  faith.  They  never 
stopped  believing  that  with  the  freedom  to 
try  and  try  again,  they  could  make  tomorrow 
a  better  day.  .  .  . 

Free  people  build  free  markets  that  ignite 
dynamite  development  for  everyone;  and 
that's  the  key,  but  that's  not  all.  Something 
else  helped  us  create  these  unparalleled  op- 
portunities for  growth  and  personal  fulfill- 
ment. A  strong  sense  of  cooperation;  free 
association  among  individuals,  rooted  in  in- 
stitutions of  family,  church,  school,  press,  and 
voluntary  groups  of  every  kind.  Government 
too  played  an  important  role.  It  helped 
eradicate  slavery  and  other  forms  of 
discrimination.  It  opened  up  the  frontier 
through  actions  like  the  Homestead  Act  and 
rural  electrification.  And  it  helped  provide  a 
sense  of  security  for  those  who,  through  no 
fault  of  their  own,  could  not  support 
themselves. 

What  President  Reagan  was  saying 
was  that  government  properly  does 
those  things  that  open  up  opportunities 
for  individuals  and  that  allow  natural  in- 
centives to  operate  in  freedom.  That  is 
quite  different  from  a  government  that 
tries  to  compel  and  command  people  to 
fit  into  a  preconceived  mold,  keeping 
them  in  submission  and  dependence.  It 
is  no  accident  that  those  countries  that 
have  allowed  free  play  for  personal  ini- 
tiative and  economic  rewards  for  success 
now  produce  more  than  one-half  of  the 
world's  product.  Furthermore,  those 
developing  countries  in  the  Third  World 
that  have  recently  been  growing  the 
fastest  are  precisely  those  that  have  in- 
creased the  economic  freedom  of  their 
people. 


gust  1983 


27 


ECONOMICS 


Thus  the  most  important  contribu- 
tion that  the  United  States  can  make  to 
world  development  is  to  carry  to  the 
governments  and  peoples  of  the  less 
developed  countries  (LDCs)  the  message 
of  our  experience— to  explain  to  them  its 
lessons.  The  sooner  they  turn  their 
backs  on  the  false  claims  and  real 
failures  of  socialism,  the  sooner  they  re- 
ject the  philosophy  of  compulsion,  coer- 
cion, and  command,  the  sooner  will  they 
open  the  way  to  accelerated,  meaningful 
development.  This  message  is  the  foun- 
dation of  a  program  that  helps  other 
countries  help  themselves. 

Use  of  Resources 

In  ensuring  development,  possessing 
resources  for  growth  is  not  enough.  The 
resources  must  be  effectively  used.  Un- 
fortunately, there  are  far  too  many 
cases  in  which  countries  have 
squandered  precious  resources  in  ques- 
tionable investments  or  in  subsidizing 
consumption.  In  other  cases,  the  most 
precious  resource  of  all— human  in- 
itiative—has not  been  given  the  freedom 
to  make  the  kinds  of  economic  decisions 
which  can  lead  to  dynamic  and  pro- 
sperous economic  growth.  The  most 
critical  contribution  these  countries  can 
make  to  their  development  lies  in  pursu- 
ing appropriate  domestic  economic 
policies.  This,  I  may  add,  is  equally  true 
for  the  United  States. 

Accordingly,  U.S.  policy  to  stimulate 
economic  growth  in  the  developing 
world  must  encourage  countries  to  adopt 
market-oriented  policies.  We  focus  at- 
tention on  the  role  of  the  private  sec- 
tor—domestic as  well  as  foreign— for 
mobilizing  and  effectively  utilizing 
resources  for  development.  Fortunately, 
there  appears  to  be  increased  recogni- 
tion in  both  developed  and  developing 
nations  of  the  role  of  appropriate 
economic  policies.  We  are  continuing  to 
encourage  movement  in  this  direc- 
tion—directly through  bilateral  discus- 
sions and  indirectly  through  the  interna- 
tional financial  institutions. 

Building  on  these  basic  principles, 
there  are  tangible  steps  the  United 
States  is  taking,  and  can  enlarge  upon, 
to  facilitate  world  development.  No 
country  has  a  better  record  than  our 
own  for  positive  measures— public  and 
private— that  contribute  to  the  strength 
of  the  world  economy  and  to  growth  in 
the  less  developed  countries. 


In  discussing  positive  U.S.  measures 
to  promote  development  in  the  Third 
World,  I  begin  from  a  basic  premise:  In 
addressing  the  economic  difficulties  and 
prospects  of  the  developing  world, 
restoring  sustained  noninflationary 
economic  growth  in  the  United  States  is 
the  single  most  significant  contribution 
we  can  make.  The  reason  for  that  can  be 
seen  from  a  few  statistics. 

In  1981  the  United  States  purchased 
more  than  $120  billion  in  goods  and 
services  from  developing  countries.  To 
be  sure,  a  significant  amount  of  this  is 
accounted  for  by  petroleum  products. 
Nevertheless,  U.S.  purchases  amounted 
to  nearly  20%  of  all  the  exports  of  those 
LDCs  that  do  not  export  oil  and  to  35% 
of  all  their  exports  to  developed  nations. 
The  growth  in  U.S.  imports  of  manufac- 
tured goods  from  the  developing  coun- 
tries has  been  impressive.  During  the 
1970s,  these  imports  grew  at  an  average 
rate  of  27%  per  year;  in  other  words, 
they  doubled  every  32  months,  on  the 
average.  The  United  States  now  absorbs 
over  half  of  all  the  manufactured  ex- 
ports that  non-oil  LDCs  sell  to  the 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD)  countries, 
even  though  the  U.S.  market  is  only 
one- third  of  the  total  OECD  market. 
That  means  that  we  take  50%  more 
than  our  proportionate  share.  When  you 
consider  the  billions  of  dollars  of  imports 
from  the  developing  world  by  the  United 
States  alone,  not  to  mention  the  imports 
from  the  other  developed  countries, 
direct  aid  pales  by  comparison. 

Trade  and  Private  Investment 

In  the  long  run,  it  is  only  through  trade 
that  the  developing  world  will  be  able  to 
earn  the  external  resources  it  needs  for 
its  development.  In  view  of  the 
magnitudes  we  are  dealing  with,  and  of 
the  U.S.  role  as  the  developing  world's 
largest  customer,  we  have  a  responsibili- 
ty to  the  rest  of  the  world,  as  well  as  to 
ourselves,  to  ensure  that  there  is  sus- 
tained real  economic  growth  in  the 
United  States.  Correspondingly,  as  the 
world's  largest  trading  nation,  we  must 
make  every  effort  to  ensure  that  the 
global  trading  system  is  open  so  that  the 
developing  world  and  the  developed 
world  will  benefit  from,  and  contribute 
to,  each  other's  growth. 

Fortunately,  the  United  States  ap- 
pears to  be  well  on  the  road  to  sustained 
noninflationary  growth.  For  the  past 


two  decades,  our  government  has  <  iva 
spent,  overtaxed,  and  overregulated.  I 
Our  growth  rate  declined.  Inflation 
began  to  creep,  then  to  run,  and  then 
gallop.  Interest  rates  rose  to  almost  t 
precedented  heights.  The  bold  measuj 
of  the  Reagan  Administration  have  n< 
turned  the  tide.  For  a  while  it  appear 
to  some  doubting  Thomases  that  Ron; 
Reagan  would  prove  to  be  another  Ki 
Canute.  But,  as  the  President  says,  b 
knows  that  his  policies  are  turning  th 
tide  because  the  press  no  longer  refei 
to  his  policies  as  "Reaganomics." 

The  short-term  costs  of  turning  tl 
tide  were  high,  but  now  inflation  and 
terest  rates  are  down,  the  leading 
economic  indicators  are  up,  and  inves 
and  consumer  confidence  are  returnir 
The  United  States  is  doing  its  part  in 
ensuring  a  long-term  global  economic 
recovery.  Furthermore,  despite  the 
economic  difficulties  of  the  past  few 
years  and  the  pressure  for  protection: 
trade  measures,  the  United  States  re- 
mains an  essentially  open  market. 

The  United  States  is  unique  in  bei 
the  world's  largest  free  trade  area  an 
one  of  the  most  open  to  world  market 
a  number  of  other  countries  have 
discovered  the  same  ingredient  of  sue 
cess.  Like  the  United  States,  these  co 
tries — advanced  developing  countries 
and  newly  industrialized  countries— al 
contribute  through  trade  to  the  growl, 
of  the  LDCs.  Their  recent  growth  hat 
been  the  fastest  in  the  world,  and  the 
growing  imports  are  a  spur  to  growth 
the  other  countries  they  trade  with. 

Closely  related  to  trade  in  terms  < 
long-term  U.S.  impact  on  developmen 
private  investment.  In  addition  to  pre 
viding  additional  financial  resources  t. 
developing  countries,  foreign  investm 
promotes  long-term  growth  by  provid 
technology,  management  know-how, 
access  to  international  markets.  Here 
too,  the  United  States  has  an  exeeller. 
record.  In  the  1970s,  U.S.  investment 
developing  countries  accounted  for  mi 
than  half  of  total  investment  by  OEC1I 
countries  in  these  nations.  In  the  latte 
half  of  the  past  decade,  U.S.  direct 
private  investment  in  the  developing 
countries  grew  at  approximately  20% 
per  year.  In  1981,  reflecting  the  genei 
economic  climate,  the  rate  of  growth  i 
U.S.  investment  abroad  dropped  but  s 
continued  at  around  5%.  By  the  end  o 
19X1,  U.S.  direct  investment  in  develo 
ing  countries  had  reached  the  impress 
level  of  $5(>  billion. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


ECONOMICS 


ferences  Among  Developing 
intries 

to  now  I  have  discussed  the  develop- 
countries  as  if  they  were  all  alike, 
arly.  however,  these  countries  differ 
fitly  among  themselves.  Any  effective 
1  realistic  policy  must  differentiate 
ong  countries  and  tailor  development 
itegies  to  the  needs  and  potentials  of 
ividual  countries  and  regions.  While 
Bsification  is  alway  somewlrit  ar- 
•ary,  we  have  frequently  found  it 
ful  in  Washington  to  recognize 
eral  groups  of  developing  countries. 
The  first  group  consists  of  the  oil- 
jorting  countries,  which  have  capital 
pluses.  To  achieve  their  ambitious 
ns  for  development,  these  countries 
d  prosperity  in  the  industrial 
nomies  so  they  can  sell  their  oil  and 
est  their  surpluses  there. 
Then  there  are  the  so-called  newly 
ustrialized  countries.  These  nations, 
ough  their  own  efforts  and  a 
orable  economic  climate,  which  has 
mitted  great  increase  in  exports  and 
stantial  inflows  of  capital,  have 
ieved  dramatic  growth. 
Next  there  is  a  larger  growth  of 
ntries,  sometimes  referred  to  as 
Idle-income  developing  countries, 
ch  have  achieved  some  progress  but 
have  widespread  poverty.  These 
ntries,  which  in  most  cases  are 
endent  on  exports  of  one  of  two  com- 
iities,  have  suffered  as  the  global 
■ession  has  reduced  their  exports  in 
h  quantity  and  price.  More  than 
ewed  growth  in  the  industrial  coun- 
ts is  required,  however,  if  these  eoun- 
s  are  to  prosper.  Significant  ad- 
.ments  in  their  economies  also  are 
ded. 

The  fourth  group  contains  the  very 
Test  developing  countries.  These 
?er  widespread  poverty  and  play  only 
linor  role  in  the  global  economy.  They 
;  the  basic  infrastructure  to  compete 
ictively  in  world  markets  so  cannot 
•act  investment  and  financing.  If  self- 
taining  growth  is  to  be  achieved 
hin  a  reasonable  time,  they  need 
I  rity.  Frequently,  their  economic  and 
1  ernmental  policies  are  so  bad  that 
I  rity,  or  "aid,"  is  simply  futile.  In  our 
■  istance  to  these  countries,  we  concen- 
1  :e  in  three  areas  where  over  the 
I  rs  the  United  States  has  developed 
l«cial  competence,  namely,  food  and 
iculture,  energy,  and  health  and 
cation.  We  try  to  use  our  aid  in  ways 


which  encourage  economic  reforms, 
which  in  turn  attract  private  in- 
vestments. 

Of  course,  I  would  mislead  you  if  1 
let  it  seem  that  aid  to  the  poorest 
developing  countries  is  the  most  impor- 
tant help  we  can  give  them.  On  the  con- 
trary, in  their  case  as  in  others,  trade  is 
more  important  than  aid,  because  trade 
helps  them  to  help  themselves.  We  have 
a  special  program  by  which  their  goods 
come  to  the  U.S.  market  duty-free, 
called  the  generalized  system  of 
preferences  (GSP).  Although  the  amount 
of  trade  affected  by  this  program  is 
small  in  terms  of  the  U.S.  market,  it  is  a 
large  and  important  spur  to  develop- 
ment in  those  countries  that  export  to 
us  with  its  stimulus. 

Even  these  groupings  of  countries 
are  partly  misleading,  however,  because 
they  mask  the  individuality  and  unique- 
ness of  each  country.  We  base  our 
specific  programs  on  careful  study  and 
consultation  with  the  government  and 
people  of  each  country  itself.  We  listen, 
we  learn,  we  identify  problems,  and  we 
work  out  solutions  jointly  with  them. 

Direct  Aid 

A  few  comments  on  direct  aid  are  in 
order.  Despite  the  economic  upturn  that 
is  under  way  in  the  United  States  and 
some  other  countries,  the  outlook  for 
substantial  increases  in  direct  aid  is  not 
bright.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  decade  of 
the  1980s  will  see  increases  in  foreign 
aid  comparable  to  those  of  the  1970s. 
Calls  by  some  developing  nations  for 
massive  gifts  are  completely  unrealistic. 
Budgetary  conditions  in  the  United 
States  and  in  other  major  donor  nations 
simply  preclude  it. 

This  makes  it  all  the  more  important 
that  we  focus  our  limited  funds  on  those 
countries  where  it  will  do  the  most  good. 
How  much  good  our  aid  does  depends 
not  so  much  on  how  badly  the  recipients 
need  it  as  on  how  well  they  use  it.  Aid, 
to  be  effective,  must  open  the  way  to  ex- 
pand trade  and  attract  investment.  It 
cannot  do  that  in  the  face  of  unsound 
governmental  policies  that  do  not  sup- 
port free  markets,  protect  private  prop- 
erty, and  maintain  a  rule  of  law  and 
political  stability. 

This  means  that  the  relative  role  of 
concessional  aid  is  diminishing.  In  fact, 
this  aid  is  increasing,  but  trade  and  bor- 
rowing in  private  markets  are  increasing 


much  faster.  These  latter  two  contribu- 
tions to  development  deserve  the  em- 
phasis that  I  gave  them,  but  I  would  be 
negligent  if  I  failed  to  mention  the  way 
that  direct  aid  fits  into  the  picture.  In 
line  with  what  I  have  just  been  saying, 
the  United  States  works  closely  with 
host  governments  on  economic  policy 
problems  important  to  development.  We 
encourage  sound  agricultural  policies  on 
pricing,  credit,  and  freedom  of  enter- 
prise. 

Furthermore,  about  half  of  our 
development  aid  goes  to  food  and 
agriculture.  Besides  encouraging  more 
private  initiative,  we  contribute  to  the 
fundamental  research  and  to  the 
development  of  new  applied  technology, 
in  the  role  that  government  is  most 
qualified  to  fill.  A  major  part  of  our  aid 
also  goes  to  public  health  and  population 
control  programs.  By  concentrating  our 
aid  in  recent  years  on  the  activities  in 
which  government  makes  a  unique  con- 
tribution, we  have  made  its  effectiveness 
grow  rapidly  even  though  its  amount 
grew  relatively  slowly. 

The  United  States  has  also  concen- 
trated its  aid  increasingly  where  it  is 
most  needed — in  the  least  developed 
countries,  as  I  noted  earlier.  Our  con- 
tributions to  multilateral  development 
banks  in  Asia,  Latin  America,  and 
Africa  are  permitting  growth  rates  of 
lending  of  14%-15%  per  year.  The 
United  States  continues  to  be  the  largest 
provider  of  official  development  aid,  and 
over  two-thirds  of  our  aid  goes  to  the 
poorest  countries. 

Resolving  Debt  Problems 

No  discussion  of  Third  World  Develop- 
ment can  ignore  the  serious  debt  prob- 
lems which  a  number  of  developing  na- 
tions now  face.  During  the  past  decade, 
borrowing  on  private  capital  markets 
became  an  increasingly  important  source 
of  financing  for  many  developing  coun- 
tries, particularly  the  middle-  and  upper- 
income  ones.  As  the  borrowing  climate 
changed  and  the  world  slipped  into  a 
prolonged  recession,  a  number  of  na- 
tions came  face-to-face  with  serious  debt 
problems. 

Several  steps  must  be  taken  if  these 
debt  problems  are  to  be  resolved  in  a 
durable  way. 


iust  1983 


29 


ECONOMICS 


•  Sound  economic  policies  must  be 
pursued  in  the  debtor  countries.  These 
should  include  sound  debt  monitoring 
and  management.  The  World  Bank  and 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
provide  valuable  assistance  in  this.  It  is, 
obviously,  important  that  neither 
developed  not  developing  nations  impose 
new  barriers  to  trade. 

•  Financial  resources  must  continue 
to  be  provided  by  the  international  com- 
munity to  support  the  adjustment  of 
borrowing  countries  to  sound  policies. 
Here  the  IMF  plays  a  major  role.  The 
increases  in  IMF  quotas  that  are  now 
being  considered  by  Congress  are  essen- 
tial. 

•  The  governments  and  central 
banks  of  lending  countries  must  be 
prepared  to  provide  short-term,  transi- 
tional financing  to  fill  the  gap  until  IMF 
programs  are  in  place. 

•  Commercial  banks  and  export 
credit  agencies  must  continue  a  flow  of 
finance  to  debtor  countries  that  are 
undertaking  sound,  IMF-supported  ad- 
justment programs. 

•  Sustained  noninflationary 
economic  growth  must  take  place  in 
developing  nations. 

Development  Prospects  at  the 
Economic  Summit  and  UNCTAD 

Now  I  would  like  to  outline  for  you  what 
the  United  States  hopes  to  accomplish 
with  regard  to  development  at  the 
May  28-30  economic  summit  in 
Williamsburg  and  during  the  June 
UNCTAD  VI  conference  in  Belgrade. 

First,  we  hope  that  the  summit  will 
confirm  that  the  West's  major  economies 
are  working  effectively  toward  a 
restoration  of  sustainable  noninfla- 
tionary growth.  We  hope  also  that  the 
participating  countries  will  commit 
themselves  to  a  rollback  of  restrictions 
on  trade  which  they  have  introduced  in 
response  to  the  difficult  world  economic 
situation.  If  these  developments  occur,  it 
will  be  a  major  step  toward  achieving  a 
healthier  world  economy.  In  turn,  the 
developing  countries  will  have  an  oppor- 
tunity in  Belgrade  to  take  similar  ac- 
tions that  will  restore  confidence  in 
global  recovery. 

Second,  we  expect  that 
Williamsburg  will  heighten  awareness  of 
the  interrelations  among  trade,  finance, 
and  development.  The  specific  relations 
I  refer  to  are  four: 


•  Between  an  open  international 
trading  system  and  sustainable  non- 
inflationary  economic  growth; 

•  Between  open  international 
markets  and  solution  of  the  debt  prob- 
lems of  developing  countries  and. 
specifically,  the  link  between  their  ability 
to  export  and  their  ability  to  service 
debt; 

•  Between  short-term  financing 
needed  to  maintain  essential  imports. 
and  the  economic  adjustments  they  must 
make,  in  many  developing  countries;  and 

•  Between  growth  in  developed 
countries  and  growth  in  developing 
countries. 

As  for  UNCTAD  VI,  the  United 
States,  drawing  on  the  discussions  at 
the  Williamsburg  summit,  will  emphasize 
the  linkages  I  have  mentioned  earlier 
and  draw  the  attention  of  the  developing 
world  to  the  fact  that  effective  North- 
South  economic  relations  hinge  on 
mutual  responsibilities  and  benefits  in 
sustaining  and  improving  an  open  inter- 
national trading  and  financial  system. 
We  will  focus  attention  also  on  the  in- 
dispensable role  of  free  markets  in 
mobilizing  energies  and  resources  and 
more  generally  on  the  importance  of 
sound  economic  policies. 

The  United  States  views  UNCTAD 
as  a  significant  major  forum  for  discus- 
sions of  development  issues.  We  do  not, 
however,  generally  regard  UNCTAD  as 
a  suitable  forum  for  negotiating  in  detail 
specific  development  measures.  In  our 
view,  negotiations  of  measures  to 
ameliorate  current  economic  difficulties 
or  strengthen  the  existing  trade  or 
financial  system  are  more  properly 
handled  within  the  specialized  independ- 
ent international  agencies  designed  to 
address  these  issues— for  example  the 
IMF.  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT),  and  the  World  Bank. 

Our  discussions  with  less  developed 
countries  and  with  others  at  UNCTAD 
can  make  significant  progress  toward 
the  solutions  of  real  problems  if  there  is 
genuine  dialogue  and  a  willingness  to 
listen  to  each  others'  points  of  view. 
Therefore,  in  our  preliminary  discussions 
with  other  governments  in  preparation 
for  UNCTAD,  we  are  working  hard  to 
assure  that  the  conference  will  take 
place  in  a  cooperative  atmosphere  rather 
than  one  of  needless  polarization,  which 
would  sacrifice  the  opportunity  for 
agreement.  We  emphasize  that  progress 
lies  through  recognition  of  the  principle 


of  mutual  benefit  through  general 
growth,  and  that  developmental  discul 
sions  will  achieve  the  most  when  they  J 
have  a  practical  orientation  aimed 
toward  finding  and  correcting  the  real 
obstacles  to  development,  case-by-cas« 
or  toward  discovering  unexploited  op 
portunities.  Cooperative  efforts  can  tl 
remove  those  obstacles  or  open  up  th< 
opportunities.  It  is  also  important  to 
recognize  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the 
ternational  specialized  agencies,  such 
the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank,  can  ma 
important  contributions  in  their  areas 
expertise. 

In  summary,  the  most  important 
single  source  of  growth  and  develop- 
ment is  the  talents  of  individuals, 
allowed  to  develop  fully  and  freely  by 
free  institutions.  Government  provide 
the  framework— the  protection  of  law 
and  the  assurance  of  opportunity— wi 
in  which  individuals  can  reach  their  fi 
potential  and  contribute  to  national 
development.  This  framework  permit: 
trade  to  flourish,  both  domestic  and  ii 
ternational.  When  many  countries  hai 
open,  free  economies,  they  reinforce 
each  other  while  sharing  the  benefits 
growth  and  development.  Thus,  open 
economies  with  free-flowing  trade  an( 
private  investment,  both  in  developed 
and  developing  countries,  provide  the 
one  sure  route  to  rapid  development  ( 
the  less  developed  countries.  Because 
the  difficult  adjustments  now  necessai 
in  the  developing  world,  because  of  th 
heavy  debts  and  the  hangover  from  th 
binge  of  inflation  in  the  past  decade,    I 
open  economies  and  free-flowing  priv;| 
investment  are  especially  important  t<  I 
recovery  and  to  the  resumption  of  ran 
development.  Direct  aid  between  counl 
tries  also  will  play  an  important,  thoul 
secondary,  role. 

The  most  important  thing  is  to  ke  | 
our  economies  free— both  developed  a  I 
less  developed— and  to  support  and 
maintain  the  sound  international  instil 
tions  that  play  a  supporting  role  durinl 
this  period  of  adjustment.  Keeping  to  I 
this  sound  course  will  permit  the 
recovery  now  firmly  under  way  to  hav 
the  maximum  effect  on  the  welfare  of 
our  people  and  of  people  in  the  develojl 
ing  world,  ■ 


30 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


ECONOMICS 


I  Collective  Approach  to 
Sast-West  Economic  Relations 


W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  American  Society 
business  Press  Editors  in  Chicago  on 
e20,  1983.  Mr.  Wallis  is  Under 
maryfor  Economic  Affairs. 

talk  this  morning  is  concerned  with 
effort  that  the  United  States  and  its 
inese,  Canadian,  and  European  part- 
;  are  making  to  fashion  a  collective 
-oach  to  their  economic  relations 
!  the  Soviet  Union.  As  you  know, 
is  a  particularly  difficult  under- 
ng.  The  problems  lie  in  the  nature  of 
'Soviet  system,  in  the  events  of  the 
dozen  or  so  years,  and  in  various 
lomic  and  geographic  differences 
ng  the  United  States  and  its  part- 
.  Nevertheless,  the  undertaking  is 
eeding  with  important  concrete  and 
ible  results  to  show  for  our  common 
rts. 

[  will  describe  some  of  these  results 
few  moments,  but  first  I  will  review 
Hy  how  we  got  where  we  are  and 
this  process  is  such  a  difficult,  but 
le  same  time  important,  under- 
ig- 

iew  of  East-West  Relations 

dd- 1983,  it  is  difficult  to  recall  how 
ti,  even  euphoric,  the  atmosphere  of 
,-West  relations  was  in  1972,  the 
lay  of  detente.  The  Soviet  Union  and 
Jnited  States  had  just  signed  a 
;egic  arms  limitation  agreement, 
teived  at  the  time  as  an  important 
stone  in  limiting  arms  expenditures 
as  the  prime  indicator  of  relaxation 
wiet-American  relations.  President 
m  and  Premier  Brezhnev  exchanged 
s  and  signed  numerous  agreements, 
is  on  both  sides  joined  in  to  create  a 
spread  spirit  of  East-West  detente, 
©conomic  relations,  naturally, 
<ed  a  major  part  in  the  new  at- 
ohere.  The  West  liberalized  its  credit 
is,  and  the  Soviets  took  advantage 
lis  liberalization  to  increase  their 
hases  of  Western  grain  and  of 
nology  and  equipment  that  they 
i  make  only  with  difficulty  or  not  at 
Truck  assembly  lines,  entire  chemical 
ts  and  innumerable  pieces  of  capital 
:pment  were  purchased  by  the 
<ets.  Both  sides  experienced  eco- 
ic  and  political  benefits  from  the  in- 
sed  level  of  trade. 


The  theory  underlying  detente  was 
that  a  well  of  economic,  scientific, 
cultural,  and  political  relationships  would 
so  interlink  Soviet  and  Western  societies 
that  their  views  on  security  and  other 
core  issues  would  tend  to  converge.  It 
was  believed  that  the  tangible  benefits 
flowing  from  economic  and  other  inter- 
changes would  encourage  Soviet  re- 
straint in  foreign  policy. 

In  forging  economic  links  with  the 
Soviets,  the  United  States  was  as  eager 
as  any  nation  to  increase  the  level  of  its 
commerce.  From  1972  to  1975,  U.S. 
trade  with  the  Eastern  bloc  nearly 
tripled.  The  Pullman  Corporation  helped 
the  Soviets  to  set  up  production  lines  at 
the  Kama  River  truck  plant,  and  the 
Bryant  Manufacturing  Company  sold  the 
Soviets  equipment  that  allowed  it  to 
make  miniature  ball  bearings  of  extreme 
precision. 

We  all  know  how  the  hopeful  views 
of  East- West  relations  spawned  early  in 
the  decade  soured  at  the  end  of  the 
decade,  especially  after  1979.  Detente, 
with  its  web  of  relationships  and  in- 
contestible  economic  benefits  to  Soviet 
society,  was  no  barrier  at  all  when 
Soviet  decisionmakers  saw  opportunities 
to  advance  their  strategic  position 
through  overseas  adventurism  or 
outright  military  aggression.  Anyone 
who  had  illusions  that  fundamental 
Soviet  views  had  changed  during 
detente  was  quickly  disabused  of  those 
notions.      .  _ 

It  is  a  familiar  litany  to  describe  how 
the  Soviets,  in  the  late  1970s  and  after, 
failed  to  live  up  to  the  hopes  of  a  decade 
earlier.  Their  sponsorship  of  Cuban 
adventures  in  Africa,  their  continuing 
activities  in  Indochina,  their  invasion  of 
Afghanistan,  their  crackdown  in  Poland, 
and  their  involvement  in  Central 
America  were  visible  indications  that 
their  fundamental  values  and  policies 
had  not  been  changed  at  all  by  a  more 
lenient,  friendly,  and  cooperative  at- 
titude on  the  part  of  the  West.  Under- 
lying these  aggressive  acts,  of  course, 
was  the  massive  and  unrelenting  Soviet 
military  buildup  that  went  far  beyond 
any  reasonable  notion  of  what  would  be 
needed  to  defend  the  U.S.S.R.  Even  in 
the  area  of  strategic  arms,  supposedly 
restrained  by  the  SALT  [Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks]  agreement,  the  Soviets 
continued  the  most  massive  buildup  in 
all  history. 


Western  Reevaluation  of  Relationship 

As  the  Soviets  demonstrated  that  their 
fundamental  values  and  policies  had  not 
changed,  Western  governments  began  to 
reevaluate  their  economic,  political,  and 
security  relationships  with  the  East.  At- 
titudes changed  quickly  in  the  United 
States.  A  pivotal  point  was  our  refusal 
in  1979  to  ratify  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 
That  has  been  followed  by  strenuous  ef- 
forts to  increase  our  defenses  against 
the  Soviet  threat.  Our  allies  and  part- 
ners also  concluded,  in  the  various  and 
wondrous  ways  by  which  democratic  na- 
tions reach  decisions,  that  the  relaxed 
policies  of  a  decade  earlier  were  no 
longer  appropriate— perhaps  never  had 
been.  Soviet  behavior  made  it  obviously 
dangerous  to  conduct  economic  relations 
with  the  Soviets  in  ways  that  underwrite 
and  enhance  military  capabilities.  The 
danger  was  underscored  by  direct  use  by 
the  Soviets  of  equipment  from  the  West 
to  manufacture  items  for  their  military. 
The  ship  that  had  embarked  so  hopefully 
upon  the  seas  of  detente  obviously  had 
to  come  about  and  chart  a  new  course. 

In  the  economic  area,  it  was  hardly 
a  surprise  that  U.S.  attitudes  changed 
more  rapidly  than  those  of  our  Euro- 
pean and  Japanese  partners.  European 
and  Japanese  trade  with  the  East  has 
always  been  much  more  extensive  than 
that  of  the  United  States,  even  before 
the  Russian  revolution  of  1917.  There  is 
a  natural  complementarity  of  trade  be- 
tween Eastern  raw  materials  and 
Western  manufactured  goods.  This  fac- 
tor, combined  with  geographic  proximi- 
ty, means  that  East- West  trade  is  much 
more  important  to  Europeans  and 
Japanese  than  to  Americans. 

As  Western  views  changed,  dif- 
ferences in  the  pace  with  which  in- 
dividual governments  reevaluated  their 
positions  on  East- West  economic  rela- 
tions created  noticeable  tensions  within 
the  alliance.  Such  tensions  are,  of 
course,  a  fact  of  life  in  relations  among 
democratic  states.  It  is  the  job  of 
statesmen  to  resolve  the  differences  and 
preserve  the  fundamental  community  of 
values  among  their  respective  nations. 

It  is  interesting  to  trace  this  change 
in  attitudes,  to  see  how  difficult  it  can 
be  to  change  course  on  a  major  policy 
question.  In  announcing  his  candidacy 
for  president,  Ronald  Reagan  said: 

On  the  foreign  front,  the  decade  of  the 
1980s  will  place  severe  pressures  upon  the 
United  States  and  its  allies.  We  can  expect  to 
be  tested  in  ways  calculated  to  try  our  pa- 
tience, to  confound  our  resolve,  and  to  erode 
our  belief  in  ourselves. 


ust  1983 


31 


ECONOMICS 


For  the  most  of  the  last  forty  years,  we 
have  been  preoccupied  with  the  global  strug- 
gle—the competition  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  with  our  responsibilities  to  our  allies.  But 
too  often  in  recent  times  we  have  just  drifted 
along  with  events,  responding  as  if  we 
thought  of  ourselves  as  a  nation  in  decline. 

It  is  now  time  to  take  stock  of  our  own 
house  and  to  resupply  its  strength. 

Our  process  started  within  the 
government  with  a  thorough  analysis  of 
East- West  economic  relations,  and  the 
work  with  the  allies  began  in  earnest  at 
the  Ottawa  economic  summit  in  July 
1981.  The  leaders  at  Ottawa  made  a 
significant  statement  about  East- West 
relations: 

We  concluded  that  consultations  and, 
where  appropriate,  coordination  are  neces- 
sary to  ensure  that,  in  the  field  of  East- West 
relations,  our  economic  policies  continue  to  be 
compatible  with  our  political  and  security  ob- 
jectives. 

During  the  following  year,  leading 
up  to  the  summit  at  Versailles,  we 
worked  with  our  summit  partners  on  a 
number  of  specific  issues — principally  on 
the  problem  of  European  vulnerability  to 
disruption  of  Soviet  gas  exports.  At  Ver- 
sailles, the  leaders  again  adopted  a 
statement  on  East- West  economic 
issues,  but  it  was  clear  that  the  analyses 
of  the  issues  by  the  leaders  were  dif- 
ferent enough  to  create  problems  in  in- 
terpretation and  implementation. 

Last  summer,  when  Secretary 
Shultz  entered  office,  he  was  asked  by 
the  President  to  listen  carefully  to  what 
our  allies  and  friends  were  saying. 
George  Shultz  is  an  able  and  experi- 
enced negotiator  who  appreciates  the 
value  of  listening.  As  he  listened,  he 
recognized  two  fundamental  facts.  First, 
that  there  was  enough  convergence  in 
the  views  that  he  heard  to  give  a  good 
chance  of  reaching  agreement  on  a  col- 
lective approach  to  East- West  economic 
relations  and,  second,  that  a  collective 
approach  would  be  much  more  effective 
than  a  unilateral  approach. 

On  Secretary  Shultz's  recommenda- 
tion, President  Reagan  last  November 
lifted  the  restrictions  imposed  5  months 
earlier  on  the  sale  of  oil  and  gas  equip- 
ment to  the  Soviet  Union.  In  taking  this 
action,  the  President  emphasized  that 
the  United  States  and  its  European, 
Japanese,  and  Canadian  partners  had 
agreed  to  undertake  a  series  of  analyses 
of  East-West  economic  relations  de- 
signed to  provide  a  framework  for  a  col- 
lective approach  to  these  relations.  The 
analyses  were  undertaken  immediately 
in  a  variety  of  locations.  It  is  the  results 


of  those  analyses  that  are  the  core  of  my 
message  today. 

•  In  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development,  East- 
West  financial  relations  and  credit  terms 
were  examined.  Special  attention  was 
given  to  problems  stemming  from 
Eastern  nations'  centralized  control  of 
trade.  A  continuous  review  of  a  broad 
spectrum  of  problems  in  East- West 
economic  relations  was  started. 

•  The  International  Energy  Agency 
analyzed  the  dangers  created  by  undue 
energy  dependence,  and  it  considered 
alternative  sources  of  energy. 

•  The  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization  examined  the  overall 
security  implications  of  East-West 
economic  relations. 

•  The  Coordinating  Committee  for 
Multilateral  Security  Export  Controls 
(COCOM)  studied  ways  of  improving 
surveillance  and  control  over  Western 
exports  that  have  strategic  or  military 
implications. 

Basic  Framework 

While  some  work  is  continuing  in  each 
of  these  organizations,  major  segments 
of  the  analyses  that  were  started  last 
November  have  now  been  completed. 
The  results  achieved  thus  far  provide  a 
basic  framework  that  has  been  agreed 
upon  by  the  United  States  and  its  part- 
ners for  the  conduct  of  East- West 
economic  relations.  The  hopes  of  Presi- 
dent Reagan  and  Secretary  Shultz  in 
undertaking  the  analyses  have  been 
borne  out  amply  by  the  positive  and  con- 
structive spirit  in  which  they  were  con- 
ducted and  by  the  results  that  have  been 
achieved.  In  fact,  the  conclusions  based 
on  those  analyses  that  had  been  agreed 
to  before  the  1983  summit  meeting  of  in- 
dustrialized countries  made  it  unneces- 
sary for  the  seven  heads  of  government 
to  spend  much  time  at  Williamsburg  on 
this  subject.  In  the  Williamsburg 
declaration  the  heads  of  state  and 
government  said: 

East-West  economic  relations  should  be 
compatible  with  our  security  interests.  We 
take  note  with  approval  of  the  work  of  the 
multilateral  organizations  which  have  in  re- 
cent months  analyzed  and  drawn  conclusions 
regarding  the  key  aspects  of  East- West 
economic  relations.  We  encourage  continuing 
work  by  these  organizations,  as  appropriate. 

Let  me  review  for  you  some  of  the 
major  points  on  which  the  leaders  based 
that  statement. 


First,  they  recognize  that  the 
Soviets  use  some  forms  of  trade  to 
enhance  their  military  capabilities  and 
that,  as  a  result,  we  must  be  vigilant  1 
ensure  that  economic  relations  are  cot 
sistent  with  our  common  security  in 
terests.  While  some  forms  of  trade  th; 
are  conducted  on  commercially  sound 
terms  can  benefit  both  sides,  we  must 
insist  on  a  balance  of  advantages  and 
avoid  preferential  treatment  of  the 
Soviets. 

Second,  in  regard  to  energy,  the 
United  States  and  its  partners  recogn 
that  natural  gas,  with  its  relatively  in- 
flexible supply  system,  poses  particula 
security  problems.  We  have  agreed  th: 
in  meeting  future  gas  needs,  we  will 
take  concrete  steps  to  ensure  that  no 
one  producer  is  in  a  position  to  exercis 
monopoly  power  over  industrial  coun- 
tries. Further,  we  are  also  acting  to  ei 
courage  the  production  of  natural  gas 
from  Norwegian  and  North  American 
sources,  and  each  nation  is  improving 
safety-net  measures  in  order  to  be  abl< 
to  deal  with  any  interruptions  of  suppl 
The  United  States  and  its  partners  ha' 
agreed  also  to  conduct.  Regular  reviev 
of  each  country's  energy  policy,  giving 
special  attention  to  dependencies  and 
alternative  sources  of  supply.  We  belie 
that  these  concrete  accomplishments  w 
enhance  Western  energy  security  and 
make  it  more  difficult  for  the  Soviets  t 
use  its  abundant  energy  resources  to  e 
tract  political  gains. 

Third,  we  reached  agreeement  tha 
it  is  not  sensible  to  continue  to  give  th. 
Soviets  the  same  reductions  on  interes 
rates  given  to  newly  industrialized  cou 
tries  to  finance  their  imports.  Our 
agreed  minimum  interest  rate  for  offic 
lending  to  rich  countries,  including  the 
Soviets  is  now  12.4%,  nearly  two  point 
above  the  current  U.S.  prime  rate.  Als 
in  the  area  of  credits,  we  are  working 
improve  our  ability  to  monitor  credit 
flows,  so  that  our  data  on  foreign  in- 
debtedness will  be  accurate  and  up  to 
date. 

Finally,  in  coordinating  controls 
over  the  export  of  strategic  technology 
we  are  united  with  our  allies  in  declarii 
that  economic  relations  should  not  be 
permitted  to  contribute  to  Soviet 
military  capabilities.  At  an  April  high- 
level  meeting  with  our  COCOM  partner 
we  explored  ways  in  which  the  multi- 
lateral system  of  controls  could  be 
strengthened.  The  proceedings  of  the 
meeting  are  confidential,  but  I  can  say 
that  the  United  States  is  well  pleased 
with  the  work  on  improving  coordinatio 
in  export  licensing  and  in  the  enforce- 


32 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


ECONOMICS 


nt  of  controls.  We  are  confident  that 
results  of  the  COCOM  work  will 

luce  the  flow  of  high  technology  to 
East. 

As  you  are  aware,  none  of  the 
gnizations  within  which  these 
lyses  were  performed  (IEA,  OECD, 
TO,  and  COCOM),  is  a  supranational 
ly  whose  recommendations  are  bin- 
g  on  member  states.  Indeed,  such  a 
d  arrangement  would  be  antithetical 
he  spirit  of  our  alliances  and  friend- 
>s  with  other  democratic  countries. 
;ead,  the  countries  with  which  we 
e  collaborated  in  these  analyses  have 
eed  with  us  concerning  the  validity, 
vance,  and  importance  of  the  find- 
;;  and  they  have  agreed  to  take  the 
illusions  strongly  into  account  as  they 
nulate  their  own  national  policies, 
are  confident  that  the  results  that 
S  been  achieved  through  this  collee- 
approach  to  East-West  economic 
es  will  yield  valuable  benefits  for 
tern  security. 

I  mentioned  earlier  that  some 
sets  of  the  studies  are  continuing, 
are  seeking  to  build  on  the  results 
.  have  been  achieved  thus  far  and 
;hten  awareness  of  the  security 
ension  of  East-West  economic  rela- 
s.  We  are  starting  a  process  that  will 
nine  East-West  economic  relations 
hey  develop  and  will  provide  in- 
led  analyses  for  the  use  of 
ymakers.  Specific  efforts  that  are  in 
•ess  now  include: 

•  An  effort  in  COCOM  to 
ngthen  that  organization  and  ex- 
le  whether  members'  security  in- 
sts  require  controls  on  additional 

technology  items; 

>  Continuing  work  within  NATO  on 

security  implications  of  East-West 

iomic  relations; 

»  An  analysis  in  OECD  of  the  bal- 

•  of  economic  advantages  in  East- 
t  trade;  and 

•  The  ongoing  study  I  mentioned 
ler  of  national  energy  policies  and 
tern  energy  security. 

Before  I  conclude,  let  me  restate  our 
•tion  on  East- West  economic  rela- 
5  and  say  why  we  think  this  area  is 
nportant.  First,  let  me  emphasize 
gorically  that  we  are  not  waging 
iomic  warfare  against  the  Soviet 
>n.  We  do  not  seek  to  cause  the  "col- 
e"  of  their  economy.  In  fact,  we 
Id  not  want  that— that  would  be  a 
jerous  development.  We  favor 
ally  beneficial  economic  relations 
re  those  relations  are  conducted  on 


commercial  terms  and  where  the  advan- 
tages are  mutual  and  balanced.  An  ex- 
ample of  mutually  beneficial  trade  is 
agriculture,  where  a  U.S.  team  is  at  this 
moment  in  Moscow  negotiating  a  new 
long-term  agreement  for  grain  sales  to 
the  Soviets. 

We  must  keep  in  mind,  however, 
that  the  Soviets  vigorously  seek  to  use 
trade  with  the  West  to  enhance  their 
strategic  position  and  that  they  choose 
to  devote  15%  of  their  gross  national 
product  to  the  military— a  level  far 
beyond  what  can  possibly  be  regarded  as 
"defense."  They  have  also  not  acted  as  a 
responsible  and  restrained  member  of 
the  international  order.  As  Secretary 
Shultz  put  it  last  week  in  his  statement 
to  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee, unconstructive  Soviet  behavior 
has  needlessly  drawn  more  and  more  in- 
ternational problems  into  the  East-West 
rivalry  and  made  the  task  of  managing 
our  relationship  more  difficult.  In  the 
light  of  this,  the  United  States  and  its 
partners  have  agreed  to  conduct  their 
economic  relations  with  the  Soviets  in  a 
way  that  does  not  give  preferential 
treatment  to  the  Soviets  or  benefit  their 
military  position.  It  is  crucial  that  we 


not  permit  our  economic  relations  with 
the  Soviets  to  be  used  in  ways  that 
reduce  Western  security. 

Conclusion 

To  summarize,  let  me  again  state  that 
the  process  of  turning  away  from  the 
economics  of  detente  has  been  a  long 
and  reluctant  one  for  the  United  States 
and  its  friends  and  allies.  Differences  of 
perception  within  the  alliance  and  varia- 
tions in  the  pace  at  which  views  have 
evolved  sometimes  have  made  the  path 
rocky.  Yet,  through  patient  and 
statesmanlike  determination,  a  collective 
approach  to  East- West  economic  rela- 
tions has  been  forged. 

We  are  confident  that  this  collective 
approach  has  strengthened  our  common 
security,  just  as  President  Reagan  said 
in  his  radio  address  last  November  13 
that  it  would.  It  has  provided  a  sound 
basis  for  Western  economic  policy 
toward  the  East  for  the  rest  of  the 
decade  and  beyond.  Perhaps  this  ap- 
proach can  reduce,  at  least  modestly, 
the  amounts  that  we  must  spend  each 
year  to  defend  the  values  and  liberties 
that  we  and  our  partners  hold  dear.  ■ 


The  World  Economy  After  Williamsburg 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  American 
Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Wellington, 
New  Zealand,  on  June  22,  1983.  Mr. 
Wallis  is  Under  Secretary  for  Economic 
Affairs. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  with  you  this  after- 
noon to  look  briefly  at  the  world 
economy  after  Williamsburg.  I  must  con- 
fess that  6  months  ago  I  was  not  sure 
that  there  would  be  a  world  after 
Williamsburg— we  in  Washington  were 
so  wrapped  up  in  its  preparation.  But  I 
was  brought  back  to  the  real  world  one 
Sunday  afternoon  in  March.  I  was  in 
Florida  with  some  old  friends  from 
Rochester.  One  of  the  group  asked  me 
what  I  was  doing  in  Washington;  I  said 
I  was  the  "sherpa"  for  the  economic 
summit.  He  said:  "The  summit,  what's 
that?"  I  recount  this  story  to  put  the 
Williamsburg  meeting  in  its  proper 
perspective— an  important  meeting  but 
not  an  event  that  will  shake  the  world. 
The  world  after  Williamsburg  depends 
not  on  what  the  participants  did  and 


said  there  but  what  they  will  do  back 
home:  to  support  the  recovery,  to 
reverse  protectionism,  and  to  encourage 
the  process  of  economic  development 
around  the  world.  And  it  depends  as 
much  on  the  heads  of  other  governments 
as  on  the  seven  presidents  and  prime 
ministers  who  met  at  Williamsburg  the 
last  3  days  in  May. 

After  reading  the  final  declaration, 
President  Reagan  added  his  personal 
assessment  of  the  results.  He  said:  "Our 
meeting  has  shown  a  spirit  of  con- 
fidence, optimism,  and  certainty — con- 
fidence that  recovery  is  underway,  opti- 
mism that  it  will  be  durable,  and  certain- 
ty that  economic  policy  and  security  ties 
among  us  will  be  strengthened  in  the 
future." 

Sustaining  International  Recovery 

Let  me  elaborate  on  these  points.  "Con- 
fidence that  recovery  is  underway"  is 
not  simply  wishful  thinking.  It  is  based 
on  good  evidence  that  virtually  all  of  the 
leaders  brought  to  Williamsburg.  Speak- 
ing for  the  United  States,  I  can  assure 


33 


ECONOMICS 


you  that  our  economy  certainly  looks 
good.  Industrial  production  has  been  ris- 
ing for  6  months  and  by  May  was  nearly 
7%  above  its  November  low.  Employ- 
ment has  increased  by  nearly  800,000 
from  its  December  low,  and  the 
unemployment  rate  has  fallen  from 
10.7%  in  December  to  10.0%  in  May. 
Personal  incomes  are  rising  and  retail 
sales  are  gaining  momentum.  Although 
real  GNP  rose  at  only  a  2.5%  annual 
rate  in  the  first  quarter  of  this  year,  we 
estimate  it  grew  at  over  6%  during  the 
second  quarter,  and  we  forecast  that  the 
fourth  quarter  of  1983  will  exceed  the 
fourth  quarter  of  1982  by  at  least  5%. 

The  beginning  of  the  recovery  has 
been  accompanied  by  price  stability.  The 
producer  price  index  for  all  finished 
goods  was  no  higher  in  April  than  it  had 
been  the  previous  September,  and  the 
consumer  price  index  in  April  was  less 
than  1%  above  its  level  6  months  earlier. 
This  favorable  price  performance  is,  in 
part,  a  reflection  of  the  unusual  decline 
in  energy  prices  that  has  occurred  in  the 
past  few  months.  But  even  when  the 
volatile  prices  of  energy,  food,  and 
shelter  are  excluded,  the  consumer  price 
index  increased  at  an  annual  rate  of  only 
4%  between  October  and  April. 

Labor  productivity  is  increasing 
sharply  this  year,  and  wages  are  rising 
only  moderately.  Thus,  unit  labor  costs 
are  increasing  very  little.  In  the  first 
quarter  of  1983,  unit  labor  costs  in  non- 
farm  business  rose  at  an  annual  rate  of 
only  1.2%,  down  dramatically  from  the 
7.2%  increase  in  1982  and  the  11.2%  in- 
crease in  1981. 

When  the  inflation  news  is  so  good 
month  after  month,  it  is  easy  to  forget 
that  consumer  prices  rose  25%  as 
recently  as  the  2  years  ending  in 
December  1980. 

President  Reagan's  "optimism  that 
the  recovery  will  be  durable"  is  based  on 
the  leaders'  determination  to  avoid  the 
pitfalls  that  have  brought  us  a  decade  of 
boom-bust,  stop-go  economic  perfor- 
mance. The  Williamsburg  declaration 
clearly  emphasizes  the  need  to  avoid 
three  dangers  if  we  are  to  achieve 
growth  that  is  noninflationary  and  sus- 
tainable. 

First,  the  Williamsburg  declaration 
follows  thi'  consensus  established  at  the 
OECD  | Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  minis- 
terial meeting  earlier  in  May  to  take  a 
medium-term  approach  to  economic 
policy,  eschewing  the  route  of  "quick 
fixes"  and  quicker  disappointments. 

Second,  the  participants  at 
Williamsburg  recognized  trade  as  the 
mechanism  that  transmits  growth  in  one 


country  to  other  countries,  thereby 
enlarging  the  market,  increasing  effi- 
ciency, and  spurring  more  growth.  The 
statement  on  trade  from  Williamsburg  is 
the  strongest  yet  in  a  series  of  recent 
major  statements  on  world  trade.  At  the 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade]  meeting  last  November,  the 
trade  ministers  hinted  at  the  need  to 
remove  trade  barriers.  At  the  OECD, 
ministers  agreed  to  fight  protectionism 
and  dismantle  trade  barriers.  At 
Williamsburg,  the  heads  of  government 
of  the  seven  largest  economies  commit- 
ted themselves  "to  halt  protectionism, 
and  as  recovery  proceeds  to  reverse  it 
by  dismantling  trade  barriers."  They 
went  on  to  state  their  intention  to 
monitor  this  commitment  "within  the  ap- 
propriate existing  fora"  such  as  the 
GATT  and  the  OECD.  A  new  wave  of 
protection  would  spell  the  end  to  the 
recovery  before  it  gets  underway.  Only 
heads  of  government  can  balance  all  of 
the  interests  and  judge  that  protection  is 
the  wrong  way  to  go.  As  I  said  earlier, 
the  words  at  Williamsburg  will  not 
change  the  world,  but  adherence  to  this 
one  commitment  on  trade  can.  You 
could  be  certain  that  we  in  the  United 
States  will  be  pursuing  this  vigorously. 

A  third  danger  to  sustaining  the 
recovery  that  was  dealt  with  at 
Williamsburg  is  more  international  in 
character:  the  heavy  burden  of  debt  that 
hangs  over  more  than  a  score  of 
developing  countries.  Substantial  prog- 
ress has  been  made  in  the  past  year  in 
dealing  with  the  serious  financial  prob- 
lems of  Mexico,  Brazil,  and  other  coun- 
tries, but  the  situation  is  far  from  set- 
tled. Failure  to  resolve  these  problems 
could  threaten  the  trading  and  financial 
arrangements  of  the  world  and  thus 
undermine  the  recovery  that  is  clearly 
underway.  The  debtor  countries  must 
continue  to  make  substantial,  indeed 
painful,  adjustments  to  bring  their 
domestic  finances  and  international 
trade  balances  into  a  more  satisfactory 
state.  At  the  same  time,  the  commercial 
banks,  the  IMF  [International  Monetary 
Fund],  and  the  individual  governments 
must  also  strengthen  their  own  col- 
laborative efforts.  The  Williamsburg 
declaration  is  clear  on  this  point,  again 
in  terms  very  similar  to  the  consensus 
reached  at  the  OECD  earlier.  A  key 
step— early  ratification  of  the  IMF  quota 
increases— is  a  top  legislative  priority 
for  us  hack  in  Washington.  We  have 
recently  had  good  news  from  the  Senate 
on  this  score. 


Three  Fallacies 

Many  would  add  the  budget  deficits  ii 
the  United  States  to  this  list  of  dange 
to  the  growing  recovery.  I  do  not  wax 
to  dismiss  the  evil  of  budget  deficits 
lightly,  but  before  I  address  their  evil 
side,  allow  me  a  few  moments  to  ad- 
dress three  fallacies  which  are  tied  ba 
to  budget  deficits.  The  fallacies  arise 
from  a  chain  of  causality  that  goes 
something  like  this:  high  deficits,  caus 
by  the  recent  tax  rate  reductions  and 
the  defense  spending  program,  force  i 
real  interest  rates.  These  higher  real 
terest  rates  attract  capital  from  abroz 
which  raises  the  value  of  the  U.S.  doll 
relative  to  other  currencies.  Let's  con 
sider  three  links  in  this  chain: 

•  The  link  between  exchange  rate 
and  interest  rates; 

•  The  link  between  interest  rates 
(especially  real  interest  rates)  and 
budget  deficits;  and 

•  The  link  between  deficits  and 
taxes  (throwing  in  defense  expenditur 
for  good  measure). 

Exchange  Rates  and  Interest 
Rates.  To  be  sure,  the  dollar  has  beer 
strong.  Equivalently,  the  franc,  the 
pound,  and  the  mark  have  been  weak 
Also,  the  United  States  is  running  a  c 
rent  account  deficit  in  its  balance  of 
payments,  largely  because  the  value  o 
imports  exceeds  the  value  of  exports. 
That  deficit  is  expected  to  reach  recor 
levels  this  year. 

The  strong  dollar  is  a  spur  to  exp« 
industries  in  foreign  countries  and  to 
their  industries  that  compete  with  im- 
ports from  the  United  States.  Cor- 
respondingly, it's  a  handicap  to  our  e> 
porters  in  a  very  big  way. 

Individuals  who  believe  that  the 
dollar  is  overvalued,  in  the  sense  that 
they  believe  that  its  foreign  exchange 
value  will  fall,  can  readily  put  their  ov< 
money  where  their  judgments  are  and 
buy  francs,  marks,  and  so  forth,  or  se 
the  dollar  short.  Note  that  the  interna 
tional  monetary  market  of  the  Chieagi 
Mercantile  Exchange  and  other  future 
exchanges  offer  easy  and  efficient  acc< 
to  those  wishing  either  to  speculate  in 
foreign  exchange  markets  or  to  hedge 
against  exchange  rate  changes  and 
volatility.  The  strength  of  the  dollar  is 
largely  a  consequence  of  the  successfu 
anti-inflation  policy  of  the  United  Stat< 
of  the  safe  haven  the  United  States  af- 
fords foreign  investors,  and  of  the  im- 
proved prospects  in  the  United  States 
for  substantial  economic  recovery.  In  r 
judgment,  high  interest  rates  are  not  t 
major  factor  causing  the  dollar  to  be  s< 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


ECONOMICS 


lh.  When  interest  rates  in  the  United 
ates  fell  sharply  from  July  through 
ivember  of  1982,  the  dollar  continued 
strengthen  against  the  British  pound, 
!  German  mark,  the  French  franc,  the 
panese  yen,  the  Italian  lira,  and  other 
ijor  foreign  currencies.  If  U.S.  in- 
est  rates  are  crucial  in  determining 
eign  exchange  rates,  why  did  the 
liar  strengthen,  not  weaken,  when 
9.  interest  rates  cascaded  down? 

Look  at  a  specific  example:  Since 
cember  1980  the  French  franc  has 
Dreciated  about  65%  against  the 
lar,  from  4.5  francs  per  dollar,  to  7.4. 
lat  has  happened  to  interest  rates  in 
•  United  States  and  France  over  that 
•iod?  U.S.  short-term  rates  were 
3%  in  December  1980  and  are  now 
>und  8.7%.  Comparable  French  rates 
-re  11.5%  then,  12.6%  now.  U.S.  rates 
re  fallen  sharply — French  rates  have 
in.  The  differential  has  shifted  by 
irly  10  percentage  points  in  favor  of 
?nch  assets.  If  anything,  that  should 
'e  led  to  a  stronger  franc  and  a 
aker  dollar.  It  obviously  didn't.  Even 

a  more  recent  period — say  since  May 
■51 — the  franc  has  fallen  by  about 
7o;  the  interest  rate  differential  has 
ved  about  5  points  in  favor  of  French 
■ets.  Similar  lack  of  correlation  be- 
;en  changes  in  interest  rates  and 

nges  in  exchange  rates  can  be  found 
>ther  pairs  of  currencies,  though  they 

not  often  as  dramatic.  We  must 

nowledge  that  other  factors  have 
n  more  important  than  interest  rates 
letermining  exchange  rates. 

Deficits  and  Interest  Rates.  Now  1 

it  to  turn  to  the  link  between  deficits 
1 1  interest  rates.  Now  that  I  have 
1  iunked  the  idea  that  interest  rates 
I  ninate  exchange  rates,  you  may  not 
)  interested  in  U.S.  interest  rates— but 
I  y  are  important,  both  for  the  U.S. 
I  overy  and  for  the  debt  servicing 
|  blems  of  developing  countries  or 
(  er  countries  with  external  debt. 
I  Nominal  interest  rates  in  the  United 
\  tes  have  fallen  drastically.  In  1981, 

!  first  year  of  the  Reagan  Administra- 
i,  interest  rates  peaked  at  15.5% 
^iA  corporate  bonds)  when  the 
leral  deficit  was  $60  billion,  or  2%  of 
1.  gross  national  product.  So  far  this 
r,  the  same  long-term  rate  is  about 
o  while  the  projected  deficit  is  $191 
on  (for  calendar  year  1983),  about 
of  GNP.  In  other  words,  the  deficit 
■led  as  a  percentage  of  the  total 
nomy  and  long-term  bond  rates  have 
pped  by  more  than  a  quarter. 
It  is  a  widespread  myth  that  the  real 
3  of  interest  in  the  United  States  at 


present  is  high.  This  is  emphasized 
especially  by  those  who  blame  most  of 
the  world's  ills  on  the  high  real  rate  of 
interest  in  the  United  States.  They  are 
just  imagining  that  it's  high;  it's  not.  In 
fact,  there  is  no  evidence  at  all  that  the 
real  rate  in  the  United  States  today  is 
high. 

How  is  the  real  rate  of  interest 
calculated?  The  correct  way  is  to  take 
the  nominal  rate  of  interest  and  subtract 
from  it  the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation. 
The  incorrect,  but  common,  way  is  to 
take  the  nominal  rate  and  subtract  the 
current  rate  of  inflation.  At  present, 
there  is  a  substantial  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  current  and  the  anticipated 
rates  of  inflation.  Consequently,  there  is 
a  substantial  difference  between  the  real 
real  rate  and  the  unreal  real  rate. 

The  nominal  rate  of  interest  current- 
ly is  something  on  the  order  of  10%.  A 
recent  survey  of  businessmen  shows  that 
they  anticipate  a  rate  of  inflation  of 
6-7%  for  the  next  10  years.  This  implies 
that  the  real  real  rate  of  interest  cur- 
rently is  3-4%,  which  is  in  line  with 
historical  experience.  The  unreal,  or  er- 
roneous, real  rate,  however,  appears  to 
be  7  or  8%  if  the  current  rate  of  infla- 
tion is  2  or  3%. 

Why  the  discrepancy  between  the 
current  and  the  anticipated  rates  of  in- 
flation? The  answer,  I  think,  is  ex- 
perience. Since  the  Second  World  War, 
the  U.S.  Government  has  said  con- 
tinuously and  emphatically  that  it  was 
going  to  eliminate  inflation.  Inflation 
has,  in  fact,  been  essentially  eliminated 
three  or  four  times  in  that  period.  Mark 
Twain  said  that  he  knows  that  it  is  easy 
to  stop  smoking,  because  he  has  done  it 
many  times.  Similarly,  we  can  say  that 
it  is  easy  to  stop  inflation:  we  know, 
because  we  have  done  it  several  times. 
After  each  time,  however,  we  went  back 
to  a  rate  of  inflation  that  was  even 
higher  than  the  one  we  cured.  People  in 
the  market  are  aware  of  this;  so, 
regardless  of  the  intentions  of  the  Ad- 
ministration, they  are  going  to  be  slow 
to  conclude  that  inflation  really  has  been 
brought  under  lasting  control.  If,  in  fact, 
inflation  is  kept  under  control  for  a 
period,  people  in  the  market  will 
gradually  regain  confidence  and  lower 
their  anticipations  of  the  rate  of  infla- 
tion. After  all,  until  about  20  years  ago, 
the  United  States  had  very  little  infla- 
tion except  in  times  of  war.  The  average 
rate  from  the  beginning  of  the  govern- 
ment until  20  years  ago,  omitting 
periods  of  war,  was  about  zero,  and 
perhaps  even  half  a  percent  negative.  So 
there  is  a  real  chance  of  bringing  real  in- 
terest rates  down,  provided  that  the 
government  manages  to  "stay  the 


course."  The  only  way  to  lower  the  real 
rate  of  interest  is  to  gain  credibility  for 
government  intentions. 

Deficits  and  Taxes.  Since  the 
Reagan  Administration  proposed  and 
the  Congress  passed  a  major  tax  bill  cut- 
ting marginal  tax  rates  and  then  index- 
ing tax  rates  to  eliminate  so-called 
bracket  creep,  it  is  assumed  by  many 
that  the  deficit  is  due  to  insufficient  tax- 
ation. Why  else  would  we  be  hearing  so 
many  voices  in  Washington  advocating 
cancellation  of  the  1983  tax  rate  cut  or 
elimination  of  indexation?  But  taxes  are 
not  the  issue,  nor  as  I  just  said,  are 
deficits;  the  issue  is  government  spend- 
ing. Government  spending  uses  up 
resources  and  leaves  fewer  resources  for 
the  private  sector.  If  resources  are  used 
less  efficiently  in  the  public  sector  than 
in  the  private  sector,  overall  efficiency 
falls.  Even  if  the  same  number  of  people 
are  at  work,  total  output  is  less  useful, 
less  valuable.  This  is  the  equivalent  of  a 
fall  in  output.  I  believe  that  we  are  well 
past  this  point  at  the  present  time  in 
most  areas  of  government  expenditures. 
This  is  the  major  reason  for  shrinking 
the  public  sector  in  order  to  make  possi- 
ble a  larger  total  pie. 

If  more  resources  are  to  be  chan- 
neled into  the  public  sector,  higher  taxes 
depress  private  sector  activity,  thereby 
freeing  resources  and  making  them 
available  for  the  public  sector.  However, 
when  President  Reagan  took  office  tax 
rates  had  become  so  high— largely 
because  effective  rates  had  been  driven 
up  by  inflation  rather  than  being  ex- 
plicitly legislated  by  Congress— that  the 
private  sector  was  too  depressed  for  our 
own  good.  Moreover,  the  depressive  ef- 
fects of  high  and  rising  marginal  tax 
rates  have  differentially  depressed  sav- 
ing, capital  formation,  and  risk  taking 
more  than  consumption,  and  reduced 
work  effort  more  than  leisure. 

High  taxes  worked  all  too  well  in 
curtailing  private  sector  activity.  We 
needed  a  reduction  in  marginal  tax 
rates,  especially  those  taxes  that 
discourage  investment,  saving,  risk  tak- 
ing, and  work.  We  also  needed  a  reduc- 
tion in  marginal  tax  rates  to  undo  some 
or  all  of  the  bracket  creep  of  recent 
years.  To  achieve  these  results,  the 
President's  program  proposed  a  perma- 
nent and  predictable  cut  in  marginal  tax 
rates,  including  indexation  of  the  tax 
system  to  prevent  future  bracket  creep. 
Higher  taxes  would  only  reduce  output, 
employment,  and  economic  growth. 

I  believe  we  hear  so  little  about 
speeding  up  or  enlarging  tax  cuts  and  so 
much  about  rescinding  the  1983  tax  cut 


gust  1983 


35 


ECONOMICS 


and  the  future  indexing  of  the  Federal 
tax  code  precisely  because  there  is  a 
well  understood  link  between  revenues 
and  government  spending.  Spenders 
simply  want  the  revenues  to  maintain  or 
to  expand  government  spending. 
Spenders  want  control  of  more  income 
so  they  can  spend  it  the  way  they  wish. 

Understandably,  the  big  spenders 
are  fighting  hard  to  retain  the  revenue 
system  that  depends  on  inflation- 
induced,  unlegislated  tax  rate  in- 
creases—bracket creep— under  which 
they  have  prospered  while  the  economy 
has  suffered.  To  succeed,  the  big 
spenders  need,  as  before,  the  coopera- 
tion of  fiscal  conservatives  eager  or  will- 
ing to  raise  taxes  to  reduce  deficits.  In 
the  process,  fiscal  conservatives  become 
the  tax  collectors  for  spenders.  After 
each  tax  increase,  deficits  don't  really 
decline  because  expenditures  tend  to  rise 
at  lease  as  fast  as  revenues.  Many  of  us 
who  supported,  and  continue  to  support, 
tax  reduction  and  indexation  of  the  tax 
code  do  so  precisely  because  we  believe 
that  restraining  revenues  is  necessary  to 
restrain  government  spending. 

This  is  why  deficits  do  matter  and 
must  be  reduced.  Deficits  are  the 
measure  of  indiscipline  in  government 
spending.  The  Williamsburg  declaration 
contained  a  commitment  to  reduce 
budget  deficits — not  by  raising  taxes  but 
by  limiting  the  growth  of  expenditures. 
The  Administration  remains  committed 
to  this  goal. 

These  elements— the  facts  that 
recovery  is  well  underway  in  the  United 
States  and  elsewhere;  that  the  summit 
leaders  have  agreed  on  a  strategy  that 
gives  real  promise  it  will  be  sustained 
and  noninflationary;  and  their  com- 
mitments to  assure  it  is  transmitted  to 
other  countries  through  positive  action 
to  reduce  trade  barriers  and  maintain  an 
adequate  flow  of  financial  resources  to 
manage  current  international  debt  prob- 
lems—can indeed  give  us  confidence  that 
we  will  be  able  to  meet  and  surmount 
the  challenges  we  face  in  the  future. 
However,  as  I  stressed  earlier,  it  is  what 
we  do,  not  what  we  say  that  is  the  only 
guarantee  of  our  success.  Thus,  the  real 
judgment  on  the  prospects  for  global 
recovery  and  sustainable  growth  will  be 
determined  by  our  actions  in  the  months 
to  come.  Williamsburg  laid  the  founda- 
tions on  which  we  can  build;  it  will  be  up 
to  the  governments  represented  there, 
in  cooperation  with  their  partners  in 
other  countries,  to  make  the 
Williamsburg  concepts  reality.  ■ 


Building  Trade  With  Africa 


Following  is  a  joint  statement 
prepared  by  Leonard  H.  Robinson,  Jr., 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  fur  African 
Affairs,  and  Denis  Lamb,  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs,  and  submitted  to  ttu 
Subcommittees  on  African  Affairs  and 
International  Economic  Policy  and 
Trade  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  <  'om- 
m  it  tee  and  the  Subcommittee  on  General 
Oversight  and  the  Economy  of  the  Housi 
Committee  on  Business  Affairs,  on 
May  19,  1983. 

The  title  of  this  hearing  is  "building 
trade  with  Africa."  The  subject  implied 
by  the  committee's  written  questions  is, 
however,  clearly  somewhat  broader,  in- 
volving aid,  investment,  and  other 
aspects  of  this  Administration's  policy  of 
emphasizing  the  private  sector  in  our 
relationship  with  Africa.  We  firmly 
believe  that  this  broader  perspective  is 
correct  and  that  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
see  our  export  trade  relationship  with 
Africa  in  isolation  from  other  concerns. 
In  the  end,  our  exports  to  Africa  will  de- 
pend on  the  growth  and  development  of 
the  African  economies.  The  question  is 
how  we  can  influence  this  process,  and 
your  interest,  if  we  understand  correct- 
ly, is  focused  on  the  role  of  African  and 
American  entrepreneurs,  large  and 
small,  in  attaining  mutual  goals. 

The  subject  under  discussion  is  of 
great  concern  to  us.  Virtually  every  ac- 
tion we  have  taken  in  the  last  3  years 
has  emphasized  the  theme  of  encourag- 
ing the  private  sector  as  an  agent  of 
economic  growth  and  development  in 
Africa.  We  view  such  growth  and  de- 
velopment as  a  prerequisite  for  our 
broader  goal  of  a  just,  prosperous,  and 
stable  Africa — a  goal  which  is,  first  and 
foremost,  that  of  the  Africans  them- 
selves. We  have  been  at  pains  to  em- 
phasize that  this  policy  is  not  one  of 
"stuffing  capitalism  down  the  throats  of 
reluctant  socialists,"  that  it  is  responsive 
to  African  aspirations,  and  that  it  en- 
compasses small  producers  and  en- 
trepreneurs, including  farmers — both  in 
Africa  and  in  the  United  States — as  well 
as  larger,  sometimes  multinational  cor- 
porate traders  and  investors.  Ours  is  a 
multiple  agenda — encouraging  small 
scale  African  producers,  helping  build  in- 
stitutions and  policies  thai  will  underpin 
large-scale  African  enterprise  in  the 
future,  and  supporting  our  own  traders 
and  investors  in  their  efforts  to  venture 
into  this  often  unfamiliar  world. 


Role  of  State  Department  and  Other 
Agencies 

One  of  the  purposes  of  this  hearing  is 
determine  how  the  State  Department 
and  other  agencies  work  together  to  ir 
plement  this  new  policy.  Briefly,  State 
role  has  three  aspects,  each  rooted  in 
our  conviction  that  a  stronger  private 
sector  relationship  with  our  African 
partners  will  be  politically  and 
economically  advantageous  to  both  side 

First,  the  State  Department  en- 
courages greater  attention  by  our 
specialized  economic  agencies — Com 
merce,  OPIC  [Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment Corporation],  Exlm  bank  [Expoj 
Import  Bank],  AID  [Agency  for  Intern 
tional  Development],  and  others — to  tr 
problems  and  opportunities  of  the 
world's  least  developed  continent. 

Second,  at  our  embassies  abroad, 
State  Department  commercial  officers 
implement  a  number  of  programs  and 
offer  a  host  of  services  to  visiting  1  '.S 
businessmen. 

Third,  in  cooperation  with  Com 
merce  and  other  agencies,  we  have  an 
active  outreach  program  to  acquaint 
American  business  here  at  home,  most 
emphatically  including  small  and  minor 
ity  business,  with  the  challenge  of  trad* 
and  investment  in  Africa  and  the  rele- 
vant U.S.  Government  support  services 

We  would  like  to  say  a  word  about 
each  of  these  three  functions,  and  then 
conclude  by  noting  some  possible  areas 
for  improvement. 

Use  of  Other  Agencies.  In 

Washington,  State  operates  under  sonn 
serious  constraints.  We  have  no  budget 
or  operational  responsibility  for  private 
sector  support  programs.  We  rely 
almost  entirely  on  other  agencies.  Yet 
we  are  the  only  agency  that  is  charged 
with  viewing  such  programs  in  the  con- 
text of  our  overall  foreign  policy  in- 
terests. As  a  result,  we  spend  much  tin 
encouraging  other  agencies  to  do  more 
in  Africa  and  trying  to  make  sure  that 
individual  countries  or  regions  are  not 
neglected.  The  appointment  of  a  Depiffl 
Assistant  Secretary  in  the  Africa 
Bureau  dedicated  to  private  sector 
issues  reflects  the  importance  we  at  tad 
to  this  objective.  To  this  end,  a  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Africa 
Bureau  meets  informally  with  other 
agency  colleagues  about  once  a  month. 
Similarly,  the  State  Department, 
through  the  Economic  Bureau,  works 
hard  within  the  councils  of  the  executivf 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


ECONOMICS 


nch  to  achieve  a  more  effective  policy 
mework.  For  example,  we  have  sup- 
ited  liberalization  of  the  tax  regime 
American  businessmen  abroad,  the 
■talent  of  export  trading  company 
ligation— which  should  make  it  easier 
i  small  and  medium  firms  to  operate 
\frica— and  the  revision,  still  under 
iberation  by  the  Congress,  of  the 
reign  Corrupt  Practices  Act.  At  the 
ne  time,  we  have  supported  AID's 
■wing  emphasis  on  building  the  in- 
enous  private  sector  in  Africa. 
Following  President  Reagan's  com- 
ment at  Cancun,  the  Africa  Bureau 
worked  with  AID  to  design 
■icultural  assistance  teams  composed 
icademic  and  commercial  experts  that 
ted  Liberia  in  1982  and  Guinea  in 
ly  1983  to  identify  profitable 
icultural  ventures  and  to  define 
itegies  for  attracting  new  capital  to 
Joit  those  opportunities.  These  ef- 
ts should  help  Liberia  and  Guinea  at- 
1  agricultural  self-reliance  and  pro- 
s  opportunities  for  sales  of  U.S. 
icultural  tools  and  technical  services. 
State  also  cooperated  with  a  major 
;.  bank  to  place  an  experienced 
lerican  financial  expert  as  a  personal 
iser  to  President  Sekou  Toure  of 
nea.  He  will  be  able  to  offer  Presi- 
it  Toure  critical  analysis  on  the  im- 
:iments  to  economic  growth  in  Guinea 
I  to  suggest  reforms  required  to  at- 
pt  capital  into  productive  activity. 
We  remain  attentive  in  other  ways 
he  problems  which  U.S.  businesses 
front  in  the  difficult  African  environ- 
nt.  The  Departments  of  State  and 
.  nmerce,  as  well  as  the  Department  of 
S  riculture  and  AID,  are  active  par- 
I  pants  in  a  number  of  established 
|  urns  that  also  seek  to  encourage 

5  'ican  governments  to  improve  the 

;  iate  for  profit-oriented  enterprises. 

These  include,  for  example,  the 
[  ^.-Nigeria  Business  Council  and  the 

6  5. -Nigeria  Joint  Agricultural  Con- 
3  Lation  Committee,  each  of  which 

I  ets  in  both  Washington  and  Lagos,  as 
111  as  the  U.S. -Sudan  Business  Council 
v  ich  meets  in  Washington  and  Khar- 
i  m.  These  councils  provide  business- 
I  n  an  opportunity  to  discuss  their  con- 
I  ns  regarding  commercial  policies  and 
I  rulations  directly  and  frankly  with 

■  lior  government  officials  on  both  con- 
I  ents.  They  are  also  vehicles  which  can 
1  ng  potentially  profitable  opportunities 
t  the  attention  of  American  investors 

A  i  traders. 

I   U.S.  Embassies.  The  Department's 
i'atest  tangible  asset  is  not,  however, 

■  Washington.  It  consists  of  our  em- 


bassies abroad.  In  34  of  our  sub-Saharan 
posts,  the  State  Department  retains 
responsibilities  for  commercial  activities, 
and  in  the  others  we  work  closely  with 
the  foreign  commercial  service.  But  the 
role  of  our  embassies  goes  far  beyond 
promoting  trade,  important  as  that  is. 
They  also  provide  a  wealth  of  informa- 
tion, including  what  amounts  to  free 
political  risk  assessment  for  American 
businessmen.  Such  services  may  not  be 
important  in  developed  countries  or  even 
in  more  advanced  LDCs  [less  developed 
countries],  but  they  are  often  invaluable 
in  the  relatively  unfamiliar  world  of 
Africa. 

Much  the  same  kind  of  service  is 
also  provided  by  State  desk  officers  in 
Washington,  where  we  have  for  the  last 
3  years,  and  with  the  explicit  support  of 
the  Secretary,  maintained  an  "open 
door"  policy  toward  business  visitors. 
Our  embassies,  from  Ambassador  to 
political  and  economic  officers,  also  play 
a  role  in  providing  frank  counsel  to 
African  governments  on  suggested 
reforms  to  promote  economic  growth 
and  stability. 

"Outreach."  Our  third  concern  can 
be  broadly  defined  as  "outreach."  More 
than  1.4  million  cables  pour  into  the 
State  Department  annually,  and  much  of 
this  information  is  of  interest  to  the 
business  community.  We  are  convinced 
that  when  American  entrepreneurs  are 
better  informed  about  African  oppor- 
tunities, we  will  see  growth  in  our  trade 
and  investment  in  Africa.  To  achieve 
this,  State  and  Commerce  have  jointly 
sponsored  a  series  of  regional  con- 
ferences on  trade  and  investment  in 
Africa,  the  most  recent  of  which  took 
place  in  Houston  in  April.  Similarly,  the 
Economic  Bureau  holds  executive- 
diplomatic  seminars  with  segments 
devoted  to  each  major  region  of  the 
world,  and  we  participate  in  many 
events  sponsored  by  private  groups  for 
the  same  general  purpose.  I  would  em- 
phasize that  in  describing  commercial 
opportunities  in  Africa  we  attempt  to  be 
objective  and  do  not  gloss  over  the  dif- 
ficulties that  cloud  the  business  climate 
in  many  sub-Saharan  countries.  We  have 
consistently  emphasized  that  business 
success  in  Africa  usually  demands  a 
long-term  commitment  and  patient,  per- 
sonal contact  with  Africans. 

Within  our  outreach  agenda  we 
place  special  emphasis  on  opportunities 
for  small  and  minority  businesses.  In- 
vitation lists  to  conferences  and 
seminars  are  compiled  with  care  to  en- 
sure minority  representation.  Minority 
firms  have  participated  in  such  major 


events  as  the  January  1982  cabinet-level 
trade  mission  to  Africa,  and  both  AID 
and  Commerce  maintain  offices  which 
are  charged  with  encouraging  increased 
participation  of  minority  firms  in  our  ex- 
port and  foreign  assistance  programs. 

Future  Plans 

We  would  like  to  say  a  little  about  the 
future,  and  what  could  be  done  better.  It 
goes  without  saying  that  we  have  a  long 
way  to  go.  Viewed  from  the  end  of  a 
world  recession,  and  bearing  in  mind 
that  recovery  will  come  last  to  Africa, 
the  distance  sometimes  seems  infinite. 
In  1982,  according  to  the  latest  Com- 
merce Department  figures,  U.S.  imports 
from  sub-Saharan  Africa  fell  by  15%, 
partly  due  to  sharp  decline  in  oil  pur- 
chases from  Nigeria,  while  our  exports 
were  off  by  almost  7%,  from  $6.6  billion 
in  1981  to  $5.4  billion  in  1982. 

These  figures  certainly  do  not  mean 
that  Africa  is  a  hopeless  case.  They  do 
illustrate  something  we  already 
know — that  commodity  dependent  LDCs 
have  been  particularly  hard  hit  by  world 
recession.  They  underline  the  urgency  of 
African  economies  diversifying  and 
developing  a  broader  range  of  produc- 
tive activities,  beginning  necessarily  with 
the  traditionally  neglected  agricultural 
sector.  They  also  suggest  that  our  ap- 
proach to  these  deeply  troubled 
economies  should  not,  indeed,  cannot  be 
"business  as  usual." 

Passage  of  Legislation.  First,  we 
can  push  through  to  completion  the  Ad- 
ministration's current  legislative  agenda, 
including  passage  of  a  revised  Foreign 
Corrupt  Practices  Act  to  eliminate 
needless  ambiguities  in  that  law.  We  can 
press  ahead  with  our  agenda  of  bilateral 
investment  treaties  to  help  regularize 
our  private  sector  relationships  in  Africa 
and  elsewhere.  Bilateral  investment 
treaties  negotiations  are,  among  other 
things,  a  useful  vehicle  for  engaging  in 
dialogue  with  African  governments  on 
means  of  improving  the  local  investment 
climate. 

Encouraging  Supportive  Institu- 
tions and  Policies.  We  must  further 
refine  our  ongoing  effort  to  encourage, 
largely  through  AID,  the  kinds  of  in- 
stitutions and  policies  that  will  support, 
not  stifle,  the  most  productive  elements 
in  African  society.  I  would  note  that 
AID  is  pursuing  this  effort  on  two 
tracks.  In  its  agriculture,  health,  and 
other  programs,  AID's  Africa  Bureau 
engages  in  constant  dialogue  with 
African  governments  to  improve  the 


«jgust  1983 


37 


EUROPE 


policy,  regulatory,  and  legal  framework, 
with  the  aim  of  stimulating  indigenous 
private  enterprise  and  increasing  en- 
trepreneurial and  managerial  skill.  AID's 
programs  are  also  designed  to  maximize 
the  role  of  market  forces  as  opposed  to 
the  practice — prevalent  among  many  aid 
donors  in  the  past— of  relying  exclusive- 
ly on  government  bureaucracies  and 
often  creating  new  ones. 

Meanwhile,  the  new  Private  Enter- 
prise Bureau  (PRE)  is  designing  ex- 
perimental projects  in  selected  countries 
to  develop  financial  institutions  and  in- 
termediaries and  to  assist  governments 
in  privatizing  state-owned  enterprises. 
PRE  is  also  developing  a  program  of 
private  sector  advisory  services  which 
will  be  available  to  be  drawn  upon  by  in- 
dividual AID  missions  in  Africa  and 
around  the  world. 

Specialized  Economic  Agencies.  It 

was  mentioned  earlier  that  one  of  the 
Africa  Bureau's  functions  is  to  stimulate, 
wherever  possible,  adequate  allocation  of 
resources  to  Africa  by  our  specialized 
economic  agencies.  A  recent  study  by 
the  Battelle  Corporation  entitled 
"Obstacles  to  Private  Sector  Activities  in 
Africa"  concludes  that  the  State  Depart- 
ment should  accelerate  and  formalize 
this  coordinating  role.  I  would  note  that 
although  the  study  was  sponsored  by  the 
State  Department,  we  certainly  did  not 
"precook"  the  results.  We,  nevertheless, 
find  the  conclusions  interesting  and  will 
be  studying  it  with  some  care. 

One  theme  that  pervades  the  Bat- 
telle study — and  that  is  echoed  by  prac- 
tically anyone  with  business  experience 
in  Africa — is  the  concerted  manner  in 
which  the  Europeans  and  Japanese 
devote  resources  to  their  traders  and  in- 
vestors. This  support  is  sometimes  in 
the  form  of  subsidization  (e.g.,  the  use 
of  mixed  credits  which,  with  limited  ex- 
ception in  the  case  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, are  contrary  to  U.S.  policy). 
Underlying  this  issue,  however,  is  a 
totally  different  relationship  between 
government  and  business  and  how  they 
relate  to  Third  World  economic  policies. 
Our  allies  see  aid  as  serving  multiple 
ends,  including  political  objectives,  ex- 
port promotion,  and  facilitation  of 
investment  as  well  as  development.  In- 
deed, they  see  these  goals  as  com- 
plementary, not  conflicting.  Their 
approach  is  epitomized  by  the  Lome  con- 
vention, which  wraps  aid,  trade,  and 
technology  transfer  instruments  into  one 
contractual  relationship  between  the 
European  Community  and  its  former 
colonies. 

Our  own  approach  is  very  different. 
U.S.  business  and  government  have 


traditionally  operated  independently, 
and  U.S.  Government  agencies  each  pur- 
sue separate  and  usually  distinct  objec- 
tives. The  American  public  and,  indeed, 
the  U.S.  Congress,  often  perceives  aid 
as  a  kind  of  charity,  not  as  a  means  of 
enhancing  our  own  self-interest.  Political 
and/or  commercial  objectives  are  typical- 
ly regarded  as  antithetical  to  the  goal  of 
development.  In  short,  our  policy  does 
not  integrate  political,  aid,  trade,  and  in- 
vestment goals. 

The  Administration's  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative  represents  a  modest 
step  away  from  our  traditional  ap- 
proach, toward  the  European  model. 
Perhaps  we  should  consider  whether  the 
poorest  countries,  many  of  which  are  in 
Africa,  do  not  also  deserve  a  measure  of 
special  treatment.  It  could  take  many 
forms,  not  necessarily  similar  to  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative.  But  there  is 
no  question  that  we  need  to  give  serious 
thought  to  this  issue — how  to  make  our 


policy  fit  the  special  conditions  of  Afric 
and  serve  our  own  broadening  political 
and  economic  objectives. 

From  our  perspective,  it  seems  ob- 
vious that  there  is,  indeed,  a  relationsr 
between  our  various  goals.  Surely 
political  stability  in  Africa  is  a  sine  quu 
non  for  economic  stability.  Developmei 
in  the  agricultural  sector  will  create  ne 
opportunities  for  U.S.  trade  and  invest 
ment,  especially  in  the  field  of 
agribusiness,  where  the  United  States 
leads  the  world.  Seen  from  this  point  < 
view,  our  aid,  if  it  successfully  stimu- 
lates a  better  investment  climate,  is 
anything  but  charity,  and  our  commer- 
cial concerns  can  hardly  be  divorced 
from  our  interest  in  African 
development. 


'I 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  wif 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


North  Atlantic  Council 
Meets  in  Paris 


Secretary  Shultz  departed  Washing- 
ton, D.C,  on  June  8,  1983,  to  attend  the 
regular  semiannual  session  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  ministerial  meeting 
(June  9-10}. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  the 
Secretary's  news  conference  held  in  Paris 
and  the  North  Atlantic  Council  final 
communique. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JUNE  8,  1983' 

Q.  Could  you  say  what  the  importance 
of  this  NATO  meeting  is  and  what  we 
can  expect  from  it? 

A.  This  is  one  of  a  series  of  very  im- 
portant meetings  starting  with  the 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development!  meeting 
in  Paris,  a  month  or  so  ago,  the 
Williamsburg  summit,  the  NATO 
Defense  Ministers'  meeting  last  week, 
and  now  this  meeting,  which,  significant- 
ly, takes  place  in  Paris.  These  meetings, 
on  the  one  hand,  bring  together  a  vary- 
ing but,  nevertheless,  consistent  group 
of  countries — the  industrial  democracies 
of  the  world — in  various  settings,  and 
we  see  these  meetings  taking  place 


against  the  background  of  problems  ai 
challenges  to  the  industrial  democracie 
At  the  same  time,  the  basis  for  increa 
ing  confidence  is  that  we  are  meeting 
these  problems  and  challenges 
successfully. 

In  the  OECD  meeting  and  at 
Williamsburg,  of  course,  there  was  a 
concentration  on  economic  issues,  and 
we  now  see  the  beginnings  of  recover} 
in  the  free  world  economy,  with  much 
lower  inflation  than  we've  had  at  the 
start  of  past  recoveries  and  good  pros- 
pects for  keeping  inflation  under  c<  mtr 
That's  a  very  good  situation  and,  at  th" 
same  time,  there  has  been — and  I  felt 
this  at  the  first  NATO  Foreign 
Ministers'  meeting  that  I  went  to  last 
October  and  then  in  December  in 
Brussels  and  at  successive  meetings—; 
real  sense  of  unity  and  cohesion  and 
determination  to  identify  and  defend  oi 
values  and  to  see  the  relationship  of  th 
goal  to  the  kinds  of  things  that  are  be- 
ing done  in  NATO. 

In  particular,  right  now,  of  course, 
the  focus  is  on  both  tracks  of  the  dual- 
track  1979  NATO  decision.  We  are  mo' 
ing  into  the  time  of  1983  when  negotia- 
tions are  going  on  intensively  in  Gene! 
At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  clear  to 


38 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


EUROPE 


grybody  that  the  decision  made  to 
ploy,  unless  there  is  a  negotiating  out- 
ttie,  is  a  very  firm  decision.  So,  all  of 
?se  things  are  coming  together  in  this 
t  of  meetings.  This  is  the  fourth  one  in 
i  series,  and  it's  a  meeting  of  extraor- 
tary  importance  as  we  try  to  bring 
;se  things  together.  It  should  give  us 
lewed  confidence  as  a  free  people  in 
«  countries,  recognizing,  with  candor, 
;  problems  that  we  have  and  strug- 
ng  with  them  and  gradually  finding 
iitions  or  ways  of  coping  with  a 
bater  and  greater  success  with  these 
)blems. 

Q.  Isn't  there  some  danger  that 
th  all  these  meetings  you  may  run 
t  of  things  to  say  with  each  other? 

A.  This  is  a  time  when  it's  very  im- 
-tant  to  stay  glued  together.  We've 
I  an  intensive  process  of  consultation. 
S  focused  on  these  four  meetings, 
ere  are  innumerable  other  contacts  by 
ile,  letter,  and  by  individuals  traveling 
>und — Europeans,  Japanese,  and 
tericans,  people  from  Washington  and 
•ious  capitals — and  I  think  that  the  in- 
se  and  continuing  consultative  pat- 
ns  that  have  been  established  are 
*d.  It  may  be  that  we  don't  have 
lething  brand  new  and  fresh  to  say, 

at  the  same  time,  it's  important  to 
;p  reaffirming  the  track  we're  on. 
i  even  as  the  weeks  and  months  go 

there  are  developments  that  need  to 
assessed,  and  we'll  do  it. 

Q.  You  said  that  this  meeting 
rnificantly"  takes  place  in  Paris, 
lid  you  go  into  that  significance,  of 
I  French  invitation  and  of  Paris  as  a 
I  ce  for  the  meeting? 

A.  You  have  identified  properly  why 
ade  that  comment,  and  it  simply 
lifies  the  cohesion  of  Europe  with  the 
ited  States  in  the  sense  that  NATO 

the  North  Atlantic  alliance  having 
agnized  the  distinctiveness  of  each 
ntry  and  the  distinctiveness  of 
nee  and,  I  might  say,  the  United 
tes.  One  of  the  magic  qualities  of  our 
esion  these  days  is  the  fact  that 
ty  country  is  insistently  sovereign 

independent  but,  nevertheless,  on 
;  basis,  people  are  talking  together, 
•king  together  and,  within  that 
nework,  cooperating  effectively.  It's 
:  balance  of  insistent  sovereignty 
i  a  sense  of  cohesion  and  collabora- 

that,  perhaps,  especially  underlines 
importance  of  this  setting  and  the 
ity  to  do  that. 


Q.  Re  Nicaragua:  Why  was  the 
decision  made  to  respond  to  the  expul- 
sion of  three  American  diplomats  so 
severe?  If  that  leads  to  a  break  in 
diplomatic  relations,  would  you  con- 
sider that  a  negative  consequence? 

A.  We  don't  have  any  thoughts  of 
breaking  diplomatic  relations.  Senator 
Stone  [Richard  B.  Stone,  Ambassador- 
at-Large  and  special  representative  of 
the  President  to  Central  America]  has 
Nicaragua  on  his  itinerary.  We  expect  to 
see  that  continue;  that's  our  intent  as  we 
seek  a  regional  solution  to  the  problem 
of  Central  America,  a  peaceful  solution, 
a  solution  that  will  yield  economic 
development  and  progress  toward 
democratic  institutions  in  the  area.  That 
is  our  objective,  an  objective  that  can 
hardly  be  served  when  you  have  the 
kind  of  military  buildup  that's  been  tak- 
ing place.  Now  as  far  as  the  actions 
taken  are  concerned,  there  was  no 
justification  whatever  for  the  expulsion 
of  the  three  American  diplomats  and, 
under  the  circumstances,  it  seemed  to  us 
that  it  was  important  to  express  our 
reaction  to  that,  and  we  did  nothing 
about  people  in  the  Embassy  in 
Washington  but  simply,  basically  close 
the  Consulates  scattered  around  the 
country. 

Q.  You  said  it  is  the  U.S.  intent 
for  Ambassador  Stone  to  be  in 
Nicaragua  on  Friday.  Do  you  expect 
him  to  be  received  officially? 

A.  We  expect  he  will  be.  The  point 
is  that  we  seek  a  regional  peaceful  solu- 
tion to  the  problem.  The  President  has 
named  an  outstanding  American,  with 
great  talent  and  knowledge  of  the  area. 
He  is  now  going  around  in  a  listening 
pattern  trying  to  help  people  compose 
the  differences.  That  is  unambiguously  a 
good  thing,  and  I  should  hope  that 
Nicaragua  responds  to  it,  and  I  expect 
that  they  will. 

Q.  How  would  you  assess  the 
state  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  the 
COMECON  [Council  for  Mutual  Eco- 
nomic Assistance]  countries  after  the 
change  of  leadership  in  the  Soviet 
Union? 

A.  I  hesitate  because  I  much  prefer 
to  talk  about  the  United  States  and  the 
alliance  and  what  we  are  doing  and  then 
look  for  outcomes  that  may  be  different 
from  the  past  based  on  things — on 
behavior  and  changes  that  take  place 
that  you  can  identify  in  terms  of 
substantive  result.  As  of  now,  we  don't 
see  any  substantive  result.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  you  point  out,  there  is  new 
leadership,  and  that  always  tends  to 
make  you,  and  should  reinvigorate  your 


efforts  to,  probe  and  test  and  to  see  if  a 
different  pattern  can  be  brought  out.  It 
remains  to  be  seen.  But  as  in  the  case  of 
my  response  to  questions  about 
Nicaragua,  the  U.S.  position,  and  I'm 
sure  the  position  of  our  allies,  is  that  we 
are  determined;  we  are  going  to  be 
strong;  we  are  going  to  defend  our 
values;  and,  at  the  same  time,  we  are 
always  ready  to  work  for  constructive 
solutions  to  problems  if  those  can  be  ob- 
tained. They  are  substantive  and 
reasonable  and  not  just  rhetorical.  We 
just  have  to  wait  and  see  but  be  ready  to 
work  with  the  other  side  as  the  substan- 
tive opportunities  arise. 

Q.  Would  you  comment  on  our 
policies  with  respect  to  Greece  and 
Turkey?  Will  we  get  Greece  to  agree 
to  the  7-10  ratio  on  arms  sales?  Will 
we  get  Greece  to  sign  a  base  agree- 
ment? 

A.  First  of  all,  Greece  and  Turkey 
are  both  our  allies.  They  both  are 
friends.  We  want  to  keep  it  that  way, 
and  we  like  our  friends  to  be  friends. 
That  isn't  always  the  case,  but  anything 
that  can  happen  and  encourages  that 
trend,  we  are  for  it.  The  base  negotia- 
tions are  ongoing  and  at  an  intense 
stage  right  now,  and  we  want  to  see  a 
constructive  outcome.  I'll  just  leave  it  at 
that  rather  than  comment  on  what's  go- 
ing on  in  a  particular  negotiation. 

In  terms  of  U.S.  support  levels,  we 
have  proposals  to  the  Congress,  and 
there  is  gradual  action  taking  place  in 
terms  of  the  1983  supplemental  and  the 
1984  authorization  and  appropriation 
bills  that  are  working  their  way  along.  I 
don't  think  that  we  want  to  find  our- 
selves pinned  down  to  some  sort  of  for- 
mula approach  to  any  of  these  things 
and  really  can't  do  it  even  if  we  want  to, 
given  the  nature  of  the  authorization 
and  appropriation  process.  But,  certain- 
ly, we  want  to  deal  with  each  country  in 
an  equitable  and  helpful  way. 

Q.  Will  East- West  trade  be  a  ma- 
jor part  of  the  NATO  agenda? 

A.  It  will  certainly  be  part  of  the 
agenda.  It's  an  important  subject.  Last 
December,  when  this  group  met,  there 
was  a  great  deal  of  sentiment  for  having 
a  broad  study,  kind  of  an  umbrella 
study,  of  East- West  economic  relations, 
take  place  within  the  NATO  framework. 
As  I  went  around  Europe  and  discussed 
that,  it  seemed  to  jell.  It  was  the  posi- 
tion favored  by  President  Mitterrand  as 
well — discovered  when  I  came  to 
Paris— and  so  the  NATO  economic  com- 
mittee undertook  a  study.  We  think  it  is 
a  good  study,  and  I'm  sure  that  study 
will  be  discussed,  as  it  should  be,  not  on- 


}ust  1983 


39 


EUROPE 


ly  in  this  NATO  meeting  but  as  a  contin- 
uing matter  as  we  find  ourselves  more 
and  more  with  a  broad  sense  of  generali- 
ty of  views  on  the  importance  of,  at 
least,  certain  apsects  of  East- West 
economic  relations.  So,  I  expect  that  will 
be  an  important  topic  of  discussion. 

Q.  Could  you  bring  us  up  to  date 
on  the  Middle  East,  particularly 
General  Walters'  [Ambassador  at 
Large  Vernon  Walters]  visit  last 
week? 

A.  We  are  seeking  to  explain  and  to 
develop  support  for  the  idea  of  with- 
drawal of  all  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon,  and  General  Walters  made  a 
trip  around  in  that  regard,  and  I'm  not 
going  to  comment  on  particulars  of  what 
he  said  or  somebody  said  to  him  in  the 
places  he  visited,  but  he  certainly  got  a 
cordial  reception  as  he  always  does,  and 
people  listened.  I  think  it  was  an  effec- 
tive thing  to  do.  The  Lebanese  have 
been  putting  on  a  strenuous  effort  to  go 
round  the  various  capitals — particularly 
Arab  capitals,  but  also  others,  including 
Europe — and  particularly  the  countries 
of  all  of  us  who  are  contributing  to  the 
multinational  force,  and  similarly  want- 
ing to  develop  support  for  a  withdrawal 
of  all  foreign  forces.  Right  now  what 
that  means  is  Syrian  and  PLO  forces, 
since  the  Israelis,  have  agreed  to 
withdraw.  We  are  supporting  that  idea, 
and  it's  very  important  to  bring  that 
about. 

Beyond  the  problems  in  Lebanon, 
are  the  basic  difficulties  of  the  peace 
process  itself,  and  it  is  apparent  to 
everyone — certainly  it  is  apparent  to  the 
Lebanese — that  it  is  critical  for  them  in 
the  long  run  to  find  some  kind  of  solu- 
tion to  the  problems  of  the  Palestinians 
and  a  way  of  serving  the  rights  and 
aspirations  of  the  Palestinian  people. 
The  President's  September  1  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  pro- 
posals addressed  themselves  to  that  ob- 
jective; those  remain  important  pro- 
posals. I  found,  in  my  trip  to  the  Middle 
East,  that  they  are  very  much  alive  in 
the  minds  of  the  leaders  with  whom  I 
spoke.  It  is  clear,  also,  that  the  key  is 
finding  some  way  to  have  legitimized, 
from  many  points  of  view,  Palestinian 
participation  in  talks  with  Israel  about 
that  and  related  Israeli  security  issues. 
We  continue  to  pursue  that,  and  it  leads 
you  inevitably  to  scratch  your  head  in 
the  light  of  all  of  the  developments 
around,  to  scratch  your  head  more  and 
more  about  the  human  beings  called 
Palestinians,  and  ask  yourself  what  is 
being  done  and  what  can  be  done  to 
make  life  better  for  them  and  perhaps, 


in  a  way,  this  is  the  sort  of  thing  that 
will  improve  that  process. 

Q.  There  are  reports  this  morning 
that  the  PLO  was  planning  to  bring 
its  troops  back  into  the  Bekaa  from 
Tunisia,  Yemen,  and  elsewhere.  Can 
you  comment  on  those  reports? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  comment  on  any 
particular  report,  but  any  development 
that  puts  more  foreign  forces  into 
Lebanon  than  were  there  at  the  time  of 
cessation  of  the  main  hostilities  is 
unwelcome.  We  are  trying  to  move  in 
the  other  direction.  It  only  adds  to  the 
tensions  in  the  area,  and  those  tensions 
always  have  the  potential  of  leading  to 
an  outbreak  of  major  hostilities.  We 
don't  want  to  see  that;  I  don't  think  the 
Syrians  want  to  see  that,  from  all  I 
know;  I'm  sure  the  Israelis  don't  want  to 
see  that;  and  we  don't  want  to  see  that. 
It's  very  undesirable  to  have  additional 
forces  going  into  the  Bekaa. 

Q.  The  Administration  supported 
the  idea  of  a  Bulgarian-Soviet  plot. 
Now  that  position  has  changed.  Why? 

A.  I  really  don't  have  any  comment 
on  it,  but  you  go  ahead  and  ask  your 
question.  This  is  a  matter  that  is  under 
investigation  by  the  authorities  of  Italy 
and  we  support  their  investigation  and 
await  its  outcome. 

Q.  Do  you  see  a  role  for  Spain  as  a 
mediator  in  Central  America? 

A.  The  Spanish,  of  course,  have  a 
very  special  relationship  to  Latin 
America,  particularly  the  Spanish- 
speaking  countries — but  to  all  countries 
in  Latin  America— and  constructive  ef- 
forts by  anyone  are  always  welcome. 
There  are  lots  of  mediators  around  now, 
and  I'm  sure  that— I  won't  try  to  speak 
for  somebody  else— we  welcome  the  ef- 
forts of  the  Contadora  four  who  are 
working  with  the  situation.  I  believe  that 
the  efforts  that  Senator  Stone  is  making 
on  behalf  of  the  President  are  also  seen 
as  constructive  in  the  region.  Somehow 
it  is  worthwhile  to  help  the  frontline  of 
this  mediation  effort  to  work  and,  prob- 
ably, Mr.  Gonzales  has  that  in  mind.  I'm 
sure  he'll  have  constructive  things  to 
contribute  on  this  score.  I  had  a  discus- 
sion with  him  last  December;  we 
touched  on  this  matter,  but  he  was  just 
new  in  office  and  didn't  develop  his 
thoughts  too  extensively.  He'll  be  in 
Washington  shortly,  and  we'll  have  a 
chance  to  review  it  with  him  then. 

Q.  Back  to  Europe:  Britain  and 
France  don't  want  to  be  included  in 
the  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  talks.  What  is  the  position  of 
the  Administration? 


A.  Our  feeling— and  the  feeling  of 
Britain,  France,  and  all  our  allies— is 
that  these  are  national  forces,  and  the; 
don't  have  a  role  in  the  Geneva  talks,  ! 
they  are  not  there.  That  was  stated  01 
more  in  the  Williamsburg  security  and 
peace  statement. 

Q.  You  talked  about  waiting  to 
see  if  the  Soviets  will  be  conciliator 
Do  you  think  there  is  any  chance  of 
movement  before  a  high-level  meet- 
ing—you and  Gromyko  or  Andropov 
and  the  President? 

A.  On  certain  things,  it  depends  o 
the  subject.  Certainly,  it's  reasonable  t 
expect  that  the  capable  negotiators  th< 
both  sides  have  in  these  various  negoti 
tions  will  be  able  to  make  progress  if  tj 
national  governments  involved  want  tc 
see  that  happen.  The  U.S.  Governmen 
and,  I  think,  those  of  our  allies,  wants 
see  it  happen.  So  there  is  no  reason  w 
competent  negotiators  can't  get 
somewhere.  I  hope  that  a  strong  and 
significant  conclusion  can  be  brought  c 
of  the  CSCE  [Conference  for  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  meetings 
Madrid  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
Western  side.  We  have  unity  and  pur- 
pose there,  and  we  have  outstanding 
representation  in  the  various  delega- 
tions. And  from  the  U.S.  standpoint, 
Max  Kampelman  is  doing  a  terrific  job 
So  there  is  no  reason  why  you  couldn' 
have  an  outcome  there. 

Q.  The  President  is  supposed  to 
announce  new  START  proposals  to- 
day- Could  you  give  us  a  preview?  C 
you  envisage  START  and  INF  being 
grouped  into  one  negotiation? 

A.  I  think  they  are  separate.  Whj 
we  have  said  is  that  we  are  prepared 
keep  negotiating  and  working  for  the 
ultimate  goal  of  the  elimination  of  all 
these  weapons  and  for  as  low  a  level  n 
possible  of  equal  and  verifiable  deploy 
ments.  If  the  elimination  goal  is  not 
reached  right  away,  and  in  the  event  ( 
the  start  of  deployment,  at  least  from 
our  standpoint,  we  are  prepared  to  coi 
tinue  the  negotiations,  and  I  don't  see 
there  is  any  implication  there  of  mergi 
the  negotiations.  We  probably  would  jr 
keep  it  the  way  it's  going  now. 

Q,  Do  you  see  an  evolution  in  th> 
relationship  between  the  alliance  am 
Japan  on  the  basis  of  the  Williams- 
burg declaration? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  anybody  is  tr) 
ing  to  work  toward  a  formal  alliance. 
There  is  a  relationship  between  major 
industrial  democracies,  and  there  is  a 
common  concern,  born  out  of  security 
interests  on  the  one  hand  and  economii 


40 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


EUROPE 


nkages  on  the  other.  That  was  well  il- 
istrated  by  both  statements  that  came 
ut  of  Williamsburg.  The  way  in  which 
ihat  is  working  now  is  perfectly  satisfac- 
,ory.  There  is  a  lot  of  interaction  be- 
ween  ourselves  and  the  Japanese — 
Diplomatic  work — and  of  course,  direct 
jelationship  on  security  concerns  and 
jetween  Japan  and  Europe  as  well. 

Q.  The  paragraph  in  the  statement 
■n  security  re  "indivisibility."  What 
/as  that  addressing? 

A.  It  was  a  broad  statement  of  con- 
option,  and,  at  the  same  time,  was  an 
lcfirmation  of  the  position  that  has  been 
jiken  by  ourselves  as  a  spokesman  for 
/eryone  in  the  INF  negotiations  that 
nong  the  principles  that  have  been  put 
Jirward  there,  by  Ambassador  Nitze, 
'aul  H.  Nitze,  head  of  the  U.S.  delega- 
tm  to  the  INF  talks]  and  the  President, 
lated  as  guiding  principles,  one  is  a 
'obal  approach. 

Q.  An  apparent  contradiction:  If 
ere  is  no  INF  agreement  and  deploy- 
ent  goes  ahead,  you  accept  inequali- 
.  But  in  the  negotiations,  you  seek 
luality. 

A.  What  has  happened  since  the 
I  'cision  was  taken  to  proceed  with  a 
|  mble-track  decision,  is  that  the  Soviet 
ii  nion  has  continued  a  relentless  and  ex- 
I  nsive  deployment  process.  From  our 
I  andpoint,  the  thing  for  us  to  do  is  to 
I  oceed  with  planned  deployments  if  the 

gotiations  don't  indicate  some  other 
;■  tcome,  and  then  we'll  have  to  appraise 
I  e  situation  as  we  go  along.  But,  of 
■  urse,  what  we  want  to  see  happen  is 
I -at  as  the  Soviet  Union  deepens  its  ap- 

eciation  of  the  resolve  and  the  cohe- 
i  >n  and  the  unity  of  the  alliance,  it  will 
J  cide  that  it's  better  to  have  a 
I  gotiated  outcome,  either  before  or 
i  :er  deployment  starts.  So  the  principle 
I  equality  obtained,  we  don't  have  it 
|  w;  that's  the  reason  deployments  are 
{  needed,  the  Soviet  Union  has  a 
i  mopoly  of  these  weapons  and  seeks  to 
I  dntain  it,  and  we  don't  accept  that. 

Q.  Are  we  willing  to  accept  in- 
(  uality  at  higher  levels? 

A.  We  don't  appreciate  inequality  at 
1  i  level,  and  we  want  to  see  levels  kept 
Iwn.  So  we  think  the  right  way  to  ap- 
I  iach  things  right  now  is  to  proceed 
1  :h  the  deployments  that  are  planned 
I  less  negotiations  yield  a  result  for 
i  ne  other  pattern  of  deployment.  We 
I  ieve  that  the  best  pattern  and  the 
1  rt  level  of  equality  is  at  zero;  we  con- 
i  ue  to  believe  that,  and  we'll  continue 


working  for  it.  It  leaves  you  right  where 
you  were  when  you  started  the  question. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  There  seems  to  be  a  widespread 
feeling  in  Europe  that  it  isn't  fair  for 
the  United  States  to  seek  equal  levels 
with  the  Soviet  Union  when  the 
Soviets  have  to  face  French,  British, 
and  Chinese  weapons  as  well.  Is  the 
United  States  prepared  to  take  this  in- 
to account? 

A.  It  is  a  commentary  on  people's 
mentality  that  there  emerges  into  think- 
ing that  the  Soviet  Union  has  to  be  more 
heavily  armed  than  all  the  rest  of  the 
world  combined.  That's  not  an  accept- 
able way  to  think  about  it,  and  from  our 
standpoint,  we  take  the  position  and 
we'll  maintain  the  position  that  in  this 
strategic  area  we  have  to  think  about 
the  Soviet  systems  and  the  systems  of 
the  United  States  and  seek  a  balanced 
outcome— an  equal  outcome  to  the  rela- 
tionship between  those  forces. 

Q.  What  happens  if  the  allies  don't 
show  cohesion? 

A.  They  are  showing  cohesion  and 
have  demonstrated  that  time  and  again. 
It  is  interesting,  as  you  review  the 
history  of  the  alliance,  that  periodically 
it  rises  to  a  crescendo,  but  it  is  always 
there— a  sense  of  a  lack  of  cohesion  and 
so  on — and  yet  here  we  are,  what  is  it, 
35  years  later.  The  statements  and  the 
actions  and  the  ability  to  adapt  to  the 
evolution  of  circumstances  remain 
strong.  It  seems  to  me  the  basic  reason 
must  be  that  the  values  that  unite  us  are 
preeminent,  and,  in  the  end,  are  the 
things  which  tie  us  together  and  will 
continue  to  do  so. 

Q.  With  [French]  President 
Mitterrand  having  signed  the 
Williamsburg  agreement  and  with  the 
NATO  meeting  being  held  in  Paris,  do 
you  see  a  chance  in  the  French  at- 
titude toward  the  alliance  from  that  of 
the  previous  government? 

A.  I  see  the  French  Government  as 
being  very  strong  minded,  independent, 
conscious  of  its  sovereignty  and,  fun- 
damentally, very  supportive  of  the 
security  concerns  of  the  alliance.  That 
has  been  evident  to  me  in  every  meeting 
that  I  have  held  with  President 
Mitterrand.  It  was  evident  in 
Williamsburg,  and  it  is  evident  in  the 
behavior  of  what  the  French  are  doing. 
I'll  just  leave  it  at  that. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  talking  to 
the  British  and  French  to  get  bargain- 
ing chips  in  the  INF  talks? 


A.  No.  These  are  independent 
forces,  and  we've  gone  through  that 
argument  again  and  again. 

Q.  Is  there  any  merit  to  this,  in 
asking  them  in  some  way  to  join  with 
the  United  States? 

A.  No.  They  are  not  part  of  it.  They 
are  not  to  be  counted  in  these  negotia- 
tions. They  are  not  part  of  it,  they  don't 
want  to  be  part  of  it,  and  that's  where 
the  situation  rests. 

Q.  Does  the  Soviet  Union  possess 
strategic  superiority  in  the  world? 

A.  No.  The  question  that  was  raised 
was  different.  It  was:  Should  the 
Soviet — if  I  can  rephrase  the  ques- 
tion— you  were  saying:  Isn't  it  legiti- 
mate that  the  Soviet  Union  should  be 
superior  to  any  given  country  and  think 
of  itself  as  equal  to  all  the  rest  of  the 
world  combined.  I  say:  No.  That's  not  a 
legitimate  point  of  view  at  all.  We  don't 
accept  that  at  all. 

Q.  Is  it  your  impression  that  they 
have  superiority?  Would  you  trade 
U.S.  armaments  for  theirs? 

A.  When  you  ask  that  kind  of  ques- 
tion, you  have  to  put  it  in  its  broadest 
context.  Armaments  are  one  thing,  and 
what  stands  behind  the  armaments  has 
to  go  with  it.  I  wouldn't  trade  our  situa- 
tion for  theirs,  even  remotely,  because  a 
free  system  will  yield  the  best  results  as 
we  go  along.  Also,  ultimately,  in  terms 
of  human  values  and  in  terms  of  our 
determination  and  ability  to  defend 
ourselves. 

You  have  to  think  of  this  as  one  big 
pot,  in  a  way,  and  I  don't  have  any 
doubt  whatsoever  of  the  superiority  of 
Western  values  and  abilities.  Now  in- 
sofar as  particular  elements  of  ar- 
maments are  concerned,  there  is  no 
doubt  that,  in  some  very  important 
areas,  there  is  a  clear  margin  of  Soviet 
superiority.  One  that  has  been  focused 
on  in  the  NATO  dual-track  decision  is 
the  Soviet  monopoly  of  these  highly 
destructive  intermediate-range  nuclear 
missiles,  and  if  you  .  .  .  and  there  are 
various  ways  of  establishing  or  counting 
elements  of  that  picture,  but  there  are 
important  overall  elements,  throw- 
weight,  perhaps,  being  the  one  that  is 
most  prominent,  where  there  is  a  huge 
Soviet  advantage.  That  isn't  true  across 
the  board;  I  fully  recognize  that.  But 
there  are  some  very  important  elements 
of  Soviet  superiority  which  we  seek  to 
remedy.  But,  take  overall,  our  system, 
their  system,  our  military  forces,  their 
military  forces  and  the  impact  of  free 
people— I  don't  have  any  doubts  about 
which  side  I  want  to  be  on. 


igust  1983 


41 


EUROPE 


Q.  What  is  your  assessment  of 
Soviet  policy  in  the  Middle  East 
today? 

A.  I  don't  like  to  make  comments 
about  their  intentions  and  what  they  are 
trying  to  do,  because  we  can  all 
speculate  about  it.  And  unless  you  have 
a  seat  around  the  table  in  the  Kremlin, 
you  don't  know  for  sure.  All  I  can  say 
about  it  is  that,  first,  they  have  installed 
powerful  and  more  far-reaching  weapons 
in  Syria  than  were  there  before;  second, 
their  own  forces  are  manning  those 
weapons;  and  third,  in  terms  of  their 
public  statements,  they  have  denounced 
and  opposed  the  agreement  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel  for  the  security  of 
the  southern  part  of  Lebanon  and  the 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces.  I  don't  con- 
sider any  one  of  those  three  things  to  be 
constructive  contributions  toward  stabili- 
ty and  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Q.  Why  are  you  meeting  here  with 
Giscard?  Do  you  plan  to  meet  with 
other  opposition  leaders? 

A.  It  is  not  so  much  a  question  of 
opposition  leaders.  Valery  Giscard 
d'Estaing  is  a  friend  of  mine  for  many 
years  standing.  I  have  gone  to  see  him 
when  I've  come  to  Paris,  when  he's  been 
in  town,  many  times;  we  have  visited 
together  elsewhere;  he  is  just  a  very 
good  friend  and  a  person  with  whom  I 
enjoy  talking. 

Q.  What  is  the  significance  of  the 
Soviet  proposal  for  a  nuclear  freeze 
zone  in  Western  Europe? 

A.  It's  always  interesting  when  the 
suggestion  is  made  that  other  people  be 
nuclear  free  but  not  themselves.  I  can't 
help  but  wonder  what  that  suggests 
about  their  attitude  toward  Soviet  sub- 
marines in  the  waters  of  other  countries. 
Is  this  a  mea  culpa,  or  what  is  it?  I  don't 
see  it  as  a  particularly  forthcoming 
proposition. 

Q.  The  feeling  here  is  that  Presi- 
dent Mitterrand  got  trapped  into  sign- 
ing the  Williamsburg  declaration  and 
that  the  United  States  is  pushing  the 
socialist  government  into  a  corner. 
What  about  this,  given  the  presence  of 
communists  in  the  French 
Government? 

A.  I  would  have  to  say  that  I  admire 
the  positions  that  President  Mitterrand 
has  taken  on  this  general  field  and  point 
out  to  you  that  there  may  be  com- 
munists in  the  French  Government,  but 
there  are  communists  from  the  Soviet 
Union  who  used  to  reside  in  France  who 
aren't  here  any  more,  and  that's  a  deci- 
sion the  French  Government  made.  I  ap- 


plaud the  decision,  purely  the  French 
Government's  decision.  I'm  sure  that 
whatever  President  Mitterrand  does  he 
will  do  as  a  sovereign  and  independent 
Head  of  State.  That's  always  been  the 
case  and  that  is,  I  may  say,  always  the 
case  with  France.  But  as  far  as  all  of 
your  questions  on  the  internal  political 
arrangements  in  France  are  concerned. 
I  pass  on  that;  that's  France's  internal 
affair. 

Q.  On  East-West  trade,  one  has 
the  impression  that  the  Export  Ad- 
ministration Act  is  unraveling  and 
that  there  was  a  lot  of  pressure  on  the 
United  States  in  Williamsburg.  What 
is  the  Administration  seeking  on 
restricting  trade  with  the  East?  What 
do  you  expect  from  Congress  on  this? 

A.  As  far  as  the  legislation  is  con- 
cerned, and  the  legislative  situation, 
there  are  different  versions,  and  neither 
is  precisely  what  the  Administration  pro- 
posed. That's  fairly  typical  of  the  way 
legislation  takes  place  in  the  United 
States;  everybody  doesn't  agree,  as  you 
know.  There  is  a  struggle  about  that, 
and  our  friends  and  allies  have  made  it 
clear — long  before  Williamsburg,  but  at 
Williamsburg — that  there  are  aspects  of 
the  Administration's  position,  along  the 
lines  that  you  mentioned,  that  they  don't 
like.  So  we  know  that. 

I  might  say  that  my  lawyers  have 
taught  me  not  to  say  "extraterritoriality" 
any  more;  that's,  in  part,  because  it  is 
replaced  as  the  current  jawbreaker.  We 
refer  to  it  as  conflict  of  jurisdiction,  and 
that  point  can  be  brought  out  very  clear- 
ly if  you  take  a  hypothetical  case.  The 
U.S.  firm  that  has  developed  a  process 
of  some  kind  and  licenses  that  process  to 
a  firm  in  another  country  on  the  written 
and  clear  understanding  that  if  U.S.  ex- 
ports control  policy  is  applied  to  that 
category  of  technology,  then  those  con- 
trols will  carry  over  to  the  other  coun- 
try. Now  some  people  say  that's  bad, 
that's  extraterritorial  reach.  The  other 
side  of  the  argument  is  that  there  is 
nothing  wrong  with  it;  that's  what  has 
been  laid  out  in  the  contract;  it  was  an 
understanding  undertaken,  clearly,  and, 
at  best,  it  is  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction  as 
to  who  is  going  to  have  something  to 
say  about  that.  There  is  a  legitimate 
legal  and  conceptual  issue  here  that  is  a 
deep  and  difficult  issue. 

We  have  embarked  on  some  exten- 
sive discussions  of  this  issue  in  which 
I've  asked  Ken  Dam — who  doubles  as  a 
lawyer,  and  a  very  good  one — the  Depu- 
ty Secretary  of  State,  to  participate. 
He's  been  working  with  the  Deputy  At- 
torney General,  Ed  Schmultz,  and  we 


have  been  conferring  with  the  Cana- 
dians, the  British,  and  others.  They've 
delved  into  this  issue  at  some  depth  ar 
length  conceptually  and  in  terms  of 
statute.  In  terms  of  what  we  seek  in  t 
area,  it  is  broadly  two  things:  These 
things  have  been  reflected  in  the  discu 
sions  we  have  had,  and  there  is  a 
general  view  that  there  has  been  a  lot 
technology  transfer  to  the  Soviet  Unio 
in  one  way  or  another  over  the  past 
years  which  has  helped  them  militarily 
considerably — that  is  not  a  smart  thin] 
for  us  to  do;  we  should  get  control  of  i 
and  we  are  trying  hard  to  get  control 
it.  There  is  a  general  view  that  that  is 
the  thing  to  do. 

Beyond  that,  we  don't  see  any 
reason  why — given  the  fact  that  the 
mass  of  armaments  that  we  have  unde 
taken  are  provided  by  the  developmen 
of  armaments  on  the  Soviet  side — whj 
it  makes  any  sense  for  us,  as  a  group 
nations,  to  have  trade  with  them  on 
other  than  a  market  basis.  So  these  ar 
basically  the  things  that  we  seek;  it's  r 
a  trade  war,  it  is  that  kind  of  control. 
Now  as  far  as  legislation  is  concerned 
the  United  States,  for  the  government 
to  exercise  control  on  exports  of  any 
kind,  there  has  to  be  a  statutory  basis 
for  it;  otherwise,  a  firm  is  free  to  mak 
sales  as  it  chooses,  and  we,  therefore, 
seek  statutory  authority  to  do  that. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  something  abc 
interest  rates  and  the  prices  of  the 
dollar? 

A.  Something  about  the  interest 
rates  and  the  price  of  the  dollar.  The  i 
terest  rates  are  higher  than  the  Presi- 
dent wants.  We  would  like  to  see  then 
lower,  nominal  interest  rates  and  real 
terest  rates.  The  price  of  the  dollar  is 
basically  governed  by  market  forces  ai 
at  least,  as  I  see  it,  there  are  three 
elements  to  that  market:  One  is  what 
happening  in  the  field  of  trade,  which, 
taken  by  itself,  would  suggest  a  lower 
value  for  the  dollar.  Another  is 
developments  in  the  field  of  capital 
flows,  partly,  flows  that  are  oriented  t 
interest  rates  but  also  to  a  major  extei 
in  my  opinion,  flows  that  are  oriented 
a  kind  of  safe-haven  objective;  it  is  the 
size  of  the  capital  flows  that  has  pro- 
duced the  strong  dollar  and  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  U.S.  exporting  com- 
munity, they  don't  like  it.  To  some  ex- 
tent they  scratch  their  heads  at  the 
ways  the  Europeans  and  others  are  con 
plaining  about  it,  because  if  the  dollar 
were  to  be  a  lot  lower  in  value, 
American  goods  would  be  a  lot  more 
competitive,  particularly  in  third 
markets.  That's  kind  of  roundabout,  bu 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


EUROPE 


e  value  of  the  dollar  represents  the 
arket's  evaluation  of  it  and  is  reflect- 
g,  as  it  must,  the  flows  of  money 
hich  are  made  up  of  these  different 
mponents. 

As  far  as  interest  rates  are  con- 
rned,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  as  we  are 
ccessful  in  reducing  the  rate  of  infla- 
>n  in  the  United  States  and  as  the  con- 
ation grows  that  the  rate  of  inflation 
11  stay  more  or  less  under  control, 
en  we'll  see  interest  rates  continue 
sir  decline.  The  decline  has  been  quite 
amatic  over  the  last  2  years.  Of  the 
ars  of  the  Reagan  Administration,  in 
3rt-term  rates  it  has  been  significant 
t  not  as  dramatic  in  long-term  rates, 
aen  the  President  took  office  the 
)rt-term  rates  were  about  20%.  Now, 
3-month  treasuries,  872%  or  some- 
ng  like  that,  so  that's  a  big  drop.  The 
.g-term  rates  have  not  come  down  as 
ch.  It  isn't  quite  right  to  say  that 
ans  that  the  long-term  real  rate  of  in- 
est  is  high  in  the  United  States.  It  is 
•re  correct  to  say  that  the  level  of  the 
g-term  interest  rates  represents  a 
rket  hesitation  to  judge  inflation  as 
ig  under  control,  let's  say  5  or  10 
rs  from  now.  The  fact  that  the  long- 
n  interest  rates  have  been  coming 
m  represents  an  emergence  of  more 

more  credibility.  The  inflation  may 
ander  control,  but  people  in  the 
•kets  have  been  burned  so  much  over 

last  10  or  15  years  that  there  is  a  lot 
kepticism.  That  is  one  of  the  reasons 

President  is  as  determined  to  do 

ething  about  not  so  much  the  near- 
n  deficits  in  our  budget,  but  the  out- 
f  deficits  in  our  budgets. 


j  ;al  communique, 

1 JE  10,  1983 

1  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in  Ministerial 
6  ion  in  Paris  on  9th  and  10th  June,  1983. 
B  sters  reaffirmed  that  their  supreme  ob- 
I  /e  is  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
I  lorn.  A  stable  military  balance  is  essen- 
a  o  this  objective. 

I  'he  countries  of  the  Alliance  are  deter- 
I  d  to  ensure  through  negotiations  that 
i  lalance  will  be  established  at  the  lowest 
I'ble  level.  They  are  equally  determined  to 
a  -e  their  security  and  their  independence. 
B  will  defend  the  liberty  and  the  justice 
Hi  hich  their  democracies  are  founded. 

'hey  have  put  forward  a  broad  set  of 
■  control  and  disarmament  initiatives  on: 

I    strategic  arms  reductions  (START) 

I    intermediate  range  nuclear  forces 

-I 

I    Mutual  and  Balanced  Force  Reductions 

|Tt) 


•  a  Conference  on  Confidence-  and 
Security-Building  Measures  and  Disarmament 
in  Europe  (CDE) 

•  a  total  ban  on  chemical  weapons. 

They  call  up  the  Soviet  Union  to  demonstrate 

by  its  deeds  an  equal  resolution  to  achieve 
concrete  results  in  these  negotiations. 

As  regards  intermediate  range  nuclear 
forces,  the  Ministers  affirmed  the  importance 
of  the  double-track  decision  taken  on  12th 
December,  1979,  by  the  countries  concerned. 
They  hope  that,  in  the  near  future,  a 
verifiable  agreement  providing  for  United 
States  and  Soviet  equality  can  be  reached  in 
Geneva.  If  concrete  results  through  negotia- 
tions cannot  be  reached,  deployments  as 
planned  will  begin  as  already  decided  in 
December  1979.2 

1.  Recognising  that  the  cohesion  and 
strength  of  the  Alliance  is  of  paramount  im- 
portance for  the  preservation  of  peace  and 
improved  international  relations,  Ministers 
agreed  as  follows: 

The  Programme  for  Peace  in  Freedom 
adopted  in  the  Bonn  Summit  Declaration  of 
10th  June,  1982,  emphasises  the  Alliance's 
resolve  to  deter  aggression  by  means  of  a 
strong  defence  and  to  develop  through  co- 
operation and  dialogue,  a  constructive  East- 
West  relationship  aimed  at  genuine  detente. 
This  balanced  policy  will  continue  to  serve 
peace  and  uphold  the  independence  and 
democratic  values  of  the  free  peoples  of  the 
Alliance. 

The  Alliance  remains  a  fundamental 
forum  for  close  and  regular  consultation  on 
matters  of  common  concern  and  permits 
member  states  to  adjust  their  aims  and  in- 
terests through  free  exchanges  of  views. 

The  maintenance  of  adequate  defences  by 
the  Allied  countries  threatens  no  one.  In  Ar- 
ticle 1  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  the 
members  of  the  Alliance  reaffirmed  the 
undertaking  to  refrain  in  their  international 
relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  in 
any  manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of 
the  United  Nations.  This  solemn  obligation 
was  restated  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  signed 
by  thirty-five  countries  and  will  always  be 
fully  honoured  hy  the  members  of  the 
Alliance.  Each  and  every  sovereign  member 
of  the  Alliance  is  a  guarantor  that  none  of 
their  weapons  will  be  used  except  in  response 
to  attack. 

2.  The  Allies  view  with  concern  the  sus- 
tained increase  in  Soviet  military  strength  in 
Europe  and  capability  for  military  action 
world-wide,  which  far  exceed  defence  needs. 
The  Soviet  Union  maintains  its  build-up  of 
conventional  arms,  chemical  weapons,  naval 
forces,  nuclear  forces,  and  in  particular  the 
deployment  of  SS-20  intermediate  range 
nuclear  missiles.  Faced  with  this  threatening 
situation,  the  Allies  are  resolved  to  ensure 
that  conditions  never  exist  which  could  tempt 
the  Soviet  Union  to  exploit  its  military  power 
against  any  of  the  Allies.  They  are  deter- 
mined to  meet  the  legitimate  security  re- 
quirements for  the  entire  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  area.  A  sufficient  level  of  both  con- 
ventional and  nuclear  forces  remains 


necessary  for  the  credibility  of  deterrence. 
The  security  and  sovereignty  of  the  Euro 
pean  members  of  the  Alliance  remain 

guaranteed  l>\   their  own  defences,  by  the 

presence  of  North  American  forces  on  Euro- 
pean territory  and  by  the  United  States 
strategic'  nuclear  commitment  to  Europe.  The 
United  States  and  Canada  likewise  depend 
for  their  own  securit)  upon  the  contribution 
of  the  European  partners  to  the  defence  of 
the  Alliance. 

3.  The  Allies  have  reviewed  the  trends  of 
Soviet  policies  which  bear  upon  Western  in- 
terests. They  are  resolved  to  maintain  a  firm, 
realistic  and  constructive  attitude  and  agree 
that  it  is  important  to  maintain  a  dialogue, 
not  least  in  periods  of  tension. 

The  Allies  stress  that  respect  for  the 
obligation  not  to  use  force  is  mandatory  and 
applicable  between  all  states  without  excep- 
tion. The  reaffirmation  of  this  obligation,  con- 
tained in  the  United  Nations  Charter  and  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act,  cannot  substitute  for 
deeds.  The  Allies  therefore  call  on  the  Soviet 
Union  for  a  complete  end  to  the  use  of  force 
in  Afghanistan  and  the  threat  of  use  of  force, 
as  in  the  case  of  Poland.  The  exercise  of 
restraint  and  responsibility  by  the  Soviet 
Union  is  essential  for  the  constructive  rela- 
tions which  the  Allies  wish  to  establish  with 
it.  Such  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  are 
possible  on  the  full  range  of  East- West 
issues. 

The  Allies  look  to  the  Soviet  Union  to 
contribute  to  the  achievement  of  tangible 
results  in  the  negotiations  on  arms  control, 
disarmament  and  confidence-building 
measures,  since  this  would  enhance  the 
credibility  of  the  principle  of  non-use  of  force. 
They  would  welcome  any  serious  proposals  to 
improve  confidence  and  cooperation  between 
East  and  West. 

4.  The  Allies  deplore  the  continuing  vio- 
lation by  the  Polish  authorities  of  the  commit- 
ments undertaken  by  Poland  in  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act.  They  look  to  those  authorities  to 
honour  the  wish  of  the  Polish  people  for  na- 
tional reconciliation,  the  release  of  political 
prisoners  and  the  establishment  of  civil 
rights,  including  the  right  of  the  workers  to 
have  trade  unions  of  their  own  choice.  This 
would  enhance  Poland  to  overcome  its  crisis. 
More  normal  trade  and  economic  co-operation 
with  Poland,  for  which  the  Allies  wish,  could 
be  effective  if  progress  were  made  towards 
national  reconciliation  without  which  there 
can  be  no  genuine  economic  and  social 
recovery.  The  Allies  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to 
cease  its  pressure  on  Poland  so  as  not  to  im- 
pede the  efforts  of  the  Polish  people  for  na- 
tional renewal  and  reform. 

5.  The  Soviet  Union's  actions  in 
Afghanistan  also  pose  a  major  obstacle  to  the 
normal  development  of  international  rela- 
tions. Intensified  Soviet  aggression  there  con- 
tinues to  meet  with  the  determined  resistance 
of  the  Afghan  people.  The  mounting  toll  of 
civilian  casualties  and  destruction  emphasises 
the  urgency  of  a  political  solution  based  on 
the  verifiable  application  of  the  resolutions  of 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  which 
called  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  Soviet 


lust  1983 


43 


EUROPE 


forces,  the  restoration  of  Afghanistan's  in- 
dependence, sovereignty  and  non-aligned 
status,  the  right  of  the  Afghan  people  to  self- 
determination,  and  the  voluntary  return  of 
refugees. 

6.  Defence  and  arms  control  are  integral 
parts  of  the  security  policy  of  the  Alliance.  In 
pursuit  of  this  policy  the  Allies  have  submit- 
ted a  comprehensive  series  of  proposals 
designed  to  lead  to  equitable,  verifiable  and 
militarily  significant  agreements  for  major 
reductions  to  a  stable  balance  of  forces  at  the 
lowest  possible  levels. 

7.  In  this  spirit,  the  Allies  concerned 
underline  the  continued  importance  of  the 
decision  of  12th  December,  1979,  which  com- 
bined the  modernization  of  United  States 
longer  range  INF  (LRINF)  with  a  parallel  of- 
fer of  negotiations  and  the  unilateral 
withdrawal  from  Europe  of  a  thousand 
United  States  nuclear  warheads;  which  was 
completed  in  1980.  Since  that  decision  was 
taken,  the  Soviet  Union  has  relentlessly  con- 
tinued its  deployment  of  modern  SS-20 
missiles,  greatly  expanding  its  monopoly  in 
this  class  of  weapons  which  has  created  an 
entirely  new  threat  for  Europe.  Ignoring  the 
concerns  of  countries  threatened  by  these 
systems,  the  Soviet  Union  is,  at  the  same 
time,  resisting  achievement  of  an  equitable 
negotiated  solution.  The  Soviet  approach 
would  undermine  the  vital  link  between  the 
defence  of  Europe  and  the  American 
strategic  deterrent.  Present  Soviet  proposals 
would  include  third  country  national  deter- 
rent forces  which  have  no  place  in  the 
negotiations  and  leave  the  Soviets  with  more 
SS-20  missiles  than  when  the  negotiations 
began,  deny  the  right  to  modernise  the  deter- 
rent to  this  threat,  leave  unrestrained  large 
Soviet  SS-20  forces  in  the  Eastern  USSR 
which  threaten  Europe  as  well  as  Asia,  and 
remove  from  Europe  aircraft  of  the  United 
States  which  are  essential  to  conventional 
defence. 

The  Allies  concerned  reaffirm  that  in  the 
absence  of  concrete  negotiating  results  which 
obviate  deployments,  deployments  will  begin 
at  the  end  of  1983,  in  accordance  with  the 
schedule  established  in  the  decision  of  1979. 
At  the  same  time  these  Allies  remain  fully 
committed  to  reaching  a  successful  outcome 
in  the  INF  negotiations,  which  they  continue 
to  monitor  and  evaluate  closely.  They  will 
support  continued  negotiations  even  after  ini- 
tial deployments.  These  Allies  will  examine 
NATO's  LRINF1  requirements  when  concrete 
results  are  achieved  in  the  negotiations,  and 
will  make  appropriate  adjustments  in  the 
levels  of  deployments  already  decided  in 
1979.  They  fully  support  the  efforts  of  the 
United  States,  in  close  consultation  with 
them,  to  achieve  progress  in  Geneva.  These 
Allies  strongly  prefer  the  elimination  of  all 
United  States  and  Soviet  LRINF  missiles,  as 
proposed  by  the  United  States.  They  welcome 
and  support  as  a  further  effort  to  achieve 
progress  toward  that  end  the  United  States 
proposal  for  an  interim  agreement  which 
would  result  in  equal  global  ceilings  on 
warheads  on  United  States  and  Soviet  land- 
based  LRINF  missile  systems  at  the  lowest 


possible  level.  This  proposal  which  establishes 
a  flexible  framework  for  negotiations  was 
developed  through  close  consultation  among 
the  Allies  concerned.  They  call  on  the  Soviet 
Union  to  contribute  constructively  to  a  suc- 
cessful outcome  of  the  negotiations  which  ad- 
dresses the  legitimate  security  concerns  of 
both  sides  and  welcome  current  United 
States  efforts  to  that  end.  They  strongly 
hope  a  balanced  agreement  will  be  rapidly 
reached.3 

8.  Allies  expressed  their  full  support  for 
the  effort  of  the  United  States  to  negotiate 
reductions  in  United  States  and  Soviet 
strategic  arms,  and  to  secure  an  agreement 
which  will  enhance  strategic  stability.  They 
welcome  new  steps  being  taken  by  the  United 
States  to  promote  progress  in  the  START 
negotiations,  and  called  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  to  respond  in  a  similarly  positive  spirit. 

9.  The  Allies  participating  in  the  Mutual 
and  Balanced  Force  Reductions  (MBFR)  talks 
attach  great  importance  to  achieving  prog- 
ress. They  consider  that  the  comprehensive 
approach  embodied  in  their  draft  Treaty  text 
of  July  1982  provides  the  basis  of  an  accord 
which  would  lead  to  parity  at  the  agreed  col- 
lective ceilings  for  combined  ground  and  air 
force  manpower  in  Central  Europe  through 
substantial  staged  reductions.  This  major  ini- 
tiative met  what  had  been  represented  by  the 
East  as  a  fundamental  requirement.  It  also 
proposed  a  well  defined  and  practical  pro- 
gramme for  implementing  an  agreement  with 
the  East.  Western  participants  hope  that  the 
East  will  respond  in  a  more  constructive  way 
and  recognise  that,  in  order  to  contribute  to 
stability  and  security  in  Europe,  an  MBFR 
agreement  must  provide  for  reductions  and 
limitations  based  on  agreed  data  and  for  ef- 
fective Associated  Measures  on  verification 
and  confidence-building. 

10.  In  the  Committee  on  Disarmament 
the  Allies  seek  disarmament  measures  which 
are  balanced,  realistic  and  verifiable,  and 
which  would  maintain  or  enhance  global 
security.  In  particular,  they  are  working  for 
an  agreement  on  the  prohibition  of  the 
development,  production  and  stockpiling  of 
chemical  weapons  and  on  the  destruction  of 
all  existing  stocks  as  well  as  the  means  of 
production.  The  Allies  call  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  to  co-operate  in  developing  effective 
inspection  and  verification  measures  leading 
to  agreements  for  the  elimination  of  this  en- 
tire category  of  weapons. 

The  Allies  remain  gravely  concerned 
about  strong  evidence  of  continued  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  South  East  Asia  and 
Afghanistan  in  violation  of  international  law 
and  of  Soviet  involvement  in  the  use  of  such 
weapons.4  They  welcome  procedures  being 
developed  by  the  United  Nations  to  in- 
vestigate allegations  of  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons. 

1 1.  The  Allies  are  continuing  their  ef- 
forts at  the  Madrid  CSCE  Follow-up  meeting 
in  arnve  at  a  substantial  and  balanced  con- 
cluding document,  including  a  precise 
negotiating  mandate  for  the  <  Conference  on 
i  Confidence  and  Security  Building  Measures 


and  Disarmament  in  Europe.  They  conside 
that,  as  a  result  of  the  latest  proposal  by  tl 
neutral  and  non-aligned  Mates,  an  agreemi 
is  now  within  reach  which  could  permit  a  s 
cessful  and  early  conclusion. 

The  Allies  have  already  stated  their  wr 
ingness  to  accept  the  draft  concluding  doct 
ment  submitted  bj  the  neutral  and  non- 
aligned  states,  subject  to  limited  and 
reasonable  amendments  favourably  receive 
by  other  participants  and  designed  to 
enhance  the  balance  of  the  agreement.  Tht 
Allies  therefore  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to 
change  its  attitude  and  negotiate  a  solutioi 
the  few  remaining  issues.  This  would 
demonstrate  that  the  Soviet  Union  shares 
interest  shown  by  other  participating  coun- 
tries ill  a  successful  outcome  to  the  Madrid 

meeting  which  will  consolidate  the  CSCE 
process.  The  Allies  are  convinced  that  a 
substantial  and  balanced  concluding  docu- 
ment, together  with  renewed  efforts  to  giv 
full  effect  to  the  final  Act  through  concret 
action,  would  be  of  particular  importance  f 
developing  a  more  constructive  East-West 
relationship. 

The  Allies  emphasise  the  importance,  i 
the  present  circumstances,  not  only  of  a  re 
affirmation  of  the  1975  Helsinki  com- 
mitments as  a  whole,  hut  also  of  an  expres 
sion  of  the  determination  of  the  thirty-five 
signatory  states  to  carry  them  out.  They 
reaffirm,  too.  the  importance  they  attach  t 
the  convening  of  a  Conference  which,  as  at 
integral  part  of  the  CSCE  process,  would 
have  as  its  purpose  the  adoption  of  verifiaj 
militarily  significant  and  binding  provision 
applicable  to  the  whole  of  Europe.  The  Alii 
also  remain  committed  to  further  progress 
the  important  humanitarian  aspects  of  Has 
West  relations. 

12.  The  Allies  support  confidence- 
building  measures  designed  to  promote 
greater  openness  about  armed  forces  and 
military  activities,  overcome  misapprehens 
and  distrust  and  thus  facilitate  disarmamei 
negotiations.  The  Allies  recall  that  in  1982 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  re- 
affirmed the  importance  of  confidence- 
building  measures  and  invited  all  states  to 
consider  the  introduction  of  such  measures 
their  region.  The  Allies  have  taken  a  numb 
of  concrete  initiatives  in  that  direction.  1'rt 
posals  put  forward  by  the  Soviet  Union,  in 
contrast,  are  often  declarator).  The  United 
States  government,  in  an  effort  to  help 
develop  a  stable  peace,  has  tabled  a  series  i 
confidence-building  measures  in  the  STAR' 
and  INF  negotiations  and  has  suggested  ne 
proposals  in  the  nuclear  field  and  in  mutual 
communications  between  the  United  Slates 
anil  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Allies  will,  in  th< 
context  of  the  Conference  on  Disarmament 
Europe,  put  forward  concrete  proposals  f<i§ 
new  generation  of  confidence  and  security 
building  measures  in  Europe.  The  Allies  vfl 
continue  their  efforts  to  build  confidence 
through  improved  verification  procedures^ 
provision  of  clear  and  comparable  data  on 
defence  spending  and  oi  her  steps  likelj  to 
remove  misconceptions.  They  urge  the  Sovi 
Union  to  join  them  in  this  endeavour. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


EUROPE 


13.  The  maintenance  of  a  calm  situation 
and  around  Berlin  and  the  strict  observ- 
es and  full  implementation  of  the 
iadripartite  Agreement  of  3rd  September, 
171,  including  unimpeded  traffic  on  the  ac- 
ss  routes,  remain  of  fundamental  impor- 
nce  for  East-West  relations. 

Recalling  their  Rome  statement  of  5th 
ay,  1981,  the  Allies  express  the  hope  that 

efforts  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
my  towards  further  practical  progress  in 
ler-German  relations  and  towards  im- 
avements  for  travel  in  both  directions  will 
ng  direct  benefits  for  Berlin  and  the  Ger- 
in  people  in  both  states. 

14.  The  Allies  reiterate  their  abhorrence 
i  condemnation  of  recurring  terrorist  acts 
ich  menace  democratic  institutions  as  well 
the  conduct  of  international  relations.  The 
ies  reaffirm  their  determination  to  pursue 
necessary  efforts  to  combat  and  suppress 
mes  of  terrorism. 

15.  The  Ministers  note  that  since  their 
:  meeting  several  aspects  of  East- West 
>nomic  relations  have  been  studied  in- 
fing  the  security  implications  of  these 
utions.  Trade  conducted  on  the  basis  of 
imercially  sound  terms  and  mutual  advan- 
e,  that  avoids  preferential  treatment  of 

Soviet  Union,  contributes  to  constructive 
;t-West  relations.  At  the  same  time, 
teral  economic  relations  with  the  Soviet 
on  and  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
;t  remain  consistent  with  broad  Allied 
urity  concerns.  These  include  avoiding 
endence  on  the  Soviet  Union,  or  con- 
uting  to  Soviet  military  capabilities.  Thus, 
wopment  of  Western  energy  resources 
tld  be  encouraged.  In  order  to  avoid  fur- 
•■  use  by  the  Soviet  Union  of  some  forms 
-ade  to  enhance  its  military  strength,  the 
?s  will  remain  vigilant  in  their  continuing 
ew  of  the  security  aspects  of  East-West 
lomic  relations.  This  work  will  assist 
?d  governments  in  the  conduct  of  their 
lies  in  this  field.5 

16.  Sustained  economic  recovery  in  the 
t  is  essential  since  the  strength  and 
rity  of  the  member  countries  rest  upon 
il  stability  and  progress  as  well  as  upon 
nee  preparedness.  In  accordance  with  Ar- 

2  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  the  Allies 
seek  to  eliminate  conflict  in  their  interna- 
■al  economic  policies  and  will  encourage 
omic  collaboration  among  them.  The 
|s  reaffirm  the  importance  of  this  com- 
lent  and  of  support  from  programmes 
'h  are  intended  to  benefit  the  economies 
ss  favoured  partners. 

17.  The  Allies  will  continue  to  work  for 
urther  development  of  peaceful  and 
dly  international  relations  and  will  pro- 
■  conditions  of  stability  and  well-being, 
aid  which  they  give  bilaterally  and 
ilaterally  is  an  important  contribution  to 
end.  Countries  in  the  Third  World  should 

the  freedom  to  develop  politically, 
omically  and  socially  without  outside  in- 
rence.  The  Allies  urge  respect  for 
reignty  and  genuine  non-alignment. 


The  Allies  recognise  thai  events  outside 
the  Treaty  area  may  affect  their  common  in- 
terests as  members  of  the  Alliance.  If  it  is 
established  that  their  common  interests  are 
involved,  they  will  engage  in  timely  consulta- 
tions. Sufficient  military  capabilities  must  be 
assured  in  the  Treaty  area  to  maintain  an 
adequate  defence  posture.  Individual  member 
governments  who  are  in  a  position  to  do  so 
will  endeavour  to  support,  at  their  request, 
sovereign  nations  whose  security  and  in- 
dependence are  threatened.  Those  Allies  in  a 
position  to  facilitate  the  deployment  of  forces 
outside  the  Treaty  area  may  do  so  on  the 
basis  of  national  decision. 

The  Spanish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
informed  the  North  Atlantic  Council  of  the 
present  state  of  the  review  that  the  Spanish 
Government  has  undertaken  regarding  its 
participation  in  the  Alliance,  pending  which 
he  reserved  his  government's  position  on  the 
present  Communique. 


At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Spanish 
Minister  expressed  that  his  Government 
shares  in  the  Communique  in  so  far  as  it 
reflects  positions  already  expressed  by  Spain 
in  her  relations  with  the  member  countries  of 
the  Alliance. 

The  Danish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
repeated  Danish  Government  support  for  the 
double-track  decision  but  at  the  same  time  he 
presented  to  his  colleagues  the  motion  passed 
by  the  Folketing  on  26th  May. 


'Press  release  212  of  June  14,  1983. 

2Greece  reserves  its  position  on  this 
paragraph  (footnote  in  original  text). 

3Greece  reserves  its  position  on 
paragraph  7  (footnote  in  original  text). 

■•Greece  recalls  its  position  as  it  has  been 
expressed  during  the  previous  Ministerial 
Session  (footnote  in  original  text). 

6Greece  recalled  its  position  on  various 
aspects  of  this  paragraph  (footnote  in  original 
text).  ■ 


Unacceptable  Intervention: 
Soviet  Active  Measures 


by  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

The  following  article  is  reprinted 
from  NATO  Review,  Volume  31,  No.  1, 
1983.  Ambassador  Eagleburger  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Political  Affairs. 

In  recent  times,  the  Soviet  term  "active 
measures"  (aktivnyye  meropriyatiya)  has 
caught  the  public's  attention.  The  phrase 
describes  a  range  of  deceptive  tech- 
niques— such  as  front  groups,  disinfor- 
mation, forgeries,  press  manipulations, 
and  agents  of  influence — which  are  used 
routinely  in  the  Soviet  Union's  conduct 
of  foreign  relations.  No  phrase  in 
English  conveys  precisely  the  meaning 
of  "active  measures."  Perhaps  World 
War  II  psychological  warfare  operations 
provide  the  closest  parallel. 

Active  measures  are  used  against 
virtually  all  countries  outside  the  Soviet 
bloc,  although  communist  countries  such 
as  North  Korea  and  China  are  targets, 
as  well  as  members  of  NATO.  A  sam- 
pling from  the  recent  public  record 
shows  the  variety  of  such  activities: 

•  A  Soviet  Ambassador  expelled 
from  New  Zealand  in  1980  after  he  was 
caught  handing  money  to  the  local 
Moscow-line  Communist  Party; 


•  A  French  author  and  journalist 
convicted  for  acting  as  a  Soviet  agent  of 
influence  for  almost  20  years; 

•  A  large-scale  media  disinformation 
effort  to  undermine  U.S.-sponsored  ef- 
forts to  solve  the  Namibia  conflict; 

•  The  exposure  of  more  than  a 
dozen  forgeries,  mostly  fabricated  U.S. 
Government  documents  or  letters,  dur- 
ing 1982; 

•  A  media  campaign  involving 
covertly  planted  stories  and  forgeries 
falsely  accusing  the  United  States  of 
supporting  the  November  1981  coup  at- 
tempt in  the  Seychelles;  and 

•  Radio  stations  pretending  to 
speak  for  opposition  political  factions  in 
China  and  Iran  but  broadcasting  from 
unacknowledged  locations  within  the 
U.S.S.R. 

Inside  View 

While  this  list  of  publicly  exposed  active 
measures  can  be  expanded  greatly,  in- 
telligence services  throughout  the  world 
are  aware  of  many  more  that  have  not 
been  revealed  to  the  public,  either 
because  this  could  compromise  sensitive 
sources  or  because  of  political  or 
diplomatic  considerations. 


45 


EUROPE 


Nor  are  active  measures  a  new  addi- 
tion to  the  Soviet  political  repertoire.  In 
the  1920s,  Soviet  political  operatives  in- 
filtrated Russian  emigre  organizations  in 
the  West  to  set  them  squabbling  among 
themselves.  During  the  1930s,  Soviet 
agents  manipulated  front  groups,  skill- 
fully camouflaging  Moscow's  hand  until 
the  Hitler-Stalin  pact  in  August  1939.  At 
the  time,  a  veteran  communist  organizer 
working  for  the  Comintern,  Willi 
Munzenberg,  spoke  cynically  of  these 
fronts  as  "innocents'  clubs."  An  early 
postwar  Soviet  disinformation  campaign 
orchestrated  false  charges  of  U.S.  use  of 
"germ  warfare"  during  the  Korean  war. 
On  occasion,  we  get  a  glimpse  of  ac- 
tive measures  from  the  Soviet  side.  The 
defection  of  former  KGB  Major 
Stanislav  Levchenko,  who  coordinated 
active  measures  in  Japan  from  1975  to 
1979  while  nominally  a  correspondent 
for  New  Times,  and  who  for  a  while  was 
Acting  Chief  of  the  KGB's  active 
measures  group  in  Japan,  yields  such  an 
opportunity.  Levchenko  recalls  in  his 
recently  released  testimony  before  the 
U.S.  Congress  several  successful  forgery 
and  disinformation  operations.  He  states 
that  during  the  1970s,  the  KGB  influ- 
enced Japanese  politics  through 
numerous  agents  of  influence  including  a 
former  cabinet  minister,  Members  of 
Parliament,  and  prominent  journalists. 
Levchenko  estimated  that  the  Tokyo 
KGB  residency  received  several  hundred 
active  measures  directives  each  year.  Of 
these,  according  to  Levchenko,  it  was 
able  to  implement  successfully  about 
one-third. 

The  exposure  by  Danish  authorities 
of  the  clandestine  relationship  between 
the  KGB  and  Arne  Herloev  Petersen,  an 
author  and  journalist,  provides  another 
glimpse  into  active  measures  operations. 
In  the  summer  of  1981,  the  Soviets  ar- 
ranged to  cover  Petersen's  expenses  for 
placing  a  series  of  advertisements  in 
which  Danish  artists  expressed  support 
for  a  Nordic  nuclear  weapons-free  zone. 
On  one  occasion,  Petersen  delivered  to 
the  North  Korean  Embassy  foreign 
policy  documents  which  were  supplied 
by  the  Soviet  Embassy  and  which,  on  in- 
structions, he  misrepresented  as  coming 
from  an  American  source.  In  another 
typical  disinformation  ploy,  Petersen 
published  a  pamphlet  attacking  British 
Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher,  the 
text  of  the  pamphlet  having  been 
supplied  by  the  Soviet  Embassy.  As  the 
I  tanish  Government  statement  on  the 
case  noted,  it  was  typical  of  these  el 
forts  to  influence  public  debate  that  the 
Soviet  origin  of  the  opinions  was  con- 
cealed in  order  to  preserve  their  effec- 


tiveness. Vladimir  Merkulov,  a  KGB  of- 
ficer serving  as  a  Second  Secretary  at 
the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Copenhagen,  was 
exposed  as  Petersen's  clandestine  con- 
tact and  was  expelled  from  Denmark  in 
October  1981  for  improper  conduct. 


Large  Bureaucratic  Structure 

A  large  organizational  structure  in  the 
U.S.S.R.  sustains  the  active  measures 
effort.  The  covert  arm  of  active 
measures  is  Service  A  of  the  KGB's 
First  Chief  (Foreign  Intelligence)  Direc- 
torate. In  the  field,  any  KGB  officer  or 
intelligence  asset  may  be  used  to  imple- 
ment active  measures,  and  in  the  larger 
KGB  residencies  there  are  specialized 
groups,  as  in  Tokyo,  concerned  with 
these  covert  operations.  Active 
measures  techniques  are  an  integral  part 
of  the  training  of  all  KGB  case  officers. 

In  formulating  these  operations, 
Service  A  works  closely  with  the  Inter- 
national Department  and  the  Interna- 
tional Information  Department  of  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  Communist 
Party.  Other  elements  of  the  Soviet 
structure  such  as  magazines,  radio  sta- 
tions, and  Aeroflot  are  all  called  upon  as 
need  arises. 

The  International  Information  De- 
partment supervises  Soviet  foreign  prop- 
aganda activities  and  thus  is  crucial  to 
active  measures  operations.  For  exam- 
ple, the  Soviet  propaganda  machinery 
commonly  redisseminates  misleading 
and  tendentious  stories  that  were 
originally  placed  in  foreign  press  outlets 
by  KGB  assets.  The  technique  allows  the 
Soviet  propagandists  to  give  extensive 
coverage  to  false  stories  which  have  the 
seeming  legitimacy  of  having  originated 
in  a  foreign— and  ostensibly  unbiased- 
press  organ.  Propaganda  organs  also 
support  active  measures  operations  by 
trumpeting  the  campaign  themes  of 
front  groups.  Publications  such  as  New 
Times  are  in  the  forefront  of  the  effort. 
as  are  Radio  Moscow  and  the  purported- 
ly unofficial  Radio  Peace  and  Progress. 

The  International  Department  is 
responsible  for  liaison  with  foreign  com 
munist  parties  and  communist  front 
organizations.  It  persuades  or  com- 
mands communist  parties  abroad  to 
undertake  political  and  propaganda  ac- 
tions in  support,  of  particular  active 
measures  campaigns.  Front  groups  such 

as  the  various  Soviet  friendship 
societies,  the  Afro-Asian  People's  Soli- 
darity Organization,  and  the  World 
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  are  con- 
trolled by  the  International  Department 
through  Soviet  counterpart  organiza- 
tions. 


9" 

II 

IS 


One  front,  the  World  Peace  Counc  i 
(WPC),  was  expelled  from  France  and 
from  Austria  for  activities  directed 
against  its  hosts.  Finally  it  succeeded 
establishing  a  headquarters  in  Helsink 
in  1957.  For  more  than  30  years,  WP( 
positions  on  international  issues  have 
variably  coincided  with  those  of  the 
Soviet  Union:  the  WPC  approved  past 
Soviet  military  interventions  in  Hunga  itr 
and  Czechoslovakia  as  well  as  the  Sov  *i 
invasion  and  occupation  of  Afghanista 
Support  of  Soviet  aggression,  howeve:  el 
has  not  prevented  it  from  serving  as  t  b 
Soviet  stalking-horse  in  a  number  of     is 
"peace"  movements,  ranging  from  the  a 
Stockholm  appeal  to  "ban  the  bomb"  ii 
1950  and  the  1977  campaign  against  t 
"neutron  bomb,"  to  today's  agitation     ii 
against  INF  [intermediate-range  nucle  a 
force]  modernization. 

Since  the  bulk  of  the  WPC's  finam 
ing  comes  from  Soviet  sources,  some 
noncommunist  peace  movement  suppc 
ers,  by  accepting  WPC  cooperation  in 
their  activities,  have  been  receiving  in 
direct  Soviet  support.  It  is  distressing 
that  Moscow  is  able  to  take  part  in  th 
West's  public  debate  on  the  defense 
measures  needed  to  offset  the  Soviet 
threat  through  use  of  a  mechanism  as 
transparent  as  the  WPC. 


Assessing  Effect  of  Active  Measure 

How  effective  is  the  active  measures  i 
fort?  There  is  no  simple  answer.  Not 
only  is  it  impossible  to  run  controlled 
periments,  but  the  deception  inherent 
active  measures  complicates  an  assess- 
ment. Moreover,  active  measures  are 
not  used  independently,  but  in  coordii 
tion  with  other  elements  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy  such  as  diplomatic,  com 
mercial,  informational,  and  military  a« 
tivities.  The  contribution  of  active 
measures  to  the  end  result  is  not  easy) 
isolate. 

Clearly,  however,  the  Soviet  leade 
ship  believes  they  are  effective.  The 
manpower  and  money  required  to  com 
struct  and  operate  a  worldwide  active 
measures  infrastructure  of  fronts  and 
agents  are  substantial.  We  consider  it 
probable  that  the  Soviet  campaign 
against  the  "neutron  bomb"— which  th 
regard  as  one  of  their  most  success- 
ful—cost some  $100  million.  From  the 
Soviet  perspective,  the  moiuw   was  we 
spent.  The  U.S.S.R.  was  able  to  distJ 
the  public  debate  on  the  topic  and  dirt 
attention  from  the  massive  Soviet 
military  buildup  and  the  clear  threat  I 
European  security  posed  by  Warsaw- 
Pact  conventional  forces— the  threat 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


EUROPE 


vhich  enhanced  radiation  weapons  can 
o  effectively  counter.  Rut  besides  direct 
nonetary  costs,  the  Soviets  also  are  wili- 
ng to  expend  prestige  and  good  will  as 
heir  hand  in  some  active  measures 
derations  inevitably  is  exposed.  This  in- 
lirect  cost  goes  beyond  immediate  em- 
iarrassment;  over  the  longer  term,  the 
J.S.S.R.'s  use  of  deceptive  and  manipu- 
itive  techniques  increases  disenchant- 
lent  with  the  Soviet  model. 

While  it  is  obvious  that  the  Soviets 
elieve  the  game  is  worth  the  candle,  we 
hould  attempt  our  own  independent 
valuation.  Active  measures  are  not 
lagic,  nor  does  the  world  dance  to  a 
overt  Soviet  tune.  Moscow  does  not 
ominate  the  political  processes  of  the 
Western  democracies.  Nonetheless,  the 
ersistent  Soviet  attempts  to  influence 
ur  political  agenda  are  not  always  with- 
ut  effect.  This  is  especially  true  when 
oviet  active  measures  are  designed  to 
agnify  and  channel  the  sincere  con- 
rns  of  noncommunist  critics  of  official 
Western  government  policies.  Moreover, 
lese  efforts  tend  to  exacerbate  internal 
visions  in  our  societies,  a  long-standing 
aviet  goal. 

In  developing  countries,  the  impact 
greater.  Their  governments,  often 
istable,  economically  stressed  and  lack- 
g  tested  political  institutions,  are  more 
llnerable  to  covert  manipulation, 
syond  the  occasional  contribution  of  ac- 
/e  measures  to  the  bringing  to  power 
a  government  under  Moscow's  in- 
lence,  these  techniques  tend  to  in- 
ease  the  insecurity  of  legitimate 
ivernments  and  distract  their  leaders' 
tention  from  their  primary  task — de- 
■lopment.  The  tenuous  state  of  free 
ess  institutions  in  many  of  these 
ates  and  the  plain  fact  that  journalism 
less  developed  countries  is  often  an 
.remunerative  profession  provide 
vorable  ground  for  Soviet  manipula- 
>ns. 

orrosive  Effect  on  Open 
olitical  Systems 

1  both  developed  and  developing  coun- 
ies,  beyond  the  success,  or  lack  of  it, 
particular  operations,  active  measures 
ftve  a  corrosive  effect  on  open  political 
'stems.  The  confusions  produced  by 
edia  manipulations,  forgeries,  calcu- 
ted  rumors,  falsely  attributed  radio 
•oadcasts,  and  the  activities  of  agents 
'  influence  may,  over  time,  weaken 
ablic  confidence  in  political  institutions 
id  processes. 

In  view  of  the  historical  record  and 
ie  substantial  bureaucracy  that  sup- 
)rts  these  activities,  we  do  not  expect 
te  Soviet  active  measures  program  to 


THE  SECRETARY  OF  COMMERCE 
Washing-on.  D.C.    2-233 


SFZCIAI 

ON   STP.A 


PRESIDENTIAL  VCj.XI.iG   GROUP 

"Z'zc  economic  pclicy 


Date    February  IS,   1982 


Recommendations  of  the  S 
Economic  Policy.  Member 

Department  of  Comr—" 


Central 


-  - 1  i  -■  - 


ger.ce  Aser.c-. 


Department  of  State 


Department  of  Treasury 


esidential  Working  Group  on  Strategic 
follows : 

Malcolm  Baldridge,  Secretary  of  Commer 

Lionel  H,  Olmer,  Under  Secretary  for 

International  Trade 

Robert  G.  Dederick,  Assistant  Secretar 

Raymond  J.  Waldnar.,  ■  Assistant  Secretar 

Thomas  Collamore,  Confidential  Assista 

to  the  Secretary 

Eugene  K.  Lawson,  Deputy  Assistant 

Secretary 

Maurice  Ernst,  Director,  Office  of 
Economic  Research 

Martin  Kohn,  Deputy  Director,  Office 
of  Economic  Research 

Ernest  B.  Johnston,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary 

Nicholas  Sr.  Piatt,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary 

Gordon  L.  Streab,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary 

.William  3.  Milam,  Director,  Department 
of  International  Pir_ar.ce  and  Develcpme 

Marc  E.  z&eland,  Assistant  Secretary 

East-'i^V^srartomic  Folic} 


In  order  to  carry   out   the   strategic   objectives   of  6^r/^g  1 
we  view  as   desirable  to  submit   for   the  approval   of  t? 
following   concept   of  our   economic   policy: 

Within  the    sanctions    imposed   upon   the   Soviet    union  by   the   United   States 
and   consequently   by   our  V.'estern  European   Allies,    we   propose   undertaking 
actions,   whose   objective  would   be   the   definite   severance   cf   the  gas 
pipeline   contract   between   the  Soviet   Union   and    some   of   our  Western 

Forged  Secretary  of  Commerce  memorandum,  dated  Feb.  18,  1982,  recommending  actions 
to  sever  the  gas  pipeline  contract  between  the  U.S.S.R.  and  several  West  European  allies 
of  the  United  States.  The  memorandum  states  that,  among  other  advantages,  this  measure 
will  weaken  the  economies  of  the  European  countries  concerned  and  make  them  more 
dependent  on  the  United  States. 


ugust 1983 


47 


EUROPE 

respond  to  variations  in  the  international 
climate.  They  did  not,  for  example,  show 
a  noticeable  decline  in  the  peak  period  of 
detente  in  the  1970s.  Rather,  the  use  of 
these  offensive  techniques,  which  seek  to 
harm  countries  which  the  Soviets 
perceive  as  adversaries,  is  an  indicator 
of  underlying  hostility.  As  such,  active 
measures  should  remain  a  cause  of  con- 
cern to  the  alliance.  Conversely,  the 
cessation  of  these  activities  would 
remove  a  significant  obstacle  to  im- 
proved relations. 

Before  addressing  the  question  of 
how  to  counter  Soviet  active  measures, 
it  is  useful  to  discuss  an  attitude  that 
does  not  contribute,  in  the  view  of  the 
U.S.  Government,  to  a  useful  approach. 

This  is  the  "ho-hum"  response  to 
Soviet  active  measures  usually  presented 
in  terms  such  as:  "We  all  know  that  the 
Soviets  engage  in  dirty  tricks,  so  what  is 
new?  Why  get  excited?"  The  implication 
is  that  it  is  naive  to  concern  oneself  with 
such  activities  since  they  are  an  im- 
mutable, but  trivial,  element  in  the 
Soviets'  international  conduct. 

This  approach  prejudges  the  ques- 
tion of  the  importance  of  Soviet  active 
measures  and,  by  discounting  it  in  ad- 
vance, works  against  a  realistic  ap- 
praisal. Active  measures,  by  definition, 
involve  deception,  and  their  effective- 
ness and  seriousness  vary  in  time  and 
place.  Only  careful  examination  can  pro- 
duce a  balanced  assessment.  Belittling 
the  problem  impairs  needed  efforts  to 
limit  the  effectiveness  of  Soviet  active 
measures. 

It  is  worth  considering  basic  asym- 
metries in  the  situations  of  East  and 
West  with  respect  to  active  measures. 
The  closely  controlled  Soviet  political 
system  offers  little  scope  for  covert 
manipulation.  Agents  of  influence  are 
not  going  to  penetrate  or  disorient  the 
structures  of  "democratic  centralism." 
The  controlled  press  of  the  U.S.S.R.  of- 
fer limited  opportunities  for  external  in- 
fluence. Western  societies,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  open  to  diverse  political  in- 
fluences, including  those  deceptively  in- 
troduced in  the  service  of  Soviet  foreign 
policy.  In  Western  countries,  the  use  of 
most  active  measures  techniques  does 
not  carry  a  criminal  penalty  for  fear  of 
imposing  limits  on  legitimate  political  ex- 
pression. Moreover,  unlike  the  West,  if  a 
clandestine  effort  goes  awry  in  the 
totalitarian  society  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
there  is  no  political  opposition  to  take 
advantage  of  the  rulers'  embarrassment, 
and  an  obedient  press  will  keep  the 
failure  off  the  public  record.  The  answer 
to  the  "everybody  does  it"  attitude  is 
that  active  measures  are  a  field  in  which 


NATO   SECRET 

KBMZ     HEADQUARTERS     ALLIED     POV\ 


SUPREME     HEADQUARTERS     ALLlstU     POWERS     EUROPE 
!  GRAND     GUARTiER     GENERAL     DES     PUISSANCES     ALLIEES     EN     EUROP: 

BELGIUM 


26  June    1979 


His    Excellency   Joseph   M.A.U.    Luna 
The    Secretary    Ceneral 
North   Atlantic   Treaty   Or^nijation 
Sxucs-ils/Zaventcc:  Autoroute 
3-1110    irusaela,    Beljiuta 


Dear   Joseph, 


'.'i 
/.^r 


(•< 


*'.V.\;;-.<V\-' 


I  i 


Think   you    for  your    letter  of  June   25    betting   out    certain  results 
of   our   joint   work,  which   have  had,    I   believe,    a   direct    and    lasting  effect 
on    the    formulation  and    realization  of    the    allied   defense   program.     Tor 
my    par:,    I   highly    appreciate  your    cooperation    ar.d   hope    that  you  are 
equally   satisfied. 

On    leaving    the    post    of   Supreme    Allied   Cooicander    in   Europe,    I    feel 


5  ii   ay   duty    to    seres*    once    again  certain  aspects   of    allied    strategy  which, 
■J  demand    our   further   attention  and   effort. 

I 
Aa   you   know,    on*   of   our  presuppositions    in   nuclear   planning   ia   that.' 
under    certain    circumstances    likely    to   develop    ia   Europe,    we  cay  be   forced 
to  make    first    use   of   nuclear  weapons.      This    obviously    requires    chat    the     j 
allied   nuclear   deterrent    should   be   strengthened   and    its    links   with  major 
U.S.    strategic    systems    tightened.      Moreover,    it    is    vital    to   speed   up  and 
[[finalize   current    projects    for    the    limited   use   of   U.S.    nuclear   forces    in 
[ Europe    and   for   other  military  measures   at   our   disposal    for   a   possible 
emergency.      This    strategy   will    be  more  realistic    and   effective   if  a  de- 
cision  on    the  modernization  of   allied   tactical    nuclear    forces    ia    taken. 

With   your   help,    a    great   deal    of   progress    has    been  made    recently 
toward   strengthening    the  Alliance.      Yet,    in  my  view,    planning   for  the 
deployment    and   use   of  modernized   nuclear   forces    in   Europe    can  be   ade- 
quately  accomplished   only    if    full   understanding   and   cooperation  are 
achieved.      It-  is    therefore   necessary    to   prepare,    systematically  and 
persistently,    a    basis    for   making   e    success    of    the    NATO   Council   meeting 
in  December,    bearing    in  mind   primarily    the    crisis    in»idc    the  Alliance 
over   neutron  weapons    deployment.      Ev^ry  effort    should   be  made    to   counter 
Bny   hesitation   or  vacillation  among    the  allied    nations    during   decision- 
making meetings. 


Foreed  letter  from  departing  NATO  Commander  Gen.  Alexander  M.  Haig,  Jr.,  to  NATO 
Secret  General  Joseph  ilns.  dated  June  26.  1979.  It  was  calculated  to  stimulate  Euro 
pean  opposition  to  intermediate-range  nuclear  force  (INF)  modernization  by  distorting 
NATO  strategy  and  playing  on  European  fears  of  a  limited  nuclear  conflict  in  Europe. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


EUROPE 


democratic  systems  cannot  effectively 

compete. 

In  democracies,  certainly  in  the 
limited  States,  all  opinions,  including  the 
Advocacy  of  positions  that  correspond 
with  those  of  foreign  adversaries,  are 
fully  and  properly  protected  by  law.  Ef- 
forts to  contain  active  measures  inter- 
ventions, except  in  cases  of  illegal  acts 
ommitted  on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power, 
hould  focus  on  the  foreign  agents  of 
ieception,  not  on  citizens  who  hold  ex- 
)tic  opinions.  Quite  the  contrary,  we 
egard  the  free  competition  of  ideas, 
whatever  their  origin,  not  only  as  a 
undamental  attraction  of  our  societies 
»ut  as  the  well  spring  of  democratic 
igor.  The  resort  by  the  Soviet  Union 
nd  its  proxies  to  active  measures  is  a 
acit  admission  of  weakness.  It  is  be- 
ause  their  ideology  cannot  stand  on  its 
nerits  that  they  rely  so  heavily  on 
eception  and  psychological  warfare  in 
ompetition  in  the  international  arena. 


leed  for  Persistent  Response 

he  soundest  response  to  the  Soviet  use 
f  active  measures  is  to  keep  our 
alance.  It  is  as  unwise  to  ignore  the 
ireat  as  it  is  to  become  obsessed  with 
le  myth  of  a  super  Soviet  conspiracy 
lanipulating  our  essential  political  proc- 
5ses.  We  should  keep  in  mind  that  ac- 
ve  measures  are  only  one  aspect  of  our 
)mplex  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
nion. 

The  foundation  of  a  sound  Western 
nswer  to  active  measures  is  under- 
anding  the  problem.  This  involves  the 
Election  and  analysis  of  relevant  infor- 
lation.  It  is  not  only  an  intelligence 
atter,  however,  as  the  purpose  of  ac- 
/e  measures  is  both  political  and 
;ychological.  Another  complication  is 
at  active  measures  transcend  national 
irders;  a  forgery  targeted  to  harm  the 
terests  of  one  country  may  be  surfaced 
ilf  a  world  away.  Disinformation  cam- 
.igns  involve  media  in  many  countries, 
lese  and  other  problems  are  not  insur- 
ountable  obstacles  to  a  greatly  im- 
oved  understanding  of  the  worldwide 
ttern  of  active  measures  if  we  align 
ir  antennae  to  face  the  challenge. 

Since  the  Soviets  are  committed  to 
tive  measures  as  a  regular  instrument 
foreign  policy,  it  must  be  viewed  as  a 
oblem  for  the  long  run.  Sudden  en- 
usiasms  to  expose  their  dirty  tricks 
llowed  by  troughs  of  apathy  are  not 
e  answer.  A  reasoned  and  effective 
sponse  must  be  persistent  and  continu- 
5,  and  this  is  best  achieved  by  a  grow- 
g  public  understanding  and  emerging 
nsensus  on  the  significance  of  these 


activities.  Governments  also  have  the 
responsibility  to  protect  their  sovereign- 
ty from  active  measures  distortions  by 
exposing  and  removing  the  foreign  in- 
struments of  intervention,  such  as  the 
diplomat  who  engages  in  improper  ac- 
tivities or  the  foreign  journalist  whose 
position  is  a  cover  for  disinformation  ac- 
tivities. 

But  our  response  must  not  be 
limited  to  effective  counterintelligence, 
important  as  that  may  be.  Active 
measures  need  to  be  countered  by  public 
exposure.  They  are  infections  that  thrive 
only  in  darkness,  and  sunlight  is  the  best 
antiseptic.  Governments  should  make 
available  to  their  publics  as  much  as 
possible  of  our  growing  knowledge  of 
Soviet  practices.  Needless  to  say,  any 
exposure  of  covert  Soviet  manipulations 
has  to  meet  the  highest  standards  of  ac- 
curacy. 

Publicity  serves  a  number  of  pur- 
poses. Our  publics  need  the  best  infor- 
mation to  perform  their  democratic 
duties.  Moreover,  awareness  of  Soviet 
practices  helps  citizens  to  avoid  becom- 
ing the  victims  of  specific  active 
measures  operations.  Publicity  also  acts 


as  a  disincentive  to  the  U.S.S.R.  by  in- 
creasing the  price  of  failure.  Conversely, 
a  tacit  acceptance  of  the  Soviets'  use  of 
active  measures  would  encourage  them 
to  bolder  actions. 

To  sum  up,  the  Soviet  Union  uses 
active  measures  extensively  and  has 
created  a  large  bureaucracy  to  imple- 
ment these  activities.  While  not  an  im- 
mediate, mortal  threat  to  the  West,  they 
are  harmful,  although  the  precise  degree 
is  difficult  to  determine.  Whatever 
danger  active  measures  pose,  their  con- 
tinuing use  in  itself  is  an  obvious 
obstacle  to  improved  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  While  recognizing  that  ac- 
tive measures  are  but  one  aspect  of  our 
complex  relationship,  common  sense  re- 
quires that  we  counter  these  intrusions 
not  only  through  effective  counterintelli- 
gence but  by  keeping  our  citizens  as  ful- 
ly informed  as  possible  of  the  deceptive 
practices  to  which  they  are  exposed. 
Much  as  we  would  like  to  see  active 
measures  eliminated  from  the  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs,  we  must  realistically  ac- 
cept the  implications  of  these  hostile 
Soviet  activities  and  contain  them  to  the 
best  of  our  ability.  ■ 


14th  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JUNE  16,  19831 

During  the  period  since  my  last  report, 
there  has  been  considerable  international 
focus  on  Cyprus.  The  Cyprus  question 
was  debated  in  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  which  adopted  a  Resolution  on 
May  13  calling  for  "meaningful,  result- 
oriented,  constructive  and  substantive 
negotiations"  between  the  two  com- 
munities. Approximately  50  countries 
spoke  in  the  Assembly  and  supported 
continuation  of  the  intercommunal  talks 
under  the  aegis  of  the  Secretary 
General.  We  reaffirmed  our  commitment 
to  the  success  of  the  Secretary  General's 
good  offices  role  although  we  abstained 
on  the  Resolution,  believing  it  contained 
elements  potentially  unhelpful  to  the  in- 
tercommunal talks. 

Now  that  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly session  is  past,  we  anticipate  a 
period  of  reevaluation  by  both  com- 
munities. We  expect,  nevertheless, 
representatives  of  the  two  communities 
to  return  to  the  intercommunal  talks. 
We  continue  to  believe  those  talks  hold 
the  best  prospect  for  finding  answers  to 
the  problems  of  Cyprus. 


On  May  (i  the  U.N.  Secretary 
General  issued  a  report  (a  copy  of  which 
is  attached)  on  the  question  of  Cyprus  in 
which  he  notes  that  the  intercommunal 
talks,  although  recessed  for  the  Greek 
Cypriot  elections,  reconvened  in  April  in 
"a  cooperative  and  constructive  at- 
mosphere." 

The  Secretary  General,  within  his 
Security  Council  mandate,  has  pledged 
to  "make  every  effort  to  give  fresh  im- 
petus to  the  process"  of  the  talks,  an  ef- 
fort we  fully  support. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Richard 
Burt  visited  Cyprus  during  the  period 
for  indepth  discussions  with  leaders  of 
both  communities  and  with  U.N.  of- 
ficials. Other  diplomatic  representatives 
also  remain  in  close  contact  with  all  par- 
ties to  the  problem. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  I 
O'Neill,  .Ir.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Charles  H.  Percy,  chairman 
of  the  Seriate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  June  20,  1983).  ■ 


49 


EUROPE 


A  Critical  Juncture  for 
the  Atlantic  Alliance 


by  Richard  R.  Burt 

Address  before  the  Time  conference 
on  the  Atlantic  alliance,  Hamburg, 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  on 
April  25,  1983.  Mr.  Burt  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  Affairs. 

This  conference  could  not  be  more  time- 
ly. And  the  need  to  view  trans-Atlantic 
developments  with  care  could  not  be 
more  critical.  As  a  former  journalist,  I 
am  aware  that  those  outside  government 
have  the  opportunity  to  observe  the  ebb 
and  flow  of  current  affairs  with  a  unique 
perspective.  As  a  government  official,  I 
am  also  aware  that  this  opportunity  is 
not  always  seized  as  often  as  it  might 
be.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Time  and 
the  conference  organizers  deserve  our 
most  sincere  thanks  and  appreciation. 
Indeed,  those  of  us  enmeshed  in  the  day- 
to-day  of  policymaking  are  in  need  of 
the  criticism  and  vision  of  people  such  as 
yourselves  and  gatherings  such  as  this. 
Without  the  benefit  of  perspective,  we 
are  less  likely  to  shape  historical  forces 
than  to  be  shaped  by  them. 

I  believe  we  have  arrived  at  a 
critical  juncture  in  the  annals  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance.  Let  me  hasten  to  add 
that  this  is  not  because  we  are  in  a  deep 
crisis  as  some  would  have  us  believe. 
Rather,  we  are  in  the  midst  of  what  can 
best  be  described  as  a  grand  debate.  It 
is  a  debate  over  the  very  essence  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance — its  purpose,  its  shape, 
its  future. 

This  is  hardly  the  first  time  the 
alliance  has  been  in  the  throes  of  self- 
examination  and  self-criticism.  Indeed, 
the  Atlantic  alliance  was  born  amidst 
controversy.  The  entire  notion  of 
peacetime  engagement  in  the  affairs  of 
Europe  went  against  the  grain  of 
American  history.  Postwar  America  was 
anxious  to  bring  its  boys  back  home  and 
bring  about  a  parochial  peace  with  pros- 
perity. 

Nor  were  the  formative  years  of  the 
alliance  easy  ones  for  Europeans.  Recon- 
struction and  recovery  were  foremost  in 
everyone's  mind.  Arming  to  prevent  yet 
another  war  demanded  all  too  scarce 
resources;  forging  bonds  of  trust  with 


recent  foes  demanded  the  intellectual 
courage  to  look  ahead  rather  than  back. 

But  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean,  the 
uncommon  men  of  the  immediate  post- 
war era  made  difficult,  and  sometimes 
unpopular,  decisions.  In  the  United 
States,  two  world  wars  had  shown  all 
too  clearly  the  folly  of  isolationism.  It 
was  understood  that  Jefferson's  famous 
injunction  against  "entangling  alliances" 
did  not  have  permanent  application.  In 
Europe  it  was  understood  that  the 
security  of  the  Continent  against  the 
emerging  Soviet  threat  required  perma- 
nent association  with  a  noncontinental 
power.  Out  of  these  twin  recognitions 
the  alliance  came  to  life.  The  initial 
debate  had  been  decided. 

The  alliance  of  the  1950s  was  an 
alliance  overwhelmingly  dominated  by 
the  United  States.  Deterrence  depended 
on  U.S.  nuclear  superiority  to  offset  a 
Red  Army  which  never  demobilized. 
Decisions  were  largely  reached  in 
Washington  and  communicated  through 
NATO  in  Paris.  For  the  most  part,  we 
spoke,  Europe  listened;  we  led,  Europe 
followed. 

By  the  1960s  it  was  increasingly  evi- 
dent that  such  a  formula  had  grown  ob- 
solete. Europe  was  no  longer  prostrate. 
Economic  recovery  had  succeeded.  The 
alliance  was  no  longer  based  on  a  simple 
security  guarantee  but  had  evolved  into 
a  true  military  coalition  with  integrated 
national  forces.  And  Europeans  were 
less  and  less  willing  to  accept  American 
leadership  without  question.  The  condi- 
tions for  a  second  great  debate  had 
materialized. 

Many  of  the  strains  accompanying 
these  developments  were  manifested  in 
the  nuclear  realm.  Then,  as  today, 
nuclear  politics  went  to  the  heart  of  the 
alliance.  Two  principal  issues  emerged  in 
the  nuclear  debate  of  the  1960s.  The 
problem  was  in  part  military.  The 
American  guarantee  was  no  longer  as 
convincing,  given  Soviet  strides  in 
developing  their  nuclear  arsenal.  How 
could  the  U.S.  strategic  deterrent  com- 
pensate for  conventional  weakness  and 
deter  Soviet  strategic  forces  simultane- 
ously? Equally,  the  problem  was 


political.  Europeans  wanted  some  say  it,] 
the  life-and-death  decisions  affecting 
nuclear  weapons. 

Washington's  proposed  approach  fo 
dealing  with  these  problems— the  NAT' 
multilateral  nuclear  force— only  exacer-l 
bated  these  tensions.  Fortunately,  the  I 
ultimate  solution  had  the  opposite  effec  | 
The  doctrine  of  flexible  response,  for- 
mally adopted  by  the  alliance  in  1967, 
provided  for  a  continuum  of  forces- 
conventional,  theater  nuclear,  and 
strategic  nuclear— by  which  deterrence 
could  be  maintained  at  all  levels.  And  a 
new  institution,  the  NATO  Nuclear  Plai 
ning  Group,  was  created.  Responsibility 
for  nuclear  policymaking  would 
henceforth  be  shared.  The  basic  Atlanti 
bond  was  maintained. 

Evolution  of  the  Current  Debate 

But  in  the  best  tradition  of  Hegelian 
logic,  yesterday's  synthesis  has  given 
way  to  today's  antithesis.  There  is  no  Hi 
tie  irony  in  this.  In  the  1960s,  Europeai 
concerns  reflected  a  perceived  lack  of 
U.S.  commitment  to  maintain  the 
American  nuclear  guarantee;  in  the 
1980s,  the  most  vocal  elements  in 
Europe  view  with  alarm  American  ef- 
forts to  ensure  the  credibility  of  this 
same  nuclear  guarantee. 

Thus,  in  1983,  we  are  once  more 
hearing  from  many  quarters  that  the 
alliance  is  no  longer  relevant,  or  viable, 
or  both;  that  only  radical  surgery  can 
prolong  the  patient's  life.  If  I  read  the 
signs  correctly,  a  third  grand  debate  is 
underway.  The  reasons  for  this  happen- 
ing now  are  several. 

First,  the  passage  of  time  has  dullt 
the  initial  Atlantic  impulse;  the  alliance 
no  longer  seems  as  relevant  to  the  con- 
cerns of  young  people  bearing  outlooks 
formed  by  experiences  far  from  those  o 
the  postwar  era. 

Second,  European  states  and  in- 
stitutions have  advanced  in  capacity, 
wealth,  and  independence.  Many  on  bot 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  view  the  alliance  as 
an  anachronism,  a  product  of  an  era  of 
American  strength  and  European 
weakness  which  no  longer  exists. 

Third,  U.S.  and  European  interests 
are  not  always  identical  or  even  com- 
plementary. We  are  often  economic  coir< 
petitors.  We  often  have  differing  views 
of  Third  World  »r  regional  crises.  We  at 
times  have  contrasting  assessments  of 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


the  Soviet  Union,  the  threat  it  poses, 
ind  how  best  to  manage  East-West  rela- 
tions. 

Fourth,  a  prolonged  period  of 
sconomic  recession  has  increased  com- 
letition  for  budgetary  allocations.  Pro- 
■idmg  more  for  defense  and  deciding 
low  much  each  member  of  the  alliance 
blight  to  provide  are  increasingly  con- 
entious. 

Finally,  shifts  in  the  military 
lalance  and  the  emergence  of 
J. S. -Soviet  strategic  parity,  in  par- 
icular,  have  raised  anew  the  issue  of 
American  reliability.  The  credibility  of 
he  U.S.  strategic  deterrent  is  some- 
imes  doubted.  The  emergence  of  Soviet 
uperiority  at  the  intermediate  nuclear 
>vel  has  raised  new  questions  as  to  the 
atipling  of  the  defense  of  Europe  and 
le  U.S.  strategic  deterrent. 

That  a  great  debate  over  the  future 
f  the  Atlantic  alliance  should  evolve  out 
f  such  circumstances  is  hardly  odd;  in- 
deed, it  would  be  odd  if  one  were  not  to 
ike  place.  Not  surprisingly,  we  are 
?eing  challenges  to  the  basic  Atlantic 
lodel  coming  from  all  parts  of  the 
olitical  spectrum.  Both  sides  of  the 
tlantic  are  participating.  What  I  should 
ike  to  do  today  is  make  my  modest  con- 
•ibution  to  this  debate. 

merican  Challenges  to  the 
tlantic  Model 

1  the  United  States,  it  is  significant 
lat  we  are  not  witnessing  a  revival  of 
aditional  isolationism.  Fortress 
merica  is  not  being  promoted  as  a 
odel  of  American  well-being.  Perhaps 

«e  notion  is  simply  too  discredited  to 
>ld  much  attraction;  perhaps  most  have 
mply  come  to  accept  that  the  United 
;ates  is  too  dependent  upon,  and  in- 
rdependent  with,  the  rest  of  the  world 
pursue  this  simplistic  and  dangerous 

|  )tion. 

Other  challenges  to  the  Atlantic  con- 

i  'ction  exist,  however.  There  is,  for  ex- 
nple,  an  American  school  of  thought 
at  has  come  to  be  known  as  "global 
lilateralism."  Adherents  of  this  school 
■gin  with  an  appreciation  of  the  global 
ope  of  U.S.  interests.  They  note  the 
oad  range  of  possible  threats  to  the 
nited  States.  And  they  would  reduce 
•e  U.S.  commitment  to  Europe  so  that 


President  Meets  With 
NATO  Secretary  General 


(White  House  photo  by  BUI  Fitz-Patrick) 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
APR.  26.  1983' 

Earlier  today,  the  President  met  with 
Joseph  Luns,  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization. 
The  President  and  the  Secretary 
General  met  in  the  Oval  Office.  The 
Secretary  General  is  in  the  United 
States  to  meet  with  [Defense]  Secretary 
Weinberger  and  to  maintain  his  regular 
consultations  with  U.S.  leaders.  They 
last  met  in  June  1982  during  the  NATO 
summit  in  Bonn. 

The  two  discussed  the  INF  [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  forces]  negotia- 
tions and  the  close  and  continuing  allied 
consultations  that  have  led  to  the 
alliance's  strong  unity  behind  the  U.S. 
proposal.  Both  men  agreed  on  the  need 
for  the  alliance  to  remain  steady  on  its 


deployment  course  if  a  concrete  agree- 
ment with  the  Soviets  is  not  reached. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary 
General  also  discussed  the  NATO  Eco- 
nomic Committee's  study  of  the  security 
implications  of  East-West  economic  rela- 
tions. The  President  told  the  Secretary 
General  that  the  study  is  an  important 
part  of  the  overall  allied  effort  to 
develop  a  comprehensive  Western  ap- 
proach to  East-West  economic  relations. 

The  President  also  took  this  oppor- 
tunity to  express  his  deep  respect  to  the 
Secretary  General  for  his  continuing  and 
outstanding  contributions  to  alliance 
security  and  unity. 


'Made  by  White  House  Deputy  Press 
Secretary  Larry  Speakes  at  his  daily  press 
briefing  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 

Presidential  Documents  of  May  2,  1983).  ■ 


ugust 1983 


51 


EUROPE 


we  could  enhance  our  flexibility  to  act 
everywhere. 

This  approach  is  flawed.  All  in- 
terests are  not  vital;  all  are  not  equal. 
The  balance  of  power  in  Europe  is  cen- 
tral to  world  stability  and  American  in- 
volvement in  Europe  is  central  to  the 
balance  there.  Moreover,  our  range  of 
ties,  commercial  and  cultural,  cannot  be 
duplicated  or  done  without.  The  reality 
is  that  there  is  no  cheap  way  of  protect- 
ing these  interests.  Deterrence,  to  be 
credible,  requires  a  large  U.S.  continen- 
tal commitment;  it  also  requires  that  we 
act  together  as  a  true  coalition. 

A  second  challenge  is  perhaps  better 
known  to  you.  For  want  of  a  better 
phrase,  I  call  it  "Atlantic  reconstruc- 
tion." It  manifests  itself  in  several 
places— the  Congress  and  the  media 
most  notably— and  in  several  ways  by, 
for  example,  threatening  troop  with- 
drawals or  not  funding  defense  pro- 
grams critical  to  the  defense  of  Europe. 

The  roots  of  this  American  move- 
ment are  to  be  found  in  the  soil  of 
frustration  and  resentment.  There  is  a 
growing  belief  in  the  United  States  that 
Europeans  are  not  doing  their  share,  be 
it  to  defend  themselves  or  to  defend 
common  interests  around  the  world. 
Sometimes  tied  to  this  view  is  the  belief 
that  Europe's  commitment  to  detente 
outweighs  its  commitment  to  the 
alliance,  that  Europe  is  more  concerned 
with  its  economic  well-being  than  with 
Western  defense.  The  reconstructionists 
want  to  end  this  alleged  "free  ride." 
They  wish  to  send  a  signal  to  Europe  to 
stimulate  a  larger  European  defense  ef- 
fort. 

As  is  often  the  case,  neither  analysis 
nor  prescription  is  accurate.  That  we  all 
need  to  do  more  to  strengthen  deter- 
rence is  obvious.  And  that  there  is  a  re- 
quirement for  equity  on  defense  efforts 
in  a  coalition  of  democratic  states  is  also 
clear.  More  must  be  done,  and  the 
Reagan  Administration  has  worked  hard 
to  increase  defense  spending  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic.  At  the  same  time, 
we  have  sought  to  deflate  misconcep- 
tions about  allied  contributions  to  the 
common  defense.  There  is  not  enough 
awareness,  for  example,  that  should  con- 
flict arise  in  Europe,  90%  of  NATO's 
land  forces  and  75%  of  its  sea  and  air 
forces  would  be  European. 

There  are  those  who  argue  that  we 
could  improve  the  situation  by  cutting 
U.S.  efforts.  I  do  not  doubt  that  by 


doing  less  in  Europe  the  United  States 
would,  indeed,  "send  a  signal."  Unfor- 
tunately, it  would  be  the  wrong  signal 
with  the  wrong  result.  In  the  name  of 
enhancing  deterrence  and  defense,  those 
who  would  cut  back  America's  contribu- 
tion could  well  achieve  precisely  the  op- 
posite. Reducing  U.S.  strength  and  rais- 
ing questions  about  the  U.S.  commit- 
ment are  hardly  self-evident  ways  of 
promoting  peace  and  stability. 

European  Alternatives 

An  even  greater  debate  is  taking  place 
on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  This  is  to  be 
expected,  given  the  immediacy  of  the 
issues  here.  Let  me  address  briefly  what 
I  see  as  the  principal  alternatives  being 
presented. 

Neutralism.  Three  schools  of 
thought  appear  to  dominate.  The  first 
would  exchange  the  alliance  for 
neutralism.  Some  go  as  far  as  to  see  this 
neutralism  embracing  all  of  Europe, 
West  and  East.  It  is  argued  that  a 
Europe  without  allegiance  to  either  bloc 
and  without  significant  military  forces 
would  be  a  safer  haven,  less  likely  to  be 
drawn  into  a  confrontation  between  the 
two  superpowers.  Somewhat  differently, 
it  is  asserted  that  Europe  (and  especially 
Germany)  could  make  its  most  important 
contribution  to  peace  by  serving  as  a 
bridge  between  the  two  superpowers, 
explaining  one  to  the  other. 

These  are  romantic  visions.  With  or 
without  its  Eastern  neighbors,  a  weak 
and  neutral  Western  Europe  would  be 
under  the  sway  of  the  strongest  con- 
tinental power,  the  Soviet  Union.  What 
is  needed  for  peace  is  less  a  bridge  than 
a  bulwark.  Our  problems  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  are  not  caused  by  a  lack  of 
communication,  although  communication 
is  important.  Our  problems  with  the 
U.S.S.R  are  caused  by  a  lack  of  Soviet 
restraint  and  respect  for  the  interests 
and  well-being  of  others. 

Armed  Independence.  Some 
recognize  these  realities  and,  instead, 
argue  for  a  Western  Europe  that  is 
strong,  independent  of  the  United 
States,  and  able  to  provide  fully  for  its 
own  security.  An  image  of  a  European 


military  entity  is  held  up,  the  analogue 
to  European  political  cooperation  and 
economic  integration.  In  this  model, 
Europe  would  thus  be  able  to  mediate 
between  the  two  powers  from  a  positio 
of  strength— able  to  deter  one  without 
being  tied  to  the  other.  European  in- 
terests would  prosper,  we  are  told. 

I  can  do  no  better  in  describing  this 
school  of  thought  than  by  quoting  Hedl 
Bull  of  Oxford  University: 

The  course  that  the  Western  European 
countries  should  now  be  exploring  may  be 
called  the  Europeanist  one.  It  requires  the 
countries  of  Western  Europe  to  combine 
more  closely  together,  increase  their  defens 
efforts,  and  take  steps  toward  reducing  the 
military  dependence  on  America. 

Professor  Bull's  vision,  too,  suffers 
from  a  lack  of  realism.  Europe  at  pres- 
ent lacks  the  requisite  political  basis  fo 
constituting  such  collective  managemer 
of  its  security.  It  is  not  clear  that 
European  states  would  be  willing  to 
make  the  necessary  political  commit- 
ments and  economic  investment.  And  i 
is  not  at  all  certain  that  the  emergence 
of  an  independent,  armed  Europe— wit 
conventional  and  nuclear  forces  alike— 
could  occur  without  crisis  or  even  con- 
flict. Indeed,  the  security  and  stability 
we  all  know  and  enjoy  now  could  be 
jeopardized  by  such  development. 

Reconstruction.  A  third  approach 
embodied  by  proposals  now  coming  fro 
opposition  parties  in  northern  Europe. 
In  many  respects,  these  ideas  are  the 
mirror  image  of  the  proposals  offered 
American  reconstructionists.  The  Eurc 
pean  reconstructionists  have  several 
goals:  to  lessen  the  influence  of  the 
United  States;  to  reduce  the  likelihood 
of  nuclear  war  in  Europe;  to  carry  out 
more  independent  policy  toward 
Moscow;  and  to  promote  European  in- 
terests around  the  world  as  they  see  fi 
They  seek  not  to  leave  the  alliance  so 
much  as  to  change  it  from  within. 

Even  such  "reformist"  policies  are 
not  without  major  difficulties;  indeed, 
they  draw  upon  several  of  the  worst 
features  of  the  two  alternatives  just 
discussed.  We  should  not  delude 
ourselves.  Conventional  defense  needs 
strengthening.  But  more  robust  conver 
tional  defense  efforts  will  not  make 
nuclear  forces  irrelevant  or  redundant. 
Soviet  conventional  and  nuclear  advan- 
tages must  be  offset,  whether  by 
deployments,  arms  reductions,  or  both. 
The  bond  between  forces  in  Europe  am 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


EUROPE 


U.S.  strategic  deterrence,  or  coupling, 
must  be  maintained.  At  the  same  time, 
uonventional  force  improvements  will 
Rove  costly;  a  consensus  for  a  major  in- 
crease in  the  level  of  defense  effort  has 
/et  to  emerge.  And  heightened  Euro- 
Dean  independence  from  the  United 
States  has  its  risks;  Europeans  cannot 
ihoose  when  they  wish  to  enjoy  the 
ruits  of  alliance  and  when  they  do  not. 
There  is  room  for  disagreement  and  dif- 
ference within  the  alliance  but  not  for 
selective  commitment. 

)ther  Concepts 

Neutralism,  armed  independence, 
econstruction— these  are  the  three  basic 
European  alternatives  to  the  current 
Ulanticist  framework  for  Western 
ecurity.  Cutting  across  these  ap- 
roaches  are  various  themes  which 
/ould  also  alter  the  current  Atlantic 
ridge  in  a  decisive  manner. 

Antinuclearism  is  one  such  idea.  The 
im  is  to  reduce  or,  if  possible,  eliminate 
ne  presence  of  nuclear  weapons  in 
lurope  and  with  them  the  risk  of 
uclear  war.  The  most  ardent  en- 
lusiasts  of  this  proposition  would  do  so 
nilaterally  in  hopes  of  eliciting  parallel 
oviet  restraint. 

But  I  agree  with  [former  Secretary 
Defense]  Harold  Brown's  observation 
Dout  U.S. -Soviet  arms  competition: 
Vhen  we  build,  the  Soviet  Union 
ailds;  and  when  we  don't  build,  the 
oviet  Union  still  builds."  Moreover, 
lilateral  actions  by  the  West  would 
idermine  our  best  chance  for  mean- 
gful  arms  control  negotiations.  More 
■riously,  unilateral  nuclear  disarma- 
ent  would  threaten  deterrence  and 
'ighten  the  vulnerability  of  the  West, 
10. 

Nor  can  there  be  a  policy  of  "no  first 
ie"  of  nuclear  weapons.  The  effect 
ould  once  again  be  decoupling  and  thus 
■ode,  not  enhance,  deterrence.  It  is  the 
■ospect  of  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons 
id  the  full  weight  of  American  might 
bich  helps  to  keep  the  peace  in 
■urope. 

Wishing  away  the  possibility  that 
iclear  weapons  will  be  used  is  not 
,ough.  Declarations  are  simply  words, 
eanwhile,  Soviet  conventional, 
emical,  and  nuclear  capabilities  are 
al  and  increasing.  Were  the  alliance  to 
iopt  a  policy  of  no  first  use  of  nuclear 
capons,  the  danger  of  conventional 
ir— which  would  be  incredibly  destruc- 


tive in  our  age— would  be  increased  and 
with  it  the  possibility  of  nuclear  tragedy. 
More  than  50  million  people  perished  in 
World  War  II;  we  cannot  adopt  policies 
which  would  heighten  the  risk  of  conven- 
tional, not  to  mention  nuclear,  war  in 
Europe. 

Lastly,  there  are  those  who  remain 
within  the  alliance  or  Atlantic  house  but 
who  place  all  their  hopes  on  arms  con- 
trol. Arms  control— whether  some  ver- 
sion of  a  nuclear  freeze  or  negotiations 
more  broadly— is  held  up  as  the  panacea 
for  Europe's  dilemma.  Only  arms  con- 
trol, it  is  alleged,  offers  the  means  to 
limit  the  threat,  reduce  the  levels  of 
weapons  and  the  spending  on  them,  and 
promote  renewed  detente. 

But  such  hopes  cannot  live  in  isola- 
tion. Arms  control  will  only  prosper  if 
the  Soviet  Union  has  incentive  to 
negotiate;  what  is  required  to  bring  this 
about  is  a  sound  military  foundation  on 
our  part.  Nor  can  arms  control  be  ex- 
pected to  persuade  the  Soviet  leadership 
to  eschew  the  role  of  force;  Soviet  policy 
at  home  and  abroad  depends  on  it  too 
much.  Arms  control  has  the  potential  to 
buttress  our  security  and  deterrence;  it 
cannot  take  the  place  of  our  collective 
efforts  to  do  the  same. 


Elections  in  Turkey 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 

MAY  7,  1983' 

When  the  military  took  power  in  Turkey 
under  conditions  of  near  anarchy  in 
1980,  they  committed  themselves  to 
restoring  democratic  government  as 
soon  as  possible.  The  United  States 
welcomed  the  timetable  they  set  for  car- 
rying out  that  promise,  and  we  have  ex- 
pressed our  support  for  each  step  along 
the  way. 

I  warmly  welcome  President  Evren's 
recent  announcement  that  parliamentary 
elections  will  be  held  on  November  6, 
thus  completing  the  process  of  restoring 
democracy.  I  congratulate  the  Turkish 
people  for  this  remarkable  achievement 
and  assure  them  of  the  continued  sup- 
port and  friendship  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  people. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  16,  1983. 


What  Is  at  Stake 

In  more  normal  times,  debates  involving 
competing  conceptions  of  alliance  securi- 
ty would  be  welcomed.  Over  years  or 
even  decades,  we  would  perhaps  create 
a  new  consensus.  But  1983  is  not  a  nor- 
mal time.  To  the  contrary,  1983  could 
well  turn  out  to  be  the  most  important 
year  in  the  history  of  the  Atlantic 
alliance  since  its  inception. 

The  reason  for  so  stating  is  clear.  To 
a  degree  unlike  any  other  year  since 
1949,  the  determination  and  credibility 
of  the  alliance  are  being  tested.  How  we 
implement  the  December  1979  decision 
on  intermediate  nuclear  forces  will  have 
a  major  impact  on  our  future.  Those 
who  would  apply  their  abstract  or 
idealized  notions  of  how  best  to  struc- 
ture the  Atlantic  relationship  to  deter- 
mine the  outcome  of  the  INF  [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  forces]  debate 
should  only  do  so  with  a  full  under- 
standing of  what  is  at  stake. 

Not  surprisingly,  this  temptation 
exists.  There  are  those  in  the  United 
States  who  wonder  why  we  should  go  to 
such  lengths  to  bring  about  the  im- 
plementation of  the  decision.  They  are 
unhappy  that  so  many  facets  of  the 
U.S. -European  relationship  are  held 
hostage  to  the  INF  decision  and  cite  the 
possibility  that  deployment  of  U.S. 
missiles  in  Europe  could  heighten  the 
risk  of  a  direct  Soviet  nuclear  attack  on 
the  American  homeland. 

On  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  there 
are  those— particularly  the  new  neu- 
tralists—who maintain  precisely  the  op- 
posite. They  argue  that  new  U.S. 
weapons  based  on  the  Continent  would 
enable  us  to  localize  or  limit  an  East- 
West  nuclear  exchange  to  Europe. 
Others  simply  argue  that  the  new 
missiles  are  not  necessary  because  the 
Soviet  Union  has  no  intention  of  ex- 
ploiting its  current  INF  monopoly.  Or, 
in  yet  another  variation,  there  are  those 
who  are  prepared  to  wait  indefinitely  for 
arms  control  to  solve  the  security  prob- 
lem created  by  SS-20  deployment.  In 
every  case,  they  seek  to  opt  out  of  im- 
plementing the  1979  decision. 

The  fallacies  in  each  of  these  ap- 
proaches are  manifest.  The  United 
States  cannot  be  secure  for  long  in  a 
world  in  which  Western  Europe  is  not. 
Americans  who  would  weaken  or 
remove  the  U.S.  nuclear  guarantee 
would  jeopardize  the  prospects  for 
stability  and  peace  everywhere.  In  the 
name  of  reducing  risk  to  themselves, 
they  will  have  raised  it  for  everyone. 


53 


EUROPE 


European  opponents  of  deployment 
are  also  mistaken.  The  effect  of  new 
U.S.  missiles  would  not  be  to  limit  or 
localize  a  nuclear  exchange  in  Europe 
but  rather  to  prevent  one.  Indeed,  it  is 
in  part  through  the  threat  of  escalation 
and  full  American  involvement  that  we 
help  to  promote  stability  and  deterrence 
in  Europe.  Indeed,  no  better  proof  for 
this  proposition  exists  than  Defense 
Minister  Ustinov's  recent  comment  that 
the  Soviet  Union  would  respond  to  a 
strike  by  U.S.  systems  in  Europe  by 
directly  attacking  the  United  States.  If 
that's  not  coupling,  I  don't  know  what  is. 

Those  who  maintain  no  new  deploy- 
ments are  needed,  whether  owing  to 
Soviet  good  will  or  the  prospects  of 
arms  control,  are  simply  deluding 
themselves.  It  is  probably  true  that 
Westen  Europe  could  live  with  a  Soviet 
preponderance  of  force;  but  to  expect 
the  Soviets  not  to  exploit  any  advantage 
for  its  own  paranoic,  political  purposes 
is  to  ignore  every  lesson  of  history. 
Similarly,  the  U.S.S.R.  cannot  be  ex- 
pected to  negotiate  seriously  in  the 
absence  of  any  incentive  to  do  so; 
deployment,  either  in  promise  or  in  fact, 
remains  our  best  and  only  way  to  get 
the  Soviets  to  come  to  the  negotiating 
table  in  good  faith. 

In  short,  the  implementation  of  the 
INF  double-track  decision  has  become 
the  touchstone  for  Western  security  in 
the  1980s.  The  decision  continues  to 
have  a  sound  political  and  a  sound 
military  rationale.  It  was  taken  in 
response  to  an  unprovoked  Soviet 
buildup  which  continues  unabated.  It 
represents  continued  alliance  commit- 
ment to  a  concept  of  deterrence 
predicated  on  the  notion  that  American 
power  tied  to  Europe  is  the  best  way  of 
promoting  European  stability  and  peace. 
The  commitment  of  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration and  allied  governments  to 
pursuing  both  tracks— arms  control  and, 
if  need  be,  deployment— of  the  1979 
decision  is  now  unshakeable. 

My  support  for  decisions  taken  some 
3V2  years  ago  and  my  criticism  of 
various  alternative  visions  of  the  alliance 
should  not  be  interpreted  as  complacen- 
cy. The  flaws  of  the  various  alternatives 
I  have  described  should  not  be  taken  as 
a  complete  dismissal  of  their  validity. 
Nor  should  it  be  understood  as  a  com- 
plete endorsement  of  the  status  quo.  If  I 


may  modify  an  old  American  adage  for 
my  purposes  here  tonight,  I  would  sim- 
ply advise  against  fixing  the  alliance 
more  than  it  is  broken.  Or,  to  shift 
metaphors,  I  would  simply  urge  you  to 
beware  of  cures  worse  than  the  disease. 

This  is  not  a  call  for  standing  pat. 
Reform  is  needed.  So  too  is  close  con- 
sultation. We  must  upgrade  not  only  our 
nuclear  deterrent  but  also  our  conven- 
tional forces.  More  must  be  done  to 
safeguard  common  interests  outside  the 
formal  treaty  area.  We  must  ensure  that 
our  commercial  relations  with  the  East 
are  consistent  with  our  political  and 
security  requirements.  And  we  must 
continue  to  be  imaginative  and  flexible 
in  our  search  for  meaningful  arms  con- 
trol agreements. 

We  must  be  careful,  though,  in  how 
we  proceed.  Europe  in  the  30  years 
since  the  Second  World  War  has  been 
spared  armed  conflict.  We  have  achieved 
levels  of  prosperity  and  freedom  without 
historical  precedent.  Too  much  is  at 


stake  to  go  ahead  precipitously  or 
recklessly.  The  alliance  and  the  basic 
Atlantic  model  or  structure  remain  rele 
vant  and  viable.  Only  within  its  contour 
can  we  harness  the  resources  of  the 
West  in  a  manner  which  maximizes  ef- 
fectiveness and  minimizes  the  burden  0 
our  free  societies  and  strained 
economies. 

There  is  a  wonderful  line  from  the 
novel,  The  Leopard,  by  the  Italian 
author  Giuseppe  di  Lampedusa.  "If  we 
want  things  to  stay  as  they  are,  things 
will  have  to  change."  To  a  degree  this  i: 
true.  Indeed,  the  history  of  the  alliance 
is  a  series  of  adaptations  to  evolving  cii 
cumstances.  The  alliance  of  1983  is  not 
the  alliance  of  1949. 

Yet,  there  must  also  be  limits  to  oui 
departures.  The  essentials  of  the  Atlan 
tic  model  that  is  the  alliance  have  serve 
us  well  and  should  be  saved.  The  allian< 
can  continue  to  safeguard  our  interests 
if  we  are  as  wise  about  what  to  keep  as 
we  are  about  what  to  change.  ■ 


Visit  of  Spanish  President 


President  Felipe  Gonzalez  Marqm  1 
of  Spain  made  an  official  working  visit 
to  Washington,  D.C.,  June  20-  .'.'.  1983, 
to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other 
government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
Presidents  Reagan  and  Gonzalez  after 
their  meeting  on  June  -V.1 

President  Reagan 

I  would  like  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
underscore  our  great  pleasure  at  receiv- 
ing President  Gonzalez  and  express  once 
again  our  friendship  and  admiration  and 
support  for  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  Spain. 

The  President  and  I  had  an  excep- 
tionally productive  and  cordial  meeting 
today.  We  reviewed  international  and 
bilateral  matters  in  an  open,  understand 
ing,  and  democratic  spirit  that  one 
would  expect  between  friends  and  allies. 


We  affirmed  the  need  for  strong  leadef 
ship  to  deal  with  the  political  and 
economic  and  social  problems  which 
underlie  so  much  of  the  unrest  in  the 
world  today. 

We  agreed  on  the  importance  of 
maintaining  Western  strength  and 
solidarity  in  those  critical  times  and  ex 
pressed  our  desire  to  work  closely 
together  as  we  face  the  challenges 
ahead.  We  agreed  on  the  desirability  qd 
.in  early,  positive,  and  balanced  conclu- 
sion to  the  CSCE  fConference  on  Seen 
t\  and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  review 
conference  presently  underway  in 
Madrid.  I  expressed  our  appreciation  § 
President  Gonzalez's  recent  initiative  ir 
this  regard,  which  we'll  be  discussing 
with  our  friends  and  allies. 

There  are  numerous  areas  of  closer 
cooperation,  including  the  pursuit  of  00 
common  energy  security  interests.  W4 
value  Spam  as  an  important  partner.  \\ 
welcome  the  President's  high  sense  of 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


EUROPE 


ssponsibility  in  guiding  his  country  at 
lis  critical  moment  in  its  history.  We 
fclaud  Spain's  aspirations  to  join 
grope  fully  and  to  make  its  voice  heard 
Europe's  leading  institutions. 
\\V  believe  the  West's  must  fun- 
mental  resource  is  the  strength  of 
mocratic  institutions.  The  consolida- 
:>n  cif  democracy  in  Spain  is  a  ringing 
prmation  of  the  vitality  of  Western  in- 
tutions  and  the  appeal  of  Western 
lies. 

resident  Gonzalez 

irst,  I  want  to  thank  President  Reagan 
r  this  occasion  to  hold  an  open  conver- 
tion  with  the  United  States,  which  we 
nsider  a  friendly  country,  a  good 
iend  of  Spain. 

As  you  know,  Spain  is  a  very  old 
ttropean  country  which,  among  other 
ings,  discovered  this  land  that 
wadays  occupies  this  great  country  of 
urs.  But  it's  also  a  young  country,  not 
ly  because  the  country  people  are 
ung  but  because  we  just  recovered  the 
jnity  of  being  a  democratic  country. 

A  simple  definition  of  Spain  would 
aracterize  what  its  foreign  policy 
ould  be.  Spain  is  a  European  and  a 
estern  country — the  most  Western  of 

European  countries — nothing  then  is 
>re  logical  than  its  wish  to,  and  its 
sire  to,  participate  and  integrate  in 

European  and  the  Western  world 
d  cooperate  with  the  Western  world 
a  common  destiny. 

But  we  are  also  a  southern  country 
Europe.  We  are  very  close  to  Africa, 
d  our  coast  is  in  the  Mediterranean 
sin.  This  defines  another  important 
)ect  of  our  foreign  policy:  the  north  of 
rica  and  the  important  waters  of  the 
■diterranean  Basin. 

The  fact  that  I  cannot  communicate 
,h  you  in  English  means  that  there  is 
jther  dimension  in  our  policy  and 
ntity:  the  fact  that  we  can  com- 
.nicate  in  our  language,  in  Spanish, 
;h  practically  300  million  people  in  the 
lerican  Continent.  This  gives  a  third 
lension  in  the  foreign  policy  of  Spain, 


t 


"**. 

\L-Z-L 


(White  House  photo  by  Pete  Souza) 


without  meaning  that  any  one  of  them 
means  a  priority  against  the  others. 

Let  me  tell  you  that  I  am  41  years 
old,  and  during  33  of  these  years,  I  was 
dreaming  of  a  free  and  democratic 
Spain.  This  is,  of  course,  what  we  want 
and  we  hope  for  our  people.  But  this  is 
also  what  we  want  and  we  hope  for 
other  peoples  wherever  we  can  project 
this  foreign  policy.  We,  therefore,  wish 
and  want  for  other  countries  which  can 
communicate  with  us  in  cultural  level: 
peace,  freedom,  pluralism,  and  progress. 


Because  it's  America  and  because  it's 
such  an  important  country  in  the  world, 
you'll  understand  perfectly  well  that  we 
want  also  to  make  our  links  with  the 
United  States  even  closer,  which  ex- 
plains two  things:  my  presence  here  ac- 
cepting a  gracious  and  very  kind  invita- 
tion of  President  Reagan  and  my 
satisfaction  because  of  the  course  of 
these  conversations  we  have  just  had. 


■Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  27,  1983. 


gust  1983 


55 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Soviet  Jewry 


by  Elliott  Abrams 

Statement  he/arc  the  Subcommittee 
mi  Hiiiiiiiii  Rights  and  International 
Organizations  of  the  House  Foreign  Af- 
fair* <  'iiniiinttee  mi  J  nut  .'■:.  ins.;.  Mr. 
Abrams  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian 
Affairs.' 

I  would  like  to  discuss  the  situation  of 
Jews  in  the  Soviet  Union  today  with 
special  reference  to  four  general  areas 
of  concern:  anti-Semitic  propaganda,  at- 
tacks on  the  study  of  Hebrew  and 
Jewish  culture;  attacks  on  the  Jewish 
religion;  and  emigration.  Before  doing 
that,  however,  I  want  to  say  a  few 
words  about  the  history  of  the  Jewish 
community  in  the  Soviet  Union,  for  I 
believe  that  in  order  to  understand  the 
Jewish  situation  in  the  Soviet  Union  to- 
day, we  must  go  back  to  the  very  begin- 
ning of  the  Soviet  regime. 

The  encounter  between  the  Soviet 
regime  and  Russian  Jewry  has 
developed  over  several  stages.  Initially, 
the  Bolshevik  Revolution  offered  Jews, 
like  other  minority  groups  in  Russia,  an 
awkward  bargain:  the  exchange  of  large 
parts  of  their  traditional  heritage  for 
equality  with  the  Russians.  For  Jews, 
this  tacit  offer  was  particularly 
awkward.  Religion  was  the  core  of  the 
Jewish  heritage,  but  Marxism  was 
atheist  and  deeply  committed  to  extir- 
pating religion  as  a  living  force  in  the 
country's  life.  Nevertheless,  this  bargain 
provided  a  basis  for  a  somewhat  free 
Jewish  life  in  Russia.  Marxism,  with  its 
basis  in  the  philosophy  of  the  Enlighten- 
ment, fought  anti-Semitism  vigorously  in 
the  immediate  aftermath  of  the 
Bolshevik  Revolution. 

Under  Stalin,  however,  the 
strengthened  totalitarian  impulse  to 
"reforge"  the  masses  of  human  beings 
inevitably  created  grave  dangers  for  any 
community  that  was  distinctive  or  had 
an  ancient  heritage.  The  storm  did  not 
break  on  Soviet  Jews  until  just  after 
World  War  II.  In  1946  the  campaign 
against  "rootless  cosmopolitans"  began. 
It  died  down  briefly  in  1950-51  but  was 
continued  and  horribly  intensified  in  the 
campaign  against  "Zionists"  by  1950-53, 
culminating  in  the  so-called  doctors  af- 
fair, in  which  a  number  of  prominent 
Jewish  physicians  were  accused  of 
murdering  several  Soviet  leaders  and 
plotting  to  murder  others. 


Two  things  were  noteworthy  about 
this  emergence  of  anti-Semitism. 

First,  it  was  not  social  anti- 
Semitism,  or  an  atavistic  return  to  tradi- 
tion, but  official  policy.  On  one  day,  the 
state-run  papers  would  be  free  of 
references  to  Jews,  on  the  next  day  full 
of  anti-Semitic  innuendo. 

Second,  this  official  policy  was 
decided  on  after  an  analysis  of  prior  ex- 
perience. Given  its  timing,  it  is  very 
probable  that  the  Soviet  Government's 
turn  to  anti-Semitism  was  a  conscious 
imitation  of  Hitler's  policy.  It  seems  to 
have  been  based  on  a  perception  that 
the  Nazi  use  of  anti-Semitism  had  been 
enormously  successful.  Thus,  with  stag- 
gering cynicism,  the  Soviet  regime 
followed  V-E  Day  by  imitating  the  core 
of  the  political  program  of  its  defeated 
Facist  enemy. 

What  this  brief  summary  of  Soviet 
history  shows  is  that  the  Enlightenment 
heritage  in  Marxist  ideology — which  had 
initially  protected  Jews — had  undergone 
an  astonishing  decomposition  by  1946, 
less  than  30  years  after  the  revolution. 
By  1983  the  decay  of  Soviet  ideology  has 
proceeded  even  further.  To  read  books 
of  Soviet  ideology  is  to  see  the  lifeless 
juggling  of  sterile  jargon  according  to 
political  expediency.  To  visit  the 
U.S.S.R.  is  to  feel  a  stifling  cynicism 
about  the  political  principles  of 
communism. 

I  believe  that  this  is  an  essential 
part  of  the  problem  which  Soviet  Jews 
face  today.  Basically,  the  encounter  be- 
tween Soviet  communism  and  the  Jews 
is  a  conflict  between  the  most  rapidly 
decaying  ideology  in  human  history  and 
one  of  the  most  permanent — the 
heritage  of  the  Jewish  people — which 
has  stood  for  thousands  of  years. 

This  fundamental  contrast,  more- 
over, cannot  but  be  profoundly  disturb- 
ing to  Soviet  leaders.  It  makes  them 
deeply  suspicious  of  Jews  as  those  who 
possess  an  apparently  inexplicable  inner 
firmness  which  ideologists  cannot  con- 
trol and  which  will  outlast  Soviet 
ideology. 

Thus,  Soviet  anti-Semitism  was  not 
cancelled  after  Stalin's  death  like  some 
other  innovations  of  Stalin's.  The 
codeword  "Zionists"  for  Jews  was  in- 
troduced in  the  Soviet  press  in 
November  1952,  specifically,  as  part  of 
t  lie  preparation  for  the  anti-Semitic  ter- 
ror intended  to  surround  the  doctors  af- 
fair. This  codeword  still  remains  part  of 
Soviet  rhetoric.  Most  of  the  public 
bodies  purged  of  Jews  from  1948  to 
1953  have  remained  juden.rein.  The  ter- 


ror hanging  over  Soviet  Jews  eased 
after  Stalin's  death,  as  it  did  for  other 
Soviet  citizens.  For  a  period  during  the 
1950s  and  1960s,  many  Jews  had  suc- 
cessful professional  careers  and  had  ob- 
tained higher  education  in  substantial 
numbers.  But  anti-Semitism  quicky 
resurfaced  during  the  early  1970s.  Thei 
have  been  some  ebbs  and  flows  over  tht 
past  decade,  but  the  overall  trend  has 
been  toward  an  increasingly  vicious,  of- 
ficial campaign  of  anti-Semitism,  which 
purports  to  be  anti-Zionism. 

With  this  background  in  mind,  let 
me  turn  now  to  the  situation  of  Jews  in 
the  Soviet  Union  today  and  to  the  four 
areas  I  singled  out  for  special  concern. 

Anti-Semitic  Propaganda 

For  many  years  now,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  been  orchestrating  a  vicious  anti- 
Semitic  propaganda  campaign  under  th 
guise  of  "anti-Zionism."  The  contents  oi 
this  anti-Semitic  campaign  resemble 
nothing  so  much  as  that  notorious  anti- 
Semitic  forgery,  The  Protocols  of  the 
Elders  ofZion.  Soviet  propagandists 
have  equated  Zionism  with  every  con- 
ceivable evil,  including  racism,  im- 
perialism, capitalist  exploitation,  co- 
lonialism, militarism,  crime,  murder,  es- 
pionage, terrorism,  and  even  Nazism.  T 
give  the  distinguished  members  of  this 
committee  some  idea  of  the  nature  and 
scope  of  this  campaign,  let  me  read  yoi 
a  brief  excerpt  from  an  article  which  a) 
peared  in  the  October  10,  1980,  issue  o 
Pionerskaya  Pravda,  a  weekly  magazir 
for  children,  ages  9  to  14,  belonging  to 
the  Soviet  youth  organization,  Pioneers 

Most  of  the  largest  monopolies  in  the 
manufacture  of  arms  are  controlled  by  Jewi 
bankers.  Business  made  on  blood  brings  the 
enormous  profits.  Bombs  and  missiles  ex- 
plode in  Lebanon — the  bankers  Lazars  and 
the  Leibs  are  making  money.  Thugs  in 
Afghanistan  torment  schoolchildren  with 
gases — the  bundles  of  dollars  are  multiplyir 
in  the  safes  of  the  Lehmans  and  Gug- 
genheims.  It  is  clear  that  Zionism's  principa 
enemy  is  peace  mi  earth. 

I  could  go  on  and  cite  literally  hun- 
dreds of  similar  excerpts  from  the 
Soviet  media,  but  I  want  to  draw  the 
committee's  attention  to  some  of  the 
most  recent  manifestations  of  Soviet 
anti-Semitic  propaganda.  These  include 
the  formation  in  April  of  this  year  of  ai 
anti-Zionist  committee  of  the  Soviet 
public  to  parrot  the  official  propaganda 
line;  the  broadcast,  in  recent  months,  o 
a  blatantly  anti-Semitic  television  pro- 
gram on  Zionism  in  which  certain 
Jewish  leaders  w:ere  labeled  "enemies  o 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


mmanity,"  and  in  which  the  term  "final 
olution"  was  used;  and  the  publication 
.f  a  book,  The  Class  Essence  of  Zionism, 
,/hich  contends  that  Jews,  themselves, 
're  partly  responsible  for  Europe's 
listory  of  violent  anti-Semitism.  Such 
[roadcasts  and  books  could  not  see  the 
|ght  of  day  without  official  approval. 

jittacks  on  the  Study  of  Hebrew 
)nd  Jewish  Culture 

loviet  anti-Semitism  also  manifests 
self  in  the  attempt  to  discourage  the 
tudy  of  Hebrew  and  Jewish  culture, 
ewish  cultural  activists  and  Hebrew 
jachers  have  been  officially  warned  to 
jase  their  activities  or  face  various 
trms  of  retaliation.  Two  cultural  ac- 
vists  in  Sverdlovsk  (Shefer  and 
elchin)  were,  in  1982,  each  sentenced 
5  years  in  a  strict  regime  labor  camp 
>r  "defaming  the  Soviet  state,"  based 
i  their  possession  of  Hebrew  books.  In 
ovember  1982  prominent  activist  Iosif 
egun  was  arrested;  he  is  still  awaiting 
ial  on  charges  of  "anti-Soviet  agitation 
id  propaganda." 

ttacks  on  the  Jewish  Religion 

ne  practice  of  Judaism  is  subject  to  the 
.me  stifling  official  restrictions  that 
wern  other  religious  groups  in  the 
.S.S.R.  For  example,  organized 
ligious  instruction  of  children  is  legally 
oscribed,  and  state  officials  closely 
rutinize  all  aspects  of  congregational 
tivity.  Numbers  of  operating 
nagogues  and  trained  clergy  are  kept 
inadequate  levels.  There  is  no  func- 
>ning  rabbinical  seminary  throughout 
e  length  and  breadth  of  the  U. S.S.R. 
Soviet  Jews  are  put  by  the  govern- 

B;nt  in  a  double  bind:  They  are  allowed 
ither  limited  cultural  and  political 
tonomy — like  almost  all  of  the  na- 
malities  of  the  Soviet  Union — nor 
similation  into  the  Russian  people, 
ost  Soviet  nationalities  have  union 
publics  or  other  national  political 
ts,  as  well  as  indigenous-language 
ltural  expression  (newspapers,  books 
.Wishing,  radio,  theater,  etc.),  within 
finite  limits.  On  the  whole,  creativity 
the  modern  language  is  allowed,  as 
ig  as  official  guidelines  are  followed, 
d  the  study  of  most  classics  in  ancient 
iguages  is  allowed.  But  Yiddish 
ltural  expression  and  specific  Jewish 
ltural  expression  in  Russian  is  virtual- 
impossible.  Most  forms  of  the  study  of 
;brew  are  prohibited,  and  Hebrew 
oks  are  not  available.  Jewish  religious 
actice  is  severely  restricted  by  the 


small  number  of  synagogues,  the  lack  of 
any  rabbinical  seminary  to  correspond  to 
the  Orthodox  and  Moslem  seminaries, 
and  the  virtual  incompatibility  of 
religious  worship  with  Communist  Party 
membership— and,  therefore,  with  many 
types  of  middle-class  jobs. 

On  the  other  hand,  Jews  are  denied 
the  path  of  assimilation  into  the  Russian 
or  other  nationalities  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  It  is  virtually  impossible  for  an 
adult  to  get  rid  of  the  designation  "Jew" 
in  his  or  her  internal  passport.  (The  in- 
ternal passport  which  all  Soviet  citizens 
are  issued  indicates  their  nationality.) 
Being  labeled  in  this  way  subjects  Soviet 
Jews  to  pervasive  discrimination. 

It  is  important  to  realize  that  this  in- 
volves not  only  quotas  as  in  the  uni- 
versities but  the  virtually  complete  ex- 
clusion of  Jews  from  a  number  of 
professions  and  organizations,  such  as 
significant  positions  in  the  Communist 
Party  apparatus,  the  secret  police,  and 
the  officer  corps  of  the  army. 

Emigration 

For  large  numbers  of  Soviet  Jews, 
emigration  offers  the  only  way  out  of 
this  double  bind.  Unfortunately,  Jewish 
emigration  from  the  Soviet  Union  has 
fallen  drastically— from  51,300  in  1979 
to  21,500  in  1980;  9,400  in  1981  and 
under  2,700  in  1982,  the  lowest  since 
1970.  This  year,  the  decline  has  con- 
tinued: less  than  600  Jews  have 
emigrated  during  the  first  5  months  of 
1983.  The  January  1983  monthly  figure 
of  81  was  the  lowest  since  1970.  This 
compares  with  monthly  totals  of  over 
4,000  for  most  of  1979.  Moreover, 
Jewish  emigration  applicants  are 
routinely  dismissed  from  their  jobs  and 
forced  into  temporary  and/or  menial 
employment.  This  practice  is  especially 
prevalent  against  those  holding  profes- 
sional or  technical  positions. 

The  children  of  Soviet  Jews  who  ap- 
ply for  emigration  are  also  subjected  to 
persecution.  School-aged  children  are 
commonly  made  objects  of  teacher- 
encouraged  ridicule  and  harassment. 
Young  men  have  been  promptly  con- 
scripted upon  reaching  draft  age, 
despite  their  families'  well-known  inten- 
tion to  emigrate.  Conscription  can  delay 
a  family's  emigration  by  as  much  as  8 
years — up  to  3  years  of  military  service, 
followed  by  a  5-year  period  in  which  the 
inductee  is  ineligible  for  emigration  due 
to  his  exposure  to  "military  secrets." 

Discrimination  against  Soviet  Jews 
in  employment  and  education  is  not 


limited  to  "refuseniks."  Jewish  enroll- 
ment in  universities  and  entry  into  cer- 
tain professions  are  limited  by  more  dif- 
ficult qualifying  standards  than  those 
imposed  on  other  ethnic  groups. 

A  number  of  Jewish  scientists —  1 1 
cases  are  documented  but  estimates 
range  much  higher — were  stripped  of 
their  academic  degrees  during  1980-82. 
Fortunately,  the  practice  seems  to  have 
abated  since  its  public  disclosure  in  the 
West. 

The  U.S.  Government  is  deeply  con- 
cerned about  the  severe  downturn  in 
emigration,  and  the  issue  is  being  raised 
with  the  Soviets  at  every  appropriate 
opportunity — both  in  public  forums, 
such  as  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  and  in 
bilateral  talks.  Secretary  Shultz  has 
placed  particular  stress  on  this  and 
other  human  rights  issues  during  discus- 
sions with  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko.  Embassy  Moscow  and  Con- 
sulate General  Leningrad  follow 
developments  on  a  daily  basis  and  make 
numerous  representations  in  support  of 
emigration  applicants. 

Conclusion 

There  are  no  easy  solutions  to  any  of  the 
problems  which  I  have  discussed.  In  the 
short  run,  our  goals  must  be  to  help  as 
many  individuals  as  we  can,  limit 
discriminatory  practices,  and  obtain 
freer  emigration.  Over  the  longer  term, 
we  have  to  try  to  obtain  a  Soviet  system 
that  is  more  open  to  outside  influence, 
since  that  is  our  best  hope  for  a  peaceful 
evolution  of  that  society  into  one  that  is 
easier  to  live  with,  as  well  as  to  live  in. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


57 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


U.S.  Submits  Pleading  to  ICJ  Concerning 
Canadian  Maritime  Boundary 


On  June  28,  1983,  the  United  States 
filed  its  second  written  pleading 
(counter-memorial)  with  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)  in  The 
Hague  in  the  "Case  Concerning  the 
Delimitation  of  the  Maritime  Boundary 
in  the  Gulf  of  Maine  Area"  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States.  Canada 
also  filed  its  second  pleading  on  the 
same  date.  The  first  written  pleading 
(memorial)  was  filed  with  the  Court  by 
both  the  United  States  and  Canada  on 
September  27,  1982. 

The  case  is  before  the  Court  as 
the  result  of  a  boundary  settlement 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Canada  which  entered  into  force  on 
November  20,  1981.  A  chamber  of  five 
judges  has  been  established  by  the  Court 
to  hear  the  case.  The  members  of  the 
chamber  are  Judge  Roberto  Ago  of  Ita- 
ly, as  President,  Judge  Andre  Gros  of 
France,  Judge  Hermann  Mosler  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Judge 
Stephen  Schwebel  of  the  United  States, 
and  Judge  ad  hoc  Maxwell  Cohen  of 
Canada. 

The  Court  will  establish  the  single 
maritime  boundary  between  the  two 
countries  that  will  divide  their  Continen- 
tal Shelf  jurisdictions  and  200-nautical- 
mile  fishery  zones  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine 
area.  That  boundary  will  also  delimit  the 
200-nautical-mile  exclusive  economic 
zone  of  the  United  States  in  the  Gulf  of 
Maine  area.  At  stake  is  approximately 
15,000  square  nautical  miles  of  resource- 
rich  ocean  off  the  New  England  coast. 
This  Atlantic  area  includes  rich  fisheries 
developed  by  the  United  States  on 
Georges  Bank,  a  site  of  significant  cod, 
haddock,  scallop,  and  other  catches.  The 
bank  may  also  contain  valuable  oil  and 
gas  resources. 

The  boundary  proposed  by  the 
United  States  claims  jurisdiction  over  all 
of  Georges  Bank.  New  England 
fishermen  developed  the  fisheries  of 
Georges  Bank  during  the  19th  century 
and  fished  the  area  exclusively  until  the 
late  1950s  when  an  influx  of  foreign 
fishermen  began.  Over  the  last  200 


years,  the  United  States  has  undertaken 
the  primary  responsibility  for  surveying 
and  charting  the  area,  the  maintenance 
of  other  navigational  aids,  the  provisions 
of  search  and  rescue  services,  the  con- 
duct of  scientific  research,  and  defense. 
The  boundary  proposed  by  the  United 
States  respects  the  natural  divisions  in 
the  marine  environment  of  the  area  by 
taking  into  account  the  Northeast  Chan- 
nel, which  separates  the  Georges  Bank 


ecological  regime  from  the  separate 
ecological  regime  of  the  Scotian  Shelf. 

One  further  round  of  written 
pleadings  may  be  submitted.  Oral  argu 
ment  is  currently  contemplated  to  be 
scheduled  in  early  1984. 

The  agent  of  the  United  States 
directing  the  case  is  Davis  R.  Robinson 
the  Legal  Adviser  of  the  Department  o 
State.  The  Agent  for  Canada  is  L.  H. 
Legault,  Legal  Adviser  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  Internal  Affairs. 


Press  release  236. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Israel-Lebanon 
Peace  Agreement 


PRESIDENTS  REMARKS, 
WAY  17,  19831 

instead  of  the  usual  chit-chat  here  now 
krhile  the  cameras  are  on  us,  I'm  going 
10  make  a  little  statement  in  their  pres- 
ence because  of  an  event  that  took  place 
his  morning,  and  that  was  the  agree- 
ment that's  been  drawn  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel  and  was  signed  this 
looming  and,  I  think,  is  a  positive  step 
oward  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

And  I'd  like  to  extend  my  personal 
longratulations  to  President  Gemayel 
|nd  to  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  their 
|olleagues  for  the  courage  and  states- 
manship that  they've  shown.  But  also  I 
i/ould  like  to  extend,  and  I  think  on 
ehalf  of  all  of  the  country,  the  heartfelt 
hanks  to  our  Secretary  of  State,  George 
I  hultz.  On  top  of  the  long-term  efforts 
n  our  Ambassadors  Habib  and  Draper 
Philip  C.  Habib,  special  representative 
f  the  President  to  the  Middle  East,  and 
1  [orris  Draper,  special  negotiator  for 
Lebanon],  who  are  working  over  there, 
eorge  went  over  and,  I  think,  set  some 
ind  of  record  for  going  without  sleep  or 
hst  in  a  real  nonstop  shuttle. 

And  now  that  brings  about  this 
jreement  that  I  think  gives  hope  for 
i  iding  the  suffering  of  the  Lebanese 
sople.  It'll  initiate  a  process  which  will 
llminate  in  the  withdrawal  of  all  exter- 
al  forces  from  Lebanon  and  of  restor- 
ig  Lebanon's  sovereignty,  independ- 
ice,  and  control  over  its  territory.  And 
i  lis  will  enhance  the  security,  I  think, 
I  id  well-being  of  Lebanon  and  all  of  its 
sighbors. 

It  deserves  the  support  of  all  of 
ebanon's  friends  in  the  Middle  East 
id  around  the  world.  And  the  way  is 
i  iw  clear  for  others,  whose  forces  are  in 
ebanon,  to  agree  to  withdraw  as  well, 
nd  this  opportunity  shouldn't  be  al- 
wed  to  slip  away.  The  risks  if  with- 
i  rawal  fails  are  far  greater  than  the 
sks  of  completing  the  withdrawal.  And 
e  will  stand  firmly  beside  Lebanon  as 
lis  effort  continues  in  the  weeks  and 
lonths  ahead. 


Again,  my  thanks  to  George  Shultz 
for  what  he  has  accomplished  over 
there. 


'Made  as  reporters  assembled  in  the 
Cabinet  Room  at  the  White  House  to  observe 
the  beginning  of  a  meeting  between  the 
President  and  Republican  congressional 
leaders  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  23,  1983).  ■ 


The  Lebanon 
Emergency 
Assistance  Act 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  27,  1983' 

I  am  pleased  to  sign  into  law  S.639,  the 
Lebanon  Emergency  Assistance  Act  of 
1983.  This  act  authorizes  the  appropria- 
tion of  urgently  needed  economic  and 
military  assistance  for  Lebanon.  The 
funding  authorized  by  this  act  will  great- 
ly assist  in  promoting  the  economic  and 
political  stability  of  that  country  and 
support  the  international  effort  to 
strengthen  a  sovereign  and  independent 
Lebanon. 

Section  4(a)  of  the  act  confirms  this 
Administration's  announced  intention 
with  respect  to  congressional  authoriza- 
tion concerning  any  future  substantial 
expansion  in  the  number  or  role  of  U.S. 
forces  in  Lebanon.  As  indicated  in  its 
legislative  history,  that  section  does  not 
prevent  the  initiation  of  such  actions,  if 
circumstances  require  it,  while  Congress 
is  considering  a  request  for  statutory 
authorization;  nor,  of  course,  is  it  in- 
tended to  infringe  upon  the  constitu- 
tional authority  of  the  President  as  com- 
mander in  chief,  particularly  with 
respect  to  contingencies  not  expected  in 
the  context  of  the  multinational  effort  to 
strengthen  the  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence of  Lebanon. 


Persecutions  and 
Repression  in  Iran 


PRESIDENTS  MESSAGE, 
MAY  22,  19831 

America  and  the  world  are  increasingly 
alarmed  and  dismayed  at  the  persecu- 
tion and  severe  repression  of  the 
Baha'i's  in  Iran.  Recently  we  have 
learned  that  the  Government  of  Iran  has 
sentenced  22  prominent  members  of  the 
Baha'i  faith  to  death.  This  is  in  addition 
to  the  more  than  130  who  have  been 
killed  since  the  beginning  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  Iran,  including  one  man  executed 
January  1,  1983,  and  three  hanged  in 
Shiraz  on  March  12,  1983. 

These  individuals  are  not  guilty  of 
any  political  offense  or  crime,  they  have 
not  plotted  the  overthrow  of  the  regime, 
and  they  are  not  responsible  for  the 
deaths  of  anyone.  They  only  wish  to  live 
according  to  the  dictates  of  their  own 
consciences.  I  strongly  urge  other  world 
leaders  to  join  me  in  an  appeal  to  the 
Ayatollah  Khomeini  and  the  rest  of 
Iran's  leadership  not  to  implement  the 
sentences  that  have  been  pronounced  on 
these  innocent  people.  Sparing  their 
lives  would  be  a  step  forward  for  Iran 
and  the  world  community. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  30,  1983. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  4,  1983. 


tugust  1983 


59 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


Challenges  of  the  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Regime 


by  Richard  T.  Kenned;/ 

Address  hi  inn  tht  Atomic  Industrial 
Forum  andFORATOM*  in  Geneva  on 
June  l.  1983.  Mr.  Kennedy  is  U.S.  per- 
manent representative  to  ttu  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agt  ncy  (IAEA) 
and  .  1  mbassador  at  Large  and  spt  cial 
adviser  to  the  Secretary  on  nonprolifera- 
tion policy  and  nuclear  energy  affairs. 

I  am  delighted  to  be  with  you  today  here 
in  the  beautiful  city  of  Geneva.  And  I 
am  equally  pleased  to  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  talk  with  you  about  a  subject 
which  is  my  preoccupation,  my  abiding 
concern,  and  one  which  I  know  is  a  mat- 
ter of  utmost  concern  to  you,  your 
governments,  and  to  thoughtful  people 
everywhere:  preventing  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons. 

I  recognize  many  in  the  audience  as 
old  and  valued  friends,  colleagues  from 
former  times,  people  who  have  con- 
cerned themselves  with  nuclear  matters 
almost  from  the  dawn  of  the  atomic  age. 
We  sometimes  forget  that  this  incredible 
technology  we  deal  with  is  so  very 
young  in  human  terms.  It  is,  after  all, 
scarcely  40  years  old.  By  way  of  con- 
trast, the  first  literary  reference  we 
have  to  the  city  which  is  now  Geneva 
was  in  Caesar's  Gallic  Wars.  Old  Julius 
describes  it  as  "an  oppidum  of  the 
Allobroges  whose  territory  was  con- 
nected to  that  of  the  Helvetii  by  a  bridge 
which  Caesar,  for  military  reasons,  was 
forced  to  destroy."  Caesar  always  used 
the  third  person,  as  you  Latinists  will 
recall. 

That  event  occurred,  and  those  facts 
were  recorded,  about  50  years  before 
the  birth  of  Christ.  If  the  world  is  as  old 
as  we  think  it  is,  the  atomic  age,  in 
relative  terms,  has  barely  occupied  the 
time  needed  for  a  twinkling  of  the  eye. 
Being  in  this  old  ami  beautiful  city  gives 
us  a  chance  to  take  a  long-term  perspec- 
tive for  a  change.  It  gives  us  the  oppor- 
tunity to  forget  the  trees  and  look  at  the 
forest  for  once.  If  we  want,  we  can  take 
a  refreshing  pause  from  the  transient 
difficulties  or  short-term  setbacks  we  all 
have  come  to  know  and  even  to  expect 
in  our  work. 

I  am  going  to  take  that  opportunity 
right  now  and,  stopping  back  from  the 
daily  fray,  from  the  alarms  and  diver- 
sions of  the  moment,  try  to  take  a  brief 


look  at  the  big  picture.  My  impression  is 
that,  despite  the  criticism  we  hear  from 
time  to  time,  despite  the  fact  that  there 
are  some  obvious  trouble  spots  around 
the  world — despite  all  of  these  things, 
my  impression  is  that  our  common  ef- 
forts to  prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  are  working.  Let  me  tell  you 
why  I  feel  this  way.  You  judge  a  tree  by 
its  fruit.  The  fruit  of  this  tree  is  sound. 
We  have  in  place  an  international 
nuclear  nonproliferation  regime  which, 
while  it  is  clearly  not  perfect,  is  func- 
tioning. We  want  to  make  that  regime 
and  the  institutions,  norms,  and  prac- 
tices which  comprise  it  stronger,  more 
complete,  and  more  effective. 

During  President  .John  Kennedy's 
Administration  20  years  ago,  the  con- 
sensus of  policy  experts  was  that  by  the 
mid-1980s,  15  to  25  countries  would 
have  nuclear  weapons.  They  were 
wrong.  Serious  commentators  then  ac- 
cepted, almost  without  question,  the  idea 
that  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  was 
inexorable,  working  its  way  out  like  a 
Greek  tragedy,  inevitably  moving  to  a 
foreordained  conclusion.  Again,  they 
were  wrong. 

To  the  contrary,  there  is  growing  ac- 
ceptance in  the  international  community 
today  that  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  must  be  avoided.  For  it  is  in- 
creasingly clear  that  it  would  add  to  the 
insecurity  of  nations,  worsen  the  divi- 
sions among  countries,  and  contribute  to 
vastly  greater  instability  in  the  world 
community.  There  is  a  growing  consen- 
sus symbolized  by  the  adherence  of  116 
countries  to  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  that  acquiring  nuclear  weapons  is 
not  a  sensible  or  reasonable  course  for 
nations  to  pursue.  Rather,  the  consensus 
is  that  nuclear  programs  should  be  car- 
ried on  only  where  there  are  adequate 
safeguards  and  other  arrangements  to 
make  clear  a  country's  commitment  to 
the  use  of  the  atom  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses. 

In  the  United  States,  we  have  laws, 
policies,  and  procedures  aimed  at 
preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Every  other  major  nuclear- 
exporting  country  has  adopted  com- 
parable although,  obviously,  not  wholly 
identical  restrictions.  We  can  and  should 
take  considerable  comfort  from  these 
facts. 


The  United  States,  as  you  well 
know,  is  firmly  and  fully  committed  to 
preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons.  This  is  a  commitment  that 
dates  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 
nuclear  age,  and  it  is  a  commitment  th 
is  shared  by  most  other  countries 
around  the  globe. 

U.S.  Progress 

Let  me  cite  just  a  few  specifics  which 
are  very  much  on  the  positive  side  of  t 
ledger  as  we  look  at  the  nonproliferatii 
balance  sheet  today.  We  in  the  United 
States  have  made  significant  progress 
on  our  program  for  reduced  enrichmer 
for  fuels  for  test  and  research  reactors 
Other  countries  have  similar  programs 
These  efforts  over  time  will  go  a  long 
way  toward  eliminating  traffic  in  high- 
enriched  uranium,  while  still  allowing 
countries  to  meet  their  legitimate 
research  and  scientific  objectives. 

The  negotiation  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  by  the  countries  of  Latin 
America,  creating  a  nuclear-weapons- 
free  zone  for  that  region,  also  is  reaso 
for  optimism.  Recently,  the  United 
States  ratified  Protocol  I,  and  we  urge 
other  countries  to  ask  themselves 
whether  their  long-term  interests  wou 
not  be  served  by  taking  the  steps  they 
can — as  soon  as  they  can — to  bring  th 
vital  treaty  into  force  everywhere  in  tl' 
hemisphere. 

The  United  States  also  has  put  int 
place  a  coherent,  realistic,  yet  prudent 
plutonium  use  policy.  We  believe  that 
the  potential  risks  of  reprocessing  and 
use  of  plutonium  as  a  fuel  must  be 
recognized.  But  we  also  realize  that  th 
energy  needs  of  some  nations  may  die 
tate  its  use  at  some  point  in  the  future 
We  believe,  therefore,  that  where  it  ca 
be  judged  that  reprocessing  and  use  o: 
plutonium  in  civil  nuclear  power  pro- 
grams involves  no  proliferation  risk,  it 
neither  necessary  nor  wise  to  place  cri 
pling  restrictions  on  our  allies  and 
friends  who  have  advanced  nuclear  pn 
grams  and  who  seek  to  develop  more 
secure  energy  sources.  Instead,  our  nc 
proliferation  goals  require  that  we  woi 
with  these  countries  to  ensure  adequat 
security  and  safeguards  for  the  use  of 
plutonium  in  their  peaceful  nuclear 
energy  programs. 

We  also  can  and  should  take  con- 
siderable satisfaction  from  the  progres 
we  have  made  in  strengthening  those  i 
ternationally  agreed  rules  of  nuclear 


60 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


•ade  without  which  peaceful  nuclear 
ammerce  would  no  longer  be  possible. 

But  let  us  be  completely  candid: 
jhere  are  strains  on  the  existing  norms, 
nd  there  is  need  for  still  further  efforts 
)  broaden  and  strengthen  these  rules  of 
uclear  trade. 

ompetition  and  Guidelines 

1  each  of  our  countries,  there  are  large 
aclear  industries,  created  at  a  time 
hen  projected  energy  demand  was 
mch  greater  and  when  it  seemed  that 
le  future  for  nuclear  power  was  un- 
mnded.  But  times  have  changed,  and 
e  are  all  faced  with  the  problem  of 
ow  to  preserve  those  nuclear  industries 
>r  the  future  when  demand  for  nuclear 
>wer  will  again  grow — as  I  believe  it 
ill.  In  this  situation,  it  is  only  natural 
at  competitive  pressures  are  intense, 
nd  those  pressures  are  focused  increas- 
gly  on  the  effort  to  find  new  markets 
iroad. 

But  it  is  in  the  interest  of  every  na- 
>n — supplier  and  purchaser  alike — that 
mpetition  for  those  markets  be  carried 
it  in  terms  of  such  factors  as  the  quali- 
of  equipment,  know-how  and  exper- 
ie,  financing,  delivery  schedules,  and 
e  like.  These  are  the  traditional  and 
derstood  grounds  for  competition  in 
e  marketplace. 

Competition  must  not  be  conducted 
a  way  that  it  will  hinge  on  the 
adiness  of  a  supplier  to  shade  safe- 
;ards  or  other  nonproliferation  condi- 
»ns,  to  look  for  possible  technology 
/eeteners  that  will  make  purchasing 
Dm  it  seem  more  attractive  than  from 
(Other  country  that  honors  existing 
und  norms.  For  once  the  process  of 
ading  our  shared  nonproliferation 
indards  begins,  we  will  end  up  with 
e  lowest  common  denominator  of  what 
n  be  agreed  to  among  nations,  each 
Dtivated  not  by  its  or  the  world's  long- 
rm  interest  but  by  short-term  gain  and 
ar  of  what  its  neighbors  might  do. 
ider  these  conditions,  the  non- 
oliferation  regime  will  gradually 
travel,  and  we  will  find  ourselves 

Eable  to  realize  the  atom's  promise  for 
3  health  and  well-being  of  all. 

The  prospective  emergence  of  new 
ppliers  on  the  scene  adds  even  greater 
gency  to  our  efforts  to  preserve  and 
rengthen  the  agreed  rules  of  nuclear 
ade.  If  there  is  disharmony  and  con- 
Dversy  among  the  major  nuclear  sup- 
iers  on  conditions  for  nuclear  export, 
w  suppliers  inevitably  will  be  tempted 


to  use  nonproliferation  conditions  as  a 
bargaining  factor  in  their  pursuit  of 
sales.  If  they  see  their  role  models  per- 
forming in  this  way,  what  else  can  we 
reasonably  expect?  By  contrast,  agree- 
ment now  among  the  existing  suppliers 
on  sound  guidelines  and  a  commitment 
to  honor  those  guidelines  will  make  it 
easier  to  urge  new  suppliers  to  follow 
those  agreed  and  sensible  export  prac- 
tices in  the  future. 

A  further  word  about  such  common 
supplier  policies  and  guidelines:  It  is 
clear  that  no  list  of  sensitive  materials 
can  ever  be  immutable.  The  items  on 
any  such  list  must  change  over  time  as 
technologies  change  and  as  our  under- 
standing of  technologies  becomes 
broader  and  deeper. 

But  there  are  other  items  whose 
relation  to  sensitive  activities  is  more 
complex.  What  should  we  do,  for  exam- 
ple, if  a  nation  seeks  to  buy  a  computer 
which  could  be  useful  in  the  operation  of 
an  unsafeguarded  reprocessing  plant? 
Here  we  get  to  the  heart  of  the  dual-use 
question:  The  same  computer  that  could 
help  in  the  operation  of  a  reprocessing 
plant  could  also  be  used  quite  properly 
and  harmlessly  in  a  large  chemical  facili- 
ty. How  should  the  nations  of  the  world 
decide  which  request  to  honor  and  which 
to  reject?  The  nuclear-exporting  states, 
after  all,  are  those  most  likely  to  be  in  a 
position  to  export  the  computer  in  ques- 
tion. Should  there  be  a  policy  aimed  at 
foreclosing  the  export  of  any  item  which 
has  a  dual  use?  Should  any  item  be 
barred  which  could  conceivably  find  its 
way  into  a  facility  which  could  be  used 
in  developing  nuclear  explosives?  This  is 
no  simple  question,  and  there  are  no 
simple  answers.  Clearly,  for  example,  a 
blanket  export  prohibition  might  prevent 
the  construction  of  a  perfectly  respec- 
table, indeed  vitally  necessary,  chemical 
plant  in  a  developing  country.  But  by 
the  same  token,  the  potential  dangers 
cannot  be  ignored. 

If  we  can  have  confidence  that  the 
intended  use  of  that  mythical  computer 
is  not  related  to  the  manufacture  of 
nuclear  explosives,  the  question  is  clear- 
ly much  easier  to  answer.  But  how  can 
the  requesting  nation  generate  that  con- 
fidence? One  clear  answer  would  be  by 
adhering  to  the  Nuclear  Non-Prolifera- 
tion  Treaty  or,  in  the  case  of  Latin 
American  countries,  by  accepting  and 
agreeing  to  be  bound  by  the  Treaty  of 


Tlatelolco.  The  voluntary  acceptance  of 
IAEA  [International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency]  safeguards  on  all  of  a  country's 
nuclear  facilities  and  activities  is  yet 
another  way  to  generate  that  needed 
confidence. 

Let  me  elaborate.  In  order  to 
manufacture  nuclear  explosives,  a  nation 
needs  two  things:  first,  the  know-how 
and  technical  backup.  This  means  scien- 
tists, the  necessary  materials,  and  equip- 
ment. This  is  the  technical  side  of  the 
equation  and,  though  the  barriers  re- 
main considerable,  more  and  more  na- 
tions are  coming  to  possess  the  technical 
wherewithal  to  cross  those  barriers. 

Second  is  the  political  decision  to  "go 
nuclear."  A  nation  must  consciously 
make  this  hard  decision,  presumably 
because  it  sees  some  benefit  to  itself  by 
doing  so.  This  is  the  political  ingredient. 
After  all  is  said  and  done,  the  political 
ingredient  is  by  far  the  more  important. 
All  the  export  controls  that  the  suppliers 
can  devise  or  the  safeguards  that  the 
IAEA  can  implement  cannot  forever  bar 
a  country  from  acquiring  nuclear  ex- 
plosives. A  nation  can,  however,  rule  out 
"going  nuclear"  by  an  act  of  political 
will.  It  can  turn  its  back  on  the  develop- 
ment of  nuclear  weapons  by  adhering  to 
the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty 
and  accepting  safeguards  on  all  its 
nuclear  activities.  One  hundred  and  six- 
teen non-nuclear-weapons  states  so  far 
have  done  just  that.  Where  such 
regional  treaties  such  as  the  Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  exist,  adherence  to  them  can 
serve  the  same  goal. 

But  there  is  more  to  it  than  a  simple 
signature  on  a  treaty.  The  best  way  for 
a  nation  to  demonstrate  its  bona  fides — 
the  most  graphic  way — is  to  accept 
safeguards  in  spirit  as  well  as  in  the  let- 
ter. It  is  unseemly  for  nations  to  haggle 
about  the  niceties  of  safeguards — 
whether  a  given  action  or  a  particular 
technical  change  is  within  the  writ  of  a 
particular  IAEA  safeguards  agreement. 
Instead  of  a  preoccupation  with  the 
precise  legal  letter  of  safeguards — as 
distinguished  from  the  spirit  of  safe- 
guards, a  preoccupation  with  form  over 
substance — all  nations  should  work  to 
strengthen  the  IAEA  safeguards  system 
and  help  it  to  perform  its  vital  task. 

Only  such  a  cooperative  attitude  can 
provide  the  proper  basis  for  nuclear 
commerce.  Without  it,  that  mutual  trust 
and  confidence,  which  is  essential  if  we 
are  to  continue  to  be  able  to  use  nuclear 


61 


PACIFIC 


energy  for  peaceful  purposes,  will  be 
lacking.  For  after  we  strip  away  all  the 
verbiage,  it  comes  down  to  this:  trust 
has  to  be  the  predicate  for  all  nuclear 
commerce.  The  exporting  nation  must 
have  confidence  that  the  materials  it  ex- 
ports will  not  be  turned  into  devices  of 
war  and  destruction.  Recipient  nations 
must  have  confidence  that,  having 
demonstrated  by  word  and  deed  their 
own  bona  fides,  they  can  get  the  help 
they  need  to  realize  the  atom's  peaceful 
promise. 

Many  means  are  at  hand,  as  I  have 
suggested,  for  building  that  confidence 
for  both  suppliers  and  recipients.  The 
Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  is 
there,  and  the  relatively  few  nations 
which  have  not  adhered  to  date  could 
join  at  any  time.  For  the  countries  of 
Latin  America,  the  Treaty  of  Tlatelolco 
waits  to  be  embraced.  The  IAEA  is 
there  ready,  willing,  and  able  to  apply 
safeguards  to  all  facilities  not  yet 
covered. 

Our  plea  to  the  nations  which  have 
not  yet  done  so  is  to  make  a  formal, 
public  commitment  to  peace  and  to 
demonstrate  that  commitment  by  joining 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  nations  in 
the  world  in  accepting  the  obligations  of 
these  precedent-shattering  treaties. 

How  strongly  do  we  feel  about  this? 
Very  strongly,  indeed.  President  Reagan 
in  his  Los  Angeles  address  on  March  31 
of  this  year  put  it  this  way: 

For  arms  control  to  be  truly  complete 
and  world  security  strengthened  ...  we  must 
also  increase  our  efforts  to  halt  the  spread  of 
nuclear  arms.  Every  country  that  values  a 
peaceful  world  order  must  play  its  part.  Our 
allies,  as  important  nuclear  exporters,  also 
have  a  very  important  responsibility  to  pre- 
vent the  spread  of  nuclear  arms.  To  advance 
this  goal,  we  should  all  adopt  comprehensive 
safeguards  as  a  condition  for  nuclear  supply 
commitments  that  we  make  in  the  future. 

Conclusion 

Why  are  we  pursuing  this  initiative? 
What  do  we  hope  to  accomplish?  That 
brings  me  full  circle,  back  to  my  begin- 
ning. Our  goal  is  to  strengthen  the  inter- 
national nonproliferation  regime  which 


we  have  struggled  together  to  erect  over 
the  last  four  decades.  We  want  to  put 
into  place  a  set  of  norms  and  standards 
with  which  everyone  agrees — a  set  of 
norms  which,  in  effect,  will  be  the  rules 
of  conduct,  honored  by  supplier  nations 
and  receiving  nations  alike.  President 
Reagan's  call  for  comprehensive  safe- 
guards is  one  more  step  in  perfecting 
this  regime.  We  want  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  around  the 
world  because  we  think  that  spread 
would  be  dangerous  to  the  security  of 
every  nation  on  earth.  Nuclear  energy 
has  much  to  offer  the  peoples  of  the 
world — for  power,  for  medicine,  for 
agriculture,  for  industry.  But,  to  realize 


that  promise,  we  must  control  the  threa 
of  nuclear  proliferation. 

We  need  not,  we  must  not,  despair 
that  the  task  is  too  great  or  that 
chances  of  success  are  too  small.  We 
have  a  solid  base  of  experience  to  build 
upon.  And  we  have  a  growing  aware- 
ness that  the  cost  of  failure  can  be  enor 
mous.  It  is  a  challenge  to  all  and  a  chal- 
lenge which  all  must  pursue.  As  Presi- 
dent Reagan  said,  "Every  country  that 
values  a  peaceful  world  must  play  its 
part." 


*FORATOM  represents  the  atomic  trac 
associations  of  14  West  European  countries. 


Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister 


(White  House  photo  by  Pete  Souza) 


Prime  Minister  Robert  J. I..  Hawke 

of  Australia  made  an  official  working 
visit  to  Washington,  B.C.,  June  11-15, 
1983,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and 
other  government  officials. 

Following  ore  remarks  made  tig 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Hawke  after  their  meeting  on  June  Li. ' 


President  Reagan 

I'm  delighted  that  Prime  Minister  Bob 
Hawke  has  been  able  to  come  to 
Washington  so  early  in  his 
administration. 

We've  had  a  productive  session, 
reviewing  bilateral  issues  as  well  as 
world  developments.  And,  more  impor- 
tantly, we've  had  a  chance  to  put  our 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


PACIFIC 


relationship  on  a  personal  basis.  We  find 
we  have  much  in  common,  but  that's  no 
surprise  between  friends  and  allies.  The 
bonds  between  our  two  nations  are 
longstanding.  Our  ties  are  a  precious 
tradition,  reflecting  our  many  concerns 
and  shared  values. 

Australia  is  a  great  nation  that  plays 
a  vital  role  in  regional  and  world  affairs. 
It's  a  key  ally  upon  whom  we  can  count. 
Ours  is  an  alliance  of  trust  and  friend- 
ship. I'm  grateful  for  the  good  will  ex- 
pressed by  Prime  Minister  Hawke  today, 
and  I  welcome  his  wise  counsel.  I've 
been  looking  forward  to  getting  to  know 
him.  And  it  was  our  first  meeting,  but 
certainly  not  our  last.  We  will  be  in  fre- 
quent contact  in  the  future.  And  I  wish 
the  Prime  Minister  and  all  Australians 
the  best  of  luck.  And,  again,  welcome. 

Prime  Minister  Hawke 

I  join  with  you  in  expressing  the  ap- 
preciation that  I  have  for  having  placed 
the  relationship  between  our  two  coun- 
tries now  in  terms  of  a  personal  meeting 
between  us. 

I,  like  you,  have  been  looking  for- 
ward to  this  meeting.  I  have  been  able 
to  convey  to  you,  and  through  you  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  the  fun- 
damental importance  that  we  in  the  new 
Labor  government  attach  to  the  rela- 
tionship with  the  United  States. 

I  was  able  to  remind  the  President 
that  it  was  a  Labor  government  during 
the  last  war  which  fundamentally 
reoriented  the  international  relationship 
of  Australia  toward  that  alliance  with 
the  United  States.  It  was  an  alliance 
which  served  us  well,  the  United  States 
and  Australia,  during  that  war.  And  in 
the  period  since  the  war,  that  relation- 
ship, in  general  and  particularly  in  terms 
of  the  ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  pact]  treaty  relationship, 
has  continued  to  serve  both  our  coun- 
tries well. 

There  is  no  country,  I  have  sug- 
;ested  to  the  President,  that  this  coun- 
try will  be  able  to  rely  on  more  as  a  con- 
structive ally  than  Australia.  It  will  be  a 
relationship  of  deep  friendship  and,  as  is 
oefitting  between  people  and  nations 
who  are  friends,  it  will  be  one,  at  times, 
where  there  may  be  differences  of  em- 
phasis in  our  perceptions  of  particular 
issues.  Those  differences,  if  they  exist, 
will  be  honestly  and  directly  expressed 
Out  will  in  no  way  diminish  the  fun- 
damental depth  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween our  two  countries. 


I  appreciate  the  opportunity  that  I 
have  had  to  discuss  with  the  President 
matters  of  immediate  bilateral  impor- 
tance to  us,  matters  of  concern  in  the 
immediate  region  of  Australia,  and 
issues  of  global  consideration.  And  we 
have  found  in  all  those  areas  an  identity 
of  interest.  I  have  expressed  to  the 
President,  as  he  has  to  me,  our  firm  in- 
tention on  both  our  parts  to  ensure  that 
the  relationship,  which  has  been  strong 


and  productive  in  the  past,  will  continue 
to  be  even  more  so  in  the  future.  And 
that  will  reflect  the  relations  between 
our  countries  and  what  is  now  a  firm, 
personal  relationship  between  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  and  myself  as 
Prime  Minister  of  Australia. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compiliation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  20,  1983. 


Micronesia  Approves  Free 
Association  With  U.S. 


Unofficial  results  of  the  June  21,  1983, 
plebiscite  in  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia  (FSM)  represent  a  significant 
victory  for  the  compact  of  free  associa- 
tion. In  the  yes-or-no  vote,  the  citizens 
of  the  FSM  approved  the  compact  by 
more  than  75%.  The  compact  was  ap- 
proved by  three  of  the  FSM's  four  states 
as  required  under  the  FSM  Constitution. 

Under  the  compact  and  its  sub- 
sidiary agreements,  negotiated  over  a 
14-year,  period,  the  FSM  will  be  fully 
responsible  for  internal  and  foreign  af- 
fairs, while  the  United  States  will  pro- 
vide economic  assistance  and  will 
assume  the  obligation  and  authority  to 
defend  the  island  nation. 

The  voters  of  the  FSM  were  asked 
other  questions  on  the  plebiscite  ballot, 
including  the  political  status  they  would 
prefer  if  free  association  were  not  ap- 
proved. The  voters  were  asked  to  choose 
either  a  relationship  with  the  United 
States  closer  than  free  association  or  in- 
dependence. Early  returns  indicate  a 
preference  for  independence  over  a 
closer  relationship  with  the  United 
States;  however,  this  will  be  moot  given 
the  overwhelming  vote  for  free 
association. 

The  Government  of  the  FSM 
mounted  an  intensive  and  thorough 
public  education  program  in  advance  of 
the  plebiscite.  That  program,  which 
started  more  than  5  months  before  the 
vote,  included  translation  of  all  the  perti- 
nent documents,  radio  and  television 
programs  and  debates,  town  hall 
meetings,  and  village  discussions.  Of- 
ficial observers  from  the  U.N. 
Trusteeship  Council  traveled  to  the  FSM 
to  observe  the  final  days  of  the  educa- 
tion program,  the  voting,  and  the  tabula- 
tion of  ballots. 


The  FSM  is  one  of  the  three  states 
of  the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific 
Islands  to  conduct  plebiscites  on  the 
compact.  Palau  approved  the  compact  by 
a  62%  majority  in  a  February  10,  1983, 
plebiscite,  and  the  United  States  and  the 
Marshall  Islands  have  recently  an- 
nounced September  7  as  the  date  of  the 
last  plebiscite  in  the  trust  territory. 

The  Northern  Mariana  Islands,  a 
fourth  political  jurisdiction  in  the  trust 
territory,  voted  in  1975  to  become  a 
commonwealth  of  the  United  States. 
Under  this  arrangement,  the  people  of 
the  northern  Mariana  Islands  will 
become  U.S.  citizens  when  the 
trusteeship  ends.  All  four  political 
jurisdictions  of  the  trust  territory  have 
locally  elected  constitutional 
governments. 

The  compact  defines  the  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  the  new 
Micronesian  states,  as  well  as  their  in- 
ternational political  status  after  the 
trusteeship  is  terminated.  Now  that  the 
people  of  the  FSM  have  approved  the 
compact,  it  must  be  approved  according 
to  their  constitutional  processes  and 
receive  majority  approval  in  both 
Houses  of  the  U.S.  Congress. 

The  United  States  has  administered 
the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific 
Islands  since  1947  under  a  trusteeship 
agreement  with  the  United  Nations.  The 
FSM  consists  of  the  island  states  of 
Yap,  Truk,  Ponape,  and  Kosrae.  The 
FSM  and  the  other  island  groups  of  the 
trust  territory  were  administered  by 
Japan  under  a  League  of  Nations  man- 
date after  World  War  I.  The  United 
States  liberated  the  islands  from 
Japanese  occupation  during  the  last 
years  of  World  War  II.  Today  the  island 
states  of  the  FSM,  marked  by  their 


August  1983 


63 


PACIFIC 


spectacular  beauty  and  their  unusually 
rich  and  diverse  marine  ecology,  are 
preparing  themselves  for  future 
economic  development.  Fishing, 
agriculture,  and  tourism  are  expected  to 
contribute  to  this  growth.  The  compact 
of  free  association  contains  incentives 


for  investment,  trade,  and  business 
development  and  also  guarantees 
economic  development  assistance  from 
the  United  States. 


Press  release  237  of  June  28,  1983. 


U.S.-Marshall  Islands 
Call  Plebiscite 


The  Governments  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  Marshall  Islands  have  an- 
nounced September  7,  1983,  as  the  date 
for  a  plebiscite  on  political  status  in  the 
Marshall  Islands.  The  plebiscite  will  be 
an  act  of  self-determination  by  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Marshall  Islands  and,  together 
with  earlier  plebiscites  in  the  Republic  of 
Palau  and  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia — components  of  the 
U.S. -administered  Trust  Territory  of  the 
Pacific  Islands — clears  the  way  for 
bringing  the  last  U.N.  trusteeship  to  a 
close. 

The  voters  of  the  Marshall  Islands 
will  be  asked  whether  they  approve  or 
disapprove  a  compact  of  free  association 
and  a  number  of  agreements  subsidiary 
to  it,  all  of  which  have  been  signed  by 
representatives  of  the  two  govern- 
ments—Ambassador Fred  M.  Zeder, 
Personal  Representative  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  for  Microne- 
sian  Status  Negotiations  and  the 
Honorable  Amata  Kabua,  President  of 
the  Marshall  Islands. 

In  addition  to  addressing  the  ques- 
tion of  free  association  in  the  plebiscite, 
voters  will  be  asked  to  state  their 
preference  for  an  alternative  political 
status  to  be  negotiated  with  the  United 
States  in  the  event  that  free  association 
is  not  approved.  The  choices  will  be  in- 
dependence or  a  continuing  relationship 
with  the  United  States  other  than  free 
association,  and  the  voter  will  be  given 
the  further  opportunity  to  describe  that 
relationship. 

The  United  States  and  the  Marshall 
Islands  agreed  to  call  the  plebiscite 


jointly,  and  an  announcement  of  the 
date  was  made  on  June  25  in  Majuro, 
capital  of  the  Marshall  Islands,  by  Am- 
bassador Zeder  and  President  Kabua. 
Included  in  the  announcement  was  a 
statement  that  the  two  governments  had 
reached  agreement  on  a  comprehensive 
settlement  of  all  claims  brought  by  the 
inhabitants  of  Bikini,  Enewetak, 
Rongelap,  and  Utirik  arising  out  of  the 
U.S.  nuclear  testing  program  in  the 
Marshall  Islands  from  1946  to  1958. 

At  the  request  of  the  United  States, 
the  U.N.  Trusteeship  Council  agreed  on 
December  20,  1982,  to  organize  a  series 
of  observer  missions  to  witness  the 
plebiscites  in  the  Marshall  Islands  and  in 
two  other  jurisdictions  of  the  Trust  Ter- 
ritory of  the  Pacific  Islands.  The  first 
such  mission  observed  a  plebiscite  in  the 
Republic  of  Palau  on  February  10,  1983, 
and  the  second  observed  the  June  21 
plebiscite  in  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia.  The  compact  of  free  associa- 
tion with  the  United  States  was  ap- 
proved in  both  votes,  by  over  62%  in 
Palau  and  by  approximately  75%  in  the 
Federated  States.  Another  UN  observer 
mission  will  travel  to  the  Marshall 
Islands  in  time  to  observe  the  education 
program,  the  voting,  and  the  counting  of 
the  ballots.  The  education  program  in 
the  Marshall  Islands  is  being  conducted 
by  a  commission  established  by  the  Mar- 
shall Islands  Government. 

The  announcement  of  a  plebiscite  on 
political  status  represents  the  completion 
of  more  than  a  decade  of  negotiations. 


Press  release  238  of  June  28,  1983. 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


POPULATION 


U.S.  Population  Policy 
and  the  United  Nations 


by  Richard  Elliot  Benedick 

Excerpts  from  a  statement  before  the 
UN  Development  Program  Governing 
Council  on  the  UN  Fund  for  Population 
Activities  (UNFPA)  in  New  York  on 
June  20,  1983.  Ambassador  Benedick  is 
Coordinator  of  Population  Affairs. 

Two  years  ago,  at  the  28th  session  of 
I  this  governing  council,  I  compared  the 
current  world  phenomenon  of  population 
growth  to  falling  snow— a  gradual  and 
seemingly  imperceptible  accumulation 
which  only  attracts  attention  when  the 
problem  is  in  a  very  advanced  stage  and 
consequently  very  difficult  to  solve. 

But  2  years  ago,  there  were  several 
million  fewer  people  added  to  the 
world's  population  than  will  be  added 
during  this  current  year.  Next 
year— and  for  many  years  there- 
after—the increments  will  continue  to 
frise. 

Barring  unforeseen  events,  most  of 
the  countries  represented  in  this  room 
will  experience  at  least  a  doubling  of 
their  current  population  size  within  the 
next  two  generations— adding  to  and 
implicating  already  well-known  prob- 
ems  of  food  supply,  health,  resource 
scarcity,  pressure  on  the  environment, 
anemployment,  migration,  and  frustra- 
:ion  of  aspirations  for  a  better  life. 

This  is  the  reality  which  must  deeply 
nfluence  our  deliberations  at  this 
neeting. 

A  more  encouraging  development  in 
•ecent  years  has  been  the  nearly  uni- 
versal recognition,  by  the  leaders  of  the 
Third  World  countries  most  affected  by 
;his  condition,  that  something  has  to  be 
lone  to  limit  the  continuing  rapid  rise  in 
jopulation— in  order  for  these  countries 
,o  make  effective  use  of  domestic  invest- 
nent  and  external  assistance  and 
;hereby  make  meaningful  progress 
.oward  attaining  a  better  quality  of  life 
'or  their  citizens.  Symbolic  of  this 
significant  change  in  attitude  and  policy 
s  the  Continent  of  Africa,  which  now 
ind  for  the  foreseeable  future  will  have 
.he  world's  highest  population  growth 
•ate.  A  survey  this  spring  undertaken  by 
J.S.  Embassies  in  Africa  revealed  that 
ilmost  everywhere  on  this  continent  sig- 
lificant  changes  in  attitudes  are  under- 


way. This  greater  recognition  of  the 
dangers  of  continued  rapid  growth  in 
population  has  also  been  noted  by 
observers  from  the  UNFPA  and  the 
World  Bank 

Against  this  background,  the  role  of 
the  UNFPA  is  particularly  critical,  as 
the  world's  largest  multilateral  agency 
dedicated  to  bridging  the  gap  between 
recognition  of  the  population  problem 
and  effective  measures  to  address  it  in 
an  effective  and  yet  humane  way.  Two 
years  ago,  this  council  decided  upon 
UNFPA's  prospective  role  for  the 
decade  of  the  1980s:  South  and  North 
united  in  an  historic  reorientation  of 
UNFPA's  priorities,  recognizing  the 
urgent  need  to  reduce  birth  rates  and 
provide  family  planning  services  and 
education  to  the  growing  milions  of  peo- 
ple who  need  this  help. 

The  United  States  wishes  to  com- 
mend Executive  Director  Rafael  Salas 
and  the  UNFPA  for  the  responsiveness 
and  sensitivity  with  which  this  institu- 
tion is  responding  to  the  wishes  of  this 
council  and  the  needs  of  the  countries 
which  it  serves.  .  .  .  Especially  during  a 
time  of  resource  constraint,  UNFPA's 
management  deserves  the  appreciation 
of  this  council  for  their  candid  and 
realistic  approach  toward  future  plan- 
ning  

Enormous  logistical  difficulties  still 
stand  in  the  way  of  extension  of  these 
services  to  the  people  and  communities 
who  need  them.  The  United  States 
would  like,  in  this  context,  to  offer  some 
observations  on  specific  aspects  of 
UNFPA's  activities. 

In  order  more  effectively  to  meet 
the  recognized  priority  needs,  those  UN 
executing  agencies  which  spend  most  of 
the  funds  approved  by  this  council  must 
design  their  programs  and  projects  in 
greater  conformity  with  the  mandates  of 
this  council— namely,  the  priority  for 
family  planning  and  related  activities. 
The  United  States  intends  to  pursue  this 
matter  in  the  governing  bodies  of  other 
UN  agencies,  and  we  urge  UNFPA  and 
member  governments  represented  here 
to  do  the  same.  .  .  . 

In  the  experience  of  the  United 
States  in  administering  the  world's 
largest  population  assistance  programs 
for  many  years,  we  have  found  a 


tremendous  vitality  in  the  private  sector. 
Voluntary  family  planning  and  popula- 
tion programs  are  most  effective  when 
they  involve  the  active  participation  of 
the  people  through  creative  projects  at 
community  level,  commercial  retail  sales 
of  contraceptives,  and  the  like.  We 
believe  that  the  energy  and  creativity  of 
nongovernmental  organizations  can  and 
should  be  more  effectively  harnessed  by 
UNFPA,  and  we  note  with  concern  that 
both  the  amount  and  percentage  of 
UNFPA  funding  through  such  organiza- 
tions declined  between  1981  and  1982. 
We  urge  that  this  trend  be  reversed.  .  .  . 

The  need  for  safer,  better,  and  more 
acceptable  methods  of  fertility  regula- 
tion continues  to  grow  more  urgent. 
This  was  the  message  of  an  interna- 
tional conference  of  science 
policymakers  and  researchers  convened 
in  Stockholm,  Sweden,  in  February  of 
this  year.  The  governing  council  last 
year  stressed  that  research  on  contra- 
ceptives is  "crucial"  to  the  attainment  of 
the  fund's  objectives.  .  .  . 

The  United  States  recommends  that 
this  council  direct  UNFPA  to  adopt  a 
"holistic"  approach  to  biomedical  re- 
search funding,  in  recognition  of  the 
multiplicity  of  effective  international 
programs  and  networks  active  in  such 
research.  In  this  connection,  I  might  cite 
the  recent  entry  into  this  field  of  a 
UNESCO-associated  agency,  the  Inter- 
national Organization  for  Chemistry  in 
Development,  which  includes  among  its 
directors  a  number  of  distinguished 
scientists,  including  the  Swedish  Nobel- 
laureate,  Dr.  Sune  Bergstrom,  who 
directed  the  outstanding  report  on 
contraceptive  research  produced  last 
year  for  this  council.  In  addition,  there 
are  many  other  research  organizations, 
which  merit  support  in  their  efforts  to 
find  better  contraceptives,  including  the 
International  Committee  for  Contracep- 
tive Research,  the  Program  for  Applied 
Research  in  Fertility  Regulation,  the 
WHO  Special  Program  of  Research  in 
Human  Reproduction,  Family  Health  In- 
ternational, the  Program  for  the  In- 
troduction and  Adaptation  of  Contra- 
ceptive Technology,  and  the  Medical 
Research  Councils  of  numerous  in- 
dividual countries.  The  United  States  is 
supporting  many  of  these  organizations; 
we  also  have  bilateral  agreements  for 
cooperative  research  in  human  reproduc- 
tion with  India,  China,  and  most  recent- 
ly, Italy,  and  we  are  discussing  similar 
arrangements  with  several  other  coun- 
tries. This  is  a  field  which  deserves  in- 
creasing priority  by  UNFPA  and  the  in- 
ternational community. 


August  1983 


65 


REFUGEES 


In  conclusion,  I  would  like  to  stress 
the  continued  strong  commitment  of  the 
U.S.  Government,  both  the  executive 
branch  and  the  Congress,  to  be  respon- 
sive to  requests  from  developing  coun- 
tries for  assistance  to  their  population 
programs— through  our  bilateral  pro- 
grams, through  private  organizations, 
and  through  the  excellent  work  of  the 
UNFPA.  This  Administration  has  reaf- 
firmed that  population  concerns  are  an 
essential  element  of  our  development  aid 
strategy.  Even  under  conditions  of  ex- 
treme budgetary  stringency,  the  high 
priority  of  this  subject  is  reflected  in  the 
continuing  increases  in  U.S.  aid  and  re- 
search funding. 

We  have  placed  particular  emphasis 
in  designing  policies  and  programs  that 
are  sensitive  to  local  cultural  and 
religious  traditions.  The  United  States 
will  support  only  voluntary  family  plan- 
ning activities.  We  strongly  oppose  any 
coercion  in  population  programs,  and  we 
believe  equally  strongly  that  couples 
should  be  offered  freedom  to  choose 
among  a  variety  of  ways  of  planning 
their  family  size,  including  various 
medically  approved  as  well  as  the 
natural  family  planning  (periodic 
abstinence)  methods. 

Thus,  the  United  States  believes  in 
enlightened  population  policies,  aiming 
ultimately  at  improvements  in  the  quali- 
ty of  life  of  mothers  and  children  and  of 
future  generations.  We  believe  that  such 
policies  and  programs  can  be  fully  con- 
sistent with  the  values  of  human  dignity 
and  stability  of  the  family  which  we 
cherish. 

We  are  pleased  to  be  associated  with 
an  organization  like  the  UNFPA  in  pur- 
suit of  these  important  goals,  and  we 
look  forward  to  working  together  with 
UNFPA  and  with  other  governments  in 
making  the  1984  International  Con- 
ference on  Population  in  Mexico  City  a 
true  landmark  on  the  road  of  human  and 
national  development.  ■ 


Refugees:  A  Continuing  Concern 


by  James  N.  Purcell,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Immigration  and  Refugee  Policy  of 
the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  on 
June  20,  1983.  Mr.  Purcell  is  Director  of 
the  Bureau  of  Refugee  Programs.1 

When  the  Refugee  Act  of  1980  was 
adopted  nearly  3  years  ago,  it  was  hailed 
as  landmark  legislation  representing  a 
new  era  in  America's  commitment  to 
refugees.  Although  the  United  States 
had  long  been  recognized  as  a  leader  in 
world  efforts  to  assist  and  protect  those 
fleeing  their  countries  to  escape  persecu- 
tion, our  domestic  legislation  on  the  sub- 
ject had  not  previously  dealt  with 
refugees  in  a  comprehensive  and  prin- 
cipled manner.  The  Refugee  Act  of  1980 
changed  that,  and  it  is  a  tribute  to  this 
subcommittee  and  committee  that  the 
act  has  been  so  widely  praised  for  its 
statesmanship  and  adherence  to  interna- 
tionally recognized  standards. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  in  previous 
decades,  although  the  United  States  had 
been  generous  in  admitting  refugees — 
Hungarians  in  1956,  Cubans  and  Czecho- 
slovakians  in  the  1960s,  Indochinese 
following  the  fall  of  Vietnam  in  1975— 
these  programs  were  carried  out  under 
what  came  to  be  recognized  as  a 
stretched  application  of  humanitarian 
parole.  What  had  been  intended  to  aid 
individual  refugees  had  come  to  serve  as 
a  means  to  admit  large  groups  totaling 
in  the  many  thousands. 

What  the  process  lacked  in  legal  ele- 
gance, it  made  up  in  serviceability.  Con- 
sultations took  place  with  congressional 
committees,  often  at  short  notice,  and 
decisions  were  reached  providing  a 
specified  number  of  admissions  for  a 
particular  group  or  class  of  refugees. 
For  the  groups  covered  by  the  paroles, 
it  can  be  said  that  the  system  worked, 
sometimes  with  such  swiftness  that  it 
led  to  the  arrival  in  our  country  of  large 
numbers  of  refugees  with  only  brief  ex- 
aminations overseas  and  with  limited 
preparation  by  the  private  voluntary 
agencies  that  then  and  now  play  such 
vital  roles  in  our  refugee  programs. 

By  the  late  1970s,  the  group  parole 
system  became  increasingly  perceived  as 
inadequate  to  the  realities  of  the  modern 
world.  Refugees  were  appearing  in 
larger  numbers,  more  frequently,  in 


more  places.  Although  there  continued 
to  be  major  refugee  exoduses  from 
communist-dominated  lands — from  Indo-| 
china  after  1975,  from  Afghanistan 
following  the  Soviet  invasion,  and  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa — there  were  also  grow- 
ing numbers  of  refugees  in  areas  away 
from  the  periphery  of  the  communist 
states.  The  previous  system,  which 
amounted  to  an  ad  hoc  selection  among 
potential  refugee  groups,  was  seen  as  nc 
longer  responsive  to  the  requirements  ol 
the  new  situation.  Spurred  by  the  need 
to  cope  with  the  tide  of  boat  people  fron 
Vietnam,  the  Congress  and  the  Adminis 
tration  worked  together  toward  the  new 
definition  and  procedures  embodied  in 
the  Refugee  Act  of  1980. 

The  Definition  of  "Refugee" 

The  centerpiece  of  the  act  is  its  defini- 
tion of  a  refugee.2  There  was  little 
dispute  that  the  definition  to  be  adopted 
by  the  United  States  should  be  consist- 
ent with  the  international  standard  con- 
tained in  the  1951  Refugee  Convention 
and  its  1967  protocol  (which  eliminated 
the  time  limitation  and  the  geographical 
restriction  by  which  the  convention 
applied  only  to  Europe).  In  the  interven- 
ing years,  some  92  countries,  including 
the  United  States,  have  become  parties 
to  the  convention  or  its  protocol,  reflect 
ing  a  general  perception  in  virtually  all 
regions  of  the  world  that  the  interna- 
tional definition  properly  identifies  the 
class  of  persons  in  distress  who  merit 
the  special  protection  and  assistance 
that  the  international  community  has 
established  for  refugees. 

Because  the  word  "refugees"  is  ofte. 
used  loosely  to  describe  people  in 
various  kinds  of  difficulty,  it  is  some- 
times made  more  precise  by  reference  6 
"convention"  or  "protocol"  refugees.  For 
example,  in  recent  months  we  have  seer 
the  word  "refugees"  applied  to  such  per- 
sons as  West  Africans  returning  to  theii 
home  countries  after  being  expelled  by 
Nigeria  as  illegal  immigrants,  to  Afri- 
cans seeking  new  sources  of  food  in  the 
face  of  drought,  even  to  residents  of  oui 
own  western  states  forced  to  evacuate 
their  homes  during  spring  floods. 

What  the  international  definition 
provides  is  a  recognition  that  refugees, 
in  the  legal  sense,  form  a  distinguishable 
category  of  persons  in  need.  A  body  of 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


REFUGEES 


w,  practice,  and  programs  has  grown 
i)  around  this  concept,  with  the  result 
at  helping  refugees  has  taken  on  a 
atus,  even  a  stature,  that  defines  it 
id  separates  it  from  programs  to 
llieve  other  areas  of  human  suffering, 
has  been  said  that  the  UN  High  Com- 
Sssioner  for  Refugees  should  not  be 
Insidered  "the  high  commissioner  for 
|  good  causes,"  a  statement  that  recog- 
les  that  refugees  are  not  the  only  per- 
ns in  need,  even  as  it  emphasizes  their 
ecial  status. 

So  it  is  refugees,  in  this  interna- 
mally  established  legal  sense,  to  which 
:  address  ourselves  in  this  hearing, 
d  who  are  the  subject  of  the  definition 
the  Refugee  Act.  Although  there  may 
disagreement  about  the  manner  in 
lich  the  refugee  definition  is  applied  in 
lividual  cases  or  to  certain  groups,  it 
our  conclusion  that  the  definition  has 
Dved  its  usefulness  in  practice.  It  has 
ved  us  well,  and  we  see  no  gain  in  at- 
npting  to  modify  it. 

Previous  testimony  has  dealt  with 
^gestions  that  the  definition  be  nar- 
wd,  but  it  should  be  recognized  that 
i  more  common  assertion  that  we  face 
the  management  of  our  programs  is 
it  the  definition  should  be  broadened 
cover  individuals  or  groups  who  are 
:  now  qualified  for  refugee  status. 
One  such  broadening  of  the  defini- 
n  would  have  it  apply  to  persons 
ced  to  leave  their  home  countries 
:ause  of  foreign  occupation  or  civil 
'e — a  formulation  contained  in  the 
ican  refugee  convention  adopted  in 
9  by  the  Organization  of  African  Uni- 
OAU).  Although  this  definition  has 
n  accepted  and  applied  in  a  number 
■efugee  situations  in  Africa,  this  says 
e  about  the  traditions  of  hospitality 
J  "he  African  states  than  about  the 
i  .irability  of  extending  this  formulation 
I  )ther  areas  of  the  world.  In  South- 
B  t  Asia,  for  example,  we  have  ob- 
I  ved  the  opposite  tendency:  a  consist- 
|  refusal  by  states  of  the  area  to  offer 
B  e  haven  to  refugees  except  on  a  tem- 
g  -ary  basis,  and  then  only  with  guaran- 
I  s  that  refugees  will  be  moved  else- 

■  ere  for  permanent  resettlement. 

I  By  contrast,  at  the  African  refugee 
piference  in  1979,  President  Julius 
lerere  of  the  host  country,  Tanzania, 

■  lis  keynote  statement  said  of  Africa: 
I  e  welcome  the  refugees,  we  give 

tl  m  our  space."  Such  a  generous  ap- 
faiach  reflects  the  communality  of 
l-ica,  which  has  made  possible  the 
r  ettlement  within  the  region  of  many 


thousands  of  refugees.  However,  we  do 
not  believe  such  a  broad  definition 
should  be  considered  for  U.S.  admissions 
purposes. 

Another  broadening  of  the  definition 
would  have  it  cover  "economic  refugees" 
on  the  ground  that  persons  deprived  of 
a  decent  livelihood  by  oppressive  eco- 
nomic conditions  should  have  as  much 
right  to  international  protection  and 
assistance  as  refugees  from  political  or 
religious  persecution.  The  problem  with 
such  an  expansion  of  the  definition  is 
that  it  would  encompass  a  major  part  of 
the  world's  population— those  who  live 
in  the  majority  of  countries  classified  as 
impoverished  or  underdeveloped. 
Western  nations  have  recognized  a  re- 
sponsibility to  assist  in  the  moderniza- 
tion and  economic  development  of  the 
Third  World  by  means  of  various  forms 
of  trade  and  assistance,  private  and 
public.  But  a  readiness  to  assist  in  im- 
proving the  living  conditions  of  the  poor 
majority  does  not  carry  with  it  an 
obligation  to  treat  them  all  as  refugees. 
Among  those  concerned  with  interna- 
tional refugee  problems  there  has  been 
little  inclination  to  broaden  the  definition 
in  this  direction. 

Admissions  Criteria 

It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  defini- 
tion of  a  refugee,  in  international  law 
and  in  the  Refugee  Act,  provides  the 
framework  for  international  protection 
and  assistance  but  does  not  of  itself 
define  the  terms  a  government  may  set 


process  which  was  mandated  in  law  by 
the  Refugee  Act  of  1980. 

Although  the  United  States  employs 
the  definition  as  part  of  the  process 
through  which  refugees  are  considered 
for  admission,  the  definition  does  not 
tell  us  how  many  refugees  shall  be  ad- 
mitted or  from  which  groups  or  regions 
the  refugees  shall  be  drawn.  Those 
determinations  remain,  for  us  as  for  the 
other  nations  accepting  refugees  for  in- 
ternational resettlement,  a  subject 
governed  by  national  interest  and 
foreign  policy  as  well  as  humanitarian 
considerations. 

Resettlement  countries  have  their 
own  procedures  for  deciding  which 
refugees  to  admit,  and  in  what  number. 
Some  countries  give  priority  to  those 
with  whom  they  have  family  or  other 
ties.  For  example,  many  of  the  Indo- 
chinese  accepted  by  France  had  prior 
associations  with  that  country.  Other 
governments,  including  the  United 
States,  also  look  for  such  ties  and  tend 
to  honor  them  in  the  context  of  a 
refugee  program. 

Some  countries  with  smaller  pro- 
grams, such  as  Switzerland  and  the 
Scandinavian  countries,  have  special  pro- 
grams to  admit  handicapped  refugees, 
thus  helping  relieve  what  are  often 
especially  compelling  humanitarian  prob- 
lems. 

Where  some  other  countries  differ 
from  the  United  States  in  their  selection 
of  refugees  is  in  the  application  of  stand- 
ards of  professional  qualifications,  lang- 
uage skills,  education — sometimes 


In  our  implementation  of  the  Refugee  Act,  we 
have  established  a  prescreening  process  aimed  at 
selecting  refugees  for  the  purpose  of  admission  on 
the  basis  of  "priorities"  which  take  account  of  the 
immediacy  of  a  refugee's  plight  and  the  relatives 
in,  or  other  ties  a  refugee  may  have  to,  the  United 
States. 


for  the  admission  of  refugees  into  its 
territory  for  permanent  resettlement. 
This  committee  is,  of  course,  familiar 
with  the  procedures  followed  by  the 
United  States  in  determining  how  many 
and  which  refugees  we  will  admit  each 
year.  The  regular  consultations  and  the 
annual  ceilings  are  at  the  heart  of  the 


summed  up  with  the  phrase  "selection 
for  quality" — with  the  selection  carried 
out  by  immigration  officials  with 
relatively  broad  discretion  to  evaluate 
such  "quality"  attributes. 

The  United  States  has  looked  for 
more  objective  criteria  to  determine 
which  refugees  to  accept  for  admission. 


.gust  1983 


67 


REFUGEES 


During  the  period  of  group  paroles,  this 
tended  to  amount  to  accepting  all 
refugee  applicants  within  a  given  group 
or  category  until  the  numbers  were  ex- 
hausted. In  our  implementation  of  the 
Refugee  Act,  we  have  established  a  pre- 
screening  process  aimed  at  selecting 
refugees  for  the  purpose  of  admission  on 
the  basis  of  "priorities"  which  take  ac- 
count of  the  immediacy  of  a  refugee's 
plight  and  the  relatives  in,  or  other  ties 
a  refugee  may  have  to,  the  United 
States.  The  priorities  represent  a  con- 
sidered effort  on  the  part  of  the  U.S. 
Government  to  state  in  an  objective 
manner  the  principles  to  be  followed  in 
deciding  which  refugees  to  admit. 

There  is  a  threshold  question  before 
the  assignment  of  priorities  is  reached, 
and  that  is  to  determine  that  the  per- 
sons to  be  considered  are  in  fact 
refugees.  On  this  issue,  the  definition  in 
the  Refugee  Act  has  provided  the  scope 
to  cover  a  wide  range  of  refugee  situa- 
tions of  interest  to  the  United  States 
and  the  precision  needed  to  make  possi- 
ble equitable  decisions  in  individual 
cases.  We  believe  it  should  be  main- 
tained in  its  current  form. 

In  addition  to  applying  the  priorities 
and  the  refugee  definition,  it  is  our 
policy  that  refugees  who  have  a  firm  of- 
fer of  resettlement  elsewhere  will  not  be 
considered  for  admission  to  the  United 
States.  There  are  exceptions,  such  as  in- 
dividuals who  may  have  family  ties  both 
in  the  United  States  and  elsewhere,  with 
the  stronger  connection,  however,  to  the 
United  States;  and  Soviet  Jews  for 
whom  a  visa  to  Israel  is  the  necessary 
condition  of  departure  from  the 
U.S.S.R.,  even  though  the  individuals 
have  relatives  or  other  ties  supporting 
their  intention  to  come  to  the  United 
States.  The  general  policy,  however,  is 
not  to  consider  refugees  for  the  United 
States  if  they  have  a  firm  offer  of  reset- 
tlement elsewhere. 

Administering  the  Program  Fairly 

In  our  application  of  the  definition  and 
the  priorities,  we  have  sought  to  achieve 
fairness  as  well  as  humaneness.  The 
United  States  cannot  accept  all  deserv- 
ing refugees.  We  can,  however,  strive  to 
make  our  program  as  equitable  as  possi- 
ble, without  losing  sight  of  other  con- 
siderations of  national  interest  and 
foreign  policy.  In  most  cases  this  means 
that  we  are  able  to  apply  our  priorities 
with  consistency  within  each  geographic 
region  and  on  a  worldwide  basis.  Where 
such  an  equal  application  leads  to  un- 


equal results,  however,  and  in  particular 
when  it  leads  to  results  at  variance  with 
the  projections  provided  in  the  consulta- 
tions with  the  Congress,  we  must  adjust 
the  application  of  the  priorities  accord- 
ingly. We  have  kept  the  Congress  in- 
formed of  such  adjustments. 

The  effectiveness  of  a  program  can 
be  seen  in  terms  of  its  results,  and  we 
believe  the  admissions  criteria  that  have 
been  employed  under  the  Refugee  Act 
have  produced  a  balanced  program  that 
has  been  responsive  to  our  foreign  policy 
and  humanitarian  concerns  and  to  the 
requirements  of  our  domestic  situation. 

During  the  past  year,  we  have  taken 
a  series  of  actions,  in  cooperation  with 
the  U.S.  Coordinator  and  the  Depart- 
ments of  Justice  and  Health  and  Human 
Services,  aimed  at  improving  procedures 
for  the  successful  integration  of  refugees 
in  our  communities  and  cities.  Our  goal 
has  been  a  program  that  ensures  that  all 
refugees  admitted  to  the  United  States 
should  have  a  positive  start  on  the  road 
to  self-sufficiency  through  employment 
as  productive  members  of  our  society. 

The  programs  we  have  instituted 
come  during  a  period  in  which  the 
number  of  refugees  arriving  in  the 
United  States  has  been  substantially  re- 
duced from  previous  years.  Responding 
to  the  clearly  stated  views  of  this  com- 
mittee and  its  counterpart  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  we  have  operated 
well  within  the  ceilings  set  during  last 
fall's  consultations.  Against  an  overall 
ceiling  of  90,000,  we  expect  the  total 
number  of  arrivals  this  year  to  be  in  the 
60,000-65,000  range. 

Our  tentative  region-by-region  pro- 
jections for  FY  1983  are  as  follows: 

•  Africa:  3,000  admissions  (3,000 
ceiling); 

•  East  Asia:  38,000-40,000  admis- 
sions (64,000  ceiling); 

•  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet 
Union:  15,000  admissions  (15,000 
ceiling); 

•  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean: 
600-800  admissions  (2,000  ceiling);  and 

•  Near  East  and  South  Asia:  5,500 
admissions  (6,000  ceiling). 

As  can  be  seen,  Indochinese  admis- 
sions account  for  the  largest  part  of  the 
reductions  below  the  ceiling.  To  some 
extent,  this  results  from  the  expansion 
of  our  English  language  training  and 
cultural  orientation  programs.  At  the 
end  of  FY  1983,  there  will  be  13,000  In- 
dochinese undergoing  or  completing  4-6 
months  of  training  in  the  refugee  proc- 
essing centers  and  another  2,000-3,000 
waiting  to  be  placed  in  classes.  These 


are  refugees  approved  by  the  Immi- 
gration and  Naturalization  Service  (IN!) 
in  FY  1983  who  will  enter  the  United 
States  in  FY  1984. 

The  lower  admissions  totals  in 
Southeast  Asia  provide  for  the  possible 
release  of  "re-education"  camp  prisoner 
from  Vietnam,  many  of  whom  would  u 
doubtedly  deserve  a  high  priority  for  a 
mission  to  the  United  States,  and  for  a 
(litinnal  Vietnamese-American  children 
and  their  mothers  and  other  immediate 
relatives.  Although  all  of  these  number 
may  not  be  used  in  FY  1983.  we  must 
continue  to  be  prepared  to  consider 
these  groups  for  admission  in  future 
years. 

This  has  been  a  year  in  which  we 
have  been  able  to  "manage  down"  our 
admissions  program,  in  that  we  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  reduced  numbe 
to  achieve  improvements  in  the  way 
refugees  are  processed  overseas  and  in 
their  reception  and  placement  in  the 
United  States,  in  the  following  areas: 

•  Steps  to  regularize  the  flow  of 
refugees  from  overseas  and  to  provide 
more  information  on  arriving  refugees 
to  voluntary  agencies  and  state  refuge< 
coordinators; 

•  Improvements  in  the  medical  dia 
nosis  and  treatment  of  refugees  before 
they  enter  the  United  States; 

•  Expansion  of  English-as-a-Secon 
Language/Cultural  Orientation 
(ESL/CO)  overseas  programs; 

•  Improvements  in  the  reception 
and  placement  program  and  in  our  moi 
toring  of  the  voluntary  agencies;  and 

•  Actions  to  implement  the  Refugt 
Assistance  amendments  of  1982. 

Actions  to  Regularize  the  Flow 
of  Refugees 

One  of  the  basic  responsibilities  of  the 
Bureau  for  Refugee  Programs,  in  coon 
nation  with  the  INS,  is  to  determine  th 
allocations  of  admissions  numbers  and 
schedules  for  processing  refugees 
throughout  the  year.  Our  actions  on  th* 
subject  flow  directly  from  the  congres- 
sional consultations  and  the  President's 
determination  of  refugee  admissions  ce 
ings  for  each  geographic  area. 

Once  the  numbers  are  set,  the 
bureau's  Office  of  Refugee  Admissions 
breaks  down  the  regional  ceilings  by 
quarters  and  makes  suballocations  in  at 
cordance  with  the  consultations.  There 
periodic  monitoring  to  assure  that  the 
flow  is  controlled  to  the  most  even  and 
consistent  extent  possible,  on  a  monthlj 
as  well  as  quarterly  basis,  with  the  aim 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulleth 


REFUGEES 


>f  ensuring  an  orderly  flow  of  refugees 
.hroughout  the  year. 

Such  a  smoothing  out  of  the  process- 
ng  cycle  is  not  always  easy  to  achieve. 
Refugees  do  not  present  themselves  in 
m  orderly  flow:  by  their  nature  they 
.end  to  arrive  in  waves,  the  result  of 
political  or  other  factors  beyond  their  or 
^ur  control.  Preservation  of  first  asylum 
nd  the  legal  protection  of  refugees  are 
he  first  priority  for  the  UN  High  Com- 
nissioner  for  Refugees,  in  which  our 
.nd  other  third-country  resettlement 
irograms  play  vital  roles.  In  some  cases, 
efugee  processing  posts  are  visited  only 
t  intervals  by  INS  officers.  Our  in- 
reased  emphasis  on  ESL/CO  means 
hat  larger  groups  of  refugees  will  be  in 
raining  courses  with  fixed  starting  and 
nding  dates. 

Despite  the  occasional  unavoidable 
bunching"  of  refugee  arrivals,  we  have 
een  able  to  achieve  a  substantially 
moother  flow,  a  pattern  we  expect  to 
e  able  to  continue  into  the  future.  The 
eriod  of  ESL/CO  training  affords  time 
>r  advance  information  to  reach  the 
oluntary  agencies  and  state  refugee 
Dordinators  and  makes  possible  a  more 
rderly  placement  of  refugees  to  reduce 
Dncentrations  in  areas  of  high  impact. 

mprovements  in  Medical 
■iagnosis  and  Treatment 

11  refugees  who  are  being  considered 
>r  admissions  to  the  United  States 
iust  meet  the  medical  grounds  of 
igibility  as  provided  in  the  Immigration 
id  Nationality  Act.  No  refugee  is  ad- 
itted  who  has  a  dangerous,  contagious 
sease.  (Waivers  are  granted  for  special 

i  imanitarian  reasons,  such  as  a  need 
ir  treatment  at  a  U.S.  hospital.)  Effec- 
ve  December  1,  1982,  the  following  ad- 

I  tional  steps  were  instituted  in  the 
agnosis  and  medical  treatment  of  Indo- 
linese  refugees: 

•  All  Indochinese  refugees  from  age 
vo  upward  receive  X-ray  examinations; 

•  All  Indochinese  refugees  who  have 
stive,  noninfectious  tuberculosis,  must 

!  implete  a  6-month  regimen  of  drugs 
•ior  to  entry  into  the  United  States, 
his  6-month  treatment  is  sufficient  to 
implete  TB  treatment  prior  to  entry.  If 
eded,  such  treatment  and  other  medi- 
il  care  are  provided  at  the  refugee 
•ocessing  centers  in  conjunction  with 
SL/CO  training;  and 

•  Pregnant  women  and  unaccom- 
inied  minors  destined  for  foster  homes 

the  United  States  are  given  a  hepa- 


titis B  vaccine  prior  to  entry  if  the 
medical  examination  reveals  the  pres- 
ence of  the  hepatitis  B  antigen  in  their 
system. 

Plans  are  underway  to  provide  bet- 
ter dental  treatment  for  Indochinese 
refugees  prior  to  their  entry  into  the 
United  States  and  to  provide  eye-care 
and  glasses,  where  needed.  The  Depart- 
ment hopes  that  in  the  coming  year 
similar  improvements  in  the  medical 
treatment  of  refugees  from  other  areas 
of  the  world  will  be  implemented. 

ESL/CO 

Within  the  limits  of  current  capacity,  all 
Indochinese  refugees  who  are  potential 
wage  earners  between  the  ages  of  16 
and  55  are  required  to  participate  in 
ESL/CO  training  as  a  condition  of  re- 
settlement. Each  student  receives  a 
minimum  of  14  weeks  of  instruction, 
which  includes  216  hours  of  English 
language  training  and  100  hours  of 
cultural  orientation.  An  additional  6 
weeks  is  provided  for  beginning 
students. 

Approximately  84%-88%  of  all  age- 
eligible  refugees  from  Indochina  will 
receive  such  training  during  this  fiscal 
year.  Some  20,000  students  will  be 
graduated  from  these  programs  by  the 
end  of  September  1983.  We  have  also 
established  ESL/CO  programs  for  Ethio- 
pian refugees  in  the  Sudan  and  cultural 
orientation  for  East  European  refugees 
in  Europe. 

Last  year,  the  Bureau  for  Refugee 
Programs  contracted  with  an  indepen- 
dent research  corporation  to  study  the 
impact  of  overseas  training  on  domestic 
resettlement.  The  preliminary  report, 
which  resulted  from  visits  to  the  over- 
seas training  sites,  confirms  the  results 
of  entry  and  exit  tests  conducted  in  all 
camps  by  the  Center  for  Applied 
Linguistics  in  cooperation  with  the 
Educational  Testing  Service,  which 
clearly  show  that  students  at  all  levels 
are  making  significant  progress  in  both 
English  language  skills  and  cultural 
orientation. 

The  second  phase  of  the  independent 
tracking  study,  which  will  compare  the 
resettlement  experience  of  trained  and 
untrained  refugees,  is  not  yet  complete. 
We  do,  however,  have  preliminary  data 
which  indicate  that  trained  refugees 
enter  the  United  States  better  able  to 
cope  successfully  with  American  society 
than  those  who  did  not  participate  in 
training.  This  is  particularly  encouraging 
since  the  untrained  refugees  tested  thus 


far  include  many  refugees  who  had 
studied  English  for  some  years  before 
entering  this  country.  Preliminary  data 
also  point  to  positive  evaluations  of 
ESL/CO-trained  refugees  by  service  pro- 
viders and  voluntary  agencies. 

A  final  report  on  the  domestic  track- 
ing study  will  be  made  available  to  the 
Congress  as  soon  as  it  is  completed. 

Reception  and  Placement  Programs 
and  Voluntary  Agency  Monitoring 

In  the  spring  of  1982,  the  bureau  estab- 
lished the  Office  of  Reception  and  Place- 
ment. Its  responsibilities  include  manag- 
ing the  reception  and  placement  cooper- 
ative agreements,  monitoring  the  volun- 
tary agencies'  activities  under  the  terms 
of  these  agreements,  serving  as  liaison 
with  the  domestic  community,  and 
assisting  in  the  coordination  of  the  inter- 
national and  domestic  aspects  of  the  pro- 
gram. 

The  first  major  assignment  of  that 
office  was  to  establish  a  systematic 
monitoring  program  of  the  voluntary 
agencies.  To  date,  five  onsite  reviews 
have  taken  place  in  areas  of  heavy 
refugee  resettlement— Arlington, 
Boston,  Seattle,  Los  Angeles,  and  New 
York.  A  team  of  two  officers  has  just 
returned  from  the  two  states  which  par- 
ticipate in  reception  and  placement- 
Iowa  and  Idaho— and  we  are  scheduling 
a  monitoring  trip  to  Texas  in  late  July. 
We  have  also  carried  out  followup 
reviews  in  three  areas. 

Once  a  review  is  completed— these 
customarily  take  about  2  full  weeks  per 
site— we  brief  the  voluntary  agencies  on 
our  observations  and  recommended  ac- 
tions. We  have  found  a  number  of 
positive  things  going  on  through  the 
agencies,  particularly  the  continuing  con- 
tribution of  the  private  sector  to  reset- 
tlement. This  does  not  necessarily  trans- 
late into  a  church  or  American  family 
serving  as  a  sponsor  for  each  incoming 
refugee.  Improving  the  quality  of  spon- 
sorship is  an  area  which  deserves  and 
will  receive  our  attention  in  the  weeks 
ahead. 

Private  contributions  are,  nonethe- 
less, significant  and  take  many  forms: 
donation  of  lawyers'  time  to  advise 
refugees;  volunteers  teaching  English  as 
a  second  language;  someone  devoting  a 
Saturday  morning  to  teaching  refugees 
to  drive;  donations  of  money,  clothing, 
food;  American  friends  helping  out  with- 
out assuming  full  sponsorship;  and  so 
on.  We  believe  that  the  American  public 


ugust 1983 


69 


SOUTH  ASIA 


does  still  give  of  itself  to  this  program 
and  that  a  reserve  of  good  will  is  there 
for  the  long  run. 

We  have  also  found  that  many  of  the 
voluntary  agencies  have  unilaterally  im- 
proved their  management  practices. 
Some  have  developed  strong  monitoring 
programs  by  their  headquarters  and  by 
the  regional'  offices  of  their  local  af- 
filiates, some  have  established  systems 
to  communicate  more  effectively  with 
their  affiliates,  and  some  have  instituted 
better  recordkeeping  practices,  for  ex- 
ample. 

Clearly,  however,  there  are  areas 
which  need  improvement.  Problem  areas 
which  emerged  at  various  affiliates  con- 
cerned the  documentation  of  services 
rendered  to  refugees,  lack  of  contact 
and  assistance  to  refugees  for  the  full 
90-day  period,  service  provision 
stretched  thin  because  of  reduced  staff 
due  to  fewer  new  arrivals,  lack  of  conti- 
nuing aggressive  posture  toward  undue 
welfare  usage,  and  placement  of 
refugees  in  areas  too  far  from  an  office 
to  ensure  proper  supervision  of  services. 

Our  responses  to  these  and  other 
problems  have  taken  several  forms. 
Where  a  problem  could  be  dealt  with  at 
the  local  or  national  agency  level,  we 
have  requested  corrective  actions  and 
conducted  return  visits  to  determine  if 
the  appropriate  changes  have  been 
made.  Where  a  problem  is  broader  and 
needs  to  be  more  clearly  formulated  in 
policy,  we  have  dealt  with  it  through  our 
contractual  documents— the  agency  pro- 
posals and  the  cooperative  agreement. 

In  1983,  the  bureau,  for  the  first 
time,  requested  written  proposals  from 
the  voluntary  agencies,  pursuant  to  pro- 
visions of  the  Refugee  Act  of  1980.  We 
indicated  that  each  proposal  should  in- 
clude information  on,  among  other 
things,  the  voluntary  agency's  organiza- 
tional network,  its  sponsorship  arrange- 
ments, how  it  attempts  to  reduce 
reliance  on  welfare,  how  it  assures  that 
core  services  are  provided,  the  extent  of 
its  consultation  and  cooperation  with 
state  and  local  governments,  and  its 
ability  to  tap  the  private  sector. 

In  1983,  the  bureau  also  extensively 
modified  the  cooperative  agreement.  The 
changes  were  based  on  observations 
from  the  monitoring  discussed  earlier, 
the  Refugee  Assistance  amendments  of 
1982,  comments  from  the  voluntary 
agencies,  and  suggestions  from  the 
Department  of  Health  and  Human  Serv- 
ices and  state  refugee  coordinators.  The 
new  agreement,  effective  May  1,  1983, 
further  emphasizes  our  commitment  to 


refugee  self-sufficiency,  early  employ- 
ment, and  case  management;  includes 
language  on  placement  policy;  requires 
close  cooperation  with  welfare  depart- 
ments; and  strengthens  and  clarifies  the 
language  relating  to  refugee  health.  The 
proposals  and  the  cooperative  agree- 
ment together  serve  as  the  basis  for  our 
relationship  with  the  agencies,  whereas 
in  the  past,  the  agreement  alone  served 
this  purpose. 

Refugee  Assistance  Amendments 

The  Refugee  Assistance  amendments  of 
1982  contained  a  number  of  areas  with 
implications  for  our  reception  and  place- 
ment program.  Through  the  new  co- 
operative agreement  and  the  proposal 
process,  we  have  responded  to  the  re- 
quirements relating  to  employment, 
domestic  consultations,  placement  policy, 
expenditure  of  funds,  contact  with 
welfare  offices,  and  medical  care  for 
newly  arrived  refugees. 

The  amendments  require  that 
employable  refugees  be  placed  in  jobs  as 
soon  as  possible  after  their  arrival  in  the 
United  States.  We  asked  each  agency 
for  a  description  of  its  policy  toward 
refugee  employment  and  self-sufficiency, 
the  practices  employed  in  support  of  the 
policy,  and  demonstrated  results.  Our 


proposal  review  also  covered  the  volun 
tary  agency's  policy  toward  welfare  d* 
pendence  as  translated  into  practice.  1 
included  language  in  the  cooperative 
agreement  relating  to  early  employme 
and  welfare  dependency  and  will 
monitor  for  compliance  in  these  centr; 
areas. 

To  implement  the  consultation  pre 
sion  of  the  amendments,  specifically  ti 
local  voluntary  agency  activities  shoul 
be  conducted  in  close  cooperation  and 
advance  consultation  with  state  and  lc 
governments,  we  have  asked  each  age 
cy  for  its  plans  for  consultation   and 
coordination  with  other  actors  in  reset 
tlement  and  have  included  requiremen 
on  this  subject  in  the  cooperative  agre 
ment.  We  also  asked  national  voluntai 
agencies  to  have  their  local  affiliates 
discuss  the  proposals  and  the 
cooperative  agreement  with  interestec 
state  and  local  government  officials, 
especially  state  refugee  coordinators, 
part  of  their  "consultation  activities," 
and  required  each  voluntary  agency  tc 
develop  on  a  yearly  basis  a  national 
overview  and  state-by-state  descriptio 
of  its  activities  under  reception  and 
placement. 

We  have  taken  several  actions  to 
respond  to  the  placement  provisions  o 
the  amendments.  We  have  included 


Recent  Soviet  Actions  in  Afghanistan 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAY  20,  19831 

Numerous  reliable  reports  continue  to 
reach  us  from  refugee  and  other  sources 
of  extremely  heavy,  brutal,  and  pro- 
longed Soviet  and  Soviet-mandated 
bombing  of  civilian  areas  within 
Afghanistan  in  recent  weeks,  especially 
of  areas  around  Herat,  the  country's 
third  largest  city,  and  north  and  west  of 
Kabul. 

These  reports  leave  no  room  of 
doubt  that  casualties  among  the  civilian 
population  have  been  extremely  heavy. 
It's  not  possible  to  measure  precisely  the 
extent  of  those  casualties,  but  they  cer- 
tainly number  many  hundreds  and  are 
probably  in  the  thousands. 

Such  a  massive  and  ruthless  assault 
on  people  who  are,  for  the  most  part, 
without  any  means  of  defending  them- 
selves is  intolerable  by  any  standard  of 
civilized  behavior.  It  would  appear  that 
the  Soviet  Union  believes  that  the  world 
is  either  unaware  of  or  no  longer  cares 


about  what  it  is  doing  in  Afghanistan 
and  that  in  its  desperation  to  subdue  t 
spirit  of  the  vast  majority  of  Afghans 
who  yearn  for  their  nation's  freedom, 
the  Soviet  Union  is  willing  to  employ 
any  means,  no  matter  how  brutal. 

The  United  States  cannot  stand 
silently  by  and  witness  this  slaughter. 
The  Soviet  Union  is  aware  of  our  stro 
concern.  We  call  on  it  once  more  to 
desist  from  its  heartless  assault  on  a 
courageous  and  independent  people  ar 
to  seek  urgently  a  solution  to  the  crisii 
in  Afghanistan  which  preserves  humai 
life  and  responds  to  the  principles  out- 
lined in  four  successive  resolutions  by 
the  UN  General  Assembly. 

These  call  for  the  complete  with- 
drawal of  Soviet  forces,  self- 
determination  for  the  Afghan  people, ; 
independent  and  nonaligned  Afghani- 
stan, and  the  return  of  the  refugees  in 
safety  and  with  honor. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  l>y  Depa 
ment  spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


70 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


UNITED  NATIONS 


inguage  in  the  cooperative  agreement 
pecifying  that  refugees  be  assigned  geo- 
raphically  in  accordance  with  the  place- 
lent  policy  and  that  voluntary  agencies 
articipate  in  meetings  with  state  and 
>cal  governments  to  plan  and  coor- 
inate  the  appropriate  placement  of 
efugees  in  advance  of  their  arrival.  By 
lUgust,  we  will  expand  the  monthly 
ity/state  report  sent  to  state  refugee 
aordinators  to  include  a  refugee's 
ame,  age,  sex,  country  of  birth,  occupa- 
onal  code,  level  of  English  training, 
ponsoring  organization,  placement 
Dde,  and  estimated  date  of  arrival.  This 
iformation  will  be  provided  immediately 
pon  a  sponsorship  being  assured  and  in 
)me  cases  will  be  available  several 
lonths  before  a  refugee's  arrival. 

Regarding  the  requirement  that 
inds  provided  to  the  voluntary  agencies 
my  only  be  obligated  or  expended  dur- 
ig  the  fiscal  year  in  which  they  are  pro- 
ded,  since  October  1982  our  coopera- 
ve  agreement  has  included  language  to 
ie  effect  that  funds  shall  be  expended 
)  later  than  12  months  following  the 
id  of  the  fiscal  year  in  which  they  are 
inded,  unless  approved  in  writing  by 
e  bureau.  The  agreement  further 
ipulates  that  unexpended  funds  re- 
aining  at  the  end  of  the  specified 
:riod  shall  be  returned  to  the  bureau 
r  deposit  in  the  U.S.  Treasury. 

To  respond  to  the  provisions  relating 
contact  between  the  voluntary  agen- 
ts and  welfare  offices,  the  new 
operative  agreement  stipulates  that 
•e  voluntary  agencies  provide  notice  to 
e  appropriate  county  or  other  local 
slfare  office  at  the  time  the  agency 
■comes  aware  that  a  refugee  has  been 
fered  employment,  and  inform  the 
fugee  that  such  notice  has  been  pro- 
ded.  We  also  have  specified  that  volun- 
ry  agencies  must  respond  to  contacts 
Dm  a  state  or  state  agency  relating  to 
refugee's  application  for  and  receipt  of 
sh  or  medical  assistance. 

Finally,  to  implement  the  provision 
lating  to  medical  care  for  a  refugee 
th  a  condition  affecting  public  health, 
iter  consulting  with  the  Department  of 
alth  and  Human  Services,  extensive 
anges  regarding  health  have  been 
ded  to  the  cooperative  agreement.  For 
fugees  with  conditions  affecting  public 
alth,  the  voluntary  agency  is  required 
ensure  that  refugees  report  to  the  of- 
:ial  public  health  agency  within  7  days 
arrival. 


Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  I  join  with  my  colleagues 
in  expressing  our  support  for  the  recom- 
mended extension  of  the  Refugee  Act  of 
1980.  We  believe  it  has  worked  in  a 
practical  and  satisfactory  manner.  We 
will  continue  to  consult  with  this  com- 
mittee on  our  application  of  the  refugee 
definition  and  believe  that  any  desired 
modifications  in  our  admissions  or  reset- 
tlement practices  can  be  accommodated 
within  the  framework  of  this  important 
and  now  time-tested  legislation. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

2Sec.  212(aX42)  of  the  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  Act,  as  amended  1980: 

The  term  'refugee'  means  (A)  any  person 
who  is  outside  any  country  of  such  per- 


Nicaragua 


Following  are  statements  by  Am- 
bassador Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick,  U.S.  Per- 
manent Representative  to  the  United  Na- 
tions, in  the  U.N.  Security  Council  on 
May  9,  16,  and  18,  1983,  and  the  text  of  a 
resolution  adopted  on  May  19. 


STATEMENT, 
MAY  9,  19831 

It  is  an  extraordinary  experience  to  hear 
the  representative  of  Nicaragua's  harsh 
dictatorship  invoke  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention in  internal  affairs,  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  other 
international  laws,  and  accuse  the 
United  States  of  invasion.  It  is  an  extra- 
ordinary experience  to  hear  the  repre- 
sentative of  Nicaragua's  harsh  dictator- 
ship speak  of  the  rule  of  law,  talk  about 
American  public  opinion  polls,  quote 
American  media  and  even  American 
elected  officials.  I  am  especially  struck 
by  the  invocation  of  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention by  Nicaragua's  dictators. 
Since  they  have  come  to  power,  they 
have  been  busy  fomenting  war  in  the 
region,  destroying  the  peace  and  the 
possibility  of  progress  in  El  Salvador 
and  Honduras  and  other  neighboring 
states,  forcing  militarization  on  the 
region. 


son's  nationality  or,  in  the  case  of  a  per- 
son having  no  nationality,  is  outside  any 
country  in  which  such  person  last 
habitually  resided,  and  who  is  unable  or 
unwilling  to  return  to,  and  is  unable  or 
unwilling  to  avail  himself  or  herself  of  the 
protection  of,  that  country  because  of 
persecution  or  a  well-founded  fear  of 
persecution  on  account  of  race,  religion, 
nationality,  membership  in  a  particular 
social  group,  or  political  opinion,  or  (B)  in 
such  special  circumstances  as  the  Presi- 
dent after  appropriate  consultation  (as 
defined  in  section  207(e)  of  this  Act)  may 
specify,  any  person  who  is  within  the 
country  of  such  person's  nationality  or,  in 
the  case  of  a  person  having  no  nationali- 
ty, within  the  country  in  which  such  per- 
son is  habitually  residing,  and  who  is 
persecuted  or  who  has  a  well-founded 
fear  of  persecution  on  account  of  race, 
religion,  nationality,  membership  in  a  par- 
ticular social  group,  or  political  opinion. 
The  term  'refugee  does  not  include  any 
person  who  ordered,  incited,  assisted,  or 
otherwise  participated  in  the  persecution 
of  any  person  on  account  of  race, 
religion,  nationality,  membership  in  a  par- 
ticular social  group,  or  political  opinion.  ■ 


The  United  States  does  not  invade 
small  countries  on  its  borders.  We  do 
not  have  100,000  occupation  troops  in 
any  country  in  the  world,  least  of  all  on 
our  borders.  Our  neighbors  need  have  no 
such  concerns.  I  thought,  however,  since 
the  representative  of  Nicaragua  has 
relied  so  heavily  on  American  media  this 
morning  in  his  presentation  to  the  Coun- 
cil, the  record  ought  to  be  set  straight.  I 
thought  I  might  have  recourse  as  well  to 
some  American  media  concerning  events 
in  Central  America  and  the  respect 
which  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
habitually  shows  to  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention in  the  affairs  of  its  neigh- 
bors. 

The  current  Time  magazine,  for  ex- 
ample, has  a  very  interesting  article, 
which  I  recommend  to  the  members  of 
the  Council.  It  is  entitled,  "How  the 
Salvadoran  Rebels  Order  Outside  Help 
for  Their  Revolution."  It  begins  by  say- 
ing "...  the  building  of  a  Nicaraguan 
arms  link  to  El  Salvador  began  almost 
as  soon  as  the  victorious  revolutionaries 
took  power  in  the  Nicaraguan  capital  of 
Managua  in  July  1979."  It  has  maps  with 
arrows  which  describe  supply 
routes — they're  not  quite  as  good  as  our 
government  maps,  but  they're  not  bad. 
They  are  good  enough  so  that  the 
members  of  the  Council  can  get  a 
general  impression  about  the  regular 
flow  of  arms  from  Nicaragua  through 
Honduras  into  El  Salvador. 

The  article  itself  describes  various 


jgust  1983 


71 


UNITED  NATIONS 


arms  infiltration  routes.  One,  for  exam- 
ple, it  says  ".  .  .  hugged  the  Honduran 
Pacific  coast  between  Nicaragua  and  El 
Salvador,  then  angled  into  the  remote 
areas  of  El  Salvador  where  Marxist 
rebels  hold  almost  undisputed  sway. 
U.S.  analysts  estimate  that  15  to  20 
such  land  routes  exist  across  Honduras." 
One  wonders  about  Honduras'  right  to 
be  free  of  infiltration  by  its  neighbors. 
The  article  goes  on  to  say:  "Other 
military  shipments  come  in  by  air  and 
sea.  Sandinista  smugglers  have  been 
known  to  move  supplies  directly  across 
the  20-mile-wide  Gulf  of  Fonseca.  When 
the  going  is  safe,  the  Nicaraguans  make 
nighttime  forays  from  the  Pacific  gulf 
port  of  Potosi  aboard  small  fishing 
boats,  equipped  with  false  bottoms,  or 
50-foot  frame  canoes.  That  practice  has 
now  been  curtailed  because  of  the 
patrols  of  U.S.  electronic  surveillance 
ships  in  the  area  and  the  greater  vigi- 
lance of  the  Salvadoran  and  Honduran 
navies."  One  can  readily  understand  why 
neighbors  engaging  in  such  practices 
would  not  want  any  electronic 
surveillance  in  their  region. 

The  article  continues:  "At  night,  the 
Jiquilisco  region  is  also  known  as  a 
favorite  destination  of  arms-laden  heli- 
copters [from  Nicaragua]  and  light  fixed- 
wing  aircraft.  ...  An  important  alter- 
native air  route  for  the  smugglers  [from 
Nicaragua]  is  from  the  former  British 
colony  of  Belize  into  Guatemala.  After 
that,  the  rebels  and  their  supplies  filter 
south  into  Salvadoran  rebel  strong- 
holds." Apparently  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  has  a  bit  of  a  problem 
respecting  the  right  of  the  Government 
of  Guatemala  to  be  free  of  infiltration 
across  its  borders  as  well. 

The  article  is  very  detailed.  It  sums 
up  its  point  about  the  extent  and  detail 
of  the  supply  route  between  Nicaragua 
and  El  Salvador  with  a  line  which  it  also 
uses  for  its  title:  "Like  a  Sears,  Roebuck 
Catalogue."  It  says  that  rebels  in  El 
Salvador  can  order  from  Nicaragua 
whatever  they  need.  One  unit  may  say  I 
need  candles,  boots,  batteries,  diarrhea 
medicine,  bullets,  and  mortar  rounds.  If 
they  don't  get  what  they  want,  they 
complain.  The  fact  that  they  complain 
shows  they  have  a  pipeline  they  think 
they  can  depend  on. 

The  consequences,  of  course,  of  this 
gross  violation  of  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention in  the  life  of  neighboring 
states  by  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
is  the  destruction  of  peace  in  the  region. 


It  is  especially  tragic  for  the  society  of 
El  Salvador  where  the  economy  has 
been  deliberately  targeted  and 
deliberately  destroyed. 

I  pointed  out  not  long  ago  in  a 
discussion  of  this  same  issue  that  some 
34  bridges  and  145  electrical  transmis- 
sion towers  had  been  destroyed  in  El 
Salvador  last  year,  that  some  18,000 
Salvadorans  had  been  put  out  of  work 
by  this  destruction.  The  President  of  the 
United  States  spoke  2  weeks  ago  to  the 
Congress  and  pointed  out  in  his  speech, 
and  I  quote:  "Tonight  in  El  Salvador — 
because  of  ruthless  guerrilla  attacks — 
much  of  the  fertile  land  cannot  be 
cultivated;  less  than  half  the  rolling 
stock  of  the  railways  remains  opera- 
tional; bridges,  water  facilities,  tele- 
phone and  electric  systems  have  been 
destroyed  and  damaged.  In  one  22- 
month  period,  there  were  5,000  inter- 
ruptions of  electrical  power;  one  region 
was  without  electricity  for  a  third  of  a 
year."  Thus  the  consequences  for  one  of 
Nicaragua's  neighbors  of  Nicaragua's  re- 
spect for  the  principle  of  noninterven- 
tion. 

The  distinguished  representative  of 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has  re- 
ferred repeatedly  to  the  debate  now 
underway  in  the  United  States,  among 
Americans,  about  what  American  policy 
should  be  with  regard  to  the  area.  He  is 
quite  right,  of  course.  There  is  a  debate. 
And  the  debate  is  on  the  question  of 
whether  the  United  States  should  help 
the  people  of  El  Salvador  and  the  people 
of  Nicaragua  to  defeat  the  effort  to  im- 
pose upon  them  totalitarian  dictator- 
ships with  the  assistance  and  by  means 
of  arms  filtered  to  them  by  a  ruthless, 
international  terrorist.  There  is  a  debate 
in  the  United  States  about  whether  the 
United  States  should  leave  small  coun- 
tries powerless,  small  peoples  helpless, 
without  defense  against  conquest  by 
violent  minorities  trained  and  armed  by 
remote  dictators.  Such  a  debate  is 
underway  in  the  United  States.  It  is  not 
complete,  and  we  will  continue  that 
debate  in  our  own  way.  We  will  continue 
it  not  by  the  method  of  lies  but  by  the 
method  of  democracy. 

The  method  of  democracy  relies  on 
discussion.  We  will  make  our  decision  at 
the  end  of  our  debate,  and  we  will  make 
that  decision  by  democratic  means.  We 
very  much  wish  that  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  would  join  us  in  such  a  demo- 
cratic decision  process.  We  very  much 
wish  that  there  could  be  debate  in 
Nicaragua  about  the  public  policies  of 


that  government.  We  very  much  wish 
that  the  people  of  Nicaragua,  its  jour-  I 
nalists,  its  political  leaders  were  free  tl 
make  their  arguments  in  public  arenasl 
to  discuss  the  question  before  that  perl 
pie,  to  criticize  their  government,  to  rij 
in  legislative  arenas  and  state  their 
criticisms  freely.  We  wish  that  the  peel 
pie  of  Nicaragua  had  the  opportunity  tl 
be  polled  by  honest  and  objective  publij 
opinion  organizations.  We  wish  that  trl 
people  of  Nicaragua  had  the  opportunil 
to  settle  their  discussions  and  decision  I 
and  debates  by  voting.  We  in  the  Unit  I 
States  will  live  by  the  results  of  our 
democratic  processes.  We  can  wish 
nothing  better  for  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  than  that  they  be  given  a 
comparable  opportunity. 

The  relationship  between  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  its  peor. 
is,  of  course,  at  the  heart  of  much  of  t' 
discussion  here.  What  is  the  nature  of 
this  problem?  What  is  the  nature  of 
what  the  Nicaraguan  representative 
calls  an  "American  invasion"?  Needless 
to  say,  there  is  no  American  invasion  ( 
Nicaragua.  It  is  a  fact  that  there  is 
fighting  in  Nicaragua.  It  is  a  fact  that 
there  is  very  widespread  unhappiness, 
indeed  misery,  in  Nicaragua.  It  is  a  fai 
that  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has 
problem.  The  nature  of  that  problem 
of  course,  not  international.  The  natur 
of  that  problem  is  national.  Nicaragua 
problem  is  with  Nicaraguans.  In  Nicar 
agua  today,  Nicaraguans  fight  other 
Nicaraguans  for  the  control  of  their 
country's  destiny. 

I  thought  since  the  representative 
Nicaragua  had  brought  to  the  attentio 
of  the  Council  so  many  items  from  the 
American  press,  I  might  impose  on  th< 
Council  a  second  item  from  yesterday': 
Washington  Post  which  was  referred  t 
by  the  representative  of  Nicaragua. 
(Demonstrating  the  advantages  of  free 
discussion,  by  the  way,  you  can  find  a 
lot  of  different  kinds  of  evidence  in  oui 
newspapers.)  The  item  that  I  would  lik  | 
to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Council 
is  a  column  by  Jack  Anderson,  who  is  ; 
well-known  liberal  columnist  in  the 
United  States,  not  a  reliable  supporter 
of  the  Administration  that  currently 
governs  the  United  States. 

The  column  is  called  "A  Popular 
Force,"  and  I  would  like  to  read  from  i 
briefly. 

While  Congress  debates  the  Reagan  ad- 
ministration's clandestine  operations  in 
Nicaragua,  the  American  public  is  beset  by 
conflicting  information  about  exactly  what  i 
going  on  there.  .  .  . 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


UNITED  NATIONS 


To  get  some  reliable,  firsthand  answers 

0  these  crucial  questions,  I  sent  my 
associate,  Jon  Lee  Anderson,  to  the  troubled 
region.  He  has  just  returned  from  a  week- 
Jong  foray  into  northern  Nicaragua  with  anti- 
Sandinista  guerrillas.  They  belong  to  the 
Nicaraguan  Democratic  Forces  (FDN),  the 
Snajor  group  of  .  .  .  insurgents. 

He  traveled  with  a  well-armed,  50-mem- 
ler  guerrilla  band  led  by  a  commander  whose 
Bm  de  guerre  is  El  Gorrion — The  Sparrow. 
fheir  base  camp  was  deep  in  the  rugged 

Inountains  of  Nicaragua's  Nueva  Segovia 
jrovince,  near  the  Honduran  border. 

It  quickly  became  obvious  that  the  guer- 
illas had  the  support  of  the  populace.  They 
|/ere  fed  and  protected  by  local  peasants  at 
[very  step.  Traveling  on  foot,  and  only  by 
light  to  avoid  detection  by  government 
Iroops,  the  guerrillas  spent  the  days  hiding  in 
hafe  houses,"  often  within  shouting  distance 
If  government-held  towns.  If  the  peasants 
lad  wanted  to  betray  them,  it  would  have 
leen  a  simple  matter  to  tip  off  the  Sandinista 
liilitia  to  their  hiding  places. 

The  peasants  also  provided  The  Sparrow 
rith  up-to-the-minute  intelligence  on  the 
[■hereabouts,  movement  and  strength  of  the 
Jandinista  forces. 

The  anti-Sandinista  guerrillas'  military 
Irowess  is  not  so  clear-cut.  My  associate 
l.scovered  this  to  his  dismay  when  he  accom- 

1  inied  The  Sparrow's  band  on  a  planned  pre- 
liwn  ambush  of  government  troop  carriers 

I  ong  a  country  road. 

.  .  .  the  guerrillas  were  themselves  sur- 
mised by  sniper  fire  from  hilltop  positions 
I  >ove  them  and  were  forced  to  pull  out.  The 
1  'treat  was  carried  out  skillfully,  however, 
1  id  two  nights  later  the  guerrillas  avenged 
|  eir  defeat  with  an  attack  on  the  hilltop 

lipers'  nest.  The  FDN  commandos  treated 
l  e  snipers  to  a  half-hour  barrage  of  rockets, 
•enades  and  machine-gun  fire,  before  re- 
rning  satisfied  to  their  base  camp. 

Most  of  the  FDN  guerrillas  were  local 
•asants,  not  Somoeista  exiles.  But  there 
1  ere  also  former  National  Guardsmen,  and 
i  ey  tend  to  be  in  positions  of  command  be- 
use  of  their  military  experience. 
Still,  the  core  of  The  Sparrow's  group 
i  nsisted  of  locally  recruited  peasants.  In 

ct,  on  my  associate's  last  day  with  the  rebel 
I  .nd,  he  witnessed  the  arrival  of  50  new 
\  cruits  all  of  them  peasants  from  the  neigh- 
ring  province  of  Madriz. 

One  of  the  new  recruits  was  a  defecting 
indinista  army  instructor.  There  were  other 
i  -Sandinistas  in  the  guerrilla  troop.  One  was 
inia,  a  star  graduate  of  the  Sandinista's 
■st-revolution  literacy  campaign.  .  .  .  Dunia 
h  d  so  well  she  was  rewarded  with  a  junket  to 
li  iba.  She  is  now  the  camp  medic  for  The 
larrow's  band. 

The  rebels  and  their  noncombatant  col- 
sorators  cited  a  variety  of  reasons  for  their 
itsenchantment  with  the  Sandinistas:  en- 
rced  food  rationing,  expropriation  of  the 
rmers'  markets,  enforced  organization  of 
■asant  co-ops,  the  Sandinistas'  anti-religious 
r.  •licies  and  harassment  of  the  Catholic 
lurch . 


The  Sandinistas  themselves  indirectly  aid 
ed  the  guerrillas'  recruitment  of  at  least  a 
dozen  of  the  new  arrivals.  They  said  they  had 
been  under  increasing  pressure  to  join  the 
militia.  Forced  to  take  sides,  they  chose  the 
"contras." 

Still,  it  was  not  an  easy  choice  for  many. 
They  expressed  genuine  anguish  at  being 
forced— one  way  or  another— to  fight  against 
fellow  Nicaraguans. 

"We  don't  want  to  fight  our  Nicaraguan 
brothers,"  they  said.  The  ones  they're  after 
are  the  Sandinista  leaders  and  their  Cuban, 
East  German,  Bulgarian  and  other  foreign 
advisers. 

That's  not  the  end  of  the  column; 
there  are  two  paragraphs  left  for 
anyone  who  is  interested. 

I  would  like  to  reiterate  to  the  Coun- 
cil that  the  U.S.  Government  has  repeat- 
edly, throughout  the  brief  history  of  the 
Sandinista  dictatorship,  sought  to  estab- 
lish constructive  relations  with  that 
government  and,  during  the  period  of  its 
destabilization  of  the  area,  sought  to 
work  with  others  in  the  area  to  achieve 
regional  peace. 

In  August  1981,  on  a  special  mission 
to  Managua,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  Thomas  Enders  presented  a  five- 
point  peace  plan  to  the  Sandinistas  to 
reduce  regional  tensions.  Based  on  the 
termination  of  Nicaraguan  support  for 
guerrilla  groups,  the  plan  called  for  a 
U.S.  pledge  to  enforce  strictly  laws 
governing  exiles'  activities  in  U.S.  ter- 
ritory, reaffirmation  of  nonintervention 
and  noninterference  by  all  parties,  limits 
on  arms  and  military  forces,  resumption 
of  U.S.  economic  assistance  to  Nica- 
ragua which  had  been  very  substantial, 
and  a  U.S. -Nicaraguan  cultural  ex- 
change program.  The  Sandinista  govern- 
ment made  no  substantive  response. 

On  April  19,  1982,  U.S.  Ambassador 
Anthony  Quainton  delivered  an  eight- 
point  peace  proposal  to  the  Sandinistas 
that  called  for  an  end  to  Nicaraguan 
support  for  guerrillas  in  neighboring 
countries.  It  called  for  limits  on  arms 
and  foreign  military  advisers,  a  joint 
pledge  of  noninterference  and  noninter- 
vention, arms  limit  verification 
measures,  resumption  of  U.S.  economic 
assistance,  implementation  of  cultural 
exchange  programs,  and  the  reaffirma- 
tion of  Sandinista  commitments  to 
pluralism,  free  elections,  and  a  mixed 
economy.  The  Sandinistas  made  a  non- 
substantive response  that  did  not  even 
address  the  U.S.  plan.  They  presented 
only  rhetorical  counterproposals. 

On  October  19,  1982,  eight  regional 
democracies,  including  the  United 
States,  set  forth  the  essential  conditions 


for  peace  in  Central  America,  again  in- 
cluding verifiable  limits  on  arms  and 
foreign  military  advisers,  national  recon- 
ciliation through  the  democratic  process, 
a  halt  to  support  for  insurgent  groups, 
mutual  respect  for  pledges  of  noninter- 
vention, and  respect  for  basic  human 
rights.  The  countries  asked  Costa  Rica 
to  discuss  these  conditions  with  Nica- 
ragua. That,  too,  came  to  nought. 

In  addition,  the  Sandinistas  have  re- 
jected other  proposals  put  forth  by  their 
neighbors.  As  late  as  1983,  they  refused 
to  meet  with  Costa  Ricans,  Hondurans, 
Salvadorans,  and  Guatemalans  in  multi- 
lateral discussions  supported  by  the  Con- 
tadora  group  [Colombia,  Mexico, 
Panama,  Venezuela],  but  you've  already 
heard  about  this. 

The  Sandinista  insistence  on 
bilateral  rather  than  multilateral  talks 
underlines  its  desire  to  resolve  its  exter- 
nal problems  while  avoiding  the  issue  of 
its  export  of  revolution,  war,  and  misery 
to  its  neighbors.  The  record  speaks  for 
itself.  I  should  just  like  to  close  these 
remarks  by  reminding  members  of  the 
Council  that  in  his  speech  to  the  joint 
session  of  the  U.S.  Congress,  President 
Reagan  asserted:  "To  support  these 
diplomatic  goals  [in  the  region],  I  offer 
these  assurances,"  and  I  should  like  to 
offer  these  assurances  again  to  the 
Council  on  behalf  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States: 

•  The  United  States  will  support  any 
agreement  among  Central  American  coun- 
tries for  the  withdrawal — under  fully  veri- 
fiable and  reciprocal  conditions — of  all 
foreign  military  and  security  advisers  and 
troops. 

•  We  want  to  help  opposition  groups  join 
the  political  process  in  all  countries  and  com- 
pete by  ballots  instead  of  bullets. 

•  We  will  support  any  verifiable,  recipro- 
cal agreement  among  Central  American  coun- 
tries on  the  renunciation  of  support  for  in- 
surgencies on  neighbors'  territory. 

•  And,  finally,  we  desire  to  help  Central 
America  end  its  costly  arms  race  and  will 
support  any  verifiable,  reciprocal  agreements 
on  the  nonimportation  of  offensive  weapons. 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  say  to 
members  of  the  Council  that  every  na- 
tion in  the  United  Nations — especially 
small  nations,  especially  nations  with 
powerful  neighbors — should  ponder 
carefully  this  case,  should  think  well 
about  what  is  being  demanded  once 
again  of  this  Council  by  the  Government 
of  Nicaragua.  The  Government  of  Nica- 
ragua has  once  again  come  to  us 
demanding  of  the  United  Nations  inter- 
national protection  while  it  destabilizes 
its  neighbors.  It  is  claiming  that  a  people 


jgust 1983 


73 


UNITED  NATIONS 


repressed  by  foreign  arms  of  a  super- 
power has  no  right  to  help  against  that 
repression.  That  is  a  principle  that  I 
should  suppose  every  member  of  the 
United  Nations  which  is,  in  fact,  com- 
mitted to  principles  of  national  inde- 
pendence, self-determination,  and  non- 
intervention would  do  well  to  think  hard 
about. 


STATEMENT, 
MAY  16,  19832 

The  hour  being  late,  I  will  try  to  be  very 
brief.  I  would  simply  note  that  one  hears 
here  a  very  great  deal  of  falsification  of 
history  and  of  current  events. 

The  first  point  that  I  would  like  to 
make  concerning  these  most  recent  falsi- 
fications is  simply  that  the  United  States 
is  neither  a  champion  of  Central  Ameri- 
can cooperation  nor  an  opponent  of  Cen- 
tral American  cooperation.  If  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region  desire,  in  fact,  to 
meet  together  to  try  to  work  out  solu- 
tions to  their  problems,  the  United 
States  poses  no  obstacles  to  that.  No 
more  do  we  pose  obstacles  to  the  desire 
of,  shall  we  say,  Libya  and  Chad  to  try 
to  find  solutions  to  their  problems  within 
the  framework  of  the  OAU  [Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity]  or  a  great  many 
nations  of  this  United  Nations  who  have 
come  before  this  body  and  preferred,  in 
fact,  to  find  regional  solutions.  The 
United  States  neither  champions  that 
nor  opposes  it.  We  believe,  in  general,  in 
the  right  and  the  practicality  of  nations 
most  immediately  involved  in  conflicts 
seeking  to  work  out  solutions  to  their 
problems. 

Second,  the  United  States  has  not 
invaded  Nicaragua  and  does  not  intend 
to  do  so.  The  most  that  the  United 
States  has  been  reproached  for  or  ac- 
cused of  by  serious  people  is  providing 
arms  and  advice  to  Nicaraguans  fighting 
for  their  right  to  national  self- 
determination. 

Third,  concerning  one  more  falsifica- 
tion, the  question  of  who  has  done  what 
with  regard  to  which  meeting  at  what 
past  time.  The  past  is  always  less  impor- 
tant than  the  present.  The  principles 
that  are  presumably  at  stake  here  are 
relatively  clear,  I  think.  The  Central 
American  democratic  community,  to 
which  the  Nicaraguan  Foreign  Minister 
objects,  issued  a  declaration — the 
declaration  of  San  Jose — which  asserted 
some  principles,  many  of  which  have 
also  been  identified  by  the  Contadora 
group  as  principal  concerns  in  the  area. 


Those  include  an  end  to  the  importation 
of  all  arms  from  outside  the  area  into 
the  area,  with  verification  of  that;  an 
end  to  the  importation  of  foreign  ad- 
visers; and  the  end  of  the  use  of  foreign 
advisers  throughout  the  area  and 
verification  of  that. 

In  addition  to  that,  there  has  been 
recent  reaffirmation  in  the  most  current 
declaration  of  Contadora  of  some  other 
principles  which  were  affirmed  at  San 
Jose.  Those  include,  and  I'm  reading 
now  from  the  U.N.  unofficial  translation 
of  the  Contadora  communication:  "Self- 
determination  and  non-intervention  in 
the  affairs  of  other  States;  the  obligation 
not  to  allow  the  use  of  territory  of  one 
State  for  acts  of  aggression  against 
another;  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
disputes;  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of 
force  to  resolve  conflict." 

To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  the 
basic  problem  which  confronts  the 
region  is  that  one  state  in  the  region — 
namely  Nicaragua — is  precisely  unwill- 
ing to  affirm  respect  for  the  territorial 
integrity  of  other  states,  is  unwilling  to 
affirm  its  obligation  not  to  allow  its  ter- 
ritory to  be  used  for  acts  of  aggression 
against  another.  It  still  claims  for  itself 
unique  enjoyment  of  these  rights.  I 
believe  that  the  Security  Council  should 
see  very  clearly  that  the  United 
States — and  I  suspect  all  the  other 
states  involved  in  the  Contadora  proc- 
ess, except  perhaps  Nicaragua — is  will- 
ing in  very  short  order  to  agree  to 
respect  for  self-determination  and  non- 
intervention in  the  affairs  of  other 
states;  the  obligation  not  to  allow  the 
territory  of  one  state  for  acts  of  aggres- 
sion against  another;  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  disputes;  the  prohibition  of  the 
threat  of  the  use  of  force  to  resolve  con- 
flicts. 

There  has  been  a  reference  to  the 
dreams  of  the  people  of  Central 
America.  The  people  of  Nicaragua  have 
dreams  too,  and  those  dreams  have  been 
very  cruelly  betrayed.  I  believe  that  if 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  would 
simply  keep  the  promises  it  has  solemnly 
made  to  its  own  people,  which  promises 
we  have  frequently  reviewed  here — re- 
spect for  human  rights,  for  democratic 
processes — and  would  be  willing  to  live 
in  peace  with  its  neighbors,  if  there 
were  a  will  to  do  those  things  and  to 
respect  the  principles  of  the  Charter, 
then  the  precise  format  in  which  those 
questions  were  discussed  and  decided 
would  turn  out  to  be  quite  unimportant. 


STATEMENT, 
MAY  18,  19833 

I  would  just  like  to  reply  to  certain  of 
the  assertions  made  by  the  distinguish' 
representative  of  the  Soviet  Union.  I 
should  like  to  note  first  the  stunning 
cynicism  of  his  remarks.  It  is,  indeed, 
stunningly  cynical  for  the  representati' 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  whose  country 
undertook  to  flood  the  region  of  Centr 
America  with  arms,  heavy  weapons 
which  had  never  been  seen  in  the  regie 
and  military  advisers  of  an  extraor- 
dinary assortment  who  have  in  commo 
a  particular  relationship  with  his  own 
country — a  relationship  which  is  char- 
acterized by  the  hegemony  of  the  Sovii 
Union  vis-a-vis  the  various  client  state 
Those  are  the  people  who  have  intro- 
duced heavy  weapons  into  Central 
America.  Those  are  the  people  who  ha 
undermined  economic  progress  and 
development  in  the  region  which  was, 
fact,  proceeding  at  quite  a  steady  rate 
before  the  deliberate  efforts  at 
militarization  and  destabilization  of  th( 
region. 

The  suggestion  was  also  made  by 
the  distinguished  delegate  of  the  Sovie 
Union  that  the  United  States  sought  b 
determine  the  internal  life  of  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  should, 
fact,  be  indifferent — should  bug  off — 
from  any  concern  about  the  organizati 
of  its  politics  or  economics.  I  should  ju 
like  to  say  that  the  United  States  does 
not  attempt  to  influence  in  inappropri; 
ways  the  organization  of  any  country's 
economic  system.  We  hope  that  all  coi 
tries  in  the  world  will  organize  their 
economic  systems  in  such  a  fashion  th 
they  will  be  productive  of  goods  and  f< 
the  well-being  of  their  people.  But  tha 
we  regard  wholly  as  their  decision.  W' 
also  regard  the  form  of  government  o: 
other  countries  as  their  decision. 

We  cannot,  however,  be  indifferen 
to  gross  violations  of  human  rights  by 
other  governments  nor  does  the  Chart 
of  the  United  Nations  suggest  that  we 
should  do  so.  The  Charter  of  the  Unit* 
Nations,  in  fact,  identifies  respect  for 
human  freedom  and  other  human  righ 
as  central  concerns  of  this  organizatioi 
and  of  all  member  states  of  this 
organization. 

The  United  States  also  belongs  to 
some  other  organizations  and  takes 
cognizance  of  obligations  which  are  coi 
tracted  vis-a-vis  other  organizations.  V 
have  noted  here,  for  example,  that  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  undertook 
some  solemn  commitments  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States  con! 


74 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


UNITED  NATIONS 


;erning  the  kind  of  government  it  would 
)rganize  were  it,  in  fact,  to  become  the 
overnment  of  Nicaragua.  It  undertook 
;ommitments  to  organize  democratic  in- 
ititutions,  provide  its  people  with  demo- 
:ratic  institutions  in  respect  of  their 
luman  rights  and  rule  of  law — regular, 
ivil  rule  of  law,  quite  specifically.  We 
lave  suggested  that  those  commitments 
lave  not  been  fulfilled.  And  since  the 
■uling  clique  of  Nicaragua  secured  the 
issistance  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States  in  its  rise  to  power  on 
he  basis  of  those  commitments,  it  raises 
.ome  question  about  the  basis  of  their 
government. 

The  representative  of  the  Soviet 
Jnion  also  referred  to  the  bloody  crimes 
'f  the  United  States,  I  think  was  his 
ihrase.  The  phrase  reminded  me  of  an 
:em  which  I  had  read  yesterday  in  a 
]uropean  newspaper  concerning  the 
eath  of  some  3,000  Afghan  civilians 
ist  week  due  to  bombing  of  civilian 
opulations  by  the  nearly  150,000  Soviet 
ccupation  troops  of  that  beleaguered 
ountry.  The  article  that  I  read  also 
oticed  that  the  UN  Security  Council 
or  any  other  body  of  the  United  Na- 
ons  had  taken  any  note  of  this  mass 
laughter  of  Afghans.  I  would  like,  while 
'e  are  talking  about  bloody  crimes,  to 
ake  formal  note  of  the  suffering  of  the 
fghan  people. 

I  would  finally  just  like  to  say  that  it 
as  been  suggested  by  the  Soviet  repre- 
>ntative  and  some  others  that  they  sup- 
ort  regional  efforts  to  achieve  peace, 
nd  I  would  emphasize  that  that  is,  of 
>urse,  precisely  what  we  all  support.  If 
ley  support  regional  efforts  to  achieve 
eace,  then  there  is  unanimity  because 
;rtainly  the  rest  of  us  support  regional 
?forts  to  achieve  peace.  The  United 
tates,  for  its  part,  stands  ready  at  any 
me  to  support  any  agreements  to  end 
le  importation  of  all  arms  and  foreign 
ilitary  advisers  into  the  region — any 
jreement  to  do  so  which  is  verifiable — 
id  to  support  any  agreement  that  pro- 
des  for  the  mutual  respect  of  borders 
/  all  countries  in  the  region  and  the 
)ninterferenee  in  the  affairs  of  one 
lother  and  the  end  to  all  efforts  at 
^stabilization. 


ECURITY  COUNCIL 
ESOLUTION  530, 
AY  19,  19834 

|  ie  Security  Council, 

Hamng  heard  the  statement  of  the 
>reign  Minister  of  the  Republic  of 
I  icaragua, 


Having  also  heard  the  statements  of 
various  States  Members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions in  the  course  of  the  debate, 

Deeply  concerned,  on  the  one  hand,  at  the 
situation  prevailing  on  and  inside  the  north- 
ern border  of  Nicaragua  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  at  the  consequent  danger  of  a  military 
confrontation  between  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua,  which  could  further  aggravate  the 
existing  crisis  situation  in  Central  America, 

Recalling  all  the  relevant  principles  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  particularly 
the  obligation  of  States  to  settle  their 
disputes  exclusively  by  peaceful  means,  not 
to  resort  to  the  threat  or  use  of  force  and  to 
respect  the  self-determination  of  peoples  and 
the  sovereign  independence  of  all  States, 

Noting  the  widespread  desire  expressed 
by  the  States  concerned  to  achieve  solutions 
to  the  differences  between  them, 

Commending  the  appeal  of  the  Contadora 
group  of  countries,  Colombia,  Mexico, 
Panama  and  Venezuela,  in  its  12  May  1983 
communique  (S/15762)  that  the  deliberations 
of  the  Council  should  strengthen  the  prin- 
ciples of  self-determination  and  non- 
interference in  the  affairs  of  other  States,  the 
obligation  not  to  allow  the  territory  of  a 
State  to  be  used  for  committing  acts  of  ag- 
gression against  other  States,  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes  and  the  prohibition  of 
the  threat  or  use  of  force  to  resolve  conflict. 

Considering  the  broad  support  expressed 
for  the  efforts  of  the  Contadora  Group  to 
achieve  solutions  to  the  problems  that  affect 
Central  American  countries  and  to  secure  a 
stable  and  lasting  peace  in  the  region, 

1 .  Reaffirms  the  right  of  Nicaragua  and 
of  all  the  other  countries  of  the  area  to  live  in 
peace  and  security,  free  from  outside  inter- 
ference; 

2.  Commends  the  efforts  of  the  Con- 
tadora group  and  urges  the  pursuit  of  those 
efforts; 

3.  Appeals  urgently  to  the  interested 
States  to  co-operate  fully  with  the  Contadora 
group,  through  a  frank  and  constructive 
dialogue,  so  as  to  resolve  their  differences; 

4.  Urges  the  Contadora  group  to  spare 
no  effort  to  find  solutions  to  the  problem  of 
the  region  and  to  keep  the  Security  Council 
informed  of  the  results  of  these  efforts; 

5.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
keep  the  Security  Council  informed  of  the 
development  of  the  situation  and  of  the 
implementation  of  the  present  resolution. 


'USUN  press  release  28. 
2USUN  press  release  35. 
3USUN  press  release  36. 
••Adopted  unanimously.  ■ 


Namibia 

Following  are  statements  made  in 
the  Security  Council  by  A  mbassador 
Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick,  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations,  on 
May  25,  1983,  and  Ambassador  Charles 
M.  Lichenstein,  U.S.  Alternate  Repre- 
sentative, on  May  31,  as  well  as  the  text 
of  Security  Council  Resolution  532  of 
May  31. 


AMBASSADOR  KIRKPATRICK, 
MAY  25,  19831 

The  events  of  this  past  weekend  in 
Pretoria  and  Maputo  are  a  bloody 
reminder,  if  any  was  needed,  of  the  con- 
sequences of  violence  and  of  the  very 
real  potential  that  today  exists 
throughout  southern  Africa  for  the  fur- 
ther escalation  of  that  violence.  As  is  all 
too  often  the  case,  the  victims  of  these 
most  recent  tragic  events  include  many 
who  were  entirely  innocent  and 
blameless. 

The  United  States  deplores  such  acts 
of  violence,  from  whatever  quarter, 
whether  perpetrated  in  the  name  of 
change  or  in  opposition  to  it.  Violence 
cannot  solve  the  pressing  problems  of 
the  region.  On  the  contrary,  by  creating 
new  victims,  new  grievances,  and  new 
grounds  for  anger  and  hatred,  such  acts 
can  only  increase  the  danger  of  new  and 
greater  violence  in  an  ever-escalating  cy- 
cle. Ultimately,  we  must  count  among 
the  wounded  of  these  acts  all  those  who 
seek  and  hope  for  peaceful  change 
through  negotiation  and  dialogue. 

My  government,  for  the  past  several 
years,  has  been  seeking  to  assist  the 
governments  of  the  region  to  find 
peaceful  ways  to  address  and  to  resolve 
mutual  problems.  We  have  been  en- 
couraged by  the  purposeful  high-level 
dialogue  between  Mozambique  and 
South  Africa,  a  dialogue  which  the 
events  of  last  weekend  must  not  be  per- 
mitted to  place  in  jeopardy.  We  have 
made  known  to  both  South  Africa  and 
Mozambique — and,  indeed,  to  all  govern- 
ments of  the  region — our  willingness  to 
help.  We  have  stressed  our  conviction 
that  the  problem  of  cross-border 
violence,  if  allowed  to  go  unresolved, 
will  seriously  endanger  prospects  for 
both  stability  and  peaceful  change. 

Let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  the 
United  States  deplores  violent  cross- 
border  activities  in  southern  Africa,  in 


ugust 1983 


75 


UNITED  NATIONS 


whatever  direction  and  for  whatever 
stated  goal.  Similarly,  we  categorically 
reaffirm  the  principle  that  all  states 
have  a  duty  to  refrain  from  tolerating  or 
acquiescing  in  organized  activities  within 
their  territory  by  guerrillas  or  dissidents 
planning  acts  of  violence  in  the  territory 
of  another  state.  There  can  be  no  double 
standard  for  southern  Africa.  Cross- 
border  violence  cannot  be  condoned, 
whether  it  be  in  the  form  of  a  bomb 
placed  in  a  crowded  square  in  Pretoria 
by  externally  based  organizations  or  of 
the  continuing  violation  of  Angola's  ter- 
ritorial integrity  by  South  African 
forces. 

The  Security  Council  also  bears  a 
solemn  responsibility  to  uphold  the  prin- 
ciples of  nonviolence  and  the  settlement 
of  disputes  by  peaceful  means.  Those 
principles  are  especially  pertinent  to  the 
issue  which  this  meeting  of  the  Council 
has  been  convened  to  consider. 

The  United  States  welcomes  the  op- 
portunity afforded  by  this  meeting  to 
participate  in  a  review  of  the  efforts 
that  are  being  made  to  bring  about  the 
independence  of  Namibia,  in  accordance 
with  decisions  previously  taken  by  the 
Council.  As  all  are  aware,  the  United 
Nations,  and  in  particular  the  Security 
Council,  bears  a  unique  responsibility  for 
furthering  the  interests  of  the  people  of 
Namibia  and  their  aspirations  for  peace, 
justice,  and  independence.  It  has  been  2 
years  since  the  Council  last  met  to  ex- 
amine the  question  of  Namibia,  and  it  is, 
therefore,  appropriate  that  it  should 
wish  to  review  what  has  transpired  in 
the  intervening  period. 

The  participation  in  this  debate  of  so 
many  distinguished  foreign  ministers 
testifies  to  the  importance  and  the 
urgency  which  the  international  com- 
munity as  a  whole  attaches  to  the  attain- 
ment by  the  people  of  Namibia  of  their 
justly  deserved  and  too  long  delayed  in- 
dependence. I  especially  welcome  the 
presence  here  of  the  foreign  ministers  of 
the  front-line  states,  with  which  govern- 
ments of  the  Western  contact  group 
have  enjoyed  an  active,  constructive, 
and  vital  partnership  in  our  efforts  to 
hasten  Namibia's  independence. 

Finally,  I  welcome  this  opportunity 
to  report  to  you  on  the  role  that  my 
government,  in  partnership  with  the 
other  members  of  the  Western  contact 
group,  has  sought  to  play  in  helping  to 
promote  a  peaceful,  negotiated  settle- 
ment for  the  earliest  possible  attainment 
of  Namibia's  independence. 

Before  doing  so,  however,  I  wish  to 
pay  a  special  tribute  to  the  Secretary 
General.  I  know  first-hand  his  deeply 


felt  commitment  to  the  attainment  of 
Namibia's  independence.  I  have  been  im- 
pressed by  his  dedication  and  objectivity 
and  have  full  confidence  in  his  ability  to 
carry  out  the  responsibility  assigned  to 
him  under  Security  Council  Resolution 
435.  I  am  also  aware  of  the  efforts  he 
and  his  staff  have  made  to  ensure  that 
all  is  in  readiness  for  the  day  when 
agreement  is  reached  for  implementa- 
tion of  the  UN  settlement  plan. 

I  also  wish  to  thank  the  Secretary 
General  for  his  report,  which  provides 
an  accurate  summation  of  what  has 
transpired  since  the  Council  last  met  on 
this  issue  in  April  1981.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  recapitulate  what  he  has 
already  set  out.  I  would,  however,  like 
to  recall  the  very  different  circum- 
stances that  prevailed  at  the  time  of 
that  last  meeting. 

The  tone  and  the  outcome  of  that 
debate  were  very  much  a  reflection  of 
the  widespread  disappointment  over  the 
failure  of  the  preimplementation 
meeting  in  Geneva  to  reach  agreement 
on  a  date  for  the  start  of  the  cease-fire 
envisaged  in  Security  Council  Resolution 
435.  The  preimplementation  meeting 
ended  only  a  few  days  before  the  Ad- 
ministration, of  which  I  am  now  a 
member,  took  office  in  Washington.  It 
became  one  of  the  urgent  tasks  of  the 
new  American  Government  to  assess, 
jointly  with  its  contact  group  partners, 
the  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the  Geneva 
meeting. 

It  would  be  fair  to  say  that  the  new 
American  Government  was  the  recipient 
of  a  great  deal  of  advice  at  that  time.  I 
will  be  frank  in  telling  you  that  there 
were  those  who  advised  strongly  against 
a  continuing  U.S.  role  in  pursuit  of  a 
negotiated  settlement  of  the  Namibian 
problem.  It  was  said  that  the  obstacles 
to  a  peaceful  settlement  were  too  great 
to  be  overcome  and  that  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  in  the  region  did  not 
justify  the  tremendous  commitment  of 
time  and  energy  that  would  be  required. 

Needless  to  say,  those  responsible 
for  formulating  the  policies  of  this  Ad- 
ministration did  not  share  these  views. 
Although  mindful  of  the  great  dif- 
ficulties involved,  they  were  also  aware 
of  the  efforts  that  had  already  been 
made  and  of  the  opportunity  which  ex- 
isted to  resolve,  through  peaceful 
negotiations,  this  pressing  issue.  They 
were  in  this  regard  sensitive  to  the  car- 
dinal importance  attached  to  Namibia's 
early  independence  by  the  nations  of 
Africa.  These  goals  more  than  justified  a 
rededication  of  efforts  which  the  contact 
group  had  first  undertaken  4  years 
earlier. 


At  the  same  time,  we  were  anxious 
in  our  renewed  approach  to  the  probler 
to  avoid,  if  at  all  possible,  the  frustra- 
tions of  the  past.  We  sought  an  ap- 
proach that  would  not  result  in  the  san 
disappointment  so  keenly  felt — above  a 
by  the  people  of  Namibia — following  th 
failure  of  the  Geneva  preimplementatio 
meeting.  With  this  firmly  in  mind,  we 
undertook  a  fresh  round  of  consulta- 
tions, first  with  our  contact  partners 
and  then  with  the  other  concerned  par- 
ties— the  front-line  states,  the  South 
African  Government,  SWAPO  [South 
West  Africa  People  Organization]  and 
the  Namibian  political  parties  that  wou 
also  participate  in  the  UN-supervised 
elections  envisaged  in  Resolution  435. 

In  the  course  of  these  consultations 
several  facts  became  abundantly  clear. 

•  We  were  assured  of  the  interest 
and  the  desire  of  all  those  directly  con- 
cerned that  the  negotiations  should  con 
tinue. 

•  It  was  clear  that  in  the  absence  i 
a  peaceful  negotiated  settlement  leadin; 
to  Namibia's  independence,  the  situatio 
of  armed  conflict  and  instability  in  the 
region  would  only  worsen,  with  unac- 
ceptable consequences  for  all  the  in- 
habitants of  the  region. 

•  We  were  assured  by  those  with 
the  greatest  stake  in  the  success  of  the 
negotiations  that  the  contact  group  hao 
a  continuing  and  important  role  to  play 
in  helping  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  set 
tlement. 

On  the  basis  of  this  assessment,  tht 
foreign  ministers  of  the  contact  group 
met  in  May  1981  and  decided  to  redou- 
ble their  efforts  to  bring  about  a  nego- 
tiated settlement.  They  reaffirmed  thei 
conviction  that  only  a  settlement  under 
the  aegis  of  the  United  Nations  would 
find  broad  international  acceptance  and 
that  Security  Council  Resolution  435 
continued  to  provide  the  basis  for 
Namibia's  peaceful  transition  to  in- 
dependence. Bearing  in  mind  the  dif- 
ficulties that  had  arisen  at  the 
preimplementation  meeting  in  Geneva, 
the  contact  group  of  foreign  ministers 
further  decided  to  develop  specific  pro- 
posals that  would  address  directly  the 
concerns  that  had  thus  far  prevented  th 
implementation  of  Resolution  435.  They 
considered  that  the  purpose  of  these 
proposals  should  be  to  give  all  concerne 
greater  confidence  as  regards  the  futurr 
of  an  independent  Namibia. 

Since  the  relaunching  of  their 
negotiating  efforts  in  the  spring  of  1981 
the  members  of  the  contact  group  have 
worked  closely  and  intensively  with  all 


76 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


UNITED  NATIONS 


the  parties  concerned.  It  is  a  matter  of 
the  greatest  regret  to  us — as  I  know  it 
s  to  all  of  those  here — that  the  promise 
)f  Namibia's  independence  has  not  yet 
jeen  realized.  At  the  same  time, 
lowever,  I  believe  it  would  be  a  mistake 
x>  discount  the  progress  that  has  been 
ichieved  toward  the  implementation  of 
Resolution  435  since  the  Council  last 
net  to  review  the  situation. 

First,  it  is  important  to  note  that  all 
)arties  concerned  have  reaffirmed  their 
icceptance  of  Resolution  435.  That 
esolution,  and  the  settlement  plan  it  en- 
lorsed,  remains  the  only  agreed  and 
ecognized  basis  for  an  internationally 
acceptable  settlement  of  the  Namibia 
luestion. 

Second,  all  parties  have  committed 
hemselves  to  constitutional  principles 
vhich  will  serve  as  a  guide  to  the 
•lected  constituent  assembly  in  drafting 
democratic  constitution  for  an  in- 
ependent  Namibia.  This  agreement, 
/hich  was  confirmed  to  the  Secretary 
reneral  in  July  of  last  year  and  which  is 
oted  in  his  report  to  the  Security  Coun- 
il,  has  helped  to  reassure  all  those  who 
/ill  participate  in  the  UN-supervised 
lections  of  the  democratic  future  of  an 
idependent  Namibia. 

Third,  substantial  progress  has  also 
•een  made  in  resolving  the  issues  which 
'ere  responsible  for  the  unsuccessful 
utcome  of  the  Geneva  preimplementa- 
on  meeting.  In  particular,  through  in- 
msive  consultations  which  took  place  in 
ew  York  and  Washington  last  summer, 
lvolving  representatives  of  the  front- 
ne  states,  SWAPO,  South  Africa,  and 
f  the  UN  Secretariat,  understandings 
ere  reached  that  will  assure  all  parties 
i )  the  elections  of  the  fairness  and  im- 
artiality  of  the  process  leading  to 
amibia's  independence. 

Finally,  through  their  own  consulta- 
ons  with  the  parties  concerned,  the 
ecretary  General  and  his  staff  have 
iade  substantial  progress  in  resolving 
I  itstanding  questions  concerning  the 
I  )mposition  and  deployment  of  the 
I  lilitary  component  of  UNTAG  [UN 
ransition  Assistance  Group].  Here  I 
ould  like  once  again  to  express  our  ap- 
!  reciation  to  the  Secretary  General  for 
le  determined  efforts  he  has  made  to 
isure  that  all  is  in  readiness  for  the  im- 
jlementation  of  the  UN  settlement  plan. 
Because  of  the  substantial  progress 
lat  has  been  made  over  the  past  2 
lears,  only  two  major  issues  remain  to 
;  a  resolved  in  preparation  for  the  im- 
i  iementation  of  Resolution  435.  These 


•  The  choice  of  the  electoral  system 
to  be  employed  in  the  elections,  which 
all  parties  are  agreed  must  be  settled  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Resolution  435  and  in  a  manner  that 
does  not  cause  delay,  and 

•  Final,  technical  matters  concern- 
ing the  composition  of  the  military  com- 
ponent of  UNTAG. 

While  the  United  States  is  pleased 
with  the  record  of  what  has  been 
achieved  over  the  past  2  years,  we  are 
by  no  means  satisfied.  Indeed,  none  of 
us  can  rest  content  until  the  goal  which 
we  seek  has  been  attained.  But  the  fact 
that  much  has  been  achieved  justifies 
continued  commitment  to  the  course. 

Apart  from  the  specific  accom- 
plishments I  have  just  mentioned,  there 
has  been  the  development  of  an  at- 
mosphere of  confidence  which  we  hope 
will  make  it  possible  for  the  parties  con- 
cerned to  take  the  important  political 
decisions  necessary  to  go  forward  with 
the  implementation  of  Resolution  435. 
We  have  been  especially  gratified  by  the 
constructive  and  flexible  attitude 
displayed  by  the  concerned  parties, 
which  has  made  possible  the  progress 
that  has  been  achieved  to  date. 

We  share  the  concern  that  the  fac- 
tors relating  to  the  regional  situation  in 
southern  Africa,  which  are,  however, 
outside  the  scope  of  the  mandate  of  the 
contact  group,  have  not  yet  permitted 
implementation  of  the  UN  plan.  We 
believe  that  these  issues  should  be 
resolved  rapidly,  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  the  sovereignty  of  all  states  con- 
cerned, so  that  the  people  of  Namibia 
can  exercise  their  right  of  self- 
determination.  The  ministers  have  ac- 
cordingly decided  that  the  contact  group 
should  continue  its  work  with  all  urgen- 
cy. 

We  are  convinced — now  more  than 
ever  before — that  with  the  continued 
good  faith  and  cooperation  of  all  con- 
cerned, our  shared  objective  of  a 
negotiated  settlement  leading  to  a 
stable,  democratic,  prosperous,  and  in- 
dependent Namibia  will  be  realized. 

Here  I  would  like  to  say  a  word 
about  the  role  and  the  objectives  of  my 
government  in  these  negotiations. 

•  I  wish  to  stress  above  all  that  the 
United  States  neither  desires  nor  seeks 
any  special  advantage  or  position  for 
itself  in  these  negotiations. 

•  It  is  not  our  intention,  nor  is  it 
within  our  power,  to  impose  our  own 
views  or  wishes  on  those  whose  interests 
and  aspirations  are  most  directly  in- 
volved. 


•  We  fully  respect  the  fact  that  the 
political  decisions  needed  to  proceed 
with  the  implementation  of  the  UN  set- 
tlement plan  are  sovereign  decisions 
that  can  only  be  taken  by  the  govern- 
ments most  immediately  and  directly 
concerned. 

•  Furthermore,  we  recognize  that 
those  who  must  take  those  decisions  will 
wish  to  assure  themselves  that  their  own 
interests  and  security  will  be  respected 
and  protected. 

•  In  the  sometimes  thankless  role 
that  we  have  assumed,  our  sole  objective 
has  been  to  assist  the  parties  in  over- 
coming the  difficulties  that  have  to  date 
prevented  the  implementation  of  Securi- 
ty Council  Resolution  435  and  the  attain- 
ment of  Namibia's  independence. 

•  Finally,  I  wish  to  assure  all  those 
here  assembled  that  the  United  States 
will  continue  to  work  for  Namibia's  tran- 
sition to  stable  and  prosperous  independ- 
ence once  an  agreement  has  been 
achieved.  With  other  members  of  the 
United  Nations,  we  are  prepared  to  con- 
tribute a  fair  share  to  ensure  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  UN  Transition  Assistance 
Group.  We  also  stand  ready  to  cooperate 
with  others  in  providing  the  assistance 
that  will  be  essential  to  giving  all  Na- 
mibians  the  opportunity  to  lead  peaceful 
and  productive  lives. 

I  am  keenly  aware  of  the  sense  of 
frustration  felt  by  members  of  this  body 
because  the  aspirations  of  the  people  of 
Namibia  have  not  been  realized.  We 
share  that  frustration,  and  we  have  sym- 
pathy for  the  people  of  Namibia,  and  the 
region,  who  suffer  from  the  continuing 
conflict.  We  will  not,  however,  allow  our 
feelings  of  frustration  to  lead  us  to 
despair.  Our  common  efforts  will  suc- 
ceed. The  only  alternative  to  the  con- 
tinued, vigorous  pursuit  of  a  peaceful, 
negotiated  settlement  is  a  more 
dangerous  and  ever  more  destructive 
escalation  of  the  violence  that  the  people 
of  Namibia  and  those  throughout  the 
region  have  known  too  well  too  long. 

Those  of  us  who  are  privileged  to 
participate  in  the  decisions  of  this  body 
have  a  special  responsibility  to  do  all  we 
can  to  help  achieve  Namibian  independ- 
ence peacefully  and  promptly.  We  are 
ready  to  work  closely  with  other 
members  of  the  Council  and  with  the 
parties  concerned  to  achieve  such  an 
outcome,  which  we  know  will  also 
enhance  the  prospects  for  peace,  securi- 
ty, and  economic  development 
throughout  the  region. 


■  ugust  1983 


77 


UNITED  NATIONS 


SECURITY  COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION  532, 
MAY  31,  19832 

The  Security  Council. 

Having  considered  the  report  of  the 
Secretary -General, 

Recalling  General  Assembly  Resolutions 
1514  (XV)  of  14  December  1960  and  2145 
(XXI)  of  27  October  1966, 

Recalling  and  reaffirming  its  Resolutions 
301  (1971),  385  (1976),  431  (1978),  432  (1978), 
435  (1978)  and  439  (1978), 

Reaffirming  the  legal  responsibility  of  the 
United  Nations  over  Namibia  and  the 
primary  responsibility  of  the  Security  Council 
for  ensuring  the  implementation  of  its 
Resolutions  385  (1976)  and  435  (1978),  in- 
cluding the  holding  of  free  and  fair  elections 
in  Namibia  under  the  supervision  and  control 
of  the  United  Nations, 

Taking  note  of  the  results  of  the  interna- 
tional conference  in  support  of  the  struggle 
of  the  Namibian  people  for  independence, 
held  at  UNESCO  House  in  Paris  from  25  to 
29  April  1983, 

Taking  note  of  the  protracted  and  ex- 
haustive consultations  which  have  taken  place 
since  the  adoption  of  Resolution  435  (1978), 

Noting  with  regret  that  those  consulta- 
tions have  not  yet  brought  about  the  im- 
plementation of  Resolution  435  (1978), 

1.  Condemns  South  Africa's  continued  il- 
legal occupation  of  Namibia  in  flagrant  de- 
fiance of  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly 
and  decisions  of  the  Security  Council  of  the 
United  Nations; 

2.  Calls  upon  South  Africa  to  make  a 
firm  commitment  as  to  its  readiness  to  com- 
ply with  Security  Council  Resolution  435 
(1978)  for  the  independence  of  Namibia; 

3.  Further  calls  upon  South  Africa  to  co- 
operate forthwith  and  fully  with  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  in 
order  to  expedite  the  implementation  of 
Resolution  435  (1978)  for  the  early  in- 
dependence of  Namibia; 

4.  Decides  to  mandate  the  Secretary- 
General  to  undertake  consultations  with  the 
parties  to  the  proposed  cease-fire,  with  a 
view  to  securing  the  speedy  implementation 
of  Security  Council  Resolution  435  (1978); 

5.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
report  to  the  Security  Council  on  the  results 
of  these  consultations  as  soon  as  possible  and 
not  later  than  31  August  1983; 

6.  Decides  to  remain  actively  seized  of  the 
matter. 


AMBASSADOR  LICHENSTEIN, 
MAY  31,  19833 

The  United  States  is  pleased  to  have 
been  able  to  vote  for  the  resolution  we 
adopted  this  morning.  We  share  the 
common  objective  of  all  members  of  the 
Council — the  swiftest  possible  attain- 
ment of  Namibian  independence,  and  we 


believe  that  this  resolution  will  make  a 
positive  contribution  to  that  end. 

The  United  States  must  point  out 
that  preambular  paragraph  2  refers  to 
several  resolutions,  among  which  there 
was  one — Security  Council  Resolution 
439  (1978)— which  the  United  States  did 
not  support.  Our  affirmative  vote  on  the 
present  resolution  does  not  imply  any 
change  in  the  U.S.  position  on  Resolu- 
tion 439. 

With  regard  to  the  fifth  preambular 
paragraph,  echoing  the  comments  of  the 
representative  of  the  United  Kingdom,  I 
would  note  that  my  government, 
although  represented  at  the  Paris  con- 
ference on  Namibia,  was  not  a  party  to 
its  decisions.  Together  with  other 
members  of  the  contact  group,  the 
United  States  informed  the  Secretary 
General  that  it  would  not  participate  in 
the  decisions  of  the  conference  in  view 
of  its  role,  as  a  member  of  the  contact 
group,  in  the  negotiations  aimed  at 
achieving  Namibia's  independence. 

Over  the  past  2  years  and  longer, 
my  government  has  been  deeply  in- 
volved in  the  search  for  a  settlement  of 
the  Namibia  problem.  We  understand 
the  frustration  that  Namibia  in- 
dependence has  not,  in  fact,  yet  been 
achieved.  However,  in  addition  to  the 
very  substantial  progress  which  has 
been  made  in  fleshing  out  the 
framework  of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  435,  we  believe  a  great  deal 
has  also  been  accomplished  toward 
establishing  an  environment  in  which  all 
parties  are  able  to  take  the  political  deci- 
sions necessary  to  implement  the  UN 
plan.  If  there  is  to  be  a  lasting  settle- 
ment, we  need  to  create  the  conditions 
in  which  all  countries  in  the 
region — most  particularly  South  Africa 
and  Angola — can  feel  secure  and  turn 
their  energies  to  their  own  development. 
This  would,  of  necessity,  involve  not  on- 
ly complete  respect  for  territorial  in- 
tegrity by  all  countries  within  the 
region,  it  must  also  involve  the 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  in  the 
region.  Creating  the  secure  conditions 
that  in  turn  may  provide  a  climate  of 
confidence  will  be  an  essential  part  of 
this  settlement  for  which  we  all  devoutly 
wish  and  toward  which  we  are  all 
earnestly  working. 


UNICEF 


■USUN  press  release  11 
2 Adopted  unanimously. 
3USUN  press  release  44. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT. 
APR.  18,  19831 

For  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century,  the 
United  States  has  generously  offered 
resources  and  know-how  to  give  a  bet- 
ter, healthier  life  to  ill  and  malnourishei 
people  throughout  the  world.  Despite 
past  efforts  and  progress  by  the  United 
States  and  many  other  countries,  the 
United  Nations  Children's  Fund 
(UNICEF)  recently  reported  that  over 
40,000  children  in  developing  countries 
will  die  every  day,  victims  of  malnutri- 
tion and  disease.  This  is  a  tragedy  of 
global  proportions  and  requires  a  global 
effort  in  response. 

UNICEF  is  now  pursuing  a  "health 
revolution"  for  children  in  developing 
countries  that  involves  a  new  combina- 
tion of  technological  and  social  ap- 
proaches to  health.  It  is  estimated  that 
this  combination,  coupled  with  networks 
of  trained  health  workers  backed  by 
government  services  and  international 
assistance,  can  save  the  lives  of  20,000 
children  each  day  within  a  decade. 
Moreover,  literally  hundreds  of  millions 
of  young  lives  would  be  healthier. 

One  technological  achievement  has 
been  the  development  and  distribution  c 
an  inexpensive  home  treatment  for  diar 
rhea,  a  major  contributor  to  deaths 
among  young  children  in  developing 
countries.  This  treatment  was  developei 
after  years  of  research  in  the  Interna- 
tional Center  for  Diarrheal  Disease 
Research  in  Bangladesh.  The  United 
States  has  contributed  to  that  institutio 
for  more  than  20  years.  The  World 
Health  Organization  has  also  been  a 
focal  point  for  international  support  anc 
study  of  diarrheal  diseases. 

A  second  element  is  the  develop- 
ment of  low-cost  vaccines  which  do  not 
require  refrigeration  and  which  can  be 
used  in  remote  areas  to  protect  children 
from  such  killers  as  measles,  diphtheria, 
tetanus,  whooping  cough,  polio,  and 
tuberculosis. 

Another  factor  is  the  promotion  of 
breast  feeding  for  its  nutritional  and 
hygienic  value,  as  well  as  its  im- 
munological qualities.  Still  another  is  a 
simple  infant  weight  chart  kept  by  the 
child's  mother  which  indicates  a  child's 
progress  at  monthly  weighings,  making 


78 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


malnutrition  quickly  detectable.  Its 
Idesign  and  use  have  been  improved  and 
tested  in  U. S. -supported  maternal-child 
'health  programs  around  the  world. 
UNICEF  has  found  that  a  great  portion 
of  malnutrition  cases  are  due  to  the 
problem  going  undetected  rather  than 
'lack  of  food  in  the  family. 

The  American  people  have  always 
been  in  the  vanguard  of  support  for 


children's  health  and  well-being.  As 
President  of  the  United  Slates,  I  am 
asking  the  American  people  to  help 
bring  about  a  health  revolution  for 
children  during  the  coming  decade  by 
supporting  UNICEF's  humanitarian  pro- 
gram. 


■Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  25,  1983. 


Caribbean  Basin  Recovery  Act 


by  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
vi  Trade  of  the  House  Ways  and  Means 
'ommittee  on  June  9.  1983.  Am- 
nisssador  Eagleburger  is  Under 
■secretary  for  Political  Affairs.1 

t  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to  appear  before 
his  committee  to  testify  on  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  initiative.  The  Secretary 
isked  me  to  express  his  regret  that  he 
vould  not  be  able  to  appear  himself.  He 
s  attending  a  NATO  Foreign  Ministers 
neeting  in  Paris.  Both  he  and  I — 
ndeed,  the  Administration  as  a 
vhole — place  a  great  deal  of  importance 
m  this  program  and  on  the  need  for 
apid  action.  It  has  already  been  too 
ong  delayed. 

The  House  of  Representatives  last 
December  passed  the  Caribbean  Basin 
nitiative,  and  I,  therefore,  hope  that 
I  his  committee  and  this  chamber  will  be 
.ble  to  act  expeditiously.  The  House 
■^ave  a  large  bipartisan  vote  to  the 
egislation  last  year,  which  is  a  clear  in- 
lication  that  the  importance  of  the  ini- 
(iative  to  the  U.S.  national  interest  is 
lready  widely  understood.  But  let  me 
ust  recall  some  of  the  crucial  points  in 
javor  of  the  program. 

First,  although  the  United  States  is 
in  enormously  powerful  and  prosperous 
lation,  we  are  not  isolated  from  the  rest 
f  the  world.  Indeed,  to  a  large  extent, 
^e  draw  our  strength  and  our  prosperi- 
y  from  that  of  our  neighbors  and 
rriends.  The  Caribbean  Basin  is  our 
eighborhood  and,  as  such,  it  is  a  region 
f  particular  importance  to  us.  By  this 
dme,  many  in  the  Congress  already 
;now  some  of  the  facts  regarding  our  in- 
erdependence  with  the  region;  for  ex- 
mple,  that  half  of  our  trade,  including 
wo-thirds  of  our  energy  trade,  passes 
hrough  the  sealanes  of  the  Caribbean 
iSasin.  Our  historical,  social,  and 


economic  ties  also  are  extremely  strong. 
It  is  the  second  largest  source  of  im- 
migration to  the  United  States  and  of- 
fers a  $6  billion  market  for  our  goods. 
Clearly,  its  prosperity  and  peacefulness 
are  not  just  of  altruistic  interest  to  us; 
the  lives  of  our  citizens  are  and  will  con- 
tinue to  be  deeply  affected  by  what  hap- 
pens there. 

Prosperity  and  peace  in  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  mean  greater  security  and 
new  economic  opportunities  for  us  in  the 
United  States  and  social  exchanges 
based  on  mutual  interest  enriching  all 
our  societies  and  cultures.  Economic 
decline  and  political  disruption  in  the 
Caribbean  Basin,  on  the  other  hand, 
mean  a  continued  need  by  the  United 
States  to  devote  resources  to  protect 
itself  against  the  possibility  of  the  area 
being  dominated  by  hostile  powers.  Pro- 
longed social  and  economic  disruption 
would  also  provoke  an  exodus  of 
desperate  people  seeking  a  safe  haven  in 
the  United  States.  Our  nation  has 
gained  enormously  from  the  skills  and 
energies  of  political  and  economic- 
refugees.  It  is,  clearly,  in  our  and  other 
nations'  interest,  however,  to  promote 
cultural  and  economic  interchange 
without  the  terrible  personal  suffering 
that  massive  refugee  movements 
produce. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  countries 
of  the  Caribbean  Basin  desperately  need 
this  program.  These  small  states  lack 
the  large  domestic  markets  needed  to 
encourage  broad-based  industrial  and 
agricultural  development.  While  some 
countries  have  begun  to  diversify  during 
recent  decades,  their  economies  still  de- 
pend heavily  on  a  few  primary  exports 
such  as  coffee,  sugar,  bananas,  and 
bauxite,  and  on  tourism.  As  small  coun- 
tries, they  are  extraordinarily  vulnerable 
to  the  effects  of  international  economic 
developments. 


The  economies  of  this  region  have 
been  devastated  by  the  worldwide 
economic  recession  of  the  past  several 
years.  In  almost  every  country,  the  past 
'1  years  have  seen  falling  income  and  ris- 
ing unemployment.  Shrinking  govern- 
ment revenues  have  delayed  vital 
development  projects  and  social  pro- 
grams. The  U.S.  recession  caused  a 
steep  drop  in  the  tourism  revenues  so 
essential  to  many  Caribbean  countries. 
In  Central  America,  recession  has  been 
exacerbated  by  violence,  causing  a 
severe  drop  in  intraregional  trade  and 
bringing  new  investment  to  a  standstill. 
As  the  economic  situation  in  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  has  worsened,  it  has  indirect- 
ly affected  the  United  States.  Lower  ex- 
port earnings  have  made  it  difficult  for 
many  of  the  countries  to  service  their 
external  debts,  a  large  part  of  which  is 
held  by  U.S.  banks.  Economic  disloca- 
tion has  contributed  to  illegal  immigra- 
tion into  this  country.  Our  exports  to  the 
region  fell  by  almost  $300  million  in 
1982,  a  cost  to  our  economy  of  some 
10,000  jobs. 

Impact  of  the  Initiative 
on  U.S.  Employment 

As  I  noted  before,  I  believe  that  there  is 
already  a  broad  understanding  of  our 
interdependence  with  the  Caribbean 
Basin  and,  hence,  of  the  need  for  the 
United  States  to  act  to  help.  However, 
there  is  also  concern  in  some  quarters 
about  the  impact  of  the  initiative  on 
employment  in  the  United  States.  On 
this  point,  the  critics  make  one  fun- 
damental assumption  about  trade  and 
economic  relationships  which  I  strongly 
believe  to  be  false.  They  seem  to  believe 
that  what  the  Caribbean  Basin  gains  will 
be  lost  by  the  United  States.  Trade  is 
not  a  zero  sum  game.  All  economic 
history  proves  it.  Economic  exchange  oc- 
curs because  both  parties  have  some- 
thing to  gain  from  the  transaction.  Con- 
sequently, the  increase  in  prosperity 
which  we  are  aiming  to  achieve  in  the 
Caribbean  Basin  will  not  come  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  U.S.  economy.  The  jobs 
created  in  the  Caribbean  Basin  will  not 
mean  that  an  equivalent  number  of  jobs 
is  lost  in  the  United  States.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  increased  prosperity  of  Carib- 
bean Basin  countries  will  mean  both  an 
increase  in  jobs  for  their  own  people  at 
home — thus  reduced  emigration — and 
an  increase  in  their  demand  for  U.S.  ex- 
ports. The  results  on  both  counts  should 
be  additional  jobs  for  our  unemployed. 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


There  are  other  critics  who 
recognize  that,  while  increased  trade 
may  be  beneficial  over  the  long  term 
to  the  United  States  as  a  whole,  certain 
groups  within  the  United  States  might 
be  adversely  affected — notably 
industries  particularly  sensitive  to  im- 
ports. There  are  some  issues  of  transi- 
tion and  adjustment  which  must  be 
addressed.  This  legislation  does  that. 
There  are  safeguard  provisions  which 
allow  for  reimposition  of  the  duty  in 
cases  where  U.S.  industries  or  workers 
are  threatened  with  serious  injury. 
Rules-of-origin  requirements  will  prevent 
mere  pass  through  or  simple  assembly 
operations  which  do  not  involve  signifi- 
cant local  value  added.  The  legislation 
passed  by  the  House  last  year  excludes  a 
number  of  politically  sensitive  products. 
Any  further  product  exceptions  or 


weakening  of  the  economic  provisions  of 
this  legislation  would,  in  my  view,  be 
clearly  unnecessary  and,  more  impor- 
tantly, would  result  in  a  program  with 
more  promise  than  performance. 

Providing  Incentives 

If  we  want  to  help  our  neighbors,  then 
let  us  do  it  effectively.  We  need  to  give 
these  small  economies  real  incentives — 
incentives  which  are  comprehensive, 
simple  to  understand  and  take  advan- 
tage of,  and  sufficiently  long  term  to 
provide  stable  expectations.  The  opening 
of  our  large  market  to  Caribbean  Basin 
countries  for  a  12-year  period  without 
duty  impediments  is  a  bold  and  effective 
step.  In  passing  such  a  program,  this 
Congress  will  help  provide  a  powerful 
new  set  of  opportunities  for  the  Carib- 


bean Basin  countries  and,  at  the  same 
time,  will  provide  some  rich  new  oppor-i 
tunities  to  our  own  industries  and 
workers. 

The  threat  which  increased  imports 
from  the  Caribbean  Basin  pose  to  us  is 
minimal.  Remember  that  the  Caribbean 
Basin  economies  are  equal  to  only  2%  c 
our  gross  national  product,  and  our  tot 
imports  from  the  region  are  less  than 
4%  of  our  global  imports.  The  products 
that  would  be  extended  duty-free  entry 
as  a  result  of  this  legislation  comprise 
only  one-half  of  1%  of  our  total  import' 
Clearly  then,  the  risk  of  injury  to  the 
United  States  is  small.  The  Caribbean 
Basin  countries  can  experience  a  very 
significant  increase  in  production  and 
exports  without  having  an  appreciable 
impact  on  the  U.S.  economy.  I  hope  an 
expect  that  this  increase  will  occur  botl 


U.S.  Medical  Team  to  El  Salvador 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  2,  19831 

As  a  humanitarian  gesture,  the  United 
States  will  provide  a  medical  team  to  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador.  The  team  is 
a  battalion-size  unit  of  20  to  25 
members,  composed  of  doctors,  techni- 
cians, medics,  and  corpsmen,  who  will 
assist  the  El  Salvadoran  Government  in 
emergency  medical  services.  The  unit  is 
composed  of  military  personnel  from  the 
various  service  branches.  About  a  third 
of  that  total  will  be  doctors. 

The  decision  which  was  approved  by 
the  President  was  in  response  to  a  re- 
quest by  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador.  There  have  been  reports,  both 
from  the  government  and  from  the 
private  sector,  that  have  cited  the 
serious  medical  problems  faced  by  the 
military  and  civilian  population  in  El 
Salvador.  Of  particular  interest  was  a 
study  by  the  New  England  Journal  of 
Medicine,  which  pointed  out  in  specific 
terms  the  difficulties  faced  by  the  people 
of  El  Salvador. 

After  these  needs  were  pointed  out 
by  the  government,  and  prior  to  the 
New  England  medical  publication,  the 
United  States  sent  a  survey  team  to  El 
Salvador  to  study  the  needs  and  to 
recommend  a  U.S.  response.  The  action 
is  a  result  of  their  recommendations. 

Consultations  with  appropriate 


Members  of  Congress  began  several 
weeks  ago.  We  have  kept  Congress  fully 
abreast  of  our  plans.  The  reaction 
among  key  Members  of  Congress  has 
been  one  of  understanding  and  general 
approval. 

This  decision  in  no  way  conflicts 
with  our  self-imposed  commitment  to 
hold  the  number  of  military  trainers  to 
55.  The  number  at  the  moment  is  52 
military  trainers,  but  it  does  vary  vir- 
tually on  a  day-to-day  basis.  It  has  not 
exceeded  55,  and  we  have  no  plans  to 
exceed  this  limit. 

The  medical  team,  which  will  be 
headed  by  two  medical  service  officers, 
will  be  under  the  policy  direction  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy.  They  will  report  through 
appropriate  military  channels.  They  will 
assist  the  Salvadoran  Government  in 
treating  their  civilian  and  military 
casualties.  They  will  provide  guidance  to 
the  government  in  establishing  their 
own  medical  services. 

It  is  our  desire  in  taking  this  action 
to  help  alleviate  a  devastating  situation. 
It  is  our  intention  to  provide  basic 
humanitarian  medical  relief  through 
training  medics,  helping  establish  a 
medical  supply  system,  and  repairing 
medical  equipment. 

This  team  would  be  able  to  under- 
take an  extensive  survey  in  the  military 
hospital  medical  system  and  begin  repair 
of  equipment  and  establishment  of  a 
medical  logistics  system  and  would  in- 


struct El  Salvadoran  armed  forces 
medical  personnel  in  field-medic  tech- 
niques. 

This  project  is  designed  to  help 
alleviate  a  bad  situation,  which  is  gettii 
worse.  They  will  operate  in  the  San 
Salvador  area.  The  duration  of  their 
stay  is  expected  to  be  about  6  months.  | 
The  U.S.  survey  teams,  which  have 
observed  medical  conditions  in  El 
Salvador  for  a  number  of  weeks,  repor 
the  medical  situation  in  the  country  is  I 
critical.  The  Salvadorans  are  faced  wit  I 
crowded  medical  facilities,  lack  of  equ|  I 
ment  and  sufficiently  trained  medical 
personnel. 

The  President,  once  informed  and 
briefed  on  the  situation,  directed  this  e 
fort  be  made  to  aid  the  people  of  El 
Salvador  in  coping  with  a  difficult  situj 
tii m.  It  is  an  effort  on  our  part  to  allow 
a  nation  struggling  to  establish  demo- 
cratic principles  to  meet  yet  another 
challenge  imposed  on  them  by  an  unfor 
tunate  and  vicious  war  being  waged  an  I 
directed  by  forces  from  outside  their 
country. 

The  President  said,  "The  United 
States  will  not  stand  by  idly  while 
human  suffering  is  at  such  a  level." 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Prin- 
cipal I)epul\   Press  Secretary  lo  the  Presi- 
dent, Larry  Speakes  (text  from  Weekh  Ccffi 
pilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  June  ( 
[983).  ■ 


80 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Sirough  expansion  of  existing  produc- 
tion and  through  entirely  new  produc- 
tion in  sectors  in  which  there  is  no  trade 
at  present. 

All  economic  decisions  involve  some 
risk,  but  if  we  are  paralyzed  into  inac- 
tion or  into  meager  action  by  an  ex- 
cessive fear  of  risk,  then  we  end  up  with 
not  only  stagnation  but  even  less  than 
the  status  quo.  To  move  forward — even 
to  stand  still — we  must  work  in  favor  of 
change,  the  kind  of  change  which 
benefits  ourselves  and  our  neighbors. 

Other  Donor  Countries 

This  program  also  deserves  your  support 
because  it  represents  a  new  departure  in 
our  relationship  with  developing  coun- 
tries. It  is  a  program  which  is  derived 
from  an  intensive  dialogue  with  both 
potential  beneficiaries  and  other  donors. 
Consequently,  it  represents  far  more 
:han  just  a  unilateral  U.S.  effort.  The 
egislation  before  you  is  a  crucial  part  of 
he  international  effort — but  only  a  part. 
Dther  countries  have  contributed,  sig- 
lificantly,  both  in  terms  of  financial 
assistance  and/or  new  trade  and  invest- 
nent  opportunities.  These  efforts  in- 
lude  not  only  those  of  international  in- 
stitutions such  as  the  World  Bank  and 
he  Inter- American  Bank,  and  of 
ieveloped  countries  such  as  Canada,  but 
also  of  the  three  countries  which  have 
heir  own  particular  development  prob- 
ems — Colombia,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela. 
Perhaps  even  more  importantly,  the 
afforts  of  the  donor  countries  are  being 
supported  and  magnified  by  the 
domestic  efforts  of  the  beneficiary  coun- 
ties. Despite  their  limited  resources  and 
:he  meager  lifestyles  that  many  of  their 
oeople  experience,  these  countries  are 
undertaking  some  extremely  painful 
economic  reforms.  They  recognize  that 
:oherent  and  economically  rational 
iomestic  policies  are  essential  to  put 
hem  on  the  road  to  self-sustaining 
growth.  External  assistance  provides 
>nly  the  indispensable  margin  of 
•esources  and  support  to  help  make 
heir  efforts  succeed.  I  want  to  em- 
)hasize  the  sacrifices  which  many  of 
;hese  countries  are  already  making  to 
ulace  themselves  on  the  road  to  recovery 
and  stable,  continued  growth. 


Support  for  Private  Firms 

Another  way  in  which  this  program  is  a 
departure  from  our  traditional  approach 
tn  development  is  that  it  integrates  aid, 
trade,  and  tax  measures  into  a  com- 
plementary and  mutually  reinforcing 
package.  I  was  pleased  last  summer 
when  the  Congress  approved  the 
assistance  portion  of  the  President's 
original  Caribbean  Basin  proposals.  All 
of  the  $350  million  that  was  ap- 
propriated already  has  been  obligated 
for  use  by  the  private  sector  in  those 
countries  with  the  most  serious  financial 
problems.  This  assistance  has  helped 
many  established,  productive  private 
firms  to  continue  operating  and  to  ob- 
tain needed  raw  materials  and  equip- 
ment from  the  United  States.  But,  as 
the  President  said  when  he  requested 
the  special  initiative  appropriation: 
financial  assistance  is  only  a  short-term 
remedy  which  must  be  accompanied  by 
measures  in  other  areas.  Indeed, 
development  will  not  occur  on  a  self- 
sustaining  basis  unless  it  is  a  broad- 
based  process  which  draws  the 
marginalized  sectors  of  these  societies 
into  the  development  process  while 
preserving  basic  individual  rights  and 
freedoms.  We  believe  that  such  develop- 
ment can  only  be  achieved  through  a 
strategy  which  encourages  private  ini- 
tiative and  investment,  which  opens 
markets  and  stimulates  production 
beyond  the  limitations  of  these  small, 
traditional  economies.  This  legislation  is 
the  embodiment  of  that  belief. 


Other  Important  Features 

I  have  focused  on  the  trade  provisions 
because  the  trade  incentive  is  the  heart 
of  the  bill.  I  would  like  to  mention, 
however,  other  important  features.  As 
you  know,  we  had  originally  requested 
an  investment  tax  credit  as  an  additional 
spur  to  foreign  investment.  This  commit- 
tee substituted,  instead,  the  convention 
tax  deduction,  a  provision  which  was 
enthusiastically  welcomed  by  the  coun- 
tries in  the  basin  as  a  positive  stimulus 
to  tourism.  Other  provisions,  which  I 
have  not  focused  upon  today  but  which 
are  very  important,  strengthen  the 
economies  of  Puerto  Rico  and  the  Virgin 
Islands.  These  include  the  rebate  of  ex- 
cise taxes  on  rum,  treating  inputs  from 
Puerto  Rico  and  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands 


as  Caribbean  content  in  meeting  the 
rules  of  origin  requirements  and  allow- 
ing industries  in  Puerto  Rico  and  the 
Virgin  Islands  to  petition  for  import 
relief.  All  of  these  features  of  the  bill 
are  essential  to  our  comprehensive 
policy  toward  the  region. 

Conclusion 

Let  me  close  by  repeating  that  this  is  a 
strong  program,  carefully  designed  to 
promote  the  interests  both  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  nations  of  the  Carib- 
bean Basin.  It  is  a  necessary  program, 
one  that  will  make  a  crucial  difference 
to  Caribbean  Basin  countries  in  turning 
their  economies  and  their  societies 
around.  And,  finally,  it  is  a  program 
whose  implementation  is  long  overdue. 
It  is  now  15  months  since  the  President 
sent  his  original  proposal  to  the 
Congress. 

Secretary  Shultz  earlier  referred  to 
the  Caribbean  Basin  initiative  as  a  far- 
sighted  effort  to  get  ahead  of  history  in 
this  turbulent  region.  The  recent  course 
of  events  in  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean  certainly  underlines  that  the 
effort  is  anything  but  premature.  In- 
deed, we  cannot  afford  to  lose  any  more 
time  in  getting  it  underway.  As  the 
Secretary  has  said,  failure  to  pass  the 
initiative  "would  extinguish  the  hopes 
that  have  been  raised  in  the  region  that 
the  United  States  is  willing  to  give 
significant  help  to  foster  economic  and 
social  progress  in  the  Caribbean  Basin." 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Visit  of  Belize  Prime  Minister 


(White  House  photo  by  Michael  Evans) 


Prime  Minister  George  C.  Price  of 
Belize  made  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  B.C.,  May  11- U,  1983,  to 
meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other 
gureniment  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Price  after  their  meeting  on  May  12. ' 

President  Reagan 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  speak 
with  Prime  Minister  Price  of  Belize,  to 
listen  to  his  views,  and  to  exchange 
ideas. 

Our  two  countries  share  fundamen- 
tal values.  Foremost  among  them  is  a 
deep  and  abiding  commitment  to 
democratic  government.  And  this  has 
been  very  much  emphasized  in  the  con- 
versations that  we've  had  so  far  today. 


In  contrast  to  the  war  and  turmoil 
elsewhere  in  the  region,  Belize — Central 
America's  newest  independent 
democracy — serves  as  a  model  of  peace 
and  stability.  Belize  is  a  developing 
country  struggling  with  serious 
economic  problems.  And  I'm  hopeful 
that  we  can,  as  a  neighbor,  be  of  help, 
especially  in  those  areas  affecting  the 
private  sector. 

Equally  important,  Belize  should 
benefit  under  the  trade  provisions  of  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  now  before 
the  Congress.  But  Prime  Minister  Price 
and  I  have  discussed  in  some  detail  his 
country's  economic  challenges. 

We  also  touched  on  another  struggle 
Belize  has  been  waging — the  battle 


against  marijuana.  And  I'm  impressed 
and  encouraged  by  the  efforts  of  Prim< 
Minister  Price's  government  to  suppret 
the  cultivation  of  cannibas,  a  drug  whk 
threatens  the  foundations  of  both  our 
societies. 

Our  meeting  was  productive  and  cc 
dial.  Our  conversations  have  reaffirmec 
the  close  relations  between  our  two 
countries,  the  friendship  of  our  peoples 
and  our  mutual  commitment  to  freedor 
and  human  rights. 

And,  once  again,  Mr.  Prime 
Minister,  it's  been  a  great  pleasure  to 
have  you  and  your  group  of  ministers 

Prime  Minister  Price 

We  are  happy  to  be  received  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  And  our  exchange  of  views 
served  to  further  the  good  relations  be 
tween  our  two  countries,  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Belize. 

Our  two  countries  share  the  same 
side  of  planet  Earth.  We  can  draw 
wisdom  and  strength  from  the  basic 
values  of  a  common  heritage,  the  same 
language  and  common  law,  a  kindred 
parliamentary  democracy,  and  a  mixed 
economy. 

Belize  is  thankful  for  the  Caribbeai 
Basin  Initiative  and  the  helpful  cooper? 
tion  of  your  people  and  your  govern- 
ment in  our  daily  task  to  maintain 
stability  and  security,  which  result  fror 
mutual  respect  and  recognition  of 
Belize's  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity. 

It  is  our  policy  to  live  in  peace  with 
our  neighbors  and  to  develop  with  equ; 
standing  our  resources  as  together  we 
create  wealth  to  share  in  social  justice. 

To  continue  this  difficult  task,  we 
need  that  wisdom  and  strength  of  whic 
the  Father  of  your  Nation,  President 
George  Washington,  spoke  in  his  partii 
address,  and  I  quote:  "Of  all  the  dispos 
tions  and  habits  which  lead  to  political 
prosperity,  religion  and  morality  are  in 
dispensable  supports." 

With  these  supports  and  with  faith 
in  God,  may  both  our  nations  continue 
do  valiantly  and  thus  achieve  the  well- 
being  and  the  happiness  of  our  peoples. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  1<>.  1983. 


82 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Visit  of  Salvadoran  President 


President  Alvaro  Magana  Borja  of 
El  Salvador  made  an  official  working 
visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  June  16-18, 
1983,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and 
ither  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
Presidents  Reagan  and  Magana  after 
\heir  meeting  on  June  17. 

President  Reagan 

resident  Magana  and  I  have  had  a  cor- 
dial and  a  very  useful  exchange  of  views 
>n  the  situation  in  El  Salvador  and  in 
Central  America.  At  this  time,  his 
government  is  deeply  involved  in 
reparations  for  Presidential  elections 
ind  is  attempting  through  the  Peace 
Commission  to  encourage  the  participa- 
ion  in  the  electoral  process  of  all 
5alvadorans,  including  the  extreme  left. 
?his  is  the  true  path  of  peace  for  that 
ountry. 

We  discussed  the  military  situation 
n  El  Salvador.  President  Magana  also 
letailed  his  government's  reform  efforts, 
deluding  the  land  reform  program  and 
he  recently  announced  plan  for  judicial 
eform.  He  reaffirmed  his  government's 
ommitment  to  human  rights. 

Regionally,  our  talks  focused  on  the 
hreat  posed  by  Nicaragua  to  other 
ountries  in  Central  America.  We 
eviewed  the  status  of  the  Contadora 
litiative  and  the  efforts  of  democratic 
ountries  in  the  region  to  find  a  peaceful 
olution. 

President  Magana  is  a  courageous 
nd  talented  leader.  He's  making  ad- 
lirable  progress  in  the  difficult  task  of 
loving  El  Salvador  toward  democracy 
mile  at  the  same  time  coordinating  a 
efense  against  Marxist-led  guerrillas 
mo  would  turn  his  country  into  a 
luban-style  dictatorship.  President 
lagana,  the  Government  of  El 
alvador,  and  the  people  of  that  brave 
ountry  deserve  and  have  our  support. 
Lnd  it's  a  great  pleasure  to  have 
ou  here. 


'resident  Magana 

'hank  you  for  your  encouraging  words. 
Ve  believe  in  democracy,  liberty,  and  all 
he  principles  that  have  made  this  coun- 
ry  great.  We  welcome  your  support, 
nd  we  want  a  lasting  peace  through 
i  emocracy.  This  is  the  summary  of  the 
emarks  that  I'm  going  to  make.2 


(White  House  phot"  by  Bill  Fitz-Patnck) 


Message  of  the  Constitutional  President 
of  the  Republic  of  El  Salvador,  Dr.  Alvaro 
Magana,  in  the  presence  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  Ronald 
Reagan,  on  the  occasion  of  the  official  visit  of 
President  Magana  to  Washington,  D.C. 

My  visit  to  the  United  States  of  America 
is  made  in  order  to  strengthen  the  ties  that 
have  historically  united  us  with  this  country. 

It  is  a  propitious  opportunity  to  present 
to  the  people  of  the  United  States  of  America 
a  true  picture  of  my  country  and  of  the  goals 
we  have  set  within  the  context  of  the  difficult 
conditions  which  confront  us.  These  goals 
sustain  our  conviction  that  President  Reagan 
is  giving  his  support  to  a  legitimate  govern- 
ment, and  to  the  just  cause  of  the  Salvadoran 
people  for  maintaining  and  consolidating  a 
democratic  system  in  accordance  with  the 
tradition  of  liberty  and  human  solidarity 
which  have  constituted  the  basis  for  the  birth 
and  the  greatness  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

The  situation  in  El  Salvador  is  part  of  a 
world  situation  of  economic  crisis  and 
ideological  conflict.  However,  our  problems 
are  not  solely  the  result  of  external  factors. 
For  a  long  time,  social  and  economic  in- 
equalities have  been  obstacles  to  the  full 
development  of  democracy.  They  have  pro- 
vided the  opportunity  for  extrahemispheric 
interests,  most  particularly  those  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  her  satellites  working 
through  two  Latin  American  countries  to 
make  us  victims  of  their  expansionistic  policy. 


Our  government  is  the  outcome  of  the 
electoral  decision  of  the  Salvadoran  people, 
who  on  March  28,  1982,  risked  their  lives  in 
order  to 'choose  overwhelmingly  and  without 
doubt  the  democratic  system  as  a  preferred 
form  of  political  organization.  Consequently, 
my  government  is  not  the  result  of  one  or 
another  ideological  faction  having  prevailed: 
rather  it  is  the  clear  and  constitutional  ex- 
pression of  the  sovereign  will  of  the  people 
expressed  in  the  most  multitudinous  free 
election  known  in  our  entire  history. 

With  this  legitimate  mandate  of  the  vast 
majority  of  Salvadorans  the  Government  of 
National  Unity  was  formed.  On  August  3, 
1982,  we  adopted  the  basic  platform,  now 
known  as  the  "Apaneca  Pact."  This  pact  in- 
cludes the  common  objectives  of  the  political 
parties  expressed  during  the  electoral  cam- 
paign. These  objectives  included  progress 
toward  peace,  democracy,  full  respect  for 
human  rights,  consolidation  of  social  reforms 
and  economic  recovery:  all  of  which  are  being 
carried  out  in  spite  of  the  adverse  circum- 
stances, national  and  international,  that  we 
face. 

In  order  to  ensure  the  accomplishment  of 
these  objectives  put  forth  by  the  platform,  a 
political  commission  was  set  up.  This  commis- 
sion being  composed  of  the  constitutional 
President  of  El  Salvador,  the  Foreign 
Minister,  the  Defense  Minister  and  represent- 
atives of  the  political  parties.  The  commission 
is  assisted  by  other  organizations  which  are 
responsible  for  each  of  the  specific  objectives. 

Respect  for  human  life  and  the  physical 


august  1983 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


integrity,  along  with  the  dignity  of  all 
Salvadorans  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Com- 
mission on  Human  Rights  and  the  constant 
concern  of  my  Government.  I  am  pleased  to 
say  that  in  order  to  safeguard  those  human 
rights,  we  have  adopted  concrete  and  prag- 
matic measures,  such  as  the  granting  of 
amnesty,  accelerated  consideration  of  cases 
involving  political  crimes,  plans  to  reform 
legal  procedures  applicable  to  such  crimes, 
cooperation  with  the  International  Red  Cross, 
ministerial  directives  to  the  security  forces  to 
insure  strict  compliance  to  legal  procedures, 
and  other  similar  measures.  One  important 
step  toward  guaranteeing  respect  for  human 
rights  will  be  the  judicial  reform  which  is  en- 
visioned in  the  new  constitution:  independent 
judicial  authority  and  an  independent  At- 
torney General,  with  sufficient  authority  and 
sufficient  means  to  improve  the  administra- 
tion of  justice.  Furthermore,  the  Attorney 
General  will  have  the  technical  capability  for 
the  scientific  investigation  of  crime. 

The  reduction  in  the  gravity  of  conflicts 
resulting  from  the  economic  and  social 
reforms  has  contributed  to  the  strengthening 
of  the  democratic  process  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  National  Unity  has  committed  itself 
to  maintain  and  consolidate;  well  aware  that 
they  are  important  conditions  for  social 
stability,  created  in  an  atmosphere  of  con- 
fidence, and  a  determinating  factor  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  democracy. 

Convinced  of  the  importance  of  the 
private  sector  to  economic  recovery,  the 
Government  of  National  Unity  has  sought  to 
create  a  favorable  climate  for  the  growth  of 


private  enterprise.  The  private  sector  has 
joined  the  public  sector  in  forming  a  commit- 
tee charged  with  economic  recovery  in  El 
Salvador.  These  efforts  at  recovery  face  dif- 
ficult obstacles  caused  primarily  by  low  prices 
paid  for  our  basic  exports,  increased  prices  of 
imports,  and  the  problems  of  the  ( lentral 
American  Common  Market.  To  these  I  must 
add  violence  and  the  destruction  of  the  in- 
frastructure. Nonetheless,  based  on  the  spirit 
of  diligence  and  sacrifice  of  the  Salvadoran 
people,  the  economic  cooperation  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  a  financial 
discipline  of  austerity  which  has  permitted  us 
to  maintain  tolerable  rates  of  inflation  and 
reasonable  currency  stability,  my  government 
has  succeeded  in  reverting  the  declining 
trend  of  the  economy. 

The  peace  program  of  the  Government  of 
National  Unity  rests  fundamentally  upon  the 
electoral  process  and  on  behalf  of  this 
government.  I  reaffirm  that  the  solution  to 
the  problem  of  violence  should  be  essentially 
democratic.  Accordingly,  elections  with  par- 
ticipation by  all  Salvadorans  without  distinc- 
tion, constitute  the  only  means  to  obtain  a 
definitive  and  permanent  peace  in  order  to 
establish  a  pluralist  system  that  insures 
democracy. 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  the  par- 
ticipation of  all  Salvadorans  in  the  coming 
elections,  in  a  spirit  of  good  will  and  in  order 
to  create  conditions  favorable  to  this  full  par- 
ticipation, we  have  enacted  a  generous 
amnesty  law.  To  date  500  political  prisoners 
who  were  subject  to  the  legal  process,  have 
been  freed  under  this  law. 


El  Salvador  Commission 
Announces  Peace  Initiative 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  2,  19831 

In  a  declaration  to  all  Salvadorans  wide- 
ly publicized  over  the  past  2  days  by  the 
Salvadoran  media,  the  Salvadoran  Peace 
Commission  has  reaffirmed  that  "the 
solution  to  the  problem  of  violence 
should  be  essentially  political  and 
democratic"  and  appealed  to  all  armed 
groups  to  participate  peacefully  in 
democratic  elections  scheduled  for  later 
this  year.  In  its  declaration,  the  Peace 
Commission  called  on  the  leftist  Revolu- 
tionary Democratic  Front  to  begin  a 
constructive  dialogue  for  their  peaceful 
incorporation  into  the  "Salvadoran  fami- 
ly." The  commission  also  appealed  to  the 
armed  guerrilla  groups  to  participate  in 
the  democratic  process,  which  allows  the 
Salvadoran  people  themselves  to  choose 
the  officials  who  will  govern  them, 


noting  that  the  government's  amnesty  is 
an  important  step  in  the  process  of 
political  reconciliation. 

We  welcome  this  initiative,  and  it 
has  our  full  support.  As  President 
Reagan  indicated  in  his  address  before  a 
joint  session  of  Congress  on  April  27,  we 
will  support  dialogue  and  negotiations 
within  each  country  with  the  terms  and 
conditions  of  participation  in  election 
being  negotiable.  "The  United  States," 
the  President  stated,  "will  work  toward 
a  political  solution  in  Central  America 
which  will  serve  the  interests  of  the 
democratic  process."  This  recent  ini- 
tiative by  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador  is  very  much  in  support  of  this 
objective. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  acting  Department  spokesman  Alan 
Romberg.  ■ 


In  order  to  better  achieve  our  objectives 
the  Peace  Commission  on  May  31  of  this  ye; 
appealed  to  the  political  sector  of  the  subvet 
sive  elements  for  the  establishing  of  a 
dialogue  to  determine  conditions  and 
guarantees  for  their  participation  in  the  nex 
elections.  This  appeal  has  been  repeated 
twice  in  recent  days. 

Just  as  the  essence  of  democracy  consisi 
of  the  right  of  the  citizens  to  elect  their 
leaders  and  to  confer  political  power  on  thei 
representatives,  negotiating  away  a  portion 
of  this  political  power  would  be  a  divest  men 
and  betrayal  of  the  electorate.  This  my 
government  would  never  commit. 

Our  program  of  peace  is  the  genuine 
democratic  alternative.  In  this  way,  peace 
will  be  the  logical  consequence  of  the 
democratic  process  which  will  be  assured  in 
the  next  electoral  events.  It  will  also  result 
from  respect  for  human  rights,  consolidation 
of  the  social  reforms,  and  economic  recoven 
In  summary,  it  will  result  from  the  combing 
efforts  of  all  Salvadorans. 

Foreign  military  intervention  in  domesti 
affairs  constitutes  the  main  obstacle  to  our 
efforts  to  attain  peace.  The  interference  of 
extracontinental  communist  countries  by  wa 
of  Cuba  and  Nicaragua  in  support  of  armed 
groups  against  a  legitimate  constitutionally 
elected  government,  is  a  form  of  aggression 
which  violates  the  essence  of  international 
law,  specifically  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention in  the  internal  affairs  of  other 
states. 

Faced  with  this  situation,  our  armed 
forces  have  the  constitutional  obligation  to 
defend  the  nation's  sovereignty  and  to  repel 
in  legitimate  self-defense,  the  armed  subver- 
sion that  has  been  imposed  upon  us  from 
abroad. 

This  external  aggression  has  destroyed 
villages,  forcing  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
humble  Salvadorans  to  abandon  their  homes 
It  has  subjected  our  productive  facilities,  oui 
crops,  our  bridges  and  roads,  our  communic; 
tion  and  transportation  systems  and  the  in- 
frastructure of  all  public  services  to 
systematic  destruction. 

To  alleviate  this  situation,  integral  pro- 
grams have  been  commended  to  the  "Com- 
mission for  the  Reconstruction  of  Specific 
Areas,"  coordinated  by  the  armed  forces  anc 
tending  to  bring  normalcy  of  activities  to  the 
inhabitants  of  areas  affected  by  violence, 
with  the  reestablishing  of  public  services  anc 
the  reconstruction  of  the  infrastructures. 

No  one  can  dispute  a  nation's  right  to  de 
fend  itself  against  external  aggression  and 
against  the  destruction  of  the  scarce  assets 
which  in  a  developing  country  are  produced 
at  great  sacrifice.  For  this  reason,  we  have 
the  right  to  understanding  and  solidarity  of 
all  free  nations  of  the  world.  For  these 
reasons  we  have  the  right  to  the  understand- 
ing and  solidarity  from  all  other  free  nations; 
as  we  have  had  from  our  Central  American 
brothers,  those  with  whom  we  share 
democratic  ideals,  and  for  whom  I  wish  to  ex 
press  our  gratitude. 


84 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


El  Salvador  has  not  responded  to  aggres- 
sion with  aggression,  nor  to  intervention  with 
intervention.  Last  year,  with  a  peace  loving 
spirit  we  proposed  a  regional  dialogue  to 
strengthen  democratic  institutions,  to  end  the 
arms  race  and  the  arms  traffic,  and  to  im- 
prove commercial  and  economic  relations. 
With  the  same  spirit  we  accepted  the  ini- 
tiative of  the  "Grupo  Contadora,"  whose  in- 
vitations we  have  always  responded  to 
positively. 

With  the  future  of  democracy  in  our 
country  in  great  peril,  we  do  know  how  to  ap- 
preciate and  be  grateful  for  the  solidarity  and 
sympathy  that  President  Reagan  has  clearly 
expressed  for  our  cause,  both  in  public  and  in 
private,  and  has  responded  with  concrete  and 
significant  action. 

El  Salvador  fights  not  only  for  the  sur- 
vival of  its  own  democratic  system;  we  also 
defend  western  democracy.  For  this  reason  I 
want  to  appeal  to  the  honorable  members  of 
the  United  States  of  America's  Congress  to 
support  the  efforts  of  President  Reagan  to 
aid  El  Salvador.  This  assistance  strengthens 
:he  cause  of  democracy  in  the  Central 
American  region.  A  weak,  vacillating  commit- 
ment endangers  peace  and  hemispheric  se- 
curity. For  this  reason  the  people  of  the 
Jnited  States  must  fully  understand  that  we 
,'ace  a  common  threat. 

Our  aspirations  have  been  incorporated 
nto  the  draft  of  the  political  constitution  that 
.he  Constituent  Assembly  of  El  Salvador  will 
iebate  and  vote  upon  in  the  next  days. 
Therein  will  be  established  the  constitutional 
guarantees  for  the  great  objectives  of  the 
Government  of  National  Unity  first  embodied 
n  the  "Apaneca  Pact,"  and  will  become  a  per- 
nanent  reality. 

El  Salvador,  my  small  country,  is  an  ex- 
.mple  of  a  newborn  democracy  defending  its 
>lood  the  democratic  system  of  the  western 
vorld  against  a  totalitarian  Communist 
egime. 

El  Salvador  reaffirms  its  unwavering 
ommitment  to  the  defense  of  peace, 
lemocracy  and  liberty  with  the  understand- 
ng  and  solidarity  of  all  free  nations. 


Sugar  Imports  From  Central  America 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
'residential  Documents  of  June  20,  1983. 

2At  this  point,  President  Magana,  whose 
pening  remarks  were  delivered  in  English, 
ead  in  Spanish  from  a  text.  As  printed,  the 
emainder  of  this  item  follows  the  text,  as 
■repared  by  the  Salvadoran  Government  and 
iaae  available  by  the  Office  of  the  White 
louse  Press  Secretary.  ■ 


WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
MAY  10,  19831 

The  President  today  announced  changes 
in  the  Administration  of  the  quota  on 
U.S.  imports  of  sugar  for  four  Central 
American  countries.  The  quota  for 
Nicaragua  will  be  reduced  to  6,000  short 
tons  (ST),  and  this  reduction  will  be 
reallocated  to  three  neighboring  coun- 
tries—Honduras, Costa  Rica,  and  El 
Salvador.  This  action  will  become  effec- 
tive in  fiscal  year  1984  (which  begins 
October  1,  1983). 

The  President  is  taking  this  action 
because  of  the  extraordinary  situation  in 
Central  America  and  its  implications  for 
the  United  States  and  the  region  as  a 
whole,  including  Honduras,  Costa  Rica, 
and  El  Salvador.  These  three  countries 
are  experiencing  enormous  problems, 
caused  in  considerable  part  by 
Nicaraguan-supported  subversion  and 
extremist  violence.  The  additional  quota 
for  these  three  countries  represents  a 
total  of  roughly  $14  million  in  foreign 
exchange  per  year.  This  occurs  because 
the  U.S.  internal  price  (21<£-22«/lb.)  in 
recent  weeks  is  far  higher  than  in  most 
other  markets  of  the  world  (6«-7C/lb). 
The  transfer  of  the  Nicaraguan  quota 
will  significantly  benefit  the  recipient 
countries. 

By  denying  to  Nicaragua  a  foreign 
exchange  benefit  resulting  from  the  high 
U.S.  sugar  price,  we  hope  to  reduce  the 
resources  available  to  that  country  for 
financing  its  military  buildup  and  its 
support  for  subversion  and  extremist 
violence  in  the  region. 


This  is  a  signal  of  the  U.S. 
seriousness  with  regard  to  the  economic 
and  political  stability  of  its  neighbors  in 
the  hemisphere  which  is  integrally 
related  to  the  security  of  the  region  and 
the  United  States.  The  United  States 
will  continue  to  respond  to  developments 
in  that  region. 

The  sugar  quota  decision  does  not 
affect  our  continued  willingness  to  talk 
with  the  Nicaraguans  about  regional 
issues.  We  are  ready  to  maintain  as 
positive  a  relationship  with  Nicaragua  as 
warranted  by  Nicaraguan  actions. 

Nicaragua's  present  quota  is  58,800 
ST,  while  that  for  Honduras  is  28,000 
ST;  for  Costa  Rica  42,000  ST;  and  for 
El  Salvador  72,800  ST. 

The  transfer  from  the  Nicaraguan 
quota  will  be  allocated  to  the  countries 
as  follows:  Honduras  52%,  Costa  Rica 
30%,  and  El  Salvador  18%.  This  alloca- 
tion is  based  on  a  comparison  of  actual 
recent  shipments  (1979-81)  to  the 
United  States  from  these  countries  and 
their  present  quotas  (which  are  derived 
from  shipment  shares  from  1975  to 
1981).  Consequently,  the  country  which 
has  had  the  fastest  growth  of  its  sugar 
industry  and  exports  since  1975 — Hon- 
duras— will  receive  the  largest  share  of 
the  transferred  quota. 

This  is  not  a  fundamental  change  in 
the  overall  sugar  program.  The  quotas 
of  all  countries  other  than  the  four 
specified  above  are  unchanged  and  con- 
tinue to  be  based  on  the  formula  an- 
nounced in  May  1982,  when  the  quota 
program  was  initiated. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  16,  1983. 


august  1983 


85 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Cuban  Involvement  in 
Narcotics  Trafficking 


by  James  H.  Michel 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Security  and  Terrorism-  of  the  Senate 
Judiciary  Committee  and  the  Subcom- 
mittee on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  of 
tlw  Senate  Foreign  Relations  <  'am in ittee 
on  April  SO,  1983.  Mr.  Michel  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- American 
Allans. ' 

I  am  very  pleased  to  appear  before  you 
to  testify  on  Cuba's  involvement  in  nar- 
cotics trafficking.  This  is  a  subject  of  im- 
portance to  the  Administration.  We  have 
been  following  closely  events  relating  to 
this  drug  traffic  because  it  is  a  clear  and 
evident  danger  to  the  United  States. 

In  his  testimony  on  March  12  of  last 
year,  Assistant  Secretary  [for  Inter- 
American  Affairs  Thomas  0.]  Enders 
described  to  you  the  first  detailed  and 
reliable  information  we  had  obtained 
linking  Cuba  to  trafficking  in  nar- 
cotics as  well  as  arms.  Much  of  that  in- 
formation was  based  on  the  activities  of 
Colombian  drug  trafficker,  Jaime  Guillot 
Lara,  who  was  in  custody  in  Mexico. 

Since  that  time,  four  high  Cuban  of- 
ficials have  been  indicted  by  a  Florida 
grand  jury,  and  the  United  States  has 
developed  new  evidence  from  a  variety 
of  independent  sources  confirming  that 
Cuban  officials  have  facilitated  narcotics 
trafficking  through  the  Caribbean  for  at 
least  the  past  2  years.  They  have  done 
so  by  developing  a  relationship  with  key 
Colombian  drug  runners  who,  on  Cuba's 
behalf,  purchased  arms  and  smuggled 
them  to  Cuban-backed  insurgent  groups 
in  Colombia.  In  return,  the  traffickers 
received  safe  passage  of  ships  carrying 
cocaine,  marijuana,  and  methaqualone 
through  Cuban  waters  to  the  United 
States. 

We  are  now  able  to  provide  some 
further  details  on  the  Cuban-Colombian 
traffickers'  M-19  nexus.  We  are  also 
prepared  to  provide  briefings  on  more 
sensitive  information— in  a  closed  ses- 
sion. 

We  now  have  information  that 
Guillot  started  his  narcotics  trafficking 
activity  under  official  Cuban  protection 
during  the  summer  of  1980.  His  ar- 
rangement with  the  Cuban  authorities 
asured  him  safe  passage  through  Cuban 
waters  in  return  for  payoffs  at  the 
Cuban  Coast  Guard  station  on  the 
Cuban  north  coast  across  from  Andros 
Island,  The  Bahamas. 


In  addition  to  provision  of  safe 
passage,  Cuban  officials  maintained 
close  coordination  with  Guillot.  His  con- 
tacts included,  at  the  Cuban  Embassy  in 
Bogota,  Ambassador  Fernando  Ravelo 
Renedo  and  Minister  Counselor  Gonzalo 
Bassols  Suarez,  both  members  of  the 
American  Department  of  the  Cuban 
Communist  Party's  Central  Committee. 
He  also  dealt  with  an  America  Depart- 
ment official  in  the  Cuban  Embassy  in 
Mexico.  Bassols  urged  Guillot  to  work 
with  the  M-19.  In  November  1981  he 
reportedly  "loaned"  Guillot  $10,000  with 
which  to  purchase  500  kilograms  of  co- 
caine on  behalf  of  the  M-19  and  arrange 
its  shipment  to  the  United  States.  We 
also  know  that  Guillot,  fearing  arrest  by 
the  Mexican  authorities,  at  one  point 
considered  taking  refuge  in  the  Cuban 
Embassy  in  Mexico  to  avoid  arrest  and 
was  told  by  a  Cuban  contact  there  that 
"Fidel"  had  instructed  the  Cuban  Em- 
bassy to  protect  him. 

At  one  point,  Guillot  received  a 
Nicaraguan  visa  from  the  Nicaraguan 
Ambassador  to  Mexico,  who  apparently 
acted  on  a  request  from  M-19  military 
leader  Bateman.  We  know  from  sep- 
arate sources  that  in  early  1982  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  was  negotiating 
the  sale  of  a  DC-6  aircraft  to  a  known 
Colombian  drug  runner.  Whether  or  not 
this  indicates  a  Nicaraguan  role  is  not 
clear  from  the  information  available,  but 
this  is  something  we  will  be  examining 
closely. 

We  have  a  report  that  the  Com- 
munist Party  Presidium,  and  specifically 
Fidel  Castro,  in  early  1979  considered  a 
scheme  to  begin  dealing  with  narcotics 
smugglers  using  Cuba  as  a  bridge  and 
support  base  for  the  networks  to  the 
United  States  as  a  means  to  aid  Cuba 
economically  and  to  contribute  to  the 
deterioration  of  American  society.  Also 
during  an  interview  with  Colombian 
journalists  in  October  1982,  Fidel  Castro 
described  Guillot  as  a  "good  friend  of 
Cuba."  Castro's  later  statement  to  the 
"Caracol"  Colombian  news  agency  in 
January  1983  that  Cuba  detains  some 
Americans  involved  in  narcotics  traffick- 
ing is  true  in  itself,  but  this  does  not 
preclude  Cuba  from  also  using  the  drug 
weapon  as  it  sees  fit. 

We  cannot  expect  the  Cuban 
Government  to  acknowledge  its  involve- 


ment in  drug  trafficking  to  the  United 
States.  But  the  evidence  clearly  indi- 
cates more  than  a  case  of  corruption  by 
local  or  mid-level  security  officials  in 
Cuba.  The  association  with  Guillot  of  the* 
Cuban  Embassies  in  Mexico  City  and 
Bogota  and  officers  from  the  America 
Department  of  the  Cuban  Communist 
Party  Central  Committee  gives  strong 
indication  of  official  policy  approval. 

Narcotics  trafficking  has  apparently 
been  sanctioned  by  Cuba  as  a  means  to 
finance  subversion  in  Latin  America. 
The  Administration  is  determined  to 
discover  the  exact  extent  of  Cuban  in- 
volvement in  narcotics.  Let  me  assure 
you  that  we  attach  a  particularly  high 
priority  to  any  evidence  of  Cuba's  use 
of  narcotics  as  a  weapon  against  this 
country. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committees  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Return  of  Certain 
Mariel  Cubans 


The  chief  of  the  Cuban  Interests  Section 
in  Washington  was  requested  on  May  2.r> 
by  Assistant.  Secretary  for  Inter- 
American  Affairs  Thomas  O.  Enders  to 
ask  his  government  to  take  back  certain 
Cuban  nationals  who  came  to  the  I 'niter 
States  in  the  Marie!  boatlift  of  1980. 

During  that  period,  some  125,000 
Cubans  entered  the  United  States 
without  authorization.  The  vast  majority 
were  law  abiding,  were  allowed  to  join 
relatives  and  friends,  and  soon  found 
homes  and  employment.  A  few  thousand 
were  detained  by  the  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  Service  because  of  serioui 
criminal  conduct  in  Cuba.  Many  of  these 
remain  in  detention.  Additionally,  others 
have  been  convicted  of  crimes  in  this 
country  and  have  served  or  are  current- 
ly serving  sentences  in  State  or  local 
prisons.  Finally,  some  are  ineligible  to 
remain  in  the  United  States  for  other 
substantive  reasons.  The  Cuban  Govern- 
ment has  refused  to  take  back  any  of 
these  persons. 

Under  Section  243(g)  of  the  Im- 
migration and  Nationality  Act,  the 
Department  is  required  to  discontinue 
the  issuance  of  immigrant  visas  in  any 


86 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATIES 


country  upon  notification  by  the  At- 
torney General  that  said  country,  upon 
request,  denies  or  unduly  delays  accepl 
pice  of  the  return  of  its  nationals  found 
ineligible  to  remain  in  the  United  States 
kinder  U.S.  immigration  law.  The  At- 
torney Genera]  lias  so  notified  the 
Secretary  of  State. 

Coincident  with  the  Mariel  boatlift, 
the  U.S.  Interests  Section  in  Havana 
was  obliged  to  discontinue  the  issuance 
f  visas  because  hundreds  of  Cuban  ap- 
plicants, seeking  escape  from  Cuban 
©lice  action  outside  the  building,  took 
efuge  in  its  premises.  The  section  later 
esumed  the  issuance  of  nonimmigrant 
/isas  and  of  immigrant  visas  to  im- 
nediate  relatives  (spouses,  minor 
hildren,  and  parents)  of  U.S.  citizens 
md  to  certain  U.S.  permanent  residents 
who  had  been  in  Cuba  for  protracted 
lays,  but  continued  not  issuing  im- 
nigrant  visas  to  other  applicants. 

With  the  concurrence  of  the  At- 
orney  General,  and  pursuant  to 
egulatory  authority,  the  U.S.  Interests 
Section  in  Havana  will  continue  its  cur- 
ent  policy  of  issuing  immigrant  visas  in 
he  above  categories.  We  will  also  con- 
inue  issuing  nonimmigrant  visas  in 
Iavana,  as  well  as  immigrant  visas  in 
11  categories  to  Cuban  applicants  in 
hird  countries.  Once  all  the  Cuban  na- 
ionals  who  came  with  the  Mariel 
oatlift  who  are  ineligible  to  remain  in 
■he  United  States  for  substantive 
easons  have  been  returned  to  Cuba,  the 
'ay  will  be  clear  for  the  U.S.  Interests 
•ection  in  Havana  to  resume  issuance  of 
nmigrant  visas  in  all  categories  to 
uban  applicants. 

Finally,  we  wish  to  make  it  very 
iear  that  members  of  the  Cuban  com- 
lunity  who  came  with  the  Mariel 
oatlift  and  who  maintain  "Cuban- 
[aitian  entrant"  status  will  not  be  af- 
'Cted  by  this  initiative.  Neither  will 
lembers  of  the  Cuban-American  com- 
mnity  who  came  before  Mariel. 


iress  release  192  of  May  25,  1983. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctic  treaty.  Signed  at  Washington 

Dec.  1.  1959,  Entered  into  force  June  23, 

1961.  TIAS4780. 

Accession  deposited:  China.  June  8,  1983. 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
New  York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
June  7.  1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970. 
TIAS  6997. 

Notification  of  succession:  Djibouti,  June  14, 
1983. 

Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the 
return  of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  ob- 
jects launched  into  outer  space.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  22, 
1968.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1968.  TIAS 
6599. 
Accession  deposited:  Japan,  June  20,  1983. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Dec.  lti,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14, 
1971.  TIAS  7192. 

Accession  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,1  Apr.  28,  1983. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text 
of  the  convention  on  international  civil  avia- 
tion (TIAS  1591),  with  annex.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  30,  1977.2 
Acceptance  deposited:  Austria,  May  4,  1983. 

toffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 2 
Signatures:  Austria,  Paraguay,  June  15, 
1983;  Burundi,  Costa  Rica,  May  19,  1983; 
Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast,  June  13,  1983; 
Cyprus,  June  7,  1983;  Dominican  Republic, 
Guatemala,  Italy,  June  16,  1983;  El  Salvador, 
Sri  Lanka,  June  20,  1983;  Greece,  May  20, 
1983;  Japan,  June  1,  1983;  Kenya,  May  17, 
1983;  Nicaragua,  Togo,  June  17,  1983;  Papua 
New  Guinea,  June  21,  1983;  Zaire,  June  3, 
1983. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  June  1,  1983. 
Extension  of  the  international  coffee  agree- 
ment, 1976  (TIAS  8683).  Done  at  London 
Sept.  25,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1, 
1982.  TIAS  10439. 
I  lefinitive  acceptance  deposited:  <  Ireece, 

June  10,  1983. 


Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 

for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 

Geneva  June  27,  1980.- 

Signatures:  Colombia,  June  14,  1983; 

Dominican  Republic,  June  15,  1983; 

Guatemala,  June  I,  1983;  Guyana, 

Madagascar,  Thailand,  Zimbabwe,  June  s, 

1983;  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Suriname, 

June  20,  1983. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands,  June  9, 

1983 

Ratifications  deposited:  Guinea-Bissau, 

June  7,  1983;  Pakistan,  June  9,  1983. 

Cultural  Relations— UNESCO 

Protocol  to  the  agreement  on  the  importation 

of  educational,  scientific,  and  cultural 

materials  of  Nov.  22,  1950  (TIAS  6129). 

Adopted  at  Nairobi  Nov.  26,  1976.  Entered 

into  force  Jan.  2,  1982.3 

Ratification  deposited:  Belgium,  June  6, 

1983. 

Customs 

International  convention  on  the  simplification 
and  harmonization  of  customs  procedures, 
with  annexes.  Signed  at  Kyoto  May  18,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  25,  1974.3 
Senate  ad\  ice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  21,  1983. 

Education— UNESCO 

Convention  on  the  recognition  of  studies, 
diplomas,  and  degrees  concerning  higher 
education  in  the  states  belonging  to  the 
Europe  Region.  Done  at  Paris  Dec.  21,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  19,  1982.3 
Ratifications  deposited:  Italy,  Jan.  20,  1983; 
San  Marino,  Apr.  15,  1983. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  17,  1980. 
TIAS  9614. 
Ratification  deposited:  F.R.G.,  May  24,  1983. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  abolishing  the  requirement  of 
legalization  for  foreign  public  documents, 
with  annex.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  5,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1965;  for  the 
United  States  Oct.  15,  1981.  TIAS  10072. 
Signature:  Norway,  May  30,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  May  30, 
1983. 

Jute 

International  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 
products,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Geneva  Oct.  1,  1982.  Enters  into  force 
July  1,  1983,  or  any  date  thereafter,  if  by 
that  date  certain  requirements  have  been 
met. 


kugust  1983 


87 


TREATIES 


Signatures:  Bangladesh,  Feb.  11,  1983; 
Belgium,  Luxembourg,  May  16,  1983;  Den- 
mark, EEC,  F.R.G.,  Ireland,  Italy,  June  6, 
1983;  Egypt,  June  20,  1983;  Finland,  Nor- 
way, Sweden,  Jan.  14,  1983;  France,  Apr.  19, 
1983;  Greece,  May  20,  1983;  Japan,  Mar.  18, 
1983;  Netherlands,  Feb.  15,  1983;  U.S., 
June  24,  1983. 

Notifications  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Belgium,  EEC,  F.R.G.,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  June  6,  1983; 
France,  Apr.  19,  1983. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  June  1,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Denmark,  June  6, 
1983. 

Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  on  civil  liability  for 

oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 

Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force 

June  19,  1975.3 

Acceptance  deposited:  Guatemala,  Oct.  20, 

1982. 

Accessions  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  Apr.  12, 

1983;  Vanuatu,  Feb.  2,  1983. 

International  convention  relating  to  interven- 
tion on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil  pollution 
casualties,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels 
Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  May  6, 
1975.  TIAS  8068. 
Accession  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  Apr.  12, 

1983. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the  U.K. 
to  Anguilla,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Cayman 
Islands,  Falkland  Islands  and  Dependencies, 
Montserrat,  Pitcairn,  Henderson,  Ducie  and 
Oeno  Islands,  St.  Helena  and  Dependencies, 
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands,  U.K.  Sovereign 
Base  Areas  of  Akrotiri  and  Dhekelia  on  the 
Island  of  Cyprus,  Sept.  8,  1982. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  International 
Maritime  Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 
6490,  8606,  10374).  Adopted  at  London 
Nov.  17,  1977.2 
Acceptance  deposited:  Italy,  June  13,  1983. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  International 
Maritime  Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 
6490,  8606,  10374).  Adopted  at  London 
Nov.  15,  1979.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Argentina,  Italy, 
July  13,  1983;  France,  Tanzania,  May  26, 
1983;  Senegal,  Togo,  Yemen  (Aden),  June  20, 
1983. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimum 
age  for  marriage  and  registration  of  mar- 
riages. Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  9,  1964. 3 
Accession  deposited:  Venezuela,  May  31, 
1983. 


Nuclear  Material— Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 

nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at 

Vienna  Oct.  26,  1979.2 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,1  May  25, 

1983. 

Postal 

General  regulations  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the 
universal  postal  convention  with  final  pro- 
tocol and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  1,  1981.  TIAS  9972. 
Accession  deposited:  Guatemala,  Dec.  16, 

19X2 

Approvals  deposited:  Monaco,  Dec.  27,  1982; 

Papua  New  Guinea,  Jan.  18,  1983;  Sweden, 

Mar.  23,  1983. 

Ratification  deposited:  Kenya,  Mar.  24,  1983. 

Money  orders  and  postal  traveler's  checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  with 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 
1981.  TIAS  9973. 
Approvals  deposited:  Monaco,  Dec.  27,  1982; 

Sweden,  Mar.  23,  1983. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of 
all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Adopted  at 
New  York  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  4,  1969.3 

Accession  deposited    1  lominican  Republic, 
May  25,  1983. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 

at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London 

Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May  25, 

1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Accession  deposited:  Fiji,  Mar.  4,  1983. 

Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  Mar.  29, 

1983. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1974 
(TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  May  1,  1981.  TIAS  10009. 
Accession  deposited:  G.D.R.,  Apr.  28,  1983. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for 
damage  caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29, 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1972;  for 
the  U.S.  Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accession  deposited:  Japan,  June  20.  1983. 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects 
launched  into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  Y<  irk 
Jan.  14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15, 
1976.  TIAS  8480. 
Acre:  iion  deposited:  Japan,  June  20,  1983. 


Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
tected persons,  including  diplomatic  agents. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532* 
Accession  deposited:  Korea.  May  25,  1983. 

Tonnage 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure 
ment  of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
July  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  10,  1983. 
TIAS  10490. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Kuwait,  Mar.  2,  1983. 

Trade 

Convention  on  contracts  for  the  international 
sale  of  goods.  Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  11.  1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Hungary,  June  16, 

1983. 

Convention  on  the  limitation  period  in  the  in- 
ternational sale  of  goods.  Done  at  New  York 
June  12,  1974,  and  Protocol  done  at  Vienna 
Apr.  11,  1980.2 
Ratification  deposited:  Hungary,  June  16, 

1983. 

Agreement  on  government  procurement. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1981.  TIAS  10403. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Israel,  May  30,  1983. 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  art.  VII  of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(customs  valuation).  Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12  | 
1979,  and  Protocol  done  at  Geneva  Nov.  1, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981.  TIAS 
10402. 

Acceptance  deposited:  South  Africa,  June  1, 
19X3 

U.N.  Industrial  Development 
Organization 

Constitution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  a 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.2 
K;ii  if'ications  deposited:  <  'ongo,  Maj  16,  198 

( Greece,  June  10,  1983. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  21,  1983.4 

Weapons 

Convention  on  prohibitions  or  restrictions  on 
the  use  of  certain  conventional  weapons 
which  may  be  deemed  to  be  excessively  in- 
jurious or  to  have  indiscriminate  effects,  will 
annexed  Protocols.  Adopted  at  Geneva 
Oct.  10,  19X0. 

Ratifications  and  acceptances  deposited: 
Poland,  June  2,  1983;  Yugoslavia,  May  24, 
1983. 
Enters  into  force:  Dec.  2,  1983.6 


88 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


TREATIES 


Whaling 

International  whaling  convention  and 
schedule  of  whaling  regulations.  Done  at 
Washington  Dec.  2,  1946.  Entered  into  force 
Nov.  10,  1948.  TIAS  1849. 
Adherence  deposited:  Mauritius,  June  17, 

198.1. 

Wheat 

k983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
theat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 
Ho  force  July  1.  1983. 
►Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  June  6,  1983. 
testifications  deposited:  Korea,  Mauritius, 

lune  17,  1983. 

[Declarations  of  provisional  application 

leposited:  « luatemala,  June  14,  1983; 

brtugal,  June  15,  1983. 

983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
bod  aid  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 
nto  force  July  1,  1983. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  June  6,  1983. 

.Vomen 

Convention  on  the  political  rights  of  women. 
Done  at  New  York  Mar.  31,  1953.  Entered 
nto  force  July  7,  1954;  for  the  U.S.  July  7, 
976.  TIAS  8289. 
Accession  deposited:  Venezuela,  May  31, 

9S3. 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 
liscrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 
Jew  York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  3,  1981. 3 
Signatures:  Cameroon,  June  6,  1983;  Korea, 

Hay  25,  1983. 

Ratification  deposited:  Greece,  June  7,  1983. 

Vorld  Health  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organi- 
ation.  Done  at  New  York  July  22,  1946. 
ntered  into  force  Apr.  7,  1948.  TIAS  1808. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Solomon  Islands, 
ipr.  4,  1983. 

Amendments  to  arts.  24  and  25  of  the  Con- 
titution  of  the  World  Health  Organization 
TIAS  1808,  8086,  8534).  Adopted  at  Geneva 
Hay  17.  1976,  by  the  29th  World  Health 
Assembly.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Benin,  Hungary, 
Hay  4,  1983;  Italy,  May  17,  1983;  Jordan, 
une  10,  1983;  Zaire,  May  2,  1983. 


HLATERAL 

Antigua  and  Barbuda 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
'or  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
irevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
axes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
V.  16.  I945.  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165, 
H24,  6089). 


Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958;  for  Antigua 
Jan.  19,  1959.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  of  termination  by  Antigua  and 
Barbuda:  Feb.  26,  1983;  effective  Aug.  26, 
1983. 

Argentina 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  4,  1970  (TIAS  7022)  establishing  the 
OMEGA  navigation  station.  Signed  at 
Washington  May  11.  1983.  Entered  into  force 
May  11,  1983. 

Barbados 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165, 
4124,  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  Barbados:  June  28,  1983; 
effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Belgium 

General  administrative  agreement  relating  to 
participation  in  severe  nuclear  accident 
research  programs.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Brussels  Mar.  29  and  Apr.  18,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  18,  1983;  effective 
Feb.  10,  1983. 

Belize 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165, 
4124,  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  Belize:  June  28,  1983;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1984. 

Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  1,  1971,  as  amended  and  extended, 
relating  to  a  program  of  scientific  and 
technological  cooperation  (TIAS  7221).  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brasilia  May 
31,  1983.  Entered  into  force  May  31,  1983. 


Burundi 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  Belgium 
relating  to  the  extension  to  the  Belgian  Con- 
go and  Ruanda- Urundi  of  the  convention  for 
the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income  of  Oct.  28,  1948,  as  amended 
(TIAS  2833,  4280).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Apr.  2,  1954,  and  July 
28,  1959.  Entered  into  force  July  28,  1959. 
TIAS  4280. 

Notification  by  U.S.  of  termination  of  exten- 
sion  to  Burundi:  June  28,  1983;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1984. 

Canada 

Protocol  amending  the  convention  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  on  capital  of 
Sept.  26,  1980. 2  Signed  at  Ottawa  June  14, 
1983.  Enters  into  force  upon  the  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratification. 

Chad 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
International  Military  Education  and  Train- 
ing (IMET)  Program.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  N'Djamena  Feb.  22  and  Apr.  22, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  22,  1983. 

Cook  Islands 

Treaty  on  friendship  and  delimitation  of  the 

maritime  boundary  between  the  U.S.  and  the 

Cook  Islands.  Signed  at  Rarotonga  June  11, 

1980. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  21,1983. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  and  memorandum 
of  understanding  of  Oct.  20,  1982.  Signed  at 
San  Jose  Apr.  26,  1983.  Enters  into  force 
when  the  importer  country  notifies  the  ex- 
porter country  that  all  constitutional  re- 
quirements have  been  met. 

Djibouti 

Investment  incentive  agreement.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Djibouti  May  11,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  May  11,  1983. 

Dominica 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165, 
4124,  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  Dominica:  June  28,  1983;  effec- 
tive Jan.  1,  1984. 


August  1983 


89 


TREATIES 


Gambia 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165, 
4124). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  The  Gambia:  June  28,  1983; 
effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  relating  to  severe  nuclear  acci- 
dent research  programs.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Karlsruhe  Mar.  29  and 
Apr.  15,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  15, 
1983. 

Grenada 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165, 
4124,  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  Grenada:  June  28,  1983;  effec- 
tive Jan.  1,  1984. 

Haiti 

Agreement  for  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  8,  1979,  with  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Signed  at  Port-au-Prince 
June  8,  1983.  Entered  into  force  June  8, 
1983. 

Israel 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
information  and  cooperation  in  nuclear  safety 
matters,  with  addenda.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  11,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  11, 
1983. 

Kiribati 

Treaty  of  friendship  with  agreed  minutes. 
Signed  at  Tarawa  Sept.  20,  1979. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  21,  1983. 

Malawi 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Lilongwe  Mar.  10,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  May  16,  1983. 


Agreement  continuing  in  force  between  the 
U.S.  and  Malawi  the  convention  between  the 
U.S.  and  the  U.K.  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  for  the 
avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the  preven- 
tion of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to  taxes  on 
income,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  3165,  4124). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Zomba  and 
Blantyre  Dec.  17,  1966,  Jan.  6  and  Apr.  4, 
1967.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  4,  1967.  TIAS 
6328. 

Notification  of  termination  by  the  U.S.: 
June  28,  1983;  effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Mexico 

Convention  for  the  recovery  and  return  of 
stolen  or  embezzled  vehicles  and  aircraft. 
Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  15,  1981. 
Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged: 

June  28,  1983. 

Entry  into  force:  June  28,  1983. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  relating  to  severe  nuclear  acci- 
dent research  programs.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Petten  Mar.  29  and  Apr.  1 1 , 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  11,  1983;  effec- 
tive Feb.  15,  1983. 

New  Zealand 

Treaty  on  the  delimitation  of  the  maritime 
boundary  between  Tokelau  and  the  U.S. 
Signed  at  Atafu  Dec.  2,  1980. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  21,  1983. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  25,  1980  (TIAS  9782).  Signed  at 
Islamabad  Mav  15,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
May  15,  1983. 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Dec.  4,  1973,  relating  to  civil 
air  transport,  as  renewed  and  amended 
(TIAS  7901,  9431),  with  related  letters.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bucharest 
Apr.  22 "and  28,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  28,  1983;  effective  Jan.  31,  1983. 

Rwanda 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  Belgium 
relating  to  the  extension  to  the  Belgian  Con- 
go and  Ruanda- Uru ik li  of  the  convention  for 
the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income  of  Oct.  28,  1948,  as  amended 
(TIAS  2833,  4280).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Apr.  2,  1954,  and 
July  28,  1959.  Entered  into  force  July  28, 
1959.  TIAS  4280. 

Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of  ex- 
tension to  Rwanda:  June  28,  1983;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1984. 


St.  Lucia 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  316E 
4124,  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  St.  Lucia:  June  28,  1983; 
effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

St.  Vincent  and  The  Grenadines 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  316t 
4124,  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3.  195*' 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  of  St.  Vincent  and  The  Grenadine; 
June  28.  1983;  effective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

Seychelles 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  316' 
4124.  6089). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
relating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
convention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
specified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3.  195M 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  Seychelles:  June  28,  1983;  effec- 
tive Jan.  1,  1984. 

Sierra  Leone 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  31.  1978  (TIAS  9210).  Signed  at 
Freetown  Apr.  29,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  29,  1983. 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 

for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546,  316S 

412-11. 


90 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


CHRONOLOGY 


greement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
gating  to  the  application  of  the  income  tax 
invention  of  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  modified,  to 
jecified  British  territories.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  19,  1957,  and  Dec.  3,  1958. 
ntered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1958.  TIAS  4141. 
otification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
(tension  to  Sierra  Leone:  June  29,  1983; 
'fective  Jan.  1,  1984. 

pain 

greement  amending  the  agreement  of 

IB.  29,  1964,  as  amended  (TIAS  5533,  5896, 

714),  for  a  tracking  and  data  acquisition  sta- 

on.  Effected  bv  exchange  of  notes  at 

adrid  Feb.  1  and  May  2,  1983.  Entered  into 

irce  May  2,  1983. 

ri  Lanka 

greement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
'  agricultural  commodities  of  Oct.  29,  1982 
'IAS  10596).  Signed  at  Colombo  Apr.  20, 
)83.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  20,  1983. 

greement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
id  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
its,  with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
rtes  at  Colombo  May  10,  1983.  Entered  into 
rce  May  10,  1983;  effective  May  1,  1983. 

tiailand 

greement  amending  the  agreement  of 
:t.  4,  1978,  as  amended  and  extended 
'IAS  9215,  9462,  9643,  9717,  9937,  10153, 
1368,  10461),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
aol,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
oducts.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
ingkok  Apr.  15  and  28,  1983.  Entered  into 
irce  Apr.  28,  1983. 

ivalu 

■■eaty  of  Friendship.  Signed  at  Funafuti 
>b.  7,  1979. 

■nate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
me  21,  1983. 

nited  Kingdom 

invention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
>n  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
spect  to  taxes  on  income.  Signed  at 
ashington  Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended 
IAS  1546,  3165,  4124,  6089). 
itification  by  U.S.  of  termination  of  exten- 
)n  to  Falkland  Islands,  Montserrat,  St. 
nristopher-Nevis-Anguilla:  June  28,  1983, 
(fective  Jan.  1,  1984. 


lire 

greement  between  the  U.S.  and  Belgium 
lating  to  the  extension  to  the  Belgian  Con- 
and  Ruanda-Urundi  of  the  convention  for 
e  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
■evention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
xes  on  income  of  Oct.  28,  1948,  as  amended 
'IAS  2833,  4280).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
ites  at  Washington  Apr.  2,  1954,  and  July 
!,  1959.  Entered  into  force  July  28,  1959. 
(AS  4280. 

otification  by  U.S.  of  termination  of  exten- 
pn  to  Zaire:  June  28,  1983;  effective  Jan.  1, 
)84. 


Zambia 

Convention  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  16,  1945,  as  amended  (TIAS  1546.  3165, 
4124). 

Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
continuing  in  force  for  Southern  Rhodesia, 
Northern  Rhodesia,  and  Nyasaland  individual 
ly  the  income  tax  convention  of  Apr.  16, 
1945,  as  modified.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Dec.  31,  1963.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  31,  1963.  TIAS  5501. 
Notification  by  the  U.S.  of  termination  of 
extension  to  Zambia:  June  28,  1983;  effec- 
tive Jan.  1,  1984. 


■With  reservation. 
zNot  in  force. 
3Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
4With  understandings. 
6Not  for  the  U.S.  ■ 


June  1983 


June  1 

In  Manila,  U.S. -Philippines  sign  memorandum 

of  agreement  concluding  review  of 

LI. S. -Philippines  Military  Bases  Agreement. 

June  3 

On  behalf  of  President  Reagan,  Secretary 
Shultz  transmits  the  14th  semiannual  Report 
on  the  Implementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  to  Chairman  Dante  Fascell  of  the  Com- 
mission on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe.  The  report  covers  the  period 
December  1,  1982,  through  May  31,  1983. 

June  4 

Louis  C.  Thomas,  an  attache  at  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy, Moscow,  is  declared  persona  non  grata 
by  the  Soviet  Union  for  alleged  espionage 
activities. 

June  6 

Nicaraguan  Government  expels  three  U.S. 
diplomats  accusing  them  of  attempting  to 
"destabilize"  the  Sandinista  government.  The 
three  are  Linda  M.  Pfeifel,  chief  of  embassy's 
political  section;  David  N.  Greig,  political  of- 
ficer; and  Ermila  L.  Rodriguez,  second 
secretary.  U.S.  protests  the  expulsions  and 
rejects  Nicaraguan  Government's  allegations. 
Ivory  Coast  President  Felix  Houphouet- 
Boigny  makes  a  state  visit  to  the  U.S. 
June  6-12  and  to  Washington,  D.C.,  June 
6-9. 

June  6-July  3 

Sixth  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  (UNCTAD)  is  held  in  Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia.  Deputy  Secretary  Kenneth  Dam 
leads  the  U.S.  delegation,  attending  the  con- 
ference June  10-14. 

June  7 

Nicaraguan  Ambassador  to  Washington  is  in- 
formed by  the  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  of 


State  for  Inter-American  Affairs  that  in 
response  to  Nicaragua!s  expulsion  of  U.S. 
diplomats  June  ii.  the  U.S.  requires  the  clos- 
ing of  six  Nicaraguan  consular  posts  in  the 
U.S.  and  the  departure  of  Nicaraguan  of 
ficials  and  staff  assigned  I"  them. 

June  8 

President  Reagan  announces  that  he  is  direct 
ing  U.S.  START  negotiators  to  adjust  the 
U.S.  position  by  relaxing  the  current  proposal 
for  tin  850  deployed  ballistic  missile  limit.  The 
U.S.,  however,  retains  the  goal  of  a  reduction 
in  ballistic  missile  warheads  to  5,000.  This 
charge  reflects  the  recommendations  of  the 
Scowcroft  commission  and  consultation  with 
the  Congress. 

In  Geneva,  U.S.  and  Soviet  Union  resume 
strategic  arms  reduction  talks  after  a 
10-week  recess. 

June  9 

State  Department  publishes  and  issues  a 
special  report  entitled  "Security  and  Arms 
Control:  The  Search  for  a  More  Stable 
Peace."  The  report  examines  the  contribution 
of  arms  control  to  security,  discusses  the 
state  of  negotiations  in  principal  areas  of 
arms  control,  and  sets  forth  the  U.S.  ap- 
proach on  security  and  arms  control. 

June  9-10 

NATO  ministerial  meeting  is  held  in  Paris. 

June  10 

State  Department  announces  that  the  U.S. 
will  release  an  additional  $25  million  in 
emergency  food  aid  to  drought-stricken 
African  countries.  The  food  will  consist 
primarily  of  sorghum,  corn,  wheat,  and 
vegetable  oil.  Prior  to  this  announcement,  10 
southern  African  countries  received  over 
$68.2  million  or  about  250,000  tons  of  food 
through  the  U.S.  PL  480  Food  for  Peace 
program. 

President  Reagan  signs  an  Executive 
order  extending  the  Scowcroft  commission  to 
January  3,  1984. 

Results  of  general  elections  held  June  9 
in  the  LInited  Kingdom  show  Prime  Minister 
Margaret  Thatcher's  Conservative  Party  win- 
ning a  majority  of  more  than  100  seats  over 
the  combined  opposition. 

June  11-15 

Australian  Prime  Minister  Robert  J.L. 
Hawke  makes  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C. 

June  13 

The  following  newly  appointed  Ambassadors 
present  their  credentials  to  President 
Reagan:  Gabriel  Manueco  of  Spain;  Abdallah 
Bouhabib  of  Lebanon;  Dr.  Jose  Antonio 
Jarquin  Toledo  of  Nicaragua;  Guy-Landry 
Hazoume  of  Benin;  and  Richard  Bertil  Muller 
of  Finland. 

June  14 

By  a  vote  of  65-2,  with  4  abstentions, 
Lebanese  Parliament  overwhelmingly  ap- 
proves its  agreement  with  Israel  for  a 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  troops  from  Lebanon. 


91 


PRESS  RELEASES 


June  14-16 

As  part  of  the  1982  U.N.  General  Assembly 
agreement  between  Secretary  Shultz  and 
Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko,  the  State 
Department  announces  that  the  U.S.  is 
holding  a  second  round  of  bilateral  consulta- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  on  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  issues. 

June  16 

General  Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party, 
Yuriy  Andropov,  is  elected  to  the  position  of 
Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet,  thereby  now  assuming  all  three  posts 
previously  held  by  Leonid  I.  Brezhnev. 

June  16-18 

Salvadoran  President  Alvaro  Alfredo  Magana 
Borja  makes  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C. 

June  18 

Chinese  National  People's  Congress  elects  Li 
Xiannian  as  president,  the  third  chief  of  state 
since  the  communist  takeover  in  1949. 

June  20-22 

Spanish  Prime  Minister  Felipe  Gonzalez 
Marquez  makes  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C. 

June  20-July  1 

As  part  of  the  35th  anniversary  celebration 
of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights,  a  special  seminar  is  held  in  Geneva  to 
emphasize  the  positive  side  of  countries'  ex- 
periences in  implementing  international 
human  rights  standards.  U.S.  representative 
is  Warren  Hewitt,  Director  of  the  Office  of 
Human  Rights,  Bureau  of  International 
Organization  Affairs. 

June  21 

Honduran  Congress  authorizes  establishment 
of  U.S.  training  camps  that  will  be  used  to 
teach  Salvadoran  soldiers  to  fight  leftist 
rebels  in  El  Salvador.  The  authorization  was 
based  on  a  1954  U.S. -Honduran  agreement. 
Two  U.S.  journalists — Richard  Gross,  a 
freelance  photographer  for  U.S.  News  and 
World  Report  and  Dial  Torgerson,  a  reporter 
for  The  Lux  Angeles  Times — are  killed  while 
driving  on  a  road  in  Honduras  near  the 
Nicaraguan  border.  The  Honduran  Govern- 
ment states  that  an  anti-tank  grenade  was 
fired  into  Honduras  from  Nicaragua  hitting 
the  journalists'  car  and  files  a  letter  of  pro- 
test with  the  Nicaraguan  Foreign  Minister 
sending  copies  to  the  U.N.  Security  Council. 
OAS,  and  the  Contadora  countries. 
Nicaraguan  Foreign  Ministry  issues  a  state 
merit  denying  charges. 

June  23 

U.S.  Embassy  in  Managua  protests 
Nicaraguan  responsibility  for  the  deaths  of 
two  U.S.  journalists  in  Honduras. 

June  22-23 

U.S. -European  Communities  agree  to 
establish  an  informal  working  group  to 
discuss  export  subsidies  and  other  forms  of 
agricultural  assistance  to  agricultural  prod- 
ucts. The  group  will  attempt  to  "develop  a 


92 


common  approach"  on  ways  to  define  and 
clarify  internationally  agreed  upon  rules  on 
trade  in  agriculture. 

June  23-July  7 

Vice  President  Bush  makes  an  official  work- 
ing visit  to  northern  Europe  to  explain  U.S. 
policy  in  Latin  America.  The  Vice  President 
visits  London,  June  23-25;  West  Germany, 
June  25;  Norway,  June  26-27,  June  29-30; 
Sweden  June  27-29;  Finland,  July  1-3;  Den- 
mark, July  3-4;  Ireland,  July  4-5;  and 
Iceland,  July  5-7. 

June  23-July  8 

Secretary  Shultz  makes  an  official  working 
visit  to  East  and  South  Asia  and  the  Middle 
East.  The  Secretary  will  visit  the  Philippines 
June  25-26;  Thailand,  to  address  the  opening 
session  of  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers' 
post-ministerial  meeting  and  to  hold  discus- 
sions with  the  Royal  Thai  Government,  June 
26-29;  India,  June  30-July  2;  and  Pakistan, 
July  2-4;  Saudi  Arabia,  July  3-4;  Lebanon, 
July  5;  Syria,  July  5-6;  Israel,  July  6-7;  and 
Jordan  and  Egypt,  July  7.  The  Secretary 
returned  to  Washington  on  July  8. 

June  24-25 

Sixteenth  ASEAN  ministerial  meeting  is  held 
in  Bangkok. 

June  27 

President  Reagan  signs  S.639,  the  Lebanon 
Emergency  Assistance  Act  of  1983.  The  bill 
authorizes  appropriation  for  reconstruction  of 
the  Lebanese  economy,  foreign  military  sales, 
loan  guarantees,  and  military  training  of  the 
Lebanese  armed  forces. 

In  Guam,  U.S. -Marshall  Islands  reach 
agreement  on  a  comprehensive  settlement  of 
all  claims  brought  by  inhabitants  of  the 
Islands  arising  from  nuclear  testing  30  years 
ago.  The  agreement,  signed  by  U.S.  Am- 
bassador Fred  M.  Zeder,  II,  Personal 
Representative  of  the  President  for  Microne- 
sian  Status  Negotiations,  and  President  of 
the  Islands,  Amata  Kabua,  ends  14  years  of 
negotiations  and  also  resolves  a  major 
obstacle  blocking  a  proposed  compact  of  free 
association. 

June  27-30 

UN  World  Food  Council  holds  ninth 
ministerial  conference  in  New  York.  The  con- 
ference focuses  on  present  food  difficulties 
facing  developing  countries  in  light  of  current 
adverse  economic  conditions  and  concludes  by 
adopting  a  consensus  set  of  conclusions  and 
recommendations  expressing  deep  concern 
over  excessive  concentration  of  world  grain 
supplies  in  North  America.  The  Ministers 
conclude  that  in  order  to  improve  global  food 
security,  trade  policies  and  practices  must  be 
improved,  i.e.,  increased  liberation  of 
agricultural  trade.  The  Ministers  also  reject 
the  use  of  food  as  an  instrument  of  political 
pressure.  The  U.S.  delegation  was  headed  by 
John  Block,  Secretary  of  Agriculture. 

June  29 

Honduran  military  issues  a  statement  saying 
that  a  land  mine  laid  by  Nicaraguans  is 
responsible  for  killing  two  American  jour- 
nalists, not  gunfire  as  had  been  believed. 


State  Department  confirms  that  two 
Americans  are  among  five  foreign  relief 
workers  taken  hostage  in  Boma,  in  southern 
Sudan,  by  an  organization  calling  itself  the 
Liberation  Front  of  Southern  Sudan.  The  tw> 
Americans  are  John  Haspels,  an  employee  of 
the  African  Committee  for  the  Rehabilitatior 
of  Southern  Sudan,  and  Ron  Pontier, 
employed  by  the  African  Inland  Mission. 
( )ther  hostages  are  German,  Dutch,  and 
Canadian. 

U.S.  Navy  F-14  jets  from  the  aircraft 
carrier  USS  Eisenhower  intercept  two  Libya 
MiG-23  aircraft  during  a  routine  operational 
exercise  off  the  Gulf  of  Sidra.  According  to  e 
Department  spokesman,  the  interception  oc- 
curs "in  international  airspace  north  of  the 
Libyan  coastline"  and  no  shots  or  missiles 
were  fired  by  either  side.  The  Defense 
Department  states  that  "a  notice  or  intent  to 
operate  aircraft  within  the  Tripoli  flight  in- 
formation region"  was  issued  prior  to  the  ex- 
ercise. ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

195  6/6  Shultz:  remarks  to  Foreign 

Policy  Association,  New 
York,  May  26. 
195A    6/6  Shultz:  question-and-answer 

session  following  Foreign 
Policy  Association 
remarks,  May  26. 

196  6/1  Shultz:  interview  on  NBC- 

TV's  "Today  Show," 
Williamsburg,  May  31. 

197  6/2         Availability  of  additional 

Department  of  State 
records  1950-54,  for 
research. 

*198      6/2  State  Department,  Marshall 

Foundation  honor  George 
C.  Marshall  as  Secretary 
of  State. 
199      6/2         Shultz:  changes  in  ambas- 
sadorships. 

*200       6/3         Program  for  the  state  visit 
to  Washington,  D.C,  of 
Ivory  Coast  President 
Felix  Houphouet-Boigny, 
June  6-12. 

*2()1       6/7  Shultz:  news  briefing  aboard 

Air  Force  One  en  route  to 
Williamsburg,  May  27. 

*202      6/6  Allen  Clayton  Davis  sworn 

in  as  Ambassador  to  Ugan 
da  (biographic  data). 
203       6/9         Joint  statement  by  the  par- 
ticipants at  the  Williams- 
burg economic  summit 
read  on  their  behalf  by 
Secretary  Shultz. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


PUBLICATIONS 


Shultz:  news  briefing, 
Williamsburg,  May  29. 

Shultz:  news  briefing, 
Williamsburg,  May  30. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  of 
Australian  Prime  Minister 
Robert  J.  L.  Hawke,  June 
11-15. 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCC),  Subcommit- 
tee on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea  (SOLAS),  working 
group  on  fire  protection, 
June  28. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, working  group  on 
multilateral  investment 
standards  for  MNE's  and 
UN  activities,  July  6. 

Shultz:  commencement 
address,  Stanford  Univer- 
sity, June  12. 

U.S.,  Sri  Lanka  sign  new 
bilateral  textile  agree- 
ment, May  10. 

Myles  Robert  Rene 

Frechette  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Cameroon 
(biographic  data). 

Shultz:  news  conference, 
Paris,  June  8. 

Shultz:  statement  before 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee. 

Program  for  the  official 
visit  to  Washington,  D.C., 
of  Salvadoran  President 
Alvaro  Magana  Borja, 
June  16-18. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  of 
Spanish  President  Felipe 
Gonzalez,  June  20-22. 

Edward  J.  Derwinski  sworn 
in  as  Counselor  of  the 
Department  (biographic 
data). 

Nicholas  A.  Veliotes  sworn 
in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs 
(biographic  data). 

Documents  on  German 
Foreign  Policy  1918-1945, 
Series  C  (1933-1937)  The 
Third  Reich:  First  Phase, 
Vol.  VI,  Nov.  1, 
1936-Nov.  14,  1937. 

France  assures  U.S.  of  non- 
discriminatory treatment 
of  U.S.  airlines. 

Executive  Seminar  cele- 
brates 25th  anniversary. 

Shultz:  news  conference. 

U.S.,  Romania  sign  new 
textile  agreement  Jan.  28 
and  March  31,  1983. 


*223      6/24 


*224       6/24 


*225      6/24 


*226       6/24 


*227      6/24 


*228      6/28 


229  6/28 

230  6/27 

*231       6/28 


*232  6/28 

*233  6/28 

*234  6/28 

*235  6/28 

236  6/28 


237 

6/28 

238 

6/28 

239 

240 

6/28 

Richard  R.  Burt  sworn  in 
as  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  Affairs 
(biographic  data). 

H.  Allen  Holmes  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Portugal 
(biographic  data). 

James  M.  Rentschler  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  Malta 
(biographic  data). 

John  Davis  Lodge  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to 
Switzerland  (biographic 
data). 

Stephen  W.  Bosworth 

appointed  Chairman  of  the 
Secretary's  Policy  Plan- 
ning Council,  Jan.  3. 

Appointment  of  U.S.  dele- 
gation chairman  to  the 
High  Frequency  World 
Administrative  Radio  Con- 
ference for  planning  use  of 
HF  Broadcasting  Bands, 
Geneva,  Jan.-Feb.  1984. 

Shultz:  statement,  Bangkok, 
June  26. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  Mala- 
canang  luncheon,  Manila, 
June  25. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCITT),  Integrated  Serv- 
ices Digital  Network,  July 
19-21. 

CCITT,  study  group  A, 
July  21. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  standards  of  training 
and  watchkeeping, 
July  27. 

Presidential  Commission  on 
the  Conduct  of  U.S. -Japan 
Relations,  July  14. 

W.  Allen  Wallis  sworn  in  as 
Under  Secretary  for 
Economic  Affairs 
(biographic  data) 

U.S.  submits  pleadings  to  the 
International  Court  of 
Justice  in  the  case  con- 
cerning the  maritime 
boundary  with  Canada  in 
the  Gulf  of  Maine  area. 

Federated  States  of  Micro- 
nesia approves  free 
association  with  U.S. 

U.S.  and  Republic  of  the 
Marshall  Islands  call 
plebiscite  on  compact  of 
free  association. 

[Not  issued.] 

Joint  news  conference  by 
Foreign  Ministers  of 
ASEAN  post-ministerial 
meeting,  Bangkok. 


Department  of  State 


Free,  single  copies  ol  the  following 
Department  of  State  publications  are 
available  from  the  Public  Information  Serv- 
ice, Bureau  'if  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations  in  the  Context  of  1 1.S. 
Foreign  Policy,  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee,  June  15,  1983  (Current 
Policy  #491i). 

On  Learning  From  Experience:  The  Respon- 
sibility of  the  Democracies,  Stanford 
University,  Stanford,  California,  June  12, 
1983  (Current  Policy  #491). 

Africa 

Southern  Africa:  America's  Responsibility 
for  Peace  and  Change,  Under  Secretary 
Eagleburger,  National  Conference  of 
Editorial  Writers,  San  Francisco,  June 
X\.  1983  (Current  Policy  #497). 

Background  Notes  on  Botswana  (May  1983). 

Arms  Control 

Security  and  Arms  Control:  The  Search  for 
a  More  Stable  Peace,  June  1983  (Pam- 
phlet). 

( lhallenges  of  the  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Regime,  Richard  T.  Kennedy,  Am- 
bassador at  Large  and  special  adviser  to 
the  Secretary  on  nonproliferation  policy 
and  nuclear  energy  affairs,  Atomic  In- 
dustrial Forum  and  FORATOM,  Geneva, 
Switzerland,  June  1,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#493). 

East  Asia 

Background  Notes  on  Japan  (May  1983). 
Korea:  Status  Report  (GIST,  June  1983). 

Europe 

A  Critical  Juncture  for  the  Altantic  Alliance, 
Assistant  Secretary  Burt,  Time,  Inc., 
Conference  on  the  Atlantic  Alliance, 
Hamburg,  F.R.G.,  April  25,  1983  (Cur- 
rent Poilcy  #486). 

The  Atlantic  Alliance:  Facts  and  Lessons 
of  History,  Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  Con- 
ference sponsored  by  Atlantik-Bruecke 
and  the  American  Council  of  Germany, 
West  Berlin,  March  25,  1983  (Current 
Policy  #489). 

NATO,  Western  Security,  and  Arms  Reduc- 
tion, Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  Executive 
Club,  Oslo,  Norway,  Mar  21,  1983  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #488). ' 

Background  Notes  on  Belgium  (June  1983). 

Background  Notes  on  Spain  (May  1983) 


"Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


ugust 1983 


93 


PUBLICATIONS 


Middle  East 

Middle  East  Policy  Update,  Assistant  Secre 
tary  Veliotes,  Subcommittee  on  Europe 
and  the  Middle  East,  House  Foreign  Af 
fairs  Committee,  June  2,  1983  (I  lurrent 
Policj  #490). 
Background  Notes  on  Bhutan  (May  1983) 
B       ground  Notes  on  Kuwait  (June  1983) 

Western  Hemisphere 

Background  Paper:  Central  America,  joint 

release  by  Department  of  State  and 

Department  of  Defense,  May  27,  1983 

(Pamphlet  I. 
Central  America:  U.S.  Policy  ((HST.  June 

1983). 
World  Peace  Council:  1983  Prague  Assembly 

(GIST,  June  1983).  ■ 


Documents  on  German 
Foreign  Policy  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  June  24, 
1983,  released  Volume  VI  of  Series  C, 
Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy, 
1918-19^5.  This  volume  represents  the 
19th  and  final  to  be  prepared  and 
published  in  the  cooperative  project  of 
the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and 
France  for  the  publication  of  documents 
from  the  archives  of  the  pre-World 
War  II  German  Foreign  Office.  These 
archives,  restored  to  the  German 
Federal  Republic  in  1958,  had  been  cap- 
tured at  the  end  of  World  War  II  and 
held  by  the  United  States  and  British 
Governments  for  more  than  10  years 
during  which  documents  were  selected, 
microfilmed,  and  annotated  for  publica- 
tion. The  project  was  originally  planned 
to  cover  the  period  1918-45  but  was 
eventually  limited  to  the  years  1933-41. 
Volume  VI,  Series  C,  is  the  last  volume 
to  be  produced  by  the  tripartite  publica- 
tion project,  thus  completing  coverage  of 
the  period  from  Adolf  Hitler's  accession 
to  power  through  the  German  declara- 
tion of  war  against  the  United  States 
after  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.  The 
materials  in  this  and  the  companion 
volumes  are  of  inestimable  value  to 
students  of  German  history  and 
specialists  in  international  diplomacy. 

The  main  themes  of  the  580 
documents  presented  in  this  volume, 
which  opens  on  November  1,  1936,  and 
closes  November  14,  1937,  are  the  failed 
attempts  by  West  European  countries  to 
confine  the  increasingly  expansionist 
tendencies  of  Nazi  Germany  and  the 


gradual  coming  together  of  the  partners 
of  the  future  Rome-Berlin-Tokyo  Axis. 
Of  particular  menace  to  the  West  was 
the  German-Japanese  Anti-Comintern 
Agreement  signed  November  25,  1936, 
and  the  growing  German-Italian 
cooperation  on  European  issues  that 
reached  a  milestone  with  Italian  dictator 
Mussolini's  visit  to  Germany  at  the  end 
of  September  1937. 

Axis  cooperation  and  Germany's 
political  and  economic  strength  in 
Southeast  Europe  throughout  1937  pro- 
vide the  background  for  Nazi  Germany's 
impending  dramatic  moves  against 
Austria  and  Czechoslovakia  in  1938. 
German-Soviet  relations,  increasingly 
strained  by  Germany's  anti-Bolshevik 
crusade  and  by  Soviet  accusations 
against  Germany  in  the  Moscow  purge 
trials,  appeared  to  reach  a  nadir  in 
November  1937  with  Soviet  insistence 
on  the  closing  of  all  but  two  German 
consulates  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Never- 
theless, out  of  public  sight,  there  were 
diplomatic  hints  of  Soviet,  interest  in 
achieving  a  political  rapproachement 
with  Germany  foreshadowing  the  Nazi- 
Soviet  pact  of  1939. 

In  accordance  with  the  practice 
followed  in  all  volumes  of  this  Allied 
project,  the  selection  of  documents  in 
this  volume  has  been  made  jointly  by  the 
British,  French,  and  U.S.  editors  who 
share  responsibility  for  the  selections 
made.  This  volume  was  printed  by  Her 
Majesty's  Stationery  Office  and  is  being 
released  in  identical  volumes  by  the  U.S. 
and  U.K.  Governments. 

Copies  of  this  volume — Department 
of  State  Publication  9338— may  be  pur- 
chased for  $18.00  (domestic  postpaid) 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Checks  or 
money  orders  should  be  made  out  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents. 


Press  release  218. 


94 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


JDEX 


lugust  1983 
tolume  83,  No.  2077 


bhanistan 

(cent  Soviet  Actions  in  Afghanistan  (Depart- 

I  ment  statement) 70 

rica 

ilding     Trade     With     Africa    (Lamb, 

Robinson)    36 

jthern  Africa:    America's  Responsibility  for 

Peace  and  Change  (Eagleburger) 8 

;h  Anniversary  ofthe  OAU  (Shultz,  message 

from  the  President) 16 

ms  Control 

aretary    Shultz's    News    Conference    of 

June  22  5 

•ategic  Modernization:  Foreign  Policy 
and  Arms  Control  Implications  (Dam)  .  .  17 
stralia.  Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister 

(Hawke,  Reagan) 62 

Blize.     Visit    of    Belize     Prime     Minister 

J  (Price,  Reagan) 82 

Gnada.  U.S.  Submits  Pleading  to  ICJ  Con- 

I  cerning  Canadian  Maritime  Boundary  .  .58 

Bmmodities.  Sugar  Imports  From  Central 

I  America  (White  House  announcement)  .  85 

Ingress 

lilding    Trade     With     Africa    (Lamb, 

)  Robinson)    36 

Iribbean        Basin        Recovery        Act 

I  (Eagleburger)   79 

iban  Involvement  in  Narcotics  Trafficking 

I  (Michel)   86 

ih  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 

j  gress) 49 

I?    Lebanon    Emergency    Assistance    Act 

J  (Reagan)    59 

liigees:    A  Continuing  Concern  (Purcell)  66 

j-iet  Jewry  (Abrams) 56 

(ategic  Modernization:    Foreign  Policy  and 

'.  Arms  Control  Implications  (Dam) 17 

Di. -Philippine    Relations    and    the    Military 
,  Bases  Agreement  Review  (Wolfowitz)  .21 
~>a 
C  lan  Involvement  in  Narcotics  Trafficking 

(Michel)   86 

8  .urn  of  Certain  Mariel  Cubans 86 

£jrus.    14th    Report   on   Cyprus   (message 

i  to  the  Congress) 49 

I  veloping  Countries 

/  lerican  Policy  To  Promote  World  Develop- 
ment (Wallis)  27 

1  >  Challenge  of  Economic  Growth  (Dam)  .  23 
I  momics 

Zierican  Policy  To  Promote  World  Develop- 
ment (Wallis)  27 

H:    World    Economy    After    Williamsburg 

(Wallis)    33 

I  Salvador 

i  Salvador  Commission  Announces  Peace  Ini- 
tiative (Department  statement) 84 

E'sident's    News    Conference    of   June    28 

(excerpts)    4 

S:retary    Shultz's    News    Conference    of 

June  22  5 

1 5.  Medical  Team  to  El  Salvador 80 

Bit    of    Salvadoran     President    (Magana, 

Reagan) 83 

I  man  Rights 

Sithern    Africa:    America's    Responsibility 

•    for  Peace  and  Change  (Eagleburger)  ...   8 

£/iet  Jewry  (Abrams) 56 

1 3.  Medical  Team  to  El  Salvador 80 

I  migration 

I  turn  of  Certain  Mariel  Cubans 86 

Iternational   Law.   U.S.   Submits   Pleading 

p  to    ICJ    Concerning   Canadian    Maritime 

Boundary    58 


Iran.  Persecutions  and  Repression  in  Iran 
(Reagan)    59 

Israel.  Israel-Lebanon  Peace  Agreement 
(Reagan)    59 

Ivory  Coast.  Visit  of  Ivory  Coast  President 
(Houphouet,  Reagan) 14 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Caribbean  Basin  Recovery  Act 
(Eagleburger)   79 

Saving  Freedom  in  Central  America 
(Reagan)    1 

Sugar  Imports  From  Central  America  (White 
House  announcement) 85 

Lebanon 

Israel-Lebanon  Peace  Agreement  (Reagan)  59 

The  Lebanon  Emergency  Assistance  Act 
(Reagan)    59 

Marshall  Islands.  U.S. -Marshall  Islands  Call 
Plebiscite 64 

Micronesia.  Micronesia  Approves  Free  As- 
sociation With  U.S 63 

Middle  East 

Secretary  Shultz's  News  Conference  of 
June  22  5 

Namibia 

Namibia  (contact  group  statement) 13 

Namibia  (Kirkpatrick,  Lichenstein,  text  of 
resolution) 75 

Narcotics.  Cuban  Involvement  in  Narcotics 
Trafficking  (Michel) 86 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua  (Kirkpatrick,  text  of  resolution)  .  71 

President's  News  Conference  of  June  28 
(excerpts)    4 

Secretary  Shultz's  News  Conference  of 
June  22  5 

Non-Self-Governing  Territories 

Micronesia  Approves  Free  Association  With 
U.S 63 

U.S.-Marshall  Islands  Call  Plebiscite 64 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

A  Collective  Approach  to  East-West  Economic 
Relations  (Wallis) 31 

A  Critical  Juncture  for  the  Atlantic  Alliance 
(Burt) 50 

North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in  Paris  (Shultz, 
final  communique 38 

President  Meets  With  NATO  Secretary  Gen- 
eral (White  House  statement) 51 

Nuclear  Policy 

Challenges  of  the  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Regime  (Kennedy) 60 

Strategic  Modernization:  Foreign  Policy  and 
Arms  Control  Implications  (Dam) 17 

Philippines 

U.S.-Pnilippine  Relations  and  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement  Review  (Wolfowitz)  .  21 

U.S.,  Philippines  Conclude  Bases  Agreement 
Review  (Department  announcement,  joint 
statement,  memorandum  of  agreement, 
President  Reagan's  letter) 19 

Poland.  President's  News  Conference  of 
June  28  (excerpts) 4 

Population.  U.S.  Population  Policy  and  the 
United  Nations  (Benedick) 65 

Presidential  Documents 

Elections  in  Turkey 53 

14th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   49 

Israel-Lebanon  Peace  Agreement 59 

The  Lebanon  Emergency  Assistance  Act  .  .59 

Persecutions  and  Repression  in  Iran 59 

President's  News  Conference  of  June  28 
(excerpts)    4 

Saving  Freedom  in  Central  America 1 

20th  Anniversary  of  the  OAU  (Shultz) 16 

UNICEF   78 

U.S.,  Philippines  Conclude  Bases  Agreement 
Review  (Department  announcement,  joint 
statement,  memorandum  of  agreement. 
President  Reagan's  letter) 19 

Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister  (Hawke, 
Reagan) 62 


Visit  of  Belize  Prime  Minister  (Price, 
Reagan) 82 

Visit  of  Ivory  Coast  President  (Houphouet, 
Reagan) 14 

Visit  of  Salvadoran  President  (Magana, 
Reagan) 83 

Visit  of  Spanish  President  (Gonzalez, 
Reagan) 54 

Publications 

Department  of  State 93 

Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy  Re- 
leased     94 

Refugees.  Refugees:  A  Continuing  Concern 
(Purcell) 66 

Spain.  Visit  of  Spanish  President  (Gonzalez, 
Reagan) 54 

Trade 

Building  Trade  With  Africa  (Lamb, 
Robinson)    36 

Caribbean  Basin  Recovery  Act 
(Eagleburger)   79 

The  Challenge  of  Economic  Growth  (Dam)  .23 

A  Collective  Approach  to  East-West  Economic 
Relations  (Wallis) 31 

Treaties 

Current  Actions 87 

U.S.,  Philippines  Conclude  Bases  Agreement 
Review  (Department  announcement,  joint 
statement,  memorandum  of  agreement, 
President  Reagan's  letter) 19 

Turkey.  Elections  in  Turkey  (Reagan) 53 

U.S.S.R. 

A  Collective  Approach  to  East- West  Economic 
Relations  (Wallis) 31 

A  Critical  Juncture  for  the  Atlantic  Alliance 
(Burt) 50 

North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in  Paris  (Shultz, 
final  communique) 38 

Recent  Soviet  Actions  in  Afghanistan  (Depart- 
ment statement) 70 

Secretary  Shultz's  News  Conference  of 
June  22  5 

Soviet  Jewry  (Abrams) 56 

Unacceptable  Intervention:  Soviet  Active 
Measures  (Eagleburger) 45 

United  Nations 

Namibia  (contact  group  statement) 13 

Namibia  (Kirkpatrick,  Lichenstein,  text  of 
resolution) 75 

Nicaragua  (Kirkpatrick,  text  of  resolution)  .71 

UNICEF  (Reagan) 78 

U.S.  Population  Policy  and  the  United  Nations 
(Benedick) 65 


Name  Index 

Abrams,  Elliott 56 

Armacost,  Michael  H 19 

Benedick,  Richard  Elliot 65 

Burt,  Richard  R 50 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 17,  23 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S 8,  45,  79 

Gonzalez  Marquez,  Felipe 54 

Hawke,  Robert  J.  L 62 

Houphouet-Boigny,  Felix 14 

Kennedy,  Richard  T 60 

Kirkpatrick,  Jeane  J 71,  75 

Lamb,  Denis 36 

Lichenstein,  Charles  M 75 

Magana,  Alvaro  Borja 83 

Michel,  James  H 86 

Price,  George  C 82 

Purcell,  James  N.,  Jr 66 

Reagan,  President  ....  1,  4,  14,  16,  19,  49,  53, 
54,  59,  62,  78,  82,  83 

Robinson,  Leonard  H.,  Jr 36 

Romualdez,  Benjamin  T 19 

Shultz,  Secretary 5,  16,  38 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 27,  31, 33 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 21 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

375 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 
Penalty  for  private  use,  $300 


Second  Class 


l>SB       StRIA286SHSSUO£00ob 

SbklALS    RbCfelPIi 

bOVrON    PUBLIC    LIB 

HO  bOX  286 

bUiTUN         «A   0*1 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription 
promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3  months  in  advance  of 
the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your  subscription  will  receive  immediate  atten- 
tion if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


o 


Depart ment 


bulletin 


e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  83  /  Number  2078 


September  1983 


Vice  President 
in  Europe/1 

Secretary  in 

ANZUS/71 
El  Salvador/79 


up!* 


Him 


JMENTS 


2  5  I983 


D&O&TQKf 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  83  /  Number  2078  /  September  1983 


Cover:  Assistant  Secretary 
Langhorne  A.  Motley 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Department  of  State  Bulletin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.i 
20402 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


1       Vice  President  Bush  Visits  Northern  Europe  (Addresses, 
Remarks,  Toasts) 


The  President 


18 


19 


300th  Anniversary  of  German 
Settlement  in  America 

News  Conference  of  July  26 
(Excerpts) 


The  Secretary 

23       Visit  to  East  and  South  Asia  and 
the  Middle  East  (Remarks, 
Statements,  Toasts,  News  Con- 
ferences) 

45       Comprehensive  Strategy  for  Cen- 
tral America 

47       Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Africa 


50 


51 


51 


U.S.  Military  Assistance  to  Chad 
(Department  Statement) 

Situation  in  Chad  (White  House 
Statement) 

AWACS  Withdrawn  From  Sudan 
(Department  Statement) 


Department 

52       Legislative  Veto  in  Foreign 
Affairs  (Kenneth  W.  Dam) 

East  Asia 

55       POW-MIAs  and  U.S.  Policy 

Toward  Southeast  Asia  (Paul  D. 
Wolfowitz) 

Energy 

57       Export  of  Alaskan  Oil 

(Richard  T.  McCormack) 

Europe 

59       An  Assessment  of  the  Madrid 
CSCE  Followup  Meeting 
(Max  M.  Kampelman, 
President  Reagan) 

Middle  East 

66  Visit  of  Lebanese  President 

(Amin  Gemayel,  President 
Reagan) 

67  Situation  in  the  Middle  East 

(White  House  Statement) 
67       Visit  of  Amir  of  Bahrain  (Shaikh 
Isa  bin  Salman  al-Khalifa, 
President  Reagan) 


Military  Affairs 

69       Production  of  the  MX  Missile 

(President  Reagan,  Letter  to  the 
Congress) 

Pacific 

71  ANZUS  Council  Meets  in  Wash- 
ington (Joint  News  Conference, 
Communique) 

Science  &  Technology 

76       U.S.  Policy  on  Cooperation  in 
Science  and  Technology 
(William  Schneider,  Jr.) 

Western  Hemisphere 

79  Elections  in  El  Salvador 

(Langhorne  A.  Motley) 

80  Situation  in  Central  America 

(White  House  Statement) 

81  U.S.-Honduran  Military  Exercise 

(White  House  Statement) 

82  Fourth  Certification  of  Progress 

in  El  Salvador  (Elliott  Abrams, 
Langhorne  A.  Motley) 

83  The  Contadora  Process  (Presi- 

dent's Letter  to  Presidents  of  the 
Contadora  Four) 

85  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative 

(President  Reagan) 

Treaties 

86  Current  Actions 

Chronology 

89       July  1983 

Press  Releases 

91       Department  of  State 

Index 


With  President  Mauno  Koivisto  of  Finland. 


(White  House  photos  by  Valerie  Hodson) 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


Vice  President  Bush 
Northern  Europe 


Vice  President  Bush  departed  Washington,  B.C., 

June  23,  1983,  to  visit  the  United  Kingdom 

(June  23-25),  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

(June  25),  Norway  (June  25-27  and  June  29-30), 

Sweden  (June  27-29),  Finland  (July  1-3),  Denmark 

(July  3-4.),  Ireland  (July  4-5),  and  Iceland  (July  5-7). 

He  returned  to  Washington  on  July  7. 

Following  are  the  Vice  President's  addresses, 

remarks,  and  toasts  he  made  on  various  occasions 

during  the  trip.1 


London 


ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
DEMOCRATIC  UNION, 
JUNE  24,  1983 

One  year  ago  this  month,  President 
Reagan  spoke  before  the  British  Parlia- 
ment and  announced  a  new  commitment 
by  the  United  States  to  act  on  behalf  of 
democracy  throughout  the  world.  "Let 
us  now  begin  a  major  effort,"  the  Presi- 
dent said,  "to  secure  the  best — a  crusade 
for  freedom  that  will  engage  the  faith 
and  fortitude  of  the  next  generation. 
For  the  sake  of  peace  and  justice,  let  us 
move  toward  a  world  in  which  all  people 
are  at  least  free  to  determine  their  own 
destiny." 


Our  Administration  has  now  sub- 
mitted to  the  Congress  an  initiative  for 
democracy — a  program  under  which  our 
political  parties,  business  and  labor 
groups,  and  other  public-minded 
organizations  can  work  with  the 
American  Government  to  provide  sup- 
port to  those  who,  in  nations  less  for- 
tunate than  our  own,  are  struggling  to 
establish  democracy.  Our  initiative 
reflects  the  lessons  we  have  learned 
from  those  of  our  NATO  allies  which 
have  already  successfully  set  in  place 
such  programs  to  foster  democratic 
development,  and  we  intend  our  own  ef- 
fort to  complement  those  of  other 
Western  democracies  and  of  organiza- 
tions such  as  the  European  Democratic 
Union  (EDU). 

Today  we  mark  the  founding  of  the 
International  Democratic  Union  (IDU),  a 
body  that  will  likewise  carry  on  the 
great  work  of  promoting  democracy. 
Democracy  begins  with  an  acute 
awareness  of  what  it  is  democracy's  pur- 
pose to  protect:  the  sacredness  of  the  in- 
dividual. It  is  because  democracy  holds 


!ptember1983 


that  each  man,  however  humble,  must 
be  listened  to,  that  democracies  grant  all 
their  people  a  voice  in  government.  It  is 
because  democracy  believes  that  each 
man,  however  offensive  or  mistaken, 
possesses  the  right  to  speak,  worship, 
and  earn  his  living  as  he  chooses,  that 
democracies  accord  all  their  people  equal 
protection  under  the  law.  "Democracy," 
the  educator  Robert  Hutchins  wrote,  "is 
the  only  form  of  government  that  is 
founded  on  the  dignity  of  man,  not  the 
dignity  of  some  men,  or  of  rich  men,  or 
of  educated  men  .  .  .  but  of  men." 

Our  age  teems  with  states  and 
ideologies  that  reject  any  such  notion  of 
individual  dignity.  Communism  for  one 
refuses  to  reserve  any  sphere  of 
freedom  to  individuals  but,  instead,  lays 
claim  to  its  subjects'  very  personalities. 
Lenin  himself  believed,  as  the  British 
political  philsopher  Isaiah  Berlin  has 
written,  that  the  people  needed  to  be 
turned  into  "an  obedient  force  held 
together  by  military  discipline  and  a  set 
of  perpetually  ingeminated  formulae 
...  to  shut  out  independent  thought." 

In  our  century,  totalitarian  govern- 
ments have,  as  a  matter  of  policy, 
deprived  masses  of  men,  women,  and 
children  not  only  of  their  rights  but  of 
their  lives.  Millions  have  been  murdered 
in  Europe,  in  Asia,  most  recently  in 
Kampuchea.  Those  of  us  who  adhere  to 
the  values  democracy  embodies  cannot 
accept  the  notion  that  such  governments 
were  in  their  own  ways  coping  with 
events  as  best  they  could.  No.  They  did 
wrong,  monstrous  wrong. 

Yet  democracy  represents  far  more 
than  a  mere  recognition  of  morality.  It 
represents  as  well  a  means  to  vigor,  an 
approach  to  life.  Totalitarian  states, 
lacking  means  for  reform,  attempting  to 
impose  one  rigid  will  on  their  people, 
must  grow  stagnant  in  spirit  and  brittle 
in  form.  They  must  fear  change,  shrink 
from  the  uncertainties  of  the  future,  and 
attempt  to  dwell  instead  in  the  darkness 
of  the  past. 

Yet  democracies  can  face  the  future 
with  confidence.  By  providing  the  means 
for  reform,  they  achieve  stability  and 


With  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  of 
the  United  Kingdom. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


omestic  peace  even  in  the  midst  of 
pheavals  in  public  life.  In  democracies, 
wreover,  the  free  play  of  ideas  rein- 
jrces  the  free  play  in  the  marketplace 
"  research,  discovery,  innovation,  and 
nterprise.  Experiments  in  democracies 
in  flourish,  knowledge  can  be  gathered, 
nanges  can  be  adjusted  to  and  turned 
advantage  even  as  they  occur. 
The  goods  that  have  flowed  in  our 
ntury  alone  from  the  energy,  skill,  and 
litiative  of  individuals  acting  in  freedom 
ave  raised  the  living  standards  not  only 
f  the  millions  who  inhabit  democracies 
it,  in  their  superabundance,  of  millions 
lore  who  do  not  yet  share  that 
ivilege.  Across  the  world  people  today 
it  better  and  live  longer,  less  subject  to 
mine  and  sickness  than  ever  before, 
hey  do  so  in  the  main  because  our 
mocracies  have  produced  innova- 
jns — from  disease-resistant  seeds  to 
echanical  harvesters — that  have  enor- 
ously  increased  the  world's  production 
food;  because  our  democracies  have 
panded  and  improved  world  trade; 
id  because  our  democracies  have  pro- 
iced  such  medical  advances  as  the 
sntification  of  vitamins,  the  discovery 
penicillin  and  of  vaccinations  against 
lallpox,  measles,  polio,  and  tuber- 
losis,  and  the  development  of  means 
control  malaria. 

As  they  have  made  such  strides,  the 
mocracies  have  been  able  to  provide 
iployment  for  ever-growing  numbers 
citizens.  Many  democracies,  including 
e  United  States,  now  face  relatively 
?h  unemployment.  Yet  even  those  na- 
ins  now  employ  millions  more  than 
sy  did  just  a  decade  ago,  and  the  clear 
lg-term  trend  in  democracies,  certain 
continue,  is  one  not  of  shrinking  but 
owing  employment.  The  vitality  of 
mocratic  economies  has  even  shown 
elf  equal  to  the  challenge  of  control- 
(g  an  ill  that  used  to  be  considered  an 
?scapable  side-effect  of  economic  prog- 
>s — pollution.  Solid  evidence  has  been 
:umulating  for  some  time  that  in  the 
iustrialized  democracies,  hazardous  air 
llution  is  now  on  the  decline  and  the 
ality  of  rivers,  streams,  and  lakes  has 
gun  to  improve. 

The  fundamental  resource  in  this 
iterial  advance  has  been  not  water 
wer  or  fossil  fuels  or  nuclear  energy 
the  mind  of  man.  It  is  the  mind  that 


conceives  uses  for  the  materials  of  the 
Earth;  it  is  the  mind  that  finds  methods 
for  combining  those  materials  with 
labor.  In  democracies  the  human  mind 
has  found  both  stimulation  and  scope  for 
its  activities. 

It  is  still  true  that  for  many,  life  re- 
mains, in  Thomas  Hobbes'  words,  "poor, 
nasty,  brutish,  and  short."  Yet  our  prog- 
ress since  Hobbes  composed  that  phrase 
has  been  vast.  Man,  the  stargazer,  has 
left  his  footprints  on  the  Moon.  The 
engine  of  that  progress  has  been 
freedom;  its  location  our  democracies. 

In  foreign  relations,  democracies 
seek  peace.  Free  peoples  understand 
that  in  peace  they  can  flourish  but  that 
in  war  they  must  accept  a  restriction  of 
personal  liberty,  put  on  a  military  bear- 
ing they  abhor,  and  risk  the  loss  of  what 
they  so  cherish — human  life. 

Today  diplomatic  initiatives  under- 
taken by  the  Western  democracies  pre- 
sent a  hope  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
and  for  the  independence  of  Namibia  in 


Vice  President 

'S 

Itinerary 

June  23-25 

u 

lited  Kingdom 

June  25 

Germany 

June  25-27 

Norway 

June  27-29 

Sweden 

June  29-30 

Norway 

July  1-3 

Finland 

July  3-4 

Denmark 

July  4-5 

Ireland 

July  5-7 

Iceland  ■ 

southern  Africa.  In  Central  America,  the 
United  States,  aided  by  other  democ- 
racies, is  giving  the  free  nations  of  the 
region  the  aid  they  need  to  build 
democracies  of  their  own.  The  United 
States  is  providing  the  free  Central 
American  nations  with  both  military 
assistance  to  help  them  resist  attempts 
at  subversion  by  forces  beholden  to 
totalitarian  powers  and,  in  a  proportion 
three  times  greater,  economic  assistance 
to  help  them  overcome  the  poverty  and 
social  ills  that  breed  unrest. 

Much  more,  however,  must  be  done 
to  undergird  democracy  in  the  nations  of 
this  troubled  region.  We  look  to 
organizations  such  as  the  EDU  and  the 
IDU  to  assist  in  such  work. 


The  Soviet  Union,  democracy's  main 
opponent,  has  by  contrast  in  recent 
years  overrun  and  occupied  Afghanistan; 
rained  poisonous  chemicals  on  the  inno- 
cent peoples  of  both  Afghanistan  and 
Southeast  Asia;  arrayed  tanks  and 
troops  on  the  proud  soil  of  Poland  in 
defense  of  an  authoritarian  regime;  and 
pointed  nuclear  missiles  at  the  great 
capitals  of  Western  Europe  in  an  at- 
tempt to  intimidate  the  European 
democracies  and  rupture  the  NATO 
alliance. 

Let  me  now  state  what  all  leaders  of 
alliance  nations  have  stated:  The  NATO 
alliance  so  cherishes  freedom  and  peace, 
and  so  detests  armed  conflict,  that  it 
stands  determined  to  undertake  every 
necessary  measure  and  to  bear  every 
necessary  sacrifice  to  achieve  an  effec- 
tive deterrent  to  war.  Our  aim  is  not  the 
mere  control  but  the  reduction  of  arms. 
Our  method,  now  and  in  the  months  to 
come,  is  not  belligerence  but  determined 
negotiations  backed  by  our  united 
strength. 

Today  let  us  be  mindful  both  of  all 
our  great  democracies  have  so  far  given 
to  mankind  and  of  all  that  with  firmness 
of  purpose  they  might  yet  give.  Let  us 
inaugurate  the  International  Democratic 
Union  in  the  determination,  to  use 
Lincoln's  words  in  a  manner  he  would 
have  endorsed,  that  the  world,  under 
God,  shall  have  a  new  birth  of  freedom; 
and  that  government  of  the  people,  by 
the  people,  and  for  the  people,  shall  not 
perish  from  the  Earth. 


ADDRESS  AT  DINNER  FOR 
INTERNATIONAL  DEMOCRATIC 
UNION  PARTY  LEADERS, 
JUNE  24,  1983 

Today  we  have  gathered  to  celebrate  the 
founding  of  the  International  Demo- 
cratic Union  and  to  consider  the  state  of 
democracy  throughout  the  world.  Of  all 
forms  of  government  we  have  asserted, 
democracy  alone  is  founded  upon  the 
universal  dignity  of  man.  In  recent  cen- 
turies, we  have  remarked,  democracy 
has  come  to  flourish,  from  Britain,  the 
mother  of  parliaments,  to  the  plains  and 
forests  of  North  and  South  America — 
the  New  World;  from  the  ancient  na- 
tions of  the  European  Continent  to  the 


Biptember  1983 


savannahs  of  Africa,  the  outback  of 
Australia,  the  mountains  of  Japan,  and 
the  teeming  cities  of  India. 

Today,  however,  we  must  also 
recognize  that  democracies  face  grave 
threats  from  hostile  ideologies  and 
states.  The  main  such  threat  to  most 
democracies  comes,  as  you  know,  from 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  main  defense 
against  that  threat  rests  in  turn  with  the 
NATO  alliance.  Our  consideration  of  the 
current  state  of  democracy  cannot  be 
complete  until  we  consider  the  state  of 
that  alliance. 

The  NATO  Alliance: 
Surveying  the  Record 

We  can  begin  by  surveying  its  record.  In 
the  nearly  four  decades  since  its  forma- 
tion, the  NATO  alliance  has  compiled  a 
list  of  achievements  that  anyone  familiar 
with  European  history,  the  theory  of 
coalitions,  or  the  pressures  of  geopolitics 
must  find  stunning. 

During  these  years,  more  than  100 
major  armed  conflicts  have  taken  place 
in  the  world.  Yet  Western  Europe— part 
of  a  continent  that  for  all  its  previous 
history  had  known  outbreak  after  out- 
break of  battle  and  that  had  undergone 
the  awful  carnages  of  the  first  half  of 
this  century — has  experienced  peace  and 
risen  to  become  the  most  prosperous 
community  of  nations  on  Earth.  The 
land  mass  of  Western  Europe — a 
relatively  narrow  and  strategically  dif- 
ficult seaward  projection,  overmatched 
in  size  by  the  gigantic  Soviet  state, 
flanked  by  the  vast  land  forces  of  the 
Eastern  bloc — has,  nevertheless,  en- 
joyed complete  military  security.  The 
alliance  between  Western  Europe  and 
North  America,  originally  a  wartime  ar- 
rangement, has  survived  world  crises 
and  complicated  disputes  to  become  the 
longest  lasting  peacetime  coalition  of 
sovereign  states  in  modern  history. 

Now  and  in  the  days  ahead,  as 
various  peace  movements  press  their  ap- 
peals, we  would  do  well  to  remember 
that  one  peace  movement  has  been 
quietly  and  successfully  at  work  since 
midcentury  and  that  its  name  is  NATO. 
Acting  on  behalf  of  the  alliance,  the 
United  States  has  taken  great  steps  in 
the  interests  of  peace,  proposing  to  the 
Soviets  marked  mutual  reductions  in 


European  conventional  forces,  a  total 
ban  on  chemical  weapons,  deep  mutual 
cuts  in  strategic  nuclear  weapons,  and 
the  complete  elimination  of  all  land- 
based  intermediate-range  nuclear 
missiles. 

Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 

Recently,  attention  both  in  the  United 
States  and  Europe  has  turned  to  the 
alliance  position  regarding  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces  (INF).  Let  me  take 
a  moment  to  set  out  the  facts. 

In  a  speech  here  in  London  in  1977, 
former  German  Chancellor  [Helmut] 
Schmidt  warned  of  the  SS-20,  the 
Soviet  intermediate-range  nuclear 
missile,  a  dangerous  and  destabilizing 
new  weapon.  At  that  time  the  Soviets 
had  mounted  under  30  warheads  on  such 
missiles.  By  December  1979,  the  number 
of  such  Soviet  warheads  had  increased 
to  some  450.  In  March  1982,  Chairman 
[Leonid  I.]  Brezhnev  announced  a 
moratorium  on  the  further  deployment 
of  SS-20s.  At  that  time,  the  number  of 
warheads  had  reached  900.  The  Soviets 
then  ignored  the  moratorium  they 
themselves  had  proclaimed,  and  today 
the  number  of  warheads  placed  on 
SS-20  missiles  exceeds  1,050.  When  the 
warheads  placed  on  SS-4  and  SS-5 
missiles  are  included  in  the  count,  the 
number  of  Soviet  intermediate-range 
nuclear  warheads  totals  more  than 
1,200.  I  am  speaking  of  nuclear  missiles 
that  can  reach  London  or  any  other 
target  in  Western  Europe  in  a  matter  of 
minutes. 

The  United  States  possesses  no  com- 
parable intermediate-range  nuclear 
weapons  whatsoever.  Surveys  indicate 
that  many  in  America  and  Western 
Europe  do  not  understand  that  point,  so 
let  me  repeat  it.  The  Soviet  Union  has 
more  than  1,200  warheads  mounted  on 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles.  The 
United  States  possesses  no  correspond- 
ing intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles 
whatsoever.  None. 

To  counter  the  present  Soviet 
monopoly,  in  December  1979,  the  NATO 
alliance  took  a  double,  or  two-track, 
decision.  The  first  track  calls  for  the 
United  States  to  negotiate  with  the 
Soviet  Union  to  achieve  a  reduction  in 
INF  missiles.  We  are  now  doing  so  in 


Geneva.  President  Reagan  first  pro- 
posed that  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  should  eliminate  all  land- 
based  INF  missiles,  not  only  from 
Europe  but  from  the  face  of  the  Earth, 
a  position  on  the  moral  high  ground. 
The  total  elimination  of  INFs  remains 
the  final  outcome  the  United  States 
seeks,  but  when  the  Soviets  rejected 
that  proposal  the  President  offered  in- 
stead to  limit  the  number  of  INF 
warheads  we  would  deploy  if  the  Soviet 
in  turn  would  agree  to  reduce  their 
warheads  to  an  equal  number. 

As  you  know,  the  Soviets  have 
stated  that  any  count  of  INF  systems 
must  include  British  and  French 
missiles.  But  the  British  and  French 
weapons  are  not  intended  for  the 
defense  of  NATO  but  for  the  ultimate 
defense  of  Britain  and  France  them- 
selves; and,  as  Moscow  knows  full  well, 
the  Soviet  Union  now  possesses 
thousands  of  nuclear-capable  aircraft 
and  shorter-range  missiles  that  more 
than  compensate  for  the  British  and 
French  deterrents. 

The  second  track  calls  for  the 
deployment  of  572  Pershing  and  cruise 
missiles,  less  than  half  the  number  of 
INF  warheads  the  Soviets  have  already 
set  in  place,  should  the  failure  of  the 
Soviets  to  come  to  an  agreement  in 
Geneva  make  that  necessary.  Let  me 
stress  that  if  we  must  deploy,  such  a 
decision  would  not  result  in  the  additioi 
of  a  single  nuclear  warhead  to  the  ex- 
isting U.S.  stockpile  in  Europe.  If  the 
program  does  have  to  be  carried  out,  fo 
each  Pershing  or  cruise  missile  deploye 
one  warhead  from  existing  stockpiles 
will  be  removed.  The  alliance,  moreovei 
is  currently  reviewing  its  nuclear  re- 
quirements to  make  certain  that  it  keep 
in  place  the  smallest  number  of  nuclear 
weapons  that  its  strategy  of  deterrence 
will  permit;  and  in  a  move  that  has 
received  surprisingly  scant  attention  or 
credit,  during  the  last  3  years  the 
United  States  has  unilaterally  with- 
drawn 1,000  nuclear  warheads  from 
Europe. 

The  planned  deployment  of  inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  forces  will  take 
place  over  5  years  and  involve  only  a 
few  missiles  at  a  time.  If  at  any  point 
agreement  should  be  reached  at  Geneva 
NATO  would  then  bring  the  numbers  o) 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


3  Pershing  and  cruise  missiles  into  line 
ith  the  terms  of  the  accord.  What  can 
>  in  can  come  out,  and  we  shall  remain 
>t  only  willing  but  eager  to  remove 
issiles,  should  an  accord  so  direct. 

The  Soviets  put  their  intermediate- 
nge  nuclear  missiles  in  place, 
iservers  agree,  to  intimidate  Western 
arope  and  rupture  the  alliance  by  split- 
lg  Europe  away  from  North  America. 
)  what  extent  have  the  Soviets  suc- 
eded?  None,  whatsoever.  The  alliance 
mains  strong  and  resolute.  During  my 
ip  to  Europe  last  January,  I  met  the 
iders  of  six  NATO  nations.  Each  sup- 
■rted  the  alliance  and  its  policies  un- 
akably. 

In  May,  the  summit  conference  at 
illiamsburg  produced  not  the  squab- 
ng  of  allies  in  disarray  but  wide  agree- 
;nt  on  economic  matters  and 
animous  support  for  the  Western 
liance.  "Our  nations,"  the  Western 

Siders  said  in  a  statement,  believe  that 
,'curity  is  indivisible,"  and  "express  the 
i'ong  wish  that  a  balanced  INF  agree- 
|>nt  be  reached  shortly  ...  it  is  well 
(own  that  should  this  not  occur,  the 
I  intries  concerned  will  proceed  with 
t>  planned  deployment  of  U.S.  systems 
it  Europe  at  the  end  of  1983."  The 
a  ance  break  down?  Not  while  the 
urorous  peoples  of  Western  Europe  and 
B  rth  America  continue  to  cherish  their 
Dependence.  Not  while  they  continue 
lisee  clearly  the  awful  alternative, 
ij  When  I  visited  Germany  last 
Ji  luary,  as  Chancellor  Kohl  [West  Ger- 
■  n  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl]  knows,  I 
lipped  at  a  small  and  ancient  farming 
yjage  call  Moedlareuth.  I  will  never 
tt?et  what  I  saw  there.  Down  the  main 
Spet  of  that  village  ran  a  tall  concrete 
n  1  topped  with  barbed  wire  so  densely 
m  ked  that  no  one  could  have  inserted 
anuch  as  a  finger.  On  the  near  side  of 
d  wall — the  West  German  side — the 
vjigers  were  going  about  the  ordinary 
oj  iness  of  their  daily  lives  in  peace  and 
fclom.  On  the  far  side— the  East  Ger- 
ii i  side — soldiers  stood  watch  with 
fchineguns,  and  attack  dogs  ran  along 
tl  wall  on  chains.  Trip  wires  had  been 
sljtched  near  the  wall  so  that  if  any 
faner  or  grocer  or  baker  attempted  to 
ejipe  to  the  West,  even  before  the 
s  reached  him  or  the  guards  opened 


on  him,  he  would  be  cut  down  by 
remote-control  weapons. 

Today  millions  live  under  such  op- 
pression, and  the  powers  responsible  for 
that  oppression  seek  to  expand  their 
control  still  further.  We  in  the  West, 
therefore,  have  in  our  trust  not  only  the 
prosperity  of  nations  but  the  liberty  of 
mankind.  In  the  name  of  that  trust,  we 
have  acted  for  nearly  40  years  with 
ceaseless  diligence.  In  the  name  of  that 
trust,  we  continue  to  stand  united.  In 
the  name  of  that  trust,  under  God,  we 
look  to  the  future  with  determination 
and  with  confidence. 

Please  join  me  in  a  toast  to 
democracy  and  to  the  alliance  that  has 
done  so  much  to  protect  not  only  our 
own  democracies  but  democracy 
throughout  the  world. 


Krefeld 


REMARKS  AT  THE 
TRICENTENNIAL  CEREMONY 
OF  GERMAN  IMMIGRATION 
TO  AMERICA, 
JUNE  25,  1983 

I  am  pleased  to  be  back  in  Germany  and 
deeply  honored  to  be  invited  to  speak 
here  today.  We  are  delighted  that  Presi- 
dent [Karl]  Carstens  will,  in  turn,  mark 
the  German- American  tricentennial  with 
a  visit  to  the  United  States,  and  I  would 
like  to  invite  all  of  you  who  can  do  so, 
particularly  the  young,  to  come  to 
America  this  year  "Zum  Andenken." 

Three  centuries  ago,  after  a  75-day 
voyage  across  the  Atlantic  in  a  cramped 
ship,  32  Mennonites  and  Quakers  from 
Krefeld  and  two  infants  that  had  been 
born  during  the  passage  landed  on  the 
east  coast  of  the  New  World.  It  was  Oc- 
tober. The  air  had  grown  crisp  and  the 
autumn  rains  had  begun.  Exhausted  and 
sick  after  their  voyage,  the  Germans 
trudged  from  Philadelphia,  then  a  settle- 


ment with  two  dirt  roads,  through  6 
miles  of  dense  forest  to  found  a  settle- 
ment of  their  own. 

As  winter  approached  they  chopped 
down  scores  of  trees  and  built  their  first 
homes  of  logs.  "It  may  neither  be 
described  nor  believed,"  wrote  Franz 
Daniel  Pastorius,  the  Krefelders'  leader, 
"under  what  conditions  of  need  and 
poverty  .  .  .  this  German  township  was 
founded." 

Yet  the  Germans  had  found  what 
they  came  for— freedom  of  worship — 
and  in  a  modest  way  their  settlement 
soon  began  to  thrive.  The  people  grew 
flax,  raised  sheep  for  wool,  and  became 
known  in  the  American  colonies  for  their 
weaving.  News  of  the  success  encour- 
aged other  Germans  to  leave  the  Old 
World  for  the  New. 

By  the  outbreak  of  the  American 
War  for  Independence  in  1776,  more 
than  200,000  Germans  had  come  to 
North  America.  The  Napoleonic  wars 
triggered  a  new  wave  of  immigration 
beginning  in  1825.  Entire  villages  in 
Bavaria  and  Wurttemberg  sold  their 
land,  houses,  and  cattle  and  set  out  for 
America,  taking  pastor  and  school- 
master with  them.  In  the  second  half  of 
the  last  century,  still  another  wave  of 
immigration  began,  and  during  the  two 
decades  following  1880  the  number  of 
Germans  entering  America  each  year 
averaged  more  than  100,000.  By  the 
turn  of  the  century,  more  than  5  million 
Germans  had  come  to  the  United  States. 


300  Jahre 
Deutsche  in 
Amerika 


Krefeld  1983 


As  they  came  the  Germans  settled 
not  only  on  the  east  coast  but  pushed 
west.  They  traveled  across  the  country 
by  foot,  by  mule  and  horseback,  on  flat- 
boats,  in  the  famous  Conestoga  wagons 
invented  by  Germans  in  Pennsylvania, 
and  later,  in  crowded,  fetid  railroad 
cars.  They  arrived  at  their  new  homes 
with  nothing— no  furniture,  no  savings, 
often  no  clothes  but  those  they  had  worn 
throughout  the  long  passage  from 
Germany. 


)tember1983 


I  just  said  the  Germans  arrived  with 
nothing.  Let  me  change  that.  They  ar- 
rived with  nothing  but  their  faith.  For 
the  Germans  brought  to  their  new 
homes  a  belief  in  God,  the  family,  and 
the  goodness  of  the  earth  as  solid  as  the 
Alps  and  as  steady  as  the  Rhine.  And 
they  brought  another  belief,  a  belief  in 
work — hard,  honest  work. 

And  work  they  did.  They  felled  the 
timbers  of  Minnesota  and  Wisconsin. 
They  cleared  the  plains  of  Illinois.  They 
explored  the  grazing  grounds  of  Texas. 
They  ploughed  the  land,  planted  grain, 
raised  hogs,  tended  cows,  herded  steer. 
Wherever  the  Germans  settled  and 
worked  the  land,  flourishing  towns  grew 
up;  Frankfort,  Indiana;  Bismarck,  North 
Dakota;  New  Munich,  Minnesota;  New 
Braunfels,  Texas;  New  Holstein, 
Wisconsin. 

Germans  who  came  later  gathered  in 
America's  great  cities.  St.  Louis  and 
Milwaukee  both  became  known  for  their 
Germans;  by  1900  Chicago  had  a 
German-speaking  population  larger  than 
Frankfurt,  and  the  Germans  in  New 
York  outnumbered  the  inhabitants  of 
Munich.  These  city  Germans  became 
skilled  carpenters,  tanners,  meat- 
packers.  They  established  newspapers, 
textile  works,  breweries.  Heinz  revolu- 
tionized food  processing;  Strauss 
manufactured  blue  jeans;  Roebling  built 
bridges,  including  the  most  beautiful 
American  bridge,  the  Brooklyn  Bridge. 

Throughout,  the  German  women 
worked  as  hard  as  their  men,  raising  big 
families  and  trying  to  keep  city 
tenements  and  farmhouses  with  dirt 
floors  clean.  They  did  the  cooking,  sew- 
ing, and  housecleaning  for  families  in 
which  a  dozen  children  were  not  uncom- 
mon. The  wife  of  a  farmer  or  laborer 
might  rise  at  6  a.m.  to  get  breakfast  for 
her  husband,  later  get  breakfast  for  the 
children,  and  then  prepare  meals  for  all 
again  at  noon  and  in  the  evening. 
Always  there  were  clothes  to  be 
patched. 

The  work — the  sheer,  relentless 
work— of  those  German  immigrants 
helped  build  vigorous  industries  and 
create  some  of  the  richest  farmland  in 
the  world.  And  those  German  im- 
migrants gave  America  not  only  farms 
and  industry,  but  their  children. 


r\*    wnru«&ni 


With  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  of  West 
Germany. 


At  the  beginning  of  the  last  century, 
Burkhardt  Mencken  came  to  America 
from  Saxony.  Burkhardt  himself 
achieved  neither  wealth  nor  fame,  but 
his  grandson,  H.  L.  Mencken,  became 
the  feisty  editor  of  The  Baltimore  Sun, 
published  books  on  politics,  literature, 
and  music,  and  became  known  across 
the  country  as  "the  sage  of  Baltimore." 

During  the  1890s,  a  German  family 
in  Baltimore  raised  a  boy  who  liked 
baseball.  His  name  was  Babe  Ruth,  and 
when  he  grew  up,  he  became  the 
greatest  slugger  in  baseball  history,  hit- 
ting 714  home  runs  and  becoming  a  hero 
to  millions  of  Americans,  including  a 
young  George  Bush. 

Three  hundred  years  ago,  when  that 
first  ship  set  sail  for  the  New  World 


from  Krefeld,  one  of  those  on  board  w: 
named  Thones  Kunders.  Eight  genera- 
tions later  the  family  name  had  change 
from  Kunders  to  Conrad,  and  Charles 
Conrad,  Jr.,  a  direct  descendant  of 
Thones,  became  an  astronaut  and 
walked  on  the  Moon. 

Today  60  million  Americans,  more 
than  one  in  four,  are  the  descendants  o 
German  immigrants,  and  they  inhabit  a 
country  made  prosperous  and  free  larg' 
ly  by  the  work  of  German  hands.  When 
just  a  generation  ago  Germany  itself  er 
countered  need,  America,  therefore, 
responded.  The  Marshall  Plan  helped  tr 
new  German  democracy  rise  from  the 
rubble  of  war  to  become  a  nation  of 
greatness.  The  Berlin  airlift  demon- 
strated the  American  commitment  to  tl 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


lefense  of  democratic  Germany  when, 
till  recovering  from  war,  West  Berlin 
mcountered  crude  threats  from  the 
Cast. 

Our  histories  are  thus  utterly  inter- 
wined.  We  now  contribute  to  each 
ithers'  trade,  enjoy  each  others' 
ultures.  Our  values — peace,  freedom, 
he  dignity  of  the  individual — are  the 
ame. 

Yet  we  must  remember  that  our 
eace  and  prosperity  are  ceaselessly 
hreatened  by  hostile  ideologies  and 
tates.  The  main  such  threat  to  our 
emocracies  continues  to  come,  as  you 
now,  from  the  Soviet  Union.  To 
stablish  a  firm  defense  against  the 
oviet  challenge,  at  the  end  of  World 
/ar  II  a  number  of  the  democracies  of 
urope  joined  the  United  States  and 
anada  in  forming  the  NATO  alliance, 
he  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and 
le  United  States  have  now  labored 
gether  in  that  alliance  for  more  than  3 
scades. 

At  a  time  of  peace  and  material 
ell-being  such  as  the  present,  it 
;comes  only  too  easy  to  forget  that  the 
«edoms  we  enjoy  depend  upon  our 
(gilance.  Both  our  governments  are 
sed  upon  respect  for  human  rights 
id  both,  as  democracies,  remain  always 
>en  to  reform.  The  Soviet  system,  by 
■ntrast,  possesses  no  workable  means 
r  reform;  seeks  to  impose  on  all  its 
■ople  a  single,  rigid  will;  and  has,  in  re- 
nt years,  overrun  and  occupied 
fghanistan;  rained  poisonous  chemicals 
i  the  innocent  peoples  of  both 
fghanistan  and  Southeast  Asia;  and 
ttered  down  attempts  to  assert  the 
diments  of  human  rights  in  East  Ger- 
:any,  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  and 
i)land. 

Membership  in  the  NATO  alliance 
res,  indeed,  impose  burdens.  The 
I  lited  States,  for  example,  has  had  to 
fition  some  300,000  troops  in  Europe, 
|  d  the  Federal  Republic  in  turn  has 
]  d  to  help  support  large  numbers  of 
snerican  troops  on  its  soil.  East  Euro- 
I  an  countries  have  also  had  to  live  with 
1-ge  numbers  of  foreign  troops  on  their 
iil,  however,  and  we  must  not  forget 
le  sharp  differences  between  the  two 
Its  of  circumstances.  As  Arthur  Burns, 
te  American  Ambassador  to  the 
'"deral  Republic,  recently  put  it:  "The 


invited  presence  of  American  troops  in 
Europe  has  the  express  purpose  of  help- 
ing to  protect  the  values  of  our  Western 
civilization,  whereas  the  Soviet  armies 
that  have  willfully  occupied  Eastern 
Europe  for  35  years  are  there  to  insure 
the  suppression  of  the  freedoms  for 
which  their  citizens  yearn  to  this  day." 

History  twists  and  turns,  giving  to 
different  nations  different  duties  at  dif- 
ferent times.  Now  the  strength  of  the 
Federal  Republic,  the  United  States,  and 
the  other  NATO  countries  provide  the 
underpinning  necessary  to  keep  the  free 
world  free.  For  centuries  the  German 
people,  both  in  the  Old  World  and  the 
New,  have  set  us  examples  of  strength 
and  courage.  Let  us  follow  those  ex- 
amples. Let  us  make  the  sacrifices  we 
must  to  keep  our  defenses  strong. 

In  the  end  it  is  freedom  that  binds 
us — free  elections,  a  free  press,  freedom 
of  worship,  freedom  of  speech,  freedom 
to  dissent.  Our  freedom  strengthens  us, 
brightens  our  lives,  gives  us  hope  for  the 
future.  Today  and  in  the  coming  months, 
however,  as  we  in  Germany  and 
America  celebrate  the  freedom  we 
share,  let  us  remember  the  duty  that 
freedom  entails.  And  let  us  do  our  duty 
with  vigor. 


Bergen 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
JUNE  25,  1983 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  my  wife 
Barbara  and  me  to  be  in  Norway.  We 
have  heard  a  great  deal  about  your 
beautiful  country,  and  we  are  delighted 
to  have  the  chance  to  enjoy  some  of  it  in 
the  next  couple  of  days.  This  evening 
and  tomorrow  we  plan  to  relax,  see 
some  of  Bergen,  and  take  a  short  tour  in 
the  nearby  fjord  area  on  a  Norwegian 
naval  vessel.  We  hope  the  weather  will 
cooperate,  but  I  am  told  that  it  is  easy 


to  be  a  weather  forecaster  in  western 
Norway— predict  anything  but  carry  an 
umbrella. 

I  am  happy  to  bring  with  me  the 
greetings  of  President  Reagan  and  all 
Americans.  Norway  is  admired  and 
respected  in  our  country  for  much  more 
than  its  magnificent  scenery.  Its  strug- 
gle against  tyranny  in  World  War  II  has 
been  followed  in  the  difficult  and 
sometimes  dangerous  postwar  period  by 
staunch  support  for  NATO  and  a 
ceaseless  dedication  to  the  search  for 
peace.  Those  efforts  have  created  a 
strong  and  lasting  bond  between  our 
two  peoples. 

We  greatly  appreciate  being  re- 
ceived by  Foreign  Minister  and  Mrs. 
Stray.  I  look  forward  to  arriving  in  Oslo 
next  Wednesday  for  the  official  portion 
of  my  visit.  But  for  now  and  tomorrow 
we  intend  to  relax  and  enjoy  ourselves 
in  the  beautiful  Bergen  area. 


Stockholm 


DINNER  REMARKS, 
JUNE  28,  19832 

Thank  you  for  this  evening's  warm 
welcome  and  delightful  dinner.  Our  visit 
to  Stockholm  has  proved  as  enlightening 
and  thought-provoking  as  it  has  been 
pleasurable.  My  highest  compliments  to 
you  and  to  everyone  who  helped  to  make 
it  so.  You  and  your  wife,  in  particular, 
have  been  generous  with  your  ideas  as 
well  as  your  time  and  have  made  this 
stay  memorable  for  both  Barbara  and 
me. 

Before  coming  to  your  beautiful 
country,  I  knew  that  Swedish  culture  in- 
volved both  an  active  interest  in  history 
and  a  confident,  vigorous  approach  to 
the  future.  Evidence  of  these  traits 
abounds.  Stockholm  itself  succeeds,  as 
do  few  cities,  in  combining  carefully  pro- 
tected architectural  treasures  with  ex- 
citing modern  design. 


jptember1983 


The  Swedish  sense  of  history  comes 
out,  again,  in  Stockholm's  tens  of 
museums  and  in  the  superb  Drottning- 
holm  Court  Theater— which  it  was  our 
great  pleasure  to  visit  last  night.  Your 
progressiveness  is,  in  turn,  evident  in 
the  leading  role  Sweden  plays  in  fields 
such  as  international  cooperation,   the 
social  sciences,  and  high  technology. 

Since  this  year  marks  the  bicenten- 
nial of  the  start  of  our  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, we  might  consider  where  we  stood 
two  centuries  ago.  Stockholm  in  1783 
was  a  grassy  town,  one-tenth  its  present 
population;  the  City  of  Washington,  for 
its  part,  had  not  even  been  designed;  the 
young  United  States,  its  capital  still  in 
Philadelphia,  had  just  begun  its  experi- 
ment in  democracy;  and  Sweden,  under 
Crown  Prince  Karl  Johan,  was  enjoying 
a  prolonged  period  of  peace. 

The  years  since  have  been  produc- 
tive both  for  our  nations  and  for  the 
friendship  between  them.  Even  when  we 
have  disagreed  on  certain  issues, 
cooperation  between  our  peoples— in 
trade,  in  scientific  and  technical  develop- 
ment, in  some  of  the  most  imaginative 
thinking  on  the  problems  of  modern 
societies— has  continued  and,  indeed, 
widened. 

My  brief  stay  in  Stockholm  has  il- 
lustrated the  scope  of  this  relationship. 
The  Prime  Minister  and  I  held  searching 
discussions  of  the  important  interna- 
tional issues  of  the  day.  At  the  same 
time,  our  wives  were  exploring  a  shared 
interest  in  the  education  of  our  youth— 
particularly,  those  who  require  special 
help.  We  Bushes  and  Palmes  thus  pur- 
sued the  two  great  interests  of  all 
Americans  and  Swedes:  peace  on  the 
one  hand,  and  on  the  other,  the  fullest 
possible  development  of  each  individual. 

My  talks  with  the  Prime  Minister 
and  his  colleagues  have  ranged  fruitfully 
over  a  number  of  topics.  I  have  restated 
we  have  both  obtained  a  firmer  under- 
standing of  one  another's  positions.  All 
of  us  have  made  clear  our  commitment 
to  free  but  fair  international  trade. 

Most  important,  however,  our  talks 
have  demonstrated  that  Sweden  and  the 
United  States  hold  common  fundamental 


With  Prime  Minister  Olof  I'alme  of 
Sweden. 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


dues.  Such  differences  as  stand  be- 
veen  us  are  essentially  tactical  ones 
Dout  how  best  to  achieve  goals  we 
lare:  the  defense  of  Western  Europe, 
eductions  in  nuclear  arms,  the  allevia- 
on  of  poverty  and  injustice  in  the  Third 
forld.  On  peace,  on  freedom,  on 
?mocracy,  on  the  universal  dignity  of 
an,  we  are  the  same. 

The  years  since  1783  have  seen  the 
ittlement  of  new  continents,  world 
ars,  technological  revolutions, 
hroughout,  however,  our  two  nations 
ive  remained  friends  and  worked 
aselessly  on  behalf  of  the  values  they 
lare.  We  do  not  know  what  the  coming 
icades  hold.  But  we  do  know  that  we 
all  remain  true  to  our  values,  and  to 
ir  friendship. 


olsas 


IRIVAL  REMARKS, 
TO  HEADQUARTERS, 

rNE  29,  1983 

the  Americans  here  I  bring  greetings 
>m  President  Reagan  and  the  rest  of 
ur  fellow  countrymen  across  the 
an.  To  all  of  you — Norwegian,  Ger- 
tn,  Danish,  British,  and  Canadian,  as 
11  as  American — I  bring  heartfelt 
eetings  from  America. 

I  want  to  tell  you  that  we  in 
ishington,  and  all  the  allies  I've  had 
chance  to  meet  and  confer  with  on 
s  trip,  as  well  as  those  I've  spoken 
:h  at  other  times,  are  highly  conscious 
the  superlative  job  you  are  all  doing 
•e  at  AFNORTH  [Allied  Forces 
rthern  Europe].  You  certainly  have 
extended  and  varied  region  under 
or  command:  from  the  plains  of  north- 
Germany  to  the  mountains  and 
rds  of  Norway. 

In  light  of  the  accelerating  Soviet 
val  buildup,  the  Baltic  approaches  and 
!  Norwegian  Sea  are  taking  on  an 


ever-increasing  importance  in  NATO 
defense.  We  all  know  that  in  the  event 
of  a  conflict,  northern  Norway  would  be 
crucial  in  securing  the  vital  sealanes  of 
the  North  Atlantic. 

In  the  defense  of  Norway,  our  ability 
to  rapidly  deploy  troops  from  other 
NATO  countries  is  of  major  importance. 
We  are  very  pleased  with  the  progress 
that  has  already  been  made  in  the 
Marine  Corps  prepositioning  program 
for  Norway,  in  the  COBS  program,  and 
in  the  other  reinforcement  efforts  such 
as  the  Canadian  air/sea  transportation 
brigade.  We  are  doing  our  best  to  work 
out  whatever  difficulties  there  are  with 
NATO's  infrastructure  funding  so  that 
these  vital  programs  will  not  be  delayed. 


With  (left  to  right)  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Norway  Mark  Evans  Austad,  Foreign 
Minister  Sven  Stray,  and  Prime  Minister 
Kaare  Willoch. 


5ptember1983 


We  also  recognize  that  air  defense  is 
extremely  important  to  the  security  of 
this  region,  and  we  hope  to  soon  see 
some  real  improvement  in  this  area.  As 
defenders  of  NATO's  northern  flank, 
you  here  at  the  AFNORTH  command 
are  a  crucial  bulwark  in  the  defense  of 
the  free  world.  I've  been  doing  a  lot  of 
talking  on  this  trip,  to  all  sorts  of  groups 
and  individuals.  As  you're  aware,  NATO 
plans  to  deploy  INFs  in  December,  if  we 
can't  first  reach  some  fair  accommoda- 
tion with  the  Soviets.  With  this  planned 
deployment,  the  so-called  peace  move- 
ment has  become  quite  vocal  and  is  very 
much  on  the  people's  minds. 

One  thing  I've  been  saying  on  this 
trip,  and  I  think  it  bears  repeating  and 
repeating  often,  is  that  NATO— you 
men  and  women  here— are  one  of  the 
most  effective  peace  movements  in  all 
history.  For  over  30  years,  you've  kept 
Western  Europe  free  and  at  peace  by 
keeping  it  strong;  over  30  years  of  peace 
and  security— that's  a  record  to  be 
proud  of.  And  for  that,  all  of  us  who  live 
and  work  in  freedom,  who  enjoy  the 
fruits  of  peace  and  security,  are  all  pro- 
foundly grateful. 


Oslo 


DINNER  TOAST, 
JUNE  29,  19833 

Thank  you,  for  your  kind  words  of 
welcome  and  for  receiving  us  tonight  in 
the  magnificent  castle  of  Akershus.  This 
ancient  building  powerfully  evokes  the 
proud  history  of  Norway,  and  Barbara 
and  I  feel  honored  to  be  here  this 
evening. 

Before  World  War  II,  the  United 
States  and  Norway  shared  a  tradition  of 
avoiding— to  borrow  a  phrase  from 
George  Washington— "entangling 
alliances."  The  awful  events  of  that  war 
demonstrated,  however,  that  in  the 
modern  world  attacks  against  other  free 
nations  can  soon  lead  to  attacks  against 
one's  own  nation.  In  1949,  when  it  had 
become  clear  that  our  democracies  were 
again  under  military  threat,  Norway  and 


the  United  States  joined  the  other  great 
democracies  of  the  West  in  forming  the 
NATO  alliance. 

Like  you,  we  remain  deeply  commit- 
ted to  collective  security  as  the  best 
means  to  secure  the  peace  and  freedom 
that  we  continue  to  enjoy.  During  this 
period  when  our  democratic  values  re- 
main threatened,  let  no  one  doubt  our 
determination  to  reduce  tensions  be- 
tween East  and  West  and  to  build  a 
lasting  peace.  President  Reagan,  I 
believe,  has  a  better  chance  than  any 
other  recent  American  leader  of  achiev- 
ing real  arms  reduction.  No  one  should 
question  our  sincerity  in  seeking  mean- 
ingful arms  control.  But  no  one  should 
question  our  will  to  defend,  if  necessary, 
the  freedom  we  cherish. 

My  government  deeply  appreciates 
Norway's  efforts  within  the  NATO 
alliance,  in  particular  your  augmented 
efforts  to  improve  Norway's  conven- 
tional forces  and  your  influential  and 
supportive  role  in  NATO's  INF  decision. 
The  constructive  counsel  of  your  govern- 
ment, as  well  as  that  of  other  NATO 
allies,  has  contributed  to  the  formation 
of  our  modified  INF  negotiating  posi- 
tion. We  continue  to  believe  that 
eliminating  an  entire  class  of  weapons 
would  be  the  most  desirable  result. 
Toward  this  aim  we  will  continue  to 
seek,  with  all  the  means  at  our  disposal, 
deep  reductions  in  nuclear  arms. 

The  United  States  remains  firmly 
committed  to  continuing  close  consulta- 
tion with  Norway  on  the  full  array  of 
issues  that  we  face.  The  warm  friend- 
ship that  has  marked  Norwegian- 
American  relations  for  decades  is  a 
source  of  great  pride  to  the  American 
people.  I  look  forward  to  our  private 
talks  tomorrow  and  thank  you  for  this 
delicious  meal  and  extraordinarily  warm 
hospitality. 

In  the  spirit  of  friendship  that  joins 
our  countries  as  allies,  please  rise  and 
join  me  in  a  toast:  to  His  Majesty,  King 
Olav  of  Norway,  to  our  Host,  Prime 
Minister  Willoch,  and  to  the  bonds  of 
freedom  that  unite  us. 


Helsinki 


DINNER  TOAST, 
JULY  2,  19834 

Thank  you  for  your  extraordinary 
hospitality  here  this  evening.  Barbara 
and  I  are  delighted  to  be  here  and  to 
bring  greetings  from  the  American  peo 
pie.  Americans  have  long  held  Finland 
high  esteem.  The  courage  your  nation 
has  shown  in  defending  its  independen< 
has  earned  our  keen  admiration.  The 
role  Finland  plays  in  international  af- 
fairs in  turn  commands  our  respect.  Tr» 
United  States  fully  recognizes  Finland'; 
unique  position  in  the  world  and  firmly 
supports  your  nation's  neutrality. 
As  you  stated  a  moment  ago, 
neutrality  does  not  mean  indifference, 
and  we  deeply  appreciate  Finland's  ef- 
forts in  the  pursuit  of  peace.  We  feel 
particular  gratitude  for  the  current 
deployment  of  Finnish  troops  in 
Lebanon  as  part  of  the  U.N.  peacekee] 
ing  forces,  and  we  welcome  the  Finnis 
role  in  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe,  born  here  in 
Helsinki  and  now,  we  believe,  progress 
ing  to  a  new  and  promising  stage. 

The  United  States  shares  Finland's 
yearning  for  a  world  free  of  the  dread 
threat  of  nuclear  conflict.  As  we 
negotiate  in  Geneva,  we  are  acutely 
aware  that  the  issue  of  nuclear  weapoi 
affects  not  just  the  Soviet  Union  and  tt 
United  States  but  all  nations. 

Let  me  assure  you  and  the  Finnish 
people  of  President  Reagan's  strong 
commitment  to  achieving  not  only  arm 
control  but  significant  arms  reductions 
The  President  has  instructed  our 
negotiators  at  Geneva  to  remain  flexib 
as  we  seek  a  more  durable  peace.  We 
believe  that  the  security  not  only  of  th< 
United  States  but  of  all  nations  would 
greatly  enhanced  by  the  deep  cuts  in 
nuclear  weapons  we  hope  to  accomplis 


10 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


The  United  States  knows  Finland  as 
country  active  not  only  in  international 
ilitics  but  international  trade — a  coun- 
y  whose  exports  include  steel,  timber, 
d  consumer  products  of  every  descrip- 
>n  known  worldwide  for  the  beauty 
id  elegance  of  their  design.  We  value 
nland  as  a  trading  partner,  look  for- 
ird  to  expanding  our  exchange  of 
ods  and  services  with  your  nation  still 
rther,  and  share  Finland's  abhorrence 
protectionism  and  firm  commitment 
free  trade. 

I  have  deeply  appreciated  the  oppor- 
nity  to  meet  with  you  and  your  col- 
igues  to  describe  the  positions  of  the 
agan  Administration  and  to  seek  Fin- 
:h  counsel  on  the  array  of  issues  our 
intries  now  face.  For  all  the  instant 
■nmunications  the  modern  age  has 
en  us,  the  world  has  yet  to  find  a 
placement  for  the  face-to-face  ex- 
inge  of  views,  and  I  have  found  our 
ks  invaluable. 

I  The  past  year  has  been  an  especially 
jbd  one  for  Finnish- American  rela- 
las.  As  a  result  of  the  "Scandinavia 
Iday"  celebrations,  hundreds  of 
I  >usands  of  Americans  received  ex- 
|;ure  to  Finnish  painting,  sculpture, 
I  sic,  and  literature.  I  participated  in 
I  grand  opening  of  that  celebration, 
I  i  I  remember  that  a  Finnish  choir 
E  itivated  an  audience  of  some  60,000. 
I  ter  in  the  year  the  Finnish  National 
[  era  appeared  in  New  York  and 
i  lieved  a  triumph.  Such  cultural  ex- 
s  mges,  I  believe,  foster  the  most  im- 
f  -tant  bond  of  international  under- 
i  nding,  for  they  affect  not  only  the 
j  ifessional  lives  of  diplomats  but  uplift 
i  ordinary  lives  of  millions  of  our 
B  zens.  They  remind  us  of  the  heritage 
I  it  both  the  United  States  and  Finland 
i  'rish  and  that  both  our  nations,  in 
B  ir  own  ways,  seek  to  make  secure. 
1   Please  join  me  in  a  toast  to  Finland, 

I  the  friendship  between  our  nations, 

II  to  the  peace  and  freedom  both  our 
I, ions  enjoy  and  seek  to  preserve. 


With  Prime  Minister  and  Mrs.  Kalevi 
Sorsa  of  Finland. 


Copenhagen 


ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE 
FOREIGN  POLICY  SOCIETY, 
JULY  4,  1983 

Our  basic  agreement  on  fundamental 
issues  is  not  always  clearly  recognized. 
While  my  conversations  with  the  leaders 
I've  visited  so  far  have  revealed  many 
points  of  agreement,  I  have  found  dur- 
ing this  visit  to  Northern  Europe,  and 
especially  in  talking  with  the  press,  that 
key  aspects  of  American  foreign  policy 
are  sometimes  misunderstood. 

The  responsibility  for  explaining 
American  foreign  policy,  of  course, 
belongs  to  the  United  States,  and  I 
welcome  this  opportunity  to  dispel  cer- 
tain misconceptions— I  call  them 
myths— about  what  President  Reagan  is 
trying  to  accomplish. 

Clarifying  Misconceptions 

Nuclear  Arms  Reductions.  The  first 
such  myth  holds  that  President  Reagan 
is  insincere  about  seeking  nuclear  arms 
reductions.  Nothing  could  be  further 
from  the  truth.  The  President's  record 
speaks  for  itself.  In  the  last  2  years,  the 
Reagan  Administration — working  with 
Denmark  and  other  close  allies — has 
come  forward  with  new  and  far-reaching 
proposals: 

•  To  eliminate  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces  (INF); 

•  To  reduce  substantially  intercon- 
tinental strategic  forces; 

•  To  reduce  troop  levels  in  Europe 
to  equal  levels;  and 

•  To  ban  completely  the  production 
and  stockpiling  of  all  chemical  weapons. 

In  negotiation  after  negotiation,  we 
have  demonstrated  our  flexibility.  In  the 
INF  negotiations,  for  example,  the 
President  announced  last  spring  that  if 


I3tember1983 


11 


the  Soviet  Union  refused  to  eliminate  an 
entire  class  of  the  missiles,  the  United 
States  would  be  willing  instead  to  enter 
into  an  interim  agreement  providing  for 
lower  levels  of  INF  warheads. 

More  recently,  the  President  has 
demonstrated  his  flexibility  in  strategic 
arms  reductions  by  announcing  that  if 
the  Soviet  Union  rejected  the  original 
American  proposal  for  cuts  in  ballistic 
missiles,  the  United  States  would  be 
willing  to  discuss  a  different  limit.  Now 
I  know  some  people  argue  that  this  is  all 
just  a  public  relations  ploy  and  that  the 
President  isn't  really  interested  in 
achieving  agreement.  This  is  simply  un- 
true. I  know  the  President  well,  and  I 
know  his  innermost  feelings  on  this  mat- 
ter. President  Reagan  is  a  man  deeply 
committed  to  arms  reductions— a  man 
with  a  vision  of  a  world  free  from  the 
burden  of  the  nuclear  threat. 

The  President  demonstrated  his 
sincerity  again  just  last  week  when  the 
United  States  announced  that  it  would 
support  the  effort  of  the  Spanish 
Government  to  find  a  compromise  agree- 
ment at  the  Madrid  meeting  on  security 
and  cooperation  in  Europe.  We  are  en- 
couraged by  what  appears  to  be  a 
favorable  Soviet  response  to  this  effort, 
and  we  hope  that  the  Spanish  initiative 
soon  produces  an  outcome  that  will 
enhance  the  prospects  for  both  disarma- 
ment and  the  observance  of  human 
rights  in  Europe. 

Central  America.  Another  myth  I 
have  encountered  concerns  U.S.  policy 
in  Central  America.  Critics  accuse  us  of 
attempting  to  overthrow  a  just  govern- 
ment in  Nicaragua  while  propping  up 
military  dictatorships  elsewhere.  Both 
accusations  are  utterly  unfounded. 

For  the  first  year  after  the  San- 
dinistas gained  power,  the  United  States 
gave  Nicaragua  more  economic 
assistance  than  did  any  other  nation.  It 
was  only  after  the  Sandinistas  broke 
their  promise  to  establish  democracy 
that  the  United  States  withdrew  its  sup- 
port. The  Sandinistas  now  censor  the 
Nicaraguan  press,  and  they  have  refused 
to  hold  elections. 


•  They  crudely  embarrassed  the 
Pope  during  his  visit. 

•  They  have  brutally  driven  the 
Miskito  Indians  from  their  homelands. 

•  They  have  become  the  main  sup- 
pliers of  the  guerrillas  who  have  ravaged 
large  sections  of  El  Salvador. 

Let  me  state  clearly  that  the  United 
States  remains  willing  to  talk  with  the 
Sandinistas  again  if  they  prove  open  to 
serious  discussion.  In  the  meantime,  our 
policy  toward  Nicaragua  is  only  to  pre- 
vent the  Sandinista  regime  from 
threatening  the  other  nations  of  the 
region. 

Our  regional  policy,  quite  simply,  is 
to  foster  democracy.  We  are  opposed  to 
replacing  one  dictatorship  with  another. 
We  recognize  that  hunger,  poverty,  and 
social  ills  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  region's 
unrest.  Three  out  of  every  four  dollars 
of  U.S.  assistance  to  Central  American 
nations,  therefore,  goes  to  economic  aid. 
While  countries  of  Central  America 
face  a  long  road  on  the  way  to  becoming 
vigorous  democracies,  they  have  already 
made  good  progress.  El  Salvador  has 
enacted  land  reform— land  reform  that 
has  moved  forward  in  spite  of  constant 
guerrilla  attacks.  Both  El  Salvador  and 
the  other  free  nations  of  the  region  have 
undertaken  significant  measures  to  im- 
prove the  lives  of  their  poor.  Most  im- 
portant, these  nations  have  held  free 
and  open  elections. 

As  the  last  election  in  El  Salvador 
approached,  you  may  recall  the  people  of 
that  nation  were  subjected  to  death 
threats  from  Marxist  guerrillas.  One 
guerrilla  slogan  proclaimed  "Vote  today, 
die  tonight."  Yet  when  election  day  end- 
ed, 80%  of  the  population  had  braved 
such  threats  and  gone  to  the  polls.  No 
one  need  doubt  the  yearning  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  people  to  be  free,  or  the 
American  determination  to  help  them. 

Nuclear  Arms  Race.  Returning  to 
Europe,  another  myth  considers  it  is 
longstanding  American  policy  to  seek 
not  arms  control  but  an  unconstrained 
nuclear  arms  race.  Yet  once  again,  the 
record  speaks  for  itself.  The  United 
States  has  always  stood  at  the  very  fore 
front  of  arms  control.  It  was  an 
American,  Bernard  Baruch,  who,  in  the 
aftermath  of  World  War  II  before  the 


Soviets  even  had  nuclear  weapons,  pro 
posed  that  all  countries  relinquish  to  the 
United  Nations  their  right  to  deploy 
nuclear  weapons.  The  Soviet  Union  re- 
jected that  proposal.  It  was  an 
American,  President  Dwight 
Eisenhower,  who  came  forward  with  th 
"Open  Skies"  proposal  designed  to  lowei 
tensions  by  giving  both  sides  the  ability 
to  observe  each  other's  military  pro- 
grams with  reconnaissance  aircraft.  Tht 
Soviet  Union  rejected  that  proposal.  It 
was  an  American,  President  Ronald 
Reagan  taking  the  moral  high  ground, 
who  called  for  the  total  elimination  of  a 
entire  class  of  INF  missiles.  Again,  the 
Soviet  Union  rejected  that  proposal. 
The  United  States  adamantly  op- 
poses an  arms  race.  Despite  all  the  talk 
you  hear  of  weapons  piling  up,  the  fact 
is  that  the  United  States  has  fewer 
nuclear  warheads  in  its  stockpile  today 
than  it  did  15  years  ago,  and  the  total 
destructive  power  of  those  warheads  is 
lower  than  at  any  point  in  the  last  25 
years.  In  a  decision,  moreover,  that 
received  surprisingly  little  attention  or 
credit,  the  United  States  over  the  last  I 
years  unilaterally  withdrew  1,000 
nuclear  weapons  from  Europe.  And  if 
we  are  forced  to  deploy  INF  missiles, 
we  have  agreed  with  our  allies  that  for 
every  new  warhead  that  is  set  in  place, 
an  existing  nuclear  warhead  will  be 
withdrawn. 

In  the  interest  of  arms  reductions, 
we  are  willing  to  consider  every  option 
and  we  have  not  ruled  out  a  summit 
meeting  with  the  Soviet  Union.  For  su« 
a  meeting  to  succeed,  however,  it  must 
be  thoroughly  prepared,  and  President 
Reagan  has  made  it  clear  that  he  will  ii 
sist  on  such  preparation.  We  owe  too 
much  to  the  American  people— to  the 
people  of  the  world— not  to  do  our  besi 
to  ensure  that  a  summit  produces  not 
frustrated  hope  but  substantive  results. 
I  did  not  come  to  Northern  Europe 
to  engage  in  confrontation,  but  I  believ 
we  would  do  well  to  pose  certain  ques- 
tions to  the  Soviets. 

•  Why  did  the  Soviet  Union,  with  i 
warning,  begin  its  buildup  of  SS-20s  in 
the  mid-1970s? 


12 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


•  Why  did  the  Soviet  Union,  after 
NATO's  December  1979  decision,  con- 
inue  its  SS-20  buildup  when  Soviet 
eaders  themselves  openly  proclaimed 
hat  a  balance  already  existed  in 
Europe? 

•  And  why,  even  after  Moscow  an- 
lounced  last  year  that  there  would  be  a 
noratorium  on  deployment,  did  the 
oviet  Union,  nevertheless,  deploy  even 
irger  numbers  of  SS-20s? 

'hese  questions  bear  directly  on  the 
ves  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  free  men 
nd  women.  The  peoples  of  the  West 
eserve  answers. 

Limited  Nuclear  War  in  Europe.  A 

inal  myth  holds  that  the  United  States 
;  planning  to  fight  a  limited  nuclear  war 
1  Europe.  This  is  the  most  pernicious 
lyth  of  all.  It  is  not  now,  and  never  has 
een,  American  policy  to  fight  a  nuclear 
ar  or  to  try  to  limit  any  East- West 
Dnflict  to  Europe.  Indeed,  the  whole 
ATO  strategy  of  deterrence  has  been 
esigned  to  make  it  absolutely  un- 
tistakable  to  any  potentional  aggressor 
iat,  in  the  words  of  NATO  doctrine,  an 
:tack  on  one  is  an  attack  on  all.  It  is 
le  very  essence  of  deterrence  that  the 
'ospect  of  American  retaliation  against 
l  attack  on  Europe  lowers  the  incen- 
ve  for  such  aggression. 

We  have  no  illusions  about  the  terri- 
e  consequences  of  nuclear  war.  Presi- 
nt  Reagan  has  repeatedly  stated  that 
a  nuclear  war  there  can  be  no  win- 
rs,  only  losers.  And  it  is  because  we 
iffer  no  illusions  that  we  stand  utterly 
itermined  to  do  whatever  we  must  to 
j  "event  a  nuclear  cataclysm. 

When  we  recognize  these  myths  for 
:  hat  they  are,  there  is  good  reason  for 
)timism  about  the  prospects  for 
jeedom  and  peace.  President  Reagan's 
immitment  to  the  achievement  of 
bnificant  arms  reductions  is,  as  I 
lated,  unshakeable.  And  because  of  his 
alistic  assessment  of  Soviet  intentions 
iid  his  determination  to  keep  the 
Inited  States  strong,  in  my  judgment, 
resident  Reagan  has  a  better  chance 
Ian  any  recent  American  President  of 
l!gotiating  major  arms  reductions. 

There  is  another  good  reason  for  op- 
Inism  and  that  is  the  record  of  the 


NATO  alliance.  In  the  more  than  3 
decades  since  the  formation  of  the 
alliance,  over  100  wars  have  taken  place 
in  the  world.  Yet  under  NATO's  protec- 
tion, Western  Europe,  part  of  a  conti- 
nent that  for  all  its  history  had  known 
outbreak  after  outbreak  of  battle  and 
that  had  undergone  the  awful  carnages 
of  the  first  half  of  this  century,  has, 
nevertheless,  experienced  peace. 

Conclusion 

I  want  to  close  by  saying  a  word  to  the 
young  people  of  Western  Europe — to 
those  who  are  too  young,  maybe,  to 
remember  anything  at  all  about  the  Sec- 
ond World  War.  Like  many  of  your 
parents  and  grandparents,  I  lived  that 
war — fought  in  it  as  a  pilot  in  the 
Pacific,  got  shot  down  once,  saw  some 
of  my  best  friends  killed  before  my  eyes. 

I  want  you  to  know  that  I  under- 
stand your  love  of  peace,  because  to 
those  of  us  who  lived  through  that  war, 
these  past  30  or  more  years  of  peace 


With  Prime  Minister  Poul  Schluter  of 
Denmark. 


have  been  more  precious  than  words  can 
tell.  And  because  I  have  children — and 
grandchildren — I  don't  want  them  ever 
to  have  to  go  through  what  I  and  so 
many  others  went  through. 

You  must  believe  us  when  we  tell 
you  that  peace  doesn't  just  happen.  It 
has  to  be  built  and  then  protected.  I 
know  that  many  of  you  belong  to  peace 
movements,  and  I  admire  your  idealism. 
But  I  would  like  you  to  realize  that  one 
organization — the  NATO  alliance — has 
successfully  kept  the  peace  for  these 
three  and  more  decades.  This  alliance  of 
free  nations  represents  the  true  Euro- 
pean peace  movement.  We  are  joined 
not  just  by  security  but  by  our  fun- 
damental commitment  to  democratic 
values — by  our  fundamental  commit- 
ment to  freedom. 


jptember  1983 


13 


The  alliance  does,  of  course,  impose 
its  responsibilities.  Some  nations,  the 
United  States  among  them,  have  had  to 
station  troops  far  from  home;  others  in 
turn  have  had  to  live  with  foreign  troops 
on  their  soil.  All  our  nations  have  had  to 
spend  more  on  defense  and  keep  more 
men  in  uniform  than  we'd  like  to  do  in 
peacetime.  All  our  people  have  had  to 
live  with  the  pressures  and  tensions  in- 
volved in  maintaining  our  freedom  in  a 
turbulent  world. 

Yet  beyond  the  Elbe,  millions  bear 
burdens  far  heavier  than  our  own.  We 
speak  out  at  will.  Andrei  Sakharov, 
Anatoli  Shcharanskiy,  and  Lech  Walesa 
know  no  such  freedom.  We  travel  from 
country  to  country  as  we  choose.  Those 
behind  the  Berlin  Wall  know  no  such 
liberty.  During  this  visit,  I  have  en- 
countered some  protests.  Who  among  us 
would  not  thrill  at  the  sight  of  an  anti- 
nuclear  demonstration  in  Red  Square? 
But  the  Soviets  have  shown  us  how  they 
treat  freedom— East  Germany,  1953; 
Hungary,  1956;  Czechoslovakia,  1968; 
Afghanistan,  1979;  Poland  today. 

"We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self- 
evident,"  Thomas  Jeffereson  wrote  in 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  "that 
all  men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are 
endowed  by  their  creator  with  certain 
unalienable  rights,  that  among  these  are 
life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  hap- 
piness." 

For  more  than  three  decades  the 
people  of  Western  Europe  and  North 
America  have  enjoyed  the  exercise  of 
their  self-evident  rights  in  peace.  I  am 
confident  that  if  the  NATO  alliance 
keeps  the  support  not  only  of  those  of  us 
who  have  known  war,  but  of  those  of 
you  we  pray  never  shall,  then  we  will 
continue  to  defend  those  rights  and  to 
keep  that  peace. 


Aalborg 


REMARKS  AT  THE 

REBILD  JULY  4TH  FESTIVAL, 

JULY  4,  1983 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  convey  not 
only  our  own  greetings  but  the  warm 
wishes  of  President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  to 
all  of  you  participating  in  this  superb 
Independence  Day  celebration. 

Last  September  in  Minneapolis,  Min- 
nesota, I  had  the  privilege  of  addressing 
the  grand  opening  of  "Scandinavia  To- 
day," a  program  that  honored  Scandina- 
vian immigrants  to  the  United  States.  I 
spoke  to  some  60,000  Americans  of 
Scandinavian  descent  about  the  heritage 
their  forbears  had  brought  to  America. 

During  the  second  half  of  the  last 
century  and  the  first  decades  of  our 
own,  millions  of  Scandinavians  im- 
migrated to  America,  including  some 
400,000  from  Denmark.  Those  im- 
migrants brought  with  them  few  posses- 
sions—no furniture,  no  savings,  few 
clothes.  Yet  they  arrived  with  faith  in 
God,  the  family,  the  goodness  of  the 
earth,  and  hard,  honest  work. 

They  cleared  the  forests  of  Min- 
nesota and  Wisconsin  and  ploughed  the 
plains  of  Iowa  and  Nebraska.  They 
planted  corn  and  wheat,  raised  cattle, 
opened  mines,  built  railroads. 
Everywhere  the  Scandinavians  settled, 
thriving  towns  grew  up.  Today,  for  ex- 
ample, some  22  American  towns  bear 
the  name  "Denmark"  or  "New 
Denmark."  Working  in  freedom  with 
other  new  Americans,  those  Scandina- 
vians helped  to  build  the  strong,  varied, 
and  vital  nation  whose  207th  year  of  in- 
dependence we  mark  today. 

This  annual  Fourth  of  July  festivity 
at  Rebild,  now  over  70  years  old  itself, 
celebrates  both  the  birth  of  that  nation 
and  the  ideals  on  which  it  was  founded. 
"We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self- 
evident,"  Thomas  Jefferson  wrote  in  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  "that  all 
men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are  en- 
dowed by  their  Creator  with  certain 
unalienable  rights,  that  among  these  are 
life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  hap- 
piness." 


Yet  even  as  we  celebrate  our  self- 
evident  rights,  we  must  recognize  that 
those  rights  are  constantly  threatened 
by  hostile  ideologies  and  states.  To 
establish  a  firm  defense  against  such 
threats,  at  the  end  of  World  War  II,  the 
United  States  joined  Denmark,  Norway, 
and  other  Western  democracies  to  form 
the  NATO  alliance. 

We  would  do  well  to  remember  that 
in  the  34  years  since  the  formation  of 
that  alliance,  more  than  100  wars  have 
been  fought  in  the  world.  Yet  Western 
Europe,  part  of  a  continent  that  as 
recently  as  the  first  half  of  this  century 
underwent  the  devastation  of  war,  has 
nevertheless,  experienced  peace  and 
risen  to  become  the  most  prosperous 
community  of  nations  on  Earth.  The 
alliance  does  impose  its  burdens,  but 
they  are  far  lighter  than  the  burdens 
now  borne  by  millions  living  beyond 
the  Elbe. 

Over  the  entrance  to  the  National 
Archives,  the  building  in  Washington 
that  houses  the  original  Declaration  of 
Independence,  seven  words  are  in- 
scribed: "Eternal  Vigilance  is  the  Price 
of  Liberty."  Today,  as  we  celebrate  our 
liberty  with  joy,  let  us  also  rededicate 
ourselves  to  the  duty  of  vigilance  that 
liberty  entails.  And  let  us  give  thanks 
for  lasting  friendship  between  Denmark 
and  the  United  States  of  America. 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


lublin 


RRIVAL  STATEMENT, 

JLY  4,  1983 

rs.  Bush  and  I  are  delighted  to  return 
Dublin.  Arriving  here  on  July  4th,  the 
iniversary  of  our  country's  Declaration 
Independence,  gives  me  a  fine  oppor- 
nity  to  pay  tribute  to  the  sons  and 
.ughters  of  Ireland,  who  made  such  a 
mendous  contribution  to  the 
nerican  struggle  for  freedom.  Many  of 
j  recall  with  pride  the  celebrations  at 
prktown  in  1981  and  the  role  played  on 
lat  occasion  by  the  Irish  Army  con- 
tigent — standing  in  for  their  ancestors, 
tio  played  such  an  important  part  in 
tit  final  battle  of  our  War  for 
liependence. 

During  this  visit,  my  wife  and  I  in- 
tid  to  renew  our  love  affair  with  the 
hd  and  people  of  Ireland  and  to  enjoy 
ts  hospitality  for  which  the  Irish  are  so 
j  ;tly  famous.  I  look  forward  to  my 
c;cussions  with  Taoiseach  Garret 
I:zgerald  and  his  colleagues. 

In  those  discussions  I  will  describe 
ti  positions  of  our  Administration  and 
s;k  the  counsel  of  Ireland's  leaders  on 
t;  matters  of  international  importance 
tit  our  countries  now  face.  I  will  also 
e  Dress  the  respect  of  the  United  States 
fl'  the  contribution  that  Ireland  is  mak- 
l;  to  the  pursuit  of  peace  through  its 
eorts  in  the  United  Nations. 

The  influence  of  the  Irish  in  the 
t  ited  States  has  been  so  great  that  all 
^lericans  have  something  of  the  Irish 
3]rit  in  them,  and  arriving  here  today 
ft  Is  a  good  deal  like  a  homecoming. 
Tank  you  for  this  splendid  reception. 


With  Prime  Minister  Garret  FitzGerald  of 
Ireland. 


Sptember1983 


15 


Reykjavik 


LUNCHEON  TOAST, 
JULY  6,  19835 

I  am  delighted  to  be  here  this  afternoon 
at  Thingvellir,  the  site  of  the  original 
Althing,  the  first  parliament  in  the 
Western  World  and  one  of  the  cradles  of 
our  common  Western  democratic  tradi- 
tion. Thingvellir  is  your  national 
treasure,  but  its  significance  for  the  rule 
of  law  and  representative  government 
transcends  any  national  boundaries. 

When  the  annual  Althing  sessions 
were  held  here  some  thousands  of  years 
ago,  Icelanders  flocked  from  all  parts  of 
the  island  to  observe  and  to  take  part  in 
the  greatest  political  and  social  event  of 
the  year.  Young  people  observed  the 
workings  of  the  law  and  entertained 
themselves  with  sports,  poetry,  and 
feasts.  New  friendships  were  made.  Old 
friendships  were  renewed.  Marriages 
were  arranged.  News  and  stories  were 
exchanged. 

Here,  one  can  sense  something  of 
what  those  Icelanders  of  old  must  have 
felt.  The  feast  which  you  have  so  kindly 
provided  is  in  keeping  with  the 
character  of  those  ancient  times.  I  ap- 
preciate your  generosity,  not  only  for 
this  excellent  meal  but  for  the  oppor- 
tunity to  make  new  friendships,  to  ex- 
change views,  and  to  commemorate  the 
fact  that  our  two  peoples  have  so  much 
in  common. 

In  one  of  your  famous  sagas,  the 
Vinlandssaga,  the  discovery  of  the  New 
World  is  recounted.  Since  the  first  Vik- 
ing visits  to  North  America,  the  relation- 
ship between  Iceland  and  Vinland,  the 
New  World,  has  grown  and  prospered. 

Today,  we  are  partners  in  NATO, 
and  it  is  in  the  interests  of  both  our  na- 
tions to  keep  our  alliance  strong.  Our 
cultural  and  educational  exchanges  con- 


With  Prime  Minister  Steingrimur 
Hermannsson  (left)  and  Foreign  Minister 
Geir  Hallgrimsson  of  Iceland. 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletiri 


FEATURE 

Vice  President 

in  Europe 


rihute  greatly  to  mutual  understanding 
ind  appreciation,  and  our  commercial 
elations  are  vigorous  and  contribute  to 
>ur  mutual  welfare.  I  feel  certain  that 
he  friendship  between  Iceland  and  the 
Jnited  States  will  remain  firm  and  deep. 

The  spirit  of  Thingvellir  has  served 
is  all  well  in  the  past.  Let  it  be  an  in- 
piration  for  our  future. 


Ceflavik 


EMARKS  TO 
IATO  PERSONNEL, 
EFLAVTK  AIR  FORCE  BASE, 

ULY  7,  1983 

always  appreciate  a  chance  to  visit  one 
f  our  military  installations  overseas, 
ad  today  here  in  Keflavik,  I  am  happy 
bring  you  the  greetings  of  the  Presi- 
nt  and  others  in  our  government. 

All  of  you  serve  a  proud  tradition, 
our  efforts  contribute  to  the  defense  of 
eland,  to  the  protection  of  our  own 
nd,  and  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
urope.  For  more  than  a  generation  and 
half,  NATO  has  provided  the  founda- 
)n  for  a  peaceful  life  in  Europe  despite 
most  continuous  strife  and  fighting 
sewhere  in  the  world.  Its  success  is 
>ur  success. 


Yet  peace  must  not  be  allowed  to 
lead  to  apathy  if  we  are  to  nurture  the 
liberty  and  rights  so  valiantly  won  for  us 
at  other  times  and  in  other  places.  We 
must  remain  vigilant.  I  hope  that  you 
will  never  be  called  into  combat  or 
otherwise  be  subjected  to  the  test  of 
war,  but  if  we  are  to  prevent  that  from 
happening,  you  and  all  our  military 
forces,  along  with  those  of  our  allies, 
must  maintain  a  high  state  of  readiness. 

As  you  know,  the  President  is  deep- 
ly committed  to  substantive  reductions 
in  nuclear  weapons.  If  successful,  this 
global  reduction  of  armaments  would  be 
a  giant  step  toward  a  genuine  and 
lasting  peace.  But  in  our  pursuit  of 
peace,  you  in  Keflavik  play  a  crucial 
role.  Iceland  is  at  the  key  point  of  the 
vital  naval  and  air  lines  in  the  North 
Atlantic  which  provide  communication, 
trade,  and  defense  for  nations  on  both 
sides  of  the  ocean.  Your  role  is  critical. 


My  wife  and  I  have  spent  several 
days  in  this  beautiful  country  meeting 
its  leaders  and  glimpsing  some  of  its 
natural  wonders.  The  ties  between  our 
two  countries  are  excellent.  I  also  have 
had  a  chance  to  tour  part  of  the  NATO 
base.  The  obvious  spirit  and  pride  you 
all  take  in  your  missions  is  heartening. 
You  clearly  understand  the  importance 
of  your  tasks  and  accomplish  them  with 
admirable  vigor.  I  extend  to  you  my 
thanks  and  congratulations  and  that  of 
your  countrymen  in  the  United  States. 


'Texts  from  the  Vice  President's  Office  of 
the  Press  Secretary. 

2Made  at  a  dinner  hosted  by  Prime 
Minister  Palme. 

3Made  at  a  dinner  hosted  by  Prime 
Minister  Willoch. 

4Made  at  a  dinner  hosted  by  Prime 
Minister  Sorsa. 

6Made  at  a  luncheon  hosted  by  head  of 
the  Althing.  ■ 


ptember1983 


17 


THE  PRESIDENT 


300th  Anniversary  of 

German  Settlement  in  America 


President  Reagan's  radio  address  to 
the  nation  on  June  25,  1983. 1 

Saturday,  June  25th,  is  a  special  day  for 
Germany  and  America.  In  the  city  of 
Krefeld,  on  the  shore  of  the  Rhine,  Vice 
President  Bush  represented  all 
Americans  at  an  historic  celebration.  It 
was  from  Krefeld  that,  300  years  ago, 
the  first  German  immigrants  left  for 
America.  Those  13  Mennonite  families 
came  in  search  of  religious  freedom. 
They  landed  in  Philadelphia  and  founded 
Germantown,  Pennsylvania.  From  that 
moment  on,  Germany  has  contributed 
much  to  our  way  of  life. 

Today,  about  one  in  four  Ameri- 
cans—or some  50  million  of  us— claim 
at  least  partial  German  ancestry.  What 
has  this  meant  to  America?  Well,  the 
Conestoga  wagon,  the  Kentucky  rifle, 
blue  jeans,  the  Brooklyn  Bridge,  and 
"Snoopy";  the  first  air-tight  tin  can  and 
many  of  our  favorite  beers;  Dwight 
David  Eisenhower  and  Wernher  von 
Braun;  Chrysler  automobiles  and  Boeing 
aircraft.  German  farmers  introduced 
winter  wheat  to  our  Middle  West. 

And  no  American  should  forget  that 
at  Valley  Forge,  General  von  Steuben,  a 
German  volunteer,  turned  George 
Washington's  demoralized  troops  into  a 
disciplined  fighting  force  capable  of  win- 
ning our  struggle  for  independence. 

Some  of  our  most  brilliant  writers 
like  John  Steinbeck  and  H.  L.  Mencken; 
athletes  such  as  Babe  Ruth  and  Johnny 
Weissmuller;  inventors  like  Charles 
Steinmetz  and  George  Westinghouse; 
statesmen  such  as  Carl  Schurz  and 
George  Shultz,  our  current  Secretary  of 
State,  share  German  descent. 

For  300  years  Germans  have  helped 
to  build  America.  But  America  has  given 
as  well  as  received.  After  the  Second 
World  War,  when  Germany  lay  de- 
feated, America  gave  material  help 
through  the  Marshall  Plan  and  the 
Berlin  airlift.  Just  as  significant,  if  not 
more,  we  provided  the  inspiration  to 
develop  free  institutions  from  the  ruins 
of  totalitarianism. 

Today,  the  Federal  Republic  is  a  bul 
wark  of  democracy  in  the  heart  of  a 
divided  Europe.  It  enjoys  prosperity  un- 
dreamt of  in  1945,  and  its  political 
system  is  stable  and  strong. 


West  Germans  and  Americans  are 
rightfully  proud  of  our  common  values 
as  well  as  our  shared  heritage.  Today, 
we  stand  shoulder-to-shoulder  in  the 
NATO  alliance,  defending  freedom  and 
preserving  the  peace.  For  three  decades 
the  German- American  partnership  has 
been  a  linchpin  of  the  alliance.  Thanks  to 
it,  a  whole  generation  has  grown  up  in 
Western  Europe  free  from  the  ravages 
of  war  and  spared  from  the  repression 
suffered  by  Europeans  to  the  East. 

But  with  freedom  comes  responsibili- 
ty, not  least  the  responsibility  to  look 
beyond  simplistic  slogans  to  the  truth  on 
vital  matters  like  security  and  arms 
reductions.  I  hope  the  younger  genera- 
tion, both  in  Germany  and  in  America, 
will  honestly  consider  all  that  we're  do- 
ing to  deter  and  to  reduce  the  risks  of 

war.  .... 

In  the  face  of  a  large  Soviet  military 
buildup  of  both  conventional  and  nuclear 
weapons,  the  United  States,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  and  our  European 
allies  have  agreed  to  modernize  our  ag- 
ing forces  to  assure  an  effective  deter- 

At  the  same  time,  in  hopes  of  avert- 
ing the  large  expenditure  to  modernize 
weapons,  we're  making  a  serious  effort 
to  negotiate  major  and  effectively 
verifiable  reductions  of  Soviet  and 
American  nuclear  forces  to  lower  and 
more  stable  levels. 

In  Geneva,  we've  made  far-reaching 
proposals  to  reduce  nuclear  arsenals  and 
to  build  trust.  We  have  proposed  the 
global  elimination  of  the  entire  class  of 
intermediate-range  land-based  missiles 
and  expressed  our  willingness  to  agree 
to  any  proposal  equalizing  the  number  of 
warheads  on  such  U.S.  and  Soviet 

missiles. 

In  the  START  [strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion talks]  talks,  I  have  within  the  last  2 
weeks  issued  new  instructions,  incor- 
porating the  recommendations  of  the 
bipartisan  Scowcroft  commission  and 
giving  our  negotiator  greater  flexibility 
in  their  task. 


The  young  people  of  Germany  and 
the  United  States  should  not  doubt  our 
dedication  to  maintaining  the  peace.  We 
share  with  them  the  dream  that  some- 
day the  time  will  come  when  no  nuclear 
weapons  will  exist  anywhere  on  Earth. 

The  ideals  shared  by  our  peoples, 
the  desire  for  freedom  and  peace,  bind 
the  United  States  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  in  so  many  ways. 
Building  on  this  we've  launched  a  joint 
effort  to  provide  more  contacts  between 
our  nations  and  generations.  In  our 
country,  22  Federal  departments  and 
agencies  are  participating  in  this  effort. 
Plans  range  from  traditional  exchanges 
to  an  airlift  program  which  will  bring 
German  heart  patients  to  one  of  our 
outstanding  hospitals  for  bypass  surgery 
and  train  more  German  doctors  to  per- 
form these  life-saving  operations. 
This  fall,  a  German  will  fly  in 
NASA's  [National  Aeronautics  and 
Space  Administration]  space  shut- 
tle—the first  foreigner  to  do  so. 
Together,  Germans  and  Americans  will 
watch  the  flight's  progress  on  their 
television  screens,  all  praying  for  a  suc- 
cessful mission  and  safe  landing. 

Germans  and  Americans  of  German 
descent  can  take  special  pride  in  their 
ancestry.  But  all  Americans  have 
benefited  from  the  contributions  which 
German  Americans  have  made  to  our 
country,  and  we  should  all  participate  in 
honoring  this  heritage. 


V 


* 


JText  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  4,  1983. 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


THE  PRESIDENT 


News  Conference  of  July  26  (Excerpts) 


Excerpts  from  President  Reagan's  news 
conference  of  July  26,  1983.1 

A.  while  back,  I  got  a  letter  from  a 
L3-year-old,  and  I  apologize  for  not  hav- 
ng  answered  her  as  yet.  She  wrote, 
'Don't  you  wish  sometimes  you  could 
ust  stamp  your  feet  and  shout  at  the 
jress  or  Senators  to  be  quiet,  sit  down, 
ind  listen  to  what  you're  saying?"  Yes, 
retchen,  I  sometimes  do  feel  that  way, 
ind,  particularly,  over  the  past  week. 
)n  April  27th  I  went  to  Capitol  Hill  and 
iddressed  a  joint  session  of  the  Con- 
gress on  a  subject  of  vital  importance  to 
11  Americans. 

I  talked  about  our  goals  in  Central 
America,  and  I  asked  for  congressional 
inderstanding  and  support.  In  Central 
America,  as  elsewhere,  we  support 
emocracy,  reform,  and  human  freedom. 
Ve  support  economic  development.  We 
upport  dialogue  and  negotiations 
mong  and  within  the  countries  of  the 
egion.  And,  yes,  we  support  a  security 
hield  for  the  region's  threatened  na- 
ons  in  order  to  protect  these  other 
oals. 

In  my  view,  there  has  been  entirely 
>o  much  attention  to  the  efforts  that 
e're  making  to  provide  that  security 
lield  and  not  nearly  enough  to  the 
i  ;her  elements  of  our  policy.  Yet,  in 
i  ich  of  the  four  elements  of  the  policy, 

e  find  they  reinforce  each  other  and 
i  lat  they  are  being  pursued 
multaneously  in  a  carefully  balanced 
anner. 

I  dispatched  Ambassador  Dick  Stone 
tichard  B.  Stone,  Ambassador  at  Large 
id  special  representative  of  the  Presi- 
:nt  to  Central  America]  to  the  region 
;    facilitate  the  process  of  dialogue  and 
;gotiations.  He  is  there  now  with  a 
^rsonal  message  from  me  to  leaders  of 
■untries  in  the  region,  the  text  of  which 
I  am  making  public  tonight.  I  am 
i  :artened  by  the  efforts  of  the  Con- 
dora  countries — led  by  Colombia,  Mex- 
|  o,  Panama,  and  Venezuela — to  reach  a 
paceful  regional  solution.  I  am  en- 
j  uraged  by  some  recent  statements 
!  om  Nicaragua  and  Cuba  that  seem  to 
idicate  that  they,  too,  now  recognize 
j  e  merit  to  regional  negotiations.  I 
;ust  their  words  will  be  followed  by 
jisitive  actions  to  ease  tension  and  stop 
je  fighting  in  the  region. 

Here  at  home,  I  have  appointed  a 
1  partisan  commission  to  make  recom- 
lendations  on  the  long-term  measures, 
.eluding  economic  assistance,  that  we 


should  undertake  to  help  these  strug- 
gling nations.  I  hope  soon  to  be  signing 
the  legislation  on  the  Caribbean  Basin 
Initiative  passed  by  an  overwhelming 
bipartisan  majority  of  both  Houses  [of 
Congress].  The  program  will  bolster  the 
economic  independence  of  the  region. 
We  continue  to  promote  elections  as  the 
best  way  to  guarantee  peace,  human 
freedom,  and  responsive  government. 

The  greatest  portion  of  our  aid  goes 
toward  humanitarian  and  economic 
assistance.  For  every  $1.00  we  provide 
for  security  assistance  to  the  region,  we 
provide  $3.00  for  economic  and  human 
development.  But  we  recognize  that 
democracy  and  development  can  hardly 
flourish  when  threatened  by  violence. 
Dialogue  and  negotiations  can  best  suc- 
ceed when  the  parties  are  convinced  that 
their  goals  cannot  be  achieved  through 
the  barrel  of  a  gun.  It  is  especially  in 
our  own  hemisphere  that  the  United 
States  continues  to  be  the  foremost  pro- 
tector of  peace.  As  part  of  this  mission, 
as  a  way  to  provide  a  shield  for 
democracy  and  development,  we, 
together  with  our  friends,  are  now  plan- 
ning joint  training  exercises  in  the 
Caribbean  and  Central  America,  and  let 
me  set  the  record  straight  on  what  these 
exercises  are  and  what  they  are  not. 

Essentially,  there  will  be  two  sets  of 
practice  training  in  the  coming 
months — first,  a  series  of  ground  exer- 
cises in  Honduras  with  the  combined 
forces  of  Honduras  and  the  United 
States;  second,  a  series  of  ocean  exer- 
cises with  our  own  fleet.  We  have  con- 
ducted joint  exercises  with  Latin 
American  countries  on  a  regular  basis 
since  1965.  The  latest  exercises  with 
Honduras  took  place  earlier  this  year. 
Much  larger  scale  exercises  have  taken 
place  in  Europe,  Asia,  and  Latin 
America.  Moreover,  these  training  exer- 
cises are  limited  in  purpose. 

Yes,  we  want  to  underscore  once 
and  for  all  that  the  United  States,  along 
with  our  friends,  seriously  opposes  the 
use  of  force  by  one  neighbor  against 
another  in  Central  America,  but  we  are 
not  seeking  a  larger  presence  in  that 
region,  and  U.S.  Forces  have  not  been 
requested  there.  The  United  States 
stands  firmly  on  the  side  of  peace.  As  a 
nation  we  remain  steadfast  in  policy  and 
purpose.  We  want  to  see  an  end  to 
violence  and  bloodshed,  to  the  export  of 


revolution.  We  want  to  help  our  neigh- 
bors lift  themselves  up  to  prosperity.  We 
want  to  usher  in  a  new  era  of  peace  and 
social  justice. 

These  are  great  goals  and  worthy  of 
a  great  and  generous  people,  and  we 
shall  continue  to  keep  faith  with 
ourselves  in  the  days  ahead. 

Q.  You  complain  of  too  much  at- 
tention. How  can  the  people  ignore 
two  battleship  groups,  thousands  of 
combat  troops  going  to  Honduras,  it  is 
said  the  covert  funding  of  10,000 
rebels,  Nicaraguan  rebels?  All  these 
things  have  happened  since  April  27th. 
In  seeking  solutions,  how  far  will  you 
go  militarily? 

A.  I  have  told  you  we  have  no 
military  plans  for  intervention  of  that 
kind.  We  have  55  mainly  noncommis- 
sioned officers  helping  to  train  the 
Salvadoran  Army.  We  know  that  Cuba 
has  somewhere  in  the — it  has  thousands 
of  military  personnel  in  Nicaragua.  It 
does  seem  a  little  overbalanced  with 
regard  to  the  attention  that's  being  paid 
to  55  as  against  attention  that's  being 
paid  to  the  thousands.  To  answer  with  a 
question:  Why  are  maneuvers  that  we 
have  performed  before  and  regularly 
suddenly  treated  with  such  suspicion 
when  only  within  this  year,  last  spring, 
we  had  military  maneuvers  in  Honduras, 
and  last  year  we  had  naval  maneuvers  in 
the  Caribbean  and  no  one  seemed  to  be 
at  all  excited  about  them.  So,  is  it  just 
that  there's  no  confidence  in  the  fact 
that  when  I  say  these  are  maneuvers  of 
the  kind  we've  been  holding  regularly 
and  for  years? 

Q.  But  they're  unprecedented  to 
last  6  months.  The  polls  show  the 
American  people  are  not  for  them,  and 
they  fear  it  may  lead  to  war. 
Remembering  the  lessons  in  Vietnam, 
does  this  bother  you?  And  do  they 
have  any  say? 

A.  First,  there  is  no  comparison 
with  Vietnam,  and  there's  not  going  to 
be  anything  of  that  kind  in  this.  And 
maybe  the  people  are  disturbed  because 
of  the  confused  pattern  that  has  been 
presented  to  them  and  the  constant 
drumbeat  with  regard  to  the  fact  of 
suspicion  that  somehow  there  is  an 
ulterior  purpose  in  this. 

It  hardly  seems  to  me  that  those 
ships  are  going  there — and  I  don't  know 
that  they're  going  to  be  there  6 
months — I  don't  know  the  number  of 
ships  involved.  I  didn't  know  the  number 
that  were  involved  in  the  Caribbean  ex- 
ercises. If  they  were  there  for  some  kind 


jptember1983 


19 


THE  PRESIDENT 


of  a  hostile  purpose,  we  happen  to  know 
that  right  now  a  Soviet  freighter,  the 
UlYanov,  is  approaching  the  port  of 
Corinto  in  the  vicinity  of  Nicaragua— or 
that  port  is  in  Nicaragua — and  it  is  car- 
rying a  load  of  military  equipment, 
helicopters,  transport  helicopters  for 
military  purposes,  and  so  forth.  And  no 
one  shot  at  them. 

Q.  You've  mentioned  your  interest 
in  easing  the  tensions,  and  you've  said 
that  you  hope  the  Nicaraguan  pro- 
posals will  have  that  effect.  Your 
spokesman  has  said  that  the  4,000 
troops  that  you're  planning  to  send 
down  there  will — 

A.  Between  three  and  four. 

Q.  Between  3,000  and  4,000  troops 
that  you're  planning  to  send  down 
there  will  have  standing  orders  to  de- 
fend themselves  if  they're  fired  upon. 
How  does  that  help  to  ease  tensions? 

A.  That  is  something  that  has  been 
true  for  a  long  time,  as  far  as  I'm  con- 
cerned, with  our  troops  and  our  forces 
anywhere  they  may  be. 

We  went  through  a  period  some 
years  ago  when  American  forces  were 
pretty  much  fair  game.  Look  back  at 
some  of  our  aircraft  that  were  shot 
down  on  the  charge  that  they  had  ven- 
tured out  over  international  water — or 
out  of  international  waters  into  the 
airspace  of  a  Communist  bloc  coun- 
try— and  shot  down  and  we  protested 
diplomatically. 

It  seems  to  me  that  young  men  and 
women  who  are  going  to  defend  this 
country  of  ours  and  who  join  the 
military  should  know  that  they  have  the 
right  to  defend  themselves  if  we  have 
placed  them  in  a  position  where  they 
could  come  under  fire.  This  is  just  a 
standard  order.  We  don't  want  war.  But 
I  don't  think  that  you  prevent  war  by 
letting  your  personnel  out  there  become 
the  victims. 

Q.  But  doesn't  this  simply  in- 
crease the  chances  of  war? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  so.  All  of  the 
ships  that  are  down  in  that  area  and 
that  are  going  there  are  outside  the 
12-mile  limit.  They're  out  in  interna- 
tional waters  where  they  have  a  right 
to  be. 


Q.  A  little  earlier  you  said  yes, 
that  the  military  exercises— that  you 
did  want  to  underscore  that  the 
United  States  is  opposed  to  the  use  of 


force  in  the  region.  Is  sending  down 
our  military  might  to  the  region  a  way 
to  show  that  we  oppose  force?  Isn't 
there  some  sort  of  contradiction 
there?  Wouldn't  it  be  better  to  say— if 
we  do  these  things  regularly — isn't 
this  the  time  now  not  to  do  it,  not  to 
heighten  the  tensions,  and  to  say,  we 
oppose  the  use  of  force?  How  can  you 
oppose  it  by  sending  down  all  these 
ships  and  men? 

A.  Since  the  trouble  that  is  going  on 
down  there  comes  from  outside  the 
area — revolution  exported  from  the 
Soviet  Union  and  from  Cuba  and  from 
others  of  their  allies — then  wouldn't 
there  perhaps  be  a  risk  if  we  change  our 
pattern  and  withdrew?  Wouldn't  we  be 
sending  some  kind  of  a  signal  that  might 
be  the  wrong  kind  of  signal  to  send  if 
we  want  peace  in  that  area? 

The  simple  truth  is:  No  one  has 
asked  for  American  forces  to  come  to 
their  aid;  in  fact,  they've  gone  quite  the 
contrary  and  said  the  reverse — that  they 
don't.  Yet  they  do  acknowledge  that 
they  need  the  material  assistance  we're 
giving  them — both  economic  and  to  pro- 
vide a  shield  or  help  them  provide  their 
own  shield  against  the  attacks  that  are 
preventing  them  from  making  the 
economic  progress  they  want  to  make 
now  that  they  have  installed  a 
democratic-type  of  government  there. 
But,  as  I  say,  we've  done  this  regularly. 
I  don't  think  that  it's  destabilizing,  nor 
should  it  be. 

Q.  You've  said,  in  your  letter  to 
the  four  Contadora  nations,  that  you 
want  to  take  this  out  of  the  realm  of 
an  East-West  confrontation.  But 
doesn't  somebody  have  to  begin  to 
take  it  out  of  that  realm?  And  couldn't 
the  United  States  be  the  leader  in  that 
way  and  not  make  it  that  kind  of  an 
atmosphere  of  confrontation? 

A.  We  think  we  are.  We  have  tried 
to  make  contact  with  the  guerrillas  in  El 
Salvador  to  see  if  they  would  not  meet 
with  the  Peace  Commission  that  was 
created  by  the  Salvadoran  Government 
to  discuss  participating  in  the 
democratic  process  in  the  elections  that 
are  coming  up  in  the  entire  area  before 
the  year  is  out.  I  have  just  sent  letters, 
which  have  been  made  public  now,  but, 
letters  to  the  Contadora  Four,  of  our  ap- 
proval of  what  they're  doing,  and  our 
recognition  of  what  they  are.  And  we 
stand  ready  to  support  them  in  what 
they're  trying  to  accomplish.  We  want  a 
political  and  a  peaceful  solution. 


Q.  Military  leaders  in  the  Pen- 
tagon have  stated  recently  that  they 
never  want  to  be  involved  in  another 
war  without  the  support  of  the 
American  people.  Do  you  have  any 
sense  or  feeling  now  for  whether  the 
American  people  are  ready  to  support 
a  war  to  defend  our  interests  in  Cen- 
tral America? 

A.  First,  I  don't  think  the  Americar 
people  have  ever  wanted  a  war.  And  I 
think  we're  probably  the  most  peace- 
loving  people  in  the  world.  And  maybe 
this  has  been  part  of  what  has  lured  us 
into  wars  in  the  past,  because  we 
haven't  been  ready  for  them. 

No,  I  don't  think  the  American 
people — frankly,  I  don't  think  that 
they're  as  aware  as  perhaps  they  should 
be.  We've  tried  to  make  them  aware — 
that  this  does  constitute  something  of  a 
threat  in  this  hemisphere  to  peace  in  the 
entire  hemisphere  if  those  who  are  ex- 
porting the  revolution  here  are  suc- 
cessful. But,  no,  we're  not  planning  a 
war,  and  we  don't  think  that  that's  goinj 
to  happen  at  all.  I've  seen  four  wars  in 
my  lifetime.  I  have  sons,  and  I  have  a 
grandson.  I  agree  with  General 
Eisenhower  that  war  is  man's  greatest 
stupidity.  I  don't  want  to  see  such  a 
thing.  We  want  peace. 

But  we  also  must  recognize  that 
you've  got  to  do  more  than  just  want 
peace.  You  have  got  to  prevent  what  is 
happening  down  there  to  people  who 
want  peace  also  but  are  not  allowed  to 
have  it  because  of  outside  forces  that 
are  seizing  upon  their  situation  and  hop- 
ing to  further  their  own  ideological  aims 

Q.  Do  you  feel  the  people  support 
your  policies  in  Central  America? 

A.  Those  that  have  been  informed 
and  understand  it  do.  I  just  met  with 
some  today  who  made  it  evident  that 
they  did.  If  we  all  get  together  and  ex- 
plain what's  happening  down  there, 
perhaps  that'll  resolve  the  situation  in 
that  regard. 

Q.  If  there  is  an  incident  where 
the  American  forces  down  there 
engaging  in  the  military  exercises  are 
fired  upon  and  they  are  forced  to  fire 
back,  do  you  see  any  contingency 
where  such  an  incident  might  lead  to 
deeper  American  involvement  in  Cen- 
tral America? 

A.  No,  I  don't.  First  of  all,  those 
maneuvers  that  are  going  to  be  held  in 
Honduras  are  not  going  to  put  Amer- 
icans in  any  reasonable  proximity  to  the 
border.  It  would  have  to  be  something  ir 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  PRESIDENT 


he  nature  of  a  terrorist  attack, 
omething  of  that  kind.  And  I  think  that 
hat  could  happen  in  a  base  here  in 
America.  Again,  I  believe  that  those 
eople  who  have  taken  it  upon  them- 
elves  to  be  our  defenders  and  protec- 
ors  have  a  right  to  defend  and  protect 
heir  own  lives. 

Q.  If  Nicaragua  attacks  Honduras, 
yould  the  United  States  assist  Hon- 
uras  militarily  under  the  terms  of  the 
'io  mutual  defense  pact  treaty? 

A.  We  haven't  considered  that,  but 
great  many  people  should  know  that 
nee  1947 — and  so,  obviously,  our  Ad- 
linistration  didn't  have  anything  to  do 
•ith  it — there  is  a  pact,  the  Rio  Pact, 
lat  says  that  any  attack,  or  an  attack 
n  any  American  state,  shall  be  con- 
dered  as  an  attack  on  all  American 
cates.  That  would  require,  of  course,  ac- 
xal  outside  visible  attack  on  a  state 
id,  I  suppose,  by  a  country  flying 
ider  its  own  flag  instead  of  under  sur- 
)gate  troops.  So  we  would  have  to  deal 
ith  that  problem  when  it  arose  and 
;al  with  it  with  all  of  our  neighbors  and 
iends  in  the  Organization  of  American 
:ates. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  give  you  a  chance  to 

■  lence  this  drumbeat  of  confusion 

at  you  were  talking  about.  Why  not 
,y  categorically  that  Central  America 
ill  not  be  another  Vietnam,  that 
ider  no  circumstances  will  you  im- 
•se  U.S.  troops  in  a  combat  situation 
Central  America? 
A.  I  said  the  last  time  we  gathered 
•  at  there  are  some  things — I  can  make 

■  ery  assurance  in  the  world  that  we 

I  ve  no  such  plans,  we  have  no  desire, 
I  \r  do  the  countries  down  there  want  us 
I  /olved  in  that  way.  But  I  used  an  ex- 
3  ession  that  has  been  used  by 
I  'esidents  like  Franklin  Delano 
I  >osevelt  and  others,  and  that  is  that  a 
I  esident  should  never  say  "never," 
1  cause  that's  a  hypothetical  question 
1  at  then  asks  you  to  try  to  predict  what 
I  >uld  take — would,  could  possibly  take 
lace  in  the  future.  And  I  just  don't 
I  lieve  you  can  answer  a  hypothetical 
I  estion,  unless  it's — 

Q.  What  about  increasing  the 
I  mber  of  U.S.  advisers  in  El 
1  lvador?  Are  you  planning  to  at  all? 

A.  No  one  has  presented  a  proposal 
I  me  about  increasing  the  number, 
jiere's  no  question  that  55  of  them — if 
Isre  was  an  increase,  probably  we 
|  aid  train  the  Salvadoran  Army  and  its 
|w  recruits  that  are  coming  in  actually 


requiring  basic  training  a  little  faster 
than  we're  doing  it.  But  there's  been  no 
proposal  for  such  an  increase. 

Q.  Since  you,  yourself,  have  iden- 
tified massive  social  problems  as  one 
of  the  root  causes  of  the  troubles  in 
Central  America,  are  you  prepared  to 
make  a  commitment  to  substantial 
U.S.  aid  on  the  order  of  the  Marshall 
Plan  if  the  hostilities  can  be  calmed? 

A.  What  we've  appointed  the  com- 
mission for— the  Kissinger-chaired  com- 
mission— is  for  the  purpose  of  coming 
up  and  recommending  a  long-range  plan 
that  would  particularly  deal  with  the 
things  that  you  mention.  There's  no 
question  that  our  neighbors  to  the  south 
have,  for  too  many  years,  suffered 
revolutions  in  which  one  set  of  rulers 
simply  were  exchanged  for  another  set 
of  rulers.  And  there's  no  question  but 
their  economic  and  social  policies  have 
left  much  to  be  desired  as  far  as  the  op- 
portunity for  the  great  mass  of  their 
people.  And  what  we  want  is  a  long- 
range  policy.  This  is  what  I  discussed 
when  I  visited  South  America.  I  dis- 
cussed with  them  how  we  can  have  the 
kind  of  development  that  will  make 
these  countries  economically  self- 
sufficient,  that  will  give  them  a  standard 
of  living  in  which  there  isn't  the  fertile 
soil  that  is  presently  there  for  subver- 
sion, for  people  offering  promises  of  pie 
in  the  sky  and  then  arousing  to  revolu- 
tion. And  to,  in  other  words,  have  a  pro- 
gram that  makes  all  the  nations  here  in 
the  Americas  equal  partners  in  the 
development  of  this  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, and  what  a  great  power  for 
good  that  we  could  be  if  we  were  so 
organized.  This  is  my  dream,  and  it's 
what  I  hope  that  the  commission  will 
come  back  with. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  prepared 
to  make  the  kind  of  massive  dollar 
commitment  that  that  would  undoubt- 
edly entail? 

A.  It  does  not  follow  that  it  has  to 
undoubtedly  entail  that.  For  example, 
many  of  those  countries  are  considered 
too  high  a  risk  for  private  investment.  If 
together,  we  could  agree  upon  guar- 
antees that  the  investment  would  not  be 
confiscated,  taken  over  by  governments 
and  in  changes  of  government,  and  so 
forth.  There  is  far  more  in  the  private 
investment  pool,  far  more  there  than 
any  government  could  possibly  do.  And 
it  is  to  find  out  what  is  practical  and 
what  can  be  done.  We're  not  completely 
alone  in  this,  because  our  allies,  the 
other  industrial  nations  in  the  world, 


have  made  it  plain  to  us,  again  at 
Williamsburg,  that  not  only  here  in  our 
hemisphere,  but  in  their  own,  we  want 
to  find  ways  that  we  can  help  the 
developing  part  of  the  world,  help  them 
to  faster  development  and  a  better  way 
of  life. 

Q.  The  Lebanese  President  said 
this  past  week  that  the  Israeli  partial 
withdrawal  in  Lebanon  amounted  to 
de  facto  partition  of  that  country.  Do 
you  agree? 

A.  No,  I  am  very  hopeful  that  if  this 
partial  withdrawal  takes  place  that  it 
will  be  recognized  and  admitted  to  be, 
by  the  Israelis,  as  one  phase  of  their 
agreement  to  withdraw.  If  they 
withdraw  in  a  phased  withdrawal,  it  cer- 
tainly will  give  us  a  better  case  for 
breaking  the  roadblock  that  has  been 
established  by  Syria  and  persuading 
them  to  keep  their  original  promise  that 
when  others  withdrew  they  would  with- 
draw. I  can't  answer  as  to  whether  that 
is  the  way  that  this  is  going  to  be 
perceived,  or  whether  the  Israelis  will 
admit  to  it  or  not,  but  I  will  be  talking, 
in  a  couple  of  days  with  the  two 
Ministers  who  are  here  from  Israel, 
about  this  very  thing. 

But  if  this  is  a  phased  withdrawal  I 
think  there  is  fear  if  there  is  simply 
withdrawal  to  another  line  and  then  a 
digging  in  and  fortifying  along  that  line, 
that  this  would  be  what  it  looks  like 
Syria  is  doing  and  that  is  simply  trying 
to  partition  Lebanon,  reduce  Lebanon, 
and  grab  off  some  territory  themselves. 
But  with  the  agreement  that's  been 
signed  between  Lebanon  and  Israel.  I 
don't  think  Israel  has  that  in  mind. 

Q.  What  would  happen  if  Lebanon 
is  partitioned?  Would  it  be  that  awful? 

A.  I  believe  that  the  people  of  the 
country  have  a  right  to  determine  their 
own  destiny,  choose  their  own  govern- 
ment; if  it  was  partitioned,  it  would  be 
occupation  by  other  countries.  Yes,  I 
think  that  is  awful.  We  set  out  to  help 
Lebanon,  after  all  these  years  of  strife, 
to  regain  sovereignty  of  its  land,  protec- 
tion of  its  own  borders,  and  we're  help- 
ing in  every  way  we  can  to  bring  that 
about. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  ask  you  about  the 
Chairman  of  your  new  Commission  on 
Central  America,  Dr.  Henry  Kissinger. 
There  have  been,  as  you  know,  a 
number  of  charges  over  the  years  that 
Mr.  Kissinger,  during  the  Nixon 
years,  tried  to  destabilize  the  duly 
elected  Government  of  Chile  and  that 


liptember  1983 


21 


THE  PRESIDENT 


he  also  once  told  a  Chilean  official 
that  whatever  happens  in  the  South  is 
of  no  importance.  Did  you  check  into 
Mr.  Kissinger's  record  on  Latin 
America  before  you  appointed  him? 
A.  I  knew  what  his  position  was 
prior  to  my  taking  over  this  office  and 
how  seriously  he  considered  the  prob- 
lems that  are  going  on.  Remember,  El 
Salvador  didn't  start  with  us.  It  was 
already  in  turmoil  before  we  got  here, 
and  I  know  how  he  feels  about  that.  I 
know  also  that  there  is  no  hard  and 
fast — let  me  put  it  this  way — I  think 
there  are  some  stereotypes  about  Mr. 
Kissinger  that  a  little  actual  reading  and 
rereading  the  history  would  indicate  that 
such  stereotypes  are  not  necessarily 
valid. 


Q.  Since  Cuba  has  repeatedly  been 
labeled  as  the  fountainhead  of  most  of 
the  violence  in  Central  America,  why 
has  your  Administration  elected  to  go 
to  the  recipients  of  the  arms  and  the 
equipment  that  comes  in  instead  of  go- 
ing to  the  source? 

A.  We  have  interdicted  some  of  the 
supplies  that  are  going  from  Nicaragua 
over  to  El  Salvador.  If  you  go  to  the 
source,  I  think  you're  talking  about  the 
Soviet  Union.  They  know  and  we  have 
communicated  to  them  how  we  feel 
about  this  and  have  also  to  our  friends 
in  Cuba — told  them  how  we  feel  about 
it.  We  are  trying  to  bring  about  the  very 
thing  that  all  of  you  seem  to  think  that 
we're  shying  away  from — that  is,  not 
broadening  a  war  but  trying  to  limit  it 
and  trying  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  and 
political  settlement  in  Central  America. 

Q.  In  reply  to  Helen's  question 
you  spoke  of  confusion.  Isn't  this  Ad- 
ministration to  blame  for  much  of  that 
confusion?  Some  of  our  own  am- 
bassadors in  Central  America  were 
taken  by  surprise  by  the  maneuvers. 
Some  of  the  friendly  governments, 
especially  in  the  Contadora  group, 
were  puzzled  by  your  latest  actions. 
My  question  is,  why  was  there  not 
more  prior  consultation  and  what  can 
you  do  now  to  reassure  any  of  those 
friendly  governments  that  we're  not 
today  closer  to  war  down  there  than 
we  were  last  week? 

A.  As  I  told  you,  I've  sent  letters  to 
all  four  leaders  of  the  Contadora  coun- 
tries. And  I  don't  think  that  there's  that 
much  disturbance  among  our  friends  and 


allies  about  this.  Sometimes  there's  a 
slip  up  and  an  ambassador  doesn't  find 
out  something  they  should  find  out  soon 
enough  in  advance.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
I  received  a  cable  from  one  about  that. 
My  most  recent  appointee,  the  Am- 
bassador to  Austria,  Helene  [von  Damm] 
let  me  know  that  something  had  taken 
place  and  she  hadn't  been  told  about  it 
in  advance. 

Q.  Who  do  you  think  is  to  blame 
for  this  confusion  you  spoke  of  then? 

A.  I  don't  think  there  is  as  much 
confusion  as  they're  trying  to  point  out 
about  this.  The  training  feature  with 
Honduras  has  been  well  advertised  and 
known  for  a  long,  long  time  that  it's  go- 
ing to  take  place.  And  as  I  say,  we 
regularly  conduct  and  conduct  joint 
maneuvers  with,  very  often,  not  only  on 
land  but  with  the  navies  of  our  friends 
and  allies  in  Central  and  South  America. 
And  so,  I  just  don't  think  that  there's 
great  confusion  about  this. 

Q.  Is  it  true  that  you're  planning  a 
vast  expansion  of  covert  aid  to  the 
anti-Sandinista  rebels  in  Nicaragua? 
And,  what  would  congressional  action 
to  cut  off  such  aid  mean  to  your  ef- 
forts in  Central  America? 

A.  I  think  it  would  be  a  very  grave 
mistake  if  the  legislature  interfered  with 
what  we're  trying  to  do,  and  we're  try- 
ing to  keep  them  appraised  of  our  ac- 
tions. I  can't  answer  your  question  about 
covert  aid.  I  think  this  is  like  discussing 
intelligence  matters.  If  you  discuss 
covert  aid,  it's  no  longer  covert.  So,  I 
can  only  tell  you  that  we're  continuing 
on  a  policy  that  we  believe  is  aimed  at, 
first  of  all,  bringing  about  peace  in  El 
Salvador,  hopefully,  through  negotia- 
tions with  those  who  are  presently 
radicals  and  fighting  as  guerrillas.  And 
in  Nicaragua,  hoping  that  we  can  per- 
suade the  Nicaraguan — the  Sandinista 
government,  to  return  to  the  principles 
of  the  revolution  in  which  they,  in 
writing,  guaranteed  to  the  Organization 
of  American  States  were  going  to  be  the 
policy  of  their  government. 


Q.  Given  the  fact  that  this  covert 
operation  is  not  so  covert  any  more, 
haven't  we  reached  a  point  where  it 
really  might  make  more  sense  to  do 
things  on  an  overt  basis,  and,  in  other 
words,  hasn't  the  thing  really  become 
counterproductive? 

A.  No.  No,  I  don't  think  so.  And  I 
think  what  we're  doing  is  well  within  th> 
limits  of  common  sense,  and  those  who 
are  attempting  to  make  it  impossible  foi 
us  to  bring  aid  down  in  that  area,  I 
think,  are  the  ones  who  are  building 
up — if  they  have  their  way — to  a  giant 
headache  down  the  road  a  ways.  We're 
trying  to  prevent  such  a  headache  from 
coming  about. 


Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulleti ! 


THE  SECRETARY 


E3£3E3£3£3£3E3£3E3L3E3E3E3E2E3E3S3E3E3E3r3£3£3£3£3E3£3r3£3E3£ 

Secretary  Shultz  Visits 
East  and  South  Asia 
and  the  Middle  East 

E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E 

Secretary  Shultz  departed  Washington,  D.C., 

June  23,  1983,  to  visit 
the  Philippines;  Thailand,  where  he  addressed 

the  opening  session 

of  the  postministerial  meeting  of  the  ASEAN 

[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations] 

dialogue;  India;  Pakistan;  Syria; 

Saudi  Arabia;  Lebanon;  Israel;  Jordan;  and  Egypt. 

He  returned  to  Washington  on  July  8. 

Following  are  remarks,  statements, 

toasts,  news  conferences,  and  briefings 

held  on  various  occasions 

during  the  trip. 

3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E 


CHINA 


Philippine  Sea 


PHILIPPINES 


INDONESIA  "'  °  ^ssrl. 


Manila 


LUNCHEON  REMARKS, 
JUNE  25,  19831 

President  Marcos,  Mrs.  Marcos,  and  all 
of  those  whom  you  so  graciously  recog- 
nized at  the  beginning  of  your  toast: 
You  gave  everybody  an  eloquent  descrip- 
tion of  some  of  my  various  roles  in  life, 
and  I  do  recall  I  ran  into  one  of  the  peo- 
ple I  knew  in  Stanford  who  is  sitting 
right  down  here.  It  reminds  me  when  I 
went  from  the  government  to  business 
some  years  ago,  I  got  asked  a  lot  by 
students  from  Stanford,  who  said, 
"You've  administered  in  business,  what's 
the  difference?"  And  I  said,  "Well,  it's 
really  very  simple.  I  quickly  learned 
when  I  went  into  business  that  you  had 
to  be  very  careful  when  you  tell 
somebody  who's  working  for  you  to  do 


something  because  the  chances  were 
very  high,  he'd  do  it,  whereas  in  govern- 
ment, you  didn't  have  to  worry,  and  in 
the  university  you  weren't  supposed  to 
tell  anybody  to  do  anything  in  the  first 
place."  I  had  a  longer  answer,  too. 

But  I  remember  greeting  you  on  the 
Monument  Grounds  when  you  came  to 
Washington  last  September,  you  and 
Mrs.  Marcos.  I  remember  very  well  that 
visit  in  Washington  and  around  the 
country.  I  think,  throughout  that  visit, 
you  felt  and  you  brought  forth  a  warmth 
and  enthusiasm  from  the  American  peo- 
ple for  you  and  the  people  of  the  Philip- 
pines. I  felt  that  warmth  when  I  arrived, 
and  Mrs.  Marcos  was  so  gracious  to 
meet  me — in  this  talk  that  we've  had 
and  in  these  wonderful,  talented  young 
people  who  entertained  us  here.  I  might 
say  it's  the  first  time  I've  ever  seen  a 
fashion  show.  I  hope  it  isn't  the  last.  But 
it  was  a  warm  and  wonderful  perform- 
ance, and  it  does  show  the  touch  that 
there  is  between  the  people  of  the 
Philippines  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States. 

I  thought  you  might  just  dwell  for  a 
moment  on  what  it  is  that  accounts  for 
this  very  special  relationship.  It  is,  first 
of  all,  a  question  of  people  who  for 
decades  have  worked  together,  fought 
together,  laughed  together,  and  cried 
together.  My  wife  sits  beside  you.  She 
fought  beside  you  when  she  returned 
with  General  MacArthur  to  the  Philip- 
pines. There  are  close  to  a  million 
American  citizens  who  are  of  Filipino 
heritage.  There  is  an  extensive  two-way 
traffic  of  people  so  that  we  see  each 
other  frequently,  and  I  think  that,  in 
part,  accounts  for  this  relationship. 

We  talked  a  bit  earlier  about 
economic  matters  and,  of  course,  there 
is  a  very  considerable  commercial  rela- 
tionship between  our  countries.  The  two- 
way  trade  more  or  less  comes  to  about 
$4  billion  in  a  year.  The  amount  of  U.S. 
investment  in  the  Philippines  is  about  a 
billion  and  a  half  dollars.  So  these  are 
very  large  sums,  and  they  represent  a 
very  considerable  economic  relationship. 
You  were  kind  enough  earlier  to  refer  to 
a  talk  that  I  made  a  month  or  so  ago 
having  to  do  with  the  so-called  North- 
South  issues.  In  that  talk,  you  remarked 
that  insofar  as  our  economies  are  con- 
cerned, we  are  all  in  one  boat;  we  sail 
together,  and  we  have  a  stake  together 
in  how  that  boat  operates.  I  think  that 
we  can  take  some  comfort  from  the  fact 
that  there  does  seem  to  be  a  rise  now  in 
the  tide  of  the  world  economy,  and  it 
will  help  us  all  as  our  trade  expands 
and,  of  course,  it  will  help  our  whole  set 
of  financial  problems. 


3ptember1983 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


I  can't  help  but  call  attention  to  the 
courageous  moves  that  you  have  taken 
here  recently.  It  seems  to  me  that  those 
moves  and  with  the  rise  in  the  world 
economy  that  we're  seeing,  we're  bound 
to  see  a  very  healthy  Philippine  economy 
as  well  as  our  own. 

I  might  say  that  when  we  fought 
together,  we  fought  in  defense  of 
freedom  and  democracy.  Those  are 
values  that  are  cherished  by  both  our 
peoples,  and  we  must  continue  to  defend 
those  values  when  they  are  challenged 
and  work  to  promote  and  strengthen  the 
institutions  that  embody  them.  I 
welcome  this  opportunity  to  visit  just 
after  the  successful  conclusion  of  the 
review  of  our  military  bases  agreement 
because  it  stands  for  the  security  ele- 
ment of  our  relationship  and  represents 
a  further  strengthening  of  military 
cooperation  that  goes  back  over  40 
years.  It  has  served  our  countries  well, 
and  we  can  say  that  it  has  added  stabili- 
ty to  this  region.  We  must  also  say  that 
the  framework  of  our  relationship  is  a 
large  one.  It  is  not  simply  two  countries 
that  have  a  bilateral  relationship,  but  we 
share  concern  for  this  region  and  the 
setting  of  the  ASEAN  [Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations]  countries.  I 
support,  the  President  supports,  the 
United  States  supports  the  efforts  which 
you  and  the  other  ASEAN  countries 
have  been  making  to  see  if  we  can't  give 
the  country  of  Kampuchea  back  to  its 
own  residents  and  free  them  from  the 
indignity  of  foreign  occupation. 

As  I  raise  my  glass  to  you,  let  me 
propose  a  toast:  to  your  continued  good 
health,  to  the  preservation  of  friendship 
between  our  two  countries,  and  to  the 
success  of  our  diplomats  in  their 
endeavor  to  bring  peace  to  Southeast 
Asia.  To  President  Marcos  and  Mrs. 
Marcos. 

rwwwwwwwwwwwwirw 

b  Ob  ObO  b  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  ObOb  O  b  Ob 

Secretary's  Itinerary 


b  Ob  <lb  Obdb  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob  Ob 


June  23 

Depart  Washington 

June  24 

Elmandorf 

June  25-26 

Manila 

June  26-29 

Bangkok 

June  30 

Agra 

June  30-July  2 

New  Delhi 

July  2-3 

Islamabad 

July  3 

Peshawar 

July  3-4 

Islamabad 

July  4-5 

Jidda 

July  5 

Beirut 

July  5-6 

Damascus 

July  6-7 

Tel  Aviv 

July  7 

Amman 

July  7 

Cairo 

July  8 

Arrive  Washington 

South 
China 
Sea 


Indian  Ocean 


Bangkok 


STATEMENT, 
JUNE  26,  19832 

First  I'd  like  to  say  that  it  is  always  a 
pleasure  to  come  to  Bangkok.  I  think 
that  just  about  a  year  ago  I  was  here  as 
a  private  citizen  and  have  looked  for- 
ward to  returning,  not  only  to  Bangkok 
but  to  the  meeting  of  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries which  we  are  privileged  to  attend. 
I  am  the  fourth  Secretary  of  State  to  at- 
tend as  one  of  your  dialogue  partners, 
and  we  consider  it  an  honor  to  be  in- 
vited and  come  here  to  learn  and  also  to 
express  our  views,  so  we  look  forward 
to  the  interchange. 

I  think  here,  as  in  so  many  parts  of 
the  world,  we  inevitably  have  a  twin 
agenda.  On  the  one  hand,  we  must  at- 
tend to  our  security — and  here,  of 
course,  we  see  the  problem  of  Kam- 
puchea and  Vietnam,  and  we  have  to  ad- 
dress ourselves  to  that  problem — and 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  United  States 
we  are  particularly  interested  to  hear 
the  analysis  of  our  friends  from  ASEAN 
and  basically  take  the  position  that  we 
wish  to  support  your  efforts. 

The  problem  of  economic  develop- 
ment is  one  that  every  country  in  the 
world  feels,  and  I  noticed  in  looking 
through  reports  on  the  meetings  that 
you  have  held,  that  this  question  has 
preoccupied  you  as  it  preoccupies 
everyone.  I  think  we  must  all  take  the 
view  that  in  the  world  economy  we  are 
all  in  the  same  boat,  and  we  all  have  a 
joint  stake  in  seeing  to  it  that  this  boat 
sails  in  a  positive  and  strong  way.  We 
come  to  the  meeting  to  discuss  that  im- 
portant subject,  and  we  come  in  that 


spirit  with  some  ideas  and  readiness  to 
listen  and  also  with  the  consciousness  of 
the  great  importance  of  economic 
development.  Again,  I  am  very  pleased 
to  be  here  and  look  forward  to  our 
meetings,  both  with  you  in  your  capacity 
as  chairman  of  the  ASEAN  meeting, 
and  in  your  capacity  as  Foreign  Minister 
of  Thailand. 


STATEMENT, 
ASEAN  DIALOGUE, 
JUNE  28,  19833 

A  few  months  ago,  when  I  had  occasion 
to  talk  about  Asia  and  the  Pacific  to  an 
American  audience,  I  suggested  that 
events  in  this  part  of  the  world  have  a 
large  part  in  shaping  our  common 
future.  I  had  ASEAN  very  much  in 
mind.  I  would  single  out  three  of  your 
accomplishments  in  particular,  which  are 
a  model  for  the  rest  of  the  world. 

First,  you  have  turned  diversity 
from  potential  weakness  into  a  signifi- 
cant strength  by  identifying  and  building 
upon  common  interests. 

Second,  you  have  attracted 
worldwide  respect  and  support  by 
resolutely  resisting  aggression  while 
demonstrating  a  willingness  to 
negotiate. 

Finally,  you  have  attained 
remarkable  economic  progress  by  taking 
the  high  road  of  reliance  on  market 
mechanisms  and  disciplined  economic 
management  to  release  the  impressive 
energies  and  talents  of  your  own  people. 

There  is  great  importance  for  all  of 
us  in  each  of  these  achievements. 


Dynamism  in  Diversity 

The  United  States  and  the  ASEAN 
states  share  the  ideal  of  unity  in  diversi- 
ty, and  for  two  of  us  it  is  the  national 
motto.  When  I  think  of  the  monuments 
left  by  the  great  civilizations  of 
Southeast  Asia — Jogjakarta,  Ayutthaya, 
and  elsewhere — I  am  reminded  of  the 
different  histories  of  the  countries  of  the 
region,  but  also  of  a  common  cultural 
heritage. 

Today  when  I  see  the  different 
skylines  of  the  ASEAN  capitals — each 
of  which  has  changed  even  since  my  last 
visit — I  am  reminded  that  you  are  build- 
ing a  common  prosperity.  Not  only 
ASEAN  but  all  the  nations  of  the  world 
are  today  being  drawn  closer  to  each 
other  everyday  by  technological  innova- 
tion and  economic  expansion.  This  very 


bObObObObObObObObObObObObObOb 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


process,  however,  sometimes  makes  na- 
tions and  peoples  anxious  about  preserv- 
ing their  individual  identities.  We  all 
recognize  that  diversity  is  not  a  "prob- 
lem" but  an  expression  of  the  freedom. 
Independence,  and  moral  values  that  we 
lurture  and  safeguard.  While  our  unity 
jrovides  greater  strength  and  efficiency, 
)ur  diversity  brings  creativity,  adapt- 
ibility,  and  meaning  to  our  relation- 
ships. 

■Security  Through  Strength 
land  a  Willingness  To  Negotiate 

rio  greater  challenge  faces  our  peoples 
hr  the  leaders  of  our  countries  than  the 
rhallenge  of  preserving  peace.  President 
Reagan  believes  that  we  best  do  that  by 
combining  strength  with  a  willingness  to 
|;olve  problems  through  negotiations. 
By  rebuilding  our  own  military 
trength  we  not  only  hope  to  deter  ag- 
gression but  also  to  persuade  the  Soviet 
Jnion  to  negotiate  seriously  for  arms 
ontrol.  At  the  START  [strategic  arms 
eduction  talks]  and  INF  [intermediate- 
ange  nuclear  forces]  talks  in  Geneva,  at 
he  mutual  and  balanced  force  [reduc- 
ion]  talks  in  Vienna,  and  at  the  UN's 
Committee  on  Disarmament,  we  are 
eeking  substantial,  verifiable  reductions 
r  limitations  on  nuclear,  chemical,  and 
onventional  forces. 

Our  efforts  to  solve  problems 
irough  negotiations  extend  beyond 
rms  control  to  efforts  at  resolving  the 
sgional  disputes  that  so  often  are  the 
ause  of  wars.  We  are,  as  you  know, 
'orking  with  patience  and  determina- 
on  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  resolution 
f  the  problems  that  beset  the  Middle 
last.  Our  policies  toward  Namibia  and 
ighanistan  incorporate  the  same  prin- 
ples. 

In  the  effort  to  achieve  a  political 
?ttlement  for  one  of  the  most  impor- 
int  of  these  problems,  that  of  Kam- 
uchea,  it  is  the  ASEAN  countries  that 
ave  pointed  the  way  for  the  United 
tates  and  for  the  entire  world.  My 
overnment  strongly  supports  both 
SEAN's  refusal  to  acquiesce  in  the 
)nsequences  of  aggression  and 
SEAN's  readiness  to  negotiate  a  com- 
rehensive  political  solution. 

U.S.  support  for  ASEAN's  policy 
i  ward  Kampuchea  signifies  our  full 
|  jmmitment  to  support  our  common 
oals  in  Southeast  Asia.  We  follow  your 
ad.  We  know  that  the  chances  of  per- 
lading  Vietnam  to  change  its  course 
re  greater  if  the  message  comes  from 
s  neighbors.  Regional  security,  like 
::onomic  progress,  is  more  solidly  con- 


structed if  rooted  in  local  initiative.  But 
you  will  find  us  working  steadfastly  by 
your  side. 

Withdrawal  of  foreign  troops,  self- 
determination,  and  the  establishment  of 
a  neutral  and  independent  Kampuchean 
Government,  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  established  by  the  Interna- 
tional Conference  on  Kampuchea,  would 
protect  the  interests  not  only  of  the 
Kampuchean  people  but  of  every  state  in 
the  region,  including  Vietnam.  We  are 
painfully  aware  of  Kampuchea's  recent 
tragic  history.  The  noncommunist 
resistance  leadership  of  Prince  Sihanouk 
and  Prime  Minister  Son  Sann  has  our 
moral,  political,  and  diplomatic  backing. 
However,  we  will  have  no  dealings  with 
the  Khmer  Rouge. 

Like  you,  we  recognize  that  Thai- 
land, as  a  front-line  state,  deserves  full 
support.  We  have  a  bilateral  security 
relationship  with  Thailand.  Our  airlift  of 
howitzers  and  ammunition  and  the  ex- 
pedited delivery  of  other  material  to 
Thailand  during  the  last  Vietnamese  dry 
season  offensive  was  concrete  testimony 
to  our  resolve  in  this  regard. 

The  growing  Soviet  presence  at  Cam 
Ranh  Bay  introduces  a  further  disturb- 
ing element  of  tension  into  the  region.  A 
matter  of  particular  concern  is  the  clear 
evidence  that  toxic  weapons  have  been 
used  against  innocent  people  in  isolated 
areas  of  Kampuchea  and  Laos.  It  is  im- 
perative that  we  join  together  in  calling 
for  an  end  to  use  of  chemical  and  toxic 
weapons  on  innocent  people.  In  doing 
so,  we  may  help  to  bring  about  a  halt  to 
this  inhumane  activity. 

The  United  States  is  aware  that  one 
of  the  more  deplorable  consequences  of 
Vietnam's  policies — the  flood  of  refugees 
into  neighboring  states — is  a  problem 
that  imposes  continuing  responsibilities 
on  us  all.  Although  the  majority  of  these 
refugees  have  been  resettled  and  the 
flow  into  ASEAN  countries  has  greatly 
diminished,  neither  first  asylum  nor 
resettlement  countries  should  lose  sight 
of  those  that  remain.  The  United  States 
is  taking  steps  to  simplify  its  processing 
procedures  and  will  propose  a  program 
to  Congress  for  the  next  fiscal  year 
which,  together  with  the  continued  ef- 
forts of  other  resettlement  countries, 
should  reduce  the  refugee  population 
significantly.  We  remain  committed  to 
doing  our  part  in  helping  ease  the 
refugee  burden  on  ASEAN  members. 
We  are  confident  that  other  resettle- 
ment countries  will  also  continue  to  do 
theirs. 


On  one  particularly  painful  matter, 
we  ask  your  help.  Accounting  for  the 
Americans  missing  in  Indochina  is  a 
matter  of  highest  national  priority  for 
President  Reagan  and  the  American 
people.  We  urge  both  Hanoi  and  Viet- 
nam to  cooperate  in  resolving  this 
humanitarian  issue.  The  United  States 
greatly  values  any  assistance  the 
ASEAN  countries  can  provide  us  in 
seeking  the  fullest  possible  accounting  of 
our  missing  men.  As  for  Laos,  the 
United  States  has  shown  readiness  to 
improve  relations  based  on  concrete 
steps  by  both  sides.  We  remain 
committed  to  this  process. 

The  High  Road  to  Prosperity 

The  whole  world  is  now  painfully  aware 
of  something  that  the  ASEAN  states 
have  known  for  a  long  time — we  are  all 
in  the  same  boat  economically.  When 
one  country's  growth  falters,  all  coun- 
tries lose  markets.  When  one  country 
erects  barriers  to  trade,  people  in  all 
countries  are  denied  opportunities  for 
mutual  benefit. 

The  economic  growth  of  the  develop- 
ing countries — including  most  definitely 
the  ASEAN  countries — is  important  to 
the  United  States,  not  only  because  it  is 
good  for  you  but  also  because  it  is  good 
for  us.  One  out  of  every  20  workers  in 
our  factories  and  one  out  of  every  five 
acres  of  our  farmland  now  produce  for 
Third  World  markets.  Forty  percent  of 
total  U.S.  trade  is  with  developing  coun- 
tries. Deterioration  in  our  international 
accounts,  particularly  our  exports  to 
developing  countries,  accounted  for 
about  half  of  the  decline  in  our  GNP  last 
year. 

The  reality  of  mutual  interest  be- 
tween North  and  South  creates  a  rela- 
tionship of  mutual  responsibility.  Our 
common  task  is  to  make  this  link  a  spur 
to  growth  in  both  developing  and 
developed  countries.  Right  now  the 
name  of  the  game  is  economic  growth. 

To  meet  that  challenge,  President 
Reagan  has  set  three  broad  tasks  for  his 
Administration. 

First  is  to  lead  the  way  to  long-term 
global  economic  recovery.  That  is  the 
single  most  important  thing  the  United 
States  can  do  to  restore  growth  in  the 
developing  world.  I  am  happy  to  be  able 
to  say  that  the  progress  we  have  made 
to  date  is  encouraging.  Interest  rates 
and  inflation  are  down.  Employment  and 
labor  productivity  are  up.  U.S.  real  GNP 
rose  at  an  annual  rate  of  2.6%  in  the 


9ptember1983 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


first  quarter  and,  according  to  the 
preliminary  estimate,  at  an  annual  rate 
of  more  than  6%  in  the  second  quarter. 
The  challenge  now,  which  we  and  other 
industrialized  states  took  up  in 
Williamsburg,  is  to  turn  this  revival  into 
sustained,  noninflationary  growth. 

We  don't  pretend  that  our  recovery 
is  by  itself  the  key  to  restoring  growth 
in  the  developing  world.  To  the  con- 
trary, the  most  important  engine  of 
growth  for  developing  countries  is  the 
investment  financed  by  domestic  sav- 
ings. On  average  the  developing  coun- 
tries devote  about  one-quarter  of  their 
GNP  to  investment,  with  80%  of  that  in- 
vestment financed  by  domestic  savings. 
In  this  respect,  as  in  so  many  others,  the 
ASEAN  countries  are  doing  better. 
More  than  90%  of  your  gross  investment 
comes  from  domestic  savings.  The 
ASEAN  countries  must  be  congratu- 
lated for  having  given  their  citizens  the 
incentives  to  produce,  save,  and  invest 
while  relying  on  market  prices  to 
allocate  scarce  capital  efficiently.  They 
have  thus  moved  out  onto  the  road  of 
sustained  growth. 

However,  the  United  States  also 
does  its  part  through  official  and  private 
investment  flows.  Worldwide,  the 
United  States  is  the  largest  provider  of 
official  development  aid,  and  we  have  in- 
creased the  amount  during  each  year  of 
the  Reagan  Administration.  Of  more 
than  $8  billion  that  we  provided  last 
year,  nearly  $1  billion  went  to  ASEAN 
countries  either  as  bilateral  assistance  or 
as  the  U.S.  share  of  World  Bank  and 
Asian  Development  Bank  loans.  But  an 
even  larger  contribution,  in  the  ASEAN 
countries  at  least,  is  made  by  direct  U.S. 
private  investment,  which  we  estimate 
to  have  reached  a  level  of  about  $10 
billion  by  1982.  That  is  an  increase  of 
more  than  100%  in  just  2  years. 
American  businessmen  certainly  have 
confidence  in  ASEAN.  And  well  they 
should. 

The  second  large  contribution  that 
we  can  make  to  your  development  is  to 
provide  markets  for  your  products.  For 
the  developing  countries  in  general,  the 
income  derived  from  exports  in  1980 
was  17  times  that  from  foreign  aid.  The 
ASEAN  countries  earned  roughly  $65 
billion  from  exports  last  year,  almost  30 
times  the  amount  of  foreign  assistance 
from  all  sources.  About  17%,  or  $11 
billion,  of  these  exports  went  to  the 
United  States,  and  ASEAN  had  a  trade 
surplus  with  the  United  States  of  $1.3 
billion. 


That  is  why  our  burgeoning  recovery 
is  so  important  to  everyone.  An  increase 
of  just  two  percentage  points  in  the 
growth  rates  of  the  industrial  nations 
would  add  roughly  $20-25  billion  to  the 
annual  export  earnings  of  developing 
countries  by  1985  if  exports  grew  at  the 
same  rate.  That  is  why  the  second  task 
President  Reagan  assigned  his  Ad- 
ministration is  so  important— to  work 
with  our  trading  partners  to  resolve 
problems  of  market  access  and,  in  par- 
ticular, to  find  a  way  as  the  President 
said,  "to  integrate  developing  countries 
in  the  liberal  trading  order."  The 
ASEAN  countries  are  already  leading 
the  way  in  that  effort. 

We  greatly  appreciate  the  construc- 
tive efforts  by  your  governments  to 
strengthen  trade  liberalization  measures 
in  GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade].  The  United  States  is  pleased 
that  the  Williamsburg  conference  en- 
dorsed this  goal,  referring  in  particular 
to  the  possibility  of  a  new  negotiating 
round  with  special  emphasis  on  "expand- 
ing trade  with  and  among  developing 
countries."  We  are  also  well  aware  of 
the  importance  of  our  GSP  [generalized 
system  of  preferences]  program  to 
ASEAN  countries.  The  Reagan  Admin- 
istration is  committed  to  the  renewal  of 
that  program,  and  our  chances  of  suc- 
cess will  be  greater  the  less  are  your 
barriers  to  imports  from  us. 

The  third  task  outlined  by  President 
Reagan  is  to  lead  in  assisting  interna- 
tional financial  and  trade  institutions  to 
strengthen  world  growth.  At  Williams- 
burg, other  free  market  industrialized 
nations  joined  in  this  effort.  And  they 
share,  in  particular,  our  concern  over 
the  debt  burden  borne  by  developing 
countries. 

A  strategy  for  restoring  growth  will 
require  determined  efforts  by  many  of 
the  developing  countries  themselves,  in- 
cluding difficult  readjustment  and 
discipline  in  domestic  policies.  The 
ASEAN  countries  have  shown  that  they 
have  the  foresight  and  discipline  to 
make  such  adjustments  when  necessary. 
But  austerity  alone  is  not  a  sufficient 
solution  to  the  debt  burden  that  the 
developing  countries  face.  If  everyone 
practices  austerity  and  cuts  imports, 
that  only  chokes  world  trade  and 
spreads  the  hardships  further.  The  ob- 
jective must  be  to  preserve  the  credit- 
worthiness of  countries  and  their  ability 
to  import  new  private  capital  in  future 
years.  There  is  no  point  in  more  austeri- 
ty than  is  necessary  for  this  objective. 
Until  domestic  adjustments  and  expand- 


ing world  trade  reduce  the  relative 
burden  of  debt  service,  there  will  be  a 
continuing  role  for  official  financing  and 
emergency  assistance. 

In  each  of  the  ways  I  have  de- 
scribed, your  countries  are  ushering  in  a 
new  period  of  peace  and  prosperity  to 
Southeast  Asia.  The  efforts  of  this  ac- 
complishment reach  far  beyond  your 
region.  In  an  environment  of  global  in- 
terdependence, your  regional  initiatives 
are  felt  throughout  the  world.  All  of 
your  dialogue  partners  have  a  major 
stake  in  your  success. 

It  should  not  be  surprising, 
therefore,  that  ASEAN  is  the  central 
focus  of  our  policy  in  Southeast  Asia. 
You  may  continue  to  rely  on  the  United 
States  for  full  support  for  your  policy 
toward  Kampuchea.  You  can  also  rely 
on  us  as  a  responsive  dialogue  partner 
on  other  matters  affecting  your  security 
and  economic  development.  We  stand 
committed  to  the  security  of  Thailand  as 
the  front-line  state  and  to  playing  a  con- 
structive role  in  the  region  as  a  whole. 
Through  our  development  assistance 
programs,  our  support  for  the  interna- 
tional financial  institutions,  our  private 
sector  investment,  and  our  participation 
in  the  ASEAN-U.S.  dialogue,  we  are 
engaged  in  your  development  efforts, 
both  bilaterally  and  multilaterally.  We 
remain  committed  to  fulfilling  with  you 
our  continuing  humanitarian  duty  to 
shelter  and  resettle  Indochinese 
refugees.  As  the  1980s  face  us  with  com 
mon  problems  and  common  challenges, 
the  United  States  will  do  its  part  in  the 
common  effort. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JUNE  28,  19834 

Q.  Could  I  ask  both  Mr.  Shultz,  the 
U.S.  Secretary  of  State  and  Mr. 
[William]  Hayden,  the  Australian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  of  their 
hopes  for  the  outcome  of  the  visit  of 
the  Australian  Minister  to  Hanoi? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  views  of  the 
United  States  are  that  we  support  the 
approach  of  the  ASEAN  countries  to  th« 
problem  of  dealing  with  the  Kam- 
puchean  issue  and  all  the  related  mat- 
ters. So,  when  it  comes  to  any  approach 
to  Hanoi,  we  believe  that  it  ought  to  be 
coordinated  and  be  seen  as  useful  by  th« 
ASEAN  countries.  It  is  our  understand- 
ing that  they  feel  Mr.  Hayden's  visit 
could  be  useful,   but  I  think  it  is  up  to 
them  to  say.  This  is  the  approach  of  the 
United  States. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  As  I 

understood  the  response  yesterday  after- 
noon from  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Min- 
isters, they,  as  Mr.  Shultz  pointed  out, 
saw  that  the  visit  could  be  useful,  and 
they  supported  it.  Mr.  Shultz  made  it 
clear  later  that  if  they  supported  it,  the 
United  States  was  prepared  to 
sndorse  it. 

Q.  What  evidence  does  the  United 
States  have,  and  how  firm  is  it,  that 
;he  Vietnamese  are  withholding  the 
remains  of  Americans  killed  in  In- 
iochina,  or  missing  in  Indochina?  Why 
.vould  the  Vietnamese  be  doing  it,  and 
,vhy  are  you  making  a  point  of  it  at 
;his  meeting? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  make  a  point 
)f  our  concern  to  know  what  has  hap- 
>ened  to  the  missing-in-action  and  to 
lave  returned  to  us  the  remains  of  those 
:illed  in  action  because  we  care  so  much 
bout  the  men  in  our  Armed  Forces  who 
lave  fallen  and  about  their  families.  So, 

took  the  occasion  here  to  ask  for  help 
rom  the  countries  in  this  region,  and 
hey  all  were  considerate  enough  to  say 
hat  they  would  give  it  to  the  extent 
hey  possibly  could.  According  to  our  in- 
jrmation,  we  still  have  missing — I 
link,  2,494 — and  we  have  intelligence 
lat  suggests  that  the  remains  of  quite  a 
izable  number  are  in  hand  but  have  not 
een  turned  over  to  us.  So  we  wish,  as  a 
latter  of  deep  concern  to  the  families 
ivolved  and  out  of  respect  for  the 
eceased,  that  those  remains  be  re- 
lrned  to  us.  We  have  sought  help,  and 

has  been  offered. 

Q.  And  the  third  point  was  what 
ould  the  motivation  of  the  Viet- 
amese  be  for  what  I  understand  you 
illed  cruel  behavior? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  no  reason 
p  speculate  about  their  motives.  I  don't 
ive  anything  to  add  on  that. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  address  this 
aestion  to  Professor  [Indonesian 
oreign  Minister]  Mochtar  as  a 
>okesman  of  ASEAN  on  Mr. 
ayden's  visit.  What  is  ASEAN's  view 
i  Mr.  Hayden's  visit  to  Hanoi? 

Foreign  Minister  Mochtar.  As  long 
! ;  Mr.  Hayden's  visit  is  in  a  framework 
i '  seeking  a  solution  along  the  lines  of 
>w  ASEAN  sees  the  Kampuchean 
•oblem  should  be  solved,  we  think  it 
ight  be  useful,  and  he  is  welcome  to 
11  us  what  he  has  learned  in  Hanoi.  In 
let,  we  welcome  this  from  anybody  who 
is  relations  with  Hanoi. 


Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  a  similar 
question  to  Mr.  MacEachen  of  Canada. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  Canada  has 
been  praised  for  not  doing  the  same 
thing — 

Secretary  MacEachen.  I  want  to 
continue  to  be  praised.  And  I  find  Pro- 
fessor Mochtar's  answer  very  acceptable 
for  Canada.  If  the  Australian  Minister 
can  play  an  effective  and  useful  role, 
certainly  we  would  welcome  that. 

Q.  I  propose  my  question  to 
[Japanese  Foreign]  Minister  Abe. 
Could  you  please  elaborate  about  the 
implementation  of  Prime  Minister 
[Yasuhiro]  Nakasone's  proposal  re- 
garding the  ASEAN  and  Japanese 
meeting  of  the  Ministers  for  Science 
and  Technology,  and  second,  about  the 
act  of  the  Japanese  Government  re- 
garding the  discriminatory  tariffs 
against  ASEAN  products? 

Foreign  Minister  Abe.  First,  when 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  made  his  visit 
to  the  ASEAN  countries,  he  proposed  to 
the  leaders  that  they  hold  a  ministerial 
conference  on  science  and  technology. 
As  a  followup  to  this  proposal,  I  have 
suggested  in  this  morning's  session  with 
the  ASEAN  Ministers  that  we  will  be 
dispatching,  this  coming  August,  a 
survey  team  which  will  discuss  the  issue 
further  with  the  peoples  concerned  in 
the  ASEAN  countries.  And,  if  possible, 
by  the  end  of  this  year  we  wish  to  hold  a 
ministerial  conference  on  science  and 
technology.  If  no  particular  ASEAN  na- 
tion would  like  to  host  this  conference, 
we  will  be  happy  to  hold  it  in  Japan. 
But,  in  any  case,  the  issue  would  be  up 
for  further  consideration  among  the 
peoples  concerned. 

Second,  on  the  issue  of  customs,  I 
wish,  first  of  all,  to  point  out  that  Japan 
will  expand  by  50%  the  import  ceilings 
of  the  generalized  system  of  preference 
concerning  industrial  and  mining  prod- 
ucts and  that,  in  December  of  this  year 
when  the  tariff  council  will  be  held,  the 
items  of  interest  to  ASEAN  will  be  con- 
sidered there.  I  would  hope  that 
favorable  results  could  be  achieved  in 
the  council  through  deliberations  on  the 
ASEAN  items. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  address  my 
question  to  Secretary  Shultz.  Since 
the  United  States  did  not  sign  the 
Treaty  of  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  could 
you  tell  us  what  is  the  motive  of  that, 
and  are  you  willing  to  participate  in 
the  future  in  signing  the  treaty? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  reason  we 
have  not  signed  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Treaty  is  that  we  believe  the  provisions 


for  a  mining  convention  are  seriously 
flawed  and  will  not  lead  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  seabed  resources  but  quite 
the  reverse.  The  reason,  basically,  why 
they  are  flawed  is  that  they  say  to 
private  enterprise — which  might  want  to 
develop  the  technology  and  ability  to  do 
that — this  enterprise  must,  in  effect, 
turn  over  its  expertise  to  an  interna- 
tional authority  and  then,  with  whatever 
it  is  able  to  earn  in  the  use  of  its 
technology,  finance  that  international 
technology  to  compete  with  it.  It  doesn't 
seem  to  us  that  that  is  likely  to  strike 
any  enterprise  as  a  very  good  deal  and, 
therefore,  it  is  not  likely  to  result  in 
what  can  be  a  very  useful  exploitation  of 
the  seabed  resources.  So  we  felt  that  it 
is  a  seriously  flawed  element  of  the  trea- 
ty and,  therefore,  we  have  not  signed. 
Other  elements  of  the  treaty  which  have 
been  worked  on  a  long  time,  I  know,  are 
broadly  satisfactory  to  the  United 
States,  and  we  intend  to  live  by  them. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  address  my 
question  to  Secretary  Shultz.  In  your 
statement,  you  mentioned  your  sup- 
port—  moral,  political,  and  diplomatic 
support — for  Prince  Sihanouk  and  for 
Son  Sann.  You  added  that  you  will  not 
have  any  dealings  with  the  Khmer 
Rouge.  I  don't  hold  any  brief  for  the 
Khmer  Rouge.  In  fact,  I  am  against 
them,  but  is  there  any  purpose  in  your 
emphasis  on  this  question  at  this 
time?  I  would  also  like  to  know 
whether  ASEAN  Ministers  explained 
to  you  why  ASEAN  supports  the 
Khmer  Rouge  as  part  of  a  democratic 
Kampuchean  coalition? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  reason  we 
don't  support  the  Khmer  Rouge  is 
because  of  their  very  cruel  behavior 
when  they  were  in  charge.  We  support 
the  Sihanouk  and  Son  Sann  approach  to 
government  because  we  think  they 
represent  the  prospect  of  a  return  to  a 
sovereign  and  democratic  Kampuchea 
and  are  joined  in  an  effort  to  bring 
about  the  removal  of  the  forces  of  Viet- 
nam from  Kampuchea  according  to  the 
principles  and  programs  set  by  the 
ASEAN  countries. 

Foreign  Minister  Dhanabalan.  Ex- 
cuse me,  can  I  make  a  correction?  There 
was  an  assumption  in  your  question  that 
ASEAN  supports  the  Khmer  Rouge.  I 
must  make  a  correction.  We  do  not  sup- 
port the  Khmer  Rouge.  We  recognize 
the  Government  of  Democratic  Kam- 
puchea. We  support  the  Son  Sann  and 
Sihanouk  factions,  and  we  are  support- 
ing the  coalition  government  in  order  to 
enable  the  KPNLF  [Kampuchea  People's 
National  Liberation  Front]  and  Prince 


jptember  1983 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


Sihanouk's  groups  to  grow.    So  the 
assumption  in  your  question  is  quite 
wrong. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  address  my 
question  to  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Minister.  This  is  regarding  the 
Japanese  plan  to  repatriate  Kam- 
puchean  refugees  from  Thailand  back 
to  Kampuchea.  I  believe  no  one  pres- 
ent on  the  panel  here  today  recognizes 
the  Phnom  Penh  regime  or  has  had 
contact  with  it.  But  I  would  like  to 
find  out  what  kind  of  message  should 
be  directed  at  the  Phnom  Penh 
government  in  order  to  bring  this 
repatriation  about.  And  can  the 
Minister  explain  what  means  are  being 
considered  at  the  moment — the 
physical  mechanisms — to  get  these 
refugees  back? 

Foreign  Minister  Abe.  In  Thailand 
alone,  there  are  currently  approximately 
160,000  refugees  who  are  still  here.  The 
issue  was  discussed  at  the  dialogue  that 
we  held  with  the  ASEAN  partners,  and 
this  is  rooted  in  the  proposal  that  we 
presented  last  year.  In  last  year's 
meeting,  we  presented  a  proposal  to 
establish  a  voluntary  return  center  for 
the  refugees  in  the  western  part  of 
Kampuchea,  and  we  said  that  we  will 
provide  enough  funds  to  implement  such 
a  center.  Of  course,  I  must  point  out 
that  all  the  management  and  implement- 
ing measures  will  be  taken  by  an  ap- 
propriate international  agency.  Ever 
since  last  year,  this  idea  has  not  pro- 
gressed. But,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
there  are  many  refugees  who  wish  to 
return  on  a  voluntary  basis  under  the 
condition  that  the  implementation  will  be 
undertaken  by  an  international  agency, 
we  proposed  that  we  will  be  ready  to 
provide  enough  funds  and  assistance  in 
order  to  implement  such  an  idea. 

Q.  My  question  is  for  the  U.S. 
Secretary  of  State.  I  would  like  to  ask 
you  to  expand  on  your  remarks  con- 
cerning a  growing  Soviet  threat  to  the 
region  specifically  focused  on  Cam 
Ranh  Bay  and  Da  Nang.  Ever  since  I 
have  been  out  here  U.S.  policymakers 
have  spoken  of  a  growing  Soviet 
threat  to  the  region  based  on  Soviet 
activities  there.  But  we  get  very  few 
specifics,  so  if  you  could  expand  on 
what  the  Soviets  are  doing — 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  we  have 
to  start  with  their  support  for  the  Viet- 
namese invasion  of  Kampuchea.  That  is 
point  one.  Point  two  is  the  use  of  those 
bases.  And  point  three,  so  far  as  we  can 
see,  is  the  gradual  shift  to  using  the 


28 


bases  as  home  ports  or  basing  areas, 
particularly  for  submarines  so  that  they 
are  able  to  project  their  sea  power  into 
this  region.  Those  are  examples  of  the 
growth  of  Soviet  influence. 

Q.  But  U.S.  policymakers  said 
almost  precisely  the  same  thing  3 
years  ago.  Is  there  any  indication  now 
that  the  Soviets  are  setting  up  perma- 
nent facilities  in  Vietnam  as  opposed 
to  temporary  facilities,  or  only  using 
Vietnamese  facilities? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Those  bases  are 
there,  and  ports  are  there,  and  they 
regard  them  as  places  to  station  them- 
selves—  I  don't  know  whether  the  word 
permanent  is  the  right  word;  I  hope  it 
isn't.  But  certainly  it  is  an  effort  to  use 
those  facilities  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
jecting Soviet  power  into  this  area.  That 
is  the  statement  that  was  made. 

Q.  I  have  two  questions.  The  first 
one  I  would  like  to  address  to 
Secretary  Shultz.  It  is  a  followup  to 
the  question  on  MIAs.  Recently,  a  few 
months  ago,  some  of  the  American 
team  used  Thai  soil  to  rescue 
American  MIAs  in  Laos.  But  they 
were  not  very  successful — to  mention, 
Mr.  James  "Bo"  Gritz's  team.  Such  ac- 
tion has  surely  soured  neighborly  rela- 
tions between  Thailand  and  Laos.  Has 
Washington  introduced  any  measures 
to  prevent  such  teams  from  using  Thai 
soil  for  such  action?  If  not,  what  is 
the  American  policy  with  regard  to 
the  MIAs  in  Laos  when  the  civilian 
operations  would  rescue  them? 

My  second  question  I  would  like 
to  address  to  Mr.  Hayden  about  Kam- 
puchea. There  is  so  much  specula- 
tion—and I  hope  that  your  trip  to 
Hanoi  tomorrow  would  not  be  a 
failure — but  in  order  to  pursue  the 
solution  for  the  Kampuchean  question, 
I  think  I  am  on  the  side  of  Australia 
in  bridging  the  gap  between  the  two 
countries.  Do  you  have  any  other  op- 
tions in  mind — for  example,  an 
Australian  proposal  for  a  comprehen- 
sive political  settlement  by  bridging 
the  so-called  modalities  and  substance 
between  the  two  groupings,  or,  in  a 
large  international  conference,  to  ac- 
commodate the  two  parties  for  a 
peaceful  settlement? 

Secretary  Shultz.  As  to  your  first 
question,  I  am  not  sure  that  I  under- 
stood it  clearly,  but  to  the  extent  that  I 
did,  it  involves  how  to  approach  this 
issue.  And,  of  course,  any  means  that 
can  be  effective,  we  are  for.  There  have 
been  private  efforts  organized.  There  is 
a  joint  center  that  works  on  it,  but,  prin- 
cipally, we  believe  that  work  through  of- 


ficial channels  is  probably  the  most  ef- 
fective method  in  the  long  run.  It  is  a 
problem  sometimes  that  people  wanting 
to  be  helpful  may  push  into  something 
and  raise  hopes  which  are  dashed.  But, 
clearly,  we  are  anxious  to  have  any 
method  used  which  will  help  return  the 
remains  of  the  deceased  and  provide  in- 
formation for  us  and  for  the  families  in- 
volved on  those  who  are  missing. 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  If  I 
could  answer  the  second  question,  we 
have  certain  principles  we  have 
declared.  They  are  fairly  common  with 
those  declared  by  other  interested  par- 
ties: withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces 
from  Kampuchea  and  self-determination 
within  Kampuchea;  the  neutralization, 
independence,  and  nonalignment  of 
Kampuchea;  normalization  of  relation- 
ships within  the  region;  and,  respect  and'.i 
preservation  of  the  territorial  sovereign- 
ty of  countries  of  the  region.  They  seem 
to  be  fairly  common  principles  and,  as 
we  understand  it,  recently  have  been  ex- 
pressed by  a  Vietnamese  spokesperson. 
I  guess  the  task  I  see  ahead  of  me  is  try- 
ing to  sort  out  to  what  extent  there  is 
some  sort  of  common  understanding  as 
to  the  interpretation  of  those  declara- 
tions. In  spite  of  the  commonality  of  in- 
terests, there  hasn't  been  much  success 
in  getting  people  together.  Having  said 
all  that,  we  approach  the  task  before  us 
with  a  great  deal  of  caution  and  respect 
for  its  daunting  quality.  As  I've  said 
many  times  before,  on  the  balance  of 
probabilities,  we  shouldn't  expect  to 
achieve  much  success.  For  all  that,  we 
are  prepared  to  go  ahead  and  enter  into 
some  sort  of  discussion.  The  task  we 
embark  upon  is  nothing  more  than  that. 

Q.  This  is  for  Mr.  Shultz.  Your 
last  answer  just  raised  my  question  in 
to  a  two-parter.  You  say  that  any 
means  that  would  be  effective  we  are 
for.  Are  you  saying,  then,  that  if  you 
were  convinced  that  a  private  mission 
to  look  for  MIAs  would  be  effective, 
you  would  not  be  against  it  or  you 
would  not  try  to  stop  it?  And  the  sec- 
ond part  of  my  question  has  to  do  witl  I 
the  Kampuchean  coalition.  If  I  under-  I 
stand  U.S.  policy  correctly,  the  United! 
States  is  willing  to  give  political  and    i 
moral  support  to  the  coalition  but  not  i 
military  aid.  Could  you  be  specific  as 
to  why  military  aid  to  the  coalition 
would  not  be  productive,  or  rather, 
why  it  would  be  counterproductive? 

Secretary  Shultz.  On  the  first  ques- 
tion, I  think  the  key  word  is  "if  it  has  a 
good  chance  of  being  effective."  On  the 
second  question,  we  feel  that  we  can 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


THE  SECRETARY 


support  them,  of  course,  as  we  do 
through  our  security  relationship  with 
the  Thais.  But,  insofar  as  other  support 
is  concerned,  we  think  that  nonmilitary 
support  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  we 
should  do  in  support  of  the  ASEAN  ef- 
fort here. 

Q.  My  question  is  directed  to  Mr. 
Mochtar.  Discussions  have  taken  place 
on  the  future  of  the  New  Zealand 
force  in  Singapore  and  Australian  Air 
Force  units  in  Malaysia.  Do  the  five 
see  the  maintenance  of  these  forces  in 
place  as  a  significant  factor  in  the 
maintenance  of  a  united  stand  against 
Hanoi  on  the  question  of  Vietnam's  oc- 
cupation of  Kampuchea? 

Foreign  Minister  Mochtar.  I  think 
in  ASEAN,  there  is  a  healthy  principle 
which  we  keep.  We  make  a  distinction 
Detween  bilateral  relations  of  the  in- 
dividual countries  on  which  we  don't 

omment  because  that  is  their  own 
Dusiness  and  ASEAN  matters.  I  don't 
see  the  relationship  between  the  forces 
rou  mention  and  the  ASEAN  position 

>n  Kampuchea. 

Q.  My  question  is  addressed  to  the 
Thai  Foreign  Minister  in  his  role  as 
hairman.  I  would  like  to  know 
vhether  the  ASEAN  Ministers  have 
.ny  reservations  about  Mr.  Hayden's 
orthcoming  visit  to  Vietnam,  and 
whether  the  ASEAN  Ministers  see  Mr. 
layden  as  performing  any  role  on 
heir  behalf.  If  I  may,  Fd  also  like  to 
sk  Mr.  Shultz  whether  he  has  raised 
tie  question  of  the  American  MIAs 
■ith  Mr.  Hayden  with  a  view  to 
erhaps  Mr.  Hayden  raising  it  with 
tie  authorities  in  Hanoi. 

Foreign  Minister  Siddhi.  I  think 
mt  Mr.  Hayden  had  a  dialogue  with  us, 
mong  ASEAN.  Yesterday,  we  ex- 
lamed  our  position  very  clearly.  I  think 
lat  Mr.  Hayden  understands  very  well. 
lo,  as  this  is  an  international  problem, 
e  have  no  reservations  concerning  Mr. 
ayden's  trip  to  Hanoi.  We  also  told  Mr. 
ayden  the  progress  that  we  have  made 
ius  far.  If  he  can  probe  further  and  get 
|  ore  information  for  us,  it  would  be 
J  ?ry  useful  to  our  search  for  peace  and 
political  solution  for  Kampuchea.  I 
ould  say  that  Mr.  Hayden  has  a  role  to 
I  ay,  and  we  have  no  reservations  about 
{  s  trip  at  all. 

Q.  For  Secretary  Shultz  and  [Ger- 
1  an  Foreign  Minister  Hans-Dietrich] 

enscher.  Secretary  Shultz,  could  you 
i  immarize  the  negotiations  with  the 

jviet  Union  on  intermediate-range 
laclear  missiles  targeted  on  Western 


Europe  and  Asia?  Do  you  see  any 
movement  in  those  negotiations?  Have 
you  received  a  responsible  answer 
from  the  Soviet  Union? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  United 
States  has  made  proposals  in  Geneva  for 
reductions  in  the  deployment  of  the 
SS-20s  and  offered  first  that  those 
weapons  should  just  be  eliminated — both 
the  weapons  that  are  planned  to  be 
deployed  by  the  United  States  and  the 
comparable  Soviet  weapons.  Just 
eliminate  them  from  the  face  of  the 
Earth — that  was  not  acceptable  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  So  we  have  now  proposed 
that  they  agree  to  a  global  limit,  that 
there  be  some  number  of  warheads  that 
each  side  would  accept  as  a  limit,  and 
we  have  not  specified  a  number  because 
we  felt  that  there  was  more  room  for 
give-and-take  if  we  said  just  some  equal, 
verifiable  level.  So  we  have  proposals  on 
the  bargaining  table  that  are  reasonable, 
that  have  been  worked  out  with  our 
allies,  including  with  Mr.  Genscher  and 
his  government,  and  that  are  global.  At 
this  point,  I  can't  tell  you,  I  am  sorry  to 
say,  that  there  has  been  any  reasonable 
response,  but  we  are  there  at  the 
negotiating  table;  so  is  the  Soviet  Union. 
If  there  can  be  a  negotiated  outcome,  we 
obviously  would  regard  that  as  construc- 
tive. 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher.  We 
have  always  felt  that  the  Soviet  Union 
will  be  ready  for  serious  negotiations  on- 
ly if  it  is  firmly  convinced  that  the  in- 
tended deployment  in  Western  Europe 
will  take  place  if  no  results  have  been 
achieved  at  the  negotiating  table.  This 
will  be  one  of  the  important  points  to  be 
discussed  during  the  forthcoming  visit  to 
Moscow  which  will  take  place  next 
week.  We  should  leave  no  doubt  about 
the  fact  that,  unless  concrete  negotiating 
results  are  achieved,  deployment  of  U.S. 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles  in 
Western  Europe  will  take  place. 
Western  Europe  means  the  Federal 
Republic,  Italy,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
as  this  was  decided  by  NATO  in 
December  1979. 

Q.  May  I  address  a  question  to  the 
ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers?  ASEAN  is 
very  successful  in  staging  one  con- 
ference after  another.  You  had  the 
meeting  with  the  EEC  [European 
Economic  Community]  in  April,  and 
now  you  have  the  postministerial  con- 
ference with  the  dialogue  countries, 
but  my  impression  is  that  more  and 
more  time  is  dedicated  to  the  Kam- 
puchean  conflict,  and  I  wonder 


whether  you  have  chosen  the  right 
dialogue  countries.  Therefore,  I  would 
like  to  ask  you  what  was  the  criteria 
to  choose  dialogue  countries?  And, 
secondly,  wouldn't  it  have  been  better 
to  choose  other  dialogue  countries,  for 
instance,  Vietnam  or  China  or 
Moscow? 

Foreign  Minister  Dhanabalan.  It  is 
quite  wrong  to  say  that  we  have  spent 
all  our  time  talking  about  Kampuchea. 
We  had  two  sessions  with  the  dialogue 
countries.  One  was  what  we  call  the 
five-plus-six;  that  is,  all  of  us  together. 
We  spent  the  whole  of  yesterday  morn- 
ing and  then  we  met  with  each  of  the 
dialogue  partners.  In  the  meeting  of  the 
five-plus-six,  I  would  say  we  probably 
spent  about  25%  to  30%  of  the  time 
talking  about  Kampuchea.  In  the  five- 
plus-one,  almost  the  entire  time  was 
devoted  to  economic  and  other  issues 
and  not  Kampuchea.  So  your  question  is 
not  even  based  on  the  right  reading  of 
what  went  on  here. 

Q.  What  impact,  in  fact,  are  the 
discussions  on  the  common  issues  go- 
ing to  have  on  the  current  UNCTAD 
[UN  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development]  meeting?  Is  there  going 
to  be  a  softening  of  the  stand? 
Because  of  the  discussions,  are  these 
a  part  of  the  negotiating  tactics  which 
the  normally  [inaudible]?  At  first,  they 
start  with  the  [inaudible]  and  then 
later  on  [inaudible]  they  modify  their 
postures.  Would  the  United  States,  for 
instance,  ratify  the  common  fund  as  a 
result  of  the  discussion? 

Secretary  Shultz.  From  the  U.S. 
standpoint,  we  consider  the  development 
of  the  developing  world  to  be  of  critical 
importance  to  us— our  trading  relation- 
ship, our  strategic  relationships  with 
Third  World  countries  are  of  great 
significance,  and,  therefore,  we  have 
devoted  a  great  deal  of  thought  and  at- 
tention to  this  issue.  We  have  expressed 
ourselves  in  a  constructive  spirit,  and  we 
have  gone  to  the  UNCTAD  meeting  in 
that  same  manner.  We  feel  that  the 
general  tenor  of  the  discussions  at 
UNCTAD,  and  at  other  places,  is  becom- 
ing more  and  more  realistic  and  con- 
cerned with  the  operational  aspects  of 
development.  There  are  a  vast  number 
of  points  on  which  people  now  agree,  in 
particular,  the  importance  of  trends  and 
investment,  as  well  as  aid,  to  the 
development  process.  The  individual 
countries  must  be  willing  to  take  the 
products  of  the  developing  world  if  they 
are  to  get  anywhere.  Just  to  give  a 
number,  I  believe  that  the  earning  which 


eptember1983 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


flows  to  the  ASEAN  countries  from 
trade  exceed  those  from  aid,  including 
from  multilateral  lending  institutions,  by 
a  factor  of  30.  So  you  can  see  the 
relative  importance  of  trade. 

As  far  as  the  common  fund  is  con- 
cerned, our  view  is  that  the  problem  of 
very  volatile  commodity  prices  has 
classically  been  a  genuine  problem  for 
both  the  producing  and  consuming  coun- 
tries. But  we  do  not  feel  that  the  way  to 
get  at  that  problem  is  to  try  to  have  a 
broad  scheme  of  price  controls. 
Although  there  is  a  buffer  in  there  in 
terms  of  working  through  the 
mechanism  of  commodity  agreements, 
the  common  fund  involves  raising  money 
in  order  to  implement  what  would  be 
purchasing  policies  by  commodity  agree- 
ments to  maintain  certain  price  levels. 
We  think  that,  in  the  end,  it  wouldn't 
work.  It  would  bankrupt  the  fund.  We 
believe  that  a  better  approach  to  this 
problem  is  to  look  at  it  from  the  stand- 
point of  income  flows  to  countries  that 
are  especially  affected  by  the  commodity 
price  issue,  and  in  that  regard,  the  In- 
ternational Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  com- 
pensatory financing  approach  appeals  to 
us  more.  So,  we  haven't  found  the  com- 
mon fund  approach  one  that  we  think  is 
workable.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
ideology.  It  is  a  question  of  workability, 
and,  of  course,  we  are  ready  to  look 
with  people  at  the  practical  aspects  of 
the  common  fund  and  other  means,  but 
at  this  point  we  are  not  convinced  that  it 
will  really  serve  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  intended. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  direct  a  ques- 
tion to  the  Indonesian  Foreign 
Minister.  Foreign  Minister  Abe  has 
been  saying  that  Japan  intends  to  in- 
crease aid  to  Laos,  and  in  your  speech 
in  today's  Japan-ASEAN  meeting, 
ASEAN  accepts  the  continuation  of 
Japanese  aid  to  Laos,  but  you  said 
that  ASEAN  does  not  feel  that  such 
aid  should  be  increased.  Does  this 
statement  represent  the  views  of  all 
ASEAN  nations,  and  if  so— this  ques- 
tion might  be  directed  to  Mr.  Abe — if 
so,  what  is  Japan  going  to  do?  Is 
Japan  going  to  keep  on  with  its 
original  plan? 

Foreign  Minister  Mochtar.  I  think 
our  position  has  been  made  clear  in  the 
statement  this  morning.  I  think  the 
thrust  of  the  statement  is  that  any  aid 
to  Laos  should  not  end  up  giving  assist- 
ance to  the  occupation  of  Kampuchea. 
That  is  the  gist  of  it.  And,  as  for  the 
other  part  of  the  question,  maybe  Mr. 
Abe  can  answer. 


Foreign  Minister  Abe.  Concerning 
this  Kampuchean  question,  Japan 
strongly  supports  ASEAN's  position 
and,  until  the  Vietnamese  forces  are 
withdrawn  from  Kampuchea,  Japan  will 
continue  to  freeze  aid  to  Vietnam.  Laos, 
however,  is  not  Vietnam,  and  Laos  has 
not  invaded  Kampuchea.  Of  course, 
Laos  may  be  influenced  by  the  Viet- 
namese, but  Laos  is  an  LDC — a  less 
developed  country.  We  have  been  pro- 
viding Laos  with  humanitarian  aid  even 
though  that  aid  has  been  scaled  down 
since  the  occurrence  of  the  Kampuchea 
problem.  But,  in  view  of  this  standpoint 
of  providing  humanitarian  assistance  to 
Laos,  this  aid  to  Laos  will  continue.  But 
I  wish  to  make  one  thing  clear:  This  aid 
will  not  in  any  way  serve  to  strengthen 
the  Vietnamese  at  all.  This  will  be  strict- 
ly used  for  the  improvement  of  the  peo- 
ple's welfare  in  Laos.  Even  if  the  aid  to 
Laos  were  to  be  increased,  I  do  not 
believe  that  it  will  contradict  in  any  way 
ASEAN's  position.  Of  course,  we  do  not 
envisage  any  drastic  increase  of  our 
humanitarian  aid  to  Laos,  but  when 
necessity  arises,  it  may  be  increased  by 
some  small  scale. 

Q.  Mr.  Genscher,  what  is  your 
assessment  of  the  political  impact  of 
this  dialogue  which  has  taken  place 
here  on  the  general  East- West  rela- 
tionship? 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher.  It  has 
always  been  the  policy  of  the  countries 
of  the  European  Community  not  to 
transfer  the  West-East  conflict  to  other 
regions  of  the  world.  And  so  I  think  it  is 
clear  that  this  political  dialogue  which 
has  taken  place  between  the  member 
countries  of  ASEAN  and  the  member 
countries  of  the  European  Community— 
the  United  States,  Canada,  New 
Zealand,  Japan,  and  Australia — may 
make  an  essential  contribution  toward 
the  policy  of  greater  stability — both 
politically  and  economically — in  the 
world.  And,  seen  against  this  back- 
ground, this  present  dialogue  could  very 
well  have  a  stabilizing  effect  on  East- 
West  relations.  For  this  purpose, 
however,  it  would  be  necessary  for  both 
sides — not  only  the  Western  countries 
but  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies,  as 
well — to  pursue  a  policy  characterized 
by  moderation  all  over  the  world.  In 
other  words,  by  noninterference  in  the 
affairs  of  other  countries  and  by  the  con- 
sistent application  of  the  principle  of  the 
nonuse  of  force.  In  practical  terms,  this 
means  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces 
from  Afghanistan  and  the  withdrawal  of 
Vietnamese  forces  from  Kampuchea. 


Q.  Mr.  Shultz,  according  to 
reports  in  today's  newspapers,  you  in- 
ferred at  yesterday's  meeting  that 
Australia's  initiatives  on  Kampuchea 
were  stupid.  Did  you  use  that  word, 
and,  if  so,  in  what  context? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  used  the  word 
but  not  in  any  respect  with  regard  to 
Australia.  I  used  the  word  in  character- 
izing a  process.  We  were  discussing 
negotiations,  and  I  said  it  seems  to  me 
that  sometimes  we  get  involved  in  a 
process  where  we  say  that  we  want  to 
be  reasonable  and  we  do  want  to  be 
reasonable  and  we  make  a  proposal  and 
the  other  side  says  no.  And  so  people 
say,  "Be  reasonable.  Make  another  pro- 
posal." So  we  make  another  proposal. 
And  the  other  side  says  no.  So  we  move, 
and  so  they  say,  "Well,  you've  got  to  be 
reasonable.  Make  another  proposal." 
And  I  say,  in  that  process,  we  are  not 
being  reasonable.  We  are  being  stupid. 
And  the  point  is  that  when  we  are 
engaged  in  the  process  of  bargaining, 
we  should  be  bargaining  with  our  op- 
posite number  at  the  bargaining  table 
and  not  with  ourselves.  That  was  the 
origin  of  the  remark  "stupid,"  and  it 
wasn't  applied  to  anybody.  I  don't  know 
how  the  press  possibly  cooked  up  that 
characterization. 

Q.  My  first  question  is  directed  to 
Mr.  Hayden.  What  will  Australia's 
position  be  at  the  United  Nations  with 
regard  to  democratic  Kampuchea?  My 
second  question  is  toward  the 
Japanese  Minister  who  just  said  that 
Japan  will  make  sure  that  its  humani- 
tarian aid  to  Laos  will  strictly  be  used 
for  humanitarian  purposes.  Has  Japan 
worked  out  some  sort  of  mechanism  to 
make  sure  that  this  aid  will  only  be 
for  humanitarian  purposes? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  For 
Australia's  part,  we  will  make  a  deter- 
mination on  our  attitude  about  that  mat- 
ter at  the  United  Nations  when  it  is 
closer  to  being  discussed  at  the  United 
Nations.  At  this  point  we  recognize  no 
government  in  Kampuchea,  and  we 
recognize  one  of  the  elements  of  the  so- 
called  democratic  coalition  government 
as  it  presents  itself. 

Foreign  Minister  Abe.  Under  the 
Japanese  economic  cooperation  scheme, 
we  only  provide  economic  cooperation 
after  thorough  and  intensive  consulta- 
tion with  the  recipient  government  as  to 
the  usage  of  the  cooperation  which  will 
be  extended.  This  will  be  done  in  a  very 
close,  detailed  manner.  Japan  has  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Laos,  and  our  aid  to 
Laos  had  been  only  that  humanitarian 
aid  that  I  mentioned.  We  will  continue 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


to  make  sure  that  under  this  Japanese 
system  of  making  closely  detailed 
studies  of  how  the  aid  will  be  used.  We 
will  continue  to  implement  the  aid 
directly  linked  to  those  humanitarian 
needs. 

Q.  I  have  one  last  question  for 
Secretary  Shultz.  You  said  earlier  that 
the  U.S.  Government  might  be  pre- 
pared to  help  private  groups  try  to 
recover  the  remains  of  American  serv- 
icemen in  Vietnam  if  those  efforts  ap- 
pear to  have  a  reasonable  chance  of 
success.  Can  you  tell  us  how  that 
determination  will  be  made,  whether 
sve  are  currently  providing  aid  to  any 
:uch  group,  and  if  Bo  Gritz  came  up 
with  a  plan  that  seemed  reasonable, 
would  we  support  it? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  appreciate  your 
jiving  me  an  opportunity  to  clarify  my 
inswer,  and  I  think  I  can  concisely  do  so 
>y  saying  in  response  to  your  third  ques- 
ion  that  the  answer  is  very  unlikely,  but 
hese  things  would  have  to  be  looked 
ipon  case-by-case. 


-JEWS  CONFERENCE, 

UNE  29,  19835 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  like  to  say, 
irst  of  all,  how  much  my  wife  and  I  and 
11  the  people  traveling  with  me  have  ap- 
reciated  the  extraordinary  hospitality 
ccorded  to  us  here,  how  much  we  have 
ppreciated  the  opportunity  to  meet 
ith  the  Thai  Government,  the  Prime 
Sinister,  the  Foreign  Minister,  and 
thers,  and  also  with  their  colleagues  in 
ne  ASEAN  group.  And,  finally,  I  would 
ike  to  express  my  sense  of  privilege  at 
le  opportunity  to  be  received  later  this 
lorning  by  His  Majesty  the  King. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you  hope 
)  accomplish  in  India?  Looking  ahead 
ne  more  stop,  the  Geneva  negotia- 
ons  and  Afghanistan  have  not  really 
»me  up  with  much.  What  is  the  out- 
»ok  for  an  Afghanistan  solution? 

Secretary  Shultz.  In  India,  as  with 
ther  countries  where  we  visit,  we  seek 
i  improve  and  deepen  our  understand- 
ig  and  quality  of  our  relationships, 
eyond  that,  since  India  is  a  country  in 
le  forefront  of  dealing  with  the  prob- 
■ms  of  economic  development — prob- 
•ms  which  are  of  great  significance  in 
ae  world — I  look  forward  to  discussing 
lese  issues  with  Mrs.  Gandhi  [Indian 
rime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi]  and  her 
>lleagues,  to  learning  from  them,  and 
exchanging  views  on  these  issues.  So 


there  will  be  a  variety  of  bilateral  prob- 
lems and  things  to  talk  about  but,  also, 
some  matters  of  general  interest  to  us 
and  to  the  Indians  as  well. 

In  Pakistan,  we  have  similar  bi- 
lateral problems  of  interest  and,  at  the 
same  time,  a  host  of  issues  affecting 
Afghanistan  will,  I  am  sure,  be  dis- 
cussed. I  look  forward  to  hearing  and 
having  from  the  Pakistanis  their  insight 
into  the  negotiations  that  have  been  go- 
ing  on  about  Afghanistan.  Your  ap- 
praisal may  be  the  right  one.  I  want  to 
listen  to  the  Pakistanis  and  have  their 
view,  as  the  U.S.  Government  would  like 
to  see  a  satisfactory  solution  to  that 
problem,  and  the  definition  of  "satis- 
factory" is,  by  this  time,  quite  well 
known,  so  I  won't  review  it. 

Q.  Have  you  had  any  reaction  from 
the  Thai  Government  or  others  about 
your  endorsement  yesterday  of  border- 
crossing  forays  if  they  would  be  effec- 
tive in  returning  American  bodies? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  am  having  diffi- 
culty with  that.  I  certainly  didn't  mean 
to  endorse  border-crossing  forays  at  all, 
and  I  think  such  forays  are  counterpro- 
ductive and  serve  neither  the  deep  and 
emotional  interests  of  our  country  nor 
the  families  involved  in  finding  out  about 
the  missing-in-action  and  having  their 
remains  returned.  I  didn't  mean  to  en- 
dorse those  forays,  and  I  don't.  Of 
course,  the  legitimate  efforts  of  the 
families  involved  and  their  organizations 
are  efforts  that  we  have  great  sympathy 
for  and  try  to  be  helpful  to. 

Q.  Could  you  comment  on 
Vietnam's  recent  statement  that  Kam- 
puchea is  a  matter  between  Vietnam 
and  China  and  ASEAN  has  no  role  to 
play,  and  also  comment  on  the  just 
concluded  ASEAN  meeting? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  just  conclud- 
ed ASEAN  meeting  has  been  a  very 
constructive  one.  I  thought  the  com- 
munique they  issued  was  very  interest- 
ing, thoughtful,  and  helpful,  and  the 
meetings  with  the  dialogue  partners — 
both  the  five-plus-six  and  then  the  five- 
plus-one  meeting  that  I  attended.  Of 
course,  I  can't  speak  about  the  others;  I 
didn't  attend  them.  But  the  whole  thing 
seemed  to  be  constructive.  I  might  say 
that  both  dinners  were  extraordinary, 
and  the  one  last  night  was  capped  by 
one  of  the  most  humorous  toasts  I  have 
heard  in  a  long  while.  I  think  the  Thai 
Foreign  Minister  is  a  rival  to  Bob  Hope. 
So,  that  added  a  little  special  spice  to 
the  occasion.  As  far  as  the  statement 
that  the  Kampuchea  problem  is  really  a 


China  problem,  1  certainly  don't  see  it 
that  way  and  neither  do  the  ASEAN 
countries.  I  think  the  statements  that 
have  been  made  recently  by  the  Chinese 
bear  out  their  interest  in  an  independent 
Kampuchea  with  a  government  that 
springs  from  the  desires  of  the  people  of 
that  country  and  not  an  effort  to 
dominate  that  country. 

Q.  Going  back  to  the  question  on 
your  visit  to  India,  the  arms  aid  to 
Pakistan  by  the  United  States  is  an 
issue  affecting  India's  relations.  Are 
you  likely  to  carry  any  assurances  to 
India  on  this? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  know  that  the 
Indians  register  on  that.  We  believe  that 
it  is  important  for  us  to  support  many 
countries  around  the  world,  including 
Pakistan,  and  we  don't  regard  our  sup- 
port for  Pakistan  as  in  any  sense 
directed  against  India.  Quite  the  con- 
trary. I  think  that  the  destabilization  in 
the  region  symbolized  by  the  Afghan 
problem  is  something  that  everyone 
should  be  concerned  about. 

Q.  One  of  the  subjects,  I  guess, 
you  will  be  discussing  with  Mrs. 
Gandhi  is  the  question  of  supplying 
components  for  the  nuclear  reactor  at 
Tarapur.  Can  you  tell  us  whether  the 
United  States  has  found  a  third  coun- 
try that  is  willing  to  provide  those 
components,  and  if  not,  what  you  plan 
to  tell  Mrs.  Gandhi? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  that  I  will 
save  what  I  plan  to  tell  Mrs.  Gandhi  for 
Mrs.  Gandhi,  and  we'll  take  up  that 
issue.  I  am  sure  it  will  be  brought  up, 
and  I  think  it  is  more  appropriate  for  me 
to  report  to  you  on  what  happens  in  that 
conversation  rather  than  prospectively. 

Q.  I  recall  when  we  were  in 
Manila  you  were  asked  about  the  pro- 
posal by  the  Thai  Foreign  Minister 
which  was  endorsed  by  the  ASEAN  in 
its  communique  for  a  30-kilometer 
pullback  by  the  Vietnamese  in  return 
for  some  political  gesture.  If  I 
remember  correctly,  you  said  you 
wanted  to  discuss  it  first  with  the 
ASEAN  people  before  taking  a  posi- 
tion. Do  you  now  have  a  position  on 
that,  and  if  so,  what  is  it? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  ASEAN 
countries  have  endorsed  that  approach, 
and  we  think  that  it  may  be  helpful,  so 
we  favor  it. 

Q.  The  stories  yesterday  about  the 
MIAs  raised  once  again,  also,  the 
question  of  the  possibility  that  there 


3ptember1983 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


may  be  live  POWs  in  Southeast  Asia. 
What  is  the  Reagan  Administration's 
position  on  that?  Do  you  believe  that 
there  might  still  be  some  alive? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  are  not  in  a 
position  to  rule  it  out,  but  we  don't  have 
evidence  that  there  are  some  alive. 

Q.  There  was  a  report  out  of 
Hanoi  on  AFP  this  morning  talking 
about  the  Vietnamese  being  ready  to 
reactivate  a  nuclear  test  reactor  that 
was  built  by  the  Americans  back  in 
the  late  1960s  or  early  1970s.  Is  there 
any  fear  on  your  part  or  have  you 
heard  expressed  by  any  of  your 
ASEAN  colleagues  that  this  facility 
might  be  used  to  make  nuclear 
weapons? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  hadn't  heard 
about  that,  so  you  are  bringing  this  to 
my  attention.  Certainly,  the  use  of  any 
facility  like  that  directed  toward  nuclear 
weapons  we  would  obviously  oppose.  I 
don't  think  it  would  be  a  good  thing  at 
all. 

Q.  What  is  the  U.S.  view  on  the 
announcement  by  Vietnam  several 
weeks  back  about  the  withdrawal  of 
troops  from  Kampuchea,  and  what 
kind  of  information  might  you  have  on 
how  many  troops  may  have  been  with- 
drawn? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  or  not  there  is  a  with- 
drawal taking  place  or  a  troop  rotation 
taking  place,  and  from  what  we  can  see 
it  is  probably  the  latter.  So  it  doesn't 
have  the  implications  that  a  genuine 
withdrawal  might  have. 

Q.  You  now  say  that  you  do  not 
endorse  crossborder  forays.  Yesterday 
when  you  were  asked  about  James 
"Bo"  Gritz's  raid  into  Laos  and  what 
you  thought  of  his  using  Thai  territory 
to  stage  such  a  raid,  you  replied  that 
you  support  any  method  which  has  a 
good  chance  of  being  effective.  Can 
you  clarify  what  you  really  mean? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  tried  to  clarity 
that  this  morning,  and  I  don't  think  I 
spoke  very  clearly  about  it  yesterday.  So 
let  me  stand  on  the  answer  I  gave  at  the 
beginning  of  the  conference  which  is 
basically  that  we  believe  these  cross- 
border  forays  tend  to  do  more  harm 
than  good,  and  we  oppose  them. 

Q.  There  has  been  some  furor  in 
India  over  the  past  several  days 
because  of  remarks  allegedly  made  by 
Ambassador  Barnes  [U.S.  Ambassador 
to  India  Harry  G.  Barnes,  Jr.].  Are 
you  concerned  that  this  might  distort 
the  real  purpose  of  your  trip? 


Secretary  Shultz.  The  purpose  of 
my  trip  is  one  to  help  build  our  relation- 
ship with  India,  and  that  is  the  way  I  am 
approaching  it.  I  have  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  Indians  will  be  receiving 
me  in  any  other  spirit. 

Q.  You  said  last  night  for  moral 
reasons  you  could  not  support  the 
Khmer  Rouge.  Now,  I  think  in  inter- 
national politics  one  should  not  mix  up 
moral  issues  because  the  fact  is  that 
power  politics  don't  mix  with  morals. 
Therefore,  I  would  like  to  ask  you 
how  much  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  still 
based  on  moral  issues,  because  I  don't 
have  to  tell  you  that  moral  terms  can 
change  within  10  years.  How  relevant 
are  your  moral  issues  nowadays,  or 
how  much  is  this  just  an  excuse  for 
not  getting  involved  anymore  in  an 
area  where  you  have  had  a  bad  ex- 
perience? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  can't  give  you  a 
percentage  but  I  can  say  that  I  believe 
there  is,  has  been,  and  no  doubt  will  be 
a  continuing  element  of  American 
foreign  policy  that  derives  from  our  own 
sense  of  the  importance  of  freedom  and 
democratic  ways  of  government  general- 
ly— freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of 
religion,  freedom  of  the  press,  and  open- 
ness in  society.  We  believe  that  this  has 
been  very  good  for  us.  We  observe  that 
democratic  countries  are  not  the  coun- 
tries that  have  been  responsible  for  ag- 
gression around  the  world,  and  so  we 
think  that  this  is  the  kind  of  atmosphere 
that  will  allow  people  to  flourish. 

Therefore,  I  think  that  a  sort  of 
pure  and  simple  balance-of-power  ap- 
proach to  foreign  policy,  just  coldly  like 
that,  is  unlikely  from  the  United  States. 
There  will  be  this  continuing  strain  of 
what  might  very  well  go  under  the 
general  word  of  morality  or  however 
you  want  to  label  it.  I  think  that  will  be 
a  permanent  part  of  our  thinking.  Many 
say  that  it  shouldn't  be  there,  but  I  think 
you  will  find  that  for  the  United  States 
it  will  be  there.  It  obviously  poses  all 
sorts  of  problems  of  degree,  and  we  all 
know  that  we  all  start  with  our  imper- 
fections. Nobody  is  perfect;  no  country 
is  perfect.  So  in  applying  this  standard 
you  always  have  an  imperfect  measuring 
stick,  but,  nevertheless,  I  think  there  is 
this  underlying  sense  of  moral  purpose 
in  American  policy.  I  personally  believe 
in  it  and  hope  that  it  stays  that  way. 


New  Delhi 


REMARKS, 

INDIA-U.S.  JOINT  COMMISSION, 

JUNE  30,  19836 

It  is  an  honor  to  cochair  this  joint  com- 
mission session,  and  I  welcome  the  op- 
portunity to  reaffirm  with  you  the  en- 
during ties  between  our  two  countries. 
These  ties  are  based  on  the  principles  of 
freedom  and  democracy,  cherished  by 
both  India  and  the  United  States.  As 
former  colonies,  we  understand  the 
struggle  to  achieve  independence  from 
foreign  domination.  As  free  peoples,  wel 
respect  individuals'  right  to  choose  their 
own  government.  As  representatives  of 
the  oldest  and  the  most  populous  of  the 
world's  democracies,  respectively,  we 
must  continue  to  uphold  our  ideals.  U.S. 
relations  with  India  will  be  sustained  by 
these  values  and  our  determination  to 
cooperate  in  areas  of  mutual  interest. 

The  work  of  the  joint  commission 
and  its  four  subcommissions  is  an 
important  and  highly  promising  aspect 
of  our  bilateral  relationship.  The  ac- 
tivities of  the  subcommissions  in  the 
fields  of  economics  and  commerce, 
science  and  technology,  education  and 
culture,  and  agriculture  enable  us  to 
work  together  despite  political  differ- 
ences. They  contribute  to  the  more  con- 
structive ties  with  India  that  President 
Reagan  is  determined  to  maintain,  and 
which  I  might  say,  the  Prime  Minister's 
visit  to  the  United  States  about  10 
months  ago  did  so  much  to  develop. 

Let  me  review  briefly  the  work  of 
the  subcommissions.  First,  the  Economk 
and  Commercial  Subcommission  has  con 
tinued  to  function  as  a  forum  for  free 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


and  frank  discussions  of  mutual  eco- 
nomic interests.  The  subcommission 
should  continue  to  study  measures  to  im- 
prove the  environment  for  commercial 
and  economic  activities  between  the  two 
countries.  We  favor  early  negotiations 
on  a  tax  treaty — an  area  where  concrete 
progress  is  possible  in  our  commercial 
relations.  We  would  also  encourage  the 
subcommission  to  focus  on  the  most 
promising  areas  for  expanded  trade  and 
investment,  such  as  the  energy,  com- 
munications, agribusiness,  and  elec- 
tronics sectors  where  mutually  beneficial 
technology  transfer  prospects  exist. 

The  work  of  the  Subcommission  on 
Science  and  Technology  continues  to  en- 
joy a  healthy  momentum.  A  dozen  U.S. 
agencies  are  cooperating  with  their 
counterpart  Indian  organizations  on  over 
50  projects.  We  are  particularly  pleased 
by  the  new  impetus  given  to  our  joint 
session  and  technology  work  by  the  for- 
mation and  progress  of  the  senior  scien- 
tific panel,  which  grew  out  of  the  1982 
meeting  between  President  Reagan  and 
Prime  Minister  Gandhi.  We  look  forward 
to  results  within  2  years  from  many  of 
the  project  areas  recommended  by  the 
panel,  including  monsoon  predictability 
research  and  immunology  research. 

Our  Subcommission  on  Agriculture 
covers  one  of  the  most  important  areas 
of  cooperation  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. Even  before  the  formation  of  the 
foubcommission,  India  and  the  United 
Estates  had  collaborated  on  literally  hun- 
jireds  of  agricultural  research  and  devel- 
opment projects.  Although  the  Subcom- 
■nission  on  Agriculture  is  the  youngest 
I  }ne  of  our  subcommissions,  working 
I,  groups  are  functioning  to  cover  research 
I  ind  education,  agricultural  inputs  and 
i  illied  technology,  natural  resource 
management,  and  extension  and  train- 
ng.  In  the  area  of  agriculture,  the 
Kenior  scientific  panel  has  recommended 
mportant  projects  on  biomass  and  nitro- 
gen fixation.  We  support  the  efforts  of 
|:;he  subcommittee,  through  its  ad  hoc 
I  :ommittee,  to  facilitate  planning  and 
<  :oordination  of  the  exchanges  in  this 
J/ery  important  area. 

The  last,  but  certainly  not  the  least, 
l)f  the  subcommissions  is  devoted  to 
education  and  culture.  Already  this  sub- 
'.I'ommission  has  supported  some  very 
successful  exchanges,  but  those  are  only 
i  foretaste  of  the  vast  variety  of  ex- 
ihanges  planned  for  1984  and  1985. 
^resident  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Jandhi  designated  those  2  years  for 
special  emphasis  on  educational, 
cultural,  and  scientific  exchanges,  and 


we  are  working  hard  to  make  them  a 
success.  Both  sides  have  designated 
groups  of  prominent  citizens  to  marshal 
our  efforts  for  1984  and  1985. 

Over  the  next  2  years,  we  support 
the  establishment  of  new  ties  and 
enlargement  of  existing  ties  among  a 
wide  spectrum  of  groups  and  individuals 
in  both  countries.  We  hope  that  special 
efforts  can  be  made  to  initiate  the 
planned  Nehru  studies  program  in  the 
next  academic  year.  We  welcome  the 
decision  of  the  Education  and  Culture 
Subcommission  to  draw  up  a  program  of 
seminars  and  discussions  on  our  shared 
democratic  experience. 

Successful  execution  of  the  many  ac- 
tivities already  planned  for  all  the  sub- 
commissions  is  essential.  Moreover,  we 
need  to  explore  ways  to  place  their  ac- 
tivities on  a  solid,  long-term  basis.  There 
have  been  preliminary  informal  discus- 
sions between  our  governments  and 
within  my  own  government  on  how  to 
do  this.  One  possibility  would  be  to 
create  a  binational  endowment  which  the 
United  States,  for  its  part,  would  fund 
with  a  portion  of  the  rupees  it  now 
holds.  We  hope  that  it  would  be  possible 
to  develop  some  concrete  proposals  in 
this  area  by  the  end  of  the  year. 

Finally  I  would  like  to  express  my 
personal  satisfaction  with  the  success  of 
our  subcommission  and  the  creative  ef- 
forts under  their  auspices.  I  am  a  firm 
believer  in  the  long-term  beneficial  ef- 
fects of  cooperation  in  any  field  where 
cooperation  is  possible.  I  know  that 
Indo-U.S.  cooperative  programs  have 
helped  us  to  build  a  better  bilateral  rela- 
tionship and  I  am  confident  that  they 
will  continue  to  do  so. 


DINNER  TOAST, 
JUNE  30,  19837 

Secretary  Shultz.  Today  I  had  the  op- 
portunity to  meet  with  many  of  you  in 
this  room,  and  I  think  we  had  a  fruitful 
day's  work.  We  have  exchanged  views 
on  issues  of  international  importance, 
reviewed  areas  where  our  two  countries 
interact,  and  charted  the  tasks  which 
will  draw  our  two  countries  even  closer 
together  in  the  future.  Our  discussions 
have  reinforced  the  spirit  of  frank  and 
constructive  interaction  which  has 
marked  Indo-U.S.  relations,  especially 
since  Prime  Minister  Gandhi's  visit  to 
the  United  States  last  year.  I  would  like 
to  note  some  of  the  objectives  we  seek 
for  this  region. 


The  American  goal  in  South  Asia  is 
a  stable,  peaceful,  prospering  region. 
This  is  not  a  pious  hope.  Our  interests 
are  best  served  by  a  regional,  as  well  as 
global,  order  in  which  each  nation  is  in 
control  of  its  destiny,  immune  from 
foreign  intervention,  and  free  to  pro- 
mote the  welfare  of  its  citizens. 

Before  arriving  in  India,  I  had  the 
opportunity  to  meet  with  the  ASEAN 
leaders,  whose  firm  commitment  to 
regional  cooperation  has  resulted  in 
tangible  political  and  economic  gains  in 
Southeast  Asia.  We  encourage  regional 
cooperation  in  South  Asia  and  welcome 
the  recent  initiatives  by  India  and  other 
countries  of  the  region  to  work  toward 
greater  cooperation  and  alleviate  the 
potential  for  conflict.  In  turn,  regional 
cooperation  will  discourage  those  who 
would  upset  the  equilibrium  of  the 
region,  the  most  recent  and  tragic  exam- 
ple being  the  continued  presence  of  over 
100,000  Soviet  troops  in  Afghanistan. 

As  leader  of  the  Nonaligned  Move- 
ment, India  not  only  has  a  special  role  in 
fostering  regional  cooperation  but  plays 
an  important  international  role  repre- 
senting the  aspirations  of  the  members 
of  the  movement.  We  have  our  dif- 
ferences over  certain  elements  in  the 
declarations  of  the  nonaligned  summit. 
We,  nonetheless,  value  and  will  continue 
to  pursue  a  continuing  dialogue  on 
political  and  economic  issues  raised  by 
the  Nonaligned  Movement. 

Particularly  on  international 
economic  issues,  as  you  noted,  the 
healthy  functioning  of  the  global  trade 
and  financial  system  depends  heavily  on 
the  participation  of  both  the  developing 
countries  and  the  industrial  countries. 
This  is  a  relationship  of  mutual  respon- 
sibility and  a  positive  North-South 
dialogue  should  aim  at  restoring  and 
sustaining  worldwide  economic  growth. 
We  have  had  a  useful  exchange  of  views 
today  on  economic  and  financial  issues. 
In  the  past  year  we  have  explored  many 
avenues  to  strengthen  mutually 
beneficial  linkages  between  the  Indian 
and  U.S.  economies.  These  efforts  will 
continue.  India's  record  of  economic 
development  is  an  impressive  one,  and  it 
is  one  that  has  been  financed  primarily 
by  domestic  savings.  International 
assistance  can  supplement  self-generated 
savings  for  investment,  but  I  have  seen 
in  my  recent  visit  in  the  ASEAN  region, 
as  well  as  here  in  India,  that  aid  is  no 
substitute  for  genuine  internal  economic 
development.  The  United  States  has 
supported  Indian  development  in  the 
past  and  continues  to  do  so  today  and 


September  1983 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


will  do  so  in  the  future.  We  do  so 
through  our  bilateral  relationships  and 
through  our  major  contributions  to  inter- 
national financial  institutions.  We  stand 
by  this  commitment  to  India's  develop- 
ment. 

I  was  impressed  today  by  the  degree 
to  which  our  overall  objectives  are  paral- 
lel—in many  cases  quite  similar— but  I 
was  not  surprised.  The  commonality  of 
objectives,  in  our  case,  springs  from  the 
values  we  share  of  respect  for  human 
dignity  and  democratic  values.  Ultimate- 
ly, it  is  these  values  which  bring  us  back 
together  again  and  again.  Perhaps  at 
times,  we  take  each  other  too  much  for 
granted,  and  that  is  why  we  have  com- 
mitted ourselves  today  to  reinforce  and 
strengthen  our  ties. 

The  work  of  the  joint  commission 
and  its  four  subcommissions,  reinforced 
by  the  progress  on  last  year's  bilateral 
initiatives,  provides  tangible  evidence  of 
Indian  and  American  scientists  working 
together  on  a  variety  of  projects  to  com- 
bat disease  and  blindness,  to  increase 
agricultural  productivity,  and  to  unlock 
the  secrets  of  both  the  Sun  and  the  mon- 
soon rains.  Businessmen  and  govern- 
ment officials  have  spurred  interest  in 
bilateral  trade  and  investment.  The  1984 
U.S.  cultural  program  in  India  will  be 
matched  by  Indian  exhibitions  and  per- 
formances in  the  United  States  in  1985. 
Our  two  peoples  are  learning  more 
about  each  other  through  tourism,  the 
growing  U.S.  population  of  Indian 
ancestry,  and  through  films  like  Gandhi 
who  brought  his  message  of  peace  and 
brotherhood  to  millions  in  both  the 
United  States  and  India. 

These  programs  and  projects 
demonstrate  our  ability  to  work  together 
and  help  to  create  a  positive  and  con- 
structive atmosphere  in  which  we  can 
discuss  our  differences  without  disrupt- 
ing the  progress  of  our  cooperation  or 
denying  the  common  goals  which  unite 
us  in  the  search  for  world  peace  and  in- 
ternational economic  recovery  and 
development. 

As  Mrs.  Shultz  and  I  visited  the 
famed  Taj  Mahal  last  night  and  this 
morning,  I  was  reminded  of  the  rich  and 
ancient  culture  of  India,  a  culture  which, 
long  before,  contributed  to  the  worlds  of 
religion,  science,  and  government.  In- 
deed, as  we  dine  here  tonight  we  are 
reminded  that  wise  men  and  women 
throughout  history  have  been  able 
peacefully  to  reconcile  their  differences 
and  build  upon  their  mutual  interest.  I 
have  come  to  India  with  a  belief  in  the 
benefit  of  free  and  frank  exchanges  be- 


tween nations.  I  will  leave  with  profound 
satisfaction  that  our  relations  are  built 
on  a  firm  foundation.  With  energy  and 
commitment  from  both  sides,  I  am  confi- 
dent these  relations  will  grow  and 
flourish. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JULY  1,  19838 

Secretary  Shultz.  First,  I  would  like  to 
express  my  appreciation  to  the  Prime 
Minister,  the  Foreign  Minister,  for  the 
great  cordiality  and  the  interesting  and 
worthwhile  time  that  I  have  had  during 
my  visit.  One  of  the  outstanding 
characteristics  of  the  visit  is — not  only 
with  the  government  people  with  whom 
I  talked  but  those  in  private  pursuits— 
I  found,  on  reflection  that  in  almost 
every  meeting,  I  found  myself  engaged 
in  a  genuine  conversation.  And  reflect- 
ing on  it,  I  have  noticed  that  in  many  in- 
ternational meetings,  basically,  you  say 
what  you  think  and  they  say  what  they 
think,  and  you  kind  of  go  by  each  other. 
But  here  it's  been  rather  different. 
There  has  been  a  definite  effort  to 
engage  in  a  very  constructive  spirit,  and 
that  has  been  not  only  worthwhile  but 
fun.  It  is  engaging,  and  I  have  ap- 
preciated it. 

Q.  There's  a  report  out  of 
Washington  this  morning  on  how  Mr. 
Habib  last  week  presented  a  proposal 
or  requested  the  Israelis  to  consider 
the  possibility  of  setting  a  firm  date 
for  withdrawal  in  order  to  put 
pressure  on  the  Syrians  to  do  the 
same,  and  that  this  proposal  has  been 
approved  by  the  President  after  you 
requested  that  approval.  Can  you  com- 
ment on  that  report,  and  then  tell  us  a 
little  about  the  proposal  and  what  the 
reaction  has  been  from  the  Israelis? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Ambassador 
Habib  has  been  back  in  the  area  talking 
with  people  in  different  countries,  and 
what  the  content  of  his  discussions  are, 
of  course,  we  are  reading  about.  I  don't 
think  it  is  a  good  idea  to  comment  on 
the  content  of  the  negotiation  as  it  is  un- 
folding. I  did  see  that  account,  and  it 
doesn't  really  conform  to  what  I  have 
noted.  I  am  not  going  to  comment  on 
the  details  of  how  Ambassador  Habib  is 
going  about  his  efforts  to  attain  the  full 
objectives  that  the  President  has  set  for- 
ward and  which  I  think  have  been 
generally  agreed  to  as  the  right  objec- 
tives; namely,  the  removal  of  all  foreign 
forces  from  Lebanon;  the  chance  for  the 


emergence  of  a  sovereign  Lebanon  able 
to  take  care  of  its  own  affairs  and 
develop  its  prosperity;  and  attention  to 
the  security  needs  of  Israel  along  its 
northern  border,  recognizing  that  south- 
ern Lebanon  has  been  an  area  from 
which  Israel  has  been  attacked.  Those 
have  been  the  three  objectives  that  we 
have  had;  they  continue  to  be  the  Presi- 
dent's objectives.  I  believe  they  are 
shared  by  others  that  we  have  been 
working  with  in  the  area,  and  those  ob- 
jectives are  the  guide  of  our  diplomatic 
effort. 

Q.  In  order  to  achieve  those  objec- 
tives, does  it  make  sense  for  Israel  to 
declare  that  it  is  prepared  to 
withdraw  totally  and  thereby  have 
another  initiative,  another  possible 
way,  to  break  down  Syrian  intran- 
sigence? In  other  words,  I  am  asking 
you  the  same  question  in  a  way  that 
possibly  you  could  feel  comfortable 
replying  to? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  just  said 
ditto  on  the  answer  I  just  gave. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  knowledge 
that  India  is  preparing  to  detonate 
another  nuclear  device,  and  what  will 
be  the  President's  strategy  on  grant- 
ing the  sale  of  the  reactor  components 
if  India  is  unable  to  find  them 
elsewhere? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  no  infor- 
mation whatever  along  those  lines,  and 
from  all  that  I  can  see  there  is  no  such 
intention. 

Q.  How  will  the  President  defend 
his  decision  to  grant  the  waiver  on  the 
sale  of  component  parts  if  India  is 
unable  to  locate  them  elsewhere? 

Secretary  Shultz.  If  there  is  a  sale, 
the  President  will  defend  the  importance 
of  doing  that  on  the  ground  of  the  im- 
portance of  having  nuclear  power  sta- 
tions operate  in  a  manner  that  takes  due 
consideration  of  the  safety  and  health  of 
the  operators  of  the  plant  and  the  people 
in  the  community.  Just  as  we  said  in  our 
statement,  I  think  those  are  good  strong 
grounds. 

Q.  Have  you  asked  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  for  any  commitments 
whatsoever  as  a  condition  for  the  sup- 
ply of  spare  parts? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  there  hasn't 
been  any  conditioning.  It  has  been  clear 
for  a  long  time  that  the  United  States 
has  some  very  definite  objectives  in  the 
area  of  nonproliferation.  Those  remain, 
and  they  are  well-known. 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  There  is  a  report  in  a  German 
newspaper  today  that  India  has  agreed 
to  buy  $5  billion  worth  of  arms  from 
the  Soviet  Union.  Are  you  aware  of 
such  a  transaction,  and  if  so,  what 
would  be  the  U.S.  reaction  if  that 
were  true? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  am  not  aware 
of  that  transaction,  and  I  don't  want  to 
comment  on  hypothetical  questions. 

Q.  Given  the  job  that  Habib  and 
Draper  and  company  are  doing  now  in 
the  Middle  East,  can  you  say  at  this 
point  whether  you  expect  to  include 
the  Middle  East  in  this  current  trip  or 
can  you  now  categorically  rule  it  out? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  only  can  say  to 
you  that  the  plan  of  the  trip,  which  is  to 
go  from  here  to  Pakistan  and  from 
Pakistan  to  London  and  back  to 
Washington,  remains  intact. 

Q.  How  far  has  your  visit  removed 
all  the  irritants  from  Indo-U.S.  rela- 
tions? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  came  here  to 
discuss  not  only  bilateral  relationships 
but  also  the  many  matters  on  which 
India  and  the  United  States  share  com- 
jmon  concern  about  a  wide  variety  of 
problems  around  the  world.  We  have 
nad  very  good  talks,  as  I  mentioned  in 
Tiy  opening  statement.  They  have  been 
general  conversations.  I  have  learned 
ind  benefited  from  them,  and  I  hope  the 
same  can  be  said  for  the  other  side.  If 
■;hat  kind  of  thing  and  the  addressing  of 
i  .he  various  problems  that  we  have 
alked  about  helps,  then  naturally,  that's 
vhat  we  are  interested  in. 

I  am  sure  that  there  are  always  ir- 
ritants and  problems  of  various  kinds, 
ind  that's  a  characteristic  situation.  The 
juestion  is  whether  we  can  get  them  on 
:  .he  table  and  talk  about  them  and  work 
hem  out.  I  think  the  answer  to  it  is  yes. 
would  say  that  we  proceed  on  the  basis 
hat  here  we  have  the  world's  two 
1  argest  democracies  and  just  as  I  think 
ndia  has  a  stake  in  a  free,  democratic, 
)  'xpanding  United  States,  so  we  have  a 
I  take  in  having  India  be  a  free,  expand- 
ng  democratic  country.  And  to  the  ex- 
!  ent  that  our  relationship  is  mutually 
I  upportive  of  that  regard,  I  think,  that 
Is  a  very  good  thing. 

Q.  There  is  another  report  from 
Vashington  which  suggests  that 
ollowing  a  series  of  meetings  which 
rou  have  had  with  Soviet  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  you  appear  to  be  leaning  in 
he  direction  of  a  summit  meeting  be- 
ween  the  President  and  Mr. 


Andropov.  Could  you  give  us  any  in- 
dication at  all  as  to  what  your  think- 
ing is  at  this  time  on  that  subject? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  is  not  impor- 
tant what  my  thinking  is  but  what  the 
President's  thinking  is  and,  so  far  as  I 
know,  it  remains  what  he  has  said  and 
what  we  have  discussed;  namely,  that  as 
a  matter  of  principle,  he  thinks  that 
such  a  meeting  could  be  constructive  on- 
ly if  it  is  a  well-prepared  meeting  from 
which  there  is  a  reasonable  chance  of 
significant  results.  That  has  been  his 
position  for  as  long  as  I  have  been  talk- 
ing to  him  about  it,  and  that  remains  his 
position. 

I  think  people  don't  recognize  how 
many  places  there  are— places  in  which 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
are  discussing  one  thing  or  another. 
There  are  arms  control  START  talks  in 
Geneva,  there  are  INF  talks  in  Geneva, 
there  are  talks  about  chemical  and 
biological  weapons  in  Geneva,  there  are 
conventional  force  talks  in  Vienna. 
There's  some  talk  on  nonproliferation 
matters  going  on  alternately  in 
Washington  and  Moscow.  There  are 
talks  going  on  in  Madrid.  There  are 
many  international  bodies  where  both 
countries  are  represented;  our  Am- 
bassador in  Moscow  talks  to  people  in 
the  Soviet  Government  there.  And  I 
have  had  a  series  of  meetings,  as  was 
reported,  with  Ambassador  Dobrynin. 

Our  stance  on  the  United  States  side 
is  that  we,  first,  have  to  be  realistic 
about  what's  going  on;  second,  we  have 
to  be  strong  enough  to  defend  our  in- 
terest and  help  our  allies  defend  theirs, 
and  strength  is  clearly  far  more  than 
just  military  strength — all  of  that  is  im- 
portant—it includes  economic  strength 
and  the  kind  of  confidence  in  our  own 
positions  which  we  have;  and  third,  a 
willingness  to  sit  down  and  genuinely 
negotiate,  and  here  we  feel  that  we  have 
important  and  reasonable  positions  in  all 
of  these  discussion  fora.  We  are  also 
there  in  a  spirit  of  give  and  take,  and 
the  question  of  whether  or  not  these 
talks  are  going  to  get  anywhere  is 
basically  a  question  of  whether  or  not 
the  Soviet  Union  also  wants  to  be 
reasonable  and  approach  them  in  a  spirit 
of  give  and  take.  It  remains  to  be  seen. 

Q.  Afghanistan  is  one  of  the 
issues  in  your  talks  here  and  also  in 
Islamabad.  You  have  recently  written 
a  letter  to  Mr.  Gromyko  [Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Gromyko] 
dealing  with  Afghanistan.  Did  you  get 
any  answer  and  what  was  the  purpose 
of  this  letter? 


Secretary  Shultz.  There  has  been 
an  exchange  of  letters.  The  purpose  was 
to  assure  the  Soviet  Union,  as  we  have 
assured  others  who  are  involved  in  this 
negotiation — the  UN  Secretary  General, 
the  Pakistanis,  and  others — that  we 
wish  to  see  it  settled,  and  we  would  like 
to  see  it  settled  according  to  the 
guidelines  that  have  been  laid  out  in  the 
United  Nations.  Just  how  much  progress 
there  has  been,  I  think,  is  something  of 
a  question,  and  I  look  forward  to  my 
discussions  in  Pakistan  where  I  will  get 
another  reading  on  that  subject. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  with  Mrs. 
Gandhi  or  anyone  else  the  reported  ex- 
plosion of  a  nuclear  bomb  in  Pakistan? 
And  it  is  possible  for  such  an  explo- 
sion to  have  taken  place  without  the 
United  States  knowing  about  it? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  very 
sensitive  instruments  that  have  been 
successful  in  detecting  nuclear  explo- 
sions, and  so  far  as  our  readings  are 
concerned  we  have  no  evidence  of  such 
an  explosion. 

Q.  May  I  know  whether  the  ques- 
tion of  reprocessing  of  spent  fuel  by 
India  has  been  discussed  at  the  talks? 
And  if  so,  do  you  agree  with  the  In- 
dian position  that  India  has  a  right  to 
reprocess  its  spent  fuel,  howsoever  it 
likes? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  I  think  that 
difference  of  opinion  remains  as  it  was. 

Q.  In  the  discussion  with  Mrs. 
Gandhi  was  there  a  discussion  of  the 
Indian  proposal,  adopted  by  the 
nonaligned  summit,  for  an  interna- 
tional conference  on  money  and 
finance?  Specifically,  have  you  been 
able  to  reconcile  the  differences  on 
the  question  of  whether  the  integrity 
of  the  IMF  can  be  challenged  in  any 
such  negotiations? 

Secretary  Shultz.  First,  I  don't 
think  it  is  appropriate  for  me  to  engage 
in  a  discussion  about  what  the  Prime 
Minister  and  I  discussed,  but  let  me  just 
comment  on  your  question,  leaving  aside 
the  question  of  discussions  with  the 
Prime  Minister.  That  issue  has,  of 
course,  been  around,  and  people  are  in- 
terested in  it.  We  believe  that  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  IMF  is  of  great  impor- 
tance, particularly  right  now,  but  at  any 
time,  as  the  world  economy  faces  a 
variety  of  financial  difficulties — balance- 
of-payments  problems  of  different  coun- 
tries. The  IMF  has  been  playing,  will 
play,  a  central  role  in  that.  So  anything 
that  would  disrupt  the  IMF  is  not 
helpful  in  this  regard.  To  the  contrary, 


September  1983 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


it's  important  to  maintain  the  integrity 
and  to  bring  about  the  support  for  the 
pledges  to  the  quota  increases  that  have 
been  agreed  on.  Of  course,  we  are  work- 
ing on  that  very  hard  and  trying  to  per- 
suade the  U.S.  Congress  to  go  along 
with  the  quota  increases,  in  which  the 
United  States  will  put  up  $8.4  billion   . 
and  other  countries  will  put  up  their  pro- 
portionate share. 

Insofar  as  a  review  of  the  monetary 
system  is  concerned,  that  was  discussed 
a  great  deal  at  Williamsburg,  among 
other  places,  and  the  approach  taken  is 
to  study  the  situation  carefully  and  to  in- 
clude in  that  study  the  possible 
usefulness  of  a  larger  conference.  It  may 
very  well  be  that  such  a  conference 
would  turn  out  to  be  useful,  but,  at 
least,  our  approach  is  to  study  the  issues 
carefully  so  that  if  you  have  a  large  con- 
ference you  know  what  it  is  you  are  try- 
ing to  get  out  of  it,  and  there  can  be 
some  substantive  results,  as  distinct 
from  a  variety  of  decisions  that  don't 
really  make  contact  with  each  other. 

Q.  Did  you  in  your  discussions 
here  touch  on  the  matter  of  the  exten- 
sive U.S.  military  sales  to  India,  and 
is  there  a  prospect  that  somewhere 
down  the  calendar  there  will,  in  fact, 
be  sales  of  military  hardware  to  India? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  question  was 
discussed  and  whether  there  will  be  ac- 
tual sales  is  an  open  question.  Certainly, 
the  United  States  is  prepared  to  make 
such  sales,  and  from  the  standpoint  of 
India,  of  course,  they  will  speak  for 
themselves.  But  the  question  was 
discussed,  and  to  the  extent  that  there 
have  been  any  misunderstandings  about 
the  conditions  under  which  the  United 
States  makes  sales,  I  have  tried  to  clear 
those  up. 

Q.  You  said  you  expected  the 
Soviet  Union  to  be  reasonable  in  arms 
talks.  A  couple  of  days  ago  the  leaders 
of  the  East  European  socialist  coun- 
tries proposed  to  put  a  ban  on  nuclear 
arsenals.  This  suggestion  coincides 
with  one  of  the  nonaligned  countries 
of  which  India  is  the  chairman.  Do 
you  think  these  proposals  are  reason- 
able? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  to  see 
proposals  and  study  them  in  detail.  Pro- 
posals for  a  freeze,  for  an  extreme 
change  in  the  situation,  generally  speak- 
ing, don't  go  anywhere,  but  we  study  all 
proposals  carefully,  and  we  study  any 
proposal  that  comes  from  the  Soviet 
Union  very  seriously.  We  hope  that,  in 
the  end,  it  will  appear  to  the  Soviet 
Union  that  it  is  in  their  interest  to 


engage  with  us  in  a  program  to  reduce, 
not  just  limit,  to  reduce  the  level  of  ar- 
maments of  all  kinds. 

Q.  Was  there  an  Indian  proposal 
about  arms  purchases  from  the  United 
States? 

Secretary  Shultz.  There  is  no 
special  proposal.  There  was  a  possible 
sale,  and  in  the  course  of  the  exploration 
of  that— in  the  end  it  did  not  take 
place — a  number  of  questions  were 
raised  that  have  general  policy  implica- 
tions. So  since  there  was  at  least  the 
potential  for  misunderstanding,  in  the 
discussion  of  this  question,  we  tried  to 
clear  it  up,  and  have,  basically,  made 
some  headway  in  that  regard.  But  there 
is  no  outstanding  proposal  that  I  know 
of. 

Q.  Today  is  the  day  that  China 
becomes  eligible  for  World  Bank  con- 
cessional assistance  and  it  seems  that 
any  borrowings  by  China  will  come  at 
the  expense  of  India.  I  wonder 
whether  you  could  give  the  U.S.  posi- 
tion on  that  in  view  of  its  influential 
role  in  the  World  Bank,  what  the  U.S. 
position  will  be  on  how  much  India 
should  get  and  compare  it  to  China? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  to  look 
at  proposals  to  borrow  for  a  particular 
project  case-by-case.  There  have  been 
loans  to  China;  it  won't  be  a  new  thing. 
At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  doubt 
about  that  fact,  particularly  with  China 
as  a  member  of  the  multilateral  lending 
institutions,  particularly  the  World 
Bank.  But  even  without  China  there, 
there  is  more  need  for  concessional 
funds,  more  demand  for  them  than  there 
are  funds,  so  it  is  a  problem.  It  is  some- 
thing that  we,  both  the  donor  and  the 
recipient  countries,  have  to  think 
through  and  work  on,  and  it  is  going  to 
be  a  tough  problem. 


rwiricwicwM'oocwjr'JP'jrir 


\     G>         SOVIET  UNION 

L               CHINA 

JAFGHANiSTANr' 
IRAN         !                -> 

islJwitiad  t* 

V                 v~Takistan 

/    Q 

{LyX^-  -\3 

INDIA 

N           f*         Arabian  Sea 

\         f 

Islamabad 

ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 
JULY  2,  19839 

I  welcome  this  opportunity,  as  does  my 
wife,  to  visit  here  in  Pakistan,  and  I  ap- 
preciate very  much  the  great  hospitality 
that  you  and  your  wife  and  all  the 
others  have  shown  in  coming  here  to  the 
airport  to  greet  us.  It  is  a  very  generous 
gesture  on  your  part.  We  notice  it,  and 
we  appreciate  it. 

You  and  I  have  had  several  oppor- 
tunities to  talk,  and,  of  course,  I  know 
the  breadth  of  your  knowledge  and  the 
depth  of  your  thinking.  So  I  especially 
look  forward  to  this  visit  for  its  own 
sake  and  for  the  opportunity  it  will  af- 
ford me  for  thorough  conversations  with 
you.  When  you  and  President  Zia  visited 
Washington  in  December,  that  visit  by 
your  President  was  a  milestone  in  the 
relationship  between  Pakistan  and  the 
United  States.  I  hope  that  my  visit  here 
can  add  to  the  progress  and  the  momen- 
tum of  that  relationship.  We  have  many 
things  to  talk  about,  and  first  and 
foremost,  matters  that  concern  the  long- 
term  prospect  of  a  strong  and  enduring 
relationship  between  our  countries. 

Perhaps  the  fact  that  we  will  have  a 
first  meeting  of  the  joint  commission  is  a 
symbol  of  the  importance  of  this 
bilateral  relationship,  and  I  think  it 
deserves  emphasis.  At  the  same  time  I 
am  sure  we  will  be  discussing  a  wide 
range  of  issues  in  which  we  are  both 
concerned  and  interested— strategic 
issues,  economic  issues,  and  other  mat- 
ters as  we  survey  the  world  scene.  But 
most  particularly  will  be  those  issues 
that  emerge  from  the  Soviet  invasion 
and  occupation  of  Afghanistan.  I  will 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


look  forward  very  much  to  having  your 
views  about  the  discussions  that  have 
been  going  on  on  that  subject.  In  the 
meantime,  I  would  like  to  express  on 
behalf  of  President  Reagan  as  well  as 
myself  our  admiration  and  our  support 
for  your  efforts.  Again,  I  thank  you  very 
much  for  this  warm  welcome,  and  I  look 
forward  to  the  discussions  that  we  will 
have  in  the  days  ahead. 


TOASTS, 
JULY  2,  198310 

Foreign  Minister  Yaqub  Khan 

It  is  my  pleasure  to  extend  a  very  warm 
welcome  to  our  honored  guests  and  a 
special  welcome  to  Mrs.  Shultz  on  behalf 
of  my  wife  and  myself.  Their  presence 
amongst  us  today  is  a  source  of  great 
joy  and  a  pleasure  for  us,  and  we  do 
earnestly  hope  that  their  sojourn  in 
Pakistan,  in  spite  of  the  inclemencies  of 
the  weather  and  many  other  con- 
tretemps and  mishaps  that  have  fol- 
owed  in  the  wake  of  yesterday's  storms, 
would  not  have  upset  them  too  much. 
vVe'd  hoped  that  your  stay  here  was 
onger  so  that  you  would  get  a  chance  to 
;ee  more  of  our  country,  to  travel  its 
ength  and  possibly  also  its  breadth,  but 
ilso,  above  all,  to  be  able  to  see  the 
nountains  in  the  north  and  the  fertile 
)lains  of  the  Indus  and  the  deserts  in 
he  south:  to  be  able  also  to  get  a  chance 
o  see  monuments  of  historical  interest 
.nd  also  many  other  samples  of  our  an- 
ient civilization  and  culture.  You  would 
lave  seen  the  variegated  nature  of  the 
ultural  patterns  strung  along  the  Indus 
Hiver.  You  would  have  seen  also  how,  in 
pite  of  this  variety  of  cultures,  there  is 
bond  of  common  religion  which  pulls 
he  nation  together;  also  a  fierce  deter- 
lination  to  preserve  its  independence 
nd  to  forge  ahead  to  create  a  modern 
tate. 

Tomorrow,  you'll  be  visiting  the 
nountains  and  the  Khyber  Pass,  refugee 
;amps.  You  will  see  in  that  area  which 
las  been  the  gateway  to  history,  the 
ides  of  history  have  ebbed  and  flowed 
icross  those  passes.  More  recently,  the 
low  of  the  tide,  perhaps  unknown  in 
listory,  which  is  one  of  the  main  con- 
:erns  that  takes  you  to  those  parts,  you 
vill  see  the  enormity  of  the  humani- 
arian  problem  of  3  million  refugees  who 
lave  sought  shelter,  having  left  their 
lomes,  in  conditions  of  sorrow  and 
.nguish  and  involuntary  exile.  They  are 
ustaining  their  misfortune  with 


courage,  dignity  which  is,  indeed,  ad- 
mirable. We  have  done  our  modest  bit  to 
give  them  succor  and  to  give  them 
refuge,  food,  and  shelter  in  these  ex- 
tremely difficult  conditions.  We've  been 
helped  in  this  humanitarian  endeavor  by 
international  agencies  and,  above  all,  by 
your  country  which  with  its  usual  im- 
pulse—generosity—has come  forth  in  a 
manner  that  compels  admiration.  I'd  like 
to  express  our  country's  deepest  ap- 
preciation and  gratitude.  You  will  hear 
it  also,  of  course,  when  you  go  to  the 
refugee  camps,  and  you  will  see  how 
deeply  they  appreciate  these  generous 
impulses.  These  refugees,  the  plight  in 
which  they  find  themselves  and  their 
desire  to  return  home,  underlines  the 
need  for  a  settlement  that  will  enable 
them  to  return  home  in  dignity  and 
honor.  It  is  for  this  reason  and  for  a 
number  of  others,  that  need  not  be  gone 
into  this  evening  but  which  we  have 
discussed  in  some  detail  earlier  today,  it 
is  important  to  seek  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment, political  settlement  of  this  prob- 
lem, within  the  framework  of  the  prin- 
ciples to  which  we  are  committed  and  to 
which  we  have  every  intention  to 
adhere— principles  rooted  in  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  Islamic  Conference,  resolu- 
tions, also,  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
search  for  the  settlement,  as  far  as  we 
are  concerned,  is  sincere,  and  every 
endeavor  on  our  part  will  be  made  to 
bring  them  to  a  fruitful  conclusion. 

There  are  many  difficulties  ahead, 
and  the  path  is  thorny  and  beset  with 
many,  many  difficulties.  Nevertheless, 
we  hope  that  given  good  will  it  will  be 
possible  to  overcome  the  hurdles  that  lie 
in  our  path.  The  U.S.  support  for  this 
endeavor — for  seeking  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment to  the  Afghanistan  problem  and 
the  negotiations  that  are  now  underway, 
the  indirect  talks  under  the  auspices  of 
the  United  Nations  and  the  special 
representative  of  the  Secretary 
General — your  support  for  these  talks  is 
a  source  of  strength  to  us,  and  I'm  sure 
that  we  will  be  able  to  work  together  in 
this  endeavor  in  order  to  achieve  a  set- 
tlement that  is  honorable  and  also 
satisfactory  above  all,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  refugees  who  must  have  a 
say  in  the  conditions  of  their  return  to 
their  homes. 

So  far  as  U.S. -Pakistan  relations  are 
concerned,  I  am  happy  to  say  they  have 
developed  and  evolved  and  reached  a 
stage  of  maturity  which  is  a  source  of 
great  satisfaction  to  us.  It  is  a  stage  of 
stability  and  mutual  understanding,  of 
shared  perceptions  and  shared  values, 
all  of  which  we  greatly  appreciate.  The 


mutual,  reciprocal  regard,  which  exists 
between  our  two  countries,  was 
demonstrated  in  an  unmistakable  man- 
ner during  the  visit  of  our  president  to 
the  United  States,  where  we  were  deep- 
ly impressed  by  the  affection  with  which 
he  was  received  and  also  by  the  warmth 
of  that  welcome. 

I  appreciate  greatly  our  discussions 
with  you  this  afternoon,  and  I  hope,  dur- 
ing what  remains  of  your  stay,  I  will 
have  a  chance  to  discuss  those  series  of 
other  issues  from  which  I  would  surely 
benefit  greatly.  As  far  as  bilateral  rela- 
tions are  concerned,  fortunately,  there 
are  no  problems  which  may  be  con- 
sidered as  major,  and  our  relations  are 
on  an  even  keel  and  continuing  in  a 
splendid  way.  I  would  only  mention  the 
inaugural  session  of  the  joint  commis- 
sion today  which  is  surely  a  landmark 
and  the  articulation  of  the  joint  commis- 
sion and  the  subsidiary  bodies,  the  sub- 
commissions,  the  projects  that  they 
should  study,  objectives  they  should  pur- 
sue, will  all  contribute,  surely,  to  give 
substance  to  our  relations  and  impulse 
toward  keeping  up  the  momentum  that 
would  be  necessary  to  maintain  the  rela- 
tionship at  the  level  that  we  earnestly 
desire.  With  these  words  I  request  you 
to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  the  health  and 
happiness  of  our  honored  guests  and  the 
progress  and  prosperity  of  the  friendly 
and  the  great  people  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  to  the  consolida- 
tion of  friendly  ties  between  our  two 
countries. 

Secretary  Shultz 

I  thank  you  wholeheartedly  for  your 
welcome  today,  for  the  privilege  of  our 
discussion  this  afternoon,  and  the  pro- 
spective visit  and  continued  discussion 
that  we'll  be  having  tomorrow.  You  and 
President  Zia  are  known  around  the 
world  not  only  as  people  who  are  leading 
a  country  in  a  magnificent  way  but  also 
as  individuals  who  are  very  much  worth 
talking  to  because  of  the  range  and 
breadth  of  your  knowledge.  It's  a 
pleasure,  of  course,  to  hear  a  toast  and 
a  statement  preceding  it  by  a  counter- 
part in  another  country  and  be  able  to 
say  that  I  can  subscribe  to  everything 
that  you  put  forward.  Perhaps  that's  a 
measure  of  the  strength  of  our  bilateral 
relations  the  way  they  are  developing 
and,  also,  of  the  common  way  in  which 
we  look  at  many  of  the  world's  prob- 
lems, particularly  some  that  are  very 
close  to  us. 


>eptember  1983 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


I'd  like  to  take  as  a  theme  of  my 
comments  this  evening  a  story,  or  some- 
thing that  happened  to  my  wife  and  me, 
the  last  time  we  were  in  government. 
This  incident  happened  in  early  1974. 
You  remember  that  was  a  period  when 
oil  prices  were  going  up,  financial  im- 
plications of  that  were  beginning  to 
dawn  on  people,  and  there  was  a  kind  of 
a  frantic  feeling  that  all  of  this  was  just 
out  of  control.  It  happened  that  that 
particular  winter  was  a  mild  one,  at 
least,  in  Europe  and  the  United  States. 
In  January  of  that  year  there  was  a 
meeting  called  of  the  finance  ministers 
of  the  world,  and  I  was  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  of  the  United  States.  The 
meeting  took  place  in  Rome,  and  we  met 
for  a  couple  of  days. 

In  the  course  of  that  meeting  I  was 
accorded  and  my  wife  with  me  accorded, 
the  privilege  of  a  private  audience  with 
His  Holiness,  the  Pope.  So  we  went  to 
the  Vatican.  We  got  there,  and  we  were 
told  the  way  the  audience  would  work.  I 
would  go  in  and  be  there  12  minutes, 
then  my  wife  would  be  brought  in,  there 
would  be  some  pictures,  and  we  would 
leave.  So  we  said  well,  if  that's  the  way 
it  is,  that's  the  way  it  is.  At  any  rate, 
when  our  time  came,  the  Cardinal  who 
was  escorting  us,  let  us  know  that  the 
Pope  was  ready,  and  my  wife  sort  of 
hung  back.  He  looked  at  her  and  smiled 
and  said  "Oh,  come  on  in."  So  she  went 
in.  We  had  a  very  animated  discussion 
about  the  implications  of  the  rise  in  the 
price  of  oil  and  I  was  quite  struck  by 
how  much  the  Pope  seemed  to  know 
about  it  and  about  its  implications,  par- 
ticularly for  poorer  countries  and  his 
concern  about  that.  But  at  any  rate,  the 
time  went  by,  and  we  were  having  a 
very  good  discussion.  I  could  see  that  it 
got  to  be  half  an  hour,  then  three- ^ 
quarters  of  an  hour,  and  that  didn't  ac- 
cord with  what  we  were  told.  But,  I 
thought  maybe  this  time,  perhaps,  it  was 
up  to  me  to'  end  the  discussion.  I 
thought  to  myself,  I  should  end  this 
discussion  on  a  light  and  humorous  note. 
So  I  said  to  the  Pope,  "You  know  the 
finance  ministers  of  the  world  have  been 
over  here  discussing  what  to  do  about 
this  crisis  that  we  all  have  on  our  hands. 
None  of  us  has  been  able  to  think  of 
anything  that  has  contributed  as  much 
as  the  mild  winter  we've  been  having." 
And  I  said,  "I  am  sure  we  all  join  Your 
Holiness  in  thanking  you  for  your  in- 
tervention." He  didn't  laugh.  He  looked 
me  in  the  eye  with  a  slight  twinkle  and 
said,  "Mr.  Secretary,  you  may  be  sure  it 
will  continue." 


Now  at  this  time  of  the  year, 
Ramadan,  we  need  to  contemplate  a  bit; 
that  is  the  tradition,  and,  of  course, 
recognize  that  there  are  the  great  prob- 
lems we  are  trying  to  deal  with  day  to 
day,  week  to  week,  month  to  month. 
There  is  a  reality  to  them,  and  we  must 
come  to  grips  with  that  reality.  But,  at 
the  same  time,  we  have  to  recognize 
that  somehow  we  must  have  faith  and 
recognize  that  this  is  all  part  of 
something  larger.  That  in  the  activities 
we  are  undertaking,  it  is  important  for 
us  to  be  able  to  feel  that  these  activities 
are  in  keeping  with  our  faith,  as  it  will 
give  us  confidence  in  what  we  are  doing. 
I  believe  that  we  can  say  that  the  things 
we  are  trying  to  do  together  are  in  keep- 
ing with  the  standards  and  the  ideals 
that  a  contemplative  effort  will  put  for- 
ward. In  trying  to  do  everything  we  can 
to  construct  a  strong  relationship  be- 
tween  our  countries,  perhaps  we  should 
say  between  our  people,  between  the  in- 
dividual human  beings  that  governments 
strive  to  serve,  we  will  be  doing  some- 
thing that  will  make  our  lives  fuller  and 
better  as  we  survey  problems  around  the 
world  and  try  as  you  have  done  today, 
and  as  you  have  always  done  in  the 
discussions  I  have  been  privileged  to 
have  with  you,  to  find  a  constructive 
way  to  untangle  these  problems. 

We  are  doing  something  that  is  in 
accord  with  these  ideals  and  a  broader 
purpose.  And,  of  course,  we  see,  in  a 
way,  the  symbol,  as  well  as  an  im- 
mediate reality  of  so  many  of  the  prob- 
lems of  the  world  represented  right  on 
your  border,  as  you  have  said,  at  this 
historic  place.  There,  too,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  are  striving  for  something  that 
is  generally  in  accord  with  the  principles 
that  we  hold  important.  Not  only  the 
principles  of  having  our  sovereignty  and 
independence  and  integrity  and  wanting 
to  see  others  have  that  same  capacity, 
but  also,  particularly  at  this  time  of  the 
year,  to  recognize  that  there  are  people, 
millions,  who  are  displaced  and  who  by 
virtue  of  that  fact,  are  in  a  very  un- 
fortunate circumstance.  Our  hearts  need 
to  go  out  to  them,  and  we  need  to  say 
that  it  is  up  to  us  to  help.  I  know  that 
you  are  doing  so,  and  I  have  no  hesita- 
tion at  all  in  saying  that  the  U.S. 
Government  and  the  American  people 
are  fully  in  support  and  totally  commit- 
ted as  you  are  to  providing  that  help  in 
serving  the  broader  causes  that  we  hold 
as  key  importance  in  our  lives. 

In  that  spirit  of  recognizing  the 
reality  of  our  common  purposes  and  also 
their  broader  meaning.  I  would  like  to 
ask  you  all  to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  the 


Foreign  Minister  and  Mrs.  Yaqub  Khan 
and  thanks  for  their  warm  welcome  and 
wise  words,  and  to  the  peace  and  well 
being  which  we  trust  our  effort  will 
bring  not  only  to  ourselves  but  to  others 
around  the  world. 


NEWS  BRIEFING, 
JULY  3,  1983" 

Secretary  Shultz.  At  the  President's 
direction,  I  will  be  stopping  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  on  my  way  back  to  Washington 
rather  than  simply  flying  over  it.  I  ex- 
pect to  have  conversations  at  this  point 
with  the  heads  of  state  of  Saudi  Arabia, 
Lebanon,  Syria,  and  Israel. 

Q.  It  has  been  said  many  times 
since  you  were  last  in  the  Middle  East 
that  you  would  probably  only  go  back 
if  there  were  some  expectation  that 
your  presence  there  was  going  to 
make  a  difference,  particularly,  in 
some  kind  of  negotiations  to  withdraw 
from  Lebanon.  Is  that  the  criterion  for 
this  particular  stop? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Certainly,  I  want 
to  be  in  a  position  to  give  the  President 
a  first-hand  account  of  the  current  situa- 
tion in  the  Middle  East  and  the  views  _ 
from  the  different  countries.  I  think  it's 
best  to  do  that  on  the  basis  of  a  persona 
visit.  In  the  process,  if  things  can  be 
moved  along  toward  attainment  of  the 
objectives  that  we  and  others  have  set 
then,  obviously,  I  want  to  do  that. 

Q.  But  you  won't  have  any  sense 
right  now  that  the  Syrians  are  ready 
to  get  on  board? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  will,  of  course, 
be  very  interested  to  talk  with  the 
Syrians,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  what 
I  will  find.  Obviously,  they  have  made  a 
great  variety  of  statements  that  we  all 
know  about,  but  I  want  to  hear  first- 
hand from  them  what  their  views  are 
and  some  of  the  reasons  behind  them. 

Q.  In  a  more  specific  way,  will 
you  be  discussing  with  Israel  its 
desire  to  achieve  a  partial  withdrawal 
Then  will  you  attempt  to  use  this  par- 
tial withdrawal  to  get  the  Syrians  to 
do  likewise? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  implication 
of  your  question  is  that  there  will  be  ^ 
some  sort  of  shuttle  back  and  forth.  I'm 
not  planning  to  do  that.  I'll  discuss 
whatever  anybody  wants  to  bring  up. 
Let  me  remind  you  that  the  President's 
objectives,  and  those  of  the  Lebanese, 
the  Israelis,  and  we  would  hope  the 
Syrians  and  everyone  else,  are,  first  of 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


THE  SECRETARY 


all,  the  leaving  of  Lebanon  by  all  foreign 
forces  completely;  second,  the 
emergence  of  a  sovereign  Lebanon  able 
to  govern  itself  and  blossom  once  again; 
and  third,  arrangements  that  ensure  the 
security  of  Israel's  northern  border. 

Q.  Again,  to  achieve  that,  will  one 
way  be  to  ask  Israel  to  set  a  firm 
withdrawal  date  for  all  of  its  foreign 
forces,  along  with  a  Syrian-PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization] 
withdrawal,  so  that,  at  least,  you  have 

I  a  date  to  work  with  and  to  offer  the 

i  Syrians? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Just  what  will  be 
discussed,  of  course,  is  a  question  of 
what  people  want  to  bring  up  with  me. 
Our  objectives  are  stated — that's  the 
key,  that's  the  criterion  by  which  we 
judge  whatever  it  is  that  anyone  may 
propose.  I  look  forward  to  intensive 

I  discussion  in  each  capital  of  these  objec- 
tives and  how  to  obtain  them. 

Q.  Are  you  taking  anything  to  any 
of  these  leaders  in  the  Middle  East— 
(anything  in  the  way  of  a  proposal  to 
(any  of  them? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Our  objective  re- 
mains the  same,  and  we  want  to  discuss 
with  them  how  to  get  there,  what  the 
current  situation  is  and  how  it  may  have 
ichanged.  I  might  say,  also,  that  the 
Ipeace  process  and  its  importance  re- 
fmains  very  much  alive.  As  we  move 
I  along,  the  consideration  of  how  to  so 
Combine  the  needs  for  security  of  Israel 
vvith  the  legitimate  rights  and  aspira- 
;ions  of  the  Palestinian  people  remains  a 
|-cey  objective  for  us. 

Q.  I  wonder  whether  you  would 
iddress  a  question  that  one  of  our  col- 
eagues  put  to  you  earlier  today, 
whether  your  sudden  decision  to  visit 
he  Middle  East  represents  an  act  of 
lesperation  to  salvage  the  troop  with- 
lrawal  plan  that  you  negotiated  on  the 
ast  visit? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  seems  like  a 
;;udden  decision  because  the  President 
lecided  last  night  about  it.  Of  course, 
we've  been  thinking  about  it  for  quite 
j'ome  time.  Phil  Habib,  Morrie  Draper, 
:ind  Dick  Fairbanks  have  been  in  the 
irea.  As  is  always  the  case,  the  an- 
nouncement of  a  visit  by  me  tends  to 
pave  an  impact  on  what  they  can  or  can- 
pot  accomplish,  so  it's  better  not  to  in- 
sert an  announcement  too  early.  It  isn't 
Ls  though  this  is  a  sudden  move.  Cer- 
tainly we  want  to  review  the  bidding.  It 
\s  important  to  try  to  bring  about  a 
withdrawal,  and,  at  this  point,  we  don't 
Lave  a  reading  on  the  Syrian  situation. 
We  very  much  want  to  get  one. 


Q.  But  to  characterize  your  trip  as 
an  act  of  desperation  would  prompt 
what  sort  of  answer  from  you? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Oh,  hardly.  Do  I 
look  desperate? 

Q.  Syria  rejected  the  arrangement 
for  Lebanon  and  Israel  and  did  not 
receive  Mr.  Habib.  Have  you  detected 
any  possible  change  in  their  position? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  haven't  had 
any  discussion  about  that. 

Q.  Since  your  last  trip  out  there, 
in  your  view,  has  there  been  any 
change  that  is  in  a  forward  direction? 
Has  Mr.  Habib  or  any  others  been  able 
to  produce  any  movement  in  the  situa- 
tion which  you  now  can  capitalize  on 
in  another  trip? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  situation  is 
always  an  evolving  situation.  The  con- 
versations in  the  area  that  Ambassador 
Habib  and  others  have  had,  I  think,  have 
been  helpful  to  us.  But  as  I  said  at  the 
beginning,  I  want  to  get  a  first-hand 
reading  myself.  The  President  wants  me 
to  get  that  so  that  I  can  report  to  him 
on  just  what  the  situation  is. 

Q.  You  have  ruled  out  shuttle 
diplomacy,  but  shuttle  diplomacy 
usually  means  frequent  trips  back  and 
forth.  Is  it  possible  that  this  trip  will 
not  be  a  once-around  and,  indeed,  you 
will  have  to  carry  from  one  party  to 
another,  and  back  again  points  of 
view? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  am  not  expect- 
ing that  that  will  emerge.  Among  other 
reasons,  there  is  a  great  deal  to  do  in 
Washington,  and  I  need  to  get  back.  As 
you  probably  realize,  I've  been  away  for 
a  while.  So  I  need  to  get  back. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  possibility  of  a 
breakthrough  on  this  trip  or  any  trip 
abroad  on  Lebanon? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  would  be  a 
great  blessing.  I'd  certainly  be  delighted, 
but  I  don't  see  any  real  prospect  of  it. 
Certainly,  that's  our  objective,  and 
should  things  so  come  forward  that  that 
was  closer  to  possible,  we  would  be 
delighted. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  Saudi  Arabia 
to  ask  the  Saudis  to  try  and  persuade 
Syria  to  make  some  troop  withdrawals 
or  go  along  with  the  Israeli-Lebanon 
agreement? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I'll  be  seeking  the 
views  of  King  Fahd  and  his  advisers  on 
the  removal  of  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon,  and  also  on  the  peace  process 
more  generally.  I'll  want  to  know  what 
his  views  are  and  consult  with  him  about 
next  steps.  That's  the  purpose  of  the 
Saudi  Arabian  visit. 


Q.  Did  President  Zia  or  Foreign 
Minister  Yaqub  Khan  plan  any  role  in 
setting  up  your  visit  to  Damascus? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  I  don'1  think 
so.  If  they  did,  1  don'1  know  of  it.  I  have 
discussed  the  Middle  East  situation  with 
the  Foreign  Minister  and,  no  doubt,  in 
the  dinner  this  evening,  President  Zia 
and  I  will  talk  about  it.  But  I  don't  know 
of  any  direct  role  that  they  may  have 
played.  They  are  very  interested,  and 
they  are  very  helpful  and  thoughtful 
people. 

Q.  What  would  happen  if  Syria 
does  not  pull  out?  What  would  that 
mean  in  the  Middle  East? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  are  assuming 
on  the  basis  of  Syrian  statements,  that 
in  one  way  or  another,  they  intend  to 
leave  Lebanon.  That's  one  thing  they 
have  always  said,  and  they've  never  con- 
tradicted that.  Another  question  is,  what 
are  the  circumstances  under  which  they 
would  leave  Lebanon?  They  never  said 
that  they  wouldn't  leave. 


Peshawar 


STATEMENT  AT  NASRBAGH 
REFUGEE  CAMP, 
JULY  3,  198312 

Fellow  fighters  for  freedom,  not  only  in 
Afghanistan  but  throughout  the  world: 
My  message  to  you  from  the  United 
States  is  very  simple.  We  are  with  you. 
This  is  a  gathering — a  very  moving  ex- 
perience for  me — in  the  name  of  free- 
dom, a  gathering  in  the  name  of  self- 
determination,  a  gathering  in  the  name 
of  getting  the  Soviet  forces  out  of 
Afghanistan,  a  gathering  in  the  name  of 
a  sovereign  Afghanistan  controlled  by 
its  own  people. 

The  millions  from  Afghanistan  who 
are  refugees  here,  of  course,  bring  out 
the  human  dimension  of  this  tragedy 
brought  on  by  the  invasion  and  occupa- 
tion of  Afghanistan  by  Soviet  forces. 
The  human  dimension  has  its  counter- 
part of  tragedy  but  also  of  inspiration 
and  determination,  at  the  determination 
of  you  not  to  live  under  that  rule  but  to 
fight  back.  I  would  like  to  express  my 
appreciation  and  my  support  for  many 
people  who  are  part  of  this  effort,  for 
the  officials  of  the  Government  of 
Pakistan,  and  for  the  people  of  Pakistan, 
particularly  those  in  this  area.  I  was 
touched  to  see  that  you  spoke  so  elo- 
quently yourself,  this  morning.  I  express 
my  appreciation  to  those  from  around 


September  1983 


39 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  world  who  have  come  here  as 
volunteers  to  be  helpful.  I  feel  privileged 
as  an  American  to  be  part  of  the  sup- 
port effort  for  you,  not  only  from  the 
governmental  efforts  but  from  the 
private  organizations  which  have  come 
here  to  be  helpful. 

You  fight  valiantly,  and  your  spirit 
inspires  the  world.  I  want  you  to  know 
that  you  do  not  fight  alone;  many  all 
over  the  world  stand  with  you.  World 
opinion  is  expressed  without  equivoca- 
tion or  ambiguity  in  votes  in  the  United 
Nations.  But  you  have  also  spoken  of 
the  visible  support  that  has  come  here, 
and  I  assure  you  again  that  the  United 
States,  has,  does,  and  will  continue  to 
stand  with  you.  You  spoke  of  the  fact 
that  there  are  negotiations  taking  place 
about  the  Afghan  issue,  and  I  can  tell 
you  that  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
United  States,  negotiations  will  only  be 
successful  if  they  include  the  removal  of 
Soviet  forces  from  Afghanistan,  if  they 
include  a  provision  for  self-deter- 
mination in  Afghanistan,  if  they  include 
provisions  under  which  refugees  may 
return  to  their  country  with  dignity  and 
honor.  These  are  things  that  must  be  in- 
cluded in  any  settlement  if  it  is  to  be 
satisfactory. 

You  spoke  of  your  determination 
and  your  confidence,  and  I  agree  with 
you— there  are  not  only  the  millions 
here,  but  you  spoke  also  of  the  millions 
who  have  turned  out  in  Poland  just  in 
the  past  few  weeks.  I  share  your  con- 
fidence that,  in  the  end,  freedom  will 
prevail;  we  will  prevail.  We  will  prevail 
because  we  have  strength,  we  are  deter- 
mined, and  because  our  cause  is  the 
cause  of  right  and  justice.  Finally,  I  ex- 
press again  my  sense  of  privilege  at  be- 
ing here  with  you  and  of  sharing  these 
aspirations  for  freedom  that  you  fight 
for,  that  I  fight  for,  and  the  American 
people  stand  for. 


Islamabad 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JULY  4,  1983' 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  first  like  to 
express  my  appreciation  to  President 

Zia,  to  Foreign  Minister  Yaqub  Khan, 
and  to  the  people  of  Islamabad  and  the 
people  of  Pakistan  generally  for  the 
hospitality  with  which  1  have  been 
received,  by  the  very  thoughtful  and 
enlightening  conversations  and  the 
seriousness  of  purpose  by  which  this 
visit  has  been  treated.  It  has  been  a  very 


fine  experience  for  me,  and  I  have 
benefited  greatly  from  it.  1  feel  that  the 
relationships  between  the  United  States 
and  Pakistan,  important  as  they  are, 
have  been  advanced  through  our  discus- 
sions of  a  great  many  bilateral  matters. 
First  of  all,  those  covered  by  our  joint 
commission  effort,  where  there  are  a 
number  of  things  already  in  motion  and 
others  that  will  be  developed  by  the 
commission  activities.  Second,  by  our 
discussion  of  various  important  bilateral 
matters.  Particularly,  it  was  interesting 
to  me  that  on  three  different  occasions 
we  were  able  to  discuss  the  narcotics 
problem,  and  I  am  greatly  heartened  by 
the  reports  that  1  was  given  on  that. 
Finally,  it  has  been  a  distinct  privilege 
for  me  and  my  party  to  have  this  visit, 
marked  as  it  has  been  by  the  chance  to 
talk  with  the  Afghan  refugees  and  all 
the  events  surrounding  that  yesterday, 
to  have  this  visit  capped  by  a  most 
hospitable  and  warm  dinner  last  night 
with  President  Zia  and  a  wide-ranging 
conversation  with  him  and  his  col- 
leagues. So,  again,  I  express  my  ap- 
preciation for  not  only  the  hospitality 
but  also  the  content  that  has  come  with 
it  during  this  visit. 

Q.  As  a  result  of  your  discussions 
with  the  Foreign  Minister  and  Presi- 
dent Zia,  has  there  been  any  fine  tun- 
ing of  the  U.S.-Pakistan  position  on 
Afghanistan,  any  change  regarding 
what  Pakistan  will  convey  in  the 
Geneva  discussions? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  shared 
views  and,  of  course,  I  have  been  very 
interested  in  the  Foreign  Minister's 
report  and  analysis,  and  President  Zia's. 
We  have  become  very  well-informed 
through  an  intense  briefing  at  the  staff 
level.  Our  objectives,  which  we  share 
completely,  remain  unchanged,  and  I 
would  say  in  my  analysis  that  the  report 
I've  had  that  there  isn't  a  sense  of 
enough  progress  to  make  it  worthwhile 
continuing  the  dialogue,  but  not  so  much 
as  to  make  you  think  we're  anywhere 
near  the  end  of  it. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  divert  your  at- 
tention toward  the  interview  of  the 
Russian  Ambassador  in  Pakistan  who 
said  that  "Mr.  Shultz  is  bringing  the 
Soviet  danger  in  his  briefcase  during 
his  visit  to  Pakistan." 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  guess  the  origin 
of  that  question  has  never  visited  where 
we  visited  yesterday.  It  is  not  I  who 
brings  the  Russian  threat,  it  is  the  Rus- 
sians who  have  broughl  it  themselves 
with  their  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Afghanistan.  We  could  sec  the  human 


tragic  fallout  from  that  in  the  refugees, 
and,  particularly,  the  women,  the  chil- 
dren, the  widows.  So  the  Russian  threat 
that  is  there  has  come  forward  as  a 
result  of  Soviet  aggressive  behavior  and 
has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the 
United  States.  At  the  same  time,  we  join 
with  Pakistan  and  others  in  deploring 
this  action  and  in  expressing  our  support 
for  the  Afghan  freedom  fighters. 

Q.  According  to  Pakistani  papers, 
President  Zia  talked  to  American  jour- 
nalists last  night  saying  that  Israel 
had  planned  to  attack  Pakistan's  vital 
installations.  What  would  be  the 
American  reaction  in  this  regard? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  didn't  hear  any 
such  statement  from  President  Zia,  so 
the  entire  question  is  hypothetical,  and  I 
am  not  going  to  react  to  it. 

Q.  [Inaudible] 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  Syrians  have 
made  clear  their  opposition  to  that 
agreement,  so  that's  been  stated  and 
stated  publicly  on  the  record.  As  I  said 
yesterday,  the  purpose  of  the  trip  is  to 
gather  information,  to  have  first-hand 
basis  for  talking  with  the  President 
when  I  return  about  the  situation,  the 
ideas  that  people  have,  and  if  in  the 
process,  in  the  effort  to  remove  all 
foreign  forces  totally  from  Lebanon  and 
see  Lebanon  emerge  as  a  sovereign 
country  in  charge  of  its  own  frontiers 
with  security  for  the  northern  border  of 
Israel— those  are  our  objectives.  If  we 
can  do  something  in  serving  them  dur- 
ing the  trip,  certainly,  we  are  going  to 
try. 

Q.  While  one  can  appreciate 
America's  concern  for  strategic  and 
security  needs,  what  is  the  Reagan 
Administration's  concern  for  the  viola- 
tion of  human  rights  and  the  absence 
of  social  justice  to  the  peoples  of 

A  SIR*' 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  people  of  the 
United  States  and  the  President  are  con- 
cerned about  human  rights  problems 
everywhere  in  the  world,  including  in 
the  United  States.  It  is  a  subject  that  is 
built  into  the  character  of  the  American 
people,  and  we  are  always  alert  to  prob- 
lems. We  try  in  as  constructive  a  way  as 
we  can  to  help  in  doing  something  about 
them. 

Q.  I  think  that  your  government  is 
aware  of  the  burning  issue  of  the 
future  of  the  state  of  Jammu  and 
Kashmir  which  has  been  disturbing 
the  relations  between  India  and 
Pakistan  for  the  last  35  years.  In  the 
recent  elections  in  Indian-held 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


THE  SECRETARY 


Kashmir,  not  only  Mrs.  Indira 
Gandhi's  party  but  all  other  Indian 
parties  have  been  rejected  by  the 
Muslims  of  Kashmir  which  proves  that 
the  issue  of  Kashmir  is  very  much 
there  and  can  prove  at  any  time  a 
danger.  The  point  is  what  steps  the 
American  Government  is  going  to  take 
to  solve  the  issue  of  Kashmir  which  is 
very  much  there? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  am  not  going  to 
comment  on  questions  of  that  kind, 
beyond  saying  this;  I  found  in  India  and 
I  found  in  Pakistan  a  desire  to  improve 
the  relationship  between  India  and 
Pakistan.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
United  States,  a  country  that  values  its 
relationship  with  both  countries,  we  cer- 
tainly applaud  that  effort,  we  hope  that 
it  will,  over  a  period  of  time,  be 
eminently  successful. 

Q.  What  makes  you  pessimistic 
about  the  outcome  of  your  visit  to  the 
Middle  East  right  now? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  didn't  say  I  was 
pessimistic.  I  just  described  what  I  was 
going  to  do  and  the  objective  that  I 
have.  I  think  that  given  the  fact  that  ob- 
viously there  are  acute  problems  in  the 
Middle  East  and  have  been  for  a  con- 
siderable period  of  time,  it  made  sense 
as  we  thought  about  it  and  were  in 
touch  with  our  diplomats  in  the  area  to 
pay  a  visit  on  my  way  back  to 
Washington  rather  than  just  fly  over 
those  problems,  and  that's  what  we  are 
doing. 

Q.  After  the  inaugural  session  of 
the  Pakistan-U.S.  Joint  Commission, 
the  economic  relations  between  the 
two  countries  will  take  a  new  turn. 
What  do  you  say?  And  when  do  you 
think  the  next  meeting  of  the  joint 
commission  will  be  held? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  work  of  the 
joint  commission,  I  am  sure,  will  follow 
the  suggestions  made  by  Minister  Yaqub 
Khan  at  the  meeting;  namely,  that  we 
will  establish  three  subcommissions. 
When  these  subcommissions  get  into  the 
operational  detail  and  have  produced 
something  substantive  for  us  to  look  at 
in  the  joint  commission  as  a  whole,  then 
we  will  meet  about  that.  We've  had  our 
overall  meeting,  and  we  have  put  this 
Iprocess  in  motion.  As  I  remember  your 
(statement,  you  hope  and  I  concur  that 
we  ought  to  have  these  subcommissions 
going  before  the  end  of  the  year.  Again, 
I  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  in 
each  of  the  important  areas  involved 
there  is  already  a  lot  of  activity,  so  it 
isn't  as  though  you  have  a  standing  start 


and  you  have  to  generate  things.  There 
is  motion  there.  We  think  it  can  be  ac- 
celerated, expanded,  and  qualitatively 
improved  by  the  work  of  the  subcommis- 
sions and  the  joint  commission. 

Q.  The  $3.2  billion  deal  between 
Pakistan  and  the  United  States  is  an 
important  part  of  the  economic  assist- 
ance, but  the  recent  congressional 
debates  and  the  cuts  authorized  to 
foreign  assistance  have  been  a  cause 
of  concern  here.  Have  you  given  any 
assurances  to  the  Pakistani  side  re- 
garding the  American  commitment  for 
foreign  assistance? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  dis- 
cussed this  issue,  and,  of  course,  it  is  im- 
portant to  the  President  to  get  his  pro- 
gram through  the  Congress.  The  issues 
involved,  as  we  have  discussed  them 
here  with  President  Zia,  the  Foreign 
Minister,  are  basically  twofold.  On  one 
hand,  there  is  the  level  and  flow  of 
assistance  in  terms  of  its  magnitude  and 
composition,  and,  on  the  other,  there  is 
the  question  of  the  ability  to  plan  for 
that  continuing  flow.  Both  problems  are 
present.  It  is  a  problem  that  derives 
from  our  budget  process  in  the  United 
States. 

We  have  done  a  variety  of  things 
about  it  including,  in  particular,  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  commission  headed  by  an 
eminent  American,  Frank  Carlucci,  who 
with  a  variety  of  others  and  congres- 
sional involvement,  are  focusing  on  this 
issue.  But  we  are  going  to  [inaudible] 
our  effort,  and  the  picture  looks  good. 
We  always  have  conflicts  in  the  congres- 
sional authorization  and  appropriation 
process,  and  that  is  the  Congress  con- 
stitution [inaudible]  appropriate  funds. 
We  work  with  them  and  trust  that  they 
will  see  matters  our  way. 

Q.  You  have  visited  India.  What  is 
their  perception  with  regard  to  the 
Afghanistan  [inaudible]? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  want  to 
speak  for  another  country.  I  think  it  is 
unwise  for  me  to  characterize  their  posi- 
tion on  an  issue  and  I  would  leave  it  to 
them  to. 

Q.  [Inaudible] 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  question  was 
about  the  spares  for  Tarapur.  The  issue 
that  was  posed  was  the  question  of 
spares  for  the  Tarapur  plant.  The  Presi- 
dent's pledge  was  that  if  they  were 
unavailable  from  some  other  country,  an 
effort  will  be  made  to  find  out  the 
answer  to  that  fact.  Then  the  United 
States  would  be  ready  to  supply  the 
necessary  parts.  It  is  not  a  large 


volume— particular  things  that  are 
related  to  safety  and  health  in  the  opera- 
tion of  that  power  reactor.  I  think  the 
concerns  for  safety  and  health  in  the 
operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  here 
is  the  dominant  consideration.  The  deci- 
sion stands  on  its  own  as  an  effort  to 
serve  those  safety  and  health  objectives. 

Q.  You  had  an  exchange  of  letters 
with  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  on 
Afghanistan,  and  now  you  have  had  3 
talks  with  Foreign  Minister  Yaqub 
Khan.  In  2  or  3  months'  time  the  UN 
envoy  will  get  in  touch  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  Moscow  on  the  subject  of 
guarantees  and  other  questions 
related  to  the  Afghanistan  issue.  Do 
you  think  these  UN  talks  will  go  on 
for  years  as  other  talks  have  gone  on 
for  5  or  6  years?  What  is  your  assess- 
ment? How  soon  can  this  question  be 
solved? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  is  a  mistake  to 
try  and  put  some  sort  of  deadline  down 
on  talks  of  that  kind.  At  the  same  time, 
obviously,  nobody  concerned  wants  to 
have  talks  that  just  drag  on  endlessly 
and  pointlessly  with  the  possibility  of  not 
coming  out  with  something  constructive. 
The  expert  on  that  subject  is  sitting  on 
my  right,  but  I  have  already  character- 
ized what  my  understanding  of  the  situa- 
tion is,  and  I  don't  want  to  repeat  it. 

Q.  Don't  you  feel  that  the  Russian 
attitude  toward  Pakistan  has  become 
stiffer  day  by  day?  In  this  background, 
can  we  trust  you  regarding  our  securi- 

ty? 

Secretary  Shultz.  What  the  Rus- 
sian attitude  is  toward  Pakistan  is  a 
question  the  Foreign  Minister  should  ad- 
dress. As  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned,  we  have  a  close  relationship 
with  Pakistan.  We  have  a  security  rela- 
tionship with  Pakistan,  and  we  share 
concerns  about  Soviet  behavior,  par- 
ticularly as  it  is  exhibited  in 
Afghanistan.  We  are  supporting  each 
other  in  the  effort  to  deter  Soviet  ag- 
gression there,  and,  I  might  say,  we 
have  the  same  attitude  as  a  worldwide 
proposition. 

Q.  You  know  the  day  you  landed 
here,  there  was  an  incident  in  the 
Parachinar  area.  A  plane  flew  into 
it— into  Parachinar— and  indulged  in 
bombing.  And  it  was  a  coincidence 
that  when  Mr.  Brzezinski  came  here, 
on  the  eve  of  that  visit  also,  there  was 
a  similar  incident.  Do  you  have  any 
reading  into  it,  or  do  you  think  it  is 
just  a  stray  incident? 


iSeptember1983 


41 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary  Shultz.  No,  I  don't  have 
any  basis  for  knowing  of  any  particular 
connection. 

Q.  How  do  you  find  the  long-term 
prospects  of  a  strong  and  enduring 
relationship  with  Pakistan? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  pros- 
pects for  the  relationship  of  the  United 
States  and  Pakistan  in  the  long-term  are 
excellent,  and  the  reason  is  that  we  are 
building  this  relationship  on  a  solid  foun- 
dation of  bilateral  interests  that  we  have 
with  each  other.  Then  we  are  moving 
from  that  to  interests  we  have  in  com- 
mon about  various  problems  around  the 
world.  But  the  foundation  is  the  direct 
relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  Pakistan,  and,  as  that  grows,  it 
tends  to  be  self-reinforcing.  We  are  look- 
ing at  it  just  as  you  implied  in  your 
question — as  a  long-term  proposition 
and  not  as  some  sort  of  a  quick  relation- 
ship. 

Q.  How  do  you  view  your  meeting 
with  President  Zia? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  was  an  ex- 
cellent meeting  from  my  standpoint. 
First  of  all,  the  President  organized  it  as 
a  small  group  of  people,  so  we  were  able 
to  sit  around  for  the  entire  time  and 
have  intense  conversation.  We  covered  a 
wide  range  of  subjects,  and  I  found  it  a 
very  worthwhile  conversation.  I  might 
say,  having  met  with  President  Zia 
before— this  is  my  first  time  in  Pakistan 
and  over  an  extended  period  of  time — 
he  comes  across  as  a  man  of  great  abili- 
ty and  with  a  very  wide  range  of  knowl- 
edge and  insights,  and  so  I  benefited 
greatly  from  the  conversation. 

Q.  Does  the  American  Government 
have  interest  in  the  restoration  of 
elected  democracy  in  Pakistan?  Was 
this  the  subject  of  discussion  with 
President  Zia,  and  what  is  the  Amer- 
ican reaction  to  such  proposals  as  he 
might  have  been  making? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Of  course,  we  are 
always  interested  in  movements  in  the 
direction  of  democracy.  It  is  my  under- 
standing that  there  will  be  a  statement 
about  this  subject.  I  don't  know  what  the 
contents  of  it  will  be,  but  there  will  be  a 
statement  about  this  subject  in  the  mid- 
dle of  August.  We  look  forward  to  that 
with  keen  anticipation. 

Q.  What  are  you  going  to  do  in 
the  event  of  a  Russian  attack  on 
Pakistan?  Or  any  attack  by  Afghan 
surrogates  on  Pakistan?  What  will  you 
do? 


Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  want  to 
answer  hypothetical  questions.  I  de- 
scribed the  strength  and  work  of  the 
relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  Pakistan,  and  beyond  that,  hypo- 
thetical questions  will  have  to  go  to  the 
side. 

Q.  There  have  been  reports  that 
there  has  been  a  new  agreement  be- 
tween the  U.S.S.R.  and  India  for  pro- 
vision of  $5  billion  of  arms.  That 
would  further  increase  Pakistan's  fear 
and  insecurity.  How  do  you  look  at 
this  situation? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Various  people 
have  asked  about  that,  but  I  haven't 
seen  any  substantiation  of  that  report. 

Q.  Why  is  the  United  States  still 
opposing  the  peaceful  nuclear  program 
of  Pakistan? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment is  not  opposing  the  development  of 
nuclear  power  for  peaceful  uses  in 
Pakistan.  It  was  notable  to  me  that 
President  Zia  went  out  of  his  way  to 
assure  me  that  that,  and  only  that,  was 
the  objective  of  the  Government  of 
Pakistan.  We  discussed  this  last  night. 


Arabian 
Sea 


Jidda 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JULY  5,  1983'4 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you  have  ac- 
complished in  your  discussions? 

Secretary  Shultz.  First,  I'd  like  to 
express  my  appreciation  to  His  High- 
ness, His  Majesty,  for  receiving  me  and 
my  party  and  for  the  very  worthwhile 
and  constructive  discussions  we  had  last 
night. 


From  my  standpoint,  in  addition  to 
the  various  things  we  discussed, 
analyses  of  the  situation  and  expecta- 
tions, it  was  most  gratifying  to  see  with 
King  Fahd  that  we  continue  to  share  the 
objectives  of  the  removal  of  all  foreign 
forces  in  Lebanon,  of  the  desire  to  see 
Lebanon  emerge  as  a  country  sovereign 
and  able  to  rule  within  its  borders. 
While  we  recognize  the  importance  of 
security  arrangements  that  seek  that 
Lebanon  not  be  a  base  from  which 
hostile  actions  might  occur  to  any  of  its 
neighbors — to  Syria  or  Israel — in  addi- 
tion, we  see  that  we  continue  to  share 
the  objectives  of  seeking  an  active  peace 
process  that  among  other  things,  ad- 
dresses itself  to  legitimate  rights  and 
concerns  of  the  Palestinian  people.  The 
reaffirmation  of  the  importance  of  these 
objectives  and  our  discussions  of 
analyses  of  the  situation  and  things  to 
do  about  it  were  most  worthwhile.  I  am 
very  grateful  to  you.  Your  Highness, 
and  to  His  Majesty  for  the  time,  and 
particularly  at  this  season  of  the  year 
am  I  for  your  willingness  to  break  off 
from  other  things  and  meet  with  us. 

Prince  Sa'ud.  We  are  very  pleased 
to  receive  you  here.  On  my  part,  we  af- 
firm we  also  share  the  hope  that 
Lebanon  will  achieve  its  independence, 
and  towards  this  end  Saudi  Arabia  has 
cooperated  in  the  past  and  will 
cooperate  in  the  future.  In  the  dis- 
cussions, also,  we  were  very  pleased  to 
hear  from  the  Secretary  that  the  United: 
States  continues  to  pursue  discussions 
towards  this  objective,  independence  for 
Lebanon,  and  also  accommodating  the 
overall  Middle  East  problem,  the  rights 
of  all  the  Palestinian  people.  We  had 
fruitful  discussions  with  the  Secretary, 
and  we  hope  that  in  this  tour  in  which 
he  will  visit  other  countries,  from  the 
discussions  will  emerge  all  sorts  of  steps! 
that  will  move  the  peace  process  for- 
ward and  an  important  and  significant 
result  will  be  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces  from  Lebanon  and  for  Lebanon  tc 
achieve  and  maintain  its  security  in  full 
dignity  and  independence.  We  are 
pleased  to  receive  you  in  this  month  of 
Ramadan  and  any  other  month. 

Q.  You  talk  about  the  withdrawal 
of  Israeli  forces.  Does  Saudi  Arabia, 
also  as  the  United  States  does,  want 
to  see  the  withdrawal  of  Syrian  forces 
as  well  from  Lebanon? 

Prince  Sa'ud.  We  don't  equate  the 
two  forces.  As  I  said,  the  Israelis  are  oc- 
cupying forces.  We  want  to  see  their 
withdrawal  and  we  want  also  to  see 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Lebanon  be  able  to  maintain  its  security 
Bhrough  its  armed  forces  and  internal 
security  forces  and,  therefore,  no 
need — 

Q.  Does  that  extend  to  forces 
from  any  other  Arab  country?  Is  the 
Golan  Heights  issue  being  linked  to 
the  Lebanon  situation? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  Golan 
Heights  didn't  come  up  in  the  discussion 
at  all. 

Q.  Were  there  any  contributions, 
any  ideas  that  emerged  in  your  conver- 
sations last  night,  that  could  promote 
the  process  of  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  forces  from  Lebanon?  That 
you  could  take  to  President  Assad,  for 
example? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  want  to 
discuss  the  details  of  matters  of  ap- 
proach we  are  going  to  use,  but  I  con- 
sider that  the  discussion  was  a  very 
fruitful  one  and  is  going  to  be  helpful  to 
me  as  I  approach  these  meetings,  and  as 
I  am  sure  our  friends  from  Saudi  Arabia 
will  approach  their  own  contacts  with 
the  countries. 

Q.  Has  this  trip  changed  in 
character  from  an  information  gather- 
ing trip  to  a  negotiating  trip?  It 
sounds  like  you  were  making  more 
(headway  than  simply  gathering  infor- 
mation? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  that  my 
objective  was  to  gather  information  to 
I  help  move  the  process  along  as  I  can 
land  be  in  a  position  to  give  President 
Reagan  a  firsthand  account  of  the  views 
bf  His  Majesty  and  the  other  leaders  of 
the  region  when  I  return. 

Q.  But  has  it  become  more  than 
I  that? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  I  have 
Uaid  what  I  have  to  say. 


Beirut 


STATEMENTS, 
JULY  5,  198316 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  want  to  express  my 
appreciation  to  President  Gemayel, 
Foreign  Minister  Salem,  Prime  Minister 
Wazzan,  and  their  associates  for,  as 
always,  the  gracious  and  hospitable  way 
in  which  we  have  been  treated.  We've 
had  an  intensive  review  of  the  situation, 
compared  notes,  and  thought  about  our 
strategy,  and  also  with  President 
Gemayel  talked  a  little  bit  about  his 
forthcoming  trip  to  Washington.  How 
we'll  continue  on  to  Damascus  with  my 
appreciation  for  your  courtesy  and 
hospitality. 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  It's 
always  a  pleasure  for  us  to  welcome 
Secretary  Shultz.  His  visits  to  Beirut  are 
associated  with  success,  optimism,  and 
with  confidence.  We  in  Lebanon  have 
walked  with  the  United  States  in  this 
difficult  path  that  faces  Lebanon — a 
path  which  we  all  know  will  lead  to  total 
withdrawal  and  the  restoration  of  full 
sovereignty  and  independence  of 
Lebanon.  We  viewed  the  activities  since 
last  April  and  May.  We  discussed  points 
that  should  be  refined.  We  discussed 
some  specifics  that  should  be  examined 
in  some  greater  detail  in  Washington, 
and  we  are  reassured  by  the  American 
commitment  which  has  not  wavered  and 
changed  in  support  of  this  little  valiant 
but  great  and  unequaled  democracy 
called  Lebanon.  We  are  extremely 
grateful  for  the  support  of  President 
Reagan  and  for  the  efficient  and 
rigorous  manner  in  which  Secretary 
Shultz  is  following  the  implementation 
of  this  policy. 


Q.  Beyond  the  optimism  that  ex- 
ists, what  were  the  concrete  results  of 
Secretary  Shultz's  visit? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  I  think  we 
did  go  into  some  specifics.  We  discussed 
some  problems  that  are  facing  us.  We 
discussed  alternatives.  We  discussed  all 
kinds  of  approaches  to  the  problem — the 
major  problem — that  faces  Lebanon.  I 
believe  that  as  a  result  of  this  visit  we 
understand  the  situation  better,  and,  I 
believe,  we  can  plan  for  it  more  effec- 
tively so  that  we  can  have  speedier 
results  because  Lebanon  cannot  wait  too 
long  before  it  sees  the  full  withdrawal  of 
foreign  forces  from  Lebanon. 

Q.  May  I  ask  a  question  of  both 
the  Secretary  and  the  Minister?  Does 
the  United  States  and  does  Lebanon 
want  to  see  Israel  commit  itself  to  a 
timetable  for  withdrawal? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Of  course,  we 
want  to  see  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  agreed  upon  and,  obviously,  when 
it  is,  it  takes  place  according  to  a 
schedule  of  some  sort.  If  we  can  get  to 
that  point,  we'll  certainly  want  to  get  to 
it. 

Q.  Do  you  want  to  see  a  timetable 
even  before  [inaudible]? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  timetable  in- 
volving withdrawal  by  all  foreign  forces 
is  consistent  with  our  objective.  We  are 
not  in  any  way  discussing  or  proposing 
unilateral  or  unconditional  withdrawal 
by  the  Israelis.  We're  talking  about  a 
program  of  withdrawal  here,  right  from 
the  start,  that  involves  all  foreign 
forces.  Let  me  just  go  back  and  remind 
everybody  of  the  objectives  that  were 
set  out  by  President  Reagan  and  Presi- 
dent Gemayel  when  President  Gemayel 
visited  Washington  last  October.  They 
remain  the  same:  total  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  forces  from  Lebanon;  the 
emergence  of  Lebanon  as  a  sovereign 
state,  able  to  govern  its  territory  and 
have  territorial  integrity;  and  proper 
security  arrangements  to  insure  that  no 
neighboring  state  is  attacked  by  hostile 
forces  originating  in  Lebanon.  Those  are 
the  objectives  that  were  set  up;  those 
are  the  objectives  that  remain. 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  I  fully 
concur  with  what  the  Secretary  said. 

Q.  If  Israel  were  to  pull  back 
some  distance  from  its  current  posi- 
tions, what  would  be  the  best  way  for 
that  vacuum  to  be  filled? 


September  1983 


43 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary  Shultz.  That's  a 
hypothetical  question  and  so  I'm  going 
to  pass  on  it  except  to  say  this:  that  the 
process  of  withdrawal  and  how  it  should 
happen  was  discussed  intensively  during 
the  negotiation  of  the  agreement.  It  en- 
visaged the  coming  into  play  of  the 
security  arrangements  in  the  planning 
process,  whereby  the  armed  forces  of 
the  Government  of  Lebanon  would 
assume  responsibility  for  security  in  the 
territories  that  are  threatened. 


!■  •!(•  «ic  jcmK>  <ac  <m>  ab<u>  at.  <x.  m.  <m>  <m>  jc. 


ncwir  wirir  if  wic  w<h>  wif  ir 


Damascus 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS, 
JULY  6,  198316 

Our  time  here  has  been,  first  of  all,  very 
pleasant.  We  had  dinner  last  night  with 
the  Foreign  Minister  and  his  wife.  Then 
this  morning,  the  Foreign  Minister  and  I 
and  our  delegations  talked  for  about  an 
hour  and  a  half.  We  met  with  President 
Assad  around  10  o'clock  until  whenever 
we  broke  up  a  little  after  three.  The  con- 
tent of  our  discussion  could  be  sum- 
marized in  three  points. 

First,  we  discussed  the  Israeli- 
Lebanon  agreement  in  great  length,  and 
we  did  not  find  very  much  to  agree 
about  in  our  analysis  of  that  agreement. 

Second,  we  agreed  on  the  great  im- 
portance of  a  sovereign,  free,  and  in- 
dependent Lebanon  with  a  strong  sense 
of  government  as  something  that  both 
countries  feel  is  very  desirable; 

Third,  we  agreed  to  stay  in  touch 
and  to  consult  with  each  other  about 
how  we  might  help  together  to  attain 
that  objective.  And  to  that  end,  we  all 
undoubtedly  will  establish  a  little  work- 
ing group  to  help  sort  out  what  we  may 
be  able  to  do  to  help  in  that  regard. 


44 


Cairo 


REMARKS, 
JULY  7,  198317 

President  Mubarak.  I  welcome  the  U.S. 
Secretary  of  State  who  is  visiting  Egypt 
for  a  few  hours  after  a  long  tour  in  the 
Far  East,  then  in  the  Middle  East,  in 
Saudi  Arabia,  Lebanon,  Syria,  Jordan, 
Israel,  and  then  Egypt.  I've  listened  to 
the  results  of  his  tour  in  the  Middle 
East,  especially  concerning  Lebanon  and 
the  implementation  of  the  Lebanese- 
Israeli  agreement.  I've  also  listened  to 
his  impressions  following  his  visit  to 
Syria  and  to  the  other  Arab  countries. 
Then  we  exchanged  our  viewpoints  con- 
cerning this  special  issue  and  the  Middle 
East  crisis  as  a  whole.  He  also  informed 
me  about  all  the  American  efforts  to 
solve  the  Palestinian  issue  as  a  whole 
and  the  Lebanese-Israeli  problem  in  par- 
ticular. As  we  all  know,  this  problem 
will  need  some  time  to  convince  all  the 
parties  and  to  start  the  withdrawal  of 
forces.  It  will  need  great  effort  from  the 
United  States  and  all  the  other  friendly 
countries  which  are  participating  and 
cooperating  in  solving  the  Palestinian 
problem.  I  think  that  Secretary  Shultz  is 
very  tired  from  his  tour  and  he'll  now 
return  immediately  to  the  States. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  appreciate  very 
much  the  chance  to  meet  with  you,  and 
while  my  Arabic  is  a  little  off,  I  had  a 
little  whispering  in  my  ear,  so  I  can  ex- 
press my  appreciation  for  the  comments 
that  you  made  and,  I  might  also  say,  for 
the  strong  support  you  have  given 
publicly  and  in  our  meetings  on  the 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon  so  that  we  can  allow  Lebanon 
to  get  on  with  the  job  of  reconstructing 
itself.  Your  own  positive  statements  and 


help  are  very  much  appreciated,  not  only 
on  the  problems  of  Lebanon  as  we 
discussed  today,  but  also  the  problems 
of  the  Palestinian  people  and  your 
thoughts  about  how  we  might  make 
some  progress  on  the  basic  peace  proc- 
ess. So,  on  all  of  these  matters  I  ap- 
preciate very  much  this  chance  to  com- 
pare notes  with  you.  As  always,  you 
have  been  very  gracious  in  receiving  us 
on  short  notice  and  with  your  time  and 
ideas  and  we  appreciate  it. 

Q.  What  cards  does  the  Ad- 
ministration have  left  that  it  might  be 
willing  to  play  on  the  withdrawal 
issue? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  will  continue 
to  work  on  it.  We  have  lots  of  support 
and  good  friends — President  Mubarak. 
As  far  as  our  cards  are  concerned,  I 
think  we'll  play  them  as  we  see  fit. 

Q.  Has  this  visit  been  a  failure? 

Secretary  Shultz.  This  visit  has 
been  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of 
gathering  information,  sharing  ideas 
with  the  leaders  in  this  area,  and  from 
that  standpoint  I've  been  very  suc- 
cessful, as  I've  had  good,  candid,  and 
strong  meetings  with  the  heads  of  state 
of  all  the  immediately  concerned  coun- 
tries, not  only  about  the  Lebanon  prob- 
lem but  other  issues  in  the  Middle  East. 
So,  from  that  standpoint,  it's  been  very 
successful.  That  was  its  purpose.  Ob- 
viously, we  still  have  major  problems 
that  remain  to  be  resolved. 

Q.  Will  you  be  coming  back  to  the 
Middle  East? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Oh,  I  think 
sooner  or  later  I'll  probably  be  back 
here,  but  I  have  to  get  along  to  an 
airplane  so  that  I  can  get  back  to 
Washington,  I'm  told  about  4  a.m., 
ready  for  some  meetings  tomorrow  with 
the  President. 


Q.  Did  you  feel  any  progress  from 
the  Syrian  side  during  your  talks  with 
their  leaders  this  time?  Is  there  any 
flexibility  in  their  attitude  toward  set 
tling  their  problems  in  Lebanon? 

Secretary  Shultz.  In  our  discus- 
sions in  Syria  with  President  Assad,  he 
was  at  great  pain  to  make  clear  his  op- 
position to  the  Israeli-Lebanese  agree- 
ment, so  we  argued  about  that.  I  think 
the  real  point  is  not  so  much  the  agree- 
ment but  Syria's  readiness  to  withdraw 
from  Lebanon.  It  has  been  said  over  the 
past  months  many  times,  including  by 
President  Mubarak  when  I  was  here  the 
last  time,  that  it  was  essential  to  have 
an  agreement  for  Israeli  withdrawal. 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


THE  SECRETARY 


There  is  an  agreement  for  Israeli  with- 
drawal. They  will  withdraw  as  others 
withdraw.  So  I  think  that  any  who  are 
interested  in  seeing  the  withdrawal  of 
Israel  from  Lebanon  should  be  urging, 
as  President  Mubarak  has,  that  Syria 
and  the  PLO  withdraw,  and,  thereby, 
we  will  have  a  Lebanon  clear  of  foreign 
forces  and  able  to  exert  its  sovereignty 
and  develop  itself.  That  is  the 
President's  objective,  that  is  President 
Murabak's  objective,  that  is  the  objective 
of  the  Government  of  Lebanon,  and  I 
think  the  world  owes  Lebanon  a  chance 
to  develop  itself  again. 


■Press  release  230  of  June  27,  1983. 
2Press  release  229  of  June  28,  1983. 
3Press  release  255  of  July  1,  1983. 
4Press  release  240. 
6Press  release  274  of  July  6,  1983. 
6Press  release  259  of  July  5,  1983. 
7Press  release  258  of  July  5,  1983. 
8Press  release  279  of  July  12,  1983. 
9Press  release  265  of  July  7,  1983. 
'"Press  release  276  of  July  7,  1983. 
"Press  release  272  of  July  8,  1983. 
12Press  release  269  of  July  8,  1983. 
"Press  release  302  of  July  8,  1983. 
"Press  release  280  of  July  13,  1983. 
"Press  release  275  of  July  11,  1983. 
"Press  release  278  of  July  11,  1983. 
17Press  release  277  of  July  11,  1983. 


Comprehensive  Strategy  for 
Central  America 


Secretary  Shultz's  prepared  state- 
ment before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  August  U,  1983.1 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  you  developments  in  Central 
America.  Our  policy  toward  Central 
America  today  is  just  as  the  President 
set  it  forth  to  the  nation  before  the  joint 
session  of  Congress  on  April  27.  That 
night  he  identified  our  objectives  as 
being  to  prevent  a  wider  crisis  and  to 
bring  about  a  lasting  peaiie.  And  to 
achieve  those  ends,  the  President  de- 
fined four  activities  to  which  we  have 
committed  ourselves:  support  for 
democracy,  reform,  and  human  rights; 
support  for  economic  development;  sup- 
port for  dialogue  and  negotiations 
among  the  countries  of  the  region  and 
within  each  country;  and  support  for  the 
security  of  the  region's  threatened  na- 
tions as  a  shield  for  democratization, 
development,  and  diplomacy. 

Every  step  we  have  taken  since  then 
is  consistent  with  this  comprehensive 
strategy.  Let  me  sum  up  each  element 
as  it  stands  today  and  as  it  relates  to 
the  others  and  to  the  whole. 

Before  I  do  so,  however,  let  me  say 
that  a  key  aspect  of  the  President's 
statement  of  April  27  was  his  appeal  for 
a  bipartisan  approach  to  Central 
America's  increasing  importance.  With 
the  counsel  and  support  of  many 

if  members  of  the  Congress,  the  President 
has  now  named  a  National  Bipartisan 

s  Commission  on  Central  America  headed 
by  Henry  Kissinger.  Americans  have 
begun  to  realize  that  we  must  pay  more 


September  1983 


attention  to  our  own  neighborhood.  An 
effort  to  look  at  the  future,  and  to  do  so 
in  a  bipartisan  spirit,  has  long  been 
needed.  I  hope  everyone  will  provide  the 
commission  as  much  assistance  as  possi- 
ble as  it  begins  its  work. 

Today,  however,  I  want  to  discuss 
the  current  thrust  of  our  four-part 
policy. 

Support  for  Democracy,  Reform, 
and  Human  Rights 

First— and  it  belongs  first— support  for 
democracy,  reform,  and  human  rights: 
What  we  seek  is  a  Central  America 
more  like  Costa  Rica  than  Cuba.  We 
seek  genuine  democracy — not 
totalitarian  charades  but  respect  for 
human  freedom  and  the  rule  of  law,  not 
repression  but  governments  committed 
to  the  welfare  of  their  own  people. 

Last  year  we  observed  with  admira- 
tion Costa  Rica's  typically  enthusiastic 
and  meticulous  national  election.  Today 
we  are  working  with  the  Costa  Rican 
Government,  its  prestigious  Supreme 
Electoral  Tribunal,  and  the  new  regional 
Center  for  Electoral  Assistance  to  help 
other  countries  improve  their  electoral 
systems. 

In  1981-82,  we  supported  the  transi- 
tion to  democracy  in  Honduras.  Today 
defense  of  the  constitutional  democratic 
order  in  Honduras  is  a  key  objective. 

In  El  Salvador,  the  Constituent 
Assembly  elections  a  year  ago  last 
March  were  a  stunning  success,  demon- 
strating that  democracy  can  advance 
even  in  the  face  of  guerrilla  violence. 


To  help  with  the  next  Salvadoran 
elections,  two  prominent  elections  ex- 
perts traveled  to  El  Salvador  in  May  ac- 
companied by  officers  from  the  State 
Department  and  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID).  We  have  now 
developed  a  project  to  help  provide 
technical  assistance  and  international 
observers  to  support  the  coming  elec- 
tions. Our  goal  is  to  help  the  Salvadoran 
people  build  on  the  success  of  March 
1982,  not  just  the  next  time  but  many 
times  in  the  future. 

We  are  also  working  to  help  rebuild 
El  Salvador's  tragically  inadequate 
criminal  justice  system.  The  Attorney 
General  visited  there  in  April  to 
underline  the  importance  we  attach  to 
legal  reform  in  the  development  of  a 
working  democracy.  Legal  experts  from 
a  variety  of  U.S.  agencies  are  following 
up  and  have  visited  Honduras  and  Costa 
Rica  as  well  as  El  Salvador.  In  addition, 
at  my  invitation,  Judge  Harold  G.  Tyler 
is  conducting  a  review  of  all  materials 
available  to  us  concerning  the  1980 
murder  of  four  American  churchwomen 
in  El  Salvador  and  will  recommend  fur- 
ther actions  we  might  take  to  advance 
the  prosecution  of  those  responsible  for 
this  crime. 

Democracy  has  not  been  the  his- 
torical norm  in  most  of  Central  America, 
and  its  construction  will  not  be  easy.  But 
the  amnesty  in  El  Salvador,  the  schedul- 
ing of  elections  for  a  Constituent 
Assembly  in  Guatemala,  the  vibrancy  of 
democracy  in  Costa  Rica  and  Hon- 
duras—all are  indications  of  the  prog- 
ress Central  America  is  making. 

What  is  happening  in  Central 
America  will  be  further  advanced  by  the 
President's  democracy  initiative.  We 
have  begun  consultations— bipartisan, 
both  at  home  and  abroad— to  build  sup- 
port for  improved  cooperation  among 
political  parties  and  other  groups  com- 
mitted to  democracy. 

Economic  Development 

Second,  economic  development:  Between 
1960  and  1979,  the  nations  of  Central 
America  had  high  per  capita  growth 
rates.  But  rising  expectations  clashed 
with  outmoded  and  unresponsive 
political  institutions;  then  economic 
slowdown  brought  additional  conflict 
and  instability.  In  recent  years,  falling 
prices  of  export  commodities,  rising  im- 
port prices,  the  "rule  or  ruin"  strategy  of 
the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador,  and  the 
growing  uncertainty  caused  by 
Nicaragua's  policies  have  created  an 


45 


THE  SECRETARY 


acute  economic  crisis,  increasing  the 
region's  vulnerability  to  communist 
strategies. 

The  United  States  has  responded  to 
these  underlying  economic  problems 
with  both  generosity  and  imagination. 
Much  of  the  $610  million  in  economic 
assistance  budgeted  for  Central  America 
this  fiscal  year  is  concentrated  on 
stabilization  efforts— to  provide  hard 
currency  for  essential  imports  to  main- 
tain production  and  employment.  With 
the  rest,  AID  is  supporting  about  120  in- 
dividual development  projects.  To  take 
just  one  critical  area,  the  agrarian 
reform  in  El  Salvador,  our  assistance 
has  helped  that  program  to  benefit  more 
than  500,000  persons  or  roughly  1 
Salvadoran  in  every  10.  Other  AID  proj- 
ects are  developing  Costa  Rica's  north- 
ern zone,  upgrading  Honduras'  forestry 
and  livestock  industries,  and  helping 
Guatemala's  highland  Indians.  Region- 
wide,  U.S.  economic  assistance  is  three 
times  greater  than  our  military  aid. 

Finally,  we  have  worked  hard  with 
other  nations  and  with  you  in  the  Con- 
gress to  develop  a  new  approach  to 
assisting  economic  development— the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI).  The 
CBI  provides  12  years  of  free  trade 
guarantees  and  incentives  for  invest- 
ment in  Central  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean. It  will  be  a  powerful,  long-term  in- 
strument for  development  and  the  crea- 
tion of  new  jobs.  The  Congress  passed 
the  bill  just  a  few  days  ago;  the  Presi- 
dent will  sign  it  shortly.  The  CBI  is  a 
good  example  of  bipartisan  cooperation 
in  the  national  interest.  I  am  confident 
its  contribution  will  prove  enduring. 

Dialogue  and  Negotiations 

Third,  dialogue  and  negotiations:  Our 
diplomacy  is  designed  to  help  develop 
political  solutions  to  Central  America's 
national  and  regional  problems.  In 
Nicaragua,  the  new  Sandinista  regime 
did  not  respond  to  U.S.  efforts  at  "con- 
structive engagement."  We  then  sought 
to  resolve  our  differences  through 
dialogue.  And  when  bilateral  approaches 
in  1981  and  1982  proved  fruitless,  we 
participated  in  the  multilateral  peace 
process  launched  last  October  in  San 
Jose.  From  its  beginning  this  year,  we 
have  supported  the  efforts  of  Colombia, 
Mexico,  Panama,  and  Venezuela— the 
Contadora  group.  That  support  con- 
tinues today. 


In  El  Salvador,  we  have  consistently 
and  systematically  tried  to  facilitate 
reconciliation  with  those  among  the 
guerrillas  and  their  associates  who 
might  prove  willing  to  test  their  appeal 
in  honest  elections.  We  are  now  actively 
supporting  the  efforts  of  El  Salvador's 
Peace  Commission  to  open  a  dialogue 
with  the  Revolutionary  Democratic 
Front  (FDR) — the  political  arm  of  the 
guerrillas — to  assure  the  safe  partici- 
pation of  all  parties  in  the  democratic 
process. 

Since  his  appointment  by  the  Presi- 
dent last  April,  your  former  col- 
league— now  mine — Dick  Stone  [Richard 
B.  Stone,  Ambassador  at  Large  and 
special  representative  of  the  President 
to  Central  America]  has  worked  hard  to 
encourage  dialogue  within  El  Salvador 
and  in  the  region  as  a  whole.  He  has 
met  repeatedly  with  leaders  of  all  the 
countries  involved  in  the  Contadora 
process,  including  the  Nicaraguans.  Last 
weekend,  with  the  help  of  President 
Betancur  of  Colombia,  Ambassador 
Stone  had  a  first  contact  with  a  political 
representative  of  the  Salvadoran  guer- 
rillas. We  hope  additional  contacts  will 
take  place,  and  that  they  will  facilitate  a 
direct  and  detailed  dialogue  between  the 
guerrillas  and  the  Salvadoran  Peace 
Commission. 

Let  me  also  note  that  there  are  im- 
portant areas  of  convergence  between 
the  July  1 7  Cancun  declaration  of  the 
Contadora  presidents  and  the  principles 
subscribed  to  by  the  United  States  last 
fall  in  the  San  Jose  final  act.  The 
regional  dialogue,  though  still  very  dif- 
ficult, is  gradually  clarifying  the  essen- 
tial conditions  for  democracy  and  peace. 

Military  Assistance  and 
Cooperation 

And,  fourth,  military  assistance  and 
cooperation:  We  seek  a  security  shield, 
not  as  any  kind  of  end  in  itself,  but  to 
provide  the  necessary  protection  for  the 
political,  economic,  and  diplomatic  goals 
I  have  just  described. 

The  military  components  of  the 
President's  policy  have  been  carefully 
calculated  to  do  just  that.  Two  kinds  of 
activities  are  involved — activities  to 
help  others  defend  themselves  and  ac- 
tivities to  underline  our  own  deterrent 
capability. 

Military  assistance  is  based  on 
demonstrated  needs  in  each  country  as 
measured  against  the  threat  to  the  coun- 
try's security.  The  Administration's  re- 


quests for  fiscal  year  1984  are  as 
follows:  for  Belize— $500,000  in  grant 
aid  and  $100,000  in  training;  for  Costa 
Rica— $2  million  grant  aid  and  $150,000 
for  training;  for  El  Salvador — $55 
million  in  grants,  $1.3  million  in  train- 
ing, and  $30  million  sales  credits;  for 
Guatemala— no  grant  aid  but  $250,000 
in  training  and  $10  million  in  credit;  and 
for  Honduras — $40  million  grant  aid  and 
$1  million  for  training. 

Our  readiness  and  deterrent  capacity 
will  be  enhanced  by  the  joint  and  com- 
bined exercises  to  take  place  with  Hon- 
duran  forces  under  the  designation  of 
"Big  Pine  II"  in  conjunction  with  fleet 
units.  These  exercises  will  serve  two 
related  objectives: 

•  To  improve  the  training  and 
readiness  of  our  own  forces  and  those  of 
Honduras;  and 

•  To  provide  a  credible  assurance  to 
all  parties  that  the  United  States  has  the 
capability  to  muster  a  protective  shield 
in  the  face  of  any  challenge  to  the  inter- 
American  system  and  our  international 
legal  obligations. 

Evidence  of  Change 

These  are  the  elements  of  the  policy.  All 
four  are  essential  to  our  strategy.  And 
precisely  because  of  the  interplay  among 
them,  they  give  us  both  the  strength  and 
the  flexibility  to  achieve  results. 

Our  support  for  democracy  is  slowly 
having  an  impact.  A  basis  is  being  laid 
for  renewed  and  more  equitable 
economic  growth  once  the  shooting 
stops.  And  a  critical  interplay  is  under- 
way between  the  military  and  diplomatic 
aspects  of  our  policy. 

Nations  as  well  as  men  need  incen- 
tives to  change  their  behavior.  At  least 
until  recently,  there  has  been  no  incen- 
tive for  the  Sandinistas,  no  incentive  for 
the  Salvadoran  guerrillas,  no  incentive 
for  Fidel  Castro,  and  no  incentive  for 
the  Soviets  to  believe  that  anything 
credible,  anything  difficult  stood  in  the 
way  of  imposition  of  communist  rule  by 
armed  force  in  El  Salvador  and  in  the 
rest  of  Central  America.  For  what 
reason,  then,  would  the  Salvadoran  far 
left  be  interested  in  participation  in  the 
political  process?  Why  should  the  San- 
dinistas under  such  circumstances 
refrain  from  their  "revolution  without 
frontiers"?  Why  should  Cuba  act  any  dif- 
ferently in  Central  America  than  in 
Africa? 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


But  something  has  now  begun  to 
happen.  The  evidence  is  there— in  the  in- 
terest in  dialogue  by  the  Salvadoran 
guerrillas,  even  in  the  words  of  Ortega 
[Daniel  Ortega,  Coordinator  of 
Nicaragua's  Junta  of  National  Recon- 
struction] and  Castro.  Messages  have 
been  sent.  By  the  solidarity  among  the 
Central  American  democracies,  by  the 
Contadora  countries,  by  private  remon- 
strances from  Nicaragua's  international 
supporters,  by  a  popular  insurgency  in- 
side Nicaragua,  by  the  recent  advances 
of  the  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces,  and  by 
the  United  States  of  America. 

The  substance  of  these  messages  is 
this:  a  victory  by  the  far  left  and  its 
foreign  supporters  through  armed  force 
is  not  in  the  cards.  The  people  of  Cen- 
tral America  are  intent  on  resisting  that 
force.  They  are  increasingly  capable  of 
doing  so  because  of  their  own  efforts 
and  because  the  United  States  is  helping 
them.  The  United  States  and  Honduras, 
in  our  current  military  exercises,  are 
demonstrating  what  cooperative  training 
and  deterrence  are  all  about. 

Our  adversaries'  options— which 
have  so  far  stressed  force— must  be  nar- 
rowed toward  negotiation  and  dialogue. 
And  I  believe  it  is  the  responsibility  of 
the  Administration  and  the  Congress  to 
make  certain  that  nothing  is  done  to 
weaken  the  tools  that  can  bring  this 
about. 

Our  strategy  is  well  constructed  for 
the  problems  we  face.  It  is  sophisticated, 
realistic,  and  flexible.  It  is  showing 
results.  It  deserves  your  support  and 
that  of  the  American  people. 


Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


•Press  Release  307.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402  ■ 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
NBC's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  August  7. 
1983,  by  Bill  Monroe  and  Marvin  Kalb, 
NBC  News;  Hedrick  Smith.  The  New 
York  Times;  Karen  DeYoung,  The 
Washington  Post;  and  Lars-Erik 
Nelson,  The  New  York  Daily  News.1 

Q.  We  have  sent  antiaircraft  missiles, 
free  advisers,  two  AWACS  [airborne 
warning  and  control  system]  radar 
planes  to  help  the  African  nation  of 
Chad.  We  also  have  a  naval  force  off 
the  Libyan  coast.  Could  you  give  us 
your  description  of  what  is  happening 
in  Chad  and  what  the  U.S.  role  is? 

A.  There  is  an  insurgency  in  Chad, 
and  it's  being  helped  by  the  Libyans  who 
have,  among  other  things,  conducted 
bombing  raids  on  Faya-Largeau,  a  city 
about  which  there  is  a  fight  going  on, 
and  so  there  are  a  number  of  things  tak- 
ing place,  including  concern  by  ourselves 
and  the  French. 

Q.  Have  the  Libyan  troops  gone 
into  Chad? 

A.  That's  a  question.  Certainly  their 
planes  have  overflown  Chad,  and  we 
have  reports  of  some  Libyans  there,  yes. 

Q.  The  United  States  has  appeared 
to  be  encouraging  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  send  direct  air  support — 
planes  and  French  pilots — to  help  the 
Chad  Government.  The  French  say  this 
morning  they're  not  going  to  do  that. 
Is  the  United  States  disappointed  in 
that  French  attitude? 

A.  The  French  have  to  decide  what 
they  are  going  to  do.  It  is  an  area  of 
prime  concern  to  them,  being  a  former 
French  colony,  and,  of  course,  all  of  the 
francophone  countries  of  Africa  are 
watching  the  situation.  We're  in  close 
consultation  with  the  French,  and  I'm 
sure  that  they  will  exercise  their  respon- 
sibilities properly. 

Q.  Switching  to  the  other  foreign 
policy  hot  spot — Central  America;  the 
United  States  has  been  flexing  its 
military  muscle.  Cuba  and  Nicaragua 
have  made  new  offers  of  negotiation. 
Ambassador  Stone  [Richard  B.  Stone, 
Ambassador  at  Large  and  special 
representative  of  the  President  to 
Central  America]  has  been  talking 
with  the  Salvadoran  rebels  and  with 
the  Nicaraguan  Government.  Does  the 
United  States  have  any  plan,  any  pros- 
pect, of  focusing  all  this  activity  into 
something  really  hopeful? 


A.  The  United  States  has  a  four- 
part  set  of  policies  that  have  an  in- 
terplay together.  These  policies  include 
the  promotion  of  democracy,  the  promo- 
tion of  economic  development,  the  con- 
duct of  negotiations  within  countries  and 
among  countries,  and  the  provision  of  a 
security  shield,  helping  the  people  down 
there  provide  that  security  shield.  These 
interplay  together,  and  we  have  to  keep 
them  all  in  being.  And  I  think  there  is 
some  indication  that  these  policies  are 
beginning  to  show  some  results. 

Q.  Last  weekend  an  American 
destroyer  shadowed  a  Soviet  freighter 
off  the  Pacific  coast  of  Nicaragua. 
What's  the  point  of  American  vessels 
following  Soviet  ships  so  closely  down 
there?  Are  we  trying  to  scare  the 
Soviets,  scare  the  Nicaraguans,  or 
stop  the  Soviets  from  moving  supplies 
into  Nicaragua? 

A.  There  is  an  exercise  going  on 
down  there,  and  it's  quite  normal  when 
ships  at  sea  encounter  each  other  under 
those  circumstances  that  they  hail  a 
passing  freighter  and  ask  for  identifi- 
cation, and  so  that's  what  took  place. 

Q.  But  we  understand  the  ship 
followed  the  Soviet  ship  for  a  while. 

A.  It  went  along  to  see  where  she 
was  going. 

Q.  What's  the  point?  I  mean,  will 
this  work?  Will  it  stop  Soviet  supplies 
into  Nicaragua  if  we  let  them  proceed, 
or  will  it  take  stronger  steps? 

A.  The  maneuvers  down  there  are 
intended  to  do  two  things.  One,  they're 
part  of  the  kind  of  training  that  goes  on 
all  around  the  world  of  our  forces  and 
other  forces,  and,  second,  they  underline 
the  deterrent  capability  of  the  United 
States.  We  want  to  make  that  plain  to 
everybody,  our  friends  and  our  adver- 
saries alike. 

Q.  Should  the  Soviets  be  reading 
this  as  a  message  that  if  they  continue 
to  send  ships  to  Nicaragua  with 
military  supplies,  as  this  one  was,  that 
we  will  take  some  measures  to  stop 
those  ships? 

A.  No,  no  measure  was  taken  with 
respect  to  that  ship,  and  I'll  just  let  it  go 
at  that. 

Q.  President  Castro  of  Cuba 
signaled  a  willingness  to  negotiate 
with  us  and  with  others  to  stop  the 
flow  of  outside  arms  and  military  ad- 


September  1983 


47 


THE  SECRETARY 


visers  into  Central  America.  What 
steps  have  we  taken  to  contact  him 
since  he  did  that? 

A.  We  have  been  promoting  the 
idea  of  regional  negotiations  to  bring 
about  stability  in  that  region  for  quite  a 
long  time,  going  back  to  way  last  March 
and  further  back  than  that.  We're  glad 
to  see  statements  from  Mr.  Castro  and 
from  others  in  the  region — Mr.  Ortega 
of  Nicaragua — that  tend  to  suggest 
they're  beginning  to  see  the  point. 

From  our  standpoint,  the  point  is  to 
keep  the  pace  of  the  negotiations  going 
on,  and  we're  supporting  the  Contadora 
process  that  involves  primarily  people  in 
the  region. 

Q.  Have  we  made  actual  contact 
with  the  Cuban  Government  about  the 
statements  Mr.  Castro  made? 

A.  We  have  an  Interests  Section  in 
Havana  that  has  contact  with  the  Cuban 
Government,  but  we  haven't  had  any 
direct  response  to  that  statement. 

Q.  There  seems  to  have  been  a 
change  in  our  policy  toward  Nicaragua 
over  the  past  year.  We  used  to  talk 
about  how  our  principal  concern  was 
the  spread  of  revolution  in  Central 
America,  and  now  the  President  says 
that  he  thinks  that  any  peaceful  solu- 
tion there  would  be  difficult  with  the 
current  Sandinista  government  in 
place.  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  [Jeane 
J.  Kirkpatrick,  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
the  United  Nations]  says  that  we  need 
to  prove  that  revolutions  are  reversi- 
ble. Assuming  we  can  stop  Nicaraguan 
interference  in  El  Salvador,  can  we 
live  with  the  Marxist  government  in 
Nicaragua? 

A.  The  question  is  whether  the  peo- 
ple of  Nicaragua  can,  and  I  think  the 
evidence  is  increasing  discontent  in  that 
country.  We  don't  seek  to  overthrow 
that  government.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
they  conduct  themselves  in  such  a  way 
that  people  rise  up  against  them,  that's 
a  problem  that  can  occur  in  any  country. 
Our  chief  concern  is  that  they  not  be 
able  to,  as  they  say,  export  revolution 
without  frontiers. 

Q.  And  yet  there  doesn't  seem  to 
be  a  rising  up  in  the  country.  There's 
fighting  on  the  border,  and  there's 
some  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  sup- 
port for  the  Sandinistas  has,  in  fact, 
grown  stronger  inside  the  country 
since  the  problems  began  on  the 
border.  Do  you  really  see  an  insurrec- 
tion coming  there? 


A.  I'm  not  predicting  that,  and 
we're  not  trying  to  bring  that  about.  I 
just  was  responding  to  the  speculation  in 
your  question.  There  has  been  a  great 
deal  of  unease  in  religious  circles  about 
developments  there.  Certainly,  I  would 
imagine  in  press  circles  there  is  concern 
about  the  censorship  that  goes  on.  And 
in  many  other  ways  I  think  the  situation 
is  quite  questionable. 

Q.  But  do  you  think  there  is  a 
possibility  that  we  can  coexist  with  a 
Marxist  Nicaragua,  assuming  that  our 
concerns  about  regional  export  of 
revolution  can  be  satisfied? 

A.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  one  of 
the  attributes  of  Marxism  is  its  desire  to 
subvert  and  overthrow  other  govern- 
ments. That's  one  of  the  less  attractive 
aspects  of  that  ideology,  and  so  there's 
always  that  threat.  But  from  the  stand- 
point of  our  policy,  the  fundamentals  of 
it  are  to  seek  a  broadly  based, 
pluralistic,  democratic  form  of  govern- 
ment where  people  have  a  chance  to  ex- 
press themselves  in  these  countries  and 
to  seek  economic  development  that's 
widely  shared.  And  under  those  cir- 
cumstances, I  think  the  surrounding 
democratic  countries  will  have  real 
strength. 

Q.  There's  a  force  in  the  field  in 
Nicaragua  along  the  Honduran  border 
of  10,000  people  under  arms  called  the 
Contras.  Publicly  we  deny  that  we're 
supporting  them,  but  in  fact,  it's  an 
open  secret  that  we  do  support  them. 
What's  to  become  of  them  if  there's  a 
negotiated  settlement  in  Nicaragua? 

A.  If  there  is  a  kind  of  negotiated 
settlement  that  we're  trying  to  bring 
about  in  El  Salvador,  namely,  a  process 
of  democratic  reform  in  which  all  com- 
ers have  a  chance  to  state  their  case  to 
the  people  and  stand  before  them  in  an 
election,  then  the  people  have  a  chance 
to  do  that. 

Q.  But  some  of  these  people  under 
arms — and  they  are  our  arms,  as  far 
as  I  can  tell  from  the  press — have  the 
stated  goal  of  overthrowing  the 
Managuan  government.  Will  we  sup- 
port them  in  that  goal?  Will  we  try  to 
disarm  them?  Will  we  try  to  withdraw 
their  support? 

A.  Their  goal  is  one  that,  given  our 
opinion  of  that  government,  we  can 
hardly  turn  away  from.  But  as  far  as 
ourselves  trying  to  overthrow  another 
government,  we're  not  trying  to. 


Q.  Do  you  see  any  possibility  that 
their  goal  will  automatically  somehow 
become  our  goal,  that  they  will  find 
themselves  in  a  jam  and  call  on  U.S. 
arms  support? 

A.  I  don't  foresee  any  armed  U.S. 
effort  to  overthrow  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua,  absolutely  none. 

Q.  Not  to  overthrow  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  in  those  terms,  but, 
say,  to  save  the  skins  of  these  freedom 
fighters,  as  the  President  has  called 
them? 

A.  If  they  seek  to  leave  some  place 
and  want  asylum  or  something  like  that, 
they  may  come  here. 

I  might  say  that  one  of  the  problems 
that's  being  created  by  this  effort  to  stir 
up  insurgencies  and  export  revolution 
without  frontiers  is  the  actual  presence 
now  and  the  great  threat  of  a  tremen- 
dous refugee  movement  from  that  area. 
While  there  is  no  case  of  the  coming  into 
power  of  a  Soviet-style  system  that's  ac- 
tually benefited  the  people  of  that  coun- 
try, there  are  many  cases  in  which  it  has 
produced  a  flood  of  refugees  in  various 
parts  of  the  world.  So  we  have  to  bear 
that  in  mind. 

Q.  A  lot  of  people  in  the  Ad- 
ministration say  that  what  the  United 
States  is  really  trying  to  do  is  to  make 
certain  that  the  Nicaraguan  Marxist 
regime  does  not  get  consolidated  in 
the  same  way  that  the  Castro  regime 
got  consolidated  in  Cuba.  The  implica- 
tion, therefore,  is  that  somehow  or 
another  you  can't  have  long-term 
stability  in  Central  America  from  the 
U.S.  point  of  view  if  there  is  a  San- 
dinista regime  in  power.  Does  that 
parse?  Does  that  make  sense  in 
diplomatic  terms? 

A.  Let  me  just  deflect  a  little  bit 
and  say  that  this  all  got  started  with  the 
Sandinista  revolution,  which  was  sup- 
ported out  of  the  OAS  [Organization  of 
American  States]  based  on  undertakings 
of  what  that  revolution  sought,  including 
democratic  reform.  Those  expectations 
and  undertakings  have  been  grossly 
violated,  and  at  the  same  time 
Nicaragua  has  become  a  place  from 
which  armaments  have  gone  to  neigh- 
boring countries — El  Salvador  in  par- 
ticular— to  attempt  to  overthrow  that 
government.  Our  initial  efforts  to  work 
with  the  Sandinista  regime  were  basical- 
ly turned  aside,  and  now  we  find  this  ef- 
fort to  overthrow  other  countries.  We 
are  trying  to  interdict  that  flow  of  arms 
and  to  distract  that  government  and  in 
other  ways  to  prevent  them  from  doing 
the  thing  that  they  want  to  do,  namely, 
to  export  this  revolution. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Does  it  follow,  then,  that  you 
really  cannot  have  the  kind  of  tran- 
quility that  the  United  States  would 
like  to  see  in  Central  America  so  long 
as  that  government,  pursuing  these 
policies,  continues  in  office? 

A.  As  long  as  there  is  a  government 
trying  to  overthrow  other  governments 
in  its  region,  it  presents  a  real  problem, 
particularly  when  they're  being  armed 
through  the  Soviet  Union  and  trying  to 
bring  about  the  overthrow  of  other 
governments.  It  certainly  constitutes  a 
major  problem. 

I  might  say  that  in  the  kinds  of 
things  talked  about  in  regional  negotia- 
tions are  such  matters  as  verifiable 
undertakings  not  to  ship  arms  from  one 
country  to  another  in  the  region.  If  it's 
verifiable,  that's  the  kind  of  thing  you 
need. 

Q.  The  House  of  Representatives 
voted  228  to  195  to  cut  off  U.S.  covert 
aid  to  the  rebels  fighting  Nicaragua 
out  of  Honduran  bases.  I  take  it  from 
your  answers  here  so  far  that  the  Ad- 
ministration intends  to  ignore  that  ex- 
pression of  sentiment  from  the  House. 

A.  You  don't  ignore  it.  It's  a  very 
important  thing  when  the  House  or  the 
Senate  votes  on  an  important  subject,  so 
certainly  you  don't  ignore  it.  The  vote, 
as  such,  doesn't  have  any  immediate 
operational  meaning  in  terms  of  the 
legislation.  Legislation,  as  you  know,  has 
Ito  pass  both  Houses  of  Congress  and  be 
•  signed  into  law  in  order  to  take  effect. 
lit  registers  an  opinion,  in  effect,  of  the 
House.  Of  course,  we  take  it  very 
seriously. 

Q.  If  the  Congress  should  later 
cut  off  funds  for  those  rebels,  forbid 
the  United  States  to  spend  funds 
through  the  CIA  for  those  rebels, 
would  that  be  an  end  to  U.S.  involve- 
ment in  support  of  those  rebels? 

A.  We'll  have  to  see  what  happens. 
II  think  there  is  a  great  deal  of  sentiment 
•emerging  in  the  Congress  and  also 
Jamong  the  American  people  generally 
■that  Central  America  is  very  important 
Ito  us,  what's  going  on  down  there  is  im- 
Iportant,  and  that  we  have  to  see  to  it— 
•particularly  by  virtue  of  supporting 
Khose  who  want  to  fight  for  their  coun- 
Itry  and  their  principles— that  they're 
lable  to  do  so.  So  we  haven't,  by  any 
■means,  accepted  the  House's  verdict  as 
Ithe  final  verdict. 

Q.  I'm  talking  about  the  possibili- 
ty of  the  whole  Congress  cutting  off 
funds,  which  would  have  a  legal  ef- 
fect, would  be  an  opinion  of  the  entire 


Congress.  Could  you  see  any  way  in 
which  the  Administration  could  en- 
courage those  rebels,  could  help  them 
in  any  way  to  pursue  their  war  against 
Nicaragua,  if  the  whole  Congress  cut 
off  funds? 

A.  I'm  trying  to  answer  your  ques- 
tion by  saying  that  we're  going  to  work 
hard  to  see  that  that  doesn't  happen. 

Q.  Two  years  ago,  the  Administra- 
tion stepped  up  the  relatively  modest 
aid  the  United  States  was  giving  at 
that  point  to  El  Salvador.  Now  we 
have  large  military  exercises  going  on, 
we're  building  bases  in  Honduras, 
we've  got  fleets  off  the  coast  of 
Nicaragua  on  both  sides,  there's  talk 
that  the  CIA  wants  to  step  up  aid  to 
the  rebels  in  Nicaragua.  How  much  in- 
volvement is  it  going  to  take?  What  is 
the  timeframe  you're  talking  about 
here  that  the  American  people  and 
Congress  are  going  to  support — 2 
years,  5  years,  10  years? 

A.  In  terms  of  timeframe,  I  think 
the  effort  in  Central  America — not  so 
much  necessarily  the  military  effort,  but 
our  effort  in  Central  America — should 
be  seen  as  a  long-term  one,  because  the 
basic  problems  are  social  and  economic 
problems,  and  that's  what  we  have  to 
address,  and  that's  what  we're  trying  to 
address.  The  existence  of  this  guerrilla 
activity  makes  it  difficult  for  economic 
development  to  take  place,  and  that's  ob- 
viously one  of  the  main  reasons  why  you 
want  to  stop  it. 

Yes,  we  have  to  have  an  approach 
that's  long-term.  I  hope  that  the 
strength  that  is  evident  down  there  will 
lead  people  to  see  that  it's  in  everyone's 
interest  to  have  a  negotiated  solution 
and  to  get  on  with  the  process  of 
economic  development,  but  it  remains  to 
be  seen  whether  that  will  come  to  pass. 

Q.  When  you're  talking  about 
long-term  in  that  language,  it  sounds 
as  though  you're  talking  about 
economic  and  social  aid. 

A.  Yes,  right. 

Q.  But  I'm  talking  about  the 
military  quotient  of  this.  Are  we  look- 
ing at  2  or  3  or  4  or  5  years  of  a  bat- 
tle, of  a  civil  war  in  El  Salvador  and 
wars  kind  of  back  and  forth  across  the 
border  of  Nicaragua,  or  are  we  look- 
ing at  2  or  3  months? 

A.  I  doubt  that  2  or  3  months  is  the 
right  figure,  but  we'll  have  to  see  how  it 
goes.  I  think  we  have  to  be  prepared  to 
help  those  who  are  fighting  down  there 
to  hang  in  there.  Things  have  been  go- 
ing better  lately. 


Let  me  call  year  attention  to  some- 
thing that's  widely  misunderstood.  I 
believe  you  said  that  our  military  aid  to 
El  Salvador  this  year  has  been  stepped 
up  greatly  from  last  year.  People  have 
that  impression,  but  it  isn't  so.  What  ac- 
tually has  happened  is  that  we  had  a 
flow  of  military  aid  last  year  of  around  a 
little  over  $80  million.  In  the  flow  this 
year,  it  has  been  very  uncertain,  and  it's 
only  with  the  most  recent  vote  a  week 
or  so  ago  by  the  Congress  that  we  got 
up  to  that  level.  For  a  good  part  of  the 
year,  the  Salvador  Armed  Forces  had  to 
make  do  with  the  assumption  that  their 
aid  flow  was  going  to  be  about  half  of 
what  it  had  been  the  year  before.  So  it's 
tough  to  get  moving  under  those  cir- 
cumstances. 

Now  in  the  last  couple  of  months 
things  have  been  looking  much  better  on 
the  military  side  in  El  Salvador.  They've 
been  able  to  secure  a  large  amount  of 
territory  and  also  to  follow  through  with 
some  of  the  civic  and  economic  actions 
that  we  advocate. 

Q.  In  terms  of  a  way  out.  in  terms 
of  reducing  our  military  involvement, 
what  prospects  are  there  right  now 
for  the  negotiations  either  of  Am- 
bassador Stone  or  the  Contadora 
group,  various  others? 

A.  It's  always  difficult  to  predict 
how  the  flow  of  a  negotiation  will  go. 
But  in  the  last  month  or  so,  for  the  first 
time,  we  see  people  making  statements 
that  bear  at  least  some  family 
resemblance  to  the  San  Jose  principles 
which  we  and  others  put  forward  quite  a 
while  ago,  and  so  that's  a  mark  of  some 
progress.  Whether  it  has  a  reality  to  it 
or  it's  just  rhetoric  designed  to  get  peo- 
ple to  say,  oh,  they  have  peaceful  inten- 
tions, remains  to  be  seen,  but  we  want 
to  see  these  undertakings  called,  and  we 
look  for  agreements  that  are  verifiable, 
that  are  solid,  that  call  for  withdrawal  of 
foreign  advisers  and  so  on. 

Q.  There  seems  to  be  some  con- 
cern about  what  the  purpose  of  our 
current  exercises  in  Honduras  are, 
these  long-term  exercises  that  are  sup- 
posed to  go  into  effect  next  year. 
You've  spoken  about  providing  a  pro- 
tective shield  for  our  friends.  We've 
talked  about  training.  The  Contadora 
group  has  said  thai  they  feel  that 
these  large-scale  exercises  are  not 
helpful  to  their  efforts  right  now. 
Could  you  tell  us  what  the  purpose  of 
them  is  and  how  you  think  they'll  be 
helpful  to  the  search  for  peace  there? 


September  1983 


49 


AFRICA 


A.  They  do  two  things.  They  pro- 
vide training-  for  ourselves  and  for 
others.  Training  is  important,  [f  you're 
going  to  do  a  good  job,  if  you  exercise 
and  you  train,  you  know  what  you're  do- 
ing, you're  going  to  be  more  effective. 
That's  number  one.  Number  two,  it 
underlines  the  importance  of  the  U.S. 
deterrent  capability  for  our  friends  and 
our  foes. 

There  have  been  some  public  state- 
ments somewhat  questioning  the 
maneuvers,  there  have  been  some  quite 
the  reverse,  and  there  has  been  a 
tremendous  outpouring  of  private  state- 
ments to  our  people  that  they're  sure 
glad  to  see  the  fleet  around  down  there, 
and  I  notice  that  as  we  invite  people  to 
come  aboard  the  Ranger  and  other  of 
the  capital  ships,  those  invitations  are 
being  accepted. 

Q.  We've  said  that  these  exercises 
are  a  continuation  of  the  series  that 
began,  the  last  one  being  last  winter. 
Last  time  we  had  the  exercises,  we 
said  that  we  were  having  them  in 
eastern  Honduras  to  avoid  being  in 
the  western  part  of  the  country, 
because  it  was  a  heavy  population 
center  and  there  was  a  lot  of  fighting 
there.  This  time  the  exercises  are 
starting  in  the  western  part  of  the 
country  near  both  the  Nicaraguan  and 
Salvadoran  borders  in  areas  of  the 
heaviest  fighting.  How  are  we  going 
to  keep  from  being  involved  in  that 
fighting? 

A.  The  maneuvers  and  exercises 
we're  undertaking  are  just  that.  They 
are  training  now  for  ourselves  and  the 
Hondurans.  In  order  to  train  for 
something  like  the  stopping  and  the  in- 
terdicting of  a  flow  of  arms,  you  need  to 
do  it  in  terrain  that  resembles,  as  much 
as  possible,  where  that's  likely  to  occur 
so  that  your  training  is  realistic.  So 
there  are  some  plans — 
whether  they  finally  will  be  put  into 
place  or  not  remains  to  be  seen — to 
train  in  areas  of  that  kind.  This  is  Hon- 
duran  territory.  It  is  not  next  to  the 
border,  although  it's  not  that  far  away 
from  it,  but  it's  Honduran  territory,  and 
there  is  no  reason  in  the  world  why 
training  shouldn't  be  conducted  there. 

Q.  The  State  Department  this 
week  said  it  would  be  impractical  to 
dismantle  Israeli  settlements  on  the 
West  Bank.  That  strikes  me  as  being  a 
new  step  in  our  diplomacy  toward  the 
Middle  East.  In  the  past  we've 
thought  that  settlements  should  be— 


A.  No,  I  don't  think  it's  a  new  step. 
It  is  a  statement  that's  perfectly  consis- 
tent with  what  the  President  said  in  his 
September  1st  proposal;  namely  that  in- 
sofar as  the  settlements  on  the  West 
Bank  are  concerned,  one  could  foresee 
them  staying  right  where  they  are,  but 
the  residents  of  those  settlements  would 
live  under  the  legal  jurisdiction  of  what- 
ever jurisdiction  resulted  from  the 
negotiations.  That's  as  distinct  from 
what  happened  in  the  Sinai. 

Q.  So  you're  saying  that  Jewish 
settlers  could  live  there  conceivably 
under  Jordanian  sovereignty  or  the 
sovereignty  of  some  new 
autonomous — 

A.  I  think  the  principles  that  Jews 
have  the  right  to  live  on  the  West  Bank 
to  the  Israelis  is  an  important  principle, 
and  I  agree. 


Q.  Do  you  think  there  should  be 
any  new  settlements  established? 

A.  We  have  said  consistently,  the 
President  has  and  the  U.S.  statements 
have  been,  that  the  new  settlements  on 
the  West  Bank  are  not  constructive. 
They  don't  help  us  at  all  in  our  search 
for  peace  in  that  region,  and  we've  said 
that.  I  believe  that's  the  case. 

Q.  Do  you  see  a  Soviet-American 
summit  by  next  summer? 

A.  No  way  to  tell.  The  President  is, 
in  principle,  ready  to  have  a  summit,  but 
it  has  to  be  well  prepared  and  there  has 
to  be  a  reasonable  basis  for  thinking 
there  will  be  a  significant  outcome. 


'Press  release  305  of  Aug.  8,  1983. 


U.S.  Military  Assistance  to  Chad 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  19,  19831 

President  Reagan,  pursuant  to  his 
authority  under  Section  506(a)  of  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as 
amended,  has  determined  that: 

•  An  unforeseen  emergency  exists 
which  requires  immediate  military  assist- 
ance to  Chad; 

•  The  aforementioned  emergency 
requirement  cannot  be  met  under  the 
authority  of  the  Arms  Export  Control 
Act  or  any  other  law  except  Section 
506(a)  of  the  act. 

Therefore,  he  has  authorized  furnishing 
up  to  $10  million  in  defense  articles  and 
services  by  the  Department  of  Defense 
to  Chad  under  the  provisions  of 
Chapters  2  and  5  of  Part  II  of  the  act. 
Congress  has  been  duly  notified. 

Since  President  [Hissein]  Habre 
assumed  control  of  Chad  in  June  1982, 
Libya  has  worked  unceasingly  to  provide 
ousted  leader  [Weddeye]  Goukouni  and 
other  dissidents  with  the  means  to  over- 
throw Habre  and  assume  power.  Col. 
[Muammar]  Qadhafi  has  publicly  an- 
nounced his  determination  to  topple  the 
pro-Western  Habre.  Habre 's  forces, 
although  relatively  well  organized  and 
led,  have  lacked  the  wherewithal  to 
defeat  the  antigovernment  forces  active 
in  Chad.  Further,  the  need  constantly  to 
defend  against  insurgent  activities  has 


50 


diverted  essential  energies  and  resources 
from  the  primary  task  of  rebuilding  the 
economic  and  political  infrastructure  of 
Chad. 

Intelligence  reports  have  indicated  a 
constant  resupply  from  Libya  of  arms 
and  ammunition  to  the  Goukouni  forces 
of  the  north.  Libyan  aircraft  capable  of 
airlifting  anti-Habre  troops  into  govern- 
ment-controlled areas  and  of  providing 
close  air  support  to  ground  attacks  have 
been  positioned  in  the  Aozou  strip  and  in 
southern  Libya.  Libyan  transports  have 
been  landing  in  territory  held  by  the 
rebels  to  deliver  supplies  to  them. 
Libyan  military  advisers  and  technicians 
serve  with  the  rebel  units. 

Following  Qadhafi's  failure  last 
month  to  win  the  OAU  [Organization  of 
African  Unity]  chairmanship,  the 
Libyan-backed  rebels  launched  a  series 
of  attacks  on  northern  and  eastern 
Chadian  cities.  To  meet  the  immediate 
threat  to  the  survival  of  the  Government 
of  Chad,  France  rushed  military  assist- 
ance to  Habre,  and  Zaire  initially  provid- 
ed several  Macchi  aircraft  and  about  250 
men  for  rear  area  security.  Zaire  has 
now  sent  several  Mirage  aircraft  and 
another  1,700  men. 

The  President  has  made  available  to 
Chad  up  to  $10  million  in  defense  ar- 
ticles and  services,  some  of  which  will 
facilitate  the  support  of  Zaire's  forces  in 
defense  of  its  beleaguered  fellow  African 
state.  The  use  of  this  special  authority 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


AFRICA 


by  the  President  is  necessary  given  the 
immediacy  and  character  of  the  threat 
and  the  inability  of  the  Government  of 
Chad  to  acquire  the  essential  material 
through  its  own  means.  Failure  to  have 
taken  the  emergency  action  would  have 
involved  the  grave  risk  of  allowing  Libya 
to  establish  a  regime  favorable  to  Libya 
in  N'Djamena  and  to  use  Chad  as  a  base 
for  subverting  neighboring  states. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
jy  Department  spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


Situation  in  Chad 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
\UG.  9,  1983' 

Libya's  forces  are  centrally  involved  in 
;he  fighting  in  Chad.  In  fact,  if  it  were 
lot  for  Libya's  forces — both  through  ad- 
visers and  combat  elements  and  air 
Dower — there  would  not  be  the  kind  of 
ighting  that  we  are  seeing  in  Chad. 

The  precise  numbers  in  a  situation 
ike  this  are  hard  to  come  by,  but  our 
estimate  is  that  there  are  1,500-2,000 
Jbyan  troops  in  Chad  and  that  this 
epresents  a  significant  increase  over 
,he  number  present  in  the  weeks  before 
-he  rebel  attack  on  Faya-Largeau.  There 
s  no  question  that  the  Libyan  troops  are 
ihere,  including  mechanized  units;  nor  is 
.here  any  question  of  repeated  Libyan 
dr  attacks  against  various  northern 
■enters,  including  Faya-Largeau.  We 
nave  reports  that  the  Libyan  troops  and 
jibyan-supported  rebels  besieging  Faya- 
Largeau  have  a  substantial  number  of 
jibyan  armored  vehicles  and  heavy  ar- 
tillery for  bombardment  and  that  their 
tir  attacks  have  included  both  bombs 
tnd  napalm. 

We  consider  the  situation  at  Faya- 
Largeau  serious  and  threatening.  The 
jibyan  Government  seems  to  be  seeking 
o  portray  what's  happening  in  Chad  as 
i  civil  conflict  and  to  portray  the 
Government  of  Chad  as  not  having 
egitimacy.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that 
.he  Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU) 
iias  recognized  the  legitimacy  of  the 
iabre  government.  The  most  recent 
DAU  statement  was  one  issued  in  mid- 
jluly  by  the  OAU  summit  bureau  calling 
for  an  end  to  foreign  interference  and 
uppealing  for  a  cease-fire.  There  is  no 
question  in  the  eyes  of  the  OAU  and  the 


majority  of  African  states  that  Habre's 
is  the  legitimate  government.  Libya 
would  like  to  have  it  otherwise.  Libya 
would  like  to  overturn  that  government 
and  substitute  its  surrogate  as  the 
government  of  Chad.  Were  this  to  hap- 
pen—if Qadhafi  were  able  to  set  up  an 
established  government  simply  by  using 
its  overwhelming  military  might  to  do 
so — this  would  have  consequences 
beyond  the  borders  of  Chad. 

Our  view  is  that  we  have  provided 
limited  materiel  support  for  the  Govern- 
ment of  Chad.  We  have  done  so  in  the 
context  of  other  African  support  for 
that  government  and  in  a  far  larger 
French  effort.  In  all  of  our  contacts,  we 
have  no  information  to  suggest  that,  in 
fact,  France  has  changed  its  position  on 
support  of  Chad.  A  French  statement 
over  the  weekend  was  subsequently 
clarified  in  Paris,  and  we  understand  the 
French  position  to  be  that  they  will 
make  appropriate  decisions  in  light  of 
the  situation  in  Chad.  We  are  operating 
in  the  context  of  African  and  French 
support  for  the  Government  of  Chad. 


'Made  by  the  principal  deputy  press 
secretary  to  the  President  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Aug.  15,  1983).  ■ 


AWACS  Withdrawn 
From  Sudan 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  23,  1983' 

We  continue  to  monitor  closely  the  situa- 
tion in  Chad  and  to  cooperate  with  con- 
cerned friends  and  allies  on  the  dangers 
posed  by  the  Libyan  aggression  against 
that  country.  Our  assessment  of  the  cur- 
rent situation  is  that,  for  the  immediate 
future,  we  need  not  keep  our  Air  Force 
assets  deployed  in  Sudan.  After  con- 
sultations with  concerned  governments, 
the  United  States  has,  therefore,  decid- 
ed to  begin  redeploying  the  aircraft  and 
personnel  to  the  United  States.  None- 
theless, as  was  demonstrated  by  the 
deployment,  appropriate  assets  can  be 
rapidly  moved  to  the  area  should  the 
situation  warrant. 


The  AWACS  [airborne  warning  and 
control  systems]  were  deployed  to  Sudan 
August  7  after  consultations  with  the 
Governments  of  Chad,  Sudan,  and 
France  to  perform  a  monitoring  role 
should  that  become  necessary.  We 
believe  the  deployment  clearly 
demonstrated  U.S.  concern  over  the 
events  in  Chad.  It  also  demonstrated 
once  again  the  close  ties  between  the 
United  States  and  its  friends  and  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  respond 
quickly  and  appropriately  when  cir- 
cumstances dictate. 

The  United  States  has  expressed  its 
appreciation  to  Sudan  for  its  assistance 
in  this  operation  in  response  to  overt 
Libyan  military  aggression  in  Chad.  In 
this  context,  we  have  also  reaffirmed 
our  concern  for  Sudan's  security  in  the 
face  of  Libya's  military  intervention  in 
Chad.  We  are  continuing  our  $25  million 
emergency  assistance  program  to  Chad. 

We  are  continuing  to  work  with  the 
Government  of  Chad,  and  other  con- 
cerned governments,  to  effect  the 
withdrawal  of  Libyan  forces  from  Chad 
and  to  protect  Chad's  territorial  integri- 
ty. There  can  be  no  doubt  that  regular 
Libyan  Army  units  are  occupying  ter- 
ritory well  within  Chad's  borders  and 
that  Libyan  Air  Force  units  have 
bombed  Chad. 

We  are  encouraged  by  the  French 
deployment  of  substantial  forces  to 
Chad.  The  United  States  again  con- 
demns Libya's  blatant  act  of  aggression 
and  affront  to  international  order  and 
calls  upon  Libya  to  withdraw.  The 
United  States  maintains  its  support  for 
Chad's  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty  and  does  not  wish  to  see  a 
resolution  of  the  conflict  resulting  in  a 
partition  of  Chad. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


ieptember1983 


51 


DEPARTMENT 


Legislative  Veto  in  Foreign  Affairs 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  July  28,  1983. 
Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 1 

The  Supreme  Court  has  now  decided,  in 
INS  v.  Chadha  and  two  related  cases,2 
that  the  legislative  veto  is  unconstitu- 
tional. The  Department  of  State  and  this 
committee  both  recognize  that  the 
Court's  historic  decision  affects  a  con- 
siderable body  of  legislation  in  the  field 
of  foreign  affairs  and  national  security. 
My  principal  theme  here  today  is  that 
our  two  branches  of  government  have  a 
common  interest  in  devising  cooperative 
ways  to  fulfill  our  shared  respon- 
sibilities. We  owe  the  American  people  a 
constructive  response  to  the  issues  we 
now  face. 

The  Department  of  State  is  in  the 
process  of  reviewing  all  the  legislation 
with  which  we  deal  and  which  is  affected 
by  Chadha — the  language  of  the 
statutes,  their  legislative  history,  and 
the  record  of  executive-legislative  rela- 
tions in  working  with  these  statutes.  We 
have  reached  some  tentative  conclusions, 
which  I  am  happy  to  share  with  the 
committee.  Our  review  is  still  continu- 
ing, however,  and  we  will  keep  the  com- 
mittee informed  as  we  proceed  toward 
firmer  judgments. 

In  The  Federalist  No.  47,  James 
Madison  referred  to  the  separation  of 
powers  as  "this  essential  precaution  in 
favor  of  liberty."  The  genius  of  our  con- 
stitutional system  is  that  a  structure  of 
dispersed  powers  and  checks  and 
balances,  designed  to  limit  government 
power  and  preserve  our  freedom,  has 
also  been  able  to  produce  coherent  and 
effective  national  policy.  This  success  is 
a  tribute  to  the  Founding  Fathers  who 
built  the  structure;  it  is  also  a  tribute  to 
the  generations  of  leaders  and  states- 
men since  then  who  have  put  the 
nation's  well-being  first  and  foremost  as 
they  played  their  constitutional  roles  in 
the  various  branches  of  government.  As 
Justice  White  acknowledged  in  his  dis- 
sent in  Chadha,  "the  history  of  the 
separation  of  powers  doctrine  is  also 
a  history  of  accommodation  and 
practicality." 


The  Administration  is  prepared  to 
work  with  the  Congress  in  this  spirit. 
First,  I  would  like  to  review  with  you 
the  history  of  the  legislative  veto— what 
it  is,  how  it  has  worked — and  then  the 
Chadha  decision  itself  and  its  conse- 
quences. Finally,  I  shall  discuss  the  im- 
pact of  that  decision  on  some  of  the 
statutes  that  are  of  particular  concern  to 
the  Department  of  State  and  to  this 
committee. 

The  Legislative  Veto 

"Legislative  veto"  is  a  term  describing  a 
variety  of  statutory  devices  that  were 
meant  to  give  the  Congress  legal  control 
over  actions  of  executive  departments 
and  agencies  by  means  other  than  the 
enactment  of  laws.  Legislative  veto  pro- 
visions have  been  included  in  statutes 
for  more  than  50  years.  The  procedure 
was  first  passed  into  law  in  the  act  of 
June  30,  1932,  which  authorized  Presi- 
dent Hoover  to  reorganize  the  structure 
of  the  Federal  Government  subject  to 
congressional  review.  The  device  was 
added  to  various  statutes  during  World 
War  II,  when  the  Congress  delegated 
greater  authority  to  the  President  in  the 
area  of  foreign  affairs  and  national 
security,  subject  to  the  legislative  veto 
procedure.  Enactment  of  the  procedure 
became  frequent  again  in  the  1960s  and 
1970s,  as  Congress  sought  to  strengthen 
its  oversight  over  the  expanding  practice 
of  rulemaking  by  administrative  agen- 
cies. Adoption  of  the  legislative  veto 
procedure  reached  its  zenith  in  the  early 
1970s,  in  connection  with  some  major 
controversies  in  the  area  of  foreign  af- 
fairs and  national  security. 

Some  of  these  statutes  provide  for 
congressional  disapproval  of  proposed 
administrative  regulations.  Some  involve 
review  of  decisions  of  individual  cases— 
Chadha,  for  example,  involved  the 
suspension  of  the  deportation  of  a  single 
person— or  review  of  other  executive  ac- 
tions under  authority  granted  by 
statute.  Other  legislation,  such  as  the 
War  Powers  Resolution,  involves  the 
allocation  of  broad  constitutional 
powers. 

The  legislative  vetoes  in  all  these 
statutes  fall  into  two  general  categories. 


First,  there  are  those  in  which  the 
full  Congress,  or  one  House  or  one  com- 
mittee, is  purportedly  given  a  right  to 
"veto"  an  administrative  action.  A 
typical  statute  of  this  kind  requires  the 
President  to  report  an  action  or  rule  to 
both  Houses  of  Congress.  The  executive 
action  may  not  be  made  or  take  effect 
until  after  a  fixed  period— 60  days,  for 
example.  If  Congress  does  not  act  dur- 
ing the  period,  the  executive  action  can 
take  effect,  but  if  the  Congress  disap- 
proves— or  one  House  or  committee,  as 
the  statute  may  provide — it  does  not 
take  effect. 

Second,  there  are  statutory  schemes 
by  which  an  administrative  action  pur- 
portedly becomes  valid  only  when  ap- 
proved by  Congress.  The  typical  statute 
of  this  kind  requires  the  President  to 
report  a  proposed  action  and  then  pro- 
vides for  affirmative  approval  by  one  or 
two  Houses  of  the  Congress.  Most 
legislative  vetoes,  like  the  one  in 
Chadha,  fall  within  the  first  category. 

The  Chadha  Case 
and  Its  Implications 

The  case  of  INS  v.  Chadha  involved  a 
section  of  the  Immigration  and  Na- 
tionality Act.  That  statute  permitted  the 
Attorney  General  to  allow  a  deportable 
alien  to  remain  in  the  United  States, 
suspending  an  otherwise  valid  deporta- 
tion order.  This  suspension  authority, 
however,  was  subject  to  disapproval  by 
a  simple  resolution  of  either  House  of 
Congress.  The  Attorney  General 
suspended  Mr.  Chadha's  deportation,  bu 
the  House  of  Representatives  disap- 
proved. Chadha  brought  suit;  the 
Supreme  Court  held  the  congressional 
veto  to  be  unconstitutional.  The  ra- 
tionale of  the  Court's  holding  was  that 
legislative  actions,  to  be  valid,  must 
follow  the  course  prescribed  in  the  Con- 
stitution: approval  by  both  Houses  and 
"presentment"  to  the  President.  Thus, 
the  Court's  decision  in  Chadha  in- 
validates not  only  the  "one-House  veto" 
but  the  "two-House  veto"  and  "commit- 
tee veto"  as  well,  a  point  confirmed  by 
the  Court's  subsequent  summary  deci- 
sions of  July  6.  Those  statutes  which 
provide  for  congressional  action  by  joint 
resolution— passed  by  both  Houses  and 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


DEPARTMENT 


signed  by  the  President — would  not 
seem  to  be  affected  by  Chadha. 

The  legislative  veto  has  long  been 
controversial,  ever  since  Woodrow 
Wilson  first  vetoed  a  bill  incorporating  a 
legislative  veto  in  1920.  Since  then,  most 
Administrations  have  considered  the 
device  unconstitutional,  while  the  Con- 
gress has  tended  to  favor  it  as  another 
useful  check  on  executive  authority.  This 
specific  controversy  is  now  decided.  Yet 
paradoxically,  the  practice  of  executive- 
legislative  relations  is  unlikely  to 
undergo  any  radical  change  in  the  wake 
of  Chadha,  for  several  reasons. 

Chadha  does  not  affect  other 
statutory  procedures  by  which  the  Con- 
gress is  informed  of  or  involved  in  ac- 
tions by  the  executive  branch.  Specifical- 
ly, the  Court's  decision  does  not  affect 
statutory  requirements  for  notifications, 
certifications,  findings  or  reports  to  Con- 
gress, consultations  with  Congress,  or 
waiting  periods  which  give  Congress  an 
opportunity  to  act  before  executive  ac- 
tions take  effect.  In  the  foreign  affairs 
field,  moreover,  the  executive  branch 
and  the  Congress  have  generally  recon- 
ciled or  disposed  of  controversies  and 
differences  without  resort  to  the  process 
of  legislative  veto.  Therefore,  we  see  no 
reason  why  the  Court's  decision  need 
cause  a  fundamental  change  in  our 
relationship. 

The  Administration  is  prepared  to 
work  closely  with  the  Congress  to 
resolve  any  questions  or  problems  that 
may  arise  as  a  result  of  the  Chadha  deci- 
sion. And  we  hope  that  Congress  will 
act  in  the  same  spirit  of  cooperation. 
Perhaps  the  key  legal  question  raised  by 
Chadha  is  that  of  "severability."  The 
problem  is  an  intriguing  one:  Since  the 
legislative  veto  provision  of  a  statute  is 
unconstitutional,  is  any  of  the  rest  of  the 
law  tainted  by  that  defect?  The  Supreme 
Court  has  given  us  a  basis  for  answering 
that  question.  The  general  principle  is 
that  the  provision  containing  the 
legislative  veto  will  be  found  to  be 
severable,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
statute  will  continue  unaffected,  unless 
it  is  evident  that  the  Congress  would  not 
have  enacted  the  remainder  of  the  law 
without  the  legislative  veto.  That  test 
establishes  a  strong  presumption  in 
favor  of  severability. 

The  Court  has  also  given  us  some 
additional  guidelines.  There  is  a  further 
presumption  of  severability,  first,  if  the 
statute  contains  an  express  "severability 
clause."  Several  of  the  statutes  with 


which  we  deal— including  the  War 
Powers  Resolution  and  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act— contain  such  severability 
clauses.  Second,  the  legislative  veto  is 
also  presumed  to  be  severable  if  the 
legislative  program  in  question  is  "fully 
operative  as  a  law"  without  the  veto  pro- 
vision. In  the  statutes  with  which  we  are 
dealing,  this  seems  generally  to  be  the 
case.  These  statutes  often  establish  a 
system  under  which  the  executive 
branch  is  empowered  to  make  or  imple- 
ment a  decision  30  or  60  days  later 
unless  the  Congress  chooses  to 
intervene. 

In  foreign  affairs  cases  to  date,  in 
the  absence  of  formal  congressional  ac- 
tion, the  executive  determination  has 
proceeded,  although  congressional  views 
have  always  been  taken  fully  into  ac- 
count. This  pattern  clearly  indicates  that 
these  statutes  are  capable  of  independ- 
ent operation  with  no  further  congres- 
sional action. 

Specific  Statutes 

There  are  more  than  a  dozen  statutes  in 
the  foreign  affairs  and  national  security 
area  that  are  affected  by  the  Chadha 
decision.  I  would  say  that  four  statutes 
or  groups  of  statutes  are  of  particular 
importance.  These  are  arms  export  con- 
trols, the  War  Powers  Resolution, 
nuclear  nonproliferation  controls,  and 
trade  controls  related  to  emigration. 

Arms  Export  Control.  I  know  this 
subject  is  of  pressing  concern  to  this 
committee.  It  is  also  of  importance  to 
the  Administration,  because  of  the  im- 
portance of  such  transactions  to  the 
security  of  friendly  countries  and  to  our 
political  relations  with  friendly 
countries. 

Under  the  Chadha  decision,  we 
believe  that  the  procedures  for 
legislative  vetoes  in  several  sections  of 
the  Arms  Export  Control  Act  are  not 
valid  but  that  the  reporting  and  waiting 
periods  remain.  The  Court  decision  in  no 
way  alters  the  elaborate  structure  of 
reporting,  consultation,  and  collabora- 
tion that  the  executive  branch  and  the 
Congress  have  worked  out  over  recent 
years  to  ensure  effective  congressional 
oversight. 

Under  the  Arms  Export  Control 
Act,  for  example,  we  have  regularly  and 
formally  notified  the  Congress  of  pro- 
posed sales  under  the  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  program  and  of  proposed 
licenses  of  arms  exports  sold  through 


commercial  channels.  We  also  provide 
the  Congress  with  additional  advance 
notification  of  many  of  those  transac- 
tions. As  a  matter  of  practice  and  ac- 
commodation, we  have  agreed  to  pro- 
vide the  Congress  with  informal  pro- 
notifications  of  proposed  sales  under  the 
FMS  program  before  the  final  notice  is 
submitted.  This  procedure,  which  is  not 
in  the  statute,  has  given  Congress  the 
opportunity  to  review  and  comment 
upon  proposed  transactions  informally 
and  privately  before  the  executive 
branch  makes  a  formal  public 
commitment. 

In  addition,  under  the  Javits  amend- 
ment, we  submit  an  annual  arms  sales 
proposal  covering  all  FMS  sales  and 
commercial  exports  above  certain 
thresholds  which  are  considered  eligible 
for  approval  during  the  current  calendar 
year,  as  well  as  an  indication  of  which 
ones  are  most  likely  to  result  in  a  letter 
of  offer  or  an  export  license.  We  also 
provide,  under  Section  28  of  the  act, 
quarterly  reports  of  each  "price  and 
availability"  estimate  provided  to  a 
foreign  country,  together  with  a  list  of 
requests  received  from  a  foreign  country 
for  a  letter  of  offer  to  see  defense  ar- 
ticles and  services. 

Thus,  the  Congress  has  received  and 
will  continue  to  receive  annual,  quarter- 
ly, and  case-by-case  information,  formal 
and  informal,  on  all  actual  and  potential 
arms  sales.  In  the  last  3  years,  we  have 
sent  up  more  than  240  formal  reports  of 
intended  arms  sales — 110  in  FY  1981, 
90  in  FY  1982,  and  41  in  FY  1983  to 
date.  In  addition,  three  informal  notifica- 
tions are  currently  before  you.  While 
Congress  has  never  disapproved  any 
proposed  arms  sale,  the  Administration 
has,  on  occasion,  modified  the  terms  of  a 
proposal  in  light  of  congressional  con- 
cerns. We  have  done  so  even  though  the 
executive  branch  has  long  considered  the 
legislative  veto  to  be  unconstitutional. 

I  think  the  record  speaks  for  itself. 
The  executive  branch  does  not  live  in  a 
vacuum,  and  we  are  acutely  aware  of 
the  need  for  consultation  and  coopera- 
tion in  this  sensitive  area  of  arms  ex- 
ports. Our  foreign  policy  and  national  in- 
terest require  that  a  President,  any 
President,  be  able  to  use  this  important 
policy  instrument  effectively,  flexibly, 
and,  I  might  add,  responsibly.  We 
recognize  the  necessity  of  congressional 
oversight.  As  in  any  other  important 
area  of  national  policy,  both  Congress 
and  the  executive  have  a  heavy  respon- 
sibility to  work  together  in  the  national 
interest. 


September  1983 


53 


DEPARTMENT 


War  Powers  Resolution.  The  War 
Powers  Resolution  contains  four  major 
operative  parts.  The  first  of  these  is  a 
consultation  requirement.  In  Section  3  of 
the  resolution,  the  President  is  required 
to  consult  with  the  Congress  "in  e\  ery 
possible  instance"  before  U.S.  Armed 
Forces  are  introduced  into  hostilities  or 
into  situations  where  imminent  involve- 
ment in  such  hostilities  is  clearly  in- 
dicated by  the  circumstances.  And  the 
President  is  to  consult  regularly  while 
the  forces  remain  in  such  situations. 

The  second  operative  part  is  a  re- 
porting requirement.  In  Section  4(a)  of 
the  resolution,  the  President  is  required 
to  make  a  formal  report  to  Congress  in 
any  case  in  which  U.S.  Armed  Forces 
are  introduced 

•  "(1)  into  hostilities  or  into  situa- 
tions where  imminent  involvement  in 
hostilities  is  clearly  indicated  by  the 
circumstances; 

•  "('!)  into  the  territory,  airspace  or 
waters  of  a  foreign  nation,  while 
equipped  for  combat,  except  for 
deployments  which  relate  solely  to  sup- 
ply, replacement,  repair,  or  training  of 
such  forces;  or 

•  "(3)  in  numbers  which  substantial- 
ly enlarge  United  States  Armed  Forces 
equipped  for  combat  already  located  in  a 
foreign  nation.  .  .  ." 

The  third  operative  part,  Section 
5(b),  requires  the  President  to  withdraw 
U.S.  troops  not  later  than  60  days  after 
a  report  of  actual  or  imminent  involve- 
ment in  hostilities  unless  the  Congress 
has  affirmatively  authorized  their  con- 
tinued presence. 

The  fourth  operative  part  is  a  leg- 
islative veto.  According  to  Section  5(c), 
the  President  must  withdraw  U.S. 
troops  introduced  into  hostilities  even 
before  the  end  of  60  days  if  the  Con- 
gress so  directs  by  concurrent 
resolution. 

The  first  and  second  provisions  of 
the  War  Powers  Resolution  on  consulta- 
tion and  reporting  are,  in  our  view, 
unaffected  by  the  Chadha  decision.  We 
do  not  intend  to  change  our  practice 
with  respect  to  consultation  and 
reporting. 

The  fourth  provision,  which  asserted 
a  right  of  Congress  by  concurrent 
resolution  to  order  the  President  to 
remove  troops  engaged  in  hostilities,  is 
clearly  unconstitutional  under  the 
Supreme  Court's  holding  in  Chadha.    It 
must  be  said,  however,  that  this  holding 


is  unlikely  to  have  a  significant  impact 
on  the  way  national  security  policy  is 
conducted.  In  the  decade  since  the 
enactment  of  the  War  Powers  Resolu- 
tion, no  U.S.  forces  have  been  commit- 
ted to  long-term  hostilities.  It  is  doubtful 
that  Presidents  have  refrained  from 
such  commitments  simply  because  of  the 
legislative  veto  in  the  War  Powers 
Resolution;  it  is  equally  doubtful  that 
Presidents  will  now  feel  freer  of 
restraints  because  of  Chadha.  The  lesson 
of  recent  history  is  that  a  President  can- 
not sustain  a  major  military  involvement 
without  congressional  and  public 
support. 

The  legislative  veto  provision  of  the 
War  Powers  Resolution  is  severable 
from  the  others,  in  our  view,  according 
to  the  Supreme  Court's  test  and  guide- 
lines. The  resolution,  itself,  includes  a 
severability  clause,  and  the  other 
operative  portions  of  the  resolution  need 
not  be  affected  by  the  dropping  of  the 
veto  provision. 

The  third  operative  part  of  the  reso- 
lution, requiring  positive  congressional 
authorization  after  60  days,  does  not  fall 
within  the  scope  of  <  'hadha.  Its  constitu- 
tionality is  not  affirmed,  denied,  or  even 
considered  in  the  Chadha  decision.  As 
yon  know,  the  executive  branch  has 
traditionally  had  questions  about  this  re- 
quirement of  congressional  authorization 
for  Presidential  disposition  of  our  armed 
forces,  both  in  light  of  the  President's 
Commander  in  Chief  power  and  on  prac- 
tical grounds.  Congress,  of  course,  has 
had  a  different  view.  I  do  not  believe 
that  any  purpose  would  be  served  by 
debating  these  questions  here,  in  the 
abstract.  This  provision  is  unlikely  to  be 
tested  in  the  near  future.  Here,  too,  I 
want  to  reaffirm  the  Administration's 
strong  commitment  to  the  principles  of 
consultation  and  reporting,  confident 
that  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  the  ex- 
ecutive and  the  Congress  can  meet 
future  challenges  together  in  the  na- 
tional interest. 

Nuclear  Nonproliferation.  Nuclear 
nonproliferation  is  another  important 
policy  area  in  which  statutes  have  con- 
tained legislative  veto  provisions. 
Various  sections  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act,  for  example,  have  provided  for  a 
legislative  veto  of  Presidential  deter- 
minations to  permit  nuclear  exports  to 
foreign  countries. 


These  statutory  arrangements 
typically  involve  three  elements.  First, 
they  establish  very  strict  standards 
limiting  the  export  of  nuclear  items.  Sec- 
cond,  they  authorize  the  President  to 
waive  certain  restrictions  and  permit  ex- 
ports if  he  makes  certain  findings. 
Third,  they  have  provided  for  a  congres- 
sional veto  of  the  Presidential  waiver. 
We  consider  that  those  standards  and 
that  waiver  authority,  as  well  as  the 
statutory  requirement  of  notification  to 
Congress  and  the  observance  of  a 
waiting  period,  continue  to  be  valid.  We 
will  continue  to  wait  through  the  period 
during  which  the  Congress,  in  the  past, 
deliberated  over  its  veto;  during  that 
time,  the  Congress  may  use  its  constitu- 
tional authority  to  enact  new  legislation 
if  it  chooses.  The  only  provision  that  is 
invalid  is  the  third,  which  permitted  a 
legislative  veto  by  concurrent  resolution. 

The  Administration  and  the  Con- 
gress share  the  same  concern  about 
nuclear  proliferation.  We  have  been  ac- 
tive diplomatically  in  this  field,  as  this 
committee  well  knows.  We  vigorously 
oppose  the  development  of  nuclear 
weapons  capabilities  by  additional  coun- 
tries. Each  executive  branch  agency  is 
required  to  keep  the  Congress,  including 
this  committee,  fully  informed  of  its  ac- 
tivities in  this  field  and  of  significant 
developments  abroad.  We  have  done  so, 
and  we  are  proud  of  our  record  of  close 
consultation  and  collaboration  with  the 
Congress.  We  will  continue  that 
practice. 

Jackson-Vanik  Amendment  and 
Trade-Related  Issues.  A  fourth  impor- 
tant statutory  area  involving  a 
legislative  veto  is  the  procedure  for 
granting  most-favored-nation  (MFN) 
treatment  to  certain  nonmarket  coun- 
tries. Under  the  Jackson-Vanik  amend- 
ment, nondiscriminatory  tariff  treatment 
may  be  granted  to  these  countries  only 
when  they  comply  with  certain  condi- 
tions affecting  the  right  of  emigration. 
These  requirements  may  be  waived  on 
the  basis  of  stated  findings  and  deter- 
minations by  the  President. 

The  annual  report  required  under 
that  statute — for  continuation  of  MFN 
for  Hungary,  Romania,  and  China — is 
now  before  the  Congress.  This  report  il- 
lustrates how  we  believe  Congress  and 
the  executive  should  continue  to  work 
together  constructively. 

We  presented  that  report  to  the 
Congress  before  the  Supreme  Court 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


decision  was  announced,  but  we  would 
have  done  precisely  the  same  thing  if 
the  Chadha  decision  had  been  handed 
down  before  the  report  was  filed.  We  re- 
gard the  report  as  fully  effective  to  ex- 
tend the  waiver  authority  and  to  con- 
tinue the  waivers  currently  in  force.  At 
the  same  time,  legislative  oversight 
hearings  serve  the  salutary  purpose  of 
scrutinizing  the  implementation  of 
statutory  requirements,  of  airing  public 
concerns,  and  of  making  our  nation's 
deep  commitment  to  human  rights 
known  to  other  nations. 

The  spirit  with  which  we  expect  to 
work  with  Congress  in  the  future,  in  all 
statutory  fields,  is  illustrated  by  another 
example.  We  are  required  by  the  Case- 
Zablocki  Act  to  report  executive  agree- 
ments to  the  Congress,  and  we  do  so 
regularly.  That  procedure  notifies  the 
Congress  of  agreements  already  signed. 
There  is  also  a  procedure  for  enabling 
this  committee  and  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  to  consult  with  us  as 
to  the  form  of  significant  international 
agreements  prior  to  their  conclusion. 
This  practice  was  arranged  between  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  chairmen 
of  the  two  committees  in  1978.  It  is  not 
required  by  law  but  makes  good  sense. 
We  will  maintain  it. 

The  Future 

As  I  have  emphasized,  little  of  practical 
ignificance  need  in  fact  change  as  a 
result  of  the  Supreme  Court  decision. 
The  Department  of  State  is  committed 
to  continue  working  closely  with  the 
members  and  committees  of  Congress 
and  to  take  their  concerns  into  account 
in  reaching  decisions  on  issues  of  policy. 
If  anything,  I  believe  Chadha  will  make 
the  departments  and  agencies  of  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  more,  not  less,  conscious 
that  they  are  accountable  for  their 
actions. 

There  are  many  basic  questions 
about  the  separation  of  powers  which 
;he  Supreme  Court  will  probably  never 
settle.  In  that  realm  our  constitutional 
aw  is  determined,  in  a  sense,  as  in  Bri- 
;ain — by  constitutional  practice,  by 
political  realities,  by  the  fundamental 
ood  sense,  and  public  conscience  of  the 
American  people  and  their  representa- 
tives. This  is  how  we  have  always  set- 
tled these  questions,  and  this  is  how  we, 
the  executive  and  the  Congress,  must 
approach  these  problems  in  the  after- 
math of  Chadha. 

Our  Constitution  has  proved  to  be  a 
wise  and  enduring  blueprint  for  free 
government.  In  this  period  of  our 


history,  our  nation  faces  challenges  that 
the  drafters  of  that  document  could  not 
have  imagined.  The  Federal  Government 
has  the  duty  to  conduct  this  nation's 
foreign  policy  and  ensure  its  security  in 
a  nuclear  age,  in  an  era  of  instantaneous 
communications,  in  a  complex  modern 
world  in  which  international  politics  has 
become  truly  global.  America's  respon- 
sibility as  a  world  leader  imposes  on  us  a 
special  obligation  of  coherence,  vision, 
and  constancy  in  the  conduct  of  our 
foreign  relations.  For  this,  there  must 
be  unity  in  our  national  government. 
The  President  and  the  Congress  must 
work  in  harmony  or  our  people  will  not 
have  the  effective,  strong,  and  pur- 
poseful foreign  policy  which  they  expect 
and  deserve.  We  have  seen  in  the  last  15 
years  that  when  Congress  and  the  Presi- 
dent are  at  loggerheads,  the  result  can 
be  stalemate  and  sometimes  serious 
harm  to  our  foreign  policy. 


We  now  have  an  opportunity,  all  of 
us,  to  put  much  of  that  past  behind  us, 
and  to  start  afresh.  We  have  a  chance  to 
shape  a  new  era  of  harmony  between 
the  branches  of  our  government — an  era 
of  constructive  and  fruitful  policymak- 
ing, of  creativity  and  statesmanship. 
That  is  President  Reagan's  goal  and  the 
goal  of  all  of  us  in  his  Administration. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

'Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service 
v.  Chadha,  No.  80-132  (U.S.  June  23,  1983); 
Process  Gas  Consumers  Group  v.  Consumers 
Energy  Council  of  America,  Nos.  81-2008  et 
al.  (U.S.  July  6,  1983),  affirming  Consumers 
Energy  Council  of  America  v.  FERC,  673  F. 
2d  425  (D.C.  Cir.  1982),  and  Consumers 
Union,  Inc.  v.  FTC,  691  F.  2d  575  (D.C.  Cir. 
1982).  ■ 


POW-MIAs  and  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Southeast  Asia 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asia  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  July  14, 
1983.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs.1 

Some  2,500  Americans  are  missing  and 
unaccounted  for  as  a  result  of  the  war  in 
Indochina:  some  1,800  in  Vietnam,  near- 
ly 600  in  Laos,  and  almost  100  in  Kam- 
puchea. For  more  than  10  years,  their 
families  have  been  attempting  to  learn 
of  their  fate.  This  long  period  of  hoping 
and  waiting  has  been  a  heavy  burden  to 
bear  for  these  families.  We  owe  it  to  the 
missing,  and  to  those  who  will  fight  in 
future  wars,  to  make  every  effort  for 
the  fullest  accounting  possible. 

Administration  Policy 

President  Reagan  has  made  clear  his 
deep  concern  and  commitment  to  obtain 
the  fullest  possible  accounting  for 
Americans  missing  in  Southeast  Asia. 
This  Administration  actively  and  con- 
sistently pursues  such  an  accounting. 
Last  January  the  President  reaffirmed 
in  his  remarks  to  the  National  League  of 
Families  that  we  share  a  "common 


quest — the  return  of  POWs,  the  fullest 
possible  accounting  for  the  still  missing, 
and  the  repatriation  of  the  remains  of 
those  who  died  serving  our  nation."  This 
Presidential  commitment  is  shared  per- 
sonally by  Secretary  Shultz  and  actively 
pursued  by  the  Department  of  State.  We 
know  that  this  is  also  an  issue  of  serious 
concern  to  this  subcommittee  and  this 
task  force,  and  we  are  deeply  ap- 
preciative of  your  support  for  our  ef- 
forts. Today  I  would  like  to  discuss  some 
developments  on  the  POW-MIA  issue  in 
the  context  of  our  policy  toward  the 
region. 

The  United  States  seeks  to  play  a 
constructive  and  positive  role  in  main- 
taining peace  and  security  in  Southeast 
Asia.  We  believe,  along  with  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN),  that  Vietnam's  continued  oc- 
cupation of  Kampuchea  is  the  main 
threat  to  stability  in  the  region.  It  is  our 
policy  to  strongly  support  ASEAN  in  its 
efforts  to  obtain  a  comprehensive, 
political  settlement  in  Kampuchea  based 
on  the  principles  in  the  declaration  of 
the  international  conference  on  Kam- 
puchea. These  principles  include  the 
complete  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese 
forces  from  Kampuchea  and  the  restora- 
tion of  Khmer  independence  and  self- 
determination.  Vietnam,  however,  is  still 


.September  1983 


55 


EAST  ASIA 


determined  to  maintain  its  domination  of 
Kampuchea  by  military  occupation.  We 
have  made  it  clear  that  we  will  not  con- 
sider normalization  of  relations  with 
Vietnam  as  long  as  it  continues  to  oc- 
cupy Kampuchea  and  to  play  a  de- 
stabilizing role  in  the  region. 

At  the  same  time,  the  POW-MIA 
issue  is  a  humanitarian  issue  of  the 
highest  priority  on  which  we  believe 
progress  should  lie  made  now.  Indeed, 
our  government  sees  it  as  the  most  im- 
portant bilateral  issue  between  our  coun- 
tries In  his  January  28  address  to  the 
National  League  of  Families,  President 
Reagan  said  that  he  had  "called  on  the 
government  in  Hanoi  to  honor  then- 
pledges  to  the  American  people  on  the 
POW-MIA  issue."  During  the  past  year, 
we  have  acted  to  encourage  the  Viet- 
namese to  meet  their  humanitarian 
obligations.  We  have  also  made  efforts 
to  encourage  cooperation  from  the 
Government  of  Laos  in  the  context  of 
our  bilateral  relations.  Additionally,  we 
have  kept  this  important  humanitarian 
issue  before  the  international 
community. 

Efforts  With  the  Vietnamese 

The  highlights  of  the  Administration's 
efforts  with  the  Vietnamese  include  the 
following. 

•  In  February  1982  a  delegation  led 
by  then  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense  Armitage  traveled  to  Hanoi  to 
impress  on  the  Vietnamese  the  impor- 
tance that  this  Administration  attaches 
to  the  POW-MIA  issue. 

•  Last  August  Vietnamese  POW- 
MIA  specialists  visited  the  Joint  Casual- 
ty Resolution  Center  and  the  Central 
Identification  Laboratory  in  Hawaii. 

•  In  September  the  Vietnamese 
Foreign  Minister  announced  agreement 
to  our  longstanding  proposal  that 
POW-MIA  specialists  on  both  sides 
meet  regularly.  Four  meetings  a  year 
have  been  agreed  upon,  and  three  have 
taken  place  in  Hanoi.  The  Vietnamese 
used  the  occasion  of  the  last  meeting  to 
return  the  remains  of  nine  individuals 
and  identification  materials  of  three 
others. 

We  expect  these  meetings  to  con- 
tinue. We  have  proposed  the  next 
meeting  for  September.  We  believe  that 
they  are  useful  in  themselves  for  ex- 
change of  information  and  to  remind  the 
Vietnamese  of  the  importance  we  attach 
to  this  issue.  Their  real  value,  however, 
would  be  in  leading  to  more  extensive 


cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  Viet- 
namese Government.  Unfortunately, 
progress  on  this  issue  has  been  disap- 
pointing because  the  Vietnamese 
Government  still  seems  to  want  to  use 
this  humanitarian  issue  for  political 
purposes. 

Efforts  With  the  Lao 

We  have  also  continued  to  seek  the 
cooperation  of  Laos  and  welcome  the 


Finally,  we  have  stated  at  the 
highest  levels  of  government  that  we  are 
strongly  opposed  to  private  crossborder 
forays  in  search  of  prisoners  or  remains. 
Such  forays  are  counterproductive  and 
hurt  our  government-to-government  ef- 
forts. We  believe  that  such  forays  may 
have  delayed  the  Lao  in  responding  to 
our  interest  on  joint  crash  site  searches 
by  causing  uncertainty  about  U.S.  inten- 
tions toward  Laos. 


cooperative  gestures  which  the  Lao 
Government  has  made  in  the  past  year. 
This  Administration  supported  the 
National  League  of  Families  visit  to 
Laos  last  September.  The  visit  was  help- 
ful in  encouraging  the  Lao  Government 
to  be  more  cooperative  on  MIA  matters. 
During  the  league's  visit  with  the  Lao 
Government,  new  ground  was  broken  by 
permitting  broader  U.S.  Government 
contact  within  the  Lao  Government  and 
some  U.S.  Government  travel  outside 
Vientiane.  This  followed  earlier  U.S. 
Government  actions,  such  as  emergency 
medical  assistance  and  visits  by  several 
congressional  figures,  to  demonstrate 
our  interest  in  an  improved  relationship. 
We  followed  up  the  Lao  Government 
discussions  with  the  league  during  a 
series  of  talks  with  Lao  officials  by 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  [Daniel  A.] 
O'Donohue,  former  Senator  [from 
California,  Samuel  I.]  Hayakawa  in  his 
capacity  as  a  Special  Adviser  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  Asian  and  Pacific 
Relations,  and  the  Charge  at  the 
American  Embassy  in  Vientiane.  We 
have  made  it  clear  to  the  Lao  in  our 
discussions  that  an  improvement  in  our 
overall  bilateral  relationship  depends  on 
both  sides  taking  concrete  steps  to 
demonstrate  progress. 

Last  January  President  Reagan 
stated  before  the  league  that  progress 
on  the  POW-MIA  issue  will  be  a  prin- 
cipal measure  of  Lao  sincerity  in  im- 
proving relations.  This  past  February, 
the  Lao  permitted  a  team  from  the  Joint 
Casualty  Resolution  Center  and  the  Cen- 
tral Identification  Laboratory  to  visit 
Vientiane  for  talks  with  Lao  counter- 
parts about  specific  cases  and  joint 
searches  of  crash  sites.  This  was  the 
first  such  visit  since  1975. 

We  have  indicated  to  the  Lao  Gov- 
ernment that  a  pattern  of  Lao  coopera- 
tion on  the  POW-MIA  issue  would  be 
important  in  securing  congressional  sup- 
port for  lifting  the  legislative  ban  on  aid 
to  Laos.  Depending  on  how  our  relations 
develop,  other  steps,  such  as  upgrading 
diplomatic  relations,  could  also  be 
considered. 


Di 


Efforts  With  Other  Countries 

In  addition  to  our  efforts  on  the 
POW-MIA  issue  with  the  Vietnamese 
and  the  Lao,  this  Administration  has 
kept  this  issue  before  the  international 
community.  Our  actions  include  the 
following. 

•  At  his  meetings  in  Bangkok  last 
month,  Secretary  Shultz  asked  the 
ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers  to  help  us  in 
resolving  the  MIA  issue.  They  expressed 
their  willingness  to  help,  and  we  are 
pursuing  the  issue  with  them. 

•  We  regularly  request  senior  of- 
ficials from  these  and  other  selected 
countries  to  meet  with  the  Lao  or  Viet- 
namese to  impress  upon  them  the  impor- 
tance that  we  attach  to  this  issue.  Such 
approaches  bring  home  to  the  Lao  and 
Vietnamese  that  the  POW-MIA  issue 
can  affect  their  broader  foreign  policy 
interests. 

•  American  Embassies  in  Asia  and 
Europe  are  aware  of  the  importance  of 
this  issue  and  are  prepared  to  make  full 
use  of  opportunities  to  seek  the  help  of 
friendly  countries. 

•  The  Royal  Thai  Government  has 
granted  special  access  for  Joint  Casualty 
Resolution  Center  liaison  staff  to  the 
Lao,  Vietnamese,  and  Kampuchean 
refugee  camps  normally  closed  to  out- 
side groups.  We  greatly  appreciate  the 
Thai  Government's  forthcoming 
cooperation. 

Seeking  Information  From  Refugees 

Another  area  in  which  the  Administra- 
tion has  been  active  is  in  taking  steps  to 
improve  on  the  information  that  we  are 
getting  from  refugees.  Our  Embassies  in 
Southeast  Asia  reviewed  procedures  for 
debriefing  refugees  to  assure  that  we 
are  getting  all  of  the  information 
available.  Over  500  letters  were  sent 
from  the  Department  of  Health  and 
Human  Services  to  refugee  mutual 
assistance  associations  in  the  United 
States  requesting  that  they  contact  their 
members  for  information  regarding 
POW-MIAs. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ENERGY 


At  the  suggestion  of  the  National 
League  of  Families,  a  Department  of 
Health  and  Human  Services  pilot  project 
is  underway  to  locate  Indochinese 
refugee  public  assistance  recipients  in 
Texas  to  send  them  leaflets  inquiring  if 
they  have  information  on  MIAs.  If  the 
results  of  this  project  are  promising,  it 
:ould  be  expanded  to  other  states.  The 
ame  leaflets  will  also  be  made  available 
to  private  voluntary  organizations  in- 
volved in  the  resettlement  of  refugees  in 
the  United  States. 

Interagency  Working  Group  (IAG) 

The  agencies  primarily  concerned  with 
his  issue — the  Departments  of  State, 
Defense,  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agen- 
;y,  and  the  National  Security  Coun- 
lil — are  working  closely  with  the  ex- 
ecutive Director  of  the  National  League 
)f  Families  in  the  framework  of  the  In- 
teragency Group  on  POW-MIAs  (IAG). 

IAG  members  cooperate  in  assisting 
he  league's  efforts  to  stimulate  public 
iwareness  on  this  issue  and  implement- 
ng  the  government's  public  awareness 
arogram.  Members  work  together  in  a 
lommon  effort  to  investigate  reports 
rearing  on  the  POW-MIA  issue.  In- 
vestigations of  live  sighting  reports  are 
issigned  highest  priority  based  on  the 
issumption  that  some  Americans  are 
still  being  held  captive.  Although  hard 
evidence  of  live  POWs  has  not  yet  been 
ibtained,  information  from  all  sources  is 
ictively  solicited  and  evaluated. 

IAG  members  also  work  together  in 
leveloping  new  approaches  to  make 
jrogress  on  this  issue  and  have  especial- 
y  valued  the  working  relationship  with 
he  league.  The  league's  initiative  to  visit 
jaos  last  September  made  a  definite 
ontribution  to  moving  forward  on  the 
30W-MIA  issue  with  the  Lao.  Our  col- 
ective  public  awareness  activities  have 
rreatly  increased  public  and  media 
understanding  of  the  POW-MIA  issue. 
The  league's  institutional  knowledge  has 
>een  of  immense  help  to  us  in  imple- 
nenting  our  accounting  efforts.  Our 
■esponsible  partnership  with  the  league 
las  shown  that  there  can  be  a  variety  of 
approaches  to  resolving  this  issue  and 
hat  private  citizens  and  the  government 
:an  work  together  effectively  to  achieve 
mr  common  goal. 

The  Role  of  Congress 

Ve  particularly  appreciate  the  support 
)f  the  Congress  for  our  efforts  to  make 
progress  on  this  issue  both  with  Viet- 
lam  and  with  Laos.  With  regard  to 


Laos,  the  visits  of  former  Senator 
Hayakawa  and  of  former  Congressmen 
[Biil]  Hendon  and  [John]  LeBoutillier 
were  very  helpful  in  encouraging  a 
change  in  the  Lao  Government's  at- 
titudes on  cooperation  with  regard  to 
the  POW-MIA  issue.  We  appreciate  the 
resolutions  passed  in  Congress  last 
December  encouraging  both  the  Lao  and 
U.S.  Governments  to  act  with  despatch 
to  make  progress  on  resolving  the 
POW-MIA  issue.  Particularly  useful  was 
the  statement  of  Chairman  [Stephen  J.] 
Solarz,  that,  if  a  pattern  of  cooperation 
should  develop  between  the  United 
States  and  Lao  Governments,  especially 
on  the  POW-MIA  issue,  he  would  sup- 
port efforts  to  remove  the  aid  prohibi- 
tion on  Laos.  Further  the  POW-MIA 
task  force  has  helped  to  focus  attention 
on  this  issue.  We  welcome  the  interest 
of  Congressman  Gilman  and  others  on 
this  group.  Additionally,  several  staff 
members  of  Congress  have  regularly 
and  constructively  participated  in  the 
meetings  of  the  Interagency  Group  on 
POW-MIA  Affairs.  We  look  forward  to 
more  cooperation  of  this  kind  and 
regard  it  as  a  positive  asset  in  our  ef- 
forts to  make  progress  on  the 
POW-MIA  issue. 


Where  We  Are 

The  record  of  progress  on  the  POW- 
MIA  issue  remains  painfully  disappoint- 


ing and  frustrating.  Our  efforts  over  the 
past  year  demons!  rate  I  lie  high  priority 
that  this  Administration  and  the 
American  people  attach  to  the  POW- 
MIA  issue  and  our  determination  to  pur- 
sue actively  our  efforts.  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  clear  that  the  problem  of 
Americans  unaccounted  for  in  Indochina 
cannot  be  resolved  without  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  Governments  of  Vietnam  and 
Laos. 

Government-to-government  coopera- 
tion will  be  the  only  real  solution.  The 
Vietnamese  and  Lao  Governments  have 
admitted  that  this  is  a  humanitarian 
issue.  They  have  an  obligation  to 
cooperate.  The  Vietnamese  Government 
has  been  unwilling  to  cooperate  fully, 
and  cooperation  by  the  Lao  Government 
is  in  the  initial  stage.  For  our  part,  I  can 
assure  you  that  over  the  next  year  we 
will  work  closely  with  the  Congress,  the 
league,  and  concerned  citizens  to  meet 
our  obligations  to  our  missing  men  and 
their  families.  As  the  President  has  said, 
this  is  our  highest  national  priority.  And 
I  can  assure  you  of  my  own  determina- 
tion and  that  of  the  Department  of  State 
to  support  this  truly  national  effort. 


■The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402  ■ 


Export  of  Alaskan  Oil 


by  Richard  T.  McCormack 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
July  20,  1983.  Mr.  McCormack  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs.  l 

The  1973  Trans- Alaska  Pipeline  Act  was 
passed  at  a  time  of  rapidly  rising  oil 
prices,  mounting  uncertainty  about  long- 
term  supplies  of  oil,  and  instability  in  oil- 
producing  regions  of  the  world.  En- 
vironmentalists, at  that  time,  wanted 
assurances  that  the  volume  of  oil  trade 
would  not  be  so  great  as  to  harm  an  en- 
vironment with  which  we  had  little  ex- 
perience. Many  Americans  wanted  to 
assure  themselves  of  oil  supplies  by  re- 
taining Alaskan  oil  for  the  domestic 
market. 


As  a  result,  the  Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline  Act  included  language  that 
allowed  exports  of  Alaskan  oil  only  if 
the  President  found  that  exports  were  in 
the  national  interest  and  that  they  would 
not  decrease  domestic  oil  supplies.  In 
1977  the  Congress  strengthened  these 
restrictions  substantially  in  the  Export 
Administration  Act.  In  1979  the  restric- 
tions in  the  act  were  tightened  yet 
again.  The  Export  Administration  Act, 
as  amended,  required  that  before  allow- 
ing export  of  Alaskan  oil  the  President 
must  show  that: 

•  Exports  would  not  decrease  the 
quantity  or  quality  of  the  supply  of  oil  to 
the  United  States; 

•  Exports  would  result  in  lower  oil 
costs  to  refiners,  75%  of  which  would  be 
passed  on  to  consumers; 


September  1983 


57 


ENERGY 


•  Exports  would  be  terminated  if 
U.S.  supplies  were  threatened  or 
diminished;  and 

•  Exports  were  clearly  necessary  to 
protect  the  national  interest. 

We  recognize  the  concern  of  some 
Members  of  Congress  that  the  United 
States  may  be  deprived  of  its  own  oil  in 
a  crisis  or  that  some  regions  will  pay 
more  for  oil  if  Alaskan  oil  is  exported. 
We  also  recognize  the  view  of  many  in 
Congress  that  allocation  of  oil  by  the 
market  is  the  most  efficient  way  to 
safeguard  the  interests  of  producers  and 
consumers. 

In  each  of  the  past  3  years,  this  Ad- 
ministration has  devoted  substantial 
time  and  effort  to  assess  the  impact  of 
crude  oil  exports.  We  have  come  to  the 
analytic  conclusion  that  removal  of  legal 
restrictions  on  the  export  of  Alaskan  oil 
would  have  a  beneficial  impact  and  a 
few  adverse  effects. 

Allow  me  to  outline  here  what  I 
believe  are  the  major  benefits  and  disad- 
vantages that  could  occur  from  removal 
of  restrictions  on  Alaskan  oil  exports. 

Foreign  Policy  Effects 

First,  promoting  open  energy  markets 
through  export  of  Alaskan  oil  would 
demonstrate  to  the  international  com- 
munity U.S.  determination  to  remove  ar- 
tificial impediments  to  free  trade,  in 
general,  and  to  energy  markets,  in  par- 
ticular. Second,  we  would  provide  a 
potential  new  source  of  oil  for  one  of  our 
most  important  allies — Japan — and 
eventually,  perhaps,  for  other  countries 
on  the  Pacific  rim  with  which  we  have 
extremely  important  relations. 

Japan  is  heavily  dependent  on  Per- 
sian Gulf  oil.  It  is  acutely  aware  that 
this  region  is  prone  to  instability  and 
disruption.  Exporting  U.S.  oil  to  Japan 
promotes  the  energy  security  of  a  key 
ally  by  diversifying  its  sources  of  supply. 
Equally  important  is  the  symbolic 
gesture  of  goodwill  toward  Japan  at  a 
time  when  we  are  pressing  the  Japanese 
to  buy  more  American  coal  and  to  join 
in  the  development  of  Alaskan  gas 
resources. 

The  U.S. -Japan  energy  working 
group,  set  up  by  President  Reagan  and 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  last  January, 
has  recently  held  its  second  meeting. 
Export  of  U.S.  energy  resources  was 
clearly  a  matter  of  considerable  interest 
to  Japan  during  these  talks  and  during 
the  recent  U.S. -Japan  subcabinet  con- 
sultations. The  Japanese  are  seeking  ac- 
cess to  Alaskan  energy  resources  on  an 


open,  nondiscriminatory  basis.  It  would 
be  easier  to  obtain  U.S.  access  to 
Japanese  markets  if  we  do  not  restrict 
Japanese  access  to  our  energy  markets. 

Domestic  Effects 

Permit  me  now  to  speak  for  a  moment 
to  the  domestic  advantages  of  liberaliza- 
tion of  export  controls.  Best  case 
estimates  done  by  the  Department  of 
Energy  in  its  most  recent  review  in- 
dicate that  complete  removal  of  the  ban 
on  exports  of  Alaskan  oil  would  result  in 
savings  of  from  $3.6  to  $5.4  billion  in 
present  discounted  value  terms  through 
1990.  These  savings  result  from  the 
simpler  and  shorter  route  from  Alaska 
than  from  Persian  Gulf  oil  producers  to 
customers  in  the  Far  East,  and  the 
sharply  reduced  transportation  costs  for 
U.S.  east  coast  customers.  In  a  com- 
pletely free  market,  wellhead  prices  of 
oil  exported  to  Japan  and  other  Pacific 
rim  countries  could  improve  by  as  much 
as  $1.85  per  barrel,  of  which  over  $1.70 
would  be  increased  taxes  paid  to  the 
U.S.  and  Alaskan  Governments.  A  par- 
tial lifting  would  have  a  smaller 
economic  impact  on  producers,  U.S.  con- 
sumers, and  maritime  interests. 

The  economic  results  of  export  of 
Alaskan  crude  are  not  entirely  positive. 
U.S.  private  enterprise  has  made 
substantial  investment  in  equipment  to 
transport  oil  to  the  gulf,  west,  and  east 
coasts.  These  investments  would  be 
adversely  affected  by  the  export  of 
Alaskan  crude  oil.  Of  the  domestic 
tanker  fleet,  40%  is  in  the  Alaskan  oil 
trade.  The  removal  of  the  ban  could 
result  in  exports  of  800,000  barrels  per 
day,  and  the  owners  of  these  tankers 
could  be  forced  into  default.  Default  on 
government  loan  guarantees  on  these 
ships  could  be  substantial.  Partial 
elimination  of  the  ban  would  cause  pro- 
portionately fewer  losses  of  Jones  Act 
trade.  The  outlays  would  in  each  case  be 
less  than  anticipated  Federal  tax 
revenue  gains  from  exports  of  Alaskan 
crude.  If  exports  of  Alaskan  crude  were 
limited  to  200,000  barrels  per  day, 
relatively  few  tankers  would  be  affected. 
Benefits  of  lifting  the  ban  would  be  off- 
set to  some  extent  by  adverse  effects  of 
domestic  tankers. 

It  is  important  to  state  that,  with 
decontrol,  the  U.S.  oil  market  has 
become  an  integral  part  of  the  world  oil 
market.  The  United  States  will  find  that 
it  can  replace  Alaskan  oil  quite  readily 
since  any  oil  it  exports  will  displace 
other  oil  and  then  the  displaced  oil  will 
become  available  on  world  markets  to 


consumers,  including  the  United  States. 
For  example,  if  the  United  States  ex- 
ports crude  to  Japan,  the  100,000  bar- 
rels per  day  that  Japan  now  purchases 
from  Mexico  would  presumably  be 
available  to  U.S.  east  coast  buyers  at  a 
far  lower  transportation  cost  than  oil 
shipped  from  Valdez  through  the 
pipeline  in  Panama,  reloaded  into 
tankers  in  the  Caribbean,  and  finally, 
delivered  to  an  east  coast  buyer.  It  is  in- 
teresting to  note  here  that  the  United 
States  currently  exports  substantial 
quantities  of  refined  oil  products  to 
Japan,  Western  Europe,  and  even  the 
Soviet  Union  because  of  favorable 
economics. 


U.S.  Energy  Security 

One  of  the  most  frequently  heard 
criticisms  of  Alaskan  crude  exports  is 
that  in  an  oil  supply  crisis,  we  would 
need  to  restrict  our  exports  of 
domestically  produced  oil.  However,  a 
major  foreign  policy  goal  of  the  United 
States  remains  close  cooperation  on 
energy  supply  questions  in  a  crisis  in- 
cluding sharing  supplies  with  our  allies. 
As  we  discovered  in  the  1973-74  energy 
crisis,  maintaining  our  strategic  alliance; 
was  a  key  part  of  our  effort.  Without 
cooperation  with  our  allies  in  meeting 
the  oil  shortage  problems  of  each 
member,  we  could  not  hope  to  ensure 
their  support  for  our  efforts  to  resolve 
the  crisis. 

The  international  energy  program 
was  devised  to  accomplish  such  coopera- 
tion. As  you  are  probably  aware,  the 
program  provides  for  an  emergency  oil 
allocation  system.  Thus,  our  exports  of 
Alaskan  crude  oil  would  not  pose  addi- 
tional problems  to  the  United  States  in 
case  of  severe  disruption  in  world  oil 
markets.  Our  international  commitment! 
would  require  that  we  share  oil  with  our 
allies  based  on  a  formula  that  takes  into 
account  net  oil  imports  and  consumption 
levels  of  each  member  country  before 
and  after  the  interruption.  Alaskan  oil 
exports  would  count  as  an  offset  against 
imports,  thus  the  net  effect  under  the  in 
ternational  energy  program  would  be 
awash.  It  would  not  affect  the  U.S.  sup- 
ply right  to  remaining  oil  if  an  interrup- 
tion occurs. 

In  case  of  lesser  disruptions,  the 
United  States,  together  with  its  Far 
Eastern  allies,  would  be  dependent  on 
world  oil  markets  for  significant  por- 
tions of  our  oil.  To  the  extent  that  we 
are  able  to  offer  a  secure,  stable  source 
of  oil  to  our  Asian  allies  to  meet,  at 
least,  part  of  their  needs,  we  will  help 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


mitigate  the  fierce  competition  and  allay 
the  panic  which,  during  times  of  tight 
.upply,  cause  consumers  to  bid  up  spot 
market  prices  against  each  other  to 
;he  benefit  of  a  few  oil  exporting 
ountries. 

The  export  of  Alaskan  oil  could  pro- 
vide an  additional  incentive  for  develop- 
rient  of  domestic  oil  and  gas  resources. 
3y  enhancing  profitability  of  domestic 
esources,  we  would  be  encouraging  in- 
vestment in  U.S.  energy  supplies  and,  in 
'act,  reducing  our  dependence  on 
'oreign  energy  resources.  We  would  also 
>e  encouraging  our  allies,  by  our  exam- 
)le,  to  take  similar  steps. 

By  reducing  the  vulnerability  of  ma- 
or  petroleum  consuming  nations,  we  are 
nhancing  their  energy  security.  As  we 
ncrease  the  energy  security  of  our  allies 
ve  would  be  reducing  the  opportunity 
or  use  of  oil  as  a  political  weapon, 
igainst  ourselves  or  others. 

Given  the  current  world  oil  market, 
fting  the  ban  on  Alaskan  exports  may 
iot  lead  to  substantial  immediate  export 
ales  to  Japan  or  any  other  country.  A 
artial  removal  of  the  restrictions  would 
robably  satisfy  near-term  demand  of 
'acific  rim  nations  and  would  provide 
oom  for  growth  in  exports.  While  this 
lakes  more  economic  sense  than  con- 
inued  restrictions  of  exports,  the  State 
)epartment  would  prefer  to  see  the 
larket  make  the  decision  on  allocation 
f  this  important  resource  under  a  full 
econtrol  scenario. 

In  sum,  there  are  significant  advan- 
ages  to  export  and  a  few  disadvan- 
ages.  We  appreciate  the  opportunity  to 
resent  our  analytic  findings  and 
relcome  congressional  views  on  this 
isue  as  we  continue  our  internal  review 
nd  consultations  with  officials  of  the 
overnment  of  Japan. 


An  Assessment  of  the  Madrid 
CSCE  Followup  Meeting 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
ill  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
3  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
ocuments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
ce,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Following  are  a  statement  issued  mi 
■lull/  15,  1983,  by  Ambassador  Max  M. 
Kampelman,  chairman  of  the  U.S. 
allegation  i<>  the  Madrid  foUowup 
meeting  of  the  Conferenct  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE),  Ins 
remarks  in  the  plenary  session  of  the 
Madrid  followup  meeting  on  July  18. 
and  President  Reagan's  statement  of 
July  15. 


STATEMENT, 
JULY  15,  19831 

The  35  states  participating  in  the 
Madrid  CSCE  review  conference,  after 
almost  3  years  of  negotiation,  are  ap- 
proaching agreement  on  a  final  docu- 
ment. This  conclusion  meets  the 
Western  criteria  for  an  acceptable, 
balanced,  and  substantive  result.  It  con- 
firms and  expands  upon  the  original 
Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975.  The  United 
States  is  pleased  at  the  result  and 
believes  that  the  2  years  and  10  months 
spent  negotiating  in  Madrid  have  been 
fruitful  and  well  worth  the  extraor- 
dinary effort. 

There  follows  a  summary  followed 
by  an  outline  of  the  issues  that  have 
dominated  the  Madrid  meeting,  as  well 
as  a  report  on  how  the  final  document 
deals  with  those  issues. 

•  The  Madrid  concluding  document 
will  add  important  new  provisions  to  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975.  These  provi- 
sions deal  with  the  rights  of  workers  to 
organize,  with  human  rights,  with 
Helsinki  monitors,  religious  rights, 
human  contacts  and  family  reunification, 
access  to  diplomatic  and  consular  mis- 
sions, information,  rights  of  journalists, 
and  measures  against  terrorism. 

•  It  also  provides  for  convening  a 
conference  on  security-  and  confidence- 
building  measures  and  disarmament  in 
Stockholm  next  year  to  work  out  de- 
tailed measures  to  reduce  the  fear  of 
surprise  military  attack.  An  important 
new  element  in  this  decision  is  that  the 
measures  to  be  adopted  at  Stockholm 
will  apply  to  all  of  the  European  portion 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  right  up  to  the  Ural 
Mountains,  rather  than  only  to  the 
250-kilometer  (150-mile)  band  provided 
for  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

•  In  addition,  the  Madrid  agreement 
schedules  a  series  of  additional  meetings 
which  are  to  take  place  over  the  next  3 


years.  There  will  be  meetings  on  human 
rights,  human  contacts,  and  on  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes;  a 
cultural  forum;  and  a  seminar  on 
economic,  scientific,  and  cultural 
cooperation  in  the  Mediterranean.  A 
meeting  is  also  scheduled  in  Helsinki 
during  1985  to  mark  the  10th  anniver- 
sary of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

•  Finally,  the  Madrid  conference 
will  agree  to  convene  the  next  followup 
meeting  in  Vienna  in  November  1986  in 
order  to  carry  forward  the  review  proc- 
ess begun  in  Belgrade  in  1977-78  and 
continued  in  Madrid  over  the  past  2 
years  and  10  months. 

One  of  the  most  important  aspects 
of  the  CSCE  process  is  the  opportunity 
it  provides  for  a  thorough  review  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act.  During  this  review  in  Madrid,  there 
was  general  condemnation  of  the  failure 
of  the  East  European  states  to  live  up 
to  their  Helsinki  commitments,  with 
special  criticism  of  the  Soviet  and  Polish 
Governments  for  their  policies  of  inter- 
nal repression  and,  in  the  case  of  the 
U.S.S.R.,  its  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  Poland  and  Afghanistan. 

The  establishment  by  the  Madrid 
concluding  document  of  a  whole  series 
of  supplementary  meetings  will  ensure 
that  this  critical  attention  to  the 
behavior  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
East  European  governments  will  con- 
tinue during  the  next  3V2  years.  Those 
experts'  meetings,  and  the  Vienna 
followup  conference,  will  ensure  that 
any  state's  failure  to  live  up  to  the 
undertakings  made  in  Madrid  and  in 
Helsinki  will  again  attract  the  full 
spotlight  of  public  attention. 

Implementation  Review 

The  Madrid  preparatory  meeting,  which 
began  on  September  9,  1980,  and  did 
not  end  until  after  the  main  meeting 
opened  on  November  11,  1980,  a  period 
of  more  than  9  weeks,  focused  on 
Western  demands  that  discussions  of 
new  proposals  on  how  best  to 
strengthen  the  Helsinki  process  should 
be  preceded  by  a  review  of  how  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975 
were  being  implemented.  The  agenda 
finally  produced  by  the  preparatory 
meeting  provided  that  opportunity.  The 
period  of  November  11  to  December  19, 
1980,  was  set  aside  for  that  review,  and 


eptember  1983 


59 


EUROPE 


it  was  a  thorough  one.  The  Soviet  inva- 
sion of  Afghanistan  and  the  record  of 
human  rights  violations  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Eastern  Europe  were  ex- 
plored and  recorded  in  meticulous  detail. 
Continuing  Soviet  and  other  Eastern 
violations  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
made  it  necessary  to  extend  this  review 
of  implementation  throughout  most  of 
the  Madrid  deliberations. 

The  final  document  acknowledges 
that  this  review  took  place  ("They  .  .  . 
reaffirmed  ...  the  importance  of  the  im- 
plementation of  all  the  provisions  ...  of  the 
Final  Act  ...  as  being  .  .  .  essential.  ...  It 
was  confirmed  that  the  thorough  exchange  of 
views  constitutes  in  itself  a  valuable  contribu- 
tion towards  the  achievement  of  the  aims  set 
by  CSCE.  In  this  context,  it  was  agreed  that 
those  aims  can  only  be  attained  by  continuous 
implementation,  unilaterally,  bilaterally  and 
multilaterally,  of  all  the  provisions  and  by 
respect  for  all  the  principles  of  the  Final 
Act."),  that  the  review  is  essential  to 
the  health  of  the  process,  and  that  there 
must  be  an  improvement  in  compliance 
("Serious  violations  of  a  number  of  these  prin- 
ciples were  deplored  during  the  assessments. 
Therefore,  the  participating  states  .  .  .  con- 
sidered it  necessary  to  state  .  .  .  that  strict 
application  of  and  respect  for  these  prin- 
ciples, in  all  their  aspects,  are  essential  for 
the  improvement  of  mutual  relations  between 
the  participating  states.  .  .  "). 

The  United  States  is  fully  aware  of 
the  fact  that  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  can- 
not attain  its  objectives  when  certain 
states,  particularly  the  U.S.S.R.,  con- 
tinue to  violate  its  provisions.  There  are 
no  enforcement  mechanisms  under  the 
act.  The  Madrid  meeting  has  been, 
therefore,  the  appropriate  forum  at 
which  to  insert  political  and  moral 
pressure  into  the  process.  The  im- 
plementation review  became  the 
mechanism.  The  fact  that  it  was  effi- 
ciently undertaken  by  a  united  Western 
group  of  states,  joined  by  most  of  the 
neutral  and  nonaligned  states,  made  that 
possible. 

Equally  important,  Madrid's  im- 
plementation review  afforded  the  oppor- 
tunity for  a  large  number  of  the  par- 
ticipating states  to  communicate  to  the 
Soviet  Union  their  deep  concerns  about 
violations  of  the  accords.  The  message 
was  clear:  "Conform  to  the  promises 
made  in  1975  if  you  wish  to  be  recog- 
nized as  a  responsible  member  of  the  in- 
ternational community." 

Even  as  the  pattern  of  Helsinki 
Final  Act  violations  by  the  East  con- 
tinued, the  United  States  took  note  of 
certain  specific  acts  responding  to 
Western  concerns.  The  decision  by 
Romania  on  its  education  immigration 
tax  is  an  illustration.  The  suspension  of 


60 


some  aspects  of  martial  law  in  Poland 
and  the  release  of  Lech  Walesa  is 
another,  although  continued  arrests  and 
imprisonment  of  thousands  and  the  con- 
tinued outlawing  of  Solidarity  put  the 
bona  fides  of  those  steps  into  question. 
We  have  also  noted  and  welcomed  a  few 
gestures  from  the  Soviet  Union  and  will 
continue  to  encourage  further  such 
steps.  We  hope  there  will  be  other 
developments  in  response  to  our  con- 
cerns. 

Poland 

The  imposition  of  martial  law  in  Poland 
in  December  1981  was  a  gross  violation 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  even  as  the 
Madrid  meeting  was  in  session.  This  act 
of  blatant  defiance  was  met  by  a  deter- 
mined and  unified  presence  of  20  foreign 
ministers,  including  U.S.  Secretary  of 
State  Haig,  during  the  week  of 
February  9-12,  1982. 

From  February  9  until  March  12, 
1982,  negotiations  at  Madrid  came  to  a 
complete  halt  as  the  West  refused  to 
engage  in  "business  as  usual"  and  in- 
stead detailed  the  Helsinki  violations 
represented  by  Poland's  martial  law  and 
continued  repression  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  On  March  12,  1982,  in  recogni- 
tion of  Western  determination,  the 
Madrid  meeting  recessed  for  8  months. 

When  the  meeting  reconvened  on 
November  9,  a  group  of  Western  states 
introduced  a  series  of  14  amendments  to 
a  proposed  compromise  put  forward  by 
a  group  of  neutral  and  nonaligned  states 
(RM-39).  The  amendments  were  de- 
signed to  reflect  the  view  that  "business 
as  usual"  remained  impossible.  The 
essence  of  many  of  these  proposals  was 
incorporated  in  a  revised  neutral  and 
nonaligned  document,  submitted  on 
March  15.  1983,  after  martial  law  was 
ostensibly  and  technically  suspended 
(RM-39  revised).  That  revised  docu- 
ment, with  improvements  to  it  produced 
by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Spain  on  June 
17,  1983,  has  become  the  official  con- 
cluding document  of  Madrid. 

A  number  of  provisions  of  that  docu- 
ment reflect  our  Polish  concerns.  They 
deal  with  trade  unions,  religious 
freedom,  and  renewed  obligation  to 
refrain  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force. 
Summary  language  in  the  preamble  fur- 
ther reflects  Western  attention  to 
developments  in  Poland.  The  United 
States  and  its  Western  allies  never 
forgot  during  the  course  of  the  Madrid 
meeting  that  among  the  first  of  Solidari- 
ty's demands  in  August  1980  was  that 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act  be  reprinted  and 


widely  disseminated  in  Poland.  We  have 
kept  in  close  touch  with  representatives 
of  the  Solidarity  movement  in  Europe 
and  the  United  States,  and  we  have 
helped  communicate  their  messages  to 
the  delegations  in  Madrid. 

Trade  Unions 

The  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975  did  not 
include  any  language  on  trade  unions. 
The  Madrid  document  reflects  a 
Western  initiative  stemming  directly 
from  the  suppression  of  Solidarity  in 
Poland.  It  clearly  states  that  par- 
ticipating states  "will  ensure  the  right  of 
workers  freely  to  establish  and  join 
trade  unions,  the  right  of  trade  unions 
freely  to  exercise  their  activities  and 
their  rights  as  laid  down  in  relative  in- 
ternational instruments."  This,  of 
course,  clearly  refers  to  the  conventions 
of  the  International  Labor  Organization 
(ILO).  A  reference  to  "the  law  of  the 
State"  follows,  thereby  referring  to  the 
fact  that  all  states  have  laws  which  in 
some  measure  define  union  rights  and 
activities.  But  that  reference  is  asso- 
ciated with  another  provision  asserting 
the  requirement  that  such  measures  be 
"in  conformity  with  the  state's  obligation 
under  international  law,"  again  a 
reference  to  the  ILO. 

This  provision  also  calls  upon  states 
to  encourage  direct  contacts  among 
trade  unions  and  their  representatives. 
The  West,  which  has  always  made  the 
point  that  unions  freely  organized  in  the  I 
West  are  not  to  be  confused  with  the 
totalitarian  state-controlled  organiza- 
tions known  as  unions  in  the  East,  was    I 
able  successfully  to  insist  that  this  provi  J 
sion  be  applicable  only  to  "such"  unions    1 
which  are  indeed  freely  organized  by 
workers  and  free  to  function  under  ILO 
standards. 


Monitors 

The  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975  provided 
a  very  clear  basis  of  legitimacy  to  the 
courageous  men  and  women  who  formec 
Helsinki  monitoring  groups  within  their 
own  countries.  Their  purpose  was  to 
keep  watch  on  how  their  states  were 
complying  with  the  provisions  of  the  ac- 
cords, a  right  they  had  under  the  1975 
agreement.  In  deliberate  decisions  to 
violate  the  provisions  of  the  act, 
authorities  in  the  U.S.S.R., 
Czechoslovakia,  and  elsewhere  in 
Eastern  Europe  persecuted  and  im- 
prisoned those  who  exercised  that  right 
"to  know  and  act  upon  their  rights." 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


EUROPE 


In  Madrid,  14  states  mentioned  the 
lames  of  123  victims  of  repression, 
nany  of  them  monitors.  This  was  in  con- 
rast  to  the  Belgrade  meeting  where  the 
Jnited  States  was  one  of  only  two  coun- 
ries  to  mention  the  names  of  victims. 
,nd  we  mentioned  six.  The  Netherlands 
fas  the  other. 

The  language  on  monitors  in  the 
lelsinki  Final  Act  is  quite  clear  and 
hould  not  require  elaboration.  Indeed, 
within  the  rules  of  Madrid  requiring  con- 
ensus,  it  was  very  difficult  to  formulate 
ppropriate  additional  language  more 
learly.  We  were,  however,  able  to  in- 
orporate  language  which,  in  some  slight 
leasure,  further  supports  the  legitimacy 
f  monitor  groups  and  other  activities. 
n  the  introduction  to  the  section  on 
'Hnciples,  for  example,  a  sentence 
eads:  "The  participating  states  express 
heir  determination  ...  to  encourage 
enuine  efforts  to  implement  the  Final 
Let."  The  Soviets  may  attempt  to 
lisinterpret  this  sentence  in  order  to 
istort  its  meaning,  but  we  take  the 
istifiable  position  that  the  very  act  of 
rging  compliance  with  the  act  is 
genuine."  This  concluding  document 
lso  states  that  "governments,  institu- 
ions  organizations  and  persons  have  a 
ole  to  play"  in  that  endeavor. 

An  examination  of  the  ninth  para- 
raph  of  the  principles  section  reveals 
ignificant  strengthening  of  Principle 
'II  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  dealing 
'ith  human  rights.  Recognizing  that 
;uman  rights  "derive  from  the  inherent 
ignity  of  the  human  person,"  it  calls 
pon  states  to: 

•  "Assure  constant  and  tangible 
rogress  .  .  .  aiming  at  further  and 
teady  development  .  .  .  irrespective  of 
lieir  political,  economic  and  social 
/stems"; 

•  "Ensure  the  effective  exercise  of 
lese  rights  and  freedoms";  and 

•  Recall  "the  right  of  the  individual 
i)  know  and  act  upon  his  rights  and 
uties  in  the  field  of  human  rights  and 
andamental  freedoms,  as  embodied  in 
le  Final  Act."  The  provision  goes  on  to 
ssert  that  states  "will  take  the  neces- 
iry  action  in  their  respective  countries 
3  effectively  ensure  this  right." 

We  have  no  illusions  as  to  Soviet  in- 
jntions  in  this  important  human  rights 
rea.  Our  own  determination  must, 
owever,  always  remain  clear.  Our  in- 
istence— in  this  case  with  some  suc- 
ess— on  continuing  to  improve  the 
riginal  wording  on  the  act  is  a  clear  in- 
iication  of  that  intent.  It  is  also  impor- 
lant  that  we  keep  raising  the  standards 
Dr  responsible  international  behavior. 


President  Reagan  with  Ambassador 
Kampelman. 


Religion 

The  Madrid  final  document  makes  small 
but  important  gains  over  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act  in  four  areas  dealing  with 
religious  freedom: 

•  By  extending  and  strengthening 
Principle  VII  to  provide  that  states  will 
"take  the  action  necessary  to  ensure  the 
freedom  of  the  individual  to  profess  and 
practice,  alone  or  in  community  with 
others,  religion  or  belief  acting  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  dictates  of  his  own 
conscience"; 

•  By  specifying  that  states  "will 
consult,  whenever  necessary,  the 
religious  faiths,  institutions  and 
organizations,  which  act  within  the  con- 
stitutional framework  of  their  respective 
countries"; 

•  By  a  provision,  urged  by  the 
Vatican,  requiring  states  to  "favorably 
consider"  registering  religious  com- 
munities of  believers  practicing  or 
prepared  to  practice  within  their  con- 
stitutional frameworks;  and 

•  By  language  in  Basket  III  stating 
that  participating  states  will: 

.  .  .  Further  implement  the  relevant  pro- 
visions of  the  Final  Act  so  that  religious 
faiths,  institutions,  organizations  and  their 
representatives  can,  in  the  field  of  their  ac- 
tivity, develop  contacts  and  meetings  among 
themselves  and  exchange  information. 


Human  Contacts 

The  whole  issue  of  human  contacts  has 
been  highlighted  in  Madrid  by  the  sadly 
unsatisfactory  record  of  Soviet  perform- 
ance. Their  record  on  reunification  of 
families  is  abysmal.  We  responded  to 
these  violations  of  the  act  by  continuing 
to  highlight  the  issue  throughout  the 
meetings.  In  addition,  some  forward 
movement  beyond  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
was  achieved  through  six  specific  new 
provisions  in  the  Madrid  concluding 
document.  The  participating  states  have 
pledged: 

•  To  "favorably  deal  with"  and 
"decide  upon"  applications  for  family 
meetings,  reunification,  and  marriage. 
The  Final  Act  provided  only  that  they 
would  "consider"  or  "deal  with  applica- 
tions in  a  positive  and  humanitarian 
spirit"; 

•  That  marriage  and  family 
reunification  applications  will  be  decided 
"within  six  months,"  the  first  reference 
to  a  definite  time  period.  We  believe  this 
to  be  a  useful  improvement  over  the 
Final  Act  commitment  to  decide  "as  ex- 
peditiously as  possible"; 

•  That  making  or  renewing  applica- 
tions for  family  reunification  will  not 
modify  rights  to  "employment,  housing, 
residence  status,  family  support,  access 
to  social,  economic  or  educational 
benefits"; 

•  To  provide  the  necessary  forms 
and  information  on  procedures  and 
regulations  followed  in  emigration  cases. 
This  has  been  a  serious  problem  for 
many  trying  to  emigrate  from  the  East; 


ieptember  1983 


61 


EUROPE 


•  To  reduce  fees  charged  in  connec- 
tion with  emigration  "to  bring  them  to  a 
moderate  level  in  relation  to  the  average 
monthly  income."  The  reference  to 
monthly  income  provides  a  new  standard 
by  which  to  judge  fee  levels  which  in 
some  cases  have  been  exorbitant;  and 

•  To  inform  applicants  as  "ex- 
peditiously as  possible  of  the  decision" 
on  their  cases  and  inform  them  of  "their 
right  to  renew  applications  after 
reasonably  short  intervals"  in  cases  of 
refusal.  Both  the  fact  that  applicants 
must  be  informed  of  decisions  and  the 
recognition  of  the  right  to  reapply  are 
important  in  that  many  refuseniks  in  the 
U.S.S.R.  have  been  given  "final  refusals" 
and  told  they  could  not  reapply. 

The  Madrid  concluding  document 
also  adds  an  important  new  element  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
by  specifying  that  visitors  to  diplomatic 
and  other  official  missions  and  consular- 
posts  will  be  assured  of  access  to  them 
and  reaffirming  the  importance  of 
facilitating  the  normal  functioning  of 
those  missions. 

There  was  one  additional  step  taken 
after  months  of  debate  and  stalemate. 
The  West  believes  that  it  is  important  to 
provide  a  forum  after  Madrid  and  before 
the  next  followup  meeting  for  the  issue 
of  human  contacts  to  be  thoroughly  ex- 
plored at  a  meeting  of  experts  attended 
by  representatives  of  all  35  countries. 
We  look  upon  an  experts'  meeting  as  a 
means  of  providing  an  opportunity  for 
further  clarity  and,  perhaps,  understand- 
ing among  us  all,  so  that  by  the  time  of 
the  next  followup  meeting  this  issue 
might  be  less  of  an  irritant. 

The  Government  of  Switzerland 
shared  our  belief  and  invited  the  par- 
ticipating states  to  an  experts'  meeting 
to  deal  with  human  contacts  during 
April  1986.  This  was  finally  accepted  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  A  late  date  was 
selected  so  that  we  will  have  time  to  ex- 
amine how  the  six  new  provisions  in  the 
Madrid  agreement  will  have  been  com- 
plied with.  We  look  upon  this  meeting  as 
an  important  development. 

Human  Rights  Experts'  Meeting 

The  desirability  of  convening  a  human 
rights  experts'  meeting  was  first  ex- 
pressed by  the  West  in  Madrid  in 
February  1981.  We  looked  upon  this 
highly  controversial  proposal  as  vital  if 
we  are  ever  to  achieve  understanding 
Wot  ween  East  and  West.  We  define 
human  rights  by  what  we  consider  to  be 
the  reasonable  standard  of  individual 
freedom.  Communists  think  of  freedom 


in  terms  of  "class"  and  the  "state."  We 
are  pleased  that  the  proposed  experts' 
meeting  received  approval  after  more 
than  2  years  of  consideration.  It  is  to 
take  place  in  Ottawa,  Canada,  in  May 
1985.  Its  agenda  focuses  on  the  status  of 
human  rights  "in  their  states,"  i.e.,  the 
participating  states,  so  as  not  to  broaden 
its  scope  to  include  other  areas  of  the 
world. 


Information 

The  Madrid  document  contains  a 
number  of  new  and  helpful  provisions 
designed  to  strenthen  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  provisions  in  this  important  area. 
They  are: 

•  A  provision  that  participating 
states  will  encourage  the  public  sale  and 
distribution  of  printed  matter  from 
other  states,  including  making  them  "ac- 
cessible in  reading  rooms"; 

•  A  provision  that  prices  of  foreign 
publications  should  not  be  excessive  in 
relation  to  prices  in  their  country  of 
origin.  This  language  is  somewhat 
qualified  because  Western  governments 
find  it  difficult  to  make  commitments  in 
this  area; 

•  Language  confirming  that  states 
will  "further  extend  the  possibilities"  for 
the  public  to  take  out  foreign  subscrip- 
tions. In  acknowledging  that  anyone  can 
subscribe  to  foreign  publications,  this 
provision  extends  the  Final  Act  which 
states  only  to  "develop  possibilities  for 
taking  out  subscriptions  according  to 
modalities.  .  .  .  "; 

•  A  reference  endorsing  "direct  con- 
tacts among  journalists"  which  is  not  in 
the  Final  Act; 

•  A  pledge  to  decide  visa  applica- 
tions from  journalists  without  "undue 
delay"  and  to  reexamine  within  a 
reasonable  time  applications  which  have 
been  refused; 

•  A  sentence  stating  that  journalists 
traveling  for  personal  reasons  will 
receive  the  same  treatment  as  other 
visitors.  This  is  a  new  element,  not 
found  in  the  Final  Act,  and  is  in 
response  to  complaints  by  Western  jour- 
nalists; 

•  A  commitment  to  grant  perma- 
nent correspondents  ami  their  families 
multiple  entry  and  exit  visas  ml  id  for  a 
year, 

•  A  pledge  to  "examine  the  possibili- 
ty" of  coaccrediting  journalists  per- 
manently accredited  to  other  countries. 
This  is  a  useful  provision  for  most 
Western  news  organizations  which  have 
only  one  or  two  journalists  covering  all 
of  Eastern  Europe; 


•  A  commitment  to  take  "concrete 
measures"  to  provide  more  extensive 
travel  opportunities  for  journalists  and 
to  "inform  journalists  in  advance"  of  new 
areas  closed  for  security  reasons; 

•  A  sentence  pledging  states  to  "in- 
crease the  possibilities"  and  "improve  the 
conditions"  for  foreign  journalists  to 
"establish  and  maintain  personal  con- 
tacts and  communications  with  their 
sources."  We  look  upon  the  word  "per- 
sonal" as  implying  individual  contacts, 
thereby  strengthening  the  Final  Act; 

•  A  provision  that  radio  and  televi- 
sion journalists  may  be  accompanied  by 
their  own  sound  and  film  technicians 
and  use  their  own  equipment.  This  is 
another  useful  addition  to  the  Final  Act; 

•  A  provision  that  journalists  may 
carry  with  them  reference  material,  in- 
cluding personal  notes  and  files  to  be 
used  for  their  professional  purposes,  an 
important  addition  to  the  Final  Act.  A 
qualifier  acknowledging  that  import  of 
printed  matter  may  be  subject  to  local 
regulation— and  Western  states  also 
have  such  regulations— is  itself  qualified 
by  a  statement  that  these  regulations 
"will  be  applied  with  due  regard  to  the 
journalists'  need  for  adequate  working 
material"; 

•  A  provision  on  press  centers  open 
to  national  and  foreign  journalists  may 
be  helpful  considering  the  paucity  of 
such  facilities  in  the  U.S.S.R.  and  other 
Eastern  countries; 

•  A  sentence  in  the  culture  section   I 
committing  states  to  "gradually  lower 
custom  duties"  on  books,  films,  and 
other  forms  of  cultural  expression,  as 
well  as  "encourage  wider  dissemination 
of  and  access"  to  these  items.  This  is  a 
minor  advance  over  the  Final  Act; 

•  A  "cultural  forum"  to  be  held  in 
Budapest  in  1985.  This  will  provide  an 
opportunity  for  the  West  to  raise,  if 
necessary,  a  review  of  how  artists  and 
writers  in  East  European  states  are 
treated;  and 

•  A  provision  in  the  education  sec- 
tion calling  upon  states  to  encourage 
publication  of  "lists  and  catalogues  of 
open  archival  material,"  an  addition  to 
the  Final  Act  which  may  aid  in  nego- 
tiating future  exchange  programs  and 
may  be  helpful  to  foreign  scholars  doing 
research  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Terrorism 

The  Helsinki  Final  Act  does  not  deal 
with  the  subject  of  terrorism.  The 
United  States  joined  the  Spanish  delega- 
tion and  others  in  urging  that  the 
Madrid  final  document  include  a  provi- 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


ion  on  this  vital  threat  to  the  security 
)f  all  states.  The  final  document  does  in- 
lude  such  a  provision.  It  includes: 

•  A  statement  that  signatories  will 
take  effective  measures  for  the  preven- 
ion  and  suppression  of  acts  of  ter- 
orism,  both  at  the  national  level  and 
hrough  international  cooperation.  .  .  .  "; 

•  A  provision  that  states  will  take 
leasures  to  prevent  their  territories 
rom  being  used  for  the  preparation  or 
rganization  of  terrorist  activities 
irected  against  other  participating 
tates  and  their  citizens; 

•  A  commitment  to  refrain  from 
irect  or  indirect  assistance,  financing, 
ncouraging,  or  tolerating  terrorist  or 
ubversive  activities  directed  at  the 
iolent  overthrow  of  the  government  of 
ther  participating  states;  and 

•  A  pledge  that  states  will  "do  their 
tmost"  to  assure  necessary  security  to 
11  diplomatic,  consular,  and  official 
spresentatives  of  other  states. 

Given  the  record  of  some  of  the 
tates  which  approved  this  provision 
garding  international  terrorism,  there 
lay  be  some  understandable  skepticism 
bout  such  a  provision.  We  strongly 
elieve,  however,  that  it  is  vital  for  an 
iternational  modality  to  be  established, 
ad  this  provision  helps  to  do  so. 

ecurity 

he  negotiations  that  led  to  the  signing 
'  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  in  1975  had 
teir  conceptual  origins  in  an  original 
an  calling  for  establishment  of  a  Euro- 
;an  security  conference.  The  agree- 
ent  that  finally  came  out  of  Geneva 
id  Helsinki  was  one  that  included  a 
jry  significant  humanitarian  dimension, 
hich  the  United  States  and  its  Western 
•  iends  consider  to  be  one  of  their  major 
•complishments.  Nevertherless,  the 
•curity  questions  that  are  a  part  of  the 
elsinki  process  remain  of  great  impor- 
I  .nee  to  all  of  the  participating  states. 

The  NATO  group  of  states  in 
i  ebruary  1981  presented  a  French  pro- 
j  isal  calling  for  the  establishment  of  a 
inference  to  take  place  after  the 
I  adrid  meeting  to  deal  with  military 
jmfidence-building  measures.  The  prob- 
Im  of  surprise  military  attack  is  one  up- 
jjrmost  in  the  minds  of  Europeans.  The 
Jnited  States  joined  the  Western 
I'solve  that  a  conference  on  surprise 
I  ilitary  attack  had  to  be  carefully  struc- 
lired  in  Madrid  so  that  it  did  not 
Income  a  vaguely  worded  mandate  for  a 
ilisarmament"  meeting  in  which  prop- 


aganda speeches  rather  than  construc- 
tive decisions  would  be  the  major  ele- 
ment. 

Fortunately,  the  neutral  and  non- 
aligned  states  agreed  with  this  Western 
objective.  The  East  abandoned  its  pro- 
posal, originally  submitted  by  Warsaw, 
and  after  long  and  intensive  debate  a 
mandate  for  the  conference  fully  accept- 
able to  us  was  adopted.  It  meets  our 
four  essential  criteria: 

•  The  conference  will  be  an  integral 
part  of  the  CSCE  process; 

•  The  conference  will  not  interfere 
with  ongoing  arms  negotiations,  such  as 
MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced  force 
reductions]; 

•  The  first  stage  of  the  conference 
will  deal  exclusively  with  confidence- 
building  measures.  This  is  stated  in 
paragraphs  two  and  six  of  the  mandate 


for  the  conference  on  confidence-  and 
security-building  measures  and  disarma- 
ment in  Europe  which  provide  that 
"...  the  first  stage  will  lie  devoted 
to  .  .  .  confidence-  and  security-building 
measures  designed  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
military  confrontation  in  Europe"  and 
that  "...  a  future  follow-up  meeting  will 
consider  ways  and  appropriate  means 
for  .  .  .  supplementing  the  present  man- 
date for  the  next  stage  of  the  Con- 
ference .  .  .  ";  and 

•  Confidence-  and  security-building 
measures  agreed  at  the  conference  are 
to  be  militarily  significant,  politically 
binding,  verifiable,  and  applicable  to  the 
whole  of  Europe. 

The  extension  of  the  area  to  the 
Urals  is  quite  significant,  because  the 
limited  confidence-building  measures 


President's  Statement,  July  15,  1983s 


After  nearly  3  years  of  negotiation,  the  35 
states  participating  in  the  Madrid  review 
meeting  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  are  approaching 
agreement  on  a  concluding  document — one 
that  will  strengthen  and  extend  the  under- 
takings contained  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 
It  is  a  call  on  all  35  CSCE  states — particu- 
larly those  who  have  so  tragically  failed  to 
live  up  to  promises  made  in  Helsinki — to  give 
life  to  these  commitments  and  to  rededicate 
themselves  to  advancing  the  freedom  and 
justice  on  which  security  in  Europe  ultimately 
depends. 

We  have  agreed  to  this  concluding  docu- 
ment, as  we  did  in  1975  to  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  itself,  with  no  illusions  about  the  nature 
of  the  Soviet  Union  or  about  the  system 
which  it  seeks  to  impose  over  much  of 
Europe.  In  an  ideal  world,  agreements  such 
as  this  would  not  be  necessary.  But  we 
believe  it  is  the  best  agreement  attainable, 
one  which  significantly  improves  on  the  Hel- 
sinki Final  Act  and  advances  the  efforts  of 
the  West  to  hold  out  a  beacon  of  hope  for 
those  in  the  East  who  seek  a  more  free,  just, 
and  secure  life. 

Together  with  the  Helsinki  accords,  this 
agreement  sets  forth  a  clearer  code  of  con- 
duct for  all  35  CSCE  states — a  set  of  stand- 
ards to  which  we  and  the  other  Atlantic 
democracies  will  continue  to  hold  all  those 
who  will  have  pledged  their  word  at  Madrid. 
We  will  sign  it  with  the  hope  that  it  will 
serve  as  a  step  toward  achieving  our  objec- 
tive of  a  more  stable  and  constructive  rela- 
tionship with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Madrid  accord  will  add  important 
new  commitments  to  the  Helsinki  process,  in- 
cluding provisions  dealing  with  human  rights, 
the  trade  union  freedoms  so  tragically  vio- 
lated in  Poland,  terrorism,  religious  liberties, 


reunification  of  families,  free  flow  of  informa- 
tion, and  more.  It  will  provide  for  two 
important  meetings  of  experts  in  the  humani- 
tarian field  and  for  a  security  conference 
which  will  attempt  to  negotiate  measures  for 
reducing  the  danger  of  surprise  attack  in 
Europe.  Another  full  followup  meeting  will 
take  place  in  Vienna  in  1986,  where  we  will 
review  the  conduct  of  the  participating  states 
and  seek  to  build  on  the  accomplishments  at 
Madrid. 

The  unity  and  resolve  of  the  Western 
democracies  at  Madrid  have  made  this 
achievement  possible.  Ambassador  Kampel- 
man  and  his  NATO  colleagues  deserve  the 
highest  praise  for  bringing  this  long  and 
often  difficult  conference  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion. We  also  owe  a  special  vote  of  thanks 
to  Prime  Minister  Gonzalez  of  Spain,  whose 
thoughtful  proposal  set  the  stage  for  final 
agreement. 

In  concluding  the  Madrid  meeting,  we  re- 
affirm our  commitment  to  the  Helsinki  proc- 
ess. We  will  not  flag  in  our  continued  deter- 
mination to  work  with  all  governments  and 
peoples  whose  goal  is  the  strengthening  of 
peace  in  freedom.  As  Madrid  has  shown, 
dialogue,  when  based  on  realistic  expecta- 
tions and  conducted  with  patience,  can  pro- 
duce results.  These  results  are  often  gradual 
and  hard  won,  but  they  are  the  necessary 
building  blocks  for  a  more  secure  and  stable 
world.  The  challenge  remains:  we  must  all 
consolidate  and  build  on  these  gains;  we  must 
ensure  that  good  words  are  transformed  into 
good  deeds  and  that  the  ideals  which  they 
embody  are  given  concrete  expression.  Giving 
substance  to  the  promises  of  Madrid  and 
Helsinki  will  remain  one  of  our  prime  objec- 
tives. 


3  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  25,  1983. 


eptember  1983 


63 


EUROPE 


adopted  in  1975  exempted  the  Soviet 
Union  from  their  coverage,  except  for 
the  first  250  kilometers  within  its 
borders.  The  Soviet  Union,  after  first  re- 
jecting an  extension  to  cover  all  of  it  S 
European  area,  then  urged  that  the 
geographic  area  be  extended  into  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  as  compensation  for  its 
extension  to  the  Ural  Mountains.  The 
Soviet  objective,  of  course,  was  to 
negate  the  international  principle 
recognizing  free  use  of  the  high  seas  and 
thus  possibly  to  interfere  with  move- 
ment of  U.S.  forces  in  contingencies  in- 
volving areas  of  the  world  outside 
Europe. 

We  presented  a  provision,  which 
was  in  the  original  1975  agreement, 
making  certain  that  only  "adjoining  sea 
area  and  air  space"  would  be  included 
and  only  when  activities  in  that  area  are 
a  part  of  military  activities  taking  place 
within  Europe  itself.  This  was  eventually 
accepted  by  the  East.  We  were  pleased 
that  this  formulation  was  finally  ap- 
proved, because  it  clearly  excluded  in- 
dependent air  and  naval  activities  from 
coverage.  The  mandate  will  now  permit 
concentration  at  the  meeting,  which  will 
be  held  in  Stockholm,  on  the  crucial 
confidence-building  measures  required  to 
deal  with  the  problem  of  surprise 
military  attack  on  the  European  Conti- 
nent. 

Followup  Meetings 

During  the  preparatory  meeting  in  1980, 
the  United  States  proposed  to  all  of  the 
delegations,  most  particularly  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  that  all  participants  im- 
mediately commit  themselves  to  hold  a 
followup  meeting  within  3  years  after 
Madrid.  The  Soviet  Union  refused  to 
join  us  in  that  step  and  consistently 
refused  to  provide  the  West  with  such 
an  unconditional  commitment.  This  was 
apparently  designed  to  intimidate  other 
states  into  believing  that  the  Helsinki 
process  would  end  if  the  Madrid  meeting 
did  not  conclude  to  Soviet  satisfaction. 

We  are  very  pleased  that  the  final 
Madrid  document  provides  for  another 
followup  meeting  which  is  to  take  place 
in  Vienna  in  November  1986.  This  is  a 
longer  intervening  period  than  we  would 
have  preferred,  but  the  final  document 
also  provides  that  there  will  be  a  10th 
anniversary  commemoration  meeting  in 
Helsinki  in  1985,  the  year  we  might  or- 
dinarily have  held  a  followup  meeting. 

We  also  have  decided  to  hold  a 
series  of  supplementary  meetings  be- 
tween those  in  Madrid  and  Vienna.  We 
hope  that  these  will  help  keep  the 


Helsinki  issues  alive  and  at  the  same 
time  strengthen  the  Helsinki  process. 
Here  is  a  list  of  the  eight  future 
meetings  provided  for  in  the  Madrid 
document: 

•  The  first  stage  of  a  conference  on 
disarmament  in  Europe  commencing 
January  17,  1984,  in  Stockholm,  to  be 
preceded  by  a  3-week  preparatory 
meeting  to  take  place  beginning  on 
October  25,  1983,  in  Helsinki; 

•  A  6-week  experts'  meeting  on  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  in 
Athens,  beginning  March  21,  1984; 

•  A  seminar  on  Mediterranean 
cooperation  in  Venice  from  October  16 
to  26,  1984; 

•  An  experts'  meeting  on  human 
rights  in  Ottawa,  lasting  6  weeks  and 
commencing  on  May  7,  1985; 

•  A  commemorative  meeting  in 
Helsinki  in  1985  marking  the  10th  an- 
niversary of  the  signing  of  the  Final 
Act; 

•  A  cultural  forum  in  Budapest 
sometime  in  1985; 

•  An  experts'  meeting  on  human 
contacts  in  Bern,  Switzerland,  lasting  6 
weeks  and  commencing  April  16,  1986; 
and 

•  The  third  followup  meeting  of  the 
CSCE  in  Vienna  starting  November  4, 
i-.isi;. 


REMARKS, 
JULY  18,  1983 

After  2  years  and  more  than  10  months 
of  negotiation,  we  are  close  to  the  end  of 
our  Madrid  meeting.  We  have  just  been 
informed  by  the  delegate  from  Malta 
that  he  intends,  as  is  his  right,  to  con- 
tinue to  pursue  the  amendments  about 
which  he  has  fully  informed  us.2  He  is 
aware  that  our  delegation,  among 
others,  will  continue  to  oppose  those 
amendments  and  will  not  provide  the 
necessary  consensus  to  them. 

The  American  delegation  is  pleased 
with  the  draft  concluding  document  that 
has  emerged  out  of  our  deliberations. 
We  consider  it  noteworthy  that  in  a 
number  of  respects,  such  as  in  provi- 
sions dealing  with  the  reunification  of 
families,  religious  rights,  trade  unions, 
terrorism,  rights  of  journalists,  access  to 
missions,  and  Helsinki  monitors,  the 
Madrid  document  goes  beyond  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975. 

We  also  consider  the  decision  to  hold 
a  conference  on  security-  and  confidence- 
building  to  be  important.  This  can  be  a 
significant  step  toward  strengthening 


security  and  cooperation  in  Europe.  The 
need  to  minimize  the  risk  of  surprise 
military  attack  is  of  great  significance  to 
all  of  us.  We  welcome  a  decision  to  hold 
such  a  conference,  a  proposal  we  joined 
in  supporting  as  early  as  February  1981. 
We  look  for  a  conference  which  will 
produce  more  than  vaguely  worded 
declarations.  We  take  very  seriously  the 
provisions  in  the  mandate  that  the  con- 
ference would  concern  itself  with 
confidence-  and  security-building 
measures  which  are  militarily  signifi- 
cant, politically  binding,  verifiable,  and 
applicable  to  the  whole  of  Europe.  The 
conference  must  complement,  and  not 
interfere,  with  other  arms  control 
negotiations.  The  United  States  will  take 
a  constructive  approach  to  the  work  of 
the  conference  and  hopes  that  others 
will  do  the  same.  Agreement  to  notify 
military  activities  which  will  take  place 
on  land  in  Europe  is  an  example  of  the 
kind  of  measure  we  believe  could  be  a 
valuable  result  of  this  conference. 

It  is  also  gratifying  to  all  of  us  that 
Madrid  is  firmly  establishing  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  Helsinki  process.  We  have 
done  so  explicitly;  and  we  are  doing  so 
with  our  decision  to  hold  another 
followup  meeting  in  Vienna  in  1986, 
preceded  by  a  10th  anniversary  meeting 
in  Helsinki  in  1985.  This  continuity  is 
strengthened  by  a  decision  to  hold 
meetings,  between  the  sessions  in 
Madrid  and  Vienna,  on  human  rights, 
human  contacts,  cultural  activities,  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  peaceful  resolu- 
tion of  international  disputes. 

The  United  States  recognizes  the 
special  importance  of  arriving  at  an 
agreement  in  Madrid  at  a  time  when  in- 
ternational tensions  and  differences  con- 
tinue to  dominate  our  consciousness.  We 
hope  Madrid  will  be  a  significant  signal 
of  a  new  beginning  in  our  earnest  pur- 
suit of  peace. 

Eastern  Noncompliance  With  Helsinki 
Accords 

We  must,  however,  not  be  blind  to  the 
difficulties  of  the  task  ahead.  These  dif- 
ficulties were  dramatized  by  a  first-page 
editorial  in  the  July  14  issue  of  Pravda, 
which  I  read  shortly  after  leaving  this 
hall  on  Friday  when  34  of  us  signified 
our  provisional  approval  of  a  final  docu- 
ment. The  editorial  sharpens  for  us  not 
only  the  real  meaning  of  the  Madrid 
agreement  but  its  decided  limitations  as 
well.  The  editorial's  theme  is  the  speech 
made  to  the  June  plenum  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  Central  Committee  by  the 
leader  of  the  Soviet  Union,  during  which 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE 


he  said:  "There  is  a  struggle  for  the 
hearts  and  minds  of  billions  of  people  on 
this  planet."  Concerned  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  may  not  be  doing  too  well  in 
that  struggle,  Pravda  urges  that  Soviet 
citizens  be  "immunized"  against  hostile 
ideas.  Specifically,  it  aims  at  religion  in 
the  U.S.S.R.  as  a  danger. 

The  United  States  understands  the 
profound  seriousness  of  the  inherent 
contradictions  between  the  Soviet 
totalitarian  system  and  the  system  of 
liberty  and  individual  dignity  which  is  a 
hallmark  of  democratic  governments. 
Reaching  agreements  such  as  we  did  in 
Helsinki  and  now  in  Madrid,  do  not,  by 
themselves,  automatically  minimize 
those  differences  or  end  the  competition. 
We  intend  to  be  in  the  competition  for 
"hearts  and  minds"  to  which  Pravda 
refers.  We  welcome  a  competition  of 
ideas  and  values.  In  many  ways  the 
Madrid  forum  has  been  and  remains  a 
vehicle  for  that  competition.  What  con- 
cerns us  deeply,  however,  is  that  the 
Soviet  Union  may  believe  that  it  cannot 
win  a  competition  of  ideas  and  values 
without  the  threat  and  use  of  armed 
force  and  repression,  both  within  and 
outside  its  borders. 

The  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the 
Madrid  agreement  are  efforts  to  channel 
the  competition  of  values  within  civilized 
constraints  and  at  the  same  time  to 
strive  for  understanding  so  that  we  can 
learn  to  live  with  one  another  in  peace. 
The  fact  that  these  agreements  continue 
to  be  violated,  even  during  this  very 
period  of  negotiated  and  agreement,  is 
discouraging. 

We  cannot  in  good  conscience  per- 
mit a  limited  negotiating  success,  impor- 
tant as  we  believe  it  to  be,  to  make  us 
forget,  much  to  our  regret,  that 
signatures  on  a  document  do  not 
necessarily  produce  compliance  with  its 
provisions.  The  continued  fighting  in 
Afghanistan,  where  more  than  100,000 
invading  troups  remain,  violating  the 
sovereignty  of  that  unhappy  country  and 
abusing  the  humanity  of  its  people, 
stands  as  an  affront  to  the  peace  we  in 
Helsinki  professed  to  pursue.  The  people 
of  Poland  remain  today  subjugated  by  a 
martial  law  which  attacked  the 
legitimacy  of  their  free  trade  union, 
Solidarity,  and  continues  to  keep  in  in- 
ternment and  imprisonment  thousands 
of  persons  who  declare  and  champion 

I  their  human  rights. 

Our  delegation  believes  in  the  impor- 

,  tance  of  words.  But  we  cannot  permit 
an  agreement  on  words  to  obfuscate 
unpleasant  realities.  We  have  sought 

I  and  welcome  the  agreement  represented 


by  our  decision  in  Madrid.  We  do  not 
wish  to  minimize  the  importance  of  that 
agreement.  But  we  also  do  not  wish  to 
minimize  the  consequence  of  under- 
mining such  agreements  when  they  are 
not  complied  with  in  letter  and  in  spirit. 

What  are  we  to  think  when  at  the 
very  time  we  were  coming  to  agreement 
on  provisions  dealing  with  religious 
rights,  Pravda  Vostoka  of  Uzbekistan  in- 
formed us  that  leading  members  of  the 
Seventh  Day  Adventist  Church  have 
been  imprisoned  by  government 
authorities  precisely  because  of  their 
wish  to  practice  their  religion? 

On  December  1,  1981,  I  reluctantly 
brought  to  the  attention  of  this  body  a 
detailed  report  of  what  clearly  appeared 
to  be  a  government-sponsored  anti- 
Jewish  campaign  in  the  Soviet  Union.  It 
was  my  hope,  obviously  misplaced,  that 
I  would  never  have  reason  to  raise  that 
issue  again.  The  facts,  however,  force 
me  to  do  so.  The  decline  in  Soviet 
Jewish  immigration  is  to  the  lowest 
levels  since  the  1960s,  a  tragic  violation 
of  the  Helsinki  accords.  An  important 
escape  valve  has  thus  been  cut  off  for 
one  of  the  most  persecuted  religious 
groups  in  that  society.  We  note  too,  with 
sadness,  that  many  Jewish  scientists  and 
professionals  have  been  stripped  of  their 
educational  degrees;  that  the  teaching  of 
the  Hebrew  language  brings  on  police 
harassment  and  arrest;  and,  perhaps 
most  disturbing  of  all,  that  extreme  anti- 
Semitic  articles  are  appearing  in  the 
Soviet  press  with  increasing  frequency. 

Soviet  officials  sometimes  respond  to 
these  facts  with  assertions  of  "indigna- 
tion" and  "libel."  I  fully  understand  such 
indignation  in  the  light  of  the  horren- 
dous memories  of  anti-Semitism  during 
and  prior  to  World  War  II.  As  to  libel, 
in  many  of  our  societies  truth  is  a 
defense  to  a  charge  of  libel.  We  pray 
that  this  issue  may  soon  disappear  as  an 
issue  between  us.  Until  the  facts  justify 
that  change,  however,  I  quote  from  a 
statement  made  last  week  by  President 
Reagan:  "We  have  repeatedly  stated 
that  our  concern  for  human  rights  in 
general,  and  Soviet  Jewry  in  particular, 
is  integral  to  our  national  interest  and 
remains  a  major  focus  of  our  national 
policy." 

The  picture  is  no  more  encouraging 
when  we  turn  to  the  very  marrow  of  our 
objectives,  the  search  for  peace.  A 
Soviet  pacifist,  Alexander  Shatravka, 
was  recently  sentenced  to  3  years  in 
prison  for  circulating  a  petition  calling 
for  the  universal  abolition  of  nuclear 
weapons.  The  document  had  urged  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 


to  scrap  their  nuclear  arsenals.  Mr. 
Shatravka  had  earlier  been  associated 
with  a  group  of  young  people,  who,  a 
year  ago,  had  been  arrested  for  unfurl- 
ing a  banner  in  Red  Square  bearing  only 
the  Russian  words  for  "bread,  life,  dis- 
armament." 

The  arrest  of  these  young  Soviet 
citizens  seeking  peace  stands  in  sharp 
contrast  to  the  enthusiastic  editorial 
which  appeared  in  Pravda  last  January 
hailing  antiwar  movements  in  Western 
Europe  as  "vital  causes  of  the  people." 
Is  it  any  wonder  that  we  are  reminded 
of  a  perceptive  statement  by  Clausewitz: 
"The  aggressor,"  he  said,  "is  always 
peace  loving.  He  would  like  to  make  his 
entry  into  our  country  undisturbed." 

We  know  that  the  people  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  like  all  of  our  peoples,  are 
peace  loving.  But  we  also  know  from  the 
Pravda  editorial  of  last  week  that  Soviet 
authorities,  who  are  not  elected  by  their 
people,  fear  independent  ideas  and  want 
their  people  "immunized"  against  them. 
General  Aleksei  Yepishev,  the  political 
head  of  the  Soviet  Army,  recently  com- 
plained that  Soviet  youth  was  being  in- 
fected by  pacifism.  To  stop  independent 
ideas  is  a  lost  cause.  Ideas,  like  the  wind 
currents  and  the  climate,  reach  all  lands 
and  cannot  be  stopped  by  artificial  bar- 
riers. 

It  is  the  view  of  our  delegation  that 
in  arresting  and  harassing  those  of  its 
citizens  who  work  for  peace  and  univer- 
sal nuclear  disarmament,  Soviet 
authorities  not  only  maintain  an  indefen- 
sible double  standard,  they  clearly 
demonstrate  that  the  mantle  of  peace,  in 
which  they  would  like  to  cloak  them- 
selves, simply  does  not  fit  their  shape, 
their  ideology,  or  their  practices,  and  it 
is  not  simply  one  country  to  which  we 
wish  to  address  these  comments. 

Similarly,  a  few  weeks  ago,  more 
than  300  Czechoslovak  young  people 
were  clubbed  by  the  police,  with  many 
arrested,  for  holding  a  peace  demonstra- 
tion in  Prague  and  chanting  "we  want 
peace  and  freedom."  And  in  that  coun- 
try, Ladislav  Lis,  a  spokesman  for  the 
Charter  77  human  rights  and  peace 
organization,  a  Helsinki  monitoring 
group,  is  expected  to  go  on  trial  this 
week  for  his  activities.  Religious 
believers  are  also  facing  renewed  repres- 
sion for  their  expressions  of  faith. 

In  East  Germany — where  there  is  a 
growing  unofficial  peace  movement  that 
opposes  all  nuclear  arms,  including  those 
of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States — young  people,  many  of  them 
associated  with  churches,  also  find 
themselves  harassed.  At  least  22 


September  1983 


65 


MIDDLE  EAST 


members  of  this  group  have  recently 
been  expelled.  Patches  worn  on  clothing 
depicting  "swords  into  plowshares," 
distributed  by  East  German  church 
leaders,  have  been  outlawed  as  "the  ex- 
pression of  a  mentality  hostile  to  the 
state  and  proof  of  membership  in  an 
illegal  political  association."  Students 
wearing  the  patch  were  threatened  with 
expulsion  from  their  schools  and 
workers  from  their  jobs. 

The  irony  is  not  lost  on  us  as  we  re- 
mind ourselves  that  the  statue  of  peace 
given  by  Moscow  to  the  United  Nations 
has  the  same  motif  of  "swords  into 
plowshares." 

A  double  irony  is  that  the  harass- 
ment of  those  who  try  to  demonstrate 
for  peace  stands  in  stark  contradiction 
to  a  UN  General  Assembly  resolution  of 
last  December,  cosponsored  by  the 
United  States,  calling  on  all  states  "to 
encourage  their  citizens  freely  and 
publicly  to  express  their  own  views  on 
disarmament  changes  and  to  organize 
and  to  meet  publicly  for  that  purpose." 

Once  again,  we  have  words;  and  we 
have  deeds  contrary  to  those  words.  We 
have  the  continuation  of  a  pattern  which 
has  plagued  the  Helsinki  process  since 
1975  and  which  continues  to  plague  this 
meeting  to  this  day. 

The  Helsinki  Process  Must  Continue 

The  question  might  well  be  asked, 
therefore,  and  many  in  my  country 
understandably  ask,  why  do  we 
negotiate  about  words?  Why  do  we  seek 
to  forge  a  concluding  document?  Why  do 
we  enter  into  an  agreement  at  a  time 
when  the  repression  of  human  beings  in 
the  Soviet  Union  is  greater  than  at  any 
time  since  the  Helsinki  accords  were 
signed  in  1975? 

The  American  delegation  has  pur- 
sued these  activities  here  in  Madrid 
because  the  pursuit  of  peace  is  too  vital, 
the  need  for  understanding  too  indispen- 
sable, the  importance  of  the  Helsinki  ac- 
cords too  great  to  permit  us  to  be  dis- 
couraged by  the  task  or  by  the  obstacles 
we  face.  We  are  convinced  that  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  has  within  it  a  for- 
mula for  peace  which  is  indispensable  in 
this  age  of  potential  nuclear  devastation. 
It  is  our  conviction,  furthermore,  that 
unless  these  principles  are  taken  serious- 
ly, the  accords  will  become  historically 
irrelevant.  We,  therefore,  continue  to 
express  ourselves  on  this  issue,  even 
during  these  closing  days  of  our 
meeting,  in  order  to  help  mobilize  a 
wider  moral  and  political  insistence  upon 
universal  respect  for  the  act  by  com- 


pliance with  its  provisions.  Anything  less 
threatens  the  integrity  of  our  process 
and  of  our  relationships  under  it. 

The  American  delegation  makes  this 
statement  today  not  to  irritate  or  offend 
any  delegation  here.  We  understand  the 
need  for  patience  in  building  the  struc- 
ture of  peace  and  understanding  among 
us.  We  cannot,  however,  lull  our  publics 
into  believing  that  words  alone  are  ade- 
quate to  erase  the  pressing  threats  to 
the  integrity  of  the  Helsinki  and  Madrid 
principles. 

We  earnestly  desire  to  enter  into  a 
constructive  dialogue  at  all  levels  in 
order  to  achieve  understanding  and 
restore  the  "detente"  contemplated  in 
the  Helsinki  accords.  We  wish  to 
negotiate  reductions  in  arms  of  all  kinds 
to  ease  the  burdens  of  military  spending 
on  all  of  us.  We  wish  peace  with  every 
state  here.  We  wish  to  resolve  all  poten- 
tial conflicts  between  us,  bilateral, 
regional,  and  international.  We  seek  to 
do  so  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity  and 
mutuality. 

We  appreciate  that  in  order  to  have 
a  successful  dialogue,  we  must  be  as  at- 
tentive and  responsive  to  the  concerns 
of  others  as  we  ask  them  to  be  with 
respect  to  ours.  We  are  prepared  to  do 
so. 

I  conclude  with  an  extract  from  a 
statement  issued  by  President  Reagan  in 
Washington  last  Friday  evening: 

In  concluding  the  Madrid  meeting,  we  re- 
affirm our  commitment  to  the  Helsinki  proc- 
ess. We  will  not  flag  in  our  continued  deter- 
mination to  work  with  all  governments  and 
peoples  whose  goal  is  the  strengthening  of 
peace  in  freedom.  As  Madrid  has  shown, 
dialogue,  when  based  on  realistic  expecta- 
tions and  conducted  with  patience,  can  pro- 
duce results.  These  results  are  often  gradual 
and  hard  won,  but  they  are  the  necessary 
building  blocks  for  a  more  secure  and  stable 
world.  The  challenge  remains:  we  must  all 
consolidate  and  build  on  these  gains;  we  must 
ensure  that  good  words  are  transformed  into 
good  deeds  and  that  the  ideals  which  they 
embody  are  given  concrete  expression.  Giving 
substance  to  the  promises  of  Madrid  and 
Helsinki  will  remain  one  of  our  prime  objec- 
tives. 


'Emphasis  is  added  to  quoted  material. 

2Malta,  as  of  July  18,  1983,  withheld  its 
consensus  to  the  draft  concluding  document 
and  insisted  on  discussion  of  amendments  it 
proposed  regarding  security  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. ■ 


Visit  of  Lebanese 
President 


President  Amin  Gemayel  of  Lebanon 
made  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  July  19-23,  1983,  to 
meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other 
government  officials.  Following  are 
remarks  made  by  Presidents  Reagan  and 
Gemayel  after  their  meeting  on  July  22.1 

President  Reagan 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  welcome  our 
friend,  President  Gemayel,  to  the  White 
House  again.  We've  had  excellent  talks 
today  covering  many  vital  concerns  of 
both  our  countries.  During  his  first  visit 
here  9  months  ago,  President  Gemayel 
and  I  discussed  the  principles  upon 
which  U.S.  policy  toward  Lebanon  is 
based:  the  full  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  from  Lebanon;  support  for  a 
strong  central  government  capable  of 
asserting  its  authority  over  all  of 
Lebanon;  and  security  for  Israel's  north- 
ern border. 

Today,  I've  reaffirmed  these  prin- 
ciples to  President  Gemayel.  A  united, 
sovereign,  and  independent  Lebanon, 
free  of  all  foreign  forces,  is  the 
legitimate  aspiration  of  the  Government 
and  the  people  of  Lebanon  and  a  goal 
shared  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  Our  talks  today  focused  on  the 
next  steps  in  securing  Lebanon's  inde- 
pendence. We  admire  the  courage  and 
wisdom  demonstrated  by  the  Lebanese 
Government  during  its  negotiations  that 
resulted  in  an  agreement  for  the  depar- 
ture of  Israeli  forces. 

The  United  States  remains  firmly 
committed  to  the  earliest  possible  resolu- 
tion of  the  conflict  in  Lebanon.  This 
morning,  President  Gemayel  and  I  have 
gone  over  the  difficult  agenda  and  have 
agreed  on  next  steps  which  we  should 
take  together  to  set  this  process  in  mo- 
tion and  carry  it  through. 

And  I  have  today  designated  Robert 
McFarlane,  currently  my  Deputy  Assist- 
ant for  National  Security  Affairs,  as  my 
personal  representative  in  the  Middle 
East.  In  that  role  he  will  succeed  Philip 
Habib,  who  must  return  to  his  business 
and  academia  duties.  Phil  has  set  a  high 
standard  in  bringing  us  through  8 
months  of  difficult  negotiations  to  the 
situation  we  face  today,  and  he  will  be 
sorely  missed. 

After  further  consultation  here  in 
Washington  next  week,  Bud  McFarlane 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


and  his  team  will  depart  for  the  Middle 
East  within  10  days. 

I'm  happy  to  have  had  this  oppor- 
tunity to  confer  with  President  Gemayel 
once  again.  I'm  impressed  with  the  prog- 
ress that  he  and  the  Government  and 
people  of  Lebanon  have  made  in 
rebuilding  their  country.  It's  my  belief 
that  energy  and  perseverance  will 
triumph  in  the  end.  And  as  I  told  Presi- 
dent Gemayel,  we  do  not  lack  for  either. 
Lebanon  can  count  on  our  support. 

President  Gemayel 

My  second  visit  to  the  White  House  in 
the  course  of  the  year  is  a  further  con- 
firmation of  our  appreciation  for  the 
consistent  support  President  Reagan  has 
given  Lebanon  and  the  Lebanese  objec- 
tive, which  is  the  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  forces  and  the  reconstruction  of 
a  sovereign,  democratic,  and  united 
Lebanon. 

I'm  very  happy  to  have  with  me  this 
time  the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Shafiq 
Wazzan.  This  should  emphasize  the  im- 
portance we  attach  to  the  visit.  Indeed, 
conditions  in  Lebanon  have  changed  im- 
mensely since  my  visit  last  October.  And 
you  are  going  through  dramatic  develop- 


ments, highlighted  in  particular  by  to- 
day's events  in  Lebanon.  During  our 
meeting  this  morning  and  the  talks  held 
by  my  delegation  with  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  the  Pentagon,  we  have  amply 
covered  the  various  practical  ways  and 
means  available  to  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  and  the  United  States  in  order 
to  fulfill  our  common  goals. 

I  continue  to  be  confident  that  the 
major  problems  still  confronting  us  in 
Lebanon  and  the  Middle  East  can  best 
be  addressed  and  resolved  by  full 
cooperation  with  our  Arab  community 
and  our  American  friends.  President 
Reagan  has  reassured  us  of  his  continu- 
ing concern  and  determination  to  pursue 
his  initiative  in  Lebanon  with  the  same 
strength  and  commitment.  Our  two 
governments  will  intensify  their  con- 
sultations until  the  expected  results  are 
achieved. 

I  would  like,  finally,  to  thank  Philip 
Habib.  I'll  tell  him,  he  is  always  welcome 
in  Lebanon.  He  is  a  friend  of  Lebanon. 
He  was  with  us  during  the  difficult  time. 
And,  also,  I'll  say  in  advance,  welcome 
to  Mr.  McFarlane. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  25,  1983. 


Situation  in  the  Middle  East 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  19,  19831 

The  President,  as  you  know,  spoke  this 
morning  with  Prime  Minister  Begin 
regarding  the  postponement  of  the 
Prime  Minister's  visit  to  Washington, 
which  had  been  scheduled  for  next  week. 

While  we  regret  the  President  and 
the  Prime  Minister  will  not  be  able  to 
meet  next  week,  we  look  forward  to 
rescheduling  the  meeting  before  the  end 
of  the  year. 

Meanwhile,  we  anticipate  discussions 
on  the  Middle  East  peace  process  with 
Israel  and  other  nations  in  the  region 
will  continue.  We  see  this  as  in  no  way 
an  impediment  to  the  progress  of  our 
peace  initiative  in  Lebanon  or  in  the 
region  as  a  whole.  Secretary  Shultz  has 
just  completed  an  extensive  round  of 
talks  with  the  leaders  of  Israel,  Syria, 


Egypt,  Lebanon,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  Jor- 
dan regarding  the  current  situation.  In 
Israel,  he  had  detailed  discussions  with 
the  Prime  Minister,  the  Foreign 
Minister,  and  the  Defense  Minister.  We 
anticipate  our  diplomatic  discussions  will 
continue  at  all  levels  during  this  critical 
period. 

As  far  as  the  President  is  concerned, 
we  will  continue  our  pursuit  of  the  full 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon,  the  reestablishment  of 
Lebanon's  sovereignty  over  all  its  ter- 
ritory, and  the  security  of  its  borders. 
We  will  continue  to  have  discussions 
with  all  parties  leading  toward  this 
objective. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  continue 
our  pursuit  of  peace  as  outlined  by  the 
President  last  September  1. 


Visit  of  Amir 
of  Bahrain 


His  Highness  Shaikh  Isa  bin  Salman 
al-Khalifa,  Amir  of  Bahrain,  made  a 
state  visit  to  the  United  States 
July  17-22,  1983.  While  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  July  18-22,  he  met  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  His  Highness  at 
the  arrival  ceremony  on  July  19.1 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  25,  1983. 


President  Reagan 

Your  Highness,  it  is  a  pleasure  for 
Nancy  and  me  to  welcome  you  to  the 
United  States  as  a  guest  of  the 
American  people.  Your  concern  for  your 
people  is  well  known,  particularly  your 
commitment  to  the  education  and 
economic  well-being  of  your  citizens. 
Your  personal  involvement  in  the  prob- 
lems of  even  the  humblest  of  your  coun- 
trymen is  legendary.  For  these  reasons 
and  others,  I've  looked  forward  to  the 
day  when  we  could  meet. 

You've  guided  Bahrain  through  a 
difficult  first  decade  of  independence 
with  admirable  skill,  bringing  economic 
progress  with  imaginative  leadership. 
With  far  fewer  oil  resources  than  some 
of  your  neighbors,  you've  transformed 
Bahrain  into  a  financial  and  industrial 
center  with  one  of  the  most  diversified 
economies  in  the  region.  Just  as  impor- 
tant, because  of  your  progressive  leader- 
ship, Bahrain  also  leads  the  area  in 
health  care  and  education.  As  it  has 
been  since  ancient  times,  Bahrain  con- 
tinues to  be  a  place  where  people  of  dif- 
ferent cultures  and  religions  live 
together  in  tolerance  and  peace.  Your 
efforts  to  build  a  humane  and  diverse 
society  provide  an  effective  link  in  the 
exchange  of  technical  skills  and  cultural 
values  between  East  and  West. 

Under  your  leadership,  Bahrain  con- 
tinues to  be  an  inspiring  example  for  all 


September  1983 


67 


MIDDLE  EAST 


of  the  Middle  East  and  the  world.  The 
American  people  are  pleased  to  have 
been  counted  as  supportive  friends  as 
you  built  this  record  of  achievement. 
Our  two  peoples  have  been  partners  for 
progress  and  peace  since  the  beginning 
of  this  century.  We  have  found  this  rela- 
tionship to  be  of  great  mutual  benefit. 
Many  of  the  70  U.S.  companies  in 
Bahrain  today  continue  to  train 
Bahrainis  in  technology  and  other  skills, 
whether  they  be  modern  banking  tech- 
niques, setting  up  new  industries,  or 
preparing  coaches  and  athletes  for 
Bahrain's  Olympic  teams.  Our  long 
history  of  private  sector  cooperation  is  a 
shining  example  of  what  can  be  achieved 
in  a  partnership  based  on  mutual  trust 
and  respect. 

As  you're  keenly  aware,  continued 
prosperity  for  your  people  and  those  of 
the  gulf  region  depend  on  peace  and 
security.  It  is  no  secret  that  the  United 
States  has  a  vital  national  interest  in  the 
Middle  East.  We  and  our  allies  depend 
on  oil  originating  there,  much  of  it  pro- 
duced in  and  nearby  your  country.  Yet, 
we  also  recognize  the  value  of  partner- 
ship and  respect  for  the  culture  and 
aspirations  of  states  like  your  own— 
unlike  another  world  power  which  seeks 
to  impose  its  system  by  encouraging  and 
exploiting  conflict  and  unrest.  But  the 
United  States  seeks  peace  and  stability. 
Together  with  other  peaceloving  na- 
tions in  the  gulf  region,  we've  made 
rapid  progress  in  recent  years,  not  only 
by  helping  our  friends  meet  their  own 
defense  requirements  but  also  by 
developing  our  own  ability  to  come  to 
their  assistance  should  the  need  ever 
arise. 

Many  Americans  who  work  in  the 
region  have  experienced  hospitality  of 
the  Bahraini  people,  and  for  this  I  am 
most  appreciative.  During  his  recent 
visit,  Crown  Prince  Hamad  deepened  his 
friendship  between  our  two  countries. 
I  want  to  assure  you  that  I  share 
your  concern  about  the  conflict  between 
Iraq  and  Iran.  The  loss  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  young  men  on  both  sides 
and  the  destruction  borne  by  both  coun- 
tries are  tragic.  I  look  forward  to  con- 
sulting with  you  about  what  more  our 
countries  might  do  to  encourage  a 
negotiated  end  to  this  conflict,  which 
threatens  the  security  and  even  the 
marine  ecology  of  the  entire  area. 

We've  appreciated  your 
government's  understanding  as  we  pur- 
sue our  goal  of  seeking  the  withdrawal 
of  all  foreign  forces  from  Lebanon  and 
securing  a  settlement  for  the  Palestinian 
people  that  is  firmly  rooted  in  the  prin- 


Bahrain— A  Profile 


People 

Nationality:  Noun  and  adjective— 
Bahraini(s).  Population  (1981  est.):  358,857 
(66%  indigenous).  Ethnic  groups:  Arab  73%, 
Iranian  9%,  Pakistani,  Indian.  Religions: 
About  60%  Shi'a  Muslim,  40%  Sunni  Muslim. 
Languages:  Arabic  (official),  English,  Farsi. 
and  Urdu.  Education:  Attendance— 85%. 
Literacy— about  40%.  Work  force  (190,000, 
1979  est.):  About  60%  indigenous,  40%  ex- 
patriate. Agriculture— 5%.  Industry  and 
commerce— 85%.  Services— 5%.  Govern- 
ment — 3%. 

Geography 

Area:  676  sq.  km.  (260  sq.  mi.);  about  four 
times  the  size  of  Washington,  DC.  Bahrain  is 
an  archipelago  of  islands,  of  which  six  are  in- 
habited. Cities:  Capital— Manama  (100,000). 
Other  city—k\  Muharraq.  Terrain:  Low  in- 
terior plateau  and  hill  on  main  island. 
Climate:  Hot  and  humid. 


IRAN 


BAHBAIN    , 

SAUDI  ^-Hfii. 

ARABIA 


OMAN  7 


Government 

Type:  Traditional  emirate  (cabinet-executive 
system).  Independence:  August  15,  1971. 
Constitution:  May  26,  1973. 

Branches:  Executive— amir  (chief  of 
state),  prime  minister  (head  of  government), 


ciples  of  security  and  justice  embodied  in 
UN  Security  Council  Resolutions  242 
and  338. 

As  you  know,  Secretary  Shultz 
recently  returned  from  the  Middle  East. 
We  remain  undaunted  in  our  effort  to 
prevent  the  forces  of  violence  from  exer- 
cising a  veto  over  the  rights  of  the 
Lebanese  people.  The  people  of  Lebanon 
must  have  restored  their  basic  human 


Council  of  Ministers  (cabinet).  Judi- 
cial— independent  judiciary  with  right  of 
judicial  review.  Subdivisions:  6  towns  and 
cities. 

Political  parties:  None.  Suffrage:  None. 

Central  government  budget  (1980  est.): 
$987.66  million.  Defense  (1979):  $87.8 
million,  or  11%  of  1979  budget. 

Flag:  Three-fourths  red  field  with  ser- 
rated line  separating  white  field  on  staff  side. 

Economy 

GDP  (1979  est.):  $1.7  billion.  Annual  growth 
rate  (est.):  6%.  Per  capita  income  (1980 
est):  $6,315.  Avg.  inflation  rate  1979-81: 
7%. 

Natural  resources:  Oil.  associated  and 
nonassociated  natural  gas,  fish. 

Agriculture  (2%  of  GDP):  Eggs, 
vegetables,  dates. 

Industries  (70%  of  GDP):  Oil,  aluminum, 
ship  repair,  natural  gas,  fish. 

Services  (26%  of  GDP):  Banking,  real 
estate,  insurance. 

Trade  (1980  est.):  Exports— $3.8  billion: 
oil,  aluminum,  fish.  Major  markets— Japan, 
Saudi  Arabia,  UK,  US.  Imports— $3.6  billion: 
machinery,  industrial  equipment,  motor 
vehicles,  foodstuffs,  clothing.  Major  sup- 
pliers— Japan,  UK,  US. 

Official  exchange  rate:  0.37695  Bahraini 
dinars  =  US$1. 

Economic  aid  received:  Significant 
budgetary  support  and  project  grants  from 
Saudi  Arabia.  Kuwait,  and  the  United  Arab 
Emirates. 

Membership  in  international  organiza- 
tions: UN  and  most  of  its  specialized  agen- 
cies, Arab  League,  Organization  of  Arab 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OAPEC), 
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC). 


Taken  from  tin'  Background  Notes  of  August 
1982,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Editor:  Joanne 
Reppert  Reams.  ■ 


right  to  pursue  their  own  destiny  in  an 
atmosphere  of  peace,  security,  and 
mutual  trust. 

I  look  forward  to  discussing  our 
many  common  concerns  with  you  today. 
I  know  our  shared  goals  of  peace  and 
prosperity  for  the  region  can  be  met  in 
the  same  spirit  of  good  will  and  partner- 
ship that  has  characterized  our  friend- 
ship thus  far. 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


On  behalf  of  the  American  people  it 
is  my  privilege  to  welcome  you  to  the 
United  States. 

His  Highness  the  Amir 

I  would  like  to  offer  my  appreciation 
and  thanks  for  the  kind  thoughts  ex- 
pressed in  your  address  toward  the 
State  of  Bahrain  and  for  the  welcome 
and  hospitalities  extended  to  us  from  the 
very  beginning  of  our  official  visit  to 
your  friendly  country.  This  indicates  the 
strength  of  the  friendly  ties  existing  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  I  offer  my  gen- 
uine good  wishes  to  the  friendly  people 
of  the  United  States  of  America  for 
their  well-being  and  prosperity. 

I  believe  that  this  visit  will  succeed 
in  developing  the  relations  between  our 
two  countries;  open  up  a  new  chapter  in 

I  our  fruitful  cooperation;  and  support  our 
efforts  to  help  maintain  peace,  security, 
and  justice  for  the  world  community.  As 
you  have  referred,  in  your  address,  to 
some  of  the  most  important  economic 
and  political  issues  in  the  world,  I  should 
commend  in  this  respect  the  positive 

I  role  you  play  for  the  prosperity  and 
security  of  the  world.  We,  no  doubt, 
support  and  uphold  the  great  effort  you 

I  make  in  this  field,  as  we  firmly  believe 
that  such  issues  are  very  important  for 
the  progress  of  the  individual  in  the 
modern  world  and  that  without  them 
clashes  and  war  will  break  out.  Clashes 
and  war  will  break  out  and  destroy  all  of 
the  progress  made  over  the  years. 

In  light  of  many  common  views  we 
share  in  the  political  field,  we  believe,  as 
you  do,  that  the  Middle  East  problem 
:omes  in  the  forefront  of  political  issues 
n  the  world.  It  is  one  of  the  burning 
ind  explosive  problems  in  the  world, 
tfhich  passes  now  through  a  very 
dangerous  stage  that  poses  a  serious 
,hreat  to  the  world  peace  and  security. 
This  imposes  upon  us  the  duty  to  make 
;very  effort  to  save  the  region  from  this 
lisastrous  situation. 

We  hope  that  the  sincere  and  good 
effort  you  make  to  find  a  suitable  solu- 
•ion  to  this  problem  will  result  in 
;stablishing  just  and  durable  peace  in 
he  region,  which  has  been  exposed  to 
ive  major  wars  within  35  years  with 
lisastrous  effects  to  its  people.  The 
ragic  events  in  Lebanon  and  the 
lamage  it  has  suffered  are  but  some  of 
nany  inevitable  results  of  the  explosive 
ituation  in  the  region.  Lebanon 
leserves  all  the  help  and  backing  so  that 
ts  government  will  exercise  full  control 
'Ver  its  unified  territories. 


We  believe  that  there  will  be  no 
hope  of  stability  in  the  Middle  East 
without  the  application  of  the  same 
universal  principles  upon  the  people  of 
the  region;  and  concluding,  the  Palestin- 
ian people,  when  they  are  dealing  with 
their  legitimate  right  to  live  in  peace 
within  secure  national  boundaries. 

We  are  prepared  to  do  our  best  and 
participate  in  every  sincere,  interna- 
tional effort  to  establish  security  in  the 
Middle  East  region,  within  this' 
framework,  in  order  to  put  an  end  to 
this  terrible  conflict  and  enable  the  peo- 
ple of  the  region  to  live  in  peace. 


Finally,  it  is  my  pleasure  to  conclude 
by  wishing  you,  Mr.  President,  all  the 
success  in  your  efforts  for  the  progress 
and  advance  of  the  friendly  people  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  to  bring 
peace,  justice,  and  prosperity  to  the  peo- 
ple of  the  world. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  25,  1983. 

2Held  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House,  where  His  Highness  was  accorded  a 
formal  welcome  with  full  military  honors.  ■ 


Production  of  the  MX  Missile 


PRESIDENT'S  RADIO 
ADDRESS  TO  THE  NATION, 
JULY  16,  19831 

Today  I  want  to  talk  to  you  about  peace. 
Back  in  June  of  1963,  President  John  F. 
Kennedy  delivered  an  arms  control 
speech  that  is  still  remembered  for  its 
eloquence  and  vision.  He  told  the  gradu- 
ating seniors  at  American  University:  "I 
speak  of  peace,  therefore,  as  the 
necessary,  rational  end  of  rational  men. 
I  realize  that  the  pursuit  of  peace  is  not 
as  dramatic  as  the  pursuit  of  war  and, 
frequently,  the  words  of  the  pursuer  fall 
on  deaf  ears.  But  we  have  no  more 
urgent  task." 

Twenty  years  have  passed  since 
those  words  were  spoken,  and  they've 
been  a  troubled  era,  overshadowed  by 
the  dangers  of  nuclear  weapons.  We've 
seen  the  world's  inventory  of  nuclear 
weapons  steadily  expand.  Despite  many 
sincere  attempts  to  control  the  growth 
of  nuclear  arsenals,  those  arsenals  have 
continued  to  grow.  That's  the  bad  news. 
The  good  news  is  that  now,  at  last, 
there  is  hope  that  we  can  finally  begin  to 
reverse  this  trend.  Americans  have 
joined  together— Republicans  and  Demo- 
crats, liberals  and  conservatives — to 
face  the  greatest  challenge  of  our  time; 
the  urgent  task  of  pursuing  a  lasting 
peace  in  the  nuclear  era.  Our  political 
process  has  forged  a  consensus,  a  bipar- 
tisan consensus  that  has  united  us  in  our 
common  search  for  ways  to  protect  our 
country,  reduce  the  risk  of  war,  and, 
ultimately,  dramatically  reduce  the  level 
of  nuclear  weapons— the  foundation  we 
need  for  successful  negotiations. 


Remember,  our  MX  Peacekeeper 
missile  program  calls  for  the  deployment 
of  100  missiles.  The  level  ultimately 
deployed,  however,  will  clearly  be  in- 
fluenced by  the  outcome  in  Geneva.  If 
an  agreement  is  reached  which  calls  for 
deep  reductions— which  is,  of  course, 
our  goal— the  number  of  missiles  could 
certainly  be  adjusted  downward. 

As  the  Scowcroft  commission  rightly 
pointed  out,  the  MX  Peacekeeper  missile 
is  an  essential  part  of  a  comprehensive 
modernization  and  arms  control  pro- 
gram to  ensure  deterrence  today  and  in 
the  future.  We're  building  the  MX 
Peacekeeper  to  strengthen  deterrence. 
But  it  also  provides  vital  negotiating  in- 
centives and  leverage  in  Geneva. 

Andrei  Sakharov,  the  distinguished 
Soviet  physicist  and  Nobel  Prize 
laureate,  recently  published  an  eloquent 
article  which  forcefully  makes  the  same 
point.  He  notes  that,  given  the  Soviet 
advantage  in  land-based,  strategic 
missiles,  talks  about  limitation  and 
reduction  of  these  systems  could  become 
easier  if  the  United  States  were  to  have 
MX  missiles,  albeit  only  potentially.  An- 
drei Sakharov  is  a  hard  man  for  anyone 
to  ignore. 

When  the  Congress  reaffirms  its 
support  for  this  program  and  authorizes 
the  funds  to  modernize  our  strategic 
deterrent,  our  agenda  for  peace  will  be 
strengthened  even  further.  In  NATO,  as 
in  our  other  alliances,  there's  a  renewed 
feeling  of  solidarity.  Last  May  at 
Williamsburg,  the  leaders  of  the  major 
industrialized  nations  demonstrated 
their  commitment  to  vigorously  pursue 
the  twin  objectives  of  arms  reductions 
and  deterrence  in  the  Williamsburg  com- 
munique. This  solidarity  is  a  source  of 
much  strength. 


September  1983 


69 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


For  the  graduates  of  June  1983,  this 
is  a  time  of  opportunity  and  hope — a 
hope  that  they  and  their  children  will  en- 
joy a  safer,  more  secure  world.  That's 
why  we  must  sustain  our  consensus. 
And  that's  why  I've  spent  hundreds  of 
hours  meeting  with  members  of  this  Ad- 
ministration, with  the  bipartisan  Com- 
mission on  Strategic  Forces,  with  our 
arms  negotiators,  with  Members  of  the 
Congress,  and  with  concerned  citizens. 

My  message  to  them  and  to  you  is 
that  I  have  no  higher  priority  than 
reducing  and  ultimately  removing  the 
threat  of  nuclear  war  and  seeking  the 
stability  necessary  for  true  peace.  To 
achieve  that  objective,  we  must  reduce 
the  nuclear  arsenals  of  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  We  must 
achieve  greater  stability;  that  is,  we 
must  be  sure  that  we  obtain  genuine 
arms  reductions,  not  merely  agreements 
that  permit  a  growth  in  nuclear  arsenals 
or  agreements  that  proclaim  good  inten- 
tions without  the  teeth  necessary  to 
verify  and  enforce  compliance. 

Our  current  goal  must  be  the  reduc- 
tion of  nuclear  arsenals.  And  I,  for  one, 
believe  we  must  never  depart  from  the 
ultimate  goal  of  banning  them  from  the 
face  of  the  Earth.  That's  why  we  pre- 
sented ambitious  but  realistic  proposals, 
and  that's  why  I  have  been  and  continue 
to  be  willing  to  consider  any  serious 
Soviet  counteroffer.  And  that's  why  I've 
made  our  original  proposal  more  flexible 
and  why  I  continue  to  seek  new  ideas 
for  achieving  an  arms  reduction 
breakthrough. 

Indeed,  the  draft  treaty  our 
negotiators  recently  introduced  in 
Geneva  documents  our  flexibility.  As  op- 
portunities permit,  the  U.S.  position  will 
continue  to  evolve.  The  United  States 
will  negotiate  patiently  but  urgently  and 
always  in  good  faith. 


But  we  cannot  and  we  must  not  set- 
tle for  less  than  genuine,  mutual,  and 
verifiable  arms  reductions.  America's 
postwar  generation  has  preserved  world 
peace  in  its  lifetime,  but  it's  been  an 
uneasy  peace.  Today's  young 
Americans — indeed,  all  members  of  the 
human  family — desire  more  and  deserve 
more.  And  you  deserve  to  know  that 
your  government  is  doing  everything 
possible  to  meet  your  expectations. 

Time  and  again  our  nation  has 
proved  that  there  are  no  limits  to  what 
we  Americans  can  achieve  when  we 
work  together.  Well,  today  we  are  work- 
ing together  to  do  what  is  right.  And  as 
a  result,  we  can  look  forward  to  a  more 
secure  tomorrow. 


PRESIDENTS  LETTER  TO 
MEMBERS  OF  THE  HOUSE 
OF  REPRESENTATIVES, 
JULY  19,  19831 

This  week  the  House  will  consider  Title  III  of 
the  Fiscal  Year  1984  Defense  Authorization 
Bill  which  implements  the  bipartisan  recom- 
mendations of  the  Scowcroft  Commission. 
Endorsing  these  recommendations  will  give 
this  Nation  a  very  solid  chance  to  secure  a 
balanced,  verifiable  arms  reduction  that, 
through  greater  stability,  can  make  our  Na- 
tion, our  world,  our  people  safer.  In  terms  of 
speaking  with  one  bipartisan  voice,  of  stand- 
ing up  for  U.S.  vital  interests  and  of 
strengthening  America's  agenda  for  peace, 
this  vote  is  of  special  significance. 

When  I  endorsed  the  entire  Scowcroft 
Commission  Report,  I  did  so  by  recounting  a 
quote  from  the  report's  conclusion:  "If  we  can 
begin  to  see  ourselves  in  dealing  with  the 
issues,  not  as  political  partisans  or  as 
crusaders  for  one  specific  solution  to  a  part 
of  this  complex  set  of  problems,  but  rather  as 
citizens  of  a  great  Nation  with  the  humbling 
obligation  to  persevere  in  the  long-run  task  of 
preserving  both  peace  and  liberty  for  the 


world,  a  common  perspective  may  finally  lie 
found." 

These  words  which  guided  the  Commis- 
sion, were  instrumental  in  forging  that  bipar- 
tisanship which  aims  for  deep  reductions  in 
both  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  arsenals, 
coupled  with  necessary  modernization  of  our 
strategic  forces  in  a  way  which  will  enhance 
stability. 

Andrei  Sakharov,  the  distinguished 
Soviet  physicist  and  Nobel  laureate,  made  a 
supporting  argument  to  those  aims  when  he 
stated  in  a  recent  letter  that  "arms  control 
talks  with  the  Soviets  would  be  much  easier 
if  the  United  States  were  to  have  the  MX 
albeit  only  potentially." 

The  MX  Peacekeeper  is  being  built,  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  bipartisan  Scowcroft 
Commission's  package,  to  strengthen  deter- 
rence. It  also  provides  vital  negotiating 
leverage  in  Geneva.  That  lever  is  working. 

Although  the  Commission  called  for  the 
deployment  of  100  missiles,  the  level 
ultimately  deployed  will  be  influenced  by  the 
outcome  in  Geneva.  If  an  agreement  is 
reached  which  calls  for  deep  reduc- 
tions—  which  is  our  goal — the  number  of 
missiles  could  certainly  be  adjusted 
downward. 

We  need  the  MX,  not  only  for  force 
modernization,  but  to  keep  the  Soviets  mov- 
ing at  the  negotiation  tables.  That  is  why 
congressional  endorsement  of  the  Scowcroft 
Commission  recommendations,  as  embodied 
in  Title  III  of  the  Defense  Authorization  Bill, 
is  so  important. 

The  American  people  believe  that  this 
should  not  be  a  partisan  issue.  I  hope  that  I 
can  count  on  your  help  to  implement  all 
elements  of  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
recommendations.  Together  we  can  ensure  a 
continuing  national  consensus  that  can  lead 
to  the  eventual  elimination  of  all  nuclear 
weapons. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reaga 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  25,  1983. 


70 


PACIFIC 


ANZUS  Council  Meets 
in  Washington 


The  32d  meeting  of  the  ANZUS 
[Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States 
pact]  Council  was  held  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  July  18-19,  1983. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  a  joint 
news  conference  held  by  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Ministers  William,  Hayde?i 
of  Australia  and  Warren  Cooper  of  New 
Zealand  on  July  19  and  the  communique 
issued  on  the  same  day. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
[JULY  19,  19831 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  like  to  ex- 
press my  gratitude  to  our  friends  from 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  who  have 
ome  here  and  labored  with  us  for  2 
iays.  We  covered  a  wide  range  of  sub- 
ects,  as  the  communique  shows  and, 
rom  our  standpoint,  we  consider  it  to 
lave  been  a  very  worthwhile  discussion. 
I  would  like  to  take  the  opportunity, 
is  well,  to  thank  Mr.  Hayden,  who, 
vhen  he  visited  Hanoi  recently,  took  the 
>ccasion  to  raise  with  them  questions  of 
>ur  POWs  and  MIAs  there.  You  have 
indertaken  it  when  the  Vietnamese  visit 
'ou  in  Australia,  you  will  continue  to 
ollow  up  on  that  subject,  and  we  ap- 
ireciate  that  very  much. 

Q.  To  Foreign  Minister  Hayden. 
Vhen  you  came  in  on  an  On-the- 
tecord  conference,  you  said  that  there 
vere  two  different  interpretations  of 
LNZUS  in  Australia:  one  that  commit- 
ed  us  to  global  responsibilities,  the 
■ther  one  that  committed  the  United 
States  to  the  regional  defense  of 
Australia. 

I  understood  one  of  your  inten- 
ions  here  was  to  clarify  this  issue.  I 
ssume  that  items  3,  4,  and  5  of  the 
ommunique  addressed  that.  They 
on't  seem  to  say  anything,  and  I 
wonder,  has  the  issue  clarified  in  your 
lind  as  to  the  nature  of  the  treaty?  As 


a  result  of  this  meeting,  has  anything 
at  all  altered  as  to  our  understanding 
of  the  treaty,  or  the  American 
understanding  of  it? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  don't 
think  you  should  discriminate  against 
this  particular  communique.  It's  been 
drafted  according  to  the  great  traditions 
of  these  sorts  of  communiques.  But  if  I 
could  go  beyond  that  and  say,  for  my 
part,  a  number  of  matters  have  been 
clarified.  For  instance,  it  was  implicitly 
stated  at  one  point  in  the  discussions,  in 
the  course  of  this  morning's  session  by 
Admiral  Crewe,  that  each  nation  should 
contribute  according  to  its  abilities  and 
in  its  area  of  greatest  concern. 

For  me,  that  means  very  simply  that 
we  have  explicitly  declared  that,  for 
Australia,  our  role  should  be  seen  as  one 
of  regional  concern.  This  is  fairly  con- 
sistent with  the  view  I've  expressed  over 
a  very  long  time,  both  when  I  was 
spokesman  on  defense  matters  for  the 
Labor  Party  in  the  National  Parliament 
and,  subsequently,  when  I  was  leader  of 
the  opposition  for  the  Labor  Party.  And 
so  the  difficulties  that  we've  had  with 
the  contradictory  purposes  being 
presented  to  our  defense  planning — that 
sometimes  it  was  presumed  we  had  a 
global  role  to  fulfill  somehow  as  an  ap- 
pendix associated  with  a  superpower, 
and  at  other  times  we  had  a  regional 
role — has  been  clarified,  and  I  accept 
that  clarification.  For  my  part,  it  will 
allow  much  more  explicit  and  precise 
formulation  of  our  defense  thinking.  It's 
the  sort  of  defense  structures  that  we 
establish  for  our  defense  forces. 

Q.  Does  this  mean  that  you  don't 
think  that  ANZUS  involves  us  in  any 
global  responsibility? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  ANZUS 
doesn't  by  the  terms  in  which  it's 
drafted.  ANZUS  refers  to  attacks  on  the 
metropolitan  territory,  and  the  signatory 
members  to  territories  they  may  ad- 
minister, and  refers  to  the  area  of  the 
Pacific.  It  doesn't  refer  to  international 
obligations.  Yesterday,  Mr.  Shultz  made 
this  clear  when  he  said  that  there  would 
be  circumstances  where,  if  ANZUS 
doesn't  commit  Australia  to  U.S. 
diplomacy,  for  instance,  in  the  Middle 
East  or  Central  America,  we  may  or 
may  not  agree.  If  we  do  agree,  it  would 
be  on  the  basis  of  other  principles, 


although  the  spirit  of  ANZUS  guides 
many  things  which  we  do  even  though 
ANZUS  doesn't  cover  it. 

So  there  is  a  multinational  observer 
force  in  the  Sinai  which  was  committed 
by  the  previous  government  not  under 
obligations  arising  from  ANZUS  but 
because  of  certain  common  views,  I 
believe,  they  shared  with  the  U.S.  Ad- 
ministration. That's  one  illustration  of 
the  way  in  which  decisions  can  be  made 
which  have  an  implication  well  beyond 
the  obligations  which  are  covered  by 
ANZUS. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  follow  that  and 
ask  all  three  Ministers  what  the 
geographic  limits  are  to  the  ANZUS 
obligations  and  alliance  possibilities. 
For  example,  would  it  include  the  Per- 
sian Gulf? 

Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  We  have 
reviewed  ANZUS.  It's  been  going  for  32 
years,  successfully.  The  document  comes 
out,  in  my  opinion,  strengthened.  We 
have  not  given  precision  to  the  geo- 
graphic areas.  There  is  no  manner  in 
which  we  have  looked  at  the  latitude  or 
the  longitude.  We  have  looked  at  the 
Pacific. 

Obviously,  the  strongest  points  are 
in  the  Pacific.  There  is  still  the  impor- 
tance of  the  Indian  Ocean.  There's  a 
relevance,  of  course,  to  the  Americans 
and  Australians  in  the  Indian  Ocean. 
There  is  relevance  to  New  Zealand. 
There  is  less  relevance  to  New  Zealand 
in  regard  to,  say,  Central  America,  but 
if  there  was  an  attack  on  New  Zealand, 
on  Australia — and  if  we're  looking  at 
where  the  attack  might  come  from,  we 
would  probably  say,  sometime  in  the 
future,  from  the  Soviet  Union — we 
would  believe  that  ANZUS  covered  the 
Pacific  area.  But  we  are  very,  very  in- 
terested in  the  work  that's  done  by  the 
United  States  and  other  countries  in 
bringing  about  peace  in  other  areas. 
We  have  been  through  the  global 
responsibilities  of  the  Western  alliance 
countries  in  trying  to  create  a  bit  of 
peace.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
ANZUS  represents  the  Pacific,  but  no 
definition  is  given  to  the  geographic 
area.  That's  probably  one  of  the  main 
reasons  that  it  survived  intact  so  strong- 
ly as  a  treaty  between  the  two  anti- 
podean countries  and  the  United  States. 

Q.  It  would  seem  from  the  word- 
ing of  this  communique  that  there  is  a 
more  realistic  understanding  of  the 
expression  and  intent  of  Article  4 
which  carries  the  American  commit- 
ment as  opposed  to  the  comfortable 


ieptember1983 


71 


PACIFIC 


myths  of  the  past.  Would  New 
Zealand  have  any  reservations  on  this, 
perhaps,  new  understanding? 

Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  We  don't 
really  see  a  new  understanding.  As  I 
have  said,  we  believe  that  ANZUS  has 
come  through  a  review,  which  has  been 
overdue,  intact  and,  frankly,  we  look 
very  close  to  end  those.  There's  a  lot  of 
discussion  about  that  particular  article, 
and  it  still  commends  each  of  the  coun- 
tries to  looking  at  the  problems  that 
maybe  if  there  is  some  invasion  or  some 
military  offensive  against  each  other. 
There  is  the  clear  responsibility  to  be  in- 
volved in  a  treaty  where  freedoms  are  at 
stake.  There  will  be  different  readings  of 
that  particular  clause,  and  it  will  be 
probably  from  the  news  media.  The 
three  countries,  however,  feel  that 
ANZUS  has  served  us  and  will  continue 
to  serve  us  very  well. 

Q.  Could  I  ask  Mr.  Hayden's 
response  to  that  same  question  as 
perhaps  a  more  realistic  assessment  to 
the  wording  and  the  intent  of 
Article  4? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  think 
you  ought  to  look  at  Articles  3,  4,  and  5, 
but  the  obligations  under  ANZUS  are 
fairly  clear:  In  the  event  of  threat  or  at- 
tack a  response  is  required,  and  that 
response  has  to  be  provided  according  to 
constitutional  processes  of  the  respective 
partners.  However,  it  would  not  be  ac- 
curate to  presume  that  the  response 
guaranteed  the  automatic  provision  of 
military  forces  support.  It  may,  but  it 
would  depend  on  the  circumstances  of 
the  attack  and  how  each  party  weighed 
that  up  and  concluded  what  was  its 
proper  response  according  to  its  con- 
stitutional processes. 

It  may  be  in  certain  circumstances 
that  diplomatic  responses  or  political/ 
economic  sanctions,  or  perhaps  the  sup- 
ply of  equipment,  are  judged  to  be  the 
appropriate  response.  It  is  also  pre- 
sumed, underpinning  the  treaty,  is  the 
expectation  that  each  country  will  have 
provided  a  prudent  level  of  self-defense 
capability  commensurate  with  the 
resources  which  it  has  available.  I  think 
that  eminently  reasonable.  In  fact,  when 
I  read  the  principles  which  were  enun- 
ciated in  1969  by  former  President 
Nixon  at  Guam,  and  last  year  a  state- 
ment—I think  at  Maryland  by  Judge 
William  Clark— which  seems  to  be  a 
restatement  of  those  principles,  they  are 
eminently  sensible  and  are  in  accord 
with  the  general  principles  which  are  ex- 
plicit and  implicit  under  the  ANZUS  ar- 
rangements. In  short,  I  think  all  coun- 


t  ries  which  are  signatories  to  this  treaty 
have  an  obligation  to  make  sure  that 
they've  taken  prudent  measures  to 
develop  their  own  force  structures  and 
that  those  prudent  measures  are  com- 
mensurate with  what  they  could 
reasonably  have  provided  in  relation  to 
the  resources  which  they  have  available. 

Q.  Paragraph  25  refers  to  praise 
from  your  colleagues  for  negotiations 
you're  trying  to  bring  out  aimed  at 
achieving  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
situation  in  Lebanon  and  the  wider 
Middle  East  dispute.  Would  you 
please  explain  what  you  expect  to 
achieve  from  the  visit  of  President 
Gemayel  and  what  effect  the  absence 
of  Prime  Minister  Begin  may  have  on 
the  continuation  of  this  negotiating 
process  referred  to  in  the  ANZUS 
communique? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  knew  we'd  stick 
to  ANZUS  all  the  way  [Laughter]  and  I 
give  you  credit  for  doing  it  in  an  artful 
manner.  [Laughter] 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  think 
you'll  lose  many  to  me  because  you  bet  it 
would  happen.  [Laughter] 

Secretary  Shultz.  We,  of  course, 
will  be  conferring  very  closely  with 
President  Gemayel.  The  objectives  that 
his  government  and  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment have  are  identical  in  wanting  to 
see  all  foreign  forces  leave  Lebanon,  in 
wanting  to  see  the  emergency  of  a 
sovereign  Lebanon  able  to  carry  on  its 
work  and  prosper  and  be  sovereign  over 
all  its  territory,  and  to  see  that  there 
are  appropriate  security  arrangements 
so  that  Lebanon  doesn't  become  a  place 
from  which  attacks  can  be  launched  on 
any  neighbor  of  Lebanon.  So  those  ob- 
jectives are  there,  and  operationally, 
we've  made  some  headway  in  attaining 
them.  We  still  have  a  way  to  go,  par- 
ticularly in  bringing  about  Syrian  agree- 
ment to  withdraw.  This  subject,  among 
others  relevant  to  the  Middle  East,  will 
be  discussed  very  strongly. 

As  far  as  Mr.  Begins  visit  is  con- 
cerned, of  course,  we're  disappointed 
that  he  isn't  able  to  come.  He  has  told 
the  President  that  there  are  personal 
reasons  that  make  it  impossible  for  him 
to  come.  At  the  same  time,  of  course, 
our  relationship  with  Israel  is  close  and 
continuing,  and  there  is  a  very  strong 
dialogue  between  the  United  States  and 
Israel.  We  will,  of  course,  be  working 
with  the  Israelis  on  these  same  points. 

Q.  Did  you  get  any  indication  that 
the  United  States  will  help  New 
Zealand  and  Australia  purchase 
military  equipment  to  make  those 


countries  more  effective  ANZUS  part- 
ners? And  did  you  get  any  indication 
that  President  Reagan  might  visit 
New  Zealand  and  Australia  in 
November? 

Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  On  the 
first  question  with  regard  to  the  pur- 
chase of  military  equipment,  we  are  talk 
ing  about  ANZUS  in  regard  to  the 
general  principles  and  any  other  discus- 
sions which  take  place  in  regard  to  the 
bilateral  relationship.  It's  not  easy  for  a 
country  such  as  New  Zealand,  of  a  smal 
size  and  an  agricultural-producing  coun- 
try, to  find  the  capital  to  buy  expensive 
military  equipment,  and  I'm  sure  that 
the  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  is  aware  of 
that,  as  is  the  Defense  Secretary. 

On  the  second  one,  of  course,  we 
would  like  to  see  President  Reagan  visit 
New  Zealand.  I'm  sure  the  Australians 
would,  too.  He  is  busy,  and  I  know  that 
he  is  taking  a  five-nation  tour  of  the 
Southeast  Asian  area.  Whether  he  can 
extend  that  or  not,  I  don't  know,  but  he 
is  very  welcome  to  visit  our  country  at 
any  time  he  can  fit  it  into  his  very  busy 
work  in  the  United  States  and  externally 

Q.  Does  Secretary  Shultz  have 
anything  to  add  on  those  points. 
Secretary  Shultz.  No. 

Q.  Could  you  comment  on  the  U.S 
view  of  the  limits  of  the  regional 
aspects  of  the  ANZUS  alliance? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  hard 
kernel,  in  a  sense,  of  the  ANZUS 
alliance  is  the  undertaking  to  respond  ir 
the  event  of  an  attack  on  any  of  the 
countries  involved.  So  that's  the  sort  of 
direct  central  point.  In  our  discussion  w 
referred  to  that.  Then  there  was  also 
the  phrase,  "the  spirit  of  ANZUS,"  and 
take  it  to  mean  that  these  are  three 
countries  that,  broadly  speaking,  have 
the  same  values  and  want  to  defend 
them,  see  that  they  prosper  around  the 
world.  So  we  are  interested  in  what 
goes  on  anywhere,  as  the  discussion  tha 
we  had  here  shows. 

As  events  unfold,  it  may  turn  out 
that  two  or  three  of  us  are  involved  in 
some  part  of  the  world,  but  the  direct 
obligations  of  ANZUS  are  very  par- 
ticular, and  the  effect  of  ANZUS  is  to 
draw  us  together,  to  have  us  not  only  in 
a  yearly  consultative  mode  such  as  we'v 
had  here  for  the  last  couple  of  days,  but 
that  we  see  each  other  at  other  interna- 
tional meetings.  There  is  a  great  deal  of 
consultation  back  and  forth  through  our 
ambassadors,  and  so  it  is  a  vehicle  for 
sharing  ideas  and  seeing  how  we  can 
best  defend  the  values  we  all  have  in 
common. 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


PACIFIC 


Q.  Was  the  question  of  U.S. 
facilities — communications  facilities — 
in  Australia  raised  at  any  point  in  the 
meeting  over  the  last  few  days?  And 
what  is  your  view  of  the  proposition 
from  Australia  that  the  United  States 
should  make  a  specific  statement  of 
the  functions  of  the  three  communica- 
tions stations? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  subject  was 
discussed  but  not  extensively.  The 
Australian  delegation  will  be  here  fur- 
ther and  we  consider  that  that  was  an 
appropriate  subject  for  bilateral  discus- 
sions, in  particular,  although  in  the 
agreements  the  ANZUS  relationship  is 
referred  to  as  a  sort  of  umbrella.  So 
there  will  be  further  discussions. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  objection  to 
Australians,  coming  to  a  sign  of  ap- 
preciation of  those  facilities,  as  most 
Americans  have  access  to  understand? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  follow 
/our  question. 

Q.  It  seems  to  be  quite  common 
tnowledge  in  the  United  States  of  the 
•ole  and  function  of  those  bases  in 
general  terms,  and  the  specifics  of 
hat  have  not  been  spelled  out  for 
Australian  consumption. 

Secretary  Shultz.  Not  everything 
hat's  written  about  is  correct.  Not 
:verything  that's  written  about  and  that 
3  correct  is  necessarily  commented  on 
'fficially  here.  I  will  simply  say  that 
here  will  be  some  bilateral  discussions 
f  these  matters,  and  we'll  see  what  hap- 
>ens  in  that  event. 

Q.  There  will  be  those  in 
lustralia  who'd  be  astounded  to  find 
hat  the  discussion  about  the  security 
f  our  region  didn't  include  specific 
iscussion  of  the  U.S.  bases  in 
uslralia,  which  many  Australians 
egard  as  the  greatest  of  threat  to  our 
ecurity.  Could  you  comment  on  that 
uggestion? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  record 
lould  show  that  these  matters  were 
iscussed  but  that  they  also  are  reserved 
>r  more  intensive  discussion  on  a 
ilateral  basis,  so  it  isn't  as  though 
ley're  being  ignored  as  your  question 
nplies. 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  don't 
link  many  thoughtful  Australians 
ould  be  shocked,  but  there  was  some 
iscussion  on  the  matter,  as  Mr.  Shultz 
Dinted  out,  and  as  he  also  pointed  out 
le  discussion  hasn't  concluded.  That 
ill  be  followed  up  in  bilateral  discus- 
ons  with  appropriate  people  over  the 
ext  couple  of  days. 


I've  already  made  the  point  here— 
but  I've  made  it  many  times  publicly 
over  the  past  few  years— that  there  are 
clear  risks  in  having  those  facilities  in 
Australia,  but  they're  risks  which  we're 
prepared  to  accept  as  a  government  so 
that  we  can  contribute  toward  a  role  of 
deterrence  and  arms  verification  and  so 
that  we  have  some  moral  standing  in  the 
position  we  intend  to  take  more  actively 
in  the  United  Nations  and  other  interna- 
tional fora  in  support  of  arms  control, 
arms  reduction.  In  that  respect  we've 
already  appointed  an  ambassador  for 
disarmament  so  we  can  take  this  more 
active  role.  But  if  I  can  conclude 
quickly— anticipating  the  question  that 
might  come  from  some  sources,  having 
had  it  put  to  us  before — there's  no  con- 
tradiction in  those  two  purposes.  We're 
not  proposing  unilateral  disarmament  of 
any  particular  country,  and  certainly  not 
of  the  United  States.  That  would  be  a 
nonsense  proposition.  We  should  be 
prepared  to  defend  our  interests. 
There's  nothing  consistent,  at  the  same 
time,  to  wish  for  and  work  for  a  more 
homogenous  world,  and  that's  what  we'll 
be  aiming  at. 

Q.  I  think  it  was  yesterday  you 
said  that  your  purpose  here — what  I'm 
aiming  at  is  to  establish  what  our 
responsibilities  are,  what  our 
safeguards  are,  under  ANZUS.  Can 
you  point  to  me  in  Section  2,  3,  4,  or  5 
anything  which  in  any  way  enlarges 
anyone's  knowledge  on  what  those 
safeguards  and  responsibilities  are? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  think 
I've  done  that  fairly  effectively  in 
answer  to  either  the  first,  second,  or 
third  question,  which  had  been  men- 
tioned, when  I  spoke  about  the  obliga- 
tion for  responses  to  be  forthcoming  in 
the  event  of  threat  or  armed  attack,  but 
that  didn't  necessarily  involve  an 
automatic  provision  of  military  forces  in 
support  of  a  country  subjected  to  threat 
or  attack.  But  there  were  a  range  of 
responses  available,  and  which  response 
was  appropriate  would  be  judged  by  the 
other  signatory  countries. 

Secondly,  in  relation  to  the  geo- 
graphic region,  it's  a  matter  which  we 
explored,  and,  certainly  we  agree  it's  not 
a  limitless  commitment  for  the  signatory 
parties.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are 
benefits  in  not  being  specific,  and  that's 
something  we  acknowledged  before  we 
arrived  here.  If  we  are  specific,  then  it 
encourages  people  to  perhaps  be  adven- 
turous in  areas  outside  of  the  specific 
definition  of  responsibility  that  we  put 
down  in  a  geographic  basis. 


The  other  matter  is,  of  course,  that 
I've  clarified  with  absolute  conviction  for 
myself — I  believe  my  colleague,  Defense 
Minister  Scholes — that  the  role  we  can 
most  certainly  pursue  is  that  of  a 
regional  role,  that  we  get  rid  of  the  con- 
fusion and  contradictions  which  were 
constantly  arising  for  Australia,  where, 
on  the  one  hand,  there  would  be  an  ef- 
fort to  fulfill  a  global  role  which  always 
seemed  to  me  to  be  a  rather  ex- 
travagant purpose,  given  the  small  size 
of  Australia — population-wise — and  the 
small  aggregate  resources  we  have  com- 
pared to  large  or  superpowers.  We  have 
a  high  per  capita  income,  but  we're  talk- 
ing aggregate  sense,  what  we  can 
afford. 

Secondly,  to  clear  up  the  tendency  in 
the  past  of  some  conservative  sources  in 
Australia  to  encourage  Australians  to 
believe  that  ANZUS  covered  every  con- 
ceivable association  with  the  United 
States  and  every  conceivable  action  that 
we  might  take.  What's  been  made  clear 
is  that  ANZUS  has  clear  limitations  and 
that  there  may  be  things  we  do  outside 
of  those  limitations  or  obligations.  We 
may  well  do  them  because  of  the  spirit 
that  encouraged  the  formulation  of 
ANZUS  and  its  sustenance,  but  we  don't 
do  it  because  of  ANZUS;  we  do  it  more 
because  of  deeper-seated  commitments 
that  led  to  the  formulation  of  ANZUS. 

Q.  This  review  of  ANZUS  which 
you  have  had  this  week  happened  at 
the  suggestion  of  the  Hawke  Labor 
government.  Can  you  tell  me  when 
this  was  first  raised?  When  the 
Hawke  government  asked  for  a 
review,  whether  there  was  any  initial 
apprehension  on  the  part  of  the 
Reagan  Administration  about  what 
that  review  might  actually  mean?  And 
can  you  also  tell  me  whether  you  feel 
there's  any  advantage  from  America's 
point  of  view  in  the  sorts  of  discus- 
sions you've  had  about  the  regional, 
global,  [inaudible]  or  the  geographical 
limits?  Is  there  any  advantage  for 
Washington  in  the  types  of  talks 
you've  had? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  can't  recall 
precisely  when  it  was  raised,  probably 
through  staff  and  ambassadorial  levels.  I 
think  Mr.  Hayden  and  I  talked  about  it  a 
little  bit  when  we  met  in  Paris  in  May, 
and  we  discussed  it  with  Prime  Minister 
Hawke  when  he  was  here,  so  I  can't  pin 
down  precisely  when  this  idea  emerged. 
But  I  think  it's  an  excellent  idea,  and  it 
was  most  worthwhile  to  go  through  the 
discussion  that  we  did  and  to  arrive  at 
where  we  are.  I  think  it's  been  a  good 
exercise. 


eptember  1983 


73 


PACIFIC 


Q.  Do  you  agree  that  Australia 
has  the  right  to  be  consulted  on  the 
use  of  Australian  facilities  at  North- 
west Cape  in  any  act  which  will — in 
any  firing  order,  for  example,  or  in 
anything  which  could  involve 
Australia  in  hostile  acts? 

Secretary  Shultz.  All  the  things 
connected  with  that  facility — and  I 
listened  to  your  question  and  it  was  very 
all  encompassing — will  be  discussed 
bilaterally,  and  we  will  rest  on  that 
point. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JULY  19,  19832 

1.  The  32nd  meeting  of  the  ANZUS  Council 
was  held  in  Washington,  D.C.  on  July  18  and 
19,  1983.  Warren  Cooper,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  New  Zealand;  Bill  Hayden, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Gordon 
Scholes,  Minister  for  Defense,  Australia;  and 
George  Shultz,  Secretary  of  State  and  Caspar 
Weinberger,  Secretary  of  Defense,  United 
States  represented  their  respective  govern- 
ments. Also  participating  were  senior  foreign 
affairs  and  defense  officials  of  the  three 
governments. 

2.  After  the  Secretary  of  State  welcomed 
the  ANZUS  Delegations,  the  Council 
Members  reviewed  the  ANZUS  Alliance.  It 
was  the  first  such  review  since  the  ANZUS 
Treaty  was  signed  in  1951.  They  noted  that, 
although  international  political  and  strategic 
circumstances  which  prevailed  at  that  time 
had  changed,  it  is  a  sign  of  the  resilience  of 
the  Treaty  that  it  remains  relevant  and  vital- 
ly important  to  the  shared  security  concerns 
and  strategic  interests  of  the  three  partner 
governments. 

3.  The  Council  Members  affirmed  that 
the  Alliance  is  firmly  based  on  the  partners' 
common  traditions  and  concern  to  protect 
democratic  values.  They  value  highly  the  co- 
operative defense  arrangements,  facilitated 
by  the  Treaty  since  its  conclusion,  which  have 
served  their  governments'  mutual  security  in- 
terests and  promoted  a  strengthening  of  each 
other's  defense  capability.  In  the  spirit  of  the 
ANZUS  Alliance,  they  noted  that,  beyond  the 
activities  of  defense  cooperation,  the  various 
efforts,  individual  and  collective,  by  the  part- 
ners to  promote  both  regional  and  global 
development  and  stability  have  also  served 
the  cause  of  mutual  security. 


4.  The  Council  acknowledged  that  the 
ANZUS  Treaty  does  not  absolve  each 
Government  from  the  primary  responsibility 
to  provide  for  its  own  security  to  the  extent 
which  its  resources  allow.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  provides  that  the 
parties  will  "by  means  of  continuous  and  ef- 
fective self-help  and  mutual  aid  maintain  and 
develop  their  individual  and  collective  capaci- 
ty to  resist  armed  attack."  The  Council 
Members  also  noted  that  the  ability  of  each 
country  to  defend  itself  is  substantially 
enhanced  by  their  common  commitments 
under  the  Treaty.  A  range  of  responses  is 
available  to  the  parties  to  act  to  meet  a  com- 
mon danger  in  accordance  with  their  constitu- 
tional processes. 

5.  The  Council  also  reaffirmed  that  the 
ANZUS  Treaty  is  an  agreement  between 
sovereign  and  equal  states  committed  to  the 
democratic  tradition.  In  accordance  with  that 
tradition,  the  respective  states  would  at  times 
have  varying  views  and  perspectives  on 
various  international  political  and  economic 
issues.  Such  diversity  does  not  affect  their 
solidarity  under  the  ANZUS  Treaty,  the 
maintenance  of  which  reflects  the  fundamen- 
tal interests  of  the  three  partners. 

6.  In  order  to  strengthen  the  Alliance 
further  and  recognizing  that  national  security 
cannot  be  assured  by  military  strength  alone, 
the  Council  Members  considered  a  number  of 
practical  cooperative  measures: 

•  They  agreed  that  ANZUS  consultative 
processes  could  be  strengthened  through  fur- 
ther periodic  ANZUS  Officials  Talks.  These 
talks,  which  were  revived  this  year,  would 
rotate  between  the  three  capitals  and  address 
issues  or  areas  of  common  concern.  Par- 
ticipants would  include  mid-level  and  senior 
officials  expert  on  the  issues  or  areas  to  be 
addressed. 

•  They  also  agreed  that  the  framework 
of  ANZUS  and  bilateral  defense  cooperation 
requires  a  standardization  of  privileges  and 
immunities  and  of  jurisdictional  and  other 
matters  for  military  service  personnel  and 
their  families  serving  in  each  other's  coun- 
tries. The  Members  therefore  agreed  to  give 
priority  to  early  conclusion  of  a  reciprocal 
ANZUS  Status  of  Forces  Agreement. 

•  They  expressed  satisfaction  with  the 
continuing  programs  of  exchanges,  combined 
exercises  and  visits  among  the  Treaty  part- 
ners. They  also  reaffirmed  the  importance  of 
these  programs,  of  ongoing  efforts  to  mod- 
ernize and  to  assure  supply  of  equipment,  and 
of  continuing  to  strengthen  alliance  defensive 
capabilities  and  thus  deterrence  of  conflict. 

7.  Following  the  review  of  the  ANZUS 
Alliance,  the  Council  Members  discussed  a 
broad  range  of  global  issues  and  concerns 
which  included  the  importance  of  the 
Western  alliance,  United  States-Soviet  rela- 
tions, and  East- West  issues  generally.  The 
Council  Members  agreed  that  there  are  con- 
tinuing threats  to  international  peace,  both 
globally  and  in  a  number  of  regions.  These  in- 
clude the  continuing  Soviet  occupation  of 
Afghanistan,  the  Vietnamese  occupation  of 
Kampuchea,  and  the  continuing  growth  in 


Soviet  military  power.  The  Council  Members  | 
declared  their  commitment  to  negotiated 
solutions  to  major  East-West  problems  and  t  i 
other  problems  threatening  international 
security. 

8.  The  Council  Members  reaffirmed  theii 
commitment  to  the  negotiation  of  effective, 
equitable,  and  verifiable  arms  control 
measures,  including  reductions  of  nuclear  ar- 
maments. They  agreed  that  President 
Reagan's  proposals  in  the  START  and  INF 
Negotiations  offer  a  realistic  opportunity  for 
the  two  sides  to  achieve  meaningful  nuclear 
arms  reductions,  and  expressed  the  hope  tha 
the  Soviet  Union  would  approach  these 
negotiations  with  an  equal  commitment  to 
world  peace. 

9.  The  Council  Members  reaffirmed  thei: 
strong  commitment  to  preventing  the  pro- 
liferation of  nuclear  weapons  and  agreed  to 
intensify  their  efforts  to  strengthen  the  intei 
national  non-proliferation  regime  through 
multilateral  and  bilateral  measures.  They 
recognized  that  the  international  non- 
proliferation  regime  is  strengthened  when 
the  nuclear  weapons  states  are  able  to 
demonstrate  progress  in  fulfilling  their 
solemn  treaty  promise  to  pursue  negotiation: 
on  effective  and  verifiable  measures  to 
reduce  nuclear  armaments  and  to  end  the 
nuclear  arms  race.  In  this  context  they  reaf- 
firmed their  governments'  policies  of  workin 
towards  the  goal  of  a  comprehensive  and  ful 
ly  verifiable  nuclear  test  ban  treaty,  and  the 
took  note  of  the  continued  examination  of 
verification  and  compliance  issues  related  to 
a  nuclear  test  ban  in  the  Committee  on  Disa 
mament.  They  also  undertook  to  work  in  a 
constructive  and  cooperative  manner  to  en- 
sure the  success  of  the  Third  Review  Con- 
ference of  the  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  1985. 

10.  The  Council  Members  noted  that  the 
international  non-proliferation  regime  could 
be  enhanced  by  measures  designed  to  en- 
courage the  acceptance  of  comprehensive  an 
full  scope  safeguards  combined  with  binding 
undertakings  by  non-nuclear  weapons  states 
not  to  acquire  a  nuclear  explosive  capability. 
In  addition  they  reaffirmed  their  eommitmei 
to  seek  improved  national  and  international 
controls  over  the  transfer  of  sensitive  nuclei 
technology. 

1 1.  The  Council  Members  condemned  ar 
actions  in  violation  of  the  1925  Geneva  Pro- 
tocol and  the  1972  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention  and  reaffirmed  their 
support  for  the  efforts  being  made  in  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  to  conclude  a 
comprehensive  and  effectively  verifiable  ban 
on  the  production,  development  and  stockpil- 
ing of  chemical  weapons. 

12.  The  Council  Members  stressed  their 
continued  firm  support  for  the  Association  o 
Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  and  the 
continuing  development  of  regional  coopera- 
tion within  that  organization.  They  empha- 
sized their  support  for  the  role  that  ASEAN 
plays  in  promoting  peace,  stability  and 
economic  progress  in  the  region.  They  remai 
committed  to  continued  economic  and 
technical  assistance  to  ASEAN  countries  anc 


74 


PACIFIC 


dose  consultation  with  the  members  of 
\SEAN  on  regional  developments. 

13.  The  Council  Members  reaffirmed 
;heir  conviction  that  the  conflict  in  Kam- 
wchea  should  be  settled  by  peaceful  means, 
rhey  support  diplomatic  efforts  which  would 
ead  to  a  comprehensive  political  solution  to 
he  Kampuchean  problem.  The  Council 
velcomed  the  efforts  of  Australian  Foreign 
Minister  Hayden  to  establish  common  ground 
n  the  search  for  a  negotiated  settlement. 

14.  In  that  context,  the  Council  Members 
ilso  expressed  their  strong  support  for  the 
ipproach  to  a  Kampuchean  settlement  set 
'orth  in  the  communique  issued  at  the  end  of 
he  recent  ASEAN  Ministerial  meeting  in 
Jangkok.  They  reaffirmed  the  need  for  the 
wompt  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  troops 
inder  conditions  that  would  allow  for  a 
>eaceful  transition  and  a  comprehensive  set- 
.lement  that  would  enable  the  Khmer  people 
'reely  to  decide  their  own  future,  in  accord- 
ince  with  the  relevant  UN  resolutions.  They 
:onsidered  that  a  negotiated  settlement 
hould  be  based  on  respect  for  the  independ- 
ence, sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of 
[ampuchea,  and  the  legitimate  security  in- 
erests  of  all  parties  to  the  conflict.  The 
)ouncil  Members  further  agreed  to  continue 
ssential  humanitarian  assistance  to  the 
Ihmer  people,  recognizing  that  humanitarian 
eeds  would  persist  during  the  search  for  a 
jlution. 

15.  The  Council  Members  reviewed  the 
•agic  plight  of  Indochinese  refugees  and  the 
npact  that  the  refugee  influx  is  having  on 
ie  countries  in  the  region.  They  acknowl- 
iged  the  important  contribution  made  by 
SEAN  members  in  refugee  assistance  and 
-ocessing,  and  urged  continued  worldwide 
irticipation  in  refugee  resettlement  and  sup- 
)rt  for  UNHCR  programs  in  the  area. 

16.  Reviewing  developments  in  the  South 
acific,  the  Council  Members  noted  the 
rength  of  regional  integrity  and  stability 
;spite  resource  limitations  and  an  adverse 
ternational  economic  climate.  Recognizing 

e  link  between  regional  security  and 
onomic  development,  they  pledged  their 
mmitment  to  continue  and  to  expand  prac- 
al  co-operation  with  countries  of  the 
,gion. 

17.  The  Council  Members  emphasized  the 
iportance  of  the  ANZUS  partners'  pro- 
ams  of  continued  development  assistance 
•.d  of  cooperation  among  the  partners  to  en- 
re  the  effective  practical  implementation  of 
eir  assistance  programs.  The  continuing 
partite  arrangements  made  by  the  United 
ates,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  for  geo- 
ientific  research  in  the  South  Pacific  under 
e  Consultative  Committee  for  Offshore 
ospecting  in  the  South  Pacific  represent  a 
ngible  demonstration  of  their  cooperation  in 
e  development  of  the  region. 

18.  The  Council  Members  noted  the  very 
ep  concern  over  nuclear  issues  in  the  South 
cific  and  Australia's  proposal  to  discuss  the 
ncept  of  a  South  Pacific  Nuclear  Free  Zone 
the  meeting  of  the  South  Pacific  Forum  in 
nberra  in  August.  In  this  connection  they 


jptember  1983 


stressed  the  importance  of  upholding  the 
principles  of  freedom  of  navigation  and 
overflight  as  provided  in  international  law. 
They  also  noted  the  importance  to  the 
Alliance  and  the  region  of  security  considera- 
tions, including  access  by  allied  aircraft  and 
ships  to  airfields  and  ports  in  accordance  with 
the  sovereign  right  of  states  to  receive  such 
visits. 

19.  The  Council  Members  noted  that  the 
security  of  the  Pacific  island  states  is  closely 
related  to  that  of  the  ANZUS  partners.  In 
this  context  defense  cooperation  programs  of 
the  ANZUS  partners  are  continuing  to  make 
a  substantial  practical  contribution  to 
regional  security. 

20.  Noting  regional  developments,  the 
Council  members  welcomed  the  constructive 
approach  of  France  and  South  Pacific  Forum 
countries  to  developing  a  dialogue  on  the 
future  of  New  Caledonia.  They  also  noted  the 
major  progress  that  had  been  made  in  the 
past  year  towards  termination  of  the 
Micronesian  Trusteeship.  In  particular,  they 
welcomed  the  conclusion  of  plebiscites  in 
Palau  and  in  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia  (which  had  chosen  free  association 
with  the  United  States),  and  noted  that  a 
similar  plebiscite  would  be  held  in  the  Mar- 
shall Islands  in  September  1983.  Related  to 
these  developments,  they  also  welcomed  the 
increasing  participation  of  the  Micronesian 
Governments  in  the  affairs  of  the  region  and 
looked  forward  to  the  not  distant  future 
when  the  Micronesian  states  will  play  an 
even  more  active  role  in  the  region's 
organizations. 

21.  The  Council  Members  noted  the  U.S. 
Senate's  approval  of  the  Pacific  Islands 
Treaties  by  which  the  U.S.  relinquished  its 
claims  to  Tokelau  and  to  various  islands 
belonging  to  Kiribati,  Tuvalu  and  the  Cook 
Islands.  Completion  of  that  process  provides 
a  firm  base  for  strengthened  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  those  island 
states  and  territories  and  was  welcomed  by 
the  Australian  and  New  Zealand  members. 

22.  The  Council  Members  welcomed  the 
continuing  development  of  bilateral  relations 
between  China  and  individual  ANZUS  part- 
ners and  noted  the  recent  successful  visits  of 
the  Chinese  Premier  to  Australia  and  New 
Zealand.  Pointing  out  the  importance  of 
China  to  the  strategic  balance,  and  to 
political  stability  within  the  Asia  and  Pacific 
region,  they  emphasized  the  need  for  continu- 
ing close  relations  between  China  and  the 
ANZUS  partners. 

23.  The  Council  Members  noted  Japan's 
efforts  to  increase  its  self-defense  capability 
and  the  importance  of  defense  co-operation 
arrangements  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States.  They  welcomed  Japan's  willingness  to 
play  an  increasingly  active  and  constructive 
role  in  the  political  and  economic  affairs  of 
the  region  and  other  areas  of  common 
strategic  concern. 

24.  The  Council  Members  reaffirmed 
their  commitment  to  the  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  They 
again  called  upon  the  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea  to  take  serious  steps  to 


reduce  the  level  of  tension  in  the  area  by 
entering  into  discussions  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  They  also  ex- 
pressed their  support  for  proposals  put  for- 
ward by  the  Republic  of  Korea  to  establish 
such  a  dialogue. 

25.  Reviewing  developments  in  Lebanon 
and  the  Middle  East  peace  process,  the  Coun- 
cil Members  declared  their  support  for  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  and  its  effort  to 
recover  its  full  sovereignty,  full  control  over 
its  territory,  and  withdrawal  of  all  external 
forces.  The  Agreement  concluded  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel  is  an  important  step 
toward  this  end.  The  Council  Members  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  this  step  would  soon  be 
followed  by  a  negotiation  between  Lebanon 
and  Syria  to  advance  the  process  of 
withdrawal  of  all  external  forces  and  to  en- 
sure Lebanon's  independence  and  sovereign- 
ty. They  called  on  all  states  in  the  Middle 
East  to  participate  in  a  determined  effort 
towards  a  just  and  lasting  peace  that  ensures 
the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity,  and 
security  of  each  nation  in  the  region.  The 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  Council 
Members  expressed  their  warm  support  for 
Secretary  Shultz's  efforts  to  bring  about 
negotiations  aimed  at  achieving  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  situation  in  Lebanon  and  of 
the  wider  Middle  East  dispute.  The  Council 
Members  also  expressed  the  hope  for  a  rapid 
resolution  of  the  Iran-Iraq  conflict. 

26.  The  Council  Members  discussed  the 
Indian  Ocean  area  and  agreed  that  vital 
Western  economic  and  security  interests  are 
engaged  there.  They  agreed  that  the  proposal 
for  an  Indian  Ocean  Zone  of  Peace  should 
stress  fundamental  norms  of  international 
behavior  and  should  focus  on  basic  causes  of 
tension  in  the  region.  They  further  agreed 
that  it  should  in  no  way  restrict  the  right  of 
individual  and  collective  self-defense  or  ex- 
isting navigation  rights,  including  effective 
exercise  of  high  seas  freedoms  of  navigation 
and  overflight,  and  straits  transit  passage  in 
international  straits.  The  proposal  should  be 
developed  by  agreement  between  the  regional 
states  and  the  major  maritime  users  of  the 
Indian  Ocean,  and  should  have  as  an  impor- 
tant objective  to  bring  about  a  lasting  im- 
provement in  the  security  of  the  regional 
states,  so  facilitating  political,  social  and 
economic  development  in  the  area. 

27.  The  Council  Members  reaffirmed 
their  concern  over  the  continued  occupation 
of  Afghanistan  by  the  Soviet  Union.  This 
flagrant  violation  of  fundamental  principles 
governing  international  relations  and  human 
rights  continues  to  result  in  death  and  repres- 
sion of  the  people  of  Afghanistan  and  the 
creation  of  the  largest  single  refugee  problem 
in  the  world.  They  unequivocally  asserted 
that  a  peaceful  settlement  and  political  solu- 
tion to  the  situation  in  Afghanistan  remains 
contingent  upon  the  total  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  forces  as  envisaged  in  various  UN 
General  Assembly  resolutions.  They  noted 
the  efforts  by  the  United  Nations  Secretary- 
General's  Personal  Representative  on 
Afghanistan  to  secure  a  peaceful  settlement 
through  indirect  negotiations. 


75 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


28.  The  Council  Members  stressed  the 
importance  of  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 
stability  in  South  Asia.  They  strongly  em- 
phasized the  need  to  sustain  efforts  to  pre- 
vent nuclear  proliferation  on  the  sub- 
continent, and  to  enhance  the  security  of 
friendly  states  in  the  region  in  light  of  the 
threat  to  the  area  stemming  from  the  Soviet 
invasion  of  Afghanistan. 

29.  The  Australian  and  New  Zealand 
Council  Members  urged  wide  adherence  to 
the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of 
the  Sea  as  the  most  satisfactory  means  of 
achieving  a  secure  framework  for  all  aspects 
of  the  uses  of  the  seas  and,  in  particular,  of 
protecting  Western  security  interests  of  free 
movement  of  naval  and  merchant  vessels. 
They  emphasized  the  significance  of  the  Con- 
vention for  the  straits  and  archipelagic  states 
to  their  north  and  for  the  island  countries  of 
the  Pacific  region. 

30.  Noting  the  increasing  international 
interest  in  Antarctica,  the  Council  Members 
reaffirmed  their  conviction  that  the  Antarctic 
Treaty,  which  gives  effect  to  the  principles 
and  purposes  of  the  United  Nations  and  is 
open  to  all  countries,  continues  to  provide  the 
best  means  of  preserving  peace  and  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  Antarctica,  a  region 
where  all  three  nations  have  important  and 
enduring  interests.  The  Council  Members 
agreed  to  continue  their  close  cooperation 
concerning  Antarctica  and  the  strengthening 
of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  system. 

31.  The  Council  Members  discussed 
global  economic  prospects  and  the  outcome  of 
the  Williamsburg  Summit.  They  welcomed 
the  positive  signs  of  economic  recovery  that 
had  emerged  within  the  past  year,  but  ex- 
pressed concern  about  continuing  problems, 
including  high  levels  of  unemployment  and  in- 
debtedness. The  Council  acknowledged  the 
need  for  continued  efforts  to  promote  sus- 
tainable non-inflationary  economic  growth. 

32.  The  Council  Members  welcomed  the 
firm  determination  of  the  major  industrial 
countries  at  the  Williamsburg  Summit  to  halt 
and  reverse  the  trend  toward  increased  pro- 
tectionism. The  Council  recognized  the 
dangers  posed  to  world  economic  recovery  by 
the  recent  expansion  of  barriers  to  trade,  in- 
cluding those  for  agricultural  products,  and 
the  need  to  strengthen  and  improve  the 
multilateral  trading  system.  They  agreed  that 
the  Member  Countries  should  use  the 
favorable  conditions  provided  by  the  recovery 
to  reverse  protectionist  trends,  and  to  relax 
and  dismantle  progressively  trade  restrictions 
and  trade-distorting  domestic  measures.  The 
Members  also  welcomed  the  progress  made 
at  Williamsburg  towards  more  intensified 
economic  and  monetary  cooperation.  In  par- 
ticular, the  Council  noted  the  initiative  taken 
at  the  Williamsburg  Summit  for  Ministers  of 
Finance,  in  consultation  with  the  Managing 
Director  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund, 
to  define  the  conditions  for  improving  the  in- 
ternational monetary  system  and  to  consider 
the  part  which  might,  in  due  course,  be 
played  in  this  process  by  a  high  level  interna- 
tional monetary  conference.  The  Council 


76 


welcomed  this  as  a  useful  approach  to  the 
monetary  and  related  issues  previously  raised 
by  New  Zealand  Prime  Minister  Muldoon. 

33.  The  Council  Members  expressed  their 
deep  concern  about  the  prospects  for 
recovery  in  developing  countries,  noting  that 
the  burden  of  recession  had  fallen  heavily  on 
those  countries.  In  this  regard  they  stressed 
the  importance  of  sound  economic  growth  in 
the  developed  countries  and  of  open  markets. 
The  Council  urged  all  countries  to  take  the 


actions  required  to  assure  an  adequate  flow 
of  public  and  private  resources  to  developing 
countries  in  order  to  alleviate  international 
debt  problems  and  sustain  growth  and  trade. 
34.  The  Council  Members  agreed  to  mee' 
again  in  Wellington  in  1984  at  a  time  to  be 
decided. 


'Press  release  291. 
2Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  Department  spokesman  John  Hughes.  T 


U.S.  Policy  On  Cooperation 
in  Science  and  Technology 


by  William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Security  and  Scientific 
Affairs  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  August  2,  1983.  Mr. 
Schneider  is  Under  Secretary  for  Securi- 
ty Assistance,  Science,  and  Technology. ' 

I  particularly  appreciate  the  opportunity 
to  discuss  with  the  subcommittee  this 
nation's  policies  and  programs  for  inter- 
national cooperation  in  science  and 
technology.  It  is  a  subject  of  great  im- 
portance to  all  of  us.  American  scientists 
even  before  the  creation  of  the  Republic 
were  engaged  in  fruitful  collaboration 
with  their  colleagues  in  other  countries. 
This  mutually  beneficial  cooperation 
goes  on  today  in  thousands  of  areas  of 
scientific  endeavor  both  on  an  academic 
and  a  commercial  level  with  little 
reference  to  the  U.S.  Government.  I  do 
not  mean  to  suggest,  however,  that  the 
government  is  inactive  in  this  vitally  im- 
portant sphere  of  activity.  Nothing  could 
be  further  from  the  truth.  We  play  a 
major  role  as  a  catalyst  for,  encourager 
of,  and,  quite  often,  material  supporter 
of  both  bilateral  and  multilateral  interna- 
tional scientific  cooperation.  The  Federal 
Government  also  has  an  appropriate  role 
to  play  in  seeing  to  it  that  international 
scientific  and  technological  cooperation 
serves  the  overall  strategic  interests  of 
the  United  States. 

Mutual  Benefits 

The  magnitude  and  diversity  of 
America's  research  and  development  ac- 
tivities make  cooperation  with  the 
United  States  in  science  and  technology 
at  individual,  institutional,  and  govern- 
mental levels  extremely  attractive,  and 
often  imperative,  to  scientists  of  other 


nations.  Conversely,  American  scientist; 
and  engineers  reap  substantial  benefits 
from  such  cooperation.  Often  they  gain 
access  to  new  or  superior  scientific  in- 
strumentation or  to  unique  geographica 
settings  and  phenomena.  In  addition, 
their  human  and  financial  resources  are 
augmented  through  international 
cooperation. 

American  scientists  are  able  to 
benefit  from  the  unpublished  data 
developed  by  their  colleagues  in  other 
countries  and  to  use  facilities  which 
would  cost  a  great  deal  of  money  to 
reproduce  in  the  United  States.  Natura 
ly,  foreign  scientists  realize  similar 
benefits  from  their  cooperation  with  the 
United  States.  It  would  be  impossible  tc 
draw  up  a  balance  sheet  of  these 
benefits.  All  of  mankind  gains,  but  we 
do  know  that  the  United  States  would 
be  much  the  poorer  and  our  rate  of 
scientific  and  technological  advance 
much  slower  were  such  mutually 
beneficial  collaboration  not  taking  place 

Cooperation  With  Select  Countries 

President  Reagan  has  given  considerab 
emphasis  and  attention  to  our  program 
of  bilateral  cooperation  with  particular 
emphasis  on  selected  countries.  Especi; 
ly  important  among  these  are  Brazil,  tr 
People's  Republic  of  China,  and  India. 
He  has  taken  these  initiatives  both 
because  the  scientific  capabilities  of 
these  countries  are  sufficiently  advance 
in  some  areas  so  as  to  permit  fruitful 
cooperation  with  the  United  States  and 
because  such  scientific  cooperation  pro- 
motes more  general  American  foreign 
policy  objectives.  Naturally,  given  the 
President's  personal  involvement,  Dr. 
George  Keyworth,  his  Science  Adviser, 
has  played  a  particularly  large  role  in 
furthering  these  programs. 


1 


5 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


Brazil.  Science  and  technology 
played  an  important  role  in  the  Presi- 
dent's December  visit  to  Brazil,  and,  as 
a  result,  a  working  group  on  science  and 
technology  was  established  by  the 
Brazilian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
and  the  Department  of  State.  The  objec- 
tive of  this  body  is  to  renew  the  in- 
tergovernmental science  and  technology 
agreement  between  our  two  countries. 
To  advance  these  efforts  we  organized  a 
conference  of  American-Brazilian  private 
sector  cooperation  in  science  and 
technology  in  April  of  this  year  to  ex- 
plore ways  in  which  the  new  in- 
tergovernmental agreement  can  be  used 
to  advance  industrial  productivity  in 
Brazil  and  the  United  States. 

China.  Scientific  cooperation  with 
3hina  is  conducted  under  an  umbrella 
agreement  signed  in  1979.  Since  that 
;ime  we  have  concluded  technical  pro- 
ocols  on  cooperation  in  21  fields,  in- 
iluding  student/scholar  exchanges, 
igriculture,  and  space  technology.  Four 
>f  these  accords  were  signed  in  May 
983.  A  joint  commission  directs  and 
oordinates  the  overall  program.  The 
Chinese  attach  great  importance  to 
cientific  and  technological  cooperation 
/ith  the  United  States,  as,  indeed,  we 
to  to  our  cooperation  with  them. 

India.  Scientific  cooperation  with  In- 
ia  was  given  special  emphasis  during 
'rime  Minister  [Indira]  Gandhi's  July 
982  visit  to  Washington.  At  the  close  of 
ier  visit,  Mrs.  Gandhi  and  President 
leagan  announced  the  formation  of  a 
enior  scientific  panel  to  formulate  plans 
jr  intensified  joint  research  efforts, 
his  panel  has  been  carrying  out  its 
landate,  and  I  believe  its  activities  will 
ring  about  an  improvement  of  our 
nentific  cooperation  with  the  world's 
Bcond  most  populous  nation. 

epartment  of  State's  Role 

would  like  to  say  a  few  words  about 
le  Department  of  State's  role  in  inter- 
ational  scientific  and  technological 
operation.  We,  of  course,  take  very 
iriously  those  coordinating  respon- 
bilities  assigned  to  us  by  the  Congress 
id,  in  conformity  with  the  President's 
rections,  we  attempt  to  see  to  it  that 
ich  cooperation  serves  the  U.S.  overall 
iterests.  The  Department's  role  is 
acessarily  limited,  however.  Our  actions 
iore  often  than  not  are  catalytic.  The 
rection,  amount,  and  nature  of 
operation  must,  in  the  first  instance, 
i  decided  upon  by  the  American  scien- 
ce agencies  or  institutions  involved. 


We  can  encourage  it,  however,  which  we 
shall  continue  to  do,  and  we  can  do  our 
best  to  ensure  that  it  serves  our  national 
interests.  This,  too,  we  will  continue 
to  do. 

One  area  of  significant  international 
cooperative  programs  has  been  space 
science.  Important  civil  space  projects 
include  the  Solar  Maximum  Mission,  the 
International  Solar  Polar  Mission,  Space 
Telescope,  the  Infrared  Astronomical 
Satellite,  and  the  Galileo  Jupiter  orbiter 
and  probe.  Britain,  West  Germany,  and 
the  Netherlands  provided  instruments 
for  the  Solar  Maximum  Mission.  NASA 
[National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Ad- 
ministration] and  the  European  Space 
Agency  are  providing  spacecraft  and  in- 
struments for  the  Solar  Polar  project. 
The  Infrared  effort  involves  NASA,  the 
Netherlands,  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
Galileo  is  a  cooperative  project  with  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  The  proj- 
ect most  highlighted  by  reductions  in 
NASA's  budget  has  been  the  Interna- 
tional Solar  Polar  Mission.  As  originally 
envisaged  and  embodied  in  a  1979 
memorandum  of  understanding  between 
the  European  Space  Agency  and  NASA, 
the  program  called  for  two 
spacecraft — one  European  and  one 
American — to  make  simultaneous  obser- 
vations from  the  Northern  and  Southern 
Hemispheres  of  the  solar  system.  In  the 
fall  of  1981,  however,  NASA  found  that 
a  complete  two-spacecraft  mission  would 
be  unattainable  given  current  and 
foreseeable  budget  constraints.  At  that 
time,  the  European  Space  Agency's 
member  governments  expressed  great 
concern  to  the  Department  of  State  over 
the  resulting  reduction  and  readjustment 
of  this  program. 

The  Department,  which  followed 
these  developments  closely,  made  these 
concerns  known  within  the  executive 
branch  and  worked  with  NASA  and  the 
Europeans  to  develop  an  optimum  mis- 
sion under  the  current  financial 
restraints.  Ultimately,  we  reached  an 
agreement  to  proceed  with  the  mission 
using  a  single  European  spacecraft; 
NASA  is  to  provide  launch  services, 
tracking,  and  data  acquisition  support 
and  other  services  as  agreed  in  the  1979 
memorandum.  I  believe,  however,  that 
the  problem  is  now  largely  behind  us. 
The  mission  is  going  forward,  though  in 
a  redefined  form,  and  the  United  States 
and  the  Europeans  are  continuing 
cooperation  in  several  other  projects  and 
are  working  closely  on  defining  future 
programs. 


Your  letter  to  me  raised  the  subject 
of  our  capabilities  for  long-range  plan- 
ning for  international  scientific  policy. 
Under  the  previous  Administration  there 
existed  within  the  Department's  OES 
[Bureau  of  Oceans  and  International  En- 
vironmental and  Scientific  Affairs] 
bureau  a  policy  planning  office  charged 
with  this  function.  When  the  present 
Administration  entered  into  office,  it 
decided  for  reasons  of  economy,  and 
after  looking  at  the  results  of  having  a 
separate  planning  group,  to  return  long- 
range  planning  responsibilities  to  the 
various  offices  of  the  bureau.  It  is  within 
these  offices  where  the  officers  who  are 
most  familiar  with  the  problems  involved 
are  to  be  found.  The  OES  bureau  is  not, 
of  course,  the  only  locus  for  such  long- 
range  planning.  Other  centers  exist 
within  the  Department  and  AID  [Agency 
for  International  Development],  in  the 
scientific  agencies  and  in  the  academic 
community.  We  draw  on  all  of  these 
sources. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Exchanges 

Science  and  technology  exchanges  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are,  of  course,  an  area  of  par- 
ticular concern  to  all  of  us  here  in 
Washington.  The  history  of  these  ex- 
changes essentially  falls  into  three 
distinct  periods.  The  first  period, 
1954-72,  saw  a  steady  increase  in  the 
volume  of  exchanges  and  an  expansion 
of  research  topics.  The  second,  1972-79, 
was  characterized  by  the  establishment 
of  11  official  bilateral  agreements  be- 
tween the  two  governments.  They  pro- 
vided more  direction  and  purpose  to  the 
exchanges.  During  the  third  period, 
1980  to  the  present,  because  of  Soviet 
intervention  in  Afghanistan  and  the 
declaration  of  martial  law  in  Poland,  ex- 
changes were  greatly  curtailed.  At  pres- 
ent, they  are  operating  at  very  limited 
levels. 

The  actual  volume  of  exchanges  dur- 
ing the  first  period  fluctuated,  but,  more 
importantly,  new  technical  areas  of 
research  were  added.  These  areas  of 
common  interest  would  serve  as  a  basis 
for  the  1 1  official  agreements  to  be 
developed  in  the  mid-1970s.  The  Soviet 
Union  was  particularly  interested  in  ex- 
panding exchanges  to  the  areas  of  ap- 
plied technology  whereas  the  United 
States  preferred  concentrating  on  pure 
science  and  medicine.  This  difference  in 
interest  has  continued  through  much  of 
the  history  of  the  exchanges. 


3ptember1983 


77 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


The  official  bilateral  agreements 
were  initiated  under  the  Nixon  Ad- 
ministration with  the  purpose  of  using 
them  for  long-term  political  goals.  On 
the  advice  of  the  American  scientific 
community  that  science  exchanges  with 
the  Soviet  Union  could  be  beneficial  to 
the  United  States,  the  Nixon  Ad- 
ministration set  out  to  negotiate  con- 
crete exchange  agreements  with  the 
Soviets  which  would  provide  scientific 
gains  but  also  guard  against  the  danger 
of  inequality  of  benefit. 

The  second  period,  1972-79,  was  the 
most  active.  The  highpoint  of  the 
bilateral  agreements  occurred  in  1975  as 
the  volume  of  exchanges  reached  2,284 
individual  visits  both  ways  and  the 
Apollo-Soyuz  mission  became  a  reality  in 
July  of  that  year.  Throughout  this 
period  the  environmental  protection 
agreement,  the  science  and  technology 
agreement  and  the  health  agreement 
were  the  most  active  of  the  bilaterals. 
The  year  1979,  however,  marked  a 
downturn  in  the  volume  of  exchanges 
under  the  agreements.  Relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  were  becoming  more  strained  and 
many  American  scientists  boycotted  the 
exchanges  because  of  the  Orlov  and 
Shcharanskiy  trials  of  1978.  The  most 
destructive  blow  to  the  exchanges  came, 
however,  with  the  Soviet  intervention  in 
Afghanistan  in  December  of  1979. 

The  final  period  of  the  exchanges, 
1980  to  the  present,  has  been  char- 
acterized by  further  diminishing  contacts 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Because  of  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan  and  the  subse- 
quent arrest  of  Dr.  Sakharov  over  his 
protest  of  that  event,  the  Carter  Ad- 
ministration: 

•  Prohibited  American  participation 
in  high-level  meetings  with  the  Soviets 
on  exchanges; 

•  Declared  that  science  and  tech- 
nology would  continue  only  in  the  fields 
of  humanitarian  value  or  in  areas  pro- 
viding direct  American  benefit;  and 

•  Required  that  each  exchange  ac- 
tivity be  reviewed  on  a  case-by-case 
basis  to  determine  its  permissibility. 

The  intention  of  the  Carter  Administra- 
tion was  to  cut  back  on  the  volume  of 
exchanges  but  to  maintain  the  structure 
of  the  agreements  to  allow  resumption 
of  the  exchanges  when  the  political 
situation  permitted. 

In  late  1981,  four  of  the  more  pro- 
ductive agreements — health,  artificial 
heart,  environmental,  and  oceans — came 
up  for  decision,  and  they  were  extended 


because  of  their  benefits  to  the  United 
States.  But  within  weeks  the  bilaterals 
were  again  greatly  affected  by 
developments  in  the  Eastern  bloc.  The 
imposition  of  martial  law  in  Poland  was 
another  blow  to  the  United  States- 
Soviet  bilateral  agreements  as,  in  conse- 
quence, this  Administration  announced 
that  it  would  not  renew  the  science  and 
technology  agreement,  the  energy  agree- 
ment, or  the  space  agreement  which 
were  to  expire  in  mid- 1982.  The  Ad- 
ministration also  revoked  Aeroflot's 
landing  rights  in  the  United  States,  and 
this  further  complicated  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  exchanges. 

The  level  of  cooperative  science  and 
technology  activity  under  the  remaining 
eight  agreements  has  declined  to 
roughly  20%  of  the  1979  level,  when  all 
11  agreements  were  in  force.  We  are 
currently  proceeding  with  activities  of 
particular  benefit  to  the  United  States, 
especially  in  the  areas  of  health,  en- 
vironmental protection,  and  safety.  We 
have  maintained  the  structure  of  scien- 
tific cooperation  intact  in  most  areas  so 
that  beneficial  exchanges  could  be  ex- 
panded if  the  political  situation  should 
warrant.  Consistent  with  this  view,  since 
1979,  we  have  renewed  specialized 
agreements  on  cooperation  in  ocean- 
ography, medicine  and  public  health,  ar- 
tificial heart  research  and  development, 
environmental  protection,  and 
agriculture. 

The  primary  criterion  in  the  selec- 
tion of  those  agreements  which  have 
been  terminated  was  the  date  of  their 
expiration,  which  in  all  cases  was 
mid-1982.  Thus,  they  could  be  ended 
quickly  if  Soviet  behavior  did  not  war- 
rant continuing  them.  The  concern  felt 
by  this  Administration  about  possible 
technology  loss  through  these 
cooperative  agreements  was,  of  course, 
in  the  background  of  this  decision,  but  it 
was  not  a  controlling  factor. 

In  general,  the  cooperative  scientific 
and  technological  exchanges  provide  the 
United  States  with  information  on  the 
overall  capabilities  of  Soviet  science, 
some  Soviet-to-United  States  technology 
transfer  in  fields  where  their  domestic 
capabilities  are  more  advanced  than 
ours,  and  an  improved  knowledge  and 
understanding  among  our  own  scientific 
institutions  not  only  of  Soviet  science 
but  also  of  the  U.S.S.R.'s  internal  and 
foreign  policies.  Furthermore,  our 
bilateral  activities  provide  access  to  an 
influential  layer  of  modern  Soviet 
society — the  scientific  sector — which  is 
"ft en  receptive  to  our  efforts  at  explain- 
ing American  views. 


Nevertheless,  I  do  not  foresee  an 
early  return  to  cooperation  with  the 
Soviet  Union  on  a  scale  matching  that  of  i 
the  mid-1970s,  and  certainly  not  until 
the  political  factors  that  led  to  reduction 
in  cooperation  improve.  We  would  still 
want  to  look  very  carefully  at  what  level 
of  cooperation  was  desirable.  I  do  not 
see  this  Administration  as  entering  into 
increased  cooperation  primarily  to  have 
the  appearance  of  cooperation.  Any  proj-l 
ect  should  be  scientifically  and  technical- 
ly valid,  be  done  in  cooperation  with  the  i 
Soviets  because  they  have  a  unique  or 
important  capability  in  the  area,  and  be  I 
carefully  designed  to  control  technology  i 
transfer.  The  contributions  each  side  is    \ 
to  make  to  a  program  must  be  carefully 
evaluated  and  kept  in  balance.  The  work  I 
must  be  carefully  monitored  to  ensure 
that  each  side  is  keeping  its  com- 
mitments scrupulously. 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  repeat  my 
appreciation  for  being  invited  here  to- 
day. Given  the  great  importance  of  in- 
ternational scientific  and  technological 
activities  to  our  overall  international 
posture  and  to  our  domestic  prosperity,  I 
there  can  be  few  more  worthy  topics  fori 
examination  by  the  legislative  and  ex- 
ecutive branches  of  this  government. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402  ■ 


78 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


■ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Elections  in  El  Salvador 


Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Affairs 


■anghorne  A.  Motley  was  born  in  Rio  de 
aneiro  in  1938.  Following  his  graduation 
■om  the  American  High  School  there,  he  at- 
;nded  the  Citadel  in  Charleston,  South 
arolina,  where  he  earned  his  B.A.  in 
Dlitical  science  (1960). 

As  a  commissioned  officer  in  the  U.S.  Air 
orce  (1960-70),  Ambassador  Motley  spent  3 
;ars  on  detail  with  the  Royal  Air  Force  at 
eltwell,  England,  and  with  the  U.S. 
)uthern  Command  in  Panama.  During  his 
.signment  in  Panama,  he  traveled  extensive- 
throughout  Latin  America  helping  to  plan 
ric  action  and  training  programs  and  ex- 
anges  between  U.S.  and  Latin  American 
ilitary  units. 

Following  military  service,  Ambassador 
otley  entered  business  as  a  real  estate 
veloper  in  Anchorage.  He  founded  Cres- 
nt  Realty,  Inc.,  which  was  later  merged 
th  Area  Inc.  Realtors,  now  Alaska's  largest 
I  al  estate  firm.  He  headed  the  State  of 
aska's  Department  of  Commerce  and 
:onomic  Development  (1975-77)  and  was 
sponsible  for  a  broad  range  of  financial, 
velopmental,  and  regulatory  programs.  In 
77  he  assumed  leadership  of  Citizens  for 
Management  of  Alaska  Lands,  Inc.  and 
Drdinated  the  efforts  of  its  member  groups 
assure  balanced  use  of  Alaskan  lands. 
He  was  Ambassador  to  Brazil  from 
ptember  1981  until  July  1983.  Upon  his 
parture,  he  was  awarded  the  Grand  Cross 
the  National  Order  of  the  Southern  Cross 
•  his  contributions  to  a  strengthening  of  the 
3. -Brazilian  relationship. 

Ambassador  Motley  was  sworn  in  as 
sistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American  Af- 
rs  on  July  12,  1983.  ■ 


by  Langhorne  A.  Motley 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 

on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  August  3, 
1983. 1 

On  July  1 1  we  notified  Congress  of  our 
plan  to  reprogram  $3.4  million  from 
within  the  $140  million  in  grant 
economic  support  funds  (ESF)  available 
for  El  Salvador  in  fiscal  year  1983  to 
assist  the  development  of  the 
Salvadoran  elections  process.  In  his 
April  27  address  to  a  joint  session  of 
Congress,  President  Reagan  stated  as 
the  first  of  our  four  basic  goals  in  Cen- 
tral America: 

In  response  to  decades  of  inequity  and  in- 
difference, we  will  support  democracy, 
reform,  and  human  freedom.  This  means  us- 
ing our  assistance  ...  to  bolster  humane 
democratic  systems  where  they  already  exist 
and  to  help  countries  on  their  way  to  that 
goal  complete  the  process  as  quickly  as 
human  institutions  can  be  changed.  Elec- 
tions .  .  .  must  be  open  to  all,  fair,  and  safe. 

As  the  President's  statement  in- 
dicates, we  regard  development  of  a 
fully  functioning  constitutional 
democracy  in  El  Salvador  as  essential  to 
peaceful  national  reconciliation  in  the 
near  term.  We  also  believe  that  it  is  the 
only  sure  road  to  establishment  of  a 
stable,  responsive,  and  progressive 
system  of  government  in  the  future,  so 
that  El  Salvador  will  not  again  have  to 
face  the  anguish  and  bloodshed  of  its 
present  internal  conflict. 

Our  emphasis  on  the  establishment 
of  constitutional  democracy — with  all 
that  implies  for  economic  equity  and 
government  under  law — is  the  keystone 
upon  which  the  other  aspects  of  our 
policy  are  built. 

We  are  providing  extensive 
economic  assistance  to  El  Salvador,  in- 
cluding the  pathbreaking  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative  approved  last  week  by 
both  Houses  of  Congress.  The  stability 


and  equity  of  democratic  government 
guarantees  that  the  benefits  of  this 
assistance  will  reach  the  people  and  that 
private  investment  can  be  mobilized  to 
fulfill  its  role  as  the  engine  of  develop- 
ment. 

We  are  also  strengthening  the 
Salvadoran  military  shield  behind  which 
political  and  economic  development  can 
occur.  But  our  military  assistance  ad- 
dresses no  more  than  the  symptom, 
leftist-inspired  guerrilla  violence;  it  is 
the  development  of  constitutional 
democracy  which  meets  the  central 
challenge  of  creating  an  open  and 
responsive  political  system. 

Lastly,  our  opposition  to  power- 
sharing  negotiations  between  the  far-left 
guerrilla  groups  and  the  government 
springs  not  from  a  desire  to  pursue  a 
military  solution  but  from  our  conviction 
that  El  Salvador  has  had  enough  of 
backroom  bargains  among  powerful 
elites,  be  they  economic,  political,  or 
military,  far  right  or  far  left.  That  is  the 
old  way,  no  matter  what  guise  it  wears 
today.  As  President  Magana  said  in  his 
July  1  report  to  the  people  of  El 
Salvador  on  the  state  of  the  nation: 

.  .  .  any  negotiation  to  distribute  power 
would  run  contrary  to  the  mandate  of  the 
voters,  who  were  the  large  majority  of  the 
Salvadoran  people.  This  is  the  only  thing, 
definitely  the  only  thing,  which  my  govern- 
ment cannot  do  for  peace. 

The  Search  for  a 
Democratic  Solution 

El  Salvador  needs  a  democratic  solution, 
a  solution  of  the  kind  found  by 
Venezuela  and  Honduras  after  years  of 
internal  turmoil,  the  solution  which  has 
allowed  Costa  Rica  to  be  at  peace  with 
itself  and  its  neighbors  for  so  many 
years:  constitutional  democracy  founded 
on  honest,  open  elections. 

And  El  Salvador  is  seeking  that 
solution.  El  Salvador's  concentration  on 
development  of  a  fair,  open  system  of 


ptember  1983 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


elections  has  run  steadily  through  more 
than  3'/2  years.  Let  me  briefly  review 
the  historical  record. 

The  proclamation  of  the  armed 
forces  issued  on  October  15,  1979, 
within  hours  of  the  coup  by  reformist 
military  officers— which  overthrew  the 
old  regime  and  began  El  Salvador's 
search  for  a  new,  better  future— states 
as  two  basic  goals: 

•  "To  create  an  environment 
favorable  for  the  carrying  out  of  truly 
free  elections  within  a  reasonable  period 
of  time,"  and 

•  "To  permit  the  organization  of 
political  parties  of  every  ideology,  in 
such  a  way  as  to  strengthen  the 
democratic  system." 


Situation  in 
Central  America 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  20,  19831 

As  you  know,  yesterday  in  Managua, 
Daniel  Ortega,  the  coordinator  of  the 
Sandinista  Directorate,  issued  a  state- 
ment. Our  response  to  that  is  we 
welcome  any  sincere  and  verifiable  pro- 
posal to  lessen  tensions  in  Central 
America.  Taking  Mr.  Ortega  at  his 
word,  we  believe  the  Nicaraguan  pro- 
posal is  a  positive  step  in  that  it 
acknowledges  the  regional  nature  of  the 
problem  and  the  need  to  address  exter- 
nal support  for  insurgencies  and  ter- 
rorist groups. 

The  proposal  still  contains  a  number 
of  serious  shortcomings.  For  example, 
the  proposal  seeks  to  put  the  insurgents 
in  El  Salvador  on  the  same  level  as  the 
democratically  elected  government.  It 
fails  to  take  into  account  the  need  for 
true  democracy  as  a  means  to  resolve  in- 
ternal problems  of  the  countries  of  the 
region.  It  does  not  deal  with  Nicaragua's 
military  buildup,  and  there  are  no  clear- 
ly articulated  provisions  for  effective 
verification. 

Nonetheless,  we  would  hope  that  the 
Nicaraguan  proposal,  along  with  those 
put  forth  by  other  countries  of  the 
region  would  be  considered,  refined,  and 
expanded  as  necessary  at  the  next 
meeting  of  the  Contadora  Nine,  sched- 
uled for  later  this  month. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  25,  1983. 


After  weeks  of  frantic  efforts  to 
build  a  junta  of  government  which  would 
include  the  full  political  spectrum,  on 
January  9,  1980,  the  "Pact  Between  the 
Armed  Forces  and  the  Christian 
Democratic  Party"  announced  the  forma- 
tion of  a  new  government.  In  the  event, 
this  government  ruled  until  peacefully 
displaced  by  the  elections  of  March 
1982.  In  addition  to  the  economic  and 
social  reforms  planned  by  that  govern- 
ment, the  pact  cited  as  its  first  political 
objective: 

To  create  the  conditions  necessary  for  the 
implementation  of  the  structural  reforms 
[and]  at  the  same  time  lead  the  nation  toward 
a  democratic  solution  in  which  it  is  the  people 
who  decide  their  own  destiny. 

On  March  5,  1981,  Dr.  Jorge 
Bustamante  was  named  president  of  the 
three-member  Central  Elections  Council. 
In  his  statement  of  acceptance,  he  noted 
that,  in  his  40  years  as  an  adult,  he  had 
never  cast  a  vote  with  the  confidence 
that  it  would  be  counted.  He  emphasized 
that  the  full  junta  of  government  had 
guaranteed  that  elections  would  take 
place  as  soon  as  possible  and  be  free  of 
all  pressure  or  fraud  and  stated: 
"without  that  assurance,  we  would  not 
be  here  today."  He  then  outlined  his  im- 
mediate tasks  as  those  of  developing  an 
electoral  law  and  a  registry  of  voters. 

As  we  all  know,  though  he  was 
unable  to  compile  an  electoral  registry, 
Dr.  Bustamante's  efforts  culminated  in 
the  March  1982  elections  for  a  Constitu- 
ent Assembly.  Congressman  Livingston 
of  this  subcommittee  was  there  as  part 
of  the  official  U.S.  observer  team.  Those 
of  us  who  were  not  there  saw  the  event 
through  the  eyes  of  the  media,  which 
moved  from  its  initial  skepticism  to  en- 
thusiastic praise  for  the  overwhelming 
turnout  in  the  face  of  guerrilla  threats 
and  destruction;  for  the  fairness  and 
honesty  of  the  campaign,  the  balloting, 
and  the  vote  count;  and  for  the  dignity 
with  which  the  outgoing  government 
surrendered  power. 

Establishing  a 
Democratic  Government 

The  16  months  since  the  March  1982 
elections  have  shown  just  what  elections 
can  bring  to  El  Salvador.  They  were  not 
only  successful  as  a  process;  they  were 
successful  in  launching  a  functioning, 
democratic  government. 

The  president,  Alvaro  Magana,  a 
political  independent,  was  selected  as  a 
consensus  candidate.  There  are  also 
three  vice  presidents,  each  representing 
one  of  the  three  major  democratic 
parties. 


■ 


Following  the  installation  of  the  nev 
executive,  the  evolution  toward  a  fully 
constitutional  democracy  continued.  In 
the  Pact  of  Apaneca,  the  Salvadoran 
"Government  of  National  Unity" 
pledged,  as  its  first  two  goals,  peace  an< 
democratization.  The  pact  called  for  a 
multiparty  Political  Commission— which 
included  the  President,  the  three  Vice 
Presidents,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, and  the  Minister  of  Defense— to 
oversee  the  appointment  of  a  new  Cen- 
tral Elections  Council,  to  draft  the 
guidelines  for  the  electoral  process,  and 
to  work  on  municipal  and  presidential 
elections.  As  a  result  of  their  decisions, 
the  Central  Elections  Council  was  ex- 
panded from  three  to  five  members,  ons 
from  each  of  the  parties  elected  to  the 
assembly. 

The  Apaneca  Pact  also  led  to  the 
establishment  of  a  Peace  Commission, 
now  functioning,  with  the  mandate  to 
bring  all  Salvadoran  sectors,  including 
guerrilla  parties  such  as  the  Revolu- 
tionary Democratic  Front  (FDR),  into 
the  electoral  process.  The  Peace  Com- 
mission—with the  full  backing  of  the 
Political  Commission,  the  assembly,  anc 
President  Magana— has  several  times 
explicitly  invited  the  political  parties 
associated  with  the  guerrillas  to  begin 
talks  on  how  they  can  participate  in  the 
coming  elections.  On  June  6,  commissio 
member  Francisco  Quinonez  offered  to 
join  in  a  "dialogue  with  FDR  and  FMLI 
[Farabundo  Marti  National  Liberation 
Front]  leaders  about  their  participation 
in  the  next  elections."  On  June  11,  he 
stated  that,  "we  reiterate  our  position 
[of]  inviting  the  FDR,  if  it  is  disposed 
and  interested  in  participating  in  the 
democratic  process  ...  to  make  this  [in 
terest]  known."  The  Peace  Commission 
has  actively  sought  to  establish  contact 
with  these  groups,  facilitated  by  the  re- 
cent efforts  of  Ambassador  Stone,  Pres 
dent  Reagan's  special  envoy  to  Central 
America. 

The  Constituent  Assembly  is  writin] 
a  new  national  constitution  and  acting  i 
a  legislative  body  until  one  can  be 
elected  under  the  new  constitution.  It  is 
composed  of  60  seats,  apportioned  ac- 
cording to  the  election  results,  as 
follows:  24  for  the  Christian  Democrat 
Party  (PDC),  19  for  the  National 
Republican  Alliance  (ARENA),  14  for 
the  Party  of  National  Conciliation  (PCN 
which  has  since  divided  into  two 
parties),  2  for  the  Democratic  Action 
Party  (AD),  and  1  for  the  Salvadoran 
Popular  Party  (PPS). 

Acting  in  its  legislative  capacity,  th< 
assembly  has  extended  the  land-to-the- 


80 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


tiller  phase  of  the  agrarian  reform  and 
has  passed  and  then  extended  an  am- 
bitious amnesty  program,  thus  continu- 
ing progress  on  structural  reform  and 
national  reconciliation. 

Draft  of  a  New  Constitution.  The 

assembly  has  also  moved  ahead  on  its 
most  important  task:  writing  a  new  na- 
tional constitution.  On  July  22,  a  draft 
.was  formally  introduced  to  the  assembly 
by  the  working  committee.  The  draft 
constitution  is  more  liberal  than  its 
predecessor.  It  contains  246  articles 
iivided  into  nine  titles  named: 

I.  The  Human  Being  and  the  Goals 
)f  the  State; 

II.  Rights  and  Fundamental 
guarantees  of  the  Human  Being; 

III.  The  State,  Its  Form  of  Govern- 
nent  and  Political  System; 

IV.  Nationality; 

V.  The  Economic  Order; 

VI.  The  Organs  of  Government, 
nheir  Powers  and  Responsibilities; 

VII.  The  Central  Elections  Council; 

VIII.  The  Responsibility  of  Public 
Ifficials;  and 

IX.  Scope,  Applications,  Reforms 
nd  Derogations. 

In  the  draft,  the  rights  of  the  in- 
ividual  are  strengthened.  The  presump- 
on  of  innocence  is  codified  in  the  con- 
dition for  the  first  time.  Habeas 
irpus  and  other  safeguards  against  ar- 
itrary  arrest  are  strengthened.  The 
Dwers  of  the  legislature  and  the 
lpreme  court  are  enhanced  vis-a-vis  the 
cecutive  branch.  The  independence  of 
le  prosecutor  general  is  strengthened 
id  his  powers  increased.  There  is  an 
cplicit  prohibition  against  information 
'  an  official  party  and  against 
iramilitary  organizations  outside 
wernment  control.  The  rights  of 
orkers  are  increased.  The  presidential 
rm  is  set  at  5  years;  that  of  legislators 
3  years.  In  presidential  elections,  if  no 
.ndidate  receives  an  absolute  majority, 
runoff  between  the  front  runners  will 
:  held  within  30  days. 

During  the  week  of  July  24-31,  the 
sembly  threw  its  sessions  open  to 
mmembers  who  wished  to  comment. 
)rmal  debate  among  the  assembly 
embers  is  scheduled  to  begin  on 
jgust  8.  In  addition  to  debate  on  the 
>rmal  text  of  the  constitution,  discus- 
>ns  will  also  focus  on  transitory  ar- 
:les  designed  to  facilitate  early  elec- 
>ns.  Though  it  is  difficult  to  predict 
len  the  assembly  will  finally  pro- 


U.S.-Honduran  Military  Exercise 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  25,  19831 

There  has  been  planning  for  a  combined 
U.S.-Honduran  military  exercise  to  take 
place  this  year,  but  since  planning  is  still 
underway,  we  cannot  provide  specifics 
at  this  time.  The  United  States  has  con- 
ducted combined  military  exercises  with 
Honduras,  and  other  nations  in  the 
world,  before  and  will  do  so  again.  This 
series  of  combined  exercises  involving 
U.S.  and  Latin  American  forces  began 
in  1965.  Such  exercises  pose  no  threat  to 
any  nation.  They  play  a  crucial  role  in 
training  of  troops  and  support  personnel 
of  our  own  forces  and  those  of  the  host 
country. 

The  recent  deployment  of  the  U.S.S. 
Ranger  carrier  group  in  the  Pacific  is 
for  training  purposes  and  to  demon- 
strate our  interest  in  the  Central 
American  region. 

As  plans  for  the  joint  exercise  are 
developed,  we  will  consult  with  Members 
of  Congress.  We  have  consistently  ex- 
pressed our  support  for  a  political  solu- 
tion to  the  problems  in  Central  America, 
not  a  military  one.  We  fully  support  the 
proposals  for  a  lessening  of  tensions  in 
the  region  expressed  in  the  final  act  of 
the  San  Jose  conference  of  last  October. 
We  support  the  Contadora  process  and 
other  regional  initiatives  to  ease  tensions 
in  the  area.  Ambassador  Stone  [Richard 
B.  Stone,  Ambassador  at  Large  and 
special  representative  of  the  President 
to  Central  America]  the  President's 


special  envoy,  is  currently  on  his  third 
trip  to  the  area  and  is  conveying  to  the 
governments  of  the  Contadora  Four — 
countries  of  Colombia,  Mexico, 
Venezuela,  and  Panama — a  Presidential 
message  which  conveys  our  continuing 
support  to  the  Contadora  process.  The 
recent  Presidential  appointment  of  a  Na- 
tional Bipartisan  Commission  for  Cen- 
tral America  is  an  additional  indication 
of  this  government's  long-term  interest 
in  that  part  of  the  world. 

Our  commitment  to  a  political  solu- 
tion and  to  the  strengthening  of 
democracy  and  economic  development  in 
Central  America  is  clear.  Democracy 
and  economic  development,  however, 
must  have  a  basis  in  security,  and  our 
military  aid  to  our  allies,  as  well  as  our 
efforts  to  help  them  strengthen  their 
own  defensive  capabilities,  are  designed 
to  increase  their  security  and  thus  shield 
the  growth  of  democratic  processes, 
economic  development,  dialogue,  and 
negotiations. 

Our  policy  toward  Central  America 
is  based  on  the  four  principles  outlined 
by  the  President  in  his  April  27  speech 
to  the  joint  session  of  Congress:  support 
for  democracy,  development,  dialogue, 
and  the  necessary  military  assistance  to 
provide  a  shield  for  the  first  three.  As  a 
practical  manner,  all  four  aspects  are  in- 
terdependent, and  we  are  continuing  to 
evolve  practical  steps  to  implement  all 
the  facets  of  that  policy. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  1,  1983. 


mulgate  the  new  constitution,  we 
understand  the  target  date  is  Septem- 
ber 15,  El  Salvador's  national  in- 
dependence day. 

Preparations  for  New  National 
Elections.  Speaking  for  the  Political 
Commission,  President  Magana  an- 
nounced on  September  29,  1982,  that 
new  national  elections  would  be  held  no 
later  than  March  28,  1984.  In  early 
March  of  this  year,  he  announced  that 
they  would  be  held  before  the  end  of 
1983.  Though  there  has  been  much 
speculation  about  a  postponement  of 
elections  because  of  delays  in  passage  of 
the  constitution,  there  has  been  no 
authoritative  decision  to  postpone  them 
beyond  the  end  of  the  year. 


eptember  1983 


Electoral  preparations  are  now 
underway.  The  Christian  Democrats 
held  a  party  convention  and,  in  a  close 
contest,  chose  Napoleon  Duarte  as  the 
party's  standard  bearer.  Other  parties 
are  also  approaching  candidate  selection. 
The  Central  Elections  Council  has  a 
budget  of  $4.9  million  for  the  costs 
associated  with  preparing  for  the  elec- 
tions. 

The  window  for  elections  this  year  is 
rapidly  narrowing.  Massive  population 
displacements  occur  at  harvest  time  in 
early  December  as  people  go  to  find 
work  in  the  fields.  Elections  must  take 
place  before  then.  The  target  date  for 
promulgation  of  the  constitution  is 
September  15.  Between  promulgation  of 
the  constitution  and  early  December,  the 
electoral  law  will  have  to  be  passed,  the 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


parties  and  candidates  registered,  and 
the  actual  campaign  carried  out.  Provi- 
sion must  also  be  made  in  that  time 
period  for  a  second-round  election,  in 
case  no  candidate  wins  an  outright  ma- 
jority in  the  first  round. 

Obviously,  debate  on  an  issue  as  fun- 
damental as  the  national  constitution 
cannot  be  closed  off  artificially,  even  in 
the  name  of  elections.  El  Salvador 
desperately  needs  a  fundamental  law 
based  on  a  broad  consensus  and  vision 
of  the  future.  Only  in  that  way  will  it 
serve  as  the  legal  bedrock  for  future 
political  development. 

One  wild  card  is  the  effort  to  in- 
tegrate the  guerrilla-associated  parties 
into  the  electoral  process.  It  is  difficult 
to  predict  what  effect  their  acquiescense 
in  participating  would  have  on  the  pres- 
ent timetable.  The  Salvadoran  Govern- 
ment had  made  clear  its  desire  to  see 
the  broadest  representation  possible  in 
the  elections.  But  is  has  also  made  clear 
that  elections  will  not  be  delayed  simply 
because  the  far  left  is  unresponsive  or 
undecided.  Elections  cannot  be  held 
hostage  to  the  decisions  of  an  antidemo- 
cratic group. 

In  sum,  the  two  fundamental  steps 
in  establishing  a  constitutional  democ- 
racy are  being  taken  right  now  in  El 
Salvador:  a  constitution  is  being  drafted 
and  elections  are  being  prepared. 

U.S.  Assistance 

Our  project  to  assist  the  elections  effort 
conforms  closely  to  Salvadoran  plans.  In 
essence,  we  plan  to  provide  $3.4  million 
in  critically  short  hard  currency  to  at 
least  partially  cover  the  costs  of  a  new 
computer  and  other  equipment,  technical 
assistance,  and  a  program  for  interna- 
tional observers  to  witness  the  election. 
Our  contribution  will  account  for  less 
than  half  of  the  overall  budget  for  the 
elections  and  the  building  of  a  unified, 
independent,  autonomous  electoral 
registry. 

We  are  seeking  to  minimize  U.S.  of- 
ficial involvement.  In  equipment  pro- 
curement, our  involvement  extends  no 
farther  than  assuring  ourselves  that  the 
money  is  well  spent  on  equipment  ade- 
quate for  the  project  goal.  Part  of  our 
technical  assistance  will  enlist  advisers 
from  Costa  Rica  and  perhaps  Colombia 
to  help  in  the  planning  of  the  elections 
themselves  and  the  registry  and  a  major 
multinational  firm  to  develop  the  securi- 
ty programs  to  safeguard  the  computer 
against  tampering  with  the  data  base  or 
the  programs.  A  Salvadoran  firm  will 


provide  the  computer  and  oversee  its  in- 
stallation and  initial  programing. 

Except  for  the  observer  component, 
most  of  our  assistance  will  benefit  not 
only  the  coming  elections  but  elections  in 
the  future.  For  instance,  a  new,  small 
computer  will  not  only  be  used  to  com- 
pile an  electoral  registry  but,  more  im- 
portantly, will  be  able  to  avoid  the  long 
delays  in  processing  voting  results  which 
occurred  in  the  1982  elections.  We  also 
hope  to  fund  the  purchase  of  an 
"uninterrupted  power  source"  backup 
unit,  so  the  failure  of  the  electrical 
system,  either  through  normal  malfunc- 


tion or  guerrilla  sabotage,  cannot 
obstruct  a  smooth  vote  count. 

In  short,  our  program  of  assistance 
is  calculated  to  strengthen  the  institu- 
tional and  technical  electoral  process 
with  a  minimum  of  involvement  in  the 
actual  administration  of  the  elections. 
We  can  make  an  important  contribution, 
one  the  Salvadorans'  dedication  to 
democracy  fully  merits.  ■ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Fourth  Certification  of  Progress 
for  El  Salvador 


Following  are  statements  by 
Langhorne  A.  Motley,  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs, 
and  Elliott  Abrams,  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian 
Affairs,  before  the  Subcommittees  on 
Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  and  on 
Human  Rights  and  International 
Organizations  of  the  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee  on  August  3,  1983.1 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  MOTLEY 

On  July  20  Secretary  Shultz,  acting  on 
authority  delegated  to  him  by  the  Presi- 
dent, certified  to  the  Congress  that  El 
Salvador  meets  the  criteria  set  forth  in 
Section  728  of  the  International  Security 
and  Cooperation  Act  of  1981,  as 
amended. 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportuni- 
ty to  review  this  fourth  certification 
with  you  and,  since  this  will  be  the  last 
such  certification  under  the  1981  act,  to 
offer  some  comments  about  the  certifica- 
tion process  as  a  whole. 

As  you  know,  section  728(d)  requires 
periodic  certification  to  the  Congress 
that  the  Government  of  El  Salvador: 

(1)  is  making  a  concerted  and  significant 
effort  to  comply  with  internationally 
recognized  human  rights; 

(2)  is  achieving  substantial  control  over 
all  elements  of  its  own  armed  forces,  so  as  to 
bring  to  an  end  the  indiscriminate  torture 
and  murder  of  Salvadoran  citizens  by  these 
forces; 

(3)  is  making  continued  progress  in  im- 
plementing essential  economic  and  political 
reforms,  including  the  land  reform  program; 


(4)  is  committed  to  the  holding  of  free 
elections  at  an  early  date  and  to  that  end  hat 
demonstrated  its  good  faith  efforts  to  begin 
discussions  with  all  major  political  factions  in 
El  Salvador  which  have  declared  their  will- 
ingness to  find  and  implement  an  equitable 
political  solution  to  the  conflict,  with  such 
solution  to  involve  a  commitment  to— 

(A)  a  renouncement  of  further  military 
or  paramilitary  activity;  and 

(B)  the  electoral  process  with  interna- 
tionally recognized  observers. 

The  July  1983  amendment  to  sectioi 
728(e)  of  the  act  requires  a  determina- 
tion in  the  fourth  certification  that  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador: 

(1)  has  made  good  faith  efforts  both  to  ir 
vestigate  the  murders  of  the  seven  United 
States  citizens  in  El  Salvador  in  December 
1980  and  in  January  1981,  and  to  bring  to 
justice  all  those  responsible  for  those 
murders,  and 

(2)  has  taken  all  reasonable  steps  to  in- 
vestigate the  killing  of  Michael  Kline  in  El 
Salvador  in  October  1982.2 

Certification  Findings 

El  Salvador  is  in  its  fourth  year  under 
governments  committed  to  building  a 
lasting  democratic  order.  Despite  major 
handicaps,  including  a  long  history  of 
military  rule  and  dominance  by  a  small 
elite  and  the  violence  of  a  struggle 
against  armed  guerrillas  supported  frorr 
outside,  a  hard-fought  and  evolutionary 
democratic  process  is  underway. 

Specifically,  the  certification  report 
finds  that  at  this  time  the  Salvadoran 
Government  is  working  to  increase 
respect  for  human  rights  and  to  reduce 
abuses  by  its  security  forces.  It  has 


82 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


strengthened  institutions,  repeatedly 
and  forcefully  emphasized  the  impor- 
tance of  human  rights  at  all  levels,  and 
generally  followed  a  democratic,  re- 
formist policy.  Through  the  amnesty 
program  more  than  300  individual  guer- 
rillas and  guerrilla  supporters  have  laid 
down  their  arms  and  more  than  500 
political  prisoners  have  been  released 
from  detention. 

Nevertheless,  convictions  for  serious 
crimes,  especially  those  with  political 
overtones,  have  been  virtually  unob- 
tainable because  of  intimidation  and  cor- 
ruption of  judges,  lawyers,  witnesses, 
and  jurors.  In  order  to  rectify  this 
oasic  impediment  to  the  effective  rule  of 
law,  since  the  last  certification  the 
■Salvadoran  Government  has  begun  ef- 
;orts  to  reform  its  criminal  justice 
system.  This  long-term  program  seeks 
;o  upgrade  the  capacity  and  independ- 
>nce  of  the  system  at  investigatory, 
)rosecutorial,  and  judicial  levels — a  pro- 
gram essential  to  ensuring  that  no  one's 
ictions  are  above  the  law  and  that  none 
nay  act  outside  the  law  without  fear  of 
iwful  retribution. 

There  has  been  only  slow  progress 
hus  far  by  the  Salvadoran  authorities  in 
ringing  to  justice  the  murderers  of  U.S. 
itizens.  The  prosecution  of  the  security 
)rce  personnel  accused  of  murdering 
)ur  American  churchwomen  is  slowly 
•roceeding  through  the  Salvadoran 
Durt  system.  The  case  of  the  two  Na- 
onal  Guardsmen  accused  of  the  murder 
f  American  labor  consultants  has  been 
lised  to  the  trial  stage,  but  others  who 
lay  have  been  involved  in  the  crime 
ave  not  been  arrested.  The  positive 
ientification  in  the  United  States  of  the 
?mains  of  John  Sullivan  is  permitting  a 
ill  investigation  in  El  Salvador.3  Three 
embers  of  the  Salvadoran  army  are 
ider  detention  for  the  murder  of 
ichael  Kline,  and  the  case  is  before  the 
>urts.  There  has  been  no  progress  in 
scovering  the  whereabouts  of  Patricia 
uellar  or  in  resolving  her  disap- 
;arance.4  We  are  receiving  full 
ilvadoran  cooperation  in  the  investiga- 
3n  of  the  death  of  an  American  citizen 
lied  since  the  last  certification — Lt. 
nmmander  Albert  Schaufelberger — vic- 
ti  of  a  political  assassination  for  which 
far-left  guerrilla  death  squad  has 
limed  credit. 

The  major  economic  reforms  of 
•80 — redistribution  of  farmland,  na- 
salization of  the  banking  system,  and 
>vernment  control  of  coffee  and  sugar 
arketing — remain  in  force  and  the 
jarian  reform  has  continued  to  move 


The  Contadora  Process 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTER  TO  THE 
PRESIDENTS  OF  THE 
CONTADORA  FOUR, 
JULY  26,  19831 

Dear  Mr.  President  [de  la  Expriella]: 

Thank  you  for  the  letter  which  you  and 
the  Presidents  of  Colombia,  Mexico,  and 
Venezuela  have  sent  to  me  concerning  the 
meeting  held  in  Cancun  on  July  17,  to  review 
the  current  situation  in  Central  America. 

I  would  like  to  congratulate  you  on  the 
efforts  which  the  Contadora  Four  are  making 
to  promote  dialogue  among  the  countries  of 
Central  America.  My  government  has  con- 
sistently expressed  strong  support  for  the 
Contadora  process.  The  Cancun  Declaration, 
by  articulating  the  crucial  issues  which  must 
be  treated  to  reach  an  effective  and  enduring 
resolution  of  the  Central  American  conflict,  is 
an  important  contribution  to  advancing  that 
process. 

I  continue  to  believe  that  a  solution  to  the 
crisis  in  Central  America  must  encompass 
four  basic  principles: 

First,  it  is  essential  that  democratic  in- 
stitutions be  established  and  strengthened  as 
a  means  to  resolve  political  differences  within 
the  Central  American  states.  Only  by  ensur- 
ing free  and  open  participation  in  the 
democratic  process  can  the  peoples  of  Central 
America  achieve  reconciliation  within  their 
societies. 

Second,  there  must  be  respect  for  the 
principle  of  non-intervention,  including  a  ban 
on  support  for  subversive  elements  that  seek 
to  destabilize  other  countries. 

Third,  the  conflict  in  Central  America 
must  be  removed  from  the  context  of  an 
East-West  confrontation,  through  such 
measures  as  the  verifiable  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  military  and  security  advisers  and  a 
certifiable  freeze  on  the  acquisition  of  offen- 
sive armaments. 

And  finally,  the  countries  of  Central 
America  must  work  among  themselves  and 
with  their  neighbors  to  achieve  and  sustain  a 
level  of  economic  growth  that  will  guarantee 
the  basic  needs  of  their  people. 

I  am  pleased  that  the  Cancun  Declaration 
recognizes  the  importance  of  these  fundamen- 
tal principles.  These  issues  are  inextricably 


inter-related,  and  must  be  addressed  on  a 
comprehensive,  regional  basis  which  treats 
simultaneously  the  concerns  of  all  the  states 
affected  by  the  Central  American  conflict.  An 
attempt  to  resolve  these  issues  sequentially, 
or  on  a  piecemeal  basis,  will  not  achieve  the 
goal  we  all  share  of  a  lasting  peace  for  all  of 
Central  America. 

Equally  important  is  the  need  to  ensure 
that  all  undertakings  assumed  by  the  Central 
American  states  be  fully  reciprocal  and  sub- 
ject to  comprehensive,  fully  adequate  verifi- 
cation. Clearly,  no  initiative  can  bring  true 
peace  to  Central  America  if  one  state  is  per- 
mitted to  take  unjust  advantage  of  its 
neighbors  through  failure  to  abide  by  peace 
conditions  which  bind  the  others.  The  Charter 
of  the  Organization  of  American  States 
makes  clear  that  it  should  be  the  purpose  of 
the  OAS  to  either  prevent  unjust  acts  com- 
mitted by  one  state  against  another,  or  to 
provide  for  common  action  on  the  part  of  the 
members  in  the  event  of  difficulties.  I  believe 
the  OAS,  as  this  Hemisphere's  regional 
forum,  is  the  appropriate  mechanism  to  en- 
sure that  those  who  make  commitments,  com- 
ply with  them. 

The  problems  of  Central  America  are 
complex,  and  their  solution  demands  untiring 
efforts.  The  activities  which  you  and  your  col- 
leagues in  the  Contadora  group  have  under- 
taken are  proof  of  your  sincere  dedication  to 
the  goal  of  a  genuine  and  lasting  peace 
throughout  the  region.  My  own  efforts  in  this 
regard  have  been  to  dispatch  my  Special  Em- 
missary  to  the  region  and  establish  a  bi- 
partisan commission  to  examine  the  problems 
of  Central  America  and  to  propose  solutions. 
You  have  my  prayers  and  those  of  my  coun- 
trymen as  you  continue  your  work. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Contadora  Four  Presidents— Ricardo  de 
la  Expriella,  Panama;  Belisario  Betancur, 
Colombia;  Miguel  de  la  Madrid  Hurtado,  Mex- 
ico; and  Luis  Herrera  Campins,  Venezuela. 
The  letter  was  personally  delivered  by  Am- 
bassador Richard  B.  Stone,  Ambassador  at 
Large  and  special  representative  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  Central  America  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Aug.  1,  1983).  ■ 


ijptember  1983 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


ahead  making  more  Salvadorans  the 
owners  of  the  land  they  work.  A  major 
promotion  campaign  earlier  this  year 
resulted  in  a  sharp  increase  in  applicants 
and  beneficiaries  under  the  land-to-the- 
tiller  phase  of  the  agrarian  reform. 
Salvadoran  efforts  to  restore  illegally 
evicted  beneficiaries  have  increased.  The 
need  for  these  steps  is  underscored  by  a 
study,  compiled  by  the  Salvadoran 
Agrarian  Reform  Planning  and  Evalua- 
tion Office  as  part  of  this  effort  and  just 
received  in  Washington,  which  indicates 
that  illegal  evictions  of  beneficiaries  may 
be  higher  than  we  believed  at  the  time 
of  certification. 

Progress  in  developing  democratic 
institutions  is  evidenced  by: 

•  Continued  functioning  of  the 
elected  Government  of  National  Unity; 

•  Completion  of  the  draft  constitu- 
tion on  which  formal  debate  in  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  will  begin  August  8th; 

•  Ongoing  preparations  for  elec- 
tions, coupled  with  repeated  invitations 
by  the  Salvadoran  Government's  Peace 
Commission  to  guerrilla-associated  par- 
ties to  participate  in  them;  and 

•  Increased  activity  by  democratic 
political  parties  and  labor  unions. 

The  Constituent  Assembly  has 
become  a  forum  in  which  competition 
among  political  factions  is  conducted  in 
a  democratic  manner  and  in  which  a 
number  of  difficult  decisions  has  been 
made.  It  is  also  functioning  effectively 
as  the  national  legislature. 

The  Salvadoran  Peace  Commission 
has  made  repeated  calls,  backed  by 
President  Magana  and  the  multiparty 
Political  Commission  which  created  it, 
for  meetings  with  the  guerrilla  left  to 
find  ways  they  could  participate  in  the 
coming  elections.  This  effort  to  continue 
to  broaden  the  democratic  process  begun 
in  March  1982  is  at  the  heart  of  the 
Salvadoran  solution.  Power  sharing 
based  on  the  relative  capacity  of  each 
side  to  destroy  the  adherents  of  the 
other  is  no  solution.  Only  a  democratic 
system,  in  which  each  side  contends  for 
ballots  fairly  and  is  confident  that  if  it 
loses  today  it  may  try  again  and  prevail 
tomorrow,  can  bring  lasting  peace  to  El 
Salvador  and  ensure  responsive,  just 
government  there  in  the  future. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  Secretary 
Shultz  concluded  that  "the  statutory 
criteria  for  certification  are  met." 
However,  he  also  noted  in  his  letter  of 
transmittal  that, 


...  it  is  evident  that  the  record  falls 
short  of  the  broad  and  sustained  progress 
which  both  the  Congress  and  the  Administra- 
tion believe  is  necessary  for  the  evolution  of 
a  just  and  democratic  society  in  El  Salvador. 

The  development  of  democracy  can 
be  a  long  and  difficult  process,  even 
under  the  best  of  circumstances.  The 
situation  in  El  Salvador  today  is 
anything  but  the  "best  of  circum- 
stances." What  we  are  trying  to  accom- 
plish in  El  Salvador  by  supporting 
democratic  elements  is  nothing  less  than 
to  help  a  society  change  the  way  its 
social,  political,  and  economic  affairs 
traditionally  have  been  conducted.  We 
are  doing  this  in  the  face  of  a  campaign 
of  violence  and  terrorism  supported  and 
encouraged  from  outside  the  country. 

Despite  the  efforts  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador,  violations  of 
human  rights  continue  to  occur.  Rightist 
terrorists  bear  responsibility  for  many 
deaths  attributable  to  political  violence. 
Elements  of  the  government  security 
forces  are  believed  to  have  been  involved 
in  or  responsible  for  many  of  these  viola- 
tions of  the  rights  of  the  person. 

During  the  last  6  months,  the 
number  of  press-reported  civilian  deaths 
attributed  to  political  violence  rose  and 
disappearances  continued  at  about  the 
same  rate  as  during  the  last  half  of 
1982.  (There  are  differences  among  the 
Salvadoran  organizations  which  monitor 
human  rights  developments  over 
whether  civilian  deaths  actually  rose  or 
fell  slightly  in  this  period.) 

Major  abuses,  such  as  the  February 
slaying  of  18  persons  at  Las  Hojas,  have 
gone  unpunished.  All  of  those  involved 
in  the  murder  of  the  two  American  labor 
consultants  have  not  been  brought  to 
justice.  Though  the  Salvadoran  Govern- 
ment is  working  to  increase  respect  for 
human  rights,  it  has  not  managed  to 
punish  those  responsible  for  continuing 
abuses. 

As  Secretary  Shultz's  letter  of 
transmittal  stated: 

.  .  .  our  disappointment  over  the  pace  of 
change  should  not  obscure  the  fact  that 
change  is  occurring.  The  people  of  El 
Salvador  deserve  our  support  in  their  effort 
to  achieve  a  truly  democratic  society,  which 
will  provide  the  best  and  most  lasting 
safeguard  of  human  rights. 


The  Certification  Process 

The  certification  process  has  assisted  us 
to  support  those  Salvadoran  sectors  who 
favor  democracy,  moderation,  and  prog- 
ress by  underscoring  those  issues  of 


84 


greatest  concern  to  us  and  by  ensuring 
that  the  entire  U.S.  Government  speaks 
with  one  voice  on  these  key  issues.  The 
clarity  and  firmness  of  the  certification 
process  has  been  its  great  virtue. 

But  existing  certification  procedures 
also  have  numerous  defects.  Best  knowr 
of  these  is  the  tendency  of  the  certifica- 
tion date— essentially  a  legal  event— to 
induce  the  far  left  to  greater  violence, 
either  to  inspire  an  overreaction  by  the 
Salvadoran  defense  forces  or  to  take  ad 
vantage  of  their  temporary  paralysis. 
This  has  produced  so-called  "certificatio: 
offensives." 

Equally  important,  the  certification 
has  a  "made-in-the-U.S."  aspect  which 
may  place  it  out  of  synchronization  with 
the  realities  and  pressures  in  El 
Salvador.  For  instance,  in  this  certifica 
tion  there  is  a  criterion  on  Salvadoran 
elections— elections  already  held  with 
great  success.  Though  another  round  oi 
elections  is  also  in  the  works,  these  wer 
not  the  elections  contemplated  in  the 
original  legislation.  On  the  other  hand, 
is  clear  that  Salvadoran  political  realitit 
and  the  pressures  and  hatreds  of  so 
brutal  an  internal  conflict  have  greatly 
impeded  the  effort  to  establish  firm 
civilian  control  over  the  Salvadoran 
military  and  security  forces.  Progress 
has  been  further  impeded  during  the 
past  6  months  by  leadership  changes  in 
the  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces.  As 
Secretary  Shultz  emphasized  in  his 
transmittal  letter  to  Congress,  much 
more  needs  to  be  done. 

Perhaps  most  importantly,  the  cer- 
tification process  attempts  to  depict  th 
process  of  change  in  El  Salvador  in  a 
series  of  "snapshots"  at  6-month  inter- 
vals. On  the  basis  of  these  frozen 
moments,  a  go/no-go  decision  must  be 
made  on  U.S.  military  assistance.  This 
methodology  clearly  overemphasizes 
high  profile  events  and  understates  the 
longer  term  evolutionary  processes.  Th 
land  reform  is  a  good  example.  It  has 
now  benefited  more  than  500,000 
Salvadorans.  But  the  "snapshot"  taken 
at  this  time,  on  the  heels  of  the  bad 
news  of  the  recent  survey  of  evictions, 
obscures  the  fact  that  a  developing 
Salvadoran  institution  conducted  the 
survey  and  produced  the  report  in  ord 
to  monitor  and  further  a  key  reform 
program. 

In  attempting  political  and  econom 
reforms  of  the  scope  of  those  in  El 
Salvador,  developments  must  frequent 
accumulate  to  a  critical  mass  before 
visible  change  occurs.  When  it  does,  it 
can  occur  quite  rapidly— as  in  the  will 
the  parties  and  people  to  make  the 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


March  1982  elections  a  success;  as  in  the 
land  reform;  as  in  the  amnesty  program; 
as  in  the  call  for  dialogue  on  elections 
with  the  far  left.  Yet  as  presently  con- 
stituted, the  certification  process  creates 
expectations  of  a  continuing  incremental 
progress  on  all  fronts  which  is  not  likely 
to  be  achieved. 

Last  is  the  stick  behind  the  certifica- 
tion process.  At  180-day  intervals,  cer- 
tification determines,  immediately, 
whether  the  United  States  will  provide 
military  assistance  and  trainers  to  El 
Salvador  on  the  basis  of  the  "snapshot" 
mentioned  earlier.  As  a  result, 
Salvadoran  commanders,  in  the  midst  of 
i  major  war  effort  must  plan  on  the 
t>asis  of  a  supply  line  in  constant  danger 
>f  being  shut  off.  This  is  neither  con- 
ducive to  good  military  tactics  nor  good 
'or  building  the  political  will  to  sustain 
■he  development  of  democracy.  The 
endency  will  be  to  husband  resources 
..gainst  an  uncertain  future,  as  occurred 
<etween  October  and  January  and, 
'Otentially,  even  to  encourage  a  return 
o  traditional,  more  savage  means  of  set- 
ling  political  disputes  and  dividing  the 
conomic  pie.  The  repeated,  periodic 
ireat  of  discontinuity  can  undermine 
.S.  influence  with  those  whose  long- 
rm  commitment  to  profound  change 
mst  be  maintained. 

We  need  to  continue  in  close  con- 
izations with  the  Congress  to  see  if  we 
in  construct  an  oversight  mechanism 
hich  will  retain  the  strengths  of  the 
resent  certification  process  while 
meliorating  some  of  its  defects;  a 
echanism  by  which  we  can  arrive  at 
utually  agreed  upon,  practical  goals 
ward  which  the  Salvadorans  can  work 
ith  their  own  plans;  a  mechanism 
hich  also  permits  sound  military  plan- 
ng;  one  which  does  not  inspire  syn- 
ronized  violence  by  the  far  left  or 
a;ht;  one  which  does  not  freeze  the  ac- 
)n  into  short  intervals  that  obscure 
ng-term  trends;  but  a  mechanism 
hich  also  shows  clearly  and  forcefully 
ir  expectations  of  an  ally  and  a  friend. 


3SISTANT  SECRETARY  ABRAMS 

im  grateful  for  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
ar  before  you  once  again  to  discuss 
e  human  rights  aspects  of  American 
licy  in  El  Salvador  and  more  broadly 
Central  America.  The  advance  of 
man  rights  in  Central  America  re- 
ains  a  key  goal  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
;nt.  We  pursue  this  goal  in  two  ways, 
d  both  are  essential.  One  is  to  press 


governments  for  the  rectification  of 
specific  abuses,  and  we  work  at  this 
energetically.  But  it  is  not  enough.  Both 
the  Reagan  Administration  and  its 
critics  know  how  frustrating  this  effort 
is  if  it  is  all  we  are  doing.  It  is  frus- 
trating because  it  deals  basically  with 
symptoms— symptoms  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance for  peoples'  lives— but  not  with 
causes. 

Therefore,  we  are  also  trying  to  deal 
with  the  underlying  situation  that  pro- 
duces the  massive  violations  of  human 
rights  in  El  Salvador.  We  are  addressing 
it  in  several  ways.  First,  by  economic 
assistance  and  economic  reform  we  hope 
to  keep  the  Salvadoran  people  from  the 
edge  of  desperation,  to  spread  land 
ownership  to  larger  groups,  and  to  help 
build  the  basis  for  economic  stability  and 
growth  which  will  contribute  to  political 
progress.  Second,  by  military  training 
we  are  transforming  the  Salvadoran 
security  forces  into  a  professional  army. 
This  process  of  professionalization,  we 
believe,  will  produce  higher  discipline 
and  more  exacting  standards  toward 
civilians.  Third  and  most  important,  we 
are  encouraging  the  development  of  a 
secure  democratic  system  in  El 
Salvador.  As  elsewhere  in  the  world, 
only  democracy  will  be  a  real  guarantee 
of  respect  for  human  rights. 

So  we  have  been  extremely  active  on 
human  rights.  As  you  know,  we  used 


such  influence  as  we  had  to  press  for  a 
free  election  and  a  civilian  government 
in  Honduras.  We  have  spent  a  very 
great  deal  of  time  supporting  human 
rights  improvements  in  El  Salvador. 
These  have  been  slow  in  coming,  but  as 
Secretary  Shultz  said  in  his  letter  of 
transmittal  of  our  certification,  "...  our 
disappointment  over  the  pace  of  change 
should  not  obscure  the  fact  that  change 
is  occurring."  We  have  pressed  the 
Government  of  Guatemala  on  the  subject 
of  its  secret  courts— which  have  now 
stopped  issuing  death  sentences  and 
which  the  Government  of  Guatemala  is 
moving  to  reform  or  eliminate— and  on 
setting  a  firm  date  for  an  election,  which 
has  now  been  done.  We  have  supported 
the  Government  and  people  of  Costa 
Rica  in  their  efforts  to  maintain  their 
democracy,  which  is  a  model  for  all  Cen- 
tral America. 

Many  of  us  are  disappointed  by  the 
pace  of  progress  on  human  rights  in 
Central  America.  That  pace  is,  of 
course,  the  product  of  many  factors,  in- 
cluding the  weight  of  history.  But  there 
is  one  particular  current  factor  of  which 
we  should  take  note— namely,  the  role  of 
Nicaragua.  I  would,  therefore,  pose  the 
question,  what  would  the  human  rights 
situation  in  Central  America  be  like 
today  if  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
were  a  peaceful,  democratic  one? 


Caribbean  Basin  Initiative 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT 
JULY  14,  19831 

I  am  delighted  by  today's  action  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  the  trade 
and  tax  provisions  of  the  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative.  Although  it  took  longer 
than  I  had  hoped  to  secure  passage,  the 
vote  today  is  a  giant  step  forward.  I 
congratulate  the  chairman  of  the 
Ways  and  Means  Committee,  Dan 
Rostenkowski,  and  Members  of  the 
House  for  the  bipartisan  cooperation 
they  demonstrated  in  working  for  the 
stability  and  progress  of  some  of  our 
closest  neighbors. 

The  security  and  well-being  of  the 
people  of  the  Caribbean  are  very  much 
in  the  interest  of  the  United  States.  The 
region,  in  reality,  represents  the  third 
border  of  our  country,  and  for  far  too 
long  it  has  not  been  given  the  attention 
it  deserves.  Today's  vote  by  the  House  is 


a  signal  to  all  concerned  that  we 
recognize  the  vital  importance  of  the 
Caribbean  and  are  willing  to  meet  our 
responsibilities. 

There  have  been  a  number  of 
changes  in  the  legislation  since  its  incep- 
tion, but  the  heart  of  the  proposal  re- 
mains intact.  Through  tax  and  trade  in- 
centives the  energy  and  creativity  of  the 
private  sector  will  be  put  to  work  on  the 
economic  challenges  that  confront  our 
friends  and  neighbors  in  the  Caribbean. 
The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  will  serve 
as  a  catalyst  for  progress  and  will  offer 
broad  new  opportunities  to  the  people  of 
the  region. 

I  hope  the  Congress  will  move 
promptly  through  the  remaining 
legislative  steps  toward  enactment  of 
this  vital  piece  of  legislation. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  18,  1983. 


jptember  1983 


85 


TREATIES 


I  think  that  it  would  be  markedly 
improved.  First  of  all,  the  desire  for 
democracy  in  Nicaragua,  which  led  to 
the  overthrow  of  Somoza,  would  be 
satisfied  rather  than  repressed.  The 
Government  of  Nicaragua  would  be 
protecting  the  human  rights  of  all 
Nicaraguans  and  would  as  well  be  pro- 
viding a  model  for  its  neighbors,  perhaps 
in  the  fashion  that  Costa  Rica  does 
today.  In  addition,  Nicaragua  would  not 
be  supporting  Leninist  guerrillas  in  El 
Salvador  and  thereby  setting  back  the 
struggle  for  human  rights  in  that  coun- 
try, just  as  it  would  not  be  engaging  in 
subversion  in  Honduras. 

I  do  not  believe  it  to  be  accidental 
that  the  vast  increase  in  violence  in  El 
Salvador  has  occurred  since  1979,  pre- 
cisely the  period  of  Sandinista  rule  in 
Nicaragua.  Nor  is  it  coincidental  that  the 
armies  of  El  Salvador  and  Honduras 
have  grown  in  this  period;  in  El 
Salvador  partly  in  response  to  increased 
internal  guerrilla  strength  and  in  Hon- 
duras in  response  to  the  Nicaraguan 
military  buildup.  How  easy  is  it  to  pro- 
ceed with  economic  reforms  when  these 
economies  are  forced  into  large-scale 
military  spending  and  hammered  by 
guerrilla  attacks?  How  easy  is  it  to  in- 
crease the  control  of  democratic  civilian 
institutions  over  the  military  when 
subversion  requires  a  society  to  concen- 
trate such  massive  efforts  on  defending 
itself?  Were  Nicaragua  to  pursue  the 
path  of  pluralism  and  to  stop  subverting 
its  neighbors,  I  believe  that  not  only  the 
chance  for  democracy  but  the  actual 
achievement  of  democracy  and  respect 
for  human  rights  would  be  far  more  ad- 
vanced in  Central  America  than  we  find 
it  today. 

The  defense  of  human  rights  often 
requires  more  than  diplomatic  pressure, 
more  than  economic  assistance,  more 
than  training  programs.  Sometimes  it 
requires  a  military  shield  behind 
which  democracy  can  develop.  In 
postwar  Europe,  we  must  remember, 
the  Marshall  Plan  was  not  our  sole  ef- 
fort to  help  Europeans  achieve  stability 
and  democracy.  The  other  pillar  of  our 
policy  was  NATO— the  military  shield 
behind  which  the  European  democracies 
could  reestablish  themselves,  secure 
against  outside  aggression  or  subver- 
sion. This  policy  has  succeeded,  and 
Western  Europe  has  seen  nearly  four 
decades  of  peace,  economic  growth,  and 
democracy,  extending  most  recently, 
and  after  decades  of  dictatorship,  to 
Spain  and  Portugal.  Of  course,  Central 
America  is  not  Europe,  for  Europe  had 


86 


deep  democratic  roots  to  tap  in  the 
postwar  period.  Reestablishing 
democracy  is  a  difficult  task,  but 
building  democratic  institutions  for  the 
very  first  time  is  a  difficult  task, 
especially  when  a  region  is  in  conflict. 
The  transition  to  democracy  is  an 
extremely  difficult  undertaking  for  any 
country  and  to  achieve  it  in  a  time  of 
conflict  is  even  more  challenging  a  task. 
Our  efforts  to  achieve  peace  in  Central 
America  and  our  promotion  of  human 
rights  there  go  hand  in  hand,  for  we 
know  that  respect  for  human  rights  and 
democratic  institutions  will  be  difficult 
to  achieve  while  conflict  is  raging.  We 
are  convinced  that  our  support  for 
economic  and  social  reform,  our  pres- 
sure for  advances  in  the  cause  of  human 
rights  and  the  building  of  democratic  in- 
stitutions, and  our  efforts  to  achieve  an 
end  to  regional  conflict  in  Central 
America,  together  provide  the  most 
hopeful  path  for  the  people  of  Central 
America  toward  a  peaceful  and 
democratic  future. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

2Michael  Kline  was  a  young  U.S.  citizen 
traveling  in  El  Salvador. 

3John  Sullivan  was  a  U.S.  reporter  who 
disappeared  in  El  Salvador  in  December 
1980.  His  body  was  identified  in  February 
1983. 

4Patricia  Cuellar  is  a  dual  Salvadoran-U.S. 
citizen  who  disappeared  in  El  Salvador  on 
July  18,  1982.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  relating  to  the  Marviken  aerosol 
transport  tests,  with  appendices.  Dated 
Dec.  8,  1982.  Entered  into  force  June  1, 
1983;  effective  July  1,  1982. 
Parties:  Canada,  Finland,  France,  Italy, 
Japan,  Netherlands,  Sweden,  U.K.,  U.S. 

Aviation 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  ac 
committed  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyc 
Sept.  14,  1963.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  4, 
1969.  HAS  6768. 
Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  Feb.  4, 

1983.1 

Accessions  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,  May  9,  19831;  Mauritius. 
Apr.  5,  1983;  Monaco,  June  2,  1983;  Qatar, 
Aug.  6,  1981;  Uganda,  June  25,  1982. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Dec.  16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14, 
1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  July  7, 

1983. 

Protocol  to  amend  the  convention  for  the 
unification  of  certain  rules  relating  to  inter- 
national carriage  by  air  signed  at  Warsaw 
Oct.  12,  1929,  as  amended  (TS  876).  Done  ; 
Guatemala  City  Mar.  8,  1971. 2 
Signature:  Netherlands,  June  10,  1982. 
Ratification:  Netherlands,  Jan.  7,  1983.3 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 

convention  on  international  civil  aviation 

(TIAS  1591).  Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  30, 

1977.2 

Ratifications  deposited:  Austria,  Apr.  25, 

1983;  Denmark,  Aug.  9,  1982;  Senegal, 
Nov.  27,  1981;  Uruguay,  Nov.  10,  1981. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 
convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(TIAS  1591).  Done  at  Montreal  Oct.  6,  198' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Austria,  Apr.  25, 
1983;  Chile,  June  28,  1982;  Czechoslovakia. 
Feb.  25,  1983;  France,  Aug.  27,  1982; 
Guatemala,  Apr.  26,  1983;  Iraq,  Mar.  4,  19 
Israel,  Feb.  25,  1983;  Kenya,  Oct.  13,  1982 
Lebanon,  Apr.  14,  1983;  Panama,  Aug.  3, 
1982;  Uganda,  Mar.  10,  1982;  Uruguay, 
Jan.  7,  1982. 

International  air  services  transit  agreemen 
Signed  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  in 
force  Feb.  8,  1945.  EAS  487. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Ecuador,  July  28, 

1983. 

Convention  on  the  international  recognitior 
of  rights  in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June 
1948.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  17,  1953. 
TIAS  2847. 

Adherences  deposited:  Congo,  May  3,  1982 
Iraq,  Jan.  12,  1981. 


TREATIES 


Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982.2 
Signatures:  Angola,  EEC,  F.R.G.,  Ireland, 
Singapore,  Switzerland,  Thailand,  June  29, 
1983;  Benin,  Canada,  Central  African 
Republic,  Ecuador,  Ghana,  Haiti,  India,  In- 
donesia, Jamaica,  Malawi,  New  Zealand,  Por- 
tugal. Trinidad  &  Tobago,  June  30,  1983; 
Honduras,  June  22,  1983;  Panama,  June  28, 
1983;  Peru,  June  24,  1983. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Norway,  June  30, 
1983;  Papua  New  Guinea,  June  28,  1983. 
Sotifications  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Finland,  June  30,  1983;  Switzerland, 
ilune  29,  1983. 

xtension  of  the  international  coffee  agree- 
ment, 1976  (TIAS  8683).  Done  at  London 
Sept.  25,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1, 

982.  TIAS  10439. 

definitive  acceptance  deposited:  Zimbabwe, 

uly  15,  1983. 

collisions 

lonvention  on  the  international  regulations 
or  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  with 
egulations.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  1972. 
Intered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
accessions  deposited:  Barbados,  Jan.  13, 
-983;  Fiji,  Mar.  4,  1983. 

ommodities — Common  Fund 

.greement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 

>r  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 

.eneva  June  27,  1980.2 

jgnatures:  Angola,  Democratic  People's  Re- 

ablic  of  Korea,  Togo,  June  29,  1983;  Cuba, 

one  22,  1983;  El  Salvador,  Grenada,  Hon- 

iras,  June  28,  1983. 

atifications  deposited:  Argentina,  July  1, 

t)83;  Upper  Volta,  July  11,  1983. 

onservation 

mendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
•73  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
•ecies  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  8249). 
dopted  at  Gaborone  Apr.  30,  1983.  Enters 
to  force  for  the  parties  which  have  accepted 
60  days  after  two-thirds  of  the  parties  have 
posited  an  instrument  of  acceptance. 

jpyright 

niversal  copyright  convention.  Done  at 
meva.  Sept.  6,  1952.  Entered  into  force 
tot.  16,  1955.  TIAS  3324. 
niversal  copyright  convention,  as  revised, 
me  at  Paris  July  24,  1971.  Entered  into 
Tee  July  10,  1974.  TIAS  7868. 
sessions  deposited:  Barbados,  Mar.  18, 
»83. 

nance — African  Development  Bank 

jreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
nt  Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Khartoum 
<ig.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan  May  17, 
79.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1982. 
itification  deposited:  Brazil,  July  14,  1983. 


Jute 

International  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 

products,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at 

Geneva  Oct.  1,  1982.2 

Signatures:  China,  June  24,  1983;  India4, 

June  23,  1983;  Nepal4,  Thailand,  June  29, 

1983. 

Notification  of  provisional  application:  U.S., 

June  24,  1983. 

Ratification  deposited:  Ireland,  June  29, 

1983. 

Load  Lines 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720). 
Adopted  at  London  Oct.  12,  1971.2 
Acceptances  deposited:  Barbados,  Dec.  1, 
1982;  Jamaica,  Nov.  18,  1982. 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720). 
Adopted  at  London  Nov.  12,  1975.2 
Acceptances  deposited:  Barbados,  Dec.  1, 
1982;  Israel,  June  18,  1981;  Jamaica,  Nov. 
18,  1982. 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720). 
Adopted  at  London  Nov.  15,  1979.2 
Acceptances  deposited:  G.D.R.,  Mar.  21, 
1983;  Malaysia,  Mar.  4,  1983;  U.S.S.R., 
Feb.  15,  1983. 

Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  on  the  establishment 
of  an  international  fund  for  compensation  for 
oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels  Dec. 
18,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  16,  1978.5 
Approval  deposited:  Netherlands,  Aug.  3, 
1982. 

Accessions  deposited:  Fiji,  Mar.  4,  1983; 
Sri  Lanka,  Apr.  13,  1983. 

Convention  for  the  protection  and  develop- 
ment of  the  marine  environment  of  the  wider 
Caribbean  region,  with  annex  and  protocol 
concerning  cooperation  in  combatting  oil 
spills  in  the  wider  Caribbean  region,  with  an- 
nex. Done  at  Cartagena  Mar.  24,  1983.2 
Signatures:  Colombia,  Commission  of  the 
European  Community,  France,  Grenada, 
Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Netherlands, 
Nicaragua,  Panama,  St.  Lucia,  U.K.,  U.S., 
Venezuela,  Mar.  24,  1983. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  International  Maritime 

Organization.  Signed  at  Geneva  Mar.  6,  1948. 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1958.  TIAS 

4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Togo,  June  20,  1983. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  International 
Maritime  Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 
6490,  8606,  10374).  Adopted  at  London 
Nov.  15,  1979.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Philippines,  July  11, 
1983;  Trinidad  &  Tobago,  July  5,  1983. 


Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  International 
Maritime  Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 
6490,  7606,  10374).  Adopted  at  London  Nov. 
17,  1977.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Togo,  Yemen  (Aden), 
June  20,  1983. 

Convention  on  facilitation  of  international 
maritime  traffic,  with  annex,  as  amended. 
Done  at  London  Apr.  9,  1965.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  5,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  May  16, 
1967.  TIAS  6251. 

Accessions  deposited:  Barbados,  Sept.  30, 
1982;  Peru,  July  16,  1982. 

Amendment  of  art.  VII  of  the  convention  on 
facilitation  on  international  maritime  traffic, 
1965  (TIAS  6251).  Adopted  at  London 
Nov.  19,  1973.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Austria,  Mar.  28, 
1983;  Peru,  July  16,  1982. 

Nuclear  Material — Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 
nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Vienna  Oct.  26,  1979.2 
Signature:  Israel,  June  17,  1983.1 

Patents — Microorganisms 

Budapest  treaty  on  the  international  recogni- 
tion of  the  deposit  of  microorganisms  for  the 
purposes  of  patent  procedure,  with  regula- 
tions. Done  at  Budapest  Apr.  28,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  19,  1980.  TIAS 
9768. 

Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  June  23, 
1983. 

Postal 

General  regulations  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the 
universal  postal  convention  with  final  pro- 
tocol and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Rio  de 
Janerio  Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  1,  1981.  TIAS  9972. 
Approvals  deposited;  Finland,  May  26,  1983; 
Israel,  May  25,  1983;  Poland,  May  10,  1983. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Algeria,  Dec.  15, 
1982,  Vatican  City,  June  7,  1983. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  and 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 

1981.  TIAS  9973. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Algeria,  Dec.  15, 

1982,  Vatican  City,  June  7,  1983. 
Approval  deposited:  Finland,  May  26,  1983. 

Postal — Americas  and  Spain 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution 
of  the  Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and 
Spain,  with  general  regulations.  Done  at 
Managua  Aug.  28,  1981.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1982. 
Accession  deposited:  U.S.,  Jan.  13,  1983. 


}ptember1983 


87 


TREATIES 


I'risoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
sons. Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  L983.2 
Signature:  Spain,  June  10,  1983.6 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of 
all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Adopted  at 
Now  York  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force 
.Ian.  4,  1969.6 
Accession  deposited:  Afghanistan,  July  6, 

1983. 

Telecommunications 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendices  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982,  except  for 
certain  provisions  which  entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1981  and  Feb.  1,  1983.5 
Approval  deposited:  Bahamas,  May  6,  1983. 

Trade 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regard- 
ing international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20, 
1973,  as  extended  (TIAS  7840,  8939).  Done 
at  Geneva  Dec.  22,  1981.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1982.  TIAS  10323. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Uruguay,  June  13, 
1983. 

UN  Industrial  Development  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.2 

Ratifications  deposited:  F.R.G.  July  13,  1983; 
Guatemala,  July  8,  1983;  U.K.,  July  7,  1983. 

Weapons 

Convention  on  prohibitions  or  restrictions  on 
the  use  of  certain  conventional  weapons 
which  may  be  deemed  to  he  excessively  in- 
jurious or  to  have  indiscriminate  effects  with 
annexed  Protocols.  Adopted  at  Geneva 
<  let.  10,  1980.  Enters  into  force  Dec.  2, 
1983.7 

Ratification  and  acceptances  deposited: 
Norway,  June  7,  1983. 

Wheat 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 

wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 

Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 

into  force  July  1,  1983. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Barbados,  June  22, 

1983,  Denmark,  June  23,  1983;  F.R.G., 

July  11,  1983;  India,  Ireland,  June  28,  1983; 

Norway,  June  24,  1983;  Peru,  July  7,  1983; 

South  Africa,  June  27,  1983. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Netherlands* 

June  30,  1983;  Vatican  City,  June  22,  1983; 

U.S.S.R.  June  29,  1983. 

Accessions  deposited:  Australia,  Canada, 

June  30,  1983;  El  Salvador,  July  18,  1983; 

Lebanon,  Panama,  June  28,  1983;  Malta, 

July  22,  1983;  Trinidad  &  Tobago  June  21, 

1983. 

I  >eclarat,ions  of  provis al  application  do 

posited:  Belgium,  Pakistan,  June  29,  1983; 
Brazil,  July  1,  1983;  Egypt,  July  8,  1983; 
EEC,  U.K.9,  June  30,  1983;  France,  June  28, 
1983;  F.R.G. ,  Israel,  June  30,  1983. 


88 


1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
food  aid  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  July  1,  1983. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Denmark,  June  23, 
1983;  F.R.G.,  July  11,  1983;  Ireland,  June  28, 
1983;  Netherlands8,  June  30,  1983;  Norway, 
June  24,  1983. 

Accession  deposited:  Canada,  June  30,  1983. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Australia,  EEC,  F.R.G.,  Israel, 
United  Kingdom,  June  30,  1983;  France, 
June  28,  1983. 

World  Health  Organization 

Amendments  to  art.  24  and  25  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  World  Health  Organization 
(TIAS  1808,  8086,  8534).  Adopted  at  Geneva 
May  17,  1976  by  the  29th  World  Health 
Assembly.2 

Acceptance  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea. 
July  1,  1983. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 

world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 

Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 

Dec.  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Colombia,  May  24, 

1983. 


BILATERAL 

Antigua  and  Barbuda 

General  agreement  for  economic,  technical, 
and  related  assistance.  Signed  at  St.  John's 
June  17,  1983.  Entered  into  force  June  17, 
1983. 

Egypt 

Amendment  to  the  grant  agreement  of 
Aug.  29,  1982  (TIAS  10472)  for  decentraliza- 
tion sector  support.  Signed  at  Cairo  June  30, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  June  30,  1983. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  Dec.  15,  1982. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  San 
Salvador  May  18,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
May  28,  1983. 

France 

Technical  exchange  and  cooperation  arrange- 
ment in  the  field  of  fast  breeder  reactor  safe- 
ty research,  with  appendix.  Signed  at  Paris 
and  Washington  June  7  and  21,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  June  21,  1983. 

Guinea 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  21,  1976  (TIAS  8378).  Signed  at  Con- 
akry June  4,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
June  4,  1983. 


Hungary 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  air 
transport  agreement  of  May  30,  1972,  as 
amended  and  extended  (TIAS  7577,  8096). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Budapest 
June  7,  1983.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
1983;  effected  Jan.  1,  1982. 

Italy 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  4,  1964  (TIAS  5629),  relating  to  the 
safeguarding  of  classified  information.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Rome 
Apr.  15  and  Sept.  2,  1982.  Entered  into  fore 
Sept.  2,  1982.  TIAS  10632. 

Jamaica 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Kingston 
June  14,  1983.  Enters  into  force  30  days 
after  the  exchange  of  the  instruments  of 
ratification. 

Japan 

Agreement  concerning  Japan's  financial  con- 
tribution for  U.S.  administrative  and  related 
expenses  for  the  Japanese  fiscal  year  1983 
pursuant  to  the  mutual  defense  assistance 
agreement  of  Mar.  8,  1954  (TIAS  2957).  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  July 
12,  1983.  Entered  into  force  July  12,  1983. 

Macao 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Macau  and 
Washington  May  3  and  June  14,  1983.  Knte 
into  force  on  the  date  mutually  agreed  upon 
by  the  administrations. 

Madagascar 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sal 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  Dec.  28,  1982' 
(TIAS  10627).  Note  signed  at  Antananarivo 
July  13,  1983.  Entered  into  force  July  13, 
1983. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977  (TIAS  8952)  relating  to  addi- 
tional cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Mexico  May  12  and  27, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  May  27,  1983. 

Morocco 

Memorandum  of  agreement  with  the  Fedora 
Aviation  Administration  on  technical 
assistance,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Rabat 
Apr.  IS.  1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  IS 
L983, 


North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO) 

Supplemental  arrangement  concerning  the 
employment  by  NATO  bodies  of  U.S.  na- 
tionals. Signed  at  Brussels  June  3,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983. 

Pakistan 

Project  loan  agreement  for  rural  electrifica- 
tion. Signed  at  Islamabad  May  23,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  May  23,  19s:i. 


CHRONOLOGY 


'hilippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
iJov.  24,  1982  (TIAS  10612),  relating  to  trade 
n  cotton,  wool  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
,nd  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
Iters  at  Manila  Apr.  27  and  May  IT,  1983. 
Cntered  into  force  May  17,  1983. 

'ortugal 

agreement  relating  to  reciprocal  facilitation 
f  visa  issuance.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
otes  at  Lisbon  June  7,  1983.  Entered  into 
)rce  July  7,  1983. 

upersedes  agreements  of:  February  22  and 
i,  1950  (TIAS  2084);  July  24  and  Aug.  4, 
950  (TIAS  2113). 

udan 

.greements  amending  the  agreements  for 
lies  of  agricultural  commodities  of  Dec.  22, 
)79  and  Jan.  20,  1983.  Effected  by  ex- 
langes  of  notes  at  Khartoum  June  13,  1983. 
ntered  into  force  June  13,  1983. 

•vaziland 

-rangement  relating  to  radio  communica- 
>ns  between  amateur  stations  on  behalf  of 
ird  parties.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Mbabane  Apr.  12  and' May  27,  1983. 
itered  into  force  June  26,  1983. 

veden 

nvention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
n  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
;pect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances,  and 
'ts.  Signed  at  Stockholm  June  13,  1983. 
ters  into  force  upon  the  exchange  of  in- 
uments  of  ratification. 

nisia 

reement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
dities,  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
le  7,  1976  (TIAS  8506).  Signed  at  Tunis 
ne  4,  1983.  Entered  into  force  June  4, 
S3. 

lendment  to  the  June  4,  1983  agreement 
the  sale  of  agricultural  commodities, 
ned  at  Washington  July  1,  1983.  Entered 
a  force  July  1,  1983. 

an  da 

reement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
cheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  or 
iranteed  by  the  U.S.  Government  and  its 
mcies,  with  annexes  and  implementing 
■eements  regarding  AID  loans  and 
icultural  commodity  agreements.  Signed 
Campala  Mar.  31,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
y  23,  1983. 

.S.R. 

eement  extending  the  agreement  of 
'.  26,  1976,  as  amended  and  extended, 
cerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  the 
ted  States  (TIAS  8528,  10531,  10532).  Ef- 
ed  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 

8  and  20,  1983. 
■ered  into  force:  July  15,  1983. 


Venezuela 

General  security  of  military  information 
agreement.  Signed  at  Caracas  July  15,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1983. ' 


'With  reservation(s). 

zNot  in  force. 

3For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe  and  the 
Netherlands  Antilles. 

Signature  definitive. 

5Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

GWith  declaration(s). 

7Not  for  the  U.S. 

8For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe. 

"Applicable  to  the  Bailiwick  of  Guernsey, 
Isle  of  Man,  Bermuda,  British  Virgin  Is., 
Gibraltar,  Hong  Kong,  Montserrat,  St. 
Helena  &  Dependencies.  ■ 


July  1983 


July  1 

U.S.-Palau  sign  an  agreement  allowing  the 
U.S.  to  transport  nuclear  materials  through 
Palau  but  banning  tests  or  storage  of  nuclear 
weapons  in  the  area. 

July  7 

Defense  Department  announces  that  the  U.S. 
will  conduct  separate  joint  military  training 
exercises  with  Egypt  and  Somalia  in  August 
and  September.  "Bright  Star  '83,"  the 
bilateral  exercise  with  Egypt,  is  "designed  to 
examine  joint  capabilities  "of  the  two  forces, 
exercise  sustainment  of  forces  in  field  condi- 
tions, review  communications  capabilities, 
and  test  new  military  concepts."  The  exercise 
with  Somalia,  called  "Eastern  Win  '83,"  "is 
designed  to  enhance  Somalia's  ability  to  de- 
fend itself." 

July  8 

Five  relief  workers,  including  two  Americans, 
are  freed  by  the  Sudanese  Government  after 
being  held  for  over  2  weeks  by  Sudanese 
rebels  in  southern  Sudan. 

July  10-11 

West  German  Foreign  Minister  Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher  makes  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan. 

July  12 

The  following  newly  appointed  Ambassadors 
present  their  credentials  to  President 
Reagan:  Dr.  Gerhard  Herder  of  the  German 
Democratic  Republic;  Celso  Pastor  de  la 
Torre  of  Peru;  Meir  Rosenne  of  Israel;  Mrs. 
Giovinella  Gonthier  of  Seychelles;  and  Paul 
Peters  of  Luxembourg. 

July  13-15 

British  Foreign  Secretary  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe 
makes  official  visit  to  U.S.  to  meet  with 
Secretary  Shultz  and  other  government  of- 
ficials. 

July  14 

U.S.  House  of  Representatives  passes  the 
trade  and  tax  provisions  of  the  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative.  President  Reagan  issues  a 
statement  saying  that  such  incentives  will 
focus  the  "energy  and  creativity  of  the 
private  sector  ...  on  the  economic 
challenges"  of  the  region. 


July  14-15 

U.S. -Japan  hold  bilateral  Economic  Sub- 
cabinet  Consultations  at  Department  of 
State.  U.S.  is  represented  by  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  W.  Allen 
Wallis  and  the  Japanese  representative  is 
Deputy  Minister  Moriyuki  Motono. 

In  Washington,  D.C.,  U.S. -Ireland  sign  a 
treaty  on  extradition  which  provides  for  ex- 
tradition of  persons,  including  citizens,  for  of- 
fenses punishable  under  the  laws  of  both 
countries  by  imprisonment  for  a  period  of 
more  than  one  year.  The  treaty  covers  of- 
fenses committed  before  and  after  it  enters 
into  force.  Exceptions  to  the  extradition  in- 
clude political  offenses  and  offenses  under 
military  law.  The  treaty  is  signed  by  U.S.  At- 
torney General  William  French  Smith  and  At- 
torney General  Peter  Sutherland  of  Ireland. 
Signature  is  subject  to  ratification. 

July  15 

State  Department  announces  that  at 
Secretary  Shultz's  invitation,  a  delegation  of 
civil  nuclear  experts  from  China  held  talks 
July  11-14  with  U.S.  officials  "with  a  view  to 
establishing  a  firm  basis  for  bilateral  coopera- 
tion and  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy." 
A  senior  Department  official  emphasizes  that 
the  Chinese  are  talking  with  many  countries 
about  assistance  in  peaceful  nuclear  develop- 
ment and  are  "looking  for  a  wide  range  of 
technical  assistance  and  advice." 

U.S. -Greece  announce  initialing  of  a  new 
Defense  and  Economic  Cooperation  Agree- 
ment (DECA)  which  authorizes  the  U.S.  to 
maintain  military  facilities  in  Greece  under 
terms  and  conditions  that  have  been  agreed 
upon  between  the  parties.  This  agreement 
will  be  valid  until  terminated  by  either  side 
which  can  be  done  in  5  years  or  thereafter. 
The  agreement  will  enter  into  force  after  it 
has  been  signed  by  both  sides  and  ratified  by 
the  Greek  parliament. 

Ambassador  Max  M.  Kampelman,  chair- 
man, U.S.  delegation  to  the  Madrid  follow-up 
meeting  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE),  states  that 
the  35  participating  states  are  now  ap- 
proaching agreement  on  the  final  document. 
Pending  consensus  this  paves  the  way  for 
adoption  of  the  Madrid  accords,  updating  the 
1975  Helsinki  document.  President  Reagan 
states  that  the  new  agreement  will 
"strengthen  and  extend  the  undertakings  con- 
tained in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act"  and  that  the 
Madrid  accord  on  human  rights  is  "a  call  on 
all  35  CSCE  states"  to  "rededicate  them- 
selves to  advancing  the  freedom  and  justice 
on  which  security  in  Europe  ultimately 
depends." 

July  17-22 

Shaikh  Isa  bin  Salman  al-Khalifa,  Amir  of 
Bahrain,  makes  a  state  visit  to  the  U.S.,  July 
17-22,  and  to  Washington,  D.C.,  July  18-22. 

July  18 

President  Reagan  announces  establishment  of 
a  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America,  to  be  headed  by  former  Secretary 
of  State  Henry  A.  Kissinger,  which,  he  says, 
"will  lay  the  foundation  for  a  long-term 
unified  national  approach  to  the  freedom  and 
independence  of  the  countries  of  Central 
America." 


89 


CHRONOLOGY 


By  a  vote  of  13-10,  with  2  abstentions 
(Soviet  Union  and  Poland),  UN  Security 
Council  agrees  to  extend  the  mandate  of  the 
UN  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL)  for 
another  3  months. 

July  18-19 

Secretary  Shultz  hosts  the  32d  meeting  of 
the  ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand,  United 
States  pact]  Council  at  the  State  Department. 
The  meeting  focuses  on  global  and  regional 
issues  and  reviews  current  activities  and 
future  directions  of  the  alliance.  Other  council 
members  are  Foreign  Ministers  Warren 
( looper  of  New  Zealand  and  William  Hayden 
of  Australia. 

July  19 

President  Reagan  announces  names  of 
12-member  National  Bipartisan  Commission 
on  Central  America.  The  commission,  headed 
by  former  Secretary  of  State  Henry  A.  Kiss- 
inger, will  also  include: 

•  Nicholas  F.  Brady,  Managing  Director, 
Dillon  Read  &  Co.,  Inc.; 

•  Henry  G.  Cisneros,  Mayor,  San  An- 
tonio, Texas: 

•  William  P.  Clements,  Jr.,  former 
Governor  of  Texas; 

•  Dr.  Carlos  F.  Diaz-Alejandro,  professor 
of  economics,  Yale  University; 

•  Wilson  S.  Johnson,  President,  National 
Federation  of  Independent  Business; 

•  Joseph  Lane  Kirkland,  President, 
AFL-CIO; 

•  Dr.  Richard  M.  Scammon,  political 
scientist; 

•  Dr.  John  Silber,  President,  Boston 
1  Iniversity; 

•  Potter  Stewart,  Associate  Justice, 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  (retired); 

•  Ambassador  Robert  S.  Strauss,  at- 
torney at  law;  and 

•  William  B.  Walsh,  President,  Project 
Hope. 

The  President's  representative  to  the  commis- 
sion will  be  Ambassador  Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick, 
I  l.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations,  and  the  commission's  executive 
director,  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Argentina, 
Harry  W.  Schlaudeman. 

State  Department  announces  that  under 
provisions  of  Chapters  2  and  5  of  Part  II  of 
the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  authorizes  $10  million  in 
defense  articles  and  services  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  I  (efense  to  the  Government  of  Chad 
to  assist  in  defeating  antigovernment  forces 
active  in  that  country.  Department  officials 
state  that  failure  to  take  emergency  action  to 
aid  the  Chad  Government  "would  have  in- 
volved a  grave  risk  of  allowing  Libya  to 
establish  a  regime  favorable  to  Libya  in 
\"I  rjamena  and  to  use  Chad  as  a  base  for 
subverting  neighboring  states." 


July  19-23 

Lebanese  President  Amin  Gemayel  makes  of- 
ficial working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C. 

July  20 

Reagan  Administration  calls  a  peace  proposal 
announced  by  the  Nicaraguan  Government  on 
July  19  "a  positive  step."  In  an  announcement 
at  a  ceremony  marking  the  fourth  anniver- 
sary of  its  revolution,  Daniel  Ortega 
Saavedra,  the  coordinator  of  the  governing 
junta,  states  that  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment is  willing  to  participate  in  international 
talks  to  achieve  peace  in  Central  America. 
While  calling  for  negotiations  on  previous 
points  raised  by  the  U.S.,  including  arms  sup- 
plies and  military  support  for  leftist  rebels  in 
El  Salvador,  the  Reagan  Administration 
states  that  the  proposal  "still  contains  a 
number  of  serious  shortcomings"  and  also 
states  that  it  hopes  that  "the  Nicaraguan  pro- 
posal, along  with  those  put  forth  by  other 
countries  of  the  region,  would  be  considered, 
refined  and  expanded  as  necessary"  at  the 
next  meeting — Panama,  July  28-29— of  the 
Contadora  Nine  (Venezuela,  Colombia,  Mex- 
ico, Panama,  Honduras,  Costa  Rica,  El 
Salvador,  Guatemala,  and  Nicaragua). 

Secretary  Shultz  submits  to  the  Congress 
a  report  certifying  continued  progress  in  El 
Salvador  with  respect  to  the  criteria  required 
by  Congress  for  continuation  of  military  aid. 
In  his  letter  to  the  Congress,  the  Secretary- 
states  that  while  "progress  in  some  key  areas 
has  been  disturbingly  slow,"  he  is  opposed  to 
cutting  aid. 

July  21 

After  19  months  of  military  rule,  Poland  an- 
nounces that  it  is  formally  lifting  martial  law. 

David  S.  Dodge,  acting  President  of 
American  University  in  Beirut  who  was  kid- 
napped July  19,  1982,  by  pro-Iranian  Shiite 
Moslems,  is  released  with  the  help  of  the 
Syrian  Government. 

July  22 

President  Reagan  announces  that  Robert  C. 
McFarlane,  his  Deputy  National  Security  Ad- 
viser, is  replacing  Philip  C.  Habib  as  his 
special  representative  to  the  Middle  East. 

White  House  Press  Secretary  announces 
planning  for  a  combined  U.S.-Honduran 
military  exercise  to  take  place  this  year, 
which  will,  according  to  a  senior  White  House 
official,  "play  a  critical  role  in  training  of 
troops  and  support  personnel  of  our  own 
forces  and  those  of  the  host  country."  Ac 
cording  to  the  announcement,  "such  exercises 
pose  no  threat  to  any  nation"  and  the  "recent 
deployment  of  the  U.S.S.  Ranger  carrier 
group  in  the  Pacific"  is  for  "training  purposes 
and  to  demonstrate  U.S.  interest  in  the  Cen- 
tra] American  region."  He  goes  on  to  say  that 
"I    S    policy   toward  Central  America  is  based 
on  .  .  .  four  principles  .  .  .  support  for 
democracy,  development,  dialogue  and  I  he 
necessary  military  assistance  to  provide  a 
shield  for  the  first  three." 


July  25-27 

U.S.-F.R.G.  meet  in  Washington  to  exchang 
views  on  recent  developments  in  internation, 
communications.  U.S.  delegation  is  headed  b 
Ambassador  Diana  Lady  Dougan,  Executive 
Bianch  Coordinator  for  International  Com- 
munication and  Information  Policy.  Am- 
bassador Barthold  Witte,  <  loordinator  for  In- 
ternational Media  1'olicy  in  the  Foreign  Of- 
fice of  the  F.R.G.,  heads  the  German  delega- 
tion. 

July  28 

Reagan  Administration  announces  an  agree- 
ment in  principal  with  the  Soviet  Union  com 
mining  that  country  to  buy  at  least  9  millior 
metric  tons  of  U.S.  grain  in  each  of  the  next 
5  years. 

U.S.  House  of  Representatives  votes 
228-195  to  cut  off  further  covert  U.S. 
military  assistance  to  the  anti-Sandinista 
forces  fighting  inside  Nicaragua.  Although 
disappointed  by  the  vote,  the  State  Depart- 
ment notes  that  the  House  action  is  "but  on* 
stage"  in  the  full  cycle  of  congressional  con- 
sideration of  the  issue,  and  the  closeness  of 
the  vote  "does  not  represent  a  definitive 
judgment  on  Administration  policies."  ■ 


90 


=>RESS  RELEASES 


)epartment  of  State 


ress  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
ce  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


Date 

7/1 


Subject 


Ronald  I.  Spiers,  Ambassa- 
dor to  Pakistan  (biographic 
data). 
7/1  David  E.  Zweifel,  Ambassa- 

dor to  Yemen  Arab  Re- 
public (biographic  data). 
7/1  Charles  Edward  Marthinsen, 

Ambassador  to  Qatar  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/1  Richard  W.  Murphy,  Ambas- 

sador to  Saudi  Arabia  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/1  George  Quincey  Lumsden, 

Jr.,  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Arab  Emirates 
(biographic  data). 
7/1  Michael  H.  Newlin,  Ambassa- 

dor to  Algeria  (biographic 
data). 
7/1  Walter  Leon  Cutler,  Ambas- 

sador to  Tunisia  (biograph- 
ic data). 
7/1  Harry  G.  Barnes,  Jr.,  Am- 

bassador to  India  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/1  John  Hathaway  Reed,  Am- 

bassador to  Sri  Lanka  and 
Maldives  (biographic  data). 
7/1         Carleton  S.  Coon,  Jr., 

Ambassador  to  Nepal  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/1  Richard  N.  Viets,  Ambassa- 

dor to  Jordan  (biographic 
data). 
7/1  Robert  Sherwood  Dillon,  Am- 

bassador to  Lebanon  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/1  Robert  P.  Paganelli,  Am- 

bassador to  Syria  (bio- 
graphic data). 
[Not  issued.] 

7/1  Shultz:  statement  at  opening 

session  of  the  ASEAN 
dialogue,  Bangkok, 
June  28 
7/1  Shultz:  arrival  statement, 

Manila,  June  24. 
7/5         Otto  Juan  Reich,  adviser  to 
the  Secretary  (biographic 
data). 
7/5  Shultz:  dinner  toast,  New 

Delhi,  June  30. 
7/5  Shultz:  remarks  at  the  fifth 

session  of  the  India-U.S. 
Joint  Commission,  New 
Delhi,  June  30. 
7/11        U.S.,  Singapore  amend  tex- 
tile agreement,  Apr.  15 
and  27  and  May  11. 
7/11        U.S.,  Thailand,  amend  tex- 
tile agreement,  Apr.  15 
and  28. 


*262       7/11        U.S.,  Philippines  amend  tex- 
tile agreement,  Apr.  27 
and  May  17. 

*263       7/11        U.S.,  Pakistan  amend  textile 
agreement,  Apr.  15  and 
May  31. 

264  7/7         Foreign  Relations  of  the 

United  States  1952- 
1954— Volume  V:  Western 
European  Security  (in  two 
parts)  released. 

265  7/7         Shultz:  arrival  statement, 

Islamabad,  July  2 

*266       7/8         Robert  Brendon  Keating 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Madagascar  (biographic 
data). 

*267       7/8  Shultz:  departure  remarks, 

Islamabad,  July  3. 

*268       7/8         Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 

Damascus,  July  5. 
269       7/8  Shultz:  remarks  at  Nasrbagh 

refugee  camp,  Peshawar, 
July  3. 

*270       7/8         Shultz:  departure  remarks, 
Jidda,  July  5. 

*271       7/8  Shultz;  arrival  statement, 

Jidda,  July  4. 
272       7/8         Shultz:  news  briefing, 
Islamabad,  July  3. 

*273       7/13       Secretary's  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Private  Interna- 
tional Law,  study  group  on 
the  law  applicable  to  inter- 
national sales,  July  26. 

274  7/6  Shultz:  news  conference, 

Bangkok,  June  29. 

275  7/11        Shultz,  Salem,  statements, 

Beirut,  July  5. 

276  7/7  Shultz,  Yaqub  Khan:  toasts, 

Islamabad,  July  2. 

277  7/11        Shultz,  Mubarak:  remarks, 

Cairo,  July  7. 

278  7/11        Shultz:  departure  remarks, 

Damascus,  July  6. 

279  7/12        Shultz:  news  conference, 

New  Delhi,  July  1. 

280  7/13       Shultz:  news  conference, 

Jidda,  July  5. 

*281       7/7         Hume  Alexander  Horan 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Sudan  (biographic  data). 

*282       7/19       Shultz:  remarks  before,  the 
National  League  of 
Families  of  American 
Prisoners  and  Missing  in 
Southeast  Asia,  Arlington, 
July  16. 

*283       7/12       Shultz:  remarks  and  ques- 

tion-and-answer  session  at 
the  agricultural  summit, 
July  12. 

*284       7/13       Langhorne  A.  Motley  sworn 
in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Affairs 
(biographic  data). 

*285  7/12  Thomas  M.  Tracy,  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Administra- 
tion (biographic  data). 

"286  7/12  Helene  Von  Damm  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Austria 
(biographic  data). 


*287      7/13       Robert  E.  Fritts  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Ghana 
(biographic  data). 
*288       7/14        Program  for  the  state  visit 
of  the  Amir  of  Bahrain, 
July  17-22. 
•289      7/18       Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  of  Lebanese 
President  Amin  Gemayel, 
July  19-23. 
*290      7/18       Shultz:  interview  on  "The 

CBS  Morning  News." 
291      7/19       Shultz:  Hayden,  Cooper: 

news  conference  following 
the  ANZUS  Council 
meeting. 
*292       7/21        U.S.,  Federal  Republic  of 

Germany  consultations  on 
recent  development  in  in- 
ternational communica- 
tions. 
*293       7/21        U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consul- 
tative Committee  (CCITT), 
modem  working  party  of 
study  group  D,  Aug.  12. 
*294       7/21        U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Commitee 
(CCIR),  study  group 
CMIT,  Aug.  23. 
*295       7/22       Arthur  W.  Lewis  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Sierra 
Leone  (biographic  data). 
*296       7/27       Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCC),  Aug.  31 
*297       7/27       CCITT,  study  group  D, 

Aug.  18 
*298       7/27       CCITT,  message  handling 
systems  working  party  of 
study  group  D,  Aug. 
22-24. 
*299       7/27       CCITT,  integrated  services 
digital  network  working 
party,  Aug.  15. 
*300       7/27        U.S.  observer  team  makes 
tour  of  foreign  research 
stations  in  Antarctica. 
*301       7/29       Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  Zaire 
President  Mobuto  Sese 
Keko,  Aug.  2-6. 
302       7/8         Shultz:  news  conference, 
Islamabad,  July  4. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


■tember  1983 


91 


Atlas  of  United  States 
Foreign  Relations 

The  Atlas  of  United  States  Foreign  Relations, 
prepared  in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  U.S. 
Department  of  State,  provides  basic  informa- 
tion about  U.S.  foreign  relations  for  easy 
reference  and  as  an  educational  tool.  Com- 
prising 100  pages  with  more  than  90  maps 
and  charts,  it  is  divided  into  six  sections 
dealing  with: 

•  U.S.  national  security; 

•  Trade  and  investment; 

•  International  organizations; 

•  Elements  of  the  world  economy; 

•  Development  assistance;  and 

•  Foreign  relations  machinery. 


GPO  Order  Form 


Please  send  me 


copy(ies)  of  the  Atlas  of  United  States  Foreign  Relations 


@  $5.00  per  copy  (S/N  044-000-01973-6). 

Any  customer  ordering  100  or  more  copies  for  delivery  to  a  single  destination  will  be  allowed  a  25%  discount. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
Mail  to:     U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  DC.  20402 


GPO  prices  are  subject  to  change  without  noti 

(Confirm  by  calling  202-783-32G 


Enclosed  is  S 


□  check  or    □  money  order  (payable 


to  Superintendent  of  Documents)  or  charge  to  my 


Credit  Card  Orders  Only 

Total  charges  $ 

Credit 
Card  No 


Expiration  date 
Month/ Year 


Deposit 

Account  No 


■□ 


Order  No 


Please  Print 


Company  or  personal  name 

I   I   I   I  I   I  I  I   I  I   !   I   I  I   I   I  I   !   I   I 

II  II  I  I  II  I  I 

Additional  address  line 

i     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I 

I  I  I  I | 

Street  address 

I   I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  i  I   I  I  !  I  I  I  I  I  I 

I  II  I  I  I  I  I  II 

Ml  M  M  M  !  !           M  M  M 

State      Zip  Code 

I     I     I     I     I     I     I     I     II 

(or  Country) 

M  II  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 

For  Office  Use  Only 

Quantity 

Publications   . 
-  Subscriptions 
Special  shipping  charges 
International  handling 
Special  charges 
OPNR 


UPNS 

Balance  Due 
Discount 
Refund 


Charges 


l*e*'c0    \      

\                               Belgium 

Cameroon 

Background  Notes 

ackground  Notes  are  concise,  authoritative  pamphlets 
escribing  about  170  countries  and  geographic  entities 
f  the  world,  as  well  as  selected  international  organiza- 
ons.  They  contain  the  most  current  information  on  each 
suntry's  people,  culture,  geography,  history,  govern- 
ent,  economy,  and  political  conditions.  Background 
otes  also  include  reading  list,  travel  notes,  and  maps. 

Dproximately  60  Background  Notes  are  updated  and 
iblished  each  year.  Price:  $34.00  per  year,  domestic; 
2.50,  foreign. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

This  monthly  magazine  is  an  indispensable  foreign 
policy  reference  tool— no  library,  research  center,  or 
world  affairs  specialist  should  be  without  it.  The  Bulletin 
presents  the  official  record  of  U.S.  foreign  policy,  in- 
cluding major  addresses  of  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary, statements  to  the  Congress;  special  features  and 
analytical  articles  on  international  affairs  by  State 
Department  experts;  list  of  treaties  and  other  agree- 
ments; and  a  brief  chronology  of  world  events. 

Subscription  to  the  Department  of  State  Bulletin  in- 
cludes an  annual  index.  Price  $35.00  per  year,  domestic; 
$43.75,  foreign. 


)rder  Form  for  New  Subscriptions 


QPO  prices  are  subject  to  change  without  notice. 

(Confirm  by  calling  202-783-3238.) 


Background  Notes  (BGN) 

Annual  subscription  of  approximately  60  Notes: 

$34.00,  domestic;  $42.50,  foreign 

Department  of  State  Bulletin  (DSB) 

Annual  subscription  of  12  issues  plus  index:  $35.00,  domestic; 

$43.75,  foreign 


Mail  to: 

Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


dosed  is  $_ 


□  check  or    □  money  order  (payable 


Superintendent  of  Documents)  or  charge  to  my 


posit 
i  count  No. 


•□ 


Order  No. 


Credit  Card  Orders  Only 

Total  charges  $ 

Credit 
Card  No. 


Expiration  date 
Month /Year 


f  ase  Print 

C  mpany  or  personal  name 


A  jitional  address  line 
S  jet  address 


State      Zip  Code 


bill 
(d  Country) 


For  Office  Use  Only 

Quantity 

Publications  . 

Subscriptions. 

Special  shipping  charges 
International  handling 
Special  charges 
OPNR 


Charges 


UPNS 

Balance  Due 
Discount 
Refund 


8/83 


INDEX 


September  1983 
Volume  83,  No.  2078 


Asia.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  East  and 
South  Asia  and  the  Middle  East  (remarks, 
statements,  toasts,  news  conferences)  .  23 
Australia.  ANZUS  Council  Meets  in 
Washington  (joint  news  conference,  com- 
munique)   71 

iahrain.  Visit  of  Amir  of  Bahrain  (Reagan, 

Shaikh  Isa  bin  Salman  al-Khalifa) 67 

{razil.     U.S.    Policy    on    Cooperation    in 
Science  and  Technology  (Schneider)  ...  76 
had 
iecretary   Shultz's   Interview   on   "Meet  the 

Press" 47 

ituation  in  Chad  (White  House  statement)  .  51 
'.S.  Military  Assistance  to  Chad  (Department 

statement)    50 

^hina.  U.S.  Policy  on  Cooperation  in  Science 

and  Technology  (Schneider) 76 

ongress 

omprehensive  Strategy  for  Central  America 

(Shultz) 45 

lections  in  El  Salvador  (Motley) 79 

xport  of  Alaskan  Oil  (McCormack) 57 

ourth    Certification    of    Progress    in    El 

Salvador  (Abrams,  Motley) 82 

egislative  Veto  in  Foreign  Affairs  (Dam)  .  52 
OW-MIAs  and  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Southeast 

Asia  (Wolfowitz) 55 

reduction  of  the  MX  Missile  (Reagan,  letter  to 

the  Congress) 69 

.S.   Policy  on  Cooperation  in   Science  and 

Technology  (Schneider) 76 

aba.  Secretary  Shultz's  Interview  on  "Meet 

the  Press" 47 

epartment  and  Foreign  Service.  Legislative 

Veto  in  Foreign  Affairs  (Dam) 52 

conomic  Assistance 

)mprehensive  Strategy  for  Central  America 

(Shultz) 45 

>urth    Certification    of    Progress    in     El 

Salvador  (Abrams,  Motley) 82 

Salvador 

ections  in  El  Salvador  (Motley) 79 

>urth    Certification    of    Progress    in    El 

Salvador  (Abrams,  Motley) 82 

esident's  News  Conference  of  July  26  (ex- 
cerpts)     19 

cretary   Shultz's   Interview   on   "Meet  the 

Press" 47 

:uation  in  Central  America  (White  House 

statement)    80 

irope 

i  Assessment  of  the  Madrid  CSCE  Follow- 
up  Meeting  (Kampelman,  Reagan)  ....  59 
ce  President  Bush  Visits  Northern  Europe 

(addresses,  remarks,  toasts) 1 

irmany.    300th    Anniversary    of    German 

Settlement  in  America  (Reagan) 18 

>nduras 

esident's  News  Conference  of  July  26  (ex- 
cerpts)     19 

S.-Honduran    Military    Exercise    (White 

House  statement) 81 


Comprehensive  Strategy  for  Central  America 

(Shultz) 45 

Fourth    Certification    of    Progress    in     El 

Salvador  (Abrams,  Motlev) 82 

POW-MIAs  and  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Southeast 

Asia  (Wolfowitz) 55 

Immigration.  Legislative  Veto  in  Foreign  Af- 
fairs (Dam) 52 

India.  U.S.  Policy  on  Cooperation  in  Science 

and  Technology  (Schneider) 76 

Israel.  Situation  in  the  Middle  East  (White 

House  statement) 67 

Kampuchea.    POW-MIAs    and    U.S.    Policy 

Toward  Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz)  ...  55 

Laos.    POW-MIAs  and   U.S.   Policy  Toward 

Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz) 55 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (Reagan) 85 

Comprehensive  Strategy  for  Central  America 

(Shultz) 45 

The  Contadora  Process  (President's  letter  to 

Presidents  of  the  Contadora  Four) 83 

Lebanon 

President's  News  Conference  of  July  26  (ex- 
cerpts)     19 

Situation  in  the  Middle  East  (White  House 

statement)   67 

Visit     of    Lebanese     President    (Gemayel, 

Reagan)   66 

Libya 

Secretary   Shultz's   Interview   on   "Meet  the 

Press" 47 

Situation  in  Chad  (White  House  statement)  .51 

Middle  East 

Secretary   Shultz's   Interview   on   "Meet  the 

Press" 47 

Secretary  Shultz  Visits  East  and  South  Asia 
and  the  Middle  East  (remarks,  statements, 

toasts,  news  conferences) 23 

Military  Affairs 

AWACS  Withdrawn  From  Sudan  (Department 

statement)    51 

Legislative  Veto  in  Foreign  Affairs  (Dam)  .  52 
President's  News  Conference  of  July  26  (ex- 
cerpts)     19 

Production  of  the  MX  Missile  (Reagan,  letter  to 

the  Congress) 69 

Nicaragua 

President's  News  Conference  of  July  26  (ex- 
cerpts)     19 

Secretary   Shultz's   Interview   on   "Meet  the 

Press" 47 

Situation  in  Central  America  (White  House 

statement)    80 

New  Zealand.  ANZUS  Council  Meets  in 
Washington  (joint  news  conference,  com- 
munique)   71 

Nuclear  Policy.  Legislative  Veto  in  Foreign 

Affairs  (Dam) 52 

Petroleum.  Export  of  Alaskan  Oil  (McCor- 
mack)    57 

Presidential  Documents 

An  Assessment  of  the  Madrid  CSCE  Followup 

Meeting  (Kampelman,  Reagan) 59 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (Reagan) 85 

The  Contadora  Process  (President's  letter  to 
Presidents  of  the  Contadora 
Four) 83 


President's  News  Conference  of  July  26  (ex- 
cerpts)     19 

Production  of  the  MX  Missile  (Reagan,  letter  to 

the  Congress) 69 

300th  Anniversary  of  German  Settlement  in 

American  (Reagan) 18 

Visit  of  Amir  of  Bahrain  (Reagan,  Shaikh  Isa 

bin  Salman  al-Khalifa) 67 

Visit    of    Lebanese     President    (Gemayel, 

Reagan)    66 

Science    and    Technology.    U.S.    Policy    on 

Cooperation  in  Science  and  Technology 

(Schneider) 76 

Security  Assistance 

Comprehensive  Strategy  for  Central  America 

(Shultz) 45 

U.S.  Military  Assistance  to  Chad  (Department 

statement)    50 

Sudan.    AWACS    Withdrawn    From    Sudan 

(Department  statement) 51 

Terrorism.    An   Assessment   of  the   Madrid 

CSCE    Followup    Meeting   (Kampelman, 

Reagan)    59 

Thailand.  POW-MIAs  and  U.S.  Policy  Toward 

Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz) 55 

Trade 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (Reagan) 85 

Legislative  Veto  in  Foreign  Affairs  (Dam)  .  52 

Export  of  Alaskan  Oil  (McCormack) 57 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 86 

U.S.S.R. 

An  Assessment  of  the  Madrid  CSCE  Followup 

Meeting  (Kampelman,  Reagan) 59 

Secretary   Shultz's   Interview   on   "Meet   the 

Press" 47 

U.S.   Policy  on  Cooperation  in  Science  and 

Technology  (Schneider) 76 

Vietnam.  POW-MIAs  and  U.S.  Policy  Toward 

Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz) 55 

Name  Index 

Abe,  Shintaro 23 

Abrams,  Elliott 82 

Bush,  Vice  President 1 

Cooper,  Warren 71 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 52 

Dhanabalan,  S 23 

Gemayel,  Amin 66 

Genscher,  Hans-Dietrich 23 

Hayden,  William 23,  71 

Shaikh  Isa  bin  Salman  al-Khalifa 67 

Kampelman,  Max  M 59 

MacEachen,  Allan  J 23 

McCormack,  Richard  T 57 

Mochtar,  Kusumaatmadja 23 

Motley,  Langhorne  A 79,  82 

Mubarak,  Mohammad  Hosni 23 

Prince  Sa'ud  Al-Faisal 23 

Rao,  P. V.  Narasimha 23 

Reagan,  President 18,  19,  59,  66,  67,  69 

83,85 

Salem,  Elie  23 

Schneider,  William,  Jr 76 

Shultz,  Secretary 23,  45,  47,  71 

Siddhi  Savetsila 23 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 55 

Yaqub  Khan,  Sahabzada 23 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 


3  9999  06352  805  1 


I 

Hi! 

ill! 

Hi 

1 

! 
! 

11 


ill 


!;.'