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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




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bulletin 

ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2077 

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August 1983 



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bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2077 / August 1983 



Cover: Lawrence S. Eagleburger 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

( Iffice of Public ( lommunication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief', Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
( Iffii'i' of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
ami items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of Si mi Bui letin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C 
20402 



CONTENTS 



he President 

Saving Freedom in Central 

America 
News Conference of June 28 

(Excerpts) 

he Secretary 



News Conference of June 22 



frica 

I Southern Africa: America's Re- 
sponsibility for Peace and 
Change (Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger) 

I Namibia (Contact Group Statt 
ment) 

\ Visit of Ivory Coast President 
(Felix Houphouet-Boigny, 
President Reagan) 
20th Anniversary of the OAU 
(Message From the President , 
Secretary Shultz) 

rms Control 

Strategic Modernization: Foreign 
Policy and Arms Control Impli- 
cations (Ken neth W. Dam) 

ast Asia 

i U.S., Philippines Conclude Bases 
Agreement Review (Depart nu nt 
Announcement, Joint Statement, 
Memorandum of Agreement, 
President Reagan's Letter) 
U.S. -Philippine Relations and the 
Military Bases Agreement Re- 
view (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

conomics 

I The Challenge of Economic 
Growth (Kenneth W. Dam.) 

American Policy To Promote 
World Development (W. Allen 
Wallis) 

A Collective Approach to East- 
West Economic Relations 
(W. Allen Wallis) 

The World Economy After Wil- 
liamsburg ( W. Allen Wallis) 

Building Trade With Africa 
(Denis Lamb, Leonard H. 
Robinson, Jr.) 



Europe 

38 North Atlantic Council Meets in 

Paris (Secretary Shultz, Final 

Communique) 
45 Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet 

Active Measures (Lawrence S. 

Eagleburger) 

49 1 ltd Report on Cyprus (Message to 

tin- ( 'ongress) 

50 A Critical Juncture for the Atlan- 

tic Alliance (Richard R. Burt) 

51 President Meets With NATO Sec- 

retary General (White House 
Statement) 

53 Elections in Turkey (President 

Reagan) 

54 Visit of Spanish President (Felipe 

Marquez Gonzalez, President 
Reagan) 

Human Rights 

56 Soviet Jewry (Elliott Abrams) 

International Law 

58 U.S. Submits Pleading to ICJ 

Concerning Canadian Maritime 
Boundary 

Middle East 

59 Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement 

(President Reagan) 
59 The Lebanon Emergency As- 
sistance Act (President Reagan) 

59 Persecutions and Repression in 

Iran (President Reagan) 

Nuclear Policy 

60 Challenges of the Nuclear Non- 

proliferation Regime (Richard 
T. Kennedy) 

Pacific 

62 Visit of Australian Prime 

Minister (Robert J. L. Hawke, 
President Reagan) 

63 Micronesia Approves Free As- 

sociation With U.S. 

64 U.S. -Marshall Islands Call 

Plebiscite 



Population 

65 U.S. Population Policy and the 
United Nations (Richard Elliot 
Benedick) 



Refugees 



66 Refugees: A Continuing Concern 
(James N. Purcell, Jr.) 

South Asia 

70 Recent Soviet Actions in Afghan- 

istan (Depart went Statement) 

United Nations 

71 Nicaragua (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 

Text of Resolution) 
75 Namibia (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 

Charles M. L ichenstein. Text of 
Resolution) 

78 UNICEF (President Reagan) 

Western Hemisphere 

79 Caribbean Basin Recovery Act 

(Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

80 U.S. Medical Team to El Salvador 

(White House Statement) 

82 Visit of Belize Prime Minister 

(George C. Price, President 
Reagan) 

83 Visit of Salvadoran President 

(Alvaro Borja Magaha, Presi- 
dent Reagan) 

84 El Salvador Commission An- 

nounces Peace Initiative (De- 
partment Statement) 

85 Sugar Imports From Central 

America (White House 
A n nouncement) 

86 Cuban Involvement in Narcotics 

Trafficking (James H. Michel) 

86 Return of Certain Mariel Cubans 

Treaties 

87 Current Actions 

Chronology 



91 



June 1983 



Press Releases 

92 Department of State 

Publications 

93 Department of State 

94 Documents on German Foreign 

Policy Released 

Index 




President Reagan meets with Henry Kissinger whom he recently appointed Chairman of 
the 12-member National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. Also present are 
(clockwise from left): Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President, James A. Baker III, 
Secretary Shultz, and Vice President Bush. 



THE PRESIDENT 



Saving Freedom 
in Central America 



by President Reagan 




Address before the 

International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) 

in Hollywood, Florida, 

on July 18, 1983. l 



Our democracy encompasses many 
freedoms — freedom of speech, of 
religion, of assembly, and of so many 
other liberties that we often take for 
granted. These are rights that should be 
shared by all mankind. This union has 
always patriotically stood up for those 
freedoms. And that's why I want to talk 
to you today about freedom not in the 
United States but in a part of the world 
that's very close and very important to 
us — Central America. 

We all know that Central America 
suffers from decades of poverty, social 
deprivation, and political instability. And 
because these problems weren't dealt 
with positively, they are now being ex- 
ploited by the enemies of freedom. We 
cannot afford the luxury of turning 
away from our neighbors' struggles as if 
they didn't matter. If we do turn away, 
we'll pay a terrible price for our neglect. 

In April, I reported to the Congress 
that the problems in Central America 
have the potential to affect our national 
security. This is still the case, and I 
want to reinforce it. Many of our 
citizens don't fully understand the 
seriousness of the situation, so let me 
put it bluntly: There is a war in Central 
America that is being fueled by the 



Soviets and the Cubans. They are arm- 
ing, training, supplying, and encourag- 
ing a war to subjugate another nation to 
communism, and that nation is El 
Salvador. The Soviets and the Cubans 
are operating from a base called 
Nicaragua. And this is the first real 
communist aggression on the American 
mainland. And we must never forget 
that here in the Western Hemisphere we 
are Americans in every country from 
pole to pole. 

This Florida community where we 
meet today is closer to Nicaragua than it 
is to Washington, D.C. Two-thirds of 
our foreign trade and nearly half of our 
petroleum pass through the Caribbean. 
It's well to remember that in early 1942, 
a handful of Hitler's submarines sank 
more tonnage in that area than in all of 
the Atlantic Ocean. And they did this 
without a single naval base anywhere 
nearby. Today, Cuba is home to a Soviet 
combat brigade, a submarine base 
capable of servicing Soviet subs, and 
military air bases visited regularly by 
Soviet military aircraft. If the Nazis dur- 
ing World War II and the Soviets today 
have recognized that the Caribbean and 
Central America are vital to our in- 
terests, don't you think it's about time 
that we recognized that, too? 



THE PRESIDENT 



Some people throw up their hands 
and say, well, there's not much we can 
do down there. They say poverty and 
violence and repression in Central 
America are just the way of life, that 
democracy can't work. I say baloney, 
and I think we'd all say something 
stronger if we were down on the docks. 
Costa Rica is as strong a democracy as 
you will find anywhere with a long 
history of peace, free elections, and 
stability. They don't even have an army. 
If democracy can work in Costa Rica 
and Honduras, it can work in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua and Guatemala. 
There is still time for the people of Latin 
America to build a prosperous, peaceful, 
and free future. And we have an obliga- 
tion to help them— for our own sake as 
well as theirs. 

People throughout Latin America 
are waiting to see if Republicans and 
Democrats in this country can work 
together to make the United States 
what it should be: a loyal friend and 
reliable defender of democracy and 
human decency. I believe that we must 
exercise that leadership. And the time is 
now. 

Since I spoke to the Congress in 
April, Cuba has sent one of its best 
known combat generals to Nicaragua. 
More Cuban soldiers and Soviet sup- 
pliers have arrived in Nicaragua. This 
cannot be allowed to continue. 

Tomorrow, July 19th, is the fourth 
anniversary of the Sandinista revolution. 
This was a revolution that promised to 
bring freedom to the Nicaraguan people; 
history will call it the revolution of 
broken promises. Tomorrow the nine 
military commanders who rule Nica- 
ragua with Cuban and Soviet power will 
indulge in boastful revolutionary 
rhetoric. But there are few left who will 
believe them. The consensus throughout 
the hemisphere is that while the San- 
dinistas promised their people freedom, 
all they've done is replace the former 
dictatorship with their own — a dictator- 
ship of counterfeit revolutionaries who 
wear fatigues, and drive around in 
Mercedes sedans and Soviet tanks, and 
whose current promise is to spread their 
brand of "revolution" throughout Central 
America. 

What kind of freedom have the San- 
dinistas established? Just ask the 1,300 
stevedores at the Nicaraguan port of 
Corinto. Last month, their union 
assembly was packed with Sandinistas 
and six union leaders were arrested. 
Their presumed crime was trying to 
develop ties with independent trade 



unions, including some here affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO. I can tell you one 
thing. If all the longshoremen in Corinto 
are like Teddy Gleason [ILA president], 
the Sandinistas have got a real fight on 
their hands. Matter of fact, if they've 
got one like you, Teddy, they may be 
like those two fellows who were up saw- 
ing on a limb, and one of them fell off. 
And there was a wildcat down below, 
and there were sounds of struggle com- 
ing up, and the one still up on the limb 
called down and said, "Hold on." And he 
said, "Hold on?" He said, "Come down 
and tell me how to let him go." 

What kind of democracy is it? Ask 
the Nicaraguan refugees who've risked 
starvation and attack to escape to Hon- 
duras. Let me read to you directly from 
a newspaper article: "... one 
Nicaraguan man — still filthy, ragged, 
and, above all, hungry after an odyssey 
that began 5 weeks ago — breathed a 
note of thanks: 'God has smiled on us.' " 
Imagine, with barely clothes on his back 
and nothing in his stomach, he believed 
God had smiled on him because he had 
arrived in free, democratic Honduras. 

This man fled Nicaragua in May 
with many others when they learned the 
Sandinistas planned to relocate their 
villages. Let me quote again what one of 
the refugees had to say: "We left 
everything. We left the pigs, the corn, 
the animals. . . . This year they wouldn't 
let us plant, because they wanted us to 
move closer to the military bases, they 
wanted us to be in the militia, and we 
did not want to be executioners." 

When the Sandinistas first took 
power, all their neighbors hoped that 
they would embrace democracy as they 
promised. In the first year and a half 
after the revolution, the United States 
sent $118 million worth of emergency 
relief and recovery aid to Nicaragua, 
more than provided by any other coun- 
try in the world. But the Sandinistas 
had lied. They rejected their pledges to 
their own people, to the Organization of 
American States (OAS), and to the 
world. 

Let me say a few more words about 
those specific promises. The Sandinistas 
had promised the Organization of 
American States that they would hold 
elections and grant all human rights that 
go with a democracy. In short, they 
literally made a contract to establish a 
true democracy. The dictator Somoza 
was then persuaded by the OAS to 
resign, and the government was turned 
over to the revolutionaries and recog- 
nized officially by the OAS. 



So far so good. But then, one fad 
of the revolutionaries— backed by Cul 
and the Soviet Union — seized total 
power and ousted their revolutionary 
comrades who'd been fighting to 
establish a real democracy. Nicaragu; 
today a nation abusing its own people 
and its neighbors. The guerrilla band; 
fighting in Nicaragua are trying to 
restore the true revolution and keep t 
promises made to the OAS. Isn't it til 
that all of us in the Americas worked 
together to hold Nicaragua accountab 
for the promises made and broken 4 
years ago? 

The Link Between Nicaragua 
and El Salvador 

There is a vital link between what's h 
pening in Nicaragua and what's happ 
ing in El Salvador. And the link is ve 
simple: The dictators of Nicaragua ar 
actively trying to destroy the budding 
democracy in neighboring El Salvado 
El Salvador is moving toward a more 
open society and government in the 
midst of a foreign-supported guerrilla 
war. National presidential elections ai 
planned. Through their Peace Commi 
sion, they've offered to talk even to tl 
violent opposition about participation 
the forthcoming elections. They have 
plemented an effective land reform pi 
gram which has provided land for ove 
half a million Salvadorans, and they'v 
given amnesty to former guerrillas. 

This is El Salvador's revolution- 
is one that is building democracy. Cor 
trast this with the corrupted revolutk 
in Nicaragua — one which has repress' 
human liberties, denied free unions ai 
free elections, censored the press, 
threatened its neighbors, and violated 
public pledges. 

It's time El Salvador is recognize! 
for what they're trying to do. And it's 
true that their path has been a hard c 
Peaceful change has not always been 
easy or quick. We realize the human 
rights progress in El Salvador is not ; 
we would like it to be. The killing mus 
stop. But you have to realize much of 
the violence there— whether from the 
extreme right or left — is beyond the 
control of the government. El Salvadi 
is moving in the right direction. Its 
elected government is committed to ft 
ther improvement. They need and the 
deserve our help. 

Just remember that scene last yea 
when, after months of campaigning b) 
variety of candidates, the people of E 
Salvador were offered a chance to vot 
to choose the kind of government the) 



Department of State Bulletr 



THE PRESIDENT 



nnted. The guerrillas threatened death 
1 anyone who voted. They destroyed 
lindreds of buses and trucks to keep 
<e people from getting to the polling 
jices. Their slogan was brutal: "Vote 
jday and die tonight." But on election 
ly, an unprecedented 80% of the elec- 
(rate braved ambush and gunfire and 

I ,l any of them trudged for miles to vote 
r freedom. 
Members of our Congress who went 
ere as observers told me of a woman 
lio was wounded by rifle fire on the 
Iiy to the polls. She refused to leave 
I j line to have her wound treated until 
l;er she had voted. Another woman 
|d been told by the guerrillas that she 
l>uld be killed when she returned from 
i ? polls. She was a grandmother, and 
Be told the guerrillas, "You can kill me, 
lu can kill my family, you can kill my 
lighbors. You can't kill us all." The real 
j'edom fighters of El Salvador turned 
It to be the people of that country. The 
I irld should respect this courage and 
j t allow it to be belittled or forgotten. 
I id I say that we can never turn our 
I :ks on that. 



S. Role 

■e United States has only recently at- 
npted to correct past neglect so that 

could help Central America's strug- 
• for freedom. We are working for 
itical and economic development. 
«ist of our aid is not military at all. 
venty-seven cents out of every dollar 

will spend there this year will go for 
>nomic assistance— food, fertilizers, 
d other essentials to help break the 
ious cycle of poverty. And make no 
stake about this— of all the words I've 
)ken today, let me underline these 
jecially: America's emphasis in Cen- 
il America is on economic and social 
)gress, not on a purely military solu- 
n. 

But to give democracy and develop- 
bt a chance to work in the face of in- 
casing attacks, we are providing a 
ield of military training and assistance 
help our neighbors protect them- 
ves. Meanwhile, the trade provisions 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
11 stimulate production and employ- 
snt. Last week's congressional vote on 
3 CBI is a step toward more work for 
sir longshoremen and ours. 

Nor is that all. We are actively sup- 
rting the search for political solution 
d dialogue among and within these na- 
ins. We know that ultimately peace 
n come only if people talk to each 



other and learn to accommodate in an 

atmosphere of freedom. To this end I 
dispatched my special emissary to the 
region. Despite the fact that the guer- 
rillas rejected our offer, we remain 
ready to facilitate free and open elec- 
tions. We also support the process 
started at Contadora for a multilateral 
approach to peace. 

In my speech to the joint session, I 
asked the Congress to join me in a bold, 
generous bipartisan approach to the 
problems of peace and poverty, 
democracy and dictatorship in this 
region. Many Members of the Congress 
have responded in a genuine spirit of 
cooperation despite divergent views on 
specific strategy. Senators Jackson and 
Mathias, Congressmen Barnes and 
Kemp, have suggested the formation of 
a national commission to build on our 
bipartisan concern for these key issues. 

I agree with them that this is a good 
idea. So, today, I am announcing a 
bipartisan national commission on Cen- 
tral America. The commission will lay 
the foundation for a long-term unified 
national approach to the freedom and in- 
dependence of the countries of Central 
America. The commission will be 
honored by a very distinguished 
American, outstanding in the field of 
diplomacy— virtually a legend in that 
field— it will be headed by Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, who will present recommen- 
dations to me later this year. Their focus 
will be long term, looking to what it is 
that we want and what we must do in 
the years ahead to meet the underlying 
problems of the region. 



In the meantime, we must not allow 
totalitarian communism to win by 
default. But we cannot succeed unless 
the Congress approves the necessary 
resources. All that our neighbors ask is 
for the tools to do the job themselves. 
And I ask you and every American 
regardless of political party to join in a 
common effort to promote freedom for 
all the people of this hemisphere. Just as 
you work so your children will have a 
better future, the United States must 
work so that the fledgling democracies 
of this hemisphere will have a better 
future and so that our own future can be 
more secure. The legislative branch 
must bear its share of responsibility for 
ensuring this promise. 

You know, I was down in that area 
on a trip. I met with the heads of 
several of the states of Central and 
South America. And I pointed 
something out to them that very often 
we tend to forget. This Western 
Hemisphere is unique. We are, as I said 
before, 30 countries down there, 3 here 
on the northern continent, but we all are 
Americans. We cross the line into 
another country; it is still North and 
South and Central America. And we 
haven't gotten together the way we 
should. We don't know enough about 
that area. And we need to do more. Can 
you imagine what a power for good in 
the world these two continents, linked 
by the isthmus of Central America— we 
worship from North Pole to South Pole 
the same God, we have the same 
heritage of coming here as pioneers to 



Commission on Central America 



Chairman 

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger 

Members 

Nicholas F. Brady, Managing Director, Dillon 

Read & Co., Inc. 
Henry G. Cisneros, Mayor of San Antonio 
William P. Clements, Jr., former Governor of 

Texas 
Dr. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, professor of 

economics, Yale University 
Wilson S. Johnson, President, National Fed- 
eration of Independent Business 
Joseph Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO 
Dr. Richard M. Scammon, political scientist 
Dr. John R. Silber, President, Boston 
University 



Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, Supreme 
Court of the United States (retired) 

Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, Attorney at 
Law 

William B. Walsh, President, Project Hope 

President's Representative 
to the Commission 

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations 

Executive Director 
of the Commission 

Harry Schlaudeman, U.S. Ambassador to 
Argentina ■ 



igust 1983 



THE PRESIDENT 



these virtually undiscovered continents. 
And what a power for good we could be 
with all the resources available to these 
continents if we help them in achieving 
what we have achieved here in this land 
in freedom, in economic progress, in 
standard of living. 

Human rights means working at 
problems, not walking away from them. 
Without the necessary funds, there's no 
way for us to prevent the light of 
freedom from being extinguished in Cen- 
tral America, and then it will move on 
from there. A truly bipartisan approach 
to these problems can produce the kind 
of progress that will help the people of 
the region help themselves. 

You know I've heard already and 
before— knowing Teddy Gleason, you 
know I've heard— that ILA stands for I 
love America. And that's true. I don't 
think America has a more patriotic 
union than this one. This union is great 
for the same reason America is 
great— because so many different groups 
are working together, pulling together 
toward a common goal. The cultural 
diversity of this union and this country 
make us both strong and free. 

President Harrison once said: 

In America, a glorious fire has been 
lighted upon the altar of liberty. . . . Keep it 
burning; and let the sparks that continually 
go up from it fall on other altars, and light up 
in distant lands the fire of freedom. 

Today, I ask you to join me in an ef- 
fort to keep the light of liberty alive in 
Central America. We must never let 
freedom fade where there is a chance to 
save it. We must never let the embers of 
human dignity die out simply because 
it's easier to turn the other way. With a 
timely investment now, we can save 
freedom in Central America. I believe 
we must make that investment. I believe 
we have a moral responsibility to do so. 
And I believe with the help of organiza- 
tions like the ILA we will succeed in ex- 
panding freedom for the people of Cen- 
tral America. 



News Conference of June 28 (Excerpt 



J Text from White House press release. 



Q. Jim Wright said at the White 
House today that there are some in 
Congress who don't believe that this 
Administration wants peace in Central 
America. And your aides acknowledge 
that the polls supporting your Central 
American policy have gone down and 
the people seem to be moving away 
from that. But how do you account for 
this? 

A. I think there's a great lack of in- 
formation on the part of the people. I do 
know that after I addressed the joint 
session of Congress and the people on 
television on that subject, there was a 
decided shift in favor of our position. I 
guess that proves the power of advertis- 
ing. There has been a constant drumbeat 
ever since. I made one speech, but the 
drumbeat ever since, to the people, is 
somehow denigrating our position there 
and indicating that there's something 
wrong in that position. 

Maybe we haven't done what we 
should have done in keeping the people 
informed of what is going on because 
there — very definitely — are thousands 
of Soviets and Cubans — Soviets in Cuba. 
There is a great number of them also in 
Nicaragua. There are thousands of 
Cubans, including one of their top 
generals, most experienced generals, in 
Nicaragua. 

Several Congressmen have just 
come back from there and have told me 
that in speaking to people on the sides 
that we're against— high-ranking 
people — that they have told them that 
this is a revolution, not just for one 
country; this is a revolution that is 
aimed at all of Central America. And I 
think some of you should seek out those 
Congressmen and hear some of the 
things they had to say because of what 
they heard from these people — one in- 
dividual even suggested that in a limited 
period of time they would be at the 
Arizona-Mexican border. I think the 
United States has a stake in what is go- 
ing on there and we've got to do a bet- 
ter job of letting the people know what 
is at stake. 

Q. What is it that prevents your 
Administration from talking to 
Castro, to the Sandinistas, to the 
representatives of the rebels in El 
Salvador? I mean, to at least explore 
negotiations, and would it really harm 



the Salvadoran Government if you 
made that approach? 

A. That is a little bit not our 
business either. The Salvadorans hav 
appointed a Peace Commission that i 
trying to make contact — maybe has 
made contact — but trying to persuad 
the revolutionaries, the Marxists in t 
country to come in and discuss with 
them how they can accept amnesty a 
join in the electoral democratic proce 
that will be taking place soon. So far 
they've had nothing but turndowns. ( 
the other side in Nicaragua, it is simj 
reversed. It is the democratic revolu- 
tionaries who were ousted once the 
revolution was successful while the 
Marxists took over and created their 
totalitarian form of government. Anc 
they want, all they're fighting for is t 
return to the principles of the revolut 
that overthrew Somoza — free electio 
human rights, free press, all those 
things. 

It isn't a case of us not wanting t 
talk. Early on in my Administration, 
made contact with Mr. Castro. Nothi: 
came of it, and we haven't had much 
success since. 



Q. You have said that you are i 
going to send any combat troops in 
Central America. But at the same 
time, you have said that El Salvadc 
and the rest of the region are vital 
national security and are of crucial 
portance to our country. Isn't there | 
therefore, an inconsistency in thosi6 
two statements? If you think it is ol 
that much importance to our counti t 
why do you say you will never send 
combat troops in? 

A. Presidents never say never. I I 
have said that we have no plans to sel 
combat troops nor are they needed orl 
wanted. President Magana here said, j 
that he would not ask for them. He 
doesn't want them. And I don't think I 
other countries do. I think they want 
create their own democracies and con I 
tinue on the path they're on. But they | 
do, frankly, need our help in two areaf 
They need us to help them with trainii) 
to provide arms and munitions so that; 
they can defend themselves while theyp 
instituting these democratic programs 
And they need our economic help. 

So far our help has been three to i 
one — three- fourths of our help has bee' 



Department of State B 



u l let 



THE SECRETARY 



j the area of economic relief and only 
Le-fourth military. And those in the 
Ongress who want to whittle this down 
i where it is a pittance — they don't say, 
jlo, we won't give you anything — give 
u a few dollars here and a few dollars 
ere." In my opinion, what they're do- 
y is choosing between instant death 
d letting those countries bleed to 
ath. Then they want to be able to 
ime somebody else because they 
ssed a nickel instead of a dollar. All 
at those countries want from us is this 
onomic help and the help that we're 
ring them. You know, it's a funny 
ng. There's 1,500 Cubans training in 
caragua and there's 55 Americans in 
Salvador and all everyone seems to 
nk is a sin is our 55. 

Q. You say, though, that you'll 
ver say never. You're not giving a 
:dge to the American people then 
it you will not send combat troops 
' Is that right? 

A. You were asking a kind of a 
pothetical question so I gave a 
pothetical answer, and it's an old say- 
; that "Presidents should never say 
/er." They blew up the Maine. But, 

I see no need for it. They've never 
;n asked for. Nor do we have any 
ns or intention of sending troops to 
>se countries. 



Q. On Poland, do you think that at 
s point Lech Walesa ought to step 
| :k from the leadership role he has 
I ;en? And do you have any reason to 
I ieve that if he does step back from 
I : limelight in the Solidarity leader- 
i p position that martial law in 
I land would improve to the point 
l ere you could come through with a 
I id of relief for the Polish economy 
j i mentioned last week? 

A. I wouldn't be able to answer that 
k ause I know that the conversations 
t ween General Jaruzelski and His 
I liness were private and no one 
t )ws, and I know that also with the 
I iversations with Lech Walesa. I don't 
D >w what that situation is. I only know 
'. at the Pope himself has stated, and 
■ .t is that he has urged the Govern- 
Int of Poland to allow a free union 
I .t is not subject to government con- 
1 1. And if they did that, I think that 
would review what we were doing 
1 turn back from some of those 
ngs. 



News Conference of June 22 



! ct from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
i Documents of July 4, 1983. ■ 



jgust 1983 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
June 22, 1983. l 

Q. Are U.S. efforts to obtain a 
withdrawal of Syrian forces from 
Lebanon at an impasse? If not, what is 
our next step, and do you or Am- 
bassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, 
representative of the President to the 
Middle East] or Deputy Secretary Dam 
plan to meet with Syrian officials in 
the near future? 

A. We have been meeting with the 
Israelis and with the Lebanese. We have 
been consulting with the Saudi Arabians 
and other friends in the region. We have 
had contact with the Syrians. 

We continue to be fully engaged in 
this very important issue. I recall to you 
the President's objectives of the removal 
of all foreign forces from Lebanon, of 
the emergence of Lebanon as a 
sovereign country able to rule itself and 
develop, and to provide measures that 
ensure the security of Israel's northern 
frontier. We continue to work for those 
objectives. Ambassadors Habib and 
Draper [Morris Draper, special 
negotiator for Lebanon] will be return- 
ing to the area probably the day after 
tomorrow, and we will continue to be 
fully engaged and work on it. 

Q. What if the Israelis redeploy 
their forces to the south? Would that 
be a setback in terms of a total 
withdrawal of all foreign forces, and 
is there any deadline inherent in that? 

A. There are no particular dead- 
lines, although, obviously, the sooner a 
withdrawal process can start, the better. 
I'm speaking of a full withdrawal proc- 
ess. That is what we want. I say the 
sooner the better because it's a very 
tense area. When you have tension, the 
sooner you relieve it, the more you 
reduce the risks. 

One would hope that if there is any 
move in the direction of withdrawal, it 
would be part of an overall program. In 
any case, whatever happens, I'm sure 
there will be intensive discussion be- 
tween the parties most directly 
concerned. 

Q. But if there were a partial 
redeployment of the Israelis, would 
that be a setback in terms of the full 
withdrawal? 

A. That depends upon the condi- 
tions under which it takes place. There 
is, of course, inherently a sense that 
when one of the foreign forces with- 



draws, that is part of the territory of 
Lebanon they can take control over. 
Nevertheless, we have to come back and 
judge anything that happens according 
to these major objectives, not only of the 
President but of the others that we have 
been working with in the area. 

Q. The situation in Lebanon itself, 
with the Syrians apparently trying to 
take control of the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] in the Bekaa 
Valley and with the Syrians also at- 
tempting to set up local autonomous 
rule in part of the Bekaa Valley, 
doesn't lend itself to much optimism 
in terms of a Syrian withdrawal at any 
time soon. Do you have any reason to 
believe that ultimately the United 
States may be successful in getting 
the Syrians to withdraw? 

A. We certainly are going to con- 
tinue to work on that problem. As you 
point out, I think quite correctly, there 
are obvious indications that the prob- 
lems are real. Nevertheless, there is 
great importance throughout the world, 
and the Arab world, on the emergence 
of Lebanon again as a country that is 
free of foreign forces and great support 
for that idea. I think and hope in the 
end we'll have success and the Lebanese 
will succeed. 

Q. A debate is raging in the press 
about the central message that you 
meant to convey in your statement on 
Soviet-American relations to the 
[Senate] Foreign Relations Committee 
last week. Would you care to join and 
maybe settle that debate? 

A. I've been asked that question a 
lot. I have, after trying a variety of 
answers, settled on this one. My advice 
is: Read the statement and draw your 
own conclusions. Don't depend on 
somebody else. 

Q. Can you give us any details on 
the deaths of the two American jour- 
nalists today in Central America, and 
have you determined as yet where the 
fire came from that hit their car? 

A. I understand that the fire came 
from Nicaragua, and it hit their car. 
They were in a zone which was known 
to be a dangerous zone, and they had 
been warned, as I understand it, before 
they went there. But the fire did come 
from Nicaragua, and I want to take the 
occasion to express my sorrow and my 
condolences to their families. 



THE SECRETARY 






Q. I would like to give you 
another chance on Dan Shorr's ques- 
tion. 

A. 1 thought that might come hack. 
There is a fundamental point when peo- 
ple complain about news stories of one 
kind or another, that they should read 
something and then figure it out for 
themselves and not depend on the opin 
ion of someone else. 

Q. In the carpentry of that par- 
ticular speech, clearly, there must 
have been an emphasis in your mind of 
some sort of signal you wanted to get 
to the Kremlin, and we have in fact 
had mixed interpretations. We would 
like a little background guidance from 
you. 

A. I think there are two signals, if 
you want to use that terminology: 
strength and diplomacy. We want to 
make it clear that we are determined to 
be strong, to be able to defend our in- 
terests. We have strong allies. We're 
working effectively with them; there is 
cohesion, and we are determined. At the 
same time, we and our allies both would 
prefer a more constructive dialogue and 
set of arrangements with the Soviet 
Union than we now have. 

In the statement I say that we are 
prepared to engage in that kind of 
discussion. I think it's a question of both 
sides of the coin. They're both there. 

Q. Since you made that statement, 
and given the statements made by 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, do you 
sense, in what the Soviets have been 
saying, any indication of a Soviet 
response to the diplomatic side of your 
two-signal approach? 

A. You can take a statement 
like the full text which I read of 
Mr. Gromyko's speech a few days ago 
and, for the most part, it is, I would say, 
a very tough and categorical kind of 
speech and set of statements. However, 
it is interlarded with comments about 
the desire for — his term was, at least, as 
translated — smoother relations, and so 
you find that intermixture. 

It's fair to say that this combination 
of strength and diplomacy has been 
present in statements made by a variety 
of people, including General 
Secretary — or now President — An- 
dropov and President Reagan. The ques 
tion is, will there be a development in 
terms of substance';' 

There arc a wide variety of places in 
which discussions are going on between 
ourselves and the Soviet Union and our 
allies in the Soviet I'nion. There are 
many fora where substantive issues can 
in explored. And in those fora, we are 



prepared with reasonable positions and a 

spirit of give-and-take. So we'll see 
whether or not we have a kind of 
response that can allow the diplomatic 
side of this to develop. 

Q. Have you decided yet whether 
or not the United States will engage 
in a direct dialogue with representa- 
tives of the left in El Salvador, and 
whether that dialogue will be con- 
ducted with Ambassador Stone 
[Richard B. Stone, special represent- 
ative of the President to Central 
America) here, there, under what con- 
ditions? 

A. The basic dialogue that has been 
put forward has been put forward bj 
the Peace Commission in El Salvador, 
which has stated its willingness to 
discuss with the left conditions under 
which they might enter the electoral 
process. That is the right body to con 
duct those discussions, and the right 
way for it to go. If we can facilitate 
that, and I think if that is to happen, it 
would undoubtedly be through Am- 
bassador Stone's efforts. If we can 
facilitate that, we're glad to do so but, 
fundamentally, I think the responsibility 
rests with the people of El Salvador, 
and they have designated the Peace 
Commission as the body to engage in 
that discussion. 

Q. There seems to be some confu- 
sion about the meaning of the terms 
under which the MX missile might be 
abandoned. Is this meant as a serious 
negotiating offer, or is it meant to 
simply convey the idea that it would 
be very, verv difficult to talk us out of 
the MX? 

A. This blowup today about that 
subject is puzzling because I don't think 
that there's anything particularly new to 
be said on the subject. Let me just 
review where we are. The first point to 
remember is that the Peacekeeper, or 
MX, as it is deployed, will be a very im- 
portant modernization of the land-based 
leg of our triad deterrent force. That's 
the fundamental reason why the Presi- 
dent is recommending it, the Scowcroft 
commission recommended it, and why 
it's being funded and put there. 

At the same time, we are in the 
process of a wide-ranging discussion 
with the Soviet Union aiming at reduc- 
tions in strategic arms. That's including 
the whole variety of arms that fall under 
that category. So all of these things are 
under discussion. Hut I don't think there 
is anything particular to recommend, 
picking out a particular element in that 
bargaining and trying to place it against 



some other element in that hargainir 
If we are able to reach a result, l hi 
hope very much that we are, then 
lie a package of things that will be 
worked out between the parties, and 
that'- always the way it is in any cor 
plicated bargain, not an equation of, 
one thing. 

Q. On that point a number of p 
pie in Congress have said that the} 
believe the MX was essentially put 
forth as a bargaining chip. But 
General Scowcroft, himself, has sa 
that is not the case, that there are 
conditions under which it would m 
be deployed. Was it meant to be a 
bargaining chip? 

A. I've just answered that quest 
but I'll trj it again. The reason for tl 
proposed deployment and eventually I 
deployment of the MX or PeacekeepJ 
missile is that it constitutes a key in J 
dieiit in the land-based leg of the tritl 
of deterrent forces. That is the basic ; 
sum ami substance of it. We are en- I 
gaged in a bargaining process, at 
bargaining process is about strategic 
forces. The MX, or Peacekeeper, is (I 
of those strategic forces, so it's 
something that has to be taken accot| 
of in those discussions. It's basically 
simple as that. 

Q. If I can come back to the 
dialogue with the Soviet Union. Co 
you give us some of the flavor of tl 
talks? What I mean is aside from t 
arms control forums, which we all 
know about. Now, you've been, I 
gather, talking to [Soviet] Ambass; 
Dobrynin, and presumably [U.S.] A 
bassador Hartman had some talks 
Moscow. Are these more in the wa> 
each side reading its own brief, or 
there actually any proposals put on 
table, or is it a kind of a sterile 
discussion? We don't get any sense 
any give and take here. 

A. 1 can't point to results that st 
that somehow we're making genuine 
progress from the variety of talks we 
involved in, and by and large you kno 
them well. There are the INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] talks ir 
Geneva; there are the START |strate 
arms reduction talks) talks in Geneva 
there are the chemical warfare talks 
Geneva; there are the MBFR [mutual 
and balanced force reductions] talks i 
Vienna; there are Max Kampelman'si 
cussioiis in Madrid; there are the am- 
bassadorial discussions that you men- 
tioned; there are a wide variety of int 
national agencies in which both coun- 
tries are represented and which our 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



preservatives sometimes get together 
the venue of those talks. So there are 
.vide variety of things, and there are 
me areas where there has been some 
Ogress made. 

Of course, we have positions that we 
press, and they do, too. At the same 
le there are occasions — and I've been 
olved in some myself — in which there 
a kind of a personal give-and-take to 
But barring substantive results that 

can point to that are significant. I 
n't think that you can say the process 
leading us somewhere. In other 
rds, I say you really have to judge it 
results. There's a lot of input; there's 
ot of activity, but we have to keep 
king at the substance and asking 
^selves in those terms whether or not 

re getting anywhere, and so far we 

n't. But we will keep at it, and I hope 
it we will get somewhere. 

Q. Do you see any value in a 
eting with Foreign Minister 
omyko to try to get to some of these 
ues at a higher level in advance of 
en you'd see him normally at the 
ited Nations? 

A. If it turns out, if there is a judg- 
nt that it is desirable to do that — 
en Foreign Minister Gromyko and I 
ne to the end of our meeting in New 
•k, we agreed that if it appeared to 
lesirable to us, we would arrange a 
gting. So far it hasn't seemed worth- 
,le, but that doesn't mean that it 
ildn't be arranged. But as of now, 
re is no plan for such a meeting. 
:re's nothing to bar it, however, and 

possibility of it is always present, of 
rse. 

Q. [Inaudible] that a meeting will 
ttnight take place in Damascus be- 
;en you and President Assad at the 
1 1 of your upcoming trip to the 
ion since you said that you are in 
tact with the Syrians and consulta- 
ns with [inaudible]? 

A. We're in contact in the sense 
t we have exchanged cables. Our Am- 
sador has met with them. They have 
\ they are ready for and want to see 
dialogue with us. We feel the same 
/ about it, and we hope that such will 
arranged. But I don't have any plan 
any schedule to stop in the Middle 
it on my way back from Pakistan. 

Q. In your talks and discussions 
h the Saudi Arabians and their in- 
cession, have you felt that the 
ians perhaps would be more ame- 
nde to a withdrawal from Lebanon 
Iv since the Saudis may be involved 
H;ome of those talks? 



Also you mentioned that Am- 
bassador Habib will be going out to 
the region. Is he welcome in 
Damascus? Will he be stopping over in 
Damascus? 

A. First, we observe a very con- 
structive effort on the part of Saudi 
Arabia, and what precisely will come out 
of that remains to be seen. Other coun- 
tries also have expressed themselves and 
are being helpful. Beyond that, I don't 
have any comment to make on the Saudi 
effort. As far as Ambassador Habib in 
Damascus is concerned, they have stated 
that they don't want to receive him 
there, so he won't go, and we will find 
other people who we hope will be accept- 
able to them and be able to carry on a 
discussion with them. 

Q. I would like to take you back 
to the Honduran-Nicaraguan border 
where some of our colleagues were 
killed yesterday. That area has been 
heating up in recent months with 
military action around that border. 
Recently, General Alverez, who is the 
head of the Honduran military, was in 
Washington, and he said he would like 
assurance from the United States that 
if there were a major attack by 
Nicaragua into Honduras, the United 
States would come to the aid of Hon- 
duras. Can you tell us what the U.S. 
attitude is about that, and how likely 
do you think such a thing might be? 

A. We consider the situation in Cen- 
tral America to be of great importance 
to the people there and to ourselves. 
And because of that, we are extending 
great efforts there. The very large-scale 
shipment of arms into Nicaragua from 
the Soviet Union, sometimes directly 
ami through Cuba, is not appreciated by 
us. It's a very unfriendly thing to do. So 
we would take a major outbreak of war 
there very seriously. Beyond that, I 
don't want to make a comment, 

Q. Do you have the impression yet 
that the Soviets want to negotiate a 
way to get their troops out of Afghan- 
istan? And what would you hope to ac- 
complish on that front and on the 
Cambodian problem during your trip? 

A. The United Nations has been 
conducting, for some time now, negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union on the Af- 
ghanistan matter. Just how much prog- 
ress they've made is a little difficult to 
interpret. The Pakistanis have been in- 
volved and, of course, have been taking 
a part there. I've had the opportunity to 
discuss that with Foreign Minister 
Yaqub Kahn, and I look forward to talk- 
ing with him again. But I don't really 



have anything to point to that says that 
genuine progress has been made. There 
is a large contingent — over 100,000, we 
understand — of Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan. 

For there to be a genuine resolution 
of that problem, which we very much 
favor, it would have to include the 
removal of those troops; it would have 
to include the emergence of a non- 
aligned Government of Afghanistan; it 
would have to provide for the creation 
of a government that is responsive to 
the people of Afghanistan; and, in some 
way, the refugees would have to come 
back with honor and without prejudice. 
Those are the things, I think, that are 
pretty well agreed that we need to work 
for. There is a lot of effort going on, but 
it's hard to identify progress. 

So far as Kampuchea is concerned, 
we have been supporting the efforts of 
the ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] countries. I will be very 
interested to be talking with them in a 
few days in Bangkok. Again I think 
what we would like to see — the ASEAN 
countries would like to see, the Chinese 
would like to see — is the removal of the 
Vietnam forces, Soviet proxy forces 
from Kampuchea, and a chance for that 
country to revive 'tself. 

There are al< .of interim things be- 
ing talked about. Of course, the Thais 
are very close to that situation, so their 
views have to get some special weight. 
That is, again, something that I'll be 
discussing. 

Q. Also, on that general region, 
does your trip to Asia signal an in- 
creased American commitment to the 
Pacific and Asian region, both in 
terms of defense and trade? 

A. It is a fact that our trade with 
the nations of Asia has been increasing 
rapidly over quite a period of time. And 
if you look at the patterns of economic 
development, population, and so forth, I 
don't see how you can expect anything 
else but a continuation of that trend into 
the future. So it's a very important area 
for us from the standpoint of economics, 
and, of course, it has great strategic and 
security importance as well. So when we 
say we should be global in our outlook, it 
certainly means that we should be pay- 
ing attention to developments in Asia, 
and I have been very conscious of that 
personally, both before being in this job 
and since being in the job. 



■gust 1983 



AFRICA 



Q. What do you make of the cur- 
rent struggle within the PLO? How do 
you interpret the Syrian involvement 
in that? And if Yassir Arafat was to 
be overthrown, would that necessarily 
be a bad thing? 

A. We don't have a lot of contacts 
with the PLO, so our intelligence is all 
secondhand and thirdhand. I shouldn't 
say we don't have a lot: We don't have 
any direct contacts with the PLO. That 
always leaves you a little less well in- 
formed than you might otherwise be. 

But there is, clearly, a struggle go- 
ing on, and it has probably some 
elements of policy. There may be some 
elements of the results of indecisiveness 
involved and control over funds and 
bureaucracy — I don't know. The basic 
issue is how can it be brought about that 
more attention is paid to the problems 
of the human beings called Palestinians 
who live there, whose lot is a poor one, 
and whose prospects, not just taking it 
from year to year but almost from 
generation to generation, are not that 
great. 

It seems to me that we do have to 
pay attention — not just us but the PLO 
and everybody — to the legitimate rights 
and aspirations of these human beings, 
and see if we can't do better by them. It 
must be so that one of the reasons why 
there has been such difficulty with con- 
flict in the Middle East is the fact that 
we, as an international group of coun- 
tries, have not been able to come to 
"grips" satisfactorily with the human 
condition of the Palestinian people, and 
we really have to bear down on it. It's a 
very difficult problem, I know. That's 
the reason it hasn't been solved. But, I 
think, that is the heart of the matter 
more than internal PLO politics. 

Q. But would Arafat's coming or 
going bode ill or well for your 
ultimate objectives, do you think? 

A. It's a question of the degree of 
unity in the PLO and the extent to 
which there are factions and what orien- 
tation the PLO might have, and whether 
or not, in the end, whatever happens 
might make it more possible for King 
Hussein to have a non-PLO, legitimate 
Palestinian delegation that was endorsed 
with him in entering the peace process. 
That's what we have been trying to 
achieve. 

The extent to which Syria comes to 
dominate the organization, which may 
be happening — you read that a 
lot — makes it questionable, whether or 
not these developments would ease that 



problem. So we have to look elsewhere 
for our method; or, perhaps, in our 
discussions with the Syrians, we might 
find some answers. 

Q. Do you know of any material of 
American origin or American license 
being used by one side or the other in 
the war between Iraq and Iran? And if 
that were to happen, what would be 
your attitude toward it? 

A. We have had an attitude of 
neutrality in that war, and we haven't 
made sales directly ourselves. We have 



also prevented sales of American- 
licensed or American parts flowing 
through in somebody else's equipmer 
In saying that, I don't say that ' 
nothing could possibly have slipped 
through our efforts — maybe you havg 
example in mind or something. But Ut 
has been our policy, and we have trie 
to follow through on it with a con- 
siderable amount of argument with si 
of the countries that have wanted to h 
make those sales. 



'Press release 221. 1 



Southern Africa: 
America's Responsibility for 
Peace and Change 



by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Address before the National Con- 
ference of Editorial Writers in San 
Francisco on June 23, 1983. Ambassador 
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. 

I am grateful for this opportunity to 
speak to you who are so involved in 
helping to shape this nation's considera- 
tion of critical choices. I have come to 
speak to an issue that has occupied an 
important place on this Administration's 
agenda— an issue of common interest to 
the Western world, an issue central to 
international stability. 

From this podium, spokesmen from 
the several administrations of recent 
times have addressed the responsibilities 
which the United States bears for the 
great crisis areas of the globe— Europe, 
the Middle East, Asia, Latin America. 
Tonight I invite you to join me in con- 
sidering what is at stake in southern 
Africa and what role we can play in 
shaping that region's future. My 
message is not an easy one. It is a 
message of responsibility — responsibility 
for the use of American influence and 
power in dealing with a question of 
substantial and growing national in- 
terest. 

I do not have to tell this audience 
that there is a crisis in southern Africa. 
Nearly a decade ago, as we stood 
mesmerized by our engagement in 
Southeast Asia and by escalating war- 
fare in the Middle East, Portugal's em- 



pire in Africa collapsed. In its wake, 1 
southern Africa's conflicts, rooted asl 
they were in longstanding struggles I 
decolonization and racial equality, 
became world issues— issues that wo \ 
engage our national interests and tea 
our resolve. Angola became an area I 
intense civil strife and contest betwe I 
the Soviet Union and the West; the A 
for Zimbabwe's independence intensi I 
Mozambique was caught up in regior 
conflict; and the struggle for change 
South Africa assumed more violent e 
polarized forms. Wars which had bee 
more or less contained within nation, 
boundaries spread across frontiers, e 
the cycle of violence which has come 
plague the region took root. 

In retrospect, Western indifferer 
to change in southern Africa played 
part in creating this situation. As a r 
tion we were not well equipped to de 
with the region. Our involvement hac 
been superficial; we knew little of its 
actors or its dynamics. Our body poli 
was polarized. The left was transfixe 
by the issue of racism, while the righ 
was too often prepared to interpret 
events only in the light of the East-W 
competition. In spite of these domest 
divisions, three administrations have 
tempted to catch up with fast-moving 
events, define our national interests, 
decide how to use our influence. 

The divisions of the past, I regret 
say, still linger. There are those who 
would assure our irrelevance. As we 
meet here tonight, voices in our Cong 
ress, media, and public call for punitp 
measures against governments which 



Department of State Bulle 



AFRICA 



jt please us— banning bank loans to 
outh Africa or Krugerrand imports 
•om South Africa, denying access to the 
abilization programs of the Interna- 
onal Monetary Fund or escalating 
*tty trade control, banning food aid to 
ozambique or development assistance 
i Zimbabwe. Others repeat the slogans 
' liberation, while denying us the ability 
i add an ounce of political will or 
iplomatic investment to solving the 
igion's problems. At a time when we 
eed all the leverage available to us, 
ime argue for disinvestment and 
wipe. They confuse the making of 
atements with the ability to influence 
rents. 

There are those outside Africa 
| hose motives are more cynical. They 
|-e the advocates of violence, who would 
irn the landscape of southern African 
to an enlarged version of Lebanon 
ith the sovereignty, independence, and 
tonomic viability of the states in the 
;gion subordinated to a battle between 
I juth Africa and its neighbors. These 
•rces would welcome such an outcome, 
nee it would present new opportunities 
r neocolonial exploitation. They are 
ore than willing to shed African blood 
ad to supply copious quantities of 
eapons, even though they know 
olence cannot create anything of value 
southern Africa. Violence, for these 
itsiders, is not a means to achieve na- 
mal self-determination or to end apar- 
eid. Rather, it is an end in itself, a 
Ktical vehicle to enhance external in- 
oence and permit the political and 
eological subjugation of independent 
frica. The United States, on the other 
.nd, proceeds from the conviction that 
tr national interest and the interests of 
e West demand an engagement — con- 
nective and peaceful— in the affairs of 
uthern Africa. The United States is, I 
lieve, uniquely situated to speak to all 
les in the conflict. 

The region has enormous poten- 
ll — positive and negative. Historically, 
is a zone of Western influence and has 
ten so for 300 years. But direct 
estern control has ended. Decoloniza- 
>n, peaceful and violent, left a legacy 
weak institutions, conflicting na- 
malisms, fear, and loss of confidence 
any reliable hand. 

The implications are clear. If we 
ish to shape events, we must be 
■epared to take initiatives, make in- 
istments, support those things we 
ilieve in, build institutions and bridges. 
'e must, in short, be involved. And we 
ust, as well, be prepared to opppose 
ose from outside Africa who claim a 
edit to violent intervention. 



To succeed in southern Africa, we 
must define a coherent regional 
strategy. Apart from Namibia, we are 
talking about a community of sovereign 
states. Southern Africa is interdepend- 
ent economically in its infrastructure, its 
populations, markets, its natural links 
and, to an important degree, in its ex- 
ternal orientation. The region, unfor- 
tunately, suffers from a current and 
aggravated temptation to depend upon 
the instruments of violence. 

One way or another the states of 
southern Africa have to evolve explicit 
or tacit ground rules for cooperation and 
coexistence, for the alternatives are all 
too obvious. Both South Africa and the 
independent African states to its north 
have enunciated at different times a vi- 
sion of coexistence. Regional coex- 
istence, the only path to peace and 
stability, has an additional meaning. 
Unless there is peace and stability in 
southern Africa, it will prove impossible 
to encourage essential change in South 
Africa — and by change I mean a basic 
shift away from apartheid. 

At present, the issue of Namibia, 
and South Africa's continuing control 
there, the presence of Cuban forces in 
Angola, and the practice of harboring 
guerrillas and dissident movements to 
strike at targets across borders, pose 
severe challenges to regional security 
and Western diplomacy. As a region 
southern Africa contains parallels to the 
tragedies of the Middle East. A cycle of 



undermined, distorted, and perhaps 
destroyed. No amount of Western or in- 
ternational support and solidarity with 
these states will be productive if the 
politics of development and coexistence 
continue to be subordinated to the 
politics of survival and war. 

It is for all these reasons that this 
Administration has committed its 
prestige and energy to defining a 
regional strategy and using our in- 
fluence to shape events. The under- 
taking has several aspects which, taken 
together, are directed at encouraging 
enhanced regional security, economic 
development, and peaceful change. 

Namibia 

The quest for Namibia's independence 
remains for this Administration, as it 
was for our predecessors, a key object 
of American diplomacy. The unresolved 
status of Namibia creates a dangerous 
vacuum in the area and serves as a 
magnet for violence and external med- 
dling. Namibia remains Africa's last 
colony and a focal point of the 
continent's and the nonaligned world's 
attention. Its people suffer from war 
and outside domination. The United 
States long ago accepted responsibility 
for helping to secure Namibia's in- 
dependence. We have, since then, made 
a considerable contribution toward 
achieving that goal. Under President 



The position of the United States is clear. The 
President is committed to Namibia's independence. 
He wants to assist in creating a peaceful and in- 
dependent Angola in a peaceful and prosperous 
region. He is prepared to use his full influence to 
achieve these ends. 



violence has begun: unless it is reversed, 
the interests of the region and the West 
will be severely damaged. If southern 
Africa is at war, the consequences for 
South Africa will be clear: increased 
spending on war; reduced political will 
for addressing the domestic agenda of 
negotiated, evolutionary change; and a 
heightened polarization of attitudes that 
can only distort the internal South 
African debate about the means and 
forms of change. Similarly, if the region 
is at war, the economies and institutions 
of the neighboring African states will be 



Ford we defined the first procedure for 
a peaceful move to independence. Under 
the Carter Administration, we joined 
with our allies — France, Canada, Great 
Britain, and Germany— in negotiating 
UN Security Council Resolution 435, a 
document of seminal importance which 
defines how transition to independence 
under UN authority will occur. 

During the Reagan Administration 
we have faced squarely the need to 
secure conditions which will make it 



jgust 1983 



AFRICA 



politically possible for South Africa to 
relinquish its position in a territory it 
has controlled since 1916. 

We inherited a stalemated negotiat- 
ing process. Since that time we and our 
allies, working through what we call the 
contact group, have elaborated constitu- 
tional principles to guide the framers of 
the constitution for an independent 
Namibia. We have successfully resolved 
a series of troublesome issues related to 
the role of the United Nations. The 
fruits of this intensive diplomacy are im- 
pressive. Through sustained and coor- 
dinated effort with our allies, the front- 
line states and SWAPO [South West 
Africa People's Organization], the South 
Africans, the internal Namibian parties, 
and the UN Secretary General and his 
officials, we have virtually all elements 
in place for the implementation of 
Resolution 435. 

There is, admittedly, some frustra- 
tion over the time it has taken to move 
as far as we have. But these are com- 
plex and delicate questions which have 
required months of quiet negotiation. 
There is today virtually unanimous 
agreement on the basis for resolving this 
intricate and important problem. We are 
at the point where the transition to in- 
dependence can begin as soon as the key 
parties are prepared to take the neces- 
sary political decisions. 

Angola 

With the Government of Angola we 
have undertaken a separate but parallel 
negotiation which, if successful, will pro- 
vide for the departure of Cuban forces, 
thus opening the way to a South African 
decision to implement the international 
agreements so painstakingly developed 
on Namibia's transition to independence 
while setting the stage for peace in 
Angola itself. In IV2 years of talks, we 
have sought to build confidence in our 
objectives and to establish a principle of 
broad applicability to the region at large. 

That principle is reciprocity. Prog- 
ress in the area can be achieved only if 
all parties make a contribution and only 
if the security and sovereignty of each 
are respected. South Africa must leave 
Angola's southern provinces, and it must 
leave Namibia. Angola, on the other 
hand, can make such steps possible, 
while remaining true to its principles, by 
assuring as a separate sovereign act the 
withdrawal of Cuban combat forces 
from its territory. 

The position of the United States is 
clear. The President is committed to 
Namibia's independence. He wants to 



assist in creating a peaceful and in- 
dependent Angola in a peaceful and 
prosperous region. He is prepared to use 
his full influence to achieve these ends. 

A Framework for Regional Security 

The quest for peace in southern Africa 
does not stop with Namibia and Angola. 
Our diplomacy has consciously sought 
broader regional security. We have 
moved to rebuild our relations with 
strife-torn Mozambique. We have 
responded to Mozambique's difficult 
economic circumstances with food aid 



Our policy of con- 
structive engagement re- 
jects simplistic stereo- 
types based on race and 
ideology as inadequate 
guidelines for U.S. 
policy. 



and will shortly send an ambassador 
there. We have pressed for dialogue be- 
tween South Africa and Mozambique 
and an end to cross-border violence. Our 
efforts have been rewarded with two 
rounds of talks at ministerial level be- 
tween the governments and a commit- 
ment to a continued search for under- 
standing despite the pressures of recurr- 
ing violence. The dialogue is fragile, but 
we will continue to do what we can to 
foster it. 

Similarly, between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe and South Africa and Lesotho 
we have quietly urged patience, re- 
straint, and dialogue. Here again our ef- 
forts have achieved a measure of suc- 
cess. But, I repeat, the framework is 
new: It is vulnerable, and only through 
good will and reciprocal undertakings 
will it survive. 

This concept of regional security in 
southern Africa rests on several key 
premises. 

First, we are talking about 
sovereignty. Apart from Namibia, the 
region consists of sovereign states which 
recognize the rights and obligations of 
that statehood. Respect for international 
boundaries and renunciation of the use 
of violence across them are central to 
any framework for international securi- 






ty. There can be no double standards n 
either South Africa or its neighbors. Te 
obligations of statehood, in southern || 
Africa as elsewhere, are basic and 
reciprocal. 

Second, the United States cate- 
gorically reaffirms the principle that 
states have a duty to refrain from 
tolerating or acquiescing in organized 
activities within their territory by gue I 
rillas or dissidents planning acts of 
violence in the territory of another 
state. This applies equally to South 
Africa and its neighbors. 

Third, regional security cannot re: 
solely on the activity, the vision, or thJ 
influence of outsiders. Our task is not 
impose a structure of security. The 
structure must rest on regional realitii] 
mutual interests, and direct channels ( 
communication. Our role is to foster a 
climate conducive to building it. We 
have made a beginning by stressing 01 
readiness to work for reduced violencel 
to facilitate contact and communicatio I 
to build bridges, and to serve as hones 1 
broker. To be effective, our stance mm 
rest on a capacity to speak credibly to 
all states. We are uniquely qualified to 
play this role, and we intend to play it 
But it is up to the governments directl 
concerned — in South Africa, Mozambi- 
que, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Zambia, and others — to make the basi< 
choice between the temptations of 
violence and the challenge of coex- 
istence. 

Fourth, we recognize that it is no' 
realistic to speak of regional security 
without reference to the domestic 
political dimension of coexistence be- 
tween states. The dilemma we face is 
that peaceful domestic change in 
southern Africa and regional security 
are both urgently needed if the risks c 
growing international strife are to be 
avoided. 

In South Africa, about which I will' 
speak further in a moment, the im- 
perative of peaceful change is domesti< 
South Africa has enjoyed sovereign 
statehood for over 70 years. Yet, a 
structure of regional stability in 
southern Africa is unlikely to take root) 
in the absence of basic movement awa; 
from a system of legally entrenched ru 
by the white minority in South Africa. 
By the same token, peaceful change 
toward social justice and equality for a 
South Africans is unlikely to happen in 
regional climate of escalating strife an( 
polarization. 

In Namibia, we and our contact 
group allies are working effectively as 



10 



Department of State Bulleti 



AFRICA 



natter of highest priority to bring about 
[egotiated peaceful change to interna- 
ionally recognized independence. Sue- 
ess would directly benefit in many ways 
i.ur goals of building regional security, 
ddressing the issues of cross-border 
iolence and foreign intervention. 

he Dimensions of U.S. Regional 
nvolvement 

"here are those who see in southern 
Africa's political tensions an opportunity 
or the West to identify the good guys 
nd the bad guys and then to align itself 
ccordingly. Others argue that the 
Jnited States cannot maintain construc- 
ive ties based on principle and mutual 
iterest with both South Africa and its 
drican-ruled neighbors. Our policy of 
onstructive engagement rejects sim- 
listic stereotypes based on race and 
leology as inadequate guidelines for 
I.S. policy. From the outset of this Ad- 
linistration, we have signaled our hope 
3r constructive relations with all 
overnments in southern Africa. No 
sgional state or external power can or 
hould define our relations for us. 

Accordingly, if we are to be effective 
1 this region, we must maintain a 
alanced policy that is relevant to its 
eeds and that fully reflects its diversity 
nd divisions. Politically, we seek to 
olster those whose development policies 
nd external actions warrant that sup- 
ort. But we have also consciously held 
ut the option to others to diversify 
neir external orientation and to pursue 
oser economic ties with the West. Our 
^operative diplomacy on Namibia has 
rought us into intensive contact with 
le front-line states, a grouping that 
oans a wide range of African political 
loices— some of them still evolving. 
ice President Bush's travel last 
ovember to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
aire— and return visits here by their 
•aders— enable us to nurture these im- 
ortant ties. Our substantial commit- 
ment to the success and health of newly 
idependent Zimbabwe is another 
imension of our effort to help this 
:rategically important region find 
Lability and growth. While Zimbabwe 
aces serious difficulties, its leadership 
as committed itself to the principles of 
olitical reconciliation and a mixed 
conomy. Because of its key geographic 
osition and relatively strong economic 
<ase, it is important that Zimbabwe not 
ail as a new nation. 

Economically, some 25% of U.S. 
ilateral assistance to sub-Saharan 
vfrica goes to southern African states, 



six of which are landlocked. Though rich 
in minerals and human potential, most 
states of the area share to a greater or 
lesser degree in Africa's current 
economic crisis. As part of our effort to 
deal with the region's economic crisis, 
we are working to support Zambia's ef- 
forts to restructure its economy and 
stimulate its promising agricultural sec- 
tor. The recent visit of President Kaun- 
da to the United States and subsequent 
intensive consultations have given im- 
petus to this process. 

Southern Africa's current drought — 
the worst in decades — represents a 
serious challenge to economic security 
and human well-being in the region. 
After careful review of this potential 
food disaster, we have recently in- 
creased by $25 million our PL-480 food 
aid programs for affected nations, 
beyond the $79 million for fiscal years 
1983-84 already programmed. Over the 
longer term, even as political tensions 
threaten to divide southern Africa, there 
are potent factors of geography, history, 
and economics that pull these states 
together. Transport links, the pattern of 
interstate boundaries, and the natural 
flow of goods and people all point in the 
direction of regional cooperation. We 
are supporting the regional efforts in 
transport and food security of the 
Southern African Development Coor- 



therefore, we must reject the legal and 
political premises and consequences of 
apartheid. Indeed, it is increasingly 
recognized as impossible to maintain by 
a growing number of South Africans of 
all races. 

We reject unequivocally attempts to 
denationalize the black South African 
majority and relegate them to citizen- 
ship in the separate tribal homelands. 
We do not and will not recognize these 
areas. All Americans are repelled by the 
sight of long-settled, stable black com- 
munities being uprooted and their in- 
habitants forcibly removed to barren 
sites in far away "homelands" they have 
never seen before. Neither can we 
countenance repression of organizations 
and individuals by means of administra- 
tive measures like banning and detention 
without due process of law. 

By one means or another, South 
Africa's domestic racial system will be 
changed. Black South Africans will gain 
fuller participation in all aspects of 
South African society and politics. Our 
policy is directed, therefore, not at 
whether a nonracial order is in South 
Africa's future or what the shape of that 
nonracial order will be, but how that 
nonracial order will be arrived at. 
Western policy toward South Africa 
today must focus on how various black 
groups acquire the basis and influence 



The political system in South Africa is morally 
wrong. We stand against injustice, and, therefore, 
we must reject the legal and political premises and 
consequences of apartheid .... Our policy is 
directed, therefore, not at whether a nonracial 
order is in South Africa 's future or what the shape 
of that nonracial order will be, but how that 
nonracial order will be arrived at. 



dination Conference, while also quietly 
urging South Africa and its neighbors to 
maintain pragmatic trade and customs 
agreements based on mutual benefit. 

South Africa 

It is essential that South Africans get on 
with the business of deciding and shap- 
ing their own future. The political 
system in South Africa is morally 
wrong. We stand against injustice, and, 



necessary to participate in a genuine 
bargaining process that produces change 
acceptable to all. The future of South 
Africa depends on those who participate 
in shaping it. A peaceful process of 
change depends on support from those 
who reject, as we do, both alignment 
with the current racial order and 
violence as a means of ending it. 

We believe that South African and 
U.S. interests are best served by en- 
couraging the change that is now under 



ugust 1983 



11 



AFRICA 



way in South Africa. We are committed 
to strengthening the capacity of black 
South Africans to participate in their 
country's society as equals— economical- 
ly, culturally, and politically. It is our 
view thai such "power to participate" 
can only be made; it cannot be taken. 
This is not and cannot be a zero-sum 
game since power taken by force or a 
revolutionary upheaval will likely leave 
little worth fighting over. 

American efforts should, therefore, 
concentrate on positive steps which back 
constructive change and those who are 
working for it. We applaud the steps 
which arc being taken to expand home 
ownership opportunities, trade union 
rights,\and access to education. The 
structure and substance of apartheid are 
inevitably affected as education budgets 
grow dramatically and blacks find new 
opportunities and new influence as 
workers and consumers. The recent 
South African court decision to confirm 
urban residency rights of blacks is an 
important development. Equally, the 
findings of the de Lange Education 
Commission underline the necessity of a 
sustained expansion of opportunity on a 
basis of greater equity. The commis- 
sion's findings and recommendations 
deserve recognition and support. 

South Africa retains an independent 
judiciary and a distinguished bar— two 
institutions which tie it to the finest 
traditions of Western democracy. In- 
deed, the rule of law is for South Africa, 
as for any country, a precious in- 
heritance. In recent years the power of 
the court has been circumscribed by new 
acts of parliament and police practices 
which remove from the courts the ability 
to review executive action. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the system of 
detention, where the right of access to 
those in the hands of the police has been 
limited. Such a system leads to abuse. 
There are few things Americans should 
be prouder of than the rule of law in our 
society. Similarly, we admire efforts by 
South Africans to retain an independent 
judiciary. Those who work to rebuild the 
rule of law are forging anew South 
Africa's more important links to 
Western democracy. We wish them well. 

Our policy— constructive engage- 
ment—supports those inside and outside 
government in South Africa who are 
committed to peaceful change away 
from apartheid. Our support is both 
tangible and political. It is essential that 
we in the West, who have the most to 
offer toward peaceful change and much 
to lose if it fails, send an unambiguous 
message to the people of this increasing- 
ly important country. The message is, 



first, that we agree with those South 
Africans who recognize that change is 
imperative and. second, that we are 
determined to permit them the oppor- 
tunity to shape and define that change 
free of the threat of foreign interven- 
tion. 

Constuctive engagement seeks to 
support trade unionists, students, en- 
trepreneurs, government leaders. 



It is essential that 
we in the West who have 
the most to offer toward 
peaceful change and 
much to lose if it fails, 
send an unambiguous 
message to the people of 
this increasingly impor- 
tant country. 



cultural-political movements, civic- 
associations, and religious organizations 
which, through their commitment to 
peaceful change away from apartheid, 
can help make a better future for all 
citizens of South Africa. Such groups 
and individuals must prosper if there is 
to be multiracial bargaining leading to a 
government based on the consent of the 
governed. 

To support the positive aspects of 
change in South Africa, the Reagan Ad- 
ministration, with the support of Con- 
gress, has initiated new programs over 
the past 2 years. 

• A $4 million-a-year scholarship 
program which brings approximately 
100 black South African students a year 
to the United States for undergraduate 
and graduate degrees. The majority of 
these students are studying in the hard 
sciences. By 1985 there will be some 400 
black South Africans enrolled in U.S. in- 
stitutions of higher education, and we 
will begin graduating more black engi- 
neers, chemists, and computer engineers 
than now exist in South Africa. 

• In cooperation with the AFL-OIO, 
programs of support are being initiated 
to train labor leaders in South Africa in 
skills which will improve the collective 
bargaining ability of black and mixed 
trade unions anil enhance the dialogue 
between the American and South 
African labor communities. The U.S. 



contribution to this program will in- 
crease from $190,000 this fiscal year t'| 
$875,000 next year. 

• In cooperation with the National 
African Federated Chamber of Com- 
merce of South Africa, we are beginnir 
this year a projecl to support small 
business development in the black con 
munity. Over the next 2 years, some J 
million will be invested in this project a 
designed to enhance tin' economic lev-l 
erage of the black community. 

• In conjunction with black com- 
munity groups throughout South Afrkfl 
we have underway a tutorial program H 
assist black high school students preptl 
ing for the matriculation examination I 
which will determine their professional 
futures. ( >ver the next 2 years this S2 i 
million project should significantly booj 
the number of blacks eligible for unive 
sity admission. 

• Moreover, the U.S. Senate has i 
cently expressed its interest in setting 
aside $5 million for an internal scholar 
ship program as a counterpart to the 
program now bringing black South 
African students to the United States. 
This program, implemented through 
private South African institutions, cou 
provide scholarship support to some 4(' 
black South African students per year 

I do not pretend that these pro- 
grams, in and of themselves, are the 
answer to apartheid. But they are in- 
dicative of an approach that fully 
justifies the term "constructive" We a 
tangibly backing the things we believe 
in. By strengthening the educational 
standards of the black population, by 
enhancing the organizational ability of 
labor, and by expanding the business 
base of the black community, we are 
engaged in institution building for 
change away from apartheid while helji 
ing to encourage the alternative to it. 

In terms of supporting change in 
South Africa, the American business 
community has considerably more ex- 
perience than the U.S. Government. 
< >vor the past decade, American corpoi 
tations with subsidiaries and affiliates 
South Africa have become a force for 
change. The activities of these firms 
have had an impact far beyond the boG 
v-alue of U.S. investment in South Afrii 
and far greater than is commonly recog 
nized. U.S. firms have led the way 
toward equal employment opportunities 
in South Africa. Corporate initiative, 
both foreign and domestic, helped brill 
about changes in South African labor 
law permitting blacks to organize trade 
unions and bargain collectively. U.S. 
firms, acting through the voluntary 



12 



AFRICA 



Sullivan Code of Fair Employment Prac- 
iees. have had a significant impact on 
he well-being of black South Africans 
i>n the job. We strongly believe that 
,'oluntarv adherence to the Sullivan code 
s one of the best ways to go beyond 
■heturic about apartheid. Equally impor- 
ant, so do the great majority of our cor- 
lorate leaders. 

The record of U.S. corporate citizen- 
ship in South Africa, though not perfect, 
s clear and impressive. Our firms have 
teen pacesetters for change. Those in 
;he United States and other Western na- 
:ions who would have our firms dis- 
nvest not only ignore this record of 
ichievement but propose measures that 
•est on no discernible philosophic or 



Namibia 



ONTACT GROUP STATEMENT, 

UNE 8, 1983 1 

1 continuation of the meeting we had at 
Williamsburg, the Foreign Ministers of 
anada, France, the Federal Republic of 
ermany, the United States, and the 
olitical Director of the United Kingdom 
^presenting the British State Secretary 
ir Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
•et to pursue the efforts to achieve an 
irly settlement of the question of 
amibia in accordance with U.N. Securi- 
■ Council Resolution 435. 

They welcome the constructive spirit 
which the recent Security Council 
;bate was conducted. In particular, 
tey noted that the spirit has made 
)ssible the unanimous adoption of 
acurity Council Resolution 532. They 
elcomed, in addition, the Security 
ouncil's reaffirmation of Resolution 435 
; a basis for the settlement of the con- 
ct on the mandate given to the Secre- 
.ry General to undertake consultations 
ith a view to its speedy implementa- 
Dn. The Secretary General may count 
i their final support. 

In view of the increasing violence in 
luthern Africa, they agreed that it is 
ore necessary than ever for all con- 
>rned to promote a peaceful solution, 
hey reaffirmed in this respect their in- 
ntion to pursue their efforts to this 
id. 



■Made available to news correspondents 
acting Department spokesman Alan 
omberg. ■ 



policy promise. Disinvestment by U.S. 
firms would undo an avenue of positive 
effort. Proponents of corporate disin- 
vestment—and of stockholder or pension 
manager sales of stock of firms 
operating in South Africa— would have 
Americans wash their hands of any 
association with that country. This ap- 
parent quest for symbolic dissociation is, 
in reality, a formula guaranteed to 
assure America's irrelevance to South 
Africa's future. 

In the final analysis, however, South 
Africans themselves— both black and 
white— will have to meet the challenge 
of their society, drawing for inspiration 
primarily on their own resources and 
their own history. Movement toward 
change in South Africa is taking place. 
In the economy, blacks have been gain- 
ing ever more bargaining power as pro- 
ducers; they are moving into more 
skilled and responsible positions. As con- 
sumers, their purchasing power has 
become essential to the South African 
economy. Black trade unions have 
become a major new reality. Politically, 
Prime Minister Botha put his own 
political base in jeopardy with his pro- 
posal to extend a limited and ethnically 
based franchise to the colored and Asian 
communities. What some South Africans 
see as too much, others see as too little. 
I do not see it as our business to enter 
into this debate or to endorse the con- 
stitutional proposals now under con- 
sideration for South Africa. Nor do we 
offer tactical advice to any of the in- 
terested parties. Yet the indisputable 
fact which we must recognize is that the 
South African Government has taken 
the first step toward extending national 
political rights beyond the white 
minority. 

Many are quick to point out that 
these proposals make no provision for 
the national political participation of the 
black African majority in South Africa, 
except via the separate tribal home- 
lands. More generally, there is a tenden- 
cy to reject all incremental improve- 
ments in whatever sector of life in South 
Africa that are not explicitly linked to a 
full-blown democratic blueprint. We 
recognize the limits of current change 
and for this reason do not make a prac- 
tice of endorsing individual steps as, in 
themselves, an adequate response to the 
dead end of apartheid. At the same 
time, we believe it is incumbent on us to 
avoid the arrogance of rejecting such 



steps. Nor, if we would be credible, can 
we expect South Africa's would-be 
reformers to announce their game plan 
and their bottom line to the world at 
large. 

We state clearly and unequivocally 
our belief in the concept of government 
based on the consent of the governed. 
We do not presume to offer a formula to 
South Africa for resolving its unsettled 
political agenda other than to state that 
all South Africans must have a say in 
determining their political system. 

Conclusion 

Let me conclude by drawing your atten- 
tion to a little recognized fact. Our 
southern African policy of constructive 
engagement — extending the hand of 
friendship, cooperation, and support to 
all states and peoples of the area who 
wish it— has occasioned controversy. 
Some, it appears, have misunderstood 
the message or chosen for their own 
reasons to misunderstand it. Less 
noticed is the encouraging evidence of a 
growing consensus across party lines 
around the core principles of more ac- 
tive involvement in this increasingly im- 
portant region. Many Americans are 
coming to recognize that without a 
strong Western leadership role, it could 
become a turbulent zone of tragedy. 
They are pleased to see the United 
States striving diplomatically to build 
regional peace, to achieve independence 
for Namibia, to create conditions for the 
departure of Cuban troops from Angola. 
I detect a common sense public aware- 
ness that we can do these things only if 
we develop close and credible working 
relations with all the parties in the 
region. Whatever tactical debates may 
exist, I perceive a growing consensus in 
Congress, among businessmen, church 
leaders, trade unionists, and the media 
that it is right for Americans to do more 
than preach about apartheid. The time 
has come to support what we believe in, 
not to walk away in self-righteous in- 
dignation. ■ 



ugust 1983 



13 



AFRICA 



Visit of Ivory Coast President 



President Felix Houjihouet-Boigny of 
the Ivory < 'mist made a state visit to the 
United States June 6-20, 1983, and to 
Washington, D.C., to meet withPresi- 
dent Reagan and other government of- 
ftcials June 6-12. 

Following are remarks made at the 
arrival ceremony and dinner toasts 
made by Presidents Reagan and 
Houphouet-Boigny on June 7. 1 



ARRIVAL CEREMONY 

President Reagan 

We're privileged to welcome to 
Washington today one of the world's 
senior statesmen, a man of outstanding 
stature and the father of his coun- 
try—His Excellency President Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast. 

On the African Continent and 
throughout the world, he is known as a 
spokesman for reason and open com- 
munications as the means for resolving 
conflict and ensuring a better world. We 
share with President Houphouet this 
belief in dialogue. I look forward to our 
discussion today, and in many days to 
come, on the vital issues which face the 
African Continent and the world. 

Ivory Coast itself is an outstanding 
example of the progress and prosperity 
that can be achieved in an atmosphere 
of peace, security, and individual liberty. 
The President has often emphasized 
these as the fundamental ingredients of 
economic well-being and advancement. 
And we share his conviction — that only 
in conditions of peace and liberty can a 
nation achieve lasting economic and 
social progress. 

It's a particular pleasure for me to 
welcome today the leader of a nation 
which has so warmly and graciously 
welcomed so many of our own repre- 
sentatives. I have received enthusiastic 
reports about Ivory Coast and its 
economic vitality and vast potential from 
Secretaries Baldrige [of Commerce] and 
Block [of Agriculture], several Senators, 
Assistant Secretary of State [for African 
Affairs] Crocker, and others. And all of 
them were struck by the advances your 
country has made— advances reflecting 
your commitment to a free economy 
which encourages producers through a 
philosophy of hard work and self-help. 

There is a saying in Ivory Coast, "If 
your stomach is empty, ask your hands 
why." You and your countrymen have 
worked hard, and in doing so, you've im- 



ffv r^' 




(White House photo hy Michael Evansl 

proved your lives and gained the respect 
of the world. The remarkable progress 
of your country's agricultural endeavors 
is a tribute to your enlightened leader- 
ship. By making it possible for your 
farmers to get a fair return for their 
work and by recognizing the importance 
of this sector of your economy, you've 
spared the people the deprivation that 
has befallen many others. 

Ivory Coast has built one of the 
richest economies in Africa by 
understanding that before wealth can be 
divided, it must be created. Ivorians can 
be proud of their solid record of 
economic improvement since independ- 
ence. At the same time, your income 
distribution is among the fairest on the 
continent. 

I'm pleased that the American 
private sector has been able to plaj a 
role in realizing what you refer to as 
Ivorian well-being. 

As we welcome you once again to 
our country, we note that many changes 
have occurred since your last visit to the 
White House in 1973. Nations around 
the globe, including Ivory Coast and the 
United States, are struggling to over- 
come a period of severe economic prob- 
lems and uncertainty. But together, we 
can face the future with confidence. 

Our two peoples share a desire for 
liberty and progress that can and will 
triumph over adversity. So today, let us 
renew our pledge to each other that as 
we walk the road to the future, we, the 
people of the I 'nited States and Ivory 
( 'oast, will do so as friends. 



President Houphouet 

It is with great pleasure that I return t 
your magnificent country, where each 
my stays has been a source of discovel 
and admiration, and has strengthened 
my confidence in the future. 

Your thoughtful words of welcome ai 
to my pleasure, because they are 
evidence of your friendly interest in m; 
country, and of the strength of the ties 
that have developed between the Unite 
States and Ivory Coast over more thai 
20 years. 

In extending to me your invitation 
which honored me greatly, you were 
kind enough to tell me how much you 
value personal contacts between heads 
of state. I share your view entirely am 
look forward to being able to discuss 
with you the problems that concern mt 
and which I cannot conceive of being 
resolved without effective and forceful 
steps by the United States of America. 
That is why I am so keenly interested 
hearing your views in regard to the 
various areas where the fate of 
humankind is being played out. 

I thank you most warmly for havin 
afforded me the opportunity, once aga 
to greet the American people through 
you and to express to them the great a 
miration and friendship of the people 
Ivor)' Coast, who share their commit 
ment to the timeless values of peace ai 
justice. 

Long live the United States of 
America; long live our friendship. 



14 



Department of State Bulleti 



AFRICA 



VNER TOASTS 

isident Reagan 

isident and Mrs. Houphouet-Boigny, 
:inguished ladies and gentlemen, it's a 
cial pleasure for me to welcome our 
st of honor this evening. 
During the 1980 campaign, I sug- 
ted that the United States should 
irn to some of the basics of free 
erprise — policies that would en- 
rage individual responsibility, hard 
•k, and investment. It's taken time, 
we're at last overcoming the 
nomic uncertainty that we inherited, 
have to admit, I've always been confi- 
t that we would. I just kept telling 
self, "It worked in Ivory Coast, didn't 
[Laughter] 

Your many successes haven't gone 
oticed here in the United States, 
ike many other countries, some of 
ch are far richer in natural 
mrces, you chose the high road of 
tical and economic freedom. In doing 
you've made Ivory Coast a shining 
mple to the rest of Africa and the 
Id. 

Your wisdom has been a guiding 
t for your people and a beacon of 
;on and modernization in the world 
ia. You are a leader who stresses 
ague as a means of solving even the 
t vexing problems. You advocate 
promise over confrontation, concilia- 
over conflict. Your humane and 
ocratic values reflect well on the 
jle of Ivory Coast. 
During our discussions today, we 
:hed on many mutual areas of con- 
I especially those dealing with the 
notion of economic growth. The 
sident had been forced to make 
^h decisions concerning government 
iding. I can identify with that, 
ighter] I deeply admire his far- 
ted commitment to the long-range 
rests of his people. Today we're con- 
nt that closeness and interaction be- 
en our two peoples can be nothing 
a blessing for us all. 
I ask you now to join me in a toast 
resident Houphouet-Boigny and to 
continued friendship between our 
peoples that his visit attests to. 

sident Houphouet 

President, allow me first of all to 
ak you for your warm welcome and 
all the thoughtfulness that has been 
vvn us since our arrival here. I should 

like to express to you our sincere 
titude for your kind words describing 



Ivory Coast policies and for having af- 
firmed so clearly your desire to develop 
our cooperation. 

One of your predecessors remarked 
that history has given the United States 
the role of being either a witness to the 
failure of freedom or the architect of its 
triumph. I can only subscribe to that 
fine thought. Yet the extent of your 
commitments, the immense responsibili- 
ty they imply, even for the most power- 
ful nation in the world, might have led 
me to fear that in a time of crisis, when, 
especially in your own hemisphere as 
well as in Asia and the Middle East, 
problems as worrisome as they are sen- 
sitive require all of your vigilance and 
that of the team around you. I might 
have feared that your attention might 
have been diverted from the seemingly 
less pressing problems of Africa. It was, 
therefore, most reassuring for me to 
note your determination to help Africa 
to regain its peace and to achieve a 
prosperity that seems discouragingly 
ever more remote. 

You said on February 13, 1980, that 
the United States has an obligation to 
its citizens and to the people of the 
world never to let those who would 
destroy freedom dictate the future 
course of human existence on our 
planet. There is no lack of opportunity 
for the enemies of freedom who find, in 
poverty and ignorance, the best fuel for 
their sinister designs. It is, therefore, 
important not to neglect any political, 
social, economic, educational, or cultural 
sector — any country, any region, any 
society where there may develop and ex- 
plode the kind of conflicts that the 
enemies of freedom provoke or sustain. 
And since prevention is better than 
cure, one must also be certain not to 
allow the perpetuation of unjust situa- 
tions that foster them. 

To be sure, you have consistently 
stressed the need for individuals, like na- 
tions, to take their problems into their 
own hands, to assume responsibility for 
their own future, and to cease to rely 
solely on assistance, as some at times 
are all too pleased to do. 

In Ivory Coast we have always 
urged our fellow citizens to rely first 
and foremost on themselves. But no one 
can deny that there are individuals and 
there are nations that are handicapped 
and cannot emerge from their tragic 
situation without aid— extended aid. Nor 
can anyone deny that the world today 
finds itself in the absurd situation of 
wasting money on ever more costly 
weapons — sums of money which, com- 



pared to which the amounts of money 
that go for development assistance, are 
pitifully small. 

And the situation is aggravated by 
the constant threat of insecurity, which 
compels the developing nations that 
have modest, indeed, even inadequate 
resources to fight simultaneously on two 
fronts: the development front and the 
security front, with development too 
often having to be sacrified for the sake 
of security. So, what the developing 
countries and Africa, in particular, need 
most are peace and stability, the precon- 
ditions for any harmonious development. 

You, the American people, are the 
best equipped to recognize the lack of 
progress of countries that do not enjoy 
political stability and which are becom- 
ing increasingly serious threats to world 
peace. The best factor for peace is the 
well-being, the happiness of peoples. 
Peace and well-being are inseparable. 

The West has the means to lend ef- 
fective assistance to Africa, but that aid 
will be for naught if our own production 
efforts are constantly ruined by 
speculators. To be sure, Africa at pres- 
ent only accounts for 2% of world trade. 
That is not a great deal; we recognize 
that. But that is the Africa of today. It 
is not the Africa of tomorrow, the 
Africa of the future, the Africa we want 
to build with the West, drawing on our 
own efforts. Our potential is great. 

I should like to quote here that 
masterpiece of Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, In his conclusion 
he wrote, "I am filled with fears and 
filled with hopes. I see great evils that 
can be avoided or contained, and I am 
becoming ever more firm in my convic- 
tion that in order to be honest and pros- 
perous, the democratic nations have only 
to determine that they will be so." 

I could not conclude more fittingly 
than by expressing our confidence in the 
democratic nations, among which the 
United States holds the most important 
place. 

I would ask you to please join me in 
a toast to President Ronald Reagan and 
to Mrs. Reagan to whom I present my 
most respectful and heartfelt com- 
pliments, and also to the happiness and 
to the prosperity of the great people of 
the United States and to the friendship 
between the United States and Ivory 
Coast. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 13, 1983. 



15 



AFRICA 



20th Anniversary of the OAU 






Secretary Shultz s remarks at a 
reception in honor of the 20th anniver- 
sary of the Organization of African Uni- 
ty (OAU) on May 25, 1983. > 

This is an important event, the 20th an- 
niversary of the Organization of African 
Unity. And I am very pleased, en- 
thusiastic, for the opportunity to be here 
on this occasion. 

As President Reagan made clear in 
his message to your chairman, President 
Arap Moi of Kenya, the United States 
knows well the positive contribution that 
the OAU has made to stability and prog- 
ress in Africa over the past 20 years and 
the potential it has for even greater ac- 
complishments in the years to come. It 
is clear to us that the fundamental prin- 
ciples of the OAU deserve the support 
not only of the members of the OAU but 
all peace-loving nations. They certainly 
have our support. 

Not long after I became Secretary, I 
met with many of your foreign ministers 
and permanent representatives in New 
York at a special OAU luncheon. 
Africa's prominence in the international 
community was much on my mind then 
and has remained so ever since. 

The Administration attaches great 
importance to our relations with Africa. 
Namibian independence under interna- 
tionally acceptable terms constitutes one 
of our principal foreign policy objectives. 
And, I might say, [Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs] Chester Crocker has 
been working his heart out on that as 
have many others of us in the Depart- 
ment, and the President has spent a 
great deal of time and effort and energy 
on this. And, as I plan to say to several 
of your colleagues in New York this 
week, we remain fully committed to the 
work of the contact group and are 
hopeful that its negotiations, and those 
in which we are engaged on related 
regional issues of peace, will prove suc- 
cessful. 

In connection with southern Africa 
and in connection with the apartheid 
system, I would say unambiguously, une- 
quivocally, with no qualifications 
whatever, that the system of apartheid 
is unjust and unacceptable. 

The OAU has a noble tradition of 
promoting the peaceful resolution of 
conflict on the continent. The United 
States seeks the same objective, whether 
in southern Africa, the Western Sahara, 
or the Horn. We are particularly pleased 
to be able to work together in making a 
modest contribution to the deployment 
of the OAU's first peacekeeping force 



last year. Strengthened regional security 
is a cardinal objective of U.S. policy in 
Africa. It has been a cornerstone of the 
OAU's role and objectives for 20 years. 
This simple fact explains why we attach 
importance to the health and vitality of 
Africa's regional organization. 

We are all aware of the terrible 
economic crises much of Africa is en- 
countering. We know, too, that these 
provoke political turmoil both as their 
effects are felt and as your governments 
take the corrective measures required to 
restructure your economies on a sounder 
footing. We are working hard to restore 
the conditions of sound growth in the 
world economy. And I am sure that this 
will be a matter of central attention at 
the Williamsburg summit. Hard deci- 
sions and strong leadership are required 
in this effort. We admire the courage 
many African leaders are displaying in 
making difficult decisions to restore 
their economies, and I can assure you 
that the U.S. Government will continue 
to support those governments which 
come to grips with their economic prob- 
lems realistically. 

Tomorrow in New York, I plan to 
make a talk on the subject of economic 
development and the U.S. stake in the 
development of the developing 
economies of the world. 



It has been the President's pleasujij 
to receive more than a dozen African! J 
chiefs of state in Washington, and we, « 
look forward to the state visit next w 
month of one of the continent's most 
distinguished statesmen, President 
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast 
Vice President Bush and other Cabin' 
members have visited your continent, 
and I hope to have the opportunity tc 
so myself. I have visited but not as 
Secretary of State; it doesn't count 
when you visited there as a private 
citizen, I discovered that. But you lea 
more that way oftentimes. You get 
around among people and you find oi 
what's on their minds. 

There are enormous problems fac 
Africa today. I do not need to tell yoi 
the suffering, poverty, denials of basi 
human rights, refugee flows, armed c 
flicts, and economic woes facing your 
region. I do want you to know that w 
respect the substantial strides made i 
many countries and the constructive I 
played by the OAU itself in building i 
climate for peace and development. T 
United States cannot solve Africa's 
problems, nor would Africans want u 
to. But we can and are determined to 
support a regional organization whos< 
goals and founding principles are full 
consistent with our national interests 



•Press release 194. 






President's Message to 

OAU Chairman Daniel T. Arap Moi, 

May 25, 1983 2 



On the occasion of the Twentieth Anniver- 
sary of the Organization of African Unity, it 
is both a pleasure and an honor for me to ex- 
press the congratulations and good wishes of 
the people of the United States to you as 
Chairman of the OAU and to the member na- 
tions of the organization. The United States 
shares with the OAU its objectives of 
"freedom, equality, justice and dignity for all 
African peoples." 

We also support the fundamental prin- 
ciples of the OAU, embodied in Article 111 of 
your charter: sovereign equality of all 
member states; non-interference in the inter- 
nal affairs of states; territorial integrity; 
peaceful settlement of disputes; condemna- 
tion of political assassination and subversion; 
dedication to the total emancipation of still 
dependent African territories; and genuine 
nonalignment. We believe the OAU has made 
a positive contribution to stability and prog- 
ress in Africa over the past twenty years, 
and that it has the potential for even greater 
accomplishments in the years to come. 



The United States remains supportive 
African efforts to seek a cessation of conf 
and violence, as well as efforts aimed at 
meaningful economic progress. And we fit 
ly agree that African problems can best bi 
solved by African solutions. We applaud 
when your Organization moves forward to 
meet serious challenges on the African Co 
nent. as was demonstrated by the OAU's 
peace-keeping force in Chad. 

The OAU has experienced a difficult 
twentieth year, perhaps the most difficult 
year in its history. We are confident, 
however, as most OAU member states mu 
be, that the Organization can and will con- 
tinue to provide the unique forum for con- 
tinental cooperation. We wish the OAU we 
on this important day marking the Organii 
tion's first two decades, and we wish it we 
in all the years ahead. 

Konai 1 1 Kr,v 



2 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 30, 1983.1 



16 



Department of State Bulle 



RMS CONTROL 



Strategic Modernization: 

Foreign Policy and Arms Control Implications 



1 Kenneth W. Dam 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
\Foreiijn Opt rations of the Senate Ap- 
mpriations Committee on May 4, 1983. 
I'. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State. 1 

intaining an effective and stable 
■lear deterrent presents the President 
1 the Congress with difficult and com- 
x choices. As the chairman of the 
Bident's bipartisan Commission on 
ategie Forces, Gen. Scowcroft has 
i: "There are no simple solutions to 
questions that must be answered in 
ing our forces, achieving equitable 
is control agreements and improving 
itegic stability." 
As this committee knows, the 
cific issue of a new American ICBM 
ercontinental ballistic missile] has 
n debated hotly for almost a decade. 
3 time that we made a decision. And, 
ny view, that decision should be to 
ceed with production and deployment 
he Peacekeeper missile. 
There has been consensus on the 
d for a new ICBM for many years 
'. Each of the past four Presidents 
supported the development of a new 
:M, and the Congress has been sup- 
:ive as well. It is the choice of a bas- 
mode for that new ICBM that has 
plicated the production and deploy- 
it decision. 

The President's bipartisan Commis- 
on Strategic Forces has completed 
•eview of the overall U.S. strategic 
;ure. The commission studied a 
iber of alternative basing modes for 
■w ICBM, consulted with Congress, 
presented unanimous conclusions 
•erning U.S. strategic forces and 
s control. The commission conclu- 
s have now been accepted by the 
sident, and the President's recom- 
'dations are before the Congress, 
se recommendations provide the 
« for developing a broad national 



eign Policy 
the Strategic Balance 

most important goals of our defense 
foreign policy are to prevent war 
to maintain a just peace. The foun- 
on of peace in the nuclear age has 



been America's strategy of deterrence. 
Since we first acquired nuclear weapons, 
the United States has sought to prevent 
war by discouraging aggression against 
the United States and its allies. By 
presenting any potential aggressor with 
the prospect of certain retaliation, peace 
has been maintained for nearly 40 years. 
The history of the 20th century makes it 
sadly clear that peaceful intentions and 
good motives alone will not stop ag- 
gressors. Adequate military strength 
does do so, and the strategy of deter- 
rence has been successful in protecting 
the security of America and Western 
Europe since the end of World War II. 

The strategic balance, however, has 
dimensions beyond deterrence. That 
balance shapes the global context in 
which Ameican foreign policy operates. 
As Deputy Secretary of State, I am 
acutely aware that America's military 
strength is vital to the conduct of 
foreign policy. Our perceived strengths 
and weaknesses directly affect our abili- 
ty to achieve our goals. Therefore, the 
decisions we make or fail to make on 
weapons programs are bound to in- 
fluence the judgments not only of our 
adversaries but also of our allies and 
friends around the world. 

The growth of Soviet military power 
relative to the United States over the 
past 10 years has had a direct effect on 
Soviet willingness to challenge America's 
interests around the world. Moscow is 
using its power directly in Syria, Poland, 
and Afghanistan and indirectly through 
its proxies in Angola and closer to home 
in Central America. These are the tangi- 
ble manifestations of growing Soviet 
power. Our concern is that unless we 
maintain a strategic nuclear balance be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the problem of Soviet adven- 
turism will persist and may get even 
worse. 

If for example, the Soviets are able 
to strike effectively at our land-based 
ICBMs while we do not have comparable 
capability, Moscow might believe it could 
gain political leverage by a threat of 
nuclear blackmail. Without arguing the 
question of whether the Soviets are 
prepared to launch a nuclear first-strike, 
one can recognize that such a crucial im- 
balance in strategic capabilities could 
well make them bolder in a regional con- 



flict or in a major crisis. That situation 
cannot be in the interest of either this 
nation or of world peace. 

Our visible commitment to maintain- 
ing the strategic balance is also essential 
to sustain the confidence of our friends 
and cohesion of our alliances. While we 
have debated among ourselves and 
tabled serious arms control initiatives at 
the negotiating table, the Soviets have 
deployed— repeatedly. Over the past 
decade the Soviets have deployed three 
new ICBMs. They have tested two more 
in the last 6 months and have, at least, 
two additional new types of ICBMs in 
development. 

What would our allies and other na- 
tions conclude about American strength, 
resolve, and reliability if we were to fail 
to deploy a new ICBM in the face of 
these Soviet developments? Our foreign 
policy and our ability to defend our in- 
terests and our most cherished values 
will be decisively strengthened if the 
Congress gives strong backing to the 
program the President announced last 
month. Modernization of our deterrent, 
and of our land-based ICBM force in 
particular, is essential to the goals of 
preventing conflict, reducing the risk of 
war, and demonstrating our resolve to 
adversaries and allies alike. At the same 
time, it will also increase Moscow's in- 
centive to negotiate seriously in START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] and 
other arms reduction talks. 

Arms Reduction 

and the Strategic Balance 

It is important to note that the 
Scowcroft commission did not consider 
the ICBM problem, or even our overall 
strategic posture, in isolation from other 
issues. They also considered the relation- 
ship between strategic programs and 
arms control. The commission made 
clear that there was a necessary com- 
plementary between strategic programs 
and arms control. Both arms control and 
modernization programs can affect the 
strategic balance. Vigorous pursuit of 
both is the best course to pursue. To 
quote the Scowcroft commission report: 
"Our arms control proposals and our 
strategic arms programs should thus be 
integrated and be mutually reinforcing. 
They should work together to permit us, 



just 1983 



17 



ARMS CONTROL 



and encourage the Soviets, to move in 
directions that reduce or eliminate the 
advantage of aggression and also reduce 
the risk of war by accident or 
miscalculation." 

President Reagan adopted this dual 
approach early in his Administration. 
When he announced his modernization 
program, he also announced that the 
United States would negotiate with the 
Soviet Union to achieve mutual and deep 
nuclear arms reductions. We are now 
negotiating seriously with the Soviets in 
Geneva on both intermediate-range and 
strategic nuclear weapons. 

If we have learned anything from 
our experience in arms control negotia- 
tions over the last two decades, we 
should have learned this fundamental 
truth: The process of arms control 
depends on the demonstrated ability of 
the United States to maintain an effec- 
tive strategic force. This, in turn, 
depends, as it always has, on maintain- 
ing a modern, capable triad of strategic 
forces. The Peacekeeper ICBM is a 
critical component of that modernized 
triad. 

As a lawyer, I know that negotia- 
tions begin only when both parties 
believe they have something to gain by 
talking or something to lose by failing to 
talk. Without the incentive of gain or 
loss provided by our modernization pro- 
gram, the Soviets would see no advan- 
tage in negotiating seriously to reduce 
their own nuclear force. 

The Peacekeeper represents the 
response that each of the past four ad- 
ministrations has considered necessary 
to offset, at least partially, the for- 
midable Soviet ICBM arsenal. The ques- 
tion now before us is whether we shall 
abandon this decade-long modernization 
program. 

As the Scowcroft commission report 
reasoned: "It is illusory to believe that 
we would obtain a satisfactory agree- 
ment with the Soviets limiting ICBM 
deployments if we unilaterally ter- 
minated the only new U.S. ICBM pro- 
gram that could lead to deployment in 
this decade. . . . Abandoning the MX at 
this time in search of a substitute would 
jeopardize, not enhance, the likelihood of 
reaching a stabilizing and equitable 
agreement." 

The commission's recommendations 
included more than support for deploy- 
ing the Peacekeeper missile. The com- 
mission also recommended, and the 
President agreed, that the full modern- 
ization program begun in 1981 be con- 
tinued. It also recommended develop- 
ment of a new small single-warhead 



missile and continuation of research on 
survivability improvements for our 
ICBMs, including active defense and silo 
hardening. 

Questions have been raised about 
whether the proposed modernization 
program is consistent with our arms 
control objectives and our obligations 
under past arms control agreements. 
Let me assure you that the proposed 
program is fully consistent with those 
objectives and obligations. The 
Peacekeeper is consistent with all 
specific provisions of existing SALT 
[strategic arms limitation talks] 
agreements. Deploying 100 of the new 
missiles in existing Minuteman silos, as 
the President proposed, would involve 
no construction of new fixed launchers, 
no increase in silo volume, and no in- 
crease in MIRVed [multiple independent- 
ly targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM 
launchers. Moreover, the 100 new 
Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos 
are, obviously, far too small a force to 
be destabilizing. 

Some have wondered, however, how 
the development of a small ICBM in ad- 
dition to the Peacekeeper would be con- 
sistent with either SALT II or a possible 
START agreement. The SALT II Treaty 
would have permitted deployment of no 
more than one new ICBM on each side. 
On our side, the new missile would be 
the Peacekeeper. But that treaty, even 
if it had been ratified, would have ex- 
pired at the end of 1985. The President's 
proposal calls for the start of engineer- 
ing development of a new small ICBM, 
but no deployment would be possible un- 
til after 1990— long after the SALT II 
time period had expired. And long 
before that time, we would hope that a 
START agreement will have established 
a new regime for maintaining a stable 
strategic balance. 

Beyond this, the new small missile, 
if it proves feasible, would have broader, 
positive implications for arms control. It 
would enhance stability, because it 
would be more survivable, and stability 
has always been a central objective of 
arms control since the process began. As 
[Defense] Secretary Weinberger has ex- 
plained, it may move the evolution of 
strategic systems in a stabilizing direc- 
tion over the long term. The basic con- 
cepts underlying our START proposals 
are flexible enough to accommodate this 
small missile. 

The U.S. -Soviet strategic competi- 
tion will continue into the long-term 
future. And there is no guarantee that a 



w 



restructuring of U.S. and Soviet fore 
in the direction of single warheads 
take place in the near future. But we 
believe both sides have real incentive 
move in this direction. In the meanti 
we need now to take the hard decisk 
necessary to ensure a safe strategic 
tionship for the years immediately 
ahead. 

Conclusion 

I share with the Secretary of State a 
the Secretary of Defense the convicti 
that modernization of our strategic 
forces is a matter of the highest prio 
ty. A credible, flexible strategic force 
not only vital to the balance of powei 
but is the essential foundation of our 
role as leader and defender of free n; 
tions. The fundamental goal of nucle; 
deterrence depends on a credible fore 
Our goal of deterring non-nuclear wa 
nuclear blackmail also depends on it. 
The Peacekeeper missile is indis- 
pensable to our near-term goals of 
restoring the strategic balance, achie' 
ing deterrence, and providing an ince 
tive to the Soviets for serious negotia 
tions on arms reductions. Developmei 
of a small ICBM may well enhance 
strategic stability in the longer term. 
But as the Scowcroft commission 
stressed, neither of the two systems 
ensure security alone; they are com- 
plementary. Strength and peace are i\ 
complementary. Both must be pursue 
with determination. And with that de 
mination, both can be achieved. 



'The complete transcript of the hearing: 
will be published by the committee and wi 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



18 



Department of State Bullel 



AST ASIA 



J.S., Philippines Conclude 
Jases Agreement Review 



lEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 

IUNE 1. 1983 

1 Manila today, June 1, U.S. ami Philip- 
lie Government representatives signed 
Memorandum of Agreement coll- 
uding our review of the U.S.-Philippine 
ilitary Bases Agreement. Review 
scussions started on April 11 between 
le U.S. panel, led by U.S. Ambassador 
> the Philippines, Michael H. Armacost, 
id the Philippine panel, headed by Am- 
issador to the United States, Benjamin 
. Romualdez. Ambassadors Armacost 
id Romualdez signed the Memorandum 
' Agreement for their respective coun- 
ies. The review was conducted in a 
irdial and cooperative atmosphere. The 
jreement enters into force immedi- 
.ely. 

The review confirmed the continuing 
ilue of the Military Bases Agreement 
both countries in maintaining the 
■ace and security of the region. The 
jeement maintains the current U.S. 
•e of military facilities at Clark Air 
ise and Subic Bay Naval Base and 
fleets Philippine sovereignty over the 
ses. Several items in the agreement 
e intended to improve administrative 
rangements concerning the bases, 
nong these are the establishment of a 
nt committee, similar to ones we have 
th Japan and Korea, to address ques- 
>ns relating to the implementation of 
e Military Bases Agreement; pro- 
dures for access by Philippine base 
thorities to the U.S. facilities within 
e bases; and procedures for supplying 
formation on levels of U.S. forces per- 
inently stationed at the facilities, as 
ell as on their equipment and weapons 
stems; the withholding of Philippine 
;ome tax from the salaries of Philip- 
ne national employees working for the 
S. Armed Forces; and procedures for 
curing exemption of U.S. Armed 
>rces personnel from Philippine travel 
x and modification of automobile 
gistration fees paid by U.S. forces. 

In the light of the satisfactory coll- 
ision of the review of the Military 
ises Agreement and with a view 
ward enhancing the Philippine con- 
ibution to regional peace and stability, 
letter from President Reagan has been 
ansmitted to President Marcos stating 
at the executive branch will make its 
•st effort to obtain a total of $900 
illion in security assistance for the 
lilippines for the FY 1985-89 period, 
lis assistance will enable the United 



States to help the Philippines in its 
economic development and military 
modernization efforts. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
JUNE 1. 1983 

The Governments of the United States 
and the Republic of the Philippines have 
completed the scheduled fifth anniver- 
sary review of the 1947 Military Bases 
Agreement as called for in the 1979 
amendment. Ambassador of the Philip- 
pines to the United States, Benjamin T. 
Romualdez, and Ambassador of the 
United States to the Philippines, Michael 
H. Armacost, headed the two panels 
which, in a spirit of close and friendly 
cooperation, conducted discussions in 
Manila from April 11, 1983, to June 1, 
1983. 

Accordingly, a complete and through 
reassessment of the Military Bases 
Agreement and the manner of its im- 
plementation was accomplished to en- 
sure that the agreement continues to 
serve the interests of both parties. The 
review resulted in the signing of a 
Memorandum of Agreement between 
the two governments amending the 
Military Bases Agreement. 

The Memorandum of Agreement 
contains provisions on: 

A. Procedures for access of the 
Philippine Base Commander to the U.S. 
facilities and for the submission of infor- 
mation regarding U.S. force levels and 
their equipment and weapons systems in 
the Philippines; 

B. The obligation of the U.S. Armed 
Forces personnel to respect Philippine 
law and to abstain from any political ac- 
tivity; 

C. The U.S. pledge to cooperate 
with the Philippine Government in im- 
proving economic and social conditions 
in Angeles City and Olongapo City and 
surrounding areas; 

D. The procurement of Philippine 
goods and services by the U.S. forces to 
the maximum extent feasible; 

E. The modification of criminal 
jurisdiction arrangements in the event of 
war; 

F. The review of the Base Labor 
Agreement within 6 months; 

G. The withholding of income tax 
from Filipino employees working for the 
U.S. Armed Forces at U.S. facilities; 

H. Procedures for securing exemp- 



tion of U.S. Armed Forces personnel 
from Philippine travel tax and modifica- 
tion of automobile registration fees; 

I. The establishment of a joint com- 
mittee to facilitate more effective im- 
plementation of the Military Bases 
Agreement on a continuing basis. In ad- 
dition, the joint committee will have the 
authority to review base areas that 
might be returned to the Philippines; 
study social, health, and other problems 
with a view to recommending programs 
and activities to improve conditions and 
enhance cordial relations between 
American personnel in the U.S. facilities 
and the surrounding Filipino com- 
munities; and address other topics 
relating to the implementation of the 
agreement. 

The United States will allow the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines to pro- 
cure fuel from the pipeline between 
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air 
Base in accordance with existing U.S. 
procedures and policies regarding the 
acquisition of military items. 

During the review, both parties took 
note of the importance of the Military 
Bases Agreement in serving the security 
interests of the United States and the 
Philippines and in furthering the strong 
traditional ties between the two coun- 
tries. In the light of the satisfactory con- 
clusion of the review of the Military 
Bases Agreement and with the view 
toward enhancing the Philippine con- 
tribution to regional peace and stability, 
President Reagan has conveyed in a let- 
ter to President Marcos the intent of the 
executive branch of the U.S. Govern- 
ment to make its best effort to obtain 
appropriations for the Philippines of 
$900 million in security assistance, in- 
cluding economic support funds. The ap- 
propriations, which are subject to U.S. 
congressional approval, will be sought 
over a 5-year period beginning in U.S. 
FY 1985 in the following amounts: grant 
economic support funds $475 million; 
foreign military sales credits $300 
million; and grant military assistance 
$125 million. 



MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, 
JUNE 1, 1983 

The exchange of notes between the Govern- 
ment of the Philippines and the Government 
of the United States amending the Military 
Bases Agreement, dated January 7, 1979, 
provides: "In every fifth anniversary year 
from the date of this modification and until 
the termination of the Military Bases Agree- 
ment, there shall be begun and completed a 
complete and thorough review and reassess- 
ment of the agreement, including its objec- 



ugust 1983 



19 



EAST ASIA 



tives, its provisions, its duration, and the 
manner of implementation, to assure that the 
agreement continues to serve the mutual in- 
terests of both parties." 

Accordingly, discussions between 
representatives of the Government of the 
Philippines and the Government of the 
United States were conducted in Manila from 
April 11, 1983, to June 1, 1983. Pursuant to 
the understanding reached during the review, 
the Government of the Philippines and the 
Government of the United States agree to 
the following; 

I. Operational Use of the Bases 

Within the context of Philippine sovereignty, 
the operational use of the bases for military 
combat operations other than those con- 
ducted in accordance with the Philippines- 
United States Mutual Defense Treaty and the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
(Manila Pact), or the establishment by the 
Government of the United States of long- 
range missiles in the bases, shall be the sub- 
ject of prior consultation with the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of the Philippines, not- 
withstanding the provision of the 1979 
amendment to the Military Bases Agreement 
assuring the United States of unhampered 
military operations involving its forces in the 
Philippines. 

II. Access and Information 

With a view to keeping the Government of 
the Philippines fully informed about the ac- 
tivities of the United States forces in the 
Philippines, the following shall be established; 

(1) The Base Commander and his 
designated representative shall have access 
to all areas of the United States facilities ex- 
cept cryptographic areas and areas where 
classified equipment or information is located. 
Access to areas where classified equipment or 
information is located shall be in accordance 
with mutually agreed procedures. 

(2) The Government of the United States 
shall, within a reasonable period, inform the 
Government of the Philippines of the current 
level of the United States forces permanently 
stationed in the Philippines, and their equip- 
ment and weapons systems. Thereafter, the 
United States Government shall notify the 
Government of the Philippines of any major 
change in United States forces permanently 
stationed in the Philippines, and major 
changes in their equipment and weapons 
systems. 

III. Respect for Philippine Law 

It is the duty of members of the United 
States forces, the civilian component, and 
their dependents, to respect the laws of the 
Republic of the Philippines and to abstain 
from any activity inconsistent with the spirit 
of the Military Bases Agreement and, in par- 
ticular, from any political activity in the 
Philippines. The United States shall take all 
measures within its authority to ensure thai 
this is done. 

The appropriate authorities of the 



Government of the Philippines and the 
Government of the United States shall 
cooperate in taking such steps as are 
necessary to prevent abuse of importation 
privileges granted to the United States per- 
sonnel and their dependents pursuant to the 
Military Bases Agreement. 

In this connection, the two Governments 
wish to reaffirm existing arrangements 
established in t he prior agreements w Inch 
provide for cooperation between the United 
States Armed Forces and Philippine 
authorities. 

IV. Economic and Social Improvement 
of Areas Surrounding the Bases 

The Government of the United States reaf- 
firms the statements made by Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance in his letter of January 6, 
1979, to Minister for Foreign Affairs Carlos 
P. Romulo to the effect that the two Govern- 
ments shall take steps to promote suitable 
projects in the base lands outside the United 
States facilities and the areas surrounding 
them and that the Government of the United 
States is prepared to consider, subject to the 
approval of the United States Congress, ap- 
propriate assistance for improving economic 
and social conditions in Angeles City and 
Olongapo City and surrounding areas and to 
relate these efforts of the Government of the 
United States to plans of the Government of 
the Philippines for the utilization of returned 
base land areas. Moreover, the United States 
Forces shall procure goods and services in 
the Philippines to the maximum extent feasi- 
ble. 

V. Criminal Jurisdiction 

Paragraph 6 of the agreed official minutes 
regarding Article XIII of the Military Bases 
Agreement as revised by the Mendez-Blair 
agreement of August 10, 1965, is amended to 
read: 

"In the event of hostilities to which the 
provisions of Article V of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty apply, either the Government of the 
Philippines or the Government of the United 
States shall have the right, by giving sixty 
days notice to the other, to suspend the ap- 
plication of any provision of Article XIII of 
the Military Bases Agreement. If such notice 
is given, the two Governments shall im- 
mediately consult with a view to agreeing on 
suitable arrangements to replace the provi- 
sions suspended. Until new arrangements are 
concluded, the provisions of Article XIII shall 
continue to apply in full." 

VI. Labor and Taxation 

Representatives of the Government of the 
Philippines and the Government of the 
United States shall meet to discuss possible 
revisions of or alterations in the Agreement 
of May 27, 19t>8, concerning the employment 
of Philippine nationals by the United States 
Forces in the Philippines in light of the 
critical contribution made by the Philippine 
national work force to the effective operation 
of the United States facilities and with a view 



to ensuring that labor relations involving j 
Philippine national work force remain harl 
monious and productive. These discussion;! 
shall begin within six months after the coil 
elusion of the 1983 review of the Military 
Bases Agreement or on another date agrel 
upon. The discussions shall be conducted cl 
the basis of the principles of equality of trl 
ment, the right to organize and bargain ccl 
lectively, and respect for the sovereignty (I 
the Republic of the Philippines. 

The Government of the United States 
shall make arrangements for the withhold] 
beginning October 1, 1983, of Philippine ir 
come tax from the salaries of Philippine n; 
tionals employed by the Armed Forces of I 
United States in connection with the con- 
struction, maintenance, and operation of tl 
United States facilities, in accordance with 
applicable Philippine laws and regulations, 
except employees whose income is exempt 
from Philippine income taxation or who ar 
members of the United States Armed Fort 
The Government of the Philippines shall 
notify such employees of the United States 
that withholding has been initiated at the : 
quest of the Government of the Philippines 
and that the Government of the United 
States, in complying with that request, inc 
no obligation with respect to any reduction 
net compensation or payment which may 
result. 

The Government of the Philippines sha 
adopt a simplified procedure to facilitate tl 
travel of members of the United States 
Armed Forces, the civilian component, and 
their dependents, who shall continue to be 
empt from the payment of the travel tax ir 
posed under Presidential Decree No. 1183 
August 21, 1977. 

With regard to automobiles imported ir 
the Philippines under the Military Bases 
Agreement by members of the United Stat 
Armed Forces, the civilian component, and 
their dependents, charges imposed for the 
registration of those automobiles shall inch 
only the actual registration and license plat 
fees. 

VII. Joint Committee 

A Military Bases Agreement Joint Commit 
tee shall be established as a means of con- 
sultation between the two Governments on 
matters regarding the implementation of th> 
Military Bases Agreement which cannot be 
resolved between the Philippine Base Com- 
mander and the United States Facilities Co; 
manders or any other matter regarding im- 
plementation of the Military Bases Agree- 
ment which either side wishes to bring befo 
the Committee. The Military Bases Agree- 
ment Joint Committee will assume respon- 
sibility for matters relating to that agree- 
ment referred to in paragraph 4A of Annex 
A of the exchange of notes of May 15. 1958 
establishing the Philippine-United States 
Mutual Defense Board. In view of its special 
character and composition, the Criminal 
Jurisdiction Implementation Committee will 
remain as presently constituted. 

The Military Bases Agreement Joint 
Committee shall be composed of a represent 



20 



Department of State Bulletii 



EAST ASIA 



five of the Government of Philippines and a 

jepresentative of the Government of the 
iJnited States, each of whom shall have one 
r more deputies and staff. The Committee 
hail determine its own procedures and ar- 
ange for such auxiliary organs and ad- 
Bnistrative services as may be required. The 
'ommittee shall be so organized that it may 
heet at any time at the request of the 
lepresentative of either Government. 

If the Military Bases Agreement Joint 
'ommittee is unable to resolve any matter, it 
hall refer that matter to the respective 
rovernments for further consideration. 

This agreement shall enter into force 
pon signature. In witness whereof, the 
ndersigned, being duly authorized by their 
espective Governments, have signed this 
greement. 

Done at Manila, in duplicate, this 1st day 
f June, 1983. 

'or the Government of the 
Inited States of America 

IICHAEL H. ARMACOST 

'or the Government of the 
lepublic of the Philippines 

lENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ 



RESIDENT REAGAN'S 
,ETTER TO 
RESIDENT MARCOS 

May 31, 1983 

'ear Mr. President: 

was pleased to learn that our representa- 
ves have completed the review of the 
lilitary Bases Agreement which was agreed 
> during your state visit to the United 
tates last year. 

In light of this development, I wish to 
,ate that the Executive Branch of the 
nited States Government will, during the 
ve fiscal years beginning on October 1, 
084, make its best efforts to obtain ap- 
ropriation of security assistance for the 
hilippines in the following amounts: 

lilitary Assistance $125,000,000 

oreign Military Sales Credits . .$300,000,000 
conomic Support Fund 
Assistance $475,000,000 

In this connection the United States 
overnment will seek to provide the Foreign 
lilitary Sales Credit on the basis of a grace 
eriod of ten years and a repayment period 
f twenty years. As you are aware, under our 
onstitutional system, the Congress has sole 
uthority to appropriate funds. 

I was also pleased to note that the 
lilitary Bases Agreement review confirmed 
hat the Agreement continues to meet our 
nutual needs and interests. I believe that this 
eview has again underlined the close and 
listoric ties linking our two countries and will 
ontribute to further strengthening the peace 
ind security of the western Pacific region. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan ■ 



U.S.-Philippine Relations and the 
Military Bases Agreement Review 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asia and the Pacific of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
June 16, 1983. Mr. Wolfowitz is As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. : 

I am pleased to address today our 
overall relations with the Philippines and 
the recently concluded 5-year review of 
our 1947 Military Bases Agreement 
(MBA). This review, completed in the 
relatively short period of 7 weeks, 
reflects the excellent state of our 
bilateral relations and the important role 
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air 
Base play in furthering our mutual 
security interests. 

Long-Term Bilateral 
Relationship 

The close ties between the United States 
and the Philippines span the 20th cen- 
tury. It is a long and deep relationship. 
The U.S. influence in the Philippines has 
been a strong and positive one. And our 
own culture and society have been 
enriched, in turn, by our relationship 
with the Philippines and by the presence 
of the roughly 1 million Filipino- 
Americans and Filipinos who live in the 
United States. Our longstanding 
economic ties are healthy, also. The 
United States is still the largest market 
for Philippine goods and the primary 
source of its foreign investment. 

In addition to these shared personal 
and economic interests, our countries 
have been partners for decades in the ef- 
fort to promote our common interest in 
regional stability and security. We were 
comrades-in-arms during World War II, 
and we have continued a close security 
partnership after the Philippines became 
independent in 1946. The treaty cover- 
ing our bases dates back to 1947, our 
Mutual Defense Treaty to 1952. 

Role of the U.S. Military Presence 

U.S. military forces in the Philippines 
are evidence of our abiding commitment 
to the Philippines under our Mutual 
Defense Treaty. This security relation- 
ship is, in turn, a key element of our 
policies toward Southeast Asia, which 



have contributed significantly to the 
peace, security, and remarkable 
economic growth and political stability 
of the entire region. 

Our facilities at Subic Bay and Clark 
Air Field play a crucial role in further- 
ing our efforts: 

• To provide an effective counter- 
balance in the area to the growing 
military power of the Soviet Union and 
its surrogates; 

• To support our treaty com- 
mitments in East Asia; 

• To support ASEAN [Association 
of South East Asian Nations] and 
strengthen U.S. ties to ASEAN coun- 
tries; 

• To protect the sea and air lanes in 
and around an area that occupies an im- 
portant place in world trade; and 

• To provide the logistic support of 
U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and 
Southwest Asia that help to maintain 
peace and stability and to protect vital 
interests of the United States — and of 
U.S. allies— in that important part of 
the world. 

As President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos 
stated recently, all the countries in the 
region friendly to the United States ap- 
prove of U.S. naval and air facilities in 
the Philippines, because they ensure the 
balance of power in Southeast Asia. A 
U.S. military withdrawal would only 
benefit those who wish to fill the result- 
ant power vacuum. 

Political Situation 
in the Philippines 

Both teams of negotiators were well 
aware of these benefits as we entered 
the recent review of our bases agree- 
ment. But security factors were not the 
only concerns on our agenda. Major 
military facilities, such as those we have 
in the Philippines, can only be effectively 
operated with the support of the host 
country's government and people. Main- 
taining needed support and warm rela- 
tions between our countries, through 
due regard for Philippine sensitivities, 
was thus a major concern in our discus- 
sions on basing arrangements. 

Unfortunately, some criticism of the 
U.S. military presence has been an in- 
gredient of Philippine politics for many 



<^ugust 1983 



21 



EAST ASIA 



years. In gauging the extent of such op- 
position, however, it is worth noting 
that, despite the considerable public 
scrutiny recently focused on the bases, 
our continued role does not appear to 
have been a major matter of contention. 
We believe the support we have enjoyed 
through various Philippine governments 
since World War II will continue. 

Given our long-term security rela- 
tionship with the Philippines, we also 
pay close attention to other domestic 
political developments, including human 
rights issues. The ending of martial law 
in 1981 brought with it some im- 
provements in the civil liberties situa- 
tion. However, progress has been 
uneven. In recent months, the Marcos 
government has again introduced con- 
straints. Controls on public assembly 
and the press have been eased, although 
at times controls on the press were 
reasserted. For example, the leading op- 
position newspaper was shut down, but 
another opposition newspaper recently 
started publishing. There is criticism of 
the government and of government 
policies in the media, but it is subdued. 
One respected moderate opposition 
leader, the mayor of a large city in 
Mindanao, has been jailed. On balance, 
however, it is fair to say that in some 
respects the situation is improved over 
1978, when we last discussed our 
military presence with the Philippine 
Government. 

The increase in armed insurgent ac- 
tions, however, has caused a serious 
problem of military excesses against 
civilians. The government knows that 
this is a problem and has attempted to 
remedy it but, so far, with little success. 
Recently, however, in the first action of 
its kind, two high-ranking officers were 
convicted of abuses. 

Human rights and church groups 
regularly bring these problems to the 
government's attention. The Catholic 
church's recent pastoral letter on this 
and other problems was met with a 
declaration of the government's intent to 
engage in dialogue. 

The United States, for its part, 
welcomes any efforts on the part of the 
government and concerned groups of 
Filipinos to address their problems 
through dialogue. We look toward the 
scheduled parliamentary elections in 
1984, in which it is our expectation that 
all legitimate groups will have a fair 
chance to participate. These elections 
promise significant progress toward a 
more open political system. Meanwhile, 
we will continue to deal with human 
rights issues and problems in the Philip- 
pines through a policy of quiet dialogue 



with the government and extensive con- 
tact with a wide spectrum of Philippine 
society, including the legitimate opposi- 
tion. This active policy is a fundamental 
part of our overall approach in the 
Philippines. 

Terms of the 1983 MBA Review 

Against this background of concerns, we 
conducted the recent 5-year review of 
the MBA. The key U.S. objectives were 
to enhance our two nations' mutual 
security; to ensure the continuation of 
unhampered use of the U.S. facilities 
consistent with the respect due to Philip- 
pine sovereignty; and to facilitate resolu- 
tion of practical problems — all with an 
eye to limited U.S. resources. I am 
pleased to report that we were able to 
accomplish these objectives. For its part, 
the Philippine Government stressed, as 
did we, its continuing sovereignty over 
the U.S. facilities. 

While maintaining the essential 
structure of our current agreement, the 
review resulted in a series of new pro- 
cedures and administrative ar- 
rangements to deal with the practical 
problems which inevitably arise in a 
close bilateral undertaking of this sort. 
The most important new provision is the 
establishment of a joint committee, 
similar to the one we have with Japan 
and Korea, to facilitate implementation 
of the MBA. In addition, other note- 
worthy points included: 

• Procedures for access of the 
Philippine Base Commander to the U.S. 
facilities; 

• Procedures for the submission of 
information on U.S. force levels and 
their equipment and weapons systems; 
and 

• Procedures for securing exemp- 
tion of U.S. Armed Forces personnel 
from Philippine travel tax and modifica- 
tion of automobile registration fees. 

At the conclusion of the review, 
President Reagan transmitted a letter to 
President Marcos conveying the pledge 
of the executive branch to make its best 
efforts to provide $900 million in securi- 
ty assistance during the 5 fiscal years 
beginning October 1, 1984. The figure of 
$900 million was reached after con- 
sideration of the Philippine Govern- 
ment's economic development needs, its 
defense modernization goals, our current 
assistance efforts in the Philippines, and 
the decline in the real purchasing power 
of our assistance levels since the time of 
the last base review in 1979. 

Subject to the authorization and ap- 
propriation of funds by the Congress, 



the intention of the executive branch il 
to provide more than half of the 
package: $475 million in economic supl 
port funds (ESF). We shall soon begin! 
planning with the Philippine Govern- I 
ment on ESF projects and programs. I 
These will be submitted to the Congrel 
for approval during the normal 
budgetary process. We expect that soil 
of the funds will be used to improve til 
social and economic conditions of areal 
adjacent to the bases, while most of til 
funds will be used on a nationwide basl 
in support of Philippine economic 
development priorities. 

The rest of the proposed 5-year 
security assistance is military: $125 
million in the military assistance pro- 
gram (MAP) and $300 million in foreig 
military sales (FMS) credit guarantees 
This assistance would enable the Phili] 
pine military to begin to address serio< 
ly its modernization efforts, which in r 
cent years have been affected adverse 
by Philippine Government budgetary 
constraints. We are committed to re- 
quest the Congress for FMS credits h; 
ing a 10-year grace period, and repay- 
ment over 20 years. Although we have 
not discussed specific Philippine milita 
needs in connection with this assistanc 
package, we would expect it, on the 
basis of past practice, to be used to pu 
chase aircraft, helicopters, ground 
vehicles, engineering equipment, surfa 
vessels, communications equipment, ai 
other defense articles. 



Conclusion 

The U.S. -Philippine relationship has o^ 
the years benefited the Philippines, th> 
entire Southeast Asian region, and — b 
no means least — ourselves. We can tai 
great pride in the contributions we ha 1 
made to the area and the positive role 
we have played. I would hope that we 
will continue to be an active player in 
this important part of the world for a 
long time to come. That is also the wis- 
of leaders and people of the Philippine: 
and of the peace-loving countries of th> 
entire region. 



'The complete transcript of the hearing 
will he published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



22 



Department of State Bulletii 



ICONOMICS 





he Challenge of 
Economic Growth 

r Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the sixth UN < 'on- 
rence on Trade and Development 
'NCTAD VI) in Belgrade on June 13, 
SS. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of 
ate. 

S. participation in UNCTAD VI is 
tided by four principles. 

First, economic progress and 
velopment is a common goal. The 
hievement of that goal will require a 
rious, sustained effort on the part of 
countries, both North and South. As 
•cretary of State Shultz noted recently: 

The reality of mutual interest between 
■ Northern and Southern Hemispheres is 
: at all reflected in either the doctrinaire 
ird World theory of debilitating dependen- 
nor the aid giver's obsolete sense of 
;ronage. There is now a relationship of 
tual responsibility. Our common task is to 
ke this link a spur to growth in both 
rions. . . . 

Second, solutions to the problems 
at we face will be found in a construc- 
e and cooperative environment. It is 
this context that President Reagan 
ongly supported a continuing North- 
uth dialogue at the summit in Cancun, 
?xico. The seriousness of the situation 

face makes it imperative that we 
>rk together in the common pursuit of 
Elistic and workable solutions. 

Third, UNCTAD has an important 
>e to play, as defined by its mandate, 
the challenge of economic develop- 
•nt. Our efforts, therefore, should con- 
ltrate on reaching conclusions that 

attainable within the context of 
■JCTAD. This conference can best 
•ve the interests of its members by 
.ping, through debate and discussion, 
create greater consensus on how to 
;ure sustained economic recovery and 
velopment. 

Fourth, the central focus of interna- 
nal cooperation should be strengthen- 
r an open international trading, finan- 
.1, investment system that nurtures 
Dwth for all countries. 

I should like now to outline for you a 
3gram of action based on these four 
mciples. In so doing, I shall discuss 



the roles in development of economic 
growth, trade expansion, and interna- 
tional finance, as well as the important 
interrelationships of savings, aid, and in- 
vestment. 

Growth and Global Recovery 

We are now emerging from the longest 
recession of the postwar period. North 
America and Europe have experienced 
outright declines in economic activity; 
Japan's industrial production has 
stagnated; unemployment has soared— 
32 million people are out of work in the 
24 industrial countries of the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 

The growth of the oil-importing 
developing countries, which averaged 
5% annually in the 1970s, slackened 
from 1980 to 1982 to a 2% annual 
rate— the lowest since 1950. The 
dynamic progress of several large 
developing countries was stalled under 
the weight of large international debts. 
Total world exports declined 7% from 
1980 to 1982, from almost $2.1 trillion 
to well under $2 trillion. 



the Consumer Price Index) has plunged 
from over 12% in 1980 to just under 4% 
in the 12 months ending this April. The 
prime interest rate is now at 10.5% — 
about half its peak in 1981 of 21.5%. In 
April, industrial production jumped 
2.1%; it has been rising at an annual 
rate above 10% since its low point in 
November. 

Growth with low inflation has 
resumed also in the economies of Japan, 
Germany, Britain, and others which, 
together with the United States, account 
for about three-quarters of the produc- 
tion of the industrial countries. The 
challenge now is to turn this revival into 
a global recovery and sustained growth 
for the rest of the 1980s— and beyond. 

Trade and Commodities 

World trade is the key to this revival. In 
the near term, trade is the transmission 
belt by which recovery in the developed 
countries will produce faster growth in 
the developing countries. For all coun- 
tries, trade is the dominant source of ex- 
ternal resources, and for developing 
countries trade is the dominant impetus 
to growth. In 1980, the developing coun- 
tries' export earnings of $580 billion 
were 17 times as much as their net 
receipts of aid. Acceleration of growth 
in the industrial nations from about 2% 
this year (the forecast of the OECD 
Secretariat) to 4% the next year and 



For the developing countries, the worldwide 
recession has led to a serious income-earning prob- 
lem. The only lasting solution to that problem, and 
also to the problems of the industrial countries, is 
sustained economic growth — without renewed 
inflation. 



For the developing countries, the 
worldwide recession has led to a serious 
income-earning problem. The only 
lasting solution to that problem, and also 
to the problems of the industrialized 
countries, is sustained economic 
growth— without renewed inflation. 

The industrialized countries have 
now begun to lead an expansion of the 
world economy. In the United States, 
for example, inflation (as measured by 



beyond would itself add $20-$25 billion 
annually to the export earnings of non- 
oil developing countries. 

The United States, whose market is 
the world's largest and one of the most 
open, has contributed significantly to the 
growth and diversification of developing 
countries' exports. In 1981 the United 
States purchased more than $120 billion 
in goods and services from developing 
countries, of which $70 billion consists of 



ugust 1983 



23 



ECONOMICS 



imports from non-oil developing coun- 
tries. U.S. purchases absorbed almost 
one-quarter of all exports of those non- 
oil developing countries and more than 
half of their exports of manufactured 
goods to OECD countries. The growth 
in U.S. imports of manufactured goods 
from the developing countries has been 



on proposals for a new negotiating 
round in the GATT." 

The United States believes that 
major cooperative efforts are needed to 
assure an open international trading 
system for all, with particular emphasis 
on the growth of developing countries 
during the rest of this century. A pro- 



The United States believes that major 
cooperative efforts are needed to assure an open in- 
ternational trading system for all, with particular 
emphasis on the growth of developing countries 
during the rest of this century. 



especially strong. During the 1970s 
these imports grew at an average rate 
of 27% per year. Our market remains 
largely open. The average U.S. tariff on 
dutiable exports of developing countries 
is less than 5%; our nontariff obstacles 
to trade are relatively few. 

Large, growing, open markets are 
the main hope of the developing coun- 
tries for dealing with their debt burdens 
and growth problems. The United States 
is committed to maintaining and expand- 
ing open markets. 

Last November's ministerial meeting 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) did not accomplish all 
that we desired, but it did keep the 
GATT system moving in a positive direc- 
tion. The meeting ended with a declara- 
tion in which the ministers pledged "to 
refrain from taking or maintaining any 
measures inconsistent with the GATT." 
The OECD ministerial in early May 
went even further, with the ministers 
pledging to "reverse protectionist 
trends." 

The heads of state who met recently 
at Williamsburg agreed to translate 
these pledges on open trade from words 
to concrete actions. The summit part- 
ners agreed "to halt protectionism, and 
as recovery proceeds to reverse it by 
dismantling trade barriers." They also 
agreed to "work to achieve further trade 
liberalization negotiations in the GATT, 
with particular emphasis on expanding 
trade with and among developing coun- 
tries . . . [and] to continue consultations 



gram equal to the challenge of assuring 
an open trading system should include 
the following actions. 

• First of all, nations should 
strengthen their commitments to resist 
protectionism. Developed countries have 
particularly serious responsibilities here, 
because their constructive actions great- 
ly benefit other countries as well as 
themselves. 

• Furthermore, preparations should 
begin now under GATT auspices for a 
major new international trade liberaliza- 
tion, with emphasis on reducing barriers 
to North-South trade through mutual ex- 
change of concessions. 

• Expansion of trade among devel- 
oping countries can also be promoted 
through trade-creating tariff reductions 
among developing countries themselves. 

• Generalized preferences in devel- 
oped countries should be continued and 
refined. In the United States we expect 
to move forward shortly with legislation 
renewing our system of generalized 
trade preferences for developing coun- 
tries. We hope to provide special 
measures to improve the use of our 
generalized preferences scheme by those 
countries most in need of benefits. 

• The GATT should be strengthened 
to spearhead new trade liberalization, 
particularly with developing countries, 
bring greater discipline to the use of 
safeguards, improve dispute settlement, 
and improve the ground rules for 
agricultural trade. 



• Finally, technical assistance 
should be provided to the least 
developed countries to promote their 
trading capacity. 

This program will increase trade, 
promote growth, and provide a found: 
tion for the resolution of many of our 
present problems. 

Our efforts to promote a better 
climate for trade have particular 
relevance to the expansion of developi 
country participation in the processing 
marketing, and distribution of com- 
modities. Achieving our objectives in t 
trade area will accelerate the developi 
country role in these commodity-relate 
activities, where they have already 
demonstrated impressive growth. 

Nevertheless, the United States 
recognizes the difficult problems faced 
by many developing countries heavily 
dependent upon commodity exports. T 
fact is that commodity prices fell by ai 
average of 20% from 1980 to 1982. Tr 
long-term answer to this problem is si 
tained, noninflationary growth over th 
coming years. 

Commodity agreements have not 
been successful, by and large, in 
ameliorating wide swings in commodit 
prices. It is not, therefore, in anyone's 
interest to raise unrealistic expectatioi 
about the usefulness of new commodit 
agreements. While the United States 
will continue to consider such 
agreements on a case-by-case basis, w> 
see a limited role for price stabilizatioi 
agreements. 

More effective, in our opinion, hav 
been arrangements to provide financii 
to commodity-exporting countries wht 
their earnings temporarily fell. The Ir 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
compensatory financing facility of this- 
kind. We will join other members of tl' 
IMF in a constructive review of this 
facility. The United States supports th 
proven approach rather than the crea- 
tion of new institutions with overlappi 
purposes and smaller capital. 

We will consider participation in 
"other measures" commodity agreemei 
if it appears that they serve a useful 
function and meet appropriate criteria 
For example, we have just decided to 
join the International Jute Agreement 
The U.S. Government also is willing tc 
explore the possibility of establishing 
producer-consumer fora for com- 
modities, unless they involve efforts to 
establish price stabilization agreements 



24 



Department of State Bulleti 



ECONOMICS 



In sum, the program I have outlined 
Sr growth and trade can work. The 
(stribution of its benefits, however, will 
ppend on the domestic policies pursued 
V individual developing countries. Some 
f the fastest growing economies in the 
orld are those of East and Southeast 
Isian states which have followed a 
l-ade-oriented strategy. These states 
pve liberal import regimes; adequate in- 
ntives for producers; and realistic 
rices, interest rates, and exchange 
ttes. The experience of these states 
jmonstrates that the most critical con- 
ibution a country can make to its own 
jvelopment lies in pursuing appropriate 
)mestie economic policies. This, I might 
dd, is as true for the United States and 
;veloped countries as it is for develop- 
g countries. 

iternational Finance 

Ike the GATT in the area of trade 
;gotiations, strong international in- 
itutions exist to foster cooperation in 
oviding essential financial support to 
veioping countries. The IMF, with its 
oposed expansion of resources, will be 
lengthened in its role of assisting 
untries with balance-of-payments dif- 
ulties. The World Bank has a large 
pital base to support its essential role 
intermediation between international 
pital markets and developing countries 
th limited access to those markets, 
ese institutions, contrary to the 
.ims of their critics, are proving in the 
rrent difficult period that they are 
al and flexible instruments for sup- 
rting global recovery and economic 
1 velopment. 

The United States sees international 
i titutions such as the IMF, the World 
I nk, and the regional development 
I nks as being essential to the needs of 
I ' deficit and developing countries. 
I ice recent lending by the IMF has 
% lined Fund liquidity, the Reagan Ad- 
1 nistration strongly supports the pro- 
l-sed 47.4% quota increase and the ex- 
I asion of the General Arrangements to 
trrow (GAB) from $7 to $19 billion. 
1st week the $8.4 billion U.S. contribu- 
<n to these increases was approved on 
I ■ floor of the U.S. Senate, and action 
I the House is pending. We are con- 
1 iced that by providing both good 
I icy advice and supplementary financ- 
I ; to ease the process of adjustment, 
I* IMF contributes to the maintenance 
• economic and political stability. 

A more effective role for the IMF, 
Ijether with the multilateral banks, will 
« uire a resilient international financial 



system in (he 1980s. Working together, 
these institutions can help developing 
countries move beyond short-term 
stabilization to long-term policies that 
strengthen market forces and allocate 
resources more efficiently. The result 
should be accelerated growth, not just 
stabilization. 

The United States and other in- 
dustrial countries have been actively 
cooperating over the past 12 months 
with developing countries which face 
serious debt problems. Several Latin 
American countries, for example, have 
seen their progress halted by a burden 
of debt service. Initial steps have been 
taken to stabilize their financial situation 
through emergency international financ- 
ing through the IMF and austerity 
measures. A comprehensive strategy, 
which was endorsed at Williamsburg, 
has been pursued. This strategy contains 
the following elements: effective adjust- 
ment and development policies by debtor 
nations; adequate private and official 
financing; more open markets; and 
worldwide economic recovery. A prin- 
cipal objective of this approach has been 
to preserve the affected countries' 
creditworthiness and ability to attract 
new private capital to help finance 
growth over the coming years. Any 



Savings, Aid, and Investment 

An open trading system and a strong in- 
ternational financial system will help 
provide a framework to nurture growth 
in all countries. Such growth will be 
fueled in each instance by savings, aid, 
and investment. 

The predominant source of produc- 
tive investment in all countries is 
domestic savings. This is as true for 
developing countries as for industrial 
countries. Adequate incentives for peo- 
ple to produce, save, and invest are the 
heart of effective policies for sustained 
growth. The same incentives are essen- 
tial to limit the capital flight which has 
hurt some developing countries and has 
complicated their debt service problems. 

Saving is an area where the record 
of many developing countries over the 
past decade has been especially strong. 
As Prime Minister Gandhi pointed out at 
this conference last week, over 87% of 
the $193 billion India has invested in 
development since 1951 came from 
domestic savings. On the average, 
developing countries have devoted about 
one-quarter of their gross national prod- 
uct (GNP) to investment, with 80% of 
that investment financed by domestic 
savings. 



Foreign assistance is not a substitute for 
domestic savings. There is, in a sense, a pool of 
world savings. Foreign aid is taken from that pool. 
Such assistance has an important but limited role 
in economic development as a supplement to effec- 
tively mobilized domestic savings. 



alternative generalized approach which 
would sacrifice this objective would be a 
wasteful one for all parties. 

Achieving these results may require 
more emphasis on problems of economic 
management by the IMF and more in- 
volvement of the World Bank in sound 
adjustment programs. Such an approach 
helps attract increased private direct in- 
vestment and other financing to provide 
part of the capital the developing coun- 
tries will need over the next decade. It 
augments the direct role of the World 
Bank as intermediator between interna- 
tional capital markets and developing 
countries with limited direct access to 
those markets. 



Foreign assistance is not a 
substitute for domestic savings. There 
is, in a sense, a pool of world savings. 
Foreign aid is taken from that pool. 
Such assistance has an important but 
limited role in economic development as 
a supplement to effectively mobilized 
domestic savings. In the case of the low- 
income developing countries, where 
governments have little or no direct ac- 
cess to international capital markets, the 
role of foreign assistance is especially 
important. 

The United States continues to be 
the largest provider of official develop- 
ment aid. Last year the U.S. economic 



igust 1983 



25 



ECONOMICS 



assistance program totaled $8.2 billion, 
having risen from an average of $6.5 
billion in 1980-81. Our assistance efforts 
are focused on concrete development 
problems. At this moment, for example, 
we have assembled in Washington a 
worldwide conference on a treatment, 
developed with U.S. technology, to com- 
bat infant mortality stemming from 
dehydration. This treatment may save 
the lives of 5 million children per year in 
the developing world. 

In addition to the United States, the 
other 16 members of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) provided official 
development assistance of $20 billion in 



other economic sectors, portend human 
tragedy and prolonged turmoil in many 
African societies unless these tendencies 
are reversed. 

A prominent aspect of the economic 
crisis in Africa is the impact of drought 
on food production. As a part of a policy 
to help affected nations deal with 
drought and other severe emergencies, 
the United States regularly supplies 
emergency food aid to many countries in 
Africa. Indeed, just this past week the 
U.S. Government announced that, in 
response to the disastrous drought and 
crop failure in southern Africa, it has 
approved a special, additional $25 
million drought relief program for that 
stricken region in the year ahead. This 



Economic development is a complex process. 
Many people think of it only in terms of tangible 
things, such as the possession of resources. But the 
possession of resources will not in itself ensure 
development. The resources must be effectively 
used. 



1982. The combined contributions of all 
members support a current lending level 
of $18 billion annually by the 
multilateral development banks. Plans 
call for a rate of annual increase ranging 
from 12% to 15%, depending on the par- 
ticular bank, during the current 
replenishment cycles. 

The World Bank's International 
Development Association (IDA) is seen 
by the United States as a vital institu- 
tion for aiding the poorest developing 
countries. President Reagan has pledged 
his support to meet the full U.S. com- 
mitment to IDA's current replenishment. 
The U.S. House of Representatives has 
responded to the President's appeal by 
approving for this fiscal year the full 
amount requested by the Administration 
toward meeting the U.S. commitment to 
IDA. 

In our efforts to meet the special 
needs of the lower income developing 
countries, we have viewed with great 
concern the economic crisis that has 
spread across much of Africa. President 
Mitterrand of France has justifiably 
urged special attention to this problem, 
posing the danger, in his words, that 
Africa will become "the lost continent of 
development." Falling per capita food 
production, and low productivity in the 



addition brings our total food aid to the 
affected countries in southern Africa, 
during fiscal 1983, to just under $100 
million. 

Emergency measures, however, are 
not enough to resolve the situation in 
Africa. Improvement will require ini- 
tiatives such as the World Bank's 
"Cooperation for Development in Africa" 
and donor participation in the Southern 
Africa Development Coordinating Con- 
ference. New efforts on the part of aid 
donors are also needed to encourage and 
support urgent reform, particularly in 
agriculture. In addition, turning around 
Africa's economic problems will require 
new approaches by Africans themselves. 
For Africa, as well as the rest of the 
developing world, this means instituting 
reforms such as market prices for 
farmers, exchange rate policies that en- 
courage domestic food production, and 
elimination of biases against agriculture 
in domestic investment and credit. In 
the absence of such reforms, develop- 
ment assistance and emergency 
measures can have no lasting productive 
impact. 

One of the goals of such reforms 
should be the encouragement of foreign 
direct private investment. The combined 



effects of growth in many dynamic 
developing economies and of budgetarl 
pressures on industrial countries is thJ 
the roie of investment is growing 
relative to concessional aid. In recent I 
years U.S. aid has increased at a rate I 
about 6% a year. In contrast, both earl 
ings from exports to the United State] 
and the flow of U.S. direct investmentl 
in developing countries grew during til 
1970s by about 20% per year. By the I 
end of 1981 U.S. direct investment in I 
developing countries totaled $56 billioil 

Indeed, international private direcl 
investment presents an important opjl 
tunity for developing countries to supl 
plement domestic savings and official I 
assistance. International direct invest! 
ment can provide many economic beml 
fits to developing countries, such as 
capital, know-how and technology, as 
well as expanded employment and ex- 
ports. Most direct investment con- 
tributes to domestic productive capaci 
without the debt service implications 
which come with commercial borrowir 

One way to expand the flow of 
private investment to the developing 
world is for developed and developing 
countries to establish ground rules thi 
create favorable conditions for it. Ex- 
amples are bilateral tax treaties, in- 
surance understandings, and investme 
agreements worked out or being nego 
tiated between the United States and 
growing number of countries. We star 
ready, as well, to consider a program 
multilateral insurance of investment, ; 
suggested by the President of the Wo 
Bank. 

In addition, we urge other govern 
merits to consider the adverse effects 
that government intervention, such as 
performance requirements, can have c 
their own and the world economies. T 
United States will encourage and acth 
ly participate in continued work in 
multilateral institutions to address the 
questions. Further, we encourage 
adherence by all countries to the Pari? 
Convention for the Protection of In- 
dustrial Property and enactment of ef- 
fective intellectual property laws 
guaranteeing recognition of patent, 
copyright, trademark, and other rights 
to intellectual property. Such laws are 
essential to assure the flow of foreign 
direct investment and of related 
technology and other benefits into hot! 
developed and developing countries. Tl 
lack of adequate property rights is a 
major disincentive to investment in 
manufacturing facilities, to research ar 
development, and to the transfer of 
technologies. 



26 



Department of State Bullei 



ECONOMICS 



ooperation for Development 

|.*onomic development is a complex 
locess. Many people think of it only in 
|rms of tangible things, such as the 
ssession of resources. But the posses- 
in of resources will not in itself ensure 
velopment. The resources must be ef- 
tively used. 

The differences in rates of economic 
Dgress among countries do not result 
marily from lack of natural resources, 
tories of oppression, or differences in 
late abilities among human beings, 
ey result in the main from policies 
rsued by individual countries. Unfor- 
lately there are cases in which coun- 
s have dissipated precious resources 
questionable investments or in sub- 
izing consumption. In other cases, the 
st precious resource of all, human ini- 
ive, has not been given the incentives 
Droductivity or the freedom to make 
kinds of economic decisions which 
lead to dynamic and durable growth. 
As President Reagan said in his 
tember 1981 speech to the IMF and 
rid Bank: 

Only when the human spirit is allowed to 
nt and create, only when individuals are 
n a personal stake in deciding economic 
•ies and benefiting from their success- 
then can societies remain economically 
', dynamic, prosperous, progressive, and 

A society develops also by the free 
iciation of individuals, working 
!ther in voluntary and productive 
javors of every kind. Government 
an undeniable role— as the account- 
servant of the people; as the pro- 
r of public safety and the common 
nse; as the guarantor of human 
ts, due process of law, and equal op- 
unity. 

Governments and nations working 
ether have a vital role, because our 
sperity and progress today depend 
n the health of the global economy as 
1 as that of our own societies. All the 
ensions of development— trade 
ralization, revived commodity 
-kets, strengthened financial support, 
•eased investment, and the more effi- 
nt use of aid— require our col- 
)rative efforts. 
This UNCTAD conference has a 

role in advancing these efforts. 
CTAD is an important forum for 
•ussion of development issues. In 

regard, we are convinced that 
CTAD's effectiveness could be 
fhtened by the adoption of more 
tematic and transparent management 



methods. The results of deliberations at 
this conference can be reflected in 
specific negotiations which lake place in 
the many specialized institutions in 
which our countries work together. In 
sum, I am confident that our discussions 
can make significant progress toward 
resolving real problems in an at- 
mosphere of cooperation and genuine 
dialogue. 



In our time, the developing and in- 
dustrial countries have found their fate 
linked in a truly global economy. The 
reality of North and South is now that 
all of us are in one boat, rising and fall- 
ing together. We now have in prospect a 
rising tide— and calmer seas— to speed 
us on a course of recovery and growth. 
Working together we can catch that 
tide. ■ 



American Policy To Promote 
World Development 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before a session sponsored 
by the International Development Con- 
ference on May 18, 1983. Mr. Wallis is 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

I am honored to have this opportunity to 
address you. Clearly, the focus of this 
conference— World Development In 
Perspective: What Can America Do?— is 
significant and, judging from the size of 
this evening's group, generates con- 
siderable interest. It is also particularly 
timely, since the Williamsburg economic 
summit and the UNCTAD VI [UN Con- 
ference on Trade and Development] con- 
ference are fast approaching. 

Many people respond to the ques- 
tion, what can America do about world 
development, by talking only of the 
tangible things we do, especially em- 
phasizing foreign aid. It is easy to make 
that mistake if one sees development 
only in terms of money. Others make 
the mistake of relating it only to com- 
passion and believe that aid will cause 
deserts to bloom, industries to spring 
up, commerce to flourish, and well-being 
to rise miraculously. Still others see the 
only path to rapid development in collec- 
tivism, through which they can impose 
social, religious, or national goals, 
regardless of the cost in individual 
liberty and cultural traditions. 

Individual Worth 

The real essence of development is dif- 
ferent from all of these things. The 
foundation of development lies in the 
meaning, aspirations, and worth of each 
individual. Its realization is in human 
fulfillment, in the opportunity for all 
men and women to realize freely their 
full potential— to make the most of their 
God-given talents. President Reagan put 



it this way in his October 1981 speech to 
the Philadelphia World Affairs Council: 

We Americans can speak from experience 
on this subject. When the original settlers ar- 
rived here, they faced a wilderness where 
poverty was their daily lot, danger and star- 
vation their close companions. But through 
all the dangers, disappointments, and set- 
backs, they kept their faith. They never 
stopped believing that with the freedom to 
try and try again, they could make tomorrow 
a better day. . . . 

Free people build free markets that ignite 
dynamite development for everyone; and 
that's the key, but that's not all. Something 
else helped us create these unparalleled op- 
portunities for growth and personal fulfill- 
ment. A strong sense of cooperation; free 
association among individuals, rooted in in- 
stitutions of family, church, school, press, and 
voluntary groups of every kind. Government 
too played an important role. It helped 
eradicate slavery and other forms of 
discrimination. It opened up the frontier 
through actions like the Homestead Act and 
rural electrification. And it helped provide a 
sense of security for those who, through no 
fault of their own, could not support 
themselves. 

What President Reagan was saying 
was that government properly does 
those things that open up opportunities 
for individuals and that allow natural in- 
centives to operate in freedom. That is 
quite different from a government that 
tries to compel and command people to 
fit into a preconceived mold, keeping 
them in submission and dependence. It 
is no accident that those countries that 
have allowed free play for personal ini- 
tiative and economic rewards for success 
now produce more than one-half of the 
world's product. Furthermore, those 
developing countries in the Third World 
that have recently been growing the 
fastest are precisely those that have in- 
creased the economic freedom of their 
people. 



gust 1983 



27 



ECONOMICS 



Thus the most important contribu- 
tion that the United States can make to 
world development is to carry to the 
governments and peoples of the less 
developed countries (LDCs) the message 
of our experience— to explain to them its 
lessons. The sooner they turn their 
backs on the false claims and real 
failures of socialism, the sooner they re- 
ject the philosophy of compulsion, coer- 
cion, and command, the sooner will they 
open the way to accelerated, meaningful 
development. This message is the foun- 
dation of a program that helps other 
countries help themselves. 

Use of Resources 

In ensuring development, possessing 
resources for growth is not enough. The 
resources must be effectively used. Un- 
fortunately, there are far too many 
cases in which countries have 
squandered precious resources in ques- 
tionable investments or in subsidizing 
consumption. In other cases, the most 
precious resource of all— human in- 
itiative—has not been given the freedom 
to make the kinds of economic decisions 
which can lead to dynamic and pro- 
sperous economic growth. The most 
critical contribution these countries can 
make to their development lies in pursu- 
ing appropriate domestic economic 
policies. This, I may add, is equally true 
for the United States. 

Accordingly, U.S. policy to stimulate 
economic growth in the developing 
world must encourage countries to adopt 
market-oriented policies. We focus at- 
tention on the role of the private sec- 
tor—domestic as well as foreign— for 
mobilizing and effectively utilizing 
resources for development. Fortunately, 
there appears to be increased recogni- 
tion in both developed and developing 
nations of the role of appropriate 
economic policies. We are continuing to 
encourage movement in this direc- 
tion—directly through bilateral discus- 
sions and indirectly through the interna- 
tional financial institutions. 

Building on these basic principles, 
there are tangible steps the United 
States is taking, and can enlarge upon, 
to facilitate world development. No 
country has a better record than our 
own for positive measures— public and 
private— that contribute to the strength 
of the world economy and to growth in 
the less developed countries. 



In discussing positive U.S. measures 
to promote development in the Third 
World, I begin from a basic premise: In 
addressing the economic difficulties and 
prospects of the developing world, 
restoring sustained noninflationary 
economic growth in the United States is 
the single most significant contribution 
we can make. The reason for that can be 
seen from a few statistics. 

In 1981 the United States purchased 
more than $120 billion in goods and 
services from developing countries. To 
be sure, a significant amount of this is 
accounted for by petroleum products. 
Nevertheless, U.S. purchases amounted 
to nearly 20% of all the exports of those 
LDCs that do not export oil and to 35% 
of all their exports to developed nations. 
The growth in U.S. imports of manufac- 
tured goods from the developing coun- 
tries has been impressive. During the 
1970s, these imports grew at an average 
rate of 27% per year; in other words, 
they doubled every 32 months, on the 
average. The United States now absorbs 
over half of all the manufactured ex- 
ports that non-oil LDCs sell to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, 
even though the U.S. market is only 
one- third of the total OECD market. 
That means that we take 50% more 
than our proportionate share. When you 
consider the billions of dollars of imports 
from the developing world by the United 
States alone, not to mention the imports 
from the other developed countries, 
direct aid pales by comparison. 

Trade and Private Investment 

In the long run, it is only through trade 
that the developing world will be able to 
earn the external resources it needs for 
its development. In view of the 
magnitudes we are dealing with, and of 
the U.S. role as the developing world's 
largest customer, we have a responsibili- 
ty to the rest of the world, as well as to 
ourselves, to ensure that there is sus- 
tained real economic growth in the 
United States. Correspondingly, as the 
world's largest trading nation, we must 
make every effort to ensure that the 
global trading system is open so that the 
developing world and the developed 
world will benefit from, and contribute 
to, each other's growth. 

Fortunately, the United States ap- 
pears to be well on the road to sustained 
noninflationary growth. For the past 



two decades, our government has < iva 
spent, overtaxed, and overregulated. I 
Our growth rate declined. Inflation 
began to creep, then to run, and then 
gallop. Interest rates rose to almost t 
precedented heights. The bold measuj 
of the Reagan Administration have n< 
turned the tide. For a while it appear 
to some doubting Thomases that Ron; 
Reagan would prove to be another Ki 
Canute. But, as the President says, b 
knows that his policies are turning th 
tide because the press no longer refei 
to his policies as "Reaganomics." 

The short-term costs of turning tl 
tide were high, but now inflation and 
terest rates are down, the leading 
economic indicators are up, and inves 
and consumer confidence are returnir 
The United States is doing its part in 
ensuring a long-term global economic 
recovery. Furthermore, despite the 
economic difficulties of the past few 
years and the pressure for protection: 
trade measures, the United States re- 
mains an essentially open market. 

The United States is unique in bei 
the world's largest free trade area an 
one of the most open to world market 
a number of other countries have 
discovered the same ingredient of sue 
cess. Like the United States, these co 
tries — advanced developing countries 
and newly industrialized countries— al 
contribute through trade to the growl, 
of the LDCs. Their recent growth hat 
been the fastest in the world, and the 
growing imports are a spur to growth 
the other countries they trade with. 

Closely related to trade in terms < 
long-term U.S. impact on developmen 
private investment. In addition to pre 
viding additional financial resources t. 
developing countries, foreign investm 
promotes long-term growth by provid 
technology, management know-how, 
access to international markets. Here 
too, the United States has an exeeller. 
record. In the 1970s, U.S. investment 
developing countries accounted for mi 
than half of total investment by OEC1I 
countries in these nations. In the latte 
half of the past decade, U.S. direct 
private investment in the developing 
countries grew at approximately 20% 
per year. In 1981, reflecting the genei 
economic climate, the rate of growth i 
U.S. investment abroad dropped but s 
continued at around 5%. By the end o 
19X1, U.S. direct investment in develo 
ing countries had reached the impress 
level of $5(> billion. 



28 



Department of State Bulle 



ECONOMICS 



ferences Among Developing 
intries 

to now I have discussed the develop- 
countries as if they were all alike, 
arly. however, these countries differ 
fitly among themselves. Any effective 
1 realistic policy must differentiate 
ong countries and tailor development 
itegies to the needs and potentials of 
ividual countries and regions. While 
Bsification is alway somewlrit ar- 
•ary, we have frequently found it 
ful in Washington to recognize 
eral groups of developing countries. 
The first group consists of the oil- 
jorting countries, which have capital 
pluses. To achieve their ambitious 
ns for development, these countries 
d prosperity in the industrial 
nomies so they can sell their oil and 
est their surpluses there. 
Then there are the so-called newly 
ustrialized countries. These nations, 
ough their own efforts and a 
orable economic climate, which has 
mitted great increase in exports and 
stantial inflows of capital, have 
ieved dramatic growth. 
Next there is a larger growth of 
ntries, sometimes referred to as 
Idle-income developing countries, 
ch have achieved some progress but 
have widespread poverty. These 
ntries, which in most cases are 
endent on exports of one of two com- 
iities, have suffered as the global 
■ession has reduced their exports in 
h quantity and price. More than 
ewed growth in the industrial coun- 
ts is required, however, if these eoun- 
s are to prosper. Significant ad- 
.ments in their economies also are 
ded. 

The fourth group contains the very 
Test developing countries. These 
? er widespread poverty and play only 
linor role in the global economy. They 
; the basic infrastructure to compete 
ictively in world markets so cannot 
•act investment and financing. If self- 
taining growth is to be achieved 
hin a reasonable time, they need 
I rity. Frequently, their economic and 
1 ernmental policies are so bad that 
I rity, or "aid," is simply futile. In our 
■ istance to these countries, we concen- 
1 :e in three areas where over the 
I rs the United States has developed 
l«cial competence, namely, food and 
iculture, energy, and health and 
cation. We try to use our aid in ways 



which encourage economic reforms, 
which in turn attract private in- 
vestments. 

Of course, I would mislead you if 1 
let it seem that aid to the poorest 
developing countries is the most impor- 
tant help we can give them. On the con- 
trary, in their case as in others, trade is 
more important than aid, because trade 
helps them to help themselves. We have 
a special program by which their goods 
come to the U.S. market duty-free, 
called the generalized system of 
preferences (GSP). Although the amount 
of trade affected by this program is 
small in terms of the U.S. market, it is a 
large and important spur to develop- 
ment in those countries that export to 
us with its stimulus. 

Even these groupings of countries 
are partly misleading, however, because 
they mask the individuality and unique- 
ness of each country. We base our 
specific programs on careful study and 
consultation with the government and 
people of each country itself. We listen, 
we learn, we identify problems, and we 
work out solutions jointly with them. 

Direct Aid 

A few comments on direct aid are in 
order. Despite the economic upturn that 
is under way in the United States and 
some other countries, the outlook for 
substantial increases in direct aid is not 
bright. It is unlikely that the decade of 
the 1980s will see increases in foreign 
aid comparable to those of the 1970s. 
Calls by some developing nations for 
massive gifts are completely unrealistic. 
Budgetary conditions in the United 
States and in other major donor nations 
simply preclude it. 

This makes it all the more important 
that we focus our limited funds on those 
countries where it will do the most good. 
How much good our aid does depends 
not so much on how badly the recipients 
need it as on how well they use it. Aid, 
to be effective, must open the way to ex- 
pand trade and attract investment. It 
cannot do that in the face of unsound 
governmental policies that do not sup- 
port free markets, protect private prop- 
erty, and maintain a rule of law and 
political stability. 

This means that the relative role of 
concessional aid is diminishing. In fact, 
this aid is increasing, but trade and bor- 
rowing in private markets are increasing 



much faster. These latter two contribu- 
tions to development deserve the em- 
phasis that I gave them, but I would be 
negligent if I failed to mention the way 
that direct aid fits into the picture. In 
line with what I have just been saying, 
the United States works closely with 
host governments on economic policy 
problems important to development. We 
encourage sound agricultural policies on 
pricing, credit, and freedom of enter- 
prise. 

Furthermore, about half of our 
development aid goes to food and 
agriculture. Besides encouraging more 
private initiative, we contribute to the 
fundamental research and to the 
development of new applied technology, 
in the role that government is most 
qualified to fill. A major part of our aid 
also goes to public health and population 
control programs. By concentrating our 
aid in recent years on the activities in 
which government makes a unique con- 
tribution, we have made its effectiveness 
grow rapidly even though its amount 
grew relatively slowly. 

The United States has also concen- 
trated its aid increasingly where it is 
most needed — in the least developed 
countries, as I noted earlier. Our con- 
tributions to multilateral development 
banks in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa are permitting growth rates of 
lending of 14%-15% per year. The 
United States continues to be the largest 
provider of official development aid, and 
over two-thirds of our aid goes to the 
poorest countries. 

Resolving Debt Problems 

No discussion of Third World Develop- 
ment can ignore the serious debt prob- 
lems which a number of developing na- 
tions now face. During the past decade, 
borrowing on private capital markets 
became an increasingly important source 
of financing for many developing coun- 
tries, particularly the middle- and upper- 
income ones. As the borrowing climate 
changed and the world slipped into a 
prolonged recession, a number of na- 
tions came face-to-face with serious debt 
problems. 

Several steps must be taken if these 
debt problems are to be resolved in a 
durable way. 



iust 1983 



29 



ECONOMICS 



• Sound economic policies must be 
pursued in the debtor countries. These 
should include sound debt monitoring 
and management. The World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
provide valuable assistance in this. It is, 
obviously, important that neither 
developed not developing nations impose 
new barriers to trade. 

• Financial resources must continue 
to be provided by the international com- 
munity to support the adjustment of 
borrowing countries to sound policies. 
Here the IMF plays a major role. The 
increases in IMF quotas that are now 
being considered by Congress are essen- 
tial. 

• The governments and central 
banks of lending countries must be 
prepared to provide short-term, transi- 
tional financing to fill the gap until IMF 
programs are in place. 

• Commercial banks and export 
credit agencies must continue a flow of 
finance to debtor countries that are 
undertaking sound, IMF-supported ad- 
justment programs. 

• Sustained noninflationary 
economic growth must take place in 
developing nations. 

Development Prospects at the 
Economic Summit and UNCTAD 

Now I would like to outline for you what 
the United States hopes to accomplish 
with regard to development at the 
May 28-30 economic summit in 
Williamsburg and during the June 
UNCTAD VI conference in Belgrade. 

First, we hope that the summit will 
confirm that the West's major economies 
are working effectively toward a 
restoration of sustainable noninfla- 
tionary growth. We hope also that the 
participating countries will commit 
themselves to a rollback of restrictions 
on trade which they have introduced in 
response to the difficult world economic 
situation. If these developments occur, it 
will be a major step toward achieving a 
healthier world economy. In turn, the 
developing countries will have an oppor- 
tunity in Belgrade to take similar ac- 
tions that will restore confidence in 
global recovery. 

Second, we expect that 
Williamsburg will heighten awareness of 
the interrelations among trade, finance, 
and development. The specific relations 
I refer to are four: 



• Between an open international 
trading system and sustainable non- 
inflationary economic growth; 

• Between open international 
markets and solution of the debt prob- 
lems of developing countries and. 
specifically, the link between their ability 
to export and their ability to service 
debt; 

• Between short-term financing 
needed to maintain essential imports. 
and the economic adjustments they must 
make, in many developing countries; and 

• Between growth in developed 
countries and growth in developing 
countries. 

As for UNCTAD VI, the United 
States, drawing on the discussions at 
the Williamsburg summit, will emphasize 
the linkages I have mentioned earlier 
and draw the attention of the developing 
world to the fact that effective North- 
South economic relations hinge on 
mutual responsibilities and benefits in 
sustaining and improving an open inter- 
national trading and financial system. 
We will focus attention also on the in- 
dispensable role of free markets in 
mobilizing energies and resources and 
more generally on the importance of 
sound economic policies. 

The United States views UNCTAD 
as a significant major forum for discus- 
sions of development issues. We do not, 
however, generally regard UNCTAD as 
a suitable forum for negotiating in detail 
specific development measures. In our 
view, negotiations of measures to 
ameliorate current economic difficulties 
or strengthen the existing trade or 
financial system are more properly 
handled within the specialized independ- 
ent international agencies designed to 
address these issues— for example the 
IMF. the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and the World Bank. 

Our discussions with less developed 
countries and with others at UNCTAD 
can make significant progress toward 
the solutions of real problems if there is 
genuine dialogue and a willingness to 
listen to each others' points of view. 
Therefore, in our preliminary discussions 
with other governments in preparation 
for UNCTAD, we are working hard to 
assure that the conference will take 
place in a cooperative atmosphere rather 
than one of needless polarization, which 
would sacrifice the opportunity for 
agreement. We emphasize that progress 
lies through recognition of the principle 



of mutual benefit through general 
growth, and that developmental discul 
sions will achieve the most when they J 
have a practical orientation aimed 
toward finding and correcting the real 
obstacles to development, case-by-cas« 
or toward discovering unexploited op 
portunities. Cooperative efforts can tl 
remove those obstacles or open up th< 
opportunities. It is also important to 
recognize that, as a general rule, the 
ternational specialized agencies, such 
the IMF and the World Bank, can ma 
important contributions in their areas 
expertise. 

In summary, the most important 
single source of growth and develop- 
ment is the talents of individuals, 
allowed to develop fully and freely by 
free institutions. Government provide 
the framework— the protection of law 
and the assurance of opportunity— wi 
in which individuals can reach their fi 
potential and contribute to national 
development. This framework permit: 
trade to flourish, both domestic and ii 
ternational. When many countries hai 
open, free economies, they reinforce 
each other while sharing the benefits 
growth and development. Thus, open 
economies with free-flowing trade an( 
private investment, both in developed 
and developing countries, provide the 
one sure route to rapid development ( 
the less developed countries. Because 
the difficult adjustments now necessai 
in the developing world, because of th 
heavy debts and the hangover from th 
binge of inflation in the past decade, I 
open economies and free-flowing priv;| 
investment are especially important t< I 
recovery and to the resumption of ran 
development. Direct aid between counl 
tries also will play an important, thoul 
secondary, role. 

The most important thing is to ke | 
our economies free— both developed a I 
less developed— and to support and 
maintain the sound international instil 
tions that play a supporting role durinl 
this period of adjustment. Keeping to I 
this sound course will permit the 
recovery now firmly under way to hav 
the maximum effect on the welfare of 
our people and of people in the develojl 
ing world, ■ 



30 



Department of State Bullet 



ECONOMICS 



I Collective Approach to 
Sast-West Economic Relations 



W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the American Society 
business Press Editors in Chicago on 
e20, 1983. Mr. Wallis is Under 
maryfor Economic Affairs. 

talk this morning is concerned with 
effort that the United States and its 
inese, Canadian, and European part- 
; are making to fashion a collective 
-oach to their economic relations 
! the Soviet Union. As you know, 
is a particularly difficult under- 
ng. The problems lie in the nature of 
'Soviet system, in the events of the 
dozen or so years, and in various 
lomic and geographic differences 
ng the United States and its part- 
. Nevertheless, the undertaking is 
eeding with important concrete and 
ible results to show for our common 
rts. 

[ will describe some of these results 
few moments, but first I will review 
Hy how we got where we are and 
this process is such a difficult, but 
le same time important, under- 
ig- 

iew of East-West Relations 

dd- 1983, it is difficult to recall how 
ti, even euphoric, the atmosphere of 
,-West relations was in 1972, the 
lay of detente. The Soviet Union and 
Jnited States had just signed a 
;egic arms limitation agreement, 
teived at the time as an important 
stone in limiting arms expenditures 
as the prime indicator of relaxation 
wiet-American relations. President 
m and Premier Brezhnev exchanged 
s and signed numerous agreements, 
is on both sides joined in to create a 
spread spirit of East-West detente, 
©conomic relations, naturally, 
<ed a major part in the new at- 
ohere. The West liberalized its credit 
is, and the Soviets took advantage 
lis liberalization to increase their 
hases of Western grain and of 
nology and equipment that they 
i make only with difficulty or not at 
Truck assembly lines, entire chemical 
ts and innumerable pieces of capital 
:pment were purchased by the 
<ets. Both sides experienced eco- 
ic and political benefits from the in- 
sed level of trade. 



The theory underlying detente was 
that a well of economic, scientific, 
cultural, and political relationships would 
so interlink Soviet and Western societies 
that their views on security and other 
core issues would tend to converge. It 
was believed that the tangible benefits 
flowing from economic and other inter- 
changes would encourage Soviet re- 
straint in foreign policy. 

In forging economic links with the 
Soviets, the United States was as eager 
as any nation to increase the level of its 
commerce. From 1972 to 1975, U.S. 
trade with the Eastern bloc nearly 
tripled. The Pullman Corporation helped 
the Soviets to set up production lines at 
the Kama River truck plant, and the 
Bryant Manufacturing Company sold the 
Soviets equipment that allowed it to 
make miniature ball bearings of extreme 
precision. 

We all know how the hopeful views 
of East- West relations spawned early in 
the decade soured at the end of the 
decade, especially after 1979. Detente, 
with its web of relationships and in- 
contestible economic benefits to Soviet 
society, was no barrier at all when 
Soviet decisionmakers saw opportunities 
to advance their strategic position 
through overseas adventurism or 
outright military aggression. Anyone 
who had illusions that fundamental 
Soviet views had changed during 
detente was quickly disabused of those 
notions. . _ 

It is a familiar litany to describe how 
the Soviets, in the late 1970s and after, 
failed to live up to the hopes of a decade 
earlier. Their sponsorship of Cuban 
adventures in Africa, their continuing 
activities in Indochina, their invasion of 
Afghanistan, their crackdown in Poland, 
and their involvement in Central 
America were visible indications that 
their fundamental values and policies 
had not been changed at all by a more 
lenient, friendly, and cooperative at- 
titude on the part of the West. Under- 
lying these aggressive acts, of course, 
was the massive and unrelenting Soviet 
military buildup that went far beyond 
any reasonable notion of what would be 
needed to defend the U.S.S.R. Even in 
the area of strategic arms, supposedly 
restrained by the SALT [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] agreement, the Soviets 
continued the most massive buildup in 
all history. 



Western Reevaluation of Relationship 

As the Soviets demonstrated that their 
fundamental values and policies had not 
changed, Western governments began to 
reevaluate their economic, political, and 
security relationships with the East. At- 
titudes changed quickly in the United 
States. A pivotal point was our refusal 
in 1979 to ratify the SALT II Treaty. 
That has been followed by strenuous ef- 
forts to increase our defenses against 
the Soviet threat. Our allies and part- 
ners also concluded, in the various and 
wondrous ways by which democratic na- 
tions reach decisions, that the relaxed 
policies of a decade earlier were no 
longer appropriate— perhaps never had 
been. Soviet behavior made it obviously 
dangerous to conduct economic relations 
with the Soviets in ways that underwrite 
and enhance military capabilities. The 
danger was underscored by direct use by 
the Soviets of equipment from the West 
to manufacture items for their military. 
The ship that had embarked so hopefully 
upon the seas of detente obviously had 
to come about and chart a new course. 

In the economic area, it was hardly 
a surprise that U.S. attitudes changed 
more rapidly than those of our Euro- 
pean and Japanese partners. European 
and Japanese trade with the East has 
always been much more extensive than 
that of the United States, even before 
the Russian revolution of 1917. There is 
a natural complementarity of trade be- 
tween Eastern raw materials and 
Western manufactured goods. This fac- 
tor, combined with geographic proximi- 
ty, means that East- West trade is much 
more important to Europeans and 
Japanese than to Americans. 

As Western views changed, dif- 
ferences in the pace with which in- 
dividual governments reevaluated their 
positions on East- West economic rela- 
tions created noticeable tensions within 
the alliance. Such tensions are, of 
course, a fact of life in relations among 
democratic states. It is the job of 
statesmen to resolve the differences and 
preserve the fundamental community of 
values among their respective nations. 

It is interesting to trace this change 
in attitudes, to see how difficult it can 
be to change course on a major policy 
question. In announcing his candidacy 
for president, Ronald Reagan said: 

On the foreign front, the decade of the 
1980s will place severe pressures upon the 
United States and its allies. We can expect to 
be tested in ways calculated to try our pa- 
tience, to confound our resolve, and to erode 
our belief in ourselves. 



ust 1983 



31 



ECONOMICS 



For the most of the last forty years, we 
have been preoccupied with the global strug- 
gle—the competition with the Soviet Union 
and with our responsibilities to our allies. But 
too often in recent times we have just drifted 
along with events, responding as if we 
thought of ourselves as a nation in decline. 

It is now time to take stock of our own 
house and to resupply its strength. 

Our process started within the 
government with a thorough analysis of 
East- West economic relations, and the 
work with the allies began in earnest at 
the Ottawa economic summit in July 
1981. The leaders at Ottawa made a 
significant statement about East- West 
relations: 

We concluded that consultations and, 
where appropriate, coordination are neces- 
sary to ensure that, in the field of East- West 
relations, our economic policies continue to be 
compatible with our political and security ob- 
jectives. 

During the following year, leading 
up to the summit at Versailles, we 
worked with our summit partners on a 
number of specific issues — principally on 
the problem of European vulnerability to 
disruption of Soviet gas exports. At Ver- 
sailles, the leaders again adopted a 
statement on East- West economic 
issues, but it was clear that the analyses 
of the issues by the leaders were dif- 
ferent enough to create problems in in- 
terpretation and implementation. 

Last summer, when Secretary 
Shultz entered office, he was asked by 
the President to listen carefully to what 
our allies and friends were saying. 
George Shultz is an able and experi- 
enced negotiator who appreciates the 
value of listening. As he listened, he 
recognized two fundamental facts. First, 
that there was enough convergence in 
the views that he heard to give a good 
chance of reaching agreement on a col- 
lective approach to East- West economic 
relations and, second, that a collective 
approach would be much more effective 
than a unilateral approach. 

On Secretary Shultz's recommenda- 
tion, President Reagan last November 
lifted the restrictions imposed 5 months 
earlier on the sale of oil and gas equip- 
ment to the Soviet Union. In taking this 
action, the President emphasized that 
the United States and its European, 
Japanese, and Canadian partners had 
agreed to undertake a series of analyses 
of East-West economic relations de- 
signed to provide a framework for a col- 
lective approach to these relations. The 
analyses were undertaken immediately 
in a variety of locations. It is the results 



of those analyses that are the core of my 
message today. 

• In the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, East- 
West financial relations and credit terms 
were examined. Special attention was 
given to problems stemming from 
Eastern nations' centralized control of 
trade. A continuous review of a broad 
spectrum of problems in East- West 
economic relations was started. 

• The International Energy Agency 
analyzed the dangers created by undue 
energy dependence, and it considered 
alternative sources of energy. 

• The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization examined the overall 
security implications of East-West 
economic relations. 

• The Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Security Export Controls 
(COCOM) studied ways of improving 
surveillance and control over Western 
exports that have strategic or military 
implications. 

Basic Framework 

While some work is continuing in each 
of these organizations, major segments 
of the analyses that were started last 
November have now been completed. 
The results achieved thus far provide a 
basic framework that has been agreed 
upon by the United States and its part- 
ners for the conduct of East- West 
economic relations. The hopes of Presi- 
dent Reagan and Secretary Shultz in 
undertaking the analyses have been 
borne out amply by the positive and con- 
structive spirit in which they were con- 
ducted and by the results that have been 
achieved. In fact, the conclusions based 
on those analyses that had been agreed 
to before the 1983 summit meeting of in- 
dustrialized countries made it unneces- 
sary for the seven heads of government 
to spend much time at Williamsburg on 
this subject. In the Williamsburg 
declaration the heads of state and 
government said: 

East-West economic relations should be 
compatible with our security interests. We 
take note with approval of the work of the 
multilateral organizations which have in re- 
cent months analyzed and drawn conclusions 
regarding the key aspects of East- West 
economic relations. We encourage continuing 
work by these organizations, as appropriate. 

Let me review for you some of the 
major points on which the leaders based 
that statement. 



First, they recognize that the 
Soviets use some forms of trade to 
enhance their military capabilities and 
that, as a result, we must be vigilant 1 
ensure that economic relations are cot 
sistent with our common security in 
terests. While some forms of trade th; 
are conducted on commercially sound 
terms can benefit both sides, we must 
insist on a balance of advantages and 
avoid preferential treatment of the 
Soviets. 

Second, in regard to energy, the 
United States and its partners recogn 
that natural gas, with its relatively in- 
flexible supply system, poses particula 
security problems. We have agreed th: 
in meeting future gas needs, we will 
take concrete steps to ensure that no 
one producer is in a position to exercis 
monopoly power over industrial coun- 
tries. Further, we are also acting to ei 
courage the production of natural gas 
from Norwegian and North American 
sources, and each nation is improving 
safety-net measures in order to be abl< 
to deal with any interruptions of suppl 
The United States and its partners ha' 
agreed also to conduct. Regular reviev 
of each country's energy policy, giving 
special attention to dependencies and 
alternative sources of supply. We belie 
that these concrete accomplishments w 
enhance Western energy security and 
make it more difficult for the Soviets t 
use its abundant energy resources to e 
tract political gains. 

Third, we reached agreeement tha 
it is not sensible to continue to give th. 
Soviets the same reductions on interes 
rates given to newly industrialized cou 
tries to finance their imports. Our 
agreed minimum interest rate for offic 
lending to rich countries, including the 
Soviets is now 12.4%, nearly two point 
above the current U.S. prime rate. Als 
in the area of credits, we are working 
improve our ability to monitor credit 
flows, so that our data on foreign in- 
debtedness will be accurate and up to 
date. 

Finally, in coordinating controls 
over the export of strategic technology 
we are united with our allies in declarii 
that economic relations should not be 
permitted to contribute to Soviet 
military capabilities. At an April high- 
level meeting with our COCOM partner 
we explored ways in which the multi- 
lateral system of controls could be 
strengthened. The proceedings of the 
meeting are confidential, but I can say 
that the United States is well pleased 
with the work on improving coordinatio 
in export licensing and in the enforce- 



32 



Department of State Bullet 



ECONOMICS 



nt of controls. We are confident that 
results of the COCOM work will 

luce the flow of high technology to 
East. 

As you are aware, none of the 
gnizations within which these 
lyses were performed (IEA, OECD, 
TO, and COCOM), is a supranational 
ly whose recommendations are bin- 
g on member states. Indeed, such a 
d arrangement would be antithetical 
he spirit of our alliances and friend- 
>s with other democratic countries. 
;ead, the countries with which we 
e collaborated in these analyses have 
eed with us concerning the validity, 
vance, and importance of the find- 
;; and they have agreed to take the 
illusions strongly into account as they 
nulate their own national policies, 
are confident that the results that 
S been achieved through this collee- 
approach to East-West economic 
es will yield valuable benefits for 
tern security. 

I mentioned earlier that some 
sets of the studies are continuing, 
are seeking to build on the results 
. have been achieved thus far and 
;hten awareness of the security 
ension of East-West economic rela- 
s. We are starting a process that will 
nine East-West economic relations 
hey develop and will provide in- 
led analyses for the use of 
ymakers. Specific efforts that are in 
•ess now include: 

• An effort in COCOM to 
ngthen that organization and ex- 
le whether members' security in- 
sts require controls on additional 

technology items; 

> Continuing work within NATO on 

security implications of East-West 

iomic relations; 

» An analysis in OECD of the bal- 

• of economic advantages in East- 
t trade; and 

• The ongoing study I mentioned 
ler of national energy policies and 
tern energy security. 

Before I conclude, let me restate our 
•tion on East- West economic rela- 
5 and say why we think this area is 
nportant. First, let me emphasize 
gorically that we are not waging 
iomic warfare against the Soviet 
>n. We do not seek to cause the "col- 
e" of their economy. In fact, we 
Id not want that— that would be a 
jerous development. We favor 
ally beneficial economic relations 
re those relations are conducted on 



commercial terms and where the advan- 
tages are mutual and balanced. An ex- 
ample of mutually beneficial trade is 
agriculture, where a U.S. team is at this 
moment in Moscow negotiating a new 
long-term agreement for grain sales to 
the Soviets. 

We must keep in mind, however, 
that the Soviets vigorously seek to use 
trade with the West to enhance their 
strategic position and that they choose 
to devote 15% of their gross national 
product to the military— a level far 
beyond what can possibly be regarded as 
"defense." They have also not acted as a 
responsible and restrained member of 
the international order. As Secretary 
Shultz put it last week in his statement 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, unconstructive Soviet behavior 
has needlessly drawn more and more in- 
ternational problems into the East-West 
rivalry and made the task of managing 
our relationship more difficult. In the 
light of this, the United States and its 
partners have agreed to conduct their 
economic relations with the Soviets in a 
way that does not give preferential 
treatment to the Soviets or benefit their 
military position. It is crucial that we 



not permit our economic relations with 
the Soviets to be used in ways that 
reduce Western security. 

Conclusion 

To summarize, let me again state that 
the process of turning away from the 
economics of detente has been a long 
and reluctant one for the United States 
and its friends and allies. Differences of 
perception within the alliance and varia- 
tions in the pace at which views have 
evolved sometimes have made the path 
rocky. Yet, through patient and 
statesmanlike determination, a collective 
approach to East- West economic rela- 
tions has been forged. 

We are confident that this collective 
approach has strengthened our common 
security, just as President Reagan said 
in his radio address last November 13 
that it would. It has provided a sound 
basis for Western economic policy 
toward the East for the rest of the 
decade and beyond. Perhaps this ap- 
proach can reduce, at least modestly, 
the amounts that we must spend each 
year to defend the values and liberties 
that we and our partners hold dear. ■ 



The World Economy After Williamsburg 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Wellington, 
New Zealand, on June 22, 1983. Mr. 
Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs. 

It is a pleasure to be with you this after- 
noon to look briefly at the world 
economy after Williamsburg. I must con- 
fess that 6 months ago I was not sure 
that there would be a world after 
Williamsburg— we in Washington were 
so wrapped up in its preparation. But I 
was brought back to the real world one 
Sunday afternoon in March. I was in 
Florida with some old friends from 
Rochester. One of the group asked me 
what I was doing in Washington; I said 
I was the "sherpa" for the economic 
summit. He said: "The summit, what's 
that?" I recount this story to put the 
Williamsburg meeting in its proper 
perspective— an important meeting but 
not an event that will shake the world. 
The world after Williamsburg depends 
not on what the participants did and 



said there but what they will do back 
home: to support the recovery, to 
reverse protectionism, and to encourage 
the process of economic development 
around the world. And it depends as 
much on the heads of other governments 
as on the seven presidents and prime 
ministers who met at Williamsburg the 
last 3 days in May. 

After reading the final declaration, 
President Reagan added his personal 
assessment of the results. He said: "Our 
meeting has shown a spirit of con- 
fidence, optimism, and certainty — con- 
fidence that recovery is underway, opti- 
mism that it will be durable, and certain- 
ty that economic policy and security ties 
among us will be strengthened in the 
future." 

Sustaining International Recovery 

Let me elaborate on these points. "Con- 
fidence that recovery is underway" is 
not simply wishful thinking. It is based 
on good evidence that virtually all of the 
leaders brought to Williamsburg. Speak- 
ing for the United States, I can assure 



33 



ECONOMICS 



you that our economy certainly looks 
good. Industrial production has been ris- 
ing for 6 months and by May was nearly 
7% above its November low. Employ- 
ment has increased by nearly 800,000 
from its December low, and the 
unemployment rate has fallen from 
10.7% in December to 10.0% in May. 
Personal incomes are rising and retail 
sales are gaining momentum. Although 
real GNP rose at only a 2.5% annual 
rate in the first quarter of this year, we 
estimate it grew at over 6% during the 
second quarter, and we forecast that the 
fourth quarter of 1983 will exceed the 
fourth quarter of 1982 by at least 5%. 

The beginning of the recovery has 
been accompanied by price stability. The 
producer price index for all finished 
goods was no higher in April than it had 
been the previous September, and the 
consumer price index in April was less 
than 1% above its level 6 months earlier. 
This favorable price performance is, in 
part, a reflection of the unusual decline 
in energy prices that has occurred in the 
past few months. But even when the 
volatile prices of energy, food, and 
shelter are excluded, the consumer price 
index increased at an annual rate of only 
4% between October and April. 

Labor productivity is increasing 
sharply this year, and wages are rising 
only moderately. Thus, unit labor costs 
are increasing very little. In the first 
quarter of 1983, unit labor costs in non- 
farm business rose at an annual rate of 
only 1.2%, down dramatically from the 
7.2% increase in 1982 and the 11.2% in- 
crease in 1981. 

When the inflation news is so good 
month after month, it is easy to forget 
that consumer prices rose 25% as 
recently as the 2 years ending in 
December 1980. 

President Reagan's "optimism that 
the recovery will be durable" is based on 
the leaders' determination to avoid the 
pitfalls that have brought us a decade of 
boom-bust, stop-go economic perfor- 
mance. The Williamsburg declaration 
clearly emphasizes the need to avoid 
three dangers if we are to achieve 
growth that is noninflationary and sus- 
tainable. 

First, the Williamsburg declaration 
follows thi' consensus established at the 
OECD | Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] minis- 
terial meeting earlier in May to take a 
medium-term approach to economic 
policy, eschewing the route of "quick 
fixes" and quicker disappointments. 

Second, the participants at 
Williamsburg recognized trade as the 
mechanism that transmits growth in one 



country to other countries, thereby 
enlarging the market, increasing effi- 
ciency, and spurring more growth. The 
statement on trade from Williamsburg is 
the strongest yet in a series of recent 
major statements on world trade. At the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] meeting last November, the 
trade ministers hinted at the need to 
remove trade barriers. At the OECD, 
ministers agreed to fight protectionism 
and dismantle trade barriers. At 
Williamsburg, the heads of government 
of the seven largest economies commit- 
ted themselves "to halt protectionism, 
and as recovery proceeds to reverse it 
by dismantling trade barriers." They 
went on to state their intention to 
monitor this commitment "within the ap- 
propriate existing fora" such as the 
GATT and the OECD. A new wave of 
protection would spell the end to the 
recovery before it gets underway. Only 
heads of government can balance all of 
the interests and judge that protection is 
the wrong way to go. As I said earlier, 
the words at Williamsburg will not 
change the world, but adherence to this 
one commitment on trade can. You 
could be certain that we in the United 
States will be pursuing this vigorously. 

A third danger to sustaining the 
recovery that was dealt with at 
Williamsburg is more international in 
character: the heavy burden of debt that 
hangs over more than a score of 
developing countries. Substantial prog- 
ress has been made in the past year in 
dealing with the serious financial prob- 
lems of Mexico, Brazil, and other coun- 
tries, but the situation is far from set- 
tled. Failure to resolve these problems 
could threaten the trading and financial 
arrangements of the world and thus 
undermine the recovery that is clearly 
underway. The debtor countries must 
continue to make substantial, indeed 
painful, adjustments to bring their 
domestic finances and international 
trade balances into a more satisfactory 
state. At the same time, the commercial 
banks, the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund], and the individual governments 
must also strengthen their own col- 
laborative efforts. The Williamsburg 
declaration is clear on this point, again 
in terms very similar to the consensus 
reached at the OECD earlier. A key 
step— early ratification of the IMF quota 
increases— is a top legislative priority 
for us hack in Washington. We have 
recently had good news from the Senate 
on this score. 



Three Fallacies 

Many would add the budget deficits ii 
the United States to this list of dange 
to the growing recovery. I do not wax 
to dismiss the evil of budget deficits 
lightly, but before I address their evil 
side, allow me a few moments to ad- 
dress three fallacies which are tied ba 
to budget deficits. The fallacies arise 
from a chain of causality that goes 
something like this: high deficits, caus 
by the recent tax rate reductions and 
the defense spending program, force i 
real interest rates. These higher real 
terest rates attract capital from abroz 
which raises the value of the U.S. doll 
relative to other currencies. Let's con 
sider three links in this chain: 

• The link between exchange rate 
and interest rates; 

• The link between interest rates 
(especially real interest rates) and 
budget deficits; and 

• The link between deficits and 
taxes (throwing in defense expenditur 
for good measure). 

Exchange Rates and Interest 
Rates. To be sure, the dollar has beer 
strong. Equivalently, the franc, the 
pound, and the mark have been weak 
Also, the United States is running a c 
rent account deficit in its balance of 
payments, largely because the value o 
imports exceeds the value of exports. 
That deficit is expected to reach recor 
levels this year. 

The strong dollar is a spur to exp« 
industries in foreign countries and to 
their industries that compete with im- 
ports from the United States. Cor- 
respondingly, it's a handicap to our e> 
porters in a very big way. 

Individuals who believe that the 
dollar is overvalued, in the sense that 
they believe that its foreign exchange 
value will fall, can readily put their ov< 
money where their judgments are and 
buy francs, marks, and so forth, or se 
the dollar short. Note that the interna 
tional monetary market of the Chieagi 
Mercantile Exchange and other future 
exchanges offer easy and efficient acc< 
to those wishing either to speculate in 
foreign exchange markets or to hedge 
against exchange rate changes and 
volatility. The strength of the dollar is 
largely a consequence of the successfu 
anti-inflation policy of the United Stat< 
of the safe haven the United States af- 
fords foreign investors, and of the im- 
proved prospects in the United States 
for substantial economic recovery. In r 
judgment, high interest rates are not t 
major factor causing the dollar to be s< 



34 



Department of State Bulleti 



ECONOMICS 



lh. When interest rates in the United 
ates fell sharply from July through 
ivember of 1982, the dollar continued 
strengthen against the British pound, 
! German mark, the French franc, the 
panese yen, the Italian lira, and other 
ijor foreign currencies. If U.S. in- 
est rates are crucial in determining 
eign exchange rates, why did the 
liar strengthen, not weaken, when 
9. interest rates cascaded down? 

Look at a specific example: Since 
cember 1980 the French franc has 
Dreciated about 65% against the 
lar, from 4.5 francs per dollar, to 7.4. 
lat has happened to interest rates in 
• United States and France over that 
•iod? U.S. short-term rates were 
3% in December 1980 and are now 
>und 8.7%. Comparable French rates 
-re 11.5% then, 12.6% now. U.S. rates 
re fallen sharply — French rates have 
in. The differential has shifted by 
irly 10 percentage points in favor of 
?nch assets. If anything, that should 
'e led to a stronger franc and a 
aker dollar. It obviously didn't. Even 

a more recent period — say since May 
■51 — the franc has fallen by about 
7 o; the interest rate differential has 
ved about 5 points in favor of French 
■ets. Similar lack of correlation be- 
;en changes in interest rates and 

nges in exchange rates can be found 
>ther pairs of currencies, though they 

not often as dramatic. We must 

nowledge that other factors have 
n more important than interest rates 
letermining exchange rates. 

Deficits and Interest Rates. Now 1 

it to turn to the link between deficits 
1 1 interest rates. Now that I have 
1 iunked the idea that interest rates 
I ninate exchange rates, you may not 
) interested in U.S. interest rates— but 
I y are important, both for the U.S. 
I overy and for the debt servicing 
| blems of developing countries or 
( er countries with external debt. 
I Nominal interest rates in the United 
\ tes have fallen drastically. In 1981, 

! first year of the Reagan Administra- 
i, interest rates peaked at 15.5% 
^iA corporate bonds) when the 
leral deficit was $60 billion, or 2% of 
1. gross national product. So far this 
r, the same long-term rate is about 
o while the projected deficit is $191 
on (for calendar year 1983), about 
of GNP. In other words, the deficit 
■led as a percentage of the total 
nomy and long-term bond rates have 
pped by more than a quarter. 
It is a widespread myth that the real 
3 of interest in the United States at 



present is high. This is emphasized 
especially by those who blame most of 
the world's ills on the high real rate of 
interest in the United States. They are 
just imagining that it's high; it's not. In 
fact, there is no evidence at all that the 
real rate in the United States today is 
high. 

How is the real rate of interest 
calculated? The correct way is to take 
the nominal rate of interest and subtract 
from it the anticipated rate of inflation. 
The incorrect, but common, way is to 
take the nominal rate and subtract the 
current rate of inflation. At present, 
there is a substantial discrepancy be- 
tween the current and the anticipated 
rates of inflation. Consequently, there is 
a substantial difference between the real 
real rate and the unreal real rate. 

The nominal rate of interest current- 
ly is something on the order of 10%. A 
recent survey of businessmen shows that 
they anticipate a rate of inflation of 
6-7% for the next 10 years. This implies 
that the real real rate of interest cur- 
rently is 3-4%, which is in line with 
historical experience. The unreal, or er- 
roneous, real rate, however, appears to 
be 7 or 8% if the current rate of infla- 
tion is 2 or 3%. 

Why the discrepancy between the 
current and the anticipated rates of in- 
flation? The answer, I think, is ex- 
perience. Since the Second World War, 
the U.S. Government has said con- 
tinuously and emphatically that it was 
going to eliminate inflation. Inflation 
has, in fact, been essentially eliminated 
three or four times in that period. Mark 
Twain said that he knows that it is easy 
to stop smoking, because he has done it 
many times. Similarly, we can say that 
it is easy to stop inflation: we know, 
because we have done it several times. 
After each time, however, we went back 
to a rate of inflation that was even 
higher than the one we cured. People in 
the market are aware of this; so, 
regardless of the intentions of the Ad- 
ministration, they are going to be slow 
to conclude that inflation really has been 
brought under lasting control. If, in fact, 
inflation is kept under control for a 
period, people in the market will 
gradually regain confidence and lower 
their anticipations of the rate of infla- 
tion. After all, until about 20 years ago, 
the United States had very little infla- 
tion except in times of war. The average 
rate from the beginning of the govern- 
ment until 20 years ago, omitting 
periods of war, was about zero, and 
perhaps even half a percent negative. So 
there is a real chance of bringing real in- 
terest rates down, provided that the 
government manages to "stay the 



course." The only way to lower the real 
rate of interest is to gain credibility for 
government intentions. 

Deficits and Taxes. Since the 
Reagan Administration proposed and 
the Congress passed a major tax bill cut- 
ting marginal tax rates and then index- 
ing tax rates to eliminate so-called 
bracket creep, it is assumed by many 
that the deficit is due to insufficient tax- 
ation. Why else would we be hearing so 
many voices in Washington advocating 
cancellation of the 1983 tax rate cut or 
elimination of indexation? But taxes are 
not the issue, nor as I just said, are 
deficits; the issue is government spend- 
ing. Government spending uses up 
resources and leaves fewer resources for 
the private sector. If resources are used 
less efficiently in the public sector than 
in the private sector, overall efficiency 
falls. Even if the same number of people 
are at work, total output is less useful, 
less valuable. This is the equivalent of a 
fall in output. I believe that we are well 
past this point at the present time in 
most areas of government expenditures. 
This is the major reason for shrinking 
the public sector in order to make possi- 
ble a larger total pie. 

If more resources are to be chan- 
neled into the public sector, higher taxes 
depress private sector activity, thereby 
freeing resources and making them 
available for the public sector. However, 
when President Reagan took office tax 
rates had become so high— largely 
because effective rates had been driven 
up by inflation rather than being ex- 
plicitly legislated by Congress— that the 
private sector was too depressed for our 
own good. Moreover, the depressive ef- 
fects of high and rising marginal tax 
rates have differentially depressed sav- 
ing, capital formation, and risk taking 
more than consumption, and reduced 
work effort more than leisure. 

High taxes worked all too well in 
curtailing private sector activity. We 
needed a reduction in marginal tax 
rates, especially those taxes that 
discourage investment, saving, risk tak- 
ing, and work. We also needed a reduc- 
tion in marginal tax rates to undo some 
or all of the bracket creep of recent 
years. To achieve these results, the 
President's program proposed a perma- 
nent and predictable cut in marginal tax 
rates, including indexation of the tax 
system to prevent future bracket creep. 
Higher taxes would only reduce output, 
employment, and economic growth. 

I believe we hear so little about 
speeding up or enlarging tax cuts and so 
much about rescinding the 1983 tax cut 



gust 1983 



35 



ECONOMICS 



and the future indexing of the Federal 
tax code precisely because there is a 
well understood link between revenues 
and government spending. Spenders 
simply want the revenues to maintain or 
to expand government spending. 
Spenders want control of more income 
so they can spend it the way they wish. 

Understandably, the big spenders 
are fighting hard to retain the revenue 
system that depends on inflation- 
induced, unlegislated tax rate in- 
creases—bracket creep— under which 
they have prospered while the economy 
has suffered. To succeed, the big 
spenders need, as before, the coopera- 
tion of fiscal conservatives eager or will- 
ing to raise taxes to reduce deficits. In 
the process, fiscal conservatives become 
the tax collectors for spenders. After 
each tax increase, deficits don't really 
decline because expenditures tend to rise 
at lease as fast as revenues. Many of us 
who supported, and continue to support, 
tax reduction and indexation of the tax 
code do so precisely because we believe 
that restraining revenues is necessary to 
restrain government spending. 

This is why deficits do matter and 
must be reduced. Deficits are the 
measure of indiscipline in government 
spending. The Williamsburg declaration 
contained a commitment to reduce 
budget deficits — not by raising taxes but 
by limiting the growth of expenditures. 
The Administration remains committed 
to this goal. 

These elements— the facts that 
recovery is well underway in the United 
States and elsewhere; that the summit 
leaders have agreed on a strategy that 
gives real promise it will be sustained 
and noninflationary; and their com- 
mitments to assure it is transmitted to 
other countries through positive action 
to reduce trade barriers and maintain an 
adequate flow of financial resources to 
manage current international debt prob- 
lems—can indeed give us confidence that 
we will be able to meet and surmount 
the challenges we face in the future. 
However, as I stressed earlier, it is what 
we do, not what we say that is the only 
guarantee of our success. Thus, the real 
judgment on the prospects for global 
recovery and sustainable growth will be 
determined by our actions in the months 
to come. Williamsburg laid the founda- 
tions on which we can build; it will be up 
to the governments represented there, 
in cooperation with their partners in 
other countries, to make the 
Williamsburg concepts reality. ■ 



Building Trade With Africa 



Following is a joint statement 
prepared by Leonard H. Robinson, Jr., 
Deputy Assistant Secretary fur African 
Affairs, and Denis Lamb, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs, and submitted to ttu 
Subcommittees on African Affairs and 
International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House Foreign Affairs < 'om- 
m it tee and the Subcommittee on General 
Oversight and the Economy of the Housi 
Committee on Business Affairs, on 
May 19, 1983. 

The title of this hearing is "building 
trade with Africa." The subject implied 
by the committee's written questions is, 
however, clearly somewhat broader, in- 
volving aid, investment, and other 
aspects of this Administration's policy of 
emphasizing the private sector in our 
relationship with Africa. We firmly 
believe that this broader perspective is 
correct and that it would be a mistake to 
see our export trade relationship with 
Africa in isolation from other concerns. 
In the end, our exports to Africa will de- 
pend on the growth and development of 
the African economies. The question is 
how we can influence this process, and 
your interest, if we understand correct- 
ly, is focused on the role of African and 
American entrepreneurs, large and 
small, in attaining mutual goals. 

The subject under discussion is of 
great concern to us. Virtually every ac- 
tion we have taken in the last 3 years 
has emphasized the theme of encourag- 
ing the private sector as an agent of 
economic growth and development in 
Africa. We view such growth and de- 
velopment as a prerequisite for our 
broader goal of a just, prosperous, and 
stable Africa — a goal which is, first and 
foremost, that of the Africans them- 
selves. We have been at pains to em- 
phasize that this policy is not one of 
"stuffing capitalism down the throats of 
reluctant socialists," that it is responsive 
to African aspirations, and that it en- 
compasses small producers and en- 
trepreneurs, including farmers — both in 
Africa and in the United States — as well 
as larger, sometimes multinational cor- 
porate traders and investors. Ours is a 
multiple agenda — encouraging small 
scale African producers, helping build in- 
stitutions and policies thai will underpin 
large-scale African enterprise in the 
future, and supporting our own traders 
and investors in their efforts to venture 
into this often unfamiliar world. 






Role of State Department and Other 
Agencies 

One of the purposes of this hearing is 
determine how the State Department 
and other agencies work together to ir 
plement this new policy. Briefly, State 
role has three aspects, each rooted in 
our conviction that a stronger private 
sector relationship with our African 
partners will be politically and 
economically advantageous to both side 

First, the State Department en- 
courages greater attention by our 
specialized economic agencies — Com 
merce, OPIC [Overseas Private Invest- 
ment Corporation], Exlm bank [Expoj 
Import Bank], AID [Agency for Intern 
tional Development], and others — to tr 
problems and opportunities of the 
world's least developed continent. 

Second, at our embassies abroad, 
State Department commercial officers 
implement a number of programs and 
offer a host of services to visiting 1 '.S 
businessmen. 

Third, in cooperation with Com 
merce and other agencies, we have an 
active outreach program to acquaint 
American business here at home, most 
emphatically including small and minor 
ity business, with the challenge of trad* 
and investment in Africa and the rele- 
vant U.S. Government support services 

We would like to say a word about 
each of these three functions, and then 
conclude by noting some possible areas 
for improvement. 

Use of Other Agencies. In 

Washington, State operates under sonn 
serious constraints. We have no budget 
or operational responsibility for private 
sector support programs. We rely 
almost entirely on other agencies. Yet 
we are the only agency that is charged 
with viewing such programs in the con- 
text of our overall foreign policy in- 
terests. As a result, we spend much tin 
encouraging other agencies to do more 
in Africa and trying to make sure that 
individual countries or regions are not 
neglected. The appointment of a Depiffl 
Assistant Secretary in the Africa 
Bureau dedicated to private sector 
issues reflects the importance we at tad 
to this objective. To this end, a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Africa 
Bureau meets informally with other 
agency colleagues about once a month. 
Similarly, the State Department, 
through the Economic Bureau, works 
hard within the councils of the executivf 



36 



Department of State Bulletir 



ECONOMICS 



nch to achieve a more effective policy 
mework. For example, we have sup- 
ited liberalization of the tax regime 
American businessmen abroad, the 
■talent of export trading company 
ligation— which should make it easier 
i small and medium firms to operate 
\frica— and the revision, still under 
iberation by the Congress, of the 
reign Corrupt Practices Act. At the 
ne time, we have supported AID's 
■wing emphasis on building the in- 
enous private sector in Africa. 
Following President Reagan's com- 
ment at Cancun, the Africa Bureau 
worked with AID to design 
■icultural assistance teams composed 
icademic and commercial experts that 
ted Liberia in 1982 and Guinea in 
ly 1983 to identify profitable 
icultural ventures and to define 
itegies for attracting new capital to 
Joit those opportunities. These ef- 
ts should help Liberia and Guinea at- 
1 agricultural self-reliance and pro- 
s opportunities for sales of U.S. 
icultural tools and technical services. 
State also cooperated with a major 
;. bank to place an experienced 
lerican financial expert as a personal 
iser to President Sekou Toure of 
nea. He will be able to offer Presi- 
it Toure critical analysis on the im- 
:iments to economic growth in Guinea 
I to suggest reforms required to at- 
pt capital into productive activity. 
We remain attentive in other ways 
he problems which U.S. businesses 
front in the difficult African environ- 
nt. The Departments of State and 
. nmerce, as well as the Department of 
S riculture and AID, are active par- 
I pants in a number of established 
| urns that also seek to encourage 

5 'ican governments to improve the 

; iate for profit-oriented enterprises. 

These include, for example, the 
[ ^.-Nigeria Business Council and the 

6 5. -Nigeria Joint Agricultural Con- 
3 Lation Committee, each of which 

I ets in both Washington and Lagos, as 
111 as the U.S. -Sudan Business Council 
v ich meets in Washington and Khar- 
i m. These councils provide business- 
I n an opportunity to discuss their con- 
I ns regarding commercial policies and 
I rulations directly and frankly with 

■ lior government officials on both con- 
I ents. They are also vehicles which can 
1 ng potentially profitable opportunities 
t the attention of American investors 

A i traders. 

I U.S. Embassies. The Department's 
i'atest tangible asset is not, however, 

■ Washington. It consists of our em- 



bassies abroad. In 34 of our sub-Saharan 
posts, the State Department retains 
responsibilities for commercial activities, 
and in the others we work closely with 
the foreign commercial service. But the 
role of our embassies goes far beyond 
promoting trade, important as that is. 
They also provide a wealth of informa- 
tion, including what amounts to free 
political risk assessment for American 
businessmen. Such services may not be 
important in developed countries or even 
in more advanced LDCs [less developed 
countries], but they are often invaluable 
in the relatively unfamiliar world of 
Africa. 

Much the same kind of service is 
also provided by State desk officers in 
Washington, where we have for the last 
3 years, and with the explicit support of 
the Secretary, maintained an "open 
door" policy toward business visitors. 
Our embassies, from Ambassador to 
political and economic officers, also play 
a role in providing frank counsel to 
African governments on suggested 
reforms to promote economic growth 
and stability. 

"Outreach." Our third concern can 
be broadly defined as "outreach." More 
than 1.4 million cables pour into the 
State Department annually, and much of 
this information is of interest to the 
business community. We are convinced 
that when American entrepreneurs are 
better informed about African oppor- 
tunities, we will see growth in our trade 
and investment in Africa. To achieve 
this, State and Commerce have jointly 
sponsored a series of regional con- 
ferences on trade and investment in 
Africa, the most recent of which took 
place in Houston in April. Similarly, the 
Economic Bureau holds executive- 
diplomatic seminars with segments 
devoted to each major region of the 
world, and we participate in many 
events sponsored by private groups for 
the same general purpose. I would em- 
phasize that in describing commercial 
opportunities in Africa we attempt to be 
objective and do not gloss over the dif- 
ficulties that cloud the business climate 
in many sub-Saharan countries. We have 
consistently emphasized that business 
success in Africa usually demands a 
long-term commitment and patient, per- 
sonal contact with Africans. 

Within our outreach agenda we 
place special emphasis on opportunities 
for small and minority businesses. In- 
vitation lists to conferences and 
seminars are compiled with care to en- 
sure minority representation. Minority 
firms have participated in such major 



events as the January 1982 cabinet-level 
trade mission to Africa, and both AID 
and Commerce maintain offices which 
are charged with encouraging increased 
participation of minority firms in our ex- 
port and foreign assistance programs. 

Future Plans 

We would like to say a little about the 
future, and what could be done better. It 
goes without saying that we have a long 
way to go. Viewed from the end of a 
world recession, and bearing in mind 
that recovery will come last to Africa, 
the distance sometimes seems infinite. 
In 1982, according to the latest Com- 
merce Department figures, U.S. imports 
from sub-Saharan Africa fell by 15%, 
partly due to sharp decline in oil pur- 
chases from Nigeria, while our exports 
were off by almost 7%, from $6.6 billion 
in 1981 to $5.4 billion in 1982. 

These figures certainly do not mean 
that Africa is a hopeless case. They do 
illustrate something we already 
know — that commodity dependent LDCs 
have been particularly hard hit by world 
recession. They underline the urgency of 
African economies diversifying and 
developing a broader range of produc- 
tive activities, beginning necessarily with 
the traditionally neglected agricultural 
sector. They also suggest that our ap- 
proach to these deeply troubled 
economies should not, indeed, cannot be 
"business as usual." 

Passage of Legislation. First, we 
can push through to completion the Ad- 
ministration's current legislative agenda, 
including passage of a revised Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act to eliminate 
needless ambiguities in that law. We can 
press ahead with our agenda of bilateral 
investment treaties to help regularize 
our private sector relationships in Africa 
and elsewhere. Bilateral investment 
treaties negotiations are, among other 
things, a useful vehicle for engaging in 
dialogue with African governments on 
means of improving the local investment 
climate. 

Encouraging Supportive Institu- 
tions and Policies. We must further 
refine our ongoing effort to encourage, 
largely through AID, the kinds of in- 
stitutions and policies that will support, 
not stifle, the most productive elements 
in African society. I would note that 
AID is pursuing this effort on two 
tracks. In its agriculture, health, and 
other programs, AID's Africa Bureau 
engages in constant dialogue with 
African governments to improve the 



«jgust 1983 



37 



EUROPE 



policy, regulatory, and legal framework, 
with the aim of stimulating indigenous 
private enterprise and increasing en- 
trepreneurial and managerial skill. AID's 
programs are also designed to maximize 
the role of market forces as opposed to 
the practice — prevalent among many aid 
donors in the past— of relying exclusive- 
ly on government bureaucracies and 
often creating new ones. 

Meanwhile, the new Private Enter- 
prise Bureau (PRE) is designing ex- 
perimental projects in selected countries 
to develop financial institutions and in- 
termediaries and to assist governments 
in privatizing state-owned enterprises. 
PRE is also developing a program of 
private sector advisory services which 
will be available to be drawn upon by in- 
dividual AID missions in Africa and 
around the world. 

Specialized Economic Agencies. It 

was mentioned earlier that one of the 
Africa Bureau's functions is to stimulate, 
wherever possible, adequate allocation of 
resources to Africa by our specialized 
economic agencies. A recent study by 
the Battelle Corporation entitled 
"Obstacles to Private Sector Activities in 
Africa" concludes that the State Depart- 
ment should accelerate and formalize 
this coordinating role. I would note that 
although the study was sponsored by the 
State Department, we certainly did not 
"precook" the results. We, nevertheless, 
find the conclusions interesting and will 
be studying it with some care. 

One theme that pervades the Bat- 
telle study — and that is echoed by prac- 
tically anyone with business experience 
in Africa — is the concerted manner in 
which the Europeans and Japanese 
devote resources to their traders and in- 
vestors. This support is sometimes in 
the form of subsidization (e.g., the use 
of mixed credits which, with limited ex- 
ception in the case of agricultural com- 
modities, are contrary to U.S. policy). 
Underlying this issue, however, is a 
totally different relationship between 
government and business and how they 
relate to Third World economic policies. 
Our allies see aid as serving multiple 
ends, including political objectives, ex- 
port promotion, and facilitation of 
investment as well as development. In- 
deed, they see these goals as com- 
plementary, not conflicting. Their 
approach is epitomized by the Lome con- 
vention, which wraps aid, trade, and 
technology transfer instruments into one 
contractual relationship between the 
European Community and its former 
colonies. 

Our own approach is very different. 
U.S. business and government have 



traditionally operated independently, 
and U.S. Government agencies each pur- 
sue separate and usually distinct objec- 
tives. The American public and, indeed, 
the U.S. Congress, often perceives aid 
as a kind of charity, not as a means of 
enhancing our own self-interest. Political 
and/or commercial objectives are typical- 
ly regarded as antithetical to the goal of 
development. In short, our policy does 
not integrate political, aid, trade, and in- 
vestment goals. 

The Administration's Caribbean 
Basin Initiative represents a modest 
step away from our traditional ap- 
proach, toward the European model. 
Perhaps we should consider whether the 
poorest countries, many of which are in 
Africa, do not also deserve a measure of 
special treatment. It could take many 
forms, not necessarily similar to the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative. But there is 
no question that we need to give serious 
thought to this issue — how to make our 



policy fit the special conditions of Afric 
and serve our own broadening political 
and economic objectives. 

From our perspective, it seems ob- 
vious that there is, indeed, a relationsr 
between our various goals. Surely 
political stability in Africa is a sine quu 
non for economic stability. Developmei 
in the agricultural sector will create ne 
opportunities for U.S. trade and invest 
ment, especially in the field of 
agribusiness, where the United States 
leads the world. Seen from this point < 
view, our aid, if it successfully stimu- 
lates a better investment climate, is 
anything but charity, and our commer- 
cial concerns can hardly be divorced 
from our interest in African 
development. 



'I 



'The complete transcript of the hearing 
will be published by the committee and wif 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



North Atlantic Council 
Meets in Paris 



Secretary Shultz departed Washing- 
ton, D.C, on June 8, 1983, to attend the 
regular semiannual session of the North 
Atlantic Council ministerial meeting 
(June 9-10}. 

Following are the texts of the 
Secretary's news conference held in Paris 
and the North Atlantic Council final 
communique. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JUNE 8, 1983' 

Q. Could you say what the importance 
of this NATO meeting is and what we 
can expect from it? 

A. This is one of a series of very im- 
portant meetings starting with the 
OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development! meeting 
in Paris, a month or so ago, the 
Williamsburg summit, the NATO 
Defense Ministers' meeting last week, 
and now this meeting, which, significant- 
ly, takes place in Paris. These meetings, 
on the one hand, bring together a vary- 
ing but, nevertheless, consistent group 
of countries — the industrial democracies 
of the world — in various settings, and 
we see these meetings taking place 



against the background of problems ai 
challenges to the industrial democracie 
At the same time, the basis for increa 
ing confidence is that we are meeting 
these problems and challenges 
successfully. 

In the OECD meeting and at 
Williamsburg, of course, there was a 
concentration on economic issues, and 
we now see the beginnings of recover} 
in the free world economy, with much 
lower inflation than we've had at the 
start of past recoveries and good pros- 
pects for keeping inflation under c< mtr 
That's a very good situation and, at th" 
same time, there has been — and I felt 
this at the first NATO Foreign 
Ministers' meeting that I went to last 
October and then in December in 
Brussels and at successive meetings—; 
real sense of unity and cohesion and 
determination to identify and defend oi 
values and to see the relationship of th 
goal to the kinds of things that are be- 
ing done in NATO. 

In particular, right now, of course, 
the focus is on both tracks of the dual- 
track 1979 NATO decision. We are mo' 
ing into the time of 1983 when negotia- 
tions are going on intensively in Gene! 
At the same time, it must be clear to 



38 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



grybody that the decision made to 
ploy, unless there is a negotiating out- 
ttie, is a very firm decision. So, all of 
?se things are coming together in this 
t of meetings. This is the fourth one in 
i series, and it's a meeting of extraor- 
tary importance as we try to bring 
;se things together. It should give us 
lewed confidence as a free people in 
« countries, recognizing, with candor, 
; problems that we have and strug- 
ng with them and gradually finding 
iitions or ways of coping with a 
bater and greater success with these 
)blems. 

Q. Isn't there some danger that 
th all these meetings you may run 
t of things to say with each other? 

A. This is a time when it's very im- 
-tant to stay glued together. We've 
I an intensive process of consultation. 
S focused on these four meetings, 
ere are innumerable other contacts by 
ile, letter, and by individuals traveling 
>und — Europeans, Japanese, and 
tericans, people from Washington and 
•ious capitals — and I think that the in- 
se and continuing consultative pat- 
ns that have been established are 
*d. It may be that we don't have 
lething brand new and fresh to say, 

at the same time, it's important to 
;p reaffirming the track we're on. 
i even as the weeks and months go 

there are developments that need to 
assessed, and we'll do it. 

Q. You said that this meeting 
rnificantly" takes place in Paris, 
lid you go into that significance, of 
I French invitation and of Paris as a 
I ce for the meeting? 

A. You have identified properly why 
ade that comment, and it simply 
lifies the cohesion of Europe with the 
ited States in the sense that NATO 

the North Atlantic alliance having 
agnized the distinctiveness of each 
ntry and the distinctiveness of 
nee and, I might say, the United 
tes. One of the magic qualities of our 
esion these days is the fact that 
ty country is insistently sovereign 

independent but, nevertheless, on 
; basis, people are talking together, 
•king together and, within that 
nework, cooperating effectively. It's 
: balance of insistent sovereignty 
i a sense of cohesion and collabora- 

that, perhaps, especially underlines 
importance of this setting and the 
ity to do that. 



Q. Re Nicaragua: Why was the 
decision made to respond to the expul- 
sion of three American diplomats so 
severe? If that leads to a break in 
diplomatic relations, would you con- 
sider that a negative consequence? 

A. We don't have any thoughts of 
breaking diplomatic relations. Senator 
Stone [Richard B. Stone, Ambassador- 
at-Large and special representative of 
the President to Central America] has 
Nicaragua on his itinerary. We expect to 
see that continue; that's our intent as we 
seek a regional solution to the problem 
of Central America, a peaceful solution, 
a solution that will yield economic 
development and progress toward 
democratic institutions in the area. That 
is our objective, an objective that can 
hardly be served when you have the 
kind of military buildup that's been tak- 
ing place. Now as far as the actions 
taken are concerned, there was no 
justification whatever for the expulsion 
of the three American diplomats and, 
under the circumstances, it seemed to us 
that it was important to express our 
reaction to that, and we did nothing 
about people in the Embassy in 
Washington but simply, basically close 
the Consulates scattered around the 
country. 

Q. You said it is the U.S. intent 
for Ambassador Stone to be in 
Nicaragua on Friday. Do you expect 
him to be received officially? 

A. We expect he will be. The point 
is that we seek a regional peaceful solu- 
tion to the problem. The President has 
named an outstanding American, with 
great talent and knowledge of the area. 
He is now going around in a listening 
pattern trying to help people compose 
the differences. That is unambiguously a 
good thing, and I should hope that 
Nicaragua responds to it, and I expect 
that they will. 

Q. How would you assess the 
state of the Warsaw Pact and the 
COMECON [Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance] countries after the 
change of leadership in the Soviet 
Union? 

A. I hesitate because I much prefer 
to talk about the United States and the 
alliance and what we are doing and then 
look for outcomes that may be different 
from the past based on things — on 
behavior and changes that take place 
that you can identify in terms of 
substantive result. As of now, we don't 
see any substantive result. On the other 
hand, as you point out, there is new 
leadership, and that always tends to 
make you, and should reinvigorate your 



efforts to, probe and test and to see if a 
different pattern can be brought out. It 
remains to be seen. But as in the case of 
my response to questions about 
Nicaragua, the U.S. position, and I'm 
sure the position of our allies, is that we 
are determined; we are going to be 
strong; we are going to defend our 
values; and, at the same time, we are 
always ready to work for constructive 
solutions to problems if those can be ob- 
tained. They are substantive and 
reasonable and not just rhetorical. We 
just have to wait and see but be ready to 
work with the other side as the substan- 
tive opportunities arise. 

Q. Would you comment on our 
policies with respect to Greece and 
Turkey? Will we get Greece to agree 
to the 7-10 ratio on arms sales? Will 
we get Greece to sign a base agree- 
ment? 

A. First of all, Greece and Turkey 
are both our allies. They both are 
friends. We want to keep it that way, 
and we like our friends to be friends. 
That isn't always the case, but anything 
that can happen and encourages that 
trend, we are for it. The base negotia- 
tions are ongoing and at an intense 
stage right now, and we want to see a 
constructive outcome. I'll just leave it at 
that rather than comment on what's go- 
ing on in a particular negotiation. 

In terms of U.S. support levels, we 
have proposals to the Congress, and 
there is gradual action taking place in 
terms of the 1983 supplemental and the 
1984 authorization and appropriation 
bills that are working their way along. I 
don't think that we want to find our- 
selves pinned down to some sort of for- 
mula approach to any of these things 
and really can't do it even if we want to, 
given the nature of the authorization 
and appropriation process. But, certain- 
ly, we want to deal with each country in 
an equitable and helpful way. 

Q. Will East- West trade be a ma- 
jor part of the NATO agenda? 

A. It will certainly be part of the 
agenda. It's an important subject. Last 
December, when this group met, there 
was a great deal of sentiment for having 
a broad study, kind of an umbrella 
study, of East- West economic relations, 
take place within the NATO framework. 
As I went around Europe and discussed 
that, it seemed to jell. It was the posi- 
tion favored by President Mitterrand as 
well — discovered when I came to 
Paris— and so the NATO economic com- 
mittee undertook a study. We think it is 
a good study, and I'm sure that study 
will be discussed, as it should be, not on- 



}ust 1983 



39 



EUROPE 



ly in this NATO meeting but as a contin- 
uing matter as we find ourselves more 
and more with a broad sense of generali- 
ty of views on the importance of, at 
least, certain apsects of East- West 
economic relations. So, I expect that will 
be an important topic of discussion. 

Q. Could you bring us up to date 
on the Middle East, particularly 
General Walters' [Ambassador at 
Large Vernon Walters] visit last 
week? 

A. We are seeking to explain and to 
develop support for the idea of with- 
drawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon, and General Walters made a 
trip around in that regard, and I'm not 
going to comment on particulars of what 
he said or somebody said to him in the 
places he visited, but he certainly got a 
cordial reception as he always does, and 
people listened. I think it was an effec- 
tive thing to do. The Lebanese have 
been putting on a strenuous effort to go 
round the various capitals — particularly 
Arab capitals, but also others, including 
Europe — and particularly the countries 
of all of us who are contributing to the 
multinational force, and similarly want- 
ing to develop support for a withdrawal 
of all foreign forces. Right now what 
that means is Syrian and PLO forces, 
since the Israelis, have agreed to 
withdraw. We are supporting that idea, 
and it's very important to bring that 
about. 

Beyond the problems in Lebanon, 
are the basic difficulties of the peace 
process itself, and it is apparent to 
everyone — certainly it is apparent to the 
Lebanese — that it is critical for them in 
the long run to find some kind of solu- 
tion to the problems of the Palestinians 
and a way of serving the rights and 
aspirations of the Palestinian people. 
The President's September 1 START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] pro- 
posals addressed themselves to that ob- 
jective; those remain important pro- 
posals. I found, in my trip to the Middle 
East, that they are very much alive in 
the minds of the leaders with whom I 
spoke. It is clear, also, that the key is 
finding some way to have legitimized, 
from many points of view, Palestinian 
participation in talks with Israel about 
that and related Israeli security issues. 
We continue to pursue that, and it leads 
you inevitably to scratch your head in 
the light of all of the developments 
around, to scratch your head more and 
more about the human beings called 
Palestinians, and ask yourself what is 
being done and what can be done to 
make life better for them and perhaps, 



in a way, this is the sort of thing that 
will improve that process. 

Q. There are reports this morning 
that the PLO was planning to bring 
its troops back into the Bekaa from 
Tunisia, Yemen, and elsewhere. Can 
you comment on those reports? 

A. I don't want to comment on any 
particular report, but any development 
that puts more foreign forces into 
Lebanon than were there at the time of 
cessation of the main hostilities is 
unwelcome. We are trying to move in 
the other direction. It only adds to the 
tensions in the area, and those tensions 
always have the potential of leading to 
an outbreak of major hostilities. We 
don't want to see that; I don't think the 
Syrians want to see that, from all I 
know; I'm sure the Israelis don't want to 
see that; and we don't want to see that. 
It's very undesirable to have additional 
forces going into the Bekaa. 

Q. The Administration supported 
the idea of a Bulgarian-Soviet plot. 
Now that position has changed. Why? 

A. I really don't have any comment 
on it, but you go ahead and ask your 
question. This is a matter that is under 
investigation by the authorities of Italy 
and we support their investigation and 
await its outcome. 

Q. Do you see a role for Spain as a 
mediator in Central America? 

A. The Spanish, of course, have a 
very special relationship to Latin 
America, particularly the Spanish- 
speaking countries — but to all countries 
in Latin America— and constructive ef- 
forts by anyone are always welcome. 
There are lots of mediators around now, 
and I'm sure that— I won't try to speak 
for somebody else— we welcome the ef- 
forts of the Contadora four who are 
working with the situation. I believe that 
the efforts that Senator Stone is making 
on behalf of the President are also seen 
as constructive in the region. Somehow 
it is worthwhile to help the frontline of 
this mediation effort to work and, prob- 
ably, Mr. Gonzales has that in mind. I'm 
sure he'll have constructive things to 
contribute on this score. I had a discus- 
sion with him last December; we 
touched on this matter, but he was just 
new in office and didn't develop his 
thoughts too extensively. He'll be in 
Washington shortly, and we'll have a 
chance to review it with him then. 

Q. Back to Europe: Britain and 
France don't want to be included in 
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] talks. What is the position of 
the Administration? 



A. Our feeling— and the feeling of 
Britain, France, and all our allies— is 
that these are national forces, and the; 
don't have a role in the Geneva talks, ! 
they are not there. That was stated 01 
more in the Williamsburg security and 
peace statement. 

Q. You talked about waiting to 
see if the Soviets will be conciliator 
Do you think there is any chance of 
movement before a high-level meet- 
ing—you and Gromyko or Andropov 
and the President? 

A. On certain things, it depends o 
the subject. Certainly, it's reasonable t 
expect that the capable negotiators th< 
both sides have in these various negoti 
tions will be able to make progress if tj 
national governments involved want tc 
see that happen. The U.S. Governmen 
and, I think, those of our allies, wants 
see it happen. So there is no reason w 
competent negotiators can't get 
somewhere. I hope that a strong and 
significant conclusion can be brought c 
of the CSCE [Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] meetings 
Madrid from the standpoint of the 
Western side. We have unity and pur- 
pose there, and we have outstanding 
representation in the various delega- 
tions. And from the U.S. standpoint, 
Max Kampelman is doing a terrific job 
So there is no reason why you couldn' 
have an outcome there. 

Q. The President is supposed to 
announce new START proposals to- 
day- Could you give us a preview? C 
you envisage START and INF being 
grouped into one negotiation? 

A. I think they are separate. Whj 
we have said is that we are prepared 
keep negotiating and working for the 
ultimate goal of the elimination of all 
these weapons and for as low a level n 
possible of equal and verifiable deploy 
ments. If the elimination goal is not 
reached right away, and in the event ( 
the start of deployment, at least from 
our standpoint, we are prepared to coi 
tinue the negotiations, and I don't see 
there is any implication there of mergi 
the negotiations. We probably would jr 
keep it the way it's going now. 

Q, Do you see an evolution in th> 
relationship between the alliance am 
Japan on the basis of the Williams- 
burg declaration? 

A. I don't think that anybody is tr) 
ing to work toward a formal alliance. 
There is a relationship between major 
industrial democracies, and there is a 
common concern, born out of security 
interests on the one hand and economii 



40 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



nkages on the other. That was well il- 
istrated by both statements that came 
ut of Williamsburg. The way in which 
ihat is working now is perfectly satisfac- 
,ory. There is a lot of interaction be- 
ween ourselves and the Japanese — 
Diplomatic work — and of course, direct 
jelationship on security concerns and 
jetween Japan and Europe as well. 

Q. The paragraph in the statement 
■n security re "indivisibility." What 
/as that addressing? 

A. It was a broad statement of con- 
option, and, at the same time, was an 
l c firmation of the position that has been 
jiken by ourselves as a spokesman for 
/eryone in the INF negotiations that 
nong the principles that have been put 
Jirward there, by Ambassador Nitze, 
'aul H. Nitze, head of the U.S. delega- 
tm to the INF talks] and the President, 
lated as guiding principles, one is a 
'obal approach. 

Q. An apparent contradiction: If 
ere is no INF agreement and deploy- 
ent goes ahead, you accept inequali- 
. But in the negotiations, you seek 
luality. 

A. What has happened since the 
I 'cision was taken to proceed with a 
| mble-track decision, is that the Soviet 
ii nion has continued a relentless and ex- 
I nsive deployment process. From our 
I andpoint, the thing for us to do is to 
I oceed with planned deployments if the 

gotiations don't indicate some other 
;■ tcome, and then we'll have to appraise 
I e situation as we go along. But, of 
■ urse, what we want to see happen is 
I -at as the Soviet Union deepens its ap- 

eciation of the resolve and the cohe- 
i >n and the unity of the alliance, it will 
J cide that it's better to have a 
I gotiated outcome, either before or 
i :er deployment starts. So the principle 
I equality obtained, we don't have it 
| w; that's the reason deployments are 
{ needed, the Soviet Union has a 
i mopoly of these weapons and seeks to 
I dntain it, and we don't accept that. 

Q. Are we willing to accept in- 
( uality at higher levels? 

A. We don't appreciate inequality at 
1 i level, and we want to see levels kept 
Iwn. So we think the right way to ap- 
I iach things right now is to proceed 
1 :h the deployments that are planned 
I less negotiations yield a result for 
i ne other pattern of deployment. We 
I ieve that the best pattern and the 
1 rt level of equality is at zero; we con- 
i ue to believe that, and we'll continue 



working for it. It leaves you right where 
you were when you started the question. 
[Laughter] 

Q. There seems to be a widespread 
feeling in Europe that it isn't fair for 
the United States to seek equal levels 
with the Soviet Union when the 
Soviets have to face French, British, 
and Chinese weapons as well. Is the 
United States prepared to take this in- 
to account? 

A. It is a commentary on people's 
mentality that there emerges into think- 
ing that the Soviet Union has to be more 
heavily armed than all the rest of the 
world combined. That's not an accept- 
able way to think about it, and from our 
standpoint, we take the position and 
we'll maintain the position that in this 
strategic area we have to think about 
the Soviet systems and the systems of 
the United States and seek a balanced 
outcome— an equal outcome to the rela- 
tionship between those forces. 

Q. What happens if the allies don't 
show cohesion? 

A. They are showing cohesion and 
have demonstrated that time and again. 
It is interesting, as you review the 
history of the alliance, that periodically 
it rises to a crescendo, but it is always 
there— a sense of a lack of cohesion and 
so on — and yet here we are, what is it, 
35 years later. The statements and the 
actions and the ability to adapt to the 
evolution of circumstances remain 
strong. It seems to me the basic reason 
must be that the values that unite us are 
preeminent, and, in the end, are the 
things which tie us together and will 
continue to do so. 

Q. With [French] President 
Mitterrand having signed the 
Williamsburg agreement and with the 
NATO meeting being held in Paris, do 
you see a chance in the French at- 
titude toward the alliance from that of 
the previous government? 

A. I see the French Government as 
being very strong minded, independent, 
conscious of its sovereignty and, fun- 
damentally, very supportive of the 
security concerns of the alliance. That 
has been evident to me in every meeting 
that I have held with President 
Mitterrand. It was evident in 
Williamsburg, and it is evident in the 
behavior of what the French are doing. 
I'll just leave it at that. 

Q. Is the United States talking to 
the British and French to get bargain- 
ing chips in the INF talks? 



A. No. These are independent 
forces, and we've gone through that 
argument again and again. 

Q. Is there any merit to this, in 
asking them in some way to join with 
the United States? 

A. No. They are not part of it. They 
are not to be counted in these negotia- 
tions. They are not part of it, they don't 
want to be part of it, and that's where 
the situation rests. 

Q. Does the Soviet Union possess 
strategic superiority in the world? 

A. No. The question that was raised 
was different. It was: Should the 
Soviet — if I can rephrase the ques- 
tion — you were saying: Isn't it legiti- 
mate that the Soviet Union should be 
superior to any given country and think 
of itself as equal to all the rest of the 
world combined. I say: No. That's not a 
legitimate point of view at all. We don't 
accept that at all. 

Q. Is it your impression that they 
have superiority? Would you trade 
U.S. armaments for theirs? 

A. When you ask that kind of ques- 
tion, you have to put it in its broadest 
context. Armaments are one thing, and 
what stands behind the armaments has 
to go with it. I wouldn't trade our situa- 
tion for theirs, even remotely, because a 
free system will yield the best results as 
we go along. Also, ultimately, in terms 
of human values and in terms of our 
determination and ability to defend 
ourselves. 

You have to think of this as one big 
pot, in a way, and I don't have any 
doubt whatsoever of the superiority of 
Western values and abilities. Now in- 
sofar as particular elements of ar- 
maments are concerned, there is no 
doubt that, in some very important 
areas, there is a clear margin of Soviet 
superiority. One that has been focused 
on in the NATO dual-track decision is 
the Soviet monopoly of these highly 
destructive intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles, and if you . . . and there are 
various ways of establishing or counting 
elements of that picture, but there are 
important overall elements, throw- 
weight, perhaps, being the one that is 
most prominent, where there is a huge 
Soviet advantage. That isn't true across 
the board; I fully recognize that. But 
there are some very important elements 
of Soviet superiority which we seek to 
remedy. But, take overall, our system, 
their system, our military forces, their 
military forces and the impact of free 
people— I don't have any doubts about 
which side I want to be on. 



igust 1983 



41 



EUROPE 



Q. What is your assessment of 
Soviet policy in the Middle East 
today? 

A. I don't like to make comments 
about their intentions and what they are 
trying to do, because we can all 
speculate about it. And unless you have 
a seat around the table in the Kremlin, 
you don't know for sure. All I can say 
about it is that, first, they have installed 
powerful and more far-reaching weapons 
in Syria than were there before; second, 
their own forces are manning those 
weapons; and third, in terms of their 
public statements, they have denounced 
and opposed the agreement between 
Lebanon and Israel for the security of 
the southern part of Lebanon and the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces. I don't con- 
sider any one of those three things to be 
constructive contributions toward stabili- 
ty and peace in the Middle East. 

Q. Why are you meeting here with 
Giscard? Do you plan to meet with 
other opposition leaders? 

A. It is not so much a question of 
opposition leaders. Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing is a friend of mine for many 
years standing. I have gone to see him 
when I've come to Paris, when he's been 
in town, many times; we have visited 
together elsewhere; he is just a very 
good friend and a person with whom I 
enjoy talking. 

Q. What is the significance of the 
Soviet proposal for a nuclear freeze 
zone in Western Europe? 

A. It's always interesting when the 
suggestion is made that other people be 
nuclear free but not themselves. I can't 
help but wonder what that suggests 
about their attitude toward Soviet sub- 
marines in the waters of other countries. 
Is this a mea culpa, or what is it? I don't 
see it as a particularly forthcoming 
proposition. 

Q. The feeling here is that Presi- 
dent Mitterrand got trapped into sign- 
ing the Williamsburg declaration and 
that the United States is pushing the 
socialist government into a corner. 
What about this, given the presence of 
communists in the French 
Government? 

A. I would have to say that I admire 
the positions that President Mitterrand 
has taken on this general field and point 
out to you that there may be com- 
munists in the French Government, but 
there are communists from the Soviet 
Union who used to reside in France who 
aren't here any more, and that's a deci- 
sion the French Government made. I ap- 



plaud the decision, purely the French 
Government's decision. I'm sure that 
whatever President Mitterrand does he 
will do as a sovereign and independent 
Head of State. That's always been the 
case and that is, I may say, always the 
case with France. But as far as all of 
your questions on the internal political 
arrangements in France are concerned. 
I pass on that; that's France's internal 
affair. 

Q. On East-West trade, one has 
the impression that the Export Ad- 
ministration Act is unraveling and 
that there was a lot of pressure on the 
United States in Williamsburg. What 
is the Administration seeking on 
restricting trade with the East? What 
do you expect from Congress on this? 

A. As far as the legislation is con- 
cerned, and the legislative situation, 
there are different versions, and neither 
is precisely what the Administration pro- 
posed. That's fairly typical of the way 
legislation takes place in the United 
States; everybody doesn't agree, as you 
know. There is a struggle about that, 
and our friends and allies have made it 
clear — long before Williamsburg, but at 
Williamsburg — that there are aspects of 
the Administration's position, along the 
lines that you mentioned, that they don't 
like. So we know that. 

I might say that my lawyers have 
taught me not to say "extraterritoriality" 
any more; that's, in part, because it is 
replaced as the current jawbreaker. We 
refer to it as conflict of jurisdiction, and 
that point can be brought out very clear- 
ly if you take a hypothetical case. The 
U.S. firm that has developed a process 
of some kind and licenses that process to 
a firm in another country on the written 
and clear understanding that if U.S. ex- 
ports control policy is applied to that 
category of technology, then those con- 
trols will carry over to the other coun- 
try. Now some people say that's bad, 
that's extraterritorial reach. The other 
side of the argument is that there is 
nothing wrong with it; that's what has 
been laid out in the contract; it was an 
understanding undertaken, clearly, and, 
at best, it is a conflict of jurisdiction as 
to who is going to have something to 
say about that. There is a legitimate 
legal and conceptual issue here that is a 
deep and difficult issue. 

We have embarked on some exten- 
sive discussions of this issue in which 
I've asked Ken Dam — who doubles as a 
lawyer, and a very good one — the Depu- 
ty Secretary of State, to participate. 
He's been working with the Deputy At- 
torney General, Ed Schmultz, and we 



have been conferring with the Cana- 
dians, the British, and others. They've 
delved into this issue at some depth ar 
length conceptually and in terms of 
statute. In terms of what we seek in t 
area, it is broadly two things: These 
things have been reflected in the discu 
sions we have had, and there is a 
general view that there has been a lot 
technology transfer to the Soviet Unio 
in one way or another over the past 
years which has helped them militarily 
considerably — that is not a smart thin] 
for us to do; we should get control of i 
and we are trying hard to get control 
it. There is a general view that that is 
the thing to do. 

Beyond that, we don't see any 
reason why — given the fact that the 
mass of armaments that we have unde 
taken are provided by the developmen 
of armaments on the Soviet side — whj 
it makes any sense for us, as a group 
nations, to have trade with them on 
other than a market basis. So these ar 
basically the things that we seek; it's r 
a trade war, it is that kind of control. 
Now as far as legislation is concerned 
the United States, for the government 
to exercise control on exports of any 
kind, there has to be a statutory basis 
for it; otherwise, a firm is free to mak 
sales as it chooses, and we, therefore, 
seek statutory authority to do that. 

Q. Can you tell us something abc 
interest rates and the prices of the 
dollar? 

A. Something about the interest 
rates and the price of the dollar. The i 
terest rates are higher than the Presi- 
dent wants. We would like to see then 
lower, nominal interest rates and real 
terest rates. The price of the dollar is 
basically governed by market forces ai 
at least, as I see it, there are three 
elements to that market: One is what 
happening in the field of trade, which, 
taken by itself, would suggest a lower 
value for the dollar. Another is 
developments in the field of capital 
flows, partly, flows that are oriented t 
interest rates but also to a major extei 
in my opinion, flows that are oriented 
a kind of safe-haven objective; it is the 
size of the capital flows that has pro- 
duced the strong dollar and from the 
standpoint of the U.S. exporting com- 
munity, they don't like it. To some ex- 
tent they scratch their heads at the 
ways the Europeans and others are con 
plaining about it, because if the dollar 
were to be a lot lower in value, 
American goods would be a lot more 
competitive, particularly in third 
markets. That's kind of roundabout, bu 



42 



Department of State Bulleti 



EUROPE 



e value of the dollar represents the 
arket's evaluation of it and is reflect- 
g, as it must, the flows of money 
hich are made up of these different 
mponents. 

As far as interest rates are con- 
rned, it is fair to say that as we are 
ccessful in reducing the rate of infla- 
>n in the United States and as the con- 
ation grows that the rate of inflation 
11 stay more or less under control, 
en we'll see interest rates continue 
sir decline. The decline has been quite 
amatic over the last 2 years. Of the 
ars of the Reagan Administration, in 
3rt-term rates it has been significant 
t not as dramatic in long-term rates, 
aen the President took office the 
)rt-term rates were about 20%. Now, 
3-month treasuries, 872% or some- 
ng like that, so that's a big drop. The 
.g-term rates have not come down as 
ch. It isn't quite right to say that 
ans that the long-term real rate of in- 
est is high in the United States. It is 
•re correct to say that the level of the 
g-term interest rates represents a 
rket hesitation to judge inflation as 
ig under control, let's say 5 or 10 
rs from now. The fact that the long- 
n interest rates have been coming 
m represents an emergence of more 

more credibility. The inflation may 
ander control, but people in the 
•kets have been burned so much over 

last 10 or 15 years that there is a lot 
kepticism. That is one of the reasons 

President is as determined to do 

ething about not so much the near- 
n deficits in our budget, but the out- 
f deficits in our budgets. 



j ;al communique, 

1 JE 10, 1983 

1 North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
6 ion in Paris on 9th and 10th June, 1983. 
B sters reaffirmed that their supreme ob- 
I /e is the maintenance of peace in 
I lorn. A stable military balance is essen- 
a o this objective. 

I 'he countries of the Alliance are deter- 
I d to ensure through negotiations that 
i lalance will be established at the lowest 
I'ble level. They are equally determined to 
a -e their security and their independence. 
B will defend the liberty and the justice 
Hi hich their democracies are founded. 

'hey have put forward a broad set of 
■ control and disarmament initiatives on: 

I strategic arms reductions (START) 

I intermediate range nuclear forces 

-I 

I Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 

|Tt) 



• a Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (CDE) 

• a total ban on chemical weapons. 

They call up the Soviet Union to demonstrate 

by its deeds an equal resolution to achieve 
concrete results in these negotiations. 

As regards intermediate range nuclear 
forces, the Ministers affirmed the importance 
of the double-track decision taken on 12th 
December, 1979, by the countries concerned. 
They hope that, in the near future, a 
verifiable agreement providing for United 
States and Soviet equality can be reached in 
Geneva. If concrete results through negotia- 
tions cannot be reached, deployments as 
planned will begin as already decided in 
December 1979. 2 

1. Recognising that the cohesion and 
strength of the Alliance is of paramount im- 
portance for the preservation of peace and 
improved international relations, Ministers 
agreed as follows: 

The Programme for Peace in Freedom 
adopted in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 
10th June, 1982, emphasises the Alliance's 
resolve to deter aggression by means of a 
strong defence and to develop through co- 
operation and dialogue, a constructive East- 
West relationship aimed at genuine detente. 
This balanced policy will continue to serve 
peace and uphold the independence and 
democratic values of the free peoples of the 
Alliance. 

The Alliance remains a fundamental 
forum for close and regular consultation on 
matters of common concern and permits 
member states to adjust their aims and in- 
terests through free exchanges of views. 

The maintenance of adequate defences by 
the Allied countries threatens no one. In Ar- 
ticle 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty the 
members of the Alliance reaffirmed the 
undertaking to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in 
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations. This solemn obligation 
was restated in the Helsinki Final Act signed 
by thirty-five countries and will always be 
fully honoured hy the members of the 
Alliance. Each and every sovereign member 
of the Alliance is a guarantor that none of 
their weapons will be used except in response 
to attack. 

2. The Allies view with concern the sus- 
tained increase in Soviet military strength in 
Europe and capability for military action 
world-wide, which far exceed defence needs. 
The Soviet Union maintains its build-up of 
conventional arms, chemical weapons, naval 
forces, nuclear forces, and in particular the 
deployment of SS-20 intermediate range 
nuclear missiles. Faced with this threatening 
situation, the Allies are resolved to ensure 
that conditions never exist which could tempt 
the Soviet Union to exploit its military power 
against any of the Allies. They are deter- 
mined to meet the legitimate security re- 
quirements for the entire North Atlantic 
Treaty area. A sufficient level of both con- 
ventional and nuclear forces remains 



necessary for the credibility of deterrence. 
The security and sovereignty of the Euro 
pean members of the Alliance remain 

guaranteed l>\ their own defences, by the 

presence of North American forces on Euro- 
pean territory and by the United States 
strategic' nuclear commitment to Europe. The 
United States and Canada likewise depend 
for their own securit) upon the contribution 
of the European partners to the defence of 
the Alliance. 

3. The Allies have reviewed the trends of 
Soviet policies which bear upon Western in- 
terests. They are resolved to maintain a firm, 
realistic and constructive attitude and agree 
that it is important to maintain a dialogue, 
not least in periods of tension. 

The Allies stress that respect for the 
obligation not to use force is mandatory and 
applicable between all states without excep- 
tion. The reaffirmation of this obligation, con- 
tained in the United Nations Charter and the 
Helsinki Final Act, cannot substitute for 
deeds. The Allies therefore call on the Soviet 
Union for a complete end to the use of force 
in Afghanistan and the threat of use of force, 
as in the case of Poland. The exercise of 
restraint and responsibility by the Soviet 
Union is essential for the constructive rela- 
tions which the Allies wish to establish with 
it. Such relations with the Soviet Union are 
possible on the full range of East- West 
issues. 

The Allies look to the Soviet Union to 
contribute to the achievement of tangible 
results in the negotiations on arms control, 
disarmament and confidence-building 
measures, since this would enhance the 
credibility of the principle of non-use of force. 
They would welcome any serious proposals to 
improve confidence and cooperation between 
East and West. 

4. The Allies deplore the continuing vio- 
lation by the Polish authorities of the commit- 
ments undertaken by Poland in the Helsinki 
Final Act. They look to those authorities to 
honour the wish of the Polish people for na- 
tional reconciliation, the release of political 
prisoners and the establishment of civil 
rights, including the right of the workers to 
have trade unions of their own choice. This 
would enhance Poland to overcome its crisis. 
More normal trade and economic co-operation 
with Poland, for which the Allies wish, could 
be effective if progress were made towards 
national reconciliation without which there 
can be no genuine economic and social 
recovery. The Allies urge the Soviet Union to 
cease its pressure on Poland so as not to im- 
pede the efforts of the Polish people for na- 
tional renewal and reform. 

5. The Soviet Union's actions in 
Afghanistan also pose a major obstacle to the 
normal development of international rela- 
tions. Intensified Soviet aggression there con- 
tinues to meet with the determined resistance 
of the Afghan people. The mounting toll of 
civilian casualties and destruction emphasises 
the urgency of a political solution based on 
the verifiable application of the resolutions of 
the United Nations General Assembly which 
called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet 



lust 1983 



43 



EUROPE 



forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's in- 
dependence, sovereignty and non-aligned 
status, the right of the Afghan people to self- 
determination, and the voluntary return of 
refugees. 

6. Defence and arms control are integral 
parts of the security policy of the Alliance. In 
pursuit of this policy the Allies have submit- 
ted a comprehensive series of proposals 
designed to lead to equitable, verifiable and 
militarily significant agreements for major 
reductions to a stable balance of forces at the 
lowest possible levels. 

7. In this spirit, the Allies concerned 
underline the continued importance of the 
decision of 12th December, 1979, which com- 
bined the modernization of United States 
longer range INF (LRINF) with a parallel of- 
fer of negotiations and the unilateral 
withdrawal from Europe of a thousand 
United States nuclear warheads; which was 
completed in 1980. Since that decision was 
taken, the Soviet Union has relentlessly con- 
tinued its deployment of modern SS-20 
missiles, greatly expanding its monopoly in 
this class of weapons which has created an 
entirely new threat for Europe. Ignoring the 
concerns of countries threatened by these 
systems, the Soviet Union is, at the same 
time, resisting achievement of an equitable 
negotiated solution. The Soviet approach 
would undermine the vital link between the 
defence of Europe and the American 
strategic deterrent. Present Soviet proposals 
would include third country national deter- 
rent forces which have no place in the 
negotiations and leave the Soviets with more 
SS-20 missiles than when the negotiations 
began, deny the right to modernise the deter- 
rent to this threat, leave unrestrained large 
Soviet SS-20 forces in the Eastern USSR 
which threaten Europe as well as Asia, and 
remove from Europe aircraft of the United 
States which are essential to conventional 
defence. 

The Allies concerned reaffirm that in the 
absence of concrete negotiating results which 
obviate deployments, deployments will begin 
at the end of 1983, in accordance with the 
schedule established in the decision of 1979. 
At the same time these Allies remain fully 
committed to reaching a successful outcome 
in the INF negotiations, which they continue 
to monitor and evaluate closely. They will 
support continued negotiations even after ini- 
tial deployments. These Allies will examine 
NATO's LRINF 1 requirements when concrete 
results are achieved in the negotiations, and 
will make appropriate adjustments in the 
levels of deployments already decided in 
1979. They fully support the efforts of the 
United States, in close consultation with 
them, to achieve progress in Geneva. These 
Allies strongly prefer the elimination of all 
United States and Soviet LRINF missiles, as 
proposed by the United States. They welcome 
and support as a further effort to achieve 
progress toward that end the United States 
proposal for an interim agreement which 
would result in equal global ceilings on 
warheads on United States and Soviet land- 
based LRINF missile systems at the lowest 



possible level. This proposal which establishes 
a flexible framework for negotiations was 
developed through close consultation among 
the Allies concerned. They call on the Soviet 
Union to contribute constructively to a suc- 
cessful outcome of the negotiations which ad- 
dresses the legitimate security concerns of 
both sides and welcome current United 
States efforts to that end. They strongly 
hope a balanced agreement will be rapidly 
reached. 3 

8. Allies expressed their full support for 
the effort of the United States to negotiate 
reductions in United States and Soviet 
strategic arms, and to secure an agreement 
which will enhance strategic stability. They 
welcome new steps being taken by the United 
States to promote progress in the START 
negotiations, and called upon the Soviet 
Union to respond in a similarly positive spirit. 

9. The Allies participating in the Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks 
attach great importance to achieving prog- 
ress. They consider that the comprehensive 
approach embodied in their draft Treaty text 
of July 1982 provides the basis of an accord 
which would lead to parity at the agreed col- 
lective ceilings for combined ground and air 
force manpower in Central Europe through 
substantial staged reductions. This major ini- 
tiative met what had been represented by the 
East as a fundamental requirement. It also 
proposed a well defined and practical pro- 
gramme for implementing an agreement with 
the East. Western participants hope that the 
East will respond in a more constructive way 
and recognise that, in order to contribute to 
stability and security in Europe, an MBFR 
agreement must provide for reductions and 
limitations based on agreed data and for ef- 
fective Associated Measures on verification 
and confidence-building. 

10. In the Committee on Disarmament 
the Allies seek disarmament measures which 
are balanced, realistic and verifiable, and 
which would maintain or enhance global 
security. In particular, they are working for 
an agreement on the prohibition of the 
development, production and stockpiling of 
chemical weapons and on the destruction of 
all existing stocks as well as the means of 
production. The Allies call upon the Soviet 
Union to co-operate in developing effective 
inspection and verification measures leading 
to agreements for the elimination of this en- 
tire category of weapons. 

The Allies remain gravely concerned 
about strong evidence of continued use of 
chemical weapons in South East Asia and 
Afghanistan in violation of international law 
and of Soviet involvement in the use of such 
weapons. 4 They welcome procedures being 
developed by the United Nations to in- 
vestigate allegations of the use of chemical 
weapons. 

1 1. The Allies are continuing their ef- 
forts at the Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting 
in arnve at a substantial and balanced con- 
cluding document, including a precise 
negotiating mandate for the < Conference on 
i Confidence and Security Building Measures 



and Disarmament in Europe. They conside 
that, as a result of the latest proposal by tl 
neutral and non-aligned Mates, an agreemi 
is now within reach which could permit a s 
cessful and early conclusion. 

The Allies have already stated their wr 
ingness to accept the draft concluding doct 
ment submitted bj the neutral and non- 
aligned states, subject to limited and 
reasonable amendments favourably receive 
by other participants and designed to 
enhance the balance of the agreement. Tht 
Allies therefore urge the Soviet Union to 
change its attitude and negotiate a solutioi 
the few remaining issues. This would 
demonstrate that the Soviet Union shares 
interest shown by other participating coun- 
tries ill a successful outcome to the Madrid 

meeting which will consolidate the CSCE 
process. The Allies are convinced that a 
substantial and balanced concluding docu- 
ment, together with renewed efforts to giv 
full effect to the final Act through concret 
action, would be of particular importance f 
developing a more constructive East-West 
relationship. 

The Allies emphasise the importance, i 
the present circumstances, not only of a re 
affirmation of the 1975 Helsinki com- 
mitments as a whole, hut also of an expres 
sion of the determination of the thirty-five 
signatory states to carry them out. They 
reaffirm, too. the importance they attach t 
the convening of a Conference which, as at 
integral part of the CSCE process, would 
have as its purpose the adoption of verifiaj 
militarily significant and binding provision 
applicable to the whole of Europe. The Alii 
also remain committed to further progress 
the important humanitarian aspects of Has 
West relations. 

12. The Allies support confidence- 
building measures designed to promote 
greater openness about armed forces and 
military activities, overcome misapprehens 
and distrust and thus facilitate disarmamei 
negotiations. The Allies recall that in 1982 
the United Nations General Assembly re- 
affirmed the importance of confidence- 
building measures and invited all states to 
consider the introduction of such measures 
their region. The Allies have taken a numb 
of concrete initiatives in that direction. 1'rt 
posals put forward by the Soviet Union, in 
contrast, are often declarator). The United 
States government, in an effort to help 
develop a stable peace, has tabled a series i 
confidence-building measures in the STAR' 
and INF negotiations and has suggested ne 
proposals in the nuclear field and in mutual 
communications between the United Slates 
anil the Soviet Union. The Allies will, in th< 
context of the Conference on Disarmament 
Europe, put forward concrete proposals f<i§ 
new generation of confidence and security 
building measures in Europe. The Allies vfl 
continue their efforts to build confidence 
through improved verification procedures^ 
provision of clear and comparable data on 
defence spending and oi her steps likelj to 
remove misconceptions. They urge the Sovi 
Union to join them in this endeavour. 



44 



Department of State Bulleti 



EUROPE 



13. The maintenance of a calm situation 
and around Berlin and the strict observ- 
es and full implementation of the 
iadripartite Agreement of 3rd September, 
171, including unimpeded traffic on the ac- 
ss routes, remain of fundamental impor- 
nce for East-West relations. 

Recalling their Rome statement of 5th 
ay, 1981, the Allies express the hope that 

efforts of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
my towards further practical progress in 
ler-German relations and towards im- 
avements for travel in both directions will 
ng direct benefits for Berlin and the Ger- 
in people in both states. 

14. The Allies reiterate their abhorrence 
i condemnation of recurring terrorist acts 
ich menace democratic institutions as well 
the conduct of international relations. The 
ies reaffirm their determination to pursue 
necessary efforts to combat and suppress 
mes of terrorism. 

15. The Ministers note that since their 
: meeting several aspects of East- West 
>nomic relations have been studied in- 
fing the security implications of these 
utions. Trade conducted on the basis of 
imercially sound terms and mutual advan- 
e, that avoids preferential treatment of 

Soviet Union, contributes to constructive 
;t-West relations. At the same time, 
teral economic relations with the Soviet 
on and the countries of Eastern Europe 
;t remain consistent with broad Allied 
urity concerns. These include avoiding 
endence on the Soviet Union, or con- 
uting to Soviet military capabilities. Thus, 
wopment of Western energy resources 
tld be encouraged. In order to avoid fur- 
•■ use by the Soviet Union of some forms 
-ade to enhance its military strength, the 
?s will remain vigilant in their continuing 
ew of the security aspects of East-West 
lomic relations. This work will assist 
?d governments in the conduct of their 
lies in this field. 5 

16. Sustained economic recovery in the 
t is essential since the strength and 
rity of the member countries rest upon 
il stability and progress as well as upon 
nee preparedness. In accordance with Ar- 

2 of the North Atlantic Treaty the Allies 
seek to eliminate conflict in their interna- 
■al economic policies and will encourage 
omic collaboration among them. The 
|s reaffirm the importance of this com- 
lent and of support from programmes 
'h are intended to benefit the economies 
ss favoured partners. 

17. The Allies will continue to work for 
urther development of peaceful and 
dly international relations and will pro- 
■ conditions of stability and well-being, 
aid which they give bilaterally and 
ilaterally is an important contribution to 
end. Countries in the Third World should 

the freedom to develop politically, 
omically and socially without outside in- 
rence. The Allies urge respect for 
reignty and genuine non-alignment. 



The Allies recognise thai events outside 
the Treaty area may affect their common in- 
terests as members of the Alliance. If it is 
established that their common interests are 
involved, they will engage in timely consulta- 
tions. Sufficient military capabilities must be 
assured in the Treaty area to maintain an 
adequate defence posture. Individual member 
governments who are in a position to do so 
will endeavour to support, at their request, 
sovereign nations whose security and in- 
dependence are threatened. Those Allies in a 
position to facilitate the deployment of forces 
outside the Treaty area may do so on the 
basis of national decision. 

The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
informed the North Atlantic Council of the 
present state of the review that the Spanish 
Government has undertaken regarding its 
participation in the Alliance, pending which 
he reserved his government's position on the 
present Communique. 



At the same time, however, the Spanish 
Minister expressed that his Government 
shares in the Communique in so far as it 
reflects positions already expressed by Spain 
in her relations with the member countries of 
the Alliance. 

The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
repeated Danish Government support for the 
double-track decision but at the same time he 
presented to his colleagues the motion passed 
by the Folketing on 26th May. 



'Press release 212 of June 14, 1983. 

2 Greece reserves its position on this 
paragraph (footnote in original text). 

3 Greece reserves its position on 
paragraph 7 (footnote in original text). 

■•Greece recalls its position as it has been 
expressed during the previous Ministerial 
Session (footnote in original text). 

6 Greece recalled its position on various 
aspects of this paragraph (footnote in original 
text). ■ 



Unacceptable Intervention: 
Soviet Active Measures 



by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

The following article is reprinted 
from NATO Review, Volume 31, No. 1, 
1983. Ambassador Eagleburger is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

In recent times, the Soviet term "active 
measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) has 
caught the public's attention. The phrase 
describes a range of deceptive tech- 
niques — such as front groups, disinfor- 
mation, forgeries, press manipulations, 
and agents of influence — which are used 
routinely in the Soviet Union's conduct 
of foreign relations. No phrase in 
English conveys precisely the meaning 
of "active measures." Perhaps World 
War II psychological warfare operations 
provide the closest parallel. 

Active measures are used against 
virtually all countries outside the Soviet 
bloc, although communist countries such 
as North Korea and China are targets, 
as well as members of NATO. A sam- 
pling from the recent public record 
shows the variety of such activities: 

• A Soviet Ambassador expelled 
from New Zealand in 1980 after he was 
caught handing money to the local 
Moscow-line Communist Party; 



• A French author and journalist 
convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of 
influence for almost 20 years; 

• A large-scale media disinformation 
effort to undermine U.S.-sponsored ef- 
forts to solve the Namibia conflict; 

• The exposure of more than a 
dozen forgeries, mostly fabricated U.S. 
Government documents or letters, dur- 
ing 1982; 

• A media campaign involving 
covertly planted stories and forgeries 
falsely accusing the United States of 
supporting the November 1981 coup at- 
tempt in the Seychelles; and 

• Radio stations pretending to 
speak for opposition political factions in 
China and Iran but broadcasting from 
unacknowledged locations within the 
U.S.S.R. 

Inside View 

While this list of publicly exposed active 
measures can be expanded greatly, in- 
telligence services throughout the world 
are aware of many more that have not 
been revealed to the public, either 
because this could compromise sensitive 
sources or because of political or 
diplomatic considerations. 



45 



EUROPE 



Nor are active measures a new addi- 
tion to the Soviet political repertoire. In 
the 1920s, Soviet political operatives in- 
filtrated Russian emigre organizations in 
the West to set them squabbling among 
themselves. During the 1930s, Soviet 
agents manipulated front groups, skill- 
fully camouflaging Moscow's hand until 
the Hitler-Stalin pact in August 1939. At 
the time, a veteran communist organizer 
working for the Comintern, Willi 
Munzenberg, spoke cynically of these 
fronts as "innocents' clubs." An early 
postwar Soviet disinformation campaign 
orchestrated false charges of U.S. use of 
"germ warfare" during the Korean war. 
On occasion, we get a glimpse of ac- 
tive measures from the Soviet side. The 
defection of former KGB Major 
Stanislav Levchenko, who coordinated 
active measures in Japan from 1975 to 
1979 while nominally a correspondent 
for New Times, and who for a while was 
Acting Chief of the KGB's active 
measures group in Japan, yields such an 
opportunity. Levchenko recalls in his 
recently released testimony before the 
U.S. Congress several successful forgery 
and disinformation operations. He states 
that during the 1970s, the KGB influ- 
enced Japanese politics through 
numerous agents of influence including a 
former cabinet minister, Members of 
Parliament, and prominent journalists. 
Levchenko estimated that the Tokyo 
KGB residency received several hundred 
active measures directives each year. Of 
these, according to Levchenko, it was 
able to implement successfully about 
one-third. 

The exposure by Danish authorities 
of the clandestine relationship between 
the KGB and Arne Herloev Petersen, an 
author and journalist, provides another 
glimpse into active measures operations. 
In the summer of 1981, the Soviets ar- 
ranged to cover Petersen's expenses for 
placing a series of advertisements in 
which Danish artists expressed support 
for a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone. 
On one occasion, Petersen delivered to 
the North Korean Embassy foreign 
policy documents which were supplied 
by the Soviet Embassy and which, on in- 
structions, he misrepresented as coming 
from an American source. In another 
typical disinformation ploy, Petersen 
published a pamphlet attacking British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the 
text of the pamphlet having been 
supplied by the Soviet Embassy. As the 
I tanish Government statement on the 
case noted, it was typical of these el 
forts to influence public debate that the 
Soviet origin of the opinions was con- 
cealed in order to preserve their effec- 



tiveness. Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB of- 
ficer serving as a Second Secretary at 
the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, was 
exposed as Petersen's clandestine con- 
tact and was expelled from Denmark in 
October 1981 for improper conduct. 



Large Bureaucratic Structure 

A large organizational structure in the 
U.S.S.R. sustains the active measures 
effort. The covert arm of active 
measures is Service A of the KGB's 
First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Direc- 
torate. In the field, any KGB officer or 
intelligence asset may be used to imple- 
ment active measures, and in the larger 
KGB residencies there are specialized 
groups, as in Tokyo, concerned with 
these covert operations. Active 
measures techniques are an integral part 
of the training of all KGB case officers. 

In formulating these operations, 
Service A works closely with the Inter- 
national Department and the Interna- 
tional Information Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist 
Party. Other elements of the Soviet 
structure such as magazines, radio sta- 
tions, and Aeroflot are all called upon as 
need arises. 

The International Information De- 
partment supervises Soviet foreign prop- 
aganda activities and thus is crucial to 
active measures operations. For exam- 
ple, the Soviet propaganda machinery 
commonly redisseminates misleading 
and tendentious stories that were 
originally placed in foreign press outlets 
by KGB assets. The technique allows the 
Soviet propagandists to give extensive 
coverage to false stories which have the 
seeming legitimacy of having originated 
in a foreign— and ostensibly unbiased- 
press organ. Propaganda organs also 
support active measures operations by 
trumpeting the campaign themes of 
front groups. Publications such as New 
Times are in the forefront of the effort. 
as are Radio Moscow and the purported- 
ly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress. 

The International Department is 
responsible for liaison with foreign com 
munist parties and communist front 
organizations. It persuades or com- 
mands communist parties abroad to 
undertake political and propaganda ac- 
tions in support, of particular active 
measures campaigns. Front groups such 

as the various Soviet friendship 
societies, the Afro-Asian People's Soli- 
darity Organization, and the World 
Federation of Trade Unions are con- 
trolled by the International Department 
through Soviet counterpart organiza- 
tions. 



9" 

II 

IS 



One front, the World Peace Counc i 
(WPC), was expelled from France and 
from Austria for activities directed 
against its hosts. Finally it succeeded 
establishing a headquarters in Helsink 
in 1957. For more than 30 years, WP( 
positions on international issues have 
variably coincided with those of the 
Soviet Union: the WPC approved past 
Soviet military interventions in Hunga itr 
and Czechoslovakia as well as the Sov *i 
invasion and occupation of Afghanista 
Support of Soviet aggression, howeve: el 
has not prevented it from serving as t b 
Soviet stalking-horse in a number of is 
"peace" movements, ranging from the a 
Stockholm appeal to "ban the bomb" ii 
1950 and the 1977 campaign against t 
"neutron bomb," to today's agitation ii 
against INF [intermediate-range nucle a 
force] modernization. 

Since the bulk of the WPC's finam 
ing comes from Soviet sources, some 
noncommunist peace movement suppc 
ers, by accepting WPC cooperation in 
their activities, have been receiving in 
direct Soviet support. It is distressing 
that Moscow is able to take part in th 
West's public debate on the defense 
measures needed to offset the Soviet 
threat through use of a mechanism as 
transparent as the WPC. 



Assessing Effect of Active Measure 

How effective is the active measures i 
fort? There is no simple answer. Not 
only is it impossible to run controlled 
periments, but the deception inherent 
active measures complicates an assess- 
ment. Moreover, active measures are 
not used independently, but in coordii 
tion with other elements of Soviet 
foreign policy such as diplomatic, com 
mercial, informational, and military a« 
tivities. The contribution of active 
measures to the end result is not easy) 
isolate. 

Clearly, however, the Soviet leade 
ship believes they are effective. The 
manpower and money required to com 
struct and operate a worldwide active 
measures infrastructure of fronts and 
agents are substantial. We consider it 
probable that the Soviet campaign 
against the "neutron bomb"— which th 
regard as one of their most success- 
ful—cost some $100 million. From the 
Soviet perspective, the moiuw was we 
spent. The U.S.S.R. was able to distJ 
the public debate on the topic and dirt 
attention from the massive Soviet 
military buildup and the clear threat I 
European security posed by Warsaw- 
Pact conventional forces— the threat 



46 



Department of State Bulle 



EUROPE 



vhich enhanced radiation weapons can 
o effectively counter. Rut besides direct 
nonetary costs, the Soviets also are wili- 
ng to expend prestige and good will as 
heir hand in some active measures 
derations inevitably is exposed. This in- 
lirect cost goes beyond immediate em- 
iarrassment; over the longer term, the 
J.S.S.R.'s use of deceptive and manipu- 
itive techniques increases disenchant- 
lent with the Soviet model. 

While it is obvious that the Soviets 
elieve the game is worth the candle, we 
hould attempt our own independent 
valuation. Active measures are not 
lagic, nor does the world dance to a 
overt Soviet tune. Moscow does not 
ominate the political processes of the 
Western democracies. Nonetheless, the 
ersistent Soviet attempts to influence 
ur political agenda are not always with- 
ut effect. This is especially true when 
oviet active measures are designed to 
agnify and channel the sincere con- 
rns of noncommunist critics of official 
Western government policies. Moreover, 
lese efforts tend to exacerbate internal 
visions in our societies, a long-standing 
aviet goal. 

In developing countries, the impact 
greater. Their governments, often 
istable, economically stressed and lack- 
g tested political institutions, are more 
llnerable to covert manipulation, 
syond the occasional contribution of ac- 
/e measures to the bringing to power 
a government under Moscow's in- 
lence, these techniques tend to in- 
ease the insecurity of legitimate 
ivernments and distract their leaders' 
tention from their primary task — de- 
■lopment. The tenuous state of free 
ess institutions in many of these 
ates and the plain fact that journalism 
less developed countries is often an 
.remunerative profession provide 
vorable ground for Soviet manipula- 
>ns. 

orrosive Effect on Open 
olitical Systems 

1 both developed and developing coun- 
ies, beyond the success, or lack of it, 
particular operations, active measures 
ftve a corrosive effect on open political 
'stems. The confusions produced by 
edia manipulations, forgeries, calcu- 
ted rumors, falsely attributed radio 
•oadcasts, and the activities of agents 
' influence may, over time, weaken 
ablic confidence in political institutions 
id processes. 

In view of the historical record and 
ie substantial bureaucracy that sup- 
)rts these activities, we do not expect 
te Soviet active measures program to 



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 
Washing-on. D.C. 2-233 



SFZCIAI 

ON STP.A 



PRESIDENTIAL VCj.XI.iG GROUP 

"Z'zc economic pclicy 



Date February IS, 1982 



Recommendations of the S 
Economic Policy. Member 

Department of Comr —" 




Central 



- - 1 i -■ - 



ger.ce Aser.c - . 



Department of State 



Department of Treasury 



esidential Working Group on Strategic 
follows : 

Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commer 

Lionel H, Olmer, Under Secretary for 

International Trade 

Robert G. Dederick, Assistant Secretar 

Raymond J. Waldnar., ■ Assistant Secretar 

Thomas Collamore, Confidential Assista 

to the Secretary 

Eugene K. Lawson, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary 

Maurice Ernst, Director, Office of 
Economic Research 

Martin Kohn, Deputy Director, Office 
of Economic Research 

Ernest B. Johnston, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary 

Nicholas Sr. Piatt, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary 

Gordon L. Streab, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary 

.William 3. Milam, Director, Department 
of International Pir_ar.ce and Develcpme 

Marc E. z&eland, Assistant Secretary 

East-'i^V^srartomic Folic} 




In order to carry out the strategic objectives of 6^r/^g 1 
we view as desirable to submit for the approval of t? 
following concept of our economic policy: 

Within the sanctions imposed upon the Soviet union by the United States 
and consequently by our V.'estern European Allies, we propose undertaking 
actions, whose objective would be the definite severance cf the gas 
pipeline contract between the Soviet Union and some of our Western 

Forged Secretary of Commerce memorandum, dated Feb. 18, 1982, recommending actions 
to sever the gas pipeline contract between the U.S.S.R. and several West European allies 
of the United States. The memorandum states that, among other advantages, this measure 
will weaken the economies of the European countries concerned and make them more 
dependent on the United States. 



ugust 1983 



47 



EUROPE 

respond to variations in the international 
climate. They did not, for example, show 
a noticeable decline in the peak period of 
detente in the 1970s. Rather, the use of 
these offensive techniques, which seek to 
harm countries which the Soviets 
perceive as adversaries, is an indicator 
of underlying hostility. As such, active 
measures should remain a cause of con- 
cern to the alliance. Conversely, the 
cessation of these activities would 
remove a significant obstacle to im- 
proved relations. 

Before addressing the question of 
how to counter Soviet active measures, 
it is useful to discuss an attitude that 
does not contribute, in the view of the 
U.S. Government, to a useful approach. 

This is the "ho-hum" response to 
Soviet active measures usually presented 
in terms such as: "We all know that the 
Soviets engage in dirty tricks, so what is 
new? Why get excited?" The implication 
is that it is naive to concern oneself with 
such activities since they are an im- 
mutable, but trivial, element in the 
Soviets' international conduct. 

This approach prejudges the ques- 
tion of the importance of Soviet active 
measures and, by discounting it in ad- 
vance, works against a realistic ap- 
praisal. Active measures, by definition, 
involve deception, and their effective- 
ness and seriousness vary in time and 
place. Only careful examination can pro- 
duce a balanced assessment. Belittling 
the problem impairs needed efforts to 
limit the effectiveness of Soviet active 
measures. 

It is worth considering basic asym- 
metries in the situations of East and 
West with respect to active measures. 
The closely controlled Soviet political 
system offers little scope for covert 
manipulation. Agents of influence are 
not going to penetrate or disorient the 
structures of "democratic centralism." 
The controlled press of the U.S.S.R. of- 
fer limited opportunities for external in- 
fluence. Western societies, on the other 
hand, are open to diverse political in- 
fluences, including those deceptively in- 
troduced in the service of Soviet foreign 
policy. In Western countries, the use of 
most active measures techniques does 
not carry a criminal penalty for fear of 
imposing limits on legitimate political ex- 
pression. Moreover, unlike the West, if a 
clandestine effort goes awry in the 
totalitarian society of the Soviet Union, 
there is no political opposition to take 
advantage of the rulers' embarrassment, 
and an obedient press will keep the 
failure off the public record. The answer 
to the "everybody does it" attitude is 
that active measures are a field in which 






NATO SECRET 

KBMZ HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POV\ 



SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLlstU POWERS EUROPE 
! GRAND GUARTiER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROP: 

BELGIUM 




26 June 1979 



His Excellency Joseph M.A.U. Luna 
The Secretary Ceneral 
North Atlantic Treaty Or^nijation 
Sxucs-ils/Zaventcc: Autoroute 
3-1110 irusaela, Beljiuta 



Dear Joseph, 



'.'i 
/.^ r 



(•< 



*'.V.\;;-.<V\-' 



I i 



Think you for your letter of June 25 betting out certain results 
of our joint work, which have had, I believe, a direct and lasting effect 
on the formulation and realization of the allied defense program. Tor 
my par:, I highly appreciate your cooperation ar.d hope that you are 
equally satisfied. 

On leaving the post of Supreme Allied Cooicander in Europe, I feel 



5 ii ay duty to seres* once again certain aspects of allied strategy which, 
■J demand our further attention and effort. 

I 
Aa you know, on* of our presuppositions in nuclear planning ia that.' 
under certain circumstances likely to develop ia Europe, we cay be forced 
to make first use of nuclear weapons. This obviously requires chat the j 
allied nuclear deterrent should be strengthened and its links with major 
U.S. strategic systems tightened. Moreover, it is vital to speed up and 
[[finalize current projects for the limited use of U.S. nuclear forces in 
[ Europe and for other military measures at our disposal for a possible 
emergency. This strategy will be more realistic and effective if a de- 
cision on the modernization of allied tactical nuclear forces ia taken. 

With your help, a great deal of progress has been made recently 
toward strengthening the Alliance. Yet, in my view, planning for the 
deployment and use of modernized nuclear forces in Europe can be ade- 
quately accomplished only if full understanding and cooperation are 
achieved. It- is therefore necessary to prepare, systematically and 
persistently, a basis for making e success of the NATO Council meeting 
in December, bearing in mind primarily the crisis in»idc the Alliance 
over neutron weapons deployment. Ev^ry effort should be made to counter 
Bny hesitation or vacillation among the allied nations during decision- 
making meetings. 



Foreed letter from departing NATO Commander Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to NATO 
Secret General Joseph ilns. dated June 26. 1979. It was calculated to stimulate Euro 
pean opposition to intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization by distorting 
NATO strategy and playing on European fears of a limited nuclear conflict in Europe. 



48 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



democratic systems cannot effectively 

compete. 

In democracies, certainly in the 
limited States, all opinions, including the 
Advocacy of positions that correspond 
with those of foreign adversaries, are 
fully and properly protected by law. Ef- 
forts to contain active measures inter- 
ventions, except in cases of illegal acts 
ommitted on behalf of a foreign power, 
hould focus on the foreign agents of 
ieception, not on citizens who hold ex- 
)tic opinions. Quite the contrary, we 
egard the free competition of ideas, 
whatever their origin, not only as a 
undamental attraction of our societies 
»ut as the well spring of democratic 
igor. The resort by the Soviet Union 
nd its proxies to active measures is a 
acit admission of weakness. It is be- 
ause their ideology cannot stand on its 
nerits that they rely so heavily on 
eception and psychological warfare in 
ompetition in the international arena. 



leed for Persistent Response 

he soundest response to the Soviet use 
f active measures is to keep our 
alance. It is as unwise to ignore the 
ireat as it is to become obsessed with 
le myth of a super Soviet conspiracy 
lanipulating our essential political proc- 
5ses. We should keep in mind that ac- 
ve measures are only one aspect of our 
)mplex relationship with the Soviet 
nion. 

The foundation of a sound Western 
nswer to active measures is under- 
anding the problem. This involves the 
Election and analysis of relevant infor- 
lation. It is not only an intelligence 
atter, however, as the purpose of ac- 
/e measures is both political and 
;ychological. Another complication is 
at active measures transcend national 
irders; a forgery targeted to harm the 
terests of one country may be surfaced 
ilf a world away. Disinformation cam- 
.igns involve media in many countries, 
lese and other problems are not insur- 
ountable obstacles to a greatly im- 
oved understanding of the worldwide 
ttern of active measures if we align 
ir antennae to face the challenge. 

Since the Soviets are committed to 
tive measures as a regular instrument 
foreign policy, it must be viewed as a 
oblem for the long run. Sudden en- 
usiasms to expose their dirty tricks 
llowed by troughs of apathy are not 
e answer. A reasoned and effective 
sponse must be persistent and continu- 
5, and this is best achieved by a grow- 
g public understanding and emerging 
nsensus on the significance of these 



activities. Governments also have the 
responsibility to protect their sovereign- 
ty from active measures distortions by 
exposing and removing the foreign in- 
struments of intervention, such as the 
diplomat who engages in improper ac- 
tivities or the foreign journalist whose 
position is a cover for disinformation ac- 
tivities. 

But our response must not be 
limited to effective counterintelligence, 
important as that may be. Active 
measures need to be countered by public 
exposure. They are infections that thrive 
only in darkness, and sunlight is the best 
antiseptic. Governments should make 
available to their publics as much as 
possible of our growing knowledge of 
Soviet practices. Needless to say, any 
exposure of covert Soviet manipulations 
has to meet the highest standards of ac- 
curacy. 

Publicity serves a number of pur- 
poses. Our publics need the best infor- 
mation to perform their democratic 
duties. Moreover, awareness of Soviet 
practices helps citizens to avoid becom- 
ing the victims of specific active 
measures operations. Publicity also acts 



as a disincentive to the U.S.S.R. by in- 
creasing the price of failure. Conversely, 
a tacit acceptance of the Soviets' use of 
active measures would encourage them 
to bolder actions. 

To sum up, the Soviet Union uses 
active measures extensively and has 
created a large bureaucracy to imple- 
ment these activities. While not an im- 
mediate, mortal threat to the West, they 
are harmful, although the precise degree 
is difficult to determine. Whatever 
danger active measures pose, their con- 
tinuing use in itself is an obvious 
obstacle to improved relations with the 
Soviet Union. While recognizing that ac- 
tive measures are but one aspect of our 
complex relationship, common sense re- 
quires that we counter these intrusions 
not only through effective counterintelli- 
gence but by keeping our citizens as ful- 
ly informed as possible of the deceptive 
practices to which they are exposed. 
Much as we would like to see active 
measures eliminated from the conduct of 
foreign affairs, we must realistically ac- 
cept the implications of these hostile 
Soviet activities and contain them to the 
best of our ability. ■ 



14th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JUNE 16, 1983 1 

During the period since my last report, 
there has been considerable international 
focus on Cyprus. The Cyprus question 
was debated in the U.N. General 
Assembly which adopted a Resolution on 
May 13 calling for "meaningful, result- 
oriented, constructive and substantive 
negotiations" between the two com- 
munities. Approximately 50 countries 
spoke in the Assembly and supported 
continuation of the intercommunal talks 
under the aegis of the Secretary 
General. We reaffirmed our commitment 
to the success of the Secretary General's 
good offices role although we abstained 
on the Resolution, believing it contained 
elements potentially unhelpful to the in- 
tercommunal talks. 

Now that the U.N. General Assem- 
bly session is past, we anticipate a 
period of reevaluation by both com- 
munities. We expect, nevertheless, 
representatives of the two communities 
to return to the intercommunal talks. 
We continue to believe those talks hold 
the best prospect for finding answers to 
the problems of Cyprus. 



On May (i the U.N. Secretary 
General issued a report (a copy of which 
is attached) on the question of Cyprus in 
which he notes that the intercommunal 
talks, although recessed for the Greek 
Cypriot elections, reconvened in April in 
"a cooperative and constructive at- 
mosphere." 

The Secretary General, within his 
Security Council mandate, has pledged 
to "make every effort to give fresh im- 
petus to the process" of the talks, an ef- 
fort we fully support. 

Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Burt visited Cyprus during the period 
for indepth discussions with leaders of 
both communities and with U.N. of- 
ficials. Other diplomatic representatives 
also remain in close contact with all par- 
ties to the problem. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas I 
O'Neill, .Ir., Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman 
of the Seriate Foreign Relations Committee 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of June 20, 1983). ■ 



49 



EUROPE 



A Critical Juncture for 
the Atlantic Alliance 



by Richard R. Burt 

Address before the Time conference 
on the Atlantic alliance, Hamburg, 
Federal Republic of Germany, on 
April 25, 1983. Mr. Burt is Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs. 

This conference could not be more time- 
ly. And the need to view trans-Atlantic 
developments with care could not be 
more critical. As a former journalist, I 
am aware that those outside government 
have the opportunity to observe the ebb 
and flow of current affairs with a unique 
perspective. As a government official, I 
am also aware that this opportunity is 
not always seized as often as it might 
be. It is for this reason that Time and 
the conference organizers deserve our 
most sincere thanks and appreciation. 
Indeed, those of us enmeshed in the day- 
to-day of policymaking are in need of 
the criticism and vision of people such as 
yourselves and gatherings such as this. 
Without the benefit of perspective, we 
are less likely to shape historical forces 
than to be shaped by them. 

I believe we have arrived at a 
critical juncture in the annals of the 
Atlantic alliance. Let me hasten to add 
that this is not because we are in a deep 
crisis as some would have us believe. 
Rather, we are in the midst of what can 
best be described as a grand debate. It 
is a debate over the very essence of the 
Atlantic alliance — its purpose, its shape, 
its future. 

This is hardly the first time the 
alliance has been in the throes of self- 
examination and self-criticism. Indeed, 
the Atlantic alliance was born amidst 
controversy. The entire notion of 
peacetime engagement in the affairs of 
Europe went against the grain of 
American history. Postwar America was 
anxious to bring its boys back home and 
bring about a parochial peace with pros- 
perity. 

Nor were the formative years of the 
alliance easy ones for Europeans. Recon- 
struction and recovery were foremost in 
everyone's mind. Arming to prevent yet 
another war demanded all too scarce 
resources; forging bonds of trust with 



recent foes demanded the intellectual 
courage to look ahead rather than back. 

But on both sides of the ocean, the 
uncommon men of the immediate post- 
war era made difficult, and sometimes 
unpopular, decisions. In the United 
States, two world wars had shown all 
too clearly the folly of isolationism. It 
was understood that Jefferson's famous 
injunction against "entangling alliances" 
did not have permanent application. In 
Europe it was understood that the 
security of the Continent against the 
emerging Soviet threat required perma- 
nent association with a noncontinental 
power. Out of these twin recognitions 
the alliance came to life. The initial 
debate had been decided. 

The alliance of the 1950s was an 
alliance overwhelmingly dominated by 
the United States. Deterrence depended 
on U.S. nuclear superiority to offset a 
Red Army which never demobilized. 
Decisions were largely reached in 
Washington and communicated through 
NATO in Paris. For the most part, we 
spoke, Europe listened; we led, Europe 
followed. 

By the 1960s it was increasingly evi- 
dent that such a formula had grown ob- 
solete. Europe was no longer prostrate. 
Economic recovery had succeeded. The 
alliance was no longer based on a simple 
security guarantee but had evolved into 
a true military coalition with integrated 
national forces. And Europeans were 
less and less willing to accept American 
leadership without question. The condi- 
tions for a second great debate had 
materialized. 

Many of the strains accompanying 
these developments were manifested in 
the nuclear realm. Then, as today, 
nuclear politics went to the heart of the 
alliance. Two principal issues emerged in 
the nuclear debate of the 1960s. The 
problem was in part military. The 
American guarantee was no longer as 
convincing, given Soviet strides in 
developing their nuclear arsenal. How 
could the U.S. strategic deterrent com- 
pensate for conventional weakness and 
deter Soviet strategic forces simultane- 
ously? Equally, the problem was 



political. Europeans wanted some say it,] 
the life-and-death decisions affecting 
nuclear weapons. 

Washington's proposed approach fo 
dealing with these problems— the NAT' 
multilateral nuclear force— only exacer-l 
bated these tensions. Fortunately, the I 
ultimate solution had the opposite effec | 
The doctrine of flexible response, for- 
mally adopted by the alliance in 1967, 
provided for a continuum of forces- 
conventional, theater nuclear, and 
strategic nuclear— by which deterrence 
could be maintained at all levels. And a 
new institution, the NATO Nuclear Plai 
ning Group, was created. Responsibility 
for nuclear policymaking would 
henceforth be shared. The basic Atlanti 
bond was maintained. 

Evolution of the Current Debate 

But in the best tradition of Hegelian 
logic, yesterday's synthesis has given 
way to today's antithesis. There is no Hi 
tie irony in this. In the 1960s, Europeai 
concerns reflected a perceived lack of 
U.S. commitment to maintain the 
American nuclear guarantee; in the 
1980s, the most vocal elements in 
Europe view with alarm American ef- 
forts to ensure the credibility of this 
same nuclear guarantee. 

Thus, in 1983, we are once more 
hearing from many quarters that the 
alliance is no longer relevant, or viable, 
or both; that only radical surgery can 
prolong the patient's life. If I read the 
signs correctly, a third grand debate is 
underway. The reasons for this happen- 
ing now are several. 

First, the passage of time has dullt 
the initial Atlantic impulse; the alliance 
no longer seems as relevant to the con- 
cerns of young people bearing outlooks 
formed by experiences far from those o 
the postwar era. 

Second, European states and in- 
stitutions have advanced in capacity, 
wealth, and independence. Many on bot 
sides of the Atlantic view the alliance as 
an anachronism, a product of an era of 
American strength and European 
weakness which no longer exists. 

Third, U.S. and European interests 
are not always identical or even com- 
plementary. We are often economic coir< 
petitors. We often have differing views 
of Third World »r regional crises. We at 
times have contrasting assessments of 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



the Soviet Union, the threat it poses, 
ind how best to manage East-West rela- 
tions. 

Fourth, a prolonged period of 
sconomic recession has increased com- 
letition for budgetary allocations. Pro- 
■idmg more for defense and deciding 
low much each member of the alliance 
blight to provide are increasingly con- 
entious. 

Finally, shifts in the military 
lalance and the emergence of 
J. S. -Soviet strategic parity, in par- 
icular, have raised anew the issue of 
American reliability. The credibility of 
he U.S. strategic deterrent is some- 
imes doubted. The emergence of Soviet 
uperiority at the intermediate nuclear 
>vel has raised new questions as to the 
atipling of the defense of Europe and 
le U.S. strategic deterrent. 

That a great debate over the future 
f the Atlantic alliance should evolve out 
f such circumstances is hardly odd; in- 
deed, it would be odd if one were not to 
ike place. Not surprisingly, we are 
?eing challenges to the basic Atlantic 
lodel coming from all parts of the 
olitical spectrum. Both sides of the 
tlantic are participating. What I should 
ike to do today is make my modest con- 
•ibution to this debate. 

merican Challenges to the 
tlantic Model 

1 the United States, it is significant 
lat we are not witnessing a revival of 
aditional isolationism. Fortress 
merica is not being promoted as a 
odel of American well-being. Perhaps 

«e notion is simply too discredited to 
>ld much attraction; perhaps most have 
mply come to accept that the United 
;ates is too dependent upon, and in- 
rdependent with, the rest of the world 
pursue this simplistic and dangerous 

| )tion. 

Other challenges to the Atlantic con- 

i 'ction exist, however. There is, for ex- 
nple, an American school of thought 
at has come to be known as "global 
lilateralism." Adherents of this school 
■gin with an appreciation of the global 
ope of U.S. interests. They note the 
oad range of possible threats to the 
nited States. And they would reduce 
•e U.S. commitment to Europe so that 



President Meets With 
NATO Secretary General 




(White House photo by BUI Fitz-Patrick) 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
APR. 26. 1983' 

Earlier today, the President met with 
Joseph Luns, the Secretary General of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
The President and the Secretary 
General met in the Oval Office. The 
Secretary General is in the United 
States to meet with [Defense] Secretary 
Weinberger and to maintain his regular 
consultations with U.S. leaders. They 
last met in June 1982 during the NATO 
summit in Bonn. 

The two discussed the INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] negotia- 
tions and the close and continuing allied 
consultations that have led to the 
alliance's strong unity behind the U.S. 
proposal. Both men agreed on the need 
for the alliance to remain steady on its 



deployment course if a concrete agree- 
ment with the Soviets is not reached. 

The President and the Secretary 
General also discussed the NATO Eco- 
nomic Committee's study of the security 
implications of East-West economic rela- 
tions. The President told the Secretary 
General that the study is an important 
part of the overall allied effort to 
develop a comprehensive Western ap- 
proach to East-West economic relations. 

The President also took this oppor- 
tunity to express his deep respect to the 
Secretary General for his continuing and 
outstanding contributions to alliance 
security and unity. 



'Made by White House Deputy Press 
Secretary Larry Speakes at his daily press 
briefing (text from Weekly Compilation of 

Presidential Documents of May 2, 1983). ■ 



ugust 1983 



51 



EUROPE 



we could enhance our flexibility to act 
everywhere. 

This approach is flawed. All in- 
terests are not vital; all are not equal. 
The balance of power in Europe is cen- 
tral to world stability and American in- 
volvement in Europe is central to the 
balance there. Moreover, our range of 
ties, commercial and cultural, cannot be 
duplicated or done without. The reality 
is that there is no cheap way of protect- 
ing these interests. Deterrence, to be 
credible, requires a large U.S. continen- 
tal commitment; it also requires that we 
act together as a true coalition. 

A second challenge is perhaps better 
known to you. For want of a better 
phrase, I call it "Atlantic reconstruc- 
tion." It manifests itself in several 
places— the Congress and the media 
most notably— and in several ways by, 
for example, threatening troop with- 
drawals or not funding defense pro- 
grams critical to the defense of Europe. 

The roots of this American move- 
ment are to be found in the soil of 
frustration and resentment. There is a 
growing belief in the United States that 
Europeans are not doing their share, be 
it to defend themselves or to defend 
common interests around the world. 
Sometimes tied to this view is the belief 
that Europe's commitment to detente 
outweighs its commitment to the 
alliance, that Europe is more concerned 
with its economic well-being than with 
Western defense. The reconstructionists 
want to end this alleged "free ride." 
They wish to send a signal to Europe to 
stimulate a larger European defense ef- 
fort. 

As is often the case, neither analysis 
nor prescription is accurate. That we all 
need to do more to strengthen deter- 
rence is obvious. And that there is a re- 
quirement for equity on defense efforts 
in a coalition of democratic states is also 
clear. More must be done, and the 
Reagan Administration has worked hard 
to increase defense spending on both 
sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, 
we have sought to deflate misconcep- 
tions about allied contributions to the 
common defense. There is not enough 
awareness, for example, that should con- 
flict arise in Europe, 90% of NATO's 
land forces and 75% of its sea and air 
forces would be European. 

There are those who argue that we 
could improve the situation by cutting 
U.S. efforts. I do not doubt that by 



doing less in Europe the United States 
would, indeed, "send a signal." Unfor- 
tunately, it would be the wrong signal 
with the wrong result. In the name of 
enhancing deterrence and defense, those 
who would cut back America's contribu- 
tion could well achieve precisely the op- 
posite. Reducing U.S. strength and rais- 
ing questions about the U.S. commit- 
ment are hardly self-evident ways of 
promoting peace and stability. 

European Alternatives 

An even greater debate is taking place 
on this side of the Atlantic. This is to be 
expected, given the immediacy of the 
issues here. Let me address briefly what 
I see as the principal alternatives being 
presented. 

Neutralism. Three schools of 
thought appear to dominate. The first 
would exchange the alliance for 
neutralism. Some go as far as to see this 
neutralism embracing all of Europe, 
West and East. It is argued that a 
Europe without allegiance to either bloc 
and without significant military forces 
would be a safer haven, less likely to be 
drawn into a confrontation between the 
two superpowers. Somewhat differently, 
it is asserted that Europe (and especially 
Germany) could make its most important 
contribution to peace by serving as a 
bridge between the two superpowers, 
explaining one to the other. 

These are romantic visions. With or 
without its Eastern neighbors, a weak 
and neutral Western Europe would be 
under the sway of the strongest con- 
tinental power, the Soviet Union. What 
is needed for peace is less a bridge than 
a bulwark. Our problems with the 
U.S.S.R. are not caused by a lack of 
communication, although communication 
is important. Our problems with the 
U.S.S.R are caused by a lack of Soviet 
restraint and respect for the interests 
and well-being of others. 

Armed Independence. Some 
recognize these realities and, instead, 
argue for a Western Europe that is 
strong, independent of the United 
States, and able to provide fully for its 
own security. An image of a European 



military entity is held up, the analogue 
to European political cooperation and 
economic integration. In this model, 
Europe would thus be able to mediate 
between the two powers from a positio 
of strength— able to deter one without 
being tied to the other. European in- 
terests would prosper, we are told. 

I can do no better in describing this 
school of thought than by quoting Hedl 
Bull of Oxford University: 

The course that the Western European 
countries should now be exploring may be 
called the Europeanist one. It requires the 
countries of Western Europe to combine 
more closely together, increase their defens 
efforts, and take steps toward reducing the 
military dependence on America. 

Professor Bull's vision, too, suffers 
from a lack of realism. Europe at pres- 
ent lacks the requisite political basis fo 
constituting such collective managemer 
of its security. It is not clear that 
European states would be willing to 
make the necessary political commit- 
ments and economic investment. And i 
is not at all certain that the emergence 
of an independent, armed Europe— wit 
conventional and nuclear forces alike— 
could occur without crisis or even con- 
flict. Indeed, the security and stability 
we all know and enjoy now could be 
jeopardized by such development. 

Reconstruction. A third approach 
embodied by proposals now coming fro 
opposition parties in northern Europe. 
In many respects, these ideas are the 
mirror image of the proposals offered 
American reconstructionists. The Eurc 
pean reconstructionists have several 
goals: to lessen the influence of the 
United States; to reduce the likelihood 
of nuclear war in Europe; to carry out 
more independent policy toward 
Moscow; and to promote European in- 
terests around the world as they see fi 
They seek not to leave the alliance so 
much as to change it from within. 

Even such "reformist" policies are 
not without major difficulties; indeed, 
they draw upon several of the worst 
features of the two alternatives just 
discussed. We should not delude 
ourselves. Conventional defense needs 
strengthening. But more robust conver 
tional defense efforts will not make 
nuclear forces irrelevant or redundant. 
Soviet conventional and nuclear advan- 
tages must be offset, whether by 
deployments, arms reductions, or both. 
The bond between forces in Europe am 



52 



Department of State Bulleti 



EUROPE 



U.S. strategic deterrence, or coupling, 
must be maintained. At the same time, 
uonventional force improvements will 
Rove costly; a consensus for a major in- 
crease in the level of defense effort has 
/et to emerge. And heightened Euro- 
Dean independence from the United 
States has its risks; Europeans cannot 
ihoose when they wish to enjoy the 
ruits of alliance and when they do not. 
There is room for disagreement and dif- 
ference within the alliance but not for 
selective commitment. 

)ther Concepts 

Neutralism, armed independence, 
econstruction— these are the three basic 
European alternatives to the current 
Ulanticist framework for Western 
ecurity. Cutting across these ap- 
roaches are various themes which 
/ould also alter the current Atlantic 
ridge in a decisive manner. 

Antinuclearism is one such idea. The 
im is to reduce or, if possible, eliminate 
ne presence of nuclear weapons in 
lurope and with them the risk of 
uclear war. The most ardent en- 
lusiasts of this proposition would do so 
nilaterally in hopes of eliciting parallel 
oviet restraint. 

But I agree with [former Secretary 
Defense] Harold Brown's observation 
Dout U.S. -Soviet arms competition: 
Vhen we build, the Soviet Union 
ailds; and when we don't build, the 
oviet Union still builds." Moreover, 
lilateral actions by the West would 
idermine our best chance for mean- 
gful arms control negotiations. More 
■riously, unilateral nuclear disarma- 
ent would threaten deterrence and 
'ighten the vulnerability of the West, 
10. 

Nor can there be a policy of "no first 
ie" of nuclear weapons. The effect 
ould once again be decoupling and thus 
■ode, not enhance, deterrence. It is the 
■ospect of the use of nuclear weapons 
id the full weight of American might 
bich helps to keep the peace in 
■urope. 

Wishing away the possibility that 
iclear weapons will be used is not 
,ough. Declarations are simply words, 
eanwhile, Soviet conventional, 
emical, and nuclear capabilities are 
al and increasing. Were the alliance to 
iopt a policy of no first use of nuclear 
capons, the danger of conventional 
ir— which would be incredibly destruc- 



tive in our age— would be increased and 
with it the possibility of nuclear tragedy. 
More than 50 million people perished in 
World War II; we cannot adopt policies 
which would heighten the risk of conven- 
tional, not to mention nuclear, war in 
Europe. 

Lastly, there are those who remain 
within the alliance or Atlantic house but 
who place all their hopes on arms con- 
trol. Arms control— whether some ver- 
sion of a nuclear freeze or negotiations 
more broadly— is held up as the panacea 
for Europe's dilemma. Only arms con- 
trol, it is alleged, offers the means to 
limit the threat, reduce the levels of 
weapons and the spending on them, and 
promote renewed detente. 

But such hopes cannot live in isola- 
tion. Arms control will only prosper if 
the Soviet Union has incentive to 
negotiate; what is required to bring this 
about is a sound military foundation on 
our part. Nor can arms control be ex- 
pected to persuade the Soviet leadership 
to eschew the role of force; Soviet policy 
at home and abroad depends on it too 
much. Arms control has the potential to 
buttress our security and deterrence; it 
cannot take the place of our collective 
efforts to do the same. 



Elections in Turkey 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 

MAY 7, 1983' 

When the military took power in Turkey 
under conditions of near anarchy in 
1980, they committed themselves to 
restoring democratic government as 
soon as possible. The United States 
welcomed the timetable they set for car- 
rying out that promise, and we have ex- 
pressed our support for each step along 
the way. 

I warmly welcome President Evren's 
recent announcement that parliamentary 
elections will be held on November 6, 
thus completing the process of restoring 
democracy. I congratulate the Turkish 
people for this remarkable achievement 
and assure them of the continued sup- 
port and friendship of the U.S. Govern- 
ment and people. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 16, 1983. 



What Is at Stake 

In more normal times, debates involving 
competing conceptions of alliance securi- 
ty would be welcomed. Over years or 
even decades, we would perhaps create 
a new consensus. But 1983 is not a nor- 
mal time. To the contrary, 1983 could 
well turn out to be the most important 
year in the history of the Atlantic 
alliance since its inception. 

The reason for so stating is clear. To 
a degree unlike any other year since 
1949, the determination and credibility 
of the alliance are being tested. How we 
implement the December 1979 decision 
on intermediate nuclear forces will have 
a major impact on our future. Those 
who would apply their abstract or 
idealized notions of how best to struc- 
ture the Atlantic relationship to deter- 
mine the outcome of the INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] debate 
should only do so with a full under- 
standing of what is at stake. 

Not surprisingly, this temptation 
exists. There are those in the United 
States who wonder why we should go to 
such lengths to bring about the im- 
plementation of the decision. They are 
unhappy that so many facets of the 
U.S. -European relationship are held 
hostage to the INF decision and cite the 
possibility that deployment of U.S. 
missiles in Europe could heighten the 
risk of a direct Soviet nuclear attack on 
the American homeland. 

On this side of the Atlantic, there 
are those— particularly the new neu- 
tralists—who maintain precisely the op- 
posite. They argue that new U.S. 
weapons based on the Continent would 
enable us to localize or limit an East- 
West nuclear exchange to Europe. 
Others simply argue that the new 
missiles are not necessary because the 
Soviet Union has no intention of ex- 
ploiting its current INF monopoly. Or, 
in yet another variation, there are those 
who are prepared to wait indefinitely for 
arms control to solve the security prob- 
lem created by SS-20 deployment. In 
every case, they seek to opt out of im- 
plementing the 1979 decision. 

The fallacies in each of these ap- 
proaches are manifest. The United 
States cannot be secure for long in a 
world in which Western Europe is not. 
Americans who would weaken or 
remove the U.S. nuclear guarantee 
would jeopardize the prospects for 
stability and peace everywhere. In the 
name of reducing risk to themselves, 
they will have raised it for everyone. 



53 



EUROPE 



European opponents of deployment 
are also mistaken. The effect of new 
U.S. missiles would not be to limit or 
localize a nuclear exchange in Europe 
but rather to prevent one. Indeed, it is 
in part through the threat of escalation 
and full American involvement that we 
help to promote stability and deterrence 
in Europe. Indeed, no better proof for 
this proposition exists than Defense 
Minister Ustinov's recent comment that 
the Soviet Union would respond to a 
strike by U.S. systems in Europe by 
directly attacking the United States. If 
that's not coupling, I don't know what is. 

Those who maintain no new deploy- 
ments are needed, whether owing to 
Soviet good will or the prospects of 
arms control, are simply deluding 
themselves. It is probably true that 
Westen Europe could live with a Soviet 
preponderance of force; but to expect 
the Soviets not to exploit any advantage 
for its own paranoic, political purposes 
is to ignore every lesson of history. 
Similarly, the U.S.S.R. cannot be ex- 
pected to negotiate seriously in the 
absence of any incentive to do so; 
deployment, either in promise or in fact, 
remains our best and only way to get 
the Soviets to come to the negotiating 
table in good faith. 

In short, the implementation of the 
INF double-track decision has become 
the touchstone for Western security in 
the 1980s. The decision continues to 
have a sound political and a sound 
military rationale. It was taken in 
response to an unprovoked Soviet 
buildup which continues unabated. It 
represents continued alliance commit- 
ment to a concept of deterrence 
predicated on the notion that American 
power tied to Europe is the best way of 
promoting European stability and peace. 
The commitment of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration and allied governments to 
pursuing both tracks— arms control and, 
if need be, deployment— of the 1979 
decision is now unshakeable. 

My support for decisions taken some 
3V2 years ago and my criticism of 
various alternative visions of the alliance 
should not be interpreted as complacen- 
cy. The flaws of the various alternatives 
I have described should not be taken as 
a complete dismissal of their validity. 
Nor should it be understood as a com- 
plete endorsement of the status quo. If I 



may modify an old American adage for 
my purposes here tonight, I would sim- 
ply advise against fixing the alliance 
more than it is broken. Or, to shift 
metaphors, I would simply urge you to 
beware of cures worse than the disease. 

This is not a call for standing pat. 
Reform is needed. So too is close con- 
sultation. We must upgrade not only our 
nuclear deterrent but also our conven- 
tional forces. More must be done to 
safeguard common interests outside the 
formal treaty area. We must ensure that 
our commercial relations with the East 
are consistent with our political and 
security requirements. And we must 
continue to be imaginative and flexible 
in our search for meaningful arms con- 
trol agreements. 

We must be careful, though, in how 
we proceed. Europe in the 30 years 
since the Second World War has been 
spared armed conflict. We have achieved 
levels of prosperity and freedom without 
historical precedent. Too much is at 



stake to go ahead precipitously or 
recklessly. The alliance and the basic 
Atlantic model or structure remain rele 
vant and viable. Only within its contour 
can we harness the resources of the 
West in a manner which maximizes ef- 
fectiveness and minimizes the burden 
our free societies and strained 
economies. 

There is a wonderful line from the 
novel, The Leopard, by the Italian 
author Giuseppe di Lampedusa. "If we 
want things to stay as they are, things 
will have to change." To a degree this i: 
true. Indeed, the history of the alliance 
is a series of adaptations to evolving cii 
cumstances. The alliance of 1983 is not 
the alliance of 1949. 

Yet, there must also be limits to oui 
departures. The essentials of the Atlan 
tic model that is the alliance have serve 
us well and should be saved. The allian< 
can continue to safeguard our interests 
if we are as wise about what to keep as 
we are about what to change. ■ 



Visit of Spanish President 



President Felipe Gonzalez Marqm 1 
of Spain made an official working visit 
to Washington, D.C., June 20- .'.'. 1983, 
to meet with President Reagan and other 
government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
Presidents Reagan and Gonzalez after 
their meeting on June -V. 1 

President Reagan 

I would like to take this opportunity to 
underscore our great pleasure at receiv- 
ing President Gonzalez and express once 
again our friendship and admiration and 
support for the Government and the 
people of Spain. 

The President and I had an excep- 
tionally productive and cordial meeting 
today. We reviewed international and 
bilateral matters in an open, understand 
ing, and democratic spirit that one 
would expect between friends and allies. 



We affirmed the need for strong leadef 
ship to deal with the political and 
economic and social problems which 
underlie so much of the unrest in the 
world today. 

We agreed on the importance of 
maintaining Western strength and 
solidarity in those critical times and ex 
pressed our desire to work closely 
together as we face the challenges 
ahead. We agreed on the desirability qd 
.in early, positive, and balanced conclu- 
sion to the CSCE fConference on Seen 
t\ and Cooperation in Europe] review 
conference presently underway in 
Madrid. I expressed our appreciation § 
President Gonzalez's recent initiative ir 
this regard, which we'll be discussing 
with our friends and allies. 

There are numerous areas of closer 
cooperation, including the pursuit of 00 
common energy security interests. W4 
value Spam as an important partner. \\ 
welcome the President's high sense of 



54 



Department of State Bulletii 



EUROPE 



ssponsibility in guiding his country at 
lis critical moment in its history. We 
fclaud Spain's aspirations to join 
grope fully and to make its voice heard 
Europe's leading institutions. 
\\V believe the West's must fun- 
mental resource is the strength of 
mocratic institutions. The consolida- 
:>n cif democracy in Spain is a ringing 
prmation of the vitality of Western in- 
tutions and the appeal of Western 
lies. 

resident Gonzalez 

irst, I want to thank President Reagan 
r this occasion to hold an open conver- 
tion with the United States, which we 
nsider a friendly country, a good 
iend of Spain. 

As you know, Spain is a very old 
ttropean country which, among other 
ings, discovered this land that 
wadays occupies this great country of 
urs. But it's also a young country, not 
ly because the country people are 
ung but because we just recovered the 
jnity of being a democratic country. 

A simple definition of Spain would 
aracterize what its foreign policy 
ould be. Spain is a European and a 
estern country — the most Western of 

European countries — nothing then is 
>re logical than its wish to, and its 
sire to, participate and integrate in 

European and the Western world 
d cooperate with the Western world 
a common destiny. 

But we are also a southern country 
Europe. We are very close to Africa, 
d our coast is in the Mediterranean 
sin. This defines another important 
)ect of our foreign policy: the north of 
rica and the important waters of the 
■diterranean Basin. 

The fact that I cannot communicate 
,h you in English means that there is 
jther dimension in our policy and 
ntity: the fact that we can com- 
.nicate in our language, in Spanish, 
;h practically 300 million people in the 
lerican Continent. This gives a third 
lension in the foreign policy of Spain, 



t 



"**. 

\L-Z-L 




(White House photo by Pete Souza) 



without meaning that any one of them 
means a priority against the others. 

Let me tell you that I am 41 years 
old, and during 33 of these years, I was 
dreaming of a free and democratic 
Spain. This is, of course, what we want 
and we hope for our people. But this is 
also what we want and we hope for 
other peoples wherever we can project 
this foreign policy. We, therefore, wish 
and want for other countries which can 
communicate with us in cultural level: 
peace, freedom, pluralism, and progress. 



Because it's America and because it's 
such an important country in the world, 
you'll understand perfectly well that we 
want also to make our links with the 
United States even closer, which ex- 
plains two things: my presence here ac- 
cepting a gracious and very kind invita- 
tion of President Reagan and my 
satisfaction because of the course of 
these conversations we have just had. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 27, 1983. 



gust 1983 



55 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Soviet Jewry 



by Elliott Abrams 

Statement he/arc the Subcommittee 
mi Hiiiiiiiii Rights and International 
Organizations of the House Foreign Af- 
fair* < 'iiniiinttee mi J nut .'■:. ins.;. Mr. 
Abrams is Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs.' 

I would like to discuss the situation of 
Jews in the Soviet Union today with 
special reference to four general areas 
of concern: anti-Semitic propaganda, at- 
tacks on the study of Hebrew and 
Jewish culture; attacks on the Jewish 
religion; and emigration. Before doing 
that, however, I want to say a few 
words about the history of the Jewish 
community in the Soviet Union, for I 
believe that in order to understand the 
Jewish situation in the Soviet Union to- 
day, we must go back to the very begin- 
ning of the Soviet regime. 

The encounter between the Soviet 
regime and Russian Jewry has 
developed over several stages. Initially, 
the Bolshevik Revolution offered Jews, 
like other minority groups in Russia, an 
awkward bargain: the exchange of large 
parts of their traditional heritage for 
equality with the Russians. For Jews, 
this tacit offer was particularly 
awkward. Religion was the core of the 
Jewish heritage, but Marxism was 
atheist and deeply committed to extir- 
pating religion as a living force in the 
country's life. Nevertheless, this bargain 
provided a basis for a somewhat free 
Jewish life in Russia. Marxism, with its 
basis in the philosophy of the Enlighten- 
ment, fought anti-Semitism vigorously in 
the immediate aftermath of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. 

Under Stalin, however, the 
strengthened totalitarian impulse to 
"reforge" the masses of human beings 
inevitably created grave dangers for any 
community that was distinctive or had 
an ancient heritage. The storm did not 
break on Soviet Jews until just after 
World War II. In 1946 the campaign 
against "rootless cosmopolitans" began. 
It died down briefly in 1950-51 but was 
continued and horribly intensified in the 
campaign against "Zionists" by 1950-53, 
culminating in the so-called doctors af- 
fair, in which a number of prominent 
Jewish physicians were accused of 
murdering several Soviet leaders and 
plotting to murder others. 



Two things were noteworthy about 
this emergence of anti-Semitism. 

First, it was not social anti- 
Semitism, or an atavistic return to tradi- 
tion, but official policy. On one day, the 
state-run papers would be free of 
references to Jews, on the next day full 
of anti-Semitic innuendo. 

Second, this official policy was 
decided on after an analysis of prior ex- 
perience. Given its timing, it is very 
probable that the Soviet Government's 
turn to anti-Semitism was a conscious 
imitation of Hitler's policy. It seems to 
have been based on a perception that 
the Nazi use of anti-Semitism had been 
enormously successful. Thus, with stag- 
gering cynicism, the Soviet regime 
followed V-E Day by imitating the core 
of the political program of its defeated 
Facist enemy. 

What this brief summary of Soviet 
history shows is that the Enlightenment 
heritage in Marxist ideology — which had 
initially protected Jews — had undergone 
an astonishing decomposition by 1946, 
less than 30 years after the revolution. 
By 1983 the decay of Soviet ideology has 
proceeded even further. To read books 
of Soviet ideology is to see the lifeless 
juggling of sterile jargon according to 
political expediency. To visit the 
U.S.S.R. is to feel a stifling cynicism 
about the political principles of 
communism. 

I believe that this is an essential 
part of the problem which Soviet Jews 
face today. Basically, the encounter be- 
tween Soviet communism and the Jews 
is a conflict between the most rapidly 
decaying ideology in human history and 
one of the most permanent — the 
heritage of the Jewish people — which 
has stood for thousands of years. 

This fundamental contrast, more- 
over, cannot but be profoundly disturb- 
ing to Soviet leaders. It makes them 
deeply suspicious of Jews as those who 
possess an apparently inexplicable inner 
firmness which ideologists cannot con- 
trol and which will outlast Soviet 
ideology. 

Thus, Soviet anti-Semitism was not 
cancelled after Stalin's death like some 
other innovations of Stalin's. The 
codeword "Zionists" for Jews was in- 
troduced in the Soviet press in 
November 1952, specifically, as part of 
t lie preparation for the anti-Semitic ter- 
ror intended to surround the doctors af- 
fair. This codeword still remains part of 
Soviet rhetoric. Most of the public 
bodies purged of Jews from 1948 to 
1953 have remained juden.rein. The ter- 



ror hanging over Soviet Jews eased 
after Stalin's death, as it did for other 
Soviet citizens. For a period during the 
1950s and 1960s, many Jews had suc- 
cessful professional careers and had ob- 
tained higher education in substantial 
numbers. But anti-Semitism quicky 
resurfaced during the early 1970s. Thei 
have been some ebbs and flows over tht 
past decade, but the overall trend has 
been toward an increasingly vicious, of- 
ficial campaign of anti-Semitism, which 
purports to be anti-Zionism. 

With this background in mind, let 
me turn now to the situation of Jews in 
the Soviet Union today and to the four 
areas I singled out for special concern. 

Anti-Semitic Propaganda 

For many years now, the Soviet Union 
has been orchestrating a vicious anti- 
Semitic propaganda campaign under th 
guise of "anti-Zionism." The contents oi 
this anti-Semitic campaign resemble 
nothing so much as that notorious anti- 
Semitic forgery, The Protocols of the 
Elders ofZion. Soviet propagandists 
have equated Zionism with every con- 
ceivable evil, including racism, im- 
perialism, capitalist exploitation, co- 
lonialism, militarism, crime, murder, es- 
pionage, terrorism, and even Nazism. T 
give the distinguished members of this 
committee some idea of the nature and 
scope of this campaign, let me read yoi 
a brief excerpt from an article which a) 
peared in the October 10, 1980, issue o 
Pionerskaya Pravda, a weekly magazir 
for children, ages 9 to 14, belonging to 
the Soviet youth organization, Pioneers 

Most of the largest monopolies in the 
manufacture of arms are controlled by Jewi 
bankers. Business made on blood brings the 
enormous profits. Bombs and missiles ex- 
plode in Lebanon — the bankers Lazars and 
the Leibs are making money. Thugs in 
Afghanistan torment schoolchildren with 
gases — the bundles of dollars are multiplyir 
in the safes of the Lehmans and Gug- 
genheims. It is clear that Zionism's principa 
enemy is peace mi earth. 

I could go on and cite literally hun- 
dreds of similar excerpts from the 
Soviet media, but I want to draw the 
committee's attention to some of the 
most recent manifestations of Soviet 
anti-Semitic propaganda. These include 
the formation in April of this year of ai 
anti-Zionist committee of the Soviet 
public to parrot the official propaganda 
line; the broadcast, in recent months, o 
a blatantly anti-Semitic television pro- 
gram on Zionism in which certain 
Jewish leaders w : ere labeled "enemies o 



56 



Department of State Bulleti 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



mmanity," and in which the term "final 
olution" was used; and the publication 
.f a book, The Class Essence of Zionism, 
,/hich contends that Jews, themselves, 
're partly responsible for Europe's 
listory of violent anti-Semitism. Such 
[roadcasts and books could not see the 
|ght of day without official approval. 

jittacks on the Study of Hebrew 
)nd Jewish Culture 

loviet anti-Semitism also manifests 
self in the attempt to discourage the 
tudy of Hebrew and Jewish culture, 
ewish cultural activists and Hebrew 
jachers have been officially warned to 
jase their activities or face various 
trms of retaliation. Two cultural ac- 
vists in Sverdlovsk (Shefer and 
elchin) were, in 1982, each sentenced 
5 years in a strict regime labor camp 
>r "defaming the Soviet state," based 
i their possession of Hebrew books. In 
ovember 1982 prominent activist Iosif 
egun was arrested; he is still awaiting 
ial on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation 
id propaganda." 

ttacks on the Jewish Religion 

ne practice of Judaism is subject to the 
.me stifling official restrictions that 
wern other religious groups in the 
.S.S.R. For example, organized 
ligious instruction of children is legally 
oscribed, and state officials closely 
rutinize all aspects of congregational 
tivity. Numbers of operating 
nagogues and trained clergy are kept 
inadequate levels. There is no func- 
>ning rabbinical seminary throughout 
e length and breadth of the U. S.S.R. 
Soviet Jews are put by the govern- 

B;nt in a double bind: They are allowed 
ither limited cultural and political 
tonomy — like almost all of the na- 
malities of the Soviet Union — nor 
similation into the Russian people, 
ost Soviet nationalities have union 
publics or other national political 
ts, as well as indigenous-language 
ltural expression (newspapers, books 
.Wishing, radio, theater, etc.), within 
finite limits. On the whole, creativity 
the modern language is allowed, as 
ig as official guidelines are followed, 
d the study of most classics in ancient 
iguages is allowed. But Yiddish 
ltural expression and specific Jewish 
ltural expression in Russian is virtual- 
impossible. Most forms of the study of 
;brew are prohibited, and Hebrew 
oks are not available. Jewish religious 
actice is severely restricted by the 



small number of synagogues, the lack of 
any rabbinical seminary to correspond to 
the Orthodox and Moslem seminaries, 
and the virtual incompatibility of 
religious worship with Communist Party 
membership— and, therefore, with many 
types of middle-class jobs. 

On the other hand, Jews are denied 
the path of assimilation into the Russian 
or other nationalities of the Soviet 
Union. It is virtually impossible for an 
adult to get rid of the designation "Jew" 
in his or her internal passport. (The in- 
ternal passport which all Soviet citizens 
are issued indicates their nationality.) 
Being labeled in this way subjects Soviet 
Jews to pervasive discrimination. 

It is important to realize that this in- 
volves not only quotas as in the uni- 
versities but the virtually complete ex- 
clusion of Jews from a number of 
professions and organizations, such as 
significant positions in the Communist 
Party apparatus, the secret police, and 
the officer corps of the army. 

Emigration 

For large numbers of Soviet Jews, 
emigration offers the only way out of 
this double bind. Unfortunately, Jewish 
emigration from the Soviet Union has 
fallen drastically— from 51,300 in 1979 
to 21,500 in 1980; 9,400 in 1981 and 
under 2,700 in 1982, the lowest since 
1970. This year, the decline has con- 
tinued: less than 600 Jews have 
emigrated during the first 5 months of 
1983. The January 1983 monthly figure 
of 81 was the lowest since 1970. This 
compares with monthly totals of over 
4,000 for most of 1979. Moreover, 
Jewish emigration applicants are 
routinely dismissed from their jobs and 
forced into temporary and/or menial 
employment. This practice is especially 
prevalent against those holding profes- 
sional or technical positions. 

The children of Soviet Jews who ap- 
ply for emigration are also subjected to 
persecution. School-aged children are 
commonly made objects of teacher- 
encouraged ridicule and harassment. 
Young men have been promptly con- 
scripted upon reaching draft age, 
despite their families' well-known inten- 
tion to emigrate. Conscription can delay 
a family's emigration by as much as 8 
years — up to 3 years of military service, 
followed by a 5-year period in which the 
inductee is ineligible for emigration due 
to his exposure to "military secrets." 

Discrimination against Soviet Jews 
in employment and education is not 



limited to "refuseniks." Jewish enroll- 
ment in universities and entry into cer- 
tain professions are limited by more dif- 
ficult qualifying standards than those 
imposed on other ethnic groups. 

A number of Jewish scientists — 1 1 
cases are documented but estimates 
range much higher — were stripped of 
their academic degrees during 1980-82. 
Fortunately, the practice seems to have 
abated since its public disclosure in the 
West. 

The U.S. Government is deeply con- 
cerned about the severe downturn in 
emigration, and the issue is being raised 
with the Soviets at every appropriate 
opportunity — both in public forums, 
such as CSCE [Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] and in 
bilateral talks. Secretary Shultz has 
placed particular stress on this and 
other human rights issues during discus- 
sions with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. Embassy Moscow and Con- 
sulate General Leningrad follow 
developments on a daily basis and make 
numerous representations in support of 
emigration applicants. 

Conclusion 

There are no easy solutions to any of the 
problems which I have discussed. In the 
short run, our goals must be to help as 
many individuals as we can, limit 
discriminatory practices, and obtain 
freer emigration. Over the longer term, 
we have to try to obtain a Soviet system 
that is more open to outside influence, 
since that is our best hope for a peaceful 
evolution of that society into one that is 
easier to live with, as well as to live in. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



57 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



U.S. Submits Pleading to ICJ Concerning 
Canadian Maritime Boundary 



On June 28, 1983, the United States 
filed its second written pleading 
(counter-memorial) with the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague in the "Case Concerning the 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary 
in the Gulf of Maine Area" between 
Canada and the United States. Canada 
also filed its second pleading on the 
same date. The first written pleading 
(memorial) was filed with the Court by 
both the United States and Canada on 
September 27, 1982. 

The case is before the Court as 
the result of a boundary settlement 
treaty between the United States and 
Canada which entered into force on 
November 20, 1981. A chamber of five 
judges has been established by the Court 
to hear the case. The members of the 
chamber are Judge Roberto Ago of Ita- 
ly, as President, Judge Andre Gros of 
France, Judge Hermann Mosler of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Judge 
Stephen Schwebel of the United States, 
and Judge ad hoc Maxwell Cohen of 
Canada. 

The Court will establish the single 
maritime boundary between the two 
countries that will divide their Continen- 
tal Shelf jurisdictions and 200-nautical- 
mile fishery zones in the Gulf of Maine 
area. That boundary will also delimit the 
200-nautical-mile exclusive economic 
zone of the United States in the Gulf of 
Maine area. At stake is approximately 
15,000 square nautical miles of resource- 
rich ocean off the New England coast. 
This Atlantic area includes rich fisheries 
developed by the United States on 
Georges Bank, a site of significant cod, 
haddock, scallop, and other catches. The 
bank may also contain valuable oil and 
gas resources. 

The boundary proposed by the 
United States claims jurisdiction over all 
of Georges Bank. New England 
fishermen developed the fisheries of 
Georges Bank during the 19th century 
and fished the area exclusively until the 
late 1950s when an influx of foreign 
fishermen began. Over the last 200 




years, the United States has undertaken 
the primary responsibility for surveying 
and charting the area, the maintenance 
of other navigational aids, the provisions 
of search and rescue services, the con- 
duct of scientific research, and defense. 
The boundary proposed by the United 
States respects the natural divisions in 
the marine environment of the area by 
taking into account the Northeast Chan- 
nel, which separates the Georges Bank 



ecological regime from the separate 
ecological regime of the Scotian Shelf. 

One further round of written 
pleadings may be submitted. Oral argu 
ment is currently contemplated to be 
scheduled in early 1984. 

The agent of the United States 
directing the case is Davis R. Robinson 
the Legal Adviser of the Department o 
State. The Agent for Canada is L. H. 
Legault, Legal Adviser to the Depart- 
ment of Internal Affairs. 



Press release 236. 



58 



Department of State Bulleti 



MIDDLE EAST 



Israel-Lebanon 
Peace Agreement 



PRESIDENTS REMARKS, 
WAY 17, 1983 1 

instead of the usual chit-chat here now 
krhile the cameras are on us, I'm going 
10 make a little statement in their pres- 
ence because of an event that took place 
his morning, and that was the agree- 
ment that's been drawn between 
Lebanon and Israel and was signed this 
looming and, I think, is a positive step 
oward peace in the Middle East. 

And I'd like to extend my personal 
longratulations to President Gemayel 
|nd to Prime Minister Begin and their 
|olleagues for the courage and states- 
manship that they've shown. But also I 
i/ould like to extend, and I think on 
ehalf of all of the country, the heartfelt 
hanks to our Secretary of State, George 
I hultz. On top of the long-term efforts 
n our Ambassadors Habib and Draper 
Philip C. Habib, special representative 
f the President to the Middle East, and 
1 [orris Draper, special negotiator for 
Lebanon], who are working over there, 
eorge went over and, I think, set some 
ind of record for going without sleep or 
hst in a real nonstop shuttle. 

And now that brings about this 
jreement that I think gives hope for 
i iding the suffering of the Lebanese 
sople. It'll initiate a process which will 
llminate in the withdrawal of all exter- 
al forces from Lebanon and of restor- 
ig Lebanon's sovereignty, independ- 
ice, and control over its territory. And 
i lis will enhance the security, I think, 
I id well-being of Lebanon and all of its 
sighbors. 

It deserves the support of all of 
ebanon's friends in the Middle East 
id around the world. And the way is 
i iw clear for others, whose forces are in 
ebanon, to agree to withdraw as well, 
nd this opportunity shouldn't be al- 
wed to slip away. The risks if with- 
i rawal fails are far greater than the 
sks of completing the withdrawal. And 
e will stand firmly beside Lebanon as 
lis effort continues in the weeks and 
lonths ahead. 



Again, my thanks to George Shultz 
for what he has accomplished over 
there. 



'Made as reporters assembled in the 
Cabinet Room at the White House to observe 
the beginning of a meeting between the 
President and Republican congressional 
leaders (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 23, 1983). ■ 



The Lebanon 
Emergency 
Assistance Act 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
JUNE 27, 1983' 

I am pleased to sign into law S.639, the 
Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 
1983. This act authorizes the appropria- 
tion of urgently needed economic and 
military assistance for Lebanon. The 
funding authorized by this act will great- 
ly assist in promoting the economic and 
political stability of that country and 
support the international effort to 
strengthen a sovereign and independent 
Lebanon. 

Section 4(a) of the act confirms this 
Administration's announced intention 
with respect to congressional authoriza- 
tion concerning any future substantial 
expansion in the number or role of U.S. 
forces in Lebanon. As indicated in its 
legislative history, that section does not 
prevent the initiation of such actions, if 
circumstances require it, while Congress 
is considering a request for statutory 
authorization; nor, of course, is it in- 
tended to infringe upon the constitu- 
tional authority of the President as com- 
mander in chief, particularly with 
respect to contingencies not expected in 
the context of the multinational effort to 
strengthen the sovereignty and in- 
dependence of Lebanon. 



Persecutions and 
Repression in Iran 



PRESIDENTS MESSAGE, 
MAY 22, 1983 1 

America and the world are increasingly 
alarmed and dismayed at the persecu- 
tion and severe repression of the 
Baha'i's in Iran. Recently we have 
learned that the Government of Iran has 
sentenced 22 prominent members of the 
Baha'i faith to death. This is in addition 
to the more than 130 who have been 
killed since the beginning of the revolu- 
tion in Iran, including one man executed 
January 1, 1983, and three hanged in 
Shiraz on March 12, 1983. 

These individuals are not guilty of 
any political offense or crime, they have 
not plotted the overthrow of the regime, 
and they are not responsible for the 
deaths of anyone. They only wish to live 
according to the dictates of their own 
consciences. I strongly urge other world 
leaders to join me in an appeal to the 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the rest of 
Iran's leadership not to implement the 
sentences that have been pronounced on 
these innocent people. Sparing their 
lives would be a step forward for Iran 
and the world community. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 30, 1983. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 4, 1983. 



tugust 1983 



59 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



Challenges of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime 



by Richard T. Kenned;/ 

Address hi inn tht Atomic Industrial 
Forum andFORATOM* in Geneva on 
June l. 1983. Mr. Kennedy is U.S. per- 
manent representative to ttu Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agt ncy (IAEA) 
and . 1 mbassador at Large and spt cial 
adviser to the Secretary on nonprolifera- 
tion policy and nuclear energy affairs. 

I am delighted to be with you today here 
in the beautiful city of Geneva. And I 
am equally pleased to have the oppor- 
tunity to talk with you about a subject 
which is my preoccupation, my abiding 
concern, and one which I know is a mat- 
ter of utmost concern to you, your 
governments, and to thoughtful people 
everywhere: preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 

I recognize many in the audience as 
old and valued friends, colleagues from 
former times, people who have con- 
cerned themselves with nuclear matters 
almost from the dawn of the atomic age. 
We sometimes forget that this incredible 
technology we deal with is so very 
young in human terms. It is, after all, 
scarcely 40 years old. By way of con- 
trast, the first literary reference we 
have to the city which is now Geneva 
was in Caesar's Gallic Wars. Old Julius 
describes it as "an oppidum of the 
Allobroges whose territory was con- 
nected to that of the Helvetii by a bridge 
which Caesar, for military reasons, was 
forced to destroy." Caesar always used 
the third person, as you Latinists will 
recall. 

That event occurred, and those facts 
were recorded, about 50 years before 
the birth of Christ. If the world is as old 
as we think it is, the atomic age, in 
relative terms, has barely occupied the 
time needed for a twinkling of the eye. 
Being in this old ami beautiful city gives 
us a chance to take a long-term perspec- 
tive for a change. It gives us the oppor- 
tunity to forget the trees and look at the 
forest for once. If we want, we can take 
a refreshing pause from the transient 
difficulties or short-term setbacks we all 
have come to know and even to expect 
in our work. 

I am going to take that opportunity 
right now and, stopping back from the 
daily fray, from the alarms and diver- 
sions of the moment, try to take a brief 



look at the big picture. My impression is 
that, despite the criticism we hear from 
time to time, despite the fact that there 
are some obvious trouble spots around 
the world — despite all of these things, 
my impression is that our common ef- 
forts to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons are working. Let me tell you 
why I feel this way. You judge a tree by 
its fruit. The fruit of this tree is sound. 
We have in place an international 
nuclear nonproliferation regime which, 
while it is clearly not perfect, is func- 
tioning. We want to make that regime 
and the institutions, norms, and prac- 
tices which comprise it stronger, more 
complete, and more effective. 

During President .John Kennedy's 
Administration 20 years ago, the con- 
sensus of policy experts was that by the 
mid-1980s, 15 to 25 countries would 
have nuclear weapons. They were 
wrong. Serious commentators then ac- 
cepted, almost without question, the idea 
that the spread of nuclear weapons was 
inexorable, working its way out like a 
Greek tragedy, inevitably moving to a 
foreordained conclusion. Again, they 
were wrong. 

To the contrary, there is growing ac- 
ceptance in the international community 
today that the spread of nuclear 
weapons must be avoided. For it is in- 
creasingly clear that it would add to the 
insecurity of nations, worsen the divi- 
sions among countries, and contribute to 
vastly greater instability in the world 
community. There is a growing consen- 
sus symbolized by the adherence of 116 
countries to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty that acquiring nuclear weapons is 
not a sensible or reasonable course for 
nations to pursue. Rather, the consensus 
is that nuclear programs should be car- 
ried on only where there are adequate 
safeguards and other arrangements to 
make clear a country's commitment to 
the use of the atom for peaceful pur- 
poses. 

In the United States, we have laws, 
policies, and procedures aimed at 
preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Every other major nuclear- 
exporting country has adopted com- 
parable although, obviously, not wholly 
identical restrictions. We can and should 
take considerable comfort from these 
facts. 



The United States, as you well 
know, is firmly and fully committed to 
preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons. This is a commitment that 
dates from the very beginning of the 
nuclear age, and it is a commitment th 
is shared by most other countries 
around the globe. 

U.S. Progress 

Let me cite just a few specifics which 
are very much on the positive side of t 
ledger as we look at the nonproliferatii 
balance sheet today. We in the United 
States have made significant progress 
on our program for reduced enrichmer 
for fuels for test and research reactors 
Other countries have similar programs 
These efforts over time will go a long 
way toward eliminating traffic in high- 
enriched uranium, while still allowing 
countries to meet their legitimate 
research and scientific objectives. 

The negotiation of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco by the countries of Latin 
America, creating a nuclear-weapons- 
free zone for that region, also is reaso 
for optimism. Recently, the United 
States ratified Protocol I, and we urge 
other countries to ask themselves 
whether their long-term interests wou 
not be served by taking the steps they 
can — as soon as they can — to bring th 
vital treaty into force everywhere in tl' 
hemisphere. 

The United States also has put int 
place a coherent, realistic, yet prudent 
plutonium use policy. We believe that 
the potential risks of reprocessing and 
use of plutonium as a fuel must be 
recognized. But we also realize that th 
energy needs of some nations may die 
tate its use at some point in the future 
We believe, therefore, that where it ca 
be judged that reprocessing and use o: 
plutonium in civil nuclear power pro- 
grams involves no proliferation risk, it 
neither necessary nor wise to place cri 
pling restrictions on our allies and 
friends who have advanced nuclear pn 
grams and who seek to develop more 
secure energy sources. Instead, our nc 
proliferation goals require that we woi 
with these countries to ensure adequat 
security and safeguards for the use of 
plutonium in their peaceful nuclear 
energy programs. 

We also can and should take con- 
siderable satisfaction from the progres 
we have made in strengthening those i 
ternationally agreed rules of nuclear 



60 



Department of State Bullet 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



•ade without which peaceful nuclear 
ammerce would no longer be possible. 

But let us be completely candid: 
jhere are strains on the existing norms, 
nd there is need for still further efforts 
) broaden and strengthen these rules of 
uclear trade. 

ompetition and Guidelines 

1 each of our countries, there are large 
aclear industries, created at a time 
hen projected energy demand was 
mch greater and when it seemed that 
le future for nuclear power was un- 
mnded. But times have changed, and 
e are all faced with the problem of 
ow to preserve those nuclear industries 
>r the future when demand for nuclear 
>wer will again grow — as I believe it 
ill. In this situation, it is only natural 
at competitive pressures are intense, 
nd those pressures are focused increas- 
gly on the effort to find new markets 
iroad. 

But it is in the interest of every na- 
>n — supplier and purchaser alike — that 
mpetition for those markets be carried 
it in terms of such factors as the quali- 
of equipment, know-how and exper- 
ie, financing, delivery schedules, and 
e like. These are the traditional and 
derstood grounds for competition in 
e marketplace. 

Competition must not be conducted 
a way that it will hinge on the 
adiness of a supplier to shade safe- 
;ards or other nonproliferation condi- 
»ns, to look for possible technology 
/eeteners that will make purchasing 
Dm it seem more attractive than from 
(Other country that honors existing 
und norms. For once the process of 
ading our shared nonproliferation 
indards begins, we will end up with 
e lowest common denominator of what 
n be agreed to among nations, each 
Dtivated not by its or the world's long- 
rm interest but by short-term gain and 
ar of what its neighbors might do. 
ider these conditions, the non- 
oliferation regime will gradually 
travel, and we will find ourselves 

Eable to realize the atom's promise for 
3 health and well-being of all. 

The prospective emergence of new 
ppliers on the scene adds even greater 
gency to our efforts to preserve and 
rengthen the agreed rules of nuclear 
ade. If there is disharmony and con- 
Dversy among the major nuclear sup- 
iers on conditions for nuclear export, 
w suppliers inevitably will be tempted 



to use nonproliferation conditions as a 
bargaining factor in their pursuit of 
sales. If they see their role models per- 
forming in this way, what else can we 
reasonably expect? By contrast, agree- 
ment now among the existing suppliers 
on sound guidelines and a commitment 
to honor those guidelines will make it 
easier to urge new suppliers to follow 
those agreed and sensible export prac- 
tices in the future. 

A further word about such common 
supplier policies and guidelines: It is 
clear that no list of sensitive materials 
can ever be immutable. The items on 
any such list must change over time as 
technologies change and as our under- 
standing of technologies becomes 
broader and deeper. 

But there are other items whose 
relation to sensitive activities is more 
complex. What should we do, for exam- 
ple, if a nation seeks to buy a computer 
which could be useful in the operation of 
an unsafeguarded reprocessing plant? 
Here we get to the heart of the dual-use 
question: The same computer that could 
help in the operation of a reprocessing 
plant could also be used quite properly 
and harmlessly in a large chemical facili- 
ty. How should the nations of the world 
decide which request to honor and which 
to reject? The nuclear-exporting states, 
after all, are those most likely to be in a 
position to export the computer in ques- 
tion. Should there be a policy aimed at 
foreclosing the export of any item which 
has a dual use? Should any item be 
barred which could conceivably find its 
way into a facility which could be used 
in developing nuclear explosives? This is 
no simple question, and there are no 
simple answers. Clearly, for example, a 
blanket export prohibition might prevent 
the construction of a perfectly respec- 
table, indeed vitally necessary, chemical 
plant in a developing country. But by 
the same token, the potential dangers 
cannot be ignored. 

If we can have confidence that the 
intended use of that mythical computer 
is not related to the manufacture of 
nuclear explosives, the question is clear- 
ly much easier to answer. But how can 
the requesting nation generate that con- 
fidence? One clear answer would be by 
adhering to the Nuclear Non-Prolifera- 
tion Treaty or, in the case of Latin 
American countries, by accepting and 
agreeing to be bound by the Treaty of 



Tlatelolco. The voluntary acceptance of 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy 
Agency] safeguards on all of a country's 
nuclear facilities and activities is yet 
another way to generate that needed 
confidence. 

Let me elaborate. In order to 
manufacture nuclear explosives, a nation 
needs two things: first, the know-how 
and technical backup. This means scien- 
tists, the necessary materials, and equip- 
ment. This is the technical side of the 
equation and, though the barriers re- 
main considerable, more and more na- 
tions are coming to possess the technical 
wherewithal to cross those barriers. 

Second is the political decision to "go 
nuclear." A nation must consciously 
make this hard decision, presumably 
because it sees some benefit to itself by 
doing so. This is the political ingredient. 
After all is said and done, the political 
ingredient is by far the more important. 
All the export controls that the suppliers 
can devise or the safeguards that the 
IAEA can implement cannot forever bar 
a country from acquiring nuclear ex- 
plosives. A nation can, however, rule out 
"going nuclear" by an act of political 
will. It can turn its back on the develop- 
ment of nuclear weapons by adhering to 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and accepting safeguards on all its 
nuclear activities. One hundred and six- 
teen non-nuclear-weapons states so far 
have done just that. Where such 
regional treaties such as the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco exist, adherence to them can 
serve the same goal. 

But there is more to it than a simple 
signature on a treaty. The best way for 
a nation to demonstrate its bona fides — 
the most graphic way — is to accept 
safeguards in spirit as well as in the let- 
ter. It is unseemly for nations to haggle 
about the niceties of safeguards — 
whether a given action or a particular 
technical change is within the writ of a 
particular IAEA safeguards agreement. 
Instead of a preoccupation with the 
precise legal letter of safeguards — as 
distinguished from the spirit of safe- 
guards, a preoccupation with form over 
substance — all nations should work to 
strengthen the IAEA safeguards system 
and help it to perform its vital task. 

Only such a cooperative attitude can 
provide the proper basis for nuclear 
commerce. Without it, that mutual trust 
and confidence, which is essential if we 
are to continue to be able to use nuclear 



61 



PACIFIC 



energy for peaceful purposes, will be 
lacking. For after we strip away all the 
verbiage, it comes down to this: trust 
has to be the predicate for all nuclear 
commerce. The exporting nation must 
have confidence that the materials it ex- 
ports will not be turned into devices of 
war and destruction. Recipient nations 
must have confidence that, having 
demonstrated by word and deed their 
own bona fides, they can get the help 
they need to realize the atom's peaceful 
promise. 

Many means are at hand, as I have 
suggested, for building that confidence 
for both suppliers and recipients. The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is 
there, and the relatively few nations 
which have not adhered to date could 
join at any time. For the countries of 
Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
waits to be embraced. The IAEA is 
there ready, willing, and able to apply 
safeguards to all facilities not yet 
covered. 

Our plea to the nations which have 
not yet done so is to make a formal, 
public commitment to peace and to 
demonstrate that commitment by joining 
the overwhelming majority of nations in 
the world in accepting the obligations of 
these precedent-shattering treaties. 

How strongly do we feel about this? 
Very strongly, indeed. President Reagan 
in his Los Angeles address on March 31 
of this year put it this way: 

For arms control to be truly complete 
and world security strengthened ... we must 
also increase our efforts to halt the spread of 
nuclear arms. Every country that values a 
peaceful world order must play its part. Our 
allies, as important nuclear exporters, also 
have a very important responsibility to pre- 
vent the spread of nuclear arms. To advance 
this goal, we should all adopt comprehensive 
safeguards as a condition for nuclear supply 
commitments that we make in the future. 

Conclusion 

Why are we pursuing this initiative? 
What do we hope to accomplish? That 
brings me full circle, back to my begin- 
ning. Our goal is to strengthen the inter- 
national nonproliferation regime which 



we have struggled together to erect over 
the last four decades. We want to put 
into place a set of norms and standards 
with which everyone agrees — a set of 
norms which, in effect, will be the rules 
of conduct, honored by supplier nations 
and receiving nations alike. President 
Reagan's call for comprehensive safe- 
guards is one more step in perfecting 
this regime. We want to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons around the 
world because we think that spread 
would be dangerous to the security of 
every nation on earth. Nuclear energy 
has much to offer the peoples of the 
world — for power, for medicine, for 
agriculture, for industry. But, to realize 



that promise, we must control the threa 
of nuclear proliferation. 

We need not, we must not, despair 
that the task is too great or that 
chances of success are too small. We 
have a solid base of experience to build 
upon. And we have a growing aware- 
ness that the cost of failure can be enor 
mous. It is a challenge to all and a chal- 
lenge which all must pursue. As Presi- 
dent Reagan said, "Every country that 
values a peaceful world must play its 
part." 



*FORATOM represents the atomic trac 
associations of 14 West European countries. 



Visit of Australian Prime Minister 




(White House photo by Pete Souza) 



Prime Minister Robert J. I.. Hawke 

of Australia made an official working 
visit to Washington, B.C., June 11-15, 
1983, to meet with President Reagan and 
other government officials. 

Following ore remarks made tig 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Hawke after their meeting on June Li. ' 



President Reagan 

I'm delighted that Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke has been able to come to 
Washington so early in his 
administration. 

We've had a productive session, 
reviewing bilateral issues as well as 
world developments. And, more impor- 
tantly, we've had a chance to put our 



62 



Department of State Bulletir 



PACIFIC 



relationship on a personal basis. We find 
we have much in common, but that's no 
surprise between friends and allies. The 
bonds between our two nations are 
longstanding. Our ties are a precious 
tradition, reflecting our many concerns 
and shared values. 

Australia is a great nation that plays 
a vital role in regional and world affairs. 
It's a key ally upon whom we can count. 
Ours is an alliance of trust and friend- 
ship. I'm grateful for the good will ex- 
pressed by Prime Minister Hawke today, 
and I welcome his wise counsel. I've 
been looking forward to getting to know 
him. And it was our first meeting, but 
certainly not our last. We will be in fre- 
quent contact in the future. And I wish 
the Prime Minister and all Australians 
the best of luck. And, again, welcome. 

Prime Minister Hawke 

I join with you in expressing the ap- 
preciation that I have for having placed 
the relationship between our two coun- 
tries now in terms of a personal meeting 
between us. 

I, like you, have been looking for- 
ward to this meeting. I have been able 
to convey to you, and through you to the 
people of the United States, the fun- 
damental importance that we in the new 
Labor government attach to the rela- 
tionship with the United States. 

I was able to remind the President 
that it was a Labor government during 
the last war which fundamentally 
reoriented the international relationship 
of Australia toward that alliance with 
the United States. It was an alliance 
which served us well, the United States 
and Australia, during that war. And in 
the period since the war, that relation- 
ship, in general and particularly in terms 
of the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, 
United States pact] treaty relationship, 
has continued to serve both our coun- 
tries well. 

There is no country, I have sug- 
;ested to the President, that this coun- 
try will be able to rely on more as a con- 
structive ally than Australia. It will be a 
relationship of deep friendship and, as is 
oefitting between people and nations 
who are friends, it will be one, at times, 
where there may be differences of em- 
phasis in our perceptions of particular 
issues. Those differences, if they exist, 
will be honestly and directly expressed 
Out will in no way diminish the fun- 
damental depth of the relationship be- 
tween our two countries. 



I appreciate the opportunity that I 
have had to discuss with the President 
matters of immediate bilateral impor- 
tance to us, matters of concern in the 
immediate region of Australia, and 
issues of global consideration. And we 
have found in all those areas an identity 
of interest. I have expressed to the 
President, as he has to me, our firm in- 
tention on both our parts to ensure that 
the relationship, which has been strong 



and productive in the past, will continue 
to be even more so in the future. And 
that will reflect the relations between 
our countries and what is now a firm, 
personal relationship between the Presi- 
dent of the United States and myself as 
Prime Minister of Australia. 



'Text from Weekly Compiliation of 
Presidential Documents of June 20, 1983. 



Micronesia Approves Free 
Association With U.S. 



Unofficial results of the June 21, 1983, 
plebiscite in the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM) represent a significant 
victory for the compact of free associa- 
tion. In the yes-or-no vote, the citizens 
of the FSM approved the compact by 
more than 75%. The compact was ap- 
proved by three of the FSM's four states 
as required under the FSM Constitution. 

Under the compact and its sub- 
sidiary agreements, negotiated over a 
14-year, period, the FSM will be fully 
responsible for internal and foreign af- 
fairs, while the United States will pro- 
vide economic assistance and will 
assume the obligation and authority to 
defend the island nation. 

The voters of the FSM were asked 
other questions on the plebiscite ballot, 
including the political status they would 
prefer if free association were not ap- 
proved. The voters were asked to choose 
either a relationship with the United 
States closer than free association or in- 
dependence. Early returns indicate a 
preference for independence over a 
closer relationship with the United 
States; however, this will be moot given 
the overwhelming vote for free 
association. 

The Government of the FSM 
mounted an intensive and thorough 
public education program in advance of 
the plebiscite. That program, which 
started more than 5 months before the 
vote, included translation of all the perti- 
nent documents, radio and television 
programs and debates, town hall 
meetings, and village discussions. Of- 
ficial observers from the U.N. 
Trusteeship Council traveled to the FSM 
to observe the final days of the educa- 
tion program, the voting, and the tabula- 
tion of ballots. 



The FSM is one of the three states 
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands to conduct plebiscites on the 
compact. Palau approved the compact by 
a 62% majority in a February 10, 1983, 
plebiscite, and the United States and the 
Marshall Islands have recently an- 
nounced September 7 as the date of the 
last plebiscite in the trust territory. 

The Northern Mariana Islands, a 
fourth political jurisdiction in the trust 
territory, voted in 1975 to become a 
commonwealth of the United States. 
Under this arrangement, the people of 
the northern Mariana Islands will 
become U.S. citizens when the 
trusteeship ends. All four political 
jurisdictions of the trust territory have 
locally elected constitutional 
governments. 

The compact defines the relationship 
between the United States and the new 
Micronesian states, as well as their in- 
ternational political status after the 
trusteeship is terminated. Now that the 
people of the FSM have approved the 
compact, it must be approved according 
to their constitutional processes and 
receive majority approval in both 
Houses of the U.S. Congress. 

The United States has administered 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands since 1947 under a trusteeship 
agreement with the United Nations. The 
FSM consists of the island states of 
Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Kosrae. The 
FSM and the other island groups of the 
trust territory were administered by 
Japan under a League of Nations man- 
date after World War I. The United 
States liberated the islands from 
Japanese occupation during the last 
years of World War II. Today the island 
states of the FSM, marked by their 



August 1983 



63 



PACIFIC 



spectacular beauty and their unusually 
rich and diverse marine ecology, are 
preparing themselves for future 
economic development. Fishing, 
agriculture, and tourism are expected to 
contribute to this growth. The compact 
of free association contains incentives 



for investment, trade, and business 
development and also guarantees 
economic development assistance from 
the United States. 



Press release 237 of June 28, 1983. 



U.S.-Marshall Islands 
Call Plebiscite 



The Governments of the United States 
and of the Marshall Islands have an- 
nounced September 7, 1983, as the date 
for a plebiscite on political status in the 
Marshall Islands. The plebiscite will be 
an act of self-determination by the peo- 
ple of the Marshall Islands and, together 
with earlier plebiscites in the Republic of 
Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia — components of the 
U.S. -administered Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands — clears the way for 
bringing the last U.N. trusteeship to a 
close. 

The voters of the Marshall Islands 
will be asked whether they approve or 
disapprove a compact of free association 
and a number of agreements subsidiary 
to it, all of which have been signed by 
representatives of the two govern- 
ments—Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, 
Personal Representative of the Presi- 
dent of the United States for Microne- 
sian Status Negotiations and the 
Honorable Amata Kabua, President of 
the Marshall Islands. 

In addition to addressing the ques- 
tion of free association in the plebiscite, 
voters will be asked to state their 
preference for an alternative political 
status to be negotiated with the United 
States in the event that free association 
is not approved. The choices will be in- 
dependence or a continuing relationship 
with the United States other than free 
association, and the voter will be given 
the further opportunity to describe that 
relationship. 

The United States and the Marshall 
Islands agreed to call the plebiscite 



jointly, and an announcement of the 
date was made on June 25 in Majuro, 
capital of the Marshall Islands, by Am- 
bassador Zeder and President Kabua. 
Included in the announcement was a 
statement that the two governments had 
reached agreement on a comprehensive 
settlement of all claims brought by the 
inhabitants of Bikini, Enewetak, 
Rongelap, and Utirik arising out of the 
U.S. nuclear testing program in the 
Marshall Islands from 1946 to 1958. 

At the request of the United States, 
the U.N. Trusteeship Council agreed on 
December 20, 1982, to organize a series 
of observer missions to witness the 
plebiscites in the Marshall Islands and in 
two other jurisdictions of the Trust Ter- 
ritory of the Pacific Islands. The first 
such mission observed a plebiscite in the 
Republic of Palau on February 10, 1983, 
and the second observed the June 21 
plebiscite in the Federated States of 
Micronesia. The compact of free associa- 
tion with the United States was ap- 
proved in both votes, by over 62% in 
Palau and by approximately 75% in the 
Federated States. Another UN observer 
mission will travel to the Marshall 
Islands in time to observe the education 
program, the voting, and the counting of 
the ballots. The education program in 
the Marshall Islands is being conducted 
by a commission established by the Mar- 
shall Islands Government. 

The announcement of a plebiscite on 
political status represents the completion 
of more than a decade of negotiations. 



Press release 238 of June 28, 1983. 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



POPULATION 



U.S. Population Policy 
and the United Nations 



by Richard Elliot Benedick 

Excerpts from a statement before the 
UN Development Program Governing 
Council on the UN Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA) in New York on 
June 20, 1983. Ambassador Benedick is 
Coordinator of Population Affairs. 

Two years ago, at the 28th session of 
I this governing council, I compared the 
current world phenomenon of population 
growth to falling snow— a gradual and 
seemingly imperceptible accumulation 
which only attracts attention when the 
problem is in a very advanced stage and 
consequently very difficult to solve. 

But 2 years ago, there were several 
million fewer people added to the 
world's population than will be added 
during this current year. Next 
year— and for many years there- 
after—the increments will continue to 
frise. 

Barring unforeseen events, most of 
the countries represented in this room 
will experience at least a doubling of 
their current population size within the 
next two generations— adding to and 
implicating already well-known prob- 
ems of food supply, health, resource 
scarcity, pressure on the environment, 
anemployment, migration, and frustra- 
:ion of aspirations for a better life. 

This is the reality which must deeply 
nfluence our deliberations at this 
neeting. 

A more encouraging development in 
•ecent years has been the nearly uni- 
versal recognition, by the leaders of the 
Third World countries most affected by 
;his condition, that something has to be 
lone to limit the continuing rapid rise in 
jopulation— in order for these countries 
,o make effective use of domestic invest- 
nent and external assistance and 
;hereby make meaningful progress 
.oward attaining a better quality of life 
'or their citizens. Symbolic of this 
significant change in attitude and policy 
s the Continent of Africa, which now 
ind for the foreseeable future will have 
.he world's highest population growth 
•ate. A survey this spring undertaken by 
J.S. Embassies in Africa revealed that 
ilmost everywhere on this continent sig- 
lificant changes in attitudes are under- 



way. This greater recognition of the 
dangers of continued rapid growth in 
population has also been noted by 
observers from the UNFPA and the 
World Bank 

Against this background, the role of 
the UNFPA is particularly critical, as 
the world's largest multilateral agency 
dedicated to bridging the gap between 
recognition of the population problem 
and effective measures to address it in 
an effective and yet humane way. Two 
years ago, this council decided upon 
UNFPA's prospective role for the 
decade of the 1980s: South and North 
united in an historic reorientation of 
UNFPA's priorities, recognizing the 
urgent need to reduce birth rates and 
provide family planning services and 
education to the growing milions of peo- 
ple who need this help. 

The United States wishes to com- 
mend Executive Director Rafael Salas 
and the UNFPA for the responsiveness 
and sensitivity with which this institu- 
tion is responding to the wishes of this 
council and the needs of the countries 
which it serves. . . . Especially during a 
time of resource constraint, UNFPA's 
management deserves the appreciation 
of this council for their candid and 
realistic approach toward future plan- 
ning 

Enormous logistical difficulties still 
stand in the way of extension of these 
services to the people and communities 
who need them. The United States 
would like, in this context, to offer some 
observations on specific aspects of 
UNFPA's activities. 

In order more effectively to meet 
the recognized priority needs, those UN 
executing agencies which spend most of 
the funds approved by this council must 
design their programs and projects in 
greater conformity with the mandates of 
this council— namely, the priority for 
family planning and related activities. 
The United States intends to pursue this 
matter in the governing bodies of other 
UN agencies, and we urge UNFPA and 
member governments represented here 
to do the same. . . . 

In the experience of the United 
States in administering the world's 
largest population assistance programs 
for many years, we have found a 



tremendous vitality in the private sector. 
Voluntary family planning and popula- 
tion programs are most effective when 
they involve the active participation of 
the people through creative projects at 
community level, commercial retail sales 
of contraceptives, and the like. We 
believe that the energy and creativity of 
nongovernmental organizations can and 
should be more effectively harnessed by 
UNFPA, and we note with concern that 
both the amount and percentage of 
UNFPA funding through such organiza- 
tions declined between 1981 and 1982. 
We urge that this trend be reversed. . . . 

The need for safer, better, and more 
acceptable methods of fertility regula- 
tion continues to grow more urgent. 
This was the message of an interna- 
tional conference of science 
policymakers and researchers convened 
in Stockholm, Sweden, in February of 
this year. The governing council last 
year stressed that research on contra- 
ceptives is "crucial" to the attainment of 
the fund's objectives. . . . 

The United States recommends that 
this council direct UNFPA to adopt a 
"holistic" approach to biomedical re- 
search funding, in recognition of the 
multiplicity of effective international 
programs and networks active in such 
research. In this connection, I might cite 
the recent entry into this field of a 
UNESCO-associated agency, the Inter- 
national Organization for Chemistry in 
Development, which includes among its 
directors a number of distinguished 
scientists, including the Swedish Nobel- 
laureate, Dr. Sune Bergstrom, who 
directed the outstanding report on 
contraceptive research produced last 
year for this council. In addition, there 
are many other research organizations, 
which merit support in their efforts to 
find better contraceptives, including the 
International Committee for Contracep- 
tive Research, the Program for Applied 
Research in Fertility Regulation, the 
WHO Special Program of Research in 
Human Reproduction, Family Health In- 
ternational, the Program for the In- 
troduction and Adaptation of Contra- 
ceptive Technology, and the Medical 
Research Councils of numerous in- 
dividual countries. The United States is 
supporting many of these organizations; 
we also have bilateral agreements for 
cooperative research in human reproduc- 
tion with India, China, and most recent- 
ly, Italy, and we are discussing similar 
arrangements with several other coun- 
tries. This is a field which deserves in- 
creasing priority by UNFPA and the in- 
ternational community. 



August 1983 



65 



REFUGEES 



In conclusion, I would like to stress 
the continued strong commitment of the 
U.S. Government, both the executive 
branch and the Congress, to be respon- 
sive to requests from developing coun- 
tries for assistance to their population 
programs— through our bilateral pro- 
grams, through private organizations, 
and through the excellent work of the 
UNFPA. This Administration has reaf- 
firmed that population concerns are an 
essential element of our development aid 
strategy. Even under conditions of ex- 
treme budgetary stringency, the high 
priority of this subject is reflected in the 
continuing increases in U.S. aid and re- 
search funding. 

We have placed particular emphasis 
in designing policies and programs that 
are sensitive to local cultural and 
religious traditions. The United States 
will support only voluntary family plan- 
ning activities. We strongly oppose any 
coercion in population programs, and we 
believe equally strongly that couples 
should be offered freedom to choose 
among a variety of ways of planning 
their family size, including various 
medically approved as well as the 
natural family planning (periodic 
abstinence) methods. 

Thus, the United States believes in 
enlightened population policies, aiming 
ultimately at improvements in the quali- 
ty of life of mothers and children and of 
future generations. We believe that such 
policies and programs can be fully con- 
sistent with the values of human dignity 
and stability of the family which we 
cherish. 

We are pleased to be associated with 
an organization like the UNFPA in pur- 
suit of these important goals, and we 
look forward to working together with 
UNFPA and with other governments in 
making the 1984 International Con- 
ference on Population in Mexico City a 
true landmark on the road of human and 
national development. ■ 



Refugees: A Continuing Concern 



by James N. Purcell, Jr. 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration and Refugee Policy of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
June 20, 1983. Mr. Purcell is Director of 
the Bureau of Refugee Programs. 1 

When the Refugee Act of 1980 was 
adopted nearly 3 years ago, it was hailed 
as landmark legislation representing a 
new era in America's commitment to 
refugees. Although the United States 
had long been recognized as a leader in 
world efforts to assist and protect those 
fleeing their countries to escape persecu- 
tion, our domestic legislation on the sub- 
ject had not previously dealt with 
refugees in a comprehensive and prin- 
cipled manner. The Refugee Act of 1980 
changed that, and it is a tribute to this 
subcommittee and committee that the 
act has been so widely praised for its 
statesmanship and adherence to interna- 
tionally recognized standards. 

It will be recalled that in previous 
decades, although the United States had 
been generous in admitting refugees — 
Hungarians in 1956, Cubans and Czecho- 
slovakians in the 1960s, Indochinese 
following the fall of Vietnam in 1975— 
these programs were carried out under 
what came to be recognized as a 
stretched application of humanitarian 
parole. What had been intended to aid 
individual refugees had come to serve as 
a means to admit large groups totaling 
in the many thousands. 

What the process lacked in legal ele- 
gance, it made up in serviceability. Con- 
sultations took place with congressional 
committees, often at short notice, and 
decisions were reached providing a 
specified number of admissions for a 
particular group or class of refugees. 
For the groups covered by the paroles, 
it can be said that the system worked, 
sometimes with such swiftness that it 
led to the arrival in our country of large 
numbers of refugees with only brief ex- 
aminations overseas and with limited 
preparation by the private voluntary 
agencies that then and now play such 
vital roles in our refugee programs. 

By the late 1970s, the group parole 
system became increasingly perceived as 
inadequate to the realities of the modern 
world. Refugees were appearing in 
larger numbers, more frequently, in 



more places. Although there continued 
to be major refugee exoduses from 
communist-dominated lands — from Indo-| 
china after 1975, from Afghanistan 
following the Soviet invasion, and in the 
Horn of Africa — there were also grow- 
ing numbers of refugees in areas away 
from the periphery of the communist 
states. The previous system, which 
amounted to an ad hoc selection among 
potential refugee groups, was seen as nc 
longer responsive to the requirements ol 
the new situation. Spurred by the need 
to cope with the tide of boat people fron 
Vietnam, the Congress and the Adminis 
tration worked together toward the new 
definition and procedures embodied in 
the Refugee Act of 1980. 

The Definition of "Refugee" 

The centerpiece of the act is its defini- 
tion of a refugee. 2 There was little 
dispute that the definition to be adopted 
by the United States should be consist- 
ent with the international standard con- 
tained in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 protocol (which eliminated 
the time limitation and the geographical 
restriction by which the convention 
applied only to Europe). In the interven- 
ing years, some 92 countries, including 
the United States, have become parties 
to the convention or its protocol, reflect 
ing a general perception in virtually all 
regions of the world that the interna- 
tional definition properly identifies the 
class of persons in distress who merit 
the special protection and assistance 
that the international community has 
established for refugees. 

Because the word "refugees" is ofte. 
used loosely to describe people in 
various kinds of difficulty, it is some- 
times made more precise by reference 6 
"convention" or "protocol" refugees. For 
example, in recent months we have seer 
the word "refugees" applied to such per- 
sons as West Africans returning to theii 
home countries after being expelled by 
Nigeria as illegal immigrants, to Afri- 
cans seeking new sources of food in the 
face of drought, even to residents of oui 
own western states forced to evacuate 
their homes during spring floods. 

What the international definition 
provides is a recognition that refugees, 
in the legal sense, form a distinguishable 
category of persons in need. A body of 



66 



Department of State Bulletir 



REFUGEES 



w, practice, and programs has grown 
i) around this concept, with the result 
at helping refugees has taken on a 
atus, even a stature, that defines it 
id separates it from programs to 
llieve other areas of human suffering, 
has been said that the UN High Com- 
Sssioner for Refugees should not be 
Insidered "the high commissioner for 
| good causes," a statement that recog- 
les that refugees are not the only per- 
ns in need, even as it emphasizes their 
ecial status. 

So it is refugees, in this interna- 
mally established legal sense, to which 
: address ourselves in this hearing, 
d who are the subject of the definition 
the Refugee Act. Although there may 
disagreement about the manner in 
lich the refugee definition is applied in 
lividual cases or to certain groups, it 
our conclusion that the definition has 
Dved its usefulness in practice. It has 
ved us well, and we see no gain in at- 
npting to modify it. 

Previous testimony has dealt with 
^gestions that the definition be nar- 
wd, but it should be recognized that 
i more common assertion that we face 
the management of our programs is 
it the definition should be broadened 
cover individuals or groups who are 
: now qualified for refugee status. 
One such broadening of the defini- 
n would have it apply to persons 
ced to leave their home countries 
:ause of foreign occupation or civil 
'e — a formulation contained in the 
ican refugee convention adopted in 
9 by the Organization of African Uni- 
OAU). Although this definition has 
n accepted and applied in a number 
■efugee situations in Africa, this says 
e about the traditions of hospitality 
J "he African states than about the 
i .irability of extending this formulation 
I )ther areas of the world. In South- 
B t Asia, for example, we have ob- 
I ved the opposite tendency: a consist- 
| refusal by states of the area to offer 
B e haven to refugees except on a tem- 
g -ary basis, and then only with guaran- 
I s that refugees will be moved else- 

■ ere for permanent resettlement. 

I By contrast, at the African refugee 
piference in 1979, President Julius 
lerere of the host country, Tanzania, 

■ lis keynote statement said of Africa: 
I e welcome the refugees, we give 

tl m our space." Such a generous ap- 
faiach reflects the communality of 
l-ica, which has made possible the 
r ettlement within the region of many 



thousands of refugees. However, we do 
not believe such a broad definition 
should be considered for U.S. admissions 
purposes. 

Another broadening of the definition 
would have it cover "economic refugees" 
on the ground that persons deprived of 
a decent livelihood by oppressive eco- 
nomic conditions should have as much 
right to international protection and 
assistance as refugees from political or 
religious persecution. The problem with 
such an expansion of the definition is 
that it would encompass a major part of 
the world's population— those who live 
in the majority of countries classified as 
impoverished or underdeveloped. 
Western nations have recognized a re- 
sponsibility to assist in the moderniza- 
tion and economic development of the 
Third World by means of various forms 
of trade and assistance, private and 
public. But a readiness to assist in im- 
proving the living conditions of the poor 
majority does not carry with it an 
obligation to treat them all as refugees. 
Among those concerned with interna- 
tional refugee problems there has been 
little inclination to broaden the definition 
in this direction. 

Admissions Criteria 

It should be emphasized that the defini- 
tion of a refugee, in international law 
and in the Refugee Act, provides the 
framework for international protection 
and assistance but does not of itself 
define the terms a government may set 



process which was mandated in law by 
the Refugee Act of 1980. 

Although the United States employs 
the definition as part of the process 
through which refugees are considered 
for admission, the definition does not 
tell us how many refugees shall be ad- 
mitted or from which groups or regions 
the refugees shall be drawn. Those 
determinations remain, for us as for the 
other nations accepting refugees for in- 
ternational resettlement, a subject 
governed by national interest and 
foreign policy as well as humanitarian 
considerations. 

Resettlement countries have their 
own procedures for deciding which 
refugees to admit, and in what number. 
Some countries give priority to those 
with whom they have family or other 
ties. For example, many of the Indo- 
chinese accepted by France had prior 
associations with that country. Other 
governments, including the United 
States, also look for such ties and tend 
to honor them in the context of a 
refugee program. 

Some countries with smaller pro- 
grams, such as Switzerland and the 
Scandinavian countries, have special pro- 
grams to admit handicapped refugees, 
thus helping relieve what are often 
especially compelling humanitarian prob- 
lems. 

Where some other countries differ 
from the United States in their selection 
of refugees is in the application of stand- 
ards of professional qualifications, lang- 
uage skills, education — sometimes 



In our implementation of the Refugee Act, we 
have established a prescreening process aimed at 
selecting refugees for the purpose of admission on 
the basis of "priorities" which take account of the 
immediacy of a refugee's plight and the relatives 
in, or other ties a refugee may have to, the United 
States. 



for the admission of refugees into its 
territory for permanent resettlement. 
This committee is, of course, familiar 
with the procedures followed by the 
United States in determining how many 
and which refugees we will admit each 
year. The regular consultations and the 
annual ceilings are at the heart of the 



summed up with the phrase "selection 
for quality" — with the selection carried 
out by immigration officials with 
relatively broad discretion to evaluate 
such "quality" attributes. 

The United States has looked for 
more objective criteria to determine 
which refugees to accept for admission. 



.gust 1983 



67 



REFUGEES 



During the period of group paroles, this 
tended to amount to accepting all 
refugee applicants within a given group 
or category until the numbers were ex- 
hausted. In our implementation of the 
Refugee Act, we have established a pre- 
screening process aimed at selecting 
refugees for the purpose of admission on 
the basis of "priorities" which take ac- 
count of the immediacy of a refugee's 
plight and the relatives in, or other ties 
a refugee may have to, the United 
States. The priorities represent a con- 
sidered effort on the part of the U.S. 
Government to state in an objective 
manner the principles to be followed in 
deciding which refugees to admit. 

There is a threshold question before 
the assignment of priorities is reached, 
and that is to determine that the per- 
sons to be considered are in fact 
refugees. On this issue, the definition in 
the Refugee Act has provided the scope 
to cover a wide range of refugee situa- 
tions of interest to the United States 
and the precision needed to make possi- 
ble equitable decisions in individual 
cases. We believe it should be main- 
tained in its current form. 

In addition to applying the priorities 
and the refugee definition, it is our 
policy that refugees who have a firm of- 
fer of resettlement elsewhere will not be 
considered for admission to the United 
States. There are exceptions, such as in- 
dividuals who may have family ties both 
in the United States and elsewhere, with 
the stronger connection, however, to the 
United States; and Soviet Jews for 
whom a visa to Israel is the necessary 
condition of departure from the 
U.S.S.R., even though the individuals 
have relatives or other ties supporting 
their intention to come to the United 
States. The general policy, however, is 
not to consider refugees for the United 
States if they have a firm offer of reset- 
tlement elsewhere. 

Administering the Program Fairly 

In our application of the definition and 
the priorities, we have sought to achieve 
fairness as well as humaneness. The 
United States cannot accept all deserv- 
ing refugees. We can, however, strive to 
make our program as equitable as possi- 
ble, without losing sight of other con- 
siderations of national interest and 
foreign policy. In most cases this means 
that we are able to apply our priorities 
with consistency within each geographic 
region and on a worldwide basis. Where 
such an equal application leads to un- 



equal results, however, and in particular 
when it leads to results at variance with 
the projections provided in the consulta- 
tions with the Congress, we must adjust 
the application of the priorities accord- 
ingly. We have kept the Congress in- 
formed of such adjustments. 

The effectiveness of a program can 
be seen in terms of its results, and we 
believe the admissions criteria that have 
been employed under the Refugee Act 
have produced a balanced program that 
has been responsive to our foreign policy 
and humanitarian concerns and to the 
requirements of our domestic situation. 

During the past year, we have taken 
a series of actions, in cooperation with 
the U.S. Coordinator and the Depart- 
ments of Justice and Health and Human 
Services, aimed at improving procedures 
for the successful integration of refugees 
in our communities and cities. Our goal 
has been a program that ensures that all 
refugees admitted to the United States 
should have a positive start on the road 
to self-sufficiency through employment 
as productive members of our society. 

The programs we have instituted 
come during a period in which the 
number of refugees arriving in the 
United States has been substantially re- 
duced from previous years. Responding 
to the clearly stated views of this com- 
mittee and its counterpart in the House 
of Representatives, we have operated 
well within the ceilings set during last 
fall's consultations. Against an overall 
ceiling of 90,000, we expect the total 
number of arrivals this year to be in the 
60,000-65,000 range. 

Our tentative region-by-region pro- 
jections for FY 1983 are as follows: 

• Africa: 3,000 admissions (3,000 
ceiling); 

• East Asia: 38,000-40,000 admis- 
sions (64,000 ceiling); 

• Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union: 15,000 admissions (15,000 
ceiling); 

• Latin America and the Caribbean: 
600-800 admissions (2,000 ceiling); and 

• Near East and South Asia: 5,500 
admissions (6,000 ceiling). 

As can be seen, Indochinese admis- 
sions account for the largest part of the 
reductions below the ceiling. To some 
extent, this results from the expansion 
of our English language training and 
cultural orientation programs. At the 
end of FY 1983, there will be 13,000 In- 
dochinese undergoing or completing 4-6 
months of training in the refugee proc- 
essing centers and another 2,000-3,000 
waiting to be placed in classes. These 



are refugees approved by the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service (IN!) 
in FY 1983 who will enter the United 
States in FY 1984. 

The lower admissions totals in 
Southeast Asia provide for the possible 
release of "re-education" camp prisoner 
from Vietnam, many of whom would u 
doubtedly deserve a high priority for a 
mission to the United States, and for a 
(litinnal Vietnamese-American children 
and their mothers and other immediate 
relatives. Although all of these number 
may not be used in FY 1983. we must 
continue to be prepared to consider 
these groups for admission in future 
years. 

This has been a year in which we 
have been able to "manage down" our 
admissions program, in that we have 
taken advantage of the reduced numbe 
to achieve improvements in the way 
refugees are processed overseas and in 
their reception and placement in the 
United States, in the following areas: 

• Steps to regularize the flow of 
refugees from overseas and to provide 
more information on arriving refugees 
to voluntary agencies and state refuge< 
coordinators; 

• Improvements in the medical dia 
nosis and treatment of refugees before 
they enter the United States; 

• Expansion of English-as-a-Secon 
Language/Cultural Orientation 
(ESL/CO) overseas programs; 

• Improvements in the reception 
and placement program and in our moi 
toring of the voluntary agencies; and 

• Actions to implement the Refugt 
Assistance amendments of 1982. 

Actions to Regularize the Flow 
of Refugees 

One of the basic responsibilities of the 
Bureau for Refugee Programs, in coon 
nation with the INS, is to determine th 
allocations of admissions numbers and 
schedules for processing refugees 
throughout the year. Our actions on th* 
subject flow directly from the congres- 
sional consultations and the President's 
determination of refugee admissions ce 
ings for each geographic area. 

Once the numbers are set, the 
bureau's Office of Refugee Admissions 
breaks down the regional ceilings by 
quarters and makes suballocations in at 
cordance with the consultations. There 
periodic monitoring to assure that the 
flow is controlled to the most even and 
consistent extent possible, on a monthlj 
as well as quarterly basis, with the aim 



68 



Department of State Bulleth 



REFUGEES 



>f ensuring an orderly flow of refugees 
.hroughout the year. 

Such a smoothing out of the process- 
ng cycle is not always easy to achieve. 
Refugees do not present themselves in 
m orderly flow: by their nature they 
.end to arrive in waves, the result of 
political or other factors beyond their or 
^ur control. Preservation of first asylum 
nd the legal protection of refugees are 
he first priority for the UN High Com- 
nissioner for Refugees, in which our 
.nd other third-country resettlement 
irograms play vital roles. In some cases, 
efugee processing posts are visited only 
t intervals by INS officers. Our in- 
reased emphasis on ESL/CO means 
hat larger groups of refugees will be in 
raining courses with fixed starting and 
nding dates. 

Despite the occasional unavoidable 
bunching" of refugee arrivals, we have 
een able to achieve a substantially 
moother flow, a pattern we expect to 
e able to continue into the future. The 
eriod of ESL/CO training affords time 
>r advance information to reach the 
oluntary agencies and state refugee 
Dordinators and makes possible a more 
rderly placement of refugees to reduce 
Dncentrations in areas of high impact. 

mprovements in Medical 
■iagnosis and Treatment 

11 refugees who are being considered 
>r admissions to the United States 
iust meet the medical grounds of 
igibility as provided in the Immigration 
id Nationality Act. No refugee is ad- 
itted who has a dangerous, contagious 
sease. (Waivers are granted for special 

i imanitarian reasons, such as a need 
ir treatment at a U.S. hospital.) Effec- 
ve December 1, 1982, the following ad- 

I tional steps were instituted in the 
agnosis and medical treatment of Indo- 
linese refugees: 

• All Indochinese refugees from age 
vo upward receive X-ray examinations; 

• All Indochinese refugees who have 
stive, noninfectious tuberculosis, must 

! implete a 6-month regimen of drugs 
•ior to entry into the United States, 
his 6-month treatment is sufficient to 
implete TB treatment prior to entry. If 
eded, such treatment and other medi- 
il care are provided at the refugee 
•ocessing centers in conjunction with 
SL/CO training; and 

• Pregnant women and unaccom- 
inied minors destined for foster homes 

the United States are given a hepa- 



titis B vaccine prior to entry if the 
medical examination reveals the pres- 
ence of the hepatitis B antigen in their 
system. 

Plans are underway to provide bet- 
ter dental treatment for Indochinese 
refugees prior to their entry into the 
United States and to provide eye-care 
and glasses, where needed. The Depart- 
ment hopes that in the coming year 
similar improvements in the medical 
treatment of refugees from other areas 
of the world will be implemented. 

ESL/CO 

Within the limits of current capacity, all 
Indochinese refugees who are potential 
wage earners between the ages of 16 
and 55 are required to participate in 
ESL/CO training as a condition of re- 
settlement. Each student receives a 
minimum of 14 weeks of instruction, 
which includes 216 hours of English 
language training and 100 hours of 
cultural orientation. An additional 6 
weeks is provided for beginning 
students. 

Approximately 84%-88% of all age- 
eligible refugees from Indochina will 
receive such training during this fiscal 
year. Some 20,000 students will be 
graduated from these programs by the 
end of September 1983. We have also 
established ESL/CO programs for Ethio- 
pian refugees in the Sudan and cultural 
orientation for East European refugees 
in Europe. 

Last year, the Bureau for Refugee 
Programs contracted with an indepen- 
dent research corporation to study the 
impact of overseas training on domestic 
resettlement. The preliminary report, 
which resulted from visits to the over- 
seas training sites, confirms the results 
of entry and exit tests conducted in all 
camps by the Center for Applied 
Linguistics in cooperation with the 
Educational Testing Service, which 
clearly show that students at all levels 
are making significant progress in both 
English language skills and cultural 
orientation. 

The second phase of the independent 
tracking study, which will compare the 
resettlement experience of trained and 
untrained refugees, is not yet complete. 
We do, however, have preliminary data 
which indicate that trained refugees 
enter the United States better able to 
cope successfully with American society 
than those who did not participate in 
training. This is particularly encouraging 
since the untrained refugees tested thus 



far include many refugees who had 
studied English for some years before 
entering this country. Preliminary data 
also point to positive evaluations of 
ESL/CO-trained refugees by service pro- 
viders and voluntary agencies. 

A final report on the domestic track- 
ing study will be made available to the 
Congress as soon as it is completed. 

Reception and Placement Programs 
and Voluntary Agency Monitoring 

In the spring of 1982, the bureau estab- 
lished the Office of Reception and Place- 
ment. Its responsibilities include manag- 
ing the reception and placement cooper- 
ative agreements, monitoring the volun- 
tary agencies' activities under the terms 
of these agreements, serving as liaison 
with the domestic community, and 
assisting in the coordination of the inter- 
national and domestic aspects of the pro- 
gram. 

The first major assignment of that 
office was to establish a systematic 
monitoring program of the voluntary 
agencies. To date, five onsite reviews 
have taken place in areas of heavy 
refugee resettlement— Arlington, 
Boston, Seattle, Los Angeles, and New 
York. A team of two officers has just 
returned from the two states which par- 
ticipate in reception and placement- 
Iowa and Idaho— and we are scheduling 
a monitoring trip to Texas in late July. 
We have also carried out followup 
reviews in three areas. 

Once a review is completed— these 
customarily take about 2 full weeks per 
site— we brief the voluntary agencies on 
our observations and recommended ac- 
tions. We have found a number of 
positive things going on through the 
agencies, particularly the continuing con- 
tribution of the private sector to reset- 
tlement. This does not necessarily trans- 
late into a church or American family 
serving as a sponsor for each incoming 
refugee. Improving the quality of spon- 
sorship is an area which deserves and 
will receive our attention in the weeks 
ahead. 

Private contributions are, nonethe- 
less, significant and take many forms: 
donation of lawyers' time to advise 
refugees; volunteers teaching English as 
a second language; someone devoting a 
Saturday morning to teaching refugees 
to drive; donations of money, clothing, 
food; American friends helping out with- 
out assuming full sponsorship; and so 
on. We believe that the American public 



ugust 1983 



69 



SOUTH ASIA 



does still give of itself to this program 
and that a reserve of good will is there 
for the long run. 

We have also found that many of the 
voluntary agencies have unilaterally im- 
proved their management practices. 
Some have developed strong monitoring 
programs by their headquarters and by 
the regional' offices of their local af- 
filiates, some have established systems 
to communicate more effectively with 
their affiliates, and some have instituted 
better recordkeeping practices, for ex- 
ample. 

Clearly, however, there are areas 
which need improvement. Problem areas 
which emerged at various affiliates con- 
cerned the documentation of services 
rendered to refugees, lack of contact 
and assistance to refugees for the full 
90-day period, service provision 
stretched thin because of reduced staff 
due to fewer new arrivals, lack of conti- 
nuing aggressive posture toward undue 
welfare usage, and placement of 
refugees in areas too far from an office 
to ensure proper supervision of services. 

Our responses to these and other 
problems have taken several forms. 
Where a problem could be dealt with at 
the local or national agency level, we 
have requested corrective actions and 
conducted return visits to determine if 
the appropriate changes have been 
made. Where a problem is broader and 
needs to be more clearly formulated in 
policy, we have dealt with it through our 
contractual documents— the agency pro- 
posals and the cooperative agreement. 

In 1983, the bureau, for the first 
time, requested written proposals from 
the voluntary agencies, pursuant to pro- 
visions of the Refugee Act of 1980. We 
indicated that each proposal should in- 
clude information on, among other 
things, the voluntary agency's organiza- 
tional network, its sponsorship arrange- 
ments, how it attempts to reduce 
reliance on welfare, how it assures that 
core services are provided, the extent of 
its consultation and cooperation with 
state and local governments, and its 
ability to tap the private sector. 

In 1983, the bureau also extensively 
modified the cooperative agreement. The 
changes were based on observations 
from the monitoring discussed earlier, 
the Refugee Assistance amendments of 
1982, comments from the voluntary 
agencies, and suggestions from the 
Department of Health and Human Serv- 
ices and state refugee coordinators. The 
new agreement, effective May 1, 1983, 
further emphasizes our commitment to 



refugee self-sufficiency, early employ- 
ment, and case management; includes 
language on placement policy; requires 
close cooperation with welfare depart- 
ments; and strengthens and clarifies the 
language relating to refugee health. The 
proposals and the cooperative agree- 
ment together serve as the basis for our 
relationship with the agencies, whereas 
in the past, the agreement alone served 
this purpose. 

Refugee Assistance Amendments 

The Refugee Assistance amendments of 
1982 contained a number of areas with 
implications for our reception and place- 
ment program. Through the new co- 
operative agreement and the proposal 
process, we have responded to the re- 
quirements relating to employment, 
domestic consultations, placement policy, 
expenditure of funds, contact with 
welfare offices, and medical care for 
newly arrived refugees. 

The amendments require that 
employable refugees be placed in jobs as 
soon as possible after their arrival in the 
United States. We asked each agency 
for a description of its policy toward 
refugee employment and self-sufficiency, 
the practices employed in support of the 
policy, and demonstrated results. Our 



proposal review also covered the volun 
tary agency's policy toward welfare d* 
pendence as translated into practice. 1 
included language in the cooperative 
agreement relating to early employme 
and welfare dependency and will 
monitor for compliance in these centr; 
areas. 

To implement the consultation pre 
sion of the amendments, specifically ti 
local voluntary agency activities shoul 
be conducted in close cooperation and 
advance consultation with state and lc 
governments, we have asked each age 
cy for its plans for consultation and 
coordination with other actors in reset 
tlement and have included requiremen 
on this subject in the cooperative agre 
ment. We also asked national voluntai 
agencies to have their local affiliates 
discuss the proposals and the 
cooperative agreement with interestec 
state and local government officials, 
especially state refugee coordinators, 
part of their "consultation activities," 
and required each voluntary agency tc 
develop on a yearly basis a national 
overview and state-by-state descriptio 
of its activities under reception and 
placement. 

We have taken several actions to 
respond to the placement provisions o 
the amendments. We have included 



Recent Soviet Actions in Afghanistan 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAY 20, 1983 1 

Numerous reliable reports continue to 
reach us from refugee and other sources 
of extremely heavy, brutal, and pro- 
longed Soviet and Soviet-mandated 
bombing of civilian areas within 
Afghanistan in recent weeks, especially 
of areas around Herat, the country's 
third largest city, and north and west of 
Kabul. 

These reports leave no room of 
doubt that casualties among the civilian 
population have been extremely heavy. 
It's not possible to measure precisely the 
extent of those casualties, but they cer- 
tainly number many hundreds and are 
probably in the thousands. 

Such a massive and ruthless assault 
on people who are, for the most part, 
without any means of defending them- 
selves is intolerable by any standard of 
civilized behavior. It would appear that 
the Soviet Union believes that the world 
is either unaware of or no longer cares 



about what it is doing in Afghanistan 
and that in its desperation to subdue t 
spirit of the vast majority of Afghans 
who yearn for their nation's freedom, 
the Soviet Union is willing to employ 
any means, no matter how brutal. 

The United States cannot stand 
silently by and witness this slaughter. 
The Soviet Union is aware of our stro 
concern. We call on it once more to 
desist from its heartless assault on a 
courageous and independent people ar 
to seek urgently a solution to the crisii 
in Afghanistan which preserves humai 
life and responds to the principles out- 
lined in four successive resolutions by 
the UN General Assembly. 

These call for the complete with- 
drawal of Soviet forces, self- 
determination for the Afghan people, ; 
independent and nonaligned Afghani- 
stan, and the return of the refugees in 
safety and with honor. 



'Read to news correspondents l>y Depa 
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



70 



Department of State Bullet 



UNITED NATIONS 



inguage in the cooperative agreement 
pecifying that refugees be assigned geo- 
raphically in accordance with the place- 
lent policy and that voluntary agencies 
articipate in meetings with state and 
>cal governments to plan and coor- 
inate the appropriate placement of 
efugees in advance of their arrival. By 
lUgust, we will expand the monthly 
ity/state report sent to state refugee 
aordinators to include a refugee's 
ame, age, sex, country of birth, occupa- 
onal code, level of English training, 
ponsoring organization, placement 
Dde, and estimated date of arrival. This 
iformation will be provided immediately 
pon a sponsorship being assured and in 
)me cases will be available several 
lonths before a refugee's arrival. 

Regarding the requirement that 
inds provided to the voluntary agencies 
my only be obligated or expended dur- 
ig the fiscal year in which they are pro- 
ded, since October 1982 our coopera- 
ve agreement has included language to 
ie effect that funds shall be expended 
) later than 12 months following the 
id of the fiscal year in which they are 
inded, unless approved in writing by 
e bureau. The agreement further 
ipulates that unexpended funds re- 
aining at the end of the specified 
:riod shall be returned to the bureau 
r deposit in the U.S. Treasury. 

To respond to the provisions relating 
contact between the voluntary agen- 
ts and welfare offices, the new 
operative agreement stipulates that 
•e voluntary agencies provide notice to 
e appropriate county or other local 
slfare office at the time the agency 
■comes aware that a refugee has been 
fered employment, and inform the 
fugee that such notice has been pro- 
ded. We also have specified that volun- 
ry agencies must respond to contacts 
Dm a state or state agency relating to 
refugee's application for and receipt of 
sh or medical assistance. 

Finally, to implement the provision 
lating to medical care for a refugee 
th a condition affecting public health, 
iter consulting with the Department of 
alth and Human Services, extensive 
anges regarding health have been 
ded to the cooperative agreement. For 
fugees with conditions affecting public 
alth, the voluntary agency is required 
ensure that refugees report to the of- 
:ial public health agency within 7 days 
arrival. 



Conclusion 

In conclusion, I join with my colleagues 
in expressing our support for the recom- 
mended extension of the Refugee Act of 
1980. We believe it has worked in a 
practical and satisfactory manner. We 
will continue to consult with this com- 
mittee on our application of the refugee 
definition and believe that any desired 
modifications in our admissions or reset- 
tlement practices can be accommodated 
within the framework of this important 
and now time-tested legislation. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 Sec. 212(aX42) of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act, as amended 1980: 

The term 'refugee' means (A) any person 
who is outside any country of such per- 



Nicaragua 



Following are statements by Am- 
bassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Per- 
manent Representative to the United Na- 
tions, in the U.N. Security Council on 
May 9, 16, and 18, 1983, and the text of a 
resolution adopted on May 19. 



STATEMENT, 
MAY 9, 1983 1 

It is an extraordinary experience to hear 
the representative of Nicaragua's harsh 
dictatorship invoke the principle of non- 
intervention in internal affairs, the 
Charter of the United Nations and other 
international laws, and accuse the 
United States of invasion. It is an extra- 
ordinary experience to hear the repre- 
sentative of Nicaragua's harsh dictator- 
ship speak of the rule of law, talk about 
American public opinion polls, quote 
American media and even American 
elected officials. I am especially struck 
by the invocation of the principle of non- 
intervention by Nicaragua's dictators. 
Since they have come to power, they 
have been busy fomenting war in the 
region, destroying the peace and the 
possibility of progress in El Salvador 
and Honduras and other neighboring 
states, forcing militarization on the 
region. 



son's nationality or, in the case of a per- 
son having no nationality, is outside any 
country in which such person last 
habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion, or (B) in 
such special circumstances as the Presi- 
dent after appropriate consultation (as 
defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may 
specify, any person who is within the 
country of such person's nationality or, in 
the case of a person having no nationali- 
ty, within the country in which such per- 
son is habitually residing, and who is 
persecuted or who has a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a par- 
ticular social group, or political opinion. 
The term 'refugee does not include any 
person who ordered, incited, assisted, or 
otherwise participated in the persecution 
of any person on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a par- 
ticular social group, or political opinion. ■ 



The United States does not invade 
small countries on its borders. We do 
not have 100,000 occupation troops in 
any country in the world, least of all on 
our borders. Our neighbors need have no 
such concerns. I thought, however, since 
the representative of Nicaragua has 
relied so heavily on American media this 
morning in his presentation to the Coun- 
cil, the record ought to be set straight. I 
thought I might have recourse as well to 
some American media concerning events 
in Central America and the respect 
which the Government of Nicaragua 
habitually shows to the principle of non- 
intervention in the affairs of its neigh- 
bors. 

The current Time magazine, for ex- 
ample, has a very interesting article, 
which I recommend to the members of 
the Council. It is entitled, "How the 
Salvadoran Rebels Order Outside Help 
for Their Revolution." It begins by say- 
ing "... the building of a Nicaraguan 
arms link to El Salvador began almost 
as soon as the victorious revolutionaries 
took power in the Nicaraguan capital of 
Managua in July 1979." It has maps with 
arrows which describe supply 
routes — they're not quite as good as our 
government maps, but they're not bad. 
They are good enough so that the 
members of the Council can get a 
general impression about the regular 
flow of arms from Nicaragua through 
Honduras into El Salvador. 

The article itself describes various 



jgust 1983 



71 



UNITED NATIONS 



arms infiltration routes. One, for exam- 
ple, it says ". . . hugged the Honduran 
Pacific coast between Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, then angled into the remote 
areas of El Salvador where Marxist 
rebels hold almost undisputed sway. 
U.S. analysts estimate that 15 to 20 
such land routes exist across Honduras." 
One wonders about Honduras' right to 
be free of infiltration by its neighbors. 
The article goes on to say: "Other 
military shipments come in by air and 
sea. Sandinista smugglers have been 
known to move supplies directly across 
the 20-mile-wide Gulf of Fonseca. When 
the going is safe, the Nicaraguans make 
nighttime forays from the Pacific gulf 
port of Potosi aboard small fishing 
boats, equipped with false bottoms, or 
50-foot frame canoes. That practice has 
now been curtailed because of the 
patrols of U.S. electronic surveillance 
ships in the area and the greater vigi- 
lance of the Salvadoran and Honduran 
navies." One can readily understand why 
neighbors engaging in such practices 
would not want any electronic 
surveillance in their region. 

The article continues: "At night, the 
Jiquilisco region is also known as a 
favorite destination of arms-laden heli- 
copters [from Nicaragua] and light fixed- 
wing aircraft. ... An important alter- 
native air route for the smugglers [from 
Nicaragua] is from the former British 
colony of Belize into Guatemala. After 
that, the rebels and their supplies filter 
south into Salvadoran rebel strong- 
holds." Apparently the Government of 
Nicaragua has a bit of a problem 
respecting the right of the Government 
of Guatemala to be free of infiltration 
across its borders as well. 

The article is very detailed. It sums 
up its point about the extent and detail 
of the supply route between Nicaragua 
and El Salvador with a line which it also 
uses for its title: "Like a Sears, Roebuck 
Catalogue." It says that rebels in El 
Salvador can order from Nicaragua 
whatever they need. One unit may say I 
need candles, boots, batteries, diarrhea 
medicine, bullets, and mortar rounds. If 
they don't get what they want, they 
complain. The fact that they complain 
shows they have a pipeline they think 
they can depend on. 

The consequences, of course, of this 
gross violation of the principle of non- 
intervention in the life of neighboring 
states by the Government of Nicaragua 
is the destruction of peace in the region. 



It is especially tragic for the society of 
El Salvador where the economy has 
been deliberately targeted and 
deliberately destroyed. 

I pointed out not long ago in a 
discussion of this same issue that some 
34 bridges and 145 electrical transmis- 
sion towers had been destroyed in El 
Salvador last year, that some 18,000 
Salvadorans had been put out of work 
by this destruction. The President of the 
United States spoke 2 weeks ago to the 
Congress and pointed out in his speech, 
and I quote: "Tonight in El Salvador — 
because of ruthless guerrilla attacks — 
much of the fertile land cannot be 
cultivated; less than half the rolling 
stock of the railways remains opera- 
tional; bridges, water facilities, tele- 
phone and electric systems have been 
destroyed and damaged. In one 22- 
month period, there were 5,000 inter- 
ruptions of electrical power; one region 
was without electricity for a third of a 
year." Thus the consequences for one of 
Nicaragua's neighbors of Nicaragua's re- 
spect for the principle of noninterven- 
tion. 

The distinguished representative of 
the Government of Nicaragua has re- 
ferred repeatedly to the debate now 
underway in the United States, among 
Americans, about what American policy 
should be with regard to the area. He is 
quite right, of course. There is a debate. 
And the debate is on the question of 
whether the United States should help 
the people of El Salvador and the people 
of Nicaragua to defeat the effort to im- 
pose upon them totalitarian dictator- 
ships with the assistance and by means 
of arms filtered to them by a ruthless, 
international terrorist. There is a debate 
in the United States about whether the 
United States should leave small coun- 
tries powerless, small peoples helpless, 
without defense against conquest by 
violent minorities trained and armed by 
remote dictators. Such a debate is 
underway in the United States. It is not 
complete, and we will continue that 
debate in our own way. We will continue 
it not by the method of lies but by the 
method of democracy. 

The method of democracy relies on 
discussion. We will make our decision at 
the end of our debate, and we will make 
that decision by democratic means. We 
very much wish that the Government of 
Nicaragua would join us in such a demo- 
cratic decision process. We very much 
wish that there could be debate in 
Nicaragua about the public policies of 



that government. We very much wish 
that the people of Nicaragua, its jour- I 
nalists, its political leaders were free tl 
make their arguments in public arenasl 
to discuss the question before that perl 
pie, to criticize their government, to rij 
in legislative arenas and state their 
criticisms freely. We wish that the peel 
pie of Nicaragua had the opportunity tl 
be polled by honest and objective publij 
opinion organizations. We wish that trl 
people of Nicaragua had the opportunil 
to settle their discussions and decision I 
and debates by voting. We in the Unit I 
States will live by the results of our 
democratic processes. We can wish 
nothing better for the people of 
Nicaragua than that they be given a 
comparable opportunity. 

The relationship between the 
Government of Nicaragua and its peor. 
is, of course, at the heart of much of t' 
discussion here. What is the nature of 
this problem? What is the nature of 
what the Nicaraguan representative 
calls an "American invasion"? Needless 
to say, there is no American invasion ( 
Nicaragua. It is a fact that there is 
fighting in Nicaragua. It is a fact that 
there is very widespread unhappiness, 
indeed misery, in Nicaragua. It is a fai 
that the Government of Nicaragua has 
problem. The nature of that problem 
of course, not international. The natur 
of that problem is national. Nicaragua 
problem is with Nicaraguans. In Nicar 
agua today, Nicaraguans fight other 
Nicaraguans for the control of their 
country's destiny. 

I thought since the representative 
Nicaragua had brought to the attentio 
of the Council so many items from the 
American press, I might impose on th< 
Council a second item from yesterday': 
Washington Post which was referred t 
by the representative of Nicaragua. 
(Demonstrating the advantages of free 
discussion, by the way, you can find a 
lot of different kinds of evidence in oui 
newspapers.) The item that I would lik | 
to bring to the attention of the Council 
is a column by Jack Anderson, who is ; 
well-known liberal columnist in the 
United States, not a reliable supporter 
of the Administration that currently 
governs the United States. 

The column is called "A Popular 
Force," and I would like to read from i 
briefly. 

While Congress debates the Reagan ad- 
ministration's clandestine operations in 
Nicaragua, the American public is beset by 
conflicting information about exactly what i 
going on there. . . . 



72 



Department of State Bulleti 



UNITED NATIONS 



To get some reliable, firsthand answers 

these crucial questions, I sent my 
associate, Jon Lee Anderson, to the troubled 
region. He has just returned from a week- 
Jong foray into northern Nicaragua with anti- 
Sandinista guerrillas. They belong to the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN), the 
Snajor group of . . . insurgents. 

He traveled with a well-armed, 50-mem- 
ler guerrilla band led by a commander whose 
Bm de guerre is El Gorrion — The Sparrow. 
fheir base camp was deep in the rugged 

Inountains of Nicaragua's Nueva Segovia 
jrovince, near the Honduran border. 

It quickly became obvious that the guer- 
illas had the support of the populace. They 
|/ere fed and protected by local peasants at 
[very step. Traveling on foot, and only by 
light to avoid detection by government 
Iroops, the guerrillas spent the days hiding in 
hafe houses," often within shouting distance 
If government-held towns. If the peasants 
lad wanted to betray them, it would have 
leen a simple matter to tip off the Sandinista 
liilitia to their hiding places. 

The peasants also provided The Sparrow 
rith up-to-the-minute intelligence on the 
[■hereabouts, movement and strength of the 
Jandinista forces. 

The anti-Sandinista guerrillas' military 
Irowess is not so clear-cut. My associate 
l.scovered this to his dismay when he accom- 

1 inied The Sparrow's band on a planned pre- 
liwn ambush of government troop carriers 

I ong a country road. 

. . . the guerrillas were themselves sur- 
mised by sniper fire from hilltop positions 
I >ove them and were forced to pull out. The 
1 'treat was carried out skillfully, however, 
1 id two nights later the guerrillas avenged 
| eir defeat with an attack on the hilltop 

lipers' nest. The FDN commandos treated 
l e snipers to a half-hour barrage of rockets, 
•enades and machine-gun fire, before re- 
rning satisfied to their base camp. 

Most of the FDN guerrillas were local 
•asants, not Somoeista exiles. But there 
1 ere also former National Guardsmen, and 
i ey tend to be in positions of command be- 
use of their military experience. 
Still, the core of The Sparrow's group 
i nsisted of locally recruited peasants. In 

ct, on my associate's last day with the rebel 
I .nd, he witnessed the arrival of 50 new 
\ cruits all of them peasants from the neigh- 
ring province of Madriz. 

One of the new recruits was a defecting 
indinista army instructor. There were other 
i -Sandinistas in the guerrilla troop. One was 
inia, a star graduate of the Sandinista's 
■st-revolution literacy campaign. . . . Dunia 
h d so well she was rewarded with a junket to 
li iba. She is now the camp medic for The 
larrow's band. 

The rebels and their noncombatant col- 
sorators cited a variety of reasons for their 
itsenchantment with the Sandinistas: en- 
rced food rationing, expropriation of the 
rmers' markets, enforced organization of 
■asant co-ops, the Sandinistas' anti-religious 
r. •licies and harassment of the Catholic 
lurch . 



The Sandinistas themselves indirectly aid 
ed the guerrillas' recruitment of at least a 
dozen of the new arrivals. They said they had 
been under increasing pressure to join the 
militia. Forced to take sides, they chose the 
"contras." 

Still, it was not an easy choice for many. 
They expressed genuine anguish at being 
forced— one way or another— to fight against 
fellow Nicaraguans. 

"We don't want to fight our Nicaraguan 
brothers," they said. The ones they're after 
are the Sandinista leaders and their Cuban, 
East German, Bulgarian and other foreign 
advisers. 

That's not the end of the column; 
there are two paragraphs left for 
anyone who is interested. 

I would like to reiterate to the Coun- 
cil that the U.S. Government has repeat- 
edly, throughout the brief history of the 
Sandinista dictatorship, sought to estab- 
lish constructive relations with that 
government and, during the period of its 
destabilization of the area, sought to 
work with others in the area to achieve 
regional peace. 

In August 1981, on a special mission 
to Managua, Assistant Secretary of 
State Thomas Enders presented a five- 
point peace plan to the Sandinistas to 
reduce regional tensions. Based on the 
termination of Nicaraguan support for 
guerrilla groups, the plan called for a 
U.S. pledge to enforce strictly laws 
governing exiles' activities in U.S. ter- 
ritory, reaffirmation of nonintervention 
and noninterference by all parties, limits 
on arms and military forces, resumption 
of U.S. economic assistance to Nica- 
ragua which had been very substantial, 
and a U.S. -Nicaraguan cultural ex- 
change program. The Sandinista govern- 
ment made no substantive response. 

On April 19, 1982, U.S. Ambassador 
Anthony Quainton delivered an eight- 
point peace proposal to the Sandinistas 
that called for an end to Nicaraguan 
support for guerrillas in neighboring 
countries. It called for limits on arms 
and foreign military advisers, a joint 
pledge of noninterference and noninter- 
vention, arms limit verification 
measures, resumption of U.S. economic 
assistance, implementation of cultural 
exchange programs, and the reaffirma- 
tion of Sandinista commitments to 
pluralism, free elections, and a mixed 
economy. The Sandinistas made a non- 
substantive response that did not even 
address the U.S. plan. They presented 
only rhetorical counterproposals. 

On October 19, 1982, eight regional 
democracies, including the United 
States, set forth the essential conditions 



for peace in Central America, again in- 
cluding verifiable limits on arms and 
foreign military advisers, national recon- 
ciliation through the democratic process, 
a halt to support for insurgent groups, 
mutual respect for pledges of noninter- 
vention, and respect for basic human 
rights. The countries asked Costa Rica 
to discuss these conditions with Nica- 
ragua. That, too, came to nought. 

In addition, the Sandinistas have re- 
jected other proposals put forth by their 
neighbors. As late as 1983, they refused 
to meet with Costa Ricans, Hondurans, 
Salvadorans, and Guatemalans in multi- 
lateral discussions supported by the Con- 
tadora group [Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, Venezuela], but you've already 
heard about this. 

The Sandinista insistence on 
bilateral rather than multilateral talks 
underlines its desire to resolve its exter- 
nal problems while avoiding the issue of 
its export of revolution, war, and misery 
to its neighbors. The record speaks for 
itself. I should just like to close these 
remarks by reminding members of the 
Council that in his speech to the joint 
session of the U.S. Congress, President 
Reagan asserted: "To support these 
diplomatic goals [in the region], I offer 
these assurances," and I should like to 
offer these assurances again to the 
Council on behalf of the Government of 
the United States: 

• The United States will support any 
agreement among Central American coun- 
tries for the withdrawal — under fully veri- 
fiable and reciprocal conditions — of all 
foreign military and security advisers and 
troops. 

• We want to help opposition groups join 
the political process in all countries and com- 
pete by ballots instead of bullets. 

• We will support any verifiable, recipro- 
cal agreement among Central American coun- 
tries on the renunciation of support for in- 
surgencies on neighbors' territory. 

• And, finally, we desire to help Central 
America end its costly arms race and will 
support any verifiable, reciprocal agreements 
on the nonimportation of offensive weapons. 

Finally, I would like to say to 
members of the Council that every na- 
tion in the United Nations — especially 
small nations, especially nations with 
powerful neighbors — should ponder 
carefully this case, should think well 
about what is being demanded once 
again of this Council by the Government 
of Nicaragua. The Government of Nica- 
ragua has once again come to us 
demanding of the United Nations inter- 
national protection while it destabilizes 
its neighbors. It is claiming that a people 



jgust 1983 



73 



UNITED NATIONS 



repressed by foreign arms of a super- 
power has no right to help against that 
repression. That is a principle that I 
should suppose every member of the 
United Nations which is, in fact, com- 
mitted to principles of national inde- 
pendence, self-determination, and non- 
intervention would do well to think hard 
about. 



STATEMENT, 
MAY 16, 1983 2 

The hour being late, I will try to be very 
brief. I would simply note that one hears 
here a very great deal of falsification of 
history and of current events. 

The first point that I would like to 
make concerning these most recent falsi- 
fications is simply that the United States 
is neither a champion of Central Ameri- 
can cooperation nor an opponent of Cen- 
tral American cooperation. If the coun- 
tries of the region desire, in fact, to 
meet together to try to work out solu- 
tions to their problems, the United 
States poses no obstacles to that. No 
more do we pose obstacles to the desire 
of, shall we say, Libya and Chad to try 
to find solutions to their problems within 
the framework of the OAU [Organiza- 
tion of African Unity] or a great many 
nations of this United Nations who have 
come before this body and preferred, in 
fact, to find regional solutions. The 
United States neither champions that 
nor opposes it. We believe, in general, in 
the right and the practicality of nations 
most immediately involved in conflicts 
seeking to work out solutions to their 
problems. 

Second, the United States has not 
invaded Nicaragua and does not intend 
to do so. The most that the United 
States has been reproached for or ac- 
cused of by serious people is providing 
arms and advice to Nicaraguans fighting 
for their right to national self- 
determination. 

Third, concerning one more falsifica- 
tion, the question of who has done what 
with regard to which meeting at what 
past time. The past is always less impor- 
tant than the present. The principles 
that are presumably at stake here are 
relatively clear, I think. The Central 
American democratic community, to 
which the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister 
objects, issued a declaration — the 
declaration of San Jose — which asserted 
some principles, many of which have 
also been identified by the Contadora 
group as principal concerns in the area. 



Those include an end to the importation 
of all arms from outside the area into 
the area, with verification of that; an 
end to the importation of foreign ad- 
visers; and the end of the use of foreign 
advisers throughout the area and 
verification of that. 

In addition to that, there has been 
recent reaffirmation in the most current 
declaration of Contadora of some other 
principles which were affirmed at San 
Jose. Those include, and I'm reading 
now from the U.N. unofficial translation 
of the Contadora communication: "Self- 
determination and non-intervention in 
the affairs of other States; the obligation 
not to allow the use of territory of one 
State for acts of aggression against 
another; the peaceful settlement of 
disputes; the prohibition of the use of 
force to resolve conflict." 

To the best of my knowledge, the 
basic problem which confronts the 
region is that one state in the region — 
namely Nicaragua — is precisely unwill- 
ing to affirm respect for the territorial 
integrity of other states, is unwilling to 
affirm its obligation not to allow its ter- 
ritory to be used for acts of aggression 
against another. It still claims for itself 
unique enjoyment of these rights. I 
believe that the Security Council should 
see very clearly that the United 
States — and I suspect all the other 
states involved in the Contadora proc- 
ess, except perhaps Nicaragua — is will- 
ing in very short order to agree to 
respect for self-determination and non- 
intervention in the affairs of other 
states; the obligation not to allow the 
territory of one state for acts of aggres- 
sion against another; the peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes; the prohibition of the 
threat of the use of force to resolve con- 
flicts. 

There has been a reference to the 
dreams of the people of Central 
America. The people of Nicaragua have 
dreams too, and those dreams have been 
very cruelly betrayed. I believe that if 
the Government of Nicaragua would 
simply keep the promises it has solemnly 
made to its own people, which promises 
we have frequently reviewed here — re- 
spect for human rights, for democratic 
processes — and would be willing to live 
in peace with its neighbors, if there 
were a will to do those things and to 
respect the principles of the Charter, 
then the precise format in which those 
questions were discussed and decided 
would turn out to be quite unimportant. 



STATEMENT, 
MAY 18, 1983 3 

I would just like to reply to certain of 
the assertions made by the distinguish' 
representative of the Soviet Union. I 
should like to note first the stunning 
cynicism of his remarks. It is, indeed, 
stunningly cynical for the representati' 
of the Soviet Union, whose country 
undertook to flood the region of Centr 
America with arms, heavy weapons 
which had never been seen in the regie 
and military advisers of an extraor- 
dinary assortment who have in commo 
a particular relationship with his own 
country — a relationship which is char- 
acterized by the hegemony of the Sovii 
Union vis-a-vis the various client state 
Those are the people who have intro- 
duced heavy weapons into Central 
America. Those are the people who ha 
undermined economic progress and 
development in the region which was, 
fact, proceeding at quite a steady rate 
before the deliberate efforts at 
militarization and destabilization of th( 
region. 

The suggestion was also made by 
the distinguished delegate of the Sovie 
Union that the United States sought b 
determine the internal life of the 
Government of Nicaragua and should, 
fact, be indifferent — should bug off — 
from any concern about the organizati 
of its politics or economics. I should ju 
like to say that the United States does 
not attempt to influence in inappropri; 
ways the organization of any country's 
economic system. We hope that all coi 
tries in the world will organize their 
economic systems in such a fashion th 
they will be productive of goods and f< 
the well-being of their people. But tha 
we regard wholly as their decision. W' 
also regard the form of government o: 
other countries as their decision. 

We cannot, however, be indifferen 
to gross violations of human rights by 
other governments nor does the Chart 
of the United Nations suggest that we 
should do so. The Charter of the Unit* 
Nations, in fact, identifies respect for 
human freedom and other human righ 
as central concerns of this organizatioi 
and of all member states of this 
organization. 

The United States also belongs to 
some other organizations and takes 
cognizance of obligations which are coi 
tracted vis-a-vis other organizations. V 
have noted here, for example, that the 
Government of Nicaragua undertook 
some solemn commitments to the 
Organization of American States con! 



74 



Department of State Bullet 



UNITED NATIONS 



;erning the kind of government it would 
)rganize were it, in fact, to become the 
overnment of Nicaragua. It undertook 
;ommitments to organize democratic in- 
ititutions, provide its people with demo- 
:ratic institutions in respect of their 
luman rights and rule of law — regular, 
ivil rule of law, quite specifically. We 
lave suggested that those commitments 
lave not been fulfilled. And since the 
■uling clique of Nicaragua secured the 
issistance of the Organization of 
American States in its rise to power on 
he basis of those commitments, it raises 
.ome question about the basis of their 
government. 

The representative of the Soviet 
Jnion also referred to the bloody crimes 
'f the United States, I think was his 
ihrase. The phrase reminded me of an 
:em which I had read yesterday in a 
]uropean newspaper concerning the 
eath of some 3,000 Afghan civilians 
ist week due to bombing of civilian 
opulations by the nearly 150,000 Soviet 
ccupation troops of that beleaguered 
ountry. The article that I read also 
oticed that the UN Security Council 
or any other body of the United Na- 
ons had taken any note of this mass 
laughter of Afghans. I would like, while 
'e are talking about bloody crimes, to 
ake formal note of the suffering of the 
fghan people. 

I would finally just like to say that it 
as been suggested by the Soviet repre- 
>ntative and some others that they sup- 
ort regional efforts to achieve peace, 
nd I would emphasize that that is, of 
>urse, precisely what we all support. If 
ley support regional efforts to achieve 
eace, then there is unanimity because 
;rtainly the rest of us support regional 
? forts to achieve peace. The United 
tates, for its part, stands ready at any 
me to support any agreements to end 
le importation of all arms and foreign 
ilitary advisers into the region — any 
jreement to do so which is verifiable — 
id to support any agreement that pro- 
des for the mutual respect of borders 
/ all countries in the region and the 
)ninterferenee in the affairs of one 
lother and the end to all efforts at 
^stabilization. 



ECURITY COUNCIL 
ESOLUTION 530, 
AY 19, 1983 4 

| ie Security Council, 

Hamng heard the statement of the 
>reign Minister of the Republic of 
I icaragua, 



Having also heard the statements of 
various States Members of the United Na- 
tions in the course of the debate, 

Deeply concerned, on the one hand, at the 
situation prevailing on and inside the north- 
ern border of Nicaragua and, on the other 
hand, at the consequent danger of a military 
confrontation between Honduras and 
Nicaragua, which could further aggravate the 
existing crisis situation in Central America, 

Recalling all the relevant principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, particularly 
the obligation of States to settle their 
disputes exclusively by peaceful means, not 
to resort to the threat or use of force and to 
respect the self-determination of peoples and 
the sovereign independence of all States, 

Noting the widespread desire expressed 
by the States concerned to achieve solutions 
to the differences between them, 

Commending the appeal of the Contadora 
group of countries, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama and Venezuela, in its 12 May 1983 
communique (S/15762) that the deliberations 
of the Council should strengthen the prin- 
ciples of self-determination and non- 
interference in the affairs of other States, the 
obligation not to allow the territory of a 
State to be used for committing acts of ag- 
gression against other States, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force to resolve conflict. 

Considering the broad support expressed 
for the efforts of the Contadora Group to 
achieve solutions to the problems that affect 
Central American countries and to secure a 
stable and lasting peace in the region, 

1 . Reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and 
of all the other countries of the area to live in 
peace and security, free from outside inter- 
ference; 

2. Commends the efforts of the Con- 
tadora group and urges the pursuit of those 
efforts; 

3. Appeals urgently to the interested 
States to co-operate fully with the Contadora 
group, through a frank and constructive 
dialogue, so as to resolve their differences; 

4. Urges the Contadora group to spare 
no effort to find solutions to the problem of 
the region and to keep the Security Council 
informed of the results of these efforts; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to 
keep the Security Council informed of the 
development of the situation and of the 
implementation of the present resolution. 



'USUN press release 28. 
2 USUN press release 35. 
3 USUN press release 36. 
••Adopted unanimously. ■ 



Namibia 

Following are statements made in 
the Security Council by A mbassador 
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, on 
May 25, 1983, and Ambassador Charles 
M. Lichenstein, U.S. Alternate Repre- 
sentative, on May 31, as well as the text 
of Security Council Resolution 532 of 
May 31. 



AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, 
MAY 25, 1983 1 

The events of this past weekend in 
Pretoria and Maputo are a bloody 
reminder, if any was needed, of the con- 
sequences of violence and of the very 
real potential that today exists 
throughout southern Africa for the fur- 
ther escalation of that violence. As is all 
too often the case, the victims of these 
most recent tragic events include many 
who were entirely innocent and 
blameless. 

The United States deplores such acts 
of violence, from whatever quarter, 
whether perpetrated in the name of 
change or in opposition to it. Violence 
cannot solve the pressing problems of 
the region. On the contrary, by creating 
new victims, new grievances, and new 
grounds for anger and hatred, such acts 
can only increase the danger of new and 
greater violence in an ever-escalating cy- 
cle. Ultimately, we must count among 
the wounded of these acts all those who 
seek and hope for peaceful change 
through negotiation and dialogue. 

My government, for the past several 
years, has been seeking to assist the 
governments of the region to find 
peaceful ways to address and to resolve 
mutual problems. We have been en- 
couraged by the purposeful high-level 
dialogue between Mozambique and 
South Africa, a dialogue which the 
events of last weekend must not be per- 
mitted to place in jeopardy. We have 
made known to both South Africa and 
Mozambique — and, indeed, to all govern- 
ments of the region — our willingness to 
help. We have stressed our conviction 
that the problem of cross-border 
violence, if allowed to go unresolved, 
will seriously endanger prospects for 
both stability and peaceful change. 

Let it be clearly understood that the 
United States deplores violent cross- 
border activities in southern Africa, in 



ugust 1983 



75 



UNITED NATIONS 



whatever direction and for whatever 
stated goal. Similarly, we categorically 
reaffirm the principle that all states 
have a duty to refrain from tolerating or 
acquiescing in organized activities within 
their territory by guerrillas or dissidents 
planning acts of violence in the territory 
of another state. There can be no double 
standard for southern Africa. Cross- 
border violence cannot be condoned, 
whether it be in the form of a bomb 
placed in a crowded square in Pretoria 
by externally based organizations or of 
the continuing violation of Angola's ter- 
ritorial integrity by South African 
forces. 

The Security Council also bears a 
solemn responsibility to uphold the prin- 
ciples of nonviolence and the settlement 
of disputes by peaceful means. Those 
principles are especially pertinent to the 
issue which this meeting of the Council 
has been convened to consider. 

The United States welcomes the op- 
portunity afforded by this meeting to 
participate in a review of the efforts 
that are being made to bring about the 
independence of Namibia, in accordance 
with decisions previously taken by the 
Council. As all are aware, the United 
Nations, and in particular the Security 
Council, bears a unique responsibility for 
furthering the interests of the people of 
Namibia and their aspirations for peace, 
justice, and independence. It has been 2 
years since the Council last met to ex- 
amine the question of Namibia, and it is, 
therefore, appropriate that it should 
wish to review what has transpired in 
the intervening period. 

The participation in this debate of so 
many distinguished foreign ministers 
testifies to the importance and the 
urgency which the international com- 
munity as a whole attaches to the attain- 
ment by the people of Namibia of their 
justly deserved and too long delayed in- 
dependence. I especially welcome the 
presence here of the foreign ministers of 
the front-line states, with which govern- 
ments of the Western contact group 
have enjoyed an active, constructive, 
and vital partnership in our efforts to 
hasten Namibia's independence. 

Finally, I welcome this opportunity 
to report to you on the role that my 
government, in partnership with the 
other members of the Western contact 
group, has sought to play in helping to 
promote a peaceful, negotiated settle- 
ment for the earliest possible attainment 
of Namibia's independence. 

Before doing so, however, I wish to 
pay a special tribute to the Secretary 
General. I know first-hand his deeply 



felt commitment to the attainment of 
Namibia's independence. I have been im- 
pressed by his dedication and objectivity 
and have full confidence in his ability to 
carry out the responsibility assigned to 
him under Security Council Resolution 
435. I am also aware of the efforts he 
and his staff have made to ensure that 
all is in readiness for the day when 
agreement is reached for implementa- 
tion of the UN settlement plan. 

I also wish to thank the Secretary 
General for his report, which provides 
an accurate summation of what has 
transpired since the Council last met on 
this issue in April 1981. It is not 
necessary to recapitulate what he has 
already set out. I would, however, like 
to recall the very different circum- 
stances that prevailed at the time of 
that last meeting. 

The tone and the outcome of that 
debate were very much a reflection of 
the widespread disappointment over the 
failure of the preimplementation 
meeting in Geneva to reach agreement 
on a date for the start of the cease-fire 
envisaged in Security Council Resolution 
435. The preimplementation meeting 
ended only a few days before the Ad- 
ministration, of which I am now a 
member, took office in Washington. It 
became one of the urgent tasks of the 
new American Government to assess, 
jointly with its contact group partners, 
the reasons for the failure of the Geneva 
meeting. 

It would be fair to say that the new 
American Government was the recipient 
of a great deal of advice at that time. I 
will be frank in telling you that there 
were those who advised strongly against 
a continuing U.S. role in pursuit of a 
negotiated settlement of the Namibian 
problem. It was said that the obstacles 
to a peaceful settlement were too great 
to be overcome and that the interests of 
the United States in the region did not 
justify the tremendous commitment of 
time and energy that would be required. 

Needless to say, those responsible 
for formulating the policies of this Ad- 
ministration did not share these views. 
Although mindful of the great dif- 
ficulties involved, they were also aware 
of the efforts that had already been 
made and of the opportunity which ex- 
isted to resolve, through peaceful 
negotiations, this pressing issue. They 
were in this regard sensitive to the car- 
dinal importance attached to Namibia's 
early independence by the nations of 
Africa. These goals more than justified a 
rededication of efforts which the contact 
group had first undertaken 4 years 
earlier. 



At the same time, we were anxious 
in our renewed approach to the probler 
to avoid, if at all possible, the frustra- 
tions of the past. We sought an ap- 
proach that would not result in the san 
disappointment so keenly felt — above a 
by the people of Namibia — following th 
failure of the Geneva preimplementatio 
meeting. With this firmly in mind, we 
undertook a fresh round of consulta- 
tions, first with our contact partners 
and then with the other concerned par- 
ties — the front-line states, the South 
African Government, SWAPO [South 
West Africa People Organization] and 
the Namibian political parties that wou 
also participate in the UN-supervised 
elections envisaged in Resolution 435. 

In the course of these consultations 
several facts became abundantly clear. 

• We were assured of the interest 
and the desire of all those directly con- 
cerned that the negotiations should con 
tinue. 

• It was clear that in the absence i 
a peaceful negotiated settlement leadin; 
to Namibia's independence, the situatio 
of armed conflict and instability in the 
region would only worsen, with unac- 
ceptable consequences for all the in- 
habitants of the region. 

• We were assured by those with 
the greatest stake in the success of the 
negotiations that the contact group hao 
a continuing and important role to play 
in helping to bring about a peaceful set 
tlement. 

On the basis of this assessment, tht 
foreign ministers of the contact group 
met in May 1981 and decided to redou- 
ble their efforts to bring about a nego- 
tiated settlement. They reaffirmed thei 
conviction that only a settlement under 
the aegis of the United Nations would 
find broad international acceptance and 
that Security Council Resolution 435 
continued to provide the basis for 
Namibia's peaceful transition to in- 
dependence. Bearing in mind the dif- 
ficulties that had arisen at the 
preimplementation meeting in Geneva, 
the contact group of foreign ministers 
further decided to develop specific pro- 
posals that would address directly the 
concerns that had thus far prevented th 
implementation of Resolution 435. They 
considered that the purpose of these 
proposals should be to give all concerne 
greater confidence as regards the futurr 
of an independent Namibia. 

Since the relaunching of their 
negotiating efforts in the spring of 1981 
the members of the contact group have 
worked closely and intensively with all 



76 



Department of State Bulletir 



UNITED NATIONS 



the parties concerned. It is a matter of 
the greatest regret to us — as I know it 
s to all of those here — that the promise 
)f Namibia's independence has not yet 
jeen realized. At the same time, 
lowever, I believe it would be a mistake 
x> discount the progress that has been 
ichieved toward the implementation of 
Resolution 435 since the Council last 
net to review the situation. 

First, it is important to note that all 
)arties concerned have reaffirmed their 
icceptance of Resolution 435. That 
esolution, and the settlement plan it en- 
lorsed, remains the only agreed and 
ecognized basis for an internationally 
acceptable settlement of the Namibia 
luestion. 

Second, all parties have committed 
hemselves to constitutional principles 
vhich will serve as a guide to the 
•lected constituent assembly in drafting 
democratic constitution for an in- 
ependent Namibia. This agreement, 
/hich was confirmed to the Secretary 
reneral in July of last year and which is 
oted in his report to the Security Coun- 
il, has helped to reassure all those who 
/ill participate in the UN-supervised 
lections of the democratic future of an 
idependent Namibia. 

Third, substantial progress has also 
•een made in resolving the issues which 
'ere responsible for the unsuccessful 
utcome of the Geneva preimplementa- 
on meeting. In particular, through in- 
msive consultations which took place in 
ew York and Washington last summer, 
lvolving representatives of the front- 
ne states, SWAPO, South Africa, and 
f the UN Secretariat, understandings 
ere reached that will assure all parties 
i ) the elections of the fairness and im- 
artiality of the process leading to 
amibia's independence. 

Finally, through their own consulta- 
ons with the parties concerned, the 
ecretary General and his staff have 
iade substantial progress in resolving 
I itstanding questions concerning the 
I )mposition and deployment of the 
I lilitary component of UNTAG [UN 
ransition Assistance Group]. Here I 
ould like once again to express our ap- 
! reciation to the Secretary General for 
le determined efforts he has made to 
isure that all is in readiness for the im- 
jlementation of the UN settlement plan. 
Because of the substantial progress 
lat has been made over the past 2 
lears, only two major issues remain to 
; a resolved in preparation for the im- 
i iementation of Resolution 435. These 



• The choice of the electoral system 
to be employed in the elections, which 
all parties are agreed must be settled in 
accordance with the provisions of 
Resolution 435 and in a manner that 
does not cause delay, and 

• Final, technical matters concern- 
ing the composition of the military com- 
ponent of UNTAG. 

While the United States is pleased 
with the record of what has been 
achieved over the past 2 years, we are 
by no means satisfied. Indeed, none of 
us can rest content until the goal which 
we seek has been attained. But the fact 
that much has been achieved justifies 
continued commitment to the course. 

Apart from the specific accom- 
plishments I have just mentioned, there 
has been the development of an at- 
mosphere of confidence which we hope 
will make it possible for the parties con- 
cerned to take the important political 
decisions necessary to go forward with 
the implementation of Resolution 435. 
We have been especially gratified by the 
constructive and flexible attitude 
displayed by the concerned parties, 
which has made possible the progress 
that has been achieved to date. 

We share the concern that the fac- 
tors relating to the regional situation in 
southern Africa, which are, however, 
outside the scope of the mandate of the 
contact group, have not yet permitted 
implementation of the UN plan. We 
believe that these issues should be 
resolved rapidly, in a manner consistent 
with the sovereignty of all states con- 
cerned, so that the people of Namibia 
can exercise their right of self- 
determination. The ministers have ac- 
cordingly decided that the contact group 
should continue its work with all urgen- 
cy. 

We are convinced — now more than 
ever before — that with the continued 
good faith and cooperation of all con- 
cerned, our shared objective of a 
negotiated settlement leading to a 
stable, democratic, prosperous, and in- 
dependent Namibia will be realized. 

Here I would like to say a word 
about the role and the objectives of my 
government in these negotiations. 

• I wish to stress above all that the 
United States neither desires nor seeks 
any special advantage or position for 
itself in these negotiations. 

• It is not our intention, nor is it 
within our power, to impose our own 
views or wishes on those whose interests 
and aspirations are most directly in- 
volved. 



• We fully respect the fact that the 
political decisions needed to proceed 
with the implementation of the UN set- 
tlement plan are sovereign decisions 
that can only be taken by the govern- 
ments most immediately and directly 
concerned. 

• Furthermore, we recognize that 
those who must take those decisions will 
wish to assure themselves that their own 
interests and security will be respected 
and protected. 

• In the sometimes thankless role 
that we have assumed, our sole objective 
has been to assist the parties in over- 
coming the difficulties that have to date 
prevented the implementation of Securi- 
ty Council Resolution 435 and the attain- 
ment of Namibia's independence. 

• Finally, I wish to assure all those 
here assembled that the United States 
will continue to work for Namibia's tran- 
sition to stable and prosperous independ- 
ence once an agreement has been 
achieved. With other members of the 
United Nations, we are prepared to con- 
tribute a fair share to ensure the effec- 
tiveness of the UN Transition Assistance 
Group. We also stand ready to cooperate 
with others in providing the assistance 
that will be essential to giving all Na- 
mibians the opportunity to lead peaceful 
and productive lives. 

I am keenly aware of the sense of 
frustration felt by members of this body 
because the aspirations of the people of 
Namibia have not been realized. We 
share that frustration, and we have sym- 
pathy for the people of Namibia, and the 
region, who suffer from the continuing 
conflict. We will not, however, allow our 
feelings of frustration to lead us to 
despair. Our common efforts will suc- 
ceed. The only alternative to the con- 
tinued, vigorous pursuit of a peaceful, 
negotiated settlement is a more 
dangerous and ever more destructive 
escalation of the violence that the people 
of Namibia and those throughout the 
region have known too well too long. 

Those of us who are privileged to 
participate in the decisions of this body 
have a special responsibility to do all we 
can to help achieve Namibian independ- 
ence peacefully and promptly. We are 
ready to work closely with other 
members of the Council and with the 
parties concerned to achieve such an 
outcome, which we know will also 
enhance the prospects for peace, securi- 
ty, and economic development 
throughout the region. 



■ ugust 1983 



77 



UNITED NATIONS 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 532, 
MAY 31, 1983 2 

The Security Council. 

Having considered the report of the 
Secretary -General, 

Recalling General Assembly Resolutions 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 
(XXI) of 27 October 1966, 

Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions 
301 (1971), 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978), 
435 (1978) and 439 (1978), 

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the 
United Nations over Namibia and the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council 
for ensuring the implementation of its 
Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), in- 
cluding the holding of free and fair elections 
in Namibia under the supervision and control 
of the United Nations, 

Taking note of the results of the interna- 
tional conference in support of the struggle 
of the Namibian people for independence, 
held at UNESCO House in Paris from 25 to 
29 April 1983, 

Taking note of the protracted and ex- 
haustive consultations which have taken place 
since the adoption of Resolution 435 (1978), 

Noting with regret that those consulta- 
tions have not yet brought about the im- 
plementation of Resolution 435 (1978), 

1. Condemns South Africa's continued il- 
legal occupation of Namibia in flagrant de- 
fiance of resolutions of the General Assembly 
and decisions of the Security Council of the 
United Nations; 

2. Calls upon South Africa to make a 
firm commitment as to its readiness to com- 
ply with Security Council Resolution 435 
(1978) for the independence of Namibia; 

3. Further calls upon South Africa to co- 
operate forthwith and fully with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in 
order to expedite the implementation of 
Resolution 435 (1978) for the early in- 
dependence of Namibia; 

4. Decides to mandate the Secretary- 
General to undertake consultations with the 
parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a 
view to securing the speedy implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978); 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the Security Council on the results 
of these consultations as soon as possible and 
not later than 31 August 1983; 

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the 
matter. 



AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN, 
MAY 31, 1983 3 

The United States is pleased to have 
been able to vote for the resolution we 
adopted this morning. We share the 
common objective of all members of the 
Council — the swiftest possible attain- 
ment of Namibian independence, and we 



believe that this resolution will make a 
positive contribution to that end. 

The United States must point out 
that preambular paragraph 2 refers to 
several resolutions, among which there 
was one — Security Council Resolution 
439 (1978)— which the United States did 
not support. Our affirmative vote on the 
present resolution does not imply any 
change in the U.S. position on Resolu- 
tion 439. 

With regard to the fifth preambular 
paragraph, echoing the comments of the 
representative of the United Kingdom, I 
would note that my government, 
although represented at the Paris con- 
ference on Namibia, was not a party to 
its decisions. Together with other 
members of the contact group, the 
United States informed the Secretary 
General that it would not participate in 
the decisions of the conference in view 
of its role, as a member of the contact 
group, in the negotiations aimed at 
achieving Namibia's independence. 

Over the past 2 years and longer, 
my government has been deeply in- 
volved in the search for a settlement of 
the Namibia problem. We understand 
the frustration that Namibia in- 
dependence has not, in fact, yet been 
achieved. However, in addition to the 
very substantial progress which has 
been made in fleshing out the 
framework of UN Security Council 
Resolution 435, we believe a great deal 
has also been accomplished toward 
establishing an environment in which all 
parties are able to take the political deci- 
sions necessary to implement the UN 
plan. If there is to be a lasting settle- 
ment, we need to create the conditions 
in which all countries in the 
region — most particularly South Africa 
and Angola — can feel secure and turn 
their energies to their own development. 
This would, of necessity, involve not on- 
ly complete respect for territorial in- 
tegrity by all countries within the 
region, it must also involve the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces in the 
region. Creating the secure conditions 
that in turn may provide a climate of 
confidence will be an essential part of 
this settlement for which we all devoutly 
wish and toward which we are all 
earnestly working. 



UNICEF 



■USUN press release 11 
2 Adopted unanimously. 
3 USUN press release 44. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. 
APR. 18, 1983 1 

For nearly a quarter of a century, the 
United States has generously offered 
resources and know-how to give a bet- 
ter, healthier life to ill and malnourishei 
people throughout the world. Despite 
past efforts and progress by the United 
States and many other countries, the 
United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) recently reported that over 
40,000 children in developing countries 
will die every day, victims of malnutri- 
tion and disease. This is a tragedy of 
global proportions and requires a global 
effort in response. 

UNICEF is now pursuing a "health 
revolution" for children in developing 
countries that involves a new combina- 
tion of technological and social ap- 
proaches to health. It is estimated that 
this combination, coupled with networks 
of trained health workers backed by 
government services and international 
assistance, can save the lives of 20,000 
children each day within a decade. 
Moreover, literally hundreds of millions 
of young lives would be healthier. 

One technological achievement has 
been the development and distribution c 
an inexpensive home treatment for diar 
rhea, a major contributor to deaths 
among young children in developing 
countries. This treatment was developei 
after years of research in the Interna- 
tional Center for Diarrheal Disease 
Research in Bangladesh. The United 
States has contributed to that institutio 
for more than 20 years. The World 
Health Organization has also been a 
focal point for international support anc 
study of diarrheal diseases. 

A second element is the develop- 
ment of low-cost vaccines which do not 
require refrigeration and which can be 
used in remote areas to protect children 
from such killers as measles, diphtheria, 
tetanus, whooping cough, polio, and 
tuberculosis. 

Another factor is the promotion of 
breast feeding for its nutritional and 
hygienic value, as well as its im- 
munological qualities. Still another is a 
simple infant weight chart kept by the 
child's mother which indicates a child's 
progress at monthly weighings, making 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



malnutrition quickly detectable. Its 
Idesign and use have been improved and 
tested in U. S. -supported maternal-child 
'health programs around the world. 
UNICEF has found that a great portion 
of malnutrition cases are due to the 
problem going undetected rather than 
'lack of food in the family. 

The American people have always 
been in the vanguard of support for 



children's health and well-being. As 
President of the United Slates, I am 
asking the American people to help 
bring about a health revolution for 
children during the coming decade by 
supporting UNICEF's humanitarian pro- 
gram. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 25, 1983. 



Caribbean Basin Recovery Act 



by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
vi Trade of the House Ways and Means 
'ommittee on June 9. 1983. Am- 
nisssador Eagleburger is Under 
■secretary for Political Affairs. 1 

t is a pleasure for me to appear before 
his committee to testify on the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative. The Secretary 
isked me to express his regret that he 
vould not be able to appear himself. He 
s attending a NATO Foreign Ministers 
neeting in Paris. Both he and I — 
ndeed, the Administration as a 
vhole — place a great deal of importance 
m this program and on the need for 
apid action. It has already been too 
ong delayed. 

The House of Representatives last 
December passed the Caribbean Basin 
nitiative, and I, therefore, hope that 
I his committee and this chamber will be 
.ble to act expeditiously. The House 
■^ave a large bipartisan vote to the 
egislation last year, which is a clear in- 
lication that the importance of the ini- 
( iative to the U.S. national interest is 
lready widely understood. But let me 
ust recall some of the crucial points in 
javor of the program. 

First, although the United States is 
in enormously powerful and prosperous 
lation, we are not isolated from the rest 
f the world. Indeed, to a large extent, 
^e draw our strength and our prosperi- 
y from that of our neighbors and 
rriends. The Caribbean Basin is our 
eighborhood and, as such, it is a region 
f particular importance to us. By this 
dme, many in the Congress already 
;now some of the facts regarding our in- 
erdependence with the region; for ex- 
mple, that half of our trade, including 
wo-thirds of our energy trade, passes 
hrough the sealanes of the Caribbean 
iSasin. Our historical, social, and 



economic ties also are extremely strong. 
It is the second largest source of im- 
migration to the United States and of- 
fers a $6 billion market for our goods. 
Clearly, its prosperity and peacefulness 
are not just of altruistic interest to us; 
the lives of our citizens are and will con- 
tinue to be deeply affected by what hap- 
pens there. 

Prosperity and peace in the Carib- 
bean Basin mean greater security and 
new economic opportunities for us in the 
United States and social exchanges 
based on mutual interest enriching all 
our societies and cultures. Economic 
decline and political disruption in the 
Caribbean Basin, on the other hand, 
mean a continued need by the United 
States to devote resources to protect 
itself against the possibility of the area 
being dominated by hostile powers. Pro- 
longed social and economic disruption 
would also provoke an exodus of 
desperate people seeking a safe haven in 
the United States. Our nation has 
gained enormously from the skills and 
energies of political and economic- 
refugees. It is, clearly, in our and other 
nations' interest, however, to promote 
cultural and economic interchange 
without the terrible personal suffering 
that massive refugee movements 
produce. 

There is no doubt that the countries 
of the Caribbean Basin desperately need 
this program. These small states lack 
the large domestic markets needed to 
encourage broad-based industrial and 
agricultural development. While some 
countries have begun to diversify during 
recent decades, their economies still de- 
pend heavily on a few primary exports 
such as coffee, sugar, bananas, and 
bauxite, and on tourism. As small coun- 
tries, they are extraordinarily vulnerable 
to the effects of international economic 
developments. 



The economies of this region have 
been devastated by the worldwide 
economic recession of the past several 
years. In almost every country, the past 
'1 years have seen falling income and ris- 
ing unemployment. Shrinking govern- 
ment revenues have delayed vital 
development projects and social pro- 
grams. The U.S. recession caused a 
steep drop in the tourism revenues so 
essential to many Caribbean countries. 
In Central America, recession has been 
exacerbated by violence, causing a 
severe drop in intraregional trade and 
bringing new investment to a standstill. 
As the economic situation in the Carib- 
bean Basin has worsened, it has indirect- 
ly affected the United States. Lower ex- 
port earnings have made it difficult for 
many of the countries to service their 
external debts, a large part of which is 
held by U.S. banks. Economic disloca- 
tion has contributed to illegal immigra- 
tion into this country. Our exports to the 
region fell by almost $300 million in 
1982, a cost to our economy of some 
10,000 jobs. 

Impact of the Initiative 
on U.S. Employment 

As I noted before, I believe that there is 
already a broad understanding of our 
interdependence with the Caribbean 
Basin and, hence, of the need for the 
United States to act to help. However, 
there is also concern in some quarters 
about the impact of the initiative on 
employment in the United States. On 
this point, the critics make one fun- 
damental assumption about trade and 
economic relationships which I strongly 
believe to be false. They seem to believe 
that what the Caribbean Basin gains will 
be lost by the United States. Trade is 
not a zero sum game. All economic 
history proves it. Economic exchange oc- 
curs because both parties have some- 
thing to gain from the transaction. Con- 
sequently, the increase in prosperity 
which we are aiming to achieve in the 
Caribbean Basin will not come at the ex- 
pense of the U.S. economy. The jobs 
created in the Caribbean Basin will not 
mean that an equivalent number of jobs 
is lost in the United States. On the con- 
trary, the increased prosperity of Carib- 
bean Basin countries will mean both an 
increase in jobs for their own people at 
home — thus reduced emigration — and 
an increase in their demand for U.S. ex- 
ports. The results on both counts should 
be additional jobs for our unemployed. 



79 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



There are other critics who 
recognize that, while increased trade 
may be beneficial over the long term 
to the United States as a whole, certain 
groups within the United States might 
be adversely affected — notably 
industries particularly sensitive to im- 
ports. There are some issues of transi- 
tion and adjustment which must be 
addressed. This legislation does that. 
There are safeguard provisions which 
allow for reimposition of the duty in 
cases where U.S. industries or workers 
are threatened with serious injury. 
Rules-of-origin requirements will prevent 
mere pass through or simple assembly 
operations which do not involve signifi- 
cant local value added. The legislation 
passed by the House last year excludes a 
number of politically sensitive products. 
Any further product exceptions or 



weakening of the economic provisions of 
this legislation would, in my view, be 
clearly unnecessary and, more impor- 
tantly, would result in a program with 
more promise than performance. 

Providing Incentives 

If we want to help our neighbors, then 
let us do it effectively. We need to give 
these small economies real incentives — 
incentives which are comprehensive, 
simple to understand and take advan- 
tage of, and sufficiently long term to 
provide stable expectations. The opening 
of our large market to Caribbean Basin 
countries for a 12-year period without 
duty impediments is a bold and effective 
step. In passing such a program, this 
Congress will help provide a powerful 
new set of opportunities for the Carib- 



bean Basin countries and, at the same 
time, will provide some rich new oppor-i 
tunities to our own industries and 
workers. 

The threat which increased imports 
from the Caribbean Basin pose to us is 
minimal. Remember that the Caribbean 
Basin economies are equal to only 2% c 
our gross national product, and our tot 
imports from the region are less than 
4% of our global imports. The products 
that would be extended duty-free entry 
as a result of this legislation comprise 
only one-half of 1% of our total import' 
Clearly then, the risk of injury to the 
United States is small. The Caribbean 
Basin countries can experience a very 
significant increase in production and 
exports without having an appreciable 
impact on the U.S. economy. I hope an 
expect that this increase will occur botl 



U.S. Medical Team to El Salvador 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JUNE 2, 1983 1 

As a humanitarian gesture, the United 
States will provide a medical team to the 
Government of El Salvador. The team is 
a battalion-size unit of 20 to 25 
members, composed of doctors, techni- 
cians, medics, and corpsmen, who will 
assist the El Salvadoran Government in 
emergency medical services. The unit is 
composed of military personnel from the 
various service branches. About a third 
of that total will be doctors. 

The decision which was approved by 
the President was in response to a re- 
quest by the Government of El 
Salvador. There have been reports, both 
from the government and from the 
private sector, that have cited the 
serious medical problems faced by the 
military and civilian population in El 
Salvador. Of particular interest was a 
study by the New England Journal of 
Medicine, which pointed out in specific 
terms the difficulties faced by the people 
of El Salvador. 

After these needs were pointed out 
by the government, and prior to the 
New England medical publication, the 
United States sent a survey team to El 
Salvador to study the needs and to 
recommend a U.S. response. The action 
is a result of their recommendations. 

Consultations with appropriate 



Members of Congress began several 
weeks ago. We have kept Congress fully 
abreast of our plans. The reaction 
among key Members of Congress has 
been one of understanding and general 
approval. 

This decision in no way conflicts 
with our self-imposed commitment to 
hold the number of military trainers to 
55. The number at the moment is 52 
military trainers, but it does vary vir- 
tually on a day-to-day basis. It has not 
exceeded 55, and we have no plans to 
exceed this limit. 

The medical team, which will be 
headed by two medical service officers, 
will be under the policy direction of the 
U.S. Embassy. They will report through 
appropriate military channels. They will 
assist the Salvadoran Government in 
treating their civilian and military 
casualties. They will provide guidance to 
the government in establishing their 
own medical services. 

It is our desire in taking this action 
to help alleviate a devastating situation. 
It is our intention to provide basic 
humanitarian medical relief through 
training medics, helping establish a 
medical supply system, and repairing 
medical equipment. 

This team would be able to under- 
take an extensive survey in the military 
hospital medical system and begin repair 
of equipment and establishment of a 
medical logistics system and would in- 



struct El Salvadoran armed forces 
medical personnel in field-medic tech- 
niques. 

This project is designed to help 
alleviate a bad situation, which is gettii 
worse. They will operate in the San 
Salvador area. The duration of their 
stay is expected to be about 6 months. | 
The U.S. survey teams, which have 
observed medical conditions in El 
Salvador for a number of weeks, repor 
the medical situation in the country is I 
critical. The Salvadorans are faced wit I 
crowded medical facilities, lack of equ| I 
ment and sufficiently trained medical 
personnel. 

The President, once informed and 
briefed on the situation, directed this e 
fort be made to aid the people of El 
Salvador in coping with a difficult situj 
tii m. It is an effort on our part to allow 
a nation struggling to establish demo- 
cratic principles to meet yet another 
challenge imposed on them by an unfor 
tunate and vicious war being waged an I 
directed by forces from outside their 
country. 

The President said, "The United 
States will not stand by idly while 
human suffering is at such a level." 



'Read to news correspondents by Prin- 
cipal I)epul\ Press Secretary lo the Presi- 
dent, Larry Speakes (text from Weekh Ccffi 
pilation of Presidential Documents of June ( 
[983). ■ 



80 



Department of State Bulleti 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Sirough expansion of existing produc- 
tion and through entirely new produc- 
tion in sectors in which there is no trade 
at present. 

All economic decisions involve some 
risk, but if we are paralyzed into inac- 
tion or into meager action by an ex- 
cessive fear of risk, then we end up with 
not only stagnation but even less than 
the status quo. To move forward — even 
to stand still — we must work in favor of 
change, the kind of change which 
benefits ourselves and our neighbors. 

Other Donor Countries 

This program also deserves your support 
because it represents a new departure in 
our relationship with developing coun- 
tries. It is a program which is derived 
from an intensive dialogue with both 
potential beneficiaries and other donors. 
Consequently, it represents far more 
:han just a unilateral U.S. effort. The 
egislation before you is a crucial part of 
he international effort — but only a part. 
Dther countries have contributed, sig- 
lificantly, both in terms of financial 
assistance and/or new trade and invest- 
nent opportunities. These efforts in- 
lude not only those of international in- 
stitutions such as the World Bank and 
he Inter- American Bank, and of 
ieveloped countries such as Canada, but 
also of the three countries which have 
heir own particular development prob- 
ems — Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the 
afforts of the donor countries are being 
supported and magnified by the 
domestic efforts of the beneficiary coun- 
ties. Despite their limited resources and 
:he meager lifestyles that many of their 
oeople experience, these countries are 
undertaking some extremely painful 
economic reforms. They recognize that 
:oherent and economically rational 
iomestic policies are essential to put 
hem on the road to self-sustaining 
growth. External assistance provides 
>nly the indispensable margin of 
•esources and support to help make 
heir efforts succeed. I want to em- 
)hasize the sacrifices which many of 
;hese countries are already making to 
ulace themselves on the road to recovery 
and stable, continued growth. 



Support for Private Firms 

Another way in which this program is a 
departure from our traditional approach 
tn development is that it integrates aid, 
trade, and tax measures into a com- 
plementary and mutually reinforcing 
package. I was pleased last summer 
when the Congress approved the 
assistance portion of the President's 
original Caribbean Basin proposals. All 
of the $350 million that was ap- 
propriated already has been obligated 
for use by the private sector in those 
countries with the most serious financial 
problems. This assistance has helped 
many established, productive private 
firms to continue operating and to ob- 
tain needed raw materials and equip- 
ment from the United States. But, as 
the President said when he requested 
the special initiative appropriation: 
financial assistance is only a short-term 
remedy which must be accompanied by 
measures in other areas. Indeed, 
development will not occur on a self- 
sustaining basis unless it is a broad- 
based process which draws the 
marginalized sectors of these societies 
into the development process while 
preserving basic individual rights and 
freedoms. We believe that such develop- 
ment can only be achieved through a 
strategy which encourages private ini- 
tiative and investment, which opens 
markets and stimulates production 
beyond the limitations of these small, 
traditional economies. This legislation is 
the embodiment of that belief. 



Other Important Features 

I have focused on the trade provisions 
because the trade incentive is the heart 
of the bill. I would like to mention, 
however, other important features. As 
you know, we had originally requested 
an investment tax credit as an additional 
spur to foreign investment. This commit- 
tee substituted, instead, the convention 
tax deduction, a provision which was 
enthusiastically welcomed by the coun- 
tries in the basin as a positive stimulus 
to tourism. Other provisions, which I 
have not focused upon today but which 
are very important, strengthen the 
economies of Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands. These include the rebate of ex- 
cise taxes on rum, treating inputs from 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 



as Caribbean content in meeting the 
rules of origin requirements and allow- 
ing industries in Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands to petition for import 
relief. All of these features of the bill 
are essential to our comprehensive 
policy toward the region. 

Conclusion 

Let me close by repeating that this is a 
strong program, carefully designed to 
promote the interests both of the United 
States and of the nations of the Carib- 
bean Basin. It is a necessary program, 
one that will make a crucial difference 
to Caribbean Basin countries in turning 
their economies and their societies 
around. And, finally, it is a program 
whose implementation is long overdue. 
It is now 15 months since the President 
sent his original proposal to the 
Congress. 

Secretary Shultz earlier referred to 
the Caribbean Basin initiative as a far- 
sighted effort to get ahead of history in 
this turbulent region. The recent course 
of events in Central America and the 
Caribbean certainly underlines that the 
effort is anything but premature. In- 
deed, we cannot afford to lose any more 
time in getting it underway. As the 
Secretary has said, failure to pass the 
initiative "would extinguish the hopes 
that have been raised in the region that 
the United States is willing to give 
significant help to foster economic and 
social progress in the Caribbean Basin." 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



81 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Visit of Belize Prime Minister 







(White House photo by Michael Evans) 



Prime Minister George C. Price of 
Belize made an official working visit to 
Washington, B.C., May 11- U, 1983, to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
gureniment officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Price after their meeting on May 12. ' 

President Reagan 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak 
with Prime Minister Price of Belize, to 
listen to his views, and to exchange 
ideas. 

Our two countries share fundamen- 
tal values. Foremost among them is a 
deep and abiding commitment to 
democratic government. And this has 
been very much emphasized in the con- 
versations that we've had so far today. 



In contrast to the war and turmoil 
elsewhere in the region, Belize — Central 
America's newest independent 
democracy — serves as a model of peace 
and stability. Belize is a developing 
country struggling with serious 
economic problems. And I'm hopeful 
that we can, as a neighbor, be of help, 
especially in those areas affecting the 
private sector. 

Equally important, Belize should 
benefit under the trade provisions of the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative now before 
the Congress. But Prime Minister Price 
and I have discussed in some detail his 
country's economic challenges. 

We also touched on another struggle 
Belize has been waging — the battle 



against marijuana. And I'm impressed 
and encouraged by the efforts of Prim< 
Minister Price's government to suppret 
the cultivation of cannibas, a drug whk 
threatens the foundations of both our 
societies. 

Our meeting was productive and cc 
dial. Our conversations have reaffirmec 
the close relations between our two 
countries, the friendship of our peoples 
and our mutual commitment to freedor 
and human rights. 

And, once again, Mr. Prime 
Minister, it's been a great pleasure to 
have you and your group of ministers 

Prime Minister Price 

We are happy to be received by the 
President of the United States of 
America. And our exchange of views 
served to further the good relations be 
tween our two countries, the United 
States of America and Belize. 

Our two countries share the same 
side of planet Earth. We can draw 
wisdom and strength from the basic 
values of a common heritage, the same 
language and common law, a kindred 
parliamentary democracy, and a mixed 
economy. 

Belize is thankful for the Caribbeai 
Basin Initiative and the helpful cooper? 
tion of your people and your govern- 
ment in our daily task to maintain 
stability and security, which result fror 
mutual respect and recognition of 
Belize's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 

It is our policy to live in peace with 
our neighbors and to develop with equ; 
standing our resources as together we 
create wealth to share in social justice. 

To continue this difficult task, we 
need that wisdom and strength of whic 
the Father of your Nation, President 
George Washington, spoke in his partii 
address, and I quote: "Of all the dispos 
tions and habits which lead to political 
prosperity, religion and morality are in 
dispensable supports." 

With these supports and with faith 
in God, may both our nations continue 
do valiantly and thus achieve the well- 
being and the happiness of our peoples. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 1<>. 1983. 



82 



Department of State Bulletii 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Visit of Salvadoran President 



President Alvaro Magana Borja of 
El Salvador made an official working 
visit to Washington, D.C., June 16-18, 
1983, to meet with President Reagan and 
ither government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
Presidents Reagan and Magana after 
\heir meeting on June 17. 

President Reagan 

resident Magana and I have had a cor- 
dial and a very useful exchange of views 
>n the situation in El Salvador and in 
Central America. At this time, his 
government is deeply involved in 
reparations for Presidential elections 
ind is attempting through the Peace 
Commission to encourage the participa- 
ion in the electoral process of all 
5alvadorans, including the extreme left. 
?his is the true path of peace for that 
ountry. 

We discussed the military situation 
n El Salvador. President Magana also 
letailed his government's reform efforts, 
deluding the land reform program and 
he recently announced plan for judicial 
eform. He reaffirmed his government's 
ommitment to human rights. 

Regionally, our talks focused on the 
hreat posed by Nicaragua to other 
ountries in Central America. We 
eviewed the status of the Contadora 
litiative and the efforts of democratic 
ountries in the region to find a peaceful 
olution. 

President Magana is a courageous 
nd talented leader. He's making ad- 
lirable progress in the difficult task of 
loving El Salvador toward democracy 
mile at the same time coordinating a 
efense against Marxist-led guerrillas 
mo would turn his country into a 
luban-style dictatorship. President 
lagana, the Government of El 
alvador, and the people of that brave 
ountry deserve and have our support. 
Lnd it's a great pleasure to have 
ou here. 



'resident Magana 

'hank you for your encouraging words. 
Ve believe in democracy, liberty, and all 
he principles that have made this coun- 
ry great. We welcome your support, 
nd we want a lasting peace through 
i emocracy. This is the summary of the 
emarks that I'm going to make. 2 




(White House phot" by Bill Fitz-Patnck) 



Message of the Constitutional President 
of the Republic of El Salvador, Dr. Alvaro 
Magana, in the presence of the President of 
the United States of America, Ronald 
Reagan, on the occasion of the official visit of 
President Magana to Washington, D.C. 

My visit to the United States of America 
is made in order to strengthen the ties that 
have historically united us with this country. 

It is a propitious opportunity to present 
to the people of the United States of America 
a true picture of my country and of the goals 
we have set within the context of the difficult 
conditions which confront us. These goals 
sustain our conviction that President Reagan 
is giving his support to a legitimate govern- 
ment, and to the just cause of the Salvadoran 
people for maintaining and consolidating a 
democratic system in accordance with the 
tradition of liberty and human solidarity 
which have constituted the basis for the birth 
and the greatness of the United States of 
America. 

The situation in El Salvador is part of a 
world situation of economic crisis and 
ideological conflict. However, our problems 
are not solely the result of external factors. 
For a long time, social and economic in- 
equalities have been obstacles to the full 
development of democracy. They have pro- 
vided the opportunity for extrahemispheric 
interests, most particularly those of the 
Soviet Union and her satellites working 
through two Latin American countries to 
make us victims of their expansionistic policy. 




Our government is the outcome of the 
electoral decision of the Salvadoran people, 
who on March 28, 1982, risked their lives in 
order to 'choose overwhelmingly and without 
doubt the democratic system as a preferred 
form of political organization. Consequently, 
my government is not the result of one or 
another ideological faction having prevailed: 
rather it is the clear and constitutional ex- 
pression of the sovereign will of the people 
expressed in the most multitudinous free 
election known in our entire history. 

With this legitimate mandate of the vast 
majority of Salvadorans the Government of 
National Unity was formed. On August 3, 
1982, we adopted the basic platform, now 
known as the "Apaneca Pact." This pact in- 
cludes the common objectives of the political 
parties expressed during the electoral cam- 
paign. These objectives included progress 
toward peace, democracy, full respect for 
human rights, consolidation of social reforms 
and economic recovery: all of which are being 
carried out in spite of the adverse circum- 
stances, national and international, that we 
face. 

In order to ensure the accomplishment of 
these objectives put forth by the platform, a 
political commission was set up. This commis- 
sion being composed of the constitutional 
President of El Salvador, the Foreign 
Minister, the Defense Minister and represent- 
atives of the political parties. The commission 
is assisted by other organizations which are 
responsible for each of the specific objectives. 

Respect for human life and the physical 



august 1983 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



integrity, along with the dignity of all 
Salvadorans is the responsibility of the Com- 
mission on Human Rights and the constant 
concern of my Government. I am pleased to 
say that in order to safeguard those human 
rights, we have adopted concrete and prag- 
matic measures, such as the granting of 
amnesty, accelerated consideration of cases 
involving political crimes, plans to reform 
legal procedures applicable to such crimes, 
cooperation with the International Red Cross, 
ministerial directives to the security forces to 
insure strict compliance to legal procedures, 
and other similar measures. One important 
step toward guaranteeing respect for human 
rights will be the judicial reform which is en- 
visioned in the new constitution: independent 
judicial authority and an independent At- 
torney General, with sufficient authority and 
sufficient means to improve the administra- 
tion of justice. Furthermore, the Attorney 
General will have the technical capability for 
the scientific investigation of crime. 

The reduction in the gravity of conflicts 
resulting from the economic and social 
reforms has contributed to the strengthening 
of the democratic process which the Govern- 
ment of National Unity has committed itself 
to maintain and consolidate; well aware that 
they are important conditions for social 
stability, created in an atmosphere of con- 
fidence, and a determinating factor in the ex- 
ercise of democracy. 

Convinced of the importance of the 
private sector to economic recovery, the 
Government of National Unity has sought to 
create a favorable climate for the growth of 



private enterprise. The private sector has 
joined the public sector in forming a commit- 
tee charged with economic recovery in El 
Salvador. These efforts at recovery face dif- 
ficult obstacles caused primarily by low prices 
paid for our basic exports, increased prices of 
imports, and the problems of the ( lentral 
American Common Market. To these I must 
add violence and the destruction of the in- 
frastructure. Nonetheless, based on the spirit 
of diligence and sacrifice of the Salvadoran 
people, the economic cooperation of the 
United States of America, and a financial 
discipline of austerity which has permitted us 
to maintain tolerable rates of inflation and 
reasonable currency stability, my government 
has succeeded in reverting the declining 
trend of the economy. 

The peace program of the Government of 
National Unity rests fundamentally upon the 
electoral process and on behalf of this 
government. I reaffirm that the solution to 
the problem of violence should be essentially 
democratic. Accordingly, elections with par- 
ticipation by all Salvadorans without distinc- 
tion, constitute the only means to obtain a 
definitive and permanent peace in order to 
establish a pluralist system that insures 
democracy. 

In view of the importance of the par- 
ticipation of all Salvadorans in the coming 
elections, in a spirit of good will and in order 
to create conditions favorable to this full par- 
ticipation, we have enacted a generous 
amnesty law. To date 500 political prisoners 
who were subject to the legal process, have 
been freed under this law. 



El Salvador Commission 
Announces Peace Initiative 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JUNE 2, 1983 1 

In a declaration to all Salvadorans wide- 
ly publicized over the past 2 days by the 
Salvadoran media, the Salvadoran Peace 
Commission has reaffirmed that "the 
solution to the problem of violence 
should be essentially political and 
democratic" and appealed to all armed 
groups to participate peacefully in 
democratic elections scheduled for later 
this year. In its declaration, the Peace 
Commission called on the leftist Revolu- 
tionary Democratic Front to begin a 
constructive dialogue for their peaceful 
incorporation into the "Salvadoran fami- 
ly." The commission also appealed to the 
armed guerrilla groups to participate in 
the democratic process, which allows the 
Salvadoran people themselves to choose 
the officials who will govern them, 



noting that the government's amnesty is 
an important step in the process of 
political reconciliation. 

We welcome this initiative, and it 
has our full support. As President 
Reagan indicated in his address before a 
joint session of Congress on April 27, we 
will support dialogue and negotiations 
within each country with the terms and 
conditions of participation in election 
being negotiable. "The United States," 
the President stated, "will work toward 
a political solution in Central America 
which will serve the interests of the 
democratic process." This recent ini- 
tiative by the Government of El 
Salvador is very much in support of this 
objective. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman Alan 
Romberg. ■ 



In order to better achieve our objectives 
the Peace Commission on May 31 of this ye; 
appealed to the political sector of the subvet 
sive elements for the establishing of a 
dialogue to determine conditions and 
guarantees for their participation in the nex 
elections. This appeal has been repeated 
twice in recent days. 

Just as the essence of democracy consisi 
of the right of the citizens to elect their 
leaders and to confer political power on thei 
representatives, negotiating away a portion 
of this political power would be a divest men 
and betrayal of the electorate. This my 
government would never commit. 

Our program of peace is the genuine 
democratic alternative. In this way, peace 
will be the logical consequence of the 
democratic process which will be assured in 
the next electoral events. It will also result 
from respect for human rights, consolidation 
of the social reforms, and economic recoven 
In summary, it will result from the combing 
efforts of all Salvadorans. 

Foreign military intervention in domesti 
affairs constitutes the main obstacle to our 
efforts to attain peace. The interference of 
extracontinental communist countries by wa 
of Cuba and Nicaragua in support of armed 
groups against a legitimate constitutionally 
elected government, is a form of aggression 
which violates the essence of international 
law, specifically the principle of non- 
intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states. 

Faced with this situation, our armed 
forces have the constitutional obligation to 
defend the nation's sovereignty and to repel 
in legitimate self-defense, the armed subver- 
sion that has been imposed upon us from 
abroad. 

This external aggression has destroyed 
villages, forcing hundreds of thousands of 
humble Salvadorans to abandon their homes 
It has subjected our productive facilities, oui 
crops, our bridges and roads, our communic; 
tion and transportation systems and the in- 
frastructure of all public services to 
systematic destruction. 

To alleviate this situation, integral pro- 
grams have been commended to the "Com- 
mission for the Reconstruction of Specific 
Areas," coordinated by the armed forces anc 
tending to bring normalcy of activities to the 
inhabitants of areas affected by violence, 
with the reestablishing of public services anc 
the reconstruction of the infrastructures. 

No one can dispute a nation's right to de 
fend itself against external aggression and 
against the destruction of the scarce assets 
which in a developing country are produced 
at great sacrifice. For this reason, we have 
the right to understanding and solidarity of 
all free nations of the world. For these 
reasons we have the right to the understand- 
ing and solidarity from all other free nations; 
as we have had from our Central American 
brothers, those with whom we share 
democratic ideals, and for whom I wish to ex 
press our gratitude. 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



El Salvador has not responded to aggres- 
sion with aggression, nor to intervention with 
intervention. Last year, with a peace loving 
spirit we proposed a regional dialogue to 
strengthen democratic institutions, to end the 
arms race and the arms traffic, and to im- 
prove commercial and economic relations. 
With the same spirit we accepted the ini- 
tiative of the "Grupo Contadora," whose in- 
vitations we have always responded to 
positively. 

With the future of democracy in our 
country in great peril, we do know how to ap- 
preciate and be grateful for the solidarity and 
sympathy that President Reagan has clearly 
expressed for our cause, both in public and in 
private, and has responded with concrete and 
significant action. 

El Salvador fights not only for the sur- 
vival of its own democratic system; we also 
defend western democracy. For this reason I 
want to appeal to the honorable members of 
the United States of America's Congress to 
support the efforts of President Reagan to 
aid El Salvador. This assistance strengthens 
:he cause of democracy in the Central 
American region. A weak, vacillating commit- 
ment endangers peace and hemispheric se- 
curity. For this reason the people of the 
Jnited States must fully understand that we 
,'ace a common threat. 

Our aspirations have been incorporated 
nto the draft of the political constitution that 
.he Constituent Assembly of El Salvador will 
iebate and vote upon in the next days. 
Therein will be established the constitutional 
guarantees for the great objectives of the 
Government of National Unity first embodied 
n the "Apaneca Pact," and will become a per- 
nanent reality. 

El Salvador, my small country, is an ex- 
.mple of a newborn democracy defending its 
>lood the democratic system of the western 
vorld against a totalitarian Communist 
egime. 

El Salvador reaffirms its unwavering 
ommitment to the defense of peace, 
lemocracy and liberty with the understand- 
ng and solidarity of all free nations. 



Sugar Imports From Central America 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
'residential Documents of June 20, 1983. 

2 At this point, President Magana, whose 
pening remarks were delivered in English, 
ead in Spanish from a text. As printed, the 
emainder of this item follows the text, as 
■repared by the Salvadoran Government and 
iaae available by the Office of the White 
louse Press Secretary. ■ 



WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, 
MAY 10, 1983 1 

The President today announced changes 
in the Administration of the quota on 
U.S. imports of sugar for four Central 
American countries. The quota for 
Nicaragua will be reduced to 6,000 short 
tons (ST), and this reduction will be 
reallocated to three neighboring coun- 
tries—Honduras, Costa Rica, and El 
Salvador. This action will become effec- 
tive in fiscal year 1984 (which begins 
October 1, 1983). 

The President is taking this action 
because of the extraordinary situation in 
Central America and its implications for 
the United States and the region as a 
whole, including Honduras, Costa Rica, 
and El Salvador. These three countries 
are experiencing enormous problems, 
caused in considerable part by 
Nicaraguan-supported subversion and 
extremist violence. The additional quota 
for these three countries represents a 
total of roughly $14 million in foreign 
exchange per year. This occurs because 
the U.S. internal price (21<£-22«/lb.) in 
recent weeks is far higher than in most 
other markets of the world (6«-7C/lb). 
The transfer of the Nicaraguan quota 
will significantly benefit the recipient 
countries. 

By denying to Nicaragua a foreign 
exchange benefit resulting from the high 
U.S. sugar price, we hope to reduce the 
resources available to that country for 
financing its military buildup and its 
support for subversion and extremist 
violence in the region. 



This is a signal of the U.S. 
seriousness with regard to the economic 
and political stability of its neighbors in 
the hemisphere which is integrally 
related to the security of the region and 
the United States. The United States 
will continue to respond to developments 
in that region. 

The sugar quota decision does not 
affect our continued willingness to talk 
with the Nicaraguans about regional 
issues. We are ready to maintain as 
positive a relationship with Nicaragua as 
warranted by Nicaraguan actions. 

Nicaragua's present quota is 58,800 
ST, while that for Honduras is 28,000 
ST; for Costa Rica 42,000 ST; and for 
El Salvador 72,800 ST. 

The transfer from the Nicaraguan 
quota will be allocated to the countries 
as follows: Honduras 52%, Costa Rica 
30%, and El Salvador 18%. This alloca- 
tion is based on a comparison of actual 
recent shipments (1979-81) to the 
United States from these countries and 
their present quotas (which are derived 
from shipment shares from 1975 to 
1981). Consequently, the country which 
has had the fastest growth of its sugar 
industry and exports since 1975 — Hon- 
duras — will receive the largest share of 
the transferred quota. 

This is not a fundamental change in 
the overall sugar program. The quotas 
of all countries other than the four 
specified above are unchanged and con- 
tinue to be based on the formula an- 
nounced in May 1982, when the quota 
program was initiated. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 16, 1983. 



august 1983 



85 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Cuban Involvement in 
Narcotics Trafficking 



by James H. Michel 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Security and Terrorism- of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the Subcom- 
mittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of 
tlw Senate Foreign Relations < 'am in ittee 
on April SO, 1983. Mr. Michel is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter- American 
Allans. ' 

I am very pleased to appear before you 
to testify on Cuba's involvement in nar- 
cotics trafficking. This is a subject of im- 
portance to the Administration. We have 
been following closely events relating to 
this drug traffic because it is a clear and 
evident danger to the United States. 

In his testimony on March 12 of last 
year, Assistant Secretary [for Inter- 
American Affairs Thomas 0.] Enders 
described to you the first detailed and 
reliable information we had obtained 
linking Cuba to trafficking in nar- 
cotics as well as arms. Much of that in- 
formation was based on the activities of 
Colombian drug trafficker, Jaime Guillot 
Lara, who was in custody in Mexico. 

Since that time, four high Cuban of- 
ficials have been indicted by a Florida 
grand jury, and the United States has 
developed new evidence from a variety 
of independent sources confirming that 
Cuban officials have facilitated narcotics 
trafficking through the Caribbean for at 
least the past 2 years. They have done 
so by developing a relationship with key 
Colombian drug runners who, on Cuba's 
behalf, purchased arms and smuggled 
them to Cuban-backed insurgent groups 
in Colombia. In return, the traffickers 
received safe passage of ships carrying 
cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone 
through Cuban waters to the United 
States. 

We are now able to provide some 
further details on the Cuban-Colombian 
traffickers' M-19 nexus. We are also 
prepared to provide briefings on more 
sensitive information— in a closed ses- 
sion. 

We now have information that 
Guillot started his narcotics trafficking 
activity under official Cuban protection 
during the summer of 1980. His ar- 
rangement with the Cuban authorities 
asured him safe passage through Cuban 
waters in return for payoffs at the 
Cuban Coast Guard station on the 
Cuban north coast across from Andros 
Island, The Bahamas. 



In addition to provision of safe 
passage, Cuban officials maintained 
close coordination with Guillot. His con- 
tacts included, at the Cuban Embassy in 
Bogota, Ambassador Fernando Ravelo 
Renedo and Minister Counselor Gonzalo 
Bassols Suarez, both members of the 
American Department of the Cuban 
Communist Party's Central Committee. 
He also dealt with an America Depart- 
ment official in the Cuban Embassy in 
Mexico. Bassols urged Guillot to work 
with the M-19. In November 1981 he 
reportedly "loaned" Guillot $10,000 with 
which to purchase 500 kilograms of co- 
caine on behalf of the M-19 and arrange 
its shipment to the United States. We 
also know that Guillot, fearing arrest by 
the Mexican authorities, at one point 
considered taking refuge in the Cuban 
Embassy in Mexico to avoid arrest and 
was told by a Cuban contact there that 
"Fidel" had instructed the Cuban Em- 
bassy to protect him. 

At one point, Guillot received a 
Nicaraguan visa from the Nicaraguan 
Ambassador to Mexico, who apparently 
acted on a request from M-19 military 
leader Bateman. We know from sep- 
arate sources that in early 1982 the 
Nicaraguan Government was negotiating 
the sale of a DC-6 aircraft to a known 
Colombian drug runner. Whether or not 
this indicates a Nicaraguan role is not 
clear from the information available, but 
this is something we will be examining 
closely. 

We have a report that the Com- 
munist Party Presidium, and specifically 
Fidel Castro, in early 1979 considered a 
scheme to begin dealing with narcotics 
smugglers using Cuba as a bridge and 
support base for the networks to the 
United States as a means to aid Cuba 
economically and to contribute to the 
deterioration of American society. Also 
during an interview with Colombian 
journalists in October 1982, Fidel Castro 
described Guillot as a "good friend of 
Cuba." Castro's later statement to the 
"Caracol" Colombian news agency in 
January 1983 that Cuba detains some 
Americans involved in narcotics traffick- 
ing is true in itself, but this does not 
preclude Cuba from also using the drug 
weapon as it sees fit. 

We cannot expect the Cuban 
Government to acknowledge its involve- 



ment in drug trafficking to the United 
States. But the evidence clearly indi- 
cates more than a case of corruption by 
local or mid-level security officials in 
Cuba. The association with Guillot of the* 
Cuban Embassies in Mexico City and 
Bogota and officers from the America 
Department of the Cuban Communist 
Party Central Committee gives strong 
indication of official policy approval. 

Narcotics trafficking has apparently 
been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to 
finance subversion in Latin America. 
The Administration is determined to 
discover the exact extent of Cuban in- 
volvement in narcotics. Let me assure 
you that we attach a particularly high 
priority to any evidence of Cuba's use 
of narcotics as a weapon against this 
country. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committees and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Return of Certain 
Mariel Cubans 



The chief of the Cuban Interests Section 
in Washington was requested on May 2. r > 
by Assistant. Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs Thomas O. Enders to 
ask his government to take back certain 
Cuban nationals who came to the I 'niter 
States in the Marie! boatlift of 1980. 

During that period, some 125,000 
Cubans entered the United States 
without authorization. The vast majority 
were law abiding, were allowed to join 
relatives and friends, and soon found 
homes and employment. A few thousand 
were detained by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service because of serioui 
criminal conduct in Cuba. Many of these 
remain in detention. Additionally, others 
have been convicted of crimes in this 
country and have served or are current- 
ly serving sentences in State or local 
prisons. Finally, some are ineligible to 
remain in the United States for other 
substantive reasons. The Cuban Govern- 
ment has refused to take back any of 
these persons. 

Under Section 243(g) of the Im- 
migration and Nationality Act, the 
Department is required to discontinue 
the issuance of immigrant visas in any 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATIES 



country upon notification by the At- 
torney General that said country, upon 
request, denies or unduly delays accepl 
pice of the return of its nationals found 
ineligible to remain in the United States 
kinder U.S. immigration law. The At- 
torney Genera] lias so notified the 
Secretary of State. 

Coincident with the Mariel boatlift, 
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana 
was obliged to discontinue the issuance 
f visas because hundreds of Cuban ap- 
plicants, seeking escape from Cuban 
©lice action outside the building, took 
efuge in its premises. The section later 
esumed the issuance of nonimmigrant 
/isas and of immigrant visas to im- 
nediate relatives (spouses, minor 
hildren, and parents) of U.S. citizens 
md to certain U.S. permanent residents 
who had been in Cuba for protracted 
lays, but continued not issuing im- 
nigrant visas to other applicants. 

With the concurrence of the At- 
orney General, and pursuant to 
egulatory authority, the U.S. Interests 
Section in Havana will continue its cur- 
ent policy of issuing immigrant visas in 
he above categories. We will also con- 
inue issuing nonimmigrant visas in 
Iavana, as well as immigrant visas in 
11 categories to Cuban applicants in 
hird countries. Once all the Cuban na- 
ionals who came with the Mariel 
oatlift who are ineligible to remain in 
■he United States for substantive 
easons have been returned to Cuba, the 
'ay will be clear for the U.S. Interests 
•ection in Havana to resume issuance of 
nmigrant visas in all categories to 
uban applicants. 

Finally, we wish to make it very 
iear that members of the Cuban com- 
lunity who came with the Mariel 
oatlift and who maintain "Cuban- 
[aitian entrant" status will not be af- 
'Cted by this initiative. Neither will 
lembers of the Cuban-American com- 
mnity who came before Mariel. 



iress release 192 of May 25, 1983. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington 

Dec. 1. 1959, Entered into force June 23, 

1961. TIAS4780. 

Accession deposited: China. June 8, 1983. 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force 
June 7. 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
TIAS 6997. 

Notification of succession: Djibouti, June 14, 
1983. 

Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the 
return of astronauts, and the return of ob- 
jects launched into outer space. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 22, 
1968. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1968. TIAS 
6599. 
Accession d eposited: Japan, June 20, 1983. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague 
Dec. lti, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 
1971. TIAS 7192. 

Acc ession deposited : Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, 1 Apr. 28, 1983. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text 
of the convention on international civil avia- 
tion (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Mon- 
treal September 30, 1977. 2 
Acceptance deposited : Austria, May 4, 1983. 

toffee 

International coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 2 
Signatures: Austria, Paraguay, June 15, 
1983; Burundi, Costa Rica, May 19, 1983; 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, June 13, 1983; 
Cyprus, June 7, 1983; Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Italy, June 16, 1983; El Salvador, 
Sri Lanka, June 20, 1983; Greece, May 20, 
1983; Japan, June 1, 1983; Kenya, May 17, 
1983; Nicaragua, Togo, June 17, 1983; Papua 
New Guinea, June 21, 1983; Zaire, June 3, 
1983. 

Acceptance deposited : Japan, June 1, 1983. 
Extension of the international coffee agree- 
ment, 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London 
Sept. 25, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 1, 
1982. TIAS 10439. 
I lefinitive acceptance deposited: < Ireece, 

June 10, 1983. 



Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 

for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 

Geneva June 27, 1980.- 

Signatures : Colombia, June 14, 1983; 

Dominican Republic, June 15, 1983; 

Guatemala, June I, 1983; Guyana, 

Madagascar, Thailand, Zimbabwe, June s, 

1983; Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, 

June 20, 1983. 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, June 9, 

1983 

Ratificati ons deposited: Guinea-Bissau, 

June 7, 1983; Pakistan, June 9, 1983. 

Cultural Relations— UNESCO 

Protocol to the agreement on the importation 

of educational, scientific, and cultural 

materials of Nov. 22, 1950 (TIAS 6129). 

Adopted at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered 

into force Jan. 2, 1982. 3 

Ratification d eposite d: Belgium, June 6, 

1983. 

Customs 

International convention on the simplification 
and harmonization of customs procedures, 
with annexes. Signed at Kyoto May 18, 1973. 
Entered into force Sept. 25, 1974. 3 
Senate ad\ ice and consent to ratification: 

June 21, 1983. 

Education— UNESCO 

Convention on the recognition of studies, 
diplomas, and degrees concerning higher 
education in the states belonging to the 
Europe Region. Done at Paris Dec. 21, 1979. 
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982. 3 
Ratifications deposited: Italy, Jan. 20, 1983; 
San Marino, Apr. 15, 1983. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. 
TIAS 9614. 
Ratification deposited : F.R.G., May 24, 1983. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention abolishing the requirement of 
legalization for foreign public documents, 
with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. 
Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the 
United States Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072. 
Signature: Norway, May 30, 1983. 
Ratification deposited : Norway, May 30, 
1983. 

Jute 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Enters into force 
July 1, 1983, or any date thereafter, if by 
that date certain requirements have been 
met. 



kugust 1983 



87 



TREATIES 



Signatures : Bangladesh, Feb. 11, 1983; 
Belgium, Luxembourg, May 16, 1983; Den- 
mark, EEC, F.R.G., Ireland, Italy, June 6, 
1983; Egypt, June 20, 1983; Finland, Nor- 
way, Sweden, Jan. 14, 1983; France, Apr. 19, 
1983; Greece, May 20, 1983; Japan, Mar. 18, 
1983; Netherlands, Feb. 15, 1983; U.S., 
June 24, 1983. 

Notifications of provisional application 
deposited: Belgium, EEC, F.R.G., Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, June 6, 1983; 
France, Apr. 19, 1983. 
Acceptance deposited : Japan, June 1, 1983. 
Ratification deposited : Denmark, June 6, 
1983. 

Marine Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for 

oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 

Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force 

June 19, 1975. 3 

Acceptance deposited : Guatemala, Oct. 20, 

1982. 

Accessions deposited: Sri Lanka, Apr. 12, 

1983; Vanuatu, Feb. 2, 1983. 

International convention relating to interven- 
tion on the high seas in cases of oil pollution 
casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 
1975. TIAS 8068. 
Accession deposited : Sri Lanka, Apr. 12, 

1983. 

Territorial application : Extended by the U.K. 
to Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, 
Montserrat, Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and 
Oeno Islands, St. Helena and Dependencies, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, U.K. Sovereign 
Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the 
Island of Cyprus, Sept. 8, 1982. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977. 2 
Acceptance deposited : Italy, June 13, 1983. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979. 2 

Acceptances deposited: Argentina, Italy, 
July 13, 1983; France, Tanzania, May 26, 
1983; Senegal, Togo, Yemen (Aden), June 20, 
1983. 

Marriage 

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum 
age for marriage and registration of mar- 
riages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962. 
Entered into force Dec. 9, 1964. 3 
Accession deposite d: Venezuela, May 31, 
1983. 



Nuclear Material— Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 

nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 

Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. 2 

Ratification deposited : U.S.S.R., 1 May 25, 

1983. 

Postal 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Accession deposited : Guatemala, Dec. 16, 

19X2 

Approvals deposited : Monaco, Dec. 27, 1982; 

Papua New Guinea, Jan. 18, 1983; Sweden, 

Mar. 23, 1983. 

Ratification deposit ed: Kenya, Mar. 24, 1983. 

Money orders and postal traveler's checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations with 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro 
Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 
1981. TIAS 9973. 
A pprovals deposited : Monaco, Dec. 27, 1982; 

Sweden, Mar. 23, 1983. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969. 3 

Accession deposited 1 lominican Republic, 
May 25, 1983. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 

at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 

Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 

1980. TIAS 9700. 

Ac cession deposited : Fiji, Mar. 4, 1983. 

Ratification deposited : Venezuela, Mar. 29, 

1983. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. 
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. 
Accession deposited : G.D.R., Apr. 28, 1983. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for 
damage caused by space objects. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29, 
1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for 
the U.S. Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposite d: Japan, June 20. 1983. 

Convention on registration of objects 
launched into outer space. Done at New Y< irk 
Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 
1976. TIAS 8480. 
Acre: iion deposited: Japan, June 20, 1983. 



Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons, including diplomatic agents. 
Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. 
Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532* 
Accession depo sited: Korea. May 25, 1983. 

Tonnage 

International convention on tonnage measure 
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1982; for the U.S., Feb. 10, 1983. 
TIAS 10490. 
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, Mar. 2, 1983. 

Trade 

Convention on contracts for the international 
sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11. 1980. 
Ratification deposited : Hungary, June 16, 

1983. 

Convention on the limitation period in the in- 
ternational sale of goods. Done at New York 
June 12, 1974, and Protocol done at Vienna 
Apr. 11, 1980. 2 
Ratification deposited : Hungary, June 16, 

1983. 

Agreement on government procurement. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 10403. 
Ac cepta nce dep osited : Israel, May 30, 1983. 

Agreement on implementation of art. VII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(customs valuation). Done at Geneva Apr. 12 | 
1979, and Protocol done at Geneva Nov. 1, 
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 
10402. 

Acceptance deposite d: South Africa, June 1, 
19X3 

U.N. Industrial Development 
Organization 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted a 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 2 
K;ii if'ications deposited: < 'ongo, Maj 16, 198 

( Greece, June 10, 1983. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 21, 1983. 4 

Weapons 

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on 
the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively in- 
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, will 
annexed Protocols. Adopted at Geneva 
Oct. 10, 19X0. 

Ratifications and acceptances d e posited : 
Poland, June 2, 1983; Yugoslavia, May 24, 
1983. 
Enters into force: Dec. 2, 1983. 6 



88 



Department of State Bulletir 



TREATIES 



Whaling 

International whaling convention and 
schedule of whaling regulations. Done at 
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force 
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. 
Adherence deposited: Mauritius, June 17, 

198.1. 

Wheat 

k983 protocol for the further extension of the 
theat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
Ho force July 1. 1983. 
►Acceptance deposited : Japan, June 6, 1983. 
testifications deposited: Korea, Mauritius, 

lune 17, 1983. 

[Declarations of provisional application 

leposited: « luatemala, June 14, 1983; 

brtugal, June 15, 1983. 

983 protocol for the further extension of the 
bod aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
nto force July 1, 1983. 
Acceptance deposited : Japan, June 6, 1983. 

.Vomen 

Convention on the political rights of women. 
Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered 
nto force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 
976. TIAS 8289. 
Accession deposited : Venezuela, May 31, 

9S3. 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
liscrimination against women. Adopted at 
Jew York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981. 3 
Signatures : Cameroon, June 6, 1983; Korea, 

Hay 25, 1983. 

Ratification deposited : Greece, June 7, 1983. 

Vorld Health Organization 

Constitution of the World Health Organi- 
ation. Done at New York July 22, 1946. 
ntered into force Apr. 7, 1948. TIAS 1808. 
Acceptance deposited: Solomon Islands, 
ipr. 4, 1983. 

Amendments to arts. 24 and 25 of the Con- 
titution of the World Health Organization 
TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). Adopted at Geneva 
Hay 17. 1976, by the 29th World Health 
Assembly. 2 

Acceptances deposited: Benin, Hungary, 
Hay 4, 1983; Italy, May 17, 1983; Jordan, 
une 10, 1983; Zaire, May 2, 1983. 



HLATERAL 

Antigua and Barbuda 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
'or the avoidance of double taxation and the 
irevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
axes on income. Signed at Washington 
V. 16. I 945 . as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 
H24, 6089). 



Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958; for Antigua 
Jan. 19, 1959. TIAS 4141. 
Notification of termination by Antigua and 
Barbuda : Feb. 26, 1983; effective Aug. 26, 
1983. 

Argentina 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 4, 1970 (TIAS 7022) establishing the 
OMEGA navigation station. Signed at 
Washington May 11. 1983. Entered into force 
May 11, 1983. 

Barbados 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 
4124, 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to Barbados : June 28, 1983; 
effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

Belgium 

General administrative agreement relating to 
participation in severe nuclear accident 
research programs. Signed at Washington 
and Brussels Mar. 29 and Apr. 18, 1983. 
Entered into force Apr. 18, 1983; effective 
Feb. 10, 1983. 

Belize 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 
4124, 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to Belize : June 28, 1983; effective 
Jan. 1, 1984. 

Brazil 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Dec. 1, 1971, as amended and extended, 
relating to a program of scientific and 
technological cooperation (TIAS 7221). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Brasilia May 
31, 1983. Entered into force May 31, 1983. 



Burundi 

Agreement between the U.S. and Belgium 
relating to the extension to the Belgian Con- 
go and Ruanda- Urundi of the convention for 
the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income of Oct. 28, 1948, as amended 
(TIAS 2833, 4280). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Apr. 2, 1954, and July 
28, 1959. Entered into force July 28, 1959. 
TIAS 4280. 

Notification by U.S. of termination of exten- 
sion t o Burundi : June 28, 1983; effective 
Jan. 1, 1984. 

Canada 

Protocol amending the convention with 
respect to taxes on income and on capital of 
Sept. 26, 1980. 2 Signed at Ottawa June 14, 
1983. Enters into force upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 

Chad 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange 
of notes at N'Djamena Feb. 22 and Apr. 22, 
1983. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1983. 

Cook Islands 

Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the 

maritime boundary between the U.S. and the 

Cook Islands. Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 

1980. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 21,1983. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities and memorandum 
of understanding of Oct. 20, 1982. Signed at 
San Jose Apr. 26, 1983. Enters into force 
when the importer country notifies the ex- 
porter country that all constitutional re- 
quirements have been met. 

Djibouti 

Investment incentive agreement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Djibouti May 11, 1983. 
Entered into force May 11, 1983. 

Dominica 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 
4124, 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to Dominica: June 28, 1983; effec- 
tive Jan. 1, 1984. 



August 1983 



89 



TREATIES 



Gambia 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 
4124). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to The Gambia: June 28, 1983; 
effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement relating to severe nuclear acci- 
dent research programs. Signed at 
Washington and Karlsruhe Mar. 29 and 
Apr. 15, 1983. Entered into force Apr. 15, 
1983. 

Grenada 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 
4124, 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to Grenada: June 28, 1983; effec- 
tive Jan. 1, 1984. 

Haiti 

Agreement for sale of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
June 8, 1979, with memorandum of 
understanding. Signed at Port-au-Prince 
June 8, 1983. Entered into force June 8, 
1983. 

Israel 

Arrangement for the exchange of technical 
information and cooperation in nuclear safety 
matters, with addenda. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 11, 1983. Entered into force Apr. 11, 
1983. 

Kiribati 

Treaty of friendship with agreed minutes. 
Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 21, 1983. 

Malawi 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed 
at Lilongwe Mar. 10, 1983. Entered into 
force May 16, 1983. 



Agreement continuing in force between the 
U.S. and Malawi the convention between the 
U.S. and the U.K. of Apr. 16, 1945, for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the preven- 
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 4124). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Zomba and 
Blantyre Dec. 17, 1966, Jan. 6 and Apr. 4, 
1967. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1967. TIAS 
6328. 

Notification of termination by the U.S.: 
June 28, 1983; effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

Mexico 

Convention for the recovery and return of 
stolen or embezzled vehicles and aircraft. 
Signed at Washington Jan. 15, 1981. 
Instruments of ratification exchanged: 

June 28, 1983. 

Entry into force: June 28, 1983. 

Netherlands 

Agreement relating to severe nuclear acci- 
dent research programs. Signed at 
Washington and Petten Mar. 29 and Apr. 1 1 , 
1983. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1983; effec- 
tive Feb. 15, 1983. 

New Zealand 

Treaty on the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary between Tokelau and the U.S. 
Signed at Atafu Dec. 2, 1980. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 21, 1983. 

Pakistan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Mar. 25, 1980 (TIAS 9782). Signed at 
Islamabad Mav 15, 1983. Entered into force 
May 15, 1983. 

Romania 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Dec. 4, 1973, relating to civil 
air transport, as renewed and amended 
(TIAS 7901, 9431), with related letters. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest 
Apr. 22 "and 28, 1983. Entered into force 
Apr. 28, 1983; effective Jan. 31, 1983. 

Rwanda 

Agreement between the U.S. and Belgium 
relating to the extension to the Belgian Con- 
go and Ruanda- Uru ik li of the convention for 
the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income of Oct. 28, 1948, as amended 
(TIAS 2833, 4280). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Apr. 2, 1954, and 
July 28, 1959. Entered into force July 28, 
1959. TIAS 4280. 

Notification by the U.S. of termination of ex- 
tension to Rwan da: June 28, 1983; effective 
Jan. 1, 1984. 



St. Lucia 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 316E 
4124, 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to St. Lucia: June 28, 1983; 
effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

St. Vincent and The Grenadines 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 316t 
4124, 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3. 195*' 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension of St. Vincent and The Grenadine; 
June 28. 1983; effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

Seychelles 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 316' 
4124. 6089). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
relating to the application of the income tax 
convention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
specified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3. 195M 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to Seychelles: June 28, 1983; effec- 
tive Jan. 1, 1984. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 31. 1978 (TIAS 9210). Signed at 
Freetown Apr. 29, 1983. Entered into force 
Apr. 29, 1983. 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 

for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 316S 

412-11. 



90 



Department of State Bulletii 



CHRONOLOGY 



greement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
gating to the application of the income tax 
invention of Apr. 16, 1945, as modified, to 
jecified British territories. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 19, 1957, and Dec. 3, 1958. 
ntered into force Dec. 3, 1958. TIAS 4141. 
otification by the U.S. of termination of 
(tension to Sierra Leone: June 29, 1983; 
'fective Jan. 1, 1984. 

pain 

greement amending the agreement of 

IB. 29, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5533, 5896, 

714), for a tracking and data acquisition sta- 

on. Effected bv exchange of notes at 

adrid Feb. 1 and May 2, 1983. Entered into 

irce May 2, 1983. 

ri Lanka 

greement amending the agreement for sales 
' agricultural commodities of Oct. 29, 1982 
'IAS 10596). Signed at Colombo Apr. 20, 
)83. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1983. 

greement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
id manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
its, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
rtes at Colombo May 10, 1983. Entered into 
rce May 10, 1983; effective May 1, 1983. 

tiailand 

greement amending the agreement of 
:t. 4, 1978, as amended and extended 
'IAS 9215, 9462, 9643, 9717, 9937, 10153, 
1368, 10461), relating to trade in cotton, 
aol, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
oducts. Effected by exchange of letters at 
ingkok Apr. 15 and 28, 1983. Entered into 
irce Apr. 28, 1983. 

ivalu 

■■eaty of Friendship. Signed at Funafuti 
>b. 7, 1979. 

■nate advice and consent to ratification: 
me 21, 1983. 

nited Kingdom 

invention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
>n and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
spect to taxes on income. Signed at 
ashington Apr. 16, 1945, as amended 
IAS 1546, 3165, 4124, 6089). 
itification by U.S. of termination of exte n- 
)n to Falkland Islands, Montserrat, St . 
nristopher-Nevis-Anguilla : June 28, 1983, 
(fective Jan. 1, 1984. 



lire 

greement between the U.S. and Belgium 
lating to the extension to the Belgian Con- 
and Ruanda-Urundi of the convention for 
e avoidance of double taxation and the 
■evention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
xes on income of Oct. 28, 1948, as amended 
'IAS 2833, 4280). Effected by exchange of 
ites at Washington Apr. 2, 1954, and July 
!, 1959. Entered into force July 28, 1959. 
(AS 4280. 

otification by U.S. of termination of exte n- 
pn to Zaire: June 28, 1983; effective Jan. 1, 
)84. 



Zambia 

Convention between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546. 3165, 
4124). 

Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. 
continuing in force for Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland individual 
ly the income tax convention of Apr. 16, 
1945, as modified. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Dec. 31, 1963. Entered 
into force Dec. 31, 1963. TIAS 5501. 
Notification by the U.S. of termination of 
extension to Zambia : June 28, 1983; effec- 
tive Jan. 1, 1984. 



■With reservation. 
z Not in force. 
3 Not in force for the U.S. 
4 With understandings. 
6 Not for the U.S. ■ 



June 1983 



June 1 

In Manila, U.S. -Philippines sign memorandum 

of agreement concluding review of 

LI. S. -Philippines Military Bases Agreement. 

June 3 

On behalf of President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz transmits the 14th semiannual Report 
on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final 
Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Com- 
mission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. The report covers the period 
December 1, 1982, through May 31, 1983. 

June 4 

Louis C. Thomas, an attache at the U.S. Em- 
bassy, Moscow, is declared persona non grata 
by the Soviet Union for alleged espionage 
activities. 

June 6 

Nicaraguan Government expels three U.S. 
diplomats accusing them of attempting to 
"destabilize" the Sandinista government. The 
three are Linda M. Pfeifel, chief of embassy's 
political section; David N. Greig, political of- 
ficer; and Ermila L. Rodriguez, second 
secretary. U.S. protests the expulsions and 
rejects Nicaraguan Government's allegations. 
Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet- 
Boigny makes a state visit to the U.S. 
June 6-12 and to Washington, D.C., June 
6-9. 

June 6-July 3 

Sixth U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) is held in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia. Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam 
leads the U.S. delegation, attending the con- 
ference June 10-14. 

June 7 

Nicaraguan Ambassador to Washington is in- 
formed by the Acting Assistant Secretary of 



State for Inter-American Affairs that in 
response to Nicaragua!s expulsion of U.S. 
diplomats June ii. the U.S. requires the clos- 
ing of six Nicaraguan consular posts in the 
U.S. and the departure of Nicaraguan of 
ficials and staff assigned I" them. 

June 8 

President Reagan announces that he is direct 
ing U.S. START negotiators to adjust the 
U.S. position by relaxing the current proposal 
for tin 850 deployed ballistic missile limit. The 
U.S., however, retains the goal of a reduction 
in ballistic missile warheads to 5,000. This 
charge reflects the recommendations of the 
Scowcroft commission and consultation with 
the Congress. 

In Geneva, U.S. and Soviet Union resume 
strategic arms reduction talks after a 
10-week recess. 

June 9 

State Department publishes and issues a 
special report entitled "Security and Arms 
Control: The Search for a More Stable 
Peace." The report examines the contribution 
of arms control to security, discusses the 
state of negotiations in principal areas of 
arms control, and sets forth the U.S. ap- 
proach on security and arms control. 

June 9-10 

NATO ministerial meeting is held in Paris. 

June 10 

State Department announces that the U.S. 
will release an additional $25 million in 
emergency food aid to drought-stricken 
African countries. The food will consist 
primarily of sorghum, corn, wheat, and 
vegetable oil. Prior to this announcement, 10 
southern African countries received over 
$68.2 million or about 250,000 tons of food 
through the U.S. PL 480 Food for Peace 
program. 

President Reagan signs an Executive 
order extending the Scowcroft commission to 
January 3, 1984. 

Results of general elections held June 9 
in the LInited Kingdom show Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party win- 
ning a majority of more than 100 seats over 
the combined opposition. 

June 11-15 

Australian Prime Minister Robert J.L. 
Hawke makes an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C. 

June 13 

The following newly appointed Ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan: Gabriel Manueco of Spain; Abdallah 
Bouhabib of Lebanon; Dr. Jose Antonio 
Jarquin Toledo of Nicaragua; Guy-Landry 
Hazoume of Benin; and Richard Bertil Muller 
of Finland. 

June 14 

By a vote of 65-2, with 4 abstentions, 
Lebanese Parliament overwhelmingly ap- 
proves its agreement with Israel for a 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. 



91 



PRESS RELEASES 



June 14-16 

As part of the 1982 U.N. General Assembly 
agreement between Secretary Shultz and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the State 
Department announces that the U.S. is 
holding a second round of bilateral consulta- 
tions with the Soviet Union on nuclear non- 
proliferation issues. 

June 16 

General Secretary of the Communist Party, 
Yuriy Andropov, is elected to the position of 
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, thereby now assuming all three posts 
previously held by Leonid I. Brezhnev. 

June 16-18 

Salvadoran President Alvaro Alfredo Magana 
Borja makes an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C. 

June 18 

Chinese National People's Congress elects Li 
Xiannian as president, the third chief of state 
since the communist takeover in 1949. 

June 20-22 

Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez 
Marquez makes an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C. 

June 20-July 1 

As part of the 35th anniversary celebration 
of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, a special seminar is held in Geneva to 
emphasize the positive side of countries' ex- 
periences in implementing international 
human rights standards. U.S. representative 
is Warren Hewitt, Director of the Office of 
Human Rights, Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs. 

June 21 

Honduran Congress authorizes establishment 
of U.S. training camps that will be used to 
teach Salvadoran soldiers to fight leftist 
rebels in El Salvador. The authorization was 
based on a 1954 U.S. -Honduran agreement. 
Two U.S. journalists — Richard Gross, a 
freelance photographer for U.S. News and 
World Report and Dial Torgerson, a reporter 
for The Lux Angeles Times — are killed while 
driving on a road in Honduras near the 
Nicaraguan border. The Honduran Govern- 
ment states that an anti-tank grenade was 
fired into Honduras from Nicaragua hitting 
the journalists' car and files a letter of pro- 
test with the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister 
sending copies to the U.N. Security Council. 
OAS, and the Contadora countries. 
Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry issues a state 
merit denying charges. 

June 23 

U.S. Embassy in Managua protests 
Nicaraguan responsibility for the deaths of 
two U.S. journalists in Honduras. 

June 22-23 

U.S. -European Communities agree to 
establish an informal working group to 
discuss export subsidies and other forms of 
agricultural assistance to agricultural prod- 
ucts. The group will attempt to "develop a 



92 



common approach" on ways to define and 
clarify internationally agreed upon rules on 
trade in agriculture. 

June 23-July 7 

Vice President Bush makes an official work- 
ing visit to northern Europe to explain U.S. 
policy in Latin America. The Vice President 
visits London, June 23-25; West Germany, 
June 25; Norway, June 26-27, June 29-30; 
Sweden June 27-29; Finland, July 1-3; Den- 
mark, July 3-4; Ireland, July 4-5; and 
Iceland, July 5-7. 

June 23-July 8 

Secretary Shultz makes an official working 
visit to East and South Asia and the Middle 
East. The Secretary will visit the Philippines 
June 25-26; Thailand, to address the opening 
session of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' 
post-ministerial meeting and to hold discus- 
sions with the Royal Thai Government, June 
26-29; India, June 30-July 2; and Pakistan, 
July 2-4; Saudi Arabia, July 3-4; Lebanon, 
July 5; Syria, July 5-6; Israel, July 6-7; and 
Jordan and Egypt, July 7. The Secretary 
returned to Washington on July 8. 

June 24-25 

Sixteenth ASEAN ministerial meeting is held 
in Bangkok. 

June 27 

President Reagan signs S.639, the Lebanon 
Emergency Assistance Act of 1983. The bill 
authorizes appropriation for reconstruction of 
the Lebanese economy, foreign military sales, 
loan guarantees, and military training of the 
Lebanese armed forces. 

In Guam, U.S. -Marshall Islands reach 
agreement on a comprehensive settlement of 
all claims brought by inhabitants of the 
Islands arising from nuclear testing 30 years 
ago. The agreement, signed by U.S. Am- 
bassador Fred M. Zeder, II, Personal 
Representative of the President for Microne- 
sian Status Negotiations, and President of 
the Islands, Amata Kabua, ends 14 years of 
negotiations and also resolves a major 
obstacle blocking a proposed compact of free 
association. 

June 27-30 

UN World Food Council holds ninth 
ministerial conference in New York. The con- 
ference focuses on present food difficulties 
facing developing countries in light of current 
adverse economic conditions and concludes by 
adopting a consensus set of conclusions and 
recommendations expressing deep concern 
over excessive concentration of world grain 
supplies in North America. The Ministers 
conclude that in order to improve global food 
security, trade policies and practices must be 
improved, i.e., increased liberation of 
agricultural trade. The Ministers also reject 
the use of food as an instrument of political 
pressure. The U.S. delegation was headed by 
John Block, Secretary of Agriculture. 

June 29 

Honduran military issues a statement saying 
that a land mine laid by Nicaraguans is 
responsible for killing two American jour- 
nalists, not gunfire as had been believed. 



State Department confirms that two 
Americans are among five foreign relief 
workers taken hostage in Boma, in southern 
Sudan, by an organization calling itself the 
Liberation Front of Southern Sudan. The tw> 
Americans are John Haspels, an employee of 
the African Committee for the Rehabilitatior 
of Southern Sudan, and Ron Pontier, 
employed by the African Inland Mission. 
( )ther hostages are German, Dutch, and 
Canadian. 

U.S. Navy F-14 jets from the aircraft 
carrier USS Eisenhower intercept two Libya 
MiG-23 aircraft during a routine operational 
exercise off the Gulf of Sidra. According to e 
Department spokesman, the interception oc- 
curs "in international airspace north of the 
Libyan coastline" and no shots or missiles 
were fired by either side. The Defense 
Department states that "a notice or intent to 
operate aircraft within the Tripoli flight in- 
formation region" was issued prior to the ex- 
ercise. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

195 6/6 Shultz: remarks to Foreign 

Policy Association, New 
York, May 26. 
195A 6/6 Shultz: question-and-answer 

session following Foreign 
Policy Association 
remarks, May 26. 

196 6/1 Shultz: interview on NBC- 

TV's "Today Show," 
Williamsburg, May 31. 

197 6/2 Availability of additional 

Department of State 
records 1950-54, for 
research. 

*198 6/2 State Department, Marshall 

Foundation honor George 
C. Marshall as Secretary 
of State. 
199 6/2 Shultz: changes in ambas- 
sadorships. 

*200 6/3 Program for the state visit 
to Washington, D.C, of 
Ivory Coast President 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, 
June 6-12. 

*2()1 6/7 Shultz: news briefing aboard 

Air Force One en route to 
Williamsburg, May 27. 

*202 6/6 Allen Clayton Davis sworn 

in as Ambassador to Ugan 
da (biographic data). 
203 6/9 Joint statement by the par- 
ticipants at the Williams- 
burg economic summit 
read on their behalf by 
Secretary Shultz. 



Department of State Bulletir 



PUBLICATIONS 



Shultz: news briefing, 
Williamsburg, May 29. 

Shultz: news briefing, 
Williamsburg, May 30. 

Program for the official 
working visit to 
Washington, D.C., of 
Australian Prime Minister 
Robert J. L. Hawke, June 
11-15. 

Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on fire protection, 
June 28. 

Advisory Committee on 
International Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, working group on 
multilateral investment 
standards for MNE's and 
UN activities, July 6. 

Shultz: commencement 
address, Stanford Univer- 
sity, June 12. 

U.S., Sri Lanka sign new 
bilateral textile agree- 
ment, May 10. 

Myles Robert Rene 

Frechette sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Cameroon 
(biographic data). 

Shultz: news conference, 
Paris, June 8. 

Shultz: statement before 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 

Program for the official 
visit to Washington, D.C., 
of Salvadoran President 
Alvaro Magana Borja, 
June 16-18. 

Program for the official 
working visit to 
Washington, D.C., of 
Spanish President Felipe 
Gonzalez, June 20-22. 

Edward J. Derwinski sworn 
in as Counselor of the 
Department (biographic 
data). 

Nicholas A. Veliotes sworn 
in as Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs 
(biographic data). 

Documents on German 
Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 
Series C (1933-1937) The 
Third Reich: First Phase, 
Vol. VI, Nov. 1, 
1936-Nov. 14, 1937. 

France assures U.S. of non- 
discriminatory treatment 
of U.S. airlines. 

Executive Seminar cele- 
brates 25th anniversary. 

Shultz: news conference. 

U.S., Romania sign new 
textile agreement Jan. 28 
and March 31, 1983. 



*223 6/24 



*224 6/24 



*225 6/24 



*226 6/24 



*227 6/24 



*228 6/28 



229 6/28 

230 6/27 

*231 6/28 



*232 6/28 

*233 6/28 

*234 6/28 

*235 6/28 

236 6/28 



237 


6/28 


238 


6/28 


239 




240 


6/28 



Richard R. Burt sworn in 
as Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs 
(biographic data). 

H. Allen Holmes sworn in as 
Ambassador to Portugal 
(biographic data). 

James M. Rentschler sworn 
in as Ambassador to Malta 
(biographic data). 

John Davis Lodge sworn in 
as Ambassador to 
Switzerland (biographic 
data). 

Stephen W. Bosworth 

appointed Chairman of the 
Secretary's Policy Plan- 
ning Council, Jan. 3. 

Appointment of U.S. dele- 
gation chairman to the 
High Frequency World 
Administrative Radio Con- 
ference for planning use of 
HF Broadcasting Bands, 
Geneva, Jan.-Feb. 1984. 

Shultz: statement, Bangkok, 
June 26. 

Shultz: remarks at Mala- 
canang luncheon, Manila, 
June 25. 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Telegraph 
and Telephone Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCITT), Integrated Serv- 
ices Digital Network, July 
19-21. 

CCITT, study group A, 
July 21. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on standards of training 
and watchkeeping, 
July 27. 

Presidential Commission on 
the Conduct of U.S. -Japan 
Relations, July 14. 

W. Allen Wallis sworn in as 
Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs 
(biographic data) 

U.S. submits pleadings to the 
International Court of 
Justice in the case con- 
cerning the maritime 
boundary with Canada in 
the Gulf of Maine area. 

Federated States of Micro- 
nesia approves free 
association with U.S. 

U.S. and Republic of the 
Marshall Islands call 
plebiscite on compact of 
free association. 

[Not issued.] 

Joint news conference by 
Foreign Ministers of 
ASEAN post-ministerial 
meeting, Bangkok. 



Department of State 



Free, single copies ol the following 
Department of State publications are 
available from the Public Information Serv- 
ice, Bureau 'if Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Shultz 

U.S. -Soviet Relations in the Context of 1 1.S. 
Foreign Policy, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, June 15, 1983 (Current 
Policy #491i). 

On Learning From Experience: The Respon- 
sibility of the Democracies, Stanford 
University, Stanford, California, June 12, 
1983 (Current Policy #491). 

Africa 

Southern Africa: America's Responsibility 
for Peace and Change, Under Secretary 
Eagleburger, National Conference of 
Editorial Writers, San Francisco, June 
X\. 1983 (Current Policy #497). 

Background Notes on Botswana (May 1983). 

Arms Control 

Security and Arms Control: The Search for 
a More Stable Peace, June 1983 (Pam- 
phlet). 

( lhallenges of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime, Richard T. Kennedy, Am- 
bassador at Large and special adviser to 
the Secretary on nonproliferation policy 
and nuclear energy affairs, Atomic In- 
dustrial Forum and FORATOM, Geneva, 
Switzerland, June 1, 1983 (Current Policy 
#493). 

East Asia 

Background Notes on Japan (May 1983). 
Korea: Status Report (GIST, June 1983). 

Europe 

A Critical Juncture for the Altantic Alliance, 
Assistant Secretary Burt, Time, Inc., 
Conference on the Atlantic Alliance, 
Hamburg, F.R.G., April 25, 1983 (Cur- 
rent Poilcy #486). 

The Atlantic Alliance: Facts and Lessons 
of History, Deputy Secretary Dam, Con- 
ference sponsored by Atlantik-Bruecke 
and the American Council of Germany, 
West Berlin, March 25, 1983 (Current 
Policy #489). 

NATO, Western Security, and Arms Reduc- 
tion, Deputy Secretary Dam, Executive 
Club, Oslo, Norway, Mar 21, 1983 (Cur- 
rent Policy #488). ' 

Background Notes on Belgium (June 1983). 

Background Notes on Spain (May 1983) 



"Not printed in the Bulletin. 



ugust 1983 



93 



PUBLICATIONS 



Middle East 

Middle East Policy Update, Assistant Secre 
tary Veliotes, Subcommittee on Europe 
and the Middle East, House Foreign Af 
fairs Committee, June 2, 1983 (I lurrent 
Policj #490). 
Background Notes on Bhutan (May 1983) 
B ground Notes on Kuwait (June 1983) 

Western Hemisphere 

Background Paper: Central America, joint 

release by Department of State and 

Department of Defense, May 27, 1983 

(Pamphlet I. 
Central America: U.S. Policy ((HST. June 

1983). 
World Peace Council: 1983 Prague Assembly 

(GIST, June 1983). ■ 



Documents on German 
Foreign Policy Released 



The Department of State on June 24, 
1983, released Volume VI of Series C, 
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
1918-19^5. This volume represents the 
19th and final to be prepared and 
published in the cooperative project of 
the United States, Great Britain, and 
France for the publication of documents 
from the archives of the pre-World 
War II German Foreign Office. These 
archives, restored to the German 
Federal Republic in 1958, had been cap- 
tured at the end of World War II and 
held by the United States and British 
Governments for more than 10 years 
during which documents were selected, 
microfilmed, and annotated for publica- 
tion. The project was originally planned 
to cover the period 1918-45 but was 
eventually limited to the years 1933-41. 
Volume VI, Series C, is the last volume 
to be produced by the tripartite publica- 
tion project, thus completing coverage of 
the period from Adolf Hitler's accession 
to power through the German declara- 
tion of war against the United States 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The 
materials in this and the companion 
volumes are of inestimable value to 
students of German history and 
specialists in international diplomacy. 

The main themes of the 580 
documents presented in this volume, 
which opens on November 1, 1936, and 
closes November 14, 1937, are the failed 
attempts by West European countries to 
confine the increasingly expansionist 
tendencies of Nazi Germany and the 



gradual coming together of the partners 
of the future Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. 
Of particular menace to the West was 
the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern 
Agreement signed November 25, 1936, 
and the growing German-Italian 
cooperation on European issues that 
reached a milestone with Italian dictator 
Mussolini's visit to Germany at the end 
of September 1937. 

Axis cooperation and Germany's 
political and economic strength in 
Southeast Europe throughout 1937 pro- 
vide the background for Nazi Germany's 
impending dramatic moves against 
Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. 
German-Soviet relations, increasingly 
strained by Germany's anti-Bolshevik 
crusade and by Soviet accusations 
against Germany in the Moscow purge 
trials, appeared to reach a nadir in 
November 1937 with Soviet insistence 
on the closing of all but two German 
consulates in the Soviet Union. Never- 
theless, out of public sight, there were 
diplomatic hints of Soviet, interest in 
achieving a political rapproachement 
with Germany foreshadowing the Nazi- 
Soviet pact of 1939. 

In accordance with the practice 
followed in all volumes of this Allied 
project, the selection of documents in 
this volume has been made jointly by the 
British, French, and U.S. editors who 
share responsibility for the selections 
made. This volume was printed by Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office and is being 
released in identical volumes by the U.S. 
and U.K. Governments. 

Copies of this volume — Department 
of State Publication 9338— may be pur- 
chased for $18.00 (domestic postpaid) 
from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or 
money orders should be made out to the 
Superintendent of Documents. 



Press release 218. 



94 



Department of State Bulletir 



JDEX 



lugust 1983 
tolume 83, No. 2077 



bhanistan 

(cent Soviet Actions in Afghanistan (Depart- 

I ment statement) 70 

rica 

ilding Trade With Africa (Lamb, 

Robinson) 36 

jthern Africa: America's Responsibility for 

Peace and Change (Eagleburger) 8 

;h Anniversary ofthe OAU (Shultz, message 

from the President) 16 

ms Control 

aretary Shultz's News Conference of 

June 22 5 

•ategic Modernization: Foreign Policy 
and Arms Control Implications (Dam) . . 17 
stralia. Visit of Australian Prime Minister 

(Hawke, Reagan) 62 

Blize. Visit of Belize Prime Minister 

J (Price, Reagan) 82 

Gnada. U.S. Submits Pleading to ICJ Con- 

I cerning Canadian Maritime Boundary . .58 

Bmmodities. Sugar Imports From Central 

I America (White House announcement) . 85 

Ingress 

lilding Trade With Africa (Lamb, 

) Robinson) 36 

Iribbean Basin Recovery Act 

I (Eagleburger) 79 

iban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking 

I (Michel) 86 

ih Report on Cyprus (message to the Con- 

j gress) 49 

I? Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act 

J (Reagan) 59 

liigees: A Continuing Concern (Purcell) 66 

j-iet Jewry (Abrams) 56 

(ategic Modernization: Foreign Policy and 

'. Arms Control Implications (Dam) 17 

Di. -Philippine Relations and the Military 
, Bases Agreement Review (Wolfowitz) .21 
~>a 
C lan Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking 

(Michel) 86 

8 .urn of Certain Mariel Cubans 86 

£jrus. 14th Report on Cyprus (message 

i to the Congress) 49 

I veloping Countries 

/ lerican Policy To Promote World Develop- 
ment (Wallis) 27 

1 > Challenge of Economic Growth (Dam) . 23 
I momics 

Zierican Policy To Promote World Develop- 
ment (Wallis) 27 

H: World Economy After Williamsburg 

(Wallis) 33 

I Salvador 

i Salvador Commission Announces Peace Ini- 
tiative (Department statement) 84 

E'sident's News Conference of June 28 

(excerpts) 4 

S:retary Shultz's News Conference of 

June 22 5 

1 5. Medical Team to El Salvador 80 

Bit of Salvadoran President (Magana, 

Reagan) 83 

I man Rights 

Sithern Africa: America's Responsibility 

• for Peace and Change (Eagleburger) ... 8 

£/iet Jewry (Abrams) 56 

1 3. Medical Team to El Salvador 80 

I migration 

I turn of Certain Mariel Cubans 86 

Iternational Law. U.S. Submits Pleading 

p to ICJ Concerning Canadian Maritime 

Boundary 58 



Iran. Persecutions and Repression in Iran 
(Reagan) 59 

Israel. Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement 
(Reagan) 59 

Ivory Coast. Visit of Ivory Coast President 
(Houphouet, Reagan) 14 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Caribbean Basin Recovery Act 
(Eagleburger) 79 

Saving Freedom in Central America 
(Reagan) 1 

Sugar Imports From Central America (White 
House announcement) 85 

Lebanon 

Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement (Reagan) 59 

The Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act 
(Reagan) 59 

Marshall Islands. U.S. -Marshall Islands Call 
Plebiscite 64 

Micronesia. Micronesia Approves Free As- 
sociation With U.S 63 

Middle East 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
June 22 5 

Namibia 

Namibia (contact group statement) 13 

Namibia (Kirkpatrick, Lichenstein, text of 
resolution) 75 

Narcotics. Cuban Involvement in Narcotics 
Trafficking (Michel) 86 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua (Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) . 71 

President's News Conference of June 28 
(excerpts) 4 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
June 22 5 

Non-Self-Governing Territories 

Micronesia Approves Free Association With 
U.S 63 

U.S.-Marshall Islands Call Plebiscite 64 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

A Collective Approach to East-West Economic 
Relations (Wallis) 31 

A Critical Juncture for the Atlantic Alliance 
(Burt) 50 

North Atlantic Council Meets in Paris (Shultz, 
final communique 38 

President Meets With NATO Secretary Gen- 
eral (White House statement) 51 

Nuclear Policy 

Challenges of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime (Kennedy) 60 

Strategic Modernization: Foreign Policy and 
Arms Control Implications (Dam) 17 

Philippines 

U.S.-Pnilippine Relations and the Military 
Bases Agreement Review (Wolfowitz) . 21 

U.S., Philippines Conclude Bases Agreement 
Review (Department announcement, joint 
statement, memorandum of agreement, 
President Reagan's letter) 19 

Poland. President's News Conference of 
June 28 (excerpts) 4 

Population. U.S. Population Policy and the 
United Nations (Benedick) 65 

Presidential Documents 

Elections in Turkey 53 

14th Report on Cyprus (message to the Con- 
gress) 49 

Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement 59 

The Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act . .59 

Persecutions and Repression in Iran 59 

President's News Conference of June 28 
(excerpts) 4 

Saving Freedom in Central America 1 

20th Anniversary of the OAU (Shultz) 16 

UNICEF 78 

U.S., Philippines Conclude Bases Agreement 
Review (Department announcement, joint 
statement, memorandum of agreement. 
President Reagan's letter) 19 

Visit of Australian Prime Minister (Hawke, 
Reagan) 62 



Visit of Belize Prime Minister (Price, 
Reagan) 82 

Visit of Ivory Coast President (Houphouet, 
Reagan) 14 

Visit of Salvadoran President (Magana, 
Reagan) 83 

Visit of Spanish President (Gonzalez, 
Reagan) 54 

Publications 

Department of State 93 

Documents on German Foreign Policy Re- 
leased 94 

Refugees. Refugees: A Continuing Concern 
(Purcell) 66 

Spain. Visit of Spanish President (Gonzalez, 
Reagan) 54 

Trade 

Building Trade With Africa (Lamb, 
Robinson) 36 

Caribbean Basin Recovery Act 
(Eagleburger) 79 

The Challenge of Economic Growth (Dam) .23 

A Collective Approach to East-West Economic 
Relations (Wallis) 31 

Treaties 

Current Actions 87 

U.S., Philippines Conclude Bases Agreement 
Review (Department announcement, joint 
statement, memorandum of agreement, 
President Reagan's letter) 19 

Turkey. Elections in Turkey (Reagan) 53 

U.S.S.R. 

A Collective Approach to East- West Economic 
Relations (Wallis) 31 

A Critical Juncture for the Atlantic Alliance 
(Burt) 50 

North Atlantic Council Meets in Paris (Shultz, 
final communique) 38 

Recent Soviet Actions in Afghanistan (Depart- 
ment statement) 70 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
June 22 5 

Soviet Jewry (Abrams) 56 

Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active 
Measures (Eagleburger) 45 

United Nations 

Namibia (contact group statement) 13 

Namibia (Kirkpatrick, Lichenstein, text of 
resolution) 75 

Nicaragua (Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) .71 

UNICEF (Reagan) 78 

U.S. Population Policy and the United Nations 
(Benedick) 65 



Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 56 

Armacost, Michael H 19 

Benedick, Richard Elliot 65 

Burt, Richard R 50 

Dam, Kenneth W 17, 23 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 8, 45, 79 

Gonzalez Marquez, Felipe 54 

Hawke, Robert J. L 62 

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix 14 

Kennedy, Richard T 60 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 71, 75 

Lamb, Denis 36 

Lichenstein, Charles M 75 

Magana, Alvaro Borja 83 

Michel, James H 86 

Price, George C 82 

Purcell, James N., Jr 66 

Reagan, President .... 1, 4, 14, 16, 19, 49, 53, 
54, 59, 62, 78, 82, 83 

Robinson, Leonard H., Jr 36 

Romualdez, Benjamin T 19 

Shultz, Secretary 5, 16, 38 

Wallis, W. Allen 27, 31, 33 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 21 



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o 



Depart ment 



bulletin 



e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2078 



September 1983 




Vice President 
in Europe/1 

Secretary in 

ANZUS/71 
El Salvador/79 



up!* 



Him 



JMENTS 



2 5 I983 



D&O&TQKf 






Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2078 / September 1983 



Cover: Assistant Secretary 
Langhorne A. Motley 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



1 Vice President Bush Visits Northern Europe (Addresses, 
Remarks, Toasts) 



The President 



18 



19 



300th Anniversary of German 
Settlement in America 

News Conference of July 26 
(Excerpts) 



The Secretary 

23 Visit to East and South Asia and 
the Middle East (Remarks, 
Statements, Toasts, News Con- 
ferences) 

45 Comprehensive Strategy for Cen- 
tral America 

47 Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Africa 



50 



51 



51 



U.S. Military Assistance to Chad 
(Department Statement) 

Situation in Chad (White House 
Statement) 

AWACS Withdrawn From Sudan 
(Department Statement) 



Department 

52 Legislative Veto in Foreign 
Affairs (Kenneth W. Dam) 

East Asia 

55 POW-MIAs and U.S. Policy 

Toward Southeast Asia (Paul D. 
Wolfowitz) 

Energy 

57 Export of Alaskan Oil 

(Richard T. McCormack) 

Europe 

59 An Assessment of the Madrid 
CSCE Followup Meeting 
(Max M. Kampelman, 
President Reagan) 

Middle East 

66 Visit of Lebanese President 

(Amin Gemayel, President 
Reagan) 

67 Situation in the Middle East 

(White House Statement) 
67 Visit of Amir of Bahrain (Shaikh 
Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, 
President Reagan) 



Military Affairs 

69 Production of the MX Missile 

(President Reagan, Letter to the 
Congress) 

Pacific 

71 ANZUS Council Meets in Wash- 
ington (Joint News Conference, 
Communique) 

Science & Technology 

76 U.S. Policy on Cooperation in 
Science and Technology 
(William Schneider, Jr.) 

Western Hemisphere 

79 Elections in El Salvador 

(Langhorne A. Motley) 

80 Situation in Central America 

(White House Statement) 

81 U.S.-Honduran Military Exercise 

(White House Statement) 

82 Fourth Certification of Progress 

in El Salvador (Elliott Abrams, 
Langhorne A. Motley) 

83 The Contadora Process (Presi- 

dent's Letter to Presidents of the 
Contadora Four) 

85 Caribbean Basin Initiative 

(President Reagan) 

Treaties 

86 Current Actions 

Chronology 

89 July 1983 

Press Releases 

91 Department of State 

Index 




With President Mauno Koivisto of Finland. 



(White House photos by Valerie Hodson) 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



Vice President Bush 
Northern Europe 



Vice President Bush departed Washington, B.C., 

June 23, 1983, to visit the United Kingdom 

(June 23-25), the Federal Republic of Germany 

(June 25), Norway (June 25-27 and June 29-30), 

Sweden (June 27-29), Finland (July 1-3), Denmark 

(July 3-4.), Ireland (July 4-5), and Iceland (July 5-7). 

He returned to Washington on July 7. 

Following are the Vice President's addresses, 

remarks, and toasts he made on various occasions 

during the trip. 1 




London 



ADDRESS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
DEMOCRATIC UNION, 
JUNE 24, 1983 

One year ago this month, President 
Reagan spoke before the British Parlia- 
ment and announced a new commitment 
by the United States to act on behalf of 
democracy throughout the world. "Let 
us now begin a major effort," the Presi- 
dent said, "to secure the best — a crusade 
for freedom that will engage the faith 
and fortitude of the next generation. 
For the sake of peace and justice, let us 
move toward a world in which all people 
are at least free to determine their own 
destiny." 



Our Administration has now sub- 
mitted to the Congress an initiative for 
democracy — a program under which our 
political parties, business and labor 
groups, and other public-minded 
organizations can work with the 
American Government to provide sup- 
port to those who, in nations less for- 
tunate than our own, are struggling to 
establish democracy. Our initiative 
reflects the lessons we have learned 
from those of our NATO allies which 
have already successfully set in place 
such programs to foster democratic 
development, and we intend our own ef- 
fort to complement those of other 
Western democracies and of organiza- 
tions such as the European Democratic 
Union (EDU). 

Today we mark the founding of the 
International Democratic Union (IDU), a 
body that will likewise carry on the 
great work of promoting democracy. 
Democracy begins with an acute 
awareness of what it is democracy's pur- 
pose to protect: the sacredness of the in- 
dividual. It is because democracy holds 



!ptember1983 



that each man, however humble, must 
be listened to, that democracies grant all 
their people a voice in government. It is 
because democracy believes that each 
man, however offensive or mistaken, 
possesses the right to speak, worship, 
and earn his living as he chooses, that 
democracies accord all their people equal 
protection under the law. "Democracy," 
the educator Robert Hutchins wrote, "is 
the only form of government that is 
founded on the dignity of man, not the 
dignity of some men, or of rich men, or 
of educated men . . . but of men." 

Our age teems with states and 
ideologies that reject any such notion of 
individual dignity. Communism for one 
refuses to reserve any sphere of 
freedom to individuals but, instead, lays 
claim to its subjects' very personalities. 
Lenin himself believed, as the British 
political philsopher Isaiah Berlin has 
written, that the people needed to be 
turned into "an obedient force held 
together by military discipline and a set 
of perpetually ingeminated formulae 
... to shut out independent thought." 

In our century, totalitarian govern- 
ments have, as a matter of policy, 
deprived masses of men, women, and 
children not only of their rights but of 
their lives. Millions have been murdered 
in Europe, in Asia, most recently in 
Kampuchea. Those of us who adhere to 
the values democracy embodies cannot 
accept the notion that such governments 
were in their own ways coping with 
events as best they could. No. They did 
wrong, monstrous wrong. 

Yet democracy represents far more 
than a mere recognition of morality. It 
represents as well a means to vigor, an 
approach to life. Totalitarian states, 
lacking means for reform, attempting to 
impose one rigid will on their people, 
must grow stagnant in spirit and brittle 
in form. They must fear change, shrink 
from the uncertainties of the future, and 
attempt to dwell instead in the darkness 
of the past. 

Yet democracies can face the future 
with confidence. By providing the means 
for reform, they achieve stability and 



With Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of 
the United Kingdom. 




Department of State Bulleti 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



omestic peace even in the midst of 
pheavals in public life. In democracies, 
wreover, the free play of ideas rein- 
jrces the free play in the marketplace 
" research, discovery, innovation, and 
nterprise. Experiments in democracies 
in flourish, knowledge can be gathered, 
nanges can be adjusted to and turned 
advantage even as they occur. 
The goods that have flowed in our 
ntury alone from the energy, skill, and 
litiative of individuals acting in freedom 
ave raised the living standards not only 
f the millions who inhabit democracies 
it, in their superabundance, of millions 
lore who do not yet share that 
ivilege. Across the world people today 
it better and live longer, less subject to 
mine and sickness than ever before, 
hey do so in the main because our 
mocracies have produced innova- 
jns — from disease-resistant seeds to 
echanical harvesters — that have enor- 
ously increased the world's production 
food; because our democracies have 
panded and improved world trade; 
id because our democracies have pro- 
iced such medical advances as the 
sntification of vitamins, the discovery 
penicillin and of vaccinations against 
lallpox, measles, polio, and tuber- 
losis, and the development of means 
control malaria. 

As they have made such strides, the 
mocracies have been able to provide 
iployment for ever-growing numbers 
citizens. Many democracies, including 
e United States, now face relatively 
?h unemployment. Yet even those na- 
ins now employ millions more than 
sy did just a decade ago, and the clear 
lg-term trend in democracies, certain 
continue, is one not of shrinking but 
owing employment. The vitality of 
mocratic economies has even shown 
elf equal to the challenge of control- 
(g an ill that used to be considered an 
?scapable side-effect of economic prog- 
>s — pollution. Solid evidence has been 
:umulating for some time that in the 
iustrialized democracies, hazardous air 
llution is now on the decline and the 
ality of rivers, streams, and lakes has 
gun to improve. 

The fundamental resource in this 
iterial advance has been not water 
wer or fossil fuels or nuclear energy 
the mind of man. It is the mind that 



conceives uses for the materials of the 
Earth; it is the mind that finds methods 
for combining those materials with 
labor. In democracies the human mind 
has found both stimulation and scope for 
its activities. 

It is still true that for many, life re- 
mains, in Thomas Hobbes' words, "poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short." Yet our prog- 
ress since Hobbes composed that phrase 
has been vast. Man, the stargazer, has 
left his footprints on the Moon. The 
engine of that progress has been 
freedom; its location our democracies. 

In foreign relations, democracies 
seek peace. Free peoples understand 
that in peace they can flourish but that 
in war they must accept a restriction of 
personal liberty, put on a military bear- 
ing they abhor, and risk the loss of what 
they so cherish — human life. 

Today diplomatic initiatives under- 
taken by the Western democracies pre- 
sent a hope for peace in the Middle East 
and for the independence of Namibia in 



Vice President 


'S 


Itinerary 


June 23-25 


u 


lited Kingdom 


June 25 




Germany 


June 25-27 




Norway 


June 27-29 




Sweden 


June 29-30 




Norway 


July 1-3 




Finland 


July 3-4 




Denmark 


July 4-5 




Ireland 


July 5-7 




Iceland ■ 



southern Africa. In Central America, the 
United States, aided by other democ- 
racies, is giving the free nations of the 
region the aid they need to build 
democracies of their own. The United 
States is providing the free Central 
American nations with both military 
assistance to help them resist attempts 
at subversion by forces beholden to 
totalitarian powers and, in a proportion 
three times greater, economic assistance 
to help them overcome the poverty and 
social ills that breed unrest. 

Much more, however, must be done 
to undergird democracy in the nations of 
this troubled region. We look to 
organizations such as the EDU and the 
IDU to assist in such work. 



The Soviet Union, democracy's main 
opponent, has by contrast in recent 
years overrun and occupied Afghanistan; 
rained poisonous chemicals on the inno- 
cent peoples of both Afghanistan and 
Southeast Asia; arrayed tanks and 
troops on the proud soil of Poland in 
defense of an authoritarian regime; and 
pointed nuclear missiles at the great 
capitals of Western Europe in an at- 
tempt to intimidate the European 
democracies and rupture the NATO 
alliance. 

Let me now state what all leaders of 
alliance nations have stated: The NATO 
alliance so cherishes freedom and peace, 
and so detests armed conflict, that it 
stands determined to undertake every 
necessary measure and to bear every 
necessary sacrifice to achieve an effec- 
tive deterrent to war. Our aim is not the 
mere control but the reduction of arms. 
Our method, now and in the months to 
come, is not belligerence but determined 
negotiations backed by our united 
strength. 

Today let us be mindful both of all 
our great democracies have so far given 
to mankind and of all that with firmness 
of purpose they might yet give. Let us 
inaugurate the International Democratic 
Union in the determination, to use 
Lincoln's words in a manner he would 
have endorsed, that the world, under 
God, shall have a new birth of freedom; 
and that government of the people, by 
the people, and for the people, shall not 
perish from the Earth. 



ADDRESS AT DINNER FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC 
UNION PARTY LEADERS, 
JUNE 24, 1983 

Today we have gathered to celebrate the 
founding of the International Demo- 
cratic Union and to consider the state of 
democracy throughout the world. Of all 
forms of government we have asserted, 
democracy alone is founded upon the 
universal dignity of man. In recent cen- 
turies, we have remarked, democracy 
has come to flourish, from Britain, the 
mother of parliaments, to the plains and 
forests of North and South America — 
the New World; from the ancient na- 
tions of the European Continent to the 



Biptember 1983 



savannahs of Africa, the outback of 
Australia, the mountains of Japan, and 
the teeming cities of India. 

Today, however, we must also 
recognize that democracies face grave 
threats from hostile ideologies and 
states. The main such threat to most 
democracies comes, as you know, from 
the Soviet Union, and the main defense 
against that threat rests in turn with the 
NATO alliance. Our consideration of the 
current state of democracy cannot be 
complete until we consider the state of 
that alliance. 

The NATO Alliance: 
Surveying the Record 

We can begin by surveying its record. In 
the nearly four decades since its forma- 
tion, the NATO alliance has compiled a 
list of achievements that anyone familiar 
with European history, the theory of 
coalitions, or the pressures of geopolitics 
must find stunning. 

During these years, more than 100 
major armed conflicts have taken place 
in the world. Yet Western Europe— part 
of a continent that for all its previous 
history had known outbreak after out- 
break of battle and that had undergone 
the awful carnages of the first half of 
this century — has experienced peace and 
risen to become the most prosperous 
community of nations on Earth. The 
land mass of Western Europe — a 
relatively narrow and strategically dif- 
ficult seaward projection, overmatched 
in size by the gigantic Soviet state, 
flanked by the vast land forces of the 
Eastern bloc — has, nevertheless, en- 
joyed complete military security. The 
alliance between Western Europe and 
North America, originally a wartime ar- 
rangement, has survived world crises 
and complicated disputes to become the 
longest lasting peacetime coalition of 
sovereign states in modern history. 

Now and in the days ahead, as 
various peace movements press their ap- 
peals, we would do well to remember 
that one peace movement has been 
quietly and successfully at work since 
midcentury and that its name is NATO. 
Acting on behalf of the alliance, the 
United States has taken great steps in 
the interests of peace, proposing to the 
Soviets marked mutual reductions in 



European conventional forces, a total 
ban on chemical weapons, deep mutual 
cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, and 
the complete elimination of all land- 
based intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles. 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Recently, attention both in the United 
States and Europe has turned to the 
alliance position regarding intermediate- 
range nuclear forces (INF). Let me take 
a moment to set out the facts. 

In a speech here in London in 1977, 
former German Chancellor [Helmut] 
Schmidt warned of the SS-20, the 
Soviet intermediate-range nuclear 
missile, a dangerous and destabilizing 
new weapon. At that time the Soviets 
had mounted under 30 warheads on such 
missiles. By December 1979, the number 
of such Soviet warheads had increased 
to some 450. In March 1982, Chairman 
[Leonid I.] Brezhnev announced a 
moratorium on the further deployment 
of SS-20s. At that time, the number of 
warheads had reached 900. The Soviets 
then ignored the moratorium they 
themselves had proclaimed, and today 
the number of warheads placed on 
SS-20 missiles exceeds 1,050. When the 
warheads placed on SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles are included in the count, the 
number of Soviet intermediate-range 
nuclear warheads totals more than 
1,200. I am speaking of nuclear missiles 
that can reach London or any other 
target in Western Europe in a matter of 
minutes. 

The United States possesses no com- 
parable intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons whatsoever. Surveys indicate 
that many in America and Western 
Europe do not understand that point, so 
let me repeat it. The Soviet Union has 
more than 1,200 warheads mounted on 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The 
United States possesses no correspond- 
ing intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
whatsoever. None. 

To counter the present Soviet 
monopoly, in December 1979, the NATO 
alliance took a double, or two-track, 
decision. The first track calls for the 
United States to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union to achieve a reduction in 
INF missiles. We are now doing so in 



Geneva. President Reagan first pro- 
posed that the United States and the 
Soviet Union should eliminate all land- 
based INF missiles, not only from 
Europe but from the face of the Earth, 
a position on the moral high ground. 
The total elimination of INFs remains 
the final outcome the United States 
seeks, but when the Soviets rejected 
that proposal the President offered in- 
stead to limit the number of INF 
warheads we would deploy if the Soviet 
in turn would agree to reduce their 
warheads to an equal number. 

As you know, the Soviets have 
stated that any count of INF systems 
must include British and French 
missiles. But the British and French 
weapons are not intended for the 
defense of NATO but for the ultimate 
defense of Britain and France them- 
selves; and, as Moscow knows full well, 
the Soviet Union now possesses 
thousands of nuclear-capable aircraft 
and shorter-range missiles that more 
than compensate for the British and 
French deterrents. 

The second track calls for the 
deployment of 572 Pershing and cruise 
missiles, less than half the number of 
INF warheads the Soviets have already 
set in place, should the failure of the 
Soviets to come to an agreement in 
Geneva make that necessary. Let me 
stress that if we must deploy, such a 
decision would not result in the additioi 
of a single nuclear warhead to the ex- 
isting U.S. stockpile in Europe. If the 
program does have to be carried out, fo 
each Pershing or cruise missile deploye 
one warhead from existing stockpiles 
will be removed. The alliance, moreovei 
is currently reviewing its nuclear re- 
quirements to make certain that it keep 
in place the smallest number of nuclear 
weapons that its strategy of deterrence 
will permit; and in a move that has 
received surprisingly scant attention or 
credit, during the last 3 years the 
United States has unilaterally with- 
drawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from 
Europe. 

The planned deployment of inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces will take 
place over 5 years and involve only a 
few missiles at a time. If at any point 
agreement should be reached at Geneva 
NATO would then bring the numbers o) 



Department of State Bulletit 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



3 Pershing and cruise missiles into line 
ith the terms of the accord. What can 
> in can come out, and we shall remain 
>t only willing but eager to remove 
issiles, should an accord so direct. 

The Soviets put their intermediate- 
nge nuclear missiles in place, 
iservers agree, to intimidate Western 
arope and rupture the alliance by split- 
lg Europe away from North America. 
) what extent have the Soviets suc- 
eded? None, whatsoever. The alliance 
mains strong and resolute. During my 
ip to Europe last January, I met the 
iders of six NATO nations. Each sup- 
■rted the alliance and its policies un- 
akably. 

In May, the summit conference at 
illiamsburg produced not the squab- 
ng of allies in disarray but wide agree- 
;nt on economic matters and 
animous support for the Western 
liance. "Our nations," the Western 

Siders said in a statement, believe that 
,'curity is indivisible," and "express the 
i'ong wish that a balanced INF agree- 
|>nt be reached shortly ... it is well 
(own that should this not occur, the 
I intries concerned will proceed with 
t> planned deployment of U.S. systems 
it Europe at the end of 1983." The 
a ance break down? Not while the 
urorous peoples of Western Europe and 
B rth America continue to cherish their 
Dependence. Not while they continue 
lisee clearly the awful alternative, 
ij When I visited Germany last 
Ji luary, as Chancellor Kohl [West Ger- 
■ n Chancellor Helmut Kohl] knows, I 
lipped at a small and ancient farming 
yjage call Moedlareuth. I will never 
tt?et what I saw there. Down the main 
Spet of that village ran a tall concrete 
n 1 topped with barbed wire so densely 
m ked that no one could have inserted 
anuch as a finger. On the near side of 
d wall — the West German side — the 
vjigers were going about the ordinary 
oj iness of their daily lives in peace and 
fclom. On the far side— the East Ger- 
ii i side — soldiers stood watch with 
fchineguns, and attack dogs ran along 
tl wall on chains. Trip wires had been 
sljtched near the wall so that if any 
faner or grocer or baker attempted to 
ejipe to the West, even before the 
s reached him or the guards opened 



on him, he would be cut down by 
remote-control weapons. 

Today millions live under such op- 
pression, and the powers responsible for 
that oppression seek to expand their 
control still further. We in the West, 
therefore, have in our trust not only the 
prosperity of nations but the liberty of 
mankind. In the name of that trust, we 
have acted for nearly 40 years with 
ceaseless diligence. In the name of that 
trust, we continue to stand united. In 
the name of that trust, under God, we 
look to the future with determination 
and with confidence. 

Please join me in a toast to 
democracy and to the alliance that has 
done so much to protect not only our 
own democracies but democracy 
throughout the world. 




Krefeld 



REMARKS AT THE 
TRICENTENNIAL CEREMONY 
OF GERMAN IMMIGRATION 
TO AMERICA, 
JUNE 25, 1983 

I am pleased to be back in Germany and 
deeply honored to be invited to speak 
here today. We are delighted that Presi- 
dent [Karl] Carstens will, in turn, mark 
the German- American tricentennial with 
a visit to the United States, and I would 
like to invite all of you who can do so, 
particularly the young, to come to 
America this year "Zum Andenken." 

Three centuries ago, after a 75-day 
voyage across the Atlantic in a cramped 
ship, 32 Mennonites and Quakers from 
Krefeld and two infants that had been 
born during the passage landed on the 
east coast of the New World. It was Oc- 
tober. The air had grown crisp and the 
autumn rains had begun. Exhausted and 
sick after their voyage, the Germans 
trudged from Philadelphia, then a settle- 



ment with two dirt roads, through 6 
miles of dense forest to found a settle- 
ment of their own. 

As winter approached they chopped 
down scores of trees and built their first 
homes of logs. "It may neither be 
described nor believed," wrote Franz 
Daniel Pastorius, the Krefelders' leader, 
"under what conditions of need and 
poverty . . . this German township was 
founded." 

Yet the Germans had found what 
they came for— freedom of worship — 
and in a modest way their settlement 
soon began to thrive. The people grew 
flax, raised sheep for wool, and became 
known in the American colonies for their 
weaving. News of the success encour- 
aged other Germans to leave the Old 
World for the New. 

By the outbreak of the American 
War for Independence in 1776, more 
than 200,000 Germans had come to 
North America. The Napoleonic wars 
triggered a new wave of immigration 
beginning in 1825. Entire villages in 
Bavaria and Wurttemberg sold their 
land, houses, and cattle and set out for 
America, taking pastor and school- 
master with them. In the second half of 
the last century, still another wave of 
immigration began, and during the two 
decades following 1880 the number of 
Germans entering America each year 
averaged more than 100,000. By the 
turn of the century, more than 5 million 
Germans had come to the United States. 



300 Jahre 
Deutsche in 
Amerika 




Krefeld 1983 



As they came the Germans settled 
not only on the east coast but pushed 
west. They traveled across the country 
by foot, by mule and horseback, on flat- 
boats, in the famous Conestoga wagons 
invented by Germans in Pennsylvania, 
and later, in crowded, fetid railroad 
cars. They arrived at their new homes 
with nothing— no furniture, no savings, 
often no clothes but those they had worn 
throughout the long passage from 
Germany. 



)tember1983 



I just said the Germans arrived with 
nothing. Let me change that. They ar- 
rived with nothing but their faith. For 
the Germans brought to their new 
homes a belief in God, the family, and 
the goodness of the earth as solid as the 
Alps and as steady as the Rhine. And 
they brought another belief, a belief in 
work — hard, honest work. 

And work they did. They felled the 
timbers of Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
They cleared the plains of Illinois. They 
explored the grazing grounds of Texas. 
They ploughed the land, planted grain, 
raised hogs, tended cows, herded steer. 
Wherever the Germans settled and 
worked the land, flourishing towns grew 
up; Frankfort, Indiana; Bismarck, North 
Dakota; New Munich, Minnesota; New 
Braunfels, Texas; New Holstein, 
Wisconsin. 

Germans who came later gathered in 
America's great cities. St. Louis and 
Milwaukee both became known for their 
Germans; by 1900 Chicago had a 
German-speaking population larger than 
Frankfurt, and the Germans in New 
York outnumbered the inhabitants of 
Munich. These city Germans became 
skilled carpenters, tanners, meat- 
packers. They established newspapers, 
textile works, breweries. Heinz revolu- 
tionized food processing; Strauss 
manufactured blue jeans; Roebling built 
bridges, including the most beautiful 
American bridge, the Brooklyn Bridge. 

Throughout, the German women 
worked as hard as their men, raising big 
families and trying to keep city 
tenements and farmhouses with dirt 
floors clean. They did the cooking, sew- 
ing, and housecleaning for families in 
which a dozen children were not uncom- 
mon. The wife of a farmer or laborer 
might rise at 6 a.m. to get breakfast for 
her husband, later get breakfast for the 
children, and then prepare meals for all 
again at noon and in the evening. 
Always there were clothes to be 
patched. 

The work — the sheer, relentless 
work— of those German immigrants 
helped build vigorous industries and 
create some of the richest farmland in 
the world. And those German im- 
migrants gave America not only farms 
and industry, but their children. 



r\* wnru«&ni 




With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West 
Germany. 



At the beginning of the last century, 
Burkhardt Mencken came to America 
from Saxony. Burkhardt himself 
achieved neither wealth nor fame, but 
his grandson, H. L. Mencken, became 
the feisty editor of The Baltimore Sun, 
published books on politics, literature, 
and music, and became known across 
the country as "the sage of Baltimore." 

During the 1890s, a German family 
in Baltimore raised a boy who liked 
baseball. His name was Babe Ruth, and 
when he grew up, he became the 
greatest slugger in baseball history, hit- 
ting 714 home runs and becoming a hero 
to millions of Americans, including a 
young George Bush. 

Three hundred years ago, when that 
first ship set sail for the New World 



from Krefeld, one of those on board w: 
named Thones Kunders. Eight genera- 
tions later the family name had change 
from Kunders to Conrad, and Charles 
Conrad, Jr., a direct descendant of 
Thones, became an astronaut and 
walked on the Moon. 

Today 60 million Americans, more 
than one in four, are the descendants o 
German immigrants, and they inhabit a 
country made prosperous and free larg' 
ly by the work of German hands. When 
just a generation ago Germany itself er 
countered need, America, therefore, 
responded. The Marshall Plan helped tr 
new German democracy rise from the 
rubble of war to become a nation of 
greatness. The Berlin airlift demon- 
strated the American commitment to tl 



Department of State Bulleti 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



lefense of democratic Germany when, 
till recovering from war, West Berlin 
mcountered crude threats from the 
Cast. 

Our histories are thus utterly inter- 
wined. We now contribute to each 
ithers' trade, enjoy each others' 
ultures. Our values — peace, freedom, 
he dignity of the individual — are the 
ame. 

Yet we must remember that our 
eace and prosperity are ceaselessly 
hreatened by hostile ideologies and 
tates. The main such threat to our 
emocracies continues to come, as you 
now, from the Soviet Union. To 
stablish a firm defense against the 
oviet challenge, at the end of World 
/ar II a number of the democracies of 
urope joined the United States and 
anada in forming the NATO alliance, 
he Federal Republic of Germany and 
le United States have now labored 
gether in that alliance for more than 3 
scades. 

At a time of peace and material 
ell-being such as the present, it 
;comes only too easy to forget that the 
«edoms we enjoy depend upon our 
(gilance. Both our governments are 
sed upon respect for human rights 
id both, as democracies, remain always 
>en to reform. The Soviet system, by 
■ntrast, possesses no workable means 
r reform; seeks to impose on all its 
■ople a single, rigid will; and has, in re- 
nt years, overrun and occupied 
fghanistan; rained poisonous chemicals 
i the innocent peoples of both 
fghanistan and Southeast Asia; and 
ttered down attempts to assert the 
diments of human rights in East Ger- 
:any, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 
i)land. 

Membership in the NATO alliance 
res, indeed, impose burdens. The 
I lited States, for example, has had to 
fition some 300,000 troops in Europe, 
| d the Federal Republic in turn has 
] d to help support large numbers of 
snerican troops on its soil. East Euro- 
I an countries have also had to live with 
1-ge numbers of foreign troops on their 
iil, however, and we must not forget 
le sharp differences between the two 
Its of circumstances. As Arthur Burns, 
te American Ambassador to the 
'"deral Republic, recently put it: "The 



invited presence of American troops in 
Europe has the express purpose of help- 
ing to protect the values of our Western 
civilization, whereas the Soviet armies 
that have willfully occupied Eastern 
Europe for 35 years are there to insure 
the suppression of the freedoms for 
which their citizens yearn to this day." 

History twists and turns, giving to 
different nations different duties at dif- 
ferent times. Now the strength of the 
Federal Republic, the United States, and 
the other NATO countries provide the 
underpinning necessary to keep the free 
world free. For centuries the German 
people, both in the Old World and the 
New, have set us examples of strength 
and courage. Let us follow those ex- 
amples. Let us make the sacrifices we 
must to keep our defenses strong. 

In the end it is freedom that binds 
us — free elections, a free press, freedom 
of worship, freedom of speech, freedom 
to dissent. Our freedom strengthens us, 
brightens our lives, gives us hope for the 
future. Today and in the coming months, 
however, as we in Germany and 
America celebrate the freedom we 
share, let us remember the duty that 
freedom entails. And let us do our duty 
with vigor. 




Bergen 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 
JUNE 25, 1983 

It is a great pleasure for my wife 
Barbara and me to be in Norway. We 
have heard a great deal about your 
beautiful country, and we are delighted 
to have the chance to enjoy some of it in 
the next couple of days. This evening 
and tomorrow we plan to relax, see 
some of Bergen, and take a short tour in 
the nearby fjord area on a Norwegian 
naval vessel. We hope the weather will 
cooperate, but I am told that it is easy 



to be a weather forecaster in western 
Norway— predict anything but carry an 
umbrella. 

I am happy to bring with me the 
greetings of President Reagan and all 
Americans. Norway is admired and 
respected in our country for much more 
than its magnificent scenery. Its strug- 
gle against tyranny in World War II has 
been followed in the difficult and 
sometimes dangerous postwar period by 
staunch support for NATO and a 
ceaseless dedication to the search for 
peace. Those efforts have created a 
strong and lasting bond between our 
two peoples. 

We greatly appreciate being re- 
ceived by Foreign Minister and Mrs. 
Stray. I look forward to arriving in Oslo 
next Wednesday for the official portion 
of my visit. But for now and tomorrow 
we intend to relax and enjoy ourselves 
in the beautiful Bergen area. 




Stockholm 



DINNER REMARKS, 
JUNE 28, 1983 2 

Thank you for this evening's warm 
welcome and delightful dinner. Our visit 
to Stockholm has proved as enlightening 
and thought-provoking as it has been 
pleasurable. My highest compliments to 
you and to everyone who helped to make 
it so. You and your wife, in particular, 
have been generous with your ideas as 
well as your time and have made this 
stay memorable for both Barbara and 
me. 

Before coming to your beautiful 
country, I knew that Swedish culture in- 
volved both an active interest in history 
and a confident, vigorous approach to 
the future. Evidence of these traits 
abounds. Stockholm itself succeeds, as 
do few cities, in combining carefully pro- 
tected architectural treasures with ex- 
citing modern design. 



jptember1983 



The Swedish sense of history comes 
out, again, in Stockholm's tens of 
museums and in the superb Drottning- 
holm Court Theater— which it was our 
great pleasure to visit last night. Your 
progressiveness is, in turn, evident in 
the leading role Sweden plays in fields 
such as international cooperation, the 
social sciences, and high technology. 

Since this year marks the bicenten- 
nial of the start of our diplomatic rela- 
tions, we might consider where we stood 
two centuries ago. Stockholm in 1783 
was a grassy town, one-tenth its present 
population; the City of Washington, for 
its part, had not even been designed; the 
young United States, its capital still in 
Philadelphia, had just begun its experi- 
ment in democracy; and Sweden, under 
Crown Prince Karl Johan, was enjoying 
a prolonged period of peace. 

The years since have been produc- 
tive both for our nations and for the 
friendship between them. Even when we 
have disagreed on certain issues, 
cooperation between our peoples— in 
trade, in scientific and technical develop- 
ment, in some of the most imaginative 
thinking on the problems of modern 
societies— has continued and, indeed, 
widened. 

My brief stay in Stockholm has il- 
lustrated the scope of this relationship. 
The Prime Minister and I held searching 
discussions of the important interna- 
tional issues of the day. At the same 
time, our wives were exploring a shared 
interest in the education of our youth— 
particularly, those who require special 
help. We Bushes and Palmes thus pur- 
sued the two great interests of all 
Americans and Swedes: peace on the 
one hand, and on the other, the fullest 
possible development of each individual. 

My talks with the Prime Minister 
and his colleagues have ranged fruitfully 
over a number of topics. I have restated 
we have both obtained a firmer under- 
standing of one another's positions. All 
of us have made clear our commitment 
to free but fair international trade. 

Most important, however, our talks 
have demonstrated that Sweden and the 
United States hold common fundamental 



With Prime Minister Olof I'alme of 
Sweden. 




Department of State Bullet 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



dues. Such differences as stand be- 
veen us are essentially tactical ones 
Dout how best to achieve goals we 
lare: the defense of Western Europe, 
eductions in nuclear arms, the allevia- 
on of poverty and injustice in the Third 
f orld. On peace, on freedom, on 
?mocracy, on the universal dignity of 
an, we are the same. 

The years since 1783 have seen the 
ittlement of new continents, world 
ars, technological revolutions, 
hroughout, however, our two nations 
ive remained friends and worked 
aselessly on behalf of the values they 
lare. We do not know what the coming 
icades hold. But we do know that we 
all remain true to our values, and to 
ir friendship. 




olsas 



IRIVAL REMARKS, 
TO HEADQUARTERS, 

r NE 29, 1983 

the Americans here I bring greetings 
>m President Reagan and the rest of 
ur fellow countrymen across the 
an. To all of you — Norwegian, Ger- 
tn, Danish, British, and Canadian, as 
11 as American — I bring heartfelt 
eetings from America. 

I want to tell you that we in 
ishington, and all the allies I've had 
chance to meet and confer with on 
s trip, as well as those I've spoken 
:h at other times, are highly conscious 
the superlative job you are all doing 
•e at AFNORTH [Allied Forces 
rthern Europe]. You certainly have 
extended and varied region under 
or command: from the plains of north- 
Germany to the mountains and 
rds of Norway. 

In light of the accelerating Soviet 
val buildup, the Baltic approaches and 
! Norwegian Sea are taking on an 




ever-increasing importance in NATO 
defense. We all know that in the event 
of a conflict, northern Norway would be 
crucial in securing the vital sealanes of 
the North Atlantic. 

In the defense of Norway, our ability 
to rapidly deploy troops from other 
NATO countries is of major importance. 
We are very pleased with the progress 
that has already been made in the 
Marine Corps prepositioning program 
for Norway, in the COBS program, and 
in the other reinforcement efforts such 
as the Canadian air/sea transportation 
brigade. We are doing our best to work 
out whatever difficulties there are with 
NATO's infrastructure funding so that 
these vital programs will not be delayed. 



With (left to right) U.S. Ambassador to 
Norway Mark Evans Austad, Foreign 
Minister Sven Stray, and Prime Minister 
Kaare Willoch. 



5ptember1983 



We also recognize that air defense is 
extremely important to the security of 
this region, and we hope to soon see 
some real improvement in this area. As 
defenders of NATO's northern flank, 
you here at the AFNORTH command 
are a crucial bulwark in the defense of 
the free world. I've been doing a lot of 
talking on this trip, to all sorts of groups 
and individuals. As you're aware, NATO 
plans to deploy INFs in December, if we 
can't first reach some fair accommoda- 
tion with the Soviets. With this planned 
deployment, the so-called peace move- 
ment has become quite vocal and is very 
much on the people's minds. 

One thing I've been saying on this 
trip, and I think it bears repeating and 
repeating often, is that NATO— you 
men and women here— are one of the 
most effective peace movements in all 
history. For over 30 years, you've kept 
Western Europe free and at peace by 
keeping it strong; over 30 years of peace 
and security— that's a record to be 
proud of. And for that, all of us who live 
and work in freedom, who enjoy the 
fruits of peace and security, are all pro- 
foundly grateful. 



Oslo 



DINNER TOAST, 
JUNE 29, 1983 3 

Thank you, for your kind words of 
welcome and for receiving us tonight in 
the magnificent castle of Akershus. This 
ancient building powerfully evokes the 
proud history of Norway, and Barbara 
and I feel honored to be here this 
evening. 

Before World War II, the United 
States and Norway shared a tradition of 
avoiding— to borrow a phrase from 
George Washington— "entangling 
alliances." The awful events of that war 
demonstrated, however, that in the 
modern world attacks against other free 
nations can soon lead to attacks against 
one's own nation. In 1949, when it had 
become clear that our democracies were 
again under military threat, Norway and 



the United States joined the other great 
democracies of the West in forming the 
NATO alliance. 

Like you, we remain deeply commit- 
ted to collective security as the best 
means to secure the peace and freedom 
that we continue to enjoy. During this 
period when our democratic values re- 
main threatened, let no one doubt our 
determination to reduce tensions be- 
tween East and West and to build a 
lasting peace. President Reagan, I 
believe, has a better chance than any 
other recent American leader of achiev- 
ing real arms reduction. No one should 
question our sincerity in seeking mean- 
ingful arms control. But no one should 
question our will to defend, if necessary, 
the freedom we cherish. 

My government deeply appreciates 
Norway's efforts within the NATO 
alliance, in particular your augmented 
efforts to improve Norway's conven- 
tional forces and your influential and 
supportive role in NATO's INF decision. 
The constructive counsel of your govern- 
ment, as well as that of other NATO 
allies, has contributed to the formation 
of our modified INF negotiating posi- 
tion. We continue to believe that 
eliminating an entire class of weapons 
would be the most desirable result. 
Toward this aim we will continue to 
seek, with all the means at our disposal, 
deep reductions in nuclear arms. 

The United States remains firmly 
committed to continuing close consulta- 
tion with Norway on the full array of 
issues that we face. The warm friend- 
ship that has marked Norwegian- 
American relations for decades is a 
source of great pride to the American 
people. I look forward to our private 
talks tomorrow and thank you for this 
delicious meal and extraordinarily warm 
hospitality. 

In the spirit of friendship that joins 
our countries as allies, please rise and 
join me in a toast: to His Majesty, King 
Olav of Norway, to our Host, Prime 
Minister Willoch, and to the bonds of 
freedom that unite us. 




Helsinki 



DINNER TOAST, 
JULY 2, 1983 4 

Thank you for your extraordinary 
hospitality here this evening. Barbara 
and I are delighted to be here and to 
bring greetings from the American peo 
pie. Americans have long held Finland 
high esteem. The courage your nation 
has shown in defending its independen< 
has earned our keen admiration. The 
role Finland plays in international af- 
fairs in turn commands our respect. Tr» 
United States fully recognizes Finland'; 
unique position in the world and firmly 
supports your nation's neutrality. 
As you stated a moment ago, 
neutrality does not mean indifference, 
and we deeply appreciate Finland's ef- 
forts in the pursuit of peace. We feel 
particular gratitude for the current 
deployment of Finnish troops in 
Lebanon as part of the U.N. peacekee] 
ing forces, and we welcome the Finnis 
role in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, born here in 
Helsinki and now, we believe, progress 
ing to a new and promising stage. 

The United States shares Finland's 
yearning for a world free of the dread 
threat of nuclear conflict. As we 
negotiate in Geneva, we are acutely 
aware that the issue of nuclear weapoi 
affects not just the Soviet Union and tt 
United States but all nations. 

Let me assure you and the Finnish 
people of President Reagan's strong 
commitment to achieving not only arm 
control but significant arms reductions 
The President has instructed our 
negotiators at Geneva to remain flexib 
as we seek a more durable peace. We 
believe that the security not only of th< 
United States but of all nations would 
greatly enhanced by the deep cuts in 
nuclear weapons we hope to accomplis 



10 



Department of State Bullet 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



The United States knows Finland as 
country active not only in international 
ilitics but international trade — a coun- 
y whose exports include steel, timber, 
d consumer products of every descrip- 
>n known worldwide for the beauty 
id elegance of their design. We value 
nland as a trading partner, look for- 
ird to expanding our exchange of 
ods and services with your nation still 
rther, and share Finland's abhorrence 
protectionism and firm commitment 
free trade. 

I have deeply appreciated the oppor- 
nity to meet with you and your col- 
igues to describe the positions of the 
agan Administration and to seek Fin- 
:h counsel on the array of issues our 
intries now face. For all the instant 
■nmunications the modern age has 
en us, the world has yet to find a 
placement for the face-to-face ex- 
inge of views, and I have found our 
ks invaluable. 

I The past year has been an especially 
jbd one for Finnish- American rela- 
las. As a result of the "Scandinavia 
Iday" celebrations, hundreds of 
I >usands of Americans received ex- 
|;ure to Finnish painting, sculpture, 
I sic, and literature. I participated in 
I grand opening of that celebration, 
I i I remember that a Finnish choir 
E itivated an audience of some 60,000. 
I ter in the year the Finnish National 
[ era appeared in New York and 
i lieved a triumph. Such cultural ex- 
s mges, I believe, foster the most im- 
f - tant bond of international under- 
i nding, for they affect not only the 
j ifessional lives of diplomats but uplift 
i ordinary lives of millions of our 
B zens. They remind us of the heritage 
I it both the United States and Finland 
i 'rish and that both our nations, in 
B ir own ways, seek to make secure. 
1 Please join me in a toast to Finland, 

I the friendship between our nations, 

II to the peace and freedom both our 
I, ions enjoy and seek to preserve. 




With Prime Minister and Mrs. Kalevi 
Sorsa of Finland. 



Copenhagen 



ADDRESS BEFORE THE 
FOREIGN POLICY SOCIETY, 
JULY 4, 1983 

Our basic agreement on fundamental 
issues is not always clearly recognized. 
While my conversations with the leaders 
I've visited so far have revealed many 
points of agreement, I have found dur- 
ing this visit to Northern Europe, and 
especially in talking with the press, that 
key aspects of American foreign policy 
are sometimes misunderstood. 

The responsibility for explaining 
American foreign policy, of course, 
belongs to the United States, and I 
welcome this opportunity to dispel cer- 
tain misconceptions— I call them 
myths— about what President Reagan is 
trying to accomplish. 

Clarifying Misconceptions 

Nuclear Arms Reductions. The first 
such myth holds that President Reagan 
is insincere about seeking nuclear arms 
reductions. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. The President's record 
speaks for itself. In the last 2 years, the 
Reagan Administration — working with 
Denmark and other close allies — has 
come forward with new and far-reaching 
proposals: 

• To eliminate intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF); 

• To reduce substantially intercon- 
tinental strategic forces; 

• To reduce troop levels in Europe 
to equal levels; and 

• To ban completely the production 
and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. 

In negotiation after negotiation, we 
have demonstrated our flexibility. In the 
INF negotiations, for example, the 
President announced last spring that if 



I3tember1983 



11 



the Soviet Union refused to eliminate an 
entire class of the missiles, the United 
States would be willing instead to enter 
into an interim agreement providing for 
lower levels of INF warheads. 

More recently, the President has 
demonstrated his flexibility in strategic 
arms reductions by announcing that if 
the Soviet Union rejected the original 
American proposal for cuts in ballistic 
missiles, the United States would be 
willing to discuss a different limit. Now 
I know some people argue that this is all 
just a public relations ploy and that the 
President isn't really interested in 
achieving agreement. This is simply un- 
true. I know the President well, and I 
know his innermost feelings on this mat- 
ter. President Reagan is a man deeply 
committed to arms reductions— a man 
with a vision of a world free from the 
burden of the nuclear threat. 

The President demonstrated his 
sincerity again just last week when the 
United States announced that it would 
support the effort of the Spanish 
Government to find a compromise agree- 
ment at the Madrid meeting on security 
and cooperation in Europe. We are en- 
couraged by what appears to be a 
favorable Soviet response to this effort, 
and we hope that the Spanish initiative 
soon produces an outcome that will 
enhance the prospects for both disarma- 
ment and the observance of human 
rights in Europe. 

Central America. Another myth I 
have encountered concerns U.S. policy 
in Central America. Critics accuse us of 
attempting to overthrow a just govern- 
ment in Nicaragua while propping up 
military dictatorships elsewhere. Both 
accusations are utterly unfounded. 

For the first year after the San- 
dinistas gained power, the United States 
gave Nicaragua more economic 
assistance than did any other nation. It 
was only after the Sandinistas broke 
their promise to establish democracy 
that the United States withdrew its sup- 
port. The Sandinistas now censor the 
Nicaraguan press, and they have refused 
to hold elections. 



• They crudely embarrassed the 
Pope during his visit. 

• They have brutally driven the 
Miskito Indians from their homelands. 

• They have become the main sup- 
pliers of the guerrillas who have ravaged 
large sections of El Salvador. 

Let me state clearly that the United 
States remains willing to talk with the 
Sandinistas again if they prove open to 
serious discussion. In the meantime, our 
policy toward Nicaragua is only to pre- 
vent the Sandinista regime from 
threatening the other nations of the 
region. 

Our regional policy, quite simply, is 
to foster democracy. We are opposed to 
replacing one dictatorship with another. 
We recognize that hunger, poverty, and 
social ills lie at the heart of the region's 
unrest. Three out of every four dollars 
of U.S. assistance to Central American 
nations, therefore, goes to economic aid. 
While countries of Central America 
face a long road on the way to becoming 
vigorous democracies, they have already 
made good progress. El Salvador has 
enacted land reform— land reform that 
has moved forward in spite of constant 
guerrilla attacks. Both El Salvador and 
the other free nations of the region have 
undertaken significant measures to im- 
prove the lives of their poor. Most im- 
portant, these nations have held free 
and open elections. 

As the last election in El Salvador 
approached, you may recall the people of 
that nation were subjected to death 
threats from Marxist guerrillas. One 
guerrilla slogan proclaimed "Vote today, 
die tonight." Yet when election day end- 
ed, 80% of the population had braved 
such threats and gone to the polls. No 
one need doubt the yearning of the Cen- 
tral American people to be free, or the 
American determination to help them. 

Nuclear Arms Race. Returning to 
Europe, another myth considers it is 
longstanding American policy to seek 
not arms control but an unconstrained 
nuclear arms race. Yet once again, the 
record speaks for itself. The United 
States has always stood at the very fore 
front of arms control. It was an 
American, Bernard Baruch, who, in the 
aftermath of World War II before the 



Soviets even had nuclear weapons, pro 
posed that all countries relinquish to the 
United Nations their right to deploy 
nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union re- 
jected that proposal. It was an 
American, President Dwight 
Eisenhower, who came forward with th 
"Open Skies" proposal designed to lowei 
tensions by giving both sides the ability 
to observe each other's military pro- 
grams with reconnaissance aircraft. Tht 
Soviet Union rejected that proposal. It 
was an American, President Ronald 
Reagan taking the moral high ground, 
who called for the total elimination of a 
entire class of INF missiles. Again, the 
Soviet Union rejected that proposal. 
The United States adamantly op- 
poses an arms race. Despite all the talk 
you hear of weapons piling up, the fact 
is that the United States has fewer 
nuclear warheads in its stockpile today 
than it did 15 years ago, and the total 
destructive power of those warheads is 
lower than at any point in the last 25 
years. In a decision, moreover, that 
received surprisingly little attention or 
credit, the United States over the last I 
years unilaterally withdrew 1,000 
nuclear weapons from Europe. And if 
we are forced to deploy INF missiles, 
we have agreed with our allies that for 
every new warhead that is set in place, 
an existing nuclear warhead will be 
withdrawn. 

In the interest of arms reductions, 
we are willing to consider every option 
and we have not ruled out a summit 
meeting with the Soviet Union. For su« 
a meeting to succeed, however, it must 
be thoroughly prepared, and President 
Reagan has made it clear that he will ii 
sist on such preparation. We owe too 
much to the American people— to the 
people of the world— not to do our besi 
to ensure that a summit produces not 
frustrated hope but substantive results. 
I did not come to Northern Europe 
to engage in confrontation, but I believ 
we would do well to pose certain ques- 
tions to the Soviets. 

• Why did the Soviet Union, with i 
warning, begin its buildup of SS-20s in 
the mid-1970s? 



12 



Department of State Bullet 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



• Why did the Soviet Union, after 
NATO's December 1979 decision, con- 
inue its SS-20 buildup when Soviet 
eaders themselves openly proclaimed 
hat a balance already existed in 
Europe? 

• And why, even after Moscow an- 
lounced last year that there would be a 
noratorium on deployment, did the 
oviet Union, nevertheless, deploy even 
irger numbers of SS-20s? 

'hese questions bear directly on the 
ves of hundreds of millions of free men 
nd women. The peoples of the West 
eserve answers. 

Limited Nuclear War in Europe. A 

inal myth holds that the United States 
; planning to fight a limited nuclear war 
1 Europe. This is the most pernicious 
lyth of all. It is not now, and never has 
een, American policy to fight a nuclear 
ar or to try to limit any East- West 
Dnflict to Europe. Indeed, the whole 
ATO strategy of deterrence has been 
esigned to make it absolutely un- 
tistakable to any potentional aggressor 
iat, in the words of NATO doctrine, an 
:tack on one is an attack on all. It is 
le very essence of deterrence that the 
'ospect of American retaliation against 
l attack on Europe lowers the incen- 
ve for such aggression. 

We have no illusions about the terri- 
e consequences of nuclear war. Presi- 
nt Reagan has repeatedly stated that 
a nuclear war there can be no win- 
rs, only losers. And it is because we 
iffer no illusions that we stand utterly 
itermined to do whatever we must to 
j "event a nuclear cataclysm. 

When we recognize these myths for 
: hat they are, there is good reason for 
)timism about the prospects for 
jeedom and peace. President Reagan's 
immitment to the achievement of 
bnificant arms reductions is, as I 
lated, unshakeable. And because of his 
alistic assessment of Soviet intentions 
iid his determination to keep the 
Inited States strong, in my judgment, 
resident Reagan has a better chance 
Ian any recent American President of 
l!gotiating major arms reductions. 

There is another good reason for op- 
Inism and that is the record of the 




NATO alliance. In the more than 3 
decades since the formation of the 
alliance, over 100 wars have taken place 
in the world. Yet under NATO's protec- 
tion, Western Europe, part of a conti- 
nent that for all its history had known 
outbreak after outbreak of battle and 
that had undergone the awful carnages 
of the first half of this century, has, 
nevertheless, experienced peace. 

Conclusion 

I want to close by saying a word to the 
young people of Western Europe — to 
those who are too young, maybe, to 
remember anything at all about the Sec- 
ond World War. Like many of your 
parents and grandparents, I lived that 
war — fought in it as a pilot in the 
Pacific, got shot down once, saw some 
of my best friends killed before my eyes. 

I want you to know that I under- 
stand your love of peace, because to 
those of us who lived through that war, 
these past 30 or more years of peace 



With Prime Minister Poul Schluter of 
Denmark. 



have been more precious than words can 
tell. And because I have children — and 
grandchildren — I don't want them ever 
to have to go through what I and so 
many others went through. 

You must believe us when we tell 
you that peace doesn't just happen. It 
has to be built and then protected. I 
know that many of you belong to peace 
movements, and I admire your idealism. 
But I would like you to realize that one 
organization — the NATO alliance — has 
successfully kept the peace for these 
three and more decades. This alliance of 
free nations represents the true Euro- 
pean peace movement. We are joined 
not just by security but by our fun- 
damental commitment to democratic 
values — by our fundamental commit- 
ment to freedom. 



jptember 1983 



13 



The alliance does, of course, impose 
its responsibilities. Some nations, the 
United States among them, have had to 
station troops far from home; others in 
turn have had to live with foreign troops 
on their soil. All our nations have had to 
spend more on defense and keep more 
men in uniform than we'd like to do in 
peacetime. All our people have had to 
live with the pressures and tensions in- 
volved in maintaining our freedom in a 
turbulent world. 

Yet beyond the Elbe, millions bear 
burdens far heavier than our own. We 
speak out at will. Andrei Sakharov, 
Anatoli Shcharanskiy, and Lech Walesa 
know no such freedom. We travel from 
country to country as we choose. Those 
behind the Berlin Wall know no such 
liberty. During this visit, I have en- 
countered some protests. Who among us 
would not thrill at the sight of an anti- 
nuclear demonstration in Red Square? 
But the Soviets have shown us how they 
treat freedom— East Germany, 1953; 
Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; 
Afghanistan, 1979; Poland today. 

"We hold these truths to be self- 
evident," Thomas Jeffereson wrote in 
the Declaration of Independence, "that 
all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their creator with certain 
unalienable rights, that among these are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap- 
piness." 

For more than three decades the 
people of Western Europe and North 
America have enjoyed the exercise of 
their self-evident rights in peace. I am 
confident that if the NATO alliance 
keeps the support not only of those of us 
who have known war, but of those of 
you we pray never shall, then we will 
continue to defend those rights and to 
keep that peace. 



Aalborg 



REMARKS AT THE 

REBILD JULY 4TH FESTIVAL, 

JULY 4, 1983 

It gives me great pleasure to convey not 
only our own greetings but the warm 
wishes of President and Mrs. Reagan to 
all of you participating in this superb 
Independence Day celebration. 

Last September in Minneapolis, Min- 
nesota, I had the privilege of addressing 
the grand opening of "Scandinavia To- 
day," a program that honored Scandina- 
vian immigrants to the United States. I 
spoke to some 60,000 Americans of 
Scandinavian descent about the heritage 
their forbears had brought to America. 

During the second half of the last 
century and the first decades of our 
own, millions of Scandinavians im- 
migrated to America, including some 
400,000 from Denmark. Those im- 
migrants brought with them few posses- 
sions—no furniture, no savings, few 
clothes. Yet they arrived with faith in 
God, the family, the goodness of the 
earth, and hard, honest work. 

They cleared the forests of Min- 
nesota and Wisconsin and ploughed the 
plains of Iowa and Nebraska. They 
planted corn and wheat, raised cattle, 
opened mines, built railroads. 
Everywhere the Scandinavians settled, 
thriving towns grew up. Today, for ex- 
ample, some 22 American towns bear 
the name "Denmark" or "New 
Denmark." Working in freedom with 
other new Americans, those Scandina- 
vians helped to build the strong, varied, 
and vital nation whose 207th year of in- 
dependence we mark today. 

This annual Fourth of July festivity 
at Rebild, now over 70 years old itself, 
celebrates both the birth of that nation 
and the ideals on which it was founded. 
"We hold these truths to be self- 
evident," Thomas Jefferson wrote in the 
Declaration of Independence, "that all 
men are created equal, that they are en- 
dowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights, that among these are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap- 
piness." 



Yet even as we celebrate our self- 
evident rights, we must recognize that 
those rights are constantly threatened 
by hostile ideologies and states. To 
establish a firm defense against such 
threats, at the end of World War II, the 
United States joined Denmark, Norway, 
and other Western democracies to form 
the NATO alliance. 

We would do well to remember that 
in the 34 years since the formation of 
that alliance, more than 100 wars have 
been fought in the world. Yet Western 
Europe, part of a continent that as 
recently as the first half of this century 
underwent the devastation of war, has 
nevertheless, experienced peace and 
risen to become the most prosperous 
community of nations on Earth. The 
alliance does impose its burdens, but 
they are far lighter than the burdens 
now borne by millions living beyond 
the Elbe. 

Over the entrance to the National 
Archives, the building in Washington 
that houses the original Declaration of 
Independence, seven words are in- 
scribed: "Eternal Vigilance is the Price 
of Liberty." Today, as we celebrate our 
liberty with joy, let us also rededicate 
ourselves to the duty of vigilance that 
liberty entails. And let us give thanks 
for lasting friendship between Denmark 
and the United States of America. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 




lublin 



RRIVAL STATEMENT, 

JLY 4, 1983 

rs. Bush and I are delighted to return 
Dublin. Arriving here on July 4th, the 
iniversary of our country's Declaration 
Independence, gives me a fine oppor- 
nity to pay tribute to the sons and 
.ughters of Ireland, who made such a 
mendous contribution to the 
nerican struggle for freedom. Many of 
j recall with pride the celebrations at 
prktown in 1981 and the role played on 
lat occasion by the Irish Army con- 
tigent — standing in for their ancestors, 
tio played such an important part in 
tit final battle of our War for 
liependence. 

During this visit, my wife and I in- 
tid to renew our love affair with the 
hd and people of Ireland and to enjoy 
ts hospitality for which the Irish are so 
j ;tly famous. I look forward to my 
c;cussions with Taoiseach Garret 
I:zgerald and his colleagues. 

In those discussions I will describe 
ti positions of our Administration and 
s;k the counsel of Ireland's leaders on 
t; matters of international importance 
tit our countries now face. I will also 
e Dress the respect of the United States 
fl' the contribution that Ireland is mak- 
l; to the pursuit of peace through its 
eorts in the United Nations. 

The influence of the Irish in the 
t ited States has been so great that all 
^lericans have something of the Irish 
3]rit in them, and arriving here today 
ft Is a good deal like a homecoming. 
Tank you for this splendid reception. 




With Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald of 
Ireland. 



Sptember1983 



15 




Reykjavik 



LUNCHEON TOAST, 
JULY 6, 1983 5 

I am delighted to be here this afternoon 
at Thingvellir, the site of the original 
Althing, the first parliament in the 
Western World and one of the cradles of 
our common Western democratic tradi- 
tion. Thingvellir is your national 
treasure, but its significance for the rule 
of law and representative government 
transcends any national boundaries. 

When the annual Althing sessions 
were held here some thousands of years 
ago, Icelanders flocked from all parts of 
the island to observe and to take part in 
the greatest political and social event of 
the year. Young people observed the 
workings of the law and entertained 
themselves with sports, poetry, and 
feasts. New friendships were made. Old 
friendships were renewed. Marriages 
were arranged. News and stories were 
exchanged. 

Here, one can sense something of 
what those Icelanders of old must have 
felt. The feast which you have so kindly 
provided is in keeping with the 
character of those ancient times. I ap- 
preciate your generosity, not only for 
this excellent meal but for the oppor- 
tunity to make new friendships, to ex- 
change views, and to commemorate the 
fact that our two peoples have so much 
in common. 

In one of your famous sagas, the 
Vinlandssaga, the discovery of the New 
World is recounted. Since the first Vik- 
ing visits to North America, the relation- 
ship between Iceland and Vinland, the 
New World, has grown and prospered. 

Today, we are partners in NATO, 
and it is in the interests of both our na- 
tions to keep our alliance strong. Our 
cultural and educational exchanges con- 




With Prime Minister Steingrimur 
Hermannsson (left) and Foreign Minister 
Geir Hallgrimsson of Iceland. 



16 



Department of State Bulletiri 



FEATURE 

Vice President 

in Europe 



rihute greatly to mutual understanding 
ind appreciation, and our commercial 
elations are vigorous and contribute to 
>ur mutual welfare. I feel certain that 
he friendship between Iceland and the 
Jnited States will remain firm and deep. 

The spirit of Thingvellir has served 
is all well in the past. Let it be an in- 
piration for our future. 



Ceflavik 



EMARKS TO 
IATO PERSONNEL, 
EFLAVTK AIR FORCE BASE, 

ULY 7, 1983 

always appreciate a chance to visit one 
f our military installations overseas, 
ad today here in Keflavik, I am happy 
bring you the greetings of the Presi- 
nt and others in our government. 

All of you serve a proud tradition, 
our efforts contribute to the defense of 
eland, to the protection of our own 
nd, and to the maintenance of peace in 
urope. For more than a generation and 
half, NATO has provided the founda- 
)n for a peaceful life in Europe despite 
most continuous strife and fighting 
sewhere in the world. Its success is 
>ur success. 



Yet peace must not be allowed to 
lead to apathy if we are to nurture the 
liberty and rights so valiantly won for us 
at other times and in other places. We 
must remain vigilant. I hope that you 
will never be called into combat or 
otherwise be subjected to the test of 
war, but if we are to prevent that from 
happening, you and all our military 
forces, along with those of our allies, 
must maintain a high state of readiness. 

As you know, the President is deep- 
ly committed to substantive reductions 
in nuclear weapons. If successful, this 
global reduction of armaments would be 
a giant step toward a genuine and 
lasting peace. But in our pursuit of 
peace, you in Keflavik play a crucial 
role. Iceland is at the key point of the 
vital naval and air lines in the North 
Atlantic which provide communication, 
trade, and defense for nations on both 
sides of the ocean. Your role is critical. 



My wife and I have spent several 
days in this beautiful country meeting 
its leaders and glimpsing some of its 
natural wonders. The ties between our 
two countries are excellent. I also have 
had a chance to tour part of the NATO 
base. The obvious spirit and pride you 
all take in your missions is heartening. 
You clearly understand the importance 
of your tasks and accomplish them with 
admirable vigor. I extend to you my 
thanks and congratulations and that of 
your countrymen in the United States. 



'Texts from the Vice President's Office of 
the Press Secretary. 

2 Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Palme. 

3 Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Willoch. 

4 Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Sorsa. 

6 Made at a luncheon hosted by head of 
the Althing. ■ 



ptember1983 



17 



THE PRESIDENT 



300th Anniversary of 

German Settlement in America 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation on June 25, 1983. 1 

Saturday, June 25th, is a special day for 
Germany and America. In the city of 
Krefeld, on the shore of the Rhine, Vice 
President Bush represented all 
Americans at an historic celebration. It 
was from Krefeld that, 300 years ago, 
the first German immigrants left for 
America. Those 13 Mennonite families 
came in search of religious freedom. 
They landed in Philadelphia and founded 
Germantown, Pennsylvania. From that 
moment on, Germany has contributed 
much to our way of life. 

Today, about one in four Ameri- 
cans—or some 50 million of us— claim 
at least partial German ancestry. What 
has this meant to America? Well, the 
Conestoga wagon, the Kentucky rifle, 
blue jeans, the Brooklyn Bridge, and 
"Snoopy"; the first air-tight tin can and 
many of our favorite beers; Dwight 
David Eisenhower and Wernher von 
Braun; Chrysler automobiles and Boeing 
aircraft. German farmers introduced 
winter wheat to our Middle West. 

And no American should forget that 
at Valley Forge, General von Steuben, a 
German volunteer, turned George 
Washington's demoralized troops into a 
disciplined fighting force capable of win- 
ning our struggle for independence. 

Some of our most brilliant writers 
like John Steinbeck and H. L. Mencken; 
athletes such as Babe Ruth and Johnny 
Weissmuller; inventors like Charles 
Steinmetz and George Westinghouse; 
statesmen such as Carl Schurz and 
George Shultz, our current Secretary of 
State, share German descent. 

For 300 years Germans have helped 
to build America. But America has given 
as well as received. After the Second 
World War, when Germany lay de- 
feated, America gave material help 
through the Marshall Plan and the 
Berlin airlift. Just as significant, if not 
more, we provided the inspiration to 
develop free institutions from the ruins 
of totalitarianism. 

Today, the Federal Republic is a bul 
wark of democracy in the heart of a 
divided Europe. It enjoys prosperity un- 
dreamt of in 1945, and its political 
system is stable and strong. 



West Germans and Americans are 
rightfully proud of our common values 
as well as our shared heritage. Today, 
we stand shoulder-to-shoulder in the 
NATO alliance, defending freedom and 
preserving the peace. For three decades 
the German- American partnership has 
been a linchpin of the alliance. Thanks to 
it, a whole generation has grown up in 
Western Europe free from the ravages 
of war and spared from the repression 
suffered by Europeans to the East. 

But with freedom comes responsibili- 
ty, not least the responsibility to look 
beyond simplistic slogans to the truth on 
vital matters like security and arms 
reductions. I hope the younger genera- 
tion, both in Germany and in America, 
will honestly consider all that we're do- 
ing to deter and to reduce the risks of 

war. .... 

In the face of a large Soviet military 
buildup of both conventional and nuclear 
weapons, the United States, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and our European 
allies have agreed to modernize our ag- 
ing forces to assure an effective deter- 

At the same time, in hopes of avert- 
ing the large expenditure to modernize 
weapons, we're making a serious effort 
to negotiate major and effectively 
verifiable reductions of Soviet and 
American nuclear forces to lower and 
more stable levels. 

In Geneva, we've made far-reaching 
proposals to reduce nuclear arsenals and 
to build trust. We have proposed the 
global elimination of the entire class of 
intermediate-range land-based missiles 
and expressed our willingness to agree 
to any proposal equalizing the number of 
warheads on such U.S. and Soviet 

missiles. 

In the START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks] talks, I have within the last 2 
weeks issued new instructions, incor- 
porating the recommendations of the 
bipartisan Scowcroft commission and 
giving our negotiator greater flexibility 
in their task. 



The young people of Germany and 
the United States should not doubt our 
dedication to maintaining the peace. We 
share with them the dream that some- 
day the time will come when no nuclear 
weapons will exist anywhere on Earth. 

The ideals shared by our peoples, 
the desire for freedom and peace, bind 
the United States and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in so many ways. 
Building on this we've launched a joint 
effort to provide more contacts between 
our nations and generations. In our 
country, 22 Federal departments and 
agencies are participating in this effort. 
Plans range from traditional exchanges 
to an airlift program which will bring 
German heart patients to one of our 
outstanding hospitals for bypass surgery 
and train more German doctors to per- 
form these life-saving operations. 
This fall, a German will fly in 
NASA's [National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration] space shut- 
tle—the first foreigner to do so. 
Together, Germans and Americans will 
watch the flight's progress on their 
television screens, all praying for a suc- 
cessful mission and safe landing. 

Germans and Americans of German 
descent can take special pride in their 
ancestry. But all Americans have 
benefited from the contributions which 
German Americans have made to our 
country, and we should all participate in 
honoring this heritage. 



V 



* 



J Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 4, 1983. 



18 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE PRESIDENT 



News Conference of July 26 (Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan's news 
conference of July 26, 1983. 1 

A. while back, I got a letter from a 
L3-year-old, and I apologize for not hav- 
ng answered her as yet. She wrote, 
'Don't you wish sometimes you could 
ust stamp your feet and shout at the 
jress or Senators to be quiet, sit down, 
ind listen to what you're saying?" Yes, 
retchen, I sometimes do feel that way, 
ind, particularly, over the past week. 
)n April 27th I went to Capitol Hill and 
iddressed a joint session of the Con- 
gress on a subject of vital importance to 
11 Americans. 

I talked about our goals in Central 
America, and I asked for congressional 
inderstanding and support. In Central 
America, as elsewhere, we support 
emocracy, reform, and human freedom. 
Ve support economic development. We 
upport dialogue and negotiations 
mong and within the countries of the 
egion. And, yes, we support a security 
hield for the region's threatened na- 
ons in order to protect these other 
oals. 

In my view, there has been entirely 
>o much attention to the efforts that 
e're making to provide that security 
lield and not nearly enough to the 
i ;her elements of our policy. Yet, in 
i ich of the four elements of the policy, 

e find they reinforce each other and 
i lat they are being pursued 
multaneously in a carefully balanced 
anner. 

I dispatched Ambassador Dick Stone 
tichard B. Stone, Ambassador at Large 
id special representative of the Presi- 
:nt to Central America] to the region 
; facilitate the process of dialogue and 
;gotiations. He is there now with a 
^rsonal message from me to leaders of 
■untries in the region, the text of which 
I am making public tonight. I am 
i :artened by the efforts of the Con- 
dora countries — led by Colombia, Mex- 
| o, Panama, and Venezuela — to reach a 
paceful regional solution. I am en- 
j uraged by some recent statements 
! om Nicaragua and Cuba that seem to 
idicate that they, too, now recognize 
j e merit to regional negotiations. I 
;ust their words will be followed by 
jisitive actions to ease tension and stop 
je fighting in the region. 

Here at home, I have appointed a 
1 partisan commission to make recom- 
lendations on the long-term measures, 
.eluding economic assistance, that we 



should undertake to help these strug- 
gling nations. I hope soon to be signing 
the legislation on the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative passed by an overwhelming 
bipartisan majority of both Houses [of 
Congress]. The program will bolster the 
economic independence of the region. 
We continue to promote elections as the 
best way to guarantee peace, human 
freedom, and responsive government. 

The greatest portion of our aid goes 
toward humanitarian and economic 
assistance. For every $1.00 we provide 
for security assistance to the region, we 
provide $3.00 for economic and human 
development. But we recognize that 
democracy and development can hardly 
flourish when threatened by violence. 
Dialogue and negotiations can best suc- 
ceed when the parties are convinced that 
their goals cannot be achieved through 
the barrel of a gun. It is especially in 
our own hemisphere that the United 
States continues to be the foremost pro- 
tector of peace. As part of this mission, 
as a way to provide a shield for 
democracy and development, we, 
together with our friends, are now plan- 
ning joint training exercises in the 
Caribbean and Central America, and let 
me set the record straight on what these 
exercises are and what they are not. 

Essentially, there will be two sets of 
practice training in the coming 
months — first, a series of ground exer- 
cises in Honduras with the combined 
forces of Honduras and the United 
States; second, a series of ocean exer- 
cises with our own fleet. We have con- 
ducted joint exercises with Latin 
American countries on a regular basis 
since 1965. The latest exercises with 
Honduras took place earlier this year. 
Much larger scale exercises have taken 
place in Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America. Moreover, these training exer- 
cises are limited in purpose. 

Yes, we want to underscore once 
and for all that the United States, along 
with our friends, seriously opposes the 
use of force by one neighbor against 
another in Central America, but we are 
not seeking a larger presence in that 
region, and U.S. Forces have not been 
requested there. The United States 
stands firmly on the side of peace. As a 
nation we remain steadfast in policy and 
purpose. We want to see an end to 
violence and bloodshed, to the export of 



revolution. We want to help our neigh- 
bors lift themselves up to prosperity. We 
want to usher in a new era of peace and 
social justice. 

These are great goals and worthy of 
a great and generous people, and we 
shall continue to keep faith with 
ourselves in the days ahead. 

Q. You complain of too much at- 
tention. How can the people ignore 
two battleship groups, thousands of 
combat troops going to Honduras, it is 
said the covert funding of 10,000 
rebels, Nicaraguan rebels? All these 
things have happened since April 27th. 
In seeking solutions, how far will you 
go militarily? 

A. I have told you we have no 
military plans for intervention of that 
kind. We have 55 mainly noncommis- 
sioned officers helping to train the 
Salvadoran Army. We know that Cuba 
has somewhere in the — it has thousands 
of military personnel in Nicaragua. It 
does seem a little overbalanced with 
regard to the attention that's being paid 
to 55 as against attention that's being 
paid to the thousands. To answer with a 
question: Why are maneuvers that we 
have performed before and regularly 
suddenly treated with such suspicion 
when only within this year, last spring, 
we had military maneuvers in Honduras, 
and last year we had naval maneuvers in 
the Caribbean and no one seemed to be 
at all excited about them. So, is it just 
that there's no confidence in the fact 
that when I say these are maneuvers of 
the kind we've been holding regularly 
and for years? 

Q. But they're unprecedented to 
last 6 months. The polls show the 
American people are not for them, and 
they fear it may lead to war. 
Remembering the lessons in Vietnam, 
does this bother you? And do they 
have any say? 

A. First, there is no comparison 
with Vietnam, and there's not going to 
be anything of that kind in this. And 
maybe the people are disturbed because 
of the confused pattern that has been 
presented to them and the constant 
drumbeat with regard to the fact of 
suspicion that somehow there is an 
ulterior purpose in this. 

It hardly seems to me that those 
ships are going there — and I don't know 
that they're going to be there 6 
months — I don't know the number of 
ships involved. I didn't know the number 
that were involved in the Caribbean ex- 
ercises. If they were there for some kind 



jptember1983 



19 



THE PRESIDENT 



of a hostile purpose, we happen to know 
that right now a Soviet freighter, the 
UlYanov, is approaching the port of 
Corinto in the vicinity of Nicaragua— or 
that port is in Nicaragua — and it is car- 
rying a load of military equipment, 
helicopters, transport helicopters for 
military purposes, and so forth. And no 
one shot at them. 

Q. You've mentioned your interest 
in easing the tensions, and you've said 
that you hope the Nicaraguan pro- 
posals will have that effect. Your 
spokesman has said that the 4,000 
troops that you're planning to send 
down there will — 

A. Between three and four. 

Q. Between 3,000 and 4,000 troops 
that you're planning to send down 
there will have standing orders to de- 
fend themselves if they're fired upon. 
How does that help to ease tensions? 

A. That is something that has been 
true for a long time, as far as I'm con- 
cerned, with our troops and our forces 
anywhere they may be. 

We went through a period some 
years ago when American forces were 
pretty much fair game. Look back at 
some of our aircraft that were shot 
down on the charge that they had ven- 
tured out over international water — or 
out of international waters into the 
airspace of a Communist bloc coun- 
try — and shot down and we protested 
diplomatically. 

It seems to me that young men and 
women who are going to defend this 
country of ours and who join the 
military should know that they have the 
right to defend themselves if we have 
placed them in a position where they 
could come under fire. This is just a 
standard order. We don't want war. But 
I don't think that you prevent war by 
letting your personnel out there become 
the victims. 

Q. But doesn't this simply in- 
crease the chances of war? 

A. No, I don't think so. All of the 
ships that are down in that area and 
that are going there are outside the 
12-mile limit. They're out in interna- 
tional waters where they have a right 
to be. 



Q. A little earlier you said yes, 
that the military exercises— that you 
did want to underscore that the 
United States is opposed to the use of 



force in the region. Is sending down 
our military might to the region a way 
to show that we oppose force? Isn't 
there some sort of contradiction 
there? Wouldn't it be better to say— if 
we do these things regularly — isn't 
this the time now not to do it, not to 
heighten the tensions, and to say, we 
oppose the use of force? How can you 
oppose it by sending down all these 
ships and men? 

A. Since the trouble that is going on 
down there comes from outside the 
area — revolution exported from the 
Soviet Union and from Cuba and from 
others of their allies — then wouldn't 
there perhaps be a risk if we change our 
pattern and withdrew? Wouldn't we be 
sending some kind of a signal that might 
be the wrong kind of signal to send if 
we want peace in that area? 

The simple truth is: No one has 
asked for American forces to come to 
their aid; in fact, they've gone quite the 
contrary and said the reverse — that they 
don't. Yet they do acknowledge that 
they need the material assistance we're 
giving them — both economic and to pro- 
vide a shield or help them provide their 
own shield against the attacks that are 
preventing them from making the 
economic progress they want to make 
now that they have installed a 
democratic-type of government there. 
But, as I say, we've done this regularly. 
I don't think that it's destabilizing, nor 
should it be. 

Q. You've said, in your letter to 
the four Contadora nations, that you 
want to take this out of the realm of 
an East-West confrontation. But 
doesn't somebody have to begin to 
take it out of that realm? And couldn't 
the United States be the leader in that 
way and not make it that kind of an 
atmosphere of confrontation? 

A. We think we are. We have tried 
to make contact with the guerrillas in El 
Salvador to see if they would not meet 
with the Peace Commission that was 
created by the Salvadoran Government 
to discuss participating in the 
democratic process in the elections that 
are coming up in the entire area before 
the year is out. I have just sent letters, 
which have been made public now, but, 
letters to the Contadora Four, of our ap- 
proval of what they're doing, and our 
recognition of what they are. And we 
stand ready to support them in what 
they're trying to accomplish. We want a 
political and a peaceful solution. 



Q. Military leaders in the Pen- 
tagon have stated recently that they 
never want to be involved in another 
war without the support of the 
American people. Do you have any 
sense or feeling now for whether the 
American people are ready to support 
a war to defend our interests in Cen- 
tral America? 

A. First, I don't think the Americar 
people have ever wanted a war. And I 
think we're probably the most peace- 
loving people in the world. And maybe 
this has been part of what has lured us 
into wars in the past, because we 
haven't been ready for them. 

No, I don't think the American 
people — frankly, I don't think that 
they're as aware as perhaps they should 
be. We've tried to make them aware — 
that this does constitute something of a 
threat in this hemisphere to peace in the 
entire hemisphere if those who are ex- 
porting the revolution here are suc- 
cessful. But, no, we're not planning a 
war, and we don't think that that's goinj 
to happen at all. I've seen four wars in 
my lifetime. I have sons, and I have a 
grandson. I agree with General 
Eisenhower that war is man's greatest 
stupidity. I don't want to see such a 
thing. We want peace. 

But we also must recognize that 
you've got to do more than just want 
peace. You have got to prevent what is 
happening down there to people who 
want peace also but are not allowed to 
have it because of outside forces that 
are seizing upon their situation and hop- 
ing to further their own ideological aims 

Q. Do you feel the people support 
your policies in Central America? 

A. Those that have been informed 
and understand it do. I just met with 
some today who made it evident that 
they did. If we all get together and ex- 
plain what's happening down there, 
perhaps that'll resolve the situation in 
that regard. 

Q. If there is an incident where 
the American forces down there 
engaging in the military exercises are 
fired upon and they are forced to fire 
back, do you see any contingency 
where such an incident might lead to 
deeper American involvement in Cen- 
tral America? 

A. No, I don't. First of all, those 
maneuvers that are going to be held in 
Honduras are not going to put Amer- 
icans in any reasonable proximity to the 
border. It would have to be something ir 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



he nature of a terrorist attack, 
omething of that kind. And I think that 
hat could happen in a base here in 
America. Again, I believe that those 
eople who have taken it upon them- 
elves to be our defenders and protec- 
ors have a right to defend and protect 
heir own lives. 

Q. If Nicaragua attacks Honduras, 
yould the United States assist Hon- 
uras militarily under the terms of the 
'io mutual defense pact treaty? 

A. We haven't considered that, but 
great many people should know that 
nee 1947 — and so, obviously, our Ad- 
linistration didn't have anything to do 
•ith it — there is a pact, the Rio Pact, 
lat says that any attack, or an attack 
n any American state, shall be con- 
dered as an attack on all American 
cates. That would require, of course, ac- 
xal outside visible attack on a state 
id, I suppose, by a country flying 
ider its own flag instead of under sur- 
)gate troops. So we would have to deal 
ith that problem when it arose and 
;al with it with all of our neighbors and 
iends in the Organization of American 
:ates. 

Q. I'd like to give you a chance to 

■ lence this drumbeat of confusion 

at you were talking about. Why not 
,y categorically that Central America 
ill not be another Vietnam, that 
ider no circumstances will you im- 
•se U.S. troops in a combat situation 
Central America? 
A. I said the last time we gathered 
• at there are some things — I can make 

■ ery assurance in the world that we 

I ve no such plans, we have no desire, 
I \r do the countries down there want us 
I /olved in that way. But I used an ex- 
3 ession that has been used by 
I 'esidents like Franklin Delano 
I >osevelt and others, and that is that a 
I esident should never say "never," 
1 cause that's a hypothetical question 
1 at then asks you to try to predict what 
I >uld take — would, could possibly take 
lace in the future. And I just don't 
I lieve you can answer a hypothetical 
I estion, unless it's — 

Q. What about increasing the 
I mber of U.S. advisers in El 
1 lvador? Are you planning to at all? 

A. No one has presented a proposal 
I me about increasing the number, 
jiere's no question that 55 of them — if 
Isre was an increase, probably we 
| aid train the Salvadoran Army and its 
|w recruits that are coming in actually 



requiring basic training a little faster 
than we're doing it. But there's been no 
proposal for such an increase. 

Q. Since you, yourself, have iden- 
tified massive social problems as one 
of the root causes of the troubles in 
Central America, are you prepared to 
make a commitment to substantial 
U.S. aid on the order of the Marshall 
Plan if the hostilities can be calmed? 

A. What we've appointed the com- 
mission for— the Kissinger-chaired com- 
mission — is for the purpose of coming 
up and recommending a long-range plan 
that would particularly deal with the 
things that you mention. There's no 
question that our neighbors to the south 
have, for too many years, suffered 
revolutions in which one set of rulers 
simply were exchanged for another set 
of rulers. And there's no question but 
their economic and social policies have 
left much to be desired as far as the op- 
portunity for the great mass of their 
people. And what we want is a long- 
range policy. This is what I discussed 
when I visited South America. I dis- 
cussed with them how we can have the 
kind of development that will make 
these countries economically self- 
sufficient, that will give them a standard 
of living in which there isn't the fertile 
soil that is presently there for subver- 
sion, for people offering promises of pie 
in the sky and then arousing to revolu- 
tion. And to, in other words, have a pro- 
gram that makes all the nations here in 
the Americas equal partners in the 
development of this Western Hemi- 
sphere, and what a great power for 
good that we could be if we were so 
organized. This is my dream, and it's 
what I hope that the commission will 
come back with. 

Q. Is the United States prepared 
to make the kind of massive dollar 
commitment that that would undoubt- 
edly entail? 

A. It does not follow that it has to 
undoubtedly entail that. For example, 
many of those countries are considered 
too high a risk for private investment. If 
together, we could agree upon guar- 
antees that the investment would not be 
confiscated, taken over by governments 
and in changes of government, and so 
forth. There is far more in the private 
investment pool, far more there than 
any government could possibly do. And 
it is to find out what is practical and 
what can be done. We're not completely 
alone in this, because our allies, the 
other industrial nations in the world, 



have made it plain to us, again at 
Williamsburg, that not only here in our 
hemisphere, but in their own, we want 
to find ways that we can help the 
developing part of the world, help them 
to faster development and a better way 
of life. 

Q. The Lebanese President said 
this past week that the Israeli partial 
withdrawal in Lebanon amounted to 
de facto partition of that country. Do 
you agree? 

A. No, I am very hopeful that if this 
partial withdrawal takes place that it 
will be recognized and admitted to be, 
by the Israelis, as one phase of their 
agreement to withdraw. If they 
withdraw in a phased withdrawal, it cer- 
tainly will give us a better case for 
breaking the roadblock that has been 
established by Syria and persuading 
them to keep their original promise that 
when others withdrew they would with- 
draw. I can't answer as to whether that 
is the way that this is going to be 
perceived, or whether the Israelis will 
admit to it or not, but I will be talking, 
in a couple of days with the two 
Ministers who are here from Israel, 
about this very thing. 

But if this is a phased withdrawal I 
think there is fear if there is simply 
withdrawal to another line and then a 
digging in and fortifying along that line, 
that this would be what it looks like 
Syria is doing and that is simply trying 
to partition Lebanon, reduce Lebanon, 
and grab off some territory themselves. 
But with the agreement that's been 
signed between Lebanon and Israel. I 
don't think Israel has that in mind. 

Q. What would happen if Lebanon 
is partitioned? Would it be that awful? 

A. I believe that the people of the 
country have a right to determine their 
own destiny, choose their own govern- 
ment; if it was partitioned, it would be 
occupation by other countries. Yes, I 
think that is awful. We set out to help 
Lebanon, after all these years of strife, 
to regain sovereignty of its land, protec- 
tion of its own borders, and we're help- 
ing in every way we can to bring that 
about. 

Q. I'd like to ask you about the 
Chairman of your new Commission on 
Central America, Dr. Henry Kissinger. 
There have been, as you know, a 
number of charges over the years that 
Mr. Kissinger, during the Nixon 
years, tried to destabilize the duly 
elected Government of Chile and that 



liptember 1983 



21 



THE PRESIDENT 



he also once told a Chilean official 
that whatever happens in the South is 
of no importance. Did you check into 
Mr. Kissinger's record on Latin 
America before you appointed him? 
A. I knew what his position was 
prior to my taking over this office and 
how seriously he considered the prob- 
lems that are going on. Remember, El 
Salvador didn't start with us. It was 
already in turmoil before we got here, 
and I know how he feels about that. I 
know also that there is no hard and 
fast — let me put it this way — I think 
there are some stereotypes about Mr. 
Kissinger that a little actual reading and 
rereading the history would indicate that 
such stereotypes are not necessarily 
valid. 



Q. Since Cuba has repeatedly been 
labeled as the fountainhead of most of 
the violence in Central America, why 
has your Administration elected to go 
to the recipients of the arms and the 
equipment that comes in instead of go- 
ing to the source? 

A. We have interdicted some of the 
supplies that are going from Nicaragua 
over to El Salvador. If you go to the 
source, I think you're talking about the 
Soviet Union. They know and we have 
communicated to them how we feel 
about this and have also to our friends 
in Cuba — told them how we feel about 
it. We are trying to bring about the very 
thing that all of you seem to think that 
we're shying away from — that is, not 
broadening a war but trying to limit it 
and trying to bring about a peaceful and 
political settlement in Central America. 

Q. In reply to Helen's question 
you spoke of confusion. Isn't this Ad- 
ministration to blame for much of that 
confusion? Some of our own am- 
bassadors in Central America were 
taken by surprise by the maneuvers. 
Some of the friendly governments, 
especially in the Contadora group, 
were puzzled by your latest actions. 
My question is, why was there not 
more prior consultation and what can 
you do now to reassure any of those 
friendly governments that we're not 
today closer to war down there than 
we were last week? 

A. As I told you, I've sent letters to 
all four leaders of the Contadora coun- 
tries. And I don't think that there's that 
much disturbance among our friends and 



allies about this. Sometimes there's a 
slip up and an ambassador doesn't find 
out something they should find out soon 
enough in advance. As a matter of fact, 
I received a cable from one about that. 
My most recent appointee, the Am- 
bassador to Austria, Helene [von Damm] 
let me know that something had taken 
place and she hadn't been told about it 
in advance. 

Q. Who do you think is to blame 
for this confusion you spoke of then? 

A. I don't think there is as much 
confusion as they're trying to point out 
about this. The training feature with 
Honduras has been well advertised and 
known for a long, long time that it's go- 
ing to take place. And as I say, we 
regularly conduct and conduct joint 
maneuvers with, very often, not only on 
land but with the navies of our friends 
and allies in Central and South America. 
And so, I just don't think that there's 
great confusion about this. 

Q. Is it true that you're planning a 
vast expansion of covert aid to the 
anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua? 
And, what would congressional action 
to cut off such aid mean to your ef- 
forts in Central America? 

A. I think it would be a very grave 
mistake if the legislature interfered with 
what we're trying to do, and we're try- 
ing to keep them appraised of our ac- 
tions. I can't answer your question about 
covert aid. I think this is like discussing 
intelligence matters. If you discuss 
covert aid, it's no longer covert. So, I 
can only tell you that we're continuing 
on a policy that we believe is aimed at, 
first of all, bringing about peace in El 
Salvador, hopefully, through negotia- 
tions with those who are presently 
radicals and fighting as guerrillas. And 
in Nicaragua, hoping that we can per- 
suade the Nicaraguan — the Sandinista 
government, to return to the principles 
of the revolution in which they, in 
writing, guaranteed to the Organization 
of American States were going to be the 
policy of their government. 



Q. Given the fact that this covert 
operation is not so covert any more, 
haven't we reached a point where it 
really might make more sense to do 
things on an overt basis, and, in other 
words, hasn't the thing really become 
counterproductive? 

A. No. No, I don't think so. And I 
think what we're doing is well within th> 
limits of common sense, and those who 
are attempting to make it impossible foi 
us to bring aid down in that area, I 
think, are the ones who are building 
up — if they have their way — to a giant 
headache down the road a ways. We're 
trying to prevent such a headache from 
coming about. 



Text from White House press release. 



22 



Department of State Bulleti ! 



THE SECRETARY 



E3£3E3£3£3£3E3£3E3L3E3E3E3E2E3E3S3E3E3E3r3£3£3£3£3E3£3r3£3E3£ 

Secretary Shultz Visits 
East and South Asia 
and the Middle East 

E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E 

Secretary Shultz departed Washington, D.C., 

June 23, 1983, to visit 
the Philippines; Thailand, where he addressed 

the opening session 

of the postministerial meeting of the ASEAN 

[Association of South East Asian Nations] 

dialogue; India; Pakistan; Syria; 

Saudi Arabia; Lebanon; Israel; Jordan; and Egypt. 

He returned to Washington on July 8. 

Following are remarks, statements, 

toasts, news conferences, and briefings 

held on various occasions 

during the trip. 

3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E3E 



CHINA 




Philippine Sea 



PHILIPPINES 



INDONESIA "' ° ^ssrl. 



Manila 



LUNCHEON REMARKS, 
JUNE 25, 1983 1 

President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, and all 
of those whom you so graciously recog- 
nized at the beginning of your toast: 
You gave everybody an eloquent descrip- 
tion of some of my various roles in life, 
and I do recall I ran into one of the peo- 
ple I knew in Stanford who is sitting 
right down here. It reminds me when I 
went from the government to business 
some years ago, I got asked a lot by 
students from Stanford, who said, 
"You've administered in business, what's 
the difference?" And I said, "Well, it's 
really very simple. I quickly learned 
when I went into business that you had 
to be very careful when you tell 
somebody who's working for you to do 



something because the chances were 
very high, he'd do it, whereas in govern- 
ment, you didn't have to worry, and in 
the university you weren't supposed to 
tell anybody to do anything in the first 
place." I had a longer answer, too. 

But I remember greeting you on the 
Monument Grounds when you came to 
Washington last September, you and 
Mrs. Marcos. I remember very well that 
visit in Washington and around the 
country. I think, throughout that visit, 
you felt and you brought forth a warmth 
and enthusiasm from the American peo- 
ple for you and the people of the Philip- 
pines. I felt that warmth when I arrived, 
and Mrs. Marcos was so gracious to 
meet me — in this talk that we've had 
and in these wonderful, talented young 
people who entertained us here. I might 
say it's the first time I've ever seen a 
fashion show. I hope it isn't the last. But 
it was a warm and wonderful perform- 
ance, and it does show the touch that 
there is between the people of the 
Philippines and the people of the United 
States. 

I thought you might just dwell for a 
moment on what it is that accounts for 
this very special relationship. It is, first 
of all, a question of people who for 
decades have worked together, fought 
together, laughed together, and cried 
together. My wife sits beside you. She 
fought beside you when she returned 
with General MacArthur to the Philip- 
pines. There are close to a million 
American citizens who are of Filipino 
heritage. There is an extensive two-way 
traffic of people so that we see each 
other frequently, and I think that, in 
part, accounts for this relationship. 

We talked a bit earlier about 
economic matters and, of course, there 
is a very considerable commercial rela- 
tionship between our countries. The two- 
way trade more or less comes to about 
$4 billion in a year. The amount of U.S. 
investment in the Philippines is about a 
billion and a half dollars. So these are 
very large sums, and they represent a 
very considerable economic relationship. 
You were kind enough earlier to refer to 
a talk that I made a month or so ago 
having to do with the so-called North- 
South issues. In that talk, you remarked 
that insofar as our economies are con- 
cerned, we are all in one boat; we sail 
together, and we have a stake together 
in how that boat operates. I think that 
we can take some comfort from the fact 
that there does seem to be a rise now in 
the tide of the world economy, and it 
will help us all as our trade expands 
and, of course, it will help our whole set 
of financial problems. 



3ptember1983 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



I can't help but call attention to the 
courageous moves that you have taken 
here recently. It seems to me that those 
moves and with the rise in the world 
economy that we're seeing, we're bound 
to see a very healthy Philippine economy 
as well as our own. 

I might say that when we fought 
together, we fought in defense of 
freedom and democracy. Those are 
values that are cherished by both our 
peoples, and we must continue to defend 
those values when they are challenged 
and work to promote and strengthen the 
institutions that embody them. I 
welcome this opportunity to visit just 
after the successful conclusion of the 
review of our military bases agreement 
because it stands for the security ele- 
ment of our relationship and represents 
a further strengthening of military 
cooperation that goes back over 40 
years. It has served our countries well, 
and we can say that it has added stabili- 
ty to this region. We must also say that 
the framework of our relationship is a 
large one. It is not simply two countries 
that have a bilateral relationship, but we 
share concern for this region and the 
setting of the ASEAN [Association of 
South East Asian Nations] countries. I 
support, the President supports, the 
United States supports the efforts which 
you and the other ASEAN countries 
have been making to see if we can't give 
the country of Kampuchea back to its 
own residents and free them from the 
indignity of foreign occupation. 

As I raise my glass to you, let me 
propose a toast: to your continued good 
health, to the preservation of friendship 
between our two countries, and to the 
success of our diplomats in their 
endeavor to bring peace to Southeast 
Asia. To President Marcos and Mrs. 
Marcos. 

rwwwwwwwwwwwwirw 

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Secretary's Itinerary 



b Ob <lb Obdb Ob Ob Ob Ob Ob Ob Ob Ob Ob Ob 



June 23 


Depart Washington 


June 24 


Elmandorf 


June 25-26 


Manila 


June 26-29 


Bangkok 


June 30 


Agra 


June 30-July 2 


New Delhi 


July 2-3 


Islamabad 


July 3 


Peshawar 


July 3-4 


Islamabad 


July 4-5 


Jidda 


July 5 


Beirut 


July 5-6 


Damascus 


July 6-7 


Tel Aviv 


July 7 


Amman 


July 7 


Cairo 


July 8 


Arrive Washington 




South 
China 
Sea 



Indian Ocean 



Bangkok 



STATEMENT, 
JUNE 26, 1983 2 

First I'd like to say that it is always a 
pleasure to come to Bangkok. I think 
that just about a year ago I was here as 
a private citizen and have looked for- 
ward to returning, not only to Bangkok 
but to the meeting of the ASEAN coun- 
tries which we are privileged to attend. 
I am the fourth Secretary of State to at- 
tend as one of your dialogue partners, 
and we consider it an honor to be in- 
vited and come here to learn and also to 
express our views, so we look forward 
to the interchange. 

I think here, as in so many parts of 
the world, we inevitably have a twin 
agenda. On the one hand, we must at- 
tend to our security — and here, of 
course, we see the problem of Kam- 
puchea and Vietnam, and we have to ad- 
dress ourselves to that problem — and 
from the standpoint of the United States 
we are particularly interested to hear 
the analysis of our friends from ASEAN 
and basically take the position that we 
wish to support your efforts. 

The problem of economic develop- 
ment is one that every country in the 
world feels, and I noticed in looking 
through reports on the meetings that 
you have held, that this question has 
preoccupied you as it preoccupies 
everyone. I think we must all take the 
view that in the world economy we are 
all in the same boat, and we all have a 
joint stake in seeing to it that this boat 
sails in a positive and strong way. We 
come to the meeting to discuss that im- 
portant subject, and we come in that 



spirit with some ideas and readiness to 
listen and also with the consciousness of 
the great importance of economic 
development. Again, I am very pleased 
to be here and look forward to our 
meetings, both with you in your capacity 
as chairman of the ASEAN meeting, 
and in your capacity as Foreign Minister 
of Thailand. 



STATEMENT, 
ASEAN DIALOGUE, 
JUNE 28, 1983 3 

A few months ago, when I had occasion 
to talk about Asia and the Pacific to an 
American audience, I suggested that 
events in this part of the world have a 
large part in shaping our common 
future. I had ASEAN very much in 
mind. I would single out three of your 
accomplishments in particular, which are 
a model for the rest of the world. 

First, you have turned diversity 
from potential weakness into a signifi- 
cant strength by identifying and building 
upon common interests. 

Second, you have attracted 
worldwide respect and support by 
resolutely resisting aggression while 
demonstrating a willingness to 
negotiate. 

Finally, you have attained 
remarkable economic progress by taking 
the high road of reliance on market 
mechanisms and disciplined economic 
management to release the impressive 
energies and talents of your own people. 

There is great importance for all of 
us in each of these achievements. 



Dynamism in Diversity 

The United States and the ASEAN 
states share the ideal of unity in diversi- 
ty, and for two of us it is the national 
motto. When I think of the monuments 
left by the great civilizations of 
Southeast Asia — Jogjakarta, Ayutthaya, 
and elsewhere — I am reminded of the 
different histories of the countries of the 
region, but also of a common cultural 
heritage. 

Today when I see the different 
skylines of the ASEAN capitals — each 
of which has changed even since my last 
visit — I am reminded that you are build- 
ing a common prosperity. Not only 
ASEAN but all the nations of the world 
are today being drawn closer to each 
other everyday by technological innova- 
tion and economic expansion. This very 



bObObObObObObObObObObObObObOb 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



process, however, sometimes makes na- 
tions and peoples anxious about preserv- 
ing their individual identities. We all 
recognize that diversity is not a "prob- 
lem" but an expression of the freedom. 
Independence, and moral values that we 
lurture and safeguard. While our unity 
jrovides greater strength and efficiency, 
)ur diversity brings creativity, adapt- 
ibility, and meaning to our relation- 
ships. 

■Security Through Strength 
land a Willingness To Negotiate 

rio greater challenge faces our peoples 
hr the leaders of our countries than the 
rhallenge of preserving peace. President 
Reagan believes that we best do that by 
combining strength with a willingness to 
|;olve problems through negotiations. 
By rebuilding our own military 
trength we not only hope to deter ag- 
gression but also to persuade the Soviet 
Jnion to negotiate seriously for arms 
ontrol. At the START [strategic arms 
eduction talks] and INF [intermediate- 
ange nuclear forces] talks in Geneva, at 
he mutual and balanced force [reduc- 
ion] talks in Vienna, and at the UN's 
Committee on Disarmament, we are 
eeking substantial, verifiable reductions 
r limitations on nuclear, chemical, and 
onventional forces. 

Our efforts to solve problems 
irough negotiations extend beyond 
rms control to efforts at resolving the 
sgional disputes that so often are the 
ause of wars. We are, as you know, 
'orking with patience and determina- 
on to bring about a peaceful resolution 
f the problems that beset the Middle 
last. Our policies toward Namibia and 
ighanistan incorporate the same prin- 
ples. 

In the effort to achieve a political 
?ttlement for one of the most impor- 
int of these problems, that of Kam- 
uchea, it is the ASEAN countries that 
ave pointed the way for the United 
tates and for the entire world. My 
overnment strongly supports both 
SEAN's refusal to acquiesce in the 
)nsequences of aggression and 
SEAN's readiness to negotiate a com- 
rehensive political solution. 

U.S. support for ASEAN's policy 
i ward Kampuchea signifies our full 
| jmmitment to support our common 
oals in Southeast Asia. We follow your 
ad. We know that the chances of per- 
lading Vietnam to change its course 
re greater if the message comes from 
s neighbors. Regional security, like 
::onomic progress, is more solidly con- 



structed if rooted in local initiative. But 
you will find us working steadfastly by 
your side. 

Withdrawal of foreign troops, self- 
determination, and the establishment of 
a neutral and independent Kampuchean 
Government, in accordance with the 
principles established by the Interna- 
tional Conference on Kampuchea, would 
protect the interests not only of the 
Kampuchean people but of every state in 
the region, including Vietnam. We are 
painfully aware of Kampuchea's recent 
tragic history. The noncommunist 
resistance leadership of Prince Sihanouk 
and Prime Minister Son Sann has our 
moral, political, and diplomatic backing. 
However, we will have no dealings with 
the Khmer Rouge. 

Like you, we recognize that Thai- 
land, as a front-line state, deserves full 
support. We have a bilateral security 
relationship with Thailand. Our airlift of 
howitzers and ammunition and the ex- 
pedited delivery of other material to 
Thailand during the last Vietnamese dry 
season offensive was concrete testimony 
to our resolve in this regard. 

The growing Soviet presence at Cam 
Ranh Bay introduces a further disturb- 
ing element of tension into the region. A 
matter of particular concern is the clear 
evidence that toxic weapons have been 
used against innocent people in isolated 
areas of Kampuchea and Laos. It is im- 
perative that we join together in calling 
for an end to use of chemical and toxic 
weapons on innocent people. In doing 
so, we may help to bring about a halt to 
this inhumane activity. 

The United States is aware that one 
of the more deplorable consequences of 
Vietnam's policies — the flood of refugees 
into neighboring states — is a problem 
that imposes continuing responsibilities 
on us all. Although the majority of these 
refugees have been resettled and the 
flow into ASEAN countries has greatly 
diminished, neither first asylum nor 
resettlement countries should lose sight 
of those that remain. The United States 
is taking steps to simplify its processing 
procedures and will propose a program 
to Congress for the next fiscal year 
which, together with the continued ef- 
forts of other resettlement countries, 
should reduce the refugee population 
significantly. We remain committed to 
doing our part in helping ease the 
refugee burden on ASEAN members. 
We are confident that other resettle- 
ment countries will also continue to do 
theirs. 



On one particularly painful matter, 
we ask your help. Accounting for the 
Americans missing in Indochina is a 
matter of highest national priority for 
President Reagan and the American 
people. We urge both Hanoi and Viet- 
nam to cooperate in resolving this 
humanitarian issue. The United States 
greatly values any assistance the 
ASEAN countries can provide us in 
seeking the fullest possible accounting of 
our missing men. As for Laos, the 
United States has shown readiness to 
improve relations based on concrete 
steps by both sides. We remain 
committed to this process. 

The High Road to Prosperity 

The whole world is now painfully aware 
of something that the ASEAN states 
have known for a long time — we are all 
in the same boat economically. When 
one country's growth falters, all coun- 
tries lose markets. When one country 
erects barriers to trade, people in all 
countries are denied opportunities for 
mutual benefit. 

The economic growth of the develop- 
ing countries — including most definitely 
the ASEAN countries — is important to 
the United States, not only because it is 
good for you but also because it is good 
for us. One out of every 20 workers in 
our factories and one out of every five 
acres of our farmland now produce for 
Third World markets. Forty percent of 
total U.S. trade is with developing coun- 
tries. Deterioration in our international 
accounts, particularly our exports to 
developing countries, accounted for 
about half of the decline in our GNP last 
year. 

The reality of mutual interest be- 
tween North and South creates a rela- 
tionship of mutual responsibility. Our 
common task is to make this link a spur 
to growth in both developing and 
developed countries. Right now the 
name of the game is economic growth. 

To meet that challenge, President 
Reagan has set three broad tasks for his 
Administration. 

First is to lead the way to long-term 
global economic recovery. That is the 
single most important thing the United 
States can do to restore growth in the 
developing world. I am happy to be able 
to say that the progress we have made 
to date is encouraging. Interest rates 
and inflation are down. Employment and 
labor productivity are up. U.S. real GNP 
rose at an annual rate of 2.6% in the 



9ptember1983 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



first quarter and, according to the 
preliminary estimate, at an annual rate 
of more than 6% in the second quarter. 
The challenge now, which we and other 
industrialized states took up in 
Williamsburg, is to turn this revival into 
sustained, noninflationary growth. 

We don't pretend that our recovery 
is by itself the key to restoring growth 
in the developing world. To the con- 
trary, the most important engine of 
growth for developing countries is the 
investment financed by domestic sav- 
ings. On average the developing coun- 
tries devote about one-quarter of their 
GNP to investment, with 80% of that in- 
vestment financed by domestic savings. 
In this respect, as in so many others, the 
ASEAN countries are doing better. 
More than 90% of your gross investment 
comes from domestic savings. The 
ASEAN countries must be congratu- 
lated for having given their citizens the 
incentives to produce, save, and invest 
while relying on market prices to 
allocate scarce capital efficiently. They 
have thus moved out onto the road of 
sustained growth. 

However, the United States also 
does its part through official and private 
investment flows. Worldwide, the 
United States is the largest provider of 
official development aid, and we have in- 
creased the amount during each year of 
the Reagan Administration. Of more 
than $8 billion that we provided last 
year, nearly $1 billion went to ASEAN 
countries either as bilateral assistance or 
as the U.S. share of World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank loans. But an 
even larger contribution, in the ASEAN 
countries at least, is made by direct U.S. 
private investment, which we estimate 
to have reached a level of about $10 
billion by 1982. That is an increase of 
more than 100% in just 2 years. 
American businessmen certainly have 
confidence in ASEAN. And well they 
should. 

The second large contribution that 
we can make to your development is to 
provide markets for your products. For 
the developing countries in general, the 
income derived from exports in 1980 
was 17 times that from foreign aid. The 
ASEAN countries earned roughly $65 
billion from exports last year, almost 30 
times the amount of foreign assistance 
from all sources. About 17%, or $11 
billion, of these exports went to the 
United States, and ASEAN had a trade 
surplus with the United States of $1.3 
billion. 



That is why our burgeoning recovery 
is so important to everyone. An increase 
of just two percentage points in the 
growth rates of the industrial nations 
would add roughly $20-25 billion to the 
annual export earnings of developing 
countries by 1985 if exports grew at the 
same rate. That is why the second task 
President Reagan assigned his Ad- 
ministration is so important— to work 
with our trading partners to resolve 
problems of market access and, in par- 
ticular, to find a way as the President 
said, "to integrate developing countries 
in the liberal trading order." The 
ASEAN countries are already leading 
the way in that effort. 

We greatly appreciate the construc- 
tive efforts by your governments to 
strengthen trade liberalization measures 
in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade]. The United States is pleased 
that the Williamsburg conference en- 
dorsed this goal, referring in particular 
to the possibility of a new negotiating 
round with special emphasis on "expand- 
ing trade with and among developing 
countries." We are also well aware of 
the importance of our GSP [generalized 
system of preferences] program to 
ASEAN countries. The Reagan Admin- 
istration is committed to the renewal of 
that program, and our chances of suc- 
cess will be greater the less are your 
barriers to imports from us. 

The third task outlined by President 
Reagan is to lead in assisting interna- 
tional financial and trade institutions to 
strengthen world growth. At Williams- 
burg, other free market industrialized 
nations joined in this effort. And they 
share, in particular, our concern over 
the debt burden borne by developing 
countries. 

A strategy for restoring growth will 
require determined efforts by many of 
the developing countries themselves, in- 
cluding difficult readjustment and 
discipline in domestic policies. The 
ASEAN countries have shown that they 
have the foresight and discipline to 
make such adjustments when necessary. 
But austerity alone is not a sufficient 
solution to the debt burden that the 
developing countries face. If everyone 
practices austerity and cuts imports, 
that only chokes world trade and 
spreads the hardships further. The ob- 
jective must be to preserve the credit- 
worthiness of countries and their ability 
to import new private capital in future 
years. There is no point in more austeri- 
ty than is necessary for this objective. 
Until domestic adjustments and expand- 



ing world trade reduce the relative 
burden of debt service, there will be a 
continuing role for official financing and 
emergency assistance. 

In each of the ways I have de- 
scribed, your countries are ushering in a 
new period of peace and prosperity to 
Southeast Asia. The efforts of this ac- 
complishment reach far beyond your 
region. In an environment of global in- 
terdependence, your regional initiatives 
are felt throughout the world. All of 
your dialogue partners have a major 
stake in your success. 

It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that ASEAN is the central 
focus of our policy in Southeast Asia. 
You may continue to rely on the United 
States for full support for your policy 
toward Kampuchea. You can also rely 
on us as a responsive dialogue partner 
on other matters affecting your security 
and economic development. We stand 
committed to the security of Thailand as 
the front-line state and to playing a con- 
structive role in the region as a whole. 
Through our development assistance 
programs, our support for the interna- 
tional financial institutions, our private 
sector investment, and our participation 
in the ASEAN-U.S. dialogue, we are 
engaged in your development efforts, 
both bilaterally and multilaterally. We 
remain committed to fulfilling with you 
our continuing humanitarian duty to 
shelter and resettle Indochinese 
refugees. As the 1980s face us with com 
mon problems and common challenges, 
the United States will do its part in the 
common effort. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JUNE 28, 1983 4 

Q. Could I ask both Mr. Shultz, the 
U.S. Secretary of State and Mr. 
[William] Hayden, the Australian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, of their 
hopes for the outcome of the visit of 
the Australian Minister to Hanoi? 

Secretary Shultz. The views of the 
United States are that we support the 
approach of the ASEAN countries to th« 
problem of dealing with the Kam- 
puchean issue and all the related mat- 
ters. So, when it comes to any approach 
to Hanoi, we believe that it ought to be 
coordinated and be seen as useful by th« 
ASEAN countries. It is our understand- 
ing that they feel Mr. Hayden's visit 
could be useful, but I think it is up to 
them to say. This is the approach of the 
United States. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Foreign Minister Hayden. As I 

understood the response yesterday after- 
noon from the ASEAN Foreign Min- 
isters, they, as Mr. Shultz pointed out, 
saw that the visit could be useful, and 
they supported it. Mr. Shultz made it 
clear later that if they supported it, the 
United States was prepared to 
sndorse it. 

Q. What evidence does the United 
States have, and how firm is it, that 
;he Vietnamese are withholding the 
remains of Americans killed in In- 
iochina, or missing in Indochina? Why 
.vould the Vietnamese be doing it, and 
,vhy are you making a point of it at 
;his meeting? 

Secretary Shultz. We make a point 
)f our concern to know what has hap- 
>ened to the missing-in-action and to 
lave returned to us the remains of those 
:illed in action because we care so much 
bout the men in our Armed Forces who 
lave fallen and about their families. So, 

took the occasion here to ask for help 
rom the countries in this region, and 
hey all were considerate enough to say 
hat they would give it to the extent 
hey possibly could. According to our in- 
jrmation, we still have missing — I 
link, 2,494 — and we have intelligence 
lat suggests that the remains of quite a 
izable number are in hand but have not 
een turned over to us. So we wish, as a 
latter of deep concern to the families 
ivolved and out of respect for the 
eceased, that those remains be re- 
lrned to us. We have sought help, and 

has been offered. 

Q. And the third point was what 
ould the motivation of the Viet- 
amese be for what I understand you 
illed cruel behavior? 

Secretary Shultz. I have no reason 
p speculate about their motives. I don't 
ive anything to add on that. 

Q. I would like to address this 
aestion to Professor [Indonesian 
oreign Minister] Mochtar as a 
>okesman of ASEAN on Mr. 
ayden's visit. What is ASEAN's view 
i Mr. Hayden's visit to Hanoi? 

Foreign Minister Mochtar. As long 
! ; Mr. Hayden's visit is in a framework 
i ' seeking a solution along the lines of 
>w ASEAN sees the Kampuchean 
•oblem should be solved, we think it 
ight be useful, and he is welcome to 
11 us what he has learned in Hanoi. In 
let, we welcome this from anybody who 
is relations with Hanoi. 



Q. I would like to ask a similar 
question to Mr. MacEachen of Canada. 
In view of the fact that Canada has 
been praised for not doing the same 
thing — 

Secretary MacEachen. I want to 
continue to be praised. And I find Pro- 
fessor Mochtar's answer very acceptable 
for Canada. If the Australian Minister 
can play an effective and useful role, 
certainly we would welcome that. 

Q. I propose my question to 
[Japanese Foreign] Minister Abe. 
Could you please elaborate about the 
implementation of Prime Minister 
[Yasuhiro] Nakasone's proposal re- 
garding the ASEAN and Japanese 
meeting of the Ministers for Science 
and Technology, and second, about the 
act of the Japanese Government re- 
garding the discriminatory tariffs 
against ASEAN products? 

Foreign Minister Abe. First, when 
Prime Minister Nakasone made his visit 
to the ASEAN countries, he proposed to 
the leaders that they hold a ministerial 
conference on science and technology. 
As a followup to this proposal, I have 
suggested in this morning's session with 
the ASEAN Ministers that we will be 
dispatching, this coming August, a 
survey team which will discuss the issue 
further with the peoples concerned in 
the ASEAN countries. And, if possible, 
by the end of this year we wish to hold a 
ministerial conference on science and 
technology. If no particular ASEAN na- 
tion would like to host this conference, 
we will be happy to hold it in Japan. 
But, in any case, the issue would be up 
for further consideration among the 
peoples concerned. 

Second, on the issue of customs, I 
wish, first of all, to point out that Japan 
will expand by 50% the import ceilings 
of the generalized system of preference 
concerning industrial and mining prod- 
ucts and that, in December of this year 
when the tariff council will be held, the 
items of interest to ASEAN will be con- 
sidered there. I would hope that 
favorable results could be achieved in 
the council through deliberations on the 
ASEAN items. 

Q. I would like to address my 
question to Secretary Shultz. Since 
the United States did not sign the 
Treaty of the Law of the Sea, could 
you tell us what is the motive of that, 
and are you willing to participate in 
the future in signing the treaty? 

Secretary Shultz. The reason we 
have not signed the Law of the Sea 
Treaty is that we believe the provisions 



for a mining convention are seriously 
flawed and will not lead to the develop- 
ment of the seabed resources but quite 
the reverse. The reason, basically, why 
they are flawed is that they say to 
private enterprise — which might want to 
develop the technology and ability to do 
that — this enterprise must, in effect, 
turn over its expertise to an interna- 
tional authority and then, with whatever 
it is able to earn in the use of its 
technology, finance that international 
technology to compete with it. It doesn't 
seem to us that that is likely to strike 
any enterprise as a very good deal and, 
therefore, it is not likely to result in 
what can be a very useful exploitation of 
the seabed resources. So we felt that it 
is a seriously flawed element of the trea- 
ty and, therefore, we have not signed. 
Other elements of the treaty which have 
been worked on a long time, I know, are 
broadly satisfactory to the United 
States, and we intend to live by them. 

Q. I would like to address my 
question to Secretary Shultz. In your 
statement, you mentioned your sup- 
port — moral, political, and diplomatic 
support — for Prince Sihanouk and for 
Son Sann. You added that you will not 
have any dealings with the Khmer 
Rouge. I don't hold any brief for the 
Khmer Rouge. In fact, I am against 
them, but is there any purpose in your 
emphasis on this question at this 
time? I would also like to know 
whether ASEAN Ministers explained 
to you why ASEAN supports the 
Khmer Rouge as part of a democratic 
Kampuchean coalition? 

Secretary Shultz. The reason we 
don't support the Khmer Rouge is 
because of their very cruel behavior 
when they were in charge. We support 
the Sihanouk and Son Sann approach to 
government because we think they 
represent the prospect of a return to a 
sovereign and democratic Kampuchea 
and are joined in an effort to bring 
about the removal of the forces of Viet- 
nam from Kampuchea according to the 
principles and programs set by the 
ASEAN countries. 

Foreign Minister Dhanabalan. Ex- 
cuse me, can I make a correction? There 
was an assumption in your question that 
ASEAN supports the Khmer Rouge. I 
must make a correction. We do not sup- 
port the Khmer Rouge. We recognize 
the Government of Democratic Kam- 
puchea. We support the Son Sann and 
Sihanouk factions, and we are support- 
ing the coalition government in order to 
enable the KPNLF [Kampuchea People's 
National Liberation Front] and Prince 



jptember 1983 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



Sihanouk's groups to grow. So the 
assumption in your question is quite 
wrong. 

Q. I would like to address my 
question to the Japanese Foreign 
Minister. This is regarding the 
Japanese plan to repatriate Kam- 
puchean refugees from Thailand back 
to Kampuchea. I believe no one pres- 
ent on the panel here today recognizes 
the Phnom Penh regime or has had 
contact with it. But I would like to 
find out what kind of message should 
be directed at the Phnom Penh 
government in order to bring this 
repatriation about. And can the 
Minister explain what means are being 
considered at the moment — the 
physical mechanisms — to get these 
refugees back? 

Foreign Minister Abe. In Thailand 
alone, there are currently approximately 
160,000 refugees who are still here. The 
issue was discussed at the dialogue that 
we held with the ASEAN partners, and 
this is rooted in the proposal that we 
presented last year. In last year's 
meeting, we presented a proposal to 
establish a voluntary return center for 
the refugees in the western part of 
Kampuchea, and we said that we will 
provide enough funds to implement such 
a center. Of course, I must point out 
that all the management and implement- 
ing measures will be taken by an ap- 
propriate international agency. Ever 
since last year, this idea has not pro- 
gressed. But, in view of the fact that 
there are many refugees who wish to 
return on a voluntary basis under the 
condition that the implementation will be 
undertaken by an international agency, 
we proposed that we will be ready to 
provide enough funds and assistance in 
order to implement such an idea. 

Q. My question is for the U.S. 
Secretary of State. I would like to ask 
you to expand on your remarks con- 
cerning a growing Soviet threat to the 
region specifically focused on Cam 
Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Ever since I 
have been out here U.S. policymakers 
have spoken of a growing Soviet 
threat to the region based on Soviet 
activities there. But we get very few 
specifics, so if you could expand on 
what the Soviets are doing — 

Secretary Shultz. I think we have 
to start with their support for the Viet- 
namese invasion of Kampuchea. That is 
point one. Point two is the use of those 
bases. And point three, so far as we can 
see, is the gradual shift to using the 



28 



bases as home ports or basing areas, 
particularly for submarines so that they 
are able to project their sea power into 
this region. Those are examples of the 
growth of Soviet influence. 

Q. But U.S. policymakers said 
almost precisely the same thing 3 
years ago. Is there any indication now 
that the Soviets are setting up perma- 
nent facilities in Vietnam as opposed 
to temporary facilities, or only using 
Vietnamese facilities? 

Secretary Shultz. Those bases are 
there, and ports are there, and they 
regard them as places to station them- 
selves — I don't know whether the word 
permanent is the right word; I hope it 
isn't. But certainly it is an effort to use 
those facilities for the purpose of pro- 
jecting Soviet power into this area. That 
is the statement that was made. 

Q. I have two questions. The first 
one I would like to address to 
Secretary Shultz. It is a followup to 
the question on MIAs. Recently, a few 
months ago, some of the American 
team used Thai soil to rescue 
American MIAs in Laos. But they 
were not very successful — to mention, 
Mr. James "Bo" Gritz's team. Such ac- 
tion has surely soured neighborly rela- 
tions between Thailand and Laos. Has 
Washington introduced any measures 
to prevent such teams from using Thai 
soil for such action? If not, what is 
the American policy with regard to 
the MIAs in Laos when the civilian 
operations would rescue them? 

My second question I would like 
to address to Mr. Hayden about Kam- 
puchea. There is so much specula- 
tion—and I hope that your trip to 
Hanoi tomorrow would not be a 
failure — but in order to pursue the 
solution for the Kampuchean question, 
I think I am on the side of Australia 
in bridging the gap between the two 
countries. Do you have any other op- 
tions in mind — for example, an 
Australian proposal for a comprehen- 
sive political settlement by bridging 
the so-called modalities and substance 
between the two groupings, or, in a 
large international conference, to ac- 
commodate the two parties for a 
peaceful settlement? 

Secretary Shultz. As to your first 
question, I am not sure that I under- 
stood it clearly, but to the extent that I 
did, it involves how to approach this 
issue. And, of course, any means that 
can be effective, we are for. There have 
been private efforts organized. There is 
a joint center that works on it, but, prin- 
cipally, we believe that work through of- 



ficial channels is probably the most ef- 
fective method in the long run. It is a 
problem sometimes that people wanting 
to be helpful may push into something 
and raise hopes which are dashed. But, 
clearly, we are anxious to have any 
method used which will help return the 
remains of the deceased and provide in- 
formation for us and for the families in- 
volved on those who are missing. 

Foreign Minister Hayden. If I 
could answer the second question, we 
have certain principles we have 
declared. They are fairly common with 
those declared by other interested par- 
ties: withdrawal of Vietnamese forces 
from Kampuchea and self-determination 
within Kampuchea; the neutralization, 
independence, and nonalignment of 
Kampuchea; normalization of relation- 
ships within the region; and, respect and'.i 
preservation of the territorial sovereign- 
ty of countries of the region. They seem 
to be fairly common principles and, as 
we understand it, recently have been ex- 
pressed by a Vietnamese spokesperson. 
I guess the task I see ahead of me is try- 
ing to sort out to what extent there is 
some sort of common understanding as 
to the interpretation of those declara- 
tions. In spite of the commonality of in- 
terests, there hasn't been much success 
in getting people together. Having said 
all that, we approach the task before us 
with a great deal of caution and respect 
for its daunting quality. As I've said 
many times before, on the balance of 
probabilities, we shouldn't expect to 
achieve much success. For all that, we 
are prepared to go ahead and enter into 
some sort of discussion. The task we 
embark upon is nothing more than that. 

Q. This is for Mr. Shultz. Your 
last answer just raised my question in 
to a two-parter. You say that any 
means that would be effective we are 
for. Are you saying, then, that if you 
were convinced that a private mission 
to look for MIAs would be effective, 
you would not be against it or you 
would not try to stop it? And the sec- 
ond part of my question has to do witl I 
the Kampuchean coalition. If I under- I 
stand U.S. policy correctly, the United! 
States is willing to give political and i 
moral support to the coalition but not i 
military aid. Could you be specific as 
to why military aid to the coalition 
would not be productive, or rather, 
why it would be counterproductive? 

Secretary Shultz. On the first ques- 
tion, I think the key word is "if it has a 
good chance of being effective." On the 
second question, we feel that we can 



Department of State Bulleti 






THE SECRETARY 



support them, of course, as we do 
through our security relationship with 
the Thais. But, insofar as other support 
is concerned, we think that nonmilitary 
support is the kind of thing that we 
should do in support of the ASEAN ef- 
fort here. 

Q. My question is directed to Mr. 
Mochtar. Discussions have taken place 
on the future of the New Zealand 
force in Singapore and Australian Air 
Force units in Malaysia. Do the five 
see the maintenance of these forces in 
place as a significant factor in the 
maintenance of a united stand against 
Hanoi on the question of Vietnam's oc- 
cupation of Kampuchea? 

Foreign Minister Mochtar. I think 
in ASEAN, there is a healthy principle 
which we keep. We make a distinction 
Detween bilateral relations of the in- 
dividual countries on which we don't 

omment because that is their own 
Dusiness and ASEAN matters. I don't 
see the relationship between the forces 
rou mention and the ASEAN position 

>n Kampuchea. 

Q. My question is addressed to the 
Thai Foreign Minister in his role as 
hairman. I would like to know 
vhether the ASEAN Ministers have 
.ny reservations about Mr. Hayden's 
orthcoming visit to Vietnam, and 
whether the ASEAN Ministers see Mr. 
layden as performing any role on 
heir behalf. If I may, Fd also like to 
sk Mr. Shultz whether he has raised 
tie question of the American MIAs 
■ith Mr. Hayden with a view to 
erhaps Mr. Hayden raising it with 
tie authorities in Hanoi. 

Foreign Minister Siddhi. I think 
mt Mr. Hayden had a dialogue with us, 
mong ASEAN. Yesterday, we ex- 
lamed our position very clearly. I think 
lat Mr. Hayden understands very well. 
lo, as this is an international problem, 
e have no reservations concerning Mr. 
ayden's trip to Hanoi. We also told Mr. 
ayden the progress that we have made 
ius far. If he can probe further and get 
| ore information for us, it would be 
J ?ry useful to our search for peace and 
political solution for Kampuchea. I 
ould say that Mr. Hayden has a role to 
I ay, and we have no reservations about 
{ s trip at all. 

Q. For Secretary Shultz and [Ger- 
1 an Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich] 

enscher. Secretary Shultz, could you 
i immarize the negotiations with the 

jviet Union on intermediate-range 
laclear missiles targeted on Western 



Europe and Asia? Do you see any 
movement in those negotiations? Have 
you received a responsible answer 
from the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Shultz. The United 
States has made proposals in Geneva for 
reductions in the deployment of the 
SS-20s and offered first that those 
weapons should just be eliminated — both 
the weapons that are planned to be 
deployed by the United States and the 
comparable Soviet weapons. Just 
eliminate them from the face of the 
Earth — that was not acceptable to the 
Soviet Union. So we have now proposed 
that they agree to a global limit, that 
there be some number of warheads that 
each side would accept as a limit, and 
we have not specified a number because 
we felt that there was more room for 
give-and-take if we said just some equal, 
verifiable level. So we have proposals on 
the bargaining table that are reasonable, 
that have been worked out with our 
allies, including with Mr. Genscher and 
his government, and that are global. At 
this point, I can't tell you, I am sorry to 
say, that there has been any reasonable 
response, but we are there at the 
negotiating table; so is the Soviet Union. 
If there can be a negotiated outcome, we 
obviously would regard that as construc- 
tive. 

Foreign Minister Genscher. We 
have always felt that the Soviet Union 
will be ready for serious negotiations on- 
ly if it is firmly convinced that the in- 
tended deployment in Western Europe 
will take place if no results have been 
achieved at the negotiating table. This 
will be one of the important points to be 
discussed during the forthcoming visit to 
Moscow which will take place next 
week. We should leave no doubt about 
the fact that, unless concrete negotiating 
results are achieved, deployment of U.S. 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 
Western Europe will take place. 
Western Europe means the Federal 
Republic, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
as this was decided by NATO in 
December 1979. 

Q. May I address a question to the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers? ASEAN is 
very successful in staging one con- 
ference after another. You had the 
meeting with the EEC [European 
Economic Community] in April, and 
now you have the postministerial con- 
ference with the dialogue countries, 
but my impression is that more and 
more time is dedicated to the Kam- 
puchean conflict, and I wonder 



whether you have chosen the right 
dialogue countries. Therefore, I would 
like to ask you what was the criteria 
to choose dialogue countries? And, 
secondly, wouldn't it have been better 
to choose other dialogue countries, for 
instance, Vietnam or China or 
Moscow? 

Foreign Minister Dhanabalan. It is 
quite wrong to say that we have spent 
all our time talking about Kampuchea. 
We had two sessions with the dialogue 
countries. One was what we call the 
five-plus-six; that is, all of us together. 
We spent the whole of yesterday morn- 
ing and then we met with each of the 
dialogue partners. In the meeting of the 
five-plus-six, I would say we probably 
spent about 25% to 30% of the time 
talking about Kampuchea. In the five- 
plus-one, almost the entire time was 
devoted to economic and other issues 
and not Kampuchea. So your question is 
not even based on the right reading of 
what went on here. 

Q. What impact, in fact, are the 
discussions on the common issues go- 
ing to have on the current UNCTAD 
[UN Conference on Trade and 
Development] meeting? Is there going 
to be a softening of the stand? 
Because of the discussions, are these 
a part of the negotiating tactics which 
the normally [inaudible]? At first, they 
start with the [inaudible] and then 
later on [inaudible] they modify their 
postures. Would the United States, for 
instance, ratify the common fund as a 
result of the discussion? 

Secretary Shultz. From the U.S. 
standpoint, we consider the development 
of the developing world to be of critical 
importance to us— our trading relation- 
ship, our strategic relationships with 
Third World countries are of great 
significance, and, therefore, we have 
devoted a great deal of thought and at- 
tention to this issue. We have expressed 
ourselves in a constructive spirit, and we 
have gone to the UNCTAD meeting in 
that same manner. We feel that the 
general tenor of the discussions at 
UNCTAD, and at other places, is becom- 
ing more and more realistic and con- 
cerned with the operational aspects of 
development. There are a vast number 
of points on which people now agree, in 
particular, the importance of trends and 
investment, as well as aid, to the 
development process. The individual 
countries must be willing to take the 
products of the developing world if they 
are to get anywhere. Just to give a 
number, I believe that the earning which 



eptember1983 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



flows to the ASEAN countries from 
trade exceed those from aid, including 
from multilateral lending institutions, by 
a factor of 30. So you can see the 
relative importance of trade. 

As far as the common fund is con- 
cerned, our view is that the problem of 
very volatile commodity prices has 
classically been a genuine problem for 
both the producing and consuming coun- 
tries. But we do not feel that the way to 
get at that problem is to try to have a 
broad scheme of price controls. 
Although there is a buffer in there in 
terms of working through the 
mechanism of commodity agreements, 
the common fund involves raising money 
in order to implement what would be 
purchasing policies by commodity agree- 
ments to maintain certain price levels. 
We think that, in the end, it wouldn't 
work. It would bankrupt the fund. We 
believe that a better approach to this 
problem is to look at it from the stand- 
point of income flows to countries that 
are especially affected by the commodity 
price issue, and in that regard, the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) com- 
pensatory financing approach appeals to 
us more. So, we haven't found the com- 
mon fund approach one that we think is 
workable. It is not a question of 
ideology. It is a question of workability, 
and, of course, we are ready to look 
with people at the practical aspects of 
the common fund and other means, but 
at this point we are not convinced that it 
will really serve the purpose for which it 
was intended. 

Q. I would like to direct a ques- 
tion to the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister. Foreign Minister Abe has 
been saying that Japan intends to in- 
crease aid to Laos, and in your speech 
in today's Japan-ASEAN meeting, 
ASEAN accepts the continuation of 
Japanese aid to Laos, but you said 
that ASEAN does not feel that such 
aid should be increased. Does this 
statement represent the views of all 
ASEAN nations, and if so— this ques- 
tion might be directed to Mr. Abe — if 
so, what is Japan going to do? Is 
Japan going to keep on with its 
original plan? 

Foreign Minister Mochtar. I think 
our position has been made clear in the 
statement this morning. I think the 
thrust of the statement is that any aid 
to Laos should not end up giving assist- 
ance to the occupation of Kampuchea. 
That is the gist of it. And, as for the 
other part of the question, maybe Mr. 
Abe can answer. 



Foreign Minister Abe. Concerning 
this Kampuchean question, Japan 
strongly supports ASEAN's position 
and, until the Vietnamese forces are 
withdrawn from Kampuchea, Japan will 
continue to freeze aid to Vietnam. Laos, 
however, is not Vietnam, and Laos has 
not invaded Kampuchea. Of course, 
Laos may be influenced by the Viet- 
namese, but Laos is an LDC — a less 
developed country. We have been pro- 
viding Laos with humanitarian aid even 
though that aid has been scaled down 
since the occurrence of the Kampuchea 
problem. But, in view of this standpoint 
of providing humanitarian assistance to 
Laos, this aid to Laos will continue. But 
I wish to make one thing clear: This aid 
will not in any way serve to strengthen 
the Vietnamese at all. This will be strict- 
ly used for the improvement of the peo- 
ple's welfare in Laos. Even if the aid to 
Laos were to be increased, I do not 
believe that it will contradict in any way 
ASEAN's position. Of course, we do not 
envisage any drastic increase of our 
humanitarian aid to Laos, but when 
necessity arises, it may be increased by 
some small scale. 

Q. Mr. Genscher, what is your 
assessment of the political impact of 
this dialogue which has taken place 
here on the general East- West rela- 
tionship? 

Foreign Minister Genscher. It has 
always been the policy of the countries 
of the European Community not to 
transfer the West-East conflict to other 
regions of the world. And so I think it is 
clear that this political dialogue which 
has taken place between the member 
countries of ASEAN and the member 
countries of the European Community— 
the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, Japan, and Australia — may 
make an essential contribution toward 
the policy of greater stability — both 
politically and economically — in the 
world. And, seen against this back- 
ground, this present dialogue could very 
well have a stabilizing effect on East- 
West relations. For this purpose, 
however, it would be necessary for both 
sides — not only the Western countries 
but the Soviet Union and its allies, as 
well — to pursue a policy characterized 
by moderation all over the world. In 
other words, by noninterference in the 
affairs of other countries and by the con- 
sistent application of the principle of the 
nonuse of force. In practical terms, this 
means the withdrawal of Soviet forces 
from Afghanistan and the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. 



Q. Mr. Shultz, according to 
reports in today's newspapers, you in- 
ferred at yesterday's meeting that 
Australia's initiatives on Kampuchea 
were stupid. Did you use that word, 
and, if so, in what context? 

Secretary Shultz. I used the word 
but not in any respect with regard to 
Australia. I used the word in character- 
izing a process. We were discussing 
negotiations, and I said it seems to me 
that sometimes we get involved in a 
process where we say that we want to 
be reasonable and we do want to be 
reasonable and we make a proposal and 
the other side says no. And so people 
say, "Be reasonable. Make another pro- 
posal." So we make another proposal. 
And the other side says no. So we move, 
and so they say, "Well, you've got to be 
reasonable. Make another proposal." 
And I say, in that process, we are not 
being reasonable. We are being stupid. 
And the point is that when we are 
engaged in the process of bargaining, 
we should be bargaining with our op- 
posite number at the bargaining table 
and not with ourselves. That was the 
origin of the remark "stupid," and it 
wasn't applied to anybody. I don't know 
how the press possibly cooked up that 
characterization. 

Q. My first question is directed to 
Mr. Hayden. What will Australia's 
position be at the United Nations with 
regard to democratic Kampuchea? My 
second question is toward the 
Japanese Minister who just said that 
Japan will make sure that its humani- 
tarian aid to Laos will strictly be used 
for humanitarian purposes. Has Japan 
worked out some sort of mechanism to 
make sure that this aid will only be 
for humanitarian purposes? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. For 
Australia's part, we will make a deter- 
mination on our attitude about that mat- 
ter at the United Nations when it is 
closer to being discussed at the United 
Nations. At this point we recognize no 
government in Kampuchea, and we 
recognize one of the elements of the so- 
called democratic coalition government 
as it presents itself. 

Foreign Minister Abe. Under the 
Japanese economic cooperation scheme, 
we only provide economic cooperation 
after thorough and intensive consulta- 
tion with the recipient government as to 
the usage of the cooperation which will 
be extended. This will be done in a very 
close, detailed manner. Japan has diplo- 
matic relations with Laos, and our aid to 
Laos had been only that humanitarian 
aid that I mentioned. We will continue 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



to make sure that under this Japanese 
system of making closely detailed 
studies of how the aid will be used. We 
will continue to implement the aid 
directly linked to those humanitarian 
needs. 

Q. I have one last question for 
Secretary Shultz. You said earlier that 
the U.S. Government might be pre- 
pared to help private groups try to 
recover the remains of American serv- 
icemen in Vietnam if those efforts ap- 
pear to have a reasonable chance of 
success. Can you tell us how that 
determination will be made, whether 
sve are currently providing aid to any 
:uch group, and if Bo Gritz came up 
with a plan that seemed reasonable, 
would we support it? 

Secretary Shultz. I appreciate your 
jiving me an opportunity to clarify my 
inswer, and I think I can concisely do so 
>y saying in response to your third ques- 
ion that the answer is very unlikely, but 
hese things would have to be looked 
ipon case-by-case. 



-JEWS CONFERENCE, 

UNE 29, 1983 5 

Secretary Shultz. I would like to say, 
irst of all, how much my wife and I and 
11 the people traveling with me have ap- 
reciated the extraordinary hospitality 
ccorded to us here, how much we have 
ppreciated the opportunity to meet 
ith the Thai Government, the Prime 
Sinister, the Foreign Minister, and 
thers, and also with their colleagues in 
ne ASEAN group. And, finally, I would 
ike to express my sense of privilege at 
le opportunity to be received later this 
lorning by His Majesty the King. 

Q. Can you tell us what you hope 
) accomplish in India? Looking ahead 
ne more stop, the Geneva negotia- 
ons and Afghanistan have not really 
»me up with much. What is the out- 
»ok for an Afghanistan solution? 

Secretary Shultz. In India, as with 
ther countries where we visit, we seek 
i improve and deepen our understand- 
ig and quality of our relationships, 
eyond that, since India is a country in 
le forefront of dealing with the prob- 
■ms of economic development — prob- 
•ms which are of great significance in 
ae world — I look forward to discussing 
lese issues with Mrs. Gandhi [Indian 
rime Minister Indira Gandhi] and her 
>lleagues, to learning from them, and 
exchanging views on these issues. So 



there will be a variety of bilateral prob- 
lems and things to talk about but, also, 
some matters of general interest to us 
and to the Indians as well. 

In Pakistan, we have similar bi- 
lateral problems of interest and, at the 
same time, a host of issues affecting 
Afghanistan will, I am sure, be dis- 
cussed. I look forward to hearing and 
having from the Pakistanis their insight 
into the negotiations that have been go- 
ing on about Afghanistan. Your ap- 
praisal may be the right one. I want to 
listen to the Pakistanis and have their 
view, as the U.S. Government would like 
to see a satisfactory solution to that 
problem, and the definition of "satis- 
factory" is, by this time, quite well 
known, so I won't review it. 

Q. Have you had any reaction from 
the Thai Government or others about 
your endorsement yesterday of border- 
crossing forays if they would be effec- 
tive in returning American bodies? 

Secretary Shultz. I am having diffi- 
culty with that. I certainly didn't mean 
to endorse border-crossing forays at all, 
and I think such forays are counterpro- 
ductive and serve neither the deep and 
emotional interests of our country nor 
the families involved in finding out about 
the missing-in-action and having their 
remains returned. I didn't mean to en- 
dorse those forays, and I don't. Of 
course, the legitimate efforts of the 
families involved and their organizations 
are efforts that we have great sympathy 
for and try to be helpful to. 

Q. Could you comment on 
Vietnam's recent statement that Kam- 
puchea is a matter between Vietnam 
and China and ASEAN has no role to 
play, and also comment on the just 
concluded ASEAN meeting? 

Secretary Shultz. The just conclud- 
ed ASEAN meeting has been a very 
constructive one. I thought the com- 
munique they issued was very interest- 
ing, thoughtful, and helpful, and the 
meetings with the dialogue partners — 
both the five-plus-six and then the five- 
plus-one meeting that I attended. Of 
course, I can't speak about the others; I 
didn't attend them. But the whole thing 
seemed to be constructive. I might say 
that both dinners were extraordinary, 
and the one last night was capped by 
one of the most humorous toasts I have 
heard in a long while. I think the Thai 
Foreign Minister is a rival to Bob Hope. 
So, that added a little special spice to 
the occasion. As far as the statement 
that the Kampuchea problem is really a 



China problem, 1 certainly don't see it 
that way and neither do the ASEAN 
countries. I think the statements that 
have been made recently by the Chinese 
bear out their interest in an independent 
Kampuchea with a government that 
springs from the desires of the people of 
that country and not an effort to 
dominate that country. 

Q. Going back to the question on 
your visit to India, the arms aid to 
Pakistan by the United States is an 
issue affecting India's relations. Are 
you likely to carry any assurances to 
India on this? 

Secretary Shultz. I know that the 
Indians register on that. We believe that 
it is important for us to support many 
countries around the world, including 
Pakistan, and we don't regard our sup- 
port for Pakistan as in any sense 
directed against India. Quite the con- 
trary. I think that the destabilization in 
the region symbolized by the Afghan 
problem is something that everyone 
should be concerned about. 

Q. One of the subjects, I guess, 
you will be discussing with Mrs. 
Gandhi is the question of supplying 
components for the nuclear reactor at 
Tarapur. Can you tell us whether the 
United States has found a third coun- 
try that is willing to provide those 
components, and if not, what you plan 
to tell Mrs. Gandhi? 

Secretary Shultz. I think that I will 
save what I plan to tell Mrs. Gandhi for 
Mrs. Gandhi, and we'll take up that 
issue. I am sure it will be brought up, 
and I think it is more appropriate for me 
to report to you on what happens in that 
conversation rather than prospectively. 

Q. I recall when we were in 
Manila you were asked about the pro- 
posal by the Thai Foreign Minister 
which was endorsed by the ASEAN in 
its communique for a 30-kilometer 
pullback by the Vietnamese in return 
for some political gesture. If I 
remember correctly, you said you 
wanted to discuss it first with the 
ASEAN people before taking a posi- 
tion. Do you now have a position on 
that, and if so, what is it? 

Secretary Shultz. The ASEAN 
countries have endorsed that approach, 
and we think that it may be helpful, so 
we favor it. 

Q. The stories yesterday about the 
MIAs raised once again, also, the 
question of the possibility that there 



3ptember1983 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



may be live POWs in Southeast Asia. 
What is the Reagan Administration's 
position on that? Do you believe that 
there might still be some alive? 

Secretary Shultz. We are not in a 
position to rule it out, but we don't have 
evidence that there are some alive. 

Q. There was a report out of 
Hanoi on AFP this morning talking 
about the Vietnamese being ready to 
reactivate a nuclear test reactor that 
was built by the Americans back in 
the late 1960s or early 1970s. Is there 
any fear on your part or have you 
heard expressed by any of your 
ASEAN colleagues that this facility 
might be used to make nuclear 
weapons? 

Secretary Shultz. I hadn't heard 
about that, so you are bringing this to 
my attention. Certainly, the use of any 
facility like that directed toward nuclear 
weapons we would obviously oppose. I 
don't think it would be a good thing at 
all. 

Q. What is the U.S. view on the 
announcement by Vietnam several 
weeks back about the withdrawal of 
troops from Kampuchea, and what 
kind of information might you have on 
how many troops may have been with- 
drawn? 

Secretary Shultz. I think the ques- 
tion is whether or not there is a with- 
drawal taking place or a troop rotation 
taking place, and from what we can see 
it is probably the latter. So it doesn't 
have the implications that a genuine 
withdrawal might have. 

Q. You now say that you do not 
endorse crossborder forays. Yesterday 
when you were asked about James 
"Bo" Gritz's raid into Laos and what 
you thought of his using Thai territory 
to stage such a raid, you replied that 
you support any method which has a 
good chance of being effective. Can 
you clarify what you really mean? 

Secretary Shultz. I tried to clarity 
that this morning, and I don't think I 
spoke very clearly about it yesterday. So 
let me stand on the answer I gave at the 
beginning of the conference which is 
basically that we believe these cross- 
border forays tend to do more harm 
than good, and we oppose them. 

Q. There has been some furor in 
India over the past several days 
because of remarks allegedly made by 
Ambassador Barnes [U.S. Ambassador 
to India Harry G. Barnes, Jr.]. Are 
you concerned that this might distort 
the real purpose of your trip? 



Secretary Shultz. The purpose of 
my trip is one to help build our relation- 
ship with India, and that is the way I am 
approaching it. I have no reason to 
believe that the Indians will be receiving 
me in any other spirit. 

Q. You said last night for moral 
reasons you could not support the 
Khmer Rouge. Now, I think in inter- 
national politics one should not mix up 
moral issues because the fact is that 
power politics don't mix with morals. 
Therefore, I would like to ask you 
how much U.S. foreign policy is still 
based on moral issues, because I don't 
have to tell you that moral terms can 
change within 10 years. How relevant 
are your moral issues nowadays, or 
how much is this just an excuse for 
not getting involved anymore in an 
area where you have had a bad ex- 
perience? 

Secretary Shultz. I can't give you a 
percentage but I can say that I believe 
there is, has been, and no doubt will be 
a continuing element of American 
foreign policy that derives from our own 
sense of the importance of freedom and 
democratic ways of government general- 
ly — freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, freedom of the press, and open- 
ness in society. We believe that this has 
been very good for us. We observe that 
democratic countries are not the coun- 
tries that have been responsible for ag- 
gression around the world, and so we 
think that this is the kind of atmosphere 
that will allow people to flourish. 

Therefore, I think that a sort of 
pure and simple balance-of-power ap- 
proach to foreign policy, just coldly like 
that, is unlikely from the United States. 
There will be this continuing strain of 
what might very well go under the 
general word of morality or however 
you want to label it. I think that will be 
a permanent part of our thinking. Many 
say that it shouldn't be there, but I think 
you will find that for the United States 
it will be there. It obviously poses all 
sorts of problems of degree, and we all 
know that we all start with our imper- 
fections. Nobody is perfect; no country 
is perfect. So in applying this standard 
you always have an imperfect measuring 
stick, but, nevertheless, I think there is 
this underlying sense of moral purpose 
in American policy. I personally believe 
in it and hope that it stays that way. 







New Delhi 



REMARKS, 

INDIA-U.S. JOINT COMMISSION, 

JUNE 30, 1983 6 

It is an honor to cochair this joint com- 
mission session, and I welcome the op- 
portunity to reaffirm with you the en- 
during ties between our two countries. 
These ties are based on the principles of 
freedom and democracy, cherished by 
both India and the United States. As 
former colonies, we understand the 
struggle to achieve independence from 
foreign domination. As free peoples, wel 
respect individuals' right to choose their 
own government. As representatives of 
the oldest and the most populous of the 
world's democracies, respectively, we 
must continue to uphold our ideals. U.S. 
relations with India will be sustained by 
these values and our determination to 
cooperate in areas of mutual interest. 

The work of the joint commission 
and its four subcommissions is an 
important and highly promising aspect 
of our bilateral relationship. The ac- 
tivities of the subcommissions in the 
fields of economics and commerce, 
science and technology, education and 
culture, and agriculture enable us to 
work together despite political differ- 
ences. They contribute to the more con- 
structive ties with India that President 
Reagan is determined to maintain, and 
which I might say, the Prime Minister's 
visit to the United States about 10 
months ago did so much to develop. 

Let me review briefly the work of 
the subcommissions. First, the Economk 
and Commercial Subcommission has con 
tinued to function as a forum for free 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



and frank discussions of mutual eco- 
nomic interests. The subcommission 
should continue to study measures to im- 
prove the environment for commercial 
and economic activities between the two 
countries. We favor early negotiations 
on a tax treaty — an area where concrete 
progress is possible in our commercial 
relations. We would also encourage the 
subcommission to focus on the most 
promising areas for expanded trade and 
investment, such as the energy, com- 
munications, agribusiness, and elec- 
tronics sectors where mutually beneficial 
technology transfer prospects exist. 

The work of the Subcommission on 
Science and Technology continues to en- 
joy a healthy momentum. A dozen U.S. 
agencies are cooperating with their 
counterpart Indian organizations on over 
50 projects. We are particularly pleased 
by the new impetus given to our joint 
session and technology work by the for- 
mation and progress of the senior scien- 
tific panel, which grew out of the 1982 
meeting between President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Gandhi. We look forward 
to results within 2 years from many of 
the project areas recommended by the 
panel, including monsoon predictability 
research and immunology research. 

Our Subcommission on Agriculture 
covers one of the most important areas 
of cooperation between our two coun- 
tries. Even before the formation of the 
foubcommission, India and the United 
Estates had collaborated on literally hun- 
jireds of agricultural research and devel- 
opment projects. Although the Subcom- 
■nission on Agriculture is the youngest 
I }ne of our subcommissions, working 
I, groups are functioning to cover research 
I ind education, agricultural inputs and 
i illied technology, natural resource 
management, and extension and train- 
ng. In the area of agriculture, the 
Kenior scientific panel has recommended 
mportant projects on biomass and nitro- 
gen fixation. We support the efforts of 
|:;he subcommittee, through its ad hoc 
I :ommittee, to facilitate planning and 
< :oordination of the exchanges in this 
J/ery important area. 

The last, but certainly not the least, 
l)f the subcommissions is devoted to 
education and culture. Already this sub- 
'.I'ommission has supported some very 
successful exchanges, but those are only 
i foretaste of the vast variety of ex- 
ihanges planned for 1984 and 1985. 
^resident Reagan and Prime Minister 
Jandhi designated those 2 years for 
special emphasis on educational, 
cultural, and scientific exchanges, and 



we are working hard to make them a 
success. Both sides have designated 
groups of prominent citizens to marshal 
our efforts for 1984 and 1985. 

Over the next 2 years, we support 
the establishment of new ties and 
enlargement of existing ties among a 
wide spectrum of groups and individuals 
in both countries. We hope that special 
efforts can be made to initiate the 
planned Nehru studies program in the 
next academic year. We welcome the 
decision of the Education and Culture 
Subcommission to draw up a program of 
seminars and discussions on our shared 
democratic experience. 

Successful execution of the many ac- 
tivities already planned for all the sub- 
commissions is essential. Moreover, we 
need to explore ways to place their ac- 
tivities on a solid, long-term basis. There 
have been preliminary informal discus- 
sions between our governments and 
within my own government on how to 
do this. One possibility would be to 
create a binational endowment which the 
United States, for its part, would fund 
with a portion of the rupees it now 
holds. We hope that it would be possible 
to develop some concrete proposals in 
this area by the end of the year. 

Finally I would like to express my 
personal satisfaction with the success of 
our subcommission and the creative ef- 
forts under their auspices. I am a firm 
believer in the long-term beneficial ef- 
fects of cooperation in any field where 
cooperation is possible. I know that 
Indo-U.S. cooperative programs have 
helped us to build a better bilateral rela- 
tionship and I am confident that they 
will continue to do so. 



DINNER TOAST, 
JUNE 30, 1983 7 

Secretary Shultz. Today I had the op- 
portunity to meet with many of you in 
this room, and I think we had a fruitful 
day's work. We have exchanged views 
on issues of international importance, 
reviewed areas where our two countries 
interact, and charted the tasks which 
will draw our two countries even closer 
together in the future. Our discussions 
have reinforced the spirit of frank and 
constructive interaction which has 
marked Indo-U.S. relations, especially 
since Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to 
the United States last year. I would like 
to note some of the objectives we seek 
for this region. 



The American goal in South Asia is 
a stable, peaceful, prospering region. 
This is not a pious hope. Our interests 
are best served by a regional, as well as 
global, order in which each nation is in 
control of its destiny, immune from 
foreign intervention, and free to pro- 
mote the welfare of its citizens. 

Before arriving in India, I had the 
opportunity to meet with the ASEAN 
leaders, whose firm commitment to 
regional cooperation has resulted in 
tangible political and economic gains in 
Southeast Asia. We encourage regional 
cooperation in South Asia and welcome 
the recent initiatives by India and other 
countries of the region to work toward 
greater cooperation and alleviate the 
potential for conflict. In turn, regional 
cooperation will discourage those who 
would upset the equilibrium of the 
region, the most recent and tragic exam- 
ple being the continued presence of over 
100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 

As leader of the Nonaligned Move- 
ment, India not only has a special role in 
fostering regional cooperation but plays 
an important international role repre- 
senting the aspirations of the members 
of the movement. We have our dif- 
ferences over certain elements in the 
declarations of the nonaligned summit. 
We, nonetheless, value and will continue 
to pursue a continuing dialogue on 
political and economic issues raised by 
the Nonaligned Movement. 

Particularly on international 
economic issues, as you noted, the 
healthy functioning of the global trade 
and financial system depends heavily on 
the participation of both the developing 
countries and the industrial countries. 
This is a relationship of mutual respon- 
sibility and a positive North-South 
dialogue should aim at restoring and 
sustaining worldwide economic growth. 
We have had a useful exchange of views 
today on economic and financial issues. 
In the past year we have explored many 
avenues to strengthen mutually 
beneficial linkages between the Indian 
and U.S. economies. These efforts will 
continue. India's record of economic 
development is an impressive one, and it 
is one that has been financed primarily 
by domestic savings. International 
assistance can supplement self-generated 
savings for investment, but I have seen 
in my recent visit in the ASEAN region, 
as well as here in India, that aid is no 
substitute for genuine internal economic 
development. The United States has 
supported Indian development in the 
past and continues to do so today and 



September 1983 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



will do so in the future. We do so 
through our bilateral relationships and 
through our major contributions to inter- 
national financial institutions. We stand 
by this commitment to India's develop- 
ment. 

I was impressed today by the degree 
to which our overall objectives are paral- 
lel—in many cases quite similar— but I 
was not surprised. The commonality of 
objectives, in our case, springs from the 
values we share of respect for human 
dignity and democratic values. Ultimate- 
ly, it is these values which bring us back 
together again and again. Perhaps at 
times, we take each other too much for 
granted, and that is why we have com- 
mitted ourselves today to reinforce and 
strengthen our ties. 

The work of the joint commission 
and its four subcommissions, reinforced 
by the progress on last year's bilateral 
initiatives, provides tangible evidence of 
Indian and American scientists working 
together on a variety of projects to com- 
bat disease and blindness, to increase 
agricultural productivity, and to unlock 
the secrets of both the Sun and the mon- 
soon rains. Businessmen and govern- 
ment officials have spurred interest in 
bilateral trade and investment. The 1984 
U.S. cultural program in India will be 
matched by Indian exhibitions and per- 
formances in the United States in 1985. 
Our two peoples are learning more 
about each other through tourism, the 
growing U.S. population of Indian 
ancestry, and through films like Gandhi 
who brought his message of peace and 
brotherhood to millions in both the 
United States and India. 

These programs and projects 
demonstrate our ability to work together 
and help to create a positive and con- 
structive atmosphere in which we can 
discuss our differences without disrupt- 
ing the progress of our cooperation or 
denying the common goals which unite 
us in the search for world peace and in- 
ternational economic recovery and 
development. 

As Mrs. Shultz and I visited the 
famed Taj Mahal last night and this 
morning, I was reminded of the rich and 
ancient culture of India, a culture which, 
long before, contributed to the worlds of 
religion, science, and government. In- 
deed, as we dine here tonight we are 
reminded that wise men and women 
throughout history have been able 
peacefully to reconcile their differences 
and build upon their mutual interest. I 
have come to India with a belief in the 
benefit of free and frank exchanges be- 



tween nations. I will leave with profound 
satisfaction that our relations are built 
on a firm foundation. With energy and 
commitment from both sides, I am confi- 
dent these relations will grow and 
flourish. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JULY 1, 1983 8 

Secretary Shultz. First, I would like to 
express my appreciation to the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister, for the 
great cordiality and the interesting and 
worthwhile time that I have had during 
my visit. One of the outstanding 
characteristics of the visit is — not only 
with the government people with whom 
I talked but those in private pursuits— 
I found, on reflection that in almost 
every meeting, I found myself engaged 
in a genuine conversation. And reflect- 
ing on it, I have noticed that in many in- 
ternational meetings, basically, you say 
what you think and they say what they 
think, and you kind of go by each other. 
But here it's been rather different. 
There has been a definite effort to 
engage in a very constructive spirit, and 
that has been not only worthwhile but 
fun. It is engaging, and I have ap- 
preciated it. 

Q. There's a report out of 
Washington this morning on how Mr. 
Habib last week presented a proposal 
or requested the Israelis to consider 
the possibility of setting a firm date 
for withdrawal in order to put 
pressure on the Syrians to do the 
same, and that this proposal has been 
approved by the President after you 
requested that approval. Can you com- 
ment on that report, and then tell us a 
little about the proposal and what the 
reaction has been from the Israelis? 

Secretary Shultz. Ambassador 
Habib has been back in the area talking 
with people in different countries, and 
what the content of his discussions are, 
of course, we are reading about. I don't 
think it is a good idea to comment on 
the content of the negotiation as it is un- 
folding. I did see that account, and it 
doesn't really conform to what I have 
noted. I am not going to comment on 
the details of how Ambassador Habib is 
going about his efforts to attain the full 
objectives that the President has set for- 
ward and which I think have been 
generally agreed to as the right objec- 
tives; namely, the removal of all foreign 
forces from Lebanon; the chance for the 



emergence of a sovereign Lebanon able 
to take care of its own affairs and 
develop its prosperity; and attention to 
the security needs of Israel along its 
northern border, recognizing that south- 
ern Lebanon has been an area from 
which Israel has been attacked. Those 
have been the three objectives that we 
have had; they continue to be the Presi- 
dent's objectives. I believe they are 
shared by others that we have been 
working with in the area, and those ob- 
jectives are the guide of our diplomatic 
effort. 

Q. In order to achieve those objec- 
tives, does it make sense for Israel to 
declare that it is prepared to 
withdraw totally and thereby have 
another initiative, another possible 
way, to break down Syrian intran- 
sigence? In other words, I am asking 
you the same question in a way that 
possibly you could feel comfortable 
replying to? 

Secretary Shultz. I have just said 
ditto on the answer I just gave. 

Q. Do you have any knowledge 
that India is preparing to detonate 
another nuclear device, and what will 
be the President's strategy on grant- 
ing the sale of the reactor components 
if India is unable to find them 
elsewhere? 

Secretary Shultz. I have no infor- 
mation whatever along those lines, and 
from all that I can see there is no such 
intention. 

Q. How will the President defend 
his decision to grant the waiver on the 
sale of component parts if India is 
unable to locate them elsewhere? 

Secretary Shultz. If there is a sale, 
the President will defend the importance 
of doing that on the ground of the im- 
portance of having nuclear power sta- 
tions operate in a manner that takes due 
consideration of the safety and health of 
the operators of the plant and the people 
in the community. Just as we said in our 
statement, I think those are good strong 
grounds. 

Q. Have you asked the Govern- 
ment of India for any commitments 
whatsoever as a condition for the sup- 
ply of spare parts? 

Secretary Shultz. No, there hasn't 
been any conditioning. It has been clear 
for a long time that the United States 
has some very definite objectives in the 
area of nonproliferation. Those remain, 
and they are well-known. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. There is a report in a German 
newspaper today that India has agreed 
to buy $5 billion worth of arms from 
the Soviet Union. Are you aware of 
such a transaction, and if so, what 
would be the U.S. reaction if that 
were true? 

Secretary Shultz. I am not aware 
of that transaction, and I don't want to 
comment on hypothetical questions. 

Q. Given the job that Habib and 
Draper and company are doing now in 
the Middle East, can you say at this 
point whether you expect to include 
the Middle East in this current trip or 
can you now categorically rule it out? 

Secretary Shultz. I only can say to 
you that the plan of the trip, which is to 
go from here to Pakistan and from 
Pakistan to London and back to 
Washington, remains intact. 

Q. How far has your visit removed 
all the irritants from Indo-U.S. rela- 
tions? 

Secretary Shultz. I came here to 
discuss not only bilateral relationships 
but also the many matters on which 
India and the United States share com- 
jmon concern about a wide variety of 
problems around the world. We have 
nad very good talks, as I mentioned in 
Tiy opening statement. They have been 
general conversations. I have learned 
ind benefited from them, and I hope the 
same can be said for the other side. If 
■;hat kind of thing and the addressing of 
i .he various problems that we have 
alked about helps, then naturally, that's 
vhat we are interested in. 

I am sure that there are always ir- 
ritants and problems of various kinds, 
ind that's a characteristic situation. The 
juestion is whether we can get them on 
: .he table and talk about them and work 
hem out. I think the answer to it is yes. 
would say that we proceed on the basis 
hat here we have the world's two 
1 argest democracies and just as I think 
ndia has a stake in a free, democratic, 
) 'xpanding United States, so we have a 
I take in having India be a free, expand- 
ng democratic country. And to the ex- 
! ent that our relationship is mutually 
I upportive of that regard, I think, that 
Is a very good thing. 

Q. There is another report from 
Vashington which suggests that 
ollowing a series of meetings which 
rou have had with Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin you appear to be leaning in 
he direction of a summit meeting be- 
ween the President and Mr. 



Andropov. Could you give us any in- 
dication at all as to what your think- 
ing is at this time on that subject? 

Secretary Shultz. It is not impor- 
tant what my thinking is but what the 
President's thinking is and, so far as I 
know, it remains what he has said and 
what we have discussed; namely, that as 
a matter of principle, he thinks that 
such a meeting could be constructive on- 
ly if it is a well-prepared meeting from 
which there is a reasonable chance of 
significant results. That has been his 
position for as long as I have been talk- 
ing to him about it, and that remains his 
position. 

I think people don't recognize how 
many places there are— places in which 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
are discussing one thing or another. 
There are arms control START talks in 
Geneva, there are INF talks in Geneva, 
there are talks about chemical and 
biological weapons in Geneva, there are 
conventional force talks in Vienna. 
There's some talk on nonproliferation 
matters going on alternately in 
Washington and Moscow. There are 
talks going on in Madrid. There are 
many international bodies where both 
countries are represented; our Am- 
bassador in Moscow talks to people in 
the Soviet Government there. And I 
have had a series of meetings, as was 
reported, with Ambassador Dobrynin. 

Our stance on the United States side 
is that we, first, have to be realistic 
about what's going on; second, we have 
to be strong enough to defend our in- 
terest and help our allies defend theirs, 
and strength is clearly far more than 
just military strength — all of that is im- 
portant—it includes economic strength 
and the kind of confidence in our own 
positions which we have; and third, a 
willingness to sit down and genuinely 
negotiate, and here we feel that we have 
important and reasonable positions in all 
of these discussion fora. We are also 
there in a spirit of give and take, and 
the question of whether or not these 
talks are going to get anywhere is 
basically a question of whether or not 
the Soviet Union also wants to be 
reasonable and approach them in a spirit 
of give and take. It remains to be seen. 

Q. Afghanistan is one of the 
issues in your talks here and also in 
Islamabad. You have recently written 
a letter to Mr. Gromyko [Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko] 
dealing with Afghanistan. Did you get 
any answer and what was the purpose 
of this letter? 



Secretary Shultz. There has been 
an exchange of letters. The purpose was 
to assure the Soviet Union, as we have 
assured others who are involved in this 
negotiation — the UN Secretary General, 
the Pakistanis, and others — that we 
wish to see it settled, and we would like 
to see it settled according to the 
guidelines that have been laid out in the 
United Nations. Just how much progress 
there has been, I think, is something of 
a question, and I look forward to my 
discussions in Pakistan where I will get 
another reading on that subject. 

Q. Did you discuss with Mrs. 
Gandhi or anyone else the reported ex- 
plosion of a nuclear bomb in Pakistan? 
And it is possible for such an explo- 
sion to have taken place without the 
United States knowing about it? 

Secretary Shultz. We have very 
sensitive instruments that have been 
successful in detecting nuclear explo- 
sions, and so far as our readings are 
concerned we have no evidence of such 
an explosion. 

Q. May I know whether the ques- 
tion of reprocessing of spent fuel by 
India has been discussed at the talks? 
And if so, do you agree with the In- 
dian position that India has a right to 
reprocess its spent fuel, howsoever it 
likes? 

Secretary Shultz. No, I think that 
difference of opinion remains as it was. 

Q. In the discussion with Mrs. 
Gandhi was there a discussion of the 
Indian proposal, adopted by the 
nonaligned summit, for an interna- 
tional conference on money and 
finance? Specifically, have you been 
able to reconcile the differences on 
the question of whether the integrity 
of the IMF can be challenged in any 
such negotiations? 

Secretary Shultz. First, I don't 
think it is appropriate for me to engage 
in a discussion about what the Prime 
Minister and I discussed, but let me just 
comment on your question, leaving aside 
the question of discussions with the 
Prime Minister. That issue has, of 
course, been around, and people are in- 
terested in it. We believe that the in- 
tegrity of the IMF is of great impor- 
tance, particularly right now, but at any 
time, as the world economy faces a 
variety of financial difficulties — balance- 
of-payments problems of different coun- 
tries. The IMF has been playing, will 
play, a central role in that. So anything 
that would disrupt the IMF is not 
helpful in this regard. To the contrary, 



September 1983 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



it's important to maintain the integrity 
and to bring about the support for the 
pledges to the quota increases that have 
been agreed on. Of course, we are work- 
ing on that very hard and trying to per- 
suade the U.S. Congress to go along 
with the quota increases, in which the 
United States will put up $8.4 billion . 
and other countries will put up their pro- 
portionate share. 

Insofar as a review of the monetary 
system is concerned, that was discussed 
a great deal at Williamsburg, among 
other places, and the approach taken is 
to study the situation carefully and to in- 
clude in that study the possible 
usefulness of a larger conference. It may 
very well be that such a conference 
would turn out to be useful, but, at 
least, our approach is to study the issues 
carefully so that if you have a large con- 
ference you know what it is you are try- 
ing to get out of it, and there can be 
some substantive results, as distinct 
from a variety of decisions that don't 
really make contact with each other. 

Q. Did you in your discussions 
here touch on the matter of the exten- 
sive U.S. military sales to India, and 
is there a prospect that somewhere 
down the calendar there will, in fact, 
be sales of military hardware to India? 

Secretary Shultz. The question was 
discussed and whether there will be ac- 
tual sales is an open question. Certainly, 
the United States is prepared to make 
such sales, and from the standpoint of 
India, of course, they will speak for 
themselves. But the question was 
discussed, and to the extent that there 
have been any misunderstandings about 
the conditions under which the United 
States makes sales, I have tried to clear 
those up. 

Q. You said you expected the 
Soviet Union to be reasonable in arms 
talks. A couple of days ago the leaders 
of the East European socialist coun- 
tries proposed to put a ban on nuclear 
arsenals. This suggestion coincides 
with one of the nonaligned countries 
of which India is the chairman. Do 
you think these proposals are reason- 
able? 

Secretary Shultz. We have to see 
proposals and study them in detail. Pro- 
posals for a freeze, for an extreme 
change in the situation, generally speak- 
ing, don't go anywhere, but we study all 
proposals carefully, and we study any 
proposal that comes from the Soviet 
Union very seriously. We hope that, in 
the end, it will appear to the Soviet 
Union that it is in their interest to 



engage with us in a program to reduce, 
not just limit, to reduce the level of ar- 
maments of all kinds. 

Q. Was there an Indian proposal 
about arms purchases from the United 
States? 

Secretary Shultz. There is no 
special proposal. There was a possible 
sale, and in the course of the exploration 
of that— in the end it did not take 
place — a number of questions were 
raised that have general policy implica- 
tions. So since there was at least the 
potential for misunderstanding, in the 
discussion of this question, we tried to 
clear it up, and have, basically, made 
some headway in that regard. But there 
is no outstanding proposal that I know 
of. 

Q. Today is the day that China 
becomes eligible for World Bank con- 
cessional assistance and it seems that 
any borrowings by China will come at 
the expense of India. I wonder 
whether you could give the U.S. posi- 
tion on that in view of its influential 
role in the World Bank, what the U.S. 
position will be on how much India 
should get and compare it to China? 

Secretary Shultz. We have to look 
at proposals to borrow for a particular 
project case-by-case. There have been 
loans to China; it won't be a new thing. 
At the same time, there is no doubt 
about that fact, particularly with China 
as a member of the multilateral lending 
institutions, particularly the World 
Bank. But even without China there, 
there is more need for concessional 
funds, more demand for them than there 
are funds, so it is a problem. It is some- 
thing that we, both the donor and the 
recipient countries, have to think 
through and work on, and it is going to 
be a tough problem. 



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\ G> SOVIET UNION 






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Islamabad 





ARRIVAL STATEMENT, 
JULY 2, 1983 9 

I welcome this opportunity, as does my 
wife, to visit here in Pakistan, and I ap- 
preciate very much the great hospitality 
that you and your wife and all the 
others have shown in coming here to the 
airport to greet us. It is a very generous 
gesture on your part. We notice it, and 
we appreciate it. 

You and I have had several oppor- 
tunities to talk, and, of course, I know 
the breadth of your knowledge and the 
depth of your thinking. So I especially 
look forward to this visit for its own 
sake and for the opportunity it will af- 
ford me for thorough conversations with 
you. When you and President Zia visited 
Washington in December, that visit by 
your President was a milestone in the 
relationship between Pakistan and the 
United States. I hope that my visit here 
can add to the progress and the momen- 
tum of that relationship. We have many 
things to talk about, and first and 
foremost, matters that concern the long- 
term prospect of a strong and enduring 
relationship between our countries. 

Perhaps the fact that we will have a 
first meeting of the joint commission is a 
symbol of the importance of this 
bilateral relationship, and I think it 
deserves emphasis. At the same time I 
am sure we will be discussing a wide 
range of issues in which we are both 
concerned and interested— strategic 
issues, economic issues, and other mat- 
ters as we survey the world scene. But 
most particularly will be those issues 
that emerge from the Soviet invasion 
and occupation of Afghanistan. I will 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



look forward very much to having your 
views about the discussions that have 
been going on on that subject. In the 
meantime, I would like to express on 
behalf of President Reagan as well as 
myself our admiration and our support 
for your efforts. Again, I thank you very 
much for this warm welcome, and I look 
forward to the discussions that we will 
have in the days ahead. 



TOASTS, 
JULY 2, 1983 10 

Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan 

It is my pleasure to extend a very warm 
welcome to our honored guests and a 
special welcome to Mrs. Shultz on behalf 
of my wife and myself. Their presence 
amongst us today is a source of great 
joy and a pleasure for us, and we do 
earnestly hope that their sojourn in 
Pakistan, in spite of the inclemencies of 
the weather and many other con- 
tretemps and mishaps that have fol- 
owed in the wake of yesterday's storms, 
would not have upset them too much. 
vVe'd hoped that your stay here was 
onger so that you would get a chance to 
;ee more of our country, to travel its 
ength and possibly also its breadth, but 
ilso, above all, to be able to see the 
nountains in the north and the fertile 
)lains of the Indus and the deserts in 
he south: to be able also to get a chance 
o see monuments of historical interest 
.nd also many other samples of our an- 
ient civilization and culture. You would 
lave seen the variegated nature of the 
ultural patterns strung along the Indus 
Hiver. You would have seen also how, in 
pite of this variety of cultures, there is 
bond of common religion which pulls 
he nation together; also a fierce deter- 
lination to preserve its independence 
nd to forge ahead to create a modern 
tate. 

Tomorrow, you'll be visiting the 
nountains and the Khyber Pass, refugee 
;amps. You will see in that area which 
las been the gateway to history, the 
ides of history have ebbed and flowed 
icross those passes. More recently, the 
low of the tide, perhaps unknown in 
listory, which is one of the main con- 
:erns that takes you to those parts, you 
vill see the enormity of the humani- 
arian problem of 3 million refugees who 
lave sought shelter, having left their 
lomes, in conditions of sorrow and 
.nguish and involuntary exile. They are 
ustaining their misfortune with 



courage, dignity which is, indeed, ad- 
mirable. We have done our modest bit to 
give them succor and to give them 
refuge, food, and shelter in these ex- 
tremely difficult conditions. We've been 
helped in this humanitarian endeavor by 
international agencies and, above all, by 
your country which with its usual im- 
pulse—generosity—has come forth in a 
manner that compels admiration. I'd like 
to express our country's deepest ap- 
preciation and gratitude. You will hear 
it also, of course, when you go to the 
refugee camps, and you will see how 
deeply they appreciate these generous 
impulses. These refugees, the plight in 
which they find themselves and their 
desire to return home, underlines the 
need for a settlement that will enable 
them to return home in dignity and 
honor. It is for this reason and for a 
number of others, that need not be gone 
into this evening but which we have 
discussed in some detail earlier today, it 
is important to seek a peaceful settle- 
ment, political settlement of this prob- 
lem, within the framework of the prin- 
ciples to which we are committed and to 
which we have every intention to 
adhere— principles rooted in the resolu- 
tions of the Islamic Conference, resolu- 
tions, also, of the United Nations. The 
search for the settlement, as far as we 
are concerned, is sincere, and every 
endeavor on our part will be made to 
bring them to a fruitful conclusion. 

There are many difficulties ahead, 
and the path is thorny and beset with 
many, many difficulties. Nevertheless, 
we hope that given good will it will be 
possible to overcome the hurdles that lie 
in our path. The U.S. support for this 
endeavor — for seeking a peaceful settle- 
ment to the Afghanistan problem and 
the negotiations that are now underway, 
the indirect talks under the auspices of 
the United Nations and the special 
representative of the Secretary 
General — your support for these talks is 
a source of strength to us, and I'm sure 
that we will be able to work together in 
this endeavor in order to achieve a set- 
tlement that is honorable and also 
satisfactory above all, from the point of 
view of the refugees who must have a 
say in the conditions of their return to 
their homes. 

So far as U.S. -Pakistan relations are 
concerned, I am happy to say they have 
developed and evolved and reached a 
stage of maturity which is a source of 
great satisfaction to us. It is a stage of 
stability and mutual understanding, of 
shared perceptions and shared values, 
all of which we greatly appreciate. The 



mutual, reciprocal regard, which exists 
between our two countries, was 
demonstrated in an unmistakable man- 
ner during the visit of our president to 
the United States, where we were deep- 
ly impressed by the affection with which 
he was received and also by the warmth 
of that welcome. 

I appreciate greatly our discussions 
with you this afternoon, and I hope, dur- 
ing what remains of your stay, I will 
have a chance to discuss those series of 
other issues from which I would surely 
benefit greatly. As far as bilateral rela- 
tions are concerned, fortunately, there 
are no problems which may be con- 
sidered as major, and our relations are 
on an even keel and continuing in a 
splendid way. I would only mention the 
inaugural session of the joint commis- 
sion today which is surely a landmark 
and the articulation of the joint commis- 
sion and the subsidiary bodies, the sub- 
commissions, the projects that they 
should study, objectives they should pur- 
sue, will all contribute, surely, to give 
substance to our relations and impulse 
toward keeping up the momentum that 
would be necessary to maintain the rela- 
tionship at the level that we earnestly 
desire. With these words I request you 
to join me in a toast to the health and 
happiness of our honored guests and the 
progress and prosperity of the friendly 
and the great people of the United 
States of America, and to the consolida- 
tion of friendly ties between our two 
countries. 

Secretary Shultz 

I thank you wholeheartedly for your 
welcome today, for the privilege of our 
discussion this afternoon, and the pro- 
spective visit and continued discussion 
that we'll be having tomorrow. You and 
President Zia are known around the 
world not only as people who are leading 
a country in a magnificent way but also 
as individuals who are very much worth 
talking to because of the range and 
breadth of your knowledge. It's a 
pleasure, of course, to hear a toast and 
a statement preceding it by a counter- 
part in another country and be able to 
say that I can subscribe to everything 
that you put forward. Perhaps that's a 
measure of the strength of our bilateral 
relations the way they are developing 
and, also, of the common way in which 
we look at many of the world's prob- 
lems, particularly some that are very 
close to us. 



>eptember 1983 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



I'd like to take as a theme of my 
comments this evening a story, or some- 
thing that happened to my wife and me, 
the last time we were in government. 
This incident happened in early 1974. 
You remember that was a period when 
oil prices were going up, financial im- 
plications of that were beginning to 
dawn on people, and there was a kind of 
a frantic feeling that all of this was just 
out of control. It happened that that 
particular winter was a mild one, at 
least, in Europe and the United States. 
In January of that year there was a 
meeting called of the finance ministers 
of the world, and I was the Secretary of 
the Treasury of the United States. The 
meeting took place in Rome, and we met 
for a couple of days. 

In the course of that meeting I was 
accorded and my wife with me accorded, 
the privilege of a private audience with 
His Holiness, the Pope. So we went to 
the Vatican. We got there, and we were 
told the way the audience would work. I 
would go in and be there 12 minutes, 
then my wife would be brought in, there 
would be some pictures, and we would 
leave. So we said well, if that's the way 
it is, that's the way it is. At any rate, 
when our time came, the Cardinal who 
was escorting us, let us know that the 
Pope was ready, and my wife sort of 
hung back. He looked at her and smiled 
and said "Oh, come on in." So she went 
in. We had a very animated discussion 
about the implications of the rise in the 
price of oil and I was quite struck by 
how much the Pope seemed to know 
about it and about its implications, par- 
ticularly for poorer countries and his 
concern about that. But at any rate, the 
time went by, and we were having a 
very good discussion. I could see that it 
got to be half an hour, then three- ^ 
quarters of an hour, and that didn't ac- 
cord with what we were told. But, I 
thought maybe this time, perhaps, it was 
up to me to' end the discussion. I 
thought to myself, I should end this 
discussion on a light and humorous note. 
So I said to the Pope, "You know the 
finance ministers of the world have been 
over here discussing what to do about 
this crisis that we all have on our hands. 
None of us has been able to think of 
anything that has contributed as much 
as the mild winter we've been having." 
And I said, "I am sure we all join Your 
Holiness in thanking you for your in- 
tervention." He didn't laugh. He looked 
me in the eye with a slight twinkle and 
said, "Mr. Secretary, you may be sure it 
will continue." 



Now at this time of the year, 
Ramadan, we need to contemplate a bit; 
that is the tradition, and, of course, 
recognize that there are the great prob- 
lems we are trying to deal with day to 
day, week to week, month to month. 
There is a reality to them, and we must 
come to grips with that reality. But, at 
the same time, we have to recognize 
that somehow we must have faith and 
recognize that this is all part of 
something larger. That in the activities 
we are undertaking, it is important for 
us to be able to feel that these activities 
are in keeping with our faith, as it will 
give us confidence in what we are doing. 
I believe that we can say that the things 
we are trying to do together are in keep- 
ing with the standards and the ideals 
that a contemplative effort will put for- 
ward. In trying to do everything we can 
to construct a strong relationship be- 
tween our countries, perhaps we should 
say between our people, between the in- 
dividual human beings that governments 
strive to serve, we will be doing some- 
thing that will make our lives fuller and 
better as we survey problems around the 
world and try as you have done today, 
and as you have always done in the 
discussions I have been privileged to 
have with you, to find a constructive 
way to untangle these problems. 

We are doing something that is in 
accord with these ideals and a broader 
purpose. And, of course, we see, in a 
way, the symbol, as well as an im- 
mediate reality of so many of the prob- 
lems of the world represented right on 
your border, as you have said, at this 
historic place. There, too, it seems to me 
that we are striving for something that 
is generally in accord with the principles 
that we hold important. Not only the 
principles of having our sovereignty and 
independence and integrity and wanting 
to see others have that same capacity, 
but also, particularly at this time of the 
year, to recognize that there are people, 
millions, who are displaced and who by 
virtue of that fact, are in a very un- 
fortunate circumstance. Our hearts need 
to go out to them, and we need to say 
that it is up to us to help. I know that 
you are doing so, and I have no hesita- 
tion at all in saying that the U.S. 
Government and the American people 
are fully in support and totally commit- 
ted as you are to providing that help in 
serving the broader causes that we hold 
as key importance in our lives. 

In that spirit of recognizing the 
reality of our common purposes and also 
their broader meaning. I would like to 
ask you all to join me in a toast to the 



Foreign Minister and Mrs. Yaqub Khan 
and thanks for their warm welcome and 
wise words, and to the peace and well 
being which we trust our effort will 
bring not only to ourselves but to others 
around the world. 



NEWS BRIEFING, 
JULY 3, 1983" 

Secretary Shultz. At the President's 
direction, I will be stopping in the Mid- 
dle East on my way back to Washington 
rather than simply flying over it. I ex- 
pect to have conversations at this point 
with the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. 

Q. It has been said many times 
since you were last in the Middle East 
that you would probably only go back 
if there were some expectation that 
your presence there was going to 
make a difference, particularly, in 
some kind of negotiations to withdraw 
from Lebanon. Is that the criterion for 
this particular stop? 

Secretary Shultz. Certainly, I want 
to be in a position to give the President 
a first-hand account of the current situa- 
tion in the Middle East and the views _ 
from the different countries. I think it's 
best to do that on the basis of a persona 
visit. In the process, if things can be 
moved along toward attainment of the 
objectives that we and others have set 
then, obviously, I want to do that. 

Q. But you won't have any sense 
right now that the Syrians are ready 
to get on board? 

Secretary Shultz. I will, of course, 
be very interested to talk with the 
Syrians, and it remains to be seen what 
I will find. Obviously, they have made a 
great variety of statements that we all 
know about, but I want to hear first- 
hand from them what their views are 
and some of the reasons behind them. 

Q. In a more specific way, will 
you be discussing with Israel its 
desire to achieve a partial withdrawal 
Then will you attempt to use this par- 
tial withdrawal to get the Syrians to 
do likewise? 

Secretary Shultz. The implication 
of your question is that there will be ^ 
some sort of shuttle back and forth. I'm 
not planning to do that. I'll discuss 
whatever anybody wants to bring up. 
Let me remind you that the President's 
objectives, and those of the Lebanese, 
the Israelis, and we would hope the 
Syrians and everyone else, are, first of 



38 



Department of State Bulletii 



THE SECRETARY 



all, the leaving of Lebanon by all foreign 
forces completely; second, the 
emergence of a sovereign Lebanon able 
to govern itself and blossom once again; 
and third, arrangements that ensure the 
security of Israel's northern border. 

Q. Again, to achieve that, will one 
way be to ask Israel to set a firm 
withdrawal date for all of its foreign 
forces, along with a Syrian-PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] 
withdrawal, so that, at least, you have 

I a date to work with and to offer the 

i Syrians? 

Secretary Shultz. Just what will be 
discussed, of course, is a question of 
what people want to bring up with me. 
Our objectives are stated — that's the 
key, that's the criterion by which we 
judge whatever it is that anyone may 
propose. I look forward to intensive 

I discussion in each capital of these objec- 
tives and how to obtain them. 

Q. Are you taking anything to any 
of these leaders in the Middle East— 
(anything in the way of a proposal to 
(any of them? 

Secretary Shultz. Our objective re- 
mains the same, and we want to discuss 
with them how to get there, what the 
current situation is and how it may have 
ichanged. I might say, also, that the 
Ipeace process and its importance re- 
fmains very much alive. As we move 
I along, the consideration of how to so 
Combine the needs for security of Israel 
vvith the legitimate rights and aspira- 
;ions of the Palestinian people remains a 
|-cey objective for us. 

Q. I wonder whether you would 
iddress a question that one of our col- 
eagues put to you earlier today, 
whether your sudden decision to visit 
he Middle East represents an act of 
lesperation to salvage the troop with- 
lrawal plan that you negotiated on the 
ast visit? 

Secretary Shultz. It seems like a 
;;udden decision because the President 
lecided last night about it. Of course, 
we've been thinking about it for quite 
j'ome time. Phil Habib, Morrie Draper, 
:ind Dick Fairbanks have been in the 
irea. As is always the case, the an- 
nouncement of a visit by me tends to 
pave an impact on what they can or can- 
pot accomplish, so it's better not to in- 
sert an announcement too early. It isn't 
Ls though this is a sudden move. Cer- 
tainly we want to review the bidding. It 
\s important to try to bring about a 
withdrawal, and, at this point, we don't 
Lave a reading on the Syrian situation. 
We very much want to get one. 



Q. But to characterize your trip as 
an act of desperation would prompt 
what sort of answer from you? 

Secretary Shultz. Oh, hardly. Do I 
look desperate? 

Q. Syria rejected the arrangement 
for Lebanon and Israel and did not 
receive Mr. Habib. Have you detected 
any possible change in their position? 

Secretary Shultz. We haven't had 
any discussion about that. 

Q. Since your last trip out there, 
in your view, has there been any 
change that is in a forward direction? 
Has Mr. Habib or any others been able 
to produce any movement in the situa- 
tion which you now can capitalize on 
in another trip? 

Secretary Shultz. The situation is 
always an evolving situation. The con- 
versations in the area that Ambassador 
Habib and others have had, I think, have 
been helpful to us. But as I said at the 
beginning, I want to get a first-hand 
reading myself. The President wants me 
to get that so that I can report to him 
on just what the situation is. 

Q. You have ruled out shuttle 
diplomacy, but shuttle diplomacy 
usually means frequent trips back and 
forth. Is it possible that this trip will 
not be a once-around and, indeed, you 
will have to carry from one party to 
another, and back again points of 
view? 

Secretary Shultz. I am not expect- 
ing that that will emerge. Among other 
reasons, there is a great deal to do in 
Washington, and I need to get back. As 
you probably realize, I've been away for 
a while. So I need to get back. 

Q. Do you see any possibility of a 
breakthrough on this trip or any trip 
abroad on Lebanon? 

Secretary Shultz. It would be a 
great blessing. I'd certainly be delighted, 
but I don't see any real prospect of it. 
Certainly, that's our objective, and 
should things so come forward that that 
was closer to possible, we would be 
delighted. 

Q. Are you going to Saudi Arabia 
to ask the Saudis to try and persuade 
Syria to make some troop withdrawals 
or go along with the Israeli-Lebanon 
agreement? 

Secretary Shultz. I'll be seeking the 
views of King Fahd and his advisers on 
the removal of foreign forces from 
Lebanon, and also on the peace process 
more generally. I'll want to know what 
his views are and consult with him about 
next steps. That's the purpose of the 
Saudi Arabian visit. 



Q. Did President Zia or Foreign 
Minister Yaqub Khan plan any role in 
setting up your visit to Damascus? 

Secretary Shultz. No, I don'1 think 
so. If they did, 1 don'1 know of it. I have 
discussed the Middle East situation with 
the Foreign Minister and, no doubt, in 
the dinner this evening, President Zia 
and I will talk about it. But I don't know 
of any direct role that they may have 
played. They are very interested, and 
they are very helpful and thoughtful 
people. 

Q. What would happen if Syria 
does not pull out? What would that 
mean in the Middle East? 

Secretary Shultz. We are assuming 
on the basis of Syrian statements, that 
in one way or another, they intend to 
leave Lebanon. That's one thing they 
have always said, and they've never con- 
tradicted that. Another question is, what 
are the circumstances under which they 
would leave Lebanon? They never said 
that they wouldn't leave. 



Peshawar 



STATEMENT AT NASRBAGH 
REFUGEE CAMP, 
JULY 3, 1983 12 

Fellow fighters for freedom, not only in 
Afghanistan but throughout the world: 
My message to you from the United 
States is very simple. We are with you. 
This is a gathering — a very moving ex- 
perience for me — in the name of free- 
dom, a gathering in the name of self- 
determination, a gathering in the name 
of getting the Soviet forces out of 
Afghanistan, a gathering in the name of 
a sovereign Afghanistan controlled by 
its own people. 

The millions from Afghanistan who 
are refugees here, of course, bring out 
the human dimension of this tragedy 
brought on by the invasion and occupa- 
tion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces. 
The human dimension has its counter- 
part of tragedy but also of inspiration 
and determination, at the determination 
of you not to live under that rule but to 
fight back. I would like to express my 
appreciation and my support for many 
people who are part of this effort, for 
the officials of the Government of 
Pakistan, and for the people of Pakistan, 
particularly those in this area. I was 
touched to see that you spoke so elo- 
quently yourself, this morning. I express 
my appreciation to those from around 



September 1983 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



the world who have come here as 
volunteers to be helpful. I feel privileged 
as an American to be part of the sup- 
port effort for you, not only from the 
governmental efforts but from the 
private organizations which have come 
here to be helpful. 

You fight valiantly, and your spirit 
inspires the world. I want you to know 
that you do not fight alone; many all 
over the world stand with you. World 
opinion is expressed without equivoca- 
tion or ambiguity in votes in the United 
Nations. But you have also spoken of 
the visible support that has come here, 
and I assure you again that the United 
States, has, does, and will continue to 
stand with you. You spoke of the fact 
that there are negotiations taking place 
about the Afghan issue, and I can tell 
you that from the standpoint of the 
United States, negotiations will only be 
successful if they include the removal of 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan, if they 
include a provision for self-deter- 
mination in Afghanistan, if they include 
provisions under which refugees may 
return to their country with dignity and 
honor. These are things that must be in- 
cluded in any settlement if it is to be 
satisfactory. 

You spoke of your determination 
and your confidence, and I agree with 
you— there are not only the millions 
here, but you spoke also of the millions 
who have turned out in Poland just in 
the past few weeks. I share your con- 
fidence that, in the end, freedom will 
prevail; we will prevail. We will prevail 
because we have strength, we are deter- 
mined, and because our cause is the 
cause of right and justice. Finally, I ex- 
press again my sense of privilege at be- 
ing here with you and of sharing these 
aspirations for freedom that you fight 
for, that I fight for, and the American 
people stand for. 



Islamabad 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JULY 4, 1983' 

Secretary Shultz. I would first like to 
express my appreciation to President 

Zia, to Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, 
and to the people of Islamabad and the 
people of Pakistan generally for the 
hospitality with which 1 have been 
received, by the very thoughtful and 
enlightening conversations and the 
seriousness of purpose by which this 
visit has been treated. It has been a very 



fine experience for me, and I have 
benefited greatly from it. 1 feel that the 
relationships between the United States 
and Pakistan, important as they are, 
have been advanced through our discus- 
sions of a great many bilateral matters. 
First of all, those covered by our joint 
commission effort, where there are a 
number of things already in motion and 
others that will be developed by the 
commission activities. Second, by our 
discussion of various important bilateral 
matters. Particularly, it was interesting 
to me that on three different occasions 
we were able to discuss the narcotics 
problem, and I am greatly heartened by 
the reports that 1 was given on that. 
Finally, it has been a distinct privilege 
for me and my party to have this visit, 
marked as it has been by the chance to 
talk with the Afghan refugees and all 
the events surrounding that yesterday, 
to have this visit capped by a most 
hospitable and warm dinner last night 
with President Zia and a wide-ranging 
conversation with him and his col- 
leagues. So, again, I express my ap- 
preciation for not only the hospitality 
but also the content that has come with 
it during this visit. 

Q. As a result of your discussions 
with the Foreign Minister and Presi- 
dent Zia, has there been any fine tun- 
ing of the U.S.-Pakistan position on 
Afghanistan, any change regarding 
what Pakistan will convey in the 
Geneva discussions? 

Secretary Shultz. We have shared 
views and, of course, I have been very 
interested in the Foreign Minister's 
report and analysis, and President Zia's. 
We have become very well-informed 
through an intense briefing at the staff 
level. Our objectives, which we share 
completely, remain unchanged, and I 
would say in my analysis that the report 
I've had that there isn't a sense of 
enough progress to make it worthwhile 
continuing the dialogue, but not so much 
as to make you think we're anywhere 
near the end of it. 

Q. I would like to divert your at- 
tention toward the interview of the 
Russian Ambassador in Pakistan who 
said that "Mr. Shultz is bringing the 
Soviet danger in his briefcase during 
his visit to Pakistan." 

Secretary Shultz. I guess the origin 
of that question has never visited where 
we visited yesterday. It is not I who 
brings the Russian threat, it is the Rus- 
sians who have broughl it themselves 
with their invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan. We could sec the human 



tragic fallout from that in the refugees, 
and, particularly, the women, the chil- 
dren, the widows. So the Russian threat 
that is there has come forward as a 
result of Soviet aggressive behavior and 
has nothing whatever to do with the 
United States. At the same time, we join 
with Pakistan and others in deploring 
this action and in expressing our support 
for the Afghan freedom fighters. 

Q. According to Pakistani papers, 
President Zia talked to American jour- 
nalists last night saying that Israel 
had planned to attack Pakistan's vital 
installations. What would be the 
American reaction in this regard? 

Secretary Shultz. I didn't hear any 
such statement from President Zia, so 
the entire question is hypothetical, and I 
am not going to react to it. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

Secretary Shultz. The Syrians have 
made clear their opposition to that 
agreement, so that's been stated and 
stated publicly on the record. As I said 
yesterday, the purpose of the trip is to 
gather information, to have first-hand 
basis for talking with the President 
when I return about the situation, the 
ideas that people have, and if in the 
process, in the effort to remove all 
foreign forces totally from Lebanon and 
see Lebanon emerge as a sovereign 
country in charge of its own frontiers 
with security for the northern border of 
Israel— those are our objectives. If we 
can do something in serving them dur- 
ing the trip, certainly, we are going to 
try. 

Q. While one can appreciate 
America's concern for strategic and 
security needs, what is the Reagan 
Administration's concern for the viola- 
tion of human rights and the absence 
of social justice to the peoples of 

A SIR*' 

Secretary Shultz. The people of the 
United States and the President are con- 
cerned about human rights problems 
everywhere in the world, including in 
the United States. It is a subject that is 
built into the character of the American 
people, and we are always alert to prob- 
lems. We try in as constructive a way as 
we can to help in doing something about 
them. 

Q. I think that your government is 
aware of the burning issue of the 
future of the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir which has been disturbing 
the relations between India and 
Pakistan for the last 35 years. In the 
recent elections in Indian-held 



40 



Department of State Bulletii 



THE SECRETARY 



Kashmir, not only Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi's party but all other Indian 
parties have been rejected by the 
Muslims of Kashmir which proves that 
the issue of Kashmir is very much 
there and can prove at any time a 
danger. The point is what steps the 
American Government is going to take 
to solve the issue of Kashmir which is 
very much there? 

Secretary Shultz. I am not going to 
comment on questions of that kind, 
beyond saying this; I found in India and 
I found in Pakistan a desire to improve 
the relationship between India and 
Pakistan. From the standpoint of the 
United States, a country that values its 
relationship with both countries, we cer- 
tainly applaud that effort, we hope that 
it will, over a period of time, be 
eminently successful. 

Q. What makes you pessimistic 
about the outcome of your visit to the 
Middle East right now? 

Secretary Shultz. I didn't say I was 
pessimistic. I just described what I was 
going to do and the objective that I 
have. I think that given the fact that ob- 
viously there are acute problems in the 
Middle East and have been for a con- 
siderable period of time, it made sense 
as we thought about it and were in 
touch with our diplomats in the area to 
pay a visit on my way back to 
Washington rather than just fly over 
those problems, and that's what we are 
doing. 

Q. After the inaugural session of 
the Pakistan-U.S. Joint Commission, 
the economic relations between the 
two countries will take a new turn. 
What do you say? And when do you 
think the next meeting of the joint 
commission will be held? 

Secretary Shultz. The work of the 
joint commission, I am sure, will follow 
the suggestions made by Minister Yaqub 
Khan at the meeting; namely, that we 
will establish three subcommissions. 
When these subcommissions get into the 
operational detail and have produced 
something substantive for us to look at 
in the joint commission as a whole, then 
we will meet about that. We've had our 
overall meeting, and we have put this 
Iprocess in motion. As I remember your 
(statement, you hope and I concur that 
we ought to have these subcommissions 
going before the end of the year. Again, 
I call your attention to the fact that in 
each of the important areas involved 
there is already a lot of activity, so it 
isn't as though you have a standing start 



and you have to generate things. There 
is motion there. We think it can be ac- 
celerated, expanded, and qualitatively 
improved by the work of the subcommis- 
sions and the joint commission. 

Q. The $3.2 billion deal between 
Pakistan and the United States is an 
important part of the economic assist- 
ance, but the recent congressional 
debates and the cuts authorized to 
foreign assistance have been a cause 
of concern here. Have you given any 
assurances to the Pakistani side re- 
garding the American commitment for 
foreign assistance? 

Secretary Shultz. We have dis- 
cussed this issue, and, of course, it is im- 
portant to the President to get his pro- 
gram through the Congress. The issues 
involved, as we have discussed them 
here with President Zia, the Foreign 
Minister, are basically twofold. On one 
hand, there is the level and flow of 
assistance in terms of its magnitude and 
composition, and, on the other, there is 
the question of the ability to plan for 
that continuing flow. Both problems are 
present. It is a problem that derives 
from our budget process in the United 
States. 

We have done a variety of things 
about it including, in particular, the ap- 
pointment of a commission headed by an 
eminent American, Frank Carlucci, who 
with a variety of others and congres- 
sional involvement, are focusing on this 
issue. But we are going to [inaudible] 
our effort, and the picture looks good. 
We always have conflicts in the congres- 
sional authorization and appropriation 
process, and that is the Congress con- 
stitution [inaudible] appropriate funds. 
We work with them and trust that they 
will see matters our way. 

Q. You have visited India. What is 
their perception with regard to the 
Afghanistan [inaudible]? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't want to 
speak for another country. I think it is 
unwise for me to characterize their posi- 
tion on an issue and I would leave it to 
them to. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

Secretary Shultz. The question was 
about the spares for Tarapur. The issue 
that was posed was the question of 
spares for the Tarapur plant. The Presi- 
dent's pledge was that if they were 
unavailable from some other country, an 
effort will be made to find out the 
answer to that fact. Then the United 
States would be ready to supply the 
necessary parts. It is not a large 



volume— particular things that are 
related to safety and health in the opera- 
tion of that power reactor. I think the 
concerns for safety and health in the 
operation of nuclear power plants here 
is the dominant consideration. The deci- 
sion stands on its own as an effort to 
serve those safety and health objectives. 

Q. You had an exchange of letters 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko on 
Afghanistan, and now you have had 3 
talks with Foreign Minister Yaqub 
Khan. In 2 or 3 months' time the UN 
envoy will get in touch with the Soviet 
Union in Moscow on the subject of 
guarantees and other questions 
related to the Afghanistan issue. Do 
you think these UN talks will go on 
for years as other talks have gone on 
for 5 or 6 years? What is your assess- 
ment? How soon can this question be 
solved? 

Secretary Shultz. It is a mistake to 
try and put some sort of deadline down 
on talks of that kind. At the same time, 
obviously, nobody concerned wants to 
have talks that just drag on endlessly 
and pointlessly with the possibility of not 
coming out with something constructive. 
The expert on that subject is sitting on 
my right, but I have already character- 
ized what my understanding of the situa- 
tion is, and I don't want to repeat it. 

Q. Don't you feel that the Russian 
attitude toward Pakistan has become 
stiffer day by day? In this background, 
can we trust you regarding our securi- 

ty? 

Secretary Shultz. What the Rus- 
sian attitude is toward Pakistan is a 
question the Foreign Minister should ad- 
dress. As far as the United States is 
concerned, we have a close relationship 
with Pakistan. We have a security rela- 
tionship with Pakistan, and we share 
concerns about Soviet behavior, par- 
ticularly as it is exhibited in 
Afghanistan. We are supporting each 
other in the effort to deter Soviet ag- 
gression there, and, I might say, we 
have the same attitude as a worldwide 
proposition. 

Q. You know the day you landed 
here, there was an incident in the 
Parachinar area. A plane flew into 
it— into Parachinar— and indulged in 
bombing. And it was a coincidence 
that when Mr. Brzezinski came here, 
on the eve of that visit also, there was 
a similar incident. Do you have any 
reading into it, or do you think it is 
just a stray incident? 



iSeptember1983 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary Shultz. No, I don't have 
any basis for knowing of any particular 
connection. 

Q. How do you find the long-term 
prospects of a strong and enduring 
relationship with Pakistan? 

Secretary Shultz. I think the pros- 
pects for the relationship of the United 
States and Pakistan in the long-term are 
excellent, and the reason is that we are 
building this relationship on a solid foun- 
dation of bilateral interests that we have 
with each other. Then we are moving 
from that to interests we have in com- 
mon about various problems around the 
world. But the foundation is the direct 
relationship between the United States 
and Pakistan, and, as that grows, it 
tends to be self-reinforcing. We are look- 
ing at it just as you implied in your 
question — as a long-term proposition 
and not as some sort of a quick relation- 
ship. 

Q. How do you view your meeting 
with President Zia? 

Secretary Shultz. It was an ex- 
cellent meeting from my standpoint. 
First of all, the President organized it as 
a small group of people, so we were able 
to sit around for the entire time and 
have intense conversation. We covered a 
wide range of subjects, and I found it a 
very worthwhile conversation. I might 
say, having met with President Zia 
before— this is my first time in Pakistan 
and over an extended period of time — 
he comes across as a man of great abili- 
ty and with a very wide range of knowl- 
edge and insights, and so I benefited 
greatly from the conversation. 

Q. Does the American Government 
have interest in the restoration of 
elected democracy in Pakistan? Was 
this the subject of discussion with 
President Zia, and what is the Amer- 
ican reaction to such proposals as he 
might have been making? 

Secretary Shultz. Of course, we are 
always interested in movements in the 
direction of democracy. It is my under- 
standing that there will be a statement 
about this subject. I don't know what the 
contents of it will be, but there will be a 
statement about this subject in the mid- 
dle of August. We look forward to that 
with keen anticipation. 

Q. What are you going to do in 
the event of a Russian attack on 
Pakistan? Or any attack by Afghan 
surrogates on Pakistan? What will you 
do? 



Secretary Shultz. I don't want to 
answer hypothetical questions. I de- 
scribed the strength and work of the 
relationship between the United States 
and Pakistan, and beyond that, hypo- 
thetical questions will have to go to the 
side. 

Q. There have been reports that 
there has been a new agreement be- 
tween the U.S.S.R. and India for pro- 
vision of $5 billion of arms. That 
would further increase Pakistan's fear 
and insecurity. How do you look at 
this situation? 

Secretary Shultz. Various people 
have asked about that, but I haven't 
seen any substantiation of that report. 

Q. Why is the United States still 
opposing the peaceful nuclear program 
of Pakistan? 

Secretary Shultz. The U.S. Govern- 
ment is not opposing the development of 
nuclear power for peaceful uses in 
Pakistan. It was notable to me that 
President Zia went out of his way to 
assure me that that, and only that, was 
the objective of the Government of 
Pakistan. We discussed this last night. 







Arabian 
Sea 



Jidda 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JULY 5, 1983' 4 

Q. Can you tell us what you have ac- 
complished in your discussions? 

Secretary Shultz. First, I'd like to 
express my appreciation to His High- 
ness, His Majesty, for receiving me and 
my party and for the very worthwhile 
and constructive discussions we had last 
night. 



From my standpoint, in addition to 
the various things we discussed, 
analyses of the situation and expecta- 
tions, it was most gratifying to see with 
King Fahd that we continue to share the 
objectives of the removal of all foreign 
forces in Lebanon, of the desire to see 
Lebanon emerge as a country sovereign 
and able to rule within its borders. 
While we recognize the importance of 
security arrangements that seek that 
Lebanon not be a base from which 
hostile actions might occur to any of its 
neighbors — to Syria or Israel — in addi- 
tion, we see that we continue to share 
the objectives of seeking an active peace 
process that among other things, ad- 
dresses itself to legitimate rights and 
concerns of the Palestinian people. The 
reaffirmation of the importance of these 
objectives and our discussions of 
analyses of the situation and things to 
do about it were most worthwhile. I am 
very grateful to you. Your Highness, 
and to His Majesty for the time, and 
particularly at this season of the year 
am I for your willingness to break off 
from other things and meet with us. 

Prince Sa'ud. We are very pleased 
to receive you here. On my part, we af- 
firm we also share the hope that 
Lebanon will achieve its independence, 
and towards this end Saudi Arabia has 
cooperated in the past and will 
cooperate in the future. In the dis- 
cussions, also, we were very pleased to 
hear from the Secretary that the United: 
States continues to pursue discussions 
towards this objective, independence for 
Lebanon, and also accommodating the 
overall Middle East problem, the rights 
of all the Palestinian people. We had 
fruitful discussions with the Secretary, 
and we hope that in this tour in which 
he will visit other countries, from the 
discussions will emerge all sorts of steps! 
that will move the peace process for- 
ward and an important and significant 
result will be withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from Lebanon and for Lebanon tc 
achieve and maintain its security in full 
dignity and independence. We are 
pleased to receive you in this month of 
Ramadan and any other month. 

Q. You talk about the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces. Does Saudi Arabia, 
also as the United States does, want 
to see the withdrawal of Syrian forces 
as well from Lebanon? 

Prince Sa'ud. We don't equate the 
two forces. As I said, the Israelis are oc- 
cupying forces. We want to see their 
withdrawal and we want also to see 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Lebanon be able to maintain its security 
Bhrough its armed forces and internal 
security forces and, therefore, no 
need — 

Q. Does that extend to forces 
from any other Arab country? Is the 
Golan Heights issue being linked to 
the Lebanon situation? 

Secretary Shultz. The Golan 
Heights didn't come up in the discussion 
at all. 

Q. Were there any contributions, 
any ideas that emerged in your conver- 
sations last night, that could promote 
the process of withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Lebanon? That 
you could take to President Assad, for 
example? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't want to 
discuss the details of matters of ap- 
proach we are going to use, but I con- 
sider that the discussion was a very 
fruitful one and is going to be helpful to 
me as I approach these meetings, and as 
I am sure our friends from Saudi Arabia 
will approach their own contacts with 
the countries. 

Q. Has this trip changed in 
character from an information gather- 
ing trip to a negotiating trip? It 
sounds like you were making more 
(headway than simply gathering infor- 
mation? 

Secretary Shultz. I think that my 
objective was to gather information to 
I help move the process along as I can 
land be in a position to give President 
Reagan a firsthand account of the views 
bf His Majesty and the other leaders of 
the region when I return. 

Q. But has it become more than 
I that? 

Secretary Shultz. I think I have 
Uaid what I have to say. 







Beirut 



STATEMENTS, 
JULY 5, 1983 16 

Secretary Shultz. I want to express my 
appreciation to President Gemayel, 
Foreign Minister Salem, Prime Minister 
Wazzan, and their associates for, as 
always, the gracious and hospitable way 
in which we have been treated. We've 
had an intensive review of the situation, 
compared notes, and thought about our 
strategy, and also with President 
Gemayel talked a little bit about his 
forthcoming trip to Washington. How 
we'll continue on to Damascus with my 
appreciation for your courtesy and 
hospitality. 

Foreign Minister Salem. It's 
always a pleasure for us to welcome 
Secretary Shultz. His visits to Beirut are 
associated with success, optimism, and 
with confidence. We in Lebanon have 
walked with the United States in this 
difficult path that faces Lebanon — a 
path which we all know will lead to total 
withdrawal and the restoration of full 
sovereignty and independence of 
Lebanon. We viewed the activities since 
last April and May. We discussed points 
that should be refined. We discussed 
some specifics that should be examined 
in some greater detail in Washington, 
and we are reassured by the American 
commitment which has not wavered and 
changed in support of this little valiant 
but great and unequaled democracy 
called Lebanon. We are extremely 
grateful for the support of President 
Reagan and for the efficient and 
rigorous manner in which Secretary 
Shultz is following the implementation 
of this policy. 



Q. Beyond the optimism that ex- 
ists, what were the concrete results of 
Secretary Shultz's visit? 

Foreign Minister Salem. I think we 
did go into some specifics. We discussed 
some problems that are facing us. We 
discussed alternatives. We discussed all 
kinds of approaches to the problem — the 
major problem — that faces Lebanon. I 
believe that as a result of this visit we 
understand the situation better, and, I 
believe, we can plan for it more effec- 
tively so that we can have speedier 
results because Lebanon cannot wait too 
long before it sees the full withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Lebanon. 

Q. May I ask a question of both 
the Secretary and the Minister? Does 
the United States and does Lebanon 
want to see Israel commit itself to a 
timetable for withdrawal? 

Secretary Shultz. Of course, we 
want to see the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces agreed upon and, obviously, when 
it is, it takes place according to a 
schedule of some sort. If we can get to 
that point, we'll certainly want to get to 
it. 

Q. Do you want to see a timetable 
even before [inaudible]? 

Secretary Shultz. The timetable in- 
volving withdrawal by all foreign forces 
is consistent with our objective. We are 
not in any way discussing or proposing 
unilateral or unconditional withdrawal 
by the Israelis. We're talking about a 
program of withdrawal here, right from 
the start, that involves all foreign 
forces. Let me just go back and remind 
everybody of the objectives that were 
set out by President Reagan and Presi- 
dent Gemayel when President Gemayel 
visited Washington last October. They 
remain the same: total withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Lebanon; the 
emergence of Lebanon as a sovereign 
state, able to govern its territory and 
have territorial integrity; and proper 
security arrangements to insure that no 
neighboring state is attacked by hostile 
forces originating in Lebanon. Those are 
the objectives that were set up; those 
are the objectives that remain. 

Foreign Minister Salem. I fully 
concur with what the Secretary said. 

Q. If Israel were to pull back 
some distance from its current posi- 
tions, what would be the best way for 
that vacuum to be filled? 



September 1983 



43 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary Shultz. That's a 
hypothetical question and so I'm going 
to pass on it except to say this: that the 
process of withdrawal and how it should 
happen was discussed intensively during 
the negotiation of the agreement. It en- 
visaged the coming into play of the 
security arrangements in the planning 
process, whereby the armed forces of 
the Government of Lebanon would 
assume responsibility for security in the 
territories that are threatened. 



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ncwir wirir if wic w<h> wif ir 




Damascus 



DEPARTURE REMARKS, 
JULY 6, 1983 16 

Our time here has been, first of all, very 
pleasant. We had dinner last night with 
the Foreign Minister and his wife. Then 
this morning, the Foreign Minister and I 
and our delegations talked for about an 
hour and a half. We met with President 
Assad around 10 o'clock until whenever 
we broke up a little after three. The con- 
tent of our discussion could be sum- 
marized in three points. 

First, we discussed the Israeli- 
Lebanon agreement in great length, and 
we did not find very much to agree 
about in our analysis of that agreement. 

Second, we agreed on the great im- 
portance of a sovereign, free, and in- 
dependent Lebanon with a strong sense 
of government as something that both 
countries feel is very desirable; 

Third, we agreed to stay in touch 
and to consult with each other about 
how we might help together to attain 
that objective. And to that end, we all 
undoubtedly will establish a little work- 
ing group to help sort out what we may 
be able to do to help in that regard. 



44 




Cairo 



REMARKS, 
JULY 7, 1983 17 

President Mubarak. I welcome the U.S. 
Secretary of State who is visiting Egypt 
for a few hours after a long tour in the 
Far East, then in the Middle East, in 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, 
Israel, and then Egypt. I've listened to 
the results of his tour in the Middle 
East, especially concerning Lebanon and 
the implementation of the Lebanese- 
Israeli agreement. I've also listened to 
his impressions following his visit to 
Syria and to the other Arab countries. 
Then we exchanged our viewpoints con- 
cerning this special issue and the Middle 
East crisis as a whole. He also informed 
me about all the American efforts to 
solve the Palestinian issue as a whole 
and the Lebanese-Israeli problem in par- 
ticular. As we all know, this problem 
will need some time to convince all the 
parties and to start the withdrawal of 
forces. It will need great effort from the 
United States and all the other friendly 
countries which are participating and 
cooperating in solving the Palestinian 
problem. I think that Secretary Shultz is 
very tired from his tour and he'll now 
return immediately to the States. 

Secretary Shultz. I appreciate very 
much the chance to meet with you, and 
while my Arabic is a little off, I had a 
little whispering in my ear, so I can ex- 
press my appreciation for the comments 
that you made and, I might also say, for 
the strong support you have given 
publicly and in our meetings on the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon so that we can allow Lebanon 
to get on with the job of reconstructing 
itself. Your own positive statements and 



help are very much appreciated, not only 
on the problems of Lebanon as we 
discussed today, but also the problems 
of the Palestinian people and your 
thoughts about how we might make 
some progress on the basic peace proc- 
ess. So, on all of these matters I ap- 
preciate very much this chance to com- 
pare notes with you. As always, you 
have been very gracious in receiving us 
on short notice and with your time and 
ideas and we appreciate it. 

Q. What cards does the Ad- 
ministration have left that it might be 
willing to play on the withdrawal 
issue? 

Secretary Shultz. We will continue 
to work on it. We have lots of support 
and good friends — President Mubarak. 
As far as our cards are concerned, I 
think we'll play them as we see fit. 

Q. Has this visit been a failure? 

Secretary Shultz. This visit has 
been undertaken for the purpose of 
gathering information, sharing ideas 
with the leaders in this area, and from 
that standpoint I've been very suc- 
cessful, as I've had good, candid, and 
strong meetings with the heads of state 
of all the immediately concerned coun- 
tries, not only about the Lebanon prob- 
lem but other issues in the Middle East. 
So, from that standpoint, it's been very 
successful. That was its purpose. Ob- 
viously, we still have major problems 
that remain to be resolved. 

Q. Will you be coming back to the 
Middle East? 

Secretary Shultz. Oh, I think 
sooner or later I'll probably be back 
here, but I have to get along to an 
airplane so that I can get back to 
Washington, I'm told about 4 a.m., 
ready for some meetings tomorrow with 
the President. 



Q. Did you feel any progress from 
the Syrian side during your talks with 
their leaders this time? Is there any 
flexibility in their attitude toward set 
tling their problems in Lebanon? 

Secretary Shultz. In our discus- 
sions in Syria with President Assad, he 
was at great pain to make clear his op- 
position to the Israeli-Lebanese agree- 
ment, so we argued about that. I think 
the real point is not so much the agree- 
ment but Syria's readiness to withdraw 
from Lebanon. It has been said over the 
past months many times, including by 
President Mubarak when I was here the 
last time, that it was essential to have 
an agreement for Israeli withdrawal. 



Department of State Bulletit 



THE SECRETARY 



There is an agreement for Israeli with- 
drawal. They will withdraw as others 
withdraw. So I think that any who are 
interested in seeing the withdrawal of 
Israel from Lebanon should be urging, 
as President Mubarak has, that Syria 
and the PLO withdraw, and, thereby, 
we will have a Lebanon clear of foreign 
forces and able to exert its sovereignty 
and develop itself. That is the 
President's objective, that is President 
Murabak's objective, that is the objective 
of the Government of Lebanon, and I 
think the world owes Lebanon a chance 
to develop itself again. 



■Press release 230 of June 27, 1983. 
2 Press release 229 of June 28, 1983. 
3 Press release 255 of July 1, 1983. 
4 Press release 240. 
6 Press release 274 of July 6, 1983. 
6 Press release 259 of July 5, 1983. 
7 Press release 258 of July 5, 1983. 
8 Press release 279 of July 12, 1983. 
9 Press release 265 of July 7, 1983. 
'"Press release 276 of July 7, 1983. 
"Press release 272 of July 8, 1983. 
12 Press release 269 of July 8, 1983. 
"Press release 302 of July 8, 1983. 
"Press release 280 of July 13, 1983. 
"Press release 275 of July 11, 1983. 
"Press release 278 of July 11, 1983. 
17 Press release 277 of July 11, 1983. 



Comprehensive Strategy for 
Central America 



Secretary Shultz's prepared state- 
ment before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on August U, 1983. 1 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
with you developments in Central 
America. Our policy toward Central 
America today is just as the President 
set it forth to the nation before the joint 
session of Congress on April 27. That 
night he identified our objectives as 
being to prevent a wider crisis and to 
bring about a lasting peaiie. And to 
achieve those ends, the President de- 
fined four activities to which we have 
committed ourselves: support for 
democracy, reform, and human rights; 
support for economic development; sup- 
port for dialogue and negotiations 
among the countries of the region and 
within each country; and support for the 
security of the region's threatened na- 
tions as a shield for democratization, 
development, and diplomacy. 

Every step we have taken since then 
is consistent with this comprehensive 
strategy. Let me sum up each element 
as it stands today and as it relates to 
the others and to the whole. 

Before I do so, however, let me say 
that a key aspect of the President's 
statement of April 27 was his appeal for 
a bipartisan approach to Central 
America's increasing importance. With 
the counsel and support of many 

if members of the Congress, the President 
has now named a National Bipartisan 

s Commission on Central America headed 
by Henry Kissinger. Americans have 
begun to realize that we must pay more 



September 1983 



attention to our own neighborhood. An 
effort to look at the future, and to do so 
in a bipartisan spirit, has long been 
needed. I hope everyone will provide the 
commission as much assistance as possi- 
ble as it begins its work. 

Today, however, I want to discuss 
the current thrust of our four-part 
policy. 

Support for Democracy, Reform, 
and Human Rights 

First— and it belongs first— support for 
democracy, reform, and human rights: 
What we seek is a Central America 
more like Costa Rica than Cuba. We 
seek genuine democracy — not 
totalitarian charades but respect for 
human freedom and the rule of law, not 
repression but governments committed 
to the welfare of their own people. 

Last year we observed with admira- 
tion Costa Rica's typically enthusiastic 
and meticulous national election. Today 
we are working with the Costa Rican 
Government, its prestigious Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal, and the new regional 
Center for Electoral Assistance to help 
other countries improve their electoral 
systems. 

In 1981-82, we supported the transi- 
tion to democracy in Honduras. Today 
defense of the constitutional democratic 
order in Honduras is a key objective. 

In El Salvador, the Constituent 
Assembly elections a year ago last 
March were a stunning success, demon- 
strating that democracy can advance 
even in the face of guerrilla violence. 



To help with the next Salvadoran 
elections, two prominent elections ex- 
perts traveled to El Salvador in May ac- 
companied by officers from the State 
Department and the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID). We have now 
developed a project to help provide 
technical assistance and international 
observers to support the coming elec- 
tions. Our goal is to help the Salvadoran 
people build on the success of March 
1982, not just the next time but many 
times in the future. 

We are also working to help rebuild 
El Salvador's tragically inadequate 
criminal justice system. The Attorney 
General visited there in April to 
underline the importance we attach to 
legal reform in the development of a 
working democracy. Legal experts from 
a variety of U.S. agencies are following 
up and have visited Honduras and Costa 
Rica as well as El Salvador. In addition, 
at my invitation, Judge Harold G. Tyler 
is conducting a review of all materials 
available to us concerning the 1980 
murder of four American churchwomen 
in El Salvador and will recommend fur- 
ther actions we might take to advance 
the prosecution of those responsible for 
this crime. 

Democracy has not been the his- 
torical norm in most of Central America, 
and its construction will not be easy. But 
the amnesty in El Salvador, the schedul- 
ing of elections for a Constituent 
Assembly in Guatemala, the vibrancy of 
democracy in Costa Rica and Hon- 
duras—all are indications of the prog- 
ress Central America is making. 

What is happening in Central 
America will be further advanced by the 
President's democracy initiative. We 
have begun consultations— bipartisan, 
both at home and abroad— to build sup- 
port for improved cooperation among 
political parties and other groups com- 
mitted to democracy. 

Economic Development 

Second, economic development: Between 
1960 and 1979, the nations of Central 
America had high per capita growth 
rates. But rising expectations clashed 
with outmoded and unresponsive 
political institutions; then economic 
slowdown brought additional conflict 
and instability. In recent years, falling 
prices of export commodities, rising im- 
port prices, the "rule or ruin" strategy of 
the guerrillas in El Salvador, and the 
growing uncertainty caused by 
Nicaragua's policies have created an 



45 



THE SECRETARY 



acute economic crisis, increasing the 
region's vulnerability to communist 
strategies. 

The United States has responded to 
these underlying economic problems 
with both generosity and imagination. 
Much of the $610 million in economic 
assistance budgeted for Central America 
this fiscal year is concentrated on 
stabilization efforts— to provide hard 
currency for essential imports to main- 
tain production and employment. With 
the rest, AID is supporting about 120 in- 
dividual development projects. To take 
just one critical area, the agrarian 
reform in El Salvador, our assistance 
has helped that program to benefit more 
than 500,000 persons or roughly 1 
Salvadoran in every 10. Other AID proj- 
ects are developing Costa Rica's north- 
ern zone, upgrading Honduras' forestry 
and livestock industries, and helping 
Guatemala's highland Indians. Region- 
wide, U.S. economic assistance is three 
times greater than our military aid. 

Finally, we have worked hard with 
other nations and with you in the Con- 
gress to develop a new approach to 
assisting economic development— the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The 
CBI provides 12 years of free trade 
guarantees and incentives for invest- 
ment in Central America and the Carib- 
bean. It will be a powerful, long-term in- 
strument for development and the crea- 
tion of new jobs. The Congress passed 
the bill just a few days ago; the Presi- 
dent will sign it shortly. The CBI is a 
good example of bipartisan cooperation 
in the national interest. I am confident 
its contribution will prove enduring. 

Dialogue and Negotiations 

Third, dialogue and negotiations: Our 
diplomacy is designed to help develop 
political solutions to Central America's 
national and regional problems. In 
Nicaragua, the new Sandinista regime 
did not respond to U.S. efforts at "con- 
structive engagement." We then sought 
to resolve our differences through 
dialogue. And when bilateral approaches 
in 1981 and 1982 proved fruitless, we 
participated in the multilateral peace 
process launched last October in San 
Jose. From its beginning this year, we 
have supported the efforts of Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela— the 
Contadora group. That support con- 
tinues today. 



In El Salvador, we have consistently 
and systematically tried to facilitate 
reconciliation with those among the 
guerrillas and their associates who 
might prove willing to test their appeal 
in honest elections. We are now actively 
supporting the efforts of El Salvador's 
Peace Commission to open a dialogue 
with the Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (FDR) — the political arm of the 
guerrillas — to assure the safe partici- 
pation of all parties in the democratic 
process. 

Since his appointment by the Presi- 
dent last April, your former col- 
league — now mine — Dick Stone [Richard 
B. Stone, Ambassador at Large and 
special representative of the President 
to Central America] has worked hard to 
encourage dialogue within El Salvador 
and in the region as a whole. He has 
met repeatedly with leaders of all the 
countries involved in the Contadora 
process, including the Nicaraguans. Last 
weekend, with the help of President 
Betancur of Colombia, Ambassador 
Stone had a first contact with a political 
representative of the Salvadoran guer- 
rillas. We hope additional contacts will 
take place, and that they will facilitate a 
direct and detailed dialogue between the 
guerrillas and the Salvadoran Peace 
Commission. 

Let me also note that there are im- 
portant areas of convergence between 
the July 1 7 Cancun declaration of the 
Contadora presidents and the principles 
subscribed to by the United States last 
fall in the San Jose final act. The 
regional dialogue, though still very dif- 
ficult, is gradually clarifying the essen- 
tial conditions for democracy and peace. 

Military Assistance and 
Cooperation 

And, fourth, military assistance and 
cooperation: We seek a security shield, 
not as any kind of end in itself, but to 
provide the necessary protection for the 
political, economic, and diplomatic goals 
I have just described. 

The military components of the 
President's policy have been carefully 
calculated to do just that. Two kinds of 
activities are involved — activities to 
help others defend themselves and ac- 
tivities to underline our own deterrent 
capability. 

Military assistance is based on 
demonstrated needs in each country as 
measured against the threat to the coun- 
try's security. The Administration's re- 



quests for fiscal year 1984 are as 
follows: for Belize— $500,000 in grant 
aid and $100,000 in training; for Costa 
Rica— $2 million grant aid and $150,000 
for training; for El Salvador — $55 
million in grants, $1.3 million in train- 
ing, and $30 million sales credits; for 
Guatemala— no grant aid but $250,000 
in training and $10 million in credit; and 
for Honduras — $40 million grant aid and 
$1 million for training. 

Our readiness and deterrent capacity 
will be enhanced by the joint and com- 
bined exercises to take place with Hon- 
duran forces under the designation of 
"Big Pine II" in conjunction with fleet 
units. These exercises will serve two 
related objectives: 

• To improve the training and 
readiness of our own forces and those of 
Honduras; and 

• To provide a credible assurance to 
all parties that the United States has the 
capability to muster a protective shield 
in the face of any challenge to the inter- 
American system and our international 
legal obligations. 

Evidence of Change 

These are the elements of the policy. All 
four are essential to our strategy. And 
precisely because of the interplay among 
them, they give us both the strength and 
the flexibility to achieve results. 

Our support for democracy is slowly 
having an impact. A basis is being laid 
for renewed and more equitable 
economic growth once the shooting 
stops. And a critical interplay is under- 
way between the military and diplomatic 
aspects of our policy. 

Nations as well as men need incen- 
tives to change their behavior. At least 
until recently, there has been no incen- 
tive for the Sandinistas, no incentive for 
the Salvadoran guerrillas, no incentive 
for Fidel Castro, and no incentive for 
the Soviets to believe that anything 
credible, anything difficult stood in the 
way of imposition of communist rule by 
armed force in El Salvador and in the 
rest of Central America. For what 
reason, then, would the Salvadoran far 
left be interested in participation in the 
political process? Why should the San- 
dinistas under such circumstances 
refrain from their "revolution without 
frontiers"? Why should Cuba act any dif- 
ferently in Central America than in 
Africa? 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



But something has now begun to 
happen. The evidence is there— in the in- 
terest in dialogue by the Salvadoran 
guerrillas, even in the words of Ortega 
[Daniel Ortega, Coordinator of 
Nicaragua's Junta of National Recon- 
struction] and Castro. Messages have 
been sent. By the solidarity among the 
Central American democracies, by the 
Contadora countries, by private remon- 
strances from Nicaragua's international 
supporters, by a popular insurgency in- 
side Nicaragua, by the recent advances 
of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, and by 
the United States of America. 

The substance of these messages is 
this: a victory by the far left and its 
foreign supporters through armed force 
is not in the cards. The people of Cen- 
tral America are intent on resisting that 
force. They are increasingly capable of 
doing so because of their own efforts 
and because the United States is helping 
them. The United States and Honduras, 
in our current military exercises, are 
demonstrating what cooperative training 
and deterrence are all about. 

Our adversaries' options— which 
have so far stressed force— must be nar- 
rowed toward negotiation and dialogue. 
And I believe it is the responsibility of 
the Administration and the Congress to 
make certain that nothing is done to 
weaken the tools that can bring this 
about. 

Our strategy is well constructed for 
the problems we face. It is sophisticated, 
realistic, and flexible. It is showing 
results. It deserves your support and 
that of the American people. 



Interview on "Meet the Press" 



•Press Release 307. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402 ■ 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
NBC's "Meet the Press" on August 7. 
1983, by Bill Monroe and Marvin Kalb, 
NBC News; Hedrick Smith. The New 
York Times; Karen DeYoung, The 
Washington Post; and Lars-Erik 
Nelson, The New York Daily News. 1 

Q. We have sent antiaircraft missiles, 
free advisers, two AWACS [airborne 
warning and control system] radar 
planes to help the African nation of 
Chad. We also have a naval force off 
the Libyan coast. Could you give us 
your description of what is happening 
in Chad and what the U.S. role is? 

A. There is an insurgency in Chad, 
and it's being helped by the Libyans who 
have, among other things, conducted 
bombing raids on Faya-Largeau, a city 
about which there is a fight going on, 
and so there are a number of things tak- 
ing place, including concern by ourselves 
and the French. 

Q. Have the Libyan troops gone 
into Chad? 

A. That's a question. Certainly their 
planes have overflown Chad, and we 
have reports of some Libyans there, yes. 

Q. The United States has appeared 
to be encouraging the French Govern- 
ment to send direct air support — 
planes and French pilots — to help the 
Chad Government. The French say this 
morning they're not going to do that. 
Is the United States disappointed in 
that French attitude? 

A. The French have to decide what 
they are going to do. It is an area of 
prime concern to them, being a former 
French colony, and, of course, all of the 
francophone countries of Africa are 
watching the situation. We're in close 
consultation with the French, and I'm 
sure that they will exercise their respon- 
sibilities properly. 

Q. Switching to the other foreign 
policy hot spot — Central America; the 
United States has been flexing its 
military muscle. Cuba and Nicaragua 
have made new offers of negotiation. 
Ambassador Stone [Richard B. Stone, 
Ambassador at Large and special 
representative of the President to 
Central America] has been talking 
with the Salvadoran rebels and with 
the Nicaraguan Government. Does the 
United States have any plan, any pros- 
pect, of focusing all this activity into 
something really hopeful? 



A. The United States has a four- 
part set of policies that have an in- 
terplay together. These policies include 
the promotion of democracy, the promo- 
tion of economic development, the con- 
duct of negotiations within countries and 
among countries, and the provision of a 
security shield, helping the people down 
there provide that security shield. These 
interplay together, and we have to keep 
them all in being. And I think there is 
some indication that these policies are 
beginning to show some results. 

Q. Last weekend an American 
destroyer shadowed a Soviet freighter 
off the Pacific coast of Nicaragua. 
What's the point of American vessels 
following Soviet ships so closely down 
there? Are we trying to scare the 
Soviets, scare the Nicaraguans, or 
stop the Soviets from moving supplies 
into Nicaragua? 

A. There is an exercise going on 
down there, and it's quite normal when 
ships at sea encounter each other under 
those circumstances that they hail a 
passing freighter and ask for identifi- 
cation, and so that's what took place. 

Q. But we understand the ship 
followed the Soviet ship for a while. 

A. It went along to see where she 
was going. 

Q. What's the point? I mean, will 
this work? Will it stop Soviet supplies 
into Nicaragua if we let them proceed, 
or will it take stronger steps? 

A. The maneuvers down there are 
intended to do two things. One, they're 
part of the kind of training that goes on 
all around the world of our forces and 
other forces, and, second, they underline 
the deterrent capability of the United 
States. We want to make that plain to 
everybody, our friends and our adver- 
saries alike. 

Q. Should the Soviets be reading 
this as a message that if they continue 
to send ships to Nicaragua with 
military supplies, as this one was, that 
we will take some measures to stop 
those ships? 

A. No, no measure was taken with 
respect to that ship, and I'll just let it go 
at that. 

Q. President Castro of Cuba 
signaled a willingness to negotiate 
with us and with others to stop the 
flow of outside arms and military ad- 



September 1983 



47 



THE SECRETARY 



visers into Central America. What 
steps have we taken to contact him 
since he did that? 

A. We have been promoting the 
idea of regional negotiations to bring 
about stability in that region for quite a 
long time, going back to way last March 
and further back than that. We're glad 
to see statements from Mr. Castro and 
from others in the region — Mr. Ortega 
of Nicaragua — that tend to suggest 
they're beginning to see the point. 

From our standpoint, the point is to 
keep the pace of the negotiations going 
on, and we're supporting the Contadora 
process that involves primarily people in 
the region. 

Q. Have we made actual contact 
with the Cuban Government about the 
statements Mr. Castro made? 

A. We have an Interests Section in 
Havana that has contact with the Cuban 
Government, but we haven't had any 
direct response to that statement. 

Q. There seems to have been a 
change in our policy toward Nicaragua 
over the past year. We used to talk 
about how our principal concern was 
the spread of revolution in Central 
America, and now the President says 
that he thinks that any peaceful solu- 
tion there would be difficult with the 
current Sandinista government in 
place. Ambassador Kirkpatrick [Jeane 
J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations] says that we need 
to prove that revolutions are reversi- 
ble. Assuming we can stop Nicaraguan 
interference in El Salvador, can we 
live with the Marxist government in 
Nicaragua? 

A. The question is whether the peo- 
ple of Nicaragua can, and I think the 
evidence is increasing discontent in that 
country. We don't seek to overthrow 
that government. On the other hand, if 
they conduct themselves in such a way 
that people rise up against them, that's 
a problem that can occur in any country. 
Our chief concern is that they not be 
able to, as they say, export revolution 
without frontiers. 

Q. And yet there doesn't seem to 
be a rising up in the country. There's 
fighting on the border, and there's 
some evidence to suggest that the sup- 
port for the Sandinistas has, in fact, 
grown stronger inside the country 
since the problems began on the 
border. Do you really see an insurrec- 
tion coming there? 



A. I'm not predicting that, and 
we're not trying to bring that about. I 
just was responding to the speculation in 
your question. There has been a great 
deal of unease in religious circles about 
developments there. Certainly, I would 
imagine in press circles there is concern 
about the censorship that goes on. And 
in many other ways I think the situation 
is quite questionable. 

Q. But do you think there is a 
possibility that we can coexist with a 
Marxist Nicaragua, assuming that our 
concerns about regional export of 
revolution can be satisfied? 

A. There is a sense in which one of 
the attributes of Marxism is its desire to 
subvert and overthrow other govern- 
ments. That's one of the less attractive 
aspects of that ideology, and so there's 
always that threat. But from the stand- 
point of our policy, the fundamentals of 
it are to seek a broadly based, 
pluralistic, democratic form of govern- 
ment where people have a chance to ex- 
press themselves in these countries and 
to seek economic development that's 
widely shared. And under those cir- 
cumstances, I think the surrounding 
democratic countries will have real 
strength. 

Q. There's a force in the field in 
Nicaragua along the Honduran border 
of 10,000 people under arms called the 
Contras. Publicly we deny that we're 
supporting them, but in fact, it's an 
open secret that we do support them. 
What's to become of them if there's a 
negotiated settlement in Nicaragua? 

A. If there is a kind of negotiated 
settlement that we're trying to bring 
about in El Salvador, namely, a process 
of democratic reform in which all com- 
ers have a chance to state their case to 
the people and stand before them in an 
election, then the people have a chance 
to do that. 

Q. But some of these people under 
arms — and they are our arms, as far 
as I can tell from the press — have the 
stated goal of overthrowing the 
Managuan government. Will we sup- 
port them in that goal? Will we try to 
disarm them? Will we try to withdraw 
their support? 

A. Their goal is one that, given our 
opinion of that government, we can 
hardly turn away from. But as far as 
ourselves trying to overthrow another 
government, we're not trying to. 



Q. Do you see any possibility that 
their goal will automatically somehow 
become our goal, that they will find 
themselves in a jam and call on U.S. 
arms support? 

A. I don't foresee any armed U.S. 
effort to overthrow the Government of 
Nicaragua, absolutely none. 

Q. Not to overthrow the Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua in those terms, but, 
say, to save the skins of these freedom 
fighters, as the President has called 
them? 

A. If they seek to leave some place 
and want asylum or something like that, 
they may come here. 

I might say that one of the problems 
that's being created by this effort to stir 
up insurgencies and export revolution 
without frontiers is the actual presence 
now and the great threat of a tremen- 
dous refugee movement from that area. 
While there is no case of the coming into 
power of a Soviet-style system that's ac- 
tually benefited the people of that coun- 
try, there are many cases in which it has 
produced a flood of refugees in various 
parts of the world. So we have to bear 
that in mind. 

Q. A lot of people in the Ad- 
ministration say that what the United 
States is really trying to do is to make 
certain that the Nicaraguan Marxist 
regime does not get consolidated in 
the same way that the Castro regime 
got consolidated in Cuba. The implica- 
tion, therefore, is that somehow or 
another you can't have long-term 
stability in Central America from the 
U.S. point of view if there is a San- 
dinista regime in power. Does that 
parse? Does that make sense in 
diplomatic terms? 

A. Let me just deflect a little bit 
and say that this all got started with the 
Sandinista revolution, which was sup- 
ported out of the OAS [Organization of 
American States] based on undertakings 
of what that revolution sought, including 
democratic reform. Those expectations 
and undertakings have been grossly 
violated, and at the same time 
Nicaragua has become a place from 
which armaments have gone to neigh- 
boring countries — El Salvador in par- 
ticular — to attempt to overthrow that 
government. Our initial efforts to work 
with the Sandinista regime were basical- 
ly turned aside, and now we find this ef- 
fort to overthrow other countries. We 
are trying to interdict that flow of arms 
and to distract that government and in 
other ways to prevent them from doing 
the thing that they want to do, namely, 
to export this revolution. 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Does it follow, then, that you 
really cannot have the kind of tran- 
quility that the United States would 
like to see in Central America so long 
as that government, pursuing these 
policies, continues in office? 

A. As long as there is a government 
trying to overthrow other governments 
in its region, it presents a real problem, 
particularly when they're being armed 
through the Soviet Union and trying to 
bring about the overthrow of other 
governments. It certainly constitutes a 
major problem. 

I might say that in the kinds of 
things talked about in regional negotia- 
tions are such matters as verifiable 
undertakings not to ship arms from one 
country to another in the region. If it's 
verifiable, that's the kind of thing you 
need. 

Q. The House of Representatives 
voted 228 to 195 to cut off U.S. covert 
aid to the rebels fighting Nicaragua 
out of Honduran bases. I take it from 
your answers here so far that the Ad- 
ministration intends to ignore that ex- 
pression of sentiment from the House. 

A. You don't ignore it. It's a very 
important thing when the House or the 
Senate votes on an important subject, so 
certainly you don't ignore it. The vote, 
as such, doesn't have any immediate 
operational meaning in terms of the 
legislation. Legislation, as you know, has 
Ito pass both Houses of Congress and be 
• signed into law in order to take effect. 
lit registers an opinion, in effect, of the 
House. Of course, we take it very 
seriously. 

Q. If the Congress should later 
cut off funds for those rebels, forbid 
the United States to spend funds 
through the CIA for those rebels, 
would that be an end to U.S. involve- 
ment in support of those rebels? 

A. We'll have to see what happens. 
II think there is a great deal of sentiment 
•emerging in the Congress and also 
Jamong the American people generally 
■that Central America is very important 
Ito us, what's going on down there is im- 
Iportant, and that we have to see to it— 
•particularly by virtue of supporting 
Khose who want to fight for their coun- 
Itry and their principles— that they're 
lable to do so. So we haven't, by any 
■means, accepted the House's verdict as 
Ithe final verdict. 

Q. I'm talking about the possibili- 
ty of the whole Congress cutting off 
funds, which would have a legal ef- 
fect, would be an opinion of the entire 



Congress. Could you see any way in 
which the Administration could en- 
courage those rebels, could help them 
in any way to pursue their war against 
Nicaragua, if the whole Congress cut 
off funds? 

A. I'm trying to answer your ques- 
tion by saying that we're going to work 
hard to see that that doesn't happen. 

Q. Two years ago, the Administra- 
tion stepped up the relatively modest 
aid the United States was giving at 
that point to El Salvador. Now we 
have large military exercises going on, 
we're building bases in Honduras, 
we've got fleets off the coast of 
Nicaragua on both sides, there's talk 
that the CIA wants to step up aid to 
the rebels in Nicaragua. How much in- 
volvement is it going to take? What is 
the timeframe you're talking about 
here that the American people and 
Congress are going to support — 2 
years, 5 years, 10 years? 

A. In terms of timeframe, I think 
the effort in Central America — not so 
much necessarily the military effort, but 
our effort in Central America — should 
be seen as a long-term one, because the 
basic problems are social and economic 
problems, and that's what we have to 
address, and that's what we're trying to 
address. The existence of this guerrilla 
activity makes it difficult for economic 
development to take place, and that's ob- 
viously one of the main reasons why you 
want to stop it. 

Yes, we have to have an approach 
that's long-term. I hope that the 
strength that is evident down there will 
lead people to see that it's in everyone's 
interest to have a negotiated solution 
and to get on with the process of 
economic development, but it remains to 
be seen whether that will come to pass. 

Q. When you're talking about 
long-term in that language, it sounds 
as though you're talking about 
economic and social aid. 

A. Yes, right. 

Q. But I'm talking about the 
military quotient of this. Are we look- 
ing at 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years of a bat- 
tle, of a civil war in El Salvador and 
wars kind of back and forth across the 
border of Nicaragua, or are we look- 
ing at 2 or 3 months? 

A. I doubt that 2 or 3 months is the 
right figure, but we'll have to see how it 
goes. I think we have to be prepared to 
help those who are fighting down there 
to hang in there. Things have been go- 
ing better lately. 



Let me call year attention to some- 
thing that's widely misunderstood. I 
believe you said that our military aid to 
El Salvador this year has been stepped 
up greatly from last year. People have 
that impression, but it isn't so. What ac- 
tually has happened is that we had a 
flow of military aid last year of around a 
little over $80 million. In the flow this 
year, it has been very uncertain, and it's 
only with the most recent vote a week 
or so ago by the Congress that we got 
up to that level. For a good part of the 
year, the Salvador Armed Forces had to 
make do with the assumption that their 
aid flow was going to be about half of 
what it had been the year before. So it's 
tough to get moving under those cir- 
cumstances. 

Now in the last couple of months 
things have been looking much better on 
the military side in El Salvador. They've 
been able to secure a large amount of 
territory and also to follow through with 
some of the civic and economic actions 
that we advocate. 

Q. In terms of a way out. in terms 
of reducing our military involvement, 
what prospects are there right now 
for the negotiations either of Am- 
bassador Stone or the Contadora 
group, various others? 

A. It's always difficult to predict 
how the flow of a negotiation will go. 
But in the last month or so, for the first 
time, we see people making statements 
that bear at least some family 
resemblance to the San Jose principles 
which we and others put forward quite a 
while ago, and so that's a mark of some 
progress. Whether it has a reality to it 
or it's just rhetoric designed to get peo- 
ple to say, oh, they have peaceful inten- 
tions, remains to be seen, but we want 
to see these undertakings called, and we 
look for agreements that are verifiable, 
that are solid, that call for withdrawal of 
foreign advisers and so on. 

Q. There seems to be some con- 
cern about what the purpose of our 
current exercises in Honduras are, 
these long-term exercises that are sup- 
posed to go into effect next year. 
You've spoken about providing a pro- 
tective shield for our friends. We've 
talked about training. The Contadora 
group has said thai they feel that 
these large-scale exercises are not 
helpful to their efforts right now. 
Could you tell us what the purpose of 
them is and how you think they'll be 
helpful to the search for peace there? 



September 1983 



49 



AFRICA 



A. They do two things. They pro- 
vide training- for ourselves and for 
others. Training is important, [f you're 
going to do a good job, if you exercise 
and you train, you know what you're do- 
ing, you're going to be more effective. 
That's number one. Number two, it 
underlines the importance of the U.S. 
deterrent capability for our friends and 
our foes. 

There have been some public state- 
ments somewhat questioning the 
maneuvers, there have been some quite 
the reverse, and there has been a 
tremendous outpouring of private state- 
ments to our people that they're sure 
glad to see the fleet around down there, 
and I notice that as we invite people to 
come aboard the Ranger and other of 
the capital ships, those invitations are 
being accepted. 

Q. We've said that these exercises 
are a continuation of the series that 
began, the last one being last winter. 
Last time we had the exercises, we 
said that we were having them in 
eastern Honduras to avoid being in 
the western part of the country, 
because it was a heavy population 
center and there was a lot of fighting 
there. This time the exercises are 
starting in the western part of the 
country near both the Nicaraguan and 
Salvadoran borders in areas of the 
heaviest fighting. How are we going 
to keep from being involved in that 
fighting? 

A. The maneuvers and exercises 
we're undertaking are just that. They 
are training now for ourselves and the 
Hondurans. In order to train for 
something like the stopping and the in- 
terdicting of a flow of arms, you need to 
do it in terrain that resembles, as much 
as possible, where that's likely to occur 
so that your training is realistic. So 
there are some plans — 
whether they finally will be put into 
place or not remains to be seen — to 
train in areas of that kind. This is Hon- 
duran territory. It is not next to the 
border, although it's not that far away 
from it, but it's Honduran territory, and 
there is no reason in the world why 
training shouldn't be conducted there. 

Q. The State Department this 
week said it would be impractical to 
dismantle Israeli settlements on the 
West Bank. That strikes me as being a 
new step in our diplomacy toward the 
Middle East. In the past we've 
thought that settlements should be— 



A. No, I don't think it's a new step. 
It is a statement that's perfectly consis- 
tent with what the President said in his 
September 1st proposal; namely that in- 
sofar as the settlements on the West 
Bank are concerned, one could foresee 
them staying right where they are, but 
the residents of those settlements would 
live under the legal jurisdiction of what- 
ever jurisdiction resulted from the 
negotiations. That's as distinct from 
what happened in the Sinai. 

Q. So you're saying that Jewish 
settlers could live there conceivably 
under Jordanian sovereignty or the 
sovereignty of some new 
autonomous — 

A. I think the principles that Jews 
have the right to live on the West Bank 
to the Israelis is an important principle, 
and I agree. 



Q. Do you think there should be 
any new settlements established? 

A. We have said consistently, the 
President has and the U.S. statements 
have been, that the new settlements on 
the West Bank are not constructive. 
They don't help us at all in our search 
for peace in that region, and we've said 
that. I believe that's the case. 

Q. Do you see a Soviet-American 
summit by next summer? 

A. No way to tell. The President is, 
in principle, ready to have a summit, but 
it has to be well prepared and there has 
to be a reasonable basis for thinking 
there will be a significant outcome. 



'Press release 305 of Aug. 8, 1983. 



U.S. Military Assistance to Chad 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 19, 1983 1 

President Reagan, pursuant to his 
authority under Section 506(a) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, has determined that: 

• An unforeseen emergency exists 
which requires immediate military assist- 
ance to Chad; 

• The aforementioned emergency 
requirement cannot be met under the 
authority of the Arms Export Control 
Act or any other law except Section 
506(a) of the act. 

Therefore, he has authorized furnishing 
up to $10 million in defense articles and 
services by the Department of Defense 
to Chad under the provisions of 
Chapters 2 and 5 of Part II of the act. 
Congress has been duly notified. 

Since President [Hissein] Habre 
assumed control of Chad in June 1982, 
Libya has worked unceasingly to provide 
ousted leader [Weddeye] Goukouni and 
other dissidents with the means to over- 
throw Habre and assume power. Col. 
[Muammar] Qadhafi has publicly an- 
nounced his determination to topple the 
pro-Western Habre. Habre 's forces, 
although relatively well organized and 
led, have lacked the wherewithal to 
defeat the antigovernment forces active 
in Chad. Further, the need constantly to 
defend against insurgent activities has 



50 



diverted essential energies and resources 
from the primary task of rebuilding the 
economic and political infrastructure of 
Chad. 

Intelligence reports have indicated a 
constant resupply from Libya of arms 
and ammunition to the Goukouni forces 
of the north. Libyan aircraft capable of 
airlifting anti-Habre troops into govern- 
ment-controlled areas and of providing 
close air support to ground attacks have 
been positioned in the Aozou strip and in 
southern Libya. Libyan transports have 
been landing in territory held by the 
rebels to deliver supplies to them. 
Libyan military advisers and technicians 
serve with the rebel units. 

Following Qadhafi's failure last 
month to win the OAU [Organization of 
African Unity] chairmanship, the 
Libyan-backed rebels launched a series 
of attacks on northern and eastern 
Chadian cities. To meet the immediate 
threat to the survival of the Government 
of Chad, France rushed military assist- 
ance to Habre, and Zaire initially provid- 
ed several Macchi aircraft and about 250 
men for rear area security. Zaire has 
now sent several Mirage aircraft and 
another 1,700 men. 

The President has made available to 
Chad up to $10 million in defense ar- 
ticles and services, some of which will 
facilitate the support of Zaire's forces in 
defense of its beleaguered fellow African 
state. The use of this special authority 



Department of State Bulletir 



AFRICA 



by the President is necessary given the 
immediacy and character of the threat 
and the inability of the Government of 
Chad to acquire the essential material 
through its own means. Failure to have 
taken the emergency action would have 
involved the grave risk of allowing Libya 
to establish a regime favorable to Libya 
in N'Djamena and to use Chad as a base 
for subverting neighboring states. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
jy Department spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



Situation in Chad 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
\UG. 9, 1983' 

Libya's forces are centrally involved in 
;he fighting in Chad. In fact, if it were 
lot for Libya's forces — both through ad- 
visers and combat elements and air 
Dower — there would not be the kind of 
ighting that we are seeing in Chad. 

The precise numbers in a situation 
ike this are hard to come by, but our 
estimate is that there are 1,500-2,000 
Jbyan troops in Chad and that this 
epresents a significant increase over 
,he number present in the weeks before 
-he rebel attack on Faya-Largeau. There 
s no question that the Libyan troops are 
ihere, including mechanized units; nor is 
.here any question of repeated Libyan 
dr attacks against various northern 
■enters, including Faya-Largeau. We 
nave reports that the Libyan troops and 
jibyan-supported rebels besieging Faya- 
Largeau have a substantial number of 
jibyan armored vehicles and heavy ar- 
tillery for bombardment and that their 
tir attacks have included both bombs 
tnd napalm. 

We consider the situation at Faya- 
Largeau serious and threatening. The 
jibyan Government seems to be seeking 
o portray what's happening in Chad as 
i civil conflict and to portray the 
Government of Chad as not having 
egitimacy. The fact of the matter is that 
.he Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
iias recognized the legitimacy of the 
iabre government. The most recent 
DAU statement was one issued in mid- 
jluly by the OAU summit bureau calling 
for an end to foreign interference and 
uppealing for a cease-fire. There is no 
question in the eyes of the OAU and the 



majority of African states that Habre's 
is the legitimate government. Libya 
would like to have it otherwise. Libya 
would like to overturn that government 
and substitute its surrogate as the 
government of Chad. Were this to hap- 
pen—if Qadhafi were able to set up an 
established government simply by using 
its overwhelming military might to do 
so — this would have consequences 
beyond the borders of Chad. 

Our view is that we have provided 
limited materiel support for the Govern- 
ment of Chad. We have done so in the 
context of other African support for 
that government and in a far larger 
French effort. In all of our contacts, we 
have no information to suggest that, in 
fact, France has changed its position on 
support of Chad. A French statement 
over the weekend was subsequently 
clarified in Paris, and we understand the 
French position to be that they will 
make appropriate decisions in light of 
the situation in Chad. We are operating 
in the context of African and French 
support for the Government of Chad. 



'Made by the principal deputy press 
secretary to the President (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Aug. 15, 1983). ■ 



AWACS Withdrawn 
From Sudan 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 23, 1983' 

We continue to monitor closely the situa- 
tion in Chad and to cooperate with con- 
cerned friends and allies on the dangers 
posed by the Libyan aggression against 
that country. Our assessment of the cur- 
rent situation is that, for the immediate 
future, we need not keep our Air Force 
assets deployed in Sudan. After con- 
sultations with concerned governments, 
the United States has, therefore, decid- 
ed to begin redeploying the aircraft and 
personnel to the United States. None- 
theless, as was demonstrated by the 
deployment, appropriate assets can be 
rapidly moved to the area should the 
situation warrant. 



The AWACS [airborne warning and 
control systems] were deployed to Sudan 
August 7 after consultations with the 
Governments of Chad, Sudan, and 
France to perform a monitoring role 
should that become necessary. We 
believe the deployment clearly 
demonstrated U.S. concern over the 
events in Chad. It also demonstrated 
once again the close ties between the 
United States and its friends and the 
ability of the United States to respond 
quickly and appropriately when cir- 
cumstances dictate. 

The United States has expressed its 
appreciation to Sudan for its assistance 
in this operation in response to overt 
Libyan military aggression in Chad. In 
this context, we have also reaffirmed 
our concern for Sudan's security in the 
face of Libya's military intervention in 
Chad. We are continuing our $25 million 
emergency assistance program to Chad. 

We are continuing to work with the 
Government of Chad, and other con- 
cerned governments, to effect the 
withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad 
and to protect Chad's territorial integri- 
ty. There can be no doubt that regular 
Libyan Army units are occupying ter- 
ritory well within Chad's borders and 
that Libyan Air Force units have 
bombed Chad. 

We are encouraged by the French 
deployment of substantial forces to 
Chad. The United States again con- 
demns Libya's blatant act of aggression 
and affront to international order and 
calls upon Libya to withdraw. The 
United States maintains its support for 
Chad's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty and does not wish to see a 
resolution of the conflict resulting in a 
partition of Chad. 



'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



ieptember1983 



51 



DEPARTMENT 



Legislative Veto in Foreign Affairs 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on July 28, 1983. 
Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State. 1 

The Supreme Court has now decided, in 
INS v. Chadha and two related cases, 2 
that the legislative veto is unconstitu- 
tional. The Department of State and this 
committee both recognize that the 
Court's historic decision affects a con- 
siderable body of legislation in the field 
of foreign affairs and national security. 
My principal theme here today is that 
our two branches of government have a 
common interest in devising cooperative 
ways to fulfill our shared respon- 
sibilities. We owe the American people a 
constructive response to the issues we 
now face. 

The Department of State is in the 
process of reviewing all the legislation 
with which we deal and which is affected 
by Chadha — the language of the 
statutes, their legislative history, and 
the record of executive-legislative rela- 
tions in working with these statutes. We 
have reached some tentative conclusions, 
which I am happy to share with the 
committee. Our review is still continu- 
ing, however, and we will keep the com- 
mittee informed as we proceed toward 
firmer judgments. 

In The Federalist No. 47, James 
Madison referred to the separation of 
powers as "this essential precaution in 
favor of liberty." The genius of our con- 
stitutional system is that a structure of 
dispersed powers and checks and 
balances, designed to limit government 
power and preserve our freedom, has 
also been able to produce coherent and 
effective national policy. This success is 
a tribute to the Founding Fathers who 
built the structure; it is also a tribute to 
the generations of leaders and states- 
men since then who have put the 
nation's well-being first and foremost as 
they played their constitutional roles in 
the various branches of government. As 
Justice White acknowledged in his dis- 
sent in Chadha, "the history of the 
separation of powers doctrine is also 
a history of accommodation and 
practicality." 



The Administration is prepared to 
work with the Congress in this spirit. 
First, I would like to review with you 
the history of the legislative veto— what 
it is, how it has worked — and then the 
Chadha decision itself and its conse- 
quences. Finally, I shall discuss the im- 
pact of that decision on some of the 
statutes that are of particular concern to 
the Department of State and to this 
committee. 

The Legislative Veto 

"Legislative veto" is a term describing a 
variety of statutory devices that were 
meant to give the Congress legal control 
over actions of executive departments 
and agencies by means other than the 
enactment of laws. Legislative veto pro- 
visions have been included in statutes 
for more than 50 years. The procedure 
was first passed into law in the act of 
June 30, 1932, which authorized Presi- 
dent Hoover to reorganize the structure 
of the Federal Government subject to 
congressional review. The device was 
added to various statutes during World 
War II, when the Congress delegated 
greater authority to the President in the 
area of foreign affairs and national 
security, subject to the legislative veto 
procedure. Enactment of the procedure 
became frequent again in the 1960s and 
1970s, as Congress sought to strengthen 
its oversight over the expanding practice 
of rulemaking by administrative agen- 
cies. Adoption of the legislative veto 
procedure reached its zenith in the early 
1970s, in connection with some major 
controversies in the area of foreign af- 
fairs and national security. 

Some of these statutes provide for 
congressional disapproval of proposed 
administrative regulations. Some involve 
review of decisions of individual cases— 
Chadha, for example, involved the 
suspension of the deportation of a single 
person— or review of other executive ac- 
tions under authority granted by 
statute. Other legislation, such as the 
War Powers Resolution, involves the 
allocation of broad constitutional 
powers. 

The legislative vetoes in all these 
statutes fall into two general categories. 



First, there are those in which the 
full Congress, or one House or one com- 
mittee, is purportedly given a right to 
"veto" an administrative action. A 
typical statute of this kind requires the 
President to report an action or rule to 
both Houses of Congress. The executive 
action may not be made or take effect 
until after a fixed period— 60 days, for 
example. If Congress does not act dur- 
ing the period, the executive action can 
take effect, but if the Congress disap- 
proves — or one House or committee, as 
the statute may provide — it does not 
take effect. 

Second, there are statutory schemes 
by which an administrative action pur- 
portedly becomes valid only when ap- 
proved by Congress. The typical statute 
of this kind requires the President to 
report a proposed action and then pro- 
vides for affirmative approval by one or 
two Houses of the Congress. Most 
legislative vetoes, like the one in 
Chadha, fall within the first category. 

The Chadha Case 
and Its Implications 

The case of INS v. Chadha involved a 
section of the Immigration and Na- 
tionality Act. That statute permitted the 
Attorney General to allow a deportable 
alien to remain in the United States, 
suspending an otherwise valid deporta- 
tion order. This suspension authority, 
however, was subject to disapproval by 
a simple resolution of either House of 
Congress. The Attorney General 
suspended Mr. Chadha's deportation, bu 
the House of Representatives disap- 
proved. Chadha brought suit; the 
Supreme Court held the congressional 
veto to be unconstitutional. The ra- 
tionale of the Court's holding was that 
legislative actions, to be valid, must 
follow the course prescribed in the Con- 
stitution: approval by both Houses and 
"presentment" to the President. Thus, 
the Court's decision in Chadha in- 
validates not only the "one-House veto" 
but the "two-House veto" and "commit- 
tee veto" as well, a point confirmed by 
the Court's subsequent summary deci- 
sions of July 6. Those statutes which 
provide for congressional action by joint 
resolution— passed by both Houses and 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



DEPARTMENT 



signed by the President — would not 
seem to be affected by Chadha. 

The legislative veto has long been 
controversial, ever since Woodrow 
Wilson first vetoed a bill incorporating a 
legislative veto in 1920. Since then, most 
Administrations have considered the 
device unconstitutional, while the Con- 
gress has tended to favor it as another 
useful check on executive authority. This 
specific controversy is now decided. Yet 
paradoxically, the practice of executive- 
legislative relations is unlikely to 
undergo any radical change in the wake 
of Chadha, for several reasons. 

Chadha does not affect other 
statutory procedures by which the Con- 
gress is informed of or involved in ac- 
tions by the executive branch. Specifical- 
ly, the Court's decision does not affect 
statutory requirements for notifications, 
certifications, findings or reports to Con- 
gress, consultations with Congress, or 
waiting periods which give Congress an 
opportunity to act before executive ac- 
tions take effect. In the foreign affairs 
field, moreover, the executive branch 
and the Congress have generally recon- 
ciled or disposed of controversies and 
differences without resort to the process 
of legislative veto. Therefore, we see no 
reason why the Court's decision need 
cause a fundamental change in our 
relationship. 

The Administration is prepared to 
work closely with the Congress to 
resolve any questions or problems that 
may arise as a result of the Chadha deci- 
sion. And we hope that Congress will 
act in the same spirit of cooperation. 
Perhaps the key legal question raised by 
Chadha is that of "severability." The 
problem is an intriguing one: Since the 
legislative veto provision of a statute is 
unconstitutional, is any of the rest of the 
law tainted by that defect? The Supreme 
Court has given us a basis for answering 
that question. The general principle is 
that the provision containing the 
legislative veto will be found to be 
severable, and the remainder of the 
statute will continue unaffected, unless 
it is evident that the Congress would not 
have enacted the remainder of the law 
without the legislative veto. That test 
establishes a strong presumption in 
favor of severability. 

The Court has also given us some 
additional guidelines. There is a further 
presumption of severability, first, if the 
statute contains an express "severability 
clause." Several of the statutes with 



which we deal— including the War 
Powers Resolution and the Atomic 
Energy Act— contain such severability 
clauses. Second, the legislative veto is 
also presumed to be severable if the 
legislative program in question is "fully 
operative as a law" without the veto pro- 
vision. In the statutes with which we are 
dealing, this seems generally to be the 
case. These statutes often establish a 
system under which the executive 
branch is empowered to make or imple- 
ment a decision 30 or 60 days later 
unless the Congress chooses to 
intervene. 

In foreign affairs cases to date, in 
the absence of formal congressional ac- 
tion, the executive determination has 
proceeded, although congressional views 
have always been taken fully into ac- 
count. This pattern clearly indicates that 
these statutes are capable of independ- 
ent operation with no further congres- 
sional action. 

Specific Statutes 

There are more than a dozen statutes in 
the foreign affairs and national security 
area that are affected by the Chadha 
decision. I would say that four statutes 
or groups of statutes are of particular 
importance. These are arms export con- 
trols, the War Powers Resolution, 
nuclear nonproliferation controls, and 
trade controls related to emigration. 

Arms Export Control. I know this 
subject is of pressing concern to this 
committee. It is also of importance to 
the Administration, because of the im- 
portance of such transactions to the 
security of friendly countries and to our 
political relations with friendly 
countries. 

Under the Chadha decision, we 
believe that the procedures for 
legislative vetoes in several sections of 
the Arms Export Control Act are not 
valid but that the reporting and waiting 
periods remain. The Court decision in no 
way alters the elaborate structure of 
reporting, consultation, and collabora- 
tion that the executive branch and the 
Congress have worked out over recent 
years to ensure effective congressional 
oversight. 

Under the Arms Export Control 
Act, for example, we have regularly and 
formally notified the Congress of pro- 
posed sales under the foreign military 
sales (FMS) program and of proposed 
licenses of arms exports sold through 



commercial channels. We also provide 
the Congress with additional advance 
notification of many of those transac- 
tions. As a matter of practice and ac- 
commodation, we have agreed to pro- 
vide the Congress with informal pro- 
notifications of proposed sales under the 
FMS program before the final notice is 
submitted. This procedure, which is not 
in the statute, has given Congress the 
opportunity to review and comment 
upon proposed transactions informally 
and privately before the executive 
branch makes a formal public 
commitment. 

In addition, under the Javits amend- 
ment, we submit an annual arms sales 
proposal covering all FMS sales and 
commercial exports above certain 
thresholds which are considered eligible 
for approval during the current calendar 
year, as well as an indication of which 
ones are most likely to result in a letter 
of offer or an export license. We also 
provide, under Section 28 of the act, 
quarterly reports of each "price and 
availability" estimate provided to a 
foreign country, together with a list of 
requests received from a foreign country 
for a letter of offer to see defense ar- 
ticles and services. 

Thus, the Congress has received and 
will continue to receive annual, quarter- 
ly, and case-by-case information, formal 
and informal, on all actual and potential 
arms sales. In the last 3 years, we have 
sent up more than 240 formal reports of 
intended arms sales — 110 in FY 1981, 
90 in FY 1982, and 41 in FY 1983 to 
date. In addition, three informal notifica- 
tions are currently before you. While 
Congress has never disapproved any 
proposed arms sale, the Administration 
has, on occasion, modified the terms of a 
proposal in light of congressional con- 
cerns. We have done so even though the 
executive branch has long considered the 
legislative veto to be unconstitutional. 

I think the record speaks for itself. 
The executive branch does not live in a 
vacuum, and we are acutely aware of 
the need for consultation and coopera- 
tion in this sensitive area of arms ex- 
ports. Our foreign policy and national in- 
terest require that a President, any 
President, be able to use this important 
policy instrument effectively, flexibly, 
and, I might add, responsibly. We 
recognize the necessity of congressional 
oversight. As in any other important 
area of national policy, both Congress 
and the executive have a heavy respon- 
sibility to work together in the national 
interest. 



September 1983 



53 



DEPARTMENT 



War Powers Resolution. The War 
Powers Resolution contains four major 
operative parts. The first of these is a 
consultation requirement. In Section 3 of 
the resolution, the President is required 
to consult with the Congress "in e\ ery 
possible instance" before U.S. Armed 
Forces are introduced into hostilities or 
into situations where imminent involve- 
ment in such hostilities is clearly in- 
dicated by the circumstances. And the 
President is to consult regularly while 
the forces remain in such situations. 

The second operative part is a re- 
porting requirement. In Section 4(a) of 
the resolution, the President is required 
to make a formal report to Congress in 
any case in which U.S. Armed Forces 
are introduced 

• "(1) into hostilities or into situa- 
tions where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances; 

• "('!) into the territory, airspace or 
waters of a foreign nation, while 
equipped for combat, except for 
deployments which relate solely to sup- 
ply, replacement, repair, or training of 
such forces; or 

• "(3) in numbers which substantial- 
ly enlarge United States Armed Forces 
equipped for combat already located in a 
foreign nation. . . ." 

The third operative part, Section 
5(b), requires the President to withdraw 
U.S. troops not later than 60 days after 
a report of actual or imminent involve- 
ment in hostilities unless the Congress 
has affirmatively authorized their con- 
tinued presence. 

The fourth operative part is a leg- 
islative veto. According to Section 5(c), 
the President must withdraw U.S. 
troops introduced into hostilities even 
before the end of 60 days if the Con- 
gress so directs by concurrent 
resolution. 

The first and second provisions of 
the War Powers Resolution on consulta- 
tion and reporting are, in our view, 
unaffected by the Chadha decision. We 
do not intend to change our practice 
with respect to consultation and 
reporting. 

The fourth provision, which asserted 
a right of Congress by concurrent 
resolution to order the President to 
remove troops engaged in hostilities, is 
clearly unconstitutional under the 
Supreme Court's holding in Chadha. It 
must be said, however, that this holding 



is unlikely to have a significant impact 
on the way national security policy is 
conducted. In the decade since the 
enactment of the War Powers Resolu- 
tion, no U.S. forces have been commit- 
ted to long-term hostilities. It is doubtful 
that Presidents have refrained from 
such commitments simply because of the 
legislative veto in the War Powers 
Resolution; it is equally doubtful that 
Presidents will now feel freer of 
restraints because of Chadha. The lesson 
of recent history is that a President can- 
not sustain a major military involvement 
without congressional and public 
support. 

The legislative veto provision of the 
War Powers Resolution is severable 
from the others, in our view, according 
to the Supreme Court's test and guide- 
lines. The resolution, itself, includes a 
severability clause, and the other 
operative portions of the resolution need 
not be affected by the dropping of the 
veto provision. 

The third operative part of the reso- 
lution, requiring positive congressional 
authorization after 60 days, does not fall 
within the scope of < 'hadha. Its constitu- 
tionality is not affirmed, denied, or even 
considered in the Chadha decision. As 
yon know, the executive branch has 
traditionally had questions about this re- 
quirement of congressional authorization 
for Presidential disposition of our armed 
forces, both in light of the President's 
Commander in Chief power and on prac- 
tical grounds. Congress, of course, has 
had a different view. I do not believe 
that any purpose would be served by 
debating these questions here, in the 
abstract. This provision is unlikely to be 
tested in the near future. Here, too, I 
want to reaffirm the Administration's 
strong commitment to the principles of 
consultation and reporting, confident 
that in a spirit of cooperation the ex- 
ecutive and the Congress can meet 
future challenges together in the na- 
tional interest. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation. Nuclear 
nonproliferation is another important 
policy area in which statutes have con- 
tained legislative veto provisions. 
Various sections of the Atomic Energy 
Act, for example, have provided for a 
legislative veto of Presidential deter- 
minations to permit nuclear exports to 
foreign countries. 



These statutory arrangements 
typically involve three elements. First, 
they establish very strict standards 
limiting the export of nuclear items. Sec- 
cond, they authorize the President to 
waive certain restrictions and permit ex- 
ports if he makes certain findings. 
Third, they have provided for a congres- 
sional veto of the Presidential waiver. 
We consider that those standards and 
that waiver authority, as well as the 
statutory requirement of notification to 
Congress and the observance of a 
waiting period, continue to be valid. We 
will continue to wait through the period 
during which the Congress, in the past, 
deliberated over its veto; during that 
time, the Congress may use its constitu- 
tional authority to enact new legislation 
if it chooses. The only provision that is 
invalid is the third, which permitted a 
legislative veto by concurrent resolution. 

The Administration and the Con- 
gress share the same concern about 
nuclear proliferation. We have been ac- 
tive diplomatically in this field, as this 
committee well knows. We vigorously 
oppose the development of nuclear 
weapons capabilities by additional coun- 
tries. Each executive branch agency is 
required to keep the Congress, including 
this committee, fully informed of its ac- 
tivities in this field and of significant 
developments abroad. We have done so, 
and we are proud of our record of close 
consultation and collaboration with the 
Congress. We will continue that 
practice. 

Jackson-Vanik Amendment and 
Trade-Related Issues. A fourth impor- 
tant statutory area involving a 
legislative veto is the procedure for 
granting most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment to certain nonmarket coun- 
tries. Under the Jackson-Vanik amend- 
ment, nondiscriminatory tariff treatment 
may be granted to these countries only 
when they comply with certain condi- 
tions affecting the right of emigration. 
These requirements may be waived on 
the basis of stated findings and deter- 
minations by the President. 

The annual report required under 
that statute — for continuation of MFN 
for Hungary, Romania, and China — is 
now before the Congress. This report il- 
lustrates how we believe Congress and 
the executive should continue to work 
together constructively. 

We presented that report to the 
Congress before the Supreme Court 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



decision was announced, but we would 
have done precisely the same thing if 
the Chadha decision had been handed 
down before the report was filed. We re- 
gard the report as fully effective to ex- 
tend the waiver authority and to con- 
tinue the waivers currently in force. At 
the same time, legislative oversight 
hearings serve the salutary purpose of 
scrutinizing the implementation of 
statutory requirements, of airing public 
concerns, and of making our nation's 
deep commitment to human rights 
known to other nations. 

The spirit with which we expect to 
work with Congress in the future, in all 
statutory fields, is illustrated by another 
example. We are required by the Case- 
Zablocki Act to report executive agree- 
ments to the Congress, and we do so 
regularly. That procedure notifies the 
Congress of agreements already signed. 
There is also a procedure for enabling 
this committee and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee to consult with us as 
to the form of significant international 
agreements prior to their conclusion. 
This practice was arranged between the 
Department of State and the chairmen 
of the two committees in 1978. It is not 
required by law but makes good sense. 
We will maintain it. 

The Future 

As I have emphasized, little of practical 
ignificance need in fact change as a 
result of the Supreme Court decision. 
The Department of State is committed 
to continue working closely with the 
members and committees of Congress 
and to take their concerns into account 
in reaching decisions on issues of policy. 
If anything, I believe Chadha will make 
the departments and agencies of the ex- 
ecutive branch more, not less, conscious 
that they are accountable for their 
actions. 

There are many basic questions 
about the separation of powers which 
;he Supreme Court will probably never 
settle. In that realm our constitutional 
aw is determined, in a sense, as in Bri- 
;ain — by constitutional practice, by 
political realities, by the fundamental 
ood sense, and public conscience of the 
American people and their representa- 
tives. This is how we have always set- 
tled these questions, and this is how we, 
the executive and the Congress, must 
approach these problems in the after- 
math of Chadha. 

Our Constitution has proved to be a 
wise and enduring blueprint for free 
government. In this period of our 



history, our nation faces challenges that 
the drafters of that document could not 
have imagined. The Federal Government 
has the duty to conduct this nation's 
foreign policy and ensure its security in 
a nuclear age, in an era of instantaneous 
communications, in a complex modern 
world in which international politics has 
become truly global. America's respon- 
sibility as a world leader imposes on us a 
special obligation of coherence, vision, 
and constancy in the conduct of our 
foreign relations. For this, there must 
be unity in our national government. 
The President and the Congress must 
work in harmony or our people will not 
have the effective, strong, and pur- 
poseful foreign policy which they expect 
and deserve. We have seen in the last 15 
years that when Congress and the Presi- 
dent are at loggerheads, the result can 
be stalemate and sometimes serious 
harm to our foreign policy. 



We now have an opportunity, all of 
us, to put much of that past behind us, 
and to start afresh. We have a chance to 
shape a new era of harmony between 
the branches of our government — an era 
of constructive and fruitful policymak- 
ing, of creativity and statesmanship. 
That is President Reagan's goal and the 
goal of all of us in his Administration. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

'Immigration and Naturalization Service 
v. Chadha, No. 80-132 (U.S. June 23, 1983); 
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers 
Energy Council of America, Nos. 81-2008 et 
al. (U.S. July 6, 1983), affirming Consumers 
Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F. 
2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Consumers 
Union, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F. 2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). ■ 



POW-MIAs and U.S. Policy 
Toward Southeast Asia 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on July 14, 
1983. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. 1 

Some 2,500 Americans are missing and 
unaccounted for as a result of the war in 
Indochina: some 1,800 in Vietnam, near- 
ly 600 in Laos, and almost 100 in Kam- 
puchea. For more than 10 years, their 
families have been attempting to learn 
of their fate. This long period of hoping 
and waiting has been a heavy burden to 
bear for these families. We owe it to the 
missing, and to those who will fight in 
future wars, to make every effort for 
the fullest accounting possible. 

Administration Policy 

President Reagan has made clear his 
deep concern and commitment to obtain 
the fullest possible accounting for 
Americans missing in Southeast Asia. 
This Administration actively and con- 
sistently pursues such an accounting. 
Last January the President reaffirmed 
in his remarks to the National League of 
Families that we share a "common 



quest — the return of POWs, the fullest 
possible accounting for the still missing, 
and the repatriation of the remains of 
those who died serving our nation." This 
Presidential commitment is shared per- 
sonally by Secretary Shultz and actively 
pursued by the Department of State. We 
know that this is also an issue of serious 
concern to this subcommittee and this 
task force, and we are deeply ap- 
preciative of your support for our ef- 
forts. Today I would like to discuss some 
developments on the POW-MIA issue in 
the context of our policy toward the 
region. 

The United States seeks to play a 
constructive and positive role in main- 
taining peace and security in Southeast 
Asia. We believe, along with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), that Vietnam's continued oc- 
cupation of Kampuchea is the main 
threat to stability in the region. It is our 
policy to strongly support ASEAN in its 
efforts to obtain a comprehensive, 
political settlement in Kampuchea based 
on the principles in the declaration of 
the international conference on Kam- 
puchea. These principles include the 
complete withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces from Kampuchea and the restora- 
tion of Khmer independence and self- 
determination. Vietnam, however, is still 



.September 1983 



55 



EAST ASIA 



determined to maintain its domination of 
Kampuchea by military occupation. We 
have made it clear that we will not con- 
sider normalization of relations with 
Vietnam as long as it continues to oc- 
cupy Kampuchea and to play a de- 
stabilizing role in the region. 

At the same time, the POW-MIA 
issue is a humanitarian issue of the 
highest priority on which we believe 
progress should lie made now. Indeed, 
our government sees it as the most im- 
portant bilateral issue between our coun- 
tries In his January 28 address to the 
National League of Families, President 
Reagan said that he had "called on the 
government in Hanoi to honor then- 
pledges to the American people on the 
POW-MIA issue." During the past year, 
we have acted to encourage the Viet- 
namese to meet their humanitarian 
obligations. We have also made efforts 
to encourage cooperation from the 
Government of Laos in the context of 
our bilateral relations. Additionally, we 
have kept this important humanitarian 
issue before the international 
community. 

Efforts With the Vietnamese 

The highlights of the Administration's 
efforts with the Vietnamese include the 
following. 

• In February 1982 a delegation led 
by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Armitage traveled to Hanoi to 
impress on the Vietnamese the impor- 
tance that this Administration attaches 
to the POW-MIA issue. 

• Last August Vietnamese POW- 
MIA specialists visited the Joint Casual- 
ty Resolution Center and the Central 
Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. 

• In September the Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister announced agreement 
to our longstanding proposal that 
POW-MIA specialists on both sides 
meet regularly. Four meetings a year 
have been agreed upon, and three have 
taken place in Hanoi. The Vietnamese 
used the occasion of the last meeting to 
return the remains of nine individuals 
and identification materials of three 
others. 

We expect these meetings to con- 
tinue. We have proposed the next 
meeting for September. We believe that 
they are useful in themselves for ex- 
change of information and to remind the 
Vietnamese of the importance we attach 
to this issue. Their real value, however, 
would be in leading to more extensive 



cooperation on the part of the Viet- 
namese Government. Unfortunately, 
progress on this issue has been disap- 
pointing because the Vietnamese 
Government still seems to want to use 
this humanitarian issue for political 
purposes. 

Efforts With the Lao 

We have also continued to seek the 
cooperation of Laos and welcome the 



Finally, we have stated at the 
highest levels of government that we are 
strongly opposed to private crossborder 
forays in search of prisoners or remains. 
Such forays are counterproductive and 
hurt our government-to-government ef- 
forts. We believe that such forays may 
have delayed the Lao in responding to 
our interest on joint crash site searches 
by causing uncertainty about U.S. inten- 
tions toward Laos. 



cooperative gestures which the Lao 
Government has made in the past year. 
This Administration supported the 
National League of Families visit to 
Laos last September. The visit was help- 
ful in encouraging the Lao Government 
to be more cooperative on MIA matters. 
During the league's visit with the Lao 
Government, new ground was broken by 
permitting broader U.S. Government 
contact within the Lao Government and 
some U.S. Government travel outside 
Vientiane. This followed earlier U.S. 
Government actions, such as emergency 
medical assistance and visits by several 
congressional figures, to demonstrate 
our interest in an improved relationship. 
We followed up the Lao Government 
discussions with the league during a 
series of talks with Lao officials by 
Deputy Assistant Secretary [Daniel A.] 
O'Donohue, former Senator [from 
California, Samuel I.] Hayakawa in his 
capacity as a Special Adviser to the 
Secretary of State on Asian and Pacific 
Relations, and the Charge at the 
American Embassy in Vientiane. We 
have made it clear to the Lao in our 
discussions that an improvement in our 
overall bilateral relationship depends on 
both sides taking concrete steps to 
demonstrate progress. 

Last January President Reagan 
stated before the league that progress 
on the POW-MIA issue will be a prin- 
cipal measure of Lao sincerity in im- 
proving relations. This past February, 
the Lao permitted a team from the Joint 
Casualty Resolution Center and the Cen- 
tral Identification Laboratory to visit 
Vientiane for talks with Lao counter- 
parts about specific cases and joint 
searches of crash sites. This was the 
first such visit since 1975. 

We have indicated to the Lao Gov- 
ernment that a pattern of Lao coopera- 
tion on the POW-MIA issue would be 
important in securing congressional sup- 
port for lifting the legislative ban on aid 
to Laos. Depending on how our relations 
develop, other steps, such as upgrading 
diplomatic relations, could also be 
considered. 



Di 



Efforts With Other Countries 

In addition to our efforts on the 
POW-MIA issue with the Vietnamese 
and the Lao, this Administration has 
kept this issue before the international 
community. Our actions include the 
following. 

• At his meetings in Bangkok last 
month, Secretary Shultz asked the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers to help us in 
resolving the MIA issue. They expressed 
their willingness to help, and we are 
pursuing the issue with them. 

• We regularly request senior of- 
ficials from these and other selected 
countries to meet with the Lao or Viet- 
namese to impress upon them the impor- 
tance that we attach to this issue. Such 
approaches bring home to the Lao and 
Vietnamese that the POW-MIA issue 
can affect their broader foreign policy 
interests. 

• American Embassies in Asia and 
Europe are aware of the importance of 
this issue and are prepared to make full 
use of opportunities to seek the help of 
friendly countries. 

• The Royal Thai Government has 
granted special access for Joint Casualty 
Resolution Center liaison staff to the 
Lao, Vietnamese, and Kampuchean 
refugee camps normally closed to out- 
side groups. We greatly appreciate the 
Thai Government's forthcoming 
cooperation. 

Seeking Information From Refugees 

Another area in which the Administra- 
tion has been active is in taking steps to 
improve on the information that we are 
getting from refugees. Our Embassies in 
Southeast Asia reviewed procedures for 
debriefing refugees to assure that we 
are getting all of the information 
available. Over 500 letters were sent 
from the Department of Health and 
Human Services to refugee mutual 
assistance associations in the United 
States requesting that they contact their 
members for information regarding 
POW-MIAs. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



ENERGY 



At the suggestion of the National 
League of Families, a Department of 
Health and Human Services pilot project 
is underway to locate Indochinese 
refugee public assistance recipients in 
Texas to send them leaflets inquiring if 
they have information on MIAs. If the 
results of this project are promising, it 
:ould be expanded to other states. The 
ame leaflets will also be made available 
to private voluntary organizations in- 
volved in the resettlement of refugees in 
the United States. 

Interagency Working Group (IAG) 

The agencies primarily concerned with 
his issue — the Departments of State, 
Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agen- 
;y, and the National Security Coun- 
lil — are working closely with the ex- 
ecutive Director of the National League 
)f Families in the framework of the In- 
teragency Group on POW-MIAs (IAG). 

IAG members cooperate in assisting 
he league's efforts to stimulate public 
iwareness on this issue and implement- 
ng the government's public awareness 
arogram. Members work together in a 
lommon effort to investigate reports 
rearing on the POW-MIA issue. In- 
vestigations of live sighting reports are 
issigned highest priority based on the 
issumption that some Americans are 
still being held captive. Although hard 
evidence of live POWs has not yet been 
ibtained, information from all sources is 
ictively solicited and evaluated. 

IAG members also work together in 
leveloping new approaches to make 
jrogress on this issue and have especial- 
y valued the working relationship with 
he league. The league's initiative to visit 
jaos last September made a definite 
ontribution to moving forward on the 
3 0W-MIA issue with the Lao. Our col- 
ective public awareness activities have 
rreatly increased public and media 
understanding of the POW-MIA issue. 
The league's institutional knowledge has 
>een of immense help to us in imple- 
nenting our accounting efforts. Our 
■esponsible partnership with the league 
las shown that there can be a variety of 
approaches to resolving this issue and 
hat private citizens and the government 
:an work together effectively to achieve 
mr common goal. 

The Role of Congress 

Ve particularly appreciate the support 
)f the Congress for our efforts to make 
progress on this issue both with Viet- 
lam and with Laos. With regard to 



Laos, the visits of former Senator 
Hayakawa and of former Congressmen 
[Biil] Hendon and [John] LeBoutillier 
were very helpful in encouraging a 
change in the Lao Government's at- 
titudes on cooperation with regard to 
the POW-MIA issue. We appreciate the 
resolutions passed in Congress last 
December encouraging both the Lao and 
U.S. Governments to act with despatch 
to make progress on resolving the 
POW-MIA issue. Particularly useful was 
the statement of Chairman [Stephen J.] 
Solarz, that, if a pattern of cooperation 
should develop between the United 
States and Lao Governments, especially 
on the POW-MIA issue, he would sup- 
port efforts to remove the aid prohibi- 
tion on Laos. Further the POW-MIA 
task force has helped to focus attention 
on this issue. We welcome the interest 
of Congressman Gilman and others on 
this group. Additionally, several staff 
members of Congress have regularly 
and constructively participated in the 
meetings of the Interagency Group on 
POW-MIA Affairs. We look forward to 
more cooperation of this kind and 
regard it as a positive asset in our ef- 
forts to make progress on the 
POW-MIA issue. 



Where We Are 

The record of progress on the POW- 
MIA issue remains painfully disappoint- 



ing and frustrating. Our efforts over the 
past year demons! rate I lie high priority 
that this Administration and the 
American people attach to the POW- 
MIA issue and our determination to pur- 
sue actively our efforts. At the same 
time, it is clear that the problem of 
Americans unaccounted for in Indochina 
cannot be resolved without the coopera- 
tion of the Governments of Vietnam and 
Laos. 

Government-to-government coopera- 
tion will be the only real solution. The 
Vietnamese and Lao Governments have 
admitted that this is a humanitarian 
issue. They have an obligation to 
cooperate. The Vietnamese Government 
has been unwilling to cooperate fully, 
and cooperation by the Lao Government 
is in the initial stage. For our part, I can 
assure you that over the next year we 
will work closely with the Congress, the 
league, and concerned citizens to meet 
our obligations to our missing men and 
their families. As the President has said, 
this is our highest national priority. And 
I can assure you of my own determina- 
tion and that of the Department of State 
to support this truly national effort. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402 ■ 



Export of Alaskan Oil 



by Richard T. McCormack 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
July 20, 1983. Mr. McCormack is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. l 

The 1973 Trans- Alaska Pipeline Act was 
passed at a time of rapidly rising oil 
prices, mounting uncertainty about long- 
term supplies of oil, and instability in oil- 
producing regions of the world. En- 
vironmentalists, at that time, wanted 
assurances that the volume of oil trade 
would not be so great as to harm an en- 
vironment with which we had little ex- 
perience. Many Americans wanted to 
assure themselves of oil supplies by re- 
taining Alaskan oil for the domestic 
market. 



As a result, the Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline Act included language that 
allowed exports of Alaskan oil only if 
the President found that exports were in 
the national interest and that they would 
not decrease domestic oil supplies. In 
1977 the Congress strengthened these 
restrictions substantially in the Export 
Administration Act. In 1979 the restric- 
tions in the act were tightened yet 
again. The Export Administration Act, 
as amended, required that before allow- 
ing export of Alaskan oil the President 
must show that: 

• Exports would not decrease the 
quantity or quality of the supply of oil to 
the United States; 

• Exports would result in lower oil 
costs to refiners, 75% of which would be 
passed on to consumers; 



September 1983 



57 



ENERGY 



• Exports would be terminated if 
U.S. supplies were threatened or 
diminished; and 

• Exports were clearly necessary to 
protect the national interest. 

We recognize the concern of some 
Members of Congress that the United 
States may be deprived of its own oil in 
a crisis or that some regions will pay 
more for oil if Alaskan oil is exported. 
We also recognize the view of many in 
Congress that allocation of oil by the 
market is the most efficient way to 
safeguard the interests of producers and 
consumers. 

In each of the past 3 years, this Ad- 
ministration has devoted substantial 
time and effort to assess the impact of 
crude oil exports. We have come to the 
analytic conclusion that removal of legal 
restrictions on the export of Alaskan oil 
would have a beneficial impact and a 
few adverse effects. 

Allow me to outline here what I 
believe are the major benefits and disad- 
vantages that could occur from removal 
of restrictions on Alaskan oil exports. 

Foreign Policy Effects 

First, promoting open energy markets 
through export of Alaskan oil would 
demonstrate to the international com- 
munity U.S. determination to remove ar- 
tificial impediments to free trade, in 
general, and to energy markets, in par- 
ticular. Second, we would provide a 
potential new source of oil for one of our 
most important allies — Japan — and 
eventually, perhaps, for other countries 
on the Pacific rim with which we have 
extremely important relations. 

Japan is heavily dependent on Per- 
sian Gulf oil. It is acutely aware that 
this region is prone to instability and 
disruption. Exporting U.S. oil to Japan 
promotes the energy security of a key 
ally by diversifying its sources of supply. 
Equally important is the symbolic 
gesture of goodwill toward Japan at a 
time when we are pressing the Japanese 
to buy more American coal and to join 
in the development of Alaskan gas 
resources. 

The U.S. -Japan energy working 
group, set up by President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Nakasone last January, 
has recently held its second meeting. 
Export of U.S. energy resources was 
clearly a matter of considerable interest 
to Japan during these talks and during 
the recent U.S. -Japan subcabinet con- 
sultations. The Japanese are seeking ac- 
cess to Alaskan energy resources on an 



open, nondiscriminatory basis. It would 
be easier to obtain U.S. access to 
Japanese markets if we do not restrict 
Japanese access to our energy markets. 

Domestic Effects 

Permit me now to speak for a moment 
to the domestic advantages of liberaliza- 
tion of export controls. Best case 
estimates done by the Department of 
Energy in its most recent review in- 
dicate that complete removal of the ban 
on exports of Alaskan oil would result in 
savings of from $3.6 to $5.4 billion in 
present discounted value terms through 
1990. These savings result from the 
simpler and shorter route from Alaska 
than from Persian Gulf oil producers to 
customers in the Far East, and the 
sharply reduced transportation costs for 
U.S. east coast customers. In a com- 
pletely free market, wellhead prices of 
oil exported to Japan and other Pacific 
rim countries could improve by as much 
as $1.85 per barrel, of which over $1.70 
would be increased taxes paid to the 
U.S. and Alaskan Governments. A par- 
tial lifting would have a smaller 
economic impact on producers, U.S. con- 
sumers, and maritime interests. 

The economic results of export of 
Alaskan crude are not entirely positive. 
U.S. private enterprise has made 
substantial investment in equipment to 
transport oil to the gulf, west, and east 
coasts. These investments would be 
adversely affected by the export of 
Alaskan crude oil. Of the domestic 
tanker fleet, 40% is in the Alaskan oil 
trade. The removal of the ban could 
result in exports of 800,000 barrels per 
day, and the owners of these tankers 
could be forced into default. Default on 
government loan guarantees on these 
ships could be substantial. Partial 
elimination of the ban would cause pro- 
portionately fewer losses of Jones Act 
trade. The outlays would in each case be 
less than anticipated Federal tax 
revenue gains from exports of Alaskan 
crude. If exports of Alaskan crude were 
limited to 200,000 barrels per day, 
relatively few tankers would be affected. 
Benefits of lifting the ban would be off- 
set to some extent by adverse effects of 
domestic tankers. 

It is important to state that, with 
decontrol, the U.S. oil market has 
become an integral part of the world oil 
market. The United States will find that 
it can replace Alaskan oil quite readily 
since any oil it exports will displace 
other oil and then the displaced oil will 
become available on world markets to 



consumers, including the United States. 
For example, if the United States ex- 
ports crude to Japan, the 100,000 bar- 
rels per day that Japan now purchases 
from Mexico would presumably be 
available to U.S. east coast buyers at a 
far lower transportation cost than oil 
shipped from Valdez through the 
pipeline in Panama, reloaded into 
tankers in the Caribbean, and finally, 
delivered to an east coast buyer. It is in- 
teresting to note here that the United 
States currently exports substantial 
quantities of refined oil products to 
Japan, Western Europe, and even the 
Soviet Union because of favorable 
economics. 



U.S. Energy Security 

One of the most frequently heard 
criticisms of Alaskan crude exports is 
that in an oil supply crisis, we would 
need to restrict our exports of 
domestically produced oil. However, a 
major foreign policy goal of the United 
States remains close cooperation on 
energy supply questions in a crisis in- 
cluding sharing supplies with our allies. 
As we discovered in the 1973-74 energy 
crisis, maintaining our strategic alliance; 
was a key part of our effort. Without 
cooperation with our allies in meeting 
the oil shortage problems of each 
member, we could not hope to ensure 
their support for our efforts to resolve 
the crisis. 

The international energy program 
was devised to accomplish such coopera- 
tion. As you are probably aware, the 
program provides for an emergency oil 
allocation system. Thus, our exports of 
Alaskan crude oil would not pose addi- 
tional problems to the United States in 
case of severe disruption in world oil 
markets. Our international commitment! 
would require that we share oil with our 
allies based on a formula that takes into 
account net oil imports and consumption 
levels of each member country before 
and after the interruption. Alaskan oil 
exports would count as an offset against 
imports, thus the net effect under the in 
ternational energy program would be 
awash. It would not affect the U.S. sup- 
ply right to remaining oil if an interrup- 
tion occurs. 

In case of lesser disruptions, the 
United States, together with its Far 
Eastern allies, would be dependent on 
world oil markets for significant por- 
tions of our oil. To the extent that we 
are able to offer a secure, stable source 
of oil to our Asian allies to meet, at 
least, part of their needs, we will help 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



mitigate the fierce competition and allay 
the panic which, during times of tight 
.upply, cause consumers to bid up spot 
market prices against each other to 
;he benefit of a few oil exporting 
ountries. 

The export of Alaskan oil could pro- 
vide an additional incentive for develop- 
rient of domestic oil and gas resources. 
3y enhancing profitability of domestic 
esources, we would be encouraging in- 
vestment in U.S. energy supplies and, in 
'act, reducing our dependence on 
'oreign energy resources. We would also 
>e encouraging our allies, by our exam- 
)le, to take similar steps. 

By reducing the vulnerability of ma- 
or petroleum consuming nations, we are 
nhancing their energy security. As we 
ncrease the energy security of our allies 
ve would be reducing the opportunity 
or use of oil as a political weapon, 
igainst ourselves or others. 

Given the current world oil market, 
fting the ban on Alaskan exports may 
iot lead to substantial immediate export 
ales to Japan or any other country. A 
artial removal of the restrictions would 
robably satisfy near-term demand of 
'acific rim nations and would provide 
oom for growth in exports. While this 
lakes more economic sense than con- 
inued restrictions of exports, the State 
)epartment would prefer to see the 
larket make the decision on allocation 
f this important resource under a full 
econtrol scenario. 

In sum, there are significant advan- 
ages to export and a few disadvan- 
ages. We appreciate the opportunity to 
resent our analytic findings and 
r elcome congressional views on this 
isue as we continue our internal review 
nd consultations with officials of the 
overnment of Japan. 



An Assessment of the Madrid 
CSCE Followup Meeting 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
ill be published by the committee and will 
3 available from the Superintendent of 
ocuments, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
ce, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Following are a statement issued mi 
■lull/ 15, 1983, by Ambassador Max M. 
Kampelman, chairman of the U.S. 
allegation i<> the Madrid foUowup 
meeting of the Conferenct on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Ins 
remarks in the plenary session of the 
Madrid followup meeting on July 18. 
and President Reagan's statement of 
July 15. 



STATEMENT, 
JULY 15, 1983 1 

The 35 states participating in the 
Madrid CSCE review conference, after 
almost 3 years of negotiation, are ap- 
proaching agreement on a final docu- 
ment. This conclusion meets the 
Western criteria for an acceptable, 
balanced, and substantive result. It con- 
firms and expands upon the original 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The United 
States is pleased at the result and 
believes that the 2 years and 10 months 
spent negotiating in Madrid have been 
fruitful and well worth the extraor- 
dinary effort. 

There follows a summary followed 
by an outline of the issues that have 
dominated the Madrid meeting, as well 
as a report on how the final document 
deals with those issues. 

• The Madrid concluding document 
will add important new provisions to the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975. These provi- 
sions deal with the rights of workers to 
organize, with human rights, with 
Helsinki monitors, religious rights, 
human contacts and family reunification, 
access to diplomatic and consular mis- 
sions, information, rights of journalists, 
and measures against terrorism. 

• It also provides for convening a 
conference on security- and confidence- 
building measures and disarmament in 
Stockholm next year to work out de- 
tailed measures to reduce the fear of 
surprise military attack. An important 
new element in this decision is that the 
measures to be adopted at Stockholm 
will apply to all of the European portion 
of the Soviet Union, right up to the Ural 
Mountains, rather than only to the 
250-kilometer (150-mile) band provided 
for in the Helsinki Final Act. 

• In addition, the Madrid agreement 
schedules a series of additional meetings 
which are to take place over the next 3 



years. There will be meetings on human 
rights, human contacts, and on the 
peaceful settlement of disputes; a 
cultural forum; and a seminar on 
economic, scientific, and cultural 
cooperation in the Mediterranean. A 
meeting is also scheduled in Helsinki 
during 1985 to mark the 10th anniver- 
sary of the Helsinki Final Act. 

• Finally, the Madrid conference 
will agree to convene the next followup 
meeting in Vienna in November 1986 in 
order to carry forward the review proc- 
ess begun in Belgrade in 1977-78 and 
continued in Madrid over the past 2 
years and 10 months. 

One of the most important aspects 
of the CSCE process is the opportunity 
it provides for a thorough review of the 
implementation of the Helsinki Final 
Act. During this review in Madrid, there 
was general condemnation of the failure 
of the East European states to live up 
to their Helsinki commitments, with 
special criticism of the Soviet and Polish 
Governments for their policies of inter- 
nal repression and, in the case of the 
U.S.S.R., its interference in the internal 
affairs of Poland and Afghanistan. 

The establishment by the Madrid 
concluding document of a whole series 
of supplementary meetings will ensure 
that this critical attention to the 
behavior of the Soviet Union and other 
East European governments will con- 
tinue during the next 3V2 years. Those 
experts' meetings, and the Vienna 
followup conference, will ensure that 
any state's failure to live up to the 
undertakings made in Madrid and in 
Helsinki will again attract the full 
spotlight of public attention. 

Implementation Review 

The Madrid preparatory meeting, which 
began on September 9, 1980, and did 
not end until after the main meeting 
opened on November 11, 1980, a period 
of more than 9 weeks, focused on 
Western demands that discussions of 
new proposals on how best to 
strengthen the Helsinki process should 
be preceded by a review of how the pro- 
visions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 
were being implemented. The agenda 
finally produced by the preparatory 
meeting provided that opportunity. The 
period of November 11 to December 19, 
1980, was set aside for that review, and 



eptember 1983 



59 



EUROPE 



it was a thorough one. The Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan and the record of 
human rights violations in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe were ex- 
plored and recorded in meticulous detail. 
Continuing Soviet and other Eastern 
violations of the Helsinki Final Act 
made it necessary to extend this review 
of implementation throughout most of 
the Madrid deliberations. 

The final document acknowledges 
that this review took place ("They . . . 
reaffirmed ... the importance of the im- 
plementation of all the provisions ... of the 
Final Act ... as being . . . essential. ... It 
was confirmed that the thorough exchange of 
views constitutes in itself a valuable contribu- 
tion towards the achievement of the aims set 
by CSCE. In this context, it was agreed that 
those aims can only be attained by continuous 
implementation, unilaterally, bilaterally and 
multilaterally, of all the provisions and by 
respect for all the principles of the Final 
Act."), that the review is essential to 
the health of the process, and that there 
must be an improvement in compliance 
("Serious violations of a number of these prin- 
ciples were deplored during the assessments. 
Therefore, the participating states . . . con- 
sidered it necessary to state . . . that strict 
application of and respect for these prin- 
ciples, in all their aspects, are essential for 
the improvement of mutual relations between 
the participating states. . . "). 

The United States is fully aware of 
the fact that the Helsinki Final Act can- 
not attain its objectives when certain 
states, particularly the U.S.S.R., con- 
tinue to violate its provisions. There are 
no enforcement mechanisms under the 
act. The Madrid meeting has been, 
therefore, the appropriate forum at 
which to insert political and moral 
pressure into the process. The im- 
plementation review became the 
mechanism. The fact that it was effi- 
ciently undertaken by a united Western 
group of states, joined by most of the 
neutral and nonaligned states, made that 
possible. 

Equally important, Madrid's im- 
plementation review afforded the oppor- 
tunity for a large number of the par- 
ticipating states to communicate to the 
Soviet Union their deep concerns about 
violations of the accords. The message 
was clear: "Conform to the promises 
made in 1975 if you wish to be recog- 
nized as a responsible member of the in- 
ternational community." 

Even as the pattern of Helsinki 
Final Act violations by the East con- 
tinued, the United States took note of 
certain specific acts responding to 
Western concerns. The decision by 
Romania on its education immigration 
tax is an illustration. The suspension of 



60 



some aspects of martial law in Poland 
and the release of Lech Walesa is 
another, although continued arrests and 
imprisonment of thousands and the con- 
tinued outlawing of Solidarity put the 
bona fides of those steps into question. 
We have also noted and welcomed a few 
gestures from the Soviet Union and will 
continue to encourage further such 
steps. We hope there will be other 
developments in response to our con- 
cerns. 

Poland 

The imposition of martial law in Poland 
in December 1981 was a gross violation 
of the Helsinki Final Act even as the 
Madrid meeting was in session. This act 
of blatant defiance was met by a deter- 
mined and unified presence of 20 foreign 
ministers, including U.S. Secretary of 
State Haig, during the week of 
February 9-12, 1982. 

From February 9 until March 12, 
1982, negotiations at Madrid came to a 
complete halt as the West refused to 
engage in "business as usual" and in- 
stead detailed the Helsinki violations 
represented by Poland's martial law and 
continued repression in the Soviet 
Union. On March 12, 1982, in recogni- 
tion of Western determination, the 
Madrid meeting recessed for 8 months. 

When the meeting reconvened on 
November 9, a group of Western states 
introduced a series of 14 amendments to 
a proposed compromise put forward by 
a group of neutral and nonaligned states 
(RM-39). The amendments were de- 
signed to reflect the view that "business 
as usual" remained impossible. The 
essence of many of these proposals was 
incorporated in a revised neutral and 
nonaligned document, submitted on 
March 15. 1983, after martial law was 
ostensibly and technically suspended 
(RM-39 revised). That revised docu- 
ment, with improvements to it produced 
by the Prime Minister of Spain on June 
17, 1983, has become the official con- 
cluding document of Madrid. 

A number of provisions of that docu- 
ment reflect our Polish concerns. They 
deal with trade unions, religious 
freedom, and renewed obligation to 
refrain from the threat or use of force. 
Summary language in the preamble fur- 
ther reflects Western attention to 
developments in Poland. The United 
States and its Western allies never 
forgot during the course of the Madrid 
meeting that among the first of Solidari- 
ty's demands in August 1980 was that 
the Helsinki Final Act be reprinted and 



widely disseminated in Poland. We have 
kept in close touch with representatives 
of the Solidarity movement in Europe 
and the United States, and we have 
helped communicate their messages to 
the delegations in Madrid. 

Trade Unions 

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 did not 
include any language on trade unions. 
The Madrid document reflects a 
Western initiative stemming directly 
from the suppression of Solidarity in 
Poland. It clearly states that par- 
ticipating states "will ensure the right of 
workers freely to establish and join 
trade unions, the right of trade unions 
freely to exercise their activities and 
their rights as laid down in relative in- 
ternational instruments." This, of 
course, clearly refers to the conventions 
of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). A reference to "the law of the 
State" follows, thereby referring to the 
fact that all states have laws which in 
some measure define union rights and 
activities. But that reference is asso- 
ciated with another provision asserting 
the requirement that such measures be 
"in conformity with the state's obligation 
under international law," again a 
reference to the ILO. 

This provision also calls upon states 
to encourage direct contacts among 
trade unions and their representatives. 
The West, which has always made the 
point that unions freely organized in the I 
West are not to be confused with the 
totalitarian state-controlled organiza- 
tions known as unions in the East, was I 
able successfully to insist that this provi J 
sion be applicable only to "such" unions 1 
which are indeed freely organized by 
workers and free to function under ILO 
standards. 



Monitors 

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 provided 
a very clear basis of legitimacy to the 
courageous men and women who formec 
Helsinki monitoring groups within their 
own countries. Their purpose was to 
keep watch on how their states were 
complying with the provisions of the ac- 
cords, a right they had under the 1975 
agreement. In deliberate decisions to 
violate the provisions of the act, 
authorities in the U.S.S.R., 
Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe persecuted and im- 
prisoned those who exercised that right 
"to know and act upon their rights." 



Department of State Bulletir 



EUROPE 



In Madrid, 14 states mentioned the 
lames of 123 victims of repression, 
nany of them monitors. This was in con- 
rast to the Belgrade meeting where the 
Jnited States was one of only two coun- 
ries to mention the names of victims. 
,nd we mentioned six. The Netherlands 
fas the other. 

The language on monitors in the 
lelsinki Final Act is quite clear and 
hould not require elaboration. Indeed, 
within the rules of Madrid requiring con- 
ensus, it was very difficult to formulate 
ppropriate additional language more 
learly. We were, however, able to in- 
orporate language which, in some slight 
leasure, further supports the legitimacy 
f monitor groups and other activities. 
n the introduction to the section on 
'Hnciples, for example, a sentence 
eads: "The participating states express 
heir determination ... to encourage 
enuine efforts to implement the Final 
Let." The Soviets may attempt to 
lisinterpret this sentence in order to 
istort its meaning, but we take the 
istifiable position that the very act of 
rging compliance with the act is 
genuine." This concluding document 
lso states that "governments, institu- 
ions organizations and persons have a 
ole to play" in that endeavor. 

An examination of the ninth para- 
raph of the principles section reveals 
ignificant strengthening of Principle 
'II of the Helsinki Final Act dealing 
'ith human rights. Recognizing that 
;uman rights "derive from the inherent 
ignity of the human person," it calls 
pon states to: 

• "Assure constant and tangible 
rogress . . . aiming at further and 
teady development . . . irrespective of 
lieir political, economic and social 
/stems"; 

• "Ensure the effective exercise of 
lese rights and freedoms"; and 

• Recall "the right of the individual 
i) know and act upon his rights and 
uties in the field of human rights and 
andamental freedoms, as embodied in 
le Final Act." The provision goes on to 
ssert that states "will take the neces- 
iry action in their respective countries 
3 effectively ensure this right." 

We have no illusions as to Soviet in- 
jntions in this important human rights 
rea. Our own determination must, 
owever, always remain clear. Our in- 
istence— in this case with some suc- 
ess— on continuing to improve the 
riginal wording on the act is a clear in- 
iication of that intent. It is also impor- 
lant that we keep raising the standards 
Dr responsible international behavior. 




President Reagan with Ambassador 
Kampelman. 



Religion 

The Madrid final document makes small 
but important gains over the Helsinki 
Final Act in four areas dealing with 
religious freedom: 

• By extending and strengthening 
Principle VII to provide that states will 
"take the action necessary to ensure the 
freedom of the individual to profess and 
practice, alone or in community with 
others, religion or belief acting in ac- 
cordance with the dictates of his own 
conscience"; 

• By specifying that states "will 
consult, whenever necessary, the 
religious faiths, institutions and 
organizations, which act within the con- 
stitutional framework of their respective 
countries"; 

• By a provision, urged by the 
Vatican, requiring states to "favorably 
consider" registering religious com- 
munities of believers practicing or 
prepared to practice within their con- 
stitutional frameworks; and 

• By language in Basket III stating 
that participating states will: 

. . . Further implement the relevant pro- 
visions of the Final Act so that religious 
faiths, institutions, organizations and their 
representatives can, in the field of their ac- 
tivity, develop contacts and meetings among 
themselves and exchange information. 



Human Contacts 

The whole issue of human contacts has 
been highlighted in Madrid by the sadly 
unsatisfactory record of Soviet perform- 
ance. Their record on reunification of 
families is abysmal. We responded to 
these violations of the act by continuing 
to highlight the issue throughout the 
meetings. In addition, some forward 
movement beyond the Helsinki Final Act 
was achieved through six specific new 
provisions in the Madrid concluding 
document. The participating states have 
pledged: 

• To "favorably deal with" and 
"decide upon" applications for family 
meetings, reunification, and marriage. 
The Final Act provided only that they 
would "consider" or "deal with applica- 
tions in a positive and humanitarian 
spirit"; 

• That marriage and family 
reunification applications will be decided 
"within six months," the first reference 
to a definite time period. We believe this 
to be a useful improvement over the 
Final Act commitment to decide "as ex- 
peditiously as possible"; 

• That making or renewing applica- 
tions for family reunification will not 
modify rights to "employment, housing, 
residence status, family support, access 
to social, economic or educational 
benefits"; 

• To provide the necessary forms 
and information on procedures and 
regulations followed in emigration cases. 
This has been a serious problem for 
many trying to emigrate from the East; 



ieptember 1983 



61 



EUROPE 



• To reduce fees charged in connec- 
tion with emigration "to bring them to a 
moderate level in relation to the average 
monthly income." The reference to 
monthly income provides a new standard 
by which to judge fee levels which in 
some cases have been exorbitant; and 

• To inform applicants as "ex- 
peditiously as possible of the decision" 
on their cases and inform them of "their 
right to renew applications after 
reasonably short intervals" in cases of 
refusal. Both the fact that applicants 
must be informed of decisions and the 
recognition of the right to reapply are 
important in that many refuseniks in the 
U.S.S.R. have been given "final refusals" 
and told they could not reapply. 

The Madrid concluding document 
also adds an important new element to 
the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act 
by specifying that visitors to diplomatic 
and other official missions and consular- 
posts will be assured of access to them 
and reaffirming the importance of 
facilitating the normal functioning of 
those missions. 

There was one additional step taken 
after months of debate and stalemate. 
The West believes that it is important to 
provide a forum after Madrid and before 
the next followup meeting for the issue 
of human contacts to be thoroughly ex- 
plored at a meeting of experts attended 
by representatives of all 35 countries. 
We look upon an experts' meeting as a 
means of providing an opportunity for 
further clarity and, perhaps, understand- 
ing among us all, so that by the time of 
the next followup meeting this issue 
might be less of an irritant. 

The Government of Switzerland 
shared our belief and invited the par- 
ticipating states to an experts' meeting 
to deal with human contacts during 
April 1986. This was finally accepted by 
the Soviet Union. A late date was 
selected so that we will have time to ex- 
amine how the six new provisions in the 
Madrid agreement will have been com- 
plied with. We look upon this meeting as 
an important development. 

Human Rights Experts' Meeting 

The desirability of convening a human 
rights experts' meeting was first ex- 
pressed by the West in Madrid in 
February 1981. We looked upon this 
highly controversial proposal as vital if 
we are ever to achieve understanding 
Wot ween East and West. We define 
human rights by what we consider to be 
the reasonable standard of individual 
freedom. Communists think of freedom 



in terms of "class" and the "state." We 
are pleased that the proposed experts' 
meeting received approval after more 
than 2 years of consideration. It is to 
take place in Ottawa, Canada, in May 
1985. Its agenda focuses on the status of 
human rights "in their states," i.e., the 
participating states, so as not to broaden 
its scope to include other areas of the 
world. 



Information 

The Madrid document contains a 
number of new and helpful provisions 
designed to strenthen the Helsinki Final 
Act provisions in this important area. 
They are: 

• A provision that participating 
states will encourage the public sale and 
distribution of printed matter from 
other states, including making them "ac- 
cessible in reading rooms"; 

• A provision that prices of foreign 
publications should not be excessive in 
relation to prices in their country of 
origin. This language is somewhat 
qualified because Western governments 
find it difficult to make commitments in 
this area; 

• Language confirming that states 
will "further extend the possibilities" for 
the public to take out foreign subscrip- 
tions. In acknowledging that anyone can 
subscribe to foreign publications, this 
provision extends the Final Act which 
states only to "develop possibilities for 
taking out subscriptions according to 
modalities. . . . "; 

• A reference endorsing "direct con- 
tacts among journalists" which is not in 
the Final Act; 

• A pledge to decide visa applica- 
tions from journalists without "undue 
delay" and to reexamine within a 
reasonable time applications which have 
been refused; 

• A sentence stating that journalists 
traveling for personal reasons will 
receive the same treatment as other 
visitors. This is a new element, not 
found in the Final Act, and is in 
response to complaints by Western jour- 
nalists; 

• A commitment to grant perma- 
nent correspondents ami their families 
multiple entry and exit visas ml id for a 
year, 

• A pledge to "examine the possibili- 
ty" of coaccrediting journalists per- 
manently accredited to other countries. 
This is a useful provision for most 
Western news organizations which have 
only one or two journalists covering all 
of Eastern Europe; 



• A commitment to take "concrete 
measures" to provide more extensive 
travel opportunities for journalists and 
to "inform journalists in advance" of new 
areas closed for security reasons; 

• A sentence pledging states to "in- 
crease the possibilities" and "improve the 
conditions" for foreign journalists to 
"establish and maintain personal con- 
tacts and communications with their 
sources." We look upon the word "per- 
sonal" as implying individual contacts, 
thereby strengthening the Final Act; 

• A provision that radio and televi- 
sion journalists may be accompanied by 
their own sound and film technicians 
and use their own equipment. This is 
another useful addition to the Final Act; 

• A provision that journalists may 
carry with them reference material, in- 
cluding personal notes and files to be 
used for their professional purposes, an 
important addition to the Final Act. A 
qualifier acknowledging that import of 
printed matter may be subject to local 
regulation— and Western states also 
have such regulations— is itself qualified 
by a statement that these regulations 
"will be applied with due regard to the 
journalists' need for adequate working 
material"; 

• A provision on press centers open 
to national and foreign journalists may 
be helpful considering the paucity of 
such facilities in the U.S.S.R. and other 
Eastern countries; 

• A sentence in the culture section I 
committing states to "gradually lower 
custom duties" on books, films, and 
other forms of cultural expression, as 
well as "encourage wider dissemination 
of and access" to these items. This is a 
minor advance over the Final Act; 

• A "cultural forum" to be held in 
Budapest in 1985. This will provide an 
opportunity for the West to raise, if 
necessary, a review of how artists and 
writers in East European states are 
treated; and 

• A provision in the education sec- 
tion calling upon states to encourage 
publication of "lists and catalogues of 
open archival material," an addition to 
the Final Act which may aid in nego- 
tiating future exchange programs and 
may be helpful to foreign scholars doing 
research in the Soviet Union. 

Terrorism 

The Helsinki Final Act does not deal 
with the subject of terrorism. The 
United States joined the Spanish delega- 
tion and others in urging that the 
Madrid final document include a provi- 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



ion on this vital threat to the security 
)f all states. The final document does in- 
lude such a provision. It includes: 

• A statement that signatories will 
take effective measures for the preven- 
ion and suppression of acts of ter- 
orism, both at the national level and 
hrough international cooperation. . . . "; 

• A provision that states will take 
leasures to prevent their territories 
rom being used for the preparation or 
rganization of terrorist activities 
irected against other participating 
tates and their citizens; 

• A commitment to refrain from 
irect or indirect assistance, financing, 
ncouraging, or tolerating terrorist or 
ubversive activities directed at the 
iolent overthrow of the government of 
ther participating states; and 

• A pledge that states will "do their 
tmost" to assure necessary security to 
11 diplomatic, consular, and official 
spresentatives of other states. 

Given the record of some of the 
tates which approved this provision 
garding international terrorism, there 
lay be some understandable skepticism 
bout such a provision. We strongly 
elieve, however, that it is vital for an 
iternational modality to be established, 
ad this provision helps to do so. 

ecurity 

he negotiations that led to the signing 
' the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 had 
teir conceptual origins in an original 
an calling for establishment of a Euro- 
;an security conference. The agree- 
ent that finally came out of Geneva 
id Helsinki was one that included a 
jry significant humanitarian dimension, 
hich the United States and its Western 
• iends consider to be one of their major 
•complishments. Nevertherless, the 
•curity questions that are a part of the 
elsinki process remain of great impor- 
I .nee to all of the participating states. 

The NATO group of states in 
i ebruary 1981 presented a French pro- 
j isal calling for the establishment of a 
inference to take place after the 
I adrid meeting to deal with military 
jmfidence-building measures. The prob- 
Im of surprise military attack is one up- 
jjrmost in the minds of Europeans. The 
Jnited States joined the Western 
I'solve that a conference on surprise 
I ilitary attack had to be carefully struc- 
lired in Madrid so that it did not 
Income a vaguely worded mandate for a 
ilisarmament" meeting in which prop- 



aganda speeches rather than construc- 
tive decisions would be the major ele- 
ment. 

Fortunately, the neutral and non- 
aligned states agreed with this Western 
objective. The East abandoned its pro- 
posal, originally submitted by Warsaw, 
and after long and intensive debate a 
mandate for the conference fully accept- 
able to us was adopted. It meets our 
four essential criteria: 

• The conference will be an integral 
part of the CSCE process; 

• The conference will not interfere 
with ongoing arms negotiations, such as 
MBFR [mutual and balanced force 
reductions]; 

• The first stage of the conference 
will deal exclusively with confidence- 
building measures. This is stated in 
paragraphs two and six of the mandate 



for the conference on confidence- and 
security-building measures and disarma- 
ment in Europe which provide that 
"... the first stage will lie devoted 
to . . . confidence- and security-building 
measures designed to reduce the risk of 
military confrontation in Europe" and 
that "... a future follow-up meeting will 
consider ways and appropriate means 
for . . . supplementing the present man- 
date for the next stage of the Con- 
ference . . . "; and 

• Confidence- and security-building 
measures agreed at the conference are 
to be militarily significant, politically 
binding, verifiable, and applicable to the 
whole of Europe. 

The extension of the area to the 
Urals is quite significant, because the 
limited confidence-building measures 



President's Statement, July 15, 1983 s 



After nearly 3 years of negotiation, the 35 
states participating in the Madrid review 
meeting of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe are approaching 
agreement on a concluding document — one 
that will strengthen and extend the under- 
takings contained in the Helsinki Final Act. 
It is a call on all 35 CSCE states — particu- 
larly those who have so tragically failed to 
live up to promises made in Helsinki — to give 
life to these commitments and to rededicate 
themselves to advancing the freedom and 
justice on which security in Europe ultimately 
depends. 

We have agreed to this concluding docu- 
ment, as we did in 1975 to the Helsinki Final 
Act itself, with no illusions about the nature 
of the Soviet Union or about the system 
which it seeks to impose over much of 
Europe. In an ideal world, agreements such 
as this would not be necessary. But we 
believe it is the best agreement attainable, 
one which significantly improves on the Hel- 
sinki Final Act and advances the efforts of 
the West to hold out a beacon of hope for 
those in the East who seek a more free, just, 
and secure life. 

Together with the Helsinki accords, this 
agreement sets forth a clearer code of con- 
duct for all 35 CSCE states — a set of stand- 
ards to which we and the other Atlantic 
democracies will continue to hold all those 
who will have pledged their word at Madrid. 
We will sign it with the hope that it will 
serve as a step toward achieving our objec- 
tive of a more stable and constructive rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. 

The Madrid accord will add important 
new commitments to the Helsinki process, in- 
cluding provisions dealing with human rights, 
the trade union freedoms so tragically vio- 
lated in Poland, terrorism, religious liberties, 



reunification of families, free flow of informa- 
tion, and more. It will provide for two 
important meetings of experts in the humani- 
tarian field and for a security conference 
which will attempt to negotiate measures for 
reducing the danger of surprise attack in 
Europe. Another full followup meeting will 
take place in Vienna in 1986, where we will 
review the conduct of the participating states 
and seek to build on the accomplishments at 
Madrid. 

The unity and resolve of the Western 
democracies at Madrid have made this 
achievement possible. Ambassador Kampel- 
man and his NATO colleagues deserve the 
highest praise for bringing this long and 
often difficult conference to a successful con- 
clusion. We also owe a special vote of thanks 
to Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain, whose 
thoughtful proposal set the stage for final 
agreement. 

In concluding the Madrid meeting, we re- 
affirm our commitment to the Helsinki proc- 
ess. We will not flag in our continued deter- 
mination to work with all governments and 
peoples whose goal is the strengthening of 
peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, 
dialogue, when based on realistic expecta- 
tions and conducted with patience, can pro- 
duce results. These results are often gradual 
and hard won, but they are the necessary 
building blocks for a more secure and stable 
world. The challenge remains: we must all 
consolidate and build on these gains; we must 
ensure that good words are transformed into 
good deeds and that the ideals which they 
embody are given concrete expression. Giving 
substance to the promises of Madrid and 
Helsinki will remain one of our prime objec- 
tives. 



3 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 25, 1983. 



eptember 1983 



63 



EUROPE 



adopted in 1975 exempted the Soviet 
Union from their coverage, except for 
the first 250 kilometers within its 
borders. The Soviet Union, after first re- 
jecting an extension to cover all of it S 
European area, then urged that the 
geographic area be extended into the 
Atlantic Ocean as compensation for its 
extension to the Ural Mountains. The 
Soviet objective, of course, was to 
negate the international principle 
recognizing free use of the high seas and 
thus possibly to interfere with move- 
ment of U.S. forces in contingencies in- 
volving areas of the world outside 
Europe. 

We presented a provision, which 
was in the original 1975 agreement, 
making certain that only "adjoining sea 
area and air space" would be included 
and only when activities in that area are 
a part of military activities taking place 
within Europe itself. This was eventually 
accepted by the East. We were pleased 
that this formulation was finally ap- 
proved, because it clearly excluded in- 
dependent air and naval activities from 
coverage. The mandate will now permit 
concentration at the meeting, which will 
be held in Stockholm, on the crucial 
confidence-building measures required to 
deal with the problem of surprise 
military attack on the European Conti- 
nent. 

Followup Meetings 

During the preparatory meeting in 1980, 
the United States proposed to all of the 
delegations, most particularly to the 
Soviet Union, that all participants im- 
mediately commit themselves to hold a 
followup meeting within 3 years after 
Madrid. The Soviet Union refused to 
join us in that step and consistently 
refused to provide the West with such 
an unconditional commitment. This was 
apparently designed to intimidate other 
states into believing that the Helsinki 
process would end if the Madrid meeting 
did not conclude to Soviet satisfaction. 

We are very pleased that the final 
Madrid document provides for another 
followup meeting which is to take place 
in Vienna in November 1986. This is a 
longer intervening period than we would 
have preferred, but the final document 
also provides that there will be a 10th 
anniversary commemoration meeting in 
Helsinki in 1985, the year we might or- 
dinarily have held a followup meeting. 

We also have decided to hold a 
series of supplementary meetings be- 
tween those in Madrid and Vienna. We 
hope that these will help keep the 



Helsinki issues alive and at the same 
time strengthen the Helsinki process. 
Here is a list of the eight future 
meetings provided for in the Madrid 
document: 

• The first stage of a conference on 
disarmament in Europe commencing 
January 17, 1984, in Stockholm, to be 
preceded by a 3-week preparatory 
meeting to take place beginning on 
October 25, 1983, in Helsinki; 

• A 6-week experts' meeting on the 
peaceful settlement of disputes in 
Athens, beginning March 21, 1984; 

• A seminar on Mediterranean 
cooperation in Venice from October 16 
to 26, 1984; 

• An experts' meeting on human 
rights in Ottawa, lasting 6 weeks and 
commencing on May 7, 1985; 

• A commemorative meeting in 
Helsinki in 1985 marking the 10th an- 
niversary of the signing of the Final 
Act; 

• A cultural forum in Budapest 
sometime in 1985; 

• An experts' meeting on human 
contacts in Bern, Switzerland, lasting 6 
weeks and commencing April 16, 1986; 
and 

• The third followup meeting of the 
CSCE in Vienna starting November 4, 
i-.isi;. 



REMARKS, 
JULY 18, 1983 

After 2 years and more than 10 months 
of negotiation, we are close to the end of 
our Madrid meeting. We have just been 
informed by the delegate from Malta 
that he intends, as is his right, to con- 
tinue to pursue the amendments about 
which he has fully informed us. 2 He is 
aware that our delegation, among 
others, will continue to oppose those 
amendments and will not provide the 
necessary consensus to them. 

The American delegation is pleased 
with the draft concluding document that 
has emerged out of our deliberations. 
We consider it noteworthy that in a 
number of respects, such as in provi- 
sions dealing with the reunification of 
families, religious rights, trade unions, 
terrorism, rights of journalists, access to 
missions, and Helsinki monitors, the 
Madrid document goes beyond the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975. 

We also consider the decision to hold 
a conference on security- and confidence- 
building to be important. This can be a 
significant step toward strengthening 



security and cooperation in Europe. The 
need to minimize the risk of surprise 
military attack is of great significance to 
all of us. We welcome a decision to hold 
such a conference, a proposal we joined 
in supporting as early as February 1981. 
We look for a conference which will 
produce more than vaguely worded 
declarations. We take very seriously the 
provisions in the mandate that the con- 
ference would concern itself with 
confidence- and security-building 
measures which are militarily signifi- 
cant, politically binding, verifiable, and 
applicable to the whole of Europe. The 
conference must complement, and not 
interfere, with other arms control 
negotiations. The United States will take 
a constructive approach to the work of 
the conference and hopes that others 
will do the same. Agreement to notify 
military activities which will take place 
on land in Europe is an example of the 
kind of measure we believe could be a 
valuable result of this conference. 

It is also gratifying to all of us that 
Madrid is firmly establishing the con- 
tinuity of the Helsinki process. We have 
done so explicitly; and we are doing so 
with our decision to hold another 
followup meeting in Vienna in 1986, 
preceded by a 10th anniversary meeting 
in Helsinki in 1985. This continuity is 
strengthened by a decision to hold 
meetings, between the sessions in 
Madrid and Vienna, on human rights, 
human contacts, cultural activities, the 
Mediterranean, and the peaceful resolu- 
tion of international disputes. 

The United States recognizes the 
special importance of arriving at an 
agreement in Madrid at a time when in- 
ternational tensions and differences con- 
tinue to dominate our consciousness. We 
hope Madrid will be a significant signal 
of a new beginning in our earnest pur- 
suit of peace. 

Eastern Noncompliance With Helsinki 
Accords 

We must, however, not be blind to the 
difficulties of the task ahead. These dif- 
ficulties were dramatized by a first-page 
editorial in the July 14 issue of Pravda, 
which I read shortly after leaving this 
hall on Friday when 34 of us signified 
our provisional approval of a final docu- 
ment. The editorial sharpens for us not 
only the real meaning of the Madrid 
agreement but its decided limitations as 
well. The editorial's theme is the speech 
made to the June plenum of the Com- 
munist Party Central Committee by the 
leader of the Soviet Union, during which 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



he said: "There is a struggle for the 
hearts and minds of billions of people on 
this planet." Concerned that the 
U.S.S.R. may not be doing too well in 
that struggle, Pravda urges that Soviet 
citizens be "immunized" against hostile 
ideas. Specifically, it aims at religion in 
the U.S.S.R. as a danger. 

The United States understands the 
profound seriousness of the inherent 
contradictions between the Soviet 
totalitarian system and the system of 
liberty and individual dignity which is a 
hallmark of democratic governments. 
Reaching agreements such as we did in 
Helsinki and now in Madrid, do not, by 
themselves, automatically minimize 
those differences or end the competition. 
We intend to be in the competition for 
"hearts and minds" to which Pravda 
refers. We welcome a competition of 
ideas and values. In many ways the 
Madrid forum has been and remains a 
vehicle for that competition. What con- 
cerns us deeply, however, is that the 
Soviet Union may believe that it cannot 
win a competition of ideas and values 
without the threat and use of armed 
force and repression, both within and 
outside its borders. 

The Helsinki Final Act and the 
Madrid agreement are efforts to channel 
the competition of values within civilized 
constraints and at the same time to 
strive for understanding so that we can 
learn to live with one another in peace. 
The fact that these agreements continue 
to be violated, even during this very 
period of negotiated and agreement, is 
discouraging. 

We cannot in good conscience per- 
mit a limited negotiating success, impor- 
tant as we believe it to be, to make us 
forget, much to our regret, that 
signatures on a document do not 
necessarily produce compliance with its 
provisions. The continued fighting in 
Afghanistan, where more than 100,000 
invading troups remain, violating the 
sovereignty of that unhappy country and 
abusing the humanity of its people, 
stands as an affront to the peace we in 
Helsinki professed to pursue. The people 
of Poland remain today subjugated by a 
martial law which attacked the 
legitimacy of their free trade union, 
Solidarity, and continues to keep in in- 
ternment and imprisonment thousands 
of persons who declare and champion 

I their human rights. 

Our delegation believes in the impor- 

, tance of words. But we cannot permit 
an agreement on words to obfuscate 
unpleasant realities. We have sought 

I and welcome the agreement represented 



by our decision in Madrid. We do not 
wish to minimize the importance of that 
agreement. But we also do not wish to 
minimize the consequence of under- 
mining such agreements when they are 
not complied with in letter and in spirit. 

What are we to think when at the 
very time we were coming to agreement 
on provisions dealing with religious 
rights, Pravda Vostoka of Uzbekistan in- 
formed us that leading members of the 
Seventh Day Adventist Church have 
been imprisoned by government 
authorities precisely because of their 
wish to practice their religion? 

On December 1, 1981, I reluctantly 
brought to the attention of this body a 
detailed report of what clearly appeared 
to be a government-sponsored anti- 
Jewish campaign in the Soviet Union. It 
was my hope, obviously misplaced, that 
I would never have reason to raise that 
issue again. The facts, however, force 
me to do so. The decline in Soviet 
Jewish immigration is to the lowest 
levels since the 1960s, a tragic violation 
of the Helsinki accords. An important 
escape valve has thus been cut off for 
one of the most persecuted religious 
groups in that society. We note too, with 
sadness, that many Jewish scientists and 
professionals have been stripped of their 
educational degrees; that the teaching of 
the Hebrew language brings on police 
harassment and arrest; and, perhaps 
most disturbing of all, that extreme anti- 
Semitic articles are appearing in the 
Soviet press with increasing frequency. 

Soviet officials sometimes respond to 
these facts with assertions of "indigna- 
tion" and "libel." I fully understand such 
indignation in the light of the horren- 
dous memories of anti-Semitism during 
and prior to World War II. As to libel, 
in many of our societies truth is a 
defense to a charge of libel. We pray 
that this issue may soon disappear as an 
issue between us. Until the facts justify 
that change, however, I quote from a 
statement made last week by President 
Reagan: "We have repeatedly stated 
that our concern for human rights in 
general, and Soviet Jewry in particular, 
is integral to our national interest and 
remains a major focus of our national 
policy." 

The picture is no more encouraging 
when we turn to the very marrow of our 
objectives, the search for peace. A 
Soviet pacifist, Alexander Shatravka, 
was recently sentenced to 3 years in 
prison for circulating a petition calling 
for the universal abolition of nuclear 
weapons. The document had urged both 
the United States and the Soviet Union 



to scrap their nuclear arsenals. Mr. 
Shatravka had earlier been associated 
with a group of young people, who, a 
year ago, had been arrested for unfurl- 
ing a banner in Red Square bearing only 
the Russian words for "bread, life, dis- 
armament." 

The arrest of these young Soviet 
citizens seeking peace stands in sharp 
contrast to the enthusiastic editorial 
which appeared in Pravda last January 
hailing antiwar movements in Western 
Europe as "vital causes of the people." 
Is it any wonder that we are reminded 
of a perceptive statement by Clausewitz: 
"The aggressor," he said, "is always 
peace loving. He would like to make his 
entry into our country undisturbed." 

We know that the people of the 
Soviet Union, like all of our peoples, are 
peace loving. But we also know from the 
Pravda editorial of last week that Soviet 
authorities, who are not elected by their 
people, fear independent ideas and want 
their people "immunized" against them. 
General Aleksei Yepishev, the political 
head of the Soviet Army, recently com- 
plained that Soviet youth was being in- 
fected by pacifism. To stop independent 
ideas is a lost cause. Ideas, like the wind 
currents and the climate, reach all lands 
and cannot be stopped by artificial bar- 
riers. 

It is the view of our delegation that 
in arresting and harassing those of its 
citizens who work for peace and univer- 
sal nuclear disarmament, Soviet 
authorities not only maintain an indefen- 
sible double standard, they clearly 
demonstrate that the mantle of peace, in 
which they would like to cloak them- 
selves, simply does not fit their shape, 
their ideology, or their practices, and it 
is not simply one country to which we 
wish to address these comments. 

Similarly, a few weeks ago, more 
than 300 Czechoslovak young people 
were clubbed by the police, with many 
arrested, for holding a peace demonstra- 
tion in Prague and chanting "we want 
peace and freedom." And in that coun- 
try, Ladislav Lis, a spokesman for the 
Charter 77 human rights and peace 
organization, a Helsinki monitoring 
group, is expected to go on trial this 
week for his activities. Religious 
believers are also facing renewed repres- 
sion for their expressions of faith. 

In East Germany — where there is a 
growing unofficial peace movement that 
opposes all nuclear arms, including those 
of the Soviet Union and the United 
States — young people, many of them 
associated with churches, also find 
themselves harassed. At least 22 



September 1983 



65 



MIDDLE EAST 



members of this group have recently 
been expelled. Patches worn on clothing 
depicting "swords into plowshares," 
distributed by East German church 
leaders, have been outlawed as "the ex- 
pression of a mentality hostile to the 
state and proof of membership in an 
illegal political association." Students 
wearing the patch were threatened with 
expulsion from their schools and 
workers from their jobs. 

The irony is not lost on us as we re- 
mind ourselves that the statue of peace 
given by Moscow to the United Nations 
has the same motif of "swords into 
plowshares." 

A double irony is that the harass- 
ment of those who try to demonstrate 
for peace stands in stark contradiction 
to a UN General Assembly resolution of 
last December, cosponsored by the 
United States, calling on all states "to 
encourage their citizens freely and 
publicly to express their own views on 
disarmament changes and to organize 
and to meet publicly for that purpose." 

Once again, we have words; and we 
have deeds contrary to those words. We 
have the continuation of a pattern which 
has plagued the Helsinki process since 
1975 and which continues to plague this 
meeting to this day. 

The Helsinki Process Must Continue 

The question might well be asked, 
therefore, and many in my country 
understandably ask, why do we 
negotiate about words? Why do we seek 
to forge a concluding document? Why do 
we enter into an agreement at a time 
when the repression of human beings in 
the Soviet Union is greater than at any 
time since the Helsinki accords were 
signed in 1975? 

The American delegation has pur- 
sued these activities here in Madrid 
because the pursuit of peace is too vital, 
the need for understanding too indispen- 
sable, the importance of the Helsinki ac- 
cords too great to permit us to be dis- 
couraged by the task or by the obstacles 
we face. We are convinced that the 
Helsinki Final Act has within it a for- 
mula for peace which is indispensable in 
this age of potential nuclear devastation. 
It is our conviction, furthermore, that 
unless these principles are taken serious- 
ly, the accords will become historically 
irrelevant. We, therefore, continue to 
express ourselves on this issue, even 
during these closing days of our 
meeting, in order to help mobilize a 
wider moral and political insistence upon 
universal respect for the act by com- 



pliance with its provisions. Anything less 
threatens the integrity of our process 
and of our relationships under it. 

The American delegation makes this 
statement today not to irritate or offend 
any delegation here. We understand the 
need for patience in building the struc- 
ture of peace and understanding among 
us. We cannot, however, lull our publics 
into believing that words alone are ade- 
quate to erase the pressing threats to 
the integrity of the Helsinki and Madrid 
principles. 

We earnestly desire to enter into a 
constructive dialogue at all levels in 
order to achieve understanding and 
restore the "detente" contemplated in 
the Helsinki accords. We wish to 
negotiate reductions in arms of all kinds 
to ease the burdens of military spending 
on all of us. We wish peace with every 
state here. We wish to resolve all poten- 
tial conflicts between us, bilateral, 
regional, and international. We seek to 
do so on the basis of reciprocity and 
mutuality. 

We appreciate that in order to have 
a successful dialogue, we must be as at- 
tentive and responsive to the concerns 
of others as we ask them to be with 
respect to ours. We are prepared to do 
so. 

I conclude with an extract from a 
statement issued by President Reagan in 
Washington last Friday evening: 

In concluding the Madrid meeting, we re- 
affirm our commitment to the Helsinki proc- 
ess. We will not flag in our continued deter- 
mination to work with all governments and 
peoples whose goal is the strengthening of 
peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, 
dialogue, when based on realistic expecta- 
tions and conducted with patience, can pro- 
duce results. These results are often gradual 
and hard won, but they are the necessary 
building blocks for a more secure and stable 
world. The challenge remains: we must all 
consolidate and build on these gains; we must 
ensure that good words are transformed into 
good deeds and that the ideals which they 
embody are given concrete expression. Giving 
substance to the promises of Madrid and 
Helsinki will remain one of our prime objec- 
tives. 



'Emphasis is added to quoted material. 

2 Malta, as of July 18, 1983, withheld its 
consensus to the draft concluding document 
and insisted on discussion of amendments it 
proposed regarding security in the Mediter- 
ranean. ■ 



Visit of Lebanese 
President 



President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon 
made an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C., July 19-23, 1983, to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
government officials. Following are 
remarks made by Presidents Reagan and 
Gemayel after their meeting on July 22. 1 

President Reagan 

It is a great pleasure to welcome our 
friend, President Gemayel, to the White 
House again. We've had excellent talks 
today covering many vital concerns of 
both our countries. During his first visit 
here 9 months ago, President Gemayel 
and I discussed the principles upon 
which U.S. policy toward Lebanon is 
based: the full withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Lebanon; support for a 
strong central government capable of 
asserting its authority over all of 
Lebanon; and security for Israel's north- 
ern border. 

Today, I've reaffirmed these prin- 
ciples to President Gemayel. A united, 
sovereign, and independent Lebanon, 
free of all foreign forces, is the 
legitimate aspiration of the Government 
and the people of Lebanon and a goal 
shared by the people of the United 
States. Our talks today focused on the 
next steps in securing Lebanon's inde- 
pendence. We admire the courage and 
wisdom demonstrated by the Lebanese 
Government during its negotiations that 
resulted in an agreement for the depar- 
ture of Israeli forces. 

The United States remains firmly 
committed to the earliest possible resolu- 
tion of the conflict in Lebanon. This 
morning, President Gemayel and I have 
gone over the difficult agenda and have 
agreed on next steps which we should 
take together to set this process in mo- 
tion and carry it through. 

And I have today designated Robert 
McFarlane, currently my Deputy Assist- 
ant for National Security Affairs, as my 
personal representative in the Middle 
East. In that role he will succeed Philip 
Habib, who must return to his business 
and academia duties. Phil has set a high 
standard in bringing us through 8 
months of difficult negotiations to the 
situation we face today, and he will be 
sorely missed. 

After further consultation here in 
Washington next week, Bud McFarlane 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



and his team will depart for the Middle 
East within 10 days. 

I'm happy to have had this oppor- 
tunity to confer with President Gemayel 
once again. I'm impressed with the prog- 
ress that he and the Government and 
people of Lebanon have made in 
rebuilding their country. It's my belief 
that energy and perseverance will 
triumph in the end. And as I told Presi- 
dent Gemayel, we do not lack for either. 
Lebanon can count on our support. 

President Gemayel 

My second visit to the White House in 
the course of the year is a further con- 
firmation of our appreciation for the 
consistent support President Reagan has 
given Lebanon and the Lebanese objec- 
tive, which is the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces and the reconstruction of 
a sovereign, democratic, and united 
Lebanon. 

I'm very happy to have with me this 
time the Prime Minister, Mr. Shafiq 
Wazzan. This should emphasize the im- 
portance we attach to the visit. Indeed, 
conditions in Lebanon have changed im- 
mensely since my visit last October. And 
you are going through dramatic develop- 



ments, highlighted in particular by to- 
day's events in Lebanon. During our 
meeting this morning and the talks held 
by my delegation with the State Depart- 
ment and the Pentagon, we have amply 
covered the various practical ways and 
means available to the Government of 
Lebanon and the United States in order 
to fulfill our common goals. 

I continue to be confident that the 
major problems still confronting us in 
Lebanon and the Middle East can best 
be addressed and resolved by full 
cooperation with our Arab community 
and our American friends. President 
Reagan has reassured us of his continu- 
ing concern and determination to pursue 
his initiative in Lebanon with the same 
strength and commitment. Our two 
governments will intensify their con- 
sultations until the expected results are 
achieved. 

I would like, finally, to thank Philip 
Habib. I'll tell him, he is always welcome 
in Lebanon. He is a friend of Lebanon. 
He was with us during the difficult time. 
And, also, I'll say in advance, welcome 
to Mr. McFarlane. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 25, 1983. 



Situation in the Middle East 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 19, 1983 1 

The President, as you know, spoke this 
morning with Prime Minister Begin 
regarding the postponement of the 
Prime Minister's visit to Washington, 
which had been scheduled for next week. 

While we regret the President and 
the Prime Minister will not be able to 
meet next week, we look forward to 
rescheduling the meeting before the end 
of the year. 

Meanwhile, we anticipate discussions 
on the Middle East peace process with 
Israel and other nations in the region 
will continue. We see this as in no way 
an impediment to the progress of our 
peace initiative in Lebanon or in the 
region as a whole. Secretary Shultz has 
just completed an extensive round of 
talks with the leaders of Israel, Syria, 



Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jor- 
dan regarding the current situation. In 
Israel, he had detailed discussions with 
the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Minister, and the Defense Minister. We 
anticipate our diplomatic discussions will 
continue at all levels during this critical 
period. 

As far as the President is concerned, 
we will continue our pursuit of the full 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon, the reestablishment of 
Lebanon's sovereignty over all its ter- 
ritory, and the security of its borders. 
We will continue to have discussions 
with all parties leading toward this 
objective. 

At the same time, we will continue 
our pursuit of peace as outlined by the 
President last September 1. 



Visit of Amir 
of Bahrain 



His Highness Shaikh Isa bin Salman 
al-Khalifa, Amir of Bahrain, made a 
state visit to the United States 
July 17-22, 1983. While in Washington, 
D.C., July 18-22, he met with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and His Highness at 
the arrival ceremony on July 19. 1 




'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 25, 1983. 



President Reagan 

Your Highness, it is a pleasure for 
Nancy and me to welcome you to the 
United States as a guest of the 
American people. Your concern for your 
people is well known, particularly your 
commitment to the education and 
economic well-being of your citizens. 
Your personal involvement in the prob- 
lems of even the humblest of your coun- 
trymen is legendary. For these reasons 
and others, I've looked forward to the 
day when we could meet. 

You've guided Bahrain through a 
difficult first decade of independence 
with admirable skill, bringing economic 
progress with imaginative leadership. 
With far fewer oil resources than some 
of your neighbors, you've transformed 
Bahrain into a financial and industrial 
center with one of the most diversified 
economies in the region. Just as impor- 
tant, because of your progressive leader- 
ship, Bahrain also leads the area in 
health care and education. As it has 
been since ancient times, Bahrain con- 
tinues to be a place where people of dif- 
ferent cultures and religions live 
together in tolerance and peace. Your 
efforts to build a humane and diverse 
society provide an effective link in the 
exchange of technical skills and cultural 
values between East and West. 

Under your leadership, Bahrain con- 
tinues to be an inspiring example for all 



September 1983 



67 



MIDDLE EAST 



of the Middle East and the world. The 
American people are pleased to have 
been counted as supportive friends as 
you built this record of achievement. 
Our two peoples have been partners for 
progress and peace since the beginning 
of this century. We have found this rela- 
tionship to be of great mutual benefit. 
Many of the 70 U.S. companies in 
Bahrain today continue to train 
Bahrainis in technology and other skills, 
whether they be modern banking tech- 
niques, setting up new industries, or 
preparing coaches and athletes for 
Bahrain's Olympic teams. Our long 
history of private sector cooperation is a 
shining example of what can be achieved 
in a partnership based on mutual trust 
and respect. 

As you're keenly aware, continued 
prosperity for your people and those of 
the gulf region depend on peace and 
security. It is no secret that the United 
States has a vital national interest in the 
Middle East. We and our allies depend 
on oil originating there, much of it pro- 
duced in and nearby your country. Yet, 
we also recognize the value of partner- 
ship and respect for the culture and 
aspirations of states like your own— 
unlike another world power which seeks 
to impose its system by encouraging and 
exploiting conflict and unrest. But the 
United States seeks peace and stability. 
Together with other peaceloving na- 
tions in the gulf region, we've made 
rapid progress in recent years, not only 
by helping our friends meet their own 
defense requirements but also by 
developing our own ability to come to 
their assistance should the need ever 
arise. 

Many Americans who work in the 
region have experienced hospitality of 
the Bahraini people, and for this I am 
most appreciative. During his recent 
visit, Crown Prince Hamad deepened his 
friendship between our two countries. 
I want to assure you that I share 
your concern about the conflict between 
Iraq and Iran. The loss of tens of 
thousands of young men on both sides 
and the destruction borne by both coun- 
tries are tragic. I look forward to con- 
sulting with you about what more our 
countries might do to encourage a 
negotiated end to this conflict, which 
threatens the security and even the 
marine ecology of the entire area. 

We've appreciated your 
government's understanding as we pur- 
sue our goal of seeking the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from Lebanon and 
securing a settlement for the Palestinian 
people that is firmly rooted in the prin- 



Bahrain— A Profile 



People 

Nationality: Noun and adjective— 
Bahraini(s). Population (1981 est.): 358,857 
(66% indigenous). Ethnic groups: Arab 73%, 
Iranian 9%, Pakistani, Indian. Religions: 
About 60% Shi'a Muslim, 40% Sunni Muslim. 
Languages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi. 
and Urdu. Education: Attendance— 85%. 
Literacy— about 40%. Work force (190,000, 
1979 est.): About 60% indigenous, 40% ex- 
patriate. Agriculture— 5%. Industry and 
commerce— 85%. Services— 5%. Govern- 
ment — 3%. 

Geography 

Area: 676 sq. km. (260 sq. mi.); about four 
times the size of Washington, DC. Bahrain is 
an archipelago of islands, of which six are in- 
habited. Cities: Capital— Manama (100,000). 
Other city—k\ Muharraq. Terrain: Low in- 
terior plateau and hill on main island. 
Climate: Hot and humid. 




IRAN 



BAHBAIN , 

SAUDI ^-Hfii. 

ARABIA 




OMAN 7 




Government 

Type: Traditional emirate (cabinet-executive 
system). Independence: August 15, 1971. 
Constitution: May 26, 1973. 

Branches: Executive— amir (chief of 
state), prime minister (head of government), 



ciples of security and justice embodied in 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338. 

As you know, Secretary Shultz 
recently returned from the Middle East. 
We remain undaunted in our effort to 
prevent the forces of violence from exer- 
cising a veto over the rights of the 
Lebanese people. The people of Lebanon 
must have restored their basic human 



Council of Ministers (cabinet). Judi- 
cial— independent judiciary with right of 
judicial review. Subdivisions: 6 towns and 
cities. 

Political parties: None. Suffrage: None. 

Central government budget (1980 est.): 
$987.66 million. Defense (1979): $87.8 
million, or 11% of 1979 budget. 

Flag: Three-fourths red field with ser- 
rated line separating white field on staff side. 

Economy 

GDP (1979 est.): $1.7 billion. Annual growth 
rate (est.): 6%. Per capita income (1980 
est): $6,315. Avg. inflation rate 1979-81: 
7%. 

Natural resources: Oil. associated and 
nonassociated natural gas, fish. 

Agriculture (2% of GDP): Eggs, 
vegetables, dates. 

Industries (70% of GDP): Oil, aluminum, 
ship repair, natural gas, fish. 

Services (26% of GDP): Banking, real 
estate, insurance. 

Trade (1980 est.): Exports— $3.8 billion: 
oil, aluminum, fish. Major markets— Japan, 
Saudi Arabia, UK, US. Imports— $3.6 billion: 
machinery, industrial equipment, motor 
vehicles, foodstuffs, clothing. Major sup- 
pliers — Japan, UK, US. 

Official exchange rate: 0.37695 Bahraini 
dinars = US$1. 

Economic aid received: Significant 
budgetary support and project grants from 
Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 

Membership in international organiza- 
tions: UN and most of its specialized agen- 
cies, Arab League, Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 



Taken from tin' Background Notes of August 
1982, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



right to pursue their own destiny in an 
atmosphere of peace, security, and 
mutual trust. 

I look forward to discussing our 
many common concerns with you today. 
I know our shared goals of peace and 
prosperity for the region can be met in 
the same spirit of good will and partner- 
ship that has characterized our friend- 
ship thus far. 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



On behalf of the American people it 
is my privilege to welcome you to the 
United States. 

His Highness the Amir 

I would like to offer my appreciation 
and thanks for the kind thoughts ex- 
pressed in your address toward the 
State of Bahrain and for the welcome 
and hospitalities extended to us from the 
very beginning of our official visit to 
your friendly country. This indicates the 
strength of the friendly ties existing be- 
tween our two countries. I offer my gen- 
uine good wishes to the friendly people 
of the United States of America for 
their well-being and prosperity. 

I believe that this visit will succeed 
in developing the relations between our 
two countries; open up a new chapter in 

I our fruitful cooperation; and support our 
efforts to help maintain peace, security, 
and justice for the world community. As 
you have referred, in your address, to 
some of the most important economic 
and political issues in the world, I should 
commend in this respect the positive 

I role you play for the prosperity and 
security of the world. We, no doubt, 
support and uphold the great effort you 

I make in this field, as we firmly believe 
that such issues are very important for 
the progress of the individual in the 
modern world and that without them 
clashes and war will break out. Clashes 
and war will break out and destroy all of 
the progress made over the years. 

In light of many common views we 
share in the political field, we believe, as 
you do, that the Middle East problem 
:omes in the forefront of political issues 
n the world. It is one of the burning 
ind explosive problems in the world, 
tfhich passes now through a very 
dangerous stage that poses a serious 
,hreat to the world peace and security. 
This imposes upon us the duty to make 
;very effort to save the region from this 
lisastrous situation. 

We hope that the sincere and good 
effort you make to find a suitable solu- 
•ion to this problem will result in 
;stablishing just and durable peace in 
he region, which has been exposed to 
ive major wars within 35 years with 
lisastrous effects to its people. The 
ragic events in Lebanon and the 
lamage it has suffered are but some of 
nany inevitable results of the explosive 
ituation in the region. Lebanon 
leserves all the help and backing so that 
ts government will exercise full control 
'Ver its unified territories. 



We believe that there will be no 
hope of stability in the Middle East 
without the application of the same 
universal principles upon the people of 
the region; and concluding, the Palestin- 
ian people, when they are dealing with 
their legitimate right to live in peace 
within secure national boundaries. 

We are prepared to do our best and 
participate in every sincere, interna- 
tional effort to establish security in the 
Middle East region, within this' 
framework, in order to put an end to 
this terrible conflict and enable the peo- 
ple of the region to live in peace. 



Finally, it is my pleasure to conclude 
by wishing you, Mr. President, all the 
success in your efforts for the progress 
and advance of the friendly people of the 
United States of America, and to bring 
peace, justice, and prosperity to the peo- 
ple of the world. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 25, 1983. 

2 Held on the South Lawn of the White 
House, where His Highness was accorded a 
formal welcome with full military honors. ■ 



Production of the MX Missile 



PRESIDENT'S RADIO 
ADDRESS TO THE NATION, 
JULY 16, 1983 1 

Today I want to talk to you about peace. 
Back in June of 1963, President John F. 
Kennedy delivered an arms control 
speech that is still remembered for its 
eloquence and vision. He told the gradu- 
ating seniors at American University: "I 
speak of peace, therefore, as the 
necessary, rational end of rational men. 
I realize that the pursuit of peace is not 
as dramatic as the pursuit of war and, 
frequently, the words of the pursuer fall 
on deaf ears. But we have no more 
urgent task." 

Twenty years have passed since 
those words were spoken, and they've 
been a troubled era, overshadowed by 
the dangers of nuclear weapons. We've 
seen the world's inventory of nuclear 
weapons steadily expand. Despite many 
sincere attempts to control the growth 
of nuclear arsenals, those arsenals have 
continued to grow. That's the bad news. 
The good news is that now, at last, 
there is hope that we can finally begin to 
reverse this trend. Americans have 
joined together— Republicans and Demo- 
crats, liberals and conservatives — to 
face the greatest challenge of our time; 
the urgent task of pursuing a lasting 
peace in the nuclear era. Our political 
process has forged a consensus, a bipar- 
tisan consensus that has united us in our 
common search for ways to protect our 
country, reduce the risk of war, and, 
ultimately, dramatically reduce the level 
of nuclear weapons— the foundation we 
need for successful negotiations. 



Remember, our MX Peacekeeper 
missile program calls for the deployment 
of 100 missiles. The level ultimately 
deployed, however, will clearly be in- 
fluenced by the outcome in Geneva. If 
an agreement is reached which calls for 
deep reductions— which is, of course, 
our goal— the number of missiles could 
certainly be adjusted downward. 

As the Scowcroft commission rightly 
pointed out, the MX Peacekeeper missile 
is an essential part of a comprehensive 
modernization and arms control pro- 
gram to ensure deterrence today and in 
the future. We're building the MX 
Peacekeeper to strengthen deterrence. 
But it also provides vital negotiating in- 
centives and leverage in Geneva. 

Andrei Sakharov, the distinguished 
Soviet physicist and Nobel Prize 
laureate, recently published an eloquent 
article which forcefully makes the same 
point. He notes that, given the Soviet 
advantage in land-based, strategic 
missiles, talks about limitation and 
reduction of these systems could become 
easier if the United States were to have 
MX missiles, albeit only potentially. An- 
drei Sakharov is a hard man for anyone 
to ignore. 

When the Congress reaffirms its 
support for this prog