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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




Departtnvn t 



The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2088 



1949 — NATO — 1984 



c imiWife s 




North Atlantic Council/1 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 84 / Number 2088 / July 1984 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31 . 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage pai 
at Washington, D.C. and additional mailing office: 
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 



CONTENTS 




FEATURE 

1 North Atlantic Council Meets in Washington (Vice Presi- 
dent Bush, Claude Cheysson, Joseph M.A.H. Luns, 
President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Texts of Final 
Communique and Annex, Washington Statement on 
East-West Relations, Proclamation) 

18 Secretary Shultz's Interview for "Worldnet" 

22 35 Years of NATO 



rhe President 

7 The Struggle for Freedom in 

Latin America 
i8 Berlin — A Very Special Place for 

America 
'9 News Conferences of May 22 and 

June 14 (Excerpts) 

he Secretary 

5 A Steady Course for American 
Foreign Policy 

8 Address Before the American 

Society of Newspaper Editors 

irms Control 

"2. Arresting the Nuclear Genie 

(Kenneth L. Adehnan) 
5 Western Proposals at MBFR 

I Talks (President Reagan, 

Western Statement) 
*5 ASAT Arms Control (Kenneth L. 
Adehnan) 

ast Asia 

B U.S.-China Relations (Paul D. 

Wolfowitz) 
1 Visit of Thailand's Prime Minister 

(Prem Tinsulanonda, President 

Reagan) 

conomics 

.2 Looking Toward London: 10 

Years of Economic Summitry 
(W. Allen Wallis) 
5 The American Trade Deficit in 

Perspective (Arthur F. Burns) 
7 50th Anniversary of Reciprocal 
Trade Act (Department State- 
ment) 

'9 Japan Eases Restrictions on Yen 
(Donald T. Regan) 



60 Review of East- West Economic 

Relations (W. Allen Wallis) 
63 The Logic and Politics of the 

Next Trade Round (Denis 

Lamb) 
65 Foreign Policy: Its Impact on 

Agricultural Trade (W. Allen 

Wallis) 
68 Examining the Unitary Tax 

(W. Allen Wallis) 

Europe 

70 The Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. 
National Interest (Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick) 

73 18th Report on Cyprus (Message 
to the Congress) 

75 Situation on Cyprus (President 
Reagan) 

75 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Eco- 
nomic Council Meeting (Mark 
Palmer) 

Human Rights 

77 The Baltic States' Struggle for 
Freedom (Elliott Abrams) 



Middle East 

U.S. Response to Saudi Request 
for Military Assistance 
{Michael H. Armacost) 

U.S. to Supply Military Equip- 
ment to Saudi Arabia (Depart- 
ment Announcements) 



80 



81 



United Nations 

82 Challenge to Israel's Participation 

in UPU (Department Announce- 
ment) 

Western Hemisphere 

83 Visit of El Salvador's President- 

Elect (Joint Communique) 

83 Election of El Salvador President 

Duarte (President. Reagan) 

84 Secretary Shultz Visits El 

Salvador and Nicaragua 
(Secretary Shultz) 

85 Visit of Mexican President 

(Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, 
President Reagan) 

Treaties 

88 Current Actions 

Chronology 

90 May 1984 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 

Publications 

94 Department of State 
94 GPO Subscriptions 

Index 




Secretary of State Dean Acheson signed the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of the United 
States on April 1, 1949, in Washington, D.C. President Truman and Vice President 
Barkley (to the Secretary's right) witnessed the event. The Foreign Ministers who signed 
for the II other nations were Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Lester B. Pearson (Canada), 
Gustav Rasmussen (Denmark). Hubert Schuman (France), Bjarni Benediktsson (Iceland). 
Count Carlo Sforza (Italy), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Dirk I . Stikkcr (Netherlands). 
Ilalvard M. Lange (Norway), .lose Caerio da Matta (Portugal), and Ernest Bevin (United 
Kingdom). 





FEATURE 
NATO Ministerial 



North Atlantic Council 
Meets in Washington 



The regular semiannual session of the North Atlantic 
Council was held in Washington, D.C., May 29-31, 1984. The 
meeting coincided with the 35th anniversary of the signing of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Following are remarks by Vice President Bush, Secretary 
General Luns, and Honorary President Cheysson at the 
opening session; exchange of dinner toasts between President 
Reagan and Secretary General Luns; remarks by President 
Reagan; the final communique, with annex; the Washington 
Statement on East-West Relations; and Secretary Shultz's news 
conference. 



, OPENING SESSION, 
NORTH ATLANTIC 
COUNCIL, 
MAY 29, 1984 1 

Vice President Bush 2 

Mr. Secretary General, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs [of France Claude 
Cheysson and Honorary President], 
representatives of the Atlantic alliance 
and its 16 member nations, distinguished 
guests. It is a special pleasure for me to 
welcome you to Washington. 

Thirty-five years ago, the North 
Atlantic Treaty was signed in this city, 
bringing the alliance into being. Since 
then, the strength and resolution of our 
partnership have frequently been tested 
but never found wanting. Anniversaries 
are a time for looking back and for look- 
ing ahead, for drawing lessons from the 
past and applying them to the future. 
NATO can take great satisfaction in 
what it has accomplished. 



• Born of the statesmanship and vi- 
sion of a handful of brilliant individuals, 
the alliance has become much more than 
even they could have dreamed. 

• Peace has been guaranteed in a 
region that knew no peace. 

• Liberty has been preserved in 
Western Europe and a barrier erected 
against further Soviet advances. 

• The greatest sustained wave of 
economic and social development in 
western history was fostered by the 
security provided by the alliance. 

• Building on that security and 
prosperity, the West has led a transfor- 
mation of society and economies on a 
global scale, creating today's free, open, 
and interdependent world system. 

These achievements are cause for 
great satisfaction. They give us con- 
fidence in the future. But success should 
not make us complacent. The next 35 
years of the alliance will be as challeng- 
ing as the first — and as full of oppor- 
tunity. 

What new challenges are on the 
horizon for the alliance? I think there 
are four primary areas to which we 



ily 1984 




Vice President Bush addresses the opening session of the North Atlantic Council 
ministerial meeting at the Department of State on May 29, 1984. 



must turn our attention. They are 
familiar but fundamental: 

First, preservation of the basic 
values of western civilization, notably 
the rights and dignity of the individual; 

Second, strengthening our common 
security, with particular emphasis on 
conventional defenses; 

Third, ensuring that freedom and 
independence in the Third World is not 
destroyed by aggression and subversion; 
and 

Fourth, building a more construc- 
tive relationship with the Soviet Union 
on a realistic and durable basis. 

No one can have any doubt that the 
human values which are at the root of 
the alliance are under severe attack in 
many parts of the world today. In the 
past week, we have all been caught up 
in the tragic plight of Andrei Sakharov 
and his wife, Yelena Bonner. It is hard 
for us even to comprehend, let alone 
condone, a system where internal and 
external travel and communication are 
subject to such arbitrary state prohibi- 
tion. 

In the CSCE [Conference on Securi- 
ty and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act 
and the Madrid concluding document, 
the alliance has led the effort to 
establish international standards of 
behavior in the human rights area. We 
must work to ensure that these prin- 
ciples are increasingly respected by all 
states. 



Turning to defense, the time has 
come for the alliance to devote attention 
to conventional defense improvements. 
We must find ways to exploit the 
tremendous inventiveness of Western 
society, to bring together industries on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and to explain 
to our publics and parliaments what 
needs to be done to counter Soviet con- 
ventional forces. 

Outside of Europe, the trail of 
Soviet adventurism— from Asia to 
Africa to Latin America— poses a threat 
to the independence and territorial in- 
tegrity of sovereign states. The nations 
of the West have a continuing respon- 
sibility to help the states of the Third 
World protect themselves. Likewise, we 
have a keen interest in extending the 
conditions of peace, freedom, and stabili- 
ty which we ourselves have enjoyed for 
so long. As we have known in the 
alliance for a long time, peace is 
ultimately indivisible. 

NATO has long sought to establish a 
constructive relationship with the Soviet 
Union. NATO has never sought conflict 
or superiority. In 1967 the alliance ex- 
pressed its readiness for dialogue and its 
determination to maintain a strong 
deterrent. There has been progress in 
some areas, but there have also been 
setbacks and disappointments. 

• The Soviets did not respond ade- 
quately to the positive incentives of- 
fered. 



• 



• The Soviet military buildup did 
not stop at parity but went on ac- 
cumulating weapons of all kinds far 
beyond Soviet defensive needs. 

• Progress in Europe was not 
matched by Soviet restraint elsewhere 

Despite these Soviet actions, NATO }ii 
has never ceased its efforts to build a 
more constructive relationship. On the 
basis of alliance strength and unity, the I 
alliance has consistently sought to 
engage the Soviet Union in a dialogue 
on the full range of international issues, n 
including human rights, bilateral affairs, il 
regional conflicts, and arms control. 

Speaking personally, I had the 
privilege last month of presenting a 
draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. I 
wish I could tell you I was optimistic 
about immediate progress in this impor- 
tant area. I'm not optimistic, but we 
must keep trying. 

The alliance and the United States 
have repeatedly called upon the Soviet 
Union to return to the nuclear arms con 
trol negotiations. We hope they will do 
so as soon as possible. 

Many things have changed since 
1949. New generations have come to th 
fore. Economies have been transformed 
Our style of life and that of people 
everywhere has been transformed. 

But many things remain unchanged 
The solidarity of the North Atlantic 
alliance is still the pole around which 
peace and security revolve. Our commo 
commitment to democratic values is 
alive and well. Our economies have 
weathered difficulties and are now 
entering into sustained noninflationary 
growth. Our political and security ties 
have survived the most severe political 
and strategic challenge in a generation. 
In my opinion, they have come through 
not only intact but reinforced. 

A symphony conductor once told a 
story of how he would take his or- 
chestra, usually by bus and country 
roads, into the towns and small cities o: 
the agricultural valley. His mission wasi 
to reach new audiences and expose thei 
to the finest of classical music. At the 
conclusion of a concert in a rural school 
auditorium, a concertgoer slipped a 
message into his hand. It read: "I think 
it is only fair to inform you that the ma 
in your orchestra who blows the instru- 
ment that pulls in and out only played 
during the brief intervals when you wei 
looking at him." 



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Department of State Bulleti 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



In looking at the world, it's crucial 
lot to misinterpret events. Make no 
nistake about it. What we are seeing to- 
lay among all the free peoples of our 
lliance is an increased faith in the 
iltimacy and power of freedom — and a 
lardened resolve to take the steps 
lecessary to secure free values. 

It is a great pleasure to open this 
neeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Vashington, the first meeting of NATO 
"Weign Ministers here since 1949. It is 
lso a great honor to share the podium 
nth Joseph Luns, who has served so 
bly as Secretary General of NATO 
hrough such stirring times. He deserves 
he heartiest thanks of everyone in the 
lliance. 

One of the fundamental facts of our 
emocratic form of government is that 
11 of us in office are the servants of our 
eoples. As you are aware, this is an 
lection year in the United States. I 
mst, therefore, apologize for leaving 
au now — back to the campaign trail, 
lorida, then Texas. 

I will take with me a strong sense of 
le strength, unity, and continued vitali- 
of the NATO alliance. I respect your 
-;solve to maintain and nurture this 
* reat partnership, and I know your 
I lared vision of a just and real peace 
ill inspire the discussions and plans 
hich will follow. 



onorary President 
heysson 

n the occasion of the anniversaries 
hich are now being celebrated in my 
•untry and elsewhere, we honour the 
emory of all those who fell some 40 
;ars ago in the greatest war mankind 
is known. In recalling their sacrifice 
id the sufferings and hardships of our 
copies during a dramatic period in 
hich the fundamental values of civiliza- 
jn were at stake, we shall be more 
ature, more inclined to appreciate our 
liance and the true worth of the recon- 
liation of our peoples, the solidarity of 
ir nations, and the shared attachment 
fundamental values which ensure 
■spect for human dignity. Our deter- 
ination to keep the peace, to make war 
ipossible and even unthinkable, and to 
rve the cause of freedom will be even 
■eater. 



This treaty is a simple document. The nations which 
sign it agree to abide by the peaceful principles of the 
United Nations, to maintain friendly relations and 
economic cooperation with one another, to consult together 
whenever the territory or independence of any one of them 
is threatened, and to come to the aid of any one of them 
which may be attacked. 

President Truman 
April 4, 1949 



The honor and pleasure of opening 
the proceedings of the ministerial 
meeting fall to my lot today for the sec- 
ond time, on this occasion in the United 
States, the greatest and most powerful 
of our member nations, in the city which 
bears a glorious name, ever to be 
remembered in the history of independ- 
ent nations. Let us, therefore, recall 
with pride those fundamental principles 
which led our nations, in this city, to 
make a treaty unique in its spirit and its 
results. The same principles still guide 
our actions today, when international 
relationships— and above all East- West 
relations — are passing through a phase 
made clamorous by its associated 
rhetoric and extremely distressing by 
reason of the increasing number of 
threats. The decision, taken on the 
initiative of one of our colleagues, to 
make a careful study of developments in 
East- West relations reflects our desire 
for a better analysis of the reasons for 
this situation and will, therefore, enable 
us to define our joint course of action. 

The first essential is to make the 
analysis. What are the reasons for the 
present tension? What are the new fac- 
tors involved in it? The relationship 
which we had built up with the U.S.S.R., 
on the basis of dialogue and with a view 
to achieving balance and in which the 
Helsinki agreements are a major ele- 
ment, have deteriorated. The respon- 
sibility for this is certainly not ours. The 
U.S.S.R. has demonstrated by its 
behavior that the concept of detente 
which inspired us was inadequate. 

I refer primarily to the invasion of 
Afghanistan, the crushing of the aspira- 
tions of the Polish people and the denial 
of the freedoms which they had only just 



regained, and, unfortunately, a more 
general contempt for human rights and 
disregard for the Helsinki agreements, 
symbolized in our minds by the man and 
wife now detained in Gorky. 

These actions have been accom- 
plished by a major buildup of conven- 
tional weaponry and by the significant 
upgrading of Soviet nuclear capability, 
on land and sea, demonstrating the 
drive to gain superiority and the power 
to intimidate which flows from it. The 
clearest outward sign of this process, 
and the direct cause of the tension which 
affects us today, has been the deploy- 
ment of Soviet intermediate range 
missiles. 

No one can deny that this has upset, 
or even destroyed, the balance of forces. 
However, I am not saying that there is 
any desire for war, but who can doubt 
the determination to subject our alliance 
to formidable psychological and political 
pressure, at least in continental Europe? 

The nations concerned, mindful of 
this danger, took the 1979 two-track 
decision. They have stated that they 
would not be the first to make a move; 
their desire was not to gain an advan- 
tage but to restore the balance which 
was an essential condition for peace, and 
they restated their determination. I 
repeat, balance is the guarantee of 
peace. 

This decision has been implemented 
calmly and soberly. Thus 6 months ago, 
in Brussels, I was able, on behalf of us 
all, to applaud this act of calm courage 
in the defense of peace through the 
balance of forces. 

At the same time, we kept on stress- 
ing that we would prefer to maintain the 
balance by way of negotiation, the 



Jly 1984 



ultimate aim of which would be agree- 
ment on the lowest possible level of ar- 
maments, particularly nuclear weapons. 

The difficulties put in the way of 
these negotiations by the introduction of 
extraneous matters did not come from 
the Western side, nor did the West 
cause the negotiations to be broken off. 
The West had made no attempt to alarm 
and worry the public by resorting to 
histrionics. As we know, these attempts 
have failed; our peoples have not al- 
lowed themselves to be influenced. With 
regret — because they hoped until the 
very last moment that the negotiations 
would be successful — they accepted the 
deployment agreed for the end of 1983 
because it was necessary, and this 
deployment has taken place. 

Of course, this situation still gives 
cause for concern. New weapons are 
already being announced, and the 
danger of a new stage in the arms race 
is already becoming apparent. 

During this period there is no 
dialogue; it must be stated, restated, 
and proclaimed from the rooftops, is an 
intolerable paradox! 

Let no one anywhere doubt our will- 
ingness to discuss, to negotiate, to seek 
an understanding. Abuse in public is no 
substitute for discussion around the 
negotiating table. I reiterate here, on 
behalf of us all with all the force and 
conviction at my command, that the na- 
tions of the Atlantic alliance are 
prepared for discussion and wish to 
establish and guarantee a true balance 
of forces at the lowest possible level. In 
this spirit, they support the continuation 
of the Stockholm talks, at which they 
and the neutral and nonaligned nations 
made constructive and specific proposals 
which would be given serious and 
careful consideration by our opposite 
numbers in the East, without confining 
the discussion to a consideration of 
statements which have been trotted out 
all too often in the past. In this spirit, 
too, the allies call for the resumption of 
negotiations on strategic and inter- 
mediate-range nuclear weapons. Able, as 
we are, to count on the grit and deter- 
mination of our peoples, committed, as 
we are, to a defense effort which is and 
must be commensurate with our will for 
peace, we want to negotiate with the 
governments of the other countries of 
Europe. 




Above: Vice President greets Turkish 
Foreign Minister Halefoglu (top photo) and 
Greek Foreign Minister Haralambopoulos. 
Below: Secretary Shultz confers with West 
German Foreign Minister Genscher (top 
photo) and British Foreign Secretary 
Howe. 




(NA 1" photos) 



We also want to maintain and ex- 
pand our relations with peoples who, for 
centuries, have shared the same aspira- 
tions, developed historically along the 
same lines as many countries 
represented here. We intend to pursue 
and expand our economic and trading 
connections. It is our desire to preserve 
or rediscover the manifold cultural ties 
which our forefathers developed 
together. We owe it to the men and 
women of Europe, who have not sudden- 
ly changed because a curtain has 
descended among them. We owe it to 
Man, as a free individual, to Man who 
-per se is entitled to respect. Does anyone It 
really believe that these ideas which we 
cherish would be better served if we 
were to close the windows and doors of 
our world, if we were to refuse all con- 
tact, all fellowship, all commercial inter- 
course, and all meetings, if we were to 
behave as though our brothers and 
sisters in Eastern Europe had vanished 
from the face of the earth? Definitely 
not. 

France, the ever-faithful ally — does 
anyone doubt it? — proud of its in- 
dependence — as everyone is aware — 
intends to play its part in the realizatior 
of what the public now accepts as post- 
Yalta Europe. In remembrance of a 
bygone Europe, France will undertake 
to use its best endeavors. 

I now turn toward you, Mr. Secre- 
tary General, you who for so long have 
been the personification of our alliance, 
the mouthpiece of its needs, its con- 
cerns, its requirements, its values. You 
have voiced them with characteristic 
frankness and also with the robust gooc 
humor for which you are well known 
and which no longer takes us by sur- 
prise. We are all in your debt, and I 
shall have the opportunity on another 
occasion of describing your colorful, 
12-year stewardship of the Atlantic 
alliance. I will not go into the crises, thd 
periods of tension, and your warnings ii 
the face of the imbalances which were 
occurring. 

The time has not yet come to sing 
your praises as a man of independent 
mind and a man of principle. But the 
time has come for me to hand over to 
you and allow you once again, and for 
the last time, to display your outstand 
ing qualities during this Washington 
meeting. Once more, the deliberations 
taking place under your chairmanship 



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Department of State Bulleti 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



irill prove that your appeals have not 
alien on deaf ears. I am convinced that 
his meeting of the North Atlantic Coun- 
il will be able to demonstrate the 
olidarity, the cohesion, the stead- 
astness of its members in the defense 
f liberty and peace in the course of the 
ession which is now open. 



Secretary General Luns 

am sure that everyone who has trav- 
led here for this spring 1984 meeting of 
ie Foreign Ministers of the North 
tlantic Treaty Organization shares my 
snse of deep gratitude to our host, the 
overnment of the United States of 
merica. As the cradle of the alliance, 
ie lovely and historic city of 
'ashington, D.C., is a particularly apt 
jnue for our gathering in this, the 35th 
miversary year of NATO's birth. The 
mbolism of our location is further 
inched by the fact that this year 
arks as well the centennial of the birth 
' Harry S. Truman, that great 
merican President without whose vi- 
Dn the Atlantic alliance might never 
u.ve come into being. 

It is a rare privilege for me to be 
»le to pay public tribute here to the 
<emory of President Truman whose 
adership in world affairs won a place 
r him among the greatest Western 
atesmen of modern times. Today those 

our leaders who would like to honor 
<e memory of Harry Truman and 
knowledge the debt which free men 
roughout the world owe to him could 
>t do better than attempt to imitate his 
urage and his decisiveness when faced 
th difficult options and also his deter- 
ination to mould public opinion rather 
an follow it. The capacity to act in this 
ay is especially necessary at this par- 
:ular moment when the countries of 
e West are going through another 
riod of difficult options. 

As my term as Secretary General 
■aws to an end, if it were in my power 

fulfill the first of all the wishes I 
ake for the alliance, this wish would be 
at NATO should forever enjoy the 
(lightened leadership which Harry 
mman managed to exercise with such 
ill and drive. Without leadership of 
is caliber, the "disarray" to which 
ference is being made so often now 
ight well become more than just 
shionable speculation. Far be it for me 



ly 1984 



to preach self-satisfaction, but I am 
firmly convinced that our shared in- 
terests and values far outweigh our dif- 
ferences here or there. When all is said 
and done, in an alliance of sovereign na- 
tions differences are perfectly natural, 
and in any case we possess suitable 
machinery for dealing with them. If we 
find ourselves in a difficult international 
situation, responsibility for it can in no 
way be attributed to the alliance. We, 
for our part, have never used our 
weapons, and we will never do so unless 
attacked. As last December's Brussels 
declaration made clear, we have not 
given up our policy of the outstretched 
hand. It really is the other side which 
has complicated the dialogue and which 
seeks, for example, to lay down precon- 
ditions for the resumption of the talks 
on the control of nuclear weapons. 



In the present situation, firm leader- 
ship on either side of the Atlantic is 
more vital than ever. Unavoidably the 
greater part of that burden rests with 
the United States. It must exercise 
leadership at home to preserve a solid 
domestic constituency for the NATO 
commitment, and within the alliance, 
itself, to foster transatlantic harmony. 
Within the alliance, Washington has 
traditionally been more attentive to 
European viewpoints and sensitivities 
than it usually receives credit for but 
still more is required. Simply put, the 
United States must make a greater ef- 
fort to order what it sees as NATO's 
priorities, to consult the other allies 
about them before they become full- 
blown U.S. national policy objectives, 
and to deepen its grasp of the political, 
economic, and social determinants of 



35th Anniversary of NATO 



PROCLAMATION 5158, 
MAR. 6, 1984 1 

Thirty-five years ago, on April 4, 1949, the 
North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Wash- 
ington. Established in the dark aftermath of 
the most destructive war the world had ever 
seen, the NATO Alliance represents a living 
commitment of the nations of the West to the 
defense of democracy and individual liberty. 
By uniting Europe and North America in this 
way, it has deterred war between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact for three and a half decades 
and made possible the longest period of peace 
and prosperity in modern history. 

This success has not been won without 
effort. Throughout its history, the NATO 
Alliance has been challenged by the military 
power and political ambitions of the Soviet 
Union. Yet, in every decade, the nations of the 
Alliance have consistently pulled together to 
maintain peace through their collective 
strength and determination. On the basis of 
that strength and unity, the nations of the 
Alliance also have taken the initiative to seek a 
more constructive relationship with the Soviet 
Union. 

Over the years, NATO has grown from its 
original twelve members to include Greece, 
Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and, most recently, Spain. It has demonstrated 
a capacity to adapt to evolving political and 
security challenges and to meet the changing 
needs of its members. The Alliance's commit- 
ment to collective security has been sustained 
through full democratic respect for the 
sovereign independence of each member. 



I am proud to rededicate the United States 
to the ideals and responsibilities of our 
Alliance. In May, the United States will host 
in Washington the spring meeting of NATO 
foreign ministers. This will be a special oppor- 
tunity to celebrate the thirty-fifth anniversary 
of our common enterprise and to consider the 
future challenges facing the transatlantic part- 
nership. I call upon the Congress and people of 
the United States to join me in expressing our 
support for a bond which has served us so well 
over the years and which will continue to be 
essential to our welfare in the future. 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, 
President of the United States of America, do 
hereby direct the attention of the Nation to 
this thirth-fifth anniversary of the signing of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, and I call upon the 
Governors of the States and upon the officers 
of local governments to facilitate the suitable 
observance of this notable event throughout 
this anniversary year with particular attention 
to April, the month which marks the historic 
signing ceremony, and May, the month which 
marks the meeting of the North Atlantic Coun- 
cil in Washington. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto 
set my hand this 6th day of March, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, 
and of the Independence of the United States 
of America the two hundred and eighth. 

RONALD REAGAN 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 12, 1984 I 



contemporary European attitudes and of 
how best to influence positively those at- 
titudes. 

If there is a need for a more 
sophisticated U.S. appreciation for 
European political imperatives, it is at 
least matched by a requirement for 
greater European understanding of the 
dynamics of U.S. politics. It is equally 
important that European political 
leaders be more assertive in forthrightly 
explaining to their electorates why there 
is no substitute on the horizon for a 
strong transatlantic security partnership 
and to contradict the pernicious notion 
that Washington and Moscow somehow 
share equal blame for all the ills in the 
East- West relationship. They must ac- 
tively rebut such illusions as the one that 
holds that it is possible simultaneously to 
be for NATO and against full implemen- 
tation of the December 1979 decision on 
nuclear force modernization. They must 
speak out with greater clarity on the 
essentials of balanced arms control 
policies and give greater publicity to the 
enormous effort invested by the allies, 
including the United States, in devising 
equitable proposals and to the largely 
cynical and manipulative Soviet response 
to that effort. 

Given the sort of leadership, I have 
just described, I believe all of us can 
look forward with optimism to NATO's 
future. My own confidence in its future 
has been reinforced by how well the 
alliance has done and how fortunate it 
has been in the choice of my successor. 
Having begun these remarks with a 
salute to a great Western statesman of 
the past, I take pleasure in concluding 
them with the wish that a great 
Western statesman of the present, Lord 
Carrington, will prosper in his new of- 
fice and that he will enjoy the same sup- 
port, cooperation, and kindness that I 
have unfailingly received during my own 
term as the Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 



President Reagan hosts a dinner at the 
White House on May .'10, 1984, for the 
North Atlantic Council ministers and 
presents the Medal of Freedom to NATO 
Secretary General Luns. 



DINNER TOASTS, 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
MAY 30, 1984 3 

President Reagan 

It's an honor and a pleasure to welcome 
our NATO partners to the White House. 
This evening has been a special oppor- 
tunity to celebrate the unprecedented 
success of our enduring friendship, our 
partnership, an alliance dedicated to 
peace and freedom. 

Thirty-five years ago, in the troubled 
aftermath of a tragic conflict, 12 nations 
met here in Washington to sign the 
North Atlantic Treaty. That event was 
an act of realism. The member nations 
recognized the threat to their security 
and undertook to meet it together. 

The establishment of the North 
Atlantic alliance was also an act of op- 
timism—an affirmation of the enduring 
vitality of western civilization. Thirty- 
five years of peace, with freedom, 
testified to the wisdom and the foresight 
of those nations and of the four other 
nations which have since joined NATO. 

Although the founders could not 
have forseen the dramatic changes that 
have taken place since 1949, their vision 
was right on the mark. By uniting 
Europe and North America, NATO has 
made possible the longest period of 
peace and prosperity in modern history. 
And today our proud alliance remains 



united in its commitment to the defense 
of democracy and individual liberty. 

We cannot be content with the ac- 
complishments of the past. As we look 
ahead, there are compelling reasons to 
strengthen, even further, our solidarity 
and unity. Our commitment to collective 
security will continue to be an indispen- 
sable bulwark against aggression, ter- 
rorism, and tyranny. 

Our unity will be the essential 
framework for building a constructive 
dialogue with our adversaries and reduc- 
ing the risks of war and the level of 
nuclear arms. And I know that it will be 
our societies, the democracies, that will 
offer a bright and hopeful future for our* 
people and for people everywhere. 

We can be confident. The events of 
the past year challenged us. And the 
Western democracies stood firm in the 
face of an intense Soviet campaign of in 
timidation, aimed at undermining 
NATO's commitment to defend Europe 
and preserve peace. Today we are 
stronger and more conscious of our uni- 
ty. And that's of crucial importance, 
because when the Soviet Union becomes 
convinced that NATO cannot be shaken 
it may finally realize it has a clear and 
compelling interest to return to the 
negotiating table. We will be waiting, 
ready to meet them halfway. 

Tonight is more than a celebration 
of an anniversary. It's also an opportun 
ty to recognize the special contributions 
of our Secretary General. Joseph Luns 





FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



is a distinguished diplomat and a man of 
| many virtues. 

First, as the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, and then, at NATO's helm, he's 
been at the center of the transatlantic 
bridge for nearly 30 years. His vision, 
his humor, and his patience have sus- 
tained us in good times and bad. As 
Secretary General, he's never lost sight 
of the goals and objectives of our 
alliance, and peace has been his profes- 
sion. 

You have been a trusted friend, an 
honest broker, a respected colleague, 
and, above all, an invaluable leader of 
the Atlantic alliance. Joseph, you've said 
that the state of our alliance is like 
Wagner's music, better than it sounds. 
'Laughter] 

I must tell you that, thanks largely 
to your efforts, I rather like the way the 
illiance sounds. And I hope that, even in 
-etirement, you will still watch over our 
Dartnership and that you will not 
lesitate to share your counsel with us. 

In recognition of Joseph Luns' un- 
common dedication to the ideals of our 
alliance and in tribute to his outstanding 
! service and enduring contributions to 
>ur freedom and security, it is my great 
>rivilege to bestow America's highest 
■ivilian award — the Medal of Free- 
dom — on Secretary General Luns. 

But, before I invite him to receive 
ihe medal, I would ask that you raise 
our glasses and join me in a toast to 
Secretary General Joseph Luns and to 
he organization he has faithfully served 
.nd so ably guided. 

secretary General Luns 

feel greatly flattered, deeply honored, 
nmensely proud by having received 
rom your hands this very special award, 
/hich I value highly and for which I am 
lery, very grateful. Thank you very 
luch indeed. 

May I say that I have now been 
early 13 years Secretary General of 
nis great organization, and looking back 
n those 13 years, I must and I want to 
ratefully acknowledge the immense role 
ie United States has played in this 
lliance. Far from being a hegemonic 
ower, far from imposing your wishes 
nd your will on your allies in an alliance 
here every decision must be taken by 
lanimity, you have always taken into 



, 



NATO is unique in many respects. Of these, the most 
important by far is our common support of spiritual and 
moral values. . . . All of us are devoted to the twin ideals of 
peace and justice, neither of which can live lony without the 
other. 

President Eisenhower 
April 2, 1959 



account the views and the opinions of 
your European allies. And it is simply a 
truism to say that without the presence 
of more than 300,000 of your sons in 
Europe, the world would be a far worse 
place than it is now. And I would not be 
standing here and— nor would be the 16 
ministers of this alliance who have 
gathered here in Washington to have 
our yearly conclave, where, I must say, 
we had an excellent, excellent exchange 
of views. 

The fact that your Secretary of 
State, Mr. George Shultz, and Mr. 
Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of 
Defense, are among your guests, as well 
as so many distinguished people, whom I 
have known — some of whom for a long 
time, and some who have become per- 
sonal friends of mine — and I look at 
Tapley Bennett, who is now an Assist- 
ant Secretary of the State Department 
[former U.S. Ambassador to NATO], 
and so many others I could 
name -makes, of course, this evening 
even more special than it is. Mr. Presi- 
dent. 

I could go on telling you, the guests 
here and the ministers of the alliance, 
that we have gone through somewhat 
difficult times and that we have gone 
through very good times. 

Let me say that if I had left this 
alliance last year, this time, I would be 
less confident, less optistimic. But the 
fact that the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy 
have started to station on their territory 
the modernized missiles in order to 
counter the set of the SS-20s and, 
thereby, restoring the credibility of our 
nuclear details. And on that credibility, 
Mr. President — you have said it often 
and I repeat it— the peace of this world 
rests. And the President l'honneur Mon- 
sieur Cheysson, said it yesterday and 



has repeated it today. I, therefore, 
repeat, I go with a certain optimism. 

I am not pretending that I am 
deliriously happy to lay down my job as 
Secretary General. [Laughter] If I were 
to say what I feel, I would say, I am 
somewhat content. [Laughter] That is, 
perhaps, already an overstatement. But 
let me say that all the various positions I 
have held in life — like Secretary of State 
of the Netherlands, and I was for 14 
years a diplomat — the most rewarding, 
the most rich position, rich in achieve- 
ment, and important in what the alliance 
has done, has been that I was chosen in 
1971 to serve this great alliance, the 
greatest, the most important alliance 
and organization for peace the world has 
known. And you are quite right, Mr. 
President, that the peace has been 
preserved for a far longer period, cer- 
tainly in Europe, than we could have 
hoped for in the days after the last war. 

May I end by saying that we are all 
deeply grateful for your unflinching sup- 
port for the alliance. You have shown it 
over and over again. And let me say, 
too, that I will always treasure this very 
special award, which I will, for the days 
which will still be with me, I hope, 
always see as one of the most important 
and the most precious awards which was 
ever bestowed on me. Thank you very 
much, Mr. President. All the best to you 
and to that great nation, the United 
States of America. 



Jly 1984 




PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
MAY 31, 1984 4 



It has been a pleasure and an honor to 
welcome the ministers of the North 
Atlantic Council to the White House. 
And I'm so pleased that the United 
States is hosting this meeting because 
we're also celebrating the 35th anniver- 
sary of the signing in Washington of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. 

Last night at dinner and again this 
morning, we had the opportunity to 
discuss the major challenges facing tin 1 
alliance, including the security and 
defense of the West, relations with the 
Soviet Union, and arms control. 

We all recognize that there is no 
more important consideration than the 
development of a better working rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union — one 
marked by greater cooperation and 
understanding and leading to stable, 



secure, and peaceful relations. This has 
been and will continue to be a primary 
goal of the United States and the NATO 
alliance. The alliance is dedicated to 
peace. And thanks to the courage and 
vision of our member nations and their 
leaders, we can reflect on the past with 
pride and look to the future with con- 
fidence. 

For us, our NATO partnership is an 
anchor, a fixed point in a turbulent 
world. And it's our sincere hope that the 
Soviet Union will soon come to under- 
stand the profound desire for peace 
which inspires us. And I hope that the 
Soviet leadership will finally realize it is 
pointless to continue its efforts to divide 
the alliance. We will not be split. We 
will not be intimidated. The West will 
defend democracy and individual liberty. 
And the West will protect the peace. 

At the same time, we remain ready 
to negotiate fairly and flexibly ami 
without preconditions. It is our hope 
that the Soviet Union will soon return to 



President Reagan meets with Secretary 
(Jeneral Luns and the NATO Foreign 
Ministers in the Cabinet Room at the 
White House on Mav 31, 1984. 



h 
It 

] <■ 
i(| 
»e 
itl 



the negotiating table. Our commitment 
to dialogue and arms reduction is firm 
and unshaken. No other step in the nea « 
term would do so much for the cause of 
peace and stability as a return to con- 
structive negotiations and agreements 
reducing the levels of nuclear arms. 

I've said many times and will say 
again that when the Soviet Union 
returns to the negotiating table, we'll 
meet them halfway. I also hope that th< 
Soviet leadership will respond positively 
to the range of proposals which we and 
our allies have advanced in other areas 
of arms control. 

Our proposals serve the cause of 
peace: the draft treaty to abolish 
chemical weapons presented by Vice 
President Bush in Geneva, the recent 



m 
Diet 

lelai 



Mil : 
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- til 

■'*■-: 



Department of State Bullet 







FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



NATO proposal seeking to break the 
deadlock in the conventional force talks 
in Vienna, and the measures introduced 
by NATO in Stockholm in our effort to 
reduce the risk of surprise attack in 
Europe. 

Tomorrow I will leave for Europe. 
I'm looking forward to the trip and the 
opportunity to underscore the enduring 
importance of the political, cultural, and 
economic ties that bind the industrial 
democracies. 

The meeting of NATO Foreign 
Ministers has reinforced my own con- 
fidence in the strength and durability of 
the alliance and the common destiny of 
free societies. And, so, I want to thank 
all these NATO ministers. We're pleased 
to have had all of you with us as our 
guests and proud to have you as our 
partners. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
MAY 31, 1984 5 



The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
Session in Washington, D.C., on 29th, 30th 
und 31st May, 1984. Ministers agreed as 
ollows: 

1. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 
Vashington on 4th April, 1949, continues to 
ulfill the expectations of the Allies. It is a 
najor factor for peace and stability in an era 

I 'f world-wide change and numerous conflicts. 

I ''he strength of the Alliance and the solidari- 
y born of shared values and reinforced by 
he practice of consultation between its 
overeign member states have secured peace 
i the Treaty area and the freedom of its 

leoples. 

2. The Atlantic Alliance is a defensive 
I dliance. None of its weapons will ever be 

I sed except in response to attack. The firm 
| dherence of members of the Alliance to their 
ommitments under the North Atlantic 

reaty, the United Nations Charter and the 
lelsinki Final Act contributes to the 
laintenance of peace and to the strengthen- 
ig of international law. Faced with the con- 
inued expansion of Soviet military strength 
eyond reasonable defence needs, the Allies 
re determined to safeguard their legitimate 
ecurity interests. They look to the Soviet 

nion to respect these as the Allies respect 
ne legitimate security interests of the Soviet 
Inion. 

Without seeking superiority, the Allies 

ill maintain the conventional and nuclear 
circes necessary to deter and defend against 
ggression and to resist attempts at intimida- 



te of the Atlantic community are the single most effec- 
tive obstacle between tyranny and its desire to dominate the 
world. Our historic bonds of friendship have been 
strengthened by common values and a common goal— the 
creation of a world where free men can live at peace and in 
dignity, liberated from the bonds of hunger, poverty, and 
ignorance. 

President Kennedy 
February 15, 1961 



tion. To this end they will continue to seek 
more effective and balanced transatlantic ar- 
maments co-operation, bearing in mind the 
need for efficiency, economy of costs and ex- 
ploiting and sharing of emergency 
technologies. 

3. Ministers took note of the thorough 
appraisal called for at their last meeting with 
a view to achieving a more constructive East- 
West dialogue. They issued the "Washington 
Statement on East- West Relations." They 
reaffirmed their continued intention to work 
for genuine detente through building up more 
contacts and co-operation with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, 
while maintaining effective defence and firm 
political resolve. The aim of the Allies re- 
mains the establishment of a stable, long- 
term relationship based on mutual trust and 
understanding, and on respect for sovereign- 
ty, self-determination and human rights. 
They do not accept the Soviet view that con- 
frontation between the social systems of East 
and West is inescapable. All states should 
work resolutely to realise the hopes of the 
peoples of the world for peace and progress, 
and to dissipate the common fears of war and 
misery. 

4. Both the achievement of balanced 
arms control agreements and the restoration 
of confidence in East-West relations would 
reduce the risks of conflict and provide an en- 
during basis for peaceful progress. 

5. The members of the Alliance are com- 
mitted to ensure security by a balance of 
forces at the lowest possible level. In con- 
sultation with the Allies concerned, the 
Government of the United States has made a 
comprehensive series of proposals in the In- 
termediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) at 
Geneva for substantial reductions leading to 
arms control agreements which would be 
balanced, equitable and verifiable. The Allies 
concerned have offered to halt, reverse or 
modify deployments of US-INF— including 
the removal and dismantling of missiles 
already deployed to Europe — on the basis of 



concrete results at the negotiating table. 
They call upon the Soviet Union to resume 
negotiations on nuclear forces without 
preconditions or delay. In the absence of con- 
crete negotiated results, longer-range INF 
missiles are being deployed in accordance 
with the December 1979 decision, all parts of 
which are of equal importance. 

6. The policy of the Alliance is to main- 
tain nuclear weapons at the lowest level 
possible for effective deterrence. The Allies 
concerned withdrew 1,000 nuclear weapons 
from Western Europe in 1980 and will over 
the next few years withdraw another 1,400, 
as well as one weapon for every Pershing II 
and cruise missile deployed. The resulting 
stockpile will be the lowest in Europe for 
some 20 years. 

7. In the Conference on Disarmament 
the Allies continue to seek balanced, realistic 
and verifiable disarmament measures. They 
welcome the contributions made by several 
Allies, in particular the comprehensive draft 
treaty submitted by the United States for a 
worldwide verifiable ban on the production, 
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The 
Conference on Disarmament is the forum 
where an effective ban on chemical weapons 
can be negotiated, and the Allies will work 
seriously to that end. 

The Allies remain gravely concerned 
about strong evidence of the use of chemical 
weapons in South-East Asia and Afghanistan, 
in violation of international law, and of Soviet 
involvement in the use of such weapons. With 
regard to recent developments in the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq, they reiterate their 
categorical condemnation of any use of these 
weapons. 6 

The Allies have also proposed that the 
Conference on Disarmament identify, in the 
first instance, through substantive examina- 
tion, issues relevant to the prevention of an 
arms race in outer space. They regret that so 
far the Soviet Union and the Eastern coun- 
tries have opposed the establishment of the 
appropriate working group. 



Uly 1984 



The Allies welcomed the willingness of 
the United States to discuss with the Soviet 
Union research programmes on strategic 
defence. 

8. The Allies participating in the Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 
talks, in accordance with their commitment 
to these negotiations and following a review 
decided upon by Ministers at their meeting 
last December, have tabled a major new pro- 
posal in Vienna. This proposal seeks to 
resolve some of the most basic issues of these 
negotiations, in particular on the long- 
standing question of obtaining a satisfactory 
data base, and offers a new approach to the 
reductions and limitations process. If the 
East is prepared to match the flexibility 
demonstrated by the West in the new ini- 
tiative, it will be possible for real progress to 
be made towards an MBFR agreement that 
provides for substantial, verifiable reductions 
of personnel to equal collective levels of 
ground forces and parity of combined ground 
and air forces in Central Europe. 

9. The Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid 
Concluding Document are foundations on 
which to build constructive relations. The 
Allies reaffirm their commitment to the full 
and effective implementation by all states 
participating in the process initiated by the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) of the principles which par- 
ticipating states have undertaken to respect 
in their relations with each other. All prin- 
ciples and provisions agreed in Helsinki and 
Madrid, including those concerning relations 
between states, human rights and contracts 
between individuals, must be implemented. 
The Allies are especially concerned over 
disregard, in particular by the Soviet Union, 
of the humanitarian provisions, which affects 
not only internationally known personalities 
but also a great many others. 

In the continuing CSCE process the 
members of the Alliance will pursue efforts 
to conduct an in-depth dialogue and develop 
co-operation between all participating states. 

At the Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm the Allies at 
the outset tabled concrete proposals in con- 
formity with the mandate agreed at the 
Madrid CSCE Follow-up Conference. These 
proposals call for an agreement on measures 
designed to build confidence and increase 
security through openness about armed 
forces and military activities throughout the 
whole of Europe so as to reduce the risk of 
miscalculation or the possibility of surprise 
attack. In order to give further effect and ex- 
pression to the existing duty of all par- 
ticipating states to refrain from the threat or 
use of force in their mutual relations, agree- 
ment would be necessary on the above con- 
crete measures in accordance with the 
Madrid mandate. 



10 




French Foreign Minister Cheysson, NATO Secretary General Luns, Secretary Shultz, and 
Vice President Bush. 



10. The situation in Poland and in par- 
ticular the recent increase in the number of 
political prisoners continues to give cause for 
serious concern. The Allies call upon the 
Polish authorities to respect the aspirations 
of the people for reform and dialogue and to 
abide by the commitments in the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Docu- 
ment, particularly with regard to trade union 
freedom and human rights. The Allies remain 
ready to respond to steps which create the 
opportunity for constructive political and 
economic relations with the West. 

11. The Allies condemn the massive 
devastation and suffering inflicted on the 
civilian population by the Soviet military 
presence in Afghanistan. Increasingly severe 
attacks such as the latest assault on Panjshir 
suggest the Soviet Union is stepping up its 
brutal campaign. This is in violation of fun- 
damental principles of international law, the 
United Nations Charter and the Helsinki 
Final Act and in flagrant defiance of 
repeated calls by the United Nations General 
Assembly for the immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops, the restoration of 
Afghanistan's independence and non aligned 
status, self-determination for the Afghan peo- 
ple and the voluntary return of refugees to 
their homes in safety and honour. It is for 
the Soviet Union t<> honour its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter, to 
withdraw its troops immediately and to allow 
the Afghan people to determine their own 
future. 

12. The niaintenanci n nation 
in and around Berlin, including unimpeded 
traffic on all the access routes to the city re- 



mains of fundamental importance for East- 
West relations. The Allies welcome the ef- 
forts of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
strengthen Berlin's economy. 

They also express the hope that the con- 
tinuation of the Federal Government's 
dialogue with the GDR, together with its ef- 
forts to achieve further practical progress in 
inner-German relations and in improvements 
for travel in both directions, will directly 
benefit Berlin and the Germans in both 
states. 

13. Trade conducted on the basis of com- 
mercially sound terms and mutual advantage 
that avoids preferential treatment of the 
Soviet Union, contributes to constructive 
East-West relations. At the same time, 
bilateral economic relations with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe 
must remain consistent with broad Allied 
security concerns. These include avoiding 
dependence on the Soviet Union, or con- 
tributing to Soviet military capabilities. Thus 
development of Western energy resources 
should be encouraged. In order to avoid fur- 
ther use by the Soviet Union of some forms 
of trade to enhance its military strength, the 
Allies will remain vigilant in their continuing 
review of the security aspects of East-West 
economic relations. This work will assist 
Allied governments in the conduct of their 
policies in this field. 

14. The Alliance, which respects the 
sovereignty and legitimate interests of all 
states, works for peace, security and develop 
ment. Its member countries seek to expand 
economic and cultural relations with all coun 
tries and are committed to give assistance tc 



Department of State Bulletli 



s 

ii 






pre 

■ 

(fr, 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



developing nations, believing these policies 
are mutually beneficial and contribute to 
peaceful evolution. They consider respect for 
genuine non-alignment by all states an impor- 
tant contribution to international stability. 

The Allies recognise that events outside 
the Treaty area may affect their common in- 
terests as members of the Alliance. They will 
engage in timely consultations on such 
events, if it is established that their common 
interests are involved. Sufficient military 
capabilities must be assured in the Treaty 
area to maintain an adequate defence 
oosture. Allies who are in a position to do so 
ivill endeavour to support those sovereign na- 
;ions who request assistance in countering 
hreats to their security and independence. 
Those Allies in a position to facilitate the 
leployment of forces outside the Treaty area 
nay do so, on the basis of national decision. 

15. The Allies recall their commitment 
inder Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
.nd reaffirm the importance of programmes 
ntended to benefit the economies of less 
avoured partners who need aid for develop- 
ment. 

16. The Allies remain seriously con- 
erned about acts of international terrorism, 
n accordance with the relevant provision of 
ne Bonn Declaration, they reiterate their 
etermination to take effective measures for 
ie prevention and suppression of such 
riminal acts, which are a threat to the 
emocratic institutions they are pledged to 
efend, to stability and to the conduct of in- 
;rnational relations. 

17. The next regular meeting of the 
orth Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session 
ill be held in Brussels in December 1984. 

As on previous occasions, the Spanish 
inister of Foreign Affairs reserved his 
overnor's position on the present Communi- 
ae. 

Denmark and Greece reserve their posi- 
Dns on the INF part of this Communique. 

The Foreign Ministers paid tribute to the 
•parting Secretary General of the North 
tlantic Treaty Organization, Dr. Joseph 
jns, who is retiring after devoting a major 
irtion of his professional life to upholding 
estern security through the Alliance. Dur- 
g his thirteen years as Secretary General, 

Luns has made uniquely important con- 
ibutions to co-operation among individual 
Hies and to the cause of Allied unity. The 
jreign Ministers expressed their profound 
preciation of Dr. Luns' outstanding serv- 
es to the Alliance and to the cause of peace 
d freedom. 



What is our view of NATO today? We see it not as an 
alliance to make war but as an alliance to keep peace. . . . 
While NATO rests on the reality that we must fight together 
if war should come to the Atlantic area, it rests also on the 
reality that war will not come if we act together during 
peace. 

President Johnson 
March 23, 1966 



ANNEX TO 

FINAL COMMUNIQUE 7 



In addition to the Communique, the Foreign 
Ministers decided to publish the following ex- 
tracts from the Minutes of their Meeting on 
29th, 30th, and 31st May, 1984. 

Armaments Co-operation 

Ministers examined the report by the Con- 
ference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD). They noted steps taken to improve 
CNAD armaments planning procedures, and 
to exploit emerging technologies in selected 
high priority multinational equipment pro- 
grammes whereby co-operative development 
and procurement should be envisaged to the 
maximum extent possible. They further noted 
progress made by the CNAD in a number of 
potential co-operative programmes, and 
welcomed in particular the recent signature, 
by all the parties concerned, of a Memoran- 
dum of Understanding for the NATO Frigate 
Replacement Study. Ministers reviewed fur- 
ther progress achieved in the Transatlantic 
Dialogue, which offered prospects for an 
enhanced framework of transatlantic co- 
operation. They reaffirmed the importance of 
preventing the transfer of militarily relevant 
technology to the Warsaw Pact countries. 

Economic Co-operation and 
Assistance Within the Alliance 

Regretting the persistent differences be- 
tween the various member countries of the 
Alliance in their standard of living and aware 
that its less prosperous member countries 
suffer much more from the continuing world 
economic difficulties than the rest of the 
Alliance, Ministers took note of the Secretary 
General's report on "Economic Co-operation 
and Assistance Within the Alliance" which 
calls upon the more prosperous members to 
take better account of the development needs 
of Portugal, Turkey and Greece. 



ily 1984 



NATO Science Programme 

Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress 
of the "Science for Stability" Programme 
aimed at mobilizing the human and institu- 
tional resources of Greece, Portugal and 
Turkey on advanced technological projects of 
economic relevance. This Programme, jointly 
funded since 1981 by NATO and the three 
countries concerned, has already achieved 
some significant results. A review of the Pro- 
gramme's future and possible follow-on will 
be considered in 1985. 

The Situation in the Mediterranean 

Ministers noted the report on the situation in 
the Mediterranean. In view of the actual and 
potential impact on Alliance security of 
events in the area, they requested the Coun- 
cil in Permanent Session to continue to con- 
sult on the question and to submit further 
reports at their future meetings. 



WASHINGTON STATEMENT 
ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 
MAY 31, 1984 8 



1. At their meeting in December 1983 the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member 
countries of the Alliance, on the initiative of 
the Foreign Minister of Belgium, decided that 
the Council should undertake an appraisal of 
East- West relations with a view to achieving 
a more constructive East- West dialogue. 

2. The appraisal has confirmed the con- 
tinuing validity of the balanced approach con- 
tained in the Harmel Report of 1967. To en- 
sure the security of members of the Alliance, 
the most appropriate long-term policies are 
the maintenance of adequate military 
strength and political solidarity and, on that 
basis, the pursuit of a more stable relation- 
ship between the countries of East and West 
through dialogue and co-operation. These 



11 



f T m l 







Foreign Ministers (left to right): 
Giulio Andreotti (Italy) 
Geir Hallgrimsson (Iceland) 
Ioannis Haralambopoulos (Greece) 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher (West Germany) 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) 

elements are complementary; dialogue can 
only be fruitful if each party is confident of 
its security and is prepared to respect the 
legitimate interests of others: military 
strength alone cannot guarantee a peaceful 
future. Experience points to the continuing 
need for full, consistent and realistic im- 
plementation of the two main tasks of the 
Alliance set out in the Harmel Report. 

3. In pursuit of this approach the Allies 
sought to alleviate sources of tension and to 
create a propitious climate for expanded co- 
operation. Steps such as the Berlin 
Quadripartite Agreement, improvements in 
relations between the two German states 
with positive results for individuals, the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I ac- 
cords including the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty and the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) were the fruits of this policy. 
However, progress towards the expansion of 
human contacts and human freedoms remains 
unsatisfactory. Individuals have nonetheless 
benefitted from increased opportunities for 
contacts and communication. 

4. At the same time, the Soviet Union 
engaged in a massive military build-up. This 
poses a continuing threat to Alliance security 
and vital Western interests. The Soviet 

I i i has sought to exploit any apparent 



12 



Allan J. MacEachen (Canada) 
Leo Tindemans (Belgium) 
Claude Cheysson (France) 
Secretary General Joseph M.A.H. 
George P. Shultz (U.S.) 
Sir Geoffrey Howe (U.K.) 



Luns 



weakness which it has perceived on the part 
of the Alliance. Further, Allied restraint has 
not been met with reciprocal restraint by the 
Soviets. Instead they have pursued a 
relentless campaign to breach the solidarity 
of the Alliance. Soviet willingness to threaten 
or use military power for political ends has 
been exemplified most notably in the invasion 
of Afghanistan and pressure on Poland. 9 

5. Notwithstanding continuing fundamen- 
tal differences between countries in East and 
West, the Allies remain convinced that there 
exist areas where common interests should 
prevail. These include the need to safeguard 
peace, to build confidence, to increase securi- 
ty, to improve mechanisms for dealing with 
crises, and to promote prosperity. To this 
end, the Allies remain determined to build 
upon these and other areas of common in- 
terest in pursuing their efforts to promote 
more constructive dialogue and co-operation 
with the members of the Warsaw Pact with a 
view to achieving genuine detente. 

6. The Allies support the continuation 
and strengthening of the CSCE process 
which represents an important means of pro- 
moting stable and constructive East-West 
relations on a long-term basis. They insist on 
the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act 
and the Madrid concluding document in all 
their parts. While important agreements have 




Vahit Halefoglu (Turkey) 

Fernando Moran Lopez (Spain) 

Jaime Gama (Portugal) 

Svenn Stray (Norway) 

Hans van den Broek (Netherlands) 

Colette Flesch (Luxembourg) 



• 



been reached within the CSCE framework, 
much remains to be done. Any improvement 
in East-West relations would be incomplete if 
individuals were not able to benefit from 
greater respect for human rights and in- 
creased human contacts. 

7. The Allies will continue to be guided 
by the awareness of a common history and 
traditions of all European peoples. Given the 
continuing division in Europe and particularly 
Germany, the Alliance continues to support 
the political aim of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to work towards a state of peace in 
Europe in which the German people regains 
its unity through free self-determination. 

8. Neither side must seek unilateral ad- 
vantage, military superiority or dominance 
over other states. Mutual respect for each 
other's security on the basis of equality of 
rights, non-use of forces as called for in the 
United Nations Charter and other current in- 
ternational agreements, restraint, and 
respect for international rules of conduct are 
essential for strengthening confidence and co 
operation 

9. The Allies respect the sovereignty and 
independence of states everywhere and genu- 
ine non-alignment. This is reflected in their 
political, economic and aid relations with 



Be 
■■ 
v 
IB 
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I"-' i 



Were 
(in 



other countries. Responsible Soviet behaviotu '. 



Department of State Bulletir 



ii 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



world-wide would be an important contribu- 
tion to a durable improvement in East- West 
relations. 

10. The Allies recognise that, as 
members of the Alliance, their vital security 
interests can be affected by developments 
outside the Treaty area. They will engage in 
timely consultations on such developments. 
They underline the responsibility of all states 
to prevent the transfer of East-West dif- 
ferences to the regions of the Third World. 
They would like to see the benefits of peace, 
stability, human rights and freedom from in- 
terference which they themselves have en- 
joyed for over 35 years secured in other 
areas of the world as well. 

11. On a basis of unity of purpose and 
issured security, the Allies reaffirm their of- 
'ers to improve East-West relations, made 
■nost recently in the Declaration of Brussels 
)f 9th December 1983. They propose that 
jarticular efforts be devoted to the following: 

(a) dialogue, co-operation and contacts at 
ill levels on the full range of questions be- 
ween East and West— including political and 
ecurity problems, human rights and bilateral 
natters— aimed at mutual understanding, 
dentifying common interests, clarifying ob- 
ectives, expanding areas of agreement and 
•esolving or isolating areas of disagreement; 

(b) mutually advantageous trade and 
conomic co-operation with Warsaw Pact 
■nembers on commercially sound terms which 
>re consistent with Allies' broad security con- 
<erns, which include avoidance of con- 
-ibuting to Soviet military strength; 

(c) achieving security at the lowest possi- 
<le level of forces through balanced, equitable 
nd verifiable agreements on concrete arms 
jntrol, disarmament and confidence building 
leasures. 

To these ends, the Allies concerned will 
mtinue in particular: 

(i) to emphasize the readiness of the 
nited States to resume bilateral negotia- 
ons on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
~ ~F) and Strategic Arms Reductions 
TART) with the Soviet Union at any time 
ithout preconditions and to call on the 
oviet Union to return to the negotiating 
ible; 10 

(ii) to work for progress at the Mutual 
id Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 
jgotiations where they have recently made 
?w proposals to break the impasse on con- 
mtional force reductions; 

(iii) to urge the world-wide elimination of 
lemical weapons which is the objective of 
te United States draft Treaty tabled at the 
onference on Disarmament; 

(iv) to press at the Stockholm Conference 
DE) for agreement on concrete measures, 
: proposed by the Allies, designed to build 
mfidence and ensure the openness of 
ilitary activities in the whole of Europe, 



Jly 1984 



. . . we must build an alliance strong enough to deter 
those who might threaten war, close enough to provide for 
continuous and far-reaching consultation, trusting enough 
to accept the diversitg of views, realistic enough to deal 
with the world as it is, and flexible enough to explore new 
channels of constructive cooperation. 

President Nixon 
April 10, 1969 



thus reducing the risk of surprise attack and 
the threat of war. In order to give further ef- 
fect and expression to the existing duty of all 
participating states to refrain from the threat 
or use of force in their mutual relations, 
agreement would be necessary on the above 
concrete measures in accordance with the 
Madrid mandate. 

12. The purpose of the Alliance is ex- 
clusively defensive; none of its weapons will 
ever be used except in response to attack. 
The Alliance does not aspire to superiority, 
but seeks a stable balance of forces. Defence 
and arms control are integral parts of the 
security policy of the Alliance. The legitimate 
security interests of all countries must be 
respected on a reciprocal basis. The cohesion 
and security of the Alliance, based on a firm 
linkage between its European and North 
American members, and reinforced by close 
consultations, remain the foundation for the 
protection of their common interests and 
values. In the course of carrying out their ap- 
praisals, the Allies have confirmed their con- 
sensus on the conduct of East- West relations 
and their commitment to a constructive East- 
West dialogue. 

13. Peace and stability require a united 
effort: the Allies look to the Soviet Union 
and the other Warsaw Pact countries to join 
in an endeavour which would be of benefit to 
the world at large. The Allies are prepared to 
do their part and are ready to examine any 
reasonable proposal. A long-term, construc- 
tive and realistic relationship can then be 
brought about. 



SECRETARY SHULTZ'S 
NEWS CONFERENCE, 
MAY 31, 1984 11 



We just finished a meeting of immense 
significance, significance for the cause of 
peace and for the value of freedom. 

We met at a time when, once again, 
the Soviet Union seems to have decided 
on a policy of chilling its relations with 
the West, so it is a time of some testing. 
The meeting reviewed, among other 
things, an extensive study of East- West 
relations that was called for in our 
meeting in Brussels last December and 
approved the report and issued a com- 
munique and statement on East-West 
relations that reflects it and reflects the 
continued view of the alliance that the 
cause of freedom and peace is served by 
a set of policies that involved, first of 
all, strength on our part; second, 
political solidarity; and building on those 
fundamentals a continued willingness to 
undertake a constructive dialogue with 
the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe. 

There was, throughout our meeting, 
a very free and full and interesting ex- 
change of ideas, and a sort of quiet con- 
fidence that the alliance for 35 years has 
been basically on the right track, and 
that track remains the right one. It 
represents a strategy and a set of ac- 
tions that have worked. As they are con- 
tinually adapted to the new circum- 
stances, we'll continue in the future to 
serve the causes of peace and freedom. 



13 



Q. The Washington declaration, 
which we have just had a chance to 
see, states that the allies are deter- 
mined to build on areas of common in- 
terests in promoting constructive 
dialogue and cooperation. What areas 
are there of common interests at the 
moment in which the allies and the 
Soviet Union can engage in construc- 
tive dialogue and cooperation, 
understanding that the nuclear 
weapons talks, the INF, talks are not 
among them? 

A. Of course, first of all, there is the 
general clause of peace which we 
assume everyone is interested in. And 
then there are various ways of going 
about assurance of that through negotia- 
tions, and there is quite a list. You men- 
tioned the INF talks, and the START 
talks are in the list; it's in the statement. 
The discussions going on in Stockholm 
are another forum in which we are ad- 
dressing these issues. There are discus- 
sions in Geneva, particularly on chemical 
weapons. There are discussions in Vien- 
na on conventional forces. 

So there is an wide array of areas in 
which these discussions are going for- 
ward, and presumably the fact that 
everyone is represented there shows 
that there is some common interest. 
Beyond that, of course, there are com- 
mon interests in economic development, 
and particularly poignantly for many of 
the countries— Germany especially— the 
common interest in seeing such things 
as contacts among families and the 
human touch so much wanted in a 
divided nation. 

Q. Given the fact that the Soviets 
are not terribly interested in relations 
right now, what is your personal 
evaluation of why that is so? 

A. It's no doubt a part of their 
negotiating strategy, a tactical adaption. 
At least, that is my general view. But 
it's not so important for me to speculate 
about exactly why they are doing what 
they're doing as it is to say, what should 
we be doing. We feel that what we 
should be doing, not only the United 
States but the alliance, is looking to our 
security and deterrent capabilities, in 
sharing our thoughts, and being sure 
that we do have the political solidarity 
that is so essential and continuing to 
reaffirm and to try to implement the 
dialogue that we would like to see. 



14 




Secretary Shultz holds a news conference at the Department of State on May 31, 1984. 
With him are U.S. Ambassador to NATO David Abshire (left) and Department spokesman 
and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs John Hughes (right). 



Of course, we are not just looking 
for dialogue. We are looking for 
dialogue about important subjects and in 
a reasonable way. 

Q. Do you expect, on the basis of 
your conversations with the Dutch 
Foreign Minister, that the Dutch 
Government will agree to proceed 
with INF deployments according to 
the original schedule? 

A. The Dutch Government is having 
its difficulties, as we all know. The 
Dutch Foreign Minister was very strong 
in his views, and I believe he expressed 
himself before he left last night to go 
back. And I understand there is a Dutch 
Cabinet meeting tomorrow, probably on 
this subject. But they are struggling to 
find a way of behaving that is consistent 
with their responsibilities in the alliance 
and meets the political realities that 
they're facing in Holland. But we have 
every confidence that the Dutch will 
play a proper part in the alliance ac- 
tivities. 

Q. We've seen some reports of dif- 
ferences among the allies on the Per- 
sian Gulf question, the security ques- 
tion in the Persian Gulf. Could you ad- 
dress the question of whether it is 
desirable or even obtainable for there 
to be cooperation, any kind of joint ac- 
tion among the allies to provide 
greater security in the gulf? 

A. There wasn't any particular ex- 
pression of difference of opinion at all. 



We discussed the subject in our informal 
session for— I don't know— 20 minutes 
or so and shared information and 
thoughts about it. 

I think it is important to understand 
that NATO has a certain set of respon- 
sibilities. And, obviously, there are 
things that are in the parlance of NATO 
out-of-area that have an impact on all 
the countries concerned. After we have 
finished what you might call the more 
direct NATO discussions, we try to find 
time for discussing these out-of-area 
problems, and the gulf situation was ona 
of them. I don't think that it is ap- 
propriate to expect that NATO, as an 
alliance, would take a view or undertake 
something. But the different countries ir 
the alliance, as countries, have an in- 
terest. We have discussed it during this 
meeting, but we've discussed it before; 
more with some countries than others. 
There are many ways in which the col- 
laboration goes forward and, of course, 
including the countries in the gulf, as 
such, beyond NATO countries. 

Q. In the past, NATO was usually 
flanked by two other Western 
alliances-CENTO [Central Treaty 
Organization] and SEATO [South Eas 
Asia Treaty Organization], Do you 
believe that NATO is able now to 
operate in the area of CENTO as 
before, like when CENTO was there? 

A. You have too many initials and 
ideas going tor me. But I think that the 
point is that the NATO alliance was set! 



Department of State Bulleti 




FEATURE 
NATO Ministerial 



up for certain very important and cen- 
tral purposes to our lives. It has suc- 
ceeded brilliantly and continues to work 
along the same basic principles that 
have worked so well, adapting them, 
studying them as we go along. I think, 
obviously, the different countries, in 
various ways, have relationships and 
alliances with other countries around the 
world, but these are important and 
they're related. But the NATO meeting, 
as such, concentrates on the NATO ac- 
tivities. 

Q. I would like to draw you out a 
little further on this question of what 
you think impels the Soviet Union now 
in its colder and harder line. You gave 
a personal opinion that you thought 
that perhaps this was a part of a new 
negotiating strategy. To achieve 
specifically what objectives? 

A. I don't think I want to get drawn 
n too much into negotiating strategy 
ind speculation about the Soviet Union. 
3ut they have stated objectives on one 
•ccasion or another broadly. And then, 
nore particularly, they have negotiating 
>ositions at the table, and so do we. 
Vhat we want to do is continue to 
•ngage them and try to work out a 
■■easonable solution. 

As the President said this morning, 
n his statement at the White House, the 
Jnited States is ready to meet them half 
vay. I think that is the main point to 
mphasize. And, of course, in many of 
he fora, we are very active. We have 
■JATO proposals on the table in 
Itockholm. We have just tabled — the 
'ice President made a trip to Geneva to 
able a draft treaty on chemical warfare. 
Ve have made a proposal recently on 
he MBFR talks. So there is a very ac- 
ive negotiation taking place, and I don't 
articularly want to characterize the 
articular positions within it. 

Q. You said there are many ways 
i which collaboration goes forward 
mong the allies on the Persian Gulf, 
erhaps in a bilateral way. How is 
hat, in fact, happening, particularly 
gainst the background of the United 
tates arming the Saudis, the French 
rming Iraq, and the United States 
oping that nobody would send arms 
d either of the adversaries, Iraq and 
ran? 

A. There are many ebbs and flows in 
lis. But there are discussions that take 
lace among countries that are able to 



The United States of America, unconditionally and un- 
equivocally, remains true to the commitments undertaken 
when we siyned the North Atlantic Treaty . . . [they] are 
strategically sound, politically essential, and morally 
justifiable. . . . 



President Ford 
May 29, 1975 



have military assets in the region as a 
deterrent matter. 

We have responded to requests from 
Saudi Arabia, and I believe some other 
countries have as well. There is a 
diplomatic effort going on in the United 
Nations in which we and others are very 
active, and we discuss with them their 
positions and our positions. And there 
are efforts being made with Iran and 
Iraq, not by us directly since our rela- 
tionship with others have better relation- 
ships with the two countries than we do, 
although we do talk to Iraq. And so 
there are a great many things that are 
taking place. 

Unfortunately, the war goes on, and 
there are continued threats to its escala- 
tion in the gulf. It seems a problem that 
we will be coping with, so we need to be 
widely consultative with others in 
evaluating our own efforts to do so. 

Q. Reportedly, Turkey is the only 
NATO country which has a dialogue, a 
direct dialogue, with Iran. The 
Turkish Foreign Minister gave the 
view that the Western side should not 
put too much pressure only on Iran 
but be more even-handed. What was 
your reaction on that? 

A. First of all, I don't want to speak 
for the Foreign Minister of Turkey. He 
will speak for himself. 

I would say that he made very in- 
teresting contributions throughout our 
meeting and is an experienced and wise 
person. So he is most welcome in the 
NATO councils. And not the least of the 
virtues of it is, as you point out, Turkey 
does have a good relationship with Iran 
and is able to talk with them. 

As far as the United States is con- 
cerned, our posture on the war is one of 
neutrality. Our posture in regard to the 
openness of international waters is one 
of believing that these waters must re- 



main open. And we have stated that and 
have worked for it diplomatically, in sup- 
port of people in the region, and directly 
ourselves. 

Q. Do you believe that Turkey will 
be with the Western powers if there 
will be a military intervention in the 
gulf? 

A. As far as the NATO alliance is 
concerned, I'm sure that Turkey is a 
very firm member of the NATO alliance 
and spoke in an interesting and 
thoughtful way throughout on the out- 
of-area questions. I'm not going to try to 
go beyond that, except to say that the 
Turkish attitude toward the issues that 
we were discussing was very positive. 

Q. In your view, what is the dif- 
ference between the so-called signal 
of Brussels and this Washington 
declaration? 

A. They are consistent with each 
other and they both, broadly speaking, 
take the same view. 

At Brussels, an East- West study 
was commissioned. That was undertaken 
by NATO— a very careful, thoughtful 
document produced, some 35 pages or 
so, I think. From that careful evalua- 
tion, the Washington statement that you 
got was drawn and discussed, and it 
basically elaborates and goes into more 
detail and reaffirms. 

I think beyond that, there is no 
doubt about the fact that, obviously, this 
is a continuing subject for the alliance, 
and we will review, I'm sure, at each 
meeting how the East- West situation 
stands and what it is that we can do 
about it. So I don't think it's so much 
that's different. In fact, I think the 
reverse is the important point: there is 
continuity and reaffirmation and reaffir- 
mation of a strategy that, basically, has 
kept the peace for 35 years. 



Jly 1984 



15 



Q. You have reviewed East-West 
political relations. Do you think that 
there is a necessity to look at NATO's 
military strategy as well as its 
political strategy? Do you see any 
possibility for a review of that? And 
would you see, for example, the need 
to study removing battlefield nuclear 
weapons and improving conventional 
forces? 

A. I think that in the NATO 
strategic doctrine, the strategy of deter- 
rence is central. We discussed that, and 
I think there is no question about the 
centrality of that nuclear deterrent 
capability. At the same time, I think 
everyone wishes to see the nuclear 
threshold raised, and that does bring 
you to conventional forces, and we 
discussed that subject briefly. No doubt, 
it's the sort of thing that is more ap- 
propriately dealt with by Defense 
Ministers but, at the same time, is a 
matter of great interest to Foreign 
Ministers. I wouldn't expect any drastic 
shift at all but a continual effort to look 
at this matter. 

I think that soon as you utter the 
words "conventional forces," you also ut- 
ter the word "expensive," and everybody 
has to recognize that going in. 

Q. I wonder if you could give us 
your analysis of the role that the 
Soviet Union is currently playing in 
the Persian Gulf crisis. We have 
reports that they have recently sent 
offensive weapons to the Iraqis. Do 
you think they are trying to "steal the 
march" on the United States in terms 
of ingratiating themselves with the 
Arabs? And do you see any circum- 
stances under which the United States 
and the Soviet Union could end up on 
the opposite sides in a confrontation 
in the gulf? 

A. I think, no doubt, the Soviet 
Union feels as we do, that openness of 
international waterways is a very impor- 
tant principle. Beyond that, of course, 
we have discussed the situation, at least 
trying to make clear to the Soviet Union 
at various times what our view is, what 
our intentions are, including the limita- 
tions of our intentions so that they 
wouldn't be under any misapprehension. 

They have made statements about 
our intentions that are incorrect, that is 
that the United States is seeking to use 
the crisis as a way of implanting itself 
somehow more fully in the gulf 



16 



area — that certainly is wrong. And so 
we have done those things, and beyond 
that. I don't want to speculate about the 
Soviet Union. 

Q. What other out-of-area prob- 
lems were discussed besides the Per- 
sian Gulf, and in particular was Cen- 
tral America discussed? And if so, 
could you characterize those discus- 
sions? 

A. In truth, the discussion of East- 
West relationships and the analysis of 
the Soviet Union and of other Eastern 
European countries was, at least speak- 
ing for myself as a person who has now 
attended quite a few NATO meetings, 
more interesting and superior in quality 
to anything that I have experienced. It 
consumed most all of our time in the in- 
formal sessions. 



The only out-of-area subject that 
was really formally discussed was the 
gulf situation. I'm sure that Central 
American problems are on peoples' 
minds, and they would have like to have 
discussed it, but we literally didn't have 
time to do so. So I don't have any report 
to make on that. 

Q. Did any of the ministers renew 
the European complaints about 
technology transfer and about military 
cooperation between the United States 
and the allies, that is, in terms of the 
United States being an unreliable sup- 
plier or in terms of the two-way street 
working more to the advantage of the 
United States than to the allies? 

A. There are two very different 
issues — totally different issues — that 
you've raised, at least as I understand 



U.S. Ambassador to NATO 




David M. Abshire was born April 11, 1926, in 
Chattanooga, Trim. He graduated from the 
U.S. Military Academy (1951) and 
Georgetown I niversitj (Ph.D.. 1959). 



He was formerly President of 
Georgetown University Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), which he 
helped found in 1962. He served as a member 
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad- 
visory Board and of the Long-Range Plan- 
ning Advisory Board for the Chief of Naval 
Operations. Previously, Ambassador Abshire 
was chairman of the U.S. Board for Interna- 
tional Broadcasting (1974-77), Assistant 
Secretary of State for Congressional Rela- 
tions (1970-73), Executive Director for CSIS 
(1962-70), and Director of Special Projects at; 
the American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research (1960-62). 

In 1978-81, he was Director and Vice 
Chairman of the Board of Youth for 
Understanding. He is a former member of 
the Board of Advisors of the Naval War Col- 
lege (1975-77) and was a member of the con- 
gressional Committee on the Organization of 
the Government for the Conduct of Foreign 
Policy (1974-76). 

Ambassador Abshire is a member of the 
Council on Foreign Relations and is a direc- 
tor of the Tinker Foundation of New York 
and of the Atlantic Council of the United 
States. He served on the board of the Na- 
tional Park Foundation, lie was founder and 
co-editor of 'I'lir Washington Quarterly and isr 
the author of a number of books, including 
The South Rejects n I'mplicl; Iiilt rntitiiitml 
Broadcastiiir): A Xeu: Dinu ■iisimi of Western 
Diplomacy; and Foreign Policy Makers: 
President vs. ' 'ongress. 

Ambassador Abshire was sworn in as the Jr. 
U.S. Permanent Representative on the Coun- ij;j ; 
cil of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ^ 
on July 15, 1983. ■ 



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Department of State Bulletin 



m 




FEATURE 
NATO Ministerial 



your question. One is the supplier rela- 
tionship within NATO, and this is a sub- 
ject that is sort of a perennial subject of 
discussion. But I do have the feeling and 
observation that some headway has been 
made on it, particularly in the last 5 or 6 
months. I know our new Ambassador to 
NATO has gone there particularly hav- 
ing this problem in mind and has put a 
lot of effort into it personally. I think 
that there is a better understanding and 
also probably more action taking 
place — there's been a lot of discussion 
with the Pentagon about it. So that's 
one side of your question, and I think 
progress has been made. It didn't come 
n for a lot of discussion, and perhaps 
;hat is by way of saying that people 
-ealize that progress is being made and 
;hat the problem is getting attention. 

As far as the question of technology 
;ransfer is concerned, that's a totally dif- 
'erent issue. The agreements that were 
vorked out a year or so ago and started 
>eing reflected in the communiques, I 
hink, hold and are moving forward in 
:heir implementation. On the whole, the 
ituation there is reasonably satisfac- 
ory. 

No doubt there are differences of 
iew about a particular piece of 
echnology, and, of course, we have also 
ieen liberalizing our view of technology 
ransfer with respect to China, and this 
; ias come up for discussion in COCOM 

oordinating Committee for Multi- 
ateral Security Export Controls]. And I 
/ould be surprised if the Chinese 
i'remier isn't talking about it to some of 
ur European friends on his current 
rip. 

Q. You said you have every con- 
idence that the Dutch will play their 
roper part. Does that mean you 
elieve them to deploy not on 
chedule, but eventually? 

A. I don't want to try to set out 
arious things that they might do 
ecause they are struggling with that 
ecision. We've talked to the Prime 
linister at one time or another and, of 
ourse, the Foreign Minister, and I 
pent a considerable amount of time 
'ith him on this subject. 

There are a variety of ideas in play, 
ind just how the Dutch Government will 
ome out on this remains to be seen. I 
link the best thing for me to do at this 
tage is to say no more. 



uly 1984 



. . . NATO has always been much more than just a 
military pact. The spontaneous political development of the 
alliance demonstrates that true security . . . flows from the 
freely given support of the people and their willingness to 
participate in the defense of common ideals. 

President Carter 
March 22, 1979 



Q. With reference to the last 
paragraph of the Point 11 of the state- 
ment, I would like to ask: Is the 
United States ready, at the Stockholm 
conference, to formally reaffirm what 
is called here "the existing duty of all 
participating states to refrain from 
the threat or use of force in their 
mutual relations?" 

A. Of course, this is a proposal 
that's been made by the Soviet Union, 
and so it's under consideration. We 
believe that declarations of that kind 
take on a great deal more meaning 
when they have some real content to 
them, along the lines of the confidence- 
building measures that NATO has sug- 
gested. So what we are seeking is to 
have a discussion of all of these various 
items, and we're working for that in 
Stockholm. Prior to the outcome of that 
work, I don't want to sort of lay down 
some decision on one element or another 
of it. 

Q. At the last NATO meeting in 
Brussels, there was considerable an- 
ticipation about your session with Mr. 
Gromkyo which took place then in 
Stockholm. At this point, can you tell 
us whether there is any forum in 
which you might be able to meet with 
Mr. Gromkyo over the next few 
months? And do you expect to meet 
with him when the UN General 
Assembly meets in the fall? 

A. Traditionally there has been a 
meeting between the Secretary of State 
and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet 
Union on the occasion of the UN 
meeting. That didn't happen last year 
because Mr. Gromyko didn't come. As 
far as we're concerned, we are certainly 
prepared to have such a meeting, and I 
would expect that it would probably take 
place, but I can't speak for the Soviet 
Union, obviously. 



As far as a meeting between now 
and then is concerned, it's always a 
possibility, but there is no plan for it. If 
there seemed to be a good reason to 
have one, then it wouldn't be difficult to 
arrange it. There isn't any plan for a 
meeting, but I personally would welcome 
a meeting in New York, but it hasn't 
been formally laid on. 

Q. You said that the quality of the 
discussion on East-West affairs was 
superior. I was wondering if you 
might be willing to share some of the 
insights that were offered in that 
discussion with us. And related to 
that is, are the ministers concerned 
that the new Soviet hard line is having 
an impact on Western public opinion? 
If so, other than the declaration that 
you have issued here today, what ap- 
proach do you and other ministers 
plan to take to that? 

A. Taking the last part of your 
question first, we all believe firmly that 
we are on the right track, and that, 
broadly speaking, the populations in the 
West support what's being done and 
have done so and reaffirmed and re- 
affirmed and reaffirmed. At the same 
time, everyone recognizes that critical 
voices are raised and problems are 
talked about. We're engaged in a con- 
tinual debate, and that's well and 
proper. So we have to give attention to 
a constant process of explanation and 
argumentation, and so on. So that's one 
of the things, certainly, that motivated 
the putting forward of the communique 
each 6 months. 

In this case, in view of the fact that 
an extensive East- West study had been 
made, of making a sort of declaration 
based on it that states in detail the 
strategy and philosophy involved, and 
then goes through and identifies various 



17 



pluses and minuses and ways in which 
we're prepared to move forward, and 
lists the different forums, and so on. All 
of this is part of the process of maintain- 
ing the working life of the NATO 
alliance. And in our kind of societies, 
which are democratic societies, that's 
the name of the game — explaining to 
people what you're doing and seeing to 
it that they are on your side. 

The permanent representatives, I 
hope, will be looking at this issue 
especially: What is the public perception, 
and in what ways can we enhance 
understanding of what we're doing, and 
so on? We expect that; Dave [David 
Abshire, U.S. Ambassador to NATO], 
you're going to have a report for us 
when we meet the next time on this 
very subject. 

As far as illustrations of the discus- 
sions are concerned, it's the sort of thing 
that's a little hard to put your finger on, 
but lots of discussion of Soviet behavior 
and of the situation in different Eastern 
European countries. Several have visited 
the Soviet Union and described the 
posture that was taken there and their 
own observations about the people in- 
volved. 

Earlier someone asked a question 
about the Turkish Foreign Minister. As 
it emerges, he has served on three dif- 
ferent occasions in Moscow as Am- 
bassador there, which gives him a rather 
interesting insight. So all of these things 
together were part of our conversation. 
Perhaps the outstanding thing about it 
was that it was an easy, cordial, and 
strong informal discussion where I cer- 
tainly felt free, as did others, to try out 



ideas and give information and share 
them, not only in the general meetings 
but in the informal settings that you find 
yourself in. 

Let me just say, winding up here, 
once again that this has seemed to me to 
be a very important occasion. It came at 
a time of testing and importance, and 
the alliance leaders came together — the 
Foreign Ministers — and in a quiet, confi- 
dent way reexamined and reaffirmed the 
strategy that we have. I think we all left 
feeling that the cohesion of the West 
and the strength of the values that we 
have that lies behind that cohesion is in 
very good shape. And I think that's good 
news for the cause of freedom and it's 
good news for the cause of peace. 



'Held at the Department of State. 

2 Text from the Vice President's Office of 
the Press Secretary. 

3 Text from White House press release of 
May 31, 1984. 

4 Made in the White House Rose Garden 
following a meeting with the NATO Foreign 
Ministers (White House press release of 
Mav 31). 

s Text from NATO press release M-l (84) 
10. 

6 Greece recalled its position as it has 
been expressed during previous ministerial 
sessions [text in original). 

'Extracts for publication from the 
minutes of the ministerial meeting of the 
council. 

"Text from NATO press release M-l (84) 
11. 

'Greece and Spain reserve their positions 
on this paragraph [text in original]. 

'"Greece reserves its position on this sub- 
paragraph [text in original]. 

"Text from Department press release 
144. ■ 



Secretary Shultz's 
Interview for "Worldnet" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
May 24, 198k, by news correspondents in 
Amsterdam, Ankara, Brussels, 
Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxem- 
bourg, Madrid, Munich, Oslo, Ottawa, 
Paris, and Reykjavik. The interview was 
broadcast live on "Worldnet, " a satellite 
TV program of the U.S. Information 
Service. 1 



To mark the 35th Anniversary of 
NATO, we are broadcasting a special 
2-hour program live from Washington 
and Europe in one of the most ambitious 
satellite hookups outside the Olympic 
( lames. 

It was in April of 1949 that the 
North Atlantic Treaty was signed here 
in Washington, and it was in September 
of that year that the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization came into being. In 



those 35 years since its founding, NATO 
has been a remarkable force for peace 
and stability and prosperity not only in 
Europe but in other parts of the world 
as well. 

NATO has kept the balance and 
preserved the peace. Today we'll be 
looking not only at the past but also at 
the present and the future. We will be 
hearing about the state of the alliance, 
its strengths and its weaknesses. Is it as 
strong as it ought to be? Is Europe 
carrying its fair share of the burden? 
Above all, perhaps we should be asking, 
will the alliance be in place and in good 
shape, if needed, in the next century? 

There are big questions and not easy 
questions. To help us to examine them, 
we have an expert panel here in 
Washington: a Senator, a senior member 
of the Department of Defense, and a 
prominent European journalist. And in 
Brussels, we have a second equally ex- 
pert panel, this time made up of two 
well-known European journalists and the 
American Ambassador to NATO. 

Then, very fortunately for us, we 
have in the studio here in Washington 
the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. George 
Shultz, whose predecessor. Dean 
Acheson, was one of the signatories of 
the original treaty in 1949. 

Journalists from 14 NATO countries 
linked to this studio by satellite will be 
able to put questions to Mr. Shultz in a 
minute or two. 

But first, let's remind ourselves of 
the history of the alliance. Although 
NATO was founded in April 1949, it was 
the events of the years immediately 
before which brought the alliance into 
existence. 

The end of the Second World War 
meant Europeans could finally return to 
civilian life and the task of rebuilding. 
Along with disarmament came a reduc- 
tion in Allied Armed Forces from 5 
million men to less than a million. 

While the West wound down its war 
machine, the Soviet Union maintained 6 
million men in its armed forces. In its ef- 
forts to extend Soviet influence, Stalin 
turned his attention to southeast Europe 
by arming guerrilla forces in Greece and 
demanding the handover of Turkey's 
northeastern provinces. Less than 1 
year later, Soviet pressure moved north 
when the Communist Party of 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



n.« 



Czechoslovakia gained control of the 
government in Prague through a coup 
d'etat. 

Then on June 24, 1948, Stalin im- 
posed a total railroad and canal blockade 
on the former German capital. That left 
only the British, French, and American 
corridors open, and the allies responded 
with a now-famous Berlin airlift, flying 
in everything the Berliners needed to 
stay alive and free. 

In September 1948, Foreign 
Ministers from Belgium, France, Lux- 
embourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom met to plan a response 
to Soviet aggression. Six months later 
they signed the Brussels treaty for 
collective self-defense and set up 
the Western European Union as a de- 
fense organization. Field Marshall 
Montgomery was Britain's military rep- 
resentative. 

These steps led to a historic con- 
ference in Washington. On April 4, 
1949, leaders from the 12 original 
member nations signed the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty, establishing NATO as an 
organization designed to provide collec- 
tive defense and to preserve peace and 
security. Just 1 month later, the Berlin 
blockade was lifted. 

But the message of the blockade had 
come through loud and clear to the new 
Atlantic alliance. And so NATO's 
member nations began to reorganize and 
re-equip their defenses, producing their 
first new weapons in many years. 

The main task: a military command 
structure with General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied 
ommander in Europe. His mission: to 
organize the new alliance's collective 
defense. 

At that time, NATO had only 14 
divisions on the mainland of Europe to 
'ace the Soviet's 210 divisions. Then in 
Tune 1953, riots broke out in the eastern 
sector of Berlin and were suppressed by 
Soviet tanks. Three years later, when a 
ull-scale uprising took place in 
Budapest, Hungary, the Soviet Union 
once again sent in the tanks to crush a 
oopular rebellion. 

In 1961 President Kennedy met the 
Soviet leader, Mr. Khrushchev, to try 
ind improve East- West relations. Two 
nonths later, faced with a massive ex- 
odus of East Germans to the West, 



Khrushchev reacted by sealing off the 
Soviet sector of Berlin. 

During the previous 6 months, more 
than 100,000 East Germans had fled to 
the West. The East German regime bar- 
ricaded off East Berlin and began to 
build the Berlin Wall. As the wire and 
the concrete grew daily higher, hun- 
dreds of people made desperate last- 
minute escapes. 

In 1968 the Soviet Union and four 
Warsaw Pact countries invaded 
Czechoslovakia to put an end to 
Alexander Dubcek's socialism with a 
human face. The West condemned the 
Czech invasion, but dialogue went on. 

During the era of detente, of which 
the high-water mark was the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975, the West held back 
on building new weapons, but the 
Soviets showed no such restraint. 

In 1977 a new threat to Europe 
emerged with the initial deployment of 
what were to become hundreds of 
SS-20s, the Soviet Union's new, highly 
accurate, and mobile intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles. With three warheads 
and a reload capability, the SS-20s 
posed a new threat to virtually all of 
Europe. 

NATO agreed to begin its own INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear force] 
deployment in 1983 unless an arms con- 
trol agreement made it unnecessary. 
During this period, the Soviet Union 
continued to export its muscle around 
the world. In 1979 it invaded 
Afghanistan. More than 4 years later, 
120,000 Soviet troops still occupy that 
country. 

Then in 1981, the Soviet Union ex- 
erted pressure to smother the Solidarity 
movement in Poland. Under the threat 
of Soviet military intervention, the 
Polish authorities declared martial law 
in December and arrested Lech Walesa 
and other trade union leaders. 

Despite the Soviet action, the 
alliance's search for arms control con- 
tinued, following its zero option call to 
eliminate an entire category of missiles 
on both sides. The alliance made a series 
of compromise proposals on inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces, but the 
Soviet Union rejected any compromise 
that would deprive it of its monopoly of 
these weapons in Europe. 



luly 1984 



Finally in November 1983, faced 
with the failure of its policy of blocking 
NATO deployment, the Soviet Union 
abruptly walked out of both INF and 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
negotiations. NATO and the United 
States have repeatedly called on the 
Russians to return to the negotiating 
table. NATO is determined to hold its 
nuclear stockpile down to the lowest 
level needed to ensure deterrence and 
recently decided to cut its nuclear 
stockpile to its lowest level in 20 years. 

So this is the position in which 
NATO finds itself as it celebrates its 
35th birthday, still facing a potential 
threat from the East and trying to 
adhere to the motto "Peace: The Atlan- 
tic Promise." 

Q. Is the United States satisfied 
that NATO is as strong as it ought to 
be in this, its 35th year? 

A. It's always important to look at 
what is going on and to develop your 
strength. So, certainly, there are things 
that ought to be done. But, basically, 
NATO is strong and firm, and I think 
continues to be the best guarantee of 
peace that we have. 

Q. In Denmark and other Euro- 
pean countries, parliaments and the 
public, in various ways, have ex- 
pressed growing disenchantment with 
the NATO policies, especially around 
the 572 Pershing and cruise missiles. 
Do you see this as a real threat to 
NATO solidarity? 

A. It is, of course, a problem. At the 
same time, I think it's important for us 
to continually develop the very strong 
arguments there are in favor of being 
able to defend our values, of being able 
to deter aggression from the Soviet 
Union and standing up to these prob- 
lems, and that is what we continually 
do. 

Q. This week six countries — one of 
them Greece, a member of NATO — 
signed a peace accord telling both you 
and Moscow to stop testing, or deploy- 
ing, nuclear arms. In your opin- 
ion — you opened this by saying that 
you feel that NATO is strong, is 
firm — does this kind of cabal, this 
grouping of other countries, make the 
alliance less strong, less firm? 

A. Of course, countries will speak up 
and develop a point of view. Not all of 
those countries were NATO countries, 



19 



of course; only one. I think it's clear that 
people are concerned about nuclear 
weapons. 

President Reagan has said that his 
dream is the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. In the position taken by the 
United States on behalf of NATO, in- 
sofar as the intermediate-range weapons 
are concerned, that position was the 
total elimination of these weapons. 

I think those who say that we should 
stop deploying have to ask themselves, 
do they really want a world in which 
only the Soviets have deployed these 
weapons? Do they think that it is a safe 
world? Do they think that is the way to 
defend the values that I presume these 
countries put forward? Our answer to 
that is no. We want reduction, but they 
have to be reductions that come down in 
an equal way and leave us in a balanced 
and therefore deterrent posture. 

Q. President Reagan has just said 
that the world has never been safer. 
How can you explain that, knowing of 
the growing East-West tensions, the 
gulf war. General Ustinov's [Soviet 
Defense Minister] threats about hav- 
ing more missiles, and even close to 
the United States? 

A. Of course, there are plenty of 
tensions, and that is the state of the 
world all right. On the other hand, I 
think that the strength of the United 
States, the strength of NATO, the 
strength of other countries around the 
world, and Asia and elsewhere, is our 
best insurance policy that aggression 
will be deterred because it is apparent 
that it will meet strong resistance. In 
that sense, we have the best guarantee 
of peace. 

We all saw, and perhaps it's useful 
to remind ourselves of what happened in 
an earlier age, in the 1970s and at the 
end of the 1930s when, for some reason, 
people thought that the road to peace 
and safety was disarmament. That 
turned out to be a very poor idea, and it 
only invited aggression. 

We're strong. I think it's important 
to stay that way. We're realistic about 
what's going on around the world, and it 
is important to continually remind 
ourselves of what is really taking place. 
At the same time it's important always 
to be reasonable, to be ready to engage 
in discussions with the other side in an 
effort to bring down the levels of ar- 
maments and to work out a more accom- 



20 



modating and constructive pattern for 
our mutual behavior. Those are the prin- 
ciples on which the President and, I 
think, the NATO alliance is operating. 

Q. How would you evaluate the 
specific contribution of Spain in 
NATO if Spain should integrate the 
alliance militarily? 

A. First of all, Spain makes a con- 
tribution right now because Spain is a 
place where there are bases, and Spain 
has an armed capability, and it has 
moved in the direction of NATO. I think 
the integration of Spain fully into NATO 
and full membership, and being part of 
the so-called joint command, would 
strengthen Spain and strengthen the 
NATO alliance because it would further 
develop that alliance and add capability 
to it. So I think it would be a construc- 
tive move. It would help develop the 
deterrent capability of the alliance and, 
therefore, serve the cause of peace in 
Europe. I think that that is certainly to 
Spain's advantage. 

Q. The Soviet Union can launch a 
nuclear attack on the United States 
and Europe from the Kola Peninsula. 
How would NATO meet this Soviet 
capability; and, secondly, what are the 
prospects for Norway as a potential 
battleground? 

A. Of course, the cruel fact that we 
have to face is that the world is really a 
small place, whether you're talking 
about the ability to move information 
around, as is illustrated by this very pro- 
gram, whether it's a question of moving 
goods and services around in the trade 
that we have, or whether it's the 
awesome capability of modern weapons 
which can reach over very long 
distances. 

The fact of the matter is that all of 
us together have a stake in maintaining 
a deterrent capability so that this kind 
of nuclear battleground never comes 
into being. I don't think that geographic 
nearness, so to speak, has the same 
meaning that it might have had in 
earlier days. So no doubt the United 
States is fully as vulnerable, perhaps 
more so, than Norway. That only em- 
phasizes the underlying reason why we 
have a NATO alliance, why countries 
that are geographically spread apart 
have come together and work together 
to provide the deterrent capability that 
we need. 



Q. The French have proposed a 
renewed effort to create a European 
pillar of defense within NATO, and 
the Western European Union Foreign 
Ministers are meeting in Paris next 
month. What form do you think that 
pillar should take? Is there a danger it 
could be divided? 

A. We have been assured that the 
intent is not divisive at all, but to the 
contrary, to strengthen the European 
contribution to NATO. I have every 
reason to believe that that is precisely 
the intent, and so I think focusing on 
the capabilities of different countries 
and what further things they may do is 
a constructive move. 

Q. The United States seems to be 
putting more emphasis on military and 
defense preparations in the North 
Atlantic than before. Does this reflect 
a growing importance of this area, 
and consequently of Iceland, or 
possibly a changing strategy in the 
northern flank? 

A. No, I don't really want to com- 
ment on that from a strictly military 
point of view, but obviously, it's a very 
important area and has been regarded 
as such for a long, long time. I used to 
be in the Marine Corps in World War II, 
and of course, I fought in the Pacific 
Theater — and you associate the Marines 
in World War II with the Pacific 
Theater — but I well remember, when I 
started in, in the early 1940s, that 
Iceland was the place where the Marines 
were stationed, and people wondered if 
that's where they were going to be 
assigned. I mention that only to show 
how long it has been that people have 
seen the strategic importance of that 
area. 

Q. President Reagan, Wednesday, 
said at a press conference that 
nondeployment of cruise missiles in 
Holland will not affect NATO serious- 
ly. What is your opinion on this issue? 
And will the issue be raised, the issue 
about a Dutch decision, at the forth- 
coming NATO council in Washington 
next week? 

A. The President has emphasized on 
a great many occasions, as have the 
other NATO countries, the importance 
of carrying through on the decision 
made in 1979 to follow simultaneously a 
track of deployment to deter the Soviet 
deployments of intermediate-range 



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Department of State Bulletin 



il|1 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



missiles and continually to try to 
negotiate a limitation or, from our point 
of view, ideally, an elimination of these 
deployments. 

We support them in all of the 
deploying countries; we think it is very 
important that each country step up to 
the mark, and certainly, that is exactly 
what is taking place. I know there are 
difficulties in the Netherlands right now, 
and we continue to believe that it's very 
important that this go forward. 

Q. The German Government, 
especially the German Defense 
r Secretary, Herr Werner, is not very 
r enthusiastic over the Strategic 
Defense Initiative. The Germans think 
it could create some sort of a — two 
1 different classes of security. Do you 
think the quarrels over the SDI are a 
danger for the alliance's unity in the 
lear future? 

A. I think it's essential for us to talk 
lur differences through, and of course, 
I t's something new to talk about, and 
|i >eople have to understand it. That proc- 
ess is well underway and I think will 
I' 'esult in a general consensus of support. 
The fact of the matter is that the 
soviet Union has a deployed antiballistic 
nissile system and has been engaging in 
; -igorous research on this subject. The 
; 'resident believes that it would be a 
•ery bad thing for the alliance if we 
| vere to wake up one day and they had 

lone all this work and they had 
! irepared themselves and had something 
i eady to put in place, and we were still 

cratching our heads. So I think that 
t his is something where we have to 
] love into this in a somewhat higher 
1 ear. 

At the same time, the President has 
lade it very clear that we expect to 
i hare what we're doing with our allies so 
ii hat it's not a question of the United 
I Itates doing something and the others 
eing left behind. Of course, the fun- 
amental motive of it is to achieve the 
I ame thing as we are trying to achieve 
I y reductions, and reductions to zero in 
jhe case of the intermediate- range 
| uclear missiles — but generally, reduc- 
tions in nuclear weapons — and that is to 
I educe their capacity to harm mankind. 

Q. Before the European Parlia- 
lent. President Mitterrand today 
poke about the need for Europe to 
ave a common defense policy. Do you 



believe that by pursuing this goal, it 
will reinforce the alliance? 

A. A common defense policy, I 
assume within the framework of 
NATO— and that's what we hear reaf- 
firmed all the time, and that's where we 
stand, and we think that is very impor- 
tant to keep developing. I don't have any 
idea that President Mitterrand is sug- 
gesting separation of Europe from the 
United States— quite the contrary. We 
had outstanding talks with President 
Mitterrand when he was here not too 
long ago and reaffirmed all of these 
basic principles of our unity. 

Q. According to Portuguese 
military sources, it is known that the 
United States has plans to intervene in 
the Azores to guarantee the security 
of the residents of the American bases 
in case of conflict. 

Wouldn't it be more economical to 
grant the Portuguese Armed Forces 
the means to guarantee for themselves 
the security of the Azores, of the Por- 
tuguese territory, and in this very 
same sense, couldn't the United States 
be ready to accept the Portuguese con- 
tention for a defined command for the 
whole Portuguese national territory, 
including the Azores in the Atlantic 
area? 

A. You've asked me a question that 
has a great deal of detail in it. I don't 
want to make an effort to go through at 
length what it would take to answer 
that question fully, but I think the main 
points are these: first, the Azores are a 
very important piece of territory, as has 
been demonstrated many times; number 
two, the United States and Portugal 
have worked out an agreement about 
their use and the development of the 
Azores that has been signed, and so 
therefore, it is satisfactory to both par- 
ties; number three, the fact that it is so 
important and it has been developed 
means that if there is some threat to it, 
it certainly will be defended vigorously, 
and I assume both the United States and 
Portugal agree to that. 

Q. Military aid to Turkey was 
given to strengthen NATO's defense of 
[inaudible]. Yet, the U.S. Congress has 
made cuts in aid for other reasons. If 
because of this, this action passes, 
what do you intend to do about it? 

A. Of course, the President has 
taken a very firm position about the im- 



portance of our assistance to the 
modernization of the Turkish Armed 
Forces, and we continue to work and 
struggle to convince the Congress that 
they must go forward with that. The 
developments on Cyprus and the 
unilateral declaration on Cyprus of an 
independent state have caused great 
consternation in the United States— of 
course, we haven't recognized it; Turkey 
is the only country that has — and that 
has brought about a considerable 
amount of congressional opposition. Ob- 
viously, what we need is to get the 
Cyprus issue settled somehow or other, 
and that, as we all know, is a very dif- 
ficult proposition. But we support the 
modernization of the Turkish Armed 
Forces in its own right and for the sake 
of the NATO positions, as a whole; and 
at the same time, these issues that are 
basically unrelated nevertheless do have 
their impact on people's thinking. On the 
one hand, we tried to persuade the Con- 
gress to go ahead, and on the other, en- 
courage all the efforts by the United Na- 
tions and elsewhere to bring the Cyprus 
question to some sort of satisfactory 
conclusion, or at least get it on a 
satisfactory track for moving ahead 
toward a settlement. 

Q. Do you see a concrete way to 
bring the Soviet Union back to the 
negotiation table at Geneva without 
eliminating Pershing II and cruise 
missiles? Don't you think the Euro- 
pean NATO partners could eventually 
accelerate new negotiation initiatives? 

A. I think we have to recognize that 
the positions taken by the alliance, by 
the United States on behalf of the 
alliance, in the intermediate-range 
nuclear talks were very reasonable posi- 
tions. They are not only the positions 
the United States thinks are right, but 
they have met the test of discussion in 
the alliance, and during 1983 and this 
year, the level of conclusion has been 
really unprecedented. So they are 
reasonable positions. I think it is a great 
mistake, when one party walks out, to 
say we're going to reward that kind of 
behavior by changing our position as an 
inducement to get them to come back to 
the bargaining table. 

We're there; we're reasonable; we're 
ready for give-and-take, but the one 
thing we have to get across to the 
Soviet Union is, we are not ready to 
give away the store. To give away the 
store, to give them everything they 



uly 1984 



21 



want, would only lead to unequal levels 
of forces and increase the danger 
because it would lessen the deterrent 
capability of the alliance. And that we 
have to keep reminding ourselves of, 
while we also remind ourselves that it is 
important for us to be reasonable 
across-the-board on issues with the East 
and the Soviet Union, as we are. 

Q. In view of the present develop- 
ment in the Persian Gulf, do you find 
it feasible, desirable, or possible to 
enlarge the area of military respon- 
sibilities for NATO in that direc- 
tion — I mean in the direction of the 
Middle East — an issue that has been 
raised before? 

A. I think the question of enlarging 
NATO responsibilities, as such, is one 
issue, and it hasn't — I don't think I 
would put it quite that way: The ques- 
tion is how NATO, or individual 
member-states of NATO, will work at 
things that are out of the immediate 
area of NATO jurisdiction, you might 
say, to work at problems that are ob- 
viously problems that we all have a 
stake in. 

In the case of the Persian Gulf and 
the flow of oil resources, of course, they 
flow into a world market, and everybody 
is affected by the world market, and so 
we all have a stake there. In approach- 
ing that set of problems, of course, the 
United States has a very firm position, 
as the President has stated many times, 
and part of that position is close con- 
sultation with our allies and with the 
states of the gulf; and we engage in that 
and we are very much a part of the 
many diplomatic efforts to try to settle 
that conflict down. 

Q. The Prime Minister up here, 
Pierre Trudeau, who is about to 
retire, has spent a great deal of his 
time in the last year on sort of a peace 
crusade of his own. There has been 
some controversy with people in the 
Pentagon, whom he has described as 
"pipsqueaks" for criticizing him. I'm 
wondering whether you feel the Prime 
Minister's peace initiative helped the 
NATO alliance, or whether or not — 
just what you regard the Prime 
Minister's initiative as having ac- 
complished? 

A. Of course, it's always important 
to have leaders of the West talking 
about peace and let it be known 



22 



throughout the world that peace and 
stability are what we want. That's the 
environment within which we can 
preserve our values and develop our way 
of life and our economies. So in that 
sense, we welcome the Prime Minister's 
initiative. 

Just what fruit this has borne is a 
little difficult to say; nevertheless, 
we — the Prime Minister came down and 
met at length with the President on this 
subject — I happened to be privileged to 
take part in that meeting — and we 
welcomed the opportunity to talk with 
him about his ideas. 

Q. Do you believe that the Euro- 
pean allies are at present carrying 
their fair share of the common defense 
burden? And do you share some of the 
critical views of the allies that have 
been made recently by your former 
colleague, Mr. Eagleburger, and your 
predecessor, Mr. Kissinger? 

A. Of course, there is always more 
that we can do. We believe, in the 
United States, in our own defense 
capabilities that we should be doing 
more than we are, and we are engaged 
in a struggle with the Congress about 
that. I'm glad to say that here in the 
United States, and I believe in most of 
the countries of NATO, the question is 
not whether we should do more, but 



35 Years of NATO 



1949 

April 4 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is 
formed with the signing in Washington, D.C., 
of a treaty for collective defense by 12 coun- 
tries — Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 

The preamble to the 14 articles of the 
North Atlantic Treaty emphasizes that the 
alliance is created within the framework of 
the UN Charter. It also outlines as NATO's 
main objectives to: 

• Live in peace with all peoples and all 
governments; 

• Safeguard the freedom, common 

heritage, and civilization of their peoples, 

founded on the principles of democracy, in- 
dividual liberty, anil the rule of law; 



how much and what can we stand in the 
light of the other constraints on our 
governmental budgets and so forth. So I 
think there is a big load. It is being 
shared but, nevertheless, more should be 
done. 

I don't share the view that some ex- 
press, that somehow or other Europe is 
falling behind. Europe is a vigorous 
area — many countries from which the 
United States has drawn our 
heritage — and if it gets behind a little 
bit in certain technological areas, I think 
there are lots of capable people there, 
and it doesn't take a whole lot to turn it 
around. Of course, everybody does have 
to work and struggle to compete in the 
kind of world we're in, and Europe is no 
exception to that rule. 

Q. Is there any chance of the 
Federal Republic of Germany turning 
to neutralist tendencies if the present 
East-West stalemate continues? 

A. I don't see any danger of the 
Federal Republic of Germany becoming 
a neutralist country. It's very firmly a 
part of NATO and very firmly a part of 
the West, and that seems to be the view 
of not only the party in power in the 
government, but basically of the opposi- 
tion party as well. 



'Press release 143 of May 31, 1984. 



• Promote stability and well-being in the 
North Atlantic area; and 

• Unite their efforts for collective 
defense and for the preservation of peace ano 
security. 

The treaty is the framework for a 
military alliance designed to deter, or if 
necessary repel, aggression. It also provides 
for continuous cooperation and consultation 
in political, economic, and other nonmilitary 
fields. 

Article ."> is the core of the treaty: An 
armed attack against one member is to be 
treated as an attack against all. 

August 24 

The North Atlantic Treaty enters into force. 

September 17 

The North Atlantic Council (NAC)— NATO's 
highest decisionmaking body and forum for 
consultations— holds its first session in 
Washington. 



Department of State Bulleti 



Fein 
Grte 

[,,',, 
HA 

;;... 
I Pa 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



1950 

January 27 

President Truman approves a plan for the in- 
tegrated defense of the North Atlantic area, 
releasing $900 million in military aid funds. 

August 1 

Turkey announces its decision to apply for 
membership. 

October 2 

Turkey accepts NAC invitation to be 
associated with NATO military agencies in 
Mediterranean defense planning. 

October 5 

Greece accepts NAC invitation to be 
associated with Mediterranean defense 
planning. 

December 19 

U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower becomes 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR). 

December 20 

The Western Union Defense Organiza- 
tion — created in September 1948 by Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom — merges into NATO. 

1951 

April 2 

Allied Command Europe (ACE) becomes 
operational with Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located near 
Paris. 

July 24 

A conference, convened by the French 
Government in Paris February 15, approves 
an interim report to NATO governments 
recommending the creation of a European 
army. 

1952 

January 30 

J.S. Vice Admiral Lynde McCormick 
becomes first Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic (SACLANT). 

February 18 

Greece and Turkey become members. 

February 20-25 

^JAC, meeting in Lisbon, reorganizes the 
tructure of the alliance, and NATO becomes 
i permanent organization with headquarters 
n Paris. 



February 21 

U.K. Admiral Sir Arthur Power becomes 
first Commander in Chief of the NATO Chan- 
nel Command (CINCHAN). 

April 4 

Lord Ismay (U.K.) takes office as the first 
Secretary General. 

April 10 

SACLANT becomes operational, with head- 
quarters in Norfolk, Virginia. 

April 28 

NAC meets for the first time in permanent 
session in Paris. 

May 27 

Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany sign a treaty in Paris setting up the 
European Defense Community (EDC). NATO 
governments give guarantees to the EDC 
members. 



1954 

May 7 

In reply to a Soviet note of March 31, 
France, the U.K., and the U.S. reject the 
Soviet Union's request to join NATO. 

1955 

May 5 

The Federal Republic of Germany becomes a 
member. 

July 18 

First conference of NATO parliamentarians 
(becomes the North Atlantic Assembly in 
November 1966) meets in Paris. The con- 
ference, independent of NATO, is formed to 
encourage Atlantic solidarity in national 
parliaments. 

December 15-16 

NAC ministerial decides to equip NATO 
forces with nuclear weapons. It also decides 
to strengthen air defenses by closer coopera- 
tion among European NATO countries. 



1956 

May 4-5 

NAC ministerial instructs Gaetano Martino 
(Italy), Halvard Lange (Norway), and Lester 
Pearson (Canada)— the "Three Wise 
Men" — to draw up a report with recommen- 
dations on how to improve and extend 
cooperation among the NATO countries in 
nonmilitary fields and develop greater unity 
within the Atlantic community. 



luly 1984 



December 13 

NAC approves the report of the "Three Wise 
Men" and adopts resolutions on the peaceful 
settlement of disputes between member coun- 
tries and on nonmilitary cooperation in 
NATO. 



1957 

May 16 

Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium) succeeds Lord 
Ismay as Secretary General. 

December 16-19 

Heads of government, meeting in Paris, re- 
affirm the principles and purposes of NATO. 
NAC decides to promote closer cooperation in 
the political and economic fields and to in- 
crease scientific and nonmilitary cooperation. 

December 

NATO establishes a Science Committee to 
strengthen the scientific and technological 
capabilities of the alliance. 

1958 

April 15-17 

NATO Defense Ministers, meeting in Paris, 
reaffirm defensive character of NATO 
strategy. 

May 5-7 

NAC ministerial, meeting in Copenhagen, 
says it favors negotiations with the East, pro- 
viding the East offers prospects of settle- 
ment of outstanding problems. 

December 16-19 

In response to November 10 Soviet plan to 
terminate the four-power agreement on the 
status of Berlin, NAC ministerial declares the 
right of Western powers to remain in Berlin. 

1960 

December 16-18 

NAC ministerial confirms its declaration of 
December 1958 on Berlin. 



1961 

April 21 

Dirk Stikker (Netherlands) succeeds Paul- 
Henri Spaak as Secretary General. 

December 13-15 

NAC ministerial, meeting in Paris, reaffirms 
its position on Berlin and condemns the erec- 
tion of the Berlin Wall in August. It also ap- 
proves the renewal of diplomatic contacts 
with the Soviet Union to seek a basis for 
negotiation. 

NATO establishes a mobile task force. 



23 



1962 

May 4-6 

NAC meeting of Foreign and Defense 
Ministers, in Athens, establishes guidelines 
for alliance use of nuclear weapons. 

December 18-20 

At a meeting in The Bahamas, President 
Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan 
agree to contribute part of the U.S. and U.K. 
strategic forces to NATO. 

1963 

May 22-24 

NAC ministerial, meeting in Ottawa, assigns 
the British V-bomber force and three U.S. 
Polaris submarines to SACEUR, who is to 
appoint a deputy responsible to him for 
nuclear matters. 

June 25 

On a visit to Europe, President Kennedy 
reaffirms America's guarantee to defend 
Europe. He also reaffirms the principle of 
equal partnership within NATO. 

December 16-17 

In a message to the NAC ministerial meeting 
in Paris, President Johnson renews U.S. 
pledges of "steadfast resolve" concerning 
NATO. 



1964 

August 1 

Manlio Brosio (Italy) succeeds Dirk Stikker as 
Secretary General. 

1965 

November 27 

A special committee of the NATO Defense 
Ministers initiates a study to explore ways of 
improving allied participation in nuclear 
planning. 

1966 

March 29 

The French Government announced that 
France will withdraw from NATO's in- 
tegrated military commands on July 1, 1966, 
and that all NATO military forces and 
facilities are to be removed from France by 
April 1, 1967. 

July 25 

NATO Defense Ministers, meeting in Paris, 
adopt a NATO force plan for the period up to 
and including 1970. 



December 5 

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) ap- 
proves the Iberian Atlantic area 
(IBERLANT), the first NATO command in 
Portugal. 

December 14 

DPC establishes the Nuclear Defense Affairs 
Committee (NDAC) and the Nuclear Planning 
Group (NPG). 

1967 

March 31 

Official opening ceremony marking the 
transfer of SHAPE to Mons, Belgium. 

April 6-7 

First meeting of the NPG held in 
Washington. 

June 5 

NATO sets up NAVSOUTH in Malta as a 
principal subordinate command under the 
Commander in Chief Allied Forces, Southern 
Europe (AFSOUTH). 

October 16 

New NATO headquarters officially opens in 
Brussels. 

December 13-14 

NAC ministerial meeting approves the 
Harmel report on the future tasks of the 
alliance. 

NATO adopts a new strategic concept of 
a flexible and balanced range of appropriate 
responses, conventional and nuclear, to all 
levels of aggression or threats of aggression. 

NATO establishes the Standing Naval 
Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). 



1968 

May 10 

DPC ministerial, meeting in Brussels, re- 
affirms the need for a balance of forces be- 
tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact and 
states that present circumstances do not 
justify the development of an antiballistic 
missile system in Europe. 

June 24-25 

At NAC ministerial, meeting in Reykjavik, 
NATO proposes negotiations with the War- 
saw Pact on mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions (MBFR) in central Europe. 

November 13-14 

The Eurogroup is established within the 
framework of NATO as an informal associa- 
tion of Defense Ministers of European 
member governments. It seeks to: (1) im- 
prove the effectiveness of the European con- 
tribution to the alliance through closer coor- 



dination and the best possible use of 
resources and (2) provide a forum for 
Defense Ministers to exchange views on ma- 
jor political and strategic questions affecting 
the common defense. 

November 21 

Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean 
(MARAIRMED) is activated at Naples to im- 
prove NATO's surveillance of the Mediter- 
ranean area. 

1969 

November 6 

NATO sets up the Committee on the 
Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) to pro- 
mote international action on problems of the 
human environment. 

December 3-5 

NAC ministerial, meeting in Brussels, issues 
a declaration on East-West relations. 



1970 

March 20 

NATO launches its first communication 
satellite from Cape Kennedy, Florida. 



May 26-27 

At NAC meeting in Rome, NATO elaborates 
its MBFR proposal of December 1968. 

December 2-4 

At NAC ministerial in Brussels, the U.S. 
pledges to maintain and improve its forces in 
Europe if the other NATO allies will do the 
same. The U.S. promises that reductions will 
only be made in the context of reciprocal 
East-West reductions. 

The DPC adopts a study on "Alliance 
Defense in the '70s." 



1971 

August 20 

DPC orders transfer of NAVSOUTH from 
Malta to Naples. 

October 1 

Joseph M.A.H. Luns (Netherlands) succeeds 
Manlio Brosio as Secretary General. 

1972 



May 30-31 

At NAC ministerial, meeting in Bonn, NATO 
agrees to begin multinational preparatory 
talks in Helsinki for a Conference on Security |, IS , 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). NATO 
also proposes multilateral explorations on 
MBFR. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 



NATO Ministerial 



December 7-8 

NAC ministerial, meeting in Brussels, 
resolves to maintain NATO defenses in the 
face of expanding Warsaw Pact forces. 

1973 

July 3-7 

First phase of the 35-nation CSCE begins in 
Helsinki. 

October 30 

MBFR talks between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact open in Vienna. 

December 10-11 

At NAC ministerial, meeting in Brussels, 
members of NATO's integrated military 
structure recognize that a common alliance 
effort is needed to maintain U.S. forces in 
Europe at current levels. 

1974 

June 14 

DPC reaffirms the importance of standardiza- 
tion and specialization of defense tasks. 

(une 18-19 

Observing the 25th anniversary of NATO, 
;he NAC ministerial, meeting in Ottawa, 
idopts and publishes a declaration on Atlan- 
,ic relations. 

August 14 

jreek forces withdraw from NATO's in- 
egrated military structure. 

| 975 

ulv 31-August 1 

^inal phase of CSCE is held in Helsinki. The 
J.S., Canada, and all European countries (ex- 
ept Albania) sign the Helsinki Final Act. 

)ecember 9-10 

)PC ministerial, meeting in Brussels, notes a 
ontinued increase in Warsaw Pact strength 
nd capabilities, reaffirms the importance of 
naintaining and strengthening NATO's 
orces, and reviews efforts to improve stand- 
.rdization and compatibility of military equip- 
nent within the alliance. 



976 

)ecember 9-10 

JAC ministerial, meeting in Brussels, ex- 
resses its determination to enhance allied 
ohesion and strength and, in light of the 
lelsinki Final Act's provisions, rejects War- 
,w Pact proposals to renounce first use of 
iuclear weapons and to restrict alliance 
nembership. 



1977 

May 17-18 

DPC ministerial agrees to a long-term 
defense program for NATO. 

June 8-9 

NPG, meeting in Ottawa, notes continuing 
improvements in Soviet nuclear forces, in- 
cluding mobile intermediate-range systems. 

October 4 

First CSCE follow-up meeting opens in 
Belgrade to review compliance with the 
Helsinki Final Act. 

October 11-12 

NPG ministerial, meeting in Bari (Italy), 
establishes a high-level group on theater 
nuclear force modernization within the con- 
text of the long-term defense program. 



1978 

March 9 

CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade ends 
without agreement. 

April 18-19 

NPG, meeting in Denmark, notes with con- 
cern the increased Soviet capability in longer- 
range theater nuclear weapons — including 
the triple-warhead SS-20 mobile 
missiles — and endorses the importance of 
modernizing NATO's theater nuclear forces. 

November 18 

NATO launches its third communications 
satellite from Cape Canaveral, Florida. 

December 5-6 

NATO approves an airborne early warning 
and control system (AWACS) program. 

1979 

April 11 

NATO establishes a special group to study 
the arms control aspects of theater nuclear 
systems. 

December 12 

Following intensive NATO consultations, a 
special meeting of NATO Foreign and 
Defense Ministers, meeting in Brussels, 
adopts a "dual-track" strategy to redress the 
Soviet buildup of intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) through arms control negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union if possible but, if 
necessary, through modernization of its own 
INF forces. 

• Arms Control Track: NATO offers 
U.S. -Soviet arms control negotiations to limit 
or eliminate longer-range intermediate-range 
nuclear force (LRINF) missiles. 



• Modernization Track: NATO decides to 
deploy 572 U.S. single- warhead Pershing II 
and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) 
in Western Europe beginning at the end of 
1983 if no arms control agreement had been 
reached by that time. NATO also decides to 
withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads. In addi- 
tion, NATO pledges to withdraw one older 
nuclear weapon for each Pershing II and 
GLCM deployed. 

December 29 

Special NAC session discusses December 21 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

1980 

January 24 

NATO establishes the Special Consultative 
Group (SCG) to serve as a forum for consulta- 
tions on INF arms control matters. 

October 20 

Greek forces are reintegrated into NATO's 
military structure. 

November 11 

The second CSCE follow-up meeting opens in 
Madrid. 



1981 

November 20 

SCG welcomes President Reagan's 
"zero-zero" proposal of November 18 to 
eliminate the entire class of U.S. and Soviet 
land-based LRINF missiles., 

November 30 

U.S. and the Soviet Union open INF negotia- 
tions in Geneva. 

December 2 

Spain formally applies for membership. 

December 10 

NATO issues declaration condemning all acts 
of terrorism. 



1982 

January 11 

Special NAC ministerial issues declaration on 
Poland following General Jaruzelski's imposi- 
tion of martial law on December 13, 1981. 

May 30 

Spain becomes 16th member. 

June 10 

NAC summit meeting issues the Bonn 
declaration setting out NATO's program for 
peace in freedom. 



uly 1984 



25 



1983 

March 31 

NAC issues statement supporting the U.S. 
INF initiative of March 30, 1983, to break 
the stalemate by proposing an "interim agree- 
ment" at the Geneva INF negotiations. 

September 9 

CSCE follow-up meeting ends in Madrid with 
the signing of a concluding document by all 
35 participating nations. 

October 27 

The NPG, meeting in Montebello (Canada), 
announces that NATO will remove about 
1,400 warheads from Europe over the next 
5-6 years and thus reduce its nuclear 
stockpile to the lowest level in 20 years. 
These unilateral reductions are in addition to 
the 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons already 
withdrawn in 1980 in accordance with the 
December 1979 dual-track decision. 



December 7 

In its final communique, 



DPC ministers: 



• Emphasize determination to move 
ahead with the dual-track approach to LRINF 
modernization and arms control to redress 
the military imbalance with the Soviet Union; 

• Regret Soviet suspension of the INF 
talks on November 23, 1983, and emphasize 
NATO's desire for resumption as soon as 
possible; 



• Reaffirm that NATO is prepared, in ac- 
cordance with the terms of any INF agree- 
ment which may be reached, to halt, modify, 
or reverse its current missile deployments in 
conformity with the 1979 decision; 

• Reaffirm the need to strive for a 
mutually acceptable solution to the issues 
still barring progress at the MBFR talks in 
Vienna; and 

• Stress the importance they attach to 
the Conference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) as an opportunity to negotiate 
politically binding, militarily significant, and 
verifiable measures to reduce the risk of sur- 
prise attack. 

December 8 

SCG releases a report in Brussels listing 
NATO's efforts to secure an INF agreement. 
The report concludes that despite intensive, 
sustained alliance effort over the last 2 years, 
Soviet insistence on retaining a monopoly on 
LRINF has prevented agreement and that 
continued alliance implementation of the 1979 
decision remains essential to the prospects 
for arms control to ensure the security of the 
alliance and to provide the foundation for a 
more stable and cooperative relationship with 
the East. 



1984 

January 17 

CDE opens in Stockholm. Its mandate- 
adopted by the 35 CSCE nations in 
Madrid — is to negotiate confidence- and 
security-building measures to reduce the risks 
of a military confrontation in Europe. 

January 24 

The 16 NATO nations table the first package 
of proposals at the CDE. 

April 19 

NATO allies introduce a new proposal at the 
MBFR talks in Vienna to break the impasse 
caused by discrepancies in the Eastern and 
Western data on the size of Eastern forces 
now in central Europe. Instead of requiring 
formal data agreement on all forces in central 
Europe before reductions begin, the West 
now stands ready to accept an exchange of 
data that falls within an acceptable range of 
Western estimates on the combat and combat 
support forces of both sides. 

May 29-31 

NAC Foreign Ministers, meeting in 
Washington, issue a statement on East- West 
relations supporting the pursuit of dialogue 
and cooperation based on the maintenance of 
adequate military strength and political 
solidarity and equitable and verifiable arms 
control agreements. 

June 25 

Lord Carrington (U.K.) succeeds Joseph 
M. A. H. Luns as Secretary General. ■ 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



The Struggle for Freedom 
in Latin America 



President Reagan's remarks at a 
meeting of the Council of the Americas at 
the Department of State on May 8, H>s: t .' 

Thank you all very much, and' I ap- 
preciate this opportunity to be with you 
today. 

You may have heard that I will be 
speaking to the American people tomor- 
row evening on the very subject that 
you are discussing here, our respon- 
sibilities in this hemisphere. As members 
of the Council of the Americas, you've 
fostered cooperation and understanding 
between the United States and our 
neighbors in the south. 

Having been Governor of California, 
I've long been aware of the rich 
Hispanic heritage of our country. The 
Hispanic heritage that we appreciate so 
much in our Southwestern States 
reflects not just our traditions but on 
the many things which all the peoples of 
:his hemisphere share. 

Simon Bolivar, the Great Liberator, 
saw this natural bond between all 
\mericans. Early in the last century, he 
;aid of us, "We are a special kind of 
mman being. We have a world apart." 
Building the ties between our people and 
he 380 million people in the 33 coun- 
ries of Latin America has been of ut- 
nost importance to this Administration. 

Our polices toward Latin America 
ire aimed at achieving three consistent 
ind mutually enforcing goals. 

First, we seek to encourage the 
■ levelopment of democratic political in- 
titutions. 

Second, we want to see all the 
ieoples of the Americas better their 
tandard of living and improve the vitali- 
y of their economies. 

Third, we want to help our friends 
efend themselves from Soviet bloc- and 
luban-sponsored subversion. 

Some of the most inspirational 
eroes of human liberty emerged from 
he struggles for freedom and in- 
ependence in Latin America. One of 
hem, Jose Marti, a Cuban patriot who 
Dund refuge in the United States from 
despotic regime in his native land, 
nee said, "Like bones to the human 
ody, the axle to the wheel, the wing to 
he bird and the air to the wing, so is 
iberty the essence of life. Whatever is 
one without it is imperfect." 



uly 1984 



That spirit is alive and growing in 
Latin America today. Right now, of 
Latin America's 33 countries, 26 with 
about 90% of the region's population, 
are either democratic or in transition to 
democracy. A decade ago, less than 40% 
of Latin America's population was so 
fortunate. 

Transition to , democracy in Peru, 
Equador, and the Dominican Republic 
has been followed more recently by Hon- 
duras and Argentina. All of this should 
give us tremendous hope for the future. 
No longer can communist dictatorship be 
juxtaposed against rightist dictatorship 
as the only alternative. 

In June of 1982, I was honored to 
speak before the British Parliament, the 
living monument to democracy. I pro- 
posed that the people of free countries 
take a more active role in encouraging 
and aiding in the development of 
democratic institutions, such as political 
parties and civic groups throughout the 
world. For many years, we'd been doing 
something similar to that by helping 
build democratic trade unions. With con- 
gressional enactment of the National 
Endowment for Democracy, another 
little-noticed yet, nevertheless, 'giant 
step forward has been made. The na- 
tional endowment is now working to 
strengthen democratic parties, trade 
unions, business and civic associations, 
and other democratic institutions. 

The times we live in are as challeng- 
ing and as exciting as any in history. 
There are people in Latin and Central 
America who are fighting for their 
freedom every bit as much as our own 
forefathers. Last Sunday, this struggle 
for freedom took the shape of Presiden- 
tial elections in Equador, Panama, and 
El Salvador. 

In El Salvador, unofficial results in- 
dicate the winner will be Napoleon 
Duarte, a Christian Democrat, who for 
more than two decades has been in the 
forefront of democratic reform and in 
opposition to the communist left and the 
violent right. 

We look forward to a cordial and 
productive working relationship with El 
Salvador. The fact that the Salvadoran 
election was held at all reflects the 
dedication to democracy and personal 
courage of the people of that troubled 
land. 



The communist guerrillas warned 
people not to vote, yet the people defied 
the threat. The guerrillas mined roads, 
and still many thousands walked miles 
to mark their ballots. Each one of these 
people who braved such threats deserves 
our greatest respect and admiration. 

A member of my National Security 
Council staff, Jackie Tillman, was down 
there last Sunday. She was accompany- 
ing Members of the Congress and others 
who were there to witness the elections. 
She met a young 15-year-old poll watch- 
er and asked him— 15-year-old— asked 
him how he felt about the voting, half 
expecting a typical, nonchalant, adoles- 
cent reply. And instead, he pointed to 
his heart and very quietly said, "I feel 
this voting right here. This is what my 
country needs," he said, "to defeat the 
guerrillas and bring peace." That lad, 
and the millions of other courageous in- 
dividuals like him, people who've main- 
tained their dignity and honor in the 
face of such adversity, are, indeed, 
heroes of democracy. 

The economic challenges faced in the 
southern half of this hemisphere appear 
as monumental as those in the political 
arena. Yet, there's reason for hope. For 
the three decades after the Second 
World War, substantial economic prog- 
ress was made in Latin America. 
Growth rates, in fact, matched those in 
the industrialized democracies and im- 
proved the standard of living of a 
significant proportion of the population. 
At the same time, however, a rapid in- 
crease in the population strained 
resources and left many in dire poverty. 
The leap in energy prices and the onset 
of global recession in 1979 was felt the 
world over. Few places experienced 
more pain than Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 

While coping with worldwide 
economic currents must be the primary 
responsibility of each country, we're 
doing what we can to help. We in- 
creased by over 50% the level of 
bilateral economic assistance over the 
previous Administration. We've con- 
tinued to support contributions to the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, 
and International Monetary Fund pro- 
grams, all of which are vital to Latin 
America. Discreetly, with much care and 
consideration for political, social, as well 
as economic consequences, we worked 
with leaders in government and the 
private sector to encourage the refinanc- 
ing of international debts. And your 
cooperation has been indispensable in 
this effort. 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



And last year, the Congress enacted 
our Caribbean Basin Initiative, a 
dramatic and innovative approach to 
progress in Central America and the 
Caribbean. By opening up one-way free 
trade to the United States, the world's 
biggest market, we're bringing the vast 
resources of the private sector to play in 
our efforts to improve the lot of 165 
million hemispheric neighbors. 

There is no magic or instant solution 
to the economic woes that plague our 
neighbors to the south, but we can be 
confident because in the long run, 
freedom works. During the last century 
a Venezuelan intellectual, Andres Bello, 
noted that "liberty gives wings to the 
spirit of enterprise wherever it meets 
it." I believe that. That's what 
America — and I mean, when I say 
"America," from the North Slope of 
Alaska to the tip of Tierra del 
Fuego — what it is all about. 

Liberty is, of course, something we 
can't take for granted. One of the 
greatest challenges faced by this genera- 
tion of Americans is in Central America 
today. If we act responsibly, there's no 
reason we will not meet this challenge. 

As you're aware, a bipartisan com- 
mission on Central America, headed by 
Henry Kissinger, came to that conclu- 
sion when they reported in mid-January. 
In Central America today, freedom- 
loving people, our friends, are under at- 
tack by Soviet bloc- and Cuban-backed 
insurgents. We're trying our best to help 



these courageous and decent people 
develop their democratic institutions and 
better their economic lot. But if we do 
nothing or not enough to help them pro- 
tect themselves, there will be grim con- 
sequences to pay. It's not only their 
security; it's our security. 

If the communists succeed, if we 
face a flood of refugees and a direct 
threat on our own southern border, it 
will not be because we acted, but 
because we refused to do what was 
necessary to avert the crisis. And make 
no mistake, further communist inroads 
in Central America will undermine 
stability in the entire region and make 
financial problems far more severe. 
Together, we can make sure that doesn't 
happen. I'll be speaking more about that 
tomorrow night. 

What a mighty force for good we, 
the citizens of all this hemisphere, can 
be. What a potential we have from pole 
to pole. And yet one should never expect 
anything worthwhile to come easy. It'll 
take all of us working together, acting 
responsibly, and having the courage to 
face challenges head-on. But have no 
worry, in the end we can, with God's 
help, accomplish great things. 

I thank you for letting me be with 
you today. God bless you, and carry on 
in what you're doing. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 14, 1984. 



Berlin— A Very Special Place for America 



The following article by President 
Reagan was published in the May 23, 
1984, edition of Die Welt. 1 

Berlin is a very special place for me and 
for America. 

I visited Berlin in 1978 and again, 
after I became President, in 1982. The 
first impression entering the city by air 
is, of course, that terrible wall which 
surrounds and divides Berlin. Despite its 
bright white paint and the flowerboxes 
placed here and there to soften the ef- 
fect, the wall's inhuman purpose cannot 
be disguised. 

The wall suppresses man's natural 
impulse to be free. The angry words of 
protest splashed across the western side 
of the wall show the frustration that 
Berliners feel in living with this symbol 
of tyranny, knowing that there are 
Berliners too on the other side. 



Berlin is a microcosm of a greater 
division. The ugly slash that divides 
Berlin is replicated on a larger scale in a 
similar division of Germany and in the 
artificial line cutting off one part of 
Europe from another. In divided Berlin, 
as elsewhere in divided Europe, families 
and friends are separated; contacts 
severed; freedoms denied. 

This first impression, however, does 
not tell the full story. The tragedy of 
Berlin is evident even from a distance. 
One must move closer to see the 
triumph as well. For Berlin is a triumph 
of the human spirit. The visitor quickly 
realizes and admires the enormous 
courage and endurance of the Berliners. 
They are the inheritors of a devastated 
city. A city the Soviet Union once tried 
to bring to its knees through the Berlin 
blockade. A city cut in two by that cruel 
wall. But Berliners, all the while sur- 



rounded by a hostile environment, did 
not succumb to threats of pressure. 
They have repeatedly come through 
adversity with bravery, dignity, and 
grace. 

Berliners have had to struggle to 
maintain their liberty, and their un- 
wavering devotion to freedom is an ex- 
ample for us all. This is the first lesson 
of Berlin: that we cannot be timid in 
preserving our democratic way of life. 
We must stand up for our freedoms. 
The terrible price of losing them is vivid- 
ly demonstrated just on the other side of 
the wall. 

The United States stands with 
Berlin. We are honored to have an im- 
portant role in the preservation of 
Berlin's freedom. The United States has 
a solemn obligation to Berlin which time 
has only reaffirmed and strengthened. 
The American commitment to Berlin is 
firm and unshakable. 

Berlin, like the rest of the West, 
benefits from the ability of the Atlantic 
Alliance to deter war. The community of 
free nations, dedicated to democratic 
ideals, has given Europe a generation of 
peace. The unity and strength of the 
Atlantic Alliance provide the protective 
shield that keeps us free and secure. 
Last fall, the Soviet Union failed to in- 
timidate the Alliance over the NATO 
decision on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces. As in Berlin 35 years earlier, the 
West refused to bow to Soviet dictates 
and is more secure in consequence. The 
Soviet Union now knows that the West 
will do what is necessary to keep the 
peace. 

As a testing-ground for Western 
strength of will, Berlin has often been at 
the cutting edge of East- West relations. 
In times past, shock waves from strife 
elsewhere were frequently felt in Berlin. 
More recently, however, Berlin has 
become known for a different kind of 
East- West relationship. It has become 
an example of the successful manage- 
ment of delicate East- West problems. 

A longstanding vital function in 
which the Soviet Union and the Western 
Allies cooperate is the coordination of 
Berlin air traffic. The maintenance of 
Allied rights and responsibilities with 
respect to Berlin air traffic is an integral 
part of the working relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the Western 
Allies. 

The Quadripartite Agreement of 
1971 has helped Berlin become calmer, 
more stable and secure. Berliners have 
found it easier to visit and communicate 
with friends and relatives in East Berlin 
and the German Democractic Republic. 
Trade and travel between Berlin and the 



l\ 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Federal Republic of Germany have been 
facilitated. The Quadripartite Agree- 
ment must continue to be strictly 
observed and fully implemented, in all 
sectors of Greater Berlin. 

The second lesson of Berlin is that it 
is possible to build constructive and 
practical East-West relationships on the 
basis of realism, strength, and dialogue. 
While we cannot ignore the profound 
differences between East and West, we 
can accomplish much that is in the in- 
terest of all people. 

The applicability of this second 
lesson extends beyond Berlin — it under- 
pins the whole East- West relationship. 
By remaining unified in our determina- 
tion to defend freedom — in Berlin and 
elsewhere — while at the same time ex- 
ploring reasonable avenues for improved 
East- West relations, the West is making 
an important contribution to world 
peace. The key is solidarity. As has been 
the case for more than 35 years, the en- 
tire free world maintains its support for 
the freedom of Berlin. Today, it is im- 
portant that all of us, Berliners included, 
show the same support for oppressed 
peoples in places such as Afghanistan 
and Poland. If we are to maintain 
freedom, we must remain united. 

I am optimistic about the future of 
Berlin. Berlin is an extraordinarily vital 
world city, bustling with prosperity. It 
las a rich culture and history. The city 
s blessed with great universities and 
scientific institutes. Most of all, Berlin is 
olessed with the Berliners themselves — 
whose strength and spirit have served it 
veil. The security guarantee of the 
tVestern Allies is inalterable and perma- 
j lent, and American ties of friendship 
> vith Berlin run deep. East- West accords 
lave led to practical improvements to 
nake life easier in Berlin. But the bar- 
kers to the free flow of information, to 
luman contacts, are still far too high, 
ven the cultural life of the city is 
livided— museums, theaters, symphony 
irchestras and operas split between two 
ides. 

Such human divisions are in- 
olerable. If peace is to be secured, we 
ust increase our efforts to accom- 
odate the human aspirations of 
lillions of persons in Europe who are 
ot satisfied with the conditions under 
/hich they must live. In this regard, I 
/ould like to recall my 1982 visit to 
Serlin. At that time, I asked the Soviet 
Inion to join with the West in working 

reduce the human barriers which 
ivide Europe. Rather than a symbol of 
ppression, reflected in barbed wire and 
'alls, would it not be better for Berlin 
} be the starting point for the reduction 



of the human and political divisions 
which create misery in the world? 

Today, I would like to repeat that 
challenge. In 1987, Berlin— all of 
Berlin— will celebrate its 750th birthday. 
Would not that occasion be appropriate 
for celebrating the further reduction of 
the barriers which divide the city? 

In 1984, we celebrate another an- 
niversary — the 35th anniversary of suc- 
cessful conclusion of the Berlin Airlift. 
This historic undertaking was made 
possible by the close cooperation of 



Americans, British and French officials 
with their German friends. It was truly 
an historic turning point, and the United 
States will be forever proud of its role in 
saving the freedom of the Western Sec- 
tors of this great city. All Americans 
join me in the hope that it will not take 
another 35 years to restore the unity of 
Berlin and that Berliners on both sides 
of the wall will one day be able to live 
together in peace and liberty. 



'Text from the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 28, 1984. I 



News Conferences of May 22 
and June 14 (Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan's 
news conferences of May 22 and June 1A, 
198Jt. 

MAY 22, 1984 1 

We have an important visitor in 
Washington, Jose Napoleon Duarte, the 
President-elect of El Salvador. The 
President-elect and I yesterday issued a 
joint statement in which we agreed on 
three major objectives for Central 
America: the strengthening of 
democratic institutions, the improve- 
ment of living standards, and increased 
levels of U.S. security assistance to de- 
fend against violence from both the ex- 
treme left and the extreme right. 

The election of Jose Napoleon 
Duarte is the latest chapter in a trend 
toward democracy throughout Latin 
America. In Central America, El 
Salvador now joins Costa Rica and Hon- 
duras in having a democratically elected 
government. Democracy in Central 
America is a fundamental goal of our 
policy in that region. But continued 
progress toward that goal requires our 
assistance. 

Most of our aid, three-quarters of it, 
is economic assistance. But security 
assistance is essential to help all those 
who must protect themselves against the 
expanding export of subversion by the 
Soviet bloc, Cuba, and Nicaragua. 

Also, as I said in my speech to the 
nation on May 9th, we must support the 
democratic aspirations of the people of 
Nicaragua and oppose the Sandinista ag- 
gression against their neighbors, who 
seek genuinely democratic elections in 



uly1984 



Nicaragua, as the Sandinistas promised 
the OAS [Organization of American 
States] in 1979. 

Peace can only be achieved in Cen- 
tral America if the forces of democracy 
are strong. We strongly support 
multilateral efforts toward peace, 
especially the Contadora process. 
However, no lasting peace settlement 
through the Contadora process can be 
achieved unless there is simultaneous 
implementation of all the Contadora ob- 
jectives, including genuinely democratic 
elections in Nicaragua. The freedom 
fighters in Nicaragua have promised to 
lay down their arms and to participate 
in genuinely democratic elections if the 
Sandinistas will permit them. 

Our Congress faces some historic 
decisions this week. Those who struggle 
for freedom everywhere are watching to 
see whether America can still be 
counted upon to support its own ideals. 
The people of El Salvador are watching, 
the freedom fighters of Nicaragua are 
watching. Nicaragua's threatened 
neighbors are watching, and the enemies 
of freedom are watching as well. 

Our balanced policy can succeed if 
the Congress provides the resources for 
all elements of that policy as outlined in 
the bipartisan recommendations of the 
Kissinger commission. But if the Con- 
gress offers too little support, it'll be 
worse than doing nothing at all. The 
success of communism in Central 
America poses the threat that 100 
million people from Panama to the open 
border on our south could come under 
the control of pro-Soviet regimes. We 
could face a massive exodus of refugees 
to the United States. 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



The Congress has the opportunity to 
reaffirm our commitment to brave peo- 
ple risking their lives for the cause of 
liberty and democracy in Central 
America. The Congress also has the op- 
portunity to reaffirm our bipartisan 
tradition, which will tell the world that 
we're united when our vital interests are 
at stake. I'm asking the Members of the 
Congress to make that commitment. 

Q. I'ts been reported that you are 
willing to provide U.S. air power to 
keep oil tankers moving through the 
Persian Gulf. Could you tell us what 
the Saudi response has been to your 
proposal and under what cir- 
cumstances the United States could 
become militarily involved in that 
region? 

A. I've seen all the stories and a lot 
of them based on speculation 
already — no, we have kept in touch and 
are keeping in touch with the gulf states 
and with our own allies. But we have 
not volunteered to intervene nor have 
we been asked to intervene. And we've 
communicated with them regarding that 
and so far it seems as if the gulf states 
want to take care of this themselves. 
They're concerned, as I think we all 
should be, about not enlarging the war. 

Q. Do we have a contingency plan 
for doing so if they can't take care of 
themselves? 

A. If they ask us for help, obviously 
we've thought in terms of what we 
might do. But I don't think that's 
something I should talk about. 

Q. Senator Byrd says that our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union have 
reached the lowest point in 20 years. 
Did you misjudge the Russians? Are 
your hardline policies responsible for 
the boycott of the Olympics, the 
breakoff of the arms negotiations, 
stepped-up offensive in Afghanistan, 
more missiles off our coast? 

A. I don't think I'm responsible for 
any of those things. And if these are at 
the lowest state that we've had for 20 
years — not too long ago, just a matter 
of days ago, I gave to George Shultz one 
of our very eminent national news 
magazines for him to see an article on 
this very subject. And the article — it 
was an April issue— and the article cited 
that we had the lowest relations we'd 
ever had and the President was to blame 
for that — his vacillation and so forth and 
so on — except that it was April of 1980 
when they were saying that about our 
relations with Russia. 

And I have to say that today, no, we 
didn't walk away from the negotiating 



table. We made every effort to prove 
that we were ready to be flexible in try- 
ing to negotiate a reduction of weapons. 

And as for the Olympics, the only 
thing as a government that we did in 
the Olympics was ensure them and meet 
virtually every request that they made 
with regard to their people there up to 
allowing their cruise ship to anchor, and 
we were going to spend about a half-a- 
million dollars on protection for that 
ship. 

Q. Would you admit there's a 
heightened belligerency? And six emi- 
nent world leaders today said that 
we're headed for global suicide. What 
are you going to do about it with this 
arms race? 

A. I don't think we are, and I don't 
think we're any closer or as close as we 
might have been in the past to a possible 
conflict or confrontation that could lead 
to a nuclear conflagration. I think the 
very fact that we're stronger — yes, the 
Soviet Union is unhappy. They're unhap- 
py because, for the first time in a couple 
of decades, we are preserving our 
security ability. We're building up our 
military, and we're not unilaterally 
disarming while they continue their 
massive arms buildup. And I'm sure this 
makes them a little unhappy about that, 
that things aren't as easy as they once 
were. 

But when they're ready to come 
back to the table, it probably— or might 
not be till after the election, I don't 
know. But I think that the world maybe 
is a little safer than it has been in the 
past. 

Q. On the Persian Gulf again, is it 
true that you have written to the 
Saudis saying that should they ask the 
United States for aid, that we are 
willing to supply air cover to protect 
the oil tankers? 

A. We haven't specified what we 
would do, but we have told them, 
because I made a statement earlier that 
neither we nor the Western world as 
such would stand by and see the straits 
or the Persian Gulf closed to interna- 
tional traffic. 

Q. In your judgment, what is the 
likelihood of American servicemen be- 
ing involved in some kind of shooting 
war shortly or in the near future in 
the Middle East? 

A. I think very slight. I can't foresee 
that happening. 

Q. You cannot foresee that hap- 
pening? 

A. As things stand now, no, I don't 
think so. 



Q. You've said America's vital in- 
terests are at stake in Central 
America. What will we have to do if 
the Congress does deny that security 
assistance to stop this threat of 
Soviet-sponsored regimes taking over 
all the countries right up to our 
southern borders. 

A. You say what do we have to do 
to— 

Q. Yes. Suppose the Congress did 
not vote the money that you need for 
the freedom fighters, as you call 
them? What, then, would we be re- 
quired to do to prevent this scenario 
from developing? 

A. We'd be in the very difficult posi- 
tion, and so would they. But I have 
great hopes that after President 
Duarte's visit here and meeting with as 
many of the Congress as he did that 
there's some reason for optimism. 

Q. There are reports that the Ad- 
ministration has gone around Con- 
gress and continued to increase 
military and intelligence activities in 
Central America by channeling money, 
through accounting tactics, tricks of 
accounting, through the Pentagon to 
the CIA. While you can't discuss 
covert activities, can you at least 
assure the American people that you 
have not had this Administration go 
beyond the will of Congress in in- 
creasing the spending for military ac- 
tivities in Central America? 

A. We've followed no procedures 
that are any different from what has 
been done in past Administrations, nor 
have we done anything without the 
knowledge of the Congress. 

Q. Can you explain then, we were 
told. Congress was told about a month 
ago that if Congress didn't appropriate 
the money, the CIA-supported contras 
would run out of money by now. Now 
Congress has been told that the CIA 
has enough money to get through the 
rest of the summer. How is that possi- 
ble without their getting secret funds? 

A. Unless they guessed wrong on 
the first statement— I thought that they 
were closer to being out of money than 
they apparently are. But I don't think 
any — nothing of that kind could take 
place without the knowledge of Con- 
gress. 



Q. Two questions on your upcom- 
ing trip to Europe. First, are you con- 
cerned in any way that the planned 
demonstrations in Ireland will mar 
what was supposed to be a friendly 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



homecoming for the television 
cameras? And, secondly, you have 
gone to economic summits for 4 years 
now and told the allied leaders that 
American interest rates will be com- 
ing down and the deficit will be com- 
ing down. Given the fact that interest 
rates are going up, why should allied 
leaders believe you if you sing this 
same song — or say the same things 
this year? 

A. I think that the interest rates are 
one of those things that can be volatile. 
They slid up here this — they have, if you 
compare them to what they were when 
we started, they are well down. So, 
there was a little increase recently, 
which I think represented fear in the 
marketplace of possible return of infla- 
tion. 'I don't think it was necessary, and 
I still hold that those conditions or their 
doing that is really unwarranted. 

The rate of money increase right 
now is well within the guidelines set by 
the Federal Reserve and it's commen- 
surate with our increased growth, and 
yet it is not at a point that would add to 
inflation. So I am still optimistic that 
those interest rates — we're going to see 
them continue to come down. 

As for the deficit, I'm also going to 
be optimistic and tell you that I think 
that everyone has been overestimating. 
Not that it isn't a serious problem — it is. 
But I think that they've been 
overestimating the amount in the 
outyears in the projections of what the 
deficit will be. 

Q. Are you concerned about the 
Irish demonstrations? 

A. Oh, the Irish demonstrations, I 
think that's just Irish hospitality. They 
•know — [laughter] — that I haven't gone 
anyplace in years that there hasn't been 
a demonstration, and they don't want 
me to feel as if I'm not at home. 

Q. Your Administration has said 
that once we build up our military 
strength, the Russians would have an 
incentive to come to the negotiating 
table. You have said that we have 
built up our military defenses. Why 
have the Russians not returned to the 
negotiating table? 

A. As I say, maybe they're waiting 
I for the election to be over. But, no, we 
have built up. On the other hand, they 
pan see, for example, the modernization 
of our strategic weapons, which are all 
I mportant — the Peacekeeper, the 
(MX — they can see the contest that is go- 
ing on as to whether that's going to be 
touWt or not. And this can't help but be 
i encouraging to them. 



But I think it's true they came to the 
table, and I think they only came to the 
table because they believed in our deter- 
mination to continue our military 
buildup. And they left because their 
whole propaganda campaign against the 
deployment of the Pershings and the 
cruise missiles in Europe — which was 
agreed to in 1979 by this country, when 
NATO requested it, and we're keeping 
that promise — but at all the time that 
they were negotiating with us, they kept 
on building and adding to their stock of 
SS-20s. Now, these are triple warhead 
missiles that are intermediate range, 
targeted on all the targets of Europe. 
But also, they have been adding them 
aimed at targets in Asia. And it was for 
this — in response to this— that NATO 
asked for an intermediate-range weapon 
that could be based in Europe, targeted 
on Russia. And we're providing that. It 
won't in any way, match the 1,350 or so 
warheads that are in the SS-20s, but we 
believe it will be enough for a deterrent. 

Use of a deterrent is to have the 
enemy know that if he's contemplating 
some rash action, the cost to him might 
be more than he cares to bear. So, we're 
going forward with this. They had 
waged such a campaign to stop it that I 
think they made this other move to, 
hopefully — or in the hope that our allies 
in Europe might change their mind and 
cancel out their request. The allies stood 
firm. I don't think the alliance has ever 
been more solidly together than it is 
right now. 

Q. But given the coolness of our 
relationship right now, do you think 
the Russians have a problem of saving 
face, perhaps, in returning to the 
negotiations? If so, would you be 
prepared to offer some gesture, to 
make some overture that would be 
that positive sign that they asked for 
in order to come to the table without a 
loss of face? 

A. I don't think it would be proper 
for us to do something, some conces- 
sions that would make it look that we 
rewarded their intransigence and their 
walking out of the meetings. But we 
have pursued — and we took the lead in 
this— negotiations on a number of other 
matters between our two countries that 
have nothing to do with strategic 
weapons, and we've been making some 
progress in a number of those negotia- 
tions. I don't think things are as bad as 
they're being painted. 



Q. You said earlier that if asked, 
the United States would assist Persian 



Gulf States in keeping the Strait of 
Hormuz open. Are there any cir- 
cumstances where American interests 
could be so threatened that the United 
States would act unilaterally or 
without a request from those states? 

A. Again, I can't foresee that. We 
probably would be — among all the 
importing-of-oil nations, we would be the 
least hurt by any shutdown. It is our 
allies — it is Japan, it is our friends in 
Western Europe — who would really be 
in trouble if there was any stop to the 
Middle East oil. 

Actually, only 3% of our oil supply 
now — thanks to decontrolling oil and in- 
creasing domestic production — only 3% 
is involved in the Persian Gulf for us. 
And we have increased our stockpile of 
oil to four times what it was when we 
came here. I can't see a kind of an 
emergency that would do this. 

But also remember, we are in con- 
sultation with our allies, with those na- 
tions that would be affected, because 
we're not contemplating anything 
unilaterally here. This problem is one 
that affects all of us. 

Q. What would the United States 
do to help its allies in the event of an 
oil cutoff? Would we give them oil 
from the strategic reserve? 

A. We have had people in consulta- 
tions with our allies, and they've been 
holding meetings on discussing con- 
tingencies of this kind. We would not 
hold back on immediately turning to our 
reserve, but I'm not prepared to say 
we've made any specific plans. 

Q. The White House and the Pen- 
tagon worked very hard yesterday to 
tell people they shouldn't really worry 
about the new nuclear missile sub- 
marines the Soviet Union says they've 
placed off the American coast. Can 
you tell the American people that 
these new missile subs are not any 
cause for concern, and is there 
anything the United States must do to 
respond to the Soviets? 

A. If I thought there was some 
reason to be concerned about them, I 
wouldn't be sleeping in this house 
tonight. [Laughter] No, this isn't really 
anything new. They're announcing and 
they're publicizing, but those submarines 
off both our coasts — they've had sub- 
marines in and out and patrolling there 
for extended periods of time. Maybe 
there's one or two more than have been 
there at one time in the past, but I 
think, again, it is in keeping with their 
talk about us putting the Pershings in 



July 1984 



31 



THE PRESIDENT 



Europe and that they're now going to 
show us that they can do something in 
return if we do that. They have the sub- 
marines offshore. But they're — no, I 
don't think they pose any particular 
threat at all. 

Q. If it's any consolation to you, 
I've written all my relations in County 
Kerry not to demonstrate seriously un- 
til you and I are safely out of the 
country. [Laughter] But I wanted to 
ask you if you have any message for 
the Soviet Government or for the 
Sakharovs about the possibility of get- 
ting them out of the coun- 
try — whether there's any deal or any 
trade that can be made that would 
save their lives? 

A. On this one I have to say we're 
as concerned as anyone — deeply con- 
cerned. Mrs. Bonner has a very serious 
heart condition. She is a physician 
herself. She's a war hero also. She was 
wounded three times in World War II. 
She was permitted to leave Russia once 
and had medical treatment for her prob- 
lem outside the country, and I think it's 
only natural that someone would want 
to go back to the person who had 
treated them before. 

But I can't go further than that, 
because this is a little bit like when I put 
a moratorium on myself before I was 
here in talking about our people in the 
Embassy in Iran. I just have a feeling 
that anything I might say publicly could 
be injurious to her chances. I just hope 
and pray that the Soviet Union will do 
the humane thing and let her go. 

Q. You have said in the past that 
you have no intention of sending U.S. 
troops into combat in El Salvador, and 
President-elect Duarte said yesterday 
that he had no intention of asking for 
U.S. troops to go there. But despite 
these denials, the doubts linger. 
Walter Mondale insists that your 
policy will lead to U.S. involvement 
down there. Can you say unequivocally 
tonight that you would not send 
troops down to El Salvador, even if it 
appears that without them El Salvador 
might fall to the communists. 

A. First of all, President Duarte 
made it very plain that they would never 
request American troops. We have 
never had any consideration of doing 
that or any thought of doing that at all. 
I don't know how I can convince anyone 
that — but all you'd have to do is look at 
all our friends and neighbors in Latin 
America, and probably as a holdover 
from the past, we'd lose all those friends 



32 



and neighbors if we did that. They want 
our help. They know they have to have 
our help, economically, and in the man- 
ner in which we're giving it in military 
support — by training and supplies and 
equipment and so forth — but they don't 
want American manpower there. 

Q. If El Salvador clearly were go- 
ing to fall to the communists, would 
you feel it's in the U.S. interests to 
send our troops in there and stop that, 
or would you allow the country to go 
communist? 

A. You're asking me for a hypo- 
thetical question, and one in which that I 
think that I would be very foolish to try 
and answer. 



Q. I was wondering if you could 
give us your definition of "holding 
firm" in answer to Charlotte's 
[Charlotte Saikowski, Christian 
Science Monitor] question. You said 
our allies in Europe were holding firm 
in accepting missiles, yet the Dutch 
Government here is going through a 
little rain dance here because their 
people don't want to take the new 
missiles. Could you sort of tell me 
how that is holding firm? 

A. The decision must be made by 
the Dutch Cabinet — Cabinet of the 
Netherlands— and the Parliament, and 
they have not yet taken up that issue or 
made a decision on it. They are slated to 
get some cruise missiles there. But in 
the other countries, basically, Italy, Ger- 
many, the other NATO countries, are all 
going forward; England, the bases are 
being erected for the missiles, including 
the Pershings and, as I say, not just on 
that issue alone. 

But I have to tell you that some 
time ago when we came here we found 
there was disarray in the NATO 
alliance, and that no longer holds true 
today. I think we're closer than we've 
probably ever been. 

Q. If the Dutch Government 
reverses and changes its mind, are you 
fearful that'll set up a chain reaction 
among the other allies, where the 
situation is at best tenuous? 

A. No. I doubt that they would. 
There might be another country or so 
among some of the smaller allies that 
might follow suit, but the rest, you can 
rest assured, wouldn't. 

Q. You said a little while ago that 
you felt that the world was a little 
more secure place since you've been in 
power. How do you account for the 
fact that so many people in so many 
countries think that during the last 



3V2 years the world has moved closer 
to war, rather than closer to peace? 

A. I would say that that is because 
that's all that most of the people have 
been hearing in political dialogue from 
one side, since we've been here in the 
3V2 years, that I somehow have an itchy 
finger and am going to blow up the 
world. And that has all been duly 
reported by so many of you that that is 
the tone that the people have been get- 
ting. And it doesn't do me any good to 
tell you that, having seen four wars in 
my lifetime. I don't know of anyone, in 
or out of government, who is more 
determinedly seeking peace than I am. 
And my goal is the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons. If we can get those 
fellows back to the table and get them 
to start down that road of mutual reduc- 
tion, then they might find out what com- 
monsense it would mean to eliminate 
them. 

But I would also point out, that if 
we're that dangerous in 3V2 years, why 
is it that while the Soviets are still 
carrying on in Afghanistan and backing 
the forces in Kampuchea — the North 
Vietnamese forces there — but all those 
gains that they were making in the few 
years before we came here — Ethiopia, 
South Yemen, Angola — all of those 
things, they haven't taken another inch 
of territory since we've been here. 

Q. I think what the ordinary per- 
son is seeing is that the United States 
is rearming heavily, the Russians are 
rearming heavily, and the ordinary 
person says, "What is going to be the 
outcome of this arms race? Nobody is 
at any table." 

A. No, it is as simple as this, the 
Soviets — this isn't new for them, they're 
up at full pitch. I doubt if they could ex- 
pand their military production anyplace 
beyond where it is right now, or the rate 
that it is. 

On the other hand, they know that 
when for the first time in, as I say, 
decades, they see us determined to 
refurbish our defenses, they know that 
they can't match us in — if there is such 
a race, which means that the only alter- 
native for them is to watch us catch up 
or to sit down at the table with us and 
work out something in which they won't 
have to run the risk of someone being 
superior to them militarily. 



JUNE 14, 1984 2 

One week ago today in London, I joined 
the leaders of six major industrialized 
democracies for the annual economic 
summit. And we met to take the pulse 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



of the world economy, to measure the 
impact of the policies that we've been 
implementing during the past 3 years, 
and to continue strengthening the 
freedom, prosperity, and peace that we 
share. 

Change comes neither easily nor 
quickly in foreign affairs. But there was 
recognition in London that, while we 
continue to face pressing challenges, we 
are on the right track. By working 
together, by sticking to our policies, 
we've made impressive progress since 
1981. The Western democracies have 
been moving from weakness to strength, 
from disappointment and pessimism to 
confidence and hope for a better future. 

In 1981, our economies had an 
average growth of only 1.8%, and 8.5% 
inflation. But led by the recovery, and 
now the expansion in the United States, 
our average growth today is up to 4%, 
while inflation has been cut in half. 

There was recognition that the in- 
centives of America's recovery program, 
which sparked our economic takeoff and 
the creation of more than 6 million jobs 
in the last 18 months, have made a ma- 
jor contribution to the improvement in 
both the performance and the outlook in 
the world economy. 

I reaffirmed to our allies America's 
bedrock commitment to the NATO 
alliance and to its mission to protect 
peace and freedom in the West. Europe 
and America have enjoyed nearly 40 
years of peace. If NATO remains strong 
and unified, and I believe NATO is 
stronger and more unified today than 
ever before, then Europe and America 
will remain free and secure. 

We have reestablished strength and 
confidence stretching beyond America's 
shores to Europe and the Pacific Basin, 
and we're trying, as well, to promote a 
better, more realistic, long-term rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. And 
that's why we, and our allies, have made 
30 many initiatives to reduce nuclear 
arsenals, ban chemical weapons, break 
i the impasse in the East- West conven- 
I tional force negotiations, curb nuclear 
oroliferation, and reach agreement on 
proposals for increasing confidence and 
reducing the risk of surprise attack in 
Europe. 

The West is doing its utmost, but to 
iate, we have met with continued Soviet 
inwillingness to return to the nuclear 
arms negotiating tables. America's 
standing taller in the world today, but, if 
we're to continue on course toward a 
-nore prosperous peaceful world, we 
leed the full cooperation of the Con- 
gress. The Congress must support our 
strategic modernization program to keep 



July 1984 



America strong and convince the Soviets 
it is in their best interest to choose the 
course of negotiation, not confrontation, 
so we can safely reduce arms while 
preserving peace and stability. 

The Congress must pass the recom- 
mendations of the bipartisan commission 
on Central America and the two sup- 
plemental requests now before it to pro- 
mote industry, economic development, 
and greater security in that vital region 
to our south. 

And the Congress must promptly 
pass our deficit-reduction program to 
help ensure that our economic recovery 
remains strong. 

Q. No matter what you say you've 
done so far, two Republican leaders 
don't think you've done enough and 
they are urging you to hold regular 
summit meetings, for fear well blow 
each other up, with the Soviets 
without any conditions as to issues or 
outcome. Both you and the Soviets 
have said you will go to a summit, if 
it's carefully prepared. My question is, 
where do we stand now? Are you will- 
ing to go for a summit, start the ball 
rolling? 

A. In the first place, with regard to 
the two Senators, and I did talk to 
them, they were talking about a goal 
that would be desirable that I think we 
all share. And we were agreed on that 
and I told them some of the difficulties 
and problems that we've been having. 
But, yes, I am willing to meet and talk 
any time. So far they have been the ones 
not responding, but we have kept in 
communication. There are a number of 
issues other than arms reductions that 
we have suggested talking to them 
about and we're going to continue in the 
area of quiet diplomacy to bring that 
about. 

Q. Are you going to make an af- 
firmative move for a summit and to try 
to clear away some of these stumbling 
blocks that have really caused great 
East-West tensions? 

A. This is what I meant with my 
remarks, that we are continuing to keep 
communication with the idea leading 
toward that very thing. 

Q. Do we understand you to say 
that you're willing now to drop your 
long-held view that a summit would 
have to be carefully prepared in ad- 
vance and hold a prospect for 
reasonable success? 

A. It wouldn't really be necessary 
for me to drop that, since the Russians 
say that that's exactly what they feel 
must happen before there can be a 



meeting, that it must be carefully 
prepared and— let me explain, maybe, a 
little more fully what, when I say that, 
what I have in mind. There've been a 
couple of times in the past in which 
representatives from the free world and 
from our own country have gotten into 
things simply to get acquainted or say 
hello, and they have led to great expec- 
tations and they've led to great disap- 
pointment. And I don't think that we 
ought to go into something of that kind. 
But at the same time, I'm not talking 
about a preconstructed meeting in which 
you've got a list of points. You can have 
an agenda in which it is the general area 
of the things that you think could lead to 
better understanding. And that's good 
enough for me. 

But right now, we're getting a 
response from them that they want a 
very carefully prepared agenda. If they 
agree with me that there are things we 
can talk about that might clear the air 
and create a better understanding be- 
tween us, that's fine. 

Q. Are you willing to take steps 
now to begin the process of working 
on an agenda so that a summit could 
ultimately occur? 

A. We are taking steps. This is what 
I mean by quiet diplomacy. And I have 
been in communication, myself — written 
communication — with the Soviet leader- 
ship. 

There is one thing that I think — I've 
said this before, but I think many of you 
fail to recognize, and that is, there have 
been three Russian heads of state since I 
became President. One of them I knew 
personally. The second one was, we now 
know, in ill health because he was vir- 
tually incommunicado to anyone during 
this period. And now this newest one is 
setting up an administration, and so 
forth, so it isn't as if we've been sitting 
here for 3V2 years arguing with someone 
or not arguing with someone. There 
have been a lot of changes over there. 
But we're ready, willing, and able. 



Q. In recent speeches this year 
about the Soviets, you have held out 
an olive branch to them. But, at the 
same time, you usually either de- 
nounce their system or their actions. 
Would it be better, in an attempt to 
get this dialogue started again, 
whether at the summit or back in 
Geneva, if you simply held out the 
olive branch without also taking a 
shot at them? 

A. I don't think I've gone out of my 
way to just call them names or anything. 



33 



THE PRESIDENT 



I've usually pointed to something that is 
counter to their protestations of wanting 
peace and cooperation, such as walking 
away from the arms talks. I don't think 
that I've said anything that was as fiery 
as their referring to the funeral service 
for the Unknown Soldier as "a 
militaristic orgy." If we're going to talk 
abut comparisons of rhetoric, they've 
topped me in spades. 

Q. I don't know if everyone else is 
left as unclear as I am on where we 
stand with a summit with the Soviets. 
Are you inviting Mr. Chernenko to 
come and have a summit with you? 
And are you willing to have your ad- 
visers sit down with his advisers to 
work out the preplanning that you 
both say is necessary? 

A. We have been in contact with 
them on a number of issues that we 
think— bilateral issues that should be 
discussed between us. Of course, there is 
a matter of the arms talks, also, 
although we've not been talking about 
that since they have simply walked 
away. 

All I can tell you is that, in what I 
call quiet diplomacy, we are in contact 
with their people trying to establish a 
basis for talks. 

Q. Is this an invitation? 

A. We haven't reached that point 
yet. 

Q. There seems to be a change or 
something that we have at least not 
known before. Your communication 
with the Soviet leadership, has that 
been with Mr. Chernenko, and has the 
subject been a summit — a meeting be- 
tween you and Mr. Chernenko? 

A. No, much of the communication 
has been simply on the broad relation- 
ship between our two countries. And my 
communication, by writing, has been 
with Mr. Chernenko. 

Q. Would you be willing to meet 
with Mr. Chernenko even if he won't 
send his delegation back to the 
nuclear arms talks? 

A. Yes, yes, I'm willing to meet with 
him. 

Q. You have said recently that you 
think that U.S.-Soviet relations would 
improve in a second Reagan term. But 
several other people who have been in 
Moscow quote officials there as saying 
that isn't true, that they're not going 
to ever deal with you. They feel you 
have been too harsh. What hard 
evidence do you have that relations 
would improve after the election? 



34 



A. I've been too harsh — maybe if I 
apologize for shooting down the KAL 
747 and some things like that then 
maybe they'll warm up and be willing to 
talk. 

No, I think it's very obvious that — 
and I wouldn't expect them to do 
anything that might help me in the com- 
ing election. I think when it's over and 
they know that 4 years lie out ahead, if 
I'm here for 4 years, I think they'll talk. 

Q. Do you think that the Soviets 
could get a better deal from your 
Democratic opponent than they could 
from you? 

A. Oh, I'm not going to comment on 
that. [Laughter.] 

Q. As I recall, one of your 
previous formulations about a summit 
was that you would have to have 
something concrete to show for it. Are 
you willing to have a summit that does 
not have a concrete agreement or 
piece of paper like the new SALT 
[strategic arms limitation talks] or 
START [strategic arms reduction 
talks] treaty or some — or a new ini- 
tiative toward a SALT or START 
treaty? 

A. I've never thought about in a 
specific — of that kind. As I've said, 
there should be an agenda, a subject 
that both sides want to talk about and 
have some desire to get a settlement. 
And that holds out the promise then 
that something might be accomplished. 
When you don't plan that well, if I could 
recall, and I don't mean this to be 
critical of my predecessors, but there 
was a get-acquainted meeting with 
Lyndon Johnson and it was nothing 
more than that. Then there was a 
meeting with Kennedy and Khrushchev 
and it didn't ease tensions or make 
things any better. This was the meeting 
in Vienna. It led to even more strains. 

So, it is a two-edge sword — such a 
meeting. Yes, you want to accomplish 
something but you want to be sure that 
you aren't going to lead to more trouble. 

Q. My point was you're willing to 
have a summit that does not end in the 
signing of a treaty on arms control? 

A. Oh, yes, I've said that once 
already here. 

Q. What is your timeframe on this 
if you are now willing to negotiate the 
possibility of a summit? Do you think 
it could be held before the election? 

A. Whenever the conditions that 
lead to having one would be fine. But 
one thing— let me say and make 
clear— I'm not going to play political 



games with this subject and go rushing 
out for some kind of political advantage 
to announce that I have asked for a 
summit meeting. That wouldn't do either 
one of us any good, and certainly 
wouldn't be fair to them. 

But, this is legitimate. The door is 
open. And every once in a while, we're 
standing in the doorway, seeing if 
anyone's coming up the steps. 

Q. What's your estimation on a 
timeframe? 

A. I couldn't give you one. 

Q. Some of your advisers are say- 
ing privately that the Soviet leader- 
ship now is actually so divided and 
uncertain that there's really not much 
hope of progress at this time; and you 
seem to hint that when you say that 
there 've been three leaders since 
you've been in office. Is that your 
view? And what are the implications 
of that? 

A. We don't know. There's been the 
theory advanced that they're kind of 
marking time, and, perhaps, in some 
disagreement about what course they 
should follow. But, there's no way to 
know that. So, we'll just keep on trying. 



Q. Today the chief Kremlin 
spokesman said, "We want to have 
negotiations with the United States on 
a whole complex of issues," which is 
certainly something different than Mr. 
Chernenko said the day before. Do you 
read this as a change in Soviet policy 
or tactics? Is there something going 
on there that is happening very quick- 
ly in relations between our two coun- 
tries? 

A. We'll take a chance on finding 
out on that, because, as I say, we are in 
communication. And, if they're ready to 
talk, we are too. 

Q. You said tonight that you're 
ready and willing to talk to the 
Soviets. But Mr. Chernenko has pro- 
posed negotiating a ban on anti- 
satellite weapons and other space 
weapons. Can you tell us why, beyond 
the fact that you believe there can't be 
verification, as you said last weekend, 
why can't verification be negotiated 
once you sit down with the Soviets to 
discuss those weapons? 

A. There are a number of things, 
and we are studying that. We don't have 
a flat no on that yet. We're studying 
that whole situation. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



The Soviets are way ahead of us in 
that field. They've been at this for about 
10 years or more. And we are just in the 
field of beginning research. And I think 
we've got some definite reasons there 
for wanting to know our way before we 
talk. But we haven't slammed the door 
on that at all. 

Q. Can you also confirm reports 
about the verification issue, that there 
has been significant Soviet violations 
of all of the treaties going back to 
1958? 

A. We turned over a 200-page 
report to the Congress that was 
classified. We made public a summary of 
that, declassified in a summary. The 
other lengthy report is still classified 
because of the risk of exposing sources. 
But it was a report on outright viola- 
tions of many of the treaties in the past, 
and also some ambiguities in which — 
maybe based on language differences or 
not — they claim a different interpreta- 
tion of the treaty and that, therefore, 
they're not violating it. They're doing 
what they think the treaty prescribes. 
But between those two things, yes, 
there have been those violations. 

Q. Before you came along, in re- 
cent years, the talk had been between 
the two governments of parity in force 
between the United States and the 
i Soviet Union. Your supporters who 
wrote the 1980 Republican platform 
■ called for military superiority over the 
i Soviet Union. It's been a little bit 
fuzzy since, although you, in a couple 
of speeches, I think, starting with the 
. "star wars" speech, have gone back to 
using the parlance of parity. How do 
you feel the Republican platform this 
year would handle that issue? And 
between those two key words, 
"superiority" and "parity," where 
should that platform go and your Ad- 
ministration go? 

A. My own view is that we should 
i maintain the strength and deterrent that 
J is necessary to assure, as much as you 
II :an have such assurance, that there 
won't be a confrontation because the 
I price would be too high, but, at the same 
i 1 time, emphasizing that we want more 
"Ichan anything else to join with them in 
' I reducing the number of weapons. 

We've had arms limitation dealings 
land treaties and so forth, even such as 
j:he SALT treaties. All of those simply 
I egalized an arms race. There were 
J imitations or rules and regulations as to 
jiow many more weapons you could 
liave. 

As a matter of fact, the Soviet 
tfUnion added almost 4,000 warheads 



after the two sides had signed the 
SALT II agreement. That's not my idea 
of what we really need if we're to reduce 
the tensions in the world. What we need 
is to reduce and, hopefully, to eliminate, 
the strategic nuclear weapons. 

Q. You're on record, and I think at 
least twice, as saying that we do not 
seek anything more than parity in the 
long run. Would not a platform that 
goes further than that and repeats the 
call for superiority give a wrong 
signal to the Soviet Union? 



A. I would prefer that we not ask 
for superiority now that we've entered 
into and started this whole area. We are 
negotiating with them with other coun- 
tries in two negotiations that are going 
on that they did not leave or walk away 
from. And, yes, I believe that it could be 
counterproductive now to ask for that. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 28, 1984. 
2 Text from White House press release. 



A Steady Course for 
American Foreign Policy 



Secretary Shultz's remarks before the 
Business Council in Hot Springs, Va., 
on May 12, 198J,. 1 

Of all the credits in my resume, there 
are none I am more proud of, and none 
more meaningful, than my years in 
private business. The distinction be- 
tween "public service" and "private 
enterprise" is in many ways an artificial 
one. I believe there is no more impor- 
tant service rendered to the American 
public than that of the business com- 
munity — in terms of productivity, pros- 
perity, leadership, and systematic 
development of our nation's material and 
human resources. So I'm pleased that 
you've invited me here today, and proud 
to number myself among you — as a 
"public servant." 

Three Foreign Policy Principles 

As the President has been saying for the 
last 3 years, our foreign policy is based 
on three principles: realism, a will- 
ingness to negotiate for fair solutions, 
and strength. 

Realism is self-explanatory. We try 
to see the world as it is, not as we'd like 
it to be. This is a basic principle of 
business. If you kid yourself about your 
competition or about your own abilities 
or about where the market is, you're 
likely to fail. It's the same in foreign af- 
fairs. We call a spade a spade; aggres- 
sion is aggression and oppression is op- 
pression, whether in Poland, 
Afghanistan, southern Africa, or Central 
America. 

Secondly, we prefer to pursue our 
objectives peacefully, through negotia- 
tion, whether it's arms control or peace 
in the Middle East or Central America. 
That's what we've been doing with the 



Soviet Union, off and on, for the last 10 
years. In the Middle East, for at least 15 
years, we have sought to bridge dif- 
ferences and find reasonable solutions 
that advance everyone's interests. In 
Central America, a similar search for 
broad, peaceful solutions had led us to 
support the regional negotiations known 
as the Contadora process. 

Our experience in negotiations has 
proved the centrality of our third basic 
principle, the importance of strength. 
We use our power not to dominate the 
world, but to prevent others from 
dominating it. No diplomatic strategy 
ever succeeded from weakness. If the 
other side believes it can gain more by 
seeking to achieve its objectives 
unilaterally than by compromising, that's 
what they'll do and diplomacy probably 
will fail. So willingness to negotiate 
must be backed up by strength. When I 
say "strength," I don't refer only to 
military strength. That's essential, of 
course, but it's only one form of 
strength. A strong foreign policy 
depends equally on economic strength, 
powerful alliances, standing by friends, 
domestic unity, and an old-fashioned 
strength called "preseverance." 

Guided by these principles, President 
Reagan has set our foreign policy on a 
steady course. We have restored the 
foundation of military deterrence, both 
nuclear and conventional; we have rein- 
vigorated the U.S. economy, an essential 
prerequisite to global economic recovery; 
and we have renewed our national self- 
confidence. We are effectively defending 
our national interests, promoting inter- 
national peace and stability, and 
strengthening freedom and democratic 
values. 



July 1984 



I 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



East Asia 

Let me start my survey with East Asia, 
where our relations are now the 
strongest they have been in this century. 
Nothing explains our deep interest in 
East Asia better than two facts. First, 
for the last several years, our trade with 
that region has been greater than with 
any other region and is expanding at an 
accelerating rate. Second, our national 
security is directly affected by what hap- 
pens in Asia. Most of the countries in 
the area want our cooperation in con- 
taining Soviet and Vietnamese expan- 
sionism. 

Our relationship with Japan is very 
close, in spite of some tough trade 
issues, which themselves are a testimony 
to the complexity and maturity of our 
relationship. In the 6 months since the 
President visited Japan, we have worked 
hard on solutions to those problems, 
demonstrating that what unites us is far 
greater and far more important than 
what troubles us. Indeed, many people 
refer to our ties with Japan as "the most 
important bilateral relationship in the 
world," and they may well be right. 

After Premier Zhao's visit to 
Washington and the President's trip, we 
believe that our relationship with China 
is now on a stable, pragmatic track. It is 
based on a convergence of many in- 
terests and is no longer subject to the 
exaggerated hopes and sharp disillu- 
sionments that have marked the rela- 
tionship in recent years. In spite of our 
continuing ideological differences and 
divergent viewpoints on some issues, the 
President received a warm and en- 
thusiastic welcome. His rapport with 
China's leaders was excellent. During his 
visit we concluded several new 
agreements with the Chinese, including 
one on peaceful nuclear cooperation and 
a tax treaty that should greatly 
stimulate U.S. investment in China. 

What the China visit proved, above 
all, is that the United States can main- 
tain cooperative, mutually beneficial 
relations with a society that is 
ideologically very different from ours. 
Our relationship with China shows that 
two societies can find common interests 
amid their differences. That is our ap- 
proach and that is our preference. 

Soviet Union and Arms Control 

It is our approach and preference also 
with respect to the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union, however, has lately been 
behaving in a manner that suggests that 
it has some difficulty accepting that con- 
cept. 



36 



The Soviets' decision to boycott the 
Los Angeles Olympics was completely 
unjustified; it surprised and clearly 
dismayed even their closest allies. The 
allegations on which they ostensibly 
based their decision were flimsy and 
false. The United States had fully met 
its obligations under the Olympic 
Charter. In fact, we bent over 
backwards to meet the Soviets' 
legitimate concerns and had met them. 
For example, they had been assured 
there would be no demonstrations in 
Olympic facilities and villages or near 
their ship. We even allowed Aeroflot 
charters. Some 17,000 people will have 
security-related duties in Los Angeles; 
the U.S. Government has committed $50 
million to provide Federal support for 
Olympic security. 

So it is hard to say why they made 
their decision. Furthermore, this isn't 
the only recent case where their 
behavior is troubling. They have reacted 
to the efforts of Andrei Sakharov to 
assist his wife's travel abroad for 
medical treatment by cutting off this 
world-renowned scientist from the out- 
side world, bringing false charges 
against his wife, and even refusing to 
allow her to go to Moscow. This great 
man's life is being trifled with, and the 
whole world must be concerned. I should 
also say that their accusations against 
our people in Moscow on this subject 
were totally false, and the Soviets know 
it. 

We've seen the same kind of thing in 
our arms control negotiations. In the 
talks on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces [INF] for example, the Soviets 
resisted our proposal to eliminate those 
weapons altogether; they wanted to re- 
tain their monopoly of INF missiles. At 
the same time, they used intimidation, 
threats, and a massive propaganda of- 
fensive to try to prevent our allies from 
rectifying the imbalance by deploying 
INF missiles on their own territory. 
When their efforts failed and the 
deployments went ahead on schedule 
last December, the Soviets just walked 
out of the INF talks — permanently, they 
say — and suspended the START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] negotia- 
tions indefinitely. Here again, their 
reasoning doesn't make sense. When we 
deploy a few missiles, they walk out. 
But in the preceding 2 years, they 
deployed more than 100 missiles with 
300 warheads, while we deployed 
none — yet we continued to negotiate. 

Perhaps the Soviets think that by 
this kind of behavior they can sow fear 
and cause a failure of Western will, thus 
relieving the U.S.S.R. of the need to 



make accommodations at the negotiating 
table. Whatever the specific motives, the 
pattern seems to be that whenever the 
Soviet leaders meet with frustration or 
come up against hard decisions, they 
choose to do things that isolate them 
and their peoples from the rest of the 
world community. 

In mistreating Sakharov, they are 
isolating themselves from the world's 
scientists. In abandoning nuclear arms 
negotiations, they are isolating 
themselves from all who seek genuine 
reductions. In the Olympics case, they 
are also trying to drag their allies into 
isolation with them. And they just called 
off a scheduled high-level meeting with 
the Chinese. 

We, for our part, will stay on 
course. We will continue to shape our 
foreign policy on the basis of realism, 
strength, and a willingness to negotiate. 
We are ready to resume the dialogue 
whenever they are. Our policy is consist- 
ent and constructive. 

The process of reengaging the 
Soviets may be slow, and we will need 
to be patient. But we will be in a strong 
position to defend our interests and 
those of our friends and allies in any 
case. In the meantime, Soviet adven- 
turism is being checked. In fact, the tide 
of communist encroachment in the Third 
World, from Grenada to southern 
Africa, has begun to recede. 

The Western Alliance 

A key to the effectiveness of our Soviet 
policy has been the cohesion of our 
alliance with Western Europe. NATO 
has successfully confronted its greatest 
challenge of the last decade. With the 
successful initiation of INF deployment, 
NATO is assuring a firm linkage be- 
tween American power and European 
security for the rest of the century. 
While still giving top priority to securing 
arms control agreements on inter- 
mediate and strategic nuclear weapons, 
the alliance is now turning to other 
priority issues. There is widespread 
agreement on the need to take steps 
now to strengthen NATO's conventional 
defense. There is similar agreement on 
the need to put East- West relations on a 
firmer, more positive footing. And final- 
ly, there is widening awareness of our 
need to improve Western consultations 
on challenges beyond the European area 
and to cooperate more effectively to de- 
fend and promote Western interests in 
these regions. 

Latin America 

In Latin America, our policy has been to 
encourage democratic evolution and to 



Department of State Bulleti 



' 



THE SECRETARY 



IK 



help governments seeking to promote 
peaceful democratic change in the face 
of strong, often violent opposition from 
both the far left and the far right. 
Although we, of course, cannot take all 
the credit for it, the fact is that a 
democratic revolution, touching 90% of 
the region's population, has been taking 
place throughout Latin America. Since 
1981 four important countries, most 
recently Argentina, have moved from 
military rule to elected civilian govern- 
ments. Brazil, the region's largest coun- 
try, is now firmly pointed in that direc- 
tion. Just last Sunday, democratic elec- 
tions were held in Ecuador, Panama, 
and El Salvador. It was an exhilarating 
moment for democracy. 

Our policy is working, but the going 
isn't easy. The elections in El Salvador 
took place despite active efforts by com- 
munist guerrillas to disrupt them. But 
the people of El Salvador and of all Cen- 
tral America are determined to build 
democracy and preserve freedom — and 
we are determined to keep helping 
them, despite the obstacles. Because 
what happens to Central America is of 
enormous strategic and political impor- 
tance to the United States. 

People talk about analogies between 
Central America and Vietnam. I don't 
see many parallels; Central America is 
our own neighborhood. And as the 
President said Wednesday night, we 
don't have any plans to send American 
troops into combat there. But if they in- 
sist on pushing the analogy, and if 
they're concerned about human rights, 
they should look at what's happened in 
Southeast Asia since the North Viet- 
namese have taken over. And they 
should look at the flood of refugees that 
tragedy has produced — over half-a- 
million in this country alone. Is that 
what we want in Central America? 

We want to see the problems of the 
region resolved through diplomacy, so 
we've strongly supported the efforts of 
the Contadora group. But that effort 
can't succeed unless the countries of 
Central America are militarily and 
economically strong enough to resist 
subversion. That's why our assistance is 
so important, and why it is vital that the 
Congress make a real commitment, as 
the bipartisan commission recommended 
and the President requested. Our aid 
must be consistent and predictable over 
the long haul if it is to be effective. 

Once the Sandinistas realize that 
their clients in El Salvador can't win 
militarily and that Nicaragua's own in- 
terests can be achieved in peace and 
democracy, I believe a diplomatic solu- 
tion can be achieved. Then the countries 



July 1984 



of Central America can devote their 
resources to economic development and 
the building of democratic institutions. 

Southern Africa 

In southern Africa, we're facilitating 
dialogues between South Africa and its 
neighbors. This has already yielded 
results. Mozambique has just signed a 
nonaggression pact with South Africa 
and is improving its relationship with 
the West. Angola and South Africa have 
entered into a process in which South 
African troops are withdrawing from 
southern Angola. Our goal is a regional 
settlement that will provide in- 
dependence to Namibia. South Africa 
and its black African neighbors — 
although they still disagree strongly 
over South Africa's repugnant racial 
problems — are all cooperating with this 
effort. If this can be done through 
negotiation, America's friends in the 
region will be strengthened, and our 
own national security interests will be 
enhanced. 

In South Africa itself we continue to 
advocate peaceful change away from 
apartheid and toward a more equitable 
political and social system. American 
business has played an important role in 
South Africa's evolution through the 
voluntary adherence of many American 
firms operating there to the "Sullivan 
principles," which have improved work- 
ing conditions and opened new oppor- 
tunities for black workers. 

Middle East 

Finally, we come to the Middle East, 
where we have worked so long and so 
hard to help our friends resolve the deep 
differences among them and to defend 
themselves against the enemies of peace 
and freedom. These were the goals that 
we sought in Lebanon and that we con- 
tinue to seek throughout the region. 
Although we weren't as successful there 
as we would have liked, I think we 
shouldn't put a period after the word 
Lebanon. We should put a comma or a 
semicolon at most, because when all is 
said and done, most of the people in the 
Middle East recognize that only the 
United States has the necessary respect 
and influence throughout the region to 
serve as an honest broker and a 
peacemaker. The important thing is that 
we continue to stand by our friends and 
resist the forces of state-sponsored ter- 
rorism. If we do this, we will retain the 
trust of reasonable people on all sides, 
while they sort out their positions re- 
garding next steps in the peace process. 



President Reagan's September 1 ini- 
tiative remains on the table. It is still 
the only approach likely to meet the 
most basic needs of all sides in the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. 

In the Persian Gulf right now, we're 
facing a very dangerous situation. We've 
remained neutral and have tried to use 
our influence to bring the horrible 
fighting to an end. But we've also made 
it clear that if the fighting spreads to 
directly threaten Western access to vital 
energy supplies, we're prepared to use 
American power to keep that lifeline 
open. 

Conclusion 

What we need for a successful foreign 
policy is not only military and economic 
strength but also a sense of unity and 
purpose at home. In the last 3 years, 
President Reagan has brought us out of 
a period, following Vietnam, when we 
had lost those qualities and had suffered 
accordingly around the world. Despite 
disagreement over particular issues — 
which are inevitable in a 
democracy — there is a new unity and 
sense of common purpose in our society, 
grounded in our nation's commitment to 
freedom and democracy. This unity has 
provided great strength to America's in- 
ternational position. And after this 
week's elections in El Salvador, that 
consensus should be even stronger. 

Nevertheless, there are still linger- 
ing traces of self-doubt and neoisola- 
tionism that continue to crop up in our 
national debate. Where issues of peace 
and freedom are at stake, especially in 
our own hemisphere, the United States 
just can't be indifferent. Neither our in- 
terest nor our friends' interests are 
served by accommodating those who 
prefer force over negotiation. As a na- 
tion, we've got to be ready to defend 
what we believe in, even when the going 
is rough and the cost is high. We have 
to be united, not only on our 
values — which I believe we are — but 
also on the determination to promote 
and defend those values. 

I have touched on a great many 
problems in these few minutes, but I 
don't want to leave you in doubt about 
my belief in our country's ability to deal 
with our difficult world. America is 
back. American strength remains the 
key to the survival of liberty on this 
planet. With the President's leadership 
and your continued strong support, I 
know that the challenges before us will 
be met. 



^ress release 129 of May 11, 1984. 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary Addresses American 
Society of Newspaper Editors 



Secretary Skultz's address before the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 
and question-and-answer session with the 
members of the audience on May 11, 
1984. 1 

It is a special privilege, I know, for me 
to address this group and to respond to 
your questions and to engage in conver- 
sation with you as the program goes on, 
because you have such an impact on our 
country. I think that as we survey the 
problems of foreign policy and the op- 
portunities for foreign policy — and there 
are many of both — we know that we will 
be able to proceed with them to solve 
the problems and take advantage of the 
opportunities best if we can proceed on 
the basis of a reasonable unity in our 
country and sense of cohesion and pur- 
pose all over the country. 

So the views that you have and the 
way in which they're put forward around 
our country are of central importance, 
and I appreciate the chance to have a 
whack at you here this morning. 

As the President has thought about 
the problems of foreign policy, and as I 
have worked with him and talked with 
him, he has basically proceeded on the 
basis of three guiding ideas. 

The first is that we must be realistic 
about what's going on, not only in our 
own country but all around the world. 
The moment we start to kid ourselves 
about what the situation really is, we're 
going to get in deep trouble. We must 
not only be realistic ourselves in what 
we say to ourselves, but we have to be 
willing to call the shots as we see them, 
whatever may be going on. In other 
words, we have to try to get other peo- 
ple to be realistic too. So realism, I 
think, is a first and fundamental point in 
thinking about foreign policy or, for that 
matter, anything else of importance. 

The second idea that we have to 
keep before us all the time is that as far 
as the United States is concerned, we 
want to be part of the solution, not part 
of the problem. We believe in trying to 
work things out. We believe in negotia- 
tion. That's the best way to go about 
solving the problems and taking advan- 
tage of the opportunities, and we em- 
phasize that. I don't say just in the 
Reagan Administration. I think it's a 
deep and honorable tradition in the 
American way of approaching things, 
that we try to help people work prob- 



lems out and, as I say, be part of the 
solution. 

But finally, we know that we're not 
going to get anywhere if we don't have 
strength. And, obviously, this must in- 
clude a proper capacity to defend 
ourselves and defend our interests and 
defend our values, but it has to go fur- 
ther than that. We must have economic 
strength to draw on; and we must have 
that strength of purpose in our country 
and confidence that what we stand for is 
right, and what we're trying to do is 
right, and that purposefulness that 
comes from a sense of conviction about 
what you're doing. 

All of these things have been very 
much on the President's mind; and, at 
least in my judgment, he has made great 
strides in bringing us a greater sense of 
realism, a greater capacity to negotiate, 
and a better sense of strength in all of 
the categories that I have mentioned. 

Let me just try to apply these 
thoughts very, very quickly to three 
areas. I could spend a long time going 
around the world with you, so to speak, 
but let me just pick out three critical 
areas and comment very briefly on each 
one, and then we can have some discus- 
sion. 

First, because it's important and 
because we just got back from China, I'll 
make a comment or two about China. 



China 

I believe the President's trip, and the 
trip earlier in the year by Premier Zhao, 
should be seen as a high point in a con- 
tinuing process. A lot has come before; a 
lot will come after. In a very real sense, 
I think we can say that President Nixon 
created the opening to China, President 
Carter normalized our relationships with 
China, and President Reagan has put 
this relationship on a stable, realistic, 
and comprehensive basis. The trip kind 
of puts an exclamation point behind that 
and, I think, shows that we are now 
really on our way to a worthwhile rela- 
tionship with the Chinese people and the 
Chinese Government. 

It is going to be a stable relation- 
ship, I believe, because it is based on 
realism. It's very clear that we have dif- 
ferences in our systems and differences 
of view about many things, but it's also 
clear that we have many common in- 



terests. So we proceed on the basis of 
recognizing both these attributes of the 
relationship. 

I think the President's trip shows 
how important this relationship is to 
both countries. The range of agree- 
ments, not only those that were signed 
during the trip but those that pre- 
ceded — and perhaps even more the 
growing volume of exchanges between 
people in the two governments, on a 
commercial basis, on a scholarly basis, 
student exchanges, cultural exchanges, 
tourist exchanges — are growing very 
rapidly. It shows the comprehensiveness 
of this relationship. 

And one more point. It is interesting 
to see that this relationship has grown 
between two countries which are very 
different insofar as their economic and 
political systems are concerned. It has 
been possible for these two countries to 
develop a working and worthwhile rela- 
tionship, and that relationship has been 
brought to its present, more recent 
iteration by President Reagan, which 
brings me to the Soviet Union. 

I think the China relationship shows 
what is possible and in a sense shows 
what we would like to see. At the same 
time, I want to assure you that as we 
try to guide ourselves in our relationship 
with the Soviet Union, we will be apply- 
ing those three principles. We must be 
realistic, we must be ready to work out 
problems, but we must be strong. 

I think we can take a lesson from 
the Great Seal of our country. That has 
been kind of interesting to me, to get a 
little of the history of that that I hadn't 
quite appreciated, because in these 
wonderful antiques that we now have in 
the State Department, there are a 
number of old shields. In the old shields, 
frequently, you see the eagle turned 
toward the arrows. As you know, the 
eagle is clutching arrows in one claw 
and the olive branch in the other. 
Nowadays, the eagle is looking at the 
olive branch — and that was something 
decreed by President Truman, that it 
should be that way — standing for the 
fact that the United States will always 
look for peaceful solutions but in doing 
so recognizes that we shouldn't let go of 
those arrows. 

I think that lesson applies very well 
to the way we approach the Soviet 
Union. 

Soviet Union 

We apply these ideas across a broad 
range of issues, running from arms con- 
trol to our differences of view about 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



many regional problems — and let's not 
forget about Afghanistan and Poland 
and Kampuchea and other such places — 
to bilateral relationships and the deep 
problems of human rights that we 
perceive coming out of Soviet behavior. 
The most recent expression, in a sense, 
is what is happening to Nobelist 
Sakharov, being punished for trying to 
bring about conformance with the 
Helsinki accords, which were 
presumably undertaken voluntarily by 
the Soviet Union. 

The Soviets know that we're pre- 
pared for a reasonable and constructive 
dialogue with them. We have said that 
publicly, and we have said that private- 
ly. We have a broad agenda on the table 
that has got with it not just the inten- 
tions, but many concrete aspects to it. 
We are ready for give-and-take, but we 
are not ready to give away the store. 
That, perhaps, is their problem. 

Right now we see the Soviet Union 
engaged, in this continual process of 
negotiation that we have with them, in a 
tactic in the negotiation that involves 
withdrawal, that involves a kind of scare 
campaign, and that involves a sort of 
deep freeze. 

If we look at the negotiations over 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 
Geneva, here we see the NATO alliance 
proceeding on a decision made in 1979. I 
might note parenthetically, it is 
sometimes said we don't have any con- 
tinuity in our foreign policy. I think that 
we have great elements of continuity in 
our foreign policy, and our adherence to 
NATO, and in this case the 1979 deci- 
sion, is one of them. 

As we sought to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union and eliminate this class of 
weapons entirely, the Soviet Union 
deployed continuously. Yet when we im- 
plemented the decision this year and 
started the deployment of NATO 
missiles, the Soviet Union took that as a 
cause to withdraw from the negotiations 
and they walked out. 

In the INF negotiations, I would 
point out to you that the positions taken 
by the United States on behalf of the 
alliance were the result of very exten- 
sive consultation with our allies and 
stood the test of reasonableness through 
that consultative process. 

Similarly, in the strategic talks for 
reductions in nuclear armaments, our 
positions on the table are reasonable and 
interesting. They are bargaining-type 
positions. But here, too, the Soviet 
Union has chosen to walk out. Just as 
for reasons that I think we can speculate 
about but don't know, the Soviet Union 
has chosen to walk out of the Olympic 



July 1984 



Games. They have said the reason has to 
do with security, but that can't be the 
reason because tremendous efforts are 
being made and will continue to be made 
by the United States to assure security 
for the Olympics and a warm welcome 
for the athletes. 

That message, they have. We've had 
lots of discussions with them. Basically 
their concerns have been met, and so 
the rationale of security just doesn't hold 
up, and there must be some other 
reason. I'll leave you to speculate what 
that other reason might be. 

At any rate, as far as we're con- 
cerned, obviously we will not be in- 
timidated. We have a strategy, we have 
a course that we're on, and we will con- 
tinue to be realistic. We'll continue to be 
strong, and we will continue to be 
reasonable and ready to sit down with 
them whenever they are of a like mind. 

Central America 

Now, Central America. I think there is a 
sense in which this can be a time of ex- 
hilaration for us, because we see the 
democratic process at work. Particular- 
ly, if you've had a chance to talk with 
any of the people who went to El 
Salvador as observers, you can see what 
a moving experience it was for them to 
talk to people who are under great ten- 
sion and who are looking to the 
democratic process and the rule of law 
to help them bring stability into their 
lives so that economic development can 
take place and things can be better. 

There was a huge turnout, as you 
know, and a result, quite clearly, in 
favor of Mr. Duarte who has cam- 
paigned on a democratic, rule of law, 
human rights platform. El Salvador 
deserves our support just as Central 
America deserves our support. So in this 
moment of exhilaration about the 
democratic process, which is tending to 
sweep through our hemisphere — a very 
marked and gratifying development — we 
also must have a mood of sobriety, 
because we know that there are great 
problems. There are great problems 
right here in working out the form of 
our support for our friends and coming 
to understand that in Central America, 
our vital interests are at stake, and we 
have to stand up to that fact. 

I think we have a good chance for 
success in Central America if we can 
stand in there on a steady course and be 
strong, be realistic, and be reasonable, 
and ready to negotiate. That is the 
President's program, that is the pro- 
gram of the bipartisan commission, and 
that is the program that the House of 



Representatives voted for yesterday — 
that we should be in favor of democracy 
and the rule of law and human rights; 
that we should be in favor of economic 
development and ready to help and help 
people develop themselves; that we 
should recognize that for those things to 
take place there must be a security 
shield against the obvious aggression in 
the neighborhood; and that we have to 
be ready ourselves and to help others in 
a process of negotiation and reconcilia- 
tion internally, and in the region as a 
whole through the Contadora process, 
hoping that that process and the 21 
principles that it has evolved will be suc- 
cessful. 

I think that if we work at it and we 
stay with our ideals and our principles, 
we'll be able to succeed. 

I could go on and talk about all sorts 
of aspects of our foreign policy, but 
overall I feel pretty good about it. I can 
tell you that I'm proud to be the 
Secretary of State of the United States 
of America, working for our objectives 
here in the United States; and, perhaps 
particularly, when I travel around the 
world and talk with my peers in other 
countries and have a sense of the 
respect they have for us, not simply as a 
tremendous economic power or military 
power but as a country which stands for 
the ideals and attributes that people all 
around the world aspire to. 

Q. Would you expand, in connec- 
tion with negotiation, on your 
reference to the Contadora group? Are 
we negotiating through them? Is this 
a primary objective or is it secondary? 
We get the impression from some of 
the dispatches that we're pretty much 
ignoring that group and have not 
negotiated much with them. 

A. Quite to the contrary. We 
favored the establishment of that proc- 
ess from the beginning because it in- 
volves the countries which are there and 
which are close to Central America. We 
have seen it make progress, although 
there are great difficulties. 

We've seen the rhetoric of 
Nicaragua change, although the behavior 
hasn't changed, but at least the rhetoric 
has moved. We've seen the Contadora 
process evolve 21 principles or objec- 
tives, which, if implemented, would go a 
very long way to solving the problems. 
We support those 21 objectives, and all 
of the Central American countries have 
said they do. 

Translating general principles into 
operating reality is tough, as we all 
know. That is what they're trying to do, 
and we support them in doing so. 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



We've had two special representa- 
tives of the President, ambassadors at 
large, who have been named by the 
President and confirmed by the 
Senate — Senator Richard Stone and 
now Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman. 
These two men have made many trips to 
the areas, have met with people in the 
area when they come up here a great 
many times. 

Our present Ambassador, Harry 
Shlaudeman, is our most experienced 
Latin American diplomat. He's been an 
ambassador in three countries. He's 
been at it for about 30 years; a very sav- 
vy guy, well respected in the region. 

The reason why you may have the 
impression that we haven't been active 
is that we have tried to conduct our ac- 
tivities of the ambassador at large quiet- 
ly on the assumption that the best way 
to help the process and help the Con- 
tadora group along is not to be down 
there jumping up and down and waving 
our arms and acting as though these are 
all the things that we are going to do 
but rather be quietly helpful — respond 
to them, go around and visit with them, 
let them know what we are ready to do 
and where we stand. And to do it in that 
way, we believe, is the way to be effec- 
tive even though it may not be the way 
to attract the most public attention. But 
effectiveness is the name of the game, 
and that is what we are trying to do. 

We are very much engaged and 
behind the effort to bring forward, if it's 
possible, a negotiated solution to the 
problem. I believe we can say categori- 
cally that it will only be possible if the 
other side — the Soviet-Cuban- 
Nicaraguan side — knows that they can- 
not get their way by force of arms, and 
we must remember that. It may be an 
unpleasant fact, but it's reality. And as I 
said at the beginning, we have to stick 
with reality if we're going to get 
anywhere. 

Q. I want to go back to what you 
said about the Soviet withdrawal from 
the Olympics. You rejected the 
reasons that they stated and you in- 
vited us to speculate on the real 
reasons. We usually get in trouble 
when we do that. I would like to in- 
vite you to give us what you think the 
real reasons for the Soviet withdrawal 
are, and what are the implications for 
the future relationship between the 
two countries? 

A. Insofar as the last part of the 
question is concerned, it is, I think, 
clearly a part of the negotiating tactic, 
in a sense — broadly conceived — that we 
see in other areas. Just exactly what 



motivated them, I don't know, and I 
don't think it's particularly useful for me 
to speculate. We see a lot of speculation 
about that. 

But as far as our relationship is con- 
cerned, we will continue right on our 
steady course which, as I've said, will in- 
clude a readiness to sit down with them 
on whatever are the appropriate topics 
and have a reasonable dialogue and have 
a discussion of genuine give-and-take. 
But, as I also have said, the Reagan Ad- 
ministration is not going to give away 
the store. So we'll be reasonable; they've 
got to be reasonable. And we'll continue 
to be in that posture, and we can hope 
that perhaps at some point they will 
want to be in that posture too. 

Q. May I say that I support 
everything that you have said, but 
there is one area that you haven't 
touched upon, and that is the Middle 
East. And I have been bothered for 
some time about the question of what 
our national interest is in the Middle 
East. Why did we have a "peacekeep- 
ing force," so-called, in Lebanon for 
so long and waste so many American 
lives on what appeared to be a futile 
mission? What was our national in- 
terest in remaining there? And do we 
still have a national interest there? 

A. We did have and we do have a 
strong national interest in developments 
in the Middle East, and the importance 
of that fact is shown by the tremendous 
amount of attention that has been paid 
to the problems of the Middle East by 
successive Administrations. The Middle 
East, of course, is, first of all, a center 
of three great religions. It's a cradle of 
the religious roots that so many of us 
have. The Middle East is a place where 
there are huge energy resources on 
which the West, in many respects, is 
very dependent. 

The Middle East is a place where we 
have a close friend and ally in Israel that 
has had to exist in an environment of 
great hostility, and we want to support 
the security and continued existence of 
Israel. The Middle East is a place where 
we have important, close friends in the 
Arab world, and we need to maintain 
our posture with them and help bring 
about a peace process which must, of 
course, address the Palestinian issues, 
but other issues as well, in particular the 
security of Israel. But we want to see a 
peace process evolve into something 
where at least a reasonable sense of 
stability and continuity can be present in 
that area, because of these important 
aspects that I mentioned. 



Lebanon was very much a part of 
that process. Obviously, our effort in 
Lebanon involved some risks, and we're 
disappointed that it hasn't come out bet- 
ter. But I think the appropriate punctua- 
tion to put after the word "Lebanon" 
right now is not a period — perhaps a 
comma, but certainly no more than a 
semicolon. We're very much engaged 
there. All of the factions talk to our am- 
bassador. They want us to stay there, 
and we will stay there, in our diplomatic 
presence and our readiness to help, to 
bring about a sovereign Lebanon that is 
compatible with security on Israel's 
northern border. We hope it will develop 
some pattern of interaction with all of 
its neighbors including Israel. If that can 
come about, it will help to enhance 
stability in an area of the world where 
the United States has great interests 
and values at stake. 

Q. It seems to have been a premise 
of the Reagan Administration that for 
this nation to develop major new 
weapons systems — the MX being but 
one example — it not only will increase 
our military strength but will cause 
the Soviets to be more negotiable on 
arms control agreements. At this 
point, can you cite any examples or 
even any encouraging evidence that 
would suggest that this strategy ac- 
tually works? 

A. I think, first of all, we have to 
look at the modernization of the triad of 
our strategic forces from the standpoint 
of our ability to defend our interests and 
values and to deter war — that's the pur- 
pose. Great and important strides have 
been made in the last few years to see- 
ing that this modernization goes for- 
ward, and the MX is a part of that. So 
we don't develop our strategic triad for 
the purpose of negotiations; we develop 
it to deter aggression and to defend our 
values — that's its purpose. 

We also believe in a nuclear age that 
arms control is of vital importance. In 
fact, the President has changed the 
words "arms control" — we're trying to 
take it out of our lingo — and substitute 
the word "reduction" for "control," to 
get the numbers of these weapons 
systems and the destructive power of 
these weapons systems reduced. That's 
been a shift in the way in which this sub- 
ject has been approached. But it's a mat- 
ter of great importance to us, and so the 
Administration has put forward a very 
broad range of arms control initiatives 
and arms reduction initiatives, running 
from chemical weapons to conventional 
forces to nuclear forces and so on. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



We know that the process of 
negotiating these matters with the 
Soviet Union is a slow and arduous proc- 
ess. If you look at the history of any of 
the previous arms control accords, you 
will see that they took a very long time 
and that the Soviet Union tests you out 
all the time — your resolve, your 
strength of purpose. They try to divide 
our country; they try to divide us from 
our allies— that's part of the process of 
negotiation. 

Right now, I think the key to 
negotiation is to demonstrate to 
ourselves and to them that we do have 
strength of purpose and willpower in 
this country, that our relationships with 
our allies are strong, and that at the 
same time, whenever they are ready to 
sit down and be reasonable about these 
matters, we're there and we're ready to 
work with them. 

I think that is the approach that we 
are taking — it's the right approach — 
and I hope that in the end, they will be 
interested in reductions in armaments. 

But I would say one further thing: 
Arms control or arms reduction talks 
can't be loaded with too heavy a burden. 
Remember that President Carter with- 
drew the SALT II accords, which had 
many other problems, but he withdrew 
those from Senate consideration after 
the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. In 
other words, if we're going to get 
anywhere with bringing greater stability 
in this world, we have to address 
ourselves to the broad range of issues, 
including these regional problems, as 
well as the problem of armaments as 
such. 

Q. We've heard from an ex- 
President and an ex-Vice President on 
Latin America in the last couple of 
days, and strangely they said roughly 
the same thing. Mr. Nixon said that 
sometimes he feels the Administration 
sees communists rather than Latin 
American people or the problem of the 
economy rather than of the military. 
And Mr. Mondale, roughly, in a 
political speech said essentially the 
same thing. Could you give us some 
specifics as to how the Administration 
; truly sees other than a military solu- 
tion to the problems of Latin America? 

A. The solutions to the problems 
have to emerge out of the right political 
and social setting and a process of 
economic development which takes place 
in a way that gives widely shared 
benefits. That's the fundamental of the 
problems; that is the fundamental of the 
President's program. If you read his 



July 1984 



speech last April to a joint session of 
Congress, you'll see it all laid right out 
there. 

As for the business of seeing com- 
munists under the bed, do you have any 
doubt about what the Soviet Union's 
system is? Do you have any doubt about 
what is going on in Cuba? Do you have 
any doubt about the flow of armaments 
through that complex into Nicaragua? Is 
there any doubt about what Nicaragua 
has been up to? All you have to do is 
read what they say and observe what is 
going on. And so I think to stick your 
head in the sand and say there is no 
security threat in Central America is 
stupid. 

Certainly the solutions to these prob- 
lems cannot be brought about by 
military means. The military is not the 
answer — it's not the answer to any prob- 
lem. But unfortunately, in this 
dangerous world we live in, having 
military capability to deter aggres- 
sion — not necessarily ourselves but see- 
ing to it that our friends do in this 
case — is a necessary, although not suffi- 
cient, condition to bring about the 
political reform and the economic 
development that we want to see and 
which we know is the real solution to 
this problem. 

Q. As you know, the President of 
Mexico, I believe, is coming to 
Washington next week. He's been 
critical of us in a number of policies, 
including our support of the Con- 
tadoras. How do you see our relation- 
ship with Mexico at this time? And 
secondly, will part of the agenda be to 
look at some of the specific border 
problems ranging from sewage dis- 
posal to immigration and the whole 
gamut of things we have? 

A. We have, basically, I think, a 
very good relationship with Mexico. 
We've worked at it hard, and they have 
too. The President has made very 
special efforts to emphasize the impor- 
tance of our neighborhood — of Mexico, 
of Canada, of Central America, of Latin 
America generally, paid a great deal of 
attention to those problems. We look 
forward to President de la Madrid's 
return visit following the President's 
visit last summer in Mexico. 

Our agenda, I'm sure, will be a 
broad one. We have lots of interaction 
between our two countries in terms of 
the flow of people— Mexico is our third- 
largest trading partner; we have a big 
border and lots of problems along the 
border. Inevitably, problems are 
something that take place when there is 
a rich, varied, and comprehensive rela- 
tionship. So we'll discuss these bilateral 



matters, I'm sure, in very considerable 
detail. And as a matter of fact, just 
before we went to China, Secretary of 
State Sepulveda of Mexico was here. He 
and I have a kind of home-and-home 
visitation process, and we tried to go 
through these and see where we stood 
on many of these. So we'll have a lot of 
discussion of those kinds of issues. 

Certainly we'll discuss the problems 
of Central America, because they are of 
great importance to both countries; we 
both have put a lot of effort and labor 
into them. We don't see eye-to-eye on 
everything — we don't see eye-to-eye on 
everything within our own country — but 
we'll discuss our differences of view, and 
we'll discuss our common interests 
which are the predominant aspect of our 
view in Central America, and I hope 
that we will be able to make some prog- 
ress. I feel certain that we will. 

There is one other subject that I 
think is sure to be on the agenda and 
that's the problem of international debt. 
I think we have done, in the world at 
large and in our own country, a truly 
remarkable job of handling in the last 
year and a half an extremely difficult 
problem, with these large debts that 
have had to be serviced over the last 
year and a half or so in an environment 
of little growth in the world economy. 

Mexico has managed to turn things 
around, and President De la Madrid 
really deserves a tip of the hat for the 
tough measures that he has put into ef- 
fect and the way in which he has been 
operating their economic policy. Mexico 
seems to have gotten itself in a position 
now where its debt problems are under 
control. The rise in interest rates that 
we've been seeing recently has very 
serious implications for the debt levels. 
If you have a debt of $50 billion and you 
lay another percentage point on the in- 
terest rate, that's a lot of dough. 

These problems will be discussed, 
not only with respect to the United 
States and Mexico but also on a more in- 
ternational scale. We have been address- 
ing them, of course, and we are being 
successful in doing so, but the way to 
continued success is continual address- 
ing of these problems and continual 
work on them. President De la Madrid 
recently made a trip through many 
countries in South America and dis- 
cussed these issues, so he will have the 
insights developed from that trip, and 
I'm sure will share them with us. 

Q. Your predecessor, Secretary 
Haig, has written rather bitterly, I 
think, about his relationship with the 
White House staff in policy formation. 



41 



ARMS CONTROL 



When you get up in the morning with 
a new idea, how does that get con- 
verted into policy? Who do you call? 
And are you deeply satisfied with the 
process? 

A. Insofar as my relationships with 
my colleagues are concerned, they are 
fine. I work easily with the White House 
staff and, of course, with the President. 
The President's the boss; I work for 
him: I don't have a foreign policy; he has 
a foreign policy. So one of the things 
that I do — and I did when I was in the 
government before — is to try to come to 
understand the President's thinking and 
his approach. And, of course, I wouldn't 
be here if I didn't find myself in full 
sympathy and on the same wavelength 
as the President. But I see the President 
frequently, innumerable meetings prac- 
tically every day over in the White 
House in one way or another, as the 
course of business goes on. 

In addition to that, the President 
and I sit down together, just the two of 
us, regularly; and I have a little agenda 
I always take to the meetings, and he 
has one. It's sort of no announced agen- 
da; we just talk and try to informally ex- 
plore one issue or another. So I don't 
have any communications problems with 
the White House at all— quite to the 
contrary — and I find the working rela- 
tionships, on the whole, fine. That 
doesn't mean I don't have arguments 
with people, and I do. I don't believe in 
having our arguments in public par- 
ticularly, but I can assure you, in our 
councils I express myself and say my 
views, and I get my way a reasonable 
share of the time. 

But at any rate, if you could point 
to an Administration where nobody ever 
disagreed with each other, nobody ever 
argued, nobody ever said, "Well, just a 
minute, Mr. President, have you thought 
of this?" that would be pretty tough. 
You wouldn't want that. We have good, 
healthy discussions in this Administra- 
tion, and the President encourages it. 
And as far as I'm concerned, I find that 
he is a great leader and a wonderful 
human being to work with. Both my 
wife and I enjoy the President and 
Nancy and feel that not only are they 
the President and First Lady but also 
good friends and good company. 

Q. Speaking of arguments, we 
seem to have a little argument with 
King Hussein of Jordan. Several 
weeks ago, in an interview with 
Judith Miller of The New York Times, 
Hussein expressed considerable 
disillusionment with President 
Reagan's policy in the Middle East. 



One of the reasons he cited was the 
refusal of the United States to go into 
the United Nations and reassert its 
support for UN Resolution 242 and 
also to reaffirm its previous position 
that the settlements on the West Bank 
of the Jordan are illegal. I'd like to 
ask you whether the United States 
does continue to support UN Resolu- 
tion 242 calling for the withdrawal of 
Israel from the occupied territories, 
and whether the United States con- 
tinues to hold its previous position 
that those settlements on the West 
Bank are, in fact, illegal? 

A. I think King Hussein has been 
particularly upset about the difficulties 
of getting through the Congress our 
ability to supply him with the military 
equipment that he feels he needs — and 
which we feel he needs — to defend 
himself, not against Israel but against 
others in his neighborhood, particularly 
Syria. So I think that frustration is an 
underlying problem that King Hussein 
has, and we share that frustration. But I 
think that if King Hussein were to find 
himself in the peace process and 
negotiating with Israel, he would find 
the attitudes in this country sharply 
shifted, and that is what we work for. 



As far as Resolution 242 is con- 
cerned, we support that. The President's 
September 1, 1982, initiative was direct- 
ly based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and 
the Camp David accords. These are all 
fundamentally consistent ideas and in- 
volve the concept of an exchange of ter- 
ritory for peace. That's the formula. But 
obviously, it's much more complicated 
than that. 

And as far as the settlments are 
concerned, the President said then, and 
continues to say — and we have said it on 
any number of occasions— that we think 
the continued settlements are not a con- 
structive thing. They are an impediment 
in the peace process. We have made that 
statement, and made it and made it. 

Q. Do you consider it illegal, sir? 

A. As far as the question of legality 
is concerned, the President has said, and 
our position is, that they are not illegal. 
But its isn't a legal question; it's a ques- 
tion of what these mean to the peace 
process. We think that they are bad for 
the peace process, and we would like to 
see them curtailed. We have said that on 
a great many occasions. 



'Press release 130 of May 14, 1984. 



Arresting the Nuclear Genie 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Address before the Mid-America 
Committee in Chicago on May 2, 198i. 
Ambassador Adelman is Director of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). 

It is a pleasure to be with the Mid- 
America Committee to discuss one of 
the most critical arms control issues 
before us: stopping the spread of nuclear 
weapons or, if you will, arresting the 
nuclear genie. 

I would ask you to pause for just a 
moment and ponder the following: 

• What if Iran or Iraq had the 
nuclear bomb? 

• What if a leader like Qadhafi or 
an Idi Amin acquired that capability? 

• What if the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) or another terrorist 
group acquired nuclear weapons? 

Frightening thoughts, I am sure we 
all agree. But live issues still. Constant 
vigilance and active policies will be 



necessary to avoid having these 
nightmarish thoughts become realities. 

Even today, talk about the spread of 
nuclear weapons to Iran is in the news. 
A British defense journal recently 
alleged that Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran is 
only 2 years away from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. Our own assessment is 
that it would take many more years for 
either Iran or Iraq to develop nuclear 
weapons, even if they decided to do so. 

But even the possibility— however 
slim— clearly is frightening. For nearly 
4 years now, these two countries have 
been engaged in a bloody war of attri- 
tion. Neither has honored even the 
limited conventions for conflict that have 
grown up over the years. Iran has used 
children as suicide troops; Iraq has used 
deadly chemical weapons. There have 
been nearly a million casualties on both 
sides. 

If either of these two warring na- 
tions had nuclear weapons, does anyone 
doubt that they probably would have 
been used? Does anyone doubt that such 
use would have greatly increased the 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



already terrible destruction and loss of 
life? Does anyone doubt that the use of 
nuclear weapons, or even only its pros- 
pect, would have risked drawing in still 
other nations, raising the danger of 
wider conflict? Our interests in the Per- 
sian Gulf, as well as those of our Euro- 
pean allies and Japan, would be gravely 
jeopardized. 

Look elsewhere at the dangers of 
nuclear terrorism. Imagine the 
devastating impact upon the Western 
economies if one of the key Middle East 
oil production or distribution facilities 
were struck by a terrorist attack using a 
nuclear weapon. Or a terrorist group 
might seek to smuggle a nuclear weapon 
into a West European capital or into the 
United States. The group's objective 
might be to demand political conces- 
sions, to extort financial compensation, 
even simply to inflict terror and devasta- 
tion. 

The chances of opportunities for a 
terrorist group to acquire a nuclear 
weapon increase if the number of 
nuclear powers increase. Imagine, if you 
will, a Qadhafi with the bomb. And, I 
might add, he has stated his ambition to 
try to get one. 

There are more examples, but the 
point is clear: efforts to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons are absolute- 
ly critical to our attempts to create a 
more stable and peaceful world, to 
strengthen the already frayed fabric of 
world order. 

The spread of nuclear weapons 
around the globe would threaten not 
only their new owners' neighbors but 
also ricochet to hurt the new owners 
themselves. It would threaten the securi- 
ty and well-being of the United States 
and our close friends and allies. Indeed, 
the possible spread of nuclear weapons 
to any of the many regions of the world 
characterized by continuing crises and 
periodic military conflict poses the 
greatest danger of nuclear weapons ac- 
tually being used. 

Controlling the Threat 
of Nuclear Proliferation 

How can we meet this challenge, or con- 
trol this threat? We in ACDA wrestle 
with that question daily since we have 
major responsibilities in this critical 
arms control area. 

As a start, we need a defense in 
depth: that is, a broad range of 
measures and institutions that will 
reduce the chances that these terrifying 
weapons will spread still further around 
the globe. Or — if you will pardon the 
metaphor with the baseball season get- 



July 1984 



ting underway— this is a field in which 
we can hit singles and perhaps a few 
doubles but very rarely a home run. 

Security and Foreign Policies. A 

first part of that defense is a range of 
security relationships, guarantees, and 
other policies. These are often over- 
looked in discussions of proliferation 
problems because they have little direct- 
ly to do with nuclear weapons spread. 
By contributing to regional political 
stability, however, they reduce any in- 
centives countries might otherwise have 
to "go nuclear." Thus, these tools of our 
broad security and foreign policies are 
also indispensable to our efforts to pre- 
vent the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Measures To Control Acquisition 
of Nuclear Explosives. A second essen- 
tial element in this defense are measures 
to slow and impede the technical prog- 
ress of any country that sets out on the 
road to acquire nuclear explosives. The 
United States, has, with some other 
countries' support, pursued such 
measures to rather good effect. 

Over the past several years, we have 
led an international effort to upgrade 
and strengthen controls for nuclear 
exports applied by the major nuclear 
suppliers. Just last January, all these 
suppliers agreed on steps to tighten con- 
trols on technology, such as specialized 
electrical equipment, pumps, and motors 
used for enriching uranium. "Enriching" 
sounds innocent, but that process is one 
of the two paths by which a country 
could acquire "bomb-grade" material. 

We cannot rest as technology 
marches on. Today, work is underway to 
deal with the threat posed by other sen- 
sitive technologies, particularly those 
needed to acquire plutonium, another 
material used to make nuclear weapons. 

The U.S. Government is, I can 
assure you, on the lookout for efforts by 
countries to pursue a nuclear explosives 
capability. We have a system for 
"nuclear export alerts" that plays an im- 
portant part in trying to impede such 
pursuit. With early warning of pending 
purchases of items or technology that 
can help a country on a road to nuclear 
explosives, the United States can take 
action itself, or urge other governments, 
to prevent the shipment. In 1983, we 
had more than 100 of these "nuclear ex- 
port alerts." 

Nonetheless, nearly four decades 
have passed since the first nuclear ex- 
plosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 
July 1945. That is another way of saying 
that nuclear weapons are, in some 
respects, an old technology — as old, say, 
as television. The leaders of every coun- 



try that might be contemplating acquir- 
ing nuclear weapons know the most im- 
portant technical fact about them: they 
work. 

Thus, important as our efforts are to 
reinforce the technical barricades 
against nuclear weapons spread, they 
can in the final result only buy time. In 
some cases, of course, we can buy a 
great deal of time. In others, the time 
may be short. But, whatever time we 
buy can be valuable in itself. A later 
political change may bring to power 
leaders not committed to developing 
nuclear explosives. 

One of our most important problems 
is how to use wisely the time that has 
been bought. How do we take advantage 
of whatever breathing space we gain? 
The defense in depth can fall apart if 
that time is not put to good and 
sometimes hard use. 

One way to use that time produc- 
tively is to work on reducing the motiva- 
tions, either real or imagined, that can 
move countries toward nuclear weapons 
in the first place. This leads me back to 
the strong and credible alliances and 
security ties around the world that I 
mentioned earlier. They are vital for our 
nonproliferation goals. 

This is one reason why the Reagan 
Administration has sought to buttress 
our longstanding alliance with South 
Korea, making clear we have no inten- 
tion to withdraw U.S. troops needed to 
preserve stability on the Korean Penin- 
sula. We have also worked to establish a 
new security relationship with Pakistan, 
which holds out the best chance of 
reducing any incentives that country 
may have to acquire nuclear explosives. 

Strengthening International In- 
stitutions. Third, fielding a defense in 
depth also requires that whatever time 
is available be used to strengthen the in- 
ternational institutions that help prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons. While 
we justifiably question the net value of 
some international agencies, the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, or the 
IAEA as the jargon would have it, is 
one that is very much in our interest. 

Created in 1957, largely as a result 
of President Eisenhower's initiative, the 
IAEA has the vital responsibility to 
verify that nuclear materials in over 700 
installations throughout the world are 
used only for peaceful purposes. Over 90 
countries have signed agreements with 
the IAEA under which they have 
obligated themselves to provide that 
agency with detailed information on 
their nuclear activities and to allow the 
IAEA to carry out frequent onsite in- 
spections to verify the accuracy of that 



43 



ARMS CONTROL 



information. More than 1,700 inspec- 
tions are carried out each year in about 
50 countries with active nuclear pro- 
grams. Each year, more than 6,000 
security seals are applied or checked, 
hundreds of measuring and surveillance 
devices are used, and nearly a million 
pieces of data are analyzed. 

Countries accepting safeguards on 
all their nuclear activities demonstrate 
their peaceful intentions and reduce 
suspicions on the part of their 
neighbors. Nuclear activities outside of 
safeguards in non-nuclear weapons 
states are, of course, of proliferation 
concern. For this reason, the United 
States actively seeks to convince these 
states to accept comprehensive 
safeguards on all their nuclear activities. 
And, last year, President Reagan under- 
took a major initiative to have the 
nuclear suppliers require that acceptance 
as a condition for significant new export 
commitments. 

An effective safeguards system can 
detect possible misuse of peaceful 
nuclear technology, thereby ringing the 
alarm bell. That risk of detection can 
discourage a country from misusing 
equipment and materials designed for 
peaceful nuclear uses. 

That leaves a question, of course, of 
how countries around the world will re- 
spond if the alarm bell rings? President 
Reagan has made clear that any viola- 
tion of IAEA safeguards or of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty or a nuclear explo- 
sion by a non-nuclear power would be of 
grave concern for the United States. 
Specific sanctions also are provided by 
U.S. legislation and international 
agreements in the nuclear field. 

But, to be honest, we need to 
strengthen the prospect of strong sanc- 
tions. Those warnings are necessary for 
an effective preventive system. We need 
to remind potential proliferators that the 
response of the United States and 
others will come down hard if the alarm 
sounds. A strong manifestation of U.S. 
resolve can help tip the balance against 
a country seeking nuclear weapons. 

The International Nonproliferation 
Norm. Fourth, preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons also demands that we 
use the time available to enhance sup- 
port for the international norm against 
acquiring these weapons. Past ex- 
perience here is quite illuminating. 

In I960, France detonated its first 
nuclear weapon in the Algerian desert. 
French President de Gaulle immediately 
sent a congratulatory telegram to his 
scientists at the site, lauding their great 
feat and stressing that France, too, now 



had the access due it as a great power 
to the most advanced weaponry. Little 
more than a decade later, in 1974 India 
detonated a nuclear explosive in the 
Rajasthan desert. Rather than stress- 
ing India's acquisition of advanced 
weaponry, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi 
called that blast a "peaceful nuclear ex- 
plosion" needed to build harbors and dig 
canals. That is a distinction that we all 
know has no practical difference. India 
sought, so to speak, to sneak into the 
"nuclear weapons club" through a back 
door. 

What these two stories reflect, to 
my mind, are the changed international 
mood and expected standard of 
behavior. Put simply, it is no longer 
thought legitimate to acquire nuclear 
weapons. 

This changed international norm is 
best evidenced by the readiness of more 
than 120 countries to adhere to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under 
this treaty, non-nuclear nations renounce 
any future acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and accept international 
safeguards on all their civil nuclear ac- 
tivities. Countries with nuclear weapons 
agree not to assist other countries to ac- 
quire these weapons and to negotiate in 
good faith on agreements to limit and 
reduce their own nuclear forces. 

We continually seek to strengthen 
this barrier by encouraging the rela- 
tively few holdouts to join the treaty. In 
this Administration 10 new states 
agreed to adhere. Regrettably, several 
key countries — such as South Africa, 
Pakistan, India, and Israel — continue to 
reject the treaty for a variety of 
reasons. 

Next year a large international con- 
ference will be held to review the im- 
plementation of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. We will work long and hard to 
ensure its success, to demonstrate that 
the treaty continues to have the support 
of its many adherents. The world at 
large can ill afford to allow this crucial 
arms control treaty to be eroded. 

Another example of the non- 
proliferation norm and a key part of our 
defense in depth is the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco. This treaty was promoted 
and negotiated by our neighbors in Latin 
America and seeks to create a continent 
free of nuclear weapons. Most Latin 
American countries have joined but 
regrettably not all. All five nuclear- 
weapons states have agreed to a special 
protocol to the treaty that prohibits 
them from deploying nuclear weapons in 
Latin American countries for which the 
treaty is in force. 



Early in this Administration, Presi- 
dent Reagan sought and obtained Senate 
ratification of a second important non- 
proliferation protocol to this treaty, 
thereby removing one obstacle to its 
complete success. That success will de- 
pend principally on the recognition by 
the few countries in the region that have 
not yet joined that it is in their interest 
to do so. For example, a decision by the 
new civilian Alfonsin government in 
Argentina to accede to the treaty could 
contribute greatly to stability in the 
region. We are actively encouraging 
Argentina as well as other countries to 
take all the steps necessary to bring the 
treaty into force. 

Those countries outside these 
systems and not accepting these norms 
are, to be sure, major concerns. We 
need to use the time we buy to bring 
them closer if not completely into accord 
with the international nonproliferation 
norms and responsible behavior of most 
nations. 

In this regard, the President just an- 
nounced in Beijing our new agreement 
for peaceful nuclear cooperation with 
China. A lot of the "news" has focused 
on the prospects of nuclear commerce 
with China. An extremely important 
result of this recent opening to China 
has been frequently overlooked. 

Within the past months, China has 
moved to accept many international non- 
proliferation practices and norms. It has 
joined the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. It has stated that it will require 
recipients of Chinese nuclear equipment 
or materials to accept international 
safeguards on such items as a condition 
of sale. It has made clear that it will not 
assist or encourage other countries to 
acquire nuclear explosives. 

These three actions are most 
welcome steps. U.S. discussions on 
nuclear cooperation with China over the 
past year — as well as those of other 
countries — contributed to this beneficial 
result. That effect may be difficult to 
calculate, but it clearly serves our non- 
proliferation goals. 

Worldwide Cooperation. Fifth, our 
defense in depth against nuclear pro- 
liferation requires the cooperation of 
other countries. In the nonproliferation 
area, like so many others, we simply 
cannot do it alone — or go it alone. 

Cooperation with our European 
allies, Japan, and other countries which 
supply nuclear material and equip- 
ment — from enriched uranium fuel to 
large commercial power reactors — is 
essential if we are to continue to press 
the technical barriers against prolifera- 
tion. The cooperation of many neutral 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



and nonaligned countries as well is 
necessary if we are to ensure that the 
international norm against proliferation 
remains strong. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union also have mutual interests when 
it comes to nonproliferation. Indeed, in 
the past few years our discussions in 
this field have been intensive and exten- 
sive and on a more regular basis. Our 
two countries have continued to share 
similar views in this area for a rather 
simple reason: the Soviets do not want 
to see other countries acquire nuclear 
weapons any more than we do. They 
know that it will threaten their security. 

Cooperation at home is also neces- 
sary. Of course, we in the executive 
branch do not always agree with the 
Congress on particular proposals to deal 
with the threat of nuclear weapons 
spread. This is an area in which rea- 
sonable people can and do differ on tac- 
tics but not on the goals. And, of course, 
Members of Congress do not always 
share our approach. Despite differences 
of view, the two branches need to work 
effectively together to achieve our coun- 
try's abiding nonproliferation goals. 

Future Prospects 

What about the future? Should we be 
optimistic or pessimistic about the pros- 
pects for avoiding the further spread of 
nuclear weapons around the world? It 
strikes me in thinking about those ques- 
tions that throughout the past decades, 
the very gloomy forecasts of a world of 
more and more nuclear weapons states 
have not held true. 

This is one area of arms con- 
trol — unfortunately there are too few 
such areas — where we have succeeded 
far better than was expected. If, in the 
words of yet another one of Parkinson's 
laws, the success of a policy is measured 
by the catastrophes which do not hap- 
pen, we have to a large degree met that 
test — and met it well. This arms control 
success story should not and cannot be 
ignored. 

Let's look back a bit. In 1958 a 
special committee of the National Plan- 
ning Association predicted in a mono- 
graph 1970 Without Arms Control that 
"by 1970, most nations with appreciable 
military strength will have in their 
arsenals nuclear weapons — strategic, 
tactical or both." Similarly, President 
Kennedy warned of a world in which by 
1975 there would be 15-20 nations with 
nuclear weapons. 

Five countries are, as you know, 
nuclear weapons states. Also, India has 



July 1984 



detonated a nuclear explosive. Still the 
pessimistic predictions have not come to 
pass. 

Instead, the United States and many 
other countries have put those past 
decades to good use. Through those ef- 
forts we have many building blocks 
against the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Now most countries around the 
world have come to recognize that 
preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons is very much in their interest 
and that if they are not part of the solu- 
tion, then they are part of the problem. 

But we cannot — dare not — rest on 
past efforts and established building 
blocks. Preventing the spread of nuclear 



weapons as prophesied by President 
Kennedy "into the hands of countries 
large and small, stable and unstable, 
responsible and irresponsible, scattered 
throughout the world" is a continuing 
challenge. 

With patient effort, and high-level 
attention and public support, I believe 
that we can meet that challenge suc- 
cessfully. I know that President Reagan 
feels very strongly about this. I have 
been in a number of meetings with him 
and have not only felt but heard him 
speak of the sense of urgency which 
nonproliferation demands. The nuclear 
genie is out of the bottle but we 
can — and must — arrest its travels. ■ 



Western Proposals at MBFR Talks 



WESTERN STATEMENT, 
MAY 24, 1984 

On April 19 the Western participants [at 
the mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions (MBFR) talks] put forward an im- 
portant new proposal. This initiative 
alters the longstanding Western require- 
ment for formal agreement on the 
precise numbers of all military personnel 
in central Europe before any reductions 
can be taken. It demonstrates Western 
flexibility by designing an approach for a 
successful data exchange avoiding a 
reversion to the unproductive disputes 
of the past. 

In a spirit of compromise, under the 
new Western approach, we would re- 
quire an exchange of data prior to trea- 
ty signature and before any reductions 
take place only on a portion of just the 
ground forces in the area — namely, com- 
bat and combat support forces. In set- 
ting aside service support forces, we are 
deliberately excluding a portion of the 
forces where we believe much of the 
discrepancy has lain. 

By proposing a new mode for 
discussing data, the initiative allows for 
resolution of ambiguities regarding what 
is counted and how it is counted which 
have contributed significantly to earlier 
disagreement. Moreover, the new 
Western approach does not require a 
formal agreement on precise figures but 
only that figures fall within an accept- 
able range of the sides' estimates. 

Finally, this new methodology for 
exchanging data enables the sides to 
table official force figures in a wholly 
revised format with no direct connection 
with figures tabled earlier in the 
negotiations. 



In all these ways, the new Western 
approach would facilitate a successful 
data exchange. 

In addition, the new Western pro- 
posal also meets a number of Eastern 
concerns on a range of other important 
issues. For example, the Western pro- 
posal: 

• Accepts the Eastern idea of a no- 
increase commitment on manpower in 
the reduction area following initial 
U.S. -Soviet reductions; 

• Reduces the period required to 
reach parity from 7 to 5 years, matching 
effectively the duration of the reduction 
process proposed by the East; and 

• Accepts the Eastern requirement 
that U.S. and Soviet reductions should 
be taken in the same form, to allow for 
reductions by both the United States 
and U.S.S.R. essentially in units, with 
no more than 10% to be taken as in- 
dividuals. 

The new Western proposal thus con- 
stitutes a determined effort to resolve 
the most basic standing in the way of 
progress in these negotiations and pro- 
vides a series of additional compromises 
to promote these negotiations. 

Any objective analysis will show 
that, as in the past, nothing in the 
Western position is designed to afford 
unilateral advantage to any participant 
or side. 

Our proposal is not put forward on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis but in a construc- 
tive spirit of compromise. We are 
prepared to discuss any aspects of it. It 
would be an unfortunate error on the 
part of the East if the spirit and 
substances of the Western move were 



45 



ARMS CONTROL 



not recognized. It is now for the East to 
adopt a constructive attitude and help 
develop a common approach toward 
reaching an agreement. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAY 24, 1984 1 

Today in Vienna, negotiators from East 
and West resume the talks on mutual 
and balanced force reductions, or 
MBFR. The purpose of these talks, in 
which 18 NATO and Warsaw Pact na- 
tions are participating, is to reach an 
agreement to reduce conventional forces 
in central Europe. 

On April 19, near the end of the last 
round, the West presented a major new 
initiative aimed at moving these negotia- 
tions forward. The new Western pro- 
posal seeks to overcome the longstand- 
ing disagreement over the number of 
Warsaw Pact soldiers in central Europe. 
Our proposal will permit the two sides 
to focus initial attention on counting just 
their most highly structured and visible 
forces, since this is the area where East 
and West are already closest to agree- 
ment. 

The timing of this offer gave the 
Warsaw Pact the opportunity to study it 
in their capitals during the break be- 
tween rounds. We, therefore, hope that 
the Soviet Union and its allies are 
prepared now to respond constructively 
to our initiative and to move the 
negotiations forward. By reaching 
agreement on lower, equal, and 
verifiable levels of conventional forces in 
central Europe, we will be able to 
enhance the security of both sides and to 
strengthen peace and stability in 
Europe. The force reductions themselves 
and the associated verification measures 
called for in the Western proposal would 
enhance mutual confidence between 
East and West. 

The MBFR negotiations resume at 
the same time that another part of the 
East- West security dialogue, the con- 
ference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (known as CDE), is continuing 
in Stockholm. There, too, the West 
presented a package of proposals that 
would enhance confidence and trust 
among the 35 participating countries. 
And in both Stockholm and Vienna, the 
West is fully prepared to discuss any 
serious counterproposals from other par- 
ticipants. 

The West is doing its part to achieve 
progress in other areas of arms control 
as well. In the same week that we made 
the new MBFR proposal, Vice President 



Bush presented to the 40-nation Con- 
ference on Disarmament in Geneva a 
comprehensive U.S. proposal for a 
global ban on chemical weapons. This 
proposal will again be under discussion 
when the Conference on Disarmanent 
reconvenes in June. 

We are just as prepared to move 
forward in negotiating reductions in 
nuclear forces. But the Soviet Union still 
refuses to return to the START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] and INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 



ASAT Arms Control 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Security and Scientific 
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on April 10, 1984- Am- 
bassador Adelman is Director of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. 1 

It is a pleasure to appear before the 
committee today. I would like to concen- 
trate on the arms control aspects of 
U.S. policy on antisatellite weapons— or 
ASAT for short— and ASAT arms con- 
trol. I will expand on last week's report 
to the Congress. My plan is first to 
review the major arms control elements 
of the report and then to address 
several questions that have been raised 
with regard to our policy. 

There is a significant body of inter- 
national law and agreements that 
govern activities in space and that ban 
or limit space weapons already. These 
include: 

• The UN Charter's ban on use of 
force except in self-defense, which ap- 
plies to space; 

• The Outer Space Treaty ban on 
placing in space nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction; 

• The Limited Test Ban Treaty ban- 
ning nuclear weapons tests in outer 
space; and 

• The ABM Treaty ban on develop- 
ment, testing, or deployment of space- 
based ABM systems or components. 

With regard to specific treatment of 
ASAT arms control, two international 
efforts are particularly noteworthy. 

The 1978-79 bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, begun at U.S. initiative, 
found the sides were separated on 



negotiations which it left last fall. I 
repeat what I have said on many occa- 
sions: We are prepared to resume those 
negotiations at any time and without 
preconditions. We again invite the 
Soviet Union to return to the 
negotiating table to resume the serious 
work of reducing nuclear arsenals and 
the risks of nuclear war. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 28, 1984. 



several issues, including verification 
problems. Negotiations were not resum- 
ed following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 

Under the Reagan Administration, 
the United States has supported and 
continues to support discussions in the 
Conference on Disarmament to sort out 
space arms control issues. 

The President, in his July 4, 1982, 
space policy, said that the Administra- 
tion would continue to study space arms 
control options and would consider 
verifiable and equitable space arms con- 
trol measures that would ban or other- 
wise limit testing and deployment of 
specific weapons, should those measures 
be compatible with U.S. national securi- 
ty. The President reaffirmed this policy 
in his letter transmitting the report to 
Congress. 

ACDA plays a major role in this sub- 
ject. For example, we cochair the in- 
teragency group on ASAT arms control. 
This group was responsible for drafting 
the report to Congress. Our goal is to 
find initiatives that meet the President's 
criteria. But, as the report frankly 
states, devising space arms control ini- 
tiatives is a difficult task. 

Report to Congress 

Some of the key considerations in this 
area as set forth in the report are 
highlighted below. 

An ASAT arms control agreement, 
if equitable, effectively verifiable, and 
complied with, would have a number of 
potential benefits. Depending on the 
scope and effectiveness of an agree- 
ment, it might limit specialized threats 
to satellites and constrain future threats 
to such key satellites as those for early 
warning; it might raise the political 
threshold for attacks against satellites; 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



and it might allay some international 
concerns regarding the use of space for 
military purposes. 

These potential benefits will be dif- 
ficult to achieve because of five key 
problems. 

Verification. In general verification 
of arms control agreements is more im- 
portant for the United States than it is 
for the Soviet Union because, while the 
United States is a very open society, the 
Soviet Union is a comparatively closed 
society. Verification of an ASAT ban is 
made more essential by the fact that the 
satellites which serve U.S. and allied 
security are few in number. Cheating, 
even on a small scale, could pose a 
disproportionate risk to the United 
States. 

Breakout. Breakout is the risk that 
a nation could gain a unilateral advan- 
tage if an agreement ceased to remain 
in force by obtaining a significant head 
start in deployment of a type of weapon 
that had been banned. Breakout poten- 
tial could exist for the Soviets, even if 
they were to destroy all of their existing 
systems, because they could retain the 
capability to redeploy quickly based on 
the experience acquired with the present 
system. 

Definition. Defining what con- 
stitutes a space weapon for arms control 
purposes is difficult. Such weapons could 
include coorbital interceptors, direct as- 
cent interceptors such as exo-atmos- 
pheric antiballistic missiles, ballistic 
missiles with modified guidance logic, 
directed energy weapons such as lasers 
and particle beams, and other important 
classes of weapons. Problems of weapon 
definition are compounded because some 
non-weapon space systems, including 
civil and commercial systems, could have 
characteristics which would make them 
difficult to distinguish from weapons 
systems. The fact that many systems 
not designed to be ASAT weapons 
nonetheless have inherent ASAT 
capabilities, and the verification dif- 
ficulties above imply that a truly com- 
prehensive ban on tests of all means of 
countering satellites is simply not possi- 
ble. 

Vulnerability of Satellite Support 
Systems. An effective ban on ASAT 
arms, if achievable, could not provide 
survivability for all components of space 
systems. Attacks on other elements of a 
space system — ground stations, launch 
facilities, or communications links — in 
some cases may be easier and more ef- 
fective than attacks on satellites 
themselves. 



July 1984 



Soviet Non-Weapon Military Space 
Threat. Any examination of space arms 
control needs to include a discussion of 
the growing threat posed by present and 
projected Soviet space systems which, 
while not weapons themselves, are 
designed to support directly the 
U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event 
of a conflict. These include recon- 
naissance satellites designed to use 
radar and electronic intelligence to pro- 
vide targeting data to Soviet weapons 
platforms for use in seeking to attack 
U.S. and allied surface fleets and land 
conventional forces. 

Since 1977, we have been developing 
an antisatellite system — the miniature 
vehicle (MV) system — for basically two 
purposes: first, to deter threats to our 
own space systems by having the ability 
to respond in kind; second, to help deter 
conventional and nuclear terrestrial con- 
flict by placing at risk, within the limits 
of international law, certain satellites 
which provide support for hostile 
military forces. 

This is a prudent response to the ex- 
isting Soviet antisatellite weapon and to 
Soviet deployment in recent years of a 
number of military satellites which, even 
though not weapons themselves, are 
designed to support directly the 
U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event 
of a conflict. In the absence of a com- 
parable U.S. system, or of verifiable 
agreed limits on ASAT systems, the 
Soviets have a significant military ad- 
vantage with their ASAT system. 

This measured response to the 
Soviet space threat may be construed by 
some as constituting an arms race in 
space weapons. In my view, it does not. 
Nor does it preclude future ASAT 
negotiations should we find equitable 
verifiable arrangements that are consist- 
ent with our national security. 

With regard to multilateral space 
arms control activities, the United 
States has supported discussion of a 
broad range of questions on space arms 
control at the Conference on Disarma- 
ment (CD). Together with our allies, we 
supported in 1983 the establishment of a 
CD working group on outer space to ex- 
amine in detail the existing legal regime 
and questions concerning space arms 
control. This approach was also accept- 
able to the neutral and nonaligned group 
at the CD but was blocked by the 
Soviets and their surrogates. Recently 
we have given our CD delegation addi- 
tional authority. I cannot report to you 
at this time whether the Soviets will also 
block this approach. But I can state that 
the United States supports serious and 



responsible examination in the CD of 
space arms control issues. 

However, no way has yet been found 
to design a satisfactory comprehensive 
ASAT ban. Less sweeping options under 
study would limit specific types of 
weapons, of actions, or of threats. Since 
we must protect our satellites against 
threats that could be developed without 
our knowledge, there is a premium on 
finding ways to limit the systems most 
difficult to defend against. We are 
searching for such limits which are ef- 
fectively verifiable and which allow us to 
protect U.S. and allied forces from 
threatening Soviet satellites. Other op- 
tions would regulate certain threatening 
activities related to space. The door is 
not closed to ASAT arms control. The 
Administration is continuing the active 
search for viable arms control oppor- 
tunities in the ASAT area. 

I believe that our policy is respon- 
sive to the desire we all share to limit 
arms in those areas where such limits 
can enhance U.S. security. Given the 
problems I enumerated, however, it is 
clear that the United States is not yet in 
a position to move forward toward 
negotiations in this area at this time. 
Thus, while I share many of its objec- 
tives, I do not believe that passage of 
House Joint Resolution 120 by Con- 
gressman Moakley and several others 
would bring us any closer to achieve- 
ment of those objectives. 

Key Questions 

I would now like to address some of the 
key questions that have most frequently 
been raised about our policy. 

One question deals with the relation- 
ship between ASAT arms control, U.S. 
development of ASAT capabilities, and 
the President's Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative. Is that Initiative the "real 
reason" — as opposed to the list of prob- 
lems I gave you — why the Administra- 
tion refuses to enter into ASAT negotia- 
tions? 

The answer is no. The Strategic 
Defense Initiative has the ultimate goal 
of reducing the threat posed by nuclear- 
armed ballistic missiles. However, at 
present it is purely a research program, 
fully consistent with all our treaty 
obligations (including the ABM Treaty 
which bans development, testing, and 
deployment of space-based ABM 
systems and their components). It is 
structured to allow informed decisions in 
the early 1990s on whether to proceed 
to full-scale development and deploy- 
ment. 



47 



ARMS CONTROL 



At that time, or close to it, we will 
better understand the role arms control 
could play if we move toward a defense- 
oriented regime and in a transition to 
such a regime. At this time, with the 
research program just beginning, it 
would not be prudent to base our space 
arms control posture on assumptions as 
to whether a transition to such a regime 
will or will not take place. 

A second line of questions concerns 
our studies. What options are being 
studied? What is meant by the idea of 
"regulating" certain threatening ac- 
tivities in space? When will the conclu- 
sions of the studies be announced? 

As indicated in the report, we have 
concluded that a comprehensive ASAT 
test ban that would eliminate all means 
of countering satellites could not be ef- 
fectively verified. In fact, the more com- 
prehensive the attempted limitation, the 
greater the verification problems. For 
that reason our current studies are con- 
centrating on less sweeping options that 
would limit specific types of weapons 
systems or activities. Limits need to be 
effectively verifiable if they are to help 
build stability and protection. 

We are also examining options that 
would regulate certain threatening ac- 
tivities related to space. Such regula- 
tions could parallel and complement 
other kinds of stabilizing measures such 
as the "confidence-building measures" 
that the United States has introduced in 
the strategic arms reductions talks 
(START) and intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) negotiations. Detailed con- 
sideration is being given to measures in 
this class specifically related to anti- 
satellite weapons and space activities. 
Examples of such measures in START 
and INF are preannouncement of 
ballistic missile launches and prenotifica- 
tion of major military exercises. 

Our studies of space arms control 
are ongoing. We certainly will keep the 
Congress and the public informed as to 
their progress and conclusions. 

A third question has been raised 
concerning the relationship between our 
policy and Senator Tsongas' amendment 
to the FY 1984 Defense Authorization 
Act. That amendment requires the 
President, before an MV test against a 
space object, to certify that the United 
States is endeavoring to negotiate in 
good faith a verifiable comprehensive 
ASAT ban. As noted in the report, we 
are endeavoring to respond to the thrust 
of the Tsongas amendment by concen- 
trating, in the ongoing studies, on the 
more limited arrangements I described 
that would ban or otherwise limit 
specific weapon systems, types of ac- 
tivities, or threats. 



A fourth question frequently asked 
is whether we are losing a one-time-only 
opportunity to limit such weapons now 
before they really get going. 

That assumption is a bit off. The 
Soviet Union has possessed, for over a 
decade, an operational ASAT intercep- 
tor system which threatens U.S. low- 
altitude satellites. The U.S. MV program 
represents a reasonable counter to this 
system and, as noted, a deterrent to at- 
tack on U.S. satellites. Neither system 
precludes future ASAT agreements that 
would seek to limit more capable, more 
dangerous threats to our satellites. 

In addition, a number of limitations 
on space weapons already exist, as 
described earlier. We must be certain, 
before we attempt further limits in this 
area of rapidly changing technology, 
that we can devise proposals that are 
equitable, verifiable, and compatible with 
U.S. security. Agreements that do not 
satisfy these criteria would be in no 
one's interests. 

A fifth question relates to the Soviet 
Union's draft space arms control treaty 
introduced at the United Nations last 
August, their proposal for a moratorium 
on testing ASAT systems, and for 
bilaterial negotiations to discuss verifica- 
tion problems. 

We have studied the Soviet pro- 
posals carefully. This treaty would pro- 
hibit the use or threatened use of force 
by or against space objects. It would 
specifically prohibit testing and deploy- 
ment of space weapons and testing or 
development of antisatellite systems and 
would require destruction of existing 
ASAT systems. It provides for verifica- 
tion by national technical means (NTM), 
but nothing beyond. 

Inadequate verification is one of its 
major weaknesses. It would be nearly 
impossible to verify the elimination of 
the Soviet ASAT systems through NTM 
alone. Their ASAT interceptor is 
relatively small, as is ours, and is fitted 
to a Soviet space booster used for other 
space launch missions. We do not know 
how many ASAT interceptors have been 
manufactured. It would be quite easy for 
the Soviets to maintain a covert supply 
of interceptors which could be readied 
quickly for operational use. The Soviet 
call for a ban on space-based weaponry 
raised other verification problems as 
well. Verifying the inherent capabilities 
and functions of objects in space could, 
as you can imagine, be quite difficult. 

The draft treaty proposes that 
"piloted' spacecraft not be used for 
"military purposes." We strongly suspect 
that this provision is intended to con- 
strain the use of our space shuttle, 



which in the years ahead will serve as 
the primary U.S. launch system for both 
civil space as well as national security 
missions. At the same time, the treaty 
would apparently not constrain the 
Soviet unpiloted space station. 

With regard to the Soviet Union's 
proposed moratorium on testing ASAT 
systems, accepting it would put the 
United States at a serious disadvantage. 
The Soviets would retain their opera- 
tional ASAT, tested many times, while 
the United States would be prohibited 
from testing its ASAT interceptor. Fur- 
thermore, a test moratorium would not 
necessarily cause their operational 
system to atrophy. After a hiatus of 
several years in ASAT testing, the 
Soviets were able to resume testing of 
their system without any apparent 
degradation in performance. Programs 
that are still in research and develop- 
ment stage, as is our proposed ASAT 
system, pay a much higher price for a 
test moratorium. 

Finally, until we have determined 
whether there are in fact practical solu- 
tions to the definitional and verification 
problems associated with outer space 
arms control, we do not believe it would 
be productive to engage in formal 
bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R. 
in this area. We would, of course, 
welcome clarification from the Soviets 
with respect to means of verifying their 
proposed treaty. 

A final question concerns a com- 
parison between space and other arms 
control areas. Why is the Administration 
proposing to negotiate a chemical war- 
fare ban treaty, which has severe 
verification limitations, while it refuses 
to negotiate an ASAT test ban? 
Granted, the verification difficulties are 
great in both. To try to solve these in 
the chemical warfare realm, we will be 
proposing bold cooperative measures 
that will help verification. More impor- 
tantly, however, because of the small 
number of high-value U.S. military and 
intelligence satellites, cheating on an 
ASAT agreement, even on a small scale, 
could pose a disproportionate risk. This 
situation is not analogous to chemical 
warfare where deterrence is a much 
stronger and more effective concept, or 
to INF, where cheating on a small scale 
would probably not pose a risk of the 
same nature or alter the strategic 
balance. 

In closing I would like to paraphrase 
the conclusions of our report. ASAT 
arms control faces several very hard 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



problems; we have been working on 
them very intensively and will continue 
to do so. We are looking extensively into 
a range of possible initiatives. We do not 
believe we can or should enter into any 
negotiations until we find concrete pro- 
posals that make sense. But I can assure 



you that we certainly have not given up 
hope of finding such proposals. 



'The completed transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from trie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S.-China Relations 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on June 5, 1984. Mr. 
Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1 

I am delighted to have this opportunity 
to meet with you and to offer testimony 
on U.S.-China relations following the 
President's recent trip to the P.R.C. 

After accompanying President 
Reagan to China, I made brief stops in 
Seoul, Tokyo, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, 
Singapore, Jakarta, and Bangkok, stops 
aimed, in part, at briefing friends and 
allies in the region on the outcome of 
the President's talks in China. Although 
the perspective on China generally and 
U.S.-China relations specifically varied 
in each of the capitals I visited, I believe 
that the common reaction was highly 
favorable. That is, there was a great 
deal of appreciation for what the Presi- 
dent sought to do, for what he acheived, 
and for the obvious extent to which he 
kept in mind the concerns of our Asian 
friends and allies. 

Our fundamental approach to rela- 
tions with China is one that has enjoyed 
bipartisan support through four Ad- 
ministrations. The particular goal of this 
Administration has been to put 
U.S.-China relations on a more stable 
and increasingly comprehensive 
basis — one that avoids the extreme of 
hostility and suspicion without succumb- 
ing to the opposite extreme of euphoria 
and sentimentality. The series of produc- 
tive high-level discussions which we have 
conducted with the Chinese over the last 
15 months bears witness to the success 
of this policy. The President's trip 
reciprocated Premier Zhao's to this 
country in January — the first ever to 
this country by a P.R.C. head of govern- 
ment. The groundwork for that visit in 
turn was laid by serious, wideranging 
talks during the preceding year by 
Secretaries Shultz, Weinberger, Regan, 
and Baldrige, as well as many sub- 
cabinet officials, with their Chinese 
counterparts. 



July 1984 



The President went to China in this 
context, not to initiate a new era or to 
seek dramatic new breakthroughs but 
rather to strengthen and solidify the 
foundations of this extremely important 
relationship. 

And the President's trip was highly 
successful. The Chinese took every ef- 
fort to make it so. By this I do not mean 
only that the Chinese offered the Presi- 
dent a warm reception, though they cer- 
tainly did. As a token of the importance 
they attached to this visit, the Chinese 
scheduled a heavy load of substantive 
meetings. The President held 7 hours of 
formal meetings with China's top four 
active leaders. Secretary Shultz met 
with his counterpart, Foreign Minister 
Wu, for an additional 3 hours. Unusual 
courtesy and respect were accorded the 
President in the other arrangements: 
President Li Xiannian hosted an un- 
precedented private dinner; Deng 
Xiaoping made the unusual gesture of 
hosting a working lunch; the Chinese 
who attended the formal state occasions 
included most of the senior foreign af- 
fairs, science, economic, and military 
leadership. The President delivered a 
number of toasts and public statements, 
presented two major addresses, and 
gave a 20-minute television interview. 
Although we regret that certain signifi- 
cant portions of his remarks were not 
carried in full by the Chinese media, the 
President delivered important messages 
to a wide audience. 

At the conclusion of the visit, the 
Chinese assessment was that the exten- 
sive, indepth exchanges between the 
President and senior Chinese leaders 
had "significantly enhanced mutual 
understanding and further strengthened 
U.S.-China relations." We completely 
share that assessment. 

Economic and Commercial 
Agreements 

During the course of the President's 
meetings in Beijing and in numerous 
other official and private contacts, we 



have significantly advanced our 
economic and commercial relationship 
with the P.R.C. This Administration 
considers that a strong, stable, 
economically modernizing China which is 
expanding its ties with the major in- 
dustrialized democracies can be an in- 
creasing force for peace, both in Asia 
and the world. This is the significance of 
the President's decision this past winter 
to liberalize our technology transfer 
policy toward China. 

Closer economic ties will benefit 
both our peoples. We took important 
steps to these ends during the 
President's trip. In discussion of our cur- 
rent trade deficit with the Chinese, the 
Chinese offered a welcome affirmation 
that planned industrial purchases from 
the United States will soon turn that 
around to a surplus for us. In addition, 
as you know, during the President's trip 
we signed a bilateral tax treaty which 
will give assurances against dual taxa- 
tion to our businessmen. We signed an 
implementing accord to our cultural 
agreement, which means that official 
cultural exchanges will take place again 
after a 1-year hiatus. We also signed 
protocols involving cooperation in 
management and in scientific and 
technological information exchanges. At 
the same time, we have sought and ob- 
tained Chinese assurances that Beijing 
will fulfill the terms of its long-term 
grain agreement with the United States. 

Nuclear Cooperation 

Finally, we initialed one other important 
agreement, an agreement on peaceful 
nuclear cooperation. Since this agree- 
ment will have to be reviewed by the 
Congress, I would like to touch on it for 
a moment even though detailed 
testimony on the agreement by Am- 
bassador Kennedy [Richard T. Kennedy, 
special adviser to the Secretary on non- 
proliferation policy and nuclear energy 
affairs] must await final executive 
branch review and Presidential approval 
and authorization of the text. 

I believe that the peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement is an important 
one. It will not only have a significant, 
positive impact on overall U.S.-China 
relations but it will also further the non- 
proliferation and other foreign policy in- 
terests of the United States. Our in- 
terest in concluding this agreement with 
China results in part from the potential- 
ly significant commercial and trade 
benefits; however, our most important 
objective during the 3 years of negotia- 
tions that produced the agreement has 
been to further U.S. nonproliferation in- 
terests. 



49 



EAST ASIA 



During the period of our negotia- 
tions, China took several important 
steps which clarify its nonproliferation 
and export policies. 

• China joined the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
January. 

• China made clear that thereafter 
it would require IAEA safeguards on its 
nuclear exports. 

• Premier Zhao made important and 
authoritative statements of China's non- 
proliferation policy which make clear 
that China will not contribute to pro- 
liferation. 

This agreement will provide both a 
framework and a context for the con- 
tinuation of discussions with China on 
nonproliferation matters. Naturally, in 
the case of a nuclear cooperation agree- 
ment with the P.R.C. as with all coun- 
tries, we will follow the procedures 
established by U.S. law for review and 
submission to Congress. After the Presi- 
dent approves the agreement and it is 
signed, the agreement text, along with 
the required accompanying documents, 
will be transmitted to the Congress. 
Following its receipt by the Congress, 
the Administration will be prepared to 
discuss all aspects of the proposed 
agreement in detail. We expect this to 
be able to occur shortly. 

Agreement on nuclear cooperation 
and on measures to develop further our 
economic and commercial ties are signs 
of a relationship that is developing in a 
healthy way. This Administration 
believes such developments benefit not 
only our economic interests but our 
security concerns as well. 

Regional Issues 

The President also had a number of im- 
portant discussions on critical interna- 
tional issues. One could reasonably con- 
clude that where Chinese interests are 
directly engaged — particularly in 
countering aggression by the Soviets in 
Afghanistan and by their surrogates, the 
Vietnamese, in Kampuchea — there tends 
to be a strong identity of views between 
us. 

On the Korean Peninsula, where the 
Chinese and we have different allies and 
therefore somewhat different perspec- 
tives on the key problems and their solu- 
tions, we also acknowledge our common 
interests in seeking to reduce tensions 
and assure peace and stability. The 
President and his Chinese hosts dis- 
cussed Korea at some length, and we 
believe these conversations were con- 
structive. The President made clear to 



the Chinese that our troops are in South 
Korea to defend our ally and that the 
sole threat to peace and stability on the 
peninsula emanates from the North as 
was evidenced in the Rangoon bombing 
atrocity last year. The Chinese ex- 
pressed their support for North Korea's 
proposal for tripartite talks with the 
United States and South Korea. The 
President reiterated our strong 
preference — and that of our South 
Korean allies — for direct talks between 
North and South Korea or, if both 
Korean parties are willing, for 
quadripartite talks to involve the United 
States and China. The President in- 
dicated that he hoped the Chinese might 
be helpful on the margins of any talks 
that get started, or perhaps participate 
in talks. At present, however, the 
Chinese have said that their participa- 
tion in any formal talks would be dif- 
ficult. 

It is our view that there are many 
concrete steps toward progress on 
reducing tension on the Korean Penin- 
sula that could be taken right away 
without even waiting for formal talks to 
begin. These include such steps to 
reduce military tensions as: 

• Mutual notification of military ex- 
ercises; 

• Exchange of observers for 
military exercises; 

• Genuine demilitarization of the 
DMZ [demilitarized zone]; and 

• Investigation of DMZ incidents by 
teams from the Neutral Nations Super- 
visory Commission. 

A second category of concrete steps 
that could be taken are in the area of 
improving North-South contacts. The 
Government of the Republic of Korea 
has proposed some 20 steps of this kind 
to build confidence and reduce tension 
between North and South. Three that 
seem to us particularly sensible are pro- 
posals for direct telephone communica- 
tion between Seoul and Pyongyang, for 
exchange of mail, and for family visits, 
all of which have recently been 
reiterated. 

Such positive, concrete steps would 
go a long way in the present context to 
reducing the obstacles to reductions of 
tension and meaningful talks. We would 
all welcome a positive response from 
Pyongyang. 

Finally, current Sino-Japanese rela- 
tions are the best they have been in this 
century. This development not only 
enhances China's ability to modernize its 
economy but also directly serves our in- 
terest in peace and stability in the 
region. 



In his meetings with the Chinese 
leaders, the President demonstrated that 
when there is a genuine will on both 
sides, countries with very different 
political and social systems can never- 
theless find ways to work together, 
reduce tension, manage problems, and 
identify areas for future cooperation. 
The President was frank about our dif- 
ferences and firm on points of principle. 

This was so with regard to the ques- 
tion of Taiwan's future, which was 
raised by the Chinese on several occa- 
sions. The President stated clearly to 
the Chinese, as he and others in his Ad- 
ministration have done before, that we 
will honor our commitments, that we ex- 
pect the Chinese to honor theirs, and 
that within such a framework this issue 
is one for the Chinese on both sides of 
the strait to resolve by themselves. Our 
sole and abiding concern, the President 
reiterated, is that any resolution be a 
peaceful one. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the President's visit to 
China and the visit here in January by 
Premier Zhao were part of a process. 
The President's meetings with China's 
top leaders strengthened and advanced 
an extremely important relationship be- 
tween friendly nations. In a broader 
sense, the President's trip to China 
should be viewed in the context of his 
visits late last year to two of our Asian 
allies, Japan and Korea, and as an in- 
tegral part of his policy toward the en- 
tire Pacific Basin. This area of the world 
is developing rapidly and plays an in- 
creasingly crucial role in our global 
foreign policy. The President's China 
trip was also part of his policy of 
strengthening relations with friends and 
allies around the world, a policy which 
he will continue to advance when he 
meets next month in London with 
leaders of the industrialized 
democracies. 



•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



Visit of Thailand's 
Prime Minister 



Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda 
of the Kingdom of Thailand made an of- 
ficial working visit to Washington, D.C., 
April 12-1U, 1984, to meet with Presi- 
dent Reagan and other government of- 
ficials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Prem after their meeting on April 13. i 

President Reagan 

I'm delighted to have this opportunity to 
exchange views with Prime Minister 
Prem and to discuss with him events in 
Southeast Asia and in other parts of the 
world. 

This is the Prime Minister's second 
visit with me, and on both occasions he's 
provided valuable counsel. And I am 
particularly happy to renew our personal 
relationship, because it mirrors the deep 
friendship between the Thai and 
American people. Thailand and the 
United States have a history of friend- 
ship and cooperation going back to 1833, 
when we signed the Treaty of Amity 
and Commerce. 

Today we took our relationship one 
step further with the signing of a 
science and technology agreement. The 
150 years of our relations have seen 
many changes, yet throughout this time 
the fundamental determination of the 
Thai and American people to live their 
lives in freedom is unchanged. 

Whatever our differences of climate 
or culture, in our love of liberty we're 
the same. This is the unchanging basis 
of our friendship. The economic vitality 
found in Thailand is something else with 
which Americans identify. American in- 
vestors and traders are proud of the 
part that they're able to play in 
Thailand's growth. Working together, 
Americans and Thais are building a bet- 
ter quality of life for both our peoples. 

Prime Minister Prem will return to 
his country confident in our friendship 
and assured that America's com- 
mitments remain sound and solid. As 
treaty allies of the Manila pact, the 
United States fully appreciates the situa- 
tion in Southeast Asia and Thailand's 
key role in ASEAN's [Association of 
South East Asian Nations] effort to pro- 
mote peace and stability in that vital 
area. 

In response to Thailand's immediate 
security requirements, I'm happy to an- 



July 1984 




nounce that the United States will make 
available immediately a sizable number 
of M-48 tanks. We'll also request the 
Congress to extend the repayment 
terms of our security assistance to 
Thailand. High-level defense counsulta- 
tions between our countries will con- 
tinue. We'll discuss Thailand's overall 
defense needs, including its requirement 
for advanced aircraft, something we 
fully support. The Administration will 
confer with the Congress on these 
defense matters, as appropriate. 

Thailand today will be celebrating, 
by the old lunar calendar, the beginning 
of the new year. So, may I wish you, 
Mr. Prime Minister, and all the people 
of Thailand, a very fine Songkran holi- 
day and, for all the Thai people, pros- 
perity, health, and peace. We're pleased 
to have had you as our guest, again. 

Prime Minister Prem 

I was most pleased and honored to be 
invited to meet with President Reagan 
for the second time since my last visit 3 
years ago. My discussions with the 
President on issues of mutual concern 
and interest were most constructive and 
fruitful. Together we have decided on 
ways and means to strengthen our 
bilateral ties and to enhance our 
cooperation. 

The relationship between our two 
countries spans over one century-and-a- 
half. Over the years the relationship has 
increased in strength and expanded in 
dimension. Under the leadership of 
President Reagan, the United States has 
returned to the traditional values and 
demonstrated a determination in the 



pursuit of real peace. On our part, 
Thailand and the other ASEAN partners 
have distinguished themselves as a 
moderating influence on the interna- 
tional economic and political issues. Our 
collective efforts have served to enhance 
security in Southeast Asia, which is vital 
to the stability and prosperity of the 
East-Asian Pacific region and beyond. 

Later on today, I will meet members 
of the U.S. business community to ex- 
plore opportunities for expanding trade 
and business ties for mutual benefits. 
Thailand shares with you the faith in the 
dynamism of economic relationships be- 
tween countries in the Pacific communi- 
ty, the dynamism which has become 
more evident and which represents 
great economic potential for further 
development. 

The recovery of your economy, 
which is undoubtedly the largest single 
economy of the world, is most welcome. 
For this to be longlasting, the recovery 
must generate prosperity on the wider 
front, particularly, in the free-market 
economies such as that of Thailand. 

Finally, on behalf of the Thai nation, 
I would like to express our heartfelt 
gratitude for the Administration's full 
support to the modernization of 
Thailand's defense. This gesture reaf- 
firms the U.S. commitment to Thailand's 
security in recognition of our role in 
strengthening the fabric of peace in the 
area, which the United States considers 
to be vital to her interests. 



'Made in the East Room of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of April 16, 1984). 



51 



ECONOMICS 



Looking Toward London: 

10 Years of Economic Summitry 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the American 
Association of Exporters and Importers 
in New York City on May 23, 1984. Mr. 
Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs. 

When I accepted the invitation to be your 
keynote speaker, I realized that I would 
appear on the eve of an important event, 
the 10th annual economic summit meeting 
of the heads of state and government of 
the seven major industrialized countries: 
the United States, Canada, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, and Italy. 

The first economic summit, which did 
not include Canada or Italy, was held in 
Rambouillet, France, in 1975. 1 doubt that 
many people predicted then that Ram- 
bouillet would lead to yearly meetings of 
the leaders of the seven largest free- 
world economies to discuss mutual 
economic concerns. Certainly one of the 
thoughts most remote from my mind then 
was that I would become involved in the 
9th and 10th summits. One of my first 
assignments when I came to Washington 
in July 1982 was to serve as the Presi- 
dent's personal representative in prepar- 
ing for the Williamsburg economic sum- 
mit. That meeting was highly successful, 
thanks to the major part the President 
personally took in the preparations and 
above all to his splendid presiding at the 
actual sessions. For the past several 
months, I have been increasingly ab- 
sorbed in preparing for the London sum- 
mit, which will be held June 7-9. In fact, I 
returned only yesterday from Chevening, 
near London, where the personal repre- 
sentatives met for 2 days in their final 
preparatory session. 

I did not realize until recently that my 
speech today would be near the anniver- 
sary of another historic event of par- 
ticular significance to this meeting and to 
National Trade Week. Fifty years ago, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull shepherd- 
ed through the Congress the seminal 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Com- 
ing 4 years after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act had devastated world trade, and a 
year after the United States had 
"torpedoed" the London economic con- 
ference, the Reciprocal Trade Agree- 
ments Act was the first major step in the 
emergence of the United States into 



global economic leadership. It meant that 
the United States was beginning to shift 
from extreme protectionism toward 
assertive, forward-looking efforts to 
liberalize world trade. The act symbolized 
Hull's strong bolief, which he had voiced 
as a congressman during the First World 
War, that "unhampered trade dovetails 
with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, 
and unfair economic competition with 
war." 

A half century later, the world 
economy has changed dramatically. It is 
more complex. Yet the essential goal of 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act- 
trade liberalization— remains one of the 
central objectives of the United States as 
we approach the 10th economic summit. 
Just as Hull argued that beggar-thy- 
neighbor trade policies begat the conflict 
of World War I, we today are firmly con- 
vinced that trade liberalization and a coor- 
dinated approach to related economic 
issues are vital to Western solidarity. In 
the decades following Hull's stewardship, 
we have learned collectively that there 
can be no secure peace without economic 
harmony. 

It was this kind of thinking that led 
former French President Giscard 
d'Estaing to call the first summit meeting 
at Rambouillet, and this is why it is so 
vital today to continue regular consulta- 
tions at the highest levels of Western 
governments on issues that are basic to 
peace and prosperity— issues such as 
growth, trade, finance, money, develop- 
ment, and economic security. Less than 2 
weeks ago, Ambassador Brock, the U.S. 
Trade Representative, convoked a highly 
useful meeting of many of his main 
counterparts to let their hair down and to 
vet the problems facing the multilateral 
trade system. Last week, Secretary of the 
Treasury Regan met with 10 other finance 
ministers for a comparable purpose 
relating to international finance. But the 
value of economic summits is that they go 
beyond discussion of any single subject. 

The summits afford leaders an oppor- 
tunity to take account of the interrelation- 
ships among the various aspects of 
economic policy. Bilateral meetings can 
accomplish part of this function. Bilateral 
issues, however, tend to be relatively 
sharply defined. In an interdependent 
world, economic issues are more complex 
and multilateral. Leaders, not their staffs, 
must ultimately make the hard choices on 
economic policy that affect not only their 



electorates but also millions of people out- 
side their borders. It is valuable for them 
to hear directly from their counterparts 
other, sometimes conflicting, ideas on how 
best to approach mutual problems. 

Just as important is the fact that 
economic summits allow the heads of 
government an unusual opportunity to 
get a better sense of each other's larger 
priorities, perceptions, prejudices, and 
policies. While there is an abundance of 
opportunities each year for trade and 
finance ministers to meet, the annual 
summits provide the only regular occa- 
sion for the major Western heads of 
government to confer on economic issues. 

Evolution of the Summits 

The main topic of my talk today is our 
principal goals and objectives for the Lon- 
don summit. Before I outline them, how- 
ever, I will set the stage by sketching the 
evolution of summits since President 
Reagan took office. 

Ottawa in 1981 was President 
Reagan's first summit and, therefore, his 
first opportunity to explain his domestic 
economic policies to his summit col- 
leagues. Already in place was much of his 
program to promote sustainable, market- 
oriented, noninflationary growth. The key 
components of this program were, as they 
are today, to reduce government spend- 
ing; to change the tax code in ways that 
provide incentives for individuals to 
work, to save, and to invest; to reduce 
government regulation; and to achieve 
stable and moderate growth in the money 
supply. At the time, the President's 
strong emphasis on stopping inflation and 
on shifting resources and their manage- 
ment away from government and into 
private control was seen by some as being 
at best on the fringes of respectable 
economic policy. Thus, at Ottawa the 
President was received politely but skep- 
tically. 

The President also used the oppor- 
tunity to highlight his concerns about the 
relationship between economic relations 
with Eastern countries and Western secu- 
rity. Finally, at Ottawa the President 
gave a preview of the approach he was to 
articulate more fully at Cancun later that 
year on managing the relationship be- 
tween developed and less developed 
economies. 

At Versailles in 1982, the heads of 
government were faced with a somber 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



economic tableau— falling output, rising 
unemployment, and high interest rates. 
The sole bright spot was lower inflation in 
the United States. Concern about ex- 
change rates led to agreement to develop 
a framework in which the five countries 
with special responsibilities for the inter- 
national monetary- and financial systems— 
namely the United States, Japan, the 
F.R.G., the United Kingdom, and 
France— could consult more effectively 
about the effects of their domestic 
economic policies on the international 
economy. A study of the historical record 
of exchange rates was also launched. 
Finally, Versailles highlighted further the 
pressing need for greater consensus on 
East-West economic issues. 

By the time of Williamsburg, develop- 
ments in the American economy had 
already begun to show the success of the 
economic policies President Reagan had 
first championed at Ottawa 2 years 
earlier. The summit leaders expressed 
confidence that economic recovery was 
becoming a reality, with the United 
States in the lead. They defined a 
strategy by which, through a more open 
trade and financial system, they could 
grapple effectively with the legacies from 
the 1970s of inflation, unemployment, and 
debt. They agreed on ways to promote 
greater convergence of economic perform- 
ance, accepting thereby the conclusion 
from the study of exchange rates that 
economic convergence was essential for 
stability of exchange markets. At 
Williamsburg, the cry for massive govern- 
ment intervention intended to control ex- 
change markets was muted though not 
quite stilled. On East-West economic 
issues, the leaders pointed to a new con- 
sensus based on work carried out in in- 
stitutions such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
and the International Energy Agency. 
Finally, stressing the interrelationships 
among growth, trade, and finance, the 
leaders agreed on the components of a 
strategy for managing international debt 
and for promoting a more open trade 
system. These components included im- 
mediate actions as well as others that 
would be considered for the medium 
term, such as a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. 

With this background on the evolution 
of the last three summits, let me turn to a 
discussion of our goals and objectives for 
the next summit at London. 

U.S. Objectives 

The United States will pursue two prin- 
cipal objectives at the London summit: 



July 1984 



First, to confirm that economic 
recovery— not just in the United States 
but in other summit countries— has taken 
hold firmly and that we need to recommit 
ourselves collectively to policies that will 
ensure that growth will be sustained, will 
not become inflationary, and will spread 
to the rest of the world; 

Second, to build on the strategy 
outlined at Williamsburg for managing in- 
ternational trade and financial problems 
and to translate that strategy into a con- 
crete program of action. 

In a sense, London will be a transition 
summit, marking the passage from a 
period in which the task was to lay solid 
domestic foundations for growth to one in 
which our nations together, buildmg on 
agreements at Williamsburg, can further 
shape their v ision of the future of the in- 
ternational economic system. Since the 
beginning of his Administration, the 
President has argued that the foundation 
of a well-functioning international 
economy must be policies in each of the 
major countries to reduce inflation and to 
expand the scope for individual initiative. 
The thrust of his message has been that 
the proper role of government must be to 
remove domestic economic rigidities in 
order to facilitate, not frustrate, adjust- 
ment to changing circumstances, thus 
creating new jobs and a durable 
prosperity. 

In contrast to the situation at Ottawa, 
at Versailles, and even to some extent at 
Williamsburg, the President's message 
and, indeed, his economic program are 
now more widely accepted among our 
summit partners. The change in attitude 
of some summit countries is striking in- 
deed. Our partners now recognize that 
the President's policies have succeeded 
and that, through his contribution to the 
past three summits, he has forged with 
them a coherent strategy for sustainable, 
noninflationary growth that is bringing 
our nations out of the recessionary trough 
of the early 1980s. Although further 
reduction in market rigidities in many 
countries will be slow and painful, all now 
agree on its necessity and are working to 
achieve it. Thus, the London summit will 
provide an opportunity to review and to 
take satisfaction from our achievements 
during the President's first term, stress- 
ing the consistency and continuity of pur- 
pose that has characterized the 
President's approach to both domestic 
and international economic problems. 

But the London summit will be more 
than a summary or recitation of past suc- 
cesses. Because summit leaders will start 
their discussions already basically agreed 
on the problems they face and on the ob- 
jectives of their respective national 



economic policies, London offers the addi- 
tional and unique opportunity for leaders 
to look beyond current problems and to 
develop further a strategy that will con- 
solidate economic recovery and advance 
our objectives of more open world 
markets. 

Our two broad objectives at London, 
then, are strengthening and spreading 
recovery, and progress on international 
trade, finance, and debt. Let me translate 
these broad objectives into more specific 
goals. 

We expect that one of the main sub- 
jects discussed at London will be the 
economic situation and the outlook for 
world recovery. There has been a broad 
convergence of the economic perform- 
ances of summit countries toward faster 
growth and lower inflation. Summit coun- 
tries grew on the average of 2.4% in 1983. 
This contrasts with 0.4% in 1982 and 4.5% 
forecast for 1984. Summit-country infla- 
tion was 6.8% in 1982, 4.3% in 1983, and is 
forecast to be 4.6% this year. Continued 
non-inflationary expansion in summit 
countries is essential to spur similar 
growth in other industrialized countries 
as well as in the less developed countries. 

Thus, one of our chief tasks at London 
is to explore ways to sustain this con- 
vergence of summit-country economic 
performance and to ensure that higher 
growth and lower inflation spread to the 
rest of the world. We believe the key 
elements of our action plan should be: 

First, to restrain government spend- 
ing, thus allowing expansion of the 
private sector; 

Second, to promote stable, moderate 
monetary growth, thus inducing lower 
interest rates and increasing confidence 
that inflation will be contained; 

Third, to remove structural rigidities 
that are inhibiting the growth of employ- 
ment in some summit countries; and 

Fourth, to maintain and enhance the 
open trading system in order to foster 
economic growth, particularly in the 
developing world. 

Concerns will undoubtedly be voiced 
about U.S. budget deficits and the fear 
that they will cause higher interest rates 
that could choke off recovery and reignite 
inflation in both industrial and developing 
nations. With action now taken in both 
the House and Senate on the President's 
proposals for a "downpayment" on the 
deficit, we believe we can promise real ac- 
tion in the near future to reduce budget 
deficits. We will point again to the 
multilateral surveillance process, initiated 
at Versailles and strengthened at 
Williamsburg, as a forum for continuing 



53 



ECONOMICS 



consultations on convergence. We will 
also point out that the sizeable trade and 
current account deficits of the United 
States have made major contributions to 
growth in other countries as their exports 
to our market have risen. However, that 
situation will not last forever, so it is 
urgent that all countries pursue their ad- 
justment efforts. 

As regards the developing countries 
with severe debt problems, all parties 
must continue to fulfill their responsibili- 
ties under the five-point debt strategy en- 
dorsed at Williamsburg. The problem will 
be manageable in the long run, as well as 
the short, if each of us does his job. 

Our objective at London is to confirm 
that our strategy for managing LDC debt 
problems on a flexible, case-by-case basis 
is working and requires no fundamental 
change. This strategy has worked suc- 
cessfully to promote adjustment efforts in 
debtor countries and has checked serious 
disruption of the international trade, 
finance, and monetary systems. 

We believe this strategy is ap- 
propriate for the medium as well as the 
short term. There have been several sug- 
gestions recently that our strategy lacks 
a medium- to long-term component. In 
fact, it has both. We believe the London 
summit will offer an opportunity to ex- 
pand and clarify the medium-term aspects 
of the strategy agreed to at Williamsburg. 
We will stress four major elements: 

• The need for continued adjustments 
by debtor countries with the support of 
the IMF [International Monetary Fundi 
and lending by commercial banks; 

• The need to expand trade between 
developed and developing countries to 
promote growth in both and to assure 
that heavy debtors will be able to earn 
foreign exchange to sen-ice their debts 
and to justify increased commercial bank 
lending in the years ahead; 

• The need for developing countries to 
stimulate increased foreign direct invest- 
ment to redress the imbalance between 
debt and equity in their external finances 
and to attract the financial, technological, 
and management resources they need to 
exploit future export opportunities; and 

• The need for closer coordination be- 
tween the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Rank in order to make the 
role of the Bank more consistent with 
that of the IMP" in promoting adjustment 
in developing countries, and in strength- 
ening the Bank's contribution to longer 
term development. 

With respect to international trade, 
the challenge for summit leaders at Lon- 
don will be to consolidate the movement 
toward worldwide economic recovery, to 



54 



promote early progress in liberalizing 
trade and improving the trade system, 
and to move forward toward new multi- 
lateral trade negotiations to achieve more 
comprehensive liberalization. 

At the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] 
ministerial meeting last week, member 
countries agreed that a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations is "of 
the utmost importance to a strengthening 
of the liberal trade system." They urged 
expanded consultations with all GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] countries and gave a high priority 
to the GATT work program established in 
1982 to lay the groundwork for the devel- 
opment of a consensus on such negotia- 
tions. We hope the summit will give a real 
impetus at the highest political level to 
this undertaking. The liberalization that 
such negotiations can achieve is essential 
in order to consolidate the future success 
of the strategies for domestic growth on 
which our countries are now embarked. 

Finally, our objectives on East-West 
economic relations at London are simple 
and straightforward. We will seek to con- 
tinue to work closely with our summit 
partners and other allies to broaden our 
consensus on prudent economic relation- 
ships with the Soviet Union and the coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe. We will urge 
that work underway since 1982 in such 
specialized organizations as the OECD, 
IEA, COCOM [Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Security Export Controls] 
and NATO continues in order to make 
that consensus as comprehensive as 
possible. 

In spite of the length with which I 
have described U.S. goals and objectives 
at London and the issues we expect to 
tackle collectively, you most definitely 
should not get an impression that we ex- 
pect major breakthroughs at London that 
will make headlines in The Wall Street 
Journal, The New York Times, or the 
Journal of Commerce. For at least three 
reasons, I expect this not to occur. 

First, if the problems discussed at 
London were susceptible to easy answers 
and quick fixes, there would be no reason 
for the summit. The issues with which the 
summit leaders wrestle are complex. Only 
long-term approaches provide real solu- 
tions, and long-term approaches are com- 
plicated and difficult. Those who expect 
blinding revelations and facile cures for 
the world's economic ills will be disap- 
pointed—not only in June at London 
but perpetually everywhere. 

In a repetition of the atmosphere 
introduced by President Reagan at 



Williamsburg, we expect that summit 
leaders at London will discuss these 
longer term approaches in an informal, 
flexible manner without the rigidly struc- 
tured agenda and prenegotiated com- 
munique of most summits before 
Williamsburg. Earlier summits focused on 
detailed means to coordinate macro- 
economic policies, reflecting a view that 
the route to sustained growth lay in inter- 
nationally concerted manipulation of 
demand— so-called "fine tuning." These 
efforts were disappointing and may have 
contributed to the instability that only 
now is being brought under control. 
While our new approach to summitry may 
produce fewer headlines, it seems to me 
eminently more prudent and constructive. 

The second reason that headline 
hunters will be disappointed is that 
disagreements make the best headlines. 
As summit economies expand, scape- 
goating diminishes; nevertheless, I expect 
the stories from London to focus on ex- 
pressions of concern about interest rates, 
deficits, and debt crises. I urge that you 
not be misled if that happens. Expres- 
sions of concern, which indeed we all 
share, do not necessarily mean disagree- 
ment or disarray. While there will not be 
agreement on every issue, I will be sur- 
prised if there is significant disagreement 
on an issue of major importance. So I sug- 
gest that you look beyond the headlines, 
read carefully the statements that are 
issued, and draw your own conclusions. 

Finally, I anticipate that no startling 
news will come out of London because the 
news deals with the present but the sum- 
mit deals with the future. The real test of 
the London summit's success will be 
reflected not in next month's headlines 
but in the months that follow; not in what 
the leaders say at London but in what 
they do in the months and years ahead 
when the United States and our summit 
partners seek to implement domestically 
and internationally the policies sketched 
at London. We have come a long way, in- 
dividually and collectively, in the 50 years 
since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act, but there is still a long way to go. 
London, like its predecessor summits, will 
mark another, and I believe a significant, 
milestone on our journey. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



The American Trade Deficit 
in Perspective 



by Arthur F. Burns 

Address before the Industrie-Club in 
Dusseldorf on April 5. 1981,. Mr. Burns 
is U.S. Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity 
to address this distinguished audience 
today. The topic I have chosen to discuss 
with you is the merchandise trade of the 
United States with other countries. My 
reasons for focusing on this subject are 
not parochial. In the first place, it is im- 
portant for Europeans to understand 
that the strong recovery in America's 
overall production and employment has 
been accompanied by further deteriora- 
tion in its foreign trade. Secondly, the 
poor trade performance of the United 
States in recent years reflects a dis- 
equilibrium in the world economy as well 
as in our domestic economy. Widespread 
political strains have been the inevitable 
results. The promises of last year's 
Williamsburg summit with regard to in- 
ternational trade and finance have not 
been fulfilled. If anything, international 
tensions arising from economic issues 
have increased during the past year. 

Major Causes of 

the U.S. Trade Deficit 

Let me begin by reciting some of the 
essential facts about the foreign trade of 
the United States. Until 1970, my coun- 
try enjoyed a surplus in its merchandise 
trade with the rest of the world. Since 
then, with oil prices higher and competi- 
tion from our trading partners keener, 
trade deficits have been the rule. For a 
time this served a constructive interna- 
tional role in view of America's surplus 
on other items in its international ac- 
counts. But the trade deficit took a 
quantum jump toward the end of the 
1970s when it reached a rate of about 
$30 billion per year— a rate that was 
maintained through the first half of 
1982. More recently, the trade deficit 
has grown by leaps and bounds. It 
reached an annual rate of $75 billion in 
the final quarter of 1983 and is expected 
to exceed $100 billion this calendar year. 

To be sure, the deterioration in 
America's merchandise trade is still 
being offset by our traditional surplus on 
trade in services and on investment in- 



July 1984 



come from abroad. Even so, the deficit 
in our international current account — 
which allows for these items — reached 
over $40 billion during 1983 and ran at a 
much higher annual rate in its final 
quarter. The counterpart of this 
dramatic current account deficit has 
been a huge flow of funds from abroad 
to the United States combined with a 
sharp contraction in our traditional 
capital exports. That is hardly a 
welcome development for a nation with 
the largest and richest economy in the 
world. 

There is a widespread belief in 
American circles that many of our in- 
dustries can no longer compete against 
more efficient Japanese firms. There is 
worry as well that American producers 
are being victimized by unfair competi- 
tion from low-wage producers in 
developing countries and subsidized 
products of European and other foreign 
enterprises. Such explanations of our 
foreign trade deficit contain an element 
of truth but hardly more than that. The 
principal causes of America's recent 
trade deterioration are to be found 
elsewhere — in the high value of the 
dollar in foreign exchange markets, in 
the faster rebound from recession in the 
United States than in Western Europe 
or Japan, and in the unavoidable need of 
debt-ridden developing countries to prac- 
tice austerity. 

The strength of the dollar in foreign 
exchange markets in the past few years 
is well known in Europe. Between late 
1980 and early this year, the dollar ap- 
preciated about 30% against the Swiss 
franc, 40% against the British pound, 
50% against the German mark, 100% 
against the French franc. The dollar's 
appreciation against the Japanese yen 
and Canadian currency was much less. 
Nevertheless, taking the currencies of 
the 10 major industrial countries 
together, the dollar appreciated on the 
average about 50% during that period. 
The high cost of the dollar obviously has 
made American goods less attractive to 
foreign buyers, while the low cost of 
foreign currencies has made foreign 
products more attractive to Americans. 
Although the dollar has weakened since 
the start of this year, it still retains the 
greater part of the appreciation against 
other currencies that occurred after 
1980. 



Another major cause of America's 
trade deterioration is the difficulty that 
many developing countries have been ex- 
periencing during the past 2-3 years in 
borrowing abroad. By 1982 an increas- 
ing number of commercial bankers and 
other suppliers of credit finally realized 
that they had been less than prudent in 
accommodating — in fact, often even en- 
couraging — the eagerness of developing 
countries to pile up indebtedness. Once 
lending to these countries was curtailed, 
one after another of them found it im- 
possible to meet their scheduled debt 
repayments or even the interest due on 
their indebtedness. To prevent outright 
bankruptcy, their governments had to 
plead for financial assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund, other 
governments, and the private financial 
community; but such help could not 
remove the need to practice aus- 
terity — particularly, to cut imports and 
expand exports. The nations of Latin 
America, which have especially close 
commercial ties with the United States, 
were foremost among those suffering a 
shortage of foreign exchange. Not sur- 
prisingly, the dollar value of our exports 
to Latin America was cut almost in half 
between the first quarter of 1981 and 
the final quarter of 1983. 

A third factor in America's trade 
deterioration is the uneven cyclical 
development of the major industrialized 
countries. Economic recovery began in 
the United States toward the end of 
1982 and gathered momentum rapidly. 
The economy of Canada recovered about 
the same time and advanced almost as 
rapidly. Other industrial countries did 
not do as well. Japan's economy con- 
tinued to advance but at a diminished 
rate. Great Britain and Germany 
recovered more gradually than the 
United States, while the rest of Western 
Europe continued to experience stagna- 
tion or recession. Because of the lag of 
the recovery process outside the United 
States, our exports to Europe and Japan 
became very sluggish while our imports 
soared — as always happens during the 
expansion phase of the business cycle. 

Other Contributing Factors 

In addition to the several major causes 
of America's trade deficit on which I 
have dwelt — namely, the strong dollar, 
the distress of developing countries, and 
the rapid rebound of the American 
economy — a host of other factors played 
some part. Two of them deserve special 
mention: first, the worldwide drop in oil 
demand which forced OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
members to cut back their imports; se- 



55 



ECONOMICS 



cond, recent developments in world 
agriculture — a subject to which I will 
need to return— which also contributed 
to the deterioration of America's foreign 
trade. 

The piling up of these unfavorable 
trade developments has become a mat- 
ter of widespread concern in the United 
States. Farm income was already 
depressed during the late 1970s; and 
with foreign sales declining, it has plum- 
meted since 1980. Moreover, the 
shrinkage in exports of our manufac- 
tured products resulted in a reduction of 
both jobs and profits in numerous 
firms — particularly those engaged in 
producing machinery, civil aircraft, and 
other capital goods. Meanwhile, the rise 
in imports kept adding to the displace- 
ment of workers involved in the 
manufacture of various consumer as well 
as capital goods. 

Professional economists often look 
upon such vicissitudes of trade as nor- 
mal workings of a competitive market, 
and they are apt to express confidence 
that the difficulties will eventually be 
corrected through the marketplace. In 
principle, there is considerable justifica- 
tion for such views. 

As the economy of the United States 
continues to expand, its rate of expan- 
sion is bound to moderate. Meanwhile, 
signs of economic recovery in Western 
Europe, which have been gradually 
reemerging, are likely to multiply. With 
the gap in economic performance be- 
tween Europe and the United States 
narrowing, America's trade deficit will 
tend to diminish. On balance, Latin 
American developments should also be 
less damaging to our foreign trade. Dur- 
ing the past year, the heavily indebted 
countries of Latin America have ex- 
perienced significant improvement in 
their current account balances with the 
rest of the world. Hence, the recent 
sharp reduction in their imports from 
the United States can hardly be ex- 
pected to become still larger. Moreover, 
since the purchasing power of the dollar 
over commodities appears to be ap- 
preciably overvalued relative to other 
currencies, it would not be at all surpris- 
ing if the decline in the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar that has occurred 
since its January peak were moderately 
extended over the next year or two. In 
short, one can reasonably argue that the 
marketplace is already releasing forces 
that before long will diminish the 
American trade deficit. 

Relaxed thinking along these lines, 
however, is rarely shared by American 
businessmen, farmers, and workers who 
happen to have been adversely affected 
through foreign trade. Nor is it shared 



by politicians — particularly in an election 
year. Of late, American advocates of 
restrictive trade policies have become 
bolder, and their complaints about trade 
practices of other countries have become 
more strident. Their calls for new im- 
port barriers are being echoed by similar 
calls in Europe. After all, numerous 
European industries have also ex- 
perienced an economic setback in recent 
years, and unemployment is now exten- 
sive throughout Western Europe. With 
the virus of protectionist sentiment 
spreading, the need for economic 
statesmanship both in the United States 
and in Europe has become urgent. 

America's foreign trade problem is 
also Europe's problem, and it is impor- 
tant for both Europeans and Americans 
to try to see from an international view- 
point the trade and financial issues that 
have caused political tensions among us. 
In the process of doing that, we are all 
bound to find that what Americans 
regard as their special problem involves 
common international concerns that re- 
quire better mutual understanding — and 
often also corrective measures — on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

Trade Issues 

One of the problems that has been 
especially troublesome in the relations 
between the United States and Western 
Europe involves agricultural trade. 
Americans have long complained about 
the protectionist thrust of the European 
Community's agricultural policy — a 
policy that relies heavily on price sup- 
ports to maintain the income of its 
farmers. Each year the Community's 
member governments fix common prices 
of various agricultural products. These 
prices run above world prices. The 
domestic market of the Community is 
then protected by variable levies that 
tend to keep out lower priced imports. 
In part as a result of this policy, the 
Community's share of America's total 
agricultural exports has tended to 
decline. 

The decline would have been sharper 
if the Community's restrictions had also 
been applied to soybeans and soybean 
products — which loom large in American 
exports. This has been precluded by- 
prior international agreements that per- 
mit soybeans and their derivatives to be 
shipped duty free into the Community. 
That access has recently been threat- 
ened by the proposal of the European 
Commission to impose a consumer tax 
on vegetable oils. Quite obviously, such a 
tax would have much the same effect as 
an explicit import barrier. 



The American Government is also 
troubled by the commission's proposal to 
restrict imports of corn gluten — a prod- 
uct used in animal feeds — which now 
also enters the Community duty free on 
the basis of previous agreements. Since 
American farmers have not shared in 
the recent economic recovery, concern 
over restrictive measures against corn 
gluten and soybeans has become acute in 
the United States. 

These new European proposals have 
thus intensified a perennial complaint of 
the United States— namely, that our 
market is far more open to agricultural 
imports than the Community's market. 
There can be no denying, however, that 
Europeans have some legitimate com- 
plaints about American agricultural 
policies. The United States, for example, 
has long maintained import quotas on 
dairy products — a protectionist measure 
that has hurt European farmers. Again, 
American wine producers have recently 
been seeking congressional limitation on 
wine imports. 

The deplorable clamor for increasing 
protectionism in agriculture is not only 
interfering with the efficient use of labor 
and capital. It may also release new in- 
flationary pressures — directly by raising 
food prices, indirectly by repercussions 
on labor markets. Nor is this all. 
Agricultural policies in Europe and the 
United States are becoming a heavy 
burden on governmental budgets. Pro- 
grams for supporting farm prices and in- 
comes cost the American Government 
$28 billion in fiscal year 1983 — an enor- 
mous increase over the preceding 
2 years. The cost of supporting 
agriculture has also increased rapidly in 
the European Community, reaching over 
$13 billion in 1983. Indeed, the member 
governments of the Community are now 
engaged in an anxious search for ways 
of limiting the impact of agricultural ex- 
penditures on their budgets — a search 
that has caused severe political strains 
in Europe. 

Foreign trade in agricultural prod- 
ucts is thus an intra-European problem 
as well as a problem involving the 
United States and Western Europe — for 
that matter, much of the rest of the 
world as well. A basic cause of this com- 
mon problem is the tendency toward ex- 
cessive production of various agri- 
cultural products. Here the Europeans 
have perhaps been more at fault than 
Americans, for the agricultural support 
programs of the United States have 
usually included some incentives to cut 
back production while European support 
programs have not. In fact, the Com- 
munity's disposal of its surpluses 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



through subsidized sales on world 
markets has been a source of con- 
siderable friction between the United 
States and the Community. 

As we look ahead, the problem of 
oversupply may become more acute 
because of continuing advances in 
agricultural technology — especially in the 
grain and dairy sectors. This is clearly a 
problem that Community and American 
farmers have in common. Although our 
several governments recognize this, they 
have not yet tackled together the 
challenge posed by world overproduc- 
tion. Fortunately, both the American 
Government and the Community have of 
late moderated their rhetoric on 
agricultural trade issues, restrained 
their actions, and tried quietly to resolve 
their outstanding differences. The Ger- 
man Government, in particular, has ex- 
pressed firm opposition to a European 
consumer tax on vegetable oils. It should 
be a source of some comfort to both 
Americans and Europeans that powerful 
voices of reason are being heard at a 
time when pressures on governments 
from agricultural interests have become 
so insistent. 

Trade in steel products is another 
perennial irritant in relations between 
the United States and the European 
Community. Problems in this area have 
recently become more troublesome, 
largely as a result of declining demand 
for steel products during the recession 
but partly also because of larger produc- 
tion and exports by some developing 
countries. In view of these changed 
market conditions, steel firms on both 
sides of the Atlantic have been forced to 
curtail production, close some entire 
plants, and release many workers. 

In the early 1980s, American 
steelmakers petitioned our government 
for protection against rising steel im- 
ports from the European Community. 
The Americans argued that European 
firms were benefiting unfairly from ex- 
port subsidies and that some of their 
products were being sold in the United 
States below their fair value. If their 
complaint had run the full course per- 
mitted by American law, the result 
would certainly have been a sharp reduc- 
tion in European exports of carbon steel 
products. Fortunately, mutual good will 
prevailed over legal contests. After long 
and difficult negotiations, involving both 
steel producers and governments, an 
agreement was reached in October 1982, 
under which the Community undertook 
to limit moderately its exports of certain 
steel products to the United States 
through the end of 1985. 



July 1984 



This agreement has worked reason- 
ably well thus far, but it has by no 
means quieted the steel trade issue. The 
specialty steel branch of the American 
industry, which was not covered by the 
1982 agreement, has also suffered 
declines in profits and employment in 
recent years. Its urgent appeal for relief 
under American law led in July 1983 to 
the President's approval of temporary 
quotas and extra tariffs for specialty 
steel imports. This action was severely 
criticized in Europe — in part, no doubt, 
because it came so soon after the 
Williamsburg summit. At any rate, the 
European Community responded, as it 
had the right to do under GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] rules, by limiting certain imports 
of equivalent value from the United 
States. At times during the past year, 
the specialty steel problem threatened to 
provoke a serious rift in the relations 
between the United States and Western 



Europe. Once again, however, the mat- 
ter was settled amicably thanks to the 
willingness of the concerned parties to 
make the necessary compromises. Un- 
fortunately, both American producers 
and their organized workers have now 
joined in fresh appeals for restricting 
imports of steel generally. Difficulties 
over steel trade thus remain with us. 

In view of the restlessness that con- 
tinues to afflict international steel trade, 
there can be no escape from the conclu- 
sion that arrangements such as 
Americans and Europeans have recently 
succeeded in working out are merely 
temporary expedients. The critical fact 
is that both the United States and 
Europe face a common problem of over- 
capacity in their respective areas — a 
problem that is being accentuated by 
rising imports from the more advanced 
of the developing countries. It is only by 
addressing together these broader issues 
that we can have a reasonable chance of 



50th Anniversary of 
Reciprocal Trade Act 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JUNE 12, 1984 1 

Today is the 50th Anniversary of the 
Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, with 
which the State Department has a par- 
ticular connection. The act marked the 
start of 50 years of U.S. trade liberaliza- 
tion. Remarkably the act came only 4 
years after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
of 1930, which raised average U.S. 
tariffs to 55% and which is credited by 
many economists with turning a minor 
recession into the Great Depression. 
Recognizing the damage being done both 
to our economy and to our international 
relations, Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull persuaded Franklin Roosevelt to 
change course. 

The trade liberalization which began 
with the Reciprocal Trade Act enabled 
world trade to grow almost 50% faster 
than world production from 1948 to 
1973, raised world exports to today's 
level of $2 trillion, and will see average 
industrial country tariffs reduced to 
3%-4% by 1987. 

As modern technology brings the 
world closer together in ways both 
beneficial and threatening, trade ties 
become ever more important. When we 
exchange goods and services, we also 
exchange ideas. If a man builds a better 



mousetrap, the world beats a path to his 
door not merely to buy mousetraps but 
also to find out the secrets of his suc- 
cess. 

As U.S. trade has grown in impor- 
tance to our economy, others have 
realized that in fields such as agriculture 
and high technology, much worth 
emulating lies behind our abundant out- 
put. And as imports have challenged 
traditional U.S. industries, we too have 
learned that in areas as diverse as inven- 
tory control, employee relations, and 
quality standards, there is much abroad 
that we can adapt to our benefit. The 
lowering of the barriers among nations 
in this way benefits us all. 

We have come far in the 50 years 
since passage of the Reciprocal Trade 
Act of 1934. But we still have far to go. 
Tariff and other trade barriers still limit 
the world's trade, and challenges in new 
areas such as services trade and high 
technology remain to be taken up. We 
hope to build on the past 50 years' ac- 
complishments so that in another 50 
years our successors can look back on 
the 1980s as having marked an equally 
important beginning in world trade 
liberalization. 



'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



57 



ECONOMICS 



finding lasting solutions to our perennial 
problems in steel trade. 

Financial Concerns 

Because of limitations of time, as well as 
of my own knowledge, I shall not com- 
ment on other specific trade issues— as 
in the case of copper, footwear, machine 
tools, and wines— that are being ac- 
corded public attention in this election 
year. But in view of my past involve- 
ment in central banking, I do want to 
make a few observations about financial 
questions surrounding America's trade 
deficit that have stirred wide interest 
and controversy. 

Let us take first the case of the 
dollar's appreciation. It has served to 
reduce inflationary pressures in the 
United States, but it has had the op- 
posite effect in Europe— since a very 
large part of Europe's imports is 
denominated in dollars. On the other 
hand, the dollar's appreciation has 
severely hurt America's foreign trade, 
while it has benefited the trade of other 
countries— including those in Western 
Europe. Discerning Europeans recognize 
that the trade deficit of the United 
States has served, in effect, to drive the 
world economy forward. They have not, 
however, rejoiced over their trade ad- 
vantage, since they realize that the 
dollar's strength will not last indefinitely 
and, therefore, fear that the industrial 
structure of their countries could 
become distorted in the process of 
responding to a temporary trade ad- 
vantage. 

Europeans naturally prefer a stable 
dollar to one that oscillates in buying 
power, and so for that matter do 
Americans. But neither Europeans nor 
Americans have as yet found an accept- 
able method of returning to the kind of 
stability in exchange rates that existed 
before the abandonment of the Bretton 
Woods system. In a world in which 
capital movements often overshadow 
trade movements and in which inflation 
rates of individual countries diverge 
widely, central bank intervention in 
foreign exchange markets— a remedy 
that is still popular in some political 
circles— cannot accomplish anything 
beyond smoothing out the very short-run 
fluctuations of exchange rates. 

To be sure, many Europeans feel 
that the appreciation of the dollar has 
been largely due to the relatively high 
interest rates in the United States. 
Their argument typically runs as 
follows: 



First, high American interest rates 
are damaging European economies by 
attracting to the United States funds 
that otherwise would be directed to 
capital investment at home. 

Second, European interest rates are 
also higher than they would be in the 
absence of the outflow of capital to the 
United States. 

Third, the gigantic debt burden ol 
developing countries is being com- 
pounded by the high American interest 

Fourth, the United States could cor- 
rect these difficulties by bringing down 
its interest rates, and this could best be 
accomplished by reducing the enormous 
deficits in the American Government's 
budget. 

Finally, the American economy as 
well as the entire international economy 
would benefit in the process. 

This line of reasoning has not been 
confined to Europeans. Many Americans 
have shared it— which is not surprising 
since the above argument does embody a 
substantial element of truth. I must 
nevertheless point out that the above 
argument is incomplete. It overlooks the 
fact that the dollar is a haven of safety 
for Europeans and others in times of in- 
ternational political turmoil such as we 
have experienced in recent years. It 
overlooks the fact that there are causes 
of high interest rates beyond budget 
deficits. It overlooks the fact that the 
high American interest rates have not 
proved an obstacle to a robust recovery 
in the United States, including a revival 
of both residential construction and 
business investment in fixed capital. 
More important still, the European 
argument overlooks the fact that profit 
opportunities in the United States have 
become distinctly more favorable than in 
Western Europe. Even with American 
interest rates remaining as they are, if 
European governments moved more 
boldly to improve prospects for business 
profits in their countries, the chances 
are that the flow of capital to the United 
States would be materially checked— 
indeed, that American capital on balance 
might well start moving to Europe. 
The American Government can 
surely be helpful to the European 
economy as well as to its own by pro- 
ceeding' resolutely to reduce its pro- 
jected budget deficits. That is fully 
recognized by now both by the Reagan 
Administration and the Congress. I am 
entirely confident that a significant 
budgetary correction will be accom- 
plished before long— perhaps even by 
this summer but certainly by next 



spring. As awareness of this forthcom- 
ing development spreads through finan- 
cial markets, current pressures on in- 
terest rates will tend to be eased and 
financial investments in the United 
States may thus become less attractive 
to foreigners. But Europe can also do its 
part— namely, by improving the environ- 
ment for business risk-taking, innova- 
tion, and capital investment. In short, 
European governments as well as the 
American Government could take ac- 
tions—as, indeed, some are already 
doing— to reduce the many difficulties 
that have been caused by high interest 
rates and the strong dollar. To some 
degree, with prospective profits in 
Europe beginning to improve, a 
wholesome process of economic 
revitalization may already be getting 
underway. 

While the United States will have to 
emphasize one set of policies in dealing 
with the dollar's strength and Europe 
quite another, their approaches can and 
should be similar in dealing with the in- 
debtedness of the developing coun- 
t r i es _again a problem that the United 
States and Western Europe have in 
common. Fortunately, this has been 
recognized on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Indeed, speedy action by the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund and the Bank for 
International Settlements, working in 
concert with the governments of the 
leading industrial countries as well as 
with their central and commercial 
bankers, has staved off what might 
otherwise have been an international 
financial collapse. These constructive 
rescue missions have not, however, 
solved the underlying debt problem of 
the developing countries, since the 
debtors are being burdened with interest 
charges that some— perhaps many— of 
them may find it impossible to meet. 

All concerned parties have some fur- 
ther contribution to make. As govern- 
ments of the industrial countries con- 
tinue to work at fostering sustainable 
growth of their economies, the develop- 
ing countries will gain opportunities to 
increase their exports. That, along with 
efforts to bring down interest rates and 
curb protectionist impulses, is fun- 
damental. For their part, commercial 
banks— especially the large institutions 
that play a leadership role in interna- 
tional finance— need in their self- 
interest, as well as for the sake of 
stability in the international financial 
system, to do more than they have yet 
done to ease the payments problem of 
debtor countries. 

Typically, of course, when commer- 
cial bankers run into a debt problem of 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



one of their business customers, they 
devise means of scaling down the size of 
the debt or the interest on it, and at 
times even accept the debtor company's 
stock in place of all or part of the 
outstanding debt. That business ap- 
proach is suggestive of actions that 
could be taken in handling the in- 
debtedness of some of the more 
necessitous developing countries. 

One possibility would be for a dozen 
or so of the major international banks to 
proceed on their own to cut substantially 
the interest rates charged to those of 
the less developed countries that have 
run into insuperable difficulties in 
complying with the financial program 
worked out in their behalf by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. Such voluntary 
interest-rate reductions could not in 
practice be generalized to cover all 
banks, since many of the smaller banks 
would balk at following the initiative of 
the major banks. That, however, is not a 
fatal objection, since the relief granted 
by the major international banks would 
of itself reduce appreciably the financial 
burden facing necessitous debtors. 

In any event, leadership by the 
major international banks in interest- 
rate reductions is not the only possible 
route to relief. For example, near-term 
interest payments due from seriously 
troubled countries could be transformed 
into debt obligations that extend suffi- 
ciently into the future to provide the 
debtors essential breathing space. 

Moreover, the governments of the 
United States and Western Europe can 
play a more direct role in helping the 
less developed countries to reestablish 
their credit worthiness and resume 
economic growth. Legislation calling for 
renewal of our system of trade 
preferences for developing countries 
that is now before the Congress is im- 
portant in this regard. The European 
Community is likewise involved in 
renegotiating the Lome convention 
which permits duty-free access of raw 
materials from developing countries. 
The existing European and American 
systems of general trade preference 
deserve extension and some further 
liberalization. 

The developing countries must, 
nevertheless, be constantly reminded 
that it is decisively to their own benefit 
to expose their economies in greater 
degree to market forces. Continued 
reliance on preferential treatment is a 
dead-end policy, and one that will not be 
accepted indefinitely by the industrial 
nations. Developing countries must be 
particularly encouraged to pursue finan- 
cial policies that will attract foreign in- 



July 1984 



vestors, besides enticing back some of 
the enormous amounts of capital that 
their own frightened citizens and 
businesses had moved abroad. However 
difficult such policies may be, there is no 
other way for the developing countries 
to achieve the full partnership that they 
seek in the investment and trading 
system of the modern world. 

Conclusion 

In bringing this address to a conclusion, 
I want — even at the cost of some repeti- 
tion — to leave several basic thoughts 
with you. 

First of all, it is well to keep in 
mind that prior to last year, the biggest 
current account deficit that any country 
had ever experienced in a single year 
was about $15 billion. The $70-$80 
billion shortfall that my country is 
headed for this year is awesomely dif- 
ferent from anything experienced in the 
past. Since America's trade problem in- 
volves Europe deeply, it is essential that 
Europeans and Americans seek better 
understanding of their mutual economic 
concerns and work together toward 
their resolution. 

Second, as previously suggested, the 
United States can best contribute to 
easing the trade and debt problems that 
now confront the world by moving 
decisively toward greater fiscal 
discipline. This needs to be combined 
with a skillful monetary policy that 
tempers the robustness of economic 
growth and thus guards against infla- 
tionary pressures. In Europe the 
foremost need is for confidence-building 
measures that foster job creation, so 
that Europe can contribute more 
significantly to the recovery of world 
trade. 

Third, since the problem of interna- 
tional indebtedness is also without 
precedent — either as to dimension or 
disruptive potential — it is highly impor- 
tant to seek ways of enlarging upon the 
progress that has been achieved in the 
current phase of crisis management. We 
need, in particular, constructive ini- 
tiatives that will enable the world to ride 
out difficulties even if economic 
developments in the years ahead should 
prove disappointing. 

Fourth, the danger of protectionism 
has been growing despite some improve- 
ment in the condition of the interna- 
tional economy. In that regard, both 
Americans and Europeans must be con- 
cerned about the effects of protec- 
tionism on the developing world as well 
as about the weakening of our own 



economies through further protectionist 
actions. Even more important than that, 
we need to keep in mind that enmities 
created by trade restrictions at times 
spill over into the political arena and 
may even affect the capacity of the part- 
ners in the North Atlantic Alliance to 
cooperate as effectively as they should 
in meeting challenges to their common 
security. 

Fortunately, the several dangers and 
needs that I have emphasized are in- 
creasingly recognized on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Indeed, some have already 
been dealt with or are at present being 
considered constructively. I see, 
therefore, ample basis for hope of a bet- 
ter economic future than has been our 
lot in the past few years. 

In the course of my life, I have seen 
many crises come and go. I have also 
seen crises that were widely anticipated 
fail to materialize. It is always unwise to 
underestimate the capacity of human in- 
genuity and good will to resolve 
economic problems— whether they be 
domestic or international. Let us not 
underrate that capacity now. As 
Americans and Europeans we know in 
our hearts that the ethical, political, and 
cultural values that we share in common 
are overwhelmingly more important 
than the trade or financial issues that 
now and then excite us. ■ 



Japan Eases 
Restrictions 
on Yen 



Following is a statement by 
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. 
Regan on May 29, 198J,. 

I am here today to announce an agree- 
ment that will have important, far- 
reaching, and positive implications for 
the U.S. economy, the Japanese 
economy, and the world economy. It 
should strengthen our economic and 
financial ties and the international 
monetary system as Japan and its cur- 
rency assume a financial role ap- 
propriate to the free world's second 
largest economy. 

This report marks the culmination of 
an intensive series of meetings between 
officials of the Treasury Department and 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance which 
has taken place over the last 4 months. 
The report is a joint product; Japanese 



59 



ECONOMICS 



Ministry of Finance Takeshita and I 
have each reviewed and accepted 
report, which we believe is fully respon- 
mandate we gave the work- 
ing group on yen/dollar issues in our 
joint press announcement last 
November. Minister Takeshita is releas- 
ing simultaneously the same report in 
Japan. While the report does represent 

direct result of these most recent ef- 
it really is the product of discus- 
sions and events over a longer period of 
time. 

Since President Reagan came into 
office, we have been discussing with the 
Japanese exchange rate and capital 
market issues. President Reagan per- 
sonally conveyed our deep concern about 
these issues during his talks with Prime 
Minister Nakasone in Tokyo last 
November. In their joint press an- 
nouncement, President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Nakasone expressed 
their "mutual commitment toward 
specific steps to achieve open capital 
markets [to] allow the yen to reflect 
more fully Japan's underlying political 
stability and economic strength as the 
second largest economy in the free 
world." The President has continued to 
follow this issue closely, providing con- 
tinuous leadership to our efforts in this 
area. 

Our discussions with Japan have 
been based on our concern that Japan's 
role in the international financial system 
was not commensurate with its role as a 
great economic and trading world power 
and that Japan's restrictive policies in- 
hibited the use of yen internationally, 
adversely affected the yen/dollar ex- 
change rate, created distortions and in- 
efficiency in Japan's capital markets, 
and posed unfair barriers to U.S. firms 
seeking to operate in Japan. Although 

there have I n difficult moments in 

these discussions, I am pleased to say 
that the report being released today con- 
tains major new commitments and policy 
measures by Japan that we believe will, 

fully implemented, redress man) 
of the problems which have existed. 
mportant policy changes an 
nounced by Japan will occur in three 
broad the Euroyen market, the 

operation of Japan' tic capital 

market, and the access of foreign finan- 
cial ii he Japanese capital 
market. I would like to outline what is 
involved in each of these areas and cite 
sonic of the specii • hich are 

I he d( relopmenl of the Euri 

market is the area most important to 
the internationalization of the yen. The 

Ministrj of Finance lias, in this report. 



60 



made the basic commitments and deci- 
sions necessary to allow for the develop- 
ment of a Euroyen bond and banking 
market, where non-Japanese can borrow 
in yen outside Japan and investors will 
be able to buy a wider range of yen- 
denominated instruments. 

Specifically, in the Euroyen bond 
market, this will include: enlarging the 
number and types of issuers of Euroyen 
bonds for the first time and setting up a 
framework which we believe will be con- 
ducive to the development of the 
Euroyen bond market over time. 

Regarding the development of a 
Euroyen banking market, by the end of 

["foreign and Japanese banks will be 
authorized to issue from their offices 
outside of Japan short-term negotiable 
Euroyen loans to nonresidents. There 
will be no limits on the amount or tim- 
ing, no prior approval required. 

Substantial changes in the operation 
of Japan's domestic capital market 
policies were also announced by the 
Ministry of Finance. As part of the con- 
tinuing process of liberalizing Japanese 



capital markets, the ministry affirmed 
its intention to deregulate interest rates, 
focusing first on large denomination 
deposits and then on small deposits. We 
believe that these and other important 
changes in Japan's domestic capital 
market will allow market forces to play 
an increasing role in that market. 

The Ministry of Finance also an- 
nounced a number of important changes 
pertaining to the ability of foreign finan- 
cial institutions to do business on an 
equal footing with Japanese financial 
firms in Japan's capital market. These 
changes include such measures as allow- 
ing foreign banks to participate in trust 
banking, increasing the transparency of 
the policies affecting the operations of 
foreign financial institutions in Japan, 
and eliminating swap limits. They will 
create effective competitive oppor- 
tunities for foreign financial institutions, 
reflecting the Ministry of Finance's com- 
mitment to the principle of national 
treatment. ■ 



Review of East-West 
Economic Relations 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and tin Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 29, 1984. Mr. Wallis is Vnder 
Secretary for Economic Affairs. 1 

The Administration welcomes this oppor- 
tunity to review with you and your com- 
mittee the current status of East-West 
commercial, financial, and credit relations. 
As requested, I w ill focus my comments 
on the status of sanctions on the U.S.S.R. 
and Poland, the status of our followup 
activities in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) on East-West commercial 
and energy relations, in the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Security Ex- 
port Controls (COCOM) on technology 
transfer, and in NATO on the security 
implications of East-West relations. 

Overall Approach 

Before getting into specifics, I should 
first like to say a few words about the 
Administration's overall approach to 



East- West trade. One of the principal ob- 
jectives of this Administration's policy 
toward East-West economic relations is to 
ensure that our commerce with the East 
remains consistent with our broad securi- 
ty concerns. We want to avoid economic 
exchanges, particularly transfers of tech- 
nology, that contribute to the military 
potential of the U.S.S.R. and its allies or 
that subsidize the heavily militarized 
Soviet economy and thus alleviate their 
difficult resource allocation decisions. 

Our policy is not one of economic war- 
fare against the Soviets. We do not seek 
the "collapse" of the Warsaw Pact eco- 
nomies; we could not cause this in any 
case. This Administration believes in 
trade between the West and the com- 
munist nations— as between any na- 
tions—where that trade is conducted at 
prevailing market prices and terms, 
where there is a balance of advantages, 
and where the transaction does not con- 
tribute to the strategic advantage of the 
Soviets. Western consumers and pro- 
ducers, both agricultural and industrial, 
can benefit from trade within such an 
overall framework. 

We fully appreciate that the best ap- 
proach to East-West economic policy is 



ECONOMICS 



one that is cooridinated with our allies 
and principal economic partners. Working 
over the past 2 years in COCOM, at the 
OECD, at NATO, and at the economic 
summit, we have achieved a significant 
degree of convergence in our economic 
policies vis-a-vis the East. The areas of 
agreement include strengthening controls 
on the export of strategic technology, en- 
hancing the security of Western energy 
supplies, and tightening the credit terms 
that apply to East-West trade. Overall, in 
a move away from the economics of 
detente, the United States and its partners 
have explicitly recognized that the 
Soviets use some forms of trade to en- 
hance their military capability and, conse- 
quently, that the West must be vigilant to 
ensure that its economic relations are con- 
sistent with its security interests. 

It is these two themes— first, a rec- 
ognition of the security implications of 
our trade with the East and, second, an 
understanding that it is most effective to 
coordinate our policy with that of our 
partners— that underlie most of my com- 
ments today. 

Sanctions Policy 

U.S.S.R. Let me now turn to a discus- 
sion of our sanctions policy, focusing first 
on the Soviet Union. As you know, the 
United States announced sanctions 
against the Soviet Union in the wake of 
its invasion of Afghanistan. In 1981, fol- 
lowing the imposition of martial law in 
Poland, President Reagan announced 
suspension of Aeroflot service, the closing 
of the Soviet purchasing commission, 
oostponement of negotiations on a new 

' ong-term grains agreement, suspension 
Df negotiations on a maritime agreement 
ind a new regime of port access, and a 
complete review of exchange agreements, 
ncluding refusal to renew some 
agreements. He also expanded controls 
)n exports to the Soviet Union of oil and 
,. jas equipment and technology and then 
suspended action on all license applica- 

1 1 ions to sell either high-technology oil and 
?as equipment or technology to the 
! iJ.S.S.R. To demonstrate our dissatisfac- 
tion with the lack of progress toward 
-econciliation in Poland, the President 
ater decided to expand to subsidiaries 
Hind licensees abroad our sanctions on the 
[ ;xport of oil and gas equipment and 

' I technology. 

These steps demonstrated that the 
r > Soviet Union cannot enjoy a normal busi- 
ness relationship with this country after 

> nternational behavior which we find 
:otally repugnant. While many of our 
sanctions remain in effect, they are kept 
ander constant review to ensure that 



they continue to serve their intended pur- 
pose. In other words, they should not un- 
fairly penalize the ability of American 
firms to compete in world markets or 
damage this country's reputation as a 
reliable supplier. A case in point is the 
sanctions on oil and gas equipment which 
were removed November 13, 1982. The 
partial grain embargo against the 
U.S.S.R. was also lifted, and subse- 
quently the United States negotiated a 
new long-term grain agreement with 
Moscow. 

Our economic measures against the 
Soviet Union have had, and will continue 
to have, an effect; but the impact remains 
difficult to quantify. It is clear that the 
measures have imposed a cost on the 
Soviets for their behavior and have forced 
a readjustment in our bilateral economic 
relations. There have, of course, also been 
costs to U.S. businesses and agriculture 
from lost orders and trade diversion. 
With respect to the best publicized of this 
Administration's economic sanctions 
against the Soviet Union— those related 
to construction of the export gas pipeline 
from Siberia to Western Europe— the 
Soviets completed the pipelaying phase of 
its project last year, installed a small 
number of compressor sets, and have 
transported relatively small amounts of 
gas over the line. The Soviets have met 
their initial contract delivery commit- 
ments to West European customers for 
the gas, using surplus capacity in pre- 
viously existing pipelines. 

However, we should recall that the 
Soviets originally planned to complete the 
project, including both laying the pipe 
and installing all associated compressor 
stations, by 1984. We now estimate that 
this task will not be finished until 1986. 
We believe much of this delay can be at- 
tributed to our sanctions. Moreover, in 
evaluating the effectiveness of our sanc- 
tions, it is impossible for us to ascertain to 
what extent the Soviets have been forced 
to divert resources from other priority 
projects simply to meet this delayed 
target for pipeline completion. 

Poland. Our Polish sanctions included 
the following actions: a freeze on new of- 
ficial credits, the suspension of debt- 
rescheduling negotiations and Poland's 
most-favored-nation (MFN) status, opposi- 
tion to Poland's membership in the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, suspension of 
landing rights for regularly scheduled 
flights of the Polish airline LOT, with- 
drawal of Polish fishing rights in U.S. 
waters, suspension of travel between 
Poland and the United States under the 
Marie Sklodowska Curie Joint Travel 
Fund (which finances joint scientific 



research projects), and suspension of the 
Export-Import Bank's line of credit in- 
surance for Poland. 

To encourage national reconciliation in 
Poland, the Administration has adopted a 
step-by-step approach on our Polish policy 
designed to reward positive steps by the 
Polish Government on the political, econ- 
mic, and human rights fronts. Thus, in 
November, the President endorsed two 
limited steps to ease economic sanctions 
on Poland. First, we agreed with our 
allies to enter into debt-rescheduling 
discussions, and we are continuing to par- 
ticipate in Paris Club discussions with the 
Poles. We also agreed to permit Polish of- 
ficials to engage in discussions with 
private U.S. fishing interests about poten- 
tial fishing arrangements. Those steps 
represented a response to positive 
developments in Poland and specifically 
last summer's successful papal visit and 
the release of the majority of political 
prisoners. On January 16, in response to 
Lech Walesa's call for an easing of sanc- 
tions, the President decided to take twn 
further steps. We will permit 88 Polish 
charter flights between the United States 
and Poland this year, and we have lifted 
the ban on fishing by Polish vessels in 
U.S. waters. As soon as the legal re- 
quirements for economic cooperation with 
U.S. fishing interests are met, the Poles 
will be issued an allocation of fish. 

An evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the Administration's sanctions on Poland 
is very difficult since the Polish economy 
had already been adversely affected by 
the liquidity crisis and bank retrenchment 
in late 1980. If we believe the statements 
of the Polish Government, however, our 
Polish sanctions have exacted a huge toll 
on the Polish economy, with figures of $10 
billion and up in lost production and ex- 
ports quoted by Polish authorities. The 
actual economic impact of U.S. sanctions 
has certainly been more limited, but there 
can be no question that the Polish 
Government has paid a heavy price for 
the suppression of human rights. 

Without a doubt, our most effective 
economic sanction has been the embargo 
on new official credits. This has unques- 
tionably made Polish access to trade 
financing more difficult so that an increas- 
ing share of Poland's imports from the 
West has been on a cash-and-carry basis. 
Nevertheless, for purely financial 
reasons, lending to Poland would have 
fallen off sharply even without official 
sanctions, because the market recognizes 
Poland as a very poor credit risk. Our go- 
slow approach on debt rescheduling has 
also impeded Polish efforts toward nor- 
malization of financial relations. On the 
other hand, Poland has not made any 



July 1984 



61 



ECONOMICS 



significant payments on debt to Western 
governments since early 1982, and this de 
facto moratorium has eased the Polish 
payments burden. Meanwhile, Poland has 
used the excess hard currency earned by 
reducing imports and boosting exports to 
make substantial payments to private 
bank creditors, which have signed three 
debt-rescheduling agreements. In 1981, 
1982, and 1983, net Polish payments to 
Western banks totaled some $4.7 billion. 

The other U.S. sanctions on Poland 
have been less significant economically, 
though all have had a symbolic impact. 
The Department of Commerce is now 
completing a study to assess the effects of 
MFN withdrawal on exports to the 
United States, and we shall make that 
study available to the subcommittee upon 
completion later this spring. The 
preliminary assessment is that suspension 
of MFN reduced Polish exports to the 
United States, and we are now evaluating 
its exact impact. The suspension of Marie 
Sklodowska Curie funds has curtailed, 
though not eliminated, scientific ex- 
changes with Poland. 

Allied Participation 

I would like to say a few words about 
allied cooperation on sanctions measures. 
In response to Soviet actions in Poland, 
the European Community took steps in 
December 1981 to reduce imports of 56 
Soviet products, including vodka, furs, 
diamonds, salmon, caviar, tractors, and 
other products. Those sanctions reduced 
Soviet exports of those items by $122 
million in both 1982 and 1983. The sanc- 
tions were not renewed when they ex- 
pired at the end of 1983. With respect to 
Poland, the NATO allies agreed in 
January 1982 to halt new official credits 
to Poland and postpone debt-rescheduling 
negotiations. Our allies remain unwilling 
to offer new credits to Poland, though 
debt-rescheduling talks in the Paris Club 
were resumed last fall. 

While the impact of these economic 
measures has, in general, been less impor- 
tant than ours, in joining us— even with 
symbolic measures— the alliance has, 
nonetheless, sent an important political 
message on Western unity to Moscow and 
Warsaw. Moreover, this message has 
been reinforced by allied agreement in 
late 1982 to review key aspects of East- 
West economic relations in the OECD, 
COCOM, NATO, and IEA and to initiate 
several key studies. These efforts have 
produced a number of concrete results 
and in the process substantially increased 
allied awareness of the economic and 
security implications of East-West trade. 

For example, as a result of our com- 
mon efforts in the OECD, we are now 



62 



able to monitor more closely the West's 
trade and financial relations with Eastern 
Europe and the U.S.S.R. to help ensure 
that these relations remain on a sound 
market-oriented footing. The OECD work 
program seeks to improve information ex- 
change through enhanced data collection 
so that more comprehensive, integrated 
debt and financial statistics can be placed 
at the disposal of Western policymakers. 
On the analytical side, efforts are well 
underway to integrate more fully the 
organization's trade and financial 
analysis, and the quality of the reports 
has already measurably improved. For 
the future, we intend to press for ex- 
panded OECD work in a number of areas, 
including the balance of advantages in 
East- West trade with special emphasis on 
countertrade practices. 

Export Credit Arrangement 

The OECD Export Credit Arrangement 
has been the focus of our ongoing efforts 
to reduce official export credit support to 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
These efforts are part of our broader ob- 
jective of reducing credit subsidies 
worldwide. With the successful negotia- 
tion of a new OECD Export Credit Ar- 
rangement last October, we acheived our 
principal objectives including holding the 
line on rates to category I countries (that 
is, relatively rich countries, including the 
Soviet Union). 

This consolidated the gains made in 
1982, when participants in the arrange- 
ment agreed to raise minimum rates for 
countries, including the Soviet Union, 
from 8.75% to 12.4%. With that action and 
the general decline in market interest 
rates over the past 2 years, credit sub- 
sidies to the Soviet Union from most 
OECD countries has been greatly re- 
duced. The new arrangement provisions 
also feature automatic adjustment to 
average market rates, which will help 
prevent any future subsidization. 

NATO and COCOM 

In parallel efforts over the past year in 
the NATO Economic Committee, we have 
sought to underscore the security aspects 
of our trade and financial relationships 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. I am pleased to report that there 
is a stronger consensus than ever that 
economic relations should not be permit- 
ted to contribute to Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact military capabilities. In their com- 
munique last June, the NATO ministers 
stressed that East- West economic rela- 
tions must be consistent with our shared 
security interests and that we must exer- 



cise caution in the transfer of technology, 
dependency relationships, and other 
economic dealings that could contribute to 
the military capabilities of the Soviet 
Union. 

This heightened awareness of the 
security ramifications of East- West 
economic relations has also had a very 
positive impact on COCOM negotiations. 
In COCOM discussions over the past 
year, we have studied ways of improving 
surveillance and control over Western ex- 
ports that have strategic or military 
relevance to the Warsaw Pact nations. At 
an April 1983 COCOM high-level meeting, 
we explored a number of ways in which 
the multilateral system of controls could 
be strengthened. Specifically, our part- 
ners agreed that several categories of oil 
and gas equipment and technologies war- 
rant consideration in the context of the 
current list review for possible inclusion 
in the multilateral embargo. Ad referen- 
dum agreement has already been reached 
for addition to the COCOM list of several 
other U.S. oil- and gas-related proposals. 
Finally, COCOM has agreed to the 
establishment of a U.S. -proposed inven- 
tory of emerging technologies to be 
monitored for their potential strategic ap- 
plications. 

Perhaps our greatest success in 
COCOM, however, has been the signifi- 
cant headway in strengthening the effec- 
tiveness of the COCOM embargo. 
Governments of our COCOM allies are 
now giving increased attention to the 
problems of enforcement and are 
devoting signficantly increased resources 
to such activities. Moreover, a high priori- 
ty has been placed on resolving the third- 
country diversion issue. Cooperative ef- 
forts are underway to ensure that third 
countries are aware of the risk of illegal 
diversions through their territories to the 
Warsaw Pact. 

International Energy Agency 

In the energy sector, the President has 
urged European countries to consider the 
security implications of the new Soviet 
gas pipeline and to examine indigenous 
alternatives for increased West European 
requirements for natural gas. While the 
Western dialogue on energy security and 
natural gas dependence was strained by 
controversy over the Siberian pipeline 
and U.S. sanctions, a serious dialogue has 
emerged about European natural gas re- 
quirements, the potential of such alter- 
native sources as Norway, and the need 
to improve preparedness against gas sup 
ply disruptions. 

Last year the combined OECD-IEA 
Secretariat, completed an "Energy Re- 



Department of State Bullet 



r 



ECONOMICS 



quirements and Security Study" whose 
most important analysis centered on 
natural gas in Western Europe. IEA and 
OECD ministers subsequently endorsed a 
set of policy conclusions drawn from the 
combined Secretariat study, including a 
set of interrelated principles on the 
secure development and use of natural 
gas. The IEA study had a real impact on 
the thinking of Western energy 
policymakers responsible for planning 
Western energy supplies for the 1990s 
and beyond, and there is a new emphasis 
on developing secure energy sources, in- 
cluding OECD gas fields. 

Conclusion 

To summarize my remarks, the formula- 
tion and implementation of U.S. policy 
toward economic relations with the Soviet 
Union and its allies is, necessarily, a 
balancing act. Consider a spectrum. On 
one extreme is unrestrictive economic in- 
tercourse with the East, nothing held 
back. On the other extreme is a total em- 
bargo—nothing traded, financed, or ex- 
changed. Scarcely anyone holds to either 
extreme. The question for policymakers is 
where to draw the line. My testimony has 
reviewed the Reagan Administration's 
approach to drawing the line. The Admin- 
istration's objective as contained in a 
recent White House press release on one 
aspect of East-West trade is: "to insure 
that there is an appropriate balance be- 
tween national security and export in- 
terests." 

We are working continually with our 
allies to carry out that objective. As you 
can see, we have made substantial head- 
way over the past 2 years in advancing 
our concerns about the conduct of East- 
West economic relations and in 
strengthening our collective approach to 
East- West economic policy formulation. 
There can be no doubt that Western 
security interests have benefited directly 
as a result. Much, nevertheless, remains 
to be done, as reflected in the future work 
programs of our key multilateral institu- 
tions and NATO. We intend to persevere 
in all the areas relevant to Western 
security, knowing full well that consensus 
building among democratic countries 
must be a long-term commitment. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



The Logic and Politics 
of the Next Trade Round 



by Denis Lamb 

Address before the World. Trade Con- 
ference in Chicago on April 25, 1984. Mr. 
Lamb is Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs. 

It is no accident that trade has been a 
major engine of growth in the world 
economy since World War II. Successive 
rounds of tariff negotiations pro- 
gressively lowered duties from stultify- 
ing depression-era levels. With lower 
duties and improved transportation, 
world trade expanded considerably 
faster than world output until the reces- 
sion of 1981. 

Looking ahead, it is clear that open 
markets, permitting renewed growth in 
world trade, will be essential to a 
healthy world economy. This is par- 
ticularly so in light of the debt crisis 
facing a number of developing countries. 
To service their debts, these countries 
must expand exports. 

But, unfortunately, the nation's com- 
mitment to free trade is being tested as 
seldom before. The recession hit many 
industries hard at a time when difficult 
adjustments to a dramatic change in the 
relative cost of energy— and accompany- 
ing phenomena— were incomplete. As 
recovery continues, some of the same in- 
dustries are facing strong import com- 
petition. And now, added to this 
pressure, comes the cry to "do 
something" about the enormous U.S. 
trade deficit. 

This would seem to be a particularly 
poor time to contemplate further trade 
negotiations. Yet serious thought is 
being given to a new negotiating round. 
Why? 

One reason is protectionism itself. If 
we do not move forward toward freer 
trade, increased protectionism is the 
likely result. 

A second reason is unfinished 
business from previous trade rounds. 
Tariff-cutting has not yet gone far 
enough to eliminate some significant 
residual impediments to achieving 
economic efficiency through trade; 
agriculture continues to escape full 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] discipline; and the trade 
rules have to be further adapted to 
today's trading realities. 



July 1984 



A third reason is that trade in areas 
of new importance, including services 
and high technology, has an impressive 
potential to create jobs and wealth if we 
are wise enough to seek liberalization. 

Finally, negotiations can provide the 
incentive and the means to integrate the 
newly industrializing, and increasingly 
trade-oriented, developing countries into 
the GATT system. 

Protectionism 

Protectionism takes many guises. The 
latest is the call to reduce the U.S. trade 
deficit by curbing imports. But the 
deficit has not interfered with a strong 
U.S. recovery and rebounding corporate 
profits. Its root causes lie in the strong 
dollar; the vigor of our recovery and 
time needed to extend it to our major 
trading partners; and the precipitous 
drop in U.S. exports to key Latin 
American debtor countries. Protection is 
no solution, nor is the deficit a reason to 
defer negotiations. I argue the opposite. 
The deficit provides a strong impetus to 
move forward with a new round. Think 
of a new round as an innoculation 
against the disease of self-defeating pro- 
tectionism. 



Tariffs 

A second reason for contemplating a 
new round prominently concerns tariffs. 
Heretofore, the heart of trade negotia- 
tions in the GATT has been reciprocal 
tariff cuts, primarily among developed 
countries. We can be proud of the 
results. Average U.S. duties after the 
full Tokyo Round tariff cuts are phased 
in will be about 4.5%. European Com- 
munity tariffs will average a little over 
5%. Today, exchange rate fluctuations, 
shipping, insurance, and interest costs 
loom larger in most decisions whether or 
not to import than do tariffs at these 
low levels. Yet some tariffs remain a 
major deterrent to trade. 

Some elaboration of this point is in 
order, since not much is heard about 
tariffs these days. Many of us are aware 
of high duties in developing countries. 
Their import-substitution policies, based 
on these duties and other barriers, are a 
major impediment to expanded world 
trade. But the access of developing 
countries to markets in the North is also 



63 



ECONOMICS 



restricted. Although three-quarters of all 
U.S. duties are less than 5% and only 
1% exceed 20%, fully 14% of the goods 
we purchase from the LDCs [less 
developed countries] are assessed duties 
of 20% or more. Were textile imports 
not limited by quotas as well as duties, 
the share of developing countries' 
shipments assessed high duties would be 
even larger. 

Other developed countries have even 
more restrictive tariffs. For instance, 
Canada's average duty on imports from 
developing countries is 11%, and more 
than one-fifth of its imports from these 
countries enter at rates above 20%. 

Tariff escalation— the stair-stepping 
of duties upward as the degree of pro- 
cessing increases— is still prevalent in 
the developed countries. Raw material 
imports are frequently duty free. If a 
processed product is dutiable at 10% and 
the raw material for that product enters 
duty free, then the effective rate of pro- 
tection for the processing operation can 
be two, three, or even four times 
greater. 

The United States would seem to be 
relatively "clean" on tariff escalation, 
since only about one-quarter of U.S. 
duties exceed 5%. But consider this com- 
parison. The GATT has calculated that 
average U.S. duties on industrial raw 
materials after the Tokyo Round will be 
just under 2%. On semifinished 
manufactures, however, our duties will 
average 6.1% and for finished manufac- 
tures, 7%. 

European Community averages are 
almost identical but conceal greater 
escalation. Many sensitive products are 
not restricted by high duties but by tight 
quotas. The Community has thus 
lowered its average duty in trade- 
weighted terms without lowering its pro- 
tection. 

More than half of Japanese duties 
and three-quarters of Canadian duties 
are 5% or above. In the Japanese case, 
8% exceed the 20% level. 

Thus, when the developing countries 
express concern about tariff escalation 
or high duty levels in the developed 
countries, the figures suggest their con- 
cern is legitimate. More important 
perhaps, they also suggest that we still 
have something to bargain with on 
tariffs. 

Under the rubric of unfinished 
business we also want to tackle 
agriculture again and to tend to the 
broad trade rules on subsidies, 
safeguards, counterfeiting of traded 
goods, and other matters. 

Agriculture, though hardly a new 
area of concern, has never been brought 
under full GATT discipline. Although 



64 



there are valid reasons for regarding 
agriculture as a special case, the time 
has come to introduce more order into 
agricultural trade. The degree of sub- 
sidization in the trade is both an avoid- 
able drain on treasuries in exporting 
countries and a distortion of incentives 
for production in importing countries. 

New Areas of 
Trade Importance 

A third reason for a new trade round is 
the need to tackle new areas of trade 
importance. From the U.S. vantage 
point, a major attraction of a new trade 
round will be a focus on services and 
high technology. 

Services are of growing importance 
in international commerce. Banking, in- 
surance, and other financial services; 
engineering, communications, data proc- 
essing, and telecommunications services 
all contribute to a modern economy. 
Given the diversity of trade in services, 
it will be difficult to develop principles to 
govern this trade and encourage its ex- 
pansion. But it must be done, or history 
indicates that an array of restrictions in 
highly protected national markets will 
fragment services trade, stifle competi- 
tion, and raise prices. Services need to 
be an important part of any trade 
negotiation that aims to contribute to 
global prosperity. 

High-technology goods involve both 
exciting opportunities for gains from 
trade and special problems. For exam- 
ple, we have seen at least one case of a 
preemptive tariff increase instituted 
where a new product had barely reached 
the market, and government involve- 
ment in high technology can be of con- 
cern. These and other problems of trade 
in high-technology goods deserve special 
consideration as a new trade round 
takes shape. 

The Challenges of a 
New Trade Round 

More difficult than the why of a new 
round of trade negotiations is the how. 
The problems are considerable. It will 
not be easy to adapt the GATT 
mechanism, designed at a time when 
trade in manufactured goods was the 
paramount concern, to today's more 
complex world. It will be a challenge to 
involve the developing countries in the 
game of tariff negotiations— a game 
they have until now largely refused to 
play. 

The political problems at home will 
be considerable. In addition to the 
general climate of protectionism, there 
is the fact that some of our most sen- 



sitive sectors have to be on the table for 
negotiations to work. 

The developing countries— if they 
are to lower import barriers— will want 
concessions from us on items like tex- 
tiles, shoes, and steel. The Japanese— if 
they are to open their market to agri- 
culture, high technology, and other com- 
petitive U.S. products— will want to be 
paid. The Europeans— if they are to give 
us any satisfaction on agricultural 
trade— will want curbs on our ability to 
protect our own farmers. 

Lest we think too much in terms of 
bargaining, it is important to bear in 
mind that it is in our own interest to 
lower protection for the most highly pro- 
tected of our industries. As a general 
rule, protection in one sector diverts im- 
port competition to others. More 
precisely, while the economics and 
mathematics are complicated, it turns 
out that high tariff protection for some 
industries under a floating exchange 
rate regime means negative protection 
for those with low duties. That's right, 
"negative protection." Roughly two- 
thirds of U.S. duties are already at or 
below our 4.6% average. Only 11% are 
above 10%. Low-duty industries, and 
American exporters would be better off 
if every single U.S. duty were set at 
zero. 

Alas, economic logic is often at odds 
with political reality. Highly protected 
industries in the United States tend to 
be labor intensive and politically sen- 
sitive. The sectors that will benefit 
directly from tariff concessions are in 
many cases less labor intensive or less 
vocal politically. This suggests the 
need— in conjunction with preparations 
for a new round— to look more closely at 
the process of structural adjustment, in- 
cluding its long-term benefits and in- 
terim costs. 

If domestic resistance can be sur- 
mounted, the problem in launching a 
new trade round becomes attracting 
others to the bargaining table. The 
developing countries are formally ex- 
empt from reciprocity in trade negotia- 
tions. This is explicitly stated in Part IV 
of the GATT and was reaffirmed in the 
Tokyo Round. The idea is that develop- 
ing countries are not expected to cut 
tariffs as much as developed countries. 
However, many developing countries ap- 
pear to have expanded their notion of 
nonreciprocity. They argue that they 
should not be expected to cut tariffs at 
all, at least not when they are having 
balance-of-payments difficulties and 
debt-service problems. 

Yet developing countries need to 
lower their import barriers if they are tc 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



progress. The developing countries that 
have progressed most rapidly, and best 
weathered the recession, are also the 
most open to trade. Most of the East 
Asian and Southeast Asian countries 
have recovered smartly from the reces- 
sion through export-led growth. In con- 
trast, the Latin American economies, 
which have emphasized import substitu- 
tion and lower levels of trade, have 
proved less resilient. 

The import substitution approach to 
development is now largely discredited 
among serious students of such matters. 
Many developing countries have recog- 
nized the drawbacks of import substitu- 
tion and have moved toward freer trade 
of their own volition. Many have been 
encouraged to do so by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 
the context of needed stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs. But the 
pace has been slow. 

The crucial importance of attracting 
the developing countries to the bargain- 
ing table lies in the linkages. If the 
economic health of the developing coun- 
tries is not restored, our economy will 
suffer as well. The developing countries 
provide our fastest growing export 
markets, and 3 of our top 10 export 
destinations are LDCs. Indeed, 1983 ex- 
ports to our top 30 markets after 
Canada and Japan were divided almost 
equally between developed and develop- 
ing countries. 

Unless the developing countries ex- 
pand their exports enough to both serv- 
ice their debts and restore more normal 
import levels, they are likely to face 
political unrest on top of their economic 
woes. But unless they can be persuaded 
to use the exchange rate instead of im- 
port barriers and subsidies to balance 
their trade, both their imports and ex- 
ports are likely to be inadequate. 

In short, the stakes are high. Trade 
negotiations offer developing countries 
the opportunity to gain greater market 
access in industrial countries at the 
same time they are reducing tariff and 
nontariff barriers in their own interest. 
The challenge is to help them see it in 
this light. 

Working out the modalities of a 
negotiation with Western Europe and 
Japan also poses problems. Europe's 
high unemployment increases political 
pressures to protect sectors pressed by 
import competition. U.S. demands in 
agriculture also strain the European 
Community's delicate balance of in- 
terests on a sensitive issue. 

Japan has taken the lead in calling 
for a new round, and President Reagan 
endorsed Prime Minister Nakasone's ini- 



■V July 1984 



tiative. But the balance between those in 
Japan who would use a new round to 
leverage further market-opening 
measures and those who would use it to 
delay has yet to be tested. 

Conclusion 

The problems I have talked about 
today— of breaking new ground, deter- 
mining how to deal with our own sen- 
sitive sectors, persuading the developing 
countries to negotiate, overcoming 
European hesitation, and testing the 
commitment of the Japanese— are each 
formidable. Not all of them can be 
resolved before a new round starts. Yet, 
if we are to hold back the pressures of 



protectionism, getting started is, itself 
politically important. 

But little is likely to happe n until 
those in the private sector with a strong 
interest in trade liberalization make 
their voices heard. To neglect the 
defense of free trade is to court the risk 
of case-by-case protectionis m and a pro- 
longation of the global debt problem. It 
is to lose opportunities which a new- 
style trade round will give to U.S. 
growth industries. Ultimately, launching 
a new round depends squarely on the 
support of a private se ctor eager to con- 
front the challenges and reap the bene- 
fits of a changing— arid growing— world 
economy. ■ 



Foreign Policy: Its Impact 
on Agricultural Trade 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Board of Directors 
of the United States Feed Grains Council 
in Houston on March 7, 198k- Mr. Wallis 
is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

It is a pleasure to be able to begin by ex- 
pressing the Reagan Administration's 
hearty support for the work of the 
United States Feed Grains Council. You 
support the private export-marketing 
system, and you develop export markets. 
I have read the positions on public policy 
that you adopted 2 years ago. They are 
models of reason, common sense, and 
sound policy. 

The theme of your meeting, "strat- 
egy for transition," gives me an oppor- 
tunity to talk about what the Reagan 
Administration is doing to encourage a 
transition to a more competitive trading r 
system for agricultural products. 

The explosive growth in world agr i- 
cultural trade during the 1970s has gi ,ven 
way to much slower growth in dema nd 
but without a corresponding slowdown in 
production. Consequently, prices ar e 
soft, stocks are increasing, and gov ern- 
ments are under pressure to "do f some- 
thing." Some argue that we shou) d pro- 
tect our market share through bi lat eral 
or multilateral arrangements. Others 
argue that we should stabilize r jrices. 
Still others advise us to hide b ehind high 
price supports and import bar riers. Some 
say that we should resort to 'interna- 
tional markets only when wf > need to 
work off the burden of mist ,akes in our 
domestic programs. These forces are 



powerful. If they have their way, the 
transition v /e are in will be to govern- 
ment-orgar lized and government- 
managed ' trade in agriculture. Govern- 
ments wf juld fix market shares and 
prices, a .nd international trade would 
become a stepchild of the world's 
domes' „ic farm programs. 

Tr iere is, however, another possibil- 
ity—-' -i far better possibility. We can 
ackr iowledge that we already have too 
mu- ch government participation in inter- 
na' cional agricultural trade. We can eom- 
m .it ourselves to work together toward a 
r nore market-oriented system, free of 
distortions, based on comparative advan- 
tage. We can permit market forces to do 
their work and thus achieve efficient 
allocation of world resources. 

I want to analyze with you today the 
prospects for these two competing out- 
comes. My analysis is divided into three 
parts: first, a brief look at the starting 
point, world agricultural markets as they 
operate today; second, a review of the 
Reagan Administration's efforts to 
assure our farmers and exporters a fair 
shot at those world markets; and finally, 
the implications of our international pro- 
grams for the domestic farm program. 

World Agricultural Markets 

Those of you who believe as I do in the 
efficiency of markets and in the magic of 
the price system for organizing economic 
behavior may be distressed by what I 
must say in describing the current status 
of international markets for agricultural 
products. 



65 



ECONOMICS 



Consider first sugar. Only about 30% 
of sugar produced enters into interna- 
tional trao'e, and about 38% of that 30%. 
is traded u nder long-term contracts or 
other closed arrangements. The other 
62% of the S'0%, or less than 20% of the 
total, must aibsorb the full burden of 
price fluctuations. The price-stabilization 
efforts of the international Sugar Organi- 
zation—of whic h the United States is a 
member— have failed totally. In part this 
is because the E'uropean Economic Com- 
munity maintains' high support prices 
and heavy export subsidies, which since 
1976 have transfer med the European 
Community (EC) fr om a net importer of 
sugar to a supplier of one-third of the 
"residual free" mark'et exports in 1982. 
In addition, U.S. sug.u" producers have 
enjoyed our own price' support program, 
protected by tight quovtas. 

Consider coffee, America's favorite 
beverage. Coffee is regu lated by an in- 
ternational commodity ag reernent par- 
ticipated in by the United' States and 72 
other countries, representi ng virtually 
the entire coffee trade, botl i exporters 
and importers. The Internat ional Coffee 
Organization (ICO) attempts to stabilize 
coffee prices through the use of export 
quotas. In recent years, coffee prices 
have been relatively stable, but the suc- 
cess of the ICO in stabilizing pr.'ces in 
the face of cyclical overproductio n has 
resulted in stockpiles of coffee so large 
that they hang over the market lik'e the 
sword of Damocles. 

With coffee goes cream. Only ab out 
one-tenth of world dairy production i, s 
traded on international markets, and 
most of that consists of heavily subsi- 
dized products, such as butter and nonl at 
dry milk. About 85% of the trade in- 
volves export subsidies. Support for 
dairy production has become a very 
costly business for consumers and 
governments. Support prices in the 
United States and the EC are set far 
above domestic and international market 
clearing prices, and they generate moun- 
tains of stockpiled surplus, currently 
representing about one-quarter of a 
year's domestic production. It is small 
comfort to know that the United States 
refrains from dumping this surplus on 
the thin international market. Our par- 
ticipation in the international market has 
been limited to foreign aid and occasional 
subsidized sales for demonstration effect. 

The picture for grain is somewhat 
different, and many people point to the 
grain trade as an example of the free 
market at work. In fact, the international 
grain market is characterized by a few 
suppliers— the United States, the EC, 
( lanada, Australia, and Argentina ac- 
counted for over 95%- of exports in the 
1982-83 marketing year. Many countries, 
including Canada and Australia, sell their 



grains through government marketing 
boards. The EC, the third largest wheat 
exporter, offsets high support prices 
with substantial export subsidies. Grain 
exporters are increasingly using bilateral 
long-term agreements to lock in markets 
by political means. In 1982-83, about 
one-third of all wheat traded on the 
world market moved under long-term 
agreements. 

International markets for agricultural 
goods are dominated by commodity 
agreements, stock overhangs, quota sys- 
tems, government-to-government 
agreements, and government marketing 
boards. 

There are, however, markets— about 
which you know much more than I— that 
march to a different drummer, at least 
on the export side. In feed grains, the 
United States has a 60%-70% share of 
the total world market. Your council is 
not a government agency but an organi- 
zation of competitors. Your 1981 policy 
statement is clear in its opposition to 
commodity agreements for feed grains. 
Even in this trade there are government 
interventions— the 1973 embargo that 
severely damaged our reputation as a 
reliable supplier, the subsidies some pro- 
ducers enjoy, the threats to access we 
have heard recently from Europe; but by 
comparison it is a good example of the 
competitive market at work. 

Efforts to Liberalize 
Agricultural Trade 

The challenge we face is to open other 
markets to greater competition. Since 
government intervention is the problem, 
we must deal with governments when 
we seek to liberalize agricultural trade. 
This is where foreign policy and the 
State Department become involved with 
other U.S. agencies, especially the U.S. 
Trade Representative and the U.S. 
.Department of Agriculture (USD A). 
'Lhose three agencies, strongly supported 
bj ' President Reagan, are working 
together with other countries, one at a 
tim e or in groups, to reduce distortions 
in ti 'ade and permit each country to pro- 
duce and sell according to its com- 
parat ive advantage. The going is slow, in 
part because it is not always possible to 
put ou.r objectives for agricultural trade 
ahead of all other objectives. 

You may be interested in our efforts 
with fou.r countries or groups of 
countries . 

Japan Japan is the largest pur- 
chaser of ui' agricultural products. 
Japan bougiht over $ti billion worth of 
agricultural products from us last year. 
That was abo ut 15'? of all American 
agricultural e.\ ports. These sales result 
in part from yt 'ars of prodding the 
Japanese to ope n their markets. 



Progress has been made. For ex- 
ample, Japan has reduced the coverage 
of its import quotas from nearly 500 
products in the 1960s to only 27 today. 
Japan's overall average tariff rates are 
below those of the United States and the 
EC. We cannot ignore, however, Japan's 
remaining barriers to U.S. agricultural 
exports. The further reduction or 
elimination of agricultural trade barriers 
in Japan and an expansion of imports 
would bring clear benefits to the 
Japanese people. Consumers suffer in 
practice what economists teach in theory, 
for in the end it is consumers who pay 
the price of protectionism. Tokyo house- 
wives pay more than they should for 
beef, chicken, pork, milk, eggs, rice, and 
bread. 

Lower trade barriers, of course, 
benefit American farmers as well as 
Japanese consumers. (In general, both 
partners to trade benefit; otherwise they 
would not trade.) If Japan were substan- 
tially to expand access to its markets for 
imported beef and citrus, we expect that 
our exports— now $439 million for those 
two products— could expand significantly 
over the next few years. And you need 
not be concerned that selling more beef 
to Japan might mean a smaller market 
there for feed grains. After all, cattle 
must eat, and to the feed producer it 
makes little difference whether the steer 
is fed in Omaha or Osaka. 

Beef and citrus are just examples. 
Japan has benefited dramatically from 
the world's open trading system. We will 
continue to urge that Japan fulfill its in- 
ternational obligations and open its 
markets more broadly. 

European Community. The 10 na- 
tions of the European Community con- 
stitute another excellent market for the 
United States. Our agricultural trade 
surplus with the EC amounted to $4.6 
billion in 1983. Feed grains, nongrain 
feed ingredients, and soybeans for 
livestock represent the bulk of our 
agricultural exports to the EC. 

At the same time, through its export 
subsidies, the European Community's 
common agricultural policy — the CAP — 
has become the source of the most 
serious distortions of agricultural trade 
in the world. The CAP relies on a com- 
plex, expensive system of high domestic 
prices and variable import levies to pro- 
tect the European farmer. These ensure 
high production. Heavy export subsidies 
are then used to dispose of the surplus. 

When world supply outruns the 
world demand, as now. world agricul- 
tural prices decline and supply should ad- 
just. In the United States, this usually 
happens (dairy products being the major 
exception). Most U.S. Government pro- 
grams seek to use the market to cut pro- 
duction, to build stocks, and to place a 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



safety net under farm income. In con- 
trast, European farm prices are set 
without reference to the world market 
arice; they have increased almost every 
vear in an effort to keep up with general 
inflation. The result is that for many 
farm commodities the domestic EC price 
has been as much as twice the world 

J price. Production has soared beyond 
capacity to consume at home, creating 
huge surpluses. The surpluses are 
lumped on world markets with whatever 
subsidies are needed to move them. They 
depress world prices generally and com- 
oete with our products in third coun- 
tries. 

The EC's high-price, high-subsidy 
system thrusts a major portion of the 
;rue costs of the system upon its 
competitors. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture estimates, for example, that 
;he CAP costs us close to $6 billion per 
/ear in lost farm export earnings. 

CAP spending is driving the Euro- 
>ean Community into bankruptcy, pro- 
viding effective pressure for reform of 
he CAP. We hope that the reform will 
>roduce a policy less distortive to trade. 
3ut some of the specific proposals now 
wing considered would transfer more of 
he costs of the CAP to countries outside 
he EC. 

The EC Commission has made pro- 
wsals that would endanger our soybean 
rade and restrict our corn gluten feed 

8'xports. It has proposed a consumption 
ax on vegetable fats and oils designed to 
itimulate EC butter consumption by 
naking margarine more expensive. Coin- 
idently, it would raise money for other 
arm programs. The commission has pro- 
rased a tariff quota on nongrain feed in- 
iredients to limit further market growth. 
Soybeans and nongrain feed ingredients 
epresent trade valued at almost $5 
million, about 60% of U.S. agricultural ex- 
>orts to the EC. 

We have warned the EC that we will 
lefend our agricultural trade. Last year 
ve reluctantly subsidized sales of wheat 
lour and of butter and cheese to Egypt 
>n terms permitting our products to com- 
>ete with the EC's export subsidies. 
Also, we have used USDA's export 
redit subsidy programs— so-called 
blended" credits— to make inroads in 
narkets now held by subsidized pro- 
lucers. There is no enthusiasm in the 
Administration for following the Euro- 
jeans down the export subsidy path; we 
lo not wish to see bad policies beget 
nore bad policies. 

But there are limits to our patience. 
The EC leaders meet March 19-20 in 
D aris. They must keep in mind the depth 
>f our concern and the strength of our 
esolve. We have conveyed these con- 
ems to the EC on many levels. Sec- 
retary Shultz, Secretary [of Agriculture] 



Block, and Ambassador Brock [U.S. 
Trade Representative] made our views 
known in no uncertain terms at the 
December 9 meeting in Brussels with the 
EC Commission president and five of his 
commissioners. In January our Em- 
bassies repeated the message. I want to 
take this opportunity to stress that we 
will take action to protect our trade in- 
terests if the EC unilaterally implements 
CAP reform measures that restrict our 
access to their market. 

If my good friend Sir Roy Denman, 
the EC representative in Washington, 
were here, he would accuse me of being 
unfair. So, even in his absence, let me 
restore the balance. The European budg- 
etary crisis has forced the European 
Commission and the member countries 
to take a serious and critical look at the 
common agricultural party policy. They 
acknowledge the importance of getting 
EC support prices down to world market 
levels and of holding them there. They 
recognize the wastefulness of overpro- 
duction and subsidies. As I said a mo- 
ment ago, this budgetary crisis may have 
a silver lining for all of us interested in a 
more competitive market for agricultural 
products. 

Developing Countries. In the long 
run, the big opportunity for U.S. farm 
exports will be in the developing coun- 
tries. As countries develop, their pur- 
chasing power grows and creates larger 
markets for our products. The prospects 
for feed-grain exports, in particular, are 
staggering. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 
estimates that LDC [less developed coun- 
try] imports of coarse grains for feed will 
increase sixfold between the mid-1970s 
and the turn of the century. This poten- 
tial market is but one economic dimen- 
sion of our overall interest in self- 
sustaining economic growth among the 
developing countries. 

The free play of the market is essen- 
tial to sound and balanced economic 
growth. Developing countries will maxi- 
mize their domestic production only 
when their farmers have an incentive to 
produce. They must receive a remunera- 
tive return for their work. Market prices 
and access to inputs such as fertilizer 
and adequate "infrastructure" are all im- 
portant. We use our food aid agreements 
to encourage and assist developing coun- 
tries to meet these objectives. 

Unfortunately, many developing 
countries do everything possible to dis- 
courage agricultural production. Too 
often they follow policies 180° away from 
those followed by the European Com- 
munity. The Europeans generate huge 
surpluses with high support prices and 
high prices to the consumer. The 
developing countries impose low farm 



prices on the producer and subsidize food 
prices for the urban consumer. Instead 
of surpluses, the LDCs have chronic— 
and growing— shortages. This may seem 
to be to the advantage of U.S. ex- 
porters—but remember the definition of 
demand you learned in your basic 
economics course: the amount consumers 
are willing and able to buy at a given 
price. 

LDC debt-servicing difficulties have 
reduced foreign exchange available for 
imports, including food. The United 
States has been a leader in developing a 
strategy to deal with the debt problem. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
is playing a major role in this strategy. 
Fundamentally, the burden falls on the 
developing countries themselves to 
restore balance to their economies. A 
healthy agricultural sector is one key 
feature. But adjustment does not happen 
overnight. Increased IMF resources, in- 
cluding the $8.4 billion from the United 
States recently approved by the Con- 
gress, will help tide over the developing 
countries. With this help, they will buy 
more U.S. agricultural products. As I 
told a congressional committee last fall, 
the IMF bill was partly farm legislation. 

Financing helps only in the short 
term. In the longer run, the developing 
countries must earn the money 
necessary to service their debts and pay 
for their imports, including food. Protec- 
tionism, whether practiced by developed 
countries such as ourselves or by the 
developing countries themselves, impairs 
the ability to earn the foreign exchange 
the LDCs need to meet their obligations. 

U.S.S.R. and China. In discussing 
our efforts with Japan, with the Euro- 
pean Community, and with the develop- 
ing countries, I have portrayed the 
Reagan Administration's efforts to 
reduce the political element of 
agricultural trade and replace it with a 
less political, more market-based system 
of trade. It is the genius of the market 
system that transactions are carried out 
according to prices offered and accepted 
by actors who need not know anything 
about each other except the information 
contained in prices. In most cir- 
cumstances, the market will efficiently 
match buyers and sellers, establishing 
prices which will reflect the relative scar- 
city of the product and the demand for 
it. But there are exceptions. In the case 
of agricultural trade, our long-term 
agreements with the Soviet Union and 
China are evidence of those exceptions. 

Long-term agreements— especially 
between governments— are not the pre- 
ferred way to develop markets. Like 
other government activities, they tend to 
lock in a relationship on political 
grounds, diminish the flexibility of the 



67 



ECONOMICS 



market, and disadvantage the efficient 
supplier. 

But the Soviet Union and China are 
not your ordinary buyers. Their import 
needs can be enormous, and each tends 
to act as a single purchasing unit in 
meeting its needs. Political as well as 
economic factors influence their buying 
decisions. The potential for market dis- 
ruption is high. To minimize the scope 
for disruption, the United States has 
long-term agreements with these two 
countries, specifying a minimum annual 
purchase and an upper limit beyond 
which there must be government-to- 
government consultations. We believe 
these arrangements serve our interests. 

The rose is, however, not without its 
thorns. The very existence of a govern- 
mental agreement creates links between 
our grain trade and our overall bilateral 
relations with the Soviet Union and 
China. That link can be an irresistible 
temptation, of which the grain embargo 
of the previous administration is a vivid 
example. President Reagan has promised 
that he will not repeat that error. He has 
signed the Durenberger amendment 
guaranteeing contract sanctity for agri- 
cultural trade. But when the time rolls 
around to negotiate minimums, or ceil- 
ings, or annual offers with the Soviets, 
there is, inevitably, a discussion of the 
"signal" each option will send. Foreign 
policy considerations never are com- 
pletely out of the trade picture when 
governments are in that picture. 

Multilateral Efforts. In addition to 
our work with the four countries or 
groups of countries that I have described 
—Japan, the EC, the LDCs, and Russia 
and China— we are working also on a 
multilateral basis to improve the rules of 
agricultural trade. The General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the 
focal point of these efforts. Five rounds 
of multilateral negotiations in the GATT 
have made great strides in liberalizing 
trade in industrial products, but they 
have done little for agriculture. Our 
trade representative, Ambassador Brock, 
has proposed a new round that would ad- 
dress the problems we have in agricul- 
ture, as well as those in services and 
high-technology products. 

There is no shortage of opportunities 
to improve agricultural markets. The 
most important opportunities involve ex- 
panding access to markets by reducing 
quotas, tariffs, variable levies, and ex- 
port subsidies. Other important issues in- 
clude export credits, means of settling 
disputes, the link between production 
subsidies and exports, food aid, trade 
preferences, and technical standards and 
practices. 

It is not clear yet what shape this 
new round of multilateral neKotiations 



68 



might take, or whether there is enough 
international support for a new round to 
be productive. But a better trade climate 
for agriculture is a top priority on our 
trade agenda. We are encouraged by the 
support we have received from the Japa- 
nese. When Prime Minister Nakasone 
and President Reagan met last Novem- 
ber, the Prime Minister personally sug- 
gested that agriculture be included in a 
new trading round. The Europeans are 
understandably reluctant, since we 
would insist that greater discipline over 
export subsidies be a key element of any 
new agreement, but nevertheless they 
are thinking about it. 

Implications for Domestic Policies 

As we strive toward a more market- 
oriented international system, we must 
examine our domestic policies to see if 
they serve to advance or to hinder these 
efforts. 

Government's economic programs 
must be based on sound expenditure, 
tax, regulatory, and monetary policies. 
We should seek to ensure that govern- 
ment interferes with the market 
mechanism as little as possible. If we are 
interested in export markets, our 
domestic support prices must be held to 
levels that permit American production 
to meet and beat world prices. Support 
prices and other programs should pro- 
vide a safety net to help cushion the 
shock of catastrophies. They should not 
be a featherbed for the most efficient or 
a bomb shelter for the least efficient. 

It goes without saying that if we are 
to be successful in opening foreign 
markets, we must ourselves avoid resort- 
ing to protectionist pressures and gim- 
micks. Just as we object to protectionism 
in others, we should not expect them to 
welcome it in us, nor should we be sur- 
prised if they retaliate or use our actions 
as an excuse to justify their own protec- 
tionism. American agricultural markets 
are more open than those of most coun- 
tries, but we have our share of highly 
protected sectors: meat, dairy, and 
sugar, for example. 

Historically American farmers have 
supported free trade and American 
farmers have helped shape American 
policies on international trade. U.S. 
agriculture was the beneficiary. We 
should keep in mind that for other coun- 
tries to buy our products, we must buy 
theirs. This is especially true of the 
developing countries who are tremen- 
dously important to U.S. farmers, since 
they will be the most dynamic market 
for U.S. farm products. 

To conclude, let me return to your 
theme: "strategy for transition" and the 
two possible outcomes I outlined at the 



beginning of my remarks. Our examina- 
tion of the current state of world mar- 
kets for agricultural products revealed 
heavy government intrusion in the func- 
tioning of these markets. In contrast, the 
Reagan Administration's approach to our 
major trading partners on agricultural 
trade has sought consistently to free up 
markets and peel away the overlay of 
government. Progress is slow and often 
frustrating. But our experience within 
the United States is encouraging. 

Just in the past 5 years, competition 
has broken out in the U.S. economy. Air- 
lines made the headlines first, and the 
benefits to the traveling public are clear. 
Trucking is coming along but more 
slowly. Although the breakup of "Ma 
Bell" may be debatable, the benefits of 
enhanced competition in communications 
have been obvious for more than a 
decade. In the financial sector the out- 
break of competition has been nothing 
short of phenomenal. [Treasury Secre- 
tary] Don Regan was a leader in the 
effort from his perch as head of Merrill 
Lynch. Even now, the spread of competi- 
tion in the financial sector is being 
pushed by the private sector despite 
resistance by certain government 
agencies. 

If we can make this kind of progress 
in the United States, there is hope on 
the international front. There can be no 
doubt that a more competitive interna- 
tional market for agricultural products 
will benefit the American farmer and 
American agriculture. I said a moment 
ago that farmers have been the backbone 
of the free trade philosophy in the 
United States. We need the backing of 
the farm sector today more than ever. 
Let us hear from vou. ■ 



Examining the 
Unitary Tax 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Chamber of Com- 
merce in Coral Gables on March 8, 198k. 
Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs. 

Genesis of the Problem 

Unitary taxation originated at the turn of 
the century from the difficulties states 
had in taxing railro ids. The problem was 
how to tax the income of the first truly 
multijurisdictional corporate entities. 
Gross receipts within the state? Assets? 
And if assets, where should the railroad's 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



rolling stock be taxed? In the state of in- 
corporation or in the states in which it 
was used? 

The states simply taxed as much as 
they could get away with, until the 
Supreme Court, recognizing the potential 
for double taxation, held that the income 
should be apportioned "fairly" among the 
states. What "fairly" meant was left up to 
the states. The states came up with 
various formulas and eventually extended 
them to all taxpayers doing business in 
more than one jurisdiction. 

On a domestic basis, many states 
adopted what is known as unitary taxa- 
tion. They treat as a unit all the business 
that is done under one ownership, then 
estimate what proportion of that income 
was earned in the state and apply the 
state tax to that income. The proportion 
of the unit's income earned in the state 
usually is estimated from the proportions 
of its sales, assets, and employment in the 
state. 

Why is the Department of State in- 
terested in state taxes? The answer lies in 
the growth and integration of the interna- 
tional economy and America's increasing 
take in it. Just as individual states have 
melded into one gigantic "free-trade 
area," so the nations of the world have 
oecome, since the Second World War, an 
ntegrated trading area. 

The dramatic expansion of the world 
economy following the Second World War 
was fed by strong flows of goods and 
private investment among nations. As 
capital markets became truly interna- 
tional, investors in the United States 
could seek opportunities in Europe, Latin 
America, or virtually anywhere in the 
world. The same has been true for foreign 
investors looking for a stable business 
climate and a high rate of return, both of 
which they found in the United States. 
U.S. direct investment abroad as of 1982 
totaled some $221 billion while foreign 
direct investment in the United States in 
the same year stood at $102 billion. 

State tax administrators faced new 
problems, as a result, in accurately 
ssessing the income of corporations do- 
ing business within their jurisdictions. 
Some would say that tax authorities also 
saw this as a new opportunity. Either 
way, a number of states sought to "inter- 
nationalize" the unitary tax practice they 
had developed originally for the railroads 
to address two perceived difficulties with 
intracorporate accounting for income 
earned in different countries. 

First, they worried about the ability 
Df multinational corporations to shift in- 
come out of the country to avoid taxation 
Dr to earn so-called "synergistic" or "no- 



where" income, meaning earnings not at- 
tributable to any jurisdiction and which 
would, they alleged, escape taxation alto- 
gether. 

Second, they argued that the states 
did not have the administrative resources 
to audit the international transactions 
effectively using the so-called "arm's 
length" approach to intracorporate 
transactions. Recently, the Supreme 
Court had ruled in their favor, holding 
that the unit whose income is apportioned 
to the state may be worldwide income and 
need not be confined to income earned in 
the United States. 

The state's first concern is probably 
not serious. There are only a few corpora- 
tions so highly integrated that they can 
take advantage of tax differentials that 
lead tax authorities to assume that all 
multinationals can practice such tax 
avoidance schemes. Nevertheless, unitary 
taxation was applied to all corporations 
working internationally in order to 
restrain those few that were actually 
avoiding taxes to any appreciable extent. 

The vast majority of international 
businesses are organized around profit 
centers without which they could not 
determine effectively their rates of return 
in different countries. The term "multina- 
tional corporation" obscures the fact that 
these are separate companies related by 
ownership but whose managers are 
responsible for generating earnings 
within their individual markets. Earnings 
of individual profit centers reflect fairly 
accurately the amount generated within 
various jurisdictions. That notion is the 
basis for the separate accounting or 
"arm's length" method of taxation which 
is used by the Federal Government, by 
the vast majority of the states, and by 
other nations. The principle of "arm's 
length" taxation is embodied in an OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] convention to which 
the United States adheres. 

The notion of accurately reflecting in- 
come and corporate organization also 
bears on the states' second concern: ad- 
ministrative convenience. Some seem to 
assume that that administrative pain of a 
tax system can be measured by adding up 
the number of keystrokes on an auditor's 
calculator. That ignores what every tax 
expert will tell you is the foundation of 
any good tax system: compliance. When 
taxpayers believe that the system of taxa- 
tion does not fairly reflect the income 
they have earned, they will not comply. 
When they do not comply, the public 
loses both the costs of attempting enforce- 
ment and the revenue lost from non- 
compliance. You will recall that this coun- 
try declared its independence because of 
taxes regarded as unfair. 



International Implications 

The Boston Tea Party was vividly re- 
called to the Secretary of the Treasury 
Don Regan recently. Peter Welch, British 
chairman of the Unitary Tax Campaign, 
sent Secretary Regan a box of fine tea in 
a pointed contrast between the colonists' 
actions and the British reaction to the 
unitary tax. Small wonder that the 
British are concerned. They are the 
largest foreign direct investors in the 
United States, having investments of 
$23.3 billion as of 1982. 

They are by no means alone in their 
objections. Use of the unitary tax— first in 
California, now spread to 12 states— has 
become a major irritant in our relations 
with all our major trading partners. Dur- 
ing my tenure at the State Department, 
this issue has provoked an extensive and 
intensive reaction from foreign nations. 
Indeed, it may rank with the most con- 
troversial issues I have handled in the 
economic area. Let me give you an exam- 
ple. You know how difficult it is to get 14 
people to agree on anything, much less 14 
nations. But it happened. To express 
their concern over unitary taxation, 14 
countries (the 10 members of the Euro- 
pean Community plus Japan, Canada, 
Switzerland, and Australia) representing 
$85 billion or 84% of total foreign direct 
investment in the United States, submit- 
ted a joint diplomatic communication to 
the Department of State. They have three 
complaints. 

First, they argue that the application 
of the unitary tax to worldwide earnings 
of their corporations inevitably results in 
double taxation. Even supporters of the 
unitary tax acknowledge its potential for 
double taxation. 

Second, they point out the adminis- 
trative burden of compliance. The unitary 
tax requires that foreign firms create an 
additional set of books according to 
American accounting standards. 
Moreover, there are severe problems of 
valuation. For instance, should the tax in- 
cidence of a French corporation depend 
solely on the current conversion rate of 
the franc? If so, on which day? You may 
have noticed that exchange rates have 
shown considerable movement in recent 
years. How should a German vintner 
calculate the historical cost of a vineyard 
it purchased centuries ago? The unitary 
tax may raise as many vexing questions 
as it resolves. 

Our friends point out that unitary tax- 
ation deviates not only from the practice 
of a majority of states and the Federal 
Government but also from internationally 
accepted principles on which international 
investment depends. They question U.S. 
arguments for a more open international 



69 



EUROPE 



investment climate when their firms face 
this kind of tax treatment in the United 
States. 

Their third point underscores a poten- 
tial problem of as great concern to us as 
to them. We must anticipate adoption of 
unitary taxation by developing nations 
who are looking desperately for new 
sources of revenue. These governments 
are heavily in debt and vastly overcom- 
mitted for domestic programs, many of 
them ill advised. They are seeking 
revenue from any source to service their 
debts and fund their development pro- 
grams. As the world's largest foreign 
direct investor, the United States will be 
a big loser if unitary taxation becomes 
widespread. The developing nations 
would be even bigger losers because they 
would lose investments. 

Implications for the States 

It is easy to understand the attraction of 
unitary taxation to the states and their 
reluctance to give it up. Every state 
would like to find a new source of 
revenue. Last year, less than 3 weeks 
after the decision of the Supreme Court 
upholding California's use of the unitary 
method on a worldwide basis, the Florida 
State legislature enacted its own version 
of the unitary tax. One State Senator was 
heard to exclaim: "It was like finding 
money on the street, and we grabbed it," 
And the Director of Economic Develop- 
ment thought at the time that the new- 
law would not seriously hurt the state's 
image among investors. Moreover, within 
reasonable bounds, no one questions the 
states' right to tax as they see fit. Presi- 
dent Reagan, himself once Governor of 
California, is one of the staunchest 
defenders of that principle. 

But some are beginning to ask: at 
what cost? I wonder if your Director of 
Economic Development and the state 
legislature were as confident of the 
state's business future after a delega- 
tion of British investors canceled their 
planned trip to Florida in response to the 
passage of the unitary tax. Will they feel 
as confident if the British Parliament 
enacts a law to retaliate against Florida 
firms doing business in the United 
Kingdom 7 

Some in Florida certainly are taking 
seriously the hazards of the unitary tax. 
A blue ribbon panel set up by Governor 
Graham of Florida has recommended the 
repeal of the unitary tax. Other 
states— competing for those investment 
dollars that mean employment and 
economic growth— are taking it seriously, 
too. Recently, Governor Orr of Indiana 
was so concerned that his state might be 



70 



misrepresented as a "unitary state" that 
he issued a widely disseminated public 
statement clarifying Indiana's tax policy 
to avoid that impression. It may well be 
that competition among the states will 
restrain use of the unitary method. 

A Potential Solution 

The President, in October 1983, formed a 
working group on unitary taxation under 
the chairmanship of Treasury Secretary 
Regan. (I am the only other member of 
the Federal Government who is a 
member of the group.) Recognizing both 
the complaints of our foreign trading 
partners and the legitimate rights of the 
states, the President brought together 
representatives of the states, the 
business community, and the Federal 
Government to discuss the issue and 
possible alternatives to the current prac- 



tice of the 12 states that now use 
worldwide unitary taxation. 

The working group eschewed the 
possibility of a federally mandated solu- 
tion. In the spirit of federalism, we are 
seeking a solution which could be im- 
plemented by the states voluntarily. Our 
staff-level task force has been hard at the 
task of developing options for presenta- 
tion to the working group and Secretary 
Regan. While it would be premature to 
discuss the potential alternatives at this 
time, I can say that I am cautiously op- 
timistic that the working group can find a 
compromise that meets the needs of the 
states and minimizes the irritant that 
unitary tax has become in our foreign eco- 
nomic relations. If we don't, both the 
states individually and the country as a 
whole will find important objectives 
derailed. ■ 



The Atlantic Alliance and 

the American National Interest 



by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Address before the National Commit- 
tee on American Foreign Policy in New 
York City on April 30, 1984. Am- 
bassador Kirkpatrick is U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations. 

There is a widespread, growing sense on 
both sides of the Atlantic that we have 
come once again to one of those periodic 
times of decision: will we continue as we 
are, working in and through the existing 
framework, or is it time for new depar- 
tures? Articles on the "crisis" of the 
alliance have become a staple of editorial 
pages in the United States and in Europe. 
In the European press, these articles 
often criticize U.S. policies and question 
whether our policies and our rhetoric do 
not make the world a more dangerous 
place— for Europeans. In the United 
States, European shortcomings are less 
emphasized than questions about whether 
it makes any sense at all for the United 
States to go on investing so many people 
and so much money in the NATO enter- 
prise. 

Not all issues that are hotly discussed 
in the media and on debating platforms 
make their way onto legislative calendars. 
Some simply die. But widespread public 
interest in an important subject, if not 
necessarily a harbinger of official changes 



to come, at least gives notice of that 
possibility. 

The relationship of the United States 
and Europe is an example of an issue in 
which there is informal, unofficial discus- 
sion and little or no formal or official ac- 
tion. I should like to emphasize that there 
is now no discussion in the U.S. Govern- 
ment of restructuring NATO, withdraw- 
ing American troops, or changing Ameri- 
can strategic doctrine. Certainly no such 
discussion occurs at authoritative levels. 
Nonetheless, the discussion persists and 
spreads, the op-ed pieces multiply, and 
more and more influential persons join 
the dialogue. Have we reached a point 
like that about which John Quincy Adams 
said: "I do not recollect any change in 
policy, but there has been a great change 
in circumstances"? 

How important are the changed cir- 
cumstances which confront the Atlantic 
alliance 35 years after its founding? How 
basic? How threatening or liberating? Is 
this relationship among the nations of the 
Atlantic alliance still necessary and, if so, 
to whom and for what? 



Departure From Traditional 
U.S. Attitudes 

Certain facts— known to persons pres- 
ent—need, nonetheless, to be mentioned 
to set the questions and discussion in con- 
text. First, the fact that, from the U.S. 



Department of State Bulletin 



perspective, the alliance represented a 
sharp departure from traditional U.S. at- 
titudes and behavior. In his memoirs, 
President Harry Truman wrote: 

On April 4. 1949, I stood by Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson as he signed his name, on 
behalf of the United States, to a treaty which 
was the first peacetime military alliance con- 
cluded by the United States since the adoption 
of the Constitution. 

Signing the North Atlantic Treaty 
was, as Truman noted, "one more step in 
the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, along 
with the United Nations Charter, the 
Greek-Turkish Aid Program, and the 
Marshall Plan." It was also a specific vio- 
lation of the nation's traditional policy of 
refusing permanent alliances. 

Americans had never been comfor- 
table with the notion that our fate is 
bound up with the fate of foreign powers. 
As everyone who is familiar with Ameri- 
can history is aware, the Founding 
Fathers of the United States took pains 
not to become drawn into what they con- 
sidered the net of European entangle- 
ments, rivalries, and power politics. This 
view is, of course, summarized in George 
Washington's warning of September 
1796: 

Europe has a set of primary interests 
which to us have no, or a very remote relation, 
hence she must be engaged in frequent contro- 
versies the causes of which are centrally 
foreign to our concern. 

This policy of noninvolvement in 
European politics was supplemented in 
1823 by another famous American decla- 
ration which also distinguished our inter- 
ests from those of Europe's. The Monroe 
Doctrine extended the protection of the 
young United States beyond its continen- 
tal limits for the first time to the whole of 
the Western Hemisphere and declared 
that, at the risk of war, the United States 
would thereafter resist the creation of 
new European empires in the Western 
Hemisphere. This step was not prompted 
by a desire to become involved in interna- 
tional diplomacy. To the contrary, it was 
seen as a prudent measure which would 
ij protect the United States and the other 
American republics against the rivalries 
■ and conflicts characteristic of European 
, politics of the era, including, of course, 
| the politics of Russia. These attitudes per- 
jsisted past World War II. 

The identification of our security with 
I countries beyond our borders, beyond the 
I Atlantic, remained unsettling to Ameri- 
ji cans. The comments of the late Senator 
Robert A. Taft of Ohio, who warned 
against ratification of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, manifested these traditional 
American concerns. Addressing the U.S. 
'iSenate in 1949, Taft said: 



By executing a treaty of this kind, we put 
ourselves at the mercy of the foreign policies 
of 11 other nations, and do so for a period of 20 
years. . . . The Monroe Doctrine left us free to 
determine the merits of each dispute which 
might arise and to judge the justice and the 
wisdom of war in the light of the circum- 
stances at the time. The present treaty 
obligates us to go to war if certain facts occur. 

Although there was a growing sense 
of global interdependence in the postwar 
United States, we still approached inter- 
national commitments with caution and 
only with the expectation that they would 
be temporary in duration. The founding 
fathers of the alliance did not intend to 
establish a permanent security system. 
Rather, they hoped to allow the war- 
weakened democracies of Western 
Europe a security framework within 
which they could take refuge from Soviet 
threats and subversion until, with mas- 
sive American aid, they repaired their 
devastated economies and rebuilt their 
defenses, thereby impairing the Soviet's 
ability to challenge their security. 

Response to the Soviet Threat 

The second point I desire to emphasize is 
again well known; yet more and more 
often its importance is underestimated 
with the passage of time. It is that the 
alliance was forged as a direct response to 
the actual, imminent danger to Western 
Europe of Soviet subversion and aggres- 
sion. No amount of historical revisionism 
can explain away facts of Soviet expan- 
sion into Europe. Truman described these 
to the Congress in a speech to a joint ses- 
sion on March 17, 1948: 

Since the close of the hostilities, the Soviet 
Union and its agents have destroyed the inde- 
pendence and democratic character of a whole 
series of nations in eastern and central 
Europe. 

It is this ruthless course of action, and the 
clear design to extend it to the remaining free 
nations of Europe, that have brought about 
the critical situation in Europe today. 

The tragic death of the Republic of Czecho- 
slovakia has sent a shock throughout the 
civilized world. Now pressure is being brought 
to bear on Finland, to the hazard of the entire 
Scandinavian peninsula. Greece is under direct 
military attack from rebels actively supported 
by her Communist-dominated neighbors. In 
Italy, a determined and aggressive effort is be- 
ing made by a Communist minority to take 
control of that country. The methods vary, but 
the pattern is all too clear. 

The ensuing decades of European 
peace, stability, and economic develop- 
ment have so transformed the security 
and well-being of Europe that it is easy to 
forget the reality of destabOization, in- 
timidation, and outright aggression in the 
late 1940s. The Soviet threat to which the 



EUROPE 



alliance was a response constituted a 
large part of the "Red Scare" of the 
times. Events in Poland, Hungary, 
Finland, and Czechoslovakia dramatized 
the character as well as the reality of the 
danger confronting Greece and Italy and 
the prospects for democracies in Europe. 

Perception of Repeated Crises 

The third point that I desire to 
underscore is that despite, or perhaps 
because of, its duration and patent suc- 
cess, the alliance has repeatedly, even 
chronically, been perceived as undergoing 
some sort of crisis which threatened to 
transform if not destroy it. 

We err if we think that the alliance, 
having once enjoyed a golden age of 
nearly uniform judgments on all things 
important, has now lapsed into a progres- 
sively problematic relationship. In his 
Fire in the Ashes, published in 1953, 
Theodore White wrote of the passing of a 
period marked by great closeness and 
constructive cooperation and the entry in- 
to a period of new problems and new mis- 
understandings that challenge whether 
we can deal with these misunderstand- 
ings at all. 

The same sense that the solutions to 
the problems of the postwar Soviet threat 
to Europe were being overtaken by 
events was expressed by Arthur Schles- 
inger's comments in The Kennedy Years: 

By 1960 the economic dependence on the 
United States had largely disappeared. 
Western Europe had been growing twice as 
fast as America for a decade; it had been draw- 
ing gold reserves from America; it had been 
outproducing America in coal. Americans were 
flocking across the Atlantic to learn the 
secrets of the economic miracle. And, at the 
same time, the military dependence had taken 
new and perplexing forms. If the prospect of a 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe had ever 
been real, few Europeans believed it any 
longer. Moreover, the Soviet nuclear achieve- 
ment, putting the United States for the first 
time in its history under the threat of devas- 
tating attack, had devalued the American 
deterrent in European eyes. These develop- 
ments meant that the conditions which had 
given rise to the Marshal] Plan and NATO 
were substantially gone. The new Europe 
would not be content to remain an economic or 
military satellite of America. The problem now 
was to work out the next phase in the A tlantic 
relationship. 

Hans Morgenthau expressed the same 
concern that basic premises and charac- 
teristics of the alliance could not remain 
unchanged in a rapidly changing world. 
He wrote in 1962: 

NATO was created as, and is still today of- 
ficially considered to be, the shield that pro- 
tects Western Europe from a Soviet attack on 
land. Yet it has never been clear how NATO 



July 1984 



71 



EUROPE 



could perform that function with the forces 
actually at its disposal or how it could have 
performed that function even with the much 
larger forces which its official spokesmen from 
time to time declared to be indispensable. Nor 
has it been clear how such a military organiza- 
tion, top-heavy as it is with collective agencies 
for the making of decisions, would operate ef- 
fectively in case of war. 

These are some of the doubts which arise 
from within NATO itself. There are others 
which concern the relations between NATO 
and the overall political and military purposes 
of the Western alliance and, more particularly, 
of the United States. What is the place of 
NATO within the overall military strategy of 
the United States? What functions could 
NATO perform for the European communities 
and a more closely integrated Atlantic com- 
munity? What impact is the impending diffu- 
sion of nuclear weapons likely to have upon the 
policies and the very existence of NATO? And 
what of the probable replacement of the 
manned bomber and bases supporting it by 
long-distance missiles? These are some of the 
questions which the Western governments 
should have raised long ago and answered. 

That was 22 years ago. Today the 
search for definitive answers to those 
questions and others continues. Henry 
Kissinger has recently advised us that the 
problems facing the alliance today may re- 
quire "a remedy that is fundametal, even 
radical." He suggests that the time may 
have arrived for Europe to assume the re- 
sponsibility for its own defense against 
conventional attack, time to draw down 
or withdraw entirely the 300,000 U.S. 
troops in Germany. Recently, James 
Schlesinger and Helmut Schmidt had a 
widely reported public dialogue in which 
they, too, questioned the validity of using 
long-established NATO security arrange- 
ments to face the challenges of today. 
And perhaps the most basic question of 
all has been raised by La Stampa's Ar- 
rigo Levi: "Can one generation's experi- 
ences be bequeathed to the next?" 

The fact is that there has never been 
a time in the 35-year life of NATO when 
everyone has been entirely satisfied with 
its performance. We have disagreed as to 
the nature of the Soviet threat and an- 
guished over how to deal with it. We have 
disagreed about policies outside the area 
of the alliance. Diversity of the interests 
and views of the members in matters out- 
side the treaty area has resulted in some 
dramatic conflicts inside the alliance. It 
is hard to remember, retrospectively, the 
passion associated with the Suez crisis of 
1956, with European decolonization, and 
with France's withdrawal from NATO in 
1966. Yet even a casual review of alliance 
history reveals disagreements so frequent 
and so widespread that they have some- 
times obscured the fact that we have con- 
tinued to share a general sense of the 
reality of a potential Soviet threat to the 



72 



security of Western Europe and a belief 
that the Atlantic alliance is the best 
available option for protection from that 
threat. The permanence of the debate is 
instructive. It compels us to examine the 
reasons for the longevity of the alliance in 
defiance of the doubts and challenges that 
have plagued it and the chronic problems 
of divisive democracies trying in peace- 
time to make and maintain common 
policies with regard to a potential military 
threat. 

Flexibility and Strain 

The problems are to a significant degree a 
consequence and a reflection of its suc- 
cess. The persistence of the alliance over 
the three-and-one-half decades demon- 
strates that it is a much more flexible in- 
strument than it is usually conceived as 
being. Established as a framework for the 
participation of the United States in the 
defense of Europe, it has been a colossal 
success. Many things have changed since 
1949. But most important is the reality of 
two generations of peace and prosperity 
in Western Europe, which has not. The 
relative cohesion among European states 
that have fought one another for centu- 
ries is, itself, a remarkable occurrence. Its 
effect on the security and stability of 
Europe is also remarkable. There has not 
even been a significant European 
centered East- West confrontation since 
the last Berlin crisis in 1962. And within 
this relative stability, the economies and 
cultures of all alliance members have 
flourished. 

Indeed, European stability has been 
so uninterrupted it now seems unremark- 
able and is frequently viewed with indif- 
ference. A decade ago, the late Raymond 
Aron labeled this development "the rou- 
tinization of the Atlantic Alliance," by 
which he meant that the alliance ". . . no 
longer arouses enthusiasm or hostility." 
Aron suggested that while "we may im- 
agine a system that is better, we cannot 
dismiss as of marginal importance 
NATO's protection of Western European 
security against Soviet attack and subver- 
sion. Whatever the feasible alternatives 
to Atlantic security arrangements are, 
there is no evidence that they could hope 
to fulfill their basic purposes as succes- 
fully as the current arrangement has 
done." 

However, it is never clear that what 
is will continue to be or even that what is 
successful will survive. It is not necessary 
to be a Hegelian or a Marxist to be im- 
pressed with the tendency of solutions to 
become problems, requiring new solu- 
tions. Obviously, there are strains within 
the alliance. Some of these are deeply 
rooted. 



■■ 



The United States and its partners 
share certain characteristics of democra- 
cies that create problems for maintaining 
permanent military alliances. The dynam- 
ics of electoral politics predispose 
democracies to focus on short-range prob- 
lems and short-range solutions. Moreover, 
democracies, reflecting as they do the 
concerns of ordinary citizens, are in their 
very nature predisposed to seek and to 
expect peace, not war; to resent military 
expenditures; and to evade long-range 
planning. The very fact of four decades of 
peace in Europe makes the need for main- 
taining the alliance less plausible. 

There are also the geopolitical real- 
ities, in which the American tradition of 
isolationism and universalism are alike 
based. "An island continent," Walter 
Lippmann called us, "separated by two 
oceans from Europe and Asia, separated, I 
too, by history and demography: Most 
Americans came here seeking relief from 
their former conditions and are in some 
sense ambivalent about permanent involvi 
ment in the affairs of other nations." 
Geographic realities give the Western 
Hemisphere irreducible importance to 
America, and the westward course of 
American destiny links us to the Pacific 
states. We cannot transcend nor ignore 
these realities. 

My good friend Larry Eagleburger 
[former Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs], whose departure from 
public service impoverishes us all, 
recently predicted what he perceived as 
"the shift of the center of gravity of U.S. 
foreign policy from the transatlantic 
relationship toward the Pacific Basin and 
particularly Japan." Besides the growing 
importance of Pacific states in the world 
economy, he cites the Europeans having 
"become so concerned with their own 
problems that it has tended to make it 
ever more difficult to get Western 
Europe to look outside its borders" as tin 
reason underlying this perceived shift. 

Certainly, the U.S. involvement with 
the nations of the Pacific is longstanding. , 
We have been going west throughout our 
history. Our trade with that region has 
surpassed that with Europe and is grow- 
ing at a faster rate. 

There is also the special relationship 
with our hemisphere and the other na- 
tions of the Americas. Geography, demog 
raphy, and history alike link our security 
and destiny with the Americas. 

Beyond geography, there is, of 
course, history and identity. The United 
States has historical and demographic ties 
to the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America 
but strongest historical and demographic 
ties to Europe. 



% 



Indeed, one could say that the Atlan- 
tic community is as old as the European 
discovery of America. We are part of 
what is called Western civilization. That 
jreco-Roman, Judeo-Christian approach 
;o life defines us just as surely as it 
iefines Europe. We are the heirs of the 
iberal democratic tradition born of the 
jfforts of Englishmen and other Euro- 
jeans to make just government depen- 
dent on the consent of the governed. To 
>e an American means to be part of that 
:ivilization. It does not mean that we are 
European. It does not mean we are Euro- 
entric. But we share a civilization with 
Europe, a heritage, an identity that 
Iefines our destiny at the same time it 
inks our destiny to Europe. This sense of 
dentification reinforced those who sought 
uccessfully to involve the United States 
n World Wars I and II. And there are less 
eadily categorized ways in which our na- 
ional interest links us to Europe. 

Hans Morgenthau, writing in 1951, 
?xplained how U.S. national interests led 
is to participate in the politics of the Old 
World. 

Since a threat to our national interest in 
he Western Hemisphere can only come from 
utside it— historically from Europe— we have 
.lways striven to prevent the development of 
onditions in Europe which would be conduc- 
ve to a European nation's interfering in the 
ffairs of the Western Hemisphere or eontem- 
lating a direct attack upon the United States. 
1 hese conditions would be most likely to arise 
a European nation, its predominance unchal- 
?nged within Europe, could look across the 
ea for conquest without fear of being menaced 
t the center of its power; that is, in Europe 
tself. 

It is for that reason that the United States 
as consistently pursued policies aiming at the 
; laintenance of the balance of power in 
Europe. It has opposed whatever European 
ation— be it Great Britain, France, Germany, 
r Russia— was likely to gain ascendancy over 
,s European competitors which would have 
?opardized the hemispheric predominance and 
ventually the very independence of the 
Inited States. Conversely, it has supported 
whatever European nation appeared capable 
f restoring the balance of power by offering 
uccessful resistance to the would-be con- 



A balance of power? A would-be con- 
[ueror? Revisionists affirm these con- 
erns were ever illusory and join a larger 
horus of voices that question their con- 
emporary realism. 

lealities and Expectations 

Two questions, each important, must be 
iddressed. One concerns reality. Does the 
?oviet threat to the peace, national inde- 
)endence, and freedom of Western 
Curope, which stimulated NATO's forma- 



•i 



tion, still exist? The answer seems to me 
to be found in the sponsorship by the 
Soviet Union of subversion, coups, insur- 
gency, invasion, incorporation in other 
continents, and the new unilateral vulner- 
abilities created for Western Europe by 
Soviet deployment of new generations of 
missiles targeted on Western Europe. Le 
Monde last week commented in an 
editorial on "le style Tchernenko." 

The observers who have been wondering if 
the new Soviet leadership installed last 
February would harden the policy followed 
previously have now new evidence. Events of 
the last days in Afghanistan confirm the warn- 
ings of the leaders of Afghanistan's resistance: 
Moscow has mounted a new form of combat 
much more massive and brutal, devoid of any 
of the subtleties which Andropov demon- 
strated. 

Afghanistan is not Europe. The rulers 
of the Soviet Union are capable of differ- 
entiated response. But their continued 
boycott of the INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] talks, the demand for 
superiority present in the adamant insist- 
ence on removal of Euromissiles, seems to 
underscore many other indications that 
Soviet hegemony over Western Europe 
remains a realistic concern. The most 
powerful argument for the persistence of 
the alliance is the persistence of the 
threat of peace, national independence, 
and freedom which stimulated its forma- 
tion in the first place, a threat symbolized 
today in the in the SS-20s and their 
various cousins. 

Freedom from fear is not tantamount 
to freedom from danger, Lawrence Mar- 
tin has reminded us, adding: 

It is the difficult task of Western 
strategists ... to preserve the real safety of 
their nations in an environment of conflict 
which the nations would rather ignore and a 
price in money, and in blood, which the peoples 
would, quite reasonably, rather not pay. 

Between threat and threat perception 
lies the whole subjective world with its 
well-known possibilities for deceit, exag- 
geration, hopes, fears, and illusions con- 
cerning both self and others. There lies, 
too, the domain of value and choice. 

The objective persistence o r threat 
does not guarantee the persistence of its 
perception and constant perception does 
not guarantee constant response. 

The Europe of the late 1940s was vul- 
nerable and felt vulnerable. The recent 
experience with conquest and depotism 
had left a clear, deeply felt, widely held 
sense of the superiority of freedom, the 
horror of subjection. The United States 
of the late 1940s enjoyed clear military 
and economic superiority and, felt the 
confidence, community and purpose born 
of victory over tyrants. The confidence 



EUROPE 



was so strong that, to this day, no revi- 
sionists have arisen seriously to question 
whether World War II was a necessary 
war, whether the stakes were as high as 
then perceived, whether the devastation 
of war was justified at all. 

In neither Europe nor America is 
there today quite the same clarity and 
confidence about the choices and stakes: 
about the problem to which the alliance is 
the solution or about the solution. 

At the most radical level, some Euro- 
peans doubt today the moral difference 



18th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
APR. 17, 1984 1 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, 1 am 
submitting herewith a bimonthly report on 
progress toward a negotiated settlement of the 
Cyprus question. 

Since my 1st report to you of January 24, 
1984, President Kyprianou met with the U.N. 
Secretary General in Paris on February 4. 
Shortly thereafter, State Department 
Counselor Edward Derwinski and Special 
Cyprus Coordinator Richard Haass paid 
separate visits to the region to discuss 
developments with the governments of 
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and to urge their 
cooperation with the Secretary General. In 
March, Turkish Cypriot community leader 
Denktash visited New York for discussions 
with the Secretary General and with Messrs. 
Derwinski and Haass. Also in March, Cypriot 
Foreign Minister Iacovou met with both the 
Secretary General and with Secretary Shultz. 

These meetings have been held to discuss 
the proposal made by the two sides in early 
January, as described in my previous report, 
and to support the efforts of the Secretary 
General to promote negotiations between them 
in accordance with his Security Council 
mandate. 

We are pleased to report at this time that 
the Committee on Missing Persons has met 
and agreed on the procedure it will follow at 
future meetings. We expect the committee to 
begin its first working session shortly. 

We are encouraged by the Secretary 
General's active involvement in seeking com- 
mon ground for progress, and we continue to 
offer him our support. We are hoping for pos- 
itive results from this intensive diplomatic 
activity. 

Sincerely, 

RONALD REAGAN 



■ July 1984 



•Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Doc- 
uments of Apr. 23, 1984). ■ 



73 



EUROPE 



between "the superpowers." John 
Vinocur wrote in yesterday's New York 
Times Magazine of certain German intel- 
lectuals who speak of "America as ag- 
gressor; America as polluter, nuclear ter- 
rorist and profiteer; America as-the-force- 
keeping-us-from-the-way-we-want-to-be." 
(Of course, he also described in the same 
piece, the dramatic turnaround with re- 
gard to the United States of French intel- 
lectuals.) 

The transformations of time have 
dimmed old visions, eroded old ties, and 
created at the same time new possibil- 
ities. The rulers of East Germany have 
reinforced the wall but also seem to have 
understood that the personal ties among 
Germans lead not to satiation but to the 
desire for more. The longing to break bar- 
riers between the Germanies reinforces 
the fear of nuclear war in this front-line 
state, creating a state of mind called 
neutralism— much as the sense of unnec- 
essary vulnerability and unappreciated 
solidarity feeds American isolationist im- 
pulses. 

Accompanying these ongoing mutual 
reevaluations of moral and political 
character, strategy, and tactics are also 
widely discussed. Should Europe risk 
becoming a battlefield in a war between 
superpowers? Should Americans continue 
to expose themselves to nuclear war to 
protect Western Europe? 

The evidence suggests that in no 
country of Western Europe a majority 
holds that their interests would be better 
served outside of the NATO security 
guarantee. On the contrary, I believe that 
in many cases media coverage of con- 
structive debates over the relative merits 
of NATO defense modifications has mag- 
nified radical perceptions and prescrip- 
tions. When the die was cast, Europeans 
and Americans alike decided the issue of 
deployment in favor of an allied response 
to a new European vulnerability. 

Some Europeans like to believe that 
the American stake in Western Europe is 
so great that the United States necessarily be 
involved in an attack on a NATO nation. 

Some Americans, thinking radically, 
doubt that this is necessarily the case- 
providing we had neither troops nor 
missiles in Europe. Some Americans in- 
sist that European and American defense 
is divisible. 

It is as tempting and mistaken to ex- 
aggerate distrust, dislocation in 
U.S. -European relations as it is to ignore 
them. 

Dissatisfaction with the alliance's tac- 
tics, plans, and structures surely is rooted 
in changing economic and military facts 
and relations which must be continually 
updated. 



But much of the current "crisis mon- 
gering" is surely rooted less in changed 
objective realities than in changed expec- 
tations. We have overloaded the alliance 
with expectations which it was never in- 
tended to bear; then, because it does not 
meet these new expectations, we are sur- 
prised and view this instrument as defi- 
cient. The image of frictionless relations 
between allies is almost exactly analogous 
to the image of the frictionless marriage 
or the perfectly ordered house. These ex- 
ist only in fantasy. The fact is that the 
relations between the United States and 
its NATO allies today are very good and 
very strong. They are based on common 
values, deeply related common in- 
stitutions and legal systems, and a very 
great deal of mutual respect on the part 
of most significant figures in all of the 
societies— not just governments but 
societies. 

The debate over the alliance security 
strategies was not begun with the instal- 
lation of Soviet SS-20s. It will not end 
when deployment of INF is completed. 
For many the idea that the United States 
would consider an attack upon Western 
Europe as an attack upon itself has 
always seemed hard to accept. We would 
hope that for now the absence of any 
authoritative discussion of reducing the 
level of U.S. troop strength in Europe, 
the rejection of proposals to renounce 
first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe, 
the improvement of theater nuclear de- 
fenses, and, of course, the continued ex- 
pressions of unshakeable support from 
Washington for U.S. commitments to 
European security would allow European 
fears to subside. But questions will and, 
of course, should continue. And new 
developments will require new modifica- 
tions. The emergence of chemical 
weapons promises to raise new questions 
about the nuclear threshold to illuminate 
Europe's commitment to a nuclear de- 
fense, to illuminate, as well, U.S vulner- 
abilities deriving from any strategy that 
foresees "going nuclear" as an early 
response. 

Doubtless, too, there will be new 
demands for and against restructuring de- 
cisionmaking within the alliance. Italian 
Foreign Minister Colombo suggested in a 
recent speech a new "Euro-American 
friendship pact, and also periodic meet- 
ings between foreign ministers to coordi- 
nate their respective views . . ." and pro- 
vide continuity in discussions among 
NATO governments. 

The instrumentalities necessary for 
adaptation to changing realities exist. 
Power in the alliance is shared, as 
former German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt noted 2 years ago during the con- 
troversy over NATO modifications: 



". . . the voice of the Europeans is strong 
enough to be heard if they so desire. 
There are fifteen members in the 
Alliance, thirteen of which are Euro- 
peans. Why don't they speak if they want 
to be heard?" 

They do want to be heard. They do 
speak. The NATO system can and will 
respond. 

Doubtless, too, there will be U.S. 
frustrations with the alliance which will 
doubtless persist. In the U.S. Govern- 
ment, we chafe today over European 
failure to understand an emphasis with 
our problems outside Europe. Larry 
Eagleburger, a staunch and warm sup- 
porter of the alliance, expressed his disap- 
pointment that, in a year after the 
Falklands, the Europeans could not re- 
strain harsh criticism over the Grenada 
landing in which we moved in careful con- 
cert with the nations of the Carribean: 
"At the very least could not our friends 
have suspended judgment until the 
emerging situation became clearer?" 

It is not a perfect marriage; no 
counselor can make it one. We have and 
will continue to have distinct interests 
and shared ones as well. "Who profits 
most from the Alliance— Europe or 
America?" Aron asked a decade ago. 

The fact that the question was not 
easily answered then and is not easily 
answered today illuminates the founda- 
tions of the alliance. This pattern of co- 
operation and alliance among the nations 
of the Atlantic area will survive genera- 
tional change because it is bound on more 
than nostalgia. It will survive new impor- 
tant economic ties to the Pacific because 
it is bound together by more than shared 
economic interests. It will survive disap- 
pointments and misunderstandings 
because the leaders of the democracies 
understand, finally, that all our nations, 
and all their freedoms, depend finally but 
immediately on the civilization that sus- 
tains us all. 

There is no perfect alliance. There are 
no perfect friends, and as James Reston 
commented concerning this debate on 
NATO defense improvements: "There is 
no perfect security. There is only the 
struggle. With friends at our side doing 
the best we can." 

The American Government and the 
people it serves have every intention of 
continuing that struggle, side-by-side 
with our European friends. ■ 



5 



; 



74 



Department of State Bulletin 



Situation in 
Cyprus 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 

MAY 8, 1984 1 

\t the end of this month I will meet 
vith the Foreign Ministers of all the 
^JATO countries to mark the 35th an- 
liversary of NATO's founding. The 
illiance is sound. But continuing 
iisagreements between two vital 
nembers of the alliance, Greece and 
Turkey, are of great concern. Because 
tur friendship with each country is so 
mportant, and because their need for 
me another is so great, special efforts 
nust be made to reduce disagreements 
nd promote harmony — particularly on 
he island of Cyprus, which has become 
focal point of tension. 

Successive Administrations have 
ried unsuccessfully to solve the painful 
ispute which has divided Cyprus into 
eparate Greek and Turkish com- 
lunities. Over the last several years the 
ecretary General of the United Nations 
as worked painstakingly to keep the 
arties talking to one another. In 
lovember, after the Turkish Cypriot 
eclaration of independence, the United 
tates condemned the action and called 
ar its reversal, while also working to 
ncourage the parties to move forward 
1 making real progress. On January 2, 
le Turkish Cypriots responded by pro- 
osing a series of good will measures, 
ffering among other things to turn over 
art of the coastal city of Varosha to the 
Fnited Nations for eventual Greek set- 
ement. A few days later the Govern- 
ment of Cyprus proposed new guidelines 
or a comprehensive settlement. Turkey 
self announced the removal of 1,500 
•oops from northern Cyprus. And the 
ecretary General of the United States 
'as preparing to meet with the parties 
3 discuss his own plan. We welcomed 
lese developments as positive steps, 
lovement was at last occurring. 

At this point, less than 2 months 
go, Secretary Shultz wrote leaders of 
le Congress to caution that cuts in the 
'urkish assistance program could risk 
ndangering the progress. Unfortunate- 
/, important NATO-related funding for 
'urkey was nonetheless cut in commit- 
ee, no doubt in the mistaken hope that 
nis would somehow stimulate progress 
n Cyprus. As a result, diplomatic ef- 
Drts quickly ground to a halt. 

We are now working to get 
iplomacy back on track. We have 



e) uly 1984 



assured UN Secretary General Perez de 
Cuellar of our continuing support for his 
efforts to bridge the gaps between the 
Greek and Turkish communities of 
Cyprus. 

I understand the frustration in the 
Congress and elsewhere about the need 
for progress. Indeed, I believe the time 
has come to try a new and more positive 
approach. Rather than punishing 
Turkey, let us focus constructive energy 
on ways of encouraging the parties on 
Cyprus itself— for it is here, ultimately, 
that differences must be resolved. 

The Administration and the Con- 
gress need to work together to re-create 
conditions conducive to successful 
diplomacy. We ask the Congress to work 
with us by supporting my request for 
security assistance for our Greek and 
Turkish allies and by removing punitive 
conditions on that assistance. In return, 
I am prepared to work with the Con- 
gress in commiting now to a special 
Cyprus peace and reconstruction fund of 
up to $230 million. Specific authoriza- 
tions would be requested at such time as 
a fair and equitable solution acceptable 
to both parties on Cyprus is reached, or 
substantial progress is made toward the 
end. I intend this commitment to be a 



EUROPE 



symbol of the shared concern of the Ad- 
ministration and the Congress for pro- 
moting genuine results on Cyprus. 

Peace cannot be bought. But 
peacemakers should know that the 
United States is prepared to go to great 
lengths to ensure that their labors are 
transformed into an enduring achieve- 
ment. A reunified, stable, and secure 
Cyprus would be such an achievement. 

We need to recognize, however, that 
our security assistance to Greece and 
Turkey is not given as a favor but 
rather to deter aggression upon NATO. 
U.S. national interests are at stake. 
Greek security needs deserve to be fully 
met. And Turkey — working to 
strengthen democracy, curb terrorism, 
and defend NATO along its vast com- 
mon border with the Soviet Union — also 
deserves every penny we have re- 
quested. 

The path ahead will not be easy. But 
bringing harmony to NATO's southern 
flank and to the troubled island of 
Cyprus is a goal worthy of our most 
special efforts. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 14, 1984. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and 
Economic Council Meeting 



by Mark Palmer 

Remarks to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade 
and Economic Council meeting in New 
York City on May 23, 1984- Mr. Palmer- 
is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Euro- 
pean and Canadian Affairs. 

This council is meeting today at a time 
when U.S. -Soviet relations are "normal." 
Unfortunately since the Second World 
War, the norm has been that we were 
not doing much constructive business 
together. With only very brief periods of 
limited cooperation, practically every 
year has found us focused more on our 
differences than on the fact that the two 
most powerful nations in the world work 
together. 

The past decade has witnessed 
several sustained efforts at cooperation 
by the United States. Speaking frankly, 
we believe that each of them has been 
cut short because of Soviet actions. Not 
because we want to engage in an 
academic exercise in history, but 
because we believe greater understand- 



ing is essential as we strive to open a 
new and more durable period in our 
relations, I would like to review our 
understanding of the two most recent, 
ultimately stillborn efforts by this coun- 
try. 

Arms Control Issues 

•During the first half of 1983 we were 
beginning to make some tangible prog- 
ress. Both sides emerged from the round 
of strategic arms reductions talks 
(START) which concluded last summer 
with the view that progress was being 
made. We had each taken steps to meet 
the other's concerns. While there was 
still a long way to go, at least the direc- 
tion was positive. Similarly we were able 
to conclude a new long-term grains 
agreement which raised the levels for 
both sides. And in the United States the 
release of the Pentecostals was inter- 
preted as a gesture of goodwill. 

We are all aware of the tragedy of 
the Korean airliner. Some 61 Americans 
were killed. Nevertheless in the course 



75 



EUROPE 



of the fall, President Reagan proposed 
further steps in both the strategic and 
intermediate- range nuclear arms talks in 
Geneva. He recognized, as has every 
American President since Harry 
Truman, that in the nuclear era, there is 
no sane alternative to efforts at nuclear 
arms control between the two nations 
with the capacity to destroy civilization 
as we know it. 

Despite these sincere efforts, and 
despite the fact that the United States 
had agreed to sit down at the 
negotiating table and to stay there for 2 
years while the Soviet Union deployed 
ever-larger numbers of SS-20 missiles, 
when NATO began its deployments the 
Soviet Union walked out of the talks. 

Again, despite this negative Soviet 
action, the President determined early 
this year to once more attempt to move 
in a positive direction. 

Our policy of dealing with the Soviet 
Union on the basis of strength, realism, 
and negotiation was authoritatively ex- 
pressed by the President in his January 
16th address. At the time, he stated his 
personal commitment to seeking ways to 
bridge the very real differences between 
our two countries. 

The President subsequently reaf- 
firmed and expanded on the substance 
of his January 16th speech in a series of 
personal letters that he despatched to 
General Secretary Chernenko. 

We have followed up the President's 
statements in diplomatic channels. We 
made clear to the Soviet leadership that 
we are prepared to engage in substan- 
tive dialogue on problems now before 
the two countries, including many of 
those issues identified by the Soviet side 
as well as by the United States. In re- 
cent months, Secretary Shultz has met a 
number of times with Ambassador 
Dobrynin in Washington. Ambassador 
Hartman, who had returned several 
times to Washington for special con- 
sultations and meetings with the Presi- 
dent on this subject, has had similar ses- 
sions with First Deputy Chairman 
Gromyko. 

In the course of both this cor- 
respondence and these meetings, we 
have put forward concrete proposals. 

In the field of arms control, we 
have, of course, urged the resumption of 
formal START and INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear force] negotiations in 
Geneva but have also stressed our 
readiness to explore the substance of 
these issues in private channels away 
from any publicity and without precondi- 
tions. In doing so, we have underscored 
our readiness to pursue a give-and-take 
process in which the concerns of both 



76 



sides and the differing force structures 
of the two sides are to be taken into ac- 
count. 

As you are aware, during this period 
we also tabled a new draft chemical 
weapons treaty at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva. We have in- 
troduced a new initiative at the conven- 
tional force talks in Vienna, which at- 
tempts to build upon constructive 
elements of the East's latest proposals 
and to find a creative way around the 
longstanding dispute over data. 

Regarding the Conference on Disar- 
mament in Europe, we invited the 
Soviet Delegation head to Washington 
during this past recess. Because he was 
unable to come, U.S. delegation chief 
James Goodby went instead to Moscow 
late last month to explore the 
possibilities for moving forward and par- 
ticularly to permit full discussion of 
Eastern and Western proposals. 

At our initiative, a team of U.S. 
communications experts went to Moscow 
as well in late April to discuss our pro- 
posals to improve the "hotline" linking 
our two capitals. Considerable progress 
was made on most technical aspects, yet 
the Soviet side seems to be raising 
issues to prevent the early conclusion of 
the draft agreement we have tabled. 

In its public statements, the Soviet 
Union has expressed concern over the 
dangers posed by "militarization of outer 
space." We have offered to conduct a 
private, high-level exchange of views on 
space arms control. Moreover last year, 
in response to Soviet concerns, we pro- 
posed discussions on the President's 
Strategic Defense Initiative and its im- 
plications among our governments' ex- 
perts in START and the Standing Con- 
sultative Commission (SCC). While the 
Soviets turned aside this offer, we have 
in the latest session of the SCC pro- 
posed a special working group on 
strategic defense issues. 

We have proposed to the Soviet 
Union consultations on a number of 
regional issues, including southern 
Africa and the Middle East. We stand 
ready to proceed with such exchanges. 

We have proposed a series of steps 
to improve bilateral relations, which I 
will not detail here. 

It was logical to assume that this 
long list of constructive initiatives would 
have been greeted positively by the 
Soviet side, at least with a recognition 
that we were moving in the right direc- 
tion. But quite the opposite has 
occurred. 

Indeed, it appears that the Soviet 
Union made a deliberate decision in late 
April to chill bilateral relations with us. 



The Olympic boycott is but the most visi- 
ble action. In addition, the Soviet side 
has turned down our invitation to 
Academy of Sciences Vice President 
Velikhov to meet to discuss space arms 
control and introduced obstacles to prog- 
ress on a range of bilateral issues. 

There has been a sudden, sharp in- 
crease in attacks on the United States. 
Senior Soviet officials had for years said 
that our rhetoric was the chief obstacle 
to improving relations. Now they 
dismiss as of no importance the con- 
structive statements of the Administra- 
tion. The Soviet side called on us to 
discuss a variety of subjects, from an- 
tisatellite weapons to the Middle East. 
We have agreed and now the Soviet 
Union is unwilling to sit down to talk. 

Whatever the specific motives 
behind these negative actions, the pat- 
tern seems to be that whenever the 
Soviet leadership comes up against hard 
decisions, it chooses a path that results 
in no serious discussion and no practical 
cooperation. This is obviously not the 
Soviet role we would prefer. Rather we 
seek a Soviet Union ready to be a 
serious partner in negotiations on a full 
range of issues as the means of building 
a more constructive relationship. 

We will neither be discouraged nor 
intimidated by the current Soviet ap- 
proach. We will neither reward nor im- 
itate Soviet tactics. As Secretary Shultz 
has said: "We will continue to be 
realistic . . . and we will continue to be 
reasonable and ready to sit down [with 
the Soviet Union] whenever they are of 
a like mind." 

Trade Issues 

One area where our two countries have 
shown they can work together to mutu; 
benefit is the one you are meeting to 
discuss — trade. Our economic relation- 
ship with the U.S.S.R. has been the sub 
ject of much debate and study in recent 
years. Unfortunately, much of this 
discussion has taken place based on a 
misunderstanding of what the Ad- 
ministration's policies toward economic 
relations with the Soviet Union actually 
are. I hope to clear up some of that con 
fusion today. 

Our policy toward trade with the 
U.S.S.R. is clear. Trade can go forward 
as long as it is mutually beneficial, does 
not subsidize the Soviet economy, and 
does not contribute to the Soviet 
strategic or military capability. Let me 
stress this — our policy is not one of 
economic warfare. We have been able b la 
take a number of small positive steps ol lit 
benefit to both sides in the field of 






" 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



j cade. This was in accord with our ef- 
Drts to preserve the structure of our 
conomic relationship with the Soviets. 
Ve want that structure in place to build 
pon if future conditions permit. 

• We signed a new long-term grain 
greement providing for a 50% increase 
1 the minimum Soviet purchase require- 
lent last August. 

Our fisheries agreement with the 
oviets, which permits the joint fisheries 
enture to operate in Seattle and 
lakhodka, has been renewed three 
mes, most recently for an 18-month 
»rm. 

We are currently considering the 
mewal of our 10-year long-term 
xmomic, industrial, and technical 
^operation agreement. We are hopeful 
lis agreement can be extended. 

Last October, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
rade and Economic Council cospon- 
>red an agribusiness trade show in 
oscow. We think this is a good exam- 
e of the kind of trade between our two 
>untries for which our policy calls. We 
idorsed that exhibition, as we are sup- 
>rting this plenary session with our 
•esence. We will continue to support 
uncil activities appropriate to our 
ilicy on trade with the Soviet Union. 

Additional steps forward in the 
ade relationship are possible, 
awever, the prospects for such steps 
ill necessarily be influenced by the 
>viet approach to our concerns across 
e broad range of our relation- 
ip — arms control, regional issues, 
iman rights, as well as trade. 

Trade is not a "golden bridge" that 
• itself will lead to better relations be- 
'een our two countries. But it can be 

important part in a process of slow 
pansion and improvement of relations 
many fields. That is our hope; that is 
ir objective. 

I cannot appear before an audience 
lich includes a number of influential 
ficials from the Soviet Union without 
entioning a case which weighs heavily 
i the minds of the American people to- 
.y. There is great warmth in this coun- 
y for the peoples of the Soviet Union, 
hen we are together as human beings, 
ere is a natural affinity, a spontaneous 
}seness and respect. When we think 
out you, we remember most of all 
ur incredible courage during the war 
id the great intellectual contributions 
id courage of individual Russian 
riters, scientists, and others through- 
it history. Among your many extraor- 
nary peoples, there are two who are 
irticularly close to our hearts — a 



Jly 1984 



1 



woman who was wounded three times in 
the war and a man who was honored 
with every possible Soviet award and 
the Nobel Prize for Peace. We earnestly 
hope that you will be true to the best of 
your traditions and respond to their ap- 
peal. They are following the path of non- 
violence which Tolstoy and Gandhi trod. 
They deserve your respect and support. 
In closing, let me reiterate that for 
our part we will continue to look for 



ways our two countries can work 
together. We are prepared to be patient. 
As the President stated in his January 
16th speech: "Our policy toward the 
Soviet Union ... is a policy not just for 
this year but for the long term ... we 
want more than deterrence; we seek 
genuine cooperation; we seek progress 
for peace." ■ 



The Baltic States' Struggle for Freedom 



by Elliott Abrams 

Address before the 3d annual Human 
Rights Conference of the Baltic-American 
Freedom League in Los Angeles on 
March 17, 198b. Mr. Abrams is Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. 

Students of European history all know 
that toward the end of the 18th century 
the kingdom of Poland was partitioned 
three times among its neighbors and, as a 
result, the Polish state ceased to exist. 
Students of European history also know 
that liberal opinion throughout Europe 
was scandalized by Poland's fate, and that 
this feeling of indignation over a terrible 
historical injustice done to a "martyr na- 
tion" was a potent factor in the rebirth of 
the Polish state in the aftermath of World 
War I. 

I mention these facts here tonight not 
because they are unknown to anyone in 
this audience— on the contrary, I am sure 
they are quite well known to all of you— 
but rather because the difference in the 
reactions of liberal opinion to the fate of 
Poland in the 19th century and the fate of 
the Baltic states in the 20th century has 
been so very striking. In the case of 
Poland's loss of statehood, "enlightened 
public opinion" was genuinely outraged. 
In the case of the Baltic states, however, 
"enlightened public opinion" has often ap- 
peared considerably less than outraged at 
the forcible incorporation of three sover- 
eign states into the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent tragic fate of the Baltic 
peoples. It seems to me that this lack of 
interest in the Baltic states is both 
astonishing and revealing, and I propose 
to examine its causes tonight. First, 
though, let me read you excerpts from a 
statement by President Reagan which 
provides the immediate historical back- 
ground to the current situation. The 



President's proclamation was issued on 
June 13, 1983, to commemorate Baltic 
Freedom Day: 

In 1940, Soviet armies invaded and oc- 
cupied the independent countries of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. The peaceful Western- 
oriented Baltic nations were crushed by the 
force of arms of their hostile neighbor. Under 
the cynical arrangements of the infamous 
Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, the Soviet 
Union forcibly incorporated the three Baltic 
Republics into its empire. 

Following the Soviet takeover, tens of 
thousands of the Baltic peoples were subject to 
imprisonment, deportation, persecution, and 
execution. Their religious, cultural, and 
historical heritage has been denigrated. The 
foreign political system which now controls 
their homelands has attempted to force these 
unwilling people to accept an alien life of 
totalitarian domination. Bui. it has failed. 

Today, the Baltic peoples continue to 
struggle to attain the freedoms we enjoy. 
These men and women still suffer harsh im- 
prisonment, banishment, and persecution for 
their beliefs. Brave Lithuanians, Latvians, and 
Estonians still seek to exercise their human 
rights to think, speak, and believe as their con- 
science directs them. 

President Reagan went on to endorse 
the Baltic peoples' "right to determine 
their own national destiny," a view which 
the American people strongly endorse. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
human rights violations in the Baltic 
states are rarely reported in our media. 
Among the group of states which calls it- 
self nonaligned, moreover, the struggle of 
the Baltic peoples for self-determination 
has never been recognized, despite the 
professed adherence of the Nonaligned 
Movement to the cause of self-determina- 
tion. And at the United Nations, where 
ringing denunciations of colonialism have 
become, by now, a staple of UN rhetoric, 
virtually the only time you hear about 
Soviet colonialism in general— and about 
the plight of the Baltic states in particu- 



77 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



lar— is when the United States raises the 
subject. So I return to the question with 
which I began: Why this silence? Why 
this lack of interest? 



The Soviet Union as a 
"Progressive" Force 

Part of the reason, it seems to me, has to 
do with the fact thai the Soviet Union is 
still seen by some people as a "progres- 
sive" force in world politics. In the 19th 
century, of course, tsarist Russia occu- 
pied a very different position in the eyes 
of public opinion. It was seen as the epit- 
ome of reaction, the most formidable ob- 
stacle to political progress. "I do not trust 
any Russian. As soon as a Russian worms 
his way in, all hells breaks loose." So 
wrote one of the most famous 19th cen- 
tury progressives, Karl Marx, and he was 
far from alone in harboring such senti- 
ments. Under these circumstances, it is 
not at all surprising that liberals seized 
upon Russia's role in the partition of 
Poland as yet another illustration of the 
incorrigible character of the tsarist state. 

In the wake of the Bolshevik revolu- 
tion, of course, all this changed. Suddenly, 
"the last had become first"— the world's 
most reactionary state was transformed 
overnight into the world's most progres- 
sive state. While disillusionment with the 
Soviet Union has since set in— to the point 
where criticizing Moscow is no longer 
thought of, in "progressive" circles, as a 
crime against humanity— the tendency to 
"apologize" for Soviet actions, "to ex- 
plain"— and thereby subtly excuse— So- 
viet crimes remains in force even today. 
Thus, we are told that the Soviet annexa- 
tion of the Baltic states must be under- 
stood in terms of the imperatives of 
Soviet history, foremost among which has 
been the search for security. We are also 
told that the Soviet leadership is chroni- 
cally "insecure" and that Baltic independ 
ence would bruise the tender psyches of 
Politburo members. In short, the incor- 
poration of the Baltic states into the 
Soviet Union and the deprivation of the 
human rights of the Baltic peoples by 
Soviet authorities|are seen, somehow, as a 
necessary contribution to the mental 
health of the Soviet leadership. 

I do not think there is any need to 
spend much time over arguments of this 
sort. The spurious character of this line of 
reasoning becomes apparent the moment 
we begin to inquire whether Soviet incor- 
poration of the Baltic states has alleviated 
Moscow's sense of insecurity. Well no, we 
are told, the Soviets are still insecure— so 
insecure, in fact, that they are compelled 
to dominate the rest of Eastern Europe; 
to threaten Western Europe with their 
missile deployments; to send troops into 



78 



Afghanistan; to undertake the largest 
peacetime military buildup in history; and 
to intervene in Africa, the Caribbean, and 
Latin America. At this point, it becomes 
very clear that the argument about Soviet 
"insecurity" is no more than a convenient 
justification for Soviet imperialism. 

The "Realistic" Point of View 

There is, however, a more sophisticated 
argument which is sometimes used to jus- 
tify a lack of interest in the fate of the 
Baltic states. This argument purports to 
be based on "realism." The Soviet incor- 
poration of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia— these so-called "realists" con- 
tend—is a fact of life. It may have been 
immoral, and we may not like it, but it is 
irreversible; nothing can be done about it. 
And since nothing can be done about it, 
nothing should be done about it. After all, 
why engage in futile gestures which can 
only serve to exacerbate Soviet- American 
relations? 

Because this kind of reasoning ap- 
pears to be based on a hard-headed ap- 
praisal of the facts, it appeals to quite a 
number of people, many of whom are not 
at all pro-Soviet or "progressive" in their 
general political orientation. For this 
reason, it tends to be much more effective 
than the obviously spurious Soviet "inse- 
curity" argument. Nevertheless, it, too, is 
extremely misleading. There are three 
questions, in particular, which demon- 
strate the fallacy of the "realistic" point 
of view. 

• The first question one should ask 
the realists is this: was it "realistic" for 
Churchill to defy Hitler in 1939 and for de 
Gaulle to insist that he, rather than Mar- 
shal Petain, was the legitimate spokes- 
man for France? In our own history, was 
it realistic to think that 13 small colonies 
could defeat the British empire and 
establish a lasting, united, democratic 
order? 

• The next question one should ask is: 
if the Baltic people were allowed to deter- 
mine their future in free elections, can 
there be any doubt, realistically, over 
what the outcome of those elections 
would be? 

• And the third question I would ask 
is this: in an age such as ours when all the 
colonial empires but one have vanished, 
when even old and established nations are 
confronted by separatist movements— in 
such an age, is it realistic to assume that 
the sole remaining colonial empire, the 
Soviet empire, will survive forever? 

These questions, I think, point out the 
fallacies in the so-called "realistic" point 
of view. The simple fact is that nations, 
and even civilizations, do not survive by 



realism alone. During the Dark Ages, for 
example, it may not have been realistic 
for a handful of monks, secluded in vari- 
ous monasteries throughout Europe, to 
hope that Christianity would survive. 
But, in large part due to their efforts, the 
Christian faith did survive. Today, some 
may find the struggle of the Baltic 
peoples to hold on to their national cul- 
tures and their dream of national inde- 
pendence unrealistic; but it may well be 
precisely this lack of realism that will 
triumph in the end. 

The prospects for the Baltic peoples 
to regain their national independence im- 
prove considerably, moreover, once we 
take a longer view of history. When we 
do so, we can see at once that the Soviet 
empire is actually a historical anachron- 
ism—clearly at variance with the great 
historical currents of our time. In the 
aftermath of the American Revolution, 
there existed only two democracies: the 
United States and Switzerland. The rest 
of the world consisted overwhelmingly of 
monarchies and empires. Today, nearly 
all the monarchies are gone; all the em- 
pires but one are gone; and there are 
some 50 democracies. Is there any real- 
istic reason to assume that this trend can 
be reversed? 

The great fallacy of the so-called 
"realistic" school of thought is that its 
horizons are limited by its particular mo- 
ment in history, which it wrongly 
assumes will continue indefinitely. In the 
case of the Soviet empire, this leads to 
the assumption that it is impregnable, 
when in fact it is already being eroded by 
the vast tides of history. In this respect, 
Soviet leaders appear to be more realistic 
They are aware that demographic trends 
are leading to a majority non-Russian 
population in their empire by the end of 
this century. As a result, they have 
stepped up the attempt toward linguistic 
and cultural homogenization. Soviet 
leaders now speak of the "fusion of na- 
tions" as the "final goal" of the party's 
nationalities policy. Indeed, the Soviet 
constitution poses "social homogeneity" 
as a goal of the Soviet state. 

The Baltic peoples are particularly- 
vulnerable to such a policy. Their own 
populations were diminished by the 
casualties inflicted during World War II, 
by emigration, and by the massive depor- 
tations that accompanied Sovietization. 
Moreover, they have had to absorb an un 
usually large in-migration of non-Baltic 
persons, mostly Russians, from the Sovie 
Union. By 1970, 1 million non-Baltic 
Soviet citizens had moved to the Baltic 
coast. Eighty percent of them settled in 
the two smallest states, Latvia and 
Estonia, whose combined total populatior > 
in 1970 was only 3.7 million. According to 



U 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



ita in the 1979 Soviet census, in-migra- 
on to the Baltic states continues and 
nounted to an additional 226,000 persons 
jring 1970-79. 

As a consequence of this inflow of 
ttlers, by 1983 only about 53% of the 
Dpulation of Latvia consisted of ethnic 
atvians, compared to 77% in 1939. For 
stonians, the figure was about 63%, 
>mpared to 92% during independence. 
nly in Lithuania, because of its higher 
rth rate and lower rate of in-migration, 
Des the proportion of Lithuanians appear 
i have actually increased slightly to 80%. 
ata in the 1979 Soviet census suggest, 
Dwever, that the rate of natural increase 

Lithuania has dropped substantially, 
hile the rate of in-migration has in- 
•eased by almost 60%. Lithuania may 
>on be faced with demographic changes 
milar to those of its Baltic neighbors. 

Moreover, most Russians who move 
i the Baltic states continue to use their 
itive language, and the teaching of Rus- 
an is given a privileged position by law. 
s a result, there is strong pressure on 
ie Baltic population to acquire and use 
ussian in school, at work, in everyday 
irsuits such as shopping, and in govern- 
ent and political activities. There is a 
meral trend, most marked in Latvia and 
stonia, toward increased use of Russian 

higher education for teaching the sci- 
lces, while the Baltic languages are re- 
rved for "soft" subjects such as the 
if -ts. This has aroused anxiety that these 
nguages, a principal repository of Baltic 
hnic identity and culture, are destined 

become linguistic relics. 

he Quest for Human Rights 

hese trends underscore the necessity 
r the United States to do its utmost to 
•inforce the distinctive national identity 
' the Baltic peoples. President Reagan 
early understands this. On Novem- 
=sr 18, 1983, in a message announcing the 
itablishment of a new Baltic States Ser- 
ce Division of Radio Liberty, the Presi- 
3nt declared: 

The establishment of the Baltic radio divi- 
on reaffirms the United States policy of not 
'cognizing the forcible and unlawful incorpo- 
ition of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into 
ie Soviet Union. The new call signal, "the 
altic States Service of Radio Liberty," will 
Enforce the distinct identities of the Baltic 
tates and separate them from the rest of the 
oviet Union. 

Another means available to the 
Jnited States to reinforce the distinctive 
ientity of the Baltic states is by giving 
/ide prominence to specific instances of 
! uman rights abuse. I am pleased to 
eport that we in the State Department 



uly1984 



are, indeed, doing this. Our Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices con- 
tains a separate report on Estonia, Lat- 
via, and Lithuania— a report, I might add, 
which did not exist under the previous 
Administration. At international human 
rights fora, such as the recently con- 
cluded Madrid conference, Ambassador 
Max Kampelman raised specific cases of 
Soviet human rights violations in the 
Baltic states— cases like that of Juris 
Bumeisters, a Latvian Social Democrat 
sentenced to 15 years in a strict regime 
camp for his political convictions; Dr. 
Algirdas Statkevicius, a member of the 
Lithuanian Helsinki monitoring group 
sentenced to compulsory psychiatric 
treatment for engaging in "anti-Soviet 
agitation and propaganda;" and Dr. Juri 
Kukk, an Estonian human rights activist 
who died of a hunger strike in a transit 
prison where he had been sentenced for 
"anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." 
At a meeting of the UN Human Rights 
Commission, which ended only yesterday, 
Ambassador Richard Schifter cited the 
cases of two Latvians who have recently 
received long prison sentences. They are 
Gunnars Freimanis, who was sentenced 
to 4 years in a strict regime camp and 2 
years of internal exile, and Gunnars 
Astra, who was sentenced to 7 years of 
incarceration and 5 years of internal exile. 
One of the charges against Astra was that 
he had distributed a Latvian translation 
of George Orwell's 198^. Needless to say, 
we shall continue to protest these and 
other human rights violations. 

It is important to stress, moreover, 
that in trying to improve the human 
rights situation in the Baltic states, the 
United States is not simply helping the 
Baltic peoples; we are also helping our- 
selves. The quest for human rights is not 
only a moral crusade; it is also directly 
related to Western security. To under- 
stand why this is so, we must recognize 
that throughout the Soviet colonial em- 
pire—and I include the captive nations of 
Eastern Europe as part of that colonial 
empire— a fateful struggle is currently 
underway. The struggle is between gov- 
ernment and society, and the issue at 
stake is a fundamental one: can there be 
such a thing as a genuinely autonomous 
sphere of private life under communism, 
or is the government entitled, at any time 
and for any reason, to invade, control, or 
take over every facet of life? 

The implications of this struggle for 
Western security should be obvious. If 
communist governments were ever to 
grant their citizens any clearly defined, 
inalienable rights, then the ability of rul- 
ing communist parties to mobilize the 
populace against the West would become 



strictly circumscribed. The great, indeed 
the paramount, question of whether the 
world is to be at peace or at war would no 
longer depend, as it does today, on how a 
handful of communist rulers interprets 
the so-called "correlation of forces." In- 
stead, society in communist countries 
would be able to exert a restraining influ- 
ence on the policies and designs of the 
communist ruling class. 

Of course, the principal aim of the 
totalitarian political system established 
by Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet Union, 
and imposed by the Red Army on the 
people of Eastern Europe, is to prevent 
any such development from occurring. By 
bringing the enormous power of the state 
to bear against society, the communist 
oligarchy believes that it can prevent the 
development of society as an independ- 
ent, self-organizing, autonomous force. 
For this reason, it categorically refuses to 
accept the idea that an individual enjoys 
inalienable human rights— rights, that is, 
that are his simply by virtue of his hu- 
manity and are beyond the power of the 
state either to confer or revoke. The poli- 
cies stemming from that refusal are as 
well known as they are contemptible. 
Soviet and East European citizens trying 
to monitor their governments' compliance 
with the human rights provisions of the 
Helsinki accords have been attacked, im- 
prisoned, and placed in mental institu- 
tions. Emigration has decreased dramat- 
ically. The brave men and women who 
signed the "Baltic Appeal" in 1979 calling 
for a repudiation of the Nazi-Soviet pact 
and the restoration of full self-determina- 
tion to the Baltic states have been sent to 
labor camps, exiled, or confined to psychi- 
atric hospitals. Fathers Tamkevicius and 
Svarinskas have been sent to prison 
despite petitions signed by some 81,000 
Lithuanians on their behalf. 

Some of these repressive measures 
may well succeed in the short term. In- 
dividuals can be silenced— for a while; 
trade unions can be outlawed— for a 
while; even an entire people can be placed 
in shackles— for a while. Ideas, how- 
ever, cannot be destroyed, and what de 
Tocqueville said almost 150 years ago 
about the idea of democracy applies with 
equal force to the idea of human rights: 
"It is universal, it is durable, it constantly 
eludes all human interference, and all 
events as well as all men contribute to its 
progress." For that reason, I am confi- 
dent that the last word on the human 
rights situation in the Baltic states— and, 
indeed, on the human rights situation 
throughout the Soviet bloc— has not yet 
been spoken. 

There is another factor, quite apart 
from the long-term historical trends in 



79 



MIDDLE EAST 



favor of democracy and human rights, 
which provides a basis for optimism about 
the future of the Baltic states. In 1936, 
when Stalin was informed that one of his 
intended victims was putting up an unex- 
pected resistance, he is said to have 
asked: "Do you know how much our state 
weighs, with all the factories, machines, 
the army, with all the armaments and the 
navy? . . . Can any one man withstand the 
pressure of that astronomical weight?" 
Well, today we know that when men and 
women are armed with the idea of human 
rights, they are capable of withstanding 
the "astronomical weight" of the Soviet 
state. I am referring, of course, to indi- 
viduals like Zanis Skudras, Reverends 
Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigitas 
Tamkevicius, Mart Niklus, and a host of 
other lesser known men and women who 
comprise the movement for human rights 
in the Baltic states and who have been un- 
justly prosecuted because of this. It 
seems perfectly obvious to me that as 
Western public opinion involves itself in 
their struggle, we rediscover the moral 
wellsprings of our own democratic way of 
life and regain the moral self-confidence 
necessary to conduct an effective defense 
against the onslaught of totalitarianism. 
For the human rights activists in their 
dedication to the idea that men are of 
right free, in their sacrifices for that free- 
dom, in their reminder to us that this 
freedom is no abstraction but the very 
core of their lives as individuals— in all 
this, they show us that this struggle for 
liberty against oppression is the great 
moral struggle of our time. 

In a recent audience with more than 
1,000 Lithuanian pilgrims, Pope John 
Paul II urged them to "remain in soli- 
darity with the church in your land of 
origin." I would like to take this oppor- 
tunity to declare my solidarity, and the 
solidarity of the Reagan Administration, 
with the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia and to applaud you for your work 
on behalf of the Baltic peoples. Their 
cause is just; their courage is awesome; 
and their faith is inspiring. I am con- 
vinced that their struggle will be crowned 
with success. ■ 



U.S. Response to Saudi Request 
for Military Assistance 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the Senate Ap- 
propriations Committee on June 5, 1984. 
Ambassador Armacost is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 1 

I welcome the opportunity to discuss the 
Administration's decision to respond 
favorably to specific Saudi requests for 
military equipment and support. Before 
addressing our recent decision to sell 
Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia and 
send an air force KC-10 tanker to the 
Kingdom, I would like to note how those 
decisions complement our broader policy 
not only in the gulf but throughout 
Southwest Asia. 

Our policy in the gulf enjoys broad 
bipartisan support and reflects the deci- 
sions of two Administrations. It consists 
of four crucial elements: 

• A clear recognition of the need to 
ensure the free flow of oil to the West; 

• The strategic necessity of contain- 
ing the expansion of Soviet and other 
radical influence throughout the region; 

• A consequent need to respond 
firmly and decisively to requests from 
the gulf states for appropriate and 
justifiable security assistance. The states 
in the area must be confident that our 
interests in the gulf are sufficiently im- 
portant for us to help in a crisis. The 
United States has to be seen as a credi- 
ble partner in the search for stability 
and security; and 

• Whatever steps we take must 
complement our efforts to achieve peace 
between the Arab states and Israel. Our 
Middle East policy is built on the 
premise that we can foster and en- 
courage a secure, strong, and confident 
Israel while, at the same time, helping 
to ensure that our moderate Arab 
friends have the support and assistance 
they need to oppose Soviet and radical 
expansionism in the area. These two 
goals are not contradictory; they are 
mutually supportive. Our policy toward 
the war in the gulf reflects that reality. 

Regional Security Concerns 

The Iran-Iraq war has gone on for near- 
ly 4 years — at enormous cost in human 
lives and treasure. The land war re- 
mains stalemated, without any prospec- 
tive end in sight. The Iranians have 



amassed heavy forces in the south in 
preparation for a major offensive. We 
do not believe the result of such an of- 
fensive, if it comes, will alter the 
stalemate. The Iranians remain adamant 
in their demand for a military victory 
and the fall of the Iraqi Government. As 
long as Iranian intransigence continues, 
a diplomatic solution will be difficult to 
achieve. 

Nevertheless, we must continue to 
exert our efforts, along with our friends 
and allies, to seek an end to the fighting 
and a negotiated settlement through 
diplomatic means. We have pursued this 
course bilaterally as well as multilateral- 
ly, including in the United Nations. We 
have made clear that we are neutral in 
the war, we uphold the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of both sides, and w< 
sell arms to neither. We have been par- 
ticularly concerned about attacks on 
nonbelligerent shipping serving neutral 
ports, which is a dangerous escalation 
and widening of the war. However, as 
we have stated in the past, we have 
deplored attacks on all nonbelligerent 
shipping and firmly support the right of 
freedom of navigation in international 
waters. 

The gulf states share our desire to 
deescalate the current threat through 
diplomatic rather than military means. 
Should diplomatic efforts fail, the gulf 
states believe they can defend their 
ships and oil installations primarily with 
their own military resources. It is in our 
interest to support the efforts of Saudi 
Arabia and the gulf states to provide foi 
their own defense. We believe that the 
United States should encourage those 
states which seek to acquire the means 
of protecting themselves from aggres- 
sion rather than depending on forces 
from the outside. 

Only as a last resort would the 
United States consider direct military in 
volvement— and then only in ap- 
propriate circumstances and if we were 
asked to do so. American military ac- 
tions in the gulf would require the 
cooperation of the gulf Arab states to 
provide the necessary facilities. We 
would also consult closely with Con- 
gress. We would have intensive discus- 
sions with our major allies to see what 
mutually helpful roles we could play. 

Our interests and those of our 
closest allies and friends are directly 
threatened by the escalation of the war 



an? 
r. 



80 



Department of State Bulletin) 



MIDDLE EAST 



i the gulf. The Iraqi attacks on snip- 
ing and the Iranian retaliatory attacks 
i nonbelligerent shipping to neutral 
3rts has raised the war to a new and 
ingerous level. In its first three attacks 
i oil tankers, Iran appears to have 
liberately targeted Kuwait- and Saudi- 
ag ships near the Saudi coast. Saudi 
rabia, as the largest of the Gulf 
ooperation Council (GCC) states with 
le most extensive infrastructure and oil 
.cilities, could be directly threatened by 
irther escalation. If the war spreads to 
lese GCC states, it could endanger 
audi Arabia and deny crucial oil sup- 
ies to much of the free world. 

Access to Persian Gulf oil is vital to 
e world economy. Some 20-25% of the 
1 consumed in the free world is pro- 
iced in the gulf, which is now export- 
g nearly 8 million barrels of oil per 
ly, much of it to our major allies in 
urope and Asia. Although only 3% of 
tr oil comes directly from the gulf, we 
nnot be isolated from the world oil 
arket. Disruptions in the market and 
e concomitant increase in prices that 
uld follow would directly and adverse- 
affect the United States. The recovery 
>w underway in our own economy and 
at of the rest of the world could be cut 
ort. 

jsponse to Saudi Request 

e, therefore, faced — indeed, we con- 
lue to face — a dangerous situation 
iich threatens vital Western interests, 
such a situation, it is natural and sen- 
)le to support the efforts of the gulf 

! ites to provide for their own defense, 
tudi Arabia, facing an immediate 
nger to its security, requested on May 
d to purchase on an urgent basis air 
fense-related equipment. The principle 
at a sound defense is the basic deter- 
int to aggression has long been a fun- 
mental premise of U.S. policy that has 
joyed broad public support. 

In addition to requesting accelerated 
livery of certain munitions already in 

le sales pipeline, the Saudis sought im- 
ediate delivery of Stinger air defense 
issiles and provision of aerial refueling 
pability for their F-15s. 

These requests are clearly related, 
lr own concept of air defense calls for 
layered system. The basic idea is to in- 
rdict an intruder as far out as possible, 
th your planes, and from there work 
.ck through long-range area defense 
issiles to short-range or point defense 
individual targets. Tanker support in- 
eases the duration and effectiveness of 
mbat air patrols, the Stinger enhances 
lint defense. Both items were needed 



Jly 1984 



urgently, and we were determined to 
respond immediately. 

Our response to the military require- 
ment must be seen in the political con- 
text in the region. 

First, Iran must understand that the 
desire we, our allies, and the states in 
the region have for a peaceful solution is 
not a reaction born of weakness. 
Statements without action to support 
them have no deterrent effect and may 
invite aggression. Provision of the 
Stingers and the tanker are firm proof 
of our support for the principles we have 
been declaring. This step was taken 



without the deployment of American 
troops or direct action on our part. In- 
deed with these actions we sought to 
make direct intervention unnecessary. 
They were consistent with the desire of 
Saudi Arabia and the gulf states to han- 
dle the problem themselves. 

Second, we also had to look at the 
political implications of our decision on 
our relations with Saudi Arabia and the 
moderate Arab states. Our bilateral rela- 
tionship with Saudi Arabia is the 
keystone of our strategic interests in the 
gulf, and central to that relationship is 
our security assistance program. If we 
failed to provide urgently needed sup- 



U.S. to Supply Military 
Equipment to Saudi Arabia 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS, 
MAY 29, 1984 1 

I have two announcements to make with 
regard to supply of military assistance 
and sales to Saudi Arabia. 

With regard to tankers, the United 
States is augmenting the aerial refueling 
tanker unit assigned to Saudi Arabia 
from three tankers to four tankers to 
enhance support operations of the U.S. 
AW ACS [airborne warning and control 
system aircraft] and Saudi F-15s. 

One additional aircraft — a KC-10 
Extender— has been deployed to supple- 
ment the three KC-135s already pres- 
ent. The United States has deployed 
aerial tankers in Saudi Arabia as part of 
the AW ACS operations since 1980. The 
additional tanker aircraft could be used 
to fuel U.S. aircraft stationed in Saudi 
Arabia or Royal Saudi Air force F-15 
aircraft. 

U.S. aerial tankers have operated 
with Saudi F-15s in the past as part of 
our training program. We approved the 
sale of DC-3 aerial tankers to Saudi 
Arabia in 1982. The Saudi tankers will 
be delivered beginning in 1986. There 
has been no decision as to the length of 
stay of the additional tanker aircraft. 

As to an emergency sale of Stingers, 
in recent days, neutral shipping has been 
attacked with increasing frequency and 
in an ever-widening area in international 
waters in the gulf. Further escalation 
could threaten Saudi Arabia and oil sup- 
plies on which much of the free world 
depends. In view of the urgency of the 
situation and our long and close relation- 
ship with the Saudi Kingdom, the Presi- 
dent has authorized the immediate sale 



to Saudi Arabia of 200 Stinger short- 
range, air defense missile systems (i.e., 
launchers and missiles) and an additional 
200 missile reloads. Due to the current 
emergency circumstances, which require 
an immediate sale in the national securi- 
ty interests of the United States, the 
President acted under his special 
authority in Section 36(b) of the Arms 
Export Control Act to waive the normal 
30-day waiting period after congres- 
sional notification. 

The Stinger launchers and missiles 
are being transferred immediately. 
Saudi Arabia has agreed to strict 
safeguards to ensure the security of the 
missiles and will pay the full cost for the 
system and its transportation. Because 
the Stinger system can be deployed in 
the field shortly after delivery, its im- 
mediate transfer will quickly contribute 
to Saudi Arabian air defenses. By pro- 
viding a deterrent against hostile ac- 
tions, this transfer lowers the risk of 
broader conflict. The President's deter- 
mination reflects U.S. grave concern 
with the growing escalation in the gulf 
and its implication for the security of 
our friends in the region. 

In light of the unstable situation in 
the gulf, we also are advancing, by 
about 3 months, initial delivery of con- 
formal fuel tanks (CFTs) for Saudi 
F-15s. These CFTs are part of an order 
for 101 tank sets which were sold to 
Saudi Arabia in 1981. Finally, we are 
expediting delivery of some ammunition 
and spare parts for items already in the 
Saudi inventory. 



'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



81 



UNITED NATIONS 



port, at a time of clear and undisputed 
emergency, we would seriously undercut 
the common understanding which sup- 
ports the very structure of our bilateral 
relationship. 

Finally, we had to be certain that 
the provision of the Stinger dovetailed 
with our other major strategic interests 
in Southwest Asia. A central concern 
was that the equipment be adequately 
safeguarded so it did not pose a threat 
to any of our friends by falling into the 
hands of terrorists. We are confident 
that the rigorous system of safeguards 
on the Stinger meets the most exacting 
criteria. Also, we firmly believe that 
helping the gulf states oppose radical ag- 
gression not only supports our goals in 
the area but also makes the region a 
more secure and stable place for our 
many friends. 

Once we had made the basic decision 
to respond, we had to address the issue 
of how fast and how many. It was clear 
that we faced an emergency military re- 
quirement. It was essential that we send 
a clear and unequivocal signal, to friend 
and adversary alike, that we will sup- 
port our friends when they need help. 
The President concluded that the impor- 
tant national security interests involved 
justified his use of the special waiver 
authority. The decision was not made 
lightly; this is the first time that the Ad- 
ministration has used this provision of 
the law. The waiver authority was used 
only once previously— by the Carter Ad- 
ministration to provide arms to Yemen. 
Yet the need on this occasion was im- 
mediate, real, and critical. It required a 
decisive and expeditious step, and the 
President acted accordingly. 

The decision to send 400 Stingers 
reflected our assessment of the im- 
mediate threat and the availability of 
Stingers in the U.S. inventory. We were 
convinced that we needed to send a 
militarily significant quantity rather 
than make a purely symbolic gesture. 
We took into account the views of con- 
gressional leaders. We consulted infor- 
mally over several days, eliciting in 
response a wide variety of views. 

Our rough calculations showed that 
the Saudis, if they were to defend all 
threatened areas, could certainly make 
use of a considerably larger number of 
Stingers than were provided. After in- 
tensive deliberations in the Administra- 
tion, and weighing the results of our 
consultations, we decided that 200 
systems with 200 refires (a total of 400 
missiles) was an appropriate response 
and could be provided from available 
stocks. 



82 



Our decision to send a KC-10 tender 
to Saudi Arabia complements the 
Stinger sale. The former will give the 
Saudi Air Force increased loiter time, 
thereby enhancing its defensive 
capabilities. The latter supplies needed 
point defense. 

Our decisions were a prudent yet 
clear response to an escalating emergen- 
cy which threatens Saudi Arabia. They 
satisfied a clear military need. In addi- 
tion, by providing the missiles rapidly in 



response to an immediate need, as well 
as sending the additional tankers, we 
sent a political signal of both 
reassurance and deterrence. It was a 
measured response which promotes 
regional stability and security. 



': 



Vi 



J The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Challenge to Israel's 
Participation in UPU 






DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JUNE 14, 1984 1 

The 19th Universal Postal Union (UPU) 
Congress will be held in Hamburg from 
June 18 to July 27. Regrettably some 
Arab countries are sponsoring a move to 
expel Israel fronm the UPU, continuing 
the ill-considered campaign against 
Israel's participation in the UN system 
that we have witnessed in other UN 
forums during recent years. 

The United States will oppose this 
move with all available diplomatic 
resources. We know that many other 
countries will likewise oppose this inroad 
against the principle of universality 
underlying the United Nations. 

The United States has repeatedly 
declared that an attack on Israel's right 
to participate in any UN organization, if 
successful, would have grave conse- 



quences for its own continued participa- - 
tion and support. U.S. policy was fully 
explained by Secretary Shultz on Oc- 
tober 16, 1982. The United States 
wishes to make it clear that Israel's ex- 
pulsion from the UPU at the Hamburg 
congress would immediately cause us to 
pull our delegation out of the congress, 
suspend our participation in UPU ac- 
tivities, and withhold payments to the 
UPU. The suspension of our participa- 
tion and the withholding of our 
payments would continue until the illega* 
action was reversed. 

This stand reflects the strong senti- 
ment of the American people and is em- 
bodied in Public Law 98-164 passed by 
the Congress in November 1983. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



VESTERN HEMISPHERE 



f\s\\ of El Salvador': 
Resident-Elect 



President-elect Jose Napoleon Duarte 
the Republic of El Salvador visited 
'ashington, D.C., May 19-23, 198A. 
ollowing is the joint communique 
sued after his meeting with President 
eagan. 



DINT COMMUNIQUE, 
AY 21, 1984 1 

■esident Ronald Reagan and President-elect 
se Napoleon Duarte have undertaken con- 
ltations together, May 21, 1984, in recogni- 
m that a new chapter in the history of El 
.lvador as a democratic nation is about to 
enacted. 

During the past three years, Salvadorans 
widely differing political views have joined 
jether in a process of building democracy 
lich has moved successfully through the 
iges of elections for a constituent assembly 
March 1982, approval of a new condition 
d the presidential elections, just completed, 
e United States applauds this historic proc- 
; and proudly welcomes President-elect 
larte as the first freely and directly elected 
.der of democratic El Salvador. 

The two Presidents, having reviewed the 
jhlems of Central America, which are of 
icern to free people throughout our 
misphere, hereby express their joint views 
i conclusions regarding the future basis of 
derstanding and collaboration between 
;ir two nations. We agree on three major 
iectives for Central America and 
Salvador. 



1. The strengthening of democratic in- 
tutions; 

2. The improvement of living standards 
1 expanded economic development; 

3. The need for an increased level of U.S. 
;istance to obtain peace and to defend 
iinst Communist-supported guerrillas of 

■ extreme left and the violence of the ex- 
me right. 

The peoples of both nations look forward 
the coming five-year term of elected 
/ernment in El Salvador as a period of 
isolidation of bilateral relations in a spirit 
deep friendship as close neighbors in our 
nisphere. Both nations will take into ac- 
mt their common interests and problems, 
intaining the fullest respect for each 
ler's sovereignty, 

Both nations share with other countries 
the Americas a fundamental interest in the 
engthening of democracy and the firm re- 
tion in this hemisphere of any form of 
alitarianism or outside interference in the 
airs of sovereign nations. Democracy 
lances their individual and collective 
■urity. Democratic neighbors are peaceful 
ghbors, capable of regulating their rela- 



ly 1984 



tions in a framework of cooperation, consulta- 
tion, mutual respect and peaceful settlement 
of differences. 

It is a fundamental objective of the 
Duarte administration to broaden and 
strengthen El Salvador's democratic institu- 
tions. And it is the intention of the United 
States to provide support and assistance to 
help achieve that objective. 

Both Presidents proclaim that democracy, 
justice and the rule of law require the par- 
ticipation and commitment of all sectors in 
the political and economic mainstream of the 
nation. The rule of law requires protection 
for all against violence and criminal actions. 
It requires full confidence that the judicial 
process will produce punishment of the guilty 
and timely justice with due process for all. 
Both Presidents reaffirm their staunch com- 
mitment to the promotion of human rights, 



which are central to the democratic process 
and our freedoms. They believe that there 
should be greater support for genuinely 
democratic organizations from public and 
private sources in the major democracies, 
such as in the U.S. National Endowment for 
Democracy. 

The two Presidents pledge to work for 
the achievement of economic development 
and growth, and increased regional coopera- 
tion, to improve the standard of living of the 
people of EI Salvador and throughout the 
hemisphere. President-elect Duarte joins 
President Reagan in support of the com- 
prehensive legislative proposal now before 
the U.S. Congress which will contribute so 
greatly, once enacted, to Central American 
peace and prosperity. The two Presidents ex- 
press the view that a continuing and healthy 
economic assistance relationship between the 
two countries will be needed over the years 
immediately ahead. Such a relationship will 
complement broader initiatives, such as the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative and the National 
Bipartisan Commission Report, so that El 
Salvador's interdependent economic and 
social objectives can be met. 



Election of El Salvador 
President Duarte 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
MAY 18, 1984 1 

On Wednesday, May 16, the Central 
Elections Commission of El Salvador 
certified Jose Napoleon Duarte as the 
winner of the May 6 presidential election 
in that country. By this act, the people 
of El Salvador have made clear their 
choice of Mr. Duarte as the first 
popularly elected President of that coun- 
try in recent history. 

The voters have chosen as President 
a man who has dedicated his life to 
achieving democracy and reform for his 
homeland. We congratulate President- 
elect Duarte on his victory and pledge 
that we will do all in our power to 
strengthen the ties of freedom and 
democracy that unite us. 

Mr. Duarte carried with him a clear 
mandate from the people of El Salvador, 
over 80% of whom voted on May 6, that 
democracy and the vote should deter- 
mine their future. The United States 
bipartisan observer delegation noted 
that, "This election was fair and honest, 
and . . . provided a clear and undeniable 
mandate to whichever candidate is 
elected." Election observers from other 
countries echoed a similar conclusion. 

In protecting both rounds of the re- 
cent elections, the Salvadoran Armed 
Forces took more than 80 casualties, 



demonstrating once again their deter- 
mination to defend freedom. They acted 
professionally and apolitically, and are 
showing us now that they will respect 
the popular electoral will. In contrast, 
the guerrillas refused to participate in 
the election and intensified the combat 
before, during, and after the voting. 

As El Salvador's voters had to brave 
the intimidation of the guerrillas, their 
newly elected President will have to face 
the challenges of creating a peaceful and 
secure framework for social and 
humanitarian reform, economic develop- 
ment, and further democratic advance. 

The people of El Salvador have 
spoken. We, along with other nations 
committed to a democratic form of 
government, must heed their courageous 
action. We will support their newly 
elected government in the pursuit of and 
the opportunity for a better life. 

I look forward to meeting with El 
Salvador's new President-elect on Mon- 
day, May 21, during his visit to 
Washington. In addition, I have asked 
Secretary of State George Shultz to 
head our delegation to the President- 
elect's inauguration on June 1 in San 
Salvador. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 21, 1984. 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The protection and promotion of a strong 
private sector, with opportunities for small, 
medium and large entrepreneurs, is an in- 
dispensable means of expanding wealth and 
creating employment. Close collaboration be- 
tween the public and private sectors will 
enhance the revitalization of production, im- 
provement in public health and education, 
reintegration of displaced persons, and na- 
tional construction. This collaboration is a 
basis for stimulating domestic confidence, en- 
suring access to international credit and at- 
tracting new international investment. 

The consolidation of democracy requires 
social peace and the protection and improve- 
ment of basic reforms begun in El Salvador 
in the 1980's, including the finding of new 
ways to stimulate production, ensure clear 
titles to land, pay adequate compensation and 
guarantee land reform beneficiaries per- 
manence and tranquillity in their new owner- 
ship. 

Democracy cannot survive or thrive 
without security. Military assistance and the 
existence of a strong well-equipped national 
armed force is essential to shield democratic 
development. All governments have the 
obligation to guarantee their peoples full 
political participation and must have the 
means to protect democratic institutions 
against those who would subvert them, be 
they Marxist guerrillas and their external 
allies or violent internal extremist groups. 

The two Presidents share the view that 
the armed conflict in El Salvador must be 
resolved through national reconciliation based 
on the full integration of all its people into 
the political processes of the country. This 
participation should take place within the 
democratic rule which establishes that the on- 
ly success to power is in accordance with the 
will of the people expressed through free 
elections. They particularly welcome the ef- 
forts to achieve regional peace undertaken 
within the Contadora process and reaffirm 
their full commitment to the principles of the 
Contadora Document of Objectives. 

The two Presidents reaffirm strongly 
that abandonment of El Salvador and Central 
America in the midst of a continuing armed 
struggle serves neither the interests of their 
two nations, nor those of the community of 
free countries. They support the development 
of strong democracies in all parts of Central 
America, the democratic forces in Nicaragua, 
and the objective of holding free, fair and 
democratic elections in each of the countries 
of the region. On the basis of common na- 
tional interests and common belief in the 
principles of democracy and freedom, they 
pledge to work together toward peace with 
security and toward human betterment with 
freedom, for El Salvador and for all of Cen- 
tral America. 

To achieve these objectives, the two 
Presidents have decided to maintain regular 
and frequent contact to carry out these joint 
principles, assuring that their relations are 
guided by considerations of dignity, equality, 
friendship and mutual respect. 



Secretary Shultz Visits 
El Salvador and Nicaragua 



Secretary Shultz attended the in- 
auguration of Jose Napoleon Duarte as 
President of El Salvador on June 1, 
198A, and on the same day went to 
Nicaragua to meet with Comandante 
Daniel Ortega. 

Following are his remarks made 
after the meeting. l 

President Reagan sent me to Central 
America on a mission of peace. I went 
to El Salvador and witnessed the in- 
auguration of the new President— an in- 
spiring event. And I have come to 
Nicaragua for a meeting with Coman- 
dante Daniel Ortega, Foreign Minister 
D'Escoto, and their colleagues. 

Our discussions here were quiet, 
direct, candid, and frank. Having met 
last night with the foreign ministers of 
eight of the nine Contadora countries, 
and now here with the leaders of 
Nicaragua, I have met with all of the 
representatives of the Contadora coun- 
tries. 

Reflecting the discussions here, I 
can say that we, as the other countries 
involved, support the Contadora process 
as the basic way to resolve regional 
issues. During the discussions here, I ex- 
pressed the U.S. concerns and sum- 
marized them under four headings: 



An end to the export of subver- 



sion; 



The restoration of a reasonable 
military balance; 

• The importance of removing Cen 
tral America from the East- West con- 
frontation by taking foreign advisers 
that represent that confrontation out ol 
the picture; and 

• The importance of the implemen- 
tation of the Sandinista statements to 
the OAS [Organization of American 
States] some years ago promising free 
elections, political and democratic 
pluralism, and concern for human rightr 

After the presentation of the U.S. I 
views and the views of Nicaragua, and ! 
some discussion, we agreed that furthei 
discussions would take place. The Unita 
States designated Ambassador Harry 
Shlaudeman to represent us in these 
discussions. 

As I said earlier, both countries sup 
port the Contadora process, represent- 
ing as it does the fact that the problem! 
and, therefore, the solutions to a con- j 
siderable degree are regional in nature. 
We expect that the discussions between 
our two countries will make a contribu- 
tion to the Contadora process. The 
discussion here in Nicaragua has been i 




'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 28, 1984. 



Secretary Shultz with Comandante Daniel Ortega (center) and Foreign Minister Miguel 
D'Escoto. 



84 



Department of State Bulled 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



1 instructive one and the meeting was 
orthwhile. 

Q. Is the United States planning to 
I ithdraw military advisers from Hon- 

fras and El Salvador and cease sup- 
rt to the "Contras"? 

A. The points I made about U.S. 
•oblems in the area represent a state- 
ent of our views. Beyond that, 
hatever may come up in the discus- 
3ns between Ambassador Shlaudeman 
id the Nicaraguan representative, we 

discuss. Our plans are for discus- 
dd. 



Q. The United States has demands; 
does the United States have any of- 
fers? 

A. I have given you a report on the 
meeting and its content reflecting the 
United States' views. Among the things 
I reported is that there will be further 
meetings and further discussions in 
those meetings. The nature of those 
discussions remains to be seen. 



'■ 



'Press release 146 of June 7, 1984. 



isit of Mexican President 



President Miguel de la Madrid Hur- 
do of the United Mexican States made 
date visit to the United States May 
-17, 1984, to meet with President 
agan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
o Presidents at the arrival ceremony 
d toasts made at the state dinner on 
vy 15, and remarks made to legislators 
■ending the 2Uth annual meeting of the 
rxico-U.S. Interparliamentary Con- 
■ence on May 1 7. 1 



IRIVAL CEREMONY, 

I\Y 15, 1984 2 



] esident Reagan 

1 3 an honor and a pleasure for Nancy 
I d me to welcome you and Mrs. De la 
I idrid to Washington. We welcome you 
| th the respect and admiration due to 
B leader of a great nation. We 
■lcome you also with the warmth and 
od will with which one greets a friend. 

A special relationship between the 
esidents of our countries is becoming 
mewhat of a tradition, and the rapport 
' build as individuals is in keeping with 
B finest sense of that valuable tradi- 
n. Our ability to meet and, face to 
:e, discuss the issues of the day, 
nestly and without reservation, is 
neficial to both our countries. The 
last between us is something of great 
| lue which should never be taken for 
anted. 

I well recall first making your ac- 
aintance in June of 1981 at Camp 
tvid. And the next time we met, you 
jre President-elect of Mexico, and we 
reed then, even before you were 
rorn into office, to maintain a continu- 
5 dialogue and to meet and confer 



often. Your visit today builds upon the 
professional and personal bonds about 
which I'm speaking. 

We have much to discuss. That is as 
one would expect between the elected 
leaders of two countries whose people, 
by the millions, interact with each other 
on a daily basis. Not only are our 
destinies tied, but in ways too numerous 
to count, our present as well. 

We're fully aware of your commit- 
ment to overcoming Mexico's current 
economic difficulties. We applaud your 
dedication and wish you success in your 
drive to invigorate your economy and 
better the lives of your people. Our sup- 
port represents the best wishes of a 
friend and more. 

Mexico is now the third largest 
trading partner of the United States. 
We, on the other hand, are the world's 
largest market for Mexican goods. The 
prosperity and happiness of our peoples 
are inexorably linked by these bonds of 
commerce and friendship. I hope when 
you return home that you will bring the 
message to your citizens that the 
American people are on your, the people 
of Mexico's, side. 

The United States and Mexico have 
a common border and a common 
American heritage as well. The people 
of our countries — Spanish- and English- 
speaking alike — represent the values 
and culture of the New World, a bond 
shared by 650 million Americans from 
the North Slope of Alaska to the tip of 
Tierra del Fuego. It behooves all of us 
to work together to ensure the peace 
and stability of our hemisphere. 

That is especially true in regard to 
Central America. I understand your 
deep concerns about the turmoil plagu- 
ing that region. We do not agree on 
everything concerning this situation. 



Yet, the level of respect in our relation- 
ship remains high, and that is the way it 
should be between neighbors who trust 
each other. 

Where we do disagree is not on 
goals or principles. Instead, it is on the 
means by which to achieve our goals. 
The magnitude of our agreement, on the 
other hand, is substantial and should not 
be underestimated. Both the United 
States and Mexico are motivated by a 
love of liberty and independence in- 
herent in our systems of government 
and embedded in the souls of our people. 

As you said in your book on con- 
stitutional law while assessing 
Rousseau's influence, "Liberty and 
equality are values incompatible with 
despotism, and mankind will not benefit 
from them while there may be op- 
pressors and oppressed." Our fundamen- 
tal beliefs suggest that a lasting peace 
for Central America must be based on 
the principles of democracy, on economic 
development that expands opportunity 
for all people, on noninterventionism, 
and on the avoidance of military 
cooperation with communist and other 
aggressor regimes. 

We appreciate the creative and 
energetic efforts to bring peace to the 
region by the Contadora group, in which 
Mexico has participated. The 
Contadora's 21-point document of objec- 
tives enunciates the goals we both sup- 
port. We pray that the consensus that 
produced the document of objectives can 
translate what has already been done in- 
to sound treaty provisions that can be 
monitored, verified, and enforced on a 
reciprocal basis. 

For the United States, the con- 
flagration in Central America appears 
too close to ignore. Like a fire in one's 
neighborhood, this threat should be of 
concern to every nation in the 
hemisphere. We can and should work 
together to save lives and prevent fur- 
ther destruction. 

Complicating the situation and mak- 
ing it even more dangerous has been the 
intervention of a totalitarian coalition 
which has undermined what we had 
hoped would be a democratic revolution. 
These totalitarians have been pouring 
gasoline onto the fire by pumping 
massive supplies of weapons into Cen- 
tral America and encouraging tyranny 
and aggression. Thousands of Cubans 
and Soviet-bloc military personnel have 
accompanied this flow of weapons and 
equipment into the region. 

Responsible governments of this 
hemisphere cannot afford to close their 
eyes to what is happening or to be lulled 
by unrealistic optimism. I look forward 



ily 1984 



85 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



to discussing with you this issue of ut- 
most importance. 

President De la Madrid, earlier this 
year, you visited Buenos Aires where 
you said, "We do not want new conflicts 
and wars in our vast territory. We need 
peace and well-being. We do not want 
martyrs from war-like confrontations. 
We are civilian heroes." Well, I agree 
with that sentiment completely. 

Let me reaffirm today that the 
United States will do what it can. It will 
go the extra mile to find peaceful solu- 
tions and to protect democracy and in- 
dependence in the hemisphere. 

Cooperation and respect between 
the United States and Mexico will do 
much in our efforts to promote peace 
and improve the standard of living of 
our people. As adversaries, our horizons 
would be limited. As friends, equal in 
each other's eyes and drawing from each 
other's strength, a universe of oppor- 
tunity awaits. 

I speak for all the citizens of my 
country when I say your friends 
welcome you to the United States. 

President De la Madrid 3 

I have come here to continue a personal 
dialogue that we began in San Diego in 
1982 and continued in La Paz in 1983. 
Being constantly in touch has allowed us 
to become better acquainted and, in our 
friendly and honorable dealings, to meet 
more effectively our responsibility to 
solve the problems and overcome the 
obstacles in the wide-ranging and com- 
plex relations between our two coun- 
tries. 

It is with great pleasure that I 
transmit through you warm greetings 
from the people of Mexico to the great 
people of the United States of America. 
We Mexicans wish to continue building 
not only peaceful and dignified neighbor- 
ly relations but also a fruitful and 
positive friendship. Our two countries 
are reliable neighbors and friends, and 
we know how to conduct our relations in 
mutual respect for our independence and 
our cultural and political concepts. 

We have learned to solve our prob- 
lems with serenity and realism. Two 
peoples with different histories and 
cultures with imbalances and disparities 
have found the path of dialogue and 
communication to be the basis for their 
understanding. The wide range and 
diversity of our bilateral relations 
highlight our dialogue. 

Our talks will cover trade and 
tourism, financing and investment, the 
very close relationship between our 
border zones, and human and labor 



86 



aspects of the Mexican workers who 
migrate to the United States, to name 
only some of the most important topics. 
Progress has been made in several of 
these areas since the last time we spoke 
to each other. In others, solutions are 
pending, as will always be the case in 
our dynamic relations. The important 
thing is that we must continue to tackle 
our problems frankly, and in good faith, 
and that we, with imagination and deter- 
mination, seek the best possible solu- 
tions for the benefit of our countries. 

I must acknowledge that I have 
always found this to be your attitude 
and that of your associates. Your 
government has supported various finan- 
cial programs for overcoming our 
economic problems, and it has also been 
willing to help surmount difficulties in 
our trade relations. We must broaden 
and enhance this open attitude to 
dialogue and negotiations. 

Our exchange of ideas goes beyond 
solely bilateral matters. Both countries 
are members of the international com- 
munity, and we share responsibilities on 
the American Continent. We are all con- 
cerned about threats to peace, the prob- 
lem of the arms race, and the severe 
economic crisis that is hampering the ef- 
forts of developing countries to pursue 
their goal of economic and social prog- 
ress in order to satisfy their people's 
legitimate ambitions and to banish 
hunger, unhealthy conditions, ignorance, 
and poverty. 

The United States and Mexico 
should be concerned, as well, about the 
specially serious difficulties that Latin 
American countries are experiencing. 
Peace has been disrupted in Central 
America, and the risk of a generalized 
war, the scope and duration of which no 
one can foresee, is growing. Every coun- 
try on the continent must do its utmost 
to restore peace and avoid war by 
respecting and upholding the sovereign 
right of its people to decide their own 
destiny and by rejecting interventionist 
solutions of any kind. 

In peacetime, we must also support 
the Central Americans in their social 
and economic development programs 
and encourage their efforts to build 
democracy and respect human rights. To 
that end, let us apply the principles and 
rules of international law established by 
the countries of the American Conti- 
nent: self-determination, noninterven- 
tion, equality of states before the law, 
peaceful solution of conflicts, and inter- 
national cooperation for development. 

Latin America is suffering the most 
severe economic crisis of modern times. 
Its peoples and governments have been 



obliged to implement harsh economic 
programs to cope with the situation. Wj 
are correcting the internal imbalances i 
that come under our responsibility, the j 
reduction of fiscal deficits, and the im- J 
balance in our commercial and financial 
accounts with foreign countries. The 
Mexican people are giving ample proof J 
of their vigor and responsibility. 

Nonetheless, our determined effort! 
require international understanding ana 
cooperation in the field of trade and 
finance so that international conditions! 
do not frustrate domestic actions. The I 
crucial point is external debt servicing J 
and the high and rising interest rates. 1 
the short term, it is necessary to take I 
effective action on the cost of money. I 
The broadest and most far-reaching 
solution is to recover our payment 
capacity so that we can meet our debt ' 
obligations to regain our purchasing 
power abroad, to renew the process of j 
economic growth, and to generate 
employment, thereby strengthening thei 
basis of stability. 

Solutions are not easy. It is we who 
must make the basic effort. We have 
already shown that we are both willing 
and able to do so. Now we ask the inteti 
national community and essentially thei 
industrialized countries to accept that. 
Since interdependence is an irreversible! 
fact, the imperative of solidarity is a 
duty based not only on ethics but also o 
expedience. 

I have no doubt that in a climate of' 
frankness and friendship our talks will* 
enhance our understanding of these 
topics, and we will be able to find new 
solutions to the problems that concern 
us. 



DINNER TOASTS. 
MAY 15, 1984 4 



President Reagan 

Being here with so many friends from 
Mexico, I can't help but take my 
thoughts back to California. Tonight is 
reminiscent of the gala evenings in old 
California, the vineyards, the music, th 
pride and accomplishments of the 
Hispanic frontier men and women, in- 
dividuals who conquered a wilderness, 
but while doing so, maintained a 
phenomenal level of dignity. All of this, 
and more, reflects the character of a 
people whose legacy is now shared by 
the citizens of our two countries. 

I'm not certain it goes back as far * 
the hacienda days, but I would like to 
extend to you a traditional greeting thai 
I've adopted as my own, just as I 



: 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 






t 



opted California. President and Mrs. 

la Madrid, mi casa es su casa [my 
use is your house]. 

Today, we've had frank and fulfilling 
scussions. I hope you agree with me 
at although we do not see eye to eye 
everything, it is clear that we as in- 
/iduals, and our two nations as well, 
main solid in our friendship and 
deterred in our trust. 

The good will between us goes far 
yond the transitory issues of the day. 
ir people recognize that issues, even 
ase that seem important at the mo- 
ent, will someday pass from the scene, 
hat will not change are the many gifts 
d mandates given to us by God that 
rve as the basis of our societies. I 
n't believe that the Lord brought us to 
s level of political, social, and 
)nomic development, that He located 

the Mexican and American 
ople — in such proximity, and did not 
end us to be friends. 

In the last 50 years, when people of 
'dering countries in so many parts of 
s world were killing each other, or 
re immersed in envy and hatred, the 
itual respect and ever-increasing 
>peration between our peoples and 
/ernments shined in contrast. 
Our trade and commerce is a power- 
engine for economic progress for 
h our countries. The cultural and 
ial ties between our people enrich and 
i diversity and flavor to our everyday 
;s. Yet the cement with the strongest 
ip is found in the ideals and values 
it our people share. 
President Thomas Jefferson, a man 
important to the development of 
h nan liberty, outlined in his first in- 
a jural address some of the aspirations 

our new republic. Although spoken 

1 1 years ago, the words still ring true. 
C r desire in foreign affairs, he said, 
« s "equal and exact justice to all men, 
a whatever state or persuasion, 
r igious or political peace, commerce, 
a 1 honest friendship with all 

■ ;ions. . . ." 

1 I heard an echo of these sentiments 
1 1 August in La Paz when you said, 
Nationalism, cultural identity, freedom, 
d nocracy, economic development with 
3 'ial justice, an independent foreign 

icy, and defense of our territorial in- 
■rrity are shared values embodied in 

<J ■ national design and vital bonds that 
li< us all." 

1 If we can be guided by these prin- 
i les with our shared values and in- 

■ ests overshadowing momentary 

I agreements, surely the good will be- 
ll een us will endure, and our relation- 



ship will continue to shine as an example 
to others. 

And now will all of you join me in a 
toast to our honored guests — to Presi- 
dent and Mrs. De la Madrid, to their 
health and to the continued good will 
between our two great nations. 

President De la Madrid 3 

May my first words be to express my 
gratitude for the kind courtesies that we 
have received during our visit to 
Washington today. Both during our 
work meetings and today, during this 
dinner, we have seen proofs of affec- 
tionate and cordial friendship that both 
my wife, myself, and the members of my 
party appreciate very much. 

This kind of a dialogue is also 
always fruitful. It makes it possible for 
us to compare our analysis and evalua- 
tion, our perceptions of reality, to agree 
on our similarities, and also to know our 
differences. 

Geography has influenced both of us. 
It has led us to be neighbors, and it has 
led us to be friends. Neighbors we are 
because geography is as it is, but friends 
is something that comes from our own 
self. It is a quality of the human being. 

Friends always seek to extend areas 
of consensus and to make their dif- 
ferences smaller, to seek formulas to 
overcome the problems that come from 
our close, complex, and very broad rela- 
tionship. Friendship presupposes all of 
this. There must be sincerity and 
frankness, dignity and respect in our 
dealings, careful examination of our 
discrepancies and, above all, it demands 
good will. 

Differences of opinion are natural 
and can be explained among human be- 
ings. They can be explained among us. 
Even though Mexico and the United 
States have often traveled the same 
road, even though they stem from the 
same roots, there are differences in our 
culture, and these differences have made 
our sensibilities also different. It has 
come to enrich the human race, because 
it is variation which is needed for this 
enrichment. It is not good for everyone 
to be just the same. 

In this way, Americans and Mex- 
icans find themselves face to face with a 
rich culture and a rich and profound 
perception of our nationalities. But there 
are not only differences between us. 
Analogies are also evident. 

Both nations have rooted their 
political and social systems in the aspira- 
tion to live in freedom, to permanently 
build democracy, and to seek the equali- 
ty of opportunity for all. Both nations 



postulate respect for law and justice as a 
norm for peaceful and dignified coex- 
istence. And that which makes our two 
countries similar is that we are not 
societies that are frozen and opposed to 
change. We are societies that are open 
to change. 

We who love freedom must be open 
to change. We cannot freeze the human 
spirit. And it is for this reason that we 
are also obliged to be tolerant. 

Our conversations have been 
honorable and cordial. They reflect our 
common purpose: to extend the areas in 
which we agree and to reduce our dif- 
ferences. But the road to travel is a long 
one. The life of individuals has a limit, 
but the life of nations does not have a 
historical horizon. 

The important thing about this 
meeting is that we have renewed our 
will to continue to travel that road as in- 
dividuals, and as nations that are living 
in good faith. As I said before, during 
the luncheon that was kindly offered me 
by Secretary Shultz, we know that you 
want to have dignified, prosperous, and 
strong neighbors. 

It is very important that a powerful 
nation such as the United States, which 
is the most powerful nation of all, can 
say to the other countries, "We have 
neighbors who are dignified; they are 
not slaves." I, therefore, express my 
hope that this relationship with dignity 
and cordiality that has been built by the 
Americans and the Mexicans will always 
be the common denominator of our rela- 
tionship, that we shall always be capable 
with talent and good will to continue to 
strengthen our friendship to our mutual 
benefit. 

This is the thinking and the will of 
the Mexican people. And I am certain 
that there is this same thinking and this 
same will in the United States. That is 
why I express my wishes that the rela- 
tions between Mexico and the United 
States will always be vigorous, that they 
may be strengthened by our will to 
understanding, and because friendship 
and cooperation is what will bring us 
together. 

I wish to ask you to join me in a 
toast to the personal happiness of Presi- 
dent Reagan and his charming wife, 
Nancy, to the happiness and prosperity 
of the American people, and to those 
values which we cherish which are 
freedom, democracy, and justice. 



«ly 1984 



87 



TREATIES 



REMARKS TO LEGISLATORS. 
MAY 17, 1984 6 

President Reagan 

Welcome. I think it's a wonderful coin- 
cidence that these meetings have coin- 
cided and that we have an opportunity 
together to welcome you here for your 
own meetings. 

President De la Madrid and myself 
have just concluded our second meeting. 
We've had good conversations, and we 
both listened to what the other had to 
say. 

I believe that we both sharpened our 
perceptions and, at the same time, know 
we deepened our personal friendship. 
And like good friends, we spoke openly 
and with candor on those few issues on 
which there might have been differences 
between us. But let me hasten to say 
that we found that the differences were 
not with regard to our goals. 

We both share a commitment to 
democracy, to the greater economic 
well-being and a secure peace in all the 
Americas. Our differences, where there 
were any, were only with regard to the 
means of reaching the goals and objec- 
tives that we share. And both our 
delegations at the ministerial level 
worked very hard and, I think, have 
made great progress on a number of 
bilateral issues. 

And let me just say to all of you 
here — and I think I'm really speaking 
for what was the tone of our conversa- 
tion — we must remember that we are all 
in this Western Hemisphere. Our na- 
tions were born of people that were 
seeking the same things — freedom, bet- 
ter life in this New World that was here 
for our forefathers to discover. We've 
been given great gifts, resources, 
technology and, above all, that spirit of 
freedom. 

Early in my Administration I made 
a trip down through Central America 
and into South America and in all of 
them said the same thing. There have 
been misunderstandings between us in 
the past, and maybe there's been an in- 
sensitivity on the part of our own coun- 
try, the United States. But what I 
wanted to find out was, how could we all 
meet as partners here in this Western 
Hemisphere, recognizing that from the 
tip of South America all the way to the 
North Slope of Alaska, we are all 
Americans. We are all related in a sense 
that is not true in any other part of the 
world — that when we cross a border 
from one country into another, we still 
have that common heritage. 

And if we look at ourselves, 650 
million people in North, Central, and 



88 



South America, and we look at the 
potential of what we can achieve, we 
cannot only be a great force for good 
here in the Western Hemisphere, we can 
be a great force for good in the entire 
world. 

President De la Madrid 3 

It is a great pleasure for me to be able 
to greet you at the beginning of a new 
interparliamentary meeting between the 
United States and Mexico. 

In accordance with our constitu- 
tional norms are the relations, the for- 
mal relations of our countries which are 
formed through a very complex process 
that is in the hands of the legislative and 
the executive bodies. It is one of the 
most serious responsibilities that this 
Presidential system gives the heads of 
the executive branch, both in the United 
States and in Mexico. But there is no 
doubt that the political process through 
which the foreign policy is formed has as 
one of its basic ingredients the opinions 
of the Congresses and, particularly, of 
the Senates. 

That is why it is very promising that 
this meeting among legislators is begin- 
ning precisely when the meeting be- 
tween the Presidents has just finished. I 
agree with what my friend, President 
Reagan, has said just a few minutes ago. 
Our dialogue has progressed as it should 
between good friends that work with 
dignity. Both sides have been led by the 
main guideline of our conversations, 
which has been the interest of our 
peoples, mutual respect, and, also, 
respect for one another's truth. 

As President Reagan has already 
said, we have made progress during 
these conversations. We have made 
progress in coming to a better under- 
standing of each other and also in keep- 
ing each other better informed and 
bringing about certain solutions to some 
of our problems, problems which are 
every day more complex and deeper be- 
tween Mexico and the United States. 

I have no doubt that the work that 
you will be beginning today will be 
another positive and constructive 
episode. An exchange of points of view 
within a framework of sincerity, of 
respect, and of dignity will give each one 
of our countries new elements of judg- 
ment in order to continue to work 
toward a stronger friendship and a rela- 
tionship which is every day more cordial 
and more sincere. 



■Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 21, 1984. 

2 Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House, where President De la Madrid was ac- 



corded a formal welcome with full military 
honors. 

3 President De la Madrid spoke in 
Spanish, and his remarks were translated by 
an interpreter. 

4 Made in the State Dining Room of the 
White House. 

5 Made in the East Room of the White 
House. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 
Accession deposited: Finland, May 15, 1984. 

Aviation, Civil 

Convention on offenses and certain other act | 
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo ! 
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 
1969. TIAS 6768. 

Accessions deposited: Bahrain, 1 Feb. 9, 19841 
Czechoslovakia, 1 Feb. 23, 1984; Jamaica. 
Sept. 16, 1983; St. Lucia, Oct. 31, 1983; 
Tanzania, Aug. 12, 1983. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful I 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Dona 
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Guinea, May 2, 1984; ] 

Nauru, May 17, 1984. 

Ratification deposited: Haiti, May 9, 1984. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 
1977. 2 

Ratifications deposited; Afghanistan, 
Sept. 28, 1983; Algeria, Jan. 16, 1984; 
Federal Republic of Germany, Feb. 15, 1984; 
Italy, Oct. 13, 1983; Seychelles, Sept. 23, 
1983; Sri Lanka, Jan. 30, 1984; Vietnam, 
Sept. 20, 1983. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1980.' 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium Sept. 23, 
1983; Denmark, Dec. 22, 1983; Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Oct. 19, 1983; Mali, 
Jan. 11, 1984; Philippines, Jan. 31, 1984; 
Seychelles, Sept. 23, 1983; Spain, July 11, 
1983. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Accessions deposited: Sierra Leone, Apr. 30, 
1984; Zimbabwe, Mar. 5, 1984. 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Mar. 26, 
1984; Finland, May 8, 1984; Haiti, Mar. 14, 
1984; Mexico. Mar. 21, 1984; Portugal, 
Mar. 30, 1984. 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATIES 



' nservation 

( nvention on the conservation of Antarctic 
I .rine living resources, with annex for an ar- 
I ral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 

30. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS 
' MO. 
; tification deposited: Poland, Mar. 28, 1984. 



ltural Property 

itutes of the International Centre for the 
idy of the Preservation and Restoration of 
ltural Property. Adopted at New Delhi 
v.-Dec. 1956, as amended at Rome 
r. 24, 1963, and Apr. 14-17, 1969. 
tered into force May 10, 1958; for the U.S. 

20, 1971. TIAS 7038. 
session deposited: Philippines, Dec. 15, 



;::. 



1 ucation— UNESCO 

ivention on the recognition of studies, 
lomas, and degrees concerning higher 
i ication in the states belonging to the 
rope region. Done at Paris Dec. 21, 1979. 
tered into force Feb. 19, 1982. 3 
ification deposited: Sweden, Mar. 7, 1984. 



rironmental Modification 

ivention on the prohibition of military or 
c er hostile use of environmental modifica- 
t i techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva 
I / 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 

8; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614. 
t ession deposited: Sweden, Apr. 27, 1984. 



G locide 

C ivention on the prevention and punish- 

it it of the crime of genocide. Adopted at 

9 is Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force 

1. 12, 1951. 3 

J ession deposited: Maldives, Apr. 24, 1984. 

H nan Rights 

Ii 'rnational convenant on civil and political 
r! its. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
B ered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 3 
\ essi on deposited: Zambia, Apr. 10, 1984. 

Ii rnational convenant on economic, social, 
3 cultural rights. Adopted at New York 
0.16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 

^■ ession deposited: Zambia, Apr. 10, 1984. 

hi 

I| 'rnational agreement on jute and jute 

:M lucts, 1982, with annexes. Done at 

(leva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro- 

Jjnally Jan. 9, 1984. 

S essions deposited: Australia, Apr. 12, 

■4; Pakistan, Apr. 13, 1984. 

B ification deposited: Finland, May 8, 1984. 

V)-ine Pollution 

J vention on the prevention of marine 
Jution by dumping of wastes and other 
■per, with annexes. Done at London, Mex- 
J Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. 
Jered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 

B ification deposited: Italy, 4 Apr. 30, 1984. 



Nuclear Material— Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. 2 
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, 1 Apr. 10, 
1984; Hungary, 1 May 4, 1984. 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union. 
Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Accession deposited: Solomon Islands, 
Mar. 12, 1984. 

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo 
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 
1971, except for Art. V which entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Accession deposited: Solomon Islands, 
Mar. 12, 1984. 
Ratification deposited: Malawi, Jan. 27, 1984. 

Second additional protocol to the Constitution 

of the Universal Postal Union. Done at 

Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force 

Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 

Accession deposited: Solomon Islands, 

Mar. 12, 1984. 

Ratification deposited: Malawi, Jan. 27, 1984. 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention, with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981; except for Art. 124 of the 
general regulations which became effective 
Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Accessions deposited: Albania, Apr. 12, 1984; 
Solomon Islands, Mar. 12, 1984. ' 
Ratifications deposited: Liberia, Feb. 23, 
1984; Malawi, Jan. 27, 1984; Mexico, Mar. 1, 
1984; Tanzania, Dec. 12, 1983. 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations with 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janiero 
Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 
1981. TIAS 9973. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Mar. 1, 1984. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as re- 
vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the 
U.S. Sept. 5, 1970, except for Arts. 1-12 
which entered into force May 19, 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6923, 7727. 
Notification of accession: New Zealand, 5 
Mar. 20, 1984. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellec- 
tual Property Organization. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. 
TIAS 6932. 
Accessions deposited: New Zealand, 6 Mar. 14, 

1984; Rwanda, Nov. 3, 1983. 



Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969. 3 
Accession deposited: Maldives, Apr. 24, 1984. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, with annexes. 
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 2 
Ratification deposited: Equatorial Guinea, 

May 4, 1984. 

Wheat 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
into force July 1, 1983. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, 
May 24, 1984. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Sept. 3. 1984. 3 
Signature: Nigeria, Apr. 23, 1984. 



BILATERAL 



Bolivia 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 31, 1978, (TIAS 9518) for sales of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at La Paz Apr. 13, 1984. 
Entered into force Apr. 13, 1984. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the United States, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington Sept. 22, 1983. 
Entered into force: Apr. 12, 1984. 

Canada 

Agreement for cooperation in severe 
(nuclear) accident research. Signed at 
Washington and Ottawa Mar. 2 and 16, 1984. 
Entered into force Mar. 16, 1984; effective 
Feb. 10, 1984. 

Chile 

Investment incentive agreement. Effective by 
exchange of notes at Santiago Sept. 22, 1983. 
Entered into force : Feb. 14, 1984. 
Supersedes: Agreement of July 29, 1960. 

Cook Islands 

Investment incentive agreement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Wellington and 
Rarotonga Sept. 2 and Oct. 10, 1983. 
Entered into force: Apr. 16, 1984. 

Czechoslovakia 

Agreement amending and extending the air 
transport agreement of Feb. 28, 1969, as 
amended and extended (TIAS 6644, 7356, 
7881, 8868), with annex. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Dec. 19 and 
23, 1983. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1983. 



by 1984 



89 



CHRONOLOGY 



Ecuador 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of debts owed to, guaranteed 
by, or insured by the U.S. Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Quito 
Mar. 19, 1984. Entered into force May 4, 
1984. 

El Salvador 

Memorandum of understanding covering 
cooperative investigations in earthquake 
research. Signed at Reston and San Salvador 
Apr. 16 and 24, 1984. Entered into force 
Apr. 24, 1984. 

France 

Technical exchange and cooperation arrange- 
ment in the field of safety of radioactive 
waste management. Signed at Washington 
and Paris Jan. 3 and 10, 1984. Entered into 
force Jan. 10, 1984. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Port-au-Prince Feb. 17 and May 4, 
1984. Entered into force May 4, 1984; effec- 
tive Jan. 1, 1984. 

Arrangement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 25 and Apr. 1, 1982, as amended (TIAS 
10749), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au- 
Prince Feb. 17, and May 3, 1984. Entered in- 
to force May 3, 1984; effective Dec. 31, 1983. 

Italy 

Supplemental agreement to the agreement of 
May 23, 1973 on the matter of social securi- 
ty. Signed at Rome Apr. 17, 1984. Enters in- 
to force on the first day of the month follow- 
ing the month in which the contracting states 
shall have notified each other of the fulfill- 
ment of the procedures required by their 
respective internal rules for entry into force. 

Jamaica 

Agreement concerning conversion and remit- 
tance of Jamaican dollar earnings by U.S. 
airlines. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kingston Mar. 22 and 30, 1984. Entered into 
force Mar. 30, 1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the United States 
through the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States. Signed at Mexico Mar. 7, 
1984. Entered into force May 2, 1984. 

Norway 

Agreement on social security, with final pro- 
tocol and administrative agreement. Signed 
at Washington Jan. 13, 1983. 
Entered into force: July 1, 1984. 

Peru 

Agreement for the sales of agricultural com 
modities. Signed at Lima May 1 1, 1984. 
Entered into force May 11, 1984. 



90 



Poland 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Aug. 2, 1976 concerning fisheries off the 
coasts of the United States (TIAS 8524). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
and Warsaw Mar. 7 and 30, 1984. Enters in- 
to force following written notification of the 
completion of internal procedures of both 
governments. 

Portugal 

Agreement concerning the installation in Por- 
tugal of a ground-based, electro-optical deep 
space surveillance (GEODSS) station. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Lisbon 
Mar. 27, 1984. Entered into force Mar. 27, 
1984. 

Senegal 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 16, 1980, (TIAS 10239) for sales of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Dakar Mar. 22 and 
Apr. 3, 1984. Entered into force Apr. 3, 
1984. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 31, 1978 (TIAS 9210). Signed at 
Freetown Feb. 23, 1984. Entered into force 
Feb. 23, 1984. 

Singapore 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products, with annexes. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington 
May 17-18, 1984. Entered into force 
May 18. 1984. 

Thailand 

Agreement on cooperation in science and 
technology. Signed at Washington Apr. 13, 
1984. Entered into force Apr. 13, 1984. 

USSR 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended (TIAS 8528, 
10531) concerning fisheries off the coasts of 
the United States. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Feb. 28 and Apr. 11, 
1984. Enters into force following written 
notification of the completion of internal pro- 
cedures of both governments. 

Uruguay 

Agreement concerning exports of certain tex- 
tile products manufactured in Uruguay to the 
United States, with annexes. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Montevideo Dec. 30, 1983, 
and Jan. 23, 1984. Entered into force 
Jan. 23, 1984; effective Aug. 1, 1983. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understandings, as effected by the agreement 
of Mar. 17 and May 19, 1982, as amended 
and extended (TIAS 10450, 10676). relating 
to air transport and nonscheduled air serv- 
ices. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Belgrade Mar. 23 and 30, 1984. Entered into 
force Mar. 30, 1984. 



Zaire 

Agreement for technical assistance for the 
maintenance of the extra high voltage DC 
tertie Inga-Shaba project. Signed at Kinsh 
Apr. 14, 1984. Entered into force Apr. 14, 
1984. 



'With reservation(s). 
2 Not in force. 

3 Not in force for the United States. 
4 With statement. 

Applicable to Cook Islands, Niue, and 
Tokelau. ■ 



May 1984 



May 1-2 

Secretary Shultz visits South Korea and 
Japan. 

May 1 

Acting State Department spokesman 
Romberg reiterates the Administration's 
belief that the Contadora process offers the 
best hope for a comprehensive, verifiable 
peace in Central America. 

Acting State Department spokesman 
Romberg says a major Soviet offensive is 
continuing in Afghanistan's Panjsher Valley 
and that reports that the entire valley has j 
been secured are "not accurate." 

In a report to the Congress on the 
technology transfer control program, Defena 
Secretary Weinberger says that 135 Soviets! 
were expelled from 21 countries in 1983, 
most for suspected military-related industrial 
espionage. 

May 2 

President Reagan and His Holiness Pope 
John Paul II meet in Fairbanks. The Presi- 
dent is returning from China, and the Pope|| 
en route to Asia. 

Lebanese Cabinet meets for the first 
time. Three of the 10 Cabinet members do , 
not attend. 

May 3 

Acting State Department spokesman 
Romberg describes two recent border attacH 
by Nicaragua into Costa Rica as "the latest il 
a series of territorial violations going back at 
least 2 years." 

May 4 

During a visit to Moscow, Polish leader Geiu 
Jaruzelski and Soviet President Chernenko I 
sign a 15-year economic pact. 

May 5 

In an address before the South Carolina Bar 
Association in Columbia, Secretary Shultz 
says that efforts to force allies to abide by 
U.S. sanctions and jurisdiction were causing 
disputes that threaten "the moral foundation 
to our common defense." To resolve dif- 
ferences, he offers a four-point approach: 

• Use diplomacy to harmonize policies; 

• When diplomacy fails, the U.S. should 
apply sanctions only after trying to take 
foreign interests into account; 






Department of State Bulletin 



'. 



CHRONOLOGY 



I • Develop procedures to assure that 
,« ier agencies consult the State Department 
jj en contemplating actions that may touch 

Jeign sensitivities about conflicts of 
isdiction; and 

i» Discuss procedures with individual 
ntries and international organizations, 
ough the OECD and the UN, for ensuring 
/ance consultation. 

iy 6 

Salvadorans vote in the run-off presiden- 

election. The two candidates are Jose 
poleon Duarte (Christian Democratic Par- 
and Roberto d'Aubuisson (Nationalist 
publican Alliance). 

Panama holds its first direct presidential 
:tion in 16 years. The two main candidates 

Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid (Opposition 
mocratic Alliance) and Nicholas Ardito 

letta Vallarino (National Democratic 
ion). 

Ecuador holds a presidential election. The 
i candidates are Rodrigo Borja Cevallos 
mocratic Left Party) and Leon Febres 
■dero Rivadeneira (National Reconstruc- 
1 Front). 

y 7-10 

sident Quett K. J. Masire of Botswana 

res an official visit to Washington, D.C. 

5 7 7-18 

holds its annual assembly in Geneva. 

? '7 

ing State Department spokesman 

iberg says Costa Rica has asked the U.S. 

immediate U.S. military assistance to deal 

i "the mounting level of Nicaraguan- 

ated border incidents." The U.S. is 

lered in this request, he says, because the 

1984 appropriation of $2.15 million has 

i earmarked and the FY 1984 supplemen- 

■equest of $7.85 million has not been 

d upon by the Congress and, therefore, is 

yet available to assist Costa Rica. 

An American Presbyterian minister, Rev. 

jamin Weir, is kidnapped outside his 

e in Beirut. 

West German Foreign Minister Genscher 

ts with President Reagan and Secretary 

ltz. 

8-20 

President Bush visits Japan (May 8-10), 
>nesia (May 10-12), India (May 12-15), 
istan (May 15-18), and Oman 
y 18-20). 

8 
emarks before the Council of the 
ericas Conference, Secretary Shultz says 

"over 90% of the people living in Latin 

rica live under conditions of democracy 
ery rapid movements toward democracy" 

that "this is something that we must 

jetuate." 

The second round of the CDE convenes 

tockholm. 



Soviet National Olympic Committee an- 
nounces that Soviet athletes will not par- 
ticipate in the Summer Olympic Games to be 
held in Los Angeles. In its official 
statements, the committee voices "serious 
concern over the rude violations by the 
organizers of the games of the rules of the 
Olympic Charter and the anti-Soviet cam- 
paign launched by reactionary circles in the 
United States with the connivance of the of- 
ficial authorities." White House spokesman 
says that the U.S. has "made exhaustive ef- 
forts to meet Soviet concerns about ar- 
rangements in Los Angeles" and that the 
Soviets "have disregarded the feelings of 
most nations and millions of people the world 
over that the Olympics will be conducted in a 
nonpolitical atmosphere. State Department 
spokesman Hughes describes the Soviet deci- 
sion as "a blatant political action for which 
there is no real justification." 

State Department spokesman Hughes ex- 
presses U.S. concern about reports that 
Soviet human rights activists and Nobel 
laureate Andrei Sakharov has been on a 
hunger strike since May 2 and that his wife, 
Elena Bonner, has been charged with 
slandering the Soviet state. Hughes says "the 
refusal of Soviet authorities to reveal any in- 
formation about the present welfare and 
whereabouts of the Sakharovs lends credence 
to these reports." Sakharov went on the 
hunger strike to demand medical treatment 
for his wife abroad; Soviet authorities have 
prevented her from leaving the closed city of 
Gorky. 

May 9 

In a televised address to the nation. Presi- 
dent Reagan appeals to Congress to approve 
his military and economic assistance package 
for Central America. He says that the com- 
munists will likely succeed in toppling the El 
Salvador Government if Congress rejects the 
aid. 

State Department spokesman Hughes 
lists U.S. efforts to reassure the Soviets con- 
cerning their security at the Summer Olym- 
pics: 

• Authorized a Soviet request for at least 
25 Aeroflot charter flights; 

• Assured the Soviets privately and in 
writing that all Olympic participants would 
be able to enter the U.S. on the basis of their 
Olympic identity cards without visas; 

• Authorized a month-long port call for a 
Soviet cruise ship that would serve as the 
Soviet's Olympic headquarters; 

• Assured the Soviets privately that 
after an initial customs and safety inspection, 
subsequent searches of the ship would be 
only for cause; 

• Authorized advance entry into the U.S. 
of Aeroflot and shipping personnel; 

• Indicated its willingness to receive an 
Olympic attache with full diplomatic status 
(but not the person originally proposed); 

• Informed Soviet officials they would be 
permitted to rent vehicles (normally pro- 
hibited) during the Olympics; 

• Told the Soviets publicly and privately 
that emigre groups organizing demonstra- 
tions or planning to incite defections had no 
U.S. Government sanction whatsoever; 



• Opened all areas containing Olympic 
sites, hotels, and airports to Soviet travel 
from June 1 to Aug. 15; 

• Undertook full responsibility for securi- 
ty of the Soviet ship; and 

• Assured the Soviets privately that 
every possible security precaution for the 
games was being taken. 

Bulgaria withdraws from participation in 
the Summer Olympics. 

An organization in Lebanon, calling itself 
the Islamic Jihad, claims responsibility for ab- 
ducting American clergyman Benjamin Weir 
May 7 and for holding two other 
Americans — U.S. Embassy official William 
Buckley and Cable News Network bureau 
chief Jeremy Levin. 

In a proclamation designating July 20 as 
National POW/MIA Recognition Day, Presi- 
dent Reagan calls on the nation to honor and 
remember "those who have served their coun- 
try so faithfully" and to "recognize the special 
debt all Americans owe to our fellow citizens 
who gave up their freedom in the service of 
our country and to the families who have 
undergone a great travail." 

May 10 

By a vote of 212 to 208, the House of 
Representatives approves authorization bill 
funding President Reagan's package for Cen- 
tral America implementing the FY 1984 and 
FY 1985 economic and military assistance 
levels recommended by the National Bipar- 
tisan Commission on Central America. 

In an interim decision, the World Court 
calls for cessation of mining of Nicaraguan 
harbors and of any support of military or 
paramilitary activities in violation of interna- 
tional law. State Department spokesman 
Hughes says the U.S. "respects the Court 
and the rule of law and intends to act accord- 
ingly." He points out that the Court has not 
ruled on its jurisdiction in this case and that 
the U.S. will push for a quick decision on this 
issue. 

A Sri Lankan separatist group kidnaps an 
American couple from their home in Jaffna 
and demands that the Sri Lanka Government 
release 20 jailed rebels and pay $2 million in 
gold to an Indian state or the couple will be 
killed. 

East Germany withdraws from participa- 
tion in the Summer Olympics. 

May 11-12 

Representatives of 14 industrial and develop- 
ing nations meet in Washington to discuss 
trade and finance. 

May 11 

The Central Elections Council officially 
declares Jose Napoleon Duarte to be the win- 
ner of El Salvador's presidential run-off elec- 
tion. He received almost 54% of the vote. 
Vietnam and Laos withdraw from par- 
ticipation in the Summer Olympics. 

May 12 

Czechoslovakia and Mongolia withdraw from 
participation in the Summer Olympics. 

Sri Lanka President Jayewardene says 
his country will not pay ransom to the kid- 
nappers of the American couple. 



91 



CHRONOLOGY 



May 13 

Afghanistan withdraws from participation in 
the Summer Olympics. 

Talks are held under Zambian auspices 
among SWAPO, the Namibian Multi-Party 
Conference, and the South African Ad- 
ministrator General of Namibia. 

May 14-17 

President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado of 
Mexico makes a state visit to the U.S. 

May 14-31 

Ambassador to the UN Kirkpatrick visits 
China, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and 
the Philippines. 

May 14 

President Reagan says the U.S. will 
withdraw one additional nuclear weapon from 
Europe for each Pershing II and cruise 
missile it deploys. He also appeals to the 
House of Representatives to approve funds 
for the MX program. 

In an address before the League of 
Women Voters in Detroit, Secretary Shultz 
says the U.S. remains committed to arms 
control but emphasized "that commitment is 
not based on naivete or wishful thinking." 

Soviet news agency TASS announces that 
the Soviet Union will place more missiles on 
East German territory in response to the 
NATO deployments in Western Europe. 

Elections are held for 183 contested seats 
in the Philippine National Assembly. Govern- 
ment party wins about two-thirds of the 
seats; opposition parties about one-third. 

May 15 

State Department spokesman Hughes says 
"there is no justification whatsoever for any 
Soviet counterdeployments [in Eastern 
Europe] in view of their current nuclear and 
conventional advantages." 

White House spokesman Speakes says 
the U.S. has seen reports that Iran has joined 
Iraq in attacking ships in the Persian Gulf, 
presumably as part of its stated intention of 
closing the gulf to shipping if Iraq used 
sophisticated missiles against ships. He says, 
"We feel strongly that the Persian Gulf 
should remain open for shipping and we have 
made strong representations to both govern- 
ments in the past." State Department 
spokesman Hughes says the recent attacks 
"represent a dangerous escalation of the Iran- 
Iraq war and a growing threat to freedom of 
navigation in the gulf." 

ACDA releases its annual report, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. 
It shows that the Soviet Union is still the 
leading arms supplier in the world, providing 
37% of the total transfers to developing coun- 
tries. 

Nicaragua and Costa Rica sign an agree- 
ment aimed at lessening tensions and armed 
conflict along their joint border. 

Sri Lankan separatists release unharmed 
the American couple they abducted May 10. 



May 16 

White House spokesman Speakes says the 
U.S. is determined to keep the Persian Gulf 
open to shipping and "will do what is 
necessary" to accomplish that end. State 
Department spokesman Hughes confirms that 
U.S. AWACS aircraft are providing aerial 
surveillance data to the Saudi Air Force to 
enhance its air defense capability. 

Department spokesman Hughes indicates 
the Costa Rican request for military 
assistance to deal with Nicaraguan border in- 
cidents can be accommodated under the Ad- 
ministration's existing FY 1984 military 
assistance program supplemental request. 

Hungary withdraws from participation in 
the Summer Olympics. 

May 17-18 

OECD's annual ministerial meeting is held in 
Paris. Commerce Secretary Baldrige leads 
the U.S. delegation. 

May 17 

Foreign Ministers of the members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) — Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates — meet to discuss at- 
tacks on Arab oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. 
This emergency session comes in the wake of 
a May 16 attack on a Saudi tanker by a plane 
the U.S. believes was Iranian and attacks on 
two Kuwaiti tankers earlier in the week by 
warplanes which Kuwait claims came from 
Iran. In a declaration the GCC reaffirms the 
principle of collective security and its deter- 
mination to deal jointly with security threats. 

White House spokesman Speakes says 
there has been no specific U.S. offer of direct 
military support made to the Persian Gulf 
countries nor has any been requested by 
those countries. 

Libya's official news agency announces 
that suicide squads have been formed to wipe 
out foes of Libyan leader Qadhafi. 

Poland withdraws from participation in 
the Summer Olympics. 

May 18 

State Department spokesman Hughes con- 
demns Libya's announced intention to use 
suicide squads to assassinate foes of Libyan 
leader Qadhafi as "another indication that 
Qadhafi is prepared to use terrorism as an in- 
strument of Libyan policy." 

Donald Rumsfeld resigns his position as 
the President's special envoy to the Middle 
East. 

May 19-23 

President-elect Jose Napoleon Duarte of El 
Salvador visits Washington, D.C. 

May 19 

State Department confirms that a 
Panamanian-registered cargo vessel sank in 
the Persian Gulf after being attacked by Iraqi 
jets May 18. 

Lebanese Cabinet approves a ministerial 
policy statement concerning the future of 
Lebanon. 



Group of 10 ministers and their deputies 
meet in Rome. The deputies report on prog- . 
ress made thus far in refining the interna- i 
tional monetary system. 

May 20 

Foreign Ministers of the 21-member Arab 
League, meeting in Tunis, issue a resolutionl 
accusing Iran of aggression in its war again! 
Iraq and in connection with attacks against I 
ships in international sealanes and in ter- 
ritorial waters in the Persian Gulf. It is 
estimated that about 20 ships have been at- j 
tacked since January. 

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov says til 
Soviet Union has increased the number of I 
missile-carrying submarines off the U.S. 
coasts. 

May 21 

GCC announces it will ask the UN Security 
Council to give urgent attention to threats A 
international shipping in the Persian Gulf 

President Reagan sends a letter to Saua 
King Fahd. 

In remarks made during the visit to 
Moscow of West German Foreign Minister j 
Genscher, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromykd 
says the Soviet Union will stay away from 
the arms control talks until the U.S. remove 
its nuclear missiles from Western Europe. 1 

Acting State Department spokesman 
Romberg says the deployment of Soviet 
missile-carrying submarines off the U.S. 
coasts is not new and represents no signifi- 
cant change in the strategic situation. 

Acting State Department spokesman 
Romberg says the U.S. does not have in- 
dependent confirmation of reports that An- 
drei Sakharov has been moved to a hospitalj 
nor does the U.S. have information regardii 
the whereabouts or health of Mrs. Sakharov 

Mav 22-24 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Counej 
meets in New York. 

May 22 

In his opening statement at a news con- 
ference. President Reagan asserts that with 
proper U.S. assistance, El Salvador and othe 
nations in Central America can resist com- 
munist subversion and develop their 
democratic institutions in prosperity. He ate 1 
says the U.S. is consulting with its allies rc.i 
cerning the security situation in the Persian 
Gulf but says the possibility of direct in- 
tervention is very slight. 

State Department spokesman Hughes 
says the U.S. seeks a diplomatic solution to 
the fighting in the Persian Gulf between Ira 
and Iraq, and he repeats that Saudi Arabia 
has not made a request for U.S. military 
assistance. 

Greek Prime Minister Papandreou says 
U.S. nuclear warheads stockpiled in Greece 
are a provocation and are there without an 
official agreement between the two govern- 
ments. 






92 



Department of State Bulletii 



:.■ 



PRESS RELEASES 



UNESCO Director General M'Bow says 
ij e U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO 
the end of 1984 may not exempt it from 
.ying its share of the 1985 budget and sug- 
sts this might be a matter for the ICJ. U.S. 
tibassador to UNESCO Gerard says the 
S. position that it will owe nothing further 
lowing its actual withdrawal is based on a 
und legal rationale. 

ly 23-24 

y IEA countries, plus France, meet out- 
e Paris to discuss further refining IEA 
rtingeney plans to meet any future disrup- 
ns of oil flows. The focus of the meeting is 
ways to build existing oil stocks and on 

potential for a coordinated stock draw in 

event of emergency. 

ly 23 

ite Department spokesman Hughes says 
• U.S. is actively considering selling 
nger missiles to Saudi Arabia and has been 
:ontact with congressional leadership on 
5 subject. 

President Hussein says Iraqi forces will 
itinue an air and naval blockage of Iran's 
*est oil terminal at Kharg Island. 

Cuba withdraws from participation in the 
nmer Olympics. 

Jury convenes in final stage of 2V2-year 
il of five Salvadoran former national 
:rdsmen charged in the killing of four 

erican churchwomen in 1980. 

U.S. and Japan reach agreement on a 
ft accord to open Japanese capital 
-kets and internationalize the yen, thus 
■ring that currency more available for in- 
rational use as payment for traded goods 

as a reserve. 

I y 24 

^i planes attack ships leaving Kharg 
nd. Iran retaliates by attacking an oil 
ti ker off the Saudi coast. 
I By a vote of 267 to 154, the House of 
fi iresentatives approves $61.75 million in 
I 1984 emergency supplemental aid for El 
3 /ador. 

I By a vote of 241 to 177, the House of 
1 iresentatives rejects further FY 1984 

1 rgency supplemental financing for 

N iraguan rebel groups. The legislation now 

if s back to the Senate. 

1 Jury convicts five Salvadorans on charges 

<l .ggravated homicide in the 1980 deaths of 

A • American churchwomen. 

j At the MBFR talks in Vienna, the War- 
m Pact turns down the Apr. 19 NATO pro- 
nal on the way of counting troops in central 
■ •ope. 

I UNESCO's executive board appoints a 
1] nember special committee to draw up pro- 
Jals for changing the way the agency func- 



lv 25 

(I Security Council begins debate on attacks 
ainst ships in the Persian Gulf. 
f Iraq claims its forces destroyed eight 
fj is in a convoy in the Persian Gulf; there is 
ri ndependent confirmation. 



May 26 

South Yemen withdraws from participation in 
the Summer Olympics. 

May 27 

Egypt holds elections for 448 contested seats 
in its parliament. 

May 28 

Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with 
Angolan Interior Minister Rodriques in 
Lusaka. 

Nicolas Ardito Barletta Vallarino receives 
credentials as President-elect of Panama. 

May 29-31 

The regular semiannual NATO ministerial 
session is held in Washington, D.C. At the 
opening meeting, Vice President Bush tells 
the NATO Foreign Ministers that four issues 
challenging the alliance are to: 

• Get Moscow to join in an improved 
relationship with the West; 

• Preserve the basic values of western 
civilization; 

• Make certain that freedom and in- 
dependence in the Third World are not 
destroyed by aggression and subversion; and 

• Strengthen NATO's common security, 
with particular emphasis on conventional 
defenses. 

At the conclusion of the ministerial, a 
final communique and a Washington State- 
ment on East-West Relations are issued. 

May 29 

President Reagan signs authorization for 200 
Stinger launchers and missiles, 200 additional 
missile reloads, and a KC-10 tanker to be 
sent to Saudi Arabia because of "a grave con- 
cern with the growing escalation" in the Per- 
sian Gulf conflict. The President exercises his 
authority for this sale under Section 36(b) of 
the Arms Export Control Act to waive the 
normal 30-day waiting period following con- 
gressional notification. 

According to official results, Egyptian 
President Mubarak's National Democratic 
Party wins 390 of the 448 contested seats in 
the parliamentary election, based on 73% of 
the popular vote nationwide. 

Treasury Secretary Regan announces 
that the U.S. and Japan have agreed that 
Japan will ease restrictions on the interna- 
tional use of the yen and on foreign participa- 
tion in its domestic financial markets. He 
says the Japanese actions will have positive 
effects on "the U.S. economy, the Japanese 
economy, and the world economy." 

May 30 

Iraq claims to have hit another ship near 
Iran's principal oil terminal at Kharg Island; 
the claim cannot be confirmed. 

State Department spokesman Hughes 
confirms that U.S. Consul in Leningrad 
Ronald Harms was beaten on Apr. 17 by a 
group of young men and that the U.S. im- 
mediately lodged a strong protest with the 
Soviet Government. 



State Department spokesman Hughes 
says the U.S. has no new information to con- 
firm a TASS report that Andrei Sakharov is 
"doing just fine." He adds that a relative of 
Dr. Sakharov in Western Europe doubts the 
report. 

May 31 

Iraq threatens to destroy Kharg Island if 
Iran launches a new ground offensive or 
refuses to negotiate an end to the war. 

Defense Department spokesman Burch 
says the U.S. is reviewing an informal re- 
quest by Kuwait on the availability and 
delivery of Stinger antiaircraft missiles. 

Lebanese Prime Minister Karami submits 
to the parliament for approval the Cabinet 
program for modifying the country's political 
structure and ending the civil war. He also 
asks for special powers to rule by decree for 
9 months. 

President Reagan signs a waiver extend- 
ing for another year MFN treatment for 
China, Hungary, and Romania. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

"121 5/4 Program for the working 

visit of President Quett K. 
J. Masire of the Republic 
of Botswana, May 7-10. 

122 5/4 Shultz: toast at dinner hosted 

by Korean Foreign 
Minister Lee, Seoul, 
May 1. 

123 5/7 Shultz: address before the 

South Carolina Bar 
Association, Columbia, 
May 5. 

* 124 5/7 Shultz: interview on "This 

Week With David 
Brinkley," Apr. 29. 

*125 5/8 Shultz: remarks before the 
XV Washington Con- 
ference for Corporate Ex- 
ecutives. 
126 5/8 Shultz: remarks at Foreign 
Service Day memorial 
dedication ceremony, 
May 7. 

*127 5/11 Program for the state visit 
of President Miguel de la 
Madrid Hurtado of Mexico, 
May 14-17. 

*128 5/11 Shultz: press briefing at Jing 
Jiang Hotel, Shanghai, 
Apr. 30. 

129 5/11 Shultz: remarks before the 

Business Council, Hot 
Springs, Va., May 12. 

130 5/14 Shultz: address and question- 

and-answer session before 
the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, 
May 11. 



Sy 1984 



93 



PUBLICATIONS 



'131 5/21 Shultz: remarks at the 

American Legion ceremony 
honoring U.S. Marine 
Security Guards, May 11. 
132 5/14 Shultz: address before the 
League of Women Voters, 
Detroit. 

•133 5/15 Dr. S. L. Abbott sworn in as 
Ambassador to Lesotho 
(biographic data). 

*134 5/16 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on UNCTAD, June 26. 

♦135 5/16 SCC, Committee on Ocean 
Dumping, June 1. 

*136 5/17 Regional foreign policy con- 
ference, St. Louis, May 24. 

*137 5/24 Robert T. Hennemeyer 

sworn in as Ambassador to 
the Republic of The Gam- 
bia (biographic data), 
May 22. 

"138 5/25 Department of State Ad- 
visory Committee on 
Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scien- 
tific Affairs, June 21. 

*139 5/24 Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, June 13. 

•140 5/25 National Committee of the 
U.S. Organization for the 
International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee, 
June 13. 

* 14 1 5/25 Secretary's Advisory Com- 
mittee on Private Interna- 
tional Law, study group on 
trusts, June 20. 

*142 5/25 Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, June 18. 

143 5/31 Shultz: interview on USIA's 

"Worldnet," May 24. 

144 5/31 Shultz: news conference at 

conclusion of North Atlan- 
tic Council meeting. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin ■ 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Free multiple copies may be obtained by 
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and 
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

U.S. Interests in Central America, address 
to the nation, May 9, 1984 (Current Policy 
#576). 



The U.S. and China: Building a Lasting 
Friendship, Fudan University, Shanghai, 
Apr. 30, 1984 (Current Policy #575). 

A Historic Opportunity for the U.S. and 
China, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, 
Apr. 27, 1984 (Current Policy #574). 

Secretary Shultz 

Realism and Responsibility: The U.S. Ap- 
proach to Arms Control, League of Women 
Voters, Detroit, May 14, 1984 (Current 
Policy #577). 

Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction, South Carolina Bar Associa- 
tion, Columbia, May 5, 1984 (Current 
Policy #573). 

Africa 

Africa: U.S. Policy (GIST, May 1984). 

Arms Control 

Arms Control: MBFR Talks (GIST, 
Apr. 1984). 

Economics 

Looking Toward London: Ten Years of 
Economic Summitry, Under Secretary 
Wallis, American Association of Exporters 
and Importers, New York, May 23, 1984 ■ 
(Current Policy #579). 

The Near West: America and the Pacific, 
Under Secretary Wallis, World Affairs 
Council, Pittsburgh, May 9, 1984 (Current 
Policy #578). 

Europe 

NATO Ministerial Meeting (GIST, May 1984). 



Refugees 

Refugees: Overseas Aid and Domestic 
Admissions, Director Purcell, 7th Annual 
National Legal Conference on Immigration 
and Refugee Policy, Mar. 30, 1984 (Current 
Policy #571). 

Science and Technology 

East-West Relations and Technology 
Transfer, Under Secretary Schneider (given 
by policy adviser Marks), Federal Bar 
Association, Newton, Mass., Mar. 29, 1984 
(Current Policy #568). 

Western Hemisphere 

U.S. Central American Policy at a Cross- 
roads, Assistant Secretary Motley, Subcom- 
mittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
House Foreign Relations Committee, 
May 2, 1984 (Current Policy #572). 

An Expanding Private Sector: Key to Un- 
precedented Growth, Ambassador Midden- 
dorf, conference sponsored by the Brazilian 
Exporters Association, National Confedera- 
tion of Commerce, State of Sao Paulo 
Federation of Industry, and Brazilian 
Courier Association; Rio de Janeiro, 
Mar. 28; Sao Paulo, Mar. 30, 1984 (Current 
Policy #570). 

U.S. Relations With Honduras and 
Nicaragua, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Michel, Subcommittee on Military Installa- 
tions and Facilities, House Armed Services 
Committee, Mar. 28, 1984 (Current Policj 
#569). 

U.S.-Mexican Relations (GIST, May 1984). 



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I 



I 



94 



Department of State Bulletii 



IDEX 



My 1984 
>lume 84, No. 2088 



Mca. A Steady Course for American 

BForeign Policy (Shultz) 35 

jjiculture Foreign Policy: Its Impact on 

{Agricultural Trade (Wallis) 65 
s Control 
sting the Nuclear Genie (Adelman) .... 42 
T Arms Control (Adelman) 46 

;h Atlantic Council Meets in Washington 
Bush, Cheysson, Luns, Reagan, Shultz, 
;exts of final communique and annex, 
Washington statement on East-West rela- 

;ions, proclamation) 1 

ident Reagan's News Conferences of 

Vlay 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 

etary Addresses American Society of 

Newspaper Editors 38 

eady Course for American Foreign Policy 

Shultz) 35 

-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council 

Meeting (Palmer) 75 

tern Proposals at MBFR Talks (Reagan, 
Vestern statement) 45 

ainess. Examining the Unitary Tax 
Wallis) 68 

ha 

align Policy: Its Impact on Agricultural 
>ade (Wallis) 65 

aetary Addresses American Society of 
■lewspaper Editors 38 

-.6 China Relations (Wolfowitz) 49 

oifress 

ST Arms Control (Adelman) 46 

4 Report on Cyprus (message to the 
-ongress) 73 

e"w of East- West Economic Relations 
Wallis) 60 

.i China Relations (Wolfowitz) 49 

.6 Response to Saudi Request for Military 
assistance (Armacost) 80 

yjus 

it Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 73 

;t\ tion in Cyprus (Reagan) 75 

eloping Countries. Foreign Policy: Its 
•npact on Agricultural Trade (Wallis) . . 65 

a> Asia 
teady Course for American Foreign 
olicy (Shultz) 35 

i China Relations (Wolfowitz) 49 

c< omics 

* lining the Unitary Tax (Wallis) 68 

o< ing Toward London: 10 Years of 
.conomic Summitry (Wallis) 52 

81 :w of East-West Economic Relations 
Vallis) 60 

.8 China Relations (Wolfowitz) 49 

1 ilvador 

la ion of El Salvador President Duarte 
i leagan) 83 

-«dent Reagan's News Conferences of 
i lay 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 

x Struggle for Freedom in Latin America 
ieagan) 27 

ii of El Salvador's President-Elect (joint 
pmmunique) 83 

ania. The Baltic States' Struggle for 
rreedom (Abrams) 77 

■Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. National 

Interest (Kirkpatrick) 70 

■ «i Atlantic Council Meets in Washington 
|3ush, Cheysson, Luns, Reagan, Shultz, 
fsxts of final communique and annex, 
i Washington statement on East- West rela- 
tions, proclamation) 1 

fdent Reagan's News Conferences of 
Vlay 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 



Secretary Shultz's Interview on "Worldnet" 18 
A Steady Course for American Foreign Policy 

(Shultz) 35 

Western Proposals at MBFR Talks (Reagan, 

Western statement) 45 

Germany. Berlin— A Very Special Place for 

America (Reagan) 28 

Industrialized Democracies 

Foreign Policy: Its Impact on Agricultural 

Trade (Wallis) 65 

Looking Toward London: 10 Years of 

Economic Summitry (Wallis) 52 

Israel. Challenge to Israel's Participation 

in UPU (Department announcement) . . 82 
Japan 
Foreign Policy: Its Impact on Agricultural 

Trade (Wallis) 65 

Japan Eases Restrictions on Yen (Regan) . . 59 
Korea. U.S.-China Relations (Wolfowitz) . .49 
Latvia. The Baltic States' Struggle for Free- 
dom (Abrams) 77 

Lithuania. The Baltic States' Struggle for 

Freedom (Abrams) 77 

Mexico 

Secretary Addresses American Society of 

Newspaper Editors 38 

Visit of Mexican President (De la Madrid, 

Reagan) 85 

Middle East 

President Reagan's News Conferences of 

May 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 

Secretary Addresses American Society of 

Newspaper Editors 38 

A Steady Course for American Foreign Policy 

(Shultz) 35 

U.S. Response to Saudi Request for Military 

Assistance (Armacost) 80 

Monetary Affairs 

The American Trade Deficit in Perspective 

(Burns) 55 

Examining the Unitary Tax (Wallis) 68 

Japan Eases Restrictions on Yen (Regan) . . 59 

Nicaragua 

President Reagan's News Conferences of 

May 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 

Secretary Shultz Visits El Salvador and 

Nicaragua (Shultz) 84 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

The Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. National 

Interest (Kirkpatrick) 70 

North Atlantic Council Meets in Washington 

(Bush, Cheysson, Luns, Reagan, Shultz, 

texts of final communique and annex, 

Washington statement on East- West rela- 
tions, proclamation) 1 

Secretary Shultz's Interview on "Worldnet" 18 

35 Years of NATO (chronology) 22 

Nuclear Policy 

Arresting the Nuclear Genie (Adelman) .... 42 

U.S.-China Relations (Wolfowitz) 49 

Poland. Review of East-West Economic 

Relations (Wallis) 60 

Presidential Documents 

Berlin — A Very Special Place for America 

(Reagan) 28 

18th Report on Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 73 

Election of El Salvador President Duarte 

(Reagan) 83 

Situation in Cyprus (Reagan) 75 

The Struggle for Freedom in Latin America 

(Reagan) 27 

Visit of Mexican President (De la Madrid, 

Reagan) 85 

Visit of Thailand's Prime Minister (Prem, 

Reagan) 51 

Western Proposals at MBFR Talks (Reagan, 

Western statement) 45 

Publications 

Department of State 94 

GPO Subscriptions 94 

Saudi Arabia 

U.S. Response to Saudi Request for Military 

Assistance (Armacost) 80 

U.S. to Supply Military Equipment to Saudi 

Arabia (Department announcements) . .81 



Security Assistance 

The Struggle for Freedom in Latin America 

(Reagan) 27 

U.S. Response to Saudi Request for Military 

Assistance (Armacost) 80 

U.S. to Supply Military Equipment to Saudi 

Arabia (Department announcements) . . 81 
Terrorism. Arresting the Nuclear Genie 

(Adelman) 42 

Thailand. Visit of Thailand's Prime Minister 

(Prem, Reagan) 51 

Trade 

The American Trade Deficit in Perspective 

(Burns) 55 

50th Anniversary of Reciprocal Trade Act 

(Department statement) 57 

Foreign Policy: Its Impact on Agricultural 

Trade (Wallis) 65 

The Logic and Politics of the Next Trade 

Round (Lamb) 63 

Looking Toward London: 10 Years of Eco- 
nomic Summitry (Wallis) 52 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council 

Meeting (Palmer) 75 

Treaties. Current Actions 88 

U.S.S.R. 

The Baltic States' Struggle for Freedom 

(Abrams) 77 

Foreign Policy: Its Impact on Agricultural 

Trade (Wallis) 65 

North Atlantic Council Meets in Washington 

(Bush, Cheysson, Luns, Reagan, Shultz, 

texts of final communique and annex, 

Washington statement on East- West rela- 
tions, proclamation) 1 

President Reagan's News Conferences of 

May 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 

Review' of East-West Economic Relations . . 60 
Secretary Addresses American Society of 

Newspaper Editors 38 

A Steady Course for American Foreign Policy 

(Shultz) 35 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council 

Meeting (Palmer) 75 

United Nations 

Challenge to Israel's Participation in UPU 

(Department announcement) 82 

Western Hemisphere 

President Reagan's News Conferences of 

May 22 and June 14 (excerpts) 29 

Secretary Addresses American Society of 

Newspaper Editors 38 

Secretary Shultz Visits El Salvador and 

Nicaragua (Shultzi 84 

A Steady Course for American Foreign Policy 

(Shultz) 35 

The Struggle for Freedom in Latin America 

(Reagan) 27 



Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 77 

Adelman, Kenneth L 42, 46 

Armacost, Michael H 80 

Burns, Arthur F 55 

Bush, Vice President 1 

Cheysson, Claude 1 

De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel 85 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 70 

Lamb, Denis 63 

Luns, Joseph M.A.H 1 

Palmer, Mark 75 

Prem Tinsulanonda 51 

Reagan, President 1, 27, 28, 29, 45, 51, 

73, 75, 83, 85 

Regan, Donald T 59 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 18, 35, 38, 84 

Wallis, W. Allen 52, 60, 65, 68 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 49 



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j "he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2089 



August 1984 



7 

r 



mmvm* 



UMENl^: 




London 

* 



President Mitterrand 



Economic 
Summit/1 



President Reagan 



Prime Minister Nakasone 



nepartmvnt of State 

bulletin 



Volume 84/Number 2089/August 1984 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
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periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



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will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
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Eor sale by the Superintendent of Documents. I B 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 



CONTENTS 



FEATURE 

1 London Economic Summit (President Reagan, 
Declarations, Statement) 



The President 

7 Visit to Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and France 
(Garret FitzGerald, Patrick J. 
Hillery, President Reagan) 

The Vice President 

25 Visit to East and South Asia and 
the Middle East (Statements, 
Toasts, Remarks) 

The Secretary 

29 



31 



Terrorism: The Problem and the 

Challenge 
Terrorism: The Challenge to the 

Democracies 



Pacific 

63 U.S. Policy in the Pacific Island 
Region (President Reagan) 

Refugees 

66 Refugees: Overseas Aid and 

Domestic Admissions (James N. 
Purcell, Jr.) 

Science & Technology 

68 East- West Relations and Tech- 
nology Transfer (William 
Schneider, Jr.) 

71 The Role of Science and Tech- 
nology in Foreign Affairs 
(James L. Malone) 



Arms Control 

34 Negotiating With the Soviets 

(Paul H. Nitze) 
38 Nuclear Arms Control and the 

NATO Alliance (Edward L. 

Rovmy) 
44 Preserving Freedom and Security 

(Kenneth W. Dam) 

Economics 

47 Steel: Domestic Industry in a 

Global Market (W. Allen Wallis) 

50 The Near West: America and the 
Pacific (W. Allen Wallis) 

Europe 

53 Cyprus: Reports of Turkish 

Cypriot Settlement in Varosha 
(Department Statement) 

53 Soviet Active Measures 

(William E. Knepper) 

54 Baltic Freedom Day, 1984 

(Proclamation) 

55 Berlin's Status in European Parli- 

ament Elections (Joint 
Response) 



United Nations 

73 Iran-Iraq War (Jose S. Sorzano, 

Text of Resolution) 

Western Hemisphere 

74 Future Opportunities for U.S.- 

Latin American Trade: The U.S. 

Perspective (Langhorne A. 

Motley) 
77 U.S. Central American Policy at 

a Crossroads (Langhorne A. 

Motley) 
84 Visit of Dominican Republic Presi- 
dent (Salvador Jorge Blanco, 

President Reagan) 

Treaties 

86 Current Actions 

Chronology 

88 June 1984 

Press Releases 

92 Department of State 



General 

57 Doctrine of Moral Equivalence 
(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick) 

Middle East 

62 U.S. Position on Jerusalem 
(Michael H. Armacost) 



Publications 

92 Department of State 

92 GPO Subscriptions 

93 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 



Index 



4 




X 



FEATURE 



Economic Summit 



London 
Economic Summit 

President Reagan attended the 

10th economic summit of 

the industrialized nations in London 

June 7-9, 1984, which was hosted 

by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 

The other participants were 

Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau (Canada), 

President Francois Mitterrand (France), 

Chancellor Helmut Kohl (West Germany), 

Prime Minister Bettino Craxi (Italy), 

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan), 

and Gaston Thorn, President of the 

European Communities Commission. 

Following are texts of four declarations 

and a statement issued by the participants 

and President Reagan's radio address. 1 



ncaster House, the site of the 10th eco- 
■ mic summit of industrialized nations, is 
I uated adjacent to St. James's Palace 
i .Tlooking the Mall. It is a notable exam- 
| ; of a great London mansion of the 
|riod spanning the end of the Georgian 
< i and the beginning of that of Queen Vic- 
I'ia. Construction began in 1825, and the 
Iiin design and most of the decoration 
rre the work of Benjamin Dean Wyatt. 
I 'tween 1838 and 1843, Sir Charles Barry 
|>e architect of the Houses of Parliament) 
lis employed to decorate the great stair- 
«se hall, which is the most splendid of its 
Sad and date in England. Lancaster House 
fused the collection for the London 
! iseum during 1914-46 and was the locale 
> a number of conferences marking impor- 
I nt stages in the constitutional develop- 
ment of the Commonwealth countries. 



Declaration on 
Democratic Values, 
June 8, 1984 

We, the Heads of State or Government of 
seven major industrial democracies with the 
President of the Commission of the European 
Communities, assembled in London for the 
Tenth Economic Summit meeting, affirm our 
commitment to the values which sustain and 
bring together our societies. 

2. We believe in a rule of law which 
respects and protects without fear or favour 
the rights and liberties of every citizen and 
provides the setting in which the human 
spirit can develop in freedom and diversity. 

3. We believe in a system of democracy 
which ensures genuine choice in elections 
freely held, free expression of opinion and 
the capacity to respond and adapt to change 
in all its aspects. 

4. We believe that, in the political and 
economic systems of our democracies, it is 
for Governments to set conditions in which 
there can be the greatest possible range and 



freedom of choice and personal initiative; in 
which the ideals of social justice, obligations 
and rights can be pursued; in which enter- 
prise can flourish and employment oppor- 
tunities can be available for all; in which all 
have equal opportunities of sharing in the 
benefits of growth and there is support for 
those who suffer or are in need; in which the 
lives of all can be enriched by the fruits of in- 
novation, imagination and scientific 
discovery; and in which there can be con- 
fidence in the soundness of the currency. Our 
countries have the resources and will jointly 
to master the tasks of the new industrial 
revolution. 

5. We believe in close partnership among 
our countries in the conviction that this will 
reinforce political stability and economic 
growth in the world as a whole. We look for 
co-operation with all countries on the basis of 
respect for their independence and territorial 
integrity, regardless of differences between 
political, economic and social systems. We 
respect genuine non-alignment. We are aware 
that economic strength places special moral 
responsibilities upon us. We reaffirm our 



ugust 1984 




determination to fight hunger and poverty 
throughout the world. 

6. We believe in the need for peace with 
freedom and justice. Each of us rejects the 
use of force as a means of settling disputes. 
Each of us will maintain only the military 
strength necessary to deter aggression and to 
meet our responsibilities for effective 
defence. We believe that in today's world the 
independence of each of our countries is of 
concern to us all. We are convinced that in- 
ternational problems and conflicts can and 
must be resolved through reasoned dialogue 
and negotiation and we shall support all ef- 
forts to this end. 

7. Strong in these beliefs, and endowed 
with great diversity and creative vigour, we 
look forward to the future with confidence. 



Left to right are Prime Minister Craxi, President Thorn, President Reagan, Prime 
Minister Thatcher, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Nakasone, Prime Minister 
Trudeau, and Chancellor Kohl. 



Economic Declaration, 
June 9, 1984 2 

We, the Heads of State or Government of 
seven major industrialised countries and the 
President of the Commission of the European 
Communities, have gathered in London from 
7 to 9 June 1984 at the invitation of the Kt 
Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP, the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, for the 
tenth annual Economic Summit. 

2. The primary purpose of these meetings 
is to enable Heads of State or Government to 
come together to discuss economic problems, 
prospects and opportunities for our countries 



and for the world. We have been able to 
achieve not only closer understanding of eacli 
other's positions and views but also a large 
measure of agreement on the basic objective? 
of our respective policies. 

3. At our last meeting, in Williamsburg i 
1983, we were already able to detect clear 
signs of recovery from world recession. That 
recovery can now be seen to be established ii 
our countries. It is more soundly based than 
previous recoveries in that it results from th< 
firm efforts made in the Summit countries 
and elsewhere over recent years to reduce in 
flation. 



FEATURE 



Economic Summit 



4. But its continuation requires unremit- 
l efforts. We have to make the most of 

opportunities with which we are now 
sented to reinforce the basis for enduring 
iwth and the creation of new jobs. We 
■d to spread the benefits of recovery wide- 
both within the industrialised countries 
1 also to the developing countries, especial- 
;he poorer countries who stand to gain 
re than any from a sustainable growth of 
world economy. High interest rates, and 
ure to reduce inflation further and damp 
vn inflationary expectations, could put 
overy at risk. Prudent monetary and 
Igetary policies of the kind that have 
ught us so far will have to be sustained 
I where necessary strengthened. We re- 
rm the commitment of our Governments 
:hose objectives and policies. 

5. Not the least of our concerns is the 
■wing strain of public expenditure in all 

■ countries. Public expenditure has to be 
it within the limits of what our national 
nomies can afford. We welcome the in- 
asing attention being given to these prob- 

Jis by national governments and in such in- 
national bodies as the Organisation for 
imomic Co-operation and Development 
|CD). 

I 6. As unemployment in our countries re- 
n ins high, we emphasise the need for sus- 
tt led growth and creation of new jobs. We 
til st make sure that the industrial economies 
il,pt and develop in response to demand and 
ti technological change. We must encourage 

■ ive job training policies and removal of 
lidities in the labour market, and bring 

I mt the conditions in which more new jobs 

I I be created on a lasting basis, especially 
I the young. We need to foster and expand 
I international trading system and 

li 'ralise capital markets. 
I 7. We are mindful of the concerns ex- 
p ssed by the developing countries, and of 
t political and economic difficulties which 
8 ny of them face. In our discussion of each 
dthe issues before us we have recognised 
t economic interdependence of the in- 
ijjtrialised and developing countries. We 
l.ffirm our willingness to conduct our rela- 
• ns with them in a spirit of goodwill and co- 
loration. To this end we have asked 
I nisters of Finance to consider the scope for 
fensified discussion of international finan- 

■ 1 issues of particular concern to developing 
iintries in the IBRD [International Bank for 

■ construction and Development] Develop- 
l-nt Committee, an appropriate and broadly 
liresentative forum for this purpose. 

I 8. In our strategy for dealing with the 
jot burdens of many developing countries, a 
jy role has been played by the International 
Imetary Fund (IMF), whose resources have 
1 gn strengthened for the purpose. Debtor 
i antries have been increasingly ready to ac- 
i at the need to adjust their economic 
jilicies, despite the painful and courageous 



efforts it requires. In a climate of world 
recovery and growing world trade, this 
strategy should continue to enable the inter- 
national financial system to manage the prob- 
lems that may still arise. But continuously 
high or even further growing levels of inter- 
national interest rates could both exacerbate 
the problems of the debtor countries and 
make it more difficult to sustain the strategy. 
This underlines the importance of policies 
which will be conducive to lower interest 
rates and which take account of the impact of 
our policies upon other countries. 
9. We have therefore agreed: 

(1) to continue with and where necessary 
strengthen policies to reduce inflation and in- 
terest rates to control monetary growth and 
where necessary reduce budgetary deficits; 

(2) to seek to reduce obstacles to the 
creation of new jobs: 

• by encouraging the development of in- 
dustries and services in response to demand 
and technological change including in in- 
novative small and medium-sized businesses; 

• by encouraging the efficient working of 
the labour market; 

• by encouraging the improvement and 
extension of job training; 

• by encouraging flexibility in the pat- 
terns of working time; 

• and by discouraging measures to 
preserve obsolescent production and 
technology; 

(3) to support and strengthen work in the 
appropriate international organisations, 
notably the OECD, on increasing understand- 
ing of the sources and patterns of economic 
change, and on improving economic efficiency 
and promoting growth, in particular by en- 
couraging innovation and working for a more 
widespread acceptance of technological 
change, harmonising standards and facili- 
tating the mobility of labour and capital; 

(4) to maintain and wherever possible in- 
crease flows of resources, including official 
development assistance and assistance 
through the international financial and 
development institutions, to the developing 
countries and particularly to the poorest 
countries; to work with the developing coun- 
tries to encourage more openness towards 
private investment flows; and to encourage 
practical measures in those countries to con- 
serve resources and enhance indigenous food 
and energy production. Some of us also wish 
to activate the Common Fund for Com- 
modities; 

(5) in a spirit of co-operation with the 
countries concerned, to confirm the strategy 
on debt and continue to implement and 
develop it flexibly case by case; we have 
reviewed progress and attach particular im- 
portance to: 



• helping debtor countries to make 
necessary economic and financial policy 
changes, taking due account of political and 
social difficulties; 

• encouraging the IMF in its central role 
in this process, which it has been carrying 
out skillfully; 

• encouraging closer co-operation be- 
tween the IMF and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
and strengthening the role of the IBRD in 
fostering development over the medium and 
long term; 

• in cases where debtor countries are 
themselves making successful efforts to im- 
prove their position, encouraging more ex- 
tended multi-year rescheduling of commercial 
debts and standing ready where appropriate 
to negotiate similarly in respect of debts to 
governments and government agencies; 

• encouraging the flow of long-term 
direct investment; just as there is need for in- 
dustrial countries to make their markets 
more open for the exports of developing 
countries, so these countries can help 
themselves by encouraging investment from 
the industrial countries; 

• encouraging the substitution of more 
stable long-term finance, both direct and 
portfolio, for short-term bank lending; 

(6) to invite Finance Ministers to carry 
forward, in an urgent and thorough manner, 
their current work on ways to improve the 
operation of the international monetary 
system, including exchange rates, sur- 
veillance, the creation, control and dis- 
tribution of international liquidity and the 
role of the IMF; and to complete the present 
phase of their work in the first half of 1985 
with a view to discussion at an early meeting 
of the IMF Interim Committee. The question 
of a further allocation of Special Drawing 
Rights is to be reconsidered by the IMF In- 
terim Committee in September 1984; 

(7) to carry forward the procedures 
agreed at Versailles and at Williamsburg for 
multilateral monitoring and surveillance of 
convergence of economic performance toward 
lower inflation and higher growth; 

(8) to seek to improve the operation and 
stability of the international financial system, 
by means of prudent policies among the ma- 
jor countries, by providing an adequate flow 
of funding to the international financial 
institutions, and by improving international 
access to capital markets in industrialised 
countries; 

(9) to urge all trading countries, in- 
dustrialised and developing alike, to resist 
continuing protectionist pressures, to reduce 
barriers to trade and to make renewed ef- 
forts to liberalise and expand international 
trade in manufactures, commodities and serv- 
ices; 



jgust1984 



(10) to accelerate the completion of cur- 
rent trade liberalisation programmes, par- 
ticularly the 1982 GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade] work programme, in 
co-operation with other trading partners; to 
press forward with the work on trade in serv- 
ices in the international organisations; to 
reaffirm the agreement reached at the OECD 
Ministerial Meeting in May 1984 on the im- 
portant contribution which a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations would make to 
strengthening the open multilateral trading 
system for the mutual benefit of all econ- 
omies, industrial and developing; and, 
building on the 1982 GATT work programme, 
to consult partners in the GATT with a view 
to decisions at an early date on the possible 
objectives, arrangements and timing for a 
new negotiating round. 

10. We are greatly concerned about the 
acute problems of poverty and drought in 
parts of Africa. We attach major importance 
to the special action programme for Africa, 
which is being prepared by the World Bank 
and should provide renewed impetus to the 
joint efforts of the international community 
to help. 

11. We have considered the possible im- 
plications of a further deterioration of the 
situation in the Gulf for the supply of oil. We 
are satisfied that, given the stocks of oil 
presently available in the world, the avail- 
ability of other sources of energy, and the 
scope for conservation in the use of energy, 
adequate supplies could be maintained for a 
substantial period of time by international co- 
operation and mutually supportive action. We 
will continue to act together to that end. 

12. We note with approval the continuing 
consensus on the security and other implica- 
tions of economic relations with Eastern 
countries, and on the need to continue work 
on this subject in the appropriate organisa- 
tions. 

13. We welcome the further report of the 
Working Group on Technology, Growth and 
Employment created by the Versailles 
Economic Summit, and the progress made in 
the eighteen areas of co-operation, and invite 
the Group to pursue further work and to 
report to Personal Representatives in time 
for the next Economic Summit. We also wel- 
come the invitation of the Italian Government 
to an international conference to be held in 
Italy in 1985 on the theme of technological 
innovation and the creation of new jobs. 

14. We recognise the international dimen- 
sion of environmental problems and the role 
of environmental factors in economic develop- 
ment. We have invited Ministers responsible 
for environmental policies to identify areas 
for continuing co-operation in this field. In 
addition we have decided to invite the Work- 
ing Group on Technology, Growth and Em- 
ployment to consider what has been done so 
far and to identify specific areas for research 



on the causes, effects and means of limiting 
environmental pollution of air, water and 
ground where existing knowledge is inade- 
quate, and to identify possible projects for in- 
dustrial co-operation to develop cost-effective 
techniques to reduce environmental damage. 
The Group is invited to report on these mat- 
ters by 31 December 1984. In the meantime 
we welcome the invitation from the Govern- 
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
certain Summit countries to an international 
conference on the environment in Munich on 
24-27 June 1984. 

15. We thank the Prime Minister of 
Japan for his report on the Hakone Con- 
ference of Life Sciences and Mankind, 
organised by the Japan Foundation in March 
1984, and welcome the intention of the 
French Government to sponsor a second Con- 
ference in 1985. 

16. We believe that manned spaced sta- 
tions are the kind of programme that pro- 
vides a stimulus for technological develop- 
ment leading to strengthening economies and 
improved quality of life. Such stations are be- 
ing studied in some of our countries with a 
view to their being launched in the 
framework of national or international pro- 
grammes. In that context each of our coun- 
tries will consider carefully the generous and 
thoughtful invitation received from the Presi- 
dent of the United States to other Summit 
countries to participate in the development of 
such a station by the United States. We 
welcome the intention of the United States to 
report at the next Summit on international 
participation in their programme. 

17. We have agreed to meet again next 
year and have accepted the Federal 
Chancellor's invitation to meet in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 



Declaration on 
East-West Relations 
and Arms Control, 
June 9, 1984 

1. We had a substantial discussion of East- 
West relations. We stressed that the first 
need is for solidarity and resolve among us 
all. 

2. At the same time, we are determined 
to pursue the search for extended political 
dialogue and long-term co-operation with the 
Soviet Union and her allies. Contacts exist 
and are being developed in a number of 
fields. Each of us will pursue all useful oppor- 
tunities for dialogue. 

3. Our aim is security and the lowest 
possible level of forces. We wish to see early 
and positive results in the various arms con- 
trol negotiations and the speedy resumption 
of those now suspended. The United States 



has offered to re-start nuclear arms control 
talks anywhere, at any time, without precon- 
ditions. We hope that the Soviet Union will 
act in a constructive and positive way. We 
are convinced that ihis would be in the com- 
mon interest of both East and West. We are 
in favour of agreements which would build 
confidence and give concrete expression, 
through precise commitments, to the princi- 
ple of the non-use of force. 

4. We believe that East and West have 
important common interests: in preserving 
peace; in enhancing confidence and security; 
in reducing the risks of surprise attack or 
war by accident; in improving crisis manage- 
ment techniques; and in preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 



Declaration on 
International 
Terrorism, 
June 9, 1984 

1. The Heads of State and Government dis- 
cussed the problem of international ter- 
rorism. 

2. They noted that hijacking and kid- 
napping had declined since the Declarations 
of Bonn (1978), Venice (1980) and Ottawa 
(1981) as a result of improved security 
measures, but that terrorism had developed 
other techniques, sometimes in association 
with traffic in drugs. 

3. They expressed their resolve to comb. < 
this threat by every possible means, 
strengthening existing measures and develoj, 
ing effective new ones. 

4. They were disturbed to note the ease 
with which terrorists move across interna- 
tional boundaries, and gain access to 
weapons, explosives, training and finance. 

5. They viewed with serious concern the 
increasing involvement of states and govern- 
ments in acts of terrorism, including the 
abuse of diplomatic immunity. They 
acknowledge the inviolability of diplomatic 
missions and other requirements of interna- 
tional law; but they emphasised the obliga- 
tions which that law also entails. 

6. Proposals which found support in the 
discussion included the following: 

• closer co-operation and co-ordination 
between police and security organisations an- 
other relevant authorities, especially in the 
exchange of information, intelligence and 
technical knowledge; 

• scrutiny by each country of gaps in its 
national legislation which might be exploited 
by terrorists; 

• use of the powers of the receiving stat 
under the Vienna Convention in such matter 
as the size of diplomatic missions, and the 
number of buildings enjoying diplomatic 
immunity; 



Department of State Bulletir 



FEATURE 



Ecomonic Summit 



1 action by each country to review the 
le of weapons to states supporting ter- 
rism; 

1 consultation and as far as possible 
'''•operation over the expulsion or exclusion 
'■'< am their countries of known terrorists, in- 
lding persons of diplomatic status involved 
terrorism. 

7. The Heads of State and Government 
cognised that this is a problem which af- 
cts all civilised states. They resolved to pro- 
Dte action through competent international 
ganisations and among the international 
J mmunity as a whole to prevent and punish 
rrorist acts. 



statement on the 
-an-Iraq Conflict, 
.une 9, 1984 

We discussed the Iraq/Iran conflict in all 
'. various aspects. 

2. We expressed our deep concern at the 
punting toll in human suffering, physical 

; . mage and bitterness that this conflict has 
ought; and at the breaches of international 
manitarian law that have occurred. 

3. The hope and desire of us all is that 
th sides will cease their attacks on each 

! her and on the shipping of other states, 
le principle of freedom of navigation must 
respected. We are concerned that the con- 
ct should not spread further and we shall 
• what we can to encourage stability in the 
gion. 

4. We encourage the parties to seek a 
aceful and honourable settlement. We shall 
.pport any efforts designed to bring this 
iout, particularly those of the United Na- 
)ns Secretary-General. 

5. We also considered the implications for 
orld oil supplies on the lines set out in the 
conomic Declaration. We noted that the 
orld oil market has remained relatively 
able. We believe that the international 
■stem has both the will and the capacity to 

I >pe with any foreseeable problems through 
I le continuation of the prudent and realistic 
I jproach that is already being applied. 




In January 1984, President Reagan committed the United States to develop a permanently 
manned space station by the early 1990s to satisfy U.S. civil and commercial requirements 
in space. At the same time, he invited America's friends and allies to participate in the 
program. The space station will benefit the scientific research of all participating nations 
and provide the capability to conduct space-based research in many fields including 
astrophysics, earth sciences and applications, life sciences, astronomy, materials process- 
ing, and communications. Viewing the model space station with President Reagan are EC 
Commission President Thorn, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Minister Thatcher, Italian Foreign 
Minister Andreotti, Canadian Finance Minister Lalonde, and Prime Minister Nakasone. 



President's 
Radio Address, 
June 9, 1984 3 

Greetings from London. As you prob- 
ably know, Nancy and I have been in 
Europe for 8 days, visiting Ireland, com- 
memorating the 40th anniversary of 
D-Day at Normandy, and now meeting 
with the leaders of the major in- 
dustrialized democracies at the economic 
summit to strengthen the basis for 
freedom, prosperity, and peace. 

Change comes neither easily nor 
quickly in foreign affairs. Finding solu- 
tions to critical global problems requires 
lengthy and sustained efforts, the kind 
we've been making ever since my first 
economic summit in Ottawa in 1981. 
Those efforts are now paying off as we 
reap the benefits of sound policies. 
Think back 4 years — America was weak 
at home and abroad. Remember double- 
digit inflation, 20% interest rates, zero 



growth, and those never-ending excuses 
that such misery would be part of our 
lives for years to come. And remember 
how our foreign policy invited Soviet ag- 
gression and expansion in Afghanistan, 
Central America, and Africa. Entire 
countries were lost. Doubt spread about 
America's leadership in defense of 
freedom and peace. And so, freedom 
and peace became less secure. 

A lot has changed. Today America 
stands taller in the world. At home 
we've made a fundamental change in 
direction — away from bigger and bigger 
government, toward more power and in- 
centives for people; away from confusion 
and failure, toward progress through 
commitment to the enduring values of 
Western civilization; away from 
weakness and instability, toward peace 
through strength and a willingness to 
negotiate. 

Together with our allies, we've tried 
to adopt a similar strategy for progress 
abroad — guided by realism, by common 



\ugust 1984 

■4. 



values and interests, and by confidence 
that we will not remain prisoners of fear 
and a disappointing past. We can and 
will move forward to better days. 

Last year the United States hosted 
the Williamsburg summit. It has been an 
active year for allied relations as we 
grappled with economic and security 
problems, but we didn't dwell on dif- 
ferences. We joined in a peace and 
security statement and a blueprint for 
world economic recovery. Williamsburg 
was an unprecedented endorsement of 
Western values. Our alliance emerged 
stronger and more united than ever. 
Peace and prosperity were made more 
secure. 

Later in the year I traveled to Japan 
and Korea to emphasize the importance 
we attached to the dynamic Pacific 
region. Here too, we faced tough prob- 
lems, particularly in trade with Japan. 
But Prime Minister Nakasone is a man 
of vision and strength, who has worked 
hard with me to iron out our dif- 
ferences, and we've made progress. 
Japan has opened up its trading and 
financial markets and moved to increase 
its defense expenditures, so vital to pre- 
serving peace and freedom in the Pacific 
Basin. This will mean more U.S. jobs 



and greater security for both our na- 
tions. 

In April I returned to the Pacific 
region to visit China. Our relations have 
steadily improved and our visit capped 
important agreements that will 
stimulate U.S. exports to China as we 
cooperate with them to modernize their 
economy. 

Now here in London at this year's 
economic summit, it's clear we've made 
impressive gains. In 1981 our economies 
had an average growth rate of only 
1.8% and 8V 2 % inflation. Today, our 
average growth rate has risen to 4%, 
while inflation has been cut in half. 
Stronger growth means more jobs with 
the U.S. economy leading the way. 
We've created more than 6 million jobs 
in the last 18 months, and we're ventur- 
ing into new, promising areas. We've of- 
fered our summit partners the oppor- 
tunity to participate with us in the 
development of our manned space sta- 
tion. An international space station will 
stimulate technology development, 
strengthen our economies, and improve 
the quality of life into the next century. 

I've stressed in London that con- 
tinued progress will require new deter- 
mination to carry out our common 



strategy for prosperity and peace. We 
must summon courage. We must con- 
tinue with action to curb inflation by 
reducing unnecessary spending, spur 
greater growth by reducing regulation, 
trade barriers, and personal income tax 
rates. And, yes, we must be prepared 
for peace by strengthening NATO's abili- 
ty to deter war, while making clear 
we're prepared to reduce nuclear 
weapons dramatically as soon as the 
Soviets are ready to work with us on 
this all-important goal. 

This has been a year of progress, a 
year when we and our friends in Europe 
and the Pacific set aside differences and 
united as great democracies should be 
with shared vision and values. That 
progress, stretching beyond America 
from the Pacific Basin to a strengthened 
Atlantic alliance, is a source of hope for 
a more prosperous and safer world. 



■Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 18, 1984. 

2 Prime Minister Thatcher read the 
declaration to reporters assembled in the 
Great Hall of the Guildhall and in the 
presence of the other summit participants. 

3 Recorded in London for broadcast in the 
United States. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Visit to Ireland, 

the United Kingdom, 

and France 



President Reagan departed the 

United States on June 1, 1984, 

to visit Ireland (June 1-4), 

the United Kingdom (June 4-10), 

where he attended the economic summit, 

and to participate in ceremonies 

commemorating the 40th anniversary 

ofD-Day at Normandy (June 6). 

He returned to Washington on June 10. 

Following are remarks made on 

various occasions during the trip. 1 



IRELAND 

Shannon, 
Arrival Remarks, 
June 1, 1984 

President and Mrs. Hillery, Prime 
Minister and Mrs. FitzGerald, 
distinguished guests, and I want to add 
with the greatest of pleasure — I'll 
try — a chairde Gaeil [Irish friends]. 
[Laughter] How did I do? [Applause] But 
on behalf of Nancy and myself, thank 
you very much for your warm and 
wonderful Irish welcome. 

We're beginning a mission to 
strengthen ties of friendship and 
cooperation among the world's leading 
democracies. It's our deepest hope and 
our earnest conviction that we can make 
genuine progress together toward a 
safer world, a more prosperous world, a 
far better world. 

To be able to begin our journey on 
this isle of wondrous beauty, with a 
countryside green as no other place 
seems to be, to be able to stand on the 
soil of my ancestors among all of you is, 
for me, a very special gift. I want you to 



know that for this great-grandson of 
Ireland, this is a moment of joy. 

And I'm returning not only to my 
own roots, I'm returning to America's 
roots. So much of what America means 
and stands for we owe to you — to your 
indomitable spirit and generosity and to 
your impassioned love for liberty and in- 
dependence. 

There are few people on Earth 
whose hearts burn more with the flame 
of freedom than the Irish. George 
Washington said, "When our friendless 
standard was first unfurled for 
resistance, who were the strangers who 
first mustered around our staff? And 
when it reeled in fight, who more brave- 
ly sustained it than Erin's generous 
sons?" You did. 

America has always been a haven of 
opportunity for those seeking a new life. 
They, in turn, have given to us, they 
have shaped us and enriched us. And 
from the beginning, when that first 
large party of your ancestors arrived at 
Newport News in 1621, your Irish blood 
has enriched America. 

With courage and determination, 
you helped our struggling colony break 
free. And then day by day, by the sweat 
of your brow and with an ache in your 



THE PRESIDENT 



back, you helped turn our small, 
undeveloped country into a great and 
mighty nation. Your hearts and minds 
shaped our literacy and cultural history. 
Your smiles, mirth, and song lifted our 
spirits with laughter and music. And 
always, you reminded us by your deep 
faith that wisdom and truth, love and 
beauty, grace and glory begin in 
Him— our Father, our Creator, our lov- 
ing God. 

No wonder we've been blessed all 
these years by what some call "the luck 
of the Irish." 

Today the sons and daughters of our 
first Irish settlers number 40 million 
strong. Speaking for them, and even for 
those not so fortunate, may I say: We're 
still part of you; we have and will re- 
main true to your values; long live Irish- 
American friendship. 

The challenges to peace and freedom 
that we face today are neither easy nor 
free from danger. But face them we 
must, and surmount them we can, pro- 
viding that we remember the rights of 
individual liberty, and of government 
resting on the consent of the governed, 
are more than the sole position of a 
chosen few; they are universal rights, 
gifts from God to men and women 
everywhere. And those rights are a 
crucial anchor for stability in a troubled 
world, a world where peace is threaten- 
ed by governments that oppress their 
citizens, renounce God, and prey on 
their neighbors. Edmund Burke's warn- 
ing of nearly two centuries ago holds 
true today: "The only thing necessary 
for the triumph of evil is for good men 
to do nothing." 

Ireland today is undertaking impor- 
tant responsibilities in international 
councils, and through your peacekeeping 
forces, to help reduce the risks of war. 
The United States bears a heavy burden 
for strengthening economic development 
and preserving peace, and we're deeply 
grateful for Ireland's contributions. 
Americans are people of peace. 
We've known and suffered the trauma 
of war, witnessed the fruits of recon- 
ciliation. And that is why we pray 
tolerance and reconciliation will one day 
unite the Catholics and Protestants in 
Northern Ireland in a spirit of commun- 
ion and community. And that is why 
those who advocate violence or engage 
in terrorism in North Ireland will never 
be welcome in the United States. 

Looking to the future, I believe 
there's reason for optimism and con- 
fidence. America's economic expansion 
can and should bring more jobs and op- 
portunities to your people. And the more 



than 300 U.S. companies that are based 
here demonstrate our clear commitment 
to a future of peace and well-being for 
all the people of Ireland, North and 
South. 

So, thank you, again, for making 
Nancy and me feel so welcome. And 
may I speak for so many of your 
families and friends in America when I 
say the words: "Ireland, oh, 
Ireland . . . Country of my fathers . . . 
Mother of my yearning, love of all my 
longings, home of my heart ..." 

Galway, 

University College, 
June 2, 1984 a 

A Chairde Gaeil — thank you. 

I very much appreciate the honor 
that you've done me today. A degree, 
honorary though it may be, is a recogni- 
tion of a certain understanding of 
culture and of the truths that are at the 
foundation of Western civilization. And 
a degree from an Irish university, in this 
respect, is of even greater significance. 

I have to confess that on the 25th 
anniversary of my own graduation, my 
alma mater presented me with an 
honorary degree, and thereby 
culminated 25 years of guilt that I had 
nursed, because I had always thought 
the first one they gave me was 
honorary. [Laughter] 

But I would like to take this moment 
to congratulate your distinguished presi- 
dent of University College, Galway, Dr. 
O'hEocha for all that he has done and is 
doing to overcome the spiral of violence 
which has plagued Northern Ireland. As 
chairman of the New Ireland Forum, 
you helped to open doors of opportunity 
for peace and reconciliation. 

Progress will depend on other 
responsible leaders, in both parts of 
Ireland and in Great Britain, following 
your example. As far as the United 
States is concerned, we applaud all 
those who strove for constructive 
political cooperation and who renounce 
violence. We pray that men and women 
of good will in all parts of this land can, 
through mutual consent and consulta- 
tion, find a way of bringing peace and 
harmony to this island that means so 
much to us. 

It was here in Ireland that monks 
and scholars preserved the theological 
and classical achievements of the 
Western world during a time of 
darkness on the Continent of Europe. 



.:. 



With the triumph of St. Patrick and 
Christianity, Ireland emerged as one of j 
the most learned countries of Europe, 
attracting students from distant lands 
and known for centuries as the Island of h 
Saints and Scholars. 

This veneration of knowledge is part 
of our heritage I am most proud to 
share. While tyrants in many nations 
stamped their populations into conformi- 
ty and submission, our ancestors enjoyed 
heated exchang'es of ideas as far back as- 
in the court of good King Brian Boru. 
It's part of our blood. That's what I keepfi 
telling myself every time I try to iron 
out my differences with the Speaker of 
our House of Representatives, a lad by 
the name of Tip O'Neill. [Laughter] 
He's a great son of Ireland and 
America as well, and I can say that, 
knowing that we have heartfelt dif- 
ferences of opinion. Yet, in free 
societies, differences are expected, in- 
deed, encouraged. It is this freedom to 
disagree, to question, to state one's case 
even when in opposition to those in 
authority that is the cornerstone of 
liberty and human progress. 

When I arrived in Shannon yester- 
day, I mentioned that I was not only 
returning to my own roots but also to 
those of my country's freedom. 
Historically, of course, no one can doubt 
Ireland's enormous contributions to 
American liberty. Nine of the signers of 
our Declaration of Independence were oi 
Irish ancestry; four were born in 
Ireland. Twenty generals in our Revolu- 
tionary Army were of Irish ancestry. 
Generals Montgomery, Sullivan, Wayne, 
and others were in the thick of the bat- 
tle. On Washington's personal staff were 
Generals Moyland and Fitzgerald. And 
on the high seas, Commodore John 
Barry, considered by many the father of 
the United States Navy, was born in 
County Wexford. 

As officers and as soldiers, sailors, 
and marines, Irish immigrants added 
fire to the American Revolution, a fire 
that ignited a flame of liberty as had 
never before been seen. This was not a 
result of uncontrollable historical forces 
but the accomplishment of heroic in- 
dividuals whose commitment and 
courage shook the foundations of em- 
pires. William Butler Yeats put it well: 
"Whatever flames upon the night, man's 
own resinous heart has fed." And I 
imagine the British weren't surprised to 
see just who was fanning those flames. 
Sir Henry Clinton wrote home to Lon- 
don that, "the emigrants from Ireland 
are our most serious opponents." 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



By the time of the American Revolu- 
n, Ireland was already a nation 
eped in culture and historical tradi- 
ns, a fact evidenced by your own city 
Gal way — now my own city of 
way — which is celebrating its 500th 
niversary. Permit me to congratulate 
of your citizens on this august occa- 
>n. 

This esteemed university is only one 
rt of the traditional educational glory 
Galway. I'm told that as far back as 
80, Galway Mayor Dominick Lynch 
unded a free school here which became 
well-known center of Catholic culture 
id nationalist activity, attracting pupils 
am near and far. By 1627 so many 
jre flocking here, many with no means 
support, that the city ordered 
Dreign beggars and poor scholars" to 
whipped out of town. Now, consider- 
g the degree you've just bestowed on 
e, I can hope that that rule is no 
nger in effect. [Laughter] 

I'm afraid we have no communities 
lite so venerable as Galway in the 
nited States. But what we lack in 
:ars we try to make up for and try 
ird in spirit. From the time of our in- 
■pendence until the present moment, 
e mainspring of our national identity 
is been a common dedication to the 
inciples of human liberty. Further, we 
'lieve there's a vital link between our 
eedom and the dramatic progress — the 
crease in our material well-being that 
e've enjoyed during these last 200 
;ars. 

Freedom motivates people of 
urage and creativity to strive, to im- 
•ove, and to push back the boundaries 
' knowledge. Here, too, the Irish 
laracter has contributed so much, 
alway, a city Columbus, as has been 
id already, is supposed to have visited 
i his way to the New World, is on a 
>ast which for so long was the western 
ige, the frontier of the known world. 

This is the 1,500th anniversary of 
le birth of St. Brendan, who, legend 
■lis us, sailed west into uncharted 
aters and discovered new lands. This 
an of God, a man of learning whose 
onasteries were part of Ireland's 
olden Age, may, indeed, have been the 
rst tie between Ireland and America. I 
nderstand much time and effort has 
one into organizing what will be an an- 
ual transatlantic yacht race between 
reland and the United States com- 
lemorating Brendan's voyage. I com- 
lend those making this effort to 
stablish what could prove to be an ex- 
iting new link between our two coun- 
ries. 




President Reagan, accompanied by Michael Leahy (left). Mayor of Galway, and Colm 
D'hEocha, President of the University College, on his way to receive an honorary doc- 
torate of law degree from the university. 



\ugust 1984 



THE PRESIDENT 



Whether Brendan reached the 
American Continent or not, there is no 
doubt about the Irish role in taming the 
wilderness of the New World and turn- 
ing America into an economic dynamo 
beyond imagination. The Irish came by 
the millions, seeking refuge from tyran- 
ny and deprivation — from hunger of the 
body and of the soul. Irish Americans 
worked in the factories. They built our 
railroads and, as with my family, settled 
and farmed the vast stretches of un- 
cultivated prairie in the heartland of 
America. 

The dream of a better life brought 
these people to our shores and millions 
of others from every corner of the 
world. They and their descendants main- 
tain great pride in their ancestry — but 
also to say thank you to your nation and 
to your people for all you contributed to 
the spirit and well-being of the United 
States of America. 

Certainly an important part of that 
spirit has and must remain close people- 
to-people contacts. The Prime Minister 
and I are, therefore, pleased to an- 
nounce our agreement to increase 
academic exchange programs between 
the United States and Ireland. 

We have instructed the appropriate 
agencies to put this into effect as soon 
as possible. We have a long tradition of 
academic cooperation; we'll strengthen 
it. And for our part, we intend to triple 
the number of students and scholars — 
triple them — in participating in the 
programs. 

America in these last four decades 
has assumed a heavy burden of respon- 
sibility to help preserve peace and pro- 
mote economic development and human 
dignity throughout the world. Some- 
times, as is to be expected in all human 
endeavors, mistakes were made. Yet, 
overall, I believe that we have an admir- 
able record. 

There is something very important I 
want you to know, and then I will 
hasten on. The American people still 
hold dear those principles of liberty and 
justice for which our forefathers sacri- 
ficed so much. Visiting America you 
understand this — and I hope that each 
of you will one day be able to do that. 

We're still a nation comprised of 
good and decent people whose fun- 
damental values of tolerance, compas- 
sion, and fairplay guide and direct the 
decisions of our government. 

Today, the free world faces an enor- 
mously powerful adversary. A visit to 
that country or to its colonies would 
reveal no public disagreement, no right 
of assembly, no independent unions. 



What we face is a strong and aggressive 
military machine that prohibits fun- 
damental freedoms. 

Our policy is aimed at deterring ag- 
gression and helping our allies and 
friends to protect themselves, while, at 
the same time, doing everything we can 
to reduce the risks of war. 

We seek negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, but unfortunately we face 
an empty chair. 

I'll be speaking more on this in my 
speech to Parliament, but right now I 
think that I should cut short whatever I 
was going to say, because I would like to 
bring up a proclamation in which we are 
congratulating Galway on its 500th 
anniversary. 

This is our greeting on the quin- 
centennial from our country to your city. 
Let us hope in our hearts that we will 
always stand together. Brothers and 
sisters of Ireland, Dia libh go leir [God 
be with you all]. 



Radio Address, 
June 2, 1984' 

Top o' the mornin' to you. I'm speaking 
from a small town named Cong in 
western Ireland, first stop on a 10-day 
trip that will also take Nancy and me to 
France and England. 

We're in an area of spectacular 
beauty overlooking a large lake filled 
with islands, bays, and coves. And those 
of you who, like me, can claim the good 
fortune of Irish roots, may appreciate 
the tug I felt in my heart yesterday 
when we saw the Emerald Isle from Air 
Force One. I thought of words from a 
poem about Ireland: 

"A place as kind as it is green, the greenest 
place I've ever seen." 

I told our welcoming hosts that to 
stand with them on the soil of my 
ancestors was, for this great-grandson 
of Ireland, a very special moment. It 
was a moment of joy. 

Earlier today we were in Galway, a 
coastal city celebrating its 500th an- 
niversary. Legend has it Columbus 
prayed at a church there on his way to 
the New World. For a thousand years, 
Ireland was considered the western edge 
of civilization and a place that continued 
to revere learning during a time of 
darkness on the Continent of Europe. 

That reverence earned Ireland its 
reputation as the Island of Saints and 
Scholars. I was pleased to address 
representatives of University College in 
Galway, to speak to them of Ireland's 



' 



many contributions to America, and to 
give thanks for those great, great forces 
of faith and love for liberty and justice 
that bind our people. 

The president of that institution, Dr. 
O'hEocha, also chaired a group called 
the New Ireland Forum, which has 
sought to foster a spirit of tolerance and 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland, so thi 
spiral of violence that has cost so many 
innocent lives there can be finally ended. 

Ireland is a beautiful, proud, and in- 
dependent land with a young and 
talented population. But they have an 
employment problem. By the strength ol 
our economy, and by the presence of 
some 300 U.S. firms here, Americans 
can and will help our Irish cousins 
create jobs and greater opportunities. 
And, of course, what helps them will 
help us, too. 

Tomorrow, Nancy and I will travel 
to Ballyporeen for a nostalgic visit to 
the original home of the Reagan clan. 
On Monday, we'll be in Dublin, where IT 
have the honor of addressing a joint ses 
sion of the Irish Parliament, as John 
Kennedy did here 21 years ago. 

When we leave Ireland, we'll be par- 
ticipating in two events that mark 
America's determination to help build a 
safer, more prosperous world. 

On June 6th, I'll join former U.S. 
Army Rangers at the historic battlefield 
of Pointe du Hoc and, later, President 
Mitterrand and other American veteran* 
at Omaha Beach and Utah Beach on the 
Normandy coast of France. Together 
we'll commemorate the 40th anniversar 
of D-Day, the great Allied invasion that 
set Europe on the course toward liberty 
democracy, and peace. 

That great battle and the war it 
helped bring to an end mark the begin- 
ning of nearly 40 years of peace in 
Europe — a peace preserved not by good 
will alone, but by the strength and mora 
courage of the NATO alliance. On June 
6th, I will reaffirm America's faithful 
commitment to NATO. If NATO re- 
mains strong and unified, Europe and 
America will remain free. If NATO can 
continue to deter war, Europe and 
America can continue to enjoy 
peace — 40 more years of peace. 

And let me make one thing very 
plain: A strong NATO is no threat to 
the Soviet Union. NATO is the world's 
greatest peace movement. It never 
threatens; it defends. And we will con- 
tinue trying to promote a better 
dialogue with the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets could gain much by helping us 
make the world safer, particularly 
through arms reductions. That would 



: 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 




*i&a*V$S&* 



■■>;■■ 



ee them to devote more resources to 

eir people and economy. 
Growth and prosperity will occupy 

lr attention when we return to London 
. |r the annual economic summit of the 
j ajor industrialized countries. And we'll 
j? marking another important anniver- 
liry: 50 years ago, America's leaders 
lid the vision to enact legislation known 
j 5 the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
I: 1934. It helped bring an end to a ter- 
jble era of protectionism that nearly 
lestroyed the world's economies. 



We'll talk about how best to main- 
tain the recent progress that has lifted 
hopes for a worldwide recovery for our 
common prosperity. You can be proud 
that the strength of the U.S. economy 
has led the way. I believe continued 
progress lies with freer trade and more 
open markets. Less protectionism will 
mean more progress, more growth, 
more jobs, a bigger slice of pie for 
everyone. 

As we meet in Normandy and Lon- 
don, we'll have much to be thankful for, 
much to be optimistic about, but still 
much to do. 



The President and Secretary Shultz confer 
at Ashford Castle (background), where 
President and Mrs. Reagan stayed during 
part of their visit in Ireland. Built over a 
period of 30 years by Lord Ardilaun in the 
19th century, Ashford Castle incorporates 
in its castlellated facade the remains of a 
13th century De Burgo Castle and the 
original Ashford House, built in the style 
of a French chateau. In more recent years, 
Ashford has been renovated and luxurious- 
ly appointed to create one of Europe's 
premier castle hotels. It has a fairy tale 
setting on the shores of beautiful Lough 
Corrib, the second largest lake in Ireland, 
with its hundreds of islands, bays, and 
coves. 



August 1984 



11 



THE PRESIDENT 



Ballyporeen, 
Village Square, 
June 3, 1984 

In the business that I formerly was in, I 
would have to say this is a very difficult 
spot — to be introduced to you who have 
waited so patiently — following this 
wonderful talent that we've seen here. 
And I should have gone on first, and 
then you should have followed — 
[laughter] — to close the show. But thank 
you very much. 

Nancy and I are most grateful to be 
with you here today, and I'll take a 
chance and say, Muintir na Heireann 
[People of Ireland]. Did I get it right? 
[Applause] All right. It's difficult to ex- 
press my appreciation to all of you. I 
feel like I'm about to drown everyone in 
a bath of nostalgia. Of all the honors 
and gifts that have been afforded me as 
President, this visit is the one that I will 
cherish dearly. You see, I didn't know 
much about my family background — not 
because of lack of interest, but because 
my father was orphaned before he was 6 
years old. And now thanks to you and 
the efforts of good people who have dug 
into the history of a poor immigrant 
family, I know at last whence I came. 
And this has given my soul a new con- 
tentment. And it is a joyous feeling. It is 
like coming home after a long journey. 

You see, my father, having been or- 
phaned so young, he knew nothing of his 
roots also. And, God rest his soul, I told 
the father, I think he's here too, today, 
and very pleased and happy to know 
that this is whence he came. 

Robert Frost, a renowned American 
poet, once said, "Home is the place, 
where, when you have to go there, they 
have to take you in." [Laughter] It's 
been so long since my great-grandfather 
set out that you don't have to take me 
in. So, I'm certainly thankful for this 
wonderful homecoming today. I can't 
think of a place on the planet I would 
rather claim as my roots more than 
Ballyporeen, County Tipperary. 

My great-grandfather left here in a 
time of stress, seeking to better himself 
and his family. From what I'm told, we 
were a poor family. But my ancestors 
took with them a treasure, an in- 
domitable spirit that was cultivated in 
the rich soil of this country. 

And today I come back to you as a 
descendant of people who are buried 
here in paupers' graves. Perhaps this is 
God's way of reminding us that we must 
always treat every individual, no matter 
what his or her station in life, with 



12 










President Reagan addresses the citizens of Ballyporeen, his ancestral home. Located at 
the foot of the Knockmealdown-Kilworth Mountains in County Tipperary, Ballyporeen is 
village in the heart of Ireland's dairyland. 



dignity and respect. And who knows? 
Someday that person's child or grand- 
child might grow up to become the 
Prime Minister of Ireland or President 
of the United States. 

Looking around town today, I was 
struck by the similarity between 
Ballyporeen and the small town in II- 
lionis where I was born, Tampico. Of 
course, there's one thing you have that 
we didn't in Tampico. We didn't have a 
Ronald Reagan Lounge in town. 
[Laughter] The spirit is the same, this 
spirit of warmth, friendliness, and open- 
ness in Tampico and Ballyporeen, and 
you make me feel very much at home. 

What unites us is our shared 
heritage and the common values of our 
two peoples. So many Irish men and 
women from every walk of life played a 
role in creating the dream of America. 
One was Charles Thompson, Secretary 
of the Continental Congress, and who 
designed the first Great Seal of the 
United States. I'm certainly proud to be 
part of that great Irish-American tradi- 
tion. From the time of our revolution 
when Irishmen filled the ranks of the 
Continental Army, to the building of the 
railroads, to the cultural contributions of 
individuals like the magnificent tenor 
John McCormack and the athletic 
achievements of the great heavyweight 
boxing champion John L. Sullivan — all 
of them are part of a great legacy. 



Speaking of sports, I'd like to take 
this opportunity to congratulate an 
organization of which all Irish men and 
women can be proud, an organization 
that this year is celebrating its 100th ai 
niversary: the Gaelic Athletic Associa- 
tion. I understand it was formed a hun- 
dred years ago in Tipperary to foster 
the culture and games of traditional 
Ireland. Some of you may be aware the 
I began my career as a sports broad- 
caster, so I had an early appreciation f< 
sporting competition. Congratulations t 
all of you during this GAA centennial 
celebration. 

I also understand that not too far 
from here is the home of the great Irisl 
novelist Charles Joseph Kickham. The 
Irish identity flourished in the United 
States. Irish men and women proud of 
their heritage can be found in every 
walk of life. I even have some of them 
my Cabinet. One of them traces his 
maternal roots to Mitchellstown, just 
down the road from Ballyporeen. And 
he and I have almost the same name. 
I'm talking about Secretary of the 
Treasury Don Regan. 

He spells it R-e-g-a-n. We're all of 
the same clan, we're all cousins. I tried 
to tell the Secretary one day that his 
branch of the family spelled it that way 
because they just couldn't handle as 
many letters as ours could. [Laughter] 



i 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE PRESIDENT 



nd then I received a paper from 
eland that told me that the clan to 
bich we belong, that in it those who 
id "Regan" and spelled it that way 
ere professional people and the 
lucators, and only the common 
borers call it "Reagan." [Laughter] So, 
eet a common laborer. 

The first job I ever got — I was 14 
ars old, and they put a pick and a 
ovel in my hand and my father told 
|e that that was fitting and becoming 
one of our name. 

The bond between our two countries 

s deep and strong, and I'm proud to 
here in recognition and celebration of 
r ties that bind. My roots in 
llyporeen, County Tipperary, are little 
ferent than millions of other 
mericans who find their roots in towns 
id countries all over the Isle of Erin. I 
st feel exceptionally lucky to have this 
ance to visit you. 

Last year a member of my staff 
me through town and recorded some 
essages from you. It was quite a tape, 
id I was moved deeply by the sen- 
nents that you expressed. One of your 
wnsmen sang me a bit of a tune about 
;an Tracy, and a few lines stuck in my 
ind. They went like this — not that I'll 
ig — "And I'll never more roam, from 
y own native home, in Tipperary so 
r away." 

The Reagans roamed to America, 
it now we're back. And Nancy and I 
ank you from the bottom of our hearts 
3 r coming out to welcome us, for the 
armth of your welcome. God bless you 

! 
IS I 

lublin, 

firmer Toasts, 
jne 3, 1984 5 

•ime Minister FitzGerald 

accordance with long-established 
stom and given that it's expected of 
, let me start on an historical note. 
e are believed, outside this country, to 
ways plunge back into the depths of 
story. I'm going to do so, because in 
e year 1029, King Reagan of Brega in- 
cted a crushing defeat on the Vikings 
Dublin. [Laughter] 

The victor demanded as ransom for 
e Viking King, Olaf Sitricson, the 
llowing: 1,200 cows, 6 score Welsh 
>rses — I don't know why Welsh — 60 
inces of gold, 60 ounces of pure silver, 
id all the "Irishmen of Leinster and of 
le North" who were being held prisoner 
Dublin on this very site, then the for- 
ess of the Viking city. 

ugust 1984 



Fortunately for us FitzGeralds, we 
didn't arrive for another 140 years— 
[laughter]— when the Reagans, having in 
the meantime failed in a bid for the 
High Kinship of Ireland — you made it 
on a second try, playing on a different 
field — had become less powerful. And 
fortunately for us, because I doubt if my 
family could have bought themselves out 
of a Reagan jail at that price. [Laughter] 

We, the FitzGeralds, do, however, 
owe the Reagans one important debt. 
For it was one, Malachy Reagan, then 
Latin secretary to a rather well-known 
king of Leinster — whom I don't need to 
and would prefer not to name — who 
wrote to us inviting us over here in 
1169. [Laughter] The Irish people 800 
years later are, I need hardly tell you, 
deeply grateful. [Laughter] 

Your great grandfather and my 
grandfather left for London from two 
places divided 7 miles apart a century 
and a quarter ago. They both married 
Irish wives, in the very same church in 
that city, Southwark Cathedral. And 
thereafter their paths divided, bringing 
us by very different routes to the leader- 
ship of our respective governments. 

Since they both left Ireland, much 
has happened in this small country. 
Much of it has been good. An indepen- 
dent Irish State has come into existence 
that is now respected by the nations of 
the world. Literature in the English 
language has since been transformed by 
towering Irish figures such as Shaw and 
Wilde, Yeats, and Joyce. And the grind- 
ing poverty in which our people lived 
three generations back has been re- 
placed by a modest prosperity, as you 
will have seen traveling through Mayo 
and Galway and Tipperary and flying 
over other counties. 

This modest prosperity has not 
marred the beauty and calm of our coun- 
tryside, which continues to draw hun- 
dreds of thousands of your compatriots 
as welcome visitors to our shores. 

Most significantly for the future, the 
last decade has seen the growth in 
Ireland of high technology industry— the 
vast bulk of it the fruit of U.S. invest- 
ment here, now in total amounting to 
over $4 billion and employing one in six 
of our manufacturing labor force. 
Ireland's share of Europe's high tech- 
nology activity is now totally dispropor- 
tionate to our size and population. We 
are well on the way to becoming a 
silicon valley in Europe, as your in- 
vestors match their inventiveness with 
the special skills and enthusiasm of our 
dynamic, well-educated laborforce — the 
youngest in Europe. 



There is, of course, another side to 
this picture — one of heavy unemploy- 
ment as the worldwide recession, now 
lifting in your country, continues to take 
its toll in Europe and, particularly, in 
this island. And we also have our own 
specific economic and financial problems. 
We'll have an opportunity to discuss 
some of these issues together tomorrow. 

But worst of all, we have within this 
island a conflict that threatens the peace 
and stability of this corner of Europe, 
one that has brought tragedy to 
thousands of homes in Northern Ireland 
and to many here, also, and in Britain. 
This is a conflict of two traditions, two 
identities in this island, but first and 
foremost, within Northern Ireland. 

You are aware of the work of the 
New Ireland Forum, launched in this 
great hall, and you have commented 
supportively on it. The New Ireland 
Forum made only one set of proposals in 
its report. It used the word "proposes" 
only once. It proposes, as necessary 
elements of a framework within which a 
new Ireland could emerge, a set of re- 
quirements, a list of "musts," centered 
on the need to accommodate each of the 
two Irish traditions equally satisfactorily 
in new structures. I'm deliberately avail- 
ing of this important occasion to em- 
phasize this point, because it has, 
perhaps, not been fully understood. 

The forum goes on to express the 
belief— the belief, not the demand— 
of nationalists that unity offers the best 
solution and our further preference that 
the particular form of unity we would 
wish to see established is a unitary 
state, achieved by agreement and con- 
sent. That is our belief, our strong 
preference; it is not a demand. We set 
out our best arguments in favor of this 
preference, but we also set out the 
arguments in favor of two quite dif- 
ferent alternatives that we considered: a 
federal-confederal state and joint 
authority. And most significantly of all, 
we committed ourselves to being open to 
discuss other views which may con- 
tribute to political development. 
Nothing, I believe, could be more open 
than that approach. 

The report of the New Ireland 
Forum is, as I have said, an agenda, not 
a blueprint. We know that you and our 
European friends want, in an ap- 
propriate way, to help to end this 
tragedy. The people of Northern Ireland 
have suffered far too much. They 
deserve and they need our help and 
yours. 



13 



THE PRESIDENT 



You will forgive me for having dwelt 
for some minutes on a problem that is so 
close to our hearts, so ever-present to 
our minds. It is, alas, only one of the 
many problems of violence and threats 
of violence in the world today — prob- 
lems to which you and I will be turning 
our thoughts together tomorrow 
morning. 

Dominating everything, of course, is 
the issue of East- West relations, the 
arms race, and, in particular, the 
nuclear menace that threatens life on 
this planet. Here, above all, as we have 
indeed been discussing together the last 
few minutes, there's an absolute need 
for dialogue between the superpowers, 
for the reopening of channels of com- 
munication that have become clogged, 
for the creation, if it can be achieved, of 
the kind of trust and confidence upon 
which alone world peace can be built. 
We look forward to hearing you speak 
on aspects of these problems to the joint 
session of the Houses of Oireachtas 
[Parliament] tomorrow. 

Ireland is a small country with a 
nightmare past. More than most people, 
therefore, we are deeply concerned at 
the violent tyranny that tears apart 
small countries like Afghanistan, at the 
repression that seeks to still the power- 
ful instinct for freedom in Eastern Euro- 
pean countries like Poland, and at the 
deprivation of human rights in so many 
countries of Latin America. With many 
of these Latin American countries our 
people have close emotional ties through 
the work of our priests and nuns and lay 
helpers there who seek to relieve the 
poverty of the people and to give them 
back their dignity of which they've been 
deprived by oppressive regimes. Our 
people's deep concern is that these prob- 
lems be resolved peacefully by the peo- 
ple of the region themselves — in Central 
America, along the lines proposed by the 
Contadora countries. In this connection, 
I might add that many people in Ireland 
have been most heartened by the news 
of Secretary Shultz' visit to Nicaragua 
on Friday last and hope that this may 
lead to the restoration of normal rela- 
tions between that small state and your 
great country, thus enhancing the 
climate for peace and democracy in that 
troubled region. 

In 4 weeks' time, Ireland takes over 
the responsibilities of the Presidency of 
the European Community. It will be our 
task to bring to a conclusion the negotia- 
tions to enlarge the community by ad- 
mitting Spain and Portugal as members 
and to complete the negotiations for the 
new convention between the EEC and 



the African, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, 
and Pacific countries. We should also be 
seeking during this presidency to secure 
agreement to a more coherent organiza- 
tion of the economic policies of our 
member states so as to take fuller ad- 
vantage of the recovery that has been 
taking place in the United States. Hope- 
fully, this task may be made somewhat 
easier by the discussions that you will be 
having with other major economic 
powers in London this week. 

There's another task we should also 
tackle. Just as in our first Presidency of 
the European Community in 1975, it fell 
to me as President of the Council of 
Ministers of the community to establish 
and get working the new system of 
political consultation between Europe 
and America that had been decided upon 
in the previous year, so in this new Irish 
presidency we shall endeavor to recon- 
cile economic differences between 
Europe and America and to secure a 
greater convergence of views on foreign 
policy issues. 

There are few tasks that the Irish 
Government could look forward to with 
as much enthusiasm or commitment. 
After all, our own relations with your 
great country are based first on human 
considerations, on people, rather than on 
the cold concerns of policy. It is on that 
human dimension, on such old, enduring, 
and unquenchable friendships that the 
hope of our world can best rely today. 

Your visit to your homeland has 
reinforced and revitalized that precious 
bond. I ask all here to raise their glasses 
in a toast to the President of the United 
States and Mrs. Reagan. 

President Reagan 

Nancy and I are delighted to be here in 
the homeland of my ancestors and de- 
lighted to be with all of you this eve- 
ning. The magnificent green of your hills 
and meadows, likewise, the warmth and 
kindredship of your people during our 
visit has touched us deeply. May I offer 
in return a heartfelt thank you from 
both Nancy and me. 

Every American, even those not 
lucky enough to be of Irish background, 
has much to be grateful for in the Isle of 
Erin. I think I have some firsthand 
knowledge of this. You see, Nancy and I 
reside in a house that was designed by 
an Irishman. [Laughter] 

We all know the Irish names and the 
lists of their achievements in our 
government, going all the way back to 
our Revolutionary history. Not only have 



*[» 



Ireland's own had great impact on 
America but the opposite has also been e 
true. 

The cross-pollination of American 
and Irish liberty is truly an historic 
phenomenon. Benjamin Franklin, a 
preeminent influence on the course of 
American democracy, visited here dur- 
ing our Revolutionary period. As Prim 
Minister FitzGerald pointed out to me 
during his last visit to Washington, mo 
than just a "couple" of American 
Presidents — and one which I will not 
mention — descend from this land. 

On the other side of the coin, in- 
dividuals significant to the developmen 
of Irish liberty were much affected by 
what was happening in America. Danie 
O'Connell, a nationalist hero and a true 
humanitarian, was influenced by our 
great pamphleteer, Thomas Paine. Anc 
the great parliamentarian, Charles 
Stewart Parnell, journeyed to America 
as a youth, a journey which may well 
have colored his political views of the 
world. And, of course, Eamon de 
Valera, your third President, was actu; 
ly born in the United States. 

And yet, with our countries so clos 
there are some influences we're not so 
proud of. And I believe I speak for all 
Americans of Irish descent who now 
hold elected office when I join you in 
condemning any misguided American 
who supports terrorists in Northern 
Ireland. I want to offer my thanks to 
Prime Minister FitzGerald for his stror 
stand on this issue. When he last visite 
Washington, he articulated a message 
conviction and courage and, by doing s 
I'm sure has saved some innocent lives 

Oscar Wilde had a comment on wa: 
that is also applicable to terrorism. He 
said, "When it is looked upon as vulgar 
Wilde said, "it will cease to be popular. 

The American people overwhelming 
ly support peaceful efforts to reconcile 
the differences between the two tradi- 
tions on this island. We pray there will 
be a new dawn, that it will come soon, 
when both Catholics and Protestants in 
Northern Ireland can live in the sunligr 
of a peaceful and just society. 

We're following, with keen interest, 
the efforts that your government has 
been making, and we wish you success. 
We especially welcome the hard work 
and thought that went into the New 
Ireland Forum's report. We hope it will 
strengthen Anglo-Irish cooperation in 
resolving the Northern Ireland problem 
through a peaceful reconciliation. 

Ireland, even with this problem at 
home, has been exerting an admirable 
influence internationally. As peace- 



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14 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE PRESIDENT 



epers, working within the structure of 
e United Nations, you've taken great 
iks for peace. Your bilateral develop- 
ing assistance to less fortunate coun- 
es is a tribute to your generosity and 
ur humanitarianism, as is the personal 
dication of Irish men and women 
gaged in voluntary service throughout 
e world. 

Ireland has had an active and 
spected role in the European Corn- 
unity. We look forward to consulting 
)sely with your government during 
land's forthcoming presidency of the 
iropean Community Commission, 
eland has always promoted an open 
id meaningful dialogue between the 
lited States and the member states of 
I e community, and I know we can 
unt on a continuation of that fine and 
ry practical tradition. 

We respect Ireland's independent 
urse in international affairs. We 
spect Ireland's contributions, which 
jre predicted by President Kennedy, 
a maker and shaper of world peace. 
in id we respect the democratic and 
imanitarian values embodied in your 
tions. Taoiseach [Prime Minister], our 
ople have a common love of freedom 
d a sense of decency that transcends 
litical consideration. In many respects, 
y journey here is a celebration of our 
is and ideals, as well as of family, 
ley are ties that secure our friendship 
.d ensure our good will. 

That Thomas Paine that I mentioned 
moment ago said— and I think that all 
us should take this to heart— said 
> ■ at the opportunity is ours, we have it 

our power to start the world over 
T ;ain. And I think we share another 
if : eal. What is our goal when we talk of 
i eologies and philosophies? It is one, 
•ry simple: the ultimate in individual 
4 eedom consistent with an orderly 
■ciety. That is our goal. 

Ladies and gentlemen, please join 
e in a toast to the Prime Minister of 
eland. 



d 







At the dinner hosted by Prime Minister FitzGerald are (left to right) Secretary Shultz, 
Mrs. FitzGerald, President Reagan, the Prime Minister, and Mrs. Reagan. 



Irish Parliament, 
June 4, 1984 6 

I am fully cognizant of the great honor 
that has been done me by your invitation 
for me to speak here. [Applause] Thank 
you. 

And I can't help but say, I wonder if 
there is an awareness in some that there 
are countries in the world today where 
representatives would not have been 
able to speak as they have here. 7 

When I stepped off Air Force One 
at Shannon a few days ago and saw 
Ireland, beautiful and green and felt 
again the warmth of its people, 
something deep inside began to stir. 

Who knows but that scientists will 
someday explain the complex genetic 
process by which generations seem to 
transfer across time and even oceans 
their fondest memories. Until they do, I 
will have to rely on President Lincoln's 
words about the "mystic chords of 
memory"— and say to you that during 
the past few days at every stop here in 
your country, those chords have been 
gently and movingly struck. So, I hope 
you won't think it too bold of me to say 
that my feelings here this morning can 
best be summarized by the words 
"home — home again." 

I know some of us Irish Americans 
tend to get carried away with our 
ancestral past and want very much to 
impress our relatives here with how well 
we've done in the New World. Many of 
us aren't back in Ireland 5 minutes 
before, as the American song has it, 



we're looking to shake the hand of Uncle 
Mike and kiss the girl we used to swing 
down by the garden gate. [Laughter] 

I do want you to know that for 
Nancy and me these last few days will 
remain in our hearts forever. From 
Shannon to Galway, to Ballyporeen to 
Dublin, you have truly made us feel as 
welcome as the flowers in May, and for 
this we'll always be grateful to you and 
to the Irish people. 

Of course I didn't exactly expect a 
chilly reception. As I look around this 
chamber, I know I can't claim to be a 
better Irishman than anyone here, but I 
can perhaps claim to be an Irishman 
longer than most any of you here. 
[Laughter] There are those who just 
refuse to let me forget that. [Laughter] I 
also have some other credentials. I am 
the great-grandson of a Tipperary man; 
I'm the President of a country with the 
closest possible ties to Ireland; and I 
was a friend of Barry Fitzgerald. 
[Laughter] One Irishman told me he 
thought I would fit in. "Mr. President," 
he said, "you love a good story, you love 
horses, you love politics— the accent we 
can work on." [Laughter] 

But I also came to the land of my 
forebears to acknowledge two debts: to 
express gratitude for a light heart and a 
strong constitution; and to acknowledge 
that well-spring of so much American 
political success: the Blarney Stone. I 
don't have to tell you how the Blarney 
Stone works. Many times, for example, I 
have congratulated Italians on 
Christopher Columbus' discovery of 



ugust 1984 



15 



THE PRESIDENT 



America, but that's not going to stop me 
from congratulating all of you on 
Brendan the navigator. [Laughter] 

I think you know, though, that 
Ireland has been much in our thoughts 
since the first days in office. I'm proud 
to say the first Embassy I visited as 
President was Ireland's, and I'm proud 
that our Administration is blessed by so 
many Cabinet members of Irish extrac- 
tion. Indeed I had to fight them off Air 
Force One or there wouldn't be anyone 
tending the store while we're gone. And 
that's not to mention the number of 
Irish Americans who hold extremely im- 
portant leadership posts today in the 
U.S. Congress. 

I can assure you that Irish 
Americans speak with one voice about 
the importance of the friendship of our 
two nations and the bonds of affection 
between us. The American people know 
how profoundly Ireland has affected our 
national heritage and our growth into a 
world power. And I know that they 
want me to assure you today that your 
interests and concerns are ours and 
that, in the United States, you have true 
and fast friends. 

Our visit is a joyous moment, and it 
will remain so. But this should not keep 
us from serious work or serious words. 
This afternoon, I want to speak directly 
on a few points. 

I know many of you recall with 
sadness the tragic events of last 
Christmas: the five people killed and 92 
injured after a terrorist bomb went off 
in Harrods of London. Just the day 
before, a Garda recruit, Gary Sheehan, 
and Private Patrick Kelly, a young Irish 
soldier with four children, were slain by 
terrorist bullets. These two events, oc- 
curring 350 miles apart — one in Ireland, 
one in Britain — demonstrated the 
pitiless, indiscriminate nature of ter- 
rorist violence, a violence evil to its core 
and contemptible in all its forms. And it 
showed that the problems of Northern 
Ireland are taking a toll on the people of 
both Britain and Ireland, north and 
south. 

Yet the trouble in the north affects 
more than just these two great isles. 
When he was in America in March, your 
Prime Minister courageously denounced 
the support that a tiny number of 
misguided Americans give to these ter- 
rorist groups. I joined him in that 
denunciation, as did the vast majority of 
Irish Americans. 

I repeat today, there is no place for 
the crude, cowardly violence of ter- 
rorism — not in Britain, not in Ireland, 
not in Northern Ireland. All sides should 
have one goal before them, and let us 



state it simply and directly: to end the 
violence, to end it completely, and to 
end it now. 

The terrorism, the sense of crisis 
that has existed in Northern Ireland has 
been costly to all. But let us not 
overlook legitimate cause for hope in the 
events of the last few months. As you 
know, active dialogue between the 
governments — here in Dublin, and in 
London — is continuing. There's also the 
constructive work of the New Ireland 
Forum. The forum's recent report has 
been praised. It's also been criticized. 
But the important thing is that men of 
peace are being heard and their message 
of reconciliation discussed. 

The position of the United States in 
all of this is clear: We must not and will 
not interfere in Irish matters nor 
prescribe to you solutions or formulas. 
But I want you to know that we pledge 
to you our good will and support, and 
we're with you as you work toward 
peace. 

I'm not being overly optimistic when 
I say today that I believe you will work 
out a peaceful and democratic reconcilia- 
tion of Ireland's two different traditions 
and communities. Besides being a land 
whose concern for freedom and self- 
determination is legendary, Ireland is 
also a land synonymous with hope. It is 
this sense of hope that saw you through 
famine and war, that sent so many Irish 
men and women abroad to seek new 
lives and to build new nations, that gave 
the world the saints and scholars who 
prescribed Western culture, the mis- 
sionaries and soldiers who spoke of 
human dignity and freedom and put 
much of the spark to my own country's 
quest for independence and that of other 
nations. 

You are still that land of hope. It's 
nowhere more obvious than in the 
economic changes being wrought here. I 
know Ireland faces a serious challenge 
to create jobs for your population, but 
you've made striking gains, attracting 
the most advanced technology and in- 
dustries in the world and improving the 
standard of living of your people. And 
you've done all of this while maintaining 
your traditional values and religious 
heritage, renewing your culture and 
language, and continuing to play a key 
role in the world community. 

Based on Ireland's traditional 
neutrality in international affairs, you 
can be proud of your contribution to the 
search for peace. Irish soldiers have 
been part of eight UN peacekeeping 
operations since you joined that 
organization. 



In the economic sphere, we 
Americans, too, are proud that our 
businesses have been permitted to pros 
per in Ireland's new economic environ- 
ment. As you know, there are more thai 
300 American businesses here providing 
between 35,000 and 40,000 jobs. We're 
continuing to encourage this investment 
And I assure you today that we will en- 
courage even greater investment for the 
future. 

I think part of the explanation for 
the economic progress you are making 
here in Ireland can be found in your na 
tion's historic regard for personal 
freedom. Too often the link between 
prosperity and freedom is overlooked. Ii 
fact, it's as tight as ever. And it pro 
vides a firm basis for increasing 
cooperation, not only between our two 
countries but among all countries of the 
globe that recognize it. 

Men and women everywhere in our 
shrinking world are having the same ex- 
perience. For most of mankind the 
oceans are no longer the fearful 
distances they were when my great- 
grandfather, Michael Reagan, took 
weeks to reach America. Some men and 
women still set out with their children ii 
small boats fleeing tyranny and depriva- 
tion. For most of us, though, the oceans 
and airways are now peaceful avenues, 
thronged with ideas, people, and goods 
going in every direction. They draw us 
together. Slowly, but surely, more and 
more people share the values of peace, 
prosperity, and freedom which unite 
Ireland and America. 

In the last year, I've made two visits 
to America's neighbors across the 
Pacific in Asia. This century has brough 
the Pacific nations many hardships, and 
many difficulties and differences remain 
But what I found everywhere was 
energy, optimism, and excitement. Som* 
nations in Asia have produced astound- 
ing economic growth rates by providing 
incentives that reward initiative by 
unleashing freedom. More and more, 
there is a sense of common destiny and 
possibility for all the peoples of this 
great region. The vast Pacific has 
become smaller, but the future of those 
who live around it is larger than ever 
before. 

Coming to Ireland, I sensed the 
same stirring, the same optimism 
toward a better future. 

I believe that great opportunities do 
lie ahead to overcome the age-old 
menaces of disease and hunger and 
want. But moments of great progress 
can also be moments of great testing. 
President Kennedy noted, when he was 



re. 
a 
:: 

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nil 



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16 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



:» 



re, that we live in a "most climactic 
riod" but also, he said, "in the most 
'ficult and dangerous struggle in the 
story of the world." He was talking 
5a out our century's struggle between the 
•ces of freedom and totalitarianism — a 
uggle overshadowed, we all know too 
nt|;l], by weapons of awful destruction on 
th sides. 

Believe me, to hold the office that I 
w hold is to understand, each waking 
anient of the day, the awesome 
sponsibility of protecting peace and 
eserving human life. The responsibility 
nnot be met with halfway wishes; it 
n be met only by a determined effort 
consolidate peace with all the 
"ength America can bring to bear. 

This is my deepest commitment; to 
hieve stable peace, not just by being 
epared to deter aggression but also by 
suring that economic strength helps to 
id the way to greater stability through 
owth and human progress — being 
epared with the strength of our com- 
tment to pursue all possible avenues 
r arms reduction; and being prepared 
th the greatest strength of all, the 
iritual strength and self-confidence 
at enables us to reach out to our 
versaries. To them, and to all of you 
io have always been our dear and 
asted friends, I tell you today from my 
art, America is prepared for peace. 

What we're doing now in American 
reign policy is bringing an enduring 
i sadiness, particularly in the search for 
l ms reduction. Too often in the past, 
i sought to achieve grandiose objec- 
ts and sweeping agreements over- 
gilt. At other times, we set our sights 
low that the agreements, when they 
1 ire made, permitted the numbers and 
i tegories of weapons to soar. For ex- 
i nple, our nation from the time of the 
jning of the SALT II agreement until 
e present added 3,950 warheads to its 
senal. That might be arms limitation; 
certainly isn't arms reduction. The 
suit wasn't even arms control, 
irough all of this, I'm afraid, differing 
•oposals and shifting policies have 
imetimes left both friends and adver- 
tries confused or disconcerted. 

And that's why we've put forward, 
ethodically, one of the most extensive 
•ms control programs in history. We 
;lieve there can be only one policy, for 
1 nations, if we are to preserve civiliza- 
on in this modern age. A nuclear war 
innot be won and must never be 
>ught. 

In five areas, we have proposed 
lbstantive initiatives. In Vienna less 
lan 2 months ago, the Western side put 



ugust 1984 



forward new proposals on reducing the 
levels of conventional military forces in 
Europe. In the same week in Geneva, 
Vice President Bush put forward a draft 
agreement for a worldwide ban on 
chemical weapons, the gases that have 
been used in Afghanistan and in Kam- 
puchea. In Stockholm we're pursuing at 
the Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe a series of proposals that will 
help reduce the possibility of conflict. 
And in Geneva — as most of you are 
aware — we have been participating, un- 
til recently, in arms reductions talks on 
two fronts: the START talks on reduc- 
ing intercontinental nuclear forces, and 
the INF talks, which deal with the issue 
of intermediate-range missiles world- 
wide. In addition, we're working to pre- 
vent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
to require comprehensive safeguards on 
all nuclear exports. 

During the months the START and 
INF talks were underway, the United 
States proposed seven different ini- 
tiatives. None of these was offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Indeed, we made 
a number of adjustments to respond to 
the stated concerns of the Soviet side. 
While Soviet flexibility did not match 
our own, the Soviets also made some 
steps of the kind required in any serious 
negotiations. But then, after the first 
deployment of intermediate-range 
missiles here in Europe, the Soviets quit 
the bargaining table. 

This deployment was not something 
we welcomed. It had been my hope, and 
that of the European leaders, that 
negotiations would make the deploy- 
ments unnecessary. Unfortunately, the 
Soviet stance in those talks left us no 
alternative. Since 1977, while we were 
not deploying, but urging the Soviets to 
negotiate, they were deploying some 370 
SS-20 missiles, capable of reaching 
every city in every country in Europe. 
We and our allies could not ignore this 
threat forever. 

But I believe today it is still possible 
to reach an agreement. Let me assure 
you that in both the START and INF 
talks, we want to hear Soviet proposals; 
we want them to hear our own; and 
we're prepared to negotiate tomorrow if 
the Soviets so choose. I'm prepared to 
halt, and even reverse, the deployment 
of our intermediate-range missiles from 
Europe as the outcome of a verifiable 
and equitable agreement. But for such 
an outcome to be possible, we need to 
have the Soviets return to the bargain- 
ing table. And before this body, and the 
people of Europe, I call on them to do 
so. 



Indeed, I believe we must not be 
satisfied — we dare not rest, until the 
day we've banished these terrible 
weapons of war from the face of the 
Earth forever. 

My deepest hope and dream has 
been that if once we can, together, start 
down the road of reduction, we will in- 
evitably see the common sense of going 
all the way, so that our children and 
grandchildren will not have to live with 
that threat hanging over the world. 

In addition to the arms control 
negotiations, I want to stress today that 
the United States seeks greater dialogue 
in two other critical areas of East- West 
relations. Just as we seek to reduce the 
burden of armaments, we want to find, 
also, ways to limit their use in trouble- 
some or potentially difficult regional 
situations. We seek serious discussions 
with the Soviets to guard against 
miscalcuation or misunderstanding in 
troubled or strategically sensitive areas 
of the world. I want to stress again to- 
day the serious commitment of the 
United States to such a process. 

In the Stockholm conference I men- 
tioned a moment ago, the United States 
and 34 other nations are negotiating 
measures to lessen East- West tensions 
and reduce uncertainties arising from 
military activities in Europe, the area 
with the greatest concentration of 
armed forces in the world. The 16 na- 
tions of the Atlantic alliance have ad- 
vanced concrete proposals which would 
make conflict in Europe less likely. The 
Soviet Union has not accepted these pro- 
posals, but has focused upon a declara- 
tion of the non-use of force. 

Mere restatement of a principle all 
nations have agreed to in the UN 
Charter and elsewhere would be an in- 
adequate conclusion to a conference 
whose mandate calls for much more. We 
must translate the idea into actions 
which build effective barriers against the 
use of force in Europe. If the Soviet 
Union will agree to such concrete ac- 
tions, which other countries in the 
Stockholm conference already seem 
prepared to accept, this would be an im- 
portant step forward in creating a more 
peaceful world. 

If discussions on reaffirming the 
principle not to use force, a principle in 
which we believe so deeply, will bring 
the Soviet Union to negotiate agree- 
ments which will give concrete, new 
meaning to that principle, we will gladly 
enter into such discussion. I urge the 
Soviet Union now to join all other coun- 
tries in the Stockholm conference to 



17 



THE PRESIDENT 



move promptly to take these steps which 
will help ensure peace and stability in 
Europe. 

We seek to build confidence and 
trust with the Soviets in areas of mutual 
interest by moving forward in our 
bilateral relations on a broad front. In 
the economic field, we're taking a 
number of steps to increase exchanges 
in nonstrategic goods. In other areas, 
we have for example, extended our very 
useful incidents-at-sea agreement for 
another term. And we've proposed 
discussions for specific steps to expand 
and multiply contacts of benefit to our 
people. I might add here that the 
democracies have a strong mutual 
obligation to work for progress in the 
area of human rights. And positive 
Soviet steps in this area would be con- 
sidered by the United States a signifi- 
cant signal. 

In summary then, we're seeking in- 
creased discussion and negotiation to 
reduce armaments, solve regional prob- 
lems, and improve bilateral relations. 
Progress on these fronts would enhance 
peace and security for people every- 
where. 

I'm afraid the Soviet response has 
been disappointing. Rather than join us 
in our efforts to calm tensions and 
achieve agreements, the Soviets appear 
to have chosen to withdraw and to try 
to achieve their objective through prop- 
aganda rather than negotiations. 

The Soviets seek to place the blame 
on the Americans for this self-imposed 
isolation. But they have not taken these 
steps by our choice. We remain ready 
for them to join with us and the rest of 
the world community to build a more 
peaceful world. In solidarity with our 
allies, confident of our strength, we 
threaten no nation. Peace and prosperity 
are in the Soviet interest as well as in 
ours. So let us move forward. 

Steadiness in pursuing our arms 
reductions initiatives and bettering East- 
West relations will eventually bear fruit. 
But steadiness is also needed in sustain- 
ing the cause of human freedom. 

When I was last in Europe, I spoke 
about a crusade for freedom, about the 
ways the democracies could inaugurate a 
program promoting the growth of 
democratic institutions throughout the 
world. And now it is underway. And this 
can have an impact in many ways in 
many places and be a force for good. 

Some, of course, focusing on the na- 
tions that have lost their freedom in the 
postwar era, argue that a crusade for 
democratic values is impractical or 
unachievable. But we must take the long 



18 



view. At the start of this century, there 
were but few democracies. Today, there 
are more than 50, comprising one-third 
of the world's population. And it is no 
coincidence — showing once again the 
link between political, economic 
freedom, and material progress — that 
these nations enjoy the highest stand- 
ards of living. 

History is the work of free men and 
women, not unalterable laws. It is never 
inevitable, but it does have directions 
and trends; and one trend is clear — 
democracies are not only increasing in 
number, they're growing in strength. 
Today they're strong enough to give the 
cause of freedom growing room and 
breathing space, and that's all that 
freedom ever really needs. "The mass of 
mankind has not been born with saddles 
on their backs." Thomas Jefferson said 
that. Freedom is the flagship of the 
future and the flashfire of the future. Its 
spark ignites the deepest and noblest 
aspirations of the human soul. 

Those who think the Western 
democracies are trying to roll back 
history are missing the point. History is 
moving in the direction of self- 
government and the human dignity that 
it institutionalizes, and the future 
belongs to the free. 

On this point of democratic develop- 
ment, I think it is vital to appreciate 
what has been happening in the Western 
Hemisphere, particularly Latin America. 
Great strides have been made in recent 
years. In fact, 26 of 33 Latin American 
countries today are democracies, or are 
striving to become democracies. I think 
it is also vital to understand that the 
U.S. current program of assistance to 
several Central American countries is 
designed precisely to assist this spread 
of democratic self-rule. 

I know that some see the United 
States, a large and powerful nation, in- 
volved in the affairs of smaller nations 
to the south, and conclude that our mis- 
sion there must be self-seeking or in- 
terventionist. The Irish people, of all 
people, know Americans well. We strive 
to avoid violence or conflict. History is 
our witness on this point. 

For a number of years at the end of 
the last war, the United States had a 
monopoly on nuclear weapons. We did 
not exploit this monopoly for territorial 
or imperial gain. We sought to do all in 
our power to encourage prosperity and 
peace and democracy in Europe. One 
can imagine if some other countries, 
possibly, had had these weapons instead 
of the United States, would the world 
have been as much at peace in the last 
40 years as it has been. 



■r- 

m 
i 



:. 



In a few days in France, I will stano » 
near the only land in Europe that is oc- 
cupied by the United States — those 
mounds of earth marked with crosses 
and stars of David, the graves of 
Americans who never came home, who 
gave their lives that others might live in 
freedom and peace. It is freedom and 
peace that the people of Central 
America seek today. 

Three times in little more than 2 
years, the people of El Salvador have 
voted in free elections. Each time they 
had to brave the threats of the guerrilla! ii 
supported by the Sandinista regime in 
Nicaragua and by Cuba and the Soviet 
Union. These guerrillas use violence to 
support their threats. Their slogan in 
each one of those elections has been, 
"Vote today and die tonight." Yet the 
people of El Salvador — 1.4 million of 
them — have braved ambush and gunfire 
and trudged for miles to vote for 
freedom and then stood in line for hours 
waiting their turn to vote. 

Some of our observers who went 
down there — many of them going down 
convinced that perhaps we were wrong 
in what we are trying to do there — 
came home converted. Some of them 
came home converted by one woman 
standing in the voting line — had been 
there for hours. She had been shot. She 
suffered from a rifle bullet. She refused 
to leave the line for medical treatment 
until she had had her opportunity to 
vote. They came home convinced that 
the people of El Salvador want 
democracy. 

All the United States is attempting 
to do — with only 55 military advisers 
and $474 million in aid, three-fourths of 
which is ear-marked for economic and 
social development — is give the 
Salvadorans the chance they want for 
democratic self-determination, without 
outside interference. But this the 
Government of Nicaragua has been 
determined not to permit. 

By their own admission, they've 
been supplying and training the 
Salvadoran guerrillas. In their own 
country they have never held elections. 
They have all but crushed freedom of 
the press and moved against labor 
unions, outlawed political freedoms, and 
even sponsored mob action against 
Nicaragua's independent human rights 
commission and imprisoned its director. 

Despite this repression, a hundred 
thousand Nicaraguan Catholics attended 
a rally on Good Friday this year to sup- 
port their church, which has been 
persecuted by the Sandinistas' com- 
munist dictatorship. And the bishop has 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



™! iw written a pastoral letter citing this 
* rsecution of the church by that 
ivernment. And yet, even in our own 
untry we didn't read anything of that 
■monstration. Somehow word of it 
dn't get out through the news channels 
the world. 

In a homily to 4,000 Nicaraguans 
icked into Don Bosco Church several 
eeks ago, the head of the Nicaraguan 
shops Conference, Bishop Pablo 
ntonio Vega, said, "The tragedy of the 
icaraguan people is that we are living 
ith a totalitarian ideology that no one 
ants in this country." You may not 
ive heard about this — again, as I say, 
e words of Nicaraguan Archbishop 
aando y Bravo. "To those who say that 
e only course for Central American 
iuntries is Marxism-Leninism, we 
iristians must show another way. That 
to follow Christ, whose path is that of 
uth and liberty." 

The vast majority of those now 
ruggling for freedom in Nicaragua — 
ntrary to what the Sandinistas would 
ive the world believe — are good and 
orthy people who did not like the 
)moza dictatorship and who do not 
ant the communist dictatorship. The 
agedy is they haven't been given the 
lance to choose. 

The people of Nicaragua and El 
ilvador have a right to resist the 
ghtmare outside forces want to impose 
1 them, just as they have the right to 
•sist extremist violence from within 
hether from the left or right. The 
nited States must not turn its back on 
ie democratic aspirations of the people 
Central America. 

Moreover, this is a worldwide strug- 
e. The Irish orator James Philpot 
jrran once said, "The condition upon 
hich God hath given liberty to man is 
ernal vigilance." And yes, military 
rength is indispensable to freedom. I 
ive seen four wars in my lifetime; none 
' them came about because the forces 
freedom were too strong. 
In the moving words used by the 
zechoslovak Charter 77 group just a 
eek ago, in reply to supporters of 
uclear disarmament in the West, they 
lid, "Unlike you, we have personal ex- 
erience of other, perhaps less con- 
Dicuous, but no less effective means of 
stroying civilization than those 
epresented by thermonuclear war; some 
f us, at the very least, prefer the risk 
wolved in maintaining a firm stance 
( gainst aggression to the certainty of 
lie catastrophic consequences of ap- 
easement." 



The struggle between freedom and 
totalitarianism today is not ultimately a 
test of arms or missiles but a test of 
faith and spirit. And in this spiritual 
struggle, the Western mind and will is 
the crucial battleground. We must not 
hesitate to express our dream of 
freedom; we must not be reluctant to 
enunciate the crucial distinctions be- 
tween right and wrong — between 
political systems based on freedom and 
those based on a dreadful denial of the 
human spirit. 

If our adversaries believe that we 
will diminish our own self-respect by 
keeping silent or acquiescing in the face 
of successive crimes against humanity, 
they're wrong. What we see throughout 
the world is an uprising of intellect and 
will. As Lech Walesa said: "Our souls 
contain exactly the contrary of what 
they wanted. They wanted us not to 
believe in God, and our churches are 
full. They wanted us to be materialistic 
and incapable of sacrifices; we are anti- 
materialistic, capable of sacrifice. They 
wanted us to be afraid of the tanks, of 
the guns, and instead we don't fear 
them at all." Lech Walesa. 

Let us not take the counsel of our 
fears. Let us instead offer.the world a 
politics of hope, a forward strategy for 
freedom. The words of William 
Faulkner, at a Nobel prize ceremony 
more than three decades ago, are an elo- 
quent answer to those who predict 
nuclear doomsday or the eventual 
triumph of the superstate. "Man will not 
merely endure," Faulkner said, "he will 
prevail . . . because he will return to the 
old verities and truths of the heart. He 
is immortal because, alone among 
creatures, he has a soul, a spirit of com- 
passion and sacrifice and endurance." 

Those old verities, those truths of 
the heart — human freedom under 
God — are on the march everywhere in 
the world. All across the world 
today — in the shipyards of Gdansk, the 
hills of Nicaragua, the rice paddies of 
Kampuchea, the mountains of 
Afghanistan — the cry again is liberty. 
And the cause is the same as that 
spoken in the chamber more than two 
decades ago by a young American Presi- 
dent, who said, "A future of peace and 
freedom." 

It was toward the end of his visit 
here that John Fitzgerald Kennedy said, 
"I am going to come back and see old 
Shannon's face again." And on his last 
day in Ireland, he promised, "I certainly 
will come back in the springtime." 

It was a promise left unkept, for a 
spring that never came. But surely in 



our hearts there is the memory of a 
young leader who spoke stirring words 
about a brighter age for mankind, about 
a new generation that would hold high 
the torch of liberty and truly light the 
world. 

This is the task before us: to plead 
the case of humanity, to move the con- 
science of the world, to march to- 
gether — as in olden times — in the cause 
of freedom. 

Thank you again for this great 
honor, and God bless you all. 



Luncheon Toasts, 
June 4, 1984 8 



President Reagan 

Nancy and I are delighted to welcome 
you here this afternoon. We hope to 
return the kind hospitality that has been 
extended to us from the moment that 
we set foot on this Emerald Isle. By the 
way, I noted that this house has a Blue 
Room, a Coral Room, and a Gold 
Room — and that reminds me of the 
White House back in Washington. As 
you may have seen when you visited 
Washington, Mr. Prime Minister, the 
White House is a good home for an 
Irishman, because every March 17th, I 
can honor St. Patrick by spending all 
day in the Green Room. [Laughter] 

For Americans, the very mention of 
Ireland holds a magical sense of allure. 
It brings to mind images of green 
pastures, rugged highlands, and wide 
lakes — like Lough Conn, Corrib, 
Killarney — images of a lovely village 
square in Galway or the graceful 
Georgian architecture here in Dublin. 
Perhaps what strikes Americans most 
when they visit Ireland is that yours is a 
land of many faces — a face of rich and 
unparalleled beauty, a face of a proud 
and glorious past, and a face of a young 
and bright and hopeful future. 

More than eight centuries before 
Columbus discovered the New World, 
Irish monasteries were great centers of 
faith and learning. Scholars from all 
over Europe came here to study 
theology, philosophy, Greek, and Latin. 
Your ancestors created stunning il- 
luminated manuscripts, including a book 
many consider the most beautiful ever 
made, the Book of Kells. 

Today, you and your sons and 
daughters are making Ireland young 
again— young in your spirit of hope and 
faith in the future; young in your deter- 
mination to create new opportunities 



Rugust 1984 



19 



THE PRESIDENT 




President and Mrs. Hillery accompany President and Mrs. Reagan to Air Force One for 
the latters' departure from Ireland. 



and attract new technologies to help 
your economy along. And you're young 
in heart, ready to give and forgive, and 
ready to reach out in goodness and 
friendship and love. 

Our own country, of course, remains 
a young nation simply because it is a 
young nation. Only a few centuries have 
passed since the first settlers landed on 
our eastern shores. And they and those 
who followed them came from virtually 
every nation on Earth. By 1900, nearly 
4 million had come from Ireland alone. 
They cleared the land, built towns, 
established legislatures. They created a 
new and distinctly American way of life, 
and yet they continued to cherish 
memories of their homelands. Today 
Ireland and the United States share a 
living bond: the many Irish people who 
have cousins in America, and the 40 
million Americans of Irish descent who 
always keep a special place for this 
island in our hearts. 



Our two countries share a second 
bond — a bond of fundamental beliefs 
and enduring values. And as Ireland 
works to foster international under- 
standing in this troubled world, you'll 
have the admiration, the respect, and 
the support of the United States. We 
pledge our unremitting effort for the 
cause of peace with freedom and human 
dignity. 

As you may know, my own family 
left Ireland for the United States more 
than a hundred years ago. Some of the 
people in our country say I was with 
them. [Laugher] This homecoming to the 
land of my ancestors has moved me 
more deeply than I can say. And Nancy 
and I, as we draw our visit to a close, 
know that many Irish Americans who 
can't be here today will watch from 
home. They're with us in spirit and shar- 
ing a deep affection for Ireland and its 
people — an affection that's shared, as 
well, by your great poet, or I should 



20 



say — he did share it when he wrote — 
William Butler Yeats, when he wrote: 
"Land of Heart's Desire, Where beauty . 
has no ebb . . . But joy is wisdom, time 
an endless song." 

Would you please join me in a toast 
to the President of Ireland, President 
Hillery. 

President Hillery 

Somebody remarked to me that your 
progress in Irish was so rapid that I 
should begin my speech in Irish and that 
you would understand it. [Laughter] 9 

I would like to thank you for your 
kind words, for your invitation to Maeve 
and to me to be here, and to thank you 
and Mrs. Reagan for arranging this very, 
happy occasion. I'm sure everybody here 
would wish to thank you both personal- 
ly, if time allowed, because for us it is a < 
really happy occasion. 

We will, when you have left, wonder 
after your all too brief visit — we'll 
reflect on the personal and official 
reasons and aspects of your visit and 
what made it such a success. And I 
think I'd start off by saying that you 
brought to us a cheerful atmosphere, 
which Europe is badly in want of. 

I suppose it's safe to say that if 
anybody in the free world has cause to 
look worried and overburdened, it's you. 
And still you come among us with 
courageous cheerfulness, showing us the 
way you're going and assuring and 
reassuring our people and the people of 
the world. And I thank you for doing 
that. 

Your search for Irish roots has ob- 
viously been an important consideration 
for you and for us. It goes straight to 
the heart of the relationship between 
this country and the United States of 
America. We have our friends and rela- 
tions in your country, and you have 
yours here. 

You were here for the first time in 
1948 as a private citizen, and you 
returned in 1972 as Governor of Califor- 
nia. Now, 12 years later you have come 
again, this time as President of the 
United States. It is not necessary for me 
to say how much we welcome you. 

We're not promoting the idea that 
every American who comes to Ireland 
three times will become President of the 
United States — [laughter] — but some 
among us are pointing to the wisdom of 
letting young people in America know 
that they cannot visit Ireland too early 
or too often. In fact, inherited wisdom 
has brought Ronald Reagan, Jr., here 
twice already. [Laughter] 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Your visit has consolidated the 
lecial friendship which exists between 
eland and the United States. Your 
J e -esence among us testifies to that 
>ecial friendship — a friendship which 
is endured and grown and become 
ore, not less, important with the 
issage of time, and moving away from 
ie original links of history. It is based 
blood and kinship and reinforced by 
ie bedrock of shared beliefs and ideals. 

Ireland shares with the United 
tates of America a profound respect 
>r the rights of the individual, for the 
riding worth of democracy, and for the 
gnity of the human person. The tyran- 
y of flying time compels me to omit 
jference to very many aspects of our 
iendship and ties at official and unof- 
cial levels. Some, but not all have been 
jferred to and recalled over the past 3 
ays. Suffice it to say that the bonds 
hich bind us are many and strong and 
iduring. 

The best guarantee of ensuring the 
srmanence of such a happy relationship 
in the best tradition of old friends — 
to visit more often. With that in mind, 
hope that you and Mrs. Reagan will 
)on return to our shores. And you will, 
t me assure you, receive Cead Mille 
ailte [one hundred thousand welcomes]. 

I now ask those of you who are not 
[r. and Mrs. Reagan — [laughter] — to 
in with me in a toast to the President 
f the United States of America. 




At the Normandy Cemetery, Mrs. Reagan 
places flowers at the graves of U.S. service- 
men who died during the D-Day invasion. 
More than 9,000 Americans are buried 
here. 



NORMANDY 

Pointe du Hoc, 
June 6, 1984 10 

We're here to mark that day in history 
when the Allied armies joined in battle 
to reclaim this continent to liberty. For 
4 long years, much of Europe had been 
under a terrible shadow. Free nations 
had fallen, Jews cried out in the camps, 
millions cried out for liberation. Europe 
was enslaved, and the world prayed for 
its rescue. Here in Normandy the rescue 
began. Here the Allies stood and fought 
against tyranny in a giant undertaking 
unparalleled in human history. 

We stand on a lonely, windswept 
point on the northern shore of France. 
The air is soft, but 40 years ago at this 
moment, the air was dense with smoke 
and the cries of men, and the air was 
filled with the crack of rifle fire and the 
roar of cannon. At dawn, on the morn- 
ing of the 6th of June, 1944, 225 
Rangers jumped off the British landing 
craft and ran to the bottom of these 
cliffs. Their mission was one of the most 
difficult and daring of the invasion: to 
climb these sheer and desolate cliffs and 
take out the enemy guns. The Allies had 
been told that some of the mightiest of 
these guns were here and they would be 
trained on the beaches to stop the Allied 
advance. 

The Rangers looked up and saw the 
enemy soldiers — the edge of the cliffs 
shooting down at them with machine 
guns and throwing grenades. And the 
American Rangers began to climb. They 
shot rope ladders over the surface of 
these cliffs and began to pull themselves 
up. When one Ranger fell, another 
would take his place. When one rope 
was cut, a Ranger would grab another 
and begin his climb again. They climbed, 
shot back, and held their footing. Soon, 
one by one, the Rangers pulled them- 
selves over the top, and in seizing the 
firm land at the top of these cliffs, they 
began to seize back the Continent of 
Europe. 

Two hundred and twenty-five came 
here. After 2 days of fighting, only 90 
could still bear arms. 

Behind me is a memorial that sym- 
bolizes the Ranger daggers that were 
thrust into the top of these cliffs. And 
before me are the men who put them 
there. 

These are the boys of Pointe du 
Hoc. These are the men who took the 
cliffs. These are the champions who 



August 1984 



21 



THE PRESIDENT 



helped free a continent. These are the 
heroes who helped end a war. 

Gentlemen, I look at you, and I 
think of the words of Stephen Spender's 
poem. You are men who in your "lives 
fought for life . . . and left the vivid air 
signed with your honor." 

I think I know what you may be 
thinking right now— thinking "we were 
just part of a bigger effort; everyone 
was brave that day." Everyone was. Do 
you remember the story of Bill Millin of 
the 51st Highlanders? Forty years ago 
today, British troops were pinned down 
near a bridge, waiting desperately for 
help. Suddenly, they heard the sound of 
bagpipes, and some thought they were 
dreaming. They weren't. They looked up 
and saw Bill Millin with his bagpipes, 
leading the reinforcements and ignoring 
the smack of the bullets into the ground 
around him. 

Lord Lovat was with him — Lord 
Lovat of Scotland, who calmly an- 
nounced when he got to the bridge, 
"Sorry I'm a few minutes late," as if he'd 
been delayed by a traffic jam, when in 
truth he'd just come from the bloody 
fighting on Sword Beach, which he and 
his men had just taken. 

There was the impossible valor of 
the Poles who threw themselves be- 
tween the enemy and the rest of Europe 
as the invasion took hold, and the unsur- 
passed courage of the Canadians who 
had already seen the horrors of war on 
this coast. They knew what awaited 
them there, but they would not be de- 
terred. And once they hit Juno Beach 
they never looked back. 

All of these men were part of a 
rollcall of honor with names that spoke 
of a pride as bright as the colors they 
bore: the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, 
Poland's 24th Lancers, the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers, the Screaming Eagles, the 
Yeoman of England's armored divisions, 
the forces of Free France, the Coast 
Guard's "Matchbox Fleet" and you, the 
American Rangers. 

Forty summers have passed since 
the battle that you fought here. You 
were young the day you took these 
cliffs; some of you were hardly more 
than boys, with the deepest joys of life 
before you. Yet, you risked everything 
here. Why? Why did you do it? What im- 
pelled you to put aside the instinct for 
self-preservation and risk your lives to 
take these cliffs? What inspired all the 
men of the armies that met here? We 
look at you, and somehow we know the 
answer. It was faith and belief; it was 
loyalty and love. 




President Mitterrand and President Reagan place WTeaths at the Ranger Monument at 
Pointe du Hoc which is located on a cliff overlooking Omaha Beach. The monument was 
erected by the French to honor the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion and was officially turned 
over to the U.S. Government in 1979. 



The men of Normandy had faith that 
what they were doing was right, faith 
that they fought for all humanity, faith 
that a just God would grant them mercy 
on this beachhead or on the next. It was 
the deep knowledge — and pray God we 
have not lost it — that there is a pro- 
found, moral difference between the use 
of force for liberation and the use of 
force for conquest. You were here to 
liberate, not to conquer, and so you and 
those others did not doubt your cause. 
And you were right not to doubt. 

You all knew that some things are 
worth dying for. One's country is worth 
dying for, and democracy is worth dying 
for, because it's the most deeply 
honorable form of government ever 
devised by man. All of you loved liberty. 
All of you were willing to fight tyranny, 
and you knew the people of your coun- 
tries were behind you. 

The Americans who fought here that 
morning knew word of the invasion was 
spreading through the darkness back 
home. They felt in their hearts, though 
they couldn't know in fact, that in 
Georgia they were filling the churches at 
4 a.m., in Kansas they were kneeling on 
their porches and praying, and in 
Philadelphia they were ringing the 
Liberty Bell. 



Something else helped the men of 
D-Day: their rockhard belief that Prov- 
idence would have a great hand in the 
events that would unfold here; that God 
was an ally in this great cause. And, so, 
the night before the invasion, when 
Colonel Wolverton asked his parachute 
troops to kneel with him in prayer he 
told them: "Do not bow your heads, but 
look up so you can see God and ask His 
blessing in what we're about to do." Also 
that night, General Matthew Ridgway 
on his cot, listening in the darkness for 
the promise of God made to Joshua: "I 
will not fail thee nor forsake thee." 

These are the things that impelled 
them; these are the things that shaped 
the unity of the Allies. 

When the war was over, there were 
lives to be rebuilt and governments to be 
returned to the people. There were na- 
tions to be reborn. Above all, there was 
a new peace to be assured. These were 
huge and daunting tasks. But the Allies 
summoned strength from the faith, 
belief, loyalty, and love of those who fell 
here. They rebuilt a new Europe 
together. 

There was first a great reconcilia- 
tion among those who had been enemies, 
all of whom had suffered so greatly. The 
United States did its part, creating the 
Marshall Plan to help rebuild our Allies 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



d our former enemies. The Marshall 
Ian led to the Atlantic alliance — a 

t great alliance that serves to this day as 
Bur shield for freedom, for prosperity, 
d for peace. 

In spite of our great efforts and suc- 
sses, not all that followed the end of 
le war was happy or planned. Some 
berated countries were lost. The great 
adness of this loss echoes down to our 
wn time in the streets of Warsaw, 
J 'rague, and East Berlin. Soviet troops 
f hat came to the center of this continent 
I id not leave when peace came. They're 
till there, uninvited, unwanted, 
nyielding, almost 40 years after the 
/ar. Because of this, allied forces still 
tand on this continent. Today, as 40 
ears ago, our armies are here for only 
ne purpose — to protect and defend 
emocracy. The only territories we hold 
re memorials like this one and 
raveyards where our heroes rest. 

We in America have learned bitter 
jssons from two World Wars: It is bet- 
er to be here ready to protect the peace 
han to take blind shelter across the sea, 
ushing to respond only after freedom is 
Dst. We've learned that isolationism 
iever was and never will be an accept- 
able response to tyrannical governments 
*dth an expansionist intent. 

But we try always to be prepared 
or peace, prepared to deter aggression; 
irepared to negotiate the reduction of 
irms; and, yes, prepared to reach out 
tgain in the spirit of reconciliation. In 
ruth, there is no reconciliation we 
vould welcome more than a reconcilia- 
ion with the Soviet Union, so, together, 
ve can lessen the risks of war, now and 
orever. 

It's fitting to remember here the 
;jreat losses also suffered by the Russian 
people during World War II: 20 million 
Perished, a terrible price that testifies to 
ill the world the necessity of ending 
war. I tell you from my heart that we in 
he United States do not want war. We 
want to wipe from the face of the Earth 
,he terrible weapons that man now has 
in his hands. And I tell you, we are 
eady to seize that beachhead. We look 
for some sign from the Soviet Union 
that they are willing to move forward, 
that they share our desire and love for 
peace, and that they will give up the 
ways of conquest. There must be a 
changing there that will allow us to turn 
our hope into action. 

We will pray forever that some day 
that changing will come. But for now, 
particularly today, it is good and fitting 
to renew our commitment to each other, 
to our freedom, and to the alliance that 
protects it. 



We are bound today by what bound 
us 40 years ago, the same loyalties, 
traditions, and beliefs. We're bound by 
reality. The strength of America's allies 
is vital to the United States, and the 
American security guarantee is essential 
to the continued freedom of Europe's 
democracies. We were with you then; 
we are with you now. Your hopes are 
our hopes, and your destiny is our 
destiny. 

Here, in this place where the West 
held together, let us make a vow to our 
dead. Let us show them by our actions 
that we understand what they died for. 
Let our actions say to them the words 
for which Matthew Ridgway listened: "I 
will not fail thee nor forsake thee." 

Strengthened by their courage, 
heartened by their valor, and borne by 
their memory, let us continue to stand 
for the ideals for which they lived and 
died. 



Omaha Beach, 
June 6, 1984 11 

We stand today at a place of battle, one 
that 40 years ago saw and felt the worst 
of war. Men bled and died here for a 
few inches of sand, as bullets and 
shellfire cut through their ranks. About 
them, General Omar Bradley later said, 
"Every man who set foot on Omaha 
Beach that day was a hero." 

No speech can adequately portray 
their suffering, the sacrifice, their hero- 
ism. President Lincoln once reminded us 
that through their deeds, the dead of 
battle have spoken more eloquently for 
themselves than any of the living ever 
could. But we can only honor them by 
rededicating ourselves to the cause for 
which they gave a last full measure of 
devotion. 

Today we do rededicate ourselves to 
that cause. And at this place of honor, 
we're humbled by the realization of how 
much so many gave to the cause of 
freedom and to their fellow man. 

Some who survived the battle of 
June 6, 1944, are here today. Others 
who hoped to return never did. 

"Someday, Lis, I'll go back," said 
Private First Class Peter Robert 
Zanatta, of the 37th Engineer Combat 
Battalion, and first assault wave to hit 
Omaha Beach. "I'll go back, and I'll see 
it all again. I'll see the beach, the bar- 
ricades and the graves." 

Those words of Private Zanatta 
come to us from his daughter, Lisa 



Zanatta Henn, in a heart-rending story 
about the event her father spoke of so 
often. "In his words, the Normandy in- 
vasion would change his life forever," 
she said. She tells some of his stories of 
World War II but says of her father, 
"the story to end all stories was D-Day." 

"He made me feel the fear of being 
on that boat waiting to land. I can smell 
the ocean and feel the seasickness. I can 
see the looks on his fellow soldiers' 
faces — the fear, the anguish, the uncer- 
tainty of what lay ahead. And when they 
landed, I can feel the strength and 
courage of the men who took those first 
steps through the tide to what must 
have surely looked like instant death." 

Private Zanatta's daughter wrote to 
me, "I don't know how or why I can feel 
this emptiness, this fear, or this deter- 
mination, but I do. Maybe it's the bond I 
had with my father. All I know is that it 
brings tears to my eyes to think about 
my father as a 20-year-old boy having to 
face that beach." 

The anniversary of D-Day was 
always special for her family. And like 
all the families of those who went to 
war, she describes how she came to 
realize her own father's survival was a 
miracle: "So many men died. I know 
that my father watched many of his 
friends be killed. I know that he must 
have died inside a little each time. But 
his explanation to me was, You did 
what you had to do, and you kept on go- 
ing.' " 

When men like Private Zanatta and 
all our Allied forces stormed the beaches 
of Normandy 40 years ago, they came 
not as conquerors but as liberators. 
When these troops swept across the 
French countryside and into the forests 
of Belgium and Luxembourg they came 
not to take but to return what had been 
wrongly seized. When our forces 
marched into Germany, they came not 
to prey on a brave and defeated people 
but to nurture the seeds of democracy 
among those who yearned to be free 
again. 

We salute them today. But, Mr. 
President [Mitterrand], we also salute 
those who, like yourself, were already 
engaging the enemy inside your beloved 
country — the French Resistance. Your 
valiant struggle for France did so much 
to cripple the enemy and spur the ad- 
vance of the armies of liberation. The 
French Forces of the Interior will 
forever personify courage and national 
spirit. They will be a timeless inspiration 
to all who are free and to all who would 
be free. 



August 1984 



23 



THE PRESIDENT 




Today, in their memory, and for all 
who fought here, we celebrate the 
triumph of democracy. We reaffirm the 
unity of democratic peoples who fought 
a war and then joined with the van- 
quished in a firm resolve to keep the 
peace. 

From a terrible war we learned that 
unity made us invincible; now, in peace, 
that same unity makes us secure. We 
sought to bring all freedom-loving na- 
tions together in a community dedicated 
to the defense and preservation of our 
sacred values. Our alliance, forged in the 
crucible of war, tempered and shaped by 
the realities of the post-war world, has 
succeeded. In Europe, the threat has 
been contained, the peace has been kept. 

Today, the living here assembled — 
official, veterans, citizens — are a tribute 
to what was achieved here 40 years ago. 
This land is secure. We are free. These 
things are worth fighting and dying for. 

Lisa Zanatta Henn began her story 
by quoting her father, who promised 
that he would return to Normandy. She 
ended with a promise to her father, who 
died 8 years ago of cancer: "I'm going 
there, Dad, and I'll see the beaches and 
the barricades and the monuments. I'll 
see the graves, and I'll put flowers there 
just like you wanted to do. I'll feel all 
the things you made me feel through 
your stories and your eyes. I'll never 
forget what you went through, Dad, nor 
will I let anyone else forget. And, Dad, 
I'll always be proud." 



Eight heads of state gather at Utah Beach for the closing ceremony commemorating the 
40th anniversary of the D-Day landing at Normandy. Left to right are Prime Minister 
Trudeau (Canada), Queen Beatrix (Netherlands), King Olav V (Norway), King Baudouin 
(Belgium), President Mitterrand (France), Queen Elizabeth II (United Kingdom), Grand 
Duke Jean (Luxembourg), and President Reagan. 



Through the words of his loving 
daughter, who is here with us today, a 
D-Day veteran has shown us the mean- 
ing of this day far better than any Presi- 
dent can. It is enough for us to say 
about Private Zanatta and all the men of 
honor and courage who fought beside 
him four decades ago: We will always 
remember. We will always be proud. We 
will always be prepared, so we may 
always be free. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 11, 1984. 

2 Made at the airport. 

3 Made in Quadrangle Square at the 
university. Prior to his address, the President 
received an honorary doctorate of law degree 
from the National University, of which the 
college at Galway is a part, and was 
presented with the Freedom of the City and 
a resolution scroll by Mayor Michael Leahy. 



4 Broadcast to the United States from 
Ashford Castle in Cong, County Mayo, where 
the President and Mrs. Reagan stayed during 
their visit in Galway. 

5 Hosted by the Prime Minister in honor 
of President Reagan in St. Patrick's Hall in 
Dublin Castle. 

6 Made before a joint session of the Parlia- 
ment in the Dail [House of Representatives] 
at Leinster House. 

'The President was referring to three 
members of the National Parliament who pro- 
tested the President's presence and left the 
room after he was introduced by the Prime 
Minister. 

"Hosted by President Reagan in honor of 
President Hillery at Deerfield, the residence 
of the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland. 

9 President Hillery opened his remarks in 
Irish. 

10 Made at the site of the U.S. Ranger 
Monument where veterans of the Normandy 
invasion had assembled for the anniversary. 

"Made at the Omaha Beach Memorial. ■ 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 






Vice President Bush Visits 
East and South Asia 
and the Middle East 



i 



Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C., 

May 8, 1984, to visit Japan (May 8-10), 

Indonesia (May 10-12), India (May 12-15), 

Pakistan (May 15-18), and Oman (May 18-20). 

He returned to Washington on May 20. 

Following are the Vice President's statements, 

toasts, and remarks he made on various 

occasions during the trip. 1 



JAPAN 

Tokyo, 

Dinner Toast, 
May 9, 1984 2 

Six months ago, President Reagan and 
Prime Minister [Yasuhiro] Nakasone met 
here to renew a personal friendship and 
to strengthen a national friendship. Both 
men share a vision of U.S. -Japan bi- 
lateral and global cooperation unham- 
pered by the barrier of lingering trade 
problems, and together they set a 
demanding agenda for progress to 
realize that vision. 

In the succeeding 6 months, we have 
witnessed an unprecedented chapter in 
our relations: an almost unbroken period 
of intense communication and close 
cooperation marked by frequent per- 
sonal consultations. I know, Mr. Foreign 
Minister [Shintaro Abe], the important 
role that you played in these negotia- 
tions, and we are grateful to you for 
your efforts. 

We have made real and significant 
progress. Still, much remains to be 
done. Our work together is far from 
complete. We must continue to build on 
the gains we have already made to forge 
new progress for the future. 

In a relationship of the size and 
scope of that between the United States 
and Japan, there will always be prob- 
lems to command our attention. But I 
think we have demonstrated in this last 
half year of negotiations that we have 
the imagination and means to find solu- 
tions to those difficulties as they arise. 



In so many ways, our two countries are 
providing the world with the promise of 
a better future. 

Finally, let me stress how highly my 
country values its relationship with 
Japan. Together we stand as engines of 
prosperity in the world economy and 
bulwarks in defense of freedom and 
democratic values in a world too often 
beset by tyranny. As President Reagan 
said in his address to the Diet last year, 
"Together, there is nothing Japan and 
America cannot do." 

I would like to propose a toast to 
you, Mr. Foreign Minister, and to your 
gracious and hospitable country, our 
partner in prosperity and ally in 
democracy. 



Statement, 
May 10, 1984 3 

We have had a wonderful stay in Japan, 
and it has been a great pleasure to meet 
with my Japanese colleagues who have, 
as always, proven to be the most 
thoughtful and gracious of hosts. 

My discussions with the Prime 
Minister [Yasuhiro Nakasone], the 
Foreign Minister [Shintaro Abe], Mr. 
[Toshio] Komoto [Director General of 
Economic Planning Agency] and other 
distinguished leaders focused largely on 



the follow-up process stemming from the 
President's visit to Japan last 
November. 

Our meetings were extremely friend- 
ly, and our discussions frank and to the 
point. There was a clear recognition on 
both sides of all that remains to be done. 

We have accomplished much in the 
last 6 months, but our work together in 
resolving the difficult trade and 
economic issues is far from complete. 
I'm sure that if we approach the prob- 
lems that remain in the same spirit of 
cooperation that has marked our 
negotiations so far, we will continue to 
make progress; and the strong and vital 
Japan-U.S. relationship will continue to 
prosper. 

I leave Japan today more convinced 
than ever of the importance of that rela- 
tionship to both of our great nations. 




With Prime Minister Nakasone. 



(White House photos by Dave Valdez) 



August 1984 



25 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



INDONESIA 

Jakarta, 
Statement, 
May 12, 1984 3 

On the personal level, I leave with some 
feeling of regret that I have had too lit- 
tle time to see more of Indonesia. My 
visit to Taman Mini yesterday brought 
home to me the tremendous variety and 
grandeur of this beautiful country. 

But on an official level, during these 
2 days of talks I have learned much and, 
I think, we have accomplished much. In 
excellent meetings with President 
Soeharto, with Vice President Umar, 
and with other senior officials of the 
Government of Indonesia, I took every 
opportunity to stress how much the 
United States values our broad and 
friendly ties with Indonesia. 

I spent a good deal of time discuss- 
ing with President Soeharto the subject 
of East- West relations. I wanted to con- 
vey to him President Reagan's deep and 
abiding commitment to arms control and 
listen to his views on these issues that 
affect the peace of all mankind. Presi- 
dent Reagan has proposed negotiations 
in five vital areas with the Soviets. They 
include proposals to limit strategic arms, 
intermediate force missiles, mutual force 
reductions, chemical warfare, and 
confidence-building measures. I noted 
that despite the fact that the Soviets 
have rejected these efforts, President 
Reagan is determined to push forward 
in this important area. 

I was also pleased to discuss with 
President Soeharto President Reagan's 
recent trip to China and stressed that 
President Reagan sees improved rela- 
tions with the People's Republic of China 
as a progressive step designed to bring 
stability to the world. I think it's impor- 
tant to note that improved relations 
with the People's Republic of China will 
not come at the expense of our friend- 
ship with the member nations of 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations]. 

I am grateful for President 
Soeharto's views on these issues of im- 
portance for peace in both the region 
and the world. I will report what I have 
heard to President Reagan upon my 
return. President Soeharto will, I know, 
convey the details of our discussion to 
the other leaders of ASEAN when they 
meet in Jakarta this coming July. 






With President Soeharto. 

I came here to learn; and thanks to 
my very productive meetings, I did. I 
learned much about what Indonesia, 
under President Soeharto's leadership, 
has accomplished in nationbuilding; and 
I was extremely impressed with the 
strides Indonesia has made in promoting 
economic development. 

As we leave today, I am confident 
that relations between the United States 
and Indonesia are stronger than at 
anytime. It is our intention to work 
jointly with the government of President 
Soeharto to strengthen our friendship 
even further in the months and years to 
come. 

Finally, I want to express my 
sincere appreciation and that of my 
wife, Barbara, and our entire traveling 
party for the kindness that we have 
been afforded during the past few days. 
As I said at the very beginning, we have 
seen too little of this beautiful country, 
and I spent too little time here. We all 
look forward to returning one day. 



INDIA 

New Delhi, 
Dinner Toast, 
May 12, 1984 4 



i 



:: 



In looking at the relationship between 
India and the United States, I am im- 
pressed by the many values our two 
countries share. First, of course, is our 
common heritage as two nations in the 
forefront of the anti-colonial struggle. 
We both know the pain and price of in- 
dependence, and we both appreciate the 
necessity of carefully guarding our hard- 
won freedom. 

It is significant, I believe, that in 
both our countries national elelctions 
will be held within the next few months. 
Our common democratic traditions hold 
our two nations in an enduring alliance 
of the spirit — the vibrant, unbreakable 
alliance of free men everywhere. 

Closely related to our shared 
democratic ideals is the pluralistic 
nature of our two societies. The peoples 
of both countries — so varied in ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural backgrounds — 
have chosen to bind themselves together 
through democratic institutions in order 
to protect their diversity and their in- 
dividual liberties. 

Third, both societies value openness 
of discussion and debate, whether in the 
political arena or in a free press. Both 
India and the United States know that 
freedom of expression is the ultimate 
guarantor of our survival as free and 
proud peoples. We have seen too many 
countries around the world stagnate anc 
decay — both spiritually and econom- 
ically — as freedom withered under press 
censorship and state control. 

Given all this that our two societies 
have in common, some have asked why 
there is not greater accord between In- 
dia and the United States in the way we 
look at the world. Let me say, first, that 
I count myself among those who believe 
there is no fundamental conflict between 
the foreign policy objectives of the 
United States and those of India. Each 
of us, in our own way, seeks a better lift 
for our people in a world at peace with 
itself. 

We do bring different perspectives 
to bear on the problems of our planet. 
Such differences are in the natural order 
of things; and as open, democratic 
societies which value the intellectual fer- 
ment stimulated by the debate of ideas, 
we should not confuse such debate with 
irreconcilable differences nor give such 
debate a greater importance than it 
deserves. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Let us take, for example, my coun- 
ty's policy toward this region, South 
sia. The United States supports a 
astern of stable, peaceful, and pros- 
erous South Asian states — states free 
) choose their own system of govern- 
lent and to exercise their rights as 
)vereign, independent nations. 

The United States recognizes the im- 
ortant role of a strong India, whose 
ell-established democratic institutions 
elp it serve as an anchor of regional 
tability. 

Good relations between a strong, 
ee, and united India and its neighbors 
Iso contributes to regional stability and 
le peaceful, economically progressing 
outh Asia we seek. We have welcomed 
fforts to increase regional cooperation, 
s well as India's efforts to improve 
ilateral relations with China and 
akistan. India and its neighbors, ob- 
iously, must determine the pace and 
ath of the normalization process, but 
ou should know that the United States 
tands ready to support it in whatever 
/ays we reasonably can. 

In our view, the most destabilizing 
actor to emerge in the region in recent 
ears has been the brutal Soviet inva- 
ion and continuing war against 
Afghanistan. The presence of more than 
00,000 Soviet troops in that country 
.as fundamentally altered the strategic 
ialance in the region and created the 
vorld's largest refugee problem. 

I look forward to discussing these 
nd other matters with Prime Minister 
Indira] Gandhi and her officials. India 
md the United States have differences 
vhich we are sensitive to, but our com- 
non interests, which are grounded in a 
■ommon commitment to democracy and 
mman dignity, are larger and ultimately 
nuch more important. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to 
oin me in a toast to Vice President 
Mohammed] Hidayatullah and to the 
Republic of India. 



nt 



Statement, 
JMay 15, 1984 3 

My talks with Indian leaders have been 
friendly, frank and, I think, productive. 
Prime Minister [Indira] Gandhi was 
especially gracious. We met together 
privately for a full 2 hours and ex- 
changed views on a far-ranging array of 
global and regional issues. One can hard- 
ly overestimate the importance of such 



intimate discussions. I feel that I came 
away from my meeting with Mrs. 
Gandhi with a renewed appreciation of 
the Indian perspective on the problems 
that confront our world. 

The United States and India 
together possess the basis of a strong 
and enduring friendship. Mutually 
beneficial exchanges in the fields of 
education, culture, and science are going 
on between India and the United States 
largely on a case-to-case basis. The Indo- 
U.S. Joint Commission is actively in- 
volved in these activities. I understand 
that representatives of our Embassy and 
the Government of India have had useful 
discussions in recent months on how to 
provide a more systematic framework 
for such bilateral exchanges in the 
future. These discussions will be con- 
tinued further and will, we trust, be suc- 
cessful. 

In conclusion, I would like to 
reiterate the firm commitment of the 
United States to a strong and united In- 
dia. We see India as a major, pivotal 
power and a key element in a peaceful 
and prosperous South Asia. We believe 
India and its neighbors have a vital, 
long-range interest in each other's 
stability, and a stable South Asia is im- 
portant to the world. For our part, we 
will do what we can to help promote the 
stability and peaceful prosperity of the 
region. 

I leave India extremely optimistic 
that our two great democracies will con- 
tinue to build an even stronger relation- 
ship based on our common interests and 
the many traditions and values we 
share. 



With Prime Minister Gandhi. 




August 1984 



PAKISTAN 

Islamabad, 
Arrival Statement, 
May 15, 1984 

I am delighted to be here. I come on 
behalf of President Reagan and the 
American people to reaffirm our coun- 
try's support for a strong, stable, and in- 
dependent Pakistan at peace with its 
neighbors. 

The United States shares with your 
country an enduring commitment to the 
security and stability of this region. And 
we hope to continue to cooperate with 
Pakistan's efforts to enhance its security 
and to further its economic and social 
development. 

I have come here to listen and learn, 
and to share views with the leaders of 
your country on a variety of issues of 
common interest. I look forward to 
meeting with President Zia [General 
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq], Foreign 
Minister [Sahabzada] Yaqub Khan, and 
other senior officials, and to the oppor- 
tunity to meet with your countrymen 
here in Islamabad, Lahore, and 
Peshawar. 

In Peshawar I will have the oppor- 
tunity to visit an Afghan refugee village 
and learn more about the Afghan strug- 
gle for freedom. 

We believe that this visit will con- 
tribute to a broader understanding and 
reinforce the already strong ties that ex- 
ist between our two nations. 



Peshawar, 
Remarks (excerpts) 
at Afghan 
Refugee Camp, 
May 17, 1984 

My dear Afghan brethren, I want to 
thank you for your invitation to visit this 
refugee village. To the officials of the 
Pakistani Government and to the 
representatives of the relief agencies, I 
also want to say thank you for making 
this visit possible. 

I have today witnessed firsthand the 
tragic results of the invasion of your 
homeland. I have seen much suffering 
here, much hardship and pain; but I 
have also seen a courageous and proud 
people who remain hospitable and 
generous despite want — a strong and 
noble people whose commitment to 
freedom and faith in a loving God re- 
mains undampened by adversity. 



27 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




With President Zia. 



Across the border, a brutal war is 
being waged against the people of 
Afghanistan. Reports come out of that 
tragic country of indiscriminate bombing 
of civilian population centers, and 
scorched earth tactics. These tactics are 
laying waste to the land and creating 
millions of homeless and thousands of 
dead. 

My dear Afghan brethren, you and 
your people have suffered greatly. You 
have shown courage and fortitude 
beyond the usual measure. You have my 
heartfelt admiration and that of my 
countrymen. You have earned the ad- 
miration of free men everywhere. 

I have seen the indomitable spirit of 
freedom living on in this refugee camp. 
Your homeland, the proud nation of 
Afghanistan, has never been conquered. 
The bravery and independence of the 
Afghan people is legend. Those who try 
to deprive you of freedom and place you 
in bondage will, I am convinced, learn 
that the light of liberty that burns so 
brightly in your valiant nation can never 
be extinguished. 

The Soviets must withdraw their 
military machine and stop interfering in 
the internal affairs of the sovereign na- 
tion of Afghanistan. We do not want the 
suffering to be prolonged — we want to 
see a negotiated settlement as soon as 



possible. But the critical issue remains 
Soviet withdrawal. I know your resist- 
ance will continue until the Soviets 
realize they cannot subjugate 
Afghanistan. 

Before I leave, I would like to pay 
tribute to the officials and citizens of 
Pakistan who have welcomed over 3 
million Afghan refugees into this coun- 
try with such compassion and sacrifice. I 
would also like to salute the workers 
from all over the world who are here 
with the relief agencies caring for the 
refugees. The work you all do is obvious- 
ly outstanding. I am also proud of the 
American Government's contribution to 
the relief program. 

I am pleased to announce that as 
part of our continuing effort to help the 
Afghan refugees, I have brought with 
me a check for $14 million from the peo- 
ple of America to the people of 
Afghanistan. And yesterday, a cargo 
plane arrived bearing $1 million worth 
of medical supplies, a sample of which 
will be on display. 

In this village, in the midst of 
despair, survives hope. Deprived by 
tyranny of all material things, the people 
of Afghanistan fight for that most 
precious possession of all — freedom. 
Your cause is right, your cause is just. I 
feel very privileged to be able to shake 
your hands. Meeting you, I feel confi- 
dent that the proud people of 
Afghanistan will once again win back 
their homeland — that the cause of 
freedom will prevail. 

Long live Afghanistan! 

Lahore, 
Statement, 
May 18, 1984 3 

I would like to take this opportunity to 
publicly thank President Zia, who has 
extended to us his warm and generous 
hospitality for which we are most 
grateful. 

The chance I have had in these last 
few days to travel to differrent parts of 
Pakistan with President Zia has given 
me an increased understanding of his 
unique qualities as a leader and a 
stronger admiration of this proud na- 
tion. 

In the last few days, as well, we 
have had many valuable discussions with 
the President and other top government 
officials. The United States admires 
Pakistan's constructive role in the 
nonaligned movement and OIC 
[Organization of the Islamic Conference] 



and strongly supports its ongoing effort 
to improve its relations with India. We 
also welcome President Zia's plans to 
bring about the return of more repre- 
sentative government in Pakistan. Our 
constructive talks about these and other 
issues have conributed to a clearer 
understanding of our respective posi- 
tions that I'm sure will enhance our 
already strong bilateral relations. 

As you know, yesterday I visited an 
Afghan refugee camp close by the 
border. It was an experience I shall 
never forget; and the suffering of those 
proud, courageous people, fighting alom i» 
against overwhelming odds — this is a 
reality to which the world must never 
close its eyes. 

Great credit must be given the 
Pakistani people for the humanitarian 
assistance they are providing the 
refugees. The extraordinary generosity 
of the Pakistanis, who have opened up 
the doors of their nation to their 
homeless neighbors, deserves the praise 
of compassionate people the world over. 

Both the United States and Pakistai 
want a just solution to the war in 
Afghanistan based on the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces, the restoration of 
Afghanistan's independence and 
sovereignty and the return with honor 
of Afghanistan's millions of refugees. 



I 



OMAN 

Muscat, 
Statement, 
May 19, 1984 3 




With Sultan Qaboos. 



My first visit to the Sultanate of Oman 
has renewed my admiration for the 
courage, energy, and determination of 
His Majesty Sultan Qaboos [bin Said] 
and the entire Omani people. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



'effor 



THE SECRETARY 



My consultations with His Majesty 
'Ultan Qaboos and his ministers have 
nderscored the determination of our 
wo countries to continue our joint ef- 
3rts on behalf of international peace 
't nd mutually valuable economic 
rogress. 

These talks have also underscored 
he respect and friendship which have 
or so long characterized the relations 
W ai etween the Sultanate of Oman and the 
Jnited States. President Reagan and I 
re proud of our close relationship with 
iwi lis Majesty Sultan Qaboos. We consider 
do im to be an inspiring leader, a 
I tatesman whose advice we seek and 
»S emember and, above all, a friend. As 
his visit has shown so well, His Majesty 
,nd his people are also warm and 
an ;enerous hosts to friends like ourselves 

I'ho journey here from afar. 
sity As regards the developments in the 
| ^ilf, we are, of course, paying very 
lose attention. The recent attacks 
w gainst neutral shipping on the high seas 
re in violation of international law and 
ihould be a source of very great concern 
jo all nations. We deplore the loss of life 
( tnd property and would hope that the 
wo belligerents reconsider this perilous 
•oad they are moving down. In fact, I 
hink the whole world would welcome an 
:nd to the fighting which has gone on 
oo long, wasted too many lives, and 
irofits no one. 



i 

il 



'Texts from the Vice President's Office of 
he Press Secretary. 

2 Made at dinner hosted by Foreign 
vlinister Shintaro Abe. 

^ 3 Made at a news conference. 
"Made at dinner hosted by Vice President 
ohammad Hidayatullah. ■ 



Terrorism: The Problem 
and the Challenge 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
June IS, 198J,. 1 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
with you the problem of international 
terrorism and the challenges it poses to 
our country. This subject was discussed 
thoroughly at the recent meeting in 
London of heads of state and govern- 
ment and by their foreign ministers. A 
declaration was issued on June 9 which 
my staff has made available to you. In 
that declaration, the leaders ". . . ex- 
pressed their resolve to combat this 
threat by every possible means, 
strengthening existing measures and 
developing effective new ones." One of 
the points in that declaration called on 
each country to close gaps in its national 
legislation, and that is one of the 
reasons for my appearance today. First, 
however, I want to discuss with you the 
problem in general and why it is of such 
growing concern to the President and 
me. 

Terrorism has been a growing prob- 
lem since 1968 when our Ambassador to 
Guatemala was assassinated. Terrorist 
incidents reached a plateau in number in 
1979. The number of recorded attacks 
has not varied significantly since then. 
In 1983 there were more than 500 at- 
tacks by international terrorists of which 
more than 200 were against the United 
States. This was only the tip of the ice- 
berg because there were at least as 
many threats and hoaxes. These are a 
cheap way to create an atmosphere of 
fear, and they also absorb a substantial 
amount of our resources as well as those 
of the host governments. Beyond this 
are national or indigenous terrorist ac- 
tivities which probably exceed by a fac- 
tor of 100 what we define as interna- 
tional terrorism. 

This problem is not confined to any 
geographic area. Fortunately, inside the 
United States we experience relatively 
few incidents. The problem for the 
United States is primarily in other areas 
of the world. The largest number of in- 
cidents overall and against the United 
States occurs in Europe followed by 
Latin America and the Middle East. 



Why Are We So Concerned? 

Let me summarize briefly. 

• In 1983 more Americans were 
killed and injured by acts of terrorism 
than in the 15 preceding years for which 
we have records. 

• The attacks in 1983 were unique 
in the sheer violence of them. From our 
point of view, the worst tragedies were 
the destruction of our Embassy and the 
Marine barracks in Beirut and of our 
Embassy annex in Kuwait. But we were 
not the only victims. There was the 
bombing at Harrods in London, the 
bombing at Orly airport in Paris, the 
murder of four members of the South 
Korean Cabinet in Rangoon, the bomb- 
ing destruction of a Gulf Air flight in 
one of the emirates, and others. 

• Closely tied to the rising violence 
has been the indiscriminate targeting of 
innocents — people who have no known 
role in either causing or redressing the 
alleged grievances of the terrorists. 

• A source of growing concern is 
the extensive travel of terrorists outside 
their own countries and regions to com- 
mit acts of terror abroad. Again, intelli- 
gence tells us that this occurs extensive- 
ly in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin 
America, but reports are increasing of 
such travel to the United States. And 
we also know that some Americans are 
engaged in supporting the terrorist ac- 
tivities of foreign states and groups that 
engage in terrorism. 

• The most disturbing trend of all is 
the extent to which the agencies of 
foreign states are engaged in terrorist 
acts. Seventy or more incidents in 1983 
probably involved significant state sup- 
port or participation. No longer the ran- 
dom acts of isolated groups of local 
fanatics, terrorism is now a method of 
warfare, no less because it is undeclared 
and even (though not always) denied. 

• Some 40% of all the incidents and 
a large proportion of all the threats and 
hoaxes are aimed at the United States— 
our diplomats, members of our Armed 
Forces, our businessmen, or other 
Americans. 

We are now faced with a problem 
which is of major and growing signifi- 
cance. The problem is not only repre- 
sented by the grim statistics but by the 
threat that terrorism represents to 



August 1984 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



civilized life. The main target of ter- 
rorists is not just individuals but the 
basic interests and values of the 
democracies. It is a form of low-level 
warfare directed primarily at Western 
nations and institutions and their friends 
and allies. We are the targets because 
our belief in the rights of the individual 
is an obstacle to those who wish to im- 
pose their will on others. And it is pre- 
cisely because the democratic nations 
respect the rights of the individual and 
maintain the most open and responsive 
societies that they are so vulnerable to 
terrorists. The goal of the terrorist is to 
create anarchy and disorder, for it is out 
of disorder that he hopes to instill fear, 
discredit governments, demoralize 
societies, or alter national policies. 

What Are We Doing About It? 

We are working with our closest allies 
to develop a consensus on how we deal 
with international terrorism and the 
security problems it presents for us. The 
consensus embodied in the declaration in 
London on June 9 is heartening. In 
earlier summit meetings we had ad- 
dressed specific issues such as aircraft 
hijacking and protection of our 
diplomats. We have made considerable 
progress in these areas. But on this oc- 
casion we discussed the basic political 
problem of states engaging in terrorism, 
and we ackowledged the international 
character of the problem. We noted that 
in our respective countries we have gaps 
in legislation for combating terrorism. 

The legislation before the Congress 
today will not fill all those gaps for the 
United States, but it will fill some of 
them. Part of the legislation we have 
proposed is to implement two interna- 
tional conventions that the Senate has 
previously approved. These are relative- 
ly noncontroversial, but it is time to get 
the job done. The two other bills now 
before this committee deal with areas of 
law where we feel that legislative im- 
provements can help in the fight against 
terrorism. We welcome this opportunity 
to work with the Congress in finding the 
best legislative answers possible to the 
complex questions that terrorism poses. 
The draft of the bill on training and sup- 
port services has been modified 
significantly to take account of congres- 
sional comments. 

We are working in this Administra- 
tion to review and apply the whole 
range of options available. We do not 
have any single answer that we think 
will work all the time. What we must 
do, therefore, is attack the problem on 
many different fronts. 



• We have organized ourselves bet- 
ter within the executive branch to deal 
with these problems. Within the Depart- 
ment of State the responsibility for 
policy, planning, and operations on these 
matters has been consolidated in the Of- 
fice of the Under Secretary for Manage- 
ment. The policy and planning for the 
Department as well as the government 
in general is the task of the Director of 
the Office for Counterterrorism and 
Emergency Planning while the opera- 
tions are in the Office of Security. 

• We have added more resources to 
intelligence collection, and we have 
strengthened cooperation with other 
governments. We have also streamlined 
our procedures for advising our posts 
abroad of threats and analysis of their 
security problems. We believe that this 
procedure is now working much better. 
We believe that we need to do more. 

• We have stepped up our training 
and are also conducting exercises for 
our personnel overseas on the types of 
terrorist incidents they might have to 
deal with. We have, for example, added 
segments in every appropriate course at 
the Foreign Service Institute on how to 
deal with such problems. 

• The Congress approved last year 
a program which will permit us to train 
foreign law enforcement officers on how 
to deal with terrorist acts. We are ac- 
tively engaged in implementing that pro- 
gram. Although this program is de- 
signed to help other governments deal 
with these problems as it affects them, 
it should also improve considerably the 
response from other governments when 
we need help at one of our posts. 

• We are carrying out security en- 
hancement programs at all of our high- 
threat posts. We appreciate greatly the 
consistent support we have received 
from this committee in that effort. 

• We have also taken steps to im- 
prove our ability to respond when in- 
cidents occur overseas. We have teams 
available to assist on crisis management, 
security, communications, and other 
matters. 

• The cooperation of other govern- 
ments often depends on how responsive 
we are on the security problems their 
diplomatic missions may have in the 
United States. The Congress has ap- 
proved legislation which will assure that 
we have a comprehensive program to 
protect foreign officials, not only in 
Washington and New York City but 
other places in the United States. We 
are seeking funds for that program in 
the current budget. 



• Finally, we are actively seeking to 
improve our capability to prevent at- 
tacks against our interests abroad. The 
London summit declaration discussed, 
among other things, "closer cooperation 
and coordination between police and 
security organizations and other rele- 
vant authorities, especially in the ex- 
changes of information, intelligence and 
technical knowledge." And within the 
U.S. Government we are continuing to 
study other ways and means of deter- 
ring or preemptively dealing with a 
range of terrorist threats in conformity 
with existing law. 

The legislation before you represents 
modest but necessary steps. They are 
essential steps because the problem will 
not go away: this is certainly not the 
last you will hear about the problem of 
terrorism. 

But we need your help. The Presi- 
dent and the Congress owe it to this 
country to do whatever is necessary to 
protect our people, our interests, and 
our most basic principles. 



'Press release 154. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Terrorism: The Challenge 
o the Democracies 



1 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
Jonathan Institute's second Conference 
m International Terrorism on June 2U, 
98U- 1 

'ive years have passed since the 
onathan Institute held its first con- 
erence on terrorism, and in that time 
he world has seen two major develop- 
gj nents: one a cause for great distress; 
he other a reason for hope. 

The distressing fact is that over 
hese past 5 years terrorism has in- 
reased. More people were killed or in- 
ured by international terrorists last 
'ear than in any year since governments 
>egan keeping records. In 1983 there 
vere more than 500 such attacks, of 
vhich more than 200 were against the 
Jnited States. For Americans the worst 
ragedies were the destruction of our 
Embassy and then the Marine barracks 
n Beirut. But around the world, many 
)f our close friends and allies were also 
rictims. The bombing of Harrods in Lon- 
lon, the bombing at Orly Airport in 
aris, the destruction of a Gulf Air 
light in the United Arab Emirates, and 
he Rangoon bombing of South Korean 
>fficials are just a few examples— not to 
•nention the brutal attack on a West 
Jerusalem shopping mall this past April. 

Even more alarming has been the 
-ise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the 
oast 5 years more states have joined the 
-anks of what we might call the "League 
i>f Terror," as full-fledged sponsors and 
supporters of indiscriminate — and not so 
ndiscriminate— murder. Terrorist at- 
tacks supported by what [Libyan 
leader] Qadhafi calls the "holy alliance" 
3f Libya, Syria, and Iran, and attacks 
sponsored by North Korea and others, 
have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. 
Seventy or more such attacks in 1983 
probably involved significant state sup- 
port or participation. 

As a result, more of the world's peo- 
ple must today live in fear of sudden and 
unprovoked violence at the hands of ter- 
rorists. After 5 years, the epidemic is 
spreading and the civilized world is still 
groping for remedies. 

Nevertheless, these past 5 years 
have also given us cause for hope. 
Thanks in large measure to the efforts 
of concerned governments, citizens, and 
groups like the Jonathan Institute, the 
peoples of the free world have finally 
begun to grapple with the problem of 



August 1984 



terrorism in intellectual and in practical 
terms. I say intellectual because the first 
step toward a solution to any problem is 
to understand that there is a problem 
and then to understand its nature. In re- 
cent years we have learned a great deal 
about terrorism, though our education 
has been painful and costly. We know 
what kind of threat international ter- 
rorism poses to our free society. We 
have learned much about the terrorists 
themselves, their supporters, their 
targets, their diverse methods, their 
underlying motives, and their eventual 
goals. 

Armed with this knowledge we can 
focus our energies on the practical 
means for reducing and eventually 
eliminating the threat. We can all share 
the hope that, when the next conference 
of this institute is convened, we will look 
back and say that 1984 was the turning 
point in our struggle against terrorism, 
that having come to grips with the prob- 
lem we were able to deal with it effec- 
tively and responsibly. 

The Anatomy of Terrorism 

Let me speak briefly about the anatomy 
of terrorism. What we have learned 
about terrorism, first of all, is that it is 
not random, undirected, purposeless 
violence. It is not, like an earthquake or 
a hurricane, an act of nature before 
which we are helpless. Terrorists and 
those who support them have definite 
goals; terrorist violence is the means of 
attaining those goals. Our response must 
be twofold: we must deny them the 
means but above all we must deny them 
their goals. 

But what are the goals of terrorism? 
We know that the phenomenon of ter- 
rorism is actually a matrix that covers a 
diverse array of methods, resources, in- 
struments, and immediate aims. It ap- 
pears in many shapes and sizes — from 
the lone individual who plants a home- 
made explosive in a shopping center, to 
the small clandestine group that plans 
kidnapings and assassinations of public 
figures, to the well-equipped and well- 
financed organization that uses force to 
terrorize an entire population. Its stated 
objectives may range from separatist 
causes to revenge for ethnic grievances 
to social and political revolution. Inter- 
national drug smugglers use terrorism 



to blackmail and intimidate government 
officials. It is clear that our responses 
will have to fit the precise character and 
circumstances of the specific threats. 
But we must understand that the 
overarching goal of all terrorists is the 
same: with rare exceptions, they are at- 
tempting to impose their will by 
force — a special kind of force designed 
to create an atmosphere of fear. And 
their efforts are directed at destroying 
what all of us here are seeking to build. 
They're a threat to the democracies. 

The Threat to the Democracies 

The United States and its democratic 
allies are morally committed to certain 
ideals and to a humane vision of the 
future. In our foreign policies, we try to 
foster the kind of world that promotes 
peaceful settlement of disputes, one that 
welcomes change without violent con- 
flict. We seek a world in which human 
rights are respected by all governments, 
a world based on the rule of law. We 
know that in a world community where 
all nations share these blessings, our 
own democracy will flourish, our own 
nation will prosper, and our own people 
will continue to enjoy freedom. 

Nor has ours been a fruitless search. 
In our lifetime, we have seen the world 
progress, though perhaps too slowly, 
toward this goal. Civilized norms of con- 
duct have evolved, even governing rela- 
tions between adversaries. Conflict per- 
sists; but, with some notorious excep- 
tions, even wars have been conducted 
with certain restraints — indiscriminate 
slaughter of innocents is widely con- 
demned; the use of certain kinds of 
weapons has been proscribed; and most, 
but not all, nations have heeded those 
proscriptions. 

We all know that the world as it ex- 
ists is still far from our ideal vision. But 
today, even the progress that mankind 
has already made is endangered by 
those who do not share that vision — 
who, indeed, violently oppose it. 

For we must understand, above all, 
that terrorism is a form of political 
violence. Wherever it takes place, it is 
directed in an important sense against 
us, the democracies — against our most 
basic values and often our fundamental 
strategic interests. The values upon 
which democracy is based — individual 
rights, equality under the law, freedom 
of thought and expression, and freedom 
of religion — all stand in the way of those 
who seek to impose their will, their 
ideologies, or their religious beliefs by 
force. A terrorist has no patience and no 
respect for the orderly processes of 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



democratic society, and, therefore, he 
considers himself its enemy. 

And it is an unfortunate irony that 
the very qualities that make democracies 
so hateful to the terrorists also make 
them so vulnerable. Precisely because 
we maintain the most open societies, 
terrorists have unparalleled opportunity 
to strike against us. 

Terrorists and Freedom Fighters 

The antagonism between democracy and 
terrorism seems so basic that it is hard 
to understand why so much intellectual 
confusion still exists on the subject. We 
have all heard the insidious claim that 
"one man's terrorist is another man's 
freedom fighter." Let me read to you 
the powerful rebuttal that was stated 
before your 1979 conference by a great 
American, Senator Henry Jackson, who, 
Mr. Chairman, as you observed, is very 
much with us. 

The idea that one person's "terrorist" is 
another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanc- 
tioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries 
don't blow up buses containing non-combat- 
ants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters 
don't set out to capture and slaughter school 
children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom 
fighters don't assassinate innocent business- 
men, or hijack and hold hostage innocent 
men, women, and children; terrorist 
murderers do. It is a disgrace that democ- 
racies would allow the treasured word 
"freedom" to be associated with acts of ter- 
rorists. 

Where democracy is struggling to 
take root, the terrorist is, again, its 
enemy. He seeks to spread chaos and 
disorder, to paralyze a society. In doing 
so he wins no converts to his cause; his 
deeds inspire hatred and fear, not 
allegiance. The terrorist seeks to under- 
mine institutions, to destroy popular 
faith in moderate government, and to 
shake the people's belief in the very idea 
of democracy. In Lebanon, for example, 
state-sponsored terrorism has exploited 
existing tensions and attempted to pre- 
vent that nation from rebuilding its 
democratic institutions. 

Where the terrorist cannot bring 
about anarchy, he may try to force the 
government to overreact, or impose 
tyrannical measures of control, and 
hence lose the allegiance of the people. 
Turkey faced such a challenge but suc- 
ceeded in overcoming it. Martial law was 
imposed; the terrorist threat was 
drastically reduced; and today we see 
democracy returning to that country. In 
Argentina, the widely and properly 
deplored "disappearances" of the 1970s 
were, in fact, part of a response — a 



32 



deliberately provoked response — to a 
massive campaign of terrorism. We are 
pleased that Argentina, too, has re- 
turned to the path of democracy. Other 
countries around the world face similar 
challenges, and they, too, must steer 
their course carefully between anarchy 
and tyranny. The lesson for civilized na- 
tions is that we must respond to the ter- 
rorist threat within the rule of law, lest 
we become unwitting accomplices in the 
terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized 
society. 

Once we understand terrorism's 
goals and methods, it is not too hard to 
tell, as we look around the world, who 
are the terrorists and who are the free- 
dom fighters. The resistance fighters in 
Afghanistan do not destroy villages or 
kill the helpless. The contras in 
Nicaragua do not blow up school buses 
or hold mass executions of civilians. 

How tragic it would be if democratic 
societies so lost confidence in their own 
moral legitimacy that they lost sight of 
the obvious: that violence directed 
against democracy or the hopes for 
democracy lacks fundamental justifica- 
tion. Democracy offers mechanisms for 
peaceful change, legitimate political com- 
petition, and redress of grievances. But 
resort to arms in behalf of democracy 
against repressive regimes or move- 
ments is, indeed, a fight for freedom, 
since there may be no other way that 
freedom can be achieved. 

The free nations cannot afford to let 
the Orwellian corruption of language 
hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, 
our interests, or our friends. We know 
the difference between terrorists and 
freedom fighters, and our policies reflect 
that distinction. Those who strive for 
freedom and democracy will always have 
the sympathy and, when possible, the 
support of the American people. We will 
oppose guerrilla wars where they 
threaten to spread totalitarian rule or 
deny the rights of national independence 
and self-determination. But we will op- 
pose terrorists no matter what banner 
they may fly. For terrorism in any cause 
is the enemy of freedom. 

The Supporters of Terrorism 

If freedom and democracy are the 
targets of terrorism, it is clear that 
totalitarianism is its ally. The number of 
terrorist incidents in or against totali- 
tarian states is negligible. States that 
support and sponsor terrorist actions 
have managed in recent years to co-opt 
and manipulate the phenomenon in pur- 
suit of their own strategic goals. 



It is not a coincidence that most acts 
of terrorism occur in areas of impor- 
tance to the West. More than 80% of the 
world's terrorist attacks in 1983 oc- 
curred in Western Europe, Latin 
America, and the Middle East. The re- 
cent posture statement of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff put it this way: 

Terrorists may or may not be centrally 
controlled by their patrons. Regardless, the 
instability they create in the industrialized 
West and Third World nations undermines 
the security interests of the United States 
and its allies. 

States that sponsor terrorism are 
using it as another weapon of warfare, 
to gain strategic advantage where they 
cannot use conventional means. When 
Iran and its allies sent terrorists to 
bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they 
hoped to weaken the West's commit- 
ment to defending its interests in the 
Middle East. When North Korea spon- 
sored the murder of South Korean 
Government officials, it hoped to weaken 
the noncommunist stronghold on the 
mainland of East Asia. The terrorists 
who assault Israel are also enemies of 
the United States. When Libya and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization pro- 
vide arms and training to the com- 
munists in Central America, they are 
aiding Soviet efforts to undermine our 
security in that vital region. When the 
Soviet Union and its clients provide 
financial, logistic, and training support 
for terrorists worldwide; when the Red 
Brigades in Italy and the Red Army 
faction in Germany assault free coun- 
tries in the name of communist 
ideology— they hope to shake the West's 
self-confidence and sap its will to resist 
aggression and intimidation. And we are 
now watching the Italian authorities un- 
ravel the answer to one of the great 
questions of our time: was there Soviet- 
bloc involvement in the attempt to 
assassinate the Pope? 

We should understand the Soviet 
role in international terrorism without 
exaggeration or distortion: the Soviet 
Union officially denounces the use of ter- 
rorism as an instrument of state policy. 
Yet there is a wide gap between Soviet 
words and Soviet actions. One does not 
have to believe that the Soviets are pup- 
peteers and the terrorists marionettes; 
violent or fanatic individuals and groups 
are indigenous to every society. But in 
many countries, terrorism would long 
since have passed away had it not been 
for significant support from outside. The 
international links among terrorist 
groups are now clearly understood; and 
the Soviet link, direct or indirect, is also 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



ac ts early understood. The Soviets use ter- 
>rist groups for their own purposes, 

*\ id their goal is always the same— to 
eaken liberal democracy and under- 
line world stability. 

Counterstrategy Against Terrorism 

having identified the challenge, we must 
ow consider the best strategy to 
nunter it. We must keep in mind, as we 
evise our strategy, that our ultimate 
im is to preserve what the terrorists 
jek to destroy: democracy, freedom, 
nd the hope for a world at peace. 

The battle against terrorism must 
egin at home. Terrorism has no place 
l our society, and we have taken 
igorous steps to see that it is not im- 
orted from abroad. We are now work- 
ig with the Congress on law enforce- 
lent legislation that would help us ob- 
ain more information about terrorists 
hrough the payment of rewards to in- 
armants and would permit prosecution 
f those who support states that use or 
ponsor terrorism. Our FBI is improving 
ur ability to detect and prevent ter- 
orist acts within our own borders. 

We must also ensure that our people 
nd facilities in other countries are bet- 
er protected against terrorist attacks. 
iO we are strengthening security at our 
Embassies around the world to prevent 
recurrence of the Beirut and Kuwait 
Embassy bombings. 

While we take these measures to 
irotect our own citizens, we know that 
errorism is an international problem 
hat requires the concerted efforts of all 
•ree nations. Just as there is collabora- 
ion among those who engage in ter- 
orism, so there must be cooperation 
imong those who are its actual and 
>otential targets. 

An essential component of our 
trategy, therefore, has been greater 
•ooperation among the democratic na- 
ions and all others who share our hopes 
'or the future. The world community has 
ichieved some successes. But, too often, 
countries are inhibited by fear of losing 
commercial opportunities or fear of pro- 
/oking the bully. The time has come for 
;he nations that truly seek an end to ter- 
•orism to join together, in whatever 
:orums, to take the necessary steps. The 
declaration on terrorism that was 
agreed upon at the London economic 
ummit 2 weeks ago was a welcome sign 
that the industrial democracies share a 
common view of the terrorist threat. 
And let me say that I trust and I hope 
that that statement and the specific 
things referred to in it will be the tip 



and only the visible part of the iceberg. 
We must build on that foundation. 

Greater international cooperation of- 
fers many advantages. If we can collec- 
tively improve our gathering and shar- 
ing of intelligence, we can better detect 
the movements of terrorists, anticipate 
their actions, and bring them to justice. 
We can also help provide training and 
share knowledge of terrorist tactics. To 
that end, the Reagan Administration has 
acted promptly on the program that 
Congress approved last year to train 
foreign law enforcement officers in anti- 
terrorist techniques. And the President 
has sent Congress two bills to imple- 
ment two international conventions to 
which the United States is a signatory: 
the International Convention Against 
the Taking of Hostages and the Mon- 
treal convention to protect against sabo- 
tage of civilian aircraft. 

We must also make a collective ef- 
fort to address the special problem of 
state-sponsored terrorism. States that 
support terror offer safehavens, funds, 
training, and logistical support. We must 
do some hard thinking about how to 
pressure members of the "League of 
Terror" to cease their support. Such 
pressure will have to be international, 
for no one country can exert sufficient 
influence alone. Economic sanctions and 
other forms of pressure impose costs on 
the nations that apply them, but some 
sacrifices will be necessary if we are to 
solve the problem. In the long run, I 
believe, it will have been a small price to 

pay. 

We must also discourage nations 
from paying blackmail to terrorist 
organizations. Although we recognize 
that some nations are particularly 
vulnerable to the terrorist threat, we 
must convince them that paying black- 
mail is counterproductive and inimical to 
the interests of all. 

Finally, the nations of the free world 
must stand together against terrorism 
to demonstrate our enduring commit- 
ment to our shared vision. The terrorists 
may be looking for signs of weakness, 
for evidence of disunity. We must show 
them that we are unbending. Let the 
terrorists despair of ever achieving their 
goals. 

Active Defense 

All the measures I have described so 
far, domestic and international, are im- 
portant elements in a comprehensive 
strategy. But are they enough? Is the 
purely passive defense that these 
measures entail sufficient to cope with 



the problem? Can we as a country— can 
the community of free nations— stand in 
a solely defensive posture and absorb 
the blows dealt by terrorists? 

I think not. From a practical stand- 
point, a purely passive defense does not 
provide enough of a deterrent to ter- 
rorism and the states that sponsor it. It 
is time to think long, hard, and seriously 
about more active means of defense — 
about defense through appropriate pre- 
ventive or preemptive actions against 
terrorist groups before they strike. 

We will need to strengthen our 
capabilities in the area of intelligence 
and quick reaction. Human intelligence 
will be particularly important, since our 
societies demand that we know with 
reasonable clarity just what we are do- 
ing. Experience has taught us over the 
years that one of the best deterrents to 
terrorism is the certainty that swift and 
sure measures will be taken against 
those who engage in it. As President 
Reagan has stated: 

We must make it clear to any country 
that is tempted to use violence to undermine 
democratic governments, destabilize our 
friends, thwart efforts to promote democratic 
governments, or disrupt our lives, that it has 
nothing to gain, and much to lose. 

Clearly there are complicated moral 
issues here. But there should be no 
doubt of the democracies' moral right, 
indeed duty, to defend themselves. 

And there should be no doubt of the 
profound issue at stake. The democ- 
racies seek a world order that is based 
on justice. When innocents are victi- 
mized and the guilty go unpunished, the 
terrorists have succeeded in undermin- 
ing the very foundation of civilized socie- 
ty, for they have created a world where 
there is no justice. This is a blow to our 
most fundamental moral values and a 
dark cloud over the future of humanity. 
We can do better than this. 

No matter what strategy we pursue, 
the terrorist threat will not disappear 
overnight. This is not the last conference 
that will be held on this subject. We 
must understand this and be prepared to 
live with the fact that despite all our 
best efforts the world is still a danger- 
ous place. Further sacrifices, as in the 
past, may be the price for preserving 
our freedom. 

It is essential, therefore, that we not 
allow the actions of terrorists to affect 
our policies or deflect us from our goals. 
When terrorism succeeds in intimidating 
governments into altering their foreign 
policies, it only opens the door to more 
terrorism. It shows that terrorism 



August 1984 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



works; it emboldens those who resort to 
it; and it encourages others to join their 
ranks. 



The Future 

If we remain firm, we can look ahead to 
a time when terrorism will cease to be a 
major factor in world affairs. But we 
must face the challenge with realism, 
determination, and strength of will. Not 
so long ago we faced a rash of political 
kidnapings and embassy takeovers. 
These problems seemed insurmountable. 
Yet, through increased security and the 
willingness of governments to resist ter- 
rorist demands and to use force when 
appropriate, such incidents have become 
rare. In recent years, we have also seen 
a decline in the number of airline hijack- 
ings — once a problem that seemed to fill 
our newspapers daily. Tougher security 
measures and closer international 
cooperation have clearly had their effect. 

I have great faith that we do have 
the will, and the capability, to act 
decisively against this threat. It is really 
up to us, the nations of the free world. 
We must apply ourselves to the task of 
ensuring our future and consigning ter- 
rorism to its own dismal past. 



'Press release 156 of June 26, 1984. 



Negotiating With the Soviets 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the Foreign Policy 
Association in New York City on June 1, 
198 i. Ambassador Nitze is head of the 
U.S. delegation to the intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) negotiations. 

In 1954, just after the summit meeting 
between President Eisenhower, 
Khrushchev, and Bulganin in Geneva, 
Chip Bohlen, then our Ambassador to 
the U.S.S.R. invited Phyllis and me and 
our children to stay with them at the 
U.S. Ambassador's residence in Moscow. 
At that time the British Ambassador in 
Moscow was Sir William Hayter. There 
was a story about Hayter that, when 
asked what it was like to negotiate with 
the Russians, he said it was rather like 
dealing with a defective vending 
machine. You put a coin in and nothing 
comes out. There may be some sense in 
shaking it; you may get your coin back; 
but there is no point of talking to it. 

Soviet Tactics 

Hayter's statement, like most witty 
cracks, is a gross overstatement, but 
there is a kernel of truth in it. Negotia- 
tions with the Russians can be important 
and sometimes, in the past, have achiev- 
ed useful results. But progress is 
generally possible only if there has been 
a prior Soviet Defense Council, or full 
Politburo, decision favoring a deal on 
the specific subject matter. If there has 
been such a prior high-level decision, 
then it is up to the Soviet negotiators to 
get the best possible deal for the 
U.S.S.R., but they will negotiate serious- 
ly with the objective of arriving at a 
deal. If there has been no such prior 
positive high-level decision, the United 
States will find itself negotiating with 
itself. It will offer one position which 
will be firmly rejected, modify it in the 
hope that the new position will be more 
acceptable to the Soviet side, modify it 
again and again until finally it either 
comes down to a position so onesidedly 
favorable to the Soviets that they can't 
fail to accept it or the United States has 
to draw back and wait until Soviet 
higher authority comes to the conclusion 
that other events in the world are evolv- 
ing in such a way that it would, in fact, 
be advantageous for them to make a 
balanced deal on terms that take ac- 
count of U.S. interests, not only their 
own. 



As I look back on my experience in 
negotiating with representatives of the 
Soviet Union, a number of instances 
come to mind. 

Lend-Lease. In 1943 President 
Roosevelt merged the organization of 
the Board of Economic Warfare, of 
which I was a part, with the Lend-Lease 
Administration in the Foreign Economic 
Administration. The lend-lease people 
had worked out a procedure under 
which the Soviet lend-lease mission in 
Washington would submit documenta- 
tion indicating the specifications of the 
various items they needed and the ports 
to which they should be delivered by 
what dates. The Soviet mission had 
fallen behind in getting these documents 
to us. Arutinian, head of their mission in 
Washington, was called in to explain the 
delay. When the point was made to him 
that he was behind in giving us the 
necessary documentation, he flew into a 
rage. He cried out that he had come to 
the meeting to talk about "your behind," 
not "my behind." Nevertheless, the prob- 
lems were sorted out, and we did 
manage to get to the Soviet Union the 
additional necessary war material in 
time to help them defeat Hitler's armies 
in Russia. In that instance both sides 
had a common interest in winning the 
war. 

In the summer of 1946, I was ap- 
pointed to head a U.S. team to negotiate 
with a Soviet team the implementation 
of Article XII of the Lend-Lease Agree- 
ment. That article called for the two 
sides to sit down promptly after the 
defeat of Germany to work out the op- 
timum way of conducting trade between 
two states organized on differerent 
social principles. As it happened, Arutin- 
ian was again head of the Soviet team. 
It proved impossible to entice Arutinian 
into any discussion of the problem; he 
had received no green light to do so. I 
tried a number of different approaches 
but in response to each one Arutinian 
would say, "Mr. Nitze, what is your 
specific proposal?" I was not authorized 
to make a specific proposal. I wanted to 
enter into a discussion with Arutinian 
and his team with a view to developing a 
joint proposal for consideration by our 
governments. This he would not do. Un- 
doubtedly he had received no guidance 
from Moscow that they wanted an 
agreement on that subject at that time. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



Forces in Germany. When the 
Soviets lifted the 1949 blockade of 
Berlin, they laid down as a precondition 
that we agree to a prompt meeting of 
the Foreign Ministers of the United 
States, the U.S.S.R., the United 
Kingdom, and France. They gave us lit- 
tle indication as to what it was they 
wished to discuss at that meeting. 
George Kennan and I thought they must 
have something highly important in 
. : ; t mind; we thought they might well pro- 
pose the removal of both U.S. and 
Soviet forces from Germany. We 
developed a plan called Plan A to re- 
spond to that contingency. Chip Bohlen 
told us we were quite wrong, that there 
was no possibility that the Soviet Union 
would wish to remove its forces from 
Germany. We developed another plan, 
Plan B, to respond to that alternate con- 
tingency. On the very first day of the 
conference, General Chuikov, the Soviet 
High Commissioner in Germany, asked 
Bohlen to have lunch with him. Early in 
the conversation Chuikov said that he 
understood there were those who 
thought both sides should remove their 
forces from Germany. He said, "They 
are mad. The Germans hate us. It would 
be madness to remove our forces." It 
soon became evident in the conference 
that no progress was possible on the 
unification of Germany or even of 
Berlin. It was possible to work out clear- 
ing arrangements with respect to trade 
between the two parts of Germany and 
Berlin and to make some headway on 
the Austrian State Treaty, but nothing 
more. They had insisted on the foreign 
minister meeting as a way of saving face 
when they had concluded it was wiser 
for them to lift the Berlin blockade than 
to continue with it. 

Disarmament. Prior to 1961, almost 
all thought about arms control was in 
the context of an international, 
worldwide disarmament solution. The 
Baruch Plan would have created a world 
entity with authority restricted to one 
subject matter— full ownership and con- 
trol over nuclear raw materials and the 
plants that processed or used those 
materials. The Soviets rejected that con- 
cept. They later came up with an unen- 
forceable and impractical plan for what 
they called "total and complete disarma- 
ment." 

During 1959, 1960, and 1961, there 
were a series of meetings on the subject 
in what were called the eight-nation 
disarmament negotiations. I was an ad- 
viser to the U.S. delegation during a 
portion of those talks. It soon became 
quite evident that the Soviet position 



August 1984 



was wholly directed toward supporting 
their propaganda effort depicting the 
Soviet Union as the great proponent of 
peace and that they had no intention of 
arriving at any concrete agreement as a 
result of the talks. 

Early in the Kennedy Administra- 
tion, it became clear that the pollution of 
the atmosphere caused by atmospheric 
tests of large weapons — particularly by 
the mammoth, multimegatonnage 
weapons tested by the Soviets — would, 
if continued, cause dangerous worldwide 
pollution of the atmosphere. Once we in 
Washington had worked out the kind of 
a limited test ban treaty we could live 
with, there was no great difficulty in 
working out an agreement with the 
Soviet Union. As I remember, it took 
Averell Harriman and Gladwyn Jebb no 
more than 13 days in Moscow to do so. 
In that instance there was a definite 
common interest in arriving at an agree- 
ment. This was also true of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty which followed 
thereafter. 

The idea of U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks 
directed toward the limitation of the 
nuclear weapons of the two principal 
nuclear powers, rather than toward a 
worldwide international disarmament 
agreement, arose later during the 
Kennedy Administration, specifically in 
1963. Secretary McNamara tried to per- 



In the attempt to get a comprehensive 
treaty on offensive forces to parallel the 
ABM Treaty, we offered a series of ma- 
jor concessions, but in the end they 
brought us nothing. The result was the 
ineffective short-term accord, the In- 
terim Agreement. 

During the SALT II negotiations, 
there never was an indication that the 
Politburo had come to the decision that 
they wanted a mutually advantageous 
agreement. This again resulted in the 
United States making one not fully 
reciprocated concession after another in 
an attempt to move the negotiations for- 
ward. The final signed but unratified 
SALT II Treaty, in my view, was un- 
satisfactory. It was a one-sided agree- 
ment which, by its terms, would expire 
in 1985, before it would have any 
substantial effect on the programs of 
either side. More importantly, it did not 
constitute a good foundation for SALT 
III. The invasion of Afghanistan nailed 
down its nonratifiability. 

INF Negotiations 

Over the last 2V2 years, I have been in- 
volved in the intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) negotiations. Those negotia- 
tions have focused on the Soviet SS-20 
missile force and NATO's counter- 
deployments of Pershing II and ground- 



. . . progress [in negotiations with the Russians] is general- 
ly possible only if there has been a prior Soviet Defense 
Council, or full Politburo, decision favoring a deal on the 
specific subject matter. 



suade Kosygin of the merits of such an 
approach at Glassboro in 1967. It was 
not until 1968, however, that the Soviets 
came to the conclusion that such talks 
might be useful. The talks finally began 
in Helsinki in the fall of 1969. Semenov, 
the head of the Soviet delegation, said 
that it was not until the fall of 1970 that 
he received word indicating that the 
Politburo had decided in favor of 
reaching an agreement. The Politburo 
interest, however, was restricted to an 
agreement limiting antiballistic missile 
(ABM) systems, not to an agreement 
limiting the offensive forces of the two 
sides. After a further year of intense 
negotiations, it proved possible to arrive 
at the ABM Treaty. A comprehensive 
treaty of indefinite duration on offensive 
forces proved to be impossible to obtain. 



launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). In 
November 1982, before the negotiations 
began, we stated the ongoing U.S. posi- 
tion. That was that the United States 
would entirely forego its planned deploy- 
ment of 572 Pershing lis and GLCMs if 
the Soviets would eliminate their 
SS-20s. I continue to believe that objec- 
tively this would have been the optimum 
solution for both sides. It would have 
eliminated the entire class of INF 
missiles worldwide. It would have been 
verifiable with high confidence. 

The first rounds of the negotiations 
in Geneva were largely exploratory. The 
U.S. side set forth the considerations it 
thought important to arriving at a 
mutually acceptable agreement. In 
February 1982, we tabled a draft treaty 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



text setting forth in detail the provisions 
we thought desirable to implement that 
approach. Subsequently the Soviet side 
set forth their considerations and tabled 
a draft treaty text which embodied their 
approach. Toward the end of the first 
two rounds, each side quite fully 
understood the position of the other 
side. The question was how could one 



On the Soviet side all the basic 
elements of the package were rejected, 
as was the free, uninstructed mode of 
negotiation which led to it. I was subse- 
quently told by Ambassador Kvitsinskiy 
that Moscow had pretty well completed 
its policy review by the time he returned 
to Moscow after our "walk in the 
woods." Our formula was quite contrary 



During the SALT II negotiations, there never was an in- 
dication that the Politburo had come to the decision that 
they wanted a mutually advantageous agreement 



cut through the maze of disagreements 
and arrive at a mutually acceptable com- 
promise. 

At that point Ambassador 
Kvitsinskiy, the head of the Soviet 
delegation, told me that a basic review 
of Soviet policy toward the INF negotia- 
tions was scheduled to take place that 
summer in Moscow. He said he thought 
it important to make as much progress 
as we could prior to that review taking 
place. Once it had taken place the Soviet 
position would become set in concrete 
and it would be much harder thereafter 
to get it changed. It was with the pros- 
pect in mind that he and I decided we 
should attempt, with some urgency, to 
work out a package of mutual conces- 
sions which might cut through the 
panoply of issues dividing the sides. The 
result was the "walk in the woods" for- 
mula, in which the United States would 
have moved off of its proposal to 
eliminate all longer-range INF missiles 
and would have agreed to deploy only 
cruise missiles, and, for their part, the 
Soviets would have accepted some U.S. 
deployments in Europe, agreed to 
reduce their systems in Europe to an 
equal level, and to freeze their systems 
in Asia. This dropped their unjustified 
demand for compensation for British 
and French nuclear forces. 

From the U.S. standpoint the "walk- 
in-the-woods" formula was not wholly 
satisfactory. The United States would 
have preferred freedom to choose within 
the agreed ceiling the number of Persh- 
ing lis or cruise-missile launchers which 
it wished to deploy. It also would have 
preferred a lower ceiling on SS-20s in 
the Far East than a freeze at the then 
current number of 90. However, 
Washington approved the basic ap- 
proach and the method by which Kvit- 
sinskiy and I had arrived at. the formula. 



to the decisions they had reached. As 
best as I can reconstruct it, they had 
come to the following decisions. 

• From the standpoint of the sum of 
Soviet interests and objectives, it would 
be better for there to be no agreement 
and for U.S. deployments to go forward 
as scheduled rather than for them to 
agree to and thus sanction any U.S. INF 
missile deployments whatsoever. The 
reason for this was basically political. 
For the U.S.S.R. to enter into an agree- 
ment sanctioning even minimal U.S. 
deployments would undercut their grow- 
ing group of supporters in NATO 
Europe, including the supporters of anti- 
Americanism and the antinuclear and 
peace movements. These were all groups 
into the support of which they had made 
a major investment. 

• They judged it improbable that 
the United States and NATO would 
agree to forego deploying INF missiles 
if the U.S.S.R. would not eliminate their 
SS-20s and that the negotiations were, 
therefore, headed for a stalemate. 

• It was decided to initiate im- 
mediately a propaganda campaign 
designed to throw the onus for the 
failure of the negotiations onto the 
United States. 

• They decided to convey to the 
U.S. INF delegation a threat to pull out 
of the Geneva negotiations if and when 
the United States took practical steps to 
deploy INF weapons. 

• They authorized the Soviet 
military to proceed with full prepara- 
tions for counter-counterdeployments to 
begin when U.S. counterdeployments 
began. 

• They decided that after the 
United States had begun their 
counterdeployment to the SS-20s and 
the Soviets had begun their counter- 
counterdeployments to the Pershing lis 



and GLCMs, the U.S.S.R. would take 
the position that in any follow-on 
negotiation the proper trade would be 
their counter-counterdeployments 
against our counterdeployments. This 
would leave their existing SS-20 
deployments substantially untouched. 

After they walked out of the INF 
and START negotiations in November- 
December 1983, they announced they 
were undertaking another basic policy 
review of these_issues. It appears that 
that review has resulted largely in a con- 
firmation and hardening of their earlier 
1982 decisions. 

Soviet Decisionmaking Process 

A good deal of study had been given to 
the question of how decisions are ar- 
rived at in the Soviet Union. I think it is 
pretty well agreed that nothing can be 
done by the Soviet Government or by 
any of the other organs of Soviet society 
subject to party control which is in con- 
flict with decisions of the Politburo. Fur- 
thermore, it is generally agreed that the 
basic issues concerning defense, national 
security, and arms control are made in 
the Defense Council, which is customari- 
ly chaired by the General Secretary of 
the Party and on which a certain 
number of the other members of the 
Politburo also sit. Kvitsinskiy told me 
there is also a subordinate body, chaired 
by Foreign Minister Gromyko, which 
deals with the day-to-day operations con- 
cerned with arms control. On that com- 
mittee are members of the military 
establishment; Zamyatin, who chairs the 
Central Committee subcommittee deal- 
ing with the media and propaganda; and 
Zagladin, who chairs the Central Com- 
mittee subcommittee dealing with rela- 
tions with other communist parties and 
with what they call "political action," as 
well as representatives from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
KGB. Kvitsinskiy left me with the im- 
pression that it was this group that for- 
mulated his instructions and coordinated 
them with the political action, propagan- 
da, and other campaigns which were 
related to the objectives which their 
arms control positions and statements 
were designed to support. 

Future of INF Talks 

What is the outlook for the immediate 
future? The U.S. position is clear. We do 
not think the INF talks, or START, 
should have been broken off. The Soviet 
spokesmen gave as the reason for their 
walking out, the votes in the British 
Parliament, the Italian Parliament, and 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



finally in the Bundestag reaffirming 
their 1979 decision that in the absence 
of an INF agreement, the United States 
should deploy INF missiles on their ter- 
ritory. The Soviets say they cannot 
negotiate while we are deploying; we 
must remove the missiles already 
deployed before they will return to the 
negotiating tables. This is a worthless 
argument. We sat at the table in Geneva 
and negotiated hard and constructively 
for 2 years while they were adding to 
their already large deployments of 
SS-20s an additional SS-20 system per 
week. 

We are ready to return to the 
negotiating table on 24-hours' notice. 
Part of our INF delegation is in Geneva 
at the present time. The rest of us are 
prepared to return on a moment's 
notice. It is the Soviet Union, not the 
United States, which has blocked and 
continues to block progress in the 
negotiations. Soviet higher authority 
does not wish at this time to resume 
either the INF or the START negotia- 
tions. Instead, they are concentrating 
upon a political, psychological warfare 
campaign backed by a continuing com- 
prehensive military build-up. They hope 
to expand and exploit fissures within the 
North Atlantic alliance and over time, if 
possible, to get the United States out of 
Europe. The main target of their cam- 
paign is the United States and, in par- 
ticular, President Reagan. 

Soviet Analysis of Policy 

It is worth reviewing for a moment the 
way in which communists think that 
policy should be analyzed. They start 
with the proposition that there are cer- 
tain fundamental theses which 
distinguish the communist approach to 
the world from that of others, par- 
ticularly from that of the capitalist 
world. Among those theses is the 
primacy of the class struggle and the 
continuing fight against imperialism in 
the formerly colonial world. These 
theses they hold to be unchangeable. 
They have a different view with 
respect to strategy. They think that 
strategy should, from time to time, be 
changed to reflect changes in the cor- 
relation of forces. In the correlation of 
forces they include not only military 
forces but economic, political, and 
psychological ones as well. When the 
correlation of forces is favorable to their 
side their doctrine calls on them to ex- 
ploit that favorable correlation by mov- 
ing forward. When it is negative, the 
doctrine calls upon them to hold or to 
retreat while they attempt to reverse 
the trends in the correlation of forces. 



August 1984 



With respect to tactics, they believe 
there should be great flexibility. The 
guiding thoughts should be deception 
and surprise. They also hold that it is 
important at all times to decide upon 
what they call the "general line." By that 
they mean that it is necessary at all 
times to correctly identify that group 
which constitutes the major potential 
future threat to their ability to carry 
their program forward. During the early 
years after the October 1917 revolution, 
the "general line" called for concen- 
trating their attack on the social 
democrats within the U.S.S.R., the 
group having the greatest potential ap- 
peal to workers, the class they claimed 
to represent but were less close to than 
the social democrats. Later, after their 
victory in the civil war, the "general 
line" called for concentrating their at- 
tack on the social democrats in other 
countries, particularly Germany. In 1946 



U-2s over the U.S.S.R., but they could 
not shoot them down. During that 
period they showed no anger. The mo- 
ment they were able to shoot down a 
U-2, Khrushchev put on a tremendous 
show of anger and beat his shoe upon 
the podium at the UN meeting of that 
year. I doubt that there is merit in the 
common thesis that the Soviet leader- 
ship is angry at the United States or at 
President Reagan, I believe that propa- 
gandists are telling the Politburo that, 
at least for the time being, this is the 
astute impression to create. 

A major point that emerges from 
what I have been saying is that there is, 
indeed, a contrast between the way the 
United States and other countries in the 
West approach foreign policy issues and 
the way in which they are approached 
by the Soviet Union. We approach 
foreign affairs from the standpoint of 
being a uniquely important member, but 



The Soviets say they cannot negotiate while we are deploy- 
ing . . . [yet we] negotiated hard and constructively for 2 
years while they were adding to their already large 
deployments. . . . 



Stalin made it clear that he saw the 
United States as being the principal 
potential opponent, even at a time when 
President Truman and his advisers were 
striving hard to preserve in peacetime 
the wartime collaboration between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. Today 
the general line focuses directly on the 
United States, and particularly on Presi- 
dent Reagan, as being at the heart of 
the only potentially effective opposition 
to their program. 

A further Soviet communist precept 
is never to let emotion interfere with 
what they call "scientific realism." One 
should never let anger influence one's 
judgment, although it might be advisable 
from time to time to show anger. For 
some time before 1960 we were flying 



still a member having rights no greater 
than those of other members, in a 
relatively loose coalition of independent 
states. The government of each of the 
NATO states, for instance, is responsible 
to a parliament elected by the votes of a 
free populace informed by a free press. 
On the Soviet side the situation is quite 
different. Those who equate what they 
call the two superpowers and imply that 
they somehow are equally responsible 
for today's difficulties are far off the 
mark. The United States, like every 
democratic country, continuously makes 
mistakes, but the processes of a 
democratic government permit mistaken 
trends to be reversed and to some ex- 
tent corrected. The totalitarian states, 
when they go wrong, can go very wrong 
indeed. ■ 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 



Nuclear Arms Control and 
the NATO Alliance 



by Edward L. Rowny 

Address before the Royal United 
Services Institute, in London on June 21, 
198U. Ambassador Rowny is chief 
negotiator for the U.S. delegation to the 
strategic arms reductions talks 
(START). 

More than 6 months have passed since 
the Soviets walked out of the INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks 
in Geneva and refused to set a resump- 
tion date for START, the strategic arms 
reduction talks. These Soviet actions are 
as regrettable as they are unnecessary. 
They do, however, give us the oppor- 
tunity to reflect upon the events of the 
past several years. Accordingly, let me 
review developments to date in START, 
discuss the impact which recent events 
have had on the NATO alliance, and, 
finally, give you my thoughts on where 
we should go from here. 

Let me begin with a preview of 
these issues. The major thought I would 
like to leave with you is that throughout 
START the United States has nego- 
tiated seriously and flexibly. The Reagan 
Administration remains committed to 
the notion that the best way to increase 
strategic stability is through substantial 
reductions in nuclear arms. Next, we 
made a number of modifications to the 
original U.S. position in an effort to take 
account of reasonable Soviet concerns. 
Despite these efforts, a wide gulf con- 
tinues to separate the U.S. and Soviet 
positions in START. Nevertheless, more 
progress was achieved in the course of 
the talks than is generally recognized. 
When the Soviets return to the 
negotiating table, it should be possible to 
build on that progress. I am convinced 
that their own self-interest will eventual- 
ly impel the Soviets to return to the 
table. When they do, the best way to 
build on the progress already made is 
through the concept of trade-offs be- 
tween areas of U.S. and Soviet advan- 
tage, which President Reagan enun- 
ciated as his plan for achieving an agree- 
ment in the interest of both nations. 

In walking out of the negotiations on 
intermediate-range forces, the Soviets 
are clearly testing Western resolve. The 
Western democracies have met that 
test. The best way to encourage the 
Soviets to return to the table is to con- 
tinue current programs designed to en- 



sure our common defense, while 
simultaneously reiterating our readiness 
to resume negotiations toward balanced 
and verifiable agreements. One-sided 
cuts in our defense programs or failure 
to uphold alliance commitments would 
only reward the Soviets for their intran- 
sigence and make a return to the 
negotiating table less likely. 

Achieving a high degree of Western 
unity, however, has not been without its 
price. In recent months, voices have 
been heard on both sides of the Atlantic 
which challenge some of the fundamen- 
tals of NATO defense policy. Most 
Americans and Europeans recognize 
that the deployment of U.S. inter- 
mediate-range missiles in Europe and 
the modernization of U.S. strategic de- 
terrent forces constitutes a necessary 
and measured response to the massive 
and continuing buildup of Soviet forces 
threatening Western Europe and the 
United States. At the same time, an 
understandable concern about the conse- 
quences of a strategy which relies for its 
ultimate sanction on the possible use of 
nuclear weapons has led many to ask if 
there is not some better alternative. 

We cannot ignore these questions. It 
is patently obvious that we cannot 
"disinvent" nuclear weapons. For the 
foreseeable future, they will remain a 
crucial element of the deterrent forces 
necessary to preserve our liberties. We 
need, however, to look for ways to 
assure deterrence through reduced 
reliance on weapons of mass destruction. 
We must reduce the risk that nuclear 
war would occur for, as President 
Reagan has said, "A nuclear war can 
never be won and must never be 
fought." Strategic arms control 
agreements which are soundly conceived 
and firmly supported by our democratic 
societies can improve the stability of the 
nuclear balance between the super- 
powers. Stability can also be enhanced 
by upgrading NATO's conventional 
forces in Europe. Raising the nuclear 
threshold in Europe, in concert with in- 
creased strategic nuclear stability, 
reduces Soviet incentives to stimulate or 
exploit crises and, therefore, reduces the 
risk of nuclear war. 



Developments in START 

Let me briefly discuss the developments 
to date in START. On May 9, 1982, 
President Reagan outlined the basic 
elements of the U.S. START proposal in 
a speech at Eureka College. The Presi- 
dent sought to break the mold of past 
negotiations which concentrated on 
limiting strategic offensive arms at high 
levels. He sought to improve strategic 
stability through substantial reductions 
in the more destabilizing strategic offen- 
sive arms. Specifically, he proposed to 
reduce the number of ballistic missile 
warheads on each side to 5,000, approx- 
imately a one-third reduction from ex- 
isting U.S. and Soviet levels. He also 
proposed to reduce deployed ballistic 
missiles to no more than 850. This 
amounted to a 50% reduction from the 
prevailing U.S. level of such missiles, a 
level that was already considerably 
lower than the Soviet level. 

To achieve the basic objective of in- 
creased stability, President Reagan 
sought to focus reductions on the most 
threatening strategic weapons — ballistic 
missiles and, particularly, land-based in- 
tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 
These are the most dangerous systems 
because large numbers of powerful and 
highly accurate warheads can be de- 
ployed on them and because their fixed 
basing mode makes them vulnerable to 
attack. Our proposals also asked each 
nation to reduce its heavy bombers to 
lower equal levels. 

The Soviets, for their part, proposed 
to limit the numbers of ballistic missiles 
and heavy bombers to a combined total 
of 1,800. It was encouraging that the 
Soviets joined us in departing from 
SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] 
by proposing to limit not only launchers 
but their weapons. In most other 
respects, however, the Soviet proposal 
closely paralleled the SALT II Treaty. 

Nevertheless, by the spring of 1983, 
it was clear that the U.S. and the Soviet 
positions were still far apart. After an 
exhaustive reevaluation, President 
Reagan decided to make a number of 
changes in the U.S. position. These 
modifications were undertaken to meet 
the major concerns the Soviets had ex- 
pressed with our original proposal. 

• We offered to raise the proposed 
limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles. 

• We offered to drop the constraints 
we had proposed on the number of 
heavy and medium-sized ICBMs. We 
also said we would no longer insist on 
strict equality in U.S. and Soviet throw- 
weight, provided the agreement substan- 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



tially reduced the current 3-to-l Soviet 
advantage in this area. 

• We offered to limit air-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs) from the outset 
of an agreement and proposed limita- 
tions on numbers of heavy bombers and 
ALCMs to levels well below those of 
SALT II. 

• In making these modifications, we 
reaffirmed the importance of reductions 
to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads. 

On July 7, 1983, the United States 
tabled a draft START treaty which 
reflected these changes. In response, the 
Soviets modified some of the more ex- 
treme elements of their initial position. 
They stated their willingness to limit 
ALCMs numerically instead of banning 
them and revised their one-sided pro- 
posals on U.S. sea-based systems, which 
would have banned the U.S. D-5 
missiles and limited us to 4-6 Trident 
submarines. 

As a result of these developments, 
when the fourth round of START ended 
last summer, we left Geneva with the 
expectation that we might be on the 
verge of a breakthrough. Both sides ap- 
peared to have begun the natural proc- 
ess of modifying their original ingoing 
positions in order to come closer to a 
mutually acceptable accord. 

Prospects for progress in START 
were further enhanced in October 1983 
when President Reagan decided to incor- 
porate the mutual guaranteed build- 
down into the U.S. START approach. 
Build-down, which is important not only 
in its own right but because it also has 
wide bipartisan backing in the U.S. Con- 
gress, is intended to encourage the 
modernization of strategic forces in a 
manner which leads toward stability. 
President Reagan also took the highly 
significant step of proposing that the 
United States and the Soviet Union ex- 
plore the concept of trade-offs between 
areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage. 

Unfortunately, when round five of 
START resumed in October 1983, the 
Soviets reacted negatively to the new 
U.S. proposals. They dismissed build- 
down and refused seriously to consider 
trade-offs. It was evident from the 
beginning of the round that the Soviets 
were concentrating their efforts on 
preventing U.S. deployments of missiles 
in Europe. Reflecting their displeasure 
that NATO had proceeded with INF 
deployments, the Soviets walked out of 
the INF talks and refused to agree to 
our proposal to resume START negotia- 
tions in February 1984. 

As I mentioned earlier, considerable 
progress was made during the first year 



of the START negotiations, even though 
it was obviously less than we would have 
liked. For their part, the Soviets pro- 
posed lower limits on the numbers of 
missiles and bombers than they were 
willing to consider in SALT and 
acknowledged that, in any future agree- 
ment, it is not sufficient to limit only 
ballistic missile launchers. Some modest 
progress was also made on verification; 
the Soviets indicated a willingness to 
consider cooperative measures to supple- 
ment national technical means of 
verification. 

Nevertheless, a wide gulf still 
separates the United States and the 
Soviet Union in several fundamental 
areas. The first major area of disagree- 
ment concerns the level of reductions. 
The United States has proposed the 
most substantial reductions since the 
beginning of U.S. -Soviet strategic arms 
negotiations. Even though the Soviets 
have proposed 25% reductions in the 
number of delivery vehicles, under their 
proposal the Soviets could actually 
deploy about 45% more missile 
warheads than they now have. Their 
proposal thus gives the appearance, but 
not the reality, of reducing offensive 
arms. 

The second major area of disagree- 
ment concerns the treatment of heavy 
bombers and the nuclear weapons they 
carry. The United States proposed that 
heavy bombers and ALCMs, while 
limited to new lower levels, be treated 



slower flying cruise missile. This pro- 
posal is unacceptable because it fails to 
distinguish between ballistic missiles — 
whose large size, multiple warheads, 
great accuracy, and short time of flight 
give them the capability to be used in a 
first strike — and cruise missiles — whose 
slow speed of flight makes them clearly 
retaliatory weapons. 

Moreover, the Soviet proposal com- 
pletely ignores the fact that the 
retaliatory U.S. bomber force must be 
capable of penetrating massive Soviet 
air defenses which are unconstrained by 
any agreement. It is clear that the 
Soviets seek, through their proposal, a 
large superiority in the number of 
ballistic missile warheads. 

We recognize that the kind of 
changes we seek in Soviet and U.S. 
strategic forces cannot be accomplished 
quickly. Nor do we seek mirror image 
force structures with the U.S.S.R. We 
do, however, insist that any agreement 
substantially reduce the number of 
ballistic missile warheads and redress a 
serious disparity in missile throw- 
weight. 

Fundamentally, the disagreement 
over these issues revolves around the 
question of whether a future agreement 
will allow the Soviets to maintain their 
3 to 1 advantage in ballistic missile 
capability of strategic weapons. The best 
measurement of such capability is throw- 
weight, which constitutes the total 
weight of warheads a missile is capable 



Raising the nuclear threshold in Europe, in 
concert with increased strategic nuclear stability, 
reduces Soviet incentives to stimulate or exploit 
crises and, therefore, reduces the risk of nuclear 
war. 



separately and not lumped together in a 
combined aggregate limit of all weapons. 
We made this proposal because heavy 
bombers and their weapons are less 
destabilizing than ballistic missiles. The 
Soviets, however, have proposed a com- 
bined ceiling on ballistic missile 
warheads and all bomber weapons, in- 
cluding ALCMs, shorter range air- 
launched missiles, and bombs. In effect, 
the Soviet proposal would equate the 
large, highly accurate, and fast-flying 
warheads carried on their SS-18 ICBM 
with the much smaller warheads on a 



of delivering to a target together with 
its associated targeting devices. Past 
agreements allowed the Soviets a 
superiority in ballistic missile throw- 
weight on grounds that their technology 
lagged behind ours. Whatever the merits 
of that argument then, it has no validity 
now, since the Soviets have caught up 
and even surpassed us in many areas of 
missile technology. The Soviet advan- 
tage in throw-weight has allowed them 
to deploy over 6,000 large and highly ac- 
curate warheads on their ICBMs. This 
gives the Soviets a massive and highly 



August 1984 



39 



ARMS CONTROL 



destabilizing advantage in their ability to 
attack "hardened targets" quickly. Such 
hardened targets include missile silos, 
command posts and the like. This means 
that the Soviet Union has the only gen- 
uine first-strike force in the world today, 
a situation which will not change when 
we deploy the MX, since the number we 
plan to deploy would be objectively in- 
sufficient for a first strike on the Soviet 
Union. The United States, of course, has 
never had and never will have any inten- 
tion of using its strategic nuclear 
weapons in a first strike. Consequently, 
we must effectively refuse Soviet claims 
that the MX will even give us the poten- 
tial of doing so. 

The INF Connection 

Another major area of disagreement 
between the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. concerns the relationship be- 
tween limits on strategic and intermedi- 
ate-range systems. The Soviets attempt- 
ed to link the START and INF negotia- 
tions by conditioning the reductions they 
proposed in START to no deployments 
of Pershing II intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles and ground-launched 
cruise missiles (GLCMs). The Soviets 
claimed that U.S. systems deployed in 
Europe— which they call "forward-based 
systems" — have strategic significance 
because they can strike the U.S.S.R. We 
pointed out that these U.S. systems did 
not meet the previously agreed criteria 
for intercontinental weapons. In SALT 
II, an ICBM, for example, was defined 
as a land-based ballistic missile of over 
5,500 kilometer range. Moreover, the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
were negotiating on Pershing lis and 
GLCMs— along with equivalent Soviet 
missiles— in the INF talks. Absent an 
INF agreement, however, NATO was 
determined to deploy U.S. missiles to 
counter the threat presented by the 
much larger numbers of Soviet 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, a 
threat which continues to grow as the 
Soviets deploy even more SS-20s. 

At the heart of this Soviet position 
is a concept they call "equality and equal 
security." At first glance, this seems to 
be an unexceptional, if vague, formula. 
However, as the Soviets envision it, 
"equality and equal security" appears to 
be nothing less than an insistence of a 
Soviet "right" to possess nuclear forces 
equal to those of all other nuclear 
powers combined. In other words, it is a 
prescription for Soviet global hegemony. 

I do not want to get into a detailed 
discussion of the INF negotiations. Let 



me simply point out that in INF, as in 
START, the United States negotiated 
seriously and flexibly, making every ef- 
fort to take account of legitimate Soviet 
concerns. Unfortunately, all our efforts 
foundered on the inflexible Soviet in- 
sistence on retaining a monopoly of 
longer range INF missiles. In essence, 
the Soviet position in INF was aimed at 
undermining NATO's ability to defend 
itself. 

Faced with Soviet unwillingness to 
consider a balanced INF agreement, 
NATO had no choice but to proceed with 
deploying Pershing lis and GLCMs. We 
stressed, however, our willingness to 
continue the negotiations even after 
deployments began and to remove these 
missiles if a balanced agreement could 
be achieved. We also pointed out that, 
since the initiation of the INF negotia- 
tions, the U.S.S.R. had deployed about 
100 SS-20s— with some 300 warheads— 
in addition to the 270 SS-20s already in 
place when the talks began. 

Impact on the NATO Alliance 

The Soviets are clearly testing Western 
resolve. Their hope is that the absence 
of negotiations will impel the West to 
make one-sided concessions to draw the 
Soviets back to the negotiating table. So 
far, I am happy to state, this Soviet 
gambit has failed. 

Let me stress my strong support for 
the NATO alliance. I have been involved 
in NATO affairs for almost 30 years. As 
special assistant in the mid-1950s to 
Gen. Lemnitzer, who was then the 
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, I witnessed the wrenching debate 
the alliance went through in its initial ef- 
forts to devise a common military 
strategy. The alliance emerged from 
that debate all the stronger. The nations 
of the alliance share a common political, 
economic, and cultural heritage which 
links our destinies closely together. The 
ability of free people in Western Europe 
and the United States to question the 
policies of their elected governments 
constitutes the bedrock of our common 
heritage and represents one of our 
greatest assets. The alliance could not 
have survived this long if it could not 
change in response to changing cir- 
cumstances. The democratic process 
followed in NATO represents the best 
way to allow new ideas to be developed, 
debated, and, if found desirable, carried 
out in practice. 

If this process is to work, however, 
it demands an honest examination of our 
current circumstances, including a will- 
ingness to face unpleasant facts. We 



cannot allow our satisfaction with 35 
years of joint effort in successfully 
deterring aggression to blind us to the 
new political and military realities 
NATO faces. 

First, the Soviet threat continues to 
grow. In recent years the Soviets have 
made major efforts to reduce the 
qualitative edge in weaponry on which 
NATO has traditionally relied to offset 
massive Soviet quantitative advantages. 
In addition, the growing global reach of 
Soviet military power has given Moscow 
the capability to threaten vital alliance 
interests in areas outside Western 
Europe, such as the Middle East and the 
Persian Gulf. 

Second, NATO's military strategy is 
being questioned. For the past two 
decades, NATO policy for deterring at- 
tack on Western Europe has rested on 
its strategy of flexible response. This 
policy is now being challenged by some 
who believe that the costs of using 
nuclear weapons — if it would ever come 
to that — would be out of all proportion 
to any conceivable benefit. 

The overwhelming majority of Euro- 
peans and Americans support a strong 
NATO. Some Europeans, however, 
assert that within the alliance frame- 
work, European interests would best be 
served by steering a middle course be- 
tween the the two superpowers. At the 
same time, some Americans urge the 
United States to place less emphasis on 
its Atlantic ties and to direct more at- 
tention elsewhere. The former position 
hints of a return to pre-World War II 
appeasement; the latter of pre-World 
War II isolationism. Both are wrong. 

The existence of differences between 
the United States and its European 
allies is neither new nor particularly sur- 
prising. NATO is an alliance of 
sovereign nations. It is not, after all, the 
Warsaw Pact. Moreover, in the broad 
sweep of historical perspective, the ex- 
istence of an alliance of sovereign na- 
tions for over 35 years may well be un- 
precedented. 

Within a number of European na- 
tions, the events surrounding deploy- 
ment of NATO INF missiles stimulated 
a broader debate on questions of nuclear 
strategy. In reality, the debate among 
Europeans over the missiles highlights 
the importance of this issue to the 
defense of Europe. By enhancing the 
credibility of nuclear deterrent, the INF 
deployment is designed to protect the 
values of liberty, democracy, and 
humanity which all Europeans would 
agree mark the difference between 
Western Europe and its totalitarian 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



adversary to the East; values which 
Western Europe has done so much to 
create and to spread throughout the 
world. 

The political challenge facing the 
alliance is compounded by changes in 
European perception of the United 
States, due in part to the fact that the 
leaders who were present at the creation 
of NATO are passing from the scene. 
They personally experienced the libera- 
tion of Europe at the end of the Second 
World War and helped plan U.S. 
assistance to Europe in the early 
postwar years. The place of the older 
generation in positions of influence in 
Western Europe is being taken by what 
is often called the "successor 
generation." This later generation 
entered into active political life during 
the 1960s; their initial perceptions of the 
United States were often formed during 
the difficult years of Vietnam and 
Watergate. 

In the years ahead, we will need to 
devote more energies to ensuring that 
our common political heritage and 
mutual goals are better understood and 
more solidly supported. This will require 
more effort on both sides of the Atlantic 
to understanding the different perspec- 
tives which Europeans and Americans 
bring to the alliance. To take one exam- 
ple drawn from my experience as 
START negotiator, the alliance has 
developed a pattern of close and regular 
briefings and consultations, a process 
that has been very effective in ensuring 
that European concerns are factored 
into our bilateral negotiations. 

As we chart the course of the 
alliance over the coming years, I believe 
we must keep in mind several basic 
propositions. 

First, the democratic traditions and 
national independence of the Western 
community are worth defending. We can 
take comfort in the fact that there is lit- 
tle disagreement on this point. 

Second, the defense of our liberties 
will require sacrifices. These sacrifices 
must be borne equally by all members of 
the community. As President Reagan 
said recently, the defense of Western 
Europe is vital to U.S. security, and the 
United States will continue to do its part 
in our common defense. At the same 
time, the United States cannot be ex- 
pected to attach greater importance to 
the security of Europe than Europeans 
do themselves. The nations of Western 
Europe can, and should, do more to de- 
fend themselves. 

Third, it is imperative for the 
alliance to devote more attention to im- 



proving its conventional defense capabili- 
ty. The desirability of reducing our 
reliance on nuclear weapons is one 
lesson we can learn from the anti- 
nuclear protestors who filled the streets 
of Europe last autumn. But if NATO is 
ever to reduce its dependence on nuclear 
weapons, it must have a better capabili- 
ty to deter a Soviet attack on Western 
Europe through conventional means. 



these areas as rapidly as possible. At the 
same time, we must avoid becoming the 
captive of past ways of thinking. Thus, 
developing the ability to successfully at- 
tack communications and logistics 
facilities deep in the enemy's rear would 
not, as is sometimes charged, represent 
a change in the defensive orientation of 
NATO. Rather, it would constitute a 
recognition that successful defense 



The United States, of course, has never had 
and never will have any intention of using its 
strategic nuclear weapons in a first strike. 



If we fail to improve the serious im- 
balance between NATO's conventional 
defensive capability and the conventional 
capability of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union may be 
tempted to commit aggression with its 
conventional forces or to increase its ef- 
forts to intimidate the nations of 
Western Europe. Thus, upgrading 
NATO's conventional forces is not only 
urgent, but it is compatible with our 
arms control proposals. 

Fortunately, we are now presented 
with a window of opportunity for en- 
hancing the alliance's conventional 
capability by the introduction of new 
technology. These improvements could 
enhance the alliance's ability to deter 
Soviet conventional attack and, by rais- 
ing the nuclear threshold, would reduce 
the possibility of a devastating nuclear 
war. 

Without going into detail, let me 
refer you to the recent "European 
Security Study" report on strengthening 
conventional deterrence in Europe. This 
report highlighted five critical areas for 
improving defense and deterrence by 
NATO. These areas are: 

• Countering an initial Warsaw Pact 
attack; 

• Eroding Soviet air power; 

• Attacking Warsaw Pact follow-on 
forces; 

• Disrupting Warsaw Pact com- 
mand and control; and 

• Improving NATO command and 
control. 

We should welcome, therefore, the 
decision at the last meeting of NATO 
defense ministers to consider ways in 
which emerging technology could be ap- 
plied. I urge the alliance to proceed in 



would be enhanced by an ability to 
disrupt the second echelon of the enemy 
offensive before it reaches the battle- 
front. We should avoid adopting a 
Maginot Line philosophy; that 
philosophy did not work in the 1940s, 
and it could not work in the 1980s or 
1990s either. In any case, emerging 
technologies can be applied to the entire 
range of military tasks to counter the 
Soviet threat. 

Increased use of advanced tech- 
nology would allow the NATO alliance to 
exploit one of our greatest advantages 
over the Soviet bloc. In exploiting this 
advantage, however, we must be careful 
to avoid excessive reliance on "gadgets" 
and trap ourselves into the mistaken 
belief that these new weapons could 
allow us to defend with fewer soldiers. 
As an infantry officer with service in 
three wars, I am convinced that nothing 
will ever eliminate the need for sizable 
numbers of soldiers on the ground, with 
their unique capability to seize and hold 
terrain. However, if our soldiers are 
given proper recognition of their import- 
ance, their effectiveness can be im- 
proved with modern technology. They 
can be given more hope of successfully 
defending against an attack. In short, 
our soldiers in NATO are outnumbered 
and must be assured that they can make 
up for their smaller numbers with the 
better weapons which advanced 
technology of the West can provide. 

In this connection, it is important 
that we give more than lip service to en- 
suring that all members of the alliance 
share in the arms procurement process 
for such advanced technology weapons. 
Too often our plans for technological im- 
provements have foundered over our in- 
ability to resolve this thorny problem. 



August 1984 



41 



ARMS CONTROL 



Our current opportunity for improving 
NATO's conventional capabilities and 
thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war 
should not be missed because of our in- 
ability to cope with the problem of pro- 
curement sharing. 

In strengthening NATO's conven- 
tional capability we must recognize that 
as long as nuclear weapons exist, they 
will be a factor in the defense of the 
alliance. This means that the United 
States will, for the foreseeable future, 
have an important role to play in the 
defense of Western Europe. 

Only the United States has the 
capability to maintain sufficient nuclear 
forces to deter the Soviets across the en- 
tire range of theater and strategic 
threats. The fact that U.S. strategic 
forces will remain NATO's ultimate 
deterrent means that an American of- 
ficer should remain at the head of 
NATO's military command. No doubt, 
there are many ways in which NATO's 
political and military structure can be 
improved to increase European par- 
ticipation. However, appointing a Euro- 
pean to the post of SACEUR [Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe] is not one of 
the ways in which NATO's structure 
should be changed. It would be a grave 
mistake to do so. 

Lessons Learned From Negotiating 
With the Soviets 

Turning from START and alliance 
issues, let me discuss some of the 
lessons I have learned from 10 years of 
negotiating strategic arms control with 
the Soviets. The first lesson is that the 
wide differences in the historical and 
cultural experiences of the United States 
and the Soviet Union have a direct im- 
pact on our respective approaches to 
negotiations. Americans tend to be 
idealistic, activist, and pragmatic in our 
approach to problemsolving. We are 
often impatient. If one approach does 
not work, we try another. 

Conditioned by their Russian heri- 
tage, however, the Soviets take a longer 
view. Although they can be flexible on 
tactics, their long-term objectives seldom 
vary. Above all, they are remarkably 
patient. 

The Russian language has no native 
root for the word "compromise"; the 
word has been derived from other 
languages. To Soviet negotiators, com- 
promise carries a distinctly pejorative 
connotation, one more associated with 
"weakness" or "capitulation" than with 
the Western connotation of "sensible" or 
"reasonable." 



These differences in Soviet and 
American negotiating style have both 
positive and negative features. On the 
positive side, the American orientation 
toward problemsolving means that most 
of the breakthroughs in arms control 
negotiations have come about as a result 
of U.S. initiatives. On the other hand, 
our impatience has, on repeated occa- 
sions, allowed the Soviets to outlast us. 
A common Soviet tactic is to react, not 
initiate. As long as the United States 
keeps coming up with new proposals, 
the Soviets sit back patiently until one 
appears that they like. 

It is particularly important that we 
remember this Soviet tactic now. In 
both START and INF, the United States 
has made a good faith effort to take ac- 
count of Soviet concerns. We are 
prepared to continue to negotiate on 
that basis. But we cannot make uni- 
lateral concessions designed solely to 
lure the Soviets back to the negotiating 
table. 

The second lesson is that even 
though our two nations differ in 
ideology, in historical experience, in 
moral values, and in negotiating style, 
we share one important common objec- 
tive: a mutual desire to avoid nuclear 
war. We must, therefore, continue to 
negotiate with one another toward this 
common objective. 

As long as the Soviet Union remains 
determined to expand its power and in- 
fluence at the expense of legitimate 
Western interests, the United States 
and the Soviet Union will be rivals. 
Arms control will not end that rivalry 
which stems from the very nature of the 
Soviet system. Arms control can, how- 
ever, make the rivalry less dangerous. It 
can add a measure of predictability to 
the U.S. -Soviet relationship and place 
some bounds on the competition. 

A corollary to this second lesson is 
that arms control is an important ele- 
ment of our foreign policy and thus can- 
not be divorced from the general climate 
of U.S. -Soviet relations. Arms control 
cannot by itself turn around a climate of 
relations which Soviet actions have 
soured. Nor, in the final analysis, would 
it be realistic to expect the United 
States and the Soviet Union to be able 
to conclude far-reaching arms control 
agreements at a time when relations are 
at a low point. At such times, our first 
priority must be to repair the basic 
fabric of the relationship, to set the 
stage for further arms control. 

A third lesson is that we must be 
realistic about the military benefits of 
strategic arms control. Balanced arms 



control agreements can improve stabili- 
ty. But arms control agreements can 
never, by themselves, substitute for the 
determination of free people to maintain 
the ability to deter Soviet aggression. 
Indeed, such determination is a vital 
prerequisite for any effective arms con- 
trol agreement with the U.S.S.R. This is 
a central paradox of arms control 
negotiations, a paradox not well under- 
stood by many Western critics. If we are 
to negotiate arms control agreements 
with the U.S.S.R., we must not appear 
to be overly eager for an arms control 
agreement. We must be able to convince 
the Soviets not only that they will be 
better off with an agreement, but that 
they will be worse off without one. Put 
another way, if we want to be in a posi- 
tion to negotiate arms reductions with 
the Soviets, we first have to convince 
them that we have the will to match 
them in the absence of an agreement. 

At the same time, we have to recog- 
nize that arms control agreements must 
be based on existing military realities. 
One of these realities is the difference in 
the structure of U.S. and Soviet strate- 
gic forces. An arms control agreement 
can be useful in closing off dangerous 
areas of competition and in encouraging 
trends which lead toward greater stabili- 
ty of the U.S. -Soviet military relation- 
ship. However, we should not delude 
ourselves into thinking that an arms 
control agreement will free us from the 
responsibility of taking care of our own 
security. Moreover, arms control 
agreements by themselves will not 
necessarily result in major savings in 
defense spending. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union maintain 
large, complex, and expensive strategic 
forces. They will undoubtedly continue 
to do so after any conceivable strategic 
arms control agreement. 

An arms control agreement should 
improve the stability of the strategic 
balance in two important ways. 

First, it should inhibit the deploy- 
ment of large numbers of strategic of- 
fensive weapons capable of being used in 
a first strike. 

Second, it should encourage the 
deployment of survivable and retaliatory 
systems. 

Achieving an agreement which im- 
proves the stability of the strategic 
balance calls for the necessity of recog- 
nizing that not all reductions have an 
equally beneficial impact on strategic 
stability. The SALT II Treaty, painfully 
negotiated over a period of 7 years, 
would have required a reduction of 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



is B 



ARMS CONTROL 



fflce 



■;) 



.bout 300 Soviet strategic missiles or 
lombers. One of its most important 
hortcomings, however, was that it per- 
nitted a massive increase in the 
lumbers of ballistic missile warheads, 
i'he Soviets were able to use their 
hrow-weight advantage to deploy such 
nassive numbers of large, highly ac- 
urate nuclear warheads that they are in 
i position to threaten the destruction of 
are t large part of the U.S. ICBM force 
vith only a small portion of their own 
trategic forces. 

It is evident, therefore, that only an 
igreement which limits in a verifiable 
manner both the number and the de- 
structive power of ballistic missile 
varheads can genuinely improve the 
tability of the strategic balance. 

Stability, survivability, and moder- 
nization are interrelated, particularly in 
view of the different way the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. have chosen to 
structure their strategic forces. 
Historically, the Soviet Union has 
deployed the bulk of its strategic forces 
in land-based ICBMs. Nevertheless, the 
Soviets recognize that their ICBMs will 
become more vulnerable as the United 
States begins to redress its current 
asymmetries by deploying modern, more 
(capable systems. The Soviets, therefore, 
are already planning to deploy a portion 
of their ICBMs in a mobile basing mode. 
The United States, even though it has a 
smaller portion of its total forces in 
land-based systems, also recognizes the 
decreased vulnerability of moving to 
mobile land-based systems. 

Mobile ICBMs demonstrate what 
may become an increasingly difficult 
problem for arms control in the coming 
years: their verifiability. Mobile ICBMs 
must be effectively verified. Otherwise 
they could be extremely destabilizing be- 
cause the opposing side might have no 
real idea of the magnitude of the threat 
it faces. 

Cruise missiles present a similar 
dilemma. Because of their long flight 
time, cruise missiles are inherently 
retaliatory weapons. Yet cruise missiles, 
because of their small size and because 
they can be deployed in a variety of bas- 
ing modes, are difficult to verify. 

The United States has a number of 
serious concerns about Soviet failure to 
comply with previous arms control 
agreements. We will continue to press 
these concerns with the Soviet Union 
through diplomatic channels and insist 
upon explanations, clarifications, and 
corrective actions. At the same time, the 
United States is continuing to carry out 
its own obligations and commitments 
under relevant agreements. 



August 1984 



We should recognize, however, that 
ensuring compliance with arms control 
agreements remains a serious problem. 
Better verification and compliance provi- 
sions and better treaty drafting will 
help, and we are working toward this in 
ongoing negotiations. It is fundamental- 
ly important, however, that the Soviets 
take a constructive attitude toward com- 
pliance. 

Future arms control agreements 
will, accordingly, require more effective 
verification measures than in past agree- 
ments. In particular, a START agree- 
ment will require cooperative verifica- 
tion measures, possibly including some 
form of onsite inspection, to supplement 
national technical means. 

Conclusion 

With the talks in limbo for over 6 
months, the natural question is where do 
we go from here? Discussion of this 
question has to begin with a few basic 
facts. 

First, it was the Soviet Union and 
not the United States which interrupted 
the negotiations. The United States is 
ready to resume the negotiations at any 
time without preconditions. We have re- 
peatedly made this point to the Soviets, 
both in public and in private channels. 

Second, the United States has good 
positions on the table in START and 
INF. We believe an agreement based on 
our proposals will serve the interest of 
both nations. 



bomber capabilities in return for equiva- 
lent Soviet limits on its advantage in 
ballistic missile capabilities. We have a 
number of concrete ideas in mind on 
how the concept of trade-offs might be 
applied in START, and we are ready to 
explore them with the Soviets in some 
detail once the Soviets decide to resume 
the negotiations. 

But it takes two to negotiate, and, 
accordingly, the natural next question is 
what do the Soviets intend to do? As a 
longtime student of Soviet affairs, I 
recognize the pitfalls in attempting to 
predict Soviet actions. 

One reason why the Soviets are not 
negotiating is the uncertain situation in 
the Soviet hierarchy. In the past year 
and a half, the Soviets have experienced 
two changes of leadership. In the not 
too distant future, they may face yet 
another leadership turnover. 

Chernenko's accession to power rep- 
resented a victory for the conservative 
old guard, the small group of men who 
have stood at the top of the Soviet 
Government since the Brezhnev era. 
They show little inclination to undertake 
the innovative or imaginative measures 
which would be required to resolve the 
serious internal problems facing the 
Soviet Union. In the economy, to take 
one example, Chernenko appears to be 
backpedaling from even the relatively 
modest innovations which Andropov 
sought to introduce. In the time-honored 
style of Soviet bureaucrats, Chernenko 
apparently seeks to resolve Soviet eco- 



The Russian language has no native root for 
the word "compromise"; . . . To Soviet negotiators, 
compromise carries a distinctly pejorative conna- 
tion, one more associated with "weakness" or 
"capitulation" than with the Western connotation 
of "sensible" or "reasonable. " 



Third, any negotiation is a process 
of give-and-take. As I noted earlier, we 
have already modified our initial position 
to take account of several of the Soviets' 
major concerns. We have also told the 
Soviets that, in an effort to reach a 
mutually acceptable accord, we are 
ready to explore trade-offs between 
areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage. 
Specifically, the United States is pre- 
pared to limit its advantage in heavy 



nomic problems by tinkering with the 
administrative apparatus rather than by 
undertaking the far-reaching structural 
changes which most observers believe 
are required. 

In foreign policy, likewise, the 
watchword of the Chernenko regime is 
continuity. It would be wrong, however, 
to conclude that this accent on continui- 
ty will prevent the Soviets from carrying 
out an effective foreign policy. 



43 



ARMS CONTROL 



The Soviets recognize that they lost 
the first round of the INF contest. How- 
ever, they are far from ready to admit 
that the game is over. Having failed to 
block initial deployments, the Soviets 
hope to force us to pay a high political 
price for proceeding with further sched- 
uled deployments. 

Through their adamant stand 
against any NATO INF deployments 
and by appearing to make the with- 
drawal of these missiles a precondition 
for the resumption of negotiations, the 
Soviets have, in effect, painted them- 
selves into a corner. For the present, 
the Soviets seem disinclined to take any 
actions to get themselves out of this 
situation. It would be a mistake for us to 
make unilateral concessions simply to 
get the talks resumed. The West should, 
however, refrain from actions which 
could make it more difficult for the 
Soviets to extract themselves from their 
corner. But as the President has said: 
"The door is open and every once in a 
while we're standing in the doorway to 
see if anyone's coming up the steps." 

The Soviets, for the time being, are 
continuing to use their deployments as 
well as ours as a basis for creating an 
atmosphere of crisis around East-West 
relations. They have blamed the United 
States for the breakdown of the negotia- 
tions and have claimed that NATO INF 
deployments make war more likely. In 
fact, the opposite is true. NATO INF 
deployments, by increasing its ability to 
deter Soviet attack, actually increase the 
prospects for lasting peace. 



In calling for a rollback in NATO 
INF deployments, without any reduction 
in the threat that Soviet SS-20 missiles 
and other nuclear forces present to 
Europe, the Soviets are, in effect, deny- 
ing any legitimacy to the security con- 
cerns of Western Europe. The Soviet ob- 
jective is clear. They are attempting to 
decouple the United States from the 
defense of Europe and to pressure the 
Western alliance in an effort to extract 
one-sided concessions. At the same time, 
the Soviets are using the unwarranted 
argument that the NATO INF deploy- 
ments are responsible for a change in 
the strategic situation between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. 

It is my belief that in these circum- 
stances, NATO must do two things. 
First, it must continue to exhibit firm- 
ness in the face of Soviet pressure tac- 
tics. Second, it must seize the opportuni- 
ty that new weapons technology makes 
possible to upgrade its conventional 
military capability in Europe. 

We in the United States continue to 
modernize our strategic forces and will 
continue to hold out the prospects for 
negotiations. 

I believe that eventually the Soviets 
will recognize that it is in their interest 
to return to the negotiating table. What 
is necessary is a political decision by the 
Soviets which recognizes that the time 
for posturing is over and the time for 
serious negotiations is long overdue. 
When the Soviets make that decision, 
they will find us ready. ■ 



Preserving Freedom and Security 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on June IS, 1984. 
Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State. 1 

No issue is of greater importance to the 
Administration or to the American peo- 
ple than war and peace. As President 
Reagan has said, "We must both defend 
freedom and preserve the peace. We 
must stand true to our principles and 
friends while preventing a holocaust." 
There is no escaping this dual respon- 
sibility. Indeed, the task of preserving 
our freedom and security has never been 
more important or more complex than it 
is today. 

A sound national security policy 
rests on the conviction that, whatever 



our differences, the United States and 
the Soviet Union have a profound com- 
mon interest in avoiding nuclear war 
and its unimaginable consequences. A 
responsible national security policy must 
include both a firm resolve to maintain 
deterrent forces and an active pursuit of 
arms control to restrain competition. 
That is our policy. 

Arms control is not a panacea for 
our problems around the world. It is one 
facet of our relationship with the Soviet 
Union, albeit a very important one. 

It is useful to keep in mind what 
nuclear arms control can and cannot do. 
Arms control cannot: 

• Eliminate the threat of nuclear 
war. Nuclear weapons cannot be 
disinvented; 



• Save vast amounts of money. 
Nuclear forces constitute about 15% of 
the budget of the Defense Department; 

• Substantially reduce casualties or 
damage should a nuclear war occur. A 
small number of weapons can do 
catastrophic damage. 

Arms control, however, can: 

• Substantially reduce nuclear 
forces. 

• If approached properly (that is, if 
the constraints encourage an evolution 
toward smaller, more survivable, and 
more stable forces on both sides), arms 
control can enhance stability and reduce 
the risk of war. 

We must bear in mind that progress 
in arms control requires good faith 
bargaining on both sides and also 
depends on many factors beyond the 
substance of our proposals. For arms 
control to succeed, we must work to 
shape the conditions that make success 
possible: we must maintain the balance 
of power and ensure the strength of our 
alliances even as we recognize the 
legitimate security concerns of our 
adversaries. 

Modernization of our military forces 
is an important — and essential— element 
of our approach to preserving the 
balance and creating an environment in 
which arms control can be successful. As 
you know, during the past decade or 
more, Soviet military expenditures have, 
in many vital categories, far outstripped 
our own. The President's modernization 
program is designed to restore the 
balance, enhance deterrence, and in- 
crease Soviet incentives to negotiate 
equitable, verifiable arms control 
agreements. Modernization is, thus, an 
integral part of our national security 
policy that includes both effective deter- 
rence and effective arms control. 

In all of the many arms control ef- 
forts this Administration has under- 
taken, we are guided by four objectives. 

Reductions. We seek agreements 
that actually constrain the military 
capabilities of the parties through 
substantial reductions in weapons and 
forces, not merely freezing them at ex- 
isting or higher levels. 

Equality. The final result should be 
equal or equivalent levels of forces on 
both sides. An agreement that 
legitimizes unequal forces creates in- 
stability which could unravel the agree- 
ment and may, over time, increase the 
risk of conflict. 



44 



'Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



vs< 



Stability. An agreement must im- 
rove the stability of deterrence in a 
risis. If each side's forces are secure 
nough to survive an all-out attack, the 
ncentive to preempt in a crisis or con- 
'rontation will be minimized. This is an 
mportant message of the bipartisan 
Scowcroft commission's report on the 
future of our strategic forces. 

Verifiability. Finally, arms control 
agreements must be effectively 
verifiable. In the past, agreements for 
which compliance cannot be verified 
have generated mistrust and suspicion 
rather than reinforced the prospects 
with greater stability. The President's 
January report to Congress finding 
Soviet violations or probable violations 
of several arms control agreements 
underscores the need for effective 
verification. 

Building on these four principles, 
this Administration has undertaken an 
unprecedented range of arms control 
negotiations across the whole spectrum 
of East- West security issues. As part of 
our effort to create an environment con- 
ducive to successful negotiations, the 
Administration has adopted a policy of 
not taking actions that would undercut 
: existing strategic arms agreements, pro- 
vided the Soviet Union exercises equal 
restraint. This continues to be our 
policy. 

Let me turn now to several of the 
more significant subjects. 

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 

The major goal of our approach to 
strategic arms control is to enhance 
stability and reduce the risk of war 
through significant reductions in U.S. 
and Soviet ballistic missile forces, par- 
ticularly ICBMs [intercontinental 
ballistic missiles]. As you are well aware, 
these systems can present special prob- 
lems. Reduced reliance on ICBMs— 
especially large MIRVed [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry vehicle] 
ICBMs— would directly diminish the in- 
centive for one side to use its nuclear 
weapons first in a crisis against 
elements of the other side's strategic 
deterrent. 

Thus, the heart of our position in 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
is a substantial reduction in the number 
of ballistic missile warheads. After close 
consultation with Congress, we have 
proposed to accomplish these reductions 
by means of a "build-down," where each 
side reduces more weapons than it 
deploys until the agreed limit is reached. 



August 1984 



In addition, we have been sensitive 
to Soviet concerns that our position re- 
quires extensive restructuring of their 
strategic force. Consequently, over the 
past year we made several modifications 
to our original proposal. We tabled a 
draft treaty that collapsed the two 
phases envisioned in our original pro- 
posal into a single agreement, making 
clear that all systems would be limited 
from the outset. We also demonstrated 
flexibility and solicited Soviet ideas on 
how to reduce the current large dis- 
parity in ballistic missile throw-weight. 
Finally, the President has communicated 
our willingness to negotiate trade-offs 
between areas of comparative U.S. and 
Soviet advantage. 

Soviet responsiveness to our con- 
cerns over the course of five rounds of 
negotiation has been less than we would 
have liked, but they have taken some 
positive steps. While our positions re- 
main far apart, the Soviets have in- 
dicated their willingness to discuss 
reductions in their nuclear delivery 
vehicles and have offered some changes 
in their own position. For the most part, 
however, the Soviet proposals are 
designed to allow them to retain their 
advantage in ballistic missile destructive 
power and even to increase the number 
of their ballistic missile warheads. 

We believe our proposal for trade- 
offs could pave the way for future prog- 
ress. But, unfortunately, the Soviets tied 
progress in START to preventing INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
deployments in Europe. Last December, 
they refused to agree to a resumption 
date for START, apparently due to 
frustration over their failure to prevent 
the deployment of Pershing lis and 
GLCMs [ground-launched cruise 
missiles]. What is needed now is for the 
Soviets to return to the negotiating 
table. It is in their interest as well as 
ours. 



Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Our proposals in negotiations on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces fur- 
ther underscore our commitment to the 
goal of reductions in nuclear weapons. 
The President's objective in these 
negotiations, familiar to all, was even 
more far reaching than in START — to 
eliminate an entire category of missiles 
on a global basis. When the Soviet 
Union found this approach too far 
reaching, we proposed an interim solu- 
tion whereby we would significantly 
reduce our planned deployments if the 
Soviet Union would reduce its SS-4s, 5s, 
and 20s to an equal number of 



warheads. However, the Soviets rejected 
this interim approach as well, since any 
outcome which would allow the deploy- 
ment of a single U.S. intermediate-range 
missile is inconsistent with their policy 
of maintaining a monopoly of such 
missiles in Europe and Asia. We again 
modified our position several times dur- 
ing 1983 to take account of express 
Soviet concerns regarding Pershing II, 
aircraft limitations, and global con- 
straints. 

Nevertheless, the Soviets remained 
intransigent on preserving their 
monopoly of these missiles. Every Soviet 
proposal permits none for the United 
States. Their final idea, proffered im- 
mediately prior to breaking off negotia- 
tions, would have had eaeh side reduce 
actual or planned deployments by 572 
warheads — thus leaving them 700 
warheads and the United States zero. 

The Soviet Union attributed its 
walkout to the initiation of the U.S. 
deployment of INF missiles in Europe. 
There is no justification for the Soviet 
walkout. We negotiated in good faith 
despite the fact that during the 2 years 
of negotiation the Soviet Union deployed 
over 100 new SS-20 missiles with more 
than 300 warheads. Moreover, many 
U.S. nuclear weapons have been and are 
in the process of being withdrawn from 
Europe under decisions taken by NATO 
ministers in 1979 and 1983. By the time 
our INF deployments are complete, 
more than five warheads will have been 
withdrawn for every new one deployed. 

We are ready to resume negotia- 
tions—in both START and INF— at any 
time and place, without preconditions. 
Our proposals are fair and workable. All 
the elements for an agreement are on 
the table. We hope the Soviet Union will 
come to recognize that its policy of non- 
negotiation and countermeasures is not 
intimidating Western publics. 

Nuclear Testing 

On nuclear testing limitations, the Ad- 
ministration determined that the 1974 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its com- 
panion, the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Ex- 
plosions Treaty, are not effectively 
verifiable in their present form. On a 
number of occasions last year, we ap- 
proached the Soviets and invited them 
to discuss with us verification im- 
provements to these accords. Each time, 
the U.S.S.R. rebuffed our request for 
talks. We remain determined to make 
progress in this area, but our efforts 
have been made much more difficult by 
the Soviet attitude. Possible next steps 
on this issue are under active review. 



45 



ARMS CONTROL 



Space Arms Control 

The United States has long been com- 
mitted to the exploration and use of 
space for peaceful purposes. We played 
a leading role in formulating the con- 
siderable body of international law 
regarding space. The Limited Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty 
of 1967, and the Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched Into Outer Space of 1968 are 
notable examples. The Charter of the 
United Nations also includes provisions 
germane to outer space. 

The United States does not seek an 
arms race in space, nor do we 
underestimate the current and potential 
future threat of Soviet antisatellite 
weapons. The Administration has been 
seriously studying the question of 
whether constraints on space weapons 
or activities could be found that would 
be equitable, verifiable, and compatible 
with U.S. security. The President's 
report on U.S. policy on controlling anti- 
satellite weapons, sent to Congress in 
April, provides the initial findings of this 
study. We are continuing on an urgent 
basis our studies to see whether accep- 
table measures banning or limiting 
specific weapons systems can be iden- 
tified. 



Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR) 

In addition to our efforts to reduce 
nuclear weapons, we and our allies have 
continued discussions with the Warsaw 
Pact nations on the mutual and balanced 
reduction of conventional forces in cen- 
tral Europe. The United States is play- 
ing a constructive role, broadening the 
scope of the East- West arms control 
agenda and pursuing reductions in con- 
ventional forces to lower, equal levels. 
The major stumbling block for some 
time has been the discrepancy between 
the manpower figures provided by the 
Warsaw Pact and our estimates of those 
forces. We, with our NATO allies, 
recently proposed a new initiative 
designed to resolve this problem, which 
we hope will lead to serious negotiations 
on verifiable reductions to parity. The 
initial Soviet response, however, is not 
encouraging. 

Chemical Weapons 

Our major challenge in the area of 
chemical weapons is to reestablish the 
longstanding code of restraint against 
the use of chemical weapons. The United 



States seeks the total elimination of 
chemical weapons. In April, Vice Presi- 
dent Bush presented to the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva a draft trea- 
ty for a comprehensive ban on their 
development, production, stockpiling, 
transfer, and use. The draft treaty also 
contains innovative verification provi- 
sions that we hope the Soviet Union will 
be willing to address. We firmly believe 
that the chemical weapons problem 
demands a radical solution, and we are 
prepared to go forth with one. 

Confidence-Building Measures 

Complementing our proposals to reduce 
nuclear and conventional forces, we are 
proposing confidence-building measures 
designed to reduce the risk of war as 
the result of surprise attack, accident, or 
miscalculation. Over the last year, we 
and the Soviets have held a series of 
constructive meetings on upgrading the 
"hotline," the direct communications link 
between Washington and Moscow. 

In START and in INF, we have 
made a number of proposals, such as for 
prior notification of ballistic missile 
launches and major military exercises 
and expanded exchanges of military 
force data. 

In the Stockholm Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe, the United 
States, with its allies, is pursuing addi- 
tional measures on notification and in- 
spection of military exercises. The 
Soviet Union has not accepted these pro- 
posals, focusing instead on a declaration 
of the non-use of force. As the President 
said in Dublin: 

If discussions on reaffirming the principle 
not to use force, a principle in which we 
believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union 
to negotiate agreements which will give con- 
crete, new meaning to that principle, we will 
gladly enter into such discussions. 

Lastly, both East and West are 
already routinely exchanging notification 
of exercises that might be otherwise 
misinterpreted. We believe these prac- 
tices should be broadened and made 
mandatory. 

Conclusion 

Ultimate success in these arms control 
efforts will depend on a number of fac- 
tors: credible deterrent forces, a strong 
alliance, and a willingness to work 
together to conclude balanced and effec- 
tive agreements which safeguard each 
nation's interests. But these conditions 
will, in turn, depend on the qualities that 
we as a nation bring to the negotiating 



table: patience, perseverance, and unity. 
Just as cohesion among allies is crucial 
to the West's position in such negotia- 
tions as INF and MBFR, unity in this 
country is critical to progress in all these 
negotiations. If we appear divided, the 
Soviets will conclude that they can ac- 
complish at least some of their objec- 
tives without negotiations, without com- 
promise, and without constraints on 
their forces. On the other hand, con- 
structive bipartisan support of our arms 
control proposals and strategic mod- 
ernization programs will advance the 
prospects for arms control. 

President Reagan has often spoken 
of his desire to build a constructive rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. His ap- 
proach is based on credible deterrence, 
peaceful competition, and constructive 
cooperation. Unfortunately, the Soviets 
have not yet taken up this challenge. 
The shrill tenor of recent Soviet 
statements directed toward the United 
States is disappointing. While we have 
shown flexibility in both our INF and 
START proposals and have made clear 
we will meet the Soviets half way should 
they return to Geneva, they still refuse 
to reestablish the nuclear arms control 
dialogue. Success in arms control will re- 
quire substantial changes in the Soviet 
approach. 

We continue to express our will- 
ingness to resume these negotiations 
any time, without preconditions. We 
have no intention of sacrificing our basic 
objectives of reductions, equality, stabili- 
ty, and verification. Yet we realize there 
may be more than one way to achieve 
these objectives, and the President has 
made clear that there is flexibility in our 
approach. We stand ready; we have 
taken the first step. Now it is up to the 
Soviets to respond. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



Steel: Domestic Industry in 
a Global Market 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Convention of the 
Iron and Steel Society of the American 
Institute of Metallurgical Engineers in 
Chicago on April 2, 1984. Mr. Wallis is 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

I may say more about steel than about 
foreign policy, but this group should not 
object if I do that. My comments will be 
based on some principles of a free- 
enterprise, market economy. These prin- 
ciples are accepted widely on faith but 
often violated in practice. My remarks 
will fall into three categories: history, 
economics, and international politics. 
First, I w-ill review briefly some 
recent history of government-industry 
relations, especially government interven- 
tions in the affairs of the steel industries 
here and abroad. Then I will explore 
some major economic problems that have 
arisen in the steel industry as a result of 
government intervention. Finally, I will 
look at some of the major international 
political problems facing our domestic 
steel industry, and the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's responses. 

The Dismal History of Government- 
Steel Industry Relations 

The recent history of the relations be- 
tween our government and the steel in- 
dustry is instructive; but, like lots of in- 
struction, it is painful. 

In 1952 the Federal Wage Stabiliza- 
tion Board made recommendations for a 
new contract between the major steel 
companies and the United Steelworkers. 
The companies refused to accept the 
wage board's proposals, and the union 
called a strike. President Truman issued 
an executive order seizing the steel 
plants, and the Secretary of Commerce 
was made responsible for operating them. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court reversed 
the President's action a month later. 
Labor and management eventually 
worked out an agreement. 

In 1962, after a wage settlement domi- 
nated by the government, Roger Blough, 
the president of U.S. Steel, announced a 
price increase. The announcement moved 
President Kennedy to excoriate Blough 
publicly, to initiate antitrust investiga- 
tions against the steel companies, to 
launch examinations of the personal tax 
returns of steel executives, to have the 



FBI rouse newspaper reporters out of 
bed in the middle of the night for ques- 
tioning, and generally to loose all of the 
vast powers of the government for a pur- 
pose which, as I said in a speech in 
Pittsburgh shortly after the event, was 
"... entirely outside the law. Since the 
powers he used . . .," I said, "are per- 
fectly legal, redress through the courts 
[such as was obtained after President 
Truman's action] is probably impossible 
and certainly improbable." Needless to 
say, the industry yielded to this authori- 
tarian intimidation and coercion. 

Thus began a pattern which has led to 
wages and benefits for steel workers far 
higher than in most other industries. In 
addition to government pressures on 
wages, or perhaps because of the results 
of those pressures, there have been 
significant restrictions on imports of steel 
during 9 of the last 16 years. We have had 
so-called "voluntary" export restraints by 
our major steel suppliers; we have had 
trigger-price mechanisms I and II; we 
have had a surge-monitoring mechanism; 
we have had a special arrangement with 
the European Community. These devices, 
conceived as temporary, did not solve the 
industry's problems, well intentioned 
though they were. 

At this moment, we face two new ma- 
jor initiatives for protection against steel 
imports. In one, Bethlehem Steel and the 
United Steelworkers have filed a petition 
for protection under Title II, Section 203 
of the Trade Act of 1974. This is a 
legitimate step under our laws, and I 
want to emphasize that I am in no way 
criticizing it. The U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC) will decide in 
early June whether steel imports have 
been a significant cause of serious injury 
to our steel industry and, if so, will recom- 
mend action to the President in early 
July. It would be inappropriate for me to 
comment on the merits of this case until 
the ITC has submitted its report and the 
President has made his decision. 

But the other proposal is much more 
serious, and I have no hesitation in speak- 
ing out against it. In fact, I feel obliged to 
do so because the "Fair Trade in Steel 
Act" is dangerous to the health of the in- 
dustry. The "Fair Trade in Steel Act" 
would limit steel imports to 15% of con- 
sumption. Whatever you think of that, 
listen to this: the act would require the in- 
dustry to submit to the Secretary of Com- 
merce an acceptable plan to invest 
"substantially all of the cash flow from 



the steel sector for reinvestment in, and 
the modernization of, the steel sector." 
The bill further provides for oversight of 
these plans by the Secretary of Com- 
merce and requires him to make annual 
determinations as to whether the im- 
plementation of the investment plan is 
satisfactory. 

If such a bill had been on the books a 
couple of years ago, the diversification 
which most major steel companies have 
embarked upon could not have taken 
place. If the bill is enacted, the industry 
will cede to the government effective con- 
trol over investment decisions— precisely 
the situation in state-owned steel in- 
dustries. This is bad enough on its face, 
but it is even worse that the statute 
would direct the industry's funds ex- 
clusively to steelmaking instead of allow- 
ing the individual firms to find the most 
remunerative uses of their funds. This 
kind of managed investment would not 
enable our firms to reduce costs to the 
level of those in countries like Korea. I 
urge any of you who have been sym- 
pathetic to the "Fair Trade in Steel Act" 
to take another look at it. It represents a 
threat of government industrial planning 
and direction that would kill forever any 
hope of vitality and strength in the steel 
industry. 

Problems of Government Intervention 

Whether it's the seizure of steel mills, the 
pillorying of steel company executives, or 
building trade barriers, government in- 
volvement in the affairs of the steel in- 
dustry will not strengthen the steel 
industry but will only hurt the industry 
and the whole economy. Among the many 
reasons why this is true, I will single out 
three. 

First, one of the laws of physics ap- 
plies also to trade policy: every action 
generates an equal and opposite reaction. 
In the trade area I can't guarantee that 
the reaction will be equal, but I can guar- 
antee that it will be opposite. And in 
trade matters, there are two opposite re- 
actions, one domestic and one foreign. As 
Bethlehem Steel and the United Steel- 
workers make their case for import con- 
trols, the auto industry, the machine tool 
industry, the home appliance industry, 
the construction industry, and other users 
of steel will be making the case for unfet- 
tered trade in steel. Some of them will 
make the point that limits on imports of 
steel will increase their own production 
costs and make them less competitive 
with imports in their own sectors. Some 
spokesmen for the steel-consuming indus- 
tries may take another tack and argue 
that the steel industry certainly needs 



August 1984 



47 



ECONOMICS 



protection from import competition, but, 
of course, their industry will also need to 
be protected. And they will have a good 
point. The 19th-century humorist Ambrose 
Bierce in his Devil's Dictionary defined a 
tariff as a "tax on imports designed to 
protect the domestic producer against the 
greed of his consumer." This definition 
applies equally to quotas. 

As to foreign reactions, we can be 
sure that any restrictions on our imports 
will be answered with restrictions on our 
exports. We, ourselves, retaliate for 
foreign restrictions on our exports, as we 
have a right to do under the rules of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade-the GATT. Other countries act 
the same way. When the cycle of action- 
reaction is completed, a competitive 
American exporter will find its profitabil- 
ity cut in order to pay for the protection 
given another domestic industry. For ex- 
ample, last year the United States im- 
posed tariffs and quotas on imports of 
specialty steel. In reply, the European 
Community raised barriers to our exports 
of sporting equipment, fire and burglar 
alarms, and certain chemicals. What our 
import controls did was transfer benefits 
to the makers of specialty steel from the 
makers of chemicals, sporting goods, and 
alarms. 

The second reason why government 
intervention will hurt the industry and 
the economy, not help them, is that 
government intervention will make the in- 
dustry less competitive than it would be if 
left alone. There is a very dramatic dif- 
ference between the average cost of labor 
in the American steel industry, reported 
by the American Iron and Steel Institute 
to be around $21 an hour, and the average 
cost of labor in other American manufac- 
turing industries, reportedly from $10 to 
$12 an hour. (It is perhaps worth noting 
that the cost of labor in the steel sector in 
Japan is about $12 an hour, and in Korea 
it is about $4 an hour. To make matters 
worse, The New York Times recently 
reported that our steel mills require'l3 
man-hours to produce a ton of steel, 
whereas the comparable figure in Japan is 
8.) I realize that the unions and companies 
in your industry have slashed labor costs 
by 19% in just 1 year; that was a truly 
remarkable achievement and merits 
strong commendation. But that $21 figure 
is also remarkable and not so commend- 
able. When our steel firms return to prof- 
itability, as is generally expected later 
this year, there will be renewed pres- 
sures for wage increases. 

It is my hope that whatever needs to 
be done with regard to labor costs in the 
U.S. steel industry will be done by the 
parties concerned without government in- 



tervention and certainly without the 
presumption that the U.S. Government 
will try to validate labor contracts by in- 
sulating steel producers from foreign 
competition. Note that I am not saying 
what, if anything at all, must be done; 
that is a judgment for the industry and 
the unions. But if steel firms decide that 
they cannot compete with wage costs as 
they are, they must be prepared to do 
what is necessary to change those costs in 
the give-and-take of collective bargaining 
with the unions. They should not ask 
government to pressure the unions or to 
penalize consumers or other industries. 

My third reason why government in- 
tervention will hurt, not help, involves 
the relationship between import protec- 
tion and industrial adjustment. It is 
popular to argue that if the government is 
going to restrict competition for the 
benefit of domestic producers (and the 
detriment of domestic consumers), then 
the government must ensure that 
domestic producers apply the "tem- 
porary" benefits to modernize and ra- 
tionalize their particular industry. I have 
already described this phenomenon when 
I talked about the "Fail- Trade in Steel 
Act." Normally, industries seeking pro- 
tection are quick to give the government 
pledges of desire and intent to restruc- 
ture. They say that they merely lack the 
profitability to do so without projection 
from imports. The restructuring plans 
never suggest the development of dif- 
ferent lines of business, the steady 
phasedown of capacity in the protected in- 
dustry, or the elimination of inefficient 
companies. In many instances, obviously, 
these are precisely the actions that would 
make the most sense. It is universally 
assumed (probably correctly) that an in- 
dustry must persuade the government 
that it will do the same things better, 
rather than do new things, if it is to ob- 
tain protection from import competition. 
This means that protection not only ex- 
tracts a price from consumers but also 
acts as a drag on the economy by lessen- 
ing pressure for technological innovation, 
directing resources away from more pro- 
ductive sectors, and encouraging manage- 
ment to look to government, rather than 
the market, for guidance. 

I want to be clear: I am aware of the 
fact that adjustment probably means a 
loss of jobs in some industries, but in a 
healthy economy that loss will be more 
than compensated in other sectors. I am 
conscious of the importance of the steel 
industry to our national defense, hut ad- 
justment is not terminal. What we need 
for a strong defense is a strong economy 
which can support the defense expen- 
ditures; we can't afford to debate guns or 



butter, nor do we need to. A healthy 
growing economy will provide guns and 
butter. For steel, in particular, our na- 
tional defense requires an industry that is 
lean and mean, rational, efficient, and 
competitive in a truly global steel in- 
dustry. 

The World Steel Industry 

Without doubt, steel is the quintessential 
example of global industry. The steel in- 
dustry was a leading force in the rapid 
economic expansion that followed the 
Second World War. At the end of the 
war, about half of the world's steelmaking 
capacity was in the United States, but 
new steel plants soon were established in 
Europe and Japan and then in the 
developing countries, particularly in Asia 
and Latin America. By 1982, only about 
13% of steelmaking capacity was in the 
United States, 1(5% was in Japan, and 19% 
was in the European Community; so 
about half of total world capacity was in 
the free world. The communist countries 
have only about 28% of world capacity. 
Among the developing countries, Latin 
America has about 15%, and the develop- 
ing countries of Asia about 9%. 

Not only is steel a global industry, but 
the steel market is a world market. As is 
true of other manufacturing industries, 
world steel production is gradually in- 
creasing in a number of developing coun- 
tries, while production in Europe, the 
United States, and Japan is shrinking. 
This phenomenon has happened in other 
industries in the past, and it will happen 
in the future. Indeed, it is through this 
evolutionary process that the major in- 
dustrial countries, including the United 
States, developed from exporters of raw 
materials only to major exporters of 
manufactured goods. 

It is doubtless true that some develop- 
ing countries have made uneconomic in- 
vestments in steel and have unwisely 
channeled resources away from more pro- 
ductive sectors so that they could join the 
ranks of the steelmaking nations. It is, 
nevertheless, also true that a number of 
the developing countries have significant 
natural advantages, for example, rich 
deposits of iron ore and coal, cheap 
energy, and relatively inexpensive labor, 
which attract investments in steel. Steel 
capacity in the developing countries has 
doubled in the short period of 8 years. It 
has been estimated that during the next 2 
years capacity in Latin America alone will 
increase another 15%. 

The response of the developed coun- 
tries to the rise in the production of steel 
by less developed countries has been 
gradually to reduce capacity and employ- 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



ment. The European Community em- 
ployed 895,000 steelworkers in 1970 but 
by 1982 had reduced that figure by 409%. 
During the same period, the number of 
Japanese employed in the steel industry 
dropped by 19% . Peak employment in 
steel in the United States was 550,000 in 
1977. By 1982 the number was barely half 
that, at 289,000. Most notable has been 
the adjustment undertaken in the United 
Kingdom, where the number of workers 
now employed in the steel industry is 
only 25% of what it was in 1970. 

In the European Community the 
reduction of capacity in the steel sector 
has been directed by public authorities 
and subsidized with billions of dollars. 
Restructuring in the United States, 
however, is being carried out by the steel 
firms themselves without government in- 
terference and at no direct cost to the tax- 
payer. It is the decisions of your com- 
panies and your unions relating to invest- 
ment, rationalization, modernization, 
diversification, labor relations, executive 
compensation, and the closure of ineffi- 
cient facilities that have pointed the in- 
dustry as a whole in the direction of 
renewed profitability. 

The improving health of our steel in- 
dustry is the best answer to those who 
say that the governments of the steel- 
producing countries should organize and 
manage world trade in steel. Trade in 
steel should continue to benefit from the 
impulse of the market and should not be 
exempted from the sound rules embodied 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Those industries that have not 
been subject to the healthy discipline of 
the GATT continue to experience over- 
production brought about by subsidiza- 
tion and protection against competition 
from imports. The same fate awaits any 
industry' that tries to establish a cartel or 
otherwise manage and control trade in its 
products. The economic health of the 
country can only suffer. 

The Reagan Administration and the 
Steel Industry 

The Reagan Administration will resist 
the cartelization of steel trade. It will also 
enforce the laws which neutralize any ar- 
tificial competitive advantages of foreign 
firms, whether from government sub- 
sidies or from selling at prices below costs 
of production. If we could count on a 
perpetual flow of such foreign assistance, 
perhaps we could just relax and accept 
the "generosity" of foreign taxpayers. 
But we can be certain that subsidies and 
dumping would not continue if our in- 
dustry were crippled, so we cannot allow 
that to happen. The neutralization of the 



artificial advantages is not protectionist; 
quite the contrary. Such measures 
enhance the efficiency of the market by 
"correcting" price distortions. 

The United States participates ac- 
tively in consultations on steel in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and in the 
work of the OECD Steel Committee. 

In both the Steel Committee and the 
Committee on Export Credit, we will con- 
tinue to press for an end to government 
subsidies in export financing and more 
specifically in the export of steel manufac- 
turing facilities. If the buyers and sellers 
of steelmaking plants and equipment can- 
not raise the necessary funds for new in- 
vestment on the international financial 
markets, the markets are telling them 
something. It is foolish and wasteful for 
developed countries to compete with each 
other to supply subsidized credit to build 
new steelmaking facilities which will not 
make profits adequate to cover the cost of 
capital on international markets. 

I have been stressing the importance 
of keeping the government out of deci- 
sions which properly belong to the steel 
industry, but I do not want to convey the 
impression that the Reagan Administra- 
tion is indifferent to the fate of the in- 
dustry. When the Administration took of- 
fice, spokesmen for the steel industry 
stressed that they faced four major prob- 
lems: unfairly traded imports, high ex- 
penses for p.^'lution control, disruptive 
taxation, and crippling constraints to sen- 
sible mergers. After 3 years of effort by 
the Administration, the situation is quite 
different— though not yet as different as 
we hope to make it. 

First, on trade policy, we have 
scrupulously enforced our trade statutes 
and now have in effect a wide range of an- 
tidumping and countervailing duties on 
steel from many countries, including 
developing nations. It is sometimes 
charged that our laws against unfair 
trade are not enforced. I reject that 
charge; but I suggest that trade laws, no 
matter how meticulously enforced, cannot 
solve the basic problems facing your in- 
dustry (or any other industry). 

Second, our regulations for control- 
ling pollution have been rationalized with 
a consequent reduction in costs to your 
companies. This is part of President 
Reagan's broader commitment to reform 
regulatory codes so that they are less 
burdensome to business and the economy. 

Third, the Reagan Administration 
and the Congress have made giant strides 
in easing the tax burden on business. 
Depreciation schedules for the steel in- 
dustry have been significantly shortened, 



with savings of millions of dollars for the 
industry. Many more millions of dollars 
have been saved through the safe-harbor 
leasing provisions of the Administration's 
1981 Tax Equity Act. 

Fourth, The Administration recog- 
nizes that steel is a global industry in a 
global marketplace, and we are sympa- 
thetic to industrial mergers which prom- 
ise increased efficiency without seriously., 
diminishing competition. This is evi- 
denced by the approval recently given to 
the revised merger proposal of the LTV 
Corporation and Republic Steel. 

Conclusion 

By far the most important thing for the 
steel industry is the general economic 
recovery. The dramatic decline of infla- 
tion, the rapid advance in employment, 
and the broad increase in demand all 
point to better days ahead for the steel in- 
dustry and for the economy generally. 
This Administration will continue its fight 
to see that the responsibility for the 
future of the steel industry remains in the 
hands of the steel industry, so that the 
tremendous strength of the free- 
enterprise, free-market system can ad- 
vance the well-being of your companies, 
their employees, and their shareholders, 
along with the prosperity of the nation as 
a whole. ■ 



August 1984 



49 



ECONOMICS 



The Near West: America 
and the Pacific 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council in Pittsburgh on May 9, 1984. 
Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for 
Economic, Affairs. 

Since I am an economist, it will not sur- 
prise you that from the three foci of your 
meeting— economics, politics, and securi- 
ty—I have selected economics. And since 
this meeting is about Asia, it will not sur- 
prise you if I discuss our evolving 
economic relationship with Asia, how it 
differs from our relationship with Europe, 
and what we and our Asian partners can 
do to maximize the mutual benefits from 
our relationship. 

First, I will consider what has been 
described as a shift in the focus of U.S. 
foreign policy from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. Second, I will touch on the 
reasons why Asia has captured our atten- 
tion and become so attractive to our 
traders and investors. Finally, I will com- 
ment on the direction of economic policy, 
both in the U.S. and in Asia, that will pro- 
mote solid and enduring ties. 

U.S. Focus on the Pacific 

Last month the French newspaper, Le 
Monde, quoted a famous American as say- 
ing that "Western history began with a 
Mediterranean era, passed through an 
Atlantic era, and is now moving into a 
Pacific era." Indeed, our geography and 
the quest for economic growth inevitably 
have pushed our center of gravity west- 
ward. America has had a Pacific coast 
since 1819, and the population center of 
America moves steadily toward it with 
each succeeding census. 

Recent events spotlight this trend. 
President Reagan has crossed the world's 
largest ocean four times in the past 6 
months. Vice President Bush even now is 
visiting in the Orient. I have traveled to 
Asia three times in the past 6 months- 
heading the U.S. delegations to the 
U.S.-ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] economic dialogue, to our 
economic consultations with Korea and 
with Japan, and accompanying Secretary 
[of the Treasury] Regan to the meetings 
of the U.S.-China Joint Economic Com- 
mission. A list of high-level official 
travelers to the region would illustrate 
the emphasis the Reagan Administration 
places on our Pacific relationships. 



This emphasis is explained by today's 
economic realities. For two decades, 
Japan has been our largest overseas 
trading partner; it is the largest foreign 
purchaser of American goods, after 
Canada. The United States and Japan 
combined account for over one-third of 
the world's total gross national product. 
They are the two most significant 
developers and producers of high 
technology. In the 21st century, we are 
likely to be both the world's major 
economic competitors and the world's ma- 
jor economic partners. Since the late 
1970s, trade with our East Asian and 
Pacific partners has exceeded our trade 
with Western Europe. In 1983 this 
transpacific trade was $26 billion larger 
than our trade with Europe. Of our 20 
largest overseas customers, seven are in 
the East Asian and Pacific region. Our 
European friends wonder where this 
leaves them. 

Ironically, I received the invitation to 
speak to you the day before I left for a 
trip to Europe. (I have traveled to 
Europe six times in the past 6 months.) In 
Europe I noticed that the press was filled 
with speculation about an American tilt 
toward Asia and away from Europe. I 
want emphatically to dispel that notion. 
The Reagan Administration certainly will 
not swap Europe for Asia in our foreign 
policy portfolio. A strong Atlantic alliance 
is, and will remain, vital to our economic, 
political, and security interests. We can- 
not, however, ignore the Soviet buildup in 
the Pacific. We have interests in Asia as 
well as in Europe. 

Our ties with Europe go far beyond 
economics and security. Probably more 
than 90% of this audience traces its 
ancestry to Europe. We share with 
Europe a common culture, literature, 
music, art, science, legal system, and 
economic system. We inherited our 
political ideals from Europe. We are prob- 
ably closer to Europe and Europeans now 
than at any time in our history, and it 
would be a sad thing, indeed, if the ties 
should weaken. 

Traditionally, we have thought of 
Asia as the "Far East." We looked far, 
and we looked east, across Europe to 
Asia. Now we look west, across the 
Pacific, to Asia. East Asia and the Pacific 
region have become the "Near West." 

While our cultural ties are not so 
strong with Asia as with Europe, they 
are neither new nor insignificant. Asian 



immigrants contributed significantly to 
the unification of our country by rail and 
to the development of Pacific coast 
agriculture. An important and growing 
number of Americans boast of Asian 
ancestry. They have become leaders in 
business, government, education, science, 
and the arts, and they participate in forg- 
ing new and stronger links between 
America and Asia. In declaring this week 
"Asian Pacific American Heritage 
Week," President Reagan said 
"Americans who have come from Asian 
and Pacific countries have added a special 
quality to the United States. . . . This 
Nation owes a debt of gratitude to the 
Asian and Pacific immigrants. Their de- 
sire for liberty strengthens and under- 
scores our own." 

More times than we care to 
remember, Americans have joined Asians 
fighting for freedom in Asia and the 
Pacific. Our commitments to the security 
of the region are designed to prevent hav- 
ing to fight there again. Fortunately, 
most countries in the region share our in- 
terest in a secure and stable environment 
for growth and development. 

For many reasons the Asian and 
Pacific region is vital to the 
United States. 

• The Soviet threat hangs over the en- 
tire region. As the President has noted, 
this is a growing concern to all freedom- 
loving states in the region. 

• Vietnamese aggression in Kam- 
puchea is perceived by all of Southeast 
Asia as a threat, particularly to Thailand. 

• North Korea remains hostile toward 
the South three decades after the official 
"cessation" of hostilities on the peninsula. 

• The Republic of Korea in the south 
is not only a key ally but also provides a 
striking contrast between its market 
economy and the totalitarian society to 
the north. 

• The six countries of the Asso- 
ciation of South East Asian Nations 
form a political and economic grouping 
which has taken a united stand in oppos- 
ing Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression 
in Indochina. We are strengthening our 
economic cooperation with ASEAN as a 
group and individually. 

• Thailand provides refuge for hun- 
dreds of thousands fleeing aggression, 
while struggling to overcome formidable 
challenges. Our continued support of this 
front-line state is critical. 

• Malaysia provides us with important 
strategic materials and has great poten- 
tial for vigorous economic development. 

• Singapore is a stable and growing 
city-state which provides a striking 
example of the effectiveness of a free 
market svstem. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



• Indonesia is the fifth most populous 
lation in the world and a major supplier 
if our imported petroleum. 

• The Philippines hosts two important 
American military bases, as well as a 
significant amount of American private 
nvestment. 

• Newly independent Brunei boasts 
he highest per capita income in the 
•egion, derived from its petroleum. 

• Taiwan continues to be a major trad- 
ng partner, despite the absence of official 
rovernmental ties. 

• Hong Kong is a true miracle of the 
narket, converting barren mountains into 
>ne of the world's leading trade and finan- 
cial centers. 

• Improving relations with the Peo- 
jie's Republic of China is a major element 
)f our regional policy. China's shift 
toward a more open and decentralized 

conomy is important for Western trade 
and investment. 

• Australia and New Zealand are 
longstanding allies with key economic 
inkages to Japan and to the region as 
i whole. 

• Finally, the Pacific includes ter- 
ritories administered by the United 

States that are important to us 
trategically. 

Trade and Investment 

So much for my brief survey of the 
region. Many of you have visited some of 
those places, possibly first as members of 
our military. Fortunately, the weight of 
American involvement has shifted signifi- 
cantly to trade and investment, bringing 
new challenges for both cooperation and 
competition. 

Those of you involved in foreign trade 
understand well the importance of our 
growing economic ties to Asia, but most 
of the rest of us are prone to forget the 
growing impact of the international 
I economy on our lives. Exports now repre- 
I sent 20% of U.S. industrial output, about 
t twice the proportion of 12 years ago. One 
out of three agricultural jobs and one out 
I of eight manufacturing jobs is export 
I related. It is estimated that our $52 
I billion in sales last year to the East Asian 
! and Pacific region provided 1.3 million 
I American jobs. Many companies in the 
| Pittsburgh area depend on exports for 
their survival. 

What factors account for the economic 
dynamism of this vast region? 

By almost every measure we can 
devise, Asia is a region of diversity. 
When we cite broad statistics, we obscure 
this diversity. When we use terms like 
"East Asia and the Pacific," we 
sometimes forget that we are not dealing 



with a homogeneous entity. Not only are 
the countries I mentioned spread over a 
large portion of our globe, they vary 
widely in area. Several are roughly the 
size of the United States, but some are 
smaller than Pittsburgh. In population 
they range from China, with over a billion 
people to the tiny ministates of the Pacific 
Islands. In language and culture, 
Australia and New Zealand share our 
roots, and the rest of the region is a rich 
tapestry of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic 
variety. Their economic systems range 
from the nearly pure laissez-faire 
capitalism of Hong Kong to the rigid 
Marxist control of North Korea. 

Levels of development vary widely as 
well. Economic size and influence range 
from Japan with a per capita GNP of over 
$9,000 to Burma with a per capita GNP of 
less than $200. The three OECD [Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] members of this region 
(Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) have 
standards of living similar to ours. A 
group of rapidly industrializing economies 
in Asia have that goal clearly in sight. A 
few countries in the region still have 
serious developmental problems, and 
their people have yet to enjoy the 
benefits of the modern world. 

This very diversity attracts us to the 
region and gives it the force and energy— 
the "dynamism"— that we are addressing 
today. 

Beyond the diversity, we find some 
common characteristics, especially in the 
economic sphere. The most successful 
economies of the region have obviously 
studied the growth and development of 
the West. There is a growing application 
in Asian and Pacific nations of those 
economic principles which have served 
America so well. Where these have been 
adopted, economies are growing rapidly 
and becoming more attractive to our 
traders and investors. 

Let me comment on a few of the prin- 
ciples that have promoted better-than- 
average economic performance. 

The first is willingness to rely on the 
market. The most successful economies in 
the region have free-market orientations 
with major roles for private enterprise. 
Among the developing economies of the 
region, this is particularly evident in the 
ASEAN countries and also in Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. We see this 
trend even in countries without free- 
market orientations. The President noted 
just last week, for example, that China 
too is moving toward market incentives to 
spur production. 

The second factor that has created 
economic growth in Asia is effective 
utilization of Asia's most abundant 



resource— people. It is well known that 
Asia has a large population. It is less well 
known that the human resources in many 
of these countries have been carefully 
nurtured. Literacy rates vary greatly 
among the nations in the region but 
average about 70% in developing Asia, 
well ahead of South America and Africa. 
Population growth rates are lower than 
the average for low- and middle-income 
countries as a group. The people are 
healthy; average life expectancy, at just 
over 62 years, is higher than in other 
developing regions of the world. 

Third, sound financial management 
has helped protect Asian countries from 
crises like those that have plagued other 
areas of the world, especially Latin 
America. The ratio of debt service to ex- 
ports is the lowest of any region— under 
16% in 1982. The ratio of outstanding debt 
to exports, near 80%, is also the best in 
the world. 

Finally, a solid technological base has 
resulted from the high priority placed on 
scientific and technical education. On the 
upper end of the scale, Australia and New 
Zealand are modern industrial democra- 
cies with a scientific tradition similar to 
our own. Science and technology in Japan 
have evolved to their present impressive 
stages from a base established well before 
the Meiji restoration of 1868. The Asian 
less developed countries have used 
bilateral and multilateral assistance effec- 
tively to acquire the technology they 
needed to achieve rapid growth in 
agricultural and industrial productivity. 
Trade and investment have replaced 
foreign assistance as primary forces for 
growth. Both have become effective 
vehicles for introducing modern 
technology. 

These principles, applied effectively 
by skilled leaders, have created vibrant, 
growing economies that serve their 
citizens well and contribute to the well- 
being of the world in general. As a group, 
the economies in the East Asia and 
Pacific region outpaced the rest of the 
world in the 1970s. Equally as important 
is their resilience in bad times. During the 
recent recession, economic growth con- 
tinued in much of this region, though 
more slowly. 

There is no question that the 
economies of this region are tough com- 
petitors. You in Pittsburgh already know 
that well. We do well to remember, 
however, that our suppliers, as well as 
our customers, are important to our 
economy. Pacific Basin suppliers provide 
a vast array of basic materials, intermedi- 
ate goods, and finished products. Ninety 
percent of our natural rubber comes from 
the region, which also supplies large 



August 1984 



51 



ECONOMICS 



amounts of wool, tin, bauxite, and oil. We 
import from this region significant quan- 
tities of meat and dairy products, sugar, 
and plywood, as well as a wide variety of 
manufactured goods which we American 
consumers find attractive. While Asian 
and Pacific producers are competition for 
some American producers, they meet 
critical supply needs, help keep our prices 
down, and enable the United States to 
sell more to them. 

Trade and investment have largely 
supplanted the need for foreign assistance 
in many East Asian countries. This is 
what economic development is all about. 
r>y whatever method we use to measure 
American investment in the region, it is 
clear that American businesses are forg- 
ing ever stronger links with our Pacific 
Basin trading partners. Estimates are 
that American private investment in East 
Asia and the Pacific jumped some $4 
billion in 1981, to a total estimated at 
nearly $30 billion. 

Investment climates in the region 
generally are favorable to foreign invest- 
ment. Where problems still exist, virtual- 
ly all the market economies are making 
improvements. The Reagan Administra- 
tion has taken positive steps to ensure 
that American investors are treated fairly 
throughout the world. An energetic pro- 
gram, led by Ambassador William Brock 
[U.S. Trade Representative], to negotiate 
and conclude bilateral investment 
treaties, is the hallmark of this effort. The 
ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, and the 
Philippines) together have absorbed over 
$10 billion in American private invest- 
ment. China continues to attract Ameri- 
can companies. Agreements reached dur- 
ing the President's visit will open even 
more opportunities in that vast market. 
We naturally welcome the fact that 
trade and investment are supplying the 
capital and technology once provided only 
by foreign assistance. We can be proud, 
nonetheless, of the results of the 
assistance we have given to countries in 
the region. To put this in proper perspec- 
tive, however, I note that the total of all 
economic assistance ever given by the 
United States to Korea is approximately 
equal to American exports to Korea in 
just 1 year. For Taiwan our total past 
development assistance amounts to only 
half a year's exports to Taiwan. Both of 
these graduates of American economic 
assistance now have impressive aid pro- 
grams of their own. 

These few examples of the success 
stories of a remarkable part of the world 
clearly demonstrate that the Asian and 
Pacific region will be important to the 
well-being of Americans. For a long time 



to come, we must be vigilant to manage 
constructively the frictions that in- 
evitably accompany broad and complex 
ties among nations. 

Direction of Economic Policy 

Rising protectionist sentiment at home 
and abroad is the greatest threat to con- 
tinued growth in East Asia and the 
Pacific. Much of my time at the State 
Department is devoted to encouraging 
our trading partners to open their 
markets to foreign competition. While the 
world is still far from a free trade Utopia, 
we are making progress. Japan captures 
most of the headlines. While we are still 
engaged in complex negotiations with the 
Japanese, we have seen progress since 
the President's visit there 6 months ago. 
Korea has unilaterally lowered trade bar- 
riers. American firms, including banks, 
are already benefiting, but we will con- 
tinue to press for more liberalization. In 
December, at the U.S.-ASEAN economic 
dialogue, I discussed with ASEAN 
leaders the mutual benefits of trade 
liberalization. Ambassador Brock is ac- 
tively exploring with his ASEAN col- 
leagues innovative ideas for reducing 
trade barriers between ASEAN and the 
United States. Worldwide, we are seek- 
ing a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in the GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade]. We will press 
for further tariff reductions and elimina- 
tion of nontariff barriers. Countries in 
Asia, led by Japanese Prime Minister 
Nakasone, are supportive of new negotia- 
tions in the GATT. 

During his trip to Asia last November, 
President Reagan stated succinctly the 
case for free trade: 

. . . protectionism is defensive and 
dangerous. Erecting barriers always invites 
retaliation, and retaliation is a threat to the 
une out of every eight American jobs depend- 
ent on our exports. At the end of this vicious 
cycle are higher costs for consumers and lost 
American jobs, the exact opposite of what we 
all want. 

Let's recognize Japanese and Korean effi- 
ciency for what it is. If their products are bet- 
ter made and less expensive, then Amsricans 
who buy them benefit by receiving quality and 
value. And that's what the magic of the 
marketplace is all about. 

This Administration is committed to 
free markets. Experience shows that this 
is the most beneficial policy not only for 
the United States but also for the Asian 
and Pacific nations. 

Where we see Americans disadvan- 
taged by protectionism in Asian markets, 
we will press for changes. Where trade 
barriers exist in less developed countries, 



we will argue that trade must be expand- 
ed through tariff reductions among those 
countries themselves. We will also press 
for the continuation of generalized 
preference schemes in developed nations. 
Our own generalized system of prefer- 
ences legislation is currently before the 
Congress. The Reagan Administration 
strongly supports renewal. 

New and innovative international 
business relationships will be required to 
meet the challenges of the future. I men- 
tion in passing the increasingly complex 
legal problems which may affect our abili- 
ty to cooperate and may damage our abili- 
ty to compete. How we manage such 
issues as "unitary tax," antitrust, bank 
secrecy, and trade sanctions will be 
crucial to our success in developing a 
mature economic relationship with Asia. 
At home, the President has pledged 
to the American people that he will strive 
to keep our markets open to competition, 
both domestically and internationally. 
From an economic standpoint, that is the 
prudent course regardless of what the 
rest of the world may be doing. Nonethe- 
less, we are dedicated to seeking progress 
in creating new opportunities for 
American exporters through further 
liberalization of the world's trading 
system. Asia's dynamism is traceable to 
the willingness of many countries in the 
region to adopt market-based economic 
policies like those which have served us 
so well. As these countries become 
serious competitors, we must treat them 
as new export opportunities. Above all, 
we must not abandon our own adherence 
to the principles of competition and open 
markets. 



Conclusion 

I said I would concentrate on economics 
and I have. I am an economist, after all; 
but a few words on political and security 
matters. 

Political stability and security in the 
Pacific region are obviously vital to our 
own security. It is also true that the 
political situation in the region has made 
possible its spectacular economic growth. 
At the end of the Second World War, the 
United States controlled the Pacific 
Ocean region militarily. We converted our 
military supremacy into formal security 
arrangements with Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, and others. To- 
day there are new challenges to our 
Pacific relationships. The Reagan Admin- 
istration has taken steps to buttress the 
old ties and to reach new levels of 
understanding with friendly nonaligned 
nations, for example China. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



I began my remarks by quoting a 
'amous American who said that Western 
listory began with a Mediterranean era, 
massed through an Atlantic era, and is 
ow moving into a Pacific era. That 
American was not one of our contem- 
poraries. It was Theodore Roosevelt in a 
speech he gave after he had, as he put it, 
ust chipped the Philippines away from 
Spain." If we were moving into a Pacific 
era then, now we have arrived in the 
Pacific era, led by our burgeoning 
economic relationship. ■ 



Cyprus: Reports of 
Turkish Cypriot 
Settlement in 
Varosha 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JUNE 4, 1984 1 

We now have evidence that the Turkish 
Cypriots are permitting settlement by 
some of their people in a formerly closed 
sector of the city of Varosha, or 
Famagusta. 

The area involved is in a portion of 
the city which has remained uninhabited 
since the Turkish military intervention 
of 1974. The settlement by Turkish 
Cypriots in the area establishes a prece- 
dent which we believe will prove 
unhelpful to the search for a fair and 
final settlement in the Cyprus problem. 

We have urged the Turkish Cypriot 
communities' leaders not to proceed with 
this action and urged all parties to the 
Cyprus question to avoid any act which 
might complicate the situation as the 
UN Security Council prepares to con- 
sider renewal of the UN peacekeeping 
mandate for Cyprus, which expires 
June 15. 

We are hoping that mandate can be 
renewed with minimal debate and that 
the Secretary General can then proceed 
with his good office's role in the search 
for diplomatic progress. 



Soviet Active Measures 



'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



by William E. Knepper 

Address before the Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations on May 30, 198b. 
Mr. Knepper is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary in the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research. 

I'm delighted to be here and appreciate 
this opportunity to help shed some light 
on one of the aspects of Soviet 
clandestine activities which attempt to 
influence world public opinion. One of 
the activities that falls within the pur- 
view of my new responsibilities has been 
an interagency working group on Soviet 
active measures. To us "active 
measures" means unorthodox and covert 
Soviet and Soviet-bloc efforts to affect 
political attitudes and influence public 
opinion in the noncommunist world. 
State chairs the group which includes 
representatives from several agencies in- 
cluding the Defense Department, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
U.S. Information Agency. Among its 
several responsibilities, the group is 
charged with identifying forged 
documents prepared by Soviet KGB 
[Committee for State Security] 
operatives or the closely coordinated 
East European or Cuban intelligence 
services. 

Our Embassies abroad have as a 
priority requirement reporting likely 
forgeries that may appear in the press 
or be circulated privately among influen- 
tial foreign leaders and opinionmakers. 
Our active measures working group 
meets every other week to review the 
"surfacing" of possible forgeries any 
place in the world. Confirmed forgeries 
are officially denied and publicly exposed 
in discussions such as this one. 

Larry Eagleburger, who retired 
May 7 as the Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs — the highest rank- 
ing position then held by a career officer 
in the State Department — wrote in a re- 
cent article: 

Soviet Active Measures need to be 
countered by public exposure. They are infec- 
tions that thrive only in darkness, and 
sunlight is the best antiseptic. Governments 
should make available to their publics as 
much as possible of our growing knowledge 
of Soviet practices. 



Overview 

Before we see some examples of 
forgeries, let's look behind the cloak of 
secrecy with which the Soviets seek to 
shroud their intelligence operations. 

The term "active measures" itself is 
a literal translation from the Russian 
aktivnye meropriyatiya. That's the name 
of the organization in the KGB's First 
Chief Directorate responsible for 
worldwide direction of these activities. 
As the Soviets use the concept, active 
measures encompass a wide range of 
practices, including disinformation, 
manipulating the media in foreign coun- 
tries, the use of communist parties and 
communist front groups, and other 
operations to expand Soviet political in- 
fluence. Unlike overt Soviet diplomatic 
and informational efforts, active 
measures usually involve an element of 
deception and frequently employ 
clandestine means to mask Moscow's in- 
volvement. 

Intelligence operations and prop- 
aganda can be grouped in three 
categories; white, black, and gray. 
White refers to openly acknowledged 
government positions, policies, and 
statements. Black operations are sup- 
posedly never officially acknowledged or 
attributed. Gray affairs fall somewhere 
in between. 

Looking at the whole spectrum of 
Soviet foreign policy, diplomatic, trade, 
and informational programs may be con- 
sidered white or overt activities. The use 
of procommunist fronts, local communist 
parties, or traditional media information 
outlets fall into a gray category. 
Spreading rumors, planting false stories, 
surfacing forgeries, and use of agents of 
influence — collaborators, voluntary or 
paid — are black or clandestine opera- 
tions. Active measures thus involve 
either gray or black operations, depend- 
ing on the specific circumstances. 
Characteristic of Soviet active measures 
is their wide scope, geographic spread, 
and persistence over time, as well as the 
frequent use of fabricated documents to 
underpin disinformation operations. 

As a policy tool, active measures 
trace back to the 1920s when the 
Soviets sought to discredit emigre 
groups in Western Europe, particularly 
in France, by spreading disinformation. 
They also lured emigre activists back to 
Russia through various subterfuges. 



August 1984 



53 



EUROPE 



Some of you may have watched last fall 
on PBS the 10-part series, "Reilly, Ace 
of Spies." A character in the series was 
lured back to his death in Russia by a 
supposed exile organization, "The 
Trust," which was in reality a KGB 
black operation. Even before the 1917 
revolution, the tsarist secret police 
employed similar deception techniques. 
They used agents abroad not only to col- 
lect intelligence but also to sow dissent 
among emigre groups of that era. They 
also gave covert subsidies to selected 
journals to stimulate a better press for 
imperial Russia. 

After World War II, the Soviets in- 
stitutionalized these activities. They 
established a disinformation unit — De- 
partment D — within the First Chief 
Directorate of the KGB, the Soviet 
overseas intelligence arm. In the 1960s, 
the term "active measures" first ap- 
peared when the Soviets changed the 
name of Department D to the Active 
Measures Department. The switch con- 
veyed that the scope of the department's 
activities was far broader than mere 
dissemination of false stories in the 
press or floating forged documents. 

Some of our best information on 
Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence opera- 
tions is provided by defectors. In 1968 



the one-time chief of the disinformation 
section of Czechoslovak intelligence, 
Ladislav Bittman, defected and has pro- 
vided unusual insights into active 
measures operations. Bittman recounts 
that one of the main aims of Czech ac- 
tivities was to brand West German of- 
ficials as Nazis. But he was also involved 
in anti-U.S. operations taking place as 
far afield as Indonesia and central 
Africa. 

Bittman's experience underscores 
the close cooperation between the 
Soviets and satellite intelligence serv- 
ices. Indeed, it is often difficult to know 
whether the Soviets or one of their sur- 
rogates are implementing an operation. 
Since their overall purpose is the same, 
the difficulty in differentiating a Russian 
from an East German or Cuban effort is 
an interesting challenge but not really 
significant. 

In the mid-1970s, the KGB active 
measures department was upgraded to a 
"service," a further indication of the im- 
portance the Soviet leadership attached 
to active measures. This change meant 
that the chief of the service would have 
KGB general officer rank. The timing of 
the shift in the mid-1970s suggests a 
connection with Soviet disappointment 
with the fruits of detente — during which 



Baltic Freedom Day 



PROCLAMATION 5209, 
JUNE 14, 1984 1 

It has been over 40 years since invading 
Soviet armies, in collusion with the Nazi 
regime, overran the three independent Baltic 
Republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
forceably incorporated them into Moscow's 
expanding empire. The new regime then 
ordered the illegal deportation, murder, and 
imprisonment of tens of thousands of Baltic 
peoples whose only "crime" was to resist 
foreign tyranny and to defend their liberties 
and freedoms. 

Oppression and persecution continue to 
this day, but despite this long dark night of 
injustice, the brave men and women of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have never 
abandoned the battle for their national in- 
dependence and God-given rights. Although 
the full measure of their struggle and 
sacrifice is screened by the oppression and 
censorship under which they live, the friends 
and families of the Baltic peoples all over the 
world are aware of their heroic endeavors 
and aspirations. 

Their peaceful demands for their rights 
command the admiration of everyone who 
loves and honors freedom. All the people of 
the United States of America share the just 
aspirations of the Baltic nations for national 



independence, and we uphold their right to 
determine their own national destiny free of 
foreign domination. The United States has 
never recognized the forceable incorporation 
of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, 
and it will not do so in the future. The Con- 
gress of the United States, by Senate Joint 
Resolution 296, has authorized and requested 
the President to issue a proclamation for the 
observance of June 14, 1984, as "Baltic 
Freedom Day." 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim June 14, 1984, as Baltic 
Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the 
United States to observe this day with ap- 
propriate remembrance and ceremonies and 
to reaffirm their commitment to the prin- 
ciples of liberty and freedom for all oppressed 
people. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this fourteenth day of June, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-four, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and eighth. 

Ronald Reagan 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 18, 1984. 



time forgeries had fallen off sharply. It 
indicated renewed willingness to employ 
deception techniques on a larger scale in 
support of Soviet aims. Reflective of 
this, the Carter Administration was 
targeted with an upsurge of active 
measures, frequently involving fake U.S. 
documents. These were particularly 
directed against the U.S. -Egyptian rela- 
tionship and the Camp David process. 
Organizationally, the KGB Active 
Measures Service has the primary role 
of backstopping foreign active measures 
operations, which are directed in general 
terms at the Politburo level— the summit 
of the Soviet hierarchy. The service is 
organized along functional and geo- 
graphic lines with roughly half a dozen 
departments. It is believed to employ 
directly about 300 people. They monitor 
ongoing active measures around the 
world; process proposals for new opera- 
tions; maintain liaison on active 
measures with KGB regional and coun- 
try desks and with overseas operations; 
and provide technical support for opera- 
tions through preparation of forgeries 
and fabrications, translation of 
documents, and printing and publication 
of materials. 

Our best view under the Soviet 
cloak of secrecy has been provided by 
Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB 
major and active measures specialist 
who defected to the United States in 
1979 while working as a "journalist" in 
Japan. At the time of this defection, 
Levchenko was acting chief of the active 
measures section of the KGB "residency" 
in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. He 
supervised five case officers or KGB 
operatives. They, in turn, ran a string of 
25 agents of Japanese or third-country 
nationalities. Levchenko was sentenced 
to death by a Soviet military tribunal 
meeting in secret in August 1981. He 
has declared open opposition to what he 
views as ". . . the corrupt Soviet 
system." The Soviets are preventing his 
wife and teenage son from joining him 
in the United States. 

According to Levchenko, KGB 
"residencies" or foreign stations 
operating under diplomatic cover in 
Soviet Embassies or missions consider 
active measures part of their core opera- 
tional work, along with espionage. 
Residencies submit proposals for new ac- 
tive measures and assessments of old ac- 
tivities in the annual plan sent to 
Moscow every December. Residencies 
can take the initiative in proposing new 
operations to take advantage of per- 
ceived opportunities at any time during 
the year. Final approval, however, rests 
with KGB headquarters as approved by 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



the Politburo. Moscow can, of course, in- 
struct residencies to undertake active 
measures at any time. 

Most official or quasi-official Soviet 
representatives abroad are likely to be 
involved from time to time in active 
measures. Even Soviet scholars, journ- 
alists, and representatives of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, who are often 
accepted abroad as legitimate counter- 
parts by their non-Soviet colleagues, also 
often engage in these types of active 
measures. Unlike their free-world 
counterparts, they often must play a 
dual role. Their legitimate academic or 
other pursuits sometimes play a sub- 
sidiary role to their political activities on 
behalf of the Kremlin. They are required 
to obey instructions from the bodies 
which plan and control Soviet active 
measures. 

While the specifics of active 
measures vary widely, Levchenko 
stresses that all are specifically designed 
to reinforce Soviet policy objectives in a 
particular country or region. The United 
States and NATO are the Soviet Union's 
principal worldwide targets. However, 
as Major Levchenko's activities in Japan 
show, other countries are also on the 
receiving end of active measures. 

When Levchenko defected, he was 
ostensibly working as a correspondent 
for the Soviet news magazine, New 
Times. He found cover as a journalist to 
be especially useful for active measures 
operations, since it provided broader ac- 
cess than more traditional diplomatic 
cover. 

Ideally, the KGB seeks publication of 
disinformation in reputable noncom- 
munist media. The Soviet press then 
replays the story, citing credible sources. 
It may also be replayed elsewhere, for 
example by wire services or others un- 
aware that they are repeating disinfor- 
mation. Sometimes the KGB runs disin- 
formation in pro-Soviet news outlets. 
This is in the hope that the phony story 
will gain acceptance through frequent 
repetition, even though the initial surfac- 
ing vehicle lacks credibility. 

Spreading rumors is perhaps the 
crudest form of active measures. This 
was done on a considerable scale by both 
the Axis and the Allied nations in World 
War II. In recent years, there are in- 
dications that the Soviets may have 
resumed the practice. In 1979 after the 
seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca 
by religious fanatics, U.S. Embassies 
picked up numerous reports that the 
Soviets were falsely spreading the word 
to Arab contacts that the United States 
was implicated. Levchenko told the 
House Permanent Select Committee on 



Berlin's Status in 
European Parliament Elections 



The following is a joint response by 
France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States to the Soviet Union's pro- 
test on Berlin's participation in the elec- 
tion to the European Parliament. The 
allied response was read by Department 
of State spokesman John Hughes on 
June 15, 19&U- 

On instructions of my government, I 
would like to state the following with 
regard to the statement of the U.S.S.R. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of June 11, 
1984: 

The three powers, in accordance 
with the established procedures and in- 
sofar as is compatible with allied rights 
and responsibilities, in 1957 approved 
the extension to the western sectors of 
Berlin of the treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC). 
On the same basis they subsequently ap- 
proved the extension to the western sec- 
tors of Berlin of other constitutive 
treaties of the European Community. 
Consequently, the western sectors of 
Berlin have since 1957 been included in 
the area of application of these treaties. 
The three powers have throughout that 
period ensured that allied rights and 



responsibilities, including those relating 
to matters of security and status, were 
not affected by developments in the 
European Community. The Quadripar- 
tite Agreement in no way affected the 
application in the western sectors of 
Berlin of the European Community 
treaties. 

Direct elections to the European 
Assembly, in the work of which 
representatives from the western sec- 
tors of Berlin have participated since its 
inception, were provided for in the EEC 
treaty of 1957. As in the past, repre- 
sentatives from the western sectors of 
Berlin will continue to be included within 
the quota of the Federal Republic of 
Germany at the assembly. They are not 
directly elected but are selected by the 
Berlin House of Representatives^. In 
these circumstances it is clear that con- 
tinued participation of Berlin represen- 
tatives in the European Assembly does 
not affect the status of Berlin. Such par- 
ticipation can therefore not constitute a 
violation of the Quadripartite Agree- 
ment. 

In conclusion, my government re- 
calls the importance which the three 
powers attach to avoiding complications 
in and around Berlin. ■ 



Intelligence that he personally partici- 
pated in several operations to spread 
rumors in Japan directed against the 
People's Republic of China. One such ef- 
fort was to suggest secret collusion on 
nuclear matters between the Chinese 
and the Italians. 

Forgeries 

Many disinformation operations gain ac- 
ceptance by showing tangible "proof." 
Fabricated documents and forgeries are 
provided as "evidence." In some cases a 
Soviet role in manufacturing these docu- 
ments may be uncovered by content and 
forensic analyses of the document, the 
method of surfacing, the relative level of 
sophistication of the forgery, or its near- 
ly instananeous replay by the Soviet 
media. While it is not entirely clear why 
the Soviets have made forgeries such a 
specialty, the fake U.S. Government 
document has become a postwar hall- 
mark of Soviet disinformation opera- 
tions. In 1961 then CIA Assistant Direc- 
tor Richard Helms told the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that some 32 



forgeries of U.S. Government 
documents had been uncovered during 
the preceding 4 years. These ranged 
from fake high-level plans on Middle 
East policy, involving Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles and then New York 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller, to false 
Pentagon documents alleging that most 
U.S. strategic bomber pilots were 
medical wrecks. 

Nineteen years later in February 
1980, John McMahon, a successor to 
Helms as chief of the CIA's clandestine 
service, told the House Intelligence 
Committee a similar tale of fabricated 
U.S. Government documents. He provid- 
ed background on the renewed Soviet 
surfacing of forgeries following the 
establishment of the Active Measures 
Service in the mid-1970s. McMahon 
elaborated on some two dozen forgeries, 
such as a series intended to create fric- 
tions in U.S. -Egyptian relations. 

Since 1980, the KGB forgery curve 
has continued to rise. According to CIA 
testimony before the House Intelligence 
Committee in 1982, and our own State 



August 1984 



55 



EURO PE 

Department reports on Sovi. 
measures, 4 forgeries surfaced in 1980, 
7 in 1981. 9 in 1982, and 12 in 1983-or 
over 30 since 1980. In addition, several 
earlier forgeries have been purposely re- 
iced a number of times. 
The technical quality of re 
forgeries has h over earlier KGB 

products. The formatting is on the whole 
good, certainly sufficient to decer 
those unfamiliar with U.S. Government 
documents. There are, howe\ 
always some discrepancies and mistakes. 
It is difficult for an outsider to duplicate 
U.S. Government documents with total 
accuracy, given the frequent changes in 
form and procedures. (It's even difficult 
for us insiders to do it "by the book"— 
skilled secretaries and word processors 
are highly prized.) While the American 
English in most forged documents is col- 
loquial, there are occasional linguistic 
flaws, use of stilted language or of 
British rather than American phrases or 
spelling. In some instances, literal trans- 
lations expose the likely Soviet author- 
ship. In a fake U.S. document that was 

aced in Nigeria, the term "wet af- 
fair" was used to describe a proposed 
assassination. "Wet affair" is the euphe- 
mism in the Soviet intelligence lexicon 
for "assassination." In a letter from the 
New Orleans-based aviation personnel 
agency to the South African Air Force 
chief, the term "competent bodies" is 
, id. "Competent bodies" is the way the 
Soviets describe their security services. 

In contrast to the 1950s when the 
So\ often satisfied with surfac- 

. ries in the communist press, in 
recent years the KGB has sought publi- 
cation in noncommunist media. When 
successful, this enhances the credibility 
of the disinformation operation and pro- 
vides more believable sourcing for replay 

.mmunist media. A number of re- 
spected noncommunist journals have 
been victimized by fabrications during 
the past 2 years. 

The ometimes surface 

forgeries through blind mailings sent to 
newsmen with no return addi 
other indication of the sender's identity . 
This is a random affair since most 
serious media outlets will either n 

mously sent documentor, at 
ihr lea heel efo >rin1 ing Fhe 
Soviets also use journalists working as 
KGB a: > dis- 

info to plant I 

her gullible or un- 
to acce] ' 

authenticity of a iimenl with 

Ling. 



Some fabrications are circulated 
privately and do not seem intended for 
publication in the media. This method 
prevents the alleged author from finding 
out about the forgery and thus is unable 
[eny the document's authen- 
ticity. 

Many fabrications never attain un- 
critical publication or surface only in 

viunist or procommunist journals; 
still, forgeries are one of the most 

■ ilar tools of disinformation. One 
reason forgeries are so frequently used 
is the difficulty in rebutting them effec- 
tively. The United States or other of- 
iV ni led parties can forcefully deny fabri- 
cations. However, once published, a 

, frequently assumes a life of its 
own. Either the denial does not catch up 
with the original false report or a few 
people are willing to believe the story 
simply because it is in print. 

Now let's review several examples of 
forgeries that dovetail with Soviet 
propaganda themes. 

• Probably the most enduring set of 
forgeries are the so-called Holocaust 
papers, designed to create tension be- 
tween the United States and our Euro- 
pean allies. This is a collection of altered 
and authentic U.S. war plans that date 
from the early 1960s. The papers allege 
that the United States would sacrifice 
Western Europe by nuclear bombing 
strikes during a prospective world 
war III to save the continental United 
States. The papers surfaced initially in a 
Norwegian magazine in 1967. More 
recently, they were the subject of ques- 
tions in the town council of Graz, 
Austria, in December 1982. At least 20 
separate surfacings have been identified. 

The Soviets received at least some 
of the authentic documents from an es- 
pionage agent, a U.S. Army sergeant. 
The sergeant was stationed in Paris as a 
military courier in the early 1960s. In 
1965 he was tried and convicted of es- 
pionage and given 25 years in prison. He 
passed a wide variety of U.S. documents 
to the Soviets, some of which still occa- 
sionally appear in altered form. 

• In November 1981 an attempt was 
made in Madrid to surface a forged let- 
ter from ['resident Reagan to the King 
of Spain. The forgery was technically 
well done with the correct White House 
stationery and typescript. In terms in- 
tended to offend Spanish sensitivities, 
the letter urged the King both to join 
NATO and to crack down on groups 
such as the "Opus Dei pacifists" and the 

1 wing opposition." 

Alter an initial blind mailing to 
Spanish journalists failed to obtain 



publication, the forgery was circulated 
on November 11 to all delegations (ex- 
cept the U.S. and Spanish) to the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) then meeting in Madrid. 
This time several Madrid newspapers 
ran stories that exposed the letter as a 
fabrication, probably of Soviet origin. 
• This forgery of an alleged June 
1979 letter from then NATO Com- 
mander Alexander Haig to NATO Secre 
tary General Joseph Luns surfaced in 
April 1982. The letter discusses a possi- 
ble nuclear first strike and calls for 
"... action of a sensitive nature to jolt 
the faint hearted." The letter is intended 
to stimulate the nuclear disarmament 
campaign by suggesting a Haig-Luns 
collusion against opponents of the 
modernization of nuclear forces in 
Europe. Technically, the quality is good 
but does include mistakes, such as inap- 
propriate stationery and also the "Dear 
Joseph" greeting instead of the "Dear 
Joe" habitually used by General Haig. 
The forgery was surfaced in a leftist 
Belgian weekly and reported to Belgian 
television and radio. Its appearance coin- 
cided with numerous antinuclear demon- 
strations in the spring of 1982. 

• In January 1982, a forged letter 
and an accompanying research analysis 
dated September 23, 1981, from Judge 
William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of 
State, to the U.S. Ambassador to 
Greece, Monteagle Stearns, was sur- 
faced in Athens. This forgery indicated 
U.S. support for the conservatives in the 
October Greek elections. It alluded to a 
possible military coup if socialist leader 
Andreas Papandreou won at the polls 
(as he did). On the basis of Embassy 
assurances that the letter was a fake, it 
was not initially published. Several 
weeks later, after copies had been circu- 
lated at the CSCE in Madrid, a small 
Athens daily published it. However, the 
daily described the letter as of doubtful 
authenticity and probably attributable to 
a "third-country" intelligence service. 

• Two faked 1982 telegrams were 
allegedly from the U.S. Embassy in 
Rome. They depict the Italian investiga- 
tion of a possible Bulgarian connection 
in the assassination attempt against 
Pope John Paul II as a campaign orches- 
trated by the United States. The forgery 
appeared in a leftist Rome newsweekly 
in late July 1983. The cables are cleverly 
done and read much like State Depart- 
ment cables. An exception is the use of 
the term "spynest Sofia" and various 
technical formatting errors. The fabri- 
cation apparently was designed to pro- 
vide "credible evidence" for Soviet media 
allegations that the United States had 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



orchestrated the arrest of the Bulgarian 
intelligence officer, Antonov, as part of 
an effort to blame the Soviets and 
Bulgarians for the papal assassination 
attempt. 

• Another active measure alleging 
military cooperation with South Africa is 
a forged letter from the U.S. Defense 
Mapping Agency, addressed to a Lt. 
Gen. Dutton, South African Defense 
Force. This purports to be a positive 
reply to a South African request for 
satellite-produced maps and charts of 
Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. Let 
me point out that Lt. Gen. Dutton has 
not held a command in the South 
African forces for years. There are 
many other features about this letter 
which indicate that the Defense Mapping 
Agency would never have written it, 
such as curious and ungrammatical 
punctuations— even for U.S. Govern- 
ment bureaucratese. The word "con- 
cretize" is used, which is similar to a 
Russian word in general usage. 

• Jeune Afrique, an influential 
French-language newsweekly published 
in Paris and widely read in Francophone 
Africa, reported on November 17, 1982, 
that despite the U.S. embargo on arms 
sales to South Africa, Northrop Aviation 
was offering to sell South Africa its new 
Tigershark fighter. To "prove" the point, 
Jeune Afrique published a picture of a 
letter ostensibly sent by Northrop's vice 
president for marketing to the com- 
mander of the South African Air Force. 
When Northrop called the letter a fake, 
Jeune Afrique ran a new story on 
January 19, 1983, suggesting that the 
denial was untrue and the original letter 
was authentic. 

In this case, the perpetrator of the 
active measure apparently obtained a 
copy of a genuine letter that Northrop 
had routinely sent to many countries, 
but not to South Africa, and simply 
typed in the South African addressee. 
The purpose of this active measure was 
to suggest that the U.S. embargo on 
military sales to South Africa was a 
sham. The envelope also had a 20C 
stamp— not enough to reach South 
Africa. 

• Tn. Lima, Peru, last year a report 
surfaced that the United States was 
planning to sell nuclear-tipped cruise 
missiles to Chile. Nothing, of course, 
could be further from the truth. The ob- 
vious intent was to stir up trouble be- 
tween Peru and Chile and make the 
Peruvians suspicious of and antagonistic 
toward the United States. The report 
was based on a fake airgram appearing 
there. The Peruvians quickly realized 
that an attempt was being made to dupe 



them, and nearly every newspaper in 
Lima denounced the report as a forgery, 
most likely of Soviet inspiration. 

Impact of Active Measures 

The box score for disinformation and 
other media influence efforts is mixed. 
Despite extensive KGB active measures 
operations, it is hard to perceive any 
major impact on well-established, non- 
communist, Western media outlets. Most 
fabrications or disinformation efforts are 
able to achieve publication only in 
obscure journals or in those known for 
their predilection for the Soviet line. 
Probably more damaging are repeaters. 
Even though exposed, through repeated 
surfacing and occasional uncritical publi- 
cation, the impression can be created 
that "where there is smoke, there is 
fire." 

Unfortunately for the United States, 
the Soviets have had much more success 
with active measures in the Third 
World. In Africa and South Asia, in par- 



ticular, they have probably significantly 
added to U.S. image problems. Over the 
years, the KGB and its allies have 
developed well-established outlets to 
float disinformation. They also have had 
considerable success in arranging for 
press plants of distorted news stories in 
Africa. 

In gauging the overall impact of ac- 
tive measures, it is important to view it 
through Soviet, not just American, eyes. 
The Soviets, as Levchenko points out, 
take a long-term view. They are not 
seeking immediate, short-term gains or 
necessarily a big impact from any one 
operation. Rather, they regard active 
measures like pawns in a chess game, 
able to damage the opponent at the 
margin. If Dr. Goebbels espoused the 
technique of the "big lie," the Soviets in 
active measures operations have more 
modest aspirations. They take the long- 
term view and by all accounts appear 
satisfied that the cumulative impact 
makes their considerable investment 
worthwhile. ■ 



Doctrine of Moral Equivalence 



by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Address before the Royal Institute 
for International Studies in London on 
April 9, 198U- Ambassador Kirkpatrick 
is U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations. 

I am honored by the invitation of the 
Royal Institute for International Affairs 
to appear here today. I thought a good 
deal about what I might speak about and 
was greatly tempted to offer a lecture on 
American presidential nominating poli- 
tics, about which not too long ago I wrote 
a large book. I decided, however, it was 
not quite appropriate. The famous cracks 
within the alliance that are so much 
discussed in public presented themselves. 
It is clear there exists on both sides of the 
Atlantic a growing sense that we have 
come again to one of those periodic times 
of decision: Will we continue as we are, 
working in and through the existing 
framework, or is it time for new 
departures? 

Not all issues that are discussed in 
public places make their way onto a 
legislative calendar. Some simply die. But 
widespread public interest in an impor- 
tant subject, if not a harbinger of official 
changes to come, at least gives notice of 



that possibility. Articles on the "crisis" of 
the alliance have become a staple of the 
editorial pages in the United States and 
Europe. In the European press, these ar- 
ticles usually deal with U.S. faults and 
raise questions whether our policies and 
our rhetoric do not make the world more 
dangerous— for Europeans. The U.S. ar- 
ticles deal with European shortcomings 
and question whether it makes any sense 
at all for the United States to go on in- 
vesting people and money in the NATO 
enterprise. 

I should like to emphasize that there 
is no discussion in the U.S. Government 
of withdrawing American troops from 
Europe or changing American strategic 
doctrine. Nonetheless, op-ed pieces about 
the alliance multiply and influential per- 
sons join the dialogue. Only last week, 
after I had begun to think about this 
statement, The Wall Street Journal 
featured a column on anti-Americanism 
by a Swiss diplomat which paraphrased 
Lord Acton: "Dependency corrupts, and 
absolute dependency corrupts 
absolutely." Recently also, James 
Schlesinger and Helmut Schmidt had a 
widely reported public dialogue in 
Brussels. Henry Kissinger has suggested 
the time may have arrived for Europe to 
assume the responsibility for its own 
defense against conventional attack, time 



August 1984 



57 



GENERAL 



to draw down or withdraw entirely the 
300,000 U.S. troops in Germany. The per- 
sistence of the unofficial discussions made 
it almost inevitable that officials would 
join the discussion. That has happened. 
Under Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger has recently addressed the 
issues in two public fora. I propose today 
to enter this discussion at a somewhat dif- 
ferent point. 

Naturally, being an American and an 
official of the U.S. Government, I shall 
speak from an American perspective, but 
my subject is not only the United States. 
I shall try to speak to the same subject 
addressed here in Britain by my col- 
league, Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger, concerning whether there is 
or is not a moral difference between the 
so-called "superpowers"— the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. But this subject 
is, I think, only a subtopic (albeit a ter- 
ribly important one) of a more general 
question: whether there is a significant 
moral difference between the democratic 
countries of the West and the communist 
countries of the Eastern bloc. Many, 
perhaps most, of the most influential 
treatments of East-West differences dur- 
ing the last decade or so propose tacitly, 
and sometimes explicitly, that the dif- 
ferences are not that great after all. 

Europe 

First, there was the vogue enjoyed by 
theories of converging development not 
long ago, which argued that the dynamics 
of modernity would force increasing 
openess and liberalization of the Soviet 
Union and, at the same time, force pro- 
gressively autocratic centralization in the 
industrial democracies in such a way that, 
before long, both would become modified 
bureaucratic autocracies presided over by 
technocrats with a feel for popular 
desires. When "things" seemed not to 
develop as predicted, the convergence 
theory was shelved without comment to 
be replaced by a more aggressive argu- 
ment that required less cooperation from 
history: now it was argued that in fun- 
damental moral respects the democracies 
and communist states were already much 
alike, a position that simultaneously 
denies the virtues of the democracies and 
the vices of the totalitarian systems of the 
East. This position, too, threatens, as 
Raymond Aron emphasized in his impor- 
tant book In Defense of Decadent Europe, 
to undermine the virtue of the Western 
nations, the ". . . capacity for collective 
action and historic vitality that now, as 
always, remains the ultimate cause of the 
fortunes of nations and of their rise and 
fall." 



Recently, another Frenchman, Jean- 
Francois Revel, has sounded a more 
urgent alarm. In his book, Comment les 
Democraties Finissent, Revel wonders 
aloud if democracy may not be a mere 
parenthesis in the long march of 
autocracy, ". . . the first system in history 
which, confronted by a power that wants 

to destroy it, accuses itself " Revel 

further wrote: 

The distinctive mark of our century is the 
humility with which democratic civilization 
agrees to disappear and works to legitimize 
the victory of its mortal enemy. 

That communism shall have been more 
clever and effective in its offensive would only 
be one additional example of one power being 
a better strategist than the other. ... It is less 
natural and newer that the targeted civiliza- 
tion should not only judge that its defeat is 
justified, but provide its partisans as well as 
its adversaries ample reason to regard all 
forms of self-defense as immoral, or at best 
superfluous and useless, if not downright 
dangerous. 

Revel's subject is the delegitimization 
of the West, which he believes is in 
danger of becoming a willing victim. My 
subject is the delegitimization of the 
United States by and within the West. I 
am concerned not with the charges of our 
adversaries, who accuse us of the most 
terrible crimes, but rather with the grow- 
ing tendency inside the political class of 
our allies in Great Britain and continental 
Europe to feel that, after all, in many im- 
portant respects, there may not be signifi- 
cant differences between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 

It is difficult for an American to raise 
such questions without sounding defen- 
sive, but the subject is too important to 
be pushed under the rug. 

To illustrate my meaning, to dispel 
any suggestion that my impression of the 
situation is illusory or exaggerated, I 
shall take as my text three recent com- 
ments: one from the Guardian, a second 
from the Observer, the third from a 
leading politician. 

First, the Guardian, which printed on 
October 28: 

There are plenty around who are already 
prepared to see the U.S. as no better than the 
Soviet Union in the standards of its interna- 
tional behaviour. There are many more, 
however, who still expect superior standards 
of the U.S., who are shocked and bewildered 
at the spectacle of Americans engaging in an 
act of aggression quite as blatant as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, which was deplored in 
such fine-sounding words. 

Next, the Observer, in its leader of 
October 30: 



. . . Reagan should be told that when the 
U.S. borrows Soviet methods . . . European 
distrust of American behaviour, which lies at 
the root of the peace movement, is vastly 
reinforced. 

And finally, these comments from a 
political leader who provided unwelcome 
confirmation that extreme distrust of the 
United States displayed by the peace 
movement, in some of its forms, was 
shared in high political circles. Concern- 
ing threats to the peace, he was reputed 
to have said: "There is an almost 
miserable equity of threat;" or, in another 
formulation, an "equity of menace." 

The suggestion that the United States 
and the Soviet Union are morally 
equivalent, that with regard to methods 
and policies there is a rough moral sym- 
metry, is now common enough among our 
closest allies that its expression no longer 
causes shock in Europe. Obviously, this is 
a serious matter. We are democratic coun- 
tries in which broad consensus is required 
to sustain foreign policy. If the opinion 
that the United States is a lawless, 
reckless gunslinger spreads widely 
enough, the alliance will simply collapse 
by mutual consent based on distrust on 
the European side and disgust on the 
American side. 

As I understand it, the charge that 
there exists a moral symmetry between 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. has 
taken form only in the past year or so, 
with Grenada, Central America, and 
missile deployment serving as landmarks 
in its evolution. Less harsh but still 
serious charges had been around for some 
time. Chief among them was the convic- 
tion that the United States— especially 
under Ronald Reagan— is obsessed with 
East-West relations and that viewing the 
world through the lenses of East-West 
conflict causes us to see political conflicts 
where there may be none and obscures 
more important indigenous, basic social 
and economic factors and predisposes us 
to emphasize bilateral approaches over 
broader international cooperation and 
military solutions where economic and 
social remedies would be more appro- 
priate. Now, on behalf of the U.S. 
Government, and very formally, I should 
like to enter a plea of "not guilty" even to 
this charge, which, though serious, is less 
than those associated with the doctrine of 
moral symmetry. 



Assistance Programs 

And, though we could spend the rest of 
the day on this subject alone, let me note 
briefly that our economic assistance pro- 
grams alone belie the charge that U.S. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



foreign policy is driven by a preoccupa- 
tion with East- West conflict. The United 
States is a major supporter of multilateral 
assistance programs. We remain the 
largest contributors to UN independent 
agencies and special programs, such as 
the UN Development Program, UN In- 
ternational Children's Emergency Fund, 
World Food Program, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, World Health 
Organization, and to the international 
development banks and multilateral fiscal 
institutions. The contrast between U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. support for multilateral pro- 
grams is important. But that is not all. 

Today, as in the past, the United 
States has a powerful proclivity for trying 
to serve universal goals through its 
foreign policy. Reluctant to become deep- 
ly involved in foreign affairs in the first 
place, we have always tended to feel that 
our participation is justified only if it is 
devoted to abstract universal ends like 
"making the world safe for democracy" 
and "abolishing war, hunger, chaos." We 
are still at it, as demonstrated by 
Secretary Shultz's statement to the Con- 
gress this year on the foreign assistance 
package. In that statement the Secretary 
of State emphasized to U.S. lawmakers 
that the proposed U.S. assistance pro- 
gram for some $15.9 billion in economic 
and military assistance in fiscal year 1985 
serves four U.S. interests: 

• Our interest in a growing world 
economy which enhances the well-being of 
citizens in both the developing and the in- 
dustrialized world; 

• Our interest in security, protecting 
our vital interests abroad, strengthening 
our friends, contributing to regional 
stability, and backstopping our diplomatic 
efforts for peaceful solutions to regional 
problems; 

• Our interests in building democracy 
and promoting adherence to human rights 
and the rule of law; and 

• Our humanitarian interest in 
alleviating suffering and easing the im- 
mediate consequences of catastrophe on 
the very poor. 

My point is that, when we speak to 
one another, we justify our assistance in 
terms of trying to build a "world of 
stability and progress." Contrast, I sug- 
gest, our practices not only with the 
Soviets, who limit their aid to military 
assistance to countries who are members 
of the Soviet bloc or ripe for incorporation 
in it; compare our assistance programs 
even with those of major allies who, to an 
extent greater than we, use aid to rein- 
force special relationships, for example, 
with former colonies. 



I seek no kudos when I say that the 
U.S. assistance programs provide sub- 
stantially more economic than military 
assistance and only rarely are allocated on 
the basis of U.S. national security in what 
are called "superpower rivalries." I am 
not even certain this is a wise allocation of 
scarce resources. But it is a fact. 

What is true for our assistance pro- 
grams is true also for many other aspects 
of our foreign policy. In Africa, for exam- 
ple, the United States has worked hard 
throughout this Administration and 
previous ones to achieve, through 
peaceful negotiation, an independent, 
democratic, stable Namibia. Why? Not 
because Namibia is a matter of vital U.S. 
interest. It is not. It is on the other side 
of the world. We have no significant 
cultural or historical ties with it. The fact 
is, we believe Namibia's right to in- 
dependence should be achieved in a 
negotiated settlement rather than 
through the imposition of solutions by 
force— by whomever. 

Another recent example of U.S. ef- 
forts to achieve relatively disinterested 
goals through foreign policy may be seen 
in Lebanon. A myth has already arisen 
that the United States sought to impose a 
military solution wholly inappropriate to 
the problem, which, according to some 
mythology, is based on historic, in- 
digenous Lebanese rivalries. Nothing 
could be more mistaken. In 1958 the 
United States, seeing Lebanon's in- 
dependence threatened by radical Arab 
nationalism, sent 15,000 Marines to pro- 
tect Lebanon's independence. In 1983 the 
United States sent 1,500 Marines to a 
joint peacekeeping effort with France, 
the United Kingdom, and Italy, first, to 
ensure the safe evacuation of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO)— hardly a goal sought by us 
because we were trying to fit the conflict 
into an East- West framework. The 
multinational force (MNF) departed as 
soon as that task was completed. But 
after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, 
the MNF returned in a classical peace- 
keeping role, interposing itself between 
factions all of whom, it was believed, 
basically desired peace. 

The effort was sabotaged by someone 
else's determination to impose a military 
solution but not that of the United States, 
the other MNF parties, or Israel. Syria, 
sending more than 100 tons of ordnance 
daily into the Shouf, has very nearly suc- 
ceeded in imposing a military solution. It 
is symptomatic of the different ap- 
proaches that President Assad, in his 
search for a settlement, undertook no 
shuttles in the manner of Ambassadors 
Habib, Rumsfeld, or Secretary Shultz. He 



sent armed emmissaries and waited for 
peacekeepers to come to him. Various 
criticisms may be made of our Lebanon 
policy, but not, I think, that reflected a 
preoccupation with East- West affairs nor 
a predilection for military solutions. 

Central America 

But even if our whole policy is not 
governed by obsession with East- West 
rivalry, and even if we do not have an un- 
controllable desire to impose military 
solutions everywhere, surely in Central 
America the United States reflects, in 
purest form, all the worst tendencies of 
U.S. foreign policy: seeing communist in- 
fluence where there are only indigenous 
social and economic factors; attempting 
military solutions where only reforms are 
appropriate. 

Once again, I respectfully dissent. 
The government headed by Ronald 
Reagan has not the slightest tendency to 
imagine that the political turmoil in Cen- 
tral America has no roots in social and 
economic problems. We know the people 
of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Costa Rica have been ill fed, ill housed, ill 
clothed, and illiterate for centuries. We 
know they have generally been governed 
by bad governments, one-party systems 
as under Somoza or military dictatorships 
as in El Salvador before 1979. We know 
that there existed in both countries 
neglect, unmet needs, unfulfilled hopes, 
and that these gave rise to movements for 
reform and revolution. We understand, 
broadly speaking, how it happened. 

In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, 
three political currents existed: 

First, the traditional oligarchs who 
had most of what there was to get; 

Second, a large group of middle class, 
farmers, trade unionists, businessmen, 
who wanted to get rid of the dictator and 
establish a democratic government; and 

Third, a small group of Marxist- 
Leninists tied to Havana and Moscow, 
trained, as they themselves have told us, 
in Havana, in the Middle East with the 
PLO, or elsewhere in the Soviet bloc; 
armed and advised by their Soviet 
sponsors. 

In Nicaragua, these two groups, the 
democrats and Leninists, joined in a 
broad-based popular front to overthrow 
Somoza. Their program was democracy, 
but once in power, the Leninists forced 
out the democrats and betrayed the 
promises of democracy made to the 
Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the Nicaraguan people. Most of the 
democrats are now in exile; many are 
with the Contras, still fighting for a 



August 1984 



59 



GENERAL 



democratic Nicaragua. The Leninists, 
meanwhile, have consolidated one-party 
control. 

In El Salvador, where the same three- 
sided contest existed, no popular front 
was formed. Instead, after a coup over- 
threw General Romero in October 1979, 
the democratic forces came to power in 
the administration of Napoleon Duarte, 
who immediately undertook to democ- 
ratize the government, nationalize credit, 
and instigate sweeping land reforms; the 
guerrillas and the traditional armed right 
took up armed struggle against the 
government— one operating out of 
Managua; the other, it is said, out of 
Guatemala. 

The stakes are high. The Soviet 
Union understood the strategic impor- 
tance of the region, through which most 
sealanes pass with most of the oil and 
other strategic materials the United 
States would supply to Europe in case of 
an emergency. By 1967 the Soviets were 
writing in theoretical journals about op- 
portunities for tying down the United 
States in the Western Hemisphere and 
rendering us less able to act in such 
remote places as Europe and Asia. The 
United States, finally, has also 
understood the stakes and the challenge 
and believes that challenge must be met. 

Here, concerning U.S. policy in Cen- 
tral America, the charge of obsessive con- 
cern with East-West relations melds im- 
perceptibly into an argument that there is 
no significant moral difference between 
Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and U.S. 
policy in Central America. This position 
was put with clarity during the Oxford 
Union debate by a questioner who asked: 

Is it not true that your country controls in, 
for example, the whole of Latin America, 
many corrupt and puppet governments— and 
surely the question we are asking you to ad- 
dress yourself tonight is what is the difference, 
if any— and I suspect there is no difference— as 
do many, many people in this country— what is 
the difference between your puppet regimes 
and the puppet regimes of the Soviet Union? 

In a followup exchange the questioner 
charged Central American governments, 
supported by the United States, with 
"terrorizing, torturing, killing." 

The first striking fact about views 
such as those of the questioner is that the 
level of outrage far exceeds the level of 
information. The charges do not -quare 
with the facts. The United States does 
not, repeat not, support dictatorships in 
Central America. Let me be specific. It it 
not generally understood in Europe that 
the United States tried hard to encourage 
and help develop a democracy in 
Nicaragua: 



• By supporting the efforts to replace 
Somoza and helping to negotiate his de- 
parture—supporting the OAS resolution 
that called for his ouster; 

• By providing $25 million in 
emergency food and medical aid in the 
first week the Sandinistas came to power 
and $115 million in generous, prompt 
economic aid; and 

• By offering assistance of diverse 
kinds relevant to the development of 
democratic institutions, even though the 
Sandinista junta gave early signs of claim- 
ing a monopoly of power and imposing 
censorship. We also supported, inside the 
international fiscal institutions such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank, 
Nicaraguan loan applications enabling it 
to secure from these institutions more 
assistance than the Somoza regime had 
received from international fiscal institu- 
tions in the previous 20 years. 

The United States remains hopeful 
that Nicaragua's government will decide 
to cease destabilization of its neighbors, 
relax repression, and expand freedom in 
Nicaragua. 

In El Salvador, it is well known that 
the United States supported the coup 
that brought down General Romero in 
October 1979, installed Napoleon Duarte 
and his Christian Democrats in office, and 
sponsored the land reforms which were 
designed by AFL-CIO specialists. From 
that time forward, the United States has 
encouraged and assisted a process of 
democratic development in El Salvador, 
which has been warmly supported by the 
Salvadoran people— who walk for miles, 
stand for hours, braving bullets and 
threats to cast their votes in favor of 
democracy in El Salvador. In a hundred 
ways, the people of El Salvador continue 
to demonstrate their lack of support for 
the guerrillas whose violence has not YSon 
the hearts or minds of the Salvadorans. 
Violent minorities— relying on revolution 
and not persuasion— can devastate the 
economy, terrorize families and villages. 
But in more than 4 years of trying, they 
have not prevented the great majority of 
Salvadorans from showing their opposi- 
tion to politics of violence and extending 
their support for democratic politics. 

It is true that the United States has 
strategic goals in Central America. We 
believe it would be bad for the people of 
the region and bad for the United States 
for there to be installed one-party, 
Marxist-Leninist states integrated into 
the Soviet bloc and willing to have their 
territory serve as bases for the projection 
of Soviet military power in the hemi- 
sphere. That is the strategic basis of our 
policy. We also have serious political and 
moral grounds for this position. 



• We do not think it is moral to leave 
small countries and helpless people 
defenseless against conquest by violent 
minorities which are armed and trained 
by remote dictatorships. The amount of 
Soviet-bloc arms funneled into El 
Salvador is staggering. So is the 
sophistication of the guerrilla command 
and control system, including a special 
communication system that guides the in- 
surgency from outside Managua. 

• We believe our political goal, a more 
democratic and stable hemisphere, re- 
quires building democracies, not the 
multiplication of dictatorships. 

The U.S. Government warmly sup- 
ports the democratic governments of 
Costa Rica and Honduras and works to 
further democratic development in Cen- 
tral America. To that end, the recommen- 
dations of the Kissinger commission have 
been translated into a legislative package 
which has been submitted to Congress. 
The package calls for a mix of social, 
economic, political, and security 
assistance, not unlike the support 
package that helped to rebuild Europe 
after World War II. 

The U.S. Government agrees with the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Cen- 
tral America that: 

Central America is both vital and 
vulnerable and that whatever other cases may 
arise to claim the nation's attention, the U.S. 
cannot afford to turn away from that threat- 
ened region. Central America's crisis is our 
crisis. 

We do see East-West dimensions to 
that crisis. We do see external support as 
well as indigenous social and economic 
factors. We want to respond to all levels 
of the problem. We do seek a negotiated 
diplomatic solution. We support and have 
supported a wide variety of diplomatic ef- 
forts, the most important current one, the 
Contadora process, to resolve the regional 
problems within the region. We will con- 
tinue to do so. 

The time has come in this discussion 
to confront the issue of using force. I am 
aware that the United States is charged 
today with displaying a proclivity for the 
use of force to solve problems, a penchant 
for military solutions. The proofs cited, as 
I understand it, are our landing in 
Grenada, which both we and the 
Grenadans call a liberation, not an inva- 
sion; our military assistance to the 
Government of El Salvador; our presence, 
through military maneuvers, in Hon- 
duras; and our putative support for 
Nicaragua's insurgents. Sometimes par- 
ticipation in the multinational force in 
Lebanon is also adduced to support the 
view that the U.S. Government is headt 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



by gunslingers who would, in the words 
of a famous American cigarette advertise- 
ment, "rather fight than switch." 

I desire to deal forthrightly with 
these questions, beginning with Central 
America. Let me turn, then, to Grenada 
and the arms race. 

The facts are not really difficult to 
establish. El Salvador has been the object 
of unceasing armed attacks by insurgents 
whose identity, training, supplies, and 
goals are clear. The leadership of El 
Salvador's FMLN [Farabundo Marti Na- 
tional Liberation Front] has been open 
about their commitment to armed strug- 
gle and prolonged war. An article by 
Shafik Handal in the World Marxist 
Review of fall 1980 straightforwardly ex- 
plains that the FMLN has no interest in a 
negotiated settlement, being persuaded 
that full victory is within reach. Since 
then, certain proposals for what they call 
"power sharing" have been made— all in- 
volve "restructuring" the government; 
"purging" the armed forces, national 
guard, and police; and otherwise assum- 
ing power over the state. They have con- 
tinued to this moment to reject utterly 
"power sharing" based on free elections 
held in the presence of international 
observers. The reasons, doubtless, are 
that they know they do not enjoy popular 
support; and they do not, in any case, 
recognize popular sovereignty expressed 
through free elections as the legitimate 
basis of a legitimate government. 

Confronted with the need to combat 
the guerrillas and also control violence 
from other sources, the Government of El 
Salvador requires arms, training, and 
communications equipment. Otherwise, it 
will simply be vanquished by superior 
force, after which a new dictatorship will 
be imposed on an unwilling people. There 
is only one group seeking to impose a 
military solution in El Salvador; they are 
the guerrillas. It is all very well to argue 
that persons of good will ought to be able 
to find a peaceful solution peaceably. But 
if one side makes surrender a precondi- 
tion of peace, then the alternatives are 
only to surrender or resist. We can, of 
course, continue to try to persuade the 
other party to reconsider. And that is 
precisely what the United States has 
done and is doing in El Salvador. Mean- 
while, however, we believe it necessary 
and acceptable to supply military 
assistance needed to permit the govern- 
ment to continue to resist guerrilla at- 
tacks. Morality does not, indeed cannot, 
require that we stand by passively while 
a small nation— underequipped and un- 
sophisticated—succumbs to well-armed 
and trained guerrilla forces. 



August 1984 



More than El Salvador is at stake. 
Subversion and violence have already 
disrupted ordinary life in Costa Rica and 
Honduras. Do we leave them essentially 
defenseless against externally supported 
violence? What of Chad? What of the 
Sudan? Has the transvaluation of values 
so far progressed that now, in the West, 
it is not permissible to help countries help 
protect themselves against armed subver- 
sion and armed aggression? 

From our side of the Atlantic, it 
sometimes seems that in Europe there is 
more sympathy for the Nicaraguans who 
threaten the peace, independence, and 
freedom of all their neighbors than for the 
neighbors themselves. Sometimes it 
seems there is more "understanding" of 
the thousands of Cuban and Soviet-bloc 
military advisers in Nicaragua— one of 
whose tasks it is to direct the struggle 
against El Salvador— than for the 37 or so 
U.S. military advisers in El Salvador who 
help that country fend off its would-be 
conquerers. Sometimes it seems that 
there is more enthusiasm for Nicaragua's 
preparations for what gives every 
evidence of being staged, rigged elections 
than for El Salvador's earnest efforts to 
have genuinely free elections under dif- 
ficult circumstances. Sometimes it sounds 
as though our friends are as inclined to 
exaggerate America's minimal use of 
force for limited, defensive purposes as 
they are to minimize the Soviet bloc's 
regular reliance on force to subvert and 
overwhelm hapless, too often helpless, 
Third World nations. 

Grenada and Afghanistan 

With the landing on Grenada, attacks on 
the United States reached a crescendo. 
Americans, it was asserted, were no bet- 
ter than the Soviets. Invading Grenada is 
no different than Argentina invading the 
Falklands. One Member of Parliament 
asserted there was an "uncanny 
resemblance." Another charged: 

If the governments arrogate to themselves 
the right to change the governments of other 
sovereign states, there can be no peace in this 
world in perhaps the most dangerous age 
which the human race has ever known. It is 
quite improper for Hon. Members to condemn, 
as we have, the violation of international law 
by the Soviet Union in its attack on 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan if we do not 
apply the same standards to the United 
States' attack on Grenada two days ago. 

Obviously, we don't agree. Moreover, 
we found it truly unbelievable that coun- 
tries which were themselves so recently 
liberated by force from the occupying 
troops and quisling governments of Nazi 
tyrants, or who participated in that 



liberation, should have been unable to 
distinguish between force used to conquer 
and victimize and force used to liberate. 
We believe we acted on solid legal 
grounds to protect 1,000 American na- 
tionals—some of whom we had good 
reason to believe were in real 
danger— and at the request of the Gover- 
nor General and the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which, 
in turn, acted in accordance with its trea- 
ty. We have discussed our view of the 
legal grounds of our actions at length in 
other arenas. I am concerned today with 
the Grenada-Afghanistan analogy, which 
is perhaps the clearest example of the 
argument that there is no moral dif- 
ference between the superpowers. 

To argue that the use of force by the 
United States in Grenada was equivalent 
to the Soviet's use of force in 
Afghanistan, it is necessary to overlook 
the circumstances under which the two 
"invasions" were undertaken, the policies 
followed after the so-called "invasions" 
took place, and the views of the populace 
involved. 

First, the circumstances— it is true 
that the Soviet Union cited as justifica- 
tion of its invasion of Afghanistan a sup- 
posed request for assistance made by the 
Afghan Government under the 1978 
Soviet- Afghan treaty of friendship. But, 
whereas United States and OECS forces 
went to great lengths to protect and 
rescue Sir Paul Scoon, who was in hiding 
for his life and who is now alive and free 
to verify his participation in invoking the 
action— as well as to lay the groundwork 
for free elections and the establishment of 
constitutional government in 
Grenada— the very first action of Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan was the murder, by 
a special Soviet assault team, of then- 
President Hafizullah Amin, in whose 
name they claimed to be acting. 

Second, less than 1 week after the 
military action in Grenada began, Gover- 
nor General Scoon was beginning to lay 
the groundwork for future free elections 
and a return to constitutional govern- 
ment. U.S. forces were reduced from 
3,000 to fewer than 300 in a matter of 
weeks. Four years after the Soviet inva- 
sions of Afghanistan, there has never 
been the slightest suggestion by Soviet 
authorities or by the regime they in- 
stalled in Kabul that free elections will 
ever be held in Afghanistan. Moscow has 
repeatedly declared that the "Socialist 
revolution" in Afghanistan, i.e., the coup 
of April 27, 1978, is "irreversible," has 
refused to suggest any timetable for 
withdrawal of its forces, has annexed por- 
tions of Afghan territory, has built 



61 



MIDDLE EAST 



massive permanent military installations, 
and has thousands of Soviet personnel 
making the actual decisions in nominally 
Afghan Government offices. 

Third, the people of Grenada have 
welcomed U.S. and OECS forces as 
liberators and are assuredly not fighting 
against them; indeed, many, if not most, 
members of the Grenadan Army and 
militia laid down their arms and returned 
to civilian life. It was outside occupation 
forces— i.e., Cubans— who dug in and 
fought, leading to ongoing suffering. 

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, 
Soviet forces numbering close to 125,000 
are supported by a mere handful of com- 
munist party functionaries dependent on 
Soviet protection and are opposed by the 
general population, who form the 
resistance which has been fighting the 
Soviet occupation for 4 years. Not even 
the Soviet Union reported grateful 
Afghans lining the streets of Kabul to 
shout "God Bless Brezhnev." 

The proof of the pudding is in the 
eating. Not only did the students and the 
people of Grenada welcome the American, 
Jamaican, Barbadian, and OECS forces as 
liberators but a recent poll in Grenada- 
conducted by an American academic 
organization not famous for its support of 
the Administration— shows approximately 
84% of the population both believed they 
were in danger and were glad that U.S. 
troops came to Grenada. The American 
students feel the same way and still have 
not forgiven the U.S. reporters whom 
they accuse of failing to understand the 
danger. 



Conclusion 

In conclusion, let me say that the most 
important problem about the doctrine of 
moral equivalence is that it eliminates all 
the most important distinctions and con- 
fuses almost all the important issues of in- 
ternational affairs today. Take the arms 
race: the very notion that there is an 
arms race in the first place and not a 
belated response to Soviet military 
buildup is a problem. The very wide- 
spread assumption that they respond to 
our provocations is equally false; in fact, 
we permitted them, as a matter of 
deliberate policy, to gain parity. And, 
having gained parity, the Soviets pro- 
ceeded to accelerate further their arms 
buildup, not to slow it down. 

In thinking about the doctrine of 
moral symmetry, I was reminded of the 
doctrine of "tous azimuts, " which the 
French Communist Party has advocated 
from time to time in regard to the force de 
frappe. It seemed to me that a doctrine of 
"tous azimuts " in regard to moral quali- 
ty is perhaps even more dangerous than 
one with regard to nuclear weapons. If it 
is no longer possible to distinguish be- 
tween freedom and despotism— the 
United States is a free society; between 
consent and violence, we are a society 
based on consent; between open and 
closed societies, we are an open 
society— then the erosion of the founda- 
tion of a distinctively Western, 
democratic civilization is already far 
advanced and the situation is serious 
indeed. ■ 



U.S. Position on Jerusalem 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Statement befort the Subcommittees 
for Europe and the Middle East and In- 
ational < > iterations of the House 

i 'ommittee on June 21, 
1984. Ambassador Armacost is Under 
i for Political AffairsA 

I appreciate the opportunity to meet 
with the members of these subcommil 

disi the Administration's posi- 
•77. which provide 
,S, Embassy and Ambassador's 

n Israel to be moved froi 
to lerusalem. 
The i olved in this bill 

important and 
reaching implies 
the MM. tie East. Before I outline the 



reasons for our opposition to this bill, let 
me describe the context from which we 
approach this issue. 

The United States has long been 
Israel's closest friend and supporter. In 
1948, the State of Israel proclaimed its 
independence, and the United States 
was the first country to extend it 
recognition. We established diplomatic 
relations and opened an embassy in Tel 
Aviv, then Israel's seat of government. 
Since then, the United States and Israel 
have shared a special friendship whose 
depth and uniqueness are recognized 
throughout the world. No one can doubt 
the commitment of the United States to 
the security and well-being of Israel. No 
one can deny that the Reagan Ad- 
ministration regards a strong Israel not 
only as a guarantor of security for its 



people but as a close friend and valued 
strategic partner to America and the 
West. No one can discount or diminish 
the many tangible steps taken by this 
Administration to broaden and deepen 
the scope of day-to-day friendship and 
cooperation between Israel and the 
United States. 

I regret that the location of our Em- 
bassy in Israel has been made the sub- 
ject of legislative proposals. We 
recognize the sincerity of the motiva- 
tions of those sponsoring or supporting 
the bill before the committee. We also 
appreciate the special importance of 
Jerusalem to Israel and to Jews the 
world over. I am not here to take issue 
with these facts. I do, however, want to 
review with you the serious, sober, and 
substantial reasons for our position on 
the issue of our Embassy's location. 

As you know, the United States has 
consistently sought to encourage peace 
in the Middle East through negotiations, 
and we have consistently opposed ef- 
forts to resolve Arab-Israeli differences 
through force or unilateral actions. This 
principled commitment of the United 
States has helped preserve our ability to 
serve as the only effective mediator be- 
tween the parties. 

Jerusalem is a city with deep 
religious significance for Jews, Muslims, 
and Christians throughout the world. Its 
status is also one of the fundamental 
issues Arabs and Israelis will have to 
resolve if there is to be peace between 
them. Precisely because of the key 
mediating role we have played in the 
past — and the interest we have in being 
able to play such a role in the 
future — our position on this sensitive 
issue is of critical importance to the par- 
ties. A change in the U.S. position on 
the status of Jerusalem, we are con- 
vinced, would seriously impair our abili- 
ty to play a constructive role when the 
parties resume the search for peace. In- 
deed, it would complicate the resump- 
tion of that process. Moving our em- 
bassy to Jerusalem would be interpreted 
by many as prejudging the outcome of 
negotiations, thereby seriously eroding 
our credibility as an honest broker. 

Our Embassy has remained in Tel 
Aviv for over three decades. This deci- 
sion has not been capricious. The ra- 
tionale has been found persuasive by 
eight Administrations — Democratic and 
Republican. Each has had to deal with 
the Jerusalem question in one way or 
another. Each has considered it a 
mistake for the United States to endorse 
or acquiesce in the effort of any state to 
determine the status of the city 
unilaterally. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



PACIFIC 



As early as 1949, when Israel began 
to relocate government ministeries to 
Jerusalem, we explained that we could 
not accept its unilateral claim to the city 
and could not move our Embassy there. 
Again, in 1960, we informed Jordan of 
our opposition to its making the eastern 
part of the city Jordan's second capital. 
We sought to preclude any unilateral ac- 
tions that would prejudice a negotiated 
resolution of the status of the city or its 
reunification. The Israeli actions of 1967 
to extend Israeli law and administration 
to the eastern part of the city did not af- 
fect the U.S. commitment to a 
negotiated settlement of the status of 
Jerusalem. 

Surely, a key question for us all is 
whether a move of the embassy would 
improve, or harm, prospects of achiev- 
ing the peace we all seek. We would not 
have achieved the Camp David 
accords — which led to Israel's first peace 
treaty with an Arab state — if the United 
States had adopted the position of either 
Israel or Egypt on the subject of 
Jerusalem. President Carter's separate 
letter attached to the Camp David 
accords reiterated the U.S. position that 
the status of Jerusalem must be resolved 
through negotiations. That position was 
restated by President Reagan in his 
September 1, 1982, Middle East ini- 
tiative: "Jerusalem must remain undivid- 
ed but its final status should be deter- 
mined through negotiations." We remain 
dedicated to encouraging the process of 
such negotiations. 

The bill before the committee also 
raises serious constitutional problems. In 
our view, it would be a direct in- 
terference in the President's constitu- 
tional authority to conduct foreign af- 
fairs. The President has historically been 
responsible for conducting diplomatic 
relations on behalf of the United States. 
This has included the determination of 
where and through what means to con- 
duct such relations and deciding ques- 
tions of recognition. Legislation direct- 
ing him to relocate an embassy would be 
in direct conflict with this basic 
principle. 



I am fully aware of the frustrations 
many feel because of our position on this 
issue. Much as all of us in the Ad- 
ministration understand this and regret 
it, we must look at the long term. I am 
convinced that in the long term it is 
peace for Israel that will bring with it a 
solution to the problem of the status of 
Jerusalem. Throughout the history of 
the State of Israel, the United States 



has been committed to helping secure 
for that nation a just and lasting peace. 
We must continue to be able to play 
what has become an indispensable role. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. Policy in the Pacific Island Region 



President Reagan's responses to ques- 
tions submitted by Pacific Magazine, 
May Jf, 198i. 1 

Q. Is it possible to state in a few con- 
cise words what the basic principles 
and goals are of U.S. policy in the 
Pacific island region? 

A. First of all, we are part of the 
Pacific island region. Hawaii, American 
Samoa, Guam, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, which soon should for- 
mally acquire commonwealth status, 
make the United States of America a 
permanent part of the area. In addition, 
we continue to have a special relation- 
ship with the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, and the Republic of Palau. 

Our relationship with the Pacific 
island region is a partnership. We share 
a strong belief in freedom and 
democracy, respect for human rights, 
and faith in the power of the free 
market. We want to build on these 
values to establish even better relation- 
ships with the new nations of the 
Pacific. And we want to help the 
islanders keep the region free from ten- 
sions and rivalries as it has been since 
World War II. 

Q. Is there any likelihood that in 
the future there will be more U.S. aid 
to the Pacific island nations, possibly 
on a direct bilateral basis? 

A. We intend to maintain a helpful 
development assistance role, supple- 
menting the larger programs of 
Australia and New Zealand. We an- 
ticipate that future U.S. aid to the 
region will be at modestly increasing 
levels. 

Our assistance is available indirectly 
through the Asian Development Bank, 
the United Nations, and various regional 
institutions. There are grants to local 
and U.S. private voluntary organizations 
for programs in the individual countries. 



and of course, we have the U.S. Peace 
Corps. The system seems to work quite 
well. This approach provides a broad 
range of U.S. assistance on a regional 
and individual country basis. 

I should also add that private 
business can and will play a larger role 
in the economic development of the 
Pacific island region than aid from any 
government. This theme was stressed in 
my message to the South Pacific con- 
ference held in American Samoa 
IV2 years ago. The free enterprise 
system is the best way to promote 
growth and development. As far as 
Micronesia is concerned, we are the 
primary donor, and if Congress ap- 
proves, we will continue to support the 
economic development of the Microne- 
sian states under the Compact of Free 
Association. 

Q. Vanuatu has recently estab- 
lished full diplomatic relations with 
Cuba. The Solomon Islands has 
adopted a policy of looking to 
Southeast Asia for partners in its 
economic development. Western 
Samoa has full diplomatic relations 
with the People's Republic of China 
and a significant cultural exchange 
program. Kiribati is receiving some 
material aid from the People's 
Republic of China. Do you regard 
these events as a trend that may cause 
the United States to reassess its 
Pacific islands policies? 

A. As independent countries, 
Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Western 
Samoa, and Kiribati have the right to 
choose their friends. We share a com- 
munity of values and interests with the 
islanders. We try to understand their ac- 
tivities in light of our common interests. 
We hope they take the same approach 
with us. 



Au